The Geoeconomic Diplomacy of European Sanctions Networked Practices and Sanctions Implementation (Diplomatic Studies, 19) 9004518819, 9789004518810

Citation preview

The Geoeconomic Diplomacy of European Sanctions

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Diplomatic Studies Series Editor Jan Melissen (Leiden University and University of Antwerp)

volume 19

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/​dist

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

The Geoeconomic Diplomacy of European Sanctions Networked Practices and Sanctions Implementation By

Kim B. Olsen

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Cover illustration: grayscale photography of human holding coins –​Frantisek_​Krejci in pixabay: Poverty Black And White Emotion -​Free photo on Pixabay Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Olsen, Kim B., author. Title: The geoeconomic diplomacy of European sanctions : networked practices and sanctions implementation / by Kim B. Olsen. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, Nijhoff, [2022] | Series: Diplomatic studies, 1872-8863 ; volume 19 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: lccn 2022020501 (print) | lccn 2022020502 (ebook) | isbn 9789004518810 (hardback) | isbn 9789004518834 (ebook) Subjects: lcsh: Economic sanctions, European–Russia. | Economic sanctions, European–Syria. | Diplomacy–Economic aspects–Europe. Classification: lcc HF1413.5.O47 2022 (print) | lcc HF1413.5 (ebook) | ddc 327.1/11094–dc23/eng/20220518 lc record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022020501 lc ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022020502

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/​brill-​typeface. issn 1872-​8 863 isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​5 1881-​0 (hardback) isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​5 1883-​4 (e-​book) Copyright 2022 by Kim B. Olsen. Published by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R unipress. Koninklijke Brill nv reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-​use and/​or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill nv via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-​free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Contents  Preface ix  Acknowledgements xvi  Abbreviations xviii  Introduction The EU in the Age of Geoeconomic Multipolarisation 1 1  The Puzzle: Instrumentalising Economic Power in Europe’s Liberal Market Capitalism 3 2  The Approach: Practices and Actor-​Networks of Geoeconomic Diplomacy 5 3  The Limitations: Neglecting the Outcomes of Geoeconomic Interventions 9 4  Outline of Chapters 13 1  Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions 16 1  The Realist-​Liberalist Divide: Classical Conceptions of Economic Power in ir 17 1.1  Realist Recognitions: Non-​state Actors’ Influence on Economic Means of Power 21 1.2  Realist Remainders: The Legacy of Geopolitics as an Analytical Category 23 2  Geoeconomics: A Renewed Debate on Economic Power in the 21st Century’s Multipolar Order 25 2.1  Geoeconomics as Global Governance: Managing International Interdependencies 26 2.2  Geoeconomics as National Policies: Instrumentalising Wealth in Foreign and Security Policy 30 3  Economic Sanctions: A Popular, Yet Challenging, Geoeconomic Instrument 34 3.1  Conventional Analytical Approaches to the Study of Sanctions 35 3.2  The Complex Institutional Framework of EU Sanctions Implementation 39 2  Geoeconomic Diplomacy Enhancing Abilities to Instrumentalise Economic Means of Power 44 1  Geoeconomic Disparities in the ‘Multipolar’ 21st Century 45

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

vi Contents

1.1  The (Overestimated) Structural Advantages of State Capitalism 49 1.2  The (Underestimated) Structural Disadvantages of Liberal Market Capitalism 51 2  Exploring the Paradox: Limited Governmental Control over Geoeconomic Levers 53 3  Geoeconomic Diplomacy: Leveraging Economic Power through Diplomatic Relationship Building 56 3  Sanctioning Russia The Domestic Drivers Behind the Geoeconomic Diplomacy of France and Germany 63 1  Case i: EU Sanctions on Russia –​an Inductive Search for Geoeconomic Diplomatic Behaviour 65 2  European mfa s in the 2010s: Reforming Diplomatic Capacities in the State-​Market Nexus 68 2.1  Political Drivers behind French and German mfa Reforms  70 2.2  The ‘Streamlining’ of the French and German mfa s in the Geoeconomic Field 71 3  Handling Domestic Agency Relations: The Diplomatic Quest to Implement the Russia Sanctions 73 3.1  Offices of Heads of States and Governments 74 3.2  Other Ministries 75 3.3  Legislative and Sub-​State Actors 77 3.4  Business and Market Actors 79 4  Moving from Domestic Network of Actors to Practices of Actor-​Networks 81 4  A New Framework for Studying Sanctions ‘Networked Practices’ of Geoeconomic Diplomacy 83 1  Theoretical Approach: Studying the Practices of Foreign and Security Policy Implementation 84 1.1  A Pragmatic Understanding to Practices 85 2  A Half Turn to Practices: The Problem of ipt’s Empirical Biases 87 2.1  Empirical Bias i: Focus on Decision-​Making over Policy Implementation 88 2.2  Empirical Bias ii: Disregard of Non-​state Actors 90 2.3  Moving beyond the Bias: Analysing ‘Polylateral’ Relationships of Policy Implementation 92

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

vii

Contents

3  Completing the Practice Turn: Networked Practices in Diplomacy’s Implementation Phase 94 3.1  Actor-​Network Theory in Diplomacy Studies 95 3.2  The Framework: Bringing Actor-​Network Theory into Diplomacy Studies 97 3.3  Critiques, Limitations, and Competing Understandings of Social Networks 100 4  Methodology and Data Collection: Challenges, Choices, and Consequences 103 4.1  Accessing Practices through Praxiography 103 4.2  Data Collection through ‘Multimethod Research’: Qualitative Interviews, Textual Analysis, and Ethnographic Observations 106 4.3  The Researching Practitioner vs the Practicing Researcher 108 5  Sanctioning Syria The Networked Practices Shaping EU Sanctions Implementation 110 1  Case ii: EU Sanctions on Syria –​a Framework-​Driven Analysis of Networked Practices 110 2  Defend or Dispute? The Heated Policy Debate about the EU Sanctions’ Role in the Syria Crisis 113 3  Practices of Actor-​Networks: Implementing the EU’s Syria Sanctions 115 3.1  Enforcement Practices 115 3.2  Monitoring Practices 119 3.3  Refinement Practices 122 3.4  Deterrence Practices 125 4  Exerting Control over Actor-​Networks? European Diplomats’ Successes and Limitations as ‘Obligatory Passage Points’ 127 6  Conflicting Practices? Ensuring Coherency across Geoeconomic Actor-​Networks 132 1  Expanding the Syria Case: Disentangling EU Sanctions from other Geoeconomic Instruments 133 1.1  Conflicting Practices between Geoeconomic Instruments: Caught between EU Sanctions and Targeted Economic Assistance 134 1.2  Conflicting Practices between Geoeconomic Partners: The Impact of US Sanctions 139

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

viii Contents 2  The Geoeconomic Diplomacy of Economic Sanctions: Instrumentalising Market Shares, Managing Global Interdependencies 141 7  Geoeconomic Diplomats as Sanctions ‘Shapers’ 145 1  Leveraging Geoeconomic Network Positions: Consequences for Policy-​Makers and Diplomats 145 2  The Explanatory Power of Pragmatism: Diplomats as ‘Shapers’ of Geoeconomic Practices 148 3  Normatively Blindsided? Facing the Moral Dilemmas of Geoeconomic Diplomacy 151  Conclusions Identifying the Human Impact on Economic Power Politics 157  Bibliography 163  Index 197

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Preface This book is being sent to press in the midst of a defining moment for the European continent. With the first phase of Russia’s military attack on Ukraine still unfolding at the time of writing, we have yet to understand the human, political, economic, and security-​related consequences of this blatant assault on a European state’s sovereignty, not to mention the human dignity of its people. These earliest hours of Europe’s first war since the 1990s have not only brought us pictures of human tragedy and moral abyss, but also taught us some preliminary lessons about the European Union’s (EU) response to military ­warfare, even when it encompasses and potentially threatens its geographical borders. Hesitant of engaging its own armed forces in what could result in a military confrontation between the EU –​and ultimately allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato) –​with another nuclear power, EU governments have agreed to the delivery of lethal and non-​lethal military e­ quipment as their only direct interference in the theatre of war. Some EU governments have further promised substantial enhancements of their own defence spending and pledged to deepen the integration of their military capabilities. Meanwhile, without ruling out further European military support to Ukraine, it is already apparent that the EU’s initial response to Russia’s military invasion has mainly been a geoeconomic one. At an astonishing pace and in close coordination with the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland, and other partners and allies, the EU has launched a series of financial and economic sanctions against Russia, and its collaborator Belarus, in a scope, scale, and complexity that are beyond comparison to any previous sanctions regime. In these early days of the conflict, it has been remarkable to follow how the very announcement of comprehensive sanctions has been enough to cause severe turbulence in the Russian economy and financial sector. Whatever short-​and medium-​term effects they might have on Vladimir Putin and his inner circle are yet to be seen. What can already be glimpsed through the first fog of military warfare and geoeconomic retaliation is that the sanctions by the EU and others, and the possible Russian counter-​sanctions, will not only have immense and dire consequences for the socioeconomic well-​being of Russian citizens. Europeans are also discovering that the comprehensive sanctioning of a major trade partner and key fossil fuel energy provider could impact their daily lives in a hitherto unseen –​and possibly uncontrollable –​manner. We are all learning in real time how the power of economic disruption, once unleashed, can be hard to restrain.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

x Preface Although this book’s manuscript was finalised before the fateful course of events of early spring of 2022, it explains how governments are reliant on a successful geoeconomic diplomacy to maintain some control over the unpredictable processes that unfold when sanctions and similar instruments unearth deep-​rooted market structures and trade relationships. By introducing and describing this particular type of diplomatic activity characterised by distinct processes and actor-​networks in the state-​market nexus, the book unveils lessons from previous European attempts to implement large-​scale sanctions regimes in coherent, efficient, and effective manners. These lessons could be of value to those diplomatic practitioners and foreign policy observers who ponder governments’ abilities to instrumentalise economic means of power in the 21st century’s highly interdependent and multipolar global order. Indeed, geoeconomics, which is the strategic utilisation of national wealth to obtain geostrategic objectives, has manifested itself as a central and distinctive feature of contemporary foreign and security policy-​making, both in and beyond the European context. The world’s major economies have in recent decades ramped up their government-​led instrumentalisation of economic power in their conduct of foreign affairs, all while seeking to influence the international rules and frameworks that might enable or limit such geoeconomic behaviour. In this rapidly evolving playing field, dominated by wealthy states such as the United States, China, India, and, at least in terms of energy resources, Russia, the EU has been obliged to also advance the scope and sophistication of its geoeconomic toolbox. Aware of the fact that geoeconomic leverage can best be obtained by acting in concert through its Common Foreign and Security Policy (cfsp) or similar frameworks, the EU’s 27 Member States, the European Commission, and the European External Action Service (eeas) have invested in creating a broad palette of geoeconomic instruments that, besides the use of unilateral economic sanctions to coerce actors or states into behavioural change, also includes the use of targeted economic development assistance to back and support specific individuals, groups, or governments in fragile security environments or armed conflicts; the management of energy resources as a means of supporting or pressuring geostrategic friends or foes; defensive trade or anti-​coercion instruments to protect EU policies and market shares against malign trade practices by other major economic powers; and the granting or revoking of trade tariff reductions to countries receiving EU development assistance, just to name a few. Much of the scholarly and practical understanding of geoeconomics perceives wealthy governments as both capable and willing to steer and control capital, markets, and critical infrastructure according to their political desires. In this book, which builds on my doctoral dissertation defended at the University

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Preface

xi

of Antwerp in November 2020, I challenge this conventional assumption. By diving into the engine room of diplomatic practice in the geoeconomic realm, the book identifies the ‘networked practices’ between governmental and private actors that influence and guide the interplay between states and markets in the European context. This interplay, I argue, is dominated by a paradox. While EU institutions and governments are keen to understanding themselves as influential geoeconomic actors, their ability to exert direct control over the economic means that underpin the use of geoeconomic measures is limited by governance models dictated by liberal market capitalism, where much of states’ wealth rests in the hands of independent private actors. I present the argument that to compensate for this lack of direct control over economic resources in foreign and security policy-​making, the EU and its Member States are dependent on the skilful conduct of geoeconomic diplomacy. To dive deeper into these assumptions and questions about the limits to European geoeconomics, this book will contribute to both academic and practical discussions about the use of economic sanctions, which already before the events of early 2022 had become a leading ‘weapon of choice’ in the EU’s geoeconomic arsenal. In recent years, whenever European geostrategic interests or values were challenged, politicians and public opinion have often responded by threatening to sanction the identified perpetrators. Sanctions –​ or in EU parlance, ‘restrictive measures’ –​are designed to either curb trade and financial relations with another state or restrict the physical or financial access of specific individuals or firms to the EU. This book examines in detail two of the most pertinent cases of the past decade where EU policy-​makers adopted sanctions to respond to critical geostrategic developments in their immediate neighbourhood: the EU sanctions regimes against Russia (2014-​) and Syria (2011-​). Through a critical examination of the structural obstacles that EU policy-​ makers and diplomats encounter in their attempts to apply economic sanctions, the book challenges the fervour with which EU politicians and observers often call for the use of such restrictive measures as quick solutions to difficult questions. As was pertinently summarised by US observers of Western uses of sanctions policies, “having such a powerful hammer means all of the world’s challenges can appear as nails” (Mortlock & O’Toole 2018: 2). When it comes to swinging the European sanctions hammer, examples are plentiful. But too often the hammer has been used when pliers may have sufficed. In addition to cases where the EU has responded with sanctions to critical geopolitical developments –​such as against Russia (2014-​), Syria (2011-​), Iran (2007-​), North Korea (2006-​), and Libya (2011-​) as well as against Russia and Belarus (2022-​) in the context of the currently unfolding war in Ukraine –​EU policy-​makers

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

xii Preface have in recent years contemplated the use of restrictive measures in a variety of cases with different backgrounds and characteristics: Reacting to the brutal crackdown and repression by security forces against the pro-​democratic opposition in Belarus, a disturbing development in its immediate geographical neighbourhood, the EU’s short-​and medium-​term response centred around the use of economic coercion against the government of president Alexander Lukashenko. Having originally lifted most restrictive measures against Belarus in 2016, on the basis of a generally improving EU-​ Belarus relationship and the acceptance by Belarussian authorities to release a number of political prisoners, the EU changed its attitude in light of the brutality shown to public protests before, during, and after the 2020 parliamentary elections. Soon after the elections, the EU adopted numerous rounds of restrictive measures, targeting a total of 90 individuals with asset freezes and travel bans. But Minsk would not be deterred. In May 2021, it forced an Athens to Vilnius passenger flight to land in Minsk; six months later, it transported large numbers of mostly Syrian, Iraqi, and Afghani refugees to its border with Poland and Lithuania, triggering further EU sanctions. Besides banning additional individuals and entities, especially those involved in the ‘instrumentalisation of human beings’, the EU imposed an overflight airspace ban and restricted access to its airports on Belarusian airlines as well as trade sanctions against key Belarusian exports such as petroleum and potash. In comparison to sanctions targeted at actors in its immediate neighbourhood, the EU sanctions regimes against Myanmar and Venezuela represent cases where policy-​makers responded with restrictive measures against countries conducting human rights violations far beyond the EU’s borders. After initially acknowledging positive political developments in Myanmar in the wake of its 2012 parliamentary elections, which led to a lifting of all EU restrictive measures bar the arms embargo, relations with the EU once again deteriorated from 2018 onwards. Following grave concerns over human rights abuses in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, particularly against ethnic Rohingyas, EU Member States agreed to reimpose restrictions on exports of dual-​use goods, military training and cooperation as well as travel bans and asset freezes for a list that now includes 35 individuals. Similar measures, including the targeting of up to 55 individuals, have been in place against Venezuela since 2017, when the EU imposed such sanctions on the regime of Nicolás Maduro for undermining democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. Recent moves against Lebanon embody another type of EU sanctions use, in this case to nudge a political non-​foe towards faster political and economic reform. In light of the stagnating political situation and rapidly declining Lebanese economy, particularly French policy-​makers pushed for the

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Preface

xiii

establishment of a targeted EU sanctions regime against Lebanese politicians responsible for the country’s ongoing crisis and widespread corruption. While the legal framework that makes possible such listings was formally adopted by the EU Council in July 2021, specific names were initially not added to the new sanctions regime. This represents a peculiar case where the EU has legally established a legal sanctions framework without putting it into immediate use. The most ‘innovative’ restrictive measures in recent years have been the EU’s new horizontal sanctions regimes against human rights violations and cyber-​attacks, legal frameworks that can be used for targeting individuals without designing sanctions regimes against entire states or (terrorist) groups. In late 2020, the Council of the EU adopted the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, enabling the EU to target both state and non-​state individuals and entities responsible for or involved in human rights violations and abuses worldwide. Besides asset freezes and travel bans, the measures also include prohibiting EU individuals and entities to make funds available to those targeted with the sanctions. To emphasise the usability of the new tool, by March 2021 the Council was already taking advantage of it to list eleven individuals and four entities accused of involvement in human rights violations such as arbitrary detentions and executions, torture and repression, or forced disappearances in China, North Korea, Libya, Russia, South Sudan, and Eritrea. A similar logic was behind the Council’s adoption in May 2019 of a sanctions modality as part of the EU’s wider ‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’ to respond to cyber-​attacks against the interests of the EU and its Member States. Subsequent listings have so far targeted eight individuals and four entities in response to actions such as the cyber-​attack against the German Bundestag and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (opcw). These examples only add evidence to the claim that the high volume of the EU’s use of sanctions has in recent years gained width and depth. Still, this book is neither about why the sanctions hammer is being used nor whether it is effective. Such analyses already exist in abundance in academic and policy-​ oriented literature. While important, they however often lack a coherent understanding of the diplomatic actors and actions that guide governments’ use of economic power and geoeconomic instruments. By developing a conceptual approach of geoeconomic diplomacy, the book focuses on the aptitude of EU actors to apply the sanctions hammer with precision, effectiveness, and care. Personally, the need for an analytical approach to study geoeconomic instruments as tools of diplomacy and to understand how diplomats can assist in ameliorating their use became apparent to me throughout my experiences as a diplomat working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. Be it

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

xiv Preface at postings in Germany and France, at the Turkish border of conflict-​ridden Syria, in post-​revolution Tunisia, or at the United Nations (UN) headquarters in New York –​I observed a similar peculiarity: while academic and policy analyses are tremendously interested in the role of the EU’s vast economic resources as a material basis for its engagement in the world, most approaches do not fully capture that economic power is dependent on the conduct of relationships between a variety of state, private, and non-​governmental actors influencing the complex state-​market nexus. In this nexus, governments are not operating in vacuums, but are required to engage in and steer networks of actors who traditionally do not play key roles in foreign and security policy, but suddenly do so when geoeconomic tools are invoked. To effectively use wealth and market access to their government’s advantage, it is therefore a key task of diplomats to engage with businesses and firms, non-​governmental organisations, lobbyists, unions, and many other actors that are relevant to a specific geoeconomic field. This book is therefore based on my observation that both academics and practitioners lack common conceptual reference points and analytical frameworks for acknowledging the practical complexities and actor-​oriented interdependences between the spheres of states and markets in a hyper-​globalised economy. As the reader will hopefully see, this book’s study of geoeconomic diplomacy is driven by a number of contentions. Not only does it seek to widen the understanding of geoeconomic practitioners of the processes, practices, actor-​relations, and networks that come into play when states seek to instrumentalise economic power to advance their foreign and security policy ambitions. It also sides with the expanding number of practice-​oriented scholars who insist on building analytical approaches based on nuanced understandings of the lived realities of diplomatic practitioners. At the same time, the book calls for a greater scholarly engagement with all aspects of diplomatic practice, i.e. to focus less on dynamics and outcomes of diplomatic negotiations, but more on the dynamics that guide how diplomats solve the quest of putting policy decisions into actual practice, which is where the great bulk of diplomatic action takes place. Finally, the book should be read as a careful reflection on the causes and consequences of the EU’s enhanced use of economic power resources, which should be treated with equal shares of humility, boldness, and caution. Humility, because sanctions are very difficult to implement as intended when sketched and planned in meeting rooms. Boldness, because an informed and coherent approach to geoeconomic diplomacy will enable the EU to make better use of its position as a powerful economic actor on the global stage. And caution, because even small attempts to instrumentalise economic resources

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Preface

xv

and interdependences can affect the lives of millions, no matter how far they are from the given geostrategic context that was targeted on paper. The early days of Russia’s warfare in Ukraine, and the international community’s sanctions-​focused responses hereto, have nothing but emphasised these concerns. As further unforeseeable geoeconomic battlefields might open in the years to come, it is my hope that this book can be of benefit both for those entrusted with geoeconomic decision-​making powers and for those eager to engaging in public debates about these pertinent issues on an informed basis. Only by learning from previous lessons will we be able to solve future tasks and navigate the complex geoeconomic realm that will nothing but continue to dominate 21st century foreign and security policy-​making.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Acknowledgements This book builds on my doctoral dissertation prepared and defended at the University of Antwerp, Belgium, in November 2020. The work reflects both an intellectual and a geographical journey inspired by the people met and places seen at my various diplomatic postings over the past decade. Early mind maps, initial ideas, and first project proposals were outlined in Berlin and Paris. Individual chapters and the final dissertation manuscript were composed and drafted in Istanbul and New York. The doctoral defence as well as the manuscript edits for this book were, recently, completed in Tunis and Copenhagen. Observing and taking part in diplomatic practices in some of Europe’s most powerful capitals, the multilateral forums of the United Nations, as well as in the conflict-​ridden southern European neighbourhood have been instrumental in pursuing this book’s aim of introducing the academic and practical value of, and reflecting on the challenges inherent to, the practice of geoeconomic diplomacy. Though mostly written in professional solitude far away from the University of Antwerp’s beautiful campus, the dissertation, and hence this book, would not have come to life without essential fellowship and personal support. This does not least hold true for a writing process, which, for its most part, was undertaken while also working as a diplomatic practitioner. I would therefore like to express my sincere gratitude: To Catherine for being my unwavering companion, closest intellectual sparring partner, harshest critic, and invaluable pillar of love and support from the journey’s very beginning and all the way through its end. To my doctoral supervisor, Jan Melissen, for his extraordinary ability to provide clearheaded and result-​oriented guidance, unyielding encouragement, positive inspiration, the proactive paving of new professional pathways as well as the creation of an intellectual space that fosters an atmosphere of genuine curiosity, doubt, joined reflection, and –​most important –​utmost honesty. To the chair and members of my Ph.D. commission, Jorg Kustermans and Beverly Crawford, for their willingness to engage wholeheartedly with the premise of my argument and for giving me precious advice, as well as to the members of my doctoral jury, Christian Lequesne and Dirk De Bièvre, for taking their time to evaluate and give very constructive and useful feedback to my final argument. To staff members at the University of Antwerp’s Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science, and Doctoral School for always providing clear and pragmatic guidance tailored to a remote, and somehow unusual, dissertation process.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Acknowledgements

xvii

To Maaike Okano-​Heijmans for her openness towards engaging in early reflections about my rough sketches for a project idea, and her encouragement to pursue the project further in cooperation with her own doctoral supervisor. To civil society activists and field workers who, even when living directly with the dreadful consequences of armed conflict and violence, dedicate resources to sharing their observations with researchers. It is on us to honour the responsibility for granting space to and actively requesting their views when analysing the world of diplomacy from institutional headquarters and academic armchairs. To the numerous professional diplomats who understand the value of disclosing insights from the highly undisclosed field of foreign and security policy, and to admit doubts, failures, and incomplete reflections to advance intellectual and democratic debates on these issues. To many colleagues in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other European mfa s who shared valuable repositories of personal experiences and expertise to reflect on various aspects of the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy, and its value and consequences for the everyday realities of European diplomacy. To Volker Stanzel for inviting me to join the working group ‘Diplomacy in the 21st Century’ at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (swp), which not only developed into a unique cohort of deliberations between diplomatic scholars and practitioners, but also served as a platform for my first publications on the need for reflecting on Europe’s geoeconomic diplomacy and provided me the opportunity to discuss these thoughts at a roundtable with representatives of Berlin’s foreign policy circle. To the editors and peer reviewers of the Hague Journal of Diplomacy and Brill who through their demanding questions and valuable suggestions had an impact on my thinking far beyond the various manuscripts under review. To Richard Nephew for seeking to open the doors of the Center on Global Energy Politics at Columbia University to encourage further practice-​oriented transatlantic dialogue on the parameters and consequences for applying economic sanctions. To Evan Pheiffer and Catherine Wolf for outstanding assistance in tweaking syntax and grammar. And, last but definitely not least, to family, friends, and colleagues who ­continuously encouraged me to pursue my very individual, and at times untraditional, dissertation and book journey while often navigating through unchartered waters. You know who you are.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

newgenprepdf

Abbreviations a iib a nt b ri b rics c fsp d eei d me e cj e eas e gc e np e.o. EU fac f pa g dp g 7 i nstex i pe i pt i r J CPoA l me m fa n ato o ecd o fac o pcw o pp s p oe r 2p SeME s me s oe t feu UN u nsc

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Actor-​Network Theory Belt and Road Initiative Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa Common Foreign and Security Policy Directorate for Enterprises and International Economy Dependent Market Economies European Court of Justice European External Action Service European General Court European Neighbourhood Policy Executive Order European Union Foreign Affairs Council Foreign Policy Analysis Gross Domestic Product Group of Seven Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges International Political Economy International Practice Theory International Relations Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Liberal Market Economies Ministry of Foreign Affairs North Atlantic Treaty Organization Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development Office of Foreign Assets Control Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Obligatory Passage Points Privately Owned Enterprise Responsibility to Protect State-​enhanced Market Economies Small and Medium-​sized Enterprise State Owned Enterprise Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union United Nations United Nations Security Council

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Introduction

The EU in the Age of Geoeconomic Multipolarisation

For governments around the globe, their ability to instrumentalise economic resources for geostrategic purposes has yet again become a cornerstone of foreign affairs and diplomacy. Not least against the backdrop of the 21st century’s evolving multipolar order and a hyper-​globalised economy characterised by unprecedented levels of interconnectedness and economic interdependence, a rising number of economically powerful states are re-​exploring the relationship between economics and security and, in particular, how the former may enhance the latter. This phenomenon of geoeconomics is a key theme of this book, which further focuses on economic sanctions, one of the most prominent and debated geoeconomic instruments of contemporary foreign and security policy-​making. The book engages in the revitalising public and academic debate on economic power politics based on my observation that governmental control over national economic capabilities –​i.e. the material basis of any geoeconomic intervention –​might be more limited than is often acknowledged by both scholars and practitioners, and that this obstacle might particularly be challenging for governments of liberal market economies. In response hereto, the book introduces geoeconomic diplomacy as a new conceptual approach to the study of the inherent challenges diplomats face when tasked with changing the course of geopolitical events by instrumentalising complex webs of global state-​market relations. Based on a theoretical framework that helps to identify the ‘networked practices’ that shape the relationships between state and market actors in the geoeconomic realm, the book explains how EU policy-​makers and diplomats can enhance their diplomatic abilities to become better equipped for successfully utilising economic sanctions and other geoeconomic instruments. While the relationship between wealth and power has been a long-​standing core driver of theoretical debates and innovation in the fields of international relations (ir) and international political economy (ipe), scholars and practitioners alike have in recent years intensified their conceptual thinking about the prospects for governments’ strategic utilisation of state-​market relationships embedded in highly integrated global markets and value chains. The contemporary popularity of notions such as ‘weaponized interdependence’ (Farrell & Newman 2019), ‘geoeconomic order’ (Roberts et al. 2019), ‘war by other means’ (Blackwill & Harris 2016), and ‘connectivity wars’ (Leonard 2016) testifies to a widespread interest in studying this quickly transforming

© Kim B. Olsen, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004518834_002

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

2 Introduction and hence relatively unexplored field. From the perspective of the EU, habitually portrayed as a military dwarf but an economic superpower, the emerging geoeconomic playing field could present itself with favourable options. Even as the medium-​and long-​term consequences related to the political, economic and social shocks emanating from the covid-​19 pandemic are yet to be fully understood, observers generally agree that the EU, through its position as the world’s largest trading block,1 will remain well-​equipped to utilise its relative market share to shape and influence trajectories of both international economic competition and geopolitical conflicts (Gehrke 2020a; Gewirtz 2020; Hackenbroich 2020; Helwig 2020). In this evolving geoeconomic landscape, the EU is therefore far from unchartered waters when it comes to the proactive instrumentalisation of market shares and sources of national wealth for geostrategic purposes. Over the past decades, interventions through its Common Foreign and Security Policy (cfsp) framework have regularly been supported by the use of geoeconomic policies and instruments such as economic sanctions, targeted economic assistance, and trade instruments (Gehrke 2020b; Helwig 2019; Schwarzer 2020). If one assumed that the status as an economic superpower automatically translated into geoeconomic superpower status, European foreign policy-​makers would hold potent cards in their hands in times where both Western and non-​Western governments have enhanced their focus on the merits of using economic power instruments (Drezner 2019). But this assumption might be overstated, which is why this book sets out to investigate the circumstances and challenges that characterise European policy-​makers’ ability to use and implement key geoeconomic instruments as they intend. The European preference for geoeconomic-​oriented foreign and security policy-​making has been particularly tangible in the past decade in which EU governments have shown utmost resistance to the engagement of large-​scale military commitments, even in situations where armed conflicts reached its eastern and southern neighbourhood. Two such cases, the armed conflicts in Ukraine (2014-​) and Syria (2011-​), will serve as case studies for this book. They are notable examples of how existential threats to the EU’s collective security and joint norms were responded to by EU Member States with geoeconomic instruments rather than military ones. In particular, economic interventions 1 In 2018, EU Member States (including the UK) collectively represented a Gross Domestic Product (gdp) of usd 18.768 trillion, the world’s second largest after the US (usd 20.544 trillion) and before China (usd 13.608 trillion) (World Bank 2020). The EU’s total trade volume (excluding the UK and intra-​EU27 trade) was eur 3,967 billion, the world’s largest; eur 50 billion more than China and eur 342 billion more than the US (Eurostat 2020).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

The EU in the Age of Geoeconomic Multipolarisation

3

took the form of sanctions –​or, in EU parlance, ‘restrictive measures’ –​including targeted asset freezes and visa bans against individuals deemed responsible for fuelling the conflicts as well as sectorial bans on areas of trade and commerce. In addition, the EU directed substantial amounts of targeted economic assistance to certain parties to the respective conflicts; the Ukrainian government in Kiev and the Syrian quasi-​and non-​state actors opposed to the regime in Damascus (F. Z. Brown 2018; icg 2019; King 2019). 1

The Puzzle: Instrumentalising Economic Power in Europe’s Liberal Market Capitalism

As will be demonstrated throughout this book, European ambitions to apply economic means of power for geostrategic purposes, and hence to instrumentalise and interfere in state-​market relations to achieve political objectives, is a more complex endeavour in foreign and security policy-​making and diplomacy than is conventionally understood in the academic literature. Such complexities are, so it is argued, particularly tangible for governments of countries adhering to governance models of liberal market capitalism with higher degrees of state-​market independence than seen in more state capitalist leaning countries, such as China and Russia. As it explores the conditions under which geoeconomic instruments are applied in the context of European state-​market relations, this book questions and provides alternatives to the conventional conceptual premises for governments’ use of economic means of power in general, and of the ‘popular’ geoeconomic instrument of economic sanctions in particular. The book addresses the specific research question of how EU governments can leverage their diplomatic relationships to advance the implementation of economic sanctions, and discusses how the structural conditions of state-​ market relations, and the myriad of actors that partake herein, influence and limit governments in their ambitions to instrumentalise specific means of economic power in their conduct of foreign and security policy. It focuses on the European context, where governments generally act as representatives of societies that cherish strong degrees of state-​market independence.2 European governments who wish to instrumentalise national wealth for foreign policy purposes may hence find themselves dependent on non-​state actors outside

2 As will be discussed later in this research, ‘liberal market capitalism’ comes in many forms and types of state-​market connections in Western and non-​Western democracies.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

4 Introduction their direct control. As much national wealth rests in private hands, it cannot be assumed that governments are free to direct their national wealth freely in their conduct of foreign and security policy. Even if governments and parliaments are generally able to make laws that limit or restrict trade between their own polity and the outside world, and hence interfere directly in market relations, such formal enactments of executive and legislative powers are not necessarily reflective of the actual control governments can exert over market actors and resources. Studies have for example described how global economic interdependencies reduce even wealthy states’ ability to consolidate market control for access to military resources (Crawford 1994). In turning the lens from military to economic power, i.e. the economic resources that lay the material foundation for any given geoeconomic intervention, this book analyses the dynamics that might impede policy-​makers’ control over economic means of power –​and hence their use of geoeconomic instruments in the conduct of foreign and security policy. A more nuanced understanding of how geoeconomic policies of the EU are implemented is particularly important when recognising that some of its geostrategic contenders might be more favourably positioned in the geoeconomic game. Countries such as China, India, Brazil, and, albeit to a lesser extent, Russia have in recent decades been among the most successful competitors in the global race to align economic wealth with geopolitical objectives (Brattberg 2016). These once rising and now manifested regional and global powers represent governance models where governments yield significant influence over or hold substantial ownership stakes in major domestic infrastructures, value chains, and companies. This form of leverage in turn can be utilised for strategic foreign policy purposes, e.g. by directly interfering in strategically vital economic sectors of rival economies, as seen in continued attempts by primarily Chinese State-​Owned Enterprises (soe s) to take over share-​holder majorities in key European companies (Espinoza & Fleming 2019). Consequently, the systemic redistribution of material wealth on an international scale and the resulting multipolarisation of the international system have further exposed and emphasised significant ideational variations of state-​market governance models among economically powerful states. European policy-​makers are hence faced with a global rise of governance forms based on different variations of state capitalism that might be better –​though not perfectly –​ equipped to instrumentalise economic means of power for geostrategic purposes (Blackwill & Harris 2016). This further demands a better understanding of how governance models of liberal market capitalism, adhering to strong degrees of state-​market independence, are able to implement geoeconomic policies as intended.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

The EU in the Age of Geoeconomic Multipolarisation

2

5

The Approach: Practices and Actor-​Networks of Geoeconomic Diplomacy

The role of economic power in international relations is a classical and recurring theme of the study of ir and ipe. Traditional ir accounts of realism (Hirschman 1945; Mastanduno 1999; Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979) and liberalism (Keohane & Nye 1977 ) have persistently claimed that high levels of national wealth almost inevitably lead to a given state’s equally high influence in geopolitical affairs. Challenging this rationalistic understanding of economic power, proponents of a more interpretivist-​leaning and constructivist approach to ir have argued for the need to understand economic power as an inherently relational phenomenon between two or more states (Lebow 2007). Simply put, “before diplomats can count, they have first to agree on what counts” (Guzzini 2013: 5). Even though particularly moderate constructivists would acknowledge the meaningful existence of material means of power outside actors’ reciprocal social relationships (Adler 2002; Wendt 1992, 1999), their ontological understanding of world politics as socially constructed restricts them from accepting the distribution of material resources as a valid starting point for the analysis of economic power politics. Consequently, even though the extensive ir literature on economic power has focused on how economic resources define relations between states, it has rarely questioned the underlying impact of governance structures as well as the relations between state and non-​state actors for governments’ ability to instrumentalise national wealth in foreign affairs. While influential ipe scholars have to some degree acknowledged the roles played by commercial actors when addressing the question of states’ economic power (Gilpin 1975; Luttwak 1990; Strange 1996), these insights have rarely led to coherent conceptual frameworks on the issue (for a notable exception see Norris 2016). Recognising that governments of liberal market capitalism cannot exert direct control over all material aspects relevant to the instrumentalisation of national wealth, this research addresses the puzzle of how EU policy-​makers are able to mitigate such inherent challenges through the use of diplomatic actors, structures, and networks. By critically addressing how existing literatures on geoeconomics, economic statecraft, ipe, and diplomacy studies have so far neglected this key aspect of EU foreign and security policy-​making, the book introduces an alternative conceptual and analytical approach to the study of diplomatic practices and networks as being essential for understanding how practices at the level of diplomacy are decisive for EU governments’ options for implementing geoeconomic policies as they intend.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

6 Introduction To capture these dynamics in an analytically coherent manner, the book introduces and develops the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy, defined here as the particular realm in which governments pursue the ability to employ national economic capabilities to realise specific geostrategic objectives in their conduct of relationships with other international actors. By suggesting a reorientation from the traditional scholarly focus on states’ use and distribution of economic power at the international level to the practices of everyday diplomacy as formative of whether governments are able to exert control over national geoeconomic actors and resources to the fullest extent possible, the book seeks to expand the way we think about economic power as a means of foreign and security policy and diplomacy. To investigate the puzzle of how the EU, one of the world’s leading economic blocks, might be impeded in using economic sanctions, one of its most frequently employed geoeconomic instruments, and to better understand how such challenges can be mitigated by diplomats through successful engagement in the field of geoeconomic diplomacy, the book is driven by a theoretical engagement with international practice theory (ipt), a steadily growing subdiscipline in the ir literature. After more than a decade of increasingly expanding its width, the once nascent ‘practice turn’ of ir has transformed the study of social practices formative to foreign and security policy-​making into a self-​contained body of theoretically rich and empirically relevant literature. Not least since the beginning of the 2010s, a series of seminal works have helped ipt gradually improve its conceptual maturity and carve out its own intellectual space within the ir discipline’s broader theoretical landscape (Adler & Pouliot 2011; Adler-​Nissen 2012; Bueger & Gadinger 2018: v; Pouliot & Cornut 2015). ipt scholars broadly share an ontological understanding of practices as the fundamental unit of analysis for deciphering the inner workings of foreign and security policy-​making. This theoretical approach has also, inter alia, significantly improved the subfield of diplomacy studies. In addition, the enhanced theoretical focus on patterns of everyday behaviour among actors relevant to the diplomatic realm has also underpinned ipt’s promising possibilities for building conceptual bridges between the theory-​driven ir community and the everyday reality of diplomatic practitioners (Adler-​Nissen 2015). However, such promises are at risk of remaining unfulfilled as long as practice theorists continue to prioritise the empirical and conceptual study of formalised decision-​making processes in foreign and security policy. This book addresses an analytical bias in the empirical scope of ipt, which has been overly focused on practices of diplomatic negotiation and decision-​making, and calls for the need to apply ipt’s insights more thoroughly for analysing processes of foreign and security policy implementation. Furthermore, even

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

The EU in the Age of Geoeconomic Multipolarisation

7

if numerous scholars have called for the inclusion of ‘non-​traditional’ agents of diplomacy and practices at diplomacy’s ‘front lines’ in ipt-​guided studies (Bicchi & Bremberg 2016: 397; Cooper & Cornut 2018; Sending et al. 2011: 528), only a few have suggested analytical frameworks that encompass the relationship building between traditional diplomats and a wider field of non-​state actors. Ironically, by largely maintaining ir’s conventional focus on traditional diplomatic actors and institutionalised processes, practice scholars have both struggled to refute reoccurring criticism of being more concerned with social stability over social change (Hopf 2018; Ringmar 2014: 17–​20) and failed to live up to their promise of advancing scholarly work that better captures the lived realities of diplomatic practitioners. Instead of focusing on the spatial differences of diplomatic practices and asking about where diplomats are operating –​i.e. by contrasting practices that take place either at the centre (headquarters) or periphery (in the field) –​this book argues that greater analytical clarity and enhanced empirical diversity can be achieved by thinking more carefully about what type of results diplomats are working towards in different phases of foreign policy processes (cf. Cooper & Cornut 2018). The suggested redirection of ipt’s empirical focus to look further into the diplomatic actors and processes, and hence the ‘networked practices’, involved in the implementation of foreign policy decisions has a direct bearing on the analytical tools being applied. Focusing on two key cases in which economic sanctions were used as the main cfsp instrument to support the EU’s geostrategic objectives in high-​ stake armed conflicts unfolding in the direct proximity of its neighbourhood, the book aims to show that even the EU’s most crucial and sensitive geoeconomic interventions can be fundamentally challenged in their implementation phase. By studying the diplomatic practices and actors constitutive to the EU’s use of economic sanctions, the book has a conceptual, a theoretical, as well as an empirical objective for advancing the scholarly debate on geoeconomics and foreign and security policy implementation. Conceptually, it introduces and applies the notion of geoeconomic diplomacy. It does so to establish an analytical category that highlights a particular causal relationship between wealth and influence in foreign and security policy-​making, while taking seriously that actors and processes at the level of diplomacy can play a critical role in steering the outcome of this relationship. It thereby distinguishes itself and presents an alternative to the overtly realist-​ dominated literatures on geoeconomics and economic statecraft, and further differentiates the field of geoeconomics from other analytical categories of diplomatic engagements in the state-​market nexus, such as economic diplomacy, trade diplomacy, commercial diplomacy, etc.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

8 Introduction Theoretically, and building hereon, the book proposes a new analytical framework for the study of ‘networked practices’ in diplomatic relations based on insights from the practice-​oriented actor-​network theory (ant). Acknowledging that implementation in the realm of geoeconomic diplomacy often builds on diplomats’ ability to form relationships with networks of state and non-​state actors, the research introduces an analytical framework built around the ant concepts of ‘translation processes’ and ‘obligatory passage points’ of actor-​networks. Even though such concepts have earlier been introduced to the ipt literature, they have yet to be utilised systematically in the study of networks centring on the role of diplomats. On the one hand, this book thereby adopts ipt’s basic ontological and epistemological assumptions about the study of international relations through patterns of meaningful social actions as the smallest component of the social world. On the other hand, it critically reviews the state of the still-​nascent literature on practices in international affairs. In so doing, it argues that ipt studies have generally been empirically skewed towards investigating specific types of international practices, namely those of diplomatic negotiation, bargaining, and mediation, at the expense of diplomatic practices of policy implementation. As such, it is argued that ipt’s promise of bringing the ir discipline closer to diplomatic practitioners can only be fulfilled if it begins to equally analyse practices of foreign and security policy implementation. By introducing an analytical framework based on ant concepts, the book seeks to encompass the engagement between various actors in the geoeconomic realm and explain how joint practices come to influence the ways in which EU governments have implemented economic sanctions. It will furthermore be used to identify examples where diplomats or ministries of foreign affairs (mfa s) have been either strengthened or circumvented by other actors playing a role in the implementation phase of geoeconomic diplomacy. Empirically, the book gives new insights into the use of EU economic sanctions against states in proximity to the European neighbourhood. First, it applies an inductive approach to detect how diplomats from the EU’s most powerful national economies, France and Germany, have reacted to the structural challenges in the geoeconomic field. It analyses how the French and German mfa s, during the 2010s, sought to mitigate such challenges through organisational reform processes, and looks at how these reforms were translated into practice when French and German diplomats, from 2014 and onwards, pursued the implementation of the EU Russia sanctions in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. Second, by applying the introduced analytical framework of ‘networked practices’, the book embarks on a theory-​guided analysis of the EU’s sanctions policy against Syria from 2011 onward. Instead

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

The EU in the Age of Geoeconomic Multipolarisation

9

of focusing on conventional questions about the effectiveness of policies on the sanctioned target’s behaviour, the book breaks new ground by focusing on how geoeconomic instruments are being implemented by the sender through relational interactions between diplomats and other state and non-​ state actors. Moreover, in further expanding the Syria case, it discusses how the actor-​networks involved in the implementation of economic sanctions might come to be at odds with actor-​networks formed around the implementation of other geoeconomic instruments, either emanating from within the EU in the form of targeted economic assistance to Syrian opposition actors or from outside the EU in the form of economic sanctions by the United States. 3

The Limitations: Neglecting the Outcomes of Geoeconomic Interventions

Studying the use of economic sanctions as an expression of geoeconomic diplomacy through diplomatic actor-​networks comes with a number of theoretical and methodological limitations. First, the study of geoeconomic diplomacy is, at least in the way it is conceptualised in this book, looking at processes rather than outcomes. It focuses on the behaviour and practices of the sender state(s) rather than the target(s) of geoeconomic instruments. To avid readers of literature on geoeconomics, economic statecraft, and the use of economic sanctions, this might seem peculiar, namely because such literature is often interested in the causal effect a specific geoeconomic intervention has on its objective. ‘Do sanctions really work?’ has for decades been a driving question for political and academic debates, and many scholars of sanctions remain sceptical of their effectiveness (Elliott 1998; Hufbauer et al. 2007; Jonathan Kirshner 2002; Pape 1998; Peksen 2019b). The approach presented here does not intend to give further clarity as to whether a specific geoeconomic intervention has been or will be successful when compared to other types of foreign and security policy interventions. Given that EU governments are increasingly adamant in their use of geoeconomic instruments, it rather sets out to provide new insights into the social dynamics and practices that can help to determine whether the ground conditions are met for a specific geoeconomic instrument to be applied to its fullest extent possible, and how diplomats can influence such an unfolding situation. In other words, the study of geoeconomic diplomacy says little about the accomplishment of geostrategic ends, but a lot about the proper preparation and utilisation of the underlying economic and diplomatic means.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

10 Introduction Second, in criticising realist-​leaning approaches to the study of economic power, the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy is likely to be biased towards a benign or neutral understanding of the relationship building between diplomats and other actors. What could be analysed as engaged relationship and network building might also be seen as merely a reflection of greater, yet less tangible, material power structures (Waltz 1979: 65). In line with similar approaches to the analysis of international relations from the level of states and governments, the concept could be accused of being ‘reductionistic’ in underemphasising the international system’s structural balances of power as the key determinant of world affairs and overemphasising the behaviour of governments or individuals. Third, by relying on an analytical framework built around concepts from actor-​network theory, which is largely aligned with the so-​called ‘pragmatic’ tradition of studying social practices, the research might blind itself to the intrinsic power relations and dispositional logics within the field of study that would be better captured by a more ‘critical’ –​or Bourdieuian –​approach to social practices (Schindler & Wille 2019). While the difference between these two dominating traditions in ipt and the reasons for choosing one over the other will be further elaborated, any choice between them will by definition obscure possible findings that might have arisen from merging the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy with other theoretical insights of practice theory. Fourth, whereas the book’s case studies are deemed helpful for illustrating its overall argument, this eclectic case selection also reduces the overall universality of the research results. The EU’s use of sanctions against Russia and Syria reflects examples where Member States relatively easily agreed on imposing restrictive measures and managed to maintain the required annual or bi-​ annual unanimity for renewing the measures, even if political divergences between Member States, especially on Russia in the time after the case study was concluded (2014-​2016), grew over the years of implementation (Orenstein & Kelemen 2017). Furthermore, while not aligned in every detail, the scrutinised cases of EU sanctions were not directly at odds with the geoeconomic strategy of the United States, the other major Western sender of unilateral sanctions. The presence of major inner-​European or transatlantic disagreements, such as has been the case regarding the Western sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear ambitions, would have added a further layer to the analysis not addressed in this study. As such, the case selection is not without limitations for the study’s overall explanatory power. The reasoning for studying two different cases of EU sanctions –​i.e. the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia from 2014 (case i) and against Syria from 2011 (case ii) –​however responds to various considerations.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

The EU in the Age of Geoeconomic Multipolarisation

11

Most importantly, the book’s case selection was determined incrementally throughout the research process, taking its departure in inductively identifying the practical challenges of geoeconomic diplomacy of diplomatic practitioners from the EU’s two largest foreign services, France and Germany.3 The open inquiry into the geoeconomic challenges faced by French and German diplomats led the author to further investigate the Russia case. The Syria case, on the other hand, was, besides its general relevance as a major EU geoeconomic intervention in its geographical vicinity, also chosen based on the author’s assessment of access to relevant empirical data. As will be explained in greater detail below, practice-​theoretical studies are particularly enhanced through empirical richness and the researcher’s opportunity to study unfolding practices as closely as possible. Due to the authors’ own professional engagement in the diplomatic context of the Syria war, this access was uniquely granted. As for the overall characteristics of EU sanctions implementation, the two cases hold various notable differences and similarities. Major differences can be found in the respective political contexts, especially in terms of the level of ‘politicisation’ surrounding the EU’s decision to impose sanctions in the first place. The political idea of adopting restrictive measures against Russia was from the outset subject to substantial political debates among European policy-​makers, both between and within EU Member States. Here, the political antagonisms within the French and German political landscape regarding questions as to whether and how severely Russia should be targeted by EU sanctions served well for a study into the domestic agencies relevant to French and German diplomats’ attempts to leverage diplomatic relationships to advance the implementation of sanctions. The imposition of sanctions against Syria, on the contrary, did not cause similar levels of politicisation at the time of their adoption. EU Member States imposed restrictive measures in great political concurrence at a speed and scope that was already deemed “unprecedented” a few months into the implementation phase (Portela 2012: 2). The Syria case hence lends itself to study the practices of sanctions implementation in a context where it can be assumed that key EU policy-​makers and diplomats, at least at the conflict’s beginning, shared specific political objectives, meaning that analytical focus can be put on the ‘general’ practices that came to shape diplomats’ relationships with various state and non-​state actors across the EU and not only within specific Member States.

3 The research was commenced after the United Kingdom’s Brexit-​vote of 23 June 2016, meaning that the UK was deliberately not considered as a research object due to the significant unsteadiness that quickly came to surround the unfolding UK-​EU relationship.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

12 Introduction Conversely, the two cases share a number of characteristics. Both represent long-​standing and largely persistent sanctions measures that have existed through the most part of the 2010s and are still in place at the time of writing. This continuity is, for instance, not reflected in a similar way in the EU’s sanctions against Iran, which has been subject to great changes and uncertainties. Both sanctions policies scrutinised in this book were furthermore imposed in reaction to armed conflicts in the EU’s direct geographical neighbourhood, emphasising the EU’s vital and immediate geostrategic interest in using sanctions, which is a prerequisite for determining a political intervention to be ‘geo’-​economic, a notion further explained in ­chapter 2. Similar characteristics of geographical proximity cannot be found in other major EU sanctions regimes, such as those targeting North Korea or Venezuela. Consequently, the two exploratory cases merely propose useful starting points for analysing challenges to implementing instruments of economic power and how practice-​theoretical concepts and perceiving actors as part of wider network structures might be particularly suited for analysing how governments leverage diplomatic relationships to advance the implementation of such instruments. While the findings of this research cannot be directly extrapolated to other case studies, the proposed conceptual and theoretical approach could also be helpful in the analysis of other sanctions regimes or other geoeconomic policies. Whether this assertation holds, however, is subject to further empirical research. Finally, studies of social practices are always challenged by the demand for extensive data collection. The need for researchers to engage beyond ‘armchair analysis’ by gathering contextual data from the field are common and well-​described demands for ipt scholars (Neumann 2002: 427–​429; Pouliot & Cornut 2015: 308). For students of actor-​networks, the level of required data for proposing methodologically valid arguments might be extraordinarily high, as the contextual analysis moves from institutionalised settings within bureaucratic organisations or formal negotiation fora out into the greater world –​ where the ‘wider picture’ might indeed become very wide. This book mitigates these challenges through the application of a ‘multimethod’ approach, building on data from 58 qualitative expert interviews, textual analysis of key documents, as well as the ethnographical observations from this author’s time as a diplomatic practitioner between 2011 and 2019 in Germany, France, and in the context of the Syria war, and hence working in the direct contexts of the book’s two case studies.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

The EU in the Age of Geoeconomic Multipolarisation

4

13

Outline of Chapters

Chapter 1 sets the theoretical stage for investigating European economic power and geoeconomics. It reviews and discusses traditional realist and liberalist approaches to the study of economic power and demonstrates how these have provided the theoretical foundation for contemporary debates on geoeconomics in the context of the 21st century’s multipolarised, interdependent global economy. The chapter proposes a distinction between various analytical approaches to the study of geoeconomics and explains the focus on geoeconomics understood as governments’ strategic utilisation of economic power instruments in foreign and security policy over geoeconomics understood as the management of global interdependencies and governance. Chapter 2 explores the book’s main puzzle, namely how European governments of liberal market capitalism face structural challenges when attempting to instrumentalise state-​market relations for geostrategic purposes. To this end, the chapter discusses the merits and limits to the argument that governments of state capitalist countries might be structurally better equipped in the geoeconomic realm than those of market capitalist countries. It then introduces and discusses the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy as a conceptual pathway for studying states’ use of economic power with a sensitivity towards the underlying state-​market relations a given government has to operate within. Lastly, it situates the book’s analytical approach in the academic literature on economic sanctions, both in general and specifically within the context of the EU, and discusses how conventional approaches have largely neglected how successful sanctions implementation is dependent on diplomatic practitioners’ engagement with a myriad of public and private actors in the state-​market nexus. Chapter 3 applies the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy to study the book’s first case study. It provides evidence for how the mfa s of France and Germany initiated reform processes in the 2010s to strengthen their abilities for operating in the geoeconomic field and explains how these organisational changes were particularly driven by demands from both countries’ foreign ministers of the time to modernise the diplomatic services to tackle the economic and security-​related challenges arising from the 21st century’s multipolarisation and hyperglobalisation. In its main analytical section, the chapter investigates the types of actors and networked relations that French and German diplomats respectively drew on in their attempts to guide the intended implementation of EU sanctions against Russia in the period 2014–​2016.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

14 Introduction Chapter 4 turns to the book’s theoretical and methodological approach. It first discusses the merits for using a pragmatic, as opposed to critical, approach to ipt for the study of geoeconomic diplomacy and discusses how ipt has not been sufficiently attentive to the analysis of foreign and security policy implementation. While acknowledging the value of a practice-​based approach to the study of diplomatic engagements, the chapter argues that the ipt literature has so far been skewed towards the empirical analysis of diplomatic negotiation and mediation at the cost of studying the implementation of policy decisions. To overcome this fallacy, it introduces an analytical framework based on insights from the practice-​oriented actor-​network concepts of translation processes and obligatory passage points to identify and study ‘networked practices’ of geoeconomic diplomacy. It concludes with a discussion of the methods and data types chosen for the research, as well as a brief reflection on the author’s own role in the conducted research as a ‘researching practitioner’ working as a diplomat in the proximity to the EU’s conflictual engagements with both Russia and Syria. Chapter 5 applies the proposed framework of ‘networked practices’ to the study of sanctions implementation. It analyses the ‘translation processes’ that came to form the actor-​network relevant to the implementation of EU sanctions against Syria from 2011 to 2019. It demonstrates how EU diplomats, on the one hand, were largely able to leverage actor-​relations through networked practices of enforcement, monitoring, refinement, and deterrence, while they, on the other hand, were limited in their ability to act as the specific actor-​ network’s ‘obligatory passage points’ and hence to steer every aspect of the implementation phase as intended. Chapter 6 expands upon these findings to discuss the conflicting relationships between the EU’s use of economic sanctions with that of other geoeconomic instruments and partners. It uses the terminology of ‘networked ­practices’ to show how the simultaneous implementation of multiple geoeconomic instruments might cause mutually detrimental effects. Building on the Syria case, it discusses how the actor-​network that was constitutive of the implementation of EU sanctions was challenged by actor-​networks that formed around the implementation of the EU’s targeted economic assistance to Syrian opposition actors as well as to the implementation of US sanctions packages against Syria. Chapter 7 concludes the book by turning to more general discussions about its implications, both in terms of its approach to utilising practice theoretical tools and in terms of the normative implications of studying geoeconomic diplomacy through ipt’s descriptive lens. On the theoretical side, the chapter critically assesses the merits of depicting diplomats as the ‘makers’ of foreign

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

The EU in the Age of Geoeconomic Multipolarisation

15

and security policy, as has been concluded in ipt studies relying on a critical understanding of diplomatic practices (Sending et al. 2015). In contrast, it argues that the use of ant concepts has given reason to understand diplomats as ‘shapers’ of the social environment they operate in. This notion of diplomatic practices as shaping the implementation of economic sanctions gives us a new understanding of how diplomats are able to leverage influence in steering the instrumentalisation of state-​market relations beyond formal means of governmental control. The chapter further reflects on the normative risks implied when analysing states’ use of economic sanctions in terms ‘mundane’ processes of diplomatic practice, without extensively questioning the real-​life impact such policy decisions imply for those targeted by them. It makes the case for how the study of geoeconomic diplomacy, and the practices it is built on, can itself by useful for identifying and discussing how diplomatic practitioners face, and ultimately address, the moral dilemmas that any leverage of economic power might involve. The book concludes by summarising the answers to the main research question. Explaining how diplomats derive geoeconomic leverage through their positions in actor-​networks, it calls for the advancement of research that further ‘humanises’ the social processes formative of what is often perceived as the conduct of ‘raw’ economic power politics. Such refined perspectives, whose development this book hopefully contributes to, could help to better assess –​and ultimately improve –​the various ways diplomats and other state and non-​state actors engage in one of the 21st century’s most critical and contested fields of foreign and security policy.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

­c hapter 1

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions The dynamics and drivers behind states’ use of economic power to advance specific objectives in the international realm constitute a fundamental and long-​standing domain of inquiry in both foreign policy practice and ir and ipe analysis. By investigating European foreign and security policy from a geoeconomic perspective, this book examines the implementation of policy decisions in situations where governments seek to instrumentalise national wealth and economic resources by interfering in state-​market relations. This chapter sets out to explain and discuss the key conceptual terms and debates that the book’s approach to the study of geoeconomics builds on. As noted by Richard Nephew (2018: 1), it is almost unconceivable for scholars of economic power not to commence their research by acknowledging how the use of economic-​based instruments by rulers and governments –​such as trade embargos, tariffs, and sanctions –​have been recorded and documented throughout most of human history. The accounts by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides of the rivalries between the ancient Greek city states of Athens and Megara in the Peloponnesian Wars in 432 bce or the description by Jewish historian Flavius Josephus of Roman forces’ siege of the city of Masada around 70 ce stand out as some of the most frequently cited historical narrations. Consequently, the abundance of historical records documenting the intentional use of economic power to either coerce, incentivise, or deter other actors into specific patterns of behaviour would make it “plausible to claim that this practice is as old as the existence of the international system as we define it today” (Giumelli 2011: 10). The theoretical debates about the assumptions that underpin economic power practices are also almost as old as the practices themselves. Within the realm of theory-​driven ir studies, scholars have pondered extensively the meaning, origins, distribution, prospects, and limits of economic power. In the  20th century, such debates mainly developed both between and within the two dominating rationalist ir traditions of realism and liberalism. Guiding this debate and helping create meaningful academic dialogue between various conceptions of these intellectual traditions was the insistence of both realist and liberal scholars to label their varying analytical approaches in sub-​ categories such as ‘classical’, ‘structural’, ‘institutional’, or ‘neo-​classical’, thereby defining and demarcating the assumptions and scope of their studies. While it is outside the realm of this study to give a comprehensive account for every

© Kim B. Olsen, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004518834_003

