China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean: History, Power Rivalry, and Regional Implications (Studies of the Americas) 3031451651, 9783031451652

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STUDIES OF THE AMERICAS

China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean History, Power Rivalry, and Regional Implications Edited by Cassandra R. Veney · Sabella O. Abidde

Studies of the Americas

Series Editor Maxine Molyneux, Institute of the Americas, University College London, London, UK

The Studies of the Americas Series includes country specific, crossdisciplinary and comparative research on the United States, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada, particularly in the areas of Politics, Economics, History, Sociology, Anthropology, Development, Gender, Social Policy and the Environment. The series publishes monographs, readers on specific themes and also welcomes proposals for edited collections, that allow exploration of a topic from several different disciplinary angles. This series is published in conjunction with University College. London’s Institute of the Americas under the editorship of Professor Maxine Molyneux.

Cassandra R. Veney · Sabella O. Abidde Editors

China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean History, Power Rivalry, and Regional Implications

Editors Cassandra R. Veney Center for Women, Gender and Global Leadership Howard University College of Arts and Sciences Washington, DC, USA

Sabella O. Abidde Department of History and Political Science Alabama State University Montgomery, AL, USA

Studies of the Americas ISBN 978-3-031-45165-2 ISBN 978-3-031-45166-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Preface

For more than seven decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC/ China) and the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan) have been involved in a Cold War originating from the Chinese Civil War which ended in 1949 but with no formal peace treaty in place. Insofar as the contest and contestations between the two Chinas, the international community grappled with two questions: which of the two Chinas was the true and legitimate representative of the Chinese people, and whether Taiwan was a province of China or a separate political entity? While the first question is clearly understood and agreed to under United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971, the second has been a constant source of regional and global tension. Because of its immense resources, power, and influence, China has been able to effectively isolate Taiwan. As of the summer of 2023, for instance, less than twenty member states of the United Nations (UN) recognize Taiwan as a nation-state. Despite China’s global reach, she has not been able to effectively isolate or make Taiwan irrelevant. This is especially the case in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) where Taipei seems to be flexing its political and economic muscles. Having decisively won the battle in the African continent, China seems to have shifted its focus to the LAC region. And unlike in Africa where Taiwan seems to have given up, she is hotly contesting the LAC region. This edited volume, among other goals, historicizes the antecedence of both countries in the LAC region: examining the history, the outcomes, v

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PREFACE

and the implications of the contests and contestations between the two Chinas. The other works that precede this edited volume are China and Taiwan in Africa: The Struggle for Diplomatic Recognition and Hegemony (Springer, 2022) and Africa-China-Taiwan Relations, 1949–2020 (Lexington Books, 2022). This book (China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean: History, Power Rivalry, and Regional Implications), therefore, furthers the examination of the global battle between both countries. In the struggle between Beijing and Taipei, one must look at the bigger picture, that is, China’s grand strategy and the implication for the USA. After all, the LAC region is in the USA’s backyard—a region that has, for decades, been her region of influence. Therefore, a careful assessment and understanding of China’s activities and motives in the region may give the US a glimpse of China’s long-term goals and intentions in the struggle for global dominance. While this book has long been in the making, we intend to, in the future, look at the other dimension of China-Taiwan relations in the LAC region. But more than that, we hope that other scholars, diplomats, and public intellectuals will pay closer attention to the two Chinas and what is going on in the region. To do so would benefit the national interest of the US and her Western and non-Western allies and friends. Even so, the People’s Republic of China should not and must not be seen as an enemy or an “evil empire.” No, never, but rather as a worthy competitor in a rapidly changing world. Cleveland, USA Montgomery, USA Summer 2023

Cassandra R. Veney, Ph.D. Sabella O. Abidde, Ph.D.

Acknowledgments

We would like to recognize and express our gratitude to all those who made this volume possible. As with most edited volumes, we had many hurdles to cross before this book became a reality. While some contributors submitted their chapters promptly, we had to cajole others to do so. A handful of contributors withdrew from the project a week or two before the due date, which made our job more challenging and stressful. Nonetheless, we are glad to be here, glad that this book has seen the light of day. Guermantes Lailari, Lt. Col, USAF (ret) was of great help in introducing scholars who agreed to replace the “no-show” and participate in this and other projects. He is a benevolent, brilliant, and well-versed officer and scholar. Thanks, G-Man! We would also like to thank Lorraine Klimowich (Senior Editor at Springer Nature) who introduced us to Anca Pusca (Executive Editor at Palgrave Macmillan) who looked favorably on our book proposal and professionally guided us through the process. We would also like to thank Shreenidhi Natarajan (Project Coordinator, Springer Nature) for her professionalism during the production process. Also, we would like to thank all the contributors who invested their time and other resources into this project. Thank you, thank you, and thank you so very much. Frankly, we can never thank you enough.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

And finally, to all the anonymous reviewers for their time and effort in rendering invaluable criticisms and suggestions. Thank you! Finally, we would like to thank our friends, family members, and network of scholars for their friendship, counsel, and support throughout the writing and editing process.

Contents

Part I History and Foreign Policy 1

2

3

4

5

Introduction: China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean: History, Power Rivalry, and Regional Implications Cassandra R. Veney and Sabella O. Abidde

3

The Early History of China and Taiwan in Latin America: Cuba and Peru from 1837 to 1971 Angela Ju

19

The “One China” Policy: Battleground for Recognition in the Caribbean Kavita Johnson

41

Taiwan and the South Atlantic: A Shared History with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay Jorge Troisi Melean

57

Taiwan’s Diplomatic Instruments and Challenges in Its Relations with China-Aligned Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean Fabricio A. Fonseca and Yen-Pin Su

81

ix

x

6

CONTENTS

Soft Power and China-Taiwan Competition for Influence in Latin America Mohamad Zreik

115

Part II The Politics of Diplomatic Fidelity 7

8

9

What Can I Do For You: The Republic of China’s Cold War Courtship of the Republic of Panama Justina Hwang Past, Present, and the Future of Colombia’s Commercial Relations with China and Taiwan Meng-Yu Liang, Jorge Andrés Contreras Calderón, and Juan Pablo López Agudelo Massive Chinese Investments in Latin America: What Is Taiwan’s Diplomatic Fate in That Region? Mohamad Zreik

145

165

201

Part III Issues and Policy Approaches 10

11

Strategic Communication: How China Promotes and Communicates Its Political Agenda in Latin America Maria Zuppello China-CARICOM Bilateral Engagements: Modalities, Motives, Impacts, and Directions for the Regional Integration Agenda Dianna DaSilva-Glasgow and Dennis Pile

12

The Belt and Road Initiative, China, Taiwan, and Brazil Charalampos Harry Stamelos and Konstantinos Tsimaras

13

An Analysis of the Relations Between China, Taiwan, and Argentina and the Belt and Road Initiative Athina Moraiti

14

Challenges China and Taiwan Face in Developing Diplomatic and Economic Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean Priye S. Torulagha

229

261 295

327

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CONTENTS

15

Concluding Remarks: China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Road Ahead in a Post-COVID-19 Era Cassandra R. Veney and Sabella O. Abidde

Index

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389

395

Notes on Contributors

Sabella O. Abidde is a professor of Political Science and a member of the graduate faculty at Alabama State University, Montgomery. He is the editor of two Book Series: The African Governance, Development, and Leadership Series (Lexington Books); and Africa-East Asia International Relations Series (Springer Nature). He is an alumnus of Saint Cloud State University Minnesota; Mankato State University Minnesota; University of Oklahoma Norman; and Howard University. His scholarship includes published volumes on Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean; and Africa-China-Taiwan Relations. He is the editor, most recently of Palestine, Taiwan, and Western Sahara: Statehood, Sovereignty, and the International System (Lexington Books, 2023); China and Taiwan in Africa: The Struggle for Diplomatic Recognition and Hegemony (Springer, 2022); and Africa-China-Taiwan Relations, 1949–2020 (Lexington Books, 2022). His forthcoming volume is entitled, “US Foreign Policy Toward Taiwan: Ambiguity and Commitment in International Relations” (Springer, 2024). From January until July 2023, he was in Taiwan as a Taiwan Fellow (of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan, ROC). He is a member of the Association of Global South Studies (AGSS); the African Studies and Research Forum (ASRF); and the American Association for Chinese Studies (AACS). Juan Pablo López Agudelo is a lawyer and a student of Political Science at Pontifical Bolivarian University in Medellín (Colombia). He is currently

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a research assistant for the Law Research Group (GRID) at Pontifical Bolivarian University in Medellín (Colombia). Jorge Andrés Contreras Calderón is a lawyer and a Law and Economics professor from the Pontifical Bolivarian University in Medellín (Colombia). He has a Ph.D. in Law from Los Andes University of Bogotá and an LL.M. in Chinese Law from the Renmin University of China. He is the director of the research center on the theory, history, and economic analysis of property, for the Law Research Group (GRID) at Pontifical Bolivarian University. He is also a Taiwan Fellow at the Academia Sinica of Taiwan, where he studies the economic and political implications of the Yuan’s digitization. Dianna DaSilva-Glasgow has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Economics, a Master of Science Degree in International Trade Policy (Distinction), and a Ph.D. in Economic Development Policy (high commendation) from the University of the West Indies. She has over ten years of experience as a lecturer/ researcher/ consultant. She has published one book; book chapters with Cambridge Scholar Publishers, World Development Outlook, and UWI Press Publishing; and journal articles with Estey Journal of International Trade Law and Policy, Transition Journal, Social and Economic Studies Journal, and International Trade Journal. She recently served as Director of the Department of Foreign Trade within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Guyana, and now serves as the Head of the Department of Economics at the University of Guyana. Fabricio A. Fonseca is an assistant professor of International Relations and Latin American Studies in the Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University (NCCU) Taiwan. He holds a Ph.D. in Asia-Pacific Studies from the College of Social Sciences at NCCU and an MA in China Studies from El Colegio de México. He is a researcher at the Center for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies at Chihlee University of Technology and the Center for Latin America and Caribbean Studies at Tamkang University. His research interests encompass international political economy and comparative development between East Asia and Latin America, and relations between both sides of the Taiwan Strait with Latin America. His academic works have been presented at multiple international conferences and published in specialized journals in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. His recent major publications are “Taiwan: From a

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Booming Economy to Local Elections and the Fourth Strait Crisis,” in Anuario Asia-Pacífico (2023); “Public Diplomacy at Work: Economic and Cultural Ties between Mexico and Taiwan”, in Taiwan’s Relations with Latin America (2021); “ROC-ROK International Fate: Decolonization, Democratization, and Pragmatism” (with Moisés de Souza), in Assessing the Landscape of Taiwan and Korean Studies in Comparison (2021). Justina Hwang is a historian of modern Latin American history. She received a Ph.D. from Brown University in 2017 and her scholarship focuses on Taiwan’s diplomatic relationships with Latin American countries during the Cold War period. This chapter is part of her dissertation, which examines the diplomatic relations between the Republic of China, Peru, Paraguay, and Panama from 1960 to 1975. It uses ideology and pragmatism as lenses to analyze how the Republic of China courted these countries’ anti-communist and later, authoritarian leaders. She posits that while the Republic of China’s appeals to anti-communist ideology were largely successful before 1968, the changing political climate in the late 1960s and early 1970s meant that solely appealing to ideology was no longer enough in Latin America. Consequently, the Republic of China was too slow to recognize this shift from ideology to pragmatism in the Global South, was unable to adapt in time, and thus, lost its seat in the United Nations and its importance in global affairs. Kavita Johnson is a lecturer in International Relations and Political Science in the Department of Government at the University of the West Indies, Mona Campus. She is a past recipient of the MEXT Monbukagakusho Scholarship and received her Ph.D. at the University of Tsukuba, Japan. Her research interests include small states, Caribbean politics, and foreign policy. Angela Ju holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Prior to her doctoral studies, she received four Bachelor of Arts degrees in Political Science, Spanish, Latin American Studies, and European Studies from the University of Washington. She is currently an assistant professor of Global Studies and Political Science at Saint Edward’s University in Austin, TX, where she won the 2021 St. Edward’s University Center for Teaching Excellence Champion Award for Mission-Informed Teaching. She has also taught at UCLA, the University of California Washington Center, York College of the City University of New York, Marymount Manhattan College, Knox College,

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and Quinnipiac University. After finishing her doctorate, she worked as an international development and migration consultant in the private and non-profit sectors in Washington, DC, and New York City for two years before returning to academia. Her research and teaching interests are focused on the politics of race, ethnicity, and migration in the Global South. She has also previously published about race relations between Chinese Cubans and Afro-Cubans and Haitian migration to Brazil and Chile. Meng-Yu Liang is an associate research fellow at Academia Sinica’s Institute of Economics (Taiwan). She has a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Wisconsin Madison, USA. Her areas of concentration are microeconomic theory, game theory, information economics, and behavior economics. She was a visiting senior fellow in the Department of Economics, National University of Singapore (2012); assistant research fellow at the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica (2005–2009); and an assistant professor in the Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, Canada (1999–2005). She is the author and co-author of several domestic and international peer-reviewed and highly-ranked publications. Jorge Troisi Melean received his Ph.D. at Emory University. He has published several books and articles on global history, both in Europe and in the Americas. He has worked as an election monitor for the Carter Center in Latin America and Africa. The Canadian, the Israeli, and the Taiwanese government also sponsored him. He is a reader of history journals in different countries. He was Visiting Professor at different universities in the US, Paraguay, and Trinidad & Tobago, and Visiting Researcher at Tamkang University, Taiwan. He is a tenured track professor and researcher at Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Argentina, where he is leading a project on global urban projects by the turn of the twentieth century. His current research interests include Latin American and Asia-Pacific relations. Athina Moraiti is a scientific collaborator at European University Cyprus, since February 2022. She has studied law in Greece and France. She holds a Ph.D. in Administrative and Energy Law. Since 2017, she has taught constitutional law and civil rights and liberties at City Unity College, European and external relations law at Panteion University (Greece), Department of European and International Sciences, as well as energy

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law at Panteion University LL.M. program. Her last book, published in September 2020, was about the EU External Relations Law (in Greek). Her main academic interests are EU law, energy law, and external relations law. She has been working as a lawyer in the Athens Bar Association for 12 years, and until October 2022, she worked as a legal officer for the Greek Ministry of Finance. She speaks fluently English, French, Italian, Spanish, and German and has a basic knowledge of Arabic and Chinese. Dennis Pile has a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics, a Master of Science degree in Economics from the University of the West Indies, and a Master of Business Administration in Oil and Gas Management from UNICAF University. He is a lecturer in the Department of Economics at the University of Guyana as well as a policy analyst with experience in the areas of Oil and Gas Management and Anti-corruption Strategies. Over the past 8 years, he has worked with government agencies strengthening governance while building institutional capacity. His research interests include technology and innovation (STI), economic policies, sustainable development with emphasis on energy efficiency, anti-corruption strategies, and social security systems in developing countries. His two upcoming papers will focus on the role of innovation at the firm level and strategies to comeback corruption in Guyana. Charalampos Harry Stamelos is a lecturer of Law at European University Cyprus Law School. He is the author of many books, book chapters, and papers in English, French, and Greek. He is an attorney-at-law in Athens, Greece. He has represented more than 15,000 clients in the courts in Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Belgium, and France. He is a member of the board of directors of the Greek Association for the Law of the European Union. Yen-Pin Su is a professor in the Department of Political Science at National Chengchi University (NCCU). He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Pittsburgh, USA. His research focuses on party politics, social movements, electoral institutions, and democratization, with a regional specialization in Latin America. His articles are published in Comparative Politics, International Political Science Review, European Political Science Review, Party Politics, Latin American Research Review, and Latin American Politics and Society. Priye S. Torulagha holds a M.A. in Comparative Politics and Public Administration from Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, an MHR in

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Counselling and Human Resources Management from the University of Oklahoma, Norman, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the same university. He writes regularly on Nigerian and African affairs, Third World politics, international terrorism, and democratic governance. He is the author of “Fidel Castro: His Impact on African Liberation and Governance,” in Sabella O. Abidde and Charity Manyeruke (eds.), Fidel Castro and Africa’s Liberation Struggle 2020; “China and Africa: The Beginning of a New World Order or A New Form of Colonialism,” in Sabella O. Abidde and Tokunbo A. Ayoola (eds.), China in Africa 2020; and “African Relations with China and Taiwan: A Web of Anticolonialism, Cold War, Recognition Politics, and Debt Trap,” in Sabella O. Abidde (ed.), Africa-China-Taiwan Relations, 1949–2020. Konstantinos Tsimaras is a professor of Law at European University Cyprus Law School and the Dean of the School. He is the author of many books, book chapters, and papers in English, French, and Greek. He is an attorney-at-law in Athens, Greece. He is a member of the Regulatory Agency for Energy in Greece and a member of the board of directors of the Open University in Greece. Cassandra R. Veney is the Executive Director of the Center for Women, Gender and Global Leadership at Howard University College of Arts and Sciences. She was Chair of the Department of International Relations at United States International University-Africa, Kenya. She has held teaching positions at Quinnipiac University, Loyola Marymount University, the University of Illinois-Chicago, the Pennsylvania State University, and Illinois State University. She is the author of Forced Migration in Eastern Africa: Democratization, Structural Adjustment, and Refugees. She is the editor of US-Africa Relations: From Clinton to Obama. She is the co-editor of Democracy and Development in Post-Conflict African Nations, Leisure in Urban Africa, Women in African Studies Scholarly Publishing. She is a member of the Advisory Board for the Center for Women, Gender, and Global Leadership (Howard University). She is a member of the Editorial Board for the African Political Science and International Relations in Focus journal (University of Johannesburg). She is on the Advisory Board for Palgrave Macmillan’s Contemporary African Political Economy Series. She received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Missouri-Columbia. Her areas of concentration were comparative politics, American politics, and international relations.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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Mohamad Zreik received a Ph.D. in International Relations from Central China Normal University (2021). He is an independent researcher; his areas of research interest are related to the Foreign Policy of China, the Belt and Road Initiative, Middle Eastern Studies, China-Arab relations, East Asian Affairs, Geopolitics of Eurasia, and Political Economy. He is the Associate Editor for the Psychology Research on Education and Social Sciences and a reviewer for the International Journal of Interdisciplinary Global Studies, International Journal of Peace and Development Studies, Eurasian Research Journal, Management and Economics Research Journal, and Contemporary Arab Affairs. He is a member of the board of trustees of the Center for Asian and Chinese Studies, he was the head of the Lebanese Community in Wuhan (October 2020–October 2021), and he was a member of the International Federation of Arab Journalists and Writes, Friends of China. He has many studies and articles published in high-ranked journals and well-known international newspapers. He is currently the author of two books in press on the Belt and Road Initiative in Lebanon and the Chinese strategy in Eurasia. His writings have been translated into many languages, including French, Arabic, Spanish, German, Albanian, Russian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, etc. Maria Zuppello is an Italian analyst based in São Paulo, Brazil. She has an extensive experience in investigative journalism, having covered Latin America for numerous international media (The Guardian, The Economist, Agence France Presse, Euronews). Since 2016, she has focused her research on security and geopolitical issues in the region. She is the author of “The crime-terror Nexus in Latin America,” Foreword by Emanuele Ottolenghi, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Washington, 2019. She is currently a contributor to Infobae, Militant Wire, and the Investigative Project on Terrorism. She holds a Bachelor of Philosophy from La Sapienza University, Rome, and a Master of Arts in Journalism and Mass Communications from Gregorian University, Rome. In addition, she holds FEMA and OSCE certifications in Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience and Prevention and Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes. She is also a Mark Twain scholar, having earned the 2007 Elmira College-Center for Mark Twain Studies Fellowship for her research on “The Friendship between Mark Twain and Robert Louis Stevenson.” Elmira College is a renowned research institution for Mark Twain’s studies.

Abbreviations

ABM ACAF AGF AI AIIB APEC APRA ASEAN BAT BNU BRI BRICS BYD CABEI CAF CARICOM CARIFORUM CATO CCP CCTV CD CDB CDP CELAC CFIUS CGTN

Argentina, Brazil and Mexico All-China Athletic Federation Asian Games Federation Artificial Intelligence Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation American Popular Revolutionary Alliance Association of Southeast Asian Nations Buenos Aires Times, Argentina Public Library of Uruguay Belt and Road Initiative Brazil Russia India China South Africa Chinese Company Central American Bank for Economic Integration Corporacion Andina de Fomento Caribbean Community Caribbean Forum Central America Trade Office Chinese Communist Party China Central Television Democratic Center China Development Bank Not-for-Profit Charity Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Committee on Foreign Investment China Global Television Network xxi

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ABBREVIATIONS

CHEC CIEF Cis CLEC CMG CNAAF CNDCFI CRI CSME CTOC CW DAC DANE DLP ECLA ECLAC ECOSOC EFTA EIBC EP EP EU EXIM FBI FDI FETS FOCAC G20 GANs GDP GNI ICC ICDF ICSID IDB IDB IDCPC IMF IOC IRI IT KMT

China Harbour Engineering Company Chinese International Educational Foundation Confucius Institutes Education Center for Language Exchange and Cooperation China Media Group China National Amateur Athletic Federation Caribbean Nationally Contribution Finance Initiative China Radio International Caribbean Single Market and Economy Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee Cognitive Warfare Development Assistance Committee Departamento Nacional de Estadísticas (Colombia) Labour Party Economic Commission for Latin America Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean United Nations Economic and Social Council European Free Trade Association Export-Import Bank of China El País, Uruguay Equator Principle European Union Export-Import Bank Federal Bureau of Investigation Foreign Direct Investment(s) Far East Trade Service Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Group of Twenty Generative Adversarial Networks Gross Domestic Product Gross National Income International Cricket Council International Cooperation and Development Fund International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes International Development Bank Inter-American Development Bank International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party International Monetary Fund International Olympic Committee International Republican Institute Information Technology Kuomintang

ABBREVIATIONS

LAC LAC LATAM LC LN MERCOSUR ML MOFA MOFA-China MOFA-Taiwan NAFTA NATO NDB NDC NDCFI NDS NOC NOC NT OAS OBOR OCAC ODA ODI OEA OECD OECS PAP PLA PLASSF PRC PRI PSUV ROC RT SEZs SIL SLP SOUTHCOM SSC TAITRA TECO TRA

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Latin America and the Caribbean Latin American Countries Latin America Library of Congress, Argentina La Nación, Argentina Southern Common Market Machine Learning Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs North America Free Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization New Development Bank National Democratic Congress Nationally Determined Contributed Financial Initiative National Department of Statistics (Colombia National Oil Company National Olympic Committee Noticias de Taiwan, Taiwan Organization of American States One Belt One Road Overseas Community Affairs Council Official Development Assistance Overseas Direct Investment Organización de los Estados Americanos Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Peruvian Aprista Party People’s Liberation Army PLA Strategic Support Force People’s Republic of China Institutional Revolutionary Party United Socialist Party of Venezuela Republic of China Russia Today Special Economic Zones Sino-Library International St. Lucia Labour Party United States Southern Command South-South Cooperation Taiwan External Trade Development Council Taipei Economic and Cultural Office Taiwan Relations Act

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ABBREVIATIONS

TT TTCO UFS UN UNCTAD UNDP UNMDG UNSC UNSDG US USA USMCA UWP WACL WTO WW11

Taiwan Today, Taiwan Taiwan Trade and Cultural Office in Argentina United Front System United Nations United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Development Programme United Nations Millennium Development Goals United Nations Security Council United Nations Sustainable Goals United States United States of America United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement United Workers Party World Anti-Communist League World Trade Organization World War II

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 9.1 Fig. 9.2 Fig. 9.3 Fig. 9.4

Fig. 9.5 Fig. 9.6 Fig. 11.1 Fig. 11.2 Fig. 11.3 Fig. 11.4 Fig. 11.5

Timeline of Grenada’s diplomatic relations with China and Taiwan (Source Compiled by author) The BRI and China’s International trade map (Source Belt and Road Research Platform) Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)-China trade flows (Source IMF) Countries recognizing Taiwan (Source Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China [Taiwan]) China oil imports 2000–2017 (Source Compiled by the author with data from the BP Review of World Energy 2018 [BP, 2018]) Chinese loans to Latin America (Source HKUST: New Silk Road) China-Latin America connections via BRI routes (Source Pacific Taycoon) CARICOM Trade with Chinese Taipei, (2002–2021) (Source International Trade Centre) CARICOM Trade with the People’s Republic of China, (2002–2021) (Source International Trade Centre) CARICOM Exports to Major Trading Partners (2002–2021) (Source International Trade Centre) CARICOM Imports from Major Trading Partners (2002–2021) (Source International Trade Centre) Grants at (Constant USD2017) (Source Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers [2022])

48 203 204 205

212 214 219 276 277 278 279 281

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 11.6

Fig. 12.1

Fig. 12.2

Fig. 12.3

Fig. 12.4

Fig. 13.1

Graph Graph Graph Graph Graph Graph

8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6

Graph 8.7

Graph 8.8 Graph 8.9

DAC versus Non-DAC bilateral aid flows to the Caribbean (US$Mn, Current prices) (Source OECD n.d.) China-Brazil Merchandise trade by product class (2001–2020) (Source United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Merchandise Trade Matrix in Thousands United States Dollars, Annual, 2001–2020,” https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/Tab leViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=217476 Taiwanese total trade statistics with Brazil (2021) (Source Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Foreign Trade) Taiwanese major exports to Brazil (2021) (Source Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Foreign Trade) Taiwanese major imports from Brazil (2021) (Source Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Foreign Trade) On February 19, 1972, China and Argentina established diplomatic relations (Image: Public Domain—The President of Argentina Raúl Lastiri with the Chinese ambassador Zheng Weizhi) Imports 1980–2022 Imports 1980–2022 Exports 1980–2022 Exports 1980–2022 Trade balance Foreign direct investment by sector (in millions of $USD) (Source Ministry of Commerce of Colombia [2021] and Giraldo-Salazar et al. [2023, pp. 35–40]) Total participation of FDI of countries with commercial agreements 2021 (Source Ministry of Commerce of Colombia [2021] and Giraldo-Salazar et al. [2023, pp. 35–40]) FDI 1994–2022 FDI 1994–2022

287

298

306

306

307

332 183 183 184 184 185

190

191 191 192

List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 5.1 Table 11.1 Table Table Table Table

11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5

Table 11.6 Table 13.1

Caribbean countries’ diplomatic relations with China and Taiwan Formal recognition of Taiwan—South American countries Taiwan-aligned countries in Latin America and the Caribbean Summary of the phases of evolution of China’s Foreign Aid Loans to CARICOM Countries China’s FDI in the Caribbean List of development grants to CARICOM Data on non-military scholarships from China to the Region (2001 to 2021) Other official flows Main customers and the main suppliers of Argentina

46 63 87 271 275 276 282 283 284 337

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PART I

History and Foreign Policy

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean: History, Power Rivalry, and Regional Implications Cassandra R. Veney and Sabella O. Abidde

Since the parting of ways between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), also referred to as the Chinese Nationalist Party (CNP), at the end of the Chinese Civil War and the establishment of both the PRC and ROC in 1949, China and Taiwan have been embroiled in a relentless and at time ferocious contest and contestation for diplomatic recognition and supremacy regionally and globally. After the establishment of both countries and for the next twenty-two years,

C. R. Veney (B) Center for Women, Gender and Global Leadership, Howard University College of Arts and Sciences, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] S. O. Abidde (B) Department of History and Political Science, Alabama State University, Montgomery, AL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_1

3

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Taiwan enjoyed global recognition and was deemed, in many parts of the world, as the rightful and legal representative of the Chinese people. However, three events caused a reversal of fortune which propelled China and stagnated Taiwan. First, China endeared itself to newly independent and emerging nations by its presence at the Bandung Conference in 1955 and subsequently investing in the decolonization of Africa. These moves would later become fruitful when, in 1971, many member states of the United Nations (UN) voted by way of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758, affirming the PRC as the sole representative of China and the Chinese people. Essentially, there was only “One China,” with Taiwan considered one of the provinces of China. And by 1979, the United States, under the President Jimmy Carter administration, severed formal diplomatic ties with Taipei and established formal diplomatic relations with Beijing instead. Although the civil war ended in 1949 with the relocation of the Kuomintang to the island of Taiwan, there was never an armistice (Larry, 2015), but rather the dispute between the belligerents has metamorphosed into a seven-decades-long legal and political question with no simple and/ or universal acceptable resolution. But rather, the global community was faced with two questions. First is the question of representation: which of the two Chinas is the true and legitimate representative of China? This question was resolved in 1971 when the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognized the PRC as “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations” and removed “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” from the UN. One of the consequences of this resolution was that many of the countries that hitherto recognized the ROC switched diplomatic allegiance to the PRC that also insisted on the “One China” policy. The second question, considered to be the more complicated of the two, is “What entity has territorial sovereignty over an emerging Taiwan?” This question persists even though Taiwan has achieved economic, political, and governmental autonomy and is, clearly, independent of China. And while China claims Taiwan as one of its provinces, Taiwan sees itself as a self-governing entity and has, over the years, rebuffed China’s entreaties at unification and the periodic threats of annexation. The result of this is that more than seven decades after the founding of modern Taiwan, it remains a contested state, an ambiguous entity (Sakharina et al., 2021), with less than eighteen countries recognizing it as a bona fide nation-state.

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Taiwan is one of the leading countries in Asia with a well-developed political and economic system and a society that is increasingly Western, modern, and globalized. China, on the other hand, is an emerging power on the cusp of global hegemony. In many respects, it is considered second only to the United States. But despite the geographic, economic, political, and military asymmetry, there is an ongoing power rivalry between both entities in Latin America, the Caribbean, and elsewhere in the world (Chen et al., 1995). In Africa, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) is the only recognized state that recognizes Taiwan. But not so in Latin America and the Caribbean where Taipei still enjoys a modicum of recognition. Thus, China has devoted tangible and intangible resources to effectuating the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan. Unlike in the African continent, therefore, the contests and contestations between the PRC and the ROC, to some extent, still loom large (Giusto & Harán, 2022).

Conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean According to Patricio Giusto and Juan Manuel Harán (2022), “China has made steady progress in recent decades in the region, becoming the top trading partner of most Latin American countries. At the same time, China’s investments and financial cooperation have also increased significantly,” and “The Taiwan issue has been at the center of Beijing’s interests in Latin America, as China seeks to increase the island’s diplomatic suffocation on a global scale and, in parallel, to annoy the United States in its historic backyard. China’s strategy has borne fruit, basically by dint of its unrivaled economic and financial attractiveness to Latin American nations” (pp. 2–3). Decades before China ventured into Latin America and the Caribbean, Taiwan was already a player in the region. Apart from Cuba, Beijing did not have an ally in the US-dominated Western Hemisphere until the 1970s when the Sino-US reconciliation began, and Taiwan started to become isolated diplomatically. To fill this diplomatic hollow, Taiwan tried to woo Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia. Taipei’s courtship mainly involved the provision of technical aid in the primary sector. Later in 1989, Taiwan managed to win the diplomatic recognition of five more states in the region because of international rage fueled by the “Tiananmen Incident in Beijing” (Linbin & Jonghyuk, 2022). And since the 2000s, Linbin and Jonghyuk

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contend, considering China’s huge economy, the balance has begun tilting to China’s side. Upset by the abandonment of the 1992 Consensus by Tsai Ing-wen’s administration, China has reignited the cross-strait diplomatic battle. In the last several decades, especially since the coming into office of Xi Jinping, “China pursued a vigorous campaign to erase any acknowledgment of Taiwanese sovereignty. To achieve this objective Beijing uses market access for businesses and the lure of foreign aid for countries in return for adherence to a “One China” policy, which means all diplomatic relations are with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and an end to recognition of Taiwan” (MacDonald, 2021, p. 4). Despite China’s vigorous, intentional, and most successful campaign against Taiwan, the recent electoral victory of the ruling party and candidate, Santiago Pena, on April 30, 2023, in Paraguay was a much-need win for Taipei.

Brief Description of the Project’s Scope and Content China and Taiwan have a continuing history of engagement with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that is worth examining. China’s foreign policy agenda and how Taiwan reacted to China’s move are also worth examining. This volume explores the immediate and future implications of China’s ascendancy and Taiwan’s increasing isolation in the region’s political, economic, and social space. China has been successful in terms of its intentions toward Taiwan. As of April 2022, for instance, Taiwan is left with just eight allies in the region. It is quite possible, therefore, that by the middle of the next decade, Taiwan will suffer the same fate as it currently does in Africa. The main purpose of this edited volume is threefold: (1) to examine the history of China’s and Taiwan’s entrance and their economic and political involvement with the regions; (2) to examine the manner, the outcomes, and the implications of the contests and contestations; and (3) to examine the implications of the rivalry on the region. Furthermore, we are also interested in exploring the immediate and future implications of China’s ascendancy and Taiwan’s continuing isolation. To achieve these aims, individual authors are given the leeway to use applicable theoretical frameworks that help to explain China’s and Taiwan’s engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean. Even so, there are a handful of theories that help to explain Cross-Strait relations (Wu, 2000). But insofar as their

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engagement with the regions is concerned, we shall pay specific attention to two frameworks: historical analysis and power rivalry. In terms of the structure, we began with an Introductory Chapter that sets the tone of the entire book and summarizes the chapters. The ensuing chapters are grouped into three sections: • Section 1: History and Foreign Policy. • Section 2: The Politics of Diplomatic Fidelity. • Section 3: Issues and Policy Approaches. Rounding up the volume is the Concluding Chapter that examines the big-picture concerning the implication of Cross-Strait relations in Latin America and the Caribbean. As China’s influence and power increase, the United States cannot afford to ignore China’s presence and activities in its immediate sphere of influence.

Summarizing the Chapters We begin with the Introductory Chapter by Cassandra Veney and Sabella Abidde who introduces the readers to the raison d’être and the structure of the volume. And Chapter 2: The Early History of China and Taiwan in Latin America: Cuba and Peru from 1837 to 1971 is by Angela Ju wherein she posits that China’s first major interactions in Latin America occurred during its Century of Humiliation from 1839 to 1949, a time of corruption, food shortages, overcrowding, and wars including the Opium War (1839–1842) and the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1860). These difficult conditions in China led to mass emigration. As a result, Cuba and Peru contracted hundreds of thousands of Chinese laborers beginning in 1837 and 1849, respectively, while the two countries were phasing out African enslavement. Initially, Chinese immigrants in both Cuba and Peru harvested sugarcane and became a major labor force for the Peruvian guano boom. After the Kuomintang (KMT) lost the Chinese Civil War against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, it retreated to the island of Taiwan, where it established an authoritarian one-party state led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. As a result, Taiwan, as the Republic of China (ROC), was recognized by most countries as the true China until 1971 when it lost its seat as China at the United Nations to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) led by the CPP. Cuba and Peru

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were among the first two countries in Latin America to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. Before 1971, Cuba was the only Latin American country to recognize the PRC in 1960. After the PRC was seated at the United Nations, the left-leaning government of Peruvian President Juan Velasco decided to recognize the PRC despite much of its Chinese community’s early connections with the Kuomintang, Taiwan, and anticommunism since the early twentieth century. For each country, she discusses the history of the first Chinese immigration in Cuba, their relationships with Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China after the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, and the decisions that led the leaders of the country to recognize China over Taiwan. Kavita Johnson, in Chapter 3: The “One China” Policy: Battleground for Recognition in the Caribbean, asserts that China’s presence in the Caribbean region has been increasing since the early 2000s. In addition to the search for markets and natural resources, it is motivated by the need to promote the One China policy and in effect, isolate Taiwan in the worldwide arena. Caribbean leaders have openly expressed their recognition of the One China policy, a principle that plays an important role in China’s engagement with the Caribbean and is the political basis for the establishment and development of their relations, whereby member states are committed to the position of supporting China’s reunification and not having official ties with Taiwan. Recognition of the One China policy is an important component in China’s relations with Caribbean countries, while some have remained staunch in their support, and others have flip-flopped over the years. The author then examines China’s fluctuating relationships with Caribbean countries such as Grenada, Dominica, and St. Lucia. In 2007, China came to the assistance of Caribbean countries by providing the necessary funds to build new stadiums. Caribbean states had been delegated to host the International Cricket Council (ICC) Cricket World Cup, but most did not have acceptable venues at that time, so it was necessary for them to build new stadiums and renovate old ones. This “stadium” diplomacy was integral in China’s quest to isolate Taiwan in the Caribbean, for example in the case of Grenada. The luring of wellneeded economic assistance and investments in exchange for recognition of China highlights the creative use of value-based resources by these small Caribbean states. From the cases presented, we will see how the decision to switch allegiance from Taiwan to China was made based on the size of the economic assistance packages and was also motivated by domestic political interests.

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In Chapter 4: Taiwan and the South Atlantic: A Shared History with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, Jorge Troisi Melean posits that connected through a river system that flows from the South Atlantic to the Mato Grosso, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay shared a common history. Remaining a backwash of the Spanish Empire until the 1760s, the region experienced a development of agricultural wealth from the nineteenth century that has remained throughout most of its history. When China became an industrialized global power in the twenty-first century, this region had a long tradition of trading manufactured goods and services from developed countries in exchange for food and raw materials. Furthermore, the chapter explores the history of the relationship between the Rio de la Plata and the Republic of China (ROC). Like most countries under the US sphere of influence, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay had satisfactory relations with ROC since 1949. Things changed in the 1970s when Argentina changed from recognizing ROC to recognizing the Popular Republic of China (PRC); in the late 1980s, Uruguay switched. Paraguay, on the other side, remains the only country in the region that still recognizes Taiwan. Through a comparative approach, we study the 1980s Taiwanese immigration to Argentina, the 1990s rapprochement, and the strategic relationship between Argentina and PRC, which includes agreements on One China and Malvinas. The chapter also analyzes why Uruguay wants to become the South American door for China and the fascinating tale of the 100.000 Chinese books that traveled from Montevideo to Taipei in the 1990s. And lastly, the author examines Paraguay’s “Taiwan cost,” or what the South American country loses remaining an ally of Taipei. In Chapter 5: Taiwan’s Diplomatic Instruments and Challenges in Its Relations with China-Aligned Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Fabricio Fonseca and Yen-Pin Su contend that Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region has historically been an important source of diplomatic “allies” for Taiwan. Many of the existing studies on relations between Taiwan and LAC have focused on those countries that officially recognize Taipei, with an important emphasis on topics such as development cooperation, aid, and diplomatic competition between Taiwan and China in the LAC region. The maintenance of those ties is of utmost importance to policymakers in Taiwan, making their study a relevant subject. Nonetheless, less attention is paid to the unofficial relations that Taiwan has been able to keep with the LAC countries that have no diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Following countries like the United

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States and Japan, many LAC countries that switched their recognition to Beijing in the 1970s also exchanged representative offices with Taipei. Since then, it has been possible for Taiwan to practice a type of public diplomacy in those major economies in the LAC region, cooperating with different groups in society and other key actors at different moments and with mixed results. The chapter also focuses on analyzing unofficial relations between Taiwan and LAC countries to present different challenges faced by Taiwanese diplomats and policymakers. Specifically, the authors provide qualitative analyses of the diplomatic instruments used by Taiwan in its relations with those countries that exchanged representative offices during the past decades, and highlight the role played by public diplomacy, with a special emphasis on the areas of trade and investments, as well as educational and cultural initiatives. Overall, the authors contribute to the literature by presenting a more comprehensive picture of the diplomatic opportunities and challenges that Taiwan is currently facing in the LAC region. And in Chapter 6: Soft Power and China-Taiwan Competition for Influence in Latin America, Mohamad Zreik avers that for the past few years, China and Taiwan have vied with one another to strengthen their economic, political, and strategic ties to Latin America. The ability to captivate and influence others without resorting to force, known as “soft power,” has been an important factor in this competition. The use of cultural diplomacy, media outreach, educational exchanges, and other similar endeavors to boost a country’s popularity and stature abroad is an example of a soft power strategy. In this chapter, we look at how soft power factors into the competition for influence between China and Taiwan in Latin America. Competition in the region is set from a historical perspective and primary factors are identified. The chapter then describes the cultural diplomacy, media outreach, and educational exchanges that both China and Taiwan use as part of their soft power strategy. The effectiveness of these plans to increase each country’s sway in the region is also evaluated in this chapter. While China has had more success in increasing its presence in Latin America, this chapter reveals that Taiwan has also made considerable efforts to keep its ties with the region alive. To strengthen its economic ties with Latin American countries, Taiwan has, for instance, looked to its strengths in renewable energy and health care. Taiwan has also put a lot of resources into cultural diplomacy activities including opening cultural centers and distributing Taiwanese movies and music abroad. When it comes to expanding its

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influence in the region, China has taken a more straightforward and outwardly focused approach, prioritizing economic investment and infrastructure development projects. The development of Confucius Institutes and the dissemination of Chinese media and culture are just two examples of China’s use of “soft power.“ The chapter engages with a discussion of the perceptions of China and Taiwan in Latin American countries and the variables that contribute to such opinions. It contends that China and Taiwan need to continue investing in soft power if they want to keep or increase their influence in Latin America and that soft power plays a significant role in defining China-Taiwan ties in the region. The chapter concludes by speculating that the balance of power in Latin America, and the future of China and Taiwan’s ties, will be heavily influenced by soft power. In Chapter 7: What Can I Do For You: The Republic of China’s Cold War Courtship of the Republic of Panama, Justina Hwang asserts that while Panama and the Republic of China had a relatively stable relationship before 1967, the coup by a leftist-leaning military led by General Torrijos led to greater uncertainty in foreign relations between the two countries. This ambiguity was reflected in Panama’s decision to abstain in the United Nations’ vote on Resolution 2758. Although the two countries’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs tried their best, and a few treaties came to fruition, the geographical distance between the two countries was often a barrier to a fruitful pragmatic relationship. This chapter examines the treaties between the Republic of China and the Republic of Panama, including a treaty for increased commerce and a treaty to send agricultural experts to Panama. While economic incentives did play a role in relations between the R.O.C and Panama, ultimately, they were too little too late for the vote in 1971. Although it was too late to save their seat, the R.O.C took their failure to heart and invested more effort in improving relations with Panama to keep their ally from switching recognition to the People’s Republic of China after 1971, including sending in an acupuncturist, who improved relations between the two countries’ leadership through Acupuncture Diplomacy, in 1972. Ultimately, while Panama did indeed switch diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China in 2017, the lessons Chiang Kai Shek’s government learned during the Cold War kept relationships between the two countries going strong for almost fifty years. And in Chapter 8: Past, Present, and the Future of Colombia’s Commercial Relations with China and Taiwan, Meng-Yu Liang, Jorge Calderón,

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and Juan Agudelo presents a study of the struggle between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan for commercial trade with Colombia. Using archive research, the chapter first explores the trade-related policies and norms which simultaneously reflect the evolution of that struggle and constitute the institutional framework upon which it has unfolded for more than forty years; then, measures the impact of those institutions over Colombia’s economy. The second part presents the balance of trade and foreign direct investment—including here the one related to the United States— and analyzes the pool of data through the lenses of economic theory. As a whole, the chapter demonstrates that, since America approved the establishment of formal diplomacy between Bogotá and Beijing in the year 1980, economic relations between Colombia and Taiwan have stalled, while those with Mainland have increased to the point of becoming Colombia’s second commercial partner; also, given the commercial war between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, the former’s increasing diplomatic efforts to protect Taiwan’s foreign relations, and the prevalence of the United States over Colombia’s politics and economy, the current state of Colombia’s trade with Mainland and Taiwan is very unlikely to change within this decade. Mohamad Zreik, in Chapter 9: Massive Chinese Investments in Latin America: What Is Taiwan’s Diplomatic Fate in That Region? claims that despite the long distances that separate China from Latin America, human, commercial, scientific, and technical communication has existed for a long time and is in constant development, especially after the Chinese President announced the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. Latin America has a large Chinese community and huge relations and mutual interests between the two nations; China is a major trading partner for most Latin American countries and many of these countries cannot achieve significant economic progress without cooperating with the Chinese. Moreover, the Belt and Road Initiative and the growing trade relations with Latin America have become a tool for achieving China’s political goals, such as recognizing the One China that includes Taiwan; an example of this is Nicaragua severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan and recognizing the One China in order not to harm its economic interests with China, which may hurt its national economy, and this applies to other Latin American countries. Taiwan may be the biggest loser in Latin America and other regions of the world. Choosing between trade relations with Taiwan or China, most countries will turn

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to establishing relations with the Chinese economic giant and thus automatically recognize China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. China has become a hot and attractive topic for many political and economic scholars, especially in recent times after the great Chinese economic rise. The chapter seeks to study the recent Sino-Latin American relations with a focus on the Belt and Road Initiative and highlight the political repercussions of this initiative on Taiwan’s diplomatic representation in Latin America and the One China issue. There is still a dearth of research related to the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America, also, research on China and Taiwan in Latin America is almost non-existent, so this chapter contributes to this field. The study concluded that China is a major partner of Latin America, and it has become a strategic relationship that brings together the two nations in the last decade, and the Belt and Road Initiative has strengthened this link, and according to the estimates of the World Bank and economic institutions, it is expected that inter-economic exchanges will increase in the coming years. China may be on the way to achieving the peaceful reunification of Taiwan, and the Belt and Road Initiative may be one of the effective tools. With a strong economy and its transformation into a factory for the world, China’s political and diplomatic position in Latin America will be enhanced at the expense of Taiwan. In Chapter 10: Strategic Communication: How China Promotes and Communicates Its Political Agenda in Latin America, Maria Zuppello maintains that in the last 20 years, Latin America has transitioned from being under the influence of the United States to forming strong economic and diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This power shift was possible due to strategic communication and soft power techniques such as cultural exchanges, language classes, social media, and diplomatic figures. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aims to position itself in Latin America as a reliable and powerful partner, offering a viable alternative to the West and presenting itself as a global leader. It also emphasizes the principles of “sovereignty,” “non-interference,” and a multipolar global order. However, recently, China has taken a more authoritarian approach, suppressed alternative narratives, and exploited partner institutions. In Latin America, Beijing capitalized on the Covid-19 pandemic by selling vaccines and medical equipment while blaming the United States for mishandling the epidemic. Its “vaccine weaponization” tactic spread false information and promoted pro-PRC propaganda. As technology evolves, the Chinese military is

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transitioning to “intelligentized” warfare, which uses Artificial Intelligence (AI) to disseminate more disruptive disinformation and create convincing fake images. Also, the Republic of China (ROC) issue has become a central focus for Beijing’s communication in Latin America, with several countries shifting alliances to PRC. China has adopted a diplomatic approach, using neutral language and institutional terms, while Taiwan’s representative centers have taken a more critical stance. With Nancy Pelosi’s visit to ROC in August 2022, Beijing’s attitudes began to change with harsh communication against the United States accused of interfering in China’s domestic affairs. Raising awareness of the PRC’s communication strategies, foreign policy, and political system can help bridge the knowledge gap in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region. Encouraging the exchange of ideas and supporting local journalists could counteract Chinese disinformation. The United States should prioritize bringing back ideology and presenting a compelling vision for the shared Western Hemisphere and its democratic values to compete with Beijing. And in Chapter 11: China-CARICOM Bilateral Engagements: Modalities, Motives, Impacts, and Directions for the Regional Integration Agenda, Dianna DaSilva-Glasgow and Dennis Pile examine the economic expansion of China in CARICOM. Much of the discussion is centered around development assistance which has been an important tool of Chinese foreign diplomacy globally. This chapter alludes to a linkage between the region’s embrace of the “One China policy” and the evolution of its economic relationship with China. In this regard, the diplomatic contest between China and Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) in the region and the associated implications undertone the discussion. The discussion also considers the implications of China’s emergence as a leading global aid donor for the status quo of the global aid architecture that sees the preeminence of DAC (Development Assistance Committee) countries. China’s South-South emphasis on development assistance offers alternative sources of financing for developing countries on terms that may be more favorable than traditional concessional financing through DAC countries and DAC-managed lending institutions. The author argues that given the region’s development agenda ensuring mutual benefit must be an indispensable denominator undergirding its engagements with China, particularly considering the lessons from China’s presence in other regions of the developing world and the need to manage relations with traditional Western allies.

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In Chapter 12: The Belt and Road Initiative, China, Taiwan, and Brazil, Charalampos Stamelos and Konstantinos Tsimaras state that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was officially launched in September 2013. And that the BRI is at the center of Chinese foreign policy under President Xi Jinping’s administration. BRI includes a web of investment programs that seek to develop infrastructure and promote economic integration within partner countries. Domestically, the BRI engages the Chinese economy as a way for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and President Xi to build legitimacy. Internationally, President Xi has affirmed that the BRI is designed for win–win cooperation and the mutual benefit of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and participating countries and that it seeks to promote multipolarity, economic globalization, and cultural diversification. There are five major priorities outlined in BRI, including policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and connecting people. As of July 15, 2022, 147 countries are part of the initiative. In the wake of the United States “Build Back Better World” infrastructure act not having funds to invest elsewhere than in the United States, countries that have so far not signed up to PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative but require development capital are increasingly turning to the PRC for finance and development. Brazil is one such country—not officially a BRI member country, but one of the largest recipients of Chinese infrastructure funding in South America. Those ties are getting stronger in the BRICS context. Brazil, as the largest economy in Latin America, has a solid foundation and great potential for cooperation with the PRC and therefore has every reason to be an important player in the BRI, Chinese Ambassador to Brazil Yang Wanming said in 2021. The bilateral relations between the PRC and Brazil are examined through the perspective of Brazil becoming an official BRI member country and the future challenges for the PRC-Brazil relations disadvantaging Taiwan’s relations with Brazil and Taiwan’s position in Latin America. Further, Taiwan, the Republic of China (ROC), and Brazil do not have official diplomatic relations since the 1971 UN recognition of the PRC as the legal representative of the PRC (“One China policy”). Taiwan has trade relations with Brazil, and there are representatives of the two entities to strengthen their bilateral relations. The areas of cooperation include 5G technologies, trade, and finance. Athina Moraiti, in Chapter 13: An Analysis of the Relations Between China, Taiwan, and Argentina and the Belt and Road Initiative, made it clear that the relations between China and Argentina and Taiwan and

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Argentina are examined. In the last ten years, Xi Jinping has given Chinese foreign policy a global facet. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become the most important strategic initiative of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy. The BRI is a proposal for international economic cooperation to execute projects related to trade and infrastructure along its economic corridors and maritime routes, with a focus on improving connectivity between Europe and Asia and making it open to all those countries of the globe that wish to participate in it. This work tries to examine the relations between China and Argentina throughout the years from 1972 until today and especially after the addition of Argentina to the BRI in February 2022. And finally, Chapter 14: Challenges China and Taiwan Face in Developing Diplomatic and Economic Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, by Priye S. Torulagha, is an examination of the challenges that China and Taiwan face and are likely to encounter as they compete to establish diplomatic and economic relations with Latin American and Caribbean states. The task is accomplished by examining the strategic goals of China, Taiwan, and Latin American and Caribbean countries, Chinese and Taiwanese investments in LAC, and analyzing the challenges that China, Taiwan, and LAC face as they interact to establish and reinforce their diplomatic and economic relationships. China, Taiwan, and LAC face several challenges that are unique to each based on their strategic circumstances in their diplomatic and economic relationships. China faces several challenges that are generated by its successes which require urgent resolution while Taiwan is confronted by existential issues that if not carefully resolved could lead to its being derecognized throughout LAC. On the other hand, Latin American and Caribbean states have the possibility of metamorphosizing into major industrial nations or becoming indebted and beholden to China in a state of dependency if the relationships are not managed with caution. The implications are far-reaching, not only for China, Taiwan and Latin America, and the Caribbean but globally. China is determined not only to reintegrate Taiwan by making sure it is derecognized diplomatically but also to usher in a new world order that is anchored on its strategic umbrella. Taiwan insists on being a sovereign state by challenging the legality of UN Resolution 2758 which legitimized the One China policy by striving to gain diplomatic relations in LAC and other parts of the world. Latin American and Caribbean countries, like those in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, want a fundamental change in the world economic system, and they are

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determined to become producers of finished industrial goods and services and be able to enhance the general well-being of their citizens. The development is prompting the United States and the West to react to restore the status quo in an increasingly changing world. For many decades, it was assumed that China did not have a coherent long-term strategy, especially in terms of how to interact with nations of the Global South. In recent decades, however, this assumption has been proved wrong given China’s steadfast march around the world—especially in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. In these three regions, what we have seen, in the last several decades, is competition and/or rivalry between both Chinas. In recent years, however, it has become a rivalry and competition in favor of China. However, that is not to say that Taiwan “is down and out forever.” No! Internal and external factors may cause China to weaken or implode which may result in the resurgence of Taiwan.

References Cheng, T., Huang, C., & G, W. S. S. (1995). Inherited rivalry: Conflict across the Taiwan Straits. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Giusto, P., & Harán, J. M. (2022). Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/ 2022/05/taiwan-fights-for-its-diplomatic-survival-in-latin-america/. Larry, D. (2015). China’s civil war: A social history, 1945–1949. Cambridge University Press. Linbin, W., & Jonghyuk, L. (2022). Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/ 2022/05/latin-americas-choice-and-the-cross-strait-diplomatic-battle/ MacDonald, S. B. (2021). Retrieved from https://nationalinterest.org/fea ture/china%E2%80%99s-inroads-latin-america-and-caribbean-demand-new-str ategy-197954 Sakharina, L., Patittingi, F., Hidayat, A., Aspan, Z., Halim, H., Hasrul, M., & Yunus, A. (2021). Taiwan’s sovereignty and its position to the South China sea dispute under the international law. Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues, 24(Special Issue 6), 1–14. Wu, Y.-S. (2000). Theorizing on relations across the Taiwan strait: Nine contending approaches. Journal of Contemporary China, 9(25), 407–428. https://doi.org/10.1080/713675943

CHAPTER 2

The Early History of China and Taiwan in Latin America: Cuba and Peru from 1837 to 1971 Angela Ju

Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to provide historical context for Taiwan’s and especially China’s relations with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly Cuba and Peru. China’s first-known interactions with Latin America date back to the sixteenth century via the trade between Manila, Philippines, and Acapulco, Mexico. According to Eugenio Chang-Rodríguez (1958), Sino-Latin American relations began in 1564 when Miguel López de Legaspi, under instructions from Philip I, sailed from New Spain to settle the islands near China, later known as the Philippines. Since the late fifteenth century, Spain had been trying to find a route to China and its neighboring countries for spices and other goods (Chang-Rodríguez, 1958). The Spanish galleon brought

A. Ju (B) St. Edward’s University, Austin, TX, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_2

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Chinese goods that had been traded for Mexican silver and some Chinese migrants and facilitated immigration during the colonial era (Connelly & Cornejo Bustamante, 1992; Palma, 2022). However, China’s first major interactions in Latin America occurred during the country’s Century of Humiliation from 1839 to 1949 when it suffered from corruption, food shortages, overcrowding, and wars including the Opium War (1839– 1842) and the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1860). These difficult conditions in China led to mass emigration. As a result, Cuba and Peru were able to contract hundreds of thousands of Chinese laborers beginning in 1837 and 1849, respectively, while the two countries were phasing out African enslavement. The contracts were not necessarily signed by the migrants themselves, and many of the migrants were illiterate and not aware of the terms of the contracts that lasted at least five years. Initially, Chinese immigrants in both Cuba and Peru primarily harvested sugarcane on the countries’ plantations. In Cuba, some Chinese contract laborers also harvested tobacco and coffee, and in Peru, many worked on the cotton plantations. Just as in the United States and Panama, the Chinese in both Cuba and Peru also helped construct the railroads. Additionally, the Chinese immigrants in Peru became a major labor force for the Peruvian guano boom in the Chincha Islands until the end of the nineteenth century. Generally, in both countries, the Chinese migrant laborers came primarily from the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, and Hong Kong (Lausant-Herrera, 2010; Zapata, 2019). After the Kuomintang (KMT), also known as the Chinese Nationalist Party, lost the Chinese Civil War against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, it retreated to the island of Taiwan, where it established an authoritarian one-party state led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. As a result, Taiwan, as the Republic of China (ROC), was recognized by most countries as the true China until 1971 when it lost its seat as China at the United Nations to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) led by the CPP. Cuba and Peru were the first and third countries in Latin America to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, while Chile did so about a year before Peru under President Salvador Allende. Before 1971, Cuba was the only Latin American country to recognize the People’s Republic of China after Fidel Castro’s government established itself as communist and terminated diplomatic relations with Taiwan in September 1960. After the People’s Republic of China was seated at the United Nations, the left-leaning government

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of Peruvian President General Juan Velasco Alvarado decided to recognize the People’s Republic of China soon after Taiwan had constructed a gateway at the entrance of Lima’s Chinatown and despite much of the Peruvian government’s and the Peruvian-Chinese community’s early connections with the Kuomintang, Taiwan, and anticommunism since the early twentieth century (Lausant-Herrera, 2010). This chapter focuses on the period between the first Chinese immigration in Cuba and Peru and the respective governments’ decisions to recognize China rather than Taiwan, contributing to the emigration of many within their Chinese communities. For each country, I discuss the history of the first Chinese immigration in Cuba, their relationships with Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China after the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, and the decisions that led the leaders of the country to recognize China over Taiwan.

The First Chinese Immigration to Cuba By the middle of the nineteenth century, Cuba was the world’s number one producer of sugar with an economy that had become heavily dependent on African enslaved labor (Hu-DeHart, 1999). After the abolitionist movement arrived in Cuba and the British launched an embargo against the African slave trade, Spanish colonizers took a cue from their British West Indies counterpart and saw inexpensive Chinese contract labor as an obvious alternative to African enslaved labor (Baltar Rodríguez, 1997; Hu-DeHart, 1999). The first Chinese contract laborers arrived in Cuba in 1847 when the Spanish brought in the first Cantonese laborers to work in the sugarcane fields alongside the enslaved Africans. However, the Chinese often worked in sugarcane processing rather than in the fields because plantation owners stereotyped them to be more precise and intelligent but less strong physically than the enslaved Africans. Due in part to China’s restrictions against women’s emigration, there was a small number of women contract laborers (fewer than five percent) who all worked in domestic services such as cleaning and sewing in Cuba’s urban areas (Zapata, 2019). Although the estimates vary, from 1848 to 1874, about 150,000 Chinese contract laborers entered Cuba. At the time, this number constituted about 10% of the total Cuban population (Baltar Rodríguez, 1997; Ju, 2014). Roughly 13% of Chinese shipped to Cuba died either en route or soon after arrival in Cuba. This high death rate, along with the high number of fugitives and their participation in the

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war of independence on the Cuban side, immigration from other countries, the continuation of the African slave trade, and the willingness of freed formerly enslaved people to work all contributed to the ending of Chinese immigration in 1873 (Chang-Rodríguez, 1958). Oriol Regué-Sendrós (2018) argues that the Spanish government created legislation excluding Chinese Cubans from the “white” racial category, which meant that they were not entitled to human rights for “free white labor” because the government considered Chinese people to be inassimilable and were wary of interracial marriage resulting from the lack of Chinese women immigrants. Since the colonial era, following the classification from the United States, these Chinese migrants were considered “yellow” (Zapata, 2019). These contract laborers suffered from exploitative conditions on the plantations, ranging from debt servitude to severe whippings, and many ended up resisting through suicide, flight, rebellion, or legal means. Half of the Chinese contract laborers in Cuba died before finishing their eight-year contracts (Yun, 2001; Zapata, 2019). Some Chinese laborers joined enslaved Africans in Cuba’s struggles for independence in 1868 in the hopes of freeing themselves from their contracts. A treaty signed between China and Spain in 1877 established Chinese consulates in Cuba (López, 2009). Upon the abolition of slavery in Cuba in the 1880s, the enslaved Africans and the Chinese contract laborers were dispersed from the plantations. With the help of Chinese immigrants from California and New York, the stereotypical Cuban image of the Chinese merchant began to emerge (Yun, 2008; Yun & Laremont, 2001). As in Peru, Chinese cooks, who were among the first entrepreneurs, opened restaurants. Along with tailoring shops, bakeries, and laundries, these Chinese cooks helped form the Chinatowns in the capital cities, serving thousands of residents of all classes. Additionally, practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine were able to gain a clientele from the upper classes (Zapata, 2019). In 1893, the Casino Chung Wah was established as an umbrella organization to represent the Chinese community in Cuba (López, 2009). The Casino Chung Wah was established with sponsorship from the recently established consulate of Imperial China. It took its statutes from the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association of San Francisco, established in 1882. In San Francisco, six different Chinese organizations united to form a single umbrella organization, generating a model that was replicated in Havana and also in Lima (Zapata, 2019).

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Even though Chinese migration to Cuba was restricted in the early years of the Cuban Republic (1902–1959), migrants continued to arrive through loopholes that permitted the entry of merchants, students, and tourists. Additionally, the need for agricultural workers to boost sugar production during World War I officially opened the gates for a new wave of Chinese immigration beginning in 1917. Unlike the earlier migrants, these new Chinese immigrants were able to maintain transnational ties to their home villages via remittances and return trips. As with other diasporic Chinese communities, the Zhigongtang (Triads) and Kuomintang vied for leadership of Havana’s burgeoning Chinatown and the broader Chinese Cuban population (López, 2009). Branches of the Partido Republicano (Republican Party) “Chee Kung Tong” (Zhigongtang), which had been established in 1902 in Cuba, spread throughout the provinces. The secret brotherhood association “Chee Kung Tong,” founded in San Francisco, California in 1880, has been recognized as the “Chinese Masons” and was known for its political support of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who is considered the founding father of the Republic of China. Triad members in Cuba generally came from among the lower strata of the Chinese community—small traders, itinerant vendors, laundrymen, tailors, barbers, gardeners, fruit stands operators, and restaurant employees. According to one report, the association maintained 10,000 members across the island in 1928. After the 1911 Chinese Revolution ousted the Qing government, branches of Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Party were established overseas, competing with the Triads for the loyalty and financial resources of the Chinese diaspora. The Cuban branch of the Kuomintang was founded in Havana in 1921. Leftist members of the Chinese community in Cuba participated in both Chinese and Cuban politics in the 1920s. During Sun Yat-sen’s brief alliance with the Soviets and the Chinese Communists, the ranks of the branches of the Kuomintang abroad were filled with left-leaning members. During these years, the Cuban branch of the Kuomintang and the Casino Chung Wah supported left-wing organizations financially, including the new Cuban branch of the Liga Anti-Imperialista (Anti-Imperialist League). In addition, the Cuban Communist Party extended its support to the revolutionary struggle in China. However, after Sun’s successor, Chiang Kai-shek, consolidated power in Nanjing in 1927, he purged Communists, causing a reduction in the number of Kuomintang members both in China and branches abroad (López, 2009). In Cuba, the KMT experienced strong competition from the left. As a result of the split from a

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united front between the KMT and the Communist Party, the magazine Su Xingbo led a leftist movement that adopted the name of Zhengyi. This group argued that Sun Yat-sen’s revolution had been incomplete and that the KMT was disloyal to the principles of the Chinese Republic. During the Chinese resistance against the Japanese invasion of China, the KMT and the leftist Chinese Cubans organized together a new united front, called the Alliance for the Defense of the Chinese Culture, bringing an impressive sum of money to support the cause (Zapata, 2019). The purge of Communists from Kuomintang branches in the Americas led to the rise of Marxist groups. For example, in Havana, Chinese community members who were alienated from the Kuomintang founded the Alianza Protectora de Obreros y Campesinos Guba Huaqiao Gongnong Geming Datongmeng (Alliance Protecting Workers and Peasants) in 1927. This group had an active role in Cuban political affairs and opposed the dictatorships of Machado and Chiang Kai-shek. Other leftists joined non-ethnic-based organizations such as the Cuban Communist Party from 1928 to 1929. In the 1930s, amidst anti-foreign sentiment, many Chinese returned to China or migrated elsewhere when the Cuban government nationalized labor (López, 2009; Zapata, 2019). After Japan invaded China in 1937, the Alianza Protectora de Obreros y Campesinos reorganized as the Alianza en Defensa de la Cultura China (Alliance in Defense of Chinese Culture) in 1938 and registered with the Cuban government in 1943. Then, in the final years of the Chinese Civil War between 1946 and 1949, the Alianza registered with the Cuban government as a cultural and mutual aid association that supported the Communists and changed its name to Alianza Nacional de Apoyo a la Democracía China (National Alliance to Protect Chinese Democracy) (López, 2009). The new Cuban constitution of 1940 liberalized entry procedures for those who already had family in Cuba. Even though after World War II, more Chinese women entered Cuba than in previous decades, marriages between Chinese men and Cuban women increased after the war. Because of the lack of Chinese women in Cuba historically, much of the Chinese Cuban community by the middle of the twentieth century was “mixed” racially (López, 2009). After having established a tradition of small business ownership beginning in the 1860s to the onset of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the Chinese in Cuba had established a Barrio Chino (Chinatown) with strong transnational ties to China in each major Cuban city (Hu-DeHart, 1999; López, 2004). However, beginning from

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the onset of the revolution to the brink of the fall of the Soviet Union, the Chinese community continued to decline (López, 2009). The revolutions in China in 1949 and in Cuba in 1959 would radically alter the profile of the Chinese Cuban community. In the 1950s, there was a migration of Chinese exiles who had fled the Communist victors to Cuba. About 3,000 Chinese exiles entered Cuba in that decade, including Catholic priests, KMT officials, and businessmen. The Chinese associations in Havana’s Chinatown underwent several changes as a result of the Cuban Revolution. For example, the Casino Chung Wah de la Habana started to accept the wives of a Chinese man and the children of one Chinese parent as members. However, these organizations started to decline because of the Cuban Revolution’s emphasis on class and national rather than ethnic solidarity. The only political Chinese association to survive called itself the Alianza Socialista China de Cuba (the Chinese Socialist Alliance of Cuba) and occupied the former building of the KMT. Relations between the government of Fidel Castro and the Chinese Cuban merchant elite deteriorated after 1960 when the Cuban government recognized the People’s Republic of China and broke off relations with Taiwan. The majority of the commercial elite went into exile in the United States. This exile was followed by that of the small shop owners after nationalization happened in 1968. It was not until after the twenty-first century that Havana’s Chinatown would be restored (Zapata, 2019). In the next sections, I discuss how relations evolved between the governments of Cuba and Taiwan and Cuba and the People’s Republic of China after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution.

Cuba’s Relations with the Republic of China Due to the historical interactions between Cuba and China before the Chinese Civil War, Cuba was one of the countries to which refugees displaced by the Communist victory over the Nationalists in China in 1949 fled. The Chinese in Cuba petitioned for their relatives to join them, and about 3,000 Chinese entered Cuba from 1950 to 1959, among them Catholic priests and Kuomintang officials. Even though the Kuomintang remained influential in Cuba in the 1950s, it lost its monopoly of political influence in the Chinese Cuban community. After the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, political associations in Havana’s Chinatown became more vocal in their

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support of Mainland China’s new government, but the Cuban government repressed the pro-Communist newspapers of the Chinese community (López, 2009). Fidel Castro’s government, which came to power in January 1959, did not terminate relations with Taiwan until September 1960 (Cheng, 2007). In his 1977 interview with American broadcast journalist Barbara Walters, in explaining Cuba’s alignment with the Soviet Union rather than the People’s Republic of China after the United States had started normalizing relations with China, Fidel Castro stated that he did not agree with China’s policies toward Taiwan as one of the reasons (Walters & Castro, 1977), a stance that Castro and his government would not change until after the fall of the Soviet Union (López, 2009). Nevertheless, Chinese Cuban Communists achieved more power after Castro’s government came to power, and they ousted Chinese Cuban organizations that supported Taiwan. For example, in 1960, the Chinese Popular Militia, José Wong Brigade, led by Pedro Eng Herrera, took over the buildings of both the Kuomintang and its newspaper, raising the flag of Communist China on the building’s balconies in Havana’s Chinatown (López, 2009).

Cuba’s Relations with Mainland China and Castro’s Decision to Recognize the People’s Republic of China After Fidel Castro openly allied Cuba with the socialist camp, the People’s Republic of China supported the country with significant economic assistance. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hoped that Castro would remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet rivalry. In the summer of 1959, Che Guevara traveled on behalf of Fidel Castro and the Cuban government to several non-Western countries, including Egypt, Indonesia, and Morocco. During these visits, Guevara secretly contacted the Chinese diplomats in these three respective countries and expressed an interest in developing relations with China. Trying to offset the potential loss of relations with the United States, Guevara urged the Chinese to purchase Cuban sugar. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai immediately reported Guevara’s request to Chairman Mao Zedong, who approved it, and then, Zhou told the embassies in the three countries to relay the information to Guevara. Additionally, on July 13, 1959, Cuban Armed Forces Minister Raúl Castro met with Yao Zhen in Havana, the head of the Chinese journalists’

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delegation. During this meeting, Castro expressed hopes of Cuba establishing a close relationship with the PRC. He told Zhen that Cuba would slowly sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of the PRC, and before formal diplomatic relations were established, he hoped that an “important Chinese cadre” could come to serve as an envoy in Havana (Cheng, 2007). In response to Raúl Castro’s request, the Chinese government selected Zhen Tao, the deputy director of the secretariat of the CCP’s municipal committee in Shanghai, as the PRC’s envoy in Havana in January 1960. Zhen Tao had received a delegation of the Cuban People’s Socialist Party led by Executive Secretary Anibal Escalante, the party’s executive secretary, when it visited China and Shanghai in October 1959. As a result of Zhen’s appointment as the PRC’s first enjoy in Havana, he also became the PRC’s first diplomatic representative in Latin America (Cheng, 2007). Mao and Zhou Enlai’s slow approach to establishing relations with Cuba was partly based on being wary about the nature of the Cuban Revolution and Cuba’s intentions to end diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Fidel Castro repeatedly and publicly denounced socialism and communism until 1959, even though he had been a firm Marxist before 1959. Castro’s government also avoided official communications with Communist countries in 1959 and much of 1960 (Cheng, 2007). After Castro announced his Communist aspirations and established communism’s dominant role in the Cuban polity, the Chinese government moved swiftly to cement Sino-Cuban relations and to pursue Castro himself. Formal diplomatic relations between Cuba and the People’s Republic of China were established in September 1960. On September 2, Fidel Castro asked an audience of over one million for approval on ending diplomatic ties with Taiwan and recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate representative of China, and the crowd cheered enthusiastically. Although no previous diplomatic discussions have been noted to have occurred before then, Castro was confident that the Chinese government would agree with this announcement. On September 9, 1960, Zhen Tao was authorized by the Chinese government to complete a communiqué with the Cuban government, and the final text was broadcast on September 28, 1960 (Cheng, 2007). Because Cuba was the first Communist country to recognize the PRC, and because it was the only Communist country in the Western Hemisphere at the time, Chinese officials took extra care when selecting the first Chinese ambassador to Cuba. Shen Jian, who had experience as a Chinese

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spy against the Nationalists, was selected as the first Chinese ambassador to Havana and was dispatched in December 1961 (Cheng, 2007). After the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Cuba and China, China’s economic aid to Cuba increased and became more public. In November 1960, Che Guevara led an economic delegation to China, with which he met with Chinese leaders including Mao, Zhou, and Chen Yi. Guevara and Li Xiannian, China’s deputy premier, signed a treaty providing Cuba with a five-year interest-free loan of sixty million dollars which the Chinese later confirmed did not have to be repaid. Guevara’s second visit to China resulted in a Chinese purchase of one million tons of Cuban sugar in exchange for Chinese rice, and to remain competitive with the Soviet Union, China agreed to buy sugar at the same fixed rate as the Soviets. Trade between China and Cuba had an average cash value of $150 million annually in the first half of the 1960s and peaked in 1965 at $224 million. China, at this point, was Cuba’s secondlargest trading partner after the Soviet Union. The Chinese also provided much economic expertise to Cuba (Cheng, 2007). Although Fidel Castro had initially tried to stay out of Chinese-Soviet polemics as the Chinese had wished, Castro realized the necessity of Soviet aid. Additionally, China could not provide direct military and technological support to Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Tensions between Cuba and China increased after Fidel Castro’s first state visit was to the Soviet Union rather than China despite Castro’s telling Zhen Tao that China would be the first country that he would visit abroad. In mid-1964, Cuba requested that China and the Soviet Union reduce their proliferation of propaganda in the island county. Because the Chinese were more dependent on propaganda, this negatively impacted China to a greater extent than the Soviet Union (Cheng, 2007). On October 18, 1964, Castro made a surprise visit to the Chinese Embassy in Havana during which he expressed a desire to mediate between China and the Soviet Union. Months later, Fidel Castro sent Che Guevara, along with Osmany Cienfuegos and Emilio Aragones, to China to try to persuade Chinese leaders to make concessions and compromise with the Soviet Union. On this trip from February 2 to February 9 of 1965, Mao declined to meet with Guevara, demonstrating a deterioration of Sino-Cuban relations (Cheng, 2007). Relations between Cuba and China continued to decline. On March 14, 1965, Castro publicly criticized China for engaging in “Byzantine feuds” and smuggling unwelcome propaganda into Cuba in a speech.

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Meanwhile, Mao’s writings were removed from Cuban bookstores, and Fidel Castro made another visit to Moscow. In both Cuba and China, particularly the latter, press coverage of the other country had declined from 1964 to 1965. During the same time, Cuba’s relations with the Soviet Union continued to improve (Cheng, 2007). The straw that broke the camel’s back for Sino-Cuban relations came in 1966 when the two countries failed to agree to the annual economic negotiations of trade of Chinese rice in exchange for Cuban sugar after fifty days. On January 2, 1966, Fidel Castro publicly denounced China for breaking its promise to maintain the same level of rice export and accused China of joining the US economic blockade of Cuba. On February 6, 1966, Castro made another lengthy speech attacking the Chinese distribution of propaganda in Cuba. In response, China published an editorial in the People’s Daily on February 22 stating that Castro “has taken an active part in the anti-China chorus” organized by Washington, Moscow, and all “international reactionaries.” Because the People’s Daily is an official organ of the CCP, it was thought that the criticisms were against Castro himself. Then, on March 13, 1966, Castro made another speech personally attacking Mao as a “senile idiot,” formally ending the Cuba-China partnership against the United States. Although the Chinese government never issued a formal response to this speech, the reaction was made apparent through the estrangement and hostility between Cuba and China (Cheng, 2007). This estrangement between the two countries would last until the dissipation of the Soviet Union.

