China's Food Security: Strategies and Countermeasures 9819907292, 9789819907298

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China’s Food Security Strategies and Countermeasures wa ng hong gua ng

China’s Food Security

Wang Hongguang

China’s Food Security Strategies and Countermeasures

CITIC Press Group|Beijing

Wang Hongguang Peking University Beijing, China

ISBN 978-981-99-0729-8 ISBN 978-981-99-0730-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0730-4 Jointly published with CITIC Press Corporation The print edition is not for sale in China (Mainland). Customers from China (Mainland) please order the print book from: CITIC Press Corporation. ISBN of the China (Mainland) edition: 978-7-5217-2371-7 © CITIC Press Corporation 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Ensure China’s food security by holding the rice bowl of the Chinese people firmly in our own hands. —From the Report of General Secretary Xi Jinping at the 19th CPC National Congress

China should protect the livelihoods of the Chinese people and work with other countries to establish global food security. Food security is a top priority for national welfare and the livelihoods of the people. Since the implementation of the 13th Five-Year Plan five years ago, the Chinese leaders have had a number of inspection tours for food production across China. On numerous occasions, the leaders have stressed the importance of ensuring food security. Based on 30 years of continuous research on food security, the book analyzes the impacts on food security by the changes of post-pandemic world, takes a historical review of global food production, consumption, and trade over the past 60 years, defines the current pattern of global food security, and forecasts its trend in the next 20 years. Meanwhile, the book identifies nine issues currently facing China on food security, estimates the potential of food production, and proposes four major strategies and eight countermeasures to ensure food security for the next 20 years. This book is a data-based illustration of history, status quo, and trends of food security in China. It evidently draws on a complete, systematic, strategic, and insightful research. It’ll serve as an important literature for readers to understand the context of “sufficient food and sufficient nutrition.” It can be used as a reference for governments at various levels in formulation of agricultural policies, for researchers on food security issues, or for teachers and students from institutes of higher learning.

Editorial Board

Wang Hongguang Li Lijun Hu Zhiquan Zhang Yong’en Chu Qingquan Wu Yongchang Wang Zhaohua Wei Wei Wang Hongyan Liu Jinghui Li Yiping Wu De’an You Lei Zhang Junxiang Yin Zhixin Zhu Shu Ma Guohui Ma Hongbo Song Zhirong

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Foreword I

Food security is a major issue faced by many countries worldwide. Nearly 690 million people were suffering from hunger in 2019, up nearly 60 million from 5 years ago. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, 130 million additional people are likely to fall into hunger in 2020, as more than 40 countries experiencing food shortages. With a huge population, China has always been plagued by the issue of food security. The people of old China were ravaged by famine-induced hunger. Over 70 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), total grain production has increased by 4.9 times, and unit area yield by 4.5 times. In 2019, China’s total grain output reached 664 million tons, and per capita share of grain exceeded 470 kg, marking the 16th consecutive year of increase in grain production and accounting for 24.4% of global total. Thus far, 1.4 billion people have been free from hunger. With only 10% of the world’s land, China feeds 20% of the world’s population, representing a tremendous achievement for the world. Relying on science and technology to increase grain yield is a fundamental solution for China. To cite the hybrid rice as an example, the past 50 years have seen eight stages of yield increase—400 kg/mu, 500 kg/mu, 600 kg/mu, 700 kg/mu, 800 kg/mu, 900 kg/mu, 1000 kg/mu, and 1110 kg/mu (1 acre = 6.07 mu), and dramatic leaps from low yield to high-yield strain, from ordinary rice to high-quality rice, from freshwater rice to saline-tolerant rice and the first ever success of growing

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desert rice. As of 2019, hybrid rice has been expanded to a total of 1.5 billion mu in China, bringing about an additional rice output of 140 million tons to feed additional 80 million people each year. The miraculous increase in grain production has generated tremendous social and economic benefits, and made significant contribution to achieving food self-sufficiency in China. I strongly support the major decision by the Chinese government to “ensure food security,” because it has to be addressed seriously as improved living standards of the people will spur a rising per capita food consumption. When the per capita share of food was 400 kg, China faced difficulty in selling food as people ate less meat. But now, with a per capita share of 470 kg, we need to import the equivalent of nearly 900 million mu of arable land. In many developed countries, the per capita food consumption (including edible grains, meat, eggs, milk, etc.) is more than 800 kg, almost double that in China. That’s the reason why we should never neglect the issue of food security. I greatly admire Professor Wang Hongguang’s concern and academic efforts of more than 30 years on food security. Fifteen years ago, I wrote the preface of the book Studies on China’s Food Security by Professor Wang, and today I am very pleased to write the preface for his new book, China’s Food Security: Strategies and Countermeasures. Through systematic research on the history, status quo, challenges, and countermeasures of food security both in China and globally, Professor Wang Hongguang has raised some major issues that deserve serious study. I agree with the judgment in this book that “China has no problem in securing sufficient food, but still needs food imports for sufficient nutrition,” I also admire the in-depth and systematic research in this book, which draws our attention to the issues like the need to import the equivalent of nearly 900 million mu of arable land, an implicit grain self-sufficiency rate of 70%, increased pressure on arable land protection from urbanization, farmers’ reluctance to grow and store food, changes in the international environment, and possible disruptions of the food supply chain, etc. This book advocates a second green revolution to further increase the unit area yield of grain. In my opinion, the goal of “800 million tons of total grain production” is fully achievable with sustained efforts, as the yield of third-generation hybrid rice is expected to hit 1200 kg or even 1300 kg per mu, and the goal of 18 tons per hectare will be fulfilled soon. Coupled with further breakthroughs in saline-tolerant rice, hybrid wheat, hybrid corn, hybrid soybeans, hybrid rapeseed, and other technologies,

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China is well positioned to ensure its food security. Chinese people’s rice bowl must be held firmly in our own hands and should be full mainly of Chinese grain. This book conducts a systematic study based on a large amount of data and information collected on food security in China and overseas, making it a treatise of academic and applicable value in food security study on China. I sincerely recommend this book to the science and technology professionals who are concerned with and engaged in food security subject.

September 2020

Yuan Longping Recipient of the Medal of the Republic Recipient of the State Supreme Science and Technology Award Winner of the World Food Prize Academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering Honorary Director General of China National Hybrid Rice Research and Development Center Changsha, China

Foreword II

Coinciding with the World Food Day, today, I am very pleased to preface a new book, China’s Food Security: Strategies and Countermeasures, written by Professor Wang Hongguang, who is an old friend of mine. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2020 (SOFI 2020), jointly released by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Health Organization (WHO), states that 2019 witnessed nearly 690 million people, or nearly one-tenth of the global population, suffering from hunger. When populations facing moderate and severe levels of food insecurity are considered, a total of 2 billion people worldwide have no access to safe, nutritious, and sufficient food on a regular basis. This trend, if not reversed, will render it difficult for the world to reach the goal of zero hunger by 2030. As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, coupled with the impacts of global climate change and recent pest outbreaks such as the African desert locust and the American fall armyworm, the global food landscape, which was already fragile, has taken a huge hit. Many countries and regions are in danger of broken food supply chains and rising food prices, leading to a situation where food-importing countries may not be able to buy enough food and low-income people may not be able to afford the food price. Countries that have food, land, and technology can barely provide

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strong support to countries that lack food, capital, land, and technology. I strongly agree with Professor Wang Hongguang’s opinion: “Globally, a food gap will exist for a long time.” Over the past 70 years, China has made remarkable achievements in food security. Going back to 1949, with a population of 450 million, China faced the threat of hunger. When the population reached 1.25 billion in 1998, the Chinese government announced a new stage of agriculture, in which the problem of insufficient quantity of food had been solved, and the hunger plaguing the country for thousands of years was basically resolved, and the poor quality of food became the main focus of problem. In 2019, Professor Wang Hongguang concluded in his book that, “China has no problem in securing sufficient food, but still need food imports for sufficient nutrition,” as China’s per capita grain production reached 470 kg, surpassing the food security line of 400 kg per capita. In view of the current issues facing the world’s food supply chains, the Chinese government’s proposal to “ensure food security” is very important and timely. Undoubtedly, China scored an unparalleled success in solving the problem of food and poverty. Since the inception of New China in 1949, the country has successfully lifted more than 1 billion people out of hunger and poverty, something that no other countries can do in such a short period of time. Based on my long years of work in international organizations, I know that if other countries in the world could solve food and poverty issues as successfully as China, the goals of “zero hunger” and “poverty eradication” proposed by the UN would be achieved at the earliest. China’s success is multifaceted, on which different countries, different institutions, and different time periods may hold different views and perspectives. As the Chinese government has made it clear that agricultural development relies on policy, science and technology, and inputs. In terms of policy, the Chinese government holds annual central rural work conference and promulgates the “No. 1 Central Document,” which is uncommon in foreign countries. In terms of science and technology, China has a great number of agricultural experts such as academician Yuan Longping, who have won the admiration of the global agricultural science and technology community by constantly raising the unit area yield of food crops to new heights and improving the efficiency of livestock production.

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With over 30 years of research in agricultural policies, especially in agricultural science and technology policies, Professor Wang Hongguang has achieved a lot of fruitful results. As the Secretary-General of the conference, Professor Wang Hongguang organized the 1st session of the International Conference on Agricultural Science and Technology, where he first advocated the “second green revolution.” He led the team to draft the first Outline of Agricultural Science and Technology Developments in China and participated in the organization of the 2nd session of the National Conference on Agricultural Science and Technology. These efforts have contributed to agricultural science and technology development both in China and overseas. Following his appointment as a professor at China Agricultural University at the age of 32, Wang Hongguang has conducted extensive research in agriculture, especially in food security. In 1993, his book titled China’s Agriculture: Problems, Potential, Paths, and Benefits pointed out that China’s food security could be featured by “low level, high difficulty, and insecurity.” Although the per capita share of food did not reach the security line of 400 kg at that time, the book had predicted that China could produce up to 640 million tons of grain. China saw a food production of 664 million tons in 2019, which proved that his prediction was relatively accurate. The publishing of China’s Food Security: Strategies and Countermeasures is the result of more than 30 years of continuous research on food security in China and overseas by Professor Hongguang and his team. With its informative data, broad and deep vision, unique views, and rigorous logic, this book is highly recommended. Firstly, this book reviews the history of world food production, consumption, and trade over the past 60 years, analyzes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global food security pattern, and predicts the trend of food security in the next 20 years. Secondly, this book summarizes the history and experience of food security in China over the past 2000 years, envisages the food security problems that China will face in the next 20 years and puts forward countermeasures. Thirdly, this book proposes an innovative and practical “six-factor index of food security,” which measures food security levels of different provinces, cities, and regions based on six elements—quantity, quality, technology, ecology, economy, and society. Fourth, the book makes a basic conclusion that “China has no problem in securing sufficient food, but still needs food imports for sufficient nutrition” and puts forward the suggestions of

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“eight measures to ensure food security and four strategies to solve food crisis.” Therefore, it’s with great pleasure that I recommend China’s Food Security: Strategies and Countermeasures by Professor Wang Hongguang to all readers, hoping to discuss and study the issue of food security with you.

October 2020

Wang Ren Former Assistant Director General, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Former Secretary-General of Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Shenzhen, China

Foreword III

Over the past 10 years or so, the increasingly wide recognition and application of concepts and technologies such as big data, cloud computing, blockchain, AI, arithmetic economy, and the IoT have accelerated the transition and transformation into a digital society. Globally, a digital economy is maturing in parallel with traditional economy of physical and material form. This undoubted progress does not dwarf the importance of the agricultural and industrial economies in their material and physical forms, which, on the contrary, are the material basis supporting the digital economy. The importance of food in the agricultural economy goes without saying. While digitalization can improve agricultural economy and food production, it cannot replace them. The reasoning is quite simple—so far, human life and people’s livelihood have all along depended on food and food chains. Only under two circumstances can humans change this inherent behavioral pattern—either humans create a complete replacement for food or humans are transformed into a species that does not need to “eat” or what is “eaten” is no longer food. Even though robots need no food, humans are not replaceable by robots in the foreseeable future. Coming back to reality, we must re-examine the perception of solving food problems through agricultural science and technology, as the population continues to grow (approaching 8 billion), the per capita area of cultivated land is decreasing, and the external conditions affecting food

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production, including soil, water, and climate, are deteriorating. For now, we can say with certainty that humanity will continue to face the challenge of food on a global scale, and that large-scale hunger will remain in certain regions. The threat of “famine” has never receded. According to the Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) released by the World Food Programme (WFP) on 21 April 2020, 821 million people in the world go hungry on a daily basis, and another 135 million people are on the verge of hunger. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has forced an additional 130 million people into the abyss of hunger. According to the worst-case predictions, there may be more than 30 countries suffering from famine in the world. Undoubtedly, hunger can only be solved by improved food supply. The success of Chinese agriculture lies in meeting the food demand for 1.4 billion people, but we can never claim that China is far from the worry of food shortage. As a result of my deep experience with hunger and my involvement in the rural economic reform over 30 years, I have always paid close attention to the food issues in China. I read an article written by Professor Wang Hongguang, titled Abandoning Optimism About Food Security and Paying Attention to Potential Risks, in the summer of 2020, and I totally agreed with the opinion therein that China is not absolutely but relatively food secure, since we still need to “import the equivalent of nearly 900 million mu of arable land” to ensure food security. This means that our food is sufficient for daily life, but not for a wartime situation. For this reason, I approached Professor Wang Hongguang and suggested that he write a book based on these ideas. I recommended this book to be selected as a key work in the Moganshan Series in 2020. Professor Wang Hongguang and I agreed that it would take 3 months to write the book. Later, I learned that Professor Wang Hongguang has over 30 years of experience, knowledge, and accumulation of information in this field. In his book titled Chinese Agriculture: Problems, Potential, Paths, and Benefits published in 1993, he raised the problem of food security at that time—low level, high difficulty, and weak security—and created ninelevel approaches to revising food production potential, predicting that the grain production could go up to 640 million tons. Based on reliable methodology, Professor Wang Hongguang arrived at an accurate judgment, evidenced by a grain production of 664 million tons in 2019. Under the leadership of Professor Wang Hongguang, in 2005 his team completed the Studies on China’s Food Security and 70 Years of China’s Farming System, suggesting that population control and protection of

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arable land are the only ways to ensure food security. Judging from the current situation, these measures proposed by him are completely accurate. Three months after talking with Professor Wang Hongguang, I was excited to receive a copy of China’s Food Security: Strategies and Countermeasures, written by Professor Wang Hongguang and his team. Focusing on in-depth thinking and academic methods, using data as a basis and food production of agricultural economy as the main line, combining historical perspectives and realistic policy, this book provides a full range of interpretations and explanations on food security faced by China. I highly appreciate the following aspects of this book: (1) an assessment of the agricultural history of the new China—the complete farewell to the history of hunger that lasted for thousands of years, the termination of the thousand-year history of farmers “paying grain to the emperor,” the forthcoming elimination of “absolute poverty” mainly characterized by not having enough food; (2) a basic judgment of the current food security in China—low level, high difficulty, tight balance, and weak security. The author points out nine major problems in food security, especially the “implicit food self-sufficiency rate of only 70%,” and actively advises the central government on these issues. The author has the sense of responsibility, level of spiritual pursuit, and academic feelings that I think a scholar should possess; (3) Construction of the “six-factor index system” for food security. The author uses 48 indicators to measure the food security levels of 31 provinces (municipalities and regions) and proposes specific, pertinent, and insightful countermeasures of “increasing food production by technology, maintaining hidden production on arable land, producing food from sea, producing food on mountains, increasing production through reform, storing food through friendly cooperation, reducing wastage in food use, and guaranteeing food security in the form of a community.” From ancient times till now, the issue of food has always affected the survival and health of human beings, as well as the peace and stability of the world. As we are entering the third decade of the twenty-first century, food is still a fundamental and strategic product for economic and social activities. The status of food will not change unless and until humans completely solve the problem of food consumption. Therefore, in addition to its significance to China’s food policies, this book is also of considerable reference value to other countries—one of the characteristics of the food issue is the inherent internationality. Among

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the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) published by the UN in 2015, “ending hunger, achieving food security and improved nutrition, and promoting sustainable agriculture” are listed as SDG2. Despite my acquaintance of only one year with Professor Wang Hongguang, I am prefacing his book for the second time. Writing the preface of this kind of book has been a great learning experience for me. Given our intellectual and spiritual compatibility, I was lucky and happy to make a new friend like Professor Wang Hongguang.

