The Search for Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation (Global Issues Series) 1403942579, 9781403942579, 9780230512580

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The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation

Graham S. Pearson

The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

Global Issues Series General Editor: Jim Whitman This exciting new series encompasses three principal themes: the interaction of human and natural systems; cooperation and conflict; and the enactment of values. The series as a whole places an emphasis on the examination of complex systems and causal relations in political decision-making; problems of knowledge; authority, control and accountability in issues of scale; and the reconciliation of conflicting values and competing claims. Throughout the series the concentration is on an integration of existing disciplines towards the clarification of political possibility as well as impending crises. Titles include: Berhanykun Andemicael and John Mathiason ELIMINATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Prospects for Effective International Verification Roy Carr-Hill and John Lintott CONSUMPTION, JOBS AND THE ENVIRONMENT A Fourth Way? John N. Clarke and Geoffrey R. Edwards (editors) GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY Malcolm Dando PREVENTING BIOLOGICAL WARFARE The Failure of American Leadership Toni Erskine (editor) CAN INSTITUTIONS HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES? Collective Moral Agency and International Relations Brendan Gleeson and Nicholas Low (editors) GOVERNING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT Global Problems, Ethics and Democracy Roger Jeffery and Bhaskar Vira (editors) CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN PARTICIPATORY NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT Ho-Won Jeong (editor) GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES Institutions and Procedures APPROACHES TO PEACEBUILDING W. Andy Knight A CHANGING UNITED NATIONS Multilateral Evolution and the Quest for Global Governance W. Andy Knight (editor) ADAPTING THE UNITED NATIONS TO A POSTMODERN ERA Lessons Learned

Kelley Lee HEALTH IMPACTS OF GLOBALIZATION (editor) Towards Global Governance GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH An Introduction Nicholas Low and Brendan Gleeson (editors) MAKING URBAN TRANSPORT SUSTAINABLE Graham S. Pearson THE UNSCOM SAGA Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation THE SEARCH FOR IRAQ’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation Andrew T. Price-Smith (editor) PLAGUES AND POLITICS Infectious Disease and International Policy Michael Pugh (editor) REGENERATION OF WAR-TORN SOCIETIES Bhaskar Vira and Roger Jeffery (editors) ANALYTICAL ISSUES IN PARTICIPATORY NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT Simon M. Whitby BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST CROPS

Global Issues Series Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–79483–4 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Also by Graham S. Pearson The UNSCOM Saga: Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Key Points for the Fourth Review Conference (co-edited with Malcolm R. Dando) Verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (co-edited with Malcolm R. Dando & Tibor Toth) Scientific and Technical Means of Distinguishing Between Natural and Other Outbreaks of Disease (co-edited with Malcolm R. Dando and Bohumir Kriz) Maximizing the Security and Development Benefits from the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (co-edited with Malcolm R. Dando, Cyril Klement and Marian Negut) The Implementation of Legally Binding Measures to Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (co-edited with Marie Chevrier, Krzysztof Chomiczewski, Henri Garrigue, Gyorgy Granasztoi, and Malcolm R. Dando) Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference (co-edited with Nicholas A. Sims & Malcolm R. Dando)

The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation Graham S. Pearson Visiting Professor in International Security University of Bradford

Foreword by Charles A. Duelfer Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction

© Graham S. Pearson 2005 Foreword © Charles A. Duelfer 2005 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–4257–9 hardback ISBN-10: 1–4039–4257–9 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pearson, Graham S., 1935– The search for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction : inspection, verification, and non-proliferation / Graham S. Pearson. p. cm. – (Global issues) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–4257–9 (cloth) 1. Weapons of mass destruction–Iraq. 2. Disarmament–Inspection–Iraq. 3. Arms control–Verification–Iraq. 4. United Nations. Special Commission on Iraq–History. 5. Chemical arms control–Verification–Iraq. 6. Biological arms control–Verification–Iraq. I. Title. II. Global issues series (Palgrave Macmillan (Firm)) U793.P43 2005 327.1′745′09567–dc22

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Chemical and biological weapons facilities in Iraq

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Contents List of Figures

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List of Tables

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Foreword by Charles A. Duelfer, Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Preface

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Acknowledgments

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List of Abbreviations/Acronyms

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1 Introduction 2 The United Nations Secretary-General Investigations in Iran and Iraq 3 The Decade of UNSCOM 4 An Analysis of UNSCOM 5 The Amorim Panel and the Creation of UNMOVIC 6 The Years of UNMOVIC 7 The Developments Leading to War in March 2003 and the Iraq Survey Group 8 Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Programmes 9 The Absence of WMD Stockpiles in Iraq 10 Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation: Lessons Learned 11 Future Roles for UNMOVIC and its Expertise 12 Prospects for the Future

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Appendices 1 2 3

United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002)

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Notes

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Index

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List of Figures Chemical and biological weapons facilities in Iraq 1.1 Chronology of events 1980 to 2005 2.1 Letters on chemical weapons to the Security Council 1982–9 3.1 Iraqi denials 1991–8 6.1 Organizational structure of UNMOVIC

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List of Tables 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7

