China's Public Diplomacy (Diplomatic Studies, 10) 9004283943, 9789004283947

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China’s Public Diplomacy

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Diplomatic Studies Series Editor Jan Melissen (Netherland Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’)

volume 10

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/dist

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China’s Public Diplomacy By

Ingrid d’Hooghe

LEIDEN | BOSTON

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This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see http://www.brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1872-8863 isbn 978-90-04-28394-7 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-28395-4 (e-book) Copyright 2015 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. Brill has made all reasonable efforts to trace all rights holders to any copyrighted material used in this work. In cases where these efforts have not been successful the publisher welcomes communications from copyright holders, so that the appropriate acknowledgements can be made in future editions, and to settle other permission matters. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

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To Peter, Vincent and Lara

∵

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Contents Acknowledgements  xiii List of Figures, Illustrations and Tables  xiv Abbreviations  xv Introduction 1 The Case of China’s Public Diplomacy  4 The Design of the Study: Questions and Assumptions  8 The Selection of Case Studies  10 Overview of the Chapters  13 1 How to Understand Public Diplomacy: An Analytical Framework  16 The Concept of Public Diplomacy  17 The Challenges of Public Diplomacy 2.0  21 Public Diplomacy and Soft Power  23 Public Diplomacy and Propaganda  26 Subsets of Public Diplomacy  28 The Domestic Dimension and the Role of Diasporas  31 The Analytical Framework  34 Dimension I: Actors and Decision-making  35 Dimension II: Public Diplomacy Content  37 Dimension III: Public Diplomacy Instruments  38 The Impact of a Country’s Political System  39 The Impact of Culture on Public Diplomacy  42 Conclusion  45 2 Assets and Liabilities for China’s Public Diplomacy  47 The Importance of Culture  47 China’s Authoritarian System  51 Media and Social Media Censorship  53 Human Rights and Tibet  56 The Lack of Cultural Freedom  63 China’s Economic Rise  67 The China Model  69 China’s Environmental Challenges  71 The Copenhagen Summit  73 China’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy  74 The Concepts of Harmonious World and Chinese Dream  81

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China’s Military Rise and Cyber-Security  86 Chinese Tourists  90 Conclusions  91 3 The Chinese Debate on Public Diplomacy  93 The Introduction of Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in China  94 The Chinese Understanding of Public Diplomacy  99 Defining Public Diplomacy  101 New Public Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy 2.0  104 Public Diplomacy and Propaganda  107 Soft Power  109 Cultural and People’s Diplomacy  113 The Domestic Dimension  115 Sources of Soft Power  118 Chinese Culture as a Source of Soft Power  118 The China Model as a Source of Soft Power  122 The Impact of Culture on Public Diplomacy  124 Challenges and Constraints  125 Conclusions  128 4 China’s Public Diplomacy System  132 The Growing Diversity of Actors  132 National State Actors  133 The State Council Information Office  134 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs  138 Chinese Embassies and Missions Abroad  141 The Ministry of National Defense and the PLA  143 Other Ministries  144 China’s Leaders  147 The Chinese Communist Party  150 The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference  151 Subnational State Actors  152 Non-State Actors  154 People’s Diplomacy Organizations  155 Intellectual Elites and Academic Institutions  156 Volunteers and Celebrities  158 Companies  159 Overseas Chinese  160 Consequences of the Diversification of Actors  162 Public Diplomacy Instruments  163

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The Media  164 The New Media  166 Foreign Media  168 Cultural Institutes and Activities  171 Educational Institutes and Activities  173 Confucius Institutes  175 Foreign Aid  179 China’s Public Diplomacy Budget  180 Conclusions  181 5 China’s Public Diplomacy Strategies: Asia and Africa  184 China’s Public Diplomacy in Asia  185 South and Southeast Asia  187 Central Asia  195 Northeast Asia: Japan and South Korea  198 China’s Public Diplomacy in Africa  206 Analysis and Conclusions  216 6 Proactive Public Diplomacy: Events The Beijing Olympic Games and the Shanghai World Expo  220 The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games  221 Winning the Olympic Bid  223 Olympics’ Public Diplomacy  229 Organizational Aspects  229 Policies  231 Beijing’s Olympic Narrative: Slogan and Themes  232 Actors and Tools  235 Ceremonies  239 Dealing with International Criticism and Controversies  241 The Torch Relay Crisis  243 The Role of the Chinese Diaspora  246 The Domestic Dimension  247 Evaluation of the Event  250 Analysis  253 The 2010 Shanghai World Expo  255 Winning the Expo Bid  257 World Expo Public Diplomacy  259 Organizational Aspects  259 Policies  260 Shanghai Expo Narrative: Slogan and Themes  263

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Actors and Tools  265 The Shanghai Expo ‘Pillars’  269 Dealing with International Criticism and Controversies  272 The Role of the Chinese Diaspora  273 The Domestic Dimension  274 Evaluation of the Event  276 Lessons Learned  280 Analysis  281 Conclusions  282 7 Reactive Public Diplomacy: Crises The SARS Epidemic, Product Scandals, and the Wenchuan Earthquake  285 The 2003 SARS Epidemic  287 The Unfolding of the Crisis  288 Public Diplomacy Actions  291 Analysis  299 Lessons Learned  301 Food and Toy Safety Crises  303 The 2007 Pet Food and Toys’ Scandals  304 The 2008 Contaminated Milk-Powder Scandal  312 Analysis  318 The 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake  320 The Role of the Domestic Media  323 The Role of the PLA  325 Analysis  327 Conclusions  328 8 The Reception of China’s Public Diplomacy  332 Measuring the Effect of Public Diplomacy  332 Global Views of China  336 Overall Views  337 Views of China’s Rise  343 Views of Values and Culture  345 Experts versus General Publics  347 Interpreting Poll Results  348 Conclusions  351

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Conclusion  353 The Importance China Attaches to Public Diplomacy  355 The Impact of China’s Authoritarian Political System  357 State-Centeredness  357 Media Control and Censorship  358 Other Impacts  360 The Impact of Chinese Culture on Public Diplomacy  362 A Strategic and Holistic Approach  362 Communication Patterns  366 Evolution and Challenges  367 Issues for Future Research  370 Bibliography  371 Books, Articles, Blogs, English Language  371 Books and Articles, Chinese Language  398 Selected Websites and Blogs  407 Index  408

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Acknowledgements This book has grown out of my long-time interest in China’s diplomacy, and in particular my research into China’s public diplomacy since 2002. It is based on my Ph.D. thesis and could not have been written without the support of my doctoral supervisor, Professor Jan Melissen of the University of Antwerp. His interest, inspiration, advice, and ongoing encouragement, also as head of my department at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael,’ long before starting my Ph.D., have been critical. I am also greatly indebted to my Ph.D. commission members: Professor David Shambaugh, George Washington University; Professor Nicholas Cull, University of Southern California; and Professor Tom Sauer, University of Antwerp, who have been very generous with their time and advice, and who have pushed me to rethink key issues and improve my work. Many others deserve my gratitude for their ideas, suggestions, comments, and encouragement, or for introducing me to their friends and contacts. I cannot mention all of them, but special thanks go to Chen Zhimin, Cui Hongjian, Jin Ling, Tiger Zhang, Wang Yiwei, Pan Xiaoli, and Frans-Paul van der Putten. I would also like to thank my fellow members of the ‘Melissen Ph.D. Club’—Ellen Huijgh, Maaike Okano-Heijmans, Manual Duran, and Arjen Uilenreef—for their critical comments and cheerful encouragement. At Clingendael, librarians Ali Molenaar and Janny Krayema, and management assistant Ragnhild Drange, have provided support throughout the years. My thinking on this topic has benefited from my work experience at the Clingendael Institute, the Netherlands’ embassies in Beijing and Washington DC, and from public diplomacy projects at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where I learned a lot about diplomacy and public diplomacy from Dutch diplomats. I would also like to thank Lisa Hanson of BRILL/Nijhoff Publishers for her practical support and confidence in this publication, and Rebecca Solheim for polishing my Dutch take on the English language. I furthermore wish to extend my deep gratitude to all the anonymous individuals in China, and in capitals around the world, who were willing to discuss China’s public diplomacy with me. I dedicate this book, with love, to my husband and companion Peter, and my children Vincent and Lara, for their loving support and patience throughout this long journey, for mocking me and making me laugh, and Peter also for his invaluable advice and ongoing encouragement. They remind me every day what is important in life.

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List of Figures, Illustrations and Tables Figure caption Chapter 1 1 2 3

State-centered Model of Public Diplomacy  36 Network Model of Public Diplomacy  36 Analytical Framework: Elements of Analysis  45

illustration caption Chapter 6 1 2 3 4

Emblem of the Beijing Bid for the 2008 Olympic Games  226 Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Emblem  234 The Shanghai Expo Emblem  265 The Shanghai Expo Mascot  265

table caption Chapter 8 1 2

Percentages of People with a Positive View of China: Development Over Time  338 Pew Regional Favorability Rates of China in 2013  341

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Abbreviations ADB Asian Development Bank APEC Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation AQSIQ Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BIE International Bureau of Expositions BIMC Beijing 2008 International Media Center BOBICO Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee BOCOG Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the xxix Olympiad BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa CAFIU Chinese Association for International Understanding CC Central Committee (of the Chinese Communist Party) CCN China Commodity Net CCP Chinese Communist Party CCPIT China Council for the Promotion of International Trade CCTV China Central Television CFPA China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation CICIR China Institute of Contemporary International Relations CIICS China Institute for International Communication Strategy CIIS China Institute of International Studies CMT Chinese Medical Team CNC China Xinhua News Network Corporation CNKI China National Knowledge Infrastructure CNTV China Network Television CPAFFC Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries CPD Central Publicity Department CPIFA Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CRI China Radio International CSR Corporate Social Responsibility CUC Communication University of China ECOSOC Economic and Social Council of the United Nations EU European Union FCO (The British) Foreign and Commonwealth Office FDA Food and Drug Administration (US) FDI Foreign Direct Investment FOCAC Forum on China–Africa Cooperation GAPP General Administration of Press and Publications

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xvi GGWJJK GMS IMF IOC LDC MFA MINUSMA Mofcom MOOTW MoU MNDIO MPC MPIS NATO NGO NPC NPR OCAO ODA OECD PAP PLA PLAN PPP PRC RMB SARFT SARS SCIO SCO SEZ SFDA SIIO SIIS SOE TCS UN UNDP UNEP

abbreviations

Gonggong Waijiao Jikan [Public Diplomacy Quarterly] Greater Mekong Subregion International Monetary Fund International Olympic Committee Least Developed Countries Ministry of Foreign Affairs UN peacekeeping mission in Mali Ministry of Commerce Military Operations Other Than War Memorandum of Understanding (Chinese) Ministry of National Defense Information Office Main Press Center Mofcom Public Information Service North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Governmental Organization National People’s Congress (US) National Public Radio Shanghai Overseas Chinese Affairs Office Official Development Aid Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development People’s Armed Police People’s Liberation Army PLA Navy Purchasing Power Parity People’s Republic of China Chinese renminbi State Administration of Radio, Film and Television Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome State Council Information Office Shanghai Cooperation Organization Special Economic Zone State Food and Drug Administration (PRC) State Information Internet Office Shanghai Institutes for International Studies State-Owned Enterprise Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (of China, Japan, and South Korea) United Nations United Nations Development Program United Nations Environment Program

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abbreviations

UNESCO UNICEF UNPKO USIA VSO WEF WHO WTO

xvii

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Peacekeeping Operations United States Information Agency Voluntary Services Overseas World Economic Forum World Health Organization World Trade Organization

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Introduction Mao Zedong once said: “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”1 China’s current leaders, however, believe it stems just as much from soft sources of power: the country’s ancient culture and values, a dazzling show during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the country’s economic success, or even a well-designed Chinese dress. On March 22 2013, China’s freshly anointed president, Xi Jinping, embarked on his first foreign visit, traveling to Russia and three African countries, a geopolitical choice that in itself was a poignant statement of the new president’s diplomatic strategy. As it turned out, however, the visit also included other statements, heralding two new elements in China’s public diplomacy. The first element was Xi’s promotion abroad of his newly introduced concept of the Chinese Dream, which can be defined as China’s pursuit of national prosperity, national rejuvenation, and the happiness of the people. At the international level, the Chinese Dream is about realizing a world shaped by China and Chinese values, the fulfillment of which, said Xi in Moscow, “will not only benefit the Chinese people, but also the people of all countries.”2 The concept was furthermore promoted as being inspiring to other countries that seek rejuvenation, for example in Africa, where the Chinese Dream, according to the Chinese media, is “intimately tied up with the African Dream of self-reliance and development.”3 The second new element concerned the role of China’s new First Lady. While analysts and policymakers were watching President Xi and discussing the significance of choosing Russia as a first stop, global audiences’ eyes were drawn to the well-dressed and charming appearance of Xi’s wife, First Lady Peng Liyuan. Pictures and film footage of Peng, who used to be a popular military singer in China and knows how to behave in front of the cameras, were shown on television screens around the globe and went viral on the internet. At home she sparked a fashion frenzy and the foreign press compared her to Michelle

1  This maxim was first put forward by Mao, using slightly different words, at the August 7 Emergence Conference of 1927. See Stuart R. Schram, Mao’s Road to Power. Revolutionary Writings, 1912–1949: The Pre-Marxist Period, 1912–1920, Volume 1 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), p. 552. 2  Xinhua, “Xi Addresses the Moscow Institute of International Relations,” China Radio International (March 24 2013). 3  Xinhua, “Xi’s Visit Starts New Era of China–Africa Ties,” China Daily (March 31 2013). © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004283954_002 Ingrid

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introduction

Obama, Carla Bruni, and Kate Middleton.4 Chinese friends told me that they could not help but feel proud that their new First Lady was a match for her popular international colleagues. The introduction of a Chinese First Lady as a media prop may seem trivial. From the perspective of public diplomacy, however, Peng Liyuan’s entry on to the global stage may prove to be an important new asset of China’s image abroad, and—at home—humanize the Chinese leadership and buttress President Xi’s more personal diplomatic style. Peng’s confidence on the global stage adds to the confidence of China’s new leader. She makes Chinese leaders look more like Western leaders and thus easier to relate to for foreign audiences. More recently, Cheng Hong, the wife of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, has been given a similar role in China’s diplomacy. Cheng was officially introduced to Chinese and foreign audiences during Premier Li’s visit to four African countries in May 2014. As a university professor in English language and literature, Cheng is expected to add a “new dimension to China’s public diplomacy by facilitating better and deeper conversations in social and cultural matters with women of other countries.”5 Few countries in the world are as sensitive to their image in the eyes of other nations as China. Face matters, also in the affairs of state.6 With its growing weight in world politics and the global economy, but at the same time often feeling misjudged by the international community, the Chinese leadership avidly seeks to improve foreign perceptions of China and its policies through the active conduct of public diplomacy. These perceptions are important to the Chinese leadership, because they are believed to influence the behavior of foreign governments toward China. Chinese leaders regard public diplomacy as a tool to strengthen China’s soft power, one of the four fundamental components of China’s Comprehensive National Power, on a par with economic, military, and political power. In the eyes of China’s power theorists, building soft power is a way to advance China’s domestic and international agenda, to guard Beijing against foreign criticism, and to boost China’s international standing. China furthermore strongly 4  See, for example, Jane Perlez and Bree Feng, “China’s First Lady Strikes Glamorous Note,” The New York Times (March 24 2013); Jeremy Page, “China Swoons Over New First Lady,” The Wall Street Journal (March 22 2013); Sorcha Pollak, “China’s First Lady Sparks Fashion Frenzy,” Time (March 26 2013); and Christopher Bodeen, “Peng Liyuan, China’s First Lady, becomes International Star after Russia Visit,” Huffington Post (March 24 2013). 5  Zhao Kejin, “A Shot in the Arm for ‘Lady Diplomacy,’ ” China Daily (May 8 2014); and Laurie Burkitt and Li Jie, “A Scholarly ‘Second Lady’ Takes the Stage for China,” China Real Time blogs, The Wall Street Journal (May 4 2014). 6  ‘Face’ here refers to ‘prestige’; see the more detailed discussion in chapter 2, paragraph 1.

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Introduction

3

perceives building soft power as an area of international competition, in which Western countries—particularly the United States—try to contain China’s rise and undermine its government with ‘soft tools.’ In the words of Tsinghua University’s Professor Yan Xuetong, “during a period of globalization, the sphere of competition is no longer about land, resources or markets, but rulemaking, setting regulations, norms or customs.”7 China wants to play a role in establishing these rules and norms, and regards public diplomacy as a powerful instrument in this endeavor. Public diplomacy has to make China’s rise palatable to the world and has to create understanding, respect, and, ultimately, support for China’s political model and policies. It has to help China to win friends and allies, and to advance China’s agenda. Public diplomacy tools, argues former Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi, “improve the nation’s diplomatic pattern” and “create a sound foundation for national development and foreign affairs.”8 Frustrated by the critical and often negative reporting in the Western press, the Chinese government seeks to project a counter-image of China that in its view does more justice to reality: China as a trustworthy, cooperative, peaceloving, developing country that takes good care of its enormous population; a China that is building a ‘harmonious society’ and realizing a ‘Chinese dream’ at home and, as a responsible player in international affairs, is contributing to a peaceful and ‘harmonious world.’ The Chinese government builds this image by pointing out, for example, its efforts in reducing tensions between North and South Korea and facilitating dialog between the two sides,9 its openness about—and international cooperation on—the 2013 outbreak of a dangerous new type of bird flu (the H7N9 virus),10 its role as mediator in the conflict between the government of Myanmar and the rebel Kachin Independence Organization,11 and its efforts to reduce carbon emissions.12

7  Yan Xuetong, cited in Mark Leonard, What Does China Think? (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2008), p. 94. 8  Former Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, quoted in Ding Ying, “Public Diplomacy Mission,” Beijing Review, No. 8 (February 21 2013). 9  “UN Chief Praises China’s Role in Reducing Korea Tension,” VOA News (June 19 2013). 10  World Health Organization, “Human Infection with Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Virus— Update,” (August 11 2013), available at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2013_08_11/en/index .html (accessed August 2013). 11  Yun Sun, “China’s Intervention in the Myanmar–Kachin Peace Talks,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 200 (February 20 2013), republished by the Brookings Institution. 12   Xinhua, “China Responsible in Combating Climate Change,” China Daily (December 2 2012).

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introduction

Public diplomacy has become an essential part of China’s foreign policy and diplomatic practice, just as it has in many other countries. As this study illustrates, the Chinese government invests much money and effort in public diplomacy; it conducts public diplomacy all over the world, from organizing a Chinese arts festival in Bahrain to establishing a Confucius Institute in Iceland, and from organizing Chinese film festivals in the United States and India to opening a Xinhua office in Fiji.13 The concept of ‘public diplomacy’ figures prominently in Chinese policy documents and in official speeches by China’s highest leaders, and it is extensively studied and debated among Chinese scholars. Policymakers and scholars closely examine other countries’ public diplomacy strategies and activities, and draw inspiration from them. They do not just copy other countries’ public diplomacy, but seek to adapt foreign strategies and tools to the Chinese situation, to what is sometimes referred to as “public diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.”14 This raises broad questions of what these Chinese characteristics entail and whether China is developing a public diplomacy approach that can be clearly distinguished from other countries’ approaches. If so, how does it differ from other countries’ public diplomacy, and what factors shape and explain this ‘Chinese’ approach?

The Case of China’s Public Diplomacy

Many studies by scholars around the globe have provided insight into the Chinese understanding of soft power and public diplomacy, China’s sources of soft power, China’s ‘go global’ policies and the content of China’s public diplomacy policies, especially its policies toward Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America.15 This book, however, covers new ground by combining in-depth 13  “Chubu xingcheng wenhua bu zongjie 2012 dui wai gongzuo chengguo zhanlue tixi chubu xingcheng” [The Ministry of Culture Summarizes the Results of External Work in 2012: The First Steps toward a Strategic System] (January 10 2013), available online at http:// news.ifeng.com/gundong/detail_2013_01/10/21057265_0.shtml (accessed January 2013); “Second Online Chinese Film Festival Launched in Bulgaria,” Xinhua (December 20 2012); and “Fiji Main Newspaper Hails Xinhua for Setting Up Office in Suva,” Xinhua (March 22 2011). 14   See, for example, Zhang Weiwei, “Improving Public Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” China International Studies, No. 3 (2009), pp. 161–174; and Yang Jiechi, “Nuli kaita zhongguo tese gonggong waijiao xin jumian” [Striving to Create a New Situation of Public Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics], Qiushi (February 16 2011). 15  Important books include: David Shambaugh, China goes Global: The Partial Power (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013); Zhao Qizheng, How China Communicates: Public

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Introduction

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empirical research of China’s public diplomacy, based on Chinese sources and interviews, with the insights from public diplomacy theorizing. The main objective is to further the study of public diplomacy by investigating the case of China. Governments around the world have woken up to the need to communicate with the general public abroad, as well as at home, and to listen to what they say, rather than focusing exclusively on government-to-government relations. This has led to a growing prominence of public diplomacy research within diplomatic studies and a broad recognition of the concept of public diplomacy.16 This does not mean that there is agreement on the definition of public diplomacy. The conceptualization of public diplomacy practice is in constant flux. There has been a paradigm shift during the last decade in the conceptualization of public diplomacy from ‘old’ or state-centered to ‘new’ or networkcentered public diplomacy.17 The first is characterized by a dominant role for foreign ministries, one-way, top—down information flows, and a focus on Diplomacy in a Global Age (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2012); Craig Hayden, “China: Cultivating a Global Soft Power,” chapter 5 of Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts (Plymouth, UK: Lexington, 2012); Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu (eds), China’s Soft Power in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011); Utpal Vyas, Soft Power In Japan–China Relations: State, Sub-state and Non-state Relations (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011); Michael Barr, Who’s Afraid of China: The Challenge of Chinese Soft Power (London and New York, NY: Zed Books, 2011); Shaun Breslin, The Soft Notion of China’s Soft Power (London: Chatham House, Asia Programme Paper, 2011); Jian Wang (ed.), Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, December 2010); Li Mingjiang (ed.), Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009); Carola McGiffert (ed.), Chinese Soft Power and its Implications for the United States (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009); Joseph S. Nye and Wang Jisi, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power and its Implications for the United States,” in Richard Rosecrance and Gu Guoliang (eds), Power and Restraint: A Shared Vision for the US–China Relationship (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2009); Sheng Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises with its Soft Power (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008); Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, China’s Foreign Policy and Soft Power in South America, Asia and Africa (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2008); and Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007). 16  Jan Melissen, “Public Diplomacy,” in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 436–452. 17  James Pamment, New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy and Practice (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), pp. 3–4.

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strategic and mass communication. The latter proceeds from an essential role for policy networks’ collaboration, and involves multiple stakeholders who are not so much regarded as targets or ‘consumers’ of messages, but rather as “possible partners and producers of diplomatic outcome.”18 In the early years of the twenty-first century, the academic debate on this shift in public diplomacy inspired practitioners to make dialog and networking a solid part of their public diplomacy strategy. This scholarly focus on the engagement of civil society actors and networked public diplomacy, however, has led to a lack of attention for and appreciation of the role of government and the primary functions and objectives of public diplomacy. This has created a gap between public diplomacy theorizing and the questions and challenges that confront practitioners.19 Recently, therefore, scholars—armed but unsatisfied with the wealth of insights that the academic debate in the past decade has brought to the field of public diplomacy and diplomatic studies— have been refocusing their attention on the basic questions concerning the role of governments in public diplomacy.20 This book positions itself within that trend. Public diplomacy is defined in this study as an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors, to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values abroad by building and managing relationships and developing an understanding of cultures, attitudes, and behavior.21 In other words, the primary aim of an entity’s public diplomacy is to exert influence on how relevant publics view the entity and its activities, with the objective of winning their sympathy and support.

18  Brian Hocking, “Rethinking Public Diplomacy,” in J. Melissen (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 65–66. 19  Conversations with public diplomacy officers of various countries and personal experience during my work as public diplomacy officer at the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Washington, DC (2005–2006). 20   See, for example, Melissen, “Public Diplomacy”; and James Pamment, New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy and Practice (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012). 21  This definition is adapted from Bruce Gregory’s definition of public diplomacy as “an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes and behaviour; to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values,” in “American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 6, Nos 3/4 (2011), pp. 351–372.

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Current understanding of public diplomacy is mainly based on Western concepts such as soft power, and on the public diplomacy practices of the United States and other Western countries with democratic political systems. China, however, may not fit into this Western paradigm of public diplomacy because, in several key respects, China is very different from Western countries. China is a country with a non-Western culture and an authoritarian political system; it is a country that has seen an unprecedentedly rapid rise to become the number two economy in the world and the only country with the potential to challenge the United States’ global position. At the same time, in terms of per capita income and many other aspects, however, China is still a developing country22 with major ecological, social, and demographic challenges. It is to a large extent integrated into the Western-dominated global economic and political order, but seeks to reform and transform that order with the aim of better guarding its sovereign rights and national interests.23 Furthermore, China is a country with a profound sense of its long history and with distinct and strong cultural traditions that permeate its modern society and heavily impact upon its policymaking.24 Last but not least, the Chinese government has given public diplomacy a central role in its diplomatic strategy and explicitly seeks to adapt public diplomacy to its political system and its culture. With its analysis of the development and conduct of China’s public diplomacy, this book aims to deepen the insight into the concept of public diplomacy. It seeks to contribute to the understanding of different public diplomacy models and issues, such as the roles of state and non-state actors in public diplomacy, the foreign policy nexus, and public diplomacy communication styles. In addition to furthering our understanding of public diplomacy, this book—based on analysis of empirical data regarding China’s public diplomacy actors, instruments and strategies—also aims to deepen our understanding of China’s foreign policy and diplomacy, and thus to contribute to the field of Chinese political studies.

22  “China Overview,” website of the World Bank, available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/ country/china/overview (accessed August 2013). 23  See, for example, Wang Jisi, “Changing Global Order: China’s Perspective,” in Ashley J. Tellis and Sean Mirskey (eds), Crux of Asia: China, India and the Emerging Global Order (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), pp. 45–52. 24  See, for example, Zhu Liqun, “China’s Foreign Policy Debates,” Chaillot Papers, No. 121 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, September 2010), pp. 27 and 47; and Qin Yaqing, “Chinese Culture and its Implications for Foreign Policymaking,” China International Studies (April 2012).

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The Design of the Study: Questions and Assumptions

This book examines how the development and conduct of China’s public diplomacy over the last two decades should be understood in relation to recent developments in the conceptualization of public diplomacy by Western scholars. It proceeds from the assumption that China’s approach to public diplomacy is different—at both the conceptual and practical levels—from that of Western countries, because China, as discussed above, differs considerably in political system and culture from the countries upon which these—mostly Western—conceptualizations are based. In order to achieve this objective, the book advances three major research questions that address factors shaping China’s public diplomacy: 1. How does the authoritarian character of China’s political regime affect China’s public diplomacy? A country’s political system is assumed to influence the way in which a country organizes the development and conduct of public diplomacy. This question therefore addresses the impact that authoritarian features—such as the limited role of society in political matters and the lack of freedom of press in China—have on the roles of state and non-state actors, and the use of instruments in China’s public diplomacy strategy. Another aspect of this question concerns the impact of China’s authoritarian political system on its sources of soft power and the issue of credibility. 2. How does Chinese culture affect China’s public diplomacy? Culture is fundamental to the way in which people think, behave and communicate, and as public diplomacy is about communication, it is assumed that culture impacts upon a country’s public diplomacy. This question addresses the ways in which patterns and styles of communication, the understanding of ‘relations’ (between individuals and between individuals and society) and cultural identity (including political culture, values, and language) influence public diplomacy messages, narratives and strategies, as well as the selection of instruments and the style of communication. 3. How do China’s public diplomacy processes and practices relate to China’s foreign policy? A country develops public diplomacy to support its foreign policies. It seeks to explain and strengthen its policies or limit the damage to its country’s reputation caused by its policies. The extent to which public diplomacy and foreign policy are closely aligned, however, may differ. In some cases, furthermore, the relationship can also be vice versa. This is the case when the aim to achieve a stated public diplomacy goal leads to changes in a country’s foreign policy. Addressing this research question involves sub-questions such as: What are the precise goals and content of China’s public diplomacy strategies, and how do they relate to China’s foreign policy? What importance does Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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the Chinese government attach to public diplomacy? And how is China’s public diplomacy received by audiences around the globe? There is no single existing theory that can be applied to investigate the complex and multidimensional questions that this book poses. The study therefore develops an analytical framework based on various existing Western theoretical approaches to public diplomacy and communication. As chapter one elaborates, this framework facilitates an understanding of how political and cultural factors shape the three dimensions that constitute a country’s public diplomacy: actors; strategies; and instruments. This framework is applied to China’s understanding of the concept of public diplomacy, as well as to seven cases of Chinese public diplomacy. It provides the basis for the empirical research, which aims to answer various sets of sub-questions about the roles played by state and non-state actors; the messages that China aims to convey; the instruments that it uses; China’s assets and liabilities for public diplomacy; and the receiving side of China’s public diplomacy. The primary method of examination uses cross-case analysis of major case studies and analysis of various small cases of China’s public diplomacy practice. An embedded design is used in conducting the case studies. Rather than taking a helicopter view of the case (a holistic approach), a number of subunits for analysis are identified and individually explored. These subunits concern the sub-questions identified above. The findings on these topics are then drawn together to yield an overall picture.25 It should be noted that the casestudy method has a drawback in that the description of a case is never objective; it is constructed. The description is an interpretation based on a selection of case elements and research materials, on the perspectives of participants in the event (the people interviewed and the authors of the documents analyzed) and on the external perspective of the researcher. These perspectives, for their part, are influenced by the observers’ value system, age, gender and political assumptions.26 The inevitable selectivity in this study is mitigated as much as possible by ‘thick descriptions’ of events and by triangulating across different sources. Furthermore, the possibility of multiple interpretations is regarded as an opportunity as much as a constraint, as it demonstrates how Chinese perspectives on China and its policies, the international environment and events differ from those generally held by Western observers.27 25  Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (London: Sage, fourth edition 2009), p. 50. 26  Robert K. Yin, Qualitative Research from Start to Finish (London and New York, NY: Guilford Press, 2011), pp. 12–13. 27  Yin, Qualitative Research from Start to Finish, p. 13. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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This research is based on analysis of primary and secondary published sources, mainly in the Chinese or English language,28 and interviews and conversations with more than 80 interlocutors, including officials of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chinese diplomats, representatives of other governmental or Chinese Communist Party organizations, representatives of the Chinese media, scholars and people with other affiliations. Research of primary sources is severely hampered by the lack of transparency in Chinese policymaking, lack of access to policymakers and the limited availability of policy documents. Primary written sources that are used include government policy documents, speeches and comments by Chinese leaders and government officials, transcripts of press conferences, event reports, television broadcasts, statistics, official surveys, government websites and opinion polls. Secondary sources used include Chinese and non-Chinese scholarly articles and books, Chinese and non-Chinese printed media reports, and websites and scholarly blogs of trusted China analysts.29 Many of these blogs focus on specific topics, such as policies with regard to the Chinese media or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in China, and offer rapid analysis that is based on—and often has internet links to—Chinese sources that are difficult to find or are easily overlooked. The research covers the development of China’s public diplomacy during the period 1991–2013, with a focus on the last decade, when the development of China’s public diplomacy took off. The year 1991 is chosen as a starting point because in that year, with the establishment of the State Council Information Office, the first steps were taken toward developing China’s public diplomacy as we know it today.

The Selection of Case Studies

The seven major cases studied in this book aim to cover the different dimensions and aspects of China’s public diplomacy practice and to illustrate the development of China’s public diplomacy over time. The cases were selected to provide analyses of different types of public diplomacy policies, with each 28  Occasionally Dutch, French, German or Spanish media sources are quoted. 29  For example, the China Media Project of the University of Hong Kong, http://cmp.hku .hk/; the independent bilingual English–Chinese media organization China Digital Times, which is based in Berkeley, CA, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/; the China Real-Time Report of The Wall Street Journal, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/; and China Copyright and Media, http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com.

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highlighting specific public diplomacy approaches and instruments: policies targeted at regions or countries; proactive event-oriented public diplomacy; and reactive crisis public diplomacy. Furthermore, the cases provide sufficient ‘thickness’—that is, the availability of sufficient empirical data from a wide variety of sources. ‘Thickness’ contributes to the validity of results, as it allows for research into many different aspects of the issue and enables triangulation. The two cases concerning China’s public diplomacy strategies toward specific regions address Asia and Africa. These regions were selected because the strategies involved are the cornerstones of China’s regional public diplomacy endeavor and comprise China’s most comprehensive public diplomacy policies. The case of Asia, where China has to deal with both developing and developed countries, as well as with both friendly and unfriendly audiences, allows for the examination of a diversity of proactive and defensive policies. The case of Africa demonstrates how China’s public diplomacy plays out where the Chinese development model and diplomatic approach hold a certain appeal to publics. Both cases provide insight into relations between China’s foreign policy and public diplomacy, the messages that China seeks to convey, the roles played by various actors, China’s assets and liabilities for public diplomacy, and the wide array of public diplomacy tools that China possesses. In addition, both cases show how China adjusts policies that are protested against by local publics, and indicate how China’s public diplomacy is partly driven by a sense of competition for influence with the United States. The two cases examining China’s event-oriented public diplomacy are the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the 2010 Shanghai World Exposition. Hosting these major events involved long-term preparations and provided China with the opportunity carefully to design public diplomacy messages, and to project a desired image to a global audience. Different in character, the two events warranted different public diplomacy approaches. The Beijing Olympic Games was a ‘media event’ celebrated by audiences all over the world.30 It was also a political event, leading to scrutiny of China’s policies and much international criticism and pressure, which necessitated rapid defensive public diplomacy policies. The Shanghai World Expo, on the contrary, drew limited foreign attention and involved less risk, as well as less prestige. In this case, public diplomacy involved practical and extended collaboration with numerous foreign state and non-state actors. In addition to promoting China and its host city 30  A media event is an event that is well prepared, negotiated and performed by various actors and subsequently celebrated by global audiences; see Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

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Shanghai, policymakers had to facilitate foreign participants in conducting their own public diplomacy. The two cases provide insight into the roles played by China’s public diplomacy actors, the impact of collaboration with foreign actors, and, as the Chinese government paid much attention to involving its own citizens in the two events, the domestic dimension of public diplomacy. Taking place two years apart, the cases furthermore offer an opportunity to investigate China’s learning curve with regard to proactively conducting public diplomacy. Subsequently, three types of crisis public diplomacy are examined: a health crisis: the 2003 SARS epidemic; product scandals: the 2007 and 2008 pet food, toys and milk powder crises; and a natural disaster: the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. These cases concern reactive public diplomacy, which requires approaches that differ considerably from those used for events diplomacy. The government of a country in crisis often comes under heavy international scrutiny, and there is little time to consider options carefully and design strategies. A country in crisis has to communicate simultaneously different types of messages to multiple, sometimes hostile, audiences at home and abroad, in a highly visible and volatile communication environment.31 The health and product safety crises concerned domestic problems, and public diplomacy involved acknowledging the government’s mistakes and shortcomings. Public diplomacy strategies on these occasions were therefore highly political in character, thus allowing for an examination of the impact of China’s political system on its public diplomacy. Taking place over a period of five years, these cases show how China developed and continuously improved its public diplomacy. The case of the Wenchuan earthquake offers a different perspective on China’s crisis public diplomacy. As the disaster generated sympathy for China and the Chinese government handled relief efforts relatively well, China was able to improve its image. In addition to these large case studies, analyses of smaller cases provide insight into the role of Chinese leaders in public diplomacy, the use of foreign media to convey public diplomacy messages, the impact of the lack of free reporting and the reception of China’s public diplomacy.

31  Rhonda Zaharna, “Asymmetry of Cultural Styles and the Unintended Consequences of Crisis Public Diplomacy,” in Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy (Malta: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomacy, 2004).

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Overview of the Chapters

Chapter one explores the general Western understanding of public diplomacy and related concepts, including soft power, propaganda, strategic communications, branding, cultural and people’s diplomacy, and domestic outreach. Drawing upon these insights, it develops the analytical framework that guides this study’s analysis of China’s public diplomacy. Chapter two provides the context in which China develops and conducts its public diplomacy. It deals with Chinese culture and the major features of China’s authoritarian political system, including media censorship. It subsequently evaluates China’s major assets and liabilities for public diplomacy in different regions around the globe. It argues that China’s authoritarian political model is the biggest obstacle to its public diplomacy in Western and Northeast Asian countries, as it creates distrust of China, which—together with fears of China’s rise and growing influence—forms a negative lens through which people view China and its policies. The politico-economic China Model, however, is a Chinese source of soft power in developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. China’s economic rise simultaneously benefits and hinders China’s public diplomacy, as it sparks fear as well as admiration. Chinese culture, which is regarded by the Chinese government as China’s biggest public diplomacy asset, has much potential as a source for public diplomacy, but is constrained by political control. Chapter three examines the extensive and lively Chinese debate on public diplomacy and related concepts, as they emerge from Chinese scholarly works and policy documents. It finds that Chinese scholars and policymakers look at soft power and public diplomacy in a highly strategic way and draw much inspiration from US public diplomacy. They regard public diplomacy primarily as a state function and an important instrument to increase China’s Comprehensive National Power. Chinese policymakers pay much attention to the domestic dimension of public diplomacy. They regard domestic publics as targets as well as instruments of public diplomacy. The Chinese government, furthermore, struggles with the question of how to mobilize non-state actors and their networks, while still maintaining government control over actions and messages. Chapter four explores China’s public diplomacy system: the proliferation of Chinese public diplomacy actors, decision-making processes and the huge investments in the development of a wide array of public diplomacy instruments. What stands out among Chinese public diplomacy actors and instruments are the expansion of the Chinese media, the proliferation of Confucius

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Institutes and the involvement of Chinese communities overseas. This chapter illustrates and underlines various issues that emerged in chapter three, including the importance that the Chinese government attaches to strengthening its public diplomacy policies, the dominance of state actors and the holistic approach to public diplomacy. Chapter five examines how China’s assets and liabilities for public diplomacy play out in practice. It presents the cases of China’s public diplomacy strategies toward Asia and Africa, where—in most of the developing countries—China’s economic investments and high-context communication style are appreciated. These cases show how China carefully fine-tunes its policies to different local conditions, and how China is continuously adapting and improving its policies. The cases reveal that China’s media expansion is driven to a large extent by frustration over Western media dominance and confirm that, even in regions that are welcoming to China’s policies, it does not succeed in raising its cultural profile. The chapter furthermore highlights China’s strategic use of public diplomacy as an integrated part of its foreign policy. Chapter six investigates China’s public diplomacy efforts around two major events that showcased China’s rise, or—as the Chinese see it—China’s rejuvenation: the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games; and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo. Both events provided a steep learning curve for China’s public diplomacy policymakers. Analysis of these cases provides insight into how China’s political system impacts upon its public diplomacy, for instance in the way that state actors dominated the development and conduct of public diplomacy, and how domestic audiences and Chinese communities overseas were involved in public diplomacy, both as targets and instruments. In the run-up to the Beijing Olympic Games, political concerns raised by international organizations and lobbying groups regularly interfered with or seriously hampered China’s carefully designed public diplomacy activities, forcing the Chinese government to reconsider and adjust its policies. Chapter seven looks at another type of public diplomacy: how China dealt with foreign—and domestic—publics during various crises. Public diplomacy actions with regard to the reputation-damaging 2003 SARS epidemic, and the 2007–2008 toys and food scandals, demonstrate the impact of the political system on China’s public diplomacy. They also highlight the government’s learning process with regard to crisis public diplomacy. The authorities’ first reaction to these crises was to deny, cover up, and trivialize the problems— behavior that reconfirmed international and domestic images of the Chinese government’s lack of credibility. Partly as a result of the growing pressure of social media in China, which broke the government’s monopoly on information, Chinese leaders came to recognize that providing transparency and

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accountability is the best way to limit damage to the government’s reputation. The 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake was a different type of crisis. The disaster raised sympathy and gave China an opportunity to improve its image by demonstrating that it was capable of rapidly organizing a large-scale disaster relief operation, and by projecting an image of a human and caring leadership. Chapter eight looks at the receiving side of public diplomacy, examining Chinese and foreign evaluations of China’s public diplomacy and exploring the question of what global audiences’ perceptions of China—as they emerge from international opinion polls—can tell us about China’s public diplomacy. Polling results strongly suggest that positive perceptions of China in the developing world are currently closely tied to expectations that people will benefit economically from expanding and deepening relations with China. They furthermore show that in spite of the Chinese government’s view that culture is China’s biggest soft power asset, it is not yet able to capitalize on culture as a resource for public diplomacy. The chapter argues that China’s negative image in the developed world cannot simply be ‘fixed’ by intensifying and expanding activities in the field of public diplomacy, but that good public diplomacy, which is credible and supported by policy actions, can help to address some of the issues causing negative views. The conclusion elaborates upon the findings of the eight chapters and places them in the context of the ongoing debate in public diplomacy studies. The analyses of the case studies show that—by adapting Western public diplomacy approaches and simultaneously creating its own concepts, instruments and strategies—the Chinese government’s approach to public diplomacy has developed many specific characteristics, which are, to a considerable extent and in various ways, shaped by China’s political system and culture. The latter factors also figure largely in the strengths and weaknesses of China’s public diplomacy. The case of China’s public diplomacy adds to our understanding of what constitutes and shapes a country’s public diplomacy and what factors undermine or contribute to its success, including the preconceived notions and knowledge about a country on the receiving side. More research is needed on the impact of culture on countries’ public diplomacy and on how cultural diplomacy may help to reduce misunderstandings that are caused by cultural differences.

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CHAPTER 1

How to Understand Public Diplomacy: An Analytical Framework This chapter provides an overview of the Western understanding1 of public diplomacy and presents the analytical framework informing this study. It does not intend to provide a full overview of the extensive and eclectic literature on public diplomacy, but focuses on relevant issues for answering the questions about what shapes China’s public diplomacy. The chapter begins with a discussion of Western approaches to public diplomacy and related concepts, such as soft power and propaganda. It identifies the elements that constitute a country’s public diplomacy, including the roles played by state and non-state actors, sources of soft power, the content of public diplomacy messages, public diplomacy instruments, and the attention paid to the domestic dimension of public diplomacy. It furthermore argues that these elements of a country’s public diplomacy are affected by its political system and culture. Extensive literature exists on public diplomacy,2 to which various academic disciplines—including international relations, communications, public relations, and marketing—contribute, but it is largely descriptive in nature, dealing with public diplomacy in a specific country or region, or focusing on a specific aspect or element of public diplomacy. Only a small number of publications aim at conceptualizing and theorizing public diplomacy.3 This lack of theorizing has two main causes. First, public diplomacy scholarship is rela1  ‘Western’ refers to Europe and North America. While there are differences in the understanding and practice of public diplomacy between Europe and the United States, and between individual European countries, the discourse largely bridges these gaps, as the public diplomacy literature on both sides of the Atlantic deals with the same issues and develops in the same direction. 2  See, for example, the bibliographies on public diplomacy published by the library of the Clingendael Institute, http://www.clingendael.nl/library/literature/; Bruce Gregory’s “Public Diplomacy Reading Lists,” http://publicdiplomacy.wikia.com/wiki/Bruce_Gregory’s_Reading_ List; Phil Taylor’s website, http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/index.cfm?outfit=pmt; and the database of the University of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School, http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/resources. 3  For example, Robert Entman, “Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The US Case,” The International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 16, No. 4 (October 2011), pp. 548–572; and Eytan Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 55–77. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004283954_003 Ingrid

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tively young. Second, as Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall point out in Essence of Diplomacy, “diplomacy has received surprisingly little attention among political scientists specializing in international relations. Indeed, diplomacy has been ‘particularly resistant to theory.’ ”4 Mai’a K. Davis Cross suggests that international relations scholars have so far largely ignored public diplomacy because they are more interested in finding answers to “big questions about the international system as a whole” rather than “studying complex social processes of relationship building that are so central to diplomacy and PD.” The latter fields of study “thus have been sidelined in favor of other research questions that lend themselves better to mainstream social science methodology.”5 Some practitioners argue that there is no need to theorize public diplomacy. For example, Patricia Kushlish, a career foreign service officer who worked for the United States Information Agency (USIA), writes: “Public diplomacy is foremost a skill, like it or not, that is most effectively learned from practitioners and best acquired on the job. Elbow grease—not theorizing—is the key.”6 This is a sentiment felt by many public diplomacy officers, but it does not mean that proper conceptualization and theorizing have nothing to contribute to the practice of public diplomacy. They help to develop the public diplomacy discipline, deepen the practitioner’s understanding of public diplomacy and its place in international relations and diplomacy, and may encourage practitioners to explore new approaches. Looking beyond the practitioner to the academic realm, theorizing public diplomacy contributes to theoretical thinking in the field of international relations as a whole.

The Concept of Public Diplomacy

The term ‘public diplomacy’ is widely used by practitioners and scholars from various fields. It is generally agreed that public diplomacy distinguishes itself from traditional diplomacy by targeting non-governmental publics, whereas 4   Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 1. The quote is from J. Der Derian, “Mediating Estrangement: A Theory for Diplomacy,” Review of International Studies, No. 13 (1987), p. 91. 5  Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “Conceptualizing European Public Diplomacy,” in Mai’a K. Davis Cross and Jan Melissen (eds), European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 1–12, at p. 3. 6  Patricia H. Kushlish, “Detroit on the Potomac,” blog (May 12 2009), http://whirledview .typepad.com/whirledview/2009/05/detroit-on-the-potomac.html#more; see also the response by John Brown and the discussion of the article by Craig Hayden of May 19 2009: “Public Diplomacy and the Phantom Menace of Theory,” http://intermap.org/2009/05/19/ public-diplomacy-and-the-phantom-menace-of-theory/. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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CHAPTER 1

traditional diplomacy concerns government-to-government relations. There is no agreement, however, on how public diplomacy should be defined, or what it exactly entails. Both the concept and practice of public diplomacy are in constant flux. During the past two decades, a theoretical paradigm shift has taken place from traditional, state-centered, and hierarchically organized public diplomacy to a network or ‘new’ public diplomacy model that involves a wide variety of actors and promotes dialog and collaboration.7 In the traditional model, the state—often the foreign ministry—monitors the interactions between domestic and international policy environments, and public diplomacy is characterized by top—down information flows and a focus on strategic and mass communication.8 People are seen as targets and instruments of foreign policy, and the effort is on targeting them more effectively.9 7  Brian Hocking, “Reconfiguring Public Diplomacy: From Competition to Collaboration,” in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalized World (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2008), pp. 62–75; Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy;” Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past,” CDP Perspectives on Public Diplomacy (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press, 2009); James Pamment, New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy and Practice (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012); Mark Leonard, Catherine Stead, and Conrad Smewing, Public Diplomacy (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2002); Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, “US Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World: From Messaging To Mutuality,” CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, No. 6 (2011); Kristin M. Lord, “Engaging the Private Sector for the Public Good: The Power of Network Diplomacy,” Policy Brief (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2010); Philip Seib (ed.), Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting US Foreign Policy (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); and many others. The importance of having a ‘two-way dialog’ and involving civil society had been raised before, among others by Edmund Gullion in 1965 and Hans Tuch in 1990, but was picked up on much more strongly after the events of 9/11 in the United States. See Gullion’s definition as cited in Nicholas J. Cull, “ ‘Public Diplomacy’ Before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase,” in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (eds), Routledge handbook of public diplomacy (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), pp. 19–23 and Hans N. Tuch, Communicating with the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1990). 8  Strategic communication is discussed further below; mass communication takes place “when a source, typically an organization, employs a technology as a medium to communicate with a large audience.” This neutral definition is chosen because mass communication theories change as quickly as the social, political and technological (media) context changes. For the above definition (p. 5) and an overview of the extensive and rapidly changing mass communication theories, see Stanley J. Baran and Dennis K. Davis, Mass Communication Theory: Foundation, Ferment and Future (Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, 2011). 9  Hocking, “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy,” p. 35. Two famous works about how to strengthen public diplomacy in this tradition are: Gifford D. Malone, Political Advocacy and Cultural Communication: Organizing the Nation’s Public Diplomacy (Boston, MA: University

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Public diplomacy in this model is ‘competitive’—that is, policies are part of bilateral diplomacy strategies, which serve national interests and which compete with other countries’ strategies. Globalization and the rise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-state actors’ involvement in diplomacy, however, have led to less clearly delineated roles and responsibilities for actors in international relations. Foreign ministries no longer have a monopoly on diplomacy; nonhierarchical public policy networks consisting of state and non-state actors have become essential in managing international relations.10 These developments have given rise to the ‘new’ or network model of public diplomacy, in which competitive strategies are complemented by collaborative strategies involving multi-stakeholders who are not regarded as targets or ‘consumers’ of messages, but as “possible partners and producers of diplomatic outcome.”11 ‘New’ public diplomacy, as Jan Melissen puts it, is a two-way affair, which involves engaging publics, starting dialogs and establishing long-term relationships that will build trust.12 As a wide variety of actors with varying perspectives are involved in creating public diplomacy messages, these messages are considered more legitimate and credible than those developed by state actors in the state-centered model. They will therefore more easily appeal to a broad audience. In this model, the process of dialog and collaboration among network members is as important as the outcome (the messages). The state actors’ role here is focused on joining, creating, or strengthening national and international networks, and facilitating dialog within the network. Public relations scholar R.S. Zaharna, who looks at this development in public diplomacy from a communication perspective, distinguishes between informational and relational approaches to public diplomacy.13 In the informational approach, mass communication is the most important instrument; the initiator, often a government actor, designs and sends out a message to a targeted audience. The messenger may use public opinion polling and other forms of intelligence to fine-tune its message for this specific audience, and

Press of America, 1988); and Jarol B. Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994). 10  Hocking, “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy,” p. 64; see also Ali Fisher, “Mapping the Great Beyond: Identifying Meaningful Networks in Public Diplomacy,” CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, No. 2 (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press, 2010), pp. 9–10. 11  Hocking, “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy,” pp. 65–66; and Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy.” 12  Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy,” p. 5. 13  R.S. Zaharna, Battles to Bridges: US Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy after 9/11 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

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controls the message at every stage of its dissemination, but has no control over how the message is received by the targeted audience.14 This is different in the relational approach, which—being relations-centered—focuses on message exchange, relationship-building, and network creation, with the result that communication not only moves at greater speed, but is also much more flexible and adaptable than in the informational approach. Zaharna point out that “[w]hereas the mass communication approach begins with a predetermined message, the network paradigm ends with the message or story.” The networks “first establish the structure and dynamics for effective communication channels, then members collaborate to craft the message.”15 The network approach thus creates soft power, whereas the mass communication approach merely wields soft power. Zaharna furthermore argues that networks may be apt to overcome cultural differences, create credibility, and to master narratives.16 The development of the concepts of ‘new,’ ‘network,’ and ‘relational’ public diplomacy signaled a new phase in conceptualizing public diplomacy and was successful in convincing governments that they should make dialog and networking a firm part of their public diplomacy strategy. At the same time, however, many governments still understand public diplomacy as primarily an ‘instrument of statecraft,’ used to support that country’s foreign policy and overall diplomacy.17 As many advocates of the new public diplomacy concepts, however, neglected the role of government actors and the function of new 14   R.S. Zaharna, “The Soft Power Differential: Network Communication and Mass Communication in Public Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, No. 2 (2007), pp. 213–228, at p. 217. 15  Zaharna, “The Soft Power Differential,” pp. 217–222, quotation on p. 221. 16  Zaharna, “The Soft Power Differential.” 17  Statecraft is understood as “the selection of means for the pursuit of foreign policy goals;” see David Allen Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 8. Examples include the United States (see the mission statement on US public diplomacy on the web page of the Under-Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs); the United Kingdom (see C. Bird, “Strategic Communication and Behaviour Change: Lessons from Domestic Policy,” in Jolyon Welsh and Daniel Fearn (eds), Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World (London: FCO, 2008), pp. 114–115); Canada (see Evan Potter, Branding Canada: Projecting Canada’s Soft Power through Public Diplomacy (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), pp. 32–33; and Mark McDowell, “Public Diplomacy at the Crossroads: Definitions and Challenges in an ‘Open Source’ Era,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 3, Special Edition (2008), p. 8: “PD takes place in public, but for it to be diplomacy, it has to entail a role for the state”); and the Netherlands (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Handleiding Publieksdiplomatie [Public Diplomacy Handbook] (The Hague: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

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public diplomacy, a gap has emerged between the academic and theoretical ideals of public diplomacy and public diplomacy in practice.18 It is not easy to understand how networks work exactly, and how policymakers can identify and engage with relevant non-state actors for interaction. Non-state actors may have different interests and their actions do not necessarily support the ideas that a government wants to promote. Furthermore, there is also a downside to focusing on networks. Networks may also develop problems with credibility, as they often consist of people that already share certain expertise, goals and ideas. They may reinforce an already existing idea or narrative, and are not necessarily open to other information or views from outsiders. Information that is shared within a network and is used to build a narrative may be selective and/or incorrect. Whereas networks may be able to reach out across national borders, they do not necessarily do so across existing views in society. In practice, most countries’ public diplomacy can be considered a combination of state-centered and network-based public diplomacy. In this hybrid model, state actors are usually the initiator and/or supporter and/or coordinator of public diplomacy actions, but they increasingly develop and conduct public diplomacy in close cooperation with members of networks that include both state and non-state actors. Most governments conduct public diplomacy to seek support for a policy or to promote an image, as well as to develop dialogs and build relationships in order to enhance understanding and co-create solutions to transnational problems. The network model is important for building mutual understanding and respect, but is not suitable for promoting a specific policy or limiting the damage of a national crisis. It would be problematic for a government to rely mainly on citizens and their networks to act as ambassadors for their country. Networks and NGOs have their own agendas and citizens may not necessarily be interested in, or willing actively to support, their countries’ policies. Furthermore, they may not always be able to engage successfully in meaningful dialogs with cultures very different from their own.

The Challenges of Public Diplomacy 2.0

The development of new forms of public diplomacy with greater roles for the public is linked to and reinforced by ongoing technological developments. New technologies have created a communication dynamic in the international political arena that is characterized by more connectivity, interactivity and 18  Pamment, New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century, p. 3.

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cultural diversity.19 The internet, mobile phones and social media interactions such as Twitter and Facebook have opened interactive, flexible, easy-to-use and ever-faster channels of communication. These new tools facilitate social networking and enable public diplomacy actors to multiply their outreach, as messages disseminated via the internet can reach a global audience. As a result, audiences and debates are increasingly moving online, and blog posts and tweets are becoming sources of information as important as newspaper op-eds.20 In public diplomacy practice, the rise of social media has led to new initiatives that are often referred to as digital diplomacy, or public diplomacy 2.0.21 While many practical aspects of the use of social media are similar to those of traditional public diplomacy, the underlying premises are different, as use of social media calls for a level of openness and transparency that contradicts more traditional public diplomacy practices.22 The rise of social media furthermore forces diplomats and other actors to react fast. Global audiences may learn about an action or event with diplomatic implications via YouTube, Facebook or Twitter within minutes, sometimes even before policymakers or diplomats. “Debates and positions are shaping up well before they hit newspapers,” and if officials take time carefully to formulate official positions, they miss chances to shape the debate.23 On the one hand, the new media ‘democratize information,’ as they permit direct access to policy- and decision makers and thus enable people to bypass hierarchies.24 The increased transparency thus lends legitimacy to messages. On the other hand, the new media allow communicators to be anonymous and manipulate information or spread false information. Furthermore, they have fragmented audiences, as people are provided with a choice of 19  Zaharna, “The Soft Power Differential,” pp. 213–228, at p. 217. 20  Fergus Hanson, “The New Public Diplomacy,” Perspectives (Sydney, NSW: Lowy Institute, April 4 2011), p. 3. 21  James K. Glassman, “Public Diplomacy 2.0: A New Approach to Global Engagement,” remarks at the New America Foundation (December 1 2008), http://www.newamerica .net/events/2008/public_diplomacy_2_0; and Evan H. Potter “Web 2.0 and the New Public Diplomacy: Impact and Opportunities,” in Jolyon Welsh and Daniel Fearn (eds), Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalized World (London: FCO, 2008). 22  Carolijn van Noort, Social Media Strategy: Bringing Public Diplomacy 2.0 to the Next Level, research paper for the Netherlands Embassy in Washington, DC (March 14 2011). 23  Hanson, “The New Public Diplomacy,” p. 3. 24   Matt Armstrong, “New Media and Persuasion, Mobilization and Facilitation,” Mountainrunner, blog (August 5 2008), http://mountainrunner.us/2008/08/new_media_ and_persuasion_mobil.html (accessed May 2010).

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sources of information, thus enabling them to consume information in a very selective way. Social media have empowered the individual, but they have also blurred the borders between private and official life. This raises the question of the extent to which officials should be allowed to communicate freely via social media such as Twitter and Facebook in private and/or official capacities. This question is answered differently in each country and official body, although in many Western countries the use of social media by individual official actors is allowed or even encouraged.25 In China, as we will see, the government is exploring the use of social media, but struggles with the transparency that it involves.

Public Diplomacy and Soft Power

No concept is so closely related to, and often mistakenly used interchangeably with, public diplomacy as Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power. Soft power refers to attraction as a form of power; it is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment,”26 or, as Nye later elaborated, “the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.”27 Hard power, by contrast, is based upon coercion or inducement. The concept of soft power has provided an important foundation for public diplomacy. It informs and justifies the development and implementation of public diplomacy strategies28 and, as Kathy Fitzpatrick has pointed out, “has contributed significantly to public diplomacy’s rise in foreign affairs.”29 The concept, however, is not without its problems.

25  See, for example, Colleen Graffy, “The Rise of Public Diplomacy 2.0,” The Journal of International Security Affairs, No. 17 (Fall 2009). 26  Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2004), p. x. 27  Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2011), p. 13. Earlier works are Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, No. 80 (1990), pp. 155–171; and Nye, Soft Power, p. x. 28  Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts (Plymouth, UK: Lexington, 2012), p. 3. 29  Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, “US Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World: From Messaging To Mutuality,” CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, No. 6 (2011), p. 40.

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Public diplomacy is a tool that may wield or generate soft power, by linking soft power resources to preferred outcomes.30 It is an instrument of what Nye calls ‘power conversion’: a process of communication and collaboration that may transform soft power resources into attraction and behavioral outcome.31 As critics point out, however, Nye remains rather vague on how this transformation process works.32 Nye’s soft power resources include culture, values, legitimate policies, a positive domestic model, successful economy and a capable military.33 The sources of soft power should not be confused with soft power itself;34 whether or not a resource can be converted into a preferred outcome depends on the behavior of the messenger, the context, and in particular on the perceptions of the targeted audience. Attraction lies in the eye of the beholder; a resource that is attractive to one audience can be disliked by another. Some soft power resources can also be a source of hard power. Economic strength, for example, is soft when others admire a country’s economic growth or regard an economic system as a role model, but is hard when it is used for economic sanctions.35 Military might is mostly a source of hard power, but becomes a source of soft power when, for example, the military provides aid after a natural disaster. These examples illustrate another often-discussed problem with regard to soft power: the difficulty of distinguishing clearly between a country’s hard and soft power resources, and between hard and soft power effects. Having hard power resources, for example, helps countries in wielding their soft power, as it may provide the economic means to develop public diplomacy instruments, or to ensure that publics pay attention to a public diplomacy message.36 Some do not believe in soft power at all. Janice Bially Mattern, for example, regards soft power as a continuation of hard power by 30  Nye, The Future of Power, pp. 100–109. 31  Nye, The Future of Power, p. 8. 32  Yong Wook Lee, “Soft Power as Productive Power,” in Lee and Melissen (eds), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia, pp. 33–50; and Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power, chapter 2, pp. 27–76. 33  Nye, Soft Power, p. 99. 34  This is what Steven Lukes calls the ‘vehicle fallacy’ in “Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds: On the Bluntness of Soft Power,” in Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams (eds), Power in World Politics (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), p. 84. 35  Joseph S. Nye, “Think Again: Soft Power,” Foreign Policy (March 1 2006). 36  See, for example, Ying Fan, “Soft Power: Power Of Attraction Or Confusion?,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2008), pp. 147–158; and Gregory F. Treverton and Seth G. Jones, Measuring National Power (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005), p. 10.

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different means.37 Realist critics, including many politicians, argue that soft power is too soft and therefore ineffective.38 They assert that countries usually do not act on the basis of their likes or dislikes, but on the basis of their interests. Nye recognizes that in addition to soft power, a country also needs to employ hard power. In cooperation with Richard L. Armitage, he developed the concept of ‘smart power’: a power that complements its economic and military weight with greater investments in soft power39 and that picks from a “full range of tools—diplomatic, economic, military, political and cultural”— to achieve its goals in a specific situation.40 This rather more political concept was embraced in 2009 by the Obama administration as the strategy that would guide its foreign policy.41 Chinese officials do not like the term ‘smart power’ because it refers to hard power elements,42 but as China invests in increasing its soft power, as well as its economic and military weight, it can be argued that China, too, aims for a foreign policy of smart power.43 The idea of leveraging soft power by developing and conducting public diplomacy provides an important basis for the traditional understanding of public diplomacy, but does not go well with the ‘new’ or relational public diplomacy approach, which focuses on dialog and relationship-building and distances itself from exerting influence.44 The question can be raised of whether it is 37  Janice Bially Mattern, “Why ‘Soft Power’ isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistics Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” Millennium, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2005), pp. 583–612. 38  See, for example, Robert Kagan in Paradise and Power (London: Atlantic Books, 2003) and more recently in “The Importance of US Military Might Shouldn’t be Underestimated,” The Washington Post (February 2 2012); and Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York, NY: Penguin, 2004), pp. 19–21. 39  For the concept of smart power, see CSIS Commission on Smart Power, Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye (co-chairs), CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter More Secure America (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2007). 40  Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nomination Hearing to be Secretary of State” (January 13 2009), http://www.state.gov/ secretary/rm/2009a/01/115196.htm. 41  “Transcript of Hillary Clinton’s Confirmation Hearing” (January 13 2009); and N.D. Batra, “The Feeling’s Mutual,” The Times of India (November 24 2009). 42  Interviews with scholars and officials in Beijing in December 2008 and April 2009. 43  See, for example, Jia Qingguo, Continuity and Change: China’s Attitude toward Hard Power and Soft Power (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, December 2010). 44  See, for example, Fitzpatrick, “US Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World,” p. 40; Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, “Public Diplomacy and Ethics: From Soft Power to Social Conscience,” in

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ethical to manipulate people’s opinion in order to have them accept or embrace a certain message, as is done in a (soft) power-based model of public diplomacy. The answer depends on the policymaker’s responsibility to take consequences for all the affected parties into account and on openness about whose interests a communication serves.45 Public diplomacy should be grounded in both the sender country’s ethical standards, and in the ethical norms of the receiving side.46 The policymaker should only aim to achieve a preferred outcome if that outcome is also favorable for the target country. The best way to ensure that this condition for ethical public diplomacy is met is via strategies that nurture long-term relationships through two-way communication strategies between symmetric parties that are equally open to the influence of the other.47 In practice, however, most countries’ public diplomacy policies are primarily focused on getting one’s own message across.

Public Diplomacy and Propaganda

Public diplomacy is sometimes equated with propaganda.48 Until Gullion introduced the term ‘public diplomacy’ in 1965, the term ‘propaganda’ was often used for what we now call public diplomacy activities. Propaganda activities were accepted as an instrument of government and the working of propaR.S. Zaharna, Amelia Arsenault and Ali Fisher (eds), Relational, Networked and Collaborative Approaches to Public Diplomacy: The Connective Mindshift (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), pp. 29–43. 45  Seong-Hun Yun, Toward Theory Building for Comparative Public Diplomacy from the Perspectives of Public Relations and International Relations: A Macro-Comparative Study of Embassies in Washington, DC, dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland (2005), p. 32. 46  Philip Seib, “The Ethics of Public Diplomacy,” in Kathy Fitzpatrick and Carolyn Bronstein (eds), Ethics in Public Relations: Responsible Advocacy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006), p. 156. 47  Richard Nelson and Foad Izadi, “Ethics and Social Issues in Public Diplomacy,” in Snow and Taylor (eds), Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, pp. 334–351, at p. 340; and Ali Fisher, “Looking at the Man in the Mirror: Understanding of Power and Influence in Public Diplomacy,” in Ali Fisher and Scott Lucas (eds), Trials of Engagement: The Future of US Public Diplomacy (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001), p. 271. Many others have pointed out that symmetrical communication is inherently ethical; see the discussion by Yun, Toward Theory Building for Comparative Public Diplomacy, p. 32. 48  See, for example, John Brown, “Public Diplomacy and Propaganda: Their Differences,” American Diplomacy, No. 9 (September 2008).

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ganda was extensively studied.49 Even today, some scholars define propaganda neutrally: as a technique or a tool to disseminate ideas and information in order to influence opinions and attitudes in a way that serves the propagandist.50 Defined this way, propaganda can be used for either good or bad ends, and aptly covers many activities that we now prefer to call public diplomacy. For most people, however, the term ‘propaganda’ is inextricably bound with negative associations such as ‘lies,’ ‘deceit,’ ‘manipulations,’ or even ‘brainwashing.’51 Many scholars have therefore sought to differentiate conceptually between propaganda and public diplomacy. A number of them regard the communication’s character as the major distinguishing factor between the two concepts. They build upon the work of Jacques Ellul, who in 1973 pointed out that propaganda consists of one-way communication, excluding an exchange of ideas or discussion.52 Melissen, as well as Nicholas Cull, David Culbert and David Welch, for example, all see propaganda as a linear activity that “dictates us what to think.”53 The target public is informed or persuaded; there is no dialog. Public diplomacy, by contrast, is a two-way street, allowing for the exchange of ideas and discussion. Another approach is to look at the content or the source of propaganda. Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, for example, draw on an older military understanding of propaganda work and distinguish black, gray and white propaganda.54 In ‘black’ propaganda, the identity of the source is deliberately concealed or distorted and/or the information provided is inaccurate. ‘White propaganda’ refers to a message that contains truthful information and comes 49  Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy, pp. 4–5. For Gullion’s coining of the term ‘public diplomacy’ see Cull, “ ‘Public Diplomacy’ Before Gullion”, pp. 19–23. 50  See, for example, Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, third edition 2003), p. 7. 51  See, for example, Nicholas J. Cull, David Culbert and David Welch (eds), Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA: ABCClio, 2003), pp. xv–xxi and pp. 317–323; and Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda, pp. 8–9. For an excellent overview of how propaganda/persuasion became a topic for study in the social sciences shortly after the First World War, see Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (London: Sage, 1999), chapter 4, pp. 122–154. 52  See, for example, Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (New York, NY: Vintage, 1973), p. 11. 53  David Welch, “Introduction: Propaganda in Historical Perspective,” in Cull, Culbert and Welch (eds), Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, p. xix. 54  Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 12; the distinction between black, gray and white propaganda is not original to Jowett and O’Donnell, but was already made by the military during the Second World War II; see, for example, Cull, Culbert and Welch (eds), Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, pp. 41–43, pp. 151–153, and pp. 425–426.

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from an identifiable source, but that may be one-sided to favor the strategy of the propagandist. ‘Gray propaganda’ lies somewhere in the middle: it may have an identifiable source, but it is not certain whether the information is accurate, or whether the information seems accurate but the source is not clear.55 In many works on propaganda, it is the intent of the propagandist to manipulate the beliefs or behavior of others that is seen as defining propaganda,56 and as such it comes close to the traditional model of public diplomacy where actors aim to influence others. Propaganda in its neutral meaning thus overlaps to a large extent with public diplomacy, as activities aimed at providing information can be considered a form of ‘white propaganda.’ Looking at the character of communication, however, public diplomacy is, as Jan Melissen puts it, “similar to propaganda in that it tries to persuade people what to think, but is fundamentally different in the sense that public diplomacy also listens to what people have to say.”57

Subsets of Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy, as it is understood in this study, encompasses citizen diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and strategic communications, and partially overlaps with nation-branding. Citizen diplomacy refers to contacts among people of different nations, as opposed to official contacts between government officials or between officials and people. Citizen diplomacy is vital for building relationships with the international community and, as citizen contacts may transcend political difficulties, it is a useful form of diplomacy when relations between countries are problematic and official contacts have been frozen. Citizen diplomacy uses instruments such as academic grants and exchanges, visitor programs, twinning activities, ‘business for public diplomacy’ initiatives, and sports and cultural activities. A special category of citizen diplomacy is track-II diplomacy, which concerns the unofficial discussion by nongovernmental actors—often academics, activists and journalists—about specific topics on the agenda of formal diplomatic negotiations. Cultural diplomacy can be defined as “the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to 55  See, for example, Cull, Culbert and Welch (eds), Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, p. 426; Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 12; and Ellul, Propaganda, p. 11. 56  Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 4; and Stanley B. Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), pp. 63–64. 57  Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy,” p. 18. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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foster mutual understanding.”58 It refers to activities such as cultural performances, exhibitions, cultural and film festivals, language promotion and participation in World Expositions.59 Like citizen diplomacy, cultural diplomacy is an important tool when relations between countries or societies are strained, as it often helps in “overcoming conventional barriers that separate peoples”60 and keeps open negotiating channels with countries where political connections are in jeopardy. Indeed, cultural relations seem to have become more important in today’s world as an instrument to bridge gaps in understanding and to “recalibrate relationships for changing times with emerging powers.”61 As a recent report for the British Council notes, there is “a growing seriousness about, and expenditure on, cultural relations in BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and more widely across Asia and the Middle East.”62 Some people, however, argue explicitly against cultural diplomacy becoming a tool of public diplomacy, as they see the value of cultural activities lying with the independence and freedom of the artist.63 The danger of cultural diplomacy being mistrusted or regarded as propaganda indeed exists when 58  Milton C. Cummings Jr, Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey (Washington, DC: Center for Arts and Culture, 2003), p. 1, as cited in Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy—Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy (Washington, DC: US Department of State, September 2005), p. 4. A narrower definition is offered by scholar-practitioner Simon Mark, who defines cultural diplomacy as “the deployment of a state’s culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy;” Simon Mark, “A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy,” Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, No. 114 (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, April 2009). See also M. Davidson, “Cultural Relations: Building Networks to Face Twenty-first-Century Challenges,” in J. Welsh and D. Fearn (eds), Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalized World (London: FCO, 2008), pp. 76–89; Hongyi Lai, China’s Cultural Diplomacy: Going for Soft Power (Seoul: East Asia Institute, October 26 2006); Kazuo Ogoura, “The Cultural Diplomacy of East Asian Nations,” Asia: Changing The World (Güterslo, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008) pp. 138–148; and the winter 2010 issue of Public Diplomacy Magazine. 59  Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, “The Model of Cultural Diplomacy: Power, Distance and the Promise of Civil Society,” in Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (eds), Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy (Oxford, UK, and New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2010), pp. 13–29 at p. 21; and Simon Mark, “A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy.” 60  J.M. Mitchell, International Cultural Relations (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 2. 61  Kirsten Bound, Rachel Briggs, John Holden and Samuel Jones, Cultural Diplomacy (London: Demos, 2007), pp. 11–12. 62  Influence and Attraction: Culture and the Race for Soft Power in the 21st Century (London: British Council, 2013), pp. 3–4. 63  See, for example, Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones, Cultural Diplomacy, p. 12. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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governments see cultural diplomacy as a key institution of foreign policy and thus interfere in the creation of cultural expressions. In practice, many countries try to have the best of both worlds. They understand the need to maintain distance from cultural diplomacy activities, but still like to have some influence in the overall approach and policy plans. They thus sometimes delegate cultural diplomacy to so-called arms-length cultural institutions. Examples include the British Council (UK), Goethe Institut (Germany), Instituto Cervantes (Spain), Alliance Française (France) and the Japan Foundation (Japan). The Confucius Institutes (China) are a special case, as will be discussed in chapter 4. Some of these institutions are technically and practically more independent from government than others, but in practice all of them work in cooperation with their country’s government.64 In this way, the government’s role can be limited to supporting or promoting the exchange of independently created expressions of culture, and the danger of becoming associated with propaganda is limited. Another subset of public diplomacy is strategic communications, a term that is understood very differently by different groups and in different countries. Some define it broadly and regard public diplomacy as a subset of strategic communications,65 but in this study strategic communications is considered as a function or subset of public diplomacy.66 Strategic communication is understood as those strategies and activities within the domain of public diplomacy that primarily aim to achieve long-term, well-defined goals on selected themes. Public diplomacy goes beyond that, as it serves broader

64  Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, “The Model of Cultural Diplomacy,” p. 21. 65  Philip M. Taylor, for example, wrote about public diplomacy as one of four pillars of ‘strategic communications,’ with the other three being information operations, psychological operations and public affairs; see Philip M. Taylor, “Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy,” in Snow and Taylor (eds), Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, p. 14. For a similar view, see Cdr S.A. Tatham, Strategic Communication: A Primer (London: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, December 2008); Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, 2004), pp. 12–13, as cited in Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms,” presentation at the American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict, George Washington University and Georgetown University, Washington DC (August 31 2005); and White House, National Framework for Strategic Communications (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010), p. 2. 66  For example, Joseph Nye, Soft Power, pp. 107–117; John Robert Kelley, “Between ‘Takeoffs’ and ‘Crash Landings’: Situational Aspects of Public Diplomacy,” in Snow and Taylor (eds), Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, p. 74; and Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power, p. 10. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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and sometimes more diffuse aims, such as building long-term relationships that are focused on more diffuse mutual understanding. Finally, the concept of branding is understood as partially overlapping with public diplomacy. Put simply, nation-branding is the application of corporate branding techniques to countries. It is based on the idea that: [. . .] the reputations of countries are analogous to the brand images of companies and products, and are equally critical to the progress and prosperity of those countries because of their influence on the opinions and behaviours of each country’s ‘target audiences.’67 Public diplomacy and nation-branding thus share the idea that a country’s reputation or image matters. As political scientist Peter van Ham argues, they are conceptually comparable, “since they both combine foreign policy goals with internal soft power strategies and objectives” and share the challenge “to attract and satisfy these two, often radically different, objectives with one, coherent set of images and messages.”68 The two concepts meet and strengthen each other in public diplomacy strategies that aim to highlight a specific aspect, such as a country’s attractiveness as a tourist destination. They are different, however, in the sense that branding is about sending a static message, captured in a slogan or a one-dimensional image that is constructed to position one facet of the nation in the global market,69 whereas public diplomacy also includes listening, dialog, or building bridges and relationships.70

The Domestic Dimension and the Role of Diasporas

Already in 1992, Benno Signitzer and Timothy Coombs had pointed out that public diplomacy and public relations are “two sides of the same coin,”71 but 67  Simon Anholt, “The Importance of National Reputation,” in Welsh and Fearn (eds), Engagement, p. 31. 68  Peter van Ham, “Place Branding: The State of the Art,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, pp. 1–24, at p. 11. 69  See, for example, F. Gilmore, “A Country—Can it be Repositioned? Spain: The Success Story of Nation Branding,” The Journal of Brand Management, Vol. 9 (April 2002), pp. 281–293. 70  Gyorgi Szondi, “Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences,” Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, No. 112 (2008), pp. 26–27; and Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy,” pp. 19–21. 71  Benno H. Signitzer and Timothy Coombs, “Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual Convergences,” Public Relations Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1992), pp. 137–147. A Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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until recently most scholars and practitioners held the view that public diplomacy concerns reaching out to foreign, as opposed to domestic, publics and that activities that target a domestic audience belong to the domain of public affairs or public relations.72 This view, however, seems to be changing. A growing number of public diplomacy scholars argue that the domestic dimension of public diplomacy has developed into a new concept that goes beyond public affairs and that has to be understood within the context of broader changes in diplomacy: the blurring of the border between domestic and international politics; the transformation toward the more network-based public diplomacy model discussed above; and the democratization of foreign policymaking, which leads to a growing need for the participation of domestic stakeholders.73 As Ellen Huijgh points out, what we traditionally understand as public affairs ignores or minimizes the “domestic—international nexus,” and the concept of domestic outreach “surpasses public affairs in stressing the increasingly (inter) active role of domestic citizens in public diplomacy.”74 Domestic civil society has become a target as well as an actor in public diplomacy.75 Domestic outreach strengthens a country’s national identity, opens new channels of communication, and enhances its public diplomacy capacity. As Evan Potter puts it in his book about Canadian public diplomacy: “If the values and image of a society are viewed as a national soft-power asset [. . .], then it is the role of the foreign ministry to harness and develop the potential of its society.”76 Better-informed domestic audiences that feel listened to and more recent study by Seong-Hun Yun also confirms “an empirical convergence between public relations and public diplomacy, not only at the level of communication behavior but also at the level of communication management;” see Yun, Toward Theory Building for Comparative Public Diplomacy, p. 3. 72  Fitzpatrick, The Future of US Public Diplomacy, p. 95. 73  See, for example, Ellen Huijgh, “Changing Tunes for Public Diplomacy: Exploring the Domestic Dimension,” Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2011), pp. 62–74; Melissen, “Public Diplomacy,” in Kerr and Wiseman (eds), Diplomacy in a Globalizing World, p. 203; Jozef Bátora, “Public Diplomacy between Home and Abroad: Norway and Canada,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2006), pp. 53–80; Zaharna, Battles to Bridges; Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, “The US Public Diplomacy’s Neglected Domestic Mandate,” USC Center on Public Diplomacy Perspectives Paper, No. 3 (October 2010), pp. 1–51; and Evan H. Potter, Branding Canada: Projecting Canada’s Soft Power through Pubic Diplomacy (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008). 74  Huijgh, “Changing Tunes for Public Diplomacy,” p. 67. 75  Ellen Huijgh, “Public Diplomacy in Flux: Introducing the Domestic Dimension,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 7 (2012), pp. 359–367, at pp. 361–362. 76  Potter, Branding Canada, p. 54.

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engaged in foreign policymaking processes will be more likely to support and promote their country’s policies abroad. A state needs to be attractive to its own citizens, because they will then “gladly associate their actions abroad with their state and hence promote its soft power.”77 Furthermore, domestic outreach can help to bridge gaps between public diplomacy goals and domestic sentiments about a country or a foreign public.78 In a number of countries, including China, Canada and Indonesia, domestic outreach is already considered an important element of public diplomacy. In many other countries, foreign ministries have in practice moved toward engaging domestic publics more actively, but do not yet look at it as a domestic dimension of public diplomacy. The reason may be that, while closely interwoven, in practice there are some differences between public diplomacy targeting foreign publics and domestic outreach. Foreign and domestic audiences have different knowledge, interests and needs, which sometimes call for different messages or for a different framing of a message. A special category of non-state actors that illustrates the blurring of borders between domestic and foreign outreach are diasporas. Within this category, there are two types of diasporas that are relevant for a public diplomacy policymaker: a state’s citizens and their descendants abroad; and other states’ immigrants and their descendants within the country. They may play a significant role in building relationships between domestic and foreign publics,79 and their language skills, cultural knowledge, political insight and understanding of both their country of origin and their new home country may inform government communication efforts at home and abroad.80 A country’s emigrants may contribute to foreign audiences’ knowledge about and understanding of their country of origin, and immigrants are vice versa important opinionformers with regard to their new ‘home’ country. As they communicate with family and friends in their countries of origin, they have an impact on how host countries are perceived abroad.81 77  Bátora, “Public Diplomacy between Home and Abroad.” 78  Zaharna, Battles to Bridges, p. 179. 79  Steven Curtis and Caroline Jaine, “Public Diplomacy at Home in the UK: Engaging Diasporas and Preventing Terrorism,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2012), pp. 369–394, at p. 370; and Cull, “Public Diplomacy.” 80  Mark Leonard and Andrew Small with Martin Rose, British Public Diplomacy in the ‘Age of Schisms’ (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2005), p. 45; see also Deborah Lee Trent, “American Diaspora Diplomacy: US Foreign Policy and Lebanese Americans,” Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, No. 125 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael,’ November 2012), p. 8. 81  Peter van Ham, Social Power in International Politics (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 134.

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The Analytical Framework

This book aims to contribute to a better understanding of how countries develop and conduct public diplomacy. It studies the development and conduct of public diplomacy of China, a country that differs considerably in political system and culture from the mostly Western countries upon which the conceptualizations of public diplomacy are based. It examines how China’s public diplomacy, at both the conceptual and practical levels, should be understood in relation to the recent developments noted above in the conceptualization of public diplomacy. This section develops the framework used to study and analyze a country’s public diplomacy. The first part of this chapter has shown that scholars and practitioners disagree about what exactly public diplomacy entails, and that the understanding of the concept is constantly changing. Public diplomacy is defined in this study as an instrument used by states, associations of states, sub-state and non-state actors to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values abroad by informing and engaging publics, building and managing relationships, and developing an understanding of cultures, attitudes and behavior.82 In other words, the primary aim of an entity’s public diplomacy is to exert influence on how publics view the entity and its activities, with the objective of winning their sympathy and support. If the entity is a country, public diplomacy is developed to support that country’s policies, in particular its foreign policies. Public diplomacy is furthermore understood to have a domestic dimension, to encompass citizen diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and strategic communications, and to overlap partially with branding. The framework is built around three major dimensions that constitute a country’s public diplomacy. The first is the organizational or policymaking dimension, which concerns a country’s public diplomacy policymaking procedures and the roles played by state and non-state actors in these procedures. The second dimension concerns the content of public diplomacy strategies: the choices for themes, narratives and messages of public diplomacy campaigns and activities. The third dimension pertains to the use of public diplomacy instruments. The organizational dimension is the most decisive, as the

82  This definition is adapted from Bruce Gregory’s definition of public diplomacy as “an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes and behaviour; to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values,” in “American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 6, Nos 3/4 (2011), pp. 351–372. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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actors determine the content of public diplomacy activities and decide on the use of instruments. Dimension I: Actors and Decision-making In most countries, both state and non-state actors are involved in public diplomacy, if not in developing, then at least in conducting public diplomacy. At the central level, public diplomacy actors may include state leaders, ministers and officials at ministries and diplomatic misions; military representatives; members of the royal family; and trade promotion and tourism offices. The biggest role at this level in most countries is played by the ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) and its diplomatic missions abroad. At the local level, state actors include representatives of local governments, provinces and cities, and harbor authorities. As a result of the decentralization and democratization of foreign policy, these sub-state actors have seized the opportunity to increase their international exposure and to develop and improve their international relations and image with their own public diplomacy strategies and activities.83 Non-state actors can be divided into five groups: (1) the academic world: representatives of universities and schools, research institutes, think tanks and student organizations; (2) NGOs and lobby groups: national and international advocacy groups; (3) business: representatives of business organizations, big companies and chambers of commerce; (4) cultural organizations: representatives of museums, galleries, theaters, cultural institutes, performing groups, festivals and individual artists; and (5) citizens: citizen representatives of exchange organizations and friendship associations, diasporas, and individual citizens. The roles that state and non-state actors play depend on how the development and conduct of public diplomacy is organized. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, there is a traditional and a ‘new’ understanding of the roles that various actors play in public diplomacy. In the traditional, hierarchically organized state-centered model of public diplomacy (Figure 1), state actors dominate both the development and conduct of public diplomacy; non-state actors are involved, but largely act upon instructions from the state and are closely controlled by the state. There can be dialog among state actors on public diplomacy policies, but not between state and non-state actors; the latter are basically told what to do and how to do it. In the network model (Figure 2), civil society actors are fully engaged. It is the network of state and non-state actors as a whole that develops and 83  See, for example, Ellen Huijgh, “The Future of Sub-State Public Diplomacy,” Public Diplomacy Magazine, special issue on Innovations in Public Diplomacy, No. 8 (summer 2012), pp. 23–30. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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State actor

Non-state actor figure 1

State-centered Model of Public Diplomacy source: author’s compilation.

State actor

Non-state actor figure 2

Network Model of Public Diplomacy source: author’s compilation.

conducts public diplomacy. State and non-state actors are equal partners and they jointly or independently develop and spread messages to the public. As a wide variety of actors with varying perspectives are involved in creating public diplomacy messages, these messages are considered more legitimate and credible than those developed by state actors. They will therefore more easily appeal to a broad audience. The state actors’ role is focused on joining, creating, or strengthening national and international networks, and facilitating dialog within the network.84 84  Brian Hocking, “Reconfiguring Public Diplomacy: From Competition to Collaboration,” in Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalized World (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2008), pp. 62–75.

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As pointed out above, the network model is frequently described in the literature as an ideal model of public diplomacy, but does not exist in practice. Most countries’ public diplomacy can be considered a combination of statecentered and network-based public diplomacy. In this hybrid model, state actors are usually the initiator and/or supporter and/or coordinator of public diplomacy actions, but they increasingly develop and conduct public diplomacy in close cooperation with members of networks that include both state and non-state actors. Dimension II: Public Diplomacy Content The second dimension of analysis concerns the content of a country’s public diplomacy: strategies, narratives and messages. Attention is focused here on the choices that a government makes with regard to the image that it wants to project. Most governments develop specific strategies and narratives that are fine-tuned to specific audiences in specific countries or regions in the world. They generally assert their (perceived) sources of soft power in areas where they believe that they have a comparative advantage over the country or audience targeted. The content of public diplomacy is developed in three domains: the domestic and foreign policy domain, serving political and security goals; the economic domain, serving economic goals via trade promotion and tourism; and the cultural domain, serving cultural goals including mutual understanding and appreciation of a country’s culture via cultural diplomacy and peopleto-people diplomacy.85 The economic domain—with activities such as trade promotion—overlaps with economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy can be defined as “the use of political means as leverage in international negotiations with the aim of enhancing national economic prosperity, and the use of economic leverage to increase the political stability of a nation.”86 Public diplomacy and economic diplomacy may reinforce each other and may both serve the end goals of economic prosperity and political stability. However, they differ where primary goals and use of instruments are concerned. Economic diplomacy primarily serves economic and business goals, and its range of instruments includes inducement and coercion. It is also more strategic in character than public diplomacy, which advances broader interests than just economic concerns by more diffuse processes of informing, attracting and persuading foreign audiences. 85  Leonard, Public Diplomacy, p. 10. 86  Maaike Okano-Heijmans, Economic Diplomacy: Japan and the Balance of National Interests (Leiden and Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), pp. 29–30.

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Dimension III: Public Diplomacy Instruments In their execution of public diplomacy, countries make use of five categories of instruments:87 (1) the media, which consists of traditional media—newspapers, journals, television and radio—and social or new media such as the internet (websites, Twitter, YouTube and Facebook) and mobile phone technologies; (2) events: small-scale and large-scale cultural and sporting events, including the Olympic Games and World Expositions; (3) strategic communication projects, using a combination of tools including media, publications, seminars and branding activities; (4) people and institutions: exchanges (student exchanges and visitor programs), network meetings (academic networks and epistemic communities), twinning relations and city- or provincial-level exchanges, as well as cultural exchanges and tourism; and (5) publications/ promotional materials, such as books, brochures and video clips. These activities can be analyzed by types of communication, as proposed by Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault, who identify three layers of public diplomacy. The first layer concerns monolog: one-way communication via mass media and publications. This layer dominates in what Zaharna calls the information approach to public diplomacy (see the beginning of this chapter). The second layer, dialog, entails two-way communication and the exchange of information and ideas. The third layer, collaboration, consists of initiatives in which people work together on a joint project.88 The latter two layers are dominant in the relational approach to public diplomacy. In most countries’ public diplomacy, these three layers are equally important. Each layer has particular advantages in serving a particular goal. Which layer of instruments should best be used to achieve a particular goal depends on the needs of the moment, the actors involved, and the audiences that need to be reached. In times of crisis, for example, a state leader’s speech can make all the difference; for improving mutual understanding, however, dialog is the most suitable instrument; and the best way to overcome distrust and increase mutual respect is to collaborate on a project that serves a common goal. In general, monolog plays a relatively large role in political communication and advocacy, and a more limited role in cultural communication. Dialog and collaboration are ideally the most important layers in the domains of cultural communication and relationship-building.

87  See Ingrid d’Hooghe, “Public Diplomacy in the People’s Republic of China,” in Jan Melissen (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy, pp. 96–98. 88  Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault, “Moving from Monolog to Dialog to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, pp. 10–30. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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Not fitting into the five categories of instruments mentioned above, but essential to the conduct of public diplomacy, is ‘listening.’ Nicholas Cull identifies ‘listening’ as the number one element of public diplomacy, preceding all other elements.89 ‘Listening’ here refers to more than the ritual of patiently waiting until the other has finished talking. It is “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by collecting and collating data about publics and their opinions overseas, and using that data to redirect its policy or its wider public diplomacy approach accordingly.”90 ‘Listening’ is a prerequisite for developing a better understanding of the target audience, but also for conducting a genuine dialog. It furthermore signals interest and respect for the other side, thereby facilitating the building of relationships and collaboration.91

The Impact of a Country’s Political System

The three dimensions of public diplomacy and a country’s analysis of the receptivity of its public diplomacy on the receiver’s side, however, do not sufficiently explain the character of a country’s public diplomacy strategies and conduct. Many other factors influence public diplomacy decision-making, the content of messages and policies, and the way in which public diplomacy instruments are used. Given that the country studied here is China, two of these factors take center stage in this study: a country’s political system; and its culture. Other factors, however, such as a country’s domestic political, economic, and social developments, its perceived sources of soft power, and the global situation and other countries’ policies, will also be addressed throughout this book. It is assumed that the nature of a country’s political system influences how a country develops and conducts public diplomacy. A country’s political system is understood as the set of rules under which a country’s political institutions operate, and which determine how decisions are made.92 Each country has its own unique political system, but for the purpose of this study, this book will 89  Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and History,” in Geoffrey Cowan and Nicholas J. Cull (eds), Public Diplomacy in a Changing World: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616 (March 2008); and Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past,” CDP Perspectives of Public Diplomacy (Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, 2009), p. 31. 90  Cull, “Public Diplomacy,” p. 32. 91  See, for example, Ali Fisher and Aurélie Bröckerhoff, Options for Influence: Global Campaigns of Persuasion in the New Worlds of Public Diplomacy (London: FCO/ Counterpoint, 2008). 92  Lowell Barrington, Comparative Politics: Structures and Choices (Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, 2012), p. 10; and James N. Danziger, Understanding the Political World: A Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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look at two archetypes of political systems: democratic; and authoritarian systems. In a democratic system, people are governed by leaders who have limited political authority, and who are selected through free and fair elections among genuine alternatives. People’s human and political rights are respected, including freedoms of association and expression, and there is a free, independent, and pluralistic media. An active civil society exists, the judiciary is independent, and there is respect for the rule of law, accountability, and transparency.93 In an authoritarian system, however, people are governed by an individual, a small group of people, or by a single political party whose authority is not based on selection through free elections and who controls government and other key parts of society, including the economy, media, and education. There is only limited accountability and transparency, and the rule of law is not fully respected. Political participation is limited and society is partially controlled by the leaders. People may form voluntary associations or groups, and may express themselves on a wide range of topics, but as soon as a group poses a threat to the leader or the system, it is co-opted or eliminated. Authoritarian leaders allow some media plurality, but they censor reports on sensitive issues.94 Within Dimension I above, the nature of the political system influences the roles played by state and non-state actors in the development and conduct of public diplomacy. It is assumed that a country with an authoritarian system, in which the government largely controls the state and society, fits Hocking’s state-centered model of public diplomacy, in which state actors dominate the development and conduct of public diplomacy. An authoritarian state does not meet the conditions for the development of a network model of public diplomacy. As it seeks to control society, it cannot allow for an approach in which non-state actors independently engage foreign publics, and build and manage relationships between countries’ civil societies. The state-centered approach leads to problems with credibility, as official messengers are never fully trusted, even less when they come from a country with an authoritarian leadership that is not considered legitimate by the public. When a country’s leadership is engaged in policy directions that create international ill-feeling, it is particularly important that the country’s population is given an interna-

Comparative Introduction to Political Science (New York: Longman, 4th edition 1998), p. 159. 93  Barrington, Comparative Politics, p. 130; and UNESCO, “Universal Declaration on Democracy” (adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Council, 161st session, Cairo, September 1997). 94  Barrington, Comparative Politics, pp. 135–136.

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tional voice and permission to broadcast a different point of view.95 In authoritarian countries, however, the population’s independent views are seldom heard because of limited freedom of speech. The political system is also expected to influence the content of public diplomacy. First, public diplomacy seeks to advance attractive values and generate power by transforming a country’s soft power resources into attraction. Democratic systems create the open environment in which attractive values are developed and cultural expression flourishes. The checks and balances in democratic systems furthermore ensure that policies are considered to be legitimate. For many publics, a country with an authoritarian system lacks sources of soft power such as inspiring values and an attractive political model. On the contrary, it has soft power liabilities resulting from its lack of political and civil rights. Second, public diplomacy messages are expected to be supported by, or to emanate from, society. With society’s limited political participation in countries with an authoritarian system, however, this public support may be lacking in the government’s messages. The lack of transparency and freedom of information in authoritarian countries furthermore raises public doubts about the nature of a message, the reliability of information, and the intention of the messenger. As a result, audiences may regard authoritarian countries’ outreach as propaganda rather than public diplomacy. Within Dimension III, the impact of a country’s political system is most evident with regard to the media. In a democratic system, the media disseminate a wide variety of information and views to the recipients of their products, thus encouraging open and unrestricted debates. In an authoritarian system, the lack of freedom of press and information, and the lack of freedom of expression, stifle public debates and undermine the media’s credibility. The high level of uniformity of official media messages, the use of untransparent sources of information, and the bans on popular international social media applications that are often seen in authoritarian countries further contribute to the audience’s suspicion vis-à-vis these countries’ public diplomacy messages. The limited freedom of expression also impacts on the instruments of cultural and educational events and exchanges. Artists or scholars who are critical of the government in an authoritarian political system may be excluded from participation in events and exchanges; art works may be banned; topics for discussion may be prohibited; and the scope of an exchange may be limited.

95  See, for example, Simon Anholt, “Protecting National Image against Unpopular Foreign Policy,” Simon Anholt’s blog (11 November 2007), online at http://www.simonanholt .blogspot.com.

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These issues will be further explored in chapter 2, where the features of China’s political system are discussed. Looking at the three layers of public diplomacy, official messengers in an authoritarian system, who are not used to open and free debates with society, will be more comfortable holding a monolog than having a dialog with foreign publics. Seeking to control society, they will furthermore be apprehensive of encouraging collaborative projects with foreign organizations or societal groups.

The Impact of Culture on Public Diplomacy

Culture is fundamental to how people think, behave and communicate, and as public diplomacy is about communication, it is a factor that impacts on a country’s public diplomacy. Culture influences the content (messages, narratives, and strategies) as well as the conduct (selection of instruments and style of communicating) of public diplomacy. ‘Culture’ here refers to a country’s cultural identity, which is a social construct that consists of intangible factors such as a nation’s ideas, values, opinions, tastes, customs, symbols, language, religion, art, history, myths, ethnicity, and everything else that distinguishes one country from another.96 From a theoretical perspective, the concepts of culture, identity, and values are problematic. They are not real, but they are defined to be real. They are social constructs, created and developed by individuals or groups. They are intangible and “not directly accessible to observation;” they are only “inferable from verbal statements and other behaviors.”97 Cultural identity may overlap with, but is not necessarily the same as, national identity. Diasporas, for example, may associate themselves with the cultural identity but not necessarily with the national identity of their countries of origin. National identity concerns a person’s sense of belonging to a nation. It is based on a nation’s territory, common myths, and historical 96  Identity is understood as the process of constructing meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute—or a related set of cultural attributes—that is given priority over other sources of meaning. See Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity: The Information Age—Economy, Society, and Culture (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2nd edition 2010) p. 6. 97  Teresa Levitin, “Values,” in J.P. Robinson and P.R. Shaver (eds), Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes (Ann Arbor, MI: Survey Research Center ISR, 1973), pp. 489–502 at p. 492, as cited in Geert Hofstede, “Attitudes, Values and Organizational Culture: Disentangling the Concepts,” Organization Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1998), pp. 477–492, at p. 478.

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memories, a common mass culture, common rights and duties, and a common economy with territorial mobility for members.98 A national identity may be forged or influenced by the nation-state, for example by emphasizing a distinction with ‘the foreign’ or creating common enemies.99 In spite of the importance of the cultural factor in the conduct of public diplomacy, public diplomacy scholarship has largely neglected this area. An exception is R.S. Zaharna, who in various publications has drawn attention to the role of culture in public diplomacy and to the culture-bound nature of scholarship on public diplomacy.100 In her paper “The Cultural Awakening in Public Diplomacy,” Zaharna points out that “when public diplomacy initiatives fail and even backfire, the reason may be the hidden side of culture, or the cultural underbelly of public diplomacy.”101 This failure may be the result of misunderstanding about communication patterns and styles, or of issues that are “tied to cultural identity.”102 Indeed, the case studies in this thesis will show that Chinese public diplomacy actions regularly fail because of a cultural disconnection. Awareness of cultural differences, however, is not only important for communication between countries with widely different cultures, but also for communication between countries with largely similar cultures, as in the latter case the two sides may be less aware of the differences. The impact of culture is analyzed in this study by examining how various cultural aspects—discussed further below—play out in the three types of public diplomacy activity. Cultural aspects that impact upon a country’s public diplomacy include patterns and styles of communication, the understanding of ‘relations’ between individuals and between individuals and society, and cultural identity, including political culture, values, and language. With regard

98  Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991), as cited in Montserrat Guibernau, “Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment,” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 10, Nos. 1/2 (2004), pp. 125–141. 99  Guibernau, “Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity,” p. 140. 100  R.S. Zaharna, “The Cultural Awakening In Public Diplomacy,” CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press, 2012); R.S. Zaharna, “Relational Spheres and the Primacy of Domestic and Diaspora Publics in Global Public Diplomacy,” paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Montreal, Canada, March 15–19 2011, pp. 17–18; Zaharna, Battles to Bridges; and R.S. Zaharna, “Asymmetry of Cultural Styles and the Unintended Consequences of Crisis Public Diplomacy,” in Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy (Malta: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomacy, 2004). 101  Zaharna, “The Cultural Awakening in Public Diplomacy,” p. 9. 102  Zaharna, “The Cultural Awakening In Public Diplomacy,” p. 21.

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to understanding differences in communication styles and views on ‘relations,’ this study uses the approach developed by anthropologist Edward T. Hall in his book Beyond Culture.103 Hall discerned two types of culture by looking at communication styles: high-context; and low-context cultures. These two types form the two ends of a continuum in which cultures can be situated in relation to one another based upon the way that they communicate, and in particular the extent to which people derive meaning from the context rather than from the words that are communicated. In high-context communications, aspects such as the speaker’s tone of voice, body language, use of silence, and his family history and status, matter more than words; people often use non-verbal and implicit ways of communicating. A high-context message “is one in which most of the information is either in the physical context or internalized in the person, while very little is in the coded, explicit, or transmitted part of the message.”104 According to Hall, high-context cultures are generally collectivist and prefer group harmony and consensus to individual achievement. Interpersonal relationships are considered to be important. African and Asian countries, including China, are at the high-context end of the scale.105 Low-context cultures are characterized by a verbal, explicit, and direct style of communication in which people emphasize logic and rationality. Most information is expected to be transmitted and clearly explained in the message. The United States and most North European countries are positioned near the low-context end of the scale.106 Cultural differences play out differently in each type of public diplomacy activity. Patterns and styles of communication may easily lead to cross-cultural misunderstandings, in particular in the public diplomacy layer of monolog. In this layer, where mass communication is an important instrument, messages are usually developed by a small group of government actors who may not have sufficient insight into the cultural sensitivities of target groups.107 Language differences increase the risk of misunderstanding, in particular when terms and concepts are used that are understood differently in different cultures or that are absent in other cultures. Cultural misunderstanding also arises in the layers of dialog and collaboration, for example when someone from a lowcontext culture interprets the lack of explicit disagreement on the side of a dia103  Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture (Garden City, NJ: Anchor/Doubleday, 1976). 104  Hall, Beyond Culture, p. 91. 105  Hall, Beyond Culture, pp. 79 and 91. 106  Hall, Beyond Culture, p. 91. 107  See also Zaharna, “The Soft Power Differential,” p. 218.

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log partner from a high-context culture as an agreement, or when a direct communication style is perceived as offensive by a network member coming from a high-context culture. There are, however, in the latter two layers, more possibilities to elaborate on issues or explain an idea, and thus to overcome a cultural hurdle. In dialogs, messages can be co-created across borders, enhancing the chance that they will resonate with audiences on both sides. In collaboration processes, cultural differences may at first confront actors and complicate the cooperation, but they are also regarded as an asset. In cultural cooperation projects in particular, cultural differences are regarded as enriching. Conclusion Bringing all elements of analysis together, the framework consists of the three dimensions that constitute a country’s public diplomacy; two factors that impact upon these three dimensions (the political system and culture); the elements of foreign policy and soft power resources, which inform public diplomacy policies and messages; and the receiving side of public diplomacy. A country needs to develop and adapt its strategies in reaction to how its messages and activities are welcomed or rejected by the public that it targets, and how effective they are. Policymakers need to know how targeted audiences perceive a country or a specific policy, and whether they recognize the

Actors and decision-making Political System

Instruments

Culture

Foreign policy

Soft P. sources

Content/ messages

Public Diplomacy

Receiver figure 3

Analytical Framework: Elements of Analysis source: author’s compilation.

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sending country’s norms and ideas.108 Most policymakers evaluate their public diplomacy strategies and activities, and will try to improve them according to an evaluation’s findings. Countries may decide to abandon or include specific themes, change a message that does not resonate with the targeted audience, or employ another instrument. This framework, which is visualized in Figure 3, will be applied in subsequent chapters to the case of China’s public diplomacy, with the aim of gaining more insight into China’s approach to developing and conducting public diplomacy, and therewith into the concept and practice of public diplomacy.

108  Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2011), pp. 99–100 and chapter 7; and Yong Wook Lee, “Soft Power as Productive Power,” in Sook Jong Lee and Jan Melissen (eds), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia, pp. 33–50.

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Assets and Liabilities for China’s Public Diplomacy This chapter portrays the political and cultural context in which China’s public diplomacy is developed. It discusses China’s culture, its authoritarian political system, including the limited media freedom and lack of political and civil rights, its economic rise, and its diplomacy. Moreover, the chapter highlights those developments, policies, and values that benefit or hinder China’s public diplomacy strategies toward different publics. In chapter one we saw that whether or not a source constitutes soft power depends on the context and the audience’s perceptions, which may change over time under the influence of international developments that China cannot control, such as an international economic crisis, political turmoil elsewhere, and natural disasters, examples of which we will see in chapters six and seven. This means that the Chinese policies and values discussed in this chapter can be an asset for public diplomacy in one country and a liability in another, or can be admired one year and denounced the following year.

The Importance of Culture

“Culture matters,” writes prominent Chinese political scientist Qin Yaqing. It “plays an important role in human life, in the way of thinking, and therefore in policymaking.” It leads states to “make different decisions and take divergent actions when pursuing similar interests and working for comparable goals.”1 Qin identifies four cultural elements that reflect Chinese mentality and influence Chinese behavior: contextuality; correlativity; complementarity; and changeability.2 By contextuality, Qin means that Chinese people are contextoriented and prefer to take a holistic approach to solve a problem. He argues that Chinese people will analyze the context or mega-trend (shi) in their environment, and prefer to take action in accordance with the trend, not against it. Good judgment regarding the mega-trends in the world and in international relations is important for the development of wise policies. With regard to

1   Qin Yaqing, “Chinese Culture and its Implications for Foreign Policymaking,” China International Studies (April 2012).  2  Qin Yaqing, “Chinese Culture and its Implications for Foreign Policymaking.”

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004283954_004 Ingrid

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China’s diplomatic strategy, this means that China tends to look at the ‘big picture’ and takes a long-term view.3 Correlativity concerns the view that everything in the universe is related to everything else. It explains the Chinese focus on relations and processes rather than the rational balancing of different issues and elements that usually takes place in Western cultures. It includes the concepts of ‘face’ and social relations (guanxi) among people. ‘Face’ is important here as it is an essential aspect of cultivating relations. Concerns about ‘face’ are not unique to China or Asia; they are universal. In every culture, people want to claim and project ‘face’—that is, a public self-image—for themselves, and give ‘face’ to others during interactions.4 Many studies have found, however, that in China the concept permeates social life to a larger degree than in Western countries.5 Furthermore, there is a different understanding of ‘face.’ As Hu Hsien-chin points out in his classic “The Chinese Concepts of ‘Face,’ ” the understanding of ‘face’ in China comprises two related but different concepts, lian and mianzi, which are both translated in English by ‘face.’6 ‘Face’ in this thesis will refer to mianzi, which concerns ‘prestige’: it is “a reputation achieved through getting on in life, through success and ostentation” and that needs to be recognized by an external environment. Lian refers to “the respect of the group for a man with a good moral reputation.”7 ‘Face’ is thus about being socially acknowledged, and in a good relationship it is not only essential to avoid the other from losing ‘face’ but also actively to give ‘face’ to the other.8 The cultural element of complementarity points toward the Chinese dialectics in which the two poles are not in conflict but complement each other, together forming a harmonious and holistic whole, as reflected in the Chinese yin and yang symbol. Changeability refers to the belief that everything 3  See also Zhu Liqun, “China’s Foreign Policy Debates,” Chaillot Papers (September 2010), p. 20. 4  Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson, Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978, 2004 edition), pp. 61–62. 5  Hui-Ching Chang and G. Richard Holt, “A Chinese Perspective on Face as Inter-Relational Concern,” in Stella Ting-Toomey (ed.), The Challenge of Facework: Cross-Cultural and Interpersonal Issues (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 95–132, at pp. 97–98. 6  Hu Hsien-chin, “The Chinese Concepts of ‘Face,’ ” American Anthropologist, No. 46 (1944), pp. 45–64, at p. 45. 7  Hu Hsien-chin, “The Chinese Concepts of ‘Face,’ ” pp. 61–62. As Hu explains, everyone, poor or rich, has a claim to lian, but mianzi is a “reward for success in life;” it depends on the status that is acquired. You can lose mianzi but still have lian; the other way around is very difficult. 8  Hui-Ching Chang and Holt, “A Chinese Perspective on Face as Inter-Relational Concern,” p. 110.