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions

17

niche of these widely branched debates, the following chapter discusses how various liberal and, in particular, realist ir approaches still influence scholarly thinking about states’ use of economic power in international affairs. Building hereon, the chapter demonstrates how contemporary scholarly utilisations of geoeconomics as a term have renewed both academic and practice-​oriented debates about the conditions and limits for governments’ use of economic power in modern foreign and security policy. Habitually coining their analytical and empirical approaches against the backdrop of the 21st century’s emerging multipolar order, scholars of this thriving field have not always succeeded in clearly labelling dissimilar conceptual approaches in fine-​ grated categorisations, thus leading to terminological confusion and analytical inconsistencies (Scholvin & Wigell 2018). Recent contributions under the umbrella-​term of ‘geoeconomics’ have approached the question of economic power from greatly varying levels of analysis, often by relying on different causations between the notions of security and wealth. The chapter reviews and categorises these various contemporary scholarly utilisations and discusses the prospects and limits of this book’s specific use of the geoeconomic terminology. 1

The Realist-​Liberalist Divide: Classical Conceptions of Economic Power in ir

The argument that the intellectual engagement with states’ economic power does not predispose a specific ontological understanding of world affairs is not a straightforward one. It was not without reason that David A. Baldwin, one of the late 20th century’s major thinkers on the role of economic statecraft in foreign and security policy, found it necessary to remind his readers that the analysis of governments’ strategic use of economic capabilities cannot itself be attributed to one theoretical structural ‘-​ism’ only. According to Baldwin (1985), both mercantilists (broadly identifying with realism’s understanding of dominant state power in global affairs)1 and liberals share the objectives 1 Key 19th century adherents of economic nationalism, such as Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List, saw it as the state’s role to nurture its national productive power to defend its national interests (John Kirshner 2009; Levi-​Faur 1997). At the same time, some scholars have argued that late 20th century proponents of realism and mercantilism began to diverge in normative, political terms. While realism came to be seen as similar to the politics of traditional conservatism, mercantilist arguments were increasingly favoured by left-​ leanings global movements calling for state interventions in an ‘uncontrolled’ globalisation (Drezner 2010).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

18 

Chapter 1

of ensuring national security, albeit through different ‘techniques’ of either strong state intervention in economic affairs (mercantilism/​realism) or the state’s provision of free-​trade and commerce between market actors (liberalism). This view was more recently supported by John Kirshner, arguing that: Liberals and realists share the view that both power and plenty are crucial and complementary aims of state action, and further that power flows from productive capability and productive capability from economic growth. The realist dissent is with liberal politics, not liberal economics. john kirshner 2009: 38

In other words, realists and liberals might ask different questions when it comes to how but certainly not whether a state should adapt its economic policy to serve its strategic interests. The prominent theoretical cleavage between realism and liberalism that came to dominate Western rationalistic thought on international affairs from the beginning of the 20th century2 should therefore be seen as an expression of both normative and theoretical disagreements about the relationship between the state and its access to and use of economic means of power. The remainder of this section will briefly recapitulate this realist-​liberal divide, as it remains much of the foundation on which scholarly debates about states’ use of economic power are based today. Classical early 20th century liberal-​idealists built their views on the optimistic Kantian belief in rational human individuals’ ability to maximise their own preferences through mutual cooperation between interdependent actors. Shortly before the commencement of World War I, Norman Angell (1911) famously pointed out that those of his contemporaries who presumed that it would be in the national interest of Europe’s great powers to engage in major wars were under ‘a great illusion’. Contrary to the expectation of many contemporary advocates for an armed conflict between Europe’s great powers, Angell argued that war would be a collectively highly irrational economic behaviour when seen in a long-​term economic perspective (see also Fettweis 2003). A similar contempt for great power rivalries was advocated by US President

2 This section deliberately does not include a review of the so-​called World Systems Theory, the third dominant line of ir thought about the structural role of national wealth and international (inter)dependencies (see also Gilpin 1987), as its relevance in contemporary debates on geoeconomics is relatively modest. This theoretical understanding of the inherent material and social dependencies is conventionally attributed to neo-​Marxist thinkers such as Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), who extrapolated Marxist assumptions about the laws of production and capitalism from the level of national economies to the global level.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions

19

Woodrow Wilson. In an increasingly globalising and de-​colonialising world, states’ possession of national wealth would, according to Wilson and his contemporaries, not be a primary source of mutual antagonism but a pathway to international cooperation. If states ensured the free passage of goods and established equal trade conditions, holding economic means of power could create resolution rather than conflict. Wilson’s claims about the normative believe that peaceful progress in the international realm could only be achieved through moral-​driven collaborations between individuals, groups, and states would, however, later come to be overshadowed by his role as an “active exponent of race politics and white supremacy both domestically and internationally” (Acharya & Buzan 2019: 93). Proponents of classical realism, developing their thought in reaction to this pre-​and inter-​war liberal optimism, mainly derived their philosophical positions from a pessimistic Hobbesian understanding of human inability to interact peacefully. Particularly attributed to thinkers such as E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau, it saw the self-​focused and interest-​maximising state as the key actor of international affairs, making inter-​state rivalry over scarce resources a defining aspect of world affairs. Carr (1946: 113–​120) made the strong argument that conflict should “frankly [be] recognised as a part of politics”, meaning that a polity’s possession of economic power should be understood as directly underpinning its potential military power (see also Clark 1989: 70–​ 71). The realms of economic and military power could not be separated. For Morgenthau (1948), national wealth, such as natural resources and industrial capacity, should be considered in combination with the military preparedness and population size as constant factors that determine a state’s power. What determined the use of these power resources was the art of diplomacy. Contrary to the conception of diplomacy presented in this book, Morgenthau specifically referred to the role of the eloquent statesman, rather than a government’s general diplomatic system, as the means to guide the use of material sources of power (B. C. Schmidt 2005: 532). Essentially extrapolating normative assumptions about human interaction at the individual level to the roles of and relations between states in the international sphere, both of these philosophical conceptions would from the 1960s onwards be flanked by more system-​oriented, descriptive approaches. These ‘neo’ versions of realist and liberalist thought would present themselves as theory-​driven and positivistic, thereby giving prominence to the role of economic power as an explanatory variable of inter-​state relations. Structural realism (or neo-​realism), predominantly attributed to the legacy of Kenneth Waltz (1979), held that international relations are first and foremost characterised by the systemic balancing between states pursuing their individual

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

20 

Chapter 1

maximisation of security through military and economic power in the anarchical international system. Power is always relative and never an end in itself, but the ­ultimate means to security. In this Waltzian conception of power, war is an imminent threat that can only be explained by analysing the structural features of a given international system and the balance of power between its units, i.e. unitarily acting states. This structural level of analysis (the ‘third’ image) stands in contrast to conceptualising an analysis at the level of either individuals (the ‘first’ image) or states (the ‘second’ image). Whereas Waltz explicitly and continuously reminded his readers that structural realism could and should not be used to analyse states’ specific foreign policy behaviour –​ “structures … can tell us a small number of big and important things” (Waltz 1986: 329) –​it is important to note that system-​oriented realist thinking is a key source of inspiration for contemporary geoeconomic thought. The liberalist response to structural realism’s advances was famously shaped by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1973, 1977), who adopted many of Waltz’ systemic core assumptions, but questioned his claim about state interests as being inherently relative. According to their notion of neoliberal institutionalism, states are able to identify and agree on rationalistic common answers to collective action problems given the strong economic interdependence between states in the highly globalised international system. Multinational cooperation would hence not be a result of shared utopian values (such as claimed by classical liberalists), but a function of states’ direct self-​interest. Despite the systemic anarchy, any nation state, aware of the possibility to assume absolute gains through enhanced international cooperation, would be willing to engage in joint institutionalised endeavours with other states. In other words, the vacuum of anarchy could be filled with international governance structures if states saw the potential of gaining advantages hereof in absolute terms. Much of today’s contemporary Western thought on economic power and geoeconomics is built around various ‘classical’, ‘structural’, or ‘neo-​classical’ conceptions of realism, essentially hailing the apprehension of international conflict over liberalism’s concern with international cooperation (Baracuhy 2019; Scholvin & Wigell 2018). Despite of these apparent shared commitments, realist-​leaning geoeconomic scholars have engaged in significant conceptual contestations. On the one hand, realists largely agree on specific ontological assumptions about the social world and international order as anarchical, conflict-​prone, and state-​dominated. On the other hand, realists propose widely different levels of analysis for state interaction. While this book, in its next chapter, will argue for a conceptual approach to geoeconomics that is less concerned with assumptions about the systemic causes and effects for

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions

21

states’ interaction, it is important to understand how the bulk of contemporary geoeconomics literature more or less explicitly accepts key realist assumptions. Before turning to the question of how variations of realist thought have fuelled conceptual frictions, contestations, and mutual misunderstandings between contemporary proponents of geoeconomics, the following section will briefly engage with key realist thinkers who, mainly through their engagement in the realm of ipe, have acknowledged the impact on state-​market relations and non-​state actors as determining aspects of power politics. Realist Recognitions: Non-​state Actors’ Influence on Economic Means of Power Working at the crossroads between ir and ipe, Robert Gilpin, Stephen D. Krasner, and Susan Strange stand out as particularly influential realist thinkers committed to questions about the relation between economy and s­ ecurity. Simultaneously building on but also challenging Waltz’ structural realism,3 Gilpin in the late 1980s foresaw an increasing role of economic power in international relations. Partly resulting from the declining American hegemony, which, according to both Gilpin and the influential works of Charles Kindleberger,4 had been pivotal for maintaining international economic order after World War ii, the fragmenting global economy would henceforth be dominated by state competition in the economic sphere: “At the end of the twentieth century, there is a powerful incentive for governments to manipulate economic policies to advance their economic, political, and related interests” (Gilpin 1987: 396). Governments would more than anything revert to sectorial 1.1

3 Gilpin generally accepted Waltz’ defining argument about how the structural conditions of the international system are constitutive of the interaction between states. Both derived their conceptions of international relations from economic models, respectively a macroeconomic theory of oligopoly (Waltz) or a microeconomic theory of marginal utility maximisation (Gilpin). But by insisting on the role of economic power and wealth in international relations, Gilpin opened a pathway for analysis on the level of the ‘first’ and ‘second’ image. As succinctly summarised by Stefano Guzzini (2002: 9): “If wealth creation becomes an integral part of the study, an approach in international political economy must account for the international structure of production and the multinational enterprise as its characteristic actor”. 4 Gilpin built his realist analysis of the US’s role after World War ii on the thoughts of Kindleberger, who through an analysis of the declining British role as the global economic hegemon in the inter-​war period had laid the intellectual groundwork for the so-​called ‘Hegemonic Stability Theory’. Prior to his famous conclusion that “for the world economy to be stabilized, there must be a stabilizer -​one stabilizer” (1973: 205), Kindleberger had argued that a hegemon was necessary for the provision of global capital, the creation of stable conditions in global currency markets, to secure macro-​economic coordination, to keep international trade markets open for commerce, and to play the role as ‘lender of last resort’.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

22 

Chapter 1

protectionism to defend key interests against adversaries in international markets, while at the same time seeking possibilities to benefit as much as possible from international economic interdependence. Furthermore, Gilpin was among the early ipe-​oriented realists to acknowledge the interplay between the global hegemon’s ability to create a regional or international order and the opportunities for multinational companies to engage in trade relationships beneficial to the hegemon itself (Gilpin 1975). Similar thoughts were formulated by Krasner, who, also abiding to realist conceptions of power and the role of hegemony as a stabilising factor for the global economy, concluded his influential presentation of state power and the structure of international trade by acknowledging the challenge by non-​state actors to realist conceptions of state power: The existence of various transnational, multinational, transgovernmental, and other nonstate actors that have riveted scholarly attention in recent years can only be understood within the context of a broader structure that ultimately rests upon the power and interests of states, shackled though they may be by the societal consequences of their own past decisions. krasner 1976: 343

Moving further into the relationship between states and markets, while critically inquiring realism’s strong focus on the relative nature of power, Strange provided valuable accounts of the intrinsic relation between states’ various sources of power. Instead of focusing on one state’s military and economic power vis-​à-​vis those of other states, she highlighted the prospect of looking at states’ access to resources of arms, production, credit, and knowledge to influence the international system through structural power. Seeing such resources of power as intrinsically connected led Strange to emphasise how difficult it was to draw a clear distinction between economic and other forms of power: It is impossible to have political power without having the power to purchase, to command production, to mobilize capital. And it is impossible to have economic power without the sanction of political authority, without the legal and physical security that can only be supplied by political authority. strange 2015 [1988]: 28

As a consequence, Strange argued that the notion of structural power could not be limited to looking only at the agency of states. Understanding the role

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions

23

of market actors could not be excluded from the analysis of power politics (Guzzini 2000). While holding on to her structural understanding of power, Strange expanded her original views further in the mid-​1990s, gradually granting more room for non-​state and commercial actors. She described the declining role of the state vis-​à-​vis the market, which, on the one hand, was a specific challenge for governments of smaller states, while, on the other hand, reflected a general proposition for all governments, as all had failed to adapt to the integration into a global market economy. This, according to Strange, would ultimately lead to a vacuum of governance at the international level (Strange 1996: 12–​16). Modern statecraft, and indeed diplomacy, had to recognise that “the transnational firm has command of an arsenal of economic weapons that are badly needed by the state wishing to win world market shares” (Strange 1992: 6–​7). Strange’s conceptualisation of state-​firm relationships thereby highlighted the need for governments to bargain with commercial actors for the sake of expanding the state’s national wealth. But her structural understanding of power always served as a baseline. The enhancement of economic resources available to the state would always be intrinsically linked to the state’s general power capabilities, and hence to support whatever strategic objective it was in its interest to follow. The acknowledgment by realist scholars of the key roles played by commercial actors in the security-​related realm of the state-​ market nexus was hence an important expansion of debates on the nature of economic power, yet unfortunately one that has rarely been translated into stringent analytical concepts or frameworks. Realist Remainders: The Legacy of Geopolitics as an Analytical Category Today’s dominating academic debates on geoeconomics largely follow state-​ centric realist concepts such as shifting global power relations, growing strategic rivalries, and the (re)balancing of economic power, which all fit neatly within the analytical toolbox of ir realism –​either its classical, neo, or neo-​classical versions.5 Sören Scholvin and Mikael Wigell, co-​editors of Geo-​Economics 1.2

5 Neo-​classical realism seeks to strike a balance between the structural conditions identified in neo-​realism and other factors that might influence foreign and security policy behaviour. As succinctly summarised by Norrin M. Ripsman (2017: 1), neo-​classical realists hold that “states respond in large part to the constraints and opportunities of the international system when they conduct their foreign and security policies, but their responses are shaped by unit-​level factors such as state-​society relations, the nature of their domestic political regimes, strategic culture, and leader perceptions”.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

24 

Chapter 1

and Power Politics in the 21st Century (Wigell et al. 2019), recently argued that geoeconomics, as an analytical category, should be seen as “[related] to ir realism” (Scholvin & Wigell 2018: 74). Such understandings of geoeconomics are further inspired by approaches found in classical literature on geopolitics as well as on the relationship between economic resources and security.6 It is interesting –​and telling –​to note here how one of the most explicit sources of inspiration for much of today’s geoeconomic academic literature has been the rather semi-​scientific works of the self-​proclaimed strategist Edward N. Luttwak, who came to popularise the terminology of ‘geoeconomics’ itself. Writing in the final days of the Cold War, times of fundamental upheaval in the international system that would soon leave the US as sole global superpower (Scholvin & Wigell 2019: 3), Luttwak pointedly predicted that this new era would see a “steadily reducing importance of military power in world affairs” (1990: 17). The commercial realm, and hence economic power, would become of central importance to states competing in the international sphere. But the driving logic behind inter-​state relations would remain characterised by adversarial confrontations and zero-​sum behaviour. In other words, the means would be different but the ends the same. This led Luttwak to suggest geoeconomics as a “neologism” to describe “the admixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of commerce –​or, as Clausewitz would have written, the logic of war in the grammar of commerce” (1990: 19). Luttwak’s simple but powerful prediction was derived from core realist assumptions about the state as the international system’s fundamental spatial entity with a priority above anything else for maximising its own security. This security would henceforth primarily be won through the use of economic means. An often overlooked, yet remarkable, limitation to his own argument was briefly reflected upon by Luttwak himself as he recognised that “states and blocs of states acting ‘geo-​ economically’ must do so within an arena that is not exclusively theirs”, but would be shared with small and large commercial actors, ranging from individuals to multinational companies (1990: 22). However, just as many other ipe-​ oriented realist thinkers, Luttwak did not draw any conceptual conclusions from this analysis, other than that the relationship between geoeconomically oriented states and private actors could vary from pure coexistence to direct state manipulation.

6 The terminology of geopolitics is conventionally traced to the thoughts of the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1897) and his Swedish student Rudolf Kjellén (1899, 1916). For thorough discussions on the origins and contemporary use of the term, see Christopher Fettweis (2003, 2015).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions

25

Following this line of reasoning, scholars have described the field of geoeconomics as the extension of geopolitics applied to economic relations between states (Jaeger & Brites 2020; Vlados et al. 2019). The conceptualisation of geopolitical means and ends therefore plays a crucial role for many of today’s geoeconomic scholars. The early-​and mid-​20th century works of British geographer Halford Mackinder and German-​born economist Alfred Hirschman in particular are much-​cited in modern geoeconomics literature (Baracuhy 2019). Both were contemporaries of geopolitical upheavals and crises and derived compelling and straightforward arguments from their individual contexts about the role of economic power for great power relationships. Mackinder became particularly renowned for his forewarnings in the early years of the 20th century about how states’ access to the landmass of wider Eurasia would be instrumental to political power (Mackinder 1904). Even after the Allies’ victory in World War I, he asserted that the republican successors of the crumbled Russian and German empires, both geographically situated in the Eurasian sphere, would continue to pose a strategic threat to Great Britain: “We have defeated the danger on this occasion, but the facts of geography remain, and offer ever-​increasing strategical opportunities to land-​power as against sea-​power” (Mackinder 1942 [1919]: 80). Mackinder foresaw that multilateral attempts at stronger inter-​state cooperation, such as the newly established League of Nations, would not be able to ensure that the Eurasian ‘Heartland’ would not again become the centre stage of a great war. Hirschman, writing in the final days of another Great War to come, suggested a more system-​oriented perspective when arguing that “commerce can become an alternative to war … by providing a method of coercion of its own in relations between sovereign nations” (1945: 15). His empirical analysis coupled Nazi Germany’s rise to power in the years before World War ii to the German exploitation of its trade relations, particularly with smaller nations. Though Hirschman recognised that such predominant trading positions could arise without the exploiting state’s explicit intention, his main conclusions about how economic dependency of less wealthy nations on wealthy ones can be utilised for geostrategic aims through unequal trade relations still today resonates with scholars and diplomatic practitioners. 2

Geoeconomics: A Renewed Debate on Economic Power in the 21st Century’s Multipolar Order

At the threshold of the 21st century’s third decade, the thoughts of Luttwak, Mackinder, and Hirschman, as well as the theoretical reasoning about

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

26 

Chapter 1

economic power found in the various iterations of ir realism, have experienced an intellectual renaissance under the generic term of ‘geoeconomics’. Typically departing from empirical observations of rising levels of international interconnectedness and interdependence between an increasing number of economically powerful states, geoeconomic scholars are investigating the systemic consequences of shifting power balances between economically powerful protagonists as well as questions about states’ instrumentalisation of economic power resources. Despite –​or maybe due to –​the term’s increasing popularity, its exact meaning and analytical implications have become a matter of major contestation. In consequence, the literature subsumed under the geoeconomics headline is today of a heterogenous nature. This book defines geoeconomics as the strategic utilisation of national wealth to obtain geostrategic objectives (Blackwill & Harris 2016). The following section aims to demonstrate how scholarly uses of the term differ, either due to different levels of analysis or because of varying implied causations between the realms of security and economics.7 Geoeconomics as Global Governance: Managing International Interdependencies Most contributions to the geoeconomics literature depart their analysis from either the level of international structures and institutions or the level of states and their national policy instruments. The former line of research investigates how growing international interdependencies and the multipolarisation of the global order8 affects ‘geoeconomic institutions’ and how governments can leverage national wealth to reshape rules, regulations, and institutions embedded in global governance.9 This form of inquiry has produced an impressive variety 2.1

7

8 9

The following overview primarily discusses various understandings of geoeconomics from the scholarly lenses of rationalistic ir, ipe, and diplomacy studies. Scholars from other disciplines such as critical, radical, and constructivist geopolitics (Domosh 2013; Mercille 2008; Moisio 2017; Gearóid Ó Tuathail & Agnew 1992; Gearóid Ó Tuathail & Dalby 1998), political geography (Käpylä & Mikkola 2016; Scholvin 2016) as well as studies on securitisation (Cowen & Smith 2009) –​stemming from the post-​structuralist Copenhagen School of ir theory (Buzan et al. 1998) –​have introduced different conceptualisations of the geoeconomic terminology. For useful discussions, see Scholvin and Wigell (2018: 78–​80) and Vihma (2018: 8–​13). The idea and consequences of the ‘multipolarisation’ of the global order will be discussed further in ­chapter 2. As aptly discussed by Baldwin (1980), the traditional scholarly use of interdependence as a category of ir studies generally refers to the notions of either ‘sensitivity interdependence’ or ‘vulnerability interdependence’. Building on works by Duvall (1978) and Keohane and Nye (1973 , 1977), Baldwin asserts that the former relates to the ‘mutual’ effects

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions

27

of research, which more often than not builds on realist rather than liberal conceptions of how global interdependencies in the 21st century foster potential adversaries between powerful states, rather than new avenues of strengthened multinational cooperation. One example hereof is the recent but widely recognised work on ‘weaponised interdependence’, in which Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman warn of the security consequences stemming from the growing interdependence between states through the steady enhancement of global economic networks. Recalling Strange’s conception of structural power and the conventional realist lens on power as a relative proposition between one or more states, the authors contain that “[globalisation] has transformed the liberal order, by moving the action away from multilateral interstate negotiations and toward networks of private actors” (Farrell & Newman 2019: 44). According to Farrell and Newman, this has crucial consequences for the location and exercise of state power. In expanding the reasoning behind well-​known realist dismissals of liberal claims about how growing global interdependencies lead to enhanced possibilities for state corporation, they argue that modern technology has brought about intensified global networks that can be ‘weaponised’ by governments. By highlighting the fields of technological finance and cyber relations, they demonstrate how states are able to mobilise power through asymmetric access to economic means such as money, goods, or information, resources that are themselves constitutive of global networks in the 21st century.10 The authors here explicitly juxtaposition themselves against newer liberal conceptions of global networks, who argue that globalisation processes have minimised the role of inter-​state relations in key policy areas of global importance, which in turn paves the way for relationship building among a plurality of networks and hence for new modes of international cooperation (Slaughter 2017). Though Farrell and Newman did not explicitly label their approach as being part of the broader geoeconomic literature, other realist scholars have linked

10

between the actors bound by a relationship, whereas the latter is defined by the opportunity cost for disrupting a relationship. Contemporary geoeconomics literature uses the two interchangeably, meaning that the notion of ‘interdependence’ in this overview also refers to a general idea of a conglomerate of multiple relations among states, more than a clear distinction between whether such interdependencies are primarily caused by mutual benefit or domination of one side over the other (see also Coate et al. 2017). Thomas J. Wright (2017) makes a similar argument in his recent monograph All Measures Short of War by exploring how major powers use global interdependencies to enhance their strategic advantages against adversaries, including –​and in some cases primarily –​ through confrontations by the use of economic means of power.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

28 

Chapter 1

works on weaponised interdependence directly to the geoeconomic field. In what they describe as a “geoeconomic order of international trade and investment”, Anthea Roberts et al. acknowledge how governments rethink global interdependence and a “greater tendency of states to both ‘weaponize interdependence’ and seek to reduce exposure to such weaponization” (2019: 660). In invoking the terminology of ‘order’, the authors address the liberalist idea of ordering principles, rules, and norms of the international system that bind states in structures of mutual engagement beyond mere anarchy. At the same time, and similar to Farrell and Newman, the authors challenge the liberalist conception of order, which they see as being in a contemporary period of change through a reorientation of the relationship between the realms of security and economy. In the post-​Cold War’s ‘neoliberal order’, so Roberts et al. argue, the question of security did not dominate inter-​state relations at a scale that would threaten the principle of ‘world peace through world trade’. However, developments in the past decades, particularly since the financial crisis of 2008, have challenged this neoliberal state of affairs. Inter-​state relations today are still ordered, but these relations are now dominated by what has emerged as the 21st century’s ‘geoeconomic order’ in which states’ focus has shifted from absolute gains, positive-​sum games, and cooperation to relative gains, zero-​sum games, and conflict. This convergence between competition in the realms of security and economy can be seen through an analysis of the US-​China rivalry, in which protectionist economic measures, much like under the Cold War’s confrontations between the US and China/​Russia (Bingham & Johnson 1979; Crawford 1993; Dobson 2010), have increasingly been justified by broader security concerns.11 However, contemporary proponents of realism have also warned against the risk of scholarly misjudgements as to which states are particularly suited to exploit the growing global economic interdependence. Directly relevant to the present research, some have questioned whether the US American use of economic sanctions, to be further discussed later, could lead to an “overreach”, 11

The role of interdependence in the Sino-​American relationship continues to spur debates in US academic circles. Nye, one of the godfathers of the liberal stance in the interdependencies debate of the 1970s and 1980s, recently assessed that while economic interdependence between the US and China, as the two leading global producers of economic goods, “has created new strategic vulnerabilities, it has also produced strategic opportunities”. In Nye’s view, the latter could be achieved if both sides work towards engaging in a “cooperative rivalry” (Nye 2020: 18–​19). Others have suggested that the US should engage in a partial economic disengagement from China through an increased closure of the US market to Chinese stakeholders, and hence to foster ties with more ‘like-​minded’ countries in particularly Europe and Asia (Friedberg & Boustany Jr. 2020).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions

29

effectively leading to a diminished global position of the US dollar, should other governments feel provoked to “find ‘de-​dollarization’ strategies that could limit their vulnerability to US economic pressure” (McDowell 2019). In addressing what he sees as the “perils” of geoeconomics, Dong Jung Kim (2019; 2021) has likewise rung the alarm bells against a too self-​secure reliance by the US on its own abilities to instrumentalise interdependencies in its favour. Drawing his reasoning directly from Hirschman, Kim argues that the necessary condition for a geoeconomic intervention to be effective in terms of its end is ‘vulnerability interdependence’ (see also Crawford 1993), i.e. a situation where the targeted state has more to lose from a bilateral economic disruption than the targeting state (D.J. Kim 2019: 156–​159). From a US perspective, this condition emerges less frequently in today’s multipolar order, where states that are targeted by US geoeconomic policies might more easily find alternative providers of export destinations or providers of vital economic resources. According to Kim, Washington’s ability to exert sustained economic pressure on strategic targets was already limited in the Cold War era but is further diminishing in a global arena with other economic powerful actors such as China. Yet in building his argument around assumptions derived from the scholarly tradition of offensive realism,12 the author –​somewhat counterintuitively –​also argues against large-​scale US efforts to counter Chinese geoeconomic activities. Even if offensive realists such as John J. Mearsheimer (2010, 2014) have proposed that a more aggressive US stance against China is inevitable, Kim reminds his readers that the bulk of Chinese investments happens in various geographical regions, particularly on the Asian and African continents, that are not within the essential interest sphere of the US, which should rather work to maintain its status as a regional hegemon in North America, Northeast Asia, and Western Europe (D. J. Kim 2021). Beyond adhering to a realist conception of world affairs, the above referenced works also represent another trend in the structure-​oriented geoeconomic literature: the rare mention of the roles played by the EU or European governments in the intensified and changing global interdependence between

12

The theoretical approaches of offensive and defensive realism, respectively, emerged in the 1980s and 1990s as versions of the neo-​realist research agenda. One of the major disagreements rests with the way major powers ensure their position in the international system. Whereas defensive realists (such as Waltz himself) argue that the anarchical nature of the international system should encourage states to act restrained and only revert to expansionist behaviour in rare instances, offensive realists see security as a limited resource that needs to be chased at every reasonable occasion (Lobell 2010).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

30 

Chapter 1

security and economy. Narrowing the geographical sphere of geoeconomic influence from a strategic perspective, Michael Wigell (2016) has explained that the EU is adhering to a ‘hegemonic’ strategy of influence in its immediate neighbourhood. In reflecting realist views on hegemonic stability by Gilpin and Kindleberger, he argues that the EU both utilises its economic domination and its political attraction to export policies to its geographical neighbours. Whereas this significant gap, which the present research seeks to fill, has not been adequately addressed in the academic literature, influential think tanks in Europe have in recent years called for attention to the issue. The focus and extents of such arguments will be further explored in the next chapter. Geoeconomics as National Policies: Instrumentalising Wealth in Foreign and Security Policy While proposing an explanation for how the EU plays a role in managing –​ and exploiting –​regional economic interdependencies, Wigell’s means-​ends-​ based understanding of geoeconomics as the geostrategic use of economic power points in the direction of another prevalent understanding of geoeconomics as the instrumentalisation of national wealth for geostrategic objectives. It is this understanding of geoeconomics that will be at the centre of the remainder of this book. This understanding of geoeconomics as a product of national policies begins its analysis at the level of individual states primarily by investigating the relationship between security and economics in their foreign affairs. The main source of contestation among scholars adhering to this level of geoeconomic analysis has been the direction of causality between security and economics, the basis on which a geoeconomic policy can be identified. Two major interpretations of this causality have repeatedly been defended, either understanding economic wealth as a means of a policy or as its end (Baru 2012; Scholvin & Wigell 2018).13 The first line of inquiry analyses the economic impact and consequences of a state’s projection of various forms of national power. This reasoning has also been circumscribed as ‘trade follows the flag’ –​and hence defines a 2.2

13

Some scholars have argued critically against the analytical possibility of disentangling the notions of geoeconomics and geopolitics (Csurgai 2018). Matthew Sparke (2018) has suggested how the reflectivist, discourse-​oriented approach of critical geopolitics helps to analyse how apparent geoeconomic policies, such as the refusal of the Trans Pacific Partnership agreement by the administration of US President Donald Trump, can be overlayered with other narratives of ethno-​nationalist greatness and military supremacy.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions

31

geoeconomic policy according to a state’s economic ends: States compete at the international arena for scarce material resources and instrumentalise various forms of state power to enhance national economic and business interests (Kundnani 2015; O’Hara & Heffernan 2006; Szabo 2014). In the words of Richard Youngs (2012: 14), this understanding of geoeconomics “denotes the use of statecraft for economic ends; a focus on relative economic gain and power; a concern with gaining control of resources; the enmeshing of state and business sectors; and the primacy of economic over other forms of security”.14 A comparable interpretation of state-​market relations has been implicit to much scholarly work done under the label of economic diplomacy (Bayne & Woolcock 2013b; Bergeijk et al. 2011; Denécé 2011; Lee & Hocking 2010; Okano-​ Heijmans 2011; Seabroke 2015; Van Bergeijk 2009). A conceptual comparison hereof will be further explored in the next chapter. The opposite, and with time more conventional, understanding identifies a geoeconomic policy as one where the ‘flag follows the trade’ –​and hence by a state’s geostrategic instrumentalisation of, or threat to, its national economic resources in its foreign and security policy. This understanding of geoeconomics implies that a state actively applies its economic power to support its specified geostrategic objective(s). Just as the use of military means of power can entail numerous strategic, economic, and humanitarian consequences, the use of economic means of power can be used to obtain a wide range of different geostrategic objectives. As it is this causal understanding of the relationship between security and economics that is also applied in this book, the remainder of this section will primarily focus on the clarification of specific terminologies and definitions relevant to the argumentation in the chapters to come. A first important step is to get a clearer understanding of the specific means and ends involved in a geoeconomic policy. 14

An analogous, though more elaborate, definition was offered in the early 2000s by the influential French thinker Pascal Lorot, who argued that geoeconomics first constitutes the state’s direct engagement in market affairs to obtain possession of strategic economic resources, which could then be used as means of power to enforce the state’s economic or social position in the international realm: “[La] géoéconomie est l’analyse des stratégies d’ordre économique –​notamment commercial –​, décidées par les États dans le cadre de politiques visant à protéger leur économie nationale ou certains pans bien identifiés de celle-​ci, à acquérir la maîtrise de technologies clés et/​ou à conquérir certains segments du marché mondial relatifs à la production ou la commercialisation d’un produit ou d’une gamme de produits sensibles, en ce que leur possession ou leur contrôle confère à son détenteur –​État ou entreprise ‘nationale’ –​un élément de puissance et de rayonnement international et concourt au renforcement de son potentiel économique et social” (Lorot 2001). For a similar conception see also Gleen Diesen (2018: 12).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

32 

Chapter 1

Looking at geoeconomics as a foreign policy practice, one can identify broad bodies of literature that have analysed causes and consequences of applying specific geoeconomic instruments such as economic sanctions (Fürrutter 2019; Nephew 2018; Peksen 2019b; Portela 2016), targeted economic assistance (Essex 2013), trade and financial policies (Kundnani 2019), energy resources (Rossbach 2019; Sattich 2016, 2018; Vihma & Turksen 2016; Vihma & Wigell 2016) and large-​scale infrastructure projects (Cai 2018; Käpylä & Aaltola 2019). Each of these instruments have specific and individual features and can be applied differently in specific historical, political, and geographical contexts. For the argument laid out in this book, it is key to note that states operating in the field of geoeconomics, as is the case in most aspects of foreign affairs, cannot be expected to hold similar levels of access to means and instruments of economic power. Such restraints are either caused by a state’s limited level of national wealth or by structural circumstances in the state-​market relationship that limit the former’s influence or control over the latter. As will be further elaborated in the chapters to come, scholars of geoeconomics have, oddly, not given much conceptual attention to such practical difficulties and have largely underestimated how governments might fail to implement geoeconomic instruments as intended (Olsen 2020). Such a neglect of states’ failure to use economic power might be linked to the literature’s strong domination by realist-​leaning approaches, which focus mostly on states’ direct security interests and less on the practical challenges governments face in the geoeconomic realm. The basic realist assumption that states hold unhindered access to the economic resources found within their borders might be particularly problematic for governments of liberal market capitalist societies, such as those of the EU. Here, much of the national wealth that forms the basis of a state’s economic power capabilities might be found in private hands and hence not under the direct control of the government that wishes to utilise it. That being said, defining a geoeconomic policy by the economic means a state seeks to leverage seems insufficient. Scholars have at great length debated what the term ‘geo’ entails in the particular context of geostrategy. Many scholars of geoeconomics, such as Luttwak himself, have loosely interpreted the geo-​dimension as merely implying the interaction between (state) actors in the international or global realm. In contrast, Sören Scholvin and Mikael Wigell have convincingly argued for a stricter interpretation, which either demands a state’s economic means or its strategic ends to have “decisive geographical features” (2018: 81). Not only does this focus on the spatial feature of foreign and security policy-​making entail a clearer indication for the instances in which states use economic resources in a geoeconomic manner,

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions

33

it also more clearly distinguishes the study of geoeconomics from the more general fields of ir and ipe, which is a useful demarcation line for this book’s conceptual approach. Challenging the definition of geoeconomics based on the geostrategic objectives in question, scholars have doubted whether a state can be assumed to hold such objectives ex ante to a particular geoeconomic intervention, and hence whether such objectives can be treated as stable analytical categories. For instance, in a recent study of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (bri), Mingjiang Li (2020) questioned the degree to which a geostrategic objective needs to be clearly defined at the commencement of a geoeconomic intervention –​or whether such objectives might solidify over time. Li argues that China’s early investments in bri, from a geostrategic viewpoint, were made based on a relatively broad idea to enhance Chinese influence in various geographical regions, but that the final end with this large-​scale financial and economic advancement continuously developed over the years. Beyond raising an important point about the analytical difficulty for narrowing the criteria for what constitutes a state’s geoeconomic behaviour at the level of foreign and security policy, Li’s work also highlights another trend in the geoeconomics literature: a widespread interest in analysing and discussing the geoeconomics of China and other countries adhering to governance models based on varieties of state capitalism. As will be further elaborated, this interest might be caused by the assumption that governments of state capitalist economies are well-​placed for instrumentalising national wealth for geostrategic purposes. By further exploring this trend in the geoeconomics literature and by juxtaposing the ideal type of state capitalism against the ideal of liberal market capitalism, the next chapter will elaborate this research’s overall puzzle, namely how governments of liberal market capitalism, which generally exert only limited direct control over economic means of national wealth, are able to meaningfully engage in and steer geoeconomic foreign and security policy-​making. Such questions into various forms of relationships between states and markets have only to a limited extent been recognised in contemporary geoeconomics literature, which remains dominated by realist interpretations (Scholvin & Wigell 2019). This book therefore calls for the need for the geoeconomics literature to show greater analytical openness and flexibility in terms of its underlying assumptions. Such calls echo those of Antto Vihma (2018: 6–​ 8), who, for example, warned against a too deterministic and pessimistic reading of Luttwak and his followers, essentially arguing that geoeconomics as an analytical category is closer to the philosophical position of Morgenthau’s

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

34 

Chapter 1

classical realism than its structurally-​oriented versions of Waltz, Mearsheimer, and Samuel P. Huntington.15 Even though such attempts for nuanced readings of scholarly contributions are always well-​placed, this book sets out to demonstrate why even basic realist assumptions about international anarchy and inter-​state antagonisms –​no matter whether they are derived from a specific understanding of human nature or from the prepositions of the international system as such –​block a clear-​eyed understanding of the (diplomatic) actors and processes that are formative of states’ actions and room of manoeuvre in the geoeconomic realm. 3

Economic Sanctions: A Popular, Yet Challenging, Geoeconomic Instrument

Among the various geoeconomic instruments available to policy-​makers in the EU, this book focuses on the one that over the past years has attracted most public attention and debates: economic sanctions. Before diving into these debates, and explaining why a stronger attention to diplomatic actors involved in the use of such sanctions is needed, the rest of this chapter discusses the broad body of scholarly literature on economic sanctions with special attention to works on the effectiveness of sanctions as geoeconomic instruments, the interplay between sanctions and diplomacy, and –​most importantly –​the limits to their implementation. Lastly, in turning to the book’s specific empirical focus on EU sanctions, it will be demonstrated why the question of proper sanctions implementation is particularly challenging within the complex and multi-​layered institutional framework of the cfsp, before discussing how conventional literature on EU sanctions has yet to deliver convincing analytical frameworks for the study of the actors and processes relevant to understanding the prospects and limits for implementing EU sanctions as intended. Economic sanctions is a geoeconomic instrument that ever since the Cold War has played a key role in EU foreign and security policy-​making (Giumelli 2020a; Lafont Rapnouil 2017; Nephew 2020; Thouvenin 2020). The term

15

Similar to Waltz and Mearsheimer, Huntington was not primarily a theorist of geoeconomics. Huntington’s assertion of the early 1990s about the increasing role of economic power in global affairs have, however, led geoeconomic scholars’ attention to his works: “[Economic power] is, indeed, probably the most important source of power, and in a world in which military conflict between major states is unlikely, economic power will be increasingly important in determining the primacy or subordination of states” (Huntington 1993: 72; see e.g. Wigell 2016).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions

35

sanctions will in this research only be used to describe so-​called ‘negative sanctions’, i.e. penalties, and does not include ‘positive’ sanctions, such as economic development funds, tariff reductions, or favoured trade treatment (cf. Baldwin 1985: 42). In line with this understanding, this book defines international sanctions as follows: Politically motivated penalties imposed as a declared consequence of the target’s failure to observe international standards or international obligations by one or more international actors (the senders) against one or more others (the targets). giumelli 2011; emphasis in original

Beyond defining the broad category of sanctions, it is important to distinguish between various forms of sanctions to be precise about the demarcation of sanctions as a geoeconomic instrument (Nephew 2018: 44–​48). Economic sanctions, in this understanding, describe a sender’s intention to deprive a target’s ability to obtain or use economic resources, which can either happen at the level of individuals (individual sanctions) or at the level of economic sectors (sectorial sanctions). In this sense, economic sanctions are to be distinguished from other types of sanctions such as diplomatic and political sanctions, e.g. the expulsion of another state’s diplomats or the exclusion of a state from an international organisation, group, or forum, military sanctions, the denial of military hardware or technological know-​how, and technological sanctions, the denial of goods and technical resources to impede a country’s technological progress, mostly in specific sectors. 3.1 Conventional Analytical Approaches to the Study of Sanctions Scholarly debates over the effectiveness of sanctions as instruments of foreign and security policy have for decades been a favoured theme of (particularly North American) ir literature. Often building on quantitative models for measuring how sanctions affect the economic calculation of targeted states and whether this results in the behavioural change aspired to by the sender, scholars have debated at length how to properly measure the effect of sanctions on a targeted state’s behaviour (Elliott 1998; Hufbauer et al. 2007; Jonathan Kirshner 2002; Pape 1998; Peksen 2019b), whether sanctions are most effectively directed against friends or foes (Drezner 1999; Escribà-​Folch & Wright 2010; McLean & Whang 2010; Peksen 2019a), the best circumstances for implementing various forms of sanctions (Giumelli 2011; Lektzian & Souva 2007; Peterson 2018), and the importance of understanding the target’s resilience when it finds itself sanctioned (Blanchard & Ripsman 2008, 2013; Nephew 2018).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

36 

Chapter 1

Although it is difficult to draw comprehensive conclusions from such a diverse body of literature, it seems fair to say that scholarly scepticism over the actual usefulness of sanctions has dominated the debate for decades. The scholarly call for caution thus stand in stark contrast to the ever-​rising popularity sanctions have among many policy-​makers.16 This research does not aspire to challenge the frequently heard claim that “sanctions don’t work” (or only under very specific conditions), also widely echoed in more popularised debates on the topic (D. S. Cohen & Weinberg 2018; Harrell 2018; Lew & Nephew 2018; Peksen 2009; Taylor 2017; Vaez 2019), but to add to the general understanding for why sanctions –​like other geoeconomic instruments –​might be a particularly difficult for governments to utilise as a means of foreign and security policy. Given that the implementation of any sanctions policy, being a geoeconomic instrument, always involves an international dimension, the role of diplomacy in sanctions policies has received some attention, particularly through works by current and former US sanctions practitioners. Juan C. Zarate (2013), a former leading civil servant of the US Treasury, provides a fascinating anecdotical account of the key role played especially by the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (ofac) in forming and implementing rapidly expanding financial sanctions, which became even more central to US foreign policy after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (see also Drezner 2015; Feaver & Lorber 2010; Kittrie 2009). ofac’s inter-​agency cooperation with the State Department has also been portrayed by former diplomatic practitioners as relatively frictionless (Nephew 2018, 2020), others have engaged in recent calls for greater focus on the coordination mechanisms and practices available to American diplomats (Fried & Fishman 2021). In spite of these empirical accounts, more systematic approaches to the study of diplomacy and diplomats in the application of sanctions have been largely neglected. One cause might be found in a general trend in literature on statecraft to categorise diplomacy as a foreign policy instrument rather than a procedual condition for foreign policy-​making. Baldwin, for example, distinguished a state’s economic statecraft from its diplomacy.17 Others have 16

17

Research has demonstrated how EU policy practitioners, operating in the sanctions field, are only partly familiarised with the evidence base that can be found in academic literature on the efficiency, effectiveness, and complex causalities underpinning the use of economic sanctions (Boogaerts 2018b). In building on a taxonomy originally introduced by Harold D. Lasswell (1958 [1936]: 204–​ 205), Baldwin (1985: 13–​14) distinguishes between four techniques of statecraft: propaganda (attempts at deliberate manipulation of verbal symbols), military statecraft (influence attempts relying on violence, weapons, or force), economic statecraft (influence

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions

37

categorised economic sanctions as “nestled somewhere between warfare and diplomacy” (Askari et al. 2003: 27; see also Haass 1998: 5). Michael Mastanduno, while recognising the interplay of sanctions and diplomacy as particularly important when states simultaneously employ various instruments of statecraft, followed a comparable categorisation when lamenting that “[too] often, diplomacy is given limited analytical attention because it is considered too weak as an alternative to force or even sanctions” (1999: 300). It is this proposed juxtaposition of a state’s choice between geoeconomic instruments, on the one hand, and the employment of diplomacy, on the other, that is among the core themes challenged in this book. The scrutiny of sanctions implementation, and the role of domestic non-​state actors herein, has been another important strand in the literature. Governance challenges might include, but are not limited to, the legal enforcement of sanctions by the executive or judicial branches against individuals or companies subject to a state’s jurisdiction. In other words, sender states depend on the willingness of commercial actors within their own jurisdiction to cease economic exchange with the target state. Matthieu Crozet et al. (2021) have, for example, demonstrated how the introduction of sanctions might lower the probability of firms to engage in targeted states’ domestic markets in general, even if this engagement generally does expand trade relations significantly, after the lifting of sanctions, to a pre-​sanctions level. Navin A. Bapat and Bo Ram Kwon (2015: 131–​135) explain how the sender state has to be willing to endure potential macro-​scale economic losses because economic actors from other states might fill the trade void left by the sender state’s own firms and businesses. The sanctions sender thus faces the trade-​off between geopolitical gains and potential economic losses, which, according to Bapat and Kwon’s quantitative approach, represents a classical game-​theory conundrum. It is exactly such representations of rationalistic actors with fixed win-​sets that is questioned in this research. The alternative view, magnified through the lens of geoeconomic diplomacy, acknowledges that diplomatic practitioners engage in actor relations that go beyond pure bargaining. Rather, it opens the avenue for disclosing how diplomats build and manage of relationships with various state and non-​state stakeholders to shape the way sanctions are implemented in complex state-​market structures. The challenges of sanctions implementation are also closely related to instances of sanction defections. These occur when “a government supports

attempts on resources having a semblance of a market price), and diplomacy (influence attempts via negotiations).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

38 

Chapter 1

and agrees to abide by a multilateral accord, but is either unaware that actors operating in its territory are violating the agreement or is unable to stop them from doing so” (Shambaugh 1999: 7). Governments engaged in geoeconomic diplomacy and in this case sanctions implementation thus have a key interest in countering such unawareness and inability. However, this task can be onerous. Already four decades ago, Robin Renwick described how sanctions enforcement generally is subject to “a complex administrative apparatus” consisting of multiple governing departments such as foreign affairs, commerce, treasury, agriculture, customs, and others, as well as central banks and specialised agencies (1981: 78). Answering directly to Renwick’s concerns, Baldwin (1985: 139) dismissed them in arguing that governments just needed to improve their expertise and learn how to effectively use economic means of power. Even if Baldwin’s point might be a rightful wish, it is important to establish evidence as to whether such hopes also play out in practice. For, whereas the challenge of sanctions implementation is well recognised, research on governance responses to challenges have to a lesser extent been subject to academic investigation. Various scholars have documented how governments have not been able to prevent sanctions defection –​taking place either legally through circumvention (legal loopholes) or illegally through defiance (disobedience of the legal act) –​by individuals, organisations, or companies (Andreas 2005; Bapat & Kwon 2015; Early 2015; K. Kim 2020; Stepien & Weber 2019). Even a government with a strong organisational apparatus in place cannot be assumed to always enforce sanctions policies to the fullest means possible, especially as this can be very costly in economic terms. Such costs might be particularly high when companies and third-​party states actively engage –​ legally or illegally –​in defying or avoiding sanctions. Businesses from the senders’ jurisdiction might become so-​called ‘sanctions busters’ by evading legal trade prohibitions through transactions in non-​sanctioned third-​party states (Early 2015: 17–​56). A crucial reason for resistance to a government’s sanctions policy can be found in the inherent collision of interests between a state and its market actors: While the sender government believes that sanctions on the target are in its interest, sanctions are not necessarily in the interest of the sender’s domestic actors. In many instances, the interests of the sender’s domestic actors and the sender government may in fact conflict. T. C. morgan & bapat 2003: 66

At the same time, it is important to note that domestic actors’ advocacy is not always in favour of easing sanctions. A government’s idea to eventually

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions

39

lift sanctions against a targeted state might be challenged by interest groups or businesses that distrust whether the targeted state will actually change its behaviour as expected (D. C. Copeland 1999: 56–​58; Mastanduno 1999: 308). The myriad of ways that various stakeholders might interfere in and impact a government’s use of sanctions as an instrument of foreign and security policy underscores this book’s objective to further scrutinise the dynamics and processes that characterise the interplay between governments, diplomats, and other state and non-​state actors when a geoeconomic policy is to be put into tangible practice. Before doing so, the chapter’s last section will provide a brief overview of how various approaches to the analysis of sanctions use in the context of EU foreign and security policy-​making. The Complex Institutional Framework of EU Sanctions Implementation Scholarly works on EU sanctions have largely followed the general trends in the broader ir literature in that significant attention has been devoted to questions about EU sanctions’ overall coherence and effectiveness. Not least in light of the steadily increasing use of EU restrictive measures in the CFSP framework, particularly over the past decade, scholars have called upon EU policy-​makers for a more standardised and less ‘ad hoc’ approach to sanctions employment (de Vries et al. 2014) and clearer ex ante definitions of success criteria for specific sanctions regimes (Giumelli & Ivan 2013). Furthermore, scholars have criticised how the factors that determine whether and how the EU imposes sanctions vary in terms of their historical, economic, and normative characteristics (Boogaerts 2018a); that EU restrictive measures are ‘symbolic’ acts rather than serious instruments of power and leverage (Nivet 2015);18 and that the EU’s increasing use of sectorial, as compared to individually targeted, sanctions should be accompanied by enhanced intra-​EU risk mitigation measures to prevent unjustified and negative humanitarian impacts of EU sanctions policies (Moret 2015; Portela 2016). While these considerations provide valuable insights into the study of EU sanctions, it is surprising to note that only modest scholarly attention has been devoted to the interplay between EU 3.2

18

In a highly critical assessment of the use of sanctions as a means of the EU’s cfsp framework, Bastian Nivet categorised restrictive measures as ‘symbols of existence’ rather than serious means of power for seeking strategic influence in international affairs: “…les sanctions internationales de l’ue confirment que l’action internationale de l’Union répond parfois autant à une volonté d’exister, de se faire reconnaître comme acteur porteur d’une identité incarnée par des valeurs et principes spécifiques, qu’à une volonté de transformer son environnement stratégique.” (Nivet 2015: 138)

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

40 

Chapter 1

institutions, Member States, and other actors relevant to the imposition and implementation of sanctions.19 This neglect is even more peculiar considering the complex institutional framework within which EU sanctions policies are created, maintained, and controlled. As part of the EU’s intergovernmental cfsp framework, restrictive measures have to be decided by Member States in the EU Council of Ministers through unanimous vote. Those aspects of sanctions that have a direct impact on the EU’s internal market, such as economic and financial trade restrictions, further need to be legally adopted through Council regulations. The Council decision to adopt measures targeting individuals, such as travel bans, as well as arms embargoes are, in contrast hereto, to be directly implemented by Member States (Portela 2015: 41). The design, adjustment, and monitoring of sanctions is, in formal terms, a collective responsibility of the eeas, the European Commission, and Member States. The former two are foreseen to play a key role in the preparation and review of sanctions (EU Council 2018: 47), meaning they both draft Council decisions and regulations and assist Member States with regional, thematic, and legal expertise. Lastly, the Court of Justice of the EU (cjeu) has, in practical terms, come to play a significant role in terms of checking the legality of restrictive measures, particularly those targeted at individuals and entities, which became particularly evident in the aftermath of the now famous cases Kadi i (cjeu 2008) and Kadi ii (cjeu 2013).20 Given the increasing number of EU restrictive measures 19

20

Such research has been more prevalent in the context of US agencies’ enforcement of economic sanctions, such as recently brought forward by Bryan R. Early and Keith A. Preble (2020), who have convincingly demonstrated how ofac’s strategy towards companies acting in violations of various sanctions provisions over the past decades shifted from a “fishing” strategy (imposing many small fines) to a “whale-​hunting” strategy (imposing few but very large fines). The cases related to the appeal of Saudi Arabian businessman Yassin Abdullah Kadi against the EU Council’s regulation to implement the decision of the Sanctions Committee under the UN Security Council to designate Kadi based on his alleged role as a financier of the designated terrorist organisation Al-​Qaeda. Given the request for a preliminary ruling, the court responsible under the cjeu was the European Court of Justice (ecj), which under Kadi i had formulated the landmark decision that it is the EU’s responsibility to ensure the lawfulness of UN sanctions when implementing those into EU regulation, and, in the particular case, decided that Kadi had experienced an infringement of his personal rights since the evidence for his listing or the specific reason for his listing had been disclosed to him. In 2013, the ecj decided under Kadi ii that the European Commission’s decision to first present Kadi with a summary of the reasons for why the UN Sanctions Committee had listed him, and thereafter maintain him on the EU sanctions list, was also unlawful. The seminal rulings by the cjeu made it clear that “even if cfsp decisions were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, the requirement

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions

41

in the 2010s, the cjeu’s role has become particularly important within the recent decade, where the cjeu annulled numerous individual designations on EU sanctions lists, often with reference to the insufficient provision of evidence for a specific listing (Chachko 2019; de Galbert 2016; Martin 2019). At the end of 2018, the European General Court (egc), the responsible court under the cjeu, had 60 pending cases relating to litigation regarding restrictive measures.21 Member States, meanwhile, carry the formal responsibility for enforcing and monitoring the practical implementation of restrictive measures. This domestic competency reflects the principle of subsidiarity, drawn from the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (tfeu) art. 5, ensuring that the EU only takes action in matters handled less effectively at the local, regional, or national level (Helwig et al. 2020: 90). Sanctions are formally enforced at the domestic level through so-​called ‘competent authorities’, which are appointed at each Member State’s discretion. Every EU sanctions regime must list each Member State’s appointed competent authorities. The length and thoroughness of these lists are subject to significant variations. Some Member States (Denmark, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Sweden) list ten or more competent authorities spanning from police, judicial, migration, and customs authorities as well as national banks and national auditors to ministries of foreign affairs, economics, finance, justice, interior, agriculture, tourism, etc. Others (Germany, Greece, France, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia) merely state that one or two particular ministries and agencies coordinate enforcement with other relevant actors. It is hence noteworthy that EU governments have dissimilar practices when implementing regulations that should be similar for all Member States. The enforcement of one of the EU’s most popular foreign policy i­nstruments is thereby not only formally delegated to at least 180 individual competent authorities from 27 Member States,22 but also monitored by 27 different national investigative and judicial systems. As concluded by Francesco Giumelli

21 22

to observe due-​process principles –​such as effective remedy and the right to be informed –​ensured that the cjeu would always undertake a judicial review of EU decisions in the realm of sanctions” (Giumelli et al. 2021: 6). Updated account of the presentation by Éric-​André Martin (2019: 19) as per the annual reporting for 2018 by the cjeu (2019). As EU Council regulations do not themselves list a full overview of Member States’ competent authorities, but merely provide internet links to each Member States’ (more or less) comprehensive listing of their respective competent national authorities, this number is derived from the author’s counting of the national competent authorities, as referenced in the regulation announcing the EU sanctions against Russia (EU Council 2014i).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

42 

Chapter 1

(2020a: 181), there is an argument to be made that the EU is lacking an equivalent to the US’s ofac agency, tasked with ensuring necessary formalised sanctions coordination across the EU (see also Golumbic & Ruff iii 2012). A similar idea of a centralised European authority has in recent years been put forward by the French government, but without gaining political traction among other Member States sceptical of handing this task to a centralized EU entity (France 24 2018). Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the European Commission in January 2021 put forward a proposal to develop a so-​called ‘Sanctions Information Exchange Repository’, designed to enable prompt information exchange between Member States on the implementation and enforcement of sanctions. Furthermore, the European Commission announced that it will “work with Member States to establish a single contact point for enforcement and implementation issues which have cross-​border dimensions” (European Commission 2021: 16–​17). Whereas the proposal is a testimony to EU experts’ ambitions to improve coordination across EU institutions and governments, it should itself be seen as a confession to the ­insufficient coordination mechanisms that until this point have marked EU sanctions cooperation. Consequently, the EU’s current legal framework and practical arrangements have left Member States with room for interpretation of how to implement restrictive measures in practice. Although EU literature is generally characterised by a great focus on institutional matters and dynamics, little is known about the actual extent of discrepancies between Member States’ sanctions enforcement at the national level (Helwig et al. 2020: 94).23 One notable exception is the work by Clara Portela (2015), who has scrutinised various pathways through which Member States have purposely undermined the application of different forms of EU sanctions. Through a sample of various cases, she argues that Member States rarely directly oppose adopted sanctions, but rather seek to circumvent restrictive measures.24 From the viewpoint of this book, one suggested reason for Member States’ circumvention of sanctions implementation is particularly interesting, as it points to the potential of disagreements between diplomats, representing Member States in the cfsp structures, and 23

24

Among the rare attempts to study implementation differences between Member State of EU restrictive measures is the work of Radka Druláková and Pavel Přikryl (2016). In qualitatively assessing the respective compliance by the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic with EU sanction norms, the authors identify a lesser degree of behavioural compliance by the latter. Notably, Portela (2015: 53–​55) only identifies a single case of outright Member State disregard of EU sanctions, namely the UK’s dismissal of the EU flight ban against commercial flights from Yugoslavia, adopted by EU Member States in wake of the Kosovo Crisis of 1998–​1999.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Economic Power, Geoeconomics, and Sanctions

43

technically oriented civil servants, more focused on sanctions’ impacts on trade volumes, as a source of intra-​governmental conflict for how strictly sanctions should be enforced at the national level (cf. Buchet De Neuilly 2003). Another important contribution on the role of non-​state private actors in EU sanctions making has been made by Francesco Guimelli. Highlighting the central role played by banks and financial institutions in putting individual sanctions into action, he recommended that “since the role of for-​profit actors is indispensable in contemporary politics of sanctions, EU institutions should consider developing mechanisms to involve, train and prepare private actors to implement targeted sanctions” (Giumelli 2018: 138). Such observations support the need for further investigation into how implementation challenges arise out of relationships between various types of actors salient to the diplomatic field, not in the least those actors not necessarily partaking in formalised cfsp decision-​making processes and therefore at risk of being outside of the focus area of conventional approaches to sanctions studies. By utilising the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy and an analytical framework focused on networked practices –​to be introduced in the next ­chapters –​this book seeks to present a comprehensive account of the myriad actors involved in sanctions implementation, and particularly of the way in which diplomatic actors relate to and leverage their positions in such actor-​ networks through everyday practices.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

