Chemical Weapons and Missile Proliferation: With Implications for the Asia/Pacific Region 9781685851590

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Chemical Weapons Missile Proliferation

Chemical Weapons X u 500 CO

i 400 co a 300 200

Systems that fall below MTCR guidelines

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(High)y system dependent)

0

100

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400 500 600 Range (km)

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Notes: Missiles that lie in the cross-hatched region may exceed MTCR thresholds, depending on their design.

of ballistic missiles. When President Kennedy was asked the difference between the Atlas rocket that put astronaut John Glenn into orbit and an Atlas rocket armed with a nuclear warhead, he replied with one word, "Attitude." The drafters of the MTCR were careful to focus its controls on large missiles and rockets but to permit continued international cooperation in the peaceful uses of space (that is, satellites and the information they handle, as opposed to launch vehicles), manned aircraft, and tactical defense projects. The regime is, moreover, directed at international transfers of hardware and technology. Consequently, adherence to the regime entails no formal obligations with respect to indigenous programs. The MTCR is directed against the proliferation of delivery systems for relatively unsophisticated military forces. Thus, the regime is concerned with levels of technology lower than those in other arms control areas. In some cases, the technology is thirty or more years old. The MTCR deals not only with potential adversaries but also with nations that have cooperative military and technical relations. The regime is aimed not at particular nations, but at specific missile and rocket projects that exceed the defined parameters. It is therefore essential to distinguish between projects with which supplier nations may cooperate and projects of concern.

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Projects of Concern What constitutes a "project of concern"? There is some international commerce in ballistic missiles that exceed the parameters of the regime. In addition, some space launch vehicles are built from the stages of ballistic missiles. The sale of any of these on world markets, whatever their purported use, would be a cause for concern. If ballistic missiles can be used as space launch vehicles, the opposite is also the case. Stages of space launch vehicles are disturbing candidates for use in medium-range, intermediate-range, or intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Sounding rockets are used by many nations for meteorological studies. Some sounding rockets have been adapted as military rockets and put on the world market. Moreover, there is a trend toward larger sounding rockets that exceed the threshold of the regime. The MTCR is concerned with cruise missiles as much as with ballistic missiles, though the threat of the proliferation of cruise missiles is developing more slowly. One reason for this is that in the past unmanned air vehicles that could be used as the basis for cruise missiles have been relatively small, with little or no payload. Target drones and reconnaissance drones do not need to carry more than relatively light packages. However, there is a recent trend toward larger drones and remotely piloted vehicles, some of which are intended to provide the option of munitions delivery. In addition, highly accurate guidance technology based on satellite signals will be widely available in the early 1990s. These two elements may lay the groundwork for cruise missile proliferation.

Prospects for Control An advanced missile can contain 250,000 parts. With the exception of some deliberately redundant items, all of these parts must operate correctly the first time they are used—and do so under extreme conditions of acceleration, vibration, temperature, and temperature changes and after experiencing shelflife deterioration, field conditions, and handling by field personnel. It is not easy to make such a missile, much less to make it reliable. Few nations have the infrastructures to do so. With the possible exception of the Scud—a ballistic missile derived from the World War II-vintage V-2—all of the missiles now considered projects of concern appear to depend directly or indirectly on ten supplier nations for at least some of their hardware. Those ten nations are the seven original adherents to the Missile Technology Control Regime plus Israel, China, and the Soviet Union. The regime's adherents have made clear their policy to hinder missile proliferation. But what about the others? Israel, perhaps more than any other nation, is a potential target for the

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missiles now proliferating. It is clearly in Israel's national interest to oppose developments that threaten it so directly. China has spoken out in public on the missile proliferation problem. In late 1989 a Foreign Ministry spokesperson was quoted in the Chinese press as saying, "Except [for] its sale of a few missiles to Saudi Arabia, China has not sold and has no plans to sell any medium-range missile to any Middle Eastern country." Although this statement falls short of MTCR undertakings, it is China's most explicit public declaration to date. The Soviet Union has addressed itself directly to the regime. In a joint US-Soviet statement released at the June 1990 summit conference, the parties announced that they "affirm their support for the objectives of the Missile Technology Control Regime . . . and they call on all nations that have not done so to observe the spirit and the guidelines of this regime." A few years ago there were no public policies to prevent the transfer of long-range missiles to proliferators or to prevent teams of engineers of the world's best aerospace talent from assisting such proliferation. Now the ten major supplier nations have publicly come out on the side of restraint; other supplier nations also are doing so. As of early 1991, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Spain had adhered to the regime, doubling the number of adherents; others are in the process of adhering; and others, such as Sweden, are quietly adapting their regulatory systems to support the regime. This has an impact on systems requiring tens or hundreds of thousands of high-quality components. It is not necessary to prevent a proliferator from acquiring all 100,000 components in order to hinder the process of missile proliferation. A substantial number of export denials—or the denial of the best components and the best engineering talent—will increase the development time, cost, and unreliability of such missile programs. International opposition will force the governments undertaking them to sacrifice other objectives that depend on international goodwill. Indeed, the statements of some government officials and other evidence show that export controls are biting into these programs—in some cases affecting their very coming into being.

Rules of the Regime How does the MTCR restrict exports to the projects of concern? The regime defines in technical detail the items to be controlled and lays out ground rules for dealing with export applications for those items. The items to be controlled (see Appendix III) are divided into two categories. The first, known as the Category I list, consists of complete rockets and missiles exceeding the 500-kilogram/300-kilometer capability threshold, major subsystems, and production equipment and technology. It is

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a very short list of very lethal items. A quick reading of items one and two on the technical annex will make this clear. The regime mandates a strong presumption of denial with respect to export applications for Category I items. The presumption of denial is an extraordinary provision. It has no precedent in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime except with respect to complete nuclear explosive devices. If the managers of a project of concern cannot buy entire missile factories or major missile components, they must assemble the necessary bits and pieces at the cost of much greater time, effort, and unreliability. The Category II list is directed to that situation. The Category II list is much longer than that of Category I, but all items on both lists were already subject to export controls by the original seven adhering nations—and by most other supplier nations—before the regime came into force. The new element introduced by the adoption of the missile technology control policy is that exports of items on the annex can be denied even to friendly nations if there is reason to believe they might be used in strategic delivery vehicles. The Category II list is not a denial list— most of its items have uses other than for projects of concern. For that reason, there is a great deal of flexibility in the treatment of Category II exports. The procedure is to give such export applications a case-by-case review in order to examine possible end uses. The "Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers" are the basic rules that every adherent to the regime will apply. The Category I rules are stringent; they almost always mean "no export." There is one absolute prohibition in the regime. Until further notice, there will be no transfer of complete production facilities for Category I items. In those rare cases when transfer of a Category I item is contemplated, binding govemment-togovemment assurances on end use are required, and no retransfer is permitted. Most important, the supplier government must take extraordinary measures; it is responsible, in the words of the guidelines, for "taking all steps necessary to ensure that the item is put only to its stated end use." This provision—putting the burden on the supplier and not just on the recipient— also has no precedent in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. The provision is a key to stopping missile proliferation. The Category II list must necessarily be subject to greater flexibility. Indeed, the presumption is that items on that list will generally be approved for export. However, if they are destined for a project of concern, they are likely to be denied. If they could contribute to a project of concern, their transfer might be denied and at least will require government-to-government assurances as to the end use and the end user. The MTCR recognizes that, under international law, a policy cannot supersede a treaty. Therefore, the regime is subject to international treaty obligations. Where there is a conflict between the MTCR and such

The Missile Technology Control

treaty arrangements prevails. Implementation individual adhering control regulations. proliferation.

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as NATO or the European Space Agency, the treaty of the regime is the responsibility of each of the governments. Each nation has its own set of export But the goal of each is the same: control of missile

Conclusion The seven nations originating the MTCR sought to design it so as to avoid giving any one nation a commercial advantage. By announcing identical policies at the same time, the seven nations essentially multiplied the effectiveness of their individual actions by a factor of seven. As more nations adopt these policies, their effectiveness becomes that much greater. The MTCR fully permits continued international sharing of the benefits of modem technology. It embodies a strong presumption of denial against the export of space launch vehicles, but it permits the provision of launch services and cooperation in the development of space satellites. The regime is directed against the spread of large military missiles. However, it permits cooperation in the areas of manned aircraft and tactical missiles essential to international security arrangements. The list of participants in the MTCR is expanding rapidly. The present participants are seeking the support of all nations, especially those capable of exporting the technologies in the annex. The effectiveness of this effort to protect mankind from the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles will depend on the support of other supplier nations and on the alertness and determination of all participating governments.