Chronology of events UN Secretary-General investigations during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s Composition of investigation teams during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s Security Council resolutions and statements during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s First Iraqi obstructions during 1991 Iraqi obstructions during 1992 and 1993 Iraqi obstructions during 1994 Iraqi obstructions during 1996 Iraqi obstructions during 1997 and early 1998 The final Iraqi obstructions in 1998 Security Council Resolutions relating to the work of UNSCOM Members of the Special Commission on Iraq 1991–9 Numbers of UNSCOM staff in New York, Baghdad and Bahrain Nationalities of seconded personnel to UNSCOM in New York Chief Inspectors for chemical weapons inspections Chief Inspectors for biological weapons inspections Iraqi chemical weapons declarations Iraqi biological weapons declarations Membership of the Amorim panel on disarmament Outstanding issues relating to chemical weapons Commissioners for UNMOVIC appointed on 10 March 2000 UNMOVIC Quarterly Reports prior to inspections in Iraq Further UNMOVIC Quarterly Reports prior to inspections in Iraq Composition of the roster of trained inspectors as of May 2003 UNMOVIC Quarterly Reports covering the period when inspections took place in Iraq UNMOVIC network of laboratories for chemical and biological analysis UNMOVIC Quarterly Reports covering the period since the suspension of inspections in Iraq xii

2 10 18 19 34 38 43 48 54 61 68 73 76 77 81 83 88 89 97 100 109 115 117 125 127 134 135

List of Tables xiii

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UNMOVIC College of Commissioners from 10 March 2000 unless indicated otherwise Staffing of Planning and Operations (DPO) and of Analysis and Assessment (DAA) Divisions from September 2000 to September 2004 UNMOVIC basic training courses UNMOVIC follow-up training courses Chief Inspectors for UNMOVIC missions from 27 November 2002 to 17 March 2003 Numbers of types of sites by discipline in Iraq Types and numbers of sites inspected by discipline in Iraq from 27 November 2002 to 18 March 2003 Chemical and biological samples collected in Iraq from 27 November 2002 to 18 March 2003 Comparison of the SCR 1051 (1996) notification mechanism and the GRL contract review system Comparison of UK Government Dossier of September 2002 and the US CIA Report of October 2002 Confidence levels for Key Judgements in extracts from classified US National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002 Weapons of mass destruction search teams in Iraq post March 2003 Summary of chemical weapon accounting and shortfalls Summary of biological weapon accounting and shortfalls Information on Iraqi weaponization of CS Information on Iraqi bulk CW agent Information on Iraqi CW munitions declared by Iraq as remaining after the 1991 Gulf war Iraqi biological agents Iraqi facilities engaged in the biological weapons programme Iraqi biological weapons delivery means General Assembly Resolutions from 1980 to 1990 relating to investigations of alleged use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons Comparison of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC WMD Treaty status for states within or adjacent to the Middle East in December 2004 Options for the future use of UNMOVIC capabilities

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Foreword International concern about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) increased sharply during the past two decades. There was little international reaction to the use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq war during the 1980s. Iraq produced and used over 100,000 chemical munitions in this war yet little outrage resulted. In the context of the times, international security concerns were dominated by the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. It was NATO vs. the Warsaw Pact and nuclear Armageddon was the crevice to be steered around. In such a context the use of chemical weapons in the Middle East by regional states – neither one particularly savoury – did not rise to the top of the agenda. In fact, the recycling of petro-dollars via arms sales was not without benefit for many countries. This nonchalance changed quickly with the 1991 war to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The Iraqi regime had the option of using chemical and/or biological weapons against US-led coalition forces. The very real threat of being on the receiving end of WMD and the resultant efforts to prepare defensively for such a contingency concentrated the attention of many senior military and policy officers in governments around the world. The United States in the lead up to Desert Storm scrambled to prepare military forces and civilian populations for the possibility of chemical or biological weapons use. These preparations were far from robust. In the end, Iraq was deterred from using WMD. The Iraqi regime was warned against using WMD prior to the 1991 conflict at a meeting between United States Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva. Baker promised a ‘regime ending’ response and no WMD were used in combat. But, this is not to say that WMD did not play a role in the conflict. Indeed, the potential of CBW use figured in coalition strategy and tactics and drove up the cost of the conflict. It was also the case that the regime in Baghdad believed their possession of WMD deterred President George H. W. Bush from pursuing the ground war to Baghdad. I had a meeting with Iraqi ministers on 18 September 1995 where they first discussed their concept of use for WMD. They described how instructions were given to load and disperse CBW warheads and bombs. Moreover, the Iraqi ministers described how Saddam gave predelegated authorization for their use under certain conditions, i.e. if the leadership was threatened or cut off. The Iraqi side described their view that this contributed to the decision by President Bush to not pursue the war beyond the limited objective of expelling Iraq from Kuwait. In a remarkable find later when the Iraq Survey Group was examining captured xv

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material, a recording of the meeting where Saddam gave these instructions was found. It is a chilling sequence. From Saddam’s perspective, he had two existential experiences where WMD saved him – in the war with Iran and the 1991 Gulf war. From the perspective of other countries, they may note that Saddam’s major blunder was to invade Kuwait before completing his nuclear weapon. Had he reversed this order of events he and his two sons might be happily smoking their cohibas in Baghdad today. Pakistan, having sneaked across the nuclear threshold, is now in relatively good stead in the international community. The international community also recognized the growing prominence of the WMD threat in the aftermath of the 1991 Iraq war. The United Nations Security Council created a mechanism of coercive disarmament in its resolution creating the cease-fire ending the 1991 war (UNSCR 687). It linked the removal of multilateral sanctions (initially established to encourage Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait) to the verifiable elimination of Iraq’s WMD capabilities. An elaborate and intrusive system of inspection was created (including the creation of UNSCOM) for implementing this type of coercive disarmament. The last time such a mechanism was used was following World War I, when the Allies built into the Versailles Treaty an International Control Commission to enact the disarmament provisions in Germany. The experiences of the Inter-Allied Control Commission and UNSCOM were remarkably similar. Iraq and Germany posed many of the same problems and the dynamic of a coalition trying to coercively disarm a committed unitary actor without occupying the country is fraught with problems. In both cases, the systems for disarmament and monitoring were not sustainable. Such experiences do render visible some important dynamics. In the case of Iraq, it is clear that at different times Saddam both chose to have WMD and later to defer re-acquiring WMD. What were the incentives and disincentives? What were the variables that the international community can control which affect how actors like Saddam may solve the equation leading to possession of WMD? These are the key points of investigation that Graham Pearson has highlighted and form the fundamentals of debate for policies regarding WMD in the international arena. In the Iraqi case, I had the unique experience of having spent many years helping direct the UNSCOM inspection and monitoring efforts as the Deputy Executive Chairman. I came to know quite well most of the leading Iraqi WMD and political figures. Subsequently, following the fall of the regime, I led the investigation and reporting of the Iraqi WMD programmes conducted by the Iraq Survey Group. This afforded me the opportunity to meet at length with many of the same individuals who could then speak without the constraints of the regime. It was fascinating and deeply illuminating of the way Saddam ran his government, evaluated his power and viewed the role of WMD. A major goal of my report, (‘The Comprehensive