­c hapter 2

Geoeconomic Diplomacy

Enhancing Abilities to Instrumentalise Economic Means of Power

The renewed interest from both practitioners and scholars in the intersection of economics and security in foreign affairs has, uncoincidentally, aligned with debates over the changing patterns of the international order in the 21st century. Ever since the turn of the century, and particularly after the financial and economic crises of 2008–​2009, observers have pondered about grand-​scale structural changes, often emanating from considerations of the declining ‘West’, the rise of the ‘Rest’, and hence the emergence of a ‘post-​liberal’ or a ‘post-​Western’ order (Bisley 2010; Cox 2012; Dunne & Flockhart 2013; Ikenberry 2008, 2011, 2014; Kupchan 2012; Stuenkel 2015, 2016; Zakaria 2008). This ‘multipolarisation’ of the global economy has arguably enhanced the necessity for economically powerful states to rethink and expand their use of geoeconomic instruments of foreign and security policy-​making. This chapter first discusses the different definitions and nuances of two ideal types of state-​market governance that have emerged between different ‘old’ and ‘new’ geoeconomic powers: the model of state capitalism and the model of liberal market capitalism (Beeson 2010; Kurlantzick 2016). It does so to set the scene for the book’s main puzzle, which is found in an apparent ‘geoeconomic paradox’ faced by the EU and its Member States. The chapter’s second part describes the paradox: On the one hand, the EU generally portrays itself as a global economic power with decisive influence on international interdependencies in finance and trade that prioritises the use of this geoeconomic leverage as part of its joint foreign and security policy-​making in the cfsp framework. On the other hand, European governments, as representatives of various shades of liberal market capitalism, are limited in their control over national economic resources, which mostly rest in the hands of highly independent market actors. This means, at least in formal terms, that European governments hold little direct influence over the management of the very material basis underpinning the geoeconomic interventions for which political demand is rising. Responding to this paradox, this chapter’s third part will argue for a more nuanced understanding of how governments interact with broad ranges of state and non-​state actors to enhance their own control over national means of economic power. Toward this end, it introduces and develops the concept of

© Kim B. Olsen, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004518834_004

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

45

Geoeconomic Diplomacy

geoeconomic diplomacy, defined as the realm where governments pursue the ability to employ national economic capabilities to realise geostrategic objectives in their conduct of relationships with other international actors. Lastly, the chapter explains the value of the empirical focus on EU economic sanctions (Giumelli 2020a, 2020b; Lafont Rapnouil 2017) as a useful pathway for scrutinising how governments of liberal market capitalism are able to instrumentalise national wealth for geostrategic objectives through an effective and well-​crafted geoeconomic diplomacy. 1

Geoeconomic Disparities in the ‘Multipolar’ 21st Century

In the decades before and after the turn of the 21st century, the accelerating redistribution of global wealth has led to an enhanced decentralisation of economic power, mainly directed towards the Global South. In his description of the emerging ‘post-​Western’ world, Oliver Stuenkel (2016: 63–​96) acknowledged how the rapid rise of new economic powerhouses such as China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil, which at the beginning of the 2000s were still depicted as ‘emerging economies’1, has been a key catalysator of an economic ‘multipolarisation’ of the global order. The notion of a multipolar order reflects a structural description of an international system with the existence of several power centres, standing in contrast to both the Cold War’s US-​Soviet bipolarity and the American unipolar moment arising after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In the words of David A. Scott, the 21st century’s “multipolarity pattern … is not so much a matter of fixed permanent alignments. Rather, this post-​Cold War multipolarity involves diffused and fluid alliances of the moment coalescing around different issues and with differential power capacities across the hard power–​soft power spectrum” (Scott 2013: 32). This fluidity gives room for new rising power centres, or what Barry Buzan and George Lawson have described as a ‘concert of capitalist powers’ in a pluralistic and decentralist order: “The emergent world order, then, is one of decentred globalism in which the principal dynamic is the interplay between competing forms of capitalist governance” (2014: 85). Aligning well with their previous works on the English School of ir, which fundamentally points to states’ possible co-​existence within an international society (as opposed to the anarchic

1 Stuenkel cites a study of M. Ayhan Kose and Eswar S. Prasad (2010), who have pointed out how, between 1990 and 2010, emerging markets almost doubled their shares in key economic indicators such as world gdp, private consumption, investment, and trade.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

46 

Chapter 2

international system) build on rules and norms, the authors particularly point to the major economic powers’ rational interest in keeping the global capitalist system alive and in motion. Such debates about the stabilities and instabilities of the 21st century’s multipolar economic order serve as a useful reminder to reflect further on the impact that the increasing global spread of wealth has on EU capabilities of utilising economic power means in policy-​making and diplomacy. Here, two aspects are of particular interest. First, the immense levels of interconnectivity and interdependencies in the economic global system not only give geoeconomic instruments a potentially wider reach, (cf. ideas about ‘weaponised interdependence’ (Farrell & Newman 2019)), but also gives targets of specific geoeconomic interventions greater options for diverging to other economic resource centres. As will be made apparent in the book’s case studies on EU sanctions targeted against Russia and Syria, both these countries were able to fend off potential material damages caused by Western sanctions by diverting trade relations to e.g. China, India, or regional allies.2 Similar patterns are visible when the EU uses other geoeconomic instruments, such as targeted economic assistance or defensive trade instruments, where targets meant to be affected negatively by a given geoeconomic measure are often capable of finding alternative sources of economic support or market opportunities. Even if they still constitute major economic powerhouses, neither the EU nor the US are alone in the geoeconomic game; and should common assumptions about the continued multipolarisation of the global economy hold true, Western relative shares of economic power capacities would only further diminish in the future. Second, the changing economic power relations do not only have consequences in the material sense. The multiplication of geoeconomic powers has also resulted in an amplification of some fundamental ideological differences between them. Among the most visible ideational discrepancies between different powerful states from different hemispheres has been a solidifying global competition over different ideas of ‘proper’ models of state-​market governance.3 Buzan and Lawson recognise a similar development and agree that such ideational competition could lead to conflict. Interestingly for this 2 Cf. Bryan R. Early’s (2015) notion of ‘sanctions busting’ through a target’s transactions with non-​sanctioned third-​party states). 3 As highlighted by Amitav Acharya (2016), this global ‘idea shift’ not only takes place at the level of ideas of state governance, but has steadily transcended Western concepts and approaches to the analysis of international affairs, a process whose origins can be traced back to the period after World War ii (see also Tickner & Wæver 2009).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Geoeconomic Diplomacy

47

book’s conceptual focus, they look to the level of policy-​making (and thus, implicitly, diplomacy) to find non-​confrontational mitigations to the looming risks: “The task for policy-​makers is to ensure that the four main modes of capitalist governance engage in peaceful competition rather than overt conflict, cooperating well enough to maintain the foundations of international order and a global market economy” (Buzan & Lawson 2014: 91). It is particularly four ideal-​types of capitalist governance that the authors see as being in global competition with each other: –​ Liberal democratic capitalism, found in, for example, Australia and the US, which seeks to combine maximal economic autonomy with democratic governance and minimal state interference. –​ Social democratic capitalism, found in, for example, Germany, France, Japan, and the Scandinavian countries, which seeks to balance the market, the state, and democracy. –​ Competitive authoritarian capitalism, found in, for example, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, Tanzania, and Venezuela, which favours state control over the market and constrains democratic governance. –​ State bureaucratic capitalism, found in, for example, China and Saudi Arabia, which aims at controlling a complex mix of state ownership and market relations, while rejecting democratic governance. While explaining details to each model’s characteristics, Buzan and Lawson also acknowledge that some states might be hard to compartmentalise. Tellingly of the possible complications, the authors point to the two former bipolar Cold War powers, the US (which can be perceived as a hybrid of the two first categories) and Russia (which can be seen as a hybrid between the two latter catogories). Namely because attempts to nuance and fine-​grain state-​market governance models will eventually end in the need for further hybrid-​or sub-​categorisations, this book only employs two ideal types of capitalist governance: ‘state capitalism’ and ‘liberal market capitalism’. Using the broader terms of state capitalism and liberal market capitalism should therefore not be confused with a simplistic logic that risks distorting important real-​life nuances or with denying that forms of state (or state-​ enhanced) capitalism were and remain inherent to European modes of state-​ market governance. A few historical examples illustrate the point: Already in the mid-​17th century, French minister of finance Jean-​Baptiste Colbert introduced a series of state-​interventionist, protectionist, and import-​reducing measures, including the attempted move of the production of important and valuable goods from other European countries to France, a legacy that has been formative of France’s approach to state-​market governance ever since (Clift

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

48 

Chapter 2

2013: 102–​105; MacDonald & Lemco 2015: 19–​21).4 In the context of World War ii, Frederick Pollock (1941: 200) recognised how the interwar period in both the US and Europe had been driving “transitional processes transforming private capitalism into state capitalism”. This not only meant a change in states’ economic structures, but the key determinant of all areas of social life, leading Pollack to warn about the difficulties for conceptualising a democratic form of state capitalism; a notion that still today underlies European debates about the relationship between liberal and economic liberalism (Brick & Postone 1976: 11).5 To nuance a common misperception that state intervention in market affairs does not (necessarily) equal political authoritarianism, Joshua Kurlantzick (2016: 28) has proposed a continuum to classify various forms of state-​capitalism based on their adherence to authoritarian or democratic governance structures. Such a continuum ranges from authoritarian countries such as China, Egypt, Iran, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam to hybrid systems such as found in Argentina, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, and Turkey before reaching democratic-​leaning Brazil and India. Interestingly, Norway –​categorised as a democracy –​is included in the overview as the only European state capitalist country. This indicates how state capitalist tendencies are still an aspect of European affairs.6 As will be elaborated below, state-​enhanced capitalism remains intrinsic to governance in many EU Member States, although the state’s hand in market affairs is generally less heavily felt than in other, mainly non-​Western, contexts. To conclude, the simplified categorisation between liberal market capitalism versus state capitalism is not only discussed because it is not the aim of the book to engage in considerations, such as those by Buzan and Lawson, on how various forms of global capitalism relate to each other collectively. It also serves to underpin the book’s research objective, i.e. to problematise and describe the basic premises of EU governments and diplomats in their quest 4 The impact of Colbert’s dirigisme on current France, and the practices of French diplomats, will be further elaborated in ­chapter 3. 5 Pollock can be categorised as a thinker with close ties to the Frankfurt School of critical theory. Another key proponent of the Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer (1973 [1940/​1942]: 4), synthesised Pollack’s concerns in one sentence: “State capitalism is the authoritarian state of the present” (original emphasis; quoted in Gangl 2016: 31). 6 Norway’s categorisation primarily relates to the Norwegian government’s legacy of nationalising activities in the oil, gas, and aluminium sectors, as well as its creation of one of the world’s largest national sovereign wealth funds (Bremmer 2009: 44; Musacchio & Lazzarini 2014: 30; Thurber et al. 2011).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Geoeconomic Diplomacy

49

to instrumentalise economic power resources. The following section hence presents the basic characteristics of the two dominating ideal types of state-​ market engagements. Without fundamentally challenging the common assertation that governments of state-​capitalist countries could, in comparison to their market capitalist contenders, be better positioned in the geoeconomic realm, this presentation will provide nuances to the claim that state capitalist governments are free to act unchallengedly when seeking to instrumentalise national economic resources for foreign policy purposes. 1.1 The (Overestimated) Structural Advantages of State Capitalism As is the case with most ideal types and broad denominators of social phenomena, the notion of state capitalism is a contested one, evoking many different meanings and implying various norms and strategies of state behaviour (Alami & Dixon 2020; Babic et al. 2020). Whether one understands state capitalism as a governance model in which governments have significant influence over national economic assets and hold substantial ownership stakes in major domestic companies (Kurlantzick 2016: 9–​12) or as instances of varying degrees of government involvement in economic policy-​making (MacDonald & Lemco 2015: 2) makes a difference for the analysis of its characteristics. A common usage of the state capitalist terminology in the 21st century relates to the former of these two understandings, namely governments’ extended abilities for the direct instrumentalisation of businesses, companies, and other economic entities for politically determined purposes.7 Even though the return of heavy-​handed state capitalism in a global context was already recognised in the 1980s (Duvall & Freeman 1981)8, it has in recent decades been closely associated with the economic rise of the so-​called brics-​countries Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (Musacchio & Lazzarini 2014). This development has led scholars to argue that state capitalism has never been practiced in such a large scale as at the beginning of the 21st century –​and that

7 The latter –​and hence broader –​understanding of state capitalism was e.g. reflected in a recently suggested distinction between the categories ‘wholly owned state-​owned enterprises’, ‘the state as a majority investor’, ‘the state as a minority investor’, and ‘the state as a strategic supporter of specific sectors’ (Musacchio et al. 2015). 8 While the empirical claim about the importance of state capitalism in the second half of the 20th century stands independently from the authors’ theoretical approach, it is worth noting that Raymond D. Duvall and John R. Freeman (1981) derive the link between the rising state capitalism and the growing global dependencies from the Wallersteinian World System Theory.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

50 

Chapter 2

this governance model might be advantageous in a geoeconomic perspective (Kateb 2011; MacDonald & Lemco 2015: 2; Rediker 2015).9 The widespread contemporary adherence to state capitalist models is important to recognise, especially as much focus in geoeconomics and ir-​ related literature on the matter is often directed at China, seen as a proponent of a “politically authoritarian, interventionist, mercantilist state capitalism” (Hilpert 2020: 28). Beside its unmatched economic strength relative to its regional neighbours, the Chinese case is a fascinating one, both due to Beijing’s obvious willingness to leverage its national wealth for strategic purposes and because the Chinese government, at least at first glance, represents one of the starkest forms of authoritarian state capitalism. Geoeconomic studies on China have focused on how Beijing uses its economic power to create regional interdependencies and strengthen bilateral relations with countries in Africa (Aidoo 2017; Gu et al. 2016; P. Morgan 2018) and in the Indo-​Pacific region (Liang et al. 2019; Yeh 2017; Zha 2015). Studies have also analysed how China has leveraged major financial and infrastructure projects such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (aiib) and the Belt and Road Initiative (Beeson 2018; Cai 2018; Forough 2019; Hilpert & Wacker 2015). Another focus of research is the unfolding of the Sino-​US and Sino-​EU relationships in a strategic, geoeconomic context (Grosse 2014; Käpylä & Aaltola 2019). Most of the mentioned studies are based on strong assumptions about the ability of China’s state capitalist government to instrumentalise commercial sectors and actors for specific objectives. While this assumption seems more well-​grounded than is the case for governments of liberal market capitalism (see below), for the purpose of the present research it is interesting to note how the limits of governmental control of economic resources in the Chinese context are only rarely addressed. William J. Norris (2016), for example, questioned the degree of Chinese governmental control over even soe s.10 Highlighting cases where Chinese authorities were not internally united in their approach and the interest of commercial actors did not harmonise with 9

10

Scholars of state capitalism have engaged in comprehensive arguments for (Kurlantzick 2016; Musacchio & Flores-​Macias 2009; Schweinberger 2014) and against (Bremmer 2009) the projected medium-​and long-​term viability of this governance model in an overall market-​capitalistic global economy. Norris (2016: 26–​43) argues that governmental control is highly case-​specific and might be particularly disrupted by incoherent internal unity among state bureaucracies, but that other factors might play important roles, such as monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures, the balance of relative resources between public and commercial actors, the nature of the reporting relationship, and the intrinsic compatibility between the government and the specific commercial actor.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Geoeconomic Diplomacy

51

those of the government, Norris shows how even key strategic endeavours (petroleum investments in Africa, the establishment of the important financial vehicle China Investment Corporation) were, at least temporarily, characterised by limited state control. Another study (Milhaupt & Zheng 2015) suggests that governmental control cannot be attributed to the Chinese government’s ownership stake in soe s, but that both soe s and privately owned enterprises (poe s) can be used strategically when circumstances allow.11 Others have further pointed out that strong state-​market connections might come at other costs: China’s own experience suggests that, though close relationships between business and the government may facilitate the weaponization of interdependence, it can also create more opportunities for corruption, a less vibrant market economy, and pushback from potential partners abroad. gertz & evers 2020: 131

Whereas a more comprehensive discussion about the strengths and weaknesses of the state capitalistic model in the geoeconomic realm is outside the scope of this book, such explorations of the limits of governmental control in state capitalism only strengthens the case for looking into the limits that European governments adhering to governance models of liberal market capitalism face in the attempt to instrumentalise economic capabilities for political purposes. The (Underestimated) Structural Disadvantages of Liberal Market Capitalism Similar to state capitalism, the precise meaning of liberal market capitalism is also disputed. For the purpose of this research, it is understood as an ideal type that, in contrast to state capitalism, is a broad common denominator of market governance models adhering to basic democratic rights and rules-​based independence between state and market actors that allow for significant means of production to be in private hands. Even if this book focuses empirically on the case of EU countries, similar challenges could be found in non-​European contexts, both for members of the Organisation for Economic Co-​operation 1.2

11

In an argument that resembles Norris’s, the authors argue that factors that determine government control over Chinese firms, both soe s and poe s, include their respective market dominance, recipient of state subsidies, proximity to state power, and execution of the state’s policy objectives (Milhaupt & Zheng 2015).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

52 

Chapter 2

and Development (oecd), but also for other states adhering to liberal market principles as part of their constitutional foundation and political culture. The ideal type of liberal market capitalism referred to broadly in this study should neither be confused with the categories applied by Buzan and Lawson, nor with the more fine-​grained debates over the institutional Varieties of Capitalism, a terminology introduced by the seminal work of Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (2001). They distinguished between ‘liberal market economies’ (lme s) –​such as the US, the UK, and Ireland –​and ‘coordinated market economies’ (cme s) –​such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Scandinavian countries –​to investigate the institutional state-​market variations between mainly Western countries.12 Whereas lme s are characterised by commercial actors’ coordination of activities through hierarchical or competitive market mechanisms, and hence a limited role of the ‘liberal’ state, in cme s commercial actors are more dependent on interacting with non-​market actors to coordinate their actions. Here, the state is seen as an ‘enabler’. Though Hall and Soskice were more interested in the institutional context of the firm, rather than the specific role of governments in state-​market relationships, their categorisation provides a good understanding of the nuances implied when investigating general challenges to European liberal market capitalism in the geoeconomic realm. Recognising the importance of a nuanced understanding of the institutional state-​market relationship, scholars have also called for further refinements of Hall and Soskice’s approach by enhancing the understanding of the state’s role in (European) capitalism. Vivien A. Schmidt (2002: 110; 2009: 521), for example, argued for the inclusion of a third model of ‘state-​enhanced market economies’ (SeMEs) to capture state-​market relations more often found in western and southern European countries such as France (see also V. A. Schmidt 2003), Italy, and Spain, but also but also Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.13 SeMEs are traditionally subject to a stronger and more ‘influencing’ role for the state than in lme s and cme s, as well as closer state-​firm relations that nonetheless stop short of direct control, as can be the case in state capitalist countries.14 12 13 14

As noted by Hall and Soskice (2001: 2), the original VoC approach concentrated on “economies of relatively high levels of development because we know them best and think the framework applies well to many problems there”. Scholars have expressed similar views using terminologies such as ‘mixed market economies’ (Molina & Rhodes 2007) or ‘entrepreneurial states’ (Tiberghien 2007). Other scholars have suggested further categories, such as the variation of ‘dependent market economies’ (dme s) to describe the post-​Soviet East Central European economies such as Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic (Nölke & Vliegenthart 2009).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

53

Geoeconomic Diplomacy

For the purpose of this book, it is key to emphasise that European governments –​even those with the highest degree of state-​interference in state-​market relations –​cannot exert significant direct control over relevant commercial or other non-​state actors in a similar fashion to the EU’s main geoeconomic state-​capitalist contenders. At the same time, the European variations of state-​market governance models call for conceptual approaches to the study of geoeconomics that take seriously the specific structural circumstances that EU governments might be confronted with when aiming at instrumentalising their national wealth for geostrategic purposes. The variations within European liberal models of state-​market governance explain why governments of different EU Member States might be differently equipped when engaging in state-​market relations. This varying ability plays a significant role in the development and application of the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy. 2

Exploring the Paradox: Limited Governmental Control over Geoeconomic Levers

If economic power is understood as the ability to leverage markets, resources, and rules that shape international economic interaction (Baracuhy 2019: 16), the material basis for the economic power that is at the heart of many vital aspects of EU foreign and security policy-​making is either in private hands or heavily influenced by actors outside the direct sphere of government control. This often underestimated hindrance to European geoeconomics, so this book argues, is propagated in academic literature by the basic, yet problematic, assumption in mainly realist-​dominated approaches to contemporary geoeconomics “that economic liberty can be limited when the government believes it is necessary” (D. J. Kim 2019: 161). From the viewpoint of European geoeconomics, this paradox becomes even more problematic for the EU’s ambitions to forcefully apply geoeconomic instruments as part of its foreign and security policy-​making when recognising that this basic assumption of ­conventional geoeconomic logic might hold truer for governments of state capitalistic countries, including the EU’s major non-​Western geostrategic contenders such as China, India, Brazil, and Russia. Particularly democracies with open economies, such as the Europeans, cannot be assumed to be “[able to] control dme s are seen as particularly dependent on foreign direct investments by transnational companies (one condition that sets it apart from SeME s). The state plays a more elaborate role than in lme s but is less prominent than in cme s.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

54 

Chapter 2

economic resources in the same way as authoritarian states do” (Kundnani 2016: 158). Limitations to market capitalist governments’ use of the main geoeconomic instruments have been outlined in the much-​cited work of Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris (2016), describing the significant geoeconomic toolbox of the United States. The authors expand on the vastness of this toolbox, which includes instruments of trade and investment policies, economic and financial sanctions, cyber tools, foreign aid and development assistance, financial and monetary policies, as well as the management of energy and commodities. At the same time, the authors warn that other geoeconomic instruments of strategic importance –​such as the use of soe s, state-​owned banks, or sovereign wealth funds –​are “largely unavailable to US and Western leaders” of market capitalist countries. Such instruments, the authors conclude, are more readily available for state capitalist countries (Blackwill & Harris 2016: 9–​10). Unfortunately, Blackwill and Harris do not use this valuable observation about the possible tensions between states and markets in the geoeconomic realm to further question whether Western governments have full access to the geoeconomic instruments that, at the outset, seem to be at their disposal. Following their implicit realist focus on the causal relationship between economic power and the degree to which national interests and security can be either promoted or defended by governments, the authors merely concentrate their analysis on instances where the empirical application of such instruments have been successful or not –​and not on the underlying dynamics that might lead to specific outcomes. The inherent tension between Western governments’ ambition of instrumentalising economic wealth and the economic liberties of liberal market societies has been picked up more thoroughly by other contemporary scholars. Hans Kundnani, in advancing the term ‘liberal geoeconomics’, has explained how Western governments “use markets to coerce or encourage other states to do what they want them to do” (Kundnani 2019: 64). This, he argues, happened when Germany, during the euro-​crisis of the early 2010s, used its relative economic weight to coerce other eurozone countries to institutionalise German preferences of state-​market management. While telling an interesting –​though also disputed (Crawford & Olsen 2017; Germann 2018) –​narrative about the use of economically-​derived resources by the EU’s largest economy in times of existential crisis of European integration, Kundnani does not further problematise the limits of the actual geoeconomic reach even within the tightly regulated legal frameworks of the EU and eurozone. Among the instruments that were arguably applied as part of Germany’s liberal geoeconomics,

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Geoeconomic Diplomacy

55

Kundnani highlights the European Semester, a mechanism established in 2011 to ensure Member States’ compliance with EU economic and social policy recommendations. Even if it cannot be disputed that German policy-​makers were among the strongest proponents for establishing the European Semester, Kundnani did not address the problems and limits that were experienced in the implementation of the mechanism (Efstathiou & Wolff 2018), including the roles played by various domestic and international non-​state actors –​such as banks, major companies, interest groups and others –​in determining the European Semester’s unsteady enforcement. This lack of interest among geoeconomic scholars for the roles of various state and non-​state actors relevant to the state-​market nexus in actual policy implementation seems even more surprising given that the conceptual insight that domestic actors can play vital roles in foreign and security policy considerations is far from new. Seminal works from Peter J. Katzenstein (1976) and Robert D. Putnam (1988) helped put debates on the structure and actor-​ relations at the domestic level on the research agenda of ir. The same goes for contributions by Andrew Moravcsik (1995) and other scholars relying on liberal intergovernmentalism to explain EU integration processes. Putnam and Moravcsik in particular were concerned with the formation of interests among domestic actors and how these affect governments’ foreign policy preferences and strategies. In his famous logic of two-​level games, Putnam explained how every government is involved in bargaining games at both the domestic and international level, using the interests expressed by domestic actors at the so-​called ‘first level’ as leverage for negotiations at the international ‘second level’ –​and vice versa (Putnam 1988). This dual negotiation process ultimately leaves governments with a determined room for manoeuvre within which a deal with other international actors can be reached. Following a somewhat similar logic, Moravcsik explained how European integration is a function of the ‘pressure’ from domestic actors on their governments who then transfer these domestic concerns into a ‘strategic bargaining’ process with other European countries (Moravcsik 1991, 1995). Such liberal accounts were essential contributions for understanding the dual pressure that diplomats often find themselves in when being tasked with simultaneously handling domestic and international interests. At the same time, the explicit focus of liberal intergovernmentalism on rational bargaining processes and its clear distinction between the level of domestic politics and the level of international negotiations are not sufficiently reflective of the reality faced by diplomatic practitioners engaging in the geoeconomic realm. Beyond being part of negotiations with diplomatic peers, diplomats engage

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

56 

Chapter 2

in practices of communication, coordination, and even cooperation between various state and non-​state actors, i.e. the types of diplomatic practices focused on in this book. 3

Geoeconomic Diplomacy: Leveraging Economic Power through Diplomatic Relationship Building

The liberal notion of the importance of analytically capturing the roles of a variety of domestic and international actors has fortunately been picked up by some contemporary scholars of geoeconomics: Defending states’ economic interests in the twenty-​first century requires a modified perception of their security needs in order to develop an efficient geoeconomic coordination between state agencies and private businesses. csurgai 2018: 45

Despite such calls, scholars of geoeconomics have largely underestimated how governments might not be able to implement geoeconomic instruments as intended, and that their limited access to geoeconomic means of power might relate to inherent dynamics of and between state-​market relations and actors. It is therefore a core claim of this book that the geoeconomics literature could gain important insights from the ir-​subfield diplomacy studies, which is less occupied with universal causalities or system-​level redistributions of power, but primarily looks at the diplomatic actors, processes, and structures that influence foreign and security policy-​making within, between, and beyond states. Building on the observation that EU governments, stripped of the possibility to fully instrumentalise their economic means of power, have to rely on other mechanisms than coercion to counter an incomplete or incoherent implementation of geoeconomic policies, this book suggests the notion of geoeconomic diplomacy as a conceptual approach to the study of governments’ engagements in the utilisation of economic power, which is defined as the particular realm in which governments pursue the ability to employ national economic capabilities to realise specific geostrategic objectives in their conduct of relationships with other international actors. In the conduct of geoeconomic diplomacy, a government must not only be willing to apply economic power, but able to do so. In this understanding, a government’s willingness is normally

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Geoeconomic Diplomacy

57

expressed through formal, consolidated decisions designed and adopted through legally established decision-​making processes. A government’s ability, however, relates to the leveraging of enabling means to realise the use of geoeconomic instruments as intended through both formal and informal relationship building with relevant state and non-​state actors. The logic of geoeconomic diplomacy as a conceptual appraoch is derived from the assertation that the usefulness of economic sanctions and other geoeconomic instruments as a meaningful part of foreign and security policy-​ making, depends, inter alia, on an implementation process that supports the political intention behind the intervention. In the case of economic sanctions, effective implementation is generally determined by the material or symbolic harm they can have on the individuals, groups, or states they are directed against (the target), and the behavioural change they hereby provoke. This normally requires the compliant implementation of the sanctions’ provisions by both state and non-​state actors subject to the jurisdiction of the state or states employing them (the sender). When governments issue sanctions against a specific target, they generally do so based on the assumption that sanctions can meaningfully and effectively curb financial or trade relationships and market access of the targeted individuals, groups, or states. In practical terms, however, effective implementation might be hampered by the government’s lack of direct control over state-​market relations. From the perspective of the sanctioning government, its aim is to mitigate such challenges with available resources. This is the aim of geoeconomic diplomacy. The field of diplomatic studies, essentially analysing the practices, institutions, and processes by which states and other polities represent themselves and their interests to one another, has increasingly consolidated itself as a subfield of ir, especially since the 1990s. In this process, a myriad of ‘diplomacies’ relating to state-​market relations have been introduced, which has created anything but conceptual clarity to the field. Typologies developed include economic diplomacy as well as subfields of commercial diplomacy (Gertz 2018; Lee & Hudson 2004; Ruël 2012), business and corporate diplomacy (Haynal 2014; Kesteleyn et al. 2014; Naray 2011), finance diplomacy (Bayne 2011), trade diplomacy (Pigman 2016), etc. –​just to name a few (see also Murray et al. 2011). How, then, is the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy a distinct category in this already crammed field? Among the various existing ‘diplomacies’, it seems most important to distinguish the notion of geoeconomic diplomacy from the well-​established concept of economic diplomacy, a concept that emerged in the early 2000s and can be understood either in terms of the causality it implies or the lens on the social

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

58 

Chapter 2

world it proposes. As the latter, economic diplomacy research has been essential for the analytical inclusion of actors relevant to the state-​market realm in the study of international affairs and international political economy.15 In terms of causalities, studies of economic diplomacy have been characterised by mainly two understandings of the phenomenon, essentially drawing on a similar means-​ends dispute between politics and economics as found in the literature on geoeconomics.16 In this way, economic diplomacy has been characterised as either being concerned with policy questions of economic relevance, including negotiations within multilateral organisations, or as activities of economic statecraft where economic means are leveraged for political ends (Berridge & James 2003: 91). However, there seems to be an emerging consensus among both practitioners and scholars to define economic diplomacy based on the diplomatic behaviour targeted at supporting a state’s economic ends and ultimately control over global markets –​and hence not based on the application of economic means, such as is the case in the understanding of geoeconomics applied in the present research (Bayne & Woolcock 2013a: 2–​5; see also Denécé 2011). To the extent that scholars of economic diplomacy have engaged with this latter understanding, and hence the implication for diplomacy in which states apply economic power, they have shown little interest in desiccating the types of actors and processes involved in this particular aspect of foreign and security policy. This neglect might relate to the general realist conception of economic statecraft and geoeconomics which grants no special attention to this field of study: Economic diplomacy conceived in this realist way is concerned with the economic agenda in diplomacy which can be distinguished from the political agenda. It does not involve a different type of diplomacy or a different set of diplomatic actors. lee & hocking 2018: 4–​5

15

16

As summarised by Donna Lee and Brian Hocking (2018: 3): “The study of economic diplomacy also informs our understanding of the international political economy in that it forces a recognition that diplomats as agents are significant actors and part of a dense, yet largely unexplored, network of market actors in the world economy”. The term economic diplomacy has been applied in particular by Asian and European scholars. In the American context, studies on the US State Department’s capacities when operating in the global state-​market nexus continue to be structured around the more ‘classical’ terminologies such as economic statecraft and international political economy (see for example Pollard & Hicks 2014).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Geoeconomic Diplomacy

59

It is this notion that the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy sets out to challenge, exactly by unpacking a different type of diplomacy and different set of diplomatic actors special to this particular field. Among the scholars of economic diplomacy who have engaged most thoroughly with the idea of economic power is Maaike Okano-​Heijmans, who proposed a ‘dual’ definition of economic diplomacy “as the use of political means as leverage in international negotiations, with the aim of enhancing national economic prosperity, and the use of economic leverage to increase the political stability of a nation” (Okano-​Heijmans 2011: 17). Economic diplomacy should thereby be seen as a ‘network term’ that encompasses multiple forms of expressions on a continuum between a ‘business end’ (in which political means are used to obtain economic ends) and a ‘power play end’ (in which economic means are used to obtain political ends). As governments might employ a multitude of means simultaneously, and not necessarily in a coordinated or inter-​linked manner, they are often faced with the demand to resolve “trade-​ offs in accordance with the balance of national interests” (Okano-​Heijmans 2011: 20). Such governmental balancing acts of various national interests between enhancing national economic prosperity and securing national political stability are vital for Okano-​Heijmans’s general conceptualisation of economic diplomacy. In contrast hereto, the study of geoeconomic diplomacy is solely interested in governments’ use of economic (and not political, military, cultural, etc.) means of power to obtain various geostrategic ends. These ends might, but do not need to, be balanced out against each other. Furthermore, as the objectives of the diplomatic engagement are geostrategic in nature, they have a clearer link to the state’s activities within the realm of foreign and security policy than the more generic end of increasing a state’s political stability, which can also happen outside the geostrategic realm. In focusing on governments’ practical ability, or lack thereof, to leverage national economic means of power through relationship building at the level of diplomatic actors, the study of geoeconomic diplomacy, in ontological terms, moves into an area of study that other scholars have circumscribed as ‘repertoires of statecraft’. Such repertoires involve “not only what people do when they are engaged in conflict with others but what they know how to do and what others expect them to do” (Tarrow 1998; quoted in Goddard, MacDonald, & Nexon, 2019:310, emphasis in original). As such, the notion of ability seems closely related to what Aristotle –​whose intellectual legacy is generally seen as being in direct lineage to today’s practice theoretical approaches to be applied later in this book’s analytical framework –​called phronesis (prudence or practical wisdom), a virtue of doing things well, also for the society one is embedded in (Kustermans 2016: 184; Nicolini 2013: 25–​28). In this sense, the notion of

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

60 

Chapter 2

prudence carries with it a reliance on the power of reason, which transcends the habitual competence that is at the core of Bourdieuian approaches to the study of practice, and therefore builds on an understanding of the ‘virtuous individual’ at its ontological core (C. Brown 2012: 441).17 It is this focus on virtuous individual actors from both various branches of government and from the non-​state, private sphere –​and the relations between them –​that sets the study of geoeconomic diplomacy apart from studies of statecraft, such as suggested by Goddard et al. The focus on a government’s diplomatic abilities rather than its statecraft is a deliberate one, which carries a specific understanding of the geoeconomic field as inherently driven by multiple types of actors –​and not just by the ‘craft’ of the state. Abilities in the geoeconomic field are not only derived from a government’s knowledge of doing something ex ante to the relationships it engages in but are also formed through these relationships. The understanding of diplomacy applied here goes beyond the classical notion of processes of international negotiation or mediation, but broadly encompasses “the conduct of relationships, using peaceful means, by and among international actors, at least one of whom is usually governmental” (Cooper et al. 2013: 2). Diplomats are here understood as governmental actors tasked with implementing a policy through relationships with state and non-​state actors holding the capacity to act at the international stage and are relevant to the implementation of the policy in question. Another attempt of a holistic study of states’ use of economic means of power has been presented in Jean-​Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman’s ‘political theory of economic statecraft’ (2008, 2013). Herein, the authors seek to investigate the international and, notably, domestic conditions under which the target state reacts to external economic coercion or incentives. Their detailed examination of the domestic characteristics of a geoeconomic intervention’s targets, rather than those of the sender of such an intervention, reflects a strong interest to understand how external “stimuli are filtered through their unique domestic political environment” (Blanchard & Ripsman 2013: 23). The concept of geoeconomic diplomacy aims at a similar level of analysis, though with two central differences: First, being a conceptual and not a theoretical approach, it does not hold a priori assumptions about the specific objectives a sender might have, but analyses instances in which political 17

The view that Pierre Bourdieu’s understanding of practice cherishes structure over agency is debated. Arguing that “more or less virtuosic individuals” in Bourdieu’s theoretical reasoning can, under specific circumstances, hold the competency to improvise because they never experience the same situation twice, scholars have emphasised that, in the Bourdieuian sense, “practice theory is a theory of agency” (Cornut 2018: 714).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

61

Geoeconomic Diplomacy

leaders and diplomats have signalled political will and interest to implement a geoeconomic instrument to fulfil a given geostrategic objective. Second, it is interested in the social ‘environment’ within which diplomats from the sender state operate. Any analysis of a sender’s geoeconomic diplomacy can aim at various types of relationship building between its diplomats and actors from both the sender, the target, or a third party that influences the sender’s geoeconomic abilities. Given that the main interest of this book is to better understand the geoeconomic limits faced by governments of liberal market capitalism, it primarily focuses on sender diplomats’ relations with state and non-​state actors relevant to the social environment of the sender state(s). In presenting a middle-​range concept to the study of governments’ geoeconomic behaviour and opportunities, the approach of geoeconomic diplomacy seeks to address a gap in the literature that other scholars have described, but not yet filled. As noted by Vihma (2018: 17), Luttwak’s observations on the role of domestic politics in countries’ geoeconomic behaviour should be a driver for “constructivist-​oriented research… [that] could make an interesting and much needed contribution to geoeconomic theory development”. By using the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy as a step to building an analytical framework based on insights from theories of practices –​related but not similar to a constructivist approach (McCourt 2016; Parsons 2015) –​this book proposes an alternative to the interest-​oriented realist and liberalist accounts to the study of geoeconomics. This alternative both takes seriously the roles of governments and diplomats in foreign and security policy-​making, and those of the multiple and various state and non-​state actors relevant to the state-​market nexus.

…

This chapter has sought to emphasise the necessity of broadening the debate about European geoeconomics to the level of relationships between actors, encompassing those both inside and outside the traditional diplomatic sphere and government apparatuses. It has laid the argumentative foundation as to why scholars of economic power need to become more sensitive towards the actors, processes, and dynamics that shape the everyday relationships in the state-​market nexus. It has made clear how the EU’s geoeconomic ambitions are dependent on the extensive engagements by its diplomats with actors that are normally left outside the realm of diplomacy. Beyond highlighting the possible limitations to the instrumentalisation of European wealth for geostrategic purposes, the analytical assertion of understanding challenges pertaining to individual cfsp instruments as aspects of a broader European geoeconomic diplomacy could be helpful pathways for furthering the scholarly-​practitioner

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

62 

Chapter 2

dialogue in the field. In singling out the EU’s use of one of such instruments –​ economic sanctions –​the rest of the book will demonstrate how the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy, not least when supported by analytical tools from international practice theory, can help us to identify how diplomatic practitioners struggle with a multitude of processes and actors in both the domestic and international sphere. The management of such processes and actors define the ways with which diplomats respond to challenges of implementing EU decision-​makers’ ambitions to use economic sanctions as an effective tool for serving their geostrategic interests.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

­c hapter 3

Sanctioning Russia

The Domestic Drivers Behind the Geoeconomic Diplomacy of France and Germany

How does geoeconomic diplomacy play out in practice?1 What types of state and market actors are relevant in this process? And in which ways can diplomats engage with such actors to strengthen their government’s abilities to implement a political decision to use a given geoeconomic tool? This chapter explores these questions from the viewpoint of the EU’s largest (post-​Brexit) economies, France and Germany. It argues that in the early 2010s, foreign ministers and senior diplomatic officials in numerous EU capitals, including in Paris and Berlin, began to develop a strong understanding for the need of diplomatic services to adapt to the hyper-​globalising international economy and the concomitant global shifts of economic power resources, pulling long-​held economic advantages away from the European continent towards the Global South. Furthermore, it builds on these analytical insights to study how French and German diplomats, respectively, handled various domestic drivers and actor that came to be vitally important for ensuring the effective implementation of one of the EU’s most significant geoeconomic interventions in the 2010s: the 2014 decision to target economic sanctions against Russia in response to its annexation of Crimea and the Russo-​Ukrainian military conflict. Research has previously shown how mfa s, both in and beyond Europe, have been increasingly geared to answer to these developments in the past decade. Observers have particularly noted the trend of sensitising diplomats and reforming foreign services to increase diplomatic support to what is traditionally perceived as the conduct of economic and trade diplomacy, i.e. the expansion and professionalisation of mfa s’ engagements to support national firms and companies to expand and export to foreign markets, to attract foreign investments and capital to the domestic economy as well as to improve trade relations and agreements (Bayne & Woolcock 2013b; Okano-​Heijmans 2011; Okano-​Heijmans & Montesano 2016). Analysing such developments through the lens of geoeconomic diplomacy, this chapter argues that similar

1 Major parts of this chapter’s case study have previously been published by the author in The Hague Journal of Diplomacy (Olsen 2020).

© Kim B. Olsen, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004518834_005

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

64 

Chapter 3

organisational and behavioural changes can likewise be identified in the field of European diplomatic practices targeted at enhancing governments’ strategic utilisation of geoeconomic instruments. By zooming in on the processes of reform and adaption experienced in the mfa s of France and Germany since the early 2010s, the chapter shows how the lens of geoeconomic diplomacy can help to identify the various ways through which European mfa s have approached the task of modernising their diplomatic organisation and practice in the state-​market nexus. The findings from the following comparative case study are mainly derived from data collected in two rounds of expert interviews in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels in 2017, totalling 30 in-​depth interviews with diplomats, civil servants, and representatives from political parties, businesses, and interest groups. In the French mfa, the Quai d’Orsay, interviewees came from the Directorate of Political Affairs, the Directorate for Enterprises and International Economy, the Policy Planning Department, and the Cabinet. In the German mfa, the Auswärtiges Amt, interviewees came from the Political Directorate-​General, the European Directorate-​General, the Directorate-​General for Economic Affairs and Sustainable Development, the Policy Planning Staff as well as the Minister’s and State Secretaries’ Offices. Furthermore, interview data was supplemented with ethnographical observations from the author’s professional engagement with the mfa s of France and Germany from 2012 to 2016. Methodologically, this data collection was guided by insights from practice theory, which has experienced a recent revival in diplomacy studies (Adler-​ Nissen & Pouliot 2014: 1–​9; Lequesne 2017: 11–​31; Neumann 2012: 1–​17, 169–​190). Practice theory, which is at the heart of this book’s analytical framework presented in the next chapter, focuses on patterns of practical relationships –​or in generic terms ‘what people do’ –​as driving social components that help to explain behaviour and power structures in diplomacy and foreign policy. The interviews were hence guided by an inductive search for the relationships that supported or impeded diplomatic practitioners in the geoeconomic field (Bueger & Gadinger 2015: 457; Kustermans 2016: 194–​195; Pouliot 2012: 45; Pouliot & Cornut 2015: 302–​303). The decision to particularly explore the EU’s sanctions towards Russia emerged out of pilot interviews with respondents from the French and German mfa s about key challenges faced in the geoeconomic field. When the interviews were conducted in the first half of 2017, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia were a top priority in both Paris and Berlin, meaning that many French and German senior diplomats came to see the conflict, and Russia’s role herein, as an existential threat to the cohesion of Europe’s eastern neighbourhood. The imposition of economic sanctions quickly became a

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

65

Sanctioning Russia

cornerstone in EU governments’ response to this threat (Fischer 2015; Scazzieri 2017; Szép 2019). After introducing the contextual background to the case study of the EU’s Russia sanctions, the chapter takes a step back to identify some of the key organisational reforms and policy changes of the French and German mfa s aimed at improving diplomats’ abilities for operating in the state-​market nexus effectively. It does so to show how organisational reforms and new emerging practices that ultimately also came to influence the various approaches to geoeconomic diplomacy that French and German diplomats relied on when faced with the same question: how to effectively implement the EU’s sanctions against its largest –​and, in geostrategic terms, most difficult –​neighbour. 1

Case i: EU Sanctions on Russia –​an Inductive Search for Geoeconomic Diplomatic Behaviour

The EU’s restrictive measures against Russia, adopted in various phases over the course of spring and summer 2014, were imposed in reaction to what was judged by EU Member States as an unlawful Russian annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. After suspending their diplomatic support for Russia’s participation in the G8 (hereafter continuing as the g7) and the announcement of possible diplomatic consequences for bilateral EU-​Russia relations, the first phase of economic sanctions was initiated from March to May 2014 in the form of asset freezes and visa bans against targeted individuals.2 In June, EU Member States moved to a next phase by prohibiting the import of goods from Crimea and Sevastopol (EU Council 2014d, 2014k). The third phase was adopted after the downing of Malaysian Airlines passenger flight MH17, en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, over Ukraine in July 2014. Attributing its downing to Russian-​backed actors, the EU adopted a set of sectorial sanctions, limiting the access to EU primary and secondary capital markets for certain Russian banks and companies, imposing an export and import ban on arms trade, banning exports of dual-​use goods for Russian military end users as well as restraining Russian access to certain sensitive technologies and services that can be used for oil production and exploration (EU 2 These measures targeted individuals accused of undermining “Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence” as well as individuals “responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds” and were initially adopted through a series of Council Decisions (EU Council 2014a, 2014b, 2014c), Council Regulations (EU Council 2014h, 2014j), and supporting implementation steps (EU Council 2014f, 2014g).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

66 

Chapter 3

Council 2014e, 2014l). These measures were further extended during the second half of 2014 and have since been reviewed –​and confirmed –​by Member States on either an annual or bi-​annual basis (Hayashi 2020) and were implemented alongside similar coercive measures imposed by the US. Whereas it is important to note that the various waves of individual and sectorial sanctions never came to prohibit EU-​Russian trade relations in general but only targeted specific persons, firms, or areas of commerce, studies have shown how economic ramifications were tangible both for the Russian economy as such, but especially for those Russian companies most directly targeted by the Western measures (Ahn & Ludema 2020). Russia, on its part, soon responded to the EU’s economic pressure with economic countermeasures prohibiting the import of certain European products, particularly in the agriculture and food sector (Klinova & Sidorova 2016).3 In attempts to show a way out of this gridlock, while remaining firm on the issue, EU Member States soon formulated clearer conditions for meaningful steps Russia could take to dismantle the sanctions. A key decision was taking by the European Council in March 2015 , linking the duration of the sanctions regime to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements (European Council 2015: 4), the latest of which had been drawn up between the conflicting parties in February 2015 (Stewart 2016). This so-​called ‘Minsk ii’ agreement had been co-​mediated by the leaders of France and Germany in the key negotiation forum between Ukraine and Russia, dubbed the ‘Normandy format’ (Scazzieri 2017: 396–​404).4 Given the important roles played by France and Germany in the formulation of Minsk ii, the meaningful implementation of the EU Russia sanctions would by default become a critical question for French and German diplomats.5 Though the idea of targeting Russia with economic sanctions, at the outset, was advocated for more potently by policy-​makers in Berlin than in Paris (Cadier 2018), both German and French diplomats would ultimately come to play key roles in ensuring the effective implementation of

3 Although much of individual EU countries’ lost trade with Russia could be regained by diverting products to other markets (particularly the EU’s internal market), estimations have shown that the Russian countersanctions reduced EU countries’ export by a monthly worth of eur 125 million, particularly stemming from declines between 11 and 30 per cent in exports of vegetables and fruits, meat, and dairy products (Cheptea & Gaigné 2020; Kutlina-​ Dimitrova 2017). 4 Interview, Brussels, Permanent Representation to the EU of a Nordic country, 15 September 2017. 5 Interview, Paris, Embassy of a Nordic country, 29 August 2017.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Sanctioning Russia

67

the EU’s restrictive measures, in a case that this chapters will describe as a complex case of geoeconomic diplomacy.6 The EU decision to target Russia with encompassing economic sanctions was a novum and something that most European policy-​makers would most likely not have deemed a realistic step before the Russian annexation of Crimea. Numerous aspects, all of which have caught widespread attention in the extensive academic literature on the case, underpin how the adoption and maintenance of the EU’s sanctions against Russia were surprising to many observers. First, the high political sensitivities relating to the EU’s open and direct confrontation of a major regional power and direct neighbour with hard power measures and the long-​term ramifications hereof (Haukkala 2015; Romanova 2016). Second, the uncertainties as to whether the sanctions would actually help to advance the EU’s geostrategic interest of catalysing a behavioural change in Moscow (Ashford 2016; Gould-​Davies 2020; Hunter Christie 2016). And third, the looming material damages and economic losses that could result from restricting European firms from interacting in certain aspects of trade relations with the –​at least for some EU countries –​lucrative Russian market (Bělín & Hanousek 2021; Crozet & Hinz 2020; Korhonen et al. 2018; Silva & Selden 2020).7 As time after the European Council decision to link the sanctions’ fate with those of Minsk ii went by, with Russia refusing to live up to the conditions set out in the latter to get rid of the former, observers expressed surprise at the durability of the sanctions, which continued to remain in place over the years (Orenstein & Kelemen 2017: 95–​98). But why did the sanctions stay in place? In a recent study of the EU’s Russia sanctions’ durability, Portela et al. (2020) question the explanatory power of factors such as the role of norms, arguments, or trust (Hellquist 2016; Karolewski & Cross 2017; Natorski & Pomorska 2017; Sjursen & Rosén 2017), the engagement of key policy-​makers in particular negotiations (Szép 2019), or the more general leadership roles played by large Member States such as Germany and France (Cadier 2018; Forsberg 2016; Gens 2019; Siddi 2016; N. Wright 2018), to explain why EU Member States would eventually opt for and hold on to the sanctions regime. In arguing that

6 Interviews, Berlin, German mfa, 6 June 2017; Brussels, Permanent Representation to the EU of a Nordic country, 15 September 2017. 7 In a study on the respective economic gains and losses of EU Member States resulting from the EU Russia sanctions, Giumelli (2017) has shown how the general losses across the union were particularly felt in Germany, Italy, Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands, while certain companies and firms, particularly in Greece, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Sweden, and Cyprus experienced increased export revenues for trade with Russia.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

68 

Chapter 3

EU governments’ positioning in questions of sanctions policies are not least determined by dynamics they encounter between actors at the domestic level, Portela et al. apply a Putnam-​inspired two-​level framework (cf. Putnam 1988) to explain the interactive relationship between dynamics at the level of negotiations within the European Council and the level of domestic politics. Their analysis focuses on the two major EU Member States Spain and Poland, namely because Madrid and Warsaw would represent policy positions that could be placed at either ends of a continuum between a ‘dovish’ (Spain) or a ‘hawkish’ (Poland) answer to the question as to whether the EU should target Russia with sanctions. The focus on domestic structures and actors, both within government and business circles, as key to understand governments’ room for manoeuvre in geoeconomic decisions aligns with some of the premises laid out in this book. But even if demonstrating a strong case for the role of domestic actors in determining an EU government’s ‘win-​set’ for sanctions negotiations in Brussels, the authors do not engage in the question of how governments more specifically engage with such domestic actors. In addition, it is acknowledged that in the case of the Russia sanctions, EU consensus would ultimately be bound on the premise that “the leaders of France and Germany need to bring other member states on board, both the hawkish and the dovish” (Portela et al. 2020: 6). As such, the case of the EU’s Russia sanctions lends itself as a useful entryway into getting a more systematic overview of the challenges faced by French and German diplomats when tasked with implementing one of the EU’s most politically sensitive geoeconomic decision in modern times. 2

European mfa s in the 2010s: Reforming Diplomatic Capacities in the State-​Market Nexus

Observers have, often in rather general terms, described how diplomats’ roles in promoting their countries’ commercial interests, i.e. their engagement in traditional forms of economic diplomacy, has continuously evolved and modernised over the past decades. Such developments have been identified in Europe and North America, but also among the brics and (other) developing countries (Afesorgbor 2018; Amariei 2014: 11–​24; Okano-​Heijmans 2011: 8; Rana 2013). In the European context, the intersection between diplomacy, trade, and market relations have recently been unfolded for particularly smaller EU Member States such as Belgium (Coolsaet 2004), Croatia (Peternel & Grešš 2021), Czechia (Zemanová & Machoň 2018), Denmark (Frijs-​Madsen 2018; Nielsen 2014), Greece (Vlachos 2020), the Netherlands (Compernolle & Vancauteren 2018), Portugal (Neves 2017), and Slovakia (Polgár 2014). At the

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Sanctioning Russia

69

same time, research on the practical engagement of major European mfa s, such as those of the key EU economic powers France and Germany, in the political-​economic nexus has so far been strikingly limited, and –​if done –​ the variation in style and disciplinary approaches does not form the basis for coherent comparison. Literature on the approach of France’s diplomacy in the macroeconomic realm has generally been guided by historical, anecdotic, and empirical accounts (Badel 2010; Fabius & Lorot 2013). These generally refer to the French state’s collective intellectual heritage of dirigisme, an economic paradigm of active state interventionism in economic activity with an emphasis on building and maintaining strong state-​enhanced businesses.8 Such active micro-​ level engagement by the Quai d’Orsay with French business interests has resulted in a century-​old –​and still ongoing –​‘turf war’ with Bercy, the French ministry of financial and economic affairs, about the formal prerogatives and competences in the field of economic diplomacy and trade promotion (Badel 2010: 83–​117). Literature on German diplomatic engagement in state-​market relations has been subject to more ir-​driven studies, where (mainly Anglo-​Saxon) scholars have vigorously argued that Germany has transformed itself into a neo-​ mercantilist European power (Kundnani 2015: 107–​114; Szabo 2015: 83–​110).9 Beyond running the risks of telling a rather unnuanced story about Germany’s conduct of foreign policy, such accounts do not reveal insights on the specific roles played by German diplomats (Mair 2016: 152). Such an analytical disengagement might stem from a traditional understanding of the German state that is driven by the intellectual heritage of ordo-​liberalism. This economic paradigm, perceived as one of the intellectual building-​blocks of (West) Germany’s post-​war economy, advances the idea of a liberal state abstaining from direct interference in intra-​market dynamics, while taking on responsibility for creating and sustaining conditions for a competitive market economy by promoting a culture of national economic stability and a rule-​based multilateral system (Ptak 2004: 133–​200). Whereas the French and German economic paradigms have been the subject of important scholarly comparisons, analyses looking at the respective 8 Intellectual roots can be traced back to the mid-​17th century, when the previously mentioned French minister under King Louis xiv, Jean-​Baptiste Colbert, introduced a series of state-​ interventionist policies. This ultimately gave name to the economic doctrine of Colbertism, whose effects on modern France are, however, disputed (Clift 2013: 102–​105; Minard 2008: 89–​93). 9 For an alternative view see Crawford and Olsen (2017: 599–​605).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

70 

Chapter 3

diplomatic approaches to handling state-​market relations are rarely taken into account when exploring differences in the conduct of diplomacy. The following section does so by focusing on the ability of the two foreign services to engage in domestic agency relations and by comparing the political drivers of recent reform processes and organisational adjustments with a view to understanding how these have influenced their capacity in the geoeconomic field. 2.1 Political Drivers behind French and German mfa Reforms In the early 2010s, policy-​makers in Paris and Berlin recognised the necessity for organisational mfa reforms with regards to the political-​economic nexus. In France, the unresolved division of competencies between the Quai d’Orsay and Bercy became a central driver behind one of the most significant reforms of the French mfa since the beginning of the century. While the level of direct engagement of the French government in market affairs had generally witnessed a decline since the 1980s, the urgency of defining the mfa’s role herein became evident in the larger discussion of how France could engage diplomatically in an increasingly complex global economy. Based on his vision of streamlining the French diplomatie économique with other diplomatic efforts, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius announced in August 2012 that the Quai d’Orsay would assume a range of economic and trade competences that had previously been with Bercy. The newly created Directorate for Enterprises and International Economy (deei) became the tangible embodiment of the mfa’s new competences. At the same time, several existing governmental entities were merged into a single entity for trade and investment promotion, Business France, that was set under the patronage of three ministries, with the Quai d’Orsay given primary responsibility over Bercy and the Ministry of Spatial Planning (Legifrance 2014). These organisational reforms were backed by a number of changes to internal mfa policies such as the launch of a formal action plan instructing all mfa directorates and French representations abroad to prioritise economic diplomacy efforts. Fabius’s vision of conclusively settling the division of competences between the Quai d’Orsay and Bercy, however, did not help to overcome the long-​held animosities between the two powerful ministries –​diplomats still refer to Bercy as ‘the fifth estate’.10 But it gave momentum to a reform process that demonstrates a re-​energisation of active diplomatic engagement with French business interests and, thus, an

10

Interview, Paris, French mfa, 2 March 2017. The alias for Bercy, Le cinquième pouvoir, is historically well known (Arthuis 1998).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Sanctioning Russia

71

urgent need to intensify traditional diplomats’ understanding of and exposure to state-​market relations. In Germany, the Auswärtiges Amt also launched a noteworthy reform exercise through the so-​called ‘Review 2014’ process. This ambitious project was initiated by Foreign Minister Frank-​Walter Steinmeier shortly after he assumed office in late 2013. For almost an entire year, the German mfa consulted domestic and international experts, public opinion, as well as its own diplomatic staff to analyse how Germany’s diplomatic system could be reformed to take on greater responsibility in a “world falling apart … [where] economic globalisation alone does not guarantee political convergence”, as Steinmeier (2014) put it. The reform process explicitly aimed at finding organisational answers to the growing challenges arising from globalisation, and its concluding report recommended more German diplomatic engagements in the fields of ‘order’, ‘crisis’, and ‘Europe’ (Auswärtiges Amt 2015: 43–​47). In response, the mfa soon thereafter established, or restructured, a number of organisational pillars working on these and related themes. Compared to the French reform initiatives, however, the reforms in Berlin were much less explicit in terms of augmenting diplomats’ exposure to market actors and enhancing the mfa’s economic expertise. Moreover, years after Steinmeier’s call for more active diplomatic engagement in economic globalisation, German diplomats, explicitly referring to ordo-​liberal principles, consistently underscored certain limits in their approach as engagements at the micro level were still “not part of our dna”.11 At the same time, both diplomats and other civil servants reported an increasing interest among Berlin’s foreign policy-​makers to shape relationships with emerging economies, not to mention a growing willingness to engage with the notion that a prosperous German economy could be used strategically for foreign policy purposes (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2019 ; Bundesregierung 2012). The ‘Streamlining’ of the French and German mfa s in the Geoeconomic Field Taken together, though neither the reforms of the Quai d’Orsay nor those of the Auswärtiges Amt can be directly attributed to coherent strategic approaches to the logic of geoeconomics as such, the comparison demonstrates how both processes were driven by a recognition, particularly at the level of foreign ministers, for the need to raise awareness and implement restructurings in their organisations to address practical diplomatic challenges arising in a 2.2

11

Interview, Berlin, German mfa, 22 February 2017.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

72 

Chapter 3

hyperglobalised economy. A closer look at the first outcomes of both reform processes also reveals how they brought about some organisational streamlining that bolstered both mfa s’ capabilities in the geoeconomic field by improving analytical capacities, the ability to cooperate with non-​state actors, and measures for intragovernmental coordination. In Paris, diplomats from the political and the economic pillars of the mfa affirmed that the creation of the deei and the ministry’s strengthened emphasis on economic affairs generally led to enhanced in-​house economic expertise and improved understanding among diplomats of the general priorities of major French businesses. Even if experts assert that much more work in this field is needed (Monlouis-​Félicité 2017: 263–​268), this was seen as helpful in terms of streamlining the mfa’s role in geoeconomic matters, particularly because it helped strengthen the technical independence from Bercy when assessing the economic effects of applying a specific economic-​based instrument. At the same time, diplomats would generally recognise that the reforms did not fundamentally change Bercy’s overwhelming capacity in every aspect of economic affairs, still making cooperation indispensable. This cooperation, however, remained characterised by reciprocal distrust, which was not least relevant in the field of sanctions, where mfa diplomats would lament Bercy’s “overtly technical approach” to the instrument, arguing that this “lack of foreign policy savviness” could become a liability for French diplomacy in times where the sanctions instrument was gaining popularity among policy-​makers in both Paris and Brussels.12 In Berlin, despite Steinmeier’s emphasis of the need for the Auswärtiges Amt to adequately represent the increasing status of Germany as a global economic power, only a few organisational adjustments were initiated to directly strengthen its geoeconomic toolbox. Among the most prominent was the creation of a new high-​budget General Directorate for Crisis Prevention, Stabilisation, Post-​Conflict Peacebuilding and Humanitarian Assistance. Such economic (assistance) activities had been decried as German ‘check book diplomacy’ in the 1980–​1990s. Now, German diplomats referred to them as a “key foreign policy instrument” that ideally would find itself embedded in a conceptual strategic approach to impede and resolve conflicts deemed detrimental to German interests.13 Other aspects within the geoeconomic field did not, however, experience similar prioritisation in organisational terms. For example, even if German foreign policy-​makers supported the intensified use 12 13

Interviews, Paris, French mfa, 1 March 2017; French mfa, 6 March 2017. Interviews, Berlin, German mfa, 22 February 2017; German mfa, 27 February 2017.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

73

Sanctioning Russia

of sanctions against Russia, Iran, and Syria, the reform process was not utilised to create an independent sanctions unit within the Auswärtiges Amt itself. Contrary to its French counterpart, the German mfa thereby accepted to a greater degree the continuation of the practical dependence on other governmental agencies, first and foremost the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi). Already in the years before the Review 2014 process, the mfa had engaged in bolstering various formats of interministerial coordination committees to ensure streamlining when working in the international realm. Diplomats would regularly mourn the “coordination burden”, yet also affirm the indispensable value of the technical expertise held by civil servants in other line ministries.14 Standing coordination practices, they explained, helped to test and establish policy lines that, in the end, were understood by all relevant actors in the individual ministries of the decentralised German government apparatus. In sum, outcomes of the respective reform processes helped diplomats in Paris and Berlin to strengthen their positioning in the political-​economic nexus. However, these organisational undertakings did not prevent coordination and cooperation challenges, which was clearly demonstrated when both countries were prompted to engage in the implementation of one of the most significant European geoeconomic interventions of recent years, the EU sanctions regime against Russia in 2014. 3

Handling Domestic Agency Relations: The Diplomatic Quest to Implement the Russia Sanctions

The following analysis compares how French and German diplomats engaged in relations with numerous state and non-​state actors, ranging from heads of states and governments, ministries, business, market actors, and political representatives from the regional level and legislative branches. The relationships presented below do not give the full picture of all domestic agencies relevant to the case, but are highlighted to illustrate how various approaches to geoeconomic diplomacy enabled or restricted the two mfa s in their task to assist, in various ways, the implementation of the first three years of the EU sanctions against Russia.