Notes 1. The author acknowledges the contribution of Dr. Jeanne S. Mintz, U S Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, who coauthored an earlier version of this chapter and who participated fully with the author in the discussions leading to establishment of the MTCR.

12 Beyond MTCR: Additional Responses to the Missile Proliferation Problem Andrew Mack

What can or should be done about the problem of missile proliferation? A number of possible approaches have been proposed. The United States and the Soviet Union, having exported short-range ballistic missiles to the Third World in the past, now believe that global security and regional stability will be enhanced by checking missile proliferation. Washington has been the major force behind the attempt to create an arms control solution to the problem.

Problems with the Arms Control Approach Quite apart from the fact that the two major Third World missile exporters, China and North Korea, are not participants in the MTCR, the regime suffers from a number of other much-discussed problems.1 The Discrimination

Problem

The most serious problem is that the MTCR seems to many Third World countries to offer a rerun of an old, familiar, and unacceptable theme. Advanced industrialized countries believe that ballistic missiles—like nuclear weapons and chemical weapons—serve the cause of deterrence and stability when in their hands. The same weapons in Third World hands are seen as undesirable and destabilizing. Many Third World nations find such sentiments patronizing, hypocritical, and unacceptable. There is a significant difference between the superpowers' position on nuclear and chemical proliferation, on the one hand, and missile proliferation on the other. Both Washington and Moscow are committed to major reductions in their nuclear weapons inventories and elimination of chemical weapons. But there are no comparable commitments to reduce or constrain

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production or deployment of nonnuclear ballistic missiles—indeed, both superpowers are developing new systems. The MTCR is also seen by some Third World states as a device that, in denying them access to particular high-technology exports, unfairly penalizes their civilian space programs and constrains high technology-oriented economic modernization programs.2 Peaceful

Uses

Space programs and ballistic missile programs are very similar—US Atlas and Titan missiles and the Soviet SS-9 have been deployed for both spacelaunch and weapons-delivery purposes. Exports allowed under MTCR rules that assist the former may also assist the latter. The one major component of a ballistic missile system that has no counterpart on a civilian space launch vehicle, and on which the control regime places stringent controls, is the reentry vehicle that contains the warhead. Of particular importance here are heat shields, heat sinks, and other items designed to permit a vehicle to withstand the heat of reentry. Similarly, warhead safing, arming, fusing, and firing mechanisms are not required on peaceful space-launch vehicles, and exports of these are also controlled.3 Commercial

Interests

Securing agreement about enforcement of the MTCR rules between and within member states has been difficult because security and commercial (trade) interests in this area have often been contradictory and because the agreement is open to differing interpretations. In the United States, the Commerce Department has taken a more liberal view of what may be exported than the Departments of State and Defense. These differences have been the cause of considerable bureaucratic dispute in Washington.4 Private corporations in MTCR countries can evade the control regime— some already have succeeded. Where profits are large and detection is difficult, the temptation to transgress will be high for unscrupulous companies. There is also the possibility of technology transfer arising from successful espionage or theft. Moreover, as East-West tensions diminish, defense budgets shrink, and traditional markets decline, Western arms manufacturers may be forced into an increasingly desperate search for new markets—most obviously in the Third World. In what will increasingly be an arms buyers' market, efforts to sustain a successful export control regime will confront growing difficulties. If proliferation continues, the number of potential suppliers will grow, restricting supply will become more difficult, and the incentive to quit the exporters' cartel will increase. An ineffective cartel will not only fail in its

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goal of limiting proliferation, it will also penalize economically those members that do not cheat by denying them access to markets that others are exploiting. The problem goes beyond the lack of corporate enthusiasm for the MTCR. Seth Carus has pointed out that some signatory states have failed to take their MTCR obligations seriously. He cites France and even the United States as examples.5 The Verification

and Compliance

Problem

Monitoring and ensuring compliance with the MTCR is hampered by the fact that there is "no international agency to monitor compliance, and no enforcement mechanisms. Adherence to guidelines is strictly consensual and subject to national interpretation, and there is no institutionalized arrangement for regular meetings among participants."6

Can the Regime Be Improved? Aaron Karp has argued that remedying the deficiencies of the MTCR will require the following steps: 1. More suppliers of missile technology must be brought into the regime. 2. The regime's restrictions must be broadened and translated into national laws for strict enforcement. 3. Exporters should make the sale of space-launch technology conditional on buyers acceding to the NPT. 4. Nations must press for a universal ban on testing of ballistic missiles.7

These measures may improve the regime, but none addresses what may be the central defect of the MTCR—namely, that it represents a "supply-side" approach to restraining proliferation. In this sense, MTCR policy is not unlike the current US "war" on drugs, in which 75 percent of resources allocated to the war are spent on enforcement, and less than 25 percent on dealing with the causes of drug abuse. The fact that drug prices have declined (indicating more supplies on the market), while enforcement efforts have increased, suggests that supply-side attempts to halt the flow of goods for which there is high demand is problematic.8 Designed to check the supply of missiles and missile technology to Third World states, the MTCR fails to address the question of demand—the often powerful political and security incentives which lead Third World states to seek missiles or missile technology in the first place. What, then, are the other potential options?

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Sanctions Negative

Sanctions

The idea of using negative sanctions against countries and companies that export missiles or their components has a great deal of support in the United States and especially in Congress, where there has been a spate of demands for tough measures to curb missile proliferation. Negative sanctions are seen in the United States as complementary to the MTCR. They are another example of supply-side arms control—a means of persuasion intended to increase the probability of MTCR guidelines being observed. When Third World states export missiles or missile technology primarily for reason of economic gain—China's sales of CSS-2s to Saudi Arabia, for example—economic sanctions have some chance of success. For sanctions to succeed in such a context, the cost to the target state of continuing to proliferate (reductions in aid, for example) must exceed the benefits it might derive from missile or missile technology exports. Given the massive US aid and investment programs in China, Washington was obviously in a strong position to threaten the Chinese with economic sanctions as a means of deterring them from further CSS-2 sales overseas.9 Negative economic sanctions are, however, unlikely to stop Third World states from pursuing what their governments perceive to be vital political or security interests. Thus, concerted and massive international economic sanctions failed to dissuade Beijing from continuing to pursue the repressive path it embarked on in June 1989. These sanctions included suspension of a US$5.8 billion Japanese aid program and a freeze of some US$4.7 billion of World Bank aid.10 The reason for the failure of these international sanctions is obvious: Beijing's leaders have a survival interest in resisting moves designed to bring about a democratization process that could lead to their political, even physical, demise. Ironically, one effect of these post-June 1989 sanctions has been to force the Chinese to seek other means of gaining hard currency, including the sale of short-range missiles to the Middle East. Economic sanctions against North Korea are hardly an option for the United States. Washington has virtually no economic leverage over Pyongyang, while the North Koreans almost certainly see the preservation of their indigenous missile program as being a vital national security interest. The United States has considerable potential economic leverage over India, but the government in New Delhi seems to believe not only that pursuit of its indigenous missile program is a vital national security interest, but that it has a significance for India well beyond its military role. K. Subhramanyam, for example, described the first successful test of the Agni as ushering in a new era: "[Agni's] role as a weapon is the least of its roles. It is a confidence-builder and a symbol of India's assertion of self-reliance not merely in defence but in the broader international political arena as well."11 Thus from India's perspective, US efforts to hinder development of the Agni

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and other systems are seen as designed to undermine India's progress toward technological self-reliance and a growing world role. Finally, whatever gains may be extracted in the short term from the use of negative economic sanctions against Third World exporters need to be weighed against the long-term implications of the deep resentments such policies may generate. One may ask what exactly is to be gained by denial of technology transfer and/or imposition of sanctions, if this merely delays a Third World state in acquiring a missile capability while at the same time generating deep resentment against the state(s) applying the sanctions. Sanctions applied not to Third World missile producers or exporters but to Western companies that seek to supply them may avoid this problem. In addition to various congressional initiatives in 1989 aimed at curbing Third World missile proliferation, the Pentagon announced that it would no longer do business with domestic or foreign companies that did not adhere to MTCR rules.12 This approach already appears to have had some success. Even before the Gulf War, cooperation had ceased between Egypt, Iraq, and Argentina on the hugely expensive Condor missile program. Egypt's decision to withdraw from the Condor project was due, at least in part, to the cessation of European technical support for the program in critical areas.13 However, the fact that Egypt was decreasingly able to afford the costs of the program, and that it had no vital security interest in acquiring missiles, may have been more important in determining Cairo's decision than the restriction on imports brought about by US pressure. Argentina later withdrew from cooperation with Iraq on the project. Positive

Sanctions

Positive sanctions—offering rewards to states to refrain from pursuing their own ballistic missile programs or exporting missiles to other states—is obviously less likely to alienate the target state, but may generate other problems. As Janne Nolan has pointed out: In the case of South Korea in the 1970s . . . US efforts to stop its d e v e l o p m e n t of a long-range surface-to-surface m i s s i l e were accompanied by compensatory transfer of advanced military equipment and more forthcoming agreements to allow Korean production of American weapons systems, including the F-5 fighter. Over time, the equipment, infrastructure and expertise gained from such transactions add to the latent capability to resume missile programs at a later stage [emphasis added]. 14

These positive sanctions did not, moreover, prevent Seoul from converting (without US permission) its US-supplied Nike-Hercules antiaircraft missile to a surface-to-surface system. The US transfer of modem

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combat aircraft to the South also broke what had until then been a tacit agreement between Washington and Moscow not to provide such weapons systems to the rival parties on the Korean Peninsula. The North has MiG23s and MiG-29s; the South is acquiring FA-18s.