The First Chinese Immigration to Peru Peru’s historical trajectory shared many similarities to Cuba’s in the early phase of Chinese immigration, but there would be notable divergences between Peru and Cuba after the Chinese Civil War. The rise of the sugar and guano industries in newly independent Peru allowed for an end to African enslavement by compensating the enslavers in 1854. To replace the labor needed for these industries, the Ley China (Chinese law) was passed to allow for the introduction of an indentured Chinese workforce in Peru. More than 100,000 Chinese laborers entered Peru from 1847 to 1874, the year of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation at Tianjin (Lausant-Herrera, 2011). Additionally, some Chinese laborers were recruited to work on Peru’s cotton plantations (Palma, 2022). The Chinese workers also helped with Peru’s guano

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boom. From 1840 to 1880, Peruvian guano was extracted for export to fields across Europe and the United States (Loustaunau et al., 2022). Additionally, the Chinese in Peru built railroads and extracted rubber and gold from the Amazon (Sanborn & Yong, 2013). Just as in Cuba, nearly all of these workers were men coming from the southern Guangdong Province or Hong Kong (Lausant-Herrera, 2010). Also, similar to the Cuban case, many of these Chinese laborers were exploited through debt servitude, many died before completing their contracts, and suicide rates were high. Some died from overdosing on opium that the plantation owners sold on the plantation and allowed as a form of social control. Opium was such good business that Peru intervened and declared a monopoly on the import of the drug, which it then sold to merchants and plantation owners (Zapata, 2019). Because of the difficult experiences of many of these Chinese migrants, the previously inward-looking Qing dynasty established China’s first relations with Latin America, beginning in 1875 (Creutzfeldt, 2019). In 1884, China sent its first diplomat to Peru (Sanborn & Yong, 2013). In 1904, Peru, once again, became a destination for Chinese labor migrants when a direct steamship line opened between Hong Kong and Callao. The years from 1905 to May 1909 were considered the golden years of free immigration. Unfortunately, these were also the years of bubonic plague in Lima and Callao. The Chinese immigrants were blamed for the disease, and this caused anti-Chinese sentiment in Peru (Palma, 2022). Peruvian plantation owners, however, defended Chinese labor as a “necessary evil,” and legally, the Peruvian government could not prevent the arrival of Chinese migrants due to the 1874 treaty with China that guaranteed the free immigration of Chinese. Within a few years, Chinese grocery and dry-goods stores could be found in nearly every city in Peru. Local Peruvians often resented the perceived domination that the Chinese had in these low-cost stores and restaurants. Newspapers called the Chinese a “yellow danger.” Furthermore, an apple of discord that existed for Peruvians was some Chinese participation in the War of the Pacific (1779–1883) on the Chilean side against Peru during the Chilean occupation of Lima. Hundreds of Chinese migrant laborers supported the Chileans in exchange for their liberation from plantation labor. The first anti-Chinese pogroms were a result of this war. The Battles of San Juan and Miraflores were followed by intense looting of the Chinatown in

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Lima, particularly by the defeated Peruvian soldiers and sectors of Lima’s general public. Although the Chinese community in Lima had supported the Peruvian cause, they suffered the consequences of resentment of the Chinese contract laborers in the South who had fought for Chile. The Chinese in Canete took refuge in a plantation where other Peruvians of color eventually massacred them. Anti-Chinese racism was common among the working classes, and anti-Chinese riots took place in cities like Lima, particularly during two riots in 1909 when working-class Lima residents attacked Chinese immigrants and Chinese-owned stores. These riots were motivated by new Chinese immigration made of low-skilled, free laborers who were seen to compete against Peruvians for jobs. For these reasons, free immigration ended on May 14, 1909, when it became strictly regulated after President Leguía succumbed to public pressure (Palma, 2022). In this year, a diplomat from Imperial China, Wu Ting Fang, came to Peru to sign a contract with Peruvian Foreign Minister Melitón Porras, limiting Chinese immigration to Peru. During this visit, the Chinese community appealed to Wu Ting Fang for help against stricter pawnshop regulations affecting business. Wu forwarded their complaint to the Ministry of Foreign Relations (McKeown, 2001). A third wave of an antiChinese movement occurred in 1919 among organized workers in Lima who saw the Chinese as lacking class solidarity. The popular and intellectual vanguards of the left distrusted the Chinese (Zapata, 2019). In 1930, Chinese immigration was prohibited when a total ban on the entry of Asians, including the wives and children of those already in Peru, was implemented (Lausant-Herrera, 2011; Palma, 2022). In spite of these measures, there were also signs of integration or establishment of the Chinese into Peruvian society and culture. The Chinatown in Lima had been in existence since the 1860s and was vibrantly filled with fruit and vegetable stores, bodegas, tailor shops, shoe stores, photography shops, and laundries. In 1910, the first Chinese magazine was published by Alfredo Chang, and by 1931, the magazine would become the voice of the Kuomintang (KMT). This magazine emphasized relations between the first and second generations of Chinese in Peru, and in the 1930s, it collaborated with the Chinese resistance against the Japanese occupation. By the 1930s, Chinese restaurants (chifas) had become popular among the general Peruvian population. In 1886, an emissary of the Emperor of China arrived in Peru, forming the Sociedad de Beneficencia China, Ton Huy Chong Koc (Chinese Benevolent Society, Ton Huy Chong Koc)

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in Lima. This diplomat sought to create a Chinese institution without links to the Catholic Church, which had tried to create such an organization. As in Cuba, the directors of this society were representatives of the commercial houses who had formal education and high economic means. The Chinese Benevolent Society formed a branch of the Red Cross to help the Chinese victims in the war against Japan in the 1930s, and the initiative continued during World War II. A census of Chinese Peruvian associations in the 1930s found that half of these organizations were dedicated to the patriotic support during the war in China or were directly political, primarily committees of the KMT. The other half were commercial, sports, or educational associations. Furthermore, the most important Peruvian populist party, the APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance), adopted a series of ideas that came from the KMT, especially the notion of a united front of social classes for national liberation. For this reason, APRA defended the Republic of China by making it easier for some Peruvian Chinese interested in local politics to become involved in the PAP (Peruvian Aprista Party). (Zapata, 2019). From 1930 to World War II, Peru experienced a military dictatorship, and successive governments passed laws to limit immigration and to restrict the freedom of Asians and their descendants who were born in Peru but who were also registered with their respective legations. For example, Law 7505 required all companies to have at least 80% Peruvian workers, impacting Chinese businesses because the majority of them were family-owned. As a result, Chinese immigration declined significantly after 1930. However, by 1931, the Chinese had settled throughout Peru and become the largest immigrant group in some southern Peruvian cities (Palma, 2022). After the end of World War II and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese community in Peru was affected by the breaking up of families. Until 1937, many in the community sent women to China to be educated (Lausant-Herrera, 2010). The majority of Chinese contract laborers who started a family in Peru were part of an interracial marriage; wealthier Chinese sent their Peruvian wives to China to be educated and to learn the Chinese language (Zapata, 2019). However, the Peruvian government had barred return of these women for fear of Communist infiltration and had also barred the entry of other relatives of the Chinese in Peru who wanted to flee China. As a result, it was through Taiwanese and Hong Kong networks that arrangements were

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made for the return and entry of these relatives to Peru (Lausant-Herrera, 2010). Relations with the Chinese Peruvian community in Mainland China broke off as a result of the Communist victory in 1949. Most of this community turned politically toward Taiwan and commercially toward Hong Kong, reinforcing the conservative political alignment that came from previous decades. The Peruvian government also contributed to the ending of relations with the People’s Republic of China because it feared the infiltration of Communist agents. Additionally, in the 1950s, the Peruvian government allied itself with the United States during the Cold War. For these reasons, during these years, Peru only maintained relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong. Furthermore, the Peruvian Catholic Church reached out to young Tusans, the descendants of the Chinese, with its anti-Communist preaching. By then, the Jesuits had left the evangelization of the Chinese Peruvian community to the Franciscans. After the Communist Revolution in China, several Catholic priests arrived in Peru after having been expelled from China. The reformist military government of General Juan Velasco generated great fears among the elite of the Chinese community after he broke off relations with Taiwan and recognized the People’s Republic of China. Some Chinese Peruvians with business interests moved to the United States and Canada. Although this appeared to be similar to Cuba’s trajectory at first, the fall of Velasco returned Peru to its previous conservatism (Zapata, 2019). By the 1960s, the Chinese community had become more integrated into Peruvian society. The magazine, Oriental, went through a generational change, and, under its new direction, the publication promoted the constitution of a Peruvian-Chinese Cultural Center, based on the full equality among descendants of Chinese born in Peru, and those born in Mainland China or Taiwan. The new generation of Chinese descendants, claiming a new identity, formed a club in 1961. From this point, the term Tusan appeared to define Chinese Peruvians, who claimed their role as a bridge between two cultures and nations (Zapata, 2019). By 1978, Chinese Peruvians were well assimilated into Peruvian society; Chinatown in Lima was a Chinese business district rather than a residential area (Wong, 1978). From 1980 to 1990, Chinese migration to Peru resumed. According to data from the Taiwanese government, nearly all of the 25,000 people of Chinese nationality currently living in Peru arrived during this wave. The majority of the recent arrivals from Mainland China came from Fujian

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Province or were born in Taiwan. Unlike the earlier waves of Chinese migration, the gender balance is more equal today. At the same time, about ten percent (three million people) of the Peruvian population has Chinese heritage. Beginning in the 1980s, the Chinatown of Lima started to lose its traditional character. Many Chinese descendants moved to less congested areas and the chifas also dispersed to various neighborhoods throughout Lima, suggesting the integration of these descendants into the broader Peruvian society. Generally, only the temples and wholesale stores remain in Lima’s Chinatown. Today, Peru also serves as a transit country for undocumented Chinese migrants seeking to enter the United States (Zapata, 2019). Despite the discrimination experienced by the Chinese in Peru in the early years of migration and despite being considered enemies of the nation after many fought on the Chilean side in the War of the Pacific, the Chinese as an immigrant group, as argued by Antonio Zapata (2019), has become one of the most accepted groups of immigrants in Peru’s history today and has integrated into the Peruvian conception of mestizaje (racial mixing). Altogether, between 1850 and 2000, about 250,000 Chinese migrated to Peru. While Chinese migration to Cuba stopped after the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Chinese migration to Peru was continuous, with a few exceptions. The last major wave started in the 1980s and 1990s (Zapata, 2019). Today, Peru has the largest Chinese ethnic population in Latin America (Sanborn & Yong, 2013). The Chinese community in Peru has provided networks in international trade and investment ventures and has played a key role in the establishment of business contacts with China (Berríos, 2010).

Peru’s Relations with the Republic of China After the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, the Nationalist Party inherited the relations with Peru established in 1875 under the Qing dynasty, even after it fled to Taiwan in 1949 (Creutzfeldt, 2019). In 1949, Peru recognized the Republic of China (Palma, 2022). Unlike their attitudes toward Communist China, Peruvian politicians were not hostile to the Nationalist government of Taiwan. The government of Taiwan invited Peruvian President Manuel Prado (1956–1962) to visit the island. In 1961, Peru sent its first ambassador to Taiwan, and the Nationalist government invited a Peruvian parliamentary commission to visit. In 1966, Victory Haya de la Torre, the founder of ARPA (American

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Popular Revolutionary Alliance Party), praised Taiwan’s agrarian reform and industrialization upon visiting the county (Palma, 2022). In the same year, after President Prado’s invited visit to Taiwan, Haya de la Torre saw Taiwan as a democratic China that was moving toward modernity. Haya de la Torre carried out a lecture tour throughout Taiwan, seeking to renew the link between APRA and the KMT, based on a common rejection of communism. At this point, Peru and Taiwan were unified in the fight against communism, and both the Peruvian Left and Right supported the ROC (Lausant-Herrera, 2010). As stated in a 1964 issue of Oriental, much of the Chinese community in Peru was disappointed when one of the major democratic world powers, France, decided to recognize the People’s Republic of China, in effect ending formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, in 1964. The fear was that the democratic world would turn against Taiwan’s Nationalist government. In Peru, the fear that the government would turn against Taiwan soon came to reality. The construction of the beautiful gateway at the entrance to Lima’s Chinatown by the government of Taiwan in 1971 came just before President Juan Velasco decided to recognize the People’s Republic of China (Lausant-Herrera, 2010).

Peru’s Relations with Mainland China and Juan Velasco’s Decision to Recognize the People’s Republic of China In 1964, while Fidel Castro was still attempting to maintain a neutral stance in the Sino-Soviet rivalry, Peru stood out as the only Latin American country with a pro-Chinese “splinter party.” The splinter party was founded by the majority of the Central Committee of the Orthodox Peruvian Communist Party. The splinter party expelled the pro-Soviet party leadership during an unauthorized conference in January 1964. Since then, both the pro-Chinese and the pro-Soviet parties used the same name. Peru, at the time, was the only Latin American country in which the pro-Chinese faction was the primary Communist group. Peru’s establishment of universities in remote regional centers also provided many opportunities for Chinese influence. Universities had long been centers of leftist thought with heavy student participation, and the Chinese government had some success in influencing student groups (Martinez, 1970).

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In 1968, General Juan Velasco Alvarado’s coup d’état put an end to neoliberal policies in Peru (Lausant-Herrera, 2010). Velasco’s Nationalist government (1968–75) sought to expand Peru’s relations with socialist countries (Berríos, 2010). Because Peru has a natural outlet to the Pacific Ocean and is a country for whom fishing is important to its economy, it has been re-evaluating its foreign policy priorities since 1968 and began to turn its attention to the Pacific Rim and strengthen its diplomatic relations with China (Berríos, 2010). Although the exact numbers are unknown, it is noted that following the Chinese in Cuba who decided to leave for the United States after the triumph of Fidel Castro’s revolution, a large number of Peruvian Chinese decided to leave for the West Coasts of the United States and Canada after the coup d’état (LausantHerrera, 2010). China was valuable to Peru’s foreign policy because China supported the non-aligned movement, of which Peru was an active member, and was sympathetic to Peru’s demand for restructuring foreign debt (Berríos, 2010). When the Velasco government decided to recognize the People’s Republic of China and completed Belaude’s agrarian reform including the expropriation and confiscation of agricultural properties and industrial enterprises affecting many in the Chinese community, these actions accelerated the departure of the Chinese of Peru (Lausant-Herrera, 2010). Initially, for the first few decades, relations between Peru and the People’s Republic of China were focused on economic and technical cooperation rather than the “strategic partnership” established in the 2000s (Sanborn & Yong, 2013). In February 1969, The New York Times reported that Peru sent a mission to Mainland China to discuss the sale of rice. By 1971, Peru had opened a trade office in Beijing and agreed to exchange its mineral, sugar, and fish products for Chinese soy, silk, laboratory equipment, and machine tools. On August 6, 1971, Peru announced diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China and voted for its admission to the United Nations. The People’s Republic of China, along with Cuba, Brazil, and several African countries, became allies in Peru’s bid for recognition of its 200-mile maritime limits (Grayson, 1972). In a joint communiqué, the government of General Velasco called Taiwan “an inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China,” acknowledging the “One-China” policy, while the Chinese government “recognized the sovereignty of Peru over 200 nautical miles of sea, adjacent to its coast.” Soon after his arrival, the Chinese ambassador to Peru announced China’s intention to purchase 150,000 tons of fishmeal from

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Peru (Grayson, 1973). In 1972, China gave Peru an interest-free loan of almost $7 million (Berríos, 2003). Furthermore, Peru supported the People’s Republic of China as the Chinese seat at the United Nations, took a Nationalist position on US-owned multinational firms, and agreed with China’s view on the principle of self-determination (Berríos, 2010). On November 2, 1971, Peru officially recognized the People’s Republic of China (Mora, 1999). Throughout 1971 and the beginning of 1972, distinguished visitors from Peru, including the wife of Peruvian President Juan Velasco, received special attention during their guided tours to China (Ratliff, 1972). Also, in the early 1970s, the Peruvian government carried out several state-sponsored development projects for which it received lines of credit and some technical assistance from China. Despite Peru’s economic stagnation in the 1980s from its large foreign debt that resulted in structural adjustment, diplomatic relations with China remained good, and trade between the two countries continued to increase (Berríos, 2010). In the Post-Mao era, diplomatic relations between China and Peru intensified in the 1990s. Peru’s renewed interest in Pacific Asia was largely influenced by Japanese Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori (1990– 2000), who saw Japan and China as promising markets for Peruvian exports. Fujimori’s Japanese roots did not hinder Peru’s relations with China. Although he had a particular interest in strengthening Peruvian relations with China, he saw China as the rising star of the Asian Pacific. In 1991, Fujimori became the first Peruvian head of state to visit the People’s Republic of China. During his ten-year presidency, he would make a total of four visits to China. Soon after Fujimori’s first visit to China, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Peru. In 1995, then-Prime Minister Li Peng made an official visit to Peru (Berríos, 2010). It should be noted that increased relations between Peru and China have not been without challenges. For one, Peru’s economy has been historically extractive. In the mining industry, one of the first sectors of Chinese investment, there have been disputes over Peruvian workers’ rights in Chinese-owned mines. Peruvian miners have clashed with Chinese management regarding low wages, long work hours, and unsafe working conditions (Berríos, 2010). These relations between Peru and China in the wake of the Peruvian government’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China would set the stage for continued Chinese migration to Peru and Chinese investment in Peru in the upcoming decades and for China to become Peru’s

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main trading partner as of the writing of this chapter. Today, the Chinese Peruvian population serves as a bridge for trade and closer ties between Peru and China.

Conclusion To understand present-day relations of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China with countries of Latin America as discussed in much of this book, it is necessary to possess a comprehension of the history of interactions among these countries not only concerning trade and economic aid but also concerning migration. The migration of Chinese migrant laborers in the nineteenth century to Cuba and Peru, in particular, resulted in Chinese Cuban and Chinese Peruvian populations that have become an important part of the histories and trajectories of these respective countries. The Chinese government has invested in keeping this history alive. For example, the new PeruvianChinese Cultural Center in the Campo de Marte, one of the largest public parks in Lima, was a donation from the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, after roughly a century of Chinese migration to both Peru and Cuba, the Chinese Civil War in 1949 had serious repercussions for the Chinese communities that had developed in these countries. Many members of the Chinese communities in Peru and Cuba were loyal to the Nationalists in Taiwan, causing significant emigration after the Peruvian and Cuban governments decided to recognize the People’s Republic of China and break off relations with Taiwan. As a result, tensions between China and Taiwan not only influenced their international relations with Latin American states but also influenced the domestic experiences of Chinese Latin American communities.

References Baltar Rodríguez, J. (1997). Los Chinos de Cuba: apuntes etnográficos. Fundación Fernando Ortíz. Berríos, R. (2010). Bridging the Pacific: Peru’s search for closer economic ties with China. In A. E. Fernández Jilberto & B. Hogenboom (Eds.), Latin America facing China: South-South relations beyond the Washington Consensus (pp. 135–152). Berghahn. Berríos, R. (2003). El Perú y la República Popular de China: Otra puente de entrada a Asia. Agenda Internacional, 9(18), 145–160.

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Chang-Rodríguez, E. (1958). Chinese labor migration into Latin America in the nineteenth century. Revista De Historia De América, 46, 375–397. Cheng, Y. (2007). Sino-Cuban relations during the early years of the Castro regime, 1959–1966, Journal of Cold War Studies, 9(3): 78–114. https:// doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2007.9.3.78 Connelly, M. & Cornejo Bustamente, R. (1992). China – América Latina: génesis y desarrollo de sus relaciones. Colegio de Mexico, Centro de Estudios de Asia y Africa. Creudtzfeldt, B. (2019). Overcoming the greatest distance: China in Latin America. In D. Johnanson, J. Li, & T. Wu (Eds.), New perspectives on china’s relations with the world (pp. 134–141). E-International Relations Publishing. Grayson, G. (1972). Peru under the generals, Current History, 62(366): 91–97, 116–117. Grayson, G. (1973). Peru’s revolutionary government, Current History, 64(378): 61–65, 87. Hu-DeHart, E. (1999). Race construction and race relations: Chinese and Blacks in nineteenth-century Cuba. In R. Rustomji-Kerns (Ed.), Encounters: People of Asian descent in the Americas (pp. 105–112). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. Ju, A. (2014). Representations of Chinese-ness in Afro-Cuban hip-hop during post-Soviet era Cuba. In C. Malone & G. Martinez (Eds.), The Organic Globalizer: Hip Hop, Political Development, and Movement Culture (pp. 171–188). Bloomsbury Academic. Lausant-Herrera, L. (2010). Tusans (Tusheng) and the changing Chinese community in Peru. In W. L. Lai & C. Tan (Eds.), The Chinese in Latin America and the Caribbean (pp. 143–183). Brill. Lausant-Herrera, L. (2011). The Chinatown in Peru and changing Peruvian Chinese Communities. Journal of Chinese Overseas, 7 , 69–113. https://doi. org/10.1163/179325411X565416 López, K. (2004). ‘One brings another’: The formation of the early twentieth century Chinese migrant communities in Cuba. In A. Wilson (Ed.), The Chinese in the Caribbean (pp. 93–128). Markus Weiner. López, K. (2009). The revitalization of Havana’s Chinatown: Invoking Chinese Cuban History. Journal of Chinese Overseas, 5(1), 177–200. Loustaunau, L., Betancourt, M., Clark, B., & Foster, J. B. (2022). Chinese contract labor, the corporeal rift, and ecological imperialism in Peru’s nineteenth-century guano boom. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 49(3), 511–535. Martinez, L. (1970). Communist China’s policy towards Latin America. Naval War College Review, 22(7), 79–98. McKeown, Adam. (2001). Chinese migrant networks and cultural change: Peru, Chicago, Hawaii, 1900–1936. The University of Chicago Press.

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Mora, F. O. (1999). Sino-Latin American relations: Sources and consequences, 1977–1997. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 41(2), 91– 116. Palma, P. (2022). The Chinese in Peru. Latin American history. Oxford University Press. Ratliff, W. (1972). Communist China and Latin America, 1949–1972. Asian Survey, 12(10), 846–863. Sanborn, C. A., & Yong, A. (2013, September). Peru’s economic boom and the Asian connection (Discussion Document 13/05). Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars. https://repositorio.up.edu.pe/bitstream/handle/11354/427/ DD1305.pdf?sequence=1 Walters, B. & Castro, F. (1977). An interview with Fidel Castro, Foreign Affairs, Autumn 1977(28): 22–51. Wong, B. (1978). A comparative study of the Assimilation of the Chinese in New York City and Lima, Peru. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 20(3), 335–358. Yun, L. (2008). The coolie speaks: Chinese indentured laborers and African slaves in Cuba. Temple University Press. Yun, L., & Laremont, R. R. (2001). Chinese coolies and African slaves in Cuba, 1847–74. Journal of Asian American Studies, 4(2), 99–122. https://doi.org/ 10.1353/jaas.2001.0022 Zapata, A. (2019). Los chinos de Cuba y del Perú: revisión historiográfica. Investigaciones Sociales, 22(42): 131–154. https://doi.org/10.15381/is.v22i42. 17485

CHAPTER 3

The “One China” Policy: Battleground for Recognition in the Caribbean Kavita Johnson

Introduction Caribbean states, during the post-colonial period, have typically relied on Western powers as sources of aid, investments, and special concessions. They adhere to foreign policy strategies based on the premise that due to their small size and colonial histories, they are in a disadvantaged position in the international system and as a result, need special consideration. At the beginning of the new millennium however, with the loss of preferential market access and concessions from Western governments, and the shrinking of Western foreign aid, Caribbean states have had to reorient their foreign policies by inter-alia, diversifying their relationships and using their natural and value-based resources (such as normative power, votes in international bodies, and support in international fora) in exchange for economic assistance. China stepped in to fill the void left by the region’s traditional development partners and purported, through

K. Johnson (B) The University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_3

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policy papers, its aim to deepen cooperation and achieve “win–win” relations by becoming partners with Caribbean countries in economic cooperation and trade, among other ventures. China’s presence in the Caribbean region has been increasing since the early 2000s. The growing relationship between China and Caribbean states became integral to their economic adjustment strategy as they coped with the changes in the international economic system. Caribbean states have been the recipient of Chinese loans and grants that have been critical to their countries’ infrastructural development. These loans have been provided at low rates of interest and prima facie without any conditionalities that have been the subject of much discontent in loans obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank. In Jamaica, for example, the China Development Bank has financed the country’s North–South Highway 2000 project with a loan of US$457 million and a further US$144 million in equity investment from the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC). On the part of China, interest in Caribbean states is motivated broadly by economic gain, political security, and global status. In addition to the search for markets and natural resources, China is motivated by the need to promote the “One China” policy and in effect, isolate Taiwan in the worldwide arena. Most Caribbean leaders have openly expressed their recognition of the “One China” policy, a principle that plays an important role in China’s engagement with the Caribbean and is the political basis for the establishment and development of their relations, whereby member states are committed to the position of supporting China’s reunification and not having official ties with Taiwan. Recognition of the “One China” policy is an important component in China’s relations with Caribbean countries, and while some have remained staunch in their support, others have flip-flopped over the years. Diplomatic recognition efforts also extend to the exchange of official high-level visits. For example, in June 2013, President Xi Jinping visited Trinidad and Tobago on the first leg of his tour in the Latin America and Caribbean Region. During his visit to Trinidad, Xi met and had bilateral talks with Caribbean heads of government from the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) countries that share diplomatic ties with China and not Taiwan. He announced that a US$3 billion concessionary facility would be given to eight Caribbean countries. Prime Minister, at that time, Kamla Persad-Bissessar of Trinidad and Tobago stressed that this concessional financing would be limited to those CARICOM

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member states that support the One China policy (Browne, 2013). In a similar vein, in August of that year, Taiwanese President Ma Ying visited the region on a 12-day tour of Latin America and the Caribbean dubbed “Project Congratulations and Friendship” (Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan), 2013). During the tour, he visited the Caribbean countries that recognized Taiwan’s independence and sought to “solidify” formal relations with them. The timing of Ma Ying’s trip so close on the heels of Xi’s is significant and highlights Taiwan’s efforts to sustain its allies in the battle for recognition. More recently, in 2019, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen embarked on the “Journey of Freedom, Democracy, Sustainability,” a four-day tour visiting Taiwan’s allies in the Caribbean (Taiwan Today, 2019). The trip was a diplomatic campaign designed as a reminder to its allies of their importance. This chapter will examine China’s fluctuating relationships with Caribbean countries such as Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia. While Dominica and Grenada adheres to the “One China” policy, St. Lucia is one of a handful of countries in the region that does not and instead, recognizes Taiwan. In the early 2000s, China came to the assistance of Caribbean countries by providing the necessary funds to build new stadiums. Caribbean states had been delegated to host the International Cricket Council (ICC) Cricket World Cup but most did not have suitable venues at that time; therefore, they needed to build new stadiums and renovate old ones. This “stadium” diplomacy was integral in China’s quest to isolate Taiwan in the Caribbean and was also consistent with China’s activity in African states. The luring of well-needed economic assistance and investments in exchange for recognition of China highlights the creative use of value-based resources by these small Caribbean states. Bernal (2016) asserts that “switching is often described as governments opportunistically switching their allegiance…depending on which relationship seems the most beneficial” (p.144). This chapter will examine why and under what circumstances these countries switched diplomatic recognition. In doing so, it will also explore the political and economic factors that influenced the switch. From the cases presented, we will see how the decision to switch allegiance from Taiwan to China was made based on the size of the economic assistance packages and was also motivated by domestic political interests. Definitions of the Caribbean are many and varied and so it is important at this juncture to note what is meant by “Caribbean” in this chapter. The most useful definition for this paper is by Payne and Sutton (1993)

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who define the region as being characterized by a combination of geography and history, closely linked to the USA by geography, language, and culture, while still being tied to European history and sentiment. This definition is the most practicable as it includes the islands in the Caribbean Sea, as well as Guyana and Belize, that share a similar political and economic history. Therefore, the countries which are included in this analysis are those that have a similar history, culture, political system, identity, and population size and which are also members of the regional organization representing CARICOM.1 Whenever the terms “Caribbean,” “Caribbean states,” and “CARICOM” are used in this article, it is only in reference to these English-speaking independent states.

Background China’s presence in the developing world has been linked to the drive to secure natural resources. In the Caribbean context, there has been some interest in oil and minerals, but there are also other equally, if not more important, motivating factors at play. Prashad (2009) opines that small states use unorthodox development strategies and posits that those countries without raw materials and commodities depend on their value-based resources. While China’s interest in Caribbean states is not predominantly focused on the exploitation of its natural resources, there are other valuebased resources that Caribbean states have to offer. This may be the case for the other CARICOM member states that lack minerals and natural gas, and yet, China assists them. Moreover, in the Caribbean context, due to the small resource base of even those countries with resources, valuebased resources are used to complement their foreign policy strategies as well. China has practiced some form of “checkbook diplomacy” in its foreign policy strategies toward the Caribbean. This is reflected within the context of the “One China” policy—as China and Taiwan competed for the allegiance of Caribbean governments. China’s interest in the region has been driven by the need to promote the crucial “One China” policy

1 CARICOM comprises Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago; as well as Montserrat which will be excluded since it is a British Overseas Territory; and Haiti and Suriname which are not English-speaking countries.

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and in effect, isolate Taiwan in the worldwide arena. The “One China” principle is the political basis for the establishment and development of relations between China and Caribbean countries, whereby member states are committed to the position of supporting China’s reunification and not having official ties with Taiwan. Manian (2005) argues that the USA’s distractions elsewhere in the world have helped to create the space that is the Caribbean region, in which this “battle” can proceed. Notably, at the beginning of the 2000s, thirty-one (31) countries held official relations with Taiwan, and fourteen (14) were from Latin America and the Caribbean. Today, only fourteen (13) countries support Taiwan’s status as an independent state. These countries are Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu, Eswatini, Holy See, Paraguay, Guatemala, Haiti, Belize, St. Lucia, St. Kitt and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The majority of countries are from the Caribbean thus presenting the region as a competitive area in state-to-state representation between China and Taiwan (see Table 3.1). From 2004 through 2008, the struggle between China and Taiwan in the region intensified. As China stepped up its activity in the region, it became a battleground for recognition. For those countries that already had diplomatic ties with Taiwan, China offered economic assistance in return, for recognition of the “One China” policy. In 2012, China completed construction on a $35 million sports stadium in the Bahamas, which was deemed by Bahamian officials as a reward for switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1997 (Archibold, 2012). In the case of Dominica, ties with Taiwan were severed in 2004 after a pledge from China of US$112 million in aid over a six-year period and the construction of a US$ 17 million cricket stadium. Following suit, in 2005, Grenada shifted its support to China as well. In a surprising turn of events, however, Taiwan was able to woo the newly elected St. Lucian government in 2007.

Dominica switches to China The Dominican government switched recognition from Taiwan to China in March 2004 which was disclosed in a notable address to the nation by Prime Minister, Roosevelt Skerrit. This decision generated much skepticism from citizens as there had been no discussion in Parliament or with the public regarding the decision to make the change in diplomatic recognition. Skerrit, however, argued that while he was aware of the lack of public knowledge regarding the diplomatic switch, “confidentiality

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Table 3.1 Caribbean countries’ diplomatic relations with China and Taiwan Country

China

Antigua and Barbuda Bahamas Barbados Belize Dominica Grenada Guyana Jamaica St Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent and the Grenadines Trinidad and Tobago

1983 1997 1977 1987–1989 2004 1985–1989, 2005 1972 1972 1997–2007

Taiwan

1989 1983 1974, 1989–2005

1983 1984–97, 2007 1981

1974

Source Compiled by the author with data collected from Bernal (2016, p.116)

was required because at that time we had formal relations with Taiwan” (Caribbean News Now, 2004). For this switch, Dominica received a pledge of US$112 million over a six-year period from China. Skerrit’s decision to embrace the “One China” policy ended twenty (20) years of diplomatic relations between Dominica and Taiwan. This was largely driven by economic factors. According to MacDonald (2022), Dominica had entered a recession and its economy had shrunk by 9.0 percent; although it had received money from Taiwan, it was not enough. China used this opportunity to woo Dominica with loans and financial assistance. Dominica played the game to see who would provide the better deal. A framework agreement was signed that facilitated Chinese loans of up to US$40 million with an interest rate of 2% per annum and a repayment period of 20 years (Bernal, 2016). These funds were designated for the construction of the Dominica State College, the State House, and road rehabilitation projects. In 2005, during the country’s general elections, diplomatic recognition became an issue on the campaigning agenda of the two main political parties. Skerrit’s Dominica Labour Party (DLP) supported China while its rival, the United Workers Party (UWP) supported Taiwan. According to Thorburn (2007), “Taiwanese flags adorned the homes of opposition supporters.” Skerrit won the elections and so the decision to switch diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China was upheld.

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Recognition of the “One China” policy is an important feature of China’s relations with Caribbean countries. In 2022, Dominica issued a statement denouncing former Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan. In it, Dominica stated that the visit was a “serious violation” and used the opportunity to reaffirm the “One China” policy that “there is but one China, and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory.” Dominica’s decision to issue a statement is multifaceted—a small state such as Dominica publicly denounces moves by the hegemon on this side of the world without fear of retribution.

Grenada Flipflops Between China and Taiwan Grenada’s relations with China and Taiwan can be best described as fluctuating, switching back and forth between the two (see Fig. 3.1). After gaining its independence in 1974, Grenada established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In October 1985, Grenada switched recognition to China which would, however, be severed just four years later, after the country re-established ties with Taiwan. This was following the election of Herbert Blaize, leader of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) as the party had forged close ties with the Taiwanese government (Jamaica Observer, 2011). In October 2000, Prime Minister of Grenada, Keith Mitchell, visited Taiwan for ROC National Day Celebrations where he met with the then President, Chen Shui-bian. Grenada benefitted from Taiwanese assistance in areas of agriculture and fisheries, sports, and infrastructural development and was the recipient of loans from the Exim-Import Bank of Taiwan totaling US$28 million over a 10-year period. In 2004, following the economic downturn from its blacklisting, and the effects of Hurricane Ivan which caused severe damage to the island’s infrastructure, Grenada established ties with China once more. It should be noted that after the hurricane, the Taiwanese government had given immediate assistance to Grenada even sending a delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to tour affected areas. Grenada was provided US$200,000 in supplies and turned a US$1.5 million fund for infrastructure projects into a disasterrelief fund (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan, 2005). The destruction of the National Cricket Stadium, formerly known as Queen’s Park, which was originally built from proceeds of a Taiwanese loan in 1997 was probably the trigger of Grenada’s decision to switch recognition. The International Cricket Council (ICC) World Cup was scheduled to be

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Fig. 3.1 Timeline of Grenada’s diplomatic relations with China and Taiwan (Source Compiled by author)

held in March 2007 in the Caribbean. Hence, the government needed to rebuild the stadium to keep its commitment to host matches. Taiwan offered $6 million in aid to rebuild the stadium. However, this package was seemingly unsatisfactory, and following the path of Dominica, the Grenadian government turned to China which offered the “better” deal. Switching Recognition to China On December 12–16, 2004, Mitchell and his Foreign Minister, Elvin Nimrod, made an official trip to China, which stirred great controversy and discontent with its Taiwanese counterparts because at that time, Grenada still officially recognized Taiwan (Taipei Times, 2004). Mitchell’s visit to China was therefore an indirect severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. China provided Grenada with monetary assistance to expand the national stadium in time to host the Cricket World Cup and the construction of 2000 housing units, thus resuming diplomatic relations

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between the two. In addition, China offered the Grenadian government a US$6 million grant to compensate for the loss of support from Taiwan, US$ 1 million scholarship fund, and US$2.5 million financial grant (Erikson, 2000). On January 28, 2005, the government of Taiwan issued a strongly worded statement formally severing ties with Grenada, stating that it regretted that: The government of Grenada, being lured through financial incentives from the People’s Republic of China, has decided to establish diplomatic relations with China. In order to uphold our national interests and dignity, the government of the Republic of China has decided to sever diplomatic relations with Grenada(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan, 2005). Moreover, Taiwan likened the conduct of the Grenadian government concerning its decision to switch recognition to that of “extortion-like behavior,” asserting that the Grenadian Prime Minister had incorrectly believed that “by his leaning towards the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan can be pressured into significantly increasing the financial assistance we provide to Grenada” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan, 2005). Lawsuit The Taiwanese Export–Import Bank filed a lawsuit in December 2006 against Grenada seeking the repayment of US$28.1 million in loans given to the country before it broke ties in 2005 (Jamaica Gleaner, 2011). The suit was regarding the repayment of loans negotiated between 1990 and 2000 by Mitchell’s administration which among them were loans issued for the construction of the Queen’s Park Stadium and other infrastructure payments (Jamaica Gleaner, 2011). The lawsuit was filed after the Grenadian government had decided to switch recognition to China a few months prior and was unable to immediately pay back the loans in full. On June 15, 2005, shortly after breaking ties, the Taiwanese Exim Bank issued a written notice of default pertaining to four loans that had been issued (Grenada Today, 2007). In January 2007, the court ruled that Grenada owed the Taiwanese government and was ordered to repay the loans in full. Grenada’s defense rested on its inability to pay its debt due to the challenges faced by hurricanes in 2004 and 2005. However, the judge ruled that this was

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not a sufficient excuse as the agreements had not provided for the delay or suspension of payments under these special circumstances. Based on the court’s ruling, the Export–Import Bank collected payments owed to Grenada by airlines and cruise ship companies (Daily Observer, 2012a, 2012b). However, in 2012, a US court released Grenada from the earlier court order that had allowed the EXIM bank to seize tourism-related revenues to pay off the loans. The consequences of the switch were farreaching and were felt beyond the lawsuit. At the inauguration ceremony for the Queen’s Stadium, which had been built by Taiwan and reconstructed by China, in the presence of Chinese diplomats, the Taiwanese national anthem was played. This diplomatic gaffe featured in news media globally and marked an embarrassing moment for Mitchell and his administration in the face of the Chinese (New York Times, 2007).

St. Lucia: Steady with Taiwan St. Lucia and Taiwan have enjoyed almost thirty (30) years of diplomatic relations in total, having first established ties in 1984 and again, in 2007. Since then, there have been several high-level official visits to and from Taiwan with the most recent being in November 2022 by Prime Minister Phillip Pierre (Yeh, 2022). During his five-day visit, Pierre met with Taiwanese President, Tsai Ing-Wen, and Foreign Minister Joseph Wu. Taiwanese officials have also made the trek to the Caribbean state. In 2013, then President Ma Ying on his 12-day tour to diplomatic allies in the Latin America and Caribbean region delivered a speech to a joint session of the St. Lucian Parliament. This was a significant moment as the last foreign political leader to have done this was Nelson Mandela in 1998. More recently, in 2019, President Tsai visited on the last leg of her four-day tour to the region and addressed the Parliament, marking the second time that a Taiwanese president had done so. The relations between the two countries strengthened on June 4, 2017, when St. Lucia opened an embassy in Taipei. Taiwan has actively contributed to the infrastructural development of St. Lucia by providing financial assistance for US$175 million Hewanorra International Airport project and US$50 million loans for an island-wide road and infrastructure program (MacDonald, 2022).

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Switching Sides (Again) On May 7, 1984, St. Lucia formally established diplomatic relations with Taiwan and maintained ties for thirteen (13) years. St. Lucia switched diplomatic recognition to China on September 1, 1997, only to later resume relations with Taiwan on May 1, 2007. Recognition of the “One China” policy, such as in the case of Dominica, was a divisive issue among the country’s two main political parties. The St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP), led by Kenny Anthony supported Taiwan, and the United Workers Party (UWP), led by John Compton, supported Taiwan (Jamaica Observer, 2012a, 2012b). St. Lucia’s decision in 1997 to recognize China was due to the election of Anthony as Prime Minister, who immediately switched recognition of Taiwan to China. Anthony asserted that the country could not “remain trapped in the arrangements of the past administration” and that the establishment of formal relations with China would “bring maximum benefit” to the country (Anthony, 1997). Under his administration, China aided with the construction of a national stadium in time to host the ICC World Cup, consistent with China’s “stadium” diplomacy activities in other Caribbean countries such as Grenada and Jamaica. The China-Taiwan issue once again became pervasive in St. Lucia’s domestic politics during its elections in 2007 when the newly elected Prime Minister, Compton of the UWP, once again re-established ties with Taiwan. Despite China’s contributions that included building the George Odlum National Stadium, St. Lucia did not gain benefits such as an influx of Chinese tourists as they had anticipated. Rufus Bosquet, St. Lucia’s then Foreign Minister, stated that the decision would be based on which suitor could offer a better deal to St. Lucia and that they would support those who “give you the most” (NBC News, 2007). The resumption of ties with Taiwan in 2007 was followed almost immediately by the suspension of diplomatic relations by China. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jiancho said that the reinstitution of diplomatic relations was a “brazen violation of the principles of the communiqué on establishing diplomatic relations between China and Saint Lucia and a gross interference in China’s internal affairs” (Jiancho, 2007). The St. Lucia case is different from that of Grenada and Dominica in the sense that it still currently recognizes Taiwan. However, what is more important are the similarities among the cases which highlight how the China-Taiwan battle influences the domestic politics of Caribbean

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states and are grounded in their search for economic attainment. Interestingly, in 2011, when the SLP under Anthony’s leadership was re-elected to power, he decided to maintain the status quo with Taiwan, an unexpected move as it was Anthony who had severed relations with Taiwan and supported China. This was following a report prepared by a former Prime Minister Professor Vaughn Lewis, which recommended that St. Lucia maintain relations with Taiwan while seeking simultaneous diplomatic ties with China. In response, the Chinese Embassy asserted that China does not accept double recognition (NBC News, 2007). Prior to Anthony’s victory at the polls, it was speculated that he would immediately reestablish ties with China especially after having accused a former ambassador of Taiwan of “meddling” in the domestic politics of the country. However, Anthony instead asserted the country could not continue to “jump from one side to another, after every general election, just for more largesse. We cannot behave as if our sovereignty is for sale to the highest bidder” (Edmonds, 2012).

Assessment and Conclusion China’s growing presence in the Caribbean at the beginning of the new millennium involved not only the strengthening of ties with countries that had already established diplomatic relations but also the increasing efforts to persuade countries that had not, to sever ties with Taiwan. What ensued was an increase in diplomatic activity by both China and Taiwan resulting in a bidding war for recognition. On China’s part, this was a deliberate move to enhance its global image, improve its relations with the developing world, and isolate Taiwan. Recognition of the “One China” policy is, therefore, an important component in the relations of the Caribbean states and China. Taiwan, in its struggle for political survival, escalated its efforts to maintain its allies to strengthen its claim as a sovereign state. In the cases presented, economic cooperation is provided in exchange for the recognition of China and Taiwan. In the context of small states in the international system, this exchange highlights the creative use of value-based resources by these small states without other resources to offer. China has actively tried to strengthen its political and diplomatic links within the international community in order to improve its image and further increase its influence. Deng (2005) asserts that China places great emphasis on the concept of international status. As a rising power, an

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improved image and increased role of China in the developing world will help to give China more influence in the international system. Caribbean countries, though small, possess strong diplomatic power in their numbers and quality advocacy. Therefore, the development of diplomatic and economic investments in the Caribbean may be considered an important strategy to augment China’s global status and to keep Taiwan’s claim to independence at bay. As seen in the cases presented, diplomatic recognition has been polarized by political parties. Support for China and Taiwan has been linked to political parties. This highlights the importance of the individual and state levels of analysis in making foreign policy decisions in small states. Domestic politics influence the foreign policies of small states in that political affiliations and consequently political division often affected the foreign policy decision-making process. Grenada’s decision to switch recognition in 2004 highlights the influence of the individual level in the foreign policy behavior of small states, whereby the Prime Minister has the power to make decisions. Moreover, the interplay of domestic and foreign is witnessed as early as 1989, when the NDC switched recognition due to its party alignment. Taiwan’s lawsuit against Grenada is a concrete example of cases where leaders of small states make decisions without complete assessment or prior consultation. Rather, decisions are made based on immediate economic goals and the need for survival. In this case, Grenada needed to rebuild the cricket stadium and China presented a more attractive package. The same is true in the cases of Dominica and St. Lucia, the decision to switch allegiance was made by the Prime Ministers upon their election to office. The recent trip of Taiwanese President Tsai to the Caribbean is significant against the backdrop of the escalation of tensions between China and Taiwan. In its claim for sovereignty and statehood, recognition by the international community is an essential criterion. The visit sought to reaffirm relations with its existing allies. Macdonald (2022) opines that Tsai’s trip sought not only to preserve existing ties but to “fend” off Chinese pressure on countries like Haiti, especially after the Dominican Republic had recently severed ties. Concerns regarding Taiwan’s further loss of diplomatic allies are valid especially when considering China’s ability to provide financial assistance and investments on a far greater level and scope.

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References Anthony, K. (1997, August 29). Address to the nation by Prime Minister, the Hon. Kenny D. Anthony on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the people’s republic of China. https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/primeminister/for mer_prime_ministers/kenny_d_anthony/statements/1997/pmonchina.htm Archibold, R. (2012, April 7). China buys inroads in the Caribbean, catching U.S. notice. NY Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/world/ame ricas/us-alert-as-chinas-cash-buys-inroads-in-caribbean.html?pagewanted=all& _r=0 Bernal, R. (2016). Dragon in the Caribbean: China’s global re-dimensioning challenges and opportunities for the Caribbean. Ian Randle Publishers. Browne, J. (2013, June 3). US $3b for region: No $$ for St Lucia, St Kitts, 3 others. Trinidad Express. http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/US-3b-forregion-209876301.html. Caribbean News Now. (2004, March 30). Dominica severs diplomatic relations with Taiwan. http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/topstory-Dominicasevers-diplomatic-relations-with-Taiwan-492.html Daily Observer. (2012, July 6). Grenada re-affirms commitment to China. http://antiguaobserver.com/grenada-re-affirms-commitment-to-china/ Deng, Y. (2005). Better than power: International status in Chinese foreign policy. In Y. Deng & F. Wang (Eds.), China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy (pp. 51–72). Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Edmonds, K. (2012, September 27). An unexpected ally: St. Lucia to maintain recognition of Taiwan. The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA). https://nacla.org/blog/2012/9/27/unexpected-allyst-lucia-maintain-recognition-taiwan Erikson, D. (2000, December 16). China in the Caribbean: The new big brother, China Brief 9(25). http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID= 32&pubID=2204 Grenada Today. (2007, February 3). Monies owed for stadium and ministerial complex. http://www.belgrafix.com/gtoday/2007news/Feb/Feb03/Tai wan-sues-for-59-million.htm. Jamaica Gleaner. (2011, October 26). Grenada says Taiwan trying to cripple economy.http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20111026/business/ business8.html ———. (2011, November 18). Lawyer clarifies Taiwan loan dispute. http://jam aica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20111118/business/business94.html Jamaica Observer. (2012, September 16). St. Lucia torn between two lovers-China and Taiwan. http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/editorial/St-Lucia-torn-bet ween-two-lovers---China-and-Taiwan_12533154 Jianchao, Liu. (2007, May 11). Remarks on Taiwan’s announcement of the resumption of its so-called “diplomatic relations” with Saint Lucia. Consulate

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General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco. http://sanfranci sco.chinaconsulate.gov.cn/eng/xw/200705/t20070511_4380585.htm Manian, S. (2005, May). For all the tea in China: China and Taiwan’s policy in the circum-Caribbean. Caribbean Studies Association (CSA), Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. MacDonald, S. (2022). The new cold war, China, and the Caribbean: Economic Statecraft. Palgrave Macmillan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan. (2005, January 28). In order to uphold our national interests and dignity, the government of the Republic of China has decided to sever diplomatic relations with Grenada as of today. http://www. mofa.gov.tw/EnMobile/News_Content.aspx? Morris, D. (2008). The commodification of sovereignty: the Caribbean’s relations with China. Presentation at Ace Conference. http://www.mona.uwi.edu/eco nomics/notices/Presentations/Ms%20Dana20Morris.pdf NBC News. (2007, May 1). China irked by St. Lucia’s new ties with Taiwan. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna18425879 New York Times. (2007, February 8). Grenada: Bandleader loses job in Chinese anthem gaffe.https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/08/world/americas/08b riefs-grenadagaffe.html Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan). (2013, August 21). President ma returns to Taiwan after trip to South America and the Caribbean. https:// english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/4222 Payne, A., & Sutton, P. (1993). Modern Caribbean politics. John Hopkins University Press. Prasad, N. (2009). Small but smart: Small states in the global system. In A. Cooper & T. Shaw (Eds.), The diplomacies of small states between vulnerability and resilience (pp. 41–64). Palgrave Macmillan. Taipei Times. (2004, December 22). MOFA has pessimistic outlook on ties with Grenada. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/ 12/22/ 203216209 Taiwan Today. (2019, July 2). MOFA announces Tsai’s Journey of Freedom, Democracy, Sustainability. https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2&post= 157933 Thorburn, D. (2007, September 25). Remapping Caribbean geopolitics. The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA). https://nacla.org/ article/remappingcaribbean-Geopolitics Yeh, J. (2022, November 27). St. Lucia Prime Minister Pierre to visit Taiwan next week: MOFA. Focus Taiwan. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202211 270010

CHAPTER 4

Taiwan and the South Atlantic: A Shared History with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay Jorge Troisi Melean

Introduction Connected through a river system that flows from the South Atlantic to the Mato Grosso, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay share a common history. Remaining a backwash of the Spanish Empire until the 1760s, the region has experienced a development of agricultural wealth since the second half of the nineteenth century that has remained throughout most of its history. When China became an industrialized global power in the

This work was generously supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Taiwan Fellowship, 2022. J. T. Melean (B) Universidad Nacional de La Plata, La Plata, Argentina e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_4

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twenty-first century, this region had a long tradition of trading manufactured goods and services from developed countries in exchange for food and raw materials. This chapter explores the history of the relationship between the Rio de la Plata and the Republic of China (ROC). Like most countries under the US sphere of influence, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay had satisfactory relations with ROC since 1949. Things changed in the 1970s when Argentina switched from recognizing ROC to recognizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC); in the late 1980s, Uruguay also switched. Paraguay, on the other side, remains the only country in the region that still recognizes Taiwan. Through a comparative approach, the chapter examines Taiwanese immigration to Argentina during the 1980s and the 1990s. It also examines the strategic relationship between Argentina and the PRC, which includes agreements on the One China/Taiwan/Tibet and Malvinas/ Falkland policies. We analyze why Uruguay wants to become the front door for China in the South Atlantic region, and the history of TaiwaneseUruguayan relations through the fascinating tale of the 100,000 Chinese books that traveled from Montevideo to Taipei in the 1990s. We will also examine the special case of Paraguay to “the Taiwan cost”, or what the South American country would lose to remain an ally of Taipei. What are the implications of China’s ascendency? Is it Taiwan’s destiny to be isolated? From these three case studies, we expect to open a debate on the consequences of the emerging relationship between China, Taiwan, and the world.

1945–1972: From Argentine Recognition to Argentine Withdrawal On January 1, 1945, the governments of China and Argentina established diplomatic relations. Sent by Vice President Juan Peron, the physician José Arce arrived at the provisional Chinese capital Chongqing in November to become the first Argentinian Ambassador in China. After a belated declaration of war against Germany, Argentina needed to be reinserted into the international community. One of the conditions for the admission of the recently created United Nations was the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Chinese state as it was one of the five members of the Security Council. In December, Arce presented his

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credentials as Argentina’s Ambassador to Chiang Kai-shek (Bosoer, 2011, pp. 74–78). Six months later, Arce traveled to New York to become the Argentine Ambassador to the UN. By then, Argentina was a new country. After the elections in February, Peron became President beginning the most important political movement in Argentine history. Arce’s activity as Ambassador was short but useful. He signed the first agreement with the ROC in 1947 (Oviedo, 2010, p. 43). In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won the Civil War. The CCP established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in mainland China while the ROC government retreated to the island of Taiwan. When both entities claimed to be the sole legitimate government of China, the Argentine Peronist government decided to recognize the ROC as the real China, as the US and most of its allies did (Oviedo, 2007, p. 21). One year later, when the United Nations Security Council denounced the North Korean move as an invasion and authorized the dispatch of forces to Korea to repel it, Argentina supported the US in declaring Communist China as an aggressor.1 On the one hand, despite the rhetoric of the “third position” between East and West, Argentina’s collaboration with the US was expressed by the American Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Argentine government (US Department of State, 1951). On the other hand, Peron ordered some government agents to make contacts to open the market for Argentine grains in China (Oviedo, 2007, p. 21). As a result of these negotiations, by the 1960s, Argentine wheat accounted for more than 90% of all trade between Latin America and China (Ratliff, 1972, p. 858). Argentine wheat exports to the PRC eroded the Chinese assumption of considering the complete Western hemisphere under the American sphere of influence and opened the door for future contacts (Worden, 1977, p. 194). China’s Communist Revolution had an evident transformative impact on global international relations that also affected the world of culture. When Switzerland promptly recognized the PRC in 1949, the Chinese librarian Lee Shih-Tseng thought that his life’s work was in danger. Lee 1 ROC official press understood from the beginning that the rise of Peronism had little to do with communism gaining any ground in South America. Nationalism could encourage anti-Yanquism but that did not get closer to the Kremlin (TT, December 1, 1952).

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had been the organizer of the Sino-Library International (SIL), a collection of more than 100,000 Chinese books and a Chinese culture agency established in Geneva, home of the League of Nations, beginning in 1933. With direct contact between Zurich and Beijing, Lee considered that the SIL was at risk of being seized by the PRC (TT , April 1, 1995). Consequently, he traveled to different countries in the Americas to finally contact Hugo Fernández Artucio, an Uruguayan friend who worked with him for the Free World magazine in New York. In turn, Artucio, a historian and Sinologist, persuaded Dionisio Trillo Pays, Director of the Public Library of Uruguay (BNU), to acquire the collection and ship it to Uruguay. The unique situation of Uruguay, with no ties to either Peking or Taipei, was the destination Lee was looking for (Alzugarat, 2019, p. 91). In 1952, the Ministry of Education of Uruguay paid the freight and shipping costs to move the library to Montevideo (TT , April 1, 1995). Lee and more than 30 specialists from ROC moved to Uruguay, including the curator Professor Hsiao Yu, a former friend of Mao Zedong (Alzugarat, 2019, pp. 93–94). The entire library of 350 boxes arrived by boat at the BNU. With the BNU in a precarious financial situation, most of the boxes would remain unopened for decades (TT , April 1, 1995). Unlike what happened in Geneva, the SIL would not have a vibrant life (Qiang, 2015, p. 138). After almost two decades, in April 1967, the SIL was officially opened. The official opening did not change the weak role of the SIL as a promoter of Chinese culture. Except for some scattered cultural events, like the 1969 exhibition 3000 Años de arte Chino, there were no activities (Alzugarat, 2019, p. 159). More significant than the presence of the SIL in Montevideo was the activity of Professor Hsiao Yu. He attracted dozens of people to Chinese art and culture in Uruguay, the most important of them was Elena Ramírez. Elena Ramirez was probably who better embodied the period of official relations between Uruguay and Taiwan. A student of the Chinese culture of Professor Yu in Uruguay, she became an admirer of Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the ROC. For his centennial, she established the Sun Yat-sen College in Montevideo in 1965. Ramirez traveled several times to Taipei to show her work as a painter and calligrapher and to give talks in different places such as Academia Sínica, Tamkang University, and Fu Jen University (TT , February 1,

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1969, Alzugarat, 173 and NT , June 7, 1972, and September 26, 1975). During her trips, Ramirez took home paintings and calligraphic scrolls becoming one of the most important collectors of Chinese art. She was a member of the Kuomintang, the only foreign woman to be admitted to the ruling party (Shek Cerne, 2022 and TT , August 1, 1969). Similar to Uruguay, Paraguay did not maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC prior to the defeat of the Nationalist government in 1949. In 1954, Alfredo Stroessner led a coup d’état that opened a period of highly authoritarian rule. Stroessner suspended civil liberties, ruling Paraguay harshly as a dictator. He served as President of Paraguay until 1989 (Lambert & Nickson, 2013, pp. 6–7). Paraguay kept its historical isolationism, relying on American economic and military aid that supported Stroessner’s anticommunism (Brunea, 1989, p. 192). Concurrently in Taiwan, during the period that came to be known as the White Terror, opponents to Chiang Kai-shek were exiled, incarcerated, tortured, and eventually executed. Chiang and Stroessner shared the same cosmovision of anticommunism and the need to maintain ties with Washington. It was not surprising that Asuncion and Taipei initiated diplomatic relations in 1957 (Tucker & Stünkel, 2020). In Argentina, a new coup d’état in 1955 started eighteen years of Peronism’s political exclusion. It was a turbulent political period with Peron in exile in Spain. Although proscribed, Peronism remained the strongest electoral base, becoming the main variable in elections. Civil governments were weak and often dominated by the presence of the military (Cortés Conde, 2008, pp. 194–243). In a region that suffered chronic instability, the Cold War set the framework where the armed forces were ready to prevent the establishment of any government with communist or even progressive overtones. From 1955, Argentina kept diplomatic relations with the ROC and commercial ties with mainland China (Oviedo, 2007, p. 23). On May 1, 1963, Carlos Echague became the first permanent Argentine ambassador to the ROC since its government moved its seat to Taipei (TT , 1963). ROC and Argentina only signed two treaties during the twentyseven years of diplomatic ties: one in 1947 and the Cultural Agreement of 1966. There was no political linkage with PRC during those years (Oviedo, 2010, p. 43). From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, the government of the ROC sent several trade missions to South America visiting Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Goodwill tours included bank agents and officials from the

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ROC. Sometimes high representatives of the ROC went to the region for special occasions, like the inauguration ceremony of Argentine President Arturo Frondizi in 1958 (China Yearbook, 1958–1959). The missions were expected to result in closer trade and cultural relations, as well as exchanges of technical cooperation. They did not have visible results except, for the purchase of agricultural products from Paraguay (wheat, cotton, corn), cowhides from Argentina, and wool from Uruguay, in exchange for small quantities of manufactured goods. Still, in the 1960s, it was difficult to increase trade between the two regions that lacked direct shipping links (TT , March 1961, August 1 and October 1, 1964, and November 1, 1965, June 1967). In exchange, Taiwan invited politicians and government officials from Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay as a way to promote international friendship. In 1969, the Ministry of Education of Taiwan started a program of scholarships for students from 18 countries that included Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay (TT , January 1, 1969, October 1, 1972). Since the late 1960s, Taipei’s efforts in keeping friendship in the region have included cultural affairs. During the early 1970s, when the Soviet Union and the US were locked in rivalry for global hegemony, the latter started to get closer to China to reverse the results of the Vietnam War. Mao Zedong accepted the proposal and invited President Nixon to visit China. That visit became a turning point in international relations between the two countries. In October 1971, the United Nations passed Resolution 2758 recognizing the PRC as “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations”.2 PRC considered this move its third wave of establishing diplomatic relations with other countries.3 Argentina abstained from voting on Resolution 2758 because it had already initiated negotiations with the PRC to normalize relations. Four months later, on February 19, 1972, the military government of Agustin 2 1976th Plenary Meeting, 25 October 1971. United Nations, General Assembly, 26th Session. 3 PRC considered this move its third wave of establishing diplomatic relations with other countries. The first wave of was in the early 50s when PRC established diplomatic ties with the USSR, the East European socialist states, and some neighboring Asian nationalist countries; the second in the 1950s–1960s, when it established diplomatic ties with more countries, and the fourth, when China entered into diplomatic relations with the newly independent countries from the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China).

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Table 4.1 Formal recognition of Taiwan—South American countries Country

Date relations established

Date relations severed

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela

1945 1919 1928 1915 1941 1946 1957 1913 1957 1941

1972 1985 1974 1971 1980 1971 Ongoing 1971 1988 1974

Source World Population Review. Countries that recognize Taiwan. https://worldpopulationreview. com/country-rankings/countries-that-recognize-taiwan

Lanusse announced the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Argentina (Oviedo, 2010, p. 23). Argentina became the fifth Latin American country to recognize Peking (Table 4.1).

1973–1988: From Dictatorship in Uruguay to Uruguayan Withdrawal In 1973, Uruguay was set to recognize the PRC, when a coup d’état shook the nation. The recognition did not happen because of the close ties between the Taiwanese and Uruguayan military that prevented it (Alzugarat, 2019, p. 195). The coup began a civic-military dictatorship that lasted until 1985. President Juan María Bordaberry closed the parliament and ruled with the assistance of a junta of military generals. Trade unions were declared illegal and the constitution was practically voided (Yaffé, 2012, pp. 13–26). While country after country was cutting relations with the island, Taiwan continued sending cultural, agricultural, and technical missions to Paraguay and Uruguay as a way of keeping their recognition (TT , August 1, 1977, and February 1, 1978). Uruguayan officials often visited Chang Kai-Shek’s mausoleum (NT , October 6, 1973, September 6, 1975, October 26, 1975). In Montevideo, the relationship between Uruguay and Taiwan was honored on different occasions. In 1975, for instance, Alma Vasconcelos

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presented a lecture on Madame Chiang Kai-shek for the celebration of the International Women’s Year at the Ateneo de Montevideo. Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, the second wife of the former president, was a wellknown figure in the West and with whom Vasconcelos met on different occasions (NT , July 16, 1974). Meanwhile, in Argentina, the Armed Forces seized power in March 1976 by a coup against the presidency of Isabel Perón, the successor and widow of former President Juan Perón. A military junta limited civil rights and launched a bloody campaign of state terrorism against civil society (Romero, 2002, pp. 215–254). In January 1979, a new event became a watershed for cross-strait relations. US President Jimmy Carter formally recognized the PRC. The American Embassy in Taipei was closed. Three months later, not yet recovered from the shock, the Stronista regime held in Asuncion the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) Conference. From the mid1970s, the regime was receiving repeated complaints of human rights violations. In 1979, Stroessner refused to authorize the visit of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, something that even the military Junta of Argentina did not dare to do. The regime considered the hosting of the WACL as the opportunity to position itself internationally as the South American champion of anticommunism (Araujo & Bohoslavsky, 2020, p. 114). From the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, all the countries from the Southern Cone were led by dictators that used the disappearance of people, torture, and baby kidnappings as their ways to fight against communism.4 The conference hosted delegations from different countries, but Stroessner considered the Taiwanese delegation the most important among them all. Stroessner was a big fan of Chiang Kai-shek. Several months after Chiang died in 1975, the Paraguayan dictator attended the National Day celebrations in Taiwan.5 He even sent Paraguayan military personnel to Taipei’s Fu Hsing Kang College for training, because he saw the Kuomintang administration of Taiwan as a model for his country (Baron, 2017). 4 The synchronicity of dictatorial governments in the Southern Cone came to be known as Operation Condor, an anticommunist plan with support of key political figures from the US (Marmontel, 2014, pp. 112–113). 5 President Juan Maria Bordaberry of Uruguay sent a letter to Taipei during the month’s mourning period (TT, June 1, 1975).

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Ku Chen-kan, a renowned representative of Taiwanese anticommunism, was the Honorary President of the WACL. Stroessner sat next to him. The conference fortified the ties between Paraguay and Taiwan (Araujo & Bohoslavsky, 2020, pp. 114–119). In Taiwan meanwhile, the US recognition of the PRC increased the fear of a Chinese invasion, making some people move from the island (Oviedo, 2018, p. 12). Some of them chose Argentina. Argentina has been a country that historically welcomed migrants. That was the case of Kun-Yao Lee, who moved to Argentina in the early 1980s “so our children could grow up in a better environment” (Wu, 2022). Like Lee, forty thousand Taiwanese decided to go to Argentina in the 1980s. In Argentina, the Taiwanese were immediately misidentified as Chinese. The now-famous Barrio Chino of Buenos Aires had the first Taiwanese-owned supermarkets, colloquially known as “chinos” (Denardi, 2016, p. 89). Taiwanese people also moved to middle size towns, like La Plata, Mar del Plata, Córdoba, Rosario, and Mendoza (Paz, 2013, p. 14). In the 1990s, Chinese people started to come from Fujian, Shanghai, and Guangdong. For the most part, the Taiwanese and the Chinese communities have lived jointly without major problems. The Taiwanese have been “visible invisible” migrants in Argentina. While they were immediately recognized as foreigners, the Argentine people have been blind to the differences between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese (Denardi, 2016, p. 89). Taiwanese migrants went also to Paraguay. At its peak, they formed a cohesive community of about 7,000 people in Asuncion (Baron, 2017). As soon as they arrived in Paraguay, the Taiwanese became incredibly active. In 1983, they opened a Confucius Cultural Center. One year later, they raised money to place a statue of Chiang Kai-shek, and in 1985, they built the Chiang Kai-shek School in Asuncion (Araujo & Bohoslavsky, 2020, pp. 118–119). That year, the Yuan opened a Consulate-General in Puerto Stroessner, Paraguay’s second city, one of the largest free trade zones in the world, and the door of entrance for contraband in Taiwanese electronics to Argentina and Brazil was opened (NT , April 16, 1985).6 6 (Long & Urdinez, 2021, p. 28). In Argentina, the military Junta lowered import barriers, liberalized restrictions on foreign borrowing, and supported the peso against foreign currencies, making the country an attractive market for Taiwanese manufactures (NT, November 26, 1980).

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Still, in 1979, the Taiwanese government tried to show optimism after the US decided to recognize PRC. In July 1979, President Chiang Chingkuo stated that since the break in relations with the US, there had been only one major change on the Taipei diplomatic scene: “Uruguay, former represented by a charge d’affaires, now has an ambassador” (TR, July 1, 1979). However, there was a change in Taiwanese policies. Since 1979, Taiwan has employed its economic strengths to enlarge its web of connections using foreign aid. Some politicians called this strategy “Taiwanese dollar diplomacy” (Lee, 1993). In 1981, for instance, the Ambassador of ROC in Uruguay, Tchen Hiong-fei, asserted that based on their cooperation in the economy, culture, and trade the relationship between the two countries was solid. Tchen was one of the most seasoned diplomats from Taiwan who defended his country’s interests in one of the twentytwo countries that still recognized it (NT , February 16, 1981). That year, Taiwan bought 20,000 metric tons of wheat from Uruguay (TT , December 1, 1981). In April 1982, public opposition due to civil rights abuses and the inability to solve the worsening economic crisis made the Argentine military Junta invade the Malvinas islands. Malvinas had been under British rule since 1833 but has been a popular cause in Argentina since the beginning of the twentieth century. The Malvinas War ended with Great Britain defeating Argentina in June of that year (On Malvinas War see, Lorenz, 2022). The return of democracy in Argentina produced a chain reaction in the region. On March 1, 1985, as a result of free elections, Julio Maria Sanguinetti was sworn in as President of Uruguay putting an end to the twelve years of conflict with Great Britain. The PRC abstained from the British resolution at the United Nations (Gomez, 2022). The Chinese abstention would improve the PRC-Argentina relationship.7 After losing the war, the Junta began to collapse and finally relinquished power in 1983 with the election of President Raúl Alfonsín (Romero, 2002, pp. 215–254). With the return of democracy, a new debate on the convenience of changing recognition between the ROC

7 Still in September 1982, the official press of Taiwan quoted the former Argentine dictator, Roberto Viola when he praised Taiwan “as being a good model for Argentina”. Three months after Argentina lost the war of Malvinas, the military had little popular support in the country, but the rabid anticommunism made Taipei sometimes to misinterpret public opinion in Latin America (NT, September 16, 1982).

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and PRC was installed (Alzugarat, 2019, p. 196). In January 1986, Antonio Marchesano, President of the House of Representatives, visited Taiwan and announced that there was no plan to change the Uruguayan position regarding cross-strait relations (NT , January 26, 1986). In August, in turn, the city of Taipei sent a statue of Confucius as a gift to the government of Montevideo (Alzugarat, 2019, p. 193). However, the pending decision did not take long to be made. On February 2, 1988, Uruguayan President Sanguinetti informed Taiwan of the establishment of formal relations with the PRC (EP, September 11, 2021). The Uruguayan decision was not based on politics—Sanguinetti was far from being a left-wing politician—nor in the context of international trends but based on the private sector. The Uruguayan wool sector lobbied to have full access to the mainland China market (EP, September 11, 2021). It was an economic strategy that Taiwan was unable to match. Eventually, the small South American country would become the fourth largest exporter of wool in the world with China serving as the main buyer (Uruguay XXI, 2021). In Paraguay, the Stronato came to an end in 1989. Stroessner’s right-hand man Andrés Rodríguez led a coup that ended a 35-year reign (Baron, 2017). A new era was born.

1989–2001: From a Shared Process of Democratization to the Argentine Crisis In terms of foreign affairs policies, Argentina was isolated from the rest of Latin America and was in opposition to the US before World War II. During the Cold War, it followed non-alignment with the US and mild integration with Latin America (Russell, & Tokatlian, 2006). Those policies changed profoundly in the 1990s. The end of the Cold War concurred with Carlos Menem’s election to the presidency. Although a Peronist, Menem aligned his economic and foreign policies with those of the US with an emphasis on the free movement of goods and capital. As Sheinin points out, so radical were the reversals in Argentine foreign relations that the Foreign Ministry had to sponsor a series of high-level private meetings to explain the shift to incredulous senior diplomats (Sheinin, 2002). From being antagonists, the US and Argentina became allies in 1990. The alignment with the US, however, did not impede Argentina from following a relatively autonomous foreign policy toward China. Although

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the Chinese government was highly criticized for human rights violations after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protest and repression, President Menem visited China in 1990 to reciprocate the visit of then-Chinese leader Yang Shangkun. He became the first leader of a Western country to visit China after the Tiananmen Square protests (Urdinez et al., 2018). When the US was attempting to subject China to diplomatic isolation, Menem showed his spirit of pragmatism (Cunhai, 2022). Menem’s pragmatism worked both ways. On July 9, 1992, Independence Day in Argentina, the South American nation opened the Argentina Trade and Cultural Office representing the country’s interests in Taiwan in the absence of formal diplomatic relations (NT , July 26, 1992). In this way, Argentina followed what has come to be known as the “Japanese model”, maintaining economic and cultural relations after a break in diplomatic relations.8 Although with no official representation, Argentina and Taiwan’s relationship became closer than ever in the 1990s. While it is true that both countries were synchronically strengthening their democratizing processes, the reason for the improvement in the relationship was purely economic. Taiwan’s rapid economic gains in the 1980s attracted the attention of Argentina which was looking for global partners to promote its economic growth.9 The relationship between the two countries went a step forward when Argentina agreed to open a maritime zone in the South Atlantic in 1993 (NT , February 2, 1993). The legal opening put an end to the recurrent incidents between the Argentine authorities and the Taiwanese fishermen that happened from 1977 when several ships traveled to the extensive fishing ground along the South Atlantic coast to catch squid after Pacific Ocean countries declared 200-mile maritime economic zones. Squid has been an indispensable staple in Chinese food culture (Chen, 1998).10

8 In 1972, when Japan switched official recognition from ROC to PRC, President Chiang Ching-kuo accepted the agreement of maintaining relations with parties even after ending diplomatic relations with them (Kawashima, 2022). 9 In different occasions, Menem praised Taiwanese economic achievements (NT, July 16, 1997). 10 In the major event between Taiwanese fishermen and Argentine authorities, in May 1986, a Taiwanese ship was sunk by an Argentine patrol vessel with two Taiwanese fishermen killed, and four others injured (AP News, May 29, 1986). There were also incidents in the twenty-first century (TT, January 26, 2004).

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Since 1993, fishing has been the largest of the economic links between Taiwan and Argentina, reaching in some years up to three-fourths of the trade between the two countries (NT , February 2, 1993). In August 1995, ROC opened the Taiwan Trade and Cultural Office (TTCO) in Buenos Aires, replacing the trade office it had from 1972 when Argentina switched diplomatic relations from ROC to the PRC. Two years later, in 1997, Argentina and Taiwan signed an agreement to promote trade and industrial exchanges. Trade increased year by year. In 1988, trade exchange reached 90 million dollars; in 1991, it grew to 200 million, and in 1994, to 444 million. The ROC imported cotton, agricultural products, and leather and exported plastic products, car parts, electronics, and sewing machines. Argentina became the fourth commercial partner of Taiwan in Latin America (NT , March 26, 1989, July 26, 1992, and August 16, 1997). Privatizations and fewer state controls paved the way for Taiwanese investments. In 1998, Argentina signed an agreement with Taiwan to help the Asian country enter the World Trade Organization (WTO). Unlike other international organizations, the WTO does not require its members to be nation-states, allowing Taiwan to join it.11 It was the 21st of 26 accession bilateral agreements with WTO members that Taiwan had to sign to become a member. In exchange, Taiwan lessened the restrictions on importing Argentine products. In 1998, Argentina exported for the first time beef and fruits to Taiwan (NT , July 16, 1998, and July 26, 1998). While Argentina and Taiwan were strengthening their ties, Argentina with Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay established the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) in 1991, to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, people, and currency. Mercosur has been mainly a customs union with a common trade policy among member countries (Malamud, 2018). In Montevideo, new negotiations aroused in 1991 pertaining to the shipping of the SIL to Taipei.12 Finally, in March 1993, the core of the library was transported to Taiwan, securing it from a potential PRC claim in Uruguay. As compensation for keeping the library for more than 40 years, the National Central Library in Taipei gave US$300,000 to the 11 The WTO is now the only major international organization in which Taiwan can participate as a full member (Charnovitz, 2006, p. 401). 12 In 1983, two Taiwanese curators were sent to Montevideo to make a Chinese and Spanish catalog, later published in Taiwan (TT, April 1, 1995).

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BNU (TT , April 1, 1995). The devolution of the SIL became a problematic affair in Uruguay that ended with the Director of the National Library quitting (Alzugarat, 2019, p. 214). In Argentina, the free-market era ended dramatically in 2001 when the country defaulted on foreign debt and the worst economic crisis in its history unfolded. The laxity of economic rules and an unfortunate combination of international shocks account for the main reasons for the economic disaster (Glaeser et al., 2018, p. 16). Following the crisis, many Taiwanese migrants left Argentina to create new lives in North America and Europe. Some even returned to Taiwan (Oviedo, 2018, p. 12). By that time, 20,000 Taiwanese were still living in Argentina; ten years later, there were 2,758, most of them in the city of Buenos Aires (NT , July 26, 1992). Taiwanese in Paraguay also moved to seek opportunities elsewhere. Most of those who stayed went to Ciudad del Este (Baron, 2017).

Epilogue: From Taiwan’s Entry to WTO to the Post-COVID-19 World (2002–2022) In January 2006, Peter Hakim, an expert on international affairs, wrote that relations between the US and Latin America were at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. He stated that after 9/11, Washington effectively lost interest in Latin America resulting in few Latin Americans considering the US to be a dependable partner (Hakim, 2006, pp. 39–40). Four years earlier, in January 2002, China and Taiwan entered the WTO with a 21 day-difference (Charnovitz, 2006, pp. 405– 406). It was a political victory for Taiwan, the world’s 14th-largest trading economy.13 For Latin America, it was the time when mainland China emerged for the first time as a significant factor in increasing Latin America’s autonomy from the US (Urdinez et al., 2018). For China, Latin America became a vital source of raw materials and foodstuffs. Only in the six first years of the twenty-first century, Chinese imports from Latin America grew more than six times (Hakim, 2006, p. 45). The rise of China changed the nature of Mercosur, as it did with every single trade bloc in the world. 13 Because trade rules for one WTO member must be applied evenly to all, Taiwan and China had to drop once-tight restrictions on business links with each other (McMIllan, 2002).

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In Argentina, the 2001 crisis was gradually reversed due to some nationalizations and the return of exchange rate controls (Glaeser et al., 2018, p. 16). But the effect of the rise of China in that recovery is undeniable. In 2013, most Argentines believed that the country had overcome the terrible economic crisis of 2001 thanks to exports to China (Paz, 2013, p. 26). Since 2008, China has become more important than the US or Europe in trading with Argentina. Argentina, Latin America’s thirdlargest economy, has been the first world supplier of soybean livestock feed. The relationship with China divided domestic policies. In the 1990s, Argentina and the US had the closest relationship ever. In the twenty-first century, some Argentine leaders moved toward Beijing. Nestor Kirchner served as President of Argentina from 2003 to 2007, and his wife, Cristina Kirchner, from 2007 to 2015, and from 2019 as the Vice President. The Kirchners , as they are known, identified themselves as Peronists and progressive. Based on their opposition to the US, they made intensive use of the rhetoric that China was a preferred country to partner with. Strengthening ties with China was framed within the foreign policy of South-South relations (Urdinez et al., 2018). In 2015, the election of opposition leader Mauricio Macri brought about a reevaluation of Argentina’s international relations, pivoting again toward the North, but far from keeping out China from the picture (Klinger & Narins, 2018, p. 11). However, burdened with infrastructure needs, budget deficits, and poor US lending, Macri welcomed Chinese support. In December 2018, Macri and the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, while attending the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires, signed a Joint Statement where “Argentina reaffirmed its continuous support for the One China policy while China reiterated its firm support for Argentina’s sovereignty rights concerning the Question of the Malvinas Islands and the resumption of bilateral negotiations” (Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). The effects of the 2018 agreement became clear on August 22, 2022, when the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi went to Taiwan. In a public statement, Argentina’s Ambassador to China, Sabino Vaca Narvaja, described the visit as a “provocation” to Beijing and a “problem for the whole international community”.

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Nevertheless, Argentine Foreign Minister Santiago Cafiero sought to clarify the country’s position after the remarks sparked a diplomatic reaction. He stated that Argentina recognized Beijing’s “One China principle” but wanted to “de-escalate conflicts” and support dialogue between the two nations. The diplomat defended the concept of “territorial integrity” in the cases of both the Asian giant and Argentina’s sovereignty claims to the Malvinas Islands (Buenos Aires Times, August 12, 2022). Pelosi’s affair exposed both the complexity of cross-strait relations in Argentina and the internal tensions within the ruling coalition between the Kircherista wing and the most loyal to President Alberto Fernández, like Cafiero. Beyond Argentine factionalism, relations between Taiwan and Argentina remain friendly entering the third decade of the twenty-first century. In 2022, Taiwan’s imports from Argentina reached US$450 million, a significant increase of 73% from the previous year, while exports stood at US$268 million, with a growth of 42% (Wu, 2022). Taiwan imports corn, soybean, fresh cheese, garlic, leather, shrimp, wine, and squid. Taiwan’s main exports are electronics, basic metals and metal products, plastics and rubber, chemicals, and machinery (OCCT, September 9, 2022). Cultural exchanges reached a peak point in 2022. In July, the Library of Congress (LC) in Argentina signed a collaborative agreement with Taipei Commercial and Cultural Office in Argentina to establish for the first time a Resource Center for Taiwan Studies. The LC also opened a center to study traditional Chinese Mandarin (CTS, July 4, 2022).14 For most of the twenty-first century, Uruguay has been the country of the Mercosur that has remained farther from Taipei. The smallest member of the bloc has been pushing for increased trade with China. Although financial flows between the two countries were limited, trade increased significantly due to China’s rapid growth. Since 2013, China has been Uruguay’s main trade partner. It also displaced the US as the main buyer of Uruguayan beef. In 2016, China and Uruguay established a strategic partnership and signed a free trade agreement in the sectors of agriculture, food products, and infrastructure. In 2021, Uruguay exported a record US$2.7 billion to China, almost 30% of its total exports, mainly 14 In 2006, the Taiwanese government created the program Study in Taiwan to enhance the cultural and academic exchange with the region (Magioreli, 182).

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beef, cellulose products, and soybeans (Koop, 2022). Uruguay was the first Mercosur country to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which Argentina joined in 2022 (TN, November 12, 2018). Uruguay’s rapprochement with China has weakened the structure of Mercosur. Uruguay wanted to become more competitive in the Chinese market by signing a bilateral free trade agreement with China to reduce tariffs for exports. This intention collided with Mercosur’s rules that prevent bilateral treaties without the bloc’s endorsement (BAT , December 7, 2022). It is not the first time that problems regarding the impossibility of individual trade agreements with third countries aroused in Mercosur. In 2007, Uruguay tried to push for a free trade agreement with the US (Malamud, pp. 174–175). Mercosur encompasses two large partners with significant internal markets—Brazil and Argentina—and two small, eager to export without restrictions—Paraguay and Uruguay. Having all the members of the bloc strong maintaining comparative advantages in agricultural staples, the largest partners preferred to apply highly protectionist policies, while the smallest want more free access to global markets. Differences among members were exposed publicly in the first face-toface summit since the beginning of the pandemic, at Luque, Paraguay, in July 2022. Differences have been so great that there has been no final joint declaration signed by all the countries in the last two summits (Koop, 2022). In December 2022 in Asuncion, Argentine Foreign Affairs Minister Santiago Cafiero even mentioned that he did not rule out the dissolution of Mercosur (Koop, 2022 and LN , December 5, 2022). Uruguayan ties with mainland China seem to be stronger than ever. In September 2018, for instance, Uruguay launched a visa-waiver program for Taiwan, after several steps taken by the TCCO in Argentina, which also handles Uruguayan affairs. Two months later, Uruguay suspended the visa-free access. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) feared China’s interference behind Uruguay’s cancelation of visa waivers, based on the frequency of mutual visits and interactions between Chinese and Uruguayan officials (TN, November 12, 2018, and December 7, 2018). The visa-waiver suspension became one of the most important reasons why the Taiwanese NGO China Index 2021 stated that Uruguay was the Latin American country with the greatest influence of the Chinese regime on its foreign policy (Gorman Insights, November 14, 2022). What about Paraguay? Will it switch from Taiwan to China? This question has been repetitive in the Latin American diplomatic press for the last

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decades. After the Central African Republic changed diplomatic relations between the ROC and the PRC in 1998, Paraguay has been the largest ally that still recognizes Taiwan as a sovereign county (Taiwan Politics Database). The Paraguayan Dilemma could be set again at any moment by any of the diverse parties that have interests in the matter (Paraguayan farmers, to expand their markets to the PRC; the Paraguayan government to negotiate more benefits from Taiwan, the Paraguayan opposition to pressure the government, or the PRC to influence public opinion in Paraguay).15 The question reached its peak in 2010 when Fernando Lugo became President. His political ideas closer to Beijing than to Taipei made political scientists speculate that a change of recognition was possible. However, in the end, he chose not to switch. He understood that Paraguay had an intense commercial relationship with the PRC, even without an embassy in Asunción (Arce, 2010). Under the so-called checkbook diplomacy, China has been behind Taipei’s diplomatic allies by promising increased trade, loans, and investments (Bernal, 2018). To counterbalance PRC influence, Taiwan has also employed its economic strength to gain friendship. In 1988, Taiwan created the International Economic Cooperation and Development Fund securing the delivery of financial loans and technical aid to small countries like Paraguay (Maggiorelli, 2019, p. 182). Between 1989 and 1991, Paraguay received $3.2 million as relief aid and project funding (Lee, 1993, p. 47). In 1999, President Luis Gonzalez Macchi negotiated a US$400 million “jumbo” loan from Taiwan (Nickson, 2004). In 2008, Kuomintang’s President Ma Ying-jeou negotiated a policy of détente with China, with both countries agreeing not to interfere with each other’s allies. A diplomatic ceasefire was suspended with the election of DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen. As soon as pressure resumed, Taipei had to give more concessions. In 2017, President Horacio Cartes secured a trade deal with the most generous terms ever agreed to by Taipei (Tucker 5). Paraguay has a healthy economic relationship with Taiwan. In 2014, Paraguay exported 880 tons of beef per year to Taiwan. It almost doubled four years later, making Taiwan the fifth destination worldwide for Paraguayan beef (Bernal, 2018). However, unlike China, Taiwan does not have the leverage to force its private sector to invest more money in

15 Paraguayan Dilemma is a concept coined by Wimer and Dalbosco (2020).

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Paraguay. Since 2018, under President Mario Abdo Benítez, Paraguay has emphasized a pro-Taiwan policy while also seeking commercial opportunities with the PRC. In 2021, trade between Taiwan and Paraguay hit a record US$ 196 million, but it represented less than 1% of the South American nation’s total trade that year (Mercopress, October 4, 2022). During the Covid-19 crisis, cross-strait relations had a new chapter in the region. In Asuncion, Taiwan accused Beijing of offering Chinesemade Covid-19 vaccines to pressure Paraguay to sever ties with the island. Taiwan’s authorities spoke about Chinese “vaccine diplomacy” (Smink, 2021). What has Paraguay lost being on the side of Taipei? This is what Long and Urdinez have asked and researched. After coining the concept of “Taiwan cost”, they argue that Paraguay uses its diplomatic recognition policy for status-seeking, which generates intangible and material benefits that offset the macroeconomic opportunity costs of foregone Chinese investment, aid, and credit (Long & Urdinez, 2021). Paraguay, as a member of Mercosur, serves as a gateway for Taiwanese businesses to enter the regional markets. In addition, because Taiwan knows it cannot count on diplomatic recognition from great powers, it searches for status among small nations like Paraguay (Long & Urdinez, 2021). On the other hand, by being the sole and unique member of the Mercosur with formal ties with Taiwan, Paraguay can keep its traditional position of balance with its two big neighbors, Brazil and Argentina. Furthermore, Paraguay’s relationship with Taiwan provides diplomatic leverage in its dealings with the US. In 2019, Mike Pompeo became the first sitting Secretary of State to visit Asunción since 1965 (Tucker 5). For a small and landlocked country, opportunities to be recognized as internationally important are scarce. As Pro-Taiwan Paraguayans often emphasizes, “For Taiwan, Paraguay matters” (Long, pp. 19–20).