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constantly changes and that two opposites may become each other or may co-evolve. According to Qin, instead of believing that something is either true or false, the Chinese think that there is truth in falsehood and falsehood in truth, and that the true can become false and vice versa.9 This latter element, together with the centrality of relations in China’s thinking, leads to a Chinese emphasis on the fluidity of China’s identity. As IR scholar Zhu Liqun explains, China denies that it has a single fixed identity; it is constantly changing as a result of the process of international interaction.10 These elements have an impact on foreign policymaking and thus also impact upon public diplomacy policymaking, as we will see in the case studies in subsequent chapters. Cultural differences are furthermore strengthened by the fact that the Chinese language, both in vocabulary and ways of expression, is dissimilar to other languages. Language expresses a country’s culture and history, and many words and concepts cannot simply be translated into another language.11 The Chinese language is ambiguous; words often have several meanings, depending on the situational or political context. The actual meaning of a diplomatic statement can be “the precise opposite of what is literally said.”12 When Chinese diplomats, for example, refer to China’s ‘friendship’ with Japan, it masks feelings of animosity13 rather than expressing warm feelings toward the Japanese. Many terms are so closely tied to the specific Chinese historical or political context that they are difficult to translate into another language. An example is the concept of tianxia, literally ‘all under heaven,’ which not only encompasses the geographical meaning of ‘the world’ but also ‘all the people’ and the ‘world institution,’ together referring to the traditional Chinese vision of the world order.14 Another example is the old concept of wenming, which is usually translated as ‘civilized’ but should also be understood as a term that is used by the government to encourage people to follow “a pattern of stipulations that leads to a perfect and ideal civic life.”15 Wenming was used most recently by the 9   Qin Yaqing, “Chinese Culture and its Implications for Foreign Policymaking.” 10  Zhu Liqun, “China’s Foreign Policy Debates,” p. 19. 11  Roman Wilhelm and Katja Hellkötter, “Do We Always Mean the Same When We Say the Same? A Glossary,” EUNIC, EU–China Cultural Compass (2011). 12  Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), p. 9. 13  Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 10. 14  See William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?,” International Studies Review, No. 10 (2008), pp. 749–761, at p. 751; and Xie Fang, “Rethinking Tianxia,” China Heritage Quarterly, No. 26 (June 2011). 15  See, for example, Susan Brownell, Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People’s Republic (Chicago, IL; University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 156; Gina Anne

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government to encourage Chinese tourists to behave more politely on overseas trips.16 Conversely, it is also difficult to translate foreign terms and concepts into Chinese. A good example is the difficulty that Chinese officials had in understanding what US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick meant precisely when he called upon China in 2005 to become a ‘responsible stakeholder.’17 The Chinese furthermore often use official slogans (kouhao) and idioms in their communications. As China scholar David Shambaugh points out, these slogans are used in communist-style political systems to “force uniformity of thought and language.” Whenever one encounters an official slogan, the appropriate response is to repeat it “so as to reflect acceptance of it.”18 These types of messages, however, do not resonate with foreign audiences. Another complicating factor is that Chinese and foreign officials and scholars often speak a ‘different language’ even when they communicate in English. They may agree on international political goals such as multipolarity, multilateralism and democratization, but their understanding of what exactly these concepts mean, all of which originated in the West, differs considerably. The concept of multilateralism, for example, is understood by the Chinese in a realist, state-centric way, whereas for people in Western countries, multilateralism involves the sharing of sovereignty.19 The Chinese discourse on democratization focuses on responsibility, responsiveness and government accountability,20 while the West regards it as a broad system that involves free media, an independent judiciary, rule of law, and full respect for civil rights. These gaps in thinking cannot simply be explained away by providing publics with more information; long-term dialog is needed to improve mutual Russo, “Better City, Better Life: Part II,” The China Beat blog (May 22 2009); and Thomas Boutonnet, “From Local Control to Globalized Citizenship: The Civilizing Concept of Wenming in Official Chinese Rhetoric,” in Corrado Neri and Florent Villard (eds), Global Fences: Literatures Limits Borders (Lyons, France: IETT, 2011), pp. 79–103. 16  See the paragraph below on Chinese tourists. 17  This was pointed out to me during a meeting with a Chinese diplomat in Washington DC in 2005 and is also illustrated by the many articles written on the topic by Chinese think tanks. See also Robert Zoellick, “Remarks to National Committee on US–China Relations,” New York City (September 21 2005). 18  David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). 19  See, for example, Christopher R. Hughes, “Nationalism and Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: Implications for Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2005), pp. 119–135. 20  See, for example, Wang Shaoguang, Minzhu si jiang [Four Lectures on Democracy] (Beijing: Sanlian Chubanshe/SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2008).

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understanding. Chinese scholars and diplomats with international experience play an important role in these efforts, and the expanding cultural exchange programs supported by governmental and civic organizations also serve this goal.

China’s Authoritarian System

China is an authoritarian state with a single political party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which controls government and other key parts of society, including the economy, media, and education. The CCP, as Chinese politics’ specialist William Joseph aptly puts it, “claims to govern in the interests of all the ‘people,’ and therefore holds a monopoly on political power that precludes any meaningful opposition.”21 The CCP, however, is not monolithic. China’s bureaucratic structure of authority is what Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg coined ‘fragmented.’22 Different actors at different levels affect policymaking in China, and the behavior of officials at each sector and level is shaped by different pressures and influences. The military’s interests differ from those of the big state-owned companies, and there are diverging ideas about China’s political and economic priorities and reforms among China’s political leaders. The CCP’s fragmented structure and pluralism lead to a system of negotiations, bargaining and consensus-building among actors. Despite this degree of pluralism in China’s social organization, citizens are not allowed to create political opposition groups or parties. The CCP still exercises a considerable degree of control over society, the economy, culture and the media, which it justifies in the name of maintaining stability and unity. This results in a lack of media freedom and a lack of political and civil rights in China, issues that can be considered big liabilities for China’s public diplomacy in democratic countries, a topic that will be discussed in more detail below. This book and its case studies will thus highlight various examples of this fragmented structure and (limited) pluralism and the way that they impact upon public diplomacy. China’s political system is in continuous transition, which manifests itself in an ongoing institutionalization of Chinese leadership politics, measures to improve the legal system, social reforms, growing civil consciousness and 21  William A. Joseph, “Studying Chinese Politics,” in William A. Joseph, Politics in China: An Introduction (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 3–36, at p. 13. 22  Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policymaking in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 22.

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influence, and delegation by central powers to lower levels and to society. Furthermore, there has been a horizontal proliferation of national-level actors in policymaking. State control is decreasing, and while domestic and international political interaction grows, the Chinese government can no longer take domestic support of its internal and foreign policies for granted.23 It has to take domestic public opinion and in particular rising nationalism in China into account when it makes its domestic and foreign policies.24 China’s rising nationalism, which regularly leads to anti-Western demonstrations and boycotts, is a serious liability for China’s public diplomacy, as we will see in chapter six. These nationalist activities are often described in the Western media as being organized by the Chinese government. As political scientist and China scholar Peter Hays Gries points out, however, nationalism in China is not just fomented by the government to be used as a tool to maintain political legitimacy.25 It is as much a bottom—up phenomenon, which has been fed by feelings of pride about China’s recent achievements and anger about perceived injustices done to China throughout the ‘Century of Humiliation,’ and also more recently by denying China the recognition that it deserves in the eyes of the nationalists.26 Nationalistic and anti-Western books are bestsellers in China and are widely debated.27 Chinese scholars argue that much of China’s nationalism can be characterized as calm and patient, and that extreme anti-Western and confrontational nationalism draws much attention but is just one of the many views on China’s way forward.28

23  See, for example, Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does ‘Public Opinion’ Matter?,” in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign Policy and Security in the Era of Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 151–187. 24  See, for example, Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011. 25  Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 136. 26  Gries, China’s New Nationalism, pp. 45–46 and chapter 8. 27  Examples include Song Xiaojun et al., Zhongguo bu gaoxing: Da shidai, da mubiao ji womende neiyou waihuan [China is Unhappy: The Great Time, Grand Vision and Our Challenges] (Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Press, 2009); Li Xiguang and Liu Kang, Yaomohua zhongguo de beihou [The Plot to Demonize China] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1996); and Song Qiang, Zhongguo keyi shuo bu [China Can Say No] (Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe, 1996). 28  Zhu Liqun, “China’s Foreign Policy Debates,” Chaillot Papers, No. 121 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, September 2010), p. 54.

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Media and Social Media Censorship

In the view of the Chinese government, the media is an important instrument in shaping public opinion. It therefore seeks to use the media to shape favorable views of China and its policies at home and abroad. It demands that the domestic media always support the Chinese government and that they adhere to official government guidelines. The media must be ‘guided’ in reporting ‘factual news stories’ that benefit the Party, the nation and the people.29 The media have to unite the ‘spirit’ of the Party with public opinion and should stay close to reality, close to the masses, and close to real life.30 The domestic media are furthermore governed by the principles that they should make a distinction between news for domestic and foreign audiences (neiwai youbie), and that the control over domestic news should be stricter than control over foreign news (neijin waisong).31 In practice, this means that articles published outside China or in the English-language press aimed at foreign readership inside China, such as The China Daily or the English version of The Global Times, are often more open and liberal in tone and content than those in Chinese aimed at the domestic readership. The above principles and guidelines illustrate the Chinese media’s lack of freedom. Although the possibilities for journalists and editors to bring their own news and messages have increased over the years, most of the content of Chinese programs, newspapers and magazines is still dictated by official policy lines. On the 2012 Press Freedom Index of the independent US organization Freedom House, China ranks 187 out of 197 countries, with 85 points on a scale that runs from 0 (the most free) to 100 (the least free).32 China has an extensive and sophisticated censorship system, which is developed and supervised

29  Speech by Hu Jintao during a work inspection visit to the People’s Daily, June 2008; translated by David Bandurski, website of China Media Project, available online at http://cmp .hku.hk/2008/06/25/1079/. 30   Speech by then politburo standing committee member in charge of ideology, Li Changchun, at a meeting of the governing council of the All-China Journalists Association on October 28 2011, partially translated by David Bandurski in “Media Czar: Be Docile, But Profitable,” website of the China Media Project (October 31 2011). 31  Anne-Marie Brady, “ ‘Treat Insiders and Outsiders Differently’: The Use and Control of Foreigners in the PRC,” The China Quarterly, No. 164 (2000), pp. 943–964; and interview with a Chinese journalist. 32  Freedom of the Press 2012, website of Freedom House, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2012.

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by the CCP’s Publicity Department (CPD). The CPD prohibits and pre-empts the publication of information that it considers harmful to China’s stability, provides detailed instructions on how to handle specific news topics, and imposes the publication of positively toned established narratives that support official policy lines.33 That is why different national and local newspapers in China publish largely identical articles about major political developments. At the same time, however, the government calls upon the media to “ ‘supervise’ official institutions as a way of curbing widespread and serious problems such as corruption.”34 This has provided reporters with the opportunity to engage in investigative journalism and reveal corruption scandals. Corruption cases that touch upon high-level or well-connected leaders, however, are generally off-limits. Furthermore, since the commercialization of the Chinese media in the 1990s, reporters need to cater to the interests of their publics, who are no longer satisfied with the boring official stories. In spite of the censorship system, Chinese publications therefore increasingly offer a variety of perspectives and opinions. A number of Chinese publications, such as the Southern Weekend and Caijing, even explicitly aim to provide independent perspectives on the news and largely manage to extend the boundaries of Chinese censorship. Every once in a while, however, they cross the boundary, with the result that a specific issue is taken off the shelves. The Chinese government not only censors the traditional media, newspapers, radio and television, but has also developed an extensive system to control the internet. In 2012 more than 500 million Chinese people had internet access, and digital communication is very popular among citizens. According to research by McKinsey, more than 300 million people are active on social media sites such as Sina Weibo, Tencent Weibo, and Renren.35 Furthermore, they are very ‘social’ on these platforms: more than 75 per cent are ‘creators’ of content rather than mere spectators, compared to just 25 per cent in the

33  Ashley Esarey and Xiao Qiang, “Digital Communication and Political Change in China,” International Journal of Communication, No. 5 (2011), pp. 298–319; and Freedom of the Press 2012. 34  Hugo de Burgh and Zeng Rong, China’s Environment and China’s Environment Journalists: A Study (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2011), p. 4. 35  Ari Silverman, Davis Lin and Cindy Chiu, “China’s Social Media Boom: Social Media is Exploding Worldwide, and China is Leading the Way,” McKinsey website (April 25 2012), http://www.mckinseychina.com/2012/04/25/chinas-social-media-boom/ (accessed April 26 2012).

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United States.36 In 2012 China also had around 50 micro-blogging sites, on which more than 200 million new posts were posted per day.37 The Chinese government’s internet censorship system employs between 20,000 and 50,000 internet police and monitors to check online content and to force internet providers to comply with the government’s censorship guidelines.38 The censors block access to websites of selected foreign media and think tanks, as well as to foreign social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter. Official Chinese media outlets such as Xinhua News Agency and Global Times do have the guts, however, to offer the possibility to share their content via Twitter and Facebook. The censors furthermore block ‘keywords,’ which means that a text that contains a banned word—such as ‘Tibet’ or ‘press freedom’—will be deleted.39 Chinese internet users easily evade this type of censorship by using homonyms or metaphors for ‘banned’ words. For example, instead of using the banned phrase ‘4 June,’ which is the date of the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, they use ‘35 May.’ To counter this evasion, the government additionally hires an estimated 250,000–300,000 ‘internet commentators’ to read internet postings, eliminate unwelcome content and spin online debates in directions that are favorable to official policy lines. So-called Chinese ‘netizens’ dubbed them the ‘Fifty Cent Party’ or ‘Fifty Cent Army,’ as 50 cents is what they are reportedly paid for their work.40 In spite of the Chinese censorship system, Chinese citizens rely on the internet for much of their information.41 They do not trust the traditional media and online networks can exchange information faster than censors can delete it. This possibility for relatively free online expression has led to the 36  Cindy Chiu, Chris Ip and Ari Silverman, “Fighting a PR Fire in China with Social Media,” McKinsey website (May 2012), http://cmsoforum.mckinsey.com/article/fighting-a-prfire-in-china-with-social-media (accessed May 2013). 37  Wang Chen, “Jiji kaizhan wei boke yulun yindao gongzuo” [Actively Carrying Out Public Opinion Channeling Work], People’s Daily (November 28 2011). 38  Gary King, Jennifer Pan and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 107, No. 2 (May 2013), pp. 1–18. 39  A regularly updated list of “sensitive words” is published by the website Digital Times: http://chinadigitaltimes.net/ (accessed July 2013). 40  See, for example, Wu Nan, “Chinese Bloggers on the History and Influence of the ‘Fifty Cent Party,’ ” China Digital Times (May 15 2008); or Zhang Lei, “Invisible Footprints of Online Commentators,” Global Times (February 5 2010). 41  Li Xiguang and Wang Jing, “Zhongguo ruhe miandui wangluo gonggong waijiao” [China Faces Internet Public Diplomacy], GGWJJK, No. 4 (summer 2010).

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development of a lively blogging and micro-blogging scene with pluralistic debates on almost every imaginable topic. Empirical analysis by Chinese internet specialists Xiao Qiang and Ashley Esarey indicates that “digital forms of communication have reduced the capacity of the Chinese state to dictate media content.”42 This is not only because of Chinese netizens’ skills in evading censorship, but also because Chinese censors are not so much concerned with critiques of Chinese policies or Chinese leaders. A study published in 2013 found that the censors focus instead on deleting comments that reinforce or spur social mobilization, regardless of content. In other words, they seek to curtail collective action, as that is what may endanger the position of the Party and the Chinese leadership.43 Esarey and Qiang argue that as a result of China’s widespread use of the internet, “a ‘network society’ is coalescing in China that stretches across the country and beyond its borders through digitally connected communities,” enabling “freedom of speech and political participation, even in an authoritarian regime.”44 Social media have thus, in recent years, provided more room for citizens to connect independently with civil society abroad and to put issues on the domestic and international agenda. This role of social media, however, has more recently been limited by the introduction of new regulations that tighten the Chinese government’s control over the internet, and by crackdowns on the online micro-blogging accounts of various Chinese bloggers and activists.45

Human Rights and Tibet

China’s lack of political and civil rights is furthermore an issue that can be considered one of the biggest liabilities for China’s public diplomacy in the Western world and democratic countries in other regions. China is widely criticized for its lack of respect for human rights at home, for obstructing the international human rights system, and for supporting regimes that violate the human rights of their populations.46 Since the early 1990s, when China wanted to break out of the isolation in which it found itself after the violent crackdown 42  Esarey and Qiang, “Digital Communication and Political Change in China.” 43  King, Pan and Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression.” 44  Esarey and Qiang, “Digital Communication and Political Change in China.” 45  See, for example, Freedom House, China Media Bulletin, No. 93 (September 2013). 46  See, for example, the annual World Report by Human Rights Watch, or the reports of Human Rights in China.

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on student protesters in June 1989, it has been seeking to address its poor reputation on human rights. It does so basically in three ways: it takes (limited) steps to improve selected areas of human rights laws and regulations and their enforcement; it continuously explains and defends Chinese views and policies with regard to human rights; and it tries to weaken accountability mechanisms in the international human rights framework.47 In addition to defending itself, China sometimes chooses to accuse others of human rights violations. From 1998 onward, China has annually published reports on human rights in the United States, blaming the US of putting forward “irresponsible remarks on the human rights situation in more than 190 countries and regions, including China,” but turning “a blind eye to its own woeful human rights situation.”48 The Chinese government often points toward the positive steps it has taken over the past two decades to improve the human rights situation in China and its international cooperation on human rights. It has signed a wide range of human rights treaties and improved domestic laws. It has expanded its diplomatic capabilities in the area of human rights, agreed to hold human rights dialogs with various countries,49 and has become active within the United Nations Human Rights Council. It has established the China Society for Human Rights Studies, a non-governmental organization (NGO) with a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), a Human Rights Net website that provides online information on China’s human rights, and since 1991 China has published a series of White Papers on the topic, including two Action Plans for Human Rights.50 Recent positive developments for China’s human rights situation include a sharply reduced number of executions, implementation of a new Criminal Procedure Law, which is expected to lead to reduced numbers of juveniles in prison, and plans for the reform of China’s labor camp system.51 The Chinese government 47  Sonya Sceats and Shaun Breslin, China and the International Human Rights System (London: RIIA, October 2012). 48  China’s State Council Information Office, “The Human Rights Record of the United States in 2004” (March 3 2005). The most recently published report is China’s State Council Information Office, “The Human Rights Record of the United States in 2012” (April 20 2012). 49  Among others, with the United States, the European Union, Australia, Germany, United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands, Hungary and Japan. 50  The White Papers are published by the State Council Information Office and are available at the website of China Human Rights Net: http://www.chinahumanrights.org/. 51   “China under the Microscope: The Second Universal Periodic Review,” Dialogue, No. 50 (San Francisco, CA: Dui Hua Foundation, February 28 2013); and “China to Reform Re-education through Labor System,” China Daily (January 7 2013).

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asks for patience and understanding, pointing out that China is a developing country facing many problems and challenges. It argues that its ideas about economic and social rights taking priority over civil and political rights are a legitimate choice in the Chinese situation, as a person “should be able to feed himself before he can cast a ballot.”52 The positive steps and growing engagement with the international human rights framework, however, do not mean that the Chinese government has embraced the international human rights concepts. China has signed, but not yet ratified, core human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and within the UN human rights institutions, its focus is on avoiding criticisms of China and on weakening the UN’s ability to report on states that abuse human rights.53 It furthermore explicitly states that while it “respects the principle of universality of human rights,” it “also upholds proceeding from China’s national conditions.”54 The Chinese government’s public diplomacy efforts cannot mask the continued violations of human rights in China. The general feeling among foreign observers is that the overall human rights situation in China has been deteriorating rather than improving in recent years.55 In reaction to the 2011 protest movements in the Middle East, Chinese authorities “unleashed one of the harshest crackdowns on political activists, human rights defenders and online activists since the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations,” and there is a steady flow of reports of harassment, intimidation and illegal detention of political dissidents.56 In April 2012, the escape from house arrest and refuge in the US Embassy in Beijing of blind civil rights activist Chen Guangcheng drew global attention to China’s violations of human rights. The episode that proved most damaging to China’s human rights image in recent years, however, was the Chinese government’s harsh reaction to the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese human rights activist Liu Xiaobo. Liu is an internationally known dissident who has been calling for political reform since the stu52  “Human Rights Can Be Manifested Differently,” People’s Daily (December 12 2005). 53  Sceats and Breslin, China and the International Human Rights System. 54  State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012– 2015), “Introduction” (June 11 2012). 55  See, for example, briefing by Michael H. Posner, US Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, on the 17th US–China Dialog on Human Rights (July 25 2012); or Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2012 (London: Amnesty International, 2012). 56  Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2012, p. 107.

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dent protests of 1989 and who is currently imprisoned for his role in drafting and promoting the petition “Charter 08,” which calls for the right to free speech, open elections, and the rule of law in China. It was clear from the start that Liu would not be able to collect the prize himself, but China also prevented Liu’s wife, family members and friends from attending the ceremony and harassed them severely. The Chinese government furthermore tried to pressure diplomats from other countries into staying away from the ceremony.57 Eighteen countries, including Russia, Pakistan and Vietnam, responded positively to China’s call, but China’s efforts created the negative image in most countries of China as a bully that threatens and intimidates others if it does not get its way.58 The images of the ceremony that have remained in people’s minds are the views of Liu’s empty chair during the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony and the audience’s minutes-long standing ovation. China also retaliated heavily against the Nobel Peace Prize Committee and its host country, Norway—a situation that persists until today.59 China canceled high-level bilateral meetings and cultural events, denied Norwegian officials visas, tightened up on imports of Norwegian products such as salmon, and in 2012 excluded Norway from its list of countries that no longer require a visa for a 72-hour stopover in Beijing.60 Another human rights policy area that contributes to a negative image and therefore figures largely in China’s public diplomacy is Tibet. The Chinese government holds the view that Tibet enjoys a high degree of autonomy and that China’s policies have brought development and higher living standards to 57  Perry Link, “At the Nobel Ceremony: Liu Xiaobo’s Empty Chair,” New York Review of Books (December 13 2010); Kiyoshi Takenaka and David Stanway, “China Asks Japan Not to Attend Nobel Peace Award,” Reuters (November 9 2010); AFP, “China Warns Western Countries: Stay Away from the Nobel Ceremony, Or Else . . .,” The Swedish Wire (November 5 2010). 58  The eighteen countries are Afghanistan, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sudan, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela and Vietnam; see Alan Cowell, “19 Countries to Skip Nobel Ceremony, While China Offers Its Own Prize,” New York Times (December 7 2010). 59  Off-the-record talk by Norwegian diplomat in China (June 2013). 60  Jerome A. Cohen and Eva Pils, “Empty Chairs in Oslo Speak Volumes,” Wall Street Journal (November 11 2010); Sharon Lafraniere, “China Retaliates against Norway in Nobel Feud,” International Herald Tribune (October 12 2010); Jamil Anderlini and Clare MacCarthy, “China Snubs Norway in Visa Reforms,” Financial Times (December 6 2012); and Wataru Sawamura and Nozomu Hayashi, “Norway, China Still Divided over Dissident’s Nobel Peace Prize,” Asahi Shimbun (October 12 2012).

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Tibet.61 Most Tibetans, however, do not accept Chinese rule and accuse Beijing of suppressing Tibetan culture and religion. Resentment against Chinese policies leads to regular uprisings (discussed in more detail below) and, in recent years, also to Tibetan self-immolations. According to the Amnesty International Report of 2013, at least 95 ethnic Tibetans set themselves on fire during the period February 2009–December 2012.62 The Chinese government pays much attention to improving its public diplomacy strategy with regard to the Tibet issue and to countering efforts by the Dalai Lama and Tibet lobbying groups to promote their views about an autonomous Tibet. During the past decade, meetings between the Dalai Lama and foreign leaders increasingly led to problems between the receiving countries and China. In November 2008, China even cancelled an EU–China Summit in retaliation for the plans of (then) EU and French President Nicolas Sarkozy to meet with the Dalai Lama. China’s increasingly harsh reactions to these visits and its slandering of the Dalai Lama, of whom some officials refer as “a wolf in monk’s clothing,”63 only increased foreign audiences’ sympathy for Tibet. The focus of China’s public diplomacy policies is on widely publicizing Chinese policies to stimulate economic growth and improve social conditions—on websites, in the printed media, and in White Papers. Since September 1992, China has published eight White Papers on Tibet, detailing China’s views on issues such as the human rights situation, democratic development, cultural development and China’s policies on the protection of culture in Tibet.64 Because of their tone and one-sided view, however, they are largely ignored by foreign observers. They use terms like “Dalai Lama clique,” and speak of “historic achievements that capture world attention,” but neglect social and political problems.65 More nuanced and balanced views are expressed by delegations of scholars and the National People’s Congress, which visit foreign think tanks and governments. Allowing for a depoliticized discussion of China’s Tibet policies and its challenges, they often manage to engage in meaningful dialog with their foreign counterparts.66 The Chinese government furthermore 61  See, for example, State Council Information Office, Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet, White Paper (Beijing: State Council Information Office, 2009). 62  Amnesty International Report 2013 (London: Amnesty International, 2013), p. 63. 63  “Dalai Lama’s Death Would Not Affect Tibet, Officials Say,” Global Times (March 8 2011). 64  Available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/ (accessed May 2013). 65  State Council Information Office, “Sixty Years of Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” (July 12 2011). 66  Meeting with a delegation of Chinese Tibet scholars at Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands on March 31 2011; for similar visits to Chile and Mexico, see “Chinese Scholars’ Delegation Spreads Tibetan Culture in Chile,” Xinhua (August 13 2010).

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organizes Tibetan cultural performances and festivals in countries all over the world.67 One of the issues in China’s public diplomacy efforts with regard to Tibet concerns the question of whether it should open up Tibet to the domestic and foreign press. Tibet is not freely accessible. The Chinese government closes the borders of the Tibet Autonomous Region to all foreigners around sensitive anniversaries, and reporters and diplomats need to apply for special permits all year round. Since the 2008 Tibetan uprising, however, China realizes that closing off Tibet for journalists may negatively affect international reporting on China’s activities in the autonomous region. On March 10 2008, the 49th anniversary of the Tibetan uprising of 1959, riots erupted in the regional Tibetan capital of Lhasa and quickly spread to other parts of Tibet.68 Angry about social discrimination, unequal pay and rumors that monks had been arrested and killed, ethnic Tibetans turned against local Han Chinese and Muslim Hui civilians and shops. Chinese police stepped in to prevent further escalation. An unknown number of people on both sides died in the unrest; figures vary from 19 people according to Chinese authorities and 140 according to the Tibetan government-in-exile.69 As the Chinese government did not allow foreign reporters into Tibet, it was difficult for the international media to verify information. This led to contrasting coverage. Tibetan support groups, for example, reported that the Chinese police used strong violence against the rioters, but the only Western journalist who happened to be in Lhasa at the time, renowned Economist reporter James Miles, said that the police showed restraint.70 In general, the Western media in their reporting on the uprising accused China of violating human rights and of political and religious suppression in Tibet. The headline of a New York Times editorial, for example, read “China Terrorizes Tibet”71 and the Dalai Lama accused China of waging cultural genocide against Tibetans.72

67  “Public Diplomacy Helps the World Listen to China’s Tibet,” People’s Daily Online (April 18 2013). 68  Including Tibetan districts in China outside the Autonomous Region of Tibet. 69  David Barboza, “660 Held in Tibetan Uprising, China Says,” New York Times (March 27 2008). 70  Transcript of the CNN interview with James Miles on Tibet, CNN World Online (March 20 2008). 71  Editorial, “China Terrorizes Tibet,” New York Times (March 18 2008). 72  Somini Sengupta, “Curbs on Protest in Tibet Lashed by Dalai Lama,” New York Times (March 17 2008).

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In their first reaction to the riots, the Chinese media downplayed the predicament,73 but after two days they switched to non-stop coverage, offering the Chinese public their own account of the situation.74 Foreign news coverage of the situation was blocked inside China. When the uprising became a major global news item, and added to the continuous and multi-faceted critique on China in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (see also chapter six), the Chinese government started a campaign in which it accused the Dalai Lama of instigating the riots75 and condemned the foreign media for biased and false reporting. It published examples of manipulated pictures and footage by Western media, including renowned companies like CNN, the Washington Post and German RTL Television. Examples included photos depicting violent police crackdowns on Tibetan protestors in Nepal and India, but labeling them as taking place in Tibet.76 The anti-Western media campaign received wide support from the Chinese public at home and from the Chinese diaspora abroad.77 Western audiences, however, saw their perception of an authoritarian regime that suppresses a minority confirmed. In particular, the Chinese government’s focus on blaming and vilifying the Dalai Lama and its lack of attention for the deeper political and economic causes of the unrest did much damage to China’s image. In response to China’s accusations of biased reporting, the Western media pointed out that they had no access to Tibet78 and were therefore not able to report first-hand information. The Chinese government tried to address some of the criticisms. It announced that it would restart talks with aides of the Dalai Lama79 and—to counter the complaint by the foreign press about lack of access to the areas of unrest—a group of twelve correspondents was allowed to travel to Lhasa for a government-guided tour. The trip, 73  “Lhasa Reverts to Calm,” Xinhua (March 15 2008). 74  Tania Branigan, “Tibet: Media Coverage—State TV Switches to Non-stop Footage of Chinese Under Attack,” The Guardian (March 18 2008). 75  “Premier: Ample Facts Prove Dalai’s Role in Lhasa Riot, Door of Dialog Still Open,” Xinhua (March 18 2008). 76  Zhou Yan, “Commentary: Biased Media Reports Reveal Credibility Crisis,” Xinhua Online (March 26 2008); Ye Jun, “Lhasa Riot Reports Show Media Bias in West,” China Daily (March 22 2008); and David Barboza, “Pressed Over Tibet, China Berates Foreign Media,” New York Times (March 25 2008). 77  “Media, Netizens and Tibet,” China Digital Times (April 8 2008); the role of the diaspora will be discussed in more detail in chapter six of this book. 78  Barboza, “Pressed Over Tibet, China Berates Foreign Media.” 79  Jim Yardley, “Beijing to Hold Talks with Dalai Lama’s Envoys,” New York Times (April 25 2008).

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however, did not become a success, as the reporters were constrained in their movements and were not allowed to interview people independently.80 This case highlights China’s weaknesses in its public diplomacy strategy on the Tibet issue. China failed to analyze and address publicly the underlying causes of the riots; instead it presented them as nothing more than an attempt “to separate Tibet from China.”81 The case also taught China the lesson that closing off a troubled area from the foreign press may severely backfire, as it creates room in the global media for unverified information and rumors. When riots erupted in 2010 in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Chinese government used a much savvier media strategy, allowing foreign journalists to report on the spot, creating a press center, and organizing tours of the violence-stricken quarters for the media.82

The Lack of Cultural Freedom

A society’s ideas, concepts, norms and cultural expressions are among the most important sources of attraction that a country can possess. Chinese policymakers and many scholars indeed consider Chinese culture as the most important resource for soft power,83 and the Chinese government has developed numerous initiatives to promote actively China’s culture abroad (see chapter four). As an editorial in the official newspaper The People’s Daily put it: 80  Richard Spencer, “Crying Monks Disrupt China’s Tibet Media Tour,” The Telegraph (March 27 2008). 81  Zhou Yan, “Commentary: Violence under the Cloak of Religion,” Xinhua (March 19 2008). 82  Peter Ford, “Urumqi Unrest: China’s Savvier Media Strategy,” Christian Science Monitor (July 10 2009); and “Journalists from More than 60 Overseas Media Come to Urumqi after Riot,” Xinhua (July 7 2009). 83  See, for example, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shenhua wenhua tizhi gaige tuding sheui zhuyi wenhua da fazhan da fanrong ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding” [Central Committee Decision Concerning the Major Issue of Deepening Cultural System Reforms, Promoting the Great Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture], published on October 25 2011 after the 6th Plenum of the 17th Central Committee (October 15–18 2011), which focused on cultural reform; Part VII (“Promoting Vigorous Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture”) of Secretary Hu Jintao’s report to the 17th Congress of the CCP (October 15 2007); or the speeches presented at a special meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on the topic of China’s culture as a major resource for building China’s soft power, held in summer 2007; Wu Jianmin, “kaizhan wenhua waijiao de jidian sikao” [Some Thoughts on the Development of Cultural Diplomacy], speech by the President of China’s Foreign Affairs University and former Ambassador to France Wu Jianmin (July 24 2007).

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Without culture to guide the way, without the great richness of a people’s spiritual world, without bringing the spiritual strength of the whole nation into play, a country and a people cannot possibly stand strong in the forest of nations.84 According to former Chinese President Hu Jintao, strengthening China’s cultural soft power could furthermore reverse “the international cultural and public opinion structure of ‘strong West and weak us.’ ”85 China’s cultural diplomacy, however, is hampered by the fact that there is no freedom of cultural expression in China. The Chinese government understands culture as ‘socialist culture,’ and art is supposed to serve the official policy goals and improve the moral quality of the people.86 This idea that art serves politics is not “entirely the invention of the Chinese Communist Party,” however. It is, as Chinese media specialist Ying Zhu writes, also: [. . .] rooted in a longer tradition of Chinese aesthetics that defines art (and entertainment). According to Chinese aesthetics, art is meant to represent the ‘good and the beautiful.’ This perspective can be traced to a moral and ethical fabric grounded in Confucianism.87 This view differs widely from Western ideas about art as encouraging creativity and pushing boundaries, or from concepts like ‘art for art’s sake.’ These Western ideas are not appreciated by the Chinese government, nor are Western commercial views on the entertainment value of popular culture. Former President 84  “Mai xiang shehui zhuyi wenhua qianghuo de weida jinjun” [The Great March toward a Great Nation of Socialist Culture], Renmin Ribao (October 19 2011), partially translated by David Bandurski, “The Fog of China’s Cultural Reform,” China Media Project (October 19 2011). 85  Hu Jintao, “Jianding bu yi zou zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi wenhua fazhan daolu; nuli jianshe shehui zhuyi wenhua qiangguo” [Resolutely Walk the Path of Socialist Culture Development with Chinese Characteristics; Striving to Construct a Strong Socialist Culture Country], Qiushi, No. 1 (2012), translated by Rogier Creemers at his website China Copyright and Media, http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/01/04/ hu-jintaos-article-in-qiushi-magazine-translated/. 86  See, for example, Part VII of Secretary Hu Jintao’s report to the 17th Congress of the CCP (October 15 2007); and Rogier Creemers, “The new Cultural Policy: Some Quick Thoughts on What it Means,” China Copyright and Media (February 18 2012). 87  Ying Zhu, “The Cultivated War and the ‘Vulgar’: China’s Cultural War,” Asian Creative Transformations, blog (April 2 2012), http://www.creativetransformations.asia/2012/04/ the-cultivated-and-the-vulgar-chinas-cultural-war/ (accessed August 2012).

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Hu Jintao stated in 2011 that the Chinese government should protect China against Western cultural pollution and safeguard China’s ‘cultural security,’88 an idea that will be discussed in more detail in chapter three. The Chinese government thus supervises all artists, cultural venues, institutions, and industries. It focuses on promoting traditional and apolitical art, while ignoring the growing number of Chinese artists, writers, filmmakers and actors who combine traditional arts with modern ideas and developments and who are conquering the world on their own. Recent examples are film director Jia Zhangke, who won the 2013 Cannes Film Festival’s Best Screenplay Award, writer Mo Yan, winner of the 2012 Nobel Prize for Literature, and architect Wang Shu, who won the 2012 Pritzker Architecture Prize. Visual artists such as Zhang Xiaogang, Yue Minjun and Ai Weiwei exhibit in the world’s most prominent museums and their works are sold for high prices. Ai Weiwei is particularly popular abroad because of his social activism and witty criticism of Chinese authorities. His mockery and activism anger the authorities and, as a result, Ai Weiwei has spent time in prison and is currently restricted in his work and private life. Interviews with or about him appear regularly in major international newspapers, and a film about him—Ai Weiwei: Never Sorry—won awards at several 2012 international film festivals.89 Thanks to these independent artists, China’s modern culture is gradually winning wider recognition from international audiences, but China’s cultural export products are no match for those of its neighboring countries Japan and South Korea. China has nothing that compares to the global allure of Japanese manga and anime, or the Korean Wave, Hallyu. The Korean Wave refers to the surge of international popularity of Korea in China and other East Asian countries from the 1990s onward, and more recently also in the Western world.90 China is not yet able to score with a mega-hit like the satirical song and video clip “Gangnam Style” by South Korean musician Psy. While the official Chinese media initially reported that many Chinese considered the song ‘vulgar,’91 it became an instant hit in China.92 When the Chinese government could no 88  David Bandurski, “All in Favor of Culture, say ‘Aye,’ ” China Media Project (October 26 2011). 89  See the website of the movie: http://aiweiweineversorry.com/ (accessed May 2013). 90  Mark Ravina, “Introduction: Conceptualizing the Korean Wave,” Southeast Review of Asian Studies, Vol. 31 (2009), pp. 3–9. 91  Feng Qiuhong, “Many Chinese Netizens Find ‘Gangnam Style’ Vulgar,” People’s Daily Online (October 9 2012). 92  Samuel Wade, “China’s Gangnam Style and the K-Pop War Machine,” China Digital Times (October 5 2012).

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longer deny the extraordinary popularity of “Gangnam Style” in China, the official media changed position and wrote that ‘vulgar’ cultural expressions and their popularity should be accepted as long as they did not violate the law.93 The song initiated an important discussion in China, as ordinary citizens raised the question of why China was not able to come up with something like “Gangnam Style.”94 The answer, as they know, is that the Chinese cultural industry is hampered by lack of freedom and is always required to put China in a positive light. South Korea, on the contrary, does not have impediments to exporting products that question or poke fun at its own society and politics.95 Not much later, China’s cultural policymaking circles and movie industry were shaken again by the enormous success of the Chinese low-budget light comedy “Lost in Thailand.”96 This apolitical movie, which was an unprecedented blockbuster in China, sparked a debate over the question of whether people should be watching this type of “inconsequential light fare.”97 The President of the Beijing Film Academy, Zhang Huijun, felt that the film, which provides “popular stars, funny dialog, good timing and a reflection of ourselves,” has helped to save the dim, domestic film industry, which usually focuses on heavy historical dramas. The People’s Daily, however, warned in a tweet on its Sina Weibo micro-blog that historical dramas should not be forgotten: “We need popcorn, but we also need bitter pills.”98 While important for the development of China’s film industry, “Lost in Thailand” was not successful abroad. It was exported to various countries, including the United States, but did not do well at the box office.99 Hoping to learn how to please foreign audiences, China is now investing in co-productions with successful Korean, Japanese and Hollywood companies and directors.100 93  Xiao Han, “Please Show More Tolerance for ‘Vulgar Culture,’ ” People’s Daily Online (November 23 2012). 94  See, for example, Peng Kan, “How to Hard-sell China’s Soft Power,” China Daily (October 26 2012). 95  John Delury, an expert on China and Korea, cited in Evan Osnos, “Why China Lacks Gangnam Style,” The New Yorker (October 3 2012). 96  Dean Napolitano, “ ‘Lost in Thailand’ Finds Box-Office Record,” China Real Time Report blog, Wall Street Journal (January 3 2013). 97  Lilian Lin, “Losing it at the Movies: Silly Beats Sober in China,” China Real Time Report blog, Wall Street Journal (December 27 2012). 98  Lin, “Losing it at the Movies.” 99  Phil Hoad, “Lost in Thailand: Did China’s Comedy Hit Get Lost in Translation?,” The Guardian (February 13 2013). 100   Lee Hyo-won, “CJ E&M Unveils Largest-Ever Korea–China Co-production,” The Hollywood Reporter (June 17 2013); Clarence Tsui, “Chinese Regulators Approve ‘Arabian Nights’ for US–China Co-production,” The Hollywood Reporter (April 6 2013); and Jason Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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China’s Economic Rise

The most important domestic factor that has shaped and still shapes China’s foreign policy and diplomacy is the country’s economic rise. China’s transition from a centrally planned economy to a (socialist) market economy, its integration into the world economy, and the resulting spectacular growth, have made China an economic powerhouse. In 2010, China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy and, according to the latest projections, China is expected to overtake the United States as the largest economy in absolute figures around 2030.101 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) forecasts that, when measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), which adjusts for the difference in prices between China and other countries, the Chinese economy will surpass the US economy in 2016.102 China’s domestic economic development has inspired admiration and attraction. Its economic success has opened many doors in the world and has given Beijing the leverage and confidence to assert itself as a global player. Being a winner is always appealing, and China’s growth offers many economic opportunities for international business. China’s rapid economic recovery after the global financial crisis in 2008, its continued high growth rates, and its willingness to support the United States and Europe in dealing with the global crisis, have further strengthened this image. An increasing number of young people from all over the globe go to China to find a job, start a small business, and build a new life.103 The number of registered foreigners employed in China rose from 74,000 in 2000 to 220,000 by 2011, and the actual number is expected to be much higher.104 There are, for example, sizeable African communities in cities across eastern China, with more than 100,000 African traders in the south Chinese city of Guangzhou alone,105 but also young Europeans Gray, “Kurosawa to Direct Japan–China Co-production Starring Leung,” Screen Daily (September 11 2012). 101  US National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington, DC: US National Intelligence Council, December 12 2012). 102  OECD, “Looking to 2060: Long-term Global Growth Prospects,” OECD Economic Policy Papers, No. 3 (Paris: OECD, November 2012). 103  See, for example, Ronald Skeldon, “China: An Emerging Destination for Economic Migration,” Country Profiles, Migration Information Source (May 2011). 104  Xinhua, “Draft Rules Target Foreigners’ Illegal Presence,” Global Times (May 5 2013). 105  See, for example, Adams Bodomo, Africans in China: A Sociocultural Study and its Implications on Africa–China Relations (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2012), chapter 1; or the CNN news item, “Growing Numbers of Africans Seeking Opportunities in the World’s Second Largest Economy, China,” CNN (April 9 2012). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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and Americans flock to China to tap into business opportunities and experience a unique culture.106 The economic rise by a non-democratic country that is also strengthening its military capabilities, however, makes many governments and business leaders around the world nervous. In 1993, this fear of a rising China led to a debate in US policymaking and academic circles about the extent to which China’s rise posed a threat to the United States and the world. This so-called ‘China Threat’ debate quickly spread across the globe and lingers on today. It refers to the idea that a rising China will destabilize regional security,107 but also includes the questions of whether China has a long-term strategic plan to defeat the United States108 and, at a global level, to what extent a rising China will harm other countries’ economies109 and the world order.110 The China Threat debate is one of the driving factors behind China’s investment in public diplomacy. Many people in Europe and the United States fear that they will lose industries and jobs to China. Others worry that China may use its economic leverage to apply pressure on bilateral and multilateral political and economic issues, or to challenge Western economic and political ideologies. In Asian capitals, policymakers worry that China’s economic strength could encourage it to dominate the region politically as well, or even to assert its power militarily. Policymakers and businessmen are furthermore frustrated by Beijing’s currency policy, the continued violation of intellectual property rights, Chinese dumping practices, and by the slow progress in opening up China’s domestic market and improving investment rules. The Western media often exaggerates China’s economic rise and influence.111 They publish, for example, alarmist press reports about Chinese investors 106  See, for example, “China: Why Expats are Heading East,” New Horizons, Guardian (February 19 2013); and Tom Hale, “Go East Young Man,” 2007 Expatriate Writing Contest 3rd Place Winner, http://www.transitionsabroad.com/listings/living/articles/living_in_ china_a_hot_place_to_be.shtml (accessed July 2013). 107  Denny Roy, “The China Threat Issue: Major Arguments,” Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 8 (August 1996), pp. 758–771; and Herbert S. Yee and Ian Storey (eds), The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002). 108  See, for example, Bill Gertz, The China Threat: The Plan to Defeat America (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2000). 109  See, for example, Arvind Subramanian, Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2011). 110  Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2010). 111  Thomas J Christensen, “The World Needs an Assertive China,” Foreign Affairs (February 21 2011). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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buying up Europe or the United States, whereas in reality, Chinese overseas investment accounts for less than 1 per cent of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in both Europe and the United States.112 China may have the world’s second largest economy, but in terms of per capita income, it is still a developing country. At the end of 2012, close to 100 million people still lived below the national poverty line.113 China furthermore faces major ecological, social and demographic challenges. As many China observers point out, a lack of continued economic growth in China poses a bigger threat to stability in the world than China’s economic rise,114 and growing economic power does not automatically translate into political power and international authority. According to China specialist Susan Shirk, “[i]t is China’s internal fragility, not its economic or military strength, that presents the biggest danger.”115

The China Model

China’s political—economic model, which shows that a country can have economic development without far-reaching political reform, is an example for many developing countries, but a big concern for Western and democratic countries. Domestically, the model is a hybrid of socialism with Chinese (authoritarian) characteristics and capitalism; internationally, it is based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and in particular the principles of state sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs and ‘no-politicalstrings-attached’ foreign aid and trade.116 China’s model is often referred to by foreign observers as the ‘Beijing Consensus,’ to contrast with the ‘Washington Consensus’ of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which calls for integration into the international economy and a reduced role 112  Thilo Hanemann, “Chinese FDI in the United States: Q4 2012 Update,” Rhodium Group (January 16 2013); Jeremy Clegg and Hinrich Voss, “Chinese Overseas Direct Investment in the European Union” (London: Europe–China Research and Advice Network (ECRAN), 2012), pp. 73–74; and Peter Nolan, Is China Buying the World? (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2012). 113  “China Overview,” website of the World Bank, available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/ country/china/overview (accessed August 2013). 114  Peter R. Orszag, “In China, Slowdown is a Bigger Threat than Growth,” Bloomberg (January 15 2013). 115  Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 6. 116  The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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for the state.117 China’s model has long been attractive to countries in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America, which are tired of Western criticism and seeking ways to develop their countries and fit into the international order while remaining independent in their political choices.118 Most democratic countries, however, reject the Chinese model because of its authoritarian character and the Chinese government’s willingness to engage with oppressive regimes, issues that hamper a strengthening of relations between China and Western countries and regional groupings such as the European Union. The ongoing worldwide discussion about a Chinese model has arisen from China’s economic success story and was strengthened by the global financial crisis of 2008, which exposed the shortcomings of Western models.119 China has since become more confident in defending and even promoting its model and the Western media and academic circles have started more seriously to discuss and study the merits and shortcomings of China’s political model. Chinese scholars publish op-eds on the topic in major Western newspapers, and scholars and opinion leaders in the West have raised the question of whether there is something that Western governments can learn from China’s model. This change in perspective on China was illustrated, for example, in an article published in Time magazine titled “Five Things the US Can Learn from China.”120

117  The term was coined by China analyst and former editor of Time magazine, Joshua Cooper Ramo; see Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: Foreign Policy Centre, May 2004), pp. 3–4. For the principles of the Washington Consensus, developed by economist John Williams, see online at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/ sc10200.doc.htm. 118  Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, pp. 3–4; see also Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power,” Survival, Vol. 48, No. 2 (summer 2006), pp. 17–36, at p. 20; and Kevin Gallagher, “The End of the ‘Washington Consensus,’ ” The Guardian (March 7 2011). 119  For an in-depth survey of the debate on the China Model, see Shaun Breslin, “The China Model and the Global Crisis: From Friedrich List to a Chinese Mode of Governance?,” International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 6 (2011); Joseph Fewsmith, “Debating ‘the China Model,’ ” China Leadership Monitor, No. 35 (2011); and “‘hongguo Moshi’ huanying zheshe de zhenshi” [The China Model: The Truth Reflected by an Illusion], Caixin, China’s Reform, No. 9 (September 1 2011). 120  Bill Powell, “Five Things the US Can Learn from China,” Time (November 12 2009).

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China’s Environmental Challenges

Closely linked to China’s fast growth are its rising need for energy, the serious environmental degradation that is taking place, public health issues and the safety of China’s food exports, all issues that will be discussed in detail in the case studies later in this book. The environmental issue, in particular, poses both challenges and opportunities for China’s public diplomacy. China’s air and water pollution often make international headlines, illustrated by grim pictures of dense smog or pitch black river water.121 In January 2013, for example, reports on Beijing’s ‘crazy bad’ air pollution, soon dubbed ‘airpocalypse’ in the foreign press, reached audiences all over the world.122 Beijing is not the only city that suffers from severe air pollution. Research has found that there are 1.2 million premature deaths each year in China because of outdoor air pollution, almost 40 per cent of the world’s total.123 In March 2013, news went viral of more than 13,000 dead pigs found flowing in the Huangpu River into Shanghai, drawing global attention to China’s problems with water pollution and food safety.124 These problems, which are increasingly exposed in the press, make China, and particularly its capital Beijing, a less attractive destination for expatriates.125 Experts agree that even in the most favorable scenario, it will be impossible for China to overcome its environmental problems within the next two 121  See, for example, John Pickrell, “Ten of the Most Polluted Places on the Planet,” ABC Environment (July 23 2012, accessed March 2013); Edward Wong, “Air Pollution Linked to 1.2 Million Premature Deaths in China,” New York Times (April 1 2013); and Gu Yongqiang, “In China, Water You Wouldn’t Dare Swim in, Let Alone Drink,” Time (March 6 2013). 122  Examples from the United States: Edward Wong, “On Scale of 0 to 500, Beijing’s Air Quality Tops ‘Crazy Bad’ at 755,” New York Times (January 12 2013); example from Europe: Clifford Coonan, “Beijing is Left Fighting for Breath as Pollution Goes Off the Scale,” The Independent (January 29 2013); from Asia: Saibal Dasgupta, “Beijing Air Pollution Soars to Toxic Levels,” The Times of India (January 14 2013); and from Australia: John Garnaut, “Toxic Air Blocks out the Sun in Beijing,” The Sydney Morning Herald (January 13 2013). 123  Wong, “Air Pollution Linked to 1.2 Million Premature Deaths in China;” and “Global Burden of Disease 2010,” The Lancet (December 15 2012). 124  From the US: David Barboza, “China: More Pigs Found in River,” New York Times (March 18 2013); from Europe: “China Pig Deaths: Toll from Shanghai Rivers nears 14,000,” BBC News (March 20 2013); and from Asia: AFP-Jiji-AP, “Dead Pigs in River Show Dark Side of China’s Food Industry,” Japan Times (March 19 2013). 125  Laurie Burkitt and Brian Spiegele, “Why Leave Job in Beijing? To Breathe,” Wall Street Journal (April 14 2013); and Jamill Anderlini, “‘Airpocalypse’ Drives Expats Out of Beijing,” Financial Times (April 1 2013).

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decades.126 As China is still at a relatively early stage of industrialization and urbanization, addressing environmental issues leads to an increase in industrial costs and a slowdown of economic growth. China needs economic growth, however, to eradicate poverty, improve living standards and legitimize its political regime.127 Almost 99 million people in China still live in poverty, meaning that their annual income is lower than the national poverty alleviation standard of CNY 2,300 (approximately US$ 375).128 This is a dilemma that is difficult to solve. The pollution created by China’s rapid growth is not only a serious domestic problem but also an international threat. China is currently the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide; its emissions account for 19.1 per cent of global emissions, compared to 18.3 per cent for US emissions.129 At a regional level, China’s neighbors regularly face the consequences of China’s environmental degradation and pollution accidents. One of the most serious cases of Chinese pollution spills across its borders occurred in 2005, when heavy benzene pollution in the Songhua River flowed from China into Russia. More recently, Japanese and South Korean scientists have complained that Chinese air pollution reaches their countries:130 “Chinese Smog Bomb Floats toward Japan” read a February 2013 headline in The Japan Times.131 These figures and stories damage China’s image, but the issue also provides opportunities for public diplomacy. The opportunity lies in showing the world that the Chinese government is serious about dealing with pollution and fighting climate change. This is what the Chinese government has done quite successfully in its public relations strategies for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai (see chapter five), and what it is trying 126  See, for example, World Bank, China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013). 127  See, for example, Junjie Zhang, Delivering Environmentally Sustainable Economic Growth: The Case of China (New York, NY: Asia Society, September 2012). 128  “Nearly 99 Million Small-scale Farmers in China Trapped in Poverty: Oxfam Rice Sale 2013 to Raise Funds in Support of the Agency’s Work in China,” website of Oxfam Hong Kong (April 23 2013), http://www.oxfam.org.hk/en/news_2146.aspx (accessed May 2013). 129  Climate Commission, The Critical Decade: Global Action Building on Climate Change (Canberra, ACT: Climate Commission, April 2013); and World Bank, China 2030, p. 39. 130  Michiyo Nakamoto, “Japanese Take Action Against Chinese Smog,” Financial Times, reprinted in The Washington Post (February 27 2013); Martin Fackler, “Scientist Says Pollution from China is Killing a Japanese Island’s Trees,” New York Times (April 24 2013); and Simon Mundy, “S Korea: Worrying about the Polluting Neighbours,” Beyondbrics blog, Financial Times (January 17 2013). 131  Eric Johnston, “Chinese Smog Bomb Floats toward Japan,” Japan Times (February 8 2013).

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to do with its overall environmental policies. China’s carbon dioxide emissions will continue to rise in the near future, but the Chinese government is currently significantly reducing growth of its emissions. It has outperformed its carbon and energy intensity targets in 2012 and set tougher targets for 2013.132 China has started introducing emissions trading schemes and, in 2012, it invested more in clean energy than any other country.133 China has become the world leader in renewable energy investment,134 and a recent World Bank report indicates that, if it strengthens its investments in green developments, China may become “a world leader in key green technologies and business models” and play an important role in commercializing globally important low-carbon technologies.135 The Copenhagen Summit Strident steps at home, however, do not necessarily translate into bold and welcome steps in the international climate arena, as the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit illustrated. China is struggling with contradictions between its domestic interests (growth) and international climate-related interests, as well as with its dual international status as a developing country and a major emitter of carbon dioxide.136 At the Copenhagen Summit in 2009, these issues hampered China from making a constructive contribution to the negotiations. China’s behavior in Copenhagen furthermore revealed the Chinese government’s inexperience in multilateral negotiations and insufficient media strategy. China was neither used to, nor well-prepared for, the Copenhagen negotiating dynamic, “featuring a circle of heads of states rolling up their sleeves and trying to hammer out a deal on the spot.”137 Misunderstanding procedures at Copenhagen, then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao had not been aware that he was expected to negotiate a deal himself and was not sufficiently prepared to play that role. The Chinese negotiators sitting at the table had not been delegated the power to make major decisions, which slowed down the 132  Climate Commission, The Critical Decade. 133  US$ 65.1 billion, 20 per cent more than in 2011, representing 30 per cent of the entire G20 nations’ investment in 2012; Climate Commission, The Critical Decade, pp. 12–15. 134  World Bank, China 2030, p. 226. 135  World Bank, China 2030, pp. 221–222. 136  Björn Conrad, “China in Copenhagen: Reconciling the ‘Beijing Climate Revolution’ and the ‘Copenhagen Climate Obstinacy,’ ” China Quarterly, No. 210 (June 2012), pp. 435–455, at p. 454. 137  For a detailed account of what went wrong on the Chinese side, see Conrad, “China in Copenhagen,” pp. 443–445.

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process.138 From a public diplomacy perspective, however, the biggest mistake that China made was to be inadequately prepared to deal with the media during the summit. As a result, and in spite of not bearing sole responsibility for the Copenhagen debacle, China received most of the blame for Copenhagen’s failure.139 During the months following Copenhagen, China extensively assessed its performance and learned lessons.140 One year later at the climate summit in Cancun (in November 2010), China took a low-key, more constructive approach and made sure that it would not again be perceived as the spoiler. It also participated in a side event in Cancun organized by an international NGO and used the presence of the global media to promote China’s domestic initiatives to reduce emissions.141

China’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

The development of China’s public diplomacy strategies cannot be detached from the rapid development of China’s foreign policy and diplomacy as a whole during the last decade, which, in its turn, cannot be detached from the enormous economic and political changes that have taken place, and are still taking place, in China. China’s political and economic transitions have led to its gradual integration into the international system. This development and China’s global rise, in particular after the global economic crisis erupted in 2008, have forced Chinese leaders to redefine China’s foreign policy and position in the world, as we will see below. While China has not abandoned its traditional approach of “keeping a low profile and never taking the lead” (taoguang yanghui) in international affairs, it has become more active (yousuo zuowei [get some things done]) and confident in its foreign policy and diplomacy.142 China’s leadership struggles to find the right balance between 138  Conrad, “China in Copenhagen.” 139  See, for example, Mark Lynas, “How Do I Know China Wrecked the Copenhagen Deal? I Was in the Room,” The Guardian (December 22 2009); and Tobias Rapp, Christian Schwägerl and Gerald Traufetter, “The Copenhagen Protocol: How China and India Sabotaged the UN Climate Summit,” Spiegel Online (May 5 2010). 140  See the analysis of Chinese scholars discussed in Anne Rulliat, “Lessons for China from the Copenhagen Summit,” in Climate Policies after Copenhagen, ECFR China Analysis No. 27 (June 2010). 141  Suzanne Goldenberg, “China on Path to Redemption in Cancun,” The Guardian (December 7 2013). 142  James T.H. Tang, “Chinese Foreign Policy Challenges: Periphery as Core,” in Ren Xiao and Allen Carlson (eds), New Frontiers in China’s Foreign Relations: Zhongguo Waijiao de Xin Bianjiang (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), pp. 173–190, at p. 186. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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these two approaches, but is also engaged in other Chinese balancing acts: in its relations with major powers, the Asian region and developing countries; between domestic interests and the international call for responsible behavior; and between domestic nationalist emotions and further integration into the global system.143 An important feature of the development of China’s diplomacy is the expansion of China’s diplomatic system. China’s foreign service has grown dramatically and, in addition, new groups of state and non-state actors have entered the diplomatic arena. Political scientist Su Changhe identifies four groups of new diplomatic actors: local governments; governmental agencies other than China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; civil society; and enterprises.144 As the state’s control over foreign policymaking and diplomacy is deeply affected by internal developments and globalization processes, a more pluralistic environment has emerged, allowing business leaders, academics, think tanks and NGOs to help shape foreign policy. This development is partially a bottom— up process, but is also promoted and sometimes initiated by the government. Like elsewhere, authorities in China have come to realize that they increasingly need the knowledge, expertise, skills and sometimes even the legitimacy of other groups in society. While the role of many of these new actors in diplomacy remains limited and is often supportive of China’s national diplomacy, their interests will not always coincide with those of China’s central government. The diversification of diplomatic actors therefore poses a challenge to the unity and decisiveness of China’s diplomacy. Implementing an effective coordination mechanism is thus a major challenge for China’s diplomatic system, including the public diplomacy system.145 During the past three decades, China’s diplomatic activities have rapidly expanded and become more sophisticated. China has developed a multidimensional and long-term diplomatic strategy that involves major-power diplomacy, good-neighbor diplomacy, an increasingly active multilateral diplomacy, and the promotion of good bilateral ties with countries all around the globe. This strategy is aimed at serving the Chinese central government’s fundamental

143  Zhao Suisheng, “Chinese Foreign Policy under Hu Jintao: The Struggle between LowProfile Policy and Diplomatic Activism,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2010), pp. 357–378. 144   Su Changhe, “Understanding Chinese Diplomatic Transformation: A Multi-Actors’ Perspective,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2010), pp. 313–329. 145   Su Changhe, “Understanding Chinese Diplomatic Transformation;” see also Linda Jacobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 26 (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2010). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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and enduring goals: to “uphold state sovereignty and territorial integrity and maintain national security and development interests.”146 In the late 1990s and first years of the new millennium, much optimism abounded about China’s growing integration into the international community and the direction in which China’s foreign policy was developing. A more pragmatic, constructive and sophisticated diplomatic style, combined with active multilateralism, proved to be important tools for China to counter the perception that it posed a threat to the world. China had rapidly increased its bilateral and multilateral relationships with countries and regional organizations all over the globe, and it stepped up its development aid and business activities in developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In the early 1990s, China developed its Go Out Policy, which encouraged Chinese enterprises to invest abroad; in 2001 it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO); in 2002, China knocked on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) door to establish contact; and in 2003, China’s President Hu for the first time attended an informal Enlarged Dialog meeting of G8 leaders and the heads of eleven developing countries. China furthermore shifted from a passive stance in multilateral forums to shaping some of the functions and rules of these multilateral organizations. It found that those forums could be used to expand influence and pursue Chinese interests. This was first and foremost visible in the Asian region, where China intensified its cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), initiated the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and played an important role as host and chair in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea.147 China’s foreign policy and diplomacy became more pragmatic, constructive and sophisticated. The Chinese government, for example, somewhat loosened its principles of non-intervention and sovereignty, enabling China 146  Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi on CCTV’s weekly news program (January 9 2009), available online at http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t531296 .htm. 147  ASEAN+3 refers to the cooperation with China, Japan and South Korea by ASEAN, a regional Southeast Asian organization of ten countries aimed at promoting economic growth and regional stability. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, initiated by China, consists of four Central Asian countries plus Russia and China, and is aimed at furthering military (anti-terrorism), political and economic cooperation. The Six-Party Talks are a series of negotiations by China, the United States, Japan, North Korea, Russia and South Korea, aimed at dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program. They have been held since 2003 and are hosted and chaired by China. For more on China’s multilateralism, see Joel Wuthnow, Xin Li and Lingling Qi, “Diverse Multilateralism: Four Strategies in China’s Multilateral Diplomacy,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 269–290.

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to become engaged in multilateral peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention.148 China’s participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) serves as an effective way “to project a more benign and positive image to the world”149 and bolsters China’s relations with host countries as well as with Western governments. It furthermore helps to protect Chinese interests abroad, such as stable markets and access to recourses. From 1990 onward, China steadily increased its participation in UNPKO. In December 2012, it had 1,842 peacekeepers in the field in nine UN mission areas,150 which is far more than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council. The United States, for example, currently has only 118 peacekeepers in the field; the United Kingdom 298.151 Moreover, as China specialist Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang write, they are “consistently rated among the most professional, well-trained, effective and disciplined contingents in UN peacekeeping operations.”152 China’s recent contribution of 170 ‘security forces’ (in fact combat troops) to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is another step toward more comprehensive engagement and an enhanced role in UN peacekeeping operations. It “marks a clear policy shift, since China in the past dispatched only non-combat staff such as engineers and medical personnel.”153 In the late 1990s and first years of the new century, many people were optimistic that China would continue its integration into the international system on Western terms and would answer US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s 2005 call to become a “responsible stakeholder.”154 From the end of 148  Allen Carlson, “More Than Just Saying No: China’s Evolving Approach to Sovereignty and Intervention since Tiananmen,” in Alistair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds), New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). 149  Zhao Lei, “China’s Influence on the Future of UN Peacekeeping,” proceedings of the conference “Beyond the ‘New Horizon’: UN Peacekeeping Future Challenges,” Geneva (June 23–24 2010), pp. 86–98, at p. 88. 150  State Council Information Office, “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” White Paper (April 2013), section V. 151  Anna Richardson, “Beijing’s Blue Berets: UN Peacekeeping and the Evolution of Chinese Diplomacy,” The Atlantic (May 13 2013). 152  Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy Implications,” SIPRI Policy Paper (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2009), p. 25. 153  Yun Sun and Michael Rettig, “Mali after the Election: Priorities of China and the US,” Up Front, Brookings Institution (July 26 2013). 154  Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?,” remarks to the National Committee on US–China Relations (September 21 2005); see also A.I. Johnston, “Learning versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s,” The China Journal, No. 35 (1996), pp. 27–61.

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2008 onward, however, China’s diplomacy seemed to change, as did Western perceptions and debates. The 2008 global financial crisis underlined China’s economic rise and the United States’ relative economic decline, and intensified the discussion about what the political impact would look like on the international system of an economically more dominant China. This is well reflected in prominent books that were published after 2008, such as Martin Jacques’ When China Rules the World and Stefan Halper’s The Beijing Consensus.155 People’s perceptions of China’s behavior began to change and various incidents involving China from late 2008 onward were interpreted by foreign observers as signals that China had become more assertive, arrogant, or even aggressive in its foreign policy and diplomacy.156 In December 2008, China shocked Europe by canceling a summit with the European Union in retaliation for meetings of European leaders with the Dalai Lama,157 and during the course of 2009 there were several incidents involving Chinese and US naval ships in the South China Sea.158 “China’s smile diplomacy shows its teeth,” wrote The Economist.159 In January 2010, China tested a new missile defense system;160 in May 2010, it refused to stand by South Korea when South Korea’s military ship, the Cheonan, was sunk by what most observers believe to have been a North Korean torpedo;161 and in September 2010, China became entangled in a fierce row with Japan over the Japanese seizure of a Chinese trawler in disputed waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. 155  Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2009); and Halper, The Beijing Consensus. 156  “China’s Aggressive New Diplomacy,” op-ed, Wall Street Journal (October 1 2010); John Pomfret, “Newly Powerful China Defies Western Nations with Remarks, Policies,” Washington Post (March 15 2010); David Shambaugh, “The Chinese Tiger Shows its Claws,” Financial Times (February 17 2010); and Geoff Dyer, “China Flexes its Diplomatic Muscles,” Financial Times (January 31 2010). 157  “Brussels Stunned as Beijing Cancels EU–China summit,” Euractive (November 27 2008, updated on October 19 2010). 158  Including in March 2009 the encirclement of the US surveillance ship USNS Impeccable by five Chinese vessels in international waters in the South China Sea. See Raul Pedrozo, “Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 62, No. 3 (summer 2009); and Barbara Starr, “Chinese Boats Harassed US Ship, Officials Say,” CNN (May 5 2009). 159  Banyan, “From the Charm to the Offensive: China’s Smile Diplomacy Shows its Teeth,” Economist (January 7 2010). 160  Andrew Jacobs, “With Defense Test, China Shows Displeasure of US,” New York Times (January 12 2010). 161  Drew Thompson, “China’s Cheonan Dilemma,” Foreign Policy (June 7 2010).

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The international press judged China’s handling of the crisis as over-reactive and aggressive.162 At the end of 2010, China’s reaction to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to political dissident Liu Xiaobo, as discussed above, further damaged China’s image. Although China’s foreign policies had not really changed, its diplomatic style seemed more unrelenting than before. Several factors may have played a role in this shift in diplomatic approach. First and foremost, the financial crisis had led to a different international environment, in which China had increased its economic and strategic weight, while Western financial systems were still struggling to recover. This gave China confidence. At the same time, however, Chinese leaders also had to cope with pressure from the international community to take more responsibility in the global fight against the financial crisis. Second, China felt provoked by US actions, such as the 2010 arms sales to Taiwan and US President Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama. Third, Chinese leaders felt insecure about China’s domestic situation. They were engaged in power struggles in the run-up to the 2012 leadership change and felt the need to accommodate the growing voice of nationalist forces in China.163 Whether primarily reactive or more aggressive, China’s confident approach changed its image from that of a benign rising country to one that aggressively asserts its territorial claims, supported by increasingly strong military means. China’s behavior and growing dominance in the region raised particular alarm among Asian countries, which turned to the United States to counterbalance China’s growing power. The United States responded by declaring that it had

162  Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 35 (2011), p. 5; Calum MacLeod, “China’s Aggressive Posture Stuns Japan, Experts,” USA Today (September 28 2010); Julian Ryall, “Chinese Military Aircraft More Aggressive since September, Japan Claims,” The Telegraph (December 30 2010); Minxin Pei, “What China Needs to Learn,” The Diplomat (October 1 2010); and Terry McCarthy, “China’s Aggressive Stance Reveals Lack of Coordination,” YaleGlobal (December 5 2012). 163  See, for example, Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs (March–April 2011); Michael Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 32 (May 11 2010); Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing’s Fears,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2012); Robert S. Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2012); and David Shambaugh, “The Chinese Tiger Shows its Claws.”

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a national interest in the region,164 and soon after announced that it would rebalance or ‘pivot’ to Asia by increasing its investment, “diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise,” in the Asia–Pacific region.165 China denounced the US ‘pivot’ and blamed Washington for raising tensions in the region.166 The Chinese government realized that its behavior and rhetoric throughout 2010 did not serve China’s interests and so changed its tone and posture in 2011 to a less confrontational mode. However, disputes between China and other claimants in the South China Sea and East China Sea, in particular Japan and the Philippines, have kept flaring up and dominate Asian agendas. On the positive side, China has in recent years played a constructive role in helping Europe and the United States deal with the financial crisis, and has mediated in conflicts with various isolated regimes. In Sudan, for example, China’s role in the peace process between North and South Sudan has been called ‘helpful’ by the United States,167 and in Myanmar, China’s efforts in arranging a dialog between the Myanmar government and the rebel Kachin Independence Organization, which are engaged in a violent conflict, have been described as ‘instrumental.’168 China’s offer in May 2013 to broker a meeting between the Israeli prime minister and the Palestinian president was also welcomed by observers as a sign that China wants to take more responsibility in the international arena.169 Both leaders, however, chose to visit China separately. As mentioned earlier, China has been instrumental in establishing and conducting the Six-Party Talks on North Korea, and has recently been praised

164  “Comments by Secretary Clinton in Hanoi, Vietnam,” US Department Of State, Office of the Spokesman (July 23 2010). 165  Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy (November 2011). 166  State Council Information Office, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, White Paper (April 2013). 167  See, for example, the US State Department’s “Briefing on the Current Situation in Sudan” (July 1 2011); and China and South Sudan, Safer World Briefing (London: Saferworld, August 2012). 168  Sun Yun, “China’s Intervention in the Myanmar–Kachin Peace Talks,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 200 (Honolulu, HI: East West Center, February 20 2013). 169  Max Fisher, “Why it’s Great News that China Wants to Mediate Israel–Palestine Talks,” Washington Post (May 3 2013); and Owen Matthews, “China: The Middle East’s New Power Broker. Could China be the Key to Peace between Israel and Iran?,” The Spectator (June 22 2013). Both leaders, however, chose to visit China separately.

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by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon for its ‘constructive’ role in reducing tensions between North and South Korea.170

The Concepts of Harmonious World and Chinese Dream

Closely linked to China’s foreign policy and diplomacy are the political cultural concepts of ‘harmonious world’ (hexie shijie) and ‘Chinese dream’ (zhongguo meng). In the past decade, ‘harmonious world’ has been an important element of China’s public diplomacy narrative. The theory of ‘harmonious world’ was introduced by former President Hu Jintao in 2005171 and officially adopted at the 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in late 2007 as an important cornerstone of China’s foreign policy. The ‘harmonious world’ theory revolves around four broad issues: (1) effective multilateralism with a strong role for the United Nations (UN); (2) development of a collective security mechanism; (3) prosperity for all through mutually beneficial cooperation; and (4) tolerance and enhancement of dialog among diverse civilizations. With the ‘harmonious world’ concept, China underscores that its rise will not be destabilizing but peaceful, and thus counters the perception that a rising China is a threat to the world. It is presented as being deeply rooted in traditional Chinese culture172 and as embodying lofty principles of human civilization, respect for the rights of people and abiding by the laws of nature. In the official view, this means narrowing the gap between rich and poor, aiding disadvantaged groups and making the distribution of wealth fairer. At the international level, it means pursuing world peace and harmony among different nations, and emphasizing cooperation and friendship with countries instead of focusing on problems. The idea of ‘harmonious world’ is thus closely linked to the principle of ‘harmoniously coexisting with differences’ (he er bu tong) (see also chapter three). It alludes to China’s pursuit of a ‘democratization of international relations,’ meaning that China aims for political—economic diversity in international

170  “UN Chief Praises China’s Role in Reducing Korea Tension,” Voice of America News (June 19 2013). 171  “Build toward a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity,” speech by Hu Jintao at the United Nations Summit in New York (September 15 2005). 172  John Delury, “ ‘Harmonious’ in China,” Hoover Institution Policy Review, No. 148 (March 31 2008).

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relations, thus challenging the dominance of the Western norms of liberal democracy and economic liberalism.173 On the Chinese internet, however, the concept of ‘harmony’ (hexie) is often ridiculed. Hexie sounds the same as ‘river crab,’ an image now used to poke fun at Chinese politics. Political cartoons by a cartoonist using the pen name Crazy Crab, for example, have spread widely across China’s internet and the term ‘being harmonized’ has become a euphemism for being censored.174 Outside China, the concept is met with much skepticism too. People point toward China’s not so harmonious activities in Asian territorial waters, or argue that the concepts are used to justify the stifling of dissent and have done nothing to counter the wealth gap and growing corruption.175 The concepts furthermore failed to catch on with the general public abroad, even in China’s own neighborhood. A 2008 public opinion survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs shows that the majority of people in Japan, Indonesia and Vietnam had not heard about ‘harmonious world.’ South Korea was the only exception, with almost 64 per cent of respondents having heard of the concept.176 Recently the concept of ‘harmonious world’ has been moved to the background to make room for a new concept: the ‘Chinese dream,’ or the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’ Discussed for some time but officially launched by President Xi Jinping when he took office in March 2013, the stated goals of promoting the Chinese Dream are to achieve national prosperity and a revitalization of the nation and people’s happiness.177 In his first speech on the 173  Frans Paul van der Putten, “China’s Ideological Diversity,” Global Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2013); and Yun Sun, “Aspiration for the New ‘International Order,’ ” Brookings Blog (March 25 2013). 174  See, for example, the website of China Digital Times, available online at http://china digitaltimes.net/2012/02/introducing-the-hexie-farm-蟹农场-cdt-series/. 175  Li Cheng and Eve Cary, “The Last Year of Hu’s Leadership: Hu’s to Blame?” Jamestown China Brief, Vol. 11, No. 23 (December 20 2011); or see, for example, the Dalai Lama’s statement to commemorate the 49th Tibetan Uprising Day: “The world is eagerly waiting to see how the present Chinese leadership will put into effect its avowed concepts of ‘harmonious society’ and ‘peaceful rise,’ ” online at http://tibet.net/2008/03/10/ statement-of-his-holiness-the-dalai-lama-on-the-forty-ninth-anniversary-of-the-tibetannational-uprising-day-10-march-2008/ (accessed May 2013); pointed out by John Delury in “ ‘Harmonious’ in China.” 176  Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Soft Power in East Asia, Comparative Topline Reports (Chicago, IL: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, June 2008), p. 74; see also Christopher B. Whitney and David Shambaugh, Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion (Chicago, IL: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2008). 177  “President Vows to Press Ahead with ‘Chinese Dream,’ ” Xinhua (March 17 2013); and Ren Zhongping, “Zhu jiu minzu fuxing de zhongguo meng” [Building on the National Revival of

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topic after taking office as president, Xi emphasized that the Chinese Dream “is a dream of the whole nation, as well as of every individual,” and that all Chinese deserve “common opportunities for enjoying a wonderful life.” He added that “China must take the Chinese way, or the way of socialism with Chinese characteristics,”178 thus underlining that China’s new leaders have no plans for Western-style reforms. The Chinese Dream’s concrete meaning, however, is kept vague, enabling people to project their own personal dream on the official concept. In that sense, the slogan is more inspiring for the general public than previous ones, but some Chinese observers point out that this vagueness also makes the concept dangerous, as a wide difference in dreams may spark controversy.179 It has indeed led to a lively debate in Chinese newspapers, journals and on the internet,180 including debates on the dream of constitutionalism. The CCP tries to silence these debates by publishing articles stating what the Chinese Dream is not,181 and emphasizing that ideas such as constitutionalism are ‘inferior’ to the Chinese Dream.182 In addition to its stated goals of achieving national prosperity and revitalizing the nation and people’s happiness, the concept is also designed to help the Chinese leadership unite the Chinese people at a time of growing political and economic uncertainty. The concept of the Chinese Dream is primarily about China’s domestic development, and it is “first and foremost, a dream shared by the 1.3 billion people of China.”183 In addition, however, it also has a foreign policy dimension and the Chinese government is actively incorporating

the Chinese Dream], People’s Daily (April 1 2013). 178  Xinhua, “ ‘Chinese Dream’ Highlighted as Parliamentary Session Concludes,” People’s Daily (March 18 2013). 179  Conversations with Chinese scholars and officials during spring and summer 2013. 180  See also William A. Callahan, China Dreams: 20 Visions of the Future (Oxford and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), who discusses twenty Chinese dreams that are part of key discussions of China’s domestic policies. 181  See also Wang Yiwei, “Debunking Ten Misconceptions of the Ideal of the Chinese Dream,” Global Times (April 11 2013). 182  Yu Zhong, “‘Zhongguo meng’ yu minzhu zhengzhi daolu de xuanze” [The “Chinese Dream” and the Choice of a Road of Democratic Politics], Hongqi wengao (June 13 2013), http:// www.qstheory.cn/hqwg/2013/201311/201306/t20130613_239240.htm (accessed July 2013). This and other articles are discussed by David Bandurski, “China’s Tyranny of Uniqueness,” China Media Project (June 14 2013). 183  Xi in an interview with media from BRICS countries: “President Xi Jinping Gives Joint Interview to Media from BRICS Countries” (March 19 2013); see also Xinhua, “Xi Jinping: Pursuing Dream for 1.3 Billion Chinese” (March 17 2013).

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the idea into its public diplomacy strategy.184 According to President Xi, the Chinese Dream at the international level is about realizing a world shaped by China and Chinese values, since foreigners and foreign policies have only brought misery to China during its ‘century of humiliation.’185 During his maiden trip as China’s president in early spring 2013, Xi often referred to the Chinese Dream in his public talks. In a speech to students at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Xi emphasized that the Chinese Dream will not only benefit the Chinese people, but also the people of all countries.186 A few days later in Tanzania, Xi connected the Chinese Dream with “the African dream of self-development through unity and growth,” and proposed that both sides should “support and help each other to make their respective dreams come true.”187 China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi promoted the concept along similar lines at a 2013 meeting with ASEAN officials and ambassadors, when he said “[t]he Chinese Dream, when realized, will not only benefit the Chinese people, but also promote development of our region and bring benefits to people of various countries.”188 To strengthen the projected image that the Chinese Dream is inclusive and has meaning for the world, the Chinese press has published articles entitled “ ‘Chinese Dream’ is a World Dream”189 and “ ‘Chinese Dream’ Carries Global Significance,” which highlighted positive comments on the concept by foreigners.190 The concept seems to resonate with audiences in Russia and developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, as they share China’s ideas about 184  In June 2013, a high-level Cultural Soft Power Research Forum was devoted to the theme “Soft Power and Chinese Dream;” see Wang Jin and Zhang Na, “Fourth High-level Forum on China’s Cultural Soft Power Held in Beijing,” People’s Daily (July 3 2013); see also, for example, “ ‘China’s Situation. Chinese Dream,’ a Major Exhibition Opening in Hong Kong,” Xinhua (June 22 2013); and “Photo Exhibition ‘China Dream–Beautiful China’ Opens in New York,” Xinhua (May 21 2013). 185  “President Xi Jinping Gives Joint Interview to Media from BRICS Countries” (March 19 2013); and “Xi Pledges ‘Great Renewal of Chinese Nation,’ ” Xinhua Online (November 29 2012). The century of humiliation refers to the period from 1829–1949, when China suffered from foreign interventions and the imperialism of Western countries and Japan. 186  Xinhua, “Xi Calls for New-type International Relations,” China Daily (March 24 2013). 187  “Xi Jinping Delivers a Speech at the Julius Nyerere International Convention Center in Tanzania, Stressing China and Africa will Always Remain Reliable Friends and Faithful Partners” (March 25 2013). 188  “Remarks by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at Meeting with Senior Officials and Ambassadors of ASEAN Countries” (April 2 2013). 189  Uking Sun, “ ‘Chinese Dream’ is a World Dream,” China Daily (March 26 2013). 190  Xinhua, “ ‘Chinese Dream’ Carries Global Significance,” China Daily (March 17 2013).

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national revival and the right to develop along one’s own path.191 In other parts of the world, however, people are more skeptical. The concept does not entail a vision for China’s place in—and responsibilities with regard to—the world, other than the idea that realizing the Chinese Dream will be good for the world, because a stronger China “will assume more international responsibilities and obligations within the scope of its capabilities and make greater contributions to the noble cause of world peace and development.”192 The concept is regularly hijacked by people who dream a different Chinese Dream. Thomas Friedman, for example, calls for a Chinese Dream “that marries people’s expectations of prosperity with a more sustainable China;”193 others hope that it includes dealing with international problems such as North Korea194 and working toward a mutually beneficial solution for China’s territorial disputes with Japan.195 The concept is also applauded by some Western observers as an idea that people— both in China and abroad—can understand and find relevant.196 In China the concept is broadly regarded as ‘another propaganda slogan’ of the government. In July 2013, Xinhua News Agency posted an article providing guidelines to the media to create “positive energy for the ‘Chinese Dream,’ ” by “singing the Chinese Dream as the crescendo of the age” and “bearing responsibility as the documenters and promoters of development as they promote the Chinese Dream.”197 Such guidelines suggest that the Chinese Dream is a dream of the government and promoted by the government, rather than a dream emerging from society. It is not expected, therefore, that the idea of 191  David M. Herszenhorn and Chris Buckley, “China’s Leader Argues for Cooperation with Russia,” New York Times (March 23 2013); and Xinhua, “Trinidad and Tobago PM Hails Chinese Dream,” China Daily (June 2 2013). 192  “President Xi Jinping Gives Joint Interview to Media from BRICS Countries.” 193  Thomas L. Friedman, “China Needs Its Own Dream,” New York Times (October 2 2012); and “Chasing the Chinese Dream,” Economist (May 4 2013). Friedman’s column was translated and published in China. 194  Anne Applebaum, “China’s Empty Dreams,” Slate (April 3 2013). 195  Emi Mifune, “Xi takes ‘Chinese Dream’ to Foreign Diplomacy Arena,” Asahi Shimbun (April 23 2013). 196  Evan Osnos on “The High Bar of the New Chinese Dream,” interview by Asia Society (May 8 2013), available online at http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2013/05/evan-osnos-the-high-barof-the-new-chinese-dream/ (accessed May 2013). 197  “Lun meiti ruhe wei shixian ‘zhongguo meng’ zhuan ti zheng nengli” [How the Media Can Create Positive Energy for the “Chinese Dream”], Xinhua (July 29 2013), available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2013–07/29/c_132581791.htm, discussed and partially translated by David Bandurski, “Dreaming of Docile News Media,” China Media Project (July 29 2013), online at http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/07/29/33688/ (accessed August 2013).

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the Chinese Dream will play a role in China’s society similarly to that of the American Dream, a concept that crystallized out of people’s experiences. It is too early to say whether the concept will be an asset for China’s public diplomacy in some parts of the world, but the domestic and international skepticism noted above indicates that it is unlikely that the Chinese Dream will catch on in Western countries.

China’s Military Rise and Cyber-Security

China’s economic and political rise goes hand in hand with a military rise. Policymakers and the general public in many countries are concerned about China’s growing military budget, its enormous army, and the lack of transparency in military affairs. As we will see in chapter eight, this is more the case in the United States and some countries in the Asian region than in Europe, which does not share direct security interests with China. The ‘limited transparency’ concerning China’s defense spending contributes to the international distrust of China’s military. It also helps to create an image of China as a country that is focusing on, and disproportionally investing in, building its military power, which is not supported by facts.198 Various US scholars and military analysts point out that the increases in China’s official defense budget “are roughly consistent with GDP growth and constitute a declining percentage of central government expenditures.”199 However, while China’s expenditure on its military may not be alarming and China’s military capabilities still lag far behind those of the United States, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is still the major land power in Asia and is engaged in a continuous military modernization program aimed at developing major power-projection capabilities on land, at sea, and in the air.200 In particular, the rapid modernization and expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is drawing attention and raising concern. PLAN has become capable of operating in waters in the 198  Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate” (March 2013), pp. 1–26 at p. 1. See also Dennis J. Blasko, Chas W. Freeman Jr, Stanley A. Horowitz, Evan S. Medeiros and James C. Mulvenon, “DefenseRelated Spending in China: A Preliminary Analysis and Comparison with American Equivalents” (Washington, DC: US–China Policy Foundation, 2007). 199  Liff and Erickson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending,” p. 22. 200  Anthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas S. Yarosh, Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: A Western Perspective (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic International Studies, July 30 2012), p. 11.

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broader Asian region and, to a limited extent, elsewhere. As already discussed, China’s military rise currently figures largely and negatively in international reporting on the regional territorial disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea, but is also an issue with regard to China’s goal of reunification with Taiwan. To counter international concerns about the PLA’s growing capabilities, China has invested much in developing military operations other than war (MOOTW). These operations include counter-piracy, disaster response, and humanitarian relief in China and abroad.201 China thus emphasizes that it aims to achieve security without the use of force, a message that is strengthened by its increased participation in international military cooperation.202 China’s involvement in peacetime missions, such as the international counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden from 2008 onward, has contributed to more friendly relations with the militaries of other participating countries.203 This is not to say that these activities do not serve China’s broader security interests,204 but they have allowed for views of the PLA as being involved in providing public goods and being cooperative in defense of the global system, thus affording China international status and influence.205 One security issue that is increasingly in the news and that worries many around the globe is China’s alleged cyber-espionage campaigns against other governments and militaries, institutions such as the IMF, and corporations and media organizations.206 Cyber-warfare is an important element in China’s security strategy. It is used to gain military knowledge and economic advantage and to send deterrent signals.207 It had been known for years that China is involved in cyber-attacks on government and media offices in various 201  Zhao Lei, “China’s Influence on the Future of UN Peacekeeping,” p. 96. 202   See, for example, Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang (eds), The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), pp. 288–289. 203  Conversation with European high-level military official (October 2010). 204  See, for example, Susanne Kamerling and Frans-Paul van der Putten, “An Overseas Naval Presence without Overseas Bases: China’s Counter-piracy Operation in the Gulf of Aden,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 4 (November 2011), pp. 119–146. 205  Andrew S. Erickson, “A Statement before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Panel III: China’s Political and Security Challenges in the Middle East, China and the Middle East Hearing,” Washington, DC (June 6 2013). 206  Bruce Drake, “China and Cyber-Attacks: A Top Concern of US Experts” (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, February 11 2013). 207  Magnus Hjortdal, “China’s Use of Cyber-Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence,” Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2011), pp. 1–24.

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countries, but for a long time companies and governments kept quiet about the issue.208 In 2010, however, Google broke this culture of silence by announcing that Chinese hackers had infiltrated Google accounts.209 One year later, a report by the US Office of the National Intelligence Executive openly identified and named China “as the country most aggressively seeking to penetrate the computer systems of American businesses and institutions to gain access to data that could be used for economic gain.” From that moment onward, China has been regularly publicly accused of hacking and cyber-espionage.210 In January 2013, China’s cyber-activities made major headlines when the New York Times revealed that it had been persistently attacked by Chinese hackers in the previous months, when the newspaper was investigating the wealth accumulated by relatives of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.211 Other media companies, including Bloomberg, the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Twitter and Facebook soon reported similar attacks.212 This is only the tip of the iceberg, as most victims of Chinese hacking, including governments, do not want to jeopardize overall relations with China and are afraid of Chinese lawsuits or retaliation.213 Chinese cyber-activities are a liability for China’s public diplomacy, as they erode trust and undermine the support of business circles for foreign govern-

208  For the UK, see Peter Warren, “Smash and Grab, the Hi-tech Way,” The Guardian (January 8 2006); and John F. Burns, “Britain Warned Businesses of Threat of Chinese Spying,” New York Times (November 1 2011). For Germany, see Spiegel staff, “Espionage Report: Merkel’s China Visit Marred by Hacking Allegations,” Der Spiegel (August 27 2007); and John Goetz and Marcel Rosenbach, “Cyber Spies: ‘Ghostnet’ and the New World of Espionage,” Der Spiegel (April 10 2009). For India, see Indrani Bagchi, “China Mounts Cyber-Attacks on Indian Sites,” The Times of India (May 5 2008). 209  Andrew Jacobs and Miguel Helft, “Google, Citing Attack, Threatens to Exit China,” New York Times (January 12 2010). 210  Ellen Nakashima, “In a World of Cyber-theft, US Names China, Russia as Main Culprits,” Washington Post (November 3 2011); and US Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013” (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2013). 211  Nicole Perlroth, “Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months,” New York Times (January 30 2013); “Exposing One of China’s Cyber-Espionage Units,” Mandiant (February 2013). 212  Craig Timberg and Ellen Nakashima, “Chinese Hackers Suspected in Attack on The Post’s Computers,” Washington Post (February 1 2013); and Siobhan Gorman, Devlin Barrett and Danny Yadron, “Chinese Hackers Target US Media,” Wall Street Journal (January 31 2013). 213  Nicole Perlroth “Some Victims of Online Hacking Edge into the Light,” New York Times (February 20 2013). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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ments’ engagement with China.214 American experts rank cyber-espionage as a more serious problem than the economic or military challenges that China poses to the United States,215 and US National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon said in March 2013 that Chinese hacking had become a ‘key point of concern’ in relations with China.216 The topic is increasingly put on the agenda of international summits and some countries are establishing cyber-security pacts to protect themselves from the “threat posed by China’s formidable cyber-warfare machine.”217 Some security specialists argue, however, that the issue may be hyped, as “certain actors in the United States and the West have an interest in overestimating China’s capabilities in cyberspace in order to maintain their budgets.”218 Beijing denies that it is behind cyber-attacks and asserts that it is a victim of such attacks from the United States.219 According to Chinese authorities, 13,408 overseas hacking attempts were made on 5.63 million mainframes in China during the first five months of 2013.220 Except for some specialists who suspected that the United States was indeed engaged in cyber-attacks on China,221 nobody believed or paid attention to these reports. In June 2013, however, Chinese allegations were confirmed, when a former CIA agent, Edward Snowden, revealed that the United States has been hacking Chinese cell-phone companies and the prestigious Chinese Tsinghua University.222 While harming the international image of the United States, Snowden’s revelations do little to improve China’s image on this theme. They only show that Beijing is also a victim and do not absolve China of its own cyber-espionage.

214  Lolita C. Baldur, “Cyber Experts Say Calling Out China May Be Working,” ABC News (June 5 2013). 215  Drake, “China and Cyber Attacks.” 216  Cited in Hannah Beech, “Hack Attack: China and the US Trade Barbs on Cyberwarfare,” Time (March 12 2013). 217  Con Coughlin, “China’s Cyber-War Machine Threatens Us All,” The Telegraph (February 19 2013). 218  Magnus Hjortdal, “China’s Use of Cyber Warfare;” and Jason Healy, “No, Cyberwarfare Isn’t as Dangerous as Nuclear War,” US News (March 20 2013). 219  See, for example, Xinhua, “Pentagon’s Cyber-Attack Accusations Irresponsible: Expert,” Global Times (May 7 2013). 220  Li Xiaokun, “China is Victim of Hacking Attacks,” China Daily (June 5 2013). 221  Beech, “Hack Attack.” 222  “Snowden Says US Targets Included China Cell Phones,” South China Morning Post (June 23 2013). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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Chinese Tourists

In recent years, China’s international tourism has sometimes been considered a liability for the country’s public diplomacy. While foreigners often praise Chinese people for their patience, hospitality and humor at home, their behavior as tourists abroad is less appreciated. As the number of Chinese tourists traveling abroad is rapidly rising, the issue is drawing more and more attention. In 2012, China was the largest contributor to international tourism, with 83 million Chinese traveling abroad.223 Newspaper stories abound of incidents around the globe involving Chinese tourists and make it to the ‘top ten most-read articles.’224 Incidents include a Chinese teenager carving graffiti on a 3,500-year-old temple in Luxor, Egypt; a French fashion designer’s announcement that he would bar Chinese tourists from his chic new hotel in Paris; and a South Korean university being invaded by Chinese tourists.225 The problem, resulting mainly from most travelers’ lack of international experience, will most likely be of a temporary character and is not dissimilar from complaints in the past about travel groups from other countries such as the United States and more recently Russia. The Chinese government and Chinese scholars, however, take it very seriously. In mid-May 2013, Chinese Vice-Premier Wang Yang stated that Chinese tourists’ behavior damages China’s image.226 Two weeks later, the Chinese Tourism Agency issued a set of guidelines urging Chinese tourists abroad to protect cultural relics, abide by local regulations, and show courtesy.227 This reaction by China’s government fits into broader Chinese policies aimed at improving the ‘quality’ (suzhi) of people via mass educational campaigns, an issue that will be discussed in more detail in chapter six.

223  World Tourism Organization, “China—the New Number One Tourism Source Market in the World,” Press Release No. 13020 (April 4 2013). 224  Amy Li, “Why are Chinese Tourists So Rude? A Few Insights,” South China Morning Post (June 6 2013). 225  “Chinese Tourists’ Graffiti Sparks National Image Discussion,” Xinhua (May 29 2013); Patrick Boehler, “Chinese Tourists to Be Barred from Chic Parisian Hotel?,” Time (October 3 2012); and Tae-jun Kang, “Ewha Woman’s University Invaded by Swarms of Chinese Tourists,” Koreabang (April 28 2013). 226  Xinhua, “Vice-Premier Stresses Polite Tourist Behavior,” Xinhua (May 16 2013); and Liu Sheng, “Chinese Bride Brawls in French Lavender Field,” Global Times (July 15 2013). 227  Cang Wei and Chen Xin, “Tourists Asked to be on Best Behavior,” China Daily (May 29 2013).

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Conclusions This chapter provides the context for the case studies in subsequent chapters, which will explore how Chinese culture and China’s authoritarian political system, as discussed above, impacts upon the country’s public diplomacy, and how China deals with its assets and liabilities for public diplomacy. Based on the above, however, a few preliminary things can be said about what is attractive or unattractive about China for audiences around the globe. China’s economic success is both an important asset and a liability for public diplomacy. It draws people to study, live and work in China, it inspires developing countries to explore new roads toward economic growth and, after the 2008 global financial crisis, it has even stimulated developed and democratic countries in the West to study and discuss seriously China’s politico—economic model and become more familiar with China’s political choices and the reasons behind them. This may help China in its long-term endeavor to create understanding for, and ultimately acceptance of, its political model. China’s economic rise also sparks fears, but these fears cannot be separated from concerns about China’s political model. It is in particular the combination of China’s economic dominance with uncertainty about its political motives that worries people, in particular in the Western world. China is not trusted to use its economic force for good, and the retaliatory actions discussed in this chapter strengthen the international community’s lack of trust. China’s authoritarian political model and its policies to control society, leading to violations of China’s human rights record and hampering the development of culture as a source of soft power, are a big liability for public diplomacy toward democratic countries. China invests a lot in addressing its image on human rights, but it will not be able to change its negative image as long as it does not structurally change its policies. Modest positive steps toward improving human rights are overshadowed by high-profile cases that underline the lack of political freedom in China. The Chinese government’s strong response to awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo worsened China’s image and its subsequent long-term retaliation toward Norway added to international concerns that a strong China may not play by the international rules. The case of the 2008 Tibetan uprising highlighted China’s struggle in dealing with the foreign press. Foreign reporters’ lack of access to Tibet backfired, because the media had to base their stories on rumors that depicted Chinese authorities as more violent in cracking down on protesters than they had been according to independent observers in the area. The Chinese government, however, learned from this mistake and adjusted its policies. A policy that

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China did not adjust, however, is accusing others of instigating riots, instead of publicly discussing and addressing the socio-economic issues that led to them. This also confirms the image that China does not care about the Tibetan people. China’s foreign policy and diplomacy form a mixed bag. Generally speaking, China does not—or cannot—live up to the high and often unrealistic expectations of the international community. China’s domestic problems and development priorities, lack of experience in Western-dominated international forums (as the example of the Copenhagen Climate Summit shows), and its perception that Western countries are trying to contain China’s rise, make the Chinese leadership wary of fully engaging within the international framework. Positive diplomatic actions, such as China’s mediation initiatives and contributions to solving the financial crisis, are overshadowed by foreign policies that create concern and lead to negative international perceptions, such as China’s current behavior in regional territorial disputes. The image of China’s foreign policy and diplomacy in the Western world is therefore still more that of a troublemaker than a responsible player. In other parts of the world, as we will see in chapter five, the image is sometimes different.

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The Chinese Debate on Public Diplomacy Over the last two decades, public diplomacy policies and activities have become an increasingly important part of China’s foreign policy strategy and diplomatic practice. In November 2012, the importance of public diplomacy in China’s foreign policy strategies was confirmed by inclusion of the term in President Hu Jintao’s report to the 18th National Party Congress. In his report, Hu said that China’s government: [. . .] will take solid steps to promote public diplomacy as well as peopleto-people and cultural exchanges, and protect China’s legitimate rights and interests overseas.1 This endorsement at the highest political level indicates that public diplomacy is in China to stay and that the government will keep expanding and strengthening related policies and strategies. Public diplomacy and soft power are much-debated topics among scholars and officials in China. Consensus exists that developing and improving public diplomacy is a priority for the country. Public diplomacy is regarded as an important tool to ease the ‘trust gap’ with other countries, clarify misunderstandings, and boost China’s global influence. Many scholars and practitioners feel, however, that China is lagging behind the rest of the world in terms of soft power and public diplomacy strategies. China’s top leaders have for years been calling for a strengthening of China’s global outreach. “We should conduct public diplomacy in a more effective way,” said former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in 2007 in an article in China’s main national newspaper, the People’s Daily,2 and this call has been echoed many times by Chinese policymakers and scholars. However, there are many hurdles ahead. The Director of the Office of Public Diplomacy of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wei Xin, detailed the shortcomings of China’s public diplomacy as follows: [. . .] the construction of the theory is in its infancy, there is room for improvement in terms of institution-building, integration of resources, 1  “Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress,” Section IX (November 8 2012). 2  Wen Jiabao, “Our Historical Task at the Primary Stage of Socialism and Several Issues concerning China’s Foreign Policy,” People’s Daily (February 27 2007).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004283954_005 Ingrid

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and the participation of civil society organizations, think tanks, and the public in public diplomacy, and the working style and methods of the relevant government departments, the transition of the discourse system and the development of the quality of employees should all be enhanced.3 In addition to these shortcomings, Chinese diplomats often point out that cultural and ideological differences are important obstacles to enhancing understanding about China abroad.4 This chapter deals with the extensive and lively Chinese debate on public diplomacy and related concepts. It shows how Chinese scholars, after a phase of studying and discussing Western theories and practices, started to develop their own understanding of public diplomacy, sometimes referred to as “public diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.”5 The chapter thus aims to explore what kind of specific public diplomacy characteristics emerge from the Chinese debate and looks at what Chinese scholars say about the impact of Chinese culture on public diplomacy.

The Introduction of Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in China

The idea of soft power, of winning people’s hearts and minds, has been around in China for more than two millennia. A text attributed to Confucianist philosopher Mengzi (372–289 BC), for example, clearly reflects an understanding of the power of attraction: There is a Way for getting the world: if you get the people you will then get the world. There is a Way to getting the people: if you get their hearts you will then get the people. There is a Way for getting their hearts: that which you desire, share with them in accumulating, and that which you dislike, 3  Cited in “Zhuanjia: Gonggong waijiao shi tisheng zhongguo ruan shili de zhongyao xuanze” [Experts: Public Diplomacy is an Important Option to Enhance China’s Soft Power], Jiefangjun bao (July 25 2010). 4  Interviews during the period 2007–2013, but see also former Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom Fu Ying’s remarks in “Chinese Ambassador on Public Diplomacy,” Xinhua Online (July 26 2009), available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/26/ content_11776991.htm; and “Speech by Ambassador Xue Hanqin on China Day Seminar hosted by the Dutch–Chinese Friendship Association” (August 25 2007). 5  See, for example, Zhang Weiwei, “Improving Public Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” China International Studies, No. 3 (2009), pp. 161–174; and Li Weijian, “Review on Expo Public Diplomacy,” website of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (March 21 2011).

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do not inflict on them. People turn toward benevolence like water flowing downward.6 Throughout China’s imperial history, Chinese culture held great attraction for the outside world. China’s civilization and values were not imposed, but people in Asia, Europe and the Middle East felt attracted by stories of the cultural splendor in the Middle Kingdom that were told by foreign traders and envoys. Already during the Tang Dynasty (618–907), China’s advanced civilization, openness to foreigners, and cultural splendors drew large numbers of international traders, official envoys, clerics, performers, soldiers, and students to China.7 One example that is regularly put forward by the Chinese in efforts to showcase Chinese historic public diplomacy are the travels by fifteenthcentury Chinese admiral Zheng He, who, as ‘a messenger of love and friendship,’ sailed the seas with gifts of silk and teas.8 Moving on to modern history, the Chinese Communist Party has also, from the very beginning, understood the power of a good image and good foreign press. Efforts aimed at creating a favorable image, however, were not yet known as public diplomacy, but were called ‘external propaganda’ (duiwai xuanchuan).9 The concepts and terms of public diplomacy (gonggong waijiao)10 and soft power (ruan shili)11 were introduced in China in the early 1990s, but became widely accepted and debated only from 2006 onward. 6  Mencius, Book 4A1, as translated in Mencius and Bryan William van Norden, Mengzi: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2008), p. 94. 7  Mark Edward Lewis, China’s Cosmopolitan Empire: The Tang Dynasty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), section on “Foreigners in Tang China,” pp. 163–178. 8  Wen Jiabao, “See China in the Light of Her Development,” speech at the University of Cambridge (February 2 2009), available online on the website of the Chinese MFA: http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t536420.htm (accessed August 2012). 9  For a detailed description of China’s external propaganda work from the 1930s onward, see Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 10  Until a few years ago, the term ‘public diplomacy’ was also regularly translated as gongzhong waijiao. Gongzhong means ‘the public’ (zhong meaning crowds), whereas gonggong means ‘public’ in the sense of common and communal. 11  The term ‘soft power’ is sometimes translated as ruan liliang or ruan quanli. In recent years the term ruan shili (literally ‘soft capacities’), which was used in the Report to the 17th Party Congress, has been most common. For a brief discussion of these terms, see Chen Zhimin and Song Lilei, “The Conceptual Gap on Soft Power Between China and Europe and Its Impact on Bilateral Relations,” in Pan Zhongqi (ed.), Conceptual Gaps in China–EU

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One of the first Chinese academic works that mentioned public diplomacy is the book Guowai waijiaoxue [Foreign Diplomacy],12 published in 1990, but this work provided only a rough introduction to the concept.13 One of the first in-depth discussions of public diplomacy appeared in 1997 in the book Waijiaoxue gailun [Introduction to Diplomacy] by Lu Yi and others.14 This work and those that followed in the first phase up until 2006, however, still largely focused on introducing and evaluating the concept of public diplomacy, as it was put forward in US literature. The same is true for the concept of soft power. In 1992, Joseph Nye’s first book on soft power, Bound to Lead, was translated into Chinese and published in China, and the concept briefly gained influence. It was picked up by Wang Huning, a political adviser to then Chinese President Jiang Zemin, who discussed it in a 1993 article in an academic journal.15 In his discussion of the sources of soft power, Wang emphasized that the main source of a country’s soft power is its culture, an idea that would become broadly adopted by Chinese scholars and officials, as will be discussed below. In the early 1990s, however, just after the 1989 student uprisings and the Chinese government’s crackdown on protesters at Tiananmen Square, the notion of ‘power of ideas’ was regarded with much suspicion in China. In the eyes of Chinese leaders, it was the introduction of foreign ideas about democracy that had led to the Tiananmen crisis.16 Furthermore, during this period many among the Chinese elites regarded soft power as a “privilege of the West, while considering their nation a victim of a subtle form of power politics.”17 In spite of these skeptical views of this ‘Western concept’ in the early 1990s, the basic idea of soft power became part of the Chinese concept of Relations: Global Governance, Human Rights and Strategic Partnerships (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 50–64. 12  Zhou Qipeng et al. (eds), Guowai waijiaoxue [Foreign Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Gongan Daxue Chubanshe, 1990). 13  Zhao Kejin, Gonggong waijiao de lilun yu shijian [Public Diplomacy: Theory and Practice] (Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Chubanshi, 2007), p. 34. 14  Lu Yi et al., Waijiaoxue gailun (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1997). 15  Wang Huning, “Guojia shili de wenhua: ruan quanli” [Culture as a Component of National Strength: Soft Power], Fudan xuebao (shekeban) [Fudan University Journal] (March 1993), pp. 91–96; and Mingjiang Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity, Parameter and Prospect,” in Mingjiang Li (ed.), Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2009), p. 25. 16  Sheng Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises with its Soft Power (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2008), p. 26. 17  Mingjiang Li, “Introduction—Soft Power: Nurture not Nature,” in Mingjiang Li, Soft Power, p. 12.

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Comprehensive National Power (zonghe guoli). This concept, which was proposed in 1992, can be defined as “the sum total of coercive, economic and ideational power of a nation.”18 It was developed by Chinese strategists to measure and compare countries’ power and thus to determine power hierarchy in the world.19 After introduction of the concept, boosting China’s Comprehensive National Power—including the element of soft power—became an important goal of China’s foreign policy and diplomacy. It was only from roughly 2006 onward, after the concepts of public diplomacy and soft power had caught the attention of China’s top leaders, that scholars took the debate one step further to analyzing the concepts critically and adapting these ideas to suit China’s situation.20 That year, during an internal meeting on foreign affairs, China’s President Hu Jintao is reported to have brought up the importance of soft power for China’s international status.21 One year later, in 2007, Hu addressed the issue of ‘soft power’ in public during his presentation of one of the most important and broadly endorsed documents of China’s political system: the President’s Report to the Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP), in this case the 17th Party Congress.22 After this official political endorsement at the highest level, the study and implementation of public diplomacy and soft power, which by then had been going on for roughly a decade, really accelerated.23 Government organizations 18  David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money and Minds (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: California University Press, 2008), p. 21. The concept was officially proposed at the 14th Party Congress of the CCP in 1992. 19  Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2000), chapter 5. 20  Zhao Kejin, Gonggong waijiao de lilun yu shijian, chapters 1–6; Li Mingjiang, Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity, Parameter and Prospect, Working Paper No. 165 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, September 2008), p. 5; and Li Mingjiang, “China Debates Soft Power,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2008), pp. 287–308, at p. 289. Two years earlier, the concept of soft power had been discussed in a group study session of the Politburo of the CCP in 2004; see Hongyi Lai, “Introduction: The Soft Power Concept and a Rising China,” Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu (eds), China’s Soft Power in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 1–20, at p. 11. 21  Ma Lisi, “Guanyu wo guo jiaqiang ruanshili jianshe de chubu sikao” [Preliminary Thoughts on Strengthening China’s Soft Power], Dangde wenxian [Literature of the Chinese Communist Party], No. 5 (2007), pp. 35–38, as quoted in Mingjiang Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse,” p. 23. 22  “Hu Jintao’s Report to the 17th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party” (October 15 2007), Part VII. 23  See, for example, Zhao Kejin, Gonggong waijiao de lilun yu shijian; Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of China’s Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy

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and CCP organs stepped up their exploration of ways to exercise China’s soft power and created new departments or units to study the concept and develop public diplomacy programs and activities. Many of China’s top universities and think tanks established new departments and study units that focus on public diplomacy research. From 2007 onward, numerous national and international conferences and seminars on public diplomacy took place throughout China, and all major Chinese academic journals on international relations started carrying articles on public diplomacy and/or soft power.24 In early 2010, a Chinese journal devoted entirely to public diplomacy surfaced: Gonggong waijiao jikan (Public Diplomacy Quarterly; hereafter GGWJJK). Interestingly, this journal is not so much an academic initiative as an instrument to support the Chinese government’s conduct of public diplomacy. The journal and the public diplomacy think tank that publishes it, the Charhar Institute, have close links with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The driving force behind it is the Committee’s former spokesman and former Director of the State Council Information Office, Zhao Qizheng, who is China’s most prominent advocate of public diplomacy.25 The current academic literature on public diplomacy covers a wide variety of topics, from the relationship between public diplomacy and soft power to sports diplomacy, and from the roles of Western parliaments in public diplomacy to Buddhist perspectives on the concept.26 The topics most frequently addressed, however, are China’s need for public diplomacy and soft power, the development of China’s public diplomacy practice, and US soft power and public diplomacy.27 A study by Wu Zelin, who analyzed 90 articles on public of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, No. 1 (2008), pp. 257–273; Li Mingjiang, “China Debates Soft Power,” pp. 287–308; and Zhongguo ruanshili wang (China’s Soft Power Network), available online at http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/166866/index.html. 24  Wu Zelin, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao yanjiu wenxian zongshu” [A Review of Chinese Research Literature on Public Diplomacy], GGWJJK, No. 10 (summer 2012). 25   See the website of Gonggong waijiao jikan (hereafter GGWJJK) [Public Diplomacy Quarterly]: http://www.china.com.cn/international/pdq/ (accessed April 2012). The Charhar Institute brings together public diplomacy scholars from China’s major universities, is supported by China’s Foreign Affairs University and aims to strengthen the theory and practice of China’s public diplomacy. For more on Zhao Qizheng’s role in developing public diplomacy in China, see Ingrid d’Hooghe, “Public Diplomacy in the People’s Republic of China,” in Jan Melissen (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy, p. 92. 26  See, for example, the contents of the GGWJJK, Nos. 2, 3 and 9. 27  Wu Zelin, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao yanjiu wenxian zongshu;” Wang Jian, “Shiyi jie san zhongquanhui yilai zhongguo tese zhengdang gonggong waijiao de tedian yu sikao” [Features and Thoughts about Chinese Political Parties’ Public Diplomacy since the

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diplomacy that appeared in Chinese academic journals on international politics during the period from late 2001 until 2011, found that most articles can be divided into three categories.28 The largest group (more than 60 per cent) addresses the practice of public diplomacy, in China or elsewhere; a second group (20 per cent) discusses theoretical and conceptual issues; and a third and small category (2 per cent) consists of articles summarizing the findings of meetings and conferences.29

The Chinese Understanding of Public Diplomacy

The understanding of public diplomacy in China has developed over time and is in constant flux. Like in the Western literature, most scholars place the development of public diplomacy in the context of globalization and changed patterns of communication between people.30 Both scholars and officials regard public diplomacy as an increasingly important part of China’s overall diplomacy,31 especially since China “is now center-stage in the world.”32 The general goals of China’s public diplomacy are to serve China’s foreign policy objectives and its domestic development by improving China’s image in the world. China’s international image is regarded as a key factor, as it is believed to translate into international public opinion on China, which, in its turn, is 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP], in Jia Qingguo (ed.), Gonggong waijiao: lilun yu shixian [Public Diplomacy: Theory and Practice] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2012) pp. 229–243, at p. 230; and Han Fangming, Gonggong waijiao gailun [Introduction to Public Diplomacy] (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, second edition 2012), pp. 4–6. 28  Wu Zelin, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao yanjiu wenxian zongshu.” His search on the term ‘public diplomacy’ in CNKI, a Chinese database of academic journals, led to a total of 653 publications on public diplomacy, including dissertations, during that period. 29  Wu Zelin, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao yanjiu wenxian zongshu.” 30  See, for example, Zhao Kejin, Gonggong waijiao de lilun yu shijian [Public Diplomacy: Theory and Practice] (Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Chubanshi, 2007), chapter 1, pp. 3–36. 31  See, for example, Zhao Qizheng, How China Communicates: Public Diplomacy in a Global Age (Beijing: Foreign Languages press, 2012); Zhang Zhijun, “Zhengfu gonggong waijiao de shijian yu nengli jianshe” [The Practice and Capacity-building of Government Public Diplomacy], GGWJJK, No. 6 (summer 2011); Xing Susu, “Chuli hao ‘waijiao’ yu ‘gonggong’ zhijian de guanxi” [How to Balance ‘Diplomacy’ and ‘the Public’], GGWJJK, No. 9 (spring 2012); and “Senior Chinese Legislator Urges Larger Role for Public Diplomacy,” Xinhuanet (May 5 2011), available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012– 05/11/c_131582978.htm (accessed July 2012). 32  Zhao Qizheng, How China Communicates, p. 23.