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Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq’s WMD’, 30 September 2004) was to describe the role and utility of WMD from Saddam’s perspective. It is now evident that Saddam so dominated the Iraqi regime that its strategic intent was his alone and his aim from 1991 to 2003 was to escape international sanctions as his first priority while sustaining future options to reconstitute WMD so long as this did not risk undermining his goal of getting out of sanctions. WMD was not an end in itself, but a tool to exert influence and power. Saddam was extremely sensitive to the use of power. He also had a long view. He saw himself as an historic Iraqi leader, in the line of Nebuchadnezzar and Hammurabi. He could defer gratification. He could absorb setbacks and rebuild. Saddam was written off at the end of the 1991 war when almost all Iraqi provinces rebelled. He fought his way back (including through the use of chemical weapons). Through our work in post-Saddam Iraq, we understand that a major reason why Iraq continued to provide a confused message regarding its WMD capabilities was that it sought to sustain the intellectual capital achieved over so many years and at such great cost. The regime wanted to be in a position to produce again with as short a lead time as possible when conditions permitted. Saddam also acknowledged that he was purposely ambiguous on occasion about his WMD capabilities to sustain a deterrent effect with regard to Iran. He was acutely aware of the Iranian nuclear and other WMD programmes. Iran was his historic enemy and he resented being constrained in an inferior position to the ‘Persians’. One point in examining the Iraqi WMD experience must be underscored. It is important for Western observers and analysts to be aware of their own assumptions and logic. I have learned much about my own thinking through long exposure to Iraqi systems and leaders. I found my assumptions blindfolded me to realities in the Iraqi context. Our expectations filter what we see. For example, we look for evidence which we believe from our own experience should exist, such as presidential decision documents. We assume there will be explicit directions from Saddam. But this is not always the case. Given the nature of his system of rule, those around him who survived became successful in anticipating what he would ask for or demand in the future. When considering the very different system that existed under Saddam Hussein, there is a risk of not seeing the meaning and not seeing the implications of the evidence. Analysts of the Iraqi WMD activities needed to look for something they may not expect or be able to see. A corollary is that not finding such evidence, such as presidential decision documents on WMD, is not evidence of absence of presidential intention or direction. Having been able to speak to Saddam has lent some clarity to this as have discussions with his top lieutenants and ministers.

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Saddam gave explicit and implicit guidance to his underlings. For example, he was explicit in sustaining the intellectual capital. He directed in 1991 that nuclear expertise be preserved. As sanctions were eroding in the period of 1998–2001, he also directed explicitly that long-range ballistic missile development be pursued. Implicitly, his top aides knew that once sanctions were gone, they should be in a position to advance in the areas that had saved the regime in past wars. They knew where Saddam wanted to be with respect to regional dominance. They knew what he had funded in the past and who had been rewarded – his underlings understood they needed to be prepared for future directions. A key inflection point in the Iraqi experience occurred when the regime finally availed itself of the opportunity offered by the UN Security Council to export oil under controls intended to limit the proceeds to ameliorating the suffering of the innocent Iraqi civilian population. Sanctions were devastating in their effect on the civil population while Saddam steadfastly refused to accept oil exports under the conditions proposed by the UN Security Council for five years. He felt accepting such conditions would remove the pressure on the Council to lift the sanctions. Council members were deeply disturbed that the sanctions they had imposed were killing thousands of innocent Iraqi children. Political pressure was building to lift sanctions as they did not affect their target, which was the regime leadership. However, the domestic civilian collapse itself became regime – threatening to Saddam and he accepted in December 1996 the so-called Oil for Food programme. It had enormous unexpected benefits for the regime in the opportunities to gain access to revenues and what became a burgeoning growth of business in Baghdad. Iraq’s infrastructure began to recover. A key indicator of the regime’s growth in this period is the growth in the budget of the Military Industrial Commission (in essence the Iraqi defense industry complex) from US$7.8 million in 1996 to US$350 million in 2002 and US$500 million planned for 2003. Conventional weapons trade in flagrant violation of UN sanctions took place largely through Syria and with the active support of the Syrian government. Many other countries actively participated, including Security Council members. Saddam was clearly once again on the path back to recovery. The WMD area which was most affected by the long application of sanctions and inspections was Iraq’s nuclear programme. Despite the direction by Saddam to preserve as much of the intellectual capital as possible, over the decade-plus sanctions regime, the large number of experts needed for nuclear development atrophied. Iraq was further away from a weapon in 2003 than in 1991. Saddam clearly wanted to preserve the achievement that Iraq came so close to completing before invading Kuwait. He initially directed the concealment of the nuclear programme from inspectors (like he