14

Interviews, Berlin, German mfa, 22 February 2017; German mfa, 24 February 2017; German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy, 27 February 2017.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

74 

Chapter 3

3.1 Offices of Heads of States and Governments Unsurprisingly, the political leadership of both countries was directly engaged in a case of such far-​reaching strategic importance to European security and economic interests. This engagement reached an extent where both German and French policy-​makers would in unison declare it Chefsache, the German term for a matter to be handled at the highest level of government. Yet, in comparison, the strong participation from the heads of states and governments was treated differently in the two diplomatic systems, with the French mfa being more accepting of another strong state actor involved in the diplomatic handling. The French President’s administration in the Elysée Palace was closely involved in the process of forming the European sanctions regime. Contrary to the German Chancellor, the French President, by definition commander-​ in-​chief and head of the Defence and National Security Council, is engaged in foreign policy deliberations and decisions on a regular, if not daily, basis. Such a centralised understanding of foreign policy decision-​making gave the Elysée an unchallenged prerogative to define the French government’s position. Yet, primarily due to its limited number of staff, the Elysée quickly gave room for the Quai d’Orsay to oversee the sanctions policy, while keeping the oversight of the Russia policy as such. Cooperation between the German Chancellery and the German mfa proved more difficult. Among mfa diplomats, the Chancellery’s hands-​on involvement regarding the Ukraine crisis was registered as a somewhat unwelcome interference. One reason for the discordance was diverging views within the coalition government between the conservative Christian Union parties (cdu/​c su) and the Social Democratic Party (spd). cdu/​c su Chancellor Angela Merkel argued for a tough position vis-​à-​vis Russian aggression, while Steinmeier, echoing the guiding principles of spd’s traditional Ostpolitik, defended a more cautious and co-​operative approach to Moscow (Forsberg 2016: 28–​37). Furthermore, strong voices in the spd argued to embed the sanctions policy in dialogue opportunities with the Russian leadership.15 The Chancellor’s authority under her Richtlinienkompetenz,16 a practical competency for deciding the government’s general policy guidelines given to the Chancellor by the Basic Law, was only invoked tacitly after lengthy deliberations, revealing that coordination practices between the two main government actors in charge of German foreign policy were not elaborate enough to quickly find common ground in a case of

15 16

Interview, Berlin, spd’s parliamentarian group, 2 June 2017 Interview, Berlin, German mfa, 24 February 2017.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Sanctioning Russia

75

the highest national interest. To make matters worse, diplomats from various EU Member States came to see the Chancellery as the German lead negotiator, which consequently put into question the validity of positions articulated by mfa officials during formal and informal EU negotiations of the sanctions regime.17 3.2 Other Ministries French and German diplomats acknowledged how strong relations with other ministries, particularly those responsible for economic affairs, would be key for the implementation of sanctions. This not only was due to the technical expertise needed to draft the complex EU sanctions regime or to ensure legal compliance at the national level, but also because diplomats were dependent on understanding how various sanctions against Russia, each a distortion of potential trade relations, would impact French and German business interests. In spite of long-​standing formal cooperation mechanisms, which proved more effective in Germany than in France, both Bercy and the BMWi repeatedly signalled significant resistance –​either internally or in the public sphere –​ against too encompassing sanctions. In France, diplomats’ cooperation with Bercy was characterised by significant frictions. The reform impetus of 2013 was utilised for coordination attempts, as the deei tried to mediate between the mfa’s political directorate and Bercy by carefully raising concerns of affected French businesses in internal mfa meetings. While such attempts were recognised by diplomats directly engaged in political negotiations, it did not have a major influence on the mfa’s overall sentiment. As one diplomat put it: “at the end of the day the Quai d’Orsay is a political, not an economic, actor”.18 Bercy representatives, on the other hand, were perceived by diplomats as recurrent proponents for the easing of the sanctions regime in a biased and unnuanced defence of specific French economic interests. Another point of friction between the Quai d’Orsay and Bercy, expressed by some diplomats, concerned intragovernmental information-​sharing practices on aspects of particular sensitivity for French economic interests. French diplomats had the impression of being less informed by Bercy about technical specificities and the implications of the EU sanctions and Russian countersanctions for the French economy than their German or British counterparts. In consequence, they felt less well

17 18

Interviews, Berlin, Embassy of a Nordic country, 23 February 2017; German Chancellery, 6 June 2017. Interviews, Paris, French mfa, 1 March 2017; French mfa, 2 March 2017.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

76 

Chapter 3

prepared when sanctions were drafted and negotiated among EU Member States.19 The French mfa’s position also came under pressure due to an existing Franco-​Russian arms trade deal, which suddenly gave the French defence ministry a significant voice in Paris’ handling of the case. In 2011, France had agreed to deliver two French-​built Mistral-​class helicopter carriers to the Russian navy, which prompted criticism from NATO allies at that time. Because the EU sanctions now explicitly targeted arms trade with Russia, senior French diplomats came to see the Mistral deal as untenable. The highly sensitive matter led to the repeated circumvention of the normal coordination procedures via the Secrétariat général des affaires européennes in the prime minister’s office (Rozenberg 2013: 67–​68). Instead, informal intragovernmental negotiations were held among representatives from the Elysée, relevant ministries and the force command. While details about these meetings have not been disclosed, French diplomats confirm that representatives expressed diverging views as to whether the execution of the deal would be non-​compliant with the EU sanctions.20 Nevertheless, in August 2015, Paris settled on a compensation agreement with Moscow and the deal was taken off the table (Perchoc 2015: 58–​59). This shows that a strong joint understanding of the sensitivities related to arms trade deals allowed French government actors to keep a common public communication line, meaning neither the ministry of defence nor other army representatives acted in way that publicly challenged the mfa’s position. In Germany, the Auswärtiges Amt invested much energy in co-​ordinating with a vast number of government entities. To strengthen its position, the mfa made use of long-​standing coordination practices, such as summoning the ‘inter-​ministerial coordination committee on Russia’, which had existed prior to the Ukraine crisis. Such committees, which also exist for other strategically important countries (e.g. China, Israel, Brazil, India), would meet at least on a biannual basis. Diplomats emphasised that even if other federal ministries can be vocal actors on such occasions, coordination committees do not override the will of the mfa which, also in the Russia case, helped diplomats steer decisions in a direction of their liking.21 Civil servants from the Auswärtiges Amt and the BMWi confirm how the established working relationship between relevant departments played out positively in co-​ordinating responses. This 19 20 21

Interview, Paris, French mfa, 6 March 2017. Interviews, Paris, French mfa, 3 March 2017; French mfa, 28 August 2017. Interviews, Berlin, German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy, 27 February 2017; German mfa, 2 June 2017.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Sanctioning Russia

77

was the case when a German position at the EU level with regards to technical questions on specific legal sanction compositions was needed, particularly in response to critical questions from German businesses. It also allowed the mfa to closely follow the BMWi’s technical compliance oversight and be informed in cases of sanctions violations by German companies or their subsidiaries.22 Such coordination practices, however, did not preclude individual ministries –​and ministers in particular –​from pursuing independent policy agendas, which came to show certain restrictions to the German mfa’s ability to steer these relations. One remarkable example was Economy Minister and spd Chairman Sigmar Gabriel’s visit to Moscow in October 2015. In line with concerns from parts of the German business community and proponents of the deeply rooted Ostpolitik, Gabriel publicly expressed his support for a rapid abandoning of the sanctions regime.23 Even if informed about his visit and the intended contradictory messaging, the mfa could not veto it. This overt digression from the German government’s agreed line-​to-​take in a situation where the stakes were lower compared to the French Mistral case shows how even elaborate interministerial coordination practices could not outweigh the autonomous agency of strong German ministries. This stands in contrast to the more streamlined communication coming out of Paris, which strengthened the French mfa’s credibility and made implementation efforts less complicated for French diplomats than for their counterparts in Berlin. 3.3 Legislative and Sub-​State Actors Though the conduct of foreign policy is traditionally understood as predominantly led by the executive branch of national government, various French and German legislative and sub-​state actors challenged the EU sanctions policy, at times even conducting own direct diplomatic engagements with the Russian government. In France, representatives from right-​leaning parties in opposition to the incumbent socialist government under President François Hollande sought direct contact with Russian policy-​makers to challenge the government’s sanctions policy. Amongst the most outspoken advocates were former President Nicolas Sarkozy who, during a visit to Moscow in October 2015, called for the lifting of all sanctions. This line was echoed in visits from mostly right-​wing senators and members of parliament to Crimea in July 2015 and Moscow in

22 23

Interviews, Berlin, German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy, 2 June 2017; German mfa, 6 June 2017. Interviews, Berlin, German mfa, 24 February 2017; German mfa, 2 June 2017.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

78 

Chapter 3

April 2016, and the adoption of a non-​binding resolution in the lower house of parliament, the Assemblée Nationale, calling on the French government to not renew the sanctions (Scazzieri 2017: 403). While these encounters can be seen as embedded in historically solid relationships between the right side of the French party spectrum and Russian policy-​makers, they still revealed that French diplomats’ communications with opposition politicians and parliamentarians barely existed, making it difficult for them to address these unwanted interventions. The parliamentary set-​up in Berlin, with diverging views between the coalition government partners cdu/​c su and spd, long remained a key obstacle for German diplomats to find a common understanding and message on German government policy. While high-​ranking spd officials continued to voice their dismay for EU sanctions, Chancellor Merkel’s unwavering defence of a pro-​sanctions policy over time helped mfa diplomats to feel safer regarding their specific mandate. A distinct challenge was, however, posed by the German state’s federal structure and the relative autonomy of regional state governments, the Landesregierungen. Though the Russia sanctions’ negative macro effects on the German economy and job market were generally limited (Bundestag 2015: 3), specific microeconomic concerns were forcefully expressed locally by small and medium-​sized enterprises (sme s). This pressure became specifically tangible in the states of Bavaria and Saxony, where regional governments began to question the federal government’s policy line and to seek independent contacts with Moscow. Such was the case when Bavaria’s Prime Minister and Chairman of the cdu’s sister party, the csu, Horst Seehofer, used a visit to Russian President Vladimir Putin in February 2016 to call for sanctions dismantlement. mfa diplomats acknowledged that regional actors’ direct ties with the Russian government were lawful, yet unhelpful in terms of aligning the German business community with the sanctions policy, and that coordination practices with regional governments were rather limited.24 In conclusion, the mfa s in France and Germany faced similar challenges: Even though legislative and sub-​state actors had limited formal competence for undermining the government’s foreign policy line in general and the sanctions policy in particular, their uncoordinated presence and contacts with Moscow gave a fragmented impression of the government’s position and, hence, unclear sincerity to support a forceful and sustained sanctions implementation.

24

Interview, Berlin, German mfa, 24 February 2017.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Sanctioning Russia

79

3.4 Business and Market Actors Representing Europe’s first-​and third-​ largest exporting countries to the Russian market in 2013, German and French diplomats also needed to invest in relationships with domestic business representatives. The Quai d’Orsay engaged directly with major French business representatives to discuss its sanctions policy. But diplomats considered the added value of this engagement to be limited, as they came to see that competition among French business representatives meant that these would neither act as a group nor divulge their individual commercial concerns in the presence of others.25 This made it difficult for the mfa to identify major sanctions-​related challenges to French business interests, particularly at the level of sme s. In contrast, ceo s from major French companies engaged in the Russian market made use of their personal contacts and networks at high-​ranking civil servant and ministerial levels to express their concerns. When Foreign Minister Jean-​Marc Ayrault travelled to Moscow in 2016, he prioritised a meeting with the ceo s of such companies. French diplomats acknowledged that extensive relations between the highest representatives of politics and business is a part of the long-​standing corporatist tradition in French diplomacy. They saw them as essential for learning about French business concerns and about how the mfa could assist French business activities with those areas of the Russian market that were not subject to sanctions.26 Diplomats also acknowledged that such contacts particularly helped to sensitise major business representatives to the French state policy. In contrast, sme s and the agricultural industry, with whom the mfa would have less direct engagement, remained more critical towards the sanctions policy. The Auswärtiges Amt also put great emphasis on reaching out to the German business community to explain the political necessity of the coercive measures and gather information regarding business concerns related to EU sanctions and Russian countersanctions. Furthermore, German diplomats pointed to the importance of engagement to counter the risk of ‘overcompliance’, where business may feel worried about not fully grasping the legal details and making mistakes, and, therefore, do not exploit even those market opportunities that are not prohibited by the sanctions.27 Auswärtiges Amt and BMWi held ad hoc meetings with business representatives that, at the same time, illustrated a co-​operative approach but also a lack of coherent practices or formal fora for such processes. 25 26 27

Interview, Paris, French mfa, 6 March 2017. Interview, Paris, French mfa, 3 March 2017. Interview, Berlin, German mfa, 6 June 2017.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

80 

Chapter 3

From the mfa’s perspective, it was helpful that the Federation of German Industries (bdi) publicly spoke out in favour of sanctions at an early stage, and furthermore kept this supportive communication line in the years to come.28 Though the bdi was challenged internally by its sub-​federation for large German businesses with interests in the Russian and Eastern European markets, the Ost-​Ausschuss (Ost-​Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft 2017), the bdi’s clear stance helped strengthen the mfa’s position towards the more sceptical sectors of the German businesses community. Public opposition from the Ost-​Ausschuss was considered by diplomats as somewhat disruptive –​ especially because the Ost-​Ausschuss enjoys direct ties to Russian government officials –​but mostly non-​influential for the mfa’s room for manoeuvre, as the vested interests from this particular lobby group were already evident.29 At the same time, while both civil servants and business representatives would underscore the theoretical state-​ market independence, they also acknowledged how regular contacts between various ministers and highest-​ ranking civil servants and major ceo s were valuable to ensuring that businesses were well informed of the government’s priorities. This was the case before the ceo of Siemens ag, Joe Kaeser, met with Putin in March 2014, only weeks after the Ukraine crisis erupted. The visit was preceded by a candid call from the Chancellery to the Siemens headquarters.30 This serves as an illustrative case: Though German diplomats cannot –​and essentially do not want to –​prevent business leaders from seeking direct contact with potential export markets, communication practices and personal contacts at the highest executive levels create a, at times helpful, grey area between politics and business. While both mfa s recognised the importance of engaging with business communities to implement sanctions, doing so, somewhat surprisingly, seemed easier for the German mfa. Despite the creation of the deei and the historically strong ties between the government and companies, the internal fragmentation in the French business community made the engagement cumbersome.31 French diplomats contrasted this with the situation in Germany,32 where the level of internal organisation and cooperation among major businesses is higher, including under the umbrella of bdi. At the same time, the informal engagement of high-​profile politicians and government 28 29 30 31 32

Interview, Berlin, German mfa, 24 February 2017. Interviews, Berlin, business interest organisation, 22 February 2017; cdu/​c su’s parliamentarian group, 31 May 2017; business interest organisation, 31 May 2017. Interview, Berlin, business interest organisation, 22 February 2017. Interview, Paris, business interest organisation, 1 March 2017. Interviews, Paris, French mfa, 3 March 2017.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

81

Sanctioning Russia

representatives with individual major companies played a key role in both Paris and Berlin’s quests to implement the sanctions policy. 4

Moving from Domestic Network of Actors to Practices of Actor-​Networks

To summarise, both the French and German mfa s –​irrespective of dissimilar intellectual traditions and norms for the engagement of diplomats in market affairs –​advanced organisational reforms in the early 2010s that helped to enhance in-​house economic expertise and, to some degree, streamline relationships between diplomats and various domestic agencies relevant to the state-​market nexus. Even if both mfa s’ reform processes fell short of thoroughly addressing the challenges relating to diplomats’ role in the geoeconomic sphere, the willingness to initiate organisational reforms relevant to the state-​market nexus might be a testimony to a broader recognition of European governments for the need to engage in this field. At the same time, both c­ ountries’ diplomatic systems struggled, yet in different ways, to secure an effective implementation of the EU sanctions against Russia of 2014. French diplomats largely succeeded in aligning relevant ministries and government actors behind a clear public support for the Russia sanctions. Diplomatic outreach to specific French companies with interests in the Russian market was likewise a priority, though this engagement lacked stringent practices for co-​ operating with the heterogeneous French business community. In spite of advancing numerous formal coordination practices, the German mfa was hard-​pressed to maintain political consensus for the depth and timing of the Russia sanctions, as both the Ministry of Economic Affairs and regional state governments articulated their dissatisfaction with the sanctions’ design. At the same time, German government officials’ trustful relations with major ceo s and well-​organised business interest groups ensured a greater co-​ operative attitude on the part of German companies than might have been expected. This chapter has thus demonstrated how European mfa s operating in the critical field of geoeconomic diplomacy face similar demands of establishing practices that allow diplomats to communicate and co-​operate with –​ and eventually influence –​domestic actors holding crucial political or economic leverage. This insight is important because it lays bare the fundamental difficulty that diplomats face when tasked to use economic power as a tool of foreign and security policy. Important as this insight may be, the mere identification of actors involved in the conduct of geoeconomic diplomacy can only represent a first step

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

82 

Chapter 3

towards a greater understanding of the pressures and possibilities that arise in these diplomatic practices. As demonstrated, actor relations in the geoeconomic field will mostly happen in parallel and often intersect, meaning that diplomatic engagement with one type of actor will rarely be isolated from the engagement with other actor types.

…

The book’s first case study has demonstrated how the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy helps us to understand how the multidimensional relations that characterises the geoeconomic space between states and markets space transcends the sphere of foreign and security policy in manners that sometime places diplomats and mfa s at the core of events and sometimes side-​lines them. A next analytical step towards a clearer understanding of the dynamics involved in geoeconomic processes, and namely how diplomats are enabled or restrained in the implementation phase of foreign policy decisions, needs to take seriously the comprehension of the complex webs of social relations that is constitutive of the realm of geoeconomic diplomacy. The following chapters will do so by demonstrating how insights from the sizeable literature on international practice theory, and in particular its focus on the ‘relationalism’ of everyday diplomacy (Adler-​Nissen 2015: 287–​290) and network analysis in diplomacy studies, can be applied in novel ways to capture the volatile social realities that mfa s face in their effort to implement various means of power –​both within and beyond the field of geoeconomics. This suggested move from identifying the domestic networks of actors relevant to the state-​ market nexus to studying the networks’ internal dynamics –​or what will be called ‘networked practices’ –​paves the way for improving our understanding of the processes that help determine the type and scope of collective action that emerges between often immensely heterogonous actors, whose cooperation is nevertheless indispensable for governments with ambitions in the geoeconomic realm.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

­c hapter 4

A New Framework for Studying Sanctions ‘Networked Practices’ of Geoeconomic Diplomacy

How can we understand the process of putting geoeconomic instruments in practice beyond describing the interactions between diplomats, ministries, parliamentarians, public agencies, private businesses and banks, interest organisations, ngo s, and activists? What creates the ability of diplomats to steer processes aimed at interfering in state-​market relations in a direction that helps to implement a geoeconomic policy decision? Which theoretical tools are already available for conducting this analysis –​and which still need to be established? Building on the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy as this book’s dominant prism for analysing the implementation of EU sanctions, this chapter introduces an analytical framework of ‘networked practices’ based on insights from studies of social practices and actor-​networks. Furthermore, it explains methodological considerations behind the application of this framework for the book’s second empirical case study, presented in the following chapters. The aim is to propose a new way of capturing the actors and processes involved in areas of diplomatic activity where governments do not hold direct control over the means they want to employ for their geostrategic purposes. The proposed analytical framework is based on insights from international practice theory, a steadily growing subfield of ir that takes patterns of social action as an analytical starting point for the study of the social world (Pouliot & Cornut 2015). A core tenet of this book’s argument for building a new framework for the study of diplomatic practices revolves around a critique of what is identified as ipt’s empirical bias towards the study of processes of foreign policy decision-​making over those relating to policy implementation. As will be explained in greater detail below, it is argued that practice scholars have been overly concerned with actors and processes situated in meeting rooms and corridors, whereby they have given insufficient attention to how decision are actually put into action outside such institutionalised settings. This bias means that even if the envisaged ‘practice turn’ of ir has served as a valuable theoretical vehicle for tremendously advancing the study of diplomatic actors and processes, the turn has only been semi-​completed. Advancing the completion of this practice turn should not merely be seen a theoretical exercise for the pleasure of theorists; it has, so this chapter argues, a direct bearing on practice scholars’ possibilities for capturing and analysing the processes that

© Kim B. Olsen, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004518834_006

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

84 

Chapter 4

are relevant to putting policies into action. Given that the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy reminds us, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, that governments’ geoeconomic ambitions depend on their diplomats’ abilities to steer the implementation phase of such policies, the question of refining the theoretical use of practice studies for the analysis of foreign policy implementation is intrinsically linked to improving our understanding of how diplomats are able –​or not –​to advance the use of geoeconomic instruments, such as economic sanctions as part of foreign and security policy-​making. As will be elaborated, the proposed framework relies on approaches in the tradition of pragmatic, as opposed to critical, understandings of social practices, committed to ‘reconstructing’ the role of empowered practitioners rather than ‘unmasking’ intrinsic power relations (Franke & Hellmann 2017: 7–​ 8; Schindler & Wille 2019). One of these pragmatic approaches to the study of practices is the so-​called actor-​network theory. To advance the study of foreign and security policy implementation, the book’s analytical framework will be constructed around two key concepts from ant literature: translations and obligatory passage points. Together, these concepts will form key components of the book’s analytical framework on ‘networked practices’ that will be used throughout the remainder of this book to demonstrate how geoeconomic diplomats, if successful, can enhance their ability for steering the implementation of geoeconomic policies by placing themselves as indispensable actors (obligatory passage points) in the formative processes (translations) that come to be constitutive of the networked practices which relevant network actors relate and react to. In other words, by identifying how diplomats relate to the networked practices that are formative for the joint actions that happen within geoeconomic actor-​networks, and thus also defining the possibilities and boundaries for such actions, it can be understood how diplomatic actors are able to ‘shape’ the manner in which sanctions and other geoeconomic instruments are –​and are not –​being put into practice. 1

Theoretical Approach: Studying the Practices of Foreign and Security Policy Implementation

Innovative theoretical thinking about network-​related practices within and around diplomacy is no novelty, as observers have long acknowledged how complexities of international relations and international political economy can rarely be captured through simple actor relations. Yet, while it has long been recognised how states (Keohane & Nye 1977 ; Slaughter 2017) and diplomats

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

A New Framework for Studying Sanctions

85

(Bagger & von Heynitz 2012; Goddard 2012; Heine 2013; Wiseman 2004) operate in webs of interdependence and networked environments with multiple state and non-​state actors, insights on how actor networks are both formed through and formative of diplomatic practice have only to a lesser degree been incorporated by ipt scholars. This neglect is even more striking when noting that practice scholars have demonstrated how some types of network studies, such as ant, can be seen as part of the broader practice-​theoretical family (Bueger & Gadinger 2018; Nexon & Pouliot 2013). Elaborating such thoughts seems particularly useful when addressing diplomacy’s implementation phase, as practitioners are here often confronted with the demand for working through informal and often rapidly changing actor constellations. 1.1 A Pragmatic Understanding to Practices Following the seminal definition of Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (2011: 4), practices are here understood as “socially meaningful patterns of actions, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world”. As will also be central to the practice-​informed framework applied in this book, the virtue of practices is more than a sum of human interaction. Understood as ‘micro-​moves’ within the realm of global politics, international practices are based on a larger or smaller degree of coherent and shared understandings between actors (Solomon & Steele 2017). Analytically, practices are hence treated as artefacts or objects situated in the social world with the potential of having an explanatory value for certain outcomes (Kustermans 2016). Just as many other ir (sub)fields, ipt has also been transformed into an intellectual breeding-​and battle-​ground for contested concepts and hence a conglomerate of many different traditions or schools (Bourbeau 2017). Two particular approaches to practice theory, rooted in different philosophical and sociological traditions, have taken theoretical centre-​stage and are often finding themselves at odds with each other (Schindler & Wille 2019: 2–​3).1 On the one hand is the ‘critical’ school of practices, often guided by Pierre Bourdieu’s (1979) theory of symbolic power as well as ideas of discursive practices as 1 As noted by Sebastian Schindler and Tobias Wille (2019: 3), who discuss the differences between the ‘critical’ and ‘pragmatic’ traditions of practice theory in great depth, scholars have presented interesting attempts for combining the two traditions into innovative analytical frameworks. For key examples see Rebecca Adler-​Nissen (2014) and Vincent Pouliot (2016).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

86 

Chapter 4

formulated by Michel Foucault (1971, 1975). Critical approaches to practice studies share the objective of disclosing inherent power and domination structures that are constitutive of preferences expressed or decisions taken among a given group of actors, often having asymmetric opportunities to influence the field in which they partake. On the other hand, a conglomerate of approaches related to the American and French sociological schools of ‘pragmatism’ apply less power-​oriented theoretical perspectives. Instead of adopting the critical agenda of unmasking power, pragmatists share the overall objective of empowering practitioners. Examples of this are the actor-​network theory by Michael Callon (1986a, 1986b), Bruno Latour (1987, 1996, 2005), and John Law (1992), the pragmatic sociology of Luc Boltanski, and communities of practices by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger (1991).2 Pragmatists generally take a less sceptical approach to power asymmetries and look to systemise observations of co-​existence by taking an analytical departure in the creative practices of the agents involved. Understanding the social world as fundamentally creative, or volatile, is a central tenet of pragmatic scholars and hence a key point of pragmatists’ critique of the more structure-​oriented approach of Bourdieu and his followers. Instead of indulging in the critical search for the reproduction of power relations, a pragmatic approach to practices, at least in the conception of thinkers such as Latour and Boltanski, implies an epistemological understanding of actors as knowledgeable, reflective, and hence potentially able to verbalise their own relative positions to other actors within their broader social ­context (Guggenheim & Potthast 2012). This approach aligns with the conceptual notion of geoeconomic diplomacy, which explicitly searches for diplomatic practitioners’ virtuous abilities for operating in the geoeconomic field. Practitioners are herein seen as capable of reacting to and mobilising resources for handling unforeseen situations, but doing so based on a set of routines, i.e. “solutions to problems of action (crises) which have proven their worth in practice” (Franke & Weber 2012: 677). Pragmatic scholars are hence interested in the ways actors build on previous shared practices to react to especially unanticipated challenges, and how they carve out new space for new ‘modes of existence’ (Latour 2013) to revert to situations of enhanced social stability (Gadinger 2014: 13–​16).

2 For an excellent overview of ipt concepts see Bueger and Gadinger (2018).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

A New Framework for Studying Sanctions

2

87

A Half Turn to Practices: The Problem of ipt’s Empirical Biases

After more than a decade of intense scholarly debates on the applicability of practice theoretical insights into ir and diplomacy studies, practice scholars have begun to review the state of play, evaluate the advances achieved, and address the room for improvements. In a recent comprehensive assessment, Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger presented mixed conclusions as to whether the practice turn of ir can be considered completed. While acknowledging ipt’s successful rise in ir, they concluded that “not all of the promises associated with turning to practice have been fulfilled” (Bueger & Gadinger 2018: 169). A major neglection relates to the lack of empirically-​guided research. Even if empirical studies focusing on the everyday making of foreign policy have been significantly enhanced through ipt’s research agenda, the authors identify a “clear continuation of a trend in which philosophical discussions, conceptual development, and abstract reasoning is prioritized” (ibid). Consequently, even if ipt scholars have engaged in the search for new shared commitments for the investigation of the social world (Adler & Pouliot 2011: 4) and opened new empirical doors to the ir discipline, it is theoretical debates about ontological and epistemological disagreements, rather than a diversified empirical-​driven research, that have come to dominate the field (Bueger & Gadinger 2018: 165–​168). Scholarly disputes about the building blocks of the social world are undoubtfully essential for intellectual progress but risk leaving the field of ipt with unfulfilled promises (Sundaram & Thakur 2019), meaning that the limited empirical scope of practice studies into the realm of diplomacy arguably poses a threat to ipt’s theoretical agenda as such. Here, it must not be forgotten that one of the key reasons for why the practice turn was originally met with widespread excitement among scholars and diplomatic practitioners alike was ipt’s unique ability to speak to the lived reality of such practitioners, who otherwise might see ir’s theoretical landscape as inherently “strange” to them and their everyday work (Adler-​Nissen 2015). Such ‘strangeness’ will not be reduced by extensive debates on epistemological disagreements, but by demonstrating ipt’s empirical span. This span has so far not proven to be as wide as initially hoped. Practice scholars have significantly prioritised cases of diplomatic negotiation, mediation, and decision-​making processes over cases that investigate the practical implementation of foreign and security policy decisions. Whereas there are some important exceptions of practice studies looking into foreign policy implementation, ipt’s promise of engaging in the lived realities of diplomacy risks remaining unfulfilled if practice-​theoretical approaches are not applied

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

88 

Chapter 4

more thoroughly to cases that also reflect on processes of policy implementation. In their overview of practice-​oriented case studies, Bueger and Gadinger (2018: 168) tellingly cite scholarly investigations into decision-​making processes within EU institutions, the UN Security Council (unsc), and nato as successful examples of ‘thick’ practice narratives that pave the way into the world of diplomacy (see also Pouliot & Cornut 2015: 303). Even if such cases are of major analytical value, they are not sufficiently representative of the various types of practices performed by diplomats. Empirical Bias i: Focus on Decision-​Making over Policy Implementation The following brief review of major practice-​related empirical works helps to shed light on the empirical bias within the realm of diplomacy studies on diplomatic negotiation, bargaining, and mediation at the cost of implementation processes. Such a bias can be found in ipt studies focusing on all levels of diplomatic practice, i.e. on the domestic, regional, and multilateral level. ipt contributions focusing on the domestic level have generally been interested in the inner workings of mfa s. For example, Iver B. Neumann’s (2012) work on practices within the Norwegian mfa was received as somewhat ground-​breaking insofar as he demonstrated how everyday practices among diplomats shape a shared understanding of the very nation state these diplomats claim to represent. Choosing a similar ethnographic approach, Christian Lequesne (2017) convincingly portrayed how patterns of practices inside the French mfa, ranging from the mediating role of desk officers to diplomats attending daily cabinet meetings, are constitutive of the continuum within which French foreign policy decisions are taken. Similarly studying the French case, Donoxti Baylon (2016) showed how learning among peers at diplomatic academies create certain communities of practices. Focusing on the European level, Rebecca Adler-​Nissen (2014) demonstrated how Bourdieuian concepts of ‘doxa’ (what is taken for undisputed) and ‘habitus’ (the human way of being in the social world) as well as Erving Goffman’s (1963) ideas of ‘stigma management’ and ‘role-​playing’ are key to understanding negotiations and relations among professional diplomats –​and hence for the integration process of and among EU Member States. More recently, Adler-​Nissen reflected on the use of technological means such as the sharing of multiple and incrementally changing versions of negotiation texts among diplomats, including parties’ suggestions to textual edits in electronic track-​ changes and how these influence practices of text negotiations, and hence policy decisions, between EU Member States (Adler-​Nissen & Drieschova 2019). Focusing on the habitus of civil servants from the European Commission 2.1

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

A New Framework for Studying Sanctions

89

and EU Member States, who based on stipulations in the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force in 2009, together began to form the recently created eeas, Lequesne (2015) exposed how developing practices slowly came to create and sustain institutionalised ‘rules’ that eeas diplomats began to live and act by. Niklas Bremberg (2016) looked at how standard solutions within the European Neighbourhood Policy (enp) shaped negotiations between the European Commission, the eeas, and Member States on how to respond to the popular uprisings in Egypt of 2011. Addressing the multilateral level, Vincent Pouliot (2016) demonstrated how stigmatisation practices led to informal hierarchies and an uneven distribution of rank and role between member states of international organisations; a ‘pecking order’ that was subsequently channelled into negotiations. Adler-​ Nissen and Pouliot (2014) unpacked how claimed competences, particularly by French and British diplomats, significantly shaped the outcome of negotiations within the unsc in 2011 that led to the adoption of Resolutions 1970 and 1973 in response to the unfolding warfare in Libya.3 Another study has recently scrutinised the practices formative of the UK’s wish to take on special responsibility in the unsc (Ralph et al. 2020). Geoffrey Wiseman (2015) observed how networks of diplomats, ngo s, think tanks, and other non-​state actors emerged around the UN headquarters in New York, contributing to both formal and informal practices of negotiation and information exchange. Oliver Schmitt (2017) then demonstrated how US diplomats’ claims of competence, in addition to a number of socialising mechanisms within nato’s organisational structures, were among the practices that led to the Alliance’s specific conduct of its campaign in Afghanistan. Such empirical cases are all of major importance for demonstrating the analytical power of ipt studies. Yet, they are not necessarily representative of the various types of key practices performed by diplomats, who are not only concerned with the formulation of decisions, but also with the practical implementation thereof. Other types of research questions, focusing on the practices of foreign policy implementation, could –​and should –​be asked. Based on the

3 Such Bourdieu-​inspired approaches to the study of competences in institutionalised settings of negotiation and deal-​making have been criticised for neglecting the role of norms and normative dimensions of international practices (Lechner & Frost 2018; Ralph 2018). Concerning the specific case study by Adler and Pouliot on Libya, critics have highlighted how the strong focus on ‘competent’ moves by particularly Western diplomats in the unsc distorts the picture, failing to capture these actors’ lacking ‘collective consciousness’ to fully commit to the normative principles enshrined in the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (Ralph & Gifkins 2017).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

90 

Chapter 4

above, these questions could hypothetically be: How did inner mfa practices influence French diplomats’ engagements with national authorities in countries targeted by French foreign direct investments? How could inherited enp principles be meaningfully applied in dialogue with Egyptian authorities to advance European objectives after 2011? How did France, the UK, and other ‘competent’ Council Members supportive of actions against Libya ensure the envisioned implementation of the adopted unsc Resolutions 1970 and 1973? Surely, the literature contains a few important exceptions to ipt scholars’ disproportionate focus on the diplomatic practices behind decision-​making over the diplomatic practices of foreign and security policy implementation. Focusing on European security engagement in the Balkans, Nina Græger (2016) showed how joint EU and nato operations in Kosovo resulted in emerging communities of practices among military and civilian personnel (at both headquarters and the field level), which helped both organisations advance the implementation of various policy decisions. Using a similar approach, Luca Raineri and Francesco Strazzari (2019) analysed how evolving communities of stabilisation practices in EU capacity-​building operations in Libya and Mali led to the increased legitimisation of local partners that would normally be outside the EU’s normative spectrum. Applying an ethnography-​ centred approach, Séverine Autesserre (2014) studied peace interventions through the everyday moves and relationships of actors on the ground to show how peace building strategies that turn out inefficient or counterproductive are also the product of stable patterns of joint action between a long array of involved state, quasi-​state, and non-​state actors. Through a study of different practices by and relationships between agents that formed the EU’s counter-​piracy response on Somalia’s coast, Bueger (2016) convincingly demonstrated how the EU slowly moved from the periphery to the centre in the implementation of the unsc mandated military activities in the Horn of Africa. Such analytical insights have, to varying degrees, informed and inspired this book’s approach to the analysis of networked implementation practices. 2.2 Empirical Bias ii: Disregard of Non-​state Actors Besides being strong examples of how ipt tools can be applied to get closer to policy implementation, these works show the analytical importance of including of the roles played by state and non-​state actors beyond traditional diplomatic settings. This demand, which is also a core claim of this book’s approach, has been recognised by ipt scholars for some time –​even if prayers have not been extensively practiced. Andrew F. Cooper and Jérémie Cornut (2018) recently made a similar observation by arguing that ipt has

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

A New Framework for Studying Sanctions

91

lost sight of the variety of diplomatic practices that shape international relations. Its analytical agenda, so the authors argue, has been too state-​centric, too headquarter-​fixated, and focused more on social continuity rather than social change. While the latter point echoes a broader theoretical debate among practice scholars aiming to protect the ipt agenda from the fallacies of the classical agency-​structure dichotomy that has haunted constructivist approaches to ir for decades (cf. Hopf 2018; McCourt 2016; Wendt 1999), the former two led Cooper and Cornut to assert that ipt has not sufficiently studied the variety of practices of ‘frontline’ diplomacy. The authors define this area of diplomatic practice as “what practitioners call ‘the field’ … the tradecraft of diplomats either posted abroad in embassies, consulates, and permanent representations or operating through other types of activity beyond headquarters” through which “states cooperate with foreign governments, non-​ governmental organizations, multilateral organizations, civil society, and individuals” (2018: 300). The authors hold that ipt scholars have provided valuable studies to this kind of frontline diplomacy, though giving too much attention to practices of high-​level negotiations, representation, and the gathering of information. ipt thereby loses view of the ‘polylateralism’ that demands that diplomats engage in novel ways particularly with non-​state actors (see also Wiseman 2004). Cooper and Cornut’s empirical critique of ipt’s analytical neglect of non-​ state actors aligns with this book’s core claims. At the same time, their primary concern for the spatial location of diplomatic practices –​i.e. the distinction between diplomatic headquarters and front lines –​might distort the real issue at play. The 21st century’s polylateral reality is a defining characteristic for most types of diplomacy, regardless of where they are conducted. In other words, it is not only at the ‘frontlines’ that traditional diplomats are faced with the demand of handling multiple, quickly altering relations with many types of actors. This is particularly true in times where the spatial distinction between diplomats working inside mfa s and those working at diplomatic representations becomes less distinctive. Diplomats participating in international negotiations are, for example, interconnected with mfa-​based colleagues in real time as modern means of technology ensure near-​constant access to written or oral communication, which itself has disrupted traditional forms of diplomatic cooperation (Adler-​Nissen & Drieschova 2019). Special envoys and thematic ambassadors primarily fulfil their mandates in ‘the field’ while maintaining a geographical base at hq-​level. Consequently, studies that do not separate but rather unite the spheres between diplomats operating abroad and those posted at hq-​level only become more relevant (Lequesne 2019: 783–​784; Wiseman 2019: 793–​795).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

92 

Chapter 4

While the use of pragmatic practice-​theoretical approaches seems particularly useful to capture the formative interplay between actors and processes in the implementation of a geoeconomic policy decision, the inspiration in the existing ipt literature for conducting such a study seems surprisingly limited. ipt’s significant advances into diplomacy studies have largely been built on an empirical over-​focus on diplomatic actors and processes relating to the negotiation, bargaining, and mediation of foreign and security policy decisions. Frequently applying analytical frameworks around the Bourdieuian vocabulary of field, habitus, capital, and authority (Bourdieu 1972), a majority of ipt contributions within the realm of diplomacy studies have shown themselves prone to analysing the performative practices and power relations between individuals or groups claiming representation of a given polity in the lead up to a joint expression of interest, be it a communiqué, policy decision, a formal agreement, or the like. Such diplomatic encounters will most likely happen within formalised agencies and organisations, and hence in more or less tightly institutionalised settings. Moving beyond the Bias: Analysing ‘Polylateral’ Relationships of Policy Implementation In contrast to these diplomatic practices of negotiations, bargains, and mediation attempts stands the implementation phase of diplomacy, which is at the heart of this book’s overall puzzle and research questions. The diplomatic leverage in the implementation phase of foreign and security policy decisions can be understood as the pursuit of individuals or groups claiming representation of a given polity to implement a specific political agreement as intended. Instead of looking at practices within the negotiation room, the analysis of policy implementation scrutinises what happens after a deal has been concluded or an agreement made. Following the seminal definition of Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky (1974: xv), implementation can be understood as the “ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results”. Being an expression of the processes that form this implementation, this phase covers “anything meant to happen after an intention or aspiration has been expressed” (Hupe 2014: 166; see also Van Meter & Van Horn 1975) and will most likely directly involve actors outside of formalised or institutionalised decision-​making structures (Sabatier 1986). These observations led this research to look for appropriate analytical tools in the toolbox of pragmatic practice theorists to capture the diplomatic action that is formative of the implementation processes of foreign policy decisions for using and enforcing economic sanctions. 2.3

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

A New Framework for Studying Sanctions

93

Further inspiration for putting a distinct analytical focus on specific practices relating to the implementation of foreign and security policy decisions can also be found in the literature on Foreign Policy Analysis (fpa). Valerie M. Hudson and Benjamin S. Day, for example, have recently proposed a distinction between a ‘foreign policy decision’ and a ‘foreign policy action’ to demonstrate how policy-​makers are manoeuvring through at least two different operational phases in a policy process. The two phases are distinct in that the implementation phase of decisions “often [leads] to profound slippage between the direction of the decision taken and the direction of the action executed” (Hudson & Day 2020: 5). However, when seen from a practice-​theoretical perspective, the juxtaposition between ‘decision-​making’ and ‘action’ does not give sufficient credit to the fact that negotiations and deliberations themselves entail action. Furthermore, as ipt scholars commonly understand ‘action’ as the basis of any social practice, this use of the term would result in less conceptual clarity. Likewise, much as is the case with ipt-​driven literature, fpa scholars have asserted that their sub-​discipline has neither been sufficiently capable of capturing the role of non-​traditional actors in foreign policy implementation (Alden & Aran 2016: 35). Even as fpa scholars have emphasised the importance of scrutinising the implementation phase as a key aspect for a better understanding of foreign and security policy-​making, the field has directed very little energy into conceptualising the actual operationalisation of policy decisions. Just as is the case for practice theorists, fpa scholars’ main interest remains on the dynamics between powerful actors in the decision-​making phase, leading Hudson to describe the search for factors that influence policy decision-​makers and decision-​making as fpa’s “most noteworthy hallmarks” (2005: 2). One of fpa’s classical contributions, Graham Allison’s (1969: 698–​700) renowned ‘bureaucratic politics model’ (bpm), serves as an exemplification of this case in point (see also Alden & Aran 2016: 46). Formulated as an attempt to suggest alternatives to explanatory models either seeing policy decisions as the result of calculations of the state as a rational, unitary actor or as mere outputs derived from bureaucratic organisations’ standard operating procedures, bpm focuses on the negotiation and bargaining roles of individuals and groups within a government or administration in the lead-​up to a decision. This view was expanded by Morton H. Halperin (1974), explaining how political games in governmental bureaucracies distort both foreign and security policy decision-​making and implementation processes (see also Jones 2017: 6). In the context of the present research, it is noteworthy how these much-​cited works barely address the potential external

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

94 

Chapter 4

challenges related to the implementation phase of a foreign policy decision. Even decades later, fpa’s focus is still primarily targeted at understanding relations between politicians, diplomats, and other government officials. The similarities of the blind spots in fpa and ipt seem puzzling. Why are two of the most actor-​centred approaches within ir’s theoretical landscape not more receptive to the study of non-​traditional agents and processes in diplomacy’s implementation phase? For fpa, such hesitance might relate to the dominance of theory-​driven approaches, as the implementation of foreign and security policies, with all their potential fallacies, disturbances, and changing agency coalitions, might be difficult to grasp through an analytical approach that generally puts theory before practice.4 ipt, though too often consumed by internal theory-​driven skirmishes, is well-​equipped to put practice before theory. Through its inherent focus on agency relationships and patterns of social actions it should, in principle, be capable of analysing the ‘polylateral’ relationships between state and non-​state actors as constitutive of foreign policy implementation (Wiseman 2004). To dive deeper into the formation and essence of such relationships, the next section will present an analytical framework of ‘networked practices’, tailored to give further understanding to the dynamics at play in the realm of geoeconomic diplomacy. 3

Completing the Practice Turn: Networked Practices in Diplomacy’s Implementation Phase

As an analytical category, diplomacy entails both a process of claiming authority and jurisdiction, a relational interface between polities, and political practices of representing and governing (Pouliot & Cornut 2015: 299–​300). The analytical question then becomes: Against whom or what is a given process of authority claimed and a relational interaction or political representation targeted? In other words, it is important to be clear about the type of activities diplomats are engaged in –​and what these activities are intended to achieve. Focusing on processes directed at the implementation of foreign and security policy decisions, practitioners and scholars have asserted that the role of the traditional diplomat is transforming into that of a ‘networked’ diplomat responsible for connecting various relevant domestic and international actors to advance a given policy process (Bagger & von Heynitz 2012; Heine 2013). Such process 4 Other scholars have claimed that it has generally been underestimated how strongly fpa has been the platform for problem-​driven, pragmatic, and even practice-​based research agendas (Franke & Hellmann 2017).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

A New Framework for Studying Sanctions

95

thinking seems particularly relevant when considering implementation processes of diplomacy, which, so this book argues, presents diplomats with less structured, less systemised and, therefore, less stable social environments than generally found in diplomatic processes of more institutionalised negotiations and deliberations. ipt’s inherent empiricism and conceptual emphasis on relationalism and social fluidity harmonises well with the ontological foundations for thinking about the practices that hold actors relevant to the diplomatic field together in social network relationships (Bueger & Gadinger 2018; McCourt 2016; Nexon & Pouliot 2013). To further unpack the practices that constitute –​and emerge from –​the relationalism between traditional diplomats with various state and non-​state actors that are essential for ensuring an efficient implementation of the geoeconomic instrument of economic sanctions, this book argues for the analytical benefits of engaging with conceptual thinking at the intersection between ipt and network-​oriented approaches. 3.1 Actor-​Network Theory in Diplomacy Studies Actor-​network theory, with its profoundly complex and multifaceted conceptual apparatus, based on initial writings from Callon (1986a, 1986b), Latour (1987, 1996, 2005), and Law (1992), became a revolutionary attempt in social theory to capture the relationalism between all relevant actants, i.e. both human and non-​human entities with the capacity to act. Among its many contributions, ant stands out as an important corrective within the ipt landscape because of its commitment to studying the creation of practices created through social interaction itself. In ant, “action is always impelled by more than one actant, and is a property of the actor-​network, not individuals” (McCourt 2016: 481). Though ant’s role as a ‘formal’ branch within the practice-​theoretical family is disputed, the similarities between the research agendas of ipt and ant allow them to be seen as part of an overall epistemological approach to the relational study of meaningful interaction between social actors (Nicolini 2013: 178–​181). The use of ant concepts in practice-​oriented ir and diplomacy literature has so far been a limited, yet still influential, undertaking.5 While this book’s

5 As summarised by Bueger and Gadinger (2018), ant approaches have been used to study phenomena such as localised networks of transnational terrorism (Cetina 2005), networks of associations between computers and algorithms in high-​frequency financial trade (Porter 2013), the networked relations building on contradictory semantic uses of the ‘failed state’ concept by different actors working in this field (Bueger & Bethke 2014), or how networked politicisation of material artefacts turned the notion of climate change into a matter of national security (Mayer 2012) (see also Gadinger 2014: 15).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

96 

Chapter 4

framework is inspired by such approaches, it takes a step further by introducing the logic and concepts of ant into the realm of diplomatic processes and practitioners, particularly those engaged in diplomatic practices relating to the process of policy implementation. Before presenting the framework in further detail, a theoretical word of caution is needed. ant was originally coined in the 1980s and 1990s by sociologists predominately looking at practices in and of science and technology. Even if these ‘founders’ of ant neither saw themselves nor were recognised by the wider scholarly community as practice scholars, the application of ant concepts within practice-​oriented, empirical cases have brought the two theoretical approaches closer to each other. In the words of Davide Nicolini (2013: 180), influential practice scholars, such as Latour, “left the task of filling in the blanks to social scientists and their empirical intelligence.” In recent years, scholars have started to fill in the blanks in the realm of ir and dared to apply ant concepts relevant to the empirical case in question. Consequently, ipt scholars’ approach to actor-​networks has transformed into an analytical search for social practices that bring about and maintain actors in networks of mutual relations. As not all elements of ant’s theoretical apparatus are hence suited for the study of mundane practices of foreign and security policy, ir and diplomacy scholars applying ant concepts generally are generally obliged to make choices about which concepts from ant’s complex vocabulary to use and which to neglect (Best & Walters 2013: 333). The widespread conceptual eclecticism by scholars using specific parts of ant’s elaborate vocabulary thereby also reflects the fact that it should not be seen as a stand-​alone theoretical approach but rather a conglomerate of related concepts: “Given its heterogeneity and although the label actor-​network theory suggests otherwise, ant should not be understood as an established ‘research programme’, ‘paradigm’, or ‘theory’ ” (Bueger & Bethke 2014: 35; emphasis in original). In the words of Bueger, “[’using’] ant in research practice means to invent and reformulate earlier ideas in the context of actual problems and situations” (2013: 339). Such an eclectic approach, which is also pursued in this book, might be opposed by some orthodox readers. Critics should, however, acknowledge that the flourishing development of ipt is supported, rather than hampered, by its ­characteristic as a ‘trading zone’ in which scholars import, merge, and omit concepts and ideas from various practice-​theoretical approaches on the basis of what seems particularly relevant to the empirical questions at hand (Bueger & Gadinger 2018: 14). Therefore, rather than transferring ant’s complete analytical apparatus to the study of diplomacy’s implementation phase, this book

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

A New Framework for Studying Sanctions

97

suggests the application of a few select concepts. The following will explain the specific choices of this research and why they are concurrent with the basic premises held in pragmatic ipt and ant. The Framework: Bringing Actor-​Network Theory into Diplomacy Studies Arguing in a pragmatic sociological tradition, ant scholar Latour perceived social change, disruption, and controversy as sources for permanent production of new relations and, ultimately, new networks. In highlighting how the forging of actor relations is driven by mutual controversies, ant established the basic premise that social stability over time is not possible. Rather, networks are reflections of a temporary stability in which participating actors enter into mutually binding social relations, not necessarily through shared ideas or norms, but through performative practices (Gadinger 2014: 14). In the most radical ant understanding, networks are “the connections between matter and body” that take form through relations between “heterogenous materials”. In this ontological understanding, nothing exists outside of relations, and any structure must be seen as “a relational effect that recursively generates and reproduces itself” (Latour 1996: 370; see also Law 1992). In short, networks are solely based on the practices that form them, because “actors mobilize networks to win controversies and in the course of the controversies the networks themselves are changed or mediated, as Latour calls it, including all actors enrolled in a network” (Guggenheim & Potthast 2012: 163). As will be explained in greater detail, ant-​based networks are therefore not to be confused with the conventional image of a social network, which scholars have described as consisting of mutually dependent nodes that are connected through ties that transmit material and non-​material products, which together define the nodes’ room for behaviour.6 In ant, networks are “the connections between matter and body” that take form through relations between “heterogenous materials” (Latour 1996: 370). This reflects an ontological understanding in which nothing exists outside of recursively reproducing relationships (Law 1992). Put in simpler and more operational terms, 3.2

6 Conventional approaches to social networks “[start] from the basis that networks involve two elements: the ‘nodes’, each representing a special actor or location within the network; and the ‘ties’ (sometimes called edges) or connections between nodes, which channel information, resources, or other forms of influence” (Farrell & Newman 2019: 50; Hafner-​Burton et al. 2009: 562). For a radical positivist-​physicalist approach to the study of social networks, see M.E.J. Newman and Juyong Park (2003).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

98 

Chapter 4

[ant] involves studying the makeup of relational networks in which phenomena […] are given content and form through relations. The core intent of ant is consequently to describe and understand the formation of such networks and the practical work required to make them durable and stable. bueger & gadinger 2018: 82

Consequently, a study of diplomacy’s implementation phase should meaningfully look for what this book will call the ‘networked practices’ that tie diplomats with other relevant actors. These networked practices can be identified through analysing social phenomena of ‘translations’ and ‘obligatory passage points’, both derived from ant’s conceptual toolbox. Translations are the key processes that bring joint network practices into being. They are analysed to describe how actors’ objectives transform and converge over time: “Through translation, actors are being enrolled into networks and given a distinct role” (Bueger & Bethke 2014: 39). Translation processes are hence the core of social ordering, meaning that the key research objective is to “explore and describe local processes of patterning, social orchestration, ordering and resistance” (Law 1992). In fact, it is only through translations that two or more actors come into co-​existence in a given social setting (Latour 2005: 108). Focus on processes of translations also sets ant apart from conventional studies of social networks, which have traditionally been concerned with identifying “the social relations of individual human actors –​their frequency, distribution, homogeneity, proximity” (Latour 1996: 369; emphasis in original).7 In other words, to understand how diplomats work with other network actors in diplomacy’s implementation phase, one has to look for practices of such translation processes of actors’ identities and how they either strengthen or impede the overall objective of implementing a specific policy. This approach to the study of informal relations opens up for the possibility of “analysing situations in which actors refuse to comply with the identities that conventional models prescribe for them” (Bueger 2013: 340). The notion of obligatory passage points (opp s) represent the idea of one or more actors coming to play central roles in a network. opp s do so by defining the rules in a way that makes these networks actors indispensable to others (Callon 1986b), and hence carry the ability to mediate network relations and, 7 As put by Barry (2013: 414), “the identity of an actor necessarily mutates as it enters into, or is enrolled or mobilized into, a field of relations with other entities. It is the relations that matter, not the actors in themselves.”