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“an important external environment with influence on China’s development.”33 The government and many scholars feel that China’s international image is discredited and demonized by the international media34 and that China must therefore engage in “the international struggle for public opinion.”35 China’s overall public diplomacy goal of improving its image can be broken down into four sub-goals. The first objective is to present the country as a stable, reliable and responsible economic partner, a rising economic power that the international community does not have to fear.36 The question of how this can be achieved by a big and rapidly rising power that still sees itself as a developing country and that has not yet found its identity is a much addressed topic.37 Some answers are found in China’s good-neighbor policy and the ‘harmonious world’ and ‘peaceful rise’ strategies, as they aim to convince people, in particular in Asia, that they can reap economic and security benefits from China’s rise. A second goal concerns China’s aim to be seen as a trustworthy and responsible member of the international political community, capable of and willing to contribute actively to world peace. China’s more active international engagement, which will be discussed in the next chapter, is an example of this strategy. Another goal is the promotion of international understanding for China’s political system and policies. China wants to portray itself as a country that strives to build a ‘harmonious society’ and that works hard to give its people a better future. The image that it tries to convey is that of a developing country in the middle of a slow but fundamental economic transition, confronted 33  Zhao Qizheng, How China Communicates, p. 42; see also Xie Xueping, “Lun wenhua ruan quanli yu zhongguo guijia xingxiang de suzao” [Cultural Soft Power and the Shaping of China’s National Image], Shanxi Shidaxue bao (shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Shanxi Normal University (Social Science Edition), Vol. 36, No. 5, pp. 41–45. 34  See, for example, CIIS scholars Qu Xing, Su Xiaohui and Li Jing, “Jiemi xifang meiti ruhe suzao mohei zhongguo xiangxiang” [How to Decrypt the Way the Western Media Manufacture a Black Image of China], Quishi Lilun Wang (May 23 2012). 35  Chief of Xinhua, Li Congjun, “Laolao zhangwo yulungongzuo zhudong quan” [Firmly Grasp the Initiative in Public Opinion Work], Renmin Ribao (September 4 2012). 36  This paragraph is based on Ingrid d’Hooghe, “The Expansion of China’s Public Diplomacy System,” in Jian Wang (ed.), Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 19–35. 37  Xie Xueping, “Lun wenhua ruan quanli yu zhongguo guijia xingxiang de suzao,” p. 42; Wang Yiwei, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao de sanzhong shiming;” Hu Wei, “Zhongguoren de guoji xingxiang zhi dao” [Ways to Improve the International Image of the Chinese People], GGWJJK, No. 9 (spring 2012), pp. 20–23; and Jia Qingguo, “Jueqi zhong de zhongguo yu gonggong waijiao,” pp. 1–7.

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with enormous challenges to which no easy responses exist. In other words, the world may not expect China’s leaders to take radical steps in political and economic reform, because rash policies will destabilize the country and bring misery to its people. In this context, the Chinese leadership has coined the slogan ‘building toward a harmonious society,’ conveying the message that China is seeking a more comprehensive, balanced and sustainable economic development without sacrificing the people’s needs for the sake of growth. Last but not least, China wants to be acknowledged and respected as an ancient, but vibrant, culture. As we will see below, culture is considered by many to be the core of China’s soft power. It is generally felt that in particular the first goal—that of abating fears about a rising country—and the third goal—that of seeking understanding for China’s political system—are difficult to achieve. Scholars point out that Chinese leaders mistakenly assume that China will be respected when it is strong enough.38 Finally, while not an official goal, a possible side-effect of developing public diplomacy is that it may help China to find its identity. In the words of Jia Qingguo: “the aim of conducting public diplomacy is not only to strengthen other countries’ understanding of China, but also to strengthen our own understanding.”39 He points out that China should first get to know what it wants before it can explain itself to others.

Defining Public Diplomacy

Scholars differ over what public diplomacy actually entails. Many therefore present their own definitions or descriptions of the concept. Three examples, all from established public diplomacy specialists, will be discussed to illustrate the differences, as well as the commonalities, in the understanding of public diplomacy among Chinese practitioners and academics. The first description is from the above-mentioned policymaker and practitioner Zhao Qizheng. He starts by stating that “public diplomacy, together with governmental diplomacy, constitutes a country’s entire diplomacy.” The biggest difference between the two, he writes, is: [. . .] that [public diplomacy] participants do not deal with foreign affairs as representatives of the state; it is precisely therefore that public

38  Wang Yiwei, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao de sanzhong shiming.” 39  Jia Qingguo, “Jueqi zhong de zhongguo yu gonggong waijiao.”

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d­ iplomacy can, in relaxed, lively and flexible ways, tell the story of the country in various forms and on many occasions.40 According to Zhao Qizheng, public diplomacy’s basic tasks are to “explain China to the world and to promote the foreign public’s knowledge of the real China.” Actors include the government, civil-society organizations, social groups, social elites and the broad masses. “Among these,” he continues, “the government is leading, non-governmental organizations, social organizations and the elites constitute the backbone, and the general public is the foundation.”41 On the one hand, this definition highlights the ‘unofficial’ character of public diplomacy, which makes it more flexible than traditional diplomacy; on the other hand, it emphasizes that the government plays a leading role in public diplomacy. Han Fangming, one of the founders of the Chinese public diplomacy think tank the Charhar Institute, and author of Gonggong waijiao gailun (Introduction to Public Diplomacy), defines public diplomacy by listing four features.42 First, he notes that public diplomacy must take place under the auspices of the central government. Actors such as local governments, companies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals must be authorized or entrusted by the central government. If this is not the case, activities and contacts among companies, scholars and social groups, etc., are considered people-to-people exchanges. The second feature concerns the object of public diplomacy, namely foreign publics, not foreign governments. The third pertains to the means of public diplomacy: public relations, broadcasting, cultural exchanges and aid. Lastly, Han distinguishes two aims of public diplomacy: the direct aim is influencing the behavior of foreign publics; the final goal is advancing the realization of one country’s foreign policies goals.43 To conclude his description, Han borrows Zhao Qizheng’s phrase about public diplomacy actors—“the government is leading, the public is the foundation, and the elites constitute the backbone”—but he adds that “the media are the key.”44 Han’s 40  Zhao Qizheng, Gonggong waijiao yu kuawenhua jiaoliu [Public Diplomacy and Communication between Cultures] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2011), p. 4. 41  Zhao Qizheng, Gonggong waijiao yu kuawenhua jiaoliu, pp. 4–5. 42  In addition, Han Fangming is a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the CPPCC National Committee, and he is attached to Peking University as a researcher. 43  Han Fangming, Gonggong waijiao gailun, pp. 8–10. 44  Han Fangming, Gonggong waijiao gailun, pp. 8–10. This phrase, which is repeated with little variation by many scholars, appeared first in Zhao Qizheng, “From People-to-People Diplomacy to Public Diplomacy,” People’s Daily (October 9 2009).

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description more explicitly states public diplomacy’s strategic goals and points out that in order to play a role in public diplomacy, non-governmental actors should be authorized by the government. Scholar Zhao Kejin, in his comprehensive book Gonggong waijiaode lilun yu shixian [Public Diplomacy: Theory and Practice], provides a very short definition. He describes public diplomacy as “a government’s direct exchanges and communication activities with another country’s public.” He further explains that “in the exchange with foreign publics, the emphasis is on the enhancement of understanding, the communication of feelings and the establishment of image,” whereas in the exchange between governments more prominence is given “to power struggles and bargaining of interests.”45 Zhao Kejin warns that public diplomacy should be separated from international exchanges of people, because in the process of public diplomacy, “whether in the foreground or hidden behind the curtain, the entire policy, organization and coordination of public diplomacy is undertaken by the government.”46 Zhao Kejin’s definition focuses more on the ‘soft’ aspects of communication, image-building and enhancing understanding. It coincides with the former definitions, however, in articulating a central role for the government, whether hidden from view or not. These three definitions by Chinese public diplomacy experts emphasize different aspects, but they all reflect an understanding of public diplomacy that largely coincides with a state-centered approach in which the central government aims to hold the reins over public diplomacy strategies and activities. They see the government play a necessary role in planning policies, organizing events, and coordinating non-official bodies and actors, so that all, as ViceMinister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Zhijun puts it, “can bring into play their own specialty or expertise.”47 This role for the government and the need for nonstate actors to be authorized are—explicitly or implicitly—part of almost all definitions by Chinese scholars and officials. Most scholars confirm in interviews that they see a major role for the government in public diplomacy, but it is important to keep in mind that in view of official Chinese policy lines, they risk trouble if they publicly deny a role for the government.

45  Zhao Kejin, Gonggong waijiao de lilun yu shijian, p. 21. 46  Zhao Kejin, Gonggong waijiao de lilun yu shijian, p. 21. 47  Zhang Zhijun, “Zhengfu gonggong waijiao de shijian yu nengli jianshe” [The Practice and Capacity-building of Government Public Diplomacy], GGWJJK, No. 6 (summer 2011).

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New Public Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy 2.0

The concepts of the ‘network model of public diplomacy’ or ‘new public diplomacy’ are not as extensively dealt with in China as in the Western literature, but they do figure in the Chinese debate, in particular in articles that address the impact of new media on China’s public diplomacy, but also—albeit to a lesser extent—within the context of public diplomacy’s domestic dimension. International relations scholar Zheng Hua notes that, compared to traditional public diplomacy, new public diplomacy (1) involves a wider variety of actors and entails a bigger role for non-governmental actors; (2) emphasizes the use of social media; (3) promotes consistency of foreign and domestic outreach; and (4) calls for the assessment of public diplomacy policies. He points out that China’s public diplomacy still largely follows the traditional public diplomacy model, with mainly the government reaching out to foreign publics and a growing but limited role for non-governmental actors. He urges China to follow the international trend and study public diplomacy models in which either the government and non-governmental actors cooperate, or in which non-governmental actors take the lead.48 Zheng Hua sees various benefits of web 2.0 technology for public diplomacy. In addition to giving a voice to grassroots opinion, he writes, it may help governments with good websites to target their audiences better, facilitate government brainstorming, and provide the government with an instrument for inviting target groups to participate actively in the creation of public diplomacy activities. It thus provides a communication platform for public dialog and for feedback on public diplomacy policies.49 Zhao Kejin sees the increasing role of social media as an irreversible trend that will reduce the role of officials in public diplomacy and may help China to overcome the foreign media bias against Chinese policies.50 His view is supported by many. An article in the People’s Daily noted: People tend to spread news among friends, relatives, colleagues and other intimate groups via the internet. They established close relations before 48  Zheng Hua, “Xin gonggong waijiao neihan dui zhongguo gonggong waijiao de qishi” [China’s Public Diplomacy from the Perspective of New Public Diplomacy], Shijie Jingji he Zhengzhi, No. 4 (2011), pp. 143–160. Zheng Hua is Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of International and Public Affairs, Jiaotong University, Shanghai. 49  Zheng Hua, “Xin gonggong waijiao neihan dui zhongguo gonggong waijiao de qishi.” 50  Zhao Kejin, “Wangluo gonggong waijiao dayou kewei” [Bright Prospects for Internet Public Diplomacy], GGWJJK, No. 4 (summer 2010).

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spreading the news, so they tend to find the news more trustworthy than those on traditional media. [. . .] Trustworthiness is the core feature of news spread from person to person via the internet and is the most compelling reason why word-of-mouth publicity should be adopted to promote the overseas publicity work.51 Others, too, argue that the opportunities of social media as a ‘diplomatic force’ outweigh the challenges and that the Chinese government “should use these tools to encourage more social forces to join in the cause of ‘public diplomacy 2.0.’ ”52 They point out that the use of the internet makes US public diplomacy very successful, whereas China’s shielding of social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook causes China’s image much harm.53 Chinese officials, however, struggle with the question of how to deal with the possibilities and challenges that social media pose for shaping their stories and narratives. They often simultaneously call for stimulating and restricting internet publicity. In an article in the People’s Daily, for example, the former Director of the State Council Information Office (SCIO) urged China’s government on the one hand to “provide more rich and various information services through micro-blogs” and to “encourage greater interaction and discussion among internet users through micro-blogs,” but called on the other hand for “strengthening the channeling and control of social media and real-time communication tools.”54 This struggle with the use of social media in shaping China’s image will dominate the development of public diplomacy in China in the coming years. Scholars Li Xiguang and Wang Jing call for the development of Chinese network public diplomacy strategies, as they think that this is the only way that China can fight international misjudgments of it. They see network public diplomacy as a war for public opinion, a war that China is currently losing because its traditional messengers always communicate the Chinese government’s point of view and international audiences therefore do not trust them. 51  Li Xiguang and Wang Jing, “China Needs Public Diplomacy Strategy for Cyberspace,” People’s Daily Online (May 31 2011). 52  Wang Wen, “Web 2.0 shidai de shijie zhengzhi” [Global Politics in the Web 2.0 Era], Waijiao Pinglun, No. 6 (2011). 53  See, for example, Li Fei, “Hulianwang gonggong waijiao zuoyong yanjiu” [An Examination of the Role of Internet Public Diplomacy], Huazhong keji daxue (2011), downloadable at http://cdmd.cnki.com.cn/Article/CDMD-10487-1012016219.htm (accessed August 2012). 54  Wang Chen, “Jiji kaizhan weibo ke yulun yindao gongzuo.” For a translation of the article, see the website of China Media Project: http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/12/06/17390/.

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Li and Wang propose taking advantage of China’s social network of millions of so-called ‘netizens’ and cell phone users who can spread what they know to their friends, colleagues, fellow students, and blog followers.55 They argue that this will help China to let its voice be heard abroad. Others ask for caution in developing network and internet public diplomacy. They point out that it is important to manage networks carefully and to improve the quality of netizens’ communications.56 Many scholars seem to struggle with defining the role of civil society in China’s public diplomacy and are somewhat ambiguous. Han Fangming, for example, emphasizes on the one hand the leading role of the Chinese government, but also writes that “the government cannot arrange public diplomacy” and should therefore authorize non-governmental organizations, interest groups and the general public to participate in shaping overall diplomacy. He regards the question of how to “coordinate governmental and public diplomacy” and “fully mobilize the enthusiasm and creativity of social actors” as one of the most important public diplomacy issues for China.57 Elsewhere, Han discusses network diplomacy and the ‘societization’ of diplomacy as important trends that China needs to study and learn from in order to improve its own public diplomacy.58 He also calls for legislation for civil society organizations so that their work becomes legal.59 The same struggle is visible in the writings of Zhao Kejin, who, as illustrated above, often emphasizes the role of the Chinese government but elsewhere points out that the government should give more freedom to non-state actors to shape public diplomacy.60 In conversations, scholars evade a discussion of this ambiguity and it is unclear whether this stems simply from conceptual difficulties in addressing the roles of different actors or whether they are toeing the party line when they stress the role of the government. A few scholars, 55  Li Xiguang and Wang Jing, “Zhongguo ruhe miandui wangluo gonggong waijiao” [How Should China Deal with Network Public Diplomacy?], GGWJJK, No. 4 (2010). 56  Yang Yifan and Li Baojun, “Wangluo gonggong waijiao: jiyu liangzhong yanjiu shijiao de fenxi” [Network Public Diplomacy: An Analysis based on Two Research Perspectives], Guoji luntan [International Forum], Vol. 14, No. 5 (September 2012), pp. 53–59. 57  Han Fangming, Gonggong waijiao gailun, p. 63. 58  Han Fangming, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao: qushi, wenti yu jianyi” [China’s Public Diplomacy: Trends, Problems and Suggestions], GGWJJK, No. 9 (spring 2012). 59  “Gonggong waijiao, rang waijiao zouxiang touming he minzhu” [Public Diplomacy, Let Diplomacy become Transparent and Democratic], interview with Han Fangming in Nanfang Zhoumo (October 1 2010). 60  Zhao Kejin, “Bawo quanqiu hua shidai gonggong waijiao de guilü” [Grasp the Law of Public Diplomacy in the Era of Globalization], GGWJJK (2010).

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however, are explicitly critical about the role of the Chinese government. Li Wei, for example, points out that China’s government controls too many of society’s resources and that society is not sufficiently nurtured, which makes it difficult to disseminate an image of the Chinese people.61 Public diplomacy scholar Wang Yiwei regards the involvement of non-state actors as one of the challenges of Chinese public diplomacy, not only internally because “Chinese civil society is not yet mature,” but also externally because of a “lack of understanding and longstanding prejudices among Western audiences.” He argues that no matter the role of Chinese civil society, foreign audiences always blame the Chinese government or the Chinese political system for cultural or conceptual differences.62

Public Diplomacy and Propaganda

There is little discussion in China on the much-addressed dichotomy in the Western literature between public diplomacy and propaganda. One likely reason is that in Chinese, as in some other languages but as distinct from its meaning in English, the word for propaganda (xuanchuan) has a neutral meaning. When Chinese authorities realized in the 1990s the bad international connotation of the word propaganda, they ordered the official translation to be changed into ‘publicity,’63 but the Chinese term remained the same. Another reason may be that an in-depth discussion of the distinction between the two concepts is too politically sensitive in China. It would touch upon issues such as government transparency and the (lack of ) accuracy and completeness of information in past propaganda campaigns. A few scholars, however, do address the issue. Zhang Guizhen, for example, writes that traditional propaganda did not always consider the truthfulness of information, as it was focused on imbuing people with ideology.64 Han 61  Li Wei, cited in Zhao Kejin, “Ruhe chuanbo zhongguoren xingxiang” [How to Communicate the Image of the People], GGWJJK, No. 9 (spring 2012). 62  Wang Yiwei, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao de sanzhong shiming” [The Three Missions of China’s Public Diplomacy], GGWJJK, first issue (spring 2010). 63  The official note by the Central Committee of the CCP was published in 1997. Su Shumin, “Gonggong waijiao yu tisheng guojia ruan quanli” [Public Diplomacy and Promoting a Country’s Soft Power], Lanzhou Xuekan, No. 2 (2008), pp. 23–27, at p. 26. 64  Zhang Guizhen, “Duiwai xuanchuan xiang gonggong waijiao de zhuanxing: cong aoyunhui dao shibo” [The Transformation from External Propaganda to Public Diplomacy: From the Olympic Games to the World Expo], Guandian zhongguo (September 17 2010), available online at http://opinion.china.com.cn (accessed August 2012).

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Fangming states that public diplomacy and political propaganda differ in three ways: in the relationship between messenger and audience; in content and form; and in goals. In public diplomacy, he writes, the relationship between messenger and audience is equal; authenticity of information is a number-one prerequisite; the form is fine-tuned to the audience; and the goal is overall and long term, namely the establishment of a good image for the country. In political propaganda, however, the messenger is superior to the audience, the form is unyielding, and the purpose is often short-term and specific. The content of political propaganda is not addressed in the article.65 Some argue that the policy to change the English translation of xuanchuan from ‘propaganda’ to ‘publicity’ should be seen as a sign that China’s public diplomacy practices have moved away from the traditional concepts of propaganda—that is, from using ‘false information’ to requiring information to be “reliable and true, based on facts well known to the public.”66 Zhang Guizhen also points out that the introduction and use of the term public diplomacy in China signifies more than a change of words; it refers to a fundamental shift in structure, process and people’s attitudes and has led to a more active and interactive outreach involving non-governmental actors.67 As mentioned above, many others discuss the need for Chinese public diplomacy to involve more non-governmental actors, without referring specifically to the public diplomacy/propaganda dichotomy. They emphasize that while the government and its policies constitute a major element of a country’s overall image, the people—as carriers of the image—are as important.68 Another factor that sets public diplomacy apart from propaganda in the Western literature—the dialog or two-way street approach—has also received

65  “Gonggong waijiao, rang waijiao zouxiang touming he minzhu,” interview with Han Fangming in Nanfang Zhoumo (October 1 2010). 66  Su Shumin, “Gonggong waijiao yu tisheng guojia ruan quanli,” p. 26. See also Jia Qingguo, “Jueqi zhong de zhongguo yu gonggong waijiao” [A Rising China and Public Diplomacy], Gonggong waijiao jikan, No. 9 (spring 2012); and Zhao Qizheng, Gonggong waijiao yu kuawenhua jiaoliu. 67  Zhang Guizhen, “Duiwai xuanchuan xiang gonggong waijiao de zhuanxing.” 68  Hu Daoming, “Lun zhongguo guojia xingxiang ji qi goujian: Jian xi ‘hexie shijie’ waijiao linian” [On China’s National Image-building: Analyzing the Diplomatic Concept of ‘Harmonious World’], in 2008 Niandu shanghai shi shehui kexue jie di liu jie xueshu nian hui wenji (shijie jingji guoji zhengzhi guoji guanxi xueke juan [Proceedings of the 2008 Sixth Shanghai Social Sciences Conference (Volume on World Economy, International Politics and International Relations)] (Shanghai, 2008)).

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much attention in recent Chinese writings.69 Jia Qingguo suggests that China should not only become more open-minded and able to accept criticism, but that in case the criticasters are correct, it should change its behavior and policies.70 The Chinese government regularly does so, as we will see in chapters four and five.

Soft Power

As discussed above, the concept of soft power was introduced in China in the early 1990s, and began to gain more scholarly attention from 2002 onward. During this first phase, many scholars introduced and accepted the concept as Joseph Nye defined it. It was only after the highest echelons of Chinese policymaking officially endorsed the concept in 2006 that the Chinese debate on soft power deepened and that Chinese scholars began to criticize Nye’s concept. Most scholars agree with Nye that it is important to emphasize the importance of non-coercive, ‘soft’ aspects of a country’s policies and behavior71 and that a country’s soft power is enhanced by means of public diplomacy.72 Many argue, however, that Nye fails to elaborate adequately on the relationship between hard and soft power and that Nye’s definition of soft power remains ‘obscure.’73 Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi, for example, write that Nye’s distinction between soft and hard power is “too simple and absolute,” because whether a certain type of power is considered soft or hard depends on the perceptions and feelings of the actor in a specific situation.74 They and others call 69  For example, Zhao Qizheng, How China Communicates; Zhao Qizheng, Cross-Border Dialog: the Wisdom of Public Diplomacy (Beijing: New World Press, 2012). 70  Jia Qingguo, “Jueqi zhong de zhongguo yu gonggong waijiao.” 71  See, for example, Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi, “Guoji zhengzhi zhongde ruan liliang yiji dui zhongguo ruan liliang de guancha” [Soft Power in International Politics and Observations of China’s Soft Power), Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi, No. 7 (2007), pp. 133–138. 72  See, for example, Zhong Xin, “Xin gonggong waijiao: ruan shili shiye xia de quanmin waijiao” [The New Public Diplomacy: A Soft Power Perspective on People’s Diplomacy], Xiandai chuanbo, No. 9 (2011), pp. 51–55, at p. 51; Su Shumin, “Gonggong waijiao yu tisheng guojia ruan quanli,” p. 24; and “Zhuanjia: Gonggong waijiao shi tisheng zhongguo ruan shili de zhongyao xuanze” [Experts: Public Diplomacy is to Enhance China’s Soft Power], Jiefangjun Bao (October 25 2010). 73  Yu Xintian, “The Role of Soft Power in China’s External Strategy,” Global Review, trial issue (2007), pp. 113–127, at p. 114. 74  Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi, “Guoji zhengzhi zhongde ruan.” See also Yu Xintian, “The Role of Soft Power in China’s External Strategy,” pp. 113–127.

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for an integrated approach, as they regard soft power as a prerequisite for the ­development of hard power and vice versa, and argue that any source of power can be hard and soft at the same time.75 In the Chinese understanding, hard and soft power are thus more intertwined and in agreement with the policy line that they are both essential parts of a state’s Comprehensive National Power. Former President Hu in fact argues in favor of using smart power when he states: [. . .] the enhancement of China’s international status and international influence must be reflected both in hard power—including the economy, science and technology—and national defense power, and in soft power such as culture.76 Other scholars criticize the American understanding of soft power as being too ‘instrumental’ and aiming for ‘soft hegemony.’77 Ye Qing, for example, expresses a broadly shared feeling when he writes how soft power has become a weapon in the competition between countries: Increasingly unable to curb the development of the emerging powers in the political and economic fields, the traditional powers increasingly emphasize the use of soft power, thereby trying to continue the monopolization of international rule-making power; [. . .] the values alliance has also become an important tool of Western developed countries to maintain internal unity and to differentiate themselves from emerging countries.78 Li Shulei from the Central Party School in Beijing takes a similar view: Culture is first and foremost an expression of our souls and emotions, our spiritual home. But to speak plainly, some powerful foreign nations wish 75  See, for example, the introduction to Han Bo and Jian Qingyong, Ruan shili: Zhongguo shijiao [Soft Power: A Chinese Perspective] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2009); but also Gong Tieying, Ruan quanli de xitong fenxi. 76  Former President Hu Jintao in an internal speech of January 2006; Ma Lisi, “Guanyu wo guo jiaqiang ruanshili jianshe de chubu sikao” [Preliminary Thoughts on Strengthening China’s Soft Power], Dangde wenxian [Literature of the Chinese Communist Party], No. 5 (2007), pp. 35–38, as quoted in Mingjiang Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse,” p. 23. 77  Chen and Song, “The Conceptual Gap on Soft Power between China and Europe.” 78  Ye Qing, “Qianxi zhongguo tese renwen waijiao” [Analysis of Cultural Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics], Guoji zhanwang [International Perspectives], No. 1 (2010).

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to use culture as a weapon against other nations, and for this reason we must work hard to raise our country’s ‘soft power.’79 Scholars and officials see a global fight for the right to speak. They feel that China is losing the competition because of a soft power deficit and a lack of channels to reach global audiences, as will be discussed further below. The most hotly debated aspect of soft power in China, however, concerns the sources of soft power. The prevalent view among scholars and policymakers is that culture is the most important source of soft power.80 A leading advocate of this view is former director of the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, Yu Xintian. According to Yu, soft power consists of three components: thoughts, ideas and principles; international and domestic institutions; and strategies and policies, all of which reflect a country’s culture. Culture is therefore the core. Yu rejects Nye’s identification of three major resources of soft power, pointing out that it is “a repetition to put culture with either ideas or political value in parallel.”81 Most scholars agree with Yu that culture is the main source of soft power,82 and so does China’s leadership.83 This emphasis on cultural soft power stems from a view that culture is the essence of a country’s identity as well as a realization that China’s political values are a hard 79  Li Shulei in an interview in the 21st Century Business Herald, as quoted in David Bandurski, “Hitting Hard with ‘Soft Power:’ China Explores Macro-Measures to Bolster its Global Cultural Prowess,” China Media Project (January 15 2008), available online at http://cmp .hku.hk/2007/12/19/797/ (accessed January 2012). 80  See, for example, Guo Jianyu, Zhongguo wenhua qiangguo zhanlue [China’s Cultural Power Strategy] (Beijing: Gaodeng Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2012); Xie Xueping, “Lun wenhua ruan quanli yu zhongguo guijia xingxiang de suzao” [Cultural Soft Power and the Shaping of China’s National Image], Shanxi Shidaxue bao (shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Shanxi Normal University (Social Science Edition)], Vol. 36, No. 5. pp. 41–45. 81  Yu Xintian, “The Role of Soft Power in China’s External Strategy,” p. 114. 82  See, for example, Guo Jianyu, Zhongguo wenhua qiangguo zhanlue [China’s Cultural Power Strategy] (Beijing: Gaodeng Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2012); Lu Gang, “Wenhua shili ruo rang zhongguo shifen” [Weak Soft Power Leads to China’s Decline], Huanqiu Shibao (June 20 2007); and Li Zhi (Communications University), He Chuanqi (CASS) and Han Bo (China’s soft power research group at Peking University), as cited in “How to Improve China’s Soft Power?,” People’s Daily Online (March 11 2010). 83  See, for example, the documents of the special meeting held in summer 2007 by the CPPCC on the topic of China’s culture as a major resource for building China’s soft power, available online at http://cppcc.people.com.cn/GB/34961/90780/index.html and on Renmin Wang [People’s Net] http://cppcc.people.com.cn/GB/34961/45591/63417/6011383.html (last accessed July 2012). See also Ingrid d’Hooghe, “Into High Gear: China’s Public Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2008), pp. 37–61, at p. 45.

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sell. Furthermore, the example of US cultural soft power, which remains strong even during periods of severe criticism of US policies, may have contributed to the preference for culture as the core of soft power.84 There is also a group of prominent scholars, however, that considers political power to be the core of soft power. This group’s leading proponent, Yan Xuetong, asserts that the enhancement of cultural strength does not necessarily lead to enhancement of a country’s soft power. In his view, soft power is operational power and political power carries the ability to ‘operate’ or effect changes, whereas culture is only a ‘passive’ source.85 In another article, Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin propose defining soft power as “a combination of a country’s international attractiveness, and its external and internal mobilization capabilities.” For Yan and Xu, the first element refers to the attraction of a country’s political system or cultural model; international mobilization capacity concerns the “non-compulsory influence of a country to allow others to accept its proposals or demands” and is “derived mainly from strategic partnerships with other countries or its powers for formulating international rules and regulations;” and domestic mobilization capability is “the internal political support a country can muster through non-compulsory means.” Shedding light on the importance of the domestic dimension of public diplomacy in China, Yan and Xu point out that failure to win domestic support for its foreign policy would lead to “international apathy.” China’s internal mobilization ability therefore “has a direct bearing on its international influence.”86 Political scientist Su Changhe also focuses on political soft power, which for him is evident in a state’s ability in international institution-building, agenda-setting, the mobilization of coalitions and ability to fulfill commitments.87 Many scholars identify various sources of soft power without regarding a particular source as being the core. Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi see China’s soft power mainly manifested in the Chinese modernization model, multilat-

84  Fang Changping, Zhong mei ruan shili bijiao ji qi dui zhongguo de qishi [A Comparison between Chinese and US Soft Power and the Implications for China], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi, No. 7 (2007), pp. 160–165. 85  Yan Xuetong, “Ruan shili de hexin shi zhengzhi shili” [The Core of Soft Power is Political Power], Huanqiu Shibao (May 23 2007). 86  Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin, “Sino–US Comparisons of Soft Power,” Contemporary International Relations, No. 2 (March–April 2008), pp. 16–27. 87  Su Changhe, “Zhongguo de ruan quanli: Yi guoji zhidu yu Zhongguo de guanxi wei li” [China’s Soft Power: An Example in the Relationship between China and International Institutions], Guoji Guancha [International Observations], No. 2 (2007), pp. 27–35.

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eralism, economic diplomacy, and a good-neighborly policy.88 Gong Tieying, in his book The Systematic Analysis of Soft Power, argues that the sources of soft power lie in the dimensions of institutional power, which refers to the ability to establish new international institutional arrangements; identifying power,89 which concerns a country’s ability to let other countries recognize its leadership role; and co-optive power, which refers to the attractiveness of a country’s culture, values and social system.90 Others seek resources for soft power in China’s ‘comparative advantages’ and find that they include “the moral justice of socialist ideology,” economic development, and the ‘Chinese experience’ and ‘Chinese model,’ as developed during China’s modernization process.91 The Chinese debates on sources of soft power are discussed in more detail below.

Cultural and People’s Diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy (wenhua waijiao) and people’s diplomacy (renmin waijiao, or minjian waijiao)92 have always been part of the diplomatic picture in the People’s Republic of China. In recent years, however, in line with the call to strengthen China’s cultural soft power, their roles have been strengthened and they are now regarded as major elements of China’s public diplomacy strategy and the best instruments to show China’s political, socioeconomic and cultural developments to the world. Furthermore, they are seen as helpful diplomatic tools when relations between countries are strained and as a good basis upon

88  Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi, “Guoji zhengzhi zhongde ruan liliang yiji dui zhongguo ruan liliang de guancha” [Soft Power in International Politics and Observations of China’s Soft Power), Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi, No. 7 (2007), pp. 133–138. 89  Translated in Gong Tieying’s book as ‘identity power,’ p. 3. 90  Gong Tieying, Ruan quanli de xitong fenxi [The Systematic Analysis of Soft Power] (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 2008), chapters 2–4. 91  Huang Jinhui and Ding Zhongyi, “Lun zhongguo ruan shili jianshe de bijiao youshi yu yueshu yinsu: yi ‘ziyuan bingfu—xingwei nengli’ wei shijiao” [On the Comparative Advantages and Limitations of China’s National Soft Power Construction: From the Perspective of “Resource Endowment Behavior Capacity”], Jiaoxue yu yanjiu [Teaching and Research], No. 10 (2011), pp. 66–73, at p. 68. 92  The terms renmin waijiao (people’s diplomacy) and minjian waijiao (diplomacy between people) are most frequently used; see Cheng A-juan, Lun gonggong waijiao he minjian waijiao de guanxi [On the Relationship between Public Diplomacy and People’s Diplomacy], Langfang shifan xueyuan xuebao, Vol. 24, No. 2 (April 2008), pp. 69–70.

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which to conduct more difficult dialogs in the areas of politics, the economy, and the military.93 Many consider people’s diplomacy and cultural diplomacy to be closely related or even intertwined, and in 2008 a term and concept that brings the two together was put forward: renwen waijiao.94 Renwen includes the words for people (ren) and culture (wen), and thus refers to both cultural and people’s diplomacy. Renwen waijiao is often translated as ‘cultural diplomacy,’ but renwen can also mean ‘people’s’ as in renwen aoyun, which was officially translated by Chinese authorities as ‘People’s Olympics,’ one of the official characteristics of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (see chapter six). It was the experience of China’s Olympic diplomacy, and in particular the promotion of the Games as renwen Olympics, that inspired the Chinese government to advance the concept.95 In his report to the CPC Central Party School on “the international situation and diplomatic work after the Olympics,” former Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi called upon China to “strongly promote renwen diplomacy.”96 One year later at the Eleventh Diplomatic Envoys’ Meeting, China’s supreme leader, former President Hu Jintao, also urged for a “strengthening of public and renwen diplomacy.”97 Zhao Kejin notes that this was the first time that China’s highest leader, “from a strategic perspective, [. . .] pointed out the direction for the development of China’s renwen diplomacy.” Zhao argues that there is not an equivalent term found in Western countries, which therefore mix up people-to-people, cultural, and public diplomacy. He identifies four characteristics of renwen diplomacy: actors are authorized by the government, otherwise their activities belong in the realm of cultural exchanges; the content concerns the field of humanities and includes issues such as language, religion, ethnicity, ideology, culture, education, science and technology, tourism, and sports; it is flexible and should serve the people, thus forming a counterweight to power politics; and finally, it is a strategic tool 93  Zhao Qizheng, Gonggong waijiao yu kuawenhua jiaoliu, p. 16. 94  Renwen waijiao; see, for example, Qin Shu, “Zhongguo tichu renwen waijiao xin silu” [China Proposes the New Idea of Renwen Diplomacy] (March 8 2009). 95  Qin Shu, “Zhongguo tichu renwen waijiao xin silu;” and “Yang Jiechi zhuanti baogao: Aoyun hou de guoji xingshi yu waijiao gongzuo” [Yang Jiechi: The International Situation and Diplomatic Work after the Olympics], Xuexi Shibao [Study Times] (October 20 2008), available online at http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/135921/8198474.html (accessed July 2012). 96  “Yang Jiechi zhuanti baogao.” 97  Lin Xiumin, “Hu Jintao: Waijiao yao ba yingdui jinrong weiji chongji zuowei zhongyao renwu” [Hu Jintao: Diplomacy should Respond to the Impact of the Financial Crisis], Zhongguo xinwen wang (July 21 2007), available online at http://intl.ce.cn/zgysj/200907/21/ t20090721_19584448.shtml (accessed August 2012). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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that facilitates implementation of a country’s foreign policy by improving its image.98 Renwen diplomacy may take three forms: ideological diplomacy (sixiang waijiao); cultural diplomacy (wenhua waijiao); and people’s diplomacy (renjian waijiao). Ideological diplomacy refers to countries’ interactions in the field of ideology and values, covering the formulation of foreign policy and diplomatic activities at all levels of people-to-people exchanges. Its purpose is to defend and expand a country’s ideology and core values. Cultural diplomacy, with its emphasis on international exchanges in the educational, scientific, cultural and artistic fields, is regarded as the most important part of renwen diplomacy. Finally, people-to-people diplomacy partly embodies the domestic dimension, as it is considered a bottom—up process that involves large-scale domestic and international exchanges between different sectors of society and common people. According to Ye Qing, the rationale behind China’s current focus on renwen diplomacy is the need to adapt Chinese diplomacy to the trends of globalization and to close the gap with international civil society. He argues that compared to people’s diplomacy, renwen diplomacy is more strategic in character, as it is consciously developed to serve China’s national development.99 He and others see the strategic role that cultural diplomacy could play in China’s overall diplomacy being strengthened after the 2008 global financial crisis. They argue that Western values are being questioned more often and that emerging powers are increasingly involved in the ongoing construction of the international system.100

The Domestic Dimension

Officials and academics in China have from the start discussed soft power and public diplomacy in the domestic as much as in the international context.101 Domestic outreach is regarded as a natural element of public diplomacy. When 98  Zhao Kejin, “Renwen waijiao: xingqi, lilun yu jizhi” [Renwen Diplomacy: Rise, Theory and Mechanisms], GGWJJK, No. 8 (2011). 99  Ye Qing, “Qianxi zhongguo tese renwen waijiao” [Analysis of Cultural Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics], Guoji zhanwang [International Perspectives], No. 1 (2010); Zhao Kejin, “Renwen waijiao;” and Jin Zhengkun and Tang Nina, “Dangdai zhongguo waijiao de xin lujing: renwen waijiao chutan” [The New Path of Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy: A Preliminary Study on Renwen Diplomacy], Jiaoxie yu Yanjiu, No. 8 (2009). 100  Interviews; see also Ye Qing, “Qianxi zhongguo tese renwen waijiao.” 101  Interviews with academics and officials from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; see also Ingrid d’Hooghe, “The Rise of China’s Public Diplomacy,” Clingendael Diplomacy Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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I asked Chinese policymakers and diplomats during interviews in 2007–2008 to explain how the two are related, the interlocutors often had difficulties in elaborating on such a ‘self-evident’ issue. At the practical level, the term public diplomacy is often used interchangeably with what most scholars in the West call ‘public affairs’ or ‘domestic outreach.’102 The Department of Information of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), for example, organizes various activities to inform domestic audiences about China’s foreign policy and diplomacy under the heading of ‘public diplomacy.’ With the aim of shortening the distance between Chinese diplomats and ordinary Chinese people, the ministry gives lectures, organizes conferences and internet discussions, and invites citizens from all walks of life to visit the foreign ministry.103 Only some Chinese scholars point out that these activities organized by the MFA belong to the realm of public affairs and should not be called public diplomacy.104 While they, like most Western scholars, distinguish between the two concepts on the basis of audience, Zheng Hua argues that there is another difference. He points out that public affairs aims to inform people and public diplomacy aims to influence people.105 Zhao Qizheng, too, distinguishes between a government’s domestic and foreign outreach, but nevertheless considers a government’s contacts with its own publics to be an important part of the public diplomacy dialog system.106 This view that the domestic dimension is an inseparable element of China’s public diplomacy policies is part of the view that internal affairs and diplomacy as a whole should be integrated.107 “Domestic and international affairs should Paper, No. 12 (July 2007), p. 6, available at http://www.clingendael.info/publications/ 2007/20070700_cdsp_paper_hooghe.pdf. 102  Interviews in Shanghai and Beijing in March 2007 and documents of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See, for example, “Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing Gives YearEnd Interview to People’s Daily” (December 20 2005), website of the Chinese MFA, available online at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t227889.htm; or “Academic Seminar on China’s Public Diplomacy” (March 19 2004), at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wshd/ t80368.htm (accessed March 5 2007). 103  Website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Close Friends Gather Together: The Foreign Ministry Holds the First ‘Public Day’ Activity in 2006” (June 3 2006); and “Gathering in 2007: Joining Hands with China’s Diplomacy: Sidelights on the 2007 First Public Open Day of the Foreign Ministry” (May 19 2007). 104  Wang Yiwei, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao de sanzhong shiming.” 105  Zheng Hua, “Xin gonggong waijiao neihan dui zhongguo gonggong waijiao de qishi,” p. 150. 106  Zhao Qizheng, How China Communicates, p. 30. 107  Interviews with foreign affairs officials at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at Chinese embassies in Washington DC, Brussels and The Hague during the period 2007–2011.

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be seen as a whole,” writes Yuan Peng,108 and former Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi states that public diplomacy “should look both inward and outward, as it always serves both domestic reform, development and stability and international peace, development and cooperation.”109 Yang furthermore points out that efforts to make international audiences understand China, and to make domestic audiences understand the international situation and China’s diplomacy, complement and reinforce each other.110 Dialog with domestic audiences is seen to increase the domestic legitimacy of China’s foreign policy, as well as to contribute to a more successful public diplomacy, because the more that domestic audiences know about China’s foreign policies, the better they can support and promote them as citizen diplomats. Former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Zhijun explains that the Chinese government and the MFA pay much attention to domestic outreach because there is a rapid upsurge in interest and participation in foreign affairs by the domestic Chinese public. It “deepens the exchange of information between the government and ordinary people,” many of whom are considered to lack understanding of Chinese foreign policy and diplomatic work.111 The domestic aspect is also clearly indicated in the above-quoted report by Hu Jintao to the 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2007, where he said that enhancing cultural soft power should better guarantee people’s cultural rights. Indeed, strengthening China’s cultural soft power and in particular renwen diplomacy is regarded by many as a tool that encourages the Chinese government to take the people’s interests into account.112 In addition to reducing international suspicion about and hostility toward China’s rise, they argue, public diplomacy may also contribute to promoting domestic reforms and China’s efforts constantly to improve itself.113 It “can help to bridge social gaps and defuse hostility in society [and thus] achieve the integration of the country, ultimately creating prosperity, freedom, harmony.”114 Former Chinese 108   Yuan Peng, “A Harmonious World and China’s New Diplomacy,” Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 17, No. 3 (May/June 2007). 109  Yang Jiechi, “Nuli kaita zhongguo tese gonggong waijiao xin jumian” [Strive to Develop a Public Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics] (February 16 2011), website of China’s central government at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2011-02/16/content_1804163.htm (accessed September 2012). 110  Yang Jiechi, “Nuli kaita zhongguo tese gonggong waijiao xin jumian.” 111  Zhang Zhijun, “Zhengfu gonggong waijiao de shijian yu nengli jianshe” [The Practice and Capacity-building of Government Public Diplomacy], GGWJJK, No. 6 (summer 2011). 112  See, for example, Jin Zhengkun and Tang Nina, “Dangdai zhongguo waijiao de xin lujing.” 113  Jia Qingguo, “Jueqi zhong de zhongguo yu gonggong waijiao.” 114  Han Bo and Jian Qingyong, Ruan shili.

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Ambassador and President to China’s Foreign Affairs University Wu Jianmin expresses a similar idea when he says “[i]nternally speaking, soft power is a kind of cohesive force; externally speaking, it is a feeling of affinity, and it can’t be imposed upon others.”115

Sources of Soft Power

Chinese Culture as a Source of Soft Power As discussed above, most Chinese scholars and officials regard culture as the primary source of China’s soft power and the country invests much in strengthening culture and in developing cultural diplomacy. Policymakers believe that “[a] country without modern cultural accomplishments and influences will not be respected, no matter how vigorous its economy is.”116 The debate on China’s ‘cultural soft power,’ as most Chinese refer to it, focuses on three aspects: the idea that China’s culture needs to be protected against the invasion of foreign, in particular Western, culture; the country’s inability to capitalize on culture; and the question of which cultural aspects to promote. The idea that China’s rich cultural heritage needs to be protected against the (perceived) global dominance of Western culture is the major underlying idea of the campaign to strengthen China’s cultural soft power. Officials and academics are urged to “fight cultural dominance by the West,” by developing policies that safeguard China’s “cultural security” and “improve the country’s core cultural competitiveness.”117 This view became widely debated in China and abroad after an article by former President Hu Jintao in the Chinese magazine Qiushi, based upon a speech that Hu gave in 2011 at the annual Plenum of the CCP’s Central Committee, stated: International hostile forces are intensifying the strategic plot of Westernizing and dividing China, and ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration. [. . .] We should deeply understand the seriousness and complexity of the ideological struggle,

115  [Significance of Cross-cultural Communication Can’t Be Underestimated], interview with Wu Jianmin, People’s Daily Online (September 5 2006). 116  “China Must Promote its Cultural Industry,” China Daily (December 12 2007). 117  Hua Jian, “Culture will be Powered Up,” China Daily (November 3 2011).

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always sound the alarm and remain vigilant, and take forceful measures to be on guard and respond.118 Hu argues that, as a remedy, China should work hard to strengthen its cultural soft power, which should be based on “socialist culture with Chinese characteristics,” a call regularly repeated by current President Xi Jinping, who adds that these values should be integrated with the “publicity and interpretation of the Chinese Dream.”119 Hu’s article was furthermore intended to raise vigilance against the infiltration of American ideology and values via information networks and other Western efforts to bring about a ‘peaceful evolution’ in China,120 a Chinese threat perception that has increased in recent years, in particular in the wake of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution and subsequent Arab Spring movement in the Middle East and North Africa. According to Gong Fangbing, senior PLA colonel and professor at China’s National Defense University, cultural security, which is regarded as being ‘highly intertwined’ with cyber security and ideological security, is one of five types of ‘unconventional security threats’ targeted by China’s recently established national security committee.121 Many scholars and practitioners point out, however, that promoting China’s own culture and values is a challenging task. They realize that the fact that China has a rich culture does not necessarily mean that China is also a big cultural power.122 They extensively discuss China’s inability to translate its ­culture 118  Hu Jintao, “Jianding bu yi zou zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi wenhua fazhan daolu; nuli jianshe shehui zhuyi wenhua qiangguo” [Resolutely Walk the Path of Socialist Culture Development with Chinese Characteristics: Striving to Construct a Strong Socialist Culture Country], Qiushi, No. 1 (January 2012), translated by China Media and Copyright, available online at http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/01/04/hu-jintaosarticle-in-qiushi-magazine-translated/ (accessed December 2012). 119  See, for example, “Xi: China to Promote Cultural Soft Power,” Xinhua (January 1 2014). 120  See also Ren Jie, “Dangqian woguo yishi xingtai jianshe de liu da tiaozhan” [Six Major Challenges that our Country’s Ideological Construction Faces at Present], Dangjian [Party Building] (July 2012), translated by Rogier Creemers. 121  Gong Fangbing, cited in Teddy Ng, “ ‘Cultural Threats’ among Five Focuses of New National Security Panel, Colonel Says,” South China Morning Post (January 14 2014). See also “Document 9,” an internal Communiqué that was circulated within the CCP in spring 2013, in which seven perils to the leadership of the CCP were identified, including the promotion of Western constitutional democracy, universal values, civil society and the West’s idea of journalism; “Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation. How Much is a Hardline Party Directive Shaping China’s Current Political Climate?” ChinaFile (November 8 2013), http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation. 122  “Zhongguo wenhua duiwai jiaoliu de sige wenti” [Four Issues of China’s Cultural Exchanges with Foreign Countries], GGWJJK, No. 10 (summer 2012).

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into what international audiences nowadays like.123 They point out that China is mainly importing books and academic concepts from abroad and that it hardly exports any, and that box office successes based on Chinese culture, such as the movies “Mulan” and “Kung Fu Panda,” were created in Hollywood, not in China.124 According to scholars and people in the cultural field, there are various reasons why China cannot capitalize on its culture. They mention the government’s focus on traditional culture; the lack of Chinese ideas and values that are of interest for the outside world; cultural differences; a young and inexperienced cultural industry; and, closely linked to these aspects, political constraints. In particular, people working in the cultural field refer to political constraints when they discuss the lack of international appeal of Chinese cultural expressions. Cultural commentator Zhou Liming, for example, said in reaction to the Chinese government’s call to strengthen China’s cultural soft power: “You can’t straightjacket artists and have them compete like athletes. Culture is not monolithic. It should be diverse.”125 Popular blogger Han Han wrote in his blog: The restriction on cultural activities makes it impossible for China to influence world literature and cinema and for people in culture to raise their heads. At the same time, China does not have any media with global influence—many things cannot be bought with money. In fact, attaining cultural prosperity is the least costly; it is just a matter of the lesser the restrictions, the greater the prosperity.126 Yang Jinlin, who works for Hong Kong Satellite Television, adds that cultural image-building is difficult because China lacks self-confidence, cannot accept criticism, and always wants recognition for what it has achieved.127 There is also a lively debate on the question of which cultural aspects to promote. Many scholars and officials feel that China’s traditional culture, 123  See, for example, Xie Xueping, “Lun wenhua ruan quanli yu zhongguo guijia xingxiang de suzao,” p. 42; and Yang Jinlin, “Zhongguoren guoji xingxiang suzao de kunnan yu tiaozhan” [Difficulties We Chinese Face in Building an International Image], GGWJJK, No. 9 (spring 2010). 124  See, for example, Yang Jinlin, “Zhongguoren guoji xingxiang suzao de kunnan yu tiaozhan.” 125  Cited in Jonathan Landreth, “China’s ‘Soft Power’ Push Stumbles at the Movies,” Agence France Presse (November 7 2011). 126  Han Han, “Yao ziyou” [On Freedom], blog (December 26 2011), available online at http:// blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4701280b0102dz9f.html (accessed January 2012). 127  Yang Jinlin, “Zhongguoren guoji xingxiang suzao de kunnan yu tiaozhan.”

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which has a long history and is rich in ideas, values and symbols, offers the best source for public diplomacy.128 They note that China has more to offer than visual arts, music, and literature alone, and that it may also provide appealing alternative values in addressing international problems. They refer to the values underlying the Chinese model, which is discussed below. More often, however, they put forward the cultural value of ‘harmony’ (he), which refers to various traditional Chinese ideas and is regarded as “the fundamental spirit of Chinese culture.”129 The word he, which also means ‘peace,’ ‘mild’ or ‘moderate,’ corresponds to ‘harmony between nature and humankind,’ which is regularly referred to in China’s fight against environmental degradation. It is also part of the ancient Chinese phrase he er bu tong, ‘harmonious but different.’130 This phrase, which can also be translated as ‘coexisting with differences,’ is often put forward in China’s public diplomacy to address cultural differences, or clashes, and to call for a focus on seeking common ground. Cultural differences are largely regarded as something positive, as a dimension of cultural diversity that should be accepted and treasured. Many therefore argue that China’s public diplomacy should not impose China’s culture and cultural values upon others.131 Policymakers are urged to be innovative in promoting China’s cultural heritage.132 The concept of harmony is furthermore directly linked to the much promoted concept of ‘harmonious world,’ as discussed in chapter two.

128  See, for example, Jiang Haiyan, “Hongyang zhonghua minzu de youxiu wenhua yu zengqiang wo guo de ruan shili” [Promoting the Outstanding Culture of the Chinese Nation and Strengthening China’s Soft Power], Journal of the Party School of the Central Committee of the CCP, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2007), pp. 107–112. 129  Then State Councillor in charge of culture, Liu Yandong, in “Chinese State Councillor Terms Harmony ‘Basic Value’ of Culture,” Xinhua (November 7 2008), available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–11/07/content_10324545.htm (accessed January 2012). 130  The full saying is he er bu tong, qiu tong cun yi, which can be translated as “living in harmony without demanding agreement, seeking common ground while setting aside differences.” 131  See, for example Wang Yiwei, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao de sanzhong shiming”; and ‘Significance of Cross-cultural Communication Can’t Be Underestimated’, interview with Wu Jianmin, People’s Daily Online, 5 September 2006. 132  See, for example, Guo Jianning, “Tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” [Enhancing National Cultural Soft Power], Henan Ribao (November 21 2007), available online at http://theory. people.com.cn/GB/166866/10062691.html (accessed November 2012).

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The China Model as a Source of Soft Power Until recently, both officials and scholars denied that there is a Chinese model, or were reluctant to promote the Chinese experience as a model that should be followed by others. International relations scholar and political adviser Shi Yinhong, for example, argues that China’s model is too imbalanced to be of interest to other countries,133 and China’s Special Representative for Darfur, Liu Guijin, said in an interview in May 2011: “Believe me, China doesn’t want to export our ideology, our governance, our model. We don’t regard it as a mature model.”134 Scholars furthermore argue that the Chinese model cannot be exported because other countries have different political and economic structures and different cultural traditions,135 and that it would be principally wrong to export the model, as China has always denied the universality of development models.136 They assert that it is too early to conclude whether the model works well, and stress that each country is unique and must therefore find its own path. They furthermore argue that China’s public diplomacy should not seek to impose ideas upon others, but should remain defensive. Since the financial crisis hit the world, however, many scholars have become confident about asserting China’s experiences in development. Peking University scholar Pan Wei argues that there is a growing self-consciousness in China about a Chinese System vis-à-vis the Western understanding of an inferior “authoritarian regime.”137 He hopes that it will help people to overcome bias and “break away from the false call for democratizing ‘authoritarian’ states.”138 Even more outspoken is prominent scholar and opinion leader Zhang Weiwei, who argues that “China’s overall success is arguably unmatched by any developing or transitional economies that have copied the Western 133  Shi Yinhong, “Zhongguo de ‘ruanquanli’ yu heping jueqi” [China’s Soft Power and Peaceful Rise], Zhongguo Pinglun, No. 118 (October 2007). 134  Liu Guijin, quoted in Peter Wonacott, “In Africa, US Watches China’s Rise,” The Wall Street Journal (September 2 2011). 135  He Liangliang, “Yindu fuzhi zhongguo moshi bu keneng chenggong” [India’s Copying of the China Model Cannot Succeed], in China Elections and Governance (2009), cited in Linlin Zhong, “Criticizing the China Model: An Overview of Discussions in China,” China Elections and Governance Review, No. 5 (April 2010), pp. 50–61, at p. 59. 136  Li Jianhua, “Bubi mangzhe gei fazhan zhong guojia chuanshou zhongguo moshi” [No Need to Busy Ourselves with Selling the China Model to Developing Nations], Changjian Ribao (2009), cited in Linlin Zhong, “Criticizing the China Model,” p. 59. 137  Pan Wei, “The Chinese Model of Development” (London: Foreign Policy Centre, October 11 2007), available online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/888.pdf (accessed February 2013). 138  Pan Wei, “The Chinese Model of Development.”

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model.”139 Zhang furthermore emphasizes that China is the only country where a millennia-old civilization coincides with a huge modern state, leading to a unique and new model of development.140 In his view, the Chinese model has eight characteristics: ‘speaking the truth through facts’ instead of through dogmas; prioritization of the people’s lives; the pre-eminence of stability; gradual reform; the sequencing of reform by letting some groups and regions reform before others; a blended economy; opening to the outside world; and having a relatively neutral, enlightened and strong government.141 In an op-ed in The New York Times, Zhang elaborates on the issue of a strong government, arguing that in the global competition between two political models, one based more on meritocratic leadership and the other on popular elections, the Chinese model may win, as it ensures a competent leadership.142 Wang Yiwei expresses a similar idea in a recent op-ed in the People’s Daily, where he writes that the Western system cannot solve today’s problems and global challenges, and that the world needs the enrichment of universal values that is offered by the Chinese model.143 Some Chinese scholars working abroad echo these ideas. Yawei Liu of the China Program at the Carter Center, for example, also argues that other countries can benefit from the Chinese Model. He writes that it is: [. . .] a comprehensive tool box that can solve different problems, a set of experiences and practices that can be borrowed and applied by different nations facing different challenges, and a new paradigm shift whose impact is going to be felt for many years to come.144

139  Zhang Weiwei, The China Wave: The Rise of a Civilizational State (Hackensack, NJ: World Century Publishing Corporation, 2012), p. 2. 140  Zhang Weiwei, The China Wave, p. 2. 141  Zhang Weiwei, “Yige qiji de pouxi: Zhongguo moshi ji qi yiyi” [The Analysis of a Miracle: The China Model and its Significance], Qiushi (March 25 2011), translated in David Bandurski, “Zhang vs. Yang on the China Model,” China Media Project (March 29 2011). 142  Zhang Weiwei, “Meritocracy versus Democracy,” The New York Times (November 9 2012). 143  Wang Yiwei, “ ‘China Model’ Breaking Hegemony of Western Universal Values,” People’s Daily (January 15 2013). 144  Yawei Liu, “How China’s Quest for Political Reform is Undercut by the China Model,” China Elections and Governance Review, No. 5 (April 2010), pp. 1–15, at p. 10.

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The Impact of Culture on Public Diplomacy

“Culture,” writes Zhao Qizheng, “is in the DNA of all aspects of society,” and cultural differences “create[s] barriers and difficulties for the world to understand China and vice versa,” posing “challenges for modern China’s public diplomacy.”145 Many Chinese scholars agree with him. Wang Yiwei, for example, argues that Chinese culture is a “considerable obstacle to effective Chinese public diplomacy.”146 At the same time, however, as Zhao Qizheng points out, cultural differences can be used “as resources for complementing and learning from each other and for achieving common prosperity.”147 Most often discussed are challenges that concern the Chinese language and communication style. With regard to language, scholars raise the issue that in order to translate a Chinese text adequately, knowledge of the cultural and social context of the speaker/writer, as well as of the people to whom the translation is addressed, is essential. Otherwise the translation can result in “subjective and partial interpretation and understanding of the semantic elements [. . .] by ‘framing them’ according to one’s own cultural background,”148 leading to serious misunderstandings. In addition, Chinese conventions in expression may complicate communication with foreign cultures. “We cannot use the texts and language of the central government and newspapers like the People’s Daily, because foreigners don’t understand the language,” writes Jia Qingguo, referring to China’s political language with its many political idioms.149 Crosscultural trainer Zhuang Enping alludes to Hall and Qin Yaqing’s elements of Chinese thinking, when he identifies three types of differences underlying communications between East and West: differences of integrated thinking versus analytical thinking; differences resulting from high-context versus low-context cultural environments; and differences in cross-cultural conflict management.150 Scholars therefore call for careful translation of concepts and ideas and for an overall improvement of China’s communication by taking 145  Zhao Qizheng, How China Communicates, pp. 88–89. 146  Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616 (2008), p. 262. 147  Zhao Qizheng, How China Communicates, p. 89. 148  Zhao Qizheng, How China Communicates, p. 92; see also “Dialog with Zhao Qizheng: Public Diplomacy and Cross-Cultural Exchanges,” Boao Forum for Asia (April 9 2013), available online at the website of the Boao Forum, http://english.boaoforum.org/mtzxxwzxen/ 7757.jhtml (accessed August 2013). 149  Jia Qingguo, “Jueqi zhong de zhongguo yu gonggong waijiao.” 150  Zhuan Enping, as cited in Wu Zelin, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao yanjiu wenxian zongshu.”

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better into account different communication styles and having a better understanding of how the world sees China.151 Another element of Chinese culture that is regularly explicitly mentioned as having a big impact on how China conducts public diplomacy is the abovementioned concept of ‘he’ (harmony). Wang Yiwei and Zhao Qizheng argue that China in its public diplomacy wants primarily to seek common ground by conveying the above-mentioned idea of ‘he er bu tong’ (harmonious but different).152 The West, asserts Wang, “with its so-called ‘universal values’ denies this logic. [. . .] While China stresses ‘harmony,’ the Western world always emphasizes ‘different.’ ”153 Others add that, contrary to US public diplomacy, Chinese public diplomacy does not want to convey ideas, but seeks friendship and understanding from foreign audiences.154 These Chinese characteristics, argues Wang Yiwei, may help Chinese public diplomacy to offset the Western “eagerness for instant success and quick benefit.”155

Challenges and Constraints

Chinese scholars and officials critically evaluate China’s public diplomacy and see that it is confronted with many challenges and constraints. One category of challenges concerns the organizational dimension of public diplomacy. Scholars and officials point out that there is insufficient coordination 151  See, for example, Dai Ying, Gouzao zhongguo guoji huayu tixi de tujing [The Way to Construct a Chinese International Discourse System], Gonggong Waijiao Jikan, No. 10 (summer 2012); and Yang Xingfeng, “Duiwai chuanbo de nanfang tansuo” [Exploring Overseas Publicity: The Nanfang Daily], GGWJJK, No. 9 (spring 2011). 152  As noted above, the full saying is he er bu tong, qiu tong cun yi, which can be translated as “living in harmony without demanding agreement, seeking common ground while setting aside differences.” See, for example, Zhao Qizheng, How China Communicates, p. 28. 153  Wang Yiwei, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao de sanzhong shiming.” 154  Yang Jiechi, Yang Jiechi, “Nuli kaita zhongguo tese gonggong waijiao xin jumian” [Strive to Open Up a New Horizon of Public Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics], Qiushi, No. 4 (February 2011); and Wei Hongxia, Zhongmei gonggong waijiao de bu duideng xianxiang fenxi [Analysis of the Inequality of Chinese and US Public Diplomacy], available online at http://www.cpdcea.com/uploads/201206121500427522.pdf). For similar views, see Zhao Qizheng, Gonggong waijiao yu kuawenhua jiaoliu; Wang Yiwei, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao de sanzhong shiming;” and Wu Baiyi, “Tisheng zhongguo gonggong waijiao de xianshi lujing fenxi” [How to Enhance China’s Public Diplomacy Practice], Guandian Zhongguo (November 1 2010). 155  Wang Yiwei, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao de sanzhong shiming.”

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among actors from different government bodies and between governmental and non-governmental actors. Furthermore, there is a shortage of public diplomacy professionals and the government should therefore invest more in training, research, and expanding human public diplomacy resources that can be mobilized when needed.156 One scholar suggests a new institutional setting by establishing a separate committee for public diplomacy under the central government that—together with the MFA—would report to China’s highest leaders.157 Some point out that public diplomacy is still too much a top—down affair instead of bottom—up. They warn that government strategies should not become straitjackets that kill people’s enthusiasm,158 and suggest that China’s public diplomacy is still too colored by officials.159 On the one hand, it is argued that China’s public diplomacy needs a broader participation, but at the same time, Chinese civil society is regarded as not yet mature enough to play a major role. The Chinese government should therefore encourage the growth of civil public diplomacy organizations.160 Also regularly discussed as a difficult challenge to overcome is that China is in a different stage of development than other big powers, and has different development goals. It is therefore argued that China is not ready to take a place under the world’s spotlight.161 Jia Qingguo argues along the same line when he writes: “There are too many uncertainties about China’s future and its vision for the future is too much ideologically confused.”162 He points out that China itself is hardly able to grasp these changes, let alone for others to understand them. Ding Lei, too, argues that before China can improve its image, it needs to know its identity and needs.163

156  Interviews, but see also Wu Zelin, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao yanjiu wenxian zongshu;” Han Fangming, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao;” and Zhao Kejin, “Ruhe chuanbo zhongguoren xingxiang.” 157  Zhao Kejin, “Ruhe chuanbo zhongguoren xingxiang.” 158  Han Fangming, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao.” 159  Song Lilei and Wang Yiwei, “Zhongguo dui ou gonggong waijiao: mubiao, jinzhan yu tiaozhan” [China’s Public Diplomacy toward Europe: Objectives, Progress and Challenges], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, No. 8 (2011), pp. 44–51. 160  Wang Yiwei, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao de sanzhong shiming.” 161  Wang Yiwei, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao de sanzhong shiming.” 162  Jia Qingguo, “Jueqi zhong de zhongguo yu gonggong waijiao.” 163  Ding Lei, Guoji xingxiang ji qi dui guojiajian xingwei de yinxiang [National Image and its Influence upon Inter-state Behaviors] (Beijing: Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe, 2009), chapter 2.

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Another challenge that has come up before but that is included in all listings of constraints to China’s public diplomacy is the country’s difficulty in letting its voice be heard and trusted in the international arena. Scholars point toward the lack of Chinese outreach channels and foreign media dominance, as well as the suspicion with which China’s messages are received by the international public. It is caused, they write, both by shortcomings in Chinese politics and culture, and demonization by the Western press.164 The latter receives by far the most attention in the Chinese debate. It is often argued that it is difficult to disseminate Chinese culture because Western countries dominate the political and cultural ideological discourse and control the international media. China is generally seen as having insufficient capacity to reach foreign audiences.165 “Communication capacity determines influence,” said Politburo Standing Committee member Li Changchun when discussing China’s soft power.166 This widely shared view has led to the huge investments in international broadcasting that will be discussed in the next chapter. Some, however, argue that China has focused too much on the techniques of dissemination and call for a remodeling of people’s values, as they constitute the core of a country’s soft power.167 A good example is journalist and prominent blogger Chen Jibing, one of the many critical voices in China, who in an editorial in a Chinese newspaper points out: Objectively speaking, the influence of Western media has been determined not just by an advantage in assets and technology translating into broad geographical coverage. To a large extent, it derives also from the high quality of their news content. So if we truly want China’s voice to 164  Wu Xu, “Niuzhuan ruan shili nicha, dazao ‘zhongguo meng’ ” [Reverse the Soft Power Deficit, Build a ‘Chinese Dream’], GGWJJK, No. 2 (summer 2010), pp. 60–66. See also Han Fangming, “Zhongshi ruan shili tuiguang gonggong waijiao” [Pay Attention to Soft Power to Promote Public Diplomacy], Di yi caijiang Ribao (September 27 2010), downloaded at http://stock.sohu.com/20100927/n275282114.shtml (accessed July 2012); Huang Jinhui and Ding Zhongyi, “Lun zhongguo ruan shili jianshe de bijiao youshi yu yueshu yinsu,” pp. 66–73; and Qiao Liang, “Ruan Liliang PK xianzai kaishi” [The New Soft Power Competition], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, No. 5 (2008). 165  Wang Yiwei in “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao de sanzhong shiming” and other articles; and Su Shumin in “Gonggong waijiao yu zhongguo guojia xingxiangde suzao,” pp. 73–77. 166  Li Changchun’s speech of December 20 2008, “Nuli goujian xiandai chuanbo tixi tigao guonei guoji chuanbo nengli” [Efforts to Build a Modern Communication System to Improve Domestic and International Dissemination Capabilities], Xinhua Online (December 23 2008). 167  See, for example, Hu Wei, “Zhongguoren de guoji xingxiang zhi dao,” pp. 20–23.

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gain a foothold on the stage of world public opinion, I am afraid that it is far from sufficient to put our energies into communication channels and the technical side alone. [. . .] But the difficulty lies in making the world accept China’s viewpoints. In the final analysis, the origin of the influence of the media or any cultural product lies in the true and credible nature of the facts of the news and in moral values with appeal.168 In order to overcome this difficulty, scholars and practitioners emphasize the vital role of public participation and interaction in public diplomacy. They are aware of the problem of China’s lack of credibility but, because of its implicit reference to lack of press freedom, the term ‘lack of credibility’ is often avoided in public discussions of public diplomacy in China. Discussing the liability of China’s political system as a whole for the country’s public diplomacy is also off-limits within China, but Wang Yiwei indirectly refers to it when he points out that the problem with China’s current cultural diplomacy is that it does not address the problems of foreign audiences “liking traditional China but not contemporary China,” “liking Chinese culture but not Chinese politics,” and “liking Chinese people but not the Chinese government.”169 Conclusions An extensive and lively debate on public diplomacy and soft power is currently taking place in China. The two concepts have caught on because they referred to ideas and practices that were already familiar to Chinese scholars and policymakers and because they are considered to be necessary instruments for achieving China’s development goals. The Chinese government encourages and supports the academic debate, which is therefore more practice-oriented than in the West. The debate focuses on exploring how to adapt public diplomacy and soft power to the Chinese situation and on how to translate these concepts into successful policies. Scholars and officials are aware of Chinese constraints on China’s public diplomacy. They look to the ongoing debate in the West for inspiration, but this does not mean that they simply adopt each new idea that comes up overseas. They critically examine Western approaches, reject, select 168  Chen Jibing, “China on the Screens of CNTV and CNC,” Chengdu Commercial Daily (February 1 2010), as translated by David Bandurski, website of China Media Project HK (February 2 2010), available online at http://cmp.hku.hk/2010/02/02/4405/ (accessed January 2012). 169  Wang Yiwei, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao de sanzhong shiming.”

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and adapt Western ideas and strategies, and simultaneously develop their own concepts and approaches. Although the Chinese government invests much in public diplomacy toward Asia and Africa (see chapter five), scholars’ writings primarily deal with the Western world, in particular the United States. China has embraced the concept of soft power to an extent not often seen with regard to political concepts that come from abroad. Strengthening and wielding soft power are regarded as indispensable in the fight for China’s right to speak and for international recognition of Chinese values and policies. The Chinese government furthermore feels engaged in a soft power competition with the Western world and in particular the United States, which in the Chinese perception increasingly tries to undermine China’s rise with the use of soft power. Soft power is therefore generally looked at in more strategic and competitive terms than in the West. Furthermore, Chinese scholars make a less clear distinction between hard and soft power; they are both elements of what China has coined a country’s ‘Comprehensive National Power.’ Soft power in China is in the first place interpreted as cultural soft power, based on socialist core values, although one group of scholars holds a different view and argues that political capability is the core of soft power. The Chinese understanding of public diplomacy still largely coincides with a hierarchical, state-centered and strategic approach, in which the government takes the lead. The concepts of a network model and the ‘societization’ of public diplomacy, however, have also entered the discussion. Everybody calls for bigger involvement by non-state actors, but adds that these non-state actors need to be authorized by the government. Many clearly struggle with precisely defining the roles of, and relationship between, state and non-state actors in public diplomacy, which bears some similarity to the situation in the West. The underlying questions, however, are different. The main question in the West is how the government can tap into existing civil society networks and encourage or guide them while staying in the background. The issue is more complicated in China, and includes the question of how to develop and mobilize China’s fledgling civil society and networks, as well as the question of how to balance between empowering and managing them in a political system in which the state aims to control society. This theme also underlies Chinese discussions of public diplomacy 2.0. The growing attention for the role of non-state actors in China is particularly visible in the call to develop renwen diplomacy, a Chinese concept that brings cultural diplomacy and people’s diplomacy together. The idea behind renwen diplomacy is that cultural diplomacy always is or should be people’s diplomacy. Also in this case, however, the Chinese government’s authorization is considered a prerequisite. Renwen diplomacy is generally seen as the core of

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China’s public diplomacy. In spite of the growing attention for Chinese political soft power resources, many are aware that in the political field in particular, China’s soft power has serious shortcomings. They stress the need to strengthen China’s institutions and social justice as a basis for soft power,170 and emphasize that when it comes to basic freedoms, China still has a long way to go.171 The most striking characteristic of the Chinese understanding of soft power and public diplomacy is that domestic outreach is considered a natural and important element of the two concepts. It is part of the view that internal affairs and diplomacy as a whole should be integrated. Domestic outreach not only contributes to the quality and legitimacy of foreign outreach, but is also regarded as a tool for strengthening national unity and encouraging the government to take the people’s interests into account. The concepts of strategic communications and branding are not part of the public diplomacy debate in China. Strategic communications, which are understood in very different ways by different governments and scholars in the West, are not a separate concept in China. The relatively young concept of branding is discussed in China, but largely in the context of marketing commercial products and not (yet) so much in the context of public diplomacy. This may change, however, as a result of the rapid development of subnational public diplomacy in China. As will be discussed in chapter four, municipal governments like those of Shanghai, Hangzhou and Kunming are becoming interested in the possibilities of city branding as a means to draw tourists and investors. The impact of China’s political culture is, with the exception of bloggers and some outspoken journalists, only touched upon indirectly by a small number of scholars when they advocate reducing the role of the government in China’s public diplomacy. The impact of Chinese cultural characteristics on public diplomacy is felt and mentioned by many, but only a few scholars who write about diplomacy and public diplomacy really explore the issue. They discuss its impact on the content as well as the conduct of public diplomacy. They 170  Wang Haijing and Qian Chengdan, “Zhidu jianshu chengqi ruan shili” [Institutional Building will Support Soft Power], Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan [Outlook Weekly], Vol. 11 (March 12 2007); and Yan Xuetong, “Zhongguo ruan shili youdai tigao” [The Path for China to Increase its ‘Soft Power’], Zhongguo yu shijie guancha [China and World Affairs], Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2006). 171  Shi Yinhong, “Chengjiu yu tiaozhan: zhongguo heping fazhan, hexie shijie linian yu duiwai zhengce xingshi” [Achievements and Challenges: China’s Peaceful Development, Harmonious World Philosophy and Foreign Policy Situation], Dangdai Shijie yu Shehuizhuyi, No. 2 (2008), pp. 81–85.

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point out that more understanding of Chinese culture and ideas are a prerequisite for acceptance of China’s policies by international publics. Furthermore, they emphasize that China’s public diplomacy actors need to bridge the differences of the Chinese language and modes of expression by learning Western ways of communication. The Chinese cultural concept of harmony, which is a cornerstone of China’s domestic and foreign policies, plays a central role in attempts to frame and explain China’s rise to the outside world. The Chinese cultural concept of ‘harmony’ embodies most of the elements that Qin Yaqing identifies as influencing China’s foreign policy and diplomacy, in particular the notions of correlativity (that is, everything is related to everything else) and complementarity (that two poles complement each other and form a whole), to which Wang Yiwei refers when he argues that the West denies China’s logic of he er bu tong (harmonious but different). Chinese scholars and officials assert that Chinese culture leads China to seek friendship and understanding rather than to convey or impose ideas, unlike their interpretation of Western countries’ public diplomacy. Chinese public diplomacy is therefore considered to be relationship-oriented and defensive, rather than result-oriented and offensive.

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CHAPTER 4

China’s Public Diplomacy System* This chapter discusses China’s public diplomacy system. It deals with the proliferation of Chinese public diplomacy actors, public diplomacy decision-making, and the growing sophistication of China’s public diplomacy instruments. It highlights the Chinese government’s dedication to, and huge investments in, public diplomacy and discusses how the government struggles to overcome shortcomings and obstacles. Finally, it shows how China’s political culture and its approaches to communication influence the way in which China conducts public diplomacy.

The Growing Diversity of Actors

From the early 1990s onward, a steadily growing and increasingly diverse group of actors has been involved in China’s public diplomacy. This proliferation and diversification of public diplomacy actors is part of the expansion of China’s overall diplomatic system, as discussed in chapter two, and has been taking place among state actors as well as non-state actors. Among state actors, a horizontal proliferation involves an increasing number of governmental and Party bodies in the conduct of public diplomacy, and a vertical proliferation has provincial and municipal governments develop their own public diplomacy activities. Among non-state actors, the diversification manifests itself in the involvement of a growing variety of civil society groups, individuals such as ‘celebrity ambassadors,’ and companies. Coordinating public diplomacy efforts therefore becomes an increasingly urgent and challenging task for the Chinese government. * This chapter draws and cites from the author’s following publications: Ingrid d’Hooghe, “The Expansion of China’s Public Diplomacy System,” in Jay Wang (ed.), Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Ingrid d’Hooghe, “Into High Gear: China’s Public Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2008), pp. 37–61; Ingrid d’Hooghe and Chen Zhimin, “China’s Evolving Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2010), pp. 309–311; and Ingrid d’Hooghe, “Public Diplomacy in the People’s Republic of China,” in Jan Melissen (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Basingstoke, UK and New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004283954_006 Ingrid

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It is important to note that most of the non-state actors discussed in this book are not fully independent actors. China’s non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or ‘social organizations’ as Chinese authorities call them, are regulated, supervised or co-opted by the government. They are supposed to maintain close ties with governmental bodies and are not allowed to go against official policies. Depending on the sensitivity of the topic with which they deal, they can be rather autonomous in daily practice and can serve their own societal or commercial interests, as long as they do not pose a serious challenge to official policies. A growing number of Chinese social organizations are able to exert their influence on policymaking, either directly by advising the government, or indirectly via national or international media. This is particularly true in the environmental and public health fields.1 When it comes to the crunch, however, they are all dependent on approval—or neglect—by the authorities. In other words, if their activities are considered harmful for China or the government, the government will close them down. Recent rules on social organizations indicate more room for maneuver for Chinese social or non-profit organizations, as well as possibilities for authorities to regulate them. This illustrates that the Chinese government wants to “support the development of NGOs, but at the same time, closely manage and supervise that developmental process.”2 Yet in spite of their ambiguous status and government control, these ‘representatives of society’ are generally better trusted as messengers by the international community than China’s government officials. As such, they play a role in softening the rough images of government policies and they strengthen the image of a country that is moving toward a pluralistic and increasingly empowered society.

National State Actors

Many Party and government bodies are in one way or another involved in developing or conducting public diplomacy. This paragraph, however, focuses on 1  See, for example, Seungho Lee, “Environmental Movements and Social Organizations in Shanghai,” China Information, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2007), pp. 269–297; Miriam Schröder, “Transnational NGO Cooperation for China’s Climate Politics,” paper for the Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (2007); and Namju Lee, “The Development of Environmental NGOs in China: A Road to Civil Society?,” China Brief, Vol. 6, No. 23 (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, November 22 2006). 2  Shawn Shieh, “Can the Chinese Government both Support and Micro-manage NGOs?,” NGOs in China, blog entry (December 13 2012), http://ngochina.blogspot.com/ (accessed January 2013).

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d­ iscussing the role that is played by only the most important national-level actors: the State Council Information Office (SCIO) and State Information Internet Office; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassies and missions abroad; the Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Education and the State Administration for Radio, Film and Television (SARFT); the Ministry of Defense and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); China’s leaders; the Communist Party of China (CCP); and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). A few other national actors that played relevant roles in specific cases, such as the Ministry of Health and the State Food and Drug Administration, will be dealt with in the case studies in subsequent chapters. Local-level players are discussed in the paragraph on subnational public diplomacy. The State Council Information Office From its creation in 1991 onward, China’s SCIO has played a major role in China’s public diplomacy. It develops public diplomacy guidelines and instruments; monitors foreign media; and guides and censors domestic media, including the internet. SCIO is an organ of the State Council (China’s central government),3 but it largely overlaps with the Office of External Publicity, a body under the Communist Party’s Central Publicity Department (CPD).4 The CPD provides guidelines to officials working in international publicity environments via the classified Internal Report (neibu tongxun), which contains guidelines for publicity work, such as permission for when and how to write on specific issues.5 It also presides over the government and Party’s external publicity conferences and meetings.6 In addition to approval from the CPD, SCIO’s policies and plans are subject to guidelines from the Central Committee 3  The State Council is the chief administrative authority in China. It is chaired by the Premier and includes the heads of each governmental department and agency. 4   The Office of External Publicity has its own webpage: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/ 64114/64139/ (accessed January 2013). 5  For examples, see Anne-Marie Brady, “Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era,” in Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2006), pp. 58–77; and Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); and the website of “China Media and Copyright,” http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/. For a detailed description of the monitoring of publicity by various ministries and offices, see David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes, and Efficacy,” The China Journal, No. 57 (January 2007). 6  For more on the conferences, see Xiaoling Zhang, “China as an Emerging Soft Power: Winning Hearts and Minds through Communicating with Foreign Publics,” Discussion Paper, No. 35 (Nottingham, UK: China Policy Institute, October 2008), p. 4.

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(CC) Publicity and Ideology Leading Small Group, and the CC Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group.7 These informal groups, which consist of China’s highest leaders in a particular field, advise the Party’s Politburo on policy and coordinate the implementation of policy decisions made by the Politburo.8 The creation of SCIO in 1991—or, in other words, the establishment of a government pendant of the CPD—coincided with the end of the period of post-Tiananmen isolation and illustrated China’s aim to become more open in its publicity work. During this period, educational and cultural exchanges were resumed and China gradually started to pay more attention to its image abroad. SCIO began issuing a steady flow of White Papers clarifying China’s policies on such critical issues as human rights (1991), Tibet (1992) and Taiwan (1993). It continues to do so until today: White Papers issued in 2012 and 2013 address, for example, China’s controversial rare-earth industry policies; judicial reforms and Chinese views on the disputed Diaoyu (Chinese) or Senkaku (Japanese) Islands in the East China Sea, which are claimed by both China and Japan; China–Africa economic and trade cooperation; and human rights in China. The information and messages provided in the White Papers are studied by foreign academics and journalists to find clues about official Chinese standpoints on a specific issue. Their interpretations of the White Papers often find their way into international newspapers and academic studies.9 SCIO’s work on China’s public diplomacy got a real kick-start in 1998 when Zhao Qizheng became Director of SCIO. The cosmopolitan Zhao, who had held various Party and government positions in Shanghai, had a good understanding of public relations.10 He expanded and modernized the government’s press conference and spokesperson system. The instrument of press conferences was occasionally used in China in the 1950s and 1960s, but it was only from 1983 onward that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other State Council organs with relations with foreign entities were required to establish a spokesperson system and to release news on a regular basis. The role of the spokespersons was defined as “ ‘shaping’ foreign reporting on China so as to 7  For more information on the Central Publicity Department and External Publicity Office, see Brady, “Guiding Hand;” and Brady, Marketing Dictatorship. 8  Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 26 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Hoover Institution, 2008). 9  See, for example, Celia Hatton, “Analysis of China ‘Reveals Army Structure’ in Defence White Paper,” BBC News (April 16 2013); and Keith Bradsher, “China, Citing Errors, Vows to Overhaul Rare Earth Industry,” The New York Times (June 20 2012). 10  See Zhao Qizheng’s biography at the website China Vitae, http://www.chinavitae.com/ biography/Zhao_Qizheng%7C327; and Susan Shirk (ed.), Changing Media, Changing China (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 238.

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enhance international understanding and support of the country.”11 In these initial years, spokespersons just read their text from papers and did not take questions. When Zhao took over at SCIO, however, a sea change in the way that Beijing deals with official information occurred. He more than doubled the frequency of press conferences; urged Chinese officials to be more accommodating toward journalists; reinstated the use of the English language at press conferences; and introduced the risky Western-style approach of speaking off the record in Beijing. Zhao continues to consider press conferences “the swiftest and most effective way to influence news coverage in domestic and foreign mainstream media.”12 Zhao left SCIO in 2005, but his successors13 continued the drive toward professionalization. They further expanded the spokespersons and news release systems to include many Party and government organizations, both at central and local levels. They traveled all over the world to establish international media cooperation projects and sent cadres to learn how to interact better with news media and in particular foreign media.14 Another of SCIO’s tasks is carefully to monitor and evaluate foreign media coverage and opinion polls of China’s development or specific Chinese policies.15 The Chinese government is deeply sensitive about foreign perceptions of China and its policies abroad, and the domestic press often quotes foreign appraisals and criticism of China’s policies.16 As was discussed in chapter three, Chinese government officials hold the Western media responsible for deliberately creating a negative image of China. Zhao Qizheng, for example, writes that Western media’s “selection of news items and the tone of commentary are often highly negative”17 and a 2012 report by the China Institute of International Studies, a think tank affiliated to the Chinese MFA, points out 11  Zou Jianhua, Waijiaobu Fayanren Jiemi [Secrets of a Foreign Ministry Spokesman] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2005), pp. 18 and 62–65; and Ni Chen, “The Evolving Chinese Government Spokesperson System,” in Wang, Soft Power in China, pp. 73–94, at p. 76. 12  Zhao Qizheng, How China Communicates, p. 49. 13  Cai Wu, Wang Chen, and Cai Mingzhao respectively. 14  “Cabinet Spokesman Cai Wu Meets the Press,” China Daily (December 29 2006). For example, for Cai’s recent visit to London, see “China to Strengthen Media Cooperation with UK: Official,” China Daily (April 17 2007). 15  See, for example, Xinhua, “State Council Information Office says Western Media Coverage has Taken a Turn for the Better” (June 24 2006). 16   See, for example, Zhao Shengnan, “Biased Reports Not Acceptable,” China Daily (February 14 2012); and Zhan Jiang, “Where does Western Media Bias Come From?,” Global Times (July 16 2009). 17  Zhao Qizheng, How China Communicates, p. 43.

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that the international media, “under the double pressure of domestic politics and foreign demands,” have an interest in discrediting China. Chinese government officials argue that while it will be difficult to change the ideological bias of Western politicians, China “can work through a variety of channels”—such as interaction with foreign correspondents in China, cooperation with international public relations firms and exchanges with think tank scholars—to create a more “objective and friendly public opinion environment.”18 Various Western studies of news reporting on China show that much Western reporting is indeed focused on negative stereotypes about China,19 an issue that will be discussed in more detail in the case study on Africa in chapter five. Only policy changes, more openness and better access to information on news issues concerning China will help to address this issue. As we will see below, the internet and popularity of social media in China pose new challenges for the Chinese government, and in order better to oversee these developments, in 2011 it established the State Information Internet Office (SIIO). SIIO operates under SCIO and major positions in both offices are largely held by the same group of people.20 This ensures coordination between internet messaging and public diplomacy policies. SIIO promotes the construction of major news websites, but also investigates and punishes websites that are violating laws and regulations.21 SIIO is generally seen as an instrument to unify all of the other agencies that oversee the Chinese internet and thus tighten the government’s grip on the online medium.22 The fact that SIIO vice-directors concurrently hold vice-minister-level positions at the Ministry

18  Qu Xing, Su Xiaohui, and Ji Ling, “Xifang meiti she hua xinxiang de xingcheng jizhi yu liyi qudong” [Mechanisms and Interests of the Western Media in Shaping China’s Image] (Beijing: China Institute of International Studies, September 14 2012). 19  Carola Richter and Sebastian Gebauer, The Portrayal of China in German Media (Berlin: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2011); and Emma Mawdsley, “Fu Manchu versus Dr Livingstone in the Dark Continent? Representing China, Africa and the West in British Broadsheet Newspapers,” Political Geography, Vol. 27, No. 5 (June 2008) pp. 509–529. Other examples include Mark Stanton, “Gatekeepers: A Critical Discussion about the Stereotypical Presentation of the Chinese ‘Other’ by British TV News,” China Media Research, Vol. 3, No. 1 (October 2007). 20  In 2011, SCIO Director Wang Chen and Vice-Director Qian Xiaoqian were also Director and Vice-Director of SIIO; the current (2013) Director of SIIO, Lu Wei, is also Vice-Director of SCIO. 21  “China Sets Up State Internet Information Office,” China Daily Online (May 4 2011). 22  Chris Buckley, “China Sets Up Agency to Tighten Grip on Internet,” Reuters (May 4 2011).

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of Industry and Information Technology, and the Ministry of Public Security, illustrates the office’s focus on the internet’s security aspects.23 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs China’s MFA is another significant player in the public diplomacy field. Public diplomacy is listed as one of its official ‘Main Responsibilities’24 and MFA officials often refer to the concept in their speeches.25 Although the Chinese MFA as an executive agency does not develop overall public diplomacy strategies, it sees an important role for itself in shaping China’s public diplomacy overseas and it has a major task in implementing public diplomacy policies. The MFA is responsible for: planning public diplomacy during high-level leaders’ visits and around major diplomatic developments or activities; media work and interaction with the domestic public; overall planning and intra-ministry and inter-agency coordination; providing guidance to Chinese embassies and consulates; and liaison with Party departments, government bodies, media groups, and think tanks.26 Together with the SCIO and other ministries, the MFA also organizes International Visitors’ Programs for foreign diplomats, media workers, and opinion leaders. The programs introduce them to specific aspects of China’s policies and developments. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Visitors’ Programs targeting different parts of the world do not always result in more favorable views of China. One European participant mentioned being surprised by hardline speeches by conservative high-level officials during the program; another said that the visit confirmed his views of the government’s control over the Chinese media.27 Since 1998, the MFA has rapidly expanded and improved its conduct of public diplomacy. During that year, the MFA established a website, which has been regularly expanded, updated and improved, and which from early on included

23  In 2011, Vice-Minister of Industry and Information Technology Xi Guohua and ViceMinister of Public Security Zhang Xinfeng were appointed as Vice-Directors of SIIO. 24  “Main Responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,” website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC (April 23 2009). 25  For a recent example, see spokesman Ma Zhaoxu’s remark on the MFA’s “further efforts in public diplomacy this year;” “China Always Welcomes Foreign Journalists: FM Spokesman,” People’s Daily Online (January 21 2010); and Yang Jiechi, “Nuli kaita zhongguo tese gonggong waijiao xin jumian” [Strive to Open Up a New Horizon of Public Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics], Qiushi, No. 4 (February 2011). 26  Yang Jiechi, “Nuli kaita zhongguo tese gonggong waijiao xin jumian.” 27  Conversations with two European participants in the program in 2010–2011: a diplomat; and a journalist.

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interactive features such as ‘Meet the Diplomats online.’28 In 2000, the MFA established its first media center—the International Press Center—to smooth relations with the international press. The Center is part of the Information Department of the MFA and deals with administrative matters concerning foreign reporters in China, organizes press conferences, briefings and reporters’ trips, and publishes media guides. A next step forward in public diplomacy work was taken in 2004 with the establishment of a Division for Public Diplomacy within the MFA’s Department of Information. As the division grew and gained importance, it was upgraded to the Office of Public Diplomacy in October 2009.29 The Office is still growing. In early 2013 it had approximately 40 people working in three divisions: Public Diplomacy Coordination; Media Relations; and Internet and Websites.30 It is responsible for the overall planning, coordination, and guidance of all the MFA’s public diplomacy activities, including the outreach activities that are targeted at domestic audiences. During the visits of Chinese leaders abroad, the Public Diplomacy Office and Department of Information organize and coordinate news briefings, media interviews, speeches, visits, and interactions with foreign publics.31 To strengthen its position in the field of public diplomacy, the Chinese MFA in 2009 began to take the lead in establishing mechanisms for coordinating public diplomacy activities among various Chinese ministries, including the Ministry of Commerce. This has led to increased awareness of public diplomacy, more synergy, and greater investments in public diplomacy activities.32 As a result of its weak position in China’s political system, however, this coordinating role is a challenge for the MFA. The ministry is often hampered in its work by lack of information and influence within the central leadership. It has never been trusted by organizations such as the PLA, and has in the past decade lost ground in foreign affairs to other ministries, in particular to the Ministry of Commerce. The MFA is not always part of consultations on major policy decisions or actions that affect foreign relations. Even worse, it is

28  “The New Website of China’s Foreign Ministry,” website of the Chinese MFA (December 25 2000), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/wjb/eng_search.jsp?page=2&channelid=75003&prepage =50&siteid=6&select=1&sw=public+diplomacy (accessed January 2008). 29  It was upgraded from a chu (处) to a bangong shi (办公室). 30  Interview with an official of the Public Diplomacy Office of the MFA (February 2013). 31  Zhang Zhijun, “Zhengfu gonggong waijiao de shijian yu nengli jianshe” [The Practice and Capacity-building of Government Public Diplomacy], GGWJJK, No. 6 (summer 2011). 32  Interviews with scholars and officials (spring 2008 and spring 2009).

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not always provided with the timely information that it needs to do its work properly.33 The MFA also attempts to involve external people, including non-governmental actors, in its public diplomacy work. In August 2010 it established a Public Diplomacy Advisory Committee, which includes senior diplomats and well-known experts and scholars. The Committee’s main responsibility is to provide advice on public diplomacy with regard to significant diplomatic activities, and interpretation of, and policy statements for, international hotspot issues.34 In December 2010, the MFA initiated the Lanting (Blue Hall) Forum, a platform for communication and exchanges among the government, business community, academia, media, and the public. The forum aims to facilitate discussions on foreign policies by multiple actors, and has so far dealt with issues such as the situation in the Asia–Pacific region, Sino–US relations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the 40th anniversary of the restoration of China’s seat in the United Nations, China–EU relations, and China–Africa cooperation.35 The MFA was furthermore involved in the recent establishment (in January 2013) of the China Public Diplomacy Association, “a non-profit organization dedicated to providing professional consultation and coordination services to advance the development of China’s public diplomacy.”36 Its president, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China’s National People’s Congress and former Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, said that the association will broaden the foundation of China’s soft power by “mobilizing and coordinating social resources and civilian efforts.”37 Vice-Chairman Ma Zhengang noted that “China lacks a national and systemic program to coordinate its

33  A striking example is the anti-satellite test of January 2007, of which the MFA was neither informed in advance nor shortly afterwards. It took the MFA almost two weeks to issue an official reaction and Chinese diplomats called in by foreign governments to explain the test were completely in the dark. See, for example, Bates Gill and Martin Kleiber, “China’s Space Odyssey: What the Anti-Satellite Test Reveals about Decision-Making in Beijing,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2007), pp. 2–6. 34  Zhang Zhijun, “Zhengfu gonggong waijiao de shijian yu nengli jianshe.” 35  See the website of the Chinese MFA and http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2010-12/02/ content_14246053.htm (accessed July 2012). 36  Zhang Yunbi, “China to Boost Public Diplomacy, Exchanges,” China Daily (January 1 2013), available online at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-01/01/content_16073723. htm (accessed January 3 2013). 37  Zhang Yunbi, “China to Boost Public Diplomacy, Exchanges.”

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public diplomacy” and the Association therefore has an important job to do.38 According to some scholars, the MFA, which oversees the Association, hopes that the body will strengthen its central role in China’s public diplomacy.39 Chinese Embassies and Missions Abroad The MFA’s increased attention for public diplomacy is even more evident in the activities employed by its diplomats abroad. Over the past decade, the MFA has invested much in the professionalization and rejuvenation of its diplomats, which has resulted in the increasing effectiveness, sophistication, and motivation of officials working at the MFA and China’s representations abroad. There has indeed been much to learn for Chinese diplomats. As one diplomat puts it: “It used to be easy to be a Chinese diplomat. You just memorized the two phrases that defined the current policy and repeated them over and over. It’s much harder now. You have to know about everything.”40 Chinese diplomats today not only receive better training at home, but increasingly attend foreign courses, including courses on public diplomacy.41 After 2000, the Chinese government and the MFA gradually gave China’s embassies more freedom to engage with the local community and to address the foreign press. Many ambassadors took this chance to raise their profile in the country where they served. An early example was former Chinese Ambassador to the Netherlands, Mrs Xue Hanqin, who, shortly after her arrival in The Hague in 2003, gave several interviews to the Dutch press. She furthermore wrote a week-long diary for one of the Netherlands’ major newspapers,42 with the result that, for the first time, the Chinese Ambassador to the Netherlands became known by a wider audience than just the diplomatic community in The Hague. Many Chinese ambassadors around the globe became similarly engaged with local audiences by giving interviews, speaking at seminars and 38  Ding Ying, “Public Diplomacy Mission: China Seeks to Boost its Public Image Globally,” Beijing Review, No. 8 (February 18 2013). 39  Conversations with a Chinese scholar and a former Chinese diplomat (February and April 2013, respectively). 40  Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip C. Saunders, “Chinese Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence,” The China Quarterly, No. 171 (September 2002), p. 597. 41  Interviews with MFA officials and diplomats (June 2010 and May 2011). 42  See, for example, the interview with Xue by Garrie van Pinxteren, “Xue praat ook over mensenrechten” [Xue Also Discusses Human Rights], NRC (August 30 2003); and interview with Xue by Anne Meydam, “In China is een hoop te verbeteren” [There is Much to be Improved in China], Trouw (September 9 2003). Xue Hanqin’s Hollands Dagboek [The Diary] was published in NRC Handelsblad during autumn 2003.

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public events, and by appearing on television. Not only heads of mission but most Chinese diplomats abroad nowadays interact with their foreign counterparts. They often attend social events, but also invite foreign counterparts for formal and informal gatherings. In interviews and conversations, Chinese diplomats43 say that public diplomacy is an increasing part of their work, although a number of them emphasize that the basic ideas of public diplomacy have always been part of Chinese diplomacy.44 Some argue that the attitude, ability and performance of diplomats in conducting public diplomacy have become “one of the major considerations in their promotion process.”45 The government in Beijing sends the Chinese missions abroad public diplomacy guidelines, policy messages to be used in interviews and public speeches, and orders to address or not to address certain topics. Diplomats emphasize, however, that each embassy must develop its own public diplomacy strategy, as it needs to be suited to the situation in the host countries. Chinese embassies have indeed developed detailed public diplomacy strategies, fine-tuned to the local situation. Their public diplomacy tasks consist of building political trust, promoting economic and trade ties, developing relations with the local media, and creating friendly feelings with the general public. At a more practical level, this means giving guest speeches and lectures; participating in seminars and conferences; media work; and organizing or supporting Chinese cultural events such as Chinese New Year Celebrations (see below). Many embassies make an effort to reach out to local youth via events involving schools, and they organize cultural days for children that are adopted from China and their family members.46 In addition, there are crises that embassies need to handle. One diplomat explained how a European embassy tried to limit the negative impact for China of a visit by the Dalai Lama to his host country, which he regarded as a crisis in bilateral relations. The embassy’s public diplomacy strategy included shifting attention away from the visit itself by: emphasizing the negative impact of the visit for bilateral relations with China in local newspapers and 43  Based on interviews and conversations with diplomats during the period 2005–2012. 44  See, for example, Ji Lili, “Renmin: Guanfang waijiao yu minjian waijiao de gongtong luojiao dian—zhuanfang zhongguo renmin waijiao xuehui fu huizhang Lu Shumin” [The People: The Common Foothold of Official Diplomacy and People’s Diplomacy—and Interview with the Vice-President of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, Lu Shumin], GGWJJK, No. 10 (summer 2010). 45  Conversation with a Chinese diplomat (September 2009). 46  Ji Lili, “Renmin: Guanfang waijiao yu minjian waijiao de gongtong luojiao dian.”

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on local television; balancing local media coverage on the issue by providing the media with material and articles on positive developments in Tibet from both Chinese and Western sources; and promoting a comprehensive understanding of the issues among the general public.47 Another example of the role that a Chinese embassy played in a crisis, this time a major international emergency, was the evacuation operation of more than 30,000 Chinese citizens from Libya in March 2011. China’s swift and efficient rescue operation, carried out by the Chinese government and military, but coordinated by the Chinese embassy, was admired as an example of China’s capability to react quickly and adequately to emergencies.48 The Ministry of National Defense and the PLA The Chinese military was a latecomer to many areas of public diplomacy, but the Ministry of National Defense and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have now actively joined China’s public diplomacy efforts. Their aim is to establish an image for the PLA as a capable and responsible military. Over the past decade, the PLA has come to realize China’s military needs to counter accusations of lack of transparency, and that the best way to do so is by communicating with domestic and international publics. In 2008, the Ministry of National Defense established an Information Office and started organizing occasional press conferences on positive topics, such as the PLA’s rescue work after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake (see also chapter seven), and maritime escort and international humanitarian rescue operations. However, only in April 2011 did the ministry start to hold regular press conferences. This was viewed as a major step forward in the further opening up of the Chinese military, but the Director-General of the Foreign Affairs Office stated that the ministry remained “sober-minded that compared with the expectations from the media and the outside, there is still space for improvement in the regular press conference mechanism.”49 The Ministry of National Defense has started sharing military news with foreign militaries, Chinese military experts, scholars, and common officers and men. It arranges for domestic and foreign media to visit combat units and conduct interviews, and provides information via its website.50 It also reaches out via its think tank, the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS). 47  Meeting with European diplomat (September 2009). 48  Zhang Zhijun, “Zhengfu gonggong waijiao de shijian yu nengli jianshe.” 49  “Qian Lihua Interprets China’s Military Diplomacy in 2011,” PLA Daily (January 28 2012). 50  Information Office of the State Council, “China’s National Defence in 2010” (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2011).

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Other activities with a public diplomacy dimension include the humanitarian medical service provided by the PLA’s hospital ship Peace Ark during its ‘Harmonious Mission 2010’ in the Gulf of Aden and ‘Harmonious Mission 2011’ in Latin America. The ship’s crew treated local people in need of medical help in the countries visited and established cooperation with local military units. While these missions serve more than just humanitarian goals, they are first and foremost meant to show the image of a responsible and friendly PLA to the world.51 In addition, the PLA also reaches out via cultural events. It organizes performances abroad of the PLA’s military band and in 2011, for example, it held a Chinese Military Culture Week in Laos.52 Other Ministries Many other Chinese ministries and government organs are contributing to China’s public diplomacy efforts, not only in Beijing but also via the growing number of attachés of line ministries at Chinese embassies abroad. As a strong player in the area of foreign policy, the Ministry of Commerce (Mofcom) is closely engaged with the MFA in planning and executing public diplomacy activities. Mofcom’s task is to explain China’s economic policies and foreign investment plans to the world, particularly as they raise much concern in the Western world. Chinese announcements of plans to buy foreign companies regularly lead to hostile reactions and to withdrawal by the Chinese side. According to Zhao Qizheng, the failure of many Chinese investment proposals “could be attributed to China’s lack of public diplomacy.”53 Examples include the 2011 failed bid by Chinese Xinmao for European cable producer Draka, and the 2012 blockage by US President Obama of Chinese investment in wind farms in the US state of Oregon.54 Furthermore, Mofcom oversees

51  Chinese Ministry of Defence, “Journalists on ‘Peace Ark’ from MND Website and China Military Online Report ‘Harmonious Mission 2011,’ ” (September 19 2011), available online at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2011-09/19/content_4299236.htm (accessed January 2013). The missions also contribute to the development of Chinese military capabilities outside the Asian region; see, for example, the blog posts of Chinese military specialist Andrew Erickson, http://www.andrewerickson.com/2011/09/plan-hospitalship-peace-ark-embarks-on-3-month-navy-medical-service-mission-in-caribbean/. 52  “Qian Lihua Interprets China’s Military Diplomacy in 2011,” PLA Daily (January 28 2012). 53  Remark by Zhao Qizheng, quoted in Ding Qingfen, “Wen Vows to Boost ODI, Foreign Trade,” China Daily (March 6 2012). 54  Stanley Pignal, “Xinmao Drops Bid for Draka,” The Financial Times (January 6 2011); and Rachelle Younglai, “Obama Blocks Chinese Wind Farms in Oregon over Security,” Reuters (September 28 2012).

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an ­important instrument of China’s public diplomacy strategies: foreign aid, which will be discussed below. Mofcom’s public diplomacy is conducted by its ministers and vice-ministers during foreign visits and at important international meetings, and by the economic counselors at Chinese missions and embassies abroad. The latter organize local economic meetings or workshops that vary from receptions for their local networks to public diplomacy seminars for locally active Chinese companies.55 Like other ministries, Mofcom has expanded its Information Office and developed a spokesperson and press release system. It established Mofcom Public Information Service (MPIS) projects such as China Commodity Net (CCN),56 which provides information on China’s international trade and economic cooperation, as well as publishing reports and the English-language Biz Opportunity Bi-weekly. Together with other government organs and the CCP’s Office of External Publicity, in 2012 Mofcom took the lead in publishing a document on the construction of a corporate culture by Chinese companies abroad, in which companies were urged to carry out public diplomacy and strengthen publicity works in efforts to improve companies’ go-out strategies.57 In the field of cultural and media outreach, major state actors include China’s Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Education, SARFT, and the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP). The Ministry of Culture is responsible for promoting, organizing and supervising international cultural cooperation and exchange. It implements the cultural memorandums of understanding (MoUs) and numerous cooperation projects between China and other countries, regions, and international organizations. It has placed Cultural Counselors in a large number of Chinese embassies, and supervises the eleven cultural centers in capitals around the world. It furthermore runs the website ChinaCulture.org, which provides information on Chinese cultural institutions and projects. The SARFT and GAPP work closely together with China’s Ministry of Culture and SCIO on cultural outreach, but they play very different roles. SARFT supervises and censors China Central Television (CCTV), China Radio International (CRI), and all film and television studios in China; GAPP oversees and distributes all printed material and internet publications. They thus obstruct rather than encourage the development of China’s public diplomacy. On the evening 55  Examples include public diplomacy seminars organized by Chinese embassies in various African capitals, which will be discussed in chapter five. 56  See the website: http://ccne.mofcom.gov.cn/. 57  See http://kg.mofcom.gov.cn/article/c/201301/20130100011525.shtml (accessed February 2012).