October 2020

Zhu Jiaming Famous Economist Visiting Professor, China University of Political Science and Law Beijing, Hengqin, China

Foreword IV

As China launched a reform that began with agriculture over 40 years ago, the then-central leadership gave the Technical and Economic Research Center of the State Council a task—to study and picture China’s economy in the year 2000, or in other words, to forecast what the economy would look like by the year 2000. Supposedly, this assignment was declined previously by intended ministries and universities due to lack of methodologies. After determinedly accepting this task, Zhu Jiaming and I calculated the data for 20 years into the future using the simplest mathematical linear equations based on the data of the previous years since the founding of New China, and finally submitted a thick book of indicators for various industries. Among all the conclusions, one alarming conclusion was that the country would see a widening grain gap by the year 2000, and even worse, lack the port handling capacity for imported grain even if resorting to imports for food security, not to mention selfsufficiency in food. China, therefore, launched the rural reform in seeking to address the projection of long-term food shortage, which put an end to the old model of food imports and reinforced the government’s commitment to rural work. Since then, the No. 1 Central Document unveiled by the government every year has been focused on rural work, and agriculture and food production has been atop the agenda of all local governments across the country. Thanks to China’s reform and industrialization plus the generally peaceful global setting, the increasingly wealthier country with rising

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foreign exchange reserve allows for supplementary food from international market. The Chinese people are not only sufficiently fed but provided for with a variety of food choices. Accompanying the availability of adequate and nutritious food, China’s dependence on imports and international markets is becoming increasingly severe. According to Professor Wang Hongguang’s research, about one-third of the food consumed in China has to be imported. In other words, China needs another nearly 900 million mu of grain production. The market economy has made people accustomed to thinking in monetary terms rather than in survival or security terms. Two years ago, when we visited some regions to study and exchange views with the local officials on the second rural reform, we heard one of the leaders saying that “an increase in grain production by 10 or 20 percentage points will not make much difference in the local economic growth.” The masterstroke of importing food has masked a great number of serious problems concerning China’s agriculture, rural areas, and farmers, impeding the second rural reform that is due to take place. Today, as the economy moves up the value chain from mid-range to the high-end, China begins to occupy a share of the high-end industrial market of the United States and even of the Western developed world. This is the reason why Western countries believe that China is changing the landscape of the world economy. The success of China in overcoming the middle-income trap and marching up into the high-end industries depends on furtherance of reforms, a system to concentrate nationwide strengths, and institutional advantages. Given that a high percentage of our food imports is from Western countries, Professor Wang Hongguang talked early about the possibility of the West using food as a weapon against China. From the economic perspective, if the West imposes a food embargo on China and forces China out of high-end industries, the benefits retained by the West are enormous and long-term. However, China will never give up its economic development toward the high end, never give up its continuous reforms, and never give up its institutional advantages. Therefore, China must be prepared for the Worst-Case Scenario of a food war, and meanwhile boost economic defense and ensure food security. We should also recognize that the global food insecurity has not been addressed and the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the global food problem. According to the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2020 (SOFI 2020) released on July 13, 2020, nearly 690 million

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people worldwide suffered from hunger in 2019, representing an increase of 10 million compared to 2018 and nearly 60 million compared to 5 years ago. Following decades of steady decline, the global number of people suffering from chronic hunger has been slowly rising again since 2014 and this trend is continuing. By the end of 2020, the COVID19 pandemic may add more than 130 million people to the number of chronically hungry people. As David Beasley, Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP), has warned, the world needs to act, or this will become a humanitarian and food crisis disaster. As a nation of 1.4 billion people, China must rely primarily on herself for food supply, instead of depending on the uncertain world market. Looking back at history, our country has been using land intensively in recent centuries. In particular, the peaceful environment and economic development over the last half century have led to continuous population growth and lessening of arable land in China. We have resorted to a range of predatory industrial means, such as fertilizers and pesticides, to satisfy the growing demand for agricultural products. However, without an essential solution to the practice of predatory land management, our agricultural land would collapse in the coming decades. By then, no industrial means would prevent food production from declining, and in the end, we would have nothing to rely on to ensure food security. We must look at China’s agricultural problems, current food strategies, and land strategies with a hundred-year vision and a hundred-year mindset. The proposition we need to bear in mind is that “food is always the primary need of human beings.” From a strategic perspective, the book written by Professor Wang Hongguang proposes eight systematic countermeasures to solve our food problem—“increasing food production by technology, maintaining hidden production on arable land, producing food from sea, producing food in mountains, increasing production through reform, storing food through friendly cooperation, reducing wastage in food use, and guaranteeing food security in the form of a community,” and accordingly seven safeguards. These insightful opinions and suggestions provide highly meaningful guidelines for the study and formulation of measures for food security in China. Academically, what is noteworthy about this book is that Professor Wang Hongguang has constructed a “six-factor index system” for food security based on his intensive research and reflection on China’s food security and his mastery and use of China’s food security data. Using

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48 indicators, the system measures the food security indexes of 31 provinces (cities and regions), marking the first study of food security at a meso-level. The implications of this innovation are self-evident. China is our great motherland, so we look forward to more and better research results from Professor Wang Hongguang and from other teams doing research in this field as well.

September 2020

Huang Jiangnan Famous Economist Adjunct Professor, China University of Political Science and Law Beijing, China Adjunct Professor, Southern University of Science and Technology Shenzhen, China

Contents

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Introduction 1 Despite the 10,000-Year History of Farming, There Still Are People Going Hungry! 2 A Food Shortage Caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic is Unfolding! 3 Looking Ahead, Can Getting Sufficient Food Be More Difficult Than Landing on the Moon? 4 Having Enough to Eat is the Most Basic Human Right! 5 What Are the Solutions to Food Security? 6 History: The Chinese Nation Has Led the Agricultural Civilization 7 Achievements: New China Said Goodbye to Four Histories in 70 Years 8 Problems: Import of the Equivalent of 900 Million Mu of Arable Land is a Serious Constraint on Food Security 9 Countermeasures: Eight Measures Need to Be Implemented to Ensure Food Security 10 Food Security is an Ongoing Issue that Precedes the Population Peak

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Part I A New Concept of Food Security 2

Post-pandemic Changes in World Pattern and Food Security 1 Politics: Accelerated Formation of a New Pluralistic Pattern 2 Economy: Embracing Changes Never Seen in a Century 3 Technology: Early Arrival of the New Revolution in Science and Technology 4 Culture: Major Trends of Exchange, Diversity, Inclusiveness, and Fusion 5 Military: Nuclear Dominance May Turn into Biological Dominance 6 US-China Competition: Intolerance to Be Overtaken Versus Unremitting Efforts for Development 7 Food Security: The Worst Upcoming Crisis in 50+ years

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A New Concept of Food Security for Today’s World 1 Concept and Connotations of Food Security 2 Definitions of Food Safety: Access to Safe Food 3 Food Security Index: Hunger Risk Assessment

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Possible Recurrence of Food Crisis and Food Wars 1 Food Crisis that Plagues Human Survival and Development 2 Sharp Rise in Risk of Food War Due to COVID-19 Outbreak

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Difficulties on the Road to Eradicating Hunger 1 Why is Eating Enough More Difficult Than Landing on the Moon? 2 How to Feed the Additional 2.3 Billion People in the Future? 3 How Many People Can Earth Feed? 4 What Are the Reliable Technologies to Increase Food Production in the Future 5 Decreased Food Production Due to Global Warming 6 Adequate Food—The Most Basic Human Right 7 Bridging the Food Gap Through Civilization

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Part II Global Food Security 6

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Food Production: A 60-Year Review and 20-Year Outlook 1 Grain Production Increased by 2.67 Times in the Past 60 Years 2 Unit Area Yield of Grain Increased by 1.89 Times in the Last 60 Years 3 Cultivated Grain Area Increased by 27% in the Last 60 Years 4 Key Countries and Technologies Boosting Food Growth 5 Total Grain Production of 4.1 Billion Tons in 2040 Grain Consumption: A 60-Year Review and 20-Year Outlook 1 Low Growth in Direct Food Consumption Over the Past 60 years 2 Rapid Growth in Indirect Food Consumption Over the Past 60 years 3 A 60-Year Review: Constant Optimization of Food Consumption Structure 4 A 20-Year Outlook: Food Consumption is Expected to Reach 4.1 Billion Tons Grain Trade: A 60-Year Review and 20-Year Outlook 1 Grain Trade: A 60-Year Review and 20-Year Outlook 2 Major Grain Exporters and Export Volume 3 Major Grain Importers and Import Volume 4 Ratio of Soybean Trade to Its Production Nearly Doubled Production of the Livestock Sector: A 60-Year Review and Outlook 1 A 60-Year Review of Meat Production 2 A 60-Year Review of Egg Production 3 A 60-Year Review of Milk Production 4 Structural Optimization and Future Trend of Livestock Industry

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Trade in Livestock Products: A 60-Year Review and 20-Year Outlook 1 Trade in Livestock Products Grows Faster Than the Production 2 Estimates of the Potential of Global Livestock Products 3 Trade in Livestock Products Is Expected to Increase by About 23% Basic Conclusions on Global Food Security 1 Overall Global Food Insecurity, and Coexistence of Obesity and Hunger 2 Basic Patterns of Global Food Security 3 Balance Between Supply and Demand of Grain and Food 4 Trends and Patterns of Global Food Security

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Part III China’s Food Security: History and Experience 12

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Remarkable History of China’s Agriculture and Food Security 1 China’s Remarkable History of Grain Cultivation for 10,000+ years 2 Four Stages of Food Security Over the Past 2000 years 3 Main Experiences in Ensuring Food Security Through the Ages Milestones of Agriculture and Food Security in New China 1 Four Milestones in the History of Chinese Agriculture in 70 years 2 Population Growth of Nearly 900 Million Making China the Most Populous Country 3 The Average Life Expectancy of Chinese People Increased by 42 Years, the Largest Increase Among Large Countries 4 China’s Total Grain Production Increased by 486%, Making It the Top Grain-Producer 5 Over 300 Million Mu of Arable Land Worth About RMB 45 Trillion Used to Support Urbanization

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Grain Production: 486% Increase in 70 Years 1 486% Increase in Total Grain Production 2 461% Increase in Unit Area Yield of Grain 3 5.5% Increase in Sown Area 4 Key Factors for Production Increase

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Grain Trade: 88-Fold Increase in 70 Years 1 88-Fold Increase in Grain Trade Volume 2 Importing the Equivalent of Nearly 900 Million mu of Cultivated Land 3 Main Varieties Traded: Soybeans Accounting for 83% 4 Major Trading Countries: The United States and Brazil Having a Combined Share of 84% 5 Major Issues: High Concentration and Rising Risks

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Grain Consumption: 577% Increase in 70 Years 1 577% Increase in Total Grain Consumption 2 95% Drop in Direct Consumption and Over 380% Rise in Indirect Consumption 3 Population Growth Contributed 50% to the Growth of Total Grain Consumption 4 Income Growth Contributed 50% to the Growth of Total Grain Consumption 5 Outlook on China’s Grain Consumption

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Part IV Food Security in China: Current Situation and Problems 17

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Efficiency and Cost of Grain Production 1 Input and Cost Required for Each 100-Million Ton Increase in Total Grain Production 2 Input and Cost for Each 1000 kg/ha Increase in Unit Area Yield Food Security in Various Provinces/Municipalities/Regions 1 Concept, Indicators, and Algorithm of Food Security Index 2 Six-Factor Index of Food Security by Province/Municipality/Region 3 Food Security Zoning in China

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Security Index of Major Crops 1 Food Imports Exceeded 100 Million Tons or 65 kg Per Capita 2 Combined Self-Sufficiency Rate of Edible Grains Stabilized at Over 98% 3 Complete Self-Sufficiency in Rice Making Exports Possible (与事实不符 Achieved, and Imports and Exports Coexisted) 4 Wheat Self-Sufficiency Rate Stood Above 95.4%, with Imports Falling 5 Corn Self-Sufficiency Rate Has Stabilized at Over 98% in Recent years 6 Soybean Self-Sufficiency Rate Dropped from 100% to Nearly 18%

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Status Quo and Problems of Food Security 1 General Conclusion on Food Security 2 Nine Major Challenges Confronting China’s Food Security

299 300

291 292

293 294 295 295

306

Part V China’s Food Security: Strategies and Countermeasures Grain Production and Demand Forecast 1 Possible Population Peak of Around 1.44 Billion 2 Expected Total Grain Production at 959 Million Tons 3 Possible Grain Consumption at 800 Million–1 Billion Tons 4 Grain Imports Remained at About 100 Million Tons

323 324 328

22

Strategies and Countermeasures for Food Security 1 Current Food Security Status and Tasks in China 2 Strategic Goals for Food Security 3 Strategies for Food Security 4 Measures for Food Security

339 339 342 346 348

23

Potential and Solutions to Food Security 1 Grain Production Potential of Over 1 Billion Tons 2 Total Grain Production Fluctuations to Be Kept Below 5%

357 357

21

332 336

364

CONTENTS

3 4 24

25

Practical Implementation of the “800-Million-Ton Food Security Project” Implementation of the “Imported Soybean Replacement Project”

Production Potential and Solutions for Major Grain-Producing Provinces 1 Shandong Province is Expected to Increase Grain Production by 20% 2 Hunan Province Has the Potential to Increase Grain Production by 20% Resolute to Win the Food War 1 Food Wars—Artificially Created Food Crises 2 Endless Food Wars Throughout the Ages, Both in China and Abroad 3 Ongoing Soybean War Between the United States and China 4 Increased Likelihood of China Being Embroiled in a Food War 5 Strategies and Tactics for Winning the Food War

xxxi

366 374 383 383 391 407 407 409 411 413 414

Afterword

419

Index

423

List of Figures

Chapter 3 Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Changes in grain self-sufficiency in China (Data Source Compiled from the relevant information from the National Bureau of Statistics) Implicit self-sufficiency of grain in China, 2014–2019 (Data Source Compiled from the China Statistical Yearbook)

31 32

Chapter 6 Fig. 1

Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4

Changes in global grain production and total population, 1961–2018 (Note Data for all figures and tables in this chapter were obtained from the Food and Agriculture Organization [unless otherwise indicated]) Changes in global soybean production and increments between 1961 and 2018 Changes in global unit area yield and increment of grain, 1961–2018 Changes in the global unit area yield and increment of soybean, 1961–2018

58 63 66 68

Chapter 7 Fig. 1

Changes in the global direct consumption of wheat, 1960–2020 (Note Data in all figures and tables in this chapter are compiled from USDA data)

83

xxxiii

xxxiv Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4 Fig. 5 Fig. 6 Fig. 7

LIST OF FIGURES

Changes in the global consumption of rice, 1960–2020 Changes in the global direct consumption of corn, 1960–2020 Changes in the global consumption of soybeans as food, 1965–2020 Changes in the global indirect consumption of wheat, 1961–2020 Changes in the global indirect consumption of corn, 1961–2020 Changes in the global consumption of soybean for crushing, 1965–2020

85 87 89 91 93 96

Chapter 8 Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4 Fig. 5

Fig. 6

Fig. 7

Fig. 8

Fig. 9 Fig. 10

Incremental changes in world wheat trade 1960–2020 (Data source Compiled and analyzed by the author based on USDA data) Changes in global exports of corn and its increment (Data source Compiled and analyzed by the author based on USDA data) Changes in the global exports of soybeans and their increment (Data source Compiled and analyzed by the author based on USDA data) Changes in global grain exports (Data source Calculated and analyzed by the author based on USDA data) Changes in wheat exports of major countries, 1961–2017 (Data source Compiled and analyzed by the author based on UN FAO data) Changes in the rice exports of major countries, 1961–2017 (Data source Compiled and analyzed by the author based on UN FAO data) Changes in the corn exports of major countries, 1961–2017 (Data source Compiled and analyzed by the author based on UN FAO data) Changes in the soybean exports of major countries, 1961–2017 (Data source Compiled and analyzed by the author based on UN FAO data) Changes in global grain imports, 1961–2018 (Data source Compiled based on USDA data) Changes in the share of global trade in major grains, 1961–2018 (Data source Compiled by the author based on UN FAO data)

105

108

110 113

115

117

118

120 121

133

LIST OF FIGURES

xxxv

Chapter 9 Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4 Fig. 5 Fig. 6

Fig. 7 Fig. 8 Fig. 9 Fig. 10

Trends in global meat production and annual growth rate from 1961 to 2018 (Data Source Compiled from UN FAO data) Production trends of major meat-producing countries worldwide, 1961–2018 (Data Source Compiled as per UN FAO data) Production trends in major pork-producing countries worldwide, 1961–2018 (Data Source Compiled as per UN FAO data) Production trends of major poultry producing countries, 1961–2018 (Data Source Compiled as per UN FAO data) Production trends of major beef producing countries, 1961–2018 (Data Source Compiled as per UN FAO data) Changes in the global mutton production, growth rate and slaughter rate, 1961–2018 (Data Source Compiled as per UN FAO data) Production trends of major egg-producing countries, 1961–2018 (Data Source Compiled as per UN FAO data) Production trend of major global milk-producing countries, 1961–2018 (Data Source Compiled as per UN FAO data) Trends in global meat structure, 1961–2018 (Data Source Compiled as per UN FAO data) Changes in global per capita GDP and meat consumption, 1961–2013 (Data Source Compiled as per UN FAO data)

137

140

142 145 149

152 154 156 157 162

Chapter 10 Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

3 4 5 6

Changes in the imports of major meat-importing countries, 1961–2017 (Source Compiled according to the UN FAO data) Changes in the exports of major meat-exporting countries, 1961–2017 (Source Compiled according to the UN FAO data) Estimate of global meat production, 2020–2040 Forecast of global egg production, 2020–2040 Forecast of global milk production, 2020–2040 Forecast of global meat trade volume, 2020–2040

167

168 169 170 170 173

xxxvi

LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 13 Fig. 1

Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4

Changes in GDP per capita and grain per capita, 1980–2019 (Source Compiled from the China Statistical Yearbook. The information contained in the figures of this chapter is compiled based on the China Statistical Yearbook) Total population change in China at the end of each year, 1949–2019 Average life expectancy of Chinese people after the founding of New China Changes in total grain production in China, 1949–2018

206 212 213 214

Chapter 14 Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Production of major grain crops in China, 1949–2019 (Data Source Compiled based on the China Statistical Yearbook) Changes in unit area yields of major grain crops in China, 1950–2018 (Data Source Compiled based on the China Statistical Yearbook) Sown areas of major grain crops in China, 1949–2019 (Data Source Compiled based on the China Statistical Yearbook)

218

219

220

Chapter 15 Fig. 1

China’s major soybean importers and their percentages in 2019 (Source Compiled based on data from FAO and China Statistical Yearbook)

229

Chapter 16 Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3

Fig. 4

China’s per capita share of grain, 1949–2019 (Data Source Compiled from the China Statistical Yearbook) Direct grain consumption by Chinese residents, 1978–2018 (Data Source Compiled from the China Statistical Yearbook) Changes in population size and structure in China, 1950–2019 (Data Source Compiled from the China Statistical Yearbook) Disposable income per capita in China, 1957–2018 (Data Source Compiled from the China Statistical Yearbook)

233 233

235 236

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 5

Engel coefficient of urban and rural residents in China, 1980–2019 (Data Source Compiled from the China Statistical Yearbook)

xxxvii

237

Chapter 17 Fig. 1

Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

4 5 6 7 8

Changes in the total grain production and area of improved seeds in China. Note Unless otherwise noted, the data in the figures and tables of this chapter are derived from the China Statistical Yearbook Changes in grain production and effective irrigated area in China Changes in grain production and total power of agricultural machinery in China Changes in grain production and fertilizer use in China Changes in grain production and pesticide use in China Changes in unit area yield of grain and fertilizer use in China Changes in grain unit area yield and pesticide use in China Changes in unit grain yield and effective irrigated area in China

246 248 250 251 253 255 256 257

Chapter 18 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Zoning for quantitative security of food Food quality and safety distribution map Zoning for ecological security of food Zoning for technological security of food Zoning for economic security of food Zoning for social security of food Food security zoning in China Radar map of high food security zones Radar map of medium–high food security zones Radar map of medium food security zones Radar map of low food security zones