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

A New Framework for Studying Sanctions

99

at times, define avenues of action for other network actors (Bueger & Gadinger 2018: 84). This position of situational power can, if the network is well-​ordered through sustained translation processes, be a platform for exerting internal control of the network. In other words, the analysis of opp s could help to understand situations where diplomats are not acting as passage points, i.e. when other networks actors are engaging in practices through which diplomats are fully or partly circumvented in their ability to steer processes and exert regulatory control. It should be noted that bringing together the conceptual approach of geoeconomic diplomacy with ant’s theoretical tools does not come without costs. By analysing actor-​networks based on the premise that they might influence the outcome of governments’ geoeconomic decisions, and the roles played by diplomats herein, collides with the premises of ant being “broadly inductive and place an emphasis on the detailed description of what takes place ‘on the ground’ ” (Nimmo 2011: 113). Making the ex ante assumption about the specific central role played by diplomats in actor-​networks might not harmonise with the ontological premises of radical ant theorists, who would leave this judgement up to the empirical analysis itself. However, it is argued that this ­analytical move provides helpful insights about instances where traditional diplomatic actors were not in control of practices relating to the implementation of geoeconomic policies. Moreover, ant’s basic premise is upheld in that an actor-​network’s composition and formative relations cannot be stipulated a priori, but are only identifiable through empirical research on its constitutive practices. In sum, the analysis of actor-​networks is relevant for the study of geoeconomic diplomacy in general, and for the analysis of the implementation of economic sanctions in particular, because it should ultimately help us to better understand how governments and diplomats interact within networks of broad ranges of state and non-​state actors relevant to the state-​market nexus. By identifying the key ‘networked practices’ that are formative of the actor-​ networks that emerge subsequent to a specific policy decision, the framework sets out to structure our understanding of the inter-​subjective ­dynamics between relevant actors that shape sanctions implementation. Whereas an actor-​network’s formation can be analysed through the identification of translation processes, the search for instances where diplomats either served or were circumvented as the network’s opp s gives us indications about their ability to mitigate the structural challenges that are inherent to the conduct of this form of geoeconomic diplomacy –​and also their ability to leverage network relations according to the political decision in question.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

100 

Chapter 4

Critiques, Limitations, and Competing Understandings of Social Networks Whereas the essence of what determines network relations resonates well with the analytical demand for addressing the implementation phase of (geoeconomic) diplomacy, the adoption of ant concepts into the world of ir is not without difficulties and limitations (Barry 2013: 419–​426). Addressing the apparent difficulties of adapting actor-​network concepts to ir, Bueger and Gadinger have explained how insights from ant literature have still formed the basis of various important studies on topics such as climate change, failed states, and democratic peace. At the same time, the authors draw the conclusion that “the language employed [in ant studies] can be opaque and lead to rather quirky concepts and terms” (Bueger & Gadinger 2018: 87). The reason for this ‘quirkiness’ is embedded in the theory’s intellectual roots: Before anything else, ant was formed as a radical approach to sociology and technoscience, leading to the development of a broad and complex analytical apparatus, geared to encompass relations beyond those traditionally captured by sociological studies. One of ant’s most crucial propositions was the analytical parity between human and non-​human ‘actants’, meaning that both human and material objects should methodologically be understood as potential elements in actor-​ networks. Beyond the ethical concerns inherent to such a stance, the proposition of refusing to draw a distinction between the social and material world has since received widespread criticism (Bueger & Gadinger 2018: 87). Indeed, when thinking about the inherently human-​centred world of diplomacy, such an approach is not intuitive, though ant’s insistence on the relevance of ‘materialism’ in diplomatic interaction is a valuable reminder to consider the interplay between human and non-​human agency as relevant to diplomatic practice. However, for the purpose of this book, the parity between human and non-​human actors will not be at the centre of analysis. While this represents a theoretical limitation and stands in contrast to the radical ­ontological potential in ant’s approach, the basic premise of actor-​networks’ formations through relational ‘translation’ processes is upheld and hence analytically useable. Such an selective use of ant is, furthermore, not unique: when applied in practice, actor-​network studies have generally tended to focus more on the agency of humans than of non-​humans (Sismondo 2010: 90). Another point of criticism to this book’s use of ant may relate to the conceptual assumptions on which the proposed analytical framework is based. As explained in the preceding chapter, the study of geoeconomic diplomacy relates to an observation about the structural challenges that diplomats face when operating in the state-​market nexus. This a priori ‘fixation’ on specific structural conditions might stand in contrast to ant’s traditional insistence on 3.3

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

A New Framework for Studying Sanctions

101

ontological parsimony. At the same time, it should be recalled that the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy does not itself entail assumptions about actors’ motivations or agendas, but merely captures and describes an empirical realm of diplomatic activity to be further scrutinised. While admittedly pushing the idea of actor-​networks into a more conceptually determined reading than Latour and others would have favoured (Bueger 2013: 339), this approach at the same time addresses another criticism of ant, namely its inability to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro’ level of analysis, and hence to give meaning to phenomena outside the directly accessible and traceable for the researcher (Nexon & Pouliot 2013: 344). Whereas the critique of working with “abstract and decontextualized formal descriptors, decoupled from the substantive texture of the practices that they are meant to make empirically describable” (Walter 2019: 556) has been targeted at practice-​theoretical approaches to ir at large, ant has been described as particularly incapable of capturing larger structural phenomena and power relations (Bueger & Gadinger 2018: 87). By suggesting an application of ant’s concepts of translation and obligatory passage points to the realm of diplomatic interaction and relationship building, this book’s approach can hopefully help to advance ant’s usability in diplomacy studies in a way that only partially compromises the ontological convictions of Latour and his followers. Further, as mentioned, practice-​based networks are not to be confused with the conventional, rationalistic understandings of a social network. The strength of such accounts of social networks lies in the analytical ability to quantify the durability of specified ties between rational actors, and hence to propose a clearer, and even ‘calculated’, vision of each actor’s role in a given network structure (Schulze & Ries 2017). In this context, social network analysis (sna) searches for ties between actors that are particularly intense, characterised by a close proximity –​or both (Granovetter 1973). This analytical move is for instance done through placing specific actors as the central node in a so-​called ‘ego-​network’ (Marin & Wellman 2011).8 This resembles ant’s conception of an obligatory passage point, though the analytical premise is different. Whereas studies of sna define their analytical starting point based on the participating actors, ant’s basic premise is to begin with the formation of relations and then address the question of opp s. This more holistic and 8 Heath et al. (2009: 648) describe an ego-​network as “a network consisting of (i) a starting point individual who is variously referred to as an ego, a focal individual or an entry point … and (ii) the individuals who are directly linked to the ego …”. In contrast, complete networks “are based upon all of the links which exist between entities within a predefined and bounded population”.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

102 

Chapter 4

less assumption-​driven approach to the study of social networks makes ant more attuned to observing relations arising out of social controversy rather than social proximity. Furthermore, ant’s insistence on social fluidity and potential dissolutions of networks makes it more sensitive to change over time than the static network conceptualisation that sna’s allow for (Borgatti et al. 2013; Schulze & Ries 2017). For the present study, this quality is particularly relevant, as it keeps open the analytical lens for encompassing relations and practices between actors that would usually seem ‘non-​traditional’ to the diplomatic field. The conceptualisation of actor-​networks also resembles, while being decisively distinct from, another commonly used ipt concept: communities of practice. As explained by Græger (2017: 350–​352), the notion of a community entails a certain degree of continued joint learning and a sense of a defined, though not necessarily formalised, membership. In contrast, the actor-​network approach is less deterministic and more open to social change, as networks are constantly created and dismantled only by virtue of the relationalism between its constituting parts (Passoth & Rowland 2010: 826). Networks are therefore, in essence, understood as fluctuating social entities that, in analytical terms, neither rule out the possibility for actors to be part of multiple and even overlapping networks nor the creation and destruction of networks on a case-​by-​case basis. This analytical departure point helps to capture the inherent volatility diplomats might find themselves particularly confronted with when operating outside institutionalised actor-​settings, such as is, for example, often the case in the realm of geoeconomic diplomacy. No matter which image of a network or a group consisting of social actors is theoretically evoked, the ontological difficulty that pertains to highlighting the actions or influence of one specific network actor over others opens up the well-​known gates of (constructivist) ir’s agency-​structure problem (Giddens 1984; Wendt 1999). Confronting this fallacy, network theorists have struggled with the puzzle of embedded agency (Powell & DiMaggio 1991), which is likewise significant for the present approach: If actors are embedded in an institutional field and subject to regulative, normative and cognitive processes that structure their cognitions, define their interests and produce their identities […] how are they able to envision new practices and then subsequently get others to adopt them? garud et al. 2007: 961

This dilemma particularly pertains to pragmatic approaches of practice studies that –​contrary to Bourdieu-​inspired ones –​search for the creative capacity

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

A New Framework for Studying Sanctions

103

of individual actors. Pragmatic practice scholars generally propose that “actors in particular positions can, if not escape ‘habitus’, at least take advantage of the friction inherent in contradictory networks” (Goddard 2009: 275). At the same time, investigating diplomats as an actor-​network’s opp runs the risk of presenting the reader with a tautological argument: states’ diplomatic representatives are indispensable to geoeconomic actor-​networks because geoeconomic action is a form of state behaviour. This study seeks to overcome this challenge by investigating the circumstances within a specific actor-​network that made it possible, or not, for diplomats to act as the network’s opp s. This move, in turn, violates particular aspects of the assumptions inherent to ant’s ontological basis, namely that opp s cannot be identified ex ante to the interpretative study of the network’s underlying practices. These limitations vis-​à-​vis orthodox ant approaches must, however, be accepted to pave the way for engaging in a meaningful discussion about the specific role of diplomats in the struggles for implementing geoeconomic policies. 4

Methodology and Data Collection: Challenges, Choices, and Consequences

Methodological challenges of tautologies and unfalsifiable theories are common, even endemic, in social science. Like other studies of ir, practice and network theoretical approaches can only overcome these by adhering to careful and stringent data collection and testing (Goddard 2009: 274). This data demand, however, itself poses a distinctive challenge to practice theorists. In assessing the methodological requirements for practice-​inspired research, Pouliot concluded that this line of inquiry is “the farthest thing on earth from taking a shortcut” (2012: 54). The suggested ant-​based approach to the study of diplomatic ‘networked practices’ of policy implementation could be further sensitive hereto, both because the use of ant concepts requires “attention to empirical detail” (Bueger 2013: 340) and because the form of practice analysis applied in this study moves the analytical focus from the institutionalised settings within bureaucratic organisations or formal negotiation fora out into the more abstract and hence socially less clearly demarcated greater space of diplomatic practices in the state-​market realm. These challenges, and the ways to address them, will be discussed in the following sections. 4.1 Accessing Practices through Praxiography For the study of practices, scholars have proposed the methodology of praxiography, understood as the ‘practice of doing practice theory driven research’

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

104 

Chapter 4

(Mol 2002). Whereas the suffix ‘-​graphy’ refers to the concern to record, describe, and make reconstructions, the prefix ‘praxio’ suggests that it is the study of practices rather than, for example, the study of culture (‘ethno’) (Bueger & Gadinger 2018: 138). At the heart of praxiography is the interpretative approach to restructuring actors’ implicit background knowledge and how it interplays with bodily movements and artefacts (Bueger 2014). Such background knowledge can be traced through the researcher’s focus on particular spatial sites, by following objects or artefacts, or by analysing situations of crisis and controversies. In line with the reasoning behind ant, the book’s second case study, presented in the next chapter, will zoom in on potential ‘controversies’ relating to the implementation of sanctions. By studying instances where actors are faced with the necessity of adapting to unforeseen events on the ground, “we can more easily see practices at work, as actors are forced to justify what they are doing” (Bueger 2014: 396–​397). The pragmatic approach to the study of practices, as applied in this book, further calls for taking the “internal perspective of practitioners much more seriously” as “social inquiry ought to take a much closer look at the vocabularies that practitioners use in describing and justifying their practice” (Grimmel & Hellmann 2019: 207–​208). In other words, the objective of pragmatism is to “empower practitioners to solve the problems with which they are confronted” (Schindler & Wille 2019: 7). Studying practices based on a pragmatic approach hence entails an empirical engagement with the actors and practices involved in a specific field of study, meaning that methods for data collection and analysis generally must go beyond the mere study of written material and actors’ verbalisations of interest and ideas. On the contrary, practice scholars are faced with the challenge of engaging with the research subject, either directly (via participant observation or ethnographic studies) or through ‘proxies’ (such as expert interviews or textual analysis). The complexity of methodological plurality, extensive data collection, and the need for researchers to engage beyond ‘armchair analysis’ by gathering contextual data from the field are common, and well-​described, demands for ipt scholars (Neumann 2002: 427–​429; Pouliot & Cornut 2015: 308). Yet, even though praxiography builds on a mix of data sources, especially in the realm of ir, it also faces reoccurring methodological challenges related to matters of access and scale (MacKay & Levin 2015: 164). This also holds true for this study. And while the challenges of access and scale will not be transcended, the following explains how this book seeks to mitigate the challenges –​which, in turn, opens the door for other potential criticisms. Access is often a relevant concern for practice scholars focusing on international affairs, as researchers’ admittance to relevant sites and actors is often restricted due to sensitivities surrounding the fields of foreign and security

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

A New Framework for Studying Sanctions

105

policy and diplomacy. This book here benefits from the author’s own professional background as a diplomatic practitioner, working in proximity to the two case studies of sanctions implementation presented herein, which gives unique access to contextual observations and relevant actors close to the practices in question. At the same time, this position as a ‘researching practitioner’ entails a number of methodological challenges, which will be discussed further below. Scale refers to an inherent problem regarding the limitation of extrapolating observations from the level of individual sets of practices to the level of global relations, systems, or structures –​and thereby to key aspects of ir’s overall research agenda. And even though practice scholars, and particularly those relying on praxiography as their main methodological avenue, reject pre-​ conceptualised notions such as ‘micro’, ‘meso’, ‘macro’, etc. as meaningful categories, the move from locally observed practices to globally relevant conclusions is not an easy one, yet one that is often aspired to for becoming recognised in ir’s disciplinary landscape. ipt scholars have thus proven quite pragmatic in their engagements with various scales of aggregation. The study of actor-​ networks, which can only be analytically captured based on the local practices that are formed among relevant actors, requires special attention to this urge for scaling local practices to broader societal contexts. In this vein, Bueger and Gadinger (2018: 141–​143) point to Nicolini’s recommendation of ‘zooming in’ and ‘zooming out’.9 This entails –​by zooming in –​to first identify connections between localised practices, to observe how these form nets of action, and –​ by zooming out –​to establish which effects these have on the ‘wider picture’, i.e. to situate the practices of actor-​networks in their broader societal context (Nicolini 2013: 230–​235). The zooming out from localised practices thus pushes the researcher to ask questions about a specific actor-​network’s relations to other nets of practices. In this process, the researcher needs to be particularly sensitive to the risks of ‘loosing connection’ between the localised practices at the heart of the actor-​network and the wider picture being discussed. Such a process of zooming out will be endeavoured in ­chapter 6, where the actor-​ network formative to the implementation of the EU’s Syria sanctions is discussed in the context of how it relates to and is impeded by other geoeconomic actor-​networks operating in the context of the war in Syria. 9 Though Nicolini assesses that “Latour and his followers cannot be considered practice theorists”, he readily acknowledges that “practice theory and actor-​network theory also share a number of family resemblances, [meaning] that these concepts and methodological recommendations can be equally employed to investigate the connectedness of practices” (Nicolini 2013: 230–​231).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

106 

Chapter 4

Data Collection through ‘Multimethod Research’: Qualitative Interviews, Textual Analysis, and Ethnographic Observations While the advice to first look for practices of localised actor-​networks and then contextualise these networked practices in the wider social setting they are performed in is analytically valuable, it also hints at the demand for data collection and analysis. Consistent with the recommendations of conducting qualitative research along the lines of both grounded theory10 and practice theory, the book’s analytical chapters build on qualitative data from various methodological sources (Bueger & Gadinger 2018: 143–​155; Johnson & Walsh 2019). This ‘multimethod’ approach11 primarily consists of qualitative interviews with experts in the field of geoeconomics and economic sanctions, textual analysis of key documents from primarily national and international executive and legislative institutions, as well as the author’s own ethnographical observations from his time as a diplomatic practitioner in various contexts relevant to the book’s two case studies. In this way, the research makes use of all three main sources of data collection available to practice scholars seeking to understand the “dispositional space” within which actors perform formative practices (Pouliot 2012: 48–​50). The study’s primary data source stems from a total of 58 expert interviews conducted in 2017 (case i) and 2020 (case ii), respectively. Respondents were both ‘traditional’ diplomatic representatives from European mfa s, the European Commission, and the eeas, in addition to other executive bodies (such as offices of heads of states and governments, line ministries, and state agencies) as well as non-​state actors (ngo s, business representatives, interest organisations, financial institutions, and legal counsels). In both case studies, interviews were conducted in two rounds, in some instances reoccurring interviews with the same respondent. The first interview rounds served to uncover the broader political and social context in question. The second focused on the specific practices at play regarding EU sanctions implementation. Given the topicality of both the 4.2

10

11

This book’s research design resembles the approach advances by proponents of grounded theory, a well-​known and widely used tradition of social science research closely related to interpretative (hermeneutic) analysis, particularly in its constructivist-​leaning version (Clarke 2019: 15). Interpretative studies aim to describe, explain, and understand the lived experiences and ‘inside’ knowledge of a group of individuals (Charmaz 1996: 30). According to John Brewer and Albert Hunter (2006: 4) “multimethod research is research that uses multiple methods and/​or methodologies, and ‘[i]‌ts fundamental strategy is to attack a research problem with an arsenal of methods that have nonoverlapping weaknesses in addition to their complementary strengths” (cited in Johnson & Walsh 2019: 521–​522, emphasis in original).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

A New Framework for Studying Sanctions

107

Russia and Syria sanctions in contemporary EU foreign and security policy, all interviews were conducted in full confidentiality. To further create an open atmosphere, all interviews were only documented through the author’s note taking, as many respondents would not have accepted audio recording of the conversations. While this approach certainly strengthened the number of accessible respondents, and hence the study’s validity, such note taking bears the risk of over-​interpretation by the researcher, which in turn has a negative impact on the study’s reliability. In this vein, qualitative researchers have at length discussed how expert interviews are a powerful yet difficult source of information, as respondents often provide a reflexive analysis of the implicit knowledge and understanding the researcher seeks to access (Cornut 2017: 15). They need to be carefully conducted with the view to ‘uncovering’ the respondent’s background beliefs and to understand the practical actions, reactions, and relationships the respondent partakes in under specific circumstances. In this way, interviews can serve as a ‘proxy’ for directly observing the practices in question. The study’s utilisation of textual analysis is mostly drawn from formally issued government documents such as legal acts, official guidelines, and organisational reports. Though the rules, regulations, and guidance found in such documents are not directly representative of the practices in question, they are helpful hints to guide the research in the direction of the background knowledge that informs such practices (Bueger 2014: 401–​402). Finally, the study rests on ethnographical notes from the author’s time as a diplomatic practitioner working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and in close proximity to both case studies: as a foreign policy adviser at the Danish embassies in Berlin and Paris (2011–​2016) and as Denmark’s senior stabilisation adviser to Syria (2017–​2019). This methodological choice is in line with the study’s overall ‘interpretivist’ approach, meaning that the ethnographic observations are not used to produce “abstract knowledge”, but “new ways of seeing and thereby challenge existing … categories of practice and analysis” (Schatz 2009: 15). Also, rather than disclosing insights into what was discussed among diplomatic practitioners, which would not be compatible with the author’s legal and ethical commitments of professional confidentiality, the notes are read in the context of interpreting how relationships are formed and performed in the field of geoeconomic diplomacy and where to ‘look’ further. In that sense, by looking for what actors are doing and how they structure their work and relations (Sedlačko 2017), the ethnographical observations serve as a unique background knowledge for structuring the case studies and guiding the research in a complex and wide-​reaching field of diplomatic

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

108 

Chapter 4

practices.12 However, while highly useful for investigating the book’s overall research question, the researcher’s proximity to the practices under investigation might also raise methodological question. The author’s particular relationship to the research subject thus demands a few words of reflection and clarification. 4.3 The Researching Practitioner vs the Practicing Researcher A researcher’s position vis-​à-​vis the subject research matter represents an inherent and well-​described tension in practice-​theoretical studies. As noted by Cornut (2017: 15), the epistemology of practice research puts the researcher in a position “characterised by a subtle equilibrium between distance and involvement, between an understanding of practices ‘from the inside’ and ‘from the outside’ of the field under study”, meaning that “it is impossible to study practices without being reflective”. Cornut here cites the sound advice of Friedrich Kratochwil (2011: 38), reminding practice researchers about the necessity of “embedding the practice of knowledge production in wider social processes” and situating themselves in the study of practices as members of specific societal groups or cultures. Particularly in research designs based on the interpretivist methodology of abduction,13 such as the present, both the researcher’s explicit presuppositions and unconscious beliefs about the subject at hand become directly relevant for the research’s results. This not only warrants the research process to be as transparent as possible (Franke & Weber 12

13

The use of ethnographic methods in diplomatic practice studies is not without critics. In assessing what he names the ‘flirt ethnographique’ of ipt, David Grondin has lamented ipt and constructivist scholars’ attempts at using ethnographic studies to overcome the ir discipline’s reoccurring agent-​structure conundrum. Following the (post-​structuralist) critique of Grondin and others (Vrasti 2008), ipt’s attempt to treat observed practices as raw data obscures that the researcher cannot escape her own subjectivity and interpretation: “Comme chercheur en sciences sociales, nous sommes condamnés à ‘observer les observateurs et interpréter les interprètes’ ” (Grondin 2017: 246; quoted from Knutsen 1997: 280). Constructivist grounded theory fundamentally relies on the researcher’s ability to reason and make conceptual and theoretical interferences about empirical observations and experiences, but also continually refine these theoretical reasonings through the addition of further data (Charmaz 2006; Strauss & Corbin 1998). The process of analysis is thereby both inductive (the generalisation of data, i.e. ‘what is going on here?’) and abductive (the relation of unexpected observations to other observations through plausible relationships and the construction of conceptual or theoretical approaches, i.e. ‘what is this a case of?’) (Reichertz 2019: 268; Tavory & Timmermans 2019: 335–​541). The approach to grounded theory, applied in this research, therefore aims at both the analysis of social conundrums and at the enrichment of conceptual and theoretical approaches for studying them (Clarke 2019: 14).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

A New Framework for Studying Sanctions

109

2012: 674), but also situates the author’s relationship to the research subject, particularly in this study. The approach taken in this research is in line with other (rare) examples of practice-​based studies formed around long-​term ethnographical observations and expert interviews in the diplomatic realm. As noted by Joseph MacKay and Jamie Levin, the Norwegian scholar Iver B. Neumann, who conducted extensive studies based on observations as a ‘researching practitioner’ in a three-​year secondment to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry (Neumann 2002, 2012), “is almost alone in accessing the upper levels of government institutions and gathering ethnographic data in real time and at length” (MacKay & Levin 2015: 167). In contrast hereto, Lequesne, who more recently concluded a remarkably extensive and valuable study of the inner workings of the French Foreign Ministry, was allowed to enter the Parisian ministry and French representations abroad to partake in meetings and daily routines over an extended time as a ‘practicing researcher’ to describe the ministry’s inner workings (Lequesne 2017). Both types of ‘immersion’ into the lived reality of diplomacy hold the promise of creating unique empirical evidence. This book’s approach resembles Neumann’s, in that the author’s professional experience with the book’s two case studies will have had a direct influence on his presuppositions for the research subject, in addition to giving him unique access to relevant interviewees. This role as a ‘researching practitioner’ raises at least two methodological concerns. First, even the most conscious researcher faces limitations when tasked with interpreting the practices formative of a professional environment she or he has been a part of or worked in close proximity to. Even the most careful triangulation of results and conclusions will not eliminate the reader’s room for scepticism regarding the author’s intentional or unintentional empirical or conceptual bias. Second, the author might be faced with ethical concerns, both in relation to the author’s perception of his or her professional environment as a research subject or matters of professional confidentiality. To mitigate these concerns, all empirical information conveyed in this book is triangulated with data from the conducted expert interviews and/​or textual evidence, meaning that no disclosed information in the following case studies stems solely from the author’s observations or interpretations.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

­c hapter 5

Sanctioning Syria

The Networked Practices Shaping EU Sanctions Implementation

How can networked practices be identified in actual cases of sanctions use? What do they tell us about the specific possibilities and limits to sanctions’ implementation and the role of diplomats played herein? And which lessons does this hold for the practicability of the increasing political ambitions of EU institutions and Member States for responding to geostrategic adversaries through the use of large-​scale sanctions regimes? The following chapter applies the analytical framework of ‘networked practices’ to examine the book’s second case study, the EU’s decision of 2011 to impose the geoeconomic instrument of economic sanctions against the Syrian Arab Republic. By zooming in on the various translation processes that came to dominate the ­implementation phase of the sanctions, the chapter analyses the networked practices –​and the various state and non-​state actors herein –​that came to ‘order’ this case of geoeconomic diplomacy. The EU’s consistent policy, since 2011, to target the political and economic interests of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-​Assad through wide-​reaching individual and sectorial sanctions, constitutes one of the largest and most encompassing EU sanctions packages ever imposed. This makes it a valuable case for understanding how emerging networked practices can come to steer the path of sanctions implementation. Through the application of the book’s analytical framework, the case study will point to examples of key processes where diplomats were limited in their ability to steer how the legal provisions of the EU sanctions would be interpreted in practice by both salient governmental and private actors, such as companies, banks, law firms, and ngo s. As will be discussed in greater detail, it is exactly these instances of limited governmental ‘reach’ that illustrate the fundamental difficulties in exercising effective and comprehensive geoeconomic diplomatic action. 1

Case ii: EU Sanctions on Syria –​a Framework-​Driven Analysis of Networked Practices

Against the backdrop of the multiple revolutionary movements that unfolded across the Middle East and North Africa in late 2010 and early 2011, and the

© Kim B. Olsen, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004518834_007

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Sanctioning Syria

111

resulting geostrategically volatile environment, many EU foreign policy-​makers were caught baffled and at times bewildered, not knowing how to choose between different tools in their foreign and security policy toolboxes to react properly to the somewhat similar, yet different, cross-​regional developments. The range of instruments put into practice would eventually be wide: From expressions of political support and halting economic assistance and military aid for countries such as Tunisia and Egypt to the decision by the EU, the US, and Arab allies to intervene militarily in what was deemed to be a looming massacre in Libya’s Benghazi (P. H. Gordon 2020). Somewhere in between these measures resided the decisions, taken separately yet in parallel in Washington D.C. and Brussels, to target the Syrian regime with ­encompassing economic sanctions. Particularly for EU decision-​makers and diplomats, this situation was not only of difficult nature, but would also unfold at a moment of institutional renewal of the joint EU foreign and security policy architecture. As foreseen in the EU’s new legal framework, the Treaty of Lisbon that entered into force in 2009, the eeas was formally established in December 2010, only weeks before the first signs of the Arab uprisings would show in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere, putting pressure on the EU’s ability to respond to these dramatic events (Bremberg 2016: 432–​433). Member States’ decisions to adopt far-​ reaching sanctions policies in such a disorderly setting, in both geostrategic and institutional terms, serve as a useful starting point to analyse the types of processes that came to translate scattered action into joint networked practices as well as to identify how diplomats from EU institutions as well as from Member States were able –​or not –​to influence these networked practices of sanctions implementation. The EU’s first restrictive measures against Syria were adopted in May 2011 in reaction to the brutal repression by the security forces of president Assad against the civil protests that had erupted a few weeks earlier in southern Syria, demanding dignity after decades of political and economic impoverishment. Among the EU’s first steps was the adoption of a general arms embargo, a ban against the trade of equipment with the potential of being used for internal repression, and travel restrictions and asset freezes for 13 persons and entities within or close to the Assad regime (EU Council 2011a, 2011b). Soon, EU restrictive measures also came to include sectorial trade restrictions. By imposing both targeted and sectorial measures, the EU’s approach also demonstrated a rare acceptance to compromise on a set of joint basic sanctions principles, first endorsed in 2004. As part of these principles, EU Member States had agreed to prioritise ‘smart’, i.e. individually targeted, sanctions over sectorial ones (EU Council 2004). Beyond the embargos on arms, equipment, goods, and technology that could have a so-​called ‘dual-​use’ for internal repression or military

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

112 

Chapter 5

conduct, Member States imposed bans on trade with oil and petroleum products and on investments in the Syrian oil sector. In a move to isolate the Assad regime, and thus to limit its ability to engage in international financial markets, the EU further prohibited financial projects and loans through both the European Investment Bank and private actors from EU Member States and initiated a freeze of assets held in Europe by both the Syrian Central Bank and the Commercial Bank of Syria. Additional trade-​related restrictions were established through bans on the trade of luxury goods and a partial suspension of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and Syria from 1977. Particularly over the first 18 months, EU Member States expanded the sectorial trade bans and listed numerous further Syrian individuals and firms. These measures would come to be added to the already existent body of multilateral UN-​mandated as well as unilateral EU and US sanctions against Syria.1 Furthermore, the EU sanctions from 2011 onwards were adopted in parallel to similar –​though not identical –​US sanctions against Damascus.2 After half a decade of sanctions implementation, a UN commissioned report concluded that Syria had become the target of one of the “most complicated and far-​reaching sanction regimes ever imposed” (Walker 2016: 6). And even though the Assad regime actively sought to mitigate the sanctions’ consequences through diversification strategies (Seeberg 2014), the negative material impact on the Syrian economy was immediately felt, given that until then, the most important trade relationship for the Syrian economy was with the EU. From 2010 to 2013, EU trade flows with Syria fell by almost 88 per cent, from an annual trade volume of eur 7,331 million to eur 888 million. In the same period, EU imports from Syria fell by 96 per cent (European Commission 2019). The legal basis for the EU’s restrictive measures against Syria is still today derived from Council Regulation 36/​2012 from January 2012 (which repealed and replaced the original Council Regulation 442/​2011) and Council Decision 2013/​255/​C FSP. The scope and target of these measures have been amended numerous times over the years, which has added further complexity to the sanctions design. Given the scale of these sanctions, scholars have argued that

1 Some of the international community’s most recent sanctions against Syria before 2011 had been adopted by the unsc in reaction to the involvement of individuals, linked to the Syrian government, in the events that led to the killing of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. Further sanctions, particularly by the US, had been adopted before 2011 in response to the Syrian state’s alleged amassment of chemical weapons (Abe 2020). 2 The relationship between the EU and US sanctions regimes will be examined in greater detail in ­chapter 6.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

113

Sanctioning Syria

the Syria case was the “real turning point” of the EU’s use of restrictive measures after the Arab Spring (Boogaerts et al. 2016). The EU’s sanctions practices against other countries in the Middle East and North Africa experiencing violent upheavals and heavy governmental repression of civilians protestors, such as Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia, turned out to be more prudent. As noted, the comprehensive Syria sanctions thereby became the first real test case for how the EU’s use of restrictive measures would unfold within its new overarching legal framework established through the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009. The new treaty text for the first time clearly defined the EU’s use of individually targeted sanctions (Portela 2015: 43). This option had not been explicitly stipulated by prior treaties in which individuals were targeted through a “far-​reaching interpretation” of the legal framework for adopting general economic sanctions against third states (Van Elsuwege 2011: 491). Therefore, the Syria sanctions were not only unprecedented in terms of their scope, but were also implemented on new legal grounds, thereby challenging diplomatic actors to think and act creatively in an unparalleled situation of uncertainty, encompassing a myriad of diplomatic and non-​diplomatic actors. 2

Defend or Dispute? The Heated Policy Debate about the EU Sanctions’ Role in the Syria Crisis

The EU’s Syria sanctions have since their initial inception in 2011–​2012 been subject to highly politicised and heatedly debates among policy-​makers, diplomats, ngo s, political analysts, and other actors with interest in the Syrian war. Almost paradoxically, they have received only modest attention in the academic sanctions literature, particularly in comparison with the encompassing scholarly attention to comparable EU sanctions packages, such as those targeted against Russia (2014-​) and Iran (2007-​). Academic contributions in the early design and implementation phase of the Syria sanctions laid important groundwork for understanding their origins and initial scope (Boogaerts et al. 2016; Portela 2012; Seeberg 2014; Thomas 2013) and pointed to their possible negative humanitarian consequences (Moret 2015). Since then, the Syria sanctions debate has been overly preoccupied with their strategic and humanitarian effects. Examining the strategic consequences of the EU’s repeated d­ ecisions to use the geoeconomic instrument of sanctions in geopolitical conflicts, scholars have criticised that the EU’s sanctions against Syria (and Iran) undermine the UN sanctions mechanisms and thereby the unsc as such, arguing that the EU sanctions either directly or indirectly carry a certain responsibility for the overall deadlock within the unsc, which has

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

114 

Chapter 5

been prevalent throughout much of the Syria crisis (Orakhelashvili 2015: 19). Others, including European think tanks, have repeatedly questioned whether the EU’s use of sanctions, in the end, is helpful to reach the aim of behavioural change by the Assad regime (Barnes-​Dacey 2020; Samaha 2019). Focusing on the humanitarian aspects, observers have also criticised how unilateral coercive measures of both the EU and the US have not granted sufficient room for humanitarian exemptions, effectively undermining efforts of international organisations and ngo s to alleviate the sufferings of Syrians caught for more than a decade in the abyss of warfare (Azar & Charif 2020; Lund 2019). More radical critics of Western sanctions against Syria identify them as main culprits behind the catastrophic situation that the Syrian economy has plummeted into, comparing economic sanctions to “carpet bombing” (Dobbins 2019) or holding that Western sanctions’ “accompanying measures on Syrian foreign trade and state institutions […] have led to the most severe impact on the livelihood of the population and the future of the country” (Aita 2020: 70). Such critical assessments of the humanitarian consequences that can result from wide-​scale economic coercion were particularly formed by the experiences of the Iraq sanctions that were at the core of unsc Resolution 661, initiated in August 1990 as a direct response to Saddam Hussein’s assault on Kuwait (Nephew 2018: 17–​26). Whereas observers would agree that the sectorial sanctions had had significant impact on the collapse of Iraq’s national economy and hence on the general impoverishment of Iraq’s population, disputes about evidence-​based causation between the sanction measures and alleged consequences such as excessive child mortality would arise in the aftermath (Dyson & Cetorelli 2017; Spagat 2010), de facto portraying the difficulty of isolating the economic impact of sanctions from other factors such as governmental corruption and mismanagement.3 While some of these normative aspects of sanctions use will be discussed in the book’s concluding chapter, it should be noted that the analysis of the geoeconomic diplomacy behind EU sanctions implementation, as proposed in the present analysis, is of a more descriptive nature. Rather than primarily addressing the question whether the EU should apply economic sanctions against Syria or not, the analysis takes a step back to unveil the networked practices that take place at the level of diplomacy once decision-​makers have decided to go down this path. 3 Studies about the ‘unintended effects’, ‘humanitarian consequences’ or ‘collateral damage’ produced by the use of (mainly sectorial) sanctions have been conducted with regards to Iran (Aloosh et al. 2019; Lam 2020), Cuba (Garfield & Santana 1997; Hernández-​Truyol 2009), and North Korea (R. Cohen 2018; Zadeh-​Cummings & Harris 2020).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

115

Sanctioning Syria

3

Practices of Actor-​Networks: Implementing the EU’s Syria Sanctions

In applying the analytical framework developed in the previous chapter, the analysis will identify and elaborate the practices of actor-​networks that came to be constitutive of the EU’s use of economic sanctions. By carefully scrutinising the background knowledge that enabled certain patterns of behaviour, the analysis first zooms in on the major translation processes that evolved between diplomats and other actors relevant to the sanctions’ implementation. The four major practices of enforcement, monitoring, refinement, and deterrence are identified as playing a particularly constitutive role of the sanctions implementation phase. In zooming out from these individual practices, it is discussed how they formed the actor-​network that came to guide the sanctions implementation, and how EU diplomats succeeded, or not, in claiming their roles as obligatory passage points in the process. 3.1 Enforcement Practices Any sanctions regime’s effectiveness rests on its coherent enforcement. The specific context of the EU’s Syria sanctions would, however, make it a case where new types of enforcement practices would bind an unusually large number of various actors together, hence becoming a key practice of the emerging actor-​network. On top of being one of the most complex and quickly designed sets of EU restrictive measures to date, the Syria sanctions’ unique –​and hence disruptive –​character was only emboldened by the fact that they were to be implemented against a country witnessing a disruptive armed conflict. In consequence, the limited physical access to Syria for external observers, and particularly for EU diplomats who, with few exceptions, left the country in the years of 2011–​2013, meant that the oversight over the sanctions’ actual enforcement would be extremely difficult to maintain, heightening the risk of possible sanctions circumvention by third states or private actors. EU policy-​makers and diplomats soon came to realise that these specific circumstances would have a major impact on the overall credibility of the quickly growing sanctions regime, should it be possible for opponents of the sanctions to document that they were not enforced effectively. In this precarious context, EU diplomats and various competent authorities at the level of Member States came to rely on the insights and proactive actions by numerous actors such as intelligence agencies, interest groups, businesses, private operators, and ngo s with links, and at times direct access, to Syria. Through these quickly multiplying contacts emerged a set of enforcement practices that would become an important social ‘glue’ between sanctions-​interested actors, both inside and outside of

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

116 

Chapter 5

EU governments. The various aspects of the enforcement practices would vary with the type of sanctions in question. Individually targeted sanctions, such as travel bans and asset freezes, were formally to be enforced by so-​called competent authorities within each Member State.4 Whereas travel bans were to be enforced through the border and immigration authorities of individual Member States, effectuated through warnings against sanctioned individuals in the Schengen Areas joint information system sis ii, asset freezes were primarily to be enforced by private banks and financial institutions which would frequently receive updated and consolidated lists from their respective national authorities, containing names of individuals to be banned from access to financial activities in the EU. Even if it is debatable whether such measures came to have an actual material impact, or were predominantly of ‘symbolic’ value, EU diplomats and Syrian quasi-​ state and non-​state actors critical of the regime would over time develop joint understandings about the necessity for sanctions to be rigorously enforced to the greatest extent possible in order to maintain their political and symbolic legitimacy. This understanding was underpinned by the engagement of many actors in sanctions enforcement. One aspect hereof related to the consolidating practices by various actors to share information about possible attempts of targeted individuals to circumvent the sanctions. Such information would either be dispatched to capital-​based diplomats via national intelligence services or via EU diplomats posted in Syria’s neighbouring countries of Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, who would receive such allegations about possible sanctions enforcement flaws via first-​or second-​hand accounts from aid workers, ngo s, and business people with access to Syria. Through these channels, diplomats also learned about weaknesses in the EU border controls, such as when sanctioned individuals would land in private planes on smaller European air strips without sufficient technical equipment for checking possible entry bans on Syrian individuals. Similarly, diplomats would receive indications about the Syrian government’s practice of providing sanctioned individuals with ‘official’ passports containing fabricated biometric data, likewise undermining a comprehensive enforcement of travel restrictions. In essence, the ability of diplomats and law enforcement agencies to trace and modify enforcement practices was dependent on numerous conventional and non-​conventional sources of 4 As elaborated in articles 3 and 4 of EU Council Decision 2011/​273/​c fsp (EU Council 2011a), annex iii of EU Council Regulation 36/​2012, which forms part of the current legal basis of the EU Syria sanctions, contains an overview of websites that lists each Member State’s nationally appointed competent authorities (EU Council 2012: 23–​24).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Sanctioning Syria

117

information, who together came to act as an emerging network of sanctions implementation oversight, with major roles plays by various non-​state and private actors. As for the asset freezes, diplomats would already in 2011 use multiple channels to receive information about widespread sanctions evasions by targeted individuals. Such evasions could, for example, happen through transfers of monetary assets from targeted individuals to bank accounts of either non-​ targeted individuals or to their own bank accounts outside EU jurisdiction. In addition, variations of translations of sanctioned individuals’ names from the Arabic to the Latin alphabet led to technical oversight flaws, because the name of the sanctioned individual on the EU’s sanctions list might be spelled differently than the form appearing on a given individual’s bank account. When informed about such flaws by alerted banks or other individuals with k­ nowledge about the possible evasion, EU diplomats would, in most cases, seek to update the lists of sanctioned individuals according to the received  information. However, given the lengthy administrative and legal process required for such alterations, which would at a minimum include numerous EU Council working groups, relevant General Directorates of the Commission as well as units from the eeas and, ultimately, a unanimous Council ­agreement, listed Syrian individuals were able to put in place circumvention measures at a quicker pace than diplomats could meaningfully react to them. Practices regarding the implementation of sectorial sanctions also manifested themselves as drivers for fostering a shared understanding among various network actors. Soon after the adoption of the EU’s first sectorial measures, major European companies and banks recognised the sincerity with which the EU was willing to ban major parts of its trade with Syria. EU policy-​makers made it repeatably clear that the sanctions against Syria were ‘here to stay’. Furthermore, EU policy-​makers and civil servants would now provide clear and operational indicators for what it would take to induce a partial or complete removal of the sanctions. In combination, these factors led most of these European businesses and banks which had previously engaged in the Syrian market to quickly and consistently withdraw their operations. European banks and vendors would in many cases even adhere to ‘over-​compliance’: Instead of carefully weighing options for seeking profit in areas of economic activity still permitted under the restrictive measures, commercial actors started to moving away from trade practices and financial services that technically would still be legal and remain unsanctioned. This translation process had long-​lasting implications, particularly for individuals and entities that were not meant to be the direct targets of the EU sanctions. Many European banks would soon

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

118 

Chapter 5

refuse to accept new or existing clients with operations in or related to Syria, even in cases where operations were legally permitted and not included under the sanctions regime. Uneven enforcement practices between national governmental agencies across the EU came to form another implementation challenge. Whereas diplomats, especially from Member States that were politically supportive of a tough line against the Assad regime, encouraged practices that would underpin the use of sanctions as a tool for reaching geostrategic objectives, some technical-​oriented national authorities proved less attuned to such political commitments. A number of instances in which allegations of sanctions violations by European companies were not adequately prevented by national authorities exemplify this point. In early 2019, a Belgian court convicted three Flemish companies for shipping 168 tons of isopropanol, a chemical product banned due to potential dual-​use for chemical weapons, to Syria without obtaining proper export certificates (Marks 2019). Belgian custom authorities were afterwards criticised for an insufficient alertness towards goods of utmost sensitivity. Later that year, a Danish-​based holding firm was charged by Danish authorities for selling jet fuel to Russian shipping companies, who would deliver the fuel to the Syrian port Banias. Herefrom it would come to be used as a key enabler for thousands of Russian-​led air strikes inside Syria, predominantly targeted at areas in the country’s rebel-​held north-​west, which EU policy-​makers would at the same time support both politically and financially (Friis et al. 2019). Danish authorities were likewise criticised for not acting decisively enough and in an uncoordinated manner, having already been notified by US authorities through classified channels in late 2016 about the allegations against a company under Danish jurisdiction. While only a limited number of such violation cases have been disclosed, diplomats acknowledge that other examples could –​and most likely do –​exist. And even though it cannot be assumed that Member States’ national authorities are able to prevent every potential sanctions violation, such cases are illustrative for limited translation processes among relevant authorities within Member States, revealing how not all actors, whose practices made them relevant to the actor-​network in question, would converge to a similar degree around the security-​related objectives as promoted by their diplomatic counterparts. Cases such as the illegal shipments of Belgian chemicals or Danish jet-​fuel, which would not only constitute a sanctions violation but also provide the Syrian government with vital enablers for its continued warfare, demonstrate how diplomatic actors are not only dependent on stringent sanctions enforcement by national authorities, thereby enhancing their agency in the actor-​network in question, but that domestic enforcement practices do not

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Sanctioning Syria

119

always enhance the convergence of shared objectives and can even undermine diplomats’ dominant network role. 3.2 Monitoring Practices Strongly related to the enforcement practices developed another type of joint action, practices related to the monitoring of the EU sanctions. Namely because of the EU’s complex and decentralised institutional sanctions implementation structure, diplomats –​particularly from the eeas’s Syria Unit and from those Member States most forcefully advocating for the necessity of sanctioning the Assad regime –​would from the outset of the sanctions’ enactment show interest in closely monitoring their enforcement. As such, contrary to the more outward-​oriented practices of enforcement, EU institutions and Member States also engaged in more inward-​looking practices of internal and mutual monitoring of sanctions implementation. Over the years of sanctions implementation, monitoring practices would emerge both out of formal meeting formats and out of diplomats’ informal consultations with non-​diplomatic actors, thereby further increasing the scope of the actor-​network to be constituted around the efforts to implement the Syria sanctions. In formal terms, monitoring practices were formed around the already established institutional structures that legally bind Member States and the European Commission to immediately inform each other about possible sanctions violations, particularly “in respect of violation and enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts” (EU Council 2012: 10). Such information sharing should ideally take place in meetings of the so-​ called ‘sanctions formation’ under the EU Council’s Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (relex/​sanctions). This specialised sub-​working-​group has since its creation in 2004 evolved into a key platform for Member States’ legal and technical deliberations of all EU sanctions regimes. Besides regular meetings between Brussels-​based counsellors, the relex/​sanctions format summons legal experts from Member State capitals at least once every quarter to exchange information and opinions on the respective handling of the restrictive measures in place. In the case of the Syria sanctions, diplomats affirm how meetings in the relex/​sanctions format were mostly concerned with information sharing on the enforcement of travel bans as well as the granting of sanctions exemptions through competent authorities at the Member State level. Given the formalised format and broad scope of participants from Member States, the European Commission, the Council’s Legal Service, and the eeas, the monitoring outcome turned out to be of limited value. Sensitive cases and questions not amounting to directly detectable sanctions violations would rather

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

120 

Chapter 5

be subjects of discussion in smaller and informal groups of representatives. Moreover, the formal information sharing within the relex/​sanctions format presented itself sporadically rather than systematically; a shared data-​base or accessible information repository that would enable Member States to track each other’s implementation decisions did not exist. Another important aspect of such formalised monitoring practices were the annual reviews of the sanctions package in the relex/​sanctions working group. Diplomats from both Member States and EU institutions would assess this process to be of a ‘technical’ nature that rarely led to substantial debates among Member State representatives about the validity of upholding restrictions against specific individuals or entities. The uneven distribution between larger and smaller Member States of practical know-​how and human resources for collecting evidence for individual cases further influenced the thoroughness of the review process. Member States with larger diplomatic services, such as France, Germany, and the UK, would de facto become responsible for collecting and updating evidence for individual cases. The eeas was here seen as both too small, too ‘new’, and too restricted as it did not have formal access to the same classified intelligence as would Member State capitals. Given that the Member State who would originally have proposed a specific listing would also, at least in practical terms, be seen as responsible for conducting the following review process over time, the dominance of larger Member States in the sanctions dossier played a role in creating a non-​confrontational atmosphere during the relevant review meetings. Diplomats from smaller Member States would be aware that much political capital would need to be invested in the working group to openly question the assessments of Paris, Berlin, or London. And even if the Syria sanctions were deemed important as a package, potential disagreement over individual listings would generally not be seen, by other Member States, as grounds enough for mobilising such capital. In addition to consultations among Member States, the Syria case demonstrated the European Commission’s central yet complicated monitoring role. On the one hand being responsible for monitoring Member States’ compliance with individual asset freezes and sectorial sanctions, as they would be based in EU regulations pertaining to the functioning of the EU’s single market, the Commission representatives, on the other hand, saw the need to act with prudence. Even if the Commission would formally be equipped to invoke infringement procedures against Member States not living up to their obligations under the EU treaties,5 such legal power would generally not be applied 5 The right to infringement is stipulated under tfeu article 258: “If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Sanctioning Syria

121

in practices because economic sanctions, ultimately being part of the cfsp framework, would be respected as an exclusive competency of the Member States. According to interviewed observers, many Member State diplomats would either not be aware of the Commission’s legal capacity to act in this field or be highly doubtful whether the Commission would ‘dare’ to take such steps in practice. The commission’s role as a ‘sparring partner’ for the legal interpretation of specific sanctions provisions would, in contrast, be highly valued among national diplomats and sanctions experts, demonstrating that the Commission actively engaged in some parts of the EU’s monitoring practices. The lack of assertiveness by the Commission in terms of monitoring sanctions implementation thereby demonstrates a shared understanding among Member States to not empower one ormalized actor to ‘assess’ the use of an instrument that is perceived to be part of the intergovernmental area of foreign and security policy-​making –​and hence under the final control of Member States. In sum, European diplomats from all sides were not able to obtain a comprehensive overview of all possible sanctions enforcement problems through well-​established monitoring practices at ormalized level, leading many to seek such information through less formal structures. To fill the resulting monitoring gap, diplomats would, for example, come to rely on bilateral coordination mechanisms between national competent authorities, such as ministries of economics and customs agencies, to share information through bilateral technical channels. On the one hand, diplomats would thereby accept that a key aspect of the EU’s sanctions implementation was institutionally anchored in relations between technical authorities in Member States, and hence beyond the realm of diplomatic oversight. On the other hand, as diplomats would generally disengage from these presumed contacts between technical national authorities, they would not be fully knowledgeable of the precise scale, density, and outcomes of these exchanges. Beyond further enlarging the actor-​network, these monitoring practices would also catalyse a certain circumvention of EU diplomats as central actors –​or opp s –​of this evolving network. Besides the monitoring practices influenced by national technical authorities, diplomats would also be highly dependent on relationships with actors outside formal institutional frameworks. Activists and journalists, in particular, would either directly inform diplomats or publish reports about possible sanctions violations conducted by EU individuals or governments. Such, for reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union” (European Union, 2012: 160).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

122 

Chapter 5

instance, was the case in 2018 when several civil society organisations publicly accused Italian security officials of arranging a meeting in Italy with Ali Mamlouk, Head of Syria’s National Security Bureau, despite Mamlouk being a target of EU restricted measures since 2011. Even though the Commission representatives raised the matter informally with the Italian government, neither formal discussions in the relex and relex/​sanctions formats nor formal repercussions against Italy followed. The case is illustrative of the monitoring practices in at least three ways: First, accusations of sanctions violations in or by a specific Member State are politically sensitive to a degree not to be discussed in formal settings. Second, allegations of a sanctions violation might only come to the knowledge of other Member States through engagement with non-​diplomatic actors outside formalised settings. And third, EU institutions did not play a proactive role in the monitoring of sanctions implementation across the Union, only reinforcing monitoring practices taking place outside of Brussels-​based meeting rooms. 3.3 Refinement Practices As is the case with most EU sanctions regimes, the sanctions against Syria would need to be adopted and changed after their implementation had started to constantly reflect the realities in the rapidly evolving armed conflict. Through multiple and subsequent formal and informal reviews of their political and legal viability, the actor-​network forming around the sanctions’ implementation would therefore also become characterised by various refinement practices. Particularly the first years of implementation led to a series of formal amendments, adding both sectorial and individual measures to the EU’s overall sanctions package against Syria. Practices of sanctions refinement would thereby become another key aspect of sanctions implementation. Comparing the refinement practices of the first years of the EU sanctions with those of later years demonstrates one of the clearest examples of translation processes among diplomatic and non-​diplomatic actors in the broader actor-​network. After EU Member States first decided in May 2011 to impose sanctions on the Syrian regime, it became a political imperative for many policy-​makers to tighten the economic grip on Assad and his inner circle. Diplomats from both Member States and EU institutions affirm how EU foreign ministers and high-​level civil servants, especially those from politically invested Member States, sought to portray toughness, demanding from cfsp negotiators to find additional restrictive measures to be ready for adoption at every monthly EU Council meeting in the Foreign Affairs Council (fac) format. This political pressure was one of the reasons for often uncoordinated and hasty compilations of individual listings. Diplomats recall how foreign ministers would

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Sanctioning Syria

123

bring with them to the fac meetings lists of individuals to be targeted, even if some of the proposed names had not yet been vetted by legal experts. While such examples may be exceptions rather than the rule, they reveal how early sanctions refinements were largely driven by politically oriented practices conducted under immense time pressure. The fact that some Member States would, in this early phase, resist the sanctioning of specific individuals with ties to the Assad regime, who even after the war began remained to be considered key informants to their embassies in Damascus and Beirut, however, added to the picture of the highly politicised refinement practices in the first years of the Syria sanctions. Such unsteady refinement practices in the early implementation phase resulted in a lack of recognisable criteria under which individuals would be sanctioned or not. Part of the confusion related to the various information sources that Member States utilised to build cases against targeted individuals. Evidence stemming from intelligence services would not be widely shared, particularly not with the eeas or European Commission, whose lack of internal intelligence units kept them outside the classified information channels. Actors from both inside and outside the diplomatic realm hence came to see the politically driven and often uncoordinated refinement practices as chaotic, unprofessional, and clumsy. The incoherency characterising such refinement practices was further catalysed when the first listed Syrian individuals took the EU Council’s decision to sanction them before the cjeu. The court revoked a number of individual listings, inter alia arguing that the case material used by the Council as evidence against listed individuals and entities needed to be publicly transparent and accessible to those accused of sanctionable behaviour (Alì 2019: 57). This demarcation of the legal thresholds that would have to be met at first came to symbolise a political defeat for Member States and the eeas. At the same time, the court’s legal precision helped to strengthen a joint understanding among EU sanctions practitioners of the type of information required to ensuring the sanctions’ legality. Member States subsequently altered their refinement practices to ensure that individual cases, which would be added to the sanctions package over time, were grounded in open source, or at least de-​ classified, information. In cases where the cjeu turn down the initial listings of certain individuals on procedural grounds, Member States would react by simply expanding the overall list of sanctionable behaviours.6 Actors inside and outside the EU machinery would now recognise how Member States 6 As pertinently summarised by Elena Chachko (2019: 32) “this again suggests that relisting based on new criteria did help the Council avoid judicial invalidation of sanctions it previously failed to defend”.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

124 

Chapter 5

‘professionalised’ their refinement practices over the years, which not least would be reflected in the 2018 update of the Council’s own sanctions guidelines (EU Council 2018). In the specific Syria case, the solidifying refinement practices would result in decreasing numbers of judicial annulations of individual listings by the cjeu, even if the total number of sanctioned individuals and entities with relation to Syria would increase significantly.7 As indicated, the high legal threshold de facto resulted in refinement practices that would be dominated by a cooperation between the largest Member States France, Germany and –​until Brexit –​the UK. Smaller Member States were either not seen as being in possession of the necessary know-​how and human resources to prepare the meticulous legal cases. This dominating position of the EU’s largest Member States was further solidified by their diplomats’ comparably elaborate information channels, consisting both of local informant networks and the growing Syrian diaspora living in Europe, who would eventually contact trusted diplomatic contacts with information on sanctions’ evasion and possible targets for additional individual listings. Such sources of valuable information were, however, not utilised to the fullest extent possible as Syrian civil society and business actors would not always share their possibly useful information with relevant EU representatives. Either because they would not feel adequately protected and assured that confidentiality measures would be upheld throughout the EU system or because they were unsure which diplomatic or governmental agency to approach when faced with the complex institutional setup spanning representatives from various EU institutions and 27/​28 Member States. In other words, the ability of diplomatic practitioners to get hold of information and sources that could be relevant for sanctions refinement would be impeded by the very complexity of the EU sanctions implementation setup itself. Sectorial measures were, albeit to a much lesser degree, also subject to refinement practices. As with individual listings, in the conflict’s first years, the Council continuously added trade-​related measures to the overall sanctions package. Observers confirm similar political dynamics as those pertaining to the refinement practices of individual sanctions, namely that the sequencing of sectorial refinements did not happen based on in-​depth economic analyses of the Syrian regime’s economic weaknesses, but rather reflected policy-​ makers’ urge to signal the EU’s commitment to put the highest possible pressure on Damascus. Diplomats assess that all ‘meaningful’ aspects of the Syrian 7 Starting out with thirteen targeted individuals and entities in 2011 (EU Council 2011b: 1), the EU has, at the time of writing, targeted 273 individuals and 70 entities with physical and financial access restrictions (EU Council 2020).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Sanctioning Syria

125

economy had been sanctioned at the end of 2012. Member States’ formalised annual reviews have in practice confirmed the design of the sectorial sanctions, in essence leading to the continued renewal since the adaption of the still valid legal framework of 2012 and 2013 (EU Council 2012, 2013). The only significant addition happened through a Council decision in late 2014, which clarified that it would henceforth be prohibited to sell jet fuel and related additives to Syria (EU Council 2014m: 2); a refinement that came to form the legal basis of the allegation raised against the above mentioned Danish fuel-​vendor a few years later. Refinement practices of sectorial sanctions hence became mostly relevant in terms of the introduction of sanctions exemptions. Through mostly informal exchanges with ngo s operating inside Syria, diplomats very soon became aware of the sanctions’ negative effects on the activities performed by humanitarian, development, and human rights organisations as well as pro-​opposition partners of EU Member States. Such continued and evolving dialogue practices helped to advance various forms of legal exemptions from the restrictive measures, such as in May 2013 when the internationally-​recognised Syrian opposition coalition, the Syrian National Council, was exempted from the ban on the purchase and transport of oil and petroleum products inside Syria (EU Council 2013). In December 2016, exemptions were also given to actors with a humanitarian mandate that were recipients of public funding from EU institutions or Member States (EU Council 2016). This influence of Syrian and international quasi-​state and non-​state actors in the practices influencing the Syria sanctions’ refinement further widened the actor-​network in question. 3.4 Deterrence Practices Even if EU sanctions are formalised through either decisions or regulations adopted by Member States in the Council, their application in often politicised contexts in combination with their, at times, complex legal nature give room for legal interpretation. Besides leading to uncertainties among those working in proximity to Syria, and therefore fearing of becoming targeted by the sanctions, such ambiguity would also come to be instrumentalised by different involved actors. In other words, the continued refinements of the sanctions’ design led to the emerging of certain deterrence practices, ultimately aimed at deterring international or non-​state organisations and companies to engage in legal or practical proximity to Syria, even if their presumed activities would not fall within the legal realm of the sanctions themselves. Such practices of would not only be advanced by EU policy-​makers and diplomats, but, interestingly, also by actors operating inside Syria or even in affiliation with the Assad regime itself. Deterrence practices surfacing from within the EU where particularly formed in the interplay between governmental authorities and those non-​state

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

126 

Chapter 5

actors who in legal terms would be eligible for receiving sanctions waivers on humanitarian grounds, but did either not receive or apply for such waivers. Even as various humanitarian exemptions became available on paper, many potential recipients of such formal exemptions, such as private businesses or ngo s, did not fully comprehend the regulations or how to benefit from them, and hence found themselves left in what they would often perceive to be a regulatory ‘jungle’. Confusion also spilled over to the financial sector, who would get spooked by the EU’s extensive compliance requirements. ngo s would report how even different branches of the same international bank would treat compliance questions, and hence the willingness to work with clients with activities related to Syria, in non-​linear and at times outright contradictory manners. This essentially caused uncertainty on the part of ngo s, businesses, and other non-​state actors about the EU sanctions’ legal boundaries. The lack of clear communication from EU institutions and Member States about the legal specificities of the restrictive measures, and hence of the range and scope of the EU sanctions, became part of emerging deterrence practices. One key aspect of these related to the EU Council decisions and regulations describing the sanctions’ legal delimitations, which would be largely unreadable for most actors without strong knowledge of EU law and regulations. Even ngo s with great experience in providing services inside Syria would dismiss the legal texts as ‘written by lawyers for lawyers’, meaning that very little practical certainty could be derived from the EU’s legal provisions themselves. Furthermore, the existence of parallel sanctions packages against designated terrorist organisations such as Hayat Tahrir al-​Sham or the so-​called Islamic State made it a highly complex task to understand whether an activity accepted under the EU restrictive measures against Syria could possibly be sanctioned under other sanctions packages. In this climate of ambiguity, the repetition by EU policy-​makers and diplomats that the EU sanctions were ‘here to stay’ made it even more self-​evident for many private actors to stay out of any engagements with the Syrian economy, sanctioned or not. In addition to the emerging deterrence practices influenced by the EU and its allies, deterrence practices also formed outside the direct influence of EU diplomats. Most notable were the deterrence practices animated by either the Syrian regime itself or by international humanitarian and development organisations, such as certain UN agencies working inside Syria. Such voices would raise loud concerns about the EU’s ‘economic warfare’ against Syria and its population, argue that EU sanctions constituted a core cause for Syria’s faltering economy, and claim that the EU’s humanitarian exemptions were effectively of no use. Such communication would further limit the willingness of humanitarian and development actors and financial institutions subject to EU jurisdiction to engage in Syria, even if legally permitted to doing so. Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

127

Sanctioning Syria

It was not long before EU diplomats found themselves caught between two strong narratives. On the one hand, they would communicate political willingness to uphold a ‘targeted’ economic pressure on the Damascus regime and its cronies, while on the other hand countering accusations that this economic pressure deprived the Syrian population from essential goods such as food and medicine and the access of humanitarian actors to Syria. The counterweight by EU practitioners to these deterrence practices would, however, in many cases not come directly from Member States diplomats working in daily proximity to the Syria sanctions. On the contrary, diplomats in national mfa s would generally not perceive it as a ‘task of diplomacy’ to ensure sufficient technical information to domestic non-​state actors about the legal possibilities and boundaries of the Syria sanctions, leaving this to more ‘technical’ agencies such as ministries of economics and law enforcement. On the EU level, institutions would engage in reaching out to non-​state actors through information campaigns. Such was the case in 2017, when the European Commission published a set of guidelines and answers to frequently asked questions relating particularly to the exemptions under the Syria sanctions (European Commission 2017). The publication of these first set of comprehensives guidelines for the ngo and business community, six years after the first EU Syria sanctions had been decided by the Council, was largely deemed an outcome of the strong feedback that EU diplomats had received in both Brussels and through contacts in the region from non-​state actors negatively affected by the uncertainty surrounding the sanctions’ implementation. For many non-​state actors, diplomatic attempts to balance the highly impactful deterrence practices did, however, not suffice to create a fully elaborated joint understanding among all network actors about the sanctions’ legal provisions, limits, and exceptions. ngo s, commercial actors, and financial institutions thus remained highly concerned about the risk of violating aspects of the legally complex sanctions regime, only fuelling the practices of over-​ compliance, described above. 4

Exerting Control over Actor-​Networks? European Diplomats’ Successes and Limitations as ‘Obligatory Passage Points’

The analysis has demonstrated how multiple translation processes came to give social order to the implementation of the EU’s unusually broad and technically complex restrictive measures against Syria. The resulting practices were formative of a wide-​spanning actor-​network, encompassing individuals from both EU and Member State diplomatic services, judicial systems and law enforcement, central banks, and other competent national authorities as well Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

128 

Chapter 5

as multiple types of non-​state actors such as commercial operators, financial institutions, humanitarian and development ngo s, project implementers, civil society actors, and other stakeholders to the Syrian state-​market nexus. By recalling that a key aspect of a successful geoeconomic diplomacy would be the ability of diplomatic representatives to advance the implementation of the Syria sanctions in the state-​market realm, that is outside direct governmental control, the last analytical section of this case study reflects on the dynamics that either solidified or weakened EU diplomats’ abilities to act as the emerging actor-​network’s obligatory passage points. Looking first at aspects that strengthened EU diplomats in their role as opp s, and hence to engage in the shaping of actor relations underpinning the goal of implementing the EU Syria sanctions as intended, the case study has ­demonstrated how EU diplomats’ ability to engage in successful geoeconomic diplomacy was highly dependent on their capacity to adapt to new modes of behaviour over the course of the sanctions’ implementation. Particularly practices of sanctions refinement demonstrated how EU diplomats would be dependent on sufficient feedback loops with various non-​state actors with access to information about attempted or successful sanctions evasions by either listed Syrian individuals and entities or by European and international organisations and companies. Only in instances where diplomats were successful in building up relations with mostly non-​state sources, they would be able to react adequately to refine –​and ultimately solidify –​the sanctions regime in a meaningful way that reflected the realities on the Syrian ground. Such refinements came to form a two-​way pattern. On the one hand, diplomats would gradually accept sectorial sanctions to be loosened by broadening the possibilities for non-​state actors to apply for exemptions on humanitarian grounds. On the other hand, they would work actively to enlarge the list of sanctioned Syrian individuals and entities. In this dual process, EU diplomats were particularly able to solidify their status as the actor-​network’s opp s when ensuring credible sanctions refinements in due time, which would reassure those non-​ state actors delivering information through formal and informal channels to EU diplomats that such feedback could actually lead to changes to of the sanctions package. Such translation processes were, for example, at play when EU policy-​ makers in 2016 managed to include an extended list of possible humanitarian exemptions –​as had been demanded by multiple quasi-​state and non-​state actors sympathetic to the EU’s overall policy objectives in the Syria conflict. Other translation processes, however, undermined EU diplomats’ abilities to act as effective actor-​network opp s. A key problem related to Member States’ on-​going disharmonised enforcement practices at the national level. Such incomplete enforcement practices led to an ‘arms-​length’ implementation

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Sanctioning Syria

129

environment with limited feedback loops between those Brussels-​based diplomats responsible for monitoring the sanctions regime’s implementation at the overall level and the numerous technical competent authorities in charge of the technical sanctions oversight at the national level. This impeded the collective efforts of diplomats of EU institutions and Member States to maintain a clear and joint understanding about possible sanctions violations happening within the EU, hence reducing their options for intervening in a timely manner. Regarding the limited information sharing in the various relex or other Council working group formats, some would point to the need for distinguishing between two types of such omissions. Cases where national diplomats were not sufficiently informed possible instances of sanctions violations from their national competent authorities could arguable be distinguished from those where diplomatic representatives deliberately chose not to inform EU colleagues about such violations. While the former could be explained as reflecting the organisational challenges that Member States face in the highly complex areas of sanctions implementation, examples of the latter, which allegedly was the case when Italian diplomats did not officially inform the Council about the entry of a sanctioned Syrian individual on Italian territory, creates an environment of distrust among diplomatic practitioners. Seen through the analytical framework of networked practices, both types of cooperation failure represent weaknesses of both the actor-​network’s formative practices and of the ability of EU diplomats to operate as key network actors. Even if it is difficult to find empirical evidence for an example of a case where diplomats did not receive relevant information from national authorities –​i.e. an ‘unknown unknown’ –​the mere assumption about the existence of such cases proved to be sufficient to negatively influence the collective practices in the Syria-​related actor-​network. As network actors outside the diplomatic circles increasingly came to see Member States representatives, engaging in formal Brussels-​based sanctions enforcement and monitoring, as being insufficiently informed about the variances of sanctions implementation across the Member States, the interest of these non-​state actors to engage genuinely with those actors inside the diplomatic circles would diminish. Some non-​state actors started to question the competence of those diplomatic representatives most vocal about the political necessity of installing sanctions against the Assad regime. Instances of sanctions evasions of EU origin, though low in (known) numbers, reinforced this dynamic. Among the more severe issues were the continued attempts by European companies to uphold trade with the Syrian state with goods that were not only legally sanctioned, but also of high political relevance in light of the allegations against the Syrian government and its allies’ use of aircraft and banned chemical weapons against

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

130 

Chapter 5

its own population. These actions demonstrated the limitations of the actor-​ network’s coherence. This was further catalysed by the emerging deterrence practices, which weakened rather than solidified the convergence of the actors’ objectives and reflected negatively on diplomats’ ability to fulfil their expected roles as the actor-​network’s opp s. In spite of the European Commission’s communication campaigns, targeted at explaining and sensitising businesses and ngo s to their economic possibilities under the sanctions regime and its exemptions, the strong political signalling from EU and Member States diplomats about the political commitment to maintaining high coercive pressure on the government in Damascus made EU financial actors and banks uneasy about the prospects of engaging in any Syria-​related activities. In other words did the forceful insistence, by some EU diplomats, on the Syria sanctions’ effectiveness vis-​à-​ vis the Assad regime at the same time limit the formal EU systems’ ability to sufficiently assure banks and other actors, seeking to maintain legal operations inside Syria, that this practice was permitted and could be continued. Such non-​state actors would increasingly operate based on their own and independent analysis of the Syria sanctions’ reach and limits, meaning that they over the course of the conflict came to rely on practices that circumvented the possibility of EU diplomats to influence them. Closely related hereto did the strong practices of enforcement and deterrence strengthen the financial and banking sectors’ reluctance to provide the necessary finance channels for ngo’s and other non-​state actors to operate in Syria. Risks for non-​compliance were perceived as being higher than potential profits coming out of such operations. Among the tangible consequences was a more limited engagement by humanitarian and development ngo s in and around Syria than possible in legal terms. Such emerging practices out of direct engagements between non-​state-​actors, without large-​scale consultation of EU representatives, serve as an example of how EU diplomats were circumvented in the actor-​network, undermining their possibility to act as the network’s opp s. While broadly able to leverage their position as indispensable network actors in most of these relations, diplomats were challenged by direct relational dynamics between non-​state actors, leading to an over-​implementation of certain regulations and instances of sanctions violations to be overseen by technical, non-​diplomatic authorities. This, to some degree, impeded diplomats’ ability to steer, as intended by policy-​makers, the implementation of one of the EU’s most crucial interventions in the Syria war.