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Romero, L. (2002). A history of Argentina in the twentieth century. Penn State University Press. Russell, R., & Tokatlian, J. (2006). Will foreign allies help? Argentina’s relationship with Brazil and the United States. In E. Epstein & D. Pion-Berlin (Eds.), Broken Promises? The Argentine crisis and argentine democracy (Chapter 17). Rowman & Littlefield. Sheinin, D. (2002). Finding an alliance: Rethinking Argentine-United States Cold War relations. MACLAS, 16. link.gale.com/apps/doc/A112127606/ LitRC?u=anon~806a7ed5&sid=googleScholar&xid=ef84351a Shek Cerne, C. (2022, May 28). From Chinese Modern and Contemporary ink Paintings. From the collection of Professor Elena Ramirez. Christie’s. https:// www.christies.com/en/lot/lot-6377528 Smink, V. (2021, April 19). Cómo Paraguay quedó atrapado en la histórica pelea entre Taiwán y China. BBC News Mundo. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/ noticias-america-latina-56740339 Tucker, J., & Stünkel, L. (2020). Taiwan-Paraguay relations: Convergent trajectories. The Institute for Security and Development Policy. Urdinez, F., Knoerich, J., & Ribeiro, P. (2018). “Don’t cry for me Argentina”: Unraveling Political views of China through legislative debates in Argentina. Journal of Chinese Political Sciences, 23, 235–256. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11366-016-9450-y Uruguay XXI. (2021). Promoción de inversiones, Exportaciones e imagen país. Gobierno de Uruguay. Wimer, R., & Dalbosco, J. (2020). El dilema de Paraguay en el siglo XXI: ¿Ccontinuidad de relaciones diplomáticas con Taiwan o apertura a la Republica Popular China? Revista Paraguay Desde las Ciencias Sociales, 11, 27–56. Worden, R. (1977). China’s foreign relations with Latin America. In Chüng-tu Hsüeh (Ed.), Dimensions of China’s foreign relations. Praeger Publishers. Wu, E. (2022, August 13). Taiwanese find their feet in Argentina. Buenos Aires Times. https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/opinion-and-ana lysis/taiwanese-find-their-feet-in-argentina.phtml Yaffé, J. (2012). La dictadura uruguaya (1973–1985): nuevas perspectivas de investigación e interpretación Historiográfica. Estudos Ibero-Americanos, 38(1), 13–26.

Newspapers AP News. Buenos Aires Times (BAT). El País, Uruguay (EP). La Nación, Argentina (LN). Mercopress.

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Noticias de Taiwan (NT). Taiwan Today (TT).

Official Publications China Yearbook. Department of State of the United States. INDEC Argentina. Marca Pais Uruguay. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Oficina Comercial y Cultural de Taipei en Argentina.

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CHAPTER 5

Taiwan’s Diplomatic Instruments and Challenges in Its Relations with China-Aligned Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean Fabricio A. Fonseca and Yen-Pin Su

Introduction Latin America and the Caribbean (the LAC) have historically represented a strategic region for foreign policymakers in the Republic of China (Taiwan).1 Since most of the countries in that region were independent by the time the ROC was established in 1911, and many of them officially joined the Allied cause during World War II (WWII) and were aligned 1 We will use the ROC and Taiwan interchangeably in this chapter.

F. A. Fonseca (B) · Y.-P. Su Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan e-mail: [email protected] Y.-P. Su Department of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_5

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with US interests, the establishment of official diplomatic ties between the ROC and the LAC countries occurred between the 1940s and 1950s, and in some cases, much earlier (Connelly & Cornejo, 1992, pp. 19–30). The Cold War years and the staunch anti-communism of many governments in Central and South America, some of them under authoritarian military regimes, made them natural supporters of the ROC government, even cooperating under the Kuomintang-sponsored World Anti-Communist League, created in 1966 (López, 2010, p. 251). However, the historical existence of nationalistic and anti-imperialistic groups and movements in some of those countries, combined with events such as the Cuban Revolution, made some of those governments follow a more independent foreign policy, not always aligned with the US interests (van Klaveren, 1992, p. 172). Some of those governments pursued a policy more aligned with the G-77 and the Third World Countries, which put them closer to recognizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Connelly & Cornejo, 1992, p. 49), which was facilitated through the US-China rapprochement under Richard Nixon. With the governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait claiming to be the sole legitimate representative of China during the Cold War, the idea of “One China” was accepted as the mechanism to conduct their relations with third countries. The voting of the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which resulted in the expulsion of Taiwan from the organization, reflected the mixed positions in Latin America.2 Once the PRC occupied the “China seat” in the UN, the balance in the LAC region began to favor Beijing over Taipei throughout the 1970s. Nonetheless, in the following decades, many governments in the Western Hemisphere remained committed to deepening their ties with Taiwan during the 1980s and 1990s, hence representing an important source of diplomatic partners (Hsiang, 2021, pp. 22–24). By November 2023, from the 13 countries that maintain official ties with Taiwan, 7 are located in Latin America and the Caribbean.3 Nevertheless, the tools

2 From the LAC members in the UN at the time of the voting of Resolution 2758, 5 voted in favor, 12 voted against, and 4 abstained. By the time of the vote, only Cuba (1960) and Chile (1970) had established diplomatic ties with the PRC (Pérez, 2002, pp. 57–58). 3 The countries from Latin America and the Caribbean that by November 2023 maintain their diplomatic recognition to the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan, followed by the year they established official relations, are: Belize (1989); Guatemala

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Taiwan possesses to effectively compete with China for the recognition of countries in this region have rapidly decreased in importance during the past twenty years (Fabbro & Gramer, 2023). Many of the existing studies on relations between Taiwan and LAC have focused on those countries that officially recognize Taipei, with an important emphasis on topics such as development cooperation and aid (Atkinson, 2018; Alexander, 2015; Cheng et al., 2015; Harold et al., 2019; Lemus-Delgado, 2017; Lemus-Delgado & Dueñas, 2021; Lin & Lin, 2017; Maggiorelli, 2019; Popma & Roessingh, 2010; Teng, 2021a; Tubilewicz, 2016; Tubilewicz & Guilloux, 2011), and diplomatic competition between Taiwan and China in the LAC region (Alexander, 2014; Erikson & Chen, 2007; Esteban, 2007; Fan, 2021; Hu, 2015; Li, 2005; Long & Urdinez, 2021; Paladini, 2011; Portada et al., 2020; Rich, 2009; Rich & Dahmer, 2022; Su, 2022; Teng, 2021b). The maintenance of those ties is of utmost importance to policymakers in Taiwan, making their study a relevant subject. Nonetheless, less attention is paid to the unofficial relations that Taiwan has been able to keep with the LAC countries that switched full diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. This chapter aims to fill the gap in the literature by analyzing how Taiwan practices public diplomacy in major economies in the LAC region. Specifically, we provide qualitative analyses of the unofficial instruments used by the Taiwanese government in its relations with the China-aligned countries that exchanged representative offices with Taiwan during the past decades. We highlight the role played by public diplomacy, with a special emphasis on the areas of trade and investments, as well as educational and cultural initiatives. Overall, we aim to contribute to the literature by presenting a more comprehensive picture of the diplomatic opportunities and challenges that Taiwan is currently facing in the LAC region.

(1933); Haiti (1956); Paraguay (1957); St. Kitts and Nevis (1983); St. Lucia (1984–1997, 2007); and St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1981).

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An Overview of Taiwan’s Relations with LAC Countries As the seat for China in the United Nations was ceded to the PRC in 1971, an increasing number of countries began to shift their diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China. From 1971 to 2000, fifteen LAC countries derecognized Taiwan and recognized China. During the Chen Shui-bian administration (2000–2008), Taiwan achieved diplomatic success by rebuilding diplomatic ties with Saint Lucia in 2007 but broke diplomatic ties with Dominica (2004), Grenada (2005), and Costa Rica (2007). During the Ma Ying-Jeou (2008–2016) administration, the so-called diplomatic truce between Taipei and Beijing allowed Taiwan to maintain its relations with LAC diplomatic allies unchanged (Hsu, 2015). However, China resumed fierce diplomatic competition with Taiwan in the region after Tsai Ing-wen took the presidency in 2016. From 2016 to November 2023, the total number of formal diplomatic allies of Taiwan fell from 21 to 13. The freezing in Cross-Strait relations since 2016 and the ongoing worsening ties between Washington and Beijing had important implications for relations between LAC and Taiwan. Under the Tsai Ing-wen government, the importance of allies in Latin America and the Caribbean resided not only in the official recognition and support they offered to Taiwan in its goal to join international organizations but also in its geographic position, in what has been labeled as “transit diplomacy” (Hsiang, 2021, p. 27). During her years in office, President Tsai was very active in pursuing official state visits to allies in the region. These visits were aimed not only at confirming Taiwan’s commitments toward those countries but also to increase contacts with the United States. Every time the president or vice president visited LAC, they had long layovers in the United States, where they attended high-profile meetings and rallies that are intended to increase Taiwan’s visibility among American audiences (Knox & Anders, 2023). Back in Taiwan, the media usually devoted more time and space to cover the stops at the United States, rather than the leaders’ agenda in Latin America. On the other hand, a closer relationship between Taipei and Washington has been responded to by Beijing with stronger incentives to take away more diplomatic allies from Taiwan. In the LAC region, the total number of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies dropped from 12 to 7. The countries that switched diplomatic ties

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from the ROC to the PRC are Panama (2017), the Dominican Republic (2018), El Salvador (2018), Nicaragua (2021), and Honduras (2023). The US government, aware of this trend, passed the TAIPEI Act in 2020. This piece of legislation is intended to put pressure on Taiwan’s remaining allies to consider it twice before switching their recognition to China (Larus, 2020). This could not stop Nicaragua and Honduras to make the switch to Beijing, or the Paraguayan Senate from continuously discussing the topic of changing its recognition (Smink, 2021). In the meantime, Taiwan has continued to use its existing instruments and mechanisms, such as the Central America Trade Office (CATO), the Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA), the International Cooperation Development Fund (ICDF), and the ROC Export– Import Bank, among others, to preserve its cooperation initiatives and programs with those nations that still maintain diplomatic ties and as an effective instrument of communication (Alexander, 2015, p. 119). The existing FTAs with those countries are also an important element for the ROC strategy to implement a more proactive strategy to negotiate and implement trade deals.4 Similarly, Taiwan has a member seat at the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) and continues to offer a wide range of scholarships and other types of aid to those nations, as was the case during the COVID-19 pandemic (Fonseca, 2021a, p. 76). In this regard, the efforts by Taipei to maintain its levels of technical cooperation and development assistance with its official partners in LAC continue to increase, despite the not-so-optimistic expectations about the future. The strategy of Taiwan’s diplomacy is to prioritize relations with more powerful unofficial partners, particularly the United States, and to a lesser extent Japan and the EU, who can offer protection and moral support to the ROC when facing the military threats posed by Mainland China. This has put the LAC countries in a difficult situation. The Taiwan diplomatic allies in LAC not only have to choose between Taipei and Beijing but also between the latter and Washington, which for many countries in Central America and the Caribbean remains as the most important economic partner and security guarantor (BNamericas, 2023).

4 By December 8th, 2023, the ROC still implements the FTAs negotiated with Panama (2003) and Guatemala (2005), as well as an Economic Cooperation Agreement signed with Paraguay in 2019.

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Table 5.1 shows the change in diplomatic relations between the ROC and the LAC countries. Among the 33 LAC countries, Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago are the only four countries that have never built any formal diplomatic ties with the ROC. For the rest of the 29 LAC countries, Nicaragua and Saint Lucia are the only countries that switched diplomatic recognition between the PRC and the ROC multiple times. Specifically, Nicaragua built diplomatic ties with the ROC in 1930, severed ties in 1985, rebuilt ties in 1990, and severed ties in 2021. Saint Lucia built diplomatic ties with the ROC in 1984, severed ties in 1997, and rebuilt ties in 2007. Moreover, Belize is the only LAC country that built diplomatic ties with the PRC first (1987) and later switched to recognize the ROC (1989). Guatemala is the country that maintains the longest diplomatic relations with the ROC, with almost 90 years. What happened to the 22 LAC countries that switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China? As shown in Table 5.1, 13 out of these 22 countries never established any representative office after severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan. In other words, Taiwan’s diplomats do not have any presence in the majority (59%) of the LAC countries that severed ties with Taiwan. The LAC countries that currently have Taiwan’s representative office for maintaining informal diplomatic relations are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. Bolivia and Venezuela used to have Taiwan’s representative offices for maintaining unofficial relations with Taiwan after switching diplomatic recognition to China, but the offices in both countries were closed in 2009. The existence of unofficial representative offices of Taiwan in other larger economies within LAC has put pressure on Taiwanese foreign policymakers about how to compete effectively with China in those countries that still support Taipei. The establishment of those institutions remains key for the communication and ties between Taiwan and the major countries in the region. In the next sections, we discuss how Taiwan maintains its informal diplomatic relations with large China-aligned countries in the LAC region.

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Table 5.1 Taiwan-aligned countries in Latin America and the Caribbean Country

Formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Informal diplomatic missions with Taiwan after diplomatic relations were severed

Taiwan’s diplomatic mission in the capital city as of November 2023

Antigua and Barbuda

No diplomatic relations were ever established

None

Argentina

Diplomatic relations were established in May 1945; the embassy was established in April 1946; diplomatic relations severed in February 1972 Diplomatic relations were established in January 1989; the embassy was established in May 1989; diplomatic relations severed in May 1997 Diplomatic relations and the embassy were established in September 1967; diplomatic relations severed in January 1977 Diplomatic relations and the embassy were established in October 1989

The Trade Mission of the Republic of China in Antigua and Barbuda was established in October 1982; Trade Mission closed in January 1983; no informal diplomatic missions established since the Trade Mission was closed The Commercial Office of Taiwan was established in January 1973 (renamed to Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in January 1996) No informal diplomatic missions established since diplomatic relations were severed

None

No informal diplomatic missions established since diplomatic relations were severed

None

N/A

Embassy of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in Belize

Bahamas

Barbados

Belize

Taipei Commercial and Cultural Office in Argentina

(continued)

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Table 5.1 (continued) Country

Formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Informal diplomatic missions with Taiwan after diplomatic relations were severed

Taiwan’s diplomatic mission in the capital city as of November 2023

Bolivia

Legation established with no ministers exchanged in December 1919; non-resident ambassador-level diplomatic relation established in May 1947; embassy established in September 1959; diplomatic relation severed in July 1985 Legation established in April 1913; embassy established in May 1943; diplomatic relation severed in August 1974

The Consular Commercial Office of the Republic of China was established in 1990 (renamed to the Commercial Office of Taiwan in 2004); Commercial Office closed in 2009; no informal diplomatic missions established since 2009 Far East Trade Service Center in Brazil (São Paulo) established in July 1975 (renamed to Taipei Trade Center in 1980); Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Brazil (Brasília) established in 1992 Far East Trade Center in Chile was established in September 1975 (renamed to Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Chile in May 1992)

None

Brazil

Chile

Non-resident minister-level diplomatic relations were established in February 1915; legation was established in May 1924; the embassy was established in December 1946; diplomatic relations severed in January 1971

Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Brazil

Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Chile

(continued)

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Table 5.1 (continued) Country

Formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Informal diplomatic missions with Taiwan after diplomatic relations were severed

Taiwan’s diplomatic mission in the capital city as of November 2023

Colombia

Non-resident minister-level diplomatic relations were established in April 1941; legation was established in May 1947; the embassy was established in April 1961; diplomatic relations severed in February 1980 Legation established in April 1941; embassy established in May 1959; relations severed in June 2007 Non-resident minister-level diplomatic relations were established in May 1913; legation was established in August 1921; the embassy was established in August 1957; relations severed in September 1960 Diplomatic relations were established in May 1983; the embassy was established in August 1984; diplomatic relations severed in January 2004

Far East Trade Center in Colombia was established in June 1980 (renamed to Taipei Commercial Office in Bogota, Colombia in 1990)

Taipei Commercial Office in Bogota, Colombia

No informal diplomatic missions established since diplomatic relations were severed in 2007

None

No informal diplomatic missions established since diplomatic relations were severed in 1960

None

No informal diplomatic missions established since diplomatic relations were severed in 2004

None

Costa Rica

Cuba

Dominica

(continued)

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Table 5.1 (continued) Country

Formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Informal diplomatic missions with Taiwan after diplomatic relations were severed

Taiwan’s diplomatic mission in the capital city as of November 2023

Dominican Republic

Non-resident minister-level diplomatic relations were established in April 1941; legation was established in July 1943; the embassy was established in June 1957; relations severed in May 2018 Non-resident minister-level diplomatic relations were established in January 1946; legation was established in January 1948; the embassy was established in July 1957; relations severed in May 2018

No informal diplomatic missions established since diplomatic relations were severed in 2018

None

Ecuador

The consular Office Commercial in Guayaquil was Office of Taipei established in October 1974; the Commercial Office of the Republic of China was established in April 1977 (renamed to Commercial Office of Taipei in June 2017)

(continued)

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Table 5.1 (continued) Country

Formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Informal diplomatic missions with Taiwan after diplomatic relations were severed

Taiwan’s diplomatic mission in the capital city as of November 2023

El Salvador

Non-resident consul-level diplomatic relations were established in June 1933; Non-resident minister-level diplomatic relations were established in April 1941; legation was established in July 1957; the embassy was established in June 1961; relations severed in August 2018 Diplomatic relations and the embassy were established in July 1989; relations severed in January 2005 Non-resident consul-level diplomatic relations were established in June 1933; the consulate-general was established in 1935; the legation was established in 1954; the embassy established in 1960

No informal diplomatic missions established since diplomatic relations were severed in 2018

None

No informal diplomatic missions established since diplomatic relations were severed in 2005

None

N/A

Embassy of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in Guatemala

Grenada

Guatemala

(continued)

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Table 5.1 (continued) Country

Formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Informal diplomatic missions with Taiwan after diplomatic relations were severed

Taiwan’s diplomatic mission in the capital city as of November 2023

Guyana

No diplomatic relations have ever been established

None

Haiti

Non-resident minister-level diplomatic relations were established in April 1956; legation was established in 1960; the embassy established in 1965 Non-resident minister-level diplomatic relations were established in April 1941; legation was established in June 1957; the embassy was established in May 1965; relations severed in March 2023 Diplomatic relations were established in August 1962; the embassy was established in September 1962; relations severed in November 1972

Taiwan Office established on February 4th, 2021; Taiwan Office closed on February 5th, 2021; no informal diplomatic missions established since the office was closed N/A

No informal diplomatic missions established since diplomatic relations were severed in 2023

None

Honduras

Jamaica

Embassy of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in Haiti

The Trade Mission of None the Republic of China in Jamaica was established in August 1992; Trade Mission closed in June 1993; no informal diplomatic missions established since the Trade Mission was closed

(continued)

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Table 5.1 (continued) Country

Formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Mexico

Diplomatic relations were established in May 1913; the embassy was established in July 1944; relations severed in November 1971

Nicaragua

Panama

Informal diplomatic missions with Taiwan after diplomatic relations were severed

Trade Office of Taipei in Mexico was established in 1973, and closed in 1974; Far East Trade Service Center was established in April 1989 (renamed to Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Mexico in July 1993) The No informal Consulate-General diplomatic missions was established in established since May 1930; legations diplomatic relations were established in were severed in 2021 May 1955; the embassy was established in September 1962; relations severed in December 1985; the embassy was re-established in December 1990; relations severed in December 2021 The No informal Consulate-General diplomatic missions was established in established since December 1912; diplomatic relations legation was were severed in 2017 established in January 1922; the embassy was established in May 1954; relations severed in June 2017

Taiwan’s diplomatic mission in the capital city as of November 2023 Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Mexico

None

None

(continued)

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Table 5.1 (continued) Country

Formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Informal diplomatic missions with Taiwan after diplomatic relations were severed

Taiwan’s diplomatic mission in the capital city as of November 2023

Paraguay

Non-resident ambassador-level diplomatic relations were established in July 1957; the embassy was established in November 1959 Legation established in April 1913; embassy established in September 1944; relations severed in November 1971

N/A

Embassy of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the Republic of Paraguay

Far East Trade Center was established in January 1978(renamed to Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Peru in November 1990) N/A

Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Peru

Peru

St. Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Diplomatic relations were established in October 1983; the embassy was established in August 1984 Diplomatic relations N/A were established in May 1984; the embassy was established in June 1984; relations severed in August 1997; the embassy was re-established in April 2007 Diplomatic relations N/A were established in August 1981; the embassy was established in March 1983

Embassy of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in Saint Christopher and Nevis Embassy of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in St. Lucia

Embassy of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in St. Vincent and the Grenadines

(continued)

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Table 5.1 (continued) Country

Formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Informal diplomatic missions with Taiwan after diplomatic relations were severed

Taiwan’s diplomatic mission in the capital city as of November 2023

Suriname

No diplomatic relations have ever been established so far No diplomatic relations have ever been established so far Diplomatic relations and the embassy were established in November 1957; the embassy was established in July 1962; relations severed in February 1988 Non-resident minister-level diplomatic relations were established in April 1941; legation was established in August 1944; the embassy was established in July 1966; relations severed in June 1974

No informal diplomatic missions have ever been established so far No informal diplomatic missions have ever been established so far Taipei Economic Office was established in July 1992; Economic Office closed in December 2002; no informal diplomatic missions were established since 2002 Taiwan Commercial Office was established in August 1974 (renamed to Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Venezuela in June 1992); the Office closed in 2009; no informal diplomatic missions established since 2009

None

Trinidad and Tobago

Uruguay

Venezuela

None

None

None

Sources Huang (2004) and MOFA (1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2015, 2017)

Taiwan and the ABM Countries Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (ABM) are the largest countries in Latin America by the size of their territories, populations, and economies. Therefore, it has been common for experts on international relations to consider those countries as middle powers in the international system, and as major powers in LAC regional affairs (Rocha & Morales, 2008, pp. 87–93). Similarly, the three countries are members of the G-20 and

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are considered emerging markets, making them attractive for international investors and foreign policymakers in countries around the world. Therefore, it is understandable that the authorities in Taiwan have also paid special attention to developing closer ties with these countries, even after they decided to break diplomatic relations with Taipei in the 1970s (Pérez, 2002, p. 140). The choice of pragmatism in the application of the “One China” policy by the ABM countries has allowed Taiwan to exchange representative offices with them, as we will analyze in the following sub-sections. Taiwan in Argentina: Ups and Downs Historically, Argentine foreign policy prioritized relations with Europe, seeing itself as a South Atlantic power (Rapoport, 2017, p. 65). The need for markets, capital, and migration from Europe made Argentine diplomats focus excessively on ties with the Old World since the independence of the country, and up to the time of the Great Depression. In the 1930s, the country turned inward, while trying to resist the increasing influence of the United States in South America in the following years (Sáenz, 2022, p. 508). The maintenance of neutrality throughout most of World War II, also made the coming together of Argentina and the ROC harder. Therefore, it was until the end of the conflict, which Buenos Aires joined the side of the Allies when it established diplomatic ties with China in 1945 (MOFA, 2021, p. 265). The status of Argentina as the most developed economy in the LAC region during the first half of the twentieth century, made it an attractive destination for immigrants from Taiwan who settled mostly in Buenos Aires. This community contributed to the creation of a Chinatown at Belgrano, in the Argentine capital (Turismo BA, 2023). Having abstained from the voting of UN Resolution 2758, Argentina followed other governments in breaking relations with Taiwan in 1972, despite being under a military regime that had come to power with an anti-communist discourse. Nonetheless, also seeing what Japan and other powers were doing with their unofficial ties with Taiwan, Buenos Aires allowed the opening of the Taiwan Representative Office in Argentina in 1973, being the first de-facto embassy established by Taipei in Latin America and using Taiwan in official title of the institution. This situation lasted until 1996, when the name was homologated with similar offices in the world,

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becoming the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in Argentina (MOFA, 2021, p. 266). Similarly, persuaded by the economic miracle of Taiwan and following the trend of other major LAC economies, Buenos Aires agreed to the creation of the Argentina Trade and Cultural Office in Taipei, in 1992 (MOFA, 2021, p. 266). The exchange of representative offices has opened the door to the implementation of commercial, cultural, and educational ties between the two countries, with a particular emphasis on the presence of the Taiwanese community in Argentina. In the 2000s, the PRC emerged as a major buyer of Argentine exports during the 2000s, and an important source of capital at a time when the country was having a hard time with the International Monetary Fund and other Western governments (Ovideo, 2015, pp. 80–81). The increasing interest of Chinese companies in the Argentine market, from financial firms to manufacturing enterprises, also made it harder for Taiwan to increase its presence in Argentina. As a result, bilateral trade has remained at low levels, especially compared to that between Argentina and China, although it remains mainly positive for the Argentine side (MOFA, 2021, p. 266). On the other hand, the successful transition to democracy in the South American nation, and the diversity of parties represented in Congress, has made TECO put an effort to cooperate with different Argentine lawmakers. Similar to other parliaments in Europe and the United States, the Congress in Argentina has taken a softer position toward Taiwan. The Library of Congress in Argentina has cooperated with TECO in the organization of social events showcasing the culture of Taiwan (MOC, 2022). Similarly, Taiwan has maintained a policy of offering annual scholarships to students and scholars in Argentina, although their number is significantly lower than those grants offered to allied countries and other friendly nations in other parts of the world (MOFA, 2021, p. 266). As will be seen in the last section of this chapter, Argentina has also been a key country in the strategy of Mandarin Chinese promotion by the Taiwanese community in Buenos Aires. Taiwan in Brazil: Economic Interests and Immigration Brazil, together with Peru and Mexico, was among the first Latin American countries to establish diplomatic ties with imperial China since the end of the nineteenth century, extending its recognition to the new

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Republican government in 1913, after the fall of the Qing Dynasty (Bussche, 2012). When the KMT took power, the South American giant was viewed as an important market and ally by key figures of the Nationalist regime. Among them, historians have reported trips and investments made in Brazil during the 1940s by figures from the powerful Soong and Kung clans (Seagrave, 1985, p. 413). During the Cold War, the military regime in Brasilia was initially favorable to the ROC cause, due to their shared anti-communist rhetoric and its alignment with the Western bloc and the US interests. Nonetheless, despite having voted against UN Resolution 2758, after the admission of the PRC to the UN and the wave of big powers extending their recognition to Beijing, the Brazilian government broke ties with Taiwan in 1974 (MOFA, 2021, p. 267). Following the trend of opening representative offices through an organization called Far East Trade Service (FETS), the Taiwanese government established a branch in Sao Paulo in 1975 (MOFA, 2021, p. 267). The creation of this office was of utmost importance to the authorities in Taipei, considering the large presence of a Taiwanese community in that city. Historically, due to its developed infrastructure and economic weight, Sao Paulo has also attracted an important number of entrepreneurs from Taiwan, who conduct their businesses not only with their counterparts in Brazil but also with firms in other neighboring countries (Ibrachina, 2020). According to MOFA official figures from 2021, Brazil hosts a community of 310,000 people with Chinese heritage. Of them, around 72,000 have roots in Taiwan, which makes it the largest Taiwanese community in LAC (MOFA, 2021, p. 268). Most of them live in the state and the city of Sao Paulo, as well as in neighboring Rio de Janeiro. Therefore, during the 1970s and 1980s, the main representation of Taiwanese interests in Brazil was done in its Sao Paulo office, which adopted the name Taipei Commercial Office in 1980. However, similar to what was happening in other parts of the world, Taiwan pushed to increase its unofficial presence in Brazil. By the beginning of 1992, Taiwan was represented in Brazil through three different offices, which were rebranded as TECO. Besides the existing office in Sao Paulo, Taiwan opened offices in Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro and signed a cooperation agreement on science and technology the same year (Pérez, 2002, p. 146). The institution in Brasilia became the most important one, given its status as the political capital of the country, receiving the largest number of staff from different ministries and bureaus in Taiwan. The

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office in Rio de Janeiro functioned for only ten years until it was closed in December 2002 (MOFA, 2021, p. 267). On the other hand, the Brazilian government decided to open a representative office in Taiwan by the end of the Cold War. In 1990, the Commercial Office of Brazil to Taipei was created, to attract investments and promote Brazilian exports (Temóteo & Amaral, 2020). The large size of the economy and the exchange of representative offices have resulted in an intense commercial relationship. The status of Brazil as a fast-growing emerging economy during the first decade of the twenty-first century, and being the largest member of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), made it extremely attractive to international capital. Since the 1990s, companies from Taiwan have also made important investments in Brazil. For instance, Foxconn has invested or pledged to invest large amounts to build facilities to assemble and commercialize high-technology products for the domestic market in Brazil and neighboring nations, though they have also found some challenges (Barboza, 2017). For the past couple of decades, Brazil has become the second-largest market in LAC for Taiwanese exports, and the main source of LAC imports in Taiwan. Reproducing the pattern of international commerce with other parts of East Asia, Brazil exports mainly commodities to Taiwan and imports manufactured goods, technology, and equipment, resulting in a considerable surplus in its bilateral trade. Trade between Brazil and Taiwan surpassed the US$3 billion mark in 2021 (MOFA, 2021, p. 267), which makes it, together with Mexico, the largest trading partner of Taiwan in LAC. Taiwan in Mexico: The Integration into North America Mexico was one of the first countries in LAC to open diplomatic channels with China, signing a bilateral treaty in 1899 (Valdés-Lakowsky, 1983, pp. 9–19). The presence of Chinese communities in Mexico, who arrived in the country seeking to eventually relocate to the United States, made Sino-Mexican relations to be centered on the issue of migration during the first decades of the twentieth century. Mexico recognized the government of the ROC in 1913 and renewed diplomatic ties when both countries were members of the Allies in World War II. However, having voted in favor of UN Resolution 2785, the government of Mexico broke ties with Taiwan in late 1971 (Haro et al., 2011, p. 219).

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Different from the other two major LAC economies, Mexico objected to the opening of a representative office of the Far East Trade Service in the 1970s, despite the initial calls made by Taiwan (MOFA, 1998). It was until the abandonment of a protectionist industrial policy and the adoption of neoliberal reforms that the Mexican government began to perceive economic ties with Taiwan as beneficial. In 1989, a branch of FETS opened in Mexico City, changing its name to TECO in 1993. At the same time, Mexico decided on the opening of a representative office in Taipei, in 1990, changing its name to the Mexican Trade Services Documentation and Cultural Office one year later (MOFA, 2021, p. 277). Since the exchange of representative offices up to 2017, the accumulated FDI from Taiwanese companies in Mexico was larger than that from Chinese firms (Fonseca, 2018, p. 109). Firms like Foxconn and other manufacturing companies have also established assembly plants in Mexico, particularly in those states bordering the United States (Chaterjee et al., 2020). Large corporations from Taiwan have made investments in Mexico mainly due to the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), seeking to use the country as an export platform to the US market. Even though Taiwanese businesses have developed a tendency to invest and outsource parts of their production process to Mainland China and Southeast Asia, to remain competitive internationally, some of them have also looked at Mexico as an alternative. This has been the case in recent years, after the ratification of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the United States-China trade war (Fonseca, 2018, pp. 119–123). For the past couple of decades, Taiwan has kept its position among the top 10 trading partners of Mexico, even though the bilateral trade is highly unbalanced, resulting in a marked deficit for Mexico each year. Mexico has become the largest market for Taiwanese exports in LAC, and the second source of imports from the region (MOFA, 2021, p. 278). However, different from Brazil, the balance is negative for the Mexican side. Given the increasing material incentives in bilateral relations, a larger number of people are migrating from Taiwan to Mexico. The TECO in Mexico has reported that more than 300 companies from Taiwan are investing in the country, and around 1500 Taiwanese live there, most of them owners or employers of those firms, as well as working for Chinese enterprises (MOFA, 2021, p. 280). Despite being a smaller number than those Taiwanese communities in Brazil and Argentina, the Taiwanese in

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Mexico have created five associations. A couple of them serve as chambers of commerce representing the business interests of their companies in their interactions with local, state, and federal governments (LTN, 2016). Similarly, TECO has found ways to collaborate with members of Congress and other NGOs in the country. In terms of scholarships, based on reported figures, Mexico is the country in Latin America with no official ties with Taiwan, receiving the largest number of scholarships. These grants are mostly provided by the Ministry of Education, not MOFA, and have become an important tool of public diplomacy of Taiwan in Mexico (Fonseca, 2021b, p. 136). Nonetheless, as happens with other LAC countries, the amount of grants is still lower than the one provided to those governments that officially recognize the ROC.

Taiwan and the Andean Nations: Consistency and Setbacks Besides the larger economies of the ABM countries, Taiwan has managed to maintain unofficial ties with other countries located along the Andes Mountains. However, the number of representative offices that Taipei used to maintain in that sub-region has decreased. For the past twenty years, the medium-sized economies in South America, given the wealthy endowment of natural resources, particularly minerals, have been considered attractive options for international investors. Nonetheless, their political developments and preferred models of economic growth have made them take different paths in the last two decades (Ruiz, 2012). The arrival of socialist movements and governments to Venezuela and Bolivia was coincidental with the increasing interest of the PRC in the natural resources of South America, mainly in the mining and energy sectors (Fierro, 2020). The extension of Chinese credits to those countries and the increasing demand for their exported goods, together with the impossibility of Taiwan offering further material incentives, resulted in the closure of representative offices that had been exchanged between those countries in the 1980s (Pérez, 2002, p. 140). The Venezuelan government’s adoption of an anti-American foreign policy, and its need to forge closer ties to the PRC, led the Chávez regime to refuse to renew the visas to the Taiwanese staff at the TECO in Caracas in 2007 (EFE, 2007). This resulted in the closure of Taiwan’s representative office in Venezuela in 2009. Moreover, Taipei also decided to close its TECO in

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Bolivia in 2009, claiming a more restrictive environment under the Evo Morales’ administration (EFE, 2009). On the other hand, despite also having been ruled by a government aligned with Venezuela between 2007 and 2017, Ecuador maintained its unofficial ties with Taiwan mostly unchanged. After having voted in favor of UN Resolution 2758 and switching diplomatic recognition to the PRC that same year, Ecuador became the only country in the region to allow Taiwan to open a representative office using the official “Republic of China” in its title. The office was created in 1974 in the city of Guayaquil (MOFA, 2021, p. 273). A new office was later opened in Quito, in 1977, which preserved that name until 2017. That year, it was rebranded as TECO. The decision to allow the title ROC in the de-facto embassy for more than four decades can be seen as influential in the inclusion of Ecuador in some of the projects of Taiwan’s ICDF, despite not being a diplomatic partner (ICDF, 2023). On the other hand, Ecuador was also among the first countries in LAC to open a representative office in Taiwan, as early as 1983. Nonetheless, after five years of operations, the institution was dismantled, having a negative impact on Ecuadoran exports to Taiwan, which remain in very low figures (MOFA, 2021, p. 274). A similar situation is found in Colombia. After the rupture of diplomatic ties in 1980, Bogota allowed the opening of the Far East Trade Service office in Colombia, that same year, with another branch in the city of Barranquilla, where a former ROC consulate was located. The office changed its name to the Taipei Commercial Office in the early 1990s, and the one in Barranquilla was closed soon afterwards (MOFA, 2021, p. 270). Although Colombia also opened a commercial office run by staff from ProColombia in 1993, the institution was also closed in 2002, mainly alleging budgetary constraints. As a result, bilateral commercial ties have remained at low levels (Ramírez, 2020). Despite the constant rhetoric from different Colombian administrations regarding a more active policy in the Asia–Pacific region, it has been hard for Bogota to insert the country into the economic trends that have characterized the other members of the Pacific Alliance (Chile, Mexico, and Peru) (García, 2022, pp. 29–30). However, the Taiwan representative office in Bogota has had some success in continuing to collaborate with local organizations. In the cases of Colombia and Ecuador, the offices there have reported the success of Taiwanese dramas when broadcasted by local TV

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stations. This represents a hit in the cultural promotion of Taiwan in that part of South America (MOFA, 2021, pp. 273–276). On the other hand, Chile and Peru remain the most important trading partners for Taiwan among the Andean nations. Both countries broke ties with Taipei at the beginning of the 1970s, followed by the establishment of representative offices of the Far East Trade Service in the following years (MOFA, 2021, pp. 269, 280). The offices changed their names to TECO at the start of the 1990s, around the same time when both countries decided to open representative offices in Taipei. With the creation of the Chilean Trade Office in 1989, Chile has managed to increase its bilateral trade with Taiwan, seeking also to diversify its exports away from traditional goods, such as minerals, wine, fruits, and salmon, among others (ProChile, 2016, pp. 2–4). This means that Chile has become the second-largest source of imports from LAC in Taiwan, enjoying a large surplus that was close to US$1 billion in 2020 (MOFA, 2021, p. 269). That strategy of commercial diversification and insertion into the Asia– Pacific regional economy has been followed closely by Peru. This country has also found in the East Asian economies an important source of economic growth, exporting minerals in large quantities to those markets, including Taiwan (Ferreyros, 2012, pp. 101–102). In 1994, the Commercial Office of Peru in Taipei was created, seeking to open new markets for Peruvian products and to attract more investments among Taiwanese firms. However, it has been difficult for Peruvian officials to replicate the Chilean experience, and the bilateral trade has remained at a level closer to that of Argentina, although with a positive balance (MOFA, 2021, p. 281). Nonetheless, the big challenge for Santiago and Lima consists in adding more value to its exports, hence decreasing its dependence on the export of commodities. As a result of the exchange of representative offices, cooperation with domestic business associations has been very active, and the provision of scholarships has been maintained. Similarly, the national governments in Lima and Santiago have agreed to exempt Taiwan passport holders from visa requirements to enter those countries. Demanding reciprocity, Taiwan has allowed Peruvian citizens to apply for an electronic visa before traveling to the island and negotiated a mutual visa waiver with Chile in 2016 (MOFA, 2021, pp. 269, 280). However, since both Chile and Peru have negotiated FTAs with China, the latter has become their largest trading partner. China is also one of the main sources of FDI for Peru

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(Kessler, 2023), making the chances for Taiwan to enlarge its cooperation with those countries in different areas to remain limited.

Public Diplomacy and Language Promotion by Taiwanese Communities The presence of representative offices in those LAC countries has facilitated the deployment of different instruments associated with public diplomacy. For the particular case of cultural diplomacy, it also has meant a chance for students and scholars from the region to visit and spend some time in Taiwan, and for students from Taiwan to visit and study at universities in LAC. The first interaction between universities from both regions goes back to the Cold War, when a few universities on the island created centers and departments for the study of Spanish (NDT, 1998). Following the trend of the time, the KMT-led government encouraged private universities, mostly those run by the Catholic Church, to open departments of Spanish. However, traditionally, those institutions and the staff who teaches there, have been trained and developed special ties with their counterparts in Spain. This is a country that historically has shown interest in forging closer links to Taiwan (Chang, 2018). The situation has contributed to limiting the interest of students in Taiwan in Latin American studies, as compared to those institutions in Mainland China that are devoted to the study of LAC, including its language and literature (Wang, 2022). On the other hand, the increasing demand for Chinese courses in some parts of LAC has also offered an opportunity for collaboration between Taiwanese entrepreneurs and Taiwan’s Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC). This organization is particularly active in those countries that do not recognize the ROC. For the past couple of decades, OCAC has provided material and human assets for Taiwanese who are interested in opening language schools for the children of their compatriots overseas (OCAC, 2021, pp. 2–3). As was seen in the past two sections, an increasing number of Taiwanese have moved to the ABM countries, where firms from the island have continued to invest. As a result, in cities like Buenos Aires, Mexico City, and Sao Paulo, it is possible to find Chinese language schools run by Taiwanese managers. These schools have received support from OCAC. Some of those educational centers were created to attend the needs of the Taiwanese community in those places. However, they eventually

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decided to expand their reach, opening courses for students with no Chinese heritage. On the other hand, despite their identification with Taiwan and the emphasis on traditional characters and other features of Mandarin or Guoyu, some of those schools have reported receiving petitions made by immigrant families from Mainland China, to accept their children as students.5 Yet, the schools have followed different strategies that obey the environment and personal preferences of their managers. As an example, two schools in Central Mexico that are run by Taiwanese entrepreneurs, when facing an increasing demand, one of them decided to make some changes, and began to offer a few courses using simplified characters, and also hiring teachers from Mainland China, together with the teachers coming from Taiwan through the assistance offered by OCAC. The other school has continued using only traditional characters and teachers who have received certification from the Ministry of Education in Taiwan. These differences also illustrate the opportunities and challenges that those schools meet when deciding their expansion overseas, including LAC markets. Being managed by Taiwanese entrepreneurs and having received support from OCAC encourages these schools to develop closer ties with the TECOs in those countries. Therefore, they also serve as a platform to promote scholarships among local students, and in some cases, they also organize summer camps in Taiwan. This gives a unique opportunity to those young people who are interested in learning more about the island’s culture and society. Scholarships can be seen as a relevant tool in the practice of public diplomacy and the management of long-term relations with key actors. Another important aspect of this effort is that these schools in the ABM countries also became authorized centers for the administration of the Test of Chinese as a Foreign Language (TOCFL), which is Taiwan’s standardized Chinese proficiency exam (TOCFL, 2022). Naturally, this test is needed in case students want to follow their professional careers in Taiwan, either studying at a Taiwanese university or working for a local company. While the Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (HSK) test has gained popularity in the past decade (Xie, 2018), it is possible to see a sustained effort from 5 The information in this section, related to the situation of Chinese language schools in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico that are managed by Taiwanese entrepreneurs, was obtained through a series of interviews with different involved actors, performed between 2021 and 2022.

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the Taiwanese schools in LAC to promote interest in the TOCFL. Using data obtained from the Ministry of Education (MOE), it is possible to see an increase in the number of students presenting the test in Latin America and the Caribbean between 2015 and 2019 (MOE, 2022). This increase obeys partially to an enlargement of the number of countries in which the test can be taken. In 2015, the test was available in 6 countries of the region, and four years later, the amount increased to 10 countries, 5 of which did not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In this sense, it is notable that the largest number of students who have signed up for the TOCFL during those years is concentrated in the ABM countries. However, since 2021, the number of students in countries with official diplomatic ties started to increase considerably (MOE, 2022). For the period 2020–2021, the number of TOCFL-takers decreased remarkably due to the many restrictions imposed in those countries after the outbreak of COVID-19. This pushed schools to implement alternative methods to continue their courses. After the pandemic situation started to worsen in LAC, schools at all levels had to move to online teaching. Initially, the Taiwanese schools that cooperated with local private elementary and secondary schools in the provision of Chinese as a second or third language, suffered from the decisions made by those institutions to cut costs and cancel language courses. However, in the case of the schools located in Mexico, they found online courses as a new way to increase their audiences and expand their reach. The interviewed staff in those schools reported that in the first year of the pandemic, they managed to compensate for the initial loss of students from the local communities, with the attraction of students located in other cities. With schools reopening and coming back to the classrooms, Mandarin schools ran by Taiwanese staff in Argentina and Mexico were contemplating the possibility of following a hybrid system, to maintain those students living in different cities. This situation makes it evident that there is room for growth for Mandarin language schools in the larger countries of Latin America in the coming years, including those institutions that are closer to Taiwan. This increases the chances for enlarging the instruments of public and cultural diplomacy in the LAC region (Fonseca, 2021b, p. 136). A common response in the interviews with staff was that schools could also benefit from more material support offered by OCAC. The challenge of maintaining the existing diplomatic ties with the countries in LAC that

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recognize Taiwan creates the way for the Latin America policy implemented by Taipei to overlook the relevance of the other middle powers in the region. Nonetheless, the need to preserve its international space and increase its soft power could also make decision-makers in Taiwan look at the opportunities derived from increasing demand for Chinese language courses in places like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.

Conclusion Given that the LAC region is crucial for Taiwan and China’s competition for diplomatic recognition, most studies focus on those countries that officially recognize Taipei, with an important emphasis on topics such as development cooperation, and aid, but research on the unofficial relations between Taiwan and countries that do not recognize Taiwan remains scarce. To fill the gap in the literature, we conducted qualitative analyses about how the Taiwanese government utilizes unofficial tools, such as trade, scholarships, and language schools, in large LAC countries. The case studies of the ABM countries and the Andean countries suggest that the achievements of Taiwan’s informal diplomatic instruments remain mixed. While it is uncertain that these achievements can help Taiwan to regain diplomatic recognition in the China-aligned countries, the case studies show that tools of public diplomacy, such as the Mandarin language schools, are crucial for Taiwan to enhance its soft power in the region. Overall, this chapter contributes to the literature on Taiwan’s international relations by providing qualitative analyses of unofficial relations between Taiwan and China-aligned LAC countries, which sheds light on the diplomatic opportunities and challenges that Taiwan is currently facing in the LAC region.

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CHAPTER 6

Soft Power and China-Taiwan Competition for Influence in Latin America Mohamad Zreik

Introduction The historical separation between China and Taiwan after the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 is the root of the current China-Taiwan competition in Latin America (Yang, 2020). Due to their competing claims of legitimacy, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC, also known as Taiwan) have fought one another for diplomatic recognition and support around the world. The rivalry has shifted its focus to Latin America because of the region’s advantageous geographical position and wealth of natural resources. Both China and Taiwan have made efforts throughout the years to strengthen their links to the region economically, politically, and strategically (Jenkins, 2017). Since the turn of the century, competition between China and Taiwan has heated up as the former has sought to counter the latter’s rise by strengthening its relationships with key regional partners and the latter

M. Zreik (B) School of International Studies, Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_6

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has sought to expand its presence in Latin America in response to China’s rapid economic growth and global influence. Joseph Nye, a political scientist, popularized the term “soft power” to describe a country’s influence over other nations’ decisions and attitudes through diplomatic and cultural means as opposed to force (Nye, 2023). Culture, the media, and education are all examples of soft power tools that can be used to improve a country’s standing in the world. Soft power is crucial in international relations because it may sway the opinions and actions of other countries without resorting to force or aggression (Zhang, 2017). The influence of soft power in international affairs has increased as the world has become more interconnected. Countries are attempting to diversify their partnerships and alliances, and this is especially true in regions like Latin America, where conventional power balances are shifting. The purpose of this chapter is to look at how soft power is being used by China and Taiwan to compete for influence in Latin America. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the success of each country’s soft power plans by studying the historical background and key drivers of this competition, as well as the soft power techniques adopted by both countries. This chapter will also examine the perceptions of China and Taiwan in Latin American countries and the variables that contribute to such opinions. This chapter’s overarching goal is to provide light on how soft power has influenced relations between China and Taiwan in Latin America and what that means for the future of power dynamics in the area.

Historical Context and Key Drivers of Competition China-Taiwan Historical Relations Relations between China and Taiwan have their origins in the Chinese Civil War, which ranged from 1927 to 1949 (Tsui, 2018). During this war, the Communist Party of China under Mao Zedong fought fiercely against the Kuomintang (KMT) under Chiang Kai-shek. As a result of the conflict, the Communist Party of China created the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the Chinese mainland in 1949, while the Kuomintang (KMT) fled to Taiwan and founded the Republic of China (ROC) (Lim, 2022).

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After the Chinese Civil War ended, the PRC and ROC took divergent political stances, with the former adhering to communism and the latter adopting a more traditional nationalist philosophy. The ideological chasm widened between the two Chinas, each of which asserted its right to speak for all of China. This resulted in a protracted diplomatic competition as both sides worked to gain international backing for their governments. In the course of the Cold War, the United States and its Western allies generally recognized the ROC as the legitimate government of China, while the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc allies recognized the PRC (Garver, 2015). In the 1970s, however, attitudes began to change as more nations acknowledged the PRC as China’s legitimate government. The United Nations General Assembly voted Resolution 2758 in 1971, officially changing China’s representation at the UN from the ROC to the PRC, solidifying this change (Kent & Center, 2007). Despite widespread recognition of the PRC, the ROC kept up diplomatic ties with a select group of countries, many of which were in Latin America. Over the ensuing decades, both the PRC and the ROC have vied for international legitimacy and influence in Latin America. The relationship between China and Taiwan with the countries of Latin America has been heavily influenced by their long-standing competition. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) have both made efforts to expand their influence in the region by using their respective economic, political, and cultural clout with other countries in the region (Shattuck, 2020). China and Taiwan are competing in Latin America as part of a larger war for global legitimacy, power, and influence. Shifts in Global Geopolitics The struggle between China and Taiwan for sway in Latin America has been affected by major transformations in global geopolitics during the past few decades. These changes present both countries with opportunities and difficulties as they attempt to increase their footprint and forge closer links in the region. China’s fast economic expansion and modernization since the late 1970s have turned it from an economically marginalized and underdeveloped nation into a major player on the international stage (Coase & Wang, 2016). China’s diplomatic, economic, and military might have grown as a result of this rise, and this includes Latin America. Investments,

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economic agreements, and diplomatic endeavors have all expanded as a result of China’s rising power and influence in the region. Due to China’s efforts to convince Latin American countries to switch allegiance from Taiwan to the PRC, competition with Taiwan has heated up (Fornes & Mendez, 2018). There was a major shift in the balance of global power after the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. The United States and its Western allies became less likely to actively back Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts as their attention switched away from restraining communism (Mandelbaum, 2016). Since Latin America was no longer at the center of the ideological conflict between the East and the West, this change opened the door for the PRC to increase its sway there. As countries in the region have sought to diversify their relationships and forge new alliances, there has been a growing trend toward regional integration and multilateralism in Latin America in recent years. This shift has been fueled in part by the rise of Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina as regional powers that aim to exert more influence over the region’s politics and economy (Liang, 2019). China and Taiwan now face new chances and difficulties in their pursuit of regional dominance as they negotiate a more complex and linked geopolitical landscape. As the United States has dealt with domestic issues and redirected its foreign policy attention to other regions, including the Middle East and Asia–Pacific, the country’s influence in Latin America has waned somewhat in the twenty-first century (Sutter, 2019). Both China and Taiwan have responded to this power vacuum by increasing their diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties to countries in Latin America. As a result of these changes in global geopolitics, both China and Taiwan have had to adjust their plans and tactics in their quest for influence in Latin America. Decisions by Latin American countries on whether or not to align with or support either China or Taiwan have been influenced by shifts in the region’s geopolitical landscape. Economic Interests in Latin America Due to its strategic location, rising consumer markets, and abundance of natural resources, Latin America has become an important economic zone for both China and Taiwan. These competing interests have been a major factor in the regional competition between the two countries.

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China and Taiwan’s economies rely heavily on imports of raw materials from Latin America. This includes minerals, hydrocarbons, and agricultural items (Kotschwar, 2014). To meet its rising domestic demand and support its developing industrial base, China in particular has attempted to secure access to these resources. As a result, China has made massive investments in industries including mining, oil and gas, and agriculture, and it has signed trade agreements with several important Latin American nations (Gallagher, 2016). Despite its modest size, Taiwan has likewise looked for ways to benefit economically from the region’s abundant natural resources. The expanding and diversifying economies of Latin American countries have made them prime destinations for Chinese and Taiwanese exports. Both nations have increased exports to the region and invested in manufacturing, infrastructure, and communications to take advantage of this development. Taiwan wants to diversify its commercial links and minimize its economic dependency on mainland China, whereas China seeks to lessen its reliance on traditional export destinations like the United States and Europe by increasing its presence in Latin America (Zreik, 2023a). Recently, Latin America has become a hotspot for foreign investment, and both China and Taiwan are eager to get a piece of the action. As part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the country has invested vast sums of money in the region’s infrastructure projects like ports, roads, and energy facilities (Moreno et al., 2020). Taiwan has also sought out investment opportunities in the area, with a particular emphasis on technology, renewable energy, and healthcare, all of which are fields in which it excels (Chien-ping et al., 2021). China and Taiwan both recognize that having robust economic relations with Latin American countries will increase their respective regional power. They can strengthen their diplomatic and strategic clout by creating close trade and investment ties, which will lead to increased goodwill, economic interdependence, and overall influence. This has increased competition between the two countries as each seeks to forge closer economic relations with countries in Latin America through preferential trade deals, bilateral investment treaties, and other economic collaborations.

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Political and Strategic Considerations The competition between China and Taiwan over Latin America has been shaped not only by economic concerns but also by political and strategic ones. Both China and Taiwan’s approaches to the region may be traced back to these factors, which include the pursuit of specific political aims and larger strategic objectives. The pursuit of diplomatic recognition is a major political factor in the China-Taiwan competition in Latin America. Both the PRC and the ROC have long vied with one another for international recognition and support despite their competing claims to be China’s legitimate government (Hughes, 2013). For Taiwan’s international legitimacy and survival, keeping in touch with its last remaining supporters in Latin America is essential. China hopes that by convincing these nations to cut connections with Taiwan and recognize the PRC as China’s sole legitimate government, it may further isolate Taiwan diplomatically and boost the PRC’s international stature. Beyond diplomatic recognition, Latin America is seen as strategically important by both China and Taiwan. As the United States has long dominated Latin America, China sees an opportunity to diversify its global power base by increasing its influence in the region (Xu, 2016). Despite mounting pressure from China, Taiwan’s geopolitical importance is bolstered by its continued presence in the region. Therefore, the two nations have made efforts to strengthen their political ties to Latin American countries through exchanges of high-level officials, financial support for development, and joint efforts to combat common threats. China and Taiwan’s ideological conflict has been less noticeable in recent years, but it is still a factor in how each country approaches Latin America. To counter the liberal democratic ideas championed by Taiwan and the West, China as a one-party communist state has promoted its own growth model and political ideology. However, in an effort to set itself apart from China and attract countries in Latin America that share its values, Taiwan has emphasized its democratic credentials and commitment to human rights (Shi, 2014). Both China and Taiwan approach their involvement in Latin America through the perspective of maintaining peace and order in the region. Due to the importance of the region to their economies and geopolitical clout, both countries have a vested interest in keeping it peaceful and secure. In order to achieve this goal, they have participated in regional

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conferences, provided development aid, and backed peacekeeping initiatives (Regilme & Hodzi, 2021). However, their divergent interests in the area can exacerbate existing tensions and make the region less secure.

Soft Power Strategies: China Cultural Diplomacy—Confucius Institutes China’s soft power in Latin America and beyond is heavily dependent on the work of Confucius Institutes. These institutes were set up and are supported by the Chinese government to spread the Chinese language and culture, deepen relations between China and other nations, and increase international understanding (Zreik, 2021). The principal goals of Confucius Institutes are language education, cultural promotion, and cross-cultural communication between China and its host nations. These institutes provide a venue for people to learn about and interact with Chinese culture through activities like language classes, cultural events, and academic conferences. In addition, they give back to the community by supporting local schools and teachers with resources including curriculum development, professional development, and interdisciplinary exchange. Over 500 Confucius Institutes have been established in more than 140 countries since 2004, with a significant number of these locations established in Latin American countries (Hogenboom et al., 2022). China’s expanding interest and participation in the region, as well as the significance it places on soft power in attaining its broader diplomatic and strategic goals, are all reflected in this expansion. China’s cultural diplomacy in Latin America relies heavily on the work of its Confucius Institutes. These institutes promote a favorable perception of China and increase goodwill among locals by giving them the chance to study Chinese and experience Chinese culture. They also assist China promote its cultural impact and ideals, which can improve the regional climate for its economic and political goals by dispelling misconceptions and fostering positive sentiment (Hartig, 2019). Confucius Institutes in Latin America have been effective in spreading the Chinese language and culture, but they have also been the subject of controversy and criticism. Some have argued that these centers serve as Chinese propaganda outlets that aim to spread the party line and silence dissenting voices. Concerns have also been raised regarding the potential

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for Chinese government influence in host institutions and the protection of academic freedom (Hogenboom et al., 2022). This complexity of China’s soft power initiatives in Latin America is exemplified by the fact that these debates have caused certain countries and institutions to reevaluate their ties to Confucius Institutes. Promotion of Chinese Culture and Media China has taken multiple steps throughout Latin America, including the founding of Confucius Institutes, to spread the language and culture of China. These initiatives aim to increase China’s “soft power” in the region by promoting goodwill toward the country, increasing mutual understanding, and discouraging prejudice. Numerous film festivals, art exhibitions, musical performances, and literary events have been organized and attended by Chinese cultural representatives in Latin America. These events allow Latin American audiences to experience the rich history and richness of Chinese culture (Eichenauer et al., 2021). China hopes to improve its knowledge of Chinese culture and values in Latin America by promoting cultural exchanges and collaborations between Chinese and Latin American artists, writers, and performers. China has made efforts to increase its visibility in the Latin American media landscape by setting up news bureaus, airing Chinese TV shows, and disseminating Chinese films and books. China’s state-owned media have expanded their coverage of the region and begun offering information in Spanish and Portuguese to appeal to local audiences. These include China Central Television (CCTV), China Radio International (CRI), and Xinhua News Agency (Morales, 2022). China can broadcast its story and viewpoints on international events and showcase its economic and social successes via these media outlets. China has also tried to reach out to Latin American populations through online and social media channels. The presence of Chinese internet giants like Tencent and Alibaba has grown in the area, providing everything from e-commerce to smartphone applications (Jilberto & Hogenboom, 2022). To reach out to local audiences and spread a positive picture of China, Chinese diplomats and state-affiliated accounts have increased their presence on Twitter and Facebook, two of the most popular social media platforms in Latin America (Schliebs et al., 2021).

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China has made considerable attempts to spread its media and culture throughout Latin America, yet the region remains dominated by Western outlets despite China’s best efforts. Skepticism and criticism of Chinese media projects have also been fueled by worries about media censorship, deception, and the promotion of official government narratives. The complexity of China’s soft power strategy in Latin America is shown by the fact that these elements have reduced the overall impact of China’s cultural and media promotion efforts in the region (Ospina Estupinan, 2017). Media Outreach—Expansion of Chinese State Media China’s growth of state-run media in Latin America is an important part of its soft power strategy in the region. China’s goal in creating a robust media presence is to spread its narratives and perspectives, challenge misperceptions, and influence the regional conversation on a variety of subjects. China’s major state-owned media agencies, including China Central Television (CCTV), China Radio International (CRI), and Xinhua News Agency, have opened news bureaus in Latin America. The purpose of these regional offices is to increase coverage in the region and provide locals with relevant news and information. China’s goal in doing so is to promote both its viewpoints on regional and global events and its credibility as a credible and influential source of information (Urdinez et al., 2016). Chinese official media have upped their output of Spanish and Portuguese language programming to appeal to Latin American audiences. Two new international news and documentary channels serving the region have recently gone live: CCTV Español and CCTV Português (Morales, 2022). China hopes to increase its influence in Latin America by airing programs in the languages spoken there. To further its influence in the region, China has also sought out alliances and cooperation with Latin American media outlets. The professional abilities of local journalists are bolstered by these collaborations, and a more favorable picture of China is spread throughout the area through cooperative reporting projects and capacity-building programs (Morales & Menechelli, 2023). China’s efforts to increase its visibility in Latin America have included using both traditional and digital media. Promotion of Chinese mobile

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apps and digital services is another part of this strategy, as is the establishment of separate social media profiles for Chinese official media outlets. China hopes to respond to the shifting habits of Latin American viewers by increasing its use of digital and social media. Collaboration with Local Media Outlets China has actively sought out collaboration with local media outlets in Latin America as part of its soft power strategy to increase its reach and influence in the region. China’s goal in reaching out to media outlets in Latin America is to strengthen ties, increase mutual understanding, and control the story being told about China and its interests there. China’s cooperation with domestic media is anchored in contentsharing pacts. The Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television (CCTV) are only two of the Chinese official media outlets that have signed deals to share their news, commentary, and multimedia content with their Latin American counterparts (Farah & Babineau, 2019). This benefits local media organizations by providing access to diverse and foreign information, and it also helps China spread its ideas and narratives to a wider audience. Chinese officials have also expressed interest in collaborating with Latin American media outlets on cooperative reporting projects. Journalists from China and Latin America collaborate on stories that focus on topics including economic growth, cultural exchange, and environmental difficulties. China hopes to provide a more favorable image of its position and interests in the region and establish deeper ties with local media partners through collaborative reporting projects (Ritzer, 2016). China has funded training programs, workshops, and exchange visits for Latin American journalists and media outlets to improve their skills and expand their reach. The goals of these endeavors include increasing familiarity with China and its culture and improving local journalists’ professional competence (Repnikova, 2022). China hopes to increase its influence in the region and improve its image among locals by funding efforts that strengthen the capacity of local media. Despite these joint efforts, China’s collaboration with Latin American local media has been hindered by obstacles. Sometimes the success of these collaborations has been hampered by differences in journalistic practices, language barriers, and worries about the influence of Chinese state media. China’s efforts to collaborate with local media outlets may

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be hampered by cultural and political biases, as well as the dominance of Western media in the region (Dai & Spires, 2018). Educational Exchanges—Scholarship Programs China and Taiwan’s scholarship programs are an integral part of their soft power objectives in the region of Latin America. By investing in the region’s future leaders through their education, China and Latin America hope to strengthen links, increase cultural exchange, and strengthen the bonds between their peoples. Scholarships to study in China are available from the Chinese government, including the Chinese Government Scholarship and the Confucius Institute Scholarship, which are particularly attractive to students from Latin America (Zhu et al., 2019). These courses are available in a wide variety of subject areas, from language and culture studies to the pure sciences. China hopes to attract brilliant students from Latin America and introduce them to Chinese culture, values, and viewpoints by giving them financial support and access to China’s educational institutions. The Taiwan Scholarship and the International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) Scholarship are just two of the many Taiwanese scholarship opportunities available to students from Latin America. Students in the arts, sciences, and humanities, as well as those pursuing advanced degrees, can find help in these programs. Taiwan’s scholarship programs aim to promote Taiwanese culture and values while also showcasing Taiwan’s capabilities in fields including renewable energy, healthcare, and IT (Cheng et al., 2015). Creating a network of alumni who may go on to play influential roles in their home countries, scholarship programs help strengthen bilateral relations between China or Taiwan and Latin American countries. These alums’ continued ties to their host nation are a source of mutual goodwill and friendship. Furthermore, students who have participated in these programs can help shape public opinion and policy decisions in their home countries by contributing to a better understanding of and engagement with China or Taiwan (Cui & García, 2016). Scholarship programs have been successful in drawing in students from Latin America and fostering connections, but they are not without their share of difficulties and limitations, such as language barriers, cultural

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differences, and worries about the quality of education. Scholarship possibilities may also be diluted when China and Taiwan, compete for influence in the region, and offer chances that overlap or compete with one another. Academic Collaborations Another important part of China’s and Taiwan’s soft power strategy in Latin America is the establishment of academic partnerships between Chinese and Latin American universities. The overarching goals of these partnerships are to strengthen linkages between institutions and scholars on both sides and to promote the free flow of information and ideas (Teferra et al., 2022). China has been very keen on forming academic connections and cooperation with its Latin American counterparts, particularly in the fields of economics, sociology, and technology. Joint conferences, workshops, and student and faculty exchange programs are common examples of the kinds of activities in which these groups engage. China’s goal in partnering with Latin American institutions is to promote mutual understanding and cooperation on common issues and possibilities, while also providing a showcase for Chinese expertise and innovation (Xu, 2016). By fostering greater mutual understanding and trust, academic collaborations between Chinese and Latin American institutions help to strengthen bilateral ties. Research and innovation can benefit on both ends from the sharing of information and experience that is made possible through these partnerships. In addition to fostering cultural understanding and mutual respect between countries, academic collaborations frequently result in the development of long-lasting professional connections among scholars and researchers (Zreik, 2021). Collaborations between universities have the potential to encourage meaningful connections and the sharing of expertise, but they are not without their difficulties. The success of joint initiatives might be hampered by factors such as differences in academic systems, language problems, and lack of financing. Economic Investment and Infrastructure Development Projects China’s soft power strategy in Latin America has largely consisted of financial investment and infrastructure-building projects. China hopes to increase its clout in Latin America and win over the region’s governments

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by funding these projects and portraying itself as a trusted partner and a source of investment and growth. Over the past two decades, China has become one of Latin America’s largest investors and trading partners, with economic investments increasing dramatically. The energy, mining, agricultural, and telecommunications industries are just some of the many that have attracted Chinese investment. These investments benefit both the Chinese economy and the economies of Latin American countries by providing access to critical resources and markets. China’s involvement in infrastructure development projects in Latin America is widespread, and it is not just part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Building new roads, trains, ports, and power plants is all part of these initiatives to boost economic growth and connectivity in the area. By funding and completing massive infrastructure projects, China shows it can and will contribute to Latin America’s growth, all the while fortifying its economic relations and strategic influence in the area (Ludena, 2017). China’s soft influence in Latin America has increased thanks to the country’s economic investments and infrastructural development projects. Providing concrete benefits in the form of economic growth, job creation, and development, these projects have won the support of many Latin American countries (Nye, 2023). China has been able to counterbalance Western influence in the region and propose an alternative economic model by portraying itself as a stable partner and source of investment.

Soft Power Strategies: Taiwan Cultural Diplomacy One major part of Taiwan’s soft power strategy in Latin America has been the dissemination of Taiwanese entertainment media. Promoting crosscultural understanding, building a positive reputation, and increasing Taiwan’s allure in the area are all goals of the country’s efforts to highlight its creative and artistic achievements. Taiwan has a long history in filmmaking, with directors like Hou Hsiao-Hsien, Edward Yang, and Ang Lee bringing Taiwanese stories to an international audience. Film festivals, screenings, and cultural exchanges are just some of how Taiwan promotes its cinema throughout Latin America. The exchange of ideas and techniques between filmmakers from

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Taiwan and Latin America that takes place at these events is invaluable to the growth of both cinematic communities (Chien-ping et al., 2021). Traditional, folk, and modern styles coexist in Taiwan’s thriving music scene. Concerts, festivals, and cultural exchange programs all help to spread the word about the country’s music throughout Latin America. These efforts do more than just expose Latin American listeners to Taiwanese music; they also pave the way for musical collaboration and exchange between Taiwanese and Latin American artists. Taiwan hopes to create good perceptions of the country and strengthen cultural ties by sharing its rich musical history (Kheir, 2021). By showcasing Taiwan’s creative and artistic achievements, the promotion of Taiwanese film and music in Latin America helps to increase Taiwan’s soft power. Cultural exchanges like these promote understanding and friendship between people of different cultures and contribute to a more favorable perception of Taiwan in Latin American countries. In addition, they pave the way for Taiwanese and Latin American artists to work together and share ideas, which has the potential to deepen cultural links between the two regions. Promoting Taiwanese film and music in Latin America has had a favorable effect, but there have also been obstacles and restrictions. In addition to competing with China’s more extensive cultural diplomacy efforts, such as the promotion of Chinese cinema and music, limited funding and resources can limit the scale and reach of these initiatives, which can hinder Taiwan’s efforts to maintain and expand its influence in the region. Furthermore, Latin American audiences may have difficulty accessing and appreciating Taiwanese cinema and music due to language and cultural barriers (Pinheiro-Machado, 2018). Educational Exchanges Taiwan’s soft power strategy in Latin America includes scholarship programs to promote education, understanding, and people-to-people ties. Latin American undergraduate, graduate, and doctorate students can study in Taiwan with full or partial support, as well as short-term language and cultural exchange programs. These honors highlight Taiwan’s diverse academic strengths and competencies (Yu, 2015). Taiwan’s scholarship programs have many aims. First, educational exchange programs foster Taiwan-Latin America knowledge, skills, and best practices. Second, scholarship winners experience Taiwanese culture

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and share their knowledge with the community. Third, they prepare future leaders and professionals to champion Taiwan (Roberts et al., 2010). Taiwan hosts alumni activities and follows up with scholarship recipients after they return home. These programs connect Taiwan’s alums with present inhabitants, promoting cooperation, information sharing, and mutual aid. Taiwan expects that investing in these ties will have a long-term influence on scholarship winners and safeguard its soft power initiatives in Latin America. Taiwan’s scholarship programs have expanded knowledge and brought people together, but they’re not perfect. Taiwan may struggle to attract and maintain top Latin American talent due to a lack of funding and competition from China’s more extensive scholarship programs. Some Latin American countries have trouble recognizing Taiwanese degrees, which may lower their appeal (Chien-ping et al., 2021). Taiwan-Latin America academic relations include joint research projects, teacher-student exchanges, academic conferences, and workshops. Science, technology, agriculture, public health, and the humanities are represented in these partnerships (Critica & Maggiorelli, 2019). Taiwan-Latin American academic exchanges are varied. First, they increase human capital and specialized knowledge through sharing information and strengthening abilities. Second, they encourage conversation and cultural exchange between Taiwanese and Latin American scholars, researchers, and students. They also prepare educational institutions for future collaboration. Taiwan funds, supplies, and facilitates Latin American academic connections. Infrastructure support may include scholarships, gas and housing subsidies, and access to libraries and computer laboratories. Taiwan intends to assist these cooperative initiatives to optimize its growth impact on both regions (Harold et al., 2019). Taiwan-Latin America academic cooperation has proven successful, yet it has also been hindered. Taiwan’s efforts to maintain and expand its influence in the region may be hampered by a lack of resources and financing and competition from China’s academic networks. Academic systems, languages, and cultural norms may hinder Taiwanese-LatinAmerican academic collaboration.

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Sector-Specific Expertise Taiwan and Latin America collaborate on renewable energy to promote sustainable development. Taiwan has advanced in solar, wind, hydro, energy storage, and smart grid technology, and it leads the renewable energy market due to its advanced R&D and production capabilities. Taiwan wants to cooperate with Latin American countries in renewable energy so that Latin American countries migrate to greener, more efficient energy sources to promote sustainable growth. Second, it connects Taiwanese renewable energy companies with Latin American partners and customers to help them develop. Third, it wants to boost its regional soft power by portraying itself as a responsible global actor and climate change leader (Teng, 2021). Taiwan and Latin America collaborate on renewable energy through research, technology transfer, capacity building, and joint companies. These renewable energy agreements include solar panels, wind turbines, energy storage, and smart grids (Castro, 2019). Taiwan-Latin America renewable energy collaboration has had notable successes and setbacks. Taiwan’s efforts to maintain and expand its influence may be hampered by China’s more broad renewable energy partnerships, especially if finance and resources constrain these collaborations. Due to legislative frameworks, market conditions, and local infrastructure, renewable energy projects may fail (Teng, 2021). Taiwan and Latin America collaborate on healthcare due to Taiwan’s expertise and the region’s pressing need for better healthcare. Taiwan’s healthcare system is world-class, with cutting-edge medical technology, a professional workforce, and a solid national health insurance program (Chen, 2020). Its public health, illness prevention, and healthcare management triumphs can benefit many nations. Taiwan showed its will to cooperate with Latin American countries in fighting communicable and non-communicable disease epidemics and the consequences of an aging population to improve regional public health and healthcare. Second, it seeks to help Taiwanese healthcare companies penetrate Latin America by creating new business opportunities and collaborations. Finally, as a healthcare innovator and responsible global actor, it seeks to boost its soft power in the field (Lee, 2021). Taiwan and Latin America promote healthcare through cooperation research, technology transfer, capacity building, and joint companies. These relationships are found in telemedicine, disease prevention and

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control, healthcare administration, and medical equipment manufacturing.

Assessing the Effectiveness of Soft Power Strategies Expanding Presence and Influence in the Region Using a mix of soft power methods and economic, political, and geopolitical reasons, China and Taiwan have been working hard to enhance their presence and influence in Latin America. China has taken a more outward and active stance in Latin America, using its economic clout to fund infrastructure projects, increase commerce, and bolster the region’s coffers. China’s soft power measures, such as the spread of the Confucius Institutes, the dissemination of Chinese media, and the establishment of scholarships and academic partnerships, have greatly increased the country’s standing in the eyes of Latin American nations. Because of this, China has become an important economic and business partner for many countries in the region (Jenkins, 2017). Taiwan, on the other hand, has prioritized keeping and strengthening its ties to the region by highlighting its expertise in fields like renewable energy and healthcare and its dedication to democracy and human rights. Taiwan’s soft power initiatives in Latin America have included the dissemination of Taiwanese film and music and the promotion of academic exchanges and scholarly cooperation. Despite difficulties caused by its lack of resources and China’s rising influence, Taiwan has kept good relations with a few countries in the region (Teng, 2021). Perception of China and Taiwan in Latin America History, culture, economics, and politics all play a role in shaping Latin Americans’ views on China and Taiwan. Both countries have implemented soft power policies and programs to boost their standing in Latin American countries, albeit to varying degrees of success. There has been a mixed reaction to China’s increasing economic influence and investment in Latin America. Many nations in Latin America see China as an important trading partner because of the country’s large

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consumer market, plentiful financial resources, and opportunities for technology exports and imports (Kaplan, 2021). The Confucius Institutes and other academic partnerships that are part of China’s “soft power” strategy have also helped improve the country’s international reputation. Some Latin American countries are skeptical and wary of China due to worries about its political influence, debt dependency, environmental and labor practices, and the possibility of undermining local industries (Abdenur, 2017). Misunderstandings and unfavorable impressions of China may also result from linguistic and cultural limitations. The promotion of Taiwanese cinema and music and academic cooperation have all worked to improve interpersonal ties and create a more favorable impression of Taiwan throughout the region through soft power initiatives. However, due to its limited resources and China’s growing presence in Latin America, Taiwan faces challenges in maintaining and expanding its influence in the region. It is possible that some countries in the region will put their economic relationships with China above their ideological or political ties to Taiwan. In addition, the “One China” policy and Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation have prevented it from deepening its political and diplomatic ties with Latin American nations (Piccone, 2016). Challenges and Limitations of Soft Power Strategies Challenges and limitations to the efficacy of soft power strategies in strengthening each country’s influence in the region have played a part in shaping the China-Taiwan competition for influence in Latin America. The implementation of soft power programs by China and Taiwan is hampered by limited resources. China has more resources at its disposal than Taiwan does, making it better able to finance and carry out ambitious initiatives. But Taiwan’s limited resources can limit the breadth and depth of its soft power initiatives, making it harder for Taiwan to compete with China. The success of soft power initiatives might be hampered by linguistic and cultural limitations. Cultural exports from China and Taiwan, such as movies and music, may have trouble connecting with Latin American audiences because of linguistic and cultural barriers. Language difficulties and different pedagogical techniques are other potential obstacles to educational efforts like the Confucius Institutes (Ray et al., 2015).

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The effectiveness of soft power techniques might be hampered by geopolitical considerations like the “One China” policy and Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation. Concerned about the effects on their relations with China, Latin American countries may be hesitant to increase their cooperation with Taiwan. There may be resistance to China and Taiwan’s soft power attempts in Latin America due to their competition for influence in the region. Some Latin American countries may prioritize economic ties with China over political and ideological alignment with Taiwan because Taiwan competes with China (Fornes & Mendez, 2018). The views and credibility of each country in the eyes of Latin American countries also play a role in the success of soft power measures. China and Taiwan need to make sure that other countries see their soft power efforts as altruistic and helpful, rather than as attempts to control or coerce them. To maximize the impact of their soft power, they must first earn the trust and credibility of their partners through open and win–win initiatives.