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did the BW programme), but concealment became untenable. UN inspectors were more aggressive and intrusive than Iraq anticipated. They made initial finds of concealed material and this had negative consequences in the UN for getting sanctions lifted. While he wanted to preserve his teams of scientists and engineers, they gradually found other projects to occupy their time and talent. Nevertheless, Saddam did state his view that Iraq would pursue a nuclear capability to match Iran in the future. The chemical weapons capability that had proven so useful militarily against Iran, as well as domestically against the Kurds and during the 1991 Shia uprising, was set aside until the lifting of sanctions. Nevertheless, as funding and commerce grew in Iraq during the period 1999 to 2001, the regime took steps to develop its indigenous chemical industry. A collateral benefit of this effort was a decrease in the lead time to produce chemical agents and weapons again, once the leadership so directed. The way Iraq organized its chemical industry in the late 1990s provided an infrastructure from which it could restart a CW programme. The domestic chemical industrial base would also allow concealment of CW-related elements or indeed a CW production capacity amidst a tangle of legitimate civilian production. Site visits and debriefs by the Iraq Survey Group revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfiguring and ‘making-do’ with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items. The ISG judged, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefings, that just prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Iraq probably could produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within months of a decision to produce. Iraq’s historical ability to implement simple solutions to weaponization challenges allowed Iraq to retain the capability to weaponize CW agent when the need arose. There was little that needed to be done to sustain a BW capability in Iraq. The knowledge had been developed and necessary production equipment could have been recreated indigenously by Iraq. The nature of BW is such that, unlike nuclear weapons, it requires small numbers of experts and the production is not especially difficult or resource intensive. Baghdad had a BW capability ready to go when Saddam desired. Saddam made clear his understanding and desire for BW in his decision to pre-authorize the use of BW against coalition forces in the 1991 war if they proceeded to Baghdad. He directed that the most dangerous agents be deployed and used in this contingency. He understood the military and especially the psychological effect employment would achieve. Moreover, Saddam determined to conceal his BW programme from UN inspectors from 1991 until 1995 (when revealing it became unavoidable under pressure of inspectors’ investigations). His intent was clear and in the analysis of ISG experts, Iraq could have reinstituted a rudimentary BW programme within a few weeks or months of a decision.

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In regard to delivery systems, it is clear that since the early 1970s, Iraq has consistently sought to acquire an effective long-range weapons delivery capability, and by 1991 Baghdad had purchased the elements and infrastructure that would form the basis for nearly all of its future missile system developments. Iraq committed substantial resources to both solid and liquid missile systems as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). By 1987, Iraq had successfully demonstrated its ability to modify some of its delivery systems to increase their range and to develop WMD dissemination options with the al Husayn missile. While other WMD programmes were strictly prohibited, the UN permitted Iraq to develop and possess missile delivery systems provided their range did not exceed 150 kilometres (km). This freedom allowed Iraq to keep its scientists and technicians engaged in developing technologies and production that would have application not only to permitted systems, but also to long-range missiles. They were positioning themselves for breakout, and, in fact Saddam ordered longer-range developments when he felt circumstances in the UN Security Council were more favourable. Between 1991 and 1998, Iraq had declared development programmes underway for liquid- and solid-propellant ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Iraq’s decisions in 1996 to accept the Oil for Food programme (OFF) and later in 1998 to cease cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA spurred a period of increased activity in delivery systems development. The pace of ongoing missile programmes accelerated, and the regime authorized its scientists to design missiles with ranges in excess of 150 km that, if developed, would have been clear violations of UNSCR 687. The ISG uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 km and for a 1,000 km range cruise missile, although none of these systems progressed to production and only one reportedly passed the design phase. We assessed that these plans demonstrate Saddam’s continuing desire – up to the beginning of OIF – for a longrange delivery capability. Given Iraq’s investments in technology and infrastructure improvements, an effective procurement network, skilled scientists, and designs already on the books for longer-range missiles, we assessed that Saddam clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and that the systems potentially were for WMD. In a mark of the confidence Baghdad had in the decay of sanctions, it is worth noting that Iraqi missile designs in the 2000 timeframe depended upon outside assistance which was readily available and in gross violation of sanctions. Imported strap-down guidance systems and on-site propulsion expertise from Russia were reflections of increased porosity of sanctions. As time has passed, UNSCOM, UNMOVIC and finally the ISG have successfully uncovered more and more information and gained a more comprehensive understanding of Iraq’s WMD programmes and their role in Saddam’s strategies. Although it is now evident that Iraq has no current

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WMD stockpile, it is clear that internationally WMD rightly continue to be a major concern worldwide. The Security Council in April 2004 adopted SCR 1540 (2004) affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The Heads of State and Government of the G8 at their summit on Sea Island in June 2004 stated that they ‘recognized the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, together with international terrorism, as the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security. This challenge requires a long-term strategy and multi-faceted approaches. All states must fulfil their arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation commitments, which we reaffirm, and we strongly support universal adherence to and compliance with these commitments under the relevant multilateral treaties. We will help and encourage states in effectively implementing their obligations under the multilateral treaty regimes, in particular implementing domestically their obligations under such treaties, building law enforcement capacity, and establishing effective export controls.’ The vital importance for international peace and security of the multilateral regimes totally prohibiting biological and chemical weapons – the BTWC which came into force in 1975 and the CWC which entered into force in 1997 – require that the lessons from Iraq are made available to the wider international community. The work of the ISG has shown that the UN regime of inspections and ongoing monitoring and verification coupled with sanctions caused Saddam Hussein to defer restarting his WMD programmes until sanctions were eliminated or eroded. Although the inspection and ongoing monitoring and verification regime related to a defeated and uncooperative State – Iraq – it is evident that conclusions reached regarding such a regime will be robust in the more normal international permissive regimes. The calculations made by Saddam on WMD and the factors we have now identified bearing on his decisions will inform future policies aimed at controlling WMD proliferation. Debate will and should continue over the efficacy of international sanctions and inspections in Iraq. The cost of sanctions to the civil population of Iraq was huge. Saddam was also on the verge of success in seeking the collapse of sanctions. Yet the dynamics of this experience can help guide efforts to improve arms prohibition and control regimes. I can think of no better qualified individual than Graham Pearson, who had been Director General and Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (CBDE) at Porton Down in Wiltshire in the United Kingdom until 1995 and subsequently a Visiting Professor of International Security in the Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford, to write an authoritative account of the search for WMD in Iraq