…

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Sanctioning Syria

131

In sum, the Syria case has demonstrated how a comprehensive EU geoeconomic diplomacy was challenged by instances where third-​state, quasi-​state, and non-​state network actors engaged in behaviour that circumvented and hence weakened the role of diplomats from both EU institutions and Member States as the actor-​network’s opp s. It is interesting to note that such challenges to the EU’s coherent and strong conduct of geoeconomic diplomacy have been recognised and acted upon by European policy-​makers in both the EU institutions and at the level of Member States. One point in case was made by current Commission President Ursula von der Leyen early in her mandate. In 2019, when preparing her presidency period, von der Leyen announced only a single major reorganisation within the framework of the cfsp: the administrative relocation of the Commission’s Sanctions Unit from the portfolio of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and hence in the organisational proximity to the eeas, to the Commission’s new Directorate General for Financial Stability, Financial Services, and Capital Markets Union, dg fisma (von der Leyen 2019a, 2019b). Moving the Commission’s sanctions oversight from the realm of traditional foreign policy and diplomacy to the auspices of its finance experts sent at least three clear signals: First, that economic sanctions remain a valuable geoeconomic cfsp instrument. Second, that the fulfilment of the EU’s geoeconomic ambitions requires sound technical capabilities. And third, that the realm of traditional diplomacy had not been thoroughly capable of ensuring these abilities exist. In the first weeks of 2021, the ambition to strengthen sanctions implementation was further concretised in a communiqué as one of three priority areas for enhancing the EU’s so-​called ‘strategic autonomy’ (European Commission 2021). The Commission here proposed a series of measures to be discussed and eventually adopted during the coming years. Addressing the defiance of information sharing among Member States, a new ‘Sanctions Information Exchange Repository’ would serve as a joint knowledge base to track sanctions implementation across the EU. Furthermore, it was proposed to establish a single contact point for cross-​border issues, for example for questions regarding humanitarian exemptions, as well as a centralised ‘whistle blower’ mechanism for suspicions of sanctions evasion. Whilst these proposed measures are yet to be spelled out in detail, experiences from the Syria case support that such measures could be both relevant and valuable if European foreign and security policy practitioners want to fortify their position as obligatory passage points in sanctions-​related actor-​networks to a greater extent than proven possible in the formative first years of the Syria sanctions regime.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

­c hapter 6

Conflicting Practices?

Ensuring Coherency across Geoeconomic Actor-​Networks

The preceding case studies have demonstrated the complex circumstances under which diplomats engage in networked practices to advance the implementation of economic sanctions. Such networks do not originate from the intentional and strategic outreach of diplomats but are primarily established through practical and relational processes between actors relevant to the specific state-​market nexus of the sanctioning and sanctioned state(s). The case studies on the implementation of sanctions against Russia and Syria have given empirical evidence of a key aspect of EU geoeconomic diplomatic practice, showing how European diplomats actively seek to leverage relationships with various network actors to their advantage, all while being limited in their ability to exert control and influence over every vital aspect of the actor-​networks they become a part of. Expanding the case study on Syria, this chapter discusses how the networked practices underpinning EU sanctions relate to those practices formative to the geostrategic utilisation of other economically-​based instruments in Syria. Since the early days of the conflict, EU institutions and Member States utilised various geoeconomic instruments in their attempts to influence the conflict’s trajectory. EU policy-​makers consistently emphasised that their strategic objectives were to end the Assad regime’s brutal human rights violations, to advance the disintegration of the regime’s political and social cohesion, to pave the way for inclusive political transition and democratic reforms, and to prevent new major refugee and migration movements towards Europe. Eager to advance these objectives, but unwilling to invest in military interventions, the EU not only applied economic sanctions but also initiated large-​scale economic assistance programmes targeted at specific Syrian and international actors operating in opposition to the regime in Damascus. Furthermore, the EU sanctions would ever since 2011 be implemented alongside the even more comprehensive sanctions package imposed unilaterally by the United States. The conceptual lens of geoeconomic diplomacy, with its emphasis on the relationship building between varying actors as formative for governments’ ability to leverage economic means of power in the state-​market nexus, grants the analytical possibility of assessing the interrelations between various geoeconomic interventions in a comprehensive manner. Adding to this,

© Kim B. Olsen, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004518834_008

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Conflicting Practices?

133

the applied framework of networked practices is well-​placed to examine such presumptions regarding the extent to which diplomatic practitioners actually treat sanctions in concert with other economically based instruments, or whether they are indeed practiced in isolation from other aspects of geoeconomic policy-​making. Assuming that the geoeconomic sphere is full of actor-​ networks focused on varying objectives, the question then becomes: in which ways do specific geoeconomic actor-​networks reconcile or remain in conflict with one another? By building on qualitative data derived from research for the case study on the EU Syria sanctions, this chapter discusses how the use of other Western geoeconomic instruments in Syria impacted the implementation of these EU sanctions. Building further on the logic behind the analytical framework of networked practices, it examines how diplomats engaged in the use of EU sanctions were continuously confronted by conflicting practices converging around other geoeconomic interventions in Syria. Special attention will hence be given to the challenge of ‘disentangling’ the networked practices of sanctions implementation from other related geoeconomic practices. The chapter does therefore not suggest an exhaustive analysis of other geoeconomic actor-​ networks, but uses the image of actor-​networks as a means to discuss how the implementation of economic sanctions might be further challenged at the diplomatic level by the broader geoeconomic context they are embedded in. 1

Expanding the Syria Case: Disentangling EU Sanctions from other Geoeconomic Instruments

One of the primary reasons for analysing EU sanctions through the conceptual lens of geoeconomic diplomacy was the analytical insistence on contextualising governments’ use of specific geoeconomic instruments as part of a larger toolbox of economic power. From this, it follows that states’ use of economic sanctions should not solely be analysed in their own rights, but also understood in a wider view of their geoeconomic context. Even realist scholars focusing on the intersection between economy and security recognised the need to embed the analysis of sanctions in the broader context of foreign and security policy: More often than not, policymakers treat economic sanctions as part of a package of foreign policy measures. Nonetheless, scholarly analysis thus far has not addressed systematically the interaction of sanctions and other instruments of statecraft. mastanduno 1999: 299

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

134 

Chapter 6

Traditional understandings of economic statecraft and geoeconomics are sympathetic to such holistic thinking about the various instruments of economic power that are available for governments (Baldwin 1985; Blackwill & Harris 2016). Yet, the simultaneous use by governments of different geoeconomic instruments is rarely analysed in a coherent manner. Granted, the embeddedness of economic sanctions in broader value chains, not to mention their unintended economic consequences, are well-​described phenomena. But apart from dynamics where commercial actors intentionally seek to circumvent sanctions in the search for profits or where sanctioned states manage to establish alternative trade and financial relations not affected by the sanctions in question (Bapat & Kwon 2015; Early 2015), the influence of other types of (geo)economic activity on states’ use of sanctions has only received modest attention. Rather than analysing how various means of economic power might be simultaneously utilised to obtain a similar geostrategic objective, instruments are more often than not solely scrutinised in their own right. Although understandable from a research design and methodological point of view, this hardly does justice to the complexity faced by the practitioner. If we recall that geoeconomic interventions generally represent instances of governmental instrumentalisation, or direct interference, in market affairs, it is important to further examine the consequences faced by diplomats and policy-​makers if several geoeconomic instruments are simultaneously aimed at the same objective or target. This simultaneous use of various geoeconomic interventions came to be a defining characteristic of the EU and its allies’ hard power response to the Syria war, as both US and EU policy-​makers largely shunned the deployment of significant military capacities to respond to the Assad regime’s behaviour, which arguably could have allowed for a game-​changing intervention in the conflict’s overall trajectory. Conflicting Practices between Geoeconomic Instruments: Caught between EU Sanctions and Targeted Economic Assistance The initial adoption and continued refinement of the EU’s Syria sanctions happened alongside the large-​scale provision of humanitarian aid and development assistance, managed either by the EU institutions or by individual Member States. According to calculations by the European Commission, EU institutions and Member States mobilised approx. eur 17 billion between 2011 and 2019 for Syria and its neighbours Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan. Of these, eur 1.4 billion were spent inside Syria, two-​thirds of which was given as humanitarian funding (European Commission 2020). For the purpose of focusing on the EU’s geoeconomic response to the Syrian war, the following 1.1

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Conflicting Practices?

135

discussion will predominately focus on non-​humanitarian funds, often referred to as ‘peace and stabilisation’ funds, targeted at actors aligned with the EU’s political aims in the conflict.1 As this type of funding is often given to specific political actors, groups, or institutions who are believed to advance the donors’ geostrategic objective(s), such targeted economic assistance can formally be classified as a geoeconomic intervention. The combined use of coercive economic sanctions (intended to diminish the material resources of the Assad regime) with the incentivising economic assistance (intended to support mainly ‘moderate’ actors in opposition hereto) came to form part of what could be seen as the EU’s pooled geoeconomic response to the Syria conflict. While experts have long highlighted the unintended consequences of economic sanctions on the delivery of humanitarian aid, both in Syria and beyond (S. Gordon et al. 2018; Mallard et al. 2020; Moret 2015; Walker 2016), little has been said about the role of and impact on the actors involved in realising the different geoeconomic interventions. A closer look at the relational diplomatic practices underpinning the use of sanctions, on the one hand, and the use of targeted economic assistance, on the other hand, indicates a lack of comprehensive ‘translation processes’ between the two geoeconomic endeavours. This, at times, led to what can be understood as conflicting objectives between those network actors working on sanctions implementation and those aiming to ensure the effective usage of targeted economic assistance, respectively. A major point of non-​alignment between the use of the EU’s two major geoeconomic instruments in Syria arose from the sanctions’ direct impact on particularly ngo s’ ability to procure goods and material relevant to their planned operations. Namely because the restrictive measures were to be enforced for activities relating to all parts of the Syrian territory, Western-​ funded ngo s, even if operating in areas outside the military and political control of the regime in Damascus, were bound to comply with sanctions as well. As explained in the previous chapter, networked practices that refined the EU sanctions regime during the first years of implementation would however not

1 The humanitarian/​non-​humanitarian distinction is important for whether funding instruments can be formally classified as part of the EU’s geoeconomic toolbox. Humanitarian assistance will in this context not be deemed a geoeconomic instrument as it, in theory, should be granted based on a strict needs-​based assessment and the four humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Whether humanitarian funds inside Syria have been granted according to these principles, especially by UN agencies and international ngo s, has been a matter of major doubt and critical conversations among observers to the conflict (Haid 2019; hrw 2019; Thépaut 2020).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

136 

Chapter 6

sufficiently strengthen the ability of ngo s and commercial operators to successfully obtain the so-​called humanitarian sanctions exemptions. Granted by competent authorities at the EU Member State level, such humanitarian exemptions would in theory also be available to ngo s working in the non-​ humanitarian field, especially if they were recipients of EU funding. The practical impact of such exemptions, however, proved more limited in reality. Beyond the sheer complexity of understanding the provisions of the legal texts and the technical details of the sanctions in question, ngo s would also refrain from applying for exemptions licences due to the amount of bureaucracy, legal due diligence, and time needed. Even those ngo s holding a high level of legal professionalism, either in-​house or through consultancies, would be discouraged by the too lengthy processing times for obtaining an exemption licence, which, in some cases, to could span up to nine months. This highly cautious approach was also reflected in the risk-​averse behaviour of other non-​state actors such as banks and international vendors. In other words, even if exemptions to the sanctions were legally foreseen in the EU’s sanctions framework, their practical usage was perceived as limited, even among humanitarian and stabilisation ngo s conducting activities funded directly by EU institutions or Member States themselves. Various non-​state practitioners working on the provision of stabilisation assistance would affirm that concerns about the limited effect of sanctions exemptions were regularly shared by ngo representatives with diplomats specialised in humanitarian aid and stabilistation assistance, working out of Brussels, various European capitals, or at European diplomatic representations in Syria’s neighbouring countries. Only more rarely they were shared directly with the diplomats and civil servants managing the technical aspects of sanctions implementation. Due to a common disconnect and lack of detailed information-​sharing between diplomatic practitioners operating in either of these two fields, practical implementation limitations on the ground were only incrementally addressed in legal terms over the years of the conflict. Among the most tangible improvements in terms of ensuring the timely and thorough dialogue between these two geoeconomic actor-​networks was the eventual acknowledgement by diplomats covering the relex/​sanctions format about the need to let ngo s raise their concerns directly in face-​to-​face meetings with sanctions experts. Even if such meetings would be limited in number, they added to a joint understanding across the various state and non-​state actors operating in the various geoeconomic actor-​networks. At the same time, such important communication improvements were far from sufficient in providing adequate clarity regarding the extent to which sanctions impeded the otherwise legal activities of ngo s, commercial operators,

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Conflicting Practices?

137

and activists. Motivated both by donors’ demands as well as by their own interests for advancing activities on the ground, some ngo s and development partners began to utilise alternative mechanisms for evading the EU sanctions, for example by ‘manipulating’ operations to comply with sanctions provisions. A few examples are illustrative of such practices: Since the procurement of so-​ called luxury goods beyond a net worth of usd 25,000 was sanctioned, actors would strip vehicles they wanted to buy of all non-​essential assets (radio, rims, seats) until their total worth fell under the monetary threshold. Another example regularly mentioned relates to ngo s’ excessive use of in-​cash payments and informal remittance systems.2 Financial activity of this kind would happen outside the direct control of European banks and the formal finance sector, meaning that the EU’s economic sanctions, initially adopted to exert more control over financial flows in and out of Syria, in reality impeded the abilities of EU diplomats to track such financial activities, fuelling concerns about the risks of possible misuse of EU humanitarian and development funds for the financing of terrorist activities inside Syria. A further aspect of the entanglement between EU sanctions and non-​ humanitarian aid inside Syria related to the EU’s insistence on the applicability of its sanctions policy on partnerships with all kinds of international actors, including UN agencies. Tapping into wider debates about the UN’s critical view on the legality of unilateral sanctions (Gazzini & Herlin-​Karnell 2011), UN agencies operating inside Syria, especially in areas under the military control of the regime in Damascus, would initially push back against any contractual clauses that bound the UN to adhere to the EU’s restrictive measures when receiving EU funding. After lengthy negotiations at the highest levels of the European Commission and the UN Secretary General’s office, it become standard practice to add a ‘sanctions clause’ to any EU-​funded contract with UN agencies receiving non-​humanitarian funding, both in and beyond the Syrian context. That the dispute between Brussels and New York was eventually solved to the former’s advantage, and that the European Commission did

2 Among the most popular in the Syrian context was Hawala, a remittance system, readily available in more countries, that serves as an alternative to money transfers through conventional banks. It is based on the principle of ‘money transfer without money movement’, meaning that money is paid by the sender to one service provider and handed out to the recipient by another provider. The relationship between the service providers, who account for the balance internally, is often characterised as built on trust and multiple connections. While legal in many countries, the so-​called ‘black Hawala’ system has been subject to law enforcement around the world due to the risk of money laundering and the potential financing illegal activities (Jost & Sandhu 2000; Mowatt-​Larssen 2016).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

138 

Chapter 6

not accept further exemptions to the EU sanctions regime, adds evidence to the general practice of letting sanctions prevail over the use of economic aid and assistance. Analysed through the conceptual prism of geoeconomic diplomacy, it can thus be argued that EU institutions and Member States only managed to reconcile their use of two geoeconomic instruments, economic sanctions and targeted economic assistance, through a, at times, contradictory compromise. While one part of the EU’s diplomatic engagement in the conflict intended to effectively disturb the market relations between the EU and Syria, another part of this engagement aimed at providing financial support to ngo s and other quasi-​and non-​state actors on the ground. Even if not being its primary objective, such assistance would also play a role in minimising the negative consequences that sanctions would have on EU-​funded activities. In practical terms, non-​state actors either managed to make use of possible exemptions to the sanctions regime, accepted their limitations to engage in certain activities, found pragmatic ways to ‘work around it’, or identified alternative value chains not affected by EU sanctions. EU diplomats and ngo representatives both affirm how such reconciliation processes would cost a lot of time and resources, meaning that Member States’ decisions to adopt and strengthen restrictive measures, especially at the conflict’s beginning, had practical limitations on the extent to which non-​humanitarian activities could be effectively implemented by partners on the ground. Consequently, the diplomatic practices that sought to ensure a strict enforcement and continued refinement of the EU sanctions were partly detrimental to EU institutions and governments’ use of other geoeconomic instruments. Even as that limitation was recognised from a relatively early stage of the Syria conflict, the joint understanding among diplomats and non-​state actors for overcoming this gap had to be developed over the years of the war, as it was not readily available from the beginning of the conflict. Whereas painful lessons about the inner tensions between the use of sanctions and the delivery of humanitarian aid –​and the devastating impact the former can have on the latter –​had been drawn from the international sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s or Iran in the 2000s, the Syrian case was unique. The decision to both target the Syrian state with comprehensive –​and indeed unprecedented –​EU sanctions and simultaneously provide large-​scale non-​humanitarian funding for politically backed activities inside the sanctioned country was unusual, meaning that European diplomats experienced a lack of both institutionalised mechanisms and informal relations to reconcile between the two actor-​ networks, respectively working to put the EU’s geoeconomic policies into viable action.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Conflicting Practices?

139

Conflicting Practices between Geoeconomic Partners: The Impact of US Sanctions Seen from the perspective of diplomats responsible for the implementation of EU sanctions, the other major geoeconomic intervention to interact with in Syria was the parallel sanctions regime instated by the United States. Syria had already been regarded as a ‘pariah’ state and was sanctioned by the US as such before the Arab uprisings in the 2010s (Thomas 2013). Designated by the US as a ‘State Sponsor of Terrorism’ since 1979, Syria became subject to further sanctions throughout the 2000s, mandated either through the US Congress or through presidential executive orders (e.o.) (Sharp & Blanchard 2011). Reacting to the Syrian government’s violent repression of demonstrators in the first half of 2011, President Obama issued e.o. 13582 (US President 2011), which for the first time introduced wide-​spanning US sectorial sanctions against Syria. The order essentially blocked all property of the Syrian regime under US jurisdiction, new investments in Syria by any US person, the supply of any services to Syria from the US or any US American person, the import of and any transactions related to petroleum products of Syrian origin, as well as a prohibition on any US American person to approve, finance, facilitate, or guarantee any transactions that would be prohibited for that person (ofac 2013). Diplomats from both sides of the Atlantic affirm that the parallel implementation of the two Western sanctions regimes against Syria worked well on a general basis. EU and US listings of individuals and entities were broadly aligned over the years, and any move by one party to expand listings would often be mirrored by the other. The strong mutual understanding of the overall geostrategic objectives behind the use of sanctions made it relatively easy to sort out disharmonies –​ not least when compared to the major transatlantic disagreements regarding the aim and scope of the sanctions targeted against Russia or Iran, the other main targets of US and EU unilateral sanctions in the 2010s. On the working level, coordination between the EU and US was, especially in the first years of the Syria war, mainly centred around regular, informal meetings between US diplomats with interlocutors from the so-​called ‘E3’ countries, Germany, France, and the UK. Over the years, such diplomatic coordination practices became more and more sporadic as the transatlantic concord about the overall approach to the use of sanctions manifested itself. However, friction between the two sanctions regimes were felt more starkly at the level of implementation. Many EU-​funded humanitarian and non-​humanitarian actors as well as their international vendors found it virtually impossible to differentiate between the European and American sanctions. The perception of the EU and US sanctions as being one ‘block’, rather than two regimes designed 1.2

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

140 

Chapter 6

independently of each other, stood out as a factor that further discouraged such actors from applying for exemptions. Furthermore, when pressed to look in one of two directions, many non-​state actors would be particularly careful about complying with US sanctions. This was mainly attributed to the general perception of US sanctions as carrying greater long-​term ramifications and less feasible legal options for appealing a sanctions designation than would be the case for the EU sanctions regime. Faced with this entangled myriad of legal constraints and uncertainties, commercial operators and ngo s would generally not find sufficient resolve of their concerns through contacts at European or US diplomatic representations or government agencies. This eventually fostered the necessity for non-​state actors to hire external legal counsels to ensure the highest possible degree of compliance (see also de Galbert 2016: 9–​11). The difference between EU and US legal practices in designing sanctions came to form a key aspect of uncertainty. On the one hand, EU Council regulations would explain in great detail the types of restricted goods under a given measure. Furthermore, the European Commission’s practice of publishing detailed legal opinions on specific measures subject to Member States’ interpretative questions as well as the rulings by the cjeu provided a solid, yet complex and very detailed, legal basis for non-​state actors to assess. The US provisions, in contrast, were overall more generic with fewer additional precisions, consequently creating anxiety among non-​state actors about the risk of unknowingly becoming accused of violating US sanctions. Such practical differences between the sanctions regimes’ designs were further exacerbated by the different communication practices used by American and European authorities. ofac, the primary office for sanctions affairs within the US Department of Treasury, would regularly publish lengthy explications, advisories, and guidelines concerning the interpretation of specific sanctions provisions, often including stark political messaging.3 The EU’s public communication efforts, in contrast, seemed less forceful, less regular, and less linear. A key challenge here related to the multiple lines of communication that would emanate from the EU, either in centralised form from the European Commission and eeas, or decentralised at the domestic level through Member States’ competent authorities. Furthermore, growing political discrepancies between certain EU Member States, among which some were less enthusiastic 3 In a recent advisory targeted at the maritime sector, ofac’s warning to actors involved in shipping of petroleum goods to Syria was clear: “To this end, the supply chain and petroleum-​ related shipments create significant sanctions risk for those in the maritime industry” (ofac et al. 2020: 35).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

141

Conflicting Practices?

about the political logic behind the sanctions policy against Syria, generally led to comparably more cautious, brief, and less strongly worded communications from EU institutions.4 Seen in the context of EU geoeconomic diplomacy, the complex practical entanglement between the EU sanctions with economic aid and development programmes and US sanctions challenged European diplomats’ ability to leverage their role as indispensable network actors regarding the implementation of EU sanctions in at least two ways. First, non-​state actors with economic ties to Syria were concerned with both EU and US sanctions regimes, and many could practically not distinguish between the two. This confusion would complicate things for EU diplomats trying to help people understand what was and was not allowed under the EU’s restrictive measures, essentially undermining the EU’s ability to specifically apply the agreed measures as politically intended. Second, as a result of the above, the EU’s ability to leverage the potential lifting of all or some of the sanctions as a ‘bargaining chip’ in formal and informal political negotiations with parties to the Syrian conflict were also diminished. Actors from all sides understood that even if the EU would lift its unilateral sanctions as part of an agreement or understanding with the Assad regime and its allies, the material consequences of such a move would remain minimal if not followed by an equal lifting of US sanctions (icg 2019: 17). Not only were EU diplomats engaged in the use of economic sanctions forced to handle myriad networked actor-​relations. Their ability to leverage such relations for their political leaders’ geostrategic objectives was further hampered by the potential ramifications in other market-​related fields. 2

The Geoeconomic Diplomacy of Economic Sanctions: Instrumentalising Market Shares, Managing Global Interdependencies

From the perspective of the EU’s geoeconomic diplomacy, the book’s case studies also point to future concerns about further complicating factors when the two levels of geoeconomics, as described in this book’s ­chapter 1, collide, i.e. when governments’ geoeconomic activity in the sphere of foreign and security 4 A contrast between the US and European communication approach could e.g. be identified in their respective clarifications about the availability of humanitarian exemptions for medical goods related to the covid-​19 outbreak. Whereas ofac’s brief on the matter is written in legalised wordings specifying the specific provisions that apply (ofac 2020), the eeas published a note what can be interpreted as a more cooperative and political tone (eeas 2020).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

142 

Chapter 6

policy is directly or indirectly affected by their attempt to manage and steer global economic interdependencies. In the realm of economic sanctions, such interdependencies particularly come to light when states, such as the US, make use of sanctions designs that allow for so-​called secondary or extraterritorial effects. In claiming that the stipulations of US unilateral sanctions also pertain to actors outside its primary jurisdiction (Lohmann 2019), the US government has for more than three decades designed measures with extraterritorial effects, essentially to block individuals and commercial entities from trading with the US market and using the US dollar (Sossai 2020: 62–​66).5 Depending on their specific outline, such extraterritorial provisions can expose virtually any European organisation or commercial entity with international activities to ramifications of the sanctions regime (Geranmayeh & Lafont Rapnouil 2019; Knudsen 2020). While European protests against the US application of extraterritorial provisions have been particularly pertinent to discussions concerning US sanctions regimes against Russia and Iran,6 the question of the secondary impact of sectorial sanctions has also become increasingly relevant in the context of Syria. In December 2019, the US Congress adopted and President Trump signed the National Defence Authorization Act of 2020, which came to include key elements of the Syria Civilian Protection Act, more commonly known as the ‘Caesar Act’.7 Originally introduced by the House of Representatives in 2016, the Caesar Act was inter alia designed to target virtually all foreign governments, commercial entities, or individuals investing in the Syrian energy or aviation sectors, lending funds to the regime, or “significantly [facilitating] the maintenance or expansion of the Government of Syria’s domestic production of natural gas, petroleum, or petroleum products” (US Congress 2019: 1111). In 5 Extraterritorial provisions of US sanctions are thus to be distinguished from situations where the US have coerced other countries from trading with geopolitical adversaries, such as was the case when the US sought to impose on its European allies its goal of trade restrictions in the ‘East-​West trade’ with the ussr (Crawford & Lenway 1985). 6 The EU guidelines on the use of sanctions make clear that the EU “will refrain from adopting legislative instruments having extra-​territorial application in breach of international law. The EU has condemned the extra-​territorial application of third country’s legislation imposing restrictive measures which purports to regulate the activities of natural and legal persons under the jurisdiction of the Member States of the European Union, as being in violation of international law” (EU Council 2018: 19; cf. Sossai 2020: 66–​67). 7 The act was named after a former Syrian military police photographer, only known to the public under his pseudonym ‘Caesar’, who after his fleeing out of Syria in 2014 shared more than 50,000 smuggled photographs, with Western governments, picturing of dead and tortured individuals and hence giving evidence to the systemic torture happening in the Syrian regime’s prisons and detention facilities.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Conflicting Practices?

143

essence, the Caesar Act was intended to curb any international reconstruction efforts inside Syria undertaken in proximity to the government in Damascus. When furthermore keeping in mind that US sanctions measures against Syria, both politically and legally, were tightly knit into existing sanctions regimes against Washington’s main regional adversaries, Iran and the Lebanon-​based militia Hezbollah, the Caesar Act, which went into effect in June 2020, would be seen as further limiting the margin of manoeuvre for actors under EU jurisdiction. Commercial activities which would be legal under the EU’s restrictive measures could be practically rendered impossible by the tightened US regime (Alloush & Simon 2020; sjac 2020). Entanglements between EU and US sanctions are therefore not merely a theoretical problem. As the Caesar Act risks exacerbating the difficulties for European diplomats reduce interdependencies with US sanctions regimes, it seems relevant to draw parallels to Iran, another case of US-​EU sanctions entanglement that has led to substantial transatlantic antagonisms and proved to be a real challenge for Europe’s ability to foster an independent geoeconomic diplomacy. The target of US and EU sanctions since the early 2000s due to its nuclear program, the Iranian government agreed in 2015 to sign the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) with the international negotiation group consisting of the so-​called P5+​1 countries.8 The Plan of Action, endorsed through unsc Resolution 2231 (UN Security Council 2015), foresaw a processual reduction of Iran’s nuclear capabilities in return for the gradual lifting of UN and EU sanctions as well as the suspension of certain secondary US sanctions.9 However, these secondary measures were reinstated in May 2018 when US president Trump, who in 2016 had led a presidential campaign highly critical of the Obama administration and its endorsement of the JCPoA, announced to unilaterally withdraw the US from the agreement (Suzuki 2020). Aiming to circumvent the US’s extraterritorial reach, the remaining P5+​1 members and Iran worked to facilitate

8 The P5+​1, consisting of the five permanent members of the unsc, China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US as well as Germany, was formed in 2006 as the main country group to negotiate with the Iranian government about its nuclear program against the backdrop of possible unsc sanctions (Nephew 2018: 39–​42). 9 The provisions included changing the status of entities listed pursuant to e.o. 13599 (US President 2012 ), signed by president Obama in 2012, from that of so-​called ‘Specially Designated Nationals’ to “designees blocked solely pursuant to e.o. 13599”, which would give non-​US entities the possibility to engage with these Iranian entities without becoming targeted by US secondary sanctions. Due to US withdrawal from the JCPoA, almost all individuals and entities delisted from e.o. 13599 where relisted as hereon in November 2018 (Katzman 2020: 3).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

144 

Chapter 6

mutual trade that would not be exposed to the US market or monetary transactions in US dollars.10 The so-​called Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges (instex), which in 2019 was further joined by further six European countries,11 facilitated its first transaction of medical equipment to Iran in March 2020 (Katzman 2020: 50).

…

This brief recapitulation of events does not pay tribute to the political and economic capital invested by EU governments to uphold their geoeconomic ‘sovereignty’ independent of US pressure. It does, however, illustrate how the two levels of geoeconomics, as laid out in ­chapter 1, might often blend in the practical conduct of foreign and security policy. In this sense, the book’s initial assumptions about the particular challenges faced by geoeconomic diplomats have not only been confirmed, but expanded. By analysing the conduct of geoeconomic diplomacy through the analytical prism of actor-​networks, it becomes more visible how geoeconomic diplomats are both forced to leverage their specific positions in such actors-​networks, while at the same time engage in processes that socially embed these networks in regional and global geoeconomic interdependencies. The book’s last chapter therefore engages in a critical reflection on the ability of the EU and its Member States to ‘weaponise interdependencies’ as part of their geoeconomic foreign and security policy, while sharing some perspectives on the normative consequences of using a conceptual and theoretical approach that ask for what geoeconomic policy-​ makers and diplomats do, rather than whether they should do it. 10

11

The application of diversification strategies on behalf of both targeted states and third-​ party states is a well-​described phenomenon. Seen from the perspective of the sanctioning state, examples of ‘sanctions busting’ can over time effectively undermine the sanctions’ material effect. As explained by Early (2015: 36), “[third-​party] states engage in extensive sanctions-​busting trade when they dramatically increase their trade with a target state after it has been sanctioned and in high enough absolute levels to mitigate the damages the sanctions inflict.” In the case of US sanctions against Iran, such examples include the purchase of Iranian oil (subject to US sanctions) by China and possibly Turkey and Syria (Singhvi et al. 2019). instex was joined by EU Member States Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, and Sweden as well as the non-​EU Member State Norway.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

­c hapter 7

Geoeconomic Diplomats as Sanctions ‘Shapers’ By reverting to the question of diplomats’ role as obligatory passage points in geoeconomic actor-​networks, and the potential challenges hereto, this final chapter discusses the consequences that arise from EU governments’ ever greater reliance on geoeconomic policies for their diplomats’ ability to guide the governmental use of economic power instruments. Perceiving diplomats as network managers in the geoeconomic realm is reminiscent of conceptions from other scholars about the power of diplomatic networks. This chapter will show how this book aligns with such conceptions of ‘networked diplomacy’ coined by scholars and foreign policy professionals since the early 21st century, all while elaborating how a more profound understanding of the network practices at play can assist policy-​makers and diplomats in leveraging network positions in the geoeconomic realm. Acknowledging both the profound possibilities and limitations for leveraging diplomatic relationship in the geoeconomic context and recalling recent diplomacy scholars’ argument for seeing diplomats as ‘makers’ of world politics (Sending et al. 2015), the chapter argues that geoeconomic diplomats, especially when operating outside the structured and well-​organised social environment of meeting rooms and formalised settings of diplomatic negotiation and mediation, rather should be seen as ‘shapers’ of both their immediate social environment as well as the actor-​networks they are bound to act through. 1

Leveraging Geoeconomic Network Positions: Consequences for Policy-​Makers and Diplomats

Among the most adept scholars of diplomatic engagements in multifaceted webs of social relations is Brian Hocking (2007: 11–​15; 2013), who pictured mfa s as being placed at the intersection between two different systems: the ‘international diplomatic network’ and the ‘national diplomatic system’. In this image, diplomats are able to clearly distinguish, on the one hand, between the fluid, networked, and volatile reality they are confronted with in the international sphere and, on the other hand, the systemised and recurring cooperation with a more fixed set of domestic actors. Citing works from former diplomatic practitioners (D. Copeland 2005; Riordan 2002), Hocking pointed to numerous

© Kim B. Olsen, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004518834_009

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

146 

Chapter 7

calls for reforms in the early 2000s to allow mfa s to better respond to societal changes of the 21st century. Such reforms should simultaneously aim at the international and domestic level, meaning that the parallel diplomatic management of these two structures would “[require] networks rather than traditional hierarchical structures” (Hocking 2007: 15) to ensure the required flexibility of encompassing both of them. Other practitioners have in recent years weighed in along similar lines. Kishan S. Rana, a former Indian ambassador and professor of diplomacy studies, assessed that the “mfa is forced to network with many official and non-​ official actors, overcoming traditional inhibitions”, adding that such actors would only be willing to engage and coordinate with mfa s if diplomats were able to mobilise added value and solutions for these non-​diplomatic actors’ concerns (Rana 2007: 23). In moving the analytical focus from networks of tangibly defined actors to the holistic understanding of globalised networks, Anne-​Marie Slaughter, a political scientist and Director of Policy Planning of the US State Department during the first Obama presidency, asserted that “[networks] are not directed and controlled as much as they are managed and orchestrated”. A government’s ‘networked power’ hence “flows from the ability to make a maximum number of valuable connections” (Slaughter 2009: 99–​100).1 Thomas Bagger, long-​term Director of the German Foreign Ministry’s Policy Planning Staff and subsequently Director of Foreign Policy of the German Federal President’s Office, built hereon in coining the term of the ‘networked diplomat’, i.e. the modern diplomatic practitioner tasked with coordinating the complex cooperation between state agencies and relevant non-​state actors (Bagger 2013; Bagger & von Heynitz 2012: 60).2 This book has both provided further theoretical underpinning and empirical evidence, but also added necessary clarification, to the image of (geoeconomic) diplomats as managers of networks of domestic and international state and non-​state actors. On the one hand, it has been demonstrated how diplomatic action in the state-​market nexus demands that diplomats engage 1 Slaugther’s holistic approach to the force of collective action in global networks resembles, but is clearly distinguished from, the conceptualisation of diplomats’ ‘network power’, as coined by Cooper (2015), who investigated how former world leaders’ are able to instrumentalise individualised relations in their “diplomatic afterlives” to influence world affairs through lobbying-​like behaviour. 2 Volker Stanzel, a former German ambassador and senior researcher with various European think tanks, expressed a similar view about the fate of mfa s in a diplomatic sphere with many state and non-​state agents, leading to “grey areas related in different degrees to foreign policy where foreign ministries can at best try to moderate and coordinate activities” (Stanzel 2016: 6).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Geoeconomic Diplomats as Sanctions ‘Shapers’

147

in, prioritise between, and manage relationships with myriad of actors. When investigated descriptively through the case study on French and German diplomats’ engagement in the implementation of the EU’s Russia sanctions, the tasks of diplomats and mfa s indeed resembled that of managers trying to organise, influence, and, ultimately, streamline the behaviour of various state and non-​state actors. Seen in this perspective, the diplomatic task would indeed consist in forging the maximum number of valuable connections and managing these through communication, coordination, and cooperation. Yet, on the other hand, by applying the developed analytical framework of networked practices, the case study of the EU’s Syria sanctions demonstrated how diplomats not only seek to manage relations between networked actors, but also aim at influencing joint networked practices to ‘shape’ the rules of the game. By advancing from a descriptive understanding to an interpretative analysis, the notion of the diplomatic network is transformed from solely describing the social relations between a range of actors involved in geoeconomic policy-​making and implementation to an interpretation of the social fabric that is created between actors and the joint understanding that makes collective action possible. In further applying ant’s terminology of obligatory passage points, the analysis of networked practices reveals how diplomatic actors, engaged in the field of geoeconomic diplomacy, can leverage the relational structures they themselves are part of. In obtaining and defending their roles as indispensable network actors, or opp s, diplomats become active agents in the relational practices that define the formative structures of the actor-​network. These insights are not just theoretical abstractions about mundane diplomatic practice. They have direct corollaries on the way (European) policy-​ makers and diplomats should perceive their options in the geoeconomic game. This game is not one of passive mediation of actor relations, but an active, diverse, and persistent engagement in them. Given that one main task of geoeconomic diplomacy –​especially in the case of sanctions –​is to win control over the ‘uncontrollable’ global market structures, financial flows, and value chains, governments engaging in the geoeconomic realm need to carefully consider how to maintain and expand their influences hereon. As this book has demonstrated, even when decided on paper by law-​and policy-​ makers, economic sanctions are not automatically rolled out in real world. On the contrary, they continuously remain subject to possible modifications as they unfold their complex and often unforeseeable ramifications, both for the targeting and the targeted side of the geoeconomic intervention. It is such complexities that geoeconomic diplomats must navigate and, ultimately, seek to shape.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

148  2

Chapter 7

The Explanatory Power of Pragmatism: Diplomats as ‘Shapers’ of Geoeconomic Practices

Such reasoning about diplomatic action as central to the steering of practices for a conglomerate of actors not only holds empirical, but also practice-​ theoretical, value. The ideas are evocative of what was discussed in a widely praised book as diplomacy’s role in the ‘making of world politics’ (Sending et al. 2015). Building on a relational and practice-​oriented understanding of diplomacy, the authors summarised a view of diplomatic action that, at least at first sight, harmonises with this book’s overall findings: To return to our relational argument, a particular political order or institutional arrangement anchored in sovereignty does not regulate the behaviour of pre-​constituted political actors. Rather, sovereignty is produced and reproduced (and transformed) through changing diplomatic practices, whereby recognition as a competent participant (diplomat) hinges on deploying or enacting some strategies and roles that reproduce the state as a recognized sovereign […] In today’s world, diplomacy is also concerned with governance, understood as a system of rule and control. sending et al. 2015: 17

While employing a Bourdieu-​inspired conceptual apparatus centring on the critical search for actors deemed ‘competent’ in the broader conduct of diplomacy, the authors were also sensitive towards the interplay between state and non-​state actors and interested in describing how the practice of diplomacy is both constitutive of the broader societal structures into which the conduct of international affairs is embedded as well as how the state/​non-​state interplay forms the playing field such actors operate in: And to the extent that diplomacy is constitutive of international society and that diplomats produce, through the practice of diplomacy, an international system that would otherwise be different, then it is important to pinpoint and account for how diplomatic practice may change[…] [We ask] how changes in the cast of actors involved affect diplomatic practice, and how, in turn, diplomatic practice itself conditions and structures non-​state actors’ strategies. sending et al. 2015: 19

Along with other contributors to their anthology, the authors suggested a relational analysis of practices that focuses on the reproduction and evolution of

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Geoeconomic Diplomats as Sanctions ‘Shapers’

149

social systems, embedded authority and hierarchies, and diplomatic culture that together create the social fabric within which world politics is made. In influencing these social rules, diplomacy becomes constitutive of other social processes of world politics because it offers an institutionalised anchor that “produces global effects beyond representation, but is also significantly shaped by the evolution of governance structures and modes” (Sending et al. 2015: 21). In a study on the relationship between diplomats and humanitarian actors, Ole Jacob Sending described how diplomatic culture and practices proliferate in a way that makes non-​diplomatic humanitarians define their own behaviour against social rules heavily influenced by diplomats: “It is in this sense that diplomacy constitutes an infrastructure –​one that privileges some practices over others” (Sending 2015: 272; emphasis added). The notions of social infrastructure and privilege serve as theoretical manifestations of the Bourdieuian tradition in which practices are commonly seen as habitual and repetitive. Such critical approaches to practice studies continue to dominate the ipt field, which, according to critics, has led to an “overemphasis on the habitual side of practice(s) [that] came at the cost of neglecting the genuine creativity of practitioners –​both the practitioners of international politics and the practitioners of ir” (Grimmel & Hellmann 2019: 211; emphasis in original).3 The complex and interdependent world of geoeconomics calls for diplomatic actors’ practical creativity. This book has therefore chosen a less trodden path within the ipt literature, the pragmatic tradition of practice studies, to focus on the empirically less recognised diplomatic activity of policy implementation. Applying an analytical apparatus with less theoretical predispositions about the role of power, competence, and socially engrained privilege than the Bourdieuian tradition, the pragmatic approach to the analysis of (geoeconomic) diplomacy highlights the possibility of thinking about practices in specific punctual moments of foreign and security policy-​making. As such, this research has highlighted how governments’ use of economic sanctions is ­contingent on the specific context in which they are implemented by their diplomatic representatives. The types of processes and actors involved in one sanctions regime cannot be assumed to be found in another. By zooming in 3 The general popularity of critical practices studies among ipt scholars might be linked to ir’s general favouring of theory-​driven and structured analysis. As argued by Andreas Grimmel and Gunther Hellmann, many ipt scholars might have been “attracted by the lures of the presumably more easily theorizable habitual (or repetitive) dimensions of ‘practice’, which seemed to suit mainstream ir’s predisposition to associate theory-​building with transhistorical generalization” (2019: 200).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

150 

Chapter 7

on the specific contextual and relational practices that bind relevant state and market actors together, it has nonetheless been possible to identify emerging practices within the conduct of diplomacy that can be used by diplomats to leverage influence in the geoeconomic sphere. At the same time, being attentive and sensitive to the formation of practices that grant room for other network actors to circumvent EU institutions and mfa s, and thus limit the influence of diplomats on such implementation practices, helped to grasp the limits of diplomatic leverage in foreign and security policy-​making. This research has thereby demonstrated that any analysis of diplomats’ engagement in the implementation of foreign and security policy calls for a more flexible understanding of their specific roles than most practice-​oriented depictions of diplomacy have so far offered. Rather than understanding diplomats as the ‘makers’ of world politics, and hence diplomacy as a specific ‘culture’ that other actors operating in the international realm need to engage with, this research suggests the more modest characterisation of diplomats as ‘shapers’ of foreign and security policy, at least when diplomats’ ability to exert direct control over other actors active in the international sphere is not formally given. Only by acknowledging that diplomatic activity spans into fields where the reach of diplomats is limited in formal terms is one able to identify the social dynamics that still allow diplomats to shape, rather than make, the broader environment they themselves are part of. The present research might also be helpful when reconsidering the semantic and conceptual boundaries that are often implied when debating the role of ‘diplomacy’. Especially when perceived as action outside domestic, international, or multilateral institutions and in connection to the use of tangible means of power, diplomacy is all too often defined in terms of what it is not. Examples from the literature discussed previously in this book give evidence to this assertation. In the anthology cited above, Sending suggested that the activity behind the implementation of development assistance, which in some cases amounts to a geoeconomic activity, is to be differentiated from the act of diplomacy itself. Development assistance, in his view, should be seen as relations and representation between donor and partner countries, and thereby as sharply distinguished from the practice of diplomacy, which entails “representation rather than governance on the territory of another state” (Sending 2015: 272).4 Baldwin, as previously noted, juxta positioned the 4 This distinction between diplomacy and economic assistance does not take into account the widespread engagement of diplomats in aid delivery, especially in cases where aid is delivered in conflict environments (Haan 2011). A look at Europe’s three largest foreign services elaborates the point. The distinction that would support Sending’s assertation most clearly,

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Geoeconomic Diplomats as Sanctions ‘Shapers’

151

conduct of information management (or, in Baldwin’s words, “propaganda”), economic statecraft, and military statecraft with negotiation through diplomacy (Baldwin 1985: 13–​14). Using a similar taxonomy, recent scholars of statecraft have also suggested a distinction between military, economic, diplomatic, and cultural instruments, arguing that states possess strategic ‘repertoires’ to mix the use of instruments with various logics of intervention: the use of economic sanctions, for instance, “is more than a reflection of power. It is collective mobilization of a political community” (Goddard et al. 2019: 315). While this understanding is more appreciative of the fluent boundaries between various practices of policy-​making, the use of economic power is not understood as an inherent aspect of diplomatic practice. Consequently, while shedding light on the importance of understanding the relational dynamics that surround the use of economic means of power in foreign and security policy, these accounts of diplomacy’s role in states’ use of economic power fail to account for the links between the intention of using economic resources and the diplomatic actors that are responsible for implementing them. By a priori defining diplomacy as merely matters of representation and negotiation, scholarly understanding of the diplomatic field is at risk of soon hitting an empirical glass ceiling that does not allow for a more fine-​grained understanding of a significant part of activities generated through and inside mfa s, multilateral and international organisations, and other diplomatic institutions –​in particular diplomats’ roles in shaping these activities. 3

Normatively Blindsided? Facing the Moral Dilemmas of Geoeconomic Diplomacy

Summing up, this book has argued that geoeconomic diplomacy demands of diplomats to operate in highly volatile and ever-​changing actor-​networks, which they can occasionally ‘shape’ by forming the networked practices that they are bound to partake in. As has been established, this insight has tangible though not fully, is found in Germany, where the Federal Foreign Office is responsible for humanitarian and non-​humanitarian stabilisation assistance while the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development governs ‘classical’ development assistance. On the contrary, in France, all aspects of economic aid are traditionally handled within the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs. A significant example of how the lines between diplomacy and development assistance are, if anything, getting less firm can be found in the UK, where it was announced in June 2020 that the Department for International Development would be merged with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to henceforth form the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (UK Government 2020).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

152 

Chapter 7

ramifications for our understanding of diplomacy’s role in the 21st century’s highly complex and multipolar order. Through specific and empirically informed analysis of the prospects and limits of diplomatic action, we can better identify instances where diplomats succeed or fail to shape the behaviour of actors beyond their traditional reach. In doing so, it is hoped, we can more fruitfully engage practitioners in scholarly debates about the complex challenges and mitigation strategies of modern-​day diplomacy. These insights have emerged from the book’s explicitly descriptive approach in theoretical terms, but also at the conceptual and empirical level. Although the reasoning for this approach has been established throughout the preceding chapters, the focus on questions of the ‘how’ over inquiries of the ‘why’ could attract criticism of being normatively blindsided to the real-​life effects and consequences of the geoeconomic policy measures discussed. This last section sets out to acknowledge this potential criticism from a theoretical as well as a conceptual and empirical viewpoint, but also to argue for the usability of the applied approach as a potential stepping stone for discussing possible normative implications of geoeconomic policy-​making in general and the use of economic sanctions in particular. By leaning on the theoretical apparatus and reasoning of pragmatic practice studies, the presented framework could be met by the same criticism that some scholars have directed against the ipt agenda as such: its lack of reflection on the normativity of practices (Bueger & Gadinger 2018: 115). Simply put, practice scholars, preoccupied with almost ‘clinical’ observations, descriptions, and analyses of the patterns of what practitioners do, have rarely left much analytical room for reflections about whether these practitioners should engage in such practices –​and what the normative consequences of their actions are. In his opening lines of a much renowned article on the role of the ‘practice turn’ in current ir thinking, Ted Hopf’s description of ipt’s objective acknowledged this analytical trend: The most important contribution of the practice turn in International Relations (ptir) theory has perhaps been to shift our focus from reflective deliberation and conscious instrumental and normative decision-​ making to the daily practices of habitual sayings and doings. hopf 2018: 687

But even as ir’s practice turn itself built on some scholars’ analytical longing for surpassing ir’s eternal debates on whether actors’ joint actions and decision-​making are based on shared interests or shared norms/​ideas, but rather the repetitive actions of practical behaviour among those actors, the

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Geoeconomic Diplomats as Sanctions ‘Shapers’

153

resulting ‘clinical’ identifications of practices should not lead to ipt’s disengagement with the normative consequences of those identified practices. Such has recently been argued by Jason Ralph and Jess Gifkins, who emphasised that “external critique is needed to hold insiders to account. Practice theory is not ‘devoid’ of normativity, even if it seeks to avoid it” (2017: 636). By applying a normative lens on the study of practices, the authors demonstrated how such accountable ‘insiders’ could, for example, be those French and British diplomats operating in the unsc, whom Adler-​Nissen and Pouliot (2014) had identified as particularly ‘competent’ in directing the drafting of unsc Resolution 1973 of 2011 that paved the way for the international military intervention in Libya. Criticising a practice-​theoretical focus on ‘penholders’ of the resolution rather than the ethical consciousness and responsibilities for protecting civilian lives, the authors argued that the question of “what competency is for” (Ralph & Gifkins 2017: 647–​648) should take centre stage when analysing practices that form the conduct of foreign affairs. In specific terms, their normative critique of ipt scholars’ fascination of bureaucratic competencies underestimates the ability to grasp the practical value of ‘collective consciousness’ and ‘normative commitments’. For the specific case of the unsc’s role in the Libya conflict, Ralph and Gifkins argue that such commitments should first and foremost be weighed against the moral and ethical standards enshrined in the norm of Responsibility to Protect (r2p).5 Instead of searching for competencies of ‘penholding’ and negotiation tactics, so the argument went, practice scholars should apply a normative lens in their analytical approach to identify which actors ensure that collective moral and ethical responsibilities are upheld and applied when states engage in international interventions. A similar critique of normative oblivion could be directed at the research presented in this book, aimed at providing a new conceptual take on analysing European diplomatic abilities of instrumentalising the state-​market nexus. The analytical quest to identify the diplomatic measures needed for ensuring an effective implementation of a geoeconomic policy decision does itself not address whether the decision is the right one and what real-​life effects the geoeconomic measures might have. Particularly when addressing the coercive 5 The principle of r2p, developed against the backdrop the horrendous genocides of Rwanda and Yugoslavia in the 1990s, was first adopted at the 2005 World Summit and has since 2009 been subject to annual reporting by the UN Secretary-​General. The principle underlines the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. To date, the international intervention in Libya of 2011 remains the only example of an unsc authorisation that was explicitly based on the r2p principle.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

154 

Chapter 7

measures of economic sanctions, the lack of normative engagement with the subject matter might seem missing. Which individuals or groups might be targeted and who experiences which and how much material and symbolic damage from sanctions remains an empirical, case-​by-​case question. And even if one does not agree with the fiercest categorisations of economic sanctions as weapons similar to economic “carpet bombing” (Dobbins 2019), “mass destruction” (Mueller & Mueller 1999), or even “genocide” (Bisharat 2001) it would be counterfactual to claim that most economic sanctions regime are not invoked to create either economic “pain” (Nephew 2018) or disruptions for targets such as specific individuals, broader populations –​or both. At the same time, senders’ use of economic sanctions is often rooted in a conviction that the sanctions’ ultimate target has engaged in unjust behaviour such as violations of international law, conventions, and human rights or the aggression against a specific regional or global order, and hence adopted and enforced to serve international justice by coercing the target to engage in behavioural change (Cortright & Lopez 1999: 754). The moral dilemma between action and inaction thereby becomes intrinsic to many cases of where the use of economic sanctions might be discussed, just as it is the case with any external foreign and security policy intervention with the risk of collateral damage. The moral principle of r2p is a pertinent example hereof. Namely because economic sanctions –​be they targeted at individuals, entities, or broader economic sectors –​aim at manipulating and restraining specific actors from accessing certain economic, financial, or geographic resources and gains, even the most ‘smartest’ sanctions will never be without unintended consequences for individuals without direct responsibilities for or influence on the sanctioned behaviour. Whether policy-​ makers and diplomats engage in normative deliberations on how to mitigate such collateral risks indeed remains an empirical question, but none the less one that needs to be thoroughly addressed. To advance such normative discussions, this book serves as a call to not only focus on the initial design of the sanctions policies, but also to continuously scrutinise the actual implementation of the sanctions measures and what impact diplomats can have on guiding this generally uncontrollable, yet practically ‘shapeable’, process in the state-​market sphere. This book’s acknowledgement of the dynamics that come into play when states agree on using economic sanctions or other geoeconomic instruments should not be misunderstood as a stance in favour of the frequent use of such instruments. Rather, awareness of the practical difficulties and complexities that might arise after a geoeconomic decision has been taken might (ideally) lead decision-​makers to rethink their inclination for perceiving many foreign and security policy problems as nails, ready to be hit with the sanctions hammer (cf. Mortlock & O’Toole 2018).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Geoeconomic Diplomats as Sanctions ‘Shapers’

155

Not only because the quest for implementing sanctions could be a challenging one, but also because it could result in unintended consequences that cannot be properly shaped at the level of diplomacy. Expanding these considerations to the book’s Syria case study further helps to demonstrate this point. As described in further detail in ­chapters 5 and 6, the EU’s main response to the war in Syria became a geoeconomic one. Void of military options in which Europeans could rely on other international actors, either through a multilateral action by the unsc (due to the blocking attitude by permanent unsc members Russia and China of initial Western propositions of regime change and calls for ‘Assad must go’ (Ralph 2018)) or an unilateral military enforcement by the US,6 the elaborate sanctions regimes by the US and EU came to manifest themselves as the strongest Western instrument directed against Damascus. Attaining this key function in the West’s geostrategic approach to post-​2011 Syria, Western unilateral use of sanctions would soon result in highly politicised and un-​nuanced debates about the sanctions’ impact and moral consequences, not least in light of the general collapse of the Syrian national economy. US and EU policy-​makers and diplomats, as well as representatives of the opposition-​leaning Syrian civil society, point to the sanctions’ careful design. This design, they argue, is targeted at curbing the reach and influence of specific sanctioned individuals or the suppression of certain areas of trade and economic activity, all while leaving sufficient room for humanitarian exemptions to spare civilians for direct ramifications. In their opinion, the Assad regime’s inhumane and brutal warfare against the Syrian population is the main reason for Syria’s economic decline. The maintenance and possible expansion of economic sanctions against the Assad regime and its interests are seen as a strategic and political cornerstone in pushing the regime towards behavioural change as well as in signalling that the normalisation of relations with Damascus depends on firm and irreversible progress towards a negotiated conflict resolution building on unsc Resolution 2254. Syria and its allies as well as various special UN rapporteurs, humanitarian organisations, and civilian groupings with pro-​Assad sentiments, on the other hand, continuously pointed to the sanctions policies as culprits of Syria’s economic distress, identifying the West’s ‘economic warfare’ as the main responsible for the economic and social suffering of the Syrian population. Sanctions are called out as tangible prove of the West’s hypocrisy and cold-​blooded acceptance of human collateral damage resulting from the sanctions effects.