The Defensive Military Option Some analysts believe that the MTCR and other approaches designed to check missile proliferation may already be too late, and that although missile proliferation may be slowed, it cannot be stopped. From this perspective, the key issue becomes the management of the dangers that proliferation poses. There is, as already noted, currently no effective defense against ballistic missile attack. An antitactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system (e.g., Patriot) could provide protection for technologically advanced and geographically compact countries like Israel,15 Japan, or South Korea, but an ATBM system could never be a serious option for most countries in the Asia/Pacific region for the foreseeable future in part because borders are frequently too long, in part because costs are too high, and not least because effective missile early-warning systems are far beyond the technical capabilities of regional states.16 Since short- and medium-range ballistic missiles have a much shorter flight time than strategic missiles, the task of defending against them is particularly difficult. Support for putting massive resources into strategic missile defenses is waning in the United States as relations with the Soviet Union continue to improve. The threat of Third World missiles, however, is increasingly being used as an argument for maintaining the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. Among Asia/Pacific states, only Japan is putting resources into missile defense research, although following the Gulf War it would not be surprising if South Korea sought to acquire Patriots.

The Offensive Military Option Countries concerned about the threat of ballistic missile attack could acquire similar capabilities with which either to destroy enemy missiles before they could be used or to threaten retaliation if attacked. The latter option— deterrence—may be effective on occasion, but the problems that beset deterrence strategies are legion.17 In the Asia/Pacific region, the former option also confronts a number of difficulties. Here the debate over the merits of defensive strategies and force postures that has become central to the mainstream security discourse in Europe is still largely unknown. Even within the community of mostly US scholars who have been researching ballistic missile proliferation, this debate has generally been ignored. It

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seems to be taken as axiomatic that Third World acquisition of ballistic missiles is bad, but there is little argument as to why this is the case. Furthermore, arms control (including confidence- and security-building measures, CSBMs) is still a largely alien concept in the Asia/Pacific region, although this is beginning to change, while the Western arms control community remains determinedly Eurocentric in its concerns. In addition, a number of particular complications will make it difficult for the United States to take an effective lead in promoting dialogue on the risks that may inhere in offensive doctrines and force postures (including SSMs) in the region. First, Third World states are likely to reject claims that ballistic missiles and other offensive systems are stabilizing in US hands but not in Third World hands. The United States may have stopped exporting ballistic and other missiles, but it has not stopped developing them. Currently under development are a follow-on to the nuclear-armed Lance; the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS); an advanced cruise missile, and Excalibur, a follow-on to the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile. At the strategic level, the US$40 billion, D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile is about to be deployed, and development is continuing on the single-warhead Midgetman ICBM. The political authority of Washington's antiproliferation policy on Third World missiles would be considerably enhanced if the United States acted on some of its own advice on the undesirability of ballistic missile proliferation. Because it is difficult to argue in today's climate that these new systems are necessary to maintain deterrence against the USSR, their curtailment would not impair US security. Moreover, although the United States has long since ceased to export ballistic missiles, it continues actively to promote the sale of combat aircraft capable of delivering heavier payloads with greater accuracy and over longer range than almost all Third World ballistic missiles. Britain, France, and the Soviet Union also continue to export strike aircraft. The effective range of such aircraft will be greatly increased as regional states acquire in-flight refueling capabilities. MTCR rules proscribe the export of unmanned aircraft (so-called remotely piloted vehicles) but not manned aircraft. The logic that determines this distinction is unclear. Second, US power in Asia/Pacific is primarily sea-based, and the US maritime strategy is highly offensive in orientation. It is designed to "take the war to the enemy," to "go for the jugular," to "win the battle of the first salvo." In Europe, NATO accepts the desirability of force structures that are defensive in orientation; in the Pacific, the United States does not. It will be difficult, therefore, for the United States to persuade Asia/Pacific states of the virtues of defensive strategies and force postures while relying itself on exactly the opposite. Third, the United States has shown neither interest nor enthusiasm for any arms control initiatives (including CSBMs) in the Asia/Pacific region,

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with the qualified exception of the Korean Peninsula. This lack of enthusiasm reflects the fact that US power in the region is primarily maritime and that the US Navy is strongly opposed to naval arms control. US willingness to take regional arms control and CSBM initiatives seriously could enhance regional security and help remove some of the incentives that lead Third World states to seek to acquire ballistic missiles in the first place.

Notes 1. See, for example, Aaron Karp, "Frantic Third World Quest," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 1988, and Janne Nolan, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World—the Limits of Non-Proliferation," Arms Control Today, November 1989. 2. See Karp, "Frantic Third World Quest." 3. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1987, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1987, p. 26. 4. For a concise description of some of these problems, see Lise Hartman, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Role of Congress," paper presented to the American Association of Advancement of Science meeting, New Orleans, 19 February 1990. 5. W. Seth Cams, "Missile Proliferation in the Third World," testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology, US Congress, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2 May 1989, p. 6. 6. Nolan, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," p. 12. 7. Karp, "Frantic Third World Quest," pp. 19-20. 8. See "Drug War: Buying Time for Education," USA Today, 28 February 1990. 9. It is difficult to say whether it was US persuasion that stopped further CSS-2 sales, or the absence of alternative buyers for a system that is grossly costineffective except with a nuclear warhead. 10. For a useful discussion of the impact of international sanctions on China following the Tiananmen Square massacre, see Peter Van Ness, "Analysing the Impact of International Sanctions on China," Working Paper, No. 4, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, December 1989. 11.K. Subhramanyam, "The Meaning of Agni," reprinted in Indian Media Reaction Report, No. 103, United States Information Service, 2 June 1989, p. 12. 12. See United States Information Service, Wireless File, 21 November 1989, p. 17. 13. See David B. Ottaway, "Egypt Drops Out of Missile Project," Washington Post, 20 September 1989; Carus, "Missile Proliferation in the Third World"; and Andrew Slade, "Condor Project 'in Disarray'," Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 February 1990. 14. Nolan, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," p. 11. 15. Israel, which deployed US Patriot ATBMs successfully in time, is developing the Arrow high-altitude, long-range antimissile system. The Israelis were provided with early-warning data from US early-warning satellites during the Gulf War. Iraq has announced that it too has tested an antitactical ballistic missile

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(ATBM), the Faw I. See Shai Feldman, "Missile Proliferation in the Middle East," paper presented to the American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting, New Orleans, 19 February 1990. 16. One study has been produced in this area, but it is filled with both irrelevancy and inaccuracy and offers little in the way of useful information or analysis. See J. Mararr, Missile Defences and Asia-Pacific Security, Macmillan, London, 1989. 17. See Andrew Mack, "What's Wrong with Deterrence Theory?" Working Paper, No. 76, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1989.