269 271 274 276 278 281 283 284 286 287 289

Chapter 19 Fig. 1

Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4

Rice production and self-sufficiency rate, 1985–2018 (Note Unless otherwise mentioned, the data in this chapter are compiled from the China Statistical Yearbook) Wheat production and selfsufficiency rate, 1985–2018 Corn production and self-sufficiency, 1985–2018 Soybean production and self-sufficiency, 1985–2018

293 294 295 296

xxxviii

LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 20 Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Fig. 5

Fig. 6

Fig. 7

Fig. 8

Fig. 9

Fig. 10

Total grain production and per capita share of grain in China, 1978–2018 (Data Source Compiled based on the information from the National Bureau of Statistics) Per capita disposable income of Chinese residents and Engel coefficient of Chinese households (Data Source Compiled based on the information from the National Bureau of Statistics) Total production and unit area yield of grain in China, 1998–2018 (Data Source Compiled based on the information from the National Bureau of Statistics) Self-sufficiency rates for grain, cereal grain, and edible grain in China, 1998–2018 (Data Source Compiled based on the information from the National Bureau of Statistics and import data from national customs) Total soybean production and imports in China, 1992–2018 (Data Source Compiled based on the information from the National Bureau of Statistics and import data from national customs) Percentages of imported soybean processing products, 1996–2018 (Source Compiled based on the information from the National Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the PRC) Multiple cropping index in China, 2004–2018 (Data Source Compiled based on the information from the National Bureau of Statistics) Grain production, fertilizer use, and pesticide use in China, 1978–2018 (Data Source Statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics) Grain prices and costs in China, 1991–2018 (Data Source Compiled based on the information from the National Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the PRC) Average cost of wheat, rice, and corn, 2003–2017 (Data Source Compiled based on the information from the National Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the PRC)

301

302

306

308

309

310

313

314

315

316

LIST OF FIGURES

xxxix

Chapter 21 Fig. 1

Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4

Total population in China, 1950–2050 (Data Source The World Population Prospects 2019 published by the United Nations) China’s urban and rural population, 1985–2050 Production of major grains in China, 2018–2050 Animal products consumption of urban and rural residents, 2000–2050

325 326 331 334

Chapter 22 Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Progress in grain production technology, from 1949 (Data Source Based on a combination of relevant data from the National Bureau of Statistics) Timeline of agricultural and grain-related policies since the establishment of New China

351 352

Chapter 23 Fig. 1

Highlights of China’s agricultural policies since the reform and opening-up

373

List of Tables

Chapter 3 Table 1

Evolution and features of the concept of food security

29

Chapter 6 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 Table 9 Table 10 Table 11 Table 12 Table 13

Fluctuations and changes in global grain production Fluctuations and changes in global grain and population growth Steps of global grain production increase (200 million tons) Fluctuations and changes in global per capita share of grain Changes in global soybean production by stage Changes in global soybean production growth by stage (50 million tons) Changes in the global unit area yield of grain by stage Change in the global unit area yield of grain by steps (750 kg/ha) Changes in the global unit area yield of soybean by stage Increase in the global unit area yield of soybean by steps (375 kg/ha) Top 10 countries with the largest increases in food production Increase of key crops production by stage (10,000 tons) Growth rate of global grain acreage by stage

59 60 61 62 64 64 66 67 69 69 73 76 79

xli

xlii

LIST OF TABLES

Chapter 7 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 Table 9 Table 10 Table 11

Changes in the increment of global direct consumption of wheat (1960–2020) Changes in the increment of global direct consumption of rice (1960–2020) Changes in the increment of global direct consumption of corn (1960–2020) Increment of global direct consumption of soybeans (1964–2020) Increment of global indirect consumption of wheat (1960–2020) Increment of global indirect consumption of corn (1960–2020) Increment of global consumption of soybean as animal feed (1964–2020) Changes in the increment of global consumption of soybean for crushing (1964–2020) Changes in the structure of global wheat consumption Changes in the structure of global consumption of corn Changes in the structure of global consumption of soybean

84 86 88 90 92 94 95 97 98 99 99

Chapter 8 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 Table 9

Changes in the increment of global trade in wheat (1960–2020) Changes in the increment of global trade in rice (1960–2020) Changes in the increment of global trade in corn (1960–2020) Changes in the increment of global trade in soybeans (1960–2020) Changes in the imports of the top 10 global wheat importers (10,000 tons) Change in the imports of the top 10 global rice-importing countries/regions (10,000 tons) Changes in the imports of the world’s top 10 corn-importing countries/regions (10,000 tons) Change in the imports of the top 10 global bean-importing countries/regions (10,000 tons) Changes in the share of global trade volume of major grains

103 106 109 111 123 125 128 130 132

LIST OF TABLES

xliii

Chapter 9 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Trends in global meat production Trends of global pork production Contribution of key factors to global growth of pork production Trends in global poultry production Contribution of key factors in global poultry growth Trends in global beef production Contribution of key factors in global beef growth Trends in global mutton production Trends in global egg production Global trends in the production of milk products Conversion efficiency of animal feed, protein, and energy Comparison of labor hours in the US farming and breeding industries

138 141 143 144 147 148 150 152 153 155 158 160

Chapter 10 Table Table Table Table

1 2 3 4

Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast

of of of of

meat production under different scenarios egg production under different scenarios milk production under different scenarios meat trade under different scenarios

171 172 172 174

Chapter 11 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5

Exportable grain in major grain-exporting countries worldwide Major countries with balanced supply and demand of grain worldwide Global balance between supply and demand of grain and food Projections of the future population in different regions of the world Decline in cultivated land in different countries and regions over time

182 183 186 188 190

Chapter 12 Table 1

Grain production and per capita grain share in China by dynasty

198

xliv

LIST OF TABLES

Chapter 15 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3

China’s grain imports and exports, 1960–2019 (Unit: 10,000 tons) Changes in China’s soybean imports and exports, 1985–2019 Main source countries and crop varieties of China’s grain imports

227 228 230

Chapter 17 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3

Change in sown area for each 100-million-ton increase in total grain production Average costs for each 100-million-ton step in total grain production Inputs required to increase the grain yield per unit area by 1000 kg/ha

243 245 254

Chapter 18 Table 1 Table 2

Indicator system of the 6-factor index of grain and food security Food security index and zoning by province/municipality/region

261 267

Chapter 20 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4

Arable land equivalent to China’s food imports, 2019 Comparison of per capita food consumption and nutrient intake in China, 2018 Average selling price of major grain crops in China, 1978–2018 (RMB/50 kg) Prices of major grain crops in China and the United States, 2011–2016 (USD/ton)

303 304 315 316

Chapter 21 Table 1 Table 2

Potential for China’s economic growth, 2025–2035 Predicted production of China’s major grains, 2021–2050 (Unit: 10,000 tons)

327 330

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3 Table 4

Total supply and demand of main varieties of grain, 2018–2050 (Unit: 10,000 tons) Per capita supply and demand of major varieties of grain, 2018–2050 (Unit: kg)

xlv

337 338

Chapter 23 Table 1 Table Table Table Table

2 3 4 5

Table 6 Table 7

Measures of implementing the “800-million-ton food security project” Evolution of unit area yield of super rice in China Evolution of unit area yields in wheat pilot fields Soybean production and its share in grain production Changes in soybean cultivated area as a share of grain cultivated area Changes in soybean yield per unit area, 1999–2018 Comparison of cultivated areas and production of corn and soybeans

368 369 370 376 376 377 378

Chapter 24 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3

Rice sown area and rice production in Hunan Province, 2010–2019 Pattern of rice cultivation in Hunan Province, 2010–2019 High-yield records for hybrid rice in China

393 395 399

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1

Despite the 10,000-Year History of Farming, There Still Are People Going Hungry!

Our planet was formed about 4.5 billion years ago, while human beings evolved 2 or 3 million years ago, and the history of growing grain began more than 10,000 years ago. Following the agricultural and industrial civilizations, we are currently in the age of information civilization. Humans have landed on the moon, soared freely in space, but yet to get rid of hunger! Human history has witnessed several wars over food and land. Many nations prospered because of food, but many regimes perished because of food shortages. Being a primary human need, food has always been an influential factor for the survival and health of human beings, and a prerequisite for peace and stability of the world. Based on our history and experience, food is essential to human beings, to economic development, to social stability, and to national autonomy. Food is also a bargaining chip for diplomatic negotiations and a tool for international competition.

© CITIC Press Corporation 2023 W. Hongguang, China’s Food Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0730-4_1

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2 A Food Shortage Caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic is Unfolding! In today’s world, food security remains a constraint on human survival and health, and peace and development. While many people are unable to get enough food, many more do not eat nutritiously or healthy. Globally, 700 million people are malnourished, and nearly 700 million become obese due to over-nutrition. Over 40 countries endure hunger due to lack of food and purchasing power, and over 20 major food-exporting countries have made great contributions to guarantee global food security. However, there are countries who use food as a diplomatic tool to interfere with the economic development, social stability, and even regime change of other countries. The COVID-19 pandemic starting in 2020 is triggering a new food crisis. Some experts predict that the number of hungry people may increase by another 100 million or more.

3 Looking Ahead, Can Getting Sufficient Food Be More Difficult Than Landing on the Moon? Humans have successfully landed on the Moon and are exploring Mars, but achieving zero hunger may be more difficult than landing on the Moon. Food surplus countries or regions have abundant land, water resources, technology, capital, and other factors of production. In contrast, food-deficit countries or regions lack land, water resources, technology, and capital. Considering that land, technology, and other factors cannot move across borders cheaply and efficiently from the former to the latter, a food gap will surely continue to exist for quite some time in the future. When and how will humanity say goodbye to hunger?

4 Having Enough to Eat is the Most Basic Human Right! The agricultural resources on Earth, such as light, heat, water, land, technology, and fertilizers, can feed and nourish not only the current population of the world but also the future population—according to the State of World Population 2020 published by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the world’s population will exceed 9 billion by 2050! We wish to see a great leap forward in human civilization, where all governments shall regard “the right to food” as the most fundamental

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3

and see that everyone enjoys the right to live and eat, where countries and organizations that uphold human rights shall take the lead in supporting countries or regions that do not have enough to eat, where food surplus countries or regions shall provide selfless assistance to countries or regions that lack food and money, where rich people shall help the poor with enough food, and where the government shall provide low-cost or free food to those who do not have enough to eat. Only then would the problem of food security be solved, and human beings be able to enjoy genuine human rights! However, this is obviously unattainable in today’s world, where the law of the jungle prevails!

5

What Are the Solutions to Food Security?

Will the COVID-19 pandemic spark new hunger in the future? Who is in need, what is required, and how much is lacking? When and how can humans say goodbye to hunger? Ensuring global food security and allowing everyone to enjoy the most fundamental right is a challenge that must be addressed. This is not only relevant to human health, survival, and development, but also to the sustainability of human civilization! We have been thinking about and exploring ways to ensure food security for many years. In the book China’s Agriculture: Problems, Potential, Paths and Benefits published in 1993, our basic conclusion on food security was “low level, high difficulty, and lack of security,” as China’s per capita share of grain at that time did not reach the security line of 400 kg. In that book, we proposed a nine-level approach to revising grain production potential. In other words, we projected that China’s grain production should go up to 640 million tons based on light, temperature, water resources, irrigation conditions, soil, fertilizer, as well as technical, economic, and social factors. The year 2019 witnessed China’s grain production reaching 664 million tons, proving the relative accuracy of our forecast. In 2005, we summarized the experience and rules of agricultural development over the past 40 years since the founding of New China in two books, Studies on China’s Food Security and 70 Years of China’s Farming System. We predicted the following development trends in agriculture for the next 20 years: (a) The global food insecurity will lead to a long-term food gap, and the problem of food security will precede the arrival of China’s population peak; (b) the grain production pattern in China will be

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significantly altered from supplying grain to north from south to northto-south allocation. The main grain-producing areas will gradually move northward, while the number of provinces and regions capable of grain transfer will decrease year by year; (c) in terms of food security, the vulnerable areas will be large cities and coastal provinces, the vulnerable varieties will be corn and soybeans, the vulnerable period will be the spring after a disaster year, and the vulnerable population will be the 50 million lowincome people; (d) the three measures to ensure food security will be urbanization of the rural population, industrialization of agriculture, and education of farmers. Specifically, China must keep the population under 1.6 billion, the reduction of arable land to 7 million hectares at maximum, and the per capita food consumption at about 400 kg. By writing the book China’s Food Security: Strategies and Countermeasures 15 years later, we intend to provide a clear, thorough, and practical narration of the history, achievements, problems, and measures pertaining to food security.

6

History: The Chinese Nation Has Led the Agricultural Civilization

During the 2000-plus years of human history, China has remained the world’s biggest economy for more than 1,700 years and is the only country with an unbroken civilization. The agricultural civilization was led by China, the industrial civilization was led by Europe, and the information civilization was led by the United States. Grain cultivation in China began more than 10,000 years ago. In the 2,000 years between the mid- to the late Warring States period (about 300 BCE) and the 18th year in the reign of Emperor Qianlong of the Qing dynasty (1753 CE), grain supply was generally secure with the per capita share of grain remaining at 382–628 kg, except for a number of food shortage occurrences triggering peasant revolts and dynastic changes. Whereas after the 18th year of Emperor Qianlong’s reign, China suffered from frequent food shortages due to increasing population, decreasing per capita arable land, and slow scientific and technological progress. This seriously hindered the survival and development of the nation. We have gone through four stages of “food security, insecurity, less security, and weak security”—in these 2000 years. Many dynasties waned from prosperity because of food shortages, many emperors began their reigns by “balancing the rich and the poor,” and numerous families were separated due to hunger.

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INTRODUCTION

5

7 Achievements: New China Said Goodbye to Four Histories in 70 Years When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949, 450 million people faced food shortages. But miraculously, China experienced “difficulty in selling and storing food” when the population reached 1.3 billion during the mid- to late 1980s. Over the past 70 years, China’s agricultural development has made remarkable achievements, and this can be summarized as the farewell to “four histories.” First, China completely bid farewell to the history of being plagued by hunger for thousands of years. The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several Major Issues Concerning Agriculture and Rural Work was adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 15th CPC Central Committee in October 1998. With this, China’s agriculture was officially declared to have “entered a new stage,” in which food shortage was solved, but poor quality of food became the major challenge. Hunger, a problem that plagued the development of the Chinese nation for thousands of years, had finally become a thing of the past. Second, China completely bid farewell to the history of farmers “paying grain to the emperor” that lasted for thousands of years. In 2006, the No. 1 document issued by the CPC Central Committee, Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Promoting the Construction of New Socialist Rural Areas, officially announced the abolition of the agricultural tax. This marked the end of the history of farmers “paying grain,” as well as unveiled the new rule of “providing farmers with subsidies according to the area being cultivated.” Third, China bid farewell to the history of “cattle-driven farming,” which lasted for thousands of years. Chairman Mao Zedong, the founder of New China, once clearly pointed out that “the future of agriculture should depend on mechanization,” and the Chinese government also put forward the goal of “basically realizing agricultural mechanization by 1980.” As a matter of fact, China finally realized the mechanization of agriculture in 2000. In 2019, machine farming, machine sowing, and machine harvesting covered over 95% of the cultivated area, while the mode of “cattle-driven farming” was largely abandoned except for remote mountainous regions. Unlike their ancestors and fathers, young farmers were not required to farm by bending, bowing, and following the rising and setting sun; the purpose of cattle was changed from tilling the land to serving as a source of meat and milk.

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Fourth, China bid farewell to the history where “absolute poverty exists.” General Secretary Xi Jinping elucidated in the press meeting of the Standing Committee of the 19th Central Political Bureau that “no one will be left behind in the overall realization of a moderately prosperous society.” Despite the immense impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese nation will soon say goodbye to the history where “absolute poverty existed.” China has created four milestones in the history of agriculture, and these will certainly go down in the annals of global agriculture and human development.

8

Problems: Import of the Equivalent of 900 Million Mu of Arable Land is a Serious Constraint on Food Security

China has no problem in securing sufficient food, but faces the problem of securing access to nutritious, safe, and healthy food. The food security has shifted from security of edible grain to security of feed grain, with its essence lying in meat security and food safety. The basic feature of China’s food security is: “low level, immense difficulty, tight balance, weak security,” which means that China has ensured sufficient food but depends on imports for sufficient nutrition, and the food sufficiency in ordinary days would probably be unattainable in wartime. Nine major problems that still exist in China’s food security are: 1. A large gap exists in total food production, as the implicit selfsufficiency rate is only 70%. 1.4 billion people consume the production of 2.9 billion mu of arable land. Although the self-sufficiency rate for edible grains reached 98% or more, China still needs to import the equivalent of nearly 900 million mu (1 acre = 6.07 mu) of arable land, resulting in an implicit self-sufficiency rate of only 70% for food and 30% for oilseeds. 2. A food war may put China at greater risk. The imported soybeans account for 86% of the total consumption in China and 84% of the imported soybeans are from the United States and Brazil. In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, over 10 countries have restricted food exports, resulting in a break in the global food supply chain. Coupled with the complex and volatile Sino-US relations, China

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is facing rapidly increasing food security risks, as a major food importing country. 3. China faces huge pressure in maintaining the arable land area, with the multiple cropping index falling by 33 percentage points. During a time of rapid urbanization, China needs to occupy a large amount of land to support urbanization and industrialization, and this has placed great pressure in maintaining the arable land area. In addition, the average monthly income of migrant workers in China was RMB 3,962 in 2019, while the income ratio of grain-growing farmers to migrant workers dropped from 1:5 in 1990 to 1:10, marking a decline in the comparative benefits of growing grain. The national multiple cropping index was 122% in 2019, down 33 percentage points from the historical record of 155%, while the abandoned land is still increasing year by year. 4. The potential role of food policy has reduced, and a new round of agricultural economic restructuring is urgently needed. China’s food prices are 70%–170% higher than those of the United States. From 1991 to 2018, the cost of food production in China has increased 6.1 times, and food prices have increased 3.2 times. Agricultural policies based on subsidies and higher purchase prices for agricultural products are “nearing the ceiling.” China’s food production is losing its international competitiveness. 5. The difficulty in lifting unit area yields of grain has elevated, and a second green revolution is urgently needed. The unit area yield of grain crops in China has increased from 1,155 kg/hectare in 1950 to 5,621 kg/hectare in 2018, an increase of 386%. The unit area yields of major crops are approaching a maximum of the same agro-ecological zones, leaving little room for further increase. Advancements on individual technology are no longer capable of elevating food production to a new height. Hence, a second green revolution is urgently needed. 6. Smallholders add difficulties to boosting efficiency of food cultivation. According the third national agricultural census, smallholders accounted for over 98% of agricultural operation entities and 90% of agricultural laborers. They cultivated 70% of China’s total arable land. The average operation scale of smallholders was 7.8 mu. The area of contracted land under assignment in 2018 accounted for only 37% of the area under the family contract system. A poor degree of scale operation leads to fewer scale benefits.