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of the Oscars’ 2013 ceremony, the well-known Chinese private investment banker Wang Ran underlined SARFT’s negative role by tweeting to his 2.6 million Sina Weibo (Chinese Twitter) followers: On the same day that ethnic Chinese director Ang Lee58 won another Oscar, SARFT announced regulations requiring that Chinese television documentaries should pass a review, just as movies and television dramas do. While other people merely enjoy the excitement provided by Hollywood, only SARFT takes practical steps to help Hollywood maintain its dominant status in global film.59 This quotation illustrates the frustration in Chinese society about the way in which censorship stifles cultural creativity. The Chinese Ministry of Education’s role in public diplomacy lies in policies aimed at internationalizing China’s educational system via instruments such as student exchanges and institutional cooperation, and via the Hanban/ Confucius Institute headquarters, which is affiliated with the ministry. (The development of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms will be discussed in more detail in the section on public diplomacy instruments later in this chapter.) The Ministry of Education furthermore has cooperation agreements with numerous countries and with organizations such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It offers extensive scholarship programs to many countries and regions, and actively supports other countries’ scholarship programs that are aimed at bringing foreign students to China,60 as will be detailed in the paragraph on educational activities below.

58  Ang Lee is a Taiwanese-born US citizen. 59  Adam Minter, “What Lee’s ‘Life of Pi’ Oscar Says of Chinese Film,” BloombergView.com (February 27 2013), available online at http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/201302-26/what-lee-s-life-of-pi-oscar-says-of-chinese-film (accessed March 2013). 60  With the United States, for example, it runs the three “10,000 projects” in which China sponsors 10,000 American college students to study in China; implements the “Chinese Bridge” study program for Chinese proficiency for 10,000 Americans in China; and sends 10,000 Ph.D. candidates to the United States on Chinese government scholarships. See Liu Yandong, “People-to-People Exchanges and the Future of China–US Relations,” speech at the China Forum at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (April 13 2011). With the EU, China has a program that offers 30,000 scholarships for European students and researchers during the period 2013–2018; see Yojana Sharma, “Beijing Wants More In-depth HE Links with Europe,” University World News, No. 271 (May 11 2013).

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China’s Leaders China’s leaders are the public face of its government. They are expected to promote a good image and understanding of China during their foreign visits and in international meetings.61 During their period in office (2005–2013), former President Hu Jintao and former Premier Wen Jiabao have indeed played important roles in China’s charm offensives abroad. They traveled extensively, reserved time to address foreign audiences, and included contacts with ‘ordinary people’ during their foreign visits. The following case of President Hu Jintao’s 2011 visit to the United States shows the careful preparations for, and attention paid to, activities that would help provide a good image of China to the American public.62 When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited the United States in January 2011, he knew that he would face an American public concerned about the consequences of China’s rise for its economic future and about China’s assertive behavior in the Asian region, in particular during the 2010 row with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.63 The Chinese government therefore carefully designed and prepared a public diplomacy strategy for Hu’s visit. Two months before the visit, in November 2010, SCIO Director Wang Chen visited the United States and met, among others, with the US Under-Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, as well as representatives of major US newspapers and news corporations. In addition to discussing cooperation on public diplomacy issues, Wang used the visit to become attuned to American media and their audiences. At the beginning of January 2011, China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi, who went to the United States to finalize preparations for the visit, gave a feel-good speech to the Council of Foreign Relations in New York about the upcoming Chinese presidential visit, titled “A State Visit to Advance China–US Relations in the New Era.”64 President Hu’s public diplomacy actions took various forms. One day before his arrival in the United States, a businesslike written interview with him was published in the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post. In the interview, Hu urged both sides to work hard to find common ground and build mutual 61  See, for example, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Zhijun’s article “Zhengfu gonggong waijiao de shijian yu nengli jianshe.” 62  Adapted from Ingrid d’Hooghe, “China’s Public Diplomacy in the US: Hu Jintao’s State Visit,” parts 1 and 2, posted on China Relations blog (January 20 and 27 2011). 63  Diaoyu is the Chinese, and Senkaku the Japanese name for the islands; the issue will be discussed in more detail in chapter five. 64  Held on January 6 2011; published at the website of the Chinese MFA: http://www.fmprc .gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t784157.htm (accessed January 2011).

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trust.65 Next and more remarkable was Hu’s performance at the press conference at the White House on the second day of his visit. Contrary to his usual routine, Hu had agreed to take unscripted questions.66 He managed the event well, looked relaxed, did not make an issue of an unexpected misunderstanding about translation arrangements, and quietly addressed questions on China’s human rights problems, acknowledging that much work still needs to be done in that area.67 During the second leg of his American trip, President Hu visited the Midwestern city of Chicago with its large manufacturing and industrial sectors. This destination was carefully chosen to enable Hu directly to address audiences worried about rising unemployment, which looms large in that part of the United States. President Hu reached out to local companies by stating that “Boeing, Motorola, Caterpillar, McDonald’s and many other Midwestern companies have become household names in China,” and by emphasizing that exports from some of the region’s states to China have grown by as much as 800 per cent.68 Hu’s message was repeated at the local Midwestern level by China’s Minister of Commerce, Chen Deming, who on Friday January 21 2011 addressed the US–China Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum in Chicago. Minister Chen said that the Midwest’s agricultural and manufacturing products were strong complements to China’s production. In Chicago, Hu also expressed his support for non-official and youth exchanges by visiting the Walter Payton College Preparatory High School and the Confucius Institute that is located on the school’s campus. Hu engaged in conversations with students, offered twenty students and teachers a trip to China, and gave a speech in which he stressed the importance of youth in cementing close ties between the countries. In all of his public speeches, President Hu pointed toward rapidly rising US exports to China, promised that China would not link its innovation policies to the provision of government procurement preferences, and paid much attention to reassuring his audience that China’s economic growth is beneficial to the United States. He

65  See Keith B. Richburg, “Chinese President Hu Looks for ‘Common Ground’ with US,” The Washington Post (January 17 2011). 66  See http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/HuJoi (accessed January 2011). 67  For the transcript and video of the press conference, see online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/press-conference-president-obama-and-presidenthu-peoples-republic-china (accessed January 2011). 68  Deanna Bellandi and Caryn Rousseau, “China’s President Hu Jintao in Chicago: Visits City’s Confucius Institute Friday,” Huffington Post (January 21 2011).

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f­ urthermore brought along US$ 45 billion worth of export deals, which would be good for 235,000 jobs in the United States.69 The most striking public diplomacy action during the trip, however, did not directly involve President Hu. It was instead the launch of a 60-second video clip titled “Experience China” on huge video billboards at New York City’s Times Square. The clip featured famous Chinese people such as National Basketball Association (NBA) star Yao Ming, pianist Lang Lang, and hybrid rice scientist Yuan Longping, but also ordinary people from all over China. For one month, the video was shown at Times Square fifteen times per hour from 6am to 2am the next day, and a 30-second version was regularly broadcasted on CNN. The advertisement was quickly criticized by a number of foreign and Chinese observers, but producing such an advertisement was nevertheless an important new step in China’s public diplomacy learning process. The ad was followed a few days later by the online release of a 30-minute movie, also aimed at improving China’s image. The movie, entitled “Perspectives,” was sent to Chinese embassies all over the world to serve as promotional material. Looking at their recent foreign travels, China’s new leaders, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, seem to devote as much if not more attention to public diplomacy than their predecessors. President Xi has more charisma than his more wooden predecessor Hu Jintao and is ‘unusually approachable,’ as was evident during his trip to the United States in 2012.70 During that trip, Xi smartly included a well-planned meeting with ordinary Americans in smalltown Iowa, where Xi had stayed on a study trip in 1985. He also visited Los Angeles, where he interacted with high-school students and watched a basketball game.71 The latest asset in the Chinese leadership’s public diplomacy, however, is President Xi Jinping’s wife, Peng Liyuan, who made her “debut in the international diplomatic arena” in late March 2013 when she accompanied Xi on his first foreign trip as head of state to Moscow and various African countries.72 69  Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, “Obama Pushes Hu on Rights but Stresses Ties to China,” New York Times (January 19 2011). 70  See, for example, Jeremy Page, Bob Davis and Tom Orlik, “China’s New Boss,” The Saturday Essay at Wall Street Journal website, WSJ.com (November 12 2012), available online at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324439804578106860600724862.html (accessed November 13 2012); Edward Wong, “Chinese Vice-President Ends US Tour on Friendly Note,” New York Times (February 18 2012); and Tania Branigan, “Xi Jinping: The ‘Big Personality’ Taking Charge in China,” The Guardian (November 15 2012). 71  William Wan, “Xi Jinping Visits Iowa, Where the Diplomatic Equivalent of Love is in the Air,” The Washington Post (February 15 2012). 72  He Wenping, “Major Step in Image-building,” China Daily (April 10 2013).

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As discussed in this book’s introduction, the elegant Peng, who wears fashionable clothes by Chinese designers and is not afraid to stand in the limelight, has started a Chinese fashion frenzy73 and is compared by the international press to Michelle Obama and Kate Middleton.74 Many in China hope, however, that she will also be able to connect with foreign audiences in other ways, for example by paying ample attention to her role as a Goodwill Ambassador for Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS for the World Health Organization (WHO), a function that she has held since 2011. During the visit to the Republic of the Congo, Peng took a step in that direction when she visited children who are infected with HIV in an orphanage in Brazzaville.75 The Chinese press is jubilant about Peng’s contribution “to the shaping and improving of China’s national image”76 and she drew many positive comments abroad.77 More recently, the wife of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, Cheng Hong, has been given a similar role on the international stage.78 These leadership couples make Chinese leaders look more like Western leaders and thus easier to relate to foreign audiences. The Chinese Communist Party The CCP has in recent years joined efforts to improve China’s image by improving its own image. Foreign audiences hold the CCP—as the founding and only ruling power of the People’s Republic of China—responsible for China’s shortcomings, including human rights violations, corruption and lack of political reform. The CCP has extended its international contacts and relationships from European socialist parties to more than 400 political parties of all kinds all over the world. Its International Department invites leaders and delegations from foreign political parties to visit China, and CCP delegations make study trips abroad. Regular exchanges have been established, such as the annual 73  See, for example, Jane Perlez and Bree Feng, “Peng Liyuan, China’s New First Lady, Adds Glamour,” New York Times (March 24 2013). 74  Peter Ford, “China’s Michelle Obama? First Lady Peng Liyuan Inspires Fashion Frenzy,” Global News blog, The Christian Science Monitor (March 27 2013); and Malcolm Moore, “Peng Liyuan: The ‘Kate Middleton’ Effect of China’s New First lady,” The Telegraph (March 24 2013). 75  Xinhua, “Xi Encourages Chinese Doctors to Help Further Improve Africa’s Health Care Services” (March 31 2013). 76  He Wenping, “Major Step in Image-building.” 77  Hanna Beech, “Peng Liyuan, China’s First Lady, 50: The 2013 Time 100,” Time (April 18 2013); and Perlez and Feng, “Peng Liyuan, China’s New First Lady, Adds Glamour.” 78  Zhao Kejin, “A Shot in the Arm for ‘Lady Diplomacy,’ ” China Daily (May 8 2014); Laurie Burkitt and Li Jie, “A Scholarly ‘Second Lady’ Takes the Stage for China,” China Real Time blogs, The Wall Street Journal (May 4 2014).

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China–UK Leadership of the Future Forum, the China–EU High-Level Political Parties Forum, and the High-Level Dialog with US Political Parties.79 The Party has also enhanced its visibility in recent years. In 2009 the CCP Central Committee approved a spokesperson system for CCP organs at national and local levels, and in June 2010 spokespersons of eleven national CCP departments made their debut.80 In 2011 they were followed by spokespersons at local CCP levels.81 The spokesperson systems are seen as vital for “ensuring the people’s rights to be informed, to participate, to be heard and to oversee.”82 The CCP furthermore established a website, which now includes interactive elements and an online database providing résumés of more than 1,600 Party and government officials.83 In addition, it has developed various news and information channels, including a 24-hour telephone hotline84 and special websites for each Party Congress, which contain a wealth of policy documents, speeches, and news items in various languages. The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference One last actor deserves to be mentioned here, as it aspires to play an important role in public diplomacy: the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The CPPCC is China’s top advisory body. Its task is to formulate suggestions and advice on issues of public concern. Its more than 2,200 members come from all walks of life, including film and sporting celebrities, and from various Chinese political parties. Seeing itself as representing Chinese society, the CPPCC aims for a bigger role in public diplomacy, and its activities in that area have been increasing in recent years. The CPPCC’s report over the period 2008–2013 states the following about its initiatives in this area: We took spurring diplomacy as an important goal in increasing the CPPCC’s foreign exchanges. We conducted high-level dialog with other countries in exchanges of visits, and engaged in in-depth communication 79  Kong Genhong, “CPC Reaches Out to Political Parties in the Developed World,” China Today (October 19 2012). 80  Zhang Xiang, “Spokespersons of CPC Departments make Group Debut,” Xinhua (June 30 2009). 81  “Spokesman of Shanghai Party Committee Makes Debut,” People’s Daily (June 23 2011). 82  Publicity Chief Li Changchun quoted in “China’s Party Spokespersons Urged to Promote Social Harmony,” Xinhua (February 22 2011). 83  “CPC Invites Feedback on New Officials Database,” People’s Daily Online (November 5 2012), http://english.people.com.cn/90785/8004636.html (accessed November 10 2012). 84  See, for example, “Information Flow will be made Easier,” China Daily (December 30 2005).

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with foreign participants at international conferences we held or attended. We made full use of the Games of the XXIX Olympiad in Beijing, the World Expo in Shanghai and international conferences on public diplomacy to deepen our friendly exchanges with relevant organizations, major think tanks, mainstream mass media, influential figures and ordinary people in foreign countries. We launched the Public Diplomacy Quarterly; supported local CPPCC committees in establishing public diplomacy associations; and intensified the CPPCC’s theoretical research on public diplomacy, put it into practice innovatively, and increased public awareness of it.85 In an interview in 2012, then CPPCC spokesman Zhao Qizheng remarked that in comparison with the Chinese MFA’s role in public diplomacy, the CPPCC’s activities cover a wider range of topics and people, including, for example, teaching Chinese entrepreneurs about the significance of public diplomacy.86 The CPPCC is indeed very active about having exchanges with international officials, representatives of companies and non-governmental organizations and overseas Chinese associations.87

Subnational State Actors

Around 2010, the Chinese government started encouraging subnationallevel governments to conduct public diplomacy. This policy is part of a trend in which subnational governments are gradually developing bigger roles in China’s overall diplomacy. This decentralization supports the central government’s efforts to open up and internationalize inland cities and regions. The official rationale for public diplomacy by cities and local areas is that their stories contribute to a more complete image of China and make China’s message more vivid and concrete.88 For the cities, it is an instrument to become better known abroad, boost tourism, expand international cooperation, and attract foreign investments and technology. The remote northwestern city of Xining, 85  Jia Qinglin, “Report on the Work of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC),” delivered at the First Session of the Twelfth CPPCC National Committee (March 3 2013). 86  China Today Online (March 14 2012), http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/se/txt/ 2012-03/14/content_439661_2.htm (accessed April 2013). 87  See the website of the CPPCC: http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/ (accessed June 2013). 88  See, for example, Zhao Qizheng, How China Communicates, pp. 63–64.

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for example, hopes that its public diplomacy will boost tourism and attract more business;89 southwestern provincial capital Kunming aims to strengthen its position as a ‘bridgehead’ to Southeast Asia;90 the city of Nanjing wants to improve its general international standing as a major Chinese city, with public diplomacy campaigns around the 2013 Asian Youth Games and the 2014 Nanjing Summer Youth Olympics;91 and the eastern Chinese city of Suzhou aims to strengthen its attraction as a tourism destination with a focus on cultural public diplomacy.92 Many subnational public diplomacy activities are carried out in the framework of China’s more than 1,700 twin towns and sister-city relationships,93 but Chinese cities also increasingly become members of international city networks such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) Creative Cities Network and Metropolis. This network gathers cities with more than one million inhabitants and promotes cooperation to strengthen the cities’ sustainability. Furthermore, local outreach can take place via the media. For example, the Nanfang Media Group in Guangdong Province publishes a “Guangdong Today” section in overseas Chinese newspapers, and tourism authorities in the city of Hangzhou have been allowed to start their own international media campaign to promote the city, which is new for municipal-level organizations in China.94 89  “Xining shi jiji shijian defang gonggong waijiao buduan tisheng chengshi ‘ruan shili’ ” [Xining City Continuously Improves the City’s Soft Power by Actively Conducting Local Public Diplomacy], website of Xining Government, http://www.xining.gov.cn/ html/4204/274695.html (accessed February 2013). 90  Zhang Jinping, “Kunming quyu xing guoji chengshi zhanlüe zhong de gonggong waijiao” [Public Diplomacy in the Strategy for Constructing Kunming into a Regionally Important International City], Yunnan Minzu daxue (Zhixue Shehui Kexue ban) [Journal of Yunnan Nationalities University (Social Sciences)], Vol. 28, No. 3 (May 2011). 91  “Shi lingdao chuxi nanjing gonggong waijiao xiehui chengli dahui ” [City Leaders Attend the Inaugural Meeting of the Nanjing Public Diplomacy Association], website of Nanjing government, http://www.nanjing.gov.cn/zwgk/ldhd/201212/t20121211_376266.htm (accessed February 2013). 92  “Kaizhan difang gonggong he renwen waijiao” [Carry Out Local Public and Renwen Diplomacy], website of Suzhou Municipal government, http://www.suzhou.gov.cn/news/ szxw/201211/t20121122_169808.shtml (accessed January 2012). 93  See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-12/28/c_13668158.htm (accessed January 2013). 94  Yang Xingfeng, “Duiwai chuanbo de nanfang tansuo” [Exploring Overseas Publicity: The Nanfang Daily], GGWJJK, No. 9 (spring 2011); and the Hangzhou Weekly (January 17 2013), available online at http://hangzhouweekly.com/tourism/unseen-beauty-unforgettablehangzhou-announced-as-new-city-slogan/ (accessed February 2013).

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In 2011, the Chinese government allowed the establishment of local public diplomacy associations. In February 2011, the Shanghai Public Diplomacy Association was set up,95 soon followed by the establishment of local public diplomacy associations in Tianjin, Guangzhou and Wenzhou96 and, after the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, in many other cities. The local associations encourage research and support national public diplomacy efforts, as well as stimulate local initiatives to promote their own region.97 The Guangdong Public Diplomacy Association, for example, has a special role to play in organizing public diplomacy during local events such as the annual Guangdong Trade Fair, and to follow up on public diplomacy work done for the 2010 Asian Games in Guangzhou and the 2011 Summer Universiade in Shenzhen.98 The Shanghai Public Diplomacy Association, for example, worked with the Shanghai Information Office to sign agreements on exchanging and broadcasting city-image videos with Houston and Chicago in the United States.99 The local associations maintain close connections with the central authorities via members and consultants with national-level official positions.100

Non-State Actors

In addition to state or Party organs, a growing number of groups in Chinese society help shape China’s diplomacy and public diplomacy. Although many 95  “Shanghai gonggong waijiao xiehui zuotian chengli ” [Yesterday the Shanghai Public Diplomacy Association was Established], Dongfang Zaobao [Oriental Morning Post] (February 26 2011). 96  “Guangdong gonggong waijiao xiehui chengli ” [The Guangdong Public Diplomacy Association is Founded], Nanfang Ribao [Nanfang Daily] (December 27 2011). 97  Wei Jinshen, “Difang canyu gonggong waijiao de feiwu zhixing suqiu fenxi” [Analysis of the Non-material/Intangible Demands of Local Participation in Public Diplomacy], in Jia Qingguo (ed.), Gonggong waijiao: lilun yu shixian [Public Diplomacy: Theory and Practice] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2012), pp. 103–119. 98  “Guangdong gonggong waijiao xiehui chengli.” 99  Huang Wei, “Shanghai Boosts Image in US Sister-Cities,” People’s Daily (March 23 2012). 100  In the case of Guangdong, the consultants include: Zhao Qizheng; Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the CPPCC and former Vice-Minister of Commerce Ma Xiuhong; Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the CPPCC, TCL Group Vice Chairman and President of the Charhar Institute Han Fangming; and CPPCC member and former Ambassador of China to Thailand Zhang Jiuhuan. Local Guangdong consultants include former Vice-Chairman of Guangdong Province’s CPPCC Ke Xiaogang. See “Guangdong gonggong waijiao xiehui pinqing xiehui guwen” [Guangdong Public Diplomacy Association Hires Consultants], Nanfang Ribao [Nanfang Daily] (July 27 2011).

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of these organizations are closely related to, supervised, or co-opted by the government, they have more room for maneuver than official organizations and reinforce China’s soft power. They include people’s diplomacy organizations, intellectual elites, volunteers and celebrities, companies, and overseas Chinese. People’s Diplomacy Organizations People-to-people diplomacy, or people’s diplomacy, has always been seen as an important aspect of foreign relations, especially in times when China was relatively isolated. Examples are China’s ping-pong diplomacy of 1971, signaling a breakthrough in relations with the United States; a symposium organized by a Chinese Friendship Association in Italy in 1991, helping China to break out of isolation after the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989;101 and more recently people-to-people exchanges between China and Japan in attempts to ease tensions over territorial disputes.102 The oldest people’s diplomacy organization is the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA), which was established in 1949. It consists of many high-level (former) diplomats and officials and is responsible for maintaining contacts with prominent (former) statesmen, ministers, political leaders, diplomats, entrepreneurs, public figures and scholars who are considered friends or are otherwise important to China, but who are not entitled to be officially received by the Chinese government. Recent examples include visits by former US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, a US Congressional staff delegation, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, and a NATO Parliamentary Assembly delegation. Vice-President of CPIFA and former Chinese Ambassador Lu Shuming likens his work for CPIFA to his former work as a diplomat, as it serves the same goals. It is just much more ‘flexible,’ he explains, as there is less protocol and more freedom in discussions.103 CPIFA is in fact an unofficial and therefore convenient extension of the Chinese government, and could be considered a sort of diplomatic reserve. 101  At a symposium organized by CPAFFC in Rome in 1991, (then) Prime Minister of Italy Giulio Andreotti called on the world to maintain friendly cooperation with China rather than to isolate it; “China’s People-to-People Diplomacy Progressed over Past 13 Years,” People’s Daily (October 29 2002). 102  “Mutual Trust can Boost Sino–Japan Relations,” China Daily (July 2 2012); and Zhang Yunbi and Li Xiaoku, “Exchanges can Benefit China–Japan Ties,” China Daily (September 28 2012). 103  See Ji Lili, “Renmin: Guanfang waijiao yu minjian waijiao de gongtong luojiao dian;” and website of the CPIFA: http://www.cpifa.org/en/n/toRMNewsList.do (accessed December 2012).

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A people’s diplomacy organization whose activities are more focused on common people is the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), which was established in 1954. It is affiliated with China’s National People’s Congress and promotes international friendship and cooperation via the 46 regional or national friendship organizations that it has established. The CPAFFC currently cooperates with nearly 500 NGOs and institutions in 157 countries, and it oversees China’s more than 1,700 sister-city relationships.104 Sister-city relationships are considered valuable in China, as they provide Chinese municipal governments with a framework within which they can conduct international relations. Another large people’s diplomacy institution with yet another focus is the Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAFIU), which was established in 1981. CAFIU, which has the status of consultant to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), works to foster understanding between political parties and civil society by means of international dialog and exchange with non-governmental international organizations and research institutes. Its members come from the CCP and other political parties, civil organizations, the academic world, and/or prominent figures. CAFIU works together with more than 250 organizations in 110 countries, and conducts, for example, a German–Chinese dialog on human rights.105 The Chinese government regards these organizations as important public diplomacy instruments. Together they indeed initiate and execute an impressive array of international exchanges and dialogs that help smooth official diplomatic relations and improve understanding between China and other countries. The close affinity with the Chinese government ensures sufficient funds and allows for alignment of these organizations’ activities with China’s foreign policies and diplomacy. In some cases, activities or the absence of activities organized by the people’s organizations are therefore political signals. Intellectual Elites and Academic Institutions Academics at China’s top universities and experts at think tanks play a significant role in public diplomacy. They are increasingly engaged with international academic networks: they attend international conferences, participate in track-II diplomacy meetings, frequently speak before foreign audiences, and participate in international debates and exchanges of information. They demonstrate a plurality of thinking on international issues, increasingly publish in 104  See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-12/28/c_13668158.htm (accessed January 2013). 105  Held together with Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

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international journals, and are often interviewed by, or cited in, major Western newspapers. At home, they are regularly invited to advise the Chinese government and increasingly influence foreign policymaking. They also engage in public debates in the local press. Abroad, they spread the image that academic freedom is growing in China and that China’s academe is an intellectual and scientific force with which to be reckoned.106 Experts at top think tanks that are closely affiliated with the Chinese government, such as the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), are sometimes posted to a Chinese embassy or mission abroad to gain diplomatic experience and advise the ambassador. This practice has existed for years. New, however, was the posting in 2008 of two Fudan University academics to a Chinese diplomatic mission, in this case the Chinese mission to the European Union (EU).107 The two mainly engaged with local scholars and opinion leaders and participated in numerous academic and policy seminars. The example, however, has not yet been widely followed and seems to have been an initiative by an individual ambassador rather than a new policy by the Chinese MFA. Scholars working at the many public diplomacy research units of Chinese think tanks and universities also contribute to the development of public diplomacy strategies and policies. They are commissioned to do research on specific public diplomacy issues and provide policymakers with much input and advice. They also help prepare high-level bilateral visits and multilateral summits.108 Being aware that China “must learn to speak the language of the target group”109 in public diplomacy, they furthermore examine how diplomats and other actors can improve their international communication skills. The latter is, for example, the focus of the China Institute for International Communication Strategy (CIICS), which is co-sponsored by CPIFA and the Communication University of China (CUC), and which aims to become a think tank and academic research institution with global influence.110 106  Quansheng Zhao, “Epistemic Community, Intellectuals, and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Policy and Society, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 39–59. 107  The Fudan scholars were public diplomacy expert Wang Yiwei and international relations professor Pan Zhongqi. 108  Wang Lili, “Sixiangku zai gonggong waijiao zhong de juese yu gongneng” [The Role and Function of the Think Tank in Public Diplomacy,” GGWJJK, No. 4 (summer 2010). 109  Yang Xingfeng, “Duiwai chuanbo de nanfang tansuo” [Exploring Overseas Publicity: The Nanfang Daily], GGWJJK, No. 9 (spring 2011). 110  “New Institute to Improve China’s Communication Abroad,” Xinhua (May 15 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-05/16/c_131592170.htm; and “CIICS to

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Volunteers and Celebrities International volunteering is growing in China and contributes to a positive image. Chinese volunteers were in the past mostly sent out via the Youth Volunteer Work Department of the Communist Youth League,111 but more recently they have also started participating in the programs of international organizations such as UNICEF, UNDP,112 and the international development charity Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO). According to a VSO country director, Chinese volunteers have a unique perspective, as most of them have witnessed poverty and know from experience that “if people have better access to basic services, to education, [they] can find a way to make a living that can lift people out of poverty.”113 China also has an extensive and longstanding Chinese Medical Team program (CMT) in Africa, which is a decentralized program in which a Chinese province is responsible for sending CMTs to one or more African countries. In mid-2012, China had more than 1,067 medical personnel working across the African continent.114 Their role in Africa will be further discussed in chapter 5. A relatively new phenomenon in China is the designation of celebrity ambassadors. Various internationally famous Chinese figures from sporting or cultural circles have in recent years acted as, or have been explicitly named as, goodwill ambassadors. Chinese superstar basketball player Yao Ming, for example, has acted as an informal but important ‘Chinese ambassador’ during his NBA career in the United States. In the words of a former US Ambassador to China, Yao Ming “gave the Chinese people and China a human face in the United States.”115 After his retirement from the NBA, Yao Ming returned to Improve China’s Communication Abroad,” Xinhua Online (May 17 2012), http://english .cri.cn/6909/2012/05/17/53s700399.htm (accessed November 2012). 111  He Na and Peng Yining, “Volunteers are on the Frontline of a New World,” China Daily (December 5 2012); and “China has been Using a New Approach to Public Diplomacy to Expand its Influence and Global Appeal,” Peace Corps News (August 8 2007). During the past decade, the Communist Youth League has sent out around 600 young Chinese to long-term volunteer service projects in 22 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 112  “30 Years of UN Volunteers in China: A Milestone for Global Development,” website of UNDP, http://www.undp.org.cn/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article& catid=14&topic=11&sid=44731&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0. 113  William Ide, “Chinese Pursue Volunteer Opportunities in Africa,” Voice of America (March 26 2013). 114  Dan Ran and Wang Yanan, “China’s Cooperative Measures with Africa Substantial, Effective,” website of FOCAC, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys/t954284.htm. 115  James Sasser, quoted in Gene Wang, “Yao Ming’s Influence was Far-reaching during Distinguished NBA Career,” The Washington Post (July 19 2011).

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China and became Goodwill Ambassador for WildAid, China’s global ambassador for the Special Olympics, and Honorary Ambassador of the Shanghai Public Diplomacy Association. Internationally renowned concert pianist Lang Lang, who appeared in the 2009 Time magazine’s annual list of the world’s 100 most influential people, was an official worldwide ambassador to the 2010 Shanghai Expo, and is Goodwill Ambassador for UNICEF. Lang Lang furthermore regularly introduces traditional Chinese music to foreign audiences during his concerts. Other examples include actress Zhou Xun, who is a China National Goodwill Ambassador for UNDP, and actress Li Bingbing, who is Goodwill Ambassador for the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). These and other people on the slowly but steadily growing list of internationally renowned Chinese celebrities contribute to the improvement of China’s image by introducing elements of China’s culture to global audiences. Companies The Chinese business community has been urged in recent years to play a bigger role in public diplomacy. China’s government calls upon them to take their publicity work beyond improving the enterprise’s reputation to contributing to China’s international image and cultural soft power.116 Furthermore, companies’ public diplomacy should help smooth Chinese business transactions. In more concrete terms, Chinese enterprises should win the respect of foreigners by abiding by local laws, participating in public welfare projects, improving their cooperation with foreign media, and stepping up the release of information.117 As CPPCC spokesman Zhao Qizheng points out, however, Chinese companies still have much to learn in this field, as they “lack in-depth and comprehensive knowledge about overseas markets, practices and rules, and they are not adept at conducting public diplomacy with the local communities.”118 The Chinese government therefore regularly organizes

116  “Guoyou qiye waixuan gongzuo zuotan hui zaijing juxing, bushu guoqi waixuan gongzuo” [State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) Foreign Publicity Work Forum Held in Beijing, Deploying State-owned Companies” External Publicity Work], Xinhua (June 23 2010), available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-06/23/c_12253762.htm (accessed November 2012). The forum was attended by SOEs such as China Ocean Shipping (Group) Corporation, China State Construction Engineering Corporation and China Non-ferrous Metal Mining Group Co. 117  Speech by Publicity Chief Liu Yunshan, published by Xinhua Online (June 22 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-06/22/c_12249030.htm (accessed December 2012). 118  “Firms Learning to Go Global,” China Daily (March 3 2012).

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symposiums and forums for companies, where public diplomacy and other publicity issues are discussed.119 Growing numbers of Chinese companies are responding to this call. In some cases their outreach is not limited to the companies’ direct business sector, but also includes organizing or supporting cultural events.120 For example, Dalian Wanda Group, the world’s biggest owner of movie theatres, is sponsoring an exhibition of Chinese artist Shu Qi in the Louvre Museum in Paris and is exploring possibilities for the coproduction of films with leading Hollywood studios.121 The call for companies to invest in public diplomacy is particularly made to Chinese companies that do business in Asia and Africa, as will be seen in chapter five. In addition to developing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies and behaving more in line with international practices and standards, Chinese companies are advised to improve their public relations management and to provide public statements whenever an incident takes place.122 Overseas Chinese The more than 50 million overseas Chinese in more than 130 countries123 are both targets and actors of China’s public diplomacy. They consist of Chinese citizens living abroad and of foreign citizens of Chinese ancestry.124 They are a target group, because Beijing wants to keep the Chinese diaspora on its side and encourage them to invest in China. Yet they are also actors, as they play a role in promoting Chinese culture and lobbying for Chinese political interests. 119  For example, the State-Owned Enterprises Foreign Publicity Work Forum, http://news. xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-06/22/c_12249030.htm (accessed December 2012); and “Guoyou qiye waixuan gongzuo zuotan hui zaijing juxing, bushu guoqi waixuan gongzuo.” 120  See, for example, the election of the top 100 Chinese soft power enterprises, http://theory .people.com.cn/GB/166866/10307066.html (accessed December 2012). 121  Terril Yue Jones, “Soft Power: China’s Wanda Eyes US Hotel, Movie Deals,” Reuters (December 3 2012). 122  Ouyang Junshan, “Yijia minqi kaizhan zijue gonggong waijiao de anli guancha” [Practice of Public Diplomacy by a Private Business], GGWJJK, No. 2 (summer 2010); Jing Tian, “Zou chuqu, shuli zhongguo qiye lianghao xingxiang” [Go Out and Establish a Good Image of Chinese Enterprises], GGWJK, No. 10 (summer 2012); and Mi Xiaosheng, “Zai fei zhongzi qiye de tiaozhan ji duice” [Challenges and Solutions for Chinese Companies in Africa], GGWJJK, No. 10 (summer 2012). 123  “President Meets Leaders of Overseas Chinese Organizations,” Xinhua (April 10 2012). 124  For a detailed discussion of the Chinese diaspora and China’s relations with them from 1949 onward, see Elena Brabantseva, Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism: De-centring China (London: Routledge, 2010).

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As He Yafei, Deputy Director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, pointed out, it would be unwise not to involve the overseas Chinese worldwide, most of whom “care very much about China’s image” and are willing to help with China’s public diplomacy work. He sees them as multipliers and go-betweens who can overcome cultural differences in communication with foreigners and whose China narrative “will not be considered ideological indoctrination.”125 In the “Outline for the Development of National Overseas Chinese Affairs (2011 to 2015),” issued by the State Council, overseas Chinese are regarded as an important part of China’s comprehensive national strength and a rich source for public diplomacy.126 China has, since the 1950s, regularly reached out to the Chinese diaspora, but more recent efforts to engage the overseas Chinese started in the early 1990s, when Deng Xiaoping called on them to “strive to ‘reunify the motherland’ and revitalize the nation.”127 Subsequent leaders have repeated this call. Premier Wen Jiabao, for example, asked overseas Chinese to “make their utmost efforts to promote China’s modernization drive, as well as to promote cultural exchanges all over the world.”128 The Chinese government develops its promotion work primarily via two channels: overseas Chinese organizations; and overseas Chinese media. It has established pro-China associations among overseas Chinese communities around the world and has supported the convening of regional conferences in a drive to form a united global network of such organizations.129 It has also been involved in the establishment of more than 2,000 overseas Chinese students’ associations and more than 300 professional organizations.130 Through these associations, the Chinese government organizes or sponsors a great number of economic, educational and cultural activities targeted at the overseas

125  He Yafei “Fahui qiaowu youshi, rang shijie liaojie yige zhenzheng de zhongguo” [To Play Overseas Chinese Affairs Advantage, Let the World Know a Real China], GGWJJK, No. 12 (winter 2012). 126  Zhu Yilong, “Jiaqiang yanjiu, tazhan qiaowu gonggong waijiao” [To Strengthen Research and Expand Public Diplomacy Concerning Overseas Chinese Affairs], GGWJJK, No. 9 (spring 2012). 127  Brabantseva, Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities, and Nationalism, p. 105. 128  “Premier Wen Calls for Overseas Chinese to Promote China’s Peaceful Reunification,” People’s Daily (May 21 2005). 129  “Beijing Wooing Overseas Chinese Away from Taiwan: Officials,” Taiwan Security News (May 30 2002). 130  Brabantseva, Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism, p. 125.

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Chinese, but sometimes also broader audiences.131 The Chinese government has furthermore supported the expansion of overseas Chinese media and has invested in strengthening its relations with them. As discussed elsewhere, Xinhua News Agency has expanded membership of its news services for the overseas Chinese media. Referring to a shared history, culture and traditions, the Chinese government tries to strengthen ties between the Chinese diaspora and China. To emphasize the importance that China’s government attaches to the role of the Chinese diaspora, (then) President Hu Jintao and others leaders regularly met with participants in overseas Chinese conferences and meetings.132 This policy seems to have been rather successful. Overseas Chinese were extensively engaged in defending China’s image in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and they were also very active in promoting the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, as will be discussed in detail in chapter six. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office has been urged in recent years to develop a more structural involvement of the Chinese diaspora in China’s public diplomacy.133 The Office disseminates materials about China’s culture and a China News Weekly to overseas Chinese, and organizes conferences for leaders of overseas Chinese associations. It has furthermore established a World Chinese Media Alliance, which organizes the World Chinese Media Forum and media workshops for overseas Chinese.

Consequences of the Diversification of Actors

This chapter has highlighted the rapid increase in the number and diversity of state and non-state actors involved in China’s public diplomacy. Many governmental and Party organizations are continuously expanding their public diplomacy activities and improving their skills. Coordinating public diplomacy activities among these actors is an enormous challenge for the government, and several coordination mechanisms have been established to deal with 131  For example, the China Synergy Program for Outstanding Youth, which gathers outstanding Chinese youth across the world to “learn about modern China and Chinese culture,” at http://www.chinasynergy.org. 132  “President Meets Leaders of Overseas Chinese Organizations,” Xinhua (April 10 2012), http://eng.mod.gov.cn/HomePicture/2012-04/10/content_4357269.htm. 133  Jin Zhengkun, “Dangdai zhongguo qiaowu gonggong waijiao tanxi” [An Exploration of Contemporary Overseas Chinese Public Diplomacy], Guangxi Shehui Kexue [Guangxi Social Sciences] (December 10 2012).

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this problem. Examples include the Foreign Culture Work Inter-ministerial Joint Conference system, which was established to coordinate activities and strengthen strategic planning,134 and the Leading Group for Cultural System Reform, which coordinates the reform and development of China’s cultural industry.135 The growing number of non-state actors in China’s public diplomacy in the past decade has brought a new dynamic to the Chinese government’s efforts to improve China’s image. These actors are often part of global networks with public and private actors, and they participate in informal international dialogs where they exchange ideas and work together with other nationals. In spite of not being fully independent of the Chinese government, they spread a diverse image of China that international audiences consider more interesting and genuine than the image projected by the government. They furthermore take international concepts and values back to China and discuss them with colleagues or friends or, in cases where they advise the government, with policymakers. In doing so, they contribute to a better understanding between China and the outside world.

Public Diplomacy Instruments

China has invested much money and effort in developing a wide range of instruments for public diplomacy. Many of these instruments are similar to those employed by Western countries in their public diplomacy, such as the media, cultural institutions, activities and exchanges, educational exchanges, and aid. The Chinese government, however, uses some of these instruments on a different scale or in a very different way.

134  Cai Wu, “Report Concerning the Work Situation in Deepening Cultural Structural Reform and Promoting the Grand Development and Grand Flourishing of Socialist Culture,” report to the 29th Meeting of the 11th Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (October 24 2012), http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/10/24/reportconcerning-the-work-situation-in-deepening-cultural-structural-reform-and-promotingthe-grand-development-and-grand-flourishing-of-socialist-culture/#more-2231. 135  “China’s Cultural Sectors Hold Joint Press Conference on Cultural Innovation,” website of CCTV (November 11 2012), http://english.cntv.cn/program/newsupdate/20121111/103494 .shtml.

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The Media The Chinese government considers the media to be the major instrument of China’s public diplomacy. Domestic media are regarded as the “main force to rely on” for the creation of a favorable public opinion abroad, but “foreign media, too, are to be enlisted.”136 As discussed in chapter three, the Chinese government feels that Chinese views on world affairs and the country’s development are underrepresented in the global media. An important part of China’s public diplomacy strategy therefore concerns increasing China’s voice in the world. A report by the China Institute of International Studies found that 50 Western multinational media companies account for 95 per cent of the world’s media market and thus shape the international image of China.137 The Chinese government wants to overcome this Western media dominance and provide foreign audiences with their own views of China and international issues. In 2001, therefore, the CPD and SARFT launched the media ‘go out’ or ‘go global’ (zou chuqu) policy, and from that moment onward the Chinese government has invested much in the expansion and strengthening of Chinese media outlets abroad. The policy got a boost in January 2009 when the Chinese government announced that it would invest 45 billion renminbi (RMB) (approximately US$ 6.6 billion) in extending China’s international media outreach.138 Major beneficiaries were China Radio International (CRI), China Central Television (CCTV), China’s official news wire, the Xinhua News Agency, and the newspaper China Daily. While other international broadcasters—such as Voice of America and the BBC World Service—have sized down over the last two decades, CRI (or Voice of China) has gradually been expanding its international presence and now broadcasts in 61 languages all over the world. It has 32 overseas correspondents’ bureaus and a stake in twelve Confucius Classrooms worldwide.139 CRI programs feature music, general international and business news, talk shows, Chinese- and English-language courses, and panel discussions with international speakers on topics that are of interest to local audiences.140 136  See, for example, Zhao Qizheng, How China Communicates, pp. 49–50. 137  Qu Xing, Su Xiaohui, and Ji Ling, “Xifang meiti she hua xinxiang de xingcheng jizhi yu liyi qudong” [Mechanisms and Interests of the Western Media in Shaping China’s Image] (Beijing: China Institute of International Studies, September 14 2012). 138  Vivian Wu and Adam Chen, “Beijing in 45b Yuan Global Media Drive,” South China Morning Post (January 13 2009). 139  CRI Website, http://english.cri.cn/11114/2012/09/20/1261s723239.htm (accessed January 2013). 140  See CRI website: http://english.cri.cn/index.htm. A recent example concerns a panel discussion on developments in the Sahel region of Africa with former US Ambassador

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CCTV is an even bigger media platform than CRI, and in addition to television also covers newspapers, movies, and the internet. CCTV now runs six international channels in six languages, and its programs reach 140 countries and regions. CCTV has correspondents in nineteen places around the world and it has established bureaus on all of the continents.141 Since the launch of the ‘go out’ policy, CCTV has attempted to become a CNN-like, internationally popular, television station.142 It changed its focus from presenting China and domestic developments to covering international affairs and thus presenting the Chinese perspective on world news to its audiences. It furthermore hired foreign anchors and editors and introduced Western-style programs. Although the quality of its international television programs has improved, content analysis by Chinese media scholar Xiaoling Zhang reveals that they are still heavily influenced by official Chinese policy lines, defend China’s stand when the country is criticized in the international media, and consciously boost Chinese ideas and concepts.143 It is therefore not likely that international audiences in Western countries, which are able to choose from a wide variety of television stations, will in large numbers turn to CCTV to get their news updates or to seek entertainment.144 Xinhua News Agency, China’s official wire service, has more than 10,000 employees stationed around the world and offers printed publications, financial services, new media research and—since 2010—global television called China Xinhua News Network Corporation (CNC) World. CNC World broadcasts around the clock in English and other languages on every continent.145 A rival of CCTV, it aims to provide an alternative information source for global audiences, similar to Al Jazeera, and reaches audiences in the Asia–Pacific region, Europe, North America and Africa. In a move that showed its ambition, to Ethiopia David Shinn; Director of Viewpoint Africa in London, Ayo Johnson; and a researcher at the Center for African Studies at Peking University in Beijing, Antoine Lokongo. See online at http://davidshinn.blogspot.com/2013/01/china-radio-internationalasked-me-to.html (accessed February 2013). 141  CCTV website, http://english.cntv.cn/20091207/103449_1.shtml (accessed January 2013). 142  See Ying Zhu, Two Billion Eyes: The Story of China Central Television (New York, NY: New Press, 2012), p. 172. 143  Xiaoling Zhang, “China’s International Broadcasting: A Case Study of CCTV International,” in Wang (ed.), Soft Power in China, pp. 57–71. 144  For more details on CCTV’s foreign efforts, see, for example, Shambaugh, China Goes Global, pp. 230–233. 145  Qiu Lin, “Top Media Armed with Global TV, China Wants More Voices Heard,” Xinhua (July 1 2010).

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CNC World’s newsroom opened a new office at New York City’s Times Square, near the offices of the New York Times and Reuters. The English-language China Daily, which was established in 1981 to serve foreigners in China, has recently expanded its international outreach by launching foreign editions of the newspaper, which better cater to the interests of regional foreign audiences. In February 2009 it launched a US edition, followed in 2010 by European and Asian weekly editions, and in 2012 by an African weekly edition. It furthermore has website editions focused at various regions in the world and it is building “a platform for effective global communication” by hosting international events such as the Beijing–Tokyo Forum, an annual non-governmental exchange event that is aimed at improving Sino– Japanese ties, and the China Daily Asia Leadership Roundtable, a platform for high-level discussions among political, business, and academic leaders of nineteen countries and regions in Asia.146 Another Chinese newspaper that is targeted at foreign readers is the English edition of the Global Times, which was launched in April 2009 and quickly became widely read by foreigners. The newspaper is much more focused on debate than the China Daily, and offers a wide variety of outspoken views on China and international developments, ranging from nationalistic to critical stands.147 The New Media The internet was launched in China in late 1994, and the Chinese government soon started to make effective use of its possibilities as an instrument for public diplomacy. Within a year, Chinese news media started to develop websites, followed in subsequent years by government organizations. These websites were continuously improved, and from early on they had accessible archives providing much information. Contrary to most foreign newspapers, the Chinese People’s Daily and China Daily made downloads of their new and archived articles free of charge. From 2001 onward, government organizations at national and provincial levels started establishing Chinese- and English-language

146  See, for example, the China Daily Asia Pacific website: http://www.chinadailyapac.com/ about-us. 147  See, for example, Allen Carlson and Jason Oaks, “Is China’s Global Times Misunderstood?,” The Diplomat (September 14 2012), http://thediplomat.com/2012/09/14/is-chinas-globaltimes-misunderstood/ (accessed September 2012).

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websites.148 The number and quality of these websites, which ­provide official information about the government, Chinese cities, major events, aspects of Chinese culture, and tourism, have gradually increased and contribute to the transparency of the Chinese government’s organs.149 Far more important than websites as digital instruments of public diplomacy are social media. As discussed in chapter two, Chinese citizens widely and actively use social media to get information and connect with their networks. Government and non-governmental organizations in China therefore increasingly use social media to reach out to society and to build networks of like-minded people. The Chinese MFA, for example, has micro-blog accounts on Sina and Tencent and was the first Chinese ministry in 2013 to open a WeChat account. WeChat, which allows users to communicate within a network of colleagues and friends, is currently the most popular mobile application in China.150 Many Chinese embassies around the globe have also opened Facebook pages. Government actors, however, are not yet very active on these platforms, as they struggle with the question of how to use social media effectively to connect with society without losing control over the conversation. The leadership furthermore seeks to contain independent-minded bloggers who exert attraction to society. There are millions of Chinese bloggers and, as a group, they increasingly contribute to the image of China as a country with a vibrant culture and lively society. They are a source of soft power rather than a public diplomacy actor, as their discussions are not initiated or supported by the Chinese government as public diplomacy acts. Their international networks are often limited to overseas Chinese and China specialists, as most blogs are in Chinese, but a growing number of international websites in English report on the Chinese blogosphere, or translate excerpts of Chinese blogs.151 Some Chinese bloggers, such as outspoken writer and racing car driver Han Han, have become internationally well known. Han Han’s blogs are translated and published abroad and he was included in Time magazine’s 2010 list of the 100 most influential people 148  Xiaoling Zhang, The Transformation of Political Communication in China: From Propaganda to Hegemony, Series on Contemporary China, Vol. 29 (Singapore: World Scientific Publishers, 2011), p. 184. 149  See, for example, http://www.china.org.cn; http://www.chinatoday.com; http://english .gov.cn/; and http://www.cultural-china.com/. 150  He Lu and Zhu Weilu, “Tell ‘Chinese Foreign Affairs Story’ with New Media,” People’s Daily (June 6 2013). 151  See http://www.globalvoicesonline.org; http://www.danwei.org; http://www.cmp.hku.hk; and http://www.chinadigitaltimes.net.

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in the world and in New Statesmen’s 2010 list of 50 people that matter.152 As a group, bloggers have become an important resource of Chinese public opinion for foreign reporters. Discussions on social media platforms such as Weibo are regularly cited in newspaper articles or even make international headlines. Examples of the latter are discussions about the 2011 Jasmine Revolutions in the Middle East and a 2011 high-speed train accident in China that killed more than 40 people.153 Foreigners have also discovered Chinese social media as a public diplomacy instrument. Most foreign diplomatic missions and companies in China have a Weibo account to inform Chinese audiences about their countries’ policies and the mission or company’s activities. Furthermore, a growing group of foreign officials and celebrities have started a Weibo account, including International Monetary Fund (IMF) Director Christine Lagarde, US business magnate Bill Gates, and US actor Tom Cruise. Foreign Media China has become a hot topic in the foreign media. Major newspapers carry reports about China on a daily basis and in addition they regularly publish special issues on developments concerning China. Radio and television also devote much attention to China, with recent examples including a special series about “China in Transition” on the United States’ National Public Radio (NPR),154 and television broadcasts of documentaries that illustrate unexpected aspects of life in China, such as “Red Obsession” on China’s thirst for wine.155 In order to have its own views disseminated to global audiences and correct alleged ‘misquotes’ in foreign reports,156 the Chinese government 152  Allan Barr (ed.), This Generation: Dispatches from China’s Most Popular Literary Star (and Race Car Driver) (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012); “The 2010 Time 100,” Time (May 2010), online at http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/completelist/0,29569,1984685,00. html; and New Statesmen (September 2010), online at http://www.newstatesman.com/ 2010/09/han-china-matter-taken-200 (December 2012). 153  Kathrin Hille, “China’s Jasmine Revolution” (February 21 2011), ft.com, available online at http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/02/21/china’s-jasmine-revolution/#axzz2KNYlzKGr (accessed February 2011); and “China Train Crash Censorship Scorned at Internet,” Reuters (August 1 2011). 154  NPR series on “China in Transition” in 2012, http://www.npr.org/series/163865744/chinain-transition-crisis-or-change (accessed May 2013). 155  Broadcasted by the BBC (May 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts22630263 (accessed May 2013). 156  See, for example, Xinhua, “US Media Misquote China-related Reports, Causing Concerns” (February 25 2013).

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increasingly reaches out to foreign media channels. In January 2013 there were approximately 700 foreign correspondents and 438 news organizations from 59 countries working in China,157 and many of these organizations engage in cooperation and exchange projects with Chinese media. Examples of such exchanges include the annual China–United States Journalists’ Exchanges and the Europe–China Media Exchange program.158 For the past few years, the Chinese government has regularly published letters or opinion pieces in major foreign newspapers, given interviews, and released information via Xinhua and press conferences. A close look at China’s public diplomacy during the January 2011 European tour of then Chinese Vice-Premier Li Keqiang provides insight into how the Chinese government uses foreign media channels to disseminate its messages to foreign audiences. Vice-Premier Li Keqiang made a European tour in January 2011, which included visits to Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom. One day ahead of each leg of the trip, Li published an editorial in a major national newspaper of the country that he was about to visit. Chinese leaders had been increasingly writing in, or granting interviews to, major international newspapers during their visits abroad, but addressing European newspaper readers on this scale—with three different editorials within a week—was a novelty in Chinese public diplomacy. The Chinese government also made sure that Li’s messages were simultaneously echoed, strengthened, or expanded in English-language publications in China, or in statements by accompanying Chinese officials. In Spain, Li published a piece in El Pais on January 3 2011, stating that Chinese officials had faith in Spain’s financial system and would continue to take part in government debt auctions.159 Accompanying Li, China’s ViceMinister of Commerce Gao Hucheng gave a press conference during which he expanded upon Li’s message to Europe as a whole, by stating that China had confidence in European financial markets and in Europe being able to overcome its debt crisis.160 One day ahead of his visit to Germany, Li wrote a guest editorial for the Süddeutsche Zeitung titled “Benefits for Both Peoples,” in which he repeated

157  Lin Meilian, “Foreign Hopes,” Global Times (April 8 2013). 158   See online at http://www.eastwestcenter.org/seminars-and-journalism-fellowships/ journalism-fellowships/china-us-journalists-exchange; and http://www.strategicdialogue .org/programs/europe-in-the-world/europe-china-media/ (accessed January 2013). 159  Li Keqiang, “Trabajemos de la mano” [Let’s Work Hand in Hand], El Pais (January 3 2011). 160  Website of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, online at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/ aarticle/newsrelease/significantnews/201101/20110107355186.html (accessed January 2011).

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his promise that China would help Europe to overcome its financial crisis and tried to charm German audiences with the following flattery: Germany is known as the country of philosophers, scientists and musicians. The Chinese people admire the German people for their wisdom and industriousness and ‘Made in Germany,’ a synonym of high quality, excellent technology and innovation, which is popular with Chinese consumers. The Chinese have always had friendly feelings for the German people.161 Not coincidentally, Li Keqiang simultaneously published another important message for European audiences in the China Daily, where he said that China would continue to strengthen intellectual-property protection and improve the business environment for foreign firms.162 While in London, the Financial Times published an article by Li titled “The World Should Not Fear a Growing China,” in which Li asserted that China is a constructive and responsible player.163 On the final day of the visit, the Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China, Yi Gang, said at a briefing in London that China saw the euro as a key pillar of a multi-currency global financial system and would be prepared to participate in future eurozone stabilization measures.164 Vice-Premier Li Keqiang appeared relaxed and willing to engage in unscripted talks during his trip. He met with officials, Spanish and British royalty, businessmen, and students. He concluded business deals in each of the three countries (€5.7 billion in Spain, €6.6 billion in Germany, and £2.6 billion in the United Kingdom) and had a special gift for the UK: two giant pandas (on loan) to Edinburgh Zoo. Li’s trip and the publications discussed above were a concerted effort by the Chinese government to signal a change in China’s diplomacy toward the EU and to convince European audiences that China wanted to give a new boost to the strained Europe–China relationship, and was willing to take concrete steps with regard to economic and commercial irritants between the two sides. 161  Li Keqiang, “Vorteile für beide Völker ” [Benefits for Both Peoples], Süddeutsche Zeitung (January 5 2011). 162  Li Keqiang, “Embracing a Brighter Future,” China Daily (January 4 2011). 163  Li Keqiang, “The World Should Not Fear a Growing China,” Financial Times (January 9 2011). 164  Sebastian Tong and Sujata Rao, “China Ready to Play Part in Euro Zone Crisis Fund– PBOC,” Reuters (January 12 2011).

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Cultural Institutes and Activities Aspiring to match Western and some Asian countries’ cultural influence in the world, China is expanding its cultural diplomacy via multiple channels. The Chinese Ministry of Culture has established cultural exchange relationships with more than 160 countries and regions, and currently runs nine foreign Chinese cultural centers in cities such as Tokyo, Berlin, and Paris, with more to follow.165 The ministry organizes international cultural events all over the world, including big and long-term events such as: the Chinese Culture Year in Turkey (2012) and in Australia (2011–2012); the year of Intercultural Dialogue with the European Union (2012); the Chinese-language year in France (2011–2012); and the Year of India–China Friendship and Cooperation (2012). In addition, there have been numerous smaller events such as the Europalia–China Arts festival in Belgium and the Netherlands (2009), and the annual bilateral Culture Festivals in Seoul and Moscow. In 2012, the Chinese Ministry of Culture spent US$ 26.7 million on ‘diplomacy,’ which included expenditure on Chinese cultural attachés and cultural centers abroad, and US$ 2.7 million on foreign visits that were aimed at promoting international cultural cooperation.166 China furthermore organizes or participates in numerous international music, film and literary festivals, and dance, documentary and art projects, and Chinese exhibitions travel the globe.167 A fairly new and prominent activity in China’s cultural diplomacy is the Chinese New Year Celebration program, which has been organized annually since 2010. In 2012, the project involved 323 cultural activities in 82 countries and regions, reaching high-level officials, as well as more than 1,500 media organizations, and about 30 million foreign people and overseas Chinese. In some cities, internationally renowned artists performed in the Chinese New Year events, such as actress Ni Ping in Paris and pianist Lang Lang in New York City. Furthermore, the Ministry of Culture and the Digital Culture Group jointly

165  Cai Wu, “Report Concerning the Work Situation in Deepening Cultural Structural Reform,” http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/10/24/report-concerningthe-work-situation-in-deepening-cultural-structural-reform-and-promoting-the-granddevelopment-and-grand-flourishing-of-socialist-culture/#more-2231. 166  “2012 Wenhua bu bumen juesuan” [Financial Accounts of the Ministry of Culture 2012], pp. 24 and 32–33. The budget for ‘diplomacy’ in 2012 was US$ 65.6 million but was not fully used because of delays in building cultural centers abroad. 167  See the Chinese Ministry of Culture’s website, Chinaculture.org, for a more extensive impression of China’s cultural cooperation.

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developed an interactive Happy Chinese New Year entertainment application in 2012, which was offered to potential clients via iTunes.168 The Chinese Ministry of Culture is joined in its efforts to expand China’s international cultural presence by other ministries, Chinese embassies, people’s organizations, and Chinese media corporations. In addition, China is working hard to build a cultural basis at home by developing its cultural industries. Since 2002, when the reform of China’s cultural industries was initiated at the 16th Party Congress, Chinese leaders have tried to find their way “on the socialist cultural development road with Chinese characteristics,” meaning that they aim to modernize the cultural industries but keep them in line with the promotion of socialist values.169 Continuous streams of official documents and speeches on cultural outreach have seen the light in the past decade, illustrating the importance that Chinese leaders attach to the topic. In 2006, a FiveYear Plan for Cultural Development was published that detailed the ‘go out’ strategy and urged cultural industries to commercialize and “expand Chinese culture’s coverage and international impact.”170 Subsequent official documents and directives, including the Twelfth Five-Year Program (2011–2015) on Cultural Reform and Development, show a continued commitment to making cultural industries an important pillar of China’s economy.171 The new policies have led to impressive growth, modernization, and internationalization of China’s creative industries.172 These industries initiate or participate in numerous cooperation projects with foreign countries, including the Beijing Design Week, Beijing Cultural and Creative Industries Expo, the Shanghai Creative Industries Activities Week, and the Shenzhen International

168  Hou Xianghua, “‘Huanle chunjie’: duiwai wenhua jiaoliu de liangli pinpai” [“Happy Chinese New Year”: A Beautiful Brand of Cultural Exchange with Foreign Countries], GGWJJK, No. 9 (2012), https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/happy-chinese-new-year-hd/ id487585085?mt=8. 169  Yun Shan, “Cultural Awareness, Cultural Confidence, Cultural Strength: An Approach for Ensuring the Thriving Development of Socialist Culture with Chinese Characteristics,” Qiushi (January 1 2011). 170  “Liu Yunshan: yi kexue fazhan guan wei liu ling tuijin wenhua jianshe” [Liu Yunshan: Promoting the Building of Culture through a Scientific View Development], at http:// www.sina.com.cn (April 8 2007). 171  Xinhua, “China Seeks to Build Modern Cultural Industry System” (February 12 2012). For a translation of the 12th five-year program (2011–2015) on cultural reform and development, see Rogier Creemers, “Ministry of Culture Plan for Redoubling Cultural Industries during the ‘12th Five-year-Plan’ Period,” China Copyright and Media (February 24 2012). 172  Li Wuwei, How Creativity is Changing China (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).

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Cultural Industries Expo. These events draw many international participants and visitors. As Ye Lang, Director of the Institute for Cultural Industries at Peking University, points out, “building a cultural superpower” takes time and involves domestic policies such as “creating healthy social and cultural environments through education via school, the media, and various forms of cultural activities.”173 However, as discussed in chapter two, the domestic cultural environment in China lacks artistic freedom. The Chinese government supervises all artists, cultural venues, institutions, and industries, and China’s cultural diplomacy focuses on promoting traditional and apolitical art. In doing so, the government fails to tap into the large pool of promising Chinese artists, writers, designers, and filmmakers who are ready to engage fully with the international cultural world. China’s participation at the 2013 Venice Biennale illustrates the Chinese government’s ambiguous attitude to these successful independent artists. The Chinese Ministry of Culture officially supported China’s national pavilion in Venice, but it was unhappy with the artists that the Chinese curator, who was selected via an open competition, invited to exhibit their work. At the international level, the government wanted to share in the fame, but at the domestic level, Chinese censors blocked the Biennale’s website.174 Educational Institutes and Activities China strongly promotes educational exchanges by providing scholarships and improving study facilities. The goal of this policy is to contribute to greater understanding of China’s culture and language globally. The numbers of foreign students in China and Chinese students abroad have been increasing for many years—in 2012 the number of foreign students coming to study in China totaled 290,000175—and the Chinese government hopes to increase the number further to some 500,000 by 2020, making China the “largest Asian destination for international students.”176 Most foreign students in China come from Asian countries—64 per cent in 2011—followed by Europe and the United States.177 173  Speech made by Ye Lang at the 8th International Forum on Cultural Industries held at Peking University (February 2012). 174  Mark Holden Platt, “China’s Venetian Quandary: Chinese Artists,” The New York Times (June 11 2013). 175  “Students Studying Abroad Increase 23%,” Chinadaily.com (August 21 2012). 176  Chinese Vice-Minister for Education, Du Yubo, in Brussels in May 2013, reported in Yojana Sharma, “Beijing wants more in-depth HE links with Europe.” 177  “Statistics of International Students in China in 2011,” website of the China Scholarship Council, http://www.csc.edu.cn/laihua/newsdetailen.aspx?cid=122&id=1399 (accessed April 2013).

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Chinese universities are rapidly expanding BA and MA programs in the English language and hiring foreign staff to improve and internationalize their courses. Foreign scholars are currently attracted to teaching temporarily in China for the unique experience and because they can “train some of the most brilliant minds in the world and have a much bigger impact than [they] can anywhere else,” but as salaries are relatively low, it is doubtful whether China can fill its ‘insatiable demand’ for high-quality foreign professors.178 China’s courses are less costly than in many other countries, but the quality differs widely. Many students point out that the study programs indeed have their shortcomings, but also that this is compensated for by “the lessons learned outside the classroom.”179 China not only receives many foreign students, but is currently also the largest source of overseas students. According to a 2012 report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China accounts for approximately 14 per cent of the global total.180 In 2012 alone, nearly 400,000 Chinese students enrolled in institutions of higher learning abroad, with the United States and Canada being the most popular destinations, followed by the United Kingdom.181 The Chinese government regards these students as an important public diplomacy instrument, as they are well positioned to promote Chinese culture and enhance friendship among peoples. They mostly leave a positive image of wellbehaved, serious, and hardworking young people. Some Chinese argue that students should be encouraged and guided in this role by Chinese embassies abroad, so that they can participate in and learn from local cultures without picking up ‘ugly habits.’182 Chinese missions abroad indeed play a role in monitoring Chinese students abroad, but there is only anecdotal evidence on this topic, and it is not clear what this monitoring would entail and on what scope it would take place. 178  Paul Gillis, an expatriate American professor and co-Director at Peking University’s Business School, quoted in Georgia McCafferty, “China in Soft Power Push with Foreign Students,” CNN (May 29 2013). 179  Paul Gillis, quoted in Georgia McCafferty, “China in Soft Power Push with Foreign Students;” and conversations with foreign students at Tsinghua and Fudan (October 2011–December 2012). 180  Wang Qingfeng, “China Becomes World’s Top Source of Overseas Students,” Caixin (September 25 2012). 181  Luo Wangshu, “Overseas Students Younger, More Diverse, China Daily, Education Special (March 12 2013). 182  Liang Zhiming, “Dangdai liuxue dachao yu zhongwai wenhua jiaoliu” [The Current High Tide of Studying Abroad and Sino–Foreign Cultural Exchange], GGWJJK, No. 12 (summer 2012).

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Much growth has also been seen in institutional exchanges. Most Chinese universities and research institutes nowadays have cooperation projects with foreign educational institutes. Many foreign universities have also established or co-established departments or centers at Chinese universities. In 2011, agreements for the establishment of New York University in Shanghai and Duke University in Kunshan, Jiangsu, were signed. They are the first cofounded international universities between China and the United States. Confucius Institutes A major part of China’s educational and cultural strategy has been the establishment of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms all over the world since 2004, a few years before public diplomacy was officially endorsed at the highest political levels. In early 2013, there were more than 400 Confucius Institutes183 and approximately 473 Confucius Classrooms184 in more than 100 countries. They are funded and directed by the Hanban/Confucius Institute Headquarters, which is affiliated to the Chinese Ministry of Education, but overseen by the State Council. In 2012, Chinese expenditure on the Confucius Institutes amounted to US$ 196.33 million.185 The aim of the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms is to promote Chinese language and culture and to strengthen understanding and friendship, equivalent to what the French Alliance Française and German Goethe Institutes do for the promotion of their national language and culture. The Confucius Institutes are regarded as “an efficient way to promote ‘soft power’ and appeal” to overseas students, and the Chinese government therefore invests much money and efforts into expanding and improving the Institutes.186 The investment in Chinese-language training for foreigners may also be inspired by hopes that Chinese will one day become a universal language similar to English. Zhao Qizheng recently expressed this hope as follows: English has been the dominant language of global communication, and Chinese people cannot precisely express themselves in English. This hinders the overall understanding of Chinese culture. If China were to be even stronger to spread Chinese throughout the world, communication 183  Xinhua, “China’s Confucius Institutes to reach 500 by 2020” (March 11 2013). 184  The number of Confucius Classrooms is from 2011; see the website of Hanban: http:// english.hanban.org/node_7716.htm (accessed February 2013). 185  Annual Report of the Confucius Institutes Headquarters 2012 (Beijing: Hanban, 2012), p. 44. Total expenditure for all Confucius Institutes in the world was US$ 396 million. 186  Chen Jia, “Class Act Promotes Global ‘Soft Power,’ ” China Daily (November 11 2010).

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would be dominated by Chinese and her culture could be introduced in its native language.187 The Institutes take the form of joint ventures with foreign-based educational institutes, often universities, which also have to participate financially. Funding is sometimes provided by companies, as is the case with the London Confucius Institute for Business, which is financially supported by a number of companies, including British Petroleum, Deloitte, and HSBC.188 This approach encourages a network-based form of public diplomacy, as foreign partners become engaged in developing ways to unlock China’s culture for a global public. It also leads to institutes that are very different in size and character. Hampered by limited funds, lack of staff, or suspicion from foreign policymakers and NGOs, not all Confucius Institutes become a success. In some places they remain small and largely unknown to the local people;189 in other cities they reach thousands of students, such as in Chicago, where the Confucius Institute runs the Chicago Public Schools’ Chinese World Language Program, involving 43 schools in Chicago, with an estimated 13,000 students. The majority of Confucius Institutes focus on organizing Chinese-language courses, but there are exceptions, such as the Confucius Institute University of Michigan, which entirely focuses on presenting China’s ancient and modern cultures; the Business Confucius Institutes at the University of Leeds and the NEOMA Business School in Rouen, France; and the Confucius Institute for Innovation and Learning in Aalborg, Denmark.190 Confucius Institutes also increasingly cooperate with local and Chinese universities in offering fulltime programs leading to a diploma. In Egypt, Kenya, and Ecuador, Confucius Institutes offer programs that combine Chinese-language teaching with vocational education; other Confucius Institutes work with local and Chinese universities to

187  “Dialog with Zhao Qizheng: Public Diplomacy and Cross-Cultural Exchanges,” Boao Forum for Asia (April 9 2013), website of the Boao Forum, http://english.boaoforum.org/ mtzxxwzxen/7757.jhtml (accessed August 2013). 188  Zhe Ren, “The Confucius Institutes and China’s Soft Power,” IDE Discussion Papers, No. 330 (March 2012), p. 6; and the website of the London Confucius Institute for Business: http://www.lse.ac.uk/CIBL/home.aspx (accessed June 2013). 189  See, for example, Falk Hartig on Confucius Institutes in Germany, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 53–76. 190  See http://lubswww.leeds.ac.uk/confucius/home/; http://www.neoma-bs-confucius.fr; and http://www.cidenmark.com.

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offer undergraduate programs.191 In 2012, the Hanban launched the Confucius China Study Plan, which allocates US$ 8 million to six programs that aim “to support young scholars from around the world to enhance the level of academic research and foster a new generation of young sinologists and experts in China studies.” The six programs include scholarships for foreigners to pursue a Ph.D. degree at Chinese universities, and grants for short-term exchange students and visitors.192 The Confucius Institutes are not uncontroversial. They are viewed by some as propaganda tools or even ‘Trojan horses’ that disseminate China’s worldview and limit discussion on topics that are politically sensitive in China, such as Tibet and human rights.193 In summer 2012, US government officials—concerned about such political restrictions and about the large number of Confucius Institutes (approximately 80) in the United States compared to American cultural institutes in China (five)—proposed measures to strengthen the rules for Confucius Institutes and the visas for their Chinese staff members. After strong and high-level protests by the Chinese government and many Confucius Institutes’ foreign staff members, however, the plan for these measures was abandoned.194 There have been other protests against, and debates about, the character of Confucius Institutes, and in some cases the foreign joint venture partner decided to close its institute.195 Many foreign joint venture partners, however, say that they have demanded and received freedom

191  “Facilitate the Integration of Confucius Institutes into Host Universities and Local Communities,” keynote speech delivered at the 7th Confucius Institute Conference by Liu Yandong (December 18 2012), website of Hanban, http://english.hanban.org/ article/2012-12/18/content_480243.htm (accessed June 2013). See also, for example, the Confucius Institute at London South Bank University, which offers a BSc in Chinese Medicine and an MBA, http://www.ci4tcm.com/courses/full-time/; and http://www .waseda.jp/wci/eng/outline/index.html. 192  Luo Wangshu, “Hanban Releases Funds for Sinology,” China Daily (November 4 2012). 193  See, for example, James F. Paradise, “China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power,” Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July/ August 2009), pp. 647–669; and Steven W. Mosher, “Confucius Institutes: Trojan Horses with Chinese Characteristics,” testimony presented to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, US House Committee on Foreign Affairs (March 28 2012). 194  Helle Dale, “The State Department’s Confusion over Confucius Institutes,” The Foundry (June 13 2012). 195  In early 2013, the Confucius Institute at McMaster University in Canada was closed; see James Bradshaw and Colin Freeze, “McMaster Closing Confucius Institute over Hiring Issues,” The Globe and Mail (February 7 2013).

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from the Hanban to discuss any topic during meetings and events at ‘their’ Confucius Institute.196 Some problems surrounding the rapidly growing numbers of Confucius Institutes, such as a shortage of qualified Chinese-language teachers and of attractive cultural materials and programs for the Institutes, may just be because of the undertaking’s infancy. The Hanban is not only expanding the number of Institutes but is currently also investing heavily in expanding language-teacher training and improving the quality of services. While the Institutes may be increasingly successful in promoting the Chinese language, the question remains whether they will really be able to become centers for Chinese culture. In addition to people’s suspicions about intentions and political restrictions, many of the Institutes do not yet have much to offer in terms of cultural programs. Most focus on providing language courses and the Hanban does not yet offer sufficient attractive cultural materials, icons and programs for the Institutes to share with their audiences. The cultural dimension, however, may in the end be more important than the language training. If the aim is to make Chinese a world language similar to English, as some people dream, the Confucius Institutes may not succeed, as the Chinese language is far more difficult than English and needs intensive and long-term study. It should be noted that promotion of the Chinese language is not limited to Confucius Institutes. The number of primary and middle schools all over the world that offer Chinese as part of their curriculum is also rapidly increasing. More than 60,000 students in primary and middle schools in the United States are learning Chinese; in Europe and Africa the same rising trends are visible; and in Asia the number goes into millions.197

196  Interview with a European academic involved in establishing a Confucius Institute. See also Falk Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China;” Alex Ballingall, “Why the Fuss over Confucius Institutes,” Macleans on-campus blog (June 25 2012), via Confucius Institutes Monitor of the USC Center of Public Diplomacy, available online at http:// uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/media_monitor_news/ci_americas; and Tania Branigan, “Chinese Ambassador Attacks ‘Cold War’ Fears over Confucius Institutes: Criticism Follows Concerns among some UK Academics about Hosting Chinese Cultural Centres in British Universities,” The Guardian (June 15 2012). 197  Report from the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, cited in Alex Dobuzinskis, “More US Students Learning Chinese as School Language Programs Expand,” Reuters (April 21 2011); and Stanley Pignal, “Mandarin has the Edge in Europe’s Classrooms,” Financial Times (October 16 2011).

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Foreign Aid Foreign aid and relief work is an important instrument of public diplomacy for China, in particular in Africa and Asia, as we will see in chapter five. China published a White Paper in 2011 on its foreign aid, in which it stated that by providing foreign aid, China is “fulfilling its due international obligations.”198 China considers its foreign aid as a form of South–South cooperation and as “mutual help between developing countries.”199 The Chinese government furthermore does not believe in providing aid as the solution, and uses a wide variety of economic instruments to stimulate growth and development in developing countries. China’s aid policies, however, are also developed with other goals in mind. They strengthen China’s strategic relationships with developing countries, help China win political support within the United Nations, benefit China’s trade, and contribute to securing access to resources. Meanwhile, many Western observers see China as a neo-colonialist power in Africa.200 Defending itself against the charge of neo-colonial aid policies, the Chinese government often emphasizes that it offers aid without the conditions imposed by Western countries (such as democratic reform); that it works fast and without expensive consultancy fees; and that Chinese workers do not shy away from difficult construction projects in remote areas. It thus implies that it regards its aid projects as more effective and as providing more benefit to the recipients than those of Western countries. China furthermore aims at creating a sense of solidarity with developing countries by referring to south— south cooperation and emphasizing that it is helping others despite the fact that it is still a developing country. China’s aid figures are difficult to assess, as few details on aid flows are published and the figures provided by the Chinese government are calculated cumulatively over many years and include other areas of assistance and finance than the OECD countries’ Official Development Aid (ODA) calculations.201 According to the above White Paper, China spent approximately US$ 38.5 billion on foreign aid during the period 1950–2009. To compare, the United 198  State Council Information Office, China’s Foreign Aid (April 2011), available online at http://www.unicef.org/eapro/China_White_Paper_on_Foreign_Aid.full_text.pdf (accessed April 2013), Preface. 199  State Council Information Office, China’s Foreign Aid, Part I. 200  See, for example, “Clinton Warns against ‘New Colonialism’ in Africa,” Reuters (June 11 2011); and Damian Grammaticas, “Chinese Colonialism?,” BBC News (July 19 2012). 201  Sven Grimm, Transparency of Chinese Aid: An Analysis of the Published Information on Chinese External Financial Flows (Stellenbosch, South Africa: Center for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University, August 2011), pp. 5–7.

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States provided US$ 31.7 billion in aid in 2011 alone,202 so in terms of volume, China’s aid is not impressive. In 2009, the largest part of China’s aid went to Africa (45 per cent), followed by Asia (32.8 per cent), and Latin America and the Caribbean (12.7 per cent).203 China’s aid focuses on improving infrastructure and living standards. China builds roads, hospitals and sports stadiums, it provides goods and materials, technical cooperation, human resource development cooperation, medical teams, emergency humanitarian aid, volunteer programs in foreign countries, and debt relief.204 Most relief aid activities are employed via the nonprofit organization China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA), which in recent years has provided relief to victims of the 2004 tsunami in South and Southeast Asia, Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005, the 2007 cyclone Sydr in Bangladesh, and cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008.205 China’s use of foreign aid as a public diplomacy instrument will be detailed in chapter five.

China’s Public Diplomacy Budget

The sections above show that a large and diverse group of Chinese institutions and actors have developed a wide array of public diplomacy instruments. As a result of this fragmentation, it is difficult to calculate how much money the Chinese government invests in public diplomacy.206 In some cases, the budgets of organizations and ministries give a rough idea about the money spent on a specific instrument or activity. Examples are the previously discussed investment in the expansion of Chinese media abroad (US$ 6.6 billion), the Hanban’s annual investment in the Confucius Institutes (US$ 196.33 million in 2012),207 and the Chinese Ministry of Culture’s total expenditure on cultural diplomacy and overseas cooperation (US$ 29.4 million). In many cases, however, there 202  USAID, “Foreign Assistance Fast Facts: FY2011,” http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/fastfacts.html (accessed May 2013). 203  Sven Grimm, Transparency of Chinese Aid, p. 8. 204  State Council Information Office, China’s Foreign Aid, Part III. 205  “China Donates Earth-moving Equipment to Myanmar for Post-Nargis Reconstruction,” Xinhua (March 6 2009); see also Parama Sinha Palit, “China’s Soft Power in South Asia,” RSIS Working Papers, No. 200 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, June 8 2010). 206  See also Jiang Wei, “Zhongguo gonggong waijiao de zhengxie tuishou xiang” [CPPCC Promoter of China’s Public Diplomacy], 21 Shiji jingji baodao (March 4 2011). 207  Annual Report of the Confucius Institutes Headquarters 2012 (Beijing: Hanban, 2012), p. 44.

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are no figures available for organizations’ public diplomacy expenditures, or the figures are not detailed enough to draw any meaningful conclusions. Furthermore, some instruments serve broader goals than just public diplomacy, and their costs cannot be fully attributed to public diplomacy. Conclusions This chapter illustrates how the development of public diplomacy practice in China preceded discussions of the concept. From the second half of the 1990s onward, China started employing a remarkable array of public diplomacy activities, whereas the academic debate on the topic at that time was still very limited, as we have seen in chapter three. The creation of SCIO in 1991 can be considered the first important step in the development of China’s public diplomacy. It showed that the Chinese government became aware that it needed to become more transparent and to inform the outside world about its plans and policies. It goes too far, however, to argue that the establishment of SCIO signals the transition from “one-way foreign propaganda to two-way international communications” and from “glorifying China” to “publicizing China in an authentic, colorful, lively, and timely way,” as scholar Zhang Zhexin does.208 Up until today, SCIO has been more involved in sending messages and projecting an ideal image than in holding genuine dialogs. The same is true for many other state actors. They have improved their communication skills, but struggle with the involvement of civil society and their engagement with foreign audiences in public diplomacy activities. The Chinese government finds it difficult to open up organizations to outsiders, although it does aim for more transparency by reaching out to domestic and foreign audiences via traditional and new media. Much of the increasing transparency, however, is lost on foreign audiences, because they do not understand the Chinese language. Chinese diplomats abroad, who seem to have more freedom to build personal contacts than their colleagues in the MFA in Beijing, are exploring ways to connect more directly with foreign publics and engage in network-building. The number and variety of both state actors and non-state actors involved in public diplomacy has rapidly grown over the past decade, but state actors still by far outnumber non-state actors. Nevertheless, the expanding group of non-state actors has brought new dynamics and, to a limited extent, more 208  Zhang Zhexin, “China’s Public Diplomacy Institution: Its Development, Challenges and Prospects of its Practice,” IO Journal (December 2009), pp. 12–17, at p. 14.

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legitimacy to China’s public diplomacy. The government aims to control these non-state actors and the image of China that they spread to the world, but it does not always succeed. The coordination of public diplomacy activities by official actors is already a challenge, let alone for authorities to manage to supervise unwieldy civil society groups and individuals. This is not to say that these groups will stray far from official narratives. The close relationship of most non-state actors with the Chinese government, and the government’s policy of co-opting Chinese civil society organizations, leads to a high level of compliance with official policies. Furthermore, the coordination of public diplomacy efforts in China may be failing in many respects, but it is more developed than in most other countries because of the involvement of China’s highest political levels in developing many of the public diplomacy strategies. China invests much in strengthening the position of the Chinese media abroad. China aims to overcome the Western media’s global dominance and create more room to promote its own perspective on the world. China’s media outlets can now reach audiences all over the world in several languages. This does not mean, however, that China’s voice is also always heard. In spite of improvements in the content and form of Chinese international television programs, they are still not attractive enough in countries where people have a wide choice of television channels. Chinese news programs are still far from being considered equivalent in quality to Al Jazeera, BBC World, or CNN. This situation is different in various developing countries, as we will see in chapter five. The Chinese government clearly struggles with the question of how it should deal with social media. On the one hand, it realizes that this powerful instrument can help China’s leadership to reach large audiences and that it may contribute to the image of a more open government and transparent society, thus strengthening China’s soft power. Indeed, the lively Chinese blogosphere in China, which is contributing to the development of a pluralistic political and youth culture, has been developing into a new source of Chinese soft power. On the other hand, however, the Chinese government is aware that the networks created via social media can turn against them. That fear has recently prompted the Chinese government to tighten internet and social media control. The Chinese blogosphere is currently under much pressure and there is a possibility that it may lose its role as a platform for debate. In the arsenal of Chinese public diplomacy actors and instruments, the involvement of overseas Chinese communities and the proliferation of Confucius Institutes stand out. Their number and dispersion over the globe make the overseas Chinese, who generally take pride in China’s economic and political rise, an important instrument, as we will also see in ­subsequent

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c­ hapters. The jury is still out on the ultimate success of the Confucius Institutes, but China’s continued efforts to expand their numbers and improve their programs is impressive. The fact that the initiative was launched several years before the highest political level endorsed public diplomacy as an important part of overall diplomacy underlines that most instruments and policies are developed in a rather fragmented way and not as part of a ‘grand plan’ for public diplomacy. In summary, this chapter has revealed the extent to which the development of public diplomacy is a priority for the Chinese government. Aware that improving its image is a broad field of endeavor, China’s government spends much money and effort to involve ever-broader groups of state and non-state actors in public diplomacy, to improve these actors’ skills, and to expand and improve public diplomacy instruments. This demonstrates that China takes a holistic approach to public diplomacy. The dominance of state actors and the government’s influence on non-state actors, also with regard to the public diplomacy functions of relationship-building and cultural communications, show that China fits the state-centered model of public diplomacy. Political communication and advocacy are an important part of China’s public diplomacy, but the government also pays much attention to expanding dialog and collaboration. The Confucius Institutes’ strategy is an important example of the latter. China’s plans with regard to the Confucius Institutes also illustrate another remarkable aspect of China’s public diplomacy: the long-term perspective of many of its policies. This issue, and the issues noted above, will be discussed further in the next chapter, which analyzes how the use by Chinese actors of public diplomacy instruments plays out in practice in Asia and Africa.

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CHAPTER 5

China’s Public Diplomacy Strategies: Asia and Africa This chapter examines Chinese public diplomacy strategies toward Asia and Africa. The word ‘strategy’ here does not refer to an officially designed and fixed set of policies, but to the whole of Chinese public diplomacy policies and activities with regard to a region or sub-region. Various regional public diplomacies activities are part of broader foreign policies, or of China’s overall diplomacy. Some activities and policies seem synchronized and fit in with China’s stated views on public diplomacy strategies toward Asia or Africa. There is no indication, however, that they are all part of a coordinated grand ‘Public Diplomacy Plan.’ On the contrary, they are a mix of global public diplomacies policies that are adjusted to specific regions, elements of regional overall diplomacy and ad-hoc initiatives by various actors. Two cases will be examined: China’s public diplomacy toward Asia; and toward Africa. The two cases are selected because they are the cornerstones of China’s public diplomacy endeavor. Involving China’s most comprehensive public diplomacy policies, they provide insight into how various actors develop and use the wide array of public diplomacy tools discussed in chapter four. Furthermore, the diversity of China’s public diplomacy policies in the Asian region, where they deal with developing countries as well as developed countries and both friendly and unfriendly audiences, allows for an examination of different types of strategies.1 There is also much diversity in culture, developmental phase, and wealth among the 53 countries of Africa, but China’s discussion of public diplomacy toward the African continent does not differentiate per sub-region or country. The case study will therefore look at China’s overall public diplomacy policies and activities in Africa. 1  For more on China’s public diplomacy and soft power in other parts of the world, see, for example, for Latin America: David Shambaugh, “China’s New Foray Into Latin America,” YaleGlobal (November 17 2008); and Katherine E. Bliss, “China’s Projection of Soft Power in the Americas,” in Carola McGiffert (ed.), Chinese Soft Power and its Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2009), pp. 45–63; and for the Middle East: Jon B. Alterman, “China’s Soft Power in the Middle East,” in McGiffert (ed.), Chinese Soft Power and its Implications for the United States, pp. 63–76.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004283954_007 Ingrid

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The cases show how the Chinese government makes use of its public diplomacy assets, or fails to do so, and how it deals with its public diplomacy liabilities. They demonstrate that the Chinese government is listening to criticism, that in some cases it is learning from its mistakes, and in some cases is willing to adjust its policies. A comparison of the cases demonstrates how China finetunes its activities to the local situation. Finally, this chapter will add to our understanding of how China’s public diplomacy both benefits and suffers from the Chinese authoritarian regime’s far-reaching control over society.

China’s Public Diplomacy in Asia

Asia is the most important target of China’s public diplomacy strategy. Good relations with countries in the neighborhood are of major economic and geostrategic importance to China. China’s public diplomacy policies therefore aim to convince Asian publics of China’s peaceful intentions and the regional benefits of its economic growth, and thus to promote the establishment of a stable and harmonious environment that is conducive to China’s domestic development.2 However, Asia is far from homogenous, and China’s rising influence plays out differently in different Asian sub-regions and countries, depending on their economic strength, political alliances and historical relationship with China. China’s public diplomacy strategies, therefore, also vary per subregion or country, and this section will deal separately with China’s overall policies toward South and Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Northeast Asian cases of Japan and South Korea. Whereas China’s public diplomacy policies differ per sub-region or country, they have a few things in common. They are all an inseparable part of China’s ‘Good Neighbor’ policy, which promotes friendship, partnership and mutually beneficial cooperation with countries in Asia. During the 1990s, the policy was focused on solving border problems, shelving territorial issues in the South China Sea, strengthening bilateral relations with countries in the region, promoting economic integration, and demonstrating to Asian countries that they would benefit from China’s economic growth. From the mid-1990s onward until the end of the first decade of the new century, this policy was successful. China’s growing engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and initiatives such as the establishment of the Shanghai 2  Ke Yinbin and Bao Maohong, Zhongguo yu dongnan ya guojia gonggong waijiao [Public Diplomacy between China and Southeast Asian Countries] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, October 2012).

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Cooperation Organization (SCO) conveyed the message that China was integrating into regional frameworks and felt committed to solving issues through negotiation and developing joint cooperation. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China’s constructive behavior and financial support to several countries strengthened its image as a pragmatic partner for peace and prosperity.3 In the first decade of the new millennium, China built confidence in the region by signing the China–ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), playing a constructive role in the Six-Party Talks with North Korea, and taking the initiative to establish an ASEAN–China Free Trade Area, which went into effect in 2010. As China’s political influence and economic weight in the region grew, many countries began to feel uneasy about their big and strong neighbor. The turning point in general Asian views of China, however, came with the eruption in 2010 of territorial conflicts in the South China Sea and East China Sea, as mentioned already in chapter two.4 The Chinese government’s defense that it had been provoked by other actors was not believed, and its statements that China remains committed to a peaceful solution of territorial disputes are undermined by continued clashes and incidents in Asian waters. Recent examples are the standoff between China and the Philippines over claims to Scarborough shoal in the South China Sea, and the clash between a Chinese patrol boat and Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel Islands in March 2013.5 China is well aware of the damage to its reputation. As the China Daily wrote in summer 2012, “China’s hard-won image as a responsible power in Southeast Asia has encountered a crisis of trust.”6 This poses enormous challenges to China’s foreign policy and public diplomacy strategies toward Asia. Finally, China’s overall public diplomacy in Asia and its efforts to maintain or strengthen its spheres of influence in the region take place in the context of a renewed interest by the United States in the Asian region. China sees the 3  See, for example, Derek J. Mitchell and Brian Harding, “China and Southeast Asia,” in McGiffert (ed.), Chinese Soft Power and its Implications for the United States. 4  Ian Storey, “China’s Missteps in Southeast Asia: Less Charm, More Offensive,” China Brief, Vol. 10, No. 25 (December 17 2010). 5  For details, see Bonnie S. Glaser, “Understanding Recent Developments in US–China–ASEAN Relations: A US Perspective,” paper for the 4th Workshop on South China Sea in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam from November 19–21 2012 (January 21 2013), p. 3, published at http:// nghiencuubiendong.vn/trung-tam-du-lieu-bien-dong/doc_download/690-bonniesglaserunderstanding-recent-developments-in-us-china-asean-relations-a-us-perspective (accessed August 29 2013); and “China and Vietnam Row over South China Sea Clash, BBC News (March 26 2013). 6  Chu Hao, “Test for China–ASEAN Ties,” China Daily (July 6 2012).

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US pivot toward Asia as a strategy to counter China’s growing influence in the region. In addition to reassuring Asian countries concerned about China’s rise, the United States’ rebalance has therefore also intensified the strategic competition between the two big powers, and this competition extends to the domain of public diplomacy. South and Southeast Asia In the less developed countries in South and Southeast Asia, China’s public diplomacy strategy makes extensive use of the instruments of foreign aid, trade and investment.7 Many activities in the region take place in the framework of China’s relations with ASEAN. In 2011, China was ASEAN’s biggest trading partner, but as an investor it is on a par with the United States and is far outweighed by Japan and the European Union (EU).8 Ties with Southeast Asian neighbors are important, as China wants to maintain a sphere of influence in its backyard, and the regions provide China with resources and a short-cut connection to the Indian Ocean. Despite growing concerns about China’s intentions, many of the countries in the regions are still attracted to the success of the Chinese model9 and they appreciate China as a key driver of economic growth in Asia. China is furthermore often a big source of economic aid and investment, and many countries benefit from China’s infrastructure projects.10 In Cambodia, for example, China has built 2,000 kilometers of roads and seven bridges in the past decade, and in April 2013 it announced that it was providing US$ 548 million in aid 7  See, for example, Parama Sinha Palit, “China’s Soft Power in South Asia,” RSIS Working Paper, No. 200 (June 2010). 8  The share of net inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to ASEAN in 2011 was: China 5.3 per cent; United States 5.1 per cent; Japan 13.2 per cent; and the EU 16 per cent. See the statistics provided by ASEAN, available online at: http://www.asean.org/images/2013/ resources/statistics/Foreign%20Direct%20Investment%20Statistics_/Table%2026.pdf. 9   See, for example, Ignatius Wibowo, “China’s Soft Power and Neo-Liberal Agenda in Southeast Asia,” in Mingjiang Li (ed.), Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), pp. 207–224; and Thomas Lum, Wayne M. Morrison, and Bruce Vaughn, China’s ‘Soft Power’ in Southeast Asia, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 4 2008), available online at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34310.pdf. 10  In 2011, China became Myanmar’s biggest investor and second biggest trading partner; see Xinhua, “China Becomes Biggest Investor in Myanmar, People’s Daily (February 21 2011). In 2011, China was also the biggest investor in Cambodia; see Heng Pheakdey, “Cambodia– China Relations: A Positive-Sum Game?,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 2 (February 2012), pp. 57–85.

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to help build hundreds of kilometers of new roads in the coming years.11 In Sri Lanka, China has financed prestigious projects such as the second international airport;12 in Laos, it has built the Laos International Conference Center;13 and in Bangladesh, China has contributed to the modernization of harbors.14 During the past decade, China has also run various volunteer programs in the region. In Laos, for example, Chinese volunteers have worked in medical health, agriculture, teaching, and sports training projects; in Myanmar, in agriculture and sports;15 and in Cambodia, Chinese volunteers build schools and orphanages.16 China also sends medical teams to remote areas of Nepal, and runs programs to train hundreds of Afghan officials and technical staff in China.17 In recent years, however, several Chinese projects have sparked local protests because of environmental concerns or because people feel that they do not benefit sufficiently from such projects. In Vietnam, for example, local communities have protested against a bauxite-mining project,18 and in Myanmar and Cambodia, people have raised opposition against Chinese water dam projects.19 In Vietnam, the critics are being silenced by their government,20 but in Myanmar, where President U Thein Sein in 2011 announced political reforms, the government openly seeks to balance Chinese influence by

11  “China Pledges $548 Million in Aid to Ally Cambodia,” Reuters (April 10 2013). 12  “Sri Lanka Opens Chinese-funded International Airport,” Reuters (March 18 2013). 13  Xinhua, “China-aided Convention Center Completed in Laos,” People’s Daily (October 10 2012). 14  Syed Tashfin Chowdhury, “Bangladesh Gets Boost from China Investment,” Asia Times (April 24 2012). 15  “Hu Jintao Visits Chinese Volunteers in Laos,” CRI News (November 21 2006); and Xinhua, “Chinese Volunteers to Offer Services in Myanmar,” People’s Daily (January 11 2006). 16  Zhang Yue, “Chinese Volunteer Workers in Cambodia,” China Daily (August 29 2012). 17  Miranda Lin, “Chinese Medical Team in Nepal,” CNTV News (April 24 2013); and Zhao Huasheng, China and Afghanistan: China’s Interests, Stances, and Perspectives (Washington DC: CSIS Report, March 2012). 18  “China and Vietnam: Bauxite Bashers,” The Economist (April 23 2009). 19  For example, the Myitsone hydropower dam and the Letpadaung copper mine projects; see Jonathan Watts, “China Angry over Burma’s Decision to Suspend Work on £2.3bn Dam,” The Guardian (October 4 2011); and Zarni Mann, “Hundreds Resume Letpadaung Mine Protest,” The Irrawaddy (March 28 2013). For the Sambor Dam project, see Toh Han Shih, “Controversial Chinese Projects in Cambodia Bow to Public Pressure, South China Morning Post (August 14 2012). 20  Shawn W. Crispin, “Vietnam’s Press Freedom Shrinks Despite Open Economy,” Special Report, Committee to Protect Journalists (September 19 2012). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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welcoming investments from the West, including the United States.21 There is also growing unease in the region about Chinese ‘ultimatum diplomacy’—that is, Chinese economic pressure on countries to behave in line with what the Chinese government wants, or else to punish them by cutting financial support or canceling projects. After the Vietnamese government invited Taiwan to attend the 2006 Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Hanoi, for example, China suspended US$ 200 million in aid to Vietnam.22 More recently, China is widely believed to have pressured Cambodia into refusing the inclusion of a reference to the bilateral disputes in the South China Sea in the text of the July 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. This led to an unprecedented failure to agree to a joint communiqué.23 Increasing scrutiny in the region and developments such as the political changes in Myanmar have forced China to rethink and adjust its economic policies and public diplomacy. Various Chinese state-owned companies have recently started to develop corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs as part of their operations in Southeast Asia.24 The Chinese government has furthermore followed up on Chinese and foreign scholars’ advice to invest more in cultural diplomacy and people’s exchanges in the Asian region.25 To ease concerns in Myanmar and counter the United States’ renewed activities in the country, the Chinese government in 2012 launched an extensive ‘Deep Fraternal Friendship’ project with Myanmar. The project includes medical assistance, educational and cultural programs, and organized visits to China for Myanmar’s political parties, civil society organizations and local media groups.26 21  Jane Perlez, “US and China Press for Influence in Myanmar,” The New York Times (March 30 2012); Reuters staff reporter, “Insight: As Myanmar Opens, China Alliance Starts to Fray,” Reuters (February 13 2012). 22  Geoffrey Cain, “Chinese Aid Wins Hearts, Twists Arms in Southeast Asia,” World Politics Review (October 28 2008). 23  Kishore Mahbubani, “Is China Losing the Diplomatic Plot?,” Project Syndicate (July 12 2012). 24  Sonu Trivedi, “Playing Responsible Big Brother in Myanmar,” The Hindu (August 4 2013); and Yun Sun, “China and the Changing Myanmar,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2012), pp. 51–77. 25  Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “China’s Powerful Soft Power in Southeast Asia,” Prachatai (July 20 2013);Yun Sun, “China and the Changing Myanmar;” and Yu Xintian, “Zhongguo dui shanghe zuzhi chengyuan guode gonggong waijiao zhanlüe silu” [China’s Public Diplomacy Strategies toward the Countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization], GGWJJK, No. 3 (fall 2010), pp. 36–40. 26  Aung Tun, “Myanmar’s ‘Look West’ Policy: Is China Being Sidelined?,” The Diplomat (June 26 2013); and Yun Sun, “China and the Changing Myanmar,” pp. 51–77. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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In other countries throughout South and Southeast Asia, China has also expanded the number and scope of people’s friendship and youth forums and it co-organizes numerous Chinese cultural and film festivals.27 China’s Ministry of Culture has signed memorandums of understanding (MoUs) on cultural cooperation with most countries in the region and has opened a large and well-equipped Chinese cultural center in Bangkok.28 The Chinese government also boosts exchanges with countries in the framework of ‘friendship years,’ such as the China–India Year of Friendship and Cooperation (2012), the Cambodia–China Year of Friendship (2013), and the announced Friendship Year for increased people-to-people interaction between India and China to be held in 2014.29 China sometimes gets help from Asian leaders in promoting its culture. During the 2013 Chinese New Year celebrations in Malaysia, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak appeared in a television advertisement, conveying Chinese New Year greetings while dressed in a traditional Chinese suit and beating on a Chinese drum. He also appeared on radio learning to speak in Mandarin, while one of his sons, who studied Mandarin at university, was heard correcting him.30 Although China is not known in the region for its attractive television programs and films, China Central Television (CCTV) and other companies increasingly collaborate with Asian companies to coproduce and exchange television series and other media programs.31 Examples include the Chinese television series “Go Lala Go,” broadcasted in Singapore and Malaysia;32 “Jin

27  See, for example, Xinhua, “Thai Princess Plays Guzheng to Hail Sino–Thai Friendship,” Global Times (August 18 2012); “President Sang’s Visit to Lift Vietnam–China Ties,” VietNamNet Bridge (June 18 2013); Xinhua, “Chinese Premier Meets Indian Youth,” Xinhua (May 16 2013); and Xinhua, “Pakistan Youth Delegation Head for China to Boost Exchanges,” People’s Daily (April 22 2011). For November 2014, China has been invited to become the “principal guest country” at the International Film Festival of India (IFFI) in Goa; see Sanjaya Baru, “India, China to Set Up Working Group on Film, Broadcast,” The Indian Express (June 19 2013). 28  See the Chinese Ministry of Culture’s website: http://www.chinaculture.org (accessed June 2013). 29  “2014 Declared as the Friendship Year to Promote Understanding between India and China,” Jagran Josh (May 21 2013). 30  Lars Henrikson, “Prepare to Profit from Asia’s Wave of ‘Soft Power,’ ” Money Week (February 12 2013). 31  See, for example, “Singapore and China Step Up Collaboration in Television and Music,” website of the Singapore Media Development Authority (July 8 2010). 32  Xinhua, “Chinese TV Series Gaining Popularity Overseas” (March 27 2013).

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Tailang’s Happy Life,” in Myanmar;33 and the “Three Kingdoms,” in Malaysia.34 In June 2013, China and India announced plans to establish a joint working group for films and the broadcasting sector, which will facilitate coproduction and the exchange of personnel, movies, and television dramas. A public diplomacy instrument used in particular in the region is so-called ‘Buddhist diplomacy.’ Buddhist diplomacy is part of China’s ‘faith diplomacy,’35 and seeks to convey to foreign audiences as well as China’s more than 100 million domestic Buddhists that China enjoys religious freedom and is inspired by the Buddhist understanding of harmony. It includes activities such as sending a 160-member Buddhist orchestra group to India, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia; exchanging Buddhist relics with Myanmar, Nepal, Hong Kong, and Thailand;36 and hosting World Buddhist Forums in 2006, 2009, and 2012.37 These Forums brought together thousands of Buddhists and are regarded as important examples of people-to-people diplomacy. As elsewhere in the world, China is furthermore rapidly expanding the number of Confucius Institutes in South and Southeast Asia. In May 2013, China had established 90 Confucius Institutes and 49 Confucius Classrooms in 31 Asian countries.38 In the Southeast Asian sub-region, Thailand and Indonesia have the largest number of Confucius Institutes: twelve and seven respectively.39 India, which has long refused the establishment of a center of Chinese soft power within its borders, only recently opened its doors to a 33  Xinhua, “Chinese TV Drama Series in Local Language Launched in Myanmar” (June 9 2013). 34  “Chinese Series ‘Three Kingdoms’ Wins Grand Prize at Seoul Drama Awards,” http://www .asiae.co.kr/news/view.htm?idxno=2011090109514398270 (accessed July 2013). 35  Juyan Zhang, “China’s Faith Diplomacy: Initiatives and Vulnerabilities,” in Naomi Leight (ed.), “Essays on Faith Diplomacy,” CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press, November 2011), pp. 47–66. 36   See, for example, Trine Angelskår, China’s Buddhist Diplomacy (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Research Centre (NOREF), March 2013), available online at http://www .peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/280b5bde8e7864209c3 3d01737fd2db0.pdf. 37  Cheng Guanqiao, “Shijie fojiao luntan gonggong waijiao zai zongjiao lingyu de chenggong changshi ” [World Buddhist Forum: A Successful Case of Public Diplomacy], GGWJJK, No. 3 (2010), pp. 95–100; and Juyan Zhang, “China’s Faith Diplomacy.” 38  Speech of Director-General of the Hanban, Xu Lin, at the May 2013 Joint Conference of Confucius Institutes in Asia held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia; in Feng Hui, “The 2013 Joint Conference of Confucius Institutes in Asia Is Held in Cambodia,” CRI Online (May 31 2013). 39  Website of Hanban: http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm (accessed June 2013).

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Confucius Institute.40 The Institutes are popular because school fees are kept low and the well-equipped classrooms stand in stark contrast to those of local public schools. Furthermore, young people in the Southeast Asian region feel that speaking Chinese will help them to find a job.41 In the coming years, China plans to increase the number of Asian students at the Confucius Institutes further. In Cambodia alone, for example, it aims to increase the number of students from the current 5,000 to 50,000 by 2020.42 Via Confucius Institutes and other channels, China furthermore provides scholarships to Asian youths, and invites government officials, academics, and journalists on exchange visits to China.43 In another development, Chinese universities are establishing branches and campuses in Asia. Soochow University in Suzhou, for example, has opened a branch in Vientiane, Laos, with plans to upgrade it to a full-fledged campus, and Xiamen University has announced plans to open a branch in Malaysia, where it aims at an annual enrolment of 10,000 by 2020.44 An asset for China’s public diplomacy in Southeast Asia is the large number of overseas Chinese. Of the 50 million overseas Chinese worldwide, about 32.7 million live in Southeast Asia45 and the Chinese government actively reaches out to them in the hope that they will positively influence China’s image in their host countries. The overseas Chinese in Asia, however, form a diverse group, consisting of people of Chinese descent who have been long assimilated in local communities, and people of Chinese birth who live in Asia. Many within this diverse group are part of transnational Chinese business and social networks, although not all of them necessarily possess a bond with China beyond economic interests and may be reluctant to serve China’s broader interests.46 China has, from early on, targeted the overseas Chinese media in Asia to make them promote China. In the early 2000s, Xinhua News 40  Express News Service, “Country’s First Confucius Institute Opens at MU Today,” The Indian Express (July 18 2013); and Charu Sudan Kasturi, “Confucius Centres Welcome, with Rider,” The Telegraph India (July 25 2013). 41  Chin Chan and Colin Meyn, “Within Confucius Institutes, China Spreads Soft Power,” Cambodia Daily (June 2 2013); and Rajesh Joshi “Why China’s Influence on Nepal Worries India,” BBC News (May 8 2013). 42  Chin Chan and Meyn, “Within Confucius Institutes, China Spreads Soft Power.” 43  Dustin Rosa, “China’s Soft Power Surge,” Foreign Policy (November 18 2012). 44  Didi Tang, “China Setting Up First University Campuses Abroad,” The Irrawady Magazine (June 19 2013). 45  Amy Chang, “Beijing and the Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia: To Serve the People,” NBR Special Report, No. 43 (June 2013). 46  Chang, “Beijing and the Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia.”

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Agency developed an ‘Asia–Pacific Plan’ offering a special Chinese-language service to attract the overseas Chinese media in Asia, a policy that has been successful.47 Other important channels to reach overseas Chinese communities are the overseas Chinese associations in Asia, including the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention, which has its secretariat in Bangkok.48 The extent to which traditional, ethnic Chinese communities in Asia strengthen China’s public diplomacy is unclear. Little research has been done on this topic, other than on the impact of Chinese transnational economic networks on regional business and trade. From the little information available, the impression rises that they are not a major factor in serving China’s public diplomacy goals. However, another group within the category of overseas Chinese in the region, students and expatriates, play a more important role, as their ties to China are much more direct, as will also be discussed in the case of Northeast Asia below. China’s public diplomacy toward South and Southeast Asia not only takes place at the national level. Southwest China’s Yunnan Province (which borders Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar) and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (which borders Vietnam) are also very active in promoting both China’s and their province’s image in the region.49 Many of the ethnic minorities living in Yunnan and Guangxi are ethnically similar to people living on the other side of the border, facilitating border trade and cultural exchanges. Yunnan has long been working on strengthening its ties with neighboring countries and ASEAN.50 In 2009, its efforts got a boost by the launch of the Yunnan Gateway Project, which aims to make Yunnan an important connector between China and Southeast Asia.51 Together with Guangxi, Yunnan also 47  Xin Xin, How the Market Is Changing China’s News: The Case of Xinhua News Agency (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2012), pp. 113–114. 48  See the website of the Secretariat of the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention: http:// www.wcec-secretariat.org/en/ (accessed July 2013). 49  See, for example, “Kaizhan gonggong waijiao zhu tui qiaotou bao jianshe” [Conducting Public Diplomacy Boosts Bridgehead Building], website of the Foreign Affairs Office of the People’s Government of Yunnan Province (June 21 2012), http://www.yfao.gov.cn/ show.aspx?id=6280 (accessed July 2013); and “Quanguo zhengxie waishi wei zai guangxi diaoyan ‘zhoubian gonggong waijiao’” [The Foreign Affairs Committee of the CPPCC Surveys “Periphery Public diplomacy” in Guangxi], Guangxi Daily (June 27 2013). 50  See, for example, Ingrid d’Hooghe, “Regional Economic Integration in Yunnan,” in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism (London: Routledge, 1994). 51  Li Yingqing, Guo Anfei, and Liu Yujiao, “Yunnan Opens All its Borders,” China Daily (June 1 2011); and Jing Wang, “Yunnan Boosts Cooperation with ASEAN,” website

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participates in the Greater Mekong Subregion cooperation (GMS). In the framework of GMS, they are involved in numerous regional cooperation programs, including healthcare and human resource development projects, and fighting crime and the drugs trade.52 With the latter projects, China provides public goods in the Asian region.53 In 2013, Yunnan hosted the first China–South Asia Expo, which included a think tank forum and various cultural events,54 and cosponsored the annual forum of the China–South Asia Friendship Organizations.55 Other examples of activities include a scholarship program for regional countries,56 organizing regional youth culture camps in Yunnan,57 and a nine-floor Chinese bookstore and social club in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.58 Yunnan Television furthermore works together with Myanmar in producing a television series.59 Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region has developed similar activities. It hosts the annual China–ASEAN Expo, makes donations of rice and tractors to regional developing countries like Cambodia,60 runs a scholarship program for of the China–South Asia Expo (April 6 2013), http://english.csaexpo.cn/html/2013/ LatestNews_0406/707.html (accessed June 2013). 52  Chen Zhimin, Jian Junbo, and Chen Diyu, “The Provinces and China’s Multi-Layered Diplomacy: The Cases of GMS and Africa,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2010), pp. 331–356; and Li Chenyang and He Shengda, “China’s Participation in the GMS Cooperation: Progress and Challenges,” in Mingjiang Li and Chong Guan Kwa (eds), China–Asian Sub-Regional Cooperation: Progress, Problems and Prospects (Singapore: World Scientific, 2011), pp. 15–36. 53  Ian Storey, “China’s Growing Security Role in Southeast Asia Raises Hopes and Fears,” World Policy Review (July 5 2013). 54  See the website of the China–South Asia Expo, http://english.csaexpo.cn/html/News Center/ (accessed July 2013). 55  Tu Lili, “Third China–South Asia Friendship Organizations’ Forum held in Kunming,” website of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) (June 10 2013), http://en.cpaffc.org.cn/content/details21-22750.html. 56  Website of China’s University and College Administration System (CUCAS), http:// scholarship.cucas.edu.cn/HomePage/content/content_32.shtml (accessed June 2013). 57  “40 Chinese-Lao Teenagers to Explore Chinese Culture in Kunming,” InKunming (July 5 2013), http://en.kunming.cn/index/content/2013-07/05/content_3349711.htm (accessed June 2013). 58  Rosa, “China’s Soft Power Surge.” 59  “China, Myanmar Sign MoU on Media Co-op,” Xinhua (March 27 2012). 60  “China’s Guangxi Donates 100 Tons Milled Rice to Cambodia,” Global Times (January 8 2013); and “China’s Guangxi Donates Tractors to Flood-hit Areas in Cambodia,” People’s Daily (November 18 2011).