Part Three Conclusion

13 Multiple Responses to an Evolving Problem Trevor Findlay and Andrew

Mack

Among the lessons to be drawn from the chapters in this book is that, for the Asia/Pacific region at least, the threat of chemical and missile proliferation in tandem is not great. Separately, however, the two technologies are a threat, with missile proliferation being more likely than chemical weapons proliferation. A further conclusion is that the mechanism of chemical weapons proliferation differs so greatly from that of missile proliferation that tackling each separately is the most logical approach. This conclusion derives partly from the obvious fact that chemical weapons are weapons, whereas missiles are a type of delivery system. Despite the experience of the Middle East, where it is reported that Iraq has at least tested a chemical warhead for its Scud missiles, a marriage of the two technologies is neither militarily logical nor inevitable, nor is the combined proliferation of the two technologies inexorable. Indeed, chemical weapons may be more effective militarily when delivered by systems other than missiles, while missile delivery systems may be more effective with other types of warhead. Aaron Karp and Julian Perry Robinson suggest that the inventories of ballistic and cruise missiles and chemical weapons that Third World states currently possess, or are seeking to acquire, are not particularly cost-effective, either in combination or separately, in comparison with the available alternatives (combat aircraft and high-explosive munitions). The chemicalmissile combination may have some utility as terror weapons against the civilian populations of urban areas, but states that pursue this option not only risk becoming international pariahs, but create strong incentives for their opponents to follow suit—if only for deterrence purposes. Where this happens, strategic advantage will tend to be canceled out. Both sides will incur the increased peacetime costs of acquiring the new systems, while if war breaks out, the likely consequence will be the mutual slaughter of civilians and undecisive military gains. Moreover, chemical weapons—having no peaceful uses, being morally 135

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dubious and of infamous reputation—are not an acquisition that states boast about. Most states have the technical capacity to produce chemical weapons, but have declined to do so. Missiles, in contrast, generate less moral opprobrium, have peaceful applications (as space launch vehicles), and are symbols of high technological achievement for those states that produce them. Given these differences, it is not surprising that the approaches to limiting missile and chemical weapon proliferation should also differ considerably, as Charles Flowerree and Richard Speier point out. Although the technological cat is out of the bag for both chemical weapons and missiles, it is only in regard to the former that an attempt is being made to put the cat back. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention as described by Peter Herby, it is proposed that there be no chemical weapon states—all will give up the CW option. The contrary assumption underlying the MTCR is that there will always be some states—the nuclear weapon states and their allies—that will and should retain missile technology, while all others should be prevented from obtaining it. MTCR is thus inherently and obviously discriminatory and for this reason is unlikely to be completely successful. The fact that the CWC requires the superpowers as well as Third World states to relinquish chemical weapons gives it a greater chance of succeeding, notwithstanding the legendary verification problems involved, as demonstrated by Shirley Freeman and Peter Dunn. Disarmament is what the CWC is about; the MTCR is about "arms control." One issue arising from a number of these chapters is that undue concern over missile and CW proliferation may have the perverse effect of suggesting that weapons systems that currently have little military utility (relative to alternative systems) are more efficacious than they in fact are. Such a perception could increase the attractiveness of such systems to Third World states. This suggests that a "demand-side" antiproliferation policy that involved concerted efforts to demystify beliefs about the military efficacy of these systems might be as or more effective in the long term than "supplyside" policies of export restraint and sanctions. But stressing the lack of military cost-effectiveness of chemical weapons and ballistic missile systems could have the unintended consequence of persuading Third World states to seek more effective alternative offensive systems, which may themselves be destabilizing. This underlines the importance of dealing with the issue of offensive force postures and strategies in general, rather than focusing on particular offensive systems. Initiatives in this area do not have to be pursued by the superpowers or even, initially at least, by states. Over the past three years there have been a number of conferences and workshops in the region (in Australia, Canada, China, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Nepal) that have brought analysts and officials together to examine some of the problems of offensive strategies and to discuss how arms control in general, and CSBMs in particular, may

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contribute to alleviating them. These meetings, some hosted by the United Nations, are continuing and will include the issue of CW and ballistic missile proliferation. They constitute a useful example of what has been called "Track II" diplomacy—unofficial or semiofficial discussions which may act as a filter or sounding board for ideas taken up subsequently at the official level. Regional states may also play a constructive role. Australia and Canada, for example, have good relations with the superpowers, offer excellent arms control credentials, are not themselves involved in any regional conflicts, and possess neither chemical weapons nor ballistic missiles. Either country could usefully encourage or even establish regional dialogues on strategic doctrine, on arms control, and on CSBMs. The particular risks that inhere in missile and chemical weapon proliferation would be central to such dialogues. Australia's successful regional initiative on chemical weapons offers a model that could be emulated (as is already being done in Latin America by Venezuela). This initiative has drawn diplomats and other officials from Southeast Asia and the South Pacific states into a dialogue with Australian arms control officials on the risks of CW proliferation and the desirability of creating a global treaty to ban all chemical weapons. It may also be helpful in the current climate of East-West détente to start thinking about policies of cooperative security between the superpowers. There are, for example, opportunities for reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula. The Soviets have already sided with the United States in pressuring North Korea to sign and implement an IAEA safeguards agreement. There seems to be no reason in principle why USSoviet cooperation should not also extend to joint diplomatic efforts, beyond the MTCR, to curb missile proliferation. To argue in favor of a greater emphasis on the demand side of the proliferation problem is not to argue against the utility of the MTCR, the Chemical Weapons Convention, or sanctions. Clearly, without an MTCR regime and sanctions, the problem of missile proliferation would be greater. In the case of chemical weapons, the CWC is an absolute necessity. But there is a strong case for arguing that the antiproliferation effort in relation to chemical weapons and missile technology has thus far focused too much on the supply side. Rectifying this imbalance should be accorded greater emphasis in the antiproliferation and disarmament agendas of the future. This will require greater attention being paid to the underlying causes of conflicts and rather less on their symptoms—of which ballistic missiles and chemical weapons are but two. Anti-proliferation programs which seek simply to deny Third World states access to weapons technology which those states believe essential for their security will continue to be resented and are unlikely to succeed in the long term. And demands from the superpowers that Third World states eschew missile and chemical weapons systems would have greater political

138

Conclusion

and moral credibility if the superpowers themselves appeared more willing to give up these systems. Supply-side arms control efforts in this area also need to be complemented by determined efforts to demystify widely held, but erroneous, beliefs about the military efficacy of Third World missiles and chemical arsenals—the experience of the Gulf War will be relevant here. But it is equally important to focus on the underlying causes of conflicts which generate the perceived need for such weapons in the first place. In the long term, the introduction of confidence-building regimes to Third World conflict zones may be more effective in curtailing the proliferation of missiles and chemical weapons than the supply-side stress on export controls which has characterized the antiproliferation approach of the industrialized states thus far.

Appendix I Summary of UN Investigations into Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Iran-Iraq War, 1984-1988

1.13-19 MARCH 1984, IRAN Members (see pages 142-143): Andersson, Dominguez, Dunn, Imobersteg, Riza Region Covered: Tehran, Shatt-e-Ali, Hoor-ul Huwaizeh, Ahvaz (in war zone) Conclusions: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Chemical weapons in the form of aerial bombs had been used Mustard gas and tabun were confirmed Extent to which chemicals had been used could not be determined Not able to state that Iraq was the aggressor.

(UN Reference S/16433 of 26 March 1984)

2.1-8 APRIL 1985, EUROPE Members: Dominguez Region Covered: London, UK; Ghent, Belgium; Recklinghausen, Federal Republic of Germany Conclusions: Examination of chemically injured casualties showed: 1. Aggressive chemicals were used during March 1985 in the war between Iran and Iraq 2. Yperite was used, affecting Iranian soldiers 3. The attacks were made by means of bombs dropped from aircraft, according to the statements of most patients 4. It is possible that hydrocyanic gas was used, alone or in combination with yperite (an amended note concerning this conclusion was issued at a later date) (UN Reference S/17127 of 17 April 1985)

139

140

Appendix

I

3.26 FEBRUARY-3 MARCH 1986, IRAN Members: Andersson, Domínguez, Dunn, Imobersteg, Riza Region Covered: Tehran, Abadan, Ahvaz, Qofas (did not visit Al-Faw war zone) Conclusions: 1. 2. 3. 4.

CW used against Iranian position by Iraqi forces Type of weapon used was aerial bombs similar to those in 1984 Chemical mainly used was mustard gas Extent to which mustard gas was used could not be determined but use of CW in 1986 appeared to be more extensive than in 1984

(UN Reference S/17911 of 12 March 1986)

4. 22 APRIL-3 MAY 1987, IRAN/IRAQ Members: Andersson, Dominguez, Dunn, Imobersteg, Riza Region Covered: Tehran, Omidiyeh, Khorramshahr, Baghdad, Basra Conclusions: 1. 2. 3. 4.