6 In 2013, President Obama ultimately decided against enforcing his own ‘red line’ that the Assad regime had crossed by using chemical weapons against its own population.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

156 

Chapter 7

The argumentative confrontation between two sides of the geostrategic, humanitarian, and, indeed, moral tragedy that has become Syria in the past decade is highlighted to demonstrate some of the questions that this book’s analytical approach to the study of networked practices of geoeconomic diplomacy cannot help to solve, as it does not represent an analytical stance for or against the use of economic power-​based instruments. In this sense, the book might be seen as culpable of the same normative neglect that other practice theoretical approaches have been criticised of. But such a bland criticism would also be reductionistic as it would not sufficiently recognise how the (pragmatic) study of practices itself can help to analytically unearth and expose some of the moral dilemmas faced by foreign and security policy practitioners, not least because sanctions critics, as demonstrated in ­chapter 5, might themselves become part of a given geoeconomic actor-​network. Understanding the complexities involved in sanctions implementation and enforcement, including considerations about the unintended humanitarian and economically harmful consequences that certain sanctions have for civilians, who do not bear direct responsibilities for a given sanctions target’s behaviour, and how to possibly prevent them, is an important task of its own. The careful analysis of the diplomatic practices behind the use of such instruments of hard power can help to clarify the role that ethical and moral concerns play among sanctions practitioners, and how such concerns are ultimately addressed –​or not –​at all levels of diplomatic practice.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Conclusions

Identifying the Human Impact on Economic Power Politics

As wealthy economies around the world continue to seek geostrategic profits from their beneficial positions in the global marketplace, it is imperative for scholars and practitioners of diplomacy to understand the challenges and consequences that the instrumentalisation of economic power has for everyday diplomatic activity. Building on the observation that particularly governments of liberal market capitalism might be impeded in their ability to exert control over the material resources that underpin a state’s economic power, this book has approached the field of geoeconomics from a European perspective. In departing from the overall research question of how EU governments leverage diplomatic relationships to advance the implementation of economic sanctions –​one of the key geoeconomic instruments in contemporary EU foreign and security policy –​the book set out to open pathways for improving our conceptual, theoretical, and empirical understanding of the geostrategic engagement of diplomats in the state-​market nexus. The book’s main conceptual contribution has been the introduction of the notion of geoeconomic diplomacy to the academic literature. Describing the realm where governments pursue their ability to employ national economic capabilities to realise geostrategic objectives in their conduct of relationships with other international actors, the concept has proven useful for scrutinising governments’ ability to instrumentalise economic means of power materially situated in market-​driven structures dominated by private, non-​state actors –​and hence often outside the direct control of governmental agents. The concept provides a lens of inquiry into how diplomats engage with state and non-​state actors to support their governments’ broader geostrategic objectives, and hence to explain how EU governments are able to utilise their diplomatic practitioners to translate national economic levers into foreign policy leverage. The book built on its conceptual approach by developing an analytical framework based on insights from the broad theoretical family of international practice theory. The inclusion of practice-​theoretical perspectives into ir has been beneficial for the study of diplomacy and its impact on dynamics that form the basis of global affairs and the conduct of foreign policy. ipt scholars, jointly pursuing the study of diplomatic relations from a premise of ‘practices first’, have shown remarkable creativity in addressing empirically relevant areas of international relations and diplomatic activity. Regrettably, this empirical scrutiny has been disproportionally focused on diplomatic practices

© Kim B. Olsen, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004518834_010

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

158 Conclusions in the context of negotiation, mediation, and policy decision bargaining, rather than at the dynamics and diplomatic activity that shape the actual implementation of such political directives. In order to fulfil the inherent promise for advancing a much-​welcomed bridge-​building between practical and academic communities, the book has argued that ipt scholarship should acknowledge, through empirical research, that diplomacy is much more than the quest of text negotiations or the mediation between international or domestic colleagues and adversaries to reach decisions. It is just as much about bringing decisions and negotiation results into practice. The book has therefore called for the need to broaden the discipline’s empirical and conceptual scope by focusing less on the diplomatic practices at play in the decision-​making phase of foreign and security policy and more on the implementation phase of such policies. Such a reorientation also implies that practice scholars be less guided by the study of the institutionalised power structures of mfa s, international organisations, or multilateral fora, and pay more attention to the policy objectives that a specific type of diplomatic activity aims to achieve. The ‘on-​the-​ground’ implementation of foreign and security policy decisions often involves diplomatic activity and actor-​relations taking place outside of meeting rooms and corridors. Confronted with this ‘polylateral’ reality of modern diplomacy, practitioners are bound to work in environments with changing state and non-​state interlocutors, some of whom are normally not embedded in foreign and security policy deliberations and actions. Such inherently flexible and unstable social environments call for analytical frameworks that can grasp fluctuating actor constellations. This book has argued that the conceptual apparatus of actor-​network theory, and in particular the notions of ‘translations’ and ‘obligatory passage points’, serves this purpose. Whereas the former denotes relational processes of objective convergence that forges ties between actors, the latter is helpful to scrutinise whether specific network actors, such as diplomats, are able to exert disproportionate influence or control over the network’s ‘rules’. The book presented two case studies on the use of economic sanctions in the EU’s cfsp framework that demonstrated the added value of studying European governments’ geoeconomic diplomacy and provided an enhanced understanding of the actor-​networks that form the diplomatic practices guiding sanctions implementation. The first case study investigated the EU’s sanctions against Russia from 2014 onwards, applying the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy to explain how diplomats from France and Germany, both of whom played pivotal negotiation roles in the Ukraine crisis of 2014 that led the EU to adopt economic sanctions against Russia, worked with multiple domestic state and non-​state actors to keep the sanctions implementation on track. In

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Identifying the Human Impact on Economic Power Politics

159

demonstrating how geoeconomic diplomacy requires diplomats to engage in multiple, simultaneous, and complex relations with actors both inside and outside of government, the case study not only established the strength of conceptualising geoeconomic policies at the level of diplomatic action, but also gave empirical insights into the struggles diplomats from Europe’s largest mfa s faced in their attempts to leverage important domestic relationships to advance the implementation of this politically sensitive and geostrategic important sanctions regime. Thereby, the study also demonstrated how much of this diplomatic work is happening at the domestic level of EU Member States. Building on these observations, the book moved on to establish an analytical framework based on insights from international practice theory and actor-​ network theory. Aiming to provide theoretical guidance for how to study the ability of diplomats to leverage their relationships in their quest to implement economic sanctions and other geoeconomic instruments, the framework of ‘networked practices’ was constructed to capture both the relational practices that enhance network actors’ shared understanding of a given situation, while also identifying instances where diplomats are either able to derive leverage by positioning themselves as the network’s obligatory passage point, or where their leverage is deprived because they are circumvented as such. The analytical framework was applied to the second case study to scrutinise the EU’s use of economic restrictive measures towards Syria from 2011 onwards. By shifting focus from the types of network actors, as analysed in the Russia case, to the types of networked practices that an actor-​network is formed around, the Syria case demonstrated how EU diplomats were engaged in translation processes evolving around the practices of sanctions enforcement, monitoring, refinement, and deterrence. These, often contradictory, modes of relational behaviour bound diplomats into an actor-​network that would come to include national line ministries, customs and border protection authorities, banks, business representatives and companies, interest groups, international and Syrian ngo s, legal counsels, and more. Moreover, the study showed how diplomats from EU institutions and Member States leveraged positions as the actor-​network’s obligatory passage points to ensure that networked practices were aligned with the political objectives behind the EU’s sanctions policy. However, namely because of the numerous and heterogenous actors that would become relevant to various networked practices, some translation processes were less responsive to this diplomatic influence, consequently undermining EU diplomats’ central position in the actor-​network. The lack of a practiced division of competencies between political and technical actors within EU institutions as well as

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

160 Conclusions between EU institutions and Member States added to diplomats’ inability to fully engage with commercial actors and ngo s in structured and meaningful dialogues about the legal boundaries of the complex EU sanctions regime. In addition, the lack of a joint understanding between Member States of how to ensure harmonised and effective practices for granting exemption licences to commercial actors and ngo s further eroded diplomats’ ability to warrant that these important provisions of the sanctions regime were used as politically intended. As discussed in the book’s final chapters, the endeavours of diplomats to leverage their network position are further complicated when practices of sanctions implementation are entangled in geoeconomic interdependencies. In the Syria case, these interdependencies were predominantly represented through the EU’s own use of non-​humanitarian assistance to Syrian actors of its political predilection as well as the imposition of various US sanctions regimes targeted at Syria and its neighbours. This revealed how networked practices in one geoeconomic field can rarely be kept independent from other geostrategic interferences in the state-​market nexus. In conclusion, the investigation of economic sanctions implementation through the conceptual lens of geoeconomic diplomacy and the analytical framework of networked practices have in at least three ways guided the answer to the book’s overall research question of how EU institutions and governments can leverage diplomatic relationships to advance the implementation of economic sanctions: First, by developing and applying the concept of geoeconomic diplomacy, this book has demonstrated how governmental interference in the state-​market sphere through instruments such as economic sanctions entails, especially in the European context, the need for diplomats to balance multiple actor relations simultaneously. Not only is there a demand for engaging with commercial and non-​governmental actors relevant to a specific intervention, but also to take into account how diplomatic and governmental actors from other EU Member States translate agreed policies into action. Since geoeconomic instruments in the cfsp framework build on maximising and utilising the EU’s joint economic clout, the conceptual approach directs our attention to how diplomats need to be vigilant about not only the behaviour of governing authorities and non-​state actors in their own country, but also of those practices taking place in other Member States. By thereby conceptually understanding the multiple and complex actor relations diplomats are faced with in the geoeconomic field, the book sets the stage for advancing our search for the ways in which diplomats can leverage such relations for properly implementing economic sanctions according to the defined geostrategic objective.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Identifying the Human Impact on Economic Power Politics

161

Second, by focusing on the implementation of geoeconomic policies, the research has not only shown the analytical value of a practice-​oriented approach to the study of economic sanctions, but also filled a gap in the rapidly expanding practice-​theoretical literature on diplomatic behaviour. By redirecting ipt’s analytical lens towards the often-​neglected study of foreign and security policy implementation, and applying so far under-​utilised theoretical concepts from actor-​network theory, the book has demonstrated the value of a pragmatic, as opposed to a critical-​Bourdieuian, ipt research agenda for understanding how practitioners experience challenges in complex and quickly changing actor environments. By enabling us to dissect areas of state-​market relations to better identify the role of diplomatic behaviour, this pragmatic understanding of social practices has demonstrated how diplomats are involved in, and derive leverage from, the actor relations that are established in the implementation phase of a geoeconomic policy. As such, diplomats partake in actor-​networks as one actor type among many, while at the same time making use of their ability to influence the practices that form around their governments’ intention for applying specific means of economic power. Strengthening this promising, yet under-​researched, strand of ipt further opens possibilities for scholars to actively engage in and enhance policy debates about salient geoeconomic issues, such as the use of economic sanctions and other related instruments. Third, apart from reminding us about the complexities that pertain to any governmental attempt to instrumentalise state-​market relations for a specific political purpose, insights from this book carry a critique of the implied causality often applied in both scholarly and practical understandings of geoeconomics as the use of economic means of power to obtain specific geostrategic objectives. It helps to further question the limits of recent scholarly arguments about governments’ ability to freely ‘weaponise’ both global interdependencies and sources of national economic wealth. The research has thereby questioned these rather simplistic depictions of the practical relationship between economic power and geostrategic influence, which, so it has been shown, is subject to many interfering factors and actors present in the eternally intertwined and interdependent global economy. The proposed analysis of the networked practices that are formative of European geoeconomic diplomacy has helped to identify and contextualise such challenges as inherent aspects of the active geostrategic engagement of diplomats in the state-​market sphere and further showed how diplomats might be able to ‘shape’ the social environments decisive to an effective implementation of geoeconomic policies. By empirically addressing some of the central complexities related to two of the EU’s most politically important and, at the time of writing, still ongoing geoeconomic interventions in response to violent upheavals at its eastern and

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

162 Conclusions southern boarders, this research has also sought to help the scholarly field of geoeconomics to become more sensitive towards normative and moral issues, which are always crucial to evoke when considering states’ use of power in conflict areas. The international power games close to Europe’s borders, as seen in both Ukraine and Syria, are dark testimonies hereof. Even in the most sanitised language of both academia and diplomacy, the human consequences and suffering resulting from the practical use of means of power –​be they military, economic, or technological –​should not go unmentioned. The study of geoeconomic diplomacy, which implies an analytical focus on the actions to be taken after one or more states decide to apply economic instruments, insists on scrutinising the human interactions that happen outside of negotiation rooms and between actors involved in the real-​life consequences of a geoeconomic intervention. Becoming more aware of the challenges that diplomatic actors encounter in their quest to fulfil a political demand could ideally pave the way for more analytical vigilance towards the normative and moral impacts of such patterns of social action. As shown in this book, the systemised disclosure of diplomatic engagement in the implementation of geoeconomic instruments provides profound insights into the dilemmas confronted by every actor involved. As such, the further ‘humanisation’ of the dynamics behind economic power politics should help sensitise those that merely perceive geoeconomics as a potentially effective use of hard power with limited human costs. It should also remind us all that, no matter their underlying political intentions, geoeconomic instruments must always be handled with great care and with utmost attention to those individuals that may ultimately bear the intended and unintended consequences of their use.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography Abe, T. (2020). Syria: The Chemical Weapons Question and Autonomous Sanctions. In M. Asada (Ed.), Economic Sanctions in International Law and Practice (pp. 200–​222). Oxon/​New York: Routledge. Acharya, A. (2016). ‘Idea-​shift’: how ideas from the rest are reshaping global order. Third World Quarterly, 37(7), 1156–​1170. Acharya, A., & Buzan, B. (2019). The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary. Cambridge/​New York/​Port Melbourne/​New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. Adler, E. (2002). Constructivism and International Relations. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, & B. A. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook of International Relations (pp. 95–​118). London: sage Publications Ltd. Adler, E., & Pouliot, V. (2011). International Practices. International Theory, 3(1), 1–​36. Adler-​Nissen, R. (2012). Bourdieu in international relations: Rethinking key concepts in IR. London: Routledge. Adler-​Nissen, R. (2014). Opting out of the European Union: diplomacy, sovereignty and European integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Adler-​Nissen, R. (2015). Conclusion: Relationalism or why diplomats find international relations theory strange. In O. J. Sending, V. Pouliot, & I. B. Neumann (Eds.), Diplomacy and the making of world politics (pp. 284–​308). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Adler-​Nissen, R., & Drieschova, A. (2019). Track-​Change Diplomacy: Technology, Affordances, and the Practice of International Negotiations. International Studies Quarterly, 63(3), 531–​545. Adler-​Nissen, R., & Pouliot, V. (2014). Power in practice: Negotiating the international intervention in Libya. European Journal of International Relations, 20(4), 889–​911. Afesorgbor, S. K. (2018). Economic diplomacy in Africa: the impact of regional integration versus bilateral diplomacy on bilateral trade. In P. A. G. Bergeijk & S. J. V. Moons (Eds.), Research Handbook on Economic Diplomacy (pp. 326–​346). Cheltenham/​ Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Ahn, D. P., & Ludema, R. D. (2020). The sword and the shield: The economics of targeted sanctions. European Economic Review, 130, 103587. Aidoo, R. (2017). The changing geoeconomics of China’s diplomacy in Africa. In J. M. Munoz (Ed.), Advances in Geoeconomics (pp. 93–​102). London/​New York: Routledge. Aita, S. (2020). The Unintended Consequences of U.S. and European Unilateral Measures on Syria’s Economy and Its Small and Medium Enterprises. The Carter Center. Atlanta, ga.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

164 Bibliography Alami, I., & Dixon, A. D. (2020). State capitalism(s) redux? Theories, tensions, controversies. Competition & Change, 24(1), 70–​94. Alden, C., & Aran, A. (2016). Foreign policy analysis: new approaches. Oxon/​New York: Routledge. Alì, A. (2019). The Challenges of a Sanctions Machine: Some Reflections on the Legal Issues of EU Restrictive Measures in the Field of Common Foreign Security Policy. In L. Antoniolli, L. Bonatti, & C. Ruzza (Eds.), Highs and Lows of European Integration (pp. 49–​62). Cham: Springer. Allison, G. T. (1969). Conceptual models and the Cuban missile crisis. American Political Science Review, 63(3), 689–​718. Alloush, B., & Simon, A. (2020). Will More Syria Sanctions Hurt the Very Civilians they Aim to Protect? War On the Rocks. June 10, 2020. Retrieved from https://​waront​hero​ cks.com/​2020/​06/​will-​more-​syria-​sancti​ons-​hurt-​the-​very-​civili​ans-​they-​aim-​to -​prot​ect/​. Aloosh, M., Salavati, A., & Aloosh, A. (2019). Economic sanctions threaten population health: the case of Iran. Public Health, 169, 10–​13. Amariei, A.-​C. (2014). Diplomacy in the Context of Economic Crisis. Europolity, 8(1), 8–​31. Andreas, P. (2005). Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy. International Studies Quarterly, 49(2), 335–​360. Angell, N. (1911). The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage (3rd ed.). New York/​London: G.P. Putnam’s & Sons. Arthuis, J. (1998). Dans les coulisses de Bercy: le cinquième pouvoir. Paris: Albin Michel. Ashford, E. (2016). Not-​So-​Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia. Foreign Affairs, 95(1), 114–​123. Askari, H., Forrer, J., Teegen, H., & Yang, J. (2003). Economic Sanctions: Examining Their Philosophy and Efficacy. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Auswärtiges Amt. (2015). Review 2014. Außenpolitik weiterdenken. Krise, Ordnung, Europa. Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt. Autesserre, S. (2014). Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Azar, N., & Charif, H. (2020). Navigating Humanitarian Exceptions to Sanctions Against Syria: Challenges and Recommendations. The Carter Center. Atlanta, GA. Babic, M., Garcia-​Bernardo, J., & Heemskerk, E. M. (2020). The rise of transnational state capital: state-​led foreign investment in the 21st century. Review of International Political Economy, 27(3), 433–​475. Badel, L. (2010). Diplomatie et grands contrats: L’Etat français et les marchés extérieurs au XXe siècle. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

165

Bagger, T. (2013). The Networked Diplomat. To Suit the Changing World, the Role of the Foreign Office Must Be Rethought. Internationale Politik, 8(3). Bagger, T., & von Heynitz, W. (2012). Der vernetzte Diplomat: Von Vernetzter Sicherheit zu einer „netzwerkorientierten” Außenpolitik. Zeitschrift für Außen-​und Sicherheitspolitik, 5(1), 49–​61. Baldwin, D. A. (1980). Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis. International Organization, 34(4), 471–​506. Baldwin, D. A. (1985). Economic Statecraft. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bapat, N. A., & Kwon, B. R. (2015). When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework. International Organization, 69(1), 131–​162. Baracuhy, B. (2019). Geo-​economics as a dimension of grand strategy. In M. Wigell, S. Scholvin, & M. Aaltola (Eds.), Geo-​Economics and Power Politics in the 21st Century -​The Revival of Economic Statecraft (pp. 14–​27). Oxon/​New York: Routledge. Barnes-​Dacey, J. (2020). Society max: How Europe can help Syrians survive Assad and coronavirus. European Council on Foreign Relations. London. Retrieved from https://​ecfr.eu/​publ​icat​ion/​society_​max_​how_​europe_​can_​help_​syrians_​su​rviv​e _​as​sad_​and_​coro​navi​rus/​. Barry, A. (2013). The Translation Zone: Between Actor-​ Network Theory and International Relations. Millennium, 41(3), 413–​429. Baru, S. (2012). Geo-​economics and Strategy. Survival, 54(3), 47–​58. Baylon, D. (2016). The making of a diplomat: the case of the French Diplomatic and Consular Institute as an identity workspace. European Security, 25(4), 502–​523. Bayne, N. (2011). The Diplomacy of the Financial Crisis in Context. In P. A. G. Bergeijk, J. Melissen, & M. Okano-​Heijmans (Eds.), Economic Diplomacy: Economic and Political Perspectives (pp. 187–​201). Leiden: Brill. Bayne, N., & Woolcock, S. (2013a). What is Economic Diplomacy? In N. Bayne & S. Woolcock (Eds.), The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-​Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations (3 ed., pp. 1–​16). Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Bayne, N., & Woolcock, S. (Eds.). (2013b). The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-​ Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations (3 ed.). Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Beeson, M. (2010). There Are Alternatives: The Washington Consensus Versus State Capitalism. In M. Beeson & N. Bisley (Eds.), Issues in 21st Century World Politics (pp. 81–​94). Basingstoke/​New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Beeson, M. (2018). Geoeconomics with Chinese characteristics: the BRI and China’s evolving grand strategy. Economic and Political Studies, 6(3), 240–​256. Bělín, M., & Hanousek, J. (2021). Which sanctions matter? Analysis of the EU/​Russian sanctions of 2014. Journal of Comparative Economics, 49(1), 244–​257.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

166 Bibliography Bergeijk, P. A. G., Melissen, J., & Okano-​Heijmans, M. (2011). Economic Diplomacy: Economic and Political Perspectives. Leiden: Brill. Berridge, G. R., & James, A. (2003). A Dictionary of Diplomacy (2nd ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Best, J., & Walters, W. (2013). “Actor-​Network Theory” and International Relationality: Lost (and Found) in Translation. International Political Sociology, 3(7), 332–​334. Bicchi, F., & Bremberg, N. (2016). European diplomatic practices: contemporary challenges and innovative approaches. European Security, 25(4), 391–​406. Bingham, J. B., & Johnson, V. C. (1979). A Rational Approach to Export Controls. Foreign Affairs, 57(4), 894–​920. Bisharat, G. E. (2001). Sanctions as Genocide Symposium: International Sanctions against Iraq: Where Are We after Ten Years. Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, 11(2), 379–​426. Bisley, N. (2010). Global Power Shift: The Decline of the West and the Rise of the Rest? In M. Beeson & N. Bisley (Eds.), Issues in 21st Century World Politics (pp. 66–​80). Basingstoke/​New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Blackwill, R. D., & Harris, J. M. (2016). War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Blanchard, J.-​M. F., & Ripsman, N. M. (2008). A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft. Foreign Policy Analysis, 4(4), 371–​398. Blanchard, J.-​M. F., & Ripsman, N. M. (2013). Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy: Sanctions, incentives, and target state calculations. London/​New York: Routledge. Boogaerts, A. (2018a). Beyond norms: A configurational analysis of the EU’s Arab spring sanctions. Foreign Policy Analysis, 14(3), 408–​428. Boogaerts, A. (2018b). A Symbiotic Relationship? Examining the Convergence of Views Between Practitioners and Scholars on Sanctions Effectiveness. European Foreign Affairs Review, 23(2), 223–​241. Boogaerts, A., Portela, C., & Drieskens, E. (2016). One Swallow Does Not Make Spring: A Critical Juncture Perspective on the EU Sanctions in Response to the Arab Spring. Mediterranean Politics, 21(2), 205–​225. Borgatti, S. P., Everett, M. G., & Johnson, J. C. (2013). Analyzing Social Networks. London: sage Publications Ltd. Bourbeau, P. (2017). The Practice Approach in Global Politics. Journal of Global Security Studies, 2(2), 170–​182. Bourdieu, P. (1972). Esquisse d’une theorie de la pratique: précédé de trois études d’ethnologie kabyle. Genève: Librairie Droz. Bourdieu, P. (1979). Symbolic Power. Critique of Anthropology, 4(13–​14), 77–​85. Brattberg, E. (2016). Mot en geoekonomisk tidsålder. Frivàrld, 2016(4). Bremberg, N. (2016). Making sense of the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings: foreign policy practice at times of crisis. European Security, 25(4), 423–​441.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

167

Bremmer, I. (2009). State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market? Foreign Affairs, 88(3), 40–​55. Brewer, J., & Hunter, A. (2006). Foundations of Multimethod Research: Synthesizing Styles. Thousand Oaks, CA: sage Publications, Inc. Brick, B., & Postone, M. (1976). Friedrich Pollock and the “Primacy of the Political”: A Critical Reexamination. International Journal of Politics, 6(3), 3–​28. Brown, C. (2012). The ‘Practice Turn’, Phronesis and Classical Realism: Towards a Phronetic International Political Theory? Millennium, 40(3), 439–​456. Brown, F. Z. (2018). Dilemmas of Stabilization Assistance: The Case of Syria. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Buchet De Neuilly, Y. (2003). European Union’s External Relations Fields: the Multi-​ pillar Issue of Economic Sanctions against Serbia. In M. Knodt & S. Princen (Eds.), Understanding the European Union’s External Relations (pp. 90–​107). London/​ New York: Routledge. Bueger, C. (2013). Actor-​Network Theory, Methodology, and International Organization. International Political Sociology, 7(3), 338–​342. Bueger, C. (2014). Pathways to practice: praxiography and international politics. European Political Science Review, 6(3), 383–​406. Bueger, C. (2016). Doing Europe: agency and the European Union in the field of counter piracy practice. European Security, 25(4), 407–​422. Bueger, C., & Bethke, F. (2014). Actor-​networking the ‘failed state’ –​an enquiry into the life of concepts. Journal of International Relations and Development, 17(1), 30–​60. Bueger, C., & Gadinger, F. (2015). The Play of International Practice. International Studies Quarterly, 59(3), 449–​460. Bueger, C., & Gadinger, F. (2018). International Practice Theory (2nd ed.). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie. (2019). Nationale Industriestrategie 2030 –​Strategische Leitlinien für eine deutsche und europäische Industriepolitik. Berlin: BMWi. Bundesregierung. (2012). Shaping Globalization –​Expanding Partnerships –​Sharing Responsibility -​A strategy paper by the German Government. Berlin: Bundesregierung. Bundestag. (2015). Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage: Auswirkungen der Sanktionen der Europäischen Union gegen die Russische Föderation. Drucksache 18/​6715, Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag. Buzan, B., & Lawson, G. (2014). Capitalism and the emergent world order. International Affairs, 90(1), 71–​91. Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A new Framework for Analysis. Boulder/​London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Cadier, D. (2018). Continuity and change in France’s policies towards Russia: a milieu goals explanation. International Affairs, 94(6), 1349–​1369.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

168 Bibliography Cai, K. G. (2018). The One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Beijing’s New Strategy of Geoeconomics and Geopolitics. Journal of Contemporary China, 27(114), 831–​847. Callon, M. (1986a). The Sociology of an Actor-​Network: The Case of the Electric Vehicle. In M. Callon, J. Law, & A. Rip (Eds.), Mapping the Dynamics of Science and Technology: Sociology of Science in the Real World (pp. 19–​34). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Callon, M. (1986b). Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay. In J. Law (Ed.), Power, action and belief: a new sociology of knowledge? (pp. 196–​223). London: Routledge. Carr, E. H. (1946). The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–​1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (2nd ed.). London: Macmillan & co. Cetina, K. K. (2005). Complex global microstructures: The new terrorist societies. Theory, Culture & Society, 22(5), 213–​234. Chachko, E. (2019). Foreign Affairs in Court: Lessons from CJEU Targeted Sanctions Jurisprudence. Yale Journal of International Law, 44(1), 1–​52. Charmaz, K. (1996). The search for Meanings: Grounded Theory In J. A. Smith, R. Harre, & L. Van Langenhove (Eds.), Rethinking Methods in Psychology (pp. 27–​49). London/​ New York/​New Delhi: sage Publications. Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis. London/​Thousand Oaks/​New Delhi: sage Publications. Cheptea, A., & Gaigné, C. (2020). Russian food embargo and the lost trade. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 47(2), 684–​718. cjeu. (2008). Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 September 2008 –​Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union, Commission of the European Communities, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ( Joined Cases C-​402/​05 P and C-​415/​05 P). C 285, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. cjeu. (2013). Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 18 July 2013 –​European Commission (C-​584/​10 P), Council of the European Union (C-​593/​10 P), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (C-​595/​10 P) v Yassin Abdullah Kadi, French Republic. C 260, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. cjeu. (2019). Annual Report 2018: the Year in Review. Luxembourg: The Court of Justice of the European Union. Retrieved from https://​curia.eur​opa.eu/​jcms/​upl​oad/​docs/​ appl​icat​ion/​pdf/​2019–​04/​ra_​pan_​2018​_​en.pdf. Clark, I. (1989). The hierarchy of states: Reform and resistance in the international order. Cambridge/​New York/​Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. Clarke, A. E. (2019). Situating Grounded Theory and Situational Analysis in Interpretive Qualitative Inquiry. In A. Bryant & K. Charmaz (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

169

Current Developments in Grounded Theory (pp. 15–​47). London/​Thousand Oaks, CA/​ New Delhi/​Singapore: sage Publications. Clift, B. (2013). Economic Patriotism, the Clash of Capitalisms, and State Aid in the European Union. Journal of Industry, Competition & Trade, 13(1), 101–​117. Coate, R. A., Griffin, J. A., & Elliott-​Gower, S. (2017). Interdependence in International Organization and Global Governance Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies (pp. 1–​34). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cohen, D. S., & Weinberg, Z. A. Y. (2018). Sanctions Can’t Spark Regime Change: The Trouble With Trump’s Approach to Venezuela and Iran. Foreign Affairs. April 29, 2018. Retrieved from https://​www.for​eign​affa​irs.com/​artic​les/​uni​ted-​sta​tes/​2019 -​04-​29/​sancti​ons-​cant-​spark-​reg​ime-​cha​nge. Cohen, R. (2018). Sanctions hurt but are not the main impediment to humanitarian operations in North Korea. Asia Policy, 13(3), 35–​41. Compernolle, P., & Vancauteren, M. (2018). Embassies matter for trade, but diplomats matter most: evaluation of Dutch economic diplomacy in Latin America. In P. A. G. Bergeijk & S. J. V. Moons (Eds.), Research Handbook on Economic Diplomacy (pp. 144–​164). Cheltenham/​Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Coolsaet, R. (2004). Trade and diplomacy: The Belgian case. International Studies Perspectives, 5(1), 61–​65. Cooper, A. F. (2015). Diplomatic Afterlives. Cambrige/​Malden, MA: Polity. Cooper, A. F., & Cornut, J. (2018). The changing practices of frontline diplomacy: New directions for inquiry. Review of International Studies, 45(2), 300–​319. Cooper, A. F., Heine, J., & Thakur, R. (2013). Introduction: The Challenges of 21st-​Century Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (pp. 1–​33). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Copeland, D. (2005). New Rabbits, Old Hats: International Policy and Canada’s Foreign Service in an Era of Reduced Diplomatic Resources. International Journal, 60(3), 743–​762. Copeland, D. C. (1999). Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Détente 1970–​74 and the End of the Cold War 1985–​91. Security Studies, 9(1–​2), 15–​58. Cornut, J. (2017). The Practice Turn in International Relations Theory. In R. A. Denemark & R. Marlin-​Bennett (Eds.), The International Studies Encyclopedia. Chichester: Wiley-​Blackwell. Cornut, J. (2018). Diplomacy, agency, and the logic of improvisation and virtuosity in practice. European Journal of International Relations, 24(3). Cortright, D., & Lopez, G. A. (1999). Are sanctions just? The problematic case of Iraq. Journal of International Affairs, 735–​755. Cowen, D., & Smith, N. (2009). After Geopolitics? From the Geopolitical Social to Geoeconomics. Antipode, 41(1), 22–​48.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

170 Bibliography Cox, M. (2012). Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West? International Relations, 26(4), 369–​388. Crawford, B. (1993). Economic Vulnerability in International Relations: East-​West Trade, Investment, and Finance. New York/​Chichester: Columbia University Press. Crawford, B. (1994). The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence. Millennium, 23(1), 25–​55. Crawford, B., & Lenway, S. (1985). Decision Modes and International Regime Change: Western Collaboration on East-​West Trade. World Politics, 37(3), 375–​402. Crawford, B., & Olsen, K. B. (2017). The Puzzle of Persistence and Power: Explaining Germany’s Normative Foreign Policy. German Politics, 26(4), 591–​608. Crozet, M., & Hinz, J. (2020). Friendly fire: The trade impact of the Russia sanctions and counter-​sanctions. Economic Policy, 35(101), 97–​146. Crozet, M., Hinz, J., Stammann, A., & Wanner, J. (2021). Worth the pain? Firms’ exporting behaviour to countries under sanctions. European Economic Review, 103683. Csurgai, G. (2018). The Increasing Importance of Geoeconomics in Power Rivalries in the Twenty-​First Century. Geopolitics, 23(1), 38–​46. de Galbert, S. (2016). Transatlantic Economic Statecraft: The Challenge to Building a Balanced Transatlantic Sanctions Policy between the United States and the European Union. Center for Strategic & International Studies and Center for a New American Society. Washington. Retrieved from https://​www.cnas.org/​publi​cati​ons/​repo​rts/​ transa​tlan​tic-​econo​mic-​sta​tecr​aft-​the-​challe​nge-​to-​build​ing-​a-​balan​ced-​transa​ tlan​tic-​sancti​ons-​pol​icy-​betw​een-​the-​uni​ted-​sta​tes-​and-​the-​europ​ean-​union. de Vries, A., Portela, C., & Guijarro-​Usobiaga, B. (2014). Improving the Effectiveness of Sanctions: A Checklist for the EU. ceps Special Reports (95). Denécé, É. (2011). Diplomatie économique et compétition des États. Géoéconomie, 56(1), 71–​78. Diesen, G. (2018). Russia’s Geoeconomic Strategy for a Greater Eurasia. Oxon/​New York: Taylor & Francis. Dobbins, J. (2019). Economic Sanctions and Carpet Bombing Are Similarly Ruinous. rand. Retrieved from https://​www.rand.org/​blog/​2019/​04/​econo​mic-​sancti​ons -​and-​car​pet-​bomb​ing-​are-​simila​rly.html. Dobson, A. P. (2010). From Instrumental to Expressive: The Changing Goals of the U.S. Cold War Strategic Embargo. Journal of Cold War Studies, 12(1), 98–​119. Domosh, M. (2013). Geoeconomic Imaginations and Economic Geography in the Early Twentieth Century. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 103(4), 944–​966. Drezner, D. W. (1999). The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Drezner, D. W. (2010). Mercantilist and Realist Perspectives on the Global Political Economy. In R. A. Denemark & R. Marlin-​Bennett (Eds.), The International Studies Encyclopedia. Chichester: Wiley-​Blackwell. Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

171

Drezner, D. W. (2015). Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance. International Interactions, 41(4), 755–​764. Drezner, D. W. (2019). Economic Statecraft in the Age of Trump. The Washington Quarterly, 42(3), 7–​24. Druláková, R., & Přikryl, P. (2016). The Implementation of Sanctions Imposed by the European Union: A Comparison of the Czech and Slovak Republics’ Compliance. Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, 10(1), 134–​160. Dunne, T., & Flockhart, T. (Eds.). (2013). Liberal World Orders. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Duvall, R. D. (1978). Dependence and Dependencia Theory: Notes Toward Precision of Concept and Argument. International Organization, 32(1), 51–​78. Duvall, R. D., & Freeman, J. R. (1981). The State and Dependent Capitalism. International Studies Quarterly, 25(1), 99–​118. Dyson, T., & Cetorelli, V. (2017). Changing views on child mortality and economic sanctions in Iraq: a history of lies, damned lies and statistics. bmj Global Health, 2(e000311). Early, B. R. (2015). Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Early, B. R., & Preble, K. A. (2020). Going Fishing versus Hunting Whales: Explaining Changes in How the US Enforces Economic Sanctions. Security Studies, 29(2), 231–​267. eeas. (2020). Syria: EU sanctions are not impeding Syria’s medical response to Covid-​ 19. Retrieved from https://​eeas.eur​opa.eu/​gene​ric-​warn​ing-​sys​tem-​taxon​omy/​404/​ 79173/​syria-​eu-​sancti​ons-​are-​not-​imped​ing-​syria%E2%80%99s-​medi​cal-​respo​nse -​covid-​19_​en. Efstathiou, K., & Wolff, G. B. (2018). Is the European Semester effective and useful? Bruegel Policy Contribution. (2018/​9). Brussels. Retrieved from https://​brue​gel.org/​ 2018/​06/​is-​the-​europ​ean-​semes​ter-​effect​ive-​and-​use​ful/​. Elliott, K. A. (1998). The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty? International Security, 23(1), 50–​65. Escribà-​Folch, A., & Wright, J. (2010). Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers. International Studies Quarterly, 54(2), 335–​359. Espinoza, J., & Fleming, S. (2019). Margrethe Vestager examines curbs on non-​EU state-​ backed companies. Financial Times. December 4, 2019. Retrieved from https://​www .ft.com/​cont​ent/​452d2​c7a-​1f0e-​11ea-​92da-​f0c92​e957​a96. Essex, J. (2013). Development, Security, and Aid: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics at the US Agency for International Development. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. EU Council. (2004). Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions). (10198/​1/​04). Brussels: General Secretariat of the Council.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

172 Bibliography EU Council. (2011a). Council Decision 2011/​273/​C FSP of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive measures against Syria. L 121, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2011b). Council Regulation (EU) No 442/​2011 of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria. L 121, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2012). Council Regulation (EU) No 36/​2012 of 18 January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria and repealing Regulation (EU) No 442/​2011. L 16, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2013). Council Decision 2013/​255/​C FSP of 31 May 2013 concerning restrictive measures against Syria. L 147, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2014a). Council Decision 2014/​119/​C FSP of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine. L 66, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2014b). Council Decision 2014/​145/​C FSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. L 78, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2014c). Council Decision 2014/​265/​C FSP of 12 May 2014 amending Decision 2014/​145/​CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. L 137, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2014d). Council Decision 2014/​386/​​C FSP of 23 June 2014 concerning restrictions on goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol, in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. L 183, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2014e). Council Decision 2014/​512/​C FSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. L 229, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2014f). Council Implementing Decision 2014/​238/​​CFSP of 28 April 2014 implementing Decision 2014/​145/​​CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine L 126, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2014g). Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 477/​2014 of 12 May 2014 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/​2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. L 137, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2014h). Council Regulation (EU) No 208/​2014 of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine. L 66, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

173

EU Council. (2014i). Council Regulation (EU) No 208/​2014 of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. L 66, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2014j). Council Regulation (EU) No 269/​2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. L 78, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2014k). Council Regulation (EU) No 692/​2014 of 23 June 2014 concerning restrictions on the import into the Union of goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol, in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol L 183, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2014l). Council Regulation (EU) No 833/​2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. L 229, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2014m). Council Regulation (EU) No 1323/​2014 of 12 December 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 36/​2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria. L 358, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2016). Council Regulation (EU) No 2016/​2137 of 6 December 2016 amending Regulation (EU) No 36/​2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria. L 332, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. EU Council. (2018). Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. (5664/​ 18). Brussels: General Secretariat of the Council. EU Council. (2020). Syria: Sanctions against the regime extended by one year [Press release]. Retrieved from https://​www.consil​ium.eur​opa.eu/​en/​press/​press-​relea​ ses/​2020/​05/​28/​syria-​sancti​ons-​agai​nst-​the-​reg​ime-​exten​ded-​by-​one-​year/​. European Commission. (2017). Commission Frequently Asked Questions on EU Restrictive Measures in Syria. Brussels: European Commission. Retrieved from https://​ec.eur​ opa.eu/​fpi/​sites/​fpi/​files/​faq​s_​po​st_​i​sc_​c​lean​_​en.pdf. European Commission. (2019). EU Trade: ‘Syria’. dg Trade. Brussels. Retrieved from https://​ec.eur​opa.eu/​trade/​pol​icy/​countr​ies-​and-​regi​ons/​countr​ies/​syria/​. European Commission. (2020, April 24, 2020). EU Neighbourhood Policy: ‘Syria’. Retrieved from https://​ec.eur​opa.eu/​neighb​ourh​ood-​enla​rgem​ent/​neighb​ourh​ood/​ countr​ies/​syria​_​en. European Commission. (2021). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European economic and financial system: fostering openness, strength and resilience. (com(2021) 32 final). Brussels: European Commission. European Council. (2015). European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015) –​ Conclusions. EUCO 11/​15, Brussels: European Council. Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

174 Bibliography European Union. (2012). Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. C326, Luxembourg: (European Union, 2012: 160). Eurostat. (2020). International Trade in Goods: Statistics Explained. Eurostat. Luxembourg. Retrieved from https://​ec.eur​opa.eu/​euros​tat/​sta​tist​ics-​explai​ned/​ pdfsca​che/​1188.pdf. Fabius, L., & Lorot, P. (2013). La France dans la bataille de la diplomatie économique. Géoéconomie, 56(2), 7–​18. Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42–​79. Feaver, P. D., & Lorber, E. B. (2010). Coercive Diplomacy and the New Financial Levers: Evalu-​ating the Intended and Unintended Consequences of Financial Sanctions. London: Legatum Institute. Fettweis, C. (2003). Revisiting Mackinder and Angell: The Obsolescence of Great Power Geopolitics. Comparative Strategy, 22(2), 109–​129. Fettweis, C. (2015). On Heartlands and Chessboards: Classical Geopolitics, Then and Now. Orbis, 59(2), 233–​248. Fischer, S. (2015). European Union sanctions against Russia: objectives, impacts and next steps. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Berlin. Retrieved from https://​www.swp -​ber​lin.org/​filead​min/​conte​nts/​produ​cts/​comme​nts/​2015​C17_​fhs.pdf. Forough, M. (2019). Intervention with Chinese characteristics: the Belt and Road Initiative reconfiguring (Afro-​ )Eurasian geo-​ economics. Conflict, Security & Development, 19(3), 275–​281. Forsberg, T. (2016). From Ostpolitik to ‘frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German foreign policy towards Russia. International Affairs, 92(1), 21–​42. Foucault, M. (1971). Madness and Civilization. London: Routledge. Foucault, M. (1975). Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison. Paris: Gallimard. France 24. (2018). Le Maire appelle l’UE à protéger ses entreprises contre les sanctions américaines en Iran. France 24 /​AFP. May 11, 2018. Retrieved from https://​www. franc​e24.com/​fr/​20180​511-​eur​ope-​iran-​bruno-​lema​ire-​ue-​prote​ger-​entr​epri​ses-​ sancti​ons-​amer​icai​nes. Franke, U., & Hellmann, G. (2017). American Pragmatism in Foreign Policy Analysis. In C. G. Thies (Ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. New York/​London: Oxford University Press. Franke, U., & Weber, R. (2012). At the Papini hotel: On pragmatism in the study of international relations. European Journal of International Relations, 18(4), 669–​691. Fried, D., & Fishman, E. (2021). The rebirth of the State Department’s Office of Sanctions Coordination: Guidelines for success. Atlantic Council. Washington D.C. Retrieved from https://​www.atla​ntic​coun​cil.org/​blogs/​new-​atla​ntic​ist/​the-​rebi​rth-​of-​the -​state-​depa​rtme​nts-​off​ice-​of-​sancti​ons-​coord​inat​ion-​gui​deli​nes-​for-​succ​ess/​. Friedberg, A. L., & Boustany Jr., C. W. (2020). Partial Disengagement: A New US Strategy for Economic Competition with China. The Washington Quarterly, 43(1), 23–​40. Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

175

Friis, M., Fischer, A., Gertsen, L., & Frandsen, M. (2019). Danish State Prosecutor Investigates Dan-​Bunkering for Violation of EU Syria Sanctions. Danmarks Radio. September 4, 2019. Retrieved from https://​www.dr.dk/​nyhe​der/​indl​and/​dan​ish -​state-​pro​secu​tor-​inves​tiga​tes-​dan-​bunker​ing-​violat​ion-​eu-​syria-​sancti​ons. Frijs-​Madsen, O. (2018). How Does Modern Diplomacy Cope with Technology-​Driven Disruption in Global Trade and Commerce? TechPlomacy and Frontloaded Economic Diplomacy Are the New Strategic Tools of the Danish Foreign and Trade Policy. Global Ambassadors’ Journal, 2(2), 7–​8. Fürrutter, M. (2019). The transnationalized reality of EU sanctioning: a new research agenda beyond the study of effective economic sanctions. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(10), 1585–​1597. Gadinger, F. (2014). Praxistheorie in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Wiesbaden: vs Verlag fúr Sozialwissenschaften. Gangl, M. (2016). The controversy over Friedrich Pollock’s state capitalism. History of the Human Sciences, 29(2), 23–​41. Garfield, R., & Santana, S. (1997). The impact of the economic crisis and the US embargo on health in Cuba. American Journal of Public Health, 87(1), 15–​20. Garud, R., Hardy, C., & Maguire, S. (2007). Institutional Entrepreneurship as Embedded Agency: An Introduction to the Special Issue. Organization Studies, 28(7), 957–​969. Gazzini, T., & Herlin-​Karnell, E. (2011). Restrictive Measures Adopted by the EU from the Standpoint of International and EU Law. European Law Review, 36, 798–​817. Gehrke, T. (2020a). After Covid-​19: economic security in EU-​Asia connectivity. Asia Europe Journal, 18, 239–​243. Gehrke, T. (2020b). What Could a Geoeconomic EU Look Like in 2020? Egmont. (123). Brussels. Retrieved from http://​www.egmo​ntin​stit​ute.be/​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2020/​ 02/​S PB​123-​final.pdf?type=​pdf. Gens, B. (2019). Germany’s Russia policy and geo-​economics: Nord Stream 2, sanctions and the question of EU leadership towards Russia. Global Affairs, 5(4–​5), 315–​334. Geranmayeh, E., & Lafont Rapnouil, M. (2019). Meeting the Challenge of Secondary Sanctions. London: European Council on Foreign Relations. Germann, J. (2018). Beyond ‘geo-​economics’: Advanced unevenness and the anatomy of German austerity. European Journal of International Relations, 24(3), 590–​613. Gertz, G. (2018). Commercial Diplomacy and Political Risk. International Studies Quarterly, 62(1), 94–​107. Gertz, G., & Evers, M. M. (2020). Geoeconomic Competition: Will State Capitalism Win? The Washington Quarterly, 43(2), 117–​136. Gewirtz, J. (2020). The Chinese Reassessment of Interdependence. China Leadership Monitor. June 1, 2020. Retrieved from https://​www.prclea​der.org/​gewi​rtz. Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

176 Bibliography Gilpin, R. (1975). US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investments. New York: Basic Books. Gilpin, R. (1987). The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Giumelli, F. (2011). Coercing, constraining and signalling: explaining UN and EU sanctions after the Cold War. Colchester: ecpr Press. Giumelli, F. (2017). The Redistributive Impact of Restrictive Measures on EU Members: Winners and Losers from Imposing Sanctions on Russia. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(5), 1062–​1080. Giumelli, F. (2018). The Role of For-​Profit Actors in Implementing Targeted Sanctions: The Case of the European Union. In O. Bures & H. Carrapico (Eds.), Security Privatization: How Non-​security-​related Private Businesses Shape Security Governance (pp. 123–​141). Cham: Springer. Giumelli, F. (2020a). Implementation of Sanctions: European Union. In M. Asada (Ed.), Economic Sanctions in International Law and Practice (pp. 116–​135). Oxon/​ New York: Routledge. Giumelli, F. (2020b). Sanctions as a Regional Security Instrument: EU Restrictive Measures Examined. In E. Cusumano & S. Hofmaier (Eds.), Projecting Resilience Across the Mediterranean (pp. 103–​123). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Giumelli, F., Hoffmann, F., & Książczaková, A. (2021). The when, what, where and why of European Union sanctions. European Security, 30(1), 1–​23. Giumelli, F., & Ivan, P. (2013). The effectiveness of EU sanctions: An analysis of Iran, Belarus, Syria and Myanmar (Burma). European Policy Center. Brussels. Retrieved from https://​www.files.ethz.ch/​isn/​173​758/​pub_​3​928_​epc_​issu​e_​pa​per_​76_​-​_​the_​ef​ fect​iven​ess_​of_​e​u_​sa​ncti​ons.pdf. Goddard, S. E. (2009). Brokering change: networks and entrepreneurs in international politics. International Theory, 1(02), 249–​281. Goddard, S. E. (2012). Brokering Peace: Networks, Legitimacy, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process. International Studies Quarterly, 56(3), 501–​515. Goddard, S. E., MacDonald, P. K., & Nexon, D. H. (2019). Repertoires of statecraft: instruments and logics of power politics. International Relations, 33(2), 304–​321. Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc. Golumbic, C. E., & Ruff III, R. S. (2012). Who Do I Call for an EU Sanctions Exemption: Why the EU Economic Sanctions Regime Should Centralize Licensing. Georgetown Journal of International Law, 44(3), 1007–​1054. Gordon, P. H. (2020). Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Gordon, S., Robinson, A., Goulding, H., & Mahyub, R. (2018). The impact of bank de-​ risking on the humanitarian response to the Syrian crisis. Humanitarian Policy

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

177

Group. London. Retrieved from https://​www.odi.org/​sites/​odi.org.uk/​files/​resou​ rce-​­docume​nts/​12376.pdf. Gould-​Davies, N. (2020). Russia, the West and Sanctions. Survival, 62(1), 7–​28. Græger, N. (2016). European security as practice: EU-​N ATO communities of practice in the making? European Security, 25(4), 478–​501. Græger, N. (2017). Grasping the everyday and extraordinary in EU-​N ATO relations: the added value of practice approaches. European Security, 26(3), 340–​358. Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 1360–​1380. Grimmel, A., & Hellmann, G. (2019). Theory Must Not Go on Holiday. Wittgenstein, the Pragmatists, and the Idea of Social Science. International Political Sociology, 13(2), 198–​214. Grondin, D. (2017). Qui a peur du tournant linguistique? Le tournant pratique en RI comme positionnement disciplinaire. Études internationales, 48(2), 231–​255. Grosse, T. (2014). Geoeconomic Relations Between the EU and China: The Lessons From the EU Weapon Embargo and From Galileo. Geopolitics, 19(1), 40–​65. Gu, J., Zhang, C., Vaz, A., & Mukwereza, L. (2016). Chinese State Capitalism? Rethinking the Role of the State and Business in Chinese Development Cooperation in Africa. World Development, 81(May 2016), 24–​34. Guggenheim, M., & Potthast, J. (2012). Symmetrical twins: On the relationship between Actor-​Network theory and the sociology of critical capacities. European Journal of Social Theory, 15(2), 157–​178. Guzzini, S. (2000). Strange’s Oscillating Realism: Opposing the Ideal -​and the Apparent. In T. C. Lawton, J. N. Rosenau, & A. C. Verdun (Eds.), Strange Power: Shaping the Parameters of International Relations and International Political Economy (pp. 215–​ 228). Ashgate: Aldershot. Guzzini, S. (2002). ‘Realisms at war’: Robert Gilpin’s political economy of hegemonic war as a critique of Waltz’s neorealism. Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. Copenhagen. Guzzini, S. (2013). Power, Realism and Constructivism. New York: Routledge. Haan, A. d. (2011). Development Cooperation as Economic Diplomacy? In P. A. G. Bergeijk, J. Melissen, & M. Okano-​Heijmans (Eds.), Economic Diplomacy: Economic and Political Perspectives (pp. 203–​217). Leiden: Brill. Haass, R. N. (1998). Introduction. In R. N. Haass (Ed.), Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Inc. Hackenbroich, J. (2020). CureVac, covid-​19, and economic statecraft: Lessons for Europe. European Council on Foreign Relations. Berlin. Retrieved from https://​www.ecfr .eu/​arti​cle/​commentary_​curevac_​covid_​19_​and_​economic_​st​atec​raft​_​les​sons​_​for​ _​eur​ope. Hafner-​Burton, E. M., Kahler, M., & Montgomery, A. H. (2009). Network Analysis for International Relations. International Organization, 63, 559–​592.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

178 Bibliography Haid, H. (2019). Principled Aid in Syria: A Framework for International Agencies. Chatham House. London. Retrieved from https://​www.chath​amho​use.org/​sites/​ defa​ult/​files/​2019-​07-​04-​Pri​ncip​ledA​idSy​ria.pdf. Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (2001). Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Halperin, M. H. (1974). Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington: The Brookings Institution. Harrell, P. (2018). Is the U.S. Using Sanctions Too Aggressively? The Steps Washington Can Take to Guard Against Overuse. Foreign Affairs. September 11. Retrieved from https://​www.for​eign​affa​irs.com/​artic​les/​2018-​09-​11/​us-​using-​sancti​ons-​too-​aggre​ ssiv​ely. Harris, J. M. (2016). America, Europe and the Necessary Geopolitics of Trade. Survival, 58(6), 63–​92. Haukkala, H. (2015). From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-​ Term Crisis in EU–​ Russia Relations. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 23(1), 25–​40. Hayashi, M. (2020). Russia: The Crimea Question and autonomous sanctions. In M. Asada (Ed.), Economic Sanctions in International Law and Practice (pp. 223–​243). Oxon/​New York: Routledge. Haynal, G. (2014). Corporate Statecraft and its Diplomacy. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 9(4), 393–​419. Heath, S., Fuller, A., & Johnston, B. (2009). Chasing shadows: defining network boundaries in qualitative social network analysis. Qualitative Research, 9(5), 645–​661. Heine, J. (2013). From Club to Network Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (pp. 54–​69). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hellquist, E. (2016). Either with us or against us? Third-​country alignment with EU sanctions against Russia/​Ukraine. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29(3), 997–​1021. Helwig, N. (2019). The new EU leadership: The von der Leyen Commission focuses on Europe’s geo-​economic power. Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Helsinki. Retrieved from https://​www.fiia.fi/​en/​publ​icat​ion/​the-​new-​eu-​lea​ders​hip. Helwig, N. (2020). Covid-​19 Calls for European Strategic Autonomy. Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Helsinki. Retrieved from https://​www.fiia.fi/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ ads/​2020/​05/​comm​ent1​3_​co​vid-​19-​calls-​for-​europ​ean-​strate​gic-​auton​omy.pdf. Helwig, N., Jokela, J., & Portela, C. (2020). Sharpening EU sanctions policy for a geopolitical era. Prime Minister’s Office. Helsinki. Retrieved from https://​www.fiia.fi/​ wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2020/​05/​vntea​s_​re​port​_​sha​rpen​ing-​eu-​sancti​ons-​pol​icy-​for -​a-​geopo​liti​cal-​era.pdf.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

179

Hernández-​Truyol, B. E. (2009). Embargo or Blockade-​The Legal and Moral Dimensions of the US Economic Sanctions on Cuba. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review, 4(53), 53–​85. Hilpert, H. G. (2020). Handel, Wirtschaft, Finanzen: Rivalitäten, Konflikte, Eskalationsrisiken. In B. Lippert & V. Perthes (Eds.), Strategische Rivalität zwischen USA und China: Worum es geht, was es für Europa (und andere) bedeutet (pp. 27–​31). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Hilpert, H. G., & Wacker, G. (2015). Geoeconomics Meets Geopolitics: China’s New Economic and Foreign Policy Initiatives. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Berlin. Retrieved from https://​www.swp-​ber​lin.org/​filead​min/​conte​nts/​produ​cts/​comme​ nts/​2015​C33_​hlp_​wkr.pdf. Hirschman, A. O. (1945). National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. London: University of California Press. Hocking, B. (2007). What is the Foreign Ministry? In K. S. Rana & J. Kurbalija (Eds.), Foreign Ministries: Managing Diplomatic Networks and Optimizing Value (pp. 3–​19). Malta/​Geneva: DiploFoundation. Hocking, B. (2013). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Diplomatic System. In P. Kerr & G. Wiseman (Eds.), Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices. New York: Oxford University Press. Hopf, T. (2018). Change in international practices. European Journal of International Relations, 24(3), 687–​711. Horkheimer, M. (1973 [1940/​1942]). The Authoritarian State. Telos, 15, 3–​20. hrw. (2019). Rigging the System: Government Policies Co-​Opt Aid and Reconstruction Funding in Syria Human Rights Watch. New York. Retrieved from https://​www.hrw .org/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​rep​ort_​pdf/​syr​ia06​19_​w​eb4.pdf. Hudson, V. M. (2005). Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-​Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations. Foreign Policy Analysis, 1(1), 1–​30. Hudson, V. M., & Day, B. S. (2020). Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (3rd ed.). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., Elliott, K. A., & Oegg, B. (2007). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3rd ed.). Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Hunter Christie, E. (2016). The Design and Impact of Western Economic Sanctions against Russia. The RUSI Journal, 161(3), 52–​64. Huntington, S. P. (1993). Why International Primacy Matters. International Security, 17(4), 68–​83. Hupe, P. (2014). What happens on the ground: Persistent issues in implementation research. Public Policy and Administration, 29(2), 164–​182.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

180 Bibliography icg. (2019). Ways out of Europe’s Syria Reconstruction Conundrum. International Crisis Group. (209). Brussels. Retrieved from https://​www.cris​isgr​oup.org/​mid​dle-​east -​north-​afr​ica/​east​ern-​medite​rran​ean/​syria/​209-​ways-​out-​euro​pes-​syria-​rec​onst​ ruct​ion-​conund​rum. Ikenberry, G. J. (2008). The rise of China and the future of the West: Can the liberal system survive. Foreign Affairs, 87(1), 23–​37. Ikenberry, G. J. (2011). The Future of the Liberal World Order. Foreign Affairs, 90(3), 56–​68. Ikenberry, G. J. (Ed.) (2014). Power, Order, and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jaeger, B. C., & Brites, P. V. P. (2020). Geoeconomics in the light of International Political Economy: a theoretical discussion. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 40(1), 22–​36. Johnson, R. B., & Walsh, I. (2019). Mixed Grounded Theory: Merging Grounded Theory with Mixed Methods and Multimethod Research. In A. Bryant & K. Charmaz (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Current Developments in Grounded Theory (pp. 517–​531). London/​Thousand Oaks, CA/​New Delhi/​Singapore: sage Publications. Jones, C. M. (2017). Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process Models Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies (pp. 1–​26). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jost, P. M., & Sandhu, H. S. (2000). The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money Laundering. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) & INTERPOL/​F OPAC. Vienna, VA/​Lyon. Retrieved from https://​www.treas​ury.gov/​ resou​rce-​cen​ter/​terror​ist-​illi​cit-​fina​nce/​Docume​nts/​Fin​C EN-​Haw​ala-​rpt.pdf. Käpylä, J., & Aaltola, M. (2019). Critical infrastructure in geostrategic competition: Comparing the US and Chinese Silk Road projects. In M. Wigell, S. Scholvin, & M. Aaltola (Eds.), Geo-​Economics and Power Politics in the 21st Century -​The Revival of Economic Statecraft (pp. 43–​60). Oxon/​New York: Routledge. Käpylä, J., & Mikkola, H. (2016). The promise of the geoeconomic Arctic: a critical analysis. Asia Europe Journal, 14, 203–​220. Karolewski, I. P., & Cross, M. K. D. (2017). The EU’s Power in the Russia–​Ukraine Crisis: Enabled or Constrained? jcms: Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(1), 137–​152. Kateb, A. (2011). La diplomatie économique des nouvelles puissances. Géoéconomie, 56(1), 87–​96. Katzenstein, P. J. (1976). International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. International Organization, 30(1), 1–​45. Katzman, K. (2020). Iran Sanctions. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

181

Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1973). World Politics and the International Economic System. In C. F. Bergsten (Ed.), The future of the international economic order: an agenda for research (pp. 115–​179). Lexington: D.C. Heath. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1977). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston, MA: Little, Brown & co. Kesteleyn, J., Riordan, S., & Ruël, H. (2014). Introduction: Business Diplomacy. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 9(4), 303–​309. Kim, D. J. (2019). The Perils of Geoeconomics. The Washington Quarterly, 42(1), 153–​170. Kim, D. J. (2021). A Case for Geoeconomic Restraint: Offensive Realism and the Inflated Threat of Chinese Economic Initiatives. Geopolitics, 26(5), 1421–​1441. Kim, K. (2020). Finding Loopholes in Sanctions: Effects of Sanctions on North Korea’s Refined Oil Prices. kdi Journal of Economic Policy, 42(4), 1–​25. Kindleberger, C. P. (1973). The world in depression, 1929–​1939. Berkeley: University of California Press. King, I. (2019). Not Contributing Enough? A Summary of European Military and Development Assistance to Ukraine Since 2014. Center for Strategic & International Studies Washington DC. Retrieved from https://​www.csis.org/​analy​sis/​not-​contr​ibut​ ing-​eno​ugh-​summ​ary-​europ​ean-​milit​ary-​and-​deve​lopm​ent-​ass​ista​nce-​ukra​ine-​2014. Kirshner, J. (2002). Economic Sanctions: The State of the Art. Security Studies, 11(4), 160–​179. Kirshner, J. (2009). Realist Political Economy: Traditional Themes and Contemporary Challenges. In M. Blyth (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (pp. 36–​47). New York: Routledge. Kittrie, O. F. (2009). New Sanctions for a New Century: Treasury’s Innovative Use of Financial Sanctions. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 30(3), 789–​822. Kjellén, R. (1899). Studier öfver Sveriges politiska gränser. Ymer, 19, 183–​331. Kjellén, R. (1916). Staten som Lifsform. Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag. Klinova, M., & Sidorova, E. (2016). Economic Sanctions and Their Impact on Russian Economic Relations with the European Union. Problems of Economic Transition, 58(3), 218–​234. Knudsen, E. (2020). The weaponisation of the US financial system: How can Europe respond? Hertie School, Jacques Delors Centre. Berlin. Retrieved from https://​www .delor​scen​tre.eu/​en/​publi​cati​ons/​det​ail/​publ​icat​ion/​the-​weapon​isat​ion-​of-​the-​us -​financ​ial-​sys​tem-​how-​can-​eur​ope-​resp​ond. Knutsen, T. (1997). A History of International Relations Theory. New York: Manchester Universiy Press. Korhonen, I., Simola, H., & Solanko, L. (2018). Sanctions, counter-​sanctions and Russia: Effects on economy, trade and finance. bofit Policy Brief, 2018(4).