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7. Young generations are reluctant to grow grains. High intensity of agro-labor, low incomes, the lack of “five social insurances and one housing fund,” coupled with serious backwardness of education, health, culture, sports, and recreation facilities in rural areas, young people have flocked to urban areas for employment. Few farmers under the age of 50 are willing to grow food. How to motivate young people to grow food has become an urgent problem. 8. Farmers’ reluctance to store grain puts pressure on the country. According to data from a white paper titled China’s Food Security released by the Information Office of the State Council in 2019, the capacity of China’s standard grain silos stood at 670 million tons in 2018, a sevenfold increase in the 22 years since 1996. Farmers do not stockpile grain, and thus, the task of grain storage is now undertaken by the government. Based on the reserve of 670 million tons of food, at least RMB 1,340 billion is required to fund the reserve. Obviously, food storage requires a lot of money, and there are dangers of “scrambling for food” and private price hikes in times of crisis. 9. The obese population of up to 250 million highlights the problem of food wastage. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the proportion of overweight and obese people in China rose from 9.9% in 1978 to 36.7% in 2018, a 2.7-fold increase in 40 years. In China, 250 million people are overweight and obese because of excess nutrition. Obesity not only causes food wastage but also leads to a series of other diseases.

9 Countermeasures: Eight Measures Need to Be Implemented to Ensure Food Security By adding ecological security, technical security, and social security to quantitative security, qualitative security, and economic security, we have created a “six-element index system” for food security. Additionally, we measured the food security indexes of 31 provinces (cities and regions) using 48 indicators. At this stage, China’s overall goals in food security are: to hold the rice bowl firmly in our own hands, to guarantee food security, to ensure absolute self-sufficiency in edible grain, to guarantee sufficient nutrition in peacetime while sufficient food in wartime, to increase the unit area

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yield of food by 20%, with total output reaching 800 million tons and per capita grain production reaching 550 kg, to establish a diversified, long-term, and stable overseas grain production base and form a supply chain of 100 million tons of grain, and to keep per capita grain imports at about 70 kg and the per capita share of grain at 650 kg so as to the per capita grain consumption at lower to medium level among mid- to high-income countries. The basic countermeasures for ensuring food security are as follows: 1. Increase food production through technology: We need to promote the second green revolution to increase grain production by 88.4 billion kg and make the yield per mu of the third-generation hybrid rice, hybrid wheat, hybrid corn, and super soybean reach 1,200 kg, 800 kg, 1,500 kg, and 300 kg, respectively. We need to drive up the unit area yield of major crops by over 10%, plant 100 million additional mu of salt-tolerant rice and quinoa to increase production by 20 billion kg, as well as take measures to develop technologies such as animal growth hormones, artificial meat, and building-integrated agriculture to create a reserve of new generation of yield increase technology. 2. Maintain hidden production on arable land: We need to carry out land use reclamation and increase the cultivated area by 0.08 billion mu and add 16 billion kg of grain. 3. Produce food from sea: We need to boost marine fishery production by 2.5 million tons and increase the utilization rate of distant seas by increasing the amount of fishing from 0.8 tons to 1.6 tons per square kilometer of distant seas, equivalent to an additional 10 billion kg of food production. 4. Produce food in the mountains: We need to make full use of the 1 billion mu of grassy hills and slopes in the south and 3 billion mu of grasslands in the north to grow high-quality forage and wood-based food, resulting in an additional 10 billion kg of grain. 5. Increase production through reform: We need to intensify the reform of grain production and distribution systems, promote the integration of grain production, processing, sales, import, and export, and improve the comprehensive efficiency of grain, thus increasing the multiple cropping index up by 5 percentage points and boosting grain production by 30 billion kg.

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6. Store food with friendly collaboration: We need to establish a diversified, long-term overseas “supply chain” covering 1 billion acres of arable land or 150 million tons of food in other countries. 7. Reduce wastage in food use: We need to save food in storage, processing, and consumption and control per capita food consumption to about 600 kg by improving dietary standards of different groups of people. 8. Guarantee food security in the form of a community: By joining forces with concerned international organizations, countries, or regions, we need to build a community for human food security, including establishing a joint institute for global food security. We need to jointly examine policies and technologies on food security, step up international collaboration, and establish a stable food supply chain to ensure food security for all of humanity. Specific measures to ensure food security are as follows: 1. Implement the “800-million-ton food security project.” By breaking down the target of a 20% increase in grain production into tiered tasks and implementing the tasks step by step, China can achieve the production capacity of 800 million tons of grain by 2030. 2. Implement the “imported soybean replacement project.” China can make major breakthroughs in the breeding of genetically modified soybeans and hybrid soybean, restore soybean planting areas, expand the cultivation of high-protein crops such as quinoa, and use 1 billion mu of grassy hills and slopes and 3 billion mu of grasslands to grow high-quality forage and wood-based food, thus reducing China’s soybean imports by about one-third. 3. Advance the new round of agricultural economic system reform. Following the three major agricultural system reforms of “land reform,” “people’s commune,” and “household contract responsibility system,” China needs to explore a diversified agricultural economy system based on integrated development of the three industries (i.e., “agricultural production” + “agricultural processing” + “agricultural market service”) and of urban and rural areas in the new era. It needs to analyze the integrated food operation system covering cultivation, processing, storage, and sales, thereby equalizing the benefits of the whole food industry chain and fundamentally solving the problem of low benefits of food cultivation.

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It needs to enhance the enthusiasm of farmers, professional cooperative organizations, companies, and other parties to grow food, increase the multiple cropping index by 5 percentage points while moving forward to large-scale, standardized, efficient, and ecological agriculture, and facilitated the fundamental transformation from a large agricultural country to a strong agricultural country. 4. Establish an overseas grain supply chain of 1 billion mu. Through collaborative development, long-term leasing, futures, and other means, China needs to establish a diversified, long-term, and stable overseas grain supply chain to ensure the ability and capacity to import 70–100 kg of grain per capita. 5. Contribute to the construction of a “community for human food security”: To guarantee the basic human right to food and prevent “food wars,” China needs to contribute to global food security by uniting with relevant international forces, jointly promoting the research, development, and promotion of food technologies, and sharing agricultural experiences and technologies for free. With the stable foundation of “hybrid rice diplomacy,” China can further promote food diplomacy to ensure food security in China and even in the world, prevent the “food war” from disrupting the supply chain and pushing up food prices, and strive to guarantee the basic human right of access to food for everyone. 6. Establish a joint institute for global food security to capitalize on top food talents in the world to develop first-class technologies for food security and ensure food security for all humanity. With the goal of setting up a “community for human food security,” and taking the “joint institute for global food security” as the carrier, China can pool together wisdoms of top experts from China and overseas on tackling major technological and policy issues for food security and promote China’s food security technologies to serve the world’s food security. 7. Encourage “scientific use of food and food saving initiatives.” China needs to implement scientific use of food and food saving initiatives based on “5 more”—“harvest more, save more during storage, save more during processing, save more in feeding, and save more at the table”; improve dietary standards for different groups of people to achieve scientific use of food, balanced nutrition, lessening of obesity, and improved health conditions.

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Food Security is an Ongoing Issue that Precedes the Population Peak

Analysis of food security is a complex and systematic work that can be interpreted differently from the perspectives of national security, social stability, economic efficiency, ecological carrying capacity, technological progress, international trade, and community for human food security. We have explored food security with a focus on quantitative security, quality security, economic security, ecological security, technological security, and social security. We welcome any feedback and corrections in case of any incongruous points in this book.

16 October 2020

Wang Hongguang

PART I

A New Concept of Food Security

The global outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 is likely to induce a new food crisis. Even with a history of over 10,000 years of food cultivation, humanity has not yet eliminated hunger! Many families were separated for lack of food, many dynasties declined from prosperity due to famines, many countries waged wars over food, and many governments started with “equal distribution of land and wealth.” Indeed, the history of human development has witnessed prolonged struggle against hunger and malnutrition. Given that food is the basis for life security, economic development, and social stability, as well as a tool for national diplomacy, food security is not only a question of whether people stop starving and eat well but by its nature, a matter of vital economic, social, and international significance. Having enough to eat is the most basic human right. Ensuring food security requires innovations in technology, policy, institution, and even in civilization. Is producing enough food more difficult than landing on the Moon?

CHAPTER 2

Post-pandemic Changes in World Pattern and Food Security

The COVID-19 pandemic has halted the global real economy and shifted the world from a “post-war” pattern to a “post-pandemic” pattern. Historic changes have been observed worldwide in six major aspects: politics, economics, technology, culture, military, and Sino-US competition.

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Politics: Accelerated Formation of a New Pluralistic Pattern

The prevention and control of the COVID-19 pandemic are perceived as a test on each country’s ability to safeguard biosecurity, a competition between country’s institutions, governing capabilities, and overall national strengths, and a rehearsal for defense against World War III. When it comes to severe pandemics, we can clearly identify who lacks the capacity and strength. The world’s political pattern has seen five major changes. 1. The political influence of the United States has been remarkably undermined by its hegemonic behaviors. The United States misused its world-class biotechnologies and medical resources with swinging epidemic prevention policies and acted as a buck-passer rather than a superpower in the face of the pandemic. Moreover, the “America First” policy has completely stripped off the “veil” of democracy and freedom. That all gives rise to a downward shift of the US

© CITIC Press Corporation 2023 W. Hongguang, China’s Food Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0730-4_2

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global influence. Johan Galtung, the “father of peace,” who accurately predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, once stated unequivocally, “The US will collapse in 2020.” According to Gallup’s latest Global Leadership Survey, “61% of Europeans are disappointed with the Trump-led government.” 2. China’s success in combating the epidemic has once again demonstrated its institutional strengths. China’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product) has grown 10.5 and 8.9 times faster than the United States over the past 41 and 70 years, respectively, when measured in US dollars. However, Western countries continued to deny China’s institutional advantages which once again demonstrated its strengths in the prevention and control of the COVID-19 epidemic, shattering the “China collapse theory.” The US National Security Strategy issued in 2018 and other documents explicitly proposed that “China would subvert the US concept of development,” signaling the recognition by the United States of the influence and vitality of China’s socialist system. 3. A clear division has emerged among NATO countries. After withdrawal of troops from Germany, the United States pressured Germany to interrupt its gas collaboration with Russia and stop collaborating with China’s Huawei. Its interference with Germany’s national sovereignty got a rarely seen tough response from Germany. The UK has also showed policy swings on restricting Huawei under US compulsion and has stopped following the United States unconditionally as it did in the past. 4. A pluralistic political pattern is taking shape. Many countries are faced with the awkward situation of choosing sides between China and the United States, but some countries may “not favor the East or the West.” As a result, a pluralistic political pattern is emerging. 5. The “Seven Mutuals” show the direction of a pluralistic pattern. The global pattern is changing with the spread of the COVID19 pandemic. Despite being extremely rampant, ultimately, hegemonism does not represent the direction of human civilization, nor will it be widely supported by the world’s peace-loving nations as well as upright and kindhearted people. Peace and development remain the themes of today’s world, while de-globalization or antiglobalization is ephemeral. The “Seven Mutuals,” namely mutual respect in politics, mutual collaboration in economy, mutual cooperation in science and technology, mutual exchange in culture, mutual

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comity in diplomacy, mutual communication in military aspects, and mutual learning in management, represent the new direction of human civilization and are promoting the formation of a new world pattern.

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Economy: Embracing Changes Never Seen in a Century

The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the global economy to a higher degree than the financial crisis of 2008, as whether the Great Depression of 1929 will be repeated remains to be seen. Seven new trends have emerged in the post-pandemic global economy. 1. The pause in globalization also means that we are entering the Globalization 4.0 stage. The COVID-19 pandemic pressed the pause button on economic globalization and even the rewind button in the short term. However, the trend of de-globalization will not last long, and the global trade and economic patterns will be reorganized, pushing globalization into the 4.0 stage. 2. The global economy is doomed to enter a depression. It is a foregone conclusion as the global economy will suffer greater losses than the 2008 financial crisis. Whether or not there will be a depression on par with the scale of the Great Depression of 1929 depends on how well the pandemic is controlled in the second half of the year. 3. China’s GDP may overtake that of the United States earlier than expected. According to forecasts from several economic institutions and think tanks around the world, the US GDP will fall by about 6% in 2020, and China’s GDP will grow by about 2%, so China may become the number one economy much earlier than predicted. We have estimated that China’s GDP could rise from 67% of the US GDP in 2019 to 75% in 2020 up 8 percentage points in just one year. 4. Along with the booming digital economy, the bioeconomy is also emerging rapidly. The bioeconomy, with a focus on the comprehensive health industry, is becoming a new economic driver. As a result of the pandemic, many governments and companies have significantly increased the investment in the bioeconomy.

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5. Following the death of “neoliberalism,” the utilization of the “two hands” of government and market has become a major trend. Some scholars argued that “neoliberalism went to hell” after 2008— with the US-China trade friction, the United States continued to motivate its allies to crack down on Huawei, interfere with the business activities of the company, and disrupt the market order, for which many scholars opined that “neoliberalism was dead.” In Gap Economics, published in July 2020, we had concluded that the fundamental reasons for China’s rapid economic growth are the balanced and differentiated development of the “two hands”— government role and market mechanism—in a manner that well suits China’s national conditions, and this has had obvious results. 6. The easing policy has raised the risk of a financial crisis. Despite the proposal of a rare US$10-trillion stimulus package by the G20 countries and the large amount of money invested by many countries to recover their economies, the production and business activities are still weak and sluggish. As a result, many experts believe that a new financial crisis is looming ahead. 7. An inevitable worldwide economic war is coming. In 2018, China and the United States accounted for 40% of the world’s GDP, 54% of the global stock trading volume, and 23% of the global trade volume, while the US dollar and the RMB accounted for 74% of the world’s currency circulation. The US-China trade friction is indeed “a worldwide economic war,” which is inevitable. With economic growth hit by the COVID-19 pandemic and the US-led “secondary disasters,” the depression will only be a matter of magnitude and duration.

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Technology: Early Arrival of the New Revolution in Science and Technology

In view of the COVID-19 outbreak, which made governments and scientists recognize the importance of life safety and biosecurity, a large amount of venture capital is being invested in biotechnology. Four new trends have emerged in the world’s science and technology pattern. 1. The competition between China and the United States will approach a watershed in the second half of the informationization process.

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As the leader of the information technology revolution, the United States has been facing challenges from Japan and Europe and is now facing a strong challenge from China in technologies such as 5G (fifth-generation mobile communication technology) and artificial intelligence. Following the success of the United States in curbing the development of the information industry in Japan and Europe, whether telecom companies such as Huawei can withstand the irrational sanctions of the United States via home-grown innovation has become a watershed for who will lead the second part of informationization. 2. A new sci-tech revolution led by biotechnology will come ahead of schedule. The global economic paralysis caused by the COVID19 pandemic is a testament to the destructive power of biological weapons over nuclear weapons. Considering that national security is built on the ability to guarantee biosecurity, “post-pandemic” biotechnology will become the focus of international scientific and technological competition, just like the “post-war” nuclear technology. All countries around the world will definitely accelerate the development of biotechnology to ensure biosecurity. A new sci-tech revolution led by life science and a fourth industrial revolution led by bioeconomy will be ushered in ahead of schedule. 3. The United States may remain the leader of the next sci-tech revolution. A growing number of governments and scientists believe that biotechnology will lead a new technological revolution after the information technology revolution. In the United States, biological and pharmaceutical research uses 50% of the national research funds, publishes 60% of the national papers, and generates 37% of the national invention patents. Furthermore, the United States is home to over 90% of the world’s “root technologies” (or source technologies) in the fields of genome, proteome, lipidome, metabolome, cell engineering, etc. All these indicate that the United States may still be the leader of the next biotechnology revolution, while China may miss out on the new sci-tech revolution once again. 4. The US-China decoupling on science and technology may turn into a “sci-tech war.” It is believed that the United States is planning to contain China’s development by sanctioning high-tech industries. Given the ceaseless restrictions imposed on China’s sci-tech development, the decoupling of China and the United States in science and technology is just a matter of degree and time, but China’s

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innovation capacity may face the risk of “decline without roots.” As the world’s science center, the United States owns over 90% of the “root technologies” in information, biology, and other high-tech fields. The decoupling may lead to a short-term decline in China’s innovation capacity.

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Culture: Major Trends of Exchange, Diversity, Inclusiveness, and Fusion

The global cultural pattern is now characterized by four major trends: communication, diversity, inclusiveness, and fusion. Networking has set up a bridge of communication among the world’s “nine cultural circles,” and mutual exchange, understanding, and inclusiveness have become major trends. Economic solidarity makes people of all countries are inextricably linked, the COVID-19 pandemic has made people of the world sail together, and cultural diversity and fusion make countries benefit from each other. The United States interprets “win–win” as winning twice by itself, but China interprets “win–win” as mutual benefit. The policy of “one country first” cannot be widely accepted when diversity and inclusiveness are the essences of the community of shared future for mankind.

5 Military: Nuclear Dominance May Turn into Biological Dominance Following the pandemic, five major changes emerged quietly in the world’s military pattern. 1. The withdrawal of the United States from the INF Treaty has reopened the military “Cold War.” As the world’s largest military power, the United States has withdrawn from the INF Treaty, established the Space Force, developed space weapons, and constantly strengthened its military capabilities. Coupled with the vagaries of the Trump administration in both policies and behavior terms, these developments have raised a high degree of fear in many countries worldwide. Some experts even believe that the door to hell has already been opened.