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paying particular attention to chemical and biological weapons in order to identify the relevant conclusions relating to inspection, verification and non-proliferation of such weapons. I came to know him when he was visiting UNSCOM to prepare for his previous book, The UNSCOM Saga, which provided an excellent authoritative and informative account of the work of UNSCOM set in the context of the elements of the web of deterrence/assurance – a concept comprising arms control, export controls, protective measures and determined responses to non-compliance that he first elaborated in 1993. It is inevitably enlightening to read Graham Pearson’s observations and prescriptions. Debate will be elevated whenever these are taken into account. I underscore a key point Graham Pearson identifies in the final chapter which has vital ramifications for the prohibition regimes for chemical and biological weapons. He highlights the dynamic that an aggressor state seeking to use chemical or biological weapons is likely to choose to develop a mobilization capability based on and embedded in dual-purpose technology and equipment. Such an aggressor state is not seeking a retaliatory capability but rather one that it can use at a time of its choosing. Following this strategy significantly alters the signature of a latent CW capability. If agents are intended to be produced just in time for use then the need for storage and stability characteristics are eliminated. Hence, chemical or biological materials may well be chosen that are not normally regarded as candidate chemical or biological agents. This scenario has important consequences for any future inspection regime in that the organizations engaged in such inspections have to be trained to look for indications of unusual chemical or biological materials of types and quantities that are inconsistent with peaceful permitted purposes. The experience gained in the search for WMD in Iraq is particularly informative in respect of the need for determined national and international response to non-compliance. In 1990 and 1991 the Security Council showed what had until then been a rare unanimity of purpose by adopting a series of resolutions which sent a clear message around the world that Iraq could not with impunity invade Kuwait and that the possession of weapons of mass destruction is unacceptable. The inability of the Security Council in recent years to show such unanimity of purpose has damaged international peace and security. It is particularly sad that key Security Council members were actively violating the weapons sanctions they passed on Iraq. Such circumstances make it very difficult to convince other states to restrain their weapons programmes based on international limits or norms. Nevertheless, it is clear that States must multilaterally strengthen international norms against weapons of mass destruction and even more important that concrete steps be taken to implement and enforce those norms.

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Imperfection in such regimes does not necessarily mean they are worse than nothing. Consider a world with no constraints or norms countering the proliferation of WMD. This would be a far more dangerous world. Passivity in respect of reinforcing or repairing WMD control regimes will be harmful to international peace and security. As the experience in Iraq is quite unique and highly relevant, this book will be a vital contribution to international efforts to counter the spread of chemical and biological weapons. Charles A. Duelfer Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction January 2004 – present Deputy Executive Chairman UNSCOM December 1993–February 2000

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Preface In the early 1980s the world became aware that Iraq was producing and using chemical weapons in its war against Iran. At that time, the Cold War was still intense and chemical weapons were known to be in the arsenals of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Although the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) totally prohibiting biological weapons had been opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975, its first Review Conference in 1980 had seen major concerns about whether the Soviet Union was in compliance with the Convention following the release of anthrax from a facility in Sverdlovsk. Negotiations towards a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) totally prohibiting chemical weapons were underway in Geneva. Today, we live in a very different world. The Cold War has dissolved and there is much more cooperation across Europe and Russia. There were high hopes in the early 1990s for a new world order of peace and stability but this has regrettably not been realized and we are now faced with an uncertain world in which there is greater concern about the potential use of chemical or biological weapons by rogue states or non-state actors such as terrorist groups. Bioterrorism is of particular concern following the anthrax letters in the United States in late 2001. The range of potential chemical and biological agents is now recognized as being considerably wider than two decades ago and the political and technical challenge to counter and prevent the acquisition and use of such weapons is thus greater than before. The Chemical Weapons Convention totally prohibiting chemical weapons entered into force in 1997 and has made the world a safer place. However, its first Review Conference in 2003 failed to face up to the potential threat to the prohibitions at the heart of that Convention posed by non-lethal or less-than-lethal agents. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention had gradually made progress since its entry into force in 1975 and was almost at the point in 2001 of reaching agreement on a legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention when the United States at the eleventh hour withdrew its support and plunged that Convention into crisis. The Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC in 2001 had to be suspended for a year and then failed to agree a Final Declaration, thereby failing to reaffirm, as at previous Review Conferences, that all relevant advances in the life sciences are covered by the prohibitions in Article I of the Convention. The general purpose criteria central to both Conventions are vital to ensure that all chemical and biological agents, both old and new, are totally prohibited. xxv