CW used against military and civilians Mustard gas but nerve agents used on some occasions Chemical bombs used, as well as rockets, the first evidence of such Iraqi forces affected by mustard gas and a pulmonary irritant, possibly phosgene—no evidence about weapons or how injuries were caused 5. Extent of use of chemical warfare agents could not be determined 6. Number of chemical casualties in Iran considerably less than seen in 1986 (UN Reference S/18852 of 8 May 1987)

5. 28 MARCH-11 APRIL 1988, IRAN/IRAQ Members: Dominguez, Holger Region Covered: Tehran, Baghdad, Bakhtaran, As Sulaymaniyah (not Halabja) Conclusions: 1. Patients examined in Iran, many of whom were civilians, had been affected by chemical weapons 2. Main chemical was mustard gas 3. A nerve agent had also been used 4. Patients in Iraq, all military personnel, had been affected by CW 5. Chemical used was mustard gas; some indications that a nerve agent may also have been used in small concentration, but no conclusive evidence 6 . No evidence about extent of CW or means of delivery 7. Team did not reach conclusions about who was responsible (UN Reference S/19823 of 25 April 1988)

UN Investigations into Chemical Weapons in the Iran-Iraq War

141

6A. 1-5 JULY 1988, IRAN Members:

Dahlgren, Domínguez, Berasategui

Region Covered:

Bakhtaran, Ahvaz

Conclusions: 1. CW continued to be used against Iranian forces on intensive and more frequent scale 2. Use of mustard gas again confirmed both medically and by chemical analysis 3. A nerve agent derived from organophosphorous compounds had also been used 4 . Effects less serious perhaps because of better protection 5. Use of nerve gas or cyanide was not confirmed by chemical analysis in field owing to rapid disappearance; team suggested that it may be necessary to review existing machinery for verification by UN teams of CW use in order to ensure timely presence 6 . Evidence pointed to an ever-increasing presence of different types of weapons associated with aggressive CW agents 7 . Examination of munition components from some locations indicated that items had come from bombs similar to those examined by teams dispatched to Iran in 1984, 1986, and 1987 (UN Reference S/20060 of 20 July 1988)

6B. 9-11 JULY 1988, IRAQ Members: as 6A Region Covered: Baghdad, As Sulyaymaniyah Conclusions: 1. Examination of mortar ammunition claimed to have been captured confirmed that they were 81 mm mortar grenades, designed to be filled with solid or liquid material, which could include chemical warfare agents (team noted that 81 mm grenades can be fired with 82 mm mortars) (UN Reference 5/20063 of 20 July 1988)

7.12-14 AUGUST 1988, IRAN Members:

Dahlgren, Imobersteg, van Heijst, Berasategui

Region Covered: Oroumiyeh Conclusions: 1. CW used against Iranian civilians in an area adjacent to an urban center lacking any protection against that kind of attack

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Appendix

I

2. Use of mustard gas again confirmed both medically and by chemical analysis 3. Determined unequivocally the presence of mustard gas in the affected zone 4 . From examinations in the area, concluded that bombs similar to those found in 1984, 1986, 1987, and 1988 had been used against Iranian civilians indicating utilization during an Iraqi air attack on Oshnaviyeh (UN Reference 5/20134 of 19 August 1988)

Mission Members, 1984r-88 Consultants Dr. Gustav Andersson Senior Research Chemist National Defence Research Institute Umea, SWEDEN Dr. Erik Dahlgren Deputy Head Department of NBC Defence National Defence Research Institute Umea, SWEDEN Colonel Dr. Manuel Dominguez Army Medical Corps and Specialist in NBC Professor of Preventive Medicine Universidad Complutense de Madrid Madrid, SPAIN Dr. Peter Dunn Chief Protective Chemistry Division Materials Research Laboratory, Department of Defence Melbourne, AUSTRALIA Dr. A.N.P. van Heijst Former Director Dutch National Poison Control Centre National Institute of Public Health and Environmental Hygiene Bosch en Duin, NETHERLANDS Colonel Oberst. Dr. Ulrich Former Chief NBC Defence Division Ministry of Defence Bern, SWITZERLAND

United

Nations

Imobersteg

Officials

Mr. Vincente Berasategui Director Department for Disarmament Affairs

UN Investigations

into Chemical

Weapons

in the Iran-Iraq

War

United Nations Secretariat, NEW YORK Mr. James Holger Director United Nations Secretariat Mr. Iqbal Riza Director Office of the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs United Nations Secretariat Mr. Sylvanus Tiewul Senior Officer Office of the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs United Nations Secretariat

Appendix II Excerpts from Reports of Major UN Missions, 1 9 8 4 , 1 9 8 6 , and 1987

Report o f the specialists appointed by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations by the Islamic Republic o f Iran concerning the use of chemical weapons, S/1433, 26 March 1984.

VI. CONCLUSIONS 35. The following are our unanimous conclusions. (a) Chemical weapons in the form of aerial bombs have been used in the areas inspected in Iran by the specialists as indicated above. (b) The types of chemical agents used were bis-(2-chlorethyl)-sulfide, also known as mustard gas, and ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidate, a nerve agent known as Tabun. 36. The extent to which these chemical agents have been used could not be determined within the time and resources available to us.

Report o f the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations o f the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq, S / 1 7 9 1 1 , 12 March 1986.

VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 5 5 . At the specific request o f the Secretary-General we visited Iran from 26 February 1986 to 3 March 1986 in order to conduct an investigation into the alleged use o f chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq conflict. Experience, knowledge and results obtained during two earlier investigations conducted in 1984 and 1985 were used to support the present investigation. Although we examined many casualties from the current conflict in the Al-Faw area, we did not visit this war zone. Casualties were seen at hospitals in Tehran and Ahvaz and a visit was made to sites in the area around Abadan.

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Appendix

II

56. Summary comments in relation to the present investigation are: (a) Detailed examination of Iranian casualties showed ocular lesions ranging from mild to severe conjunctivitis with intense palpebral edema, skin lesions including large vesicles filled with amber fluid, cutaneous separations, dark pigmentations and lesions approximating to seconddegree burns. In some of the cases respiratory injuries and reduced leucocyte levels were found. The same features were found in other casualties which were cursorily examined as well as in corpses. All the lesions observed were caused, without any doubt, by mustard gas (yperite); (b) Using a special instrument designed to detect chemical warfare agents, low concentrations of mustard gas vapour were detected in numerous craters at three sites around Abadan. Contaminated soil collected from a bomb crater (resulting from an attack the previous day on a field hospital) when analyzed in laboratories in Europe was found to contain mustard gas. In addition, a hair sample collected from a victim after he had been attacked with chemical weapons was shown to contain mustard gas; (c) Examination of metal components of aerial bombs, collected from bomb craters around Abadan, showed that the items had come from bombs that were similar to those examined by the teams in 1984. (During the present mission we did not find nor were we shown any other type of chemical weapons, such as artillery shells.); (d) Significant new evidence was provided during interviews in Tehran of Iraqi casualties. They stated that their injuries had been caused by chemical bombs dropped by Iraqi aircraft during attacks on Iranian positions; (e) Important new evidence was also provided by a captured Iraqi pilot. He confirmed that Iraqi aircraft had been used to attack Iranian positions with chemical bombs and that he had personally participated in two such "special missions." From the present investigation the following are our unanimous conclusions: (a) In areas around Abadab inspected by the mission, chemical weapons have been used against Iranian positions by Iraqi forces; (b) Based on medical examinations and testimony of Iranian and Iraqi casualties evacuated from the Al-Faw area, chemical weapons were also used in that war zone by Iraqi forces; (c) From the evidence examined by the specialists the type of weapons used was aerial bombs; (d) The chemical used was mustard gas (yperite); (e) The extent to which mustard gas was used could not be determined within the time and resources available to us. However, from the over 700 casualties actually seen in Tehran and Ahvaz it is our impression that the use of chemical weapons in 1986 appears to be more extensive than in 1984. 58. A f t e r having conducted the examination of various sites, weapons components and numerous casualties in our investigations undertaken in 1984, 1985 and 1986 according to the guidelines given by the Secretary-General, together with circumstantial evidence, we unanimously conclude that:

Reports of Major UN Missions

147

(a) On many occasions, Iraqi forces have used chemical weapons against Iranian forces; (b) The agent used has mainly been mustard gas although on some occasions nerve gas was also employed. Report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/18852, 8 May 1987.

VII. CONCLUSIONS From the present investigation, the following are our unanimous conclusions: (a) In the areas around Khorramshahr, Iran, inspected by the mission, chemical weapons have been used against Iranian positions by Iraqi forces. In addition to military personnel, civilians have also been injured in these attacks. The main chemical used was mustard gas (yperite), but nerve agents have probably been used on some occasions. (b) In the area around Baneth, Iran, civilian as well as military personnel have also been injured by mustard gas, as evidenced by the medical examination of casualties and interviews with witnesses. (c) From the examination of weapon fragments found in the Khorramshahr area, chemical bombs similar to those used in 1984 and 1986 have again been used against Iranian forces. In addition, it is most likely that chemical rockets have also been used in this area. (d) In the areas around Basra, Iraq, inspected by the mission, Iraqi forces have been affected by mustard gas and a pulmonary irritant, possibly phosgene. After having conducted the examination of various sites, weapon components and numerous casualties in our investigations undertaken in Iran in 1984, 1986 and 1987 and in Iraq in 1987, according to the guidelines given by the SecretaryGeneral, together with circumstantial evidence, we unanimously conclude that: (a) The use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces continues. The weapons are aerial bombs and very probably rockets. The chemical agents used are mustard gas (yperite) and probably, on some occasions, nerve agents. (b) Civilians in Iran have also been injured by chemical weapons. (c) Iraqi military personnel, for the first time, have sustained injuries from chemical agents, which are mustard gas (yperite) and a pulmonary irritant, possibly phosgene.