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2. Intelligence makes “warriors” out of unmanned aerial vehicles. As many countries accelerate the development of artificial intelligence and robotics, no-contact warfare will become a new way of warfare. 3. The risk of “bio-tech warfare” has escalated dramatically. Like nuclear technology after World War II, biotechnology will be the focus of future military technology development, with biological weapons likely to be the dominant and decisive factor in World War III. 4. The measure of military power worldwide may be shifting from “nuclear superiority” to “biological superiority.” Compared to nuclear weapons, which no one dares to use because of their potential to destroy the planet, biological weapons are less costly and more powerful in terms of targeted destruction. The US National Biodefense Strategy released in 2018 clearly pointed out that “biological threats are the most serious threat faced by the US” and considered biological threats to be persistent, diverse, and without borders. 5. The United States has the “biological superiority” that goes far beyond its nuclear superiority. Over the past 20 years, the United States has invested more than US$185.5 billion in biosecurity research and development, with plans to synthesize 1,000 biological molecules that are not found in nature. The United States has nearly 1,500 local P3-level biosecurity laboratories and over 200 overseas biological laboratories, putting its biotechnology superiority well ahead of its nuclear superiority. China must not assume that US biotechnology is not strong because of its failed defense against the COVID-19 outbreak.

6 US-China Competition: Intolerance to Be Overtaken Versus Unremitting Efforts for Development As predicted by our group in the book titled Filling the Second Economic Power Trap: Gaps and Trends in the US-China Economy published in 2018, the United States will increase its efforts to contain China by creating a “second economic power trap.” Only through a combination of three measures to ensure the economic growth and a nationwide mobilization can China become the first recession-proof second-largest

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economy in a century. Seven major changes have emerged in the USChina competition pattern. 1. The truth about the US-China competition is the United States creating the “second-largest economy trap.” Ever since the United States became the first economic power in 1890, the once secondlargest economies in the world—the UK, Germany, France, the Soviet Union, and Japan—have all, without exception, undergone recession and lost their second place in the power status. Following China’s emergence as the world’s second-largest economy in 2010, the United States has made it a continuing strategy to step up containment of China and extend its hegemony, while both making money from China and bringing China down. 2. Looking ahead in the US-China competition, the United States will not allow itself to be overtaken by China, and China will never give up its efforts for development. The “impossibility of restoring the former relationship” and the “difficulty of stabilizing the present situation” between the two countries are evidenced by the breach of international norms as well as the closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston by the United States. Unless and until China loses its status as the second-largest economic power, the United States will not drop its containment of China, which will result in a long-lasting, complex, and repeated competition between them. 3. The United States has employed only half of the twelve types of unconventional wars in containing China. Based on the history of the approach of the United States to contain the Soviet Union, Japan, and Germany, we have concluded by our research that the United States may contain China through twelve types of unconventional wars, but only half of them have been employed so far. In other words, system war, institutional war, trade war, science and technology war, currency war, and talent war have started to varying degrees, while network war, food war, oil war, biological war, space war, and local military war may break out at any time. 4. In view of the obvious gaps between China and the United States in terms of the overall national strength, China will not surpass the United States in the short term. After a comparative study of the overall national strength of the two countries based on 40 indicators, we found that the United States leads in 68% of the indicators, while China in 32%, and the indicators where China leads are still

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quantitative ones. There are apparent gaps between the two countries, some of which are difficult to bridge in the short term. The discussions on “China Threat” or “China’s Surpassing” lack a scientific basis, but the description of China’s accelerated development is true. 5. China’s economy will surpass the United States in terms of total volume, but not in terms of GDP per capita. In 2019, the added values of China’s primary, secondary, and tertiary industries were 6, 1.5, and 0.45 times those of the United States, respectively. Obviously, the value added of the service industry in China, with a population of 1.4 billion, was lower than even half of that in the United States with a population of 300 million. By taking advantage of the population to upgrade the tertiary industry, China will have the opportunity to surpass the United States in GDP, but not by per capita in the short term. Accompanied by the desire to reach and retain the world’s largest economy, China must implement three measures—rely on the tertiary industry to secure the first place, develop high-tech industries to hold the first place, and accelerate transformation of China into a science and tech powerhouse to remain in the first place. 6. With regard to science and innovation, China and the United States are quite close as measured by quantitative indicators but far-apart by qualitative ones. Among 14 indicators measuring science and technology innovation, China outperforms the United States in 6 quantitative indicators, including R&D personnel, papers, invention patents, and high-tech product exports, while the United States leads China in 8 indicators, including the global innovation index, the number of top talents, the R&D investment, universities among the world’s top 100, and famous brands among the world’s top 500. In case of China-US decoupling in science and technology, China would be facing the shortage of high-end instruments, innovation methods, cutting-edge talents, and a possible significant decline in innovation capability in the short term. As the leader of the current information technology revolution, the United States is also likely to become the leader of the future biotechnology revolution. Currently, scientists of Chinese origin are at the forefront of life science research. Therefore, by bringing in Chinese scientists and top foreign talents, China has the opportunity to co-lead the new science and technology revolution.

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7. The education quality and number of top talents constitute the largest but hardest-to-narrow disparity between China and the United States. By comparing the education of the two countries based on five aspects (i.e., number of universities among the world’s top 100, number of top talents, education expenditure, number of students studying abroad, and enrollment rate in higher education), our research group found that the number of top scientists in the United States is 4.3 times that of China, and the per capita education expenditure in the United States is 8 times that of China. Therefore, the biggest gap lies in the number of top talents, and the “talent deficit” is atop all of the deficits. In short, the United States has stronger overall national strength, whereas China has greater development potential. The United States has the world-class technology, while China has the world’s largest market. The combination of technology and market can increase productivity, and the rapprochement between China and the United States can create human glory; otherwise, human disaster will come. The Chinese government has repeatedly stated that China would not export its system or assume the role of the big brother, while the US politicians would not stop “creating a second economic power trap,” thus wasting its “good deck of cards.” As proven many times, those who hold the view of China Threat or China Collapse are threatening others and doomed to collapse, while China will continue to develop under the China Development Theory. With the victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, China will also be able to “fill the second economic power trap” and become the first second-largest economy who has not undergone a recession in the past 130 years.

7 Food Security: The Worst Upcoming Crisis in 50+ years Affected by the COVID-19 outbreak, many food-exporting countries have introduced policies to restrict and ban food exports since late March 2020, triggering a disruption in the global food supply chain. Countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Serbia, India, Russia, Ukraine, Brazil, and Argentina have announced bans on food exports or restrictions and monitoring on food and oilseed exports. According

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to Indian scholars, areas heavily affected by locusts will see a 30%–50% reduction in grain production. On March 31, 2020, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) issued a serious warning that the COVID-19 outbreak could trigger a food crisis. According to the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2020 (SOFI 2020) jointly released by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Health Organization (WHO) on 13 July 2020, nearly 690 million people, or 8.9% of the global population, went hungry in 2019, representing an increase of 10 million over 2018; the COVID-19 pandemic could cause 83 million additional people to go hungry in 2020, bringing the total number to 130 million; the number of hungry people in the world will exceed 840 million, or 9.8% of the total global population, by 2030; and the goal of zero hunger mentioned by the United Nations in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development will be difficult to achieve. As the world’s top agricultural exporter, the United States still has approximately “11% of households that are food insecure” in 2018, according to a survey by the US Department of Agriculture, and about a half of the surveyed believed that the COVID-19 outbreak affected food security. Given that the United States is the world’s most advanced economy and No. 1 exporter of agricultural products, the 11% of the food-insecure households has surprised many experts. As the world’s largest agricultural country, China has once more emphasized “ensuring food security” after 20 years. On 17 April 2020, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee specifically highlighted “food and energy security,” which is a renewed emphasis by the central government on food security 22 years after the central government proposed in 1998 that agriculture had entered a new phase and that the quantitative problems of agriculture had been largely solved. “For a large country of 1.4 billion people like China, the basic status of agriculture cannot ever be ignored and weakened, and only food in our hands can drive away the panic in our hearts,” said President Xi Jinping during a meeting with the members of the economic circle who participated in the 13th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

CHAPTER 3

A New Concept of Food Security for Today’s World

The access to adequate, nutritious, and safe food is basic need of humans for eating. The post-pandemic world calls for a new concept of food security, other than edible grain security, which requires a concept of “big grain” and “big market,” encompassing a global perspective on food security rather than national or a regional, and a guarantee of food security not only in times of ordinary days but in crises.

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Concept and Connotations of Food Security

Given that food security is of great concern to the world as an issue of people’s livelihood and of economic and social development, the concept of food security has been refined and enriched along with the improvement of people’s living standards. The emergence of different concepts of food security has given rise to different methods of calculation. Nowadays, in the face of the changes unseen in a century, the ever-changing technologies, and the ever-improving living standards, we need to introduce a new concept of food security that focuses more on ecological security, technological security, and social security on the basis of quantitative security, qualitative security, and economic security. We need to study how global changes triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic have affected food security, examine the issue of implicit security, and rope in scientists, entrepreneurs, economists, and politicians to work on food security together. © CITIC Press Corporation 2023 W. Hongguang, China’s Food Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0730-4_3

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The first thing in understanding food security is to clarify three basic definitions—grain, cereal grain, and edible grain. Food can be classified in a narrow or broad sense. In a narrow sense, food refers to cereal grain, including rice, wheat, corn, millet, sorghum, and other gramineous crops. This definition of food is often adopted by international organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The food usually discussed in China refers to grain in a broad sense, including cereals, legumes, and yams. Specifically, legumes include soybeans, broad beans, green beans, peas, cowpeas, etc., and yams include cassava, sweet potatoes, potatoes, etc. “Edible grain” refers to the raw food that people consume directly on a daily basis. Edible grain in the China Statistical Yearbook includes wheat and rice, but most experts consider “edible grain” as wheat and white rice. In 2015, the Chinese government confirmed the status of potatoes as a staple food. 1.1

Edible Grain Security: Access to Adequate Food

Edible grain security refers to the security of directly consumed grains (including wheat, rice, etc.). The security of edible grain means access to enough food has been secured, but it cannot be equated with food security, nor can it fully reflect whether people have access to nutritious food. In addition to edible grain, there is demand for a variety of food to meet the normal physiological needs of humans, such as meat, eggs, milk, and vegetables. In other words, people need access to “adequate food” and “nutritious food.” How much food is considered “adequate”? As per the standards recommended by government documents and research reports on food security in China and overseas, the standard for “adequate food” is 400 kg of grain per person per year, which accommodates basic physiological need of a normal person for nutrients. The food security line recommended by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is 400 kg of grain per person per year, and the reference food consumption quota stipulated in China’s National Food Security Medium and Long-Term Planning Outline (2008–2020) is also 400 kg per person per year. According to the above standards, countries and regions with a per capita grain production or share (including imported food) of 400 kg are said to have generally met the “adequate” standard, but that doesn’t mean hunger is eliminated due to uneven food consumption. In other words, some people eat more meat and consume more grain, while others may

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have inadequate food. This phenomenon is common in many countries and regions, just like the ancient poem in China—“The rich flaunted their wealth while the poor starved on the streets.” 1.2

Food Security: The Guarantee of Nutritious Food

As a dynamic process, the concept of food security has been continuously refined in line with the improvement of our living standards and technological progress. The refinement of the concept of food security has gone through four stages, as shown in Table 1. Food Security 1.0 emphasizes the quantitative security of edible grain. In the 1970s, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defined food security based on food stocks, that is, to ensure that everyone has access to adequate food for survival and health at all times. Food stocks must amount to 17–18% of grain consumption in the same year, with 6% being buffer stocks (reserve stocks) and 11–12% being cycle stocks (supply stocks). Cycle stocks are equivalent to about two month of edible grain consumption so as to connect with the next season’s harvest of cereal grain. If a country’s cereal grain stock coefficient is below 17%, it means insecure state of cereal grain supply and demand; if below 14%, meaning an emergency state, where a grain crisis may occur at any time. Normally, China’s cereal grain demand is 125 million tons, but China’s stocks are about 158 million tons, so about 3 months of edible grain consumption Table 1

Evolution and features of the concept of food security

Stage

Key indicators

Emphasized factors

Food security 1.0

Cereal grain stock coefficient Cereal grain self-sufficiency rate Grain self-sufficiency rate Grain security index

Quantitative security of edible grain Quantitative security of edible grain Quantitative security of edible grain Quantitative security of edible grain

Food security 2.0 Food security 3.0 Food security 4.0

–

–

–

Economic security

–

–

Economic security

Qualitative security

–

Economic security

Qualitative and ecological security

Technological and social security

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can be guaranteed. China’s self-sufficiency rate for edible grain remained above 100% from 2000 to 2019. Food Security 2.0 emphasizes the quantitative and economic security of cereal grain. In the 1980s, food security was defined as ensuring that all people at all times have both physical access and economic access to the basic food that they need, which required a country or region to have sufficient grain production, fairly adequate food supply, and the ability to meet food demand. The cereal grain self-sufficiency rate was an important indicator of food security in this period. From 2000 to 2019, China’s cereal grain self-sufficiency rate showed a “V”-shape trend, as the rate dropped year on year to below 85% in 2003 and rebounded to over 98% in 2019, reaching a level of basic self-sufficiency. Food Security 3.0 emphasizes the quantitative, economic, and qualitative security of food. In the 1990s, the definition of food security was expanded to the dimension of food safety: ensuring that all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their needs for a healthy life. The guarantee of food security involves the supply of agricultural products (from domestic production and imports), the price of agricultural products, the income of urban and rural residents, the distribution (trade) policy of agricultural products, and the dietary preferences of individuals or households. The grain self-sufficiency rate served as a key indicator for assessing a country’s level of food security. For any country or region, a grain self-sufficiency rate at or above 100% means absolute self-sufficiency; 95–100% means basic selfsufficiency; 90–95% means an acceptable level of food security; and below 90% means an increasing risk in grain supply and demand. According to the flow statistics and the consumption statistics methods, China’s grain self-sufficiency rate is approaching a safe level of 90% (see Fig. 1). Food Security 4.0 emphasizes overall grain security, including quantitative security, economic security, qualitative and ecological security, and technical and social security. On top of quantitative security, qualitative security and economic security, ecological security, technical security, and social security have been added to this stage, expanding the definition of food security to a comprehensive reflection of food-related technical, ecological, economic, and social issues, especially such issues as social civilization and grain supply chain security.

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Fig. 1 Changes in grain self-sufficiency in China (Data Source Compiled from the relevant information from the National Bureau of Statistics)

1.3

Potential Risks of Implicit Food Security

As seen from the evolution of Food Security 1.0 to Food Security 4.0, the first three stages put emphasis on quantity, quality, and economy, and stage 4.0 focuses on ecological, technological, and social security; however, all four stages mainly assess food security based on grain quantity or quality. The achievement of edible grain self-sufficiency, cereal grain self-sufficiency, and grain self-sufficiency has masked some deep-seated problems of food security to a certain extent. According to the concept of implicit food security proposed by Professor Wang Hongguang in 2018, at a certain scientific and technological level, the proportion of cultivated land (sown area) required for food consumption in a country or region to its own cultivatable land (arable area) is the self-sufficiency rate of cultivated land for grain production, and this rate can reflect the implicit contradiction beneath a high grain self-sufficiency rate.1 In assessing food security, the implicit self-sufficiency rate takes the area of cultivated land and sown area required to guarantee national or regional food security as a measure in substitute for grain quantity. According to the study, structural contradictions have begun to emerge

1 Wang Hongguang et al. Filling the Second Economic Power Trap: Gaps and Trends in the US-China Economy [M]. Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 2018.

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Fig. 2 Implicit self-sufficiency of grain in China, 2014–2019 (Data Source Compiled from the China Statistical Yearbook)

in China as the country moves from quantitative to qualitative food security. From 2014 to 2019, China’s implicit self-sufficiency rate showed a descending trend while basically remained above 70% (see Fig. 2).

2 Definitions of Food Safety: Access to Safe Food Food safety is defined as the absence of toxicity and harmful substances in food, the compliance with proper nutritional requirements, and the absence of any acute, subacute, or chronic hazards to human health. According to this concept, food safety includes both production and operational safety, both outcome and process safety, and both current and future safety. In 1996, the Guidelines for Strengthening a National Food Safety Programme published by the World Health Organization (WHO) defined food safety as “a guarantee that food will be prepared and consumed as intended without harm to the consumers” and food hygiene as “all conditions and measures that must be taken at all stages of the food chain to ensure the safety and suitability of food.” From the current state of studies, the international community has largely reached a consensus on the concept of food safety—food is grown, cultivated,

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processed, packaged, stored, transported, sold, and consumed in accordance with mandatory national standards and requirements, and free from toxic and hazardous substances that could harm or threaten human health and cause illness or death to consumers or endanger them and their next generations. Public health emergencies are an important indicator used to measure food safety. According to the Regulations on Response to Public Health Emergencies issued by the State Council of China and the Decision of the State Council on Further Strengthening Food Safety, China has basically built a network of emergency control systems for major food quality and safety incidents since 2004. The number of food poisoning incidents in China has been controlled at 150–200 per year since 2011, with the number of poisoned people below 9,000/year. For example, the Beijing Emergency Plan for Food Security Incidents issued by Beijing in 2007 has divided the emergencies into four levels from high to low according to the degree of danger, diffusibility, social impacts, and the resources required for response—extremely significant (Level I), significant (Level II), large (Level III), and general (Level IV), which correspond to four colors—red, orange, yellow, and blue.

3

Food Security Index: Hunger Risk Assessment

Internationally, there is no universally accepted concept of a food security index, nor is there a unified indicator system and calculation method, but the academic interest in exploring the food security index has not diminished either in China or abroad. The continuing evolution of food security as a concept usually concerns food quantity, quality, purchasing power, consumption capacity, ecology, technology, trade, food culture, etc. 3.1

Foreign Studies on the Food Security Index

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has revised the concepts and definitions of food security several times and has proposed three key indicators: (1) per capita grain share below 400 kg is considered insecure; (2) per capita energy intake below 2,200 calories per day is considered malnutrition; and (3) food stocks above 17–18% of the next year’s consumption are considered security, below 17% are considered insecurity, and below 14% are considered an emergency.