xxvi Preface

If these criteria are not maintained and reinforced, there are real dangers for international peace and security in that the comprehensive prohibition may be eroded. It is a false sense of security to assume that national measures can suffice. In an increasingly globalized world, internationally agreed multilateral measures are vital for the peace and security of all states. Against this background, the development and use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran and the subsequent uncovering by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and then more recently by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) of Iraq’s aspirations and programmes to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) provide information relating to inspection, verification and non-proliferation that is crucial to ensuring that the prohibition regimes for chemical and biological weapons are strengthened in the 21st century so as to enhance international peace and security. I was the Director General and Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down, England from 1984 to 1995 and was directly involved in ensuring that the UK armed forces were effectively protected against the threat that chemical or biological weapons might be used against them. I was also involved in some of the negotiations to complete the CWC and to strengthen the BTWC through a legally binding instrument and thus gained direct experience of the diplomatic approaches to strengthening the prohibition regimes. On reaching, in 1995, the mandatory retirement age from the British civil service, I was keen to write an authoritative book, The UNSCOM Saga, which examined the lessons to be learnt from the experience of UNSCOM in Iraq which I was well placed to do as I had not been directly involved in the activities of UNSCOM, although I had supported its activities through the provision of experts as UK commissioners and as UK experts and inspectors. I could therefore examine its activities from an analytical viewpoint. Two years after UNSCOM’s activities in Iraq were terminated, UNSCOM was replaced in 2000 by UNMOVIC. However, Iraq refused to accept UNMOVIC inspections and monitoring until November 2002 and just over three months later, UNMOVIC’s activities in Iraq were suspended with the start in March 2003 of military action against Iraq. In June 2003, the search for WMD in Iraq was taken over from US military units by the Iraq Survey Group which issued its Comprehensive Report in 2004. Throughout the past ten years, Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction have attracted increasing political attention from the Heads of State and Heads of Government around the world. As no stockpiles of WMD have been found in Iraq, the reasons for this need to be understood along with the implications for the prohibition regimes for chemical and biological weapons. This makes it all the more important that the lessons to be learned from the search for WMD in Iraq over the past 20 years are identified and provided in a form in which they can be utilized to make the

Preface xxvii

world safer for all of us against the dangers from chemical and biological weapons. The search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has involved four phases: first, the investigations carried out by small teams of experts on behalf of the UN Secretary-General who visited Iran and/or Iraq for a few days at a time on 9 occasions (6 missions to Iran and 3 missions to Iraq) between 1984 and 1988; second, the inspections carried out by UNSCOM almost continuously from 1991 to 1998; third, the inspections carried out by UNMOVIC during the just over three month period from 27 November 2002 until 18 March 2003; and fourth, the investigations carried out by the ISG from June 2003 onwards. Each is addressed here in separate chapters. The concluding chapters outline the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons programmes, the lessons that can be drawn for inspection, verification and non-proliferation, the future roles for UNMOVIC and its expertise and, finally, the prospects for the future. The absence of WMD stockpiles in Iraq is analyzed and is recognized as being unsurprising given that the Iraqi objective in acquiring such weapons was to use them aggressively at a time and place of Iraq’s choosing – and not as a means of retaliation or a means of deterrence which were the traditional objectives of previous Western possessor states. It is also evident that the absence of WMD stockpiles in a non-compliant state removes the risk that such stockpiles could be found by any international inspectorate and lead to concerted Security Council action. It follows also that such a strategy of making and using agents removes the necessity for agents to be selected that have long-term stability and storage characteristics. Alternative chemical and biological materials that may be more readily concealed within a dual-purpose capability may well be selected. This extended danger underlines the importance of the general purpose criteria in the BTWC and the CWC which ensure that all agents are totally prohibited. It furthermore emphasizes the necessity of nurturing and sustaining the general purpose criteria in the implementation of both of these Conventions nationally and internationally. For the future, the key requirement is for increased transparency through inspection, verification and non-proliferation measures under international and national regimes that totally prohibit chemical and biological weapons. There is a vital need in every country for all the elements of the web of assurance made up of the following elements: a. International and national regimes that totally prohibit chemical and biological weapons – Universality of the BTWC and CWC and the 1925 Geneva Protocol – Withdrawal of all reservations to the Geneva Protocol – Legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness of the BTWC

xxviii Preface

– National legislation implementing the BTWC and CWC in all countries – Penal sanctions upon individuals who engage in activities prohibited to states under the BTWC, CWC and the Geneva Protocol b. Controls of dangerous pathogens and chemicals – Addressing handling, use, storage and transfer both nationally and internationally c. Broadband protective measures – Preparedness, detection, diagnosis and medical countermeasures – Preparedness before and after release d. Determined national and international response to use or threat of use – Diplomatic actions, sanctions, military intervention – Security Council P5 need to recognize their responsibilities Such a web is effective against both states and non-state actors such as terrorists. A strong commitment to such a web of assurance both nationally and internationally provides two immense benefits – first to deter the would-be user from seeking such weapons and second to reassure the public both nationally and internationally that all reasonable steps are being taken to ensure their safety and security. Graham S. Pearson

Acknowledgments I am especially grateful to Demetrius Perricos, Acting Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) for his support and for the access that he provided for me to the staff of the Commission. I would also like to thank the staff of the Commission for the interest that they showed in this book and for the time they made available to discuss their impressions and views and, in many cases, to help to ensure that I had gained an accurate appreciation of their work. Within the Commission staff, particular thanks go to Ewen Buchanan, Public Information Officer, for rapidly providing information as well as reviewing the entire draft and discussing some of my tentative conclusions and also to Kay Mereish, Harald Marhold, Paulo Barretto and Svetlana Utkina of the Division of Planning and Operations, to Jean-Louis Rolland, Peter Prosser, Krzystof Strelau, William Jolley and Igor Mitrokhin of the Division of Analysis and Assessment, to Brian Mullady and Nikita Smidovitch in the Division of Technical Support and Training, to James Corcoran, David Birch and Jeffrey Allan in the Division of Information, to Rachel Davies in the Administrative Service and in addition, to Muttuswamy Sanmuganatan and Olivia Platon in the Chairman’s office. I am very grateful to Julian Perry Robinson, Professorial Fellow of the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex who read and provided invaluable comment on early drafts of crucial chapters and also gave me valuable encouragement. This was especially helpful from the point of view of identifying areas which needed to be addressed in order to enhance the value of the book. Particular thanks go to Professor Bryan Barrass, the first UK UNSCOM Special Commissioner, to Dr Ake Bovallius, the first Chief of the Biological Section in the Analysis and Assessment Division in UNMOVIC, to Dr Robert J. Mathews of the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organization, to Professor Roque Monteleone-Neto of Sao Paolo, Brazil, an UNMOVIC Commissioner, to Patrick Lamb, Deputy Head of the Counter-Proliferation Department and to Dr John Walker of the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for valuable discussions and the exchange of ideas. I am also especially grateful to Charles Duelfer for agreeing to write the Foreword to this book and to Rolf Ekeus and Hans Blix for useful exchanges. I would also like to thank my many friends and colleagues from many countries around the world who have helped to make writing this book such a rewarding task. Special thanks go to Professor Malcolm Dando of the Department of Peace Studies and others in the Department who gave valuable support and xxix