— Appendix III — MTCR Documents

STATEMENT BY THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR PRESS RELATIONS, THE WHITE HOUSE, 16 APRIL 1987 The President is pleased to announce a new policy to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The US Government is adopting this policy today in common with the governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. These nations have long been deeply concerned over the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Acting on this concern, these seven governments have formulated Guidelines to control the transfer of equipment and technology that could contribute to nuclear-capable missiles. This initiative was completed only recently, following several years of diplomatic discussions among these governments. The fact that all seven governments have agreed to common guidelines and to a common annex of items to be controlled serves to prevent commercial advantage or disadvantage for any of the countries. Both the Guidelines and its Annex will be made available to the public. The President wishes to stress that it is the continuing aim of the United States Government to encourage international cooperation in the peaceful use of modern technology, including in the field of space. The Guidelines are not intended to impede this objective. However, such encouragement must be given in ways that are fully consistent with the non-proliferation policies of the US Government. The United States, and its partners in this important initiative, would welcome adherence of all states to these guidelines in the interest of international peace and security.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME: FACT SHEET TO ACCOMPANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT The United States Government has, after careful consideration and subject to its international treaty obligations, decided that, when considering the transfer of equipment and technology related to missiles whose performance in terms of payload and range exceeds stated parameters, it will act in accordance with the attached Guidelines beginning on April 16, 1987.

149

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Appendix

GUIDELINES FOR MISSILE-RELEVANT

III

SENSITIVE TRANSFERS

1. The purpose of these Guidelines is to limit the risks of nuclear proliferation by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to nuclear weapons delivery systems other than manned aircraft. The Guidelines are not designed to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to nuclear weapons delivery systems. These Guidelines, including the attached Annex, form the basis for controlling transfers to any destination beyond the Government's jurisdiction or control of equipment and technology relevant to missiles whose performance in terms of payload and range exceeds stated parameters. Restraint will be exercised in the consideration of all transfers of items contained within the Annex and all such transfers will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The Government will implement the Guidelines in accordance with national legislation. 2. The Annex consists of two categories of items, which term includes equipment and technology. Category I items, all of which are in Annex Items 1 and 2, are those items of greatest sensitivity. If a Category I item is included in a system, that system will also be considered as Category I, except when the incorporated item cannot be separated, removed or duplicated. Particular restraint will be exercised in the consideration of Category I transfers, and there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers. Until further notice, the transfer of Category I production facilities will not be authorized. The transfer of other Category I items will be authorized only on rare occasions and where the Government (A) obtains binding government-to-government undertakings embodying the assurances from the recipient government called for in paragraph 5 of these Guidelines and (B) assumes responsibility for taking all steps necessary to ensure that the item is put only to its stated end-use. It is understood that the decision to transfer remains the sole and sovereign judgment of the United States Government. 3. In the evaluation of transfer applications for Annex items, the following factors will be taken into account: A. Nuclear proliferation concerns; B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient state; C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of nuclear weapons delivery systems other than manned aircraft; D. The assessment of the end-use of the transfers, including the relevant assurances of the recipient states referred to in sub-paragraphs 5.A and 5.B below; E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements. 4. The transfer of design and production technology directly associated with any items in the Annex will be subject to as great a degree of scrutiny and control as will the equipment itself, to the extent permitted by national legislation. 5. Where the transfer could contribute to a nuclear weapons delivery system, the Government will authorise transfers of items in the Annex only on receipt of appropriate assurances from the government of the recipient state that: A. The items will be used only for the purpose stated and that such use will

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Documents

151

not be modified nor the items modified or replicated without the prior consent of the United States Government; B. Neither the items nor replicas nor derivatives thereof will be retransferred without the consent of the United States Government. 6. In furtherance of the effective operation of the Guidelines, the United States Government will, as necessary and appropriate, exchange relevant information with other governments applying the same Guidelines. 7. The adherence of all States to these Guidelines in the interest of international peace and security would be welcome.

SUMMARY OF THE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY ANNEX (Only the full text of the Annex is authoritative, and it should be consulted for precise details.)

Category

I

• Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least a 500kg payload to a range of at least 300km as well as the specially designed production facilities for these systems. • Complete subsystems usable in the systems in Item 1, as follows, as well as the specially designed production facilities and production equipment therefor: • • • • • Category • • • • • • • • • • •

Individual rocket stages; Re-entry vehicles; Solid or liquid fuel rocket engines; Guidance sets; Thrust vector controls; Warhead safing, arming, fuzing, and firing mechanisms. II Propulsion components. Propellants and constituents. Propellant production technology and equipment. Missile structural composites: production technology and equipment. Pyrolytic deposition/densification technology and equipment. Structural materials. Flight instruments, inertial navigation equipment, software, and production equipment. Flight control systems. Avionics equipment. Launch/ground support equipment and facilities. Missile computers. Analog-to-digital converters. Test facilities and equipment.

Appendix III

152 • • •

Software and related analog or hybrid computers. Reduced observable technology, materials, and devices. Nuclear effects protection.

EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY ANNEX 1.

Introduction

(a) This annex consists of two categories of items, which term includes equipment and technology. Category I items, all of which are in Annex Items 1 and 2, are those items of greatest sensitivity. If a Category I item is included in a system, that system will also be considered as Category I, except when the incorporated item cannot be separated, removed or duplicated. Category II items are those items in the Annex not designated Category I. (b) The transfer of design and production technology directly associated with any items in the Annex will be subject to as great a degree of scrutiny and control as will the equipment itself, to the extent permitted by national legislation.

2.

Definitions

For the purpose of this Annex, the following definitions shall apply: (a)

The term technology means specific information which is required for the development, production or use of a product. The information may take the form of technical data or technical assistance. (b)(1) Development is related to all stages prior to serial production such as • design • design research • design analyses • design concepts • assembly and testing of prototypes • pilot production schemes • design data • process of transforming design data into a product • configuration design • integration design • layouts (2) Production means all production stages such as • production engineering • manufacture • integration • assembly (mounting) • inspection • testing • quality assurance (3) Use means • operation • installation (including on-site installation) • maintenance (checking)

MTCR

(c)(1)

(2)

(d) (1)

(2)

(e) (f)

Item

153

Documents

• repair • overhaul and refurbishing Technical data may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories. Technical assistance may take forms such as • instruction • skills • training • working knowledge • consulting services Note: This definition of technology does not include technology in the public domain nor basic scientific research. In the public domain as it applies to this Annex means technology which has been made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination. (Copyright restrictions do not remove technology from being in the public domain.) Basic scientific research means experimental or theoretical work undertaken principally to acquire new knowledge of the fundamental principles of phenomena and observable facts, not primarily directed towards a specific practical aim or objective. The term production facilities means equipment and specially designed software therefor integrated into facilities for prototype development or for one or more stages of serial production. The term production equipment means tooling, templates, jigs, mandrels, moulds, dies, fixtures, alignment mechanisms, test equipment, other machinery and components thereof, limited to those specially designed or modified for prototype development or for one or more stages of serial production.

1—Category

I

Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least a 500kg payload to a range of at least 300km as well as specially designed production facilities for these systems. Item

2—Category

I

Complete subsystems usable in the systems in Item 1, as follows, as well as the specially designed production facilities and production equipment therefor: (a) (b)

Individual rocket stages; Reentry vehicles, and specially designed equipment therefor, as follows, except as provided in note (1) below for those designed for non-weapons payloads: (1) Heat shields and components thereof fabricated of ceramic or ablative materials; (2) Heat sinks and components thereof fabricated of light-weight, high heat capacity materials;

154

Appendix III (3) Electronic equipment specially designed or modified for reentry vehicles; (c) Solid or liquid fuel rocket engines, having a total impulse capacity of 2.5 x 105 lb-sec or greater, except as provided in note (1) below for those specially designed or modified for orbital correction of satellites; (d) Guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy (CEP) of 10km or less at a range of 300km, except as provided in note (1) below for those designed for missiles with range under 300km or manned aircraft; (e) Thrust vector controls, except as provided in note (1) below for those designed for rocket systems with range under 300km; (f) Warhead safing, arming, fuzing, and firing mechanisms, except as provided in note (1) below for those designed for systems other than those in Item 1.