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In 2000, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) proposed seven indicators to measure food security—prevalence of malnourished population, energy intake per capita, percentage of plant-based calories such as grains, life expectancy, mortality rate for children aged 5, prevalence of underweight among children aged 5, and prevalence of underweight BMI 60% in 2014 to around 50% in 2018, and the proportion declined further in 2019. High prices of hybrid rice seeds were another reason for the declining area planted with hybrid rice. Seed prices for hybrid rice are typically RMB 40–60/kg, compared to only RMB 10–20/kg for conventional rice. 3. Fewer quality rice brands. Currently, there are more than 40,000 agricultural product processing enterprises in Hunan Province, of which 442 are medium-sized or above, and only 5 have an annual sales revenue of more than RMB 100 million. Most of them have a storage capacity of only 20,000–30,000 tons and can only handle 200–300 tons of rice per day, so their overall capabilities are not strong enough. Although two brands from Hunan Province—GAEAGEM and Yinguang—are among the top 10 rice brands in China, the sales volume and market share of these two brands are low. There are more than 200 rice brands in Hunan Province, but they are “small-scale, scattered, chaotic, and lowlevel.” Most of the rice processing enterprises in Hunan Province only can conduct preliminary processing and partially fine finish. As one of China’s six major rice-producing provinces, Hunan Province ranks sixth in terms of raw grain processing rate, behind Jiangxi, Hubei, Jiangsu, Anhui, and Heilongjiang. But as far as, quality rice varieties are concerned, Hunan Province leads the country in research on quality rice varieties. Three indica rice varieties from Hunan Province—Yuzhinxiang, Yujing 91, and Taoyouxiang—were selected in the First National Top 10 Quality Indica Rice Taste Gold Award. However, Hunan Province has fewer nationally influential rice brands. 2.1.3

Three Major Issues in Sustaining the Increase in Rice Production Despite its obvious advantages in rice production, Hunan Province faces several problems covering all aspects of pre-production, in-production, and post-production. Three most prominent issues that need to be addressed at the government level are as follows:

138.6 142.8 1465 149.4 150.8 150.6 148.7 144.8 123.8 109.5

125.1 124.6 121.7 121.0 121.8 122.8 1263 129.1 147.3 160.2

146.8 148.7 152.9 151.4 155.0 155.4 152.7 149.9 129.8 115.9

5.63 5.77 5.75 5.95 5.88 5.94 5.87 5.85 6.10 6.04

6.93 7.10 7.24 6.57 6.96 6.98 6.90 7.22 7.38 7.53

Single-cropping rice

Early rice

Late rice

Early rice

Single-cropping rice

unit area yield (tons/ha)

Area (10,000 ha)

Pattern of rice cultivation in Hunan Province, 2010–2019

Data Source National Bureau of Statistics (2011–2019)

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Year

Table 2

6.16 6.22 6.42 6.35 6.45 6.46 6.41 6.41 6.41 6.42

Late rice 779.5 824.5 841.6 888.5 886.8 895.1 873.5 846.5 755.5 661.4

Early rice

867.1 883.8 881.4 795.6 847.1 857.7 871.4 932.6 1086.7 1206.8

Single-cropping rice

Total production (10,000 tons)

905.2 925.9 981.3 961.2 998.9 1003.9 979.8 961.3 831.8 743.3

Late rice

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1. The stagnant rice processing industry leads to the challenge of “laborious agricultural work” being unresolved. Hunan Province, which has large mountainous and hilly areas, is relatively disadvantaged in terms of rice production mechanization. In 2018, though the overall mechanization level of rice ploughing, cultivation, and harvesting in Hunan Province reached 70%, the mechanization rate of seedlings transplanting was less than 30%, the mechanization rate of pest and disease control was less than 30%, and the mechanization rate of drying was only 18%. Dirty, tiring, dangerous, and toxic work involved in grain production cannot be radically solved by machines. “Laborious agricultural work” has become the main reason for farmers’ reluctance to grow food. 2. Stagnant scale operations of rice have made it difficult to increase profits. As a result of industrialization and urbanization, more and more farmers are moving out of rural areas to engage in other industries, and most of those who stay back are older and less educated. There is a shortage of labor to grow food. In addition, the malfunction of the arable land circulation system resulted in less transferrable land area. In 2019, there were a total of 160,600 grain-growing households in Hunan Province in possession of more than 30 mu of arable land each, but only 16.95 million mu of land was circulated, accounting for 34% of the total provincial paddy fields. The rise in rent, wages, and production material prices has also made it more difficult to finance grain production. Moreover, the development of organizations offering professional services for farmers is lagging. The proportion of specialized services such as machine-based transplanting, machine-based polishing, machinebased drying, and “unified prevention and treatment” of diseases, pests, and weeds is still low, all of which constrains the large-scale operation of grain production. 3. Outdated status of farmland infrastructure has made it difficult to meet the demand for high and stable grain yield. Despite significant improvements in farming facilities in Hunan Province in recent years, there are still a considerable number of regions where water conservation facilities have gradually aged, restricting grain production by not being able to ensure a good harvest in the event of drought or heavy rainfall. In China, reservoirs generally have a lifespan of around 50 years, and most of the agricultural facilities in Hunan Province are currently over-aged, as they were built in the

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1950s. Ponds are silted up, dams are blocked, ditches are poorly functioning, and roads are no longer accessible due to years of service without repair. These agricultural facilities are hardly able to withstand natural risks and need to be repaired and renewed. In the absence of efficient ditches, some farmlands are prone to stains, floods, and droughts, making it difficult to secure rice production. At present, less than 30 million mu of farmland in Hunan Province, which is only half of the total arable land, is effectively irrigated. Every year, 4–5 million mu of land in Hunan Province is rendered unproductive due to floods and droughts. Rural roads that are accessible to motor vehicles and agricultural machinery are inadequate or in a state of disrepair, making it impossible for farm machinery to reach farmland. Helpless farmers have little to no recourse, and a pattern of changing from “double cropping to single cropping” and “single cropping to wasteland” has ensued. 2.2

Hunan Province Has the Potential to Increase Grain Production by Over 20%

Based on the current state of grain production and future economic and technological trends in Hunan Province, there is a huge potential to increase grain yield per unit area by expanding the multiple cropping index, increasing the grain cultivation area, and relying on science and technology. 2.2.1

An Increase in the Multiple Cropping Index Can Create an Additional 10 Million Mu of Sown Area In 2018, Hunan Province had 4.151 million hectares of cultivated land and 7.729 million hectares of crop sown area, with a multiple cropping index of 186%. By increasing the grain sown area by 10 million mu (666,700 hectares), the multiple cropping index can reach 202%, an increase of 16 percentage points over 2018. 1. Restore 6 million mu of double-cropping early rice production. Hunan Province should restore double-cropping early rice cultivation to the level of 22.5 million mu in 2015, an increase of 6 million mu over 2019. Based on a yield of 400 kg per mu, an additional 2.4 billion kg of rice can be produced.

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2. In the medium rice area, where temperature and light resources are insufficient for double cropping and sufficient for single cropping, Hunan Province should add 2 million mu of main and ratoon cropping of medium rice. Based on a yield of 250 kg per mu of ratoon cropping, an additional 500 million kg of rice can be produced. 3. Making full use of unused land such as drought soil, high-bank fields, rain-fed paddy fields, and leaky fields, Hunan Province should develop 2 million mu of corn, soybeans, and other dryland coarse cereals. Based on yields of 400 kg per mu of corn and 150 kg per mu of soybeans, an additional 500 million kg of grain can be produced. The above three measures can increase grain production by 3.4 billion kg. 2.2.2

Technological Advances Can Increase the Unit Area Yield of Rice by 15 to 30% Continuous improvement of varieties, especially the promotion of thirdgeneration hybrid rice, and combination of the “4 improvements” of improved seeds, improved fields, improved methods, and improved conditions can boost the growth rate of rice yield per unit area to 1.5 percentage points annually from 1 percentage point in the previous 9 years. By 2030, the unit area yield of rice can increase by 15%, achieving 530 kg per mu for medium and late rice, 70 kg higher than that in 2019. Under this premise, 42 million mu of medium and late rice will add 3 billion kg to rice production. If, from 2030 to 2050, thirdgeneration hybrid rice is fully promoted in Hunan Province, the total grain production will increase by another 30% or more. According to studies on high grain yields in different provinces and regions of China, the yield per mu in two-cropping or three-cropping areas can reach more than 1,000 kg, while the yield per mu in three-cropping areas can reach 1,500 kg (see Table 3). This indicates that an increase of around 30% in grain production in Hunan Province is entirely achievable. By expanding the sown area and boosting the unit area yield, Hunan Province can increase grain production by 6.4 billion kg or 21.5% by 2030. By adding 10 million mu of grain sown area and boosting the unit area yield of rice by 15%, by 2030, Hunan Province’s total grain production can be as high as 36.15 billion kg, an increase of 21.5% over the total grain production of 29.75 billion kg in 2019, jumping to a new level of 70 billion jin.

Xinwafang Village, 100 mu/field Datun Town, Gejiu City, Honghe Prefecture, Yunnan Province

2018

100 mu/field

Yongnian District, Handan City, Hebei Province

2,500 mu

100 mu/field

Area

2017

Linli County, Changde City, Hunan Province

2019

Single-cropping rice

Huanpi Village, Longtian Town, Xingning City, Meizhou, Guangdong Province

2016

Double-cropping rice

Location

Year

High-yield records for hybrid rice in China

Type

Table 3

1,152.3

1,149.02

1,365 (591.7 for early rice, 773.3 for late rice)

1,537.78 (832.1 for early rice + 705.68 for late rice)

Annual yield (kg/mu)

Early rice: Zhuliangyou 819 Late rice: Y Liangyou 911 Xiangliangyou 900 + Precise Quantitative Cultivation Xiangliangyou 900 + Precise Quantitative Cultivation

Super hybrid rice varieties such as Xiangliangyou 900

Key technologies

(continued)

China National Hybrid Rice R&D Center, etc

China National Hybrid Rice R&D Center, etc

A research project on double-cropping super rice in South China with an annual yield of 3,000 kg per mu, full mechanization, and green and efficient model China National Hybrid Rice R&D Center

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Sub-Field No. 1, JiangtanLianxu, Sujiadang Township, Gongqingcheng City, Jiangxi Province

2019

1,000 mu/field

Nongyi Village, 100 mu/field Yangshe Town, Zhangjiagang City, Jiangsu Province

2019

Area

Location

Year

(continued)

Data Source Compiled from public reports in the media

Type

Table 3

1,022.2 for single-cropping japonica rice

1,071 for double-cropping rice and wheat

Annual yield (kg/mu)

Nanjing Agricultural University, Suzhou Promotion Center of Agricultural Technology, etc Demonstration and promotion of high efficiency cultivation pattern of high-quality japonica rice in Jiangxi Province by Jiangxi Provincial General Station of Agricultural Technology Promotion

Yongyou 1540 + Precise and quantitative cultivation Jiafengyou No.2 + Southern Japonica Rice Cultivation Technology

Projects and units involved

Key technologies

400 W. HONGGUANG

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Four Measures to Propel Grain Production to a New Level of 70 Billion Jin

Development of Diversified, Intensive, and Efficient Agriculture Hunan Province should vigorously promote modern and new intensive farming techniques and service models such as centralized rice-planting, mechanized rice transplanting (or throwing), and specialized service of unified prevention and control of disease, pest and weeds, and revert to the cultivation of double-cropping rice, medium rice, and ratoon rice. It should adopt efficient farming models (including rice and shrimp farming, and rice and fish farming) on farmland that has been changed due to the policies of “double-cropping to single-cropping,” “single-cropping to rice-planting/wasteland,” and “grain crops to cash crops.” The cultivation structure and pattern in double-cropping rice areas should be adjusted, and the pattern of early and late rice cropping rotation should be promoted. Hunan Province should push forward with the production of noodle rice, forage rice, and early glutinous rice, and set up supporting enterprises for processing rice noodle, forage, and glutinous rice products to deepen rice processing. While solving the sales problems of early indica rice and increasing the income of rice farmers, the province should also stow away grain in warehouses (i.e., store grain in the raw material warehouses and product warehouses of the processing enterprises), to ensure edible grain in times of emergency, and guarantee national food security. Hunan Province can also develop rice-based economic models, including “rice + oil,” “rice + tobacco,” and “rice + vegetables.” As for high-quality middle and late rice, Hunan Province should optimize the regional layouts, and build functional zones for grain production and key protection zones for agricultural production in conjunction with the national plans. It must divide functional areas or protection zones for high-quality rice within the regions, and carry out high yield, quality-preserving, quality-adjusting, and standardized cultivation of high-quality rice within the planned zones, with a view to guaranteeing the quality and productivity of high-grade, high-quality rice and increasing the production and quality of ordinary high-quality rice. In addition, Hunan Province should provide standardized guidance in terms of varieties and patterns and establish superior production areas for high-quality rice. It must comprehensively promote high-quality

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rice varieties that are resistant to diseases and lodging, as well as costsaving and efficiency-enhancing production techniques. It must strive for “quality and price guarantee” for high-grade, high-quality rice in superior production areas and further boost the production profit of high-quality rice varieties. On a final note, Hunan Province should organize large agricultural machinery households, agricultural machinery cooperatives, and other novel entities to vigorously carry out specialized services so that neighboring retail households can achieve large-scale operation and mechanized production without transferring their land. 2.3.2

Holistic Functioning of the Entire Industry Chain That Includes Growing, Processing, and Sales Through the development of the entire industry chain and operation of leading enterprises, Hunan Province should promote new varieties of high-quality, high-yield special rice throughout the province. It must strive to build rice brands to ensure “from good seed to good grain,” “from good grain to good rice,” and “from good rice to good price,” and strive to increase the income and brand benefits for grain farmers, especially the large ones. Hunan Province should further implement the provincial rice industry project and high-quality grain and oil project, while supporting the development of standardization bases featuring “one enterprise, one field, one seed.” It must accelerate the establishment of high-quality grain production and marketing alliances, support IT enterprises to develop big data platforms that effectively connect grain processors and producers, and achieve effective bridging between upstream and downstream players in the grain industry chain. The Province should continue to build leading agricultural enterprises and famous brands of grain products and give full play to the guiding role of regional public grain brands. It must promote cities and counties to develop public grain brands that are steeped in history, have a cultural heritage, and are recognized by the market, based on their advantageous resources and processing bases. By leveraging the key public brand “Dongting Fragrant Rice” and local special brands “NanxianDaoxia Rice,” “YiyangLanxi Rice,” “Wushan Gong Rice,” “Ziquejie Gong Rice,” “Jiangyong Fragrant Rice,” and “Songbai Rice,” the province should formulate a long-term plan and relevant policies to quickly build up well-known and high-quality local rice brands. It must establish a sound mechanism for brand maintenance and operation, further standardize the rice brand market and unified quality rice standards across the region and ensure the healthy and

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orderly development of branded rice. Enhancing the legal awareness of farmers to eliminate the risk of orders affecting agricultural development, should not be overlooked either. Depending on the climate, soil, and other natural conditions, Hunan Province should establish advantageous production zones for high-quality rice and formulate and implement technical regulations for standardized production of high-quality rice, to ensure the stability and uniformity of product quality during the order-based and brand-based operations. In addition, the contractual and legal awareness of farmers needs to be nurtured and strengthened, so that the risk of farmers defaulting on their orders will be reduced and the farmers will be empowered to use their legal knowledge and legal weapons to protect their rights and interests when an enterprise operates unscrupulously or defaults on orders. 2.3.3

Building “One-and-a-Half-Ton-Per-Mu Fields” Based on Third-Generation Hybrid Rice In recent years, Hunan Province has made notable achievements in breeding and cultivation of hybrid rice and has developed several highquality, high-yielding rice varieties, which have been used in production on a demonstration basis and have produced a better leading effect. Specifically, a team from the Hunan Hybrid Rice Research Center led by academician Yuan Longping established a mature third-generation hybrid rice breeding technology system, developed a number of sterile lines of third-generation hybrid rice and, by taking advantage of the indica and japonica subspecies, produced a series of promising combinations that achieved a yield of 1,333 kg per mu (20 tons per hectare) for single cropping. The team has set the breeding target for the fourth generation of hybrid rice as a 30% improvement in photosynthetic efficiency and a single-cropping rice yield of 1,500 kg per mu. As the next step, Hunan Province should step up its efforts to promote existing mature varieties (combinations) and related cultivation techniques on a demonstration basis, while promoting the technology of “super rice + precise cultivation of high-quality rice with strong sources and flexible stocks + mechanized transplanting and green pest and disease control.” In central and southern Hunan, early maturing combinations are used for early rice and third generation hybrid rice combinations such as “G3-1S/P19” are used for late rice, resulting in an annual yield of 1,500 kg per mu (one-and-a-half ton per mu) for double-cropping rice. In northern Hunan, Zhulangyou 819 and Zhulangyou 173 are used for early rice and Y Liangyou 911

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(a national standard grade II high-quality rice variety) is used for late rice. Supplementary techniques such as trichogramma-based pest control, fan-suction-type lamps that separate beneficial insects from harmful ones, natural enemy protection and ecological control in rice fields, rational application of organic fertilizers, disease prevention with bio-pesticides and weed control with bio-fertilizers led to an annual yield of 1,300 kg per mu (almost one-and-a-half-ton per mu) for double-cropping rice. We believe that Hunan Province should lead the provinces and the country in promoting the leapfrog development of rice production through a province-wide competition on “one-and-a-half-ton-per-mu fields,” thus further emphasizing the demonstration and leading role of technologies in modern agriculture. 2.3.4

Strengthening the System of Provincial Governors Taking Responsibility for “Rice Bags” Hunan Province needs to further strengthen assessment by adopting the system of provincial governors taking responsibility for “rice bags” and incorporate grain sown area and grain production stability into the assessment of rural revitalization. In line with the objectives of grain production, the responsibilities of all relevant departments at all levels for the relevant regions should be clearly defined. Targets and tasks should be delineated and implemented level by level. Hunan Province should reform and improve the existing farmland subsidy policy and implement precise regulation of agricultural production policy. It must improve the environment for farmers to grow grain and reduce the area changed “from one-cropping rice to flowering” and “from double-cropping to single-cropping” in the advantageous regions, while making every effort to curb the abandonment of arable land, reduce fallow land, and ensure grain production. Hunan Province should provide precise subsidies to growers according to the amount of crops planted, abolish subsidies for abandoned farmland, abolish double-cropping-related subsidies for fields changed from “double-cropping to single-cropping,” and increase subsidies for high-grade, high-quality rice and for new agricultural business entities. Furthermore, Hunan Province should increase subsidies for the purchase of social services by large farmers and provide incentive subsidies for cross-area operations of agricultural machinery and tools and social services. It must push social service organizations to lower the price of their products by subsidizing agricultural social services, reduce the farmers’ costs on outsourcing operations, and attract more farmers to enter the

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social service market, thus fostering positive interactions and guiding the healthy and orderly development of agriculture. It should also increase subsidies for insurance of large grain farmers and rice production, and entrust third parties to fix losses, settle claims directly with farmers, and raise the standard of insurance coverage. Last but not the least, Hunan Province should subsidize the construction of farmland infrastructure, incorporate it into the construction of rural public facilities, and fill the gaps in agricultural infrastructure.