Latin American Countries Attitudes Toward China and Taiwan Economic and Political Considerations The struggle for sway in Latin America between China and Taiwan is heavily influenced by economic and political factors. Both nations hope to expand their sway in the region by strengthening their strategic, political, and economic ties to the area. The demand for minerals, energy, and agricultural products in China has increased its economic interest in Latin America. In addition to being a potential destination for China’s surplus industrial capacity, the area is a vital market for Chinese exports. China’s financial and economic influence in the region has grown because of the country’s infrastructure initiatives, trade agreements, and aid programs (Eichenauer et al., 2021). Despite its smaller size compared to China, Taiwan is also eager to strengthen its relations with the Latin American economy by highlighting its achievements in renewable energy, healthcare, and technology. Taiwan hopes to lessen its economy’s reliance on China by fostering new business prospects and collaborations for its companies. China has political interests in Latin America because it wants to offset Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts and build international support for its “One China” policy (Critica & Maggiorelli, 2019). China hopes to

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strengthen its position as a global power, increase its influence in international organizations, and advocate for a multipolar world order that can counterbalance the dominance of Western nations by strengthening ties with Latin American countries (Larson, 2015). Keeping its diplomatic ties and regional recognition is vital to Taiwan’s political goals in Latin America. For Taiwan to keep its international stature and visibility, Latin America is crucial as one of the few regions remaining with formal diplomatic connections. To that end, Taiwan is actively seeking to strengthen political ties with nations that share its dedication to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. China sees Latin America as an important ally in achieving its overarching foreign policy goals, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which seeks to build infrastructure linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. China also wants to extend its global influence and security interests by strengthening ties with Latin American countries in the military and security sectors (Gélvez Rubio & Gachúz Maya, 2021). Perceptions of Chinese and Taiwanese Soft Power Chinese and Taiwanese cultural programs, educational exchanges, media presence, and commercial engagements all contribute to how the rest of Latin America views China and Taiwan. Their capacity to win the hearts and minds of the Latin American people, and the success of their soft power efforts, may depend on these impressions. In order to help more people learn about and appreciate Chinese culture, China has opened Confucius Institutes and promoted Chinese culture and arts throughout Latin America. Some observers, however, worry that the Chinese government is using these programs to advance its political agenda and spread its brand of propaganda (Beeson & Xu, 2016). Opportunities for Latin American students and academics to study and work in China through China’s scholarship programs and academic collaborations have been met with enthusiasm. Interactions of this sort promote learning from one another and strengthen bonds between individuals. Concerns have been voiced, however, concerning the potential for intellectual property theft and the safety of academic freedom. China’s profile in Latin America has risen as a result of the country’s growing state media and its collaboration with local media firms there.

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Concerns about media manipulation and the propagation of disinformation have arisen in tandem with the strategy’s success in countering negative impressions of China and promoting its perspectives (Ospina Estupinan, 2017). Many Latin American countries have looked favorably on China’s infrastructure investment and trade relations because of the financial benefits they bring to the region. Latin American students and researchers like Taiwan’s scholarship programs and academic cooperation since they allow them to spend time studying and conducting research in Taiwan. These efforts also contribute to expanding Taiwan’s and Latin America’s mutual understanding of one another and strengthening ties between the two regions. Despite Taiwan’s media being significantly less influential than China’s, the island’s emphasis on promoting democratic values and transparency has contributed to a favorable image of Taiwanese soft power (Yu, 2015). Taiwan’s contributions to the development of Latin America have been well-received since they meet pressing needs in the fields of renewable energy, healthcare, and technology. Although Taiwan’s efforts to forge new business relationships are generally viewed favorably, the country’s limited resources and economic reach may make it difficult for it to compete with China. Factors Shaping Countries’ Alignment Economic interests, political ideologies, cultural affinities, and strategic considerations all play a role in Latin American countries aligning with China or Taiwan. The extent to which a given country interacts with either China or Taiwan is heavily influenced by these characteristics. Depending on their respective trade and investment opportunities, Latin American countries may opt to align with China or Taiwan. Taiwan’s skills in technology, renewable energy, and healthcare can appeal to countries trying to diversify their economic partners, while China’s vast economy and expanding need for natural resources make it an attractive partner for many Latin American countries (Zreik, 2023b). Since these projects provide much-needed funding and development opportunities, they can sway countries toward closer alignment with China under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Voon & Xu, 2020). If Taiwan wants to compete with China in luring foreign investors through improvements to its infrastructure, it may need to do more with fewer resources.

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China does not place political conditions on its alliances; therefore, governments may find it simpler to unite with China. As diplomatic recognition of Taiwan could result in severed ties with China, the “One China” policy is a major factor that influences countries’ alignment. Many Latin American nations have chosen to keep diplomatic ties with China and acknowledge the “One China” policy, while also maintaining informal or even covert ties with Taiwan (Piccone, 2016). Latin American countries and China or Taiwan can strengthen their cultural links through the development of cultural centers, Confucius Institutes, and educational exchanges. Cultural links can be an important factor in determining whether a country will choose to identify politically and economically with China or Taiwan. The alignment of countries can also be influenced by shared histories and languages. There may be a correlation between the size of the Chinese diaspora in a country and its political and economic leanings toward China. Strategic considerations and regional dynamics can influence whether a country chooses to side with China or Taiwan. Certain nations may seek to diversify their strategic partnerships by allying with China in response to the perceived threat posed by the United States and other Western powers (Xu, 2016).

Conclusion China and Taiwan’s relationship in Latin America are heavily influenced by their respective soft power policies, which aim to entice and persuade others by means other than force. Cultural diplomacy, media outreach, educational exchanges, and economic involvement are all tactics used by China and Taiwan to gain a foothold in the region and compete with one another. Both governments are making significant investments in soft power projects, which will have a significant impact on how they are perceived and how much sway they have in Latin America. Both China and Taiwan, to keep or increase their sway in Latin America, will need to keep pouring resources into soft power initiatives. The money should be used to improve communication between locals, help them better understand one another, and resolve any problems that may crop up as a result of their presence. Fixing China’s debt dependency, cleaning up its polluted environment, and gaining control of its media will be top priorities. Maintaining Taiwan’s regional sway will need

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the island nation’s commitment to democracy, economic growth, and the rule of law to be emphasized. The future of the region’s balance of power is profoundly affected by the competition between China and Taiwan for influence in Latin America. Countries in the region may feel forced to align with China as China’s influence and assertiveness grow, which might alter the regional balance of power. As China’s influence grows, it may be necessary to have a countervailing force, and Taiwan’s efforts to maintain its influence and build tighter ties with like-minded countries may be just that. The success of both countries’ soft power tactics and their capacity to adjust to the shifting dynamics and requirements of the region will determine the fate of this battle. China and Taiwan’s future ties with Latin America, as well as the regional power balance, will be heavily influenced by their respective commitments to soft power efforts.

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PART II

The Politics of Diplomatic Fidelity

CHAPTER 7

What Can I Do For You: The Republic of China’s Cold War Courtship of the Republic of Panama Justina Hwang

Introduction: Pragmatism vs. Ideology in the Cold War Throughout the twentieth century and, particularly during the Cold War period, Panama and the Republic of China (ROC) developed a relationship based on mutual need and preventative action, namely, pragmatism, rather than ideological closeness. Cordial yet distant, their interactions were restrained by physical distance and lack of meaningful trade. While relations between the two governments warmed up during the Cold War when several agreements were signed, the 1968 coup of General Omar Torrijos ushered in change as the general still maintained a relationship with the Republic of China despite his personal political beliefs. An underlying, yet important, factor in the relationship

J. Hwang (B) Brown University alumna, Providence, Rhode Island, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_7

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between the Torrijos regime and the Chiang regime, however, was that of the Chinese community in Panama. Although their immigration to the region predated both Chiang Kai-shek’s flight to Taiwan and the creation of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese immigrants hailed largely from Mainland China and their leaders supported the Republic of China (Doc. 020000025552, 1963, p. 1). Since the Torrijos regime needed domestic economic and political support for its policies, it was forced to appeal to the Chinese community which eventually became an important bulwark of support and advocate for the ROC. In this essay, I argue that pragmatism rather than anti-communist sympathies played a major role in Panamanian-ROC relations, especially given the need to renegotiate the Panama Canal Treaty. Pragmatism and nationalism, along with a dash of anti-imperialism in Panama’s need to assert and reclaim its sovereignty over its territory from the United States, a historical oppressor, were the main factors informing Panama’s vote of abstention for Resolution 2758 in 1971.

Friendship Through Trade and Aid Ambassador Jack L. Huang wrote extensively to the Minister of Foreign Affairs documenting the relationship between the Republic of China and Panama from 1960 to 1975. Diplomatic relations during the period evolved from friendly in the early 1960s to a cordial but distant one after the ROC’s expulsion from the United Nations in 1971. Although the two countries’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs tried their best and a few treaties came to fruition, geographical distance remained a barrier to a fruitful pragmatic relationship. In an effort to deepen relations between the two countries and perhaps to reach a lucrative trade agreement, the Republic of China sent a team to determine the feasibility of opening a Chinese Trade Center at Colon, Panama, in November 1963. The Republic of China’s proposed Trade Center was intended to facilitate trade not only with Panama but also with Central America and the Caribbean and as far south as Ecuador and Peru. Taipei envisioned it not necessarily as a means to deepen the relationship with Panama but as a way to expand the trade of Chinese commodities to the Caribbean region and even South America. The cost of transportation, though, was the biggest deterrent to increased trade between the developing countries in the East and those in the West. A trade center could alleviate some of the expenses by making it possible for goods to be stored and displayed to

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the general public, taking into consideration the social status and trading capabilities of overseas Chinese (Doc. 020000025552, 1963, p. 1). These factors would help the Republic of China’s government decide whether or not to invest in the Colon Trade Center. Its government wanted to create trade opportunities for its overseas Chinese and create a group of overseas Chinese in Panama on which it could rely to lobby the Panamanian government and facilitate commercial and economic transactions. Since the Colon Trade Center might represent a large undertaking in terms of the Republic of China’s limited economic resources and budget, the government wanted to make sure it had all the detailed information it could get its hands on to make the best-informed decision possible, including how it could best take advantage of import and export tariffs, regulations, and procedures, as well as the abilities of the overseas Chinese that would help make the project work. The government in Taipei wanted to study the Free Trade Area already established in Panama to understand the benefits and drawbacks of the proposed Colon Trade Center. In addition to the financial cost of building this center, the Republic of China’s government needed to have an idea of what products could be reliably stored at the Colon Trade Center for export to the Caribbean and Latin American countries. Thus, after the ROC government figured out the logistical issues, it went on to assess the frequency of turnover of various Chinese communities; it needed to make sure it would have suitable middlemen to help run the enterprise. If this trade center could be built, it would benefit all three parties as well as expand its soft power and influence in the region. Though the Republic of China did send a team and Panama’s government tried its best to cooperate with the ROC government, in the end, the Colon Trade Center was only established in January of 1981, a decade after the decisive United Nations vote determining whether the ROC or the PRC would represent China. Following the failure of the immediate establishment of the Colon Trade Center and after the ascension of Torrijos’ government, the Republic of China’s influence in Panama waned despite the fact of being the fourth country to recognize the junta, after Peru, Nicaragua, and Honduras (Huang, 1984, p. 217). Ambassador Jack L. Huang recounts, “One of the members of the government came to the Embassy late one night and approached me for early recognition. He said, ‘J.L., I recognize that your country, the Republic of China, is far away from this continent. I want to ask if you could persuade your government to give us early

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recognition. It would help us to start a lead and would mean a great deal to the new government’” (Huang, 1984, p. 217). Huang then immediately called the ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs and convinced him, despite his conservatism and reticence, to offer early recognition by saying, “The reason for early recognition is to show our faith and friendship which should eventually bring good relations between our two countries … to protect the interest of our large Chinese community here, I strongly urge that our government put in an early recognition” (Huang, 1984, p. 217). Though the civilian and conservative governments of the 1960s had been partial to the Republic of China, only the civilian part of Torrijos’ government was sympathetic to the Republic of China. There was a split in Torrijos’ government between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Torrijos himself and the President of Panama, Demetrio B. Lakas. While Lakas was sympathetic to the Republic of China, Torrijos and Tack, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were sympathetic to the People’s Republic of China given Torrijos’ leftist sympathies and desire to join solidarity movements that would put Panama in a more neutral state vis-á-vis the United States and the Soviet Union. While Panama wanted to pursue an independent foreign policy, however, its goal of negotiating the Panama Canal Treaties meant it could not afford to alienate the United States completely. Thus, one of Panama’s foreign policy strategies in the period from 1968 to 1975 was to straddle the line between the United States and political movements that sought to stay neutral as well between Beijing and Taipei. Panama gained some leverage in terms of playing against US fears of its turning toward the Soviet Union and sympathizing with Communist countries like Cuba or the People’s Republic of China. The Panamanian government also capitalized against the Republic of China’s fears that Panama would recognize the PRC, thus allowing the Panamanian government to gain additional assistance or business opportunities from the ROC government. While this was a sound strategy, there were limited benefits to what the Panamanian government could receive from the Republic of China. Much like squeezing blood from a rock, there were only so many things the Republic of China could offer Panama, and those included agricultural and technical assistance as well as a limited commercial treaty and Trade Center (Huang, 1984, p. 216). While the Republic of China sent agricultural assistance technicians and a famed acupuncturist to Panama as part of its diplomatic efforts, offered military training to the Panamanian army, and signed several

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bilateral treaties, the lack of truly lucrative trade between the two countries ultimately hurt political relations along with the anti-communism of Chiang clashing with the leftist leanings of Torrijos. For Ambassador Jack L. Huang, the way to strengthen bilateral relationships was through economic and pragmatic means. He details this to President Lakas in a letter after citing ideological reasons why Panama and the Republic of China needed to remain allies and friends. One example is Panama’s desire to attain complete sovereignty over its national territory, i.e., to renegotiate the Panama Canal Treaty so it could regain control not only over the Panama Canal but over the Canal Zone, and, of course, the anti-communist angle. The economic and pragmatic means that Huang suggests to Lakas are largely tangible rather than ideological—unlike proposals of the prior decade, which tended toward the theoretically grand but improbable to carry out. Though Huang knows that Lakas is interested in new proposals, such as defense training and agricultural technicians, and intends to propose them to his government, it was difficult for him to persuade officials back home to invest actual currency and tangible benefits into Panama, Central, and South America. At that time, the Republic of China was feeling beaten and did not want to use cash to win allies because its head was stuck in the sand and the past regarding foreign relations strategies. While for Huang it was an uphill battle that eventually caused him to threaten to tender his resignation, in looking at Huang’s proposals, we can see just what pragmatic benefits he felt Panama needed. In addition, we see what he thought the Republic of China ought to be able to achieve in Panama, as well as what gestures Panama might be willing to accept to agree to maintain relations with the Republic of China despite its loss in status and the economic overtures of the PRC. Huang expanded on seven projects he would like to propose to the Republic of China’s government on his consultation trip to Taiwan in order to strengthen the ROC’s relations with Panama. The projects ran the gamut from agricultural cooperation to the training of cadets, to People-to-People projects, as well as basics such as trade and commerce agreements, an air transportation system, and cultural associations, given the size of the Chinese community in Panama. Of these ideas, the agricultural cooperation project was Huang’s first suggestion to President Lakas, perhaps because he felt like the agricultural cooperation was an easier sell to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs back home. It was easier for Ambassador Huang to sell this to officials in Taipei because it was a program

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they were familiar with and had already invested in. Therefore, it was more likely to be approved, and Huang could actually deliver on his promise without risking coming up short in front of Lakas. The Republic of China had successfully carried out other agricultural cooperation projects in Africa and Latin America, including Panama, so the project was likely to succeed if it got off the ground. Proposing the agricultural technical cooperation project would demonstrate Huang’s government’s sincerity and commitment to improving relations. It would also show that the Republic of China could still be useful to Panama despite the PRC’s now sizable resources, commitment to thoroughly converting all of the ROC’s allies, and willingness to outspend the ROC at every turn. Huang notes that in the past, the agricultural technical cooperation project between the Republic of China and the Republic of Panama had been successful and thus, they wished to continue and even extend it (Doc. 11-09–08–05–01–023, 1971, p. 79). As in Paraguay, Huang and the Republic of China wanted to sell their program because it was something the People’s Republic of China was not offering Central and South American countries. Since the Republic of China was renowned for its agricultural capabilities and for having a similar climate for growth that was transferable to tropical countries such as Panama and Paraguay, its agricultural experts and aid were tangible benefits it could offer to its Latin American allies. In terms of cost-effectiveness, the agricultural technical cooperation programs the Republic of China sent to Latin America were probably the cheapest. While the ROC government would pay the salary of its technicians, which it calculated to the absolute minimum amount of people it needed to send to maximize cost-effectiveness, the ROC had the host country defray some of the other costs associated with the projects, including transporting and housing the technicians it provided. The Republic of China would be responsible for the salary of the technicians as well as their airfare to the country. In short, although the agricultural technical cooperation programs did cost the ROC hard cash, it was still in effect cheaper than direct loans. Here, Huang is suggesting something a little different than what the Republic of China had traditionally offered. In addition to sending technicians to Panama, Huang suggests that the Minister of Agriculture, Ing. Nilson Espino, visit Taiwan and bring two Panamanian technicians for a short training course in land reform and agricultural improvement. After completing the course, the technicians would spread their knowledge to their fellow Panamanians. This was a departure because while the

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Republic of China had hosted diplomats and ministers before, their visitors were usually higher profile than a Minister of Agriculture and two technicians. According to a memo sent from the ROC Ambassador in Peru to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the budget for diplomatic visits to the Republic of China was limited. They were given funds to admit only a few people annually from the Americas in the 1960s, with more funds and priority given to the newly independent countries of Africa, whose leaders they hoped to bring into the anti-communist orbit. While Latin America gained importance in terms of ROC Foreign Affairs funding closer to the end of the 1960s, as US influence in the region waned due to the emergence of economic and political nationalism, the region had been given lesser priority at the beginning of the decade because the Republic of China could depend on the sway of the United States to affect votes in the United Nations on its behalf. Because it found itself having to make an effort rather than simply paying lip service to anti-communism and defending freedom, the Republic of China now had to find the budget to keep its remaining allies in the world after the loss of its seat on the United Nations Security Council. This was an example of the Republic of China stepping up its courting game and loosening its purse strings just a little. A typical visit to the Republic of China was expensive because of the distance between Latin American countries and the Republic of China. More often than not, Latin American leaders who visited the island often had to make two or more transits to arrive in Taiwan. The Republic of China covered all airfare costs for the leader and his retinue, as well as arranged tours of land reform villages, hospitals, army bases, naval bases, and popular tourist destinations. The ROC government also paid for all food and board, with the level of luxuriousness depending on the length of the visit and the prestige of the guests concerned. The Minister of Agriculture and two technicians would probably be staying at a less expensive hotel with perhaps only one banquet in their honor. Because visits like these were not cheap, the Republic of China had specific targets in mind, and thus, the decision to invite non-prestigious individuals in order to show commitment was a large concession in and of itself. Though the level of accommodations and caliber of entertainment was going to be lower for the Minister of Agriculture compared to a Minister of Foreign Affairs or head of state, they would be doubly more so for the two technicians, whose role would be to facilitate agricultural change and strengthen the bond between the countries through developmental

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diplomacy. In this case, it would seem like the visits of these three individuals were Huang’s suggestion and part of a proposed agenda rather than a done deal, which shows that while Huang hoped to bring these three individuals to the Republic of China as a part of its courtship through developmental diplomacy strategy, the plan was far from concrete. This was part of Huang’s eventual frustration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: its short-sightedness and penny-pinching made it difficult for him to show the Republic of China’s ability to produce practical benefits and quick results for its allies. While Huang could suggest enticing ideas and proposals as he does below, unless his recommendations were taken to heart and approved by the higher-ups in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which they often were not, he was operating with one hand tied behind his back at all times. While the visit of the Minister of Agriculture and the two technicians was his first suggestion to Lakas, Huang also had other cooperation and technical assistance ideas. Huang may have suggested the technician and agricultural assistance proposal first because it was the most likely to be funded and likely a bigger priority for Panama. Although Panama’s revenue was largely from the Panama Canal rather than from agriculture or the export of raw materials like its Central American neighbors, Panama still needed to produce enough to feed its people and to reduce dependence on imports. Thus, agricultural assistance was more likely to be needed than any other sort of assistance or aid short of loans or trade benefits. The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs eventually did send an Agricultural Advisory Team to Panama, consisting of one group of eight experts as part of a two-year technical assistance agreement renewed twice more during Ambassador Jack L. Huang’s tenure, along with a fishery agreement. Huang deemed the enterprise a success, saying “The team did remarkably well and won the admiration and confidence of Panama’s strongman, General Torrijos, as well President Lakas; so much so they considered it one of the greatest benefits Panama had ever received from our government” (Huang, 1984, p. 219).

How to Maintain a Relationship Huang’s second proposal for Panama had to do with military training, which was interesting given that many Latin American militaries received their paramilitary training in Panama at the School of the Americas, with instructors and funding from the United States of America. Here,

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Huang was giving the Panamanian President an offer of assistance from the Republic of China for military training for Panama as it had offered training for many Southeast Asian countries earlier in the last decade to counter Communist influence. While the emphasis of the Cold War in terms of military might have lessened with time, the military and ability of a country to defend itself against physical and territorial threats were still important to many smaller countries. Huang proposed that the Chinese Ministry of Defense help train army and air force cadets from Panama, saying, “I think General Torrijos can readily appreciate the importance of the maintenance and repairs of arms and ammunitions in countries like yours and mine where we are not ‘arsenals of democracy.’ If your government wishes to send a few students to go to Taiwan to get training and to improve their knowledge in the said field, I believe this could be arranged also” (Huang, 1984, p. 219). Ambassador Huang was giving Panama a concrete pragmatic benefit, which was military training for the army and air force cadets. While the United States had its own military training program for Latin American right-wing military groups in Panama itself, in the Canal Zone, called the School of the Americas, to which Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, El Salvador, and Panama sent soldiers, the Republic of China housed an Asian equivalent as well. Graduates of the School of the Americas in Latin America included El Salvador’s Roberto D’Aubuisson, nicknamed “Blowtorch Bob,” Guatemala’s José Efraín Ríos Montt, who perpetrated widespread massacres, torture, and genocide against his own people in the 1990s, and future president of Panama and trafficker Manuel Noriega. Though these men’s tenures at the School of the Americas preceded possible Taiwanese military collaboration there, the alumni listed are examples of the type of training one could receive in the program. Unlike his other suggestions, which risked getting rejected by his government, Ambassador Huang’s offer of military training was a done deal in terms of government approval. It was only a matter of logistics. Thus, the Panamanian government could expect it would receive this military training as well as agricultural and technical support, which not only showed commitment on the part of the Republic of China in terms of improving relations but also that it was a power to be reckoned with in terms of military training and agriculture. These were to be their comparative advantage over the People’s Republic of China, which in their minds could provide trade and economic benefits but little else that would have

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a long-lasting effect on Panamanian self-sufficiency and self-defense, an issue near and dear to any military government’s heart. Huang uses his former status as Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Service Forces to convince Lakas of the worthwhile qualities of this training, saying that the Republic of China’s forces could teach Panamanians what the United States armed forces could not, which was to produce arsenals as well as maintain and repair arms and ammunitions. While the School of the Americas taught Latin American military officers counterinsurgency training and measures, and its cadets grew to be military officers as well, it did not teach arms manufacturing, maintenance, or repair. Officers and students of the School of the Americas did not receive this training for two reasons: one, because the United States sold or provided the weapons to these Latin American countries, and two, because as officers or those being groomed to be officers, producing, maintaining, and repairing weapons were beneath their status. Ambassador Huang hoped to appeal from one military man to another, General Torrijos, through President Lakas’ intervention; for Huang, the ability of Panama to arm its own men without needing the intervention and weaponry of a third party might sweeten the deal for Torrijos. Though the Republic of China was known for being thrifty, it was important for Panama to be able to produce, maintain, and repair weapons, given the tensions inherent in its relationship with the United States over Panamanian sovereignty and Panama’s desire to regain control of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone. By bringing up that neither Panama nor the Republic of China was an “arsenal of democracy,” Huang reiterates an earlier theme in his letter to President Lakas where he brings up the similarities between the Republic of China and Panama, namely that both had a similar history of being oppressed by another power and needing to assert its sovereignty. This was a throwback to the Chinese past, where the European powers carved up China and made the government pay a huge indemnity after its loss in the Opium War, and a reference to the Panamanian past and present, where the United States projected an undue amount of influence over Panamanian affairs because of its role in helping Panama gain its independence and the signing of the first Panama Canal Treaty, which was at best an unequal treaty like the one the Qing empire had been forced to sign. Thus, by bringing up the commonalities between the two countries in their lack of ability to be “arsenals of democracy,” Huang draws Panama and the Republic of China close together once again in terms of historical

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past and present. By linking the two countries, Huang plays on President Lakas’ sympathies as well as General Torrijos’ pragmatism by selling the Panamanian President and Strongman on both ideology and pragmatic concepts at the same time. For Torrijos, the ability to manufacture, maintain, and repair their arms would reduce dependence on the United States, which would allow him more flexibility and independence at the bargaining table for the Panama Canal treaties and would allow him to increase domestic production of materials and weaponry, which could benefit Panama later if it could produce and sell weaponry to its neighbors. The Republic of China’s offer would help Panama in the long run if its army and air force members could be trained in these technical skills, which was a benefit the PRC might not be able to offer. Huang’s offer to train a few students in Taiwan to improve their knowledge in manufacturing, repairing, and maintenance served to try to sweeten the deal of receiving training in the Republic of China. The Panamanian government might not have found the offer attractive otherwise, given that the School of the Americas was much closer and could teach combat or anti-insurgency skills but not the ability to produce or maintain weaponry. In appealing to its comparative advantage, which was not only military training but how to utilize its technology and manufacturing ability to make the most out of limited resources, the Republic of China had something to offer its Latin American allies that the People’s Republic of China was not able to on the same scale. Although Taiwan was a small island, the ability of the Nationalist government to improve the island and turn it into a burgeoning economic power appealed to Latin Americans, particularly Central American governments, whose land and resources were also limited. While the Republic of China had lost to the People’s Republic of China militarily, Chiang Kai-shek was known as a good commander and the Republic of China’s military was respected worldwide, therefore giving Huang’s offer credibility.

From People-to-People to Acupuncture Diplomacy Huang’s next proposal of a series of projects to be carried out to improve industry was less well-established in Latin America compared to his first two suggestions of technical and agricultural assistance and military training. It was also less concrete in terms of its efficacy in the region, though these projects were supposedly successful in Taiwan. For his next

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idea, Huang proposed a group of People-to-People projects (Huang, 1984, p. 219). In this proposal, Huang is ambitiously proposing a group of fifty-five projects called People-to-People projects, which were tested in Taiwan and supposed to be practical, feasible, and sure-fire ideas to improve the Panamanian industry. Panama’s main revenue source of income was the Panama Canal, which produced most of Panama’s GDP and decreased the need for the immediate development of agriculture and industry. Unlike its neighbors, who needed to improve their agricultural and manufacturing outputs to raise their export income and GDP, Panama could wait for improvement. Industrial development was not a strict necessity in terms of improving the Panamanian economy, but the opportunity to develop its industry at little cost to itself was still an attractive and useful offer. While the feasibility of this series of fifty-five projects was unclear at this point, the Republic of China’s offer would still be an improvement over the current state of industrial development and worth trying if the changes in Taiwan could apply to Panama as well. Given the Republic of China’s track record of reform in terms of agriculture and land reform, much lauded as a success, and its triumph in turning Taiwan from a largely agricultural society to a burgeoning manufacturing superpower in Asia, it would not be too big of a risk to gamble on the Republic of China’s ability to replicate the changes it had successfully brought about in Taiwan to Panama. Huang’s offer for the People-to-People projects, however, was less detailed and decisive than his offer of agricultural and technical assistance or his offer of military training, though for the training he also did not give specifics. Though Huang was selling Lakas on the selection of fifty-five projects, he merely said that the Republic of China’s government would like to present the projects to the Panamanian government and give information on getting the proper equipment, materials, and technical assistance on a long-term loan basis along with a set of project brochures to the Panamanian Director of Planning, who appeared to be interested. This offer did not necessarily mean that the Republic of China would be assisting the Panamanian government for free in terms of the equipment, materials, and technical assistance required for these fifty-five projects. Although the details were sparse, it was possible that the experts and materials would be on loan, or that Panama would be required to obtain the equipment and materials by itself through long-term loans

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given by the Republic of China. This would make the projects less attractive for the Panamanian government, who most likely did not want to expend cash on a series of projects that might not work and would result in a loss if they were ineffective. That being said, one People-to-People project did come to fruition. Ambassador Jack L. Huang convinced Mr. Ku Chen-fu, an industrial tycoon and Chairman of Taiwan Cement Corporation to send a team of engineers as a People-to-People project. The engineers helped to survey, design, and supervise the building of the Bayano Cement Plant, which was capable of producing 300,000 tons yearly (Huang, 1984, p. 219). It was unclear, however, who provided the funding for the project. While the People’s Republic of China would be more willing to absorb the loss to open or improve diplomatic relations with the Republic of Panama, the more fiscally conservative and economically limited Republic of China was not willing to do so, even if there was a potential gain in terms of retaining or buying Panama’s favor. Huang’s next two suggestions were interrelated and had to do with trade, commerce, and business enterprises. Huang’s first suggestion was to take advantage of Panama’s greatest asset and curse, at least when it came to its relations with the United States: its location, to form a Sino-Panamanian Developing cooperation. The second suggestion piggybacked on the first, which was to open a branch of the International Commercial Bank of China in Panama (Huang, 1984, p. 219). Huang notes that Panama did not have much in terms of items to export, which was likely true given that agriculture was not one of Panama’s fortes. However, even if Panama were to produce significant amounts of agriculture to export, much of the agricultural products it did grow would overlap with what the Republic of China produced, therefore bringing them back to square one in terms of export trade between the two countries. Since Panama also did not produce many finished goods, while the Republic of China did, the lack of trade and commerce opportunities there too caused Ambassador Huang to say that Panama’s location was its greatest asset in terms of what the two countries could cooperate on together. With that in mind, Huang proposed that the two countries form a “fairly large Sino-Panamanian Developing cooperation to promote commerce and trade between the Orient and the Latin American countries,” using Panama as a junction. This would allow both to benefit from increased trade among developing countries, particularly if Panama allowed the Republic of China to open a branch of the International Commercial Bank of China to make

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trade easier for the Republic of China and to attract Chinese and other Asian investments into Panama. These two ideas would go hand in hand not only in improving the commercial relations between the two countries but would also allow for a symbiotic relationship between the two countries where both would benefit from the bank’s presence. The Republic of China argued that a branch of a major Chinese bank in Panama was necessary because only a Chinese bank could understand the Chinese way of doing business; they wanted to open a bank branch for the Chinese community in Panama to use and invest in. In opening a major Chinese bank in Panama, the country would benefit from the increased interest of both domestic and international Chinese businessmen in investing in the country. This would be doubly true if there were to be more shipping and export activity from the Sino-Panamanian Development cooperation. Both countries stood to gain. The Republic of China would have a foothold in the country in terms of the cooperation pact and its new bank, which would boost its reputation in the Chinese community because it was taking care of its people and providing investment opportunities. Panama would benefit from increased shipping and canal traffic as well as more Chinese businessmen investing in Panama (Huang, 1984, p. 219). In suggesting the combination of a Sino-Panamanian Development cooperation and the establishment of a branch of the International Commercial Bank of China in Panama, Ambassador Huang hoped to provide the ROC government with economic and political benefits by appealing to its Chinese community there and improving its political cachet with Panama. Ambassador Huang also sought to increase bilateral commerce in a new and creative way with Panama, since the traditional economic avenues were unavailable. In addition to increasing trade, commerce, and banking, the Republic of China also wanted to increase air traffic between the two countries, which would complement the SinoPanamanian Development cooperative and increase tourism between the two countries, creating more economic opportunities by moving people and goods. These last two suggestions would improve relations between Panama and the Republic of China on a concrete scale, not only by making increased tourism possible but also by actually interacting culturally. Closer air links between the Republic of China and Panama would increase trade between the two countries through air freight, which was faster than cargo freight and would be efficient if passengers were traveling in large numbers. Air freight trade between the two countries would

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take advantage of Panama’s strategic position and the ease of moving Latin American goods through the Panama Canal to increase trade between Asia and Latin America using Panama as a center. In terms of the Sino-Panamanian Cultural Association, though the Republic of China and Panama had signed a treaty of friendship and amity a decade earlier, neither side had taken concrete steps to exchange students, movies, or any of the other activities proposed. Although the Republic of China did send support to the Panamanian Chinese in the form of books and other materials, there was a little anchor to the motherland for the Panamanian Chinese, who were mostly from the Mainland but recognized the Republic of China as the government of China because of Mao’s government’s actions against their relatives. By forming a Sino-Panamanian Cultural Association with prominent Panamanian and overseas Chinese leaders, the Republic of China could encourage further integration, both cultural and commercial, among its overseas citizens and the Panamanian government, which was sure to result in business deals that could benefit all three parties financially, further endearing the ROC government to the overseas Chinese. While Ambassador Jack L. Huang proposed cultural activities, the Republic of China did send an acupuncturist in 1972 to improve its relations with Panama through Chinese culture. Dr. Cheng Yen-ping, a prominent acupuncturist, arrived in Panama and was welcomed by a well-attended cocktail party that included 150 high government officials, diplomats, and many prominent Chinese and Panamanian guests. The ROC might have sent an acupuncturist as a way to underscore its reputation as the “real China” to Panamanian government officials, with an acupuncturist representing a nod to traditional Chinese culture as well as a novel way to treat illnesses and to provide treatment to the Chinese community, who believed in acupuncture as a way to cure ailments. The next day, Dr. Cheng and Ambassador Huang called on the Minister of Public Health and mapped out a program for 30 “carefully selected doctors” to receive training under Dr. Cheng in 22 two-hour sessions on the “Practical Theory of Chinese Acupuncture,” from Monday to Friday. This group of 30 doctors consisted of “some of the most successful and famous professionals in their field, and six of them were Chinese.” The lectures were so educative and interesting that none of these busy doctors missed a single session, according to Ambassador Huang, who also said:

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I would say that he has accomplished his mission well. Apart from his giving the course to these doctors, he devoted his time during the weekends, to the overseas Chinese, treating from 50-80 patients a day. The overseas Chinese are grateful to him as well as to the R.O.C government for sending such a dedicated man to relieve their pains and sufferings. But what was more demanding on his time were the calls from the influential members of the Panamanian government and other leaders in society. They would come at all hours of the day and night. Dr. Cheng treated General Torrijos’ mother and mother-in-law every other day. Several times he was summoned to the Presidential palace to treat President Lakas, his wife, and his mother. Vice President Sucre, and Minister Manfredo, were but a few of the government officials who benefited from his acupuncture needles. He was invited to speak before civic and professional clubs and drew high praises for himself as well as for his government. Had it not been for Dr. Cheng’s popularity, the R.O.C would not have stood a chance to compete against communist agent Huang Hwa’s overwhelming publicity. (Doc. 11-09–08–05–01–024, 1972, p. 124)

If the PRC had used Ping Pong Diplomacy to garner support around the world, the Republic of China was retaliating with Acupuncture Diplomacy. The ROC government’s sending of Dr. Cheng was a way to court the overseas Chinese community and influential Panamanian government simultaneously and pragmatically, killing two diplomatic birds with one economically thrifty stone. Ambassador Huang himself claimed that acupuncture played a large role in Sino-Panamanian relations, saying, “My original plan calls for a 4-man team and a duration of six months. It was reduced to two persons and a period of two months. Yet, it was much due to this project that we overcame the Chinese Communist influence at the Security Council crisis this time. I still maintain that if our government had approved my original acupuncture project, we could have accomplished so much more” (Doc. 11-09–08–05–01–024, 1972, p. 124). Indeed, ROC Ambassador Huang goes on to say that he fought hard for the acupuncture project to go through so that the Panamanians would remember the help the Republic of China was offering them “before our archenemy, Huang Hwa, starts to induce the Panamanians with lucrative offers.” Ambassador Jack L. Huang went on to further extol the importance of the acupuncture project as well as the Chinese community. Huang describes an event significant to relations between the two countries but first underscores that the ROC was “working in-between the discrepancies

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of these two groups [the pro-P.R.C group in the Panamanian government, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs and General Torrijos, and the pro-democracy group, headed by President Lakas] to maintain our existence” (Doc. 11-09–08–05–01–024, 1972, p. 124). The event Huang recounts underscored the “success” of the acupuncture program, and therefore the ROC’s soft power, because when the Chinese Association of Panama gave a well-attended reception for Dr. Cheng at the “swanky Golf Club,” the Lakas surprised everyone “by being present himself and personally decorat[ing] him with the Order of Vasco Nunez de Balboa, Grand Official class,” significant because it would have been typical for a minister to present the award rather than the President himself (Doc. 11-09–08–05–01–024, 1972, p. 124). Indeed, for Huang, the event is a public relations coup of the first degree for the Republic of China, especially in raising its prestige in the Chinese community, as he recounts, “You can well imagine how it boosted the morale of the Chinese community,” and boasted that “Dr. Cheng’s farewell reception was attended by more than 300 prominent guests. Contrasting that with Huang Hwa’s welcome dinner at Pana-China Restaurant consisting of only 40 people—half of them Chinese and half of them Panamanian officials, we scored a big victory” (Doc. 11-09–08–05–01–024, 1972, p. 124). Indeed, Ambassador Jack L. Huang boasts that it is thanks to Dr. Cheng’s labor and the benefits he provided to Panamanian officials that he and the ROC obtained an advantage over the PRC, saying, “Incidentally, Dr. Cheng’s treating the many VIP’s gave me an inside track to some of the top secrets which an ambassador would not have access. I learned from high sources that after the Security Council meeting was over, Torrijos invited the leading delegates of the three communist countries to Contadora Island for a couple of days of consultation. It was a policy meeting on whether Panama would establish diplomatic relations with any of the communist countries. I was told that the Soviet representative, Yakov A. Malik, expressed the opinion that Soviet Russia would not be happy to see Panama establish relations with Communist China— so it was a choice between accepting socialistic revisionism or Maoist communism. Thus, the question of normalizing relations with Communist China was tabled for the time being” (Doc. 11-09–08–05–01–024, 1972, p. 124). He then suggests to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that Dr. Cheng be rewarded by the government for his good work.

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Conclusion: Less is Not Always More The prevailing political ideology of the 1960s made it possible for the Republic of China to invest in propaganda defending the world against the evils of communism, upholding the mantles of freedom, and fighting for world democracy rather than having to pony up hard cash or other concrete and tangible goods to improve or even maintain relations with Panama. Yet beginning in the 1970s, political ideology was no longer the most important factor and lingua franca of foreign relations in the interactions between the First and Third Worlds. In the 1970s, the so-called Third World was finding its way out of the bipolar political world between the United States and the Soviet Union. Countries in the developing world made it their mission to put their development and nationalism a priority rather than bowing to the United States and its demands in exchange for loans, aid, and subsidies, particularly in Latin America after the end of the Alliance for Progress. While the end of the 1970s saw right-wing authoritarian and military governments come into power, the beginning of the decade was the time of the leftists, military, or otherwise, who saw the 1970s as a time to implement change in their countries through reform and more equitable distribution of income, often by nationalizing properties that were owned by US companies. The problem with reform, however, was that cash was needed to carry out many of the policies Latin American governments wanted to try, such as Import Substitution Industrialization. This meant that not only did the decade begin on an unfortunate tone for the Republic of China politically, in terms of anti-United States, pro-nationalistic sentiments in the region, but it also meant a necessary change in attitude for the Republic of China regarding its policy toward investments and being a provider of economic benefits and increased trade in the region. Unfortunately, the relatively conservative government of the Republic of China did not anticipate this change in attitude and could not or would not roll with the punches and change its foreign policy plans on a fiscal level. While those on the ground advocated for an increase in investments and trade, even resulting in losses for the government, in order to maintain relations, particularly after 1971, the government refused to change, and relations weakened with Panama. Although the Republic of China was unable to offer Panama many economic and pragmatic benefits other than agricultural and technical

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assistance, as well as a few industrial projects, Panama did not end up switching diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China until 2017. It was concrete economic and pragmatic benefits given too late that kept the relationship between the Republic of China and Panama relatively distant, even though they both shared a complicated relationship with the United States. Although Torrijos sympathized with Beijing, he did not have the necessary support within his own country to break with Taipei. He needed the support of the Chinese community, which was against the PRC, in order to carry out his domestic reforms, and he needed the goodwill of the United States in order to negotiate the Panama Canal treaties. Although the Republic of China did offer and attempt to give Panama pragmatic benefits throughout its long relationship with the Central American nation, the lack of proper funding and good timing hindered its efforts; Panama’s vote in 1971 reflected this shortfall.

References 020-060703–0004–0004, 020–060703–0004–0004 to 020–060703–0004– 0009 from 020000025552 A Ministry of Foreign Affairs Trade Center Announcement 1963/00/00~1963/00/00, Academia Historica. Huang, R. (1984). Memoirs of J.L. Huang. University of Michigan Press. 11-09–08–05–01–023 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Central and South America Panama Diplomatic Missions, Units Stationed Abroad, Panamanian Ambassador Huang Renlin’s struggle against the CPP, 197106–197305,119 pages, 510.14/0006 11-CSA-01006, Academia Sinica. 11-09–08–05–01–024 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Central and South America Panama Diplomatic Missions, Units Stationed Abroad, Panamanian Ambassador Huang Renlin’s Petition for Coordinated Resolution Project, 197204– 197305, 143 pages, 510.13/0003 11-CSA-00998, Academia Sinica.

CHAPTER 8

Past, Present, and the Future of Colombia’s Commercial Relations with China and Taiwan Meng-Yu Liang, Jorge Andrés Contreras Calderón, and Juan Pablo López Agudelo

Introduction China and Taiwan are fiercely contending for presence in Latin America, and, short of military aggression, they have been willing to bring all types of diplomatic weapons into the struggle. They aim to open the door for business opportunities to their companies, assuring the flow of raw materials, and reducing the influence of each other’s governments in the region. Despite occasional declarations to the contrary and official

M.-Y. Liang Academia Sinica’s Institute of Economics, Taipei, Taiwan J. A. C. Calderón (B) · J. P. L. Agudelo Pontifical Bolivarian University, Medellín, Colombia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_8

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outrage in the face of the other side’s “checkbook diplomacy”, this is a well-known secret among scholars and diplomats. There is abundant academic literature concerning this issue; it argues that Central America and the Caribbean in particular, although negligible for China’s and Taiwan’s economies (except for the Panama Canal) play a huge role in their geopolitical strategies1 ; this owes to the fact that most countries recognizing Taipei as the legitimate government of China have historically concentrated in this area.2 Thus, through foreign aid, trade agreements, direct investment, and loans, the two Asian polities have managed to influence the region’s participation in multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, incorporating them into their sphere of influence, if only in tiny steps and usually for short periods (He Li, 2005, 2021; Leiteritz, 2012; Maggiorelli, 2019, 2021). This chapter contributes to this literature by examining the case of Colombia and the role that the United States has played in it. In April 2010, Colombia’s Ministry of Foreign Relations published the results of the Foreign Policy Mission, an over one-hundred-page report examining what this policy has been since the fall of the Soviet Union and what it should become for the following decades. The most striking aspect of the report is the primordial role its authors conferred to what they perceived to be the military and economic decline of the United States, along with the rise of China; there, this idea is so important and ubiquitous, that one might well conclude it is the main reason for Colombia’s need for a new foreign policy (Fedesarrollo, 2010, pp. 4, 9, 15, 19–20, 47–51, 66–70). However, Taiwan’s stance in the West has recently strengthened as a consequence of the economic war between the PROC and the United States and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In the same manner 1 “Taiwan has historically dedicated between 30% and 50% of its [assistance] budget to LAC region, second only to Spain (which is providing between 40 to 60 percent of its budget to this region). That happens despite the fact that Taipei doesn’t have a great economic or cultural interest in the region” (Maggiorelly, 2019, p. 192). 2 As of May 2023, there are 12 countries: Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Vatican City, Marshal Islands, Nauru, Palau, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Tuvalu. Honduras established diplomatic relationships with Mainland China in March 2023.

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Ukraine is a proxy for Russia-NATO animosity, Taiwan has become the canary in the coal mine for Western relations with Beijing. Hence, the way Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries treat Taiwan is no longer regarded as a neutral exercise of economic sovereignty but rather as a sign of geostrategic alignment; the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (or TAIPEI Act of 2019),3 which pushes the US State Department to promote Taiwan’s foreign relations, is a clear indication. Colombia faces the most difficult diplomatic juncture since the overwhelming rise of the Soviet Union and the United States at the end of the Second World War: it is aware of the latter’s declining power relative to China, but it also has reasons to believe the United States will maintain the upper hand in the West for the foreseeable future. This chapter draws on legal historiography and economic analysis to offer an in-depth explanation of the past, present, and future of Colombia’s commercial relations with China and Taiwan, in the context of the geopolitical tug-of-war between the former and the United States. The first part presents the history of Colombia-China and Colombia-Taiwan trade relations through the study of the most relevant pieces of white papers, legal documents, and official statements; to use an analogy taken from legal theory, this section comprises a history of “commerce on books”. The second part offers an account of the same relations, this time through the lenses of economic data and theory; this is the part concerning with “commerce in action”. Finally, the conclusions further elaborate on some key ideas within the document and provide a forecast for the coming evolution of those relations.

Colombia and China Spurred by the US government, Colombia and China first established formal political relations in 1947, when the Kuomintang opened a diplomatic mission or legation in Bogotá; Washington would not yet allow Colombia to recognize the existence of the People’s Republic of China (PROC), nor the government of the Communist Party. In fact, in 1961 the Taiwanese diplomatic mission in Colombia’s capital became an embassy, and in 1965 Colombia paid in kind by opening its own one in Taipei. Additionally, Colombia abstained from voting for the PROC’s

3 Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1678.

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incorporation into the UN and voted against the expulsion of Taipei’s government in 1971. However, following again Washington’s orientations,4 in 1980 Colombia ended all formal relations with the government of Taipei and recognized the Chinese Communist Party as the sole authority of China (Barbosa, 2012, pp. 204–205; Noticias de Taiwán, 1980). This decision was announced in the following Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Colombia on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations: As of February 7, 1980, the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Colombia, in accordance with the interests and aspirations of the two peoples, have decided to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. The Government of the Republic of Colombia recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate government of China. The Chinese government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Government of the Republic of Colombia has taken note of the position of the Government of the People’s Republic of China. The Government of the People’s Republic of China appreciates the relentless efforts made by the Government and the people of the Republic of Colombia to defend the independence and sovereignty of their nation, safeguard their national resources, develop their national economy, and also supports the position of the Government and the people of Colombia in promoting Latin American solidarity and cooperation. The two governments agree to develop friendly relations between the two countries based on the principles of mutual respect to their sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equal and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. The Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Colombia have agreed to exchange permanent ambassadors in the short term, and will provide all necessary assistance to each other in establishing embassies and implementing their tasks in their respective capitals. The Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations and the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Colombia to the United Nations:

4 The United States officially recognized the government of the People’s Republic of China as the legal ruler of Chinese Mainland and Taiwan in 1979.

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Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (Signature) Indalecio Liévano

New York, February 7, 19805 (Translated by the authors).

The statement was first followed by the Cultural Agreement6 and the Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation,7 both from 1981. Later, on July 17th of that year, both countries signed the “Commercial Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China”.8 Introduced in Colombia by law 53 of 1983, it has been the most consequential regulation of commercial ties between the two nations, and there are a few key points therein worth mentioning here. First, Article 3 of the law consecrates the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause; according to it, Colombia and China must confer each other’s exports as low an import tariff (tax) and as high an import quota (volume) as the one conferred by any of them to a third country; article 8 established the “Mixed Commercial Commission”, whose purpose is to review the state of commercial trade between the two nations9 ; article 9 declares 5 Retrieved from: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/nmz_680924/ 1206_681072/1207_681084/200011/t20001107_9371581.shtml. 6 Approved in Colombia by Law 6 of 1984. Retrieved from https://www.suin-juriscol. gov.co/viewDocument.asp?ruta=Leyes/1561888. 7 Approved in Colombia by Law 57 of 1983. Retrieved from https://www.suin-jur iscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?ruta=Leyes/1609945. 8 Retrieved from: https://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?ruta=Leyes/160 7088. 9 So far it has gathered on eight occasions to discuss these matters: the evolution and status of trade relations and analysis of economic prospects between the two countries; review of specific issues related to trade in goods; identification of tariff and non-tariff barriers; and the review of possible alternative solutions; it has identified business opportunities for the diversification of the export offer from Colombia, the procedures applicable in trade defense mechanisms, and reviewed specific investments and projects carried out by China in sectors such as technology, infrastructure, agroindustry, among others; finally, it has also discussed bilateral cooperation for the countries’ accession to international forums, concretely, China’s support for Colombia’s accession to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) and Colombia’s support for China’s accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO); more recently, the Commission negotiated the Reciprocal

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the agreement to last for 3 years, and to be automatically extended for equal periods as long as none of the parties expresses its intention to end it. This has not happened yet, and the agreement has been in force in Colombia since the 7th of March 1984.10 Although it paved the way for subsequent economic and commercial protocols and memoranda11 on commercial matters,12 the 1981 agreement does not cover foreign direct investment (FDI); this vacuum was filled with the 2008 Bilateral Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Colombia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments.13 Approved in Colombia by law 1462 of 2011,14 the agreement was presented

Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement and the launch of a joint study on the feasibility of a free trade agreement. 10 Retrieved from https://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?ruta=Decretos/ 1177118. 11 Protocols, memoranda of understanding, and agreements are international instruments with less formality than those entitled “treaty” or “convention”. Protocols are used to amend said treaties by establishing specific obligations or fixed interpretations of clauses. Memoranda of understanding are usually for setting out operational arrangements under an international agreement framework or for regulating technical or detailed matters. Lastly, agreements are documents that do not fit the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ definition of “treaty”, or deal with a narrower range of subject matter than treaties, generally being instruments of a technical or administrative character (United Nations, 2023). 12 I. Memorandum of Understanding on Infrastructure Cooperation with the Chinese Development Bank, May 2015. II. M. U. regarding the joint development of model projects (Buenaventura and Orinoco Projects), 2015. III. M. U. for the formulation of a Multimodal Transport Master Plan, May 2015. IV. M. U. on Cooperation in Infrastructure Construction, May 2015. V. M. U. for Industrial Capacity Building, May 2015. VI. M. U. on strengthening investment cooperation, May 2015. VII. M. U. between Procolombia and Sinosure, July 2019. VIII. M. U. between Bancoldex and Sinosure, July 2019. IX. M. U. on Transport Cooperation, July 2019. X. M. U. on Cooperation in Electronic Commerce, July 2019. 13 Retrieved from https://www.tlc.gov.co/getattachment/acuerdos/a-internacionalde-inversion/contenido/acuerdos-internacionales-de-inversion-suscritos/china/texto-finaldel-acuerdo/texto-final-china.pdf.aspx. 14 Retrieved 1681441.

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to Colombia’s Congress by the Minister of Foreign Relations and the Minister of Commerce with the following joint statement: Honorable Senators and Representatives: On behalf of the National Government, and in accordance with articles 150 numeral 16, 189 numeral 2, and 224 of the Political Constitution, we present for consideration of the Honorable Congress of the Republic the bill “by which the ‘Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Government of Colombia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China’, signed in Lima, Peru, on 22 November 2008, is approved”. The People’s Republic of China has established itself in recent years as one of the world’s emerging economic powers. Strengthening economic ties with the “Asian giant” is an imperative for any developed or developing economy. The Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, that is presented for consideration to the Congress of the Republic, is an important step towards the strengthening of the economic relations between China and the People’s Republic of China. Today, China is one of the most important emerging economies in the world. Its export capacity increased between 2007 and 2008 by 132%. Its capacity to demand goods and services, especially because of its population density, makes it an attractive market for investors. In 2008, China received $108 billion in FDI, making it the world’s third-largest recipient of foreign investment. Strengthening relations with this eastern country through this Agreement is an important rapprochement of Colombia towards the Asia-Pacific region, which has become one of the most dynamic poles of the world economy, a nucleus of development and economic growth, an epicenter of trade and investment, a leader in technological advances and an important scenario for integration and economic cooperation, as recognized by the many missions of members of the Congress of the Republic and the National Government who have visited that country. Now, enough has been said about the benefits that foreign investment brings to Colombia as a country recipient of capital, and it has already been stated that increasing foreign direct investment is the main interest of our country in signing the agreement. However, it is worth noting that due to the bilateral nature of the agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Colombian investors in China will also enjoy the benefits and standards of protection agreed between the two countries.

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It must be said about Chinese investors in Colombia and Colombian investors in China that, in addition to the fact that the Agreement grants them legal certainty for the treatment of their investments, the treatment offered by the host country will at no time be less favorable than that granted to its own nationals. For the reasons set out in this document, the ratification of the Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments is beneficial for our country insofar as economic ties between the two nations are being strengthened; a favorable atmosphere is being created for Colombian businessmen to seek new market niches in China and a climate of security and confidence is being established for investments from China. The current situation provides an important opportunity for Colombia, through this Agreement, to promote the entry of investment flows and to consolidate it as a mechanism to promote the economy. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the ratification of this agreement places Colombia on par with other states in the region that compete directly with our country to attract investment, such as Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador and Peru—among others— that currently have signed FIPAs with China; this is another reason to consider the ratification of this agreement as an element to keep Colombia within the competition to attract Chinese investment. (…)15

Because of the above, it is clear that this Agreement, and the other integration instruments and actions, will contribute to the dynamism and strengthening of relations between Colombia and China.

15 Retrieved 1681441.

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The agreement begins by defining the concepts of “investment”,16 “investor”,17 “profit”,18 and “territory”,19 and then follows with the specific protections accorded to the signatory parties. Article 3, paragraph 1, consecrates the national treatment principle, which requires that FDI receives the same treatment as a domestic investment on the same line of business, while paragraph 2 incorporates the most Favored Nation principle for FDI; article 4 prescribes that neither party can expropriate nor nationalize property related to the other party investors’ FDI, except for reasons of public or social interest and accompanied by compensation; article 6 allows the free transfer between the two countries of all capital related to the FDI, and article 9 details the different legal mechanisms a foreign investor can rely on in case a dispute arises with the country of reception: it is necessary to first exhaust the legal governmental channels before resorting to the (I) local courts or, by agreement between the parties, (II) to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)—the World Bank’s international arbitration center—or (II) another arbitration tribunal. 16 Law 1462 of 2011. Article 1. (…)The term investment refers to any type of asset of an economic nature that has been invested by investors of a Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party in accordance with the latter’s legislation (…). Pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the minimum characteristics of an investment must be: (a) The provision of capital or other resources; (b) The expectation of profits or returns; (c) The assumption of a risk by the investor. (…). 17 Ibidem. “2.1 The word ‘investor’ means:

(a) natural persons having the nationality of either Contracting Party, in accordance with the law of that Contracting Party. b) legal entities including companies, associations, partnerships, and other organizations constituted under the law of any Contracting Party, having their headquarters as well as substantial economic activities in the territory of that Contracting Party. c) Legal entities not established under the law of that Party, but effectively controlled by natural persons as defined in paragraph 2.1.a or by legal entities as defined in paragraph 2.1.b”. 18 Ibid. (…) 3. Profit

The term “profit” refers to amounts generated by an investment, including returns, dividends, interests, capital gains, royalties, fees, and other legitimate income. (…). 19 4. Territory

The term “territory” means the territory of any Contracting Party, including the land territory, internal waters, the territorial sea, and the airspace above them, as well as any maritime area beyond the territorial sea over which, according to international law and national legislation, the Contracting Party exercises sovereign rights or jurisdiction with respect to the waters, maritime soil, subsoil, and natural resources therein.

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Although these partial agreements have served as legal background for an important and constantly increasing level of FDI and financial donations from China, to Colombia’s chagrin, the balance of commerce has always been negative, and always by huge margins. Partly as an attempt to equilibrate that balance, and partly inspired by the 2010 Report of Colombia’s Foreign Policy Mission, in 2012 (the same year the Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Colombia came into effect), Colombia and the PROC formally began a feasibility study for a Comprehensive Trade Agreement (Bernal Ramírez, n.d.; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, 2012): Memorandum of Understanding for the Joint Study on the Feasibility of a Free Trade Agreement between Colombia and China between the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism of the Republic of Colombia and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism of the Republic of Colombia and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as “The Parties”) Recognizing the friendly economic and trade cooperation relations between the two countries, Desiring to further strengthen and expand bilateral economic and trade cooperation ties, Reaffirming the commitment of the Parties to enhance the multilateral trading system represented by the World Trade Organization and to promote regional economic development, Have reached the following understandings: 1. The Parties will take active and effective measures, on the basis of existing cooperation formalities, to deepen and expand economic and trade cooperation between the two countries and to promote the further development of bilateral relations. 2. The Parties, taking into consideration their respective international obligations, in particular the principles and provisions of the WTO, will seek concrete measures and procedures to develop bilateral trade relations and achieve trade liberalization. In this regard, they will undertake a joint study to explore the feasibility of establishing a Free Trade Agreement between Colombia and China. 3. The parties will form a Joint Study Group (JSG) to carry out the above-mentioned study work, examining the particularities and sensitivities of both economies. 4. This JSG will meet alternately in Colombia and China every 3 months and will aim to complete the joint study within one year.

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Signed in Beijing, on May 9, 2012 (…)20 (Signature) SERGIO DÍAZ-GRANADOS Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism Republic of Colombia

(Signature) CHEN DEMING Minister of Commerce Popular Republic of China

This memorandum was intended to produce a report within a year. However, the document has never been made public and, by the end of May 2023, there is no expectation of an upcoming Foreign Trade Agreement between the two nations (El País, 2023, par. 8).

Colombia and Taiwan Taiwan’s political system is similar to that of the United States, but its language, history, and culture share the same origin as the PROC. Following the reform and opening up at the end of the 1970s, Taiwanese businessmen became the most important partners for American companies investing in China. Among the top ten exporting companies in China, six are Taiwanese subsidiaries (Cao, 2021). When Colombia switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1980, the former’s embassy immediately transformed into a commercial delegation and a de facto consular office in Bogotá. On July 23 of that year, it registered before Colombia’s Ministry of Justice and Law as a non-profit organization under the name of Oficina Comercial de Taipéi (Taipei’s Commercial Office) and is currently under the inspection, monitoring, and control of Bogotá’s Municipal Government. Its corporate object, as stated on the certificate of existence and legal representation issued by Bogotá’s Chamber of Commerce, states the following: CORPORATE OBJECT

20 Retrieved from https://chinaenamericalatina.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ Memorando-Entendimiento-estudio-factibilidad-TLC-Colombia-China.pdf.

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The purpose of the corporation is to provide free tourism services with information, economic and commercial services, advice for technology transfer, technical assistance, cultural extension, as well as services in other fields that are recommended by public or private entities.21

The maintenance of cultural and commercial offices around the world is part of Taipei’s foreign relations strategy. As it is unable to establish such relations in an official capacity with most countries, yet cannot afford to cut ties entirely, it promotes relations through a practice some authors call “paradiplomacy”; that is, “a set of foreign activities of a nonsovereign substate regional unit, which are carried out to promote the latter’s interests concerning other, analogous substate entities abroad, as well as concerning foreign states and international organizations” (Pajtinka, 2017, p. 44). However, such a label and definition do not properly fit Taiwan, insofar as it is entirely ruled by a bureaucracy which since 1949 has, for all practical purposes, controlled the territory and carried out relations in equal standing with several foreign countries. The lack of official recognition notwithstanding, Taipei’s cultural and commercial delegations around the world deploy the same functions as its embassies—namely, diplomatic relations and consular services—with a staff constantly rotating between the former and the latter.22 Furthermore, delegations and embassies are both under the direct control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), which governs them following the Organization Act of Diplomatic Missions of the Republic of China (Taiwan); there, the term “diplomatic missions” is extended to the “offices established by the government in countries with which the Republic of China (Taiwan) does not have diplomatic relations” (art. 2, num. 2). Nevertheless, where the representative offices—or delegations—are not formally acknowledged as either embassies or consulates, their employees do not receive the protection of the Vienna Convention of 1969, leaving to each host country to decide if similar privileges and immunities are to be granted—as it is the case of the United States

21 After a request for comments, the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that Taipei’s Commercial Office in Bogotá is a private legal entity; as such, neither it nor its employees require any recognition or registry before this Ministry. 22 For instance, José Chih-Cheng Han, a former representative of the office in Bogotá, was appointed as an ambassador to Paraguay in 2020.

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(Chiu, 2007, p. 25). In addition, outdoor displays of national symbols are forbidden (Pajtinka, 2017, p. 51). Following the 1980 breakup, Taipei blockaded Colombia’s exports to Taiwan and stopped the insurance of exports and foreign investments to the country, in this way imposing a heavy toll on the commercial relations between them for more than a decade. Those relations warmed up again on May 7, 1993, when César Gaviria and Juan Manuel Santos, then Colombia’s president and Minister of Foreign Trade, approved the establishment of a commercial delegation in Taipei. To reduce tensions with the PROC, the office was not inaugurated by either of them, but by Ingrid Betancourt, who did so under the title of Foreign Trade Advisor. The office was not to exert any consular functions, and would only focus on promoting businesses between private persons, that is, without providing any logistical or financial assistance to public institutions or projects. Regardless, the delegation was always financed by a state-owned institution, named the Colombian Bank of Foreign Trade (Bancoldex23 ), whose first commercial delegate was Luis Guillermo Plata, a Colombian businessman and politician who had previously worked as the commercial aggregate of Colombia’s Embassy in Japan. Among the policies he promoted to attract Taiwanese inversion into Colombia were a reduction of import tariffs, unrestricted capital repatriation to Taiwan, and landing visas (or visas on arrival) offered to Taiwanese citizens for 90 days (El Tiempo, 1993; Noticias de Taiwán, 1992, 1993). Trade between the two nations was always meager, though, and according to an online post by the Taipei delegation in Bogotá, the office closed in 2002 due to a lack of funding from Colombian authorities (Taipei Commercial Office in Colombia, 2023). Since then, Taipei has made attempts at restoring Colombia’s delegation on the island, by offering its support to the latter’s incorporation into the APEC, which Colombia has unsuccessfully tried to be part of since 1995 (Maggiorelli, 2021, p. 206).24 About this issue, Domingo Cha, a representative of Taipei’s delegation, declared in 2017: (…) How are bilateral relations between Colombia and Taiwan? 23 For additional dex-237. 24 See also: ifico/apec.

information,

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Although we have the Taiwan office in Colombia, we hope that you can open one in our country to facilitate things. We aim to improve relations not only in commercial, but also in cultural terms, and to achieve this we want to have more contact with the national and local governments. (…) From your perspective, what is needed to strengthen the bilateral relationship? At the office, we see APEC and the Pacific Alliance (PA) as the bodies that can enable the improvement of trade exchange. That is why we want to help Colombia join APEC. For us, the most important Latin American countries are those in the PA. Mexico, Chile, and Peru are already represented in Taiwan, only Colombia is missing. What has the government said in response to your request? The difficulty is basically because of the budget. However, I am one of those who believe that everything must be done to boost trade. What are the current difficulties in trade between the two countries? As there is no trade agreement with Colombia, products are much more expensive compared to, for example, the Central American countries with which we do have an agreement. We believe that many products can be taken from here to Taiwan. (…)25

Later on, Chih-Cheng Han (or José Han), who was Taipei’s representative in Bogotá (2018–2020) before becoming the present-day ambassador in Paraguay (La Nación, 2020), explained the nature of the commercial relations between the two countries as of 2020: How is the relationship between Colombia and Taiwan? Colombia and Taiwan have been two countries that may have many advantages in terms of cooperation, but one does not know the other, and this can be seen in trade. Binational trade is just over US$100 million for Colombia exporting to Taiwan and US$300 million for Taiwan exporting to Colombia. What does Taiwan buy from Colombia? We buy coal, ferronickel, iron, scrap metal and coffee. There is an area in which Colombia can grow now that they want to emphasize agricultural

25 Retrieved from https://www.larepublica.co/globoeconomia/taiwan-ayudara-a-col ombia-a-entrar-al-apec-para-mejorar-el-comercio-2476491.

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products. But I also believe that outside of trade there is a huge possibility for investment. From Taiwan to Colombia, people have not looked at that part, but in the year and a half that I have been here, I see a very important niche, which is Colombia’s geographical position and the free trade conditions it has with the US. What does Colombia buy from Taiwan? Mainly computers, but also motorbikes, capital goods and machinery. We have very little consumer products because all the manufacturing of consumer products is done in China. For example, all iPhones are assembled by a Taiwanese company in China. (…) Did Taiwan want to be part of the Pacific Alliance? We have always had the intention of joining as an observer country, or any status that would allow us to be part of the Pacific Alliance. It is a very important market and of these four countries, Colombia is the most timid one, because Peru, Chile, and Mexico have Taiwan as a trading partner. The problem is that the Alliance’s statutes only allow sovereign countries and with the Chinese blockade of Taiwan we cannot be a member. (…) Have you met with the Minister of Foreign Trade? No, because we have a very strong blockade from China. We are trying to find ways to make Colombia understand that Taiwan can be an investment partner. We want businessmen to invest in Colombia, there is a [Taiwanese] flow that is coming out of China and this will continue to happen in the next five years and if we do not take advantage of this condition, the capital could go to Mexico. (Diario La República, 2020)

After 1980, Taiwan and Colombia exchanged some commercial trade which, lacking a formal agreement or memorandum of understanding, is currently regulated by the World Trade Organization’s (WTO)26 institutions. This is the legal framework comprised of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation, the General Agreement on Trade in Services, and the Multilateral Agreements of Trade in Goods. Surprisingly, the bumpy and scant commercial relations between them were very recently submerged into more incertitude thanks to the directive to the Colombian Federation of Municipalities issued by the Ministry of Foreign Relations of President Gustavo Petro (2022–2026): 26 Colombia became a member of the WTO on April 30, 1995; Taiwan, on January 1, 2002.

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Bogotá, DC, February 21, 2023 (…) Subject matter: Relations with Taiwan, Region of China. Messrs.: In line with the policies of the Government of President Gustavo Petro to deepen relations with the nations of the Indo-Pacific region and taking into account the relevance of the relationship with the People’s Republic of China, I would like to draw your attention to the importance of embracing and applying the “One China” principle by all public officials belonging to the national, departmental, and municipal executive branches. In this regard, it is essential that all public entities of the state bear in mind the following information. 1. The Colombian state firmly adheres to the “One China” principle, recognizing the People’s Republic of China and its authorities as the only legitimate State. Therefore, Colombia does not maintain official nor semi-official diplomatic relations with the Taiwan Region of China. 2. As a consequence of the above, all public sector officials at the national, departmental, and municipal levels must refrain from having contact, meetings, and/or expressions of support with officials of the Taiwan Region of China. I, therefore, call upon your good offices to transmit this instruction to all municipalities (and their officials) linked to the federation under your dignity, an action that will strengthen our international relations and our foreign policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the governing body of the Administrative Sector of Foreign Affairs, is responsible, under the direction of the President of the Republic, for formulating, planning, coordinating, executing, and evaluating Colombia’s foreign policy and international relations, appreciates the full observance of this directive. Cordially, (Signature) Francisco José Coy Granados Vice-minister of Foreign Relations27

Some political commentators contend that this directive does not constitute any change in Colombia’s policy regarding China and Taiwan’s

27 Retrieved from https://www.fcm.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/FCM-E2023-008524.pdf.

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situation since 1980 (Gutiérrez, 2023; Revista Semana, 2023). On the contrary, others argue that Taipei has so far maintained unofficial relations with Bogotá via the Commercial Delegation in Colombia’s capital, and this directive entails, therefore, the closure of that delegation and the complete restriction of trade and FDI with the Island (La Silla Vacía, 2023; Martínez, 2023).

Commerce in Practice During César Gaviria’s presidential term (1990–1994), Colombia started implementing the full panoply of neoliberal policies comprising the Washington Consensus within the context of John Williamson’s What Washington Means by Policy Reform (1990) and A Short History of the Washington Consensus (2004). Following the letter of the then-new “Trade Policy”, number six on the consensus, the country has since celebrated trade agreements with Panamá and Chile (1993), Caricom and México (1995), Cuba (2001), Mercosur (2005), the North Triangle Countries (2009), EFTA and Canada (2011), the United States and Venezuela (2012), the European Union (2013), and South Korea, Costa Rica and the Pacific Alliance (2016)28 ; again, although Colombia has not celebrated any bilateral trade or investment agreements with Taiwan, it has already implemented several partial ones with China. As a result, imports, exports, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have exponentially increased.29

Imports and Exports The United States is currently the world’s second exporter (1.7 trillion USD) and first importer of merchandise (2.9 trillion USD).30 By 2022, the top three destinations for US goods were Canada (16.8%), Mexico (14.7%), and China (7.7%); for imports, China (17.1%), Mexico (13.6%),

28 Retrieved from https://www.tlc.gov.co/acuerdos/vigente. 29 A detailed analysis of the impact of these agreements can be found on Colombia’s

Ministry of Commerce 2022 report on FTAs: https://www.tlc.gov.co/temas-de-interes/ informe-sobre-el-desarrollo-avance-y-consolidacion. 30 Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/usa_e.htm.

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and Canada (13.2%). Colombia is the United States’s 19th export destination (1.1%) and places 25th (0.6%) on imports origin (Ministry of Commerce of Colombia, 2023b). For its part, the PROC is the world’s first exporter (3.3 trillion USD) and second importer (2.7 trillion USD).31 Its main exports destinations in 2021 were the United States (17.2%), Hong Kong (10.4%), and Japan (4.9%), while Colombia ranked 36th (0.4%); for imports, South Korea (8.4%), Japan (8.1%), and the United States (7.2%), while Colombia reached position 50th32 with 0.2% (Ministry of Commerce of Colombia, 2023a). Although Taiwan has not been part of the United Nations since 1971, it became a full WTO member in 2002. It is also the World’s 16th exporter (447 billion USD) and 17th importer (382 billion USD) of goods. In 2021, most of its commodities went to China (28.2%), the United States (14.7%), and Hong Kong (14.1%); concerning imports, China (21.6%), Japan (14.7%), and the United States (10.4%) were its top three partners. Colombia’s trade with Taiwan fluctuates exponentially from one year to the next, as it is always anecdotic and ranges between nonexistent and negligible (World Trade Organization, 2022, n.d.-b). Taking 1980 and 2022 as first and second points of reference, Colombia imported $1.649 and USD 18.839 million from the United States, and $44 and USD 18.698 million from China, while $20 and USD 538 million from Taiwan (DANE Colombia, 2023); since 2020, the United States and the PROC are on a technical draw for the first position among Colombia’s import-origins, while Taiwan moved from place 26th to 22nd (Graphs 8.1 and 8.2). Again comparing 1980 and 2022, Colombia exported $1.053 and USD 14.836 million to the United States, $5 and USD 2.66 million to China, and $372 and 148 million USD to Taiwan (DANE Colombia, 2023). Currently, the United States is the first destination of Colombian exports, while China and Taiwan occupy positions 7th and 42nd (Graphs 8.3 and 8.4). Colombia has always had a negative trade balance with the United States, China, and Taiwan; for each country, the 2022 deficit amounted 31 Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/daily_update_e/trade_ profiles/CN_e.pdf. 32 Retrieved from https://www.mincit.gov.co/getattachment/35c3371b-5938-45ee97fa-42160371fadb/China.aspx.

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Graph 8.1 Imports 1980–2022

Graph 8.2 Imports 1980–2022

to −3,037 million USD, −14,402 million USD, and −337 million USD (Graph 8.5). From a comparative advantage perspective, Colombia competes with the United States on the production of agricultural products; with China on textiles, chemicals, clothing, and toys, while it only has complementarities with Taiwan’s economy. In sum, Taiwan imports everything Colombia exports and vice versa, but it just so happens they do not usually do it between them. Those three countries also offer an excellent source

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Graph 8.3 Exports 1980–2022

Graph 8.4 Exports 1980–2022

of technology, and Colombia has chosen to buy from one or the other in paying attention to prices. Because of this, Colombia’s technology imports from the United States have continuously dropped since the year 2000, only to be replaced with Chinese ones; this owes to the fact that

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Graph 8.5 Trade balance

China’s technology and currency are much cheaper relative to the United States’33 ; thus, the 11 percentage points fall of American participation in Colombia’s imports between 1980 and 2022 is also the principal source of China’s 23 percentage-point gain during the same period. Although the United States and the PROC are Colombia’s top two trade partners, the Latin American country is rather insignificant to them in this regard. Still, it remains unclear whether China, having firmly established itself as Colombia’s second-best, will unsettle the United States and take the top position before the end of this decade. However, there are several reasons to believe this will not be the case. Despite sporadic declarations to the contrary from public officials (EFE, n.d.), Colombia’s manufacturing industries fiercely oppose a trade agreement with China (Velosa, 2020); besides, the United States has recently unleashed a series of policies to avoid countries around the world from further integrating with the PROC at the expense of Taiwan. Instances of this are the recall of the United States’ top diplomatic officials in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Panama, just after these 33 Some Western economists and governments, including those of the United States, have accused Mainland China of deliberately devaluing the Renmin to promote exports of goods: https://www.investopedia.com/trading/chinese-devaluation-yuan/.

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countries broke off official diplomatic ties with Taipei in favor of Beijing (The New York Times, 2018); the sudden increase of American diplomacy, financial aid, and trade benefits to Guatemala and Paraguay, which explains their recent vows to keep official diplomatic relations with Taipei (Chang, 2020; US Embassy in Paraguay, 2021; Wilson Center, 2020) and above all, the passing of the TAIPEI Act on March 26, 2020. Sections 2 and 5 state noteworthy information: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. (…) (a) FINDINGS. —Congress makes the following findings: (…) (2) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 states that it is the policy of the United States ‘‘to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan’’. (…) (4) Since the election of President Tsai Ing-wen as President of Taiwan in 2016, the Government of the People’s Republic of China has intensified its efforts to pressure Taiwan. (5) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China (…) (8) According to President Tsai Ing-wen, the severance of diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China is ‘‘part of a series of diplomatic and military acts of coercion’’ by China. (…) SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING OF TIES WITH TAIWAN. (a) Sense of Congress. –– It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government should –– (1) support Taiwan in strengthening its official diplomatic relationships as well as other partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world; (2) consider, in certain cases as appropriate and in alignment with United States interests, increasing its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan; and

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(3) consider, in certain cases as appropriate, in alignment with United States foreign policy interests and in consultation with Congress, altering its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that take serious or significant actions to undermine the security or prosperity of Taiwan. (…)

The left-wing government of President Gustavo Petro (2022–2026) is speeding up Bogota’s rapprochement to Beijing and, as shown before, it is ready to offer the country’s unofficial relations with Taipei as the sacrificial lamb; but not so much when it comes to relations with the United States. Reasonable fear of American retaliation, and a cordial meeting between Presidents Petro and Biden in the White House on April 20, 2023, warrant the conclusion that Colombia will not change its trade relations with America even when it tries to increase them with the PROC (The White House, 2023). The Caribbean country cannot be faulted for this, since even the United States and Taiwan are ready to make important concessions to keep trade relations with China. For all their political bravado, Trump’s government halted negotiations for a comprehensive FTA with Taiwan during his four years of presidential tenure, and in 2022 the Biden administration excluded Taiwan from the Indo-Pacific Framework (Chen, 2022). Moreover, somewhat oblivious of her reiterated rebukes during the presidential campaigns of 2012 and 2016, Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-Wen has kept unaltered the 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) that led China to become Taiwan’s most important trade partner (Chiang, 2020; The Economist, 2023; Yan-chih & Iok-sin, 2010).

Foreign Direct Investment When it entails the arrival of new technologies and know-how, as well as a favorable business reputation for the recipient country, FDI is a big contributor to the development of a nation. Under Presidential Decree 444 of 1967, investors interested in Colombia would require beneplácito from the National Planning Department,34 would not benefit from the 34 DANE, by the Spanish acronym, it’s a Colombian agency analogous to the Economic Development Administration in the United States.

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national treatment principle, and would face numerous restrictions when repatriating investments or profits. However, point seven of the Washington Consensus recommended otherwise,35 and so, President César Gaviria (1990–1994) passed Law 9 of 1991, which contains the current legal framework for foreign exchange and investment in the country.36 Very successfully, it seems: by 1980, Colombia’s FDI was merely 0.15% of the GDP, but the percentage rose to 2.4% in 2000 and reached its historical peak of 8.34% in 2005. Up to that year, most FDI was still concentrated on the primary sector (oil, mines, and agriculture), while investments in the secondary (manufactures) and the tertiary sector (services) were few and far between; attempting to diversify Colombia’s FDI, President Álvaro Uribe (2002–2010) pushed for a new wave of FTA’s, which also had positive results for the country’s economy: For the period 2005–2019, FDI participation on the GDP represented 4.2% on average; in 2020 it dropped to 2.8%, same percentage it had in the year 2000, which is explained by the global financial crisis stemming from the commercial war between the United States and China and COVID-19related disruptions on worldwide supply chains. The downturn seems to be over, though, for FDI rose from USD 7.666 million in 2021 to USD 17.048 million in 2022, representing an annual increment of 81.7% and leaving FDI on a current 4.9% of the country’s GDP (Clavijo & Delgado Gómez, 2008, pp. 34–38; El Nuevo Siglo, 2023; Forbes Colombia, 2023;

35 “Foreign Direct Investment.

As noted above, liberalization of foreign financial flows is not regarded as a high priority. In contrast, a restrictive attitude limiting the entry of foreign direct investment (FDI) is regarded as foolish. Such investment can bring needed capital, skills, and knowhow, either producing goods needed for the domestic market or contributing new exports. The main motivation for restricting FDI is economic nationalism, which Washington disapproves of, at least when practiced by countries other than the United States. FDI can be promoted by debt-equity swaps. Parts of Washington, perhaps most notably the US Treasury, the Institute of International Finance, and the International Finance Corporation, are strongly in favor of debtor countries facilitating debt-equity swaps, on the argument that this can simultaneously further the twin objectives of promoting FDI and reducing debt. Other parts of Washington, notably the IMF, are much more skeptical. They question whether FDI should be subsidized; they ask whether the subsidized investment will be additional; they argue that, if it is not, the debtor loses by having its foreign debt reduced rather than gaining free foreign exchange; and above all they worry about the inflationary implications of adding to domestic monetary expansion” (Williamson, 2002). 36 Available at https://www.banrep.gov.co/sites/default/files/paginas/LEY09DE19 91CONHIPERVINCULOS-1.pdf.