xxx Acknowledgments

encouragement. I am also extremely grateful to the support for this project which was provided by a grant to the Department of Peace Studies from the Carnegie Corporation of New York which enabled me to make visits to obtain the information needed to write this book. I also wish to thank Alison Howson of Palgrave and Jim Whitman, the Global Issues Series General Editor, for their support and encouragement as well as for their detailed comments, which helped considerably to improve this book. However, any errors or inaccuracies in this book are my responsibility alone and I am wholly responsible for the views expressed.

List of Abbreviations/Acronyms Agent A Agent B Agent C Agent D Agent G AHG ASIO ASIS ASP BMVC BOMVIC BTWC BW BWC BZ CAM CBD CBDE CBW CCHF CIA CN CS CW CWC DAA DAS DCI DIA DPO DSC DSD EMIS EST EU ExIm FFCD FMD FMDV

Iraqi code for Clostridium botulinum toxin Iraqi code for Bacillus anthracis spores Iraqi code for aflatoxin Iraqi code for wheat cover smut Iraqi code for Clostridium perfringens Ad Hoc Group Australian Security and Intelligence Organization Australian Secret Intelligence Service Ammunition Storage Points Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Centre Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Biological weapons Biological [and Toxin] Weapons Convention 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate Chemical Agent Monitor Chemical and biological defence Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment Chemical and biological weapons Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever Central Intelligence Agency w-Chloroacetophenone o-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile Chemical weapons Chemical Weapons Convention UNMOVIC Division of Analysis and Assessment A trichothecene mycotoxin Director Central Intelligence Defence Intelligence Agency UNMOVIC Division of Planning and Operations Differential scanning calorimetry Defence Signals Directorate (of Australia) Electromagnetic isotope separation Eastern Standard Time European Union Export-import mechanism Full, final and complete disclosure Food and Mouth Disease Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility at Al-Daura xxxi

xxxii List of Abbreviations/Acronyms

G7

G8

GA GA GB GB/GF G-class GF GRL H HCOC HPLC HQ HUMINT IAEA IATA IAU IIS IISS ISG JIC LD MIC MOD MOU MPA MPC MPF MRBM MSE MT MTCR Mustard NAM NBC NIE

Group of Seven. The Heads of State and Government of Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States. Group of Eight. The Heads of State and Government of Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States. United Nations General Assembly Chemical nerve agent, tabun. O-ethyl N,N-dimethyl phosphoramidocyanidate Chemical nerve agent, sarin. O-isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate A mixture of the chemical nerve agents GB and GF Chemical nerve agents such as GA, GB, GD and GF Chemical nerve agent, O-cyclohexyl methylphosphonofluoridate Goods Review List Mustard, chemical warfare agent Bis(2-chloroethyl) sulphide The Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles High Performance Liquid Chromatography Headquarters Human intelligence International Atomic Energy Agency International Air Transport Association Information Assessment Unit Iraqi Intelligence Service International Institute for Strategic Studies Iraq Survey Group Joint Intelligence Committee Low drag Military Industrialization Corporation Ministry of Defence Memorandum of Understanding Methyl phosphonic acid Methyl thiophosphonyl dichloride Precursors for sarin Medium-range-ballistic-missile Muthanna State Establishment Metric tons Missile Technology Control Regime Chemical warfare agent Bis(2-chloroethyl) sulphide Non-Aligned Movement Nuclear, biological and chemical National Intelligence Estimate

List of Abbreviations/Acronyms xxxiii

NMD NMR NPT OFF OIF OIP OMV OPCW P3 P4 P5 PCP PCR R&D RFP RPG RPV SCR SEPP SIPRI SORGI SOTI SRBM SRG SSA SSO T-2 TEM TGA TRC TSMID U-2 UAV UK UN UNEP UNCIM UNIKOM UNMOVIC UNSCOM UNSCR US

National Monitoring Directorate Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Oil for Food programme Operation Iraqi Freedom Office of Iraq Programmes Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons High biological containment facility Maximum biological containment facility Permanent five members of the Security Council – China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States A hallucinogenic compound Polymerase chain reaction Research and development Request for Proposal Rocket Propelled Grenades Remotely Piloted Vehicle Security Council Resolution State Establishment for Pesticide Production Stockholm International Peace Research Institute State Organization for Refinery and Gas Industries State Organization for Technical Industries Short Range Ballistic Missiles Special Republican Guard Special Service Agreement Special Security Organization A trichothecene mycotoxin Technical evaluation meeting Thermogravimetric analysis Technical Research Centre Technical and Scientific Materials Import Division High altitude surveillance photography aircraft Unmanned Aerial Vehicles United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United Nations United Nations Environment Programme United Nations Commission on Inspection and Monitoring United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission United Nations Special Commission on Iraq United Nations Security Council Resolution United States of America

xxxiv List of Abbreviations/Acronyms

USA UV VEREX VRL VX WHO WMD XTF

United States of America Ultraviolet Ad Hoc Group of governmental experts to identify and examine potential verification measures Veterinary Research Laboratory Chemical nerve agent O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methyl phosphonothiolate World Health Organization Weapons of Mass Destruction Exploitation Task Force