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Cambodian and Laotian students,61 and organizes cultural festivals such as the 2013 Guangxi Culture Festival in Bangkok and China–Vietnam youth festivals in Guangxi.62 In August 2012, a Guangxi Television Showcase Week screened on the state-owned National Television of Cambodia, during which six documentaries featuring Chinese people’s daily lives were shown; in May 2008, a similar Guangxi Television Showcase Week was held on Thai state television.63 Guangxi Foreign Broadcasting Station is furthermore involved in regional broadcasting, in five languages including Thai and Vietnamese, by Guangxi Beibu Bay radio station.64 Central Asia China’s public diplomacy strategy toward Central Asia is largely developed in the framework of the SCO65 and aims to strengthen its sphere of influence in the region. Central Asia has traditionally been oriented toward Russia, and China’s relationships with the various Central Asian countries are relatively young, as they only gained independence in 1991 after the Soviet Union fell apart. The region is strategically important to China for several reasons. It provides a gateway to Eurasia, has many natural resources, but more importantly the region is home to Muslim populations that may support the Muslim Uighur population in northwest China in its aspirations to become independent. China’s public diplomacy toward Central Asia has many similarities with China’s strategy toward South and Southeast Asia. In Central Asia, too, China makes extensive use of the instruments of foreign aid, trade, and investment, and it has recently stepped up its efforts in cultural and people’s diplomacy. In the past decade, China has become a major trading partner of each of the

61  Website of CUCAS, http://scholarship.cucas.edu.cn/HomePage/content/content_31.shtml (accessed June 2013). 62  “China–Vietnam Youth Festival Continues in Guangxi,” People’s Daily (August 26 2010); National News Bureau of Thailand, “Princess Sirindhorn Opens Thai–Guangxi Culture Festival in Bangkok” (July 12 2013). 63  “China’s Guangxi TV Showcase Week Screened on Cambodia’s TV,” Global Times (August 21 2012); Xinhua, “ ‘China Guangxi TV Showcase Week’ Lunched on Thai State TV,” People’s Daily (May 9 2008). 64  “Beibu Bay Radio Launched in Nanning,” CRIENGLISH.com (October 23 2009), available online at http://english.cri.cn/6909/2009/10/23/1461s524477.htm. 65  Hu Jintao, “Upholding Lasting Peace, Promoting Common Prosperity,” remarks made at the 12th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (June 7 2012).

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Central Asian countries.66 China is building an extensive gas and oil pipeline network,67 and invests in the exploitation of resources, including oil, gas, bauxite, copper, aluminum, and gold.68 It furthermore invests heavily in the construction of infrastructure. China has built tunnels, roads, and bridges in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,69 and a railway in Kazakhstan.70 Although China’s economic rise in the region still inspires a largely proChinese attitude,71 people are gradually becoming more critical here too. In recent years, several Chinese projects have sparked local protests because of environmental concerns, or because people feel that they do not benefit sufficiently from such projects. As the International Crisis Group writes, “merited or not, the stereotype of China as the new economic imperialist is taking root.”72 These perceptions have led to incidents such as attacks on Chineseowned malls and mining sites in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.73 China is aware that in order to overcome people’s apprehension, it needs to expand further its cultural and people’s diplomacy in the region.74 Establishing

66  Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse, The Chinese Question in Central Asia: Domestic Order, Social Change and the Chinese Factor (New York, NY: Columbia University Press/ Hurst, 2012), pp. 45–46. 67  Alexandros Petersen with Katinka Barysch, Russia, China and the Geopolitics of Energy in Central Asia (London: Centre for European Reform (CER), 2011); and Alexandros Petersen, “Central Asia’s New Energy Giant: China,” The Atlantic (June 28 2013). 68  See, for example, Alexandros Petersen, “A Hungry China Sets its Sights on Central Asia,” The Atlantic (March 5 2013); and Carol Chan, “Zijin Mining Seeks to Acquire Tajikistan Pits,” South China Morning Post (August 12 2012). 69  Sébastien Peyrouse, “Tajikistan’s New Trade: Cross-Border Commerce and the China– Afghanistan Link,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, No. 169 (September 2011). 70  “Win–Win for China and Kazakhstan” (February 27 2012), website of the Chinese government, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-02/27/content_24743753.htm (accessed June 2013). 71  Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse, Globalizing Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Challenges of Economic Development (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2013), p. 307. 72  International Crisis Group, China’s Central Asia Problem, Report No. 244 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, February 27 2013), p. i. 73  Chris Rickleton, “Kyrgyzstan: China Expanding Influence, One Student at a Time,” EurasiaNet (January 4 2012); Chris Rickleton, “Kyrgyzstan: China’s Economic Influence Fostering Resentment,” EurasiaNet (April 28 2011); and “Tajikistan: China’s Advance Causing Increasing Unease among Tajiks” (February 14 2011). 74  Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “China’s Powerful Soft Power in Southeast Asia,” Prachatai (July 20 2013).

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itself as an attractive cultural partner, however, is no easy task, as Central Asian countries have traditionally been oriented toward Russia. What helps is that many of the ethnic minorities in China’s northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region—which borders Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—share language, religion, and cultural traditions with people in neighboring countries. This facilitates the strengthening of regional ties, and Xinjiang therefore plays an important role in China’s public diplomacy in Central Asia. Xinjiang is happy with that role, as—by opening up to the West and serving as an important gateway to Eurasia—the autonomous region aims to boost its economic development. According to some observers, Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi has already become Central Asia’s commercial hub and ‘beating heart.’75 It hosts, for example, the annual China–Eurasia Expo, which attracts regional leaders and business people. Local governments and organizations in Xinjiang also initiate and participate in cultural exchanges76 and sports events,77 and run a special scholarship program for students of neighboring countries.78 China’s central government is also active. It creates feelings of community by working together with five Central Asian countries on the submission of a transnational application to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to make (parts of ) the Silk Road a UNESCO world heritage site.79 The Hanban (Confucius Institutes’ Headquarters) has established one or two Confucius Institutes in each of the Central Asian countries, with the exception of Turkmenistan. Contrary to their role in other parts of the world, the Institutes are cornerstones of China’s cultural relations in Central Asia, probably because of the lack of other forums that can play a

75  Alexandros Petersen, “Central Asia’s Most Important City Is . . . Not in Central Asia, The Atlantic (July 15 2013). 76  See, for example, “Chinese and Foreign Culture Week Opens,” Tianshannet (September 3 2012); and “Xinjiang Delegation, Pakistan China Institute Mull over Cooperation in Multiple Sectors,” Nihao-Salam e-magazine (February 16 2012), website of the Pakistan China Institute at http://www.nihao-salam.com/news-detail.php?id=MTE2OA==. 77  Zhang Zhixin, Zhang Shaojie, Wu Jie, Pang Hui, and Zang Liuhong, “Zhong ya diqu de tiyu wenhua jiaoliu” [Sports and Cultural Exchanges in Central Asia], Tiyu Xuekan, No. 5 (2011). 78   See the website of the China Scholarship Council: http://www.csc.edu.cn/laihua/ scholarshipdetailen.aspx?cid=105&id=1313 (accessed July 2013). 79  Xu Ming, “Saving the Silk Road,” Global Times (January 13 2013).

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role.80 The Chinese government furthermore organizes Chinese culture days and sports activities in Central Asian countries.81 Northeast Asia: Japan and South Korea China’s public diplomacy toward the Northeast Asian economic heavyweights of Japan and South Korea is different in character from the above strategies. The instruments of economic aid and infrastructure projects have no use in these cases and China’s economic–political model has little appeal. China has strong cultural bonds and economic relations with its Northeast Asian neighbors, but political ties are complicated and in the case of Japan very tense. China is the biggest trading partner of both Japan and South Korea, and in the latter case with a volume bigger than South Korea’s trade with the United States and Japan combined.82 Meanwhile, Japan is China’s fourth largest trading partner,83 and South Korea is China’s third largest trading partner. China’s public diplomacy toward Japan is a special case, as the two countries have a problematic relationship. Both sides, however, cannot afford to let the relationship completely derail. They share a history of conflict and wars, and in recent decades have become strong competitors for economic and political influence in the Asian region and beyond. Japan occupied China during the period 1937–1945, and in Chinese eyes Japan has never fully acknowledged the atrocities that it committed during these years. This view is reinforced by Japanese leaders’ annual visits to the Yasukuni shrine, which honors the Japanese who were killed during past wars, but also the 1946 Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal war criminals. Sino–Japanese history is an extremely sensitive issue for China, because in spite of Chinese feelings of animosity toward Japan, Japan is central to Chinese national identity. Whereas for many centuries China strongly influenced Japan’s religion, writing system, art, and philosophy, 80  For Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, see, for example, Raffaello Pantucci and Alexandros Petersen, “Beijing Lays the Groundwork in Tajikistan: A View from the Ground,” China Brief, Vol. 12, No. 11 (May 25 2012); Chris Rickleton, “Kyrgyzstan: China Expanding Influence, One Student at a Time,” EurasiaNet (January 4 2012); and “Confucius Institute Contributes to China–Kyrgyzstan Ties: Senior Official,” People’s Daily (March 12 2013). 81  See, for example, “Days of the Chinese Culture in Uzbekistan,” portal of the government of the Republic of Uzbekistan (October 23 2012), available online at http://www .uzbekistan.uz/en/press/culture/16069; and “Win–Win for China and Kazakhstan.” 82  “China–S. Korea Ties are Expected to Further Flourish,” Xinhua (October 20 2011); for 2012 trade figures, see the website of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/countries/asiapacific/countries/20070730/1_24408.jsp? menu=m_30_10 (accessed August 2013). 83  “Key Facts on China–Japan Trade and Economic Ties,” Global Times (September 22 2012).

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during the last century Japan in its turn has served as “the primary reference point from which modern Chinese have defined themselves.”84 The Chinese government deliberately keeps wartime memories and stories alive and has allowed anti-Japanese feelings to become an important element of Chinese nationalism. It furthermore uses the issue of Japan’s Second World War aggression in its diplomacy and public diplomacy toward third countries, as is illustrated by its strategy to win international support for its stand in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute.85 In his speech to the UN General Assembly in New York City in September 2012, for example, then Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi said that Japan’s position on the islands: [. . .] is an outright denial of the outcomes of the victory of the world antifascist war and poses a grave challenge to the postwar international order and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.86 During the same UN meeting, China also published full-page advertisements in the New York Times and the Washington Post with headlines reading “Diaoyu Islands Belong to China.”87 Chinese leaders regularly bring up the issue in meetings with foreign leaders or during visits abroad. A recent example is a speech by China’s Premier Li Keqiang during his May 2013 visit to Potsdam, Germany, in which he said that the Potsdam Agreement, where the terms of the Second World War surrender were dictated to Japan, reaffirmed that Japan should return all territory stolen from China.88 This strategy to play up Japan’s war crimes may meet with some sympathy in countries that also suffered 84  Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), p. 36. 85  Karl Gustafsson, “The Sino–Japanese Battle for Hearts and Minds over the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands,” East Asia Forum (March 13 2013). 86  “Work Together to Achieve Common Security and Development,” speech by Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi at the UNGA (September 27 2012). 87  Jennifer Saba, “China Takes Islands Dispute with Japan to Pages of US Newspapers,” Reuters (September 28 2012). 88  Staff reporters, “Premier Li Keqiang, in Potsdam, Warns Japan on Postwar Vows,” South China Morning Post (May 27 2013). Another example is (then) Chinese Vice-Premier Li Keqiang’s September meeting with Papua New Guinean Prime Minister Peter O’Neill, during which Li said: “Both China and Papua New Guinea were victims to the Japanese fascist invasion back in the Second World War;” and “Japan’s position today on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands is an outright denial of the outcomes of victory in the war against fascism and constitutes a grave challenge to the post-war international order.” See “Li Keqiang Meets with Papua New Guinea Prime Minister O’Neill” (September 11 2012), website of

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under wartime occupation by Japan, in particular South Korea, but undermines China’s public diplomacy toward Japan. China’s animosity toward Japan, resulting in perceptions of China as an enemy rather than a friendly neighbor, makes improving China’s image in Japan very difficult.89 In the first decade of the millennium, both sides made efforts to overcome these difficulties. After Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe’s ‘icebreaking visit’ to China in October 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in April 2007 made an ‘ice-melting’ visit to Japan, during which he extensively reached out to the Japanese people. He did morning exercises in a park in Tokyo, chatted to the locals, planted tomato plants with farmers, and practiced baseball with students from Ritsumeikan University.90 This was followed in May 2008 by a five-day ‘warm spring’ state visit to Japan by China’s President Hu, who also included various public diplomacy activities in his program. He gave a speech at Waseda University, talked to Japanese youth at the opening ceremony of the China–Japan Friendly Exchange Year of Youth, met with relatives of ‘late friends’ of China, and discussed bilateral relations with the China– Japan Friendship Association.91 Since the eruption of the territorial dispute about the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2010, however, tensions and diplomatic crises have dominated the bilateral relationship, leading to a very negative image of China in Japan. Boycotts of Japanese products and violence during anti-Japanese demonstrations throughout China in reaction to the fishing trawler incident of September 2010, and the purchase by the Japanese government of three Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in October 2012, contributed to a further deterioration of relations.92 Various opinion polls conducted in Japan by Japanese media companies and the Japanese Cabinet Office during the period 2010–2012 reveal that large

the Chinese MFA at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/diaodao_665718/ t969873.shtml. 89   Shi Zhiyu, “Linbang: danqian zhongguo gonggong waijiao de zhenshi tiaozhan” [Neighbours: Real Challenges for China’s Public Diplomacy], GGWJJK, No. 4 (winter 2010). 90  Linda Sieg, “China’s Wen has Hard Sell on Thaw in Japan, at Home,” Reuters (April 12 2007); and Chinadaily.com, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-04/12/content_ 849014_4.htm. 91  Xinhua Special Report, “President Hu Visits Japan,” available online at http://news .xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/11/content_8143525.htm. 92  Ian Johnson, “Anti-Japanese Protests over Disputed Islands Continue in China,” New York Times (September 16 2012).

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majorities of more than 80 per cent of Japanese citizens harbor negative feelings toward China and consider China a threat to Japan’s national security.93 Another factor that hinders the development of Sino–Japanese relations is the two countries’ ongoing competition for leadership in Asia. China is steadily increasing its weight and political influence in the region. In 2010, China’s economy overtook Japan’s as the second biggest in the world, and China has become many Asian countries’ largest trading partner. In the area of soft power, too, China and Japan are competitors, or, as Asian public diplomacy specialist Jing Sun calls them, ‘charm rivals.’94 China’s diplomacy and public diplomacy has inspired Japan to develop its own charm offensives aimed at matching China’s influence in Asia and Africa.95 Zhao Kejin points out that in addition to the above issues of historical sensitivities and competition, differences in political systems and political ideologies contribute to the divide in Northeast Asia. He argues that promoting regional cooperation is vital for improving perceptions and calls for an expansion of media work and cultural cooperation.96 This is indeed the strategy that China currently follows. China’s public diplomacy policies emphasize cultural diplomacy and peopleto-people exchanges.97 China’s government organizes Chinese cultural festivals and performances at the Chinese Cultural Center in Tokyo and at Confucius Institutes throughout Japan. It furthermore promotes educational exchanges. Together with the Japan Foundation, it organizes, for example, student

93  Poll by Sankei Shimbun and the Fuji News Network of September 20 2011, cited in James J. Przystup, “Japan–China Relations: Muddling Through,” Comparative Connections (September 2011), available online at http://csis.org/files/publication/1102qjapan_china. pdf; and Jiji, “Record 81% of Japanese Feel No Friendship toward China, Government Survey Shows,” Japan Times (November 25 2012). 94  Jing Sun, China and Japan as Soft Power Rivals (Michigan, MI: University of Michigan Press 2012). 95  Myath Thura, “Abe’s Myanmar Visit May Help Japan Parry China’s Influence,” Japan Times (May 27 2013); Mitsuru Obe, “Seeking to Match China Influence, Japan Boosts Africa Aid Pledge,” Wall Street Journal (June 2 2013); and Prashanth Parameswaran, “Japan’s ASEAN Charm Offensive,” Foreign Policy (January 24 2013). 96  Zhao Kejin, “Dongbeiya hezuo zhongde zhongguo gonggomg waijiao” [Chinese Public Diplomacy in Northeast Asia’s Cooperation], available online at the website of Jilin University at http://cie.jlu.edu.cn/index.php?action=subnews_detail&nid=16 (accessed July 2013). 97  See also Keith Dinnie and Ada Lio, “Enhancing China’s Image in Japan: Developing the Nation Brand through Public Diplomacy,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, Vol. 6, No. 3 (August 2010), pp. 198–206.

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exchange camps aimed at building interpersonal trust.98 In 2011, almost 18,000 Japanese students were registered in China,99 compared to more than 86,000 Chinese students in Japan in 2012.100 China regards its overseas students as potential ‘people’s ambassadors.’101 The overseas Chinese press circles actively reach out to the Chinese student community. One of the overseas Chinese newspapers in Japan recently established a journal called Sino-Japanese Public Diplomacy Study, and the Sino–Japanese Public Diplomacy Research Council, which is aimed at promoting non-governmental exchanges between the two countries.102 People’s organizations such as the Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAFIU), the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) and the China–Japan Friendship Association organize numerous mutual visits and exchanges.103 When official bilateral visits are canceled over rising tensions, these organizations are vital in maintaining regular contact between the two countries.104 In addition, there are small-scale grassroots activities by individual people such as Duan Yuezhong, who owns a publishing house that brings out books on China–Japan relations and who organizes weekly Sunday evening gatherings of Chinese and Japanese people in a park in Tokyo.105 In honor of the 300th session of this discussion

98  “Believing in Ties on a Personal Level: 47 University Students from Japan and China, a Week under the Same Roof,” Wochi Kochi Magazine (September 2012). 99   “Statistics of International Students in China in 2011,” China Scholarship Council (September 22 2012). 100  International Students in Japan 2012, results of an annual survey of international students in Japan, Japan Student Services Organization (February 2013), available online at http:// www.jasso.go.jp/statistics/intl_student/documents/data12_e.pdf. 101  Cai Jianguo, “Minjian jiaoliu shi zhongri guanxi de jizhou” [People’s Exchanges are the Basis of Sino–Japanese Relations], GGWJJK, No. 3 (fall 2010), pp. 41–48. 102  “Huamei chuangban zhongri gonggong waijiao yanjiuhui, tuijin zhongri minjian jiaoliu” [Overseas Media Establishes Sino–Japanese Public Diplomacy Studies Association to Promote People’s Exchanges,” Riben Qiaobao (November 7 2011). 103  See, for example, Wu Jin, “A Review of CAFIU’s Non-governmental Exchanges with Japan in the Past Thirty Years,” website of CAFIU, http://www.cafiu.org.cn/english/NewsInfo. asp?NewsId=1130 (accessed July 2013); and the website of CPAFFC, http://en.cpaffc.org .cn/index.html (accessed July 2013). 104  See, for example, Keith Zhai, “Signs of Thaw Appear in Sino–Japan Relations Ahead of Beijing Visit,” South China Morning Post (April 2 2013); and “Head of China–Japan Friendship Association Meets Osaka Governor, Mayor,” People’s Daily (April 23 2012). 105  “Exchange Groups Continue Activities Despite Japan–China Turmoil,” Asahi Shimbun (September 20 2012).

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forum, the Asahi Shimbun published an article about Duan, stating that he has “succeeded where leaders of Asia’s two biggest powers have failed.”106 China’s most successful public diplomacy policy toward Japan in recent years was its disaster-relief aid to Japan after the devastating March 2011 Fukushima earthquake and tsunami. The Chinese government was quick to offer its condolences and provide help: its rescue team and relief materials were the first to arrive in the disaster-hit areas.107 The Chinese’s government’s solidarity and Chinese people’s show of sympathy to Japanese victims were appreciated and temporarily warmed relations.108 Soon, however, the territorial disputes dominated the relationship again. In view of the fortieth anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties, China and Japan designated 2012 as a ‘Friendship Year for Japan–China People-to-People Exchanges,’109 but in September 2012, the Chinese side canceled all remaining events.110 In May 2013, Beijing also decided to stay away from the 2013 memorial service for the victims of the 2011 Fukushima earthquake and tsunami, a decision that wiped out much of the goodwill that China had created with its aid and sympathy in 2011.111 Although not without tensions, China’s relations with South Korea are less problematic. The two countries established official ties only in 1992. They fought against each other in the Korean War (1950–1953), and China’s close relationship with North Korea subsequently long hampered the development of relations between the two countries. From 1992 onward, however, economic ties grew rapidly as a result of the economic opportunities that the Chinese market offered for South Korean industries. There are tensions over China’s support for the regime in North Korea, South Korea’s alliance with the United 106  Yuri Imamura, “Grass-roots Forum for Japanese, Chinese Marks 300th Session,” Asahi Shimbun (August 6 2013). 107  “Mutual Disaster-Relief Aid Brings Chinese and Japanese People Closer,” People’s Daily (March 23 2011); Ji Chunpeng, “China, Japan Join Hands in Fighting Catastrophic Quake, Tsunami,” People’s Daily (March 31 2011); and “Sichuan Quake Victims Reciprocate for Japanese Disaster Aid,” Asahi Shimbun (May 26 2011). 108  Daisuke Nishimura, “Fund Established for Japanese who Saved Chinese Trainees,” Asahi Shimbun (April 27 2011); and Daisuke Nishimura, “Chinese Return to Miyagi to Honor Man who Saved their Lives,” Asahi Shimbun (December 17 2011). 109  Kris Kosaka, “China and Japan: A 40-Year Friendship Worth Singing About,” Japan Times (July 19 2012). 110  Adam Westlake, “China Cancels 40-Year Celebration of Japanese Diplomatic Ties,” Japan Daily (September 24 2012). 111  Toko Sekiguchi, “Japan, China Bicker over Fukushima Service,” China Real Time Report, Wall Street Journal (March 13 2013).

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States, and historical issues,112 but as discussed above, both sides want to keep the relationship stable and positive, as they are aware that this is a prerequisite for realizing their common goal of denuclearizing North Korea.113 Furthermore, with the United States rebalancing toward Asia and relations with Japan being strained, China needs a good partner in Northeast Asia. China’s increasingly critical stand on North Korea and the renewed commitment to strengthening ties by new leaders in both China and South Korea led to a warming of relations in 2013.114 This also opened new opportunities for China’s public diplomacy. In July 2013, when South Korean President Park Heung-hye made her first visit to China as Korea’s president, the Chinese government and media wooed South Korean audiences by extending an ‘extra­ ordinarily warm welcome’ for her.115 The success of the visit was also the result of President Park’s public diplomacy. She had decided to make China her second foreign destination, after the United States but before Japan, and she charmed Chinese audiences by speaking Chinese and showing her affiliation with Chinese culture. The Chinese media gave President Park very positive treatment and referred to her as “an old friend of the Chinese people.”116 According to a South Korean opinion poll held in July 2013, 76 per cent of South Korean respondents had a positive view of the summit.117 China has long invested in public diplomacy toward South Korea. Its strategy aims to defuse tensions and to deepen the relationship. China seeks to present itself as not only an important economic partner, but also a major political and

112  The issue concerns an ancient Kingdom, Koguryo, which South Korea considers as one of the Three Kingdoms of Korea, while China claims it to have been a state subordinate to China. See, for example, Bruce Klingner, “China Shock for South Korea,” Asia Times (September 11 2004). 113  Chung Chong Wook, “China and the Two Koreas,” Talking Points from the ASAN–China Forum 2012 (December 11 2012), website of the ASAN Institute of Policy Studies at http:// asanchinaforum.org/ (accessed August 2013). 114  See, for example, Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, “China–Korea Relations: Seeking Alignment on North Korean Policy,” Comparative Connections (May 2013); and Robert R. Hill, “China’s South Korean Future,” Project Syndicate (June 23 2013). 115  Jun Ji-hye, “Media Rolls Out Red Carpet for Park,” Korea Times (June 27 2013); and “China Media: ‘Extraordinary Welcome’ to Park,” BBC News (June 28 2013). 116  Cheng Guangjin, “Park Ready to Charm China,” China Daily (June 27 2013). 117  Public Opinion on the Korea–China Summit, Favorability of the Leaders of Neighboring Countries, Attitudes on the Minimum Wage (Seoul: ASAN Institute for Policy Studies, August 6 2013).

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cultural partner that promotes regional cooperation,118 is essential to managing the issue of North Korea, and offers a cultural alternative to the United States. China’s focus on cultural diplomacy toward South Korea is, for example, illustrated by the Chinese Ministry of Culture’s decision to choose Seoul as the host for the first official Chinese Cultural Center in Asia. The Center, which was opened in 2004, organizes a wide array of exhibitions, performances, music, and Chinese-language classes and Chinese Lunar New Year festivals.119 In 2012, the Korea–China Year of Friendship involving 45 cultural events and exchanges gave a boost to cultural ties.120 Seoul was also the city where the world’s first Confucius Institute was established in 2004. China now has seventeen Confucius Institutes throughout South Korea, catering to large numbers of youth interested in learning Chinese. In June 2013, more than 70,000 South Koreans studied in China, accounting for the largest group of foreign students in the country;121 more than 80,000 Chinese are studying in South Korea. The government furthermore invests much in parliamentary and youth exchanges.122 A recent and innovative example is the July 2013 visit of Chinese ‘power micro-bloggers’ to Seoul.123 Inspired by the example of the South Korean Wave (see chapter two), Chinese government and film companies also invest in introducing Chinese films and television series in South Korea. The Chinese television series “Three Kingdoms” recently won a grand prize at the Seoul Drama Awards,124 and China and South Korea annually organize Chinese movie festivals in the South Korean cities of Seoul and Pusan. Chinese producers and directors recognize that Chinese movies are not very popular in South Korea because of lack of ‘openness in subject matter,’ but nevertheless hope to boost future sales.125 118  Zhao Kejin, “Dongbei ya hezuo zhongde zhongguo gonggong waijiao” [China’s Public Diplomacy with Regard to Northeast Asian Cooperation], Dangdai shijie, No. 7 (2012). 119  “Cultural Center in Seoul Offers Window into China,” China Daily (January 31 2011). 120  “S. Korea, China Designate 2012 as Year of Friendship,” korea.net (April 5 2012). 121  “Chinese–South Korean Cultural Exchange in Beijing,” CCTV.com (June 28 2013). 122  “China, South Korea Pledge to Enhance Exchanges,” People’s Daily (October 28 2011); and “China, S. Korea Agree to Step Up Parliamentary Exchanges,” People’s Daily (September 5 2012). 123  Yonhap, “Chinese ‘Microbloggers’ to Visit S. Korea This Week,” Globalpost (July 1 2013). 124  “Chinese Series ‘Three Kingdoms’ Wins Grand Prize at Seoul Drama Awards,” available online at http://www.asiae.co.kr/news/view.htm?idxno=2011090109514398270 (accessed July 2013). 125  Wei Xi and Wan Yu, “China and South Korea: ‘Like a Good Neighbor . . . ,’ ” People’s Daily (June 14 2013).

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In 2012, only 30 of the 632 films released in South Korea were from China, accounting for just 0.3 per cent of South Korea’s box office takings.126 Public diplomacy toward Japan and South Korea also takes place in the framework of the China, Japan, and South Korea Trilateral Cooperation. The Trilateral Cooperation was launched in 1999 and was institutionalized in 2011 with the opening of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) in Seoul. The Secretariat’s task is to explore new agendas for cooperation and to lay “the foundation for heart-to-heart exchanges.”127 The Trilateral mechanism, which concerns a long-term investment in building trust among the three countries, enables China and Japan to keep engaging when bilateral relations are in stormy weather, although in April 2013 China canceled its participation in several scheduled Trilateral meetings over tensions with Japan.128 The TCS oversees an extensive cultural and people-to-people program. The list of activities includes annual Trilateral cultural ministers’ meetings, cultural industry forums, and cultural exhibition projects, but also Trilateral cooperation projects among universities and students, a Friendship City Exchange Conference, and various youth exchanges, such as the Young Ambassador Program, sports meetings, and video and multimedia contests.129

China’s Public Diplomacy in Africa

China’s rapidly growing activities and presence in Africa have been drawing much attention and criticism during the past decade. Western media accuse the Chinese government of stealing African resources without letting Africa benefit, grabbing land, stealing local jobs, paying low wages, neglecting safety regulations, harming local African entrepreneurs by exporting cheap Chinese products, and contributing to environmental degradation. Democratic countries furthermore criticize China’s no-strings-attached aid and its policy of non-interference in conflicts in Africa. China, for its part, complains that it is demonized in the Western press. International research shows that many Western press reports do indeed contain inaccurate information and that 126  Claire Lee, “China’s Movie Industry Sets Sights on South Korea,” Wall Street Journal (June 17 2013). 127  See online at http://tcs-asia.org/dnb/user/userpage.php?lpage=1_1_greeting. 128   Andrew Yeo, “China, Japan, South Korea Trilateral Cooperation: Implications for Northeast Asian Politics and Order,” EAI Issue Briefing (November 6 2012). 129  See the website and the TCS Annual Report 2011.9–2012.8 for details: http://tcs-asia.org (accessed July 2013).

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they reflect ‘enduring stereotypes’ of Chinese ruthlessness and an insatiable appetite for resources, set against images of African weakness and Western trusteeship.130 These stories are fueled by China’s lack of transparency with regard to its aid programs and by Western concerns about China’s growing influence in Africa. International academic scrutiny reveals a more complex and nuanced image of China’s relationship with Africa. The work of Deborah Brautigam, who has studied China–Africa relations for more than two decades, for example, proves many of the Western accusations of China’s huge quid pro quo aid in exchange for access to natural resources in Africa to be false.131 Derek Scissors, a China economist at the American think tank the Heritage Foundation, shows that global media reports trumpeting ‘gigantic’ Chinese deals are regularly based on disinformation spread by host country governments: “Companies that do not exist are said to be spending billions. The huge figures thrown out are later downsized by factors of 10.”132 A recent report on large-scale land acquisitions reveals that China’s ‘land grabs’ have been greatly overestimated. “In the press you see China everywhere, but in the database there is not as much China as we think there is,” said one of the project’s lead researchers.133 This negative stereotyping, which has contributed to the bad reputation of China’s policies toward Africa, is one of the engines of China’s comprehensive public diplomacy program toward Africa. China’s public diplomacy not only targets African but also global—and in particular Western—audiences. In Africa, China’s public diplomacy aims both at maintaining and strengthening its positive image in countries that welcome China’s activities and presence, and improving its reputation among African leaders and publics who are concerned about and denounce China’s policies and significant presence in 130  For the UK media, see Emma Mawdsley, “Fu Manchu Versus Dr Livingstone in the Dark Continent? Representing China, Africa and the West in British Broadsheet Newspapers,” Political Geography, Vol. 27, No. 5 (June 2008), pp. 509–529; for German media, see Carola Richter and Sebastian Gebauer, Die China-Berichterstattung in den Deutschen Medien [The Portrayal of China in German Media] (Berlin: Heinrich-Böll Stiftung, 2010); for global media, see the website of scholar Deborah Brautigam at http://www.chinaafrica realstory.com. 131  Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), prologue; for more examples, see Brautigam’s website at http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com. 132  Derek Scissors, “Tracking Chinese Investment: Western Hemisphere Now Top Target,” Heritage Foundation (July 8 2010). 133  Math McGrath, “Database Says Level of Global ‘Land Grabs’ Exaggerated,” BBC News (June 10 2013).

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Africa.134 The end goal is securing an overall smooth development of China’s political, economic, and, in particular, energy relations with Africa. China is Africa’s largest trading partner, but trade with the African continent accounts for only 4 per cent of China’s total trade.135 Africa, however, is China’s second largest source of oil imports.136 China’s Africa policies are developed in the framework of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which was established in Beijing in 2000 in the presence of delegations from 44 African countries and seventeen international and regional African organizations.137 With its various dialog mechanisms and subforums such as the China–Africa Business Council, FOCAC has succeeded in boosting Sino–African engagement and practical cooperation, resulting in a strengthening of China’s political and economic influence in Africa. China’s policies are explained in White Papers and documents like the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2013–2015),138 and are widely publicized via the Chinese media in Africa. At home, China’s Africa programs are discussed in newspapers, on television programs, on websites, and during chats of policymakers with the online community.139 China has several advantages in conducting public diplomacy in Africa. Its activities in, and relations with, Africa are not a recent phenomenon. They date back to the 1950s and 1960s, when China supported African nations in their liberation struggles. During the 1970s, China had aid programs in more African countries than the United States did. China therefore enjoys much goodwill in many African countries.140 Second, in many respects China is also still a 134  Zhao Jun, “Xin shiqi zhongguo dui fei gonggong waijiao: dongyin yu jizhi” [China’s Public Diplomacy toward Africa in the New Era: Motivation and Mechanisms], GGWJJK, No. 9 (spring 2012). 135  Mary-Françoise Renard, “China’s Trade in Africa,” in Richard Schiere, Léonce Ndikumana, and Peter Walkenhorst (eds), China and Africa: An Emerging Partnership for Development? (Tunis: African Development Bank Group, 2011), pp. 25–50, at p. 30. 136  Li Xiaokun, “Wen: China to Import More from African Nations,” China Daily (July 19 2012). 137  See the website of FOCAC at http://www.focac.org. 138  “China’s African Policy” (2006), full text available online at http://english.peopledaily. com.cn/200601/12/eng20060112_234894.html; “China–Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation” (2010), full text available online at http://english.gov.cn/official/2010-12/23/ content_1771603.htm; and “The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China– Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013–2015),” website of FOCAC (July 23 2012). 139  Tendai Musakwa, “Top Chinese Official in Charge of African Affairs Chats with Netizens” [translation], China–Africa Project (March 22 2013). 140  Report by Globescan and BBC World Service, “Views of Europe Slide Sharply in Global Poll, While Views of China Improve” (May 10 2012).

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developing country. It speaks about its relationship with Africa in terms of South–South cooperation, and its development experiences and current phase of development enable the Chinese government to understand Africa’s needs. Third, China’s successful development model is looked upon favorably in many countries in Africa because, in the words of Africa specialist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, He Wenping, “it did not copy the Western model, but followed its own national condition in selecting which lessons to emphasize.” He adds that “[s]haring this message with African countries should be the main content of soft power construction at this stage.”141 This was exactly what was done by President Xi Jinping when he connected the concept of the Chinese Dream to the African Dream during his March 2013 trip to Africa. One example of sharing its development experience is China’s focus on investing in infrastructure and industrialization in Africa. Building infra­ structure has been an important element of China’s own development program, and Chinese policymakers recognized early on African countries’ need for roads and railways. In the 1970s, for example, China built a more than 1,000 kilometer-long railway connecting landlocked Zambia with Tanzania, and it continues to support the railway today. China has since invested enormously in roads, energy infrastructure, and other engineering projects, whereas Western countries have long shied away from financing infrastructure projects (they have only recently started developing programs in this sector).142 Another example of sharing development experiences is China’s support for the establishment of special economic zones (SEZ) in Africa, modeled after its own successful Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.143 It is unclear whether the zones will become successful,144 but the initiative, which aims to create local

141  He Wenping, “Overturning the Wall: Building China’s Soft Power in Africa,” China Security, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2010), pp. 63–69. 142  See, for example, David H. Shinn, “The China Factor in African Ethics and Human Rights,” conference paper for the Oxford–Uehiro–Carnegie Council Conference (December 2006); and Vivien Foster and Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia (eds), Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, copublished with the Agence Française de Développement, 2010). 143  See Yejoo Kim, “Chinese-led SEZs in Africa: Are They a Driving Force of China’s Soft Power?,” Discussion Paper No. 1 (Stellenbosch, South Africa: University of Stellenbosch, February 2013). 144  Eleanor Whitehead and Adam Robert Green, “WEF Africa 2012: Africa’s Special Economic Zones,” This is Africa (May 1 2012).

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economic growth, provides “a promising new approach to sustainable industrialization” in Africa, according to some observers.145 China’s overall diplomacy and public diplomacy in Africa are intimately intertwined, as China’s Africa policies can be considered a resource of soft power in Africa. China not only provides aid and assistance to Africa, but also invests in cultivating personal relations with African leaders. Chinese leaders often visit Africa and the inclusion of three African countries on President Xi’s first trip overseas in March 2013 underlined the importance that China attaches to its relationship with the continent. Chinese ministers of commerce also regularly visit Africa to discuss the development of African business, contrary to their colleagues from the United States or Europe.146 Although some African leaders are becoming more critical about China’s Africa policies, they generally still feel more treated as equals by the Chinese than by Western donors.147 As discussed in chapter four, China’s aid policies differ from most other and in particular Western countries’ policies in that they do not attach political conditions, instead emphasizing a win—win approach. China thus deliberately offers an alternative approach that is appreciated by many developing countries in Africa and elsewhere. Aid and investment are important tools, but in terms of official development assistance (ODA), China’s aid is fairly modest compared to that of other countries. China’s overall assistance, however, includes a wide variety of economic instruments and forms of financial support that do not fall within the criteria of ODA. As discussed earlier, China is not transparent with regard to these activities and only provides cumulative figures. The exact amount of China’s aid to Africa is therefore unclear, and

145  Yejoo Kim, “Chinese-led Special Economic Zones in Africa: Problems on the Road to Success,” Policy Briefing (Stellenbosch, South Africa: Stellenbosch University, Chinese Center for Chinese Studies, March 2013); and Tang Xiaoyang and Deborah Brautigam, “China’s Investment in Special Economic Zones in Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2011), pp. 27–54. 146  For the high number of visits of Chinese leaders to Africa, see the websites of FOCAC, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce; see also Filip de Beule and Daniel Van den Bulcke, “China’s Opening Up, from Shenzhen to Sudan,” in Mijne Pieter van Dijk (ed.), China’s News Presence in Africa (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), pp. 31–54, at p. 45. 147  Lisa Schlein, “Africa Welcomes China Investment,” Voice of America (January 26 2011); Deborah Brautigam, “China in Africa: What Can Western Donors Learn?,” report for Norfund (August 2011); and David Smith, “Barack Obama to Face Protests in South Africa after Years of Laissez-faire,” The Guardian (June 25 2013).

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experts speak about China being “a mid-size donor,”148 or an “important aid donor.”149 A large part of China’s activities in Africa involve construction. In addition to the above-mentioned infrastructure projects, China has built numerous schools, hospitals, anti-malaria centers, and agricultural technology demonstration centers in Africa.150 It also finances and constructs large and highly visible buildings such as sports stadiums, government offices, and opera houses in Africa. The most notable example of these ‘gestures’ or ‘prestige projects’ is the huge African Union Conference Center in Addis Ababa, which is regarded as “a symbol of the rise of Africa.”151 The enormous building includes the tallest tower in Ethiopia, and is the Chinese government’s largest African construction aid project since the Tanzania–Zambia railway. The Chinese government furthermore supports or pays for African embassies in Beijing and African participation in international events such as the Shanghai World Expo (see chapter six). These types of projects, or—as the Chinese put it—‘signs of friendship,’ generally create good publicity and are welcomed by the local people.152 Another important part of China’s investments in Africa concerns training and education. In 2012, the Chinese government reported that it had so far trained close to 40,000 African personnel in various sectors and provided over 20,000 government scholarships to African countries. By 2012, China had established 31 Confucius Institutes and five Confucius Classrooms in 26 African countries.153 In addition, twenty pairs of leading Chinese and 148  Deborah Brautigam, “China’s Role in Africa: Implications,” Hearing for the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (November 1 2011); and Deborah Brautigam, “Aid ‘with Chinese Characteristics’: Chinese Foreign Aid and Development Finance Meet the OECD–DAC Aid Regime,” Journal of International Development, Vol. 23, No. 5 (2011), conclusion. 149  David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2012), p. 160. 150   Hu Jintao, “Chinese President’s Speech at Opening Ceremony of Fifth Ministerial Conference of Forum on China–Africa Cooperation.” 151  “AU Conference Center Symbolizes Rise of Africa: Ethiopian PM,” Xinhua (January 29 2012). 152  See, for example, David Smith, “Chinese Hospital Heals Sore Spot in Zambia,” The Guardian (April 29 2013); Souad Tiemcani, “China Hopes to Hit the Right Note with Algeria Opera House,” The Guardian (April 29 2013); and Afua Hirsch, “Ghana Plays Ball as China Splashes Cash on Gyms and Stadiums,” The Guardian (April 29 2013). 153  “2012 Joint Conference of Confucius Institutes in Africa Held in South Africa,” Hanban News (September 14 2012).

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African universities have entered into cooperation.154 The Chinese approach to educational programs differs from that of the West in focusing not on primary but on tertiary education. As one observer notes, China’s approach recognizes “the need for educational foundations for international competitiveness” and “the psychological foundation a university degree confers in situations of underdevelopment,” but others are skeptical about the effectiveness of China’s educational programs in terms of improving Africans’ capacity and knowhow.155 The role of civil society in the Chinese–African relationship is still weak, but China invests in the development of programs to strengthen people-to-people diplomacy and cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). There is a biannual China–African Civil Society Dialog,156 a China–Africa People’s Forum, and an annual China–Africa Young Leaders’ Forum, initiated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and alternately held in Africa and China.157 Examples of similar initiatives by social organizations are the two international roundtables on China–Africa health collaboration in 2009 and 2011, organized by the Chinese Alliance for South–South Health Cooperation Research and cosponsored by—among others—the World Bank Institute, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.158 Chinese Friendship organizations are active in Africa,159 and there are numerous cultural activities such as the Chinese–African Cultures in Focus program,

154   Hu Jintao, “Chinese President’s Speech at Opening Ceremony of Fifth Ministerial Conference of Forum on China–Africa Cooperation.” 155  See, respectively, “How China is Educating Africa,” Poverty Matters Blog, The Guardian (May 13 2013), which provides an extract for the book by Stephen Chan (ed.), The Morality of China in Africa: The Middle Kingdom and the Dark Continent (London: Zed Books, 2013); and Jonathan Kaiman, “Africa’s Future Leaders Benefit from Beijing’s Desire to Win Hearts and Minds,” The Guardian (April 29 2013). 156  For the 2008 conference report, see http://www.za.boell.org/web/resource-governance279.html. 157  “China, Africa to Build New Model for NGO Cooperation,” Xinhua (November 11 2012); Lu Hui, “Youth Represents Hope of China–Africa Cooperation,” Xinhua (June 19 2012); and Hu Jintao, “Chinese President’s Speech at Opening Ceremony of Fifth Ministerial Conference of Forum on China–Africa Cooperation.” 158  Larry Hanauer and Lyle J. Morris, Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for US (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2014), p. 81. 159  See, for example, the seminars organized by the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, listed online at http://en.cpaffc.org.cn/project/about22313.html.

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which in 2012 brought performing troupes and cultural representatives from 42 African countries to various cities in China.160 Chinese public–private partnership projects in Africa are on the rise too. In 2005, the China–Africa Business Council was founded, which is a joint initiative of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, and the China Society of Promotion of the Guangcai Program, an agency for pro-poor government institutions. The Council’s tasks are to promote Chinese private investment in Africa and to provide a platform for Chinese firms in order to familiarize them with African culture, language, and with social and environmental regulations in African countries. Another example of public–private cooperation is the China–Africa Brightness Action initiative, which was launched in 2010. This project, which is funded by Chinese enterprises, provides Sudanese patients with free eye surgery. One interesting aspect of China’s policies toward Africa is that they are partially initiated and executed at the local level. Since the 1970s, Chinese provinces have been agents of the central government in implementing aid policies decided by Beijing. Traditionally, there was a ‘pairing arrangement’ that detailed which province was responsible for providing help to a specific African country. The central government provided the funding and the provincial governments delivered the people and expertise for the training teams, medical teams, and building companies that were sent to Africa. Over the past two decades, however, Chinese provinces and major cities have started their own, independent aid projects, and local governments are now active in Africa as independent investors, providers of aid, and organizers of exchange programs.161 The Chinese government makes sure that its activities in Africa are widely publicized. The primary aim of China’s recent dramatic expansion of media presence and outreach in Africa is to counter “some of the biased opinions about us [China] in the West” and to provide the public with the Chinese perspective on its activities in Africa.162 As part of the media’s ‘go out’ policy, Chinese media 160  Liu Wei, “ ‘African Cultures in Focus 2012’ Opens in Beijing,” Chinafrica (May 29 2012). 161  For more details, see Chen Zhimin and Jian Junbo, “Chinese Provinces as Foreign Policy Actors,” SAIIA Occasional Paper, No. 22 (Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, February 2009); and Chen Zhimin, Jian Junbo, and Chen Diyu, “The Provinces and China’s Multi-layered Diplomacy: The Cases of GMS and Africa,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2010), pp. 331–356. 162  China’s Minister of SARFT, Cai Fuchao, in “Special Report on Forum on China–Africa Media Cooperation,” website of CCTV; see also Liu Chang and Shang Xuqian, “China– Africa Media Cooperation: A Joint Force for Truth,” Xinhua (April 22 2011).

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companies such as Xinhua, CCTV and the China Daily have invested heavily in strengthening their presence in Africa. The China Daily now has regional headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya, and is increasingly staffing its offices with local and international personnel. It promotes its news services via big screens that are erected in African cities.163 The China Xinhua News Network Corporation (CNC) programs reach millions of African homes through local African cable networks, and CCTV has also launched satellite television services in Africa.164 Furthermore, various Chinese private companies buy local television channels and other media.165 In April 2011, Xinhua started cooperating with the Kenyan mobile telephone firm, Safaricom, in providing a mobile news service offering a Chinese perspective on news. It was the first mobile newspaper in the subSaharan region.166 In December 2011, CCTV followed with a China Network Television (CNTV) multi-language iPhone application program named “I Love Africa.”167 These channels pay more attention to positive stories about developments in Africa than Western media usually do, and provide a platform for Africans to speak their point of view.168 Some in Africa appreciate the Chinese approach, but others worry about the lack of press freedom for Chinese media outlets.169 In December 2012, the China Daily strengthened its outreach on the African continent by launching an Africa Weekly supplement to its newspaper.170 China also seeks to strengthen its cooperation with the African media by expanding the exchange of correspondents from media organizations on the two sides and setting up an African communications’ research

163  “China Daily Newspaper Launches Africa Edition,” BBC News (December 14 2012). 164  Yu-Shan Wu, “The Rise of China’s State-Led Media Dynasty in Africa,” SAIIA Occasional Paper, No. 117 (June 2012). 165  In June 2010, China’s private company Star Times bought a South African pay television channel and CCTV invested in the South African Independent News and Media consortium; see Anton Harber, “Chinese ‘Soft Diplomacy’ Enters South Africa’s Media Space,” Business Day Live (June 27 2013). 166  “China Daily Newspaper Launches Africa Edition.” 167  For information on the app, see http://cctv.cntv.cn/lm/africalive/app/index.shtml. 168  Paul Glader, “China’s Media Investment in Africa Shows Leadership and Raises Questions,” Forbes (July 22 2013); and Iginio Galiardone and Harry Verhoeven, “New Trends in African Media: The Growing Role of China,” OUCAN conference report (November 9 2012), available online at http://oucan.politics.ox.ac.uk (accessed July 2013). 169  See, for example, Galiardone and Verhoeven, “New Trends in African Media;” CCTV, “Africa’s True Image or China’s Strategic Vehicle;” and Mohamed Keita, “Africa’s Free Press Problem,” The New York Times (April 15 2012). 170  “China Daily Launches Africa Weekly Edition,” China Daily (December 13 2012).

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center in China.171 However, as these exchanges confront African reporters with media censorship in China, they do not necessarily lead to more positive views of the Chinese media in Africa.172 There are no figures about the number of people reached by Chinese media in Africa, but media observers expect them to have an impact on African perspectives of China.173 As China’s presence in Africa grows, however, some African leaders and societies have become more critical of China’s policies and activities.174 The increase of African scrutiny and criticism of Sino–African cooperation, as well as a number of violent incidents involving Chinese companies, their workers, and Africans,175 have made the Chinese government aware that it needs to adjust its policies and pay more attention to issues such as sustainability, the involvement of African society, labor security, and the behavior of Chinese companies. In 2005, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (Mofcom) therefore started working with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to establish CSR guidelines for Chinese companies. China’s State Council issued guidelines urging Chinese companies to observe local rules, provide safe working environments, and protect the local environment.176 The Chinese government regularly organizes events to educate Chinese entrepreneurs about adhering to local African regulations and involving local people. Examples include the seminars organized by Chinese embassies in various African capitals that are aimed at raising Chinese businesses’ awareness of local rules and circumstances, and discussing local companies’ problems with regard to maintaining China’s image. The Chinese 171  “Open Up New Prospects for a New Type of China–Africa Strategic Partnership,” speech by President Hu Jintao at the Opening Ceremony of the Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (July 19 2012). 172  See Shinn and Eisenman, China and Africa, chapter 7, which provides a detailed description of Chinese media activities in Africa. 173  AFP, “CCTV: Africa’s True Image or China’s Strategic Vehicle,” Kenya Star (August 13 2013). 174  See, for example, Lamido Sanusi, “Africa Must Get Real about Chinese Ties” Financial Times (March 11 2013); and Babette Zoumara and Abdul-Rauf Ibrahim, “Africa: China– Africa Relations—Looking Beyond the Critics,” Pambazuka (June 6 2013). 175  For example, the 2012 clash between African workers and Chinese managers at the Chinese-owned Collum coal mine in Zambia resulting in the death of a Chinese supervisor; see Andrew Bowman, “Zambian Mine Death Puts China Relations in Spotlight,” Beyondbrics blog, The Financial Times (August 6 2012); or for more on the hostilities against Chinese workers in Angola in 2010, see Benoit Faucon and Sherry Su, “Hostility toward Workers Cools Angola–China Relationship,” Wall Street Journal (August 10 2010). 176  Lu Tang and Hongmei Li, “Chinese Corporate Diplomacy: Huawei’s CSR Discourse in Africa,” in Wang (ed.), Soft Power in China, pp. 95–116.

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Embassy in Tanzania, for example, invited locally active Chinese companies such as China Railway Construction, China Telecom, Beijing Construction Engineering, and the Tanzanian–Chinese General Chamber of Commerce for a seminar that discussed a Xinhua reporter’s analysis of Tanzanian public opinion and reporting on China.177 A similar seminar was organized at the Chinese Embassy in Guyana.178 Aware of China’s growing influence in Africa, other countries try to keep up and follow the Chinese model. In 2008, India launched an India–Africa Forum Summit, but was not very successful. There has only been the one summit in 2008, which was attended by not more than fourteen African countries.179 Recently, Japan announced new plans to beef up its relations with Africa through trade and investment led by the Japanese private sector,180 and US President Barack Obama’s June 2013 tour of Africa was generally regarded as being aimed at countering China’s dominance in Africa.181

Analysis and Conclusions

The two cases of China’s public diplomacy toward Asia and Africa illustrate the comprehensiveness and diversity of China’s public diplomacy strategies. The cases show that a growing number of Chinese public diplomacy actors use an ever-wider array of public diplomacy instruments to win the hearts and minds of foreign audiences. There is no indication that these activities are part of an official public diplomacy strategy for Asia or Africa, but many 177  Website of China’s Ministry of Commerce, “Zhu tansangniya shiguan juxing zhong zi qiye, huaren shetuan gonggong waijiao zuotan hui” [Chinese Embassy in Tanzania Holds a Public Diplomacy Meeting with Chinese-funded Enterprises and Chinese Associations] (August 27 2012), available online at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/ jyjl/k/201208/20120808306315.shtml (accessed September 2012). 178  “Zhu Guiyana shiguan jingshang chu zhaokai ‘zai gui zhong zi qiye anquan jiaoyu he gonggong waijiao zuotan hui’ ” [Commercial Office of the Embassy in Guyana Holds a “Forum on Safety Education and Public Diplomacy” for Chinese-funded Enterprises in Guyana], website of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/ article/i/jyjl/l/201208/20120808312077.shtml. 179  Balaji Chandramohan, “Why China Wins in Africa,” The Diplomat (July 17 2010). 180  Suvendrini Kakuchi, “Japan Seeks to Remake Asia–Africa Relationship,” Inter Press Service (June 26 2013). 181  Gabe Joselow, “US–China Rivalry Exemplified in Obama Visit to Tanzania,” Voice of America (June 25 2013); and Peter Wonacott, “In Africa, US Watches China’s Rise,” Wall Street Journal (September 2 2011).

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public diplomacy policies and activities are in line with, or part of, China’s foreign policies and overall diplomacy toward the two regions. In many countries in both Asia and Africa, China’s foreign policy strategy of the 1990s to strengthen bilateral relationships with countries rich and poor filled a void created by the neglect of policymakers in the United States and Europe. The goodwill that this created was strengthened by China’s investment in building up personal relations and giving ‘face’ to leaders of even the poorest countries, instead of preaching to them. Like China, many of these countries have a highcontext culture and they could appreciate the gesture. Other examples of how China’s public diplomacy fits into broader policies are China’s media activities in Africa and Asia, which are part of overall media ‘go global’ strategies, and China’s construction projects, investment, and aid, which are part of China’s overall economic diplomacy toward both regions. The link between foreign policy and public diplomacy contributes to a dominant role for state actors in public diplomacy in the two regions, including for subnational authorities, which are particularly active in Southeast Asia. On both continents, however, China seeks to involve more non-state actors in its public diplomacy. The Chinese government is expanding educational exchanges and cultural projects, and China has volunteers working in developing countries. In Asia, the Chinese government also reaches out to the general public via the overseas Chinese communities. In Africa, where Chinese communities are small and mainly consist of Chinese businessmen and temporary workers, the Chinese government focuses on increasing awareness of the importance of CSR and adhering to local laws and customs. China’s economic development is clearly China’s biggest asset for public diplomacy around the globe. In Asia and Africa, China capitalizes on the economic success of the China model and China’s economic power. The China model is a source of inspiration for people in developing countries, while China’s economic power enables China to conduct a policy that provides these countries with investment, infrastructure, trade opportunities, and aid, and to invest in the costly public diplomacy tools of a global media presence and extensive network of Confucius Institutes. In Central Asian countries, the Institutes function as cornerstones of cultural relations with China, but the overall popularity of Confucius Institutes in Asia and Africa is closely linked to China’s economic power. As illustrated above, many people want to learn the Chinese language because of the economic prospects and job opportunities that Chinese-language abilities offer and not so much out of cultural interest. As China’s public diplomacy in Asia and Africa depends so much on China’s economic power, some people argue that China uses soft power only in the

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sense that it exercises its power softly.182 This is true to some extent for China’s use of economic instruments, but ignores China’s aid, volunteer work, and education and cultural projects in Asia and Africa. It also disregards how the public diplomacy strategies of big powers always contain elements of softly used hard power, and that these countries’ hard power is always a part of the attraction. Although culture is also considered an asset for China’s public diplomacy, China has difficulties raising its cultural profile in the two continents. While China’s cultural diplomacy is limited in Africa, in Asia it is a major element of China’s public diplomacy policies, in particular in Japan and South Korea, where China cannot depend on economic instruments. In spite of many Asian countries’ cultural affiliations with China and the increasing number of Chinese cultural festivals and performances in the region, China has so far failed to become a cultural center in the region. Its cultural power is no match for South Korea or Japan. In Asia, China’s recent foreign policy and diplomacy with regard to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea form a serious liability. They have changed the image that China had been building up since the 1990s of a benign and constructive regional power—whose rise would benefit Asia’s economic development—into that of a regional bully. They overshadow positive actions such as China’s mediation in Myanmar with the Kachin Independence Organization, and its shifting stand on North Korea. This makes China’s public diplomacy in Asia, which is also challenged by the renewed US presence in the region, very difficult, in particular where other claimants of disputed islands are concerned. The suspicion of Asian audiences, which are already concerned about China’s growing economic dominance and expanding military capabilities, is furthermore strengthened by China’s ‘ultimatum diplomacy.’ Foreign policy issues are of far lesser concern in Africa. African people generally regard China as a longstanding partner that, itself a developing country, understands Africa’s needs and that gives them more attention and shows them more respect than Western countries, which always seem to know better. Creating these feelings of equality between China and Africa is a fundamental characteristic of China’s public diplomacy toward Africa. This is not to say that China’s public diplomacy does not face problems in Africa. Like in the developing countries in Asia, African people are increasingly critical about Chinese projects and sometimes protest against them. This is forcing China to rethink its policies. In efforts to live up to its promises of 182  Fareed Zakaria, “The US Can Out-Charm China,” Newsweek (December 11 2005).

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win—win cooperation and its role as the leader of the developing world, the Chinese government is adjusting its policies by increasingly taking the needs and wellbeing of local communities in Asia and Africa into account. As noted above, it urges Chinese companies to adhere to local laws and ensure that local people benefit from their business, and it organizes seminars to teach companies how to develop CSR programs. This is a slow and gradual process, but it shows that China is open to learning and adjusting its policies. China’s huge investment in the expansion of Chinese media, particularly in Africa, is driven by its frustration about Western media dominance and the West’s stereotypical reporting on China and its policies. Chinese media platforms are now technically able to reach large numbers of people, including inhabitants of small and remote villages in Africa and Asia. These people often have little choice of channels in their native language, and may appreciate China’s broadcasting and the positive tone of its reporting, but others are concerned about the limited press freedom of the Chinese media. In conclusion, this chapter highlights that China knows where its opportunities lie in different regions and countries around the globe, and that it fine-tunes its use of public diplomacy instruments accordingly. It furthermore shows that China is not only expanding the range of its public diplomacy, but is also continuously improving its policies. Although China does not always react directly to criticism, it does listen, and in various cases it responds by adjusting its approach. Government control ensures adequate funds to fight against international suspicions of China’s political intentions, with the help of expensive instruments such as the Confucius Institutes, media presence, and scholarships. The challenge for China lies in raising its cultural profile and strengthening the role of non-state actors.

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Proactive Public Diplomacy: Events

The Beijing Olympic Games and the Shanghai World Expo

This chapter looks at the practice of Chinese public diplomacy by studying two examples of event public diplomacy: the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games; and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo. Organizing these events offered China great opportunities for public diplomacy, as they attracted the attention of large numbers of people from all over the world, provided a venue for extensive international exchange, and enabled China to present itself and its ideals both internationally and domestically. Indeed, these case studies show that Chinese leaders were well aware of the vast array of opportunities that hosting the two events offered and that they seized them with both hands. The Beijing Olympic Games and Shanghai World Expo were about more than sports or presenting nations. They were about China’s rise and integration into the global community, China’s political system and policies, and about the role of the domestic and foreign media in projecting a new image of China to the world. For both events, China developed extensive and sophisticated public diplomacy strategies, which included a broad engagement of domestic audiences and overseas Chinese communities. The Chinese government also had to strengthen its defensive public diplomacy capabilities, as various domestic and international crises in the run-up to the Olympic Games brought China into disrepute. Standing in the spotlight, China had to address the issues that were tarnishing its image, such as Sudan, the environment, and working conditions for foreign reporters. The case studies show that China’s political system and culture have an enormous impact on the way in which the events were used as a tool for public diplomacy and as an opportunity to propel the development of the cities of Beijing and Shanghai. The Chinese government’s control over the domestic media and social actors ensured sufficient domestic publicity and enabled the organizing committees to implement wide-scale programs to people on China’s internationalization and integration into the world community. The public diplomacy experiences of both events have led to at least temporary innovations in China’s public diplomacy system: an expansion of instruments and actors; strengthening of the coordination system of public diplomacy resources and actors; the cultivation and training of a pool of talented people who master policies, know business, and are good at communication; and the enrichment of public diplomacy theory, which should form

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the basis of a public diplomacy system with Chinese characteristics.1 Some of these gains and lessons learned, however, will likely be lost again over the course of time.

The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games

Hosting the Olympic Games is a big economic and public diplomacy opportunity for any country. For a country like China, however, which felt that it was slowly reclaiming its own place under the sun, it was much more. It marked China’s renaissance. The Chinese government hoped that the Olympics would “open a new chapter as a modern, advanced nation, just as the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 closed the book on wartime Japan.”2 At the international level, China wanted to showcase the accomplishments of 30 years of opening up and reform, as well as its goodwill and capabilities to the world. The government also wanted to capitalize on the widespread interest in China’s ancient culture.3 At the domestic—national—level, the Olympic Games were expected to boost prestige and to contribute to national unity. At the local— municipal—level, the Games would guarantee funds to improve infrastructure and environment in the three hosting cities: Beijing; Tianjin; and Shenyang. According to the rhetoric of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and host countries’ officials, there is no place for politics in the Olympic Games. In reality, of course, the Olympic Games are as much a political as a sporting event. China’s leaders understood this better than anyone else, as (Olympic) sports and politics have long been linked in China. Xu Guoqi, author of Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895–2008, observes that sports in China have always served “as an agent of social change and legitimacy, as well as a source of international recognition, prestige and an engine of nation-building.”4 This will also be illustrated in this case study. When China embraced Western sports at the beginning of the twentieth century, he writes, “they were motivated more by the project of building an image of strength and accomplishment 1  Yang Jiemian, Zhongguo shibo waijiao [China’s Expo Diplomacy] (Shanghai: Shishi chuban­ shi, 2011), p. 175. 2  Victor D. Cha, “Countdown to Beijing,” Washington Post (August 8 2007). 3   See, for example, the official website of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games: http:// en.beijing2008.cn/bocog/concepts/index.shtml (accessed throughout October 2011–January 2012). 4  Xu Guoqi, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895–2008‬(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 4.

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than by personal enjoyment.”5 The first time that China sent an athlete to the Olympic Games, in 1932, it was partly to avoid the athlete competing for the Japanese puppet regime in Manchukuo. When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949, sports events became even more politicized. It was also because of political problems that China did not participate in the Olympic Games during the period from 1953 until the 1980 Winter Olympic Games in Lake Placid in the United States. During that period, Taiwan, which is regarded by Beijing as a renegade province, was a member of the Olympic movement under the name Republic of China. It was not until 1979, when the PRC Olympics Committee was recognized as representing China again and the Taiwanese committee was renamed Chinese Taipei Olympics Com­ mittee, that China once more joined the Olympic family. Olympic Games are also what Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz call ‘media events,’ or events that give: [. . .] shape to a new narrative genre that employs the unique potential of the electronic media to command attention universally and simultaneously in order to tell a primordial story about current affairs.6 Media events are well prepared, they are negotiated and performed by various actors involved in the event, and subsequently celebrated by audiences all over the world.7 Since the ‘media event’ concept was launched, however, the development of communication technologies and the expansion of media outlets have significantly changed the character of media events. In Dayan and Price’s 2008 book Owning the Olympics: Narrative of the New China,8 Dayan points out that the organizers of media events are nowadays no longer able to claim ownership over the meaning of an event in the way that they could in the early 1990s. The meaning of an event depends on spectators’ own interpretations, and different players may offer them different definitions. As the Olympic Games provide global collective attention, many groups other than the national organizers like to take advantage of that opportunity to promote

5  Xu Guoqi, Olympic Dreams‬‬, p. 8. 6  Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 1. 7  Dayan and Katz, Media Events, chapters 3, 4, and 5. 8  Monroe Edwin Price and Daniel Dayan (eds), Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008).

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their own message.9 As will be discussed below, this is indeed what happened on a large scale in the run-up to the Beijing Games.

Winning the Olympic Bid

China’s ambition to host the Olympic Games dates back to the late 1980s. At the closing ceremony of the 11th Asian Games, which were held in Beijing in October 1990, a huge banner appeared that read: “With the success of the Asiad [Asian Games], we look forward to hosting the Olympic Games.”10 This was the Chinese government’s way of indirectly announcing to the world that it was planning to bid for the Olympic Games. A few months later, the Beijing 2000 Olympic Games Bid Committee was established, and in 1993 China made its first bid for the Olympic Games of 2000. The motto of its bid was ‘A More Open China Awaits Olympics.’ With this slogan, China wanted to draw attention to the fact that the fifteen years of reform and opening up had brought big changes to the country. It may not have been the best choice, however, as in the West the word ‘more’ drew attention to the fact that China was not yet fully open, and the word ‘China’ clearly reflected that the Chinese nation was making the bid and not a Chinese city. According to the rules of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), cities—and not national governments—may bid to host Olympic Games. Looking at this first Chinese Olympic bid, one aspect stands out. From the start, the Bid Committee paid much attention to involving the domestic public. It launched a series of campaigns to inform the Chinese population about the Olympic Movement and Olympic issues became an emerging field in Chinese sports’ science. A flood of articles on Olympic Games and Olympic sports were published in academic journals, and the subject made its appearance on the curricula of many higher physical educational institutions.11 A university-based Olympic Studies Center was established and various

9  Dayan, “Beyond Media Events: Disenchantment, Derailment and Disruption,” in Monroe Edwin Price and Daniel Dayan (eds), Owning the Olympics, pp. 391–402, p. 399. 10  “Bid for 2000,” website of the Chinese Olympic Committee, http://en.olympic.cn/china_ oly/olympic_bids/2004-03-27/121850.html (accessed October 2011–January 2012). 11  Ren Hai, China and the Olympic Movement: University Lecture on the Olympics [online article] (Barcelona: Center d’Estudis Olímpics (UAB), International Chair in Olympism (IOC–UAB), 2010).

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reading materials for a wider audience were published.12 A questionnaire survey carried out by the city of Beijing’s statistics bureau showed that 98.7 per cent of Beijing inhabitants supported the city’s bid.13 China did well in the bidding process,14 but with the crackdown of the 1989 student demonstrations still fresh in everybody’s memory, the IOC made a safe choice by awarding the 2000 Olympic Games to Sydney. This was an enormous disappointment for both the Chinese population and China’s government. The government understood, however, that the time was not ripe and Beijing did not join the bid for the Olympic Games of 2004. A few years later, however, the Chinese government decided to try again. In November 1998, the Chinese Olympic Committee submitted Beijing’s application for the 2008 Games to the IOC. In April 1999, Beijing was accepted as a candidate, and in late 1999 the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee (BOBICO) was established. BOBICO consisted of officials from various national and municipal stakeholders of the Olympic bid, including the State Council (the Chinese central government), Beijing’s municipal government, and the State General Administration of Sports. The Committee clearly benefited from the lessons learned by the first Chinese bidding committee and, knowing that it had to do better, it applied a number of new strategies that should help to win over IOC members and international audiences. With the motto it chose for the 2008 Games, ‘New Beijing, Great Olympics,’ BOBICO shifted the attention from China to the less intimidating city of Beijing as a bidder. The motto conveyed the message that reform and the opening up of China had brought about great changes in Beijing, but also implied that hosting the Olympics could bring further changes to Beijing. Interestingly, the Chinese version of the motto, Xin Beijing, Xin Aoyun (New Beijing, New Olympics) carries a slightly different meaning. It expresses a stronger link between ‘New Beijing’ and ‘New Olympics,’ thus implying that Beijing would organize a new, different kind of Olympic Games. It was felt that ‘New Olympics’ sounded too presumptuous to foreign ears, as if China would want to change the Olympic Games. The translators therefore chose the word ‘great.’15 This illustrates how China consciously and carefully considered the different audiences watching China’s 12  The center was based at Beijing Sports University; see Ren Hai, China and the Olympic Movement. 13  Ren Hai, China and the Olympic Movement. 14  Beijing only lost to Sydney in the last round by a difference of two votes. 15  Xu Guoqi, Olympic Dreams, p. 243; see also Li Hui, Imaging China through the Olympics: Government Publicity and Journalism, Ph.D. thesis (Kelvin Grove, QLD: Creative Industries Research and Application Center, Queensland University of Technology, 2005).

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bid, and provides a good example of the Chinese concept of neiwai youbie (inside and outside should be dealt with differently), as already discussed briefly in chapter two. BOBICO started with a budget of US$ 24.6 million, which enabled it to ‘think big’ in terms of promotion. One-third of the budget came from China’s central government and the remainder was raised through marketing programs. Renowned international and Chinese companies such as General Motors, Proctor & Gamble, Lenovo, and the Maersk Group became BOBICO partners. These companies not only provided funding, but also actively promoted Beijing’s Olympic bid.16 Within BOBICO, the departments of Press and Publicity, and External Relations, were largely responsible for public diplomacy matters.17 The Press and Publicity Department regularly held press conferences to publicize bid news to the more than 300 international news agencies based in Beijing, invited athletes and Olympic reporters from the major international media to visit Beijing, and updated the BOBICO official website on a daily basis. They also used the traditional public diplomacy tool of printed promotional materials. These materials included large numbers of special brochures, periodicals, and post cards in various languages.18 The most important publication was the weekly bulletin Beijing 2008, which was sent to all IOC members. The bulletin was published from January to June 2001, and contained official information about Beijing’s bid and the organizers’ views with regard to controversial issues such as Tibet and human rights in China.19 Much effort was also put into promoting the idea that China would bring a unique, Chinese, culture to the Olympic Games. This was not only expressed in press releases, brochures, and on the website, but also in the emblem of the Beijing bid and in the way that BOBICO presented its Candidature File to

16  Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games’ xxix Olympiad (BOCOG), Official Olympic Games Report, digitalized version, published by LA 84 Foundation, Vol. 1 (2010). The report can be downloaded from http://olympic-museum.de/o-reports/report2008.htm (accessed in January 2012). 17  BOBICO consisted of nine departments, two of which were involved in public diplomacy efforts: Press and Publicity; and External Relations. The other departments were: General Office; Research and Analysis; Sports and Venues; Construction and Project Planning; Finance and Marketing; Technology; and Environment and Ecosystems. See http:// images.beijing2008.cn/upload/lib/bidreport/zt2.pdf (accessed in January 2012). 18  For more detail, see Li Hui, Imaging China through the Olympics, pp. 95–100. 19  Li Hui, Imaging China through the Olympics.

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the IOC: in silk boxes with traditional Chinese locks.20 The emblem presented a Chinese knot made up of the five Olympic rings in the shape of a person practicing Chinese shadow-boxing (taijiquan) (see Illustration 1 below). The knot, a Chinese handicraft, symbolizes unity; taijiquan, a form of exercise aimed at achieving harmony, balance and unity of man and nature, represents the traditional Chinese sports culture; the five Olympic rings provide the link with modern times and Olympic values, but also mean to express cooperation among people of the five continents.21 The emblem was hailed by many for its aesthetic qualities and ingenuity, and was considered a huge improvement from the 2000 Olympic Games’ bid emblem: a static image of the Temple of Heaven in Beijing, representing China’s ancient culture. BOBICO also made a promotional movie, for which it hired internationally renowned Chinese director Zhang Yimou. The movie, “New Beijing, Great Olympics,” focused on sports activities by ordinary Chinese people of all ages, as well as by professional athletes, but also showed beautiful Chinese landscapes, cultural highlights, and a modernized Beijing. The movie, which was first shown during the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, won three prizes, including the Olympic Museum Award at the International Festival of Sport Movies and Television, held in Milan, Italy.

illustration 1  Emblem of the Beijing Bid for the 2008 Olympic Games source: official website of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.

20  Heidi Østbø Haugen, “ ‘A Very Natural Choice’: The Construction of Beijing as an Olympic City during the Bid,” in Price and Dayan, Owning the Olympics, pp. 145–162, at p. 149. 21  “Beijing Unveils Emblem, Slogan for 2008 Olympic Bid,” People’s Daily (February 2 2000).

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The organizers realized that it would be wise to seek international advice and support in the area of communication with the global media. BOBICO therefore hired two international public relations agencies that had ample experience with Olympic Games publicity work: Weber Shandwick Worldwide, which became responsible for handling publicity in the United States and Asia; and the British agency Bell Pottinger for Europe.22 These companies were very important in fine-tuning the messages for international audiences. John Tibbs, Managing Director of Bell Pottinger at the time, for example, pointed out that in order to overcome China’s negative international image, the Beijing Olympic Committee would “need to create a brand that really does promise hope. [. . .] Everything they do will have to embody their promises.”23 To facilitate communications with audiences abroad even more, BOBICO appointed internationally acclaimed Chinese celebrities and celebrities from cultural and sporting circles as Beijing’s Olympic-bid ambassadors. They included film stars Jackie Chan and Gong Li, Olympic Gold medalist in table tennis Deng Yaping, and US tennis player of Chinese origin Michael Chang.24 Like its 1993 predecessor, BOBICO did much to involve the domestic population in its bid. Supported by the Chinese government, BOBICO mobilized popular support through public relations campaigns, music, fine arts, films, and television programs, and even postage stamps to communicate Olympic concepts. It established ‘Olympic service groups’ that organized all kinds of events and programs seeking broad domestic support.25 BOBICO also made sure that from March 2000 onward, all the major Chinese media outlets created so-called ‘Olympic columns’ in their publications in order to cover Beijing’s Olympic bid.26 According to the results of a public poll conducted by Gallup in Beijing in November 2000, 94.9 per cent of Beijing’s residents strongly supported the city’s bid to host the 2008 Olympics. With regard to whether Beijing

22  Joe Lepper, “Bell Pottinger to Promote Beijing 2008 Olympic Bid,” PR Week UK (March 30 2001). 23  Kim Barnett, “Beijing Stretches its Image to Fit through the Olympic Rings,” Brand Chan­ nel, http://www.brandchannel.com/features_effect.asp?pf_id=50 (accessed October 28 2011). 24  BOCOG, Official Olympic Games Report, Vol. 1, pp. 59 and 98. According to BOCOG’s own assessment, these “innovative efforts generated measurable worldwide media coverage of its activities, 60 per cent of which was positive.” 25  Ryan Ong, “New Beijing, Great Olympics: Beijing and its Unfolding Olympic Legacy,” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, (summer 2004), p. 37. 26  BOCOG, Official Olympic Games Report, Vol. 1, p. 96.

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would be successful in winning the bid, 62.4 per cent were fairly confident that Beijing would win.27 In the weeks before the IOC had to make its decision, China also organized a number of ‘stunt’ events that drew a lot of media attention and were meant to show both international and domestic audiences that the Chinese people wholeheartedly supported Beijing’s bid. Stunts included women weaving a mile-long pigtail of their hair in support of the bid and 500 couples holding a group marriage ceremony on the Great Wall, signing their names on a huge Olympic-bidding banner.28 During the same period, on June 23 2001, the International Olympic Day, Beijing organized a concert by Luciano Pavarotti, Placido Domingo, and Jose Carreras near the Forbidden City in the center of Beijing. The tenors offered their support to a Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, and some 3.3 billion people in more than 110 countries and regions reportedly watched the live television broadcast.29 Although the IOC’s evaluation of Beijing’s bid had been positive and many stakeholders felt that China should be further engaged in the Olympic movement, three issues of widespread concern and public debate remained: China’s human rights situation; the lack of press freedom; and China’s environmental problems. The environment was extensively addressed by BOBICO in its official bid, but the committee had remained largely silent on the first two issues. In the United States, a bipartisan group of Congress members submitted a resolution to the House and Senate demanding a rejection of Beijing’s bid because of its human rights record.30 A BOBICO official’s last-minute promise that the Games would “help further advance the human rights”31 may therefore have been crucial in tipping the balance in favor of Beijing as the host city: By allowing Beijing to host the Games, you will help the development of human rights. China and the outside world need to integrate. China’s opening up is irreversible. The Olympic Games is a good opportunity to promote understanding.32 27  “Bid for 2008” (March 27 2004), website of the Chinese Olympic Committee: http:// en.olympic.cn/china_oly/olympic_bids/2004-03-27/121852.html (accessed October– November 2011). 28  See Li Yu, “The Campaign to Bid for the 2008 Olympic Games,” China Today (June 2001); and “No Stunt is Too Bizarre to Promote Bid,” CNN Sports Illustrated (July 12 2001). 29  BOCOG, Official Olympic Games Report, Vol. 1, p. 60. 30  Ong, “New Beijing, Great Olympics,” p. 37. 31  “Beijing: Olympic Bid Helps Develop Human Rights,” People’s Daily (February 7 2001). 32  Liu Jingmin, Vice-President of BOBICO, in an interview with Agence France-Presse on April 21 2001, quoted in Committee to Protect Journalists, Falling Short: As the 2008 Olympics Approach, China Falters on Press Freedom (August 2007). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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The international community did not realize, however, that this remark was an initiative by a BOBICO official rather than a government statement, let alone a government promise. It is therefore not included in official Chinese reports of the Olympic-bid process. Closely linked to this remark was the assurance— this one clearly supported by the Chinese government—that there would be no restrictions on media reporting and the movement of journalists up to and including the Olympic Games. Contrary to the former promise, this official statement was honored in January 2007. On July 13 2001, Beijing was awarded the organization of the 2008 Olympic Games.33 A majority of IOC members were confident that Beijing would be able to organize excellent Olympic Games and thought that the time was ripe to bring the Olympics to the most populous country in the world. The announcement sparked a spontaneous mass celebration throughout China, and Chinese President Jiang Zemin made an unannounced appearance on Tiananmen Square in Beijing to congratulate the crowds. The exuberant celebrations and Chinese government reactions underlined how important winning the Olympic bid was for China. Many in China felt that their country was finally recognized by the world as a responsible power and that they would now have the opportunity to show the world how rapidly China had developed since 1978.34 It was not only people in China who had high hopes for the Olympic Games. IOC members and many Western politicians also expressed hope that the buildup to the 2008 Games would contribute to more openness in China and to an improvement of China’s human rights record.

Olympics’ Public Diplomacy

Organizational Aspects A few weeks after winning the bid, a Preparatory Office of the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG) was set up, followed by the official establishment of the committee on December 13 2001. BOCOG was a new type of organization: it was officially a non-governmental organization (NGO), as required by IOC regulations, but in practice it had the status of a “State Council temporary ministry-level office.”35 BOCOG’s work was 33  The decision was taken at the IOC’s 112th Session in Moscow, Russia. 34  See the many media reports of the celebrations, such as “Jubilation on the Streets of Beijing,” Time (July 13 2001). 35  In Chinese: Guowuyuan linshixing zhengbuji banshi jigou. See Susan Brownell, “Beijing’s Olympic Education Program,” The China Quarterly, No. 197 (March 2009), pp. 44–55. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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supervised by the Supervision Commission of the Games of the xxix Olympiad.36 The President of the Executive Board of BOCOG was Liu Qi, who had also been President of the Bidding Committee. Liu Qi was Mayor of Beijing (until 2003) and, importantly, a member of the Politburo. Experience with regard to public diplomacy aspects was brought to BOCOG via its first Vice-President, State Councilor Chen Zhili, who had previously (1984–1991) been Head of the Publicity Department of the city of Shanghai,37 Executive President Liu Peng (from 2005 onward), who had been Deputy Director in the Central Publicity Department during the period 1997–2002,38 and Executive Vice-President Jiang Xiaoyu, who had been Director of the Beijing Municipal Culture Bureau and Director of the Publicity Department of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee. Jiang Xiaoyu became responsible for publicity work. By 2007, BOCOG had more than 30 departments and 4,000 staff working under its umbrella,39 but by the time that the Games took place the number of staff had grown to 8,548.40 Many employees were on loan from government branches, establishing working relationships between branches of government that did not normally work closely together.41 Publicity work was primarily the responsibility of BOCOG’s Media and Communications Department, but other departments such as the Cultural Activities Department, the International Relations Department, and the Media Operations Department were also involved. In 2005, even more actors entered the public diplomacy stage, as the Media and Communications Department got support from the Beijing Olympic Media and Communications Coordination Group42 and the Foreign Affairs Coordination Group.43 Equivalent bodies were set up at the provincial and local levels all over China to coordinate every aspect of 36  Eleni Theodoraki, Olympic Event Organization (Oxford, UK: Elsevier, 2007), p. 140. 37  See Chen Zhili’s biography, “Who’s Who in China’s Leadership,” available online at www .china.org.cn/english/features/58567.htm (accessed October 29 2011). 38   See Liu Peng’s CV at Chinavitae: http://www.Chinavitae.com/biography/Liu_Peng (accessed October 29 2011). 39  Website of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games; for an organogram of BOCOG, see the Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, Vol. iii, “Preparation for the Games: New Beijing Great Olympics,” p. 7. 40  BOCOG, Official Olympic Games Report, Vol. iii, p. 16. 41  Brownell, “Beijing’s Olympic Education Program,” p. 55. 42  Headed by Li Dongsheng, who was also Deputy Director of the Central Publicity Department in charge of the news media. 43  See Anne-Marie Brady, “The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction,” The China Quarterly, No. 197 (March 2009), pp. 1–24; “Speech by Wang Wei, Executive Vice-

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promoting the Beijing Olympic Games. BOCOG also hired various international public relations agencies, such as Burson-Marsteller, Hill & Knowlton, and Ogilvy PR China to help the committee promote a positive image, fight criticism and handle media issues.44 These organizational aspects show how Beijing ensured that all departments involved in public diplomacy could have domestic and foreign PR expertise at their disposal. It underlines that the publicity dimension was a priority for BOCOG and the Chinese government throughout the years of preparation for the Beijing Games. Policies The concept of the Beijing Olympic Games and BOCOG’s policies were outlined in the Beijing Olympic Action Plan, which was published in 2002 and made available online at the official website of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. The Plan reflected the organizers’ hopes that they would be able to stage the “bestever Olympic Games in history” and “create a unique legacy for China as well as for the whole world.”45 The Plan deals with almost every aspect of organizing the Olympic Games, but does not contain direct references to publicity work or public diplomacy. BOCOG’s public diplomacy strategy therefore has to be pieced together by looking at Chinese scholarly articles, media messages, BOCOG’s press releases and promotion materials, its media policies and a large set of other policies with cultural and/or publicity aspects. Articles about public diplomacy and the Olympic Games by Chinese scholars and officials stress the opportunity that the Olympic Games offered, not only for conducting, but also for developing and improving China’s public diplomacy.46 They mention the large number of different actors, including President of the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the xxix Olympiad” (August 9 2006). 44  David Quainton, “H&K in Beijing 2008 Task to Deflect Negative Media,” Media Week (May 4 2006); Human Rights in China, “IR2008: Packaging China for the Olympics,” China Rights Forum, No. 1 (2007), pp. 123–126. 45  “Overall Strategic Concept,” chapter 1 of the Beijing Olympic Action Plan, website of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. 46  See, for example, Dong Xiaoqing et al., “Aoyunhui yu guojia xingxiang: guowai meiti dui sige aoyun juban chengshi de baodao zhuti fenxi” [Olympic Games and National Image: An Analysis of the Reporting by Foreign Media on the Organization of Olympic Games by Four Cities], Zhongguo ruan kexue, No. 2 (2005); Xu Guoqi, Olympic Dreams; and Feng Xia and Yin Bo, “Beijing aoyun wenhua zhuanbo yu zhongguo guojia xingxiang suzao” [Beijing Olympic Culture and China’s National Image-building], Beijing Shehui Kexue, No. 4 (2007).

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many non-state actors, and the variety of exchanges and contacts that took place in the run-up to and during the 2008 Beijing Games. One author points out that this was the first time that so many domestic state and non-state actors cooperated on establishing a new image for China and that the experience of the Olympic Games’ publicity work led to the elevation of public diplomacy into an issue of concern at the highest political levels.47 In 2006, a sub-organization of the Central Publicity Department commissioned a major two-year scholarly research project on how the Olympics might help to improve China’s national image.48 Beijing’s Olympic Narrative: Slogan and Themes Beijing aimed to organize an Olympic Games with distinguishing, Chinese, features. It chose to do so through promoting the traditional Chinese idea of harmonious development of body and mind. At the same time, it wanted the world to “experience the country’s vigor and vitality and its citizens’ common aspiration for peace and prosperity.”49 BOCOG chose a motto that would shift the focus from the city of Beijing, which had stood central in the bid’s slogan (‘New Beijing, Great Olympics’) to a more comprehensive message. BOCOG solicited suggestions from the public and—after studying no less than 210,000 reactions50—it chose ‘One World, One Dream.’51 The slogan was intended to reflect the idea that the whole world shares the same dream of the Olympic spirit’s universal values: unity, friendship, progress, harmony, and participation. According to BOCOG, it voiced “the aspirations of 1.3 billion Chinese people to contribute to the establishment of a peaceful and bright world.”52 The slogan also connected well with China’s theories of ‘harmonious society’ and ‘harmonious world,’ as discussed in chapter two. At the practical level, the Beijing Olympic Games promoted three concepts: Green Olympics; Hi-tech Olympics; and People’s (renwen) Olympics. These three themes fitted well with both China’s overall public diplomacy strategy and BOCOG’s aim of promoting social and economic projects that would raise 47   Zhang Guizhen, “Duiwai xuanchuan xiang gonggong waijiao de zhuanxing—cong Aoyunhui dao shibo” [The Transition from External Publicity/Propaganda to Public Diplomacy—from the Olympic Games to the World Expo], Chinese Communist Online News (September 17 2010). 48  Brady, “The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction;” the sub-commission was the National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science. 49  BOCOG, Official Olympic Games Report, Vol. iii, p. 9. 50  BOCOG, Official Olympic Games Report, Vol. iii, p. 10. 51  In Chinese: tong yige shijie, tong yige mengxiang. 52  Website of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.

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the quality of life for people in Beijing, or, in the words of Beijing’s Mayor Liu Qi, “benefit the further development of our human rights cause.”53 In China’s narrative, the Olympic spirit and the three themes of the Beijing Games also perfectly matched traditional Chinese values such as the ‘quest for a harmonious society,’ with those of the modern Olympic movement.54 In constructing the link between its traditional values and the modern Olympic movement, China showed that it wanted to combine two messages: China is culturally unique; but aspires to be part of the global community. The concept of ‘Green Olympics’ was a natural choice for a government that was well aware of its environmental problems and the bad image that these problems caused worldwide. In addition to the above-mentioned link with the idea of harmony between man and nature, it reflected China’s commitment to sustainable development. Domestically, it was used as a means to increase domestic awareness about the environment and to secure funds to improve the city’s ecological quality of life. BOCOG took measures to clean up the air and water in and around Beijing, developed plans for energy conservation, used ‘green’ building materials for the Olympic village, and organized various campaigns to encourage citizens “to make ‘green’ consumption choices” and “to actively participate in various environmental improvement activities.” US$ 20 billion was spent on the beautification of Beijing, including improving its environment and infrastructure.55 The concept of ‘High-Tech Olympics’ conveyed the message that China had become a modern, innovative and technologically advanced country. The technology had to serve the ‘Green Olympics’ aim of fresh air, healthy food, quick travel, and overall safety of participants, but also help long-term goals such as China’s development toward becoming an affluent society.56 A team of more than 400 top-level scientists and engineers were involved in 449 projects aimed at achieving this high-tech goal. The concept was also reflected in the spectacular Olympic architecture of the ‘Watercube’ National Aquatics Center and the ‘Birds Nest’ Stadium. The third theme, renwen or ‘People’s Olympics,’ referred to the Games as “an occasion to spread modern Olympic ideas, while displaying splendid Chinese culture, Beijing’s historical and cultural heritage, and its residents’ positive attitudes.”57 As discussed in chapter three, renwen refers to both ‘people’ (ren) 53  Liu Qi, quoted in Barnett, “Beijing Stretches its Image to Fit through the Olympic Rings.” 54  Qin Xiaoying, “Harmonious Confluence of Ideas at Olympics,” China Daily (July 18 2007). 55  Barnett, “Beijing Stretches its Image to Fit through the Olympic Rings.” 56  “Beijing Aims for a High-tech Olympics,” China Daily (November 6 2004). 57  Official website of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.

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illustration 2 Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Emblem source: official website of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.

and ‘culture’ or ‘civilization’ (wen). According to many scholars, this Olympic theme expressed the essence of the Beijing Games’ public diplomacy message.58 It created an opportunity to “advance cultural exchanges, to deepen understanding and friendship between the peoples of the world, and to promote harmonious development between mankind and nature.”59 This concept was most visibly reflected in the extensive volunteer and public involvement programs discussed below in the ‘domestic dimension’ paragraph. China’s Olympic symbols expressed the same double message as the slogan and concepts. They embodied Chinese cultural traditions, but also expressed openness to the world. Take, for example, the Olympic emblem, dubbed ‘Chinese Seal, Dancing Beijing’ (see Illustration 2 below). The emblem shows an open-armed running athlete in the form of the Chinese character for ‘capital’ (the jing of Beijing) in ancient seal script. The open arms of the athlete expressed China’s welcome to the Olympic participants and visitors from all over the world. The same careful expression of China’s culture combined with the Olympic message was aimed for in other emblems (such as the torch relay’s emblem and volunteer emblem), the Olympic mascots, Olympic posters, sculptures, and the Olympic medals, etc. In their action plans, BOCOG spoke of a “cultural image system,” which was also showcased in the victory ceremonies and sports presentations at the competition venues. Even the dresses and headdresses of the victory ceremony hostesses were designed according to the cultural image system.60 58  Interviews; see also Zhang Guizhen, Duiwai xuanchuan xiang gonggong waijiao de zhuanxing. 59  “Concepts,” website of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. 60  BOCOG, Official Olympic Games Report, Vol. iii, chapter 14. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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Actors and Tools BOCOG used a variety of tools to disseminate the Olympic slogans and messages and to support an overall positive image of China. The committee recognized that the media would be crucial to its public diplomacy efforts and started early (in 2004) with preparations for services to the domestic and foreign media. It solicited advice from international media companies and developed a detailed media operations plan with the motto ‘Service First.’ China also tried to improve its understanding of how the foreign media work. A survey by six scholars of Peking University analyzed more than 3,600 newspaper articles on the organization of the Olympic Games in Atlanta, Sydney, Athens, and Beijing (until 2004). The survey found that the reporting on the preparations for the Beijing Olympics focused much more on political issues.61 It concluded that the Chinese domestic media should strengthen their ability to improve China’s image through better understanding of the working and topic selection of foreign media; that all of the actors involved—the government, companies, and organizations—coordinate their messages; that the people should play an active role; and that information on a wider variety of topics should be available. In order to brief the media on Beijing’s preparatory work for the Olympics, BOCOG and Chinese governmental organizations regularly published press releases and hosted international and domestic conferences for broadcasters and other media specialists. China thus managed to show the world that it was an effective and credible Olympic organizer. During summer 2004, for example, when Athens was criticized for delays in its preparations for the 2004 Olympic Games, Beijing announced that venue constructions would be completed well ahead of the scheduled time for the 2008 Games.62 On the domestic side, the authorities and BOCOG made sure that all news published in Chinese newspapers and magazines actively promoted the Olympics. In August 2006, the News Department of the CCP’s Central Publicity Department issued instructions to the Chinese media that they should report how the Olympic Games were “improving China’s international image, improving relations between the peoples of the world and the Chinese people, and helping to push forward China’s economic transformation.”63 In a 2007 meeting jointly hosted by the Central Publicity Department, the Central Office for Spiritual Civilization, and BOCOG, it was emphasized once again that:

61  Dong Xiaoqing et al., “Aoyunhui yu guojia xingxiang.” 62  “Beijing 2008 Games’ Work Ahead of Schedule,” China Daily (July 28 2004). 63  Brady, “The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction,” p. 13. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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[. . .] getting publicity on the Olympics right will be good for China’s international and domestic environment; if Olympics publicity has a clear direction, then China’s overall national strength will continually increase and the masses will give us wide support.64 In August 2008, another set of government guidelines for the Chinese press on covering the Beijing Olympic Games was leaked. The rules stipulated which topics were off-limits, how to refer to Taiwan and Taiwanese athletes (‘those from the precious island Taiwan’), and called for downplaying negative news and emphasizing issues such as ethnic quality.65 The collection of Chinese articles on the Beijing Olympic Games gathered by the University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy illustrates the resulting Chinese media bias well.66 In December 2006, the Chinese government published new and less restrictive regulations for foreign journalists working in China.67 Foreign journalists were no longer required to apply for permission from the Chinese government when they wanted to interview someone or gather news in other provinces than their home base. The rules, however, did not apply to Tibet and Xinjiang. Although the suspension of restrictions on foreign correspondents was officially temporary and were due to end after the Olympics were over in 2008, Chinese authorities decided to lift them permanently after the Games. These new regulations were introduced to honor the promise that there would be “no restrictions on journalists in reporting on the Olympic Games” that had been made in the official bid report, and not because Chinese leaders felt that it was time to give the press more freedom.68 It was a big and scary step for the Chinese government to allow a freer flow of information, and it turned out to be difficult to implement the regulations, in particular at a local level. The result was that foreign reporters still met many obstacles.69 Shortly before the start of the Olympic Games, the IOC also had to remind the Chinese authorities strongly that they had to honor the promise to provide free access 64  Brady, “The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction,” p. 13. 65   “Propaganda Department: A 21-Point Directive on Reporting,” China Digital Times (August 25 2008). 66  See Meg Young, “Public Diplomacy and the Beijing Olympics: Narratives and Counter Narratives” (Los Angeles, CA: USC PD, 2008). 67  BOCOG, “Guide on Reporting Activities in China by Foreign Journalists during the Beijing Olympic Games and the Preparatory Period,” website of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. 68  Beijing’s Bid Documents (2000), website of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. 69  Committee to Protect Journalists, Olympic Promises Go Unfulfilled as China Falters on Press Freedom (New York, NY: Committee to Protect Journalists, updated edition 2008).

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to the internet for foreign reporters. Shortly before the start of the Olympic Games, the Chinese government finally did. The domestic press, however, did not benefit from the new rules for foreign media. Nevertheless, the Olympic Games had a considerable impact on Chinese media. Many Chinese reporters were trained by, and intensively cooperated with, international colleagues. These experiences contributed to extensive debates among Chinese media workers on issues such as how to show China to the world, deal with criticisms from abroad, and how to handle Chinese nationalism.70 More than a year before the opening of the Games, BOCOG and seventeen government institutions established a one-stop media service office to handle all of the necessary administrative procedures for reporters. During the Games, the Main Press Center (MPC) and the Beijing 2008 International Media Center (BIMC) provided services to accredited and non-accredited media workers. The centers also organized cultural excursions, as well as informative media tours to institutions working on issues of international concern, such as the Beijing Olympic Food Inspection Center and the Beijing Olympic Environment Monitoring Center.71 Similar policies ensured that Olympic spectators were also looked after well. BOCOG developed the Spectator Service Strategic Plan, which focused on spectator information, venue services, and Games-watching support. In July 2008, one month before the Games, 400,000 city volunteers began offering services such as information consultation, first aid, and language assistance to visitors. They also operated an Olympic call center with over 1,400 volunteers from 27 countries and regions, answering phone calls fifteen hours a day.72 An important public diplomacy tool for BOCOG was the official Olympic website. The website, which had versions in several languages,73 was informative, invited people to comment on draft plans, had a fun page, provided a cultural guide for visitors and showcased BOCOG’s efforts to engage ordinary people. It drew large numbers of visitors: from August 1 2008 onward, the number of visitors increased from two million visits per day to 24 million on the day of the Opening Ceremony. Between August 14 and 24, the number 70  Based on the lecture by Chinese Central Television producer Li Xiaoping at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University (October 2 2007). See also Zhu Liqun and Lin Minwang et al., Aoyunhui yu beijing guojihua: guifan shehuihua de shijiao [Olympic Games and Beijing’s Internationalization: A Study of Norm Socialization] (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2010). 71  BOCOG, Official Report, Vol. iii, p. 128. 72  BOCOG, Official Report, Vol. iii, pp. 220–225. 73  BOCOG, Official Report, Vol. iii, p. 136.

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hit almost 200 million. Among the visitors, 71.9 per cent were citizens from foreign countries. BOCOG, in cooperation with other organizations, also produced lots of printed and audiovisual materials. It issued more than two million copies74 of general publications about the Beijing Games and/or Beijing’s and China’s touristic attractions in many languages,75 but also designed publications for specific groups such as athletes and journalists. It made videos about the slogan and the mascots of the Beijing Olympic Games, the recruitment of Olympic volunteers, and the torch relay, but also more broadly themed videos like Beijing Olympic Games: One World, One Dream, and Welcome to China: Beijing 2008.76 These videos expressed China’s ideals and dreams with regard to a harmonious China in a harmonious relationship with the world. They offered overviews of China’s touristic and cultural highlights, as well as China’s modern achievements in developed cities such as Shanghai. Some of these promotional videos—including five films made by famous directors from Britain, France, Italy, Iran, and Hong Kong—were played on more than one million flights of fourteen major international airlines.77 In its publicity policies, BOCOG paid much attention to promoting an environmentally friendly Games and Chinese culture. It produced ‘green’-themed printed materials and video clips, and organized internet media campaigns and Olympic-themed activities to raise environmental awareness. A ‘Green Olympics, Green Action’ lecture group was set up to popularize the concept of a ‘Green Olympics’ in local communities, schools, enterprises and institutions.78 BOCOG also established ‘Green Olympics information desks’ for collecting and exchanging data about ‘green’ initiatives carried out by Beijing Olympic partners. Meanwhile, it kept the IOC and the Chinese public informed of improvements for the ecological environment. Although culture was not a specific Olympic theme, it was still an important aspect of China’s Olympics public diplomacy, because it is generally regarded 74  BOCOG, Official Report, Vol. iii, p. 136. 75  Chinese, English, French, Spanish, German, Japanese, Russian, Korean, and Arabic. 76   Most videos can be watched via YouTube. See, for example, http://www.youtube .com/watch?v=tSUDEXe1pUc; and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wcxqctP_H5s& feature=related (accessed November 2011). Some of the videos are described in more detail in Nicholas J. Cull, “The Public Diplomacy of the Modern Olympic Games and China’s Soft Power Strategy,” in Price and Dayan, Owning the Olympics, pp. 135–136. 77  BOCOG, Official Report, Vol. iii, p. 136. 78  BOCOG, Official Report, Vol. iii, p. 171.

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as the best source of China’s soft power.79 One example of a big event aimed at promoting culture was the three-week Beijing 2008 Olympic Cultural Festival, which took place every summer from 2003 to 2008. The 2008 edition lasted for three months (June 23–September 16) and offered 3,400 cultural activities of all kinds in 32 Beijing venues.80 Ceremonies There were several moments when China had the opportunity to present its desired image and Olympic message directly to large international audiences. The first was the closing ceremony of the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, where Beijing was allotted nine minutes to present itself. The second and most important was the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games on August 8 2008 at 8.08 pm. This date and time were chosen because ‘eight’ is an auspicious number in China.81 The third opportunity was the closing ceremony. According to the Nielsen Company, the sixteen days of the Beijing Games attracted the attention of around 4.7 billion people or 70 per cent of the world’s population—spectators present at the site, as well as those watching on television.82 Renowned film director Zhang Yimou was selected as the leader of the international team in charge of designing and creating the three ceremonies. With regard to the Opening Ceremony, Zhang faced the difficult task of blending the highlights of 5,000 years of Chinese history and culture, including China’s recent opening up to the world, together with the concepts of ‘harmonious world’ and the themes of Green, Hi-Tech and People’s Olympics. The ceremony should impress, but not scare, international audiences and Zhang was to avoid the ‘mistakes’ of his 2004 Athens presentation, which was criticized for being boring and “spangled with cliché images.”83 This was no small challenge, but it is generally felt that Zhang Yimou succeeded. Newspaper reports show that

79  See Chapter 3 but also Feng Xia and Yin Bo, “Beijing aoyun wenhua zhuanbo yu zhongguo guojia xingxiang suzao” [Beijing Olympic Culture and China’s National Image-building], Beijing Shehui Kexue, No. 4 (2007). 80  BOCOG, Official Olympic Games Report, Vol. iii, chapter 14. 81  The word for ‘eight’ sounds similar to a word that means ‘to prosper.’ 82  “The Final Tally—4.7 Billion Tune in to Beijing 2008—More than Two in Three People Worldwide” (September 4 2008), website of the Nielsen Company, cn.en.nielsen.com/ site/9.4-en-11.shtml. 83  Zhang Xueying, “Beijing’s Gift to the World in 2008,” China Today Online (2006).

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the opening ceremony was very well received all over the world.84 Audiences were captivated and awed by the four hours-long exuberant and dazzling show, which involved more than 10,000 performers. While using cutting-edge technologies, the ceremony drew heavily on China’s history and cultural heritage. Important cultural references included the four most famous Chinese inventions (paper, printing, the compass, and gunpowder), musical traditions, martial arts, brush painting, the Silk Road, and the fifteenth century sea travels of Zheng He. The thousands of Chinese dancers and drummers, moving as one, represented China’s ideal of a ‘harmonious society’ and the Chinese character for ‘harmony’ and ‘peace’ (he) figured prominently throughout the show. The cultural subtleties of the show may have been lost on the majority of non-Chinese audiences, but the underlying message that China was back on the world stage was well understood by everybody who watched the ceremony. Although a number of other political messages, such as China’s space ambitions, were woven into the program, the ceremony as a whole was artistic rather than political. There was critique as well.85 Some newspaper articles mentioned that the scope and perfection of the show were intimidating and many discussed the incorrect information that BOCOG provided about the Opening Ceremony. That information stated that the ceremony was 100 per cent live, whereas in reality one (small) part of the broadcast, showing firework footprints over Beijing, was prerecorded. Much attention was also drawn to the part of the program where a young girl sang “Ode to the Motherland.” She was reported to have sung live, but later turned out to have lip-synched a song performed by a girl who was considered not beautiful enough to take the limelight. Chinese officials did not understand what the fuss by the Western press was all about, but audiences worldwide—interestingly, including the Chinese public—felt betrayed and did not understand the Chinese government’s pursuit of total perfection. These seemingly small incidents confirmed Western feelings that China’s government cannot be trusted to tell the truth. The closing ceremony of the Beijing Games took place on the evening of August 24 2008. It included spectacular fireworks, choreographed drumming, and dancing performances, during a ceremony in which the Olympic Flag was presented to the mayor of London, the host city of the 2012 Summer Olympic 84  See, for example, the summary of world press reports in John Ruwitch, “World Media Hails Beijing’s Perfect Night,” Reuters (August 8 2008); and “Press Hails ‘Greatest Ever’ Olympic Opening Show,” Agence France Presse (August 8 2008). 85  Ruwitch, “World Media Hails Beijing’s Perfect Night;” and “Press Hails ‘Greatest Ever’ Olympic Opening Show.”

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Games. The closing ceremony was generally perceived by the international press as “visually stunning” and as a more relaxed and “celebratory affair” than the Opening Ceremony.86 Dealing with International Criticism and Controversies As discussed above, a ‘media event’ like the Olympic Games offers many actors a platform to promote their messages. The Beijing Games were no exception. The Beijing Games were not only a major public diplomacy opportunity for China, but also provided an opportunity for the international community to urge reforms of China’s domestic and foreign policies. China’s prestige, credibility and ‘face’ were at stake and this made the regime susceptible to international pressure. The susceptibility was further strengthened by various ‘promises’ that Chinese officials had made with regard to the Olympics, as well as human rights and press freedom in China. The strongest international pressure on Beijing came from NGOs and interest groups. Foreign governments voiced their concern only lightly or indirectly and most calls on government leaders to boycott the Beijing Games were rejected.87 The international criticism focused on China’s human rights record, lack of press freedom, pollution, Tibet, and the foreign policy issues of China’s friendly relations with the regimes of Sudan and Myanmar. Research by Judy Polenbaum and Hui Li shows that human rights formed the most prominent theme in Western press reports on preparations for the Olympic Games. They also point out that the relevant issues of Beijing’s logistical preparations and the “actual campaign to land the 2008 Olympics” were ignored by the press.88 The best-known international action against the Beijing Olympics was the ‘Genocide Games’ campaign, supported by American movie star and political activist Mia Farrow. She drew the world’s attention to China’s policies toward the crisis in Darfur. With full-page advertisements and op-eds in major international newspapers, and her successful plea to movie director Steven Spielberg to abandon his role as adviser to the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Games, 86  Mark Slater, “Beijing, Over and Out—Follow That, London!,” BBC Olympics Blog (August 24 2008); “Beijing Bids Farewell to Olympics,” BBC Sports (August 24 2008); and Amy Shipley, “China’s Show of Power,” The Washington Post (August 25 2008). 87  This paragraph is based on Ingrid d’Hooghe, “De Olympische Spelen van Beijing als politiek instrument: Twee kanten van de medaille” [The Olympic Games of Beijing as a Political Instrument: Two Sides of the Medal], De Internationale Spectator, Vol. 63, No. 3 (2008), pp. 127–130, at p. 127. 88  Judy Polumbaum, “Capturing the Flame: Aspirations and Representations of Beijing’s 2008 Olympics,” in C.-C. Lee, Chinese Media, Global Contexts (London: Routledge/Curzon, 2003), pp. 57–75, at p. 65; and Li Hui, Imaging China through the Olympics, p. 235.

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Farrow was able to intensify pressure on Beijing.89 These actions most likely contributed to the Chinese government’s decision, shortly afterwards, to adapt its policy with regard to Sudan. The Chinese government appointed a special representative for Darfur, urged the Sudanese government to show more flexibility on a UN peace plan, and sent troops to support UN peacekeepers in Darfur.90 Less successful were international actions urging Beijing to change its policies with regard to Tibet, political dissidents, and citizens who protested against lack of compensation for houses that had to make way for Olympic construction. A few political prisoners were released in 2007 and early 2008,91 but many more were intimidated, arrested, and sentenced to re-education camps or prison. Among them was prominent human rights activist Hu Jia, who was one of the 43 Chinese intellectuals who signed an open letter to the Chinese government titled “One World, One Dream: Universal Human Rights.” Shortly afterwards, on September 6 2007, Hu Jia published another open letter, “The Real China and the Olympics,” discussing China’s human rights situation in the run-up to the Olympics. During the Games, there was much critique of China’s failure to fulfill its promise to allow demonstrations. In July 2008, BOCOG announced that it had designated three protest zones where Chinese demonstrators could legally stage protests.92 As in the case with the regulations for foreign reporters, this step was taken in order to fulfill IOC requirements, and not because it was widely supported by China’s government. It contravened China’s policy of suppressing dissent and the local authorities refused to implement the temporary rules. This was brought to the attention of audiences all over the world by the case of two women in their late 70s who were arrested when they applied to hold a demonstration in a designated area. While suffering from old people’s conditions and needing the support of walking sticks, the two women were sentenced to re-education through labor. Their sentence was never executed, but would-be protesters were clearly warned that an application to protest would not be without repercussions. In the end, the protest areas were never 89  Ronan Farrow and Mia Farrow, “The ‘Genocide Olympics,’ ” Wall Street Journal (March 28 2007). 90  For more detail, see d’Hooghe, “De Olympische Spelen van Beijing als politiek instrument,” p. 128. 91  Among them Wang Yi, Yang Jianli, Guo Feixiong, and Hong Kong-based journalist Ching Cheong; see the website “Human Rights in China” at http://www.hrichina.org. 92  Xinhua, “Beijing Protest Parks Wait for Games” Demonstrations” (July 25 2008).