Notes to Item 2: (1) The exceptions in (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) above may be treated as Category II if the subsystem is exported subject to end use statements and quantity limits appropriate for the excepted end use stated above. (2) CEP (circle of equal probability) is a measure of accuracy; the radius of the circle centered at the target, at a specific range, in which 50% of the payloads impact. Item 3—Category

II

Propulsion components and equipment usable in the systems in Item 1, as follows, as well as the specially designed production facilities therefor: (a)

Light-weight turbojet and turbofan engines (including turbocompound engines) that are small and fuel efficient; (b) Ramjet/Scramjet engines, including devices to regulate combustion, and specially designed production equipment therefor; (c) Rocket motor cases and specially designed production equipment therefor; (d) Staging mechanisms and specially designed production equipment therefor; (e) Liquid fuel control systems and components therefor, specially designed to operate in vibrating environments of more than 12g rms between 20Hz and 2000Hz including: (1) Servo valves designed for flow rates of 24 litres per minute or greater at a pressure of 250 bars, and having flow contact surfaces made of 90% or more tantalum, titanium or zirconium, either separately or combined, except when such surfaces are made of materials containing more than 97% and less than 99.7% titanium; (2) Pumps (except vacuum pumps), having all flow contact surfaces made of 90% or more tantalum, titanium or zirconium, either separately or combined, except when such surfaces are made of materials containing more than 97% and less than 99.7% titanium. Notes to Item 3:

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Documents

(1) Item 3(a) engines may be exported as part of a manned aircraft or in quantities appropriate for replacement parts for manned aircraft. (2) Item 3(e) systems and components may be exported as part of a satellite. Item

4—Category

II

Propellants and constituent chemicals for propellants as follows: (a)

Propulsive substances: (1) Hydrazine with a concentration of more than 70%; (2) Unsymmetric dimethylhydrazine (UDMH); (3) Spherical ammonium perchlorate with particles of uniform diameter less than 500 microns; (4) Spherical aluminium powder with particles of uniform diameter of less than 500 microns and an aluminium content of 97% or greater; (5) Metal fuels in particle sizes less than 500 microns, whether spherical, atomized, spheroidal, flaked or ground, consisting of 97% or more of any of the following: zirconium, titanium, uranium, tungsten, boron, zinc, and alloys of these; magnesium; Misch metal; (6) Nitro-amines (cyclotetramethylene-tetranitramine (HMX), cyclotetramethylenetrinitramine (RDX)) when specially formulated as propulsive substances. (b) Polymeric substances: (1) Carboxy-terminated polybutadiene (CTPB); (2) Hydroxy-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB); (c) Composite propellants including moulded glue propellants and propellants with nitrated bonding and aluminium content in excess of 5%. (d) Other high energy density fuels such as Boron Slurry, having an energy density of 40 x 106 joules/kg or greater. Item

5—Category

II

Production technology or production equipment specially designed or modified for production, handling, mixing, curing, casting, pressing, machining and acceptance testing of the liquid or solid propellants and propellant constituents as described in Item 4. Item

6—Category

II

Equipment, technical data and procedures for the production of structural composites usable in the systems in Item 1 as follows, and specially designed components and accessories and specially designed software therefor: (a)

(b)

Filament winding machines of which the motions for positioning, wrapping and winding fibres are coordinated and programmed in three or more axes, specially designed to fabricate composite structures or laminates from fibrous and filamentary materials; and coordinating and programming controls; Tape-laying machines of which the motions for positioning and

156

Appendix

III

laying tape and sheets are coordinated and programmed in two or more axes, specially designed for the manufacture of composite airframes and missile structures; (c) Interlacing machines, including adapters and modification kits for weaving, interlacing or braiding fibers to fabricate composite structures, except textile machinery which has not been modified for the above end-uses; (d) Specially designed or adapted equipment for the production of fibrous and filamentary materials as follows: as (1) E q u i p m e n t for converting polymeric fibres (such polyacrylonitrile, rayon, or polycarbosilane) including special provision to strain the fiber during heating; (2) Equipment for the vapor deposition of elements or compounds on heated filamentary substrates; and (3) Equipment for the wet-spinning of refractory ceramics (such as aluminium oxide); (e) Specially designed or adapted equipment for special fiber surface treatment or for producing prepregs and preforms. Note: Equipment covered by this sub-item includes but is not limited to rollers, tension stretchers, coating equipment, cutting equipment and clicker dies. (f) Technical data (including processing conditions) and procedures for the regulation of temperature, pressures or atmosphere in autoclaves when used for the production of composites or partially processed composites. Note to Item 6: Specially designed or adapted components and accessories for the machines covered by this entry include, but are not limited to, moulds, mandrels, dies, fixtures and tooling for the preform pressing, curing, casting, sintering or bonding of composite structures, laminates and manufactures thereof.

Item

7—Category

II

Pyrolytic deposition and densification equipment and technology as follows: (a)

(b) (c)

Item

Technology for producing pyrolytically derived materials formed on a mould, mandrel or other substrate from precursor gases which decompose in the 1300 to 2900 degrees Celsius temperature range at pressures of 1 mm Hg to 150 mm Hg (including technology for the composition of precursor gases, flow-rates, and process control schedules and parameters); Specially designed nozzles for the above processes; Equipment and process controls, and specially designed software therefor, specially designed for densification and pyrolysis of structural composite rocket nozzles and reentry vehicle nose tips.

8—Category

11

Structural materials usable in the systems in Item 1, as follows: (a)

Composite structures, laminates, and manufactures thereof, including resin impregnated fiber prepregs and metal coated fiber preforms therefor, specially designed for use in the systems in Item 1 and the

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subsystems in Item 2 made either with an organic matrix or metal matrix utilizing fibrous or filamentary reinforcements having a specific tensile strength greater than 7.62 x 10 4 m (3 x 10 6 inches) and a specific modulus greater than 3.18 x 10 6 m (1.25 x 10 8 inches); (b) Resaturated pyrolyzed (i.e., carbon-carbon) materials specially designed for rocket systems; (c) Fine grain artificial graphites for rocket nozzles and re-entry vehicle nosetips having all of the following characteristics: (1) Bulk density of 1.79 or greater (measured at 293K); (2) Tensile strain to failure of 0.7 percent or greater (measured at 293K); (3) Coefficient of thermal expansion of 2.75 x 10 6 or less per degree K (in the range of 293K to 1,255K); (d) Ceramic composite materials specially designed for use in missile radomes.

Item 9—Category II Compasses, gyroscopes, accelerometers and inertial equipment and specially designed software therefor, as follows; and specially designed components therefore usable in the systems in Item 1: (a)

Integrated flight instrument systems which include gyrostabilizers or automatic pilots and integration software therefor, specially designed or modified for use in the systems in Item 1; (b) Gyro-astro compasses and other devices which derive position or orientation by means of automatically tracking celestial bodies; (c) Accelerometers with a threshold of 0.005g or less, or a linearity error within 0.25 percent of full scale output or both, which are designed for use in inertial navigation systems or in guidance systems of all types; (d) Gyros with a rated free directional drift rate (rated free precession) of less than 0.5 degree (1 sigma or rms) per hour in a lg environment; (e) Continuous output accelerometers which utilize servo or force balance techniques and gyros, both specified to function at acceleration levels greater than lOOg; (f) Inertial or other equipment using accelerometers described by subitems (c) and (e) above or gyros described by subitems (d) or (e) above, and systems incorporating such equipment, and specially designed integration software therefor; (g) Specially designed test, calibration, and alignment equipment for the above; (h) Specially designed production equipment for the above, including the following; (1) For ring laser gyro equipment, the following equipment used to characterize mirrors, having the threshold accuracy shown or better: (i) Rectilinear Scatterometer (lOppm); (ii) Polar Scatterometer (lOppm); (iii) Reflectometer (50ppm); (iv) Profilimeter (5 Angstroms); (2) For other inertial equipment: (i) Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU Module) Tester; (ii) IMU Platform Tester;

158

Appendix

(iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi)

III

IMU Stable Element Handling Fixture; IMU Platform Balance Fixture; Gyro Tuning Test Station; Gyro Dynamic Balance Station; Gyro Run-in/Motor Test Station; Gyro Evacuation and Fill Station; Centrifuge Fixture for Gyro Bearings; Accelerometer Axis Align Station Accelerometer Test Station.

Note to Item 9: Items (a) through to (f) may be exported as part of a manned aircraft or satellite or in quantities appropriate for replacement parts for manned aircraft. Item

10—Category

II

Flight control systems usable in the systems in Item 1 as follows, as well as the specially designed test, calibration, and alignment equipment therefor: (a) (b) (c) (d)

Hydraulic, mechanical, electro-optical, or electro-mechanical flight control systems (including fly-by-wire systems) specially designed or modified for the systems in Item 1; Attitude control equipment specially designed or modified for the systems in Item 1; Design technology for integration of air vehicle fuselage, propulsion system and lifting and control surfaces to optimize aerodynamic performance throughout the flight regime of an unmanned air vehicle; Design technology for integration of flight control, guidance, and propulsion data into a flight management system for optimization of rocket system trajectory.