CHAPTER 25

Resolute to Win the Food War

Food is a necessity, a commodity, a tool of diplomacy, as well as a powerful weapon in competition between nations. Henry Kissinger, a former US Secretary of State and a geopolitical strategist, once said: “Control oil and you control nations; control food and you control the people.” Throughout human history, there have been numerous military wars, financial wars, currency wars, and energy wars, all of which have been underpinned by food. Food wars have never stopped in our history, with countless heroes and heroines bowing to food, and countless regimes ending because of food shortages.

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Food Wars---Artificially Created Food Crises

War refers to an armed battle between opposing parties to achieve certain political, economic, and military goals and is often regarded as an extreme means of politics and diplomacy. War can be defined in both a narrow and a broad sense. In a narrow sense, war refers to military struggle and conflict, while in a broader sense it includes diplomatic means designed to strengthen the economic and political position of one party, including financial means, trade-based manipulation, aids, and sanctions among others, all aimed at strengthening and surviving oneself while weakening and eliminating the enemy.

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Currently, neither China nor foreign countries have a unified and accepted concept of food war, and people do not have the same understanding of what it means. 1. Food war is an unequal war, in which the party waging the war has obvious advantages. As an alternative form of warfare, food wars are characterized by a prolonged siege and attrition. By cutting off food sources, restricting food trade, destroying food storage, and expropriating edible food from the population, the party waging a food war relies on artificial famine, unrest, and chaos to achieve its goals (Wang Meng et al., 2020). Food wars are often unequal, as the party possessing the weapon has an overwhelming advantage that determines life and death, while the party at the receiving end has no choice but to endure everything. 2. Food war is an act of political diplomacy in which food is utilized as a weapon. Some scholars also describe food war as “food diplomacy” (Xu Zhenwei, 2011), because it represents a diplomatic behavior in which food or food production factors are used as tools that compel opposing countries to act in accordance with the overt or covert intentions of the food source countries. Generally, food wars are fought through trade, aid, and embargoes, all of which use food as a tool for bargaining with the opposing countries, influencing their internal and foreign affairs and domestic reforms, and even overthrowing their regimes. The book Seeds of Destruction by F. William Engdahl, a US geopolitical scientist, released in November 2007, reveals the attempts of a handful of Western countries to dominate the world by means of “food weapons” and gives a wake-up call for food security in developing countries. 3. The essence of food war is to achieve the goals of war by breaking “rules” and creating crises. In his book Stuffed and Starved, Raj Patel argues that food wars are the politicization of food and the invisible war over markets, power, and food systems. Food wars are not only a confrontation between market supply and demand, but also the result of interactions between the parties that “control the markets.” Food producers and consumers are on one side of the food war, while countries that control food markets and trade, international food traders, and food giants are on the other. Great powers such as the United States as well as international financial giants, global food tycoons, food processing industry leaders, and

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retail titans dominate the food wars and are often the instigators of such wars. Those who suffer in the food wars are the huge numbers of farmers and consumers, as well as international institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF. Today’s food crisis is a process of wealth plundering by rich countries and the world’s food giants through the transfer of economic crises to poor countries based on unreasonable “rules.” In our research, we believe that food war is an attempt to impact the economic development and social stability of other countries and even overthrow their regimes by using food or grain as a weapon to destroy food production, control food supply, interfere with food trade, raise food prices, and create food security incidents. Hence, it is a war against humanity at the expense of the most basic human rights. Obviously, it is time for humanity to unite against any form of food war and to ensure that the most basic human right of “sufficient food” is satisfied.

2 Endless Food Wars Throughout the Ages, Both in China and Abroad Food is a necessity of human life and the most important strategic material for a country. Records of food wars since ancient times are proof that food has been an important medium of exchange and competition in both China and foreign countries. Examples abound of food wars that weakened and destroyed opponents. The state of Qi waged a food war during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period. During the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period, Qi Huangong, the ruler of the state of Qi, met his vassals and allied with them to settle the world, with the state of Qi being known as the “first of the so-called five hegemons.” Food war was one of the means through which the state of Qi-achieved hegemony (Ren Jiliang, 2005). Qi Huangong followed Guan Zhong’s advice and achieved control over his enemy states by deliberately raising the price of certain products in the enemy states, to give the state of Qi a comparative industrial advantage and cause the enemy states to abandon agricultural production. For example, the state of Qi raised the price of bengaline (a silk fabric) to subvert the states of Lu and Liang, the price of water chestnut to subvert the states of Lai and Ju, the price of deer

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to subvert the state of Chu, the price of fox to subvert the state of Dai, and the price of equipment to subvert the state of Hengshan. While the enemy states gave up producing food and chased after profits by focusing on producing these products, the state of Qi accumulated a large amount of food, creating a monopoly in the food market. Subsequently, these enemy states needed to import from the state of Qi due to a lack of food, but Qi demanded these states to submit to it under the threat of a food export embargo. Sudan’s food war in the 1880s. The Mahdist Rebellion is one of the– major historical events of modern Sudan and a symbol of the birth of Sudanese nationalism. In 1885, Mahdi (18811898) led his followers to establish the first theocratic state based on an Islamic community since the seventh century and controlled most of Sudan except for the eastern port of Suakin and the northern Wadi Halfa. From 1884 to 1898, the AngloEgyptian authority, which occupied Suakin and the frontier provinces of Egypt, tried to reconquer Sudan through food wars by continuing to trigger food shortages and famine in Sudan via food embargoes and trade blockades. The Sanat Sita famine was the climax of the food wars in the 1880s. Through the food wars, the Anglo-Egyptian authority effectively stopped the Mahdi-led army from attacking. In 1898, after the fall of the Mahdi state, the Anglo-Egyptian government regained control over the whole of Sudan. The end of the Mahdi state was partly the result of the food crisis. Food wars between the United States and the Soviet Union. For a long time after its foundation, the Soviet Union was deeply involved in the military race with the United States and developed heavy industries throughout the country, thus neglecting the issue of food. The Soviet Union continued to rely on food imports and 85.5% of imported food came from the United States. In 1963, the global food crisis triggered a severe food shortage in the Soviet Union, and the Western countries, led by the United States, imposed a severe food embargo on the Soviet Union. To ease the food crisis, the Soviet Union used one-third of its gold reserves to buy grain. In 1979, as a retribution for the Soviet Union’s attack on Afghanistan, the United States announced the cancelation of a proposed contract to export 17 million tons of grain to the Soviet Union, and implemented a 15-month food embargo against the Soviet Union in conjunction with Canada, Australia, and other European countries. In 1985, the Reagan administration convinced the Saudis to increase their oil production, causing the international price of oil to fall from

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USD 30/barrel to USD 12/barrel in less than five months. Due to the sharp decline in foreign exchange earnings, the Soviet government had to urgently seek food aid and loans from Western countries. The food wars between the United States and the Soviet Union also paved the way for the collapse of the Soviet Union. Food embargoes imposed on China by the United States. Immediately after the founding of China in 1949, the United States and other Western countries imposed a comprehensive embargo of commodities, including food, on China to trigger social unrest and thus subvert the new regime of China by disrupting the food supply. The commodity embargo imposed by the United States on China did not stop until the early 1970s (Liu Yu et al., 2010). From 1959 to 1961, China experienced a famine that was extremely rare in its history, and the United States decided to use this opportunity to force China to give in on issues such as Taiwan. In 1962, the United States offered to China to buy 3 to 5 million tons of wheat from the United States with its gold reserves or agreed to sell tens of millions of tons of wheat per year to China in the long-term and on low-interest credit, provided China give up its sovereignty over the island of Taiwan. China did not succumb to pressure from the United States, but a large number of its population suffered from hunger.

3

Ongoing Soybean War Between the United States and China

In the wake of the trade frictions launched by the United States against China, some experts proposed to reverse the United States’ containment of China by regulating the amount of soybean imports. In fact, the United States started a soybean war against China a long time ago, but China did not pay enough attention to it. 1. Through consistent collection of information on China’s soybean varieties, the United States has taken over China’s dominant place in terms of soybean yield per unit area and quality. China is the originating country of soybeans and the United States collected extensive information on China’s soybean varieties by various means and used modern technology, especially genetic modification, to breed new soybean varieties with high-yield, high protein, and high oil content.

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2. The United States forced China, originally a soybean exporter, to become a soybean importer. Prior to 1994, China was largely selfsufficient in soybeans and exported a small amount of soybeans. With the emergence of high-yield and low-cost soybeans from the United States, China lost its competitiveness in the soybean market. The CIF price of United States’ soybeans is RMB 0.1– 0.5 per kg cheaper than China’s, leaving China with no choice but to import large amounts of soybeans. In 2019, China’s soybean imports reached 88.59 million tons, accounting for 86.69% of its annual soybean consumption. 3. The United States controlled the soybean crushing industry market in China. Soybeans have a direct impact on edible oil and feed supplies, so the soybean crushing industry and supply chain are key components of the soybean battle between the United States and China. From 2001 to 2004, the price of United States’ soybeans increased from 415 cents per bushel to 1064 cents per bushel, a 156% increase in 3 years, amid the hype of Chinese demand. During the same period, Chinese soybean prices followed the trend, leading to an expansion of planting by soybean farmers in the northeast China and a significant increase in domestic crushing capacity. However, foreign soybean prices began to plummet in April 2004. In just seven months, the United States’ soybeans price fell from 1064 cents per bushel to 500 cents per bushel, a drop of 53%. China’s soybean prices followed the plunge, leaving soybean farmers and many Chinese crushing companies facing huge losses. Foreign institutions took the opportunity to make low-ball acquisitions and took control of the crushing industry in China. After taking control of China’s soybean crushing market, the foreign institutions began to seek maximum profits. Another wave of price hikes started in 2006 and pushed up the price of United States’ soybeans from 500 cents/bushel all the way to 1654 cents/bushel in July 2008. In China, soybean oil rose from RMB 5000/ton to a maximum of RMB 15,000/ton, an increase of 200%, and soybean meal rose from RMB 2000/ton to over RMB 4000/ton. This also resulted in the price of edible oil and pork in China reaching a peak in 2008. Despite no radical impact on China’s national interest and people’s livelihood, the soybean war caused great harm to the level of independence and self-sufficiency of the soybean industry chain in China.

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Increased Likelihood of China Being Embroiled in a Food War

As a major food importer globally, China imports massive quantities of grain and meat from the United States. However, given the dramatic changes in China-US relations, China is facing a greater risk of being embroiled in a food war and must therefore pay much attention to it. 1. High external dependence for certain food varieties has made China vulnerable to easy control by other countries. China has already achieved the goal of “basic self-sufficiency in cereal grain and absolute security in edible grain,” but its external dependence for some agricultural products is exceedingly high. According to the China Agricultural Outlook Report (2020–2029), China’s external dependence for major agricultural products in 2019 was as follows: 86.69% for soybeans, 33.54% for milk and related products, 28.70% for vegetable oils, 21.32% for sugar, 19.93% for beef, 7.40% for mutton, and 4.74% for pork. China is the world’s largest importer of feed soybean meal and forage, with imports of soybean meal accounting for 30.9% of total feed for soybean meal, and forage imports accounting for 23.83% of domestic forage commodities in circulation in 2017. Since China has high external dependence of agricultural products, exporters of agricultural products may restrict exports to China by subsidizing farmers, due to which, China may be exposed to the risk of food or feed shortages and be highly vulnerable to other countries’ actions. 2. Low diversification of import sources exposes China to greater risk. In 2018, China’s grain imports from the top 3 importers took the following shares in its total imports: 95.64% for soybeans, 96.07% for corn, 87.37% for rice, and 77.91% for wheat. Highly concentrated sources of imports are exceedingly vulnerable to supply chain disruptions due to climatic, economic, and diplomatic changes. In today’s turbulent international scenario, China is facing significantly greater threats to its food security. 3. A limited number of grain transport routes leaves China vulnerable to restrictions and even disruptions in transport. Concentrated sources of food imports have resulted in few options for food transport routes. Most grain imports rely on sea transport. Food imported from countries and regions such as the United States,

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Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, and the European Union are exposed to various risks and uncertainties due to lengthy sea transport and limited route options. Although the Indian Ocean-Malacca Strait-South China Sea is an important route for China’s food imports, its security is a concern. The route passes through politically unstable areas and seas where pirates are active, and where other countries have military bases (Zhang Min et al., 2015). The Strait of Malacca, an international shipping gateway, is also a vital route for China’s food imports, but other countries have strong control over the Strait of Malacca. Sudden political, military, and social events may lead to the disruption of food shipments (Wang Rui et al., 2020). 4. The international grain market is a seller’s market where China has no right or power to influence or make a decision. The threat of food embargoes remains. Food embargoes are primarily those imposed by exporting countries to punish or retaliate against an importing country, or to prioritize the exporting country’s own supply and price stability. Four major international grain traders based in the United States and France still control 80% of the international grain trade. As the international grain market is a seller’s market where China lacks a say, China, as the largest grain importer, faces a higher risk of grain embargoes. Currently, there are limited means to deal with embargoes.

5 Strategies and Tactics for Winning the Food War Food security determines the stability of a country. To win food wars, China should strategically defy the enemy, but tactically pay attention to it. In other words, China should have both a strategic top-level design and various tactical plans. 5.1

A Top-Level Design for Winning Food Wars

1. “Ensuring food security” should be considered as a major strategy for China’s stability and development. Bearing in mind that “our rice bowl should always be held firmly in our own hands and should be filled mainly with our own grain,” China should ensure

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that grain productivity does not decline, and that grain production does not suffer any significant reduction, especially in the main grain-production regions. China should always give top priority to agriculture and grain production under all circumstances and prevent the negative impact of falling grain prices on productivity and supply chains by leveraging industry to nurture agriculture and the urban to support the countryside. By increasing subsidies and support from the main grain distribution areas to the main production areas, China should raise farmers’ enthusiasm for grain production, both institutionally and economically. 2. China should implement an “imported soybean replacement project” to reduce its external dependence of soybeans by about 30% points. China should complete a top-level design to reduce soybean dependence from 85% to about 50% through various means, such as improving soybean varieties, increasing soybean sown area, and fostering domestic soybean crushing enterprises. At the same time, China should increase the productivity and self-sufficiency in soybeans, milk, and vegetable oils, of which the supplies are highly dependent on foreign countries. These will help prevent the impact of long-term turmoil in the international food market and food embargoes on domestic food supply and meet people’s basic needs. 3. China should establish diversified, long-term, and stable source of imports to ensure the availability of food for purchase. For now, China imports major grain varieties mainly from a few agriculturally developed countries. China should pursue a strategy of diversifying import sources to reduce import risks, to grasp the initiative and the right to be heard in the grain trade. It should also take advantage of domestic agricultural technologies to encourage agricultural enterprises to go global and carry out international cooperation in food production and trade. China should shift from importing grain to renting land for grain cultivation, establish decentralized production and grain bases, and scale up its potential capability to dispatch and secure food in the international market. Moreover, by leveraging the risk-hedging function of the future international market for major agricultural products, China should continue to improve its competitiveness with major international grain traders, to gain a greater say in the international market.

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4. China should open new food transport routes to ensure the safety of international food imports. Food transport routes are life-supply routes in times of war. The safety of international food transport routes affects the food security of the whole country to a substantial extent. The safety and reliability of food import routes must be carefully considered. When it comes to the layout of energy import routes, China has built three land-based transnational pipelines to ease the passive situation of the Straits of Malacca route and improve the security of energy imports. Similarly, for the safe return of imported food and materials, China should objectively address the limitations of the Malacca Strait route, draw fully on the experience of land-based energy import routes, and establish new overseas food transit bases and land-based trans-shipment routes. 5. China should step up its efforts to defend maritime transport routes. In terms of food transportation, China should make full use of its military and diplomatic strength to ensure the smooth and secure passage of food. China can prepare sufficient arms and bullets for a potential food war and retaliate against other countries that impose embargoes only by enhancing its comprehensive national power and strengthening its economic, diplomatic, and military strength. 6. A “community for human food security” should be established. In response to the common issues of food security faced by humanity, China should join hands with relevant international institutions and other countries to establish a community of human destiny for food, to learn from, support, and protect each other, and to ensure food security on an international scale. 7. New ways of “international food aid” should be explored. China should advocate the concept that “the only function of food is to be eaten,” promote a humanitarian spirit, and reduce the non-food consumption, to prioritize human survival. China should optimize stable, long-term support programs for food-deficit countries or regions to increase their food production capacity, while encouraging unconditional food aid from food-surplus regions and populations to food-deficit regions and populations through international agencies such as the FAO. 8. We should optimize the food industry chain ecosystem and reduce the political and capital control over food. Food wars, food embargoes, food price fluctuations, and other events that affect food supply are rarely caused by changes in food productivity and

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consumption levels but are more often the result of political and capitalist manipulation of food markets. To improve global food productivity and food accessibility for the poor, China must reduce the malicious manipulation of food markets by various forces, mitigate the damage to food production systems caused by large fluctuations in food prices, optimize the food supply chain ecosystem, and establish a coordinated and mutually beneficial food supply chain system for food producers, traders, and consumers. 5.2

Enhanced Responses and Measures for Winning Food Wars

1. China should expand its strategic food reserves to ensure that the strategic reserves can satisfy one year’s consumption. In addition to securing 670 million tons of national grain stocks, the Chinese government should take measures to encourage farmers and residents to store food in different forms. China should also effectively guarantee strategic reserves of important food such as grains, meat, oilseeds, and feed grains, further improve the capacity and efficiency of the food reserve system, ensure food reserves of about one year’s consumption, and guarantee the stability of food markets in the event of major disasters and artificially created food crises. 2. China should strengthen its processing and supply capacity to ensure that there is no shortage of food or price hikes when people are scrambling to buy. Among the main tactics of food wars is to incite panic purchases of food by spreading information about embargoes, production cuts, and price hikes, and to create a vicious cycle from panic buying to price hikes and then to shortages. Therefore, sufficient stocks of food and foodstuffs that are readily available for purchase are an important prerequisite for stable food markets. The Chinese government should establish a monitoring, early warning, and dispatching system for the food markets, to ensure stable and adequate supply of food during unexpected crisis, and to allow panic-stricken people to buy sufficient food at all times. In parallel, China should establish a wartime command system for food dispatching and control, thus preventing price hikes from causing social unrest and preventing other countries from disrupting China’s food supply chain with price wars and other tactics.