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used. According to the Secretary-General of BOCOG, Wang Wei, the 77 applications for demonstrations were resolved “through dialog and communication. And this is also a part of way to do [sic] in Chinese culture.”93 The critique and pressure on China on the issue of human rights was not unexpected, and the Chinese government and BOCOG were well prepared. They developed a multi-pronged strategy. First, BOCOG could refer the critique on national human rights issues to the Chinese government and would then address how organizing the Games contributed to a better life for Beijing’s citizens.94 Second, spokesmen and the media kept the discussion on a broad and general level and avoided going into concrete details of specific thematic or individual human rights issues. Third, the government and BOCOG made sure that their spokesmen and the Chinese media kept to the same counterarguments. These arguments were based on the government’s White Papers on Human Rights in China and included: (1) China is a developing country and needs more time gradually to develop human rights; (2) China has already made great progress in improving the human rights of its population by improving the population’s living standard (a focus on social and economic rights); and (3) critique on China’s human rights is just a way to politicize the Olympic Games and slur China’s image.95 Furthermore, they emphasized the theme of the People’s Games and Chinese popular support for the Olympics to convey the idea that human rights could not be a big problem; otherwise the Chinese people would not have supported the Olympic bid as enthusiastically as they did. The Torch Relay Crisis Western critique and the anti-Beijing Games movement reached its climax during the Olympic torch relay in spring 2008, a couple of months before the Games would take place. Earlier, BOCOG had made the politically sensitive decision to include Tibet and Taiwan in the Olympic torch relay route across five continents. As things turned out, this politically motivated decision backfired significantly. Shortly after the announcement of the route in 2007, critics blamed it as a trick to legitimize China’s claims over Taiwan and Tibet, and 93  Wang Wei, responding to a question about demonstrations, ninth IOC/BOCOG press conference (August 20 2008), transcript on the official website of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. 94  See, for example the website of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games; or “Beijing Official: Olympic Preparations Boost Human Rights Development,” Xinhua (October 19 2007). 95  “Spokeswoman: China Opposes Politicization of Olympics,” Xinhua (January 15 2008).

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already vowed to boycott and obstruct the relay. Shortly before the start of the torch relay on March 24 2008, riots in Tibet broke out and drew the world’s attention once more to China’s controversial Tibet policies. Tibetan lobby groups gathered wider public support and other lobby groups also benefited from this momentum. What was supposed to be a ‘Journey of Harmony’ became a disastrous torch relay, in particular in Europe. The growing protest movement culminated in a cancellation of the relay in Paris after one of the torchbearers, the Chinese disabled athlete Jin Jing, was assaulted several times by protestors. At that point, the President of the Olympic Committee, Jacques Rogge, called the relay situation a ‘crisis’ for the IOC.96 The Chinese population reacted furiously, accused the French of prosecessionist conspiracy and anti-Chinese racism, and called for a boycott of the French supermarket Carrefour97 and French products in general. There were demonstrations in front of French consulates and the French Embassy in Beijing and French flags were burned. The Chinese government and BOCOG faced the challenge of simultaneously dealing with, and satisfying, domestic and foreign audiences. In other words, China had to maintain stability at home while limiting the damage to its image abroad. This was even more important because, during the same period, several European leaders had not yet publicly announced whether they would attend the Olympic Games’ Opening Ceremony in Beijing, and they were now under pressure to decline Chinese President’s Hu Jintao’s invitation to the opening.98 The French government, however, soon took measures to repair the relationship99 and the Chinese side responded with efforts to calm the domestic situation and channel nationalistic feelings into a less offensive mode. Authorities censured internet messages calling for action against France and French products, and an editorial in the People’s Daily of April 20 2008 urged the Chinese population to “cherish patriotism” but also to express their “patriotic aspiration in an orderly and legal manner.”100 In this case too, however, the Chinese government made a concrete gesture: on April 25 2008, China announced that it would hold talks with an aid to the Dalai Lama. The talks, however, did not lead to any progress. Interestingly, 96  Andrew Jacobs, “Olympic Official Calls Protests a ‘Crisis,’ ” New York Times (April 11 2008). 97  Carrefour’s major shareholder was accused of donating money to Tibet interest groups. 98  See, for example, “Paris Sets Conditions for Sarkozy to Attend Olympics,” Agence France Presse (April 5 2008). 99  Sarkozy sent various emissaries to the Chinese government and conveyed a message of sympathy to athlete Jin Jing. 100  An Lu, “Demonstrations against ‘Tibet Independence’ Continue in Chinese Cities,” People’s Daily (April 20 2008). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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at this point, various Chinese embassies were brought into the game to calm the situation and limit the diplomatic damage. The Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom at the time, Mrs Fu Ying, published a soft-toned letter in The Telegraph, expressing China’s disappointment and shock about Western enmity during the torch relay. Although she accused the West of “demonizing China,” she also admitted that China had many problems, and she ended her letter by assigning China a task: “The world has waited for China to join it. Now China has to have the patience to wait for the world to understand China.”101 In other phases, too, Chinese ambassadors abroad engaged with the media in order to answer international critique in the run-up to the Olympic Games.102 The issue of demonization is a recurrent theme in China’s relations with the West.103 Chinese feelings that the West deliberately puts China in a bad light underscore Chinese feelings of insecurity vis-à-vis the Western world, and highlight differences between reporting by the Western and the Chinese press. Used to the generally positive reporting of the Chinese media, Chinese people find it difficult to understand and accept the Western media’s focus on bad news and problems. In this case, many Chinese also lacked contextual knowledge about why so many people in the world protested against the Olympic Games and the torch relay. Having said that, it is understandable that the Western media’s focus on political problems, and ignorance of China’s broad efforts—including those of the population—to organize the Beijing Olympic Games, created a feeling in China that the West begrudged China the joy of hosting the Games and showing the world its hard-won achievements. Then, just as the anti-Beijing Games movement was gaining steam, a natural disaster struck China: on May 12 2008, a heavy earthquake hit Sichuan province, killing more than 70,000 people and affecting fifteen million people. It inadvertently took attention away from international criticism and to a 101  Fu Ying, “Chinese Ambassador Fu Ying: Western Media has ‘Demonized’ China,” The Telegraph (April 13 2008). 102  “Ambassador Fu Ying: Olympics will be the Start of a Beautiful Relationship between China and the World,” interview with Jon Snow of Channel 4 News, addressing China’s relations with Myanmar, the Tibet issue, and the Olympics (May 12 2008), website of the Chinese Embassy in London, England, at http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/ gdxw/t451543.htm (accessed November 4 2011); and Chinese Ambassador to the US Zhou Wenzhong, “Chinese Ambassador on Quake Disaster, Olympic Protests,” PBS News Hour interview (May 13 2008). For media engagements of the Chinese Ambassador to the Netherlands, Zhang Jun, see “Embassy Events & Notices,” website of the Chinese Embassy in The Hague, The Netherlands, at http://www.chinaembassy.nl (accessed November 4 2011). 103  See, for example, Li Xiguang and Liu Kang, Yaomohua zhongguo de beihou [The Plot to Demonize China] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1996). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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certain extent it changed the international public mood for the better. The effect of the earthquake on China’s beleaguered image will be discussed in chapter seven. The Role of the Chinese Diaspora When China’s image and policies were heavily attacked in the final months before the Beijing Games, the Chinese diaspora104 became extensively involved in events. Nurtured by Chinese-language newspapers, television programs, and online publications and bulletin boards, nationalism has long been on the rise among the Chinese diaspora. Immediately after the riots in Tibet in March 2008, thousands of Chinese people demonstrated in many Western cities against Western media coverage of the Tibet riots. The demonstrations against, and obstruction of, the torch relay in London and Paris mobilized even more Chinese abroad. Many of them felt that China was a victim of foreign humiliation once more. More than 20,000 Chinese Americans participated in a pro-China rally on April 9 2008, when the torch relay reached San Francisco. This encouraged Chinese communities elsewhere, and in the following weeks numerous pro-China and pro-Beijing Games demonstrations took place in cities throughout Europe, North America, Australia, and Asia, including London, Paris (3,000 people), Vienna (1,500 people), Berlin (3,000 people), Brussels, and New York City. The major theme of these demonstrations was condemnation of the Western media bias against China.105 In many cities where the torch passed, pro-China demonstrators by far outnumbered the people demonstrating against China’s human rights situation or Tibet policies, including in Canberra, Nagano, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh City, and Hong Kong.106 Chinese diaspora communities also wrote to newspapers, published comments on websites, including YouTube, and offered public letters to local policymakers calling on the media in the West to “listen to the voice of the Chinese.”107 104  Chinese diaspora refers to: (1) ethnic Chinese with a foreign nationality; (2) Chinese nationals working or living abroad; and (3) Chinese students abroad. 105  Winnie King, “Online Chinese Nationalism toward the European Union,” in Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin (eds), Online Chinese Nationalism and China’s Bilateral Relations (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2010), pp. 177–197, at p. 181. 106  Martin Jacques, “As China’s Power Grows, the Diaspora Starts to Flex its Worldwide Muscle,” The Guardian (June 11 2008). 107  Li Hongmei, “Chinese Diaspora, the Internet, and the Image of China: A Case Study of the Beijing Olympic Torch Relay,” in Wang Jian (ed.), Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 135–155, with the quotes at p. 140. See also Barry Sautman and Li Ying, Public Diplomacy from Below:

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This outpouring of Chinese patriotism abroad was a two-edged sword that may have done China’s image more harm than good.108 The pro-China rallies were often either underreported or exaggerated in order “to imply a perception of the China threat.”109 More damaging, however, was the fact that some Chinese diaspora groups showed intolerance toward critical views of China among their Chinese peers abroad and harassed, for example, any Chinese who denounced China’s Tibet policies. Other Chinese groups became aggressive against anti-China demonstrators, as happened in South Korea, an issue that the Western press was eager to report.110 In many newspaper articles, the Chinese government was viewed as being behind the actions,111 prompting organizing groups to refuse support by Chinese consulates and embassies, and to state publicly that they organized their events independently. It is not clear whether the Chinese government was behind organizing these protest actions by overseas Chinese, as many foreign media suggested, or whether they were spontaneous actions encouraged by the strong nationalist feelings of young overseas Chinese. As Peter Hays Gries points out in his book China’s New Nationalism, Western dismissals of Chinese nationalism as a communist government tool are an oversimplification of reality and ignore the “deep-seated emotional attachments” that Chinese people have to their national identity.112 The Domestic Dimension The messages that China’s Olympic campaign wanted to convey to its domestic audience—the Chinese people—partly overlap with those that it wanted to convey to foreign audiences. The message that China was capable of organizing the world’s biggest sporting event, for example, was as important domestically as it was internationally. The same is true for projection of the image of China as an innovative and technologically advanced country. Other goals of the Olympic campaign, however, were specifically aimed at domestic audiences. The Chinese government wanted its population to feel proud of Chinese The 2008 ‘Pro-China’ Demonstrations in Europe and North America, CDP Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, No. 11 (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press, December 2011). 108  Li Hongmei, “Chinese Diaspora, the Internet, and the Image of China,” pp. 147–149. 109  Li Hongmei, “Chinese Diaspora, the Internet, and the Image of China,” p. 148. 110  See, for example, John Pomfret, “The Ugly Chinese,” in the section Pomfret’s China, of Post Global, Washington Post (May 1 2008), available online at http://newsweek.washington post.com/postglobal/pomfretschina/2008/05/the_ugly_chinese.html. 111   See, for example, “Major Pro-Beijing Rally as Olympic Torch Reaches Australia,” (Australian) Daily Mail (April 24 2008); for more sources, see Sautman and Li Ying, Public Diplomacy from Below. 112  Gries, China’s New Nationalism, pp. 18–19.

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culture, to feel involved in and part of the historic event, to be convinced of the CCP’s leadership role in China, and to accept further integration into the international community. It saw the Olympic Games as an opportunity to improve the quality of life for Beijing citizens, but also to improve the ‘quality of the people’ (renmin suzhi)113 themselves and to help the inhabitants of Beijing to become more civilized, more environmentally aware, and better prepared to interact with foreigners. Two of the most visible programs that contributed to these goals were the education and volunteer programs. The Olympic Charter requires the implementation of an education program by the host country, but China went far beyond the requirements. In 2005 it started implementing the largest ‘Olympic Education’ program ever organized by an Olympic host country.114 BOCOG and the Chinese government organized conferences, provided textbooks, courses and teacher training for schools and universities, produced exhibitions, television and radio shows, magazine and newspaper articles, billboards, and websites. The ‘Olympic Education’ program was seen as an important element of the ‘People’s Olympics,’ but it also served the other two themes—‘Green’ and ‘High-Tech Olympics.’ The education program included environmental knowledge and science. Particular attention was paid to developing youths’ environmental awareness. Many programs and activities were aimed at familiarizing students of all ages with environmental protection concepts, garbage sorting and recycling, and educating them about the protection of wildlife and water sources. A large number of people in China were involved in, and educated about, the Olympic Games via the extensive Beijing Olympic Volunteer Program, which was launched in June 2005.115 The volunteers were regarded as cultural ambassadors who would:

113  The Chinese term renmin suzhi is commonly used in the Chinese discourse on civilization. It refers to moral quality as well as more practical qualities with regard to civilized behavior. 114  Brownell, “Beijing’s Olympic Education Program,” p. 44. According to the Official Olympic Games Report, BOCOG and the Chinese Ministry of Education targeted all of the 400 million youths across China, especially the 230 million primary and middle school students. 115  See “The Beijing Olympic Games and the Olympic Volunteering,” chapter 3 of BOCOG’s handbook; for analysis of the manuals for volunteers, see Jeroen de Kloet, Gladys Pak Lei Chong and Stefan Landsberger, “National Image Management Begins at Home: Imagining the New Olympic Citizen,” in Wang Jian (ed.), Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 117–133.

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[. . .] learn about foreign cultures while serving the athletes and visitors, and help them know about good traditions and customs in China, so more foreign friends will come to know China and fall in love with her.116 The Beijing Olympic volunteers received their own symbol and their own slogans, such as ‘I participate, I contribute and I am happy’ and ‘The smile of the volunteers is the best name card of Beijing.’ The volunteers were essential in carrying out the ‘Welcome to Beijing’ campaign, which started in February 2006, and the ‘Initiative of Smiling Beijing,’ launched on August 8 2006 by the Beijing Volunteer Association and 25 local news and media agencies under the Communist Party Central Committee. It called on all the citizens of Beijing to smile in order to express and promote the concepts of ‘People’s Olympics’ and ‘socialist harmonious society.’117 The volunteers also supported the advertising campaign that was aimed at educating the population of Beijing about the ‘Olympic Ten Dos and Don’ts,’ such as ‘respect Olympic Intellectual Property/don’t trade in counterfeit goods,’ and ‘save the beauty of the city and its surroundings/don’t spit.’118 Advertisements on central and local television addressed topics such as how to be a ‘good sport’ by cheering for others’ teams and how to look after lost foreigners.119 The city’s Spiritual Civilization Office stepped up its campaigns to eliminate spitting, littering, and pushing to enter a bus or train. Each eleventh day of the month was ‘Learn to Queue Day.’120 English-language classes were organized to teach Beijing citizens basic practical English. These classes were primarily meant for people of the so-called ‘window’ industries—taxi drivers, police, Olympic volunteers, and others who would likely come into contact with foreign visitors during the Olympic Games—but were not limited to these groups. Special classes, for example, were also organized for physically disabled and mentally handicapped people.121 By early 2008, more than

116  “The Beijing Olympic Games and the Olympic Volunteering,” p. 102. 117  “The Beijing Olympic Games and the Olympic Volunteering,” p. 99. 118  This campaign was started by BOCOG in late 2007. See Dror Poleg, “Beijing 2008: Ten Commandments for a Civilized Olympics,” DANWEI (December 17 2007). 119  Brady, “The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction,” p. 17. 120  Ross Terrill, “In Beijing, Orwell Goes to the Olympics,” New York Times (August 22 2007). 121  This was part of the “Overall Plan for Citizens Speaking Foreign Languages (2003–2008),” the objective of which was to make most citizens capable of speaking 100 sentences for everyday use in at least one foreign language by the end of 2007. See Olympic Action Plan, X.6, “Language Environment,” website of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games; see also Brady, “The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction,” p. 18.

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40,000 language-learning activities had been organized, involving the participation of more than one million people.122 Citizens were constantly made aware of the upcoming Olympic Games: by their neighborhood and work unit bulletin boards, which would focus on Olympic news, by local-level Olympics-related activities, and by the Olympic countdown clocks that were set up throughout Beijing and the rest of China from autumn 2004 onward. These clocks recorded the number of days, minutes and seconds until the opening of the Games.

Evaluation of the Event

The Beijing Olympic Games were about many things. In addition to sports, they were about China’s rise and integration into the global community, China’s political system and policies, and about the role of the media. For the domestic audience, they were also about China recovering its place in the sun: [. . .] a validation of their nation’s long labors toward international acceptance, a sign that China has overcome the ‘century of humiliation and shame’ to become a full member of the community of nations.123 Hosting the 2008 Olympic Games provided Beijing with an unprecedented opportunity to project a new image of China to global audiences, but at the same time the Games also offered advocacy groups a platform to counter China’s narrative.124 In the years leading up to 2008, China was brought under intensive global scrutiny and the Games thus became a two-edged sword: a major public diplomacy tool for China, but also an international stick to urge the Chinese government to step up its compliance with international norms and values. The description of policies above shows that China went all out to get its Olympics public diplomacy right. Beijing’s Olympic narrative was well considered and corresponded with its general public diplomacy messages. The three Olympic themes (Green, High-tech and People’s Olympics) enabled the Chinese government to address international concerns such as environmental degradation and human rights in a way that was based on their own concepts 122  BOCOG, Official Olympic Games Report, Vol. II, p. 23. 123  Xu Guoqu, Olympic Dreams, p. 6. 124  Monroe E. Price, “On Seizing the Olympic Platform,” in Dayan and Price, Owning the Olympics, p. 91.

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and views. They also allowed China to project the image of a rapidly modernizing and capable country. The slogans of the Olympic Games’ bid (‘New Beijing, Great Olympics’) and of the 2008 Games (‘One World, One Dream’) expressed China’s confidence and pride, and embodied its goal of integrating into the international community. The underlying concepts of ‘harmony,’ ‘harmonious society’ and ‘harmonious world’ conveyed the message that China aimed to contribute to world peace and promoted China’s own, distinct worldview and policies. The Beijing Olympics’ public diplomacy strategy was comprehensive. It contained detailed plans for each aspect of the Olympic Games. These plans were developed and executed by a wide range of domestic actors and, in many cases, in close cooperation with international actors. Domestic players included state and non-state actors from Party and government bodies, and academic, media, cultural and business circles, as well as more than 1.7 million volunteers.125 International actors included PR firms, architects, business leaders, and many individual consultants. BOCOG was in overall command; the role of China’s highest leaders was limited to guaranteeing a sufficient budget and to approving or disapproving major decisions. When confronted with fierce criticism, Beijing managed to de-escalate and or improve the situation. Issues such as translation of the bid’s slogan and the Chinese government’s response to the torch-relay disturbance in Paris show that Beijing was very conscious of the difference between domestic and foreign audiences. BOCOG and the Chinese government used all possible public diplomacy instruments. They paid particular attention to internet communication via the official Olympic website and to the media. The domestic media, which could be told what to publish, was primarily an instrument. The foreign media was primarily a target and one of the most important groups to satisfy. BOCOG therefore made sure that the more than 32,000 journalists and reporters126 who came to China during the Olympic Games were offered good facilities and services. Providing them with freedom of information and news-gathering, however, was a big challenge for the Chinese government. On the one hand, China’s leaders wanted to show the world that they were willing to follow international norms; on the other hand, they were scared to lower the level of control of information. The result was that the rules were not fully implemented. Throughout the preparation phase, but in particular during the period from 2006–2008, BOCOG and the Chinese government had to deal with heavy critique from a wide variety of interest groups, in some cases supported by 125  BOCOG, Official Olympic Games Report, Vol. iii, p. 255. 126  BOCOG, Official Olympic Games Report, Vol. iii, p. 123.

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celebrities. China was prepared for some headwind, but the large number and fierceness of campaigns against the Beijing Games came as a surprise to the Chinese government, and certainly to the Chinese population. The Chinese people, in particular, could not understand why the world did not allow China to rejoice in hosting the Olympic Games. The Chinese government generally reacted calmly to the heavy critique. In many cases, such as over Sudan and the environment, they adopted a constructive attitude and supported their words about improving policies with concrete policy actions. In the Chinese political context, some of these policy initiatives should be considered big steps. This case also shows how much money and effort BOCOG and the Chinese government invested in the domestic dimension of China’s public diplomacy strategy. The Olympic Games were seen as an opportunity not only to improve people’s living conditions, but also their ‘personal quality’ as globally integrated citizens. The first goal was realized by improving infrastructure and the environment in Beijing; the second goal by large-scale educational programs promoting knowledge of the environment, sustainability and the English language. Some scholars and observers see these programs primarily as a form of mass distraction from domestic problems.127 This view, however, ignores the goals of China’s public diplomacy and in particular its domestic outreach, the history of China’s mass education, and the enthusiasm of a large majority of Chinese people for the Olympic Games. The Beijing Games were evaluated in the international press and in reports by several stakeholders and observing organizations, notably the Chinese government and the IOC.128 Most agree that the Games were overall a success. In terms of organization, the event was considered to have been almost perfect, and evaluation of Beijing’s ‘Green Olympics’ goals was also mainly positive. The IOC’s report finds that the active support of the Chinese government and population strongly contributed to the Games’ success and that the efforts of BOCOG to be as transparent as possible were crucial.129 However, BOCOG was unable to provide transparency at all political levels, nor on all issues. Governance issues such as coordination of decision-making by different political bodies, and the full implementation of required policies and regulations, were identified as challenges. The lack of transparency for the ticketing system, sometimes leading to half-empty stadiums, was also mentioned in articles by the foreign press and in the IOC report. 127  Brady, “The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction,” pp. 1–24. 128  The Official Report for the Beijing Olympic Games and the Paralympics (Beijing: BOBICO, August 2010); Official Olympic Games Report; and Final Report of the IOC Coordination Commission: Games of the xxix Olympiad, Beijing 2008 (Lausanne: IOC, 2010), p. 12. 129  Final Report of the IOC Coordination Commission, p. 16. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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Most importantly, in the eyes of most observers, the ‘promise’ by Chinese officials that the Games would help to advance human rights conditions in China was not fulfilled. On the contrary, controls over society were tightened, dissidence was stifled, and demonstrations were prevented, or demonstrators were punished with arrests. Beijing had to be strongly reminded to give the foreign press the promised full access to the World Wide Web. The Chinese government, however, also took a number of positive steps, such as introducing less-restrictive rules for the foreign press, adapting its policies toward Sudan, and improving the environment. These steps not only created a favorable impression abroad, but also increased domestic Chinese awareness of internationally accepted norms and values.130 Analysis The Beijing Olympic Games provided Beijing with the opportunity to present China to more than three billion people around the world via television, or by welcoming them to China. The press generally reported favorably about China’s organization of the Olympic Games and the press facilities, and hailed China’s Olympic architecture and the opening and closing ceremonies. Furthermore, most visitors were impressed by the friendliness of the volunteers in Beijing and other Olympic cities. Gains for China were the strengthening of its image as a powerful, technologically advanced and capable country, and as a country with a rich culture. With regard to normative issues, however, the Olympic legacy provides a mixed bag. The perfect organization and cultural splendor of the Beijing Games dazzled the world, but could not hide the Chinese government’s tight control over society and the lack of full openness. An opinion poll held in late 2008 and early 2009 shows that China’s favorability rate indeed slid after the Games.131 This case study’s various findings indicate an impact of China’s political system on its Olympics public diplomacy. The Chinese government’s control over the domestic media, as described above, enabled the organizers to achieve a high degree of unity of information and messages. They could also count on sufficient domestic publicity, as the Chinese government simply ordered domestic Chinese and English newspapers to publish extensively and only positively about the Olympic Games. The large-scale educational campaigns that were part of the domestic dimension of the Beijing Olympics’ public diplomacy 130  For more on the topic, see Zhu Liqun and Lin Minwang et al., Aoyunhui yu beijing guojihua. 131  BBC World Service Poll conducted by Globescan and PIPA, “Views of China and Russia Decline in Global Poll” (February 6 2009). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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reflect China’s tradition of mass education and illustrate the Chinese government’s access to neighborhood-level communities and schools. Organizing obligatory study sessions on political issues and policies in work units, schools and neighborhoods is common practice in China, and the theme of the Beijing Games was easily incorporated into these study programs. The case furthermore shows how the Chinese political system limited BOCOG’s ability to live up to the expectations of the IOC and the international community about transparency, freedom to protest and freedom of press. While the experience of the Olympic Games led to more understanding of international norms and values, and also to some policy changes, the Chinese government could not go against its own system, in which control of information and suppression of dissent play such important roles. The Chinese government furthermore guaranteed the enormous budget that the organizing committee had at its disposal to organize ‘the best games ever.’ The officially reported expenses of BOCOG are 19.34 billion yuan (approximately US$ 3 billion)132 but Chinese and foreign observers estimate that China spent US$ 42 billion on the Games, including an investment of US$ 20 billion in infrastructure projects and the beautification of Beijing.133 A big part of the budget came from selling broadcasting rights; another considerable part was raised by domestic sponsors, including a large number of Chinese state-owned companies, such as Sinopec, Bank of China, Air China, China Mobile, and the State Grid Corporation.134 There was also an impact from Chinese culture on the Beijing Olympics’ public diplomacy, which emerged in how BOCOG linked Chinese traditional concepts, values and customs with current policies and concepts. This approach was reflected in the design of Beijing’s Olympic slogans, emblems, and in the opening and closing ceremonies. Another aspect of Chinese culture manifested itself in Beijing’s aim for a perfect Olympic Games and for showcasing a perfect image of Beijing. Chinese hospitality means that hosts do their utmost to put their best face forward and provide their guests with the best that they have to offer. Almost every aspect of the Beijing Games was therefore

132  Xinhua, “Chief Auditor: Beijing Olympics’ Profit Exceeds 1 Bln Yuan” (June 19 2009). 133  Geoffrey A. Fowler and Stacy Meichtry, “China Counts the Cost of Hosting the Olympics,” The Wall Street Journal (July 16 2008). 134  There are no figures available about the total amount of financial support from domestic Chinese companies, but more information about the Beijing Games’ sponsorship program can be found in IOC, Marketing Report: Beijing 2008 (Lausanne, Switzerland: IOC, 2008).

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meticulously prepared. Nothing was allowed to tarnish the event, and discussion of problems or mistakes would mean loss of face for Chinese leaders. The widespread involvement of Chinese citizens in the Olympics’ educational and volunteer programs highlights the importance of the domestic dimension of China’s public diplomacy. According to some interlocutors, the willingness of Chinese citizens to become involved partially stemmed from a deeply felt concern about China’s image. The Chinese are proud of what China has achieved in the past three decades and wanted the world to see and acknowledge that. This contributed to the strong role that young overseas Chinese played in defending China and China’s image in the run-up to the Beijing Games. Finally, the development and implementation of extensive proactive as well as reactive public diplomacy strategies provided China with a lot of experience in conducting public diplomacy. This added to China’s understanding of the possibilities and limits of the concept, and it accelerated the development of a large pool of people with public diplomacy knowledge and skills. The exercise forced China to think about its identity, its strengths and weaknesses, and about what image it wanted to project to the world. The Chinese government also became more aware of cultural differences and the lack of understanding on many issues between China and the rest of the world. The engagement of the domestic population turned out to be successful and this strengthened the Chinese government’s idea that renwen diplomacy should be an important element of public diplomacy. The various domestic and international crises that took place in the run-up to the Beijing Games forced the Chinese government to improve its defensive public diplomacy too. Standing in the spotlight with the whole world watching closely, China had to live up to its promises and supported many of its public diplomacy activities with policy changes.

The 2010 Shanghai World Expo

On December 2 2002, one year after Beijing won the bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games, Shanghai won the bid to host the World Expo 2010. World Expositions are international fairs where countries showcase their latest economic, scientific, and cultural developments on a theme determined by the host country.135 A World Expo encourages and facilitates international 135  For more information, see the website of the International Bureau of Expositions (BIE), which organizes World Expositions: http://www.bie-paris.org/ (accessed January 15 2012).

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exchanges and leads to long-term cooperation processes between countries. This was another great opportunity for China to step up its internationalization, present itself to the world, and to broaden and deepen its international engagement and cooperation on topics of urban development and sustainability. The platform for public diplomacy that was offered by the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, however, was very different in character from the one provided by the Beijing Olympic Games. World Expos do not captivate global audiences’ imagination and therefore do not belong to the category of ‘media events,’ as defined by Dayan and Katz.136 Their audience is much smaller, there is less prestige involved, and there are no moments during which the whole world will be watching the event. Hosting a World Expo offers other public diplomacy instruments: long-term cooperation and exchange projects; direct communication and dialogs with a wide variety of international actors and publics; and in-depth exploration of topics of international interest. The public diplomacy platform of a World Expo is shared with many international governments and non-governmental actors and an important part of the host’s public diplomacy goal lies in facilitating foreign actors and helping them to shine during the event. For China, the goals of hosting a World Expo were manifold. Just like the Olympics, the Expo offered China a way to show the world that it is a rapidly transforming country capable of hosting a major global event, and that it seeks further integration with the international community. It also served—as had the Beijing Olympic Games—as an opportunity to boost and speed up the development of a major Chinese city, and to educate the people on issues such as the environment and international cooperation. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called the World Expo an “economic Olympics,” providing Shanghai with an opportunity “to propel the city’s development into an international economic, financial, trade, and shipping center.”137 For Shanghai, the 1930s ‘Paris of the East,’ the Expo was also a rebirth, a return to the position of major world metropolis that it had once held. China and Shanghai therefore wanted the 2010 Shanghai World Expo to surpass all former editions of World Expos. For the participating countries, the Shanghai Expo offered a platform for international dialog and cooperation among industries, scientists, designers, businesses, and officials on the theme of urban development. Furthermore, it was a major public diplomacy opportunity. Many were in particular eager to invest in the Shanghai Expo, as they knew that it would be the largest Expo ever, and they did not want to miss the opportunity of presenting their country 136  Dayan and Katz, Media Events, p. 1. 137  “Wen Jiabao Visits World Expo Shanghai Site,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 6 (2007).

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to the world’s most rapidly rising power. In addition to the public diplomacy aspect of introducing one’s country to the enormous Chinese population—the majority of whom have not yet been able to travel abroad—there was also an important traditional diplomacy consideration. Through their participation, countries wanted to boost their bilateral political and economic relations and show that they were committed to China.138

Winning the Expo Bid

The bidding campaign for the Expo was less extensive than that for the Olympic Games and it drew hardly any international attention. The idea of Shanghai hosting the World Expo dates back to 1984, but it was only in 1998 that the city began preparations for a possible bid.139 In October 1998, the Shanghai Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Commission was asked to undertake research on the feasibility of a bid. In 1999, after the research report—Cities Bidding for the 2010 World Expo—received positive comments from the national and municipal governments, Shanghai Mayor Xu Kuangdi began the formation of a ‘lead team’ and office for Shanghai’s bid for the 2010 World Expo. One year later, in March 2000, the State Council approved the establishment of the 2010 Shanghai World Expo Bid Committee. Contrary to the rules for Olympic Games bidding, World Expo bids are submitted by national governments and not by the municipalities that hope to host them. This regulation suited well China’s view of reserving a strong role for the central government in a possible Shanghai World Expo. China’s central government promised to support Shanghai financially. The Director of the Bid Committee was State Councilor Wu Yi, and the Vice-Chairman was Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council Xu Shaoshi. Shanghai Mayor Xu Kuangdi became team leader of the lead team for Shanghai’s Bid for the 2010 World Expo. The Shanghai Bid Committee chose ‘the city’ as the theme for the Shanghai World Expo, and ‘Better City, Better Life’ as its slogan. They felt that this theme represented “the common wish of the whole humankind for a better living in 138  Wang Yanbing, “Interview with Sue Bishop, British Consul General Shanghai,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 2 (2007); and “Access to World Expo 2010: Interview with ConsulGeneral of Switzerland in Shanghai, Mr William Frei,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 2 (2007). 139  Echo Zhou, “Bidding for the 2010 World Expo: President Zhu and His Colleagues,” The LINK, Vol. 4 (2010).

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future urban environments.”140 In addition to being an issue of international concern, city development was also particularly important for China, which is the most rapidly urbanizing country in the world. Host city Shanghai, with its fifteen million inhabitants, was regarded as a good illustration of the possibilities and challenges of city development. In its proposal and the publicity around it, China emphasized that it would be the first developing country to host a World Expo. This would be inspiring to other developing countries in terms of city-building, as well as in terms of organizing such a big event.141 The Shanghai Bid Committee promised that if its bid was successful, China would provide developing countries aspiring to take part in the Expo with aid in the form of rental, design, and the construction of exhibition halls, transportation of exhibits, and staff accommodation.142 With this policy, China confirmed its role as a leader of the developing world. China furthermore succeeded in winning the sponsorship of major European and American companies, such as Coca-Cola and Siemens. An opinion poll by Gallup showed that China’s population was also supportive: 90 per cent of the Chinese people and 93 per cent of Shanghai residents were positive about hosting the World Expo 2010 in Shanghai.143 The international communications and PR agency Publicis Consultants was hired to work with China on promoting its bid. On January 30 2002, China officially submitted its bid to the International Bureau of Expositions (BIE). The bid committee’s final presentation portrayed Shanghai as an international metropolis where east meets west and where tradition meets modernity. The accompanying promotional movie was directed by Zhang Yimou, who had also been responsible for the Olympic Games’ ceremonies. On December 3 2002, China won the majority of votes of the 89 member countries of the BIE and was announced as host of the 2010 World Expo. The news was modestly celebrated throughout China and on the streets of Shanghai.

140  Official website of the Shanghai 2010 World Expo: http://en.expo2010.cn/a/20081119/ 000001.htm (accessed January–February 2012). 141  See, for example, “Shanghai, Best Choice to Host World Expo 2010: Chinese Ambassador,” Xinhua (November 26 2002). 142  “Foreigners Back Shanghai’s World Expo Bid,” Xinhua (August 12 2002). 143  “China Confident in Success of Shanghai Expo 2010: Chinese FM,” Xinhua (August 12 2002).

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Organizational Aspects From the beginning, many national-level government organizations were involved in developing and executing Expo plans. The leading body was the Shanghai World Expo National Organizing Committee, which was headed by Vice-Premier Wu Yi, who had much experience in international relations and was generally well liked abroad for her pragmatic approach. The Committee’s Deputy Directors included: Mayor of Shanghai Han Zheng; Chairperson of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) Wan Jifei; Vice-Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng; Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Cui Tiankai; and Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council Xiang Zhaolun.144 This strong and high-level representation from the central government emphasized the importance that China’s leaders attached to the World Expo. It also ensured that the benefit of this event would not be limited to Shanghai. The 29 ‘members’ of the Committee included major Party and government stakeholders, including the Publicity Department of the CCP and the Chinese Ministry of Culture. The Shanghai World Expo Executive Committee was responsible for specific functions delegated by the National Organizing Committee. Its Director was Shanghai Mayor Han Zheng, and the Executive Director was Chairperson of the CCPIT Wan Jifei, both of whom were also members of the National Committee.145 The long list of ‘members’ included major local Communist Party departments, such as the Publicity Department, the Shanghai Economic Commission, Shanghai Foreign Affairs Office, and the Shanghai Information Office.146 The Bureau of the Shanghai World Expo Coordination was the main organizer. It consisted of eight bureaus and dealt with all of the day-to-day work.147 Finally, the Expo General Deputy of the Chinese Government took care of direct international liaison with the World Expo.148 144  Official website of the Shanghai Expo. 145  An important task of CCPIT was to invite countries with which China had not established diplomatic ties and inter-governmental organizations. See “Work Together for the International Participation Invitation of Expo Shanghai,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 2 (2007). 146  For a complete list, see the official website of the Shanghai World Expo. 147  The eight departments were: office; liaison department; PR department; market development department; construction and coordination department; HR planning department; accounting planning department; and the legal affairs department. 148  Official website of the Shanghai World Expo.

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The role and responsibility of the central government in hosting the Shanghai Expo were emphasized in many speeches by central government leaders. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and Vice-President Xi Jinping pointed out that: Expo Shanghai will be held by China but undertaken by Shanghai. [. . .] This positioning should be clear. Expo Shanghai itself is a messenger, while Shanghai, being the contractor of Expo Shanghai, is a ‘window,’ which ultimately displays the entire country’s image. Indeed the strength of Shanghai is founded upon the power of the entire country [. . .] The assessment of the success of Expo Shanghai will be linked to the national strategy, national decision-making, and its contribution to the country.149 Throughout the years of preparation, China’s government and Party leaders regularly visited Shanghai to be updated about work on the Expo. The organizers set ambitious goals for the Shanghai World Expo, which was to become “the most successful, splendid, and unforgettable World Expo in the history of the event.”150 They hoped to attract about 200 countries and international organizations to participate in the exhibition, as well as 70 million visitors from home and abroad. Both numbers would be record-breaking.151 In order to attain these goals, the organizers developed an extensive strategy for promoting the Shanghai Expo at home and abroad. They also wanted to ensure that all major countries and organizations would be represented at the Shanghai Expo. When the United States was not yet on board at the end of summer 2008, China sent a high-level delegation to the United States to encourage US participation in the Shanghai Expo.152 Policies World Expos are no longer very popular. Nowadays many people travel all over the world, and world expos have little new to offer them. Drawing the international community’s attention to the event therefore turned out to be a challenge. A 2004 “Intention Survey across Nine Countries and Regions,” 149  “Interview of Xi Jinping by State Press,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 9 (2007). 150  “Shanghai Wins Bid for World Expo 2010,” Xinhua (December 3 2002). 151  The official website of World Expo Shanghai 2010. 152  The delegation, led by Vice-Director-General of the Expo Bureau Zhou Hanmin, met with Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in Washington, DC, on September 16 2008; see “Further Strengthen Overseas Promotion of Expo 2010 Launched,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 10 (2008).

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which was ordered by the Expo organizers, showed that general awareness of Expo 2010 in the foreign countries surveyed was only 17 per cent. A similar domestic survey across 46 Chinese cities in 2006 showed that almost 99.7 per cent of the people in Shanghai were aware of the Expo but that the general range in other Chinese cities lay between 66 and 69 per cent.153 In order to increase the significance of the World Expo, the organizers tried to link the event as much as possible to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. In May 2009, for example, about 30 Beijing Olympic torchbearers gathered in Shanghai to call on people to become Expo volunteers.154 The organizers furthermore developed a detailed communication and promotion plan.155 According to this plan, the main tasks of communication and promotion were: attracting visitors, participants, global partners and sponsors; promoting Expo themes and values; promoting Chinese values and supporting the Chinese government in establishing the image of China in the twentyfirst century; adapting the strategy and execution plans to different national and international audiences, targets, and phases; and obtaining maximum global awareness of the Shanghai Expo 2010. The Plan called for adherence to the ‘One Brand, One Identity’ principle, meaning “consistent messages everywhere and consistent visuals everywhere,” and divided the communication and promotion channels into four types: (1) activities and special events; (2) PR via national and international events such as sports games, other expos, or industry activities; (3) media relations; and (4) production of environmentally friendly information materials. The plan also identified five phases in conducting Expo public diplomacy, each with its own objective: improving awareness; raising interest; calling for participants; reinforcing the image; and, after the Expo, establishing continuity. These phases were further adapted for each type of audience. As far as domestic publicity is concerned, it was noted that “Policies and laws in China prescribe that the media are obligated to place public welfare advertisements. Advertising for the World Expo belongs to that category.”156

153  The Bureau of Shanghai World Expo Coordination, “World Expo 2010 Shanghai China Communication & Promotion Plan,” p. 2. The international survey was conducted by AC Nielson, the domestic one by the State Statistics Bureau. 154  Hill & Knowlton Shanghai, Expo Express, No. 19 (May 26 2009). 155  The Bureau of Shanghai World Expo Coordination, “World Expo 2010 Shanghai China Communication & Promotion Plan.” 156  The Bureau of Shanghai World Expo Coordination, “World Expo 2010 Shanghai China Communication & Promotion Plan,” p. 19.

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The part on foreign publicity reveals that attracting visitors was a priority. Because of the expected costs of overseas media campaigns, activities focused on selected regions and countries. European and American ‘travel habit factors’—such as making tourism plans in advance—were taken into account: the promotion of overseas ticket sales would be ahead of sales promotions in China. The World Expo 2008 in Zaragoza was regarded as a major opportunity to promote the Shanghai Expo and, as described below, all other possible means were used to draw attention to the 2010 event. The publicity channels explicitly mentioned include the Expo Forum, business networks, foreign tours through sister-city alliances, and tourism fairs. Much was also invested in promotion materials for foreigners. The plan furthermore paid much attention to evaluation and to publicity tasks after the Shanghai Expo. In this so-called ‘continuity phase,’ the Expo organizers should (1) continue to call “on the whole society to build a better future together;” (2) extend thanks to the participants paying attention to the after-use of the Expo site; (3) cooperate with sponsors in the after-use of the Expo site; and (4) continue to use the media center to supply a variety of services to the media. Chinese embassies worldwide did their part in promoting the Expo in the host country,157 and during their visits home, Chinese ambassadors were invited by the Expo organizers to visit the Expo site and receive an update about the preparations and plans for the event. Chinese President Hu Jintao also shone his light again on how to conduct good Expo public diplomacy. During an inspection tour of the World Expo terrain in Shanghai, he said that Expo public diplomacy could be summed up in four points: (1) do a good job of receiving foreign high-level guests and foreign visitors, displaying China’s warm hospitality and expressing China’s openness and harmonious progress; (2) make sure information and publicity work is carried out effectively [. . .]; (3) promote mutual understanding and friendship between Chinese people and peoples across the world by promoting economic and cultural exchanges and exhibiting Chinese history and achievements, in particular those of the 30 years of reform and opening-up; (4) transform the intangible resources brought about by the 157  See, for example, the speeches and activities by Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom Liu Xiaoming (and before him Ambassador Fu Ying) at the website of the Chinese Embassy in London; the same for Chinese Ambassador to the Netherlands Zhang Jun at the website of the Chinese Embassy in The Hague; and many other Chinese embassies in the world.

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Expo into promoting economic and social development and promoting the world economic recovery.158 The Expo’s organizers furthermore hired foreign PR expertise. In April 2009, at a time when “the preparation and public relations service for Expo 2010 entered a crucial stage,” Publicis Consultants became the official press and public relations agency for the World Expo 2010. Among other things, Publicis managed press relations abroad and started a blog on the Expo called “Expo Insights.”159 Hill & Knowlton also did PR work for the World Expo 2010,160 and Ogilvy PR Beijing was hired by China’s top internet services provider, Tencent, to manage all of its Shanghai Expo media communications in 2010.161 Shanghai Expo Narrative: Slogan and Themes The slogan of the 2010 Shanghai World Expo was the same as the bid slogan: ‘Better City, Better Life.’ In May 1999, while conceiving of bidding for World Expo 2010, the Shanghai municipal government had already begun to ponder over the theme’s selection and presentation. A large number of domestic and foreign experts were involved in the process. Contrary to the case of the Beijing Olympics’ slogan, the study group started with the English version of the Expo slogan, so that there would be no translation issues.162 As sub-themes, they chose: the blending of diverse cultures; economic prosperity; innovations of science and technology; the remodeling of the city’s communities; and interaction between urban and rural areas. Via these sub-themes, the Expo 2010 aimed to “create blueprints for future cities and harmonious urban lifestyles.”163 Here, again, the concepts of ‘harmonious society’ and sustainability played important roles, together with the underlying aims of the inclusive growth and modernization of cities.

158  Speech by Hu Jintao, made during his visit to Shanghai to inspect Expo preparations, as summarized in Yang Jiemian, Zhongguo shibo waijiao, p. 175. 159  Matt Eaton, “Shanghai 2010 Expo Expands PR Roster,” Marketing-interactive.com (April 22 2009). 160  They published, for example, the Expo Express, a news monitor of the Shanghai Expo; see Hill & Knowlton, “News Release” (April 9 2009). 161   See the website of Ogilvy at http://www.ogilvy.com/News/Press-Releases/May2010-Ogilvy-PR-Awarded-Tencent-QQcom-Shanghai-Expo-Assignment.aspx (accessed January 17 2012). Tencent was in particular focused on internet promotion of the Expo. 162  “China’s Choice: The Whole Story about the Naissance of the Theme for Expo 2010,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 3 (2008). 163  The official website of the Shanghai World Expo.

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The Expo was supposed to display the great achievements of China’s reform and opening up to the world, establish an international image of peaceful development, and improve friendly cooperation with other countries. Furthermore, it had to exhibit China’s great civilization and enriched culture, strengthen external cultural exchange, and facilitate social development. The Expo should, through various means and methods, contribute to answering three questions: what kind of city will make people’s lives better?; what kind of lifestyle will make the city more harmonious and better?; and what kind of development mode for the city will make the globe better and more harmonious?164 More generally, China wanted to show that real change was happening in China’s urban development, and it hoped that the Expo would have an impact on international policymaking in urban strategy and sustainable development.165 Although less on the forefront than in the run-up to the Olympic Games, the organizers were also committed to a ‘Green Expo.’ They aimed to minimize the negative environmental impacts of the Expo, showcase ‘green’ solutions for a sustainable future, and make the city ‘greener.’ Just as in the case of the Olympic Games, China put much effort into creating an emblem that captured both the spirit of the event and China’s culture. The organizers chose an emblem that depicts three people holding hands, symbolizing the big family of mankind, and has the shape of the Chinese character shi (世), meaning ‘world’ (see Illustration 3 below). The latter aspect conveyed China’s wish to host an Expo that “is of global scale and which showcases the diversified urban cultures of the world.”166 In early 2007, the Expo’s organizers started a worldwide solicitation for the Expo’s mascot. The result was a blue figure called Haibao, meaning ‘Jewel of the Sea.’ The form of the mascot was based on the character ‘ren’ (人), meaning ‘people’ (see Illustration 4 above). The idea behind it was that “as long as people worldwide support each other, human beings coexist among themselves and with nature and society, a better life will be seen throughout the city.” The color and design of the mascot represents water, as water is the source of life. The unveiling of the mascot, however, sparked controversy, as people claimed that it looked very much like an American cartoon from the 1950s called Gumby. Another claim came from a Chinese company called Xinxiang Haibao 164   “Deeply Implementing the Scientific Outlook on Development: Comprehensively Facilitating the Preparation Works of Expo Shanghai,” interview with Zhong Yanqun, Standing Deputy Director of the Shanghai Expo Executive Committee, Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 11 (2007). 165  Institute of Cultural Diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy Outlook Report. Country Profiles: China (Berlin, Germany: Institute of Cultural Diplomacy, 2011). 166  The official website of the Shanghai Expo. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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illustration 3 The Shanghai Expo Emblem  s ource: official website of the Shanghai World Expo 2010.

illustration 4 The Shanghai Expo Mascot source: official website of the Shanghai World Expo 2010.

Electrical Appliance Co., which said that it looked like the company’s mascot and, moreover, that it carried the same name.167 The company, however, was happy with the free publicity. The designer and the Expo Commission maintained that the design was original. Whether the mascot was original or not, it never caught on, and was often ridiculed by the Chinese population as well as foreign reporters. Actors and Tools The Shanghai 2010 World Expo National Organizing Committee set up three leadership teams, which coordinated communications and the promotion of Expo 2010: the national-level Publicity/Media Relations Leadership team, led

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by the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee; the municipallevel Activity Promotion Leadership team, led by the Publicity Department of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee; and the national-level Tourism Promotion Leadership team, led by the National Tourism Administration.168 This division of labor again illustrates the strong involvement of national-level authorities. The organizers used a wide variety of public diplomacy instruments to promote the Expo and project an Expo-related image of China. They organized ‘Shanghai Weeks’ in major cities around the globe, which they tried to link as much as possible to captivating local events or ideas targeted at the general public. In order also to draw urbanization specialists, the Shanghai Weeks often included expert seminars on Expo theme-related topics.169 In Japan, an important target country for China’s Expo public diplomacy, the Shanghai Weeks were closely linked with the 2005 Aichi World Exposition in Japan. Under the title “World Expos: From Aichi to Shanghai,” the organizers had an eight-car train, the “Expo Express,” painted with the Expo logo and emblem, and decorated with 320 pictures featuring Shanghai. In London, the 2009 “Exciting Shanghai, Splendid Expo 2010—Shanghai Week” coincided with the opening of an exhibition of Chinese jade and bronze masterpieces in the British Museum. The London program included a series of seminars and exhibitions to showcase the city of Shanghai and promote Shanghai Expo themes.170 In San Francisco, the Expo Committee used the opportunity of the 30th anniversary of the sister-cities’ relationship between Shanghai and San Francisco to promote the Shanghai Expo at the year-long cultural festival “Shanghai Celebration.”171 This is just one example of how the organizers made use of Shanghai’s more than 65 sister-city relationships172 in its public diplomacy strategy. Shanghai invited many sister-cities’ mayors to visit the city during the Expo and promote their cities on the Expo grounds,173 or to set up their 168  The Bureau of Shanghai World Expo Coordination, “World Expo 2010 Shanghai China Communication & Promotion Plan,” p. 32. 169  “Shanghai Week Kicks Off in London,” EXPO Express, No. 3 (Shanghai: Hill & Knowlton, February 17 2009). 170  “A Dialog across Time and Space,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 3 (2009). 171  See the website of Shanghai Celebration at http://shanghaicelebration.com/; and http:// sanfrancisco.about.com/od/sfevents/qt/San-Francisco-Shanghai-Celebrate-Sisterhood. htm (both accessed February 6 2012). 172  Website of the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Office at http://www.shfao.gov.cn/wsb/english/ Sister_Cities/index.html. 173  For example, for Chicago, see Chen Weihua, “Chicago Mayor will Promote his ‘Windy’ Sister-City in Shanghai,” China Daily (September 13 2010); or for Osaka, see the website

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own city pavilion.174 The city furthermore hosted the 2010 China International Friendship Cities Conference in Shanghai during the Expo, thus boosting the number of foreign visitors.175 In Russia, the “Year of China in Russia” was used as a vehicle to promote the Shanghai Expo. In March 2010, the China National Tourism Office promoted the Shanghai Expo with enormous billboards at Times Square in New York City.176 The Expo’s organizers also used the 2008 Sinopec F1 Chinese Grand Prix in Shanghai to promote the event. F1 Grand Prix races draw a steady audience of 600 million worldwide and more than 100 million in China.177 During this event, the Shanghai Expo emblem, mascots, and slogan were displayed throughout the track. Another special way of globally promoting the event was through a China Eastern Airlines plane, which was painted with the slogan and emblem of the Shanghai Expo.178 Internationally renowned stars—such as Hong Kong film star Jackie Chan, Shanghai Born NBA star Yao Ming, and Chinese pianist Lang Lang—were appointed as promotion ambassadors for the Expo.179 The Expo’s organizers also invited hundreds of celebrities worldwide to compose goodwill messages for the Expo, to be published on the Expo’s website. The messages covered a range of topics such as international cooperation, the global economy, scientific innovations, and the Expo’s philosophy. The authors were political leaders, mayors of sister-cities, entrepreneurs from international corporations, heads of international organizations, Nobel Prize winners, and celebrities in economics, culture, academia, and sport. They included former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder; former President of the Republic of Korea and the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize winner Kim Dae-Jung; of the Office of the Mayor of Osaka at http://www.city.osaka.lg.jp/contents/wdu020/ seisakukikakushitsu/international/world/sister_cities.html#shanghai. 174  For example, for Rotterdam, see “Rotterdam to Show its Below-Sea-Level Creativity,” website of the Expo at http://www.china.org.cn/travel/expo2010shanghai/2010-01/18/ content_19257348.htm. 175  “Experts Discuss City Development at International Sister-City Meeting,” The People’s Daily (September 8 2010). 176  “Billboard Promoting Expo Appears at Time Square,” China Daily (March 4 2010); for more examples of cultural events in major cities around the globe, see Tang Xiaosong, “Cong shibohui kan zhonguo fangyuxing gonggomg waijiao” [China’s Defensive Public Diplomacy as Reflected in the World Expo], GGWJJK (Public Diplomacy Quarterly), No. 2 (summer 2010), pp. 27–33, at p. 30. 177  “Expo 2010 Picking up ‘Express F1’ in Global Publicity,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 11 (2008). 178  Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 3 (2006). 179  Hill & Knowlton Shanghai, Expo Express, No. 16 (May 5 2009).

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Mayor of London Boris Johnson; HSBC Chairman Stephen Green; China’s first astronaut Yang Liwei; and Grammy and Oscar-winning composer Tan Dun. English-language publications such as the monthly Expo Newsletter and Shanghai Expo Magazine, covering the Expo’s preparation process, were provided to World Expo participants, participating organizations, consulates in Shanghai, and overseas media in Shanghai in electronic and paper versions. Furthermore, the organizers regularly updated the press via public briefings. Numerous English-language books on the Expo were published, 73 of which were on display at the Frankfurt International Book Fair in October 2009. Various promotional videos introduced the Shanghai Expo, its emblem, the mascot, and the Expo terrain to the world. They were shown all over the world in shops, office buildings, and Chinese embassies, at billboards in major global cities, and during flights. The State Council Information Office also teamed up with the Discovery Channel to shoot a television documentary about preparations for the Expo.180 The Expo’s organizers furthermore produced a 52episode cartoon about the Expo’s mascot, Haibao, to be telecast on about 200 channels worldwide.181 China’s central government, as well as the Expo’s organizers in Shanghai, worked hard to mobilize the domestic and international media to support the Expo. As early as May 2006, the Information Office of the State Council organized a group of reporters from domestic and overseas news organizations to visit Shanghai to cover preparations for the 2010 Expo.182 A year later, the Department of Publicity of the CPC Central Committee organized a domestic press corps consisting of dozens of journalists, and selected provincial and municipal media to make a special trip to Shanghai for a six-day interview program. The goal of this program was to promote awareness of Expo 2010 in China and to call upon the whole country to participate in hosting the Expo actively.183 Many newspapers were ‘encouraged’ to create special columns or pages for news about the Expo. The overseas edition of the People’s Daily, for example, included ‘Expo Shanghai Special Pages’ in its paper. In December 2009, at the Expo Media Summit, more than 50 media organizations formed

180  Hill & Knowlton Shanghai, Expo Express, No. 19 (May 26 2009). 181  Hill & Knowlton Shanghai, Expo Express, No. 34 (2009); “Animation Series ‘Coming Haibao,’ ” CRIEnglish.com (September 1 2009). 182  “World Media in Shanghai to Cover Preparation for Expo Shanghai,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 4 (2006). 183  “Attention to Expo 2010 Shanghai China by the Nationwide Media,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 4 (2007).

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an Expo-reporting alliance. The organizers said that “media are key participants of the Expo and have obligations to help run the Expo well.”184 The Shanghai Expo ‘Pillars’ The Shanghai Expo offered China much more diverse opportunities for long-term image projection via in-depth cooperation than the Olympics had done. The organizers established three so-called ‘pillars’ of the Shanghai Expo: exhibitions; forums; and cultural events. Within these pillars, cooperation with foreign stakeholders—officials, businessmen, NGO representatives, and academics—took place on an almost daily basis. The exhibitions formed the largest pillar. All participants, or in some cases groups of participants, were allotted space to build a pavilion in which their countries, companies and cultures could be promoted. The Chinese Pavilion was the centerpiece of the Shanghai World Expo and China’s visiting card: one of the key instruments to represent China’s national spirit and Chinese philosophy. The Chinese pavilion was the biggest one, towering over the Expo’s terrain. Its roof of interlocking wooden brackets referred to ancient Chinese architecture dating back more than 2,500 years. According to the official Expo website, the design, which was solicited from Chinese architects around the world, was “based on the concept of ‘Oriental Crown, Splendid China, Ample Barn, and Rich People’ to express the spirit and disposition of Chinese culture.”185 The exposition inside the pavilion was themed ‘Chinese Wisdom in Urban Development.’ The theme was further defined into four categories based on adages of Chinese classical works: “make unremitting efforts for self-improvement;” “a gentle man must constantly cultivate virtue in himself to shoulder the world;” “nature is the most important guideline;” and “harmony combined with divergence.”186 In view of the budget and the time that China could spend on designing its pavilion, many felt that the exhibition inside the pavilion disappointed and did not succeed well in expressing the above themes.187 China also built five themed pavilions188 to form bridges between the host, participants, and visitors by promoting the Expo’s theme

184  Hill & Knowlton Shanghai, Expo Express, No. 45 (December 2009). 185  “Pavilion Archive,” website of the Shanghai World Expo. 186  “Image of China: China Pavilion Presents the Wisdoms of Chinese People,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 3 (2008). 187  Conversations with various European visitors, and author’s impression. 188  The City Dwellers; The City; Urban Planet; Urban Civilization; and Urban Future.

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messages.189 The organizers furthermore introduced two new features to the World Expo: Expo Shanghai Online; and the Urban Best Practices Area. Shanghai Expo Online provided an interactive experience of the World Expo for all those who would not be able to visit the physical exhibition.190 The Urban Best Practices Area of the Shanghai World Expo offered 30 cities from all over the world the opportunity to demonstrate their best practices and cases in the area of urban development.191 The second pillar, the Expo Forums, was regarded as an important public diplomacy tool. The forums served as “venues for intellectual discussions and debates with regard to sustainable urban development,” and they enabled “participants to contribute to progress in sustainable urban development through their active presence.”192 The Expo’s organizers also saw the forum meetings as a platform “for presenting China’s achievement, explaining China’s conceptions, and expanding China’s influence.”193 There were three types of forums: six themed forums; a series of public forums; and one ‘Summit Forum.’ The more than 60 public forums took place throughout China, Hong Kong, and Macao between April 2009 and April 2010. The organizers expected to attract around 100,000 visitors to the public forums, but they did not succeed, and this tool was therefore less successful than expected.194 The more technical themed forums were held during the Shanghai Expo in six major Chinese cities, and they drew high-level officials, Nobel laureates, and CEOs of relevant companies from all over the world.195 Finally, the Summit Forum, on the theme of ‘Urban Innovation and Sustainable Development,’ took place in Shanghai on the last day of the Expo, October 31 2010, and was attended by some heads of state and by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. At 189  For more on the ideas behind the themed pavilions, see “Experience the Concepts: Expatiate on the Theme Pavilions for Expo 2010,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 3 (2008). 190  “Expo Shanghai Online: A Never Ring Down Exposition,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 8 (2007). 191  “Gathering Thirty Best Cases Worldwide: Building an Urban Best Practices Area for Expo 2010,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 8 (2007). 192  Official Website of the Shanghai Expo. 193  Li Weijian, “Shibo gonggong waijiao pingxi” [Comments on World Expo Public Diplomacy], Waijiao, No. 3 (2010). 194  Li Weijian, “Shibo gonggong waijiao pingxi.” 195  The six cities and themes were: Ningbo (Information and Communication Technology (ICT), and Urban Development); Suzhou (Cultural Heritage and Urban Regeneration); Wuxi (Science and Technology Innovation, and the Urban Future); Nanjing (Toward a Low-Carbon City: Environmental Protection and Urban Responsibilities); Shaoxing (Economic Transformation and Urban–Rural Relations); and Hangzhou (Harmonious Cities and Liveable Life). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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the end of the Summit Forum, a ‘Shanghai Declaration’ was issued. The organizers hoped that the document, which calls for cities to “establish harmony between diverse cultures, between development and environment, between cultural legacies and future innovation,” would not only acknowledge the achievements of the Shanghai Expo, but also help to shape the future of global society.196 Within China, officials and the media regularly refer to the lessons that can be learned from the Shanghai Expo.197 Finally, the cultural events pillar encompassed over 20,000 performances and activities held before and during the Shanghai Expo at 32 public venues inside and outside the Expo site. The purpose of these cultural events was to promote the Expo’s theme, enliven the atmosphere, and help with crowd control. During the six months of the Shanghai World Expo (from May 1 to October 31 2010), more than 73 million visitors attended,198 and there were many opportunities to draw the public’s attention to the Shanghai Expo messages through its cultural events. One such event was the Opening Ceremony, which took place on April 30 2010 at the Expo Cultural Center. It featured 2,300 performers, including internationally renowned stars such as Hong Kong movie actor Jackie Chan, Chinese concert pianist Lang Lang, and Italian opera singer Andrea Bocelli. Attending world leaders included French President Nicolas Sarkozy, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. After the indoor ceremony, an outdoor show began along the Huangpu River with dazzling fireworks, Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy,” and a flotilla of boats carrying the national flags of participating countries floating through brightly lit, colored LED balls. An Expo song was played, written by American Quincy Jones and Chinese classical composer Tan Dun, using words in the Shanghainese dialect, and a huge screen displayed the character for peace. In terms of engagement with foreign professionals and academics during the months of the Expo, the many seminars and cultural events organized by foreign participants in their national pavilions played an important role.199 China’s active participation in the seminar “The Hague: International City of 196  “Ban, Wen Attend Summit to Bid Farewell,” website of the Shanghai Expo (October 31 2010). 197  See, for example, Cai Jianguo, “Zhiliao ‘chengshi bing’ ke xue shanghai shibo jingyan” [In Treating ‘Urban Disease’ We Can Learn from the Experience of the Shanghai World Expo], Xinhua (March 3 2011). 198  National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Statistical Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China on the 2010 National Economic and Social Development” (February 28 2011), part IX. 199  See, for example, Cai Jianguo, “Yi shibohui wei pingtai, dali tuijin gonggong waijiao he min­ jian waijiao” [Vigorously Promote Public Diplomacy and People’s Diplomacy with the Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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Peace And Justice,” which was organized by Dutch participants in the Expo, for example, should be considered acts of both Chinese and Dutch public diplomacy. Both sides conveyed the message that they were willing to hold a dialog on a theme that could touch upon sensitive issues. Dealing with International Criticism and Controversies As World Expos draw far less international attention than Olympic Games, China faced less scrutiny with regard to the Shanghai World Expo. As a consequence, there was hardly any international criticism. The issue that drew the most international attention was the forced relocation of an estimated 18,000 families that lived at or near the Expo site. The families allegedly received minimal compensation. They were not allowed to protest their eviction, and reporters were stopped from interviewing the families.200 The authorities’ official view was that these residents’ lives had improved, as they were rehoused in larger housing than they had before.201 Another issue concerned the suspicion of plagiarism of Expo symbols. In addition to the claims, discussed above, that the Expo mascot was not an original design, the official Expo 30-day countdown song turned out to be almost identical to a hit Japanese song from 1997. The song was withdrawn and, according to Japanese newspapers, the Expo’s organizers paid US$ 3.2 million to the Japanese singer.202 These claims confirmed perceptions of China as a country of plagiarism and piracy. There was some criticism of Expo arrangements during the soft opening of the World Expo. The test days were plagued by endless queues, as the security check system could not deal with the crowds, and food services turned out to be insufficient. These problems were largely solved, however, by the time that the Expo officially opened its doors. The Shanghai Expo’s huge budget also drew negative comments. The official budget was US$ 4.2 billion,203 but if all the newly built subway lines, railway, and air terminals in Shanghai are included, China reportedly spent World Expo as Platform], Gonggong waijiao jikan [Public Diplomacy Quarterly], No. 2 (summer 2010), pp. 19–27. 200  United Nations Watch, Joint NGO Appeal for 18,000 Victims of Forced Evictions by 2010 Shanghai World Expo (July 22 2010). 201  According to official reports, the average living area of these residents before the relocation was only 30 square meters; after relocation they would get an average of 75 square meters; see “Interview of Xi Jinping by State Press,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 9 (2007). 202  “Shanghai Expo Pays $3.2 Million for Plagiarized Japanese Song,” The Epoch Times (May 20 2010). 203  Li Shen, “Shanghai Expo Trial Operations and Budget Rumors,” China.org (March 11 2010). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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US$ 58 billion on the Expo.204 While some people thought that the money could have been better spent, others argued that the largely domestic investments in the Expo served as a good stimulus program for the Chinese economy and did greatly improve Shanghai’s infrastructure and public transportation. The Role of the Chinese Diaspora Shanghai Expo’s organizers identified the overseas Chinese population as a target group, as well as an instrument for the Expo’s public diplomacy. The overseas Chinese were expected to play a key role in publicizing and supporting the World Expo. In order to strengthen cooperation with this group, the Bureau of Shanghai World Expo Coordination and the Shanghai Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) organized a conference on the theme of ‘Focus on the World Expo, Propagate the World Expo, and Support the World Expo’ in December 2005. Participants included representatives of overseas Chinese associations from 25 countries and regions, and over 100 overseas Chinese or ethnic Chinese professionals who had established enterprises and were seeking development in Shanghai.205 In order to promote the World Expo globally, this group got its own press center in the offices of the Bureau of Shanghai World Expo Coordination. The press center provided free in-depth Exporelated stories or pages to overseas Chinese press companies.206 Organizations of overseas Chinese communities in many countries answered the call for support and organized local activities to increase awareness or to raise money for the Shanghai Expo.207 The national and Shanghai municipal OCAOs organized various activities for overseas Chinese, including the ‘Overseas Chinese Businesspeople Return Home to See Expo and Seek Business Opportunities’ event, an exhibition of global Chinese paintings, an interviewing week for overseas Chinese media, a global Chinese artists’ concert, and a summer camp for overseas Chinese youth. The corresponding theme of these activities during the Expo was ‘enjoying days in the Shanghai Expo and sharing opportunities.’ The first group that visited the Expo in May 2010 consisted of leaders of overseas Chinese 204  Ben Blanchard and Farah Master, “China Puts Power on Show at Shanghai Expo,” Reuters (April 29 2010); Keith B. Richburg, “Shanghai Prepares World’s Fair while Wondering about Costs,” The Washington Post (April 19 2010). 205  Dai Qian, “The Focus of Overseas Chinese on the 2010 Shanghai World Expo,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 1 (2006). 206  “Scoop for China News Service,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 5 (2007). 207  See, for example, “Expo Float to Run in LA’s Upcoming Rose Parade,” Expo Express, No. 24 (2009); “Overseas Chinese in US Deliver Support for Expo 2010,” China.org.cn (January 20 2010); and “Overseas Chinese in Australia Share Expo Joy,” website of the Shanghai World Expo. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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associations, businesspeople, technicians, artists and cultural professionals, and young people. In a speech on this occasion, Shanghai’s Mayor Han Zheng called the Expo “a grand reunion of all Chinese people.”208 Overseas Chinese were also regarded as good cultural ambassadors for the Shanghai Expo after the event had closed, and as possible financial contributors for the use of the venues after the Expo.209 The Domestic Dimension The Shanghai World Expo was even more suitable for the conduct of public affairs than the Olympic Games had been. The Expo’s six-month duration made it easy to create numerous opportunities for public involvement. Furthermore, the Chinese authorities regarded the Expo’s goal—improving city life—as much more than a theme for the event. They wanted to improve city life in China—and in particular in Shanghai—in practice. In order to achieve that goal, they needed to educate citizens. The following quote illustrates the view of the Expo’s initiators and organizers on the mobilization of citizens for the Shanghai Expo: [The mobilization] should be translated into the procedures for citizens to care more about their own city’s development and care more about public welfare establishments. In this way, city construction and management level is gradually improved and city civilization level and citizens’ quality will be remarkably uplifted. Therefore, the World Expo effect can be amplified in a wider scope and at a deeper level. The theme ‘Better City, Better Life’ can extend in the sustainable development of Shanghai [sic].210 In addition to having the Expo contribute to citizens’ lives, the organizers also wanted citizens to contribute to the Expo. Officials stressed in their speeches that the public’s participation and passion, and actual improvement of Shanghai citizens’ lives, were essential for a successful Expo.211 208  “200,000 Overseas Chinese Return Home for Shanghai Expo,” People’s Daily (May 12 2010). 209  “Shibo: huaqiao huaren kandaole shenmo?” [World Expo: What Do the Overseas Chinese See?], Shanghai Qiaobao (September 15 2010). 210  Wen Hui Daily, “Live with Civilization for a Better Life,” quoted in “Comments,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 9 (2008). 211  See, for example, “600-Day Action Plan for Welcoming World Expo is On the Way—Yu Zhengsheng: ‘Making Expo 2010 a Grand Meeting of World Culture and a World Expo

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The speeches of national leaders, the regularly updated Action Plans, and conversations with Chinese interlocutors give the impression that the Expo’s organizers considered this ‘software’ side of Expo publicity work to be the most challenging part of their task. The ‘software’ side consisted of: services; getting Chinese citizens to become enthusiastic for and involved in the Expo; and making people behave more ‘civilized’—that is, better educated about polite behavior and international customs.212 The Shanghai municipal government developed a plan called ‘welcoming the Expo by proper behavior,’ which consisted of eleven practical work projects. These included the ‘one million people learn two languages’ (Putonghua and English) and ‘millions of families learn good manners’ programs;213 the building of twenty community cultural activity centers to promote the construction of communal culture;214 and a 600-Day Action Plan, calling for achieving ‘five striking improvements’ (of the city’s image, its services, city management, urban civilization, and spiritual civilization).215 In addition, a large number of volunteers were recruited and trained to assist in the educational campaigns and on the Expo site. They got their own logo, slogans, song, and uniforms. The volunteers’ slogans included ‘At Your Service at Expo,’ ‘My Will, My Help, My Pleasure,’ ‘2010, We’re Together as One,’ and ‘Our City, Your Joy.’216 During the six months of the World Expo 2010, a total of 79,965 volunteers, mostly from Shanghai universities and colleges, worked at the various Expo venues. Other activities to engage the local population included a yearly (from 2004– 2007) ‘Expo Children Emissaries’ competition, in which more than 100,000 students from elementary schools and junior schools participated.217 The Shanghai Municipal Education Commission furthermore decided that each primary school and middle school in the municipality should organize stuof our Own,’ ” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 10 (2008); Ren Zhong, “Cong gongguan pinggu jiaodu kan shibo gonggong waijiao chengguo” [Evaluating the World Expo from the Perspective of Public Relations), GGWJJK, No. 2 (summer 2010), pp. 39–43; and many other speeches published in the Shanghai Expo Magazine. 212  See, for example, “Interview of Xi Jinping by State Press,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 9 (2007); and interview with Chinese official on May 17 2012. 213  “Interview of Xi Jinping by State Press.” 214  “An Overall Implementation of the Act Program for Welcoming the Expo,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 2 (2007). 215  “Shanghai Gives Guidance to Development and Implementation of the Expo ‘600-Day Action Plan,’ ” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 6 (2008); and “Launch of 600-Day Action to Welcome World Expo,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 10 (2008). 216  Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 4 (2009). 217  “Expo to Recruit Child Ambassadors Again,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 7 (2007).

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dents to visit at least once the Exhibition Center of World Expo 2010 Shanghai, carry out a ‘little friends’ amenity city’ situational training activity, and choose content related to Expo Shanghai as one of various cultural courses.218 In order also to “increase the caring, supporting, and understanding” of the domestic public in the rest of China, central and municipal authorities organized a travelling exhibition—‘The Path to World Expo’—that toured six major Chinese cities throughout August and September 2007.219 The organizing committee furthermore published a range of books on the Expo, for the general public as well as for students of all ages. There were ‘edu-tainment’ readers such as Haibao Takes You on a Tour of the Expo: Games, but also more serious Expo Knowledge Readers for primary and middle school students. For publicity departments in local and municipal governments, schools, enterprises, and public institutions, a Blackboard Newspaper Design Collection for the Expo was made available.220 The activities mentioned here do not constitute a complete list, but provide a good indication of the enormous scale and comprehensiveness of the Shanghai Expo’s educational and engagement programs.

Evaluation of the Event

The 2010 Shanghai World Expo turned out to be the biggest World Expo thus far in terms of participants, visitors, terrain, and budget. Including the host country China, 246 countries and organizations participated. The participants included 21 countries that had not established diplomatic ties with China and organizations such as the EU, which made its solo debut at this World Expo as standing apart from its member states. More than 73 million people visited the Expo,221 4.3 million of which were foreigners,222 and more than 12,000 reporters applied for accreditation to cover the Shanghai Expo.223 The number of foreign tourists that visited the Expo was somewhat lower than the five million 218  “Figures,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 10 (2008). 219  The cities were Shanghai, Nanjing, Beijing, Hangzhou, Chongqing, and Guangzhou; see “World Expo Touring Exhibition: A New Peak of the Promotion,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 8 (2007). 220  “600-Day Countdown to the Opening of the Expo: Publication of Expo Textbooks to be Accelerated,” Shanghai Expo Magazine, No. 9 (2007). 221  National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Statistical Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China on the 2010 National Economic and Social Development” (February 28 2011), part IX. 222  Xinhua, “Shanghai Expo Saw Influx of 4 Mln Visitors from Outside Chinese Mainland” (November 9 2010). 223  Expo Shanghai Newsletter, No. 57 (April 1 2010). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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expected by some of the organizers, in spite of the easier visa policy adopted by China during the months of the Shanghai Expo.224 Foreigners wishing to visit China in 2010 thus did not experience the problems caused by strict visa regulations that had been implemented around the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008. Chinese scholars acknowledged that it had been difficult to translate foreign awareness of the Expo into real interest and desire to visit the Shanghai Expo.225 The focus of China’s Expo campaign had been on domestic publicity, and many participating countries did not have the budget to advertise their pavilions widely. Among the foreigners who visited the Shanghai Expo, however, were more than 200 “groups of important overseas visitors,” including heads of states and prime ministers.226 Most foreign VIP guests met with Chinese leaders during their Shanghai visit, providing the Chinese government with many good (public) diplomacy opportunities. Because the world was still recovering from the financial crisis and China was regarded as a savior of world economic growth, the Shanghai Expo was used even more as a (traditional) diplomatic stage than may otherwise have been the case.227 Many foreign leaders gladly took this opportunity to meet with their Chinese counterparts, who may not always be available on other occasions. For other foreign leaders, the Shanghai Expo provided a good pretext to meet with Chinese leaders. Chinese scholars and reporters interpret French President Sarkozy’s visit to Shanghai to attend the Expo Opening Ceremony, for example, as a diplomatic ‘repair trip,’ during which he could normalize ties that had become strained in 2008.228 Attracting domestic visitors was less difficult. In order to break the Japanese Aichi World Expo record of 64 million visitors, the Expo’s organizers strongly encouraged or simply ordered work units and schools to visit the Expo, and they arranged transportation and free tickets for many of them. All permanent Shanghai inhabitants received an Expo package consisting of free tickets to the Expo, a thank-you note from the Chinese government, a map, a badge of Expo mascot Haibao, and a transportation card worth 200 yuan (approximately US$ 29).229 224  Some of the organizers expected five million foreign visitors, See “Shanghai World Expo Showcases China’s Soft Power,” China Daily (April 28 2010). 225  Li Weijian, “Shibo gonggong waijiao pingxi.” 226  Li Weijian, “Shibo gonggong waijiao pingxi.” 227  Li Weijian, “Shibo gonggong waijiao pingxi.” 228  Li Weijian, “Shibo gonggong waijiao pingxi;” and “Sarkozy to Meet Hu, Attend Expo,” People’s Daily (April 28 2010). 229  See, for example, Ren Zhongxi, “Shanghai Households to Get Free Expo Tickets,” China. org.cn (April 22 2010); and David Barboza, “Shanghai Expo Sets Record with 73 Million Visitors,” New York Times (November 2 2010). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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Halfway through the Shanghai Expo, in the second quarter of 2010, a national satisfaction survey of tourists was held. The survey shows that the tourists’ satisfaction in the Expo was indexed at 77.64, which was lower than expected. Problems mentioned included the long queues, the price of food and hotels, the accommodation capacity of the Expo’s park, and the ability of handling breaking events.230 According to a local public opinion survey that was held after the Expo was closed, more than 66 per cent thought that the Shanghai World Expo was ‘very successful’ and around 29 per cent felt that it was ‘relatively successful.’ People were in particular positive about the volunteers: 94 per cent said they were ‘very satisfied’ or ‘relatively satisfied’ with the Shanghai World Expo’s volunteer service.231 People also liked the fact that the city largely remained operating as usual during the months of the Expo, in contrast to the city of Beijing during the Olympic Games. More than 90 per cent of Shanghai residents believed that the Shanghai World Expo had a positive effect on China’s development and made the world more interested in Shanghai and China.232 Chinese officials emphasized the importance of the Shanghai Expo for developing countries. Outreach toward Africa, such as the policy of offering help and financial support to African countries wanting to participate in the Expo, had been an important aspect of the Expo’s public diplomacy strategy. It confirmed China’s solidarity with Africa and resulted in many exchanges between the two sides. African countries’ participation increased their understanding of China and the Chinese development model, and the African pavilions familiarized Chinese audiences with African countries and cultures.233 Overall, Shanghai and its image gained a lot from the Expo. Shanghai’s infrastructure was greatly improved, many parts of the city were beautified, and the inhabitants became more knowledgeable about and experienced with the international community. The Expo’s publicity did not really reach the general public abroad, but it did leave a deep impression among the foreign visitors, participants, and other actors involved in the Expo.234 Although local bureau230  Li Weijian, “Shibo gonggong waijiao pingxi.” 231  The survey was done by the Media and Public Opinion Research Center of Fudan University; see “Survey: Shanghai Residents Deem World Expo Successful,” People’s Daily (November 2 2010). 232  “Survey: Shanghai Residents Deem World Expo Successful.” 233  Li Weijian, “Shibogonggong waijiao, zhutui zhongfei guanxi” [World Expo Public Diplomacy, Boosting Sino–African ties], Xiya feizhou, No. 12 (2010). 234  Interviews; and “Expo 2010’s Legacy: What Did Shanghai Gain?,” Knowledge@Wharton (Philadelphia, PA: Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, November 24 2010),

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cracy and rules occasionally frustrated the foreign participants, they were mostly positively impressed by Shanghai’s energy, effectiveness, pragmatic approach to solving problems, and by the excellent infrastructure.235 The close cooperation between Shanghai municipality and foreign participants also led to many initiatives for joint projects after the World Expo.236 According to some analysts, Shanghai gained even more domestically, as Shanghai’s critics had to admit the city’s effectiveness and infrastructural reform were impressive.237 During the Expo, the State Council Information Office analyzed what the European and US online media reported about the Shanghai Expo. They found that the Western media reports focused on issues such as science and technology, economic ties, China’s image, and urban transformation, and that they were quite objective.238 With regard to the environmental dimension, the Expo’s organizers got some credit, as it was noted that Shanghai’s commitment went beyond the event itself. In the run-up to the Expo, the city strengthened its overall pollution-control measures and introduced various renewable and energy-efficient technologies.239 The Final Environmental Review of the Shanghai World Expo of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) concluded that the organizers put much effort into improving key areas such as air quality, transport, energy, climate neutrality, and the overall situation of the Expo site, but that Shanghai still faces challenges in terms of its dependency on coal for electricity, and monitoring and controlling air pollution.240 available online at https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/expo-2010s-legacywhat-did-shanghai-gain/. 235  “Expo 2010’s Legacy.” 236  Speech by the representative of the Dutch city of Rotterdam at the seminar ‘Continuing the Expo Effect and Promoting Public Diplomacy’ (October 31 2011). 237  Tom Doctoroff, quoted in “Expo 2010’s Legacy.” 238  State Council Information Office, Ou mei zhuliu wangluo meiti li de Shanghai shibohui xingxiang fenxi [An Analysis of the Image of the Shanghai World Expo in the European and American Mainstream Media] (July 5 2010). Several Chinese scholars also published articles on media reports about the Expo, but as the articles do not provide references to the media sources that they examined, it is difficult to assess the information provided; see, for example, Guo Ke, “Quanqiu meitizhongde shanghai shibohui ji chengshi xingxiang” [The Image of the World Expo and the City of Shanghai in the Global Media], GGWJK, No. 2 (summer 2010), pp. 34–38. 239  United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), UNEP Environmental Assessment: Expo 2010—Shanghai, China (Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP), p. 7, available online at http://www .unep.org/pdf/PressReleases/SHANGHAI_REPORT_FullReport.pdf. 240   UNEP, “Final Environmental Review of the 2010 World Exposition,” press release (November 29 2011).

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Lessons Learned

The Shanghai Expo boosted the study and development of China’s public diplomacy and, according to some scholars, Expo public diplomacy has contributed to China’s diplomatic innovation. President of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) Yang Jiemian finds that the Shanghai Expo provided “a new practical experience to China in managing large-scale summit diplomacy, multilateral economic diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, and large-scale public diplomacy.”241 With regard to the latter, Li Weijian writes that the Shanghai Expo experience helped China to (1) innovate, improve, and integrate the coordination of public diplomacy resources; (2) cultivate a talent pool of public diplomacy officials; and (3) step up development of China’s public diplomacy theory, which should provide the basis for building a “public diplomacy system with Chinese characteristics.”242 China had not earlier participated simultaneously in so many forms of communication and exchange (between government and civil society, bilateral, multilateral, formal, and informal), at different levels and on so many themes (political, economic, technological, and cultural), as in the run-up to and during the Shanghai Expo.243 The numerous studies done and articles written on the Shanghai Expo’s public diplomacy not only looked at China’s own efforts, but also discussed the success of other countries’ pavilions. A good example is a research project, commissioned by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the CPPCC and executed by Shanghai Jiaotong University, which looked into the World Expo’s public diplomacy purposes, performance, and the results of 30 participating countries.244 In order to capitalize on the experience of Expo public diplomacy and to maintain momentum in public diplomacy development, the Chinese authorities established the Shanghai Public Diplomacy Association. The Association (also discussed in chapter four) regards the consolidation and expansion of the Shanghai Expo network and public diplomacy resources as its most important tasks.245 241  Yang Jiemian, “China’s Expo Diplomacy: Experience and Innovation,” website of Shanghai Institutes of International Relations (March 18 2011). 242  Li Weijian, “Shibo gonggong waijiao pingxi.” 243  Li Wejian, “Shibo gonggong waijiao pingxi.” 244  Liu Kang, “Shanghai shibohui: geguo duihua gongong waijiao de da wutai” [Shanghai World Expo: A Big Stage for Countries’ Public Diplomacy toward China], paper presented at the Charhar Institute’s Public Diplomacy Seminar (2010). 245  Bao Jian, Yanxu shibo xiaoying tuozhan gonggong waijo [Continue the World Expo Effect to Expand Public Diplomacy], Renmin wang (May 17 2011).

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Analysis Hosting the World Expo confirmed and reinforced China’s re-emergence in the world, just as the Beijing Olympics had done. As it was less politicized than the Beijing Olympics, however, the World Expo was a much more relaxed event, which enabled the organizers to focus entirely on promoting the themes that they had selected. It was also an event that touched a lot of Chinese people’s lives. A Chinese interviewee remarked that the Chinese people had liked the projection of the Olympic Games, but had not been able to enjoy the two-week event itself; in the case of the Shanghai Expo, however, millions did enjoy the event, as visitors, or as inhabitants of Shanghai.246 For the city of Shanghai, the 2010 World Expo provided the opportunity to accelerate its development into a world-class metropolis. As a result of the World Expo, for example, the modernization of Shanghai’s infrastructure was completed ten to twenty years ahead of schedule. In its public diplomacy efforts, the organizers were closely watched by national-level authorities, who wanted to make sure that the Expo served national and not just local goals. In that sense, it is interesting to note that subnational public diplomacy in China became officially promoted only after the Shanghai Expo and not in the run-up to the event. Like the Beijing Games, the Shanghai Expo had to be the best ever and break the record of former World Expos. It was important for the Chinese government to show that it could do at least as well as, if not better than, any other country in the world, and particularly better than Japan, which had hosted the successful 2005 Aichi World Expo. No efforts were spared in improving Shanghai’s look and in attracting audiences to visit the event. The domestic media were ordered to promote the Expo actively. Having learned from the experience of the 2008 Beijing Games, Chinese officials and academics had developed a deeper understanding of public diplomacy. They knew better how to cooperate with foreign stakeholders such as governments, companies, and NGOs, and how to deal with the foreign press, and they could build on the practice of the Olympic Games’ educational and volunteer programs. They developed detailed plans that stressed the consistency of messages. Chinese academic articles and books on Expo public diplomacy far outnumber those about Olympic public diplomacy. What was special about this event was that it involved long-term and extensive collaboration with a wide variety of foreign actors, including many non-state actors on both sides, and much dialog. During the Expo months, foreign participants and 246  Interview with scholar (March 22 2012), Shanghai.

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their Chinese counterparts organized numerous seminars, roundtables, and other activities engaging foreign and Chinese publics. The overseas Chinese figured prominently as a target group as well as an instrument of public diplomacy. The government invited them to see and experience the Shanghai Expo and participate in ‘a reunion of Chinese people.’ It also called upon overseas Chinese associations, media organizations, and businessmen to promote the event in the countries where they lived and contribute financially to the event. The domestic population, too, was both a target and an instrument. People were educated about the Expo and mobilized as volunteers on a scale that is only possible in an authoritarian system. In order to break the previous—Japanese—record of visitors, the Shanghai Expo’s organizers furthermore instructed schools and work units to go and see the Expo, and in many cases provided free tickets and travel expenses to do so. Looking back at Shanghai Expo’s public diplomacy, scholars stress the importance of the practical experience gained during the Expo; the innovation and improvement of the coordination system of public diplomacy resources; the cultivation and training of a pool of talented people who master policies, know business, and are good at communication; and the enrichment of public diplomacy theory, which should form the basis of a public diplomacy system with Chinese characteristics.247 Conclusions The Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai Expo have been very important to the development of public diplomacy in China. Both cases highlight the Chinese government’s eagerness to learn and get public diplomacy right. The international prominence of the events justified the allocation of abundant financial resources and manpower to consider themes carefully, build strategies, study foreign experiences of event diplomacy, hire foreign expertise, develop people’s skills, educate the general public, and invest in creating and strengthening a wide array of instruments. Public diplomacy in the run-up and during the two events concerned a largely state-centered approach; the strategies and messages were ‘owned’ by the government. The Beijing Olympics’ public diplomacy primarily involved monolog and political advocacy. Shanghai Expo’s public diplomacy included much dialog and collaboration among various groups of state and non-state actors, but even in this case, the government at both national and local levels 247  Yang Jiemian, Zhongguo shibo waijiao, p. 175.

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steered and controlled the development and conduct of public diplomacy. Nevertheless, the extensive collaboration contributed to relationship-building between Chinese and foreign societies. The Shanghai Expo furthermore enabled China to strengthen its image as the leader of the developing world and in particular as a friend of Africa, as it provided developing countries with financial and other support, thus enabling them to participate in the Expo. For both events, the Chinese government selected the themes of harmony, people’s wellbeing, sustainability, and technological innovation. The first three themes allowed the government to address negative international perceptions about China’s foreign policies, the way that the Chinese government treats its people, and China’s environmental problems; while the latter theme—that of technological innovation—enabled the projection of China as being advanced and capable. The continuity in themes strengthened China’s messages. The messages about sustainability and people’s wellbeing were also strengthened by the policies to improve living conditions in the cities involved. The events were regarded as more than an opportunity to promote China. They were also consciously used as stepping stones to propel the development of the cities involved and to educate people about China’s internationalization and integration into the world community. China’s high-context culture manifested itself in China’s fear of losing face, the aim for perfectionism, and its efforts to take good care of foreign visitors. The aim of perfectionism is not only related to concerns about face, but also to the importance that is attached to relationships. Guests should be received in the best possible way, and audiences should be shown the very best that a host has to offer. Aspects of Chinese culture and cultural concepts furthermore figured prominently in slogans, emblems, architecture, and the opening and closing ceremonies. The impact of China’s political system emerged most clearly in the Chinese government’s control over the domestic media and the events’ public diplomacy messages, the large-scale educational programs that were part of its domestic outreach, and in the involvement of overseas Chinese populations in both events. The control over actors and messages enhanced organizational efficiency and contributed to the consistency and continuity of messages, but also strengthened China’s authoritarian image. The extent to which the government played a direct role in organizing the global overseas Chinese populations’ protests during the Olympic torch relay is contested, but it did play a major role in encouraging the Chinese diaspora to promote and contribute to the events, as well as to share in China’s pride about them. The impact of the political system also comes to light in the way in which the Olympic Games was a prestige project for the Chinese leadership, aggravating ‘face’ concerns

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and intensifying government control over each and every detail. The importance of a successful Olympic Games for the Chinese government furthermore provided foreign governments and advocacy groups with a stick to beat China, which in its turn created incentives for the Chinese government to reconsider and adjust some of its policies. Different in character, the two events taught China different things, and led to different results. The Beijing Olympics was a media event that reached a very large global audience. It taught China much about media strategies, international lobbying, transparency, and China’s public diplomacy liabilities. It forced the Chinese government to live up to international standards and expectations, and in some cases to adjust its policies. The Games left behind a general impression of a modern, powerful and capable country with a fascinating culture, but a country that is lacking in transparency, respect for human rights, and other internationally accepted norms. The challenge for the Shanghai World Expo’s public diplomacy was not to shift attention away from China’s politics or human rights, but to draw global audiences’ attention to the event. The Expo’s organizers could build upon the experience and public diplomacy resources of the Beijing Games, and were able to focus on the positive themes that they selected for promotion. The Expo reached a much smaller global audience, but as a result of the dialog and long-term cooperation with many foreign actors, it left behind—among this smaller group—a deeper and more positive impression: that of a modernizing and capable country with many flaws, but also a country in which real change is happening.

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Reactive Public Diplomacy: Crises

The SARS Epidemic, Product Scandals, and the Wenchuan Earthquake

Any crisis affects a country’s image. When caused by imputable acts, lack of prevention, or if dealt with inadequately, a crisis may severely damage a ­country’s reputation. If nobody is to be blamed, however, as in the case of a natural disaster, and the government handles the situation well, a crisis also provides opportunities to strengthen or improve a country’s image. Both cases require a good public diplomacy strategy to inform audiences about what is happening and what government organizations are doing to deal with the consequences of the crisis. Crisis public diplomacy is more complex than other dimensions of public diplomacy. The government of a country in crisis is under pressure and often comes under heavy international scrutiny. It has little time to develop strategies to cope with both the crisis and its consequences for the country’s reputation. Conducting public diplomacy in a crisis situation entails communicating simultaneously with multiple, sometimes hostile, audiences at home and abroad, “in a rapidly changing, highly visible, and competitive communication environment.”1 A crisis team and its spokespersons need to provide three types of information: information on how to cope physically with the crisis; information on how to cope psychologically with the crisis, including showing concern and sympathy; and information that will help to repair the country’s reputation. Furthermore, it has to deal with variables such as media context and culture, including political culture.2 The asymmetry of cultural styles further complicates matters, as do political, legal and media systems among audiences that are affected by the crisis or have another interest in closely following the news. Timothy Coombs and Sherry Holladay point out that crisis managers often have to operate “outside of their comfort zones, and potentially their 1  Rhonda Zaharna, “Asymmetry of Cultural Styles and the Unintended Consequences of Crisis Public Diplomacy,” in Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy (Malta: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomacy, 2004). 2  Shan R. Veil and Aimei Yang, “Sanlu’s Milk Contamination Crisis: Organizational Communication in Conflicting Cultural, Economic, and Ethical Context,” in Steve May (ed.), Case Studies in Organizational Communication: Ethical Perspectives and Practices (London: Sage, 2013), pp. 11–118, at p. 114.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004283954_009 Ingrid

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expertise.”3 They need to be aware that the words they speak and the actions they take will be understood differently by different audiences, but they will also want to avoid being inconsistent. The crisis team and spokespersons need to be well informed and have good intercultural communication skills. They also need to react quickly to avoid other stakeholders from providing “the information that will frame how the crisis will be perceived.”4 This chapter looks at Chinese public diplomacy strategies in reaction to three types of domestic crisis that have affected China’s image abroad in the past decade. It examines the cases of the 2003 SARS epidemic, the unsafe Chinese food products and toy scandals of 2007 and 2008, and the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. The analysis is informed by William Benoit’s Image Repair Theory, which looks at message options when an actor’s image is under attack.5 Benoit’s theory is developed with companies or organizations in mind, but—as will be shown below—the five communication strategies may also become part of a country’s public diplomacy strategy in cases of crisis. The Image Repair Theory assumes that the actor whose image is under attack is held responsible for the act that caused the crisis and the act is believed to be offensive.6 Although an earthquake crisis concerns a natural disaster for which nobody can be held responsible, a government can still come under attack for inadequately responding to the crisis, or for not adequately preventing damage caused by the disaster. Benoit’s theory therefore also enlightens China’s public diplomacy response to the Wenchuan earthquake and its aftermath. According to Benoit, an actor can deploy five strategies to limit the damage to its reputation caused by a crisis, and to restore its image. The first strategy consists of denial, either by denying responsibility, or by shifting the blame onto someone or something else. A second strategy focuses on evading responsibility, by claiming that the situation was provoked by others, caused by lack 3  W. Timothy Coombs and Sherry J. Holladay (eds), The Handbook of Crisis Communication (Chichester, UK: Blackwell, 2012), p. 722. 4  Coombs and Holladay (eds), The Handbook of Crisis Communication, p. 28. 5  W.L. Benoit, “Image Repair Discourse and Crisis Communication,” Public Relations Review, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1997), pp. 177–186; W.L. Benoit and A. Pang, “Crisis Communication and Image Repair Discourse,” in T. Hansen-Horn and B. Neff (eds), Public Relations: From Theory to Practice (Boston, MA: Pearson—Allyn & Bacon, 2008), pp. 243–261. 6  Benoit, “Image Repair Discourse and Crisis Communication;” and Benoit and Pang, “Crisis Communication and Image Repair Discourse.” Other crisis communication theories are Corporate Apologia, and Situational Crisis Communication Theory; see Robert R. Ulmer, Timothy L. Sellnow, and Matthew W. Seeger, Effective Crisis Communication: Moving From Crisis to Opportunity (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2010), pp. 15–18.

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of information or control over important factors that caused the situation, was an accident, or was created despite good intentions. The third strategy, reduction of offensiveness, consists of six possible sub-strategies to make the act/situation look less offensive: bolstering (reinforcing positive feelings about the accused); minimization (downplaying the severity of the act/situation); differentiation (comparison with a more offensive act); transcendence (placing the act/­situation in a more favorable context); attacking one’s accuser; and compensating (the victims). Benoit’s fourth strategy, corrective action, entails promising to deal with and correct the problem. The fifth strategy, mortification, involves admitting guilt, apologizing, and seeking forgiveness. The case studies in this chapter will show that the Chinese government followed this type of pattern and, in reaction to crises, used most of Benoit’s message options in its public diplomacy. When under attack, the Chinese government’s first response is usually denial of responsibility. When there is enough public evidence and they can no longer deny the accusation, Chinese authorities take swift and decisive corrective action, while simultaneously often still evading, reducing, or acknowledging responsibility. In public diplomacy messages targeted at foreign audiences during the crises examined, acknowledging responsibility was usually more dominant than in messages for the domestic public, where evasion and reduction of responsibility prevailed. This highlights the factor of the asymmetry of public diplomacy audiences and a neiwai youbie (that there is a difference between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’) approach in China’s public diplomacy. As few foreigners can read Chinese, the Chinese government can keep the two publics more easily separated than countries with more accessible languages, such as English.

The 2003 SARS Epidemic

In early 2003, China and other parts of the world were hit by an epidemic of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS. The highly contagious and airborne disease, which causes breathing problems, originated in the south Chinese province of Guangdong, where a first case had appeared in midNovember 2002. For reasons discussed below, Chinese authorities reacted slowly to the outbreak and did not inform the World Health Organization (WHO) until February 11 2003. The lack of openness hampered the development of measures to control the epidemic, and in the first half of 2003, the highly contagious disease spread to 26 countries worldwide. In the end, it would affect more than 8,000 people and cause more than 700 deaths

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worldwide.7 China was the country hardest hit by the epidemic. In addition to being a major health crisis, the SARS epidemic also became a major political crisis for China, both at domestic and international levels. At home, the rapid spread of the disease caused panic, disrupted civic life, and affected the ­economy.8 The international media accused China of covering up at the expense of loss of life, and came to distrust more than ever the information provided by the Chinese authorities. After phases of denying and subsequently downplaying the situation, the Chinese government finally took sweeping actions and developed public diplomacy strategies to address international concerns. The Unfolding of the Crisis9 The first cases of SARS appeared in Guangdong province in November 2002, but as the disease was unknown, patients were diagnosed with ‘unidentifiable’ pneumonia.10 As it was the season for colds and pneumonia, nobody was alarmed. When the number of cases increased, local officials informed higherlevel authorities, and the first inspection team from the Chinese Ministry of Health arrived in Guangdong in late January 2003. The team sent a report, marked ‘top secret’ to provincial and national-level authorities, but it failed to cause alarm. Various factors probably played a role, including the rule that only a few, busy, top officials were allowed to read the ‘top secret’ report, and the fact that the Chinese New Year holiday was arriving.11 People involved at the local level furthermore thought that they could solve the issue locally, and that the situation was not serious enough to bring it more actively to the attention of the central leadership. It was also not opportune for them to do so. Within 7  World Health Organization, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Status of the Outbreak and Lessons for the Immediate Future (Geneva: WHO, May 20 2003); and World Health Organization, Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of Illness from 1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003 (Geneva: WHO, April 21 2004). 8  See John Wong, Sarah Chan, and Liang Ruobing, “The Impact of SARS on Greater China Economies,” in John Wong and Yongnian Zheng (eds), The SARS Epidemic: Challenges to China’s Crisis Management (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2004), pp. 11–44. 9  A major general source for this case study is the People’s Daily Online database of SARSrelated articles, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/zhuanti/Zhuanti_335 .shtml (accessed throughout 2012). 10  See the chapter by Zheng Yongnian and Lye Liang Fook, “SARS and China’s Political System,” and the chapter by Wong, Chan, and Liang, “The Impact of SARS on Greater China Economies,” in Wong and Zheng (eds), The SARS Epidemic, pp. 45–76, at p. 48. 11  For more details, see Yanzhong Huang, “The SARS Epidemic and its Aftermath in China: A Political Perspective,” in Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2004).

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the Chinese political context, local officials are discouraged from reporting bad news to higher levels of authority, especially in times of political uncertainty. Autumn 2002 was such a time. China was in the middle of a leadership transition: in November 2002 the 16th Communist Party Congress had confirmed Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao as China’s new leaders, but they still had to be officially appointed as President and Premier, respectively, at the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2003.12 Furthermore, officials were afraid that publicizing the issue would create social unrest, and disrupt foreign investment and tourism. They also did not want to ruin the early February 2003 Chinese New Year holiday by announcing that there was a dangerous disease going around and telling people that they should not travel.13 Chinese New Year is always the year’s peak travel season, as people want to reunite with their families for the occasion. In 2013, there were more than 3.4 billion public transportation passenger trips made during the month-long holiday.14 When the disease began to spread more rapidly in early February 2003, and rumors about a ‘killer bug’ became widely discussed by mobile phone among people in Guangdong province, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, officials had to acknowledge that there was a virus going around. Guangdong provincial authorities decided to break the silence, and on February 11 2003 they gave a press conference about the outbreak, reporting that there were 305 known cases in the province. Simultaneously, however, other local authorities, such as those of the provincial capital Guangzhou, downplayed the situation by stating on the same day that the disease was ‘comprehensively’ under control.15 When people began to question the government’s handling of the outbreak, the provincial authorities on February 23 2003 again stopped reporting on the disease.16 The central authorities in Beijing also decided to downplay the situation. All attention at the time was focused on ensuring a smooth 16th NPC, which was scheduled for mid-March 2003. This meant that reporting on problematic or 12  Hu and Wen had to consolidate their power and, with former President Jiang Zemin still keeping his military positions, the leadership transition process was not finalized when the crisis unfolded. For more details on the political context, see Joseph Fewsmith, “China’s Response to SARS,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 7 (2003); and Zheng and Liang, “SARS and China’s Political System.” 13  Zheng and Liang, “SARS and China’s Political System.” 14  “China Braces for Travel Rush over Lunar New Year 2013 (Background),” Global Times (no date), available at http://www.globaltimes.cn/SPECIALCOVERAGE/2013springfestivaltra velrush.aspx. 15  Yanzhong Huang, “The SARS Epidemic and its Aftermath in China.” 16  Yanzhong Huang, “The SARS Epidemic and its Aftermath in China.”

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negative issues had to be avoided until after the NPC. When the WHO therefore issued its first global warning about SARS on March 15 2003, the Chinese media did not report it.17 Only after the NPC (from March 5–18 2003) was successfully concluded did the Chinese government stop denying that the situation was serious. The new Hu–Wen leadership immediately took measures. They disseminated information to the public, tried to enforce reporting of cases of the disease, and facilitated better communications between the provinces and the center. In spite of these measures, the number of cases remained seriously underreported. This was not a deliberate choice, but a consequence of China’s fragmented bureaucratic structure, as discussed in chapter two. For example, military hospitals in China, some of which had many SARS patients, were not obliged to report to civil authorities and were reluctant to do so.18 Leaders in Beijing therefore had great difficulties in gaining oversight of all the cases in China. The new leadership gradually stepped up domestic work on SARS, but as the central government was struggling to gather information itself, it was not ready to cooperate fully with international organizations on containing the disease. A team from the WHO was received in Beijing on March 23 2003, but was not allowed to travel to Guangdong to look into the origins of the virus until two weeks later. The head of the WHO’s office in Beijing said in a reaction that China “missed an opportunity by not releasing data and in failing to be more open about the spread of SARS.”19 While international pressure on China to cooperate and provide full information increased, the Chinese government kept publishing upbeat messages stating that the spread of SARS had been contained.20 In spite of a WHO travel advice of April 2 2003 “recommending that persons traveling to Hong Kong and Guangdong Province

17  SARS archives on the website of the WHO: http://www.who.int/csr/sars/archive/2003_ 03_15/en/. 18  For more on the lack of cooperation between military and civilian authorities during the SARS crisis, see Tony Saich, “Is SARS China’s Chernobyl or Much Ado About Nothing?,” in Arthur Kleinman and James L. Watson (eds), SARS in China: Prelude to Pandemic? (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 71–104; and Fewsmith, “China’s Response to SARS.” 19  John Pomfret, “China Agrees to Release Daily Reports on Disease,” The Washington Post (March 29 2003). 20  See, for example, “Health Minister: SARS in China Under Control, 46 Killed,” China Daily (April 3 2004); and Zhang Feng, “China Containing Spread of Virus,” China Daily (April 7 2004).

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of China ­consider postponing all but essential travel,”21 China Daily published comments by Premier Wen on April 7 2003 in which he said that China warmly welcomed foreigners to “travel, visit, and do business in China” and that China would “take every possible measure to protect their health.”22 Like the earlier warning, the April 2 2003 WHO travel advice was not reported in the Chinese media. While President Hu inspected affected areas in Guangdong Province and Premier Wen Jiabao visited hospitals and health institutions in Beijing, the disease continued to spread.23 A growing number of people suspected that Beijing was underreporting the number of cases. Pressure on Beijing by the WHO, the international community, and the domestic public to share all of its information increased further. In early April 2003, a retired Chinese army doctor, Jiang Yanyong, who was aware that there were far more cases than officially reported, decided to blow the whistle. He wrote what he knew about numerous unreported cases of SARS in a military hospital to China Central Television (CCTV) and Hong Kong Phoenix Television. The two television stations did not broadcast the information, but the army doctor’s report also reached Time magazine, which published it on April 8 2003.24 This revelation led to an avalanche of critical articles in the foreign press, which were then translated into Chinese and spread inside China, adding to the pressure on Beijing to open up. Public Diplomacy Actions China’s domestic and international image suffered much damage. The international press almost unanimously portrayed China as being irresponsible, incompetent, and lacking credibility.25 The Economist wrote that “China’s cover-up of the spread of SARS was causing the country’s biggest credibility

21  SARS archives on the website of the WHO: http://www.who.int/csr/sars/archive/2003_ 04_02/en/. 22  Zhang Feng, “China Containing Spread of Virus.” 23  “China’s Leaders Go All Out to Raise Morale as SARS Takes Hold,” CCTV.com (April 21 2003). 24  Susan Jakes, “Beijing’s SARS Attack,” Times (April 8 2003); and see Anne Bettingen, “Sars im Spiegel der Chinesischen Medien” (SARS in the Mirror of the Chinese Media) (Norderstedt, Germany: GRIN, 2007), p. 21. 25  See, for example, Chia-ju Lin, “A Textual Analysis of the Coverage of SARS and the Image of China: A Comparative Analysis,” Asian Social Science, Vol. 8, No. 3 (March 2012); Shanthi Lalathil, “Battling SARS: China’s Silence Costs Lives,” International Herald Tribune (April 3 2003); and “China Accused of SARS ‘Cover-up,’ ” BBC News (April 9 2003).

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crisis abroad since the crushing of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989.”26 “Battling SARS: China’s Silence Costs Lives” read a headline of the New York Times, and the BBC spoke of “China’s lethal secrecy over SARS.”27 Furthermore, international media reports widely discussed the weaknesses of China’s political and health systems.28 Chinese leaders were aware of the damage to China’s reputation. On April 14 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao acknowledged in a keynote speech at a State Council Conference that “the response to SARS could influence the international community’s wider perception of China.”29 Shortly afterwards, China’s new leaders finally changed course. During a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee on April 17 2003, it was decided to establish a SARS task force, share all of the available information with the public, and to order officials more forcefully to report accurately, timely, and honestly on SARS cases.30 Beijing no longer denied that there was a very serious health crisis, and started to work on improving its tarnished international image. The Politburo decisions were front-page news in all major Chinese newspapers, and from this moment onward, the government and media became more open about the situation. During this phase, corrective action was mixed with strategies to evade responsibility and reduce the offensiveness of the health crisis. At an international press conference on April 20 2003, it was acknowledged that Chinese authorities had difficulties in gathering accurate information, and that the figures that had been reported were not correct. Executive Vice-Minister of Health Gao Qiang explained the situation as follows: The major problem is: medical institutions in Beijing are subject to the jurisdiction of many departments—the Beijing municipal government, the Ministry of Health, the military, and so on. This loose administration system has caused lack of communication among hospitals, a failure to obtain accurate information on the epidemic, and a failure to take very 26  “China Wakes Up: A Health Scare may Herald Much More Profound Changes,” The Economist (April 24 2003). 27  Kalathil, “Battling SARS;” and Holly Williams, “China’s Lethal Secrecy over SARS,” BBC News (April 5 2003). 28  For example, Salil Tripathi, “Blame SARS on China’s Closed Society,” The New Statesman (April 7 2003); “China Accused of SARS ‘Cover-up;’ ” and Andreas Lorenz, “SARS: China unterdrückt weiter wichtige Informationen,” Der Spiegel (April 28 2003). 29  “Central Gov’t Fully Supports SARS Control Efforts in HK: Hu Jintao,” People’s Daily (April 14 2003). 30  John Pomfret, “Outbreak Gives China’s Hu an Opening: President Responded to Pressure Inside and Outside Country on SARS,” Washington Post (May 13 2003).