Note to Item 10: Items (a) and (b) may be exported as part of a manned aircraft or satellite or in quantities appropriate for replacement parts for manned aircraft. Item

11—Category

II

Avionics equipment specially designed or modified for use in unmanned air vehicles or rockets systems and specially designed software and components therefor usable in the systems in Item 1, including but not limited to: (a) (b) (c) (d) (1) (2) (3) (4)

Radar and laser radar systems, including altimeters; Passive sensors for determining bearing to specific electromagnetic sources (direction finding equipment) or terrain characteristics; Equipment specially designed for real-time integration, processing, and use of navigation information derived from an external source; Electronic assemblies and components specially designed for military use incorporating any of the following: Specially designed, integral structural supports; Techniques for conductive heat removal; Radiation hardening; Design for reliable short-term operation at temperatures in excess of 125 degrees Celsius;

MTCR

159

Documents

(e)

Design technology for protection of avionic and electrical subsystems against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and electromagnetic interference (EMI) hazards from external sources, as follows: (1) Technology for design of shielding systems; (2) Technology for the configuration design of hardened electrical circuits and subsystems; (3) Determination of hardening criteria for the above.

Notes to Item 11: (1) Item 11 equipment may be exported as part of a manned aircraft or satellite or in quantities appropriate for replacement parts for manned aircraft. (2) Examples of equipment included in this item: • Terrain contour mapping equipment; • Scene mapping and correlation (both digital and analog) equipment; • Doppler navigation radar equipment; • Passive interferometer equipment; • Imaging sensor equipment (both active and passive). Item

12—Category

II

Launch and ground support equipment and facilities usable for the systems in Item 1, as follows: (a)

Apparatus and devices specially designed or modified for the handling, control, activation and launching of the systems in Item 1; (b) Military vehicles specially designed or modified for the handling, control, activation and launching of the systems in Item 1; (c) Gravity meters (gravimeters), gravity gradiometers, and specially designed components therefor, designed or modified for airborne or marine use, and having a static or operational accuracy of one milligal or better, with a time to steady-state registration of two minutes or less; (d) Telemetering and telecontrol equipment suitable for use with unmanned air vehicles or rocket systems; (e) Precision tracking systems: (1) Tracking systems which use a translator installed on the rocket system or unmanned air vehicle in conjunction with either surface or airborne references or navigation satellite systems to provide realtime measurements of inflight position and velocity; (2) Software systems which process recorded data for post-mission precision tracking enabling determination of vehicle position. Item

13—Category

II

Analog computers, digital computers, or digital differential analyzers specially designed or modified for use in air vehicles or rocket systems and usable in the systems in Item 1, having any of the following characteristics: (a)

Rated for continuous operation at temperatures from below - 4 5

160

Appendix

(b) (c)

III

degrees Celsius to above 55 degrees Celsius; Designed as ruggedized or radiation-hardened equipment and capable of meeting military specifications for ruggedized or radiationhardened equipment; or, Modified for military use.

Note to Item 13: Item 13 equipment may be exported as part of a manned aircraft or satellite or in quantities appropriate for replacement parts for manned aircraft. Item

14—Category

II

Analog-to-digital converters, other than digital voltmeters or counters, usable in the systems in Item 1 and having any of the following characteristics: rated for continuous operation at temperatures from below -45 degrees Celsius to above 55 degrees Celsius; designed to meet military specifications for ruggedized equipment, or modified for military use; or designed for radiation resistance, as follows: (a) Electrical input type analog-to-digital converters having any of the following characteristics: (1) A conversion rate of more than 200,000 complete conversions per second at rated accuracy; (2) An accuracy in excess of 1 part in more than 10,000 of full scale over the specified operating temperature range; (3) A figure of merit 1 x 108 or more (derived from the number of complete conversions per second divided by the accuracy). (b) Analog-to-digital converter microcircuits having both of the following characteristics: (1) A maximum conversion time to maximum resolution of less than 20 microseconds; (2) A rated non-linearity of better than 0.025 percent of full scale over the specified operating temperature range. Item

15—Category

II

Test facilities and equipment usable for the systems in Item 1, as follows: (a) (b)

(c)

Vibration test equipment using digital control techniques and specially designed ancillary equipment and software therefor capable of imparting forces of 100 kN (22,500 lbs) or greater; Supersonic (Mach 1.4 to Mach 5), hypersonic (Mach 5 to Mach 15), and hypervelocity (above Mach 15) wind tunnels, except those specially designed for educational purposes and having a test section size (measured internally) of less than 25 cm (10 inches); Test benches with the capacity to handle solid or liquid fuel rockets of more than 20,000 lbs of thrust, and capable of measuring the three thrust components.

Note to item 15 (a): The term "digital control" refers to equipment, the functions of which are, partly or entirely, automatically controlled by stored and digitally coded electrical signals.

MTCR

Item

161

Documents

16—Category

II

Specially designed software, or specially designed software and related specially designed analog or hybrid (combined analog/digital) computers, for modeling, simulation, or design integration of rocket systems and unmanned air vehicle systems, usable for the systems in Item 1. Item

17•—Category

II

Technology, materials, and devices for reduced observables such as radar reflectivity, optical/infrared signatures and acoustic signatures (i.e., stealth technology), for military application in rocket systems and unmanned air vehicles, and usable for the systems in Item 1, for example: (a) (b)

Item

Structural materials and coatings specially designed for reduced radar reflectivity; Optical coatings, including paints, specially designed or formulated for reduced optical reflection or emissivity, except when specially used for thermal control of satellites.

18—Category

II

Technology and devices specially designed for use in protecting rocket systems and unmanned air vehicles against nuclear effects (e.g., Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), X-rays, combined blast and thermal effects), and usable for the systems in Item 1, for example: (a)

Hardened microcircuits and detectors specially designed to withstand radiation as follows: (1) Neutron dosage of 1 x 1012 neutrons/cm2 (single event); (2) Gamma dose rate of 1 x 109 rads/sec; (3) Total dose 1500 rads (single event). (b) Radomes specially designed to withstand a combined thermal shock greater than 100 cal/cm 2 accompanied by a peak overpressure of greater than 7 pounds per square inch. Note to Item 18(a): A microcircuit is defined as a device in which a number of passive and active circuit elements are considered as indivisibly associated on or within a continuous structure to perform the function of a circuit.

Glossary

AC ACDA ASEAN ATACM ATBM AWACS CAM CBM CBW CD CEP CG CIA CK CSBM CSS-2 CW CWC CWFZ CWRI CX FAE FRG FROG GA GB GD GICCW GLCM GPS

hydrogen cyanide US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Association of Southeast Asian Nations US Army tactical missile system antitactical ballistic missile US Airborne Early Warning and Control System chemical agent monitor confidence-building measure chemical and biological weapons Conference on Disarmament circular error probability phosgene US Central Intelligence Agency cyanogen chloride confidence- and security-building measure Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missile chemical weapons Chemical Weapons Convention chemical weapon-free zone Chemical Weapons Regional Initiative phosgene oxime fuel-air explosive Federal Republic of Germany Soviet short-range ballistic missile tabun, a nerve agent sarin, a nerve agent soman, a nerve agent Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons ground-launched cruise missile global positioning system 163

164 GSLV HD HE HL IAEA ICBM IISS INF IRBM L M-9 M-1B MRL MTCR NPT OSI OTH OTH-B OTRAG PRC RX-250 Scud(-B, -C) SDI SIPRI SLCM SSM TERCOM UN VX

Glossary

Indian geostationary launch vehicle mustard gas high explosive (conventional) a mustard gas/arsenical mixture International Atomic Energy Agency intercontinental ballistic missile International Institute for Strategic Studies Intermediate-range nuclear forces intermediate-range ballistic missile lewisite Chinese short-range ballistic missile Chinese short-range ballistic missile Materials Research Laboratory, Melbourne Missile Technology Control Regime Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on-site inspection over-the-horizon over-the-horizon backscatter German aerospace company People's Republic of China Indonesian sounding rocket Soviet short-range ballistic missile Strategic Defense Initiative Stockholm International Peace Research Institute sea-launched cruise missile surface-to-surface missile terrain guidance system United Nations persistent nerve agent

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Bibliography

Biological

Journals, Magazines, and Newsletters Arms Control Chronicle, Canadian Centre for Arms Control, Ottawa. Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, Washington, DC. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Chicago. Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC. Disarmament Bulletin, Ministry of External Affairs, Ottawa. Disarmament Newsletter, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, New York. Financial Times, London. Jane's Defence Weekly, London. Pacific Research, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra. Star-Bulletin