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3. China should give full play to the role of enterprises and establish and improve industrial chains that encompass the production, processing, storage, and marketing of major agricultural products. Through reforms in food production and management systems, China should identify major food varieties as strategic products, establish several food chains connected by enterprises, and take the food chains as an important strategic supplement to the government’s food reserve system, so that enterprises can fully play their role in ensuring food security. While not reducing its reserves of production materials such as fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, feeds, and veterinary drugs, China should also improve its reserves of land, production facilities, production conditions, technology, and other production factors, as well as preservation and processing facilities and equipment, to ensure that new stocks can be added as soon as the old stocks are depleted. Only then can China be prepared to win a protracted war. 4. China should provide crisis education for its residents, to enable them to react calmly in times of war. Since the founding of New China, people have become increasingly accustomed to a peaceful, stable, and well-fed life, and increasingly alienated from war, unrest, and hunger. When it comes to food sources, residential households are increasingly dependent on market supplies. Few families have the food reserves to meet their needs for three days of living. In case of mishaps, panic buying is likely to occur. As such, the Chinese government should provide crisis education to the entire population and encourage residents to stock up on food and food supplies, to prepare for emergencies. Furthermore, China should develop contingency plans for all kinds of emergencies and conduct drills on food and food supply in accordance with these plans, so that residents do not panic and are calm when faced with a crisis.

Afterword

Following Chinese Agriculture: Problems, Potential, Paths, and Benefits in 1993, Studies on China’s Food Security in 2005, and 70 Years of China’s Farming System in 2005, we have now finalized China’s Food Security: Strategies and Countermeasures. For many years, we have been making every effort to make our voice heard, to ensure food security. In May 2019, I submitted an internal article to the Economic Daily, suggesting that a possible “food war” could be triggered due to trade frictions between the United States and China, given China’s implicit selfsufficiency of grain being only 70%. In the wake of the decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on April 17, 2020, to “ensure food and energy security,” I completed the outline for China’s Food Security: Strategies and Countermeasures on May 3rd. After 100 days of effort, we wrote 360,000 words for this book, summarizing nearly 30 years of our research on food security. I would like to express my special thanks to Zhu Lilan and Xu Guanhua, former Ministers of the Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Deng Nan, former Party Secretary of the China Association for Science and Technology, and Han Deqian and Liu Yanhua, former Vice-Ministers of the Ministry of Science and Technology of the PRC. During the five years of my work in national agricultural science and technology management, all of them gave me their unstinted support both in my capacity as Head of the Drafting Team for drafting the first Outline of Agricultural Science and Technology Development (2000–2010) in China and in my capacity as Secretary-General for © CITIC Press Corporation 2023 W. Hongguang, China’s Food Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0730-4

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hosting the first “Global Conference on Agricultural Science and Technology.” I am also grateful to He Kang, the 98-year-old former minister of the Ministry of Agriculture of the PRC, who penned the foreword to the Studies on China’s Food Security 15 years ago. I am also grateful to the China Agricultural University for hiring me as the Director of CREFS (Center for Resources, Environment, and Food Security) when it was established 15 years ago. I extend my special thanks to Mr. Yuan Longping for his guidance and support in the past 20 years, and for his forewords to the Studies on China’s Food Security and this book. Renowned as the “Father of Hybrid Rice,” he has made monumental contributions to food security not only in China but also globally, by increasing the unit area yield of hybrid rice by 100 kg eight times. I particularly miss my teacher, Professor Wang Shu’an, the creator of the “one-ton-per-mu fields” who created the “one-ton grain fields” in China for the first time. He co-authored an article with me in the People’s Daily in 1997—Growing 10 Mu of Land to Feed 1.6 Billion People—refuting Lester R. Brown’s fallacious argument about “who will feed China.” I am also exceedingly thankful to researcher Wang Ren, former Assistant Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and former Secretary-General of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) of the World Bank, who, as one of my oldest friends, has given his consistent support and has continued to recommend this book to readers over the last 20 years. My great appreciation also goes to Professor Zhu Jiaming for his advice to me, in authoring this book. I have received careful guidance from him, Mr. Weng Yongxi, and Mr. Huang Jiangnan in writing this book. Despite being well into their seventies, they have a passion that never wanes and are full of ideas that can lead the future. They will always be an example for me to follow. I would also like to thank Academician Wang Xiaodong of the Tsinghua Institute of Multidisciplinary Biomedical Research, Tsinghua University, for creating an outstanding research environment for me. The chapters in this book were mainly written by me, and PhD and postdoctoral scholars that I have trained since 1997, as well as professors and students from the Tianjin University and the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China. The authors of each chapter are as follows:

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Wang Hongguang (Professor, International Center for Bioeconomy, Tsinghua University) was responsible for designing the chapters of this book, identifying the main points of each chapter, authoring Chapters I, XI, XVII, XIX, XXI, and XXII, and reviewing and finalizing the whole book. Li Lijun (Professor, College of Agriculture, Inner Mongolia Agricultural University) authored Chapters III, XIII, XIV, and XV, and co-authored Chapter XI. Hu Zhiquan (Researcher, Institute of Agricultural Economics and Development (IAED), Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences) authored Chapters V, VI, and VII. Zhang Yongen (Researcher, Agricultural Information Institute of CAAS) authored Chapters XVIII, XX, and XXIV and co-authored Chapter XVI. Wu Yongchang (Researcher, Institute of Agricultural Economics and Development (IAED), Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences) authored Chapters II and IV. Chu Qingquan (Professor, College of Agriculture, China Agricultural University) authored Chapter X and co-authored Chapter XXI. Wei Wei (Associate Researcher, Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) authored Chapters VIII and IX. Wang Zhaohua (Professor, Institute of Rural Revitalization, Qingdao Agricultural University) authored Chapter XXIII and coauthored Chapter XIX. Liu Jinghui (Professor, Institute of Rural Revitalization, College of Agriculture, Inner Mongolia Agricultural University) co-authored Chapter XVI. Wang Hongyan (Professor, College of Resources and Environment, Northeast Agricultural University) co-authored Chapter XXII. Ma Hongbo (PhD, Development and Reform Commission of Hohhot, Inner Mongolia) co-authored Chapter XX. Li Yiping (Researcher, Agricultural Extension, Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of Hunan Province) authored Chapter XXIII. Song Zhirong (Senior Agronomist, Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of Hunan Province) co-authored Chapter XXIII.

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Wu De’an (Associate Professor, College of Mathematics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China) co-authored Chapter XVII. Yin Zhixin (Associate Researcher, Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development) co-authored Chapter I. Zhu Shu (Assistant Researcher, Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development) co-authored Chapter I. Zhang Junxiang (Researcher and Strategy Director of SINOBIOWAY Group) co-authored Chapters I and XVII. You Lei (Lecturer, College of Economics, Liaoning University) coauthored Chapters I and XVII. In addition, Professor Li Wenlan from the Library of Tianjin University, along with Tian Aiping, Ma Qian, Zhai Tong, Wang Jing, and Du Jinping, worked extensively on data collection. Dr. Tan Wenjin from the College of Mathematics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, contributed to the measurement of food security indexes, for which I express my gratitude. Given the limitations of the authors’ professional writing skills and knowledge, as well as the tight schedule, this book may inevitably contain errors and omissions (with Chapter XVII on “Food Security Zoning in China” being an exploratory topic). We welcome feedback, criticisms, and corrections from leaders and readers.

August 13, 2020

Sanlihe, Xicheng District, Beijing

Index

A AEZ. See Agro-ecological Zoning Agricultural civilization, 195, 196 Agricultural economic system reform, 372 Agricultural facilities, 396, 397 Agricultural laborer, 318 Agricultural machinery, 208, 221–222, 242, 244, 245, 249, 250, 252, 253, 256, 257 Agricultural mechanization, 207, 220 Agricultural tax, 197, 208 Agricultural water replenishment project, 386 Agro-ecological Zoning (AEZ), 358 Anti-globalization, 16, 173 Arable land, 31, 222, 223, 396, 404 B Bai Chong’en, 327 Beidahuang Group, 379 Big grain, 340, 364, 365, 371 Bioeconomy, 17, 19 Biological carrying capacity, 46. See also Population carrying capacity

Biological superiority, 21 Biosecurity, 15, 18, 19, 21 Biotechnology, 18, 19, 21, 23, 379 Bohai Granary Science and Technology Demonstration Project, 391 Brown, Lester, 199

C Cai Fang, 327 Cao Cao, 203 Carbon footprint, 162 Carcass weight, 141, 142, 145, 146, 149, 159 Central Rural Work Conference, 223 China collapse. See China Threat China surpassing. See China Threat China’s food security by dynasty, 201–202 by region, 260–265 China Threat, 23, 24 Climate change, 44, 49, 50, 177, 178 Collective ownership, 353 Combined self-sufficiency rate, 292

© CITIC Press Corporation 2023 W. Hongguang, China’s Food Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0730-4

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Communal ownership. See Collective ownership COVID-19 and food security, 24, 41, 260, 308, 342 livestock industry, 163, 173 world pattern, 1–25 Cultivatable area. See Arable land Cultivated land. See Sown area D DEA-CP model, 260, 264, 265, 282 Definitions food, 24 food safety, 30, 32 food security, 27–28 De-globalization, 16, 17, 173 Deng Tuo, 201 Deng Xiaoping, 209 Dingwu Extraordinary Drought, 197 Direct consumption, 82–90 Double cropping, 390, 393, 397, 398 Double-tax system, 203 Drip irrigation, 72, 75 Du Fu, 201 Dynasty, 197, 198, 200–203 E Early rice, 395, 397, 399, 403 Ecological carrying capacity, 47, 303. See also Biological carrying capacity; Population carrying capacity Ecological environment, 70, 72 Ecological footprint, 47. See also Carbon footprint Ecological security, 271–274, 277–278 Economic security, 277–278 Economic war, 18 Edible grain security, 27, 28

Emperor Dezong, 203 Emperor Wu, 203 Engdahl, William, 408 Engel coefficient, 235–237, 301, 302 Environmental pollution, 71 Equal-field system, 203 F Family contract responsibility system. See Household contract responsibility system Farming facilities. See Agricultural facilities Feed conversion ratio, 158 Feed grain, 6, 61, 163, 231, 232, 234, 237, 295, 300, 303, 307, 308, 334, 335, 337, 339, 340, 343, 344, 365, 417 Fertility rate, 211, 324 Financial crisis, 17, 18 First Green Revolution, 49, 55, 178, 179, 350 Food aid, 41 Food balance, 184 Food crisis, 37–39. See also Food war Food deficit, 177, 259. See also Food insecurity Food diplomacy, 408 Food embargoes, 410, 411, 414–416 Food gap, 43, 51, 52, 179 Food insecurity, 175–180, 259, 299, 304, 305, 341. See also Food deficit Food reserves, 417, 418. See also Grain silos; Grain storage Food saving, 356 Food security definition, 27–28 goal, 292, 342, 343 Food security index eight-factor index, 35 Food Security Risk Index, 34

INDEX

Global Food Security Index, 34 six-factor index, 265–282 Food security indicators, 30, 33, 34, 260–265 Food security line, 28 Food Security Risk Index, 34 Food security zoning, 282–290 Food stocks, 29, 33 Food transport routes, 413, 416 Food war, 37, 41, 341, 342 Four farewells to eras, 205–210, 340 Four increasing, 226 G Galtung, Johan, 16 Gene editing, 49, 369 Genetically modified, 48, 55, 379 Geographical distribution of grain trade, 102, 112 of livestock trade, 172 GFSI. See Global Food Security Index Global Food Security Index, 34 Globalization, 17, 165, 174 Global warming, 49, 50, 359 GMO. See Genetically modified Grain balance, 183 Grain deficit, 336, 337 Grain production potential pyramid, 357–362 Grain selling dilemma, 199 Grain silos, 318, 356 Grain storage, 318, 319, 345 Grain trade-production ratio, 158 Grain trade volume share, 140, 151, 157 Grain transfer project, 285, 347 Greenhouse effect, 49, 50 Guan Zhong, 409 H Heilongjiang, 384

425

Hongqi River water diversion project, 348, 356 Houkai Wei, 326 Household contract responsibility system, 204 Huang-Huai-Hai Plain, 347 Huawei, 16, 18, 19 Human right, 50, 51 Hunan, 383–405

I Implicit food security, 31 Implicit self-sufficiency, 31, 32, 306, 307, 341, 344 Improved Seeds coverage ratio, 221, 275, 277 Income gap, 222 Indirect consumption, 81, 90–94 Industrialization, 55, 70, 71, 83, 90, 199

K King Wu, 202 Kissinger, Henry, 407

L Labor hours, 159, 160 Labor productivity, 136, 159 Labor tolerance, 159 Land circulation, 216 Land compensation, 216, 371 Land-hoarding, 203 Land ownership, 203, 204, 353 Land reform, 213, 353 Land Reform Law, 204 Land remediation, 344, 361, 371 Land resources inventory, 215 Land use rights, 354 Late rice, 395, 398, 399, 401, 403, 404

426

INDEX

Law of the jungle, 44 Life expectancy, 211–213, 398 Light resources, 359. See also Potential photosynthetic productivity Li Peng, 51

M Mahdist Rebellion, 410. See also Food war Mao Zedong, 204 100-million-ton step, 217, 238 Moderately Prosperous Society, 209 Multiple cropping index, 328, 388, 391, 392, 397

N Neoliberalism, 18 Northwest regional granary construction, 347 Nuclear, 19, 21

P Pandemic. See COVID-19 PCFA. See Pure chemical fertilizer application Photo-temperate-precipitationirrigation productivity, 360 Photo-temperate-precipitationirrigation-soil-fertilizer productivity, 361, 362 Photo-temperate-precipitationirrigation-soilfertilizer-technology productivity. See Technology-driven yield potential Photo-temperate-precipitationirrigation-soil productivity, 361

Photo-temperate-precipitation-soilfertilizer- technology-economy productivity, 362 Pluralistic pattern, 15, 16 Population carrying capacity, 45, 46, 47. See also Biological carrying capacity; Ecological carrying capacity Potential photosynthetic productivity, 358, 359 Potential photo-temperate-precipitation, 360 Potential photo-temperature productivity, 359 Precipitation resources, 360. See also Potential photo-temperate-precipitation Profit-to-cost ratio, 312, 314 Protection zone, 401 Pure chemical fertilizer application (PCFA), 362

Q Qianlong, 197, 200 Qi Huangong, 409 Qualitative security, 270–271 Quantitative security, 265–269

R Raj Patel, 408 Reform and opening-up, 204, 207–209, 216 Regression equation, 167–169, 172 Restructuring of agriculture, 72, 208, 222, 392 food consumption, 81, 100, 132, 226 livestock industry, 163 Rice brands, 394, 402

INDEX

Right to food, 51. See also Human right S Salt-tolerant rice, 367, 389 Sci-tech revolution, 19 Second economic power trap, 21, 24. See also China Threat Second green revolution, 350, 367 Seven Mutuals, 16 Shandong, 383–391 Shang Yang, 203 Single cropping, 393, 397, 398, 403 Sino-US competition, 15, 22. See also US-China Slaughter rate, 148, 151 Slaughter volume, 148–151 Small grain, 364, 365 Social security, 280–282 Society-driven yield potential, 363 Soil erosion, 190 Soil fertility, 70, 273, 317, 361 Soil reclamation, 190 South-North Water Transfer Project, 387 Sown area, 70–72, 217, 226 Sown area equivalent, 219 Soybean war, 411, 412 Straits of Malacca, 416 Sun Yat-sen, 204 Super rice, 368, 369, 399, 403 T Technological potential, 306, 315 Technological security, 275–276 Technology-driven yield potential, 362 Temperature resources, 359. See also Potential-photo-temperatureproductivity Third agricultural census, 311

427

Three synchronizations, 355 Trade friction, 18, 173, 342, 375 Trade protectionism, 173. See also Trade friction Transgenic technology, 49 Trend extrapolation method, 167, 171, 172 Trump, Donald, 16, 20 Two hands, 18 Two-tier management system, 347, 353 U Unconventional war, 22 Urbanization, 55, 70, 71, 83, 90, 222, 323, 325, 326 US-China competition, 15, 22 decoupling, 19, 23 trade friction, 18, 342, 375 W Wang Lixin, 335 Wang Mang, 197 Water conservancy, 75, 221, 387 Wheat pilot fields, 369, 370 World War II, 21, 40, 41, 185 World War III, 15, 21 Worst-case scenario, 341, 342 WWII. See World War II X Xi Jinping, 25, 42, 342, 387 Y Yangtze River basin, 196 YE. See Photo-temperate-precipitationsoil-fertilizer-technology-economy productivity

428

INDEX

Yellow River basin, 195, 196 YF. See Photo-temperate-precipitationirrigation-soil-fertilizer productivity YI. See Photo-temperate-precipitationirrigation-soil productivity YL. See Potential photosynthetic productivity YR. See Potential photo-temperateprecipitation

YS. See Photo-temperate-precipitationirrigation productivity YT. See Potential photo-temperature productivity Yuan Longping, 389, 392, 403

Z Zero hunger, 25 Zhu Jiankang, 389