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Garavito-Acosta et al., 2013, pp. 98–104; Ministry of Commerce of Colombia, 2022; Urrutia Montoya, 2003, pp. 5–12). More importantly, while between 2001 and 2009, FDI went to oil and mining on an annual average of 49.8%, for the decade 2010– 2020 this percentage fell to 38.9%, and manufactures and services rose to an average of 60%, annually; also, while in 2011 only 19.8% of the investments came from countries Colombia had FTAs with, in 2020 that percentage reached 86.7%. To put it bluntly, the neoliberal policies implemented in the country following 1991 have not only increased the levels of FDI but led to its diversification, substantially reducing the economy’s dependence on the primary sector (Graphs 8.6 and 8.7). Regarding the United States, China, and Taiwan, the official data offers Graphs 8.8 and 8.9.37 In 2022, the main origin of Colombia’s FDI was the United States, which in this regard still exceeds every other country by far.38 Between 2002 and 2020, it invested USD 40.85 million, most of which arrived after the FTA was signed with Colombia in 2006 and has been in effect since May 15, 2012 (Ministry of Commerce of Colombia, 2021, p. 75). Currently, there are approximately 450 companies on Colombian soil with American FDI; they are found throughout all sectors of the economy and create around 100 thousand local jobs (De la Hoz, 2022). By contrast, around 100 companies incorporate Chinese FDI, placing China at a distant 11th place. A good explanation for that difference lies in the fact that the American companies have made their presence in Colombia since the first half of the nineteenth century, immediately after both countries signed their first trade agreement in 1824, while Chinese FDI only took off after then Vice President Xi Jinping visited the country in February 2009. In November of that year, more than 300 Chinese investors attended the 3rd China-Latin America Business Summit, in Bogotá, and in July 2010 China bestowed the approved destination status (ADS) to the country (Creutzfeldt, 2019, pp. 189–204; Ellis, 2022); this became a significant step toward strengthening China’s FDI, for it is the only manner in which Chinese citizens other than public officials could visit the country in 37 Colombia’s Central Bank and National Planning Department started to discriminate by country only in 1994. 38 The second and third mayor investors were Spain ($2737.344 million USD) and Panama ($1982.413 million USD).

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Graph 8.6 Foreign direct investment by sector (in millions of $USD) (Source Ministry of Commerce of Colombia [2021] and Giraldo-Salazar et al. [2023, pp. 35–40])

groups of more than two people (Arita et al., 2013, pp. 6–14; ChinaContact, n.d.; Gaviria Ángel, 2010, pp. 40–45; Uribe Vélez, 2009). In any case, similar to America’s, Chinese investments are also evident throughout different sectors of the economy, with infrastructure projects, telecommunications, oil, and mining standing out as the most important ones (González, 2023; ReporteAsia, 2022). Concerning Taiwan, the lack of a comprehensive FTA like the one Colombia celebrated with the United States in 2006, or of specific agreements for the promotion and protection of FDI, like the one signed with

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Graph 8.7 Total participation of FDI of countries with commercial agreements 2021 (Source Ministry of Commerce of Colombia [2021] and Giraldo-Salazar et al. [2023, pp. 35–40])

Graph 8.8 FDI 1994–2022

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Graph 8.9 FDI 1994–2022

the PROC in 2008, or even for promotional activities like the 2009 diplomatic visit and business summit with China, explain why Taiwan ranks among the countries that do not invest in Colombia regularly (see Graph 8.9).

Conclusion After Colombia established official diplomatic relations with China in 1980, commerce between the two countries increased exponentially at the expense of trade with Taiwan and, to a certain extent, also of the one with the United States. The economic and political prevalence of China in the international arena during this century (the irony!) owes a lot to US policies during the second half of the twentieth century, which have brought Colombia and the Asian giant ever closer. Longing for the day in which their country becomes one of China’s “strategic partners” (a cathegory encompassing 110 countries, as of 2022) Colombian authorities have expressed their willingness to cut all ties with Taipei, including informal ones, recently declaring they do not maintain “official nor semi-official diplomatic relations with the Taiwan Region of China” (Quesada, 2022; Revista Semana, 2023). But no one, not even Chinese officials, apparently know what the label of strategic partner

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exactly means or why it is conferred to some countries instead of others, or even what its tangible benefits are (Boni, 2022; Echavarría Toro, 2010, pp. 33–34). Colombia might soon start reconsidering its diplomatic relations with Taipei, though, given that the United States, its most significant economic partner and military ally, has recently expressed its willingness to punish those nations which, when it comes tothe island, do not tread carefully.

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Chiang, M. (2020, April). Cross-strait economic relations: Taiwan’s perspective. In China and East Asian economic integration (pp. 67–84). World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd. https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/10.1142/978 9811200328_0005 ChinaContact. (n.d.). Approved destination status (ADS) policy. https://chinac ontact.org/information/approved-destination-status-ads-policy Chiu, H. (2007). The international law of recognition and the status of the Republic of China. In The United States and the Republic of China: Democratic friends, strategic allies, and economic partners (pp. 13–28). Transaction Publishers. https://books.google.com.co/books?id=3YgR77AzwuEC& printsec=frontcover&hl=es#v=onepage&q&f=false Clavijo, C. B., & Delgado Gómez, M. A. (2008). Inversión extranjera directa y crecimiento económico en Colombia en el periodo 1980–2004. Universidad Católica de Pereira. https://hdl.handle.net/10785/363 Congress of Colombia. (1983a, December 26). Law 53 of 1983, approving the “Commercial Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China”, was signed in Beijing on 17 July 1981. https://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?ruta= Leyes/1607088 Congress of Colombia. (1983b, December 26). Law 57 of 1983, approving the “Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China”, was signed in Beijing on 23 December 1981. https://www.suin-jur iscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?ruta=Leyes/1609945 Congress of Colombia. (1984, February 7). Law 6 of 1984, approving the “Cultural Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China”, was signed in Beijing on 1 October 1981. https://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?ruta= Leyes/1561888 Congress of Colombia. (1991, January 17). Law 9 of 1991, by which general rules are issued to which the National Government must abide to regulate international exchange and complementary measures are adopted (New Exchange Statute). https://www.banrep.gov.co/sites/default/files/paginas/ LEY09DE1991CONHIPERVINCULOS-1.pdf Congress of Colombia. (2011, June 29). Law 1462 of 2011, approving the “Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China”, was signed in Lima, Peru, on 22 November 2008. https:// www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?ruta=Leyes/1681441 Congress of the United States. (2020, March 26). Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019. https://www. congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1678/text

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Coy Granados, F. J. (2023, February 21). Directriz - Relacionamiento con la Región de Taiwán, China. Vice-Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia. https://www.fcm.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/FCME-2023-008524.pdf Creutzfeldt, B. (2019, August). China’s foreign direct investment in Colombia. In China’s foreign direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Conditions and challenges. https://dusselpeters.com/CECHIMEX/201 90804_CECHIMEX_Libro_Chinas_Foreign_Direct_Enrique_Dussel_Peters. pdf DANE Colombia. (2023). Históricos Importaciones. https://www.dane.gov.co/ index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/comercio-internacional/importaciones/imp ortaciones-historicos De la Hoz, N. (2022, June 14). La inversión de EE.UU. en Colombia duplicó niveles prepandemia en primer trimestre. Diario La República. https://www. larepublica.co/economia/la-inversion-de-ee-uu-en-colombia-duplico-nivelesprepandemia-en-primer-trimestre-3383900 Diario La República. (2017, February 25). Taiwan ayudará a Colombia a entrar al APEC para mejorar el comercio. https://www.larepublica.co/globoecon omia/taiwan-ayudara-a-colombia-a-entrar-al-apec-para-mejorar-el-comercio2476491 Diario La República. (2020, February 6). Es importante Que Colombia reabra la oficina de ProColombia que había en Taipei. https://www.larepublica. co/globoeconomia/es-importante-que-colombia-reabra-la-oficina-de-procol ombia-que-habia-en-taipei-2960885 Echavarría Toro, P. (2010, November). China y América Latina. In Colombia y China: Treinta años de amistad y cooperación. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia. https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/chi nacolombia_web.pdf EFE. (n.d.). China y Colombia aceleraron las negociaciones del TLC en encuentros de alto nivel. LegisComex. https://www.legiscomex.com/Documentos/ CHINA-COLOMBIA-ACELERARON-NEGOCIACION-TLC-JUL-07-1516NOT Ellis, E. (2022, November 10). Colombia’s relationship with the PRC. CSIS | Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/ana lysis/colombias-relationship-prc El Nuevo Siglo. (2023, March 16). En 2022 se duplicó entrada de inversión extranjera directa. https://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/03-15-2023en-2022-se-duplico-la-entrada-de-inversion-extranjera-directa-al-pais El País. (2023 April 19). Colombia no está preparada para el bum de inversión china. https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2023-04-19/colombia-no-estapreparada-para-el-bum-de-inversion-china.html

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Fedesarrollo. (2010, April). Misión de Política Exterior de Colombia. https:// www.repository.fedesarrollo.org.co/handle/11445/228 Forbes Colombia. (2023, March 1). La inversión extranjera en Colombia creció 81,7% en 2022. https://forbes.co/2023/03/01/economia-y-finanzas/la-inv ersion-extranjera-en-colombia-crecio-817-en-2022 Garavito-Acosta, A. L., Iregui-Bohórquez, A. M., & Ramírez-Giraldo, M. T. (2013, September 1). Inversión extranjera directa en Colombia: evolución, indicadores y determinantes por firma. In Flujos de capitales, choques externos y respuestas de política en países emergentes (pp. 83–136). Repositorio Banco de la República. https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/ 6637 Gaviria Ángel, G. (2010, November). Expo Shanghai: La oportunidad de oro. In Colombia y China: Treinta años de amistad y cooperación. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia. https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/ files/chinacolombia_web.pdf Giraldo-Salazar, I., et al. (2023, January). Caracterización de la Inversión Extranjera Directa en Colombia (IED): actividades económicas distintas a minas y petróleo. FLAR | Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas. https:// flar.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CARACTERIZACION-DE-LAINVERSION-EXTRANJERA-DIRECTA-EN-COLOMBIA-IED-ACTIVI DADES-ECONOMICAS-DISTINTAS-A-MINAS-Y-PETROLEO.pdf González, B. M. (2023, February 6). Las obras que están ejecutando los chinos en Colombia de las que hablaría Petro en su viaje a China. El Colombiano. https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/las-obras-que-eje cutan-empresas-chinas-en-colombia-eb20306406 Gutiérrez, J. G. (2023, April 15). Gobierno afianza vinculo con China y les recuerda a funcionarios no tener relaciones con Taiwan. El Colombiano. https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/relacion-colombiachina-gobierno-petro-pide-no-relacionarse-con-taiwan-DD21119846 Investopedia. (2017, October 16). The impact of China devaluing the Yuan in 2015. https://www.investopedia.com/trading/chinese-devaluation-yuan/ La Nación. (2020, May 29). Asume José Chih-Cheng Han, nuevo embajador de Taiwán en Paraguay. https://www.lanacion.com.py/politica/2020/05/29/ asume-jose-chih-cheng-han-nuevo-embajador-de-taiwan-en-paraguay/ La Silla Vacía. (2023, April 16). Petro pide a sus funcionarios respetar política de Una sola China. https://www.lasillavacia.com/la-silla-vacia/envivo/petropide-a-sus-funcionarios-respetar-politica-de-una-sola-china Leiteritz, R. J. (2012). China and Latin America: A marriage made in heaven? Colombia Internacional (75), 49–81. https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa? id=81223317003

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Li, H. (2005, September). Rivalry between Taiwan and the PRC in Latin America. Journal of Chinese Political Science. https://link.springer.com/art icle/10.1007/BF02877029 Li, H. (2021, October). Introduction. In Taiwan’s relations with Latin America: A strategic rivalry between the United States, China, and Taiwan. Lexington Books, Rowman & Littlefield. https://books.google.com.co/books?id=SOp DEAAAQBAJ&hl=es&source=gbs_navlinks_s Maggiorelli, L. (2019, July 25). La ayuda al desarrollo de Taiwán a América Latina y el Caribe y la política de Una Sola China. Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano. https://revistas.utadeo.edu.co/index.php/raz oncritica/article/view/1513 Maggiorelli, L. (2021, October). Economic statecraft: Taiwan and Colombia. In Taiwan’s relations with Latin America: A strategic rivalry between the United States, China, and Taiwan. Lexington Books, Rowman & Littlefield. https://books.google.com.co/books?id=SOpDEAAAQBAJ&hl= es&source=gbs_navlinks_s Martínez, J. G. (2023, April 15). Petro prohíbe apoyar a Taiwán y se cuadra con el régimen comunista. PanamPost. https://panampost.com/jose-gregorio-mar tinez/2023/04/15/petro-prohibe-apoyar-a-taiwan-regimen-comunista/ Ministry of Commerce of Colombia. (2012a). Foro Colombia China. Retrieved April 8, 2023, from https://www.mincit.gov.co/prensa/presentaciones-dela-ministra/doc-presentaciones/discurso-ministro-diaz-granados-en-el-forooportun.aspx Ministry of Commerce of Colombia. (2012b, May 8). Colombia y China dan primer paso para negociar un TLC. SICE - OAS. https://www.sice.oas.org/ TPD/COL_CHN/Info_MOU_s.pdf Ministry of Commerce of Colombia. (2012c, May 9). Memorandum of Understanding for the Joint Study on the Feasibility of a Free Trade Agreement between Colombia and China between the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism of the Republic of Colombia and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China. China en América Latina. https://chinaenameri calatina.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Memorando-Entendimientoestudio-factibilidad-TLC-Colombia-China.pdf Ministry of Commerce of Colombia. (2021). Informe sobre los acuerdos comerciales vigentes de Colombia. https://www.tlc.gov.co/temas-de-interes/inf orme-sobre-el-desarrollo-avance-y-consolidacion/documentos/ley-1868-inf orme-tlcs-2021-congreso.aspx#:~:text=A%20la%20fecha%2C%20Colombia% 20cuenta,Canad%C3%A1%20(2011)%2C%20EEUU Ministry of Commerce of Colombia. (2022). Informe sobre los acuerdos comerciales vigentes de Colombia. https://www.tlc.gov.co/temas-de-interes/inf orme-sobre-el-desarrollo-avance-y-consolidacion/documentos/ley-1868-inf orme-2022.aspx

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Ministry of Commerce of Colombia. (2023a, February 24). Perfil de China. https://www.mincit.gov.co/getattachment/35c3371b-5938-45ee-97fa-421 60371fadb/China.aspx Ministry of Commerce of Colombia. (2023b, March 10). Perfil de Estados Unidos. https://www.mincit.gov.co/getattachment/504145cb-c9564a83-99d0-abbe53b1c457/Estados-Unidos-Belice.aspx Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia. (2012, May 9). Colombia y China firmaron nueve acuerdos de cooperación. https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/new sroom/news/colombia-china-firmaron-nueve-acuerdos-cooperacion Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2000, November 7). Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Colombia on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (in Chinese). https://www.mfa.gov.cn/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/nmz_680 924/1206_681072/1207_681084/200011/t20001107_9371581.shtm Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan). (2018). Organization Act of diplomatic missions of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Laws & regulations database of the Republic of China (Taiwan). https://law.moj.gov. tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=E0000017 Noticias de Taiwán. (1980, February 16). Con Colombia: Suspensión de relaciones. https://noticias.nat.gov.tw/news.php?unit=92,106,115&post=79288 Noticias de Taiwán. (1992, February 16). Colombia establecerá oficina en Taipei. https://noticias.nat.gov.tw/news.php?unit=92,106,115&post=77350 Noticias de Taiwán. (1993, May 16). Abierta oficina de Colombia en Taiwan. https://noticias.nat.gov.tw/news.php?unit=95,106,115&post=83620 Pajtinka, E. (2017). Between diplomacy and paradiplomacy: Taiwan’s foreign relations in current practice. Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics, 11(1), 39–57. https://doi.org/10.1515/jnmlp-2017-0003 Presidency of Colombia. (1985, March 22). Decree 845 of 1985, promulgating certain international treaties. https://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocum ent.asp?ruta=Decretos/1177118 Quesada, J. D. (2022, October 20). EE UU advierte a Petro del peligro de caer en manos de China: “Agarrar Su dinero se acaba pagando”. El País América Colombia. https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2022-10-20/eeuu-advierte-a-petro-del-peligro-de-caer-en-manos-de-china-agarrar-su-dinerose-acaba-pagando.html ReporteAsia. (2022, August 1). Conoce las cifras de la relación comercial Colombia-China, Una de las mas pujantes de America Latina. https://rep orteasia.com/region/china/2022/07/30/conoce-cifras-relacion-comercialcolombia-china-mas-pujantes-america-latina/ Revista Semana. (2021, January 15). Colombia apuesta a convertirse en “socio estratégico” de China. https://www.semana.com/colombia-apuesta-conver tirse-socio-estrategico-china/135401/

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Revista Semana. (2023, April 16). Gobierno de Gustavo Petro pide a sus funcionarios acoger el principio de ‘Una sola China’, en pleno conflicto con https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/gobierno-de-gustavoTaiwan. petro-pide-a-sus-funcionarios-acoger-el-principio-de-una-sola-china-en-plenoconflicto-con-taiwan/202314/ State Council of the People’s Republic of China. (2016, November 24). Full text of China’s policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. https:// english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/11/24/content_2814754 99069158.htm Taipei Commercial Office in Colombia. (2023, January 3). Establishment history (in Chinese). https://www.roc-taiwan.org/co/post/1993.html The Economist. (2023, March 6). It is time to divert Taiwan’s trade and investment from China. https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/ 03/06/it-is-time-to-divert-taiwans-trade-and-investment-from-china The New York Times. (2018, September 8). U.S. recalls top diplomats from Latin America as worries rise over China’s influence. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/09/08/us/politics/us-latin-america-china.html The White House. (2023, April 20). Joint Statement from the United States and Colombia following the Bilateral Meeting Between President Joe Biden and President Gustavo Petro. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statem ents-releases/2023/04/20/joint-statement-from-the-united-states-and-col ombia-following-the-bilateral-meeting-between-president-joe-biden-and-pre sident-gustavo-petro/ Torrado, S. (2023, April 19). Colombia no está preparada para el bum de inversión China. El País - Colombia. https://elpais.com/america-colombia/202304-19/colombia-no-esta-preparada-para-el-bum-de-inversion-china.html United Nations. (2023). United Nations Treaty Collection, Definition of key terms used in the UN Treaty Collection. United Nations. Retrieved April 8, 2023, from https://treaties.un.org/Pages/overview.aspx?path=overview%2Fd efinition%2Fpage1_en.xml#agreements Uribe Vélez, A. (2009, November 25). Palabras del Presidente Álvaro Uribe Vélez en la Tercera Cumbre Empresarial China-América Latina. Presidency of the Republic of Colombia. https://historico.presidencia.gov.co/discursos/ discursos2009/noviembre/china_24112009.html Urrutia Montoya, M. (2003, December 30). La inversion extranjera directa en Colombia. Revista del Banco de la República, 76(914). https://publicaciones. banrepcultural.org/index.php/banrep/article/view/10126 U.S. Embassy in Paraguay. (2021, May 6). Paraguay, United States and Taiwan deepen private sector and entrepreneurship partnerships. https://py.usembassy. gov/paraguay-united-states-and-taiwan-deepen-private-sector-and-entrepren eurship-partnerships/

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Velosa, E. (2020, August 3). China: Atrapada en la Política exterior de Colombia. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. https://cl.boell.org/es/2020/08/03/ china-atrapada-en-la-politica-exterior-de-colombia Williamson, J. (2002, November). What Washington means by policy reform. Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://www.papelesdesoc iedad.info/IMG/pdf/john_williamson_what_washington_means_by_policy_ reform-2.pdf Wilson Center. (2020, October 22). Force multipliers? U.S. and Taiwanese interests in Latin America [Video]. Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter. org/event/force-multipliers-us-and-taiwanese-interests-latin-america?gad=1 World Trade Organization. (2022). Chinese Taipei trade profile. https://www. wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/daily_update_e/trade_profiles/TW_e.pdf World Trade Organization. (2023). GATS Training module: Chapter 1—Basic purpose and concepts. Retrieved April 8, 2023, from https://www.wto.org/ english/tratop_e/serv_e/cbt_course_e/c1s6p1_e.htm World Trade Organization. (n.d.-a). China—Member information. https://www. wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm#statistics World Trade Organization. (n.d.-b). Separate customs territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu—Member information. https://www.wto.org/ english/thewto_e/countries_e/chinese_taipei_e.htm World Trade Organization. (n.d.-c). United States of America—Member information. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/usa_e.htm Yan-chih, M., & Iok-sin, L. (2010, April 26). Ma, Tsai lock horns in ECFA debate. Taipei Times. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/ 2010/04/26/2003471543

CHAPTER 9

Massive Chinese Investments in Latin America: What Is Taiwan’s Diplomatic Fate in That Region? Mohamad Zreik

Introduction To “increase China’s economic and political weight by expanding regional connectivity and economic integration,” Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. Chinese foreign policy aims to safeguard political stability, national security, sovereignty, and economic prosperity through the BRI plan while securing access to global markets and crucial natural resources for China’s Communist Party (Chen & Lin, 2018). According to the Chinese government, the BRI aspires to “connect China with Europe over the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the South Pacific” (see Fig. 9.1). By September 2020, China’s BRI financial capital, which includes state-owned assets, had reached $4.3 trillion.

M. Zreik (B) School of International Studies, Sun Yat-sen University, Zhuhai, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_9

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This program has now spread to 71 countries, covering more than twothirds of the world’s population. Analysts must rely on data provided by the Chinese government or individual projects to gain a thorough count of loans and investments. A third of global trade is handled by the BRI, as well as seventy percent of the world’s oil reserves. The BRI is the most ambitious example of twenty-first-century economic statecraft to date (Zreik, 2021, pp. 51–67). The economic dominance of the United States in Latin America is thought by some to be challenged by China. Additional Latin American countries (LAC) were added to the BRI in 2018 as part of its expansion. Ministerial Forum of China-Commonwealth of Latin American and Caribbean States was held in Beijing, China (CELAC). It is possible to build BRI infrastructure and engage in economic cooperation because of China’s connection with CELAC. More than a dozen BRI building projects are currently underway in Latin America and the Caribbean region (Johnston, 2019, pp. 40–58). Bilateral trade with Latin America and the Caribbean has grown considerably in the previous two decades thanks to BRI (see Fig. 9.2). China has shown its expanding influence in the Latin American and Caribbean regions as a vital business partner (LAC). There has been a twenty-five-fold rise in bilateral trade between China and Latin American countries since 1999, according to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) 2019 Trade Directions Statistics report. The BRI now includes eleven Central American and Caribbean countries. Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, and Ecuador are all on the list. Brazil received a $42 billion loan, Argentina $18 billion, and Ecuador $17 billion from the BRI (Leiva, 2020, pp. 386–398). Investment in the area will help decrease both poverty and inequality in the community. However, despite the promise of economic growth for BRI partners, worries about the BRI and China’s economic statecraft on emerging economies are rising. Financial loans and vital infrastructure including ports, motorways, and railroads are said to benefit member governments of the BRI. Other scholars believe that participants will suffer financial ruin and other negative effects as a result of their participation. These countries may be harmed by China’s political maneuvers. This policy could lead to more economic and political instability (Zreik, 2022a, pp. 43–65). One of the most effective Chinese instruments in Latin America is the Belt and Road Initiative, which China is using in opposition to the West’s

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Fig. 9.1 The BRI and China’s International trade map (Source Belt and Road Research Platform)

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Fig. 9.2 Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)-China trade flows (Source IMF)

push to have Latin American countries recognize Taiwan as an independent state. Only 14 countries now recognize Taiwan as an independent state, which has been steadily decreasing since 1949 when the PRC was established (see Fig. 9.3). When nine countries abandoned Taipei for Beijing between 2000 and 2008, Taiwan shifted away from a strategy of trying to match Beijing’s deep pockets after a period of intense “dollar” or “checkbook” diplomacy in the 1990s and 2000s (ibid.). Taiwan tried to hold on (and even, in some cases, buy back) diplomatic recognition from foreign partners. At some point in 2008, Beijing agreed to a diplomatic truce with Taipei to try and negotiate economic and political integration with the Ma Ying-jeou administration, suspending its efforts to remove Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partners (Ascensão et al., 2018, pp. 206–209). However, China has restarted its drive to weaken Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition with the inauguration of Democratic Progressive Party leader Tsai Ing-wen as president in May 2016, utilizing enormous sums of money to encourage Taipei’s surviving partners to switch diplomatic ties to Beijing (Oropeza, 2018). Six of the ROC’s diplomatic allies have transferred recognition from Taipei to Beijing after China resumed its efforts to marginalize Taiwan in 2016. These countries include Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, and El Salvador. Recently, Nicaragua severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and considered that Taiwan is a part of the “One China.” This step came to

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Fig. 9.3 Countries recognizing Taiwan (Source Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China [Taiwan])

protect Nicaragua’s economic interests with China. Taipei is increasingly concerned about keeping the ROC’s remaining diplomatic allies from fleeing the island in light of China’s rising diplomatic pressure (Mingey & Kratz, 2021). Chinese-related infrastructure investment and project funding could help reduce poverty and create jobs around the world, notably in Latin America. This research will look into China’s economic footprint in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and the Chinese administration’s use of the BRI as a tool to eliminate Taiwan’s ambitions for official recognition by the governments of Latin America, in return for recognition of “One China,” including Taiwan.

Literature Review State recognition and statehood have been thoroughly studied and debated. Several academics argue that sovereignty emerges from the position of supreme power within a geographical unit and does not require other governments’ recognition. Following the 1993 Montevideo Convention, recognition has been questioned as declaratory or substantive statehood. Montevideo Convention’s origins in international law may

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make it unsuitable for political science (Scissors, 2020). The 1933 Montevideo Convention defines statehood as having a permanent population, defined territory, government, and the power to enter into relations with other states. This is the common definition of statehood. The Montevideo Convention articulated declaratory and constitutive theories of statehood and state recognition. The nineteenthcentury constitutive theory emphasizes international acknowledgment as a requirement for statehood. A state can only exist if other states acknowledge it, according to Stojanovska-Stefanova and others (2017). Recognized rising states get legitimacy. Despite partial recognition by some states, the constitutive theory has been criticized for political manipulation and logical contradiction (Myers & Gallagher, 2020). In the twentieth century, constitutive theory constraints led to declaratory theory. Recognition is a political process, according to Holmberg Forsyth (2012). Once an entity meets the statehood requirements, it is a state. Signing treaties or adhering to international conventions like the Montevideo Treaty grants legal status. According to Chiang and Hwang (2008), state recognition affirms its existence. Taiwan, where statehood is a difficult question, may be an example. The declaratory theory should have applied to Taiwan if it met statehood conditions. Holmberg Forsyth (2012) argues that statehood is determined by law or fact (politics). The Montevideo Convention was criticized for not addressing the balance between law and politics in recognition. Stojanovska-Stefanova and her colleagues describe a de facto state as an entity recognized by only a few countries as having land, people, and sovereignty despite being able to regulate its population (2017). The de facto country has been oppressed and assaulted by another country, similar to Taiwan. International recognition may also be reflected through a country’s membership in the UN. Despite Vatican City not being a member, Switzerland is nonetheless considered a sovereign state. Taiwan must be recognized by the five United Nations Security Council members (USA, China, Russia, Great Britain, and France) before it may join the organization. Taiwan may not be able to declare its complete sovereignty because of China’s veto (Zreik, 2022b, pp. 7–26). China-LATAM ties have grown in recent years. China’s economic, social, and political engagement in Latin America is well-documented. China-Latin America scholars fall into two categories; Chinese presence in Latin America is seen by some as a threat to U.S. hegemony

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and encroachment on its historic area of influence. A second group emphasizes commercial cooperation and the reciprocal benefits of China’s involvement in LATAM (Liu et al., 2020, pp. 137–145). China’s LATAM worries are economic and geopolitical. Interconnected problems are hard to isolate and examine. New markets and raw material sources are economic priorities. Chile provides China with raw materials and a new export market. The “One China” policy provides geopolitical benefits, such as winning support. Several Caribbean countries acknowledge Taiwan as China’s “legitimate government.” Unanswered is whether China’s role in Latin America is economic or geopolitical. Beijing maintains geopolitical concerns aren’t behind increased Chinese involvement. This official perspective fits a calm ascension. China isn’t a threat to Latin American economies, but a source of prosperity. Analysts say China’s aims are geopolitical. To comprehend geopolitical developments, consider the US-China-LATAM relationship, ChinaLATAM relations cannot be studied in isolation. Washington reportedly ignores LATAM’s concerns about China’s influence in Latin America. Academics say the United States is “excessively cautious” about China in Latin America. An alliance between China and Latin America would be bad for American interests, but it is doubtful. Scholars believe no country would benefit from a military alliance. Because geopolitical and economic issues are linked, some say China’s main motivation is geopolitical influence. This explanation illustrates Taiwan’s interest in and interprets official Chinese literature. Using geopolitics as the key motivator of Chinese participation suggests a struggle between China and the United States, China probably wants to legitimize its government and gain worldwide influence. Beijing’s rising political, economic, and military presence offers LATAM an alternative to US leadership (Zreik, 2020, pp. 47–55). Some think that China’s expanding influence in Latin America could affect US efforts to rebalance toward the Pacific. Chinese presence might lead to alternative military equipment that conflicts with US goals. China’s soft influence has grown as its economic ties with Latin America have grown. Government visits and exchanges show political and economic growth. China’s interest in Latin America may be geopolitical and economic; this shows the US-China relationship is a zero-sum game in which one side gains strength at the other’s expense (Danilovich, 2018, pp. 293–313).

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According to research, China should strengthen its economic connections with Latin America. Increase raw material availability and export markets. Following the turn of the century, trade has soared. Economic participation could create “soft power” and boost “leverage.” China’s soft power in Latin America lags behind the United States because of cultural differences. China’s reputation is improving, and because of their common colonial history, China may communicate with LATAM in a non-threatening way. There is agreement and disagreement over China’s economic influence in Latin America. Some academics consider China’s economic impact on Latin America as a “warning and an opportunity.” China was poised for long-term economic prosperity. Economic performance has geopolitical repercussions that cannot be disregarded. Some claim China’s economic growth model has surpassed Latin America’s “Washington Consensus.” There have been winners and losers from China’s presence in Latin America. Most economists say the “commodity lottery” determines economic success or failure (González et al., 2015, pp. 29–43). China buys Peruvian and Chilean goods. These countries gain the most from China’s involvement. China competes with Mexico for low-skilled US-manufactured goods. Some claim LATAM has helped commodity exporters while hurting manufacturing. Academics disagree on whether Chinese exports helped or hurt LATAM’s economy. It is hard to assess if rising trade with China has helped or damaged LATAM overall. In general, LATAM countries that export commodities have prospered while manufacturing countries have not. Chinese engagement is contextualized by LATAM-specific international interactions (Kaltencker, 2018). Historically, LATAM relations have been Eurocentric. Because “LATAM’s “international society” is characterized by its juridical tradition, sovereignty, and nonintervention. “Regional norms include international law, territorial sovereignty, morality in international affairs, solidarity, and equality of states. Certain rules must be applied to foreign engagement and influence. LATAM researchers have developed their own foreign policy by viewing Latin America as an international society” (Lemus-Delgado & Bravo, 2017, pp. 393–417). Hegemons dictate policies, whereas sovereign nations seek their interests. Brazil and Mexico are autonomous because of their size, power, location, or lack of US participation. Latin American policymakers are more confined in the economic arena than in the political-diplomatic world. Latin American foreign policy remains largely dependent.

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China-Latin America Strategic Partnership To protect its interests and diminish US strength and influence, Beijing began promoting a multipolar world following the conclusion of the Cold War. In the UN and WTO, this position resonated powerfully with the majority of developing countries. With new economic interests in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, China’s strategic commitment to the developing world is reborn (Swaine, 2015, p. 3). After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China’s ties with Latin America have seen a dramatic shift and expansion as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and his key successors. As China’s economy continues to grow, so does the need for raw materials and markets, as well as rising consumer demand. Chinese participation in international politics is becoming increasingly important as a result of these specific demands. Changing global power dynamics are demonstrated by China’s expansion into Latin America. Deng believed that the Chinese government should focus on domestic economic growth. Costly “adventures” or “global revolutions” were no longer feasible or politically acceptable under Mao’s new economic development paradigm. Latin American Maoist guerillas lost backing from the “motherland,” which contributed to their collapse (Narins, 2016, pp. 283–292). As China’s GDP grew at a rate of 10% per year, it needed to import raw materials and consolidate political power to compete with Taiwan. Interest in and linkages to Latin America evolved for pragmatic and political reasons. The absence of overt anti-Americanism was a defining characteristic of the Deng era. After Chairman Mao’s death, Cuba was the only Latin American link that remained stable. During the post-Soviet era, China’s diplomacy shifted from a focus on conflict to a focus on collaboration (Teo et al., 2019). When relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States were normalized in the early 1970s, the biggest obstacle to China-Latin America relations was removed. As late as the 1970s, the People’s Republic of China maintained diplomatic relations with countries including Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Argentina as well as Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. In 1993, China established its first strategic partnership with Brazil. Chinese foreign policy has evolved since 1978 when China started to open its doors to the outside world and begin economic reform. Five principles of peaceful coexistence guide China’s cooperation with Latin American countries. Trade, business, and economic cooperation between China and

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Latin America should prioritize the here and now, as well as the long term (Vangeli, 2018, pp. 59–83). Together with mutual support and discussions, the two nations expand global cooperation and coordination. It was in the 1980s that China and Latin American countries grew and collaborated in a wider range of ways. During the 1980s, China helped Chinese enterprises establish Joint Ventures in the Caribbean, mostly in textiles to join the US market on a local basis. In 1992, when China’s Shougang Group invested US$120 million in Peru’s largest iron ore mine, Chinese FDI moved into raw materials. China didn’t make substantial efforts in Latin America until the twenty-first century (World Bank, 2019). The twenty-first-century world is undergoing substantial changes. First, while the globe changes and adjusts, peace and development remain mainstream, despite regional and local disputes. Second, globalization and multipolarity are irreversible trends. Third, it is in the fundamental interests of all nations and their aspirations to share the historical moment of progress by tackling their common issues and championing noble goals of building a peaceful and stable world. Global peace and economic growth provide both prospects in the twenty-first century (OECD, 2018). Such potential and difficulties require developing countries like China and Latin America to cooperate and coordinate more closely. The Chinese government’s interest in Latin America changed after Jiang Zemin’s “New Security Concept” and China’s WTO admission. Given China’s ascent as a global power, the pace of economic growth needed to establish its national industries, and the paucity of national energy supplies, the Chinese government began supporting Chinese NOCs going outside in 2000. Domestic development in China and Latin America fosters improved connections. China is committed to economic, social, and political reforms (Ward & Wilson, 2018, pp. 183–207). This means China’s national agenda is development. Many Latin American countries pursue economic and social prosperity. China and many Latin American countries prioritize self-development. China and Latin America share additional identities that favor greater ties. Shared identities of emerging countries, similar historical experiences, and a desire for peace are the “political basis” for enhancing China-Latin America relations. China’s foreign policy in the early twenty-first century gives Latin American countries more priority and seeks deeper ties. Latin

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America has a long history of beautiful civilizations, wide areas, plentiful resources, and a solid foundation for economic expansion, social improvement, and development (Bao et al., 2020). For many Chinese, Latin American countries are vital elements of the emerging world and major forces contributing to world peace and development. Many Latin American countries are looking for national development models that fit their local characteristics. People’s lives have been bettered in recent decades because of Latin America’s political stability, economic prosperity, and social development. An entirely new type of Chinese investment has recently emerged in Latin America, one that is backed by the government itself (Zreik, 2020). Strategic alliances have been supported by China to gain access to Latin American resources China’s state bank is heavily tapped into for these ties. Thanks to a government-backed alliance, China is the largest consumer of Chilean copper. Codelco and Minmetals Group agreed to a $2 billion joint venture at the end of May 2005. Codelco was guaranteed money for future copper development and China was awarded a 15-year copper supply contract as part of the arrangement. Exports and loans from China’s National Development Bank are on the rise in Chile (Cai et al., 2018). Additionally, the Chinese government aids Chinese oil companies in their efforts to broaden and diversify their sources of crude oil supply, particularly in developing regions like Latin America and the Caribbean (see Fig. 9.4). One of China’s key foreign strategies is to engage with the developing world, particularly resource-rich countries like Venezuela and Brazil in Latin America, through Going Out. Commodity trading and oil investing are the centers of Going Out. These “loan-for-oil” deals have been used by Chinese NOCs all over the world (Chazan & Fildes, 2020). China’s President Jiang Zemin said in a speech to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean on April 6, 2001, that both sides must deepen mutual understanding and respect to become trustworthy friends; facilitate mutual consultations and support each other to safeguard mutual interests on the global stage. The SouthSouth cooperation concept encompasses South America’s strategy, and bilateral trade has expanded. G20 countries are a good example of China’s foreign stance. China’s participation in hemispheric institutions, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Group of Rio, and participation in the International Development Bank (IDB), as well as

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Fig. 9.4 China oil imports 2000–2017 (Source Compiled by the author with data from the BP Review of World Energy 2018 [BP, 2018])

the presence of Chinese troops on Haiti’s soil, are all examples of its involvement in hemispheric affairs (Zreik, 2022b). For better relations between China and Latin America, President Hu Jintao recommended on November 12, 2004, that the two countries build their mutual trust, establish innovative ways of working together, as well as increase cultural exchanges. Several visits to Latin America by Hu Jintao and other Chinese officials occurred between 2004 and 2008. In 2008, China published its first Latin American policy document. On the international, judicial, and police levels as well as in scientific research and education as well as in climate change and disaster relief efforts, and the armed forces, China has confirmed its commitment to working with other countries in these fields of mutual interest. The Policy Paper acknowledges the growing significance of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in regional and global political circles. In addition, it emphasizes the importance of trade and economic ties with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Also, it reaffirms the countries’ commitment to international cooperation (Crawford & Gordon, 2020). As a last point, it demonstrates that China sees its relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean as a strategic matter. It further reaffirms that China’s relations with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are based on the political principle of “One China.”

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Developing countries, particularly those in Latin America and the Caribbean, are a priority for China’s foreign policy. Bilateral trade has grown rapidly in the past two decades. For the first time, China is Latin America’s top trading partner, surpassing the United States for the first time. The exchange of currencies and the building of infrastructure were also on the rise. Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica signed free-trade agreements with China in 2009. Arms sales and military diplomacy both saw an uptick. The United States was not threatened by this collaboration and trade (Duan et al., 2020, pp. 355–364). Due to cultural agreements, cross-cultural relationships blossomed. More than a hundred ties between cities and provinces were forged. It was an honor for China to host a wide range of international dignitaries and experts from the region. Some countries and sectors benefit from LAC-China trade. This has sparked concerns that China is rushing to acquire resources in the developing world and threatening Latin American countries. President Xi Jinping visited the region on two separate occasions in 2013 and 2014 and held the first ministerial conference with CELAC in early 2015 to raise China’s diplomacy to the region’s rightful place. Brasilia hosted Xi Jinpings announcement of China’s strategy for strengthening relations with Latin America (Zreik, 2021). Both nations should treat each other with equal respect and help each other out, as well as work together for the benefit of the entire continent and its countries. There should also be more cooperation with Latin America as a whole and with each of its countries. Xi gave a speech at the China-Latin America meeting in which he mentioned three stunning figures: First, China would establish a special credit line of US$10 billion for improving Latin American infrastructure; second, China would provide US$10 billion in concessional loans for Latin American and Caribbean countries; and third, China would provide US$10 billion in concessional loans for Latin American and Caribbean countries and launch the China-Latin America Cooperation Fund with a commitment to invest a total of US$5 billion in this fund (Feigenbaum, 2020) (see Fig. 9.5). Also, China would begin a scientific and technical partnership program and an exchange for young scientists. This commitment demonstrates China’s appreciation for Latin America’s contributions to global cooperation. Post-Cold War, multilateral organizations have become more important. Several global issues confront China and Latin America. UN, WTO, and G20 all offer different ways to work together. China must

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Fig. 9.5 Chinese loans to Latin America (Source HKUST: New Silk Road)

pay more attention to both new and long-standing threats to improve bilateral relations. It will be difficult for China and Latin America to work together if there is political and economic instability in some Latin American countries (Frazier et al., 2018).

Taiwan-Latin American Trade: Evidence from Chile and Mexico Despite formal links with the People’s Republic of China, Chile continues to trade with Taiwan. These ties are maintained by the Taipei Office of Commerce and Culture in Santiago and its Chilean equivalent in Taipei. Taiwan’s third-largest trading partner in 2017 was Chile. A new set of university agreements and visa restrictions have been put in place recently. Compared to China, Taiwan is a less important trading partner. Executive and legislative branches of Chile diverge on Taiwan and other issues.

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By a vote of 102 to 12 with 12 abstentions, a Chilean lawmaker’s resolution criticizing human rights abuses in China and Venezuela was carried. A friendship agreement with Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan was not debated by Chilean politicians in 2018 after the Chinese embassy and Chilean government called to protest it “violated the One China Policy” (Harold et al., 2019). The “One China” policy appears to be on the minds of Chilean lawmakers. These activities have been prohibited by both the Chinese embassy in Chile and the Chilean executive branch. “Strategic ambiguity” is the United States approach to Taiwan. The United States is trying to persuade Taipei to reject legal independence while deterring the PRC from launching an attack. Unlike China’s preferred protocol, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) emphasized “acknowledgment” of Beijing’s authority over Taiwan. With diplomatic connections to China, the United States is one of the few countries that sell arms to Taiwan and invites Taiwan’s government leaders to the White House (Wise, 2020, pp. 277–305). Developing a clear US policy path is difficult because of the shifting Sino-American climate and the opinions of different US administrations. By breaking diplomatic connections with Taiwan, the United States would lose its credibility and diminish its support for democratic governance. The United States appears to be unsure of itself. Mexican outlets, like their counterparts in Chile, rarely address Taiwan. Since 1972, empirical evidence demonstrates that China’s opinions have remained mostly unchanged. Numerous secondary sources show that Mexico has been fully compliant over the past two decades. After Daniel Ortega won the election, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen flew into Mexican airspace. The return flight was redirected to Mexico because of Chinese pressure. A trip to Taipei in 2008 for the first global summit of emerging democracies by former President Vincente Fox had to be canceled due to political pressure (Raymond, 2018). Compared to South Korea, which had its officials at the meeting, this posture was “severe.” China’s trade expansion with Mexico is to blame for this occurrence. Mexican officials were concerned about escalating already tense relations with China, so they complied with China’s policy wishes. In the last 20 years, Taiwan has not sparked a diplomatic row between the two countries. On this “minor” issue, Mexico has abided by China’s policy choices. After South Korea and Japan, Taiwan is Mexico’s thirdlargest Asian investor (Zhang & Graeme, 2017, pp. 2330–2346).

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Taiwan in Latin America and the One China Policy With the “One China policy” at its core, Beijing has a strong foreign policy. This means that other countries can’t have diplomatic ties with both the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan. The diplomatic struggle between China and Taiwan over One-China is taking place throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Of the seventeen countries that recognize Taiwan, nine are located in this region, particularly Central America. This arrangement is maintained because Taiwan makes enormous investments to keep it that way. Since the 1980s, China has responded to Taiwan’s diplomatic friends by providing help, loans, and investments. There is a “bidding war” going on here, with both sides offering foreign help as a prize. Several large-scale infrastructure projects have been financed by both China and Taiwan in Latin America in exchange for the severing of diplomatic relations. When China uses aid as a tool to promote its “One China” policy, granted countries are rewarded for the refusal to acknowledge Taiwan’s independence. China’s relations with countries and regional organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean are based on the “one China” premise. China’s stated Latin American and Caribbean policy has this as one of its four main “goals.” Taiwan has no official ties or interactions with the majority of the countries in the region, which favor China’s reunification. Such a posture is welcomed by China, which sees it as a positive development. State-to-state interactions between China and Latin American and Caribbean countries will be based on the One China principle, according to the Chinese government (Hameiri & Jones, 2018, pp. 573–593). For China, establishing diplomatic ties with the Latin American and Caribbean nations (LAC) was tough. Only La Havana (and even then, it wasn’t easy because of Castro’s close ties to the Soviet Union) recognized the PRC because of the strong anticommunism in LAC countries in the 1950s and 1960s. The One China policy and competition with the mainland motivated Taiwan’s international aid program during this time. Taipei began by seeking diplomatic recognition from countries that had recently gained independence from colonial rule (such as those in Africa and elsewhere). Following Washington’s support for Beijing’s UN membership demands in the 1970s, China pursued a more pragmatic approach in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Venezuela, Brazil, Suriname, and

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Barbados all recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the 1970s. Later on, in the 1980s came Antigua, Bolivia, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. In 1988, Taiwan established the International Cooperation and Development Fund (TaiwanICDF). Through financial (loans and concession loans) and technical aid (primarily in the primary sector), Taiwan gained diplomatic recognition from numerous Caribbean nations (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, the Bahamas, Grenada, and Belize) (Strange et al., 2017, pp. 935–963). A “two-China policy” (recognition of China and Taiwan as two separate countries) was adopted by Belize in 1989, and Beijing terminated diplomatic ties with Belmopan. An influx of “business representative offices” was set up in Taiwan following the 1990s economic growth by several important diplomatic allies of the PRC in LAC urging Taiwanese firms to invest in the region to improve political ties, Taipei began attending Central American summits in 1991 after Taiwan invested $150 million in the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (Eichenauer et al., 2018). Some Central American states supported Taiwan’s (failed) UN petition for the repatriation of the Republic of China (ROC). When Taiwan established the Aid Fund for Central American Development in 1998, it also stepped up its ties with Paraguay, the country’s most important South American partner. It started “Study in Taiwan” in 2006 to encourage cross-cultural understanding and academic exchange (Jenkins, 2018). The Taiwanese capital has forged close ties with countries that require aid. Trade and commercial ties with Beijing are favored by larger countries with greater global influence. Various aid packages to Central America and the Caribbean have been supplied by Beijing since 1997 to oppose the Two Chinas Policy. Following that, the Bahamas and Saint Lucia (1997), Dominica (2004), and Grenada (2005) all withdrew their recognition. It was during this time that China offered a generous aid package to Costa Rica, which included funding for new soccer stadiums worth USD 83 million and US$300 million, government bond purchases, the construction of highways and other public works, and a US$1 billion joint venture to develop the country’s national petroleum refinery. China also made it easier for Costa Rican coffee and other products to reach PRC markets during this time (Wang, 2015, pp. 922–942). During a meeting in 2008, China and Taiwan agreed not to use financial incentives to seek recognition from each other’s allies. After Tsai

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Ing-wen was elected ROC president in 2016, Beijing “stopped communication” with Taiwanese counterparts. Beijing’s diplomatic isolation of Taiwan has not abated. Since that time, six countries have ceased to recognize the ROC (three in LAC). Central American allies have shifted their allegiance to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since June 2017, when Panama did so. China is the canal’s second-largest user, accounting for 40% of total traffic (Peters, 2018). For countries with more developed economies, Beijing is more likely to recognize them because they may gain more from PRC trade and financing. Since Taiwan refused to provide “astronomical” amounts of financial aid to El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, they have established relations with Beijing, breaking ties with Taiwan in 2018. The Dominican Republic and El Salvador received $3.1 billion in loans and investments from China (Tannenbaum, 2018). To show its support for China’s growing influence in the region, Nicaragua severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of China. Chinese officials applauded the move since Beijing requires that any country seeking diplomatic ties with it sever all links to Taiwan. After President Tsai Ing-wen took office in May 2016, Taiwan’s list of international friends has shrunk from 21 to 14. Taiwan’s remaining political allies could be persuaded to switch allegiance from Taiwan to China as a result of Beijing’s determination to enhance development aid, investments, and trade connections in the region. To avoid damaging US-China relations, Chinese officials have been cautious. Beijing has played a more active role in the past two decades and achieved notable diplomatic successes, such as Panama’s recognition. When it comes to expanding its Belt and Road Initiative into Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), China shows no signs of slowing down (Cabestan, 2010, pp. 22–33).

Lac’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Demise of Taiwan’s Ambitions in the Region At the outset, BRI was designed to link Asia and Europe via Africa and the Middle East. There were no plans to include Latin America in early BRI proposals. In recent years, Chinese leaders have demonstrated a greater interest in the region. By attending the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in May 2022, Argentina’s President Mauricio Macri became the first head of state from Latin America to attend. A message from President Xi: “Latin America is the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” Macri was told.

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China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a renewed push for Latin American governments to sign a “Special Declaration on the Belt and Road Initiative” at the 2018 China-CELAC Forum (Bush & Hass, 2019) (see Fig. 9.6). By the end of December 2021, the BRI will have been signed by 20 of the 24 nations in Latin America and the Caribbean. In Latin America, China’s BRI growth has a variety of reasons. China’s enormous need for crude oil, iron, and copper may be met by Latin America’s natural resources and raw minerals. Soybeans and oilseeds are major exports to China, with both Argentina and Brazil ranking high on the list. Because of the dangers posed by some African countries, BRI has decided to expand into Latin America. Because of its size and population, Latin America presents a promising market for Chinese exports of mechanical, electrical, and high-tech equipment. With the help of Latin American countries, China can counter anti-Chinese sentiment and build a more positive image of the country in the international community. Taiwan, which China views as a breakaway province, is further isolated thanks to Latin America’s inclusion in the Belt and Road Initiative and the growth of joint ventures. For this reason, China is actively courting Taiwan’s 14 diplomatic partners in

Fig. 9.6 China-Latin America connections via BRI routes (Source Pacific Taycoon)

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Latin America and the Caribbean through trade and the Belt and Road Initiative (Bowley, 2018). Last year, Nicaragua severed ties with Taiwan and joined the BRI. Membership in the BRI has ramifications in Latin America. In most Latin American countries, support for the BRI has ranged from complete indifference to outright enthusiasm. There is a possibility that a sub-regional BRI plan might be devised if the regional strategy fails. Despite regional insignificance, Latin American countries’ action framework should not yield to passivity, in a region where China and the United States are engaged in geopolitical confrontation. Latin America has become an area to provoke the United States from its backyard, just as the United States does with China in the South China Sea and the regions bordering it (DeHart, 2018). An extended discussion is taking place on the strategies that the region’s governments ought to follow amid systemic rivalry between great powers. Maintaining US support for material or symbolic reasons is the focus of this argument. The actions and decisions of Latin American governments along this continuum must be understood in light of China’s growing influence in the region. China’s ties to Latin American countries are based on a variety of factors, including historical, geographical, and systemic ones. The United States is concerned about the expansion of the BRI in Latin America because of the proximity of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean to the United States. As a result, it has emerged that this is a major problem. As Reagan’s UN ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick said to the world, “Central America is the world’s most crucial region.” US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Commander General Laura J. Richardson recently presented a comprehensive explanation of the critical challenge Washington is facing in this subregion. Despite the progress made on the Panama Canal and 21 other BRI-related infrastructure projects, the proclamation expresses disapproval of China’s efforts (Youkee, 2018). China’s investments in essential infrastructure, technology, and intellectual property theft in Latin America are also a concern for the United States. While Jamaica, six Caribbean island republics, and Costa Rica joined the campaign in 2018, Cuba was added to the effort in 2019. In 2017, Panama, El Salvador, and Nicaragua left Taiwan and joined the People’s Republic of China. Latin American countries must go beyond their conventional hemispheric and transatlantic ties in light of the current

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environment (Mendez & Alden, 2019, pp. 1–23). One may see the positive effects of China’s investments and loans in a variety of economic and social indicators. Economic underperformance is exacerbated by a lack of infrastructure in the region. It is not surprising that LAC may benefit from the BRI’s emphasis on infrastructure connections. Mexico and Brazil could sign on to the BRI after Argentina’s entry. Expanding relations with China has been a major bet for many countries, including the United States and its allies. There are numerous examples of progress in China-Uruguay relations under President Lacalle Pou, Chile’s previous President Piera, and Brazil’s former Jair Bolsonaro, and many Latin American politicians may be on the same page (Giolzetti, 2019). The countries of China and the United States should take a nonaligned stance in the escalating global conflict. After the next elections in Brazil and Colombia, the region’s foreign policy shift could be the most significant since the end of the Cold War. China is no longer filling the “voids” in the region. China’s relationship with Latin America is more than just business; it is also a political one. Political, cultural, economic, scientific, technological, and infrastructure cooperation were the goals of the 2022– 2024 China-CELAC Joint Action Plan (Gao, 2018). China’s soft power and the aura of the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America may serve as a merciful bullet to Taiwan’s diplomatic ambitions in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Conclusion Many scholars see Taiwan as a nation that is willing to participate in global politics, international development, and humanitarian aid to prove its diplomatic and political existence as an independent state. In this way, the ROC can break out of its international isolation and establish diplomatic relations with a few growing countries. Latin America and the Caribbean account for the majority of countries that recognize Taiwan’s independence. For public diplomacy purposes, both, China and Taiwan are relying on foreign aid, and LAC has received substantial loans, grants, and technical assistance. LAC receives a major share of China and Taiwan’s foreign aid expenditures. Chinese economic prowess and UN Security Council representation put China far ahead of the pack. Due to China’s position, the “One-China policy,” which specifies that only formal diplomatic

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relations can be established with either the PRC or the ROC, is being enforced. The number of nations that recognize Taiwan has been steadily decreasing, and it now has 14, thus they don’t have relations with China. As a result of Taiwanese aid, the Caribbean and Central American States can prosper and recover from disasters. The aid Taiwan receives from the international community helps it maintain diplomatic recognition and prevent isolation. To compete with Beijing’s “checkbook diplomacy,” Taiwan has used its comparative advantages, which include a positive image as a country that promotes development based on shared democratic values and human rights, its experience as a country that can withstand difficult natural environments, and its reputation as an economic development miracle (an approach that is very different from the top-down approach, focused on infrastructures, used by China). In addition to commerce and business, the provision of development financing fosters ties between Latin America and Taiwan. Taipei’s diplomatic ambitions have not been reached despite its success in the 1980s and 1990s. Particularly after President Tsai was elected to Taiwan’s presidency in 2016, China is working hard to implement a “One-China” policy in the region. Several countries have terminated ties with Taipei and reaffirmed their support for Beijing. Despite its worldwide aid efforts, Taipei can’t be too optimistic about maintaining diplomatic recognition in the region. Because of the threat of further international isolation, the United States and Taiwan are working to persuade governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to strengthen their ties with Taiwan. China is Latin America’s most important commercial partner and a key source of both foreign direct investment and lending in energy and infrastructure, especially through its Belt and Road Initiative. China has made significant investments in the aerospace industry of Latin America and has reinforced its military connections with several other countries, including Venezuela. Washington is concerned about these trends, and critics claim Beijing is using its economic might to achieve its strategic ambitions. In support of the “One China” policy, the Belt and Road Initiative has proven to be an effective economic tool in LAC. As a result, Taiwan’s position in LAC is in jeopardy as a result of the expanding Belt and Road Initiative projects that are currently taking place in several Latin economies.

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Ward, P. M., & Wilson, R. H. (2018). Latin America’s future public policy challenges: A ten-year time horizon. Latin American Policy, 9(2), 183–207. https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12150 Wise, C. (2020). The Americas. In A. J. Tellis, A. Szalwinski, & M. Wills (Eds.), U.S.-China competition for global influence (pp. 277–305). The National Bureau of Asian Research. World Bank. (2019). Belt and Road economics. World Bank. Youkee, M. (2018, November 28). Panama the new flashpoint in China’s growing presence in Latin America. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian. com Zhang, D., & Graeme, S. (2017). China’s foreign aid system: Structure, agencies, and identities. Third World Quarterly, 38(10), 2330–2346. Zreik, M. (2020, April 22). The dimensions of the US-China trade war. Open Political Science, De Gruyter, 3(1), 47–55. https://doi.org/10.1515/openps2020-0004 Zreik, M. (2021). China and Europe in Africa: Competition or cooperation? Malaysian Journal of International Relations, 9, 51–67. ISSN2289–5043; eISSN2600–8181. https://doi.org/10.22452/mjir.vol.9no1.3 Zreik, M. (2022a). U.S. - China relations in the era of multi-polarism: Trade war between the two economic giants. Eurasian Research Journal, 4(2), 43–65. https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/erj/issue/69540/1107920 Zreik, M. (2022b, January). Contemporary geopolitics of Eurasia and the Belt and Road Initiative. Eurasian Research Journal, 4(1), 7–26. ISSN 2519–2442, KAZAKHSTAN https://doi.org/10.53277/2519-2442-2022. 1-01

PART III

Issues and Policy Approaches

CHAPTER 10

Strategic Communication: How China Promotes and Communicates Its Political Agenda in Latin America Maria Zuppello

Introduction Over the past 20 years, Latin America has shifted from being under the influence of the United States to forming strong economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing. With the prospect of economic growth, the Chinese government has effectively convinced countries in the region to engage in infrastructure projects, bilateral trade agreements, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This power shift would not have been possible without strategic communication, which allowed Beijing to persuade rather than force countries to cooperate, a tactic known as “soft power.” According to the American political scientist Joseph Nye who coined the term in the late 1980s, soft power is the ability of one country to influence another country’s beliefs and decisions without coercion (Nye,

M. Zuppello (B) Independent Research, Sao Paulo, Brazil e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_10

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1990). Nye considered this approach more effective and long-lasting than hard power methods that rely on conflict or military force to impose a country’s will on another. President Xi Jinping has embraced the soft power strategy as his central tenet. In 2014, he stated at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, “We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s message to the world” (Miller, 2014). By shaping public discourse and influencing media coverage, Chinese communication in Latin America aims to advance the interests of the CCP, the single ruling party, as it does in other parts of the world. Beijing employs a range of tactics such as cultural exchanges, language classes, social media, and diplomatic and influential figures to expand its influence in the region. In 2018, Chinese authorities abolished the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television—a ministry-level executive agency—and transferred its powers to the Propaganda Department, which is under the direct control of the CCP (Radio Free Asia, 2020). This move strengthened state control over online platforms and press content, including propaganda and the manipulation of information, both within and outside China. Interestingly, the Mandarin word (宣传 Xu¯anchuán) for propaganda also means “dissemination” or “to make publicly known,” indicating that in China spreading information and propaganda are not distinct ideas (Shambaugh, 2007). CCP controls the content of several media outlets such as Xinhua news agency, China Global Television Network, China Radio International, and China Daily newspaper through its Propaganda Department. In addition, the CCP uses the United Front System (UFS) to oversee non-Party sectors and steer society toward its political goals. The UFS includes agencies, social groups, corporations, universities, research institutes, and individuals, which are utilized to carry out its propaganda both domestically and internationally. Beijing aims to position itself as a reliable and powerful partner, offering a viable alternative to the West, particularly the United States, and presenting itself as a global leader (BBC, 2017). China’s strategy also reflects CCP’s political engagement with Latin America that from the early 2000s has been based on its strategy of socalled South-South or mutually beneficial cooperation (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). Beijing’s political discourse emphasizes the principles of “sovereignty,” “non-interference,” and a multipolar global order, in stark contrast to the stance of the United States and its allies. This narrative aligns with the economic and political objectives of the

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leaders of the “New Latin American Left” such as Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, Gustavo Petro in Colombia, Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, Alberto Fernández in Argentina, who aimed to break ideological ties with the United States. In an interview with Chinese state television China Global Television Network (CGTN) in April 2023, Lula said “The world needs a stronger global governance, and China must be considered in this new model” (CGTN, 2023). Beijing’s communication in the region leaves no room for improvisation. During Xi Jinping’s visit to Peru in 2016, China released a policy document on the LAC region clearly emphasizing the importance of cultural and media cooperation and people-to-people exchanges in the region (Ellis, 2016). The aim was to reduce the outcry over Beijing’s lending practices, working conditions, and environmental damage caused by several Chinese construction projects in Latin America (Piccone, 2022). The China-CELAC Forum, a ministerial meeting established by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in 2015 to formally create a mechanism for Beijing to interact with Latin America, is adopting a similar strategy. The forum aims to “capture” the attention of Latin American elites, such as politicians, academics, journalists, and government officials, who may unknowingly serve as Chinese ambassadors (China-CELAC Forum, 2015–2019). CELAC, a regional bloc of 33 countries, was formed to enhance Latin American integration by reducing the considerable influence of the United States, which is excluded along with Canada. However, in recent months, amid the COVID-19 pandemic and growing political tensions with Taiwan, China has taken a more authoritarian approach in Latin America, transitioning from “soft” to “sharp” power (Alex, 2023). Chinese influence efforts have shifted from persuasive to monopolistic, suppressing alternative narratives and exploiting partner institutions (Cadal, n.d.). The region is central to the PRC’s more aggressive competition with the neighboring United States, which Beijing accuses of interfering in Taiwan or mishandling the pandemic. The PRC is reinforcing the idea of inviolable Chinese sovereignty over the “three Ts”: “Tibet, Taiwan, and Tiananmen,” while censoring sensitive topics such as the Hong Kong protests and the persecution of Uyghur Muslim minorities. After promoting the “China Dream” slogan in Latin America, a message of a prosperous and developed China in the future, Beijing has now launched an aggressive agenda targeting specific enemies and spreading disinformation (Atlantic Council, 2020).

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Between Information and Propaganda China has, since 2015, emphasized in its Defense White Paper the importance of being ready for “informalized local wars,” which in Latin America translates to information warfare tactics such as undermining enemy morale, confusing decision-makers, and utilizing disinformation to degrade enemy decision-making (China.org, 2015). These campaigns combine genuine and distorted information, exaggerate facts, and invent news. Chinese state propaganda in Latin America often focuses on attacking the United States and other democracies. For example, in 2019, former Chinese ambassador to Chile Xu Bu referred to American criticisms of Beijing companies as “malicious lies” and touted Chinese government investments in Latin America as “substantial contributions to economic development” contrasting them with the alleged preference of the United States for military interventions and sanctions (CGTN, 2019). Furthermore, Chinese media outlets have a history of misinterpreting comments to portray a better relationship with Beijing, as seen in the case of the Dominican Republic in 2018 (ENTREVISTA, 2018). A Spanishlanguage article by China’s Xinhua News Agency quoted Dominican Economy Minister Isidoro Santana out of context, falsely suggesting that the country would participate in the Belt and Road Initiative (Yao & He, 2018). Additionally, Beijing’s strategy includes employing the statements of others to attack China’s targets, particularly by weaponizing the criticisms of Latin American politicians against the United States. For instance, China Daily recently emphasized on social media Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s comment that the United States should respond to allegations that it sabotaged the Nord Stream pipelines (China Daily, 2023). As technology evolves, the Chinese military is currently transitioning to “intelligentized” warfare, which employs artificial intelligence (Kania, 2017). Experts have raised concerns about the technology’s potential to disseminate disruptive disinformation that can create convincing fake images. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) cautioned in 2021 that synthetic content could be utilized for cyber and foreign influence operations. The FBI defines “synthetic content” as the broad spectrum of generated or manipulated digital content, which includes images, video, audio, and text. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) techniques such as deepfakes or GANs (generative adversarial networks) can be utilized to produce synthetic content (Sewell, 2021).

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Several social media platforms promote the use of deepfakes. Experts believe that video host service TikTok, owned by China’s ByteDance, was particularly designed to facilitate the combination of various media formats, making it a platform that caters to manipulation and remixing (Farahany, 2023). These falsified videos involve digitally superimposing a face onto someone else’s body. However, exposing viewers to manipulated media for extended periods may worsen polarization and reduce their ability to distinguish fact from fiction. Also, the widespread use of deepfakes on TikTok has caused a rise in the “liar’s dividend” phenomenon (Hsu, 2022). This term was coined by law professors Bobby Chesney and Danielle Citron in a 2018 paper that highlighted the potential dangers of deepfakes to privacy, democracy, and national security (.Chesney & Citron, 2018). Essentially, the more people realize how easy it is to manipulate audio and video, the more likely they are to question the authenticity of all digital imagery, allowing bad actors to exploit this skepticism. For example, during the Brazilian presidential elections, an anonymous deep fake featuring the voice of Brazilian Globo TV host Renata Vasconcellos reading a fake poll on voting intentions was circulated across Twitter, YouTube, and TikTok, highlighting the ease with which media manipulation can be weaponized (Tardáguila, 2022). In addition, a report from the U.S. social media analytics firm Graphika in 2121 identified a pro-Beijing propaganda network renamed Spamouflage that used generative AI tools to create videos of fictional characters (Nimmo et. al., 2021). This operation targeted Spanish-speaking audiences in Latin America through fake accounts and distributed hundreds of videos praising China’s economic growth, trade, foreign policy, and COVID-19 response while criticizing the United States handling of the pandemic and its rivalry with China over sanctions and technology products. The campaign also touched on topics such as the “unification” of Taiwan with China and the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement. Chinese officials’ Twitter accounts and left-leaning Latin American politicians engaged with fake personas such as“李若水francisw (Li Ruoshui, for its Chinese identity), who tweeted in English, Chinese, and Spanish. Several prominent figures, including Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza, Venezuelan Culture Minister Ernesto Villegas Poljak, the Venezuelan Ministry of Communication and Information, and Argentine journalist and former “CNN en Español” anchor Carlos Montero, had retweeted the account without realizing it was fake (Montero, 2020).

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PRC’s principal military force, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) heavily invests in cognitive domain operations, including developing brain-inspired software, hardware, and decision-making artificial intelligence (Guangsheng et al., n.d.). According to Nathan BeauchampMustafaga, a China expert at the Rand Corporation, this marks an evolution in warfare as the PLA seeks to control the human mind, moving beyond traditional domains of land, maritime, air, and electromagnetic (Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2021). The new concept of “brain warfare” encompasses everything, from disinformation campaigns to modern weapons aimed at cognitive thinking and decision-making, and is becoming increasingly relevant. According to experts, TikTok is a prime example of cognitive influence. This video platform reportedly gathers user data to create psychogenic profiles and influence their beliefs and preferences (Chen, 2022). Unlike traditional propaganda, users unknowingly participate in information processing, shifting from passive receivers to active contributors (Pallone, Jr., 2023). TikTok has faced a ban on government work devices in countries like Canada and England due to concerns about the Chinese government accessing data (Demarest, 2023). This is because all companies in China, including foreign ones, are required by the 2017 National Intelligence Law to cooperate with intelligence services in exchanging data (Tanner, 2017). Despite concerns over its censorship practices regarding topics such as Hong Kong protests and China’s treatment of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, the Latin American debate to ban TikTok has not yet begun (Hern, 2019).

Social Media for Beijing’s Agenda Chinese social media efforts in Latin America aim to promote a favorable image of the country and its vision of prosperity and harmony. The emphasis is on showcasing how economic partnerships can reduce poverty in the region while also criticizing the U.S. involvement in the Taiwan issue. Chinese influencers, ambassadors, and media use various social media platforms to spread these messages. While prohibited in China, CCP has extensively used Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook overseas. TikTok, which is only accessible in China via its original Douyin app, has gained immense popularity in Latin America, surpassing Twitter and Snapchat to become the region’s third-largest social network in 2021, with 120,7 million users (Statista, 2022).

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During her testimony in 2023 before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Rebecca Fair, Vice President of Information Advantage at Two Six Technologies, shared research that revealed Beijing’s strategy of leveraging social media to promote its soft power. According to the report, early 30% of the PRC tweets portray China positively rather than promoting its political system and development model (Fair, 2023). For example, pro-Beijing accounts use images of Chinese scenery, food, and information about Chinese history and culture to support this agenda. Rebecca Fair noted that content too controversial for official accounts to share is spread by fake pro-PRC accounts. They usually portray the United States as having escalated the Ukraine-Russia war, interfered with China’s domestic affairs, and provoked conflicts around the world. Furthermore, the U.S. cyber threat analysis company Miburo has uncovered 2022 over 200 influencers, affiliated with the Chinese government or its state media, active on different social media platforms, including TikTok (Turner & Hinkis, 2022). Their accounts deliver tailored messages that boost China’s reputation among users in 38 languages, including Spanish. For example, the account “Jimena a tu clic” introduces herself as a “Beijing citizen who speaks Spanish and is a Chinese tea artist (Jimena, n.d.). “Like many Chinese influencers on Facebook, Jimena’s profile is labeled “China state-controlled media,” although most do not openly disclose their affiliation with their users. Through her posts, Jimena showcases her travels across Latin America and her visits to famous Chinese destinations, such as the Yellow River. Her focus on natural beauty and agriculture aligns with China’s current political agenda, which emphasizes building partnerships in the Amazon and supporting sustainable projects in Latin America. Also, Jimena provides examples of the “elite capture tactic” by recording friendly and informal videos with Latin American diplomats in China. This form of political warfare involves courting and co-opting politicians, businessmen, and academics to control their actions (Jimena, n.d.). Chinese diplomats serving in Latin American countries hold considerable sway over local media and digital platforms, alongside social media influencers. Their approach is known as “wolf warrior diplomacy,” because it is often confrontational and aggressive in response to any perceived criticism of the Chinese government. This strategy is part of Xi Jinping’s “Major Country Diplomacy” to strengthen China’s global position and increase its “discourse power” (huayuquan in Chinese), or

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“the national capability to influence global values and discussions on the world stage,” as defined by Elsa Kania from the Center for Advanced China Research (Kania, 2018). Recently, there has been a significant increase in the number of diplomatic Twitter accounts belonging to the PRC, which suggests a growing focus on diplomatic initiatives (Schecter, 2020). China’s Ministry of Finance has released a budget for 2023, which includes a 12.2 percent increase in resources allocated for “diplomatic endeavors” compared to the previous year (Hart, 2023). This category comprises expenses and personnel for Chinese diplomatic missions and external propaganda. Diplomats have been actively promoting Beijing’s interests in various Latin American countries, including Brazil where they confronted thenpresident Jair Messias Bolsonaro by emphasizing the effectiveness of Chinese-made vaccines (.Stuenkel, 2020). In Panama, they changed the local motto “Pro Mundi Beneficio” to “Pro Mutuo Beneficio,” which reflects Xi Jinping’s goal of achieving “mutual benefit” by strengthening relations with governments in the region (Dani, 2019). Additionally, their diplomatic messages always highlight China’s domestic “achievements,” such as the CCP’s poverty alleviation campaign and the superiority of China’s political system (Qiang, 2019). Furthermore, diplomats’ strategic communication played a role in CCP’s successful soft power move in the region to turn the COVID-19 pandemic to its advantage. More than a dozen Latin American countries have signed vaccine and medical equipment distribution agreements with China (Stevenson-Yang & Tugendhat, 2022). Despite PRC officials claiming that they did not pursue geopolitical objectives or economic interests in exchange for vaccines, these deals have paved the way for stronger political and economic ties (Dube & Magalhaes, 2021). The pandemic has been a turning point for China’s communication strategy, with the country using covert social media accounts to carry out a “Russian-style disinformation campaign” and deflect blame for the virus by disputing its origin in Wuhan (Rosenberger, 2022). Criticism was also directed toward other governments, particularly the United States, for failing to contain the virus. Beijing emphasized its role as a global player in managing the crisis and mobilizing medical support and vaccines worldwide while recovering its economy (Molter & DiResta, 2020). Additionally, China has sought to counter the perception that Taiwan’s response to COVID-19 was more successful than the PRC’s (Atlantic Council, 2020).

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In Argentina, Chinese diplomats launched an extensive campaign to promote Beijing’s virus prevention and control measures (Chinese Embassy in Argentina, 2023). PRC state media spotlighted the gratitude of Argentinian officials for the Chinese medical aid, vaccines, and field hospital donations to help control the pandemic (Xinhua, 2020). Meanwhile, in Chile, Beijing Ambassador Niu Qingbao defended the safety and accessibility of Chinese-made vaccines amid concerns raised by the New York Times and former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi regarding the effectiveness of Sinovac (Teletrece, 2021). The CCP employed a “vaccine weaponization” tactic in Brazil to spread false information and promote pro-PRC propaganda. In June 2020, for instance, Ambassador Li Yang claimed that the United States created COVID-19. Furthermore, in Paraguay China pressured the local government, Taiwan’s only South American ally, to cut off diplomatic ties with Taipei and recognize Beijing in exchange for millions of vaccine doses (BBC, 2021).

China’s Media and Their Local Partnerships PRC’s influence in the region is not limited to social platforms; it extends to the diffusion of Chinese media outlets and the infiltration of local media environments. In the 2016 China-Latin America Media Leaders Summit held in Santiago, Chile, Xi Jinping stressed Beijing’s intention to enhance media exchanges and cooperation in the region. The goal was to “show the world a more authentic and vibrant China” in which Latin American counterparts “jointly voice their opinions on world peace, development, and other major issues” (Barrios, 2018). CCP has made it a priority to extend the reach of Beijing state media in local languages. China boasts the largest network in the world of state-run media organizations, including Xinhua, The People’s Daily, and China Radio International (CRI). These outlets offer daily reporting in Spanish and Portuguese. Furthermore, state TV CGTN has a free, 24-hour Spanish channel called “CGTN en Español.” China Today magazine operates multiple Spanish-language websites and sells print copies in certain Latin American countries. These media outlets have a strong social media presence in Spanish, even on platforms banned in China. Local news agencies such as Agência Brasil in Brazil, Granma in Cuba, and La Tercera in Chile, often republish or cite these Chinese sources, leading to a concerning amplification of Beijing state propaganda (Barrios, 2018).

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Chinese Media outlets in Latin America provide a mix of news, entertainment, and local stories connected to global events and intended to promote a positive image of China. They highlight Beijing’s economic influence in the region by featuring infrastructure projects, state visits, and signed agreements. Their Latin American audience includes approximately 1.8 million Chinese people living in the region. Furthermore, “CGTN en Español” offers educational programs to teach Mandarin to Spanish-speaking individuals (Poston & Wong, 2016). Moreover, Beijing has adopted the “borrowing the boat to reach the sea” strategy to convey its message, which involves collaborating with local outlets and sharing content through cooperation agreements. However, Chinese officials have faced criticism for using ambiguous methods. The state-linked origins of the content published in Latin American media are often not clearly labeled and, in some cases, intentionally concealed (Cock, 2020). Despite China’s low ranking of 175 out of 180 countries in the 2022 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders, numerous media outlets in Latin America have signed agreements with Beijing for years. Financial support primarily motivates these deals, as traditional media outlets often face economic challenges (World Press Freedom Index, 2022). China gains an edge by providing this attractive “cooperation” to local media and interfering in advertising campaigns through institutional paid insertions and campaigns by Chinese corporations. This strategy allows Beijing to engage directly with journalists and news editors, using a people-to-people diplomacy approach to influence favorable treatment and avoid criticism. As a result, even media outlets with a history of journalistic integrity may find their editorial independence compromised. PRC continues to invest heavily in Latin American media, with the launch of the China-LAC Media Action project in 2021. This initiative has seen over thirty regional media organizations partnering with state television CGTN on a range of projects such as online forums, coproductions, screenings, and talk shows, all aimed at increasing China’s presence in Latin America’s media industry (CGTN, 2021). Based on Beijing’s Global Media Influence 2022 report, the countries most vulnerable to Chinese media infiltration in the region are Argentina, Mexico, and Peru (Cook et al., 2022). The report explains this is primarily due to numerous partnerships and limited knowledge among local journalists regarding Chinese expansion strategies. For example, in Argentina, the Xinhua news agency, the Spanish edition of the People’s Daily, China

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Daily, the Argentine Ministry of Communications, and major local private media outlets have multiple agreements in effect, likely due to Argentina’s crucial role in providing Beijing with essential commodities like soybeans, meat, and seafood. Similarly, Peru is drawing Chinese interest due to its abundant mineral resources and oil, as well as a community of 13,000 people of Chinese descent. Peruvian media has been highlighting positive news about Beijing through various channels, including exclusive sections, articles are written by local journalists, and a version of the CCP-owned newspaper, China Hoy. In 2016, TV Peru Channel 7, a publicly-owned TV station, aired CGTN documentaries during prime time at the APEC Summit. The Chinese embassy in Peru has also boosted its online presence. Peruvian journalists regularly cite its publications as a trustworthy source of information on China when first-hand information is not available (Ibid, 2022). In Mexico, in 1979, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) made history by establishing ties with the CCP, marking Mexico’s long-standing connection with China (Cardenal, 2021). For locals interested in news related to China, the Mexican newspaper Reforma is a popular source of information, often featuring content republished from People’s Daily. Its reports highlight China’s technological advancements and efforts toward poverty alleviation, which closely align with the official language of the PRC embassy or are directly reprinted from PRC media sources (Yin, 2021). China has a strong influence in Brazil’s media industry, with China Central Television, China News Service, and Xinhua all having regional offices in the country. Additionally, China Hoy collaborates with local media. A U.S. Department of Justice’s Foreign Agent’s Registration Act report revealed that Folha de São Paulo newspaper received $405,000 in advertising funds from China Daily between November 2016 and October 2020, while O Globo newspaper received $109,000 between 2017 and 2018 (Costa, 2021). In 2019, Band, the third-highest-viewed TV channel in Brazil, signed a content-sharing agreement with China Media Group (De Sa, 2019). One of the programs featured in the agreement, “Mundo China,” received criticism for allegedly promoting propaganda about genocide in Xinjiang (Mundo China, 2021). The most recent agreement dates back to April 2023, when Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and China’s President Xi Jinping signed a partnership between Brazil’s Institutional Relations Secretariat and China’s top

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state media company, China Media Group (CMG). The deal encouraged “content cooperation to promote the economic, social, and sustainable development of both nations” (Chade, 2023). China’s strategy in Latin America includes exchange programs and training for journalists to increase coverage of China’s activities. In 2016, Xi Jinping committed to training 500 journalists within five years through the China-Latin America Media Exchange Center, which invites journalists from all over the region to study and work in China (MFA-China, 2019). The center is an arm of the China Public Diplomacy Association. Beijing’s media training strategy also involves organizing free public relations trips to China that promote a pro-government agenda as part of its people-to-people diplomacy efforts.