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effective quarantine measures to prevent the disease from spreading [. . .] Besides, the Ministry of Health has not undertaken powerful direction and inspection work in Beijing, and this is our problem.31 Such public acknowledgements of mismanagement and systemic problems by high-level officials were—and still are—rare in China, and signaled a clear break with the cover-up policies of the weeks before. In attempts to defend the government against accusations of a cover-up, Gao Qiang emphasized health authorities’ unpreparedness for the crisis, while insisting “[t]here is an essential difference between inaccuracy of SARS statistics and intentional cover-up of the situation of the disease.”32 Many drastic measures to fight the epidemic and improve reporting were announced. Officials were called upon on a daily basis to report on SARS cases accurately and take SARS work seriously, or be harshly punished.33 From April 26 until June 24 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Health held daily news conferences on the SARS situation, which were broadcast live on television.34 The Minister of Public Health, Zhang Wenkang, and the Mayor of Beijing, Meng Xuenong, were dismissed from their posts for mishandling the SARS epidemic. Another 120 officials at lower levels also lost their jobs for the same reason. On April 23 2003, the Chinese government established a special task force: the SARS Control and Prevention Headquarters of the State Council, with Vice-Premier Wu Yi as its commander-in-chief.35 The experienced Wu Yi, who had a reputation as a pragmatist and was internationally well respected, was also placed in charge of the Ministry of Public Health. The Chinese government built, in ten days, a special hospital for SARS patients near Beijing, created a national fund for the prevention and control of SARS, established a legal framework for tackling public health crises, and made sure that strict quarantine measures were enforced.36 The government furthermore launched a nationwide ‘patriotic public health campaign’ to educate the population on SARS and SARS prevention.37 31  “China Holds Press Conference on SARS” (full text), People’s Daily (April 21 2003). 32  “Wrap-up: China Reports 1,807 SARS Cases,” Xinhua News Agency (April 20 2003). 33  See, for example, the following reports in the China Daily: “Premier Urges Honesty over SARS” (April 19 2003); “Party, Government Pay High Attention to SARS: Official” (April 20 2003); and “National Checks on Battle to Halt Virus” (April 22 2003). 34  On June 24 2003, Beijing was lifted from the WHO’s list of SARS-infected areas. 35  “China Creates SARS Task Force, Special Fund,” People’s Daily (April 24 2004). 36  “China Creates SARS Task Force, Special Fund.” 37  “Chinese Vice Premier Urges Further Efforts in Fight against SARS,” Xinhua (April 24 2003).

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As more accurate information about people affected by SARS became known, however, and the number of reported cases in Beijing alone suddenly jumped from 37 to 693 cases, including 35 deaths, the public panicked and social life came to a halt.38 People avoided public transportation and schools were temporarily closed. During this period, television stations broadcasted educational programs called ‘Classrooms in the Air’ for over 1.7 million school kids from elementary and middle schools.39 Furthermore, numerous flights to and from China were canceled. Tourists and investors stayed away, and international meetings and conferences in China were postponed or moved elsewhere. Examples include the prestigious international Boao Forum for Asia, and international sports meetings such as the 2003 FIFA Women’s World Cup and the 2003 International Ice Hockey Women’s World Championship tournaments.40 Neighboring countries closed their borders with China, and many other countries imposed restrictions on Chinese travelers.41 Underscoring the seriousness of the situation, Wen Jiabao said that the consequences of the disease for China could be “too dreadful to contemplate.”42 The Chinese government gradually allowed the domestic press to report more openly on the SARS crisis. This did not mean that the Chinese media were fully free to report all of the available SARS-related news. Publicity chief Li Changchun still called on China’s state-run mass media “to help unite the people and boost public morale in the fight against SARS.”43 When the WHO extended its travel advisory on April 23 2003 to include Beijing and Shanxi Province, for example, it was not published in the Chinese media. Instead, Chinese newspapers published an interview with a WHO official who said that he was satisfied with China’s cooperation.44 Overall, however, the press had 38  John Pomfret, “Thousands Flee Beijing, Fearing SARS; Schools Are Closed As Toll in Capital Rises to 35 Dead,” Washington Post (April 24 2003). 39  “School Kids Profit from TV Education during SARS Crisis,” People’s Daily (June 12 2003); and “English-language TV Programs on SARS Information,” CRI Online (May 6 2003). 40  “Boao Forum for Asia 2003 Annual Conference,” China Today (April 19 2004); “FIFA Women’s World Cup 2003 to Be Held in USA,” People’s Daily (May 27 2003); and the “Women’s Hockey Web,” at http://www.whockey.com/int/wwc/. 41  See, for example, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Press Conference on May 8 2003,” at the website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 42  “Ministry of Health Reports New SARS Cases, Beijing Hit Hard,” China Daily (April 22 2004). 43  “Chinese Media Urged to Boost Morale of the Nation,” People’s Daily (April 26 2003). 44  Joyce Nip, “Changing Connections: The News Media, the Government and the People in China’s SARS Epidemic,” in Angela Romano and Michael Bromley (eds), Journalism and Democracy in Asia (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 28–40.

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more freedom than before, and many domestic newspapers and magazines took the opportunity to publish critical analyses of China’s handling of the crisis and to discuss flaws in China’s political system.45 The official newspaper China Youth Daily was even allowed to discuss SARS humor and praised SARS jokes as a “precious chicken soup” inspiring “the Chinese people to defeat SARS spiritually.”46 The openness in domestic reporting was short-lived, however. In June 2003, the Chinese government resorted to its old habits of strictly controlling media coverage.47 Nevertheless, the SARS crisis left a profound impact on the Chinese media and encouraged efforts to introduce regulations on the transparency of government information.48 According to Professor Du Gangjian from the National Institute for Government Administration, it “accelerated the opening-up of the Chinese media.”49 Hu Shuli, editor in chief of the journal Caijjing, the first Chinese media outlet to provide in-depth coverage, said that the crisis made the Chinese media “more conscious of their mission to ‘inform the public and keep an eye on wrongdoing.’ ”50 Others were more skeptical. Looking back at the SARS crisis ten years later, Professor of Journalism and Communication Yu Guoming remarked: “The government established some principles and

45  See, for example, “SARS: An Opportunity, China Reshuffles Public Health System,” Xinhua (May 3 2003). More examples cited in Joseph Kahn, “The SARS Epidemic: Health and Politics; Some Chinese Say Government’s Response to Epidemic has been Too HeavyHanded,” New York Times (May 23 2003); and in particular Jacques Delisle, “Atypical Pneumonia and Ambivalent Law and Politics: SARS and the Response to SARS in China,” Temple Law Review, Vol. 77 (2003), pp. 193–244, at pp. 225–227; and David Bandurski, “How SARS Changed China,” website of China Media Project (March 5 2013). 46  P.S. Chen, “SARS youmo: feidian shiqi de ‘shenghuo weijing’ ” [SARS Humor: ‘The Spice of Life’ in the SARS Epidemic], China Youth Daily (April 26 2003), cited in Hong Zhang, “SARS Humor for the Virtual Community: Between the Chinese Emerging Public Sphere and the Authoritarian State,” in Deborah Davis and Helen F. Siu (eds), SARS, Reception and Interpretation in Three Chinese Cities (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), pp. 119–146, at p. 136. 47  By the end of June 2003, media outlets and academics had been warned not to analyze how the government had dealt with SARS. See Saich, “Is SARS China’s Chernobyl or Much Ado about Nothing?;” and Antoaneta Bezlova, “Media in China: The Door Slams Shut,” Asia Times (June 24 2003). 48  Ling Lan, “Open Government and Transparent Policy: China’s Experience with SARS, International Public Management Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2005), at http://www.ipmr.net. 49  “Chinese Media: Breaking New Ground,” China Daily (August 22 2003). 50  “Chinese Media: Breaking New Ground.”

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­ echanisms [with regard to open reporting], which is good, but in practice, m things haven’t changed completely.”51 While grappling with the spreading epidemic and domestic panic, the Chinese government stepped up its outreach to the international community. It publicized the measures that it was taking, including the overhaul of China’s public health information system, organized daily press conferences, and invited Chinese and foreign reporters to visit hospital wards where SARS patients were being treated.52 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized briefings for foreign diplomats on the SARS situation and on prevention. On April 21 2003, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told diplomats that China was “giving top priority to the health and safety of foreigners living and traveling in China, same as to the Chinese people,” and two days later, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui provided them with information on the symptoms of SARS and how best to prevent it.53 Other measures in Beijing included delivering a guide to SARS prevention and treatment to foreign agencies and organizations, asking relevant departments to designate hospitals for foreigners and to set up English-language telephone hotlines. The embassy areas and the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse were “completely sterilized” and “the sanitation and sterilization work in the residences of foreign guests” was strengthened.54 China’s Ministry of Commerce urged local departments in charge of foreign trade and economic cooperation, and state-level economic and technological development zones, to help foreign-funded enterprises prevent SARS.55 The Chinese government stepped up its cooperation with the WHO, foreign governments and other foreign institutions.56 WHO standards for monitoring the epidemic were adopted, and the Chinese Ministry of Health organized temperature checks for Chinese travelers leaving and entering China. Quarantine measures were enforced when people were suspected of having SARS. Furthermore, after growing international pressure on Beijing, the Chinese government allowed the WHO to send a team to Taiwan, which was 51  Xuyang Jingjing, “The Legacy of the SARS Outbreak,” Global Times (February 21 2013). 52  Reportedly, 130 journalists from eighteen countries went on the tour; see “Media Tour SARS Hospital Wards in Beijing,” People’s Daily (April 18 2003). 53  Report of the meeting, published at the website of the Chinese Foreign Ministry: http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/premade/47633/sars2.htm (accessed April 2012). 54  “Chinese FM Briefs Foreign Diplomats on Latest SARS Developments,” China Daily (April 21 2004). 55  “China Helps Foreign-funded Firms Fight SARS,” People’s Daily Online (May 5 2003). 56  “Wu Yi: China Hopes for Further Cooperation with US on SARS,” People’s Daily (May 6 2003).

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heavily hit by SARS.57 This was quite a step for the Chinese government, which opposes Taiwan’s participation in any international organization of states, as it may strengthen international recognition of Taiwan as an independent state.58 China also stepped up its own cooperation and exchange with Taiwan on SARS issues and allowed Taiwan’s medical experts to participate in a WHOsponsored conference on SARS.59 On April 29 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao attended the Special China– ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on SARS in Bangkok, Thailand. In his speech, Wen acknowledged that China’s SARS prevention and control work had not been ‘adequate’ and that the Chinese government had a responsibility to the world in fighting SARS. He briefed the meeting on new measures and announced that China pledged a special fund of 10 million Chinese yuan (CNY, or approximately US$ 1.5 million) to support a variety of bilateral programs with countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).60 At the World Health Assembly in Geneva in May 2003, China’s Minister of Public Health Wu Yi similarly acknowledged China’s mistakes and said that the Chinese government was “ready to cooperate sincerely” with other countries and would “shoulder its responsibility” in fighting all global diseases.61 In May 2003, foreign leaders from countries all over the world had started sending China’s government condolences and messages of appreciation for its work to contain the spread of SARS.62 Many countries also provided financial assistance and medical equipment and pharmaceuticals to China to prevent and treat SARS. By mid-May 2003, China had received US$ 31 million in donations for the fight against SARS.63 International companies donated products such as facemasks and cell phones, and health institutions in various countries cooperated with China in conducting SARS-related research.64 China accepted the donations and offers for cooperation with appreciation. 57  “Beijing to Allow WHO to Send a Team to Taiwan,” The Washington Post (May 4 2003). 58  China considers Taiwan to be a renegade province of the People’s Republic of China. 59  “Mainlanders Are Concerned for Taiwan Compatriots’ Battle against SARS,” People’s Daily (May 27 2003). 60  Speech by Premier Wen Jiabao at the Special China-ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on SARS, April 29 2003, published here: http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/53939883.html. 61  “China Vows to Play Constructive Role in Fighting Global Diseases,” People’s Daily (May 21 2003). 62  See, for example, “EU Voices Support for China’s Combat Against SARS,” People’s Daily (May 1 2003); and “Germany Strongly Supports China’s Fight against SARS: Schroeder,” People’s Daily (May 1 2003). 63  “Nation Receives Worldwide Donations,” China Daily (May 15 2003). 64  “Nation Receives Worldwide Donations.”

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Once the Chinese government got the situation under control, it sought to play a more active and even leading role in the global anti-SARS campaign. It hosted international seminars and invested much in SARS research. On June 1 and 2 2003, the Chinese government hosted the China–ASEAN Entry–Exit Quarantine Meeting on SARS in Beijing. The meeting led to the adoption of an Entry–Exit Quarantine Action Plan for Controlling the Spread of SARS. It was followed on June 3 and 4 2003 by an international SARS symposium, also in Beijing, for health officials and experts from ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea, and many Western countries.65 China not only recommended 61 ways of fighting SARS by “improving the organization of SARS prevention and treatment, integrating SARS prevention and control into the legal system, and intensifying scientific research,” but also called on Asian governments to “enhance the sharing of information about SARS” so as to “push forward international efforts to develop a vaccine.”66 A tour by President Hu to Asia and Europe, where he would be the first Chinese leader to attend a G8 meeting, was also used to improve China’s tarnished image and show the world that China was a responsible member of the international community.67 China’s outreach and display of serious measures to improve SARS- and public health-related work from mid-April 2003 onward convinced many governments and organizations that they should develop cooperation with China in this field.68 After the change of course in the second half of April 2003, and in particular by the end of May, when the number of SARS cases decreased, foreigners involved in the fight against SARS started praising China for the way it now dealt with the SARS crisis.69 In June 2003, WHO Executive Director for Communicable Diseases David Heymann “praised the openness with which the WHO team was welcomed by the Ministry of Health,” and described the

65  Wang Qian, “High-level Symposium on SARS Held in Beijing” (on June 3–4 2003), reported by China.org.cn (June 6 2003). 66  Wang Qian, “High-level Symposium on SARS Held in Beijing.” 67  Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “China’s Hu Set for Global Debut,” CNN World Online (May 26 2003); “China: Mr. Hu’s Grand Tour,” The Economist (May 29 2003). 68  See, for example, “EU Diplomatic Missions Expresses Willingness to Cooperate with China in SARS Battle,” website of the Chinese MFA (May 7 2003); and “Global Cooperation Needed for SARS Fight: World Experts,” Xinhua (June 5 2003). 69  See Jane Parry, “WHO Praises China’s Control Measures for SARS,” British Medical Journal (June 21 2003); and “WHO Official Praises Beijing’s SARS Work,” China Daily (May 31 2003).

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measures now in place to control and prevent SARS as “excellent.”70 In the Joint Statement of the Special ASEAN+3 Health Ministers’ Meeting of 10–11 June 2003, China’s government was congratulated “for its very strong political commitment in containing SARS and its utmost efforts to improve the quality and timeliness of surveillance.” These positive comments were part appreciation and part encouragement for the new leadership to become a more responsible and accountable power. They were generally accompanied by calls for better structural adjustments to China’s health emergency system. The abovementioned ASEAN+3 joint statement, for example, added suggestions for how China could “make further contributions to the global containment of SARS.” In spite of the praise for the bold way in which China had dealt with the spread of SARS from mid-April 2003 onward, credibility was not that easily restored. At the beginning of June 2003, for example, when China reported a sharp drop of new cases, WHO spokesman Ian Simpson bluntly said: We do not know enough about where these numbers are coming from. [. . .] It may simply be that there has been a dramatic drop off in the number of SARS cases, but clearly because of the way that SARS emerged in China, China has a credibility problem.71 The epidemic in Beijing began to subside in mid-May 2003, and on June 24 2003 China was taken off the WHO list of ‘Areas with Recent Local Transmission of SARS.’ The Western media had not linked the SARS crisis to China’s preparations for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, and did not raise the issue of whether the public health situation in China would pose a danger to the event. Apparently, the 2008 Games were still too far ahead to be on reporters’ minds. Analysis The SARS epidemic was the most severe Chinese crisis for the Chinese government since the 1989 crackdown on the student protests. It affected people’s health, China’s economy and national stability, and dealt a severe blow to China’s international image and credibility. The Chinese government was accused of covering up, jeopardizing lives, lacking responsibility, and an unwillingness to cooperate internationally in tackling the epidemic. The crisis also highlighted the weaknesses of China’s political system, which had contributed to the scope of the crisis. The system offered no incentives for drawing the 70  WHO, “Update 79: Situation in China” (June 12 2003), WHO website at http://www.who .int/csr/don/2003_06_12/en/. 71  “Officials Question Latest Chinese SARS Reports,” PBS Online News Hour (June 3 2003).

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central authority’s attention to local problems and had prevented the domestic media from reporting on the proliferation of cases, thus delaying measures to stop the disease from spreading. The fact that the epidemic erupted in a politically uncertain period of leadership transition, in which authorities avoid taking important decisions, aggravated the situation. The Chinese government’s reaction to the SARS epidemic can be roughly divided into three phases. During the first phase, which ran from late 2002 until the end of the NPC in mid-March 2003, Chinese authorities denied and covered up the situation. In the second phase, from mid-March until mid-April 2003, the Chinese government took corrective action, but it did not yet admit the scale of the problem and kept foreign observers at bay; publicity was aimed at reassuring domestic audiences. During the final phase, which began after the Politburo Standing Committee meeting of April 17 2003, the Chinese government opened up and acknowledged its problems, strengthened its corrective actions, engaged in international cooperation, and stepped up its public diplomacy activities to restore its badly damaged image. China’s public diplomacy during this period was aimed at convincing domestic and foreign publics that the Chinese government now provided complete and accurate information, was taking all possible measures to contain the epidemic, and that it was taking good care of the victims. Chinese leaders conveyed this message via the media and at international summits. They invested in SARS education for domestic audiences and foreigners in China via television programs, seminars, and printed material on SARS prevention, such as booklets and posters.72 For almost two months, the Chinese government held daily press conferences and, for a short while, the media were allowed to report relatively openly on all issues related to SARS. Soon, however, the domestic press was ordered again to focus on boosting people’s morale by emphasizing positive news about the fight against SARS. The government opened up to international cooperation with the WHO and other organizations, participated in international conferences and workshops on SARS, and was flexible with regard to the involvement of Taiwan in international SARS-related activities. After the height of the epidemic had subsided, China even sought to play a leading role in the global fight against SARS. By dismissing and punishing some of those who had mishandled the SARS outbreak, China’s government also showed that it was willing to hold officials politically accountable. The Economist wrote in reaction to the resignation of China’s health minister: “It almost looks like the way that politics works in a 72  “China Increases Anti-SARS Education in Rural Areas,” People’s Daily (May 8 2003).

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democratic, accountable country.”73 China’s efforts to learn from the crisis and improve domestic health-care monitoring and international coordination on health affairs continued long after the epidemic was under control. In November 2003, an opinion poll of 1,091 ‘movers and shakers’ in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou by Far Eastern Economic Review found that China’s elite believed that the Chinese government’s handling of the SARS crisis earlier in 2003 had improved China’s image.74 At an international level, however, doubts remained as to whether China would always be able and willing to give full disclosure. The SARS case also highlights the impact of the social media on government behavior. This was the first time that the Chinese leadership was seriously confronted with the power of social media to break its monopoly on information. Social media forced the Chinese government to speed up its investigation and to respond publicly. It furthermore contributed to an awareness by the Chinese government that its population had the right to know about issues affecting public safety. Lessons Learned That the Chinese government had indeed learned from the SARS epidemic became clear when, in the early months of 2004, a few new cases of SARS were found in China. Officials immediately reported them to central authorities and the WHO, and took all the necessary measures to prevent any spreading. The WHO commended the Chinese authorities “for taking swift action to contain the latest outbreak.”75 Around the same time, in January 2004, an outbreak of another disease, avian or bird flu, swept through Asia, including China. In this case, too, Chinese authorities duly reported to and cooperated with the WHO. They took bold actions to contain the spread,76 and organized a major domestic campaign to inform the Chinese people on how to deal with domestic birds in a healthy way.77 Nevertheless, suspicion of cover-ups resurfaced. The British 73  “China and SARS: China’s Chernobyl?,” The Economist (April 24 2003). 74  “China’s Elite Believe Country’s SARS Response Boosted Image: Survey,” poll by Far Eastern Economic Review (November 2003), cited in China Daily (November 14 2003). 75  “China’s Latest SARS Outbreak has been Contained, but Bio-safety Concerns Remain,” Update No. 7, WHO website (May 18 2004), online at http://www.who.int/csr/ don/2004_05_18a/en/. 76  Eric Teo Chu Cheow, “Asian Reactions to the Avian Flu Crisis: Lessons for Beijing,” China Brief, Vol. 4, No. 5 (2004). 77  See Stefan Landsberger’s website on Chinese posters, with the theme of SARS, online at http://chineseposters.net/themes/sars.php.

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journal New Scientist wrote that “official cover-up and questionable farming practices allowed Asia’s outbreak of bird flu to turn into an epidemic,”78 and other newspapers and reports voiced similar concerns about China’s openness on the issue.79 China denied any cover-up, but most experts point out that avian flu must have been circulating for a while before China established an ­information-reporting system for big veterinary epidemics in early 2004.80 This lack of credibility has been lingering for a long time and whenever there were cases of SARS, or small outbreaks of avian flu in birds or humans, foreign observers expressed doubts about Chinese measures and the accuracy of China’s reporting.81 More recently, however, China seems to have overcome many of these doubts. When a new type of bird flu—the H7N9 virus—emerged in China in late March 2013, credibility was no longer a much-discussed issue in international newspapers. Authorities took quick and adequate measures to contain the disease, published daily updates about the number of cases, were cooperative with international institutions such as the WHO, and shared research results with foreign health institutions and scholars. Its disease surveillance and reporting system was proven to be effective.82 During a press conference in Beijing, Dr Keiji Fukuda, WHO’s Assistant Director-General for Health Security, praised the Chinese government as follows: [. . .] the ingredients that you need are the right strategies, the right tools, and the political will and the leadership to implement these strategies and tools. That’s what we’ve seen, and that’s why we’ve been so impressed in our contact both with the health authorities in Shanghai and in Beijing.83 78  “China Denies Bird Flu Cover-up,” CNN.com (January 28 2004). 79  See, for example, Thomas H. Maugh II, “China Reports Presence of Avian Flu,” Los Angeles Times (January 28 2004). 80  David Cowhig, “Caijing Articles on Avian Flu: China has had the Flu for a Long Time,” website of China Digital Times (November 22 2005). 81  Gady A. Epstein, “Chinese Government Still Hedges on Avian Flu: World Health Officials Struggle for Information on Developing Threat,” The Baltimore Sun (July 2 2005); and Kerry Dumbaugh and Wayne Morrison, SARS, Avian Flu, and Other Challenges for China’s Political, Social, and Economic Transformation, CRS Report for Congress (February 12 2004). 82  See, for example, Yanzhong Huang, Coping with Public Health Hazards in Post-SARS China, testimony before the Congressional–Executive Commission on China hearing on “Food and Drug Safety, Public Health, and the Environment in China” (May 22 2013). 83  Press conference by China–WHO joint mission on H7N9 assessment, Beijing (April 24 2013), website of the WHO Office in Beijing, http://www.wpro.who.int/china/topics/ h7n9_influenza/transcript_20130424/en/.

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The Chinese government showed that it had not only learned how to deal with the outbreak of a serious infectious disease, but also how to communicate with domestic and foreign audiences and publicize its positive actions. China’s media strategy included regular news conferences, extensive coverage in English-language newspapers and English television news channels, all stressing China’s international cooperation on the virus. Various English-language newspapers opened special web pages about the virus, which provided news and background, including tips for prevention.84 The Chinese government furthermore announced that it would keep foreign countries updated and that it would accept foreign inspections.85 Together with the WHO, China organized a special presentation in Geneva on its response to the emergence of the H7N9 virus.86

Food and Toy Safety Crises

Over the past decade, food scandals have regularly erupted in China and the Chinese public has long been concerned about the safety of national food products. There was, for example, the 2004 ‘fake milk’ scandal in which more than ten babies died as a result of drinking baby formula with little nutritional value, and the Sudan I red dye case in 2005, in which a cancer-causing dye was used to color food products.87 In particular in 2007, however, a series of problems with unsafe Chinese export products drew attention from the media, governments, and health authorities around the world, and caused a major reputational crisis for China. Hong Kong-based China specialist David Zweig had already warned in spring 2007 that ‘Made in China’ could become known

84  See, for example, the SARS website “Fighting Against H7N9 Bird Flu” of the China Daily, online at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013h7n9/; or “China High Alert on Influenza A (H7N9) of People’s Daily, online at http://english.people.com.cn/102775/ 207149/index.html (accessed June 2013). 85  Xinhua, “China to Update Countries on H7N9 Bird Flu,” China Daily (April 8 2013). 86   “H7N9 Response Discussed during World Health Assembly” (May 23 2013), website of the WHO Beijing Office at http://www.wpro.who.int/china/mediacenter/ releases/2013/20130523/en/. 87  “Milk Powder Kills Babies, Premier Orders Investigation,” People’s Daily (June 25 2004); Yan Hu, “Red Dye a ‘Food for Thought’ for Chinese,” People’s Daily (March 31 2005); see also the overview in Jenifer Huang McBeath and Jerry McBeath, Environmental Change and Food Security in China (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, 2010), p. 228.

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as ‘Buyer Beware,’88 and that is exactly what happened. One year later, in autumn 2008, China again made international headlines with an unsafe product. This time it was tainted baby formula, which led to the deaths of six babies and health problems for hundreds of thousands of other Chinese infants. This crisis resulted in a serious domestic and international distrust of Chinese products that lasts until today. The 2007 Pet Food and Toys’ Scandals In April 2007, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) received reports of pets believed to have been sickened by packaged pet food imported from China.89 The United States claimed that Chinese wheat gluten contaminated by the chemical melamine had caused the pets’ health problems. Melamine is a chemical that makes food products look rich in protein but that causes serious kidney problems. US newspapers soon began to report on the allegedly contaminated Chinese-made pet food. The Chinese authorities did not immediately grasp the potential impact of the case,90 and their first reaction was to remain silent or deny the scope of the problems, just as they had done in earlier cases. In 2006, for example, when Panama reported about tainted toothpaste and deadly cough medicine made with poisonous glycerin imported from China,91 China denied that it had exported tainted products,92 and accused the Western media of fabricating stories to discredit Chinese goods.93 Within a week, however, China’s quality-control watchdog—the Chinese Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ)—had to admit that two domestic companies had indeed exported the contaminated wheat gluten and rice protein blamed for the deaths of dogs and cats in the United States.94 This time, once it had to acknowledge the problems, the Chinese government took bold corrective action. The quality-control watchdog AQSIQ launched 88  David Barboza, “Fake Goods and Unsafe Food Threaten Chinese Exports,” New York Times (May 18 2007). 89  David Barboza and Alexei Barrionuevo, “Filler in Animal Feed is an Open Secret in China,” New York Times (April 31 2007). 90  “Sino–US Relations: The View from Congress,” public discussion event with US Congressmen Mark Kirk and Rick Larsen (Washington, DC: CNA Corporation, October 17 2007). 91  Walt Bogdanisch and Jake Hooker, “From China to Panama, a Trail of Poisoned Medicine,” New York Times (May 6 2007). 92  Li Cao, “Firms Deny Responsibility for Poison Pet Food,” China Daily (April 4 2007). 93  See, for example, Anita Manning and Calum MacLeod, “China Denies Role in Pet Food Recall,” USA Today (April 3 2007). 94  McBeath and McBeath, Environmental Change and Food Security in China, p. 229.

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comprehensive food inspections throughout China, revoked business licenses and punished companies that did not adhere to safety ­regulations.95 The Chinese government also stepped up its ongoing work on structural improvements in the Chinese product-safety regime. AQSIQ set up a recall system for substandard products and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce swiftly passed new regulations imposing limits on the import and export of toxic compounds.96 The Chinese government furthermore unveiled a Five-Year Plan on import and export food safety,97 and approved various new laws strengthening the monitoring of product safety. Export companies that did not meet quality standards were blacklisted and closed.98 The United States, meanwhile, had stepped up its investigation of Chinese export products and found more cases of contamination. In late spring 2007, US authorities blocked the import of various other Chinese products, such as toothpaste and Chinese seafood that were suspected of containing harmful chemicals.99 Policymakers in Europe and Asia also expressed serious concerns about Chinese products,100 causing China, in the words of The Economist, to stand “on the verge of a global PR disaster.”101 The Chinese government tried to save the reputation of Chinese products by both downplaying the situation and taking corrective action. Whenever a new allegation about an unsafe Chinese product surfaced, the Chinese government’s initial reaction was still to deny the issue, to evade responsibility, or to reduce its offensiveness by counter-attacking other countries. China’s State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA), for example, emphasized mitigating factors by pointing out: “As a developing country, China’s food and drug supervision work began late with weak foundations. Therefore, the situation is not very satisfactory.”102 AQSIQ took a more assertive approach. In response 95  “Poisonous Pet Feed Prompts Stricter Food Safety Checks,” China Daily (May 10 2007); “China Names and Shames Companies for Exporting Substandard Food Products,” People’s Daily (July 10 2007); and Zhu Zhe, “Inferior Food Exporters Punished,” China Daily (July 21 2007). 96  Xinhua, “China Pledges Full Investigation into Tainted Toothpaste” (May 24 2007). 97  Xinhua, “Five-year Plan to Ensure Food, Drug Safety” (May 12 2007). 98  “China Blacklists 400 Exporters,” China Daily (August 5 2007). 99  Jane Zhang and Ellen Byron, “FDA Blocks Imports of Chinese Toothpaste,” Wall Street Journal (May 24 2007); and Jane Zhang and Neil King Jr., “FDA Blocks Chinese Seafood on Contamination Concerns,” Wall Street Journal (June 29 2007). 100  Jason Leow, “EU is Prepared to Send China Tough Message on Product Safety,” Wall Street Journal (July 25 2007). 101  “China’s Food Safety,” The Economist (June 12 2007). 102  Zhao Huanxin, “China’s Food Safety Beset by Challenges,” China Daily (July 11 2007).

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to the above warning by the United States’ FDA over the safety of Chinese toothpaste, AQSIQ stated that it “strongly disagreed” with the warning, adding that it was “unscientific, irresponsible and contradictory.”103 The head of AQSIQ, Li Changjiang, accused the foreign media of raising unnecessary alarm about Chinese products in order to influence the US–China trade war, when he asserted: “Especially those based in the US, have wantonly reported on socalled unsafe Chinese products. They are turning white to black.” Li added: “One company’s problem doesn’t make it a country’s problem.”104 Beijing pointed out that many countries have similar problems,105 and in its turn accused other countries of exporting tainted products to China. In late June 2007, Chinese quarantine officials said that they had seized “shipments of orange pulp and preserved apricots from the United States, citing high levels of bacteria, mildew, and sulfur dioxide,”106 and in August 2007 China rejected the import of US pacemakers, as well as Indonesian seafood, which were allegedly substandard.107 Many Chinese observers criticized this approach. Tsinghua Professor in Media and Cultural Studies, Shi Anbin, for example, pointed out that turning the tables and focusing attention on problems with US products was “not a wise strategy.” He argued that China needed to face its own problems, “rather than pointing an accusing finger at a scapegoat.” Shi added: “I believe Chinese officials still need to learn some PR and communication skills.”108 China’s SFDA also warned that China needed to tackle the problems if it wanted to avoid serious damage to its credibility on the international stage.109 An op-ed in the People’s Daily argued that despite the fact that “those who stirred up a ‘China threat’ in recent years have taken this opportunity for a malicious attack,” China would not “have to fear any media hype” when it ensures “that ‘made in China’ becomes a [high] standard in America and Europe.”110

103  Zhu Zhe, “Watchdog Rejects US’s Toothpaste Warning,” China Daily (June 4 2007). 104  “China: US Media Exaggerating Food Woes,” China Daily (July 16 2007); and Zhu Zhe, “Foreign Media Rapped over Food Reports,” China Daily (July 16 2007). 105  “WHO: Food Safety ‘Big Problem’ for All,” China Daily (July 19 2007). 106  “Official: Chinese Exports are Safe,” China Daily (June 29 2007). 107  “China Rejects Unqualified Pacemakers from US,” China Daily (August 20 2007); and “China Blacklists 400 Exporters,” China Daily (August 5 2007). 108  Shi Anbin, cited in Ariana Eunjung Cha, “After Silence, China Mounts Product Safety PR Offensive,” Washington Post (July 14 2007). 109  “China’s Reputation at Risk,” China Daily (July 9 2007). 110  Ding Gang, “ ‘Made in China’: Turning Challenge into Opportunity,” People’s Daily (July 17 2007).

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Simultaneously with the assertive approach noted above, China focused on corrective actions and ensured that the complete overhaul of the Chinese ­product-safety regime was widely publicized. AQSIQ reported that from December 2006 to May 2007, it had dealt with 23,000 cases of fake brand and substandard food and that 180 food manufacturers had been shut down for making poor-quality food.111 The watchdog also announced that inspections during spring 2007 had revealed that 86 per cent of inspected products had passed the test, and added that China’s food-safety records had much improved over recent decades.112 Chinese newspapers were told to pay much attention to government measures aimed at improving product safety. They published upbeat articles titled “Food Safety a Top Priority,” “China to Rectify Structural Flaws in Food Safety Supervision,” and “China En Route to Better Food Safety.”113 The inspections also led to the dismissal or arrest of many officials of China’s SFDA on charges that they were involved in making counterfeit products. In July 2007, a former Director of the SFDA, Zheng Xiaoyu, was executed after having been found guilty of corruption.114 The execution was intended to show that China was serious about improving its product safety, and was hailed by domestic audiences.115 The foreign press, however, condemned the sentence, pointing out that it “was unusually harsh and its execution uncommonly swift,” and that it probably served a political purpose.116 In the eyes of foreign audiences, the execution confirmed the negative image of China’s regime as being relentlessly harsh and authoritarian. As the Beijing Olympic Games were less than one year away, China’s foodsafety situation was an extremely important issue. The Chinese government realized that the series of product-safety scandals could affect people’s 111  In David Barboza, “In Food Safety Crackdown, China Closes 180 Plants,” New York Times (June 27 2007). 112  Zhu Zhe, “China’s Food Quality Up to Standard, China Daily (July 4 2007). 113  “China to Rectify Structural Flaws in Food Safety Supervision,” People’s Daily Online (July 20 2007); “Premier: Food Safety a Top Priority,” People’s Daily Online (July 26 2007); and Wu Chen and Wu Qiong, “China En Route to Better Food Safety,” Xinhua (September 16 2007). Other examples include Zhu He, “Food Safety High on Agenda,” China Daily (August 20 2007); “China Takes Measures to Enhance Product Quality, Food Safety,” People’s Daily (September 12 2007); and “China Launches Nationwide Campaign on Food Safety in Catering Sector,” People’s Daily (September 5 2007). 114  “Former SFDA Chief Executed for Corruption,” China Daily (July 10 2007). 115  Mark Magnier, “Chinese Applaud Execution of Former Drug Safety Chief,” Los Angeles Times (July 11 2007); and “Only Death Penalty Can Atone his Towering Crime!,” People’s Daily (July 12 2007). 116  Joseph Kahn, “China Quick to Execute Drug Official,” New York Times (July 11 2007).

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c­ onfidence about the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, so it began to take action. The Beijing Olympics food-security panel, which had already been established in 2005, and other stakeholders involved in food supply for the Olympics, stepped up their work.117 They organized seminars on food safety and invited foreign companies and institutions to help China design and implement measures to improve safety monitoring.118 In June 2007, for example, the Moody International Group and the Food Safety and Hygiene Authority of Beijing’s municipal government jointly carried out a comprehensive food safety and hygiene management program for the Beijing Olympic Games, in which more than 1,500 restaurant managers and catering services’ providers were trained.119 In July 2007, Beijing reported that it had developed a quality-control system to guarantee safe food for the 2008 Olympic athletes,120 and in August 2007 it announced a test run for the monitoring system.121 In subsequent months, up until the August 2008 Olympic Games, China regularly reported its measures to ensure that all food would be safe during the event.122 Foreign athletes, however, were not convinced, and many decided to bring their own food to the Beijing Games.123 In summer 2007, however, the Chinese product-safety scandal widened. In June 2007, US newspapers started reporting about unsafe Chinese-made toys. Toy company RC2 announced that it had recalled 1.5 million ‘Thomas & Friends’ trains and rail components that were coated with lead paint at a factory in China. The New York Times wrote that all of the 24 kinds of toys recalled 117  “SFDA Commissioner Shao Mingli Attends the 2nd Meeting of Beijing Olympic Games Food Safety Expert Panel,” website of the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA), online at http://former.sfda.gov.cn/cmsweb/webportal/W43879541/A64022076.html (accessed September 2012). 118   “Shao Mingli Emphasizes Intensifying Supervision and Administration to Ensure Olympic Food and Drug Safety,” August 7 2007, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2007-08/09/ content_711192.htm. 119  “Moody International China Serves Beijing Olympic Games In Food Safety Training,” available online at http://www.moody.com.cn/docs/2008-MI-China-Beijing-Olympics .pdf (accessed August 2012). 120  “Food Safety for 2008 Olympics ‘Fully Guaranteed,’ ” China Daily (July 10 2007); and Liu Weifeng, “System to Ensure Safe Food for Athletes,” China Daily (July 11 2007). 121  “Beijing to Launch Daily Reports on Food Safety,” China Daily (July 13 2007). 122  Lei Lei, “Food Safety Assurance for Olympic Games,” China Daily (August 7 2007); “Beijing Guarantees Olympic Food Safety,” CCTV program (November 11 2007); and “Food Safety Center on Cards,” China Daily (January 3 2008). 123  Ben Shpigel, “Wary US Olympians Will Bring Food to China,” New York Times (February 9 2008).

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for safety reasons in the United States during the first half of 2007 had been manufactured in China.124 The issue still drew limited public attention at the time but when, in August 2007, renowned US toymaker Mattel reported the recall of 19.6 million allegedly unsafe China-made toys,125 it was widely publicized in the Western media and the reputation of Chinese products was dealt another serious blow. The growing scope of the crisis revealed structural shortcomings in China’s inspection system and ethical business standards. Much of the domestic and foreign criticism was therefore directed at the Chinese government and China as a whole, rather than at the companies responsible for the unsafe products. Chinese leaders realized that they had to take additional action to prevent a further loss of consumer confidence. The State Council Information Office organized press conferences and involved its embassies overseas in its public diplomacy work, for example by having Chinese diplomats in the United States give press briefings to local media.126 The Chinese government invited foreign journalists to visit product-safety laboratories,127 and every positive remark on Chinese products by a foreign official was seized upon and highlighted by China’s domestic press. “Chinese Products Win Praise,” wrote the People’s Daily, with the China Daily adding “EU Toy Industry Chief: Chinese Toys’ Quality Reputable.”128 The Chinese government published a White Paper on China’s food quality and safety, which spelled out many specific measures to improve China’s ­quality-control system. The White Paper stated that “the situation of food safety is continuously improving” and that “for many years, over 99 per cent of China’s exported foodstuffs have been up to standard.”129 At the domestic level, CCTV in August 2007 aired a week-long special series of television programs titled “Believe in Made in China.” Broadcasted during primetime, the program aimed to restore domestic consumer confidence and included quotes

124  Eric S. Lipton and David Barboza, “As More Toys Are Recalled, Trail Ends in China,” New York Times (June 19 2007). 125  Eric Lipton and David Barboza, “Unsafe Chinese-made Toys Cause Alarm,” New York Times (June 18 2007); and Louise Story and David Barboza, “Mattel Recalls 19 Million Toys Sent from China,” New York Times (August 15 2007). 126   David Barboza, “China Steps Up Efforts to Cleanse Reputation,” New York Times (September 5 2007). 127  Barboza, “China Steps Up Efforts to Cleanse Reputation.” 128  “Chinese Products Win Praise,” People’s Daily (August 15 2007); or “EU Toy Industry Chief: Chinese Toys Quality Reputable,” China Daily (November 29 2007). 129  “China’s Food Quality and Safety,” State Council Information Office (August 17 2007).

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by the director of the AQSIQ, foreign businessmen, and chamber of commerce representatives, in which they praised the quality of products made in China.130 In an attempt to defend China, Assistant Minister of Commerce Wang Chao argued at a press conference on August 23 2007 that many actors from various countries are involved in China’s manufacturing, hinting that China was not the only one to be blamed for the problems with China-made products. He furthermore added a warning that if China’s production encountered any damage, it would affect many countries around the world.131 A few weeks later, the Chinese government’s hint at other countries’ shared responsibility for substandard products received support from international scholars. A report was published that argued that China was only partially to blame for the shoddy toys, as it turned out that 74 per cent of the toys were not recalled for Chinese manufacturing-related reasons, but for design-related issues.132 An op-ed in the People’s Daily lashed out at the United States: The ‘Mattel incident’ is not the first that has smeared the ‘Made-in-China’ label, nor will it be the last. The safety problems of products have become a new form in the trade disputes between China and the United States.133 Beijing succeeded in making Mattel take public responsibility and say that it was sorry for the recall of millions of toys. With the aim of serving domestic needs, the Chinese translation of Mattel’s words sounded like an apology to China.134 At the international level, however, Mattel’s ‘apology’ was not a very successful public diplomacy action, as it generated little international publicity. US newspapers furthermore emphasized that Mattel had to go along with 130  Xue Fei, “CCTV Airs Special Documentary Series ‘Believe in Made in China,’ ” Epoch Times (August 27 2007); and “ ‘Believe in Made in China’ Aims to Rebuild Trust,” Washington Times (August 21 2007). 131  Xue Fei, “CCTV Airs Special Documentary Series.” 132  The report that revealed Mattel’s shared responsibility for the unsafe toys and was cited by major newspapers around the world is Hari Bapuji and Paul W. Beamish, “Toy Recalls: Is China Really the Problem?,” Canada–Asia Commentary, No. 45 (September 13 2007). See also Louise Story; “Mattel Official Apologizes in China,” New York Times (September 21 2007). 133   “Commentary: Misunderstandings on Made-in-China Products in Mattel Incident,” People’s Daily (September 25 2007); see also Huang Qing, “Trade Barriers Taking on More Diverse Forms,” China Daily (September 6 2007). 134  Renae Merle and Ylan Q. Mui, “Mattel and China Differ on Apology,” Washington Post (September 22 2007); and Feng Chuangzhi, “Mattel’s Apology Highlights Innocence of ‘Made in China,’ ” People’s Daily (September 27 2007).

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Chinese requests for some kind of apology in order to preserve good relations with China, where most of its manufacturing was done.135 In September 2007, the Chinese government decided to strengthen its efforts to overcome the crisis by setting up a Product Quality and Food Safety Leading Group that brought together all of the relevant government bodies and was headed by China’s top trouble-shooter, Vice-Premier Wu Yi, who had also led the 2003 SARS task force.136 The Leading Group started a four-month nationwide campaign to improve the quality of goods and food safety. Wu Yi called it a “ ‘special battle’ to ensure the people’s health and interests and maintain a good image of Chinese products.”137 The issue was high on the agenda of international meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum in August and the Summer Davos in September 2007. At these meetings, China acknowledged the former shortcomings in its ­product-safety monitoring and emphasized that it was working hard to solve the problems.138 The Chinese also gradually expanded their international cooperation in the area of product safety.139 With the help of the United States and the European Union, Chinese officials were trained in monitoring product safety,140 and China’s Ministry of Health reported regularly to the WHO, sending public notices that provided information on the measures that China had taken and on plans to organize various seminars in Beijing, including a highlevel international food-safety forum.141 During a visit to China at the end of October 2007, WHO Director-General Margaret Chan praised China’s efforts to crack down on chronic food-safety problems.142 135  See, for example, Abigail Goldman, “Mattel Plays Diplomat in China,” Los Angeles Times (September 22 2007). 136  Wu Chen and Wu Qiong, “China En Route to Better Food Safety.” 137  “Beijing Launches Massive Check-up for Product Quality, Food Safety,” People’s Daily (September 11 2007). 138  “China Defends Food Safety at Asian Security Summit,” Reuters (August 1 2007); and “Full Text of Wen Jiabao’s Speech at Summer Davos,” People’s Daily (September 6 2007). 139  See Zhu Zhe, “Nations Join on Food, Drug Safety,” China Daily (August 4 2007). 140  “China Takes Measures to Enhance Product Quality, Food Safety,” Xinhua (August 27 2007); Drew Thompson and Hu Ying, “Food Safety in China: New Strategies,” Global Health Governance, Vol. I, No. 2 ( fall 2007), pp. 1–19; and “China and EU to Work Together on Consumer Product Safety,” People’s Daily (July 25 2007). 141  Websites of the WHO at http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/newsletter/27/en/; and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China at http://www.aqsiq.gov.cn/ztlm/forum/index.htm. 142  “WHO Chief Praises China’s Efforts on Food Safety,” Agence France Presse (October 31 2007).

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The Chinese government also explored more offensive ways to improve its tarnished image. The Chinese Embassy in Washington DC put together a team of lobbyists to influence US legislators working in the area of China and foreign trade, and had them trained by lobbying firm Patton Boggs.143 Authorities in Beijing hired external advisers, including public relations firms Ogilvy and Edelman, to advise them on how to improve China’s image on product quality. Ogilvy PR provided officials with advice and training in responding to international media requests regarding the export of sub-quality products. Ogilvy PR’s President in China, Scott Kronick, said that one of the things that Ogilvy PR tried to do was to encourage the Chinese side to talk more. He explained: Our major role has been in providing a view of what the world expects from China and how it should respond. [. . .] There is cause for reporting and informing the public but sometimes it can be unbalanced, largely because the press have to report in a vacuum since they don’t have anybody from the government explaining what they’re doing. [. . .] The government needs to be accessible and address things openly and honestly. They should not blame the foreign media, but focus more on what they are doing to reassure people that they are taking measures to control the situation.144 In spite of China’s efforts to improve its product-safety monitoring and restore its image, polls at the end of 2007 indicated that the reputation of the ‘Made in China’ label had suffered much as a result of the scandals. In a survey of marketing and business professionals worldwide by Interbrand, 69 per cent of respondents said that the phrase ‘Made in China’ hurt mainland brands,145 and the general public in the United States said that they would still shun Chinesemade toys.146 The 2008 Contaminated Milk-Powder Scandal One year later, in September 2008, another large-scale food-safety scandal erupted in China. This time it concerned contaminated milk and baby formula. 143   Ariana Eunjung Cha, “After Silence, China Mounts Product Safety PR Offensive,” Washington Post (July 14 2007). 144  Saabira Chaudhuri, “Can PR Save China?,” FastCompany (November 20 2007). 145  “China’s Brands: Damaged Goods,” Bloomberg Business Week Magazine (September 23 2007). 146  Zogby/Reuters Poll cited in Brad Dorfman, “Most Consumers Plan to Shun China-Made Toys,” Reuters (October 17 2007).

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Affecting 290,000 children and causing the deaths of six infants, the scandal drew the attention of media from around the world. The WHO said that the crisis was one of the largest food-safety events that it had ever had to handle.147 On September 10 2008, a few weeks after the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the Chinese press reported that children in several provinces in China were falling ill and suffering from kidney problems as a result of drinking chemically tainted baby formula.148 Two days later, the Chinese company Sanlu, a manufacturer of a popular milk-powder brand, admitted that its milk was contaminated with melamine. The melamine had been added to watered-down milk to make it look richer in protein content and therefore sellable for a higher price. It soon turned out that parents had been reporting their suspicions about problems with Sanlu milk to the company for months, and that a possible link between infants’ health problems and Sanlu milk had been reported by doctors as early as December 2007.149 The company, however, had suppressed the information, and the municipal authorities of Shijiazhuang, the city where Sanlu was based, had also decided to keep things silent when they were informed about the problems in June 2008.150 As far as the media were aware of the issue, they were not allowed to write about any possible food-safety problems. The topic was off-limits in the weeks before the Beijing Olympic Games.151 Southern Weekend editor Fu Jianfeng, for example, who heard about the issue early on, wrote in his blog: “We couldn’t do any investigation on an issue like this, at that time, in order to be harmonious.”152 New Zealand dairy cooperative Fonterra, which held a 43 per cent share in Sanlu, stated that it knew in early August 2008 about the contamination, and had urged Sanlu and local Shijiazhuang authorities to recall the product. Nothing had happened, 147  “WHO Update on the Situation of Melamine in Baby Food in China,” transcript of WHO podcast (October 9 2008), website of the WHO at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/ multimedia/podcasts/2008/transcript_49/en/. 148  Xinhua, “Baby Dies of Kidney Stones, Fake Milk Powder Suspected” (September 11 2008). 149  Jim Yardley and David Barboza, “Despite Warnings, China’s Regulators Failed to Stop Tainted Milk,” New York Times (September 26 2008). 150  Alex An and David An, “Media Control and the Erosion of an Accountable Party-State in China,” China Brief, Vol. 8, No. 19 (October 2008). 151  Editor of Southern Weekend Fu Jianfeng, quoted in Yardley and Barboza, “Despite Warnings, China’s Regulators Failed to Stop Tainted Milk.” The Central Publicity Department had been issuing guidelines emphasizing the need to publish positive news, and reporters were required to ask permission to publish about food-safety issues. 152  Blog by Fu Jianfeng, translated and published by China Digital Times, online at http:// chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/09/fu-jianfeng-let-me-skin-sanlu-alive/ (accessed April 20 2012).

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however. It was only when Fonterra informed the New Zealand government, and when New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark told Chinese leaders in Beijing about the situation, that action was taken.153 Once the news broke, the Chinese government dealt with the health crisis in a swift and decisive way. On September 12 2008, China’s Health Ministry launched a nationwide investigation into contaminated baby milk formula of all brands, and all local health agencies were summoned to report immediately any cases of infants with kidney stones.154 China’s State Council started a “first-class national food-safety emergency response”155 and set up a national Leading Group comprised of officials from China’s Health Ministry, the AQSIQ, and local governments in the hardest hit provinces. It sent inspection teams to the provinces to supervise local research into milk powder. The results were published within days. They showed that baby milk powder from more than twenty other companies was contaminated too, although less heavily then in Sanlu’s case.156 In order to address foreign concerns, China’s Ministry of Health quickly declared that the contaminated milk powder was only sold on the mainland and Taiwan,157 but to no avail. The milk powder crisis led to scrutiny of other Chinese food items, and various products such as liquid milk, eggs, chocolate, baby cereal, and White Rabbit sweets were also found to contain melamine.158 One after another, foreign countries started taking measures. Countries in the Asian region organized their own inspections and removed Chinese milk products from their shelves. On September 26 2008, the EU banned Chinese baby food with milk traces, and various African countries banned imports of

153  Austin Ramzy and Lin Yang, “Tainted-Baby-Milk Scandal in China,” Time (September 16 2008); and “Formula for Disaster: ‘The Politics of an Unconscionable Delay,’ ” The Economist (September 18 2008). 154  Xinhua, “Health Ministry Starts Nationwide Haul of Infant Kidney Stone Cases” (September 12 2008). 155  Xinhua, “China Starts Emergency Response over Tainted Milk Powder Incident” (September 13 2008). 156  Xinhua, “China Seizes 22 Companies with Contaminated Baby Milk Powder” (September 17 2008). 157  Xinhua, “Health Ministry: Tainted Milk Powder Not Sold Abroad” (September 13 2008). 158  Xinhua “Tests Find Melamine in 31 Chinese Milk Batches” (October 2 2008); “Timeline: China Milk Scandal,” BBC News online (last updated January 25 2010); and “White Rabbit Creamy Candy from China Also Tainted with Melamine,” Channel News Asia (September 21 2008).

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Chinese dairy products.159 The milk scandal “has soured China’s ‘soft power’ ” wrote the Asia Times.160 During the initial weeks, the official media reported extensively on the case, and it rapidly became a trending topic on the internet. So-called ‘netizens’ reacted with anger and black humor. They circulated ‘photo-shopped spoof versions’ of Sanlu ads and a satirical diary detailing the daily dose of toxins that life in China entails.161 Soon, however, the press was told to tone down its coverage of the scandal, remove the topic from the front page, and to focus on positive messages that praised the measures taken by the Chinese government and hailed the health benefits of milk.162 While public anger mounted, the Chinese government announced that it would improve food-quality supervision and reform the dairy industry.163 Within two weeks, it had arrested eighteen suspects and summoned more than 80 people for questioning.164 Two people were sentenced to death and executed, and the chairman of Sanlu was sentenced to life in prison. The director of AQSIQ was forced to take responsibility for the crisis and stepped down, and the mayor of Shijiazhuang was dismissed for keeping silent after the municipal government had learned about the milk formula contamination. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited children in hospital who had been sickened by the tainted milk, met with their parents, apologized, and said that he felt ‘very guilty’ about what had happened.165 The Chinese government set up health-service hotlines in the provinces and stated that the affected babies would receive free medical treatment.166 The Chinese government widely publicized its measures to ensure safe baby formula and other milk products, as well as its efforts to comfort and 159  “Timeline: China Milk Scandal;” and David Barboza, “Asia Food Tainting Spreads, Leading to Recall in US,” New York Times (September 26 2008). 160  Willy Lam, “Milk Scandal Sours China’s ‘Soft Power,’ ” Asia Times (October 10 2008). 161  Anna Greenspan, “Milk Scandal Taints China’s Self-Image,” The Nation (November 3 2008). 162  Yardley and Barboza, “Despite Warnings, China’s Regulators Failed to Stop Tainted Milk;” and Greenspan, “Milk Scandal Taints China’s Self-Image.” 163  Xinhua, “China’s Cabinet Orders Inspections, Reform of Dairy Industry” (September 17 2008). 164  “12 More Arrested in China’s Tainted Milk Scandal,” Associated Press (September 19 2008). 165  Xinhua, “Premier Wen Visits Sick Infants” (September 22 2008); Willy Lam, “Milk Scandal Sours China’s ‘Soft Power,’ ” Asia Times Online (October 10 2008); and Simon Elegant, “China’s Poisoned-Milk Scandal: Is Sorry Enough?,” Time (September 23 2008). 166  Xinhua, “China Urges Provinces to Set Up Hotlines Amid Baby Milk Scare” (September 20 2008).

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c­ ompensate sick children’s parents. Premier Wen Jiabao furthermore tried to assure the international community of China’s ability to solve the productsafety problem at international summits, such as the September 2008 UN General Assembly meeting in New York City and the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Tianjin.167 During a Q&A session at the WEF, Premier Wen said that the milk formula case indicated that China was still weak in production-­ monitoring processes, and reminded the Chinese government to attach great importance to the morality of enterprises, business ethics, and social conscience. He assured the public that China would not just focus on food or dairy, but would “make the entire ‘Made in China’ worry-free.”168 Premier Wen also mentioned that he was very moved when he saw EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson drink a cup of Chinese milk on television to show his trust for ‘Made in China’ products. “It is because he not only sees the current days, but the future,” Wen said.169 China’s efforts to improve its image had indeed been supported by Mandelson who, on September 26 2008 at one of his last press conferences as EU Trade Commissioner, had drunk a glass of Chinese milk to show solidarity with China’s dairy industry. The action and Mandelson’s words—“I shall continue drinking my favorite milk product, which I enjoy and which does not make me nervous”—were broadcast live on Chinese national television. Ironically, ten days later, Mandelson was taken to hospital where he was diagnosed with kidney stones. Although not caused by the glass of dairy product that he drank on television, the incident was very embarrassing for the Chinese government, and was widely mocked on the Chinese internet.170 In October 2008, Premier Wen Jiabao gave an interview to Science magazine in which he acknowledged that the Chinese government was partly responsible for the tainted milk scandal:

167  “Chinese Premier Vows to Ensure Product Quality, Especially Food Safety” (September 24 2008), website of the Chinese Embassy in the US, online at http://www.china-embassy .org/eng/zmgx/zmsbzyjw/C/t514596.htm (accessed February 2013). 168  Xinhua, “Premier Vows to Provide Safe Products for People and World” (September 27 2008). 169  “Premier Vows to Provide Safe Products for People and World.” 170  “Did Mandelson’s Dodgy Chinese Milk Stunt Give Him Kidney Stones?,” Mail Online (October 11 2008); Jon Swaine, “Peter Mandelson to Have Kidney Stone Removed,” The Telegraph (October 6 2008); and Bob Chen, “Melamine Inevitable, Even for EU Commissioner,” Global Voices (October 10 2008).

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We feel great sorrow about the milk incident. We feel that although problems occurred at the company, the government also has a responsibility. [. . .] I once again solemnly emphasize that it is absolutely impermissible to sacrifice people’s lives and health in exchange for temporary economic development. Food, all food, must meet international standards.171 China also closely cooperated with the WHO. The WHO had immediately been informed of the problems on September 11 2008, but had harshly criticized the Chinese government. WHO officials said that the milk-powder contamination was caused by a combination of ignorance and deliberate action. Director Shigeru Omi of the WHO’s Western Pacific regional office told a press conference that “evidently there is also a problem with internal communication. It seems people already knew of this problem for some time and did not share this information.” He added, however, that the WHO was convinced that Beijing was now taking the issue seriously.172 In Chinese reports, the negative remarks were omitted, and it was stressed that the WHO had said that it was satisfied by the close cooperation with Chinese authorities in getting the necessary information and on ensuring that contaminated products were identified and removed from the markets.173 As discussed above, this was not the case, and during the remaining months of 2008, the Chinese government had to deal continuously with new cases of food contamination. It could do little more than admit the problems, and in November 2008 it allowed US authorities to station officials in three cities to help ensure the safety of Chinese exports.174 In December 2008, it was announced that the companies involved in the scandal would compensate 300,000 affected people, and in January 2009 a number of the companies involved sent a New Year text message to millions of cell phone users in which they apologized and asked for forgiveness.

171  Hao Xin and Richard Stone, “Q&A: China’s Scientist Premier,” Science, Vol. 322, No. 5900 (October 17 2008), pp. 362–364. 172  “WHO Hits Out at China over Milk Formula Scandal,” ChannelnewsAsia.com (September 21 2008). 173  Xinhua, “WHO: China Taking Right Direction in Handling Dairy, Contamination Issue” (September 21 2008). 174  “Timeline: China Milk Scandal,” BBC News (last updated January 25 2010).

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Analysis The food and toy scandals of 2007 and 2008 dealt a severe blow to the reputation of Chinese export products, but also to China’s overall image, particularly the 2008 milk scandal, which severely damaged international perceptions of China and the Chinese political system, and which erupted within weeks of the leadership in Beijing receiving praise for successfully hosting the Olympic Games. The scandals demonstrated that China, while able to impress the world with the organization of an almost flawless Olympic Games, could not prevent dangerously tainted baby formula from being sold on the market for months, leading to the deaths of six infants, and health problems for hundreds of thousands of small children. The repetitive pattern of food scandals in 2007 and 2008 revealed that food and product-safety problems were endemic in China, and that Chinese leaders were unable to live up to the promise that their measures to improve the ­product-monitoring regime would result in safe food products. The scandals highlighted how deeply corruption is entrenched in China’s manufacturing, and how difficult it is for the Chinese government to eradicate it. Observers pointed out that China’s non-transparent political structure lay at the root of the problem and that “until the government allows more openness, transparency, and media oversight, new crises of this type are inevitable.”175 Indeed, milk and other food scandals keep erupting in China up until today.176 Examples in 2013 include cadmium-contaminated rice, ginger with dangerous pesticide, and fake mutton made from rat meat. It is highly likely that this is just the tip of the iceberg.177 The Chinese authorities have lost all credibility as far as food safety is concerned. Strong words by leaders, such as those in March 2013 by new Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang about plans to tackle the problems with an “iron fist” and make “those unscrupulous producers pay high prices,” make little impression.178

175  Anna Greenspan, “Milk Scandal Taints China’s Self-Image,” The Nation (November 3 2008). 176  A few examples include Mark McDonald, “Carcinogen Found in Chinese Baby Formula,” International Herald Tribune (July 23 2012); David Barboza, “Recycled Cooking Oil Found to be Latest Hazard in China,” New York Times (March 31 2010); and Jessie Jiang, “China: Tainted Pork Renews Food Safety Fears” (March 23 2011). 177  For these and more examples, see “China’s Recent Food Scandals,” website of the Wall Street Journal, online at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873238448 04578531402162984348. 178  Xinhua, “Premier Li Vows to Tackle Environment, Food Problems ‘with Iron Fist’ ” (March 17 2013).

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In both the 2007 and 2008 cases, the Chinese government developed comprehensive strategies aimed at restoring consumer confidence, as well as China’s overall reputation. It took bold corrective actions, using the opportunity to implement structural measures, and leading to a complete overhaul of its product-monitoring system. It established special task forces, organized a broad range of food inspections, recalled substandard products, and announced new laws and regulations. It arrested and sentenced those guilty of producing and selling the unsafe products, and those who had helped to cover up. Various responsible officials resigned. Authorities made sure that these actions were widely publicized to audiences at home and abroad. They organized press conferences and invited journalists on tours to organizations dealing with the scandals. Chinese leaders openly discussed the weaknesses of the Chinese product system at international summits and during meetings with foreign leaders. In the first weeks after the scandals, the domestic media were allowed to report relatively openly on the issue, and news that was related to the scandals would make front-page headlines. In each case, however, the press was soon afterwards told to tone down its coverage of the scandals and to focus on positive news. As the 2007 and 2008 scandals were somewhat different in character, there are also differences in the public diplomacy strategies that China developed to address them. The 2007 product scandals erupted in the United States and mainly affected foreign audiences. Chinese leaders had to deal with accusations from foreign government actors whom China suspected of ulterior motives, and its first reaction was therefore to deny the accusations. After China had to admit publicly that Chinese companies had exported tainted goods, which meant serious loss of face for the Chinese government, it chose to counterattack its accuser. Many scholars and officials voiced disagreement with this public diplomacy approach, which indeed only led to foreign perceptions that China was more interested in retaliation than in addressing its problems. The 2008 milk scandal, by contrast, erupted as a largely domestic crisis. While the problems with Sanlu milk were covered up for months at company and local governmental levels, the central government in Beijing did not resort to downplaying the problems caused by the baby formula. Neither did Chinese leaders have a problem with apologizing to the parents of the victims. On the contrary, the scandal offered them an opportunity to show that they were compassionate toward the people. Finally, the cases show how difficult it is for the Chinese government always to strike the right chord with both domestic and foreign audiences. The execution of people responsible for the product scandals was largely applauded by domestic audiences, but was criticized abroad. The Mattel ‘apology’—with

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which China wanted to convey the message to the world that foreign companies also bore responsibility for the unsafe toys—only served its purpose in China, and not abroad.

The 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake

On May 12 2008, three months before the Beijing Olympic Games and in the midst of the anti-Beijing Games protests, a massive earthquake struck Wenchuan county, Sichuan province. The earthquake measured 7.9 on the Richter Scale and left 87,000 people dead, and five million people homeless. Among the dead were 10,000 children.179 The Chinese leadership reacted quickly. Less than ten minutes after the earthquake took place, the China Earthquake Administration informed Xinhua News Agency, which released the news to the public.180 CCTV interrupted its programs to bring news and, within a few hours, also live coverage of the disaster areas. Chinese President Hu Jintao called a meeting of the Political Bureau Standing Committee, issued an order to mobilize 50,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army, and urged all-out efforts to save victims and protect those still alive. The government furthermore set up a disaster-relief headquarters, with Premier Wen Jiabao as head.181 Within hours after the disaster had struck, Premier Wen Jiabao flew to the affected area in Sichuan province to direct relief efforts personally. From the evening of May 12 2008 onward, scenes of Premier Wen planning rescue work during his flight to Sichuan, holding a bullhorn to give directions to aid workers, and climbing into ruins to encourage people trapped inside, were continuously broadcasted on Chinese television.182 The images were also released to foreign broadcasters. Newspapers published reports and a series of pictures of a weeping Premier Wen at rescue sites, comforting wounded children and 179   World Bank, “From Rubble to Knowledge: Lessons-Learned from the Wenchuan Earthquake” (December 17 2009). 180  Chen Yong and David C. Booth, The Wenchuan Earthquake of 2008: Anatomy of a Disaster (Heidelberg, Germany: Springer, 2011), p. 199. 181  Xinhua, “China’s Hu Says Quake Relief Government’s Top Priority” (May 13 2008), available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–05/13/content_8155551.htm (accessed May 9 2012). 182  Mu Xuequan, “Premier Wen Pledges to Save More Lives when Inspecting Quake-hit Hospital, School,” Xinhua (May 13 2008), available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2008-05/13/content_8155475.htm.

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orphans, and urging rescue workers to do their utmost to save lives.183 Well publicized, too, was Wen’s expression of appreciation to several American volunteers who had joined the rescue efforts and who he met on his way to one of the villages in the disaster area.184 These images of the first hours and days after the disaster gave the Chinese government a human face, and conveyed the message that China’s leadership cared about its people and was doing all it could to help the victims.185 Chinese organizations opened various Chinese– English bilingual websites to provide the latest news on quake-relief efforts,186 and the State Council Information Office organized press conferences and provided daily updates on quake-related news. Furthermore, the domestic press was able to report on the disaster in an unprecedentedly open way during the first week, as will be discussed in more detail below. China’s relief efforts were impressive, but stood out as particularly positive against the lack of an adequate response by the regime in Myanmar to the disaster caused by tropical storm Nargis eight days earlier. The British newspaper The Times, for example, wrote “China responds to disaster with compassion; Burma remains criminally negligent,”187 and The Economist compared “Myanmar’s lethargic and secretive handling of its cyclone” to China’s rapid and uncharacteristically open response, concluding that China’s leaders had “scored some unusual public-relations successes.”188 Myanmar’s leadership had not only been unable to cope with the devastation caused by the storm, but had also refused foreign aid organizations access to the victims. China, on the contrary, was more flexible than ever before toward foreign aid offers. For the first time in history, the Chinese government allowed professional searchand-rescue teams and medical assistance teams from abroad into China and the area affected by the earthquake.189 The Chinese government even f­ ormally 183  “Chinese Premier’s Expressions in Face of Disaster,” picture 11, People’s Daily (May 15 2008). 184  “Chinese Premier’s Expressions in Face of Disaster,” picture 15. 185  See, for example, Chris Buckley, “ ‘Grandpa’ Wen Comforts China’s Earthquake Victims,” Reuters (May 14 2008). 186  “Bilingual Websites on Quake Relief,” website of the Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, at http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/earthquake20080512/t457239.htm (accessed May 9 2012). 187  “China and Burma: A Seismic Shift,” The Times (May 14 2008). 188  “China’s Earthquake: Days of Disaster,” The Economist (May 15 2008). 189  Countries that sent teams included Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Hong Kong, Cuba, France, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Pakistan, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States. See United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCAP), Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action in Asia and the Pacific.

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requested the support of the international community to respond to the needs of families affected by the earthquake.190 On May 13 2008, relief goods supplied by the Taiwanese Tzu Chi Foundation and the Red Cross Society of Taiwan were the first foreign donations to reach the disaster area.191 In view of the relations between China and Taiwan, this was of highly symbolic meaning, aiming to show that in a time of humanitarian crisis, both sides were willing to put aside political difficulties. From May 16 2008 onward, aid teams of many international organizations and countries—including Taiwan, Japan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, France, Britain, and Germany—provided their services in the earthquake areas. The international community reacted positively to this effective and open approach,192 which inadvertently took away much of the attention from the troubled Beijing Olympic Games torch relay. Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and advocacy groups stopped their anti-Beijing Games campaigns. During a visit to the affected areas in Sichuan, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon praised China’s “extraordinary leadership” in dealing with the recent earthquake in Sichuan,193 US Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer called China’s response to the disaster “admirable and impressive,”194 and the International Federation of the Red Cross praised China’s rescue efforts as “swift and very effective.”195 Adding to the positive image was the domestic outpouring of financial and blood donations, and other offers of help.196 Domestic Chinese firms and private people donated an unprecedented (for China) amount of money and equipment. According to China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs, only 24 hours after the earthquake it had already received money and goods worth CNY Case Study: The National Disaster Management System of China and its Response to the Wenchuan Earthquake (December 30 2008), p. 5, available online at http://www.unescap .org/idd/events/cdrr-2009/CDR_2E.pdf. 190  “China Requests Emergency Supplies to Aid in Quake Recovery,” website of UNICEF (May 15 2008), available online at http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/china_43935.html. 191  Chen Yong and Booth, The Wenchuan Earthquake of 2008, p. 209. 192  See, for example, Michael Bristow, “Quake Reveals Softer Side to China,” BBC News (May 24 2008), available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7424262.stm (accessed May 9 2012). 193  “Ban Praises China Quake Response,” BBC (May 24 2008). 194  Speech by David Kramer, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “Remarks at Beijing Foreign Affairs University,” Beijing (May 25 2008). 195  Chen Yong and Booth, The Wenchuan Earthquake of 2008, p. 211. 196  Jonathan Cheng, “Chinese Open Hearts and Wallets to Victims,” Wall Street Journal (May 15 2008).

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221 ­million.197 It was the first time that the Chinese public had organized themselves on this scale. People queued to donate blood, clubs and societies throughout China turned themselves into voluntary organizations, and people took off from, or quit, their jobs to take part in relief work.198 The overseas Chinese communities were also extensively involved in raising funds and organizing relief aid. In many countries all over the world, overseas Chinese organized fundraisers, and Chinese embassies abroad opened special bank accounts to facilitate earthquake donations.199 In September 2008, the Overseas Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council announced that overseas donations for the earthquake and the victims of severe cold weather earlier in 2008 amounted to US$ 219 million. Later in 2008, the Overseas Affairs Office organized a special meeting to honor the outstanding donations and individual overseas Chinese citizens who had been involved in aid work.200 The Role of the Domestic Media In the first week after the disaster had struck, the transparency of reporting by the domestic press was unprecedented, and both the Chinese and foreign media had full access to the area.201 In a first reaction to the disaster, the Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had simply recycled its old general orders about positive reporting202 instead of giving specific directions. The domestic reporters ignored them,203 and demonstrated to their Western counterparts that they were able to “work to international 197  Wang Hongjiang, “Humanitarian Emotion Glitters in China Earthquake Relief,” Xinhua (May 15 2008). 198  Cheng, “Chinese Open Hearts and Wallets to Victims;” and Li Datong, “China and the Earthquake,” website of Open Democracy (May 10 2009), available online at http://www .opendemocracy.net/article/governments/china-and-the-earthquake. 199  Zheng Hangen, “Overseas Chinese Offer Helping Hands to Homeland,” Xinhua (May 17 2008); Chen Yong and Booth, The Wenchuan Earthquake of 2008, p. 212; and see the websites of the Chinese Consulate-General in New York at http://www.nyconsulate.prchina .org/eng/lsyw/qwgz/; or in Melbourne at http://melbourne.china-consulate.org/eng/zt/ donation/ (accessed February 2013). 200  “Overseas Chinese Donations Exceed 1.5 Bln Yuan for Snow, Quake Zones,” China Radio International (September 28 2009). 201  Li Datong, “China and the Earthquake;” and Andrew Jacobs “China’s Response to Quake is Unusually Open,” New York Times (May 13 2008). 202  Xinhua, “China’s Media Urged to Do a Good Job in Reporting Earthquake Relief” (May 13 2008). 203  “The Central Publicity Department Gets Overrun,” Ming Pao (May 19 2008), translated and published on the website of Zonaeuropa at http://www.zonaeuropa.com/200805b .brief.htm#025 (accessed May 10 2012).

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standards.”204 Some Chinese scholars point out that the Chinese media, for the first time “in the competition with Western media for the right to speak,” took a leading role in reporting and thus shaped a transparent image of China.205 The use and development of social media in China also got an enormous boost. According to Zhou Xisheng, Vice-President of Xinhua News Agency, the website Xinhuanet issued the first newsflash of the disaster to the world less than twenty minutes after the earthquake, and immediately reported about it in Chinese, English, and other languages, 24 hours a day.206 Soon, however, less favorable news with regard to the disaster began to dominate the media, and the government and Party reacted by resuming strict control over publicity. Chinese bloggers, activists, and the media had drawn attention to the substandard school buildings that had so easily collapsed during the earthquake, leading to a high percentage of school children among the victims. The schools were dubbed ‘tofu buildings,’ as they allegedly resembled soft and jiggling blocks of tofu. The victims’ parents called for the accountability of the corrupt officials who were responsible for the poor-quality buildings. They accused local government officials and construction companies of saving on materials and expertise when building the schools and pocketing the money saved. The China Daily wrote on May 14 2008 that China could not “afford not to raise uneasy questions about the structural quality of school buildings.”207 However, when the anger of parents increased and they began to organize themselves in protesting against corrupt officials, the mainstream media were quick to push questions about the problems in disaster response and the poor building quality into the background.208 They started to focus again on positive news, in particular on the relief work by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers, the gratitude of the people for the swift and effective response by China’s leaders, and on progress in rebuilding villages and cities.

204  Li Datong, “China and the Earthquake.” 205  Sun Hua, “Cong wenchuan da dizhen baodao kan wo guo yu xifang de meiti huayu quan zhengduo” [The Competition between Chinese and Western Media for the Right to Speak Seen from the Perspective of Reporting on the Wenchuan Earthquake], Xinnan keji daxue xuebao (zhixueshehui kexue ban), No. 4 (2008). 206  Zhou Xisheng, “Wenchuan Earthquake as Reflected in the Chinese Internet,” China.org.cn (November 7 2008). 207  “Each Lesson Counts” China Daily (May 14 2008). 208  Hu Yue, Dong Tiance, and Song Meijie, “Governmental Renewal Discourse in Rebuilding Wenchuan Earthquake-Damaged Communities,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Sheraton Phoenix Downtown, Phoenix, AZ (May 24 2012).

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Government news releases and media reports became “largely prospective rather than retrospective,” and messages conveyed the government’s strong commitment to reconstruction and renewal.209 Only more liberal publications continued debating the issues. In early June 2008, Caijing magazine, for example, published a twelve-page report on investigations into the quality of buildings in the Wenchuan area.210 The government did take various measures to address the issue of the shoddy buildings. They sent inspection teams to probe into schools that had collapsed, and to identify and punish companies involved in the quality scandal.211 Victims’ parents were offered compensation and a small pension in exchange for silence.212 In most cases they had lost their only child, on whom they would have relied for care and financial support when they retired and grew old. The lack of openness surrounding the investigations and the arrest of people involved in mobilizing parents, however, made people suspicious about the impartiality of the inquiries.213 Foreign media reported extensively on the anger of parents of the 10,000 children that died in the quake and, as a result, China lost part of the positive image that it had gained during the first weeks after the quake. The Role of the PLA The earthquake offered the PLA a good opportunity to raise its profile as “a mainstay of disaster relief”214 and thus create goodwill among domestic and foreign audiences. Military headquarters set up a ‘PLA Command Group for Resisting the Earthquake and Providing Disaster Relief,’ and quickly dispatched

209  Hu Yue, Dong Tiance, and Song Meijie, “Governmental Renewal Discourse in Rebuilding Wenchuan Earthquake-Damaged Communities.” 210  Zhang Yingguang, Chen Zhongxiaolu, and Yang Binbin, “Xuexiao daota yuan yu jianzhu zhiliangguo” [Collapse of Schools was due to Poor Quality of the Buildings], Caijing (June 3 2008). 211  Xinhua, “China Reiterates Severe Punishment for Companies Producing Substandard Building Materials” (May 29 2008). 212  Eddy Wong, “China Presses Hush Money on Grieving Parents,” New York Times (July 24 2008). 213  Chris Buckley, “China Prosecutors Join Quake School Collapse Probe,” Reuters (June 16 2008). 214  Yao Yunzhu, a researcher from the Academy of Military Science, quoted in Junmei Fan, “Earthquake Pushes Early Debut of MND Spokesperson,” available online at http://www .china.org.cn/government/central_government/2008-05/29/content_15542040.htm (accessed May 2012).

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troops to the disaster area.215 Within a week, the PLA had deployed more than 113,000 armed forces for earthquake rescue work.216 The Information Office of the Ministry of National Defense (MNDIO), which was just in the process of being established, rapidly developed a public diplomacy strategy. Three days after the earthquake, MNDIO Director Hu Changming made his debut as spokesperson, and addressed an audience that included 61 attachés from 47 countries. Hu detailed PLA and People’s Armed Police (PAP) rescue operations, and said that Beijing would “appreciate aid and support from foreign governments, people and militaries to the areas affected by the quake in Sichuan.”217 He furthermore emphasized the new level of transparency with regard to PLA work by saying: “I believe you have seen a more open and confident Chinese military.” The official account of the press conference reveals how new this type of work was for the military, by stating that officers from the four Military Headquarters (the General Staff, General Political, Logistics, and Armament Departments) who joined the press conference “answered the journalists’ sensitive questions in such a candid manner that some media judged it a ‘proper’ press conference.”218 A close examination of reporting on the earthquake disaster in the China Daily by Liangen Yin and Haiyan Wang reveals that the PLA’s work in the disaster area was constantly in the foreground, with articles emphasizing the scale of the PLA’s relief efforts, highlighting the difficulties that the PLA encountered in saving people, and expressing the local people’s admiration and gratitude for the soldiers’ work.219 On May 18 2008, Xinhua reported that armed forces “had pulled 21,566 people, both dead and alive, from the debris, [. . .] treated 34,051 injured people, and transferred 205,370 people to safety.”220 The PLA’s rapid and massive response to the earthquake, as extensively reported in the media, and its more transparent ways of operating and communicating, greatly improved its image at home and abroad. The MNDIO gave several press conferences, and military leaders praised PLA journalists for the

215  James Mulvenon, “The Chinese Military’s Earthquake Response Leadership Team,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 25 (2008). 216  Xinhua, “China Deploys 113,080 Armed Forces for Earthquake Rescue” (May 18 2008). 217  Jiao Xiaoyang, “China Welcomes Help from Foreign Militaries,” China Daily (May 22 2008). 218  Junmei Fan, “Earthquake Pushes Early Debut of MND Spokesperson.” 219  Liangen Yin and Haiyan Wang, “People-centered Myth: Representation of the Wenchuan Earthquake in China Daily,” Discourse & Communication, Vol. 4, No. 4 (2010), pp. 383–398. 220  Xinhua, “China Deploys 113,080 Armed Forces for Earthquake Rescue” (May 18 2008).

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“aggressiveness of their reporting.”221 The positive Chinese response to foreign military aid improved the PLA’s international relations and was applauded by senior foreign military leaders such as US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who “publicly contrasted China’s relatively open response to outside offers of assistance with the feckless and murderous dallying by the Burmese junta after Cyclone Nargis.”222 Analysis China’s rapid and effective response to the Sichuan earthquake greatly improved China’s battered image in the run-up to the Olympic Games, and pushed criticism of China’s policies and its human rights situation temporarily to the background. Beijing’s public diplomacy strategy aimed at rapidly providing information about the earthquake and its consequences, broadly publicizing its relief efforts, and shaping an image of a capable and compassionate government. The full access to the disaster area for domestic and foreign media, and the relatively open reporting of the domestic media during the first week after the disaster, also generated much positive publicity and goodwill within and outside China. Further adding to the positive picture was the unprecedented involvement of the common people and NGOs in organizing donations and relief aid. China’s welcoming attitude to foreign offers of rescue teams, materials, and financial support also created much goodwill, and formed a telling contrast with the response of Myanmar’s regime to the cyclone disaster shortly before the Wenchuan earthquake took place. For a while, the Wenchuan disaster created a common cause to fight against for domestic and foreign government organizations, NGOs, and individual people. Particularly active were the overseas Chinese individuals and organizations that organized events to raise money for relief work. The Chinese government explicitly acknowledged and expressed gratitude for foreign and overseas Chinese help. In addition, the case also offers an illustration of how China’s military is developing public diplomacy strategies, perhaps inspired by their colleagues at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the US Department of 221  Xu Sheng, “Xu Caihou Visits Military Information Units; Urges Military Journalists to Keep up their Good Work in Reporting the Fights of Rescuing Earthquake Survivors; Li Jinai Accompanies Him during the Visit,” Jiefangjun bao (May 19 2008), as quoted in Mulvenon, “The Chinese Military’s Earthquake Response Leadership Team.” 222  US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ speech delivered at the Shangri-La Dialog in Singapore (May 31 2008), cited in Mulvenon, “The Chinese Military’s Earthquake Response Leadership Team.”

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Defense, who invest much in public diplomacy, or, as they prefer to call it, strategic communication.223 The disaster offered the PLA the opportunity to take steps toward more transparency and to showcase a softer side of its work. The PLA played a major role in relief work, and messages of soldiers’ courage and relentless efforts were widely and abundantly publicized. The PLA’s willingness to cooperate with foreign military organizations in relief efforts also contributed to a more positive image abroad. In the end, however, the Chinese government was not yet ready to deal with the consequences of prolonged free reporting. Once critical debates developed, it returned to its default mode of controlling the news, and started emphasizing stories about successful aid work and rebuilding villages and towns in the quake-stricken region. Its reaction to public anger over the corruption that had led to substandard school buildings that had so easily collapsed revealed that it was not yet willing to deal with criticism in a transparent way, thus undermining the positive impression that China’s leadership had created with its initial response to the disaster. Conclusions This chapter analyzed China’s public diplomacy approach to two types of crisis: a series of health and product-safety crises that severely damaged China’s image and led to long-term loss of credibility; and a natural disaster that evoked sympathy and offered the Chinese government an opportunity to improve its image. China’s overall response to the health and product-safety crises reveals a pattern that contains many elements of Benoit’s Image Repair Theory and strategies. The Chinese government’s first reaction was to cover up and deny the allegations. This behavior confirmed existing suspicions among domestic and international audiences that information provided by the Chinese government cannot be trusted. The silence furthermore contributed to panic and rumor-mongering among the Chinese population. Only when the allegations and problems could no longer be denied did the Chinese government admit and acknowledge, to certain extents, its responsibility. In the 2008 baby formula powder scandal, the central authorities largely took responsibility and Chinese leaders apologized to the public, but in the 2007 toy and pet food safety crisis, which had an international character, China’s strategy included many actions that were aimed at evading its 223  Kristin M. Lord, “The State Department, Not the Pentagon, Should Lead America’s Public Diplomacy Efforts,” The Christian Science Monitor (October 29 2008).

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part of the responsibility. It reduced its offensiveness by downplaying issues, emphasizing mitigating factors, and shifting attention to positive actions. The Chinese government furthermore accused foreign governments and organizations of bearing responsibility for the crisis as well, and pointed out that they had similar problems. These messages blaming foreign governments were particularly publicized in China’s domestic media. In addressing foreign audiences and at international summits, Chinese leaders would emphasize that they were aware of the weaknesses in China’s system and that they were solving the problem. The extensive use of social media in China had an enormous impact on how the Chinese government dealt with the crises. Social media broke the government’s monopoly on information and encouraged it to become more transparent. Chinese leaders also became more aware that people have a right to know what is going on, in particular if their health is at stake. Responding to public concern is one of the most important ways in which the Chinese leadership legitimizes itself, so leaders hence have incentives to address people’s worries and demands. As discussed in chapter two, there are not only more than 500 million internet and social media users in China, but they are also very actively using these platforms to spread information. Use of the internet and cell phone messaging enabled people to find and spread information that was held back by the authorities. This pushed the Chinese government to step up its information services. This does not mean, however, that the Chinese government has lost all control over information. It is a matter of gradation. The majority of people still largely depend on Chinese state newspapers and television for their daily news. Additional news only becomes widely spread and sought with regard to crises, scandals, and celebrities. In the examples of reactive, crisis public diplomacy that have been discussed in this chapter, the impact of Chinese cultural factors was not very prominent. China’s perceived loss of face played a role in the evasive way that China reacted to foreign, in particular US, accusations during the 2007 food and product-safety scandals and in the importance that the Chinese government attached to the Mattel ‘apology.’ The impact of the political system, however, stood out very clearly. It was reflected in the Chinese government’s control over information, the role played by the domestic media, and the educational campaigns during the SARS crisis. In all of the cases, its control over information and the domestic media enabled the Chinese government to cover up problems that affected its position and image, or that were perceived as a threat to national stability. Shortly after the outbreak of the above crises, there were brief periods during which the Chinese domestic media were allowed to report relatively openly and critically about the situation. Immediately

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after the Wenchuan earthquake, there was even a stint of unprecedented free access for both domestic and foreign media to the area, local officials, and victims. This was welcomed at home and abroad, and led to positive reporting by the international media. In the end, however, controlling the media was still deemed the safest way to handle the crisis, and the domestic press was soon ordered again to boost people’s morale by emphasizing positive news about the Chinese government’s hard work and successes in dealing with the crisis, and its compassion for the victims. The biggest damage that the health and product-safety scandals did to China’s reputation concerns the related issues of the authoritarian system and credibility. Neither China’s public diplomacy, nor its overall response to the crises, could undo the damage. Over and over again, it turned out that Chinese authorities could not be trusted to provide timely, accurate information about problems that arose and that affected many people’s lives. The Chinese government stressed that the problems were a result of local corruption and flaws in immature inspection systems, and that these issues can be solved. In the eyes of international publics, however, corruption and flawed monitoring systems are inherent in China’s authoritarian system, which does not allow for independent inspection organs. China’s policy of blaming others and retaliating against countries that imposed import restrictions on Chinese products strengthened the negative impressions about China’s lack of responsibility. However, China also succeeded in improving various elements of its image. By dismissing and punishing officials and others who could be held responsible for the crises or for covering up, the Chinese government demonstrated a growing accountability. The thorough and often adequate efforts to deal with the crises and their consequences testified to the Chinese government’s capabilities. The government’s demonstration of genuine commitment to improving health and product monitoring systems, by initiating complete overhauls of these systems and cooperating with international organizations, showed that China was willing to engage in (selected) reform. As the recent outbreak of H7N9 shows, China has been successful in reforming its health systems. With regard to the more complex issue of food safety, however, China has so far failed to solve the problem. The new regulatory systems are not independent and corruption remains widespread. Food safety scandals therefore still abound. China’s public diplomacy was most successful in the case of the Wenchuan earthquake, where it drew global attention away from the riots in Tibet and the Olympic torch relay troubles, and improved various aspects of China’s global image. The earthquake gave Chinese leaders and the PLA a human face, and

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displayed the government’s abilities to organize rapidly a large-scale disasterrelief operation. China welcomed foreign help and allowed civil society to play an important role in relief efforts. The rosy picture was disturbed by the corruption scandal with regard to shoddily built school buildings, but the overall image remained largely positive, also in view of the extensive and successful rebuilding policies following the disaster. Last but not least, this chapter underlines that in times of crisis, public diplomacy can only support a country’s positive actions. Eager for relief and a solution for their problems, people will scrutinize everything that is promised or done, in particular when authorities already suffer from a lack of credibility. In the above cases, therefore, the Chinese government’s deeds spoke louder than its words.

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The Reception of China’s Public Diplomacy* The previous chapters concerned the sending side of public diplomacy; they examined why and how China develops and conducts public diplomacy. Public diplomacy policies, instruments, and messages, however, are targeted at audiences and are developed with the goal of improving a country’s image and winning foreign and sometimes also domestic audiences’ support for a country’s policies. No matter how carefully designed by the sender, it is the receiving side that determines whether or not a public diplomacy activity is successful. This final chapter therefore deals with the receiving side of China’s public diplomacy. After a brief discussion of the challenges of evaluating public diplomacy and China’s evaluation efforts, this chapter examines global audiences’ changing perceptions of a rising China over recent decades, as they have emerged from various opinion polls. It looks at different audiences’ views of China’s major assets and liabilities for public diplomacy, including its economic strength, foreign policy, and culture. It analyzes the regional differences in views of China, and highlights the obstacles to China’s image projection. The chapter furthermore ventures into exploring the question of whether the evaluation and the changing perceptions that emerge from opinion polls can tell us anything about the effectiveness of China’s public diplomacy.

Measuring the Effect of Public Diplomacy

Developing an effective public diplomacy policy or activity is difficult. Public diplomacy policymakers generally base their policies on their ideas about how target audiences will receive a message or will be attracted by the instrument used. It is important that policymakers understand the political, cultural, and social context of the receiving side. Ideally, they should know what kind of image the targeted country or group already has about their country

* This chapter draws from Ingrid d’Hooghe, “The Limits of China’s Soft Power in Europe,” in Sook Jong Lee and Jan Melissen (eds), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 163–190.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004283954_010 Ingrid

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or a ­specific policy,1 and whether people on the receiving side will recognize the country’s ideas or norms.2 Good understanding of the receiving side is no guarantee for success, but a superficial or flawed understanding increases the chance of the public diplomacy activity being ineffective. In the public diplomacy layer of monolog, the receiving side may fail to learn about the communication, may misunderstand the conveyed message, or may dislike it; in the layer of dialog, starting off on the wrong foot may spoil the conversation; and in the layer of collaboration, misunderstanding and unrealistic expectations may hurt the cooperation process and the end product. In order to understand how foreign audiences look at China and its policies, policymakers and scholars study foreign perceptions of China extensively, as they emerge from foreign press coverage and from foreign and Chinese opinion polls. Furthermore, they evaluate China’s public diplomacy strategies and activities. Some of these evaluations have been discussed in previous chapters, such as the evaluation of the Copenhagen Summit in chapter two, and the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo in chapter six, but there are many more evaluations by Chinese scholars of China’s public diplomacy activities.3 One example is the evaluation of the 2007 ‘China Year’ in Russia, based on a Russian opinion poll among Russian audiences, and supplemented with interviews by its Chinese author. It found that a majority of 70 per cent felt that the ‘China Year’ had helped them to understand China better, but that in most cases (67 per cent) it had not made them change their views of China.4 Another example is an assessment of the Confucius Institutes by a Chinese former Director of the Confucius Institute in Manchester, UK, who discusses various challenges for improving the Confucius Institutes as public diplomacy instruments, including the need for more two-way communication, more attention to promoting culture, and for a reduction of ‘the official color,’ or governmental influence, in Confucius Institutes.5 1  Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2011), pp. 99–100, and ­chapter 7. 2  Yong Wook Lee, “Soft Power as Productive Power,” in Sook Jong Lee and Jan Melissen (eds), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia, pp. 33–50. 3  See, for example, the section “Anli” [Cases] in the journal GGWJJK. 4  Liu Xiaoxiang, “Eluosi ‘zhongguo nian’ de gonggong waijiao chengxiao pinggu” [Evaluation of the Effects of Public Diplomacy of the ‘ Year of China’ in Russia], GGWJJK, No. 7 (fall 2011), pp. 35–42, Table 1. 5  Liu Hong, “Kongzi xueyuan yu zhonghua wenhua de guoji chuanbo: chengjiu yu tiaozhan” [Confucius Institutes and the International Dissemination of Chinese Culture: Achievements and Challenges], GGWJJK, No. 12 (winter 2012).

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Chinese scholars also evaluate foreign countries’ public diplomacy policies, study Western evaluations of China’s public diplomacy, and discuss their impressions of how foreign audiences receive Chinese public diplomacy.6 A report of a 2012 seminar on how to evaluate China’s public diplomacy at the Charhar Institute, for example, includes remarks such as that it is too early to evaluate the Confucius Institutes, that China does not know how to deal with being strong, and that the effects of the Chinese media’s international reporting are not yet very impressive.7 These articles and reports, however, do not pay much attention to evaluation methods, and little is published about Chinese efforts to develop comprehensive public diplomacy evaluation systems. Han Fangming and others point out that there is no “scientific assessment and evaluation system” in place, which leads to the conclusion—particularly in view of China’s huge investments in public diplomacy—that the government’s evaluation efforts are lacking.8 China is not the only country that has difficulties evaluating the effects of its public diplomacy. Many countries face this struggle,9 and scholars’ efforts to evaluate China’s broader public diplomacy endeavors, although they provide helpful insights, are never entirely satisfactory.10 There is no easy way to 6  For example, Fu Yushuai, “Hanguo gonggong waijiao de zhuti yu neirong” [The Subjects and Contents of South Korea’s Public Diplomacy], GGWJJK, No. 12 (winter 2012); and Tang Yanlin and Peng Lei, “Xifang guojia dui zhongguo gonggong waijiao de pinggu ji qishi ” [The Inspiration of Foreign Countries’ Evaluation of China’s Public Diplomacy], Dangdai shijie yu shehui zhuyi (shuangyuekan), No. 2 (2012), pp. 182–185. 7  “ ‘Ruhe pingjia gonggong waijiao de shishi xiaoguo’ jiangzuo yaodian neirong” [Main Points Made at the Seminar “How to Evaluate the Effect of the Implementation of Public Diplomacy”] (March 30 2012), website of the Charhar Institute. 8  See, for example, Han Fanming, “Wangluo waijiao cheng gonggong waijiao xinchong, zhongguo ruhe shunyong dashi ” [How should China Adapt to the New Darling of Public Diplomacy: Network Diplomacy?], GGWJJK, No. 9 (summer 2012); and Wu Baiyi, “Gonggong waijiao!!! Zhongguo waijiao biange de zhongyao yihuan” [Public Diplomacy!!! An Important Part of the Transformation of China’s Diplomacy], Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu, No. 3 (2010), pp. 115–125. 9  See, for example, Assessing US Public Diplomacy: A Nominal Model (Washington, DC: United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, September 28 2010), p. 2; or the case study on Sweden by James Pamment, New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 112. 10  See, for example, d’Hooghe, “The Limits of China’s Soft Power in Europe;” Yuanzhong Huang and Sheng Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly: An Analysis of China’s Soft Power,” East Asia Vol. 23, No. 4 (winter 2006), pp. 22–44; Sheng Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Soft Power (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), chapter 3; and G. Holyk, “Paper Tiger: Chinese Soft Power in Asia,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 126,

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measure the results of a country’s overall public diplomacy. In his useful “A Resource Guide to Public Diplomacy Evaluation,” Robert Banks names twelve reasons why this is so hard, the most important three of which are that public diplomacy’s “impact can be seen only over the long term;” that the evaluation needs to measure concepts that are intangible; and that the evaluation results may not be directly attributable to a public diplomacy intervention, in other words that it is often difficult to determine what exactly caused the result.11 It is possible to evaluate cultural and educational events, ask people what they think of a promotional movie, and count the numbers of tourists visiting China or foreign students attending Chinese universities. This information is useful in deepening the understanding of specific target audiences and in fine-tuning public diplomacy programs, but it does not necessarily say very much about how these activities impact upon people’s views of and attitudes toward China. An instrument that provides an indication of the broader views of a wide range of people is the opinion poll. This instrument, however, also has its limitations in measuring perceptions. Opinion poll outcomes are influenced by sample selection, the way in which questions are formulated and framed, and the timing of the interviews. The sample should be representative and big enough, and the questions should be neutrally worded and translated. Even if these prerequisites are met and the process is carefully executed, the timing of a survey may have a considerable impact on the polling results, as we will see below. People’s perceptions are unstable and easily influenced by the spur of the moment. In spite of these limits, however, many scholars, practitioners, and polling experts hold the opinion that “polling is integral to developing a better understanding of the barriers to and the opportunities for effective public diplomacy campaigns.”12 Political scientists Tao Xie and Ben Page used the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey to investigate what macro-level factors have a measurable impact on China’s image. They found that only a country’s levels of economic and social development have a measurable impact, with No. 2 (2011), pp. 223–254. They are not entirely satisfactory, because they provide indications of and informed guesses about the effects of public diplomacy but fail to prove a direct link between public diplomacy activities and (changes in) people’s perceptions. 11  Robert Banks, “A Resource Guide to Public Diplomacy Evaluation,” CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, No. 9 (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press, November 2011), pp. 11–12. 12  Joshua Fouts (ed.), Public Diplomacy Practitioners, Policymakers, and Public Opinion: A Report of the Public Diplomacy and World Public Opinion Forum, April 9–11 2006, Washington, DC (Los Angeles, CA: USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2006), “Executive Summary,” p. 9.

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a­ udiences in less-developed poor countries being more likely to have a positive image of China than audiences in economically developed countries.13 More research based on more extensive and recent data, however, is needed to confirm and expand these findings.

Global Views of China

In the middle of the last decade, various US and European organizations and companies began annually to include questions on China and China’s rise in their regional and global opinion surveys.14 Each of the polls has its own focus and surveys a different, although often partially overlapping, selection of countries. They also often overlap with regard to questions concerning general views of China. Their findings on individual countries, or the development of views in a specific year, sometimes differ, but in general they demonstrate similar overall trends in global views on China. In 2012, China for the first time published a large international public image survey. It examined people’s views in six countries: the United States; United Kingdom; Australia; India; Malaysia; and South Africa.15 The survey sought to gain a better understanding of the perceptions of China in developed and developing countries, with the aim of improving China’s public diplomacy strategy. It asked people, for example, how much they know about China, where they get their knowledge, and what Chinese cultural elements they like.16

13  Tao Xie and Benjamin I. Page, “What Affects China’s National Image? A Cross-national Study of Public Opinion,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 22, Issue 83 (2013), pp. 850–867. 14  The ‘fact tank’ Pew Research Center and the BBC World Service, in cooperation with Globescan/International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), started annually surveying views on China in 2005; the NGO German Marshall Fund and the Consultancy Gallup in 2006. Others started conducting occasional surveys, such as the Harris Interactive polls, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 15  Charhar Institute, “Zhongguo guojia xingxiang diaocha baogao 2012” [Report of the Survey into China’s International Image], GGWJJK, No. 12 (winter 2012). The poll by research organizations including the Charhar Institute, the International Center for Communication Studies of China International Publishing Group, and Millward Brown ACSR in Beijing, was conducted online in November 2011 with 1,959 respondents. It started by asking people what they knew about China. Majorities in the six countries surveyed said that they had some understanding of the country, which they had primarily gathered from television or the internet. 16  Charhar Institute, “Zhongguo guojia xingxiang diaocha baogao 2012.” Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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A s­ election of the results of these opinion surveys will be discussed below, focused on topics that are most relevant for the issues discussed in this book.17 Overall Views In the first half of the last decade, many people held positive views of China, not only in Asian and African countries, but also in Europe (see Table 1). At the time, people were willing to give a rising China the benefit of the doubt. They were optimistic about political reform in China and confident about the economic opportunities that China could offer. As discussed in chapter two, many people expected China to integrate rather smoothly into the multilateral regional and global system. European publics had high expectations of the EU–China ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,’ which had been established in 2003, and their worries about the global situation were focused on the unilateral behavior of the United States in the Middle East.18 During the course of 2006 and 2007, however, China’s popularity in the United States and Europe began to slip, a trend that became visible in the polls of 2007 and 2008.19 The idea that political reform would automatically follow economic reform in China began to be doubted, and global audiences increasingly worried about China’s international intentions and human rights situation. Furthermore, media scrutiny on China intensified in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, drawing attention to China’s many problems. The sliding figures in 2007 and 2008 also reflect people’s rising expectations of the Chinese government: they wanted to see China contribute more actively to solving global problems, in which China chose not to be involved. Moreover, trade barriers and a growing trade deficit with China raised concerns in Europe.20 The fall in China’s popularity during the period 2006–2008, as m ­ easured by the Pew Research Center, was the biggest in France and Germany. In France, the favorability percentage 17  Most of the figures analyzed come from the surveys conducted by Pew, as they provide the most information on the topics relevant to this study. 18  For a discussion of Chinese perceptions of Europe in the first years of this millennium, see Zhu Liqun, “Chinese Perceptions of the EU and the China–Europe Relationship,” in David Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider, and Zhou Hong (eds), China–Europe Relations: Perceptions, Policies, and Prospects (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 148–173. 19  See also, for example, BBC World Service Poll/PIPA/Globescan’s 34-country poll conducted between October 31 2007 and January 25 2008 (released April 2 2008), and similar BBC surveys in earlier years; or The Transatlantic Trends 2006 poll by the German Marshall Fund. 20  See, for example, David Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider, and Zhou Hong, “From Honeymoon to Marriage: Prospects for the China–Europe Relationship,” in Shambaugh, Sandschneider, and Zhou Hong (eds), China–Europe Relations, pp. 303–338; and David Shambaugh, “The ‘China Honeymoon’ is Over,” New York Times (November 26 2007). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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CHAPTER 8 Percentages of People with a Positive View of China: Development Over Time

Countries United States Britain France Germany Japan South Korea Indonesia Kenya

Pew 2013

Pew 2012

Pew 2011

Pew 2010

Pew 2009

Pew 2008

Pew 2007

Pew 2006

Pew 2002

% 37 48 42 28 5 46 70 78

% 40 49 40 29 15 n/a n/a a/a

% 51 59 51 34 34 n/a 67 71

% 49 46 41 30 26 38 58 86

% 50 52 41 29 26 41 59 73

% 39 47 28 26 14 48 58 n/a

% 42 49 47 34 29 52 65 n/a

% 52 65 60 56 27 n/a 62 n/a

% n/a n/a n/a n/a 55 66 n/a n/a

Source: Author’s compilation, based on figures published by the Pew Research Center21

dropped from 60 per cent in 2006 to 28 per cent in 2008; and in Germany, from 56 per cent in 2006 to 26 per cent in 2008. Previous research of people’s perceptions of China in the three big European countries—France, Britain, and Germany—in the first decade of the twentyfirst century suggested that people’s views may be shaped to a certain extent by their government’s views and policies toward China.22 In the first years of the new millennium, German and French relations with China had developed smoothly. Their leaders at the time, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French President Jacques Chirac, generally put economic interests first, and both aimed to avoid controversial issues. That situation changed when the newly elected leaders, Angela Merkel in Germany and Nicolas Sarkozy in France, initiated a shift in their countries’ policies toward China. 21  Pew Research Center, America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s (July 18 2013), which was conducted among 37,653 respondents around the globe from March 2 to May 1 2013; Pew Research Center, Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001–2008) (December 18 2008); Pew Research Center, Global Economic Gloom: China and India Notable Exceptions (June 12 2008); Pew Research Center, Global Unease with Major World Powers (June 27 2007); and Pew Research Center, Global Indicators Database (continuously updated), all from the Pew Global Attitudes Project, a series of worldwide public opinion surveys. 22  D’Hooghe, “The Limits of China’s Soft Power in Europe.”

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Merkel took over from Schröder as Chancellor in November 2005 and announced a foreign policy based on human rights. In an interview in 2006, she said that Germany should have the courage to be critical toward China on human rights and trade issues,23 and she indeed took a tougher stance against China than her predecessor. In 2007, Merkel was the first German leader to receive the Dalai Lama, and she decided to welcome him in the Chancellor’s Office, which implies recognition of the Dalai Lama as a leader of the Tibetan people. At the beginning of 2008, Merkel was also the first European leader to announce that she would not attend the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing. A second factor that may contribute to Germany’s continued low favorability rates of China is a more critical view of China’s political system, which is linked to bad memories of former East Germany’s episode as a country with an authoritarian socialist system.24 President Nicolas Sarkozy took over from Chirac in France in 2006. He launched an ambiguous policy toward China, with efforts to secure economic deals on the one hand, and criticism about Chinese politics and human rights on the other hand. Relations became bumpy and took a real downturn in March 2008 when Sarkozy threatened to boycott the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games. Relations deteriorated further, as we have seen in chapter six, when the Olympic torch relay in Paris was disrupted by protesters. The 2008 Pew Survey took place during this period of heightened bilateral tensions immediately after the disruption of China’s Olympic torch relay in Paris, and the timing may have added to the negative results, in particular as the favorability rate picked up again in 2009.25 In Britain, favorability rates of China remained relatively steady, reflecting stable Sino–British relations throughout the decade. UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2007–2010) continued his predecessor Tony Blair’s pragmatic approach toward China, and was able to avoid major incidents and upheavals in the bilateral relationship. Brown also met with the Dalai Lama, in May 2008, but saved China’s face by meeting him as a religious leader at the home of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and not at the prime minister’s office at 10 Downing Street.

23  Cited in “Mut zu kritischen Tönen” [The Courage to be Critical], Frankfurter Allgemeine (May 23 2006). 24  The latter was pointed out to me by Anja Désirée Senz of the University of DuisburgEssen, Germany, and Odila Triebel of the Institut für Auslandbeziehungen, Germany. 25  The Pew polling took place between March 17 and April 21 2008; the torch relay in Paris was held on April 7 2008.

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In the second half of 2008, after the economic and financial crisis had taken hold, views of China in the Western world changed for the better again. Although the Chinese economy was hit by the global fall in exports, it was still able to generate growth, and China became the economic engine of the world. Many governments knocked on Beijing’s door for financial support, and the Chinese government generally acted constructively. China’s positive financial situation thus became a resource of soft power. Curiously, China’s controversial diplomacy in 2010 with regard to the territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and its reaction to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo in late 2010 (see chapter two), are not reflected in the figures for 2011, which demonstrate an overall rise in positive views. Apparently for most people in the United States and Europe, China’s continued pledges to help the world overcome the financial crisis weighed more heavily than diplomatic conflicts far from home. In Japan, the percentage of positive views even grew in 2011. This relatively high favorability rate for China in Japan, which emerged from poll interviews held in April 2011,26 is most likely linked to China’s contribution to the disaster relief efforts in Japan after the March 11 2011 Fukushima earthquake and tsunami (see chapter five). During the course of 2012, however, China’s favorability rates in the United States, Europe, and Japan dropped again, which could be the result of slowing economic growth rates in China, China’s growing reluctance to bail out Europe, and increasing concerns about China’s policies with regard to its territorial disputes. Table 1 has already illustrated that China’s favorability rates vary greatly in different regions, and sometimes also between countries in the same region. Table 2 reveals this pattern in more detail, indicating that China’s policies toward Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America are generally well received in those regions. According to the 2013 Pew Survey, overall views of China are most positive in Africa, with a median 72 per cent of respondents in the six African countries surveyed looking favorably toward China.27 The median positive views in seven Latin American countries and six Asian countries, plus Australia, are both 58 per cent, but it has to be noted that in Asia, the median includes China’s very low favorability rate in Japan.28 26  See the endnote of China Seen Overtaking US as Global Superpower (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, July 13 2011). 27  The African countries surveyed by the 2013 Pew Global Attitudes poll are Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, and South Africa. 28  The Latin American countries surveyed are Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, El Salvador, Bolivia, and Venezuela; and the Asian countries surveyed by the 2013 Pew Global Attitudes

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The Reception of China ’ s Public Diplomacy table 2

Pew Regional Favorability Rates of China in 2013

Countries/regions

China’s favorability rates for 2013 %

United States Asia - Japan - South Korea - Malaysia - Philippines - Pakistan - Indonesia - Australia Africa Latin America Middle East Europe

37 58  5 46 81 48 81 70 58 72 58 52 43

Source: Author’s compilation, based on figures published by the Pew Research Center 29

In Japan, only 5 per cent of those surveyed in 2013 had a favorable opinion of China, the lowest percentage worldwide. This low score is obviously related to the bilateral territorial conflict over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which flared up again in September 2012, and the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in recent years.30 It is clear that China’s territorial disputes in Asia have a negative influence on its image in other Asian countries too. Large majorities of people in South Korea (77 per cent), the Philippines (90 per cent), and Indonesia (62 per cent) regard these issues as a big or very big problem for their country; in Japan, poll are Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, although the Asian median includes the Asia–Pacific country of Australia. 29  America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, July 18 2013), pp. 24–25. 30  In September 2012, the Japanese government purchased three disputed islands from a private Japanese citizen who claimed to be the owner of the islands. China reacted by intensifying patrols in the area. For more on the demonstrations, see chapter five of this book.