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

182 Bibliography Kose, M. A., & Prasad, E. S. (2010). Emerging Markets: Resilience and Growth Amid Global Turmoil. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Krasner, S. D. (1976). State Power and the Structure of International Trade. World Politics, 28(3), 317–​347. Kratochwil, F. (2011). Making Sense of ‘International Practices’. In E. Adler & V. Pouliot (Eds.), International Practices (pp. 36–​60). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kundnani, H. (2015). The Paradox of German Power. London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd. Kundnani, H. (2016). Europe’s Limitations. In M. Leonard (Ed.), Connectivity Wars -​ Why migration, finance and trade are the geo-​economic battlegroups of the future (pp. 156–​162). London: European Council on Foreign Relations. Kundnani, H. (2019). Germany’s liberal geo-​economics: Using markets for strategic objectives. In M. Wigell, S. Scholvin, & M. Aaltola (Eds.), Geo-​Economics and Power Politics in the 21st Century -​The Revival of Economic Statecraft (pp. 61–​74). Oxon/​ New York: Routledge. Kupchan, C. A. (2012). No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kurlantzick, J. (2016). State Capitalism: How the Return of Statism is Transforming the World. New York: Oxford University Press. Kustermans, J. (2016). Parsing the Practice Turn: Practice, Practical Knowledge, Practices. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 44(2), 175–​196. Kutlina-​Dimitrova, Z. (2017). The economic impact of the Russian import ban: a CGE analysis. International Economics and Economic Policy, 14(4), 537–​552. Lafont Rapnouil, M. (2017). Signal, constrain, and coerce: a more strategic use of sanctions. In U. E. Franke, M. Lafont Rapnouil, & S. Dennison (Eds.), The New European Security Initiative (pp. 27–​29). London: European Council on Foreign Relations. Lam, K. (2020). Collateral Damage: The Humanitarian Consequences of U.S. Sanctions on Iran. Wroclaw: New Degree Press. Lasswell, H. D. (1958 [1936]). Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: McGraw-​Hill. Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Latour, B. (1996). On actor-​network theory: A few clarifications. Soziale Welt, 47(4), 369–​381. Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An introduction to Actor-​Network-​Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Latour, B. (2013). An Inquiry into Modes of Existence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Law, J. (1992). Notes on the theory of the actor-​network: ordering, strategy and heterogeneity. Systems Practice, 5(4), 379–​393.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

183

Lebow, R. N. (2007). Power in persuasion. In F. Berenskoetter & M. J. Williams (Eds.), Power in World Politics (pp. 120–​140). Oxon/​New York: Routledge. Lechner, S., & Frost, M. (2018). Practice Theory and International Relations. Cambridge/​ New York: Cambridge University Press. Lee, D., & Hocking, B. (2010). Economic Diplomacy. In R. A. Denemark (Ed.), The International Studies Encyclopedia. Malden: Wiley Blackwell. Lee, D., & Hocking, B. (2018). Economic Diplomacy Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies (pp. 1–​17). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lee, D., & Hudson, D. (2004). The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy. Review of International Studies, 30(3), 343–​360. Legifrance. (2014). Décret no 2014–​1571 du 22 décembre 2014 relatif à l’agence Business France Paris: Ministère de l’Economie de l’industrie et du numérique. Lektzian, D., & Souva, M. (2007). An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(6), 848–​871. Leonard, M. (Ed.) (2016). Connectivity Wars -​Why migration, finance and trade are the geo-​ economic battlegroups of the future. London: European Council on Foreign Relations. Lequesne, C. (2015). EU foreign policy through the lens of practice theory: A different approach to the European External Action Service. Cooperation and Conflict, 50(3), 351–​367. Lequesne, C. (2017). Ethnographie du Quai d’Orsay -​Les pratiques des diplomates français. Paris: cnrs Éditions. Lequesne, C. (2019). Why Studying State Foreign Services Remains a Research Priority. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 30(4), 780–​785. Levi-​Faur, D. (1997). Friedrich List and the Political Economy of the Nation-​state. Review of International Political Economy, 4(1), 154–​178. Lew, J. J., & Nephew, R. (2018). The Use and Misuse of Economic Statecraft: How Washington Is Abusing Its Financial Might. Foreign Affairs, 97(6), 139–​149. Li, M. (2020). The Belt and Road Initiative: geo-​economics and Indo-​Pacific security competition. International Affairs, 96(1), 169–​187. Liang, Y., Chen, M., Lu, D., Ding, Z., & Zheng, Z. (2019). The Spatial Evolution of Geoeconomic Pattern among China and Neighboring Countries since the Reform and Opening-​Up. Sustainability, 11(2168), 1–​17. Lobell, S. E. (2010). Structural Realism/​Offensive and Defensive Realism. In R. A. Denemark & R. Marlin-​Bennett (Eds.), The International Studies Encyclopedia. Chichester: Wiley-​Blackwell. Lohmann, S. (2019). Extraterritorial U.S. Sanctions. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Berlin. Retrieved from https://​www.swp-​ber​lin.org/​filead​min/​conte​nts/​produ​cts/​ comme​nts/​2019​C05_​lom.pdf. Lorot, P. (2001). La géoéconomie, nouvelle grammaire des rivalités internationales. L’Information Géographique, 65(1), 43–​52.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

184 Bibliography Lund, A. (2019). Briefing: Just how ‘smart’ are sanctions on Syria? The New Humanitarian. 25 April, 2019. Retrieved from https://​www.the​newh​uman​itar​ian.org/​analy​sis/​2019/​ 04/​25/​brief​ing-​just-​how-​smart-​are-​sancti​ons-​syria. Luttwak, E. N. (1990). From Geopolitics to Geo-​Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce. The National Interest, 20(Summer 1990), 17–​23. MacDonald, S. B., & Lemco, J. (2015). State Capitalism’s Uncertain Future. Santa Barbara: abc-​c lio. MacKay, J., & Levin, J. (2015). Hanging out in international politics: Two kinds of explanatory political ethnography for IR. International Studies Review, 17(2), 163–​188. Mackinder, H. J. (1904). The Geographical Pivot of History. Geographical Journal, 23(4), 421–​437. Mackinder, H. J. (1942 [1919]). Democratic Ideals and Reality: a Study in the Politics of Reconstruction. London: Constable Publishers. Mair, S. (2016). Germany: A private sector perspective. In M. Leonard (Ed.), Connectivity Wars -​Why migration, finance and trade are the geo-​economic battlegroups of the future (pp. 150–​155). London: European Council on Foreign Relations. Mallard, G., Sabet, F., & Sun, J. (2020). The Humanitarian Gap in the Global Sanctions Regime: Assessing Causes, Effects, and Solutions. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 26(1), 121–​153. Marin, A., & Wellman, B. (2011). Social network analysis: An introduction. In J. Scott & P. J. Carrington (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of social network analysis (pp. 11–​25). London/​Thousand Oaks/​New Delhi/​Singapore: sage Publications. Marks, S. (2019). Belgian exporters found guilty of sending chemicals to Syria. Politico. April 14, 2019. Retrieved from https://​www.polit​ico.eu/​arti​cle/​belg​ian-​export​ers -​found-​gui​lty-​of-​send​ing-​chemic​als-​to-​syria/​. Martin, E.-​A. (2019). The Sanctions Policy of the European Union: Multilateral Ambitions Versus Power Politics. Institut français des relations internationales. Paris. Retrieved from https://​www.ifri.org/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​atoms/​files/​mart​in_​s​anct​ions​_​pol​icy _​eu_​2​019.pdf. Mastanduno, M. (1999). Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security: Agendas for Research. Security Studies, 9(1–​2), 288–​316. Mayer, M. (2012). Chaotic climate change and security. International Political Sociology, 6(2), 165–​185. McCourt, D. M. (2016). Practice Theory and Relationalism as the New Constructivism. International Studies Quarterly, 60, 475–​485. McDowell, D. (2019). How ‘Sanctions Overreach’ Could Undermine the U.S. Dollar’s Dominance. World Politics Review. December 17, 2019. Retrieved from https://​www .worl ​ d pol ​ i tic ​ s rev ​ i ew.com/ ​ a rtic ​ l es/ ​ 2 8418/ ​ o fac- ​ s ancti ​ o ns- ​ a nd- ​ t he- ​ n ew- ​ d ol ​ l ar -​diplom​acy.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

185

McLean, E. V., & Whang, T. (2010). Friends or Foes? Major Trading Partners and the Success of Economic Sanctions. International Studies Quarterly, 54(2), 427–​447. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2010). The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3(4), 381–​396. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Can China Rise Peacefully? The National Interest, 25(1), 1–​40. Mercille, J. (2008). The radical geopolitics of US foreign policy: Geopolitical and geoeconomic logics of power. Political Geography, 27(5), 570–​586. Milhaupt, C. J., & Zheng, W. (2015). Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm. Georgetown Law Journal, 103(3), 665–​722. Minard, P. (2008). Economie de marché et Etat en France: mythes et légendes du colbertisme. L’Économie politique, 37(1), 77–​94. Moisio, S. (2017). Towards Geopolitical Analysis of Geoeconomic Processes. Geopolitics, 23(1), 22–​29. Mol, A. (2002). The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice. Durham/​London: Duke University Press. Molina, O., & Rhodes, M. (2007). Conflict, Complementarities and Institutional Change in Mixed Market Economies. In B. Hancké, M. Rhodes, & M. Thatcher (Eds.), Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Contradictions, Complementarities and Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Monlouis-​Félicité, F. (2017). Les grandes entreprises et la politique étrangère française. In T. d. Montbrial & T. Gomart (Eds.), Notre intérêt national. Paris: Odile Jacob. Moravcsik, A. (1991). Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community. International Organization, 45(1), 19–​56. Moravcsik, A. (1995). Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder. jcms: Journal of Common Market Studies, 33(4), 611–​628. Moret, E. S. (2015). Humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions on Iran and Syria. European Security, 24(1), 120–​140. Morgan, P. (2018). Can China’s Economic Statecraft Win Soft Power in Africa? Unpacking Trade, Investment and Aid. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 24(3), 387–​409. Morgan, T. C., & Bapat, N. A. (2003). Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion. International Studies Review, 5(4), 65–​79. Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: a.a. Knopf. Mortlock, D., & O’Toole, B. (2018). US sanctions: Using a coercive and economic tool effectively. Atlantic Council. Washington D.C. Retrieved from https://​www.atla​ntic​ coun​cil.org/​in-​depth-​resea​rch-​repo​rts/​issue-​brief/​us-​sancti​ons-​using-​a-​coerc​ive -​and-​econo​mic-​tool-​effe​ctiv​ely/​.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

186 Bibliography Mowatt-​Larssen, K. (2016). Black Hawala: Confronting ISIL on the Financial Front. National Security Law Brief, 6(2), 59–​80. Mueller, J., & Mueller, K. (1999). Sanctions of mass destruction. Foreign Affairs, 78(3), 43–​53. Murray, S., Sharp, P., Wiseman, G., Criekemans, D., & Melissen, J. (2011). The Present and Future of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Studies. International Studies Review, 13(4), 709–​728. Musacchio, A., & Flores-​Macias, F. (2009). The Return of State-​Owned Enterprises: Should We Be Afraid? Harvard International Review. April 4, 2009. Retrieved from http://​www.stwr.org/​multin​ati-​onalc​orpo​rati​ons/​the-​ret​urn-​of-​state-​owned-​ente​ rpri​ses-​sho​uld-​we-​be-​afr​aid.html. Musacchio, A., & Lazzarini, S. G. (2014). Reinventing State Capitalism: Leviathan in Business, Brazil and Beyond. Cambridge/​London: Harvard University Press. Musacchio, A., Lazzarini, S. G., & Aguilera, R. V. (2015). New Varieties of State Capitalism: Strategic and Governance Implications. Academy of Management Perspectives, 29(1), 115–​131. Naray, O. (2011). Commercial Diplomats in the Context of International Business. In P. A. G. Bergeijk, J. Melissen, & M. Okano-​ Heijmans (Eds.), Economic Diplomacy: Economic and Political Perspectives (pp. 121–​148). Leiden: Brill. Natorski, M., & Pomorska, K. (2017). Trust and Decision‐making in Times of Crisis: The EU’s Response to the Events in Ukraine. jcms: Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(1), 54–​70. Nephew, R. (2018). The Art of Sanctions: a View From the Field. New York: Columbia University Press. Nephew, R. (2020). Implementation of Sanctions: United States. In M. Asada (Ed.), Economic Sanctions in International Law and Practice (pp. 93–​115). Oxon/​New York: Routledge. Neumann, I. B. (2002). Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 31(3), 627–​653. Neumann, I. B. (2012). At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry. Ithaca/​London: Cornell University Press. Neves, M. S. (2017). Economic diplomacy, geo-​economics and the external strategy of Portugal. janus.net e-​journal of International Relations, 8(1), 88–​118. Newman, M. E. J., & Park, J. (2003). Why social networks are different from other types of networks. Physical Review E, 68(036122). Nexon, D. H., & Pouliot, V. (2013). “Things of Networks”: Situating ANT in International Relations. International Political Sociology, 7(3), 342–​345. Nicolini, D. (2013). Practice Theory, Work & Organization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nielsen, S. R. (2014). Økonomisk diplomati får stigende betydning. Udenrigs (2), 46–​49.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

187

Nimmo, R. (2011). Actor-​network theory and methodology: Social research in a more-​ than-​human world. Methodological Innovations Online, 6(3), 108–​119. Nivet, B. (2015). Les sanctions internationales de l’Union européenne : soft power, hard power ou puissance symbolique ? Revue internationale et stratégique, 97(1), 129–​138. Nölke, A., & Vliegenthart, A. (2009). Enlarging the Varieties of Capitalism: The Emergence of Dependent Market Economies in East Central Europe. World Politics, 61(4), 670–​702. Norris, W. J. (2016). Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control. Ithaca/​London: Cornell University Press. Nye, J. S. (2020). Power and Interdependence with China. The Washington Quarterly, 43(1), 7–​21. Ó Tuathail, G., & Agnew, J. (1992). Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy. Political Geography, 111(2), 190–​204. Ó Tuathail, G., & Dalby, S. (1998). ‘Rethinking Geopolitics: Towards a Critical Geopolitics’. In G. Ó Tuathail & S. Dalby (Eds.), Rethinking Geopolitics (pp. 1–​15). London: Routledge. O’Hara, S., & Heffernan, M. (2006). From Geo-​Strategy to Geo-​Economics: The ‘Heartland’ and British Imperialism before and after Mackinder. Geopolitics, 11(1), 54–​73. ofac. (2013). Syria Sanctions Program. Washington DC: Department of the Treasury. Retrieved from https://​www.treas​ury.gov/​resou​rce-​cen​ter/​sancti​ons/​Progr​ams/​ Docume​nts/​syria.pdf. ofac. (2020). Fact Sheet: Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Trade to Combat COVID-​19. Washington DC: Department of the Treasury. Retrieved from https://​ www.treas​ury.gov/​resou​rce-​cen​ter/​sancti​ons/​Progr​ams/​Docume​nts/​cov​id19​_​fac​ tshe​et_​2​0200​416.pdf. ofac, Department of State, & US Coast Guard. (2020). Guidance to Address Illicit Shipping and Sanctions Evasion Practices. Washington DC: Department of the Treasury. Retrieved from https://​www.treas​ury.gov/​resou​rce-​cen​ter/​sancti​ons/​ Progr​ams/​Docume​nts/​0514​2020​_​glo​bal_​advi​sory​_​v1.pdf. Okano-​Heijmans, M. (2011). Conceptualizing Economic Diplomacy: The Crossroads of International Relations, Economics, IPE and Diplomatic Studies. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 6(1), 7–​36. Okano-​Heijmans, M., & Montesano, F. S. (2016). Who is Afraid of European Economic Diplomacy? Clingendael Policy Brief. Olsen, K. B. (2020). Diplomats, Domestic Agency and the Implementation of Sanctions: The MFAs of France and Germany in the Age of Geoeconomic Diplomacy. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 15(1), 126–​154. Orakhelashvili, A. (2015). The Impact of Unilateral EU Economic Sanctions on the UN Collective Security Framework: The Cases of Iran and Syria. In A. Z. Marossi

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

188 Bibliography & M. R. Bassett (Eds.), Economic Sanctions under International Law: Unilateralism, Multilateralism, Legitimacy, and Consequences (pp. 3–​ 21). The Hague: t.m.c. Asser Press. Orenstein, M. A., & Kelemen, R. D. (2017). Trojan Horses in EU Foreign Policy. jcms: Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(1), 87–​102. Ost-​Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft. (2017). Zeit für Alternativen! Einschätzungen des Ost-​ Ausschusses zu den europäisch-​ russischen Wirtschaftssanktionen. Positionspapir. Pape, R. A. (1998). Why Sanctions Still Do Not Work. International Security, 23(1), 66–​77. Parsons, C. (2015). Ideas and power: four intersections and how to show them. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(3), 446–​463. Passoth, J.-​H., & Rowland, N. J. (2010). Actor-​network state: Integrating actor-​network theory and state theory. International Sociology, 25(6), 818–​841. Peksen, D. (2009). Why sanctions won’t work. Foreign Policy. March 3, 2009. Retrieved from https://​foreig​npol​icy.com/​2009/​03/​03/​why-​sancti​ons-​wont-​work/​. Peksen, D. (2019a). Autocracies and Economic Sanctions: The Divergent Impact of Authoritarian Regime Type on Sanctions Success. Defence and Peace Economics, 30(3), 253–​268. Peksen, D. (2019b). When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature. Defence and Peace Economics, 30(6), 635–​647. Perchoc, P. (2015). Paris, Moscow, and “Europe out of the EU”. Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, 13(1), 47–​60. Peternel, I., & Grešš, M. (2021). Economic diplomacy: concept for economic prosperity in Croatia. Economic Research -​Ekonomska Istraživanja, 34(1), 109–​121. Peterson, T. M. (2018). Reconsidering economic leverage and vulnerability: Trade ties, sanction threats, and the success of economic coercion. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 37(4), 409–​429. Pigman, G. A. (2016). Trade Diplomacy Transformed: Why Trade Matters for Global Prosperity. Basingstoke/​New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Polgár, M. (2014). Economic diplomacy of Slovakia in times of current economic crisis. International Journal of Diplomacy and Economy, 2(3), 185–​201. Pollard, R. A., & Hicks, G. N. (2014). Economic Statecraft Redux: Improving the U.S. State Department’s Effectiveness in International Political Economy. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Washington DC. Retrieved from https://​www.csis.org/​analy​ sis/​econo​mic-​sta​tecr​aft-​redux. Pollock, F. (1941). State capitalism: its possibilities and limitations. Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, 9(2), 200–​225. Portela, C. (2012). The EU Sanctions against Syria: Conflict Management by other Means? unisci Discussion Papers (30), 151–​158.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

189

Portela, C. (2015). Member States Resistance to EU Foreign Policy Sanctions. Europan Foreign Affairs Review, 20(2/​1), 39–​61. Portela, C. (2016). Are European Union sanctions “targeted”? Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29(3), 912–​929. Portela, C., Pospieszna, P., Skrzypczyńska, J., & Walentek, D. (2020). Consensus against all odds: explaining the persistence of EU sanctions on Russia. Journal of European Integration, 1–​17. Porter, T. (2013). Tracing associations in global finance. International Political Sociology, 7(3), 334–​338. Pouliot, V. (2012). Methodology -​Putting practice theory into practice. In R. Adler-​ Nissen (Ed.), Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking key concepts in IR (pp. 45–​58). London: Routledge. Pouliot, V. (2016). International pecking orders: The politics and practice of multilateral diplomacy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pouliot, V., & Cornut, J. (2015). Practice theory and the study of diplomacy: A research agenda. Cooperation and Conflict, 50(3), 297–​315. Powell, W. W., & DiMaggio, P. J. (Eds.). (1991). The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A. B. (1974). Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It’s Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes. Berkeley/​Los Angeles/​London: University of California Press. Ptak, R. (2004). Vom Ordoliberalismus zur Sozialen Marktwirtschaft: Stationen des Neoliberalismus in Deutschland. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-​Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–​460. Raineri, L., & Strazzari, F. (2019). (B)ordering Hybrid Security? EU Stabilisation Practices in the Sahara-​Sahel Region. Ethnopolitics, 18(5), 544–​559. Ralph, J. (2018). What Should Be Done? Pragmatic Constructivist Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect. International Organization, 72(1), 173–​203. Ralph, J., & Gifkins, J. (2017). The purpose of United Nations Security Council practice: Contesting competence claims in the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect. European Journal of International Relations, 23(3), 630–​653. Ralph, J., Gifkins, J., & Jarvis, S. (2020). The United Kingdom’s special responsibilities at the United Nations: Diplomatic practice in normative context. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 22(2), 164–​181. Rana, K. S. (2007). MFA Reform: Global Trends. In K. S. Rana & J. Kurbalija (Eds.), Foreign Ministries: Managing Diplomatic Networks and Optimizing Value (pp. 20–​ 43). Malta/​Geneva: DiploFoundation.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

190 Bibliography Rana, K. S. (2013). Economic diplomacy: what might best serve a developing country? . International Journal of Diplomacy and Economy, 1(3/​4), 232–​247. Ratzel, F. (1897). Politische Geographie. München: R. Oldenbourg. Rediker, D. A. (2015). State Capitalism by Stealth, the New 21st Century Economic Reality. Financial Times. April 16, 2015. Retrieved from https://​www.ft.com/​cont​ent/​ 9fd8f​e9c-​4ea7-​3662-​8a3b-​63188​94dd​7b6. Reichertz, J. (2019). Abduction: The Logic of Discovery of Grounded Theory –​An Updated Review. In A. Bryant & K. Charmaz (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Current Developments in Grounded Theory (pp. 259–​281). London/​Thousand Oaks, CA/​New Delhi/​Singapore: sage Publications. Renwick, R. (1981). Economic Sanctions. Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Ringmar, E. (2014). The search for dialogue as a hindrance to understanding: practices as inter-​paradigmatic research program. International Theory, 6(1), 1–​27. Riordan, S. (2002). The New Diplomacy. Cambridge: Polity. Ripsman, N. M. (2017). Neoclassical Realism Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies (pp. 1–​21). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Roberts, A., Choer Moraes, H., & Ferguson, V. (2019). Toward a Geoeconomic Order in International Trade and Investment. Journal of International Economic Law, 22(4), 655–​676. Romanova, T. (2016). Sanctions and the Future of EU–​Russian Economic Relations. Europe-​Asia Studies, 68(4), 774–​796. Rossbach, N. (2019). Energy and the future of US primacy: The geostrategic consequences of the shale revolution. In M. Wigell, S. Scholvin, & M. Aaltola (Eds.), Geo-​ Economics and Power Politics in the 21st Century -​The Revival of Economic Statecraft (pp. 114–​127). Oxon/​New York: Routledge. Rozenberg, O. (2013). Genuine Europeanization or Monnet for Nothing? In S. Bulmer & C. Lequesne (Eds.), The Member States of the European Union (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ruël, H. (2012). Commercial Diplomacy and International Business: A Conceptual and Empirical Exploration. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited. Sabatier, P. A. (1986). Top-​down and Bottom-​up Approaches to Implementation Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis. Journal of Public Policy, 6(1), 21–​48. Samaha, N. (2019). The economic war on Syria: Why Europe risks losing. European Council on Foreign Relations. London. Retrieved from https://​ecfr.eu/​arti​cle/​ ­commentary_​the_​economic_​war_​on_​sy​ria_​why_​euro​pe_​r​isks​_​los​ing/​. Sattich, T. (2016). Energy Imports, Geoeconomics, and Regional Coordination: The Case of Germany and Poland in the Baltic Energy System -​Close Neighbours, Close(r) Cooperation? International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 6(4), 789–​800.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

191

Sattich, T. (2018). The International Reverberations of Germany’s Energiewende; Geoeconomics in the EU’s Geo-​Energy Space. In D. Scholten (Ed.), The Geopolitics of Renewables (pp. 163–​185). Cham: Springer. Scazzieri, L. (2017). Europe, Russia and the Ukraine crisis: the dynamics of coercion. Journal of Strategic Studies, 40(3), 392–​416. Schatz, E. (2009). Introduction: Ethnographic Immersion and the Study of Politics. In E. Schatz (Ed.), Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power (pp. 1–​22). Chicago/​London: University of Chicago Press. Schindler, S., & Wille, T. (2019). How Can We Critize International Practices? International Studies Quarterly. Schmidt, B. C. (2005). Competing Realist Conceptions of Power. Millennium, 33(3), 523–​549. Schmidt, V. A. (2002). The Futures of European Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schmidt, V. A. (2003). French capitalism t­ ransformed, yet still a third variety of capitalism. Economy and Society, 32(4), 526–​554. Schmidt, V. A. (2009). Putting the political back into political economy by bringing the state back in yet again. World Politics, 61(3), 516–​546. Schmitt, O. (2017). International organization at war: NATO practices in the Afghan campaign. Cooperation and Conflict, 52(4), 502–​518. Scholvin, S. (2016). Geographical conditions and political outcomes. Comparative Strategy, 35(4), 274–​283. Scholvin, S., & Wigell, M. (2018). Power politics by economic means: Geoeconomics as an analytical approach and foreign policy practice. Comparative Strategy, 37(1), 73–​84. Scholvin, S., & Wigell, M. (2019). Geo-​economic power politics: An introduction. In M. Wigell, S. Scholvin, & M. Aaltola (Eds.), Geo-​Economics and Power Politics in the 21st Century -​The Revival of Economic Statecraft (pp. 1–​13). Oxon/​New York: Routledge. Schulze, M., & Ries, F. (2017). Palgrave Handbook of Inter-​Organizational Relations in World Politics. In R. Biermann & J. A. Koops (Eds.), Palgrave Handbook of Inter-​ Organizational Relations in World Politics (pp. 113–​134). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Schwarzer, D. (2020). Weaponizing the Economy. Berlin Policy Journal, January/​ February 2020(29). Schweinberger, A. (2014). State capitalism, entrepreneurship, and networks: China’s rise to a superpower. Journal of Economic Issues, 48(1), 169–​180. Scott, D. A. (2013). Multipolarity, multilateralism and beyond…? EU–​China understandings of the international system. International Relations, 27(1), 30–​51. Seabroke, L. (2015). Diplomacy as economic consultancy. In O. J. Sending, V. Pouliot, & I. B. Neumann (Eds.), Diplomacy and the making of world politics (Vol. 136, pp. 195–​219). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

192 Bibliography Sedlačko, M. (2017). Conducting Ethnography with a Sensibility for Practice. In M. Jonas, B. Littig, & A. Wroblewski (Eds.), Methodological Reflections on Practice Oriented Theories (pp. 47–​60). Cham: Springer International Publishing. Seeberg, P. (2014). The EU and the Syrian Crisis: The Use of Sanctions and the Regime’s Strategy for Survival. Mediterranean Politics, 20(1), 18–​35. Sending, O. J. (2015). Diplomats and humanitarians in crisis governance. In O. J. Sending, V. Pouliot, & I. B. Neumann (Eds.), Diplomacy and the making of world politics (Vol. 256–​283, pp. 256–​283). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sending, O. J., Pouliot, V., & Neumann, I. B. (2011). The future of diplomacy: changing practices, evolving relationships. International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 66(3), 527–​542. Sending, O. J., Pouliot, V., & Neumann, I. B. (2015). Introduction. In O. J. Sending, V. Pouliot, & I. B. Neumann (Eds.), Diplomacy and the making of world politics (Vol. 136, pp. 1–​28). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shambaugh, G. E. (1999). States, Firms, and Power: Successful Sanctions in United States Foreign Policy. Albany: State University of New York Press. Sharp, J. M., & Blanchard, C. M. (2011). Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Assad Regime. Congressional Research Service. Washington DC. Retrieved from https://​ethz.ch/​cont​ent/​spec​iali​nter​est/​gess/​cis/​cen​ter-​for-​sec​urit​ies-​stud​ies/​en/​ servi​ces/​digi​tal-​libr​ary/​publi​cati​ons/​publ​icat​ion.html/​132​631. Siddi, M. (2016). German Foreign Policy towards Russia in the Aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis: A New Ostpolitik? Europe-​Asia Studies, 68(4), 665–​677. Silva, P. M., & Selden, Z. (2020). Economic interdependence and economic sanctions: a case study of European Union sanctions on Russia. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 33(2), 229–​251. Singhvi, A., Wong, E., & Lu, D. (2019). Defying U.S. Sanctions, China and Others Take Oil From 12 Iranian Tankers. New York Times. August 3, 2019. Retrieved from https://​www .nyti​mes.com/​inte​ract​ive/​2019/​08/​03/​world/​mid​dlee​ast/​us-​iran-​sancti​ons-​ships.html. Sismondo, S. (2010). An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies (2nd ed.). West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. sjac. (2020). The Caesar Act: Impacts and Implementation. Syria Justice and Accountability Centre. Washington DC. Retrieved from https://​syri​aacc​ount​abil​ity .org/​upda​tes/​2020/​02/​20/​the-​cae​sar-​act-​impa​cts-​and-​imp​leme​ntat​ion/​. Sjursen, H., & Rosén, G. (2017). Arguing Sanctions. On the EU’s Response to the Crisis in Ukraine. jcms: Journal for Common Market Studies, 55(1), 20–​36. Slaughter, A.-​M. (2009). America’s Edge: Power in the Networked Century. Foreign Affairs, 88(1), 94–​113. Slaughter, A.-​M. (2017). The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World. Yale: Yale University Press. Solomon, T., & Steele, B. J. (2017). Micro-​moves in International Relations theory. European Journal of International Relations, 23(2), 267–​291. Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

193

Sossai, M. (2020). Legality of Extraterritorial Sanctions. In M. Asada (Ed.), Economic Sanctions in International Law and Practice (pp. 62–​79). Oxon/​New York: Routledge. Spagat, M. (2010). Truth and death in Iraq under sanctions. Significance, 7(3), 116–​120. Sparke, M. (2018). Geoeconomics, Globalisation and the Limits of Economic Strategy in Statecraft: A Response to Vihma. Geopolitics, 23(1), 30–​37. Stanzel, V. (2016). Diplomacy in the 21st Century. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Berlin. Retrieved from https://​www.swp-​ber​lin.org/​en/​publ​icat​ion/​diplom​acy-​in -​the-​21st-​cent​ury. Steinmeier, F.-​W. (2014). Globalisation in recession. Speech at Süddeutsche Zeitung Economic Summit, Berlin 27 November, 2014. Retrieved from https://​www.auswa​erti​ ges-​amt.de/​en/​newsr​oom/​news/​141​127-​bm-​wirtsc​haft​sgip​fel/​267​354. Stepien, B., & Weber, P. M. (2019). Passive, Agressive or Creative? Adjustment Strategies of Companies Affacted by Sanctions. In R. Van Tulder, A. Verbeke, & B. Jankowsa (Eds.), International Business in a VUCA World: The Changing Role of States and Firms (pp. 131–​156). Bingley: Emerald Publishing. Stewart, S. (2016). The future of the Minsk agreements: press for implementation and support sanctions. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Berlin. Retrieved from https://​ www.swp-​ber​lin.org/​en/​publ​icat​ion/​the-​fut​ure-​of-​the-​minsk-​agr​eeme​nts. Strange, S. (1992). States, firms and diplomacy. International Affairs, 68(1), 1–​15. Strange, S. (1996). The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Strange, S. (2015 [1988]). States and Markets. London/​ New York: Bloomsbury Academic. Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory (2 ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: sage Publications. Stuenkel, O. (2015). The BRICS and the Future of Global Order. Lanham: Lexington Books. Stuenkel, O. (2016). Post-​Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order. Malden, MA: Polity. Sundaram, S. S., & Thakur, V. (2019). A pragmatic methodology for studying international practices. Journal of International Political Theory, 1–​19. Suzuki, K. (2020). Iran: The Role and Effectiveness of UN Sanctions In M. Asada (Ed.), Economic Sanctions in International Law and Practice (pp. 178–​199). Oxon/​ New York: Routledge. Szabo, S. F. (2014). Germany’s Commercial Realism and the Russia Problem. Survival, 56(5), 117–​128. Szabo, S. F. (2015). Germany, Russia, and the Rise of Geo-​Economics. London/​New York: Bloomsbury Academic. Szép, V. (2019). New intergovernmentalism meets EU sanctions policy: the European Council orchestrates the restrictive measures imposed against Russia. Journal of European Integration, 1–​17. Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

194 Bibliography Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tavory, I., & Timmermans, S. (2019). Abductive Analysis and Grounded Theory. In A. Bryant & K. Charmaz (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Current Developments in Grounded Theory (pp. 532–​ 546). London/​ Thousand Oaks, CA/​ New Delhi/​ Singapore: sage Publications. Taylor, A. (2017). Do sanctions work? The evidence isn’t compelling. Washington Post. August 2, 2017. Retrieved from https://​www.was​hing​tonp​ost.com/​news/​wor​ldvi​ ews/​wp/​2017/​08/​02/​do-​sancti​ons-​work-​the-​evide​nce-​isnt-​com​pell​ing/​. Thépaut, C. (2020). How to Aid Syria Without Aiding Assad. Foreign Policy. June 24, 2020. Retrieved from https://​foreig​npol​icy.com/​2020/​06/​24/​how-​to-​aid-​syria-​with​ out-​aid​ing-​assad/​. Thomas, A. (2013). “Pariah States” and Sanctions: the Case of Syria. Middle East Policy, 20(3), 27–​40. Thouvenin, J.-​ M. (2020). History of Implementation of Sanctions. In M. Asada (Ed.), Economic Sanctions in International Law and Practice (pp. 83–​92). Oxon/​ New York: Routledge. Thurber, M. C., Hults, D. R., & Heller, P. R. P. (2011). Exporting the “Norwegian Model”: The effect of administrative design on oil sector performance. Energy Policy, 39(9), 5366–​5378. Tiberghien, Y. (2007). Entrepreneurial States: Reforming Corporate Governance in France, Japan, and Korea. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Tickner, A. B., & Wæver, O. (2009). International relations scholarship around the world. New York: Routledge. UK Government. (2020). Prime Minister announces merger of Department for International Development and Foreign Office [Press release]. London. Retrieved from https://​www.gov.uk/​gov​ernm​ent/​news/​prime-​minis​ter-​announ​ces-​mer​ger-​of -​dep​artm​ent-​for-​intern​atio​nal-​deve​lopm​ent-​and-​fore​ign-​off​ice. UN Security Council. (2015). Resolution 2231 (2015); Adopted by the Security Council at its 7488th meeting, on 20 July 2015. S/​R ES/​2231 (2015), New York. US Congress. (2019). National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. H. Rept. 116–​333, Washington DC: US Government Publishing Office. US President. (2011). Executive Order 13582 of August 17, 2011: Blocking Property of the Government of Syria and Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Syria Federal Register, 76(162), 52209–​52211. US President. (2012). Executive Order 13599 of February 5, 2012: Blocking Property of the Government of Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions Federal Register, 77(28), 6659–​6662. Vaez, A. (2019). Trump’s ‘Maximum Pressure’ Won’t Make Iran Yield. The Atlantic. May 12, 2019. Retrieved from https://​www.thea​tlan​tic.com/​ideas/​arch​ive/​2019/​05/​why -​tru​mps-​sancti​ons-​iran-​arent-​work​ing/​589​288/​. Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Bibliography

195

Van Bergeijk, P. A. (2009). Economic diplomacy and the geography of international trade. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Van Elsuwege, P. (2011). The Adoption of “Targeted Sanctions” and the Potential for Interinstitutional Litigation after Lisbon. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 7(4), 488–​499. Van Meter, D. S., & Van Horn, C. E. (1975). The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework. Administration & Society, 6(4), 445–​488. Vihma, A. (2018). Geoeconomic Analysis and the Limits of Critical Geopolitics: A New Engagement with Edward Luttwak. Geopolitics, 23(1), 1–​21. Vihma, A., & Turksen, U. (2016). The Geoeconomics of the South Stream Pipeline Project. Journal of International Affairs, 69(1), 34–​53. Vihma, A., & Wigell, M. (2016). Unclear and present danger: Russia’s geoeconomics and the Nord Stream ii pipeline. Global Affairs, 2(4), 377–​388. Vlachos, V. (2020). Outward FDI location and economic diplomacy: the case of Greece. International Journal of Diplomacy and Economy, 6(2), 171–​188. Vlados, C., Deniozos, N., & Chatzinikolaou, D. (2019). Dialectical prerequisites on Geopolitics and Geoeconomics in Globalization’s Restructuration Era. Journal of Economic and Social Thought, 6(2), 65–​92. von der Leyen, U. (2019a). Mission Letter to Josep Borrell; High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy/​Vice-​President designate of the European Commission. Brussels: European Commission. Retrieved from https://​ec.eur​opa.eu/​ com​miss​ion/​sites/​beta-​politi​cal/​files/​miss​ion-​let​ter-​josep-​borr​ell-​2019​_​en.pdf. von der Leyen, U. (2019b). Mission Letter to Valdis Dombrovskis; Executive Vice-​President-​ designate for An Economy that Works for People. Brussels: European Commission. Retrieved from https://​ec.eur​opa.eu/​com​miss​ion/​sites/​beta-​politi​cal/​files/​miss​ ion-​let​ter-​val​dis-​domb​rovs​kis-​2019​_​en.pdf. Vrasti, W. (2008). The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations. Millennium, 37(2), 279–​301. Walker, J. (2016). Study on Humanitarian Impact of Syria-​Related Unilateral Restrictive Measures. United Nations Economic & Social Commission for Western Asia. Beirut. Wallerstein, I. (1974). The Modern World-​System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-​Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press. Walter, T. (2019). The road (not) taken? How the indexicality of practice could make or break the ‘New Constructivism’. European Journal of International Relations, 25(2), 538–​561. Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-​Wesley. Waltz, K. N. (1986). Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics. In R. O. Keohane (Ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (pp. 322–​346). New York: Columbia University Press. Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International Organization, 46(02), 391–​425. Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

196 Bibliography Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wigell, M. (2016). Conceptualizing regional powers’ geoeconomic strategies: neo-​ imperialism, neo-​mercantilism, hegemony, and liberal institutionalism. Asia Europe Journal, 14(2), 135–​151. Wigell, M., Scholvin, S., & Aaltola, M. (Eds.). (2019). Geo-​Economics and Power Politics in the 21st Century -​The Revival of Economic Statecraft. Oxon/​New York: Routledge. Wiseman, G. (2004). ‘Polylateralism’ and new modes of global dialogue. In C. Jönsson & R. Langhorne (Eds.), Diplomacy: Problems and Issues in Contemporary Diplomacy (pp. 409–​430). Thousand Oaks, CA: sage Publications. Wiseman, G. (2015). Diplomatic practices at the United Nations. Cooperation and Conflict, 50(3), 316–​333. Wiseman, G. (2019). Contemporary Challenges for Foreign Ministries: At Home and Abroad. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 30(4), 786–​798. World Bank. (2020). GDP (current US$) -​European Union, United States, China. Retrieved from https://​data.worldb​ank.org/​indica​tor/​N Y.GDP.MKTP.CD?locati​ ons=​E U-​U S-​C N. Wright, N. (2018). No Longer the Elephant Outside the Room: Why the Ukraine Crisis Reflects a Deeper Shift Towards German Leadership of European Foreign Policy. German Politics, 1–​19. Wright, T. J. (2017). All Measures Short of War: the Contest for the Twenty-​First Century and the Future of American Power. New Haven/​London: Yale University Press. Yeh, E. T. (2017). The Geoeconomics and Geopolitics of Chinese Development and Investment in Asia. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57(3), 275–​285. Youngs, R. (2012). Geo-​economic Futures. In A. Martiningui & R. Youngs (Eds.), Challenges for European Foreign Policy in 2012: What Kind of Geo-​Economic Europe? (pp. 13–​17). Madrid: fride. Zadeh-​Cummings, N., & Harris, L. (2020). The Impact of Sanctions against North Korea on Humanitarian Aid. Journal of Humanitarian Affairs, 2(1), 44–​52. Zakaria, F. (2008). The Post-​American World. New York/​London: W. W. Norton & Company. Zarate, J. C. (2013). Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare. New York: PublicAffairs. Zemanová, Š., & Machoň, M. (2018). The Economic Dimension of the Czech Foreign Policy. In A. Kizekov (Ed.), Czech Foreign Policy in 2017: Analysis (pp. 342–​360). Prague: Institute of International Relations Prague. Zha, D. (2015). China’s economic diplomacy: Focusing on the Asia-​Pacific region. China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, 1(1), 85–​104.

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

Index abduction 108 ability 2–​8, 14, 44–​45, 50–​61, 83–​84, 98–​99, 110–​116, 128–​131, 132–​135, 141–​144, 145–​ 150, 157–​161 actor-​network theory  actants in 95, 100 background of 8–​10, 84–​86, 91–​96 obligatory passage points (opp s) in 8, 14, 84, 98–​103, 115, 121, 127–​131, 145–​147, 158–​159 translations in 98–​101, 115–​127, 158 actors  commercial/​financial 5, 23–​24, 37–​38, 41–​43, 50–​55, 65, 83, 110, 116–​117, 126–​ 127, 130–​137, 159–​160 non-​governmental/​-​state 3, 7, 21–​22, 37, 53–​55, 72, 89–​91, 106, 126–​130, 136–​141, 146–​148, 157, 160 state 5, 8–​11, 15, 39, 44, 55–​57, 60–​61, 73–​ 78, 85, 90–​99, 110, 116, 125–​130, 136–​140, 146–​148, 157–​160 Afghanistan 89 Africa 29, 48–​51, 110, 113 Horn of 90 agency-​structure 91, 102 agriculture 38, 41, 66, 79 anarchy 20, 28, 34, 46 Angell, Norman 51 Asia 28–​29, 50, 52 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (aiib) 50 assistance  development 54, 134–​138, 150 humanitarian 134–​138 targeted economic 2–​3, 9, 14, 32, 46, 72, 132–​138, 160 asymmetric access 27 authoritarianism 45–​51, 53–​54 Baldwin, David A. 17, 36–​38, 150 Boltanski, Luc 86 Bourdieu, Pierre  practice theory of 10, 60, 85–​88, 92, 148–​149, 161 business interest organisations 81

capitalism  alternative models of 47 liberal market 3–​5, 13, 32–​33, 44–​48, 50–​54, 61, 157 state 22, 45–​53 varieties of 52–​53 Carr, E.H 19 China 2–​4, 28–​29, 33, 45–​53, 76, 155 Belt and Road Initiative (bri) 33, 50 rivalry with the US 28, 50 civil society 91, 122–​124, 128, 155 Clausewitz, Carl von 24 climate change 100 Colbert, Jean-​Baptiste  dirigisme of 47, 69 Cold War 24, 28–​29, 34, 45, 47 commerce, methods of 3, 18, 24–​25, 38, 66 companies, multinational (mnc s) 21–​22, 24, 27 competent authorities 41, 115–​116, 119–​121, 127–​129, 136, 140 connectivity wars 1 control, state and governmental 1, 15, 47, 50–​51, 128 corporatism 79 corruption 51, 114 Crimea 63–​67, 77 cyber 27, 54 defensive trade instruments 46 dependency, economic 25 diplomacy  commercial 7, 57 definition of 60, 148, 152 economic 7, 31, 57–​59, 68–​70 polylateral 91, 94, 158 studies 5–​6, 56, 64, 82, 87–​92, 101, 146 trade 7, 57, 63 diplomatic  cooperation 91 frontlines 91 headquarters 7, 80, 89–​91 practitioners 1, 6–​8, 11–​15, 25, 36–​37, 44–​45, 53–​62, 73–​82, 90–​94, 108–​109, 115–​131, 145–​156, 158–​161 representations 37, 70, 91, 109, 136, 140

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

198 Index dispositional spaces 10, 106 dual-​use equipment 65, 111, 118 economic  nationalism 17 resources 1–​5, 16, 23–​24, 29–​32, 35, 44, 49–​50, 54, 151 statecraft 5–​9, 17–​18, 23, 31, 36–​39, 58–​ 60, 133–​134, 151 Egypt 48, 89, 111–​113 embargo 16, 111 embedded agency 102 enterprises  privately owned (poe s) 51 state-​owned (soe s) 49–​50 ethnography 12, 64, 88–​90, 104–​109 Eurasia 25 European Economic Community 112 European Union  Common Foreign and Security Policy (cfsp) 2, 34, 39–​44, 110–​131, 132–​138 European Commission 40–​42, 89, 106, 117–​131, 134–​140 European Council 66–​68 eurozone 54 Foreign Affairs Council (fac) 122–​123 litigation of restrictive measures 40–​41, 123–​125 relex working group 119–​128 Treaty of Lisbon 111, 113 Treaty on the Functioning of the 41, 120 Foucault, Michel 86 France 47–​48, 52, 63–​82, 90, 109, 120, 124, 139, 147, 158–​159 Bercy 69–​75 Quai d’Orsay 64–​79 games  positive-​sum 28 two-​level 55, 68 zero-​sum 24, 28 geoeconomic diplomacy  definition of 6, 45–​46, 56–​62 geoeconomics  analysis of 12, 25–​34 realists thought of 5, 16–​20, 23–​29

geography 11–​12, 24–​26, 29–​33, 91 geopolitics 23–​26, 30 Germany 41, 47–​48, 52, 63–​82, 120, 124, 139, 146–​147 Auswärtiges Amt 64, 71–​79 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 73–​79 Federation of German Industries (bdi) 80 German Eastern Business Association (Ost-​Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft) 80 Nazi-​ 25 Gilpin, Robert 21, 30 globalisation 1, 20, 27, 71, 146 decentralised 45 Goffman, Erving 88 governance  global 26–​30 state-​market 4, 44–​56 grounded theory 106 habitus 88, 92, 103 Hawala system 137 hegemony 21, 29 Hegemonic Stability Theory 30 Hirschman, Alfred 25, 29 Hollande, François 77 human rights policies and violations 125, 132, 154 ideal types 44, 47–​49 implementation  policy phase of 7–​8, 11–​14, 83–​98 sanctions 11–​14, 34–​43, 73–​82, 99, 115–​131, 132–​144, 156, 158–​160 independence, state-​market 3–​4, 80 India 4, 45–​49, 53, 76, 146 Indo-​Pacific region 50 induction 8, 64, 99 infrastructure 4, 32, 50, 149 interconnectedness 1, 26 interdependence  economic 4, 30, 142 global 13, 27, 161 regional 50 vulnerability 29 weaponised 1, 27–​29, 51 international cooperation 19–​20, 27

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

199

Index international political economy (ipe) 1, 17–​24, 58, 84 international practice theory (ipt) xviii, 6, 62, 82–​83, 157, 159 international relations (ir)  constructivist theories of 5, 61, 91, 102 Copenhagen School of 26 English School of 45 liberalist theories of 5, 16–​20, 48 realist theories of 5, 16–​23, 25–​33 the ‘practice turn’ of 6, 83–​103, 152 interpretivism 5, 31–​32, 42, 107, 113, 121, 125, 140, 147 inter-​state relations 19, 23–​25 Iran 47–​48, 73, 113–​114, 138–​144 Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (instex) 144 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) 143 Iraq 114, 134, 138 Japan 47, 52 Kadi, Yassin Abdullah 40 Keohane, Robert 5, 20 Kindleberger, Charles 21, 30 Kosovo 42, 90 Krasner, Stephen D. 21 Kuwait 114

Merkel, Angela 74, 78 ministries  defence 76 economics 69–​79 Morgenthau, Hans J. 19, 33 multilateralism 25–​27, 38, 58, 69, 88–​91, 112, 150–​151, 155, 158 multimethod approach 12, 106 multipolarality 1, 4, 13, 17, 25–​33, 44–​ 48, 152 networks  actor-​ 8–​15, 43, 83–​86, 93–​103, 115–​131, 132–​144, 151 diplomatic 145–​148 ego-​ 101 global 27 plurality of 27 positions and power in 145 relations in 95, 98–​100 shaping of 15, 145–​150 social network analysis (sna) 97–​98, 101 norms 2, 28, 46, 49, 67, 81, 97, 151–​156 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato) 76 North Korea 12 Norway 48 Nye, Joseph 5, 20

Latour, Bruno 86, 96–​97, 101 League of Nations 25 Lebanon 112, 116, 134, 143 liberal intergovernmentalism 55 liberalism  Kantian 18 neo-​ 20 ordo-​ 69, 71 Libya 89–​90, 111–​113, 153 Luttwak, Edward N. 24–​25, 32–​33, 61

Obama, Barack 139, 143–​146 oil 65, 112, 125 opportunity costs 27 order  geoeconomic 1, 28 international 20, 22, 44, 47 liberal 27 multipolar 1, 17, 25–​30, 45–​49, 152 neoliberal 28 post-​Western 44–​45 Ostpolitik 74, 77

Mackinder, Halford 25 Mali 90 manipulation, state 24 Marxism  World Systems Theory of 18, 49 Mearsheimer, John J. 34 mercantilism 17–​18

parliaments 4, 77, 83 Peloponnesian Wars 16 Poland 41, 68 polylateralism 91, 94, 158 power  balance of 10, 20, 26 commercial 24

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

200 Index power (cont.) economic 16–​34, 44–​62, 132–​134, 141–​144 military 19, 24, 31 political 5, 21–​25, 157 state 17, 22, 27, 31 structural 22–​23, 27 super-​ 2, 24 practices  analytical bias in the study of 6, 87–​94 Bourdieuian and critical approaches to 10, 60, 86–​92, 102, 148–​149, 161 communities of 86–​88, 90, 102 conflicting 133–​141 definition of 85 deterrence 125–​127, 130 enforcement 115–​119, 128 localised 105 monitoring 119–​122 networked 5–​9, 83–​103, 115–​132, 133–​141, 145–​148, 159–​161 pragmatic approaches to 10, 14, 84–​86, 94–​102, 151–​156, 161 refinement 122–​125 social change in 7, 91, 97, 102 praxiography 103–​105 protectionism 22, 28, 47 Putnam, Robert D. 68 realism  classical 19, 34 neo-​classical 16, 20, 23 relationalism 82, 95, 102 Russia  countermeasures by 66 sanctions against 3–​4, 8, 10–​11, 13–​14, 46–​49, 63–​82

over-​compliance of 117, 127 targets of 10, 29, 35–​39, 46, 60, 139, 156 travel bans 3, 40, 65, 111–​120 Schengen Area 116 securitisation 26 Singapore 47–​48 social  change 7, 91, 97, 102 stability 7, 86, 97 Somalia 90 sovereign wealth funds 48, 54 sovereignty 65, 144, 148 Spain 52, 68 stabilisation policies 72, 90, 107, 135–​136 stability  political 59 social 7, 86, 97 state-​market nexus x, xiv, 7, 13, 23, 55, 58n.16, 61, 64–​65, 81–​82, 99–​100, 128, 132, 146, 153, 157, 160 Steinmeier, Frank-​Walter 71–​74 Strange, Susan 21–​22, 27 Syria  economic assistance for 9, 133–​138 sanctions against 8–​12, 110–​131, 132–​144 tariffs 16, 35 terrorism 36, 126, 137 transatlantic cooperation 10, 139, 143 Trump, Donald J. 142–​143 Tunisia 111, 113

Ukraine 2, 8, 63–​68, 73–​82, 158, 162 United Kingdom 25, 52, 75, 89–​90, 120, 124, 139, 153 United Nations Security Council 88–​90, sanctions  112–​114, 134, 153 ’smart’ 111, 154 United States of America 14, 18, 21–​29, asset freezes 3, 65, 111–​120 35–​36, 42–​48, 52–​54, 66, 86, 89, 110–​115, circumvention, violation and busting 133–​141, 145–​148 of 37–​39, 42, 78–​81, 115–​130, 137 Department of Treasury 36, 140 definition of 35 executive orders 139, 143 effectiveness of 35–​37 Office of Foreign Assets Control extraterritorial 142–​143 (ofac) 36, 42, 139–​143 humanitarian aspects and exemptions of  Specially Designated Nationals 31, 39, 113–​115, 119, 125–​128, 132–​139, 151–​156 (sdn s) 139 implementation of 11, 13–​14, 34–​43, 73–​ State Department 36, 146 82, 94–​103, 115–​131, 132–​144 US dollar, role of 29, 142, 144

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University

201

Index value chains 4, 134, 138, 147 Venezuela 12, 47 virtuosity 59–​60, 86 von der Leyen, Ursula 131

wealth, national 2–​5, 17–​24, 30–​34, 45, 50–​54, 116 Wilson, Woodrow 19 World Wars i and ii 18, 21, 25, 48

Wallerstein, Immanuel 49 Waltz, Kenneth N. 20–​21, 34

zooming in/​out 64, 104–​105, 110, 115, 149

Kim B. Olsen - 978-90-04-51883-4 Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2023 02:49:49AM via Western University