China Communication Strategy vs Russian Communication Strategy Following the conflict in Ukraine and the rising tensions with Taiwan, China has begun to align its influence operations in Latin America with Russia to establish a multipolar axis that would serve as a counterweight to the United States and its allies. Russia’s primary intention is to reshape the post-World War II liberal international order and align it more closely with China’s authoritarian governance model. Both countries have intensified their media strategy in the region, where they are looking to increase the number of allied nations and, according to experts, establish a food contingency plan in the event of international embargoes (Zuppello, 2023). They have also shared content to amplify their reach in sympathetic nations’ media, such as Venezuela’s Telesur and Hispan-TV, a Spanish-language version of Iran’s state television Press TV for Latin American audiences. For instance, Chinese state TV interviews are also broadcast by Russian state TV Russia Today (RT), as was the case during President Lula’s trip to Beijing in April 2023 (RT, 2023). Similar to Russian propaganda, official and pro-Beijing Twitter accounts have been promoting anti-U.S. propaganda, depicting Washington as a global destabilizer amid rising tensions between China and the United States (Bosco, 2023). These accounts have blamed the United States for escalating conflicts worldwide and meddling in China’s internal affairs. In addition, they have highlighted ten crucial American issues, including gun violence and border control. Since January 2023, M3, a U.S. company that tracks disinformation, has identified over ten instances

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in which PRC-affiliated Twitter accounts have disseminated anti-U.S. narratives by exploiting Latin American events such as the January 8 insurrection in Brazil (Fair, 2023). Although Beijing and Moscow share the goal of digital infiltration in Latin America, they have distinct strategies. China supports Russian narratives that serve its interests, especially anti-American ones, but it does not always align all of its content with Moscow (Ibid, 2023). For China, social media is just one part of a broader information strategy that seeks to reshape the global information landscape in accordance with its authoritarian values. PRC focuses on making China more “lovable” and its messaging aims to tell “China’s story well” (Suliman, 2021). Beijing prefers to depict PRC as a reliable partner and customize its message by region. For instance, in Latin America, China highlights the benefits of partnering with them for infrastructure and investment and encourages countries in the region to cut off ties with Taiwan. Researchers have noted that Moscow’s agenda appears to be centered on sowing social discord and unrest. For example, during the pandemic, the PRC utilized social media primarily to promote the Chinese economic model and narratives of solidarity. On the other hand, Russian propaganda was notably active in promoting its vaccine, Sputnik V, while attempting to discredit American and European vaccines through disinformation campaigns (Rosaria, 2023). According to reports, China spends at least $10 billion annually on propaganda, so even if a small portion is allocated to social media, it would have a significant effect (Shambaugh, 2015). Beijing’s information budget for information efforts is 30 times larger than Russia’s, which spends several hundred million dollars annually. The difference suggests that China can openly dominate the information environment and may have less need for covert manipulation (Harold et al., 2021). The PRC disseminates most of its open propaganda via social media using accounts openly associated with state-run media, such as Xinhua’s Twitter account. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also employs Twitter, Facebook, and other social media platforms to promote public diplomacy. Surprisingly, in April 2020, the CCP’s International Liaison Department debuted on Twitter, indicating the Party-state’s growing use of the platform it restricts within China (Hu, n.d). Compared to Russia, China has not heavily relied on bot accounts operated by software for social media manipulation, but this changed during the COVID-19 outbreak. According to the Stanford Internet

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Observatory, Twitter was flooded with bots designed to hide the news of coronavirus lockdown protests in China, which appeared to be a statedirected attempt to suppress footage of the demonstrations (Milmo & Davidson, 2022). Usually, Beijing prefers using fake Twitter accounts posing as real people to spread controversial messages against China’s enemies. These fake accounts sometimes repost official content, but they can also introduce new narratives that later become official Beijing messaging. M3 reported that around 10% of retweets for official PRC Twitter content are from fake accounts (Fair, 2023).

Beijing Cultural Strategy Beijing has also expanded its presence in Latin America by establishing Confucius Institutes (CIs), which serve as a tool to position China as a global power. The first CI in Latin America was opened in Mexico in 2006, and since then, 45 institutes have been set up in 23 countries across the region. More than 100,000 students are enrolled and over one million people participate in their cultural activities and workshops each year (Mandarin, 2023). In the Caribbean, the CIs are particularly influential, as the United States does not have an official diplomatic presence there, only an embassy in Barbados. The CI’s primary aim is to provide Mandarin language education. However, they have been established in strategic locations to support commercial activities and become increasingly important during the Xi Jinping presidency, with the Belt and Road and Maritime Silk Road initiatives focusing on Africa and Latin America. In 2011 Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the highest body of the Chinese Communist Party, claimed that Confucius Institutes are “an important channel to glorify Chinese culture, to help Chinese culture spread to the world” and “veritably with the practical mission of promoting the real-political influence of the People’s Republic” (Sahlins, 2014). As Jake Gilstrap observed in a research paper for the U.S. National Defense University, “by increasing Mandarin language abilities and cultural influence in Latin America, China hopes to establish long-lasting ties that will lead to individuals in the region wanting what China wants, becoming valuable allies” (Gilstrap, 2021). The CIs have established a foothold in the region by providing financial support to their host universities, which often lack the means to support their activities. However, Beijing’s control over these institutes

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is total, from funding to selecting professors and programs. It is part of China’s foreign policy goals, and important government figures are involved in establishing the institutes to reinforce their diplomatic character. For instance, the Confucius Institute of Medellín was inaugurated in 2010 when then-Vice President Xi Jinping visited Colombia. The University of Bogota’s CI inauguration was attended by a CCP Political Bureau member, Li Changchun (Rubiano, 2018). Brazil is home to twelve centers, making it one of Latin America’s largest CIs hubs. These centers are strategically located, even in poorer states, near facilities of interest to the Chinese administration, such as ports. The CIs frequently hold conferences to facilitate commercial agreements, like the “Fighting Poverty in the Digital Economy” seminar organized by the Federal University of Pernambuco and the hosting CI in November 2022 (Federal University of Pernambuco, 2022). However, this conference was a guise for a larger gathering, the “China-Northeast Brazil Forum: Studies on the Economic and Social Development of Brazil’s Northeast,” presided over by the CI’s president, Peng Xiantang. The event was held in the nearby state of Maranão to attract Chinese investment to the region (Maranhão, n.d). Concerns and complaints regarding the CIs’ affiliations with the CCP’s Ministry of Education and the United Front Labor Department have been raised over the years. Authorities in the United States have shut down almost half of the CIs, blaming them as a means of CCP propaganda and espionage and a way for Beijing to monitor Chinese students (Peterson, 2020). According to Jennifer Hubbert, Associate Professor of Anthropology and Asian Studies at Lewis and Clark College, CIs “are the most extensive and most future-oriented” components of China’s “massive international soft power campaign” and have the potential for “the greatest long-term impact” (Hubert, 2019). In 2013, the CCP issued a directive titled “The Current Situation of the Ideological Front,” which instituted a policy known as the “Seven Speak-Nots,” which prohibits conversations about seven topics deemed “dangerous Western influences.“ These include universal values, freedom of expression, civil society, civil rights, historical mistakes made by the Chinese Communist Party, crony capitalism, and judicial independence (Sahlins, 2014). In addition, the directive instructed cadres to prevent universities and the media from discussing a range of political ideas. As a result, specific topics are discouraged or forbidden in the CIs, including Taiwan, Tibet, and the spiritual movement Falun Gong (Carlson, 2013).

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Also of concern is the potential impact of CIs on other areas of university activities, including events and professors’ research. Alarming examples of this influence include Western universities refusing to host the Dalai Lama and silencing advocates for Falun Gong and Taiwanese independence (Hubbert, 2019). Since its establishment in 2014 in Santiago, Chile, the Confucius Institute Regional Center for Latin America (CRICAL) has increased the relevance of CIs in Latin America. CRICAL is one of only three regional centers established by China overseas, with the other two located in Washington, D.C., and London. The center, run by a small team of three individuals, provides teacher training and is critical in deepening the relationship between China and Latin America. In 2015, Chile granted CRICAL legal recognition as a foundation providing tax benefits. However, there are concerns about transparency as contracts between Latin American universities and Beijing, funding arrangements, and hiring policies for Confucius Institute staff are not publicly available (Peterson, 2017). China’s cultural influence extends beyond the CIs. In 2010, the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and the China Institute of International Studies established the China-Latin America Think Tanks Forum to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and experiences between research institutions. This forum was later integrated into the ChinaCELAC Forum in 2015. Three forums have been held to date, with 100–160 attendees consisting of notable scholars, former political leaders from Latin America, ambassadors, senior diplomats, journalists, and business executives. In addition, in the new China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation (2022–24), China pledged to “promote think tanks to deploy cooperative activities in research on eradication of poverty and offer specific recommendations to strengthen the design and implementation of public policies” (MFA-China, 2021). Moreover, in 2022 Beijing government announced its intention to increase investment in educational exchanges between China and Latin America. The initiative will include scholarships, training opportunities, and talent programs to allow Latin American youths to study or acquire job skills in China. According to the agreement, China will provide Latin Americans with 5,000 scholarships and 3,000 “training slots” from 2022 to 2024. Additionally, China will facilitate exchanges between young leaders and introduce a “Bridge to the Future” training program for 1,000 Chinese and Latin American youths (Oppenheimer, 2022).

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In summary, China’s media, academia, culture, think tanks, and other similar programs are not meant to provide alternative viewpoints. Instead, Beijing uses these programs to protect its interests beyond its borders.

China’s Strategy for Supporting Regional Policy Issues China’s communication efforts in Latin America also involve establishing connections with political parties and policymakers at all levels of government without regard for their political affiliation. Face-to-face meetings and campaigns help Beijing to promote specific topics of local policies to sway political and economic outcomes that benefit China. This tactic has been effective in some countries due to a lack of resources and legal framework to combat detrimental foreign influence. The CCP engages with a diverse range of political parties, including those that are U.S. allies, such as Colombia’s Democratic Center (CD in Spanish) founded by former President Álvaro Uribe, as well as those who are strong critics of the United States, like the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV in Spanish) headed by Nicolás Maduro (Zhang & Berg, 2021). Over the past few years, party-to-party exchanges between China and Latin American countries focused on enhancing CCP legitimacy and promoting the value of China’s governance system. For instance, Beijing has consistently backed Argentina’s claims to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, portraying them as a defense of its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Furthermore, Chinese state media has linked this to Argentina’s support of China’s stance on Taiwan, leading to improved relations between the two countries (Xinhua, 2021). China’s communication strategy has also affected political relations in Brazil and Venezuela. Under Jair Messias Bolsonaro’s administration, the CCP representatives utilized the Brazilian Congress to counter the president’s unfriendly stance toward Beijing (Truffi & Di Cunto, 2019). Various caucuses regularly promoted pro-China policies on topics such as foreign investment, land ownership, extradition, and COVID19 vaccines. The Brazil-China parliamentary group has been working to strengthen relations with Beijing since 2015, as China is Brazil’s top trading partner (Câmara dos Deputados, 2023). Led by Congressman Fausto Ruy Pinato, the group is comprised of over 50% of the Senate and 44% of the Chamber of Deputies. They maintain close connections with the Chinese embassy and PRC entrepreneurs (Pinato, 2019). The

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Agribusiness Caucus, a powerful political tool within Congress, backs the group’s efforts and mobilizes support for trade and investment policies. China has successfully built relationships with Congress members, even funding delegation trips to China (Infobae, 2019). In 2019, pro-Beijing Senator Kátia Abreu introduced a bill to reform the law that limits foreign ownership of large land areas, which would open up 2.12 million square miles of land to foreign ownership—a reform China has been advocating for (Senado Federal, 2019). Furthermore, China has used its support to persuade lawmakers to follow the “One China” policy and avoid official contact with Taiwan officials (Constantino, 2020). In Venezuela, President Nicolás Maduro has been holding several meetings with the CCP, including video conferences, which are often shared on social platforms. The Chinese Embassy in Caracas frequently highlights their similar political vision by emphasizing Maduro’s tweets with statements like “United we will win” (Embajador de China en Venezuela, 2021). PRC’s role in Venezuela is part of a larger pattern of increasing engagement in the LAC region, even when it means supporting authoritarian regimes that share the same Anti-American stance. PRC’s involvement, however, has also exacerbated regional political unrest, increased corruption, and cast doubt on democratic governance (Berg, 2021).

Taiwan’s Role in China’s Communication Strategy in Latin America In recent months, the Taiwan issue has become a central focus for Beijing’s communication efforts in Latina America, given its proximity to China’s main challenger, the United States. Since the separation of Taiwan and the PRC after the civil war in 1949, Latin America has been a significant diplomatic battleground, with Taipei having considerable political ties in the region. Nonetheless, China’s expanding influence has eroded this scenario over time. Besides Guatemala and Belize, Taiwan maintains diplomatic relationships with Paraguay and Haiti, as well as some small Caribbean countries such as Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Agence France-Presse, 2023). However, several countries in the region have shifted their alliances to Beijing over the last years, including Honduras in 2023, Nicaragua in 2021, El Salvador in 2018, Panama in 2017, and Costa Rica in 2007. Costa Rica and Panama were the first Central American countries to break

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diplomatic relations with Taiwan to improve trade relations with China and expand traditional markets. The nations of Central America and the Caribbean constitute the last cluster of diplomatic allies with Taiwan. This explains Beijing’s choice to send its best-trained diplomatic personnel to the region. Recent Chinese diplomatic efforts have increased PRC influence in the LAC region and among Taiwan’s remaining allies. Chinese officials have been using social media and media coverage to actively engage with these countries, resulting in a shift in alliances. Not surprisingly, the man chosen to head the first PRC embassy in Panama was a seasoned Latin Americanist and director for the LAC region of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (IDCPC) Wei Qiang. Ambassador Wei has been assigned to several embassies in the region. He is Beijing’s most active social media user in Latin America, with over 21,000 tweets and nearly 18,000 followers (Creutzfeldt, 2023). Beijing has adopted a diplomatic approach in Latin America, using neutral language and institutional terms rather than instigating rhetoric as Taiwan has done. China’s communication strategy has centered on the pledge of funds and infrastructure, while Taipei’s representative centers in Latin America have taken a more critical stance against the PRC on social media. With Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan as speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives on August 2, 2022, when China’s propaganda machine began to operate at full capacity, attitudes began to change. The dominant narrative concerning Taiwan’s developments is portraying the United States as a malevolent actor meddling with China’s internal affairs and characterizing the PRC as a “wolf warrior” protecting the nation’s territorial integrity. PRC state media accused the United States of interfering in China’s domestic affairs and escalating tensions across the Taiwan Strait. State broadcaster CGTN portrayed Pelosi’s visit as a “path to destruction” and posted an image online with the Chinese characters for “China,” with the middle stroke depicting the number one meaning “One China” (CCTV, 2022). The slogan stated, “There is only one China in the world.” In addition, the People’s Daily, a newspaper affiliated with the CCP, stated: “The motherland must be unified, and it must be unified.” (People’s Daily). Anti-U.S. sentiment has grown stronger in Latin America, as seen in various examples. On August 1, 2022, the Chinese Embassy in Argentina tweeted about Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan, stating, “Resolutely safeguarding China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity is the strong will

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of the more than 1.4 billion Chinese people.” The tweet also warned that those who “play with fire will perish by it” (Embajada de China en Argentina, 2022). A few days later, on August 9, the Chinese Embassy in Brazil retweeted the attack against America of Hua Chunying, PRC Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Ministry Spokesperson: “The US does not represent the whole world, still less the great many developing countries” (Embaixada da China no Brasil, 2022). The CCP’s campaign against Taiwan and the United States has also affected local media outlets, which publish articles written by CCP members without questioning their role and credibility. For instance, Jin Hongiun, the commercial attaché of the Chinese Embassy in Brazil, has been attacking Washington’s two-China policy without any evidence to support his claims. In an article published in August 2022 in one of Brazil’s leading newspapers, Folha de São Paulo, he explicitly stated, “No provocation against the principle of ‘One China’ is allowed.“ The article’s title, “The United States needs to rethink its policy toward China and Taiwan. Washington follows a pattern of creating a problem and then using it to achieve its goals,” clearly indicates its biased stance (Hongjun, 2022). China has been pressuring social media networks and expressing disapproval online regarding Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen’s visit to Guatemala and Belize in April 2023, as well as her stopover in the United States. Beijing has urged Guatemala to make the “right choice soon” (MOFA-China, 2023). Chinese state TV CNGT has been broadcasting reports in Spanish that make political activists or congressional candidates appear to be ordinary citizens who support the shift to China (CGTN, 2023). It is worth noting that 17.24% of Guatemala’s population is illiterate, making them easier to manipulate (Aquino, 2022). Beijing’s pressure is not new for Guatemala. In 2022, PRC’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Zhao Lijian, accused Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party of using diplomatic ties with the Central American country for political manipulation and claimed it could not prevent China’s reunification. Lijian had previously urged Guatemala to make decisions in line with “historical trends” (Reuters, 2022). During her visit in April 2023, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen unintentionally caused miscommunication that favored China. Western outlets, including Deutsche Welle, criticized her visit to Chimaltenango Hospital with Guatemala President Alejandro Eduardo Giammattei Falla for being associated with a corruption scandal even though Taiwan had

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no involvement in it. President Ing-Wen’s statement about the hospital providing better medical care services for 720,000 residents and 2 million people in the surrounding provinces contrasted with the corruption allegations reported in the local press, worth millions of dollars (Deutsche Welle, 2023). China applies significant pressure on countries that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan, as seen during the pandemic. For example, Beijing asked Taiwan’s only ally in South America, Paraguay, which had limited vaccine access, to switch diplomatic recognition in exchange for COVID19 vaccines and medical aid (BBC, 2021). However, despite China’s continued pressure tactics, Paraguay maintained its longstanding diplomatic relationship with Taiwan (BBC, 2023). “We have a diplomatic and historical relationship with Taiwan of more than 60 years, based on principles and democratic values that we believe are fundamental for a society like Paraguay,” said center-right President Santiago Peña after his election victory in April 2023 over Efrain Alegre, a notable supporter of China. Although Peña mentioned the need to increase trade with China, he did not specify how this would be achieved while maintaining relations with Taipei (Welle, 2023). When countries switch allegiance to China, Beijing places great emphasis on communication. For instance, the recent Honduras decision to shift to China has been amplified on social networks, with President Xiomara Castro’s move being described as the “most logical and natural step” (de la Paz, 2023). Another example is when Panama ended diplomatic relations with Taipei in 2017, and the Chinese government strongly condemned Taiwan. When media reports in Panama hinted that a bribe from China may have influenced the decision, China’s embassy expressed anger and reaffirmed its position on the “One China” policy (Qiang, nd).

Assessment Due to its proximity, China’s growing global influence is a significant challenge for the United States in the LAC region. While many countries are attracted to Beijing’s power, they may not be aware of the potential risks of aligning with the PRC’s predatory strategies in the long run. Working with the United States to gain a deeper understanding of Chinese counterparts’ motives could be a win–win strategy. It would help the United States curb Chinese advancement in a region that has historically been its backyard while also offering an opportunity for LAC

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countries to counter the predatory exploitation of their resources and preserve democracy. LAC needs to improve its understanding of China’s communication strategies, foreign policy, and political system, as this knowledge is currently very limited in the region. A recent survey conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and interviews with experts from Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and El Salvador revealed that only a small number of journalists, editors, and policy experts have comprehensive knowledge about China and are capable of sharing their insights with others. Additionally, respondents from these four countries were found to be unaware of the extent of the CCP’s investment and influence in their respective nations (Scott, 2023). Raising awareness can help bridge the knowledge gap. This can be achieved by facilitating idea exchange and organizing joint forums between professionals, like lawyers, business people, and journalists, from the United States and Latin America. In addition, supporting local journalists is essential to bring attention to Chinese authoritarian influence in the region. The U.S. Congress should allocate substantial funds to support independent journalism and journalists must be trained to recognize Beijing’s tactics of “sharp power.” This strategy often involves disguising state-led initiatives as the work of commercial media or grassroots organizations or using local actors to spread foreign propaganda and manipulation. A fair and impartial media environment will help to curb the spread of Chinese propaganda and misinformation. In addition, task forces of U.S. and Latin American journalists and communication experts should also be encouraged to investigate China’s aggressive social media campaigns and identify any potential agents or proxies involved. By working together, they can develop effective strategies to limit China’s dominance in the communication realm. For example, a database that collects cases of Chinese disinformation on social media could be a valuable tool for identifying warning signs. It could also help people targeted by Chinese disinformation better detect and counter these campaigns. Also, it is important to counteract Chinese propaganda about the necessity of PRC investments for the LAC region’s development by providing clear information highlighting the downsides of partnering with Beijing. This can be done through a transparent online dashboard that exposes the lack of transparency, corruption suspicions, and poor quality of infrastructure built by the Chinese in Latin America. For instance, some poorly executed projects include the Coca Codo Sinclair

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and Quijos hydroelectric facilities in Ecuador, the Tinaco-Anaco train line and $1 billion CVG Ferrominera Orinoco project in Venezuela, and Rosita’s hydroelectric facility and Montero-Bulo Bulo train line in Bolivia. Unfortunately, these deals resulted in negative outcomes for both parties involved (Ellis, 2023). The SOUTHCOM command should engage in staff talks and conferences with regional officials from various U.S. embassies to constantly update on Chinese influence operations. In addition, a group of government agencies could organize a “Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIUS) roadshow” to inform countries’ leaders about the structure and operation of the CFIUS. This may encourage them to establish similar agencies to evaluate Chinese investments that pose risks to their countries. Also, encouraging meetings between African and Latin American nations to discuss the negative lessons learned from Africa’s dealings with China can help Latin American countries make informed decisions about their relationships with Beijing and understand the associated risks. In conclusion, the United States should prioritize bringing back ideology and presenting a compelling vision for the Western Hemisphere focusing on its democratic values. It is important to remember that competition with Beijing is not just about economic, military, diplomatic, and political influence but also about ideology. The Inter-American Democratic Charter, which is like a regional constitution for Latin America and the Caribbean, contains shared beliefs that should inspire the Hemisphere to become a stronghold of democracy based on political and economic principles that align more closely with the United States than with China.

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CHAPTER 11

China-CARICOM Bilateral Engagements: Modalities, Motives, Impacts, and Directions for the Regional Integration Agenda Dianna DaSilva-Glasgow and Dennis Pile

Introduction This chapter focuses on China-CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market) diplomatic engagements. The motivation stems from the growth of Chinese economic presence in the region, which is reflected by increased trade, investment, and development finance. Much of the discussion is centered around Chinese development assistance which has been an important tool of Chinese foreign diplomacy globally and a basis for its insertion in the CARICOM sub-region. The chapter also considers the linkage between the region’s embrace of the ‘One China policy’ and the evolution of its economic relationship with China. In this regard, the diplomatic contest between China and

D. DaSilva-Glasgow (B) · D. Pile Department of Economics, University of Guyana, Georgetown, Guyana e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_11

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Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) in the region and the associated implications, also underscores the discussion. The region, for the most part, has responded positively to the ‘One China policy.’ All CARICOM countries maintain diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China except for five (Belize, Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Saint Lucia) that have aligned themselves with Taiwan (Republic of China). The chapter is structured as follows. First, it examines the motives for Chinese development assistance. It defines China’s foreign aid and modalities, examines who the main recipients of Chinese aid are; and through the lens of World Systems theory, World Polity theory, and the Transnational State Perspective of Robinson, analyses China’s southsouth emphasis and what that means for the status quo of global aid architecture. It also considers how the ideological motives for Chinese development assistance have evolved with time and the country’s growth and development experience. Second, it evaluates the Caribbean’s response to China and Chinese aid. It reflects on China’s aid and economic activities in the Caribbean Community through trade, aid, and foreign direct investment and considers opportunities for the region to more strategically engage China to further its development agenda. However, to ensure balance in addressing China’s presence in the region, the chapter also considers the challenges and concerns that have emanated from China’s engagements both with CARICOM as well as other regions. It concludes with appropriate policy recommendations to guide the region’s policy engagements with China to ensure mutual benefits.

Motives for Chinese Development Assistance After adopting the Zouchuqu (‘Going Out’) policy in 2000, there has been an unprecedented surge in China’s overseas development assistance (Bohoslavsky, 2016; Oh, 2020). It was from the ‘Going Out’ policy that the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South) New Development Bank were developed, and the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative was established (Carter, 2017). China is now among the top ten bilateral aid donors in the global economy and now rivals the United States which is the world’s largest bilateral aid donor. Beginning in 2000, China has spent US$843 billion

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or US$39.5 billion per year on bilateral aid. This equates to about 13,427 bilateral aid projects spread across 165 countries (Qian, 2021). However, it is important to note that China’s definition and measurement of “foreign aid” differ from “official development assistance” as defined by the OECD-DAC countries (Carter, 2017). One commonality is the ‘concessionality’ (Bräutigam, 2011) and one difference is the inclusion of military assistance and the exclusion of donor administrative costs in Chinese aid (Carter, 2017). Chinese financial aid instruments also seem to have many variations that in the words of Carter (2017) ‘lack OECD-DAC counterparts and make classification a challenge, an example is ‘bundled packages with a mixture of concessional and market rate finance’ (Grimm et al., 2011; Strange et al., 2017). Strange et al. (2017) note that ‘Chinese state-owned enterprises blur the line between official government finance and private flows, with foreign direct investment (FDI) or joint ventures coming from both private and state-owned firms.’ Haibing (2017) points to the fact that the forms of China’s foreign aid have gradually shifted from what the author describes as ‘simplified forms of capital, personnel, and material support to pluralized forms of assistance.’ The forms of Chinese aid can be broadly categorized along the lines of humanitarian, health, economic (including infrastructure financing), and socio-cultural projects. Economic forms of aid are noteworthy because infrastructure assistance is a key priority for China according to Haibing. More specifically, Lynch et al. (2020) and Carter (2017) provided the following eight specific areas that China’s overseas development assistance (ODA) financing covers: (1) Complete sets of projects (also known as “turnkey” or infrastructure-based projects); (2) Commodity aid (i.e., equipment, goods, and materials exported to other countries); (3) Technical cooperation projects; (4) Cooperation on human resources; (5) Medical teams and volunteers; (6) Emergency humanitarian aid; (7) Volunteers programs; and (8) Debt forgiveness. According to Bräutigam (2009) China rarely gives cash aid but provides development finance in ways that deviate from traditional official aid programs such as ‘strategic lines of credit provided to Chinese enterprises-with the two-state policy banks – China EximBank and the China Development Bank (CDB)—playing key roles’ (Lakatos et al., 2016). China also makes multilateral contributions to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and United Nations (UN) agencies.

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However, more than 90% of China’s aid is concentrated at the bilateral level (Kitano & Harada, 2016).

Who are the Recipients of Chinese Foreign Aid? A South-South strategy is a key element of China’s Zouchuqu (‘Going Out’) policy. China considers its South-South strategy as, “a form of mutual assistance between developing countries ” (Johnson, 2021). Therefore, the largest recipients of Chinese aid have been developing countries. Geographically, 45% of China’s ODA goes to African countries, 37% to Asian countries, and 7% to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The growth in aid to African countries emanated from the creation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 (Guillon & Mahonnat, 2019). Most of China’s aid to Africa is in the form of infrastructure assistance with commercial and concessional loans in sectors such as transportation for the construction/renovation of roads, railways, airports, and harbors. In Asia however, which is the second-largest recipient of Chinese aid, foreign aid relates to financial flows mainly to economic sectors such as energy, transport, and mining (Oh, 2020).

Interpreting China’s Emergence and South-South Emphasis World Systems theory, World Polity theory, and the Transnational State Perspective of Robinson provide a useful analytical frame for interpreting and understanding China’s South-South strategy under its ‘Going out’ policy. Taking a cross-fertilization of the theories three inferences can be made regarding China’s emergence as an aid donor and its South-South emphasis as part of its foreign aid approach, each discussed in turn below. Firstly, China’s increasing role in bilateral trade activities could be viewed as a challenge to the traditional global order that has seen dominance by Western hegemons. World Systems theory views the World System as following a stratified structure and recognizes that ‘development and underdevelopment have been structured by global power relations for centuries’ (Chase-Dunn & Grell-Brisk, 2019). This stratified structure sees a few developed countries that have emerged as global economic hegemons, and the developing and least developed countries as a lower stratum constituting the peripheral states. This is analogous

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to Raul Prebish’s ‘center-periphery’ notion. The relationship between the economic hegemons and the peripheral states while economically symbiotic, is unbalanced and has been shaped by historical exploitative factors such as colonialism. The economic advantage of these developed countries has allowed them to dominate and shape the global institutional and political architecture for foreign aid activities, which is now embodied in the DAC and its seeming exclusivity as reflected by the accession process. The growth of bilateral aid activities by non-DAC countries such as China, which are themselves part of the so-called peripheral states represents a challenge to this prevailing international economic and political order, a ‘counterhegemonic shift in aid practice’ to use the words of Jackson (2019). Both Bräutigam (2009) and Gu (2015) allude to the historical context and geopolitics of China’s regional and global circumstances having influenced its aid activities. They made specific reference to ‘the historical legacies of semi-colonialism, aid, and the effects of top-down programs such as Structural Adjustment Plans, influencing China’s perception of international development relations’ (Gu, 2015). China’s particular emphasis on a South-South agenda, in addition to challenging the prevailing order, has created a new economic and political geography of international development cooperation that sees several large-scale initiatives taking place in the South under economic leadership by the South. For example, the financing facilities in Africa through the Forum on China-African Cooperation or infrastructure investment under OBOR to connect China to countries along the ancient silk road and a new Maritime Silk Road (Carey & Li, 2016; Wang, 2016). However, Woods describes this new paradigm as a ‘silent’ revolution rather than an overt attempt by emerging donors to ‘overturn rules or replace them,’ by simply offering alternatives to developing countries, which has the effect of introducing competitive pressures into the existing system which would weaken the bargaining position of Western donors in respect of “aid-receiving countries.” This alternative is available to any developing country irrespective of governance quality, political or financial condition, or development status. In this regard, Wenner and Clarke (2016), describe China as a ‘pragmatic partner in foreign relations.’ Secondly, China and other non-DAC countries represent a challenge to the sociological constructs of ‘center’ and ‘periphery’ that defines the global economy and the identities of so-called peripheral countries.

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World Polity theory ‘provides a sociological institutionalist account of global relations within a cultural model positing norms and identities for actors and prescribing related actions and goals.’ The world is viewed as an increasingly integrated social system with actors as subsystems. The identities, structures, and behaviors of actors are shaped by the cultural context of the global environment (McNeely, 2012). As Jackson (2019) questioned, “What do core and periphery mean anymore if peripheral countries are giving aid?”. Emerging donors have principles and priorities that are different from DAC donors conditioned by a different development outlook. This led the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC, 2008, 9 in Jackson, 2019) to conclude that: southern donors are uncomfortable with reporting to the DAC because it is seen as a ’Northern club’, which may not always be open to specific South-South initiatives that do not fit into the [DAC’s] current agenda…

Woods (2008) notes that the increasing role of non-DAC countries in foreign aid is a “silent revolution… in development assistance” largely due to the failures of the “Western aid regime” to address the development needs of developing countries. Woods makes several useful points to this end. The first point is that ‘established donors are not providing enough aid to developing nations’ (and not even as much as promised). Generally, the DAC countries spend less than 1% of their gross national income (GNI) on aid. They have committed 0.7% of GDP (OECD, n.d). However, Woods notes that most DAC nations spend less than what was committed and that overall aid has not increased significantly. In 2021, DAC spending was equivalent to 0.33% or US$185.9 billion, 21.9 billion. 12% of ODA flows went toward COVID-19-related activities. Woods also makes the point that structural adjustment policies were for the most part a failure and as a result, developing countries are seeking alternative sources of assistance that are not linked to the damaging policy conditionalities imposed by DAC donors and DAC-influenced multilateral institutions such as the IMF. Wenner and Clarke (2016) point to loan financing from China as an alternative that is flexible and opened to innovative means of repayments as China accepts repayments in physical commodities such as oil which ‘broadens access to countries that may

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be illiquid or have a history of loan defaults and thus have no access to traditional capital markets.’ Woods also questioned the functionality of the Western aid regime which she regarded as being ‘too convoluted and dysfunctional’ consequent to the layers of policies and protocols inherent therein. She also pointedly indicated that the Western donors have failed ‘failed to deliver’ on better coordination and alignment due to the ‘dizzying array’ of organizations that creates ‘a cacophony of donors’ making coordination and harmonization difficult. In addition to the points made by Woods, another useful point by Brautigam is that Western aid in developing regions such as Africa has simply not delivered on the expected outcomes and aid recipients are eager for an alternative model. This she notes accounts for the success of China in quickly creating development partnerships with other southern nations. The Chinese approach with its emphasis on infrastructure, grants, loans, trade credits, commercial investments, and a marriage of public sector planning and entrepreneurial endeavors goes beyond the OECD ODA and is more responsive to the needs of aid recipients which could potentially revolutionize the OECD model instead of aligning the Chinese approach with the DAC ODA approach (Zimmerman & Smith 2011). Another point made by Woods relates to the attitudes of Western donors both toward their role and aid recipients. Woods quoted former President of Botswana, Festus Mogae who said “I find that the Chinese treat us as equals. The West treats us as former subjects.” This paints a comparative picture of how donors and their roles are perceived by developing countries. Non-DAC foreign aid allows recipients to forge a more egalitarian identity by emphasizing ‘less exploitative’ and ‘more egalitarian’ partnerships than the status quo donors who are primarily former colonial or neo-colonial powers. Thirdly, China’s Increasing Role in Global Foreign aid and Southsouth emphasis is an expansion of capitalism. Robinson (2015, 2017) advanced the notion of a transnational capitalist class and transnational state. He saw aid as being guided primarily by the interests of capital but recognized that there may be other agendas as well, some of which can be ‘at loggerheads with the neo-liberal agenda promoted by the Transnational Capitalist Class’ (Jackson, 2005, p. 9). Robinson, therefore, saw aid institutions as part of an emerging Transnational State apparatus (TNS) in the global economy (Robinson, 2017). From Robinson’s perspective

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therefore, China’s protagonism, as well as other emerging donors’ may be less about challenging the prevailing international order and more about opening space in the global system for more extensive integration and a less asymmetric global capitalism. The emphasis on the South may present a more realistic platform from which to readily achieve such goals. The scale of China’s aid engagements involvement in Africa where resources are more abundant, compared with Latin America and the Caribbean which is less resource rich causes one to ponder on the veracity of this conclusion. In just two decades, ‘China has become Africa’s biggest economic partner with no other country with such depth and breadth of engagement in Africa across trade, investment, infrastructure financing, and aid’ (Yuan Sun et al., 2017).

What Really are the Motives for Chinese Aid? Foreign aid is a tool used by countries to paint and protect their image abroad. Therefore, on the one hand, China’s motives would be no different from that of other Western countries. On the other, some critics argue that the Chinese aid system has not operated with the same degree of transparency as in the Western world, which makes its motives less clear. As a foreign aid tool, the motives for ODA may involve a mix of political, economic, and humanitarian reasons, the sum total of which would increase a country’s influence on the global stage. These reasons are also evident in Chinese aid (Bräutigam, 2009; Gu, 2015). Qian (2021b) believes that political motives underpin Chinese aid because no country commits financial resources for purely altruistic motives. Those motives could be linked to both international and domestic political factors. Zhang (2017) and Shambaugh (2015) refer to a push for soft power by China with the explicit aim of promoting China’s image and legitimacy abroad. They see this reflected in initiatives such as One Belt and One Road. Fuchs and Rudyak (2017) and Albert (2017) also argue that China’s ODA work is driven by a desire to create a ‘favorable international environment for China’s development,’ support the country’s rise to global power, influence global governance and to reward countries that abide by the ‘One China Policy.’ Haibing (2017) does point to a shift in the country’s global influence because of its foreign aid work, although Albert (2017) offers a contrary view. The domestic political factors relate to quelling political unrest by easing domestic tensions related to unemployment. As compared by Qian

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(2021b), ‘Aid is a win for China at home and abroad’ as with the US food aid program. Another domestic political factor is the competition between domestic aid institutions (Varrall, 2016; Zhang & Smith, 2017). Economically, the conventional view is that China’s aid (as well as its trade promotion) was driven by the desire to access natural resources (Bräutigam, 2009; Carter, 2017; Fuchs & Rudyak, 2017; Guillon & Mathonnat, 2019). However, Carter (2017) argues that this view is partial and misguided as there are other factors at play. In addition to access to natural resources, Wenner and Clarke (2016) noted that China after successfully building an export-oriented manufacturing sector using inexpensive labor and inward investments, needed to look outward to promote the export of Chinese-produced goods and assist in the development and brand recognition of Chinese multinational corporations. Humanitarian reasons also underpin Chinese foreign aid. According to Fuchs and Rudyak (2017), poorer countries receive more aid which is perhaps indicative of China’s concern for poverty reduction and improved livelihood of its recipients. Guillon and Mathonnat (2019) also indicated that the Chinese ODA targeted at the social infrastructure and services sector appears to be responsive to the economic needs of recipient countries. Since 2000 China has also been one of the five largest humanitarian aid providers among non-DAC countries (UNDP, 2015). China, for instance, provides training as a way of transferring knowledge on its development experience. It also provides scholarships for University studies and sends medical brigades abroad. China has also indicated that the wider goal of OBOR is building a common future for mankind. In the words of President Xi Jinping in his opening statement to the Leaders’ Roundtable of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (May, 2017): We need to make joint efforts in addressing the challenges in the world economy, create new opportunities for development, seek new driving forces for development, and explore new space for development, so as to realize mutual complementarity, mutual benefit, and win-win solution. In this way, we can make sure our joint efforts are oriented toward the goal of building a Community of Common Future for Humankind. This was my original intention in presenting this initiative, and it’s also the ultimate goal this initiative endeavors to reach.

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Evolution of the Ideological Motives Underpinning Chinese Foreign Aid Haibing (2017) identifies four phases of development of China’s foreign aid approach. Taken as a whole, these point to a gradual transformation of Chinese aid from a ‘more backstage, simplified and bilateral-centric approach to a more frontstage, pluralized, trilateral and multilateral approach to cooperation.’ In the first phase, 1949 to about 2000 when China adopted the Reform and Opening-up Policy, China’s motive for foreign aid was driven by the strategic need to uphold its national independence. The second phase is associated with the launch of the reform and opening policy approach in 2000. Here China adopted a more comprehensive aid strategy with more pluralized forms of cooperation and focused on both aid and investment and trade and contracting projects. The third phase which is the period between 2000 and 2013 is associated with institutional building where China has sought to address the integrity and synergy of its aid cooperation projects with partners in Asia, Africa, and Latin America by creating forums for dialogue. Examples of these include the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China-CELAC Forum, China-ASEAN Forum on Social Development and Poverty Reduction, etc. During this period, China also published its first white paper outlining its approach to foreign assistance (Cordell, 2021) (State Council, 2011). The fourth phase is post-2013 which has seen China focusing on an expansion of a non-pecuniary/non-material approach to development that involves sharing ideas, experiences, and values, and providing training. This period is associated with the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the New Development Bank (NDB). During this period, China published two additional white papers outlining its approach to foreign assistance in 2014 and 2021 (Cordell, 2021) (State Council, 2014) (Table 11.1). Two main factors account for the transformation of China’s foreign aid. Firstly, because of China’s own cumulative growth and development experience and learning, it has embraced a more comprehensive approach to development. China’s initial approach to development focused on its quantitative expansion but after its success at achieving a consistent and high level of growth, China’s development ideology shifted to one that saw an activist embrace of south-south cooperation.

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Table 11.1 Summary of the phases of evolution of China’s Foreign Aid Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

Post 1949 to the time of adoption of the Reform and Opening-up Policy (2000) Features Strategic need of vindicating national independence

Launch of the Reform Up to 2013 and Opening-up Policy (2000)

Post-2013

More comprehensive aid strategy

Expansion of non-pecuniary/ non-material forms of aid

Institutional building with traditional aid recipients

Phase 4

Source Adapted from Haibing (2017)

The second factor is the international development environment. There have been several international developments such as the adoption of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, the Paris Climate Agreement and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, and the G20 Hangzhou Summit. All of these have led to China mainstreaming development in its growth agenda and have influenced reform in China’s foreign aid approach. The country now has the political will to play a global leadership role in supporting sustainable development. The country has also expressly reflected, in its 2021 White Paper, the willingness to adopt an activist approach to supporting multilateral rule-setting and upholding the international order. In its 2021 White Paper, Haibing (2017) also notes that China also addresses criticisms associated with its One Belt One Road initiative.

The Region’s Response to Bilateral Engagements with Taiwan and China: Trends and Strategic Opportunities The Caribbean region has been very responsive to China and Chinese aid (Bernal, 2010). Currently, all CARICOM countries maintain diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China except for five (5) (Belize, Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Saint Lucia) which have aligned themselves with Taiwan (Republic of China).

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The five (5) are among seventeen (17) countries globally that recognize a sovereign ‘Republic of China on Taiwan’ (ROC). The Dominican Republic which is a part of CARIFORUM also has diplomatic relations with Taiwan. St. Vincent and St. Kitts established relations with Taiwan during the 1980s (1981 and 1983). Foreign aid has played a role in the region’s diplomatic response to China. Wenner and Clarke (2016) assert that up until 2008 China pursued “Chequebook Diplomacy” in the Caribbean and other parts of the developing world where essentially non-reimbursable financial assistance was given as an incentive for those countries to derecognize Taiwan. The authors further asserted that some developing countries in a bid to capitalize on strained relations between China and Taiwan would threaten to switch recognition as a means of extracting additional aid. The use of foreign aid to derecognize Taiwan is the first of what Wenner and Clarke identify as three phases of the evolution of the growing economic relations between China and the Caribbean. The second and third are, respectively, a growing presence of Chinese construction firms in public infrastructure projects and Chinese investment in tourist resort complexes, and port and logistical facilities. Taiwan has also been aggressive in using foreign aid as a way of encouraging recognition of its sovereignty; and in the Caribbean Community, it would appear that diplomatic relations between the countries and CARICOM have been a contest with aid as the ‘carrot’ to entice support. For instance, when the Dean Barrow government of Belize was considering reviewing its relations with Taiwan, a visit by President Tsai Ing-wen of the Republic of China in 2018, led to a reversal of this position and resulted in the countries committing to “deepening relations” the following year (CIJN, 2019). In addition, St. Lucia initially had relations with Taiwan but then changed to China in 1997 and then back to Taiwan in 2007 as a result of development aid (CIJN, 2019). Wenner and Clarke (2016) cite the ‘untiedness’ of Taiwanese aid as the basis for the continued relations between the country and some of the Caribbean islands. Aid from the People’s Republic of China is primarily for the construction of large public works and often is tied to the use of Chinese labor and materials, while Taiwanese aid is not.

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CARICOM Engagements with China and Taiwan: Current Trends and Strategic Opportunities What are the region’s development goals? DaSilva-Glasgow and Bynoe (2016) argue that the expansion of the Caribbean integration arrangement to more complex levels (from a free trade area to a customs union) was predicated on providing an economic environment that is conducive to the growth and prosperity of the region. Dialogue Platforms The region has always been cognizant of the importance of global markets, its vulnerability in the global market, and the importance of strategic alliances in achieving its development goals. This recognition stems from the fact that most of its significant economic partners have always been outside and all the countries have comparatively small economies which contribute to structural dependency in the global economy and functional dependency in the global policy-making arena. Therefore, very early in the integration agenda a model of open regionalism was followed. Much importance has also been ascribed to external strategic alliances through south-south and north–south cooperation platforms to improve the region’s capacity to push the development concerns of developing countries onto the agenda of the multilateral system (Bennett, 1999). While it is not possible to have cooperation platforms with Taiwan at the regional level, owing to the diplomatic position of most of the region, cooperation platforms have been formalized with the People’s Republic of China to promote consistent dialogue on development issues, particularly aimed at achieving synergy with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Noteworthy are the “Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and the China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum.” These emanate from a Cooperation Plan (2015–2019). Economic Engagements Apart from political dialogue, the region has also strategically engaged China from an economic front. Four CARICOM countries (Trinidad, Suriname, Guyana, and Jamaica) signed the Belt and Road Initiative from

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2018 to 2019. This was a strategic move on the part of the region to secure foreign investment for much-needed infrastructural works, but the region also recognized that the agreement was of strategic value to China as well. In the words of Prime Minister Rowley at the time of signing the agreement “We told them we need your investment, and you need our location in the Caribbean,” (CIJN, 2019). It is uncertain whether OBOR initiatives have been implemented. But the region has benefited from infrastructural works and can continue to engage China to help to modernize its infrastructure, particularly in areas such as ports that are needed to support intra-regional trade. Through loans to government and state enterprises, which is one of the notable modalities through which Chinese foreign assistance is provided to the region, several projects in infrastructure, energy, and ‘other’ have been possible. For instance, the renovation and expansion of the national airport in Guyana. Table 11.2 shows loans to CARICOM countries from 2005 to 2019. Foreign Direct Investments Table 11.3 outlines China’s Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in the Caribbean from 2006 to 2020. Generally, the investment inflows to the LAC region are less than 0.5% of China’s outflows. Nevertheless, these have allowed for investment projects in over thirteen sectors including ports, hotels, agriculture, electronics, minerals, energy, estate, beverages, industry, machinery equipment and tools, mining, construction, agriculture, and agroindustry. The total value of investments was approximately US$9,252 million and created approximately 24,556 jobs.1 What is not captured in these investment figures is the growth in the significant number of small-scale Chinese-owned businesses across the region. Investment in energy projects also includes a 25% stake in the Guyana Stabroek oil bloc and a 10% share in Trinidad and Tobago-based Atlantic LNG. Ex-Im Bank was the main conduit of financing. The investment in the Stabroek oil bloc in Guyana is noteworthy because, from that exploration work, significant discoveries of oil resources were made that have put the country on a new growth path and opened up tremendous opportunities for wealth creation through exports of oil and gas.

1 Cuba is considered in this data.

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Table 11.2 Loans to CARICOM Countries Country

Year

Type

No. of Projects

Lender

USD$M

Jamaica Suriname Trinidad & Tobago Cuba Guyana Antigua & Barbuda Bahamas Grenada Jamaica Suriname Guyana Dominica Dominica Cuba

2005/17 2008/19 2011/19

Infrastructure

7 5 4

Ex-Im Bank

1,825 726 491

2016/17 2010/17 2008/16

3 3 3

309 214 169

2011/12 2017 2009/11 2012 2011 2009 2019 2015

2 1 4 1 1 1 1 1

99 66 249 47 34 40 600 60

Other

Energy Energy

Source Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers (2022)

Wenner and Clarke (2016) point to investment in renewable energy as an unexploited opportunity for Chinese investment in the region. They point to the fact that China has a dominant position as one of the world’s lowest-cost manufacturers of photovoltaic cells (Table 11.3). Trade As reflected by Figs. 11.1 and 11.2, trade with both Taiwan and China has been increasing. In both cases, the value of imports far outweighs the value of exports. Comparatively, however, trade is much higher with China. In 2021, exports to Taiwan reached US$49 million while imports were US$108 million. For China, exports reached US$246.5 million and imports US$3,462 million. The dynamics of trade relations between China and the Caribbean Community can be better understood if we examine trade in two time periods 2002–2010 and 2011 to 2021. The first period captures the first nine (9) years immediately after China adopted its Zouchuqu (‘Going Out’) policy. One of the key elements of this policy was the expansion

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Table 11.3 China’s FDI in the Caribbean Countries

Year

Estimated No. of No. of Projects Jobs Created

Antigua and Barbuda Barbados Cuba Guyana Haiti Jamaica St. Lucia Suriname

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

2,342 800 3,000 190 2,719 1,521 3,702 635 1,250 889 1,000 1,800 2,960 1,152 5,496

Sectors

3 2 1 1 2 5 4 3 2 1 1 2 2 4 3

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

13.

USD$M

Ports Hotels Agriculture Electronics Minerals Energy Real Estate Food & Beverage Business Machines & Equipment Construction Agriculture and Agroindustry Industry Machinery, Equipment & Tools Mining

1,206 144 1,000 320 588 1,929 423 1,459 2,140 200 72 660 24 335 552

180000 160000 140000 120000 100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 0

Imports

2020

2021

2018

2019

2017

2016

2015

2014

2012

2013

2011

2009

2010

2007

2008

2006

2005

2004

2002

Exports

2003

US$000

Source DusselPeters_Monitor_ODA_Database_2022

Fig. 11.1 CARICOM Trade with Chinese Taipei, (2002–2021) (Source International Trade Centre)

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4000000 3500000

US$0000

3000000 2500000 Imports

2000000

Exports

1500000 1000000 500000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

0

Fig. 11.2 CARICOM Trade with the People’s Republic of China, (2002– 2021) (Source International Trade Centre)

of trade relations with low-income and middle-income countries. During the first decade post-Zouchuqu, trade grew at a faster rate when compared with the second period. The growth rate of imports from China averaged around 23% per annum while the growth rate of exports averaged around 41%. In the second period, exports to China grew around 28% per year while imports grew at an average rate of 6% per annum. Notwithstanding the growth in the region’s trade with China, the United States remains its leading trading partner. The significance of trade flows with the United States is reflected in Figs. 11.3 and 11.4, which show that both the United States and EU remain leading export markets for CARICOM countries. The United States also retains the lead on the import side. However, China has surpassed the EU to become the region’s second-largest import market. It is important to reflect on the imbalance in trade flows. Consequent to its growth, large market size, and purchasing power, China has become a lucrative export market, particularly for commodity exporters in the region. Wenner and Clarke (2016) note that “the five commodity producers in the subregion—Belize, Cuba, Guyana, Suriname, Trinidad, and Tobago—have already benefited handsomely from the commodity supercycle that China fuelled up to 2011–12.”

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12000.00

US$Mn

10000.00 8000.00 6000.00 4000.00 2000.00 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

0.00

China

USA

UK

EU-27

Fig. 11.3 CARICOM Exports to Major Trading Partners (2002–2021) (Source International Trade Centre)

However, the growth rate of imports has far outweighed that of exports due to differences in market size and consequent productive limitations in CARICOM such as ‘low labor productivity, high transport cost, high energy costs, and other impediments to competitiveness’ (Wenner and Clarke, 2016). The region needs to explore opportunities for enhancing exports to China. China has provided support for export promotion through participation in export fairs held in Beijing but an unexploited opportunity as identified by Wenner and Clarke (2016) is for Chinese investors to ‘mount export-oriented businesses’ as a way of expanding exports from the region to China. Such businesses can also exploit opportunities offered by preferential trade arrangements between signatory Caribbean states and other major trading partners such as the United States, Canada, or the European Union. Wenner and Clarke (2016) point to the potential for the export of crops (especially branded specialty crops) congruent with the region’s endowment of agricultural resources. Another element of trade relates to tourist flows. Outward tourist flows from China have been increasing. In 2014, 117 million outbound Chinese tourists. However, most of these flows were to Asia, United States, or Europe. There are limitations to attracting Chinese tourists to the Caribbean such as the cost of travel but an opportunity nonetheless exists, particularly targeting higher income brackets who may be more inclined to ‘try different experiences

Fig. 11.4

0.00

5000.00

10000.00

2006

2005 China

2009

2008 USA

2012 UK

2016

2015

EU-27

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2014

2013

2011

2010

2007

2004

2003

2002

CARICOM Imports from Major Trading Partners (2002–2021) (Source International Trade Centre)

US$Mn

15000.00 11 CHINA-CARICOM BILATERAL ENGAGEMENTS …

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and opportunities to explore far-flung and exotic cultures’ (Wenner and Clarke). Wenner and Clarke (2016) offer several suggestions for policy changes that would be required for increased capture of Chinese tourists inclusive of: streamlined or visa exemptions for Chinese nationals, more five-star hotel properties, better personal and property security, more offering of Chinese cuisine, hiring of Mandarin and Cantonese speakers as staff and tour operators, sensitizing staff and tour operators to Chinese cultural proclivities and differences, developing marketing materials and signage in the Mandarin language, offering more price-competitive shopping experiences, and establishing more airlift connections.

Chinese Foreign Aid The modalities through which Chinese aid is provided to the region are discussed below. Military Cooperation From 2003 to 2017, China issued 16 concessional grants to the region aimed at increasing military capacity domestically while deepening military-to-military cooperation. Grant recipients were Guyana (5), Jamaica (3), Barbados (2), Bahamas (1), Trinidad and Tobago (1), Suriname (2), and Antigua and Barbuda (2). Military grants targeted officers’ training, delivery of military equipment (land, sea, personnel equipment), as well as educational scholarships. Development Grants Figure 11.5 shows that the value of grants to the region has increased gradually. In 2017, over US$23 in grants were provided to the region. There are three possible types of grants; development, representational, and mixed. Development grants seek to promote economic development and welfare in the recipient country whereas, representational grants strengthen bilateral relationships through language, culture, or values from donor to recipient. Mixed grants cut across both categories and go beyond. This grant type is the least of the three. These grants are

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281

6,169,945

3,084,972

4,692,445 826,050

1,908,386

936,861

715,660

507,655

785,722

5,448,025

23,165,102

11

2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008 2008 2009 2011 2011 2012 2014 2016 2016 2017

Fig. 11.5 Grants at (Constant USD2017) (Source Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers [2022])

multi-sectoral, government-related, and provided through multiple entities, with vulnerable countries receiving a greater proportion. Table 11.4 shows that six (6) countries (Antigua, Cuba, Guyana, Jamaica, Dominica, and Grenada) have received grants above USD$80 M and account for over 70% of all development grants to the region, with Grenada receiving almost twice that of the next highest recipient. On the other hand, 48 representative grants valued close to USD$10 M over the period 2003/ 17 were donated to the region. Through this grant type, China sponsored activities related to Chinese language development through the establishment of Confucius Institutes; inter-university cooperation; and donated musical instruments and textbooks. Technical Cooperation The region has benefited from training and educational outreach in the areas of telecommunication, military relations, and health. Between 2016 and 2017, for instance, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana benefited from specialized training in telecommunication through Hauwei. This is an important area for technical support as 50% of households in the region remain unserved concerning internet access (ECLAC, 2018).

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Table 11.4 List of development grants to CARICOM Recipients

Year

No. of Development Grants

Amount (Constant USD2017)

Antigua and Barbuda Bahamas Barbados Cuba Dominica Grenada Guyana Haiti Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad and Tobago

2006/17 2004/17 2003/17 2001/17 2004/17 2005/17 2002/17 2010/17 2000/17 2000/7 2001/17 2000/15

19 13 28 32 33 60 32 21 28 7 31 8

87,874,349 53,699,111 22,358,745 96,339,476 173,174,352 301,920,444 100,827,995 20,273,431 82,801,781 48,352,630 73,671,320 9,005,301

Source Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers (2022)

Table 11.5 summarizes data on non-military scholarships that have been provided to the region by China. Through the China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2022–2024) the region and China have also committed to forging deeper cooperation in public health. In fact, since 2003 either through a Memorandum of Understanding, Cooperation Agreement, or some other form of bilateral arrangement, medical experts (surgeons, physicians, Ophthalmologists, plastic surgeons, gynecologists, cardiologists, and radiologists, nurses, etc.) from China have been supporting the region’s health care system. Other Official Flows Some of the support to the region has been placed under a broad umbrella called ‘Other Official Flows.’ To date, the region has had a total of 41 such projects. Not all projects are measured in monetary terms since not all were accounted for based on their explicit cost. Examples include sports projects, medical specialization, rehabilitation of roads, education exchanges, flood mitigation, wind farm project, railway, bioelectric plant, etc. (See Table 11.6).

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Table 11.5 Data on non-military scholarships from China to the Region (2001 to 2021) Recipients

Year

Universities

Specializations

Amount (Constant USD)

CARICOM

2000/21

1. Peking Normal

1. Technical Training True monetary value unknown 2. Undergraduate and Postgraduate Degrees 3. Language 4. Human Resource Training 5. Electrical, Civil, Food & Science, Engineering Information Technology 6. Water Supply & Waste Treatment Technology 7. Other

2. Jilin 3. Hohai 4. Nanjing Normal 5. University of Science & Technology 6. Xiangtan 7. Changsha University of Science and Technology 8. Hunan Normal 9. China Institute of Information Technology 10. Tsinghua, 11. Xiamen, 12. Shanghai Jiaotong,

(continued)

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Table 11.5 (continued) Recipients

Year

Universities

Specializations

Amount (Constant USD)

13. Sun Yat-sen 14. Confucius Institute Source Aid Data and Open Sources

Table 11.6 Other official flows Recipients

Year

No. of Projects

Amount (Constant USD2017)

Bahamas Barbados Cuba Dominica Grenada Jamaica Suriname Trinidad and Tobago

2014/16 2008/17 2001/17 2013 2007/13 2005/2017 2002/16 2013/16

2 6 15 1 2 10 5 2

486,694 167,135,876 1,723,678,575 – 4,955,476 1,099,055,420 482,498,357 82,591,259

Challenges and Concerns While the region has benefited from its engagements with both China and Taiwan, albeit to a limited extent, and there are opportunities for further engagements, it is necessary to reflect on the potential foreign policy and development concerns. The concerns can be categorized along three lines. Firstly, the region must reflect on criticisms of China’s engagement in other regions of the developing world and must be guided accordingly to safeguard control over its development agenda. China’s activism as a foreign aid donor to developing countries has had its fair share of criticisms, mostly centered around the perceived motive for Chinese aid. According to Qian (2021), China has been criticized for using foreign aid to supposedly advance its geopolitical goals and economic interests rather than truly trying to help the world’s poor. Dreher et al (2016) note that

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not being able to distinguish between what is official development assistance and merely commercially oriented state financing accounts for much of the controversy regarding Chinese aid. Critics point to the fact that most of China’s foreign aid comes almost exclusively from public resources and is largely a government-togovernment relationship (Carter, 2017). Both (Qian, 2021) and Guillon and Mathonnat (2019) also point to the fact that China’s aid is not conditioned on the nature of recipient countries’ institutions or politics; Dreher et al. (2016) add neglect of human rights issues and governance. This questions the impact such aid would have on promoting sustainable economic development in poor countries. Guillon and Mathonnat (2019) found that ‘China allocates more ODA in the economic infrastructure and services sector and the production sector to African countries with weaker institutions.’ China’s foreign aid is supported by a vast institutional arrangement that sees the involvement of over 300 Chinese government institutions and state-owned enterprises. However, critics point to the fact that China’s civil society organizations are almost absent in channeling foreign aid abroad (Carter, 2017; Poskitt et al., 2016); though this may be linked to the fact that civil society is underdeveloped in China (Poskitt et al., 2016). Criticisms are also directed at the mode of delivery, which is seen as unusual as China provides loans at highly subsidized or market interest rates for large infrastructure projects (Qian, 2021). Haibing (2017) notes that generally 59% of China’s development assistance is given as concessional loans (having preferential interest rates), 47% as grants, and 4% as loans with no interest rate. According to Carter (2017), from 2000 to 2015 US$94.4 billion worth of Chinese foreign assistance went to concessional loans to African government and state-owned enterprises from the Chinese government, banks, and contractors. As part of its concessional loans, while there are no ‘policy conditionalities’ there are nonetheless ‘strings attached.’ China may also require a linkage to Chinese firms to source materials or labor which may result in debt to China according to Qian (2021) or may ‘support the penetration of Chinese multinational corporations abroad’ according to Wenner and Clarke (2016). Carter (2017) notes that this requirement may limit capacity building and put downward pressure on wages or local workers. About the One Belt One Road Initiative where China has been funding infrastructure projects in developing countries such as Pakistan,

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Myanmar and Kenya, Cordell (2021) noted concerns related to ‘the lack of control and ad hoc nature of Chinese transactions.’ Others have expressed concern that the loans are merely debt traps for foreign influence (Qian, 2021b). Concerns have also been noted regarding the quality of the infrastructural works undertaken. Limited Transparency (Carter, 2017) has also been a criticism of China’s ODA work. According to Fuchs and Rudyak (2017), ‘China’s international aid activities are neither reported to international organizations nor has Beijing released an official and comprehensive aid database.’ Secondly, the region must evaluate the implications of its foreign policy engagements with China for its foreign policy engagements with traditional partners. Secondly, The twenty-four (24) members that comprise the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries in 1969 adopted ODA as the ‘gold standard’ of foreign aid. It is the main source of financing for development aid and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries to help developing countries participate more effectively in the global economy (OECDb n.d.). As an exclusive group, these countries have shaped and managed the international aid architecture. While they have taken on significant economic and political responsibilities in this regard, arguably they also enjoy the significant economic and political benefits that have come with being bastions of aid to developing countries. The Caribbean has shared diplomatic relations with several of the DAC countries including more particularly the United States and the UK and has benefited from their bilateral foreign engagements. All CARICOM countries are on the list of Upper Middle-income countries which are countries with Gross National Incomes between US$3,956 and $12,235, except for Trinidad and St. Kitts which are not on the most recent list of recipient countries, and Haiti which is on the list of Least Developed Countries. Antigua and Barbuda graduated from the DAC List of ODA Recipients on 1 January 2022. (OECDb n.d.) Consequent to geographical proximity, historical colonial ties, and other factors, both the United States and the UK have historically been significant aid providers to the region. Both countries have an institutional presence in the region to channel aid; the United States through the USAID and the UK through the UKAID-DFID. Aid can also be viewed as the corollary of the wider economic and political relationship the region has shared with the United States and UK. Both countries have

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been leading markets for trade and investment. Since 1960, the Caribbean has been receiving approximately 1.2% of total DAC foreign assistance to all developing countries. In recent years, there has been an increase in donor activity by non-DAC countries including Mexico, Israel, Korea, and China, among others. Most of the region’s bilateral aid still comes from DAC countries. However, as illustrated in Fig. 11.6, non-DAC support has been growing. Among the list of non-DAC ‘emerging donors,’ China has been a notable aid donor to the region. The region must therefore be mindful of its wider foreign policy interests and the impact on political maneuvering away from traditional partners. Thirdly, the region must consider the impact of its economic engagements with China and the impact on its policy space to shape its agenda. The region can strategically engage China and Taiwan for a select few, to support its development agenda, especially given China’s activism in delivering foreign aid to the developing south on terms that some perceive to be more favorable than traditional aid donors. Important, however, is that while donor partners come with their objectives, a win–win strategy must be an indispensable denominator when engaging with any bilateral donor partner. The region’s engagement with both China and Taiwan 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500

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must thus be consistently underscored by its wider development goals and improving the efficacy of foreign aid to support such goals. Although China’s growth in the region has been noted, according to Wenner and Clarke (2016), ‘China’s total involvement and exposure in the Caribbean sub-region is small’ when compared with its engagement in other regions such as South Asia, Latin America, and Africa. China’s risk profile in the region is therefore lower. However, precisely because of its small size, the region’s risk profile from foreign multinationals and foreign donors is higher. GonzalezVicente and Montoute (2020) caution that while the Chinese model of development assistance may be viewed as transformative, the region ought to be weary of ‘Chinese capitalism.’ They note that the Chinese model of capitalism deviates from the traditional dependency linked to multinational firms ‘devoted to financial markets and shareholder value’ but gives way to a new mechanism of accumulation in the region that is linked to the Chinese ‘entrepreneurial state apparatus.’ This new approach they note requires spaces of exception such as waivers of customs duties on machinery imports or the deployment of Chinese workers in place of local workers, government-to-government negotiations that eschew transparency and undercut other potential contractors due to privileges rather than inherent capacity. These exceptions may create uneven development for indigenous Caribbean firms. Gonzalez-Vicente and Montoute (2020) are also of the opinion that ‘Chinese investments have not lifted the region from its development impasses’ and have sought to reinforce the external dependency that has long characterized the region’s growth and development experience. Further, the region’s capacity for forward-looking development strategies is compromised and emphasis is placed on natural resource exploitation and infrastructure spending, which could lead to a rising debt burden. Concerning trade, Gonzalez-Vicente and Montoute (2020) argue that China’s increased trade and competitiveness have exacerbated trade imbalances and have crowded-out other developing countries out of manufacturing activities and value chains. With some CARICOM states aligning themselves with China and others with Taiwan, the region faces a foreign policy coordination problem as regional interests must give way to national political interests (Girvan, 2011). The region is unable to deliver a cohesive response to political matters involving China and Taiwan such as supporting Taiwan’s membership in international organizations or matters that may require

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aligning with China or traditional Western allies. Gonzalez-Vicente and Montoute (2020) also see China’s diplomacy as bypassing CARICOM and causing a fracture in dialogue mechanisms because some members may be excluded.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations China and CARICOM’s economic relationship has evolved and is now characterized by higher levels of trade, foreign direct investment, and development assistance. The growth in the bilateral relationship between China and CARICOM is on account of the country’s adoption of its ‘Going out’ policy, which appears to emphasize South-South Cooperation; as well as a reward for the diplomatic embrace of the ‘One China’ policy. The latter is reflective of the diplomatic contest between China and Taiwan and the former points to the fact that the Caribbean is fundamentally part of China’s global capitalist vision. Relative to other sub-regions, China’s involvement in CARICOM has been smaller, a reality that perhaps points to the region’s relatively smaller markets and endowment of resources. Nonetheless, there have been benefits concerning investments, job creation, and the ability to export and earn foreign exchange. However, there have equally been concerns at the pace of China’s expansion, albeit still lower than traditional partners such as the United States; the experience in other regions of the world where the emphasis has been on infrastructure investment and what that means for debt sustainability and increased intrusion and external influence; implications for the region’s private sector from the exceptions that are carved to facilitate Chinese investors; the ability of the region to charter its development agenda and to be truly liberated from functional dependency; and the implications for regional foreign policy cohesion as a result of a lack of a unified response to the ‘One China policy.’ Given the attendant concerns, the region must manage its diplomatic relationships in a manner that reflects its recognition of where it finds itself in the global policy agenda of bilateral partners and what is necessary to achieve its own development goals. Therefore, bilateral engagements with China must be viewed through a strategic lens and consideration must be given to ensuring mutual gains. To this end, the following policy recommendations may be considered.

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– To shift the tide of the growing trade imbalance, it is necessary to expand exports. In this regard, Chinese investment could be directed to industries with significant export potential. – Exceptions made for investors must be driven by consideration of their competitive capacity to deliver quality investments. – Development finance should be directed to areas that would make a significant impact on regional development goals of increased trade and movement of people, such as in port facilities to allow for increased intra-regional trade. – While countries may have their bilateral goals, in the interest of regional cohesion, bilateral engagements with CARICOM should remain for the most part at the regional level, and not with individual member states.

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Gallagher, K. P., & Myers, M. (2022). China-Latin America Finance Database. Washington: Inter-American Dialogue. Available at: https://www.thedia logue.org/map_list/. Accessed on 15 September 2022. Girvan, N. (2011). CARICOM’s Original Sin. Paper presented at the CARICOM Regional Civil Society Consultation. Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 10–11 February Gonzalez-Vicente, R., & Montoute, A. (2020). A Caribbean perspective on China-Caribbean relations: Global IR, dependency and the postcolonial condition. Third World Quarterly, 42(2), 219–238. Grimm, S., Rank, R., Schickerling, E., & McDonald, M. (2011). Transparency of Chinese aid: An analysis of the published information on Chinese external financial flows. Publish What You Fund and Centre for Chinese Studies. http://www.aidtransparency.net/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/Tra nsparency-of-Chinese-Aid_final.pdf Gu, J. (2015). China’s new silk road to development cooperation: Opportunities and challenges. UNU Centre for Policy Research United Nations University. http://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/1803/UNUCPR_Chinas NewSilkRoad_Gu_.pdf Guillon, M., & Mathonnat,J. (2019). What can we learn on Chinese aid allocation motivations from available data? A sectorial analysis of Chinese aid to African countries. China Economic Review, Elsevier. Haibing, Z. (2017). “The Development and Transformation of China’s Foreign Aid.” Part of Chapter 8 | Sustainable Development in ‘Parallel Perspectives on the Global Economic Order’ A US-China Essay Collection. Edited by Daniel Remler and Ye Yu. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). (2019). Trade Trend Estimates Latin America and the Caribbean. Inter-American Development Bank. Jackson, J. T. (2005). China and the New Donors of Development Assistance: Theorizing the Future of the OECD Aid Apparatus. Jackson, J. T. (2019). China and the New Donors of Development Assistance: Theorizing the Future of the OECD Aid Apparatus. https://pubs.lib.umn. edu/index.php/reconsidering/article/view/2076/1640 Johnson, Z. A. (2021). A New Era? Trends in China’s financing for international development cooperation. Donor Tracker Insights. Kitano, N., & Harada, Y. (2016). Estimating China’s Foreign Aid 2001–2013. Journal of International Development, 28(7), 1050–1074. https://doi.org/ 10.1002/jid.3081, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com Lakatos, C., Maliszewska, M., Osorio-Rodarte, I., & Go, D. S. (2016). China’s slowdown and rebalancing: potential growth and poverty impacts on SubSaharan Africa. Washington D.C.: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank. org/curated/en/976611468194051601/pdf/WPS7666.pdf

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Luu, H. N. (2019). Infrastructure and economic development in developing economies: New empirical evidence from night-time satellite imagery in Vietnam. International Journal of Social Economics. Lynch, L. A. (2020). China’s Foreign Aid: A Primer for Recipient Countries, Donors, and Aid Providers. Center for Global Development. McNeely, C.L. (2012). World polity theory. In G. Ritzer (Ed.), The wileyblackwell encyclopedia of globalization. https://doi.org/10.1002/978047 0670590.wbeog834 Oh, Y. A. (2020). Chinese development aid to Asia: Size and motives. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 5(3), 223–234. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 2057891119836521 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)a. The 0.7% GNI/ODA Target- A history. https://www.oecd.org/dac/financingsustainable-development/development-finance-standards/the07odagnitargetahistory.htm Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)b. Official Development Assistance. https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainabledevelopment/development-finance-standards/the07odagnitarget-ahistory. htm Poskitt, A., Shankland, A. & Taela, K. (2016). Civil Society from the BRICS: Emerging Roles in the New International Development Landscape. Institute of Development Studies. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a 08960e5274a27b2000051/ER173.pdf Qian, N. (2021). The case for Chinese foreign aid. https://www.project-syn dicate.org/commentary/economic-benefits-of-chinese-foreign-aid-by-nancyqian-1-2021-11?barrier=accesspaylog Qian, N. (2021b). Commentary: China’s foreign aid has ulterior motives but provides critical help to poorer nations. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/ commentary/china-world-belt-road-foreign-aid-infrastructure-development2301036 Robinson, W. (2015). The transnational state and the BRICS: A global capitalism perspective. Third World Quarterly, 36(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 01436597.2015.976012 Robinson, W. (2017). Debate on the new global capitalism: Transnational capital class, Transnational state apparatuses, and global crisis. International Critical Thought, 7 , 2171–2189. Shambaugh, D. (2015). China’s soft power push. Foreign Affairs. Accessed on 7 September 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-0616/china-s-soft-power-push State Council. (2011). White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid. Beijing, China: Xinhua/Information Office of the State Council. http://english.gov.cn/arc hive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284620.htm

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State Council. (2014). White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid. Beijing, China: Xinhua/Information Office of the State Council. http://english.gov.cn/arc hive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986592.htm Strange, A. M., Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., & Tierney, M. J. (2017). Tracking underreported financial flows: China’s development finance and the aid–conflict nexus revisited. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(5), 935–963. United Nations Development Programme - UNDP (2015). China’s humanitarian aid. Issues Brief. http://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/ library/south-south-cooperation/issue-brief--chinas-humanitarian-aid.html United Nations Economic Commission (ECLAC) and (OECD). (2018). Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)/ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Emerging challenges and shifting paradigms. New perspectives on international cooperation for development. United Nations Publication. Varrall, V. (2016). Domestic actors and agendas in Chinese aid policy. The Pacific Review, 29(1), 21–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1066414 Wang, H. (2016). A deeper look at China’s “going out” policy. Centre for International Governance Innovation. https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/ files/hongying_wang_mar2016_web.pdf Wenner, M., & Clarke, D. (2016). Chinese Rise in the Caribbean. InterAmerican Development Bank. Technical Note No IDN-TN-1073. Woods, N. (2008). Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors, and the silent revolution in development assistance. International Affairs, 84(6), 1205–1221. Yuan Sun, I., Jayaram, K. & Kassir, O. (2017). Dance of the lions and dragons. How are Africa and China engaging, and how will the partnership evolve? McKinsey & Company. http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/middleeast-and-africa/the-closest-look-yet-at-chineseeconomic-engagement-in-africa Zhang, D., & Smith, G. (2017). China’s foreign aid system: Structure, agencies, and identities. Third World Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597. 2017.1333419 Zhang, D. (2017). Why cooperate with others? Demystifying China’s trilateral aid cooperation. The Pacific Review, 30(5), 750–768. https://doi.org/10. 1080/09512748.2017.1296886 Zimmermann, F., & Smith, K. (2011). More actors, more money, more ideas for international development co-operation. Journal of International Development, 23(5), 722–738.

CHAPTER 12

The Belt and Road Initiative, China, Taiwan, and Brazil Charalampos Harry Stamelos and Konstantinos Tsimaras

Introduction The People’s Republic of China (PRC/China) initiated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and many countries are now part of it. Brazil, however, is not a member of the BRI. Nevertheless, the PRC and Brazil have developed strong bilateral relations. In parallel, Taiwan and Brazil also developed strong bilateral relations, even if Taiwan has lost its official status as an UN-recognized state since 1971 (Stamelos & Tsimaras, 2022).

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and

C. H. Stamelos (B) · K. Tsimaras European University Cyprus Law School, Nicosia, Cyprus e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_12

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Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela are, as of Spring 2023, participating in the BRI by signing the relevant Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the PRC. Brazil is not participating in China’s BRI. There is little hope that this will change during the Presidency of Lula in 2023 (Bernhard, 2022). The idea of “reviving” the ancient Silk Road by consolidating a double corridor, one part land-based and the other maritime, across the Eurasian space was first made public by President Xi Jinping in 2013 when he used a speech to envision a twenty-first-century maritime Silk Road. As of 2018, the initiative, renamed Belt and Road, focused on two corridors: the Silk Road Economic Belt, which connects China to Central and South Asia and eventually Europe, and the New Maritime Silk Road, which connects China to Southeast Asia, the Gulf states, North Africa, and Europe (Abdenur, 2019, pp. 153–155). Concerning the political sphere, China has become somewhat more willing to speak out on the internal affairs of other states, particularly when its leadership feels that the One China policy has come under threat. Because Latin America is the region of the world with the largest number of countries that maintain ties to Taiwan as well as a place where some countries have switched allegiances, the Chinese government is particularly attentive and sensitive to shifts in foreign policy toward China. The BRI is somewhere between a vision and a project and it remains a moving target-consequently, so are China-Brazil relations (Abdenur, 166). It seems that China is deepening its influence in Brazil (Stuenkel, 2019).

China and Brazil The PRC has become a global power (Feigenbaum, 2022), but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that the PRC exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices. Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, while Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are mostly ignored by Western policymakers in particular.

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China and the Imperatives of Brazil’s Economic Development Brazil initiated diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1974, three years after the PRC’s recognition by the United Nations (Stamelos & Tsimaras, 2022), but economic ties have continued to become solid in the last twenty years. Bilateral relations have grown steadily, driven by commerce, foreign direct investment (FDI), infrastructure, and financing of various projects (Hiratuka, 2019). Apart from the impressive growth of the Chinese economy due to the economic reforms started in the late 1970s, contrary to the declining Soviet economy, the PRC’s industrial acceleration, fast urbanization, and substantial expansion of infrastructure have affected both the amounts of goods needed in the PRC and the prices Chinese pay for those in markets (Farooki & Kaplinsky, 2012). The PRC’s economic growth affected commodity markets and prices for countries throughout Latin America. Due to Brazil’s size and the significance of commodity exports for its economy, Chinese demand became a particularly important factor, influencing the primary sector of the economy (farming, mining) through increased bilateral trade flows.

Imports-Exports: Trade Numbers of China and Brazil Brazilian exports to the PRC grew rapidly and reached a remarkable $67.8 billion in 2020. In relative terms, the PRC went from a nearly 2% share of Brazilian exports in 2000 to 32.4% in 2020. On the import side, the imports from the PRC reached $34.8 billion in 2020, or 21.9% of total Brazilian imports that year. In 2020, Brazil’s trade surplus with the PRC was $33 billion, accounting for roughly two-thirds of Brazil’s total trade surplus of $51 billion. The international trade data in this section is based on Brazilian official statistics (Brazilian Ministry of Economy, 2022, McGeever, 2021). Despite this growth in bilateral commerce, observers have raised concerns because Brazilian exports have been mainly concentrated in primary commodities, while imports from the PRC have included a varied set of manufactured commodities (Hiratuka, 2018a; Jenkins, 2015). The data presented in Fig. 12.1/Image 12.1 clearly show the contrast in the composition of trade flows between Brazil and the PRC. Brazil’s exports are of primary commodities, mainly food (e.g., soybeans), metals (such

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as iron ore), and oil (petroleum). In 2020, these goods covered approximately seventy-five percent of all Brazilian exports to the PRC (Brazilian Ministry of Economy, 2022). The PRC’s exports are industrial products such as electronics, industrial equipment, automotive components, chemicals, textiles, and apparel (Hiratuka & Sarti, 2016).

Fig. 12.1 China-Brazil Merchandise trade by product class (2001–2020) (Source United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Merchandise Trade Matrix in Thousands United States Dollars, Annual, 2001–2020,” https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx? ReportId=217476

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A 2021 report published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) argues that Brazil shares these characteristics of commodity dependence with other countries under economic development, amounting to long-term low economic growth, macroeconomic instability, and difficulties in raising productivity and diversifying the composition of the country’s economy (UNCTAD, 2021). Under President Jair Bolsonaro and Minister of Economy Paulo Guedes, Brazil turned to a liberal vision of economic policymaking. Lula is expected to follow a different economic path after his re-election in 2023 and in the following years (Carvahlo & Beck, 2023). In early January 2023, political supporters of Bolsonaro caused riots against the elected government of Lula due to political and economic tensions.

China-Brazil and Environmental Issues Environmental concerns (Ascensão et al., 2018) have added another layer of complexities to these economic debates since commodity extraction and harvesting can have a negative environmental impact (CEBRI, 2019; Reed & Hui, 2022). The main worry in Brazil has been deforestation caused by the expansion of soybean and livestock production in important ecosystems such as the Amazon rainforest and the Cerrado (Fearnside & Figueiredo, 2015). According to a study carried out by a nonprofit institution specializing in environmental reporting and a group called Trase that measures the environmental impact of commodity supply chains, “in 2017 soy imports into PRC were associated with 6.5 million tons of CO2 emissions linked to deforestation for soy expansion in the Amazon and Cerrado. This represents 43 percent of all CO2 emissions risk from soy deforestation in these regions” (CDP & Trase, 2019). Brazil has attempted to play a strategic role in the global food security agenda. It has also been prominent in global discussions on environmental sustainability and renewable energy (Teixeira & Rossi, 2020). However, the election of Bolsonaro counterbalanced the country’s image because of his ambiguous environmental policies, which have resulted in the spread of fires and deforestation. These studies and others point to a need for Brazil to rethink bilateral trade relations with external partners by making environmental sustainability a pillar of its national economic and commercial strategies, considering the centrality of environmentalism to global multilateralism. It may be even more important with the PRC, given the role that sustainability increasingly plays in its

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long-term development strategy (Holzman & Grünberg, 2021). In 2023 Lula is expected to deepen Brazil’s multilateral relations with China not only in the economic sector, but also in sustainable development, and cooperation against the climate crisis and environmental issues. Notably, economic concerns over Brazil’s industrial and technological development and misgivings about environmental and social sustainability affect not only trade with Brazil and China but also Chinese investment in Brazil.