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82 per cent of those surveyed hold this view; but in Malaysia only a minority of 36 per cent agrees.31 The most positive opinions about China in 2013 are found in South and Southeast Asia, with a favorability rate of 81 per cent in both Malaysia and Pakistan.32 The relatively positive views of China in Latin America are the result of China’s investment over the past decade in expanding and strengthening relations with countries in the region. Many of these countries, in particular those with leftist regimes such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, welcome Chinese attention and investment as a means to counterbalance against US dominance in the region.33 The region’s trade with China is burgeoning, and China is the third-largest investor in Latin America, after the United States and the Netherlands.34 Chinese companies have invested in resource extraction such as oil, iron, and copper, and various Chinese banks provide big loans to countries in Latin America for infrastructure projects and heavy industry.35 Although there are concerns about sustainability and profits for local communities, many people benefit from Chinese investments and trade. Furthermore, there is an interest in the Chinese politico-economic model, as various countries in the region also seek a considerable role for their state in economics and trade.36 China’s cooperation, however, is not limited to the economic domain: the Chinese government also invests in military cooperation, as briefly mentioned in chapter two, and in cultural and educational ties with the region.37 31  America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, July 18 2013). 32  America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s. 33  See, for example, David Shambaugh, “China’s New Foray into Latin America,” YaleGlobal (November 17 2008), available online at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=11615 (accessed July 2012). 34  In the case of the Netherlands, this is thanks to the investments of Shell and Heineken. See Jörn Dosch and David S.G. Goodman, “China and Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2012), pp. 3–19, at p. 4. 35  Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, and Katherine Koleski, The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America (Medford, MA: Global Development and Environment Institute at Tufts University, February 2012). 36  Alex E. Fernández Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom, “Latin America: From Washington Consensus to Beijing Consensus,” in Alex E. Fernández Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom (eds), Latin America Facing China: South–South Relations beyond the Washington Consensus (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Berghan Books, 2010), pp. 181–194, at p. 191. 37  See, for example, Katherine E. Bliss, “China’s Projection of Soft Power in the Americas,” in Carola McGiffert (ed.), Chinese Soft Power and its Implications for the United States:

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A comparison between perceptions of China and of the United States in the 39 countries surveyed by Pew in 2013 shows that the median view of China is less positive than that of the United States: 50 per cent of people around the globe express a favorable opinion of China, compared to 63 per cent with a favorable opinion of the United States. In 22 of the 39 countries surveyed, more people look favorably upon the United States than on China; in 15 countries, in particular in the Middle East, Latin America and South and Southeast Asia, it is the other way around. Positive views of China are not limited to these regions, however. In Australia, for example, 58 per cent have a favorable view of China; and in Greece the percentage is 59. One striking finding is that there is a considerable gap between perceptions of China of young and older people. Surveys by both Pew and the German Marshall Fund show that in many countries young people look far more favorably on China than older people.38 In the United States, for example, only 27 per cent of people above 50 years have a favorable view of China, but for people aged 18 to 29, the percentage is 57.39 Older people’s views are apparently influenced by images of China before it opened up to the Western world and of the June 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, whereas younger people are likely attracted to China’s dynamism and the economic opportunities that it offers. In the Chinese survey, people were also asked how they got their information about China. Large majorities said that television was the number one medium by which they learned about China, followed, at some distance, by the internet, newspapers, and magazines.40 This result will likely support the Chinese government’s view that it needs to expand and improve further its overseas television channels. Views of China’s Rise As discussed in chapter two, China has become the second largest economy in the world, and its political and military influence is growing too. Many people in the world therefore think that China has replaced, or will replace, the United Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World, a report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2009). 38  America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, July 18 2013), p. 29; and German Marshall Fund, Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2011 (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund, September 2011), p. 15, available online at http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/ files_mf/tt2011_final_web1.pdf. 39  America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s, p. 29. 40  Charhar Institute, “Zhongguo guojia xingxiang diaocha baogao 2012,” Table 2.

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States as a superpower. According to the 2013 Pew Survey, this is in particular the case in Europe, Canada, and Australia, where large majorities see China one day eclipsing the United States as the world’s major superpower. Only six countries of the 39 surveyed think that China will never replace the United States, including Japan and the Philippines.41 In Africa, however, the median percentage of people thinking that China has replaced or will replace the United States as a superpower is relatively low (39 per cent). A possible explanation is that African publics, in their cooperation with China, see more of its less-developed character than Western audiences, and they furthermore see China presenting itself as a developing country. In the United States, slightly less than half (47 per cent) of those interviewed by Pew think that China will replace the United States as a superpower, but their number is growing.42 The polls reflect Western audiences’ concerns about China’s foreign policy intentions. Majorities in Europe, North America, Northeast Asia, and Australia hold the view that China acts unilaterally and does not have much consideration for the interests of other countries. The largest majority with that view is found in Japan, where 89 per cent of those interviewed think that China acts unilaterally. It is therefore no surprise that people in these regions do not regard China as a partner, but neither do they see China as an enemy, however, with the exception of Japan. The view is totally different among audiences in South and Southeast Asia and Africa, where people appreciate China’s attention to their countries. Light to strong majorities in these regions hold the opinion that China does take their interests in to account when they make foreign policy decisions, and they furthermore think of China in terms of a partner.43 Opinions about China’s growing military power are very divided, depending on countries’ security concerns with China. Countries in China’s neighborhood, such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, regard China’s growing military power as a very negative development,44 while in the United States slightly more than half (51 per cent) think that China poses a military threat, and in Europe that percentage is 39 per cent.45 41  America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s, p. 36. 42  47 per cent said that they considered Europe as more important to the United States; see Americans Shifting Focus to Asia (Chicago, IL: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, September 10 2012). 43  America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s, p. 31. 44  America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s, p. 32. 45   German Marshall Fund, Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2012 (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund, September 2012), p. 13, available online at http://trends.gmfus .org/files/2012/09/TT-2012_complete_web.pdf.

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The 2012 Chinese opinion survey formulated questions differently and asked how people would characterize China. Majorities in the six surveyed countries agreed that China was a strong country, and a majority of respondents in the United States, India, and Malaysia regarded China as ‘offensive.’ Majorities in India, the United States and South Africa viewed China as gaining too much economic influence, and in the United States and India more than one-third agreed that China is conducting unfair trade activities. Only less than one-third of respondents in each of the surveyed countries viewed China as a peaceful country and—except for people in Malaysia and India— majorities expressed the opinion that China’s rise could affect world peace.46 Views of Values and Culture China aims to persuade the outside world that its ideas and values—which are brought together under the banners of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics,’ ‘harmonious society’ and ‘harmonious world,’ and more recently ‘Chinese Dream’—are legitimate choices in the Chinese situation. The Chinese view that China is still a developing country, and hence should be allowed to give less priority to political and civil rights, however, bounces back on the wall of ideas that are prevalent in the West and democratic countries elsewhere—such as the need to respect human rights fully, independent of any developmental stage. Various polls over the last eight years show that many people around the globe and large majorities of people in Europe, North America, Australia, and Northeast Asia are critical of China for not respecting human rights, the rule of law, or people’s personal freedoms. The 2008 Soft Power in Asia survey found that—except for publics in Indonesia—respondents in Asia and the United States rated China very low when asked if the Chinese government respected human rights and the rule of law.47 In the 2013 poll by Pew, a global median of only 36 per cent said that China respects citizens’ freedoms. In comparison, a median of 70 per cent of the same global respondents agreed that the United States respects people’s freedoms.48 The perspective, however, is different in Africa and South and Southeast Asia, where large majorities disagree with the global median and think that China does respect the freedom of its citizens.49

46  Charhar Institute, “Zhongguo guojia xingxiang diaocha baogao 2012,” Tables 3 and 4. 47  Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion (Chicago, IL: Chicago Council on Global Affairs in collaboration with the East Asia Institute, 2009 edition), p. 16. 48  America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s, p. 1. 49  America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s, p. 46.

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Strongly disapproving of China’s authoritarian political nature and its prioritization of social and economic rights above political and civil rights, many people in the United States and Europe hold the opinion that their countries do not share enough common values with China to cooperate: in Europe 55 per cent; and in the United States 45 per cent.50 Similarly large groups think that they do not share enough interests with China to be able to cooperate on international problems.51 People differentiate between China as a country—in fact China’s government—and the Chinese people, and they look more favorably on the latter than on China as a country.52 Americans furthermore attribute various positive cultural characteristics to Chinese people. A large majority of 93 per cent of US respondents in a 2012 Pew poll said that they considered the Chinese people to be hardworking, compared to 78 per cent who say the same about the Americans themselves. They think that the Chinese are competitive and inventive, and that they are less greedy, less arrogant, less selfish, less rude, and less violent than Americans. China scores less well than Americans, however, on the characteristics of honesty, tolerance, and generosity.53 Chinese policymakers regard culture as the most important asset for China’s public diplomacy, but, as discussed in previous chapters, China has not yet succeeded in becoming a cultural powerhouse. This is also reflected in the results of opinion polls. The 2013 Pew poll surveyed African and Latin American publics’ ideas about culture, and found that medians of only 46 per cent of Africans and 30 per cent of Latin Americans like the spreading of Chinese ideas and customs. When it comes to Chinese music, movies, and television, people are even less enthusiastic: only medians of 34 per cent of Africans and 25 per cent of Latin Americans were positive about China’s pop culture. In most countries, pluralities said that they disliked Chinese pop culture.54 What African and Latin American respondents do like, however, are China’s scientific and technological advances. A majority in Africa is also positive about China’s way of doing business. There are few figures available for what Asians think of Chinese culture. The latest big survey dates back to 2008, when the Chicago Council on Global 50  German Marshall Fund, Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2012, pp. 11–12. 51  52 per cent in Europe and 47 per cent in the United States; see German Marshall Fund, Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2012, pp. 11–12. 52  Pew Research Center, Global Economic Gloom, p. 38. 53  US Public, Experts Differ on China Policies (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, September 18 2012), p. 10. 54  America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s, pp. 27–28.

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Affairs examined the soft power resources of China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the United States, as they were perceived in these countries.55 An overall ‘Soft Power Index’ based on economic, cultural, human capital, political, and diplomatic soft power was developed, and the findings indicated that in 2008, China’s overall soft power was in particular recognized in Indonesia and Vietnam, with indexes of .70 and .74 respectively on a 0 to 1 scale, and to a lesser degree in South Korea (.55), Japan (.51), and the United States (.47).56 Looking at China’s cultural soft power, the report found that in the countries surveyed, people had a high regard for China’s ‘rich cultural heritage,’ but they did not consider China’s contemporary pop culture to be very appealing. An exception was Vietnam, where people rated it 8.2 on a scale of 0 to 10. Vietnam was also the only country where people said that they regularly saw Chinese entertainment on television, whereas large majorities in Japan and South Korea, and a plurality in Indonesia, said that they ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ viewed Chinese movies or television.57 At the time, there were hardly any Chinese television series and movies available to international publics, but this situation has improved somewhat, with China’s increased efforts to export cultural products and to coproduce television series with international entertainment companies, as discussed in chapters four and five. The 2012 Chinese survey asked people what they like about China. Respondents could choose five from a list of 23 traditional cultural elements, including tourist sites, cultural items, and Chinese symbols and icons. The favorite five were the panda, the Great Wall of China, Hong Kong movie actor Jackie Chan, Chinese cuisine, and the Forbidden City in Beijing.58 Experts versus General Publics The above figures reflect general audiences’ views of China, but in 2012 Pew also surveyed various US experts’ opinions on China, and compared them to the views of the general public.59 The groups of experts were composed of scholars, retired military officers, government officials, and business and trade leaders, who can be expected to be more knowledgeable about developments in China. The poll’s findings show significant differences in views between the experts and general audiences and, on some topics, also between the different expert groups. 55  Soft Power in Asia. 56  Soft Power in Asia, p. 8. 57  Soft Power in Asia, p. 17. 58  Charhar Institute, “Zhongguo guojia xingxiang diaocha baogao 2012,” Table 9. 59  US Public, Experts Differ on China Policies.

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Experts are less likely to consider China’s rise as a threat to the United States than the general public, and they are far less concerned about the US debt held by China, loss of jobs to China, and the trade deficit with China. For example, 78 per cent of the general public regards the large amount of US debt held by China as a very serious problem, but this is 53 per cent among the news media, and only 19 per cent of scholars and 20 per cent of government officials think that it is a problem. Whereas 15 per cent of the general public looks at China as an enemy, only 3 per cent of experts share this view. By far a larger majority of experts than of the general public holds the opinion that building strong relations with China is a policy priority for the United States, but they are somewhat less convinced than the general public that the United States should be tough with China on trade and the economy (49 versus 56 per cent). Experts and the general public agree, however, that China cannot be trusted.60

Interpreting Poll Results

The poll findings used for this chapter do not provide us with detailed and clear-cut answers to questions about the effectiveness of China’s public diplomacy; they only indicate general trends with regard to global audiences’ views of China. They show that peoples’ perceptions of China vary between regions and between countries within regions, and that they fluctuate, or in some cases dramatically change, over time. Respondents to the polls, however, were not asked to explain their opinions. The figures do not therefore tell us why people have positive or negative feelings about China, or why they have changed their minds over time. In some cases, more specific polling questions shed light on the reasons behind peoples’ views. In other cases, analyses of official bilateral relations provide clues for further interpretation. The polling results demonstrate the enormous gap between perceptions of China in developed countries in the Western world and developing countries in other regions. They show that favorability rates in developing countries in Southeast Asia and Africa generally remained high over the last decade, confirming the image that has already emerged from other indicators discussed in chapter five, such as media reports, leaders’ statements, developments in China’s foreign relations, and the number and character of cultural and educational exchanges. The views of Western publics were less stable, as their admiration for China’s economic ascent in the late 1990s and the early 2000s gradually changed into fear of China’s intentions and dissatisfaction with the 60  US Public, Experts Differ on China Policies.

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slow pace of political reform and the human rights situation in China. China’s economic strength and constructive behavior during the global financial crisis temporarily improved views, but favorability rates slid again in 2012 and 2013. Some poll findings over the last decade suggest that national leaders’ views of China have an impact on their domestic publics’ perceptions of China. The sudden drop in positive views of China in Germany and France during the course of 2006, for example, seems to be related to the more critical approach toward China of these countries’ national leaders at the time. This raises questions about the effectiveness of public diplomacy, as the conclusion could be drawn that it is more useful to stick to traditional diplomacy and to improve political elites and politicians’ images of China, rather than the perceptions of the general public. Improving politicians’ views is indeed vital for improving bilateral relations, but other poll findings—such as the above-mentioned (temporary) improvement of Japanese views of China in 2011 shortly after the Fukushima earthquake—point to a direct relation between China’s public diplomacy and people’s perceptions. Another example that indicates a connection between China’s public diplomacy activities and people’s views is the positive assessment by South Korean publics of the Chinese–South Korean Summit of June 2013.61 China’s public diplomacy around the summit, as discussed in chapter five, very likely contributed to that positive assessment. China’s public diplomacy messages do not enter neutral territory in Western countries. As the results of poll questions on China’s respect for citizens’ freedoms and China’s foreign policy considerations show, strong normative considerations in Europe, North America, and Northeast Asia pertaining to political and civil rights, and democracy, form a fundamental barrier against China’s public diplomacy. Negative perceptions in these regions spring not only from conflicting values, which in many North American and European people’s eyes make cooperation on international affairs impossible, but also spring from preconceived notions and lack of knowledge about China and its policies. The factor of preconceived notions is underscored by the difference in views of China between young adults and older people; and the impact of lack of knowledge is illustrated by the differences in views of experts and the general public in the United States. Experts are generally less worried about China’s economic and military rise than the general public, and are more in favor of building strong relations with China. These outcomes suggest that ­better-informed people tend to have views that are more advantageous for 61  Public Opinion on the Korea–China Summit: Favorability of the Leaders of Neighboring Countries, Attitudes on the Minimum Wage (Seoul: ASAN Institute for Policy Studies, August 6 2013).

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China, and that it is therefore worthwhile for the Chinese government to invest in deepening foreign audiences’ knowledge about China. Negative perceptions in Western countries often arise from the combination of underlying fears of China’s rising economic and political dominance and the lack of trust in China’s foreign policy intentions. For some, this lack of trust is closely tied to China’s undemocratic and untransparent political system, and its different values. This is in particular the case for those believing in the ‘democratic peace theory,’ which is based on German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s idea that democracies are more likely to produce peace than non-democracies.62 Proponents of the theory argue that a democratic China’s foreign policy would be “more attuned to the international political system” and would create a “common ethical foundation [. . .] for engaging Beijing as an equal.”63 For others, China’s rise will likely be unpeaceful, no matter whether it becomes a democracy or not. They argue, like John Mearsheimer, that China can be expected to attempt to become a regional hegemon, just as the United States did in the Western hemisphere, and will “dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries.”64 Publics in developing countries in Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America do not share these concerns. They see the Chinese government paying much attention to their countries and providing them with economic investments and various types of aid. As a result, they consider China to be a partner that takes their interests into account. As the polls also show, however, positive views in these regions are not based upon attraction to China’s pop culture, or to Chinese ideas and customs. This highlights the finding in earlier chapters of this book that China is currently not able to use culture effectively—in the meaning of cultural manifestations—in its public diplomacy. The positive US evaluation of Chinese people’s characteristics shows that Chinese cultural identity is positively perceived, however, which creates a good basis for cultural and people’s diplomacy.

62  Paul D’Anieri, International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs (Boston, MA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2013), pp. 121–124. 63  Bruce Gilley, China’s Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 228. 64  John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History: China and East Asia (Current History Magazine), Vol. 105, No. 690 (April 2006), pp. 160–162, at p. 162.

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Conclusions In view of China’s huge investment in public diplomacy, one would expect more attention to, and publications on, the evaluation of China’s public diplomacy policies. Evaluation, however, proves to be difficult. There is not one method that can satisfactorily measure the overall and long-term effects of a country’s public diplomacy efforts. The polling results used in this chapter have their limits as well, as they fail to explain to what extent people’s attraction or aversion to China are the result of China’s public diplomacy, economic diplomacy, foreign policy, or international factors beyond China’s control. Even a lack of improvement, or a deterioration of favorability rates, does not necessarily mean that China’s public diplomacy failed, as the rates may have been worse without public diplomacy efforts. This is not to say that polling results are not a useful tool to explore how China’s public diplomacy is received around the globe. Polls provide much insight into people’s perceptions of China, and may strengthen findings based upon other evaluation tools. Polling results offer many clues as to what aspects attract audiences, and what aspects form an obstacle to successful public diplomacy. In some cases, poll results suggest a direct link between people’s views and a specific public diplomacy activity, such as China’s contribution to the disaster relief efforts in Japan after the 2011 Fukushima earthquake, which temporarily led to improved Japanese views of China. Poll results furthermore underline that China’s public diplomacy messages do not enter neutral territory. Preconceived notions and the amount of knowledge about the country, as well as the way in which foreign countries and their people are positively or negatively affected by China’s rise and foreign policies, all impact upon how people look at China. This underlines the belief that public diplomacy efforts are only effective when they support other policies. This chapter also displays the flaws in China’s public diplomacy. The surveys discussed highlight, for example, that China’s image has much to gain in the area of culture. Even in regions that look favorably upon China, such as Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, audiences say that they do not feel attracted to Chinese ideas or cultural products. These polls and the findings of previous chapters in this book suggest that positive perceptions of China are currently closely tied to expectations that people will benefit economically from expanding and deepening relations with China.65 65  See also the above-mentioned article by Tao Xie and Benjamin I. Page, “What Affects China’s National Image?”

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China’s negative image in the Western world and issues of concern in other regions cannot simply be ‘fixed’ by intensifying and expanding activities in the field of public diplomacy. Good public diplomacy, however, can help to address some of the issues causing negative views. It can provide the information and context needed to understand developments and policies, correct misinformation, and draw attention to positive issues with regard to China. Even when it comes to conflicting values, a long-term socialization process in which China continuously explains its ideas may help to remove preconceived notions of China and make publics more open-minded toward China’s ideas and messages. In order to be effective, however, China’s public diplomacy needs to become more credible. Audiences want to see public diplomacy messages represented in China’s behavior and policies, and they need to hear about positive developments in China from credible messengers that are trusted to provide transparency and full information and not solely information that serves political goals. Even the best public diplomacy, however, cannot sell a country’s policies if they run counter to other countries’ interests. Nor can it fully solve a ­country’s global image problems, particularly not when the country concerned is expected to become a superpower. As will be further discussed in the Conclusion of this book, apprehensions about China’s growing economic and political weight in the world, and its authoritarian political system, may be reduced but cannot be avoided.

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Conclusion This book examines how China conducts public diplomacy, and how its approach to public diplomacy relates to conceptualizations of public diplomacy by Western scholars. It finds, first, that the Chinese approach to public diplomacy has many specific characteristics that clearly distinguish China’s public diplomacy from that of other countries. It is to a considerable extent inspired by other countries’ public diplomacy theories and practices, in particular those of the United States. However, China has selected and adapted these Western public diplomacy approaches and instruments to the Chinese political and cultural context. In this process, they are increasingly developing their own concepts, instruments, and strategies. The characteristics of China’s public diplomacy can be summarized as three major features: (1) the particular importance that the Chinese government attaches to public diplomacy as a defensive but also increasingly offensive instrument of enhancing its comprehensive power, leading to enormous investment in the development of public diplomacy tools, including some costly instruments such as the expansion of Chinese media abroad; (2) the high level of state-centeredness of China’s public diplomacy, despite the involvement of many non-state actors, reflecting the centralized character of the Chinese state; and (3) the strategic and holistic approach stemming from China’s cultural values, in which public diplomacy is closely interwoven with China’s overall foreign policy and diplomacy, and in which the foreign and domestic dimensions are regarded as equivalent, complementary, and inseparable elements of public diplomacy. The impact of China’s political system, high-context culture, and the Chinese view that all things are essentially correlated, complementary, and dynamic, are manifested in each of these three features. Second, at the conceptual level this study finds that examination of the case of China gives rise to two paradoxes with regard to the public diplomacy models discussed in chapter one. One paradox concerns China’s focus on relations and the mutuality of relations, characteristics that are usually associated with relational or network models of public diplomacy,1 whereas China’s public diplomacy is state-centered and to a large extent information-oriented. A second paradox concerns the importance that China attaches to d­ omestic 1  See, for example, Rhonda Zaharna, “The Soft Power Differential: Network Communication and Mass Communication in Public Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2007), pp. 222 and 217.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004283954_011 Ingrid

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outreach as an element of public diplomacy, as domestic outreach is also generally associated with ‘network-based’ approaches to public diplomacy.2 China’s public diplomacy policies and practices thus blur distinctions between the state-centered-versus-network, and information-versus-relational models of public diplomacy. This book focuses on the sending side of public diplomacy, but also highlights the importance of looking at the impact of the political system and culture on the receiving side of public diplomacy, where preconceived political and cultural notions, including the normative considerations of audiences, determine how public diplomacy is received. The findings highlight that—when seeking to develop foreign audiences’ understanding on issues that are very different from what is familiar to them—long-term socialization processes are required. This underlines the importance of long-term policies and the continuity of messages, something that China has well understood. Better understanding of the other’s culture contributes to mutual trust, which is important for successful public diplomacy. Investing in the instrument of cultural exchange may pay off in this respect, as research has found that people’s involvement in cultural relations between countries is associated with a higher level of mutual trust.3 Studying the case of China furthermore shows that a big power cannot avoid using its hard power in soft ways in its public diplomacy strategies. Hard power and the benefits that it can bring are part of the attraction. In China’s case, its dynamic development and successful rise add to this attraction, as people like to be part of a success story. This issue brings us back to the complexity of the hard power—soft power divide and underscores the view that hard and soft power are intertwined and that it is difficult to distinguish between them. Public diplomacy—wielding soft power—thus also builds on hard power. Having hard power resources enables countries to invest in developing public diplomacy instruments, ensures that global audiences pay attention, and is, aside from being intimidating, also attractive to people.4 2  See, for example, Ellen Huijgh, “Changing Tunes for Public Diplomacy: Exploring the Domestic Dimension,” Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2011); and Rhonda Zaharna, Battles to Bridges: US Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy after 9/11 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 182. 3  British Council, The Power of Culture to Change Lives (London: British Council, 2012), available at http://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/documents/The%20Power% 20of%20Culture.pdf. 4  See, for example, Ying Fan, “Soft Power: Power of Attraction or Confusion?,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2008), pp. 147–158; and Gregory F. Treverton and Seth G. Jones, Measuring National Power (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005), p. 10.

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The Importance China Attaches to Public Diplomacy

The importance that the Chinese government attaches to developing public diplomacy is striking. China has embraced the ideas of soft power and public diplomacy to an extent not often seen in China with regard to political concepts from abroad, and has decided to give high priority to developing instruments and strategies to bring these ideas into practice. The concepts have caught on because they refer to ideas and practices that were already familiar to Chinese scholars and policymakers and, more importantly, because the Chinese government believes that public diplomacy—the wielding of soft power—can enhance China’s Comprehensive National Power. The Chinese government believes that public diplomacy may help make China’s economic and political rise palatable to the world, contribute to the international recognition of Chinese values and policies, increase the government’s legitimacy, and that it is indispensable in the fight for China’s right to speak and to coexist with the liberal international world order with its own political model. The enormous investments in public diplomacy are also strongly driven by two negative Chinese perceptions, or even frustrations. The first concerns the sense of frustration felt by China’s leaders about how China and its policies are reported in the media, as well as the misrepresentation—in their view—of China as a menacing dragon that is plundering Africa and Latin America, or as the aspiring ‘Godzilla of Asia.’5 These representations contribute to the ongoing China Threat debate, and strongly motivate the Chinese government to step up the projection of its own image of China. The government trusts that the more foreign audiences know about China, the better they will understand the country; and that the better they understand it, the more they will accept China’s policies. The fact that international opinion polls show that experts in the United States are less worried about China’s economic rise and policies than the general US audience supports the view that more knowledge about China reduces threat perceptions. It does not mean, however, that people more easily accept China’s policies. The second negative driver concerns China’s perception of an increasing soft power competition, in particular with the United States, but also with major countries in the East Asian region such as Japan and South Korea. Not only are China’s policymakers aware that China’s economic rise is perceived as a threat, they also note that China’s public diplomacy policies and practices are often presented as a menace to the democratic, liberal world order. 5  Cited in Robert D. Kaplan, “Why John J. Mearsheimer is Right (About Some Things),” The Atlantic Magazine (January/February 2012).

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Joshua Kurlantzick, for example, writes about how China appears to be using its soft power to push incrementally Japan, Taiwan, and even the United States out of regional influence,6 and the German influential magazine Der Spiegel argues that China uses soft power to conquer the world and get what it wants.7 These perceptions have prompted policymakers in major countries such as the United States, India, and Japan to renew their own investments in public diplomacy, in particular toward developing countries in Asia and Africa, thus in effect contributing to a soft power competition. In the Chinese perception, this competition is about more, however, than winning global audiences’ hearts and minds. The Chinese leadership believes that China’s growing strengths in the domain of hard power have pushed the United States and other Western countries to focus their attention on attempts to dominate and contain China in the domain of soft power, and to use public diplomacy as an ideological instrument to bring about ‘peaceful evolution’ in China. Fostering democracy is indeed a stated goal of US public diplomacy, and the threat perception derived from this by Chinese leaders has increased in recent years, in particular in the wake of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution and subsequent Arab Spring movement in the Middle East and North Africa. This threat is what prompted former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s January 2012 article in Qiushi, calling for vigilance against “ideological and cultural infiltration” by “hostile forces.”8 These two drivers have led China to develop a public diplomacy strategy that is predominantly defensive in character. China’s public diplomacy policies, in particular those geared toward Western countries, primarily seek to defend China’s political system against foreign critique, rather than trying to encourage other countries to adopt the China model. This is also true with regard to countries that admire China’s politico-economic model. Chinese leaders think that their model is still flawed and not suitable for other countries’ conditions, just as they think that Western democratic systems are not suitable for China’s conditions. The endeavors of a growing number of Chinese scholars and policymakers actively to present China’s politico-economic model as a worthy alternative to Western democratic models, the flaws of which were 6  Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” Policy Brief, No. 47 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). 7  Erich Follath, “China’s Soft Power is a Threat to the West,” Der Spiegel (July 28 2010). 8  Hu Jintao, “Resolutely Walk the Path of Socialist Culture Development with Chinese Characteristics: Striving to Construct a Strong Socialist Culture Country,” Quishi (January 2012), available online at http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/01/04/ hu-jintaos-article-in-qiushi-magazine-translated/.

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laid bare by the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008, are aimed at promoting acceptance and the right to coexist, not at proselytizing. Yet there are also some offensive aspects to China’s public diplomacy. Many elements of its long-term strategic approach indicate that China thinks carefully about how proactive public diplomacy can assist in realizing its foreign policy goals. The enormous investment in China’s public diplomacy is not only visible in the development of a large diversity of strategies as well as a wide array of instruments, but also in the attention that government leaders give to the topic in their speeches and writings, their policies to encourage research on public diplomacy and soft power, and their eagerness to learn and get public diplomacy right, as was illustrated in the case studies. The establishment of numerous public diplomacy research groups and departments at think tanks and universities throughout China has led to an extensive and lively Chinese debate on public diplomacy and soft power, as well as to voluminous writing on these topics. As much of the research is encouraged or commissioned by the government, most of the literature is practice-oriented. Furthermore, underlying China’s public diplomacy efforts is a remarkable sense of urgency and commitment felt by Chinese scholars and policymakers, but also by ordinary citizens, to contribute to improving China’s image abroad. When discussing public diplomacy with interlocutors and other Chinese people, the author was often struck by their concern about putting China in a better light and the responsibility that they felt to make outsiders understand China.

The Impact of China’s Authoritarian Political System

State-Centeredness Analysis of the three dimensions of public diplomacy in the cases examined in this book shows that the Chinese understanding and practice of public diplomacy largely coincides with a hierarchical, state-centered and strategic approach, in which the Chinese government dominates the development and execution of public diplomacy policies. The dominant role of state actors is manifest in China’s event and crisis public diplomacy, as well as in its strategies toward specific countries and regions, even though some of these policies involved many non-state actors or included much dialog and collaboration. The concepts of a network model and the societization of public diplomacy are also broadly discussed, and many scholars and practitioners call for stronger involvement by non-state actors, but they clearly struggle with precisely defining the roles of, and relationship between, state and non-state actors in public diplomacy. They know that in order to develop successful public ­diplomacy,

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they need to tap into civil society networks and empower non-state actors, but they do not know how to manage that process in a political system in which the government aims to control society. China is certainly not the only country where the government ‘owns’ public diplomacy and where state actors dominate the development and execution of public diplomacy. What makes China different, however, is the extent to which the Chinese government dominates and directs the actors in all aspects of public diplomacy, the character of its non-state actors, and the government’s control over a major public diplomacy instrument: the domestic media. The number and variety of non-state actors in China’s public diplomacy has considerably expanded over the last decade, and their participation has brought new dynamics and, to a limited extent, more legitimacy to China’s public diplomacy. These new players make public diplomacy more dynamic because they bring fresh ideas and extend the frontiers of what can be said and done, adding to the growing plurality of Chinese voices heard abroad. The legitimacy that these non-state actors bring is limited, however, as a result of the character of state—society relations in China. NGOs and other non-state actors are often co-opted by the government and, in all circumstances, they are expected to act in accordance with Chinese policies and their goals. This leads to a high level of compliance by non-state actors with official guidelines and policies. The ‘­people’ in people’s exchange are often limited to those who support government policies or accept the requirement not to stray far from the official narrative, in particular not in public. This ensures state dominance and control, but at the same time takes away much of the potential strength of people’s exchanges in China’s public diplomacy. Media Control and Censorship China’s authoritarian political system is also visible in the Chinese government’s efforts to control the flow of information, as well as the content of Chinese media reporting within China, via an extensive and sophisticated system of censorship. This causes a lack of credibility that damages China’s image and undermines Chinese media expansion abroad. It seriously damaged China’s image, for example, during the 2003 SARS and 2007 and 2008 productsafety crises, when covering up and media silence aggravated the situation and contributed to a larger number of victims. With regard to health issues, China has learned from the SARS experience, as its transparency, accurate reporting, and international cooperation during the spring 2013 outbreak of a new type of bird flu illustrated. This is an important improvement that helps to restore domestic and foreign people’s trust in the Chinese government, but it does not

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solve the fundamental problem of the Chinese media as a mouthpiece for the government. The lack of free reporting by the Chinese media also raises questions about the effectiveness of China’s large investment in strengthening the position of the Chinese media abroad. China’s media outlets are now technically able to reach large numbers of people all over the world in several languages, including inhabitants of small and remote villages in Africa and Asia. This does not mean, however, that China’s voice is also always heard. It is heard in Africa and Asia, in particular in areas where people have little choice of channels in their native language. In Western countries, however, people have a wide choice of television channels and, with the exception of Chinese audiences overseas, local publics do not find Chinese amusement or news programs attractive. China puts much effort into improving its programs, for example by including more open debate, but suspicion of Chinese broadcasting will remain as long as its reporting is politically restricted. Similar restrictions on freedom of expression cause the dilemma that public diplomacy policymakers face with regard to social media as an instrument for public diplomacy. On the one hand, China’s leadership realizes that this powerful instrument enables it to reach large audiences, and that using social media may contribute to the image of a more open government and transparent society. There are not only more than 500 million internet and social media users in China, but they are very actively using these platforms to spread information and to connect with international networks, creating opportunities for both domestic and foreign outreach. There is also, however, a threat of losing control over information and messages. The Chinese government is aware that—in spite of its extensive system of censorship and its continued efforts to reign in discussions and the spread of information via the internet9—it can neither stop nor fully control messages that go viral via the internet, and so it realizes that the networks created via social media can turn against it. It has experienced, for example, how social media broke the Chinese government’s monopoly on domestic information during the unfolding of the SARS crisis. In that particular case, the Chinese government may have accepted people’s calls for more transparency as justified, but it is not willing to give up control in other areas. 9  In the latest attempt of September 2013, the Chinese government has taken measures to control public opinion by restricting or arresting popular micro-bloggers. See, for example, Stanley Lubman, “The ‘Legalization’ of China’s Internet Crackdown,” The Wall Street Journal (September 18 2013).

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Public diplomacy policymakers thus reluctantly explore the use of Chinese and foreign social media as an instrument to spread information or engage in domestic and international discussions, in the latter case often via anonymous commentators who are referred to as the Fifty Cent Army (wumao dang). The policymakers overlook, however, the potential of China’s lively blogosphere, which has contributed to the development of a pluralistic political and youth culture, as an asset for China’s public diplomacy. Prominent bloggers are denounced rather than regarded as a valuable source to show the world another facet of Chinese society. The Chinese government, furthermore, has recently tightened its control over social media, and various influential bloggers have seen their accounts closed down.10 The Chinese government’s concern about control over information also affects the foreign media’s work in China. This generally leads to more critical reporting on China by foreign journalists than would otherwise be the case, as the restrictions imposed on foreign reporters by the Chinese authorities are usually part of the story that is published, and thus draw continued attention to the negative aspects of China’s political system. The negative consequences of restricting foreign media were demonstrated, for example, by the case of the 2008 Tibetan uprising, when foreign reporters were not allowed in to Tibet to report on the events. They instead had to base their stories on rumors, which provided a more negative image of the Chinese authorities’ reaction to the uprising than later appeared to be justified. The lack of access thus seriously backfired. In this case, too, the Chinese government learned—at least ­temporarily—from the experience, and during the July 2009 riots in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, the government provided the media with fuller access. Other Impacts Political restrictions also hamper China’s efforts to tap into the potential of its culture as an asset for public diplomacy. In spite of the many cultural exchanges and cultural events that China organizes, China is not regarded as a cultural power. The Chinese government requires cultural products to serve moral and policy goals, and it rejects cultural products that only focus on entertainment as vulgar. As discussed, this view is also based on the cultural tradition of Chinese aesthetics, in which art is meant to represent the ‘good and the

10  See, for example, David Wertime, “Exclusive: Surprising Crackdown on China’s Hottest Social Media Platform,” in the section Tea Leaf Nation, Foreign Policy (March 13 2014); and Chris Buckley, “Crackdown on Bloggers is Mounted by China,” New York Times (September 10 2013).

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beautiful,’11 but the decision to neglect or restrict independent artists operating outside the official programs, yet who win much international acclaim for their work, is political. Instead, the Chinese government selects mainly traditional and apolitical cultural products to be promoted in its public diplomacy policies. Sometimes this is successful, for example in the case of major exhibitions abroad of highlights of traditional Chinese culture, but these only reach a limited public and do not appeal to young foreign audiences. Nor, as opinion polls show, are young people currently attracted to Chinese pop culture. Another area of public diplomacy that reveals the influence of China’s political system is the way in which the government calls upon overseas Chinese populations, who are dispersed over the globe in large numbers, to participate in China’s public diplomacy efforts. Other countries also seek to involve their diasporas, but the Chinese government does it on a well-organized and grand scale. The government has encouraged the establishment of overseas Chinese associations and networks, and has developed strong relationships with the overseas Chinese media. It has thus created a platform to promote the message that overseas Chinese populations should feel connected to China as the country of their, or their ancestors’, origin. The overseas Chinese communities generally take pride in China’s economic and political rise, and are often happy to become involved in China’s public diplomacy efforts. They organize events that promote Chinese culture in the cities in which they live, such as Chinese New Year celebrations, and participate in—or contribute financially to—major cultural events in China, such as the Shanghai World Expo. In the domestic dimension, the political system is reflected in the Chinese government’s control over the content of messages, as will be discussed in more detail further below, but also in the organization of the large-scale educational campaigns on issues of international affairs and cooperation. Campaigns in the run-up to the Beijing Olympic Games and the Shanghai World Expo, for example, reflected China’s communist tradition of mass education, and illustrated the Chinese government’s access to neighborhood-level communities and schools. Organizing obligatory study sessions on political issues and policies in work units, schools, and neighborhoods is common practice in China, but cannot easily be envisaged in a democratic system. The political system, and in particular the Chinese government’s control over actors and messages, also has positive effects on China’s public diplomacy. It enables policymakers to develop long-term policies and ensures that the Chinese government can always count on sufficient domestic publicity, as 11  Ying Zhu, “ ‘The Cultivated War and the Vulgar’: China’s Cultural War,” Asian Creative Transformations (April 2 2012).

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it can order the domestic media to publish the news items and messages that it wants to disseminate. This is, for example, demonstrated by the current attention for the concept of the Chinese Dream, which was recently introduced by Chinese President Xi Jinping. The official interpretation of the concept and President Xi’s remarks about it are widely publicized on television, and in newspapers and academic writings; government organizations and think thanks organize conferences and study sessions on the theme; and the term ‘Chinese Dream’ appears in titles of events organized by Chinese embassies overseas, in Chinese ambassadors’ speeches, on billboards, and in titles of exhibitions.12 The impact of China’s political system on the country’s public diplomacy can be summarized by saying that China’s authoritarian political system causes a serious lack of credibility, thus reducing the effectiveness of China’s public diplomacy policies.

The Impact of Chinese Culture on Public Diplomacy

A Strategic and Holistic Approach The strategic and holistic character of China’s public diplomacy approach is visible in each of the three dimensions of public diplomacy: actors; strategies; and instruments. It is this approach that emphasizes the interconnectedness of China’s public diplomacy policies and its broader foreign policy and diplomacy, thereby mutually increasing their own effectiveness. Most countries seek to integrate public diplomacy elements into their overall diplomacy, but China manages to do so to a remarkable extent. In various areas of China’s foreign policy, it is difficult to distinguish between public diplomacy and foreign policy, or between public diplomacy and overall diplomacy. This integrated approach is particularly visible in China’s economic diplomacy policies and its foreign strategies toward developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In these countries, China’s aid policies help to create goodwill and favorable views of China. The fact that majorities in 12  For an event organized by the Chinese Embassy in Pretoria, South Africa, see Xinhua, “South African Students Feel the Passion of Chinese Dream,” People’s Daily (September 18 2013); for speeches, see “Chinese Ambassador’s 2013 National Day Speeches,” as published on Chinese embassies’ websites; and for the Exhibition “China Dream, Thirty Years” in Shanghai Art Palace, see “Images of China from H.S. Liu,” Time Out Shanghai (July 15 2013).

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Africa, and majorities or relatively high percentages of the public in Asia and Latin America, see China as a partner rather than an enemy13 suggests that these policies make audiences receptive to China’s public diplomacy messages about its focus on mutually beneficial cooperation. Public diplomacy activities, such as educational exchanges and volunteer projects, may add to the goodwill that facilitates overall bilateral ties. Although major elements of China’s public diplomacy are integrated into China’s foreign policy, there are also many public diplomacy activities and policies that are developed alongside China’s foreign policy. In most cases, however, these activities are initiated and supervised by state actors and are, therefore, developed with specific foreign policy goals in mind. China’s public diplomacy thus supports China’s foreign policy, but vice versa China’s foreign policy and diplomacy do not always align with China’s public diplomacy. This creates credibility problems and undermines China’s public diplomacy. China’s foreign policy with regard to regional territorial disputes, for example, does not contribute to the image that China seeks to project of itself as a benign rising country. Another example is the Chinese government’s long-term retaliation against Norway, which added to international concerns that a strong China may not play by the international rules. China’s strategic approach is also reflected in the country’s long-term perspective on public diplomacy policies, as its policy with regard to the Confucius Institutes, for instance, demonstrates. The Confucius Institutes are a ‘unique’ Chinese instrument for public diplomacy. They differ from other countries’ so-called arms-length institutions, in that they are established on the basis of partnerships with foreign educational institutes, which leads to the active involvement of non-official foreign partners in promoting Chinese culture. As public diplomacy conducted via the Confucius Institutes is developed via dialog and collaboration with foreign partners, it helps to fine-tune programs to local publics and adds to the credibility of the information that is disseminated. The jury is still out on the ultimate success of the Confucius Institutes, as they currently face serious obstacles to becoming successful cultural centers. Many Confucius Institutes lack qualified personnel and attractive cultural materials or programs, and some foreign publics are suspicious of the Institutes as tools of Chinese propaganda. Very recently, a group of 100 professors in Chicago, for example, urged the University of Chicago to break ties with the Confucius

13  Pew Research Center, America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s (July 18 2013), chapter 3, “Attitudes toward China.”

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Institute in order to stop the “dubious practice” of allowing the Hanban to “have a voice in the research and curriculum” of the university.14 China’s continued efforts to expand their number and improve the Confucius Institutes’ programs, however, are impressive. Moreover, the Chinese government does not expect all of them to be successful overnight. It notices that the concept of the Institutes is attractive to foreign institutions, as it receives more foreign requests to establish a Confucius Institute than it can handle, and it sees no problem in first building the hardware to figure out later how to provide the right software. Equally strategic and long-term oriented is China’s selection of public diplomacy themes and messages. For example, the themes chosen for the 2008 Beijing Olympics—harmony, people’s wellbeing, sustainability, and technological innovation—allowed the Chinese government indirectly to address negative international perceptions about China’s foreign policies, how it treats its people, and China’s environmental problems. It also enabled the projection of China as advanced and capable. The continuity of these messages was guaranteed by adopting similar themes in other public diplomacy projects, notably the 2010 Shanghai World Expo. The messages about sustainability and people’s wellbeing were furthermore supported by policies to improve living conditions in Beijing and Shanghai. The holistic character of China’s public diplomacy is reflected in the Chinese concept of renwen diplomacy, which brings cultural and people’s diplomacy together. It is even more strongly reflected in the Chinese view that domestic outreach is a natural and important element of public diplomacy. It is part of the Chinese leadership’s understanding that the domestic situation cannot be viewed separately from the international situation, and that domestic affairs and diplomacy as a whole should be integrated. Chinese policymakers consider enhancing domestic audiences’ understanding of international affairs to be just as important as contributing to foreign audiences’ understanding of China. This is illustrated, for example, by the enormous investments in domestic publicity and educational programs during the Beijing Olympic Games and Shanghai World Expo. Domestic outreach is seen to contribute to the quality and legitimacy of foreign outreach, but is also regarded as a tool to strengthen national unity and shape the domestic debate on China’s foreign policies. It furthermore encourages the Chinese government to take the domestic population’s interest into account, as formulating messages for domestic publics forces the government to think about what their foreign policies mean for their 14  Andrea Chen, “China’s Confucius Institute Faces Backlash at Prestigious US School,” The South China Morning Post (May 15 2014, updated version).

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citizens. In this sense, it is a result of the need felt by the Chinese government to use its foreign policy as a tool of legitimization toward its Chinese subjects. The asymmetry of domestic and foreign audiences, however, complicates matters. This is true in all countries, but is more acute in China’s case, as the Chinese government seeks to steer foreign policy discussions in a particular direction rather than to stimulate an open discussion, and because it differentiates between messaging toward foreign and domestic audiences. Because the Chinese language is not widely understood abroad, China often gets away with disseminating different messages to domestic and foreign audiences (neiwai youbie). Sometimes, however, the foreign press and bloggers pick them up and demonstrate the difference in messages. This adds to foreign distrust of Chinese official statements. The asymmetry furthermore emerges in cultural differences, as in the case of executing the people who were responsible for the product scandals, a decision that was largely applauded by domestic audiences but was criticized abroad. The strategic nature of China’s public diplomacy approach does not mean that China has an integrated ‘grand plan’ for public diplomacy that includes the whole range of public diplomacy actors, instruments, and activities discussed in this book. It has well-developed plans for individual categories of instruments like the media, or for public diplomacy around an event or a Chinese leader’s foreign visit, but China’s public diplomacy as a whole is rather fragmented, as different policies and activities are developed by different state actors that do not necessarily keep each other informed. Furthermore, China’s State Council Information Office is not in the position to steer all of the actors involved in public diplomacy.15 Chinese policymakers and scholars therefore often complain about a lack of coordination of public diplomacy activities. Several initiatives and intra-ministerial meetings aim to improve this situation, but with the continued proliferation of actors, this will remain a challenge. Furthermore, many initiatives, such as the ‘go global’ policies and the establishment of Confucius Institutes, were launched several years before public diplomacy’s endorsement at the highest political level as an important part of China’s overall diplomacy. These activities were thus only later brought within the context of public diplomacy. In addition, there is sometimes a discrepancy between the strategic nature of the idea underlying a policy and the execution of that policy. The expansion of the Confucius Institutes, for example, is more demand-driven than strategically planned.

15  Interviews with scholars and (former) diplomats.

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Communication Patterns China’s high-context culture and the Chinese view that all things are essentially correlated, complementary, and dynamic have their own distinct influences on the conduct and content of China’s public diplomacy. They form what Rhonda Zaharna calls the “cultural underbelly of public diplomacy.”16 They are not directly visible, but lead to different messages and different communication patterns, which can easily cause cross-cultural misunderstandings, often exacerbated by the singularity of the Chinese language and problems of translation. China’s high-context culture is first and foremost visible in the importance of prestige and ‘face.’ In its conduct of public diplomacy, the Chinese leadership seeks ‘face’ and gives ‘face.’ It wants to be recognized and respected for its achievements over recent decades and for its cultural values, which have emanated from China’s old and rich civilization. Peter Hays Gries calls it China’s ‘Kissinger complex’ after former US National Security Adviser and subsequently US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who is highly regarded in China, because he has always given the leadership ‘face’ by showing great respect and admiration for his Chinese interlocutors.17 The aim of gaining ‘face’ figured largely, for example, in China’s event public diplomacy around the Beijing Olympic Games and the Shanghai World Expo, which both had to be ‘the best ever.’ The opposite, losing ‘face’ or the fear of doing so, also influences Chinese public diplomacy. Losing ‘face’ happens when things go wrong, and in particular when problems or mistakes are discussed in public. China’s perception of having lost ‘face’ contributed, for example, to the evasive way in which it reacted to foreign—in particular US—accusations during the 2007 food-­ product safety scandals. In the case of the unsafe Mattel toys that were made in China, ‘face’ concerns led the Chinese government to insist on a public apology from Mattel, which resulted in a half-hearted ‘sorry’ from Mattel that was presented in China as an ‘apology,’ but that failed to convince foreign audiences. Another important cultural element that figures prominently in China’s public diplomacy is the importance attached to relationships. This explains, for example, the Chinese view on the difference between the public diplomacy approaches of China and the United States, in which China is seen as aiming to build relationships, whereas the United States is aiming to convey its ideas.18 It 16  Rhonda Zaharna, The Cultural Awakening in Public Diplomacy, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, No. 4 (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press, 2012), p. 9. 17  Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), p. 65. 18  See chapter three in this book, footnote 154. Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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is also reflected in China’s diplomacy and public diplomacy toward developing countries in Asia and Africa, where the Chinese leadership invests heavily in personal relations with leaders, and highlights positive issues instead of pointing out problems. This gives these leaders ‘face’ and, as most of these countries are high-context cultures too, this is much appreciated. The value of relations is furthermore reflected in China’s hospitality and in its expectations about other countries’ hospitality. Guests, and in particular foreign guests, should always be received in the best possible way, and audiences should be shown the very best that a host has to offer, something that was illustrated in the meticulous preparations to receive foreign guests during the Beijing Olympic Games. The notion of the importance of context, which involves looking at the ‘big picture,’ also instructs China’s holistic and long-term approach to public diplomacy, as discussed above. China’s understanding of the complementarity of things, as expressed in the concept of he er bu tong (harmonious but different), makes China’s public diplomacy outreach focus more on commonalities than on the differences between peoples and countries, and more on coexisting than on trying to change others. This approach also underpins China’s goal to seek peaceful coexistence in the international order. However, as the idea of he er bu tong is also used to defend China’s questioning of the universality of human rights,19 the concept may not resonate positively with foreign publics. Finally, Chinese cultural views about identity being fluid and the need to change constantly and improve policies are underlying the Chinese government’s capacity to listen, and its capacity to learn. The Chinese government’s behavior is sometimes erroneously interpreted as insensitive to other players’ considerations, because its first reaction to being criticized is usually to denounce or neglect the criticism. In many cases, however, China carefully studies and considers its critics’ arguments and, after a while, quietly adjusts its stance and related public diplomacy policies. This demonstrates the dynamism of China’s public diplomacy, and shows how public diplomacy can also be an indicator of change in China.

Evolution and Challenges

Over the past two decades, China’s public diplomacy has developed a comprehensive, diverse, and in several respects unique approach to public diplomacy. China strongly invests in public diplomacy, expands the range of its public 19  See, for example, Luo Yanhua, “Building a Harmonious World and Developing Global Human Rights,” Human Rights (Beijing: China Society for Human Rights Studies, June 4 2008). Ingrid d'Hooghe - 978-90-04-28395-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:50:17AM via Western University

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diplomacy instruments, knows where its opportunities lie in different regions and countries around the globe, and fine-tunes its public diplomacy strategies accordingly. It listens, learns, and continuously improves its policies. Given China’s belief in the positive effects of public diplomacy and the long-term perspective that it has on many of its public diplomacy policies, China can be expected to continue to develop, expand, and improve its public diplomacy for years to come. In doing so, however, it also faces manifold challenges. Some of the obstacles that China faces with regard to achieving its public diplomacy goals lie beyond the reach of China’s public diplomacy per se. A major challenge, for example, lies in China’s rise as a major world power, or—as many in the Western world believe—as the next superpower. Whether this belief is justified or not, no amount of public diplomacy can deal with the suspicions, anxieties, envy, and rising expectations of global publics that this status generates. Furthermore, China will not be able to avoid negative perceptions, which result from its clashing political and economic interests with other countries. Public diplomacy cannot take away the facts. Looking at the conduct of public diplomacy, China’s major challenges lie in strengthening the credibility of public diplomacy actors and messages, and tapping into the huge, but so far underutilized, potential of Chinese culture as an asset for public diplomacy. Addressing China’s lack of credibility requires a strongly reduced role for the Chinese government in public diplomacy, more government transparency, a free flow of information, free reporting by the Chinese media, and policies that support China’s public diplomacy messages. As giving up control over information and the media are incompatible with China’s authoritarian political system, however, this challenge will be difficult to overcome as long as China does not democratize. In view of the strengthening of ideological guidelines and government control over the media, in particular social media, under the new leadership of President Xi Jinping, short-term prospects for a more open political climate within the authoritarian political system are not good.20 There is more room for improvement with regard to tapping into China’s cultural resources. This, too, requires a strongly reduced role for the Chinese government, and an increased role for independent actors in the field of culture, as well as an environment in which artists, writers, and filmmakers are encouraged to think and express themselves freely. Although the latter requirement can never be fully met in an authoritarian system, the Chinese government may gradually give in on ideas about the essentially moral ­function of c­ ultural 20  See, for example, the following analysis of the Chinese media environment: David Bandurski, “Reading the June 18 Media Circular,” China Media Project (June 20 2014).

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products, and may gradually engage more independent artists in China’s cultural exchange programs. The fact that independent artists who presently operate outside the official cultural diplomacy programs win international acclaim for their work shows that Chinese cultural products have great public diplomacy potential. Since China’s public diplomacy is developed, however, within the parameters set by the political system, the question remains of how much room will be allowed for fewer state-centered public diplomacy activities. Being less directly connected to political sensitivities, cultural activities may be an area for experimentation in this respect. Do these challenges and the limits to overcoming them mean that China’s public diplomacy is not or cannot be successful? There is no method to measure adequately the effectiveness of a country’s public diplomacy. Looking at the results of opinion polls and indicators of foreign audiences’ interest in China, however, it is possible to reflect on a possible relationship between China’s public diplomacy and foreign publics’ perceptions of China. First, it can be said that China’s image in the world is not as bad as is often stated, or as it may emerge from media reports that take a normative perspective, focusing primarily on the legitimacy of China’s political system and its policies. Majorities in most developing countries, but also large groups—and sometimes a majority—in Western democracies, have a favorable view of China.21 Furthermore, young people in particular have more favorable views of China. Figures for the number of people who are learning the Chinese language, participate in educational and cultural exchanges, and study or visit China, indicate a growing interest in learning more about the country, which is also an important result of China’s outreach. Moreover, since the global financial crisis of 2008, the international debate about China’s politico-economic model reveals a growing willingness among Western scholars and opinion-leaders to take a closer and more serious look at Chinese policies, thus becoming more familiar with these policies and the reasons behind them, which generally leads to more understanding about China as a whole. China’s economic success is currently the dominant theme in Chinese public diplomacy. It sparks fear, but it also attracts people and, importantly, it allows for China’s huge spending on public diplomacy. Some therefore argue that China uses soft power only in the sense that it exercises its power softly.22 This view, however, ignores the wide array of public diplomacy instruments 21  For example, in Australia 58 per cent, and in both the UK and Spain 48 per cent of the respondents have a positive view of China. See Pew Research Center, America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s. 22  Fareed Zakaria, “The US Can Out-Charm China,” Newsweek (December 11 2005).

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that China uses, and also disregards the point that the public diplomacy strategies of big powers always contain elements of softly used hard power. In sum, China’s public diplomacy is a mixed bag with many flaws and problems that are difficult to solve, but also many successful instruments and assets to exploit and develop. As it is clear that China will keep investing in the development and expansion of its public diplomacy, China’s public diplomacy is an area that merits the continued attention of scholars and policymakers.

Issues for Future Research

The limits of this study call attention to the need for further research. This book provides a first step in examining the impacts of political system and culture on a country’s public diplomacy. It looks at only one country’s public diplomacy, and is based on a limited number of case studies spanning the period up to 2013. Its findings can therefore not be generalized. Examining other cases of China’s public diplomacy, as well as other countries’ public diplomacy, will need to provide more evidence and insight into the political and cultural factors. Research that is grounded in other disciplines, such as communication studies, may furthermore help to refine the conceptual framework with regard to the cultural impact. An in-depth study of the role of local Chinese governments in public diplomacy could deepen our insight into the impact of the political system on China’s public diplomacy. Culture and politics, however, are not the only factors determining how public diplomacy is received, as shown by the differences in perceptions among age groups within a country. More research is needed to understand what causes these differences and whether there is a relation with China’s increased public diplomacy activities. Better evaluation methods and more focused polling could provide better insights into the effects and effectiveness of China’s public diplomacy with regard to advancing its foreign policy and improving its international image. Finally, and more generally, more research on the topic of how public diplomacy is developed and executed in politically and culturally diverse countries is needed, as it will contribute to a better conceptualization of public diplomacy, as well as to more effective cultural and political dialogs.

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No Author

“Chubu xingcheng wenhua bu zongjie 2012 dui wai gongzuo chengguo zhanlue tixi chubu xingcheng” [The Ministry of Culture summarizes the results of external work in 2012; the first steps towards a strategic system], website Chinese Ministry of Culture (January 10 2013). “Kaizhan difang gonggong he renwen waijiao” [Carry Out Local Public and Renwen Diplomacy], website of Suzhou Municipal government. “Liu Yunshan: yi kexue fazhan guan wei liu ling tuijin wenhua jianshe” [Liu Yunshan: Promoting the Building of Culture through a Scientific View Development] (April 8 2007). “Li Changchun: Nuli goujian xiandai chuanbo, tigao guonei guowai chuanbo nengli” [Li Changchun: Work Hard to Build a Modern Communication System and Raise our Domestic and International Communication Capacity] (December 20 2008). “ ‘Ruhe pingjia gonggong waijiao de shishi xiaoguo’ jiangzuo yaodian neirong” [Main Points Made at the Seminar “How to Evaluate the Effect of the Implementation of Public Diplomacy”], website Charhar Institute (March 30 2012). “Shi lingdao chuxi nanjing gonggong waijiao xiehui chengli dahui” [City Leaders Attend the Inaugural Meeting of the Nanjing Public Diplomacy Association], website of Nanjing government. “Xining shi jiji shijian defang gonggong waijiao buduan tisheng chengshi ‘ruan shili’ ” [Xining City Continuously Improves the City’s Soft Power by Actively Conducting Local Public Diplomacy], website of Xining Government. “ ‘Zhongguo Moshi’ huanying zheshe de zhenshi” [The China Model: The Truth Reflected by an Illusion], Caixin, China’s Reform, No. 9 (September 1 2011). “Zhongguo wenhua duiwai jiaoliu de sige wenti” [Four Issues of China’s Cultural Exchanges with Foreign Countries], GGWJJK, No. 10 (summer 2012). “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shenhua wenhua tizhi gaige tuidong shehui zhuyi wenhua da fazhan da fanrong ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding” [Central Committee Decision Concerning the Major Issue of Deepening Cultural System Reforms, ­Promoting the Great Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture], Xinhua (October 25 2011). “Yang Jiechi zhuanti baogao: Aoyun hou de guoji xingshi yu waijiao gongzuo” [Yang Jiechi: The International Situation and Diplomatic Work after the Olympics], Xuexi Shibao [Study Times] (October 20 2008).

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Bibliography

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Selected Websites and Blogs 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, http://en.beijing2008.cn Asian Creative Transformations, http://www.creativetransformations.asia Bruce Gregory’s Public Diplomacy Reading List, http://publicdiplomacy.wikia.com/ wiki/Bruce_Gregory’s_Reading_List China Africa Real Story, http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com China beat, http://www.thechinabeat.org China Copyright and Media, http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com China Digital Times, http://chinadigitaltimes.net Chinafile, http://www.chinafile.com China Media Project, http://cmp.hku.hk China Real-Time Report, The Wall Street Journal, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime Chinese government, http://www.china.org.cn Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn Chinese Posters, http://chineseposters.net China Radio International, http://english.cri.cn Danwei, http://www.danwei.org/ EurasiaNet, http://www.EurasiaNet.org Forum of China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), http://www.focac.org Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org Human Rights in China, http://www.hrichina.org International Bureau of Expositions (BIE), http://www.bie-paris.org Mountainrunner, http://www.mountainrunner.us NGO’s in China, http://www.ngochina.blogspot.com Shanghai World Expo 2010, http://en.expo2010.cn World Health Organization, http://www.who.int

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Index Abe, Shinzo 200 accountability 15, 40, 50, 57, 324, 330 Action Plan for Human Rights 57 Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) 304–7, 310, 314, 315 advocacy, as element of public diplomacy 183, 282 groups, see also lobby groups, NGOs 35, 250, 284, 322 Afghanistan 197 Africa, African countries, see also South Africa; North Africa, specific countries in Africa 1, 2, 44, 70, 149, 158, 160, 165, 178–179, 278, 314, 340, 356, 359 and the Shanghai Expo 278, 283 China–Africa relations 76, 135, 140, 206–216 China as viewed by 336–337, 341, 344–346, 348, 351 (public) diplomacy towards Africa 4, 11, 14, 84, 129, 158, 184, 206–216, 217–219, 362 FOCAC, see Forum on China-Africa Relations African Dream 1, 84, 209 African Union Conference Center 211 Africa Weekly 214 Aichi World Expo, see World Expo aid, see also official development assistance (ODA) foreign aid (China’s) 145, 179–80, 187, 195 ‘no-political-strings-attached’ 69, 179, 206 air pollution, see pollution ‘airpocalypse’ 71 Ai Weiwei 65 Al Jazeera 165, 182 Alliance Française 30, 175 Amnesty International Report 2013 60 Ang Lee 146 anti-Beijing Games 243, 245, 320, 322 anti-China 247 anti-Japanese 199, 200, 341

anti-Western 52, 62 APEC, see Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Arab Spring 119, 356 Armitage, Richard 25 Arsenault, Amelia 38 art festival 4, 171 Asahi Shimbun 203 Asia, see also Asia–Pacific, Central Asia, Northeast Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and public diplomacy towards Asia China as viewed by 337, 340–346, 348–351 Asia Leadership Roundtable 166 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 146 Asian financial crisis 186 Asian Games 154, 223 Asian Youth Games 153 Asia–Pacific 80, 140, 165, 193 Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 189 Asia Times 315 assertive behavior (China) 78, 84, 147, 185–7 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 76, 186, 188, 193, 297–9 China–ASEAN Expo 194 China ASEAN Free Trade Area 186 asymmetry cultural 285, 365 of publics 287, 365 Australia 171, 246 China as viewed by 336, 340–341, 343–345 Chinese Culture Year 171 authoritarian (political) system, model 40–42, 339 China’s authoritarian system 7, 13, 47, 51–52, 56, 62, 69–70, 122, 282–283, 307, 352, 368 impact on public diplomacy 8, 91, 185, 330, 346, 357–362 Bangkok 190, 193, 195, 246, 297 Bangladesh 180, 188 Sydr (cyclone 2007) 180

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409

index Ban Ki-moon 81, 270, 322 Banks, Robert 335 BBC World 164, 182, 292 ‘Beijing Consensus’ 69, 78 Beijing Cultural and Creative Industries Expo 172 Beijing Design Week 172 Beijing Games, see Olympic Games Beijing Olympics, see Olympic Games Beijing-Tokyo Forum 166 Belgium 171 Bell Pottinger 227 Benoit, William 286–287, 328 Berlin 171, 246 bias bias against, biased reporting on China 62, 104, 122, 137, 213, 246 (Chinese) media bias 236 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 212 bird flu, see also H7N9 virus, SARS 358 Blair, Tony 155, 339 blogs 10, 22, 106, 263, 313 bloggers 56, 120, 127, 130, 168, 324, 365 blogosphere 167, 182, 360 micro-blogging 55–56, 105, 167, 205 Bloomberg 88 Boao Forum 294 Bocelli, Andrea 271 boycotts anti-Beijing Games 241, 244, 339 anti-France 244 anti-Japan 200 anti-Western 52 branding 13, 28, 31, 34, 130 Brautigam, Deborah 207 Brazil 29 Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC) countries 29 Britain, see also United Kingdom 238, 322 China as viewed by 338–339 British Council 29–30 British Petroleum 176 Brown, Gordon 339 Bruni, Carla 2 Buddhist diplomacy 191 Burson-Marsteller 231 business as instrument of public diplomacy 28, 35, 67–68 75–76, 88, 140, 153, 159–160,

166, 170, 176, 197, 208, 210, 220, 251, 282, 291, 305, 309, 346 Chinese 75, 217, 256 Chinese business in Africa 215, 217, 219 ethics 309, 316 foreign 168, 170, 208, 210, 213, 269, 291, 310, 312, 347 green 73 networks 192–193, 262 overseas Chinese 273–2744, 282 Caijing 54, 295, 325 Cambodia 187–189, 190, 192, 194–195 Canada 33, 174, 344 Cancun Climate Summit 74 Cannes Film Festival 65 carbon dioxide emissions China’s 72–73 US 72 Caribbean 180 Carrefour 244 Carreras, Jose 228 celebrities as instrument of public diplomacy 155, 158–159, 252, 267 celebrity ambassadors 132, 158, 227 censorship 13, 53–56, 146, 215, 358–359 Central Asia 70, 185, 195–198, 217 Central Committee (CC), see Chinese Communist Party Central Publicity Department (CPD), see Chinese Communist Party ‘century of humiliation’ 52, 84, 250 chambers of commerce 35, 216, 310 Chan, Margaret 311 changeability 47–48 Charhar Institute 98, 102, 333–334 “Charter 08” 59 Chang, Michael 227 Chan, Jackie 227, 267, 271, 347 Chen Deming 148 Chen Guangcheng 58 Cheng Hong 2, 150 Chen Jibing 127 Chen Zhili 230 Cheonan 78 Chicago 154 Confucius Institute in 176, 363 President Hu’s visit to 148 University of Chicago 364

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410 Chicago Council on Global Affairs 82, 346 China Central Television (CCTV) 145, 164–165, 190, 214, 291, 309, 320 China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) 259 China Daily 53, 164, 166, 170, 186, 214, 291, 309, 324, 326 China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) 180 China Institute for International Communication Strategy (CIICS) 157 China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) 157 China Institute of International Strategic Studies 143 China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) 136, 157, 164 China Medical Teams 158 China Model, Chinese model 13, 69–70, 91, 113, 121–124, 216–217, 356 China National Tourism Office 267 China Radio International (CRI) 145, 164–165 China’s First Lady, see also Peng Liyuan 1, 2 China’s health system 292 China’s influence in the world 13, 68, 76, 87, 93, 110, 112, 120, 185–187, 192, 195, 198, 201, 207–208, 343, 345 China’s, Chinese military, see also People’s Liberation Army 86–87, 143–144, 326–327, 354 China’s National Security Committee 119 China Society for Human Rights Studies 57 China’s political system, see political system China’s rise 3, 13–14, 68, 100, 117, 129, 131, 147, 187, 220, 250, 368 views of 336, 343, 345, 348, 350–351 China Threat debate 68, 247, 306, 355 China Xinhua News Network Corporation (CNC), see also Xinhua 165–166, 214 China Youth Daily 295 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 174, 209 Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAFIU) 156, 202 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 51, 54, 83, 97–98, 118, 119 n. 121, 134, 145, 150–151, 156, 212, 235, 248, 259 Central Committee (CC) 118, 151

index Central Publicity Department (CPD) 134, 230, 235, 259, 323 Cultural System Reform Leading Group 163 Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group 135 International Department (CCP) 150 National Party Congress 151 16th 172 17th 97, 117 18th 93, 154 Office of External Publicity 134, 145 Politburo 127, 135, 230, 292, 300 Product Quality and Food Safety Leading Group 311 Publicity and Ideology Leading Small Group 135 Chinese Cultural Center 145, 171, 190, 201, 205 Chinese Dream 1, 3, 81–86, 119, 209, 345, 362 Chinese films, movies 120, 146, 160, 165, 190–191, 205–206, 226–227, 346–347 Chinese media, see media Chinese mentality Chinese mission(s) abroad, see also Chinese embassies 174 to the EU 157 Chinese movies 205–206 Chinese New Year celebrations, festivals 142, 171–172, 190, 205, 361 holiday 288–289 Chinese students abroad 173–174, 202 Chinese television series 190, 205, 347 Chinese tourists 50, 90 Chinese values, see values Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) 156, 202 Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) 155, 157 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 98, 134, 151–2, 159, 280 Foreign Affairs Committee 98, 280 Chirac, Jacques 338–339 citizens as actors or targets of public diplomacy 12, 21, 35, 51, 249, 255, 274–275

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index diplomacy, see diplomacy networks, see networks civil rights (in China) 41, 47, 50, 51, 56, 58, 345–346, 349 civil society 6, 32, 35, 40, 56 China’s 56, 75, 94, 102, 106–107, 115, 126, 156, 181, 212, 280, 331 Myanmar’s 189 networks, groups 129, 132, 182, 358 Clark, Helen 314 CNN 62, 149, 165, 182 collaboration as public diplomacy instrument 6, 11, 12, 18, 19, 24, 38, 39, 44, 45, 183, 281–283, 333, 357, 363 communication, see also cultural communication, strategic communication mass 6, 18–20, 44 one-way communication 27, 38, 181 patterns 43, 366 skills 157, 181, 286, 306 styles 7, 44, 125 Communication University of China (CUC) 157 Communist Youth League 158 complementarity 47–48, 131, 367 Comprehensive National Power (China’s) 2, 13, 97, 110, 129, 161, 353, 355 Confucianism 64 Confucius Classrooms 146, 164, 175, 191 Confucius Institute(s) 4, 13–14, 30, 146, 148, 176, 180, 182–183, 219, 333–334, 363–365 175–8 debate on 177, 363–364 Headquarters, see Hanban in Africa 211, 217 in Asia 191–192, 197, 201, 205 Congo, see Republic of Congo constitutionalism 83 construction Chinese construction abroad 179, 196, 211, 216–217 contextuality 47 Coombs, W. Timothy 31, 285 Copenhagen Summit 73–74, 92, 333 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 160, 189, 215, 217, 219 correlativity 47–48, 131

411 corruption (China) 54, 82, 150, 307, 318, 328, 330–331 Cowan, Geoffrey 38 credibility 8, 14, 20–21, 40–41, 128, 241, 291, 299, 302, 306, 318, 328, 330–331, 362–363, 368 Criminal Procedure Law 57 Cross, Mai’a K. Davis 17 Cruise, Tom 168 Cui Tiankai 259 Culbert, David 271 Cull, Nicholas J. 39, 271 culture as a source of soft power 13, 63, 95, 118–121, 127–128, 131, 160, 167, 172, 174, 175, 178, 198, 225, 233, 238, 269, 361 impact on public diplomacy 8, 47–51, 91, 94, 124–125, 131, 243, 254, 283, 362–366, 368 views of Chinese culture 346, 361 cultural, see also diplomacy, identity cooperation 45, 145, 171, 190, 201 differences 121 diversity 22, 121 industries (China’s) 66, 120, 163, 206 pollution 65 ‘security’ 65, 118–119 soft power 129 traditions 7 values, see values cyber-security 86–89, 119 Darfur, see also Sudan 122, 241–242 Dalai Lama 60–62, 78–79, 142, 244, 339 Dalian Wanda Group 160 Dayan, Daniel 222, 256 decentralization, of foreign policy-making 35, 152 Deloitte 176 ‘democratic peace theory’ 350 democratization of foreign policy making and international relations 32, 35, 50, 81 demonization of China 127, 245 Denmark 176 Deng Xiaoping 161 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 78, 134, 147, 199, 200, 341

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412 diaspora, see also overseas Chinese 31–33, 35, 42, 62, 160–162, 246–247, 273, 283, 361 Ding Lei 126 diplomacy see also public diplomacy bilateral 19 Buddhist 191 citizen 28–29, 34 city 152 cultural 15, 28–30, 34, 37, 64, 113–115, 118, 128–129, 171, 173, 180, 189, 201, 205, 218, 280, 369 digital, see public diplomacy 2.0 economic 37, 113, 217, 280, 351, 362 good-neighbor 75 ideological 115 major-power 75 multilateral 75 people’s, people-to-people 15, 155 191, 212 ping-pong 155 renwen 114–115, 117, 129, 255, 364 track-II 28, 156 traditional 17–18, 202, 257, 349 ‘ultimatum diplomacy’ 189, 218 diplomats 22, 61, 138, 296 Chinese 10, 49–50, 94, 116, 139–142, 155, 181, 309 domestic outreach, see public diplomacy Domingo, Placido 228 Donilon, Thomas 89 Du Gangjian 295 Duke University in Kunshan 175 earth quake, see Wenchuan Earthquake East China Sea 78, 80, 87, 135, 186, 218, 340 economic aid (Chinese) 187, 198 powerhouse (China) 67 rise (China) 13, 47, 67–69, 78, 91, 196, 355 Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) 57, 156 Economist 61, 78, 291, 300, 305, 321 Ecuador 176, 342 Edelman 312 Egypt 90, 176 Ellul, Jacques 27

index El Pais 169 embassies 211 Chinese 134, 138, 141–145, 149, 167, 172, 174, 215, 245, 247, 262, 268, 309, 323, 362 energy policy 73, 233, 279 China’s need for 71 clean, renewable 73 relations with Africa 208–209 environment education on 248, 252 environmental concerns, problems 188, 196, 228, 233, 283, 364 degradation, see also pollution 71–72, 121, 206, 250 policies 73, 213, 215, 233, 236 in Olympics’ public diplomacy 221, 233, 238, 248, 252, 253, 256 in Expo public diplomacy 261, 264, 271, 279 epistemic communities 38 Esarey, Ashley 56 ethics in business 309, 316 in public diplomacy 26 Ethiopia 211 EU, see European Union Europalia–China Arts Festival 171 Europe 67, 68, 69, 80, 86, 95, 142, 144, 150, 165, 173, 178, 210, 217, 227, 244, 246, 258, 262, 305, 306 China as viewed by 336–341, 344–346, 349 Europe–China Media Exchange Program 169 Hu’s visit to 169–170, 298 European Union (EU) 70, 78, 140, 157, 171, 187, 271, 311 China–EU High-Level Political Parties Forum 151 EU–China ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ 337 EU–China Summit 60, 78 exchanges 28, 41, 103, 140, 232, 256, 278 academic 137, 156 cultural 41, 93, 102, 114, 135, 161, 163, 190, 193, 197, 234, 262, 348, 360, 369

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index educational, student 38, 41, 135, 163, 173, 175, 217, 348, 363, 369 media 169, 215 people’s 93, 102, 103, 115, 155, 156, 189, 210–203, 205, 206, 358 youth 150–152 ‘Experience China’ 149 Expo, see Shanghai Expo ‘face’ 2, 48, 217, 241, 255, 283, 319, 329, 339, 366, 367 human face 158, 321, 330 public face 147 Facebook 22, 23, 38, 55, 88, 105, 167 Far Eastern Economic Review 301 Farrow, Mia 241–242 Fifty Cent Army, Party 55, 360 Fiji 4 financial crisis 2008 67, 70, 78–80, 91–92, 115, 122, 170, 277, 340, 349, 357, 369 Financial Times 170 Fitzpatrick, Kathy 23 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 69 Five Year Plan for Cultural Development 172 Five Year Program on Cultural Reform and Development (12th) 172 FOCAC, see Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Fonterra 313–314 food exports 71, 305, 309 pet 12, 304–308, 328 safety crisis, scandal 14, 286, 303, 305, 307–319, 328–330 Food and Drug Administration (US) (FDA) 304 Forbidden City (Beijing) 228 Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, see Chinese Communist Party Foreign Culture Work Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference 163 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Europe, US 69 foreign ministry, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs foreign perceptions, see perceptions foreign policy China’s 4, 49, 67, 74–78, 81, 83, 92, 117, 131, 186, 217, 218, 241, 365

413 foreign policymaking processes 32–33, 35, 157 relation to public diplomacy 7, 8, 11, 14, 18, 20, 30–31, 37, 45, 93, 97, 99, 112, 115–116, 217, 332, 353, 357, 362–363, 370 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 208 France, see also Paris 30, 176, 238, 244, 322, 327 Chinese-language year in France 171 China as viewed by 337–339, 349 freedom 91, 130, 141, 155, 157, 177, 181, 254, 345, 349 cultural 29, 63–66, 359 of association 40 of expression 40–41, 63, 359 of information 41, 251 press, media 8, 41, 47, 51, 53, 55, 128, 214, 219, 228, 236, 241, 251, 254, 295 of speech 41, 56 Freedom House 53 Friedman, Thomas 85 Fudan University 157 Fu Jianfeng 313 Fukuda, Keiji 302 Fukushima Earthquake 203, 340, 349, 351 Fu Ying 245 G8 (Group of 8) 76 Gangnam Style 65, 66 Gao Hucheng 169, 259 Gao Qiang 292–293 Gates, Bill 168 General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP) 145 ‘Genocide Games’ campaign 241 German Marshall Fund 343 Germany 30, 62, 169, 170, 199, 267, 322 German-Chinese dialog on human rights 156 China as viewed by 337–339, 349 Gill, Bates 77 globalization 3, 19, 75, 99, 115 Global Times 53, 55, 166 Goethe Institut 30, 175 ‘go global’ policy see also ‘go-out’ policy 4, 76, 164, 217, 365 Gong Fangbing 119 gonggong waijiao, see public diplomacy

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414 Gonggong Waijiao Jikan, see Public Diplomacy Quarterly good-neighbor diplomacy 75 policy 185 goodwill ambassador(s) 150, 158, 159 Google 88 ‘go out’ policy, see also ‘go global’ 76, 145, 164–165, 172, 213 Gong Li 227 Gong Tieying 113 government control Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 194 Greece 343 ‘green’, see also Expo, Green, and Olympics, Green 73, 233, 238, 264 Green, Stephen 268 Gregory, Bruce 34n82 Gries, Peter Hays 52, 247, 366 Guangdong Province 153, 287–291 Trade Fair 154 Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 193–195 Gulf of Aden 87, 144 Gullion, Edmund 18n7 H7N9 virus, see also bird flu, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 3, 302–303, 330 Haibao 264, 265, 268, 276–277 Hall, Edward 44, 124 Hall, Martin 17 Hallyu, see Korean Wave Halper, Stefan 78 Hanban, see also Confucius Institutes 146, 175, 177–178, 180, 197, 364 Han Fangming 102, 334 Hangzhou 153 Han Han 120, 167 hard power ‘harmonious society’ 3, 100–101, 232–233, 240, 251 ‘harmonious world’ 3, 81–82, 121, 232, 239, 251 ‘harmonious but different’ (he er bu tong) 121, 125, 131, 269 harmony (he, hexie) 44, 81–82, 117, 121, 125, 131, 191, 226, 232–233, 251, 271, 283 he, see harmony he er bu tong, see ‘harmonious but different’

index He Wenping 209 He Yafei 161 Heymann, David 298 hexie shehui, see ‘harmonious society’ hexie shijie, see ‘harmonious world’ high-context 44 communication 14, 44 culture 44–45, 124, 283, 353, 366–367 Hill&Knowlton 231, 263 Hocking, Brian 40 holistic approach 9, 14, 47, 183, 353, 362–364, 367 Holladay, Sherry J. 285 Hollywood 120, 146, 160 Hong Kong 191, 238, 246, 267, 270, 289, 290, 303 Hong Kong Sattelite TV 120 HSBC 176, 268 Huang Chin-hao 77 Huangpu River 71, 271 Hu Changming 326 Hu Hsien-chin 48 Huijgh, Ellen 32 Hui Li 241 Hu Jia 242 Hu Jintao 64–65, 81, 93, 97, 114, 117–118, 147, 149, 162, 244, 262, 289, 320, 356 human rights, see also freedom, political rights 40, 56–61, 91, 135, 148, 150, 177, 225, 228–229, 233, 241–243, 246, 250, 284, 327, 337, 339, 345, 367 Hu Shuli 295 identity 42 China’s 49, 100–101, 111, 113, 126, 198, 255 cultural 8, 42–43, 247 national 32, 42–43, 247 ideology 107, 113–115, 119, 122 Image Repair Theory 286, 328 India 4, 29, 62, 190–191, 216, 356 China as viewed by 336, 345 China–India Year of Friendship and Cooperation 171, 190 India–Africa Forum Summit 216 Indian Ocean 187 Indonesia 33, 82, 191 China as viewed by 338, 341, 345, 347 informational approach, see public diplomacy approaches

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index innovation as public diplomacy theme 176, 263, 267, 270–271, 283, 364 Institute for Cultural Industries (China) 173 Instituto Cervantes 30 intellectual property 68, 170, 249 intellectuals 156 Interbrand 312 Internal Report (neibu tongxun) 134 International Bureau of Expositions (BIE) 258 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 58 International Crisis Group 196 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 69, 87, 168 International Olympic Committee (IOC) 221, 223–226, 228–229, 236, 238, 242, 244, 252, 254 Jacques, Martin 78 Japan, see also anti-Japan 49, 65, 67, 72, 82, 187, 216, 221, 356 China’s diplomacy towards 49, 78, 80, 85, 135, 147, 155, 185–186, 198–204, 206, 218, 266, 281–282, 298, 322 China as viewed by 338, 340–341, 344, 347, 349, 351, 355 Japan Foundation 30 Japan Times 72 Jasmine Revolution 119, 168, 356 Jiang Xiaoyu 230 Jiang Yanyong 291 Jiang Zemin 96, 229 Jia Qingguo 101, 109, 124, 126 Jia Zhangke 65 Jing Sun 201 Jin Jing 244 Johnson, Boris 268 Jones, Qincy 271 Jönsson, Christer 17 Joseph, William 51 journalists 28, 238, 319, 326 China–United States Journalists’ Exchanges 169 Chinese 53, 130, 268 foreign 63, 135–136, 192, 229, 236, 251, 309, 360 Jowett, Garth 27

415 Kachin Independence Organization 3, 80, 218 Kant, Immanuel 350 Katrina (Hurricane, 2005) 180 Katz, Elihu 222, 256 Kazakhstan 196–197 Kenya 176, 214 China as viewed by 338 Kim Dae-Jung 267 Kissinger, Henry 366 ‘Kung Fu Panda’ 120 Korean Wave 65 kouhao (official slogan) 50 Kramer, David 322 Kronick, Scott 312 Kunming 130, 153 Kurlantzick, Joshua 356 Kushlish, Patricia 17 Kyrgyzstan 196–197 Lagarde, Christine 168 land grabs 207 Lang Lang 59, 149, 171, 267, 271 Lanting [Blue Hall] Forum 140 Laos 144, 188, 192–193 Latin America 70, 76, 84, 144, 180 China as viewed by 340–343, 346, 350–351, 355, 362–363 Lee Myung-bak 271 Lhasa 61–62 liabilities for public diplomacy, see public diplomacy lian, see ‘face’ Libya 143 Li Bingbing 159 Li Changchun 127, 294 Li Changjiang 306 Lieberthal, Kenneth 51 Li Keqiang 2, 149–150, 318 European visit 169–170, 199 Li Shulei 110 ‘listening’ as element of public diplomacy 31, 39 Liu Guijin 122 Liu Qi 230, 233 Liu Xiaobo 58, 79, 91, 340 Liu Yawei 123 Li Wei 107

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416 Li Weijian 280 Li Xiguang 105–6 Li Zhaoxing 140, 296 London 170, 246, 266, 268 “Lost in Thailand” 66 Louvre Museum 160 low-context culture 44, 124 Lu Shuming 155 Lu Yi 96 Macao 270 ‘Made in China’ 312, 316 Malaysia 190–192 China as viewed by 336, 341–342, 345 Mali, see also MINUSMA 77 Mandelson, Peter 316 Mao Zedong 1 Ma Zhengang 140 mass communication, see communication mass media, see media Mattel 309–10, 319, 329, 366 Mattern, Janice Bially 24 McKinsey 54 Mearsheimer, John 350 media, see also specific media outlets, censorship, journalists, freedom of press, overseas Chinese media expansion of Chinese media abroad 13–14, 162, 164, 180, 182, 201, 213, 219, 222, 353, 358 foreign media dominance 4, 127, 164, 219 mass 38, 152, 294 social, new 14, 22–23, 104–105, 137, 166–168, 182, 301, 324, 329, 359–360, mediation 80, 92 Medvedev, Dmitry 271 mega-trend (shi) 47 melamine, see also milk scandal 304, 313, 314 Melissen, Jan 19, 27–28 Meng Xuenong 293 Mengzi 94 Merkel, Angela 338–339 Metropolis 153 mianzi, see ‘face’ micro-blogging, see blogs, specific microblogging sites

index Middle East 29, 58, 95, 168, 356 China as viewed by 337, 341, 343 Middleton, Kate 2, 150 Miles, James 61 military, see also military power, People’s Liberation Army budget 86 international cooperation 87, 342 military capabilities 68, 86, 218 hospitals 290 hospital ship Peace Ark 144 Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) 87 milk powder crisis, scandal 12, 303, 312–319 number of deaths 304, 313 minjian waijiao [people’s diplomacy], see diplomacy Ministry of Civil Affairs 322 Ministry of Commerce (Mofcom) 139, 144–145, 213, 215, 296, 305 Ministry of Culture 134, 145, 171–173, 180, 190, 205, 259 Ministry of Education 134, 145–146, 175 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 10, 75, 93, 116, 126, 134–136, 138–141, 167, 296 Department of Information 139 Office of Public Diplomacy 139 Public Diplomacy Division 139 Ministry of Health 134, 288, 292, 293, 296, 298, 311, 314 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 138 Ministry of National Defense 134, 143–144, 326 Foreign Affairs Office of 143 Information Office of 143, 326 Ministry of Public Health 292–293 Ministry of Public Security 138 MINUSMA (UN peacekeeping mission in Mali) 77 monolog 38, 42, 44, 282, 333, 376 Moody International Group 308 Moscow 1, 84, 149, 171 Mo Yan 65 ‘Mulan’ 120 multipolarity 50 multilateralism 50, 76, 81

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index Myanmar 80, 180, 188–191, 193–194, 218, 241, 321, 327 Nargis, (cyclone 2008) 180, 321, 327 Nanfang Media Group 153 Nanjing 153 Asian Youth Games (2013) 153 Summer Youth Olympics (2014) 153 Nargis, (cyclone Myanmar, 2008) 180, 321, 327 nationalism 52, 199, 237, 246–247 nationalistic feelings, emotions 75, 244, 247 nationalists 52 National People’s Congress (NPC) 60, 140, 156, 289 Foreign Affairs Committee 140, 156 National Public Radio 168 NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization natural resources, see also raw materials 195, 207 neibu tongxun, see Internal Report neijin waisong 53 neiwai youbie 53, 225, 287, 365 neo-colonial aid policies 179 NEOMA Business School 176 Nepal 62, 188, 191 Netherlands, see also Dutch 141, 171, 342 networks, see also public diplomacy, overseas Chinese 13, 20–21, 35, 119, 129, 145, 153 academic 38, 156 business, economic 192–193, 262 civil society 129, 358 global, international 19, 36, 161, 163, 167, 359 policy 6, 19 social 106, 192 social media, online 55, 182, 359 newspapers, see specific newspapers New Scientist 302 New York Times 61, 88, 123, 166, 199, 292, 308 New York University in Shanghai 175 New Zealand 313–314 NGOs, see non-governmental organizations Ni Ping 171 Nobel Prize for Literature 65 for Peace 58–59, 79, 91, 267, 270, 340

417 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Chinese, in China 10, 102, 133, 327, 358 role in public diplomacy 19, 21, 35, 75, 156, 212, 229, 241, 269, 281, 358 non-interference 69, 206 norms 3, 26, 46, 63, 333 Western 82, 250–251, 253–254, 284 North Africa 119, 356 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 76, 155 Northeast Asia 13, 185, 193, 198–205 China as viewed by 344–345, 349 North Korea 76, 78, 80, 85, 186, 203–205, 218 Norway 59, 91, 363 Nye, Joseph 23–25, 96, 109, 111 Obama, Barack 79, 144, 216 Obama, Michele 2, 150 ODA, see official development assistance O’Donnell, Victoria 27 official development assistance (ODA), see also aid 179, 210 Ogilvy 231, 263, 312 Olympic Bid, see also Olympic Games Beijing 223–229, 243 emblem 225–226, 234, 254, 283 Olympic Charter 248 Olympic Games Athens 235, 239 Olympic Games Beijing (2008) anti-campaigns 241, 244, 322, 339 Beijing 2008 International Media Center (BIMC) 237 Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee (BOBICO) 224–229 Beijing Olympic Environment Monitoring Center 237 Beijing Olympic Food Inspection Center 237 Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) 229–238, 240–248, 251–254 Closing Ceremony 239–241 emblems 234, 254, 283 evaluation 228, 250, 252 Green Olympics 232–233, 238, 252 Hi-Tech Olympics 232–233, 248

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418 Olympic Games Beijing (2008) (cont.) mascot 234, 238 narrative 232, 250 Opening Ceremony 237, 239–241, 339 Peoples Olympics 114, 232–233, 239, 248–250 renwen Olympics, see People’s Olympics slogans 223, 232, 234–235, 238, 249, 251, 254, 263, 283 Torch Relay 234, 238, 243–245, 251, 253, 255 volunteers 234, 237–238, 248, 281 Olympic Games Lake Placid (1980) 222 Olympic Games London (2012) 240 Olympic Games Sydney (2000) 226 Olympic Games Tokyo (1964) 221 Oksenberg, Michel 51 Omi, Shigeru 317 one-way communication, see also monolog 5, 38, 181, 271 opinion polls 10, 15, 19, 136, 200, 204, 253, 258, 301, 332–335, 346, 355, 361, 369 Organization for International Cooperation and Development (OECD) 67, 179, 215 Oscars’ 2013 ceremony 146 overseas Chinese, see also diaspora 14, 15, 69, 167, 182, 217, 273, 359 as public diplomacy instruments and targets 160–162, 171, 192–193, 220, 247–255, 273–274, 277, 282–283, 323, 327, 361 associations, organizations 152, 161–162, 193, 282 media 153, 161–162, 192–193, 202, 262, 273, 343, 361 students 174–175, 202 Outline for the Development of National Overseas Chinese Affairs 2011–2015 161 Overseas Chinese Affairs Office 161–162, 273, 323 Page, Ben 335 Pakistan 59, 197 China as viewed by 341–342 Panama 304 panda’s 170, 374 Pan Wei 122 Paracel Islands 186 Paris 90, 160, 171, 244, 246, 251, 339

index ‘Paris of the East’ 256 Park Heung-hye 204 Party, Party Congress, see Chinese Communist Party patriotism (Chinese) 244, 247, 293 Patton Boggs 312 Paulson, Henry 155 Pavarotti, Luciano 228 peace 3, 81, 121, 186, 232, 240, 271, 350 peaceful coexistence 367 peaceful evolution 119, 356 peaceful rise, intentions 81, 100, 185, 264 world, international 85, 100, 117, 232, 251, 345 Peace Ark 144 peacekeeping, see also UNPKO 77, 242 Peking University 122, 173, 235 Peng Liyuan, see also First Lady 1–2, 149 People’s Armed Police (PAP) 326 People’s Bank of China 170, 254 People’s Daily 63, 66, 93, 104–105, 123–124, 166, 195, 244, 268, 306, 309–310 people’s diplomacy, see diplomacy People’s Liberation Army (PLA), see also military 86, 119, 134, 143–144, 291 role in Wenchuan earthquake 320, 324–328, 330 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 86 people’s organizations, see also specific organizations 156, 172, 202 people-to-people diplomacy, see diplomacy perceptions 24, 47, 109 of China 2, 15, 78, 92, 136, 196, 200–201, 272, 283, 318–319, 332–351, 355–356, 364, 368–370 pet food, see food Pew Global Attitudes Survey 335, 339–341, 343–347 Pew Research Center 337–338 Philippines 80, 186 China as viewed by 341, 344 Phoenix Television 291 ping-pong diplomacy, see diplomacy pivot to Asia (US) 80, 187 policymaking China’s 7, 10, 47, 49, 51–52, 66, 109, 133 China’s foreign policymaking 32, 33, 49, 75, 159

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index Politburo, see Chinese Communist Party political culture 8, 43, 130, 132, 285 participation 40–41, 56 political system, see authoritarian system rights, see also human rights 40, 58 pollution, see also environmental degradation, ‘airpocalypse’ 71–72, 241, 279 cultural 65 Polumbaum, Judy 241 Potter, Evan 32 poverty 69, 72, 158 China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) 180 power, see also hard power, smart power and soft power economic 2, 67, 69, 100, 217 military 2, 86, 344 politica 1, 2, 51, 69, 112 preconceived notions of China 15, 349, 351–352, 354 press conferences, as element of public diplomacy 135–136, 139, 143, 148, 169, 225, 289, 292, 296, 300, 302, 309–310, 319, 321, 326 Press Freedom Index 53 Price, Monroe Edwin 222 Pritzker Architecture Prize 65 Product Quality and Food Safety Leading Group 311 product safety, see also food safety, toy safety 12, 305, 307–309, 311–312, 318, 328–330, 366 propaganda 13, 16, 26–30, 41, 85, 95, 107–108, 177, 181, 363 Psy 65 public affairs 32, 116, 274 public diplomacy 2.0 21, 23, 104–105, 129 budget 180–181 conceptualization 5, 8, 17, 34, 353, 370 cultural underbelly 43, 366 defensive 11, 122, 131, 200, 255, 353, 356 definition 5, 101–103 domestic dimension, outreach 12–13, 16, 31–33, 104, 112, 115–117, 130, 234,

419 247–250, 252, 274, 277, 283, 353–354, 359, 361, 364 effectiveness 332, 348–349, 362, 369–370 evaluation 15, 46, 332–335, 351, 370 goals 8, 31, 33, 37, 99–100, 103, 108, 181, 193, 252 ‘grand plan’ 183, 184, 365 information(al) approach 19, 20, 38 layers of 38, 42, 44–45, 333 liabilities 9, 11, 13–14, 41, 47, 88, 90–91, 128, 184–185, 218, 284, 332 long-term approach, perspective, 48, 357, 363, 367– 368 models 7, 118, 32, 104 narratives 8, 20–21, 34, 37, 42, 54, 81, 105, 161, 182, 222, 358 Expo narrative 263–265 Olympic narrative 232–235 network approach 5, 6, 18, 19, 20–22, 32, 35–37, 40, 104–106, 129, 176, 353–354, 357 ‘new’ 18–20, 104 ‘old’, traditional 18, 22, 25, 28, 35, 104, 225 paradigms 5, 7, 18, 20, 123 receiving side 9, 15, 26, 45, 332–333, 354 relational approach 19, 20, 38 research, study 5, 17, 97–98, 104, 106, 152, 157, 280, 282, 334, 357, 370 scholarship 16, 43 state-centered approach 5, 18, 19, 31, 35–36, 40, 103, 129, 183, 282, 353, 357, 369 strategic approach, character 13–14, 129, 357, 362–365 subnational 130, 134, 152–153, 217, 281 theories 7, 220, 280, 282, 353 theorizing or lack thereof 5–6, 16–17 Public Diplomacy Advisory Committee (of China’s MFA) 140 Public Diplomacy Associations 140–141, 154 Public Diplomacy Division (of China’s MFA) 139 Public Diplomacy Office (of China’s MFA) 139 Public Diplomacy Quarterly 98, 152 public health 71, 133, 293, 296, 298–291 Publicis Consultants 258

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420 publicity, see also propaganda 108, 134 Publicity and Ideology Leading Small Group, see Chinese Communist Party public relations 16, 19, 31–32, 72, 102, 135, 160, 227, 263, 321 agencies, firms, see also specific firms 137, 227, 231, 263, 312 Qin, Yaqing 47, 49, 124 Qiushi 118, 356 Razak, Najib 190 RC2 toy company 308 rejuvenation 1, 14, 82, 141 renmin suzhi [quality of the people] 90, 248 renmin waijiao [people’s diplomacy], see people’s diplomacy Renren 54 renwen aoyun [people’s olympics] see Olympic Games renwen waijiao [people’s and cultural diplomacy], see renwen diplomacy Republic of Congo 150 research questions 8, 17 resources of soft power, see soft power responsible stakeholder 77 retaliation 60, 78, 88, 91, 319, 363 Reuters 166 rise, see China’s rise RTL Television (Germany) 62 Rogge, Jacques 244 ruan shili, see soft power rule of law 40, 50, 59, 345 Russia 1, 29, 59, 72, 84, 195, 197, 267, 322, 333 China Year in 333 Sanlu 313–315, 319 Sarkozy, Nicolas 60, 271, 277, 338–339 SARS, see Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Scarborough Shoal 186 Schröder, Gerhard 267, 338–339 Science 316 Scissors, Derek 207 scholarship programs 146, 146n60, 173, 177, 192, 194, 197, 211 Second World War 199 Senkaku Islands, see Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands

index Seoul 171, 205–206 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 3, 287–303 SARS Control and Prevention Headquarters 203 cover-up 288, 291, 293, 299 education 292, 294, 300, 329 humor 295 number of deaths 287, 294 opinion poll on China’s handling of 301 whistle blower Jiang Yanyong 291 Shambaugh, David 50 Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) 111 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 76, 140 Shanghai Creative Industries Activities Week 172 Shanghai Declaration 271 Shanghai Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Commission 257 Shanghai Jiaotong University 280 Shanghai Public Diplomacy Association 280 Shanghai World Expo 152 Bid 257 budget 272 Bureau of Coordination 273 Chinese pavilion 269 domestic dimension 274 emblem 264–268, 283 exhibition Center 276 Green Expo 264, 268, 279 Mascot, see also Haibao 264–265, 267–268, 272, 277 number of visitors 260–267, 270, 271, 276 Opening Ceremony 271, 277 satisfaction survey 278 slogan 261, 263, 267, 275, 283 volunteers 261, 275, 278, 282 Shanxi Province 294 Shenzhen International Cultural Industries Expo 172 Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) 209 Shenzhen 2011 Summer Universiade 154 shi, see mega-trend

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index Shirk, Susan 69 Shi Anbin 306 Shijiazhuang 313 Shi Yinhong 122 Shu Qi 160 Signitzer, Benno 31 Silk Road 197, 240 Simpson, Ian 299 Sina Weibo 54, 66, 146, 168 Singapore 190–191, 322 Sister cities, sister-city relationship, see also twinning 153, 156, 262, 266–267 sixiang waijiao [ideological diplomacy], see diplomacy Six-Party Talks 76, 80, 186 smart power 25, 110 Snowden, Edward 89 socialization processes 352, 354 social organizations, see also NGO’s 51, 102, 133, 212 social relations 48 Soft Power in Asia survey 345 ‘Soft Power Index’ 347 Songhua River 72 South Africa China as viewed by 336, 345 South Asia 194 China–South Asia Expo 194 China–South Asia Friendship Organizations Forum 194 South China Sea 78, 80, 87, 185–186, 189, 218, 340 Southeast Asia 4, 153, 180, 185–187, 189–190, 192–193, 195, 217 China as viewed by 340, 342–345, 348, 350–351 Southern Weekend 54, 313 South Korea 65–66, 72, 78, 81–82, 90, 185, 198, 200, 203–206, 218, 247, 271, 298, 322 China as viewed by 338, 341, 344, 347, 349, 355 South-South Cooperation 179, 209, 212 sovereignty 50, 69, 76 Spain 30, 169–170 Special Economic Zone (SEZ), see also Shenzhen Africa 209 Spiegel 356

421 Spielberg, Steven 241 spokespersons 135–136, 145, 151, 285–286, 326 Sri Lanka 188 stability 37, 51, 54, 69, 117, 123, 244, 299, 329 State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) 134, 145–146, 164 State Council Information Office (SCIO) 134–138, 145, 147, 181 State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) (China) 134, 305 State Information Internet Office (SIIO) 137 Su Changhe 75, 112 Sudan, see also Darfur 2, 3, 80, 213, 220, 241–242, 252–253, 303 Süddeutsche Zeitung 169 Summer Universiade Shenzhen (2011) 154 sustainability 153, 215, 252, 256, 263, 283, 342, 364 suzhi [quality of people], see also ‘renmin suzhi’ 90 Sydr (cyclone Bangladesh, 2007) 180 Taiwan 79, 87, 135, 188–189, 222, 236, 243, 289, 296–297, 300, 314, 322, 356 Tajikistan 196–197 Tan Dun 268, 271 Tang dynasty 95 Tanzania 84, 209, 211, 216 taoguang yanghui [keep a low profile] 74 Tao Xie 335 Taylor, Philip 30n16 Tencent 54, 167, 263 territorial disputes (China) 85, 87, 92, 155, 185, 186, 200, 203, 218, 363 views of China’s 340–341 territorial integrity 76 Thailand 66, 191, 297 think tanks (Chinese) 35, 55, 60, 75, 94, 98, 138, 152, 156–157 Tiananmen crisis, crackdown 55, 58, 96, 135, 155, 292, 343 tianxia [all under heaven] 49 Tibet 55–56, 59–63, 91–92, 135, 143, 177, 225, 236, 241–244, 246–247, 330, 339, 360 Time magazine 70, 159, 167, 291 list of 100 most influential people 159, 167

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422 Times 321 Times Square, New York City 149, 166, 267 ‘tofu buildings’ 324 Tokyo 171, 200–202, 221 Beijing-Tokyo Forum 166 War Crimes Tribunal 198 Torch Relay, see Olympic Games tourism 35, 37–38, 90, 114, 152–153, 167, 262, 289 Tourism Promotion Leadership team 266 National Tourism Administration 266–267 track-II diplomacy, see diplomacy trade China’s 135, 145, 179, 217, 296, 337, 339, 342, 345, 348 promotion 35, 37 with Africa 208, 216 with Asia 187, 193, 195 with the US 306, 310, 312 translation issues 107–108, 124, 148, 251, 263, 310, 366 transparency 14, 22–23, 40–41, 107, 167, 181, 252, 295, 318, 323, 326, 328, 352, 358–359, 368 lack of 10, 86, 143, 207, 254, 284 trust gap 93 Tsinghua University 3, 89, 306 tsunami Asia (2004) 180 Japan (2011) 203, 340 Tuch, Hans 18n7 Turkey 171 Chinese Culture Year in Turkey (2012) 171 Turkmenistan 197 twinning relations, see also sister cities 28, 38 Twitter 22–23, 38, 55, 88, 105, 146 ‘two-way street’ 27, 108 Tzu Chi Foundation 322 United Kingdom (UK), see also Britain, London 77, 169, 170, 174, 245 China as viewed by 336 China–UK Leadership of the Future Forum 151

index United Nations (UN) Charter 199 UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 146, 158–159 UN Development Program (UNDP) 146, 158 UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) UNESCO Creative Cities Network 153 UN Environment Program (UNEP) 159, 279 UN General Assembly 199 UN Human Rights Council 57 UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), missions 77 UN Security Council 77 United States (US), see also Chicago, New York China-US relations 147–149 High-Level Dialogue with US Political Parties pivot to Asia (US) 80, 187 public diplomacy 18, 105, 125, 356 United States Information Agency (USIA) 17 University of Chicago 364 University of Michigan 176 USC Center on Public Diplomacy 236 US Food and Drug Administration 304 US Office of the National Intelligence Executive 88 U Thein Sein 188 values 127 China’s, Chinese 1, 8, 84, 95, 111, 119–120, 123, 129, 233, 261, 353, 355 as soft power resource 24, 32, 41, 47, 113, 115 international, western 115, 163, 250, 253–254 socialist 129, 172 universal 125, 232 views of Chinese values 345–346, 349–350, 352 Van Ham, Peter 31 Venice Biennale 173 Vietnam 59, 82, 186, 188–189, 193, 195 China as viewed by 347

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index Visitors’ Program 138 Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO) 158 volunteers, see also Olympic Games, Shanghai Expo role in public diplomacy 155, 158, 180, 188, 217, 218, 363 Wall Street Journal 88, 147 Wang Chao 310 Wang Chen 147 Wang Haiyan 326 Wang Huning 96 Wang Jing 105 Wang Ran 146 Wang Shu 65 Wang Wei 243 Wang Yang 90 Wang Yi 84 Wang Yiwei 107, 123–125, 128, 131 Wan Jifei 259 Washington Consensus 69 Washington Post 62, 88, 147, 199 Weber Shandwick Worlwide 227 WeChat 167 Weibo, see Sina Weibo Wei Xin 93 Welch, David 27 Wenchuan Earthquake 12, 15, 143, 245, 285, 286, 320–328, 330 death toll 320 donations 322–323, 327 overseas Chinese aid 323 Taiwanese aid 322 ‘tofu buildings’ 324 wenhua waijiao [cultural diplomacy], see diplomacy Wen Jiabao 73, 88, 93, 147, 161, 200, 256, 260, 289, 291–292, 294, 297, 315–316, 320 wenming [civilized] 49 White House 148 White Papers 57, 60, 135, 208, 243 World Bank 69, 73, 212 World Chinese Media Alliance 162 World Chinese Media Forum 162 World Economic Forum (WEF) 316 World Exposition, see also Shanghai World Exposition 29, 38, 255 Aichi (2005) 266

423 International Bureau of Expositions (BIE) 258 World Health Organization (WHO) 150, 287, 290–291, 296–303, 311, 313, 317 travel advisory 290–291, 294 World Trade Organization (WTO) 76 Wu Jianmin 118 wumao dang, see Fifty Cent Army Wu Yi 257, 259, 293, 297, 311 Wu Zelin 98 Xiang Zhaolun 259 Xiao Qiang 56 Xi Jinping 1, 82, 119, 149, 209, 260, 362, 368 Xinhua News Agency 4, 55, 85, 162, 164–165, 192, 320, 324 Xining 512 Xinjiang, Uyghur Autonomous Region 63, 197, 236, 360 Xinmao 144 xuanchuan [propaganda], see propaganda Xue Hanqing 141 Xu Guoqi 221 Xu Jin 112 Xu Kuangdi 257 Xu Shaoshi 257 Yang Jiechi 114, 147 Yang Jiemian 280 Yang Jinlin 120 Yang Liwei 268 Yan Xuetong 3, 112 Yao Ming 149, 267 Yasukuni shrine 198 Ye Lang 173 Ye Qing 110 Yi Gang 170 yin and yang symbol 48 Yin Liangen 326 yousuo zuowei [get some things done] 74 youth exchanges, see exchanges Youth Olympics, see Nanjing Youtube 22, 38, 246 Youth Volunteer Work Department 158 Yuan Longping 149 Yuan Peng 117 Yue Minjun 65

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424 Yu Guomin 295 Yunnan Province 193–194 Yu Xintian 111 Zaharna, R.S. 19, 20, 38, 43, 366 Zambia 209, 211 Zhang Chi 109 Zhang Guizhen 107 Zhang Huijun 66 Zhang Weiwei 122–3 Zhang Wenkang 293 Zhang Xiaogang 65, 165 Zhang Yesui 296 Zhang Yimou 226 Zhang Yingguang, Chen Zhongxiaolu and Yang Binbin Zhang Zhexin 181 Zhang Zhijun 103 Zhao Kejin 103–104, 106, 114, 201

index Zhao Qizheng 98, 101–102, 116, 124–125, 135–136, 144, 152, 159, 175 Zheng He 95, 240 Zheng Hua 104, 116 Zheng Xiaoyu 307 Zheng Yongnian 109, 112 zhongguo meng [Chinese Dream], see Chinese Dream zou chuqu [go global], see ‘go global’ Zhou Xisheng 324 Zhou Xun 159 Zhuang Enping 124 Zhu Liqun 49 Zhu Ying 63 Zoellick, Robert 50 zonghe guoli, see Comprehensive National Power Zou Liming 120 Zweig, David 303

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