China-Brazil and Investments In the 2010s, what had been a trade-centric relationship began to shift as the two governments and both Brazilian and Chinese firms started putting greater emphasis on Foreign Direct Investments. The PRC’s support for the internationalization of Chinese companies, reinforced beginning in 2013 with the rollout of the infrastructure investment push known as the BRI, became an important driver for Chinese companies to increase their presence in many countries around the world, including Brazil, even if Brazil does not participate officially in the BRI (Hiratuka, 2018b). However, the BRI alone does not explain the growing profile of Chinese firms in Brazil’s domestic market. This trend also has stemmed from other factors like the opportunities afforded by the huge potential size of Brazil’s market, its open business environment with few restrictions on foreign companies (at least until the administration of Bolsonaro in 2022), and the availability of important Brazilian assets for foreign players to acquire (Jaguaribe, 2018; Schutte, 2020). Moreover, before Bolsonaro took office, Brazilian foreign policy— especially under at that time former president Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, known colloquially as Lula—sought greater alignment with countries in the Global South and especially with the PRC. Lula was reelected in 2023. For its part, too, the Chinese government underscored the importance of Latin America during this period, launching a regional strategy for Latin America for the first time in 2008 (Xinhua News Agency, 2008), which it then updated in 2016 (State Council of PRC, 2016). Although this document covered all of Latin America, it highlighted the importance of Brazil for Chinese policymaking in the region and sought to leverage the two countries’ joint membership in the BRICS group (along with Russia, India, and South Africa) to improve relations. This diplomatic attention was then supplemented with various strategies and documents released

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bilaterally, such as the joint Ten-Year Cooperation Plan launched in 2012 and the 2015–2021 Joint Action Plan that the PRC and Brazil concluded in 2015 (Government of Brazil, 2012, 2015; Rosito, 2020) Official statistics from the Brazilian Central Bank prove (Central Bank of Brazil, 2020a, 2020b) that, in 2005, Chinese investment stock in Brazil was approximately $327 million, or a tiny 0.2% of the country’s total stock of foreign investment. By 2010, Chinese investment stock had risen to $7.9 billion and had reached 1.3%. This rising is impressive both in absolute numbers and in percentage increase. However, the most robust growth occurred between 2010 and 2019, with the stock of Chinese Foreign Direct Investments reaching $28.1 billion, as the PRC was high in the rankings of Brazil’s leading foreign investors. While long-standing partners including the United States, Spain, France, and Japan remained the leading partners of Brazil, the PRC was one of the fastest-growing foreign investors during that decade. The total volume of Chinese investments in Brazil announced and confirmed between 2007 and 2020 was $66.1 billion, with forty-eight percent directed to electricity generation, followed by oil and gas operations (twenty-eight percent) and metal and mineral extraction (7%) (Cariello, 2021). The manufacturing industry had only a six percent share. Moreover, China-Brazil Product Cooperation Fund has operated since 2015. Macau plays an important role in connecting China with Brazil, as Macau is a Portuguese language state and Brazil is also a Portuguese language state. “The symbolism that involves the Macau Forum is only understandable when acknowledging the Macau SAR as a point of encounter of the Lusophone culture. This is the result of the colonial architectural legacy and language, details negotiated during Sino-Portuguese negotiations, but also of the support to the Portuguese language and Lusophone events by the Chinese administration” (Mendes, 2014). With a unique geographical location, “the Hengqin In-depth Cooperation Zone is involved in both domestic and international circulation and enjoys the combined advantage of policies from four special areas, including the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area, the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions, Free Trade Zones nearby, and the In-depth Cooperation Zone itself. It is designed to innovatively combine two institutions, with aims to promote the bidirectional

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opening-up of China, and the development of a diversified economy and modern finance in Macau. Continued outbreaks of the COVID-19 pandemic have dealt a major blow to Macau’s economic and social development. Modern finance, with its high added value, has now become the most important support for Macao’s diversified economy. With joint efforts of the industry and support from local government, Macau’s financial industry is expanding in a digital and green direction with more offshore and cross-border business” (World Finance, 2022), including Brazil.

Brazil’s Deindustrialization and Chinese Company BYD Brazil has been for the last three decades in a continuous process of deindustrialization, measured by losses in the share of value-added manufacturing in terms of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). “Brazil’s indicator dropped from 14.7% in 1990 to 9.9% in 2020. Thus, when measured against other emerging economies (excluding the PRC), Brazil’s share of value-added manufacturing slipped from 14% in 1990 to 7.4% in 2020 and from 2.5% to 1.3 measured against the world as a whole. This drop in Brazil’s comparative standing has been especially pronounced in the last decade, a period of turmoil in the world economy as a result of the global financial crisis and the growing adoption of emerging technologies associated with the Fourth Industrial Revolution. A Shenzhen-based Chinese company called BYD has had manufacturing operations in Brazil since 2015. BYD was founded in 1995 and left an early mark in the production of batteries, especially for the mobile phone industry. From there, the conglomerate diversified rapidly to other parts of the electronics industry, and in the early 2000s, it moved into automotive production. More recently, the group has made investments to integrate various energy-related activities, including the production of batteries, solar panels, and electric mobility products, becoming a global leader in the production of electric cars. The case analysis of BYD (batteries for electric buses and solar panels) in a time of the diplomatic rapprochement between Brazil and the PRC is addressed. In 2014 Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Brazil, followed by a 2015 visit by Prime Minister Li Keqiang. During Xi’s visit, BYD announced the first project, batteries for

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electric buses, and during Li’s visit, BYD announced the second project on solar panels. BYD is just one example of the PRC’s economic engagement with trading partners around the world, but it is quite representative of a new phase of the Chinese economy, that has been increasingly concerned with environmental sustainability and moving toward more knowledge-based and technology-intensive sectors. This transition opens new possibilities for partnerships with Brazil and other Latin American countries that go beyond the commodity-exporting arrangements that have been consolidated over the last twenty years. However, effectively taking advantage of these opportunities is an arduous task that requires long-term organizational foresight and planning to mobilize and coordinate policies among different levels of government including various ministries. Furthermore, such policies must be insulated over the long term from the region’s frequent changes in political tides, so that it is possible to consolidate the next two decades of growth on a mutually beneficial basis” (Xiaohong, 2018).

China and Brazil: BRI in 2023 and Beyond China may attempt to formally include Brazil in the BRI in 2023 or the following years. However, if the administration of Lula is incentivized to participate in the BRI remains unclear. Brazil has reasons to avoid deepening Brazil-China ties through the BRI. China is still Brazil’s top trading partner with an active investment presence, and despite a lack of Chinese policy bank or commercial bank loans to Brazil since 2020, China remains a sizeable economic influence. As Isabel Bernhard clearly states: “Brazil appears to be reaping many rewards of formal BRI accession without formally committing. Deciding to join the BRI now (on 1/ 1/2023), in a geopolitical moment of US-China tensions, would likely be seen as a pro-China and anti-US diplomatic maneuver, which Brazil may seek to avoid” (Bernhard, 2022).

Taiwan and Brazil The ROC (ROC, also known as “Taiwan” and in older times “Formosa”) and the Federative Republic of Brazil do not have official diplomatic relations, as Brazil acknowledges the One-PRC policy. However, the two nations maintain unofficial diplomatic relations via economic and

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cultural offices. Formal relations between the Empire of Brazil and the Qing dynasty were established in September 1880 with the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. The Chinese refused, however, to permit Brazilians to hire Chinese as contract laborers, knowing that non-white laborers were treated “as machines or as cheap labor.” The British were also opposed to the importation of Chinese labor to Brazil, believing it would inevitably result in de facto slavery. (Slavery in Brazil was only abolished in 1888.) Late in 1893, José de Costa Azevedo, Baron of Ladario, went to Beijing to negotiate a new treaty on immigration, but the Chinese were uninterested (Lesser, 1999, p. 29). Relations continued under the ROC on its founding in 1912 which Brazil recognized and maintained even after the central government was moved to the former Japanese colony of Taiwan (1895–1945) (National Taiwan University, 2013). In 1912, when the ROC was founded, Brazil was the first country to establish diplomatic relations with the ROC. After 1949, the government of the ROC moved to Taipei City; in 1974, the government of the ROC and the government of Brazil terminated official diplomatic relations. In 1971, Brazil voted against United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 which replaced the ROC with the PRC at the United Nations, but from August 15, 1974, Brazil recognized the PRC and suspended diplomatic relations with the ROC (Taiwan, “中华人民共和国与各国建立外交关系日期简表”. www.gov.cn). After diplomatic relations between Taiwan and Brazil were suspended, both diplomatic missions were replaced by representative offices. The Taiwanese government established the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Brazil (Chinese: 駐巴西臺北經濟文化代表處) at Brasília (“巴 西-里約熱內盧 - 外交部領事事務局全球資訊網”. boca.gov.tw), and two other offices in São Paulo (Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in São Paulo, 2023) and Rio de Janeiro. The office in Rio de Janeiro was closed in 2002. The government of Brazil similarly established the Commercial Office of Brazil in Taipei (Portuguese: Escritório Comercial do Brasil em Taipé, Chinese: 巴西商務辦事處) in the capital of Taiwan.

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Taiwan and Brazil: Trade Relations and Investments Taiwan is one of Brazil’s most important trade partners in Asia. The main export products from Brazil to Taiwan are ore, soybean, corn, wood, steel, cotton, leather, and granite. Brazil is its eighteenth trade partner Taiwan. The main products which Taiwan exports to Brazil are electrical equipment, record equipment, LCD, steel products, and plastic products (Bureau of International Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, National File, “經濟部國際貿易局::: 國家檔”. trade.gov.tw). Many Taiwanese electronic companies have established factories in Brazil. AS Foxconn, Asus, Compal, Gigabyte, Acer, and D-Link are some of the firms. Brazil is the second largest trading partner in Latin America. In 2021, Brazil was Taiwan’s 25th-largest trading partner and 21st-largest export destination. Bilateral trade between Brazil and Taiwan totaled US$4.26 billion in 2021. Brazil’s exports to Taiwan in 2021 amounted to US$2.63 billion, while Taiwan’s exports to Brazil amounted to US$1.63 billion. The industries of Taiwan and Brazil are highly complementary with great potential and room for an increase in the bilateral trade between the two sides (Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2022) (Figs. 12.2, 12.3, and 12.4). Brazil has a population of more than 210 million and is the second most attractive country for Taiwanese investors in Latin America after Mexico, particularly for the technological industry. Major Taiwanese investments include Foxconn, Asus, Compal Electronics, Acer, Braview, New Kinpo, Advantech, Delta, Askey, Pegatron, etc. In the nineteenth century, China and Brazil established diplomatic relations, and the Chinese also immigrated to Brazil, to work in agriculture or handyman (Xiyong, 2009).

Immigrants from Taiwan to Brazil: A Historic Approach In the 1950s, the Brazilian government advised the Taiwanese government to encourage Taiwanese immigrants to Brazil to help develop agriculture, Taiwanese people show a high willingness to participate in immigrating to Brazil. Significant immigration of Taiwanese to Brazil started in the 1960s. Most Taiwanese Brazilian were farmers from Kaohsiung. Many Taiwanese Brazilian now live in São Paulo, Rio Grande

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Fig. 12.2 Taiwanese total trade statistics with Brazil (2021) (Source Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Foreign Trade)

Fig. 12.3 Taiwanese major exports to Brazil (2021) (Source Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Foreign Trade)

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Fig. 12.4 Taiwanese major imports from Brazil (2021) (Source Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Foreign Trade)

do Sul, Paraná, and Rio de Janeiro. In northern Brazil, the fifth-largest city Recife is another main settlement of Taiwanese Brazilian, mostly from Meinong, Kaohsiung (中時電子報, 書刊頻道 - 中時電子報.). In the suburbs of São Paulo, over one hundred Taiwanese Brazilians established mushroom farms that supply all of Brazil (Li, 1991). Taiwan’s population was affected by immigration which was a major feature before 1895 during the rule of the Qing government. More specifically, immigrants from mainland PRC began to enter Taiwan (including Penghu). In the study of Taiwan’s immigration history, we found that the immigration of Han people to Taiwan occurred. Taiwanese also moved out of Taiwan. After 1895, Taiwan became a colony of the Japanese Empire, and the Taiwanese began to accept immigrants from the mainland of the PRC (Li, 1991). The reasons for moving outside the mainland of PRC include economics, study and employment, etc. to regions and countries, mainly Japan and Southeast Asia. After 1949, based on national security considerations, the Chinese government adopted a controlling attitude toward immigration, limiting the number of immigrants going abroad (Xiyong, 2009). However, to stabilize the status of the ROC in the United

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Nations, the Taiwan government’s foreign affairs policy aimed at the acquiescence of the United States, to obtain recognition and support from Japan and the United States as an important goal (Li, 1991). The Brazilian government welcomed Taiwanese immigrants, but the Taiwanese government due to the Taiwanese immigration plan had a supportive attitude and dispatched agricultural technicians to Brazil to assist in the development of the agricultural economy. However, Taiwanese people have set off a wave of immigrants, including those from urban and rural areas including people of Kaohsiung Meinong, Neipu, and Gaoshu towns, selling land, ancestral property, or quitting a job to finance payments to achieve emigration (Li, 1991). After the Taiwanese immigrated to Brazil, they flew to Sao Paulo and Haixi (or Haixi, Recife) and other cities—residential centers, and Haixi is especially the settlement of the Meinong people in Kaohsiung. In addition, some works discuss Chinese immigration to Central and South America after 1949 from the perspective of immigration as a whole. The words “as a whole” clearly imply a “holistic analysis” (Stamelos, 2020, 2023). Due to the hard work of the Taiwanese people and the flexible operation methods, they finally established a good reputation in different countries, including Brazil. Among the Taiwanese who immigrated to Brazil, there were many families engaged in farming (Xiyong, 2010). Taiwanese immigration to Japan and the United States and Brazil was an interesting fact in the sense that Taiwanese people, as Japanese and Koreans to Brazil, were seen as part of a growing trend of global economic power (Buechler, 2004). From the perspective of immigration as a whole, we should start from the mid-1960s, when immigrants from Taiwan and Hong Kong were indeed pioneers in carrying out new immigration trends (Kuhn, 2008). Chinese immigration after World War I was different from Chinese labor immigration in the late nineteenth century, for example, the immigration of technical personnel (Xiyong, 2012). Since 1908 Japanese immigrants have been settling en masse in Brazil as farmers, and today they dominate the agricultural produce market to the extent that Brazilians say “If the Japanese go on strike, all of Brazil will starve.” The one exception is mushrooms, which are widely used in Latin American cooking. Currently, eighty-five percent of Brazilian mushrooms are grown by immigrants from Taiwan (Li, 1991). Near the town of Mogi, an hour’s

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drive from Sao Paulo, where the highway passes by a Taiwanese Presbyterian church, mushroom sheds stretch as far as the eye can see. “As soon as you see the silvery glint of these mushroom sheds, wrapped in foil sheeting for protection against wind and rain, you know you’re ‘among your folks,’” says Pastor Chi Tsung-nan from Changhua, Taiwan, in an irrepressible tone of joy and pride (Li, 1991). “One feature of Chinese Brazilians is their way of settling in groups to offer mutual assistance in setting up businesses. Like the Japanese immigrants, many have gone into agriculture; but the Chinese arrived much later–mostly coming over from Taiwan only in the last 30 years” (Li, 1991).

Immigrants from Taiwan to Brazil: True Stories Back then “Taiwan was struggling and its economic development had only just got off the ground.” Hsu Tieh, sometime chairman of the Brazilian Taiwanese Association and currently the owner of a textile plant, notes that economic necessity compelled him to emigrate: “I worked hard as a ready-made clothing wholesaler, but barely made enough to feed and clothe my seven children. When a friend mentioned you could make an easy living in Brazil, I jumped at the chance” (Li, 1991). Arriving alone in Brazil in 1963 with US$200 in his pocket, Hsu Tieh first took a casual job in a “chiao-tzu” eatery (many early Chinese immigrants ran shops of this sort), and also worked as a farm watchman. He thought of giving it all up, but he didn’t even have the money to pay his fare home. Today Hsu Tieh owns a huge luxury home in Sao Paulo. In the boom decades of the 1950s to 1970s, Brazil was a risk-taker paradise. Chen Lung-chi, a practicing engineer with over 20 years of experience with a multinational company, recalls with amazement: “As an only slightly experienced technical expert you could easily find a job with a big multinational paying US$2,000–3,000 a month, no sweat, and vastly attractive compared to earning just NT$10,000 a month in Taiwan” (Li, 1991). Liu Chen-sheng, chairman of National Taiwan University Alumni in Brazil and a design engineer at the world’s largest hydroelectric power station—Itaipu—typifies another sort of immigrant. His ultimate goal was the United States: “People told me Brazil was so near America you could drive there (in fact, Sao Paulo is an 11-hour flight from Los Angeles), so like an idiot, I came” (Li, 1991).

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Many others like Liu Chen-sheng first came to Brazil as a steppingstone to the United States but were happy enough to stay. “To me, Brazil seemed just great; weather and scenery apart, the people were so kind, you could find a highly paid job without knowing a word of Portuguese, your workmates would offer to teach you Portuguese and show you a good time,” enthuses Liu. “Like the Bible story of Abraham’s journey to the Promised Land of Canaan, we do thank the Lord for leading us to Brazil where our community has settled down and grown,” says Mogi Presbyterian church pastor Chi Tsung-nan. This story goes back to the early 1960s, when Presbyterian congregations in Yuantou and Chichou rural districts of Changhua county happened to hear about Brazil’s life of plenty and its liberal immigration policy, and bearing in mind Taiwan’s limited land, high population density, and poor prospects for farmers, they decided without hesitation. Rev. Chi Tsung-nan’s uncle Chi Ching-cheng, an elder of the Yuantou Presbyterian church, made all the arrangements and gathered together six families from the congregation to apply for immigration as farmers, and the group of 32 set off for Brazil taking their farmers’ spades, steaming baskets, and grinding stones along with them. Five days after arriving in Brazil, Chi Ching-cheng and his six farming families jointly bought a farm alongside the highway from Sao Paulo to Rio. This six-hectare farm bought for US$4,000 became home to the six families and the base of the now roughly 86-household Taiwanese Presbyterian community around Mogi. The tiny church the original six families erected with their own hands still stands there today. These Presbyterians not only identify with one another as members of a single church, but they also share a common business interest—cooperative mushroom farming. The 65 Presbyterian mushroom-farming families in the locality have made the area Brazil’s main source of mushrooms. Their mushroom growers’ association, set up seven years ago, meets twice or three times a year to negotiate mushroom prices. “This eliminates the hostile competition and wildly fluctuating prices we used to get, to the benefit of all,” is how Chi Tsung-nan sums up the key points of this rare example of solidarity within the overseas Chinese community (Li, 1991). “Golden days are always quick to pass. In the late 1970s, the overseas Chinese community was racked by internecine strife, and Brazil’s economy took a turn for the worse. Those with the means to do so sought safety in the United States; many with no alternative returned home to Taiwan” (Li, 1991).

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The Recognition of the PRC and Taiwan after 1974: A Turning Point “Brazil’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking in 1974 was a major turning point,” says one Chinese resident. After that, “political partisanship heated up, and struggles broke out between left-wing and right-wing groups, and between supporters and opponents of Taiwan independence. And when Taiwan carried out an anti-crime sweep in 1984 several underworld figures and economic criminals fled to Brazil, adding to the complexity of the problem.” It was in 1984 that the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission’s local adviser Liao Chun-ming and the deputy chairman of the Brazilian Chinese Association Chien TangChiang were both assassinated. After that the community was plagued with rumors and everyone feared for their safety. Fortunately, these violent elements in the community wiped each other out, the dialogue was established between those with different political ideas, and chilly relations across the Taiwan Straits were gradually normalized. The overseas Chinese community has quietened down, and although there are still many small cliques—for a community numbering only 100,000 there are nearly 100 Chinese associations of all kinds—in general the established overseas Chinese, the Taiwanese immigrants, and the new arrivals from the mainland of the PRC over the past decade are all getting on well enough (Li, 1991). Outside influences have had a more serious effect. Brazil’s economy rapidly deteriorated after the first energy crisis in the 1970s, and the overseas Chinese saw all the fruits of 20 years of hard work eaten away in a decade by economic decline, inflation, and deteriorating social order. The golden days lost their luster; the immigrants’ paradise altered for the worse. It was a process too painful to look back on. According to Chen Lung-chi, who only mustered up courage two years ago to resign from the post he had held for more than 20 years, the multinational company he worked for started to go downhill after 1978 and won fewer and fewer engineering contracts, while those it did win were hampered by government procedures and delay. Originally, a simple engineer, Chen Lung-chi, was now compelled to negotiate repayment claims and budget allocations with the Ministry of Finance, a hopeless task for an outsider to Brazil like himself, lacking in personal clout. “My salary was steadily cut back from US$3,000 until by 1982 it was difficult for me to earn US$1,000. And I couldn’t afford to live on my capital.” Chen Lung-chi’s quiet voice

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takes on a tone of self-mockery and hopelessness: “Everyone said just wait a while, things will soon look up. But they never did….” As the owner of a six-hectare coffee plantation employing Japanese and Brazilian laborers, Li Jung-pin is one of the better-off members of the overseas Chinese community. But comparing himself to Taiwan’s nouveau riche he can’t help sighing: “The wheel has turned, and today we’re poor cousins compared to our relations back in Taiwan.” Economic decline, inflation, and deteriorating social order … taken all in all, most Taiwanese immigrants still live quietly, but hints of social instability have spurred many to think about more than just earning as much as they can. Third and fourth-generation Japanese immigrants are packing their bags and leaving in droves, and many Taiwanese immigrants are saying under their breath “maybe it’s time to go back home” (Li, 1991). “How hard it is, though, to say goodbye to a fine phase of your life that fills you with gratitude. Many Taiwanese immigrants aren’t willing to turn their backs on Brazil, which took them in and where they’ve built up their lives from scratch, or to kiss goodbye to their initial desire to carve out a new paradise for themselves. They are providing for their children to attend the top schools in Brazil so that they can establish themselves here, but are also forcing them to speak Mandarin and spend regular holidays in Taiwan, and encouraging them to date opposite-sex friends within the Chinese community … all in the interests of providing them with more choice. This all smacks of contradiction and inner struggle. But as firstgeneration immigrants who’ve tasted the fruits and disappointments of settling down in a distant land, what sort of future are they hoping to give their children? This is maybe the most nagging question for Brazil’s immigrants from Taiwan! To what kind of future does the long road of immigration lead? This is the problem that most concern many Taiwanese immigrants. Establishing all these mushroom sheds in a foreign land is a worthy testimony to the toughness and survival capability of Taiwanese immigrants. Six families from the same congregation in Changhua built this Presbyterian church with their bare hands brick by brick, and it still stands today. Mainland and Taiwanese children alike enjoy having a good time playing ball at the Catholic church. One major feature of immigrants to Brazil is that they arrived in groups bringing friends and family along too.

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Li Jung-pin, who came with his grandmother, typifies Hakka clan immigration. Several Catholic priests from Hopeh traveled to Europe long ago, acquired fluent Portuguese, and were of considerable assistance to early Taiwanese immigrants to Brazil. Shown here is Fr. Ho Yen-chao. Robberies are frequent in the Oriental quarter, even the temple is fitted with metal doors. The Kuan-yin Temple in the inner city’s oriental quarter is a busy place of worship dedicated to Taiwan folk deities” (Li, 1991).

Taiwan As Chinese Taipei in the Olympic Games OF RIO 2016 in Brazil Taiwan is allowed to participate independently in the Olympic Games every four years. The official name of Taiwan is Chinese Taipei because: The name dispute comes from China’s claim to Taiwan, which is officially called the Republic of China (ROC). The country is referred to as Chinese Taipei at all editions of the Olympic Games and they are not allowed their flag or anthem. These terms were agreed upon in the late 1970s after China rejected allowing the country to participate independently at the 1976 Summer Games in Montreal. Taiwan boycotted the Games in the Canadian city and the following edition in Moscow four years later after they were not permitted to use the ROC name. They participated for the first time as Chinese Taipei, a nation that technically does not exist, at the 1984 Winter Olympics in Sarajevo. It came after the IOC passed the Nagoya Resolution, forcing Taiwan to use the name Chinese Taipei and banning its Olympic Committee from using the ROC flag or national anthem. (Giles, 2018)

“The ROC’s China National Amateur Athletic Federation (CNAAF) was first recognized by IOC in 1924 as China’s national Olympic committee” (Lin, 2008, pp. 195, 262). In 1949, the ROC Olympic Committee along with most of its members fled with the ROC government to Taiwan but still claimed jurisdiction over the entirety of China. In October 1949, the PRC reorganized the remaining CNAAF into the All-China Athletic Federation (ACAF) and also claimed jurisdiction over all of China, including Taiwan. Thus began the conflict between the two Olympic committees. The PRC did not officially contact the IOC until 1952. In July 1952, in the IOC’s (International Olympic Committee) fortyseventh Session held in Helsinki, Finland, the IOC decided that both the ROC and PRC could participate in the 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games

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in those events in which they had been recognized by the respective international sports federations. But the ROC decided to withdraw, and according to T’ang, the PRC sent only one swimmer to compete in the Helsinki games. In the IOC’s forty-ninth Session held in Athens, Greece in May 1954, the PRC’s Olympic committee was officially recognized by the IOC (Lin, 2008). The name the PRC used was the “Olympic Committee of the Chinese Republic,” but this name was later changed to the “Olympic Committee of the People’s Democratic Republic of China” at the fifty-third IOC Session in Sofia, Bulgaria in 1957. Both the ROC and PRC’s IOC Members, Shou-i Tung and Zhengting Wang respectively, attended the fiftieth IOC Session held in Paris in June 1955, which was the first time that the ROC and PRC IOC Members appeared together in an IOC meeting. In the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games, the IOC originally asked the ROC to be listed as Formosa-China, under the letter “F,” and the PRC listed as Peking-China, under the letter “P.” However, the PRC withdrew from the games, and the ROC thus participated as “China Republic” under “C” (Lin, 2008). The PRC subsequently withdrew from the IOC completely in 1958 and announced that as long as the ROC and Avery Brundage, the IOC president at the time from the United States, remained in the IOC, the PRC would never join the IOC. In short, the ROC and PRC memberships were co-listed in IOC publications from May 14, 1954, to August 19, 1958. The ROC’s Olympic committee was usually named the “Chinese (National) Olympic Committee” and the PRC’s was the “Olympic Committee of the People’s Republic of China.” In the fifty-fifth IOC Session held in Munich, Germany in May 1959, the British, American, New Zealand, and Brazilian IOC Members made a suggestion approved by the delegates on May 28, 1959, that the ROC’s Chinese (National) Olympic Committee should change its name to represent its actual territory of control. Otherwise, it would remain unrecognized. Incidentally, the ROC participated in the third Asian Games held in Tokyo in 1958 as “Formosa,” not “China” (Lin, 2008, 145). After the Munich decision, the ROC decided to use the name “National Olympic Committee of the Republic of China,” and if necessary, add “(Taiwan)” at the end of the name to re-affiliate with the IOC. The ROC argued that the Republic of China was recognized by the UN. However, the IOC responded that because there was still the word “China” in the name, it could not be accepted. The IOC’s other

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suggestions were “National Chinese Olympic Committee of Taiwan” and “National Olympic Committee, Taipei, Taiwan.” By the time of the Paris IOC executive board meeting in October 1959, the compromise between the IOC and the ROC was “Taiwan: Olympic Committee of the Republic of China” (Lin, 2008, p. 145). In the IOC’s fifty-sixth Session held in San Francisco in February 1960, discussions continued whether to accept the name “Olympic Committee of the Republic of China” (Lin, 2008). Because there was inadequate attendance (only twenty-one out of sixty-five IOC Members were present) the decision was postponed to the Rome Session, to be held together with the 1960 Rome Olympic Games in August. In the San Francisco Session, the IOC also decided that the ROC athletes could participate in the Rome Games only under the name of “Taiwan” or “Formosa” (Lin, 2008). The ROC’s reaction was that as a last resort, “Taiwan” could be used in Rome but only under protest. Moreover, in the same meeting, some IOC Members realized that the ROC would not accept the name “Taiwan” and conceived of the idea of using the ROC’s capital name “Taipei.” Finally, in the fifty-seventh IOC Session held on August 22, 1960, in Rome, the IOC decided that: “According to the resolution taken by the IOC at its Munich session in 1959, the contingent of athletes coming from Taiwan will participate in the parade at the opening ceremony and in the events under the name of the territory where its Olympic Committee controls Olympic sports, namely Taiwan. Due note is taken of the fact that the name of the Olympic Committee of Taiwan which is essentially an internal concern, shall be called in the future: the Olympic Committee of the Republic of China. In the IOC publications from November 1960 to March 1966, the ROC’s membership was called “Taiwan: Republic of China Olympic Committee” (Lin, 2008, p. 145)

In other words, during this period, the ROC in the Olympic Games must appear internationally or publicly as “Taiwan,” although whatever the ROC wanted to call itself internally or privately, such as “ROC,” was the ROC’s matter. The IOC did not care. It can also be argued that the reason why this kind of decision, i.e., with “ROC” still attached, could be agreed upon by the IOC at the time was because the ROC was still a UN member. The ROC nevertheless managed to change the “publicly” approved “Taiwan” name to “China (R.O.)” at the IOC’s sixty-seventh

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Session in Mexico in 1968. The ROC’s sports diplomacy from the 1970s to the 1980s can roughly be divided into six periods. The first period is before the ROC’s exclusion from the Asian Games Federation (AGF) to the expulsion in November 1973. The second period extends from after the ROC’s expulsion from AGF to the July 1976 Montreal Olympic Games. The third period reaches from after the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games to the US-PRC normalization in January 1979. The fourth period is the entire year of 1979 when the ROC’s IOC membership was in great jeopardy by the end of 1979 (Lin, 2008). The fifth period is from late 1979 to immediately before the July 1980 Moscow Olympic Summer Games, including the 1980 Winter Olympic Games held in Lake Placid, New York, in February of that year. And the sixth period begins with the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games and lasts to when the name “Chinese Taipei” was formally agreed upon by the ROC, the IOC, and the PRC as the name of the ROC’s Olympic committee in March 1981. The IOC executive board’s Nagoya resolution, similar to FIFA’s resolution, however, was eventually passed on October 25, 1979. Brazil supported Taiwan in the 1979 negotiations (Lin, 2008, p. 145). The text of the resolution reads: The People’s Republic of China: Name: Chinese Olympic Committee. NOC (National Olympic Committee) anthem, flag, and emblem: Flag and anthem of People’s Republic of China. The emblem was submitted to and approved by the Executive Board. Constitution: In order. Committee based in Taipei: Name: Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee. NOC anthem flag and emblem: Other than those used at present and which must be approved by the Executive Board of the IOC. Constitution: To be amended in conformity with the IOC Rules by 1st January 1980. The ROC, the IOC, and the PRC, for better or for worse, finally settled on the highly ambiguous name of “Chinese Taipei” in 1981. (Lin, 2008)

Thus, Taiwan participated in the Olympic Games of Rio 2016 in Brazil as Chinese Taipei and achieved to get one gold medal and two bronze medals. Moreover, Taiwan participated also in the 2016 Paralympic Games in Rio, Brazil. These great moments were enjoyed not only by the athletes of Taiwan but also by the people of Taiwan. One of the most sensitive and moving moments was the parade of the Taiwanese athletes in the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in Rio, Brazil, in 2016 in the Maracanã Stadium.

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Two years later, in 2018, the International Olympic Committee announced that it decided that Chinese Taipei cannot officially change its name to Taiwan at the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games. “The Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (CTOC) said the IOC had decided “to not approve a name change” during their Executive Committee meeting at the beginning of May, as reported by Taiwan News. After receiving a confirmation letter from the IOC, the CTOC forwarded it to the Sports Administration of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Cabinet, and other departments. It comes after many non-Governmental organizations in Taiwan promoted the “2020 Tokyo Olympics Taiwan Renaming Referendum,” which brought a large amount of attention to the issue which stems from a dispute with China. According to CTOC secretary general Shen Yiting, IOC President Thomas Bach was aware of and concerned about the referendum situation which the CTOC had not officially called for. “The referendum to support a name change for Taiwan at the Games was not led by the CTOC, so we cannot intervene,” said Shen. “We can only relay the messages and forward the letter to the responsible organizations, and there will be someone more suitable to explain the situation.” Chinese Taipei’s IOC member CK Wu, the former President of the International Boxing Association, has now called for the decision to be respected. “When an athlete performs well, people will say we come from Taiwan,” he said. “It is a recognition of our natural origin; the name of Chinese Taipei was originally signed on the agreement and we must respect it” (Giles, 2018). In the Olympic Games of Rio 57 athletes from Taiwan participated, 26 men and 31 women. Hsu Shu-ching won the gold medal in weightlifting on August 7, 2016 (women’s 53 kg event), and the team of Taipei (Le Chien-ying, Lin Shih-chia, Tan Ya-ting) won the bronze medal in archery (women’s team event) on the same day and Kuo Hsing-Chun won the bronze medal in weightlifting on the next day (women’s 58 kg event). The participation of Taiwan in the Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games as Chinese Taipei has a symbolic meaning for Taiwanese people holding hope for future improvement of their placement in the world. Moreover, it may also be noted that the PRC proves that it is flexible in a sensitive matter on its side. Brazil hosted the Olympic Games in 2016 and accepted the status of Chinese Taipei. The gold medal and the bronze medals were significant in that context in parallel to the symbolic parade in the opening and closing ceremonies of the Games.

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Conclusion China and Taiwan struggle for the improvement of their bilateral relations with Brazil. Brazil is an emerging economy and a significant global player. It is not only about economics, it is also about important environmental issues, as Brazil provides almost half of the oxygen to the planet due to the Amazon. Moreover, political issues include the acceptance by Brazil of the One China Policy, even if Brazil voted against the recognition of the PRC in the UN in 1971. Thus, Brazil is not an official member of the Belt and Road Initiative of the PRC and at the same time, Brazil develops economic ties with Taiwan without officially recognizing Taiwan as an independent country. Bolsonaro’s administration sent contradictory signals to China. For example, Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of President Jair Bolsonaro, referred to the Coronavirus in April 2020 as the “China virus” (Stuenkel, 2020). After the re-election of Lula in Brazil in 2023, Brazil is expected to develop a multilateral relationship with China instead of deepening the bilateral relations (Reuters, 2023). However, President Xi directly stated early in January 2023 that “he is ready to work with Lula to take bilateral ties to a higher level” (Jingsi, 2023). Most analysts expect that Brazil will not join the Belt and Road Initiative of the PRC. However, the PRC will keep trying to convince Brazil to join the BRI, as Brazil’s first trade partner is the PRC. Meanwhile, Taiwan also deepens its bilateral trade relations with Brazil in its attempt to establish independent policies against the PRC. Brazil is China’s most important economic and political partner in South America, as well as a key participant in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) grouping of emerging powers that China increasingly leads. Loro Horta states: A closer analysis of Chinese and Brazilian foreign policies shows a remarkable similarity between the two nations. Both Brasilia and Beijing desire a multi-polar world order, subscribing to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Both countries have cooperated in very sensitive areas such as space technology, aviation, and military-related technologies. (Horta, 2015)

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Zhou Zhiwei notes: the “BRICS cooperation” is an important annotation for the upgrading of China-Brazil relations. Because of this, the relationship between China and Brazil has become an important part of the relationship between the major powers globally. The “Belt and Road” initiative is a policy for China to connect with the world, deepen cross-regional cooperation, explore common development, and build a community of shared future. Although it differs from the “BRICS cooperation” in some dimensions, the two policies are complementary to each other logically. (Jenkins, 2022; Zhiwei, 2018)

And Harold Trinkunas adds: As U.S.-China trade relations deteriorate, Brazil is the natural alternative to U.S. suppliers for Beijing to secure imports of food and other commodities. The rise of China as a counterweight to U.S. hegemony will remain appealing in the long term for Brazilian officials and foreign policy analysts who seek to maximize their country’s strategic autonomy internationally. For China, a “strategic partnership” is appealing to significant political and economic interests in Brazil, which suggests this approach will win out in the long run. (Trinkunas, 2020)

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Giles, T. (2018). IOC refuses Chinese Taipei name change for Tokyo 2020. Accessed 1 January 2023. http://thesportdigest.com/2018/05/ioc-refuseschinese-taipei-name-change-for-tokyo-2020/ Government of Brazil. (2012). Plano Decenal de Cooperação entre o Governo da República Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da República Popular da PRC [Ten year cooperation plan between the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the PRC]. Accessed 1 January 2023. https://www.gov.br/aeb/pt-br/programa-espacial-brasileiro/ cooperacao-internacional/documentos-PRC/acordoPRC2012.pdf Government of Brazil. (2015). Plano de Ação Conjunta entre o Governo da República Federativa do Brasil e a República Popular da PRC [Joint action plan between the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the PRC]. Accessed 1 January 2023. https://www.gov.br/aeb/pt-br/programaespacial-brasileiro/cooperacao-internacional/documentos-PRC/acordoPRC 2015_a.pdf Green Finance and Development Center. (2022, March). Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative. Accessed 1 January 2023. https://greenfdc.org/countr ies-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/?cookie-state-change=1668791813082 Guimaraes, L. (2006). The Korean community in Brazil: Challenges, achievements and prospect. Accessed 1 January 2023. http://congress.aks.ac.kr/korean/ files/2_1358492270.pdf Hiratuka, C., & Sarti, F. (2016). Relações Econômicas entre Brasil e PRC: Análise dos Fluxos de Comércio e Investimentos Estrangeiro [Brazil-PRC economic relations: Analysis of trade and foreign direct investment flows]. World Time Review, 2(1), 83–98. https://www.ipea.gov.br/revistas/index. php/rtm/article/view/50 Hiratuka, C. (2018a). Changes in the Chinese development strategy after the global crisis and its impacts in Latin America. Journal of Contemporary Economics, 22(1), 1–25. Hiratuka, C. (2018b). “Chinese OFDI in Brazil”; and Davi Kupfer and Felipe Rocha de Freitas, “Direções do Investimento Chinês no Brasil: Estratégia Nacional ou Busca de Oportunidades” [Chinese investment directions in Brazil: National strategy or search for opportunities]. In A. Jaguaribe (Ed.), Direction of Chinese global investments: Implications for Brazil. FUNAG. Hiratuka, C. (2019). Chinese OFDI in Brazil. In E. D. Peters (Ed.), PRC’s foreign direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Conditions and challenges. National Autonomous University of Mexico. Hiratuka, C. (2022, October 18). Why Brazil sought Chinese investments to diversify its manufacturing economy. Accessed 1 January 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/18/why-brazil-sought-chi nese-investments-to-diversify-its-manufacturing-economy-pub-88194

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Holzmann, A., & Grünberg, N. (2021). ‘Greening’ PRC: An analysis of Beijing’s sustainable development strategies. Mercator Institute for Chian Studies. Accessed 1 January 2023. https://merics.org/en/report/greening-PRC-ana lysis-beijings-sustainable-development-strategies Horta, L. (2015). Brazil-China relations (RSIS Working Paper 287). Singapore. Jaguaribe, A. (2018). Characteristics and direction of PRC’s global investment drive. In A. Jaguaribe (Ed.), Direction of Chinese global investments: Implications for Brazil. FUNAG. Jenkins, R. (2015). Is Chinese competition causing deindustrialization in Brazil? Latin American Perspectives, 42(6), 42–63. Jenkins, R. (2022). China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America. What has changed? Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 51(1), 13–39. Jingsi, M. (2023). Xi vows to boost ties as Brazil’s Lula takes office. Accessed 1 April 2023. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202301/04/WS63b4b2c2a3 1057c47eba7818.html. Kai-Ping Lin, K. (2008). Nationalism in international politics: The Republic of China’s Sports foreign policy-making and diplomacy from 1972 to 1981. Ph.D. Thesis, Georgetown University. Kent, R. (2003). A diaspora of Chinese settlement in Latin America and the Caribbean. In The L. Ma & C. Cartier (Eds.), Chinese diaspora: Space, place, mobility, and identity (pp. 117–138). Rowman & Littlefield. Kuhn, P. (2008). Chinese among others: Emigration in modern times. Rowman & Littlefield. Lesser, J. (1999). Negotiating national identity: Immigrants, minorities, and the struggle for ethnicity in Brazil. Duke University Press. Li, L. (1991, June). Brazil-Taiwan immigrants’ paradise lost. Accessed 1 January 2023. https://www.taiwan-panorama.com/Articles/Details?Guid=ef58eda5e68d-4f61-9422-135ab521fc5… McGeever, J. (2021, January 4). Update 1-Brazil posts 2020 trade surplus of $51 billion, up 6% from year before. Reuters. Accessed 1 January 2023. https://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-economy-trade/update-1-brazilposts-2020-trade-surplus-of-51-billion-up-6-from-year-before-idUSL1N2J F1N0 Mendes, C. (2014). Macau in China’s relations with the Lusophone World. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 57 , 225–242. National Taiwan University. (2013). The reaction of ROC government to Taiwanese immigrated to Brazil in 1960s. Oliveira, G., & Myers, M. (2021). The tenuous co-production of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Brazil and Latin America. Journal of Contemporary China, 30(129), 481–499. Park, K. (2005). The second generation of Koreans in Brazil: A portrait. Accessed 1 January 2023. http://www.international.ucla.edu/korea/latin/article.

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CHAPTER 13

An Analysis of the Relations Between China, Taiwan, and Argentina and the Belt and Road Initiative Athina Moraiti

Introduction The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was officially launched in September 2013. Under President Xi Jinping, it has become the center of China’s foreign policy. The BRI was known as One Belt One Road until 2016. The Belt and Road consist of a network of investment programs aimed at promoting infrastructure development and economic integration in partner countries. The BRI outlines five key priorities, including policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, free trade, financial inclusion, and people-to-people connectivity. As of 15 July 2022, 147 countries have joined the initiative (Wang, n.d.). The BRI not only domestically but also internationally is China’s way to build connectivity and cooperation across economic corridors. Asia

A. Moraiti (B) European University Cyprus, Engomi, Cyprus e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_13

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needs USD 26 trillion in infrastructure investment by 2030 (Asian Development Bank, 2017), and China can certainly help to provide some of this. Argentina is the third-largest economy in Latin America, after Brazil and Mexico, and a member of the Group of 20 (G20), which is the most important arena that fosters international cooperation on global economic and financial issues and an important forum that promotes dialogue between traditional and emerging powers. However, neither academia, international consulting firms, nor the press considers this key South American country as an emerging, or even middle, power. While Argentina was not a member of the BRI, in February 2022, it decided to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with China. This further strengthens the bilateral relationship between the two countries as well as promotes cooperation in other areas such as the digital economy and connectivity, aerospace, satellite system, innovation in technology, agriculture, energy, and the environment. China is already an important trade partner for Argentina. Following the establishment of their diplomatic relationship nearly 50 years ago, China and Argentina have respected and supported each other on issues of principle concerning each other’s fundamental interests. Bilateral relations have been developing vigorously and pragmatic cooperation has been advancing continuously. However, due to the economic difficulties it faces, Argentina relies heavily on financial support from the West. It is currently the largest debtor of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). During the COVID-19 pandemic (first six months of 2020), Chinese imports of primary goods such as soybean and beef helped Argentina maintain a positive trade balance, even when most economies were experiencing a recession. While Argentina’s exports of manufactured goods, fuel, and processed agricultural goods fell during this time of the pandemic, exports of primary goods to China grew in the first half of 2020. The decision to sign a memorandum of understanding may be seen in light of the strategic partnership that Argentina had signed with China in 2014 under then-President Cristina Kirchner, who was a member of the left-leaning Justicialist Party. The Kirchner administration had also signed an agreement with China in 2014 to base a deep space station in the Patagonia region. While many may view Argentina’s partnership with China as a political decision, the economic significance of this partnership cannot be sidelined.

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The signing of the MOU on the BRI will undoubtedly solidify the economic foundation for the two countries to bring tangible benefits to the people through pragmatic cooperation. Argentina urgently needs to attract international investment and increase exports. Taking part in the BRI can help Argentina better tap into the complementarity between its economy and that of China. For China, the signing of the MOU will facilitate the internationalization of China’s capital, technology, and standards, and provide new supply options for the Chinese market. China is also expanding its financial footprint in America. Since 2005, China’s two main policy banks—China Development Bank and ChinaExport Import Bank—have provided more than $141 billion in loan commitments to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries and state-owned enterprises, more than the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) or the Latin American Development Bank (CAF). They mainly concern four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela), which account for almost 93% of the total. Most of these loans were spent on energy (69%) and infrastructure (19%). Chinese loan contracts contain special confidentiality and repayment priority over other creditors’ clauses. These clauses put pressure on the country to maintain positive bilateral relations with China, as a default on the loan could trigger a series of punitive measures, such as cross-defaults on other Chinese loans to the country or mandatory prepayment of the defaulting loan. In addition, several of the China Development Bank’s contracts with Argentina also include so-called No Paris Club clauses that exclude Chinese debt from the Paris Club collective restructuring efforts, thereby ensuring that Beijing is prioritized over other creditors and allowing it to benefit from multilateral debt relief efforts (Acker and Brautigam, 2021; Gelpern et al., 2021, pp. 22–25): Clauses that exclude “Chinese” debt from the debts of other creditors such as Paris Club, can, inter alia, be found in the Preferential Buyer Credit Loan Agreement between the EXIM Bank of China and the Government of Montenegro from 30 October 2014, (https:// www.documentcloud.org/ documents/20488741-mne_2014_432, Article 6.10, p. 12); in the Government Concessional Loan Agreement between the EXIM Bank of China and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic from 15 June 2015, (https://www.documentcloud.org/docume nts/20488738-kgz_2015_427, Article 6.13, p. 13); or in the Term

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Facility Agreement between China Development Bank and the Republic of Argentina, (https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20484893arg_2019_471), Article 19.5, p. 48. Far-reaching confidentiality clauses can be e.g. found in the Government Concessional Loan Agreement between the EXIM Bank of China and the Government of Uganda from 16 January 2019, (https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20488887uga_2019_486, Article 8.7, p. 17); in the Preferential Buyer Credit Loan Agreement on Jujuy Photovoltaic Power Plant Project between the EXIM Bank of China and the Government of Argentina, (https://www.docume ntcloud.org/ documents/20484888-arg_2017_417, Article 8.7, p. 19), and in the Preferential Buyer’s Credit Loan Agreement on the New Centennial Water Source-Kaliwa Dam Project between the EXIM Bank of China and Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (Philippines) from 20 November 2018, (https://www.documentcloud.org/doc uments/20488747-phl_2018_422, Article 8.9, pp. 21–22.)

Unavoidably, such contractual provisions would seem to strengthen the Chinese lenders’ hands in more ways than one: if the plan works, the generosity and solidarity of other countries’ institutional lenders (directed to a country in distress) will fill the coffers of a superpower. However, if the plan does not work due to the reluctance of other lenders to undertake the necessary restructuring considering China’s holding out, the latter has a de facto veto power over the future of a country on the verge of bankruptcy. This seems to have happened in the context of Sri Lanka’s grant of a 99-year lease on its ports to China after defaulting on its loans. Whether by design or by coincidence, the so far successful “softlaw,” flexible custom-tailored effort to attract participants to the BRI has become, for those partners who need help for infrastructure measures, the first step to a ladder that leads to an “unequal treaty” scenario that is rightly despised by the former victims of Western colonialism. History has shown though that when a big economic power leaves a territory, there is always space for another power, big or emerging to cover the gap left by the power that pulled out. This is exactly what China did to African countries after decolonization and has been doing in Latin America (Chi, 2022, p. 34; Hulse, 2007). The bilateral relations between China and Argentina are examined through the perspective of Argentina to face the future challenges for China-Argentina relations disadvantaging Taiwan relations with Argentina and Taiwan’s position in Latin America.

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Diplomatic relations between Argentina and the Republic of China (ROC) started in 1945. However, Argentina stopped diplomatic relations with the ROC to the People’s Republic of China on February 19, 1972. In the same year, the ROC closed its embassy in Buenos Aires and established the “Oficina Comercial de Taiwán” or “Taiwan Trade Office” in 1973. Taiwan has trade relations with Argentina, and there are representatives of the two entities to strengthen their bilateral relations.

The Evolution of China and Argentina’s Relations The foundational moment for current Sino-Argentine relations took place in the late 1970s, however, during the harsh Argentine military dictatorship that began in 1976, US-Argentine intergovernmental relations took a sharp turn for the worse upon President Jimmy Carter’s inauguration in 1977. Since then, bilateral relations have experienced rapid and sustained growth with mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields. The two sides have strengthened communication and coordination on international and regional affairs, consolidating and deepening relations between the two states (Xinguang, Jinxiu, 2022) (Fig. 13.1). Argentina and China signed commercial and general economic cooperation agreements in 1978 and 1980. In 1980, General Jorge Videla was the first Argentine president to visit China. The political foundations of Sino-Argentine relations were also set because Argentina recognized one China and the assertion that Taiwan is part of China (Domínguez, n.d.). Since the official beginning of diplomatic relations in 1972, during the Government of General Alejandro A. Lanusse, Argentina and the People’s Republic of China have maintained excellent and stable diplomatic ties, resulting in fluid exchanges at a commercial, educational level, cultural and political, that have increased exponentially in the last two decades, which is why the relationship between the two countries has been strengthened especially. During the 1980s, and after the end of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas War, The Falklands War (Spanish: Guerra de las Malvinas) was a ten-week undeclared war between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982 over two British dependent territories in the South Atlantic: the Falkland Islands and its territorial dependency, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The conflict began on April 2, when Argentina invaded and occupied the Falkland Islands, followed by the invasion of South Georgia the next day. On April 5, the British government

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Fig. 13.1 On February 19, 1972, China and Argentina established diplomatic relations (Image: Public Domain—The President of Argentina Raúl Lastiri with the Chinese ambassador Zheng Weizhi)

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dispatched a naval task force to engage the Argentine Navy and Air Force before making an amphibious assault on the islands. The conflict lasted 74 days and ended with an Argentine surrender on June 14, returning the islands to British control. In total, 649 Argentine military personnel, 255 British military personnel, and three Falkland Islanders were killed during the hostilities. With the arrival of democracy in Argentina, the link with the People’s Republic of China was an important factor in the process of reintegration of Argentina into the international community. Both countries share the same point of view regarding English colonialism based on the experience of the People’s Republic of China with Hong Kong and Argentina with the Malvinas. Throughout the twentieth century, until the Falkland/ Malvinas War in 1982, Argentina competed in a quest with Brazil for political, economic, and military hegemony in the region. Brazil’s material power grew over the second half of the twentieth century, whereas Argentina entered a period of political unrest and saw a deterioration in its standing concerning its competitor. The Malvinas War shattered Argentina’s peaceful diplomatic history, which had been utilized to settle issues through peaceful means including treaties and mediation (as in the case of border disputes with Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia) (Levaggi, 2021). The last Military Process (1976–1983) changed the attitude of Argentina toward internal and external threats. The country was responsible for threatening the use of force (Beagle Conflict with Chile in 1978), for perpetuating human rights abuses, and for using military violence (i.e., the Malvinas War). With the end of the military regime in 1983, the return of democracy favored a return to the former diplomatic peaceful behavior and greater participation of civil society and public opinion in international affairs. One of Argentina’s foreign policy axes and the primary unofficial military war scenario centers on the Malvinas Islands. Argentina views the “issue of the Malvinas islands” as a conflict over sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia, South Sandwich, and other nearby marine territories between Argentina and the United Kingdom. International organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS), United Nations (UN), The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), and more recently the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) have always been regional blocs that Argentina wanted to join. The General Assembly Resolution 2065 of December 1965, which acknowledged the

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existence of a sovereignty dispute and asked both nations to dialogue to find a peaceful resolution was the most significant diplomatic success for Argentina (https://cancilleria.gob.ar/es/politica-exterior/cuestionmalvinas/la-cuestion-de-las-islas-malvinas). On the official webpage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is stated: (the original text is in Spanish): “The Question of the Malvinas Islands was, is and will be a central issue for all Argentines, as expressed in the National Constitution through its First Transitory Provision”: The Argentine Nation ratifies its legitimate and imprescriptible sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich and the corresponding maritime and insular spaces, as they are an integral part of the national territory. The recovery of said territories and the full exercise of sovereignty, respecting the way of life of its inhabitants and in accordance with the principles of International Law, constitute a permanent and inalienable objective of the Argentine people.

Argentina considers this issue a colonial case. It is also included in Argentina’s constitution. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Trade and Worship, the United Kingdom usurped the territory following its occupation in 1833 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship (2012)). Thus, Argentina, which considers this a permanent and unrelinquished goal, has repeatedly claimed its sovereignty over the islands and affirmed its recovery following international law. China has supported Argentina on this issue. Argentina’s government consistently honors the one-China principle, and China supports Argentina’s legitimate claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Levaggi, 2021). “We firmly support Argentina’s legitimate claim to full sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands.” China has always advocated that territorial disputes between countries should be resolved through peaceful negotiations following the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, said Xi Jinping, in February 2022. President Xi Jinping declared that China “reaffirms its support for Argentina’s demand for the full exercise of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands,” while President Fernández reciprocated that Argentina “reaffirms its adherence to the one-China principle,” meaning he backs China’s claim that Taiwan is not a sovereign country but rightfully a part of China. China’s claim to Taiwan and Argentina’s claim to the Falklands is key geopolitical objectives of their respective claimant, with gaining undisputed control of these islands being key goals that have dominated Chinese and Argentinian policy in the last 40 years. This

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public declaration of the two nations’ intentions may imply the wish of each nation to see their territory expanded, despite vociferous opposition from the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1988, Argentina’s first democratic president after the dictatorship, Raúl Alfonsín, also visited China to deepen trade, scientific, and cultural relations. In November 1990, President Carlos Menem was the first chief of state of a Western country to visit Beijing after the Tiananmen Square incidents. China, it should be clear, had no preference for right-wing regimes; rather, it was indifferent to the form of the political regime so long as there were political and economic gains to be made. In May 1990, Yang paid a state visit to Argentina. Six months later, President Menem visited China in return. For China, the state visits were quite significant in that they effectively frustrated Western attempts to isolate China politically, and the protocol for mutual consultation between the two governments was exemplary. The understanding and support from the Argentine government at this critical time showed the spirit of pragmatism. On the one hand, Argentina, after suffering long years at the hand of hegemony, was yearning for independence, and self-determination, and found external interference intolerable. On the other hand, the country was also eager to extricate itself from economic difficulties and hoped to strengthen relations with China, particularly in the sphere of economic cooperation. The political mutual trust and understanding between the two countries undoubtedly safeguard this vision. During the last three decades, the growth of the third sector coexisted with the most dramatic economic and political crises that affected the country in the late 1980s and in 2001/2002. Fortunately, Argentina’s economy has now recovered from the 2001/2002 crisis. Nevertheless, some crucial issues, such as those related to the international financial sector, infrastructure, and foreign investments, still need a solution. In November 2004, Argentina announced its recognition of China’s market economy status. In July 2014, President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Argentina and the two countries announced the establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, 2012). Both sides are strong advocates of multilateralism and have maintained a close connection on issues such as international cooperation against the epidemic, global governance reform, and climate change within bilateral and multilateral frameworks such as the United

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Nations (UN), the World Organization of Health (WHO), World Trade Organization (WTO), and Group of 20 (G20). Over the years, China and Argentina have had frequent high-level interactions. Argentina’s President Alberto Fernández was invited to China to attend the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympic Games in Beijing in 2022 and organized two special trips: visiting the Chairman MAO Memorial Hall and the Museum of the Communist Party of China (Altmann-Borbón and Soto, 2022). With the attention and guidance of the two presidents, the China-Argentina Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has further developed, and political mutual trust has been consolidated.

Achievements in the Practical Cooperation of the Two Countries---Toward the Addition of Argentina to the BRI In the past 50 years, China-Argentina economic and trade cooperation has developed steadily. The PRC has emerged as a global power, but little is known about how or what this means. The PRC exports its developmental model and imposes it on other nations, according to many (Feigenbaum, 2022). However, Chinese actors also use local actors and institutions to expand their influence, adapting and integrating traditional and local practices. Chinese companies are adjusting to the labor laws in Latin America; Chinese banks and funds are looking into traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are assisting local workers in Central Asia in improving their skills. Western policymakers, for the most part, ignore these adaptable Chinese strategies that work within local realities. The case of Argentina is a good example of how China has expanded its power. When the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1972, the trade volume between China and Argentina was only 6.03 million US dollars. By 2021, the bilateral trade volume has risen 28.3% year-onyear to US$17.83 billion, 2,333 times the amount of the first days of our diplomatic relations (Banco Santander, 2022). China has become Argentina’s second-largest trading partner and the largest export market for agricultural products. According to China Customs statistics in 2021, this country has become Argentina’s second-largest trading partner while the latter has become China’s fifth-largest trading partner in Latin

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Table 13.1 Main customers and the main suppliers of Argentina

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Main Suppliers (% of Imports)

2021 (%)

China Brazil United States Paraguay Germany Other countries

21.4 19.6 9.4 4.6 4.0 41.0

Source Comtrade, Latest Available Data

America. In the last five years, the two countries have signed 13 agricultural trade agreements. Argentine red shrimp, meat, soybeans, wine, and other high-quality products are preferred by Chinese consumers (Table 13.1). By working together, the two parties have fully utilized their capabilities and seen a consistent rise in mutual investment. Green development and the digital economy have also taken center stage in bilateral collaboration. Through currency exchange agreements, the two nations are continuing to advance their financial cooperation. As a result, China is investing in and funding projects in Argentina related to transportation, renewable energy, nuclear, hydroelectric, photovoltaic, and wind power, as well as natural gas and oil. Since 2014, with the establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the two countries have maintained stable and sustained development in economic and trade relations. With complementary economies, the two sides have brought benefits to peoples and pushed bilateral economic and trade cooperation in a direction that is more comprehensive, deep, balanced, sustainable, and win–win. Four wind energy parks with Chinese technology began operating in Argentina in April 2020, managing to join the Argentine Interconnection System (SADI), contributing to the transformation of the energy matrix of the country. Goldwind, the Chinese wind turbine manufacturer and developer of renewable energy projects, announced in 2020 the commissioning of the Loma Blanca II1 wind farm, with an installed capacity of 1 In 2009, a private company “isolux” submitted to the Ministry of Environment and Control of Sustainable Development of the province of Chubut, the Environmental Impact Study of the Loma Blanca Wind Farm (Ecotécnica, 2009), which

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50 MW, located 40 kilometers north of the town of Puerto Madryn, province of Chubut. In 2009, a private company “isolux” submitted to the Ministry of Environment and Control of Sustainable Development of the province of Chubut, the Environmental Impact Study of the Loma Blanca Wind Farm (Ecotécnica, 2009), which received the environmental license through Provision 179/10 that issues the corresponding Environmental Impact Declaration. According to the update of the project, the Wind Farm would consist of 67 wind turbines of 3 MW of unit power arranged in 4 independent groups: Loma Blanca I (51 MW), Loma Blanca II (48 MW), Loma Blanca III (51 MW), and Loma Blanca IV (51 MW), resulting in a total installed capacity of 201 MW. The 4 groups of wind turbines would converge on the same Transformer Substation, from where the energy generated would be evacuated through a 132 kV High Voltage Line in double triplet to the Puerto Madryn Transformer Station operated by Transpa, for its incorporation into the System Interconnection Agency (SADI) (Environmental Impact Study http://www. ambiente.chubut.gov.ar/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2-EIA-ParqueEólico-Loma-Blanca-V-y-VI-Cap2-Descripción-del-Proyecto-Rev0.pdf). In June 2021, the Loma Blanca Phase VI Wind Farm Project (Proyecto Parque Eólico Loma Blanca Fase VI) in Argentina overcame the impact of the epidemic, and its construction was completed. Approved by CAMMESA (Compañía Administradora del Mercado Mayorista Eléctrico S.A.) in Argentina,2 the project entered a commercial operation period received the environmental license through Provision 179/10 that issues the corresponding Environmental Impact Declaration. According to the update of the project, the Wind Farm would consist of 67 wind turbines of 3 MW of unit power arranged in 4 independent groups: Loma Blanca I (51 MW), Loma Blanca II (48 MW), Loma Blanca III (51 MW), and Loma Blanca IV (51 MW), resulting in a total installed capacity of 201 MW. The 4 groups of wind turbines would converge on the same Transformer Substation, from where the energy generated would be evacuated through a 132 kV High Voltage Line in double triplet to the Puerto Madryn Transformer Station operated by Transpa, for its incorporation into the System Interconnection Agency (SADI). Details on the Environmental Impact Study can be found here: http://www.ambiente.chubut.gov.ar/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2-EIAParque-Eólico-Loma-Blanca-V-y-VI-Cap2-Descripción-del-Proyecto-Rev0.pdf. 2 CAMMESA (Argentine Wholesale Electricity Market Clearing Company) (Spanish:

Compañía Administradora del Mercado Eléctrico Mayorista S.A.) is an Argentinian company which operates the wholesale energy market of the country. It was created by Executive Decree in 1992 to operate the Argentine Interconnection system, planning the power generation required and managing energy dispatch by generators, and for regulation of the spot and term wholesale electric energy markets. Despite being a private enterprise,

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of 20 years. After the completion of the “Kisse” hydropower station under the glacier, the average annual power generation capacity is 4.95 billion kWh, which can meet the electricity consumption of 1.5 million households. These Chinese investments in Argentina are the result of the growth in bilateral relations and show how China needs to integrate into foreign markets and increase its impact this way. As a major trade market and capital source, China plays an important role in the modernization of the economies not only of Argentina but also of other Latin American countries. In 2016, China was Uruguay’s largest trading partner and Paraguay’s main import partner. This complementarity in trade has benefited both sides through the exchange of goods and services. In fact, not only did China’s economic growth consolidate its center-periphery relationship and enlarged asymmetries with the three South American countries, but these economies also transferred huge amounts of dollars to China through bilateral trade between 2008 and 2017. Unlike other South American economies (e.g., Brazil or Chile), the official statistical data of Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and China allow us to define the trade relationship between the three countries, revealing China’s involvement in a “lost trade decade,” particularly in Argentina (Oviedo, 2020). At the beginning of the Chinese New Year of 2022 (February 1st, 2022), the general contract of the Argentine Nuclear Project “HPR1000 (Hua-long Pressurized Reactor)” was officially signed. (State companies Nucleoeléctrica Argentina and China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) have signed an engineering, procurement, and construction contract for the construction of a China-supplied HPR1000 nuclear power plant at what will become the Atucha III nuclear power station. See the company’s official announcement: https://www.na-sa.com.ar/en/ prensa/atucha-iii-nuclear-power-plant-project-joint-statement). “Atucha III” Nuclear Power Plant Project is part of the Comprehensive Strategic Association and the Framework Agreement for Economic and Investment as the retail electricity sector in Argentina faces heavy state regulation including low tariffs, the company has been dependent on public subsidies for years. Energy generation costs are not fully passed through to final customers. The spread between the generation cost and the fixed tariffs is covered by CAMMESA, which then makes the company dependent on public subsidies to compensate the generation companies. Also, starting from 2013, all thermal power generation companies are required to buy any required fuel through CAMMESA. This restriction was only removed for a short period between November 2018 and December 2019, when it was last put in force again.

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Cooperation—both executed in July 2014—and the Agreement between the Government of the Argentine Republic and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the Construction Project of a Pressurized Water Reactor in Argentina—signed in February 2015. The execution of Atucha III was delayed though. It was raised during the visit of the Argentine president in February 2022 to China, during the Winter Olympic Games. On this occasion, the nuclear power plant project was carried out within the framework of the signing of the memorandum of understanding for Argentina’s entry into the “Belt and Road Initiative,” making it its flagship project. The total amount of the loan initially announced in 2014 amounted to 6.715 million. The new agreement estimates an investment of 8.300 million dollars to carry out the works. In addition, clauses were included regarding the participation of 40% of national suppliers (Argentine Foreign Ministry, 2022) and the transfer of technology in terms of manufacturing the fuel necessary for the operation of the Chinese-designed hmr1000-Hua-long reactor (Froehlich et al., 2020; Klinger, 2018; Moretti & Fernández, 2022). Other noteworthy projects are the transformation of the Belgrano Freight Railway, the rehabilitation of the San Martín Freight Railway, the Southern Patagonia Railway Project, and the Metropolitan Light Train Project in Buenos Aires (https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar/detall eAviso/primera/108700/20140714). So far, the contracting of projects from China and the accumulated investment in Argentina have exceeded 10 billion US dollars, promoting bilateral economic and trade cooperation in a more comprehensive, deep, balanced, sustainable, and beneficial direction for the general population. In this context, bilateral exchanges in culture, science and technology, academia, sports, education, and civil society have become increasingly intense. For example, the initiative to learn the Chinese language continues to be fashionable in Argentina, and the “Chinese New Year” has become a great celebration in the City of Buenos Aires. Cultural exchanges and ties between the peoples of China and Argentina are booming, and the friendship between the two countries is deepening. China and Argentina have also signed cooperation documents on green development, digital economy, aerospace, satellite navigation system, scientific and technological innovation, and other fields. In 2020, Argentine President Fernández approved the enforcement of the framework

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cooperation agreement on space activities between Argentina and China3 ; the Argentine flag flew into space for the first time on a Chinese spacecraft; in the Long March 5,4 the logo of the National Committee of Space Activities of Argentina was printed; the cooperation agreement between both parties on the establishment of a joint science and technology center is implemented steadily; and the China-Argentina Forty Meter Radio Telescope project is about to be completed and put into operation. The agreement on the construction, establishment, and operation of a deep space station of China in the province of Neuquén can be found (http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/240000244999/243830/ley27123.pdf). These joint efforts symbolize that the two countries took the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations as an opportunity to focus on post-epidemic recovery and the high-quality and sustainable development of the two countries. The two sides formulate and implement exchanges and cooperation plans at all levels and in various fields, promoting the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries (Busilli, 2020). The above-mentioned highlight the Chinese policy of expanding through economic coalitions. As Oviedo writes:

3 Argentina-China Framework Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Space Activities, which was signed on 4 February 2015, and entered into force on July 24, 2020. Under this agreement, the two sides will promote co-operation in the exploitation and uses of outer space for peaceful purposes, on the basis of mutual benefit and in accordance with relevant laws, regulations, and multi-lateral agreements. Co-operation is encouraged in the following areas: (i) mutually interested space science and deep space exploration projects; (ii) joint development of spacecrafts; (iii) joint development of space-born instruments; (iv) ground infrastructure for spacecrafts research and development; (v) ground stations construction and operation for receiving, tracking, telemetry, and control of spacecrafts; (vi) launch, tracking and control services for spacecrafts, including in-orbit tasking and management; (vii) co-operation in satellite telecommunication, satellite navigation, and satellite remote sensing applications; and (viii) other areas agreed by the parties. Official website of Argentina’s Ministry of External Relations, international Trade and Worship https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/es/actualidad/noticias/argentina-y-china-pro fundizan-la-cooperacion-en-materia-espacial-energia-nuclear. 4 Long March 5 (LM-5; Chinese: 长征五号; pinyin: Chángzh¯ eng wuˇ hào), or Changzheng 5 (CZ-5), and also by its nickname “Pang-Wu” (胖五, “Fat-Five”), is a Chinese heavy-lift launch vehicle developed by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT). It is the first Chinese launch vehicle designed to use exclusively non-hypergolic liquid propellants. It is the fifth iteration of the Long March rocket family.

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“the Chinese export model and its vast internal market have generated a new economic coalition of interests, called by the Chinese government as a strategic partnership. In front of this, Argentina and the other Latin American countries have two policy options toward the new Chinese international division of labor: (1) to deploy relations with China according to a core-periphery scheme and adapt their economies to the demands of Chinese international specialization or; (2) to recognize the real economic situation and simultaneously support the deprimarization of their economies to surpass the core-periphery mode” l(Oviedo, 2012). According to Pierre Salama, “[t]here is no scientific definition of ‘primarization’, but we can say that an economy is primarized if the exports of primary products dominate their total and it is in process of primarization if this segment tends to increase significantly [41].” Inversely, we can asseverate the concept of de-primarization when the prevalence of primary products decreases their share in total exports in compared with previous times.

The Memorandum of Understanding on the Joint Construction of the Belt and Road Initiative Since 1978, Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms have eliminated China’s traditional isolationism and put into practice an export production model with gradual integration into the world economy. China’s reforms created a virtuous cycle of investment, production, and markets in a peaceful environment dominated by macroeconomic stability. These foreign investments were used to set up joint ventures or monopolies to produce different types of goods in China’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and to export goods abroad. Foreign investment and international markets have made the Chinese government the world’s factory. At the same time, it shaped the domestic market (and expanded civil society), which was once small due to planning for limited supply and demand during Chairman Mao’s time. The key to the successful reformation has been the fusion between a totalitarian regime and the gradual liberalization and marketization of the domestic economy externally oriented toward the open-door policy, manufactured goods for export, and international reserves accumulation. After more than three decades of continuous growth, the Chinese state was “deeply embedded in global capitalism” (Oviedo, 2012).

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In more than 30 years of economic modernization, China has used a lot of natural resources and other raw materials. After despoiling its reserves of minerals and energy resources, and also due to the fast increase in the demand for renewable resources, China’s government had to deploy economic diplomacy to search for these goods abroad, especially in Africa and Latin America. Jiang asserts: “It is a well-known fact that China’s resources are not enough to sustain a high growth rate. For this reason, China must acquire resources from external sources, including Africa and Latin America” (Xiang, 2011). This situation has raised the role of Latin American countries in China’s foreign policy, and this is one important reason why the Chinese government published the first policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean in November 2008 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2008). The international financial crisis in 2008 helped China to take advantage of this power vacuum due to the relative loss of economic power of the developed powers. This is the same year that coincides with the publication of China’s White Paper for Latin America and the Caribbean, thus shaping its relationship strategy with this continent. From the presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, Argentina made great efforts to strengthen the link with Beijing, through political contacts, the signing of numerous agreements, and a greater transfer of financial and human resources to give rise to the bilateral agenda. In 2008, the Guangzhou Consulate General was created, with jurisdiction over the provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, Hainan, and the Guangxi Autonomous Region (Bolinaga, 2014). Argentina also sought an ally in China on central issues of the foreign policy of the Fernández de Kirchner administration. The historical issue of the sovereignty of the Malvinas and the South Atlantic Islands was one of them, which China always supported uninterruptedly in the Committee for the Decolonization of Nations, becoming a very strong ally in this matter. On the Argentine side, the government recognizes the principle of one China and the territorial integrity of Taiwan and Tibet as inseparable parts of China. For example, Argentine Ambassador to China Sabino Vaca Narvaja said that “Argentina will always be with China and adhere to the one-China principle. Pelosi’s visit was a provocation targeting China and destabilized the region and the world” (https://english.news.cn/ 20220818/0a64af9919eb46ab920724d1f46d34e8/c.html). Geopolitically, the take-off in China’s commodity-based trade relations with South America also coincided with the rise of the “New Left” in

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some of China’s newly rediscovered trade partners. This included, most notably, the coming to power of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela (Schamis, 2006). In the decade after 2003, China’s rapidly expanding trade and investment ties throughout South America were not primarily determined by political considerations. However, China did establish especially close bilateral political ties with some New Left leaders in the region (e.g., Chavez in Venezuela and Rafael Correa in Ecuador), and also played up a kind of emerging market solidarity with others (e.g., with Brazil and the other countries of the BRICS grouping, Russia, India, and South Africa) (Ferchen, 2021). Regardless, he considerable geographical distance, a history characterized by friendship, and the absence of serious conflicts, together with the rise of China in the international economic scene make Argentina and China have common and complementary interests. However, due to the two nations’ efforts to implement modernization processes, certain contradictory interests also appear in this relationship, and this might explain why Argentina has not signed the Belt and Road Initiative. On the other hand, Argentina was once considered to be under the spell of “a crisis every decade.” The country has long suffered from a “chronic disease” of high unemployment, inflation, and foreign debt. Influenced by COVID-19, the political and economic situation in Argentina has worsened even more. According to the Institute for Argentine Social Development (IDESA), by the end of 2021, Argentina’s inflation rate had reached 50.9%, which generated social problems, such as exacerbation of unemployment and poverty (https://idesa.org/ en/argentina-world-champion-of-inflation/). In addition, Argentina maintains a marked economic dependence on the United States and the IMF (Kedar, 2010). Argentina, one of the biggest debtors of the IMF (Stanley, 2018), urgently needs to attract international investment and increase exports. Taking the above mentioned into consideration it seems that China’s Belt and Road Initiative has created an unprecedented development opportunity for the country. As an important country in the region, Argentina plays an essential role to extend the Belt and Road Initiative. Argentina is the twentyfirst country in Latin America and the Caribbean to join the Belt and Road Initiative and the first major Latin American country to support the initiative.

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To better understand the elements of the Sino-Argentine bilateral relationship, it is necessary to describe that a partner country, in terms of Chinese diplomacy, means being a friendly country, with which there will be no hostilities and with which they will be able to cooperate directly in different areas. For this reason, the element of cooperation is essential to understand that the relationship will not be competitive but collaborative. The strategic term refers to the fact that the partners will cooperate in international affairs, in addition to issues related to economic growth, both in the community of nations and internally. In reference to the integral term, it denotes that the bilateral cooperation relationship will not only cover the economic and political spheres but will also cover aspects such as scientific-technological, cultural, military, sports, and so forth. The strategic and comprehensive terms are the ones that help us understand more deeply how the Chinese government hierarchizes the bilateral relationship with Argentina. Between 2017 and 2019, the then-Argentine President Mauricio Macri attended the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation twice. In 2017, the Ministry of Finance of Argentina and the Ministry of Finance of China signed and approved the Guiding Principles for the Financing of the Belt and Road Initiative. In February 2022, before he visited China, Argentine President Fernández said in an interview with the Chinese news agency Xinhua, that the BRI had facilitated development in Argentina. China’s investment in Argentina, such as energy, food, and infrastructure construction, is increasing, and Argentina has a positive attitude toward the possibility of receiving investment from China. The incorporation of Argentina in the BRI is significant since Beijing hopes that it will serve to attract the other two major players in the region, Mexico and Brazil, to the initiative. The Argentine government maintains that the signing of the agreement enables the disbursement of investments for more than 24 billion dollars. However, a growth strategy driven by loans and foreign investment presents itself as a problem for a country such as Argentina whose economy is marked by deficits in its balance of payments and by problems in the sustainability of its debt. In addition, the spatial logic of Chinese capital in the country places it at the center of the geopolitical dispute with the United States for control of Latin America. In conclusion, we understand that the rise of China in international politics generated the following effects in Argentina: (a) commercial

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harmony; (b) the reissue of the center-periphery model and soybean privatization; (c) the start of the transition toward diversified agricultural privatization; (d) emergence of trade deficits; (e) generation of obstacles to industrialization; (f) decentralization of commercial destinations and risk mitigation; (g) change in the flow of investments and expansion of Chinese investments in Argentina; (h) widening of the asymmetric gap and formation of North–South relations; (i) growing Chinese influence and weakening of the link with Taiwan; (j) pro-China policy on human rights; and (k) deterioration of intra-zone trade and other indirect effects via Mercosur. In addition, there are other consequences linked to political, social, cultural, and migratory issues not dealt with in this chapter because it focuses on trade and financial issues and their impact on bilateral politics. We now turn to analyze each of these effects (Oviedo, 2015).

Argentina’s Relations with the Republic of China (ROC)/Taiwan In the beginning concerning the issue of Taiwan, and the foundation of the Republic of China, the position of the Argentine Republic was ambivalent, like that of most countries that were in its position. At first, Argentina abstained from Resolution 2758, which dealt with the “Restoration of the legitimate rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations.” However, in 1972, finally, Argentina recognized the People’s Republic of China. As mentioned above, very recently Argentina has declared once more the recognition of “one China” and asserts that Taiwan is part of China. Even though Argentina stopped diplomatic relations with the ROC on February 19, 1972, it established the “Oficína Comerciál de Taiwán” or “Taiwan Trade Office” in 1973. In the case of Argentina, the policy of non-intervention in internal affairs started by Alfonsín continued during the Menem governments, being a divergent aspect in the relationship with the hegemonic power, regardless of the sanctions policy. The post-Tiananmen policy of Argentina was manifested in the approval of the agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This served as a political signal indicating the continuity of friendly relations at a time when China faced isolation and sanctions from the great powers. The approval of the agreement was followed by the visit of President Yang Shang Kun, to break the isolation and prevent “Taiwanese

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dollar diplomacy” from changing the regional trend of recognizing the Beijing government as a representative of the Chinese state. Furthermore, President Menem’s official trip in November of the same year represented the first visit by a head of state from a Western country after the Tiananmen events. Argentina’s behavior as a member of the UN Human Rights Commission has been the most important fact in the political relationship. Argentina held that position from 1980 to 1993 and, currently, since 1997. After the Tiananmen events, the situation of human rights in China was presented annually to the Commission, with the exceptions of 1991 and 1998. Argentina should have expressed its vote before projects presented by European countries, such as Denmark, or allies of Taiwan, such as some Central American countries, which condemn the Beijing regime for the violation of human rights. The government’s position has been one of systematic abstention (Argentina voted abstention in 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997, and 1999. See United Nations Economic and Social Council), distancing itself from the hegemonic power and its position concerning Cuba. This was confirmed in the foreign policy during the administration of Dr. De la Rúa. On November 30, 1993, an agreement was signed in Taipei between the Argentinian Ministry of Economy, Public Works and Services, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs of Taiwan for the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments. The agreement went into effect on the day that it was signed. Of the 14 small diplomatic allies that recognize the ROC, eight are in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is a region that has become one of the main arenas of the growing geopolitical dispute between China and the United States. The question of Taiwan’s diplomatic survival as a state has become central to the China-US relationship and Latin America will be a key region in that context. China has made steady progress in recent decades in the region, becoming the top trading partner of most Latin American countries. At the same time, China’s investments and financial cooperation have also increased significantly, although this trend has recently shifted downwards. It is for this reason that both the PRC and the ROC try to secure the support of countries through the provision of assistance for economic development (Maggiorelli, 2020). In this sense, the economic-commercial relations between the PRC and Argentina have intensified as analyzed above. China may attempt to formally include Brazil in the BRI in 2023 or the following years.

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China may attempt to formally include Brazil in the BRI in 2023 or the following years. As the text of the agreement states in its preamble: in order to establish tight bonds of co-operation in technical aspects concerning their competence, and in this way to contribute in the defense and protection of human rights and all other rights and interests of individuals, taking into consideration common interests and mutual respects; helping for the democratic stability of the people; express their strong wish to consolidate this relationship.

According to section one of this agreement, the two parties agree to prepare a Joint Program of Technical Interinstitutional Co-operation and Technical Co-operation which shall be coordinated by the heads of both institutions. This Joint Program of Interinstitutional Co-operation and Technical Co-operation shall include, among others, the following actions: 1. exchange of information, 2. exchange of technical and bibliographical documentation, 3. programs, visits, apprenticeship, and all other activities of technical and professional training, 4. organization of conferences, seminars, symposiums, meetings, courses and other academic activities, 5. development of technological systems, 6. spreading of the functions of both institutions; thus, the parties hereto will exchange the corresponding information and brochures. Furthermore, the two parties agree that their representatives will meet periodically in order to update the contents of the agreement and, if they deem convenient, to make amendments to these presents. The agreement provided for a duration of five years with automatic renewal for equal periods. It has not been terminated so far (for the full text: https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode= Y0010143). We observe that the relations of the two parties are not only commercial but also cooperative in matters of justice and respect for human rights. On the contrary, no agreement on the protection of human rights

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has been made with PRC (https://www.consejoargentinochino.org/acu erdos-bilaterales). In July 2022 the Argentine Chamber of Commerce and Services (CAC) received a delegation of Taiwanese officials and businessmen, on the occasion of the signing of a memorandum of understanding with the General Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China (Taiwan), in order to strengthen the exchange and collaboration between the parties (https://www.cac.com.ar/noticia/La_CAC_firmo_un_memorandum_ de_entendimiento_con_la_Camara_de_Taiwan_14850). The president of the Entity, Natalio Mario Grinman, celebrated the signing of the agreement and assured: “For us, it is very pleasant to strengthen the ties of friendship and exchange”; while the head of the Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Hsu Shu-Po, through a recorded video stressed that this “will allow them to work hand in hand to promote economic, commercial, investment, tourism and culture. Likewise, the general director of the Commercial and Cultural Office of Taipei (Taiwan) in Argentina, Miguel Li-Jey Tsao, expressed his “joy at having contracted this economic marriage.” The main products that Taiwan imports from Argentina are corn, garlic, leather, cheese, shrimp, fishmeal, wine, sorghum, peanuts, alkali metals, and so forth. The main products that Taiwan exports to Argentina are computer parts and accessories, flat-rolled stainless-steel products, polyacetals, styrene polymers, permanent data storage devices, acrylic polymers, automobile parts and accessories, iron or steel fasteners, iron or steel tubes or profiles, and flat-rolled products of iron or nonalloy steel. In 2017 Ambassador Diego Chou, Taiwanese director of Latin American Affairs and Caribbean, pointed out to Argentina “the need to dare to increase both commercial and collaborative bilateral relations” between both countries (https://www.noticiasagropecuarias.com/2017/11/ 23/taiwan-pidio-la-argentina-incrementar-la-relacion-comercial-frenadachina/). Furthermore, he stressed that “We hope that the relationship with Argentina will grow and strengthen, but it takes two to tango and in this case, the pressure from Continental China is very clear so that we are not two,” implying that People Republic of China influences the bilateral economic relations of Taiwan and Argentina. The proposal made to Argentina was extended to countries such as Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, and Ecuador.

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In 2021, the commercial exchange between Argentina and Taiwan was 859.5 million dollars, an improvement of 67.9% compared to 2020, resulting in the second-highest value in the historical series of bilateral exchange (between 2010 and 2014 the average exchange had been $747 million, while it dropped to an average of $504 million between 2016 and 2020). It should be noted that, according to a CAC report, the maximum value of bilateral trade reached 2013 with 927 million dollars, driven by the high level of imports from that country and by Argentine exports. In 2021, exports from Argentina to Taiwan were 336.5 million dollars and marked an improvement of 79.7% compared to the previous year. Among the main products exported were grain corn (77.1% of the total), tanned bovine hides and skins (3.8%), and mozzarella cheese (2.9%). On the other side of the trade, Argentine imports from Taiwan reached 522.7 million dollars in the same year, implying an expansion of 61.1% compared to 2020. The products with the highest incidence were units of automatic machines for data processing, with 11% of the total; followed by memory units, with 9.4%; and memory plates with a surface area of less than or equal to 50 cm2 for machines, with 8.8% (Argentinian Chamber of Commerce, https://www.cac.com.ar/busqueda/Taiwan and the official webpage of Taiwan’s Office in Argentina https://www.roc-taiwan. org/ar_es/post/4046.html). The Taiwanese policies of the United States, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Australia, and India as well as European countries show that there is room for pursuing closer relations with Taiwan while at the same time adhering to a one-China policy. Thus, options for action exist in foreign and security policy, trade, and economic policy, as well as cultural policy.

Conclusion Very recently in January 2023, Argentine President Alberto Fernández invited his US and Chinese colleagues to the upcoming Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CCELAC) to be held on January 24 in Buenos Aires. As pro tempore president of the bloc, Fernández sent a note to Xi Jinping to attend the event following his invitation to US President Joseph Biden. The US president is not expected to accept, but this initiative shows the will of Argentina to become a player that can lead to new agreements and bring the two superpowers closer. Looking ahead, China-Argentina-friendly cooperation is accelerating toward far-reaching, high-quality, and sustainable development, putting

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more innovative achievements into practice. Therefore, the achievements of scientific and technological cooperation will contribute to the economic and social development of the two countries and thus contribute to solving global problems. In this framework, the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Argentina is an opportunity for bilateral rapprochement. It is hoped that the two countries will further strengthen communication and coordination on international and regional affairs, and plan and promote cooperation in various fields from a broader perspective. In the coming time, the development of stronger bilateral economic and trade cooperation in a more comprehensive, deep, balanced, sustainable, and win–win direction is conceivable with Taiwan as well, creating a new chapter in the China-Argentina and Argentina–Taiwan comprehensive strategic partnership. Both Argentina and the countries of the region must generate the regional political conditions to negotiate with China, preventing fragmentation and atomization to obtain a greater margin of maneuver to condition the financing of key infrastructure projects for the development of the economy of the Latin American countries, preventing the development of asymmetrical and subordinate relations. This can only be achieved if there are instances of collective bargaining in defense of common interests. Until now, the practice of negotiating in bilateral forums prevents strategic coordination and the use of instruments such as the most favored nation to negotiate with China. This generates enormous inequities depending on which country in the region is involved.

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CHAPTER 14

Challenges China and Taiwan Face in Developing Diplomatic and Economic Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean Priye S. Torulagha

Introduction The China-Taiwan issue is a multidimensional matter that is capable of altering the status quo and ushering in a new world order in global geopolitical and economic relations. The multidimensionality of the issue can be broken down into five aspects or circumstances. First, it involves the decades-old issue of whether there is only one China. Second, it challenges international law and protocols by questioning the legality or legitimacy of UN Resolution 2758 as Taiwan continues to insist on being treated as a sovereign state despite the global proclamation that it is part

P. S. Torulagha (B) Independent Scholar/Researcher, Valdosta, GA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_14

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of one China. Third, it challenges the supremacy of the West’s political and economic leadership of the world as China emerges from the doldrums to become a major economic and technological superpower, using the China Economic Model or Beijing Consensus to drive its engine of economic transformation that is embedded in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is increasingly outperforming the Washington Model of the US and the West (Ramo, 2004). It should be noted that some scholars do not agree with the concept of the “Beijing Consensus” or “China Economic Model,” as proposed by Joshua Cooper Ramo. Some analysts refer to it as an authoritarian model (Harper, 2010). Fourth, the emergence of China and its subsequent utilization of the China Economic Model, which some analysts refer to as a socialist market system, involving public and private partnerships has aroused the desire of countries in the developing world to increasingly pitch their economic tent with China in the hope of transforming their economies and societies. Fifth, the development is leading to a global realignment in which China plays a pivotal role in determining the direction of global political and economic relations. The issue, otherwise referred to as the two China problem, started following the communists’ victory over the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-Shek in 1949 when China technically ceases to be one as the communists established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and the nationalists continued to operate as the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. Since then, both have competed fiercely to gain global recognition even though UN Resolution 2758 of October 25, 1971, as indicated above, recognized the view that there is only one China, and the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China. The rivalry between the two is being played out in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), as in other parts of the world as they compete to establish diplomatic and business relations with the hope of outmaneuvering each other. The contention between the two is froth with several challenges.

The Purpose of the Study The purpose of this chapter is to identify and analyze the challenges the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) face and are likely to encounter as they compete to establish diplomatic and economic relations with Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) states.

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The task is accomplished by examining (1) the strategic goals of China (PRC), Taiwan (ROC), and LAC, (2) Chinese and Taiwanese investments in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and (3) the challenges confronting China, Taiwan, and the Latin American and Caribbean countries in managing the relationships. This is a qualitative case study based on the exploration of the goals, financial investments, and challenges that China, Taiwan, and Latin American and Caribbean states face in engaging in diplomatic and economic relationships.

The Strategic Goals of China, Taiwan, and Latin American and Caribbean Countries To examine the challenges facing China (PRC), Taiwan (ROC), and the LAC, it is necessary to identify the strategic goals of the two TaiwanStrait neighbors, as well as those of Latin America and the Caribbean. Thus, China’s goals are threefold: (1) to gain diplomatic recognition and spread its influence throughout the world by forging economic, political, cultural, and educational ties through building major infrastructural and economic projects under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the South-South Cooperation (SSC), (Albert, 2022) (2) to ensure the derecognition of Taiwan in the global community and reintegrate it as part of China, and (3) to create a new world order and shift the focus of the world economic system away from the West toward its axis. Therefore, China is desirous of building strong diplomatic and economic relationships with LAC and gaining recognition from those countries in the region that still recognize Taiwan (Semple, 2020). Taiwan’s strategic goals, according to its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are: implementing policies that enhance Taiwan’s prosperity and promoting foreign relations that strengthen the international status of the Republic of China, as well as making concrete contributions to the global community, and enhancing its international profile through economic and humanitarian aid policies.(Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016)

To achieve its goals, Taiwan is diplomatically engaged to neutralize China’s efforts to de-recognize it. While China relies on its BRI and the SSC to attain its goals, Taiwan relies on the International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) to do so. The ICDF’s mission

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“is dedicated to boosting socioeconomic development, enhancing human resources, and promoting economic relations in a range of developing partner countries” (The International Cooperation and Development Fund, n.d.). The ICDF is implemented through four core areas, including (1) lending and investment, (2) technical cooperation, (3) humanitarian assistance, and (4) international education and training. While China and Taiwan have their goals, it does not mean that Latin American and the Caribbean states are mere passive onlookers who are waiting to be wooed. They too have their strategic goals and objectives in place for seeking relations with China and or Taiwan. Noticeably, they want to develop and modernize their infrastructures and economies in order to become producers of finished goods and stop being mere exporters of natural resources. This goal is compatible with the general desire in the developing world, including Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, for the adoption of import-substitution industrialization and export-oriented industrialization strategies to transition from being mere consumers of imported products to becoming producers of export-oriented industrial products (Calvert & Calvert, 2007, pp. 46–47). Panamanian economist, Eddie Taiero, described the search for new economic opportunities, “We saw a big opportunity. All that created a lot of enthusiasm, and we advanced rapidly in our relationship” (Nugent & Campbell, 2021). The need for economic change also probably prompted the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to adopt a strategy for economic integration and growth by instituting the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) to ensure innovation (Caricom, n.d.). The desire for change in both diplomatic and economic relations probably prompted Barbados to drop the Queen as a head of state and adopt a republican status as it establishes ties with China (Pleasance, 2020). Antigua and Barbuda and Jamaica planned to conduct a referendum to determine whether the British monarch should be replaced as their head of state. The desire for change also prompted some LAC countries to boycott the triannual Summit of the Americas which took place in Los Angeles from June 7 to 12, 2022, over US sanctions against Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua and the refusal to invite them to the summit (McKinley, 2022). Therefore, LAC countries are meticulous in choosing either China or Taiwan to establish relations with. Hence, when they were not comfortable with the communist system, most of them opted to do business with Taiwan. However, following the US rapprochement with China in the

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early 1970s, many of them decided to establish relations with China even though some continued to do business with Taiwan. In the 1990s, LAC’s decision to seek diplomatic and business relationships with China was inspired by a desire to reform their economies following the economic recession of the 1980s. As a result, they privatized certain aspects of their economies by liberalizing trade policies, slashing tariff barriers, and reducing budget deficits and inflation, thereby opening their markets for trade (Jenkins & Moreira, 2008, pp. 235–253). The desire for the regeneration of their economies also led LAC countries to form the Latin American and Caribbean Community or Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC) in 2018. The CELAC is designed to enhance the strategic value of the region by forming a bloc. It serves as a roadmap for them to increase their political and economic relationship with China (Pleasance, 2020).

China and Taiwan’s Investments in Latin America and the Caribbean China and Taiwan have invested extensively in infrastructural development, foreign aid, financial loans, grants, and soft power in LAC. For China, the strategy is to outspend Taiwan to ensure that it is derecognized, and the West is no longer the center of geopolitical gravity in the region. Taiwan’s strategy is to reinforce its interests in those countries that continue to maintain diplomatic relations with it while working at the same time to reestablish diplomatic ties with the states that have de-recognized it.

China’s Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean Due to the convergence of strategic interests between China and LAC, a relationship took off with great impact in 2001 when China gained membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO membership increased the economic, political, and cultural ties between the two (McBride & Siripurapu, 2002). The World Economic Forum estimated that trade grew from about $12 billion to $315 billion between 2010 and 2020 (Stevenson-Yang & Tugendhut, 2022). China invested about $73 billion in LAC between 2001 and 2018, resulting in the

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building of refineries and processing plants that engage in the mining of coal, copper, natural gas, petroleum, and uranium (“Investing in Latin America,” 2020). It is also involved in the construction of dams, ports, railways, and roads (Peters, 2021); the development of artificial intelligence, cloud computing, 5G technology, and smart cities; and soft power projects dealing with educational, cultural, and healthcare projects. It spent about $4.5 billion on lithium production in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico. Lithium is the raw material for producing batteries (Sigi, 2022). When the COVID-19 pandemic struck LAC, China responded proactively by distributing ventilators, diagnostic test kits, and masks, as well as providing billions of dollars to enable countries in the region to buy Chinese vaccines. Eventually, about twelve LAC countries signed contracts with China involving the transfer of technology and research cooperation on vaccine technology (Alvardo, 2021a, 2021b). A former member of the US National Security Council who is now working for the Wilson Center, Benjamin N. Gedan, noted that the COVID-19 pandemic provided China an opportunity to penetrate the LAC even more (Nugent & Campbell, 2021). In addition, the PRC is increasingly involved in the security sector in LAC. Consequently, it offers military training exercises; provides supplies, including vehicles to law enforcement agencies and the military forces in Bolivia, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, and participated in peacekeeping operations in Haiti. Additionally, it sold multimillion-dollars worth of military hardware to Venezuela and Ecuador and developed a deep space program in Argentina while also strengthening military ties with Cuba (Roy, 2022). The China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export–Import Bank of China (EIBC) are the two major financial institutions responsible for financing infrastructural projects and providing investment loans. Some Chinese commercial banks too occasionally participate in financing certain projects. Due to the increasing business relationship between China and LAC, the PRC is now a voting member of the Latin American and Caribbean Development Bank (LACDB) just as many LAC countries have established a Free Trade Agreement with China. Likewise, 19 LAC countries are a signatory to the Belt and Road Initiative network (Nugent & Campbell, 2021).

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Taiwan’s Investments in Latin America and the Caribbean The LAC region contains the largest concentration of countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan in the world. To enhance its global diplomatic and economic relationships, Taiwan established the International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) on July 1, 1996. As indicated above, the ICDF operates through four core areas. These four areas were carefully developed to meet the stipulations of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to achieve integrated development of various sectors of society. The effort resulted in Taiwan’s recognition by the Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Nicaragua, St. Lucia, St. Kitts, and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Critica & Maggiorelli, 2019, pp. 177– 208). Due to its excellent economic performance resulting in its being characterized as one of the “Asian Tigers,” especially, during the 1990s, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico opened commercial offices in Taiwan. In return, Taiwan has been participating in Central American summits and encouraging its businesses to invest in LAC. Indeed, some Central American countries petitioned the UN to admit Taiwan as a member, especially after it deposited $150 million in the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (Esteban, 2007, pp. 65–88). As part of the effort to regain recognition, Taiwan provides foreign aid to LAC and other parts of the world. Hence, Critica and Maggiorelli noted that it allocated “$438 million in 2010, 332 million in 2012, 299 million in 2013, and 290 million in 2015” (2019, pp. 177–208). Taiwan’s aid has been particularly helpful to the Caribbean and Central American countries. For instance, Taiwan has been a major development aid donor to Haiti since both established diplomatic relations in 1956 (Rich, 2010). In addition, Taiwan has provided about $205 million in loans and $27 million in grants to Honduras. Likewise, Taiwan provided aid to the region’s Sustainable Development Initiative by hosting the first Regional Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) Investment Forum that took place in October 2018. It continues to offer support to the Caribbean Nationally Determined Contribution Finance Initiative (NDCFI) which had its second forum organized by the government of St. Lucia and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) (“Taiwan reaffirms support for Caribbean Nationally Determined Contribution,” 2022).

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The ICDF is executing about 180 projects in 10 LAC countries, of which 95 of them are in Central America, 64 in the Caribbean, and 21 in Latin America. Some projects have been completed while others are ongoing. The greatest beneficiary of Taiwan’s development endeavor seems to be Honduras with 29 projects, followed by Haiti with 25, and Nicaragua and Guatemala both with 23 projects. Most Taiwanese foreign aid and development funds are targeted at countries that already have diplomatic relations with the nation, except for Ecuador (Critica & Maggiorelli, 2019). Overall, in 2019, Taiwan provided about $318 million in Official Development Assistance (ODI) through its ICDF. These funds were invested in projects dealing with education, scholarships and health care; economic infrastructure, information, and communication, agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; municipal construction, sustainable development, and technical assistance (ICDF Report, 2019).

Challenges China, Taiwan, and Latin American Countries Face in Their Relationships China, Taiwan, and Latin American and Caribbean countries experience challenges in their relationships based on their peculiar strategic circumstances. China Chinese Employees Replacing Local Employees China has done tremendously well in executing and achieving its global goals. However, there is a pressing need for China to create employment opportunities for its teeming population. Hence, part of the process for securing employment for the citizenry involves sending them overseas where it is actively engaged in infrastructural and economic development projects. The challenge is that most parts of the world in which China does business involve developing countries that have massive unemployment problems. Therefore, when China sends its laborers to perform lower-level skill jobs that would have been assigned to local citizens, it deprives them of the opportunity to gain employment and earn income to take care of their families. This provokes anger and hatred against the Chinese in many local communities. Chris Pleasance noted, “Meanwhile

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resentment is also growing among locals who have seen large construction projects handed to Chinese laborers, under the terms of loan deals, starving them of income” (2020). Additionally, Chinese workers that remain after the completion of assigned projects contribute to the increase in the diasporan Chinese population in various countries. Their presence contributes to tension between them and local citizens, thereby creating the impression that China is tactically spreading its population around the world as a conquering strategy, further contributing to local disenchantment in LAC which is also found in Africa. Chinese Citizens Remaining Behind after the Completion of Projects to Create Businesses that Compete with Local Businesses Another challenge China faces in LAC is that thousands of Chinese who were brought to work in various construction projects as laborers, as indicated above, remain behind after the completion of the projects to establish retail businesses. These Chinese businesses compete with local retail businesses and tend to dominate them because they have a greater advantage in getting a steady supply of cheaper products from China. Consequently, it does not take long for Chinese retailers to dominate the retail business in LAC countries, thereby increasing resentment of the Chinese (Pleasance, 2020). The Possibility of a Debt Trap As China spreads its BRI and SSC goals globally, it seems to be very generous in dispensing foreign aid, loans, and other financial services to enable countries in the developing world to develop and modernize their infrastructure and economies while on the other hand, the generosity seems to turn the loans into massive debts. As a result, Weizhan Tan, quoting the German-based Kiel Institute, noted, “Between 2000 and 2017, other countries’ debt owed to China soared ten-fold, from less than $500 billion to more than $5 trillion—or from 1% of global economic output to more than 5%” (CNBC, July 12, 2019). Of these loans, one estimate indicated that China has provided loans and other financial services worth $141 billion to LAC since 2005. The amount dwarfs all the loans that the World Bank (WB), the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), and the CAF Development Bank of Latin America have lent to the region (Jenner, 2019). Some analysts speculate that China purposely provides massive loans with low-interest rates as a ploy to encourage many countries to subscribe to its financial services in order

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to turn them into debtor nations, thereby controlling them. Thus, the concern about countries incurring massive debts to China resulting in the compromising of their sovereignty is a source of perplexity, even in LAC. Already, Venezuela seems to incur the highest debt, followed by Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina (Jenner, 2019). There is concern that some countries may not be able to pay back huge debts and may fall into a debt trap. The possibility of a debt trap is ever-present since China charges less interest on its loans, thereby enabling countries to borrow massively. The Fear of Chinese Colonization Due to the increasing debt that Latin American countries are incurring as they develop and modernize their economies, there are concerns that some of them could be indebted to China to a degree whereby the country might be compelled to take over some critical assets of their economies if they default on the loans. It should be recalled that when Zambia failed to meet its loan obligation during the heydays of COVID-19, China intervened by taking over its broadcasting corporation (ZNBC). Likewise, it negotiated to run the country’s electric corporation (ZESCO) (Ajetunmobi, 2018). In 2017, Sri Lanka defaulted on its loans and decided to hand over a major port (Hambantota) to China. Kai Schultze (2017) reported: Struggling to pay its debt to Chinese firms, the nation of Sri Lanka formally handed over the strategic port of Hambantota to China on a 99-year lease last week, in a deal that government critics have said threatens the country’s sovereignty. Along the way, smaller countries like Sri Lanka have found themselves owing debts they cannot pay. Sri Lanka owes more than $8 billion to state-controlled Chinese firms, officials say.

The trepidation over possible indebtedness resulting in China’s taking over major sectors of the economy is intensified by the allegation that some conditions stipulated in the contracts for receiving Chinese loans are “hidden” in such a way that some government officials in LAC might not be cognizant of the level of debt their countries might incur. Already, Chinese companies have bought or acquired high-percentage stakes in some major economic and financial ventures in LAC. Rebecca Ray, Zara C. Albright, and Kehan Wang provided a brief list of some Chinese highstake purchases in the region:

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• China Three Gorges Corp bought Sempra’s 83.6 percent stake in Peru’s Luz del Sur, the largest electric company in Peru, for $4.1 billion. • State Grid Corp of China bought Chilquinta Energia, the third largest distributor in Chile, from Sempra for $2.4 billion. • State Grid bought Sempra’s 50 percent stake in Chilean Eletrans for $217 million. • ICBC purchased a 20 percent stake in ICBC Argentina assets from South Africa’s Standard Bank Group for $181 million. Standard Bank first became involved in ICBC Argentina when it bought BankBoston Argentina in 2006, then sold 80 percent of the assets to ICBC in 2012 (February 22, 2021). Thus, in the event of a major global economic recession, the possibility of some countries in LAC defaulting, thereby compelling China to take over some major economic facilities as a payback mechanism, is quite possible. The concern prompted Neil Davila, the head of Mexico’s federal agency that promotes foreign commerce to say, “We do not want to be China’s next Africa” (Koleski, 2011). He referred to Africa because many countries in the continent have owed extensive debts to China as they borrowed massively to develop their infrastructure and economies. Consequently, it is incumbent on China to manage the debts in a manner that does not arouse resentment in LAC. This is a major challenge China faces because the more it succeeds in spreading its BRI, the more it entangles many countries in its financial web. Despite the gloomy possibility, it should be noted that China managed the Zambian situation by negotiating a debt restructuring plan that accommodated Zambian interests (Kumon, 2022). Additionally, it forgave the $7.1bn debt that Rwanda owed. It could adopt similar strategies in LAC if a debt problem manifests. The Environmental Impact of Engaging in Massive Extraction of Minerals China is massive in every aspect of its endeavors and its industries require a massive supply of raw materials to keep them running at optimal levels. Consequently, it encourages LAC countries to mine large quantities of various minerals and cultivate agricultural products. These extractive industries contribute to environmental pollution and degradation. In addition, the clearing of forests for mining operations further degrades

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the environment. Therefore, China is increasingly being viewed as a state that contributes gargantuanly to pollution and degradation of the environment in LAC as well as in Africa and other parts of the world. To counteract the view, China articulated in its BRI the notion of “ecological civilization” in which it strives to ensure justice, harmony, efficiency, cultural development, sustainable resources use, social governance, a high degree of productivity, and the maintenance of ecological harmony (Villa, 2022). China promises to be environment-friendly in order not to be destructive to the ecology wherever it does business. Critics doubt China’s ability to comply with the “ecological civilization” policy due to its appetite for raw materials. Non-Interference or Support for Authoritarianism While it is actively spreading its BRI globally, China has made it clear that it would not interfere in the internal affairs of the countries it does business with. China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi enunciated the policy while attending the UN General Assembly in September 2012: China endeavors to strengthen political mutual trust and address problems and differences with other countries through dialogue and exchanges. China does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or impose its will on others, and China does not allow outside forces to interfere in its internal affairs (China’s Foreign Minister stresses non-interference at UN Debate. (United Nations, 2012)

This policy is intended to assuage the concerns of the citizens of the countries it does business with. Some analysts argue that it is impossible for China not to intervene when it regularly supplies arms to some governments to suppress human rights in resource-rich countries, particularly in Africa, Asia, and Venezuela (Morgan, 2018). Apart from the doubt about its ability to maintain non-interference, some human and civil rights advocates and Western governments express concern that such a policy encourages authoritarianism which results in the suppression of the opposition, especially in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (Edel & Shullman, 2021). A research professor in Latin American Studies, Evan Ellis, noted, “It’s not that China’s trying to produce antidemocratic regimes, but that antidemocratic regimes find a willing partner in the Chinese” (Roy, 2022).

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Chinese Manufactured Products versus LAC Manufactured Products A major issue that has cropped up in LAC, just as in Africa and Asia, is the competition generated between China’s manufactured products and domestically manufactured products. In other words, while the PRC has contributed immensely to the development and modernization of LAC economies, it seems to have also contributed to the denting of the capability of the countries in the region to produce manufactured goods because Chinese finished goods keep pouring into these states to compete with domestically produced goods. Generally, Chinese goods tend to kill the domestic manufacturing sector because of the economics of large-scale production that gives Chinese-produced goods an advantage over domestically produced goods. Therefore, Chinese goods tend to drive away the viability of the domestic manufacturing sector in LAC (Gallagher & Porzecanski, 2010). To avoid competition, some experts have suggested that LAC countries should concentrate on the cultivation of service-sector industries where they are likely to have an advantage over the manufacturing sector (Zamora, 2011).

The US and Western Reaction to China’s Increasing Relationship with LAC China’s increasing presence in LAC arouses US’ apprehension. The reason is that traditionally, LAC has always been part of the US sphere of influence, especially after the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 that barred European countries from interfering in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere (Lundestad, 1999). Later, the US enunciated the Good Neighbor Policy in which it promised not to interfere in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere to reduce regional concerns about its military interventions (Blake, 2005, p. 59). It appears that China has increasingly rendered the Monroe Doctrine ineffective as it establishes an extensive business relationship with the region, apart from the eight countries which continue to maintain diplomatic and economic relations with Taiwan. In particular, China’s relationship with the Caribbean states provides a very strategic footing for it to get territorially closer to the US the way the US is strategically closer to China through its relations with South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines (Nugent & Campbell, 2021).

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Apart from being entrenched in the US’s backyard, it is also dislodging some American and European companies that used to do business in LAC because of its low-interest loans and proactive involvement in the infrastructural development and modernization of the economies of the region. For instance, Kier, a British construction company, was forced to quit doing business in LAC because it could not compete with China’s firms (Pleasance, 2020). As a result, China is now the leading trading partner with South America while it is the second largest throughout Latin America, following the US which is the largest trading partner in the region (Roy, 2022). When President Donald Trump was in office, he reacted to China’s increasing presence in LAC by imposing economic sanctions against several countries in the region. He also reduced funding for some organizations in the region to show US displeasure over the increasing ties with China. In addition, President Trump withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership to punish the region for doing business with China (McBride & Siripurapu, 2002). Some observers noted that President Trump’s economic sanctions and other harsh measures contributed to the building of a stronger LAC connection with China (Stuenkel, 2020). Similarly, a high-ranking US senior naval officer, Admiral Craig S. Fuller, credited China’s successes in LAC based on the ground that the US had ignored the region while focusing its strategic interest in Asia, particularly the Pacific and the Middle East. He noted, “We are losing our positional advantage in this hemisphere and immediate action is needed to reverse this trend” (Senate Armed Services Committee, March 16, 2021). President Joe Biden who succeeded President Trump reversed some of the harsh measures instituted by his predecessor and even tried to reestablish relations with Venezuela as a means to boost the global oil supply following the Russo-Ukrainian War. The challenge generated by the US reaction to China’s increasing presence in LAC is not likely to result in a profound negative effect on the PRC. The reason is that the US and the West represent the status quo in global economic development. Hence, they did not act proactively to assist LAC countries when they needed assistance to enhance their infrastructure and economies. If the US had launched a program like the Marshall Plan to assist in modernizing the economies of the region, perhaps, they would have not sought China’s assistance. A Marshalllike plan would have tremendously enhanced the economic situation in Central America, Bolivia, Haiti, Peru, Venezuela, and so forth. China

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seized upon the West’s disinterest to fill the vacuum. Moreover, the US’s tendency to deploy economic sanctions as a geopolitical tool also contributes to pushing many LAC countries to do business with China. These countries seem to view China as an alternative to the US and Europe because of its willingness to invest massively in the infrastructural development of the region (Koleski, 2011). The US’s challenge to China is also mitigated by the fact that the free market capitalistic model, which some scholars refer to as the Washington Model is generally driven by private companies whose shareholders are mostly motivated to make huge profits in a short duration. As a result, they avoid taking the kinds of risks that China is willing to take to provide low-cost loans and other financial services to LAC countries that are determined to take their economies to a higher level of productivity. The same reason seemed to have persuaded African countries to do business with China. They want to become producers of finished industrial goods that could boost their economies and enhance the general well-being of their citizens. Thus, the Chinese Economic Model that incorporates the public and private sectors seems better equipped to take risks because of the government-private-sector partnership. The Chinese economic system also seems to do much better than the private enterprise capitalistic model in the sense that it is communalistic and is not necessarily designed to make huge profits in a short time. China can afford to invest massively and wait for a longer time to earn profits from its investments while the private-sector-driven capitalistic model does not have the tolerance to invest massively and wait for a longer duration to make a profit. The shareholders are not likely to encourage any investment that will not yield immediate short-term profits. The need to generate quick profit played out in Elon Musk’s acquisition of Twitter in 2022, resulting in uncertainty and the tumbling of the company’s fortunes (Saul, 2022). A third possible reason why the US and the West’s challenge to China in LAC might have an insignificant effect is that Latin American and Caribbean people are aware that dealing with Western multinational corporations rarely results in a recognizable benefit to the general wellbeing of the citizens. They tend to exploit the resources, make huge profits, and leave to seek greener pastures elsewhere, thereby, leaving the indigenous people to suffer even more. For instance, even in the unfortunate Russo-Ukrainian War situation, it is alleged that American gas suppliers to Europe sell natural gas at exorbitant prices to the point of

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infuriating the Europeans (McMahon, 2022).Likewise, Western multinational oil companies (MOCs) are alleged to have made huge profits while the European countries struggled to fill the shortfall in energy supply necessitated by the economic sanctions imposed against Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. Both US President Joe Biden and UN SecretaryGeneral Antonio Guterres condemned the “grotesque greed” (Fassihi, 2022). On the one hand, because Western countries are unable to modify the behavior of their multinational corporations, the West is disadvantaged in competing with China. On the other hand, because China is willing to engage in massive construction of infrastructural projects that can drastically change people’s lives, it offers an attractive business option to the LAC, just as in Africa and Asia, despite the risk of indebtedness.

Lack of Clarity in Overseas Direct Investment Financial Reports Some analysts believe that it is difficult to estimate the actual cumulative figures of China’s global Overseas Direct Investments (ODIs) because a large proportion of its funds go through Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands in the Caribbean. These international money centers tend to obscure the actual destinations of China’s funds. Therefore, a major challenge that China faces is to streamline the financial data of its overseas direct investments (ODIs). Some financial analysts warn that China is taking a big risk since it is not upholding the Equator Principle (EP) in making investment decisions. The EP is a risk management framework that provides a minimum standard for making financial decisions. Western financial investors utilize the EP to guide them against taking unnecessary financial risks (“Equator Principle III,” 2013, June). The analysts suggest that streamlining the ODI funds could help China to manage its investments in risky political and economic environments more effectively.

The Risk to China in Exercising Its Might Even though China has a greater advantage than Taiwan in attracting diplomatic recognition with LAC states, a strategic mistake could offset the advantage. To maintain its diplomatic equilibrium, China must avoid taking certain actions.

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First, any major action it takes in response to some of its business partners defaulting on their investment loans could frighten many countries, not only in LAC but also in Africa, Asia, particularly the Middle East and the Pacific Islands to recalibrate their relationship with the economic superpower. Thus, if China were to intervene aggressively in any country that has defaulted by acting like an imperial superpower, it would send a chilling message to LAC countries to be wary of entangling with the PRC. Therefore, if any country faces circumstances that indicate an incapability to meet its debt obligation, the challenge for China’s officials would be to handle the situation tactfully to minimize attracting a negative global reaction. Second, if it acts aggressively to ensure the recovery of a debt, many countries in LAC and Africa would become very cautious and probably decide to do business with Taiwan that is less threatening due to its smaller size and manageable capabilities. And third, while it is acknowledged that Taiwan is part of China based on UN Resolution 2758, it must continue to negotiate and find peaceful ways of resolving the conflict. A military invasion could frighten many countries to reduce business engagement with China for fear of being engulfed militarily. Thus, the challenge for China is to restrain itself from using the military option in Taiwan. A military invasion may well compel South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam to get even closer to the US and many LAC countries could even decide to cut diplomatic relations. China needs to continue to negotiate to resolve the Taiwan’s issue peacefully.

Challenges Confronting Taiwan in LAC As It Competes with China Taiwan is seeking to extricate itself from a unique circumstance necessitated by UN Resolution 2758 which categorically states that it is part of China and become a sovereign state. Consequently, it faces monumental challenges in LAC. The One-China Policy A major goal of Taiwan is to change the One-China policy so that it can gain diplomatic recognition and become a sovereign state, but the task seems herculean. The reason is that Taiwan originally instigated the One-China policy when it continued to bear the “Republic of China”

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after the nationalists (Kuomintang) moved to Taiwan in 1949, following the loss to the Chinese communists in a civil war. It inadvertently helped to create the two-China issue at the United Nations by insisting on one China. Because it was supported by the US and other Western nations, it succeeded in preventing the PRC from gaining a seat at the UN. Hence, it was recognized by LAC countries as the legitimate government of China (Hale, 2021).Unfortunately, the tide turned against Taiwan when the PRC gained the support of many Third World (a term used at the time) countries that had the support of the communist bloc while they were struggling to gain independence. In addition, the US rapprochement with China which resulted in its recognition of the PRC as the government of China on January 1, 1979, impacted Taiwan adversely. Eventually, the UN enacted Resolution 2758 which recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, resulting in the expulsion of Taiwan because there can be only one China at the UN. This issue might not have arisen if the nationalists had adopted the name “Republic of Taiwan” (ROT) instead of the Republic of China (ROC) which conflicted with China as a single sovereign state. Because the US accepted the One-China policy and enabled China to replace Taiwan at the UN, it is legally difficult for the US and the UN to reverse the decision. The difficulty is further complicated by the fact that China has veto power in the UN Security Council (UNSC) and could veto any effort to change the global proclamation of one China. Therefore, the challenge for Taiwan today is finding a way to convince the world that it is not part of China but is the Republic of Taiwan. One way Taiwan attempts to overcome the obstacle is by focusing its foreign policy and development aid on countries that recognize it in the hope of persuading others to de-recognize the PRC (Erikson & Chen, 2007, pp. 69–89). Changing the legal status and the political perception is a very daunting challenge that Taiwan must endure since China insists that it is part of China. Moreover, there are still nationalist (Kuomintang) elements in Taiwan who are beholden to the idea of reintegrating with China, thereby further complicating Taiwan’s efforts to be a separate state (Critica & Maggiorelli, 2019).

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The Tying of Development Aid to its Diplomatic Effort to Gain Recognition It seems that Taiwan’s tying of foreign aid to its diplomacy for recognition, as spelled out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Guidelines and the mission of the International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) was successful in the 1990s because it enabled it to gain diplomatic recognition from 22 to 30 Countries (Hsiao-Pong, 2009). However, due to the restrictive nature of the approach, Taiwan seems to prevent itself from spreading its influence widely by limiting its ability to wiggle and gain recognition from as many countries as possible. To minimize the advantage of the economics of large-scale production that China possesses, Taiwan should pursue a dynamic diplomatic strategy intended to attract even those countries that have broken diplomatic ties with it by offering them options through the application of soft power tactics by dwelling on the moral argument that it is democratic and upholds human rights, and respects the sovereignty of every state without any compulsion to threaten them to conform to its strategic orbit. While adopting the dynamic approach, it must continue to cultivate relationships with those LAC states that already have diplomatic relations with it. Thus, overcoming the challenge requires the retooling of its foreign policy and foreign aid goals to enable it to negotiate and establish relations with many as possible in the world. Instead of connecting development aid with its public diplomacy, it should free itself from the restrictive notion of “development aid” and concentrate on gaining recognition from as many countries as possible. The term “development aid or foreign aid” implies that it only seeks recognition from developing countries that need assistance. Under the circumstances, it seems to limit its ability to establish diplomatic and economic relations with developed countries, especially those it already has unofficial relations. Perhaps, Taiwan’s officials recognized the limitations and attempted to remedy the situation by initiating the New Southbound Policy which is designed to expand its relations with countries in the Indo-Pacific and Southeast Asian regions (Glick, 2022).

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Supports for the Status Quo A major obstacle in Taiwan’s effort to change its status by gaining recognition from countries in LAC, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East is that its foreign policy tends to reinforce the status quo in world affairs while most countries want to change their political and economic statuses. Arguably, this problem developed because Taiwan, going back to the end of World War II, tied its foreign relations aspirations with the West. During this time, there was an inkling by many Western colonies to gain independence. Thus, by being identified with the West, Taiwan adopted policies that were not favorable to the independence struggle in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s since Western nations were the colonial powers. In colonies like Algeria, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Laos, Mozambique, Vietnam, and so forth, the colonial powers were not eager to grant independence and these provoked wars of independence. The evidence that Taiwan stood for the status quo at a time when a change was desired in the global system was when it recognized the Republic of South Africa and even agreed to engage in a nuclear exchange program with the apartheid regime (Pickles & Woods, 1989, pp. 507–528). On the other hand, China, like other socialist and communist countries, supported the independence struggle, as indicated earlier. This meant that China opted to change the status quo in global politics because it supported groups that wanted to break their colonial yoke. Consequently, China gained an advantage in the UN while Taiwan was expelled. Likewise, the fact that Taiwan identified with the West also meant that it took a conservative approach to the issue of infrastructural and economic development just like its Western allies. China became proactive in assisting developing countries to fundamentally develop and modernize their infrastructures and economies. This seems to persuade many developing countries to pitch their tent with China rather than with the West. Hence, each time a country somewhere decides to establish diplomatic and economic relations with China, it means that the move is a minus for Taiwan and the West. Taiwan must eliminate the perception that it stands for the status quo just like the US and other Western nations. Latin American and Caribbean nations want to change their socioeconomic and technological statuses by transforming their economies. As a result, they see China as an alternative to the US and Europe since it is willing to fund major transformative developmental projects (Koleski, 2011). Kirk

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Semple concurs by saying “China’s growing interest has come as muchneeded help for Caribbean nations that have serious infrastructure needs but whose status as middle-income countries complicates their access to financing” (Semple, 2020). Lack of the Economics of Large-Scale Production Taiwan is one of the most successful political entities in the world. It is democratic with a buoyant economy, resulting in its being classified as one of the Asian Tigers. As a major producer and exporter of manufactured goods which has enabled it to accumulate a considerable amount of foreign currency reserves, it provides foreign aid as part of its effort to gain diplomatic recognition. However, despite a rosy economic outlook, it faces a great challenge in the sense that it lacks the economics of largescale production capacity, as indicated earlier, to compete with China by providing massive financial incentives in the form of low-interest loans and other financial concessions. Likewise, it is not able to provide largescale impact-creating infrastructural development projects like China to turn the diplomatic tide in its favor. As a result, some scholars predict that Taiwan may eventually lose recognition among the remaining LAC countries because many of them might be tempted to recognize China and get the kinds of infrastructural and economic-boosting ventures that are likely to lead to economic transformation. Liam Gibson noted “However, in the past decade China’s investment has ramped up rapidly, which is why we have seen Taiwan’s allies start to drop. That means the accumulative cost of sticking by Taiwan is growing each year” (2021). This prediction is supported by Rasheed Griffith, a fellow at the InterAmerican Dialogue, based in Washington DC. He believes that the remaining Caribbean countries that are still aligned with Taiwan might be compelled to de-recognize it and turn to China (Gibson, 2021). Taiwan’s Recognition is Mostly by States with no Veto Power at the United Nations Taiwan is challenged to expand the pool of states that have diplomatic relations with it by tactically gaining recognition from medium to bigger countries. So far, it is countries in Central America, the Caribbean, the Pacific, and the Vatican that continue to maintain diplomatic ties with it. Although these are sovereign states, however, they have no veto power in

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the UN to play a pivotal role in upturning the One-China policy. Moreover, their global reach in international affairs is limited, thereby limiting their diplomatic impact. Thus, the nation is on a diplomatic tightrope in the sense that while it is seeking self-determination, it must pursue the goal without pushing China to the point of using military force to absorb it. To ensure that war does not erupt, it must minimize actions that China might view as provocations that could prompt military action. The threat of war is increasing as China ramps up its military might and conducts regular military exercises near Taiwan in reaction to the US’s closer ties with the ROC. The US Senate reacted to China’s increasing threat by attempting to pass the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, which is intended to promote Taiwan’s security against China’s military threat (Chen & O’Connell, 2022). Insufficient Financial Allocation for the Official Development Assistance (ODA)Program As indicated in the ICDF Report of 2019, Taiwan allocated $318 million for ODA. This figure is insufficient to create much impact on infrastructural and economic development that could result in a noticeable transformative change in LAC. It creates the impression that Taiwan is not committed demonstratively through a robust financial investment to achieve its goal of regaining recognition. It also shows that it is very conservative in the execution of its development assistance programs. Thus, the $318 expenditure in ODA in 2019 was less than its $438 million expenditure for ODA in 2010 and $332 million allocation for 2012. It was slightly more than $299 million in 2013 and $290 million in 2015 (Critica & Maggiorelli, 2019). The fact that Taiwan with a buoyant economy spends less than $1.7bn annually on its ICDF while China spends multibillion dollars in financial investments, loans, and infrastructural construction projects throughout LAC shows that it could lose recognition among the remaining eight LAC states to China. Sustainability of the Projects Taiwan’s presence and its investments in LAC face tremendous challenges in terms of sustainability since its annual financial allocation for the ODA is not sufficient to boost its presence in the region in an

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impact-creating manner. Sensing Taiwan’s paucity of financial commitment, China may be able to persuade Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, St. Kits and Nevis, St. Lucia, Paraguay, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines to de-recognize Taiwan subsequently and join the BRI bandwagon to ensure the enhancement of their infrastructures and economies. If this were to take place, Taiwan would not be able to maintain its relations by sustaining the projects it has already carried out in LAC. If Taiwan is seriously committed to achieving its diplomatic goal, it must increase its ODA budgetary allocations. Some analysts suggest that Taiwan should concentrate on soft power projects because it cannot compete with China on construction projects (Ramos, 2016). It should be noted that China too engages in soft power projects; therefore, Taiwan does not have a monopoly in this area. The Possibility of Losing Recognition in LAC As China continues to make inroads in LAC by investing in major infrastructural projects, it seems to be attracting attention from countries that still recognize Taiwan. Hence, Nicaragua de-recognized Taiwan and re-recognized China when Daniel Ortega assumed the presidency of the country again. There is a high probability that the remaining eight LAC states that recognize Taiwan might be tempted in the future to join the China bandwagon if they desire to carry out major infrastructural projects that require massive investments. Taiwan faces this constant threat because China is overwhelming in its ability to spread projects and funds. However, there is the possibility that if conservative and anticommunist regimes come into power in the region, they could also de-recognize China and re-recognize Taiwan the way Nicaragua did when Daniel Ortega was voted out of power in 1990 and de-recognized Taiwan when he got back to power after defeating conservative Eduardo Montealegre in 2006 (Erikson & Chen, 2007, pp. 69–89). Thus, the situation is not hopeless for Taiwan since the ideological orientation of leadership in some countries in the region can influence a diplomatic change that could be favorable to Taiwan.

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Challenges Confronting Latin American and Caribbean Countries in Dealing with China and Taiwan Even though China and Taiwan are actively seeking a diplomatic and economic foothold and as such, are providing all kinds of financial and infrastructural development incentives to the LAC, nonetheless, the region also faces challenges in response to receiving various incentives from both. Most of the challenges seem to come from dealing with China and not from Taiwan. Low-Interest Loans and the Temptation to Borrow Excessively The low-interest loans and concessionary deals that LAC countries receive from China could lure them to borrow beyond their means to pay back, thereby jeopardizing their financial standing and forcing them into circumstances akin to the Zambian and Sri Lankan situations. Such a development could prompt China to take control of some of its critical assets. It should be noted that in Zambia, China ended up running the country’s broadcasting industry while in Sri Lanka, it ended up operating the country’s major seaport. Thus, the danger of overborrowing is an ever-present danger that LAC leaders must guide against. Otherwise, they might repeat what happened in the 1980s, an era known as the “lost decade,” in which they were so indebted that the West had to write off some of the debt to reduce their financial burden (Sims & Romero, 2013). The challenge for the leaders of the region is not to overborrow. The Maximization of Chinese Loans and Investments LAC countries need to use the incredible opportunity provided by China to maximize the development and modernization of their infrastructure and economies to a point where they become producers of finished industrial goods based on import-substitution industrialization and export-oriented industrialization strategies. Their populations are growing, and they need to create an economic environment that provides enormous employment opportunities for their citizens. Already, countries in Central America have a growing population problem with fewer employment opportunities, poverty, food insecurity, and gang violence. These factors compelled many men, women, and children to migrate

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and seek employment in the US and Canada (Organization of American States, 2021). Even Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and so forth are not able to provide sufficient employment opportunities to absorb a growing population, hence many citizens turn to illegal businesses to sustain themselves. Playing a Balancing Role While they are increasingly getting closer to China, LAC countries must play a balancing role and not tilt the relationship in such a manner that threatens the strategic interest of the US and the West. The US is naturally a geographic neighbor, therefore, regional leaders must always be pragmatic and ensure that they can balance the interest of China with those of the US because a territorial neighbor will always remain a neighbor, whether for good or bad. They could use their relationship with China to persuade the country to use a non-military approach to resolve the Taiwanese issue. The reason is that a Chinese military invasion could trigger US’ reaction, thereby impairing the stability of the region as the US responds militarily in a manner that could negatively impact China-Latin American and Caribbean relations. Avoiding Debt Trap LAC countries face the possibility of being indebted to the point of surrendering their sovereignty to China. Cumulatively, LAC countries have received considerable loans from China with Venezuela having taken 17 loans totaling $62.5 billion, Brazil with 13 loans amounting to $30.5 billion, Ecuador with 24 loans amounting to $18.2billion, Argentina with 17 loans amounting to $17.0 billion, Bolivia with nine loans amounting to $3.2 billion, Jamaica has 11 loans amounting to $2.1 billion, Mexico with one loan worth $1, billion, Suriname with six loans worth $773 million, the Dominican Republic has one loan totaling $600 million, Trinidad and Tobago have four loans worth $491 million, Costa Rica has two loans amounting to $435 million, Cuba with four loans totaling $369 million, Guyana with four loans amounting to $248 million, Barbados has one loan amounting to $170 million, Antigua and Barbuda with three loans worth $169 million, Bahamas with two loans worth $99 million, Grenada with one loan worth $66 million, Peru with one loan worth $50 million, and Dominica has one loan worth $40 million (Roy, 2022).

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Thus, the opportunity exists that in the haste to develop and modernize, mistakes could be made to the extent that some borrowed funds could disappear without accountability or satisfactory explanation. As shown above, Venezuela is the leading country with the highest debt profile in Latin America while Jamaica is the Caribbean country with the highest debt to China. To avoid indebtedness, monies borrowed must be used for the purposes they were intended for. Likewise, projects approved for construction must relate directly to the enhancement of the infrastructure and the economy so that they are not wasted, resulting in some uncompleted projects. Dependency The increasing reliance on China could lead to dependency. Except for those countries that continue to recognize Taiwan, all other LAC countries now rely extensively on China. In the Caribbean, China is responsible for building roads, ports, and resorts and providing investment loans to the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and so forth. In Jamaica, for instance, a Chinese company ended up operating Kingston’s Freeport, which is one of the largest container ports in the Caribbean. In Cuba, China contributed extensively to the modernization of the Santiago de Cuba port by adding a new terminal, which opened in 2018, Dominican Republic received about $3 billion in investment loans in 2018 (Pleasance, 2020). In Grenada, China spearheaded the construction of a new cricket stadium worth $55 million. Long-term soft loans could make the Caribbean nations dependent on China for a long time. Many Jamaicans and the US ambassador to the country expressed concern when China negotiated and obtained 1,200 acres of prime land in the country, fearful of China’s taking over the country incrementally (Ellington, 2019). In Latin America, China is heavily involved in infrastructural and economic development projects, including the construction of roads, dams, processing plants, and mining of various minerals, as in the Caribbean but on a much bigger scale. Latin America also borrows massively from China, as indicated above. When the opportunity provided itself, Panama jumped upon it and negotiated approximately 16 deals with China. The US had to intervene to put pressure on Panama to slow the process due to the strategic nature of the Panama Canal. A state of dependency seems to be incrementally created by the fact that China is the

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leading trading partner with South America, hence China invested $12. 8 billion in LAC in 2018. In addition, China is a major purchaser of LAC raw materials (minerals and agricultural products). Chinese high demand for these resources helps to increase their prices, thereby boosting the economies of the region. Furthermore, increasing Chinese demand for beef from Uruguay, oil from Colombia and Venezuela, copper from Chile, and soya from Brazil increases the region’s reliance on China as a market for its products (Nugent & Campbell, 2021). The possibility of dependency is further buttressed by the fact that 19 LAC states have agreed to join the China BRI program. Eight of the signees are from the Caribbean. In addition, LAC leaders established the CELAC trading bloc in 2018 which contributed to deepening relations with China. Coincidentally, it was Latin American scholars who popularized the concept of dependency. Dependency is theorized from the view that “because developing world economies are on the periphery of the world capitalist system, they have become dependent on the advanced industrialized countries” (Calvert & Calvert, 2007, p. 39). Basically, LAC countries are increasingly becoming dependent on China the way they used to be dependent on the Western economic system. Competition from Chinese Goods in LAC and Other Markets As a result of the economics of large-scale production that China possesses, LAC’s business relationship with the country involves enormous risks to the region. As stated earlier, China produces manufactured goods in large quantities, hence it can sell its goods at a much lower price than LAC countries. This means that even in the region, most people are likely to buy Chinese products more than those manufactured locally because of the low prices. Moreover, most people in the region might assume that Chinese products are of a higher quality than locally produced goods, thereby compelling them to buy Chinese goods at a higher rate. Apart from the domestic situation, LAC products also face competition from Chinese products in the sense that they compete to sell products in the same markets outside the region. Here again, China is most likely to have an advantage over LAC countries, resulting in the inhibition of the region’s ability to sell its finished products robustly in the global market. Likewise, China attracts a greater number of direct foreign investments than LAC, therefore, the relationship between the region and

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the country might, in the long run, become more problematic for the region, unless the region can produce massively and compete fiercely to gain markets (Jenkins & Moreira, 2008, pp. 235–253). Additionally, due to its large-scale economic and technological presence in the world, China increasingly sets global technological standards through its major corporations like ZTE, Dahua, Huawei, and Hikvision.

Conclusion Indeed, China, Taiwan, and LAC face several challenges in their diplomatic and economic relationships. On the one hand, the challenges China faces are generated by its successes while Taiwan is confronted by several existential threats which if not carefully resolved could lead to its being de-recognized throughout LAC. On the other hand, Latin American and Caribbean states are confronted with almost the same kinds of issues that African and Asian countries deal with in doing business with China. They have the possibility of metamorphosizing into major industrial nations or becoming indebted and beholden to China in a state of dependency. To mitigate the challenges, it is incumbent upon the parties to be strategic in their diplomatic and business engagements. Consequently, it is essential for China to find ways to reduce the use of its citizens for low-level manual jobs in LAC and other developing countries to minimize resentment. It must ensure that after certain construction projects have been completed, the laborers are sent back to China. Establish policies and take appropriate measures to manage its investment loans and contracts in a manner that does not contribute to indebtedness resulting in a debt trap and the taking over of important economic assets of the countries it does business with. It should treamline the financial data of its overseas direct investments to minimize the possibility of financial and economic mismanagement, and take steps to eliminate the perception that it is reinforcing authoritarianism in LAC and other developing countries it does business with. It should tread cautiously in attempting to reintegrate Taiwan. A forceful military intervention could turn some LAC countries and others in the world to disrupt its BRI goal. Taiwan needs to be more proactive in seeking diplomatic recognition, but it must do so without taking actions that could be interpreted as being provocative to the extent of arousing China’s military action. Taiwan needs to expand its diplomatic and business relationships beyond those it already has to

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establish a dynamic impact on the global system to upturn UN Resolution 7258. Latin American and Caribbean countries should institute mechanisms to ensure self-control to avoid being lured by the attraction of low-interest loans to borrow from China to the point of indebtedness that could warrant China’s intervention and the taking over some of their critical assets and resources as had happened in Zambia and Sri Lanka. They should avoid depending excessively on one major country as a source of their infrastructural and economic development and modernization to avoid being dependent to the extent of surrendering their sovereignty. It is important for them to utilize the generous Chinese loans to accomplish the projects they were meant for by reducing mismanagement and corruption. Moreover, they must maintain a geopolitical balance between doing business with China and the US because the latter is a territorial neighbor. The US and the West generally should reform the capitalist model, which some scholars refer to as the Washington Model, which is centered excessively on the maximization of profit and develop an economic model that includes a certain degree of corporate social responsibility to attract countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East to the Western economic orbit in a changing world. China is determined to usher in a new world order that is anchored on its strategic umbrella. Similarly, Latin American and Caribbean countries, like those in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, want a fundamental change in their economic status so that they become producers of finished industrial goods and services and be able to enhance the general well-being of their citizens.

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CHAPTER 15

Concluding Remarks: China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Road Ahead in a Post-COVID-19 Era Cassandra R. Veney and Sabella O. Abidde

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) have had long ties to Latin America and the Caribbean as the chapters in this volume examined, discussed, critiqued, and analyzed. The authors have delved into the various linkages that have been forged between the PRC, ROC, Latin America, and the Caribbean. These linkages are primarily due to historical, economic, political, cultural, diplomatic, and military relations that have ebbed and flowed, waxed, and waned over

C. R. Veney (B) Center for Women, Gender and Global Leadership, Howard University College of Arts and Sciences, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] S. O. Abidde Department of History and Political Science, Alabama State University, Montgomery, AL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9_15

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time. The changes in the relations between the four actors under review in the book can be explained depending on the external and internal factors and actors within the two regions and with the PRC and ROC. On the one hand, within the context of Latin America and the Caribbean, the historical presence and dominance of the United States in these two regions cannot be overlooked or underestimated. On the other hand, the contemporary importance and significance of China cannot be underestimated in the analyses of Chinese-Taiwanese relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. The diverse collection of chapters in this volume illustrates the complex and complicated relations that have existed and continue to exist between the PRC, ROC, Latin America, and the Caribbean. These relations, as some authors point out, will not become less complicated as China and the United States vie for global power. In addition, it is argued correctly in some chapters that the United States has lost its economic luster and glory to China, not only in Africa but in Latin America and the Caribbean. The so-called developing countries in these regions grew weary of the heavy-handed approach in the provision of loans to those economies and turned to China. There have been declarations that these loans will produce a debt trap leaving these countries indebted to China. The result will be a loss of control of certain important economic sectors. Despite this warning by the United States and Western European countries, some Latin American and Caribbean countries continue to negotiate loans with China. To better understand China’s and Taiwan’s relations with the two regions, the history of both entities involved in the regions is necessary. This is provided in the chapters that trace these relations to when and why people from China and Taiwan migrated to Latin America and the Caribbean. The presence of people from China in Peru, Brazil, and Cuba, for example, goes back for centuries. For example, during the 1840s, migrants from China arrived in Cuba and Peru to work on sugar plantations and silver mines under Spanish colonial rule. Therefore, the cultural presence of the Chinese has been in those countries for a long time. There were push and pull factors that undergirded the migrants’ decisions. The push factors were within the context of economic conditions in China and Taiwan that pushed many families into poverty. Many sought better economic conditions that would allow them to take care of their families and educate their children. It is important to note in this conclusion that there is a significant Chinese Diaspora in Cuba, Peru, Venezuela,

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Brazil, and Paraguay. The pull factors in the receiving countries were often dictated by the regime that was in power. There were regimes in power at particular times that encouraged migration from China and Taiwan. Political and historical factors were intertwined and interconnected in terms of the associations and groups that people from China and Taiwan established in the receiving countries. External political factors in China and Taiwan determined what governments and parties migrants supported in their new hosting countries. There were times when there was conflict between migrants from China and Taiwan and there were times when both communities co-existed in harmony. The migration of people from China and Taiwan made the creation of enclaves in various countries possible. The enclaves made it possible for businesses, churches, newspapers, associations, and political activities to develop. In sum, historical migration and any contemporary migration open spaces for cultural exchanges and interactions that go beyond diplomatic and consular missions. Migration allowed for person-to-person contact. The migrants and nationals often worked and socialized together, intermarried, and faced similar racism and discrimination that indigenous nationals faced. Cultural linkages have been forged by all countries that have relations with China and Taiwan through the exchange of diplomats, students, tourists, athletes, and the establishment of cultural and educational centers, especially by providing Chinese language instruction through Confucius institutes. Several chapters in this volume discuss the economic linkages and relations between China-Taiwan-Latin America-the Caribbean. They are important to unpack because China and Taiwan are two entities, Latin America and the Caribbean consist of many countries with varying levels of economic growth and development. It is important to point out that the big economies of Brazil and Argentina were analyzed. However, the smaller economies of Paraguay and Uruguay were not excluded. This indicates that no matter how big or small, each country in Latin America has an interest in maintaining relations with China or Taiwan despite the historic hegemony of their big neighbor to the north—the United States. The same can be said for the Caribbean. However, in the case of this region, historically, it has been tied to whichever European country colonized individual countries. The vast majority of them were colonized by the United Kingdom while the others were colonized by Spain, the Netherlands, and France. Regardless of their former colonial legacy and

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economic attachments, countries in both regions are moving closer and closer to China economically. Taiwan trades with various countries in the region, but it does not have the economic capacity to compete with China. The Latin American and Caribbean countries know this, and they forge relations with China that are in their best interests. Various authors provide very important and extensive data on the trade volumes and commodities that are exchanged. This is important because the sheer increase in trade between China, Latin America, and the Caribbean is a manifestation of the growing and important role of China and the decreasing and less important role of the United States. The commodities are exported to China such as beef, agricultural products including wine, oil, and copper and indicate changing economic conditions within the country. In other words, Chinese consumers have a taste for and can afford wine from Argentina and Chile and beef from Brazil. Consumers in the Caribbean and Latin America can afford to purchase exports from China that include electronics. Where does all of this leave Taiwan? One can argue that Taiwan is clinging onto sinking ships, but the ship has not sunk yet. Taiwan’s economic relations with the two regions are not as robust and no one should expect them to be as China’s economy is huge. China now competes with the United States in terms of its economic prowess. However, that does not mean that Taiwan has nothing to offer to Latin America and the Caribbean, especially for those countries that continue to recognize it in the international community. Taiwan exports include car parts, plastics, chemicals, and machine parts. In turn, it imports leather, cotton, wool, seafood, and various agricultural products. Taiwan also provides economic assistance to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, although it does not and cannot compete with China. The importance of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) cannot be ignored. This is an area where Taiwan cannot compete with China. The Caribbean and Latin America consist of developing countries with growing populations. Government and political leaders understand the necessity of expanding their economies if they want to employ their nationals. They need money to build new or to upgrade existing infrastructure such as schools, roads, bridges, ports, and even cricket and soccer venues. They do not want to receive money with strings attached and they do not want to be lectured on about the virtues of democracy, respect for the rule of law, and the importance of human rights. Therefore, they are turning to China for loans and are more apt to join the BRI. Moreover,

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they want to be treated like equals as they too are sovereign members of the international community. The membership of China, Taiwan, and Latin American and Caribbean countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is also important because this puts all of them on a more equal footing. Taiwan may lack recognition by some states, but it is a member of the WTO which allows it to engage in global trade. Regardless of the current relations between China, Taiwan, Latin America, and the Caribbean, the political dimension trumps all others. After the PRC was recognized by the international community as the sole representative of China in the United Nations, and President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, Taiwan has been on the back foot. China’s use of its One China policy has resulted in countries switching sides from Taiwan to China. China’s economic ascent has allowed it to exert more pressure on countries that want to have their cake and eat it too. In other words, those countries that want to have relations with both China and Taiwan are increasingly unable to do so as China sends a clear signal that there is only one China and it includes Taiwan. If countries want to have formal diplomatic ties with China, they must pledge to uphold the One China policy. The recognition of China allows countries to have full diplomatic relations that include embassies and consular offices. When countries derecognize Taiwan and recognize China, Taiwan does not have the same diplomatic standing and often must leave the country. If it can remain in the country, it will be a trade mission to indicate its reduced status. The political dimensions of the relations are manifested in the exchange of ambassadors, official visits by top officials in the governments, and various trade and military agreements. China clearly has the advantage politically as it is a member of the UN Security Council; it has international recognition by most countries in the United Nations; it is flexing its political muscle because it has economic and military resources (sales, training, peacekeeping), and finally, it has gained respect by many developing countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean because of its dealings with those regions and its lack of a colonial footprint. It is no longer “the devil you know” (read Western Europe and the United States), but rather, it is the hidden dragon/crouching tiger that they want to know and engage with on a more balanced and equal footing. Political leaders and ordinary citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean are aware of the effects of climate change, the importance of green development, the blue economy, and the digital economy; they know that the

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world is more interconnected than ever before and if they have a chance to advance their economies and societies for the betterment of their citizens, they no longer can afford to look to their former colonial masters and the United States for the resources to do so. They must engage with China and Taiwan to advance their agendas. Latin American and Caribbean countries were forced to put the needs of their citizens first and foremost during the COVID-19 pandemic. When China took the lead in these two regions within the context of selling or donating vaccines, testing for a vaccine, and providing personal protection equipment, there was not much that the United States and Western Europe could say. These actions were taken by the Chinese government and Chinese companies and were communicated as a humanitarian gesture. The Chinese government’s communications and media coverage of its involvement in the two regions can be viewed by some as a propaganda tactic. Whether it was a propaganda move or not, Chinese diplomats and officials in the Caribbean and Latin America used social media and other media platforms to showcase their involvement in helping the countries through the pandemic. It also used its overseas Chinese communities to demonstrate that there was solidarity and cooperation between the Chinese government, its people, and nationals in the regions. These actions were not lost on Taiwan, and they demonstrated that during times of crisis, it might be better to align with a country that can provide needed assistance. In other words, those countries that grew closer to China during the pandemic are probably not going to back away from China in a post-COVID-19 era. The pandemic created a space for forging strong ties for humanitarian, military, political, and economic cooperation and for isolating Taiwan.

Index

A Acupuncture Diplomacy, 11, 160 Agricultural experts, 11, 150 Aid, 5, 9, 14, 24, 38, 41, 48, 74, 75, 83, 121, 133, 150, 162, 216–218, 222, 237, 262–272, 285–287, 361, 368, 373 Argentina, 9, 15, 16, 58, 59, 61–73, 75, 87, 96, 97, 103, 105, 107, 118, 153, 202, 209, 219, 231, 237, 238, 245, 247, 250, 295, 328–341, 343–347, 349–351, 360, 361, 365, 379, 392 Authoritarianism, 366, 382 B Barrio Chino, 24, 65 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 12, 13, 15, 16, 73, 127, 135, 201, 202, 205, 219–222, 229, 232, 270, 295, 296, 303, 318, 327, 340, 344, 345, 348, 356, 363, 381, 392

Bilateral agreements, 69, 170, 171 Bilateral relations, 15, 100, 125, 174, 177, 214, 295, 297, 318, 328, 330, 331, 349 Bolivia, 63, 86, 88, 101, 102, 172, 217, 295, 333, 360, 368, 379 Bolsonaro, Jair Messias President, 221, 236, 245, 299, 318 Bot, 241, 242 Brazil, 15, 36, 73, 86, 88, 97–99, 105, 107, 202, 211, 221, 236, 237, 239, 243, 245, 248, 295–297, 299–305, 308–313, 316–319, 328, 344, 361, 381, 391, 392 Brazil and Belt and Road Initiative, 15, 318

C Caribbean, 5–8, 41–46, 50, 51, 53, 82, 146, 166, 187, 210, 217, 222, 262, 271, 272, 276, 286,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 C. R. Veney and S. O. Abidde (eds.), China and Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean, Studies of the Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45166-9

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396

INDEX

288, 361, 370, 375, 380, 381, 391, 394 Caribbean Community, 262, 272, 275, 359 Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), 14, 42, 44, 261, 262, 272, 273, 275, 277, 278, 283, 288, 289, 358 Castro, Fidel, President, 20, 25–29, 35, 36 Castro, Raúl, 26, 27 Central America, 85, 146, 166, 247, 378 Chile, 20, 31, 63, 82, 86, 88, 102, 103, 172, 178, 179, 181, 207, 209, 211, 213–215, 221, 232, 237, 244, 295, 333, 339, 360, 361, 365, 379, 381, 392 China-Latin America Relations, 209, 210 Chinatown, 21–26, 30, 31, 33–35, 96 Chinese Civil War, 3, 7, 8, 20, 24, 25, 38, 116, 117 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 3, 7, 13, 15, 20, 26, 27, 59, 168, 230, 236, 239, 242, 243, 246, 248 Chinese Community in Panama, 146, 149, 158 Chinese foreign policy, 15, 16, 201, 209 Chinese Taipei, 14, 262, 276, 313, 316, 317 “Chinos”, 65 Cold War, 11, 33, 61, 67, 70, 82, 98, 99, 104, 117, 145, 153, 209, 221 Colombia, 12, 63, 89, 102, 166–172, 174, 175, 177–182, 184, 185, 188–193, 221, 243, 381

Confucius Institute (CI), 11, 121, 122, 125, 131, 132, 134, 136, 242–244, 281, 391 Cuba, 7, 19–29, 38, 82, 148, 220, 274, 380, 390 Cuban Revolution, 24, 25, 27, 34, 82 D Debt trap, 286, 364, 379, 382, 390 Deepfakes, 232, 233 Dependency, 16, 119, 132, 136, 273, 288, 289, 331, 380–382 Development, 8, 9, 11, 14, 17, 37, 42, 45, 57, 121, 127, 135, 156, 162, 170, 171, 187, 210, 211, 218, 222, 235, 250, 265, 267, 270, 273, 281, 284, 286, 288, 289, 300, 308, 327, 337, 341, 345, 351, 360–362, 367, 374, 376, 378 Development assistance, 14, 85, 261, 262, 266, 285, 288, 289, 376 Diplomacy, 8, 10, 12, 43, 51, 83, 84, 104, 105, 107, 121, 128, 136, 152, 186, 204, 213, 221, 238, 240, 261, 316, 345, 373 Diplomatic recognition, 11, 36, 42, 43, 45, 46, 51, 53, 75, 82, 86, 102, 107, 115, 120, 163, 204, 222, 357, 371, 373, 375, 382 Diplomatic relations, 4, 6, 8, 12, 15, 16, 20, 27, 35, 37, 46–49, 51, 58, 61, 62, 68, 84, 86–91, 93, 94, 146, 168, 176, 186, 192, 209, 221, 247, 262, 272, 297, 304, 311, 331, 341, 361, 371, 393 Domestic, 8, 14, 21, 38, 43, 51–53, 71, 99, 103, 118, 119, 124, 146, 155, 158, 163, 173, 188, 209, 235, 236, 247, 268, 269, 300–302, 318, 342, 367, 381

INDEX

Dominica, 5, 8, 43, 44, 46, 47, 51, 84, 89, 217, 275, 281, 282, 379 Donations, 38, 174, 237

E East Asia, 99 Economic competition, 115, 119 Economic exchanges, 13 Economy, 13, 15, 21, 37, 46, 99, 103, 118, 133, 181, 209, 236, 267, 286, 297, 299, 302, 310, 318, 328, 335, 342, 364, 380, 392 Enlai, Zhou, 26, 27 Environmental issues, 300, 318 Equator Principle (EP), 370 Exports, 29, 30, 37, 59, 71–73, 97, 99, 100, 102, 119, 133, 156, 158, 169, 177, 182, 183, 185, 188, 211, 274, 275, 277, 278, 296–298, 305, 329, 336, 342, 344, 350, 392

F Foreign aid, 6, 41, 66, 166, 221, 262–272, 284, 285, 287, 288, 359, 361–363, 373, 375 Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), 12, 170, 171, 181, 187, 188, 222, 262, 263, 274, 289, 297, 301 Foreign policy, 6, 14, 16, 36, 41, 44, 53, 67, 82, 118, 134, 162, 166, 180, 208, 287, 296, 343, 347, 372, 374 Formosa, 303, 314, 315

G Global South, 17, 300 ‘Going out’ policy, 262, 264, 275, 289

397

Grenada, 8, 43, 44, 46–50, 53, 84, 217, 281, 284, 379, 380 Guano, 7, 20, 29, 30 Guevara, Che, 26, 28

H Havana, 22–28, 216 Huang, Jack L., Ambassador, 146, 147, 149, 152, 157, 159–161

I Immigrants, 7, 20, 22, 23, 31, 34, 96, 146, 305, 307–309, 312 Immigration, 8, 9, 20–23, 29, 31, 32, 146, 305, 307, 308, 312, 313 Imports, 65, 70, 72, 99, 103, 132, 181–183, 185, 275, 277, 288, 297, 307, 349, 392 Infrastructure, 11, 15, 47, 49, 71, 98, 119, 127, 130, 134, 169, 190, 205, 216, 221, 222, 238, 250, 263, 264, 268, 272, 275, 285, 289, 297, 300, 327, 328, 330, 341, 345, 358, 363, 365, 368, 375, 378, 392 Ing-wen, Tsai President, 6, 50, 74, 84, 186, 204, 218, 248, 249, 272 Investment, 5, 10, 16, 37, 42, 53, 74, 83, 99, 100, 119, 126, 127, 135, 158, 162, 169–173, 179, 188, 190, 202, 211, 216, 220, 244, 250, 251, 265, 269, 272, 274, 288, 289, 300, 301, 305, 328, 337, 340, 342, 345, 347, 357, 360, 369–371, 376, 380

J Jinping, Xi President, 6, 15, 16, 42, 71, 189, 201, 213, 230, 235,

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INDEX

237, 240, 243, 269, 302, 334, 335

K Kai-shek, Chiang, 4, 7, 20, 23, 24, 59, 61, 64, 65, 146, 356 Kirchners (Néstor and Cristina), 71, 328 Kuomintang (KMT), 3, 4, 7, 20, 21, 23–25, 31, 61, 74, 116, 167, 372

L Latin America, 5–7, 12, 13, 19, 20, 38, 43, 50, 67, 70, 82, 95, 106, 115–121, 123–125, 127, 128, 130, 131, 134, 135, 151, 159, 202, 207, 209–212, 220, 222, 229, 231, 232, 235, 240, 245, 296, 300, 305, 330, 347, 363, 392, 394 Latin American, 5, 8, 11, 12, 16, 35, 73, 97, 118, 119, 122, 124, 126–130, 132–135, 150, 154, 162, 202, 209–211, 213, 214, 216, 220, 221, 231, 236, 238, 244, 250, 303, 339, 343, 349, 364, 381 Lima, 21, 22, 30–35, 38, 103, 171 loans, 28, 37, 42, 46–49, 74, 156, 202, 213, 218, 267, 274, 285, 303, 329, 330, 363, 364, 375, 379, 380, 390, 392

M Malvinas, 9, 58, 66, 71, 72, 245, 331, 333, 334 Maritime Silk Road, 218, 242, 265, 296 Ma Ying-jeou, 74, 84, 204

Menem, Carlos, President, 67, 68, 335, 346, 347 MERCOSUR, 69, 70, 72, 73, 75, 99, 181, 333, 346 Mexico, 19, 86, 93, 99–101, 105, 107, 118, 181, 208, 215, 221, 238, 242, 316, 328, 365, 379 Motives, 249, 262, 268, 284

N Nationalist Party, 23, 34

O Official Development Assistance (ODI), 263, 285, 362, 376 Olympic Games, 313–317, 336, 340 Omar Torrijos, General, 145 One Belt One Road (OBOR), 262, 271, 285, 327 ‘One China’ policy, 289 Opium, 7, 20, 30, 154 Overseas Chinese, 147, 159, 160, 310–312, 394 Overseas Direct Investment (ODI), 370, 382

P Paraguay, 6, 9, 45, 57, 58, 61–63, 65, 67, 70, 73–75, 83, 85, 94, 166, 176, 178, 237, 249, 391 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 6, 7, 15, 20, 27, 58, 59, 62, 64, 69, 74, 82, 86, 102, 115, 117, 120, 216, 218, 234, 237, 239, 241, 246, 247, 250, 295, 297, 300, 301, 304, 307, 311, 313, 314, 316, 318, 336, 356, 360, 372, 389, 393 Peripheral relations, 264, 265 Peronism, 59, 61

INDEX

Peru, 7, 20, 21, 29–38, 103, 239, 390 Political security, 42 Pragmatism vs Ideology, 145, 155 President Lula, 240 Propaganda, 13, 28, 134, 230, 233, 237, 240, 241, 243, 250, 394

R Republic of China (ROC), 7, 9, 11, 14, 15, 20, 34, 58, 81, 82, 87–95, 116, 117, 145–159, 162, 176, 217, 220, 272, 313, 314, 331, 346, 356, 372, 389 Republic of Panama, 11, 150, 157 Resolution 2758, United Nations, 4, 11, 16, 62, 82, 96, 98, 102, 117, 146, 304, 355, 356, 371, 372 Reunification, 8, 13, 42, 45, 216, 248

S Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula da, President, 231, 239. See also President Lula Sino International Library, 60 Small states, 44, 47, 52, 53 Social media, 13, 122, 124, 230, 232–235, 237, 241, 247, 248, 250, 394 Soft power, 10, 11, 13, 107, 116, 121–124, 126–128, 130–134, 136, 137, 147, 208, 221, 229, 230, 236, 243, 268, 359, 360, 377 South-South, 14, 71, 211, 262, 264, 265, 270, 289 Soviet Union, 25, 26, 28, 29, 62, 148, 162, 167, 216 Squid, 68, 72 State-owned media, 122, 123 State recognition, 205, 206

399

St. Lucia, 8, 43–46, 50–53, 83, 94, 272, 276, 361, 377 Strategic opportunities, 271, 273 Stroessner, Alfredo, President, 61 Sugar, 21, 23, 28, 29, 390 Synthetic content, 232 T Taiwan, 3–5, 8–10, 12, 16, 17, 21, 33, 35, 43, 45, 47, 49–52, 57, 62, 63, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 74, 81–86, 96, 98–104, 107, 115–120, 127–134, 136, 146, 153, 155, 156, 165, 167, 168, 178–180, 182, 183, 186, 187, 192, 204, 207, 215–218, 220, 222, 233, 246–249, 262, 272, 273, 287, 295, 305, 307, 309, 311, 313, 315–318, 331, 334, 349, 350, 357, 359, 361, 370–377, 382, 390–394 Taiwan, 1971 Vote, 4 Taiwan cost, 9, 58, 75 Taiwan diplomatic recognition, 3, 5, 45, 75, 83, 86, 107, 136, 204, 217, 370 Taiwanese migration, 33 Taiwan-Latin America Relations, 129, 391 Trade, 10, 12, 15, 21, 29, 34, 36–38, 61, 63, 68–70, 72, 74, 75, 85, 94, 99, 100, 103, 107, 119, 135, 145–147, 149, 157, 158, 166, 169, 170, 174, 179, 181, 182, 186, 187, 208, 212–214, 218, 233, 261, 267, 273, 275, 277, 287, 290, 297, 300, 305, 318, 327, 328, 331, 335–337, 339, 340, 344, 346, 350, 359, 392, 393 Twitter, 122, 233, 234, 236, 240–242, 369

400

INDEX

U United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 59, 151, 206, 372 United Nations (UN), 4, 8, 15, 20, 58, 62, 82, 84, 117, 147, 182, 216, 263, 297, 315, 336, 346, 372, 376, 393 United States-Panamanian Relationships, 154 United States (US), 4, 5, 7, 10, 12–15, 17, 22, 26, 30, 34, 50, 59, 62, 67, 70, 71, 84, 85, 100, 118, 148, 153, 162, 163, 166–168, 176, 179, 182, 185–189, 192, 202, 208, 215, 220, 230, 232, 235, 243, 248, 250, 269, 277, 286, 289, 308, 310, 314, 337, 340, 347, 358, 368, 371, 372, 376, 379, 380, 390, 392, 394 Uruguay, 9, 58, 60, 62–64, 66, 69, 72, 73, 221, 391 US-China relations, 207, 218

V Velasco, Juan, President, 8, 21, 33, 35–37 Venezuela, 63, 95, 101, 181, 211, 216, 231, 240, 245, 246, 251, 329, 344, 360, 366, 368, 379, 381, 390

W World Anti-Communist League (WACL), 64, 65, 82 World War II (WWII), 24, 32, 67, 81, 96, 374

Y Yat-Sen, Sun, 23, 60, 284

Z Zedong, Mao, 26, 60, 62, 116