1 Introduction

A clear international norm has developed over the 90 years since World War I that two classes of weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons, are totally prohibited. The international agreements proscribing these weapons are the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical or biological weapons in war, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons, which entered into force in 1975, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of such weapons, which entered into force in 1997. Although there continues to be a clear political will by the majority of states to ensure that no state acquires such weapons, it has become apparent in the first years of the 21st century that a few states are still seeking such weapons of mass destruction. In addition to this, and especially since the anthrax letters in the United States in 2001, there is a growing concern that non-state actors and terrorists might seek to obtain and use biological or chemical weapons. World attention has been focused to an increasing extent during the past two decades on the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq because the extensive use of chemical weapons in the Iraq–Iran war from 1980 to 1988 was on the largest scale since chemical weapons were used in World War I in 1914–1918. Although there have been various books published on Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction, there have been few that have set out to provide an authoritative and comprehensive account of what happened in a definitive and unbiased way. Whilst international concern about weapons of mass destruction addresses nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery, this book focuses on biological and chemical weapons, the two classes of weapons that are totally prohibited. In my earlier book The UNSCOM Saga Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation I set out to provide an authoritative and factual account which was not distorted by political and other controversies. In this book, my objective is the same – to provide an authoritative, 1

2 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

comprehensive and factual account of the search for chemical and biological weapons in Iraq over the past couple of decades and thus to draw the lessons for inspection, verification and non-proliferation of these weapons. Consequently, in the initial chapters two and three and five to seven I set out in some detail the chronological developments (see Table 1.1) drawing heavily from the United Nations documents as I recognize that the language in these has been carefully considered and weighed. I have taken care throughout not to modify the words of the Security Council Resolutions and of the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC reports to the Security Council as these are both informative and important, and it would be unhelpful to add a gloss and thereby engender possible confusion. A conscious effort has been made not to be sidetracked into consideration of the political and other controversies which occurred during the period. In the

Table 1.1

Chronology of events

Date

Event

1980–1988

Iran–Iraq war – UN Secretary-General investigations by groups of experts

2 August 1990

Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq

16 January 1991– 28 February 1991

Coalition action (Operation Desert Storm) against Iraq

3 April 1991

UN Security Council adoption of cease-fire Resolution 687 (1991)

April 1991– December 1999

UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) active in New York

14 May 1991– 15 December 1998

UNSCOM operating in Iraq

16 December 1998– 19 December 1998

UK and US military action (Operation Desert Fox) against Iraq

January 1999–April 1999

Amorim panels on Iraq

17 December 1999

UN Security Council adoption of Resolution 1284 (1999) establishing UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission)

March 2000–Present

UNMOVIC active in New York

27 November 2002– 18 March 2003

UNMOVIC operating in Iraq

19 March 2003– 1 May 2003

Coalition action (Operation Iraqi Freedom) against Iraq

June 2003–Spring 2005

Iraq Survey Group (ISG) operating in Iraq

Introduction 3

final chapters I set out the analysis and lessons that the Iraqi experience provides for the strengthening of the regimes for the inspection, verification and non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The overall chronology of the events over the past two decades are in Table 1.1 and shown graphically in Figure 1.1. In the 1980s in the war between Iraq and Iran, the world gradually became aware that Iraq had produced and was using chemical weapons against Iran. Initial international reaction was somewhat muted despite investigations carried out on behalf of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral but as the war went on, and the use of chemical weapons became more widespread, concern began to be expressed internationally and steps were taken by like-minded states to harmonize their export controls of the chemicals and equipment needed to produce such weapons. The images of the use of chemical weapons against the people of Iran and, in particular, those of the attack against the population of Hallabjah galvanized the international community into paying attention and certainly contributed to the impetus needed to complete the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention. On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the coalition force made up of military personnel from 32 nations which then faced Iraq had to address the real prospect that chemical or biological weapons might be used against them when they sought to eject Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Fortunately, Iraq chose not to use such weapons at least in part due to President George H W Bush making it very clear that use of chemical or biological weapons would not be tolerated. This was spelt out in his letter of 5 January 1991 to

Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq

UK/US action against Iraq December 1998

Coalition action against Iraq 19 March 2003

Iran/Iraq war UNSCOM UNSCOM operating in Iraq

Amorim Panels

UNMOVIC UNMOVIC operating in Iraq

ISG

1980

Figure 1.1

1990

Chronology of events 1980 to 2005

2000

2004

4 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

Saddam Hussein, which was offered to Tariq Aziz, then Foreign Minister of Iraq, by James Baker, then Secretary of State for the United States, in which he said that ‘the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons or the destruction of Kuwait’s oil fields and installations. Further, you will be held directly responsible for terrorist actions against any member of the coalition. The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort.’ [Emphasis added]. Following the conflict in early 1991 when the coalition force liberated Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council adopted the ‘cease-fire’ resolution SCR 687 (1991) on 3 April 1991 which inter alia specified that within 15 days Iraq should declare its possession of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic missiles with a range of greater than 150 km and provide details of the types, amounts and locations of these. Iraq was required to accept unconditionally the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of such weapons and missiles and all related facilities. The resolution also required that within 120 days the Secretary-General should submit a plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq complies with its undertaking never to use, develop, construct or acquire any such weapons, missiles or facilities. A Special Commission (UNSCOM) was also to be established as part of the resolution which (together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) would carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq’s capabilities and of other sites designated by UNSCOM, would dispose of Iraq’s proscribed weapons, missiles and facilities and would monitor Iraq’s compliance with its undertaking never to reacquire such weapons, missiles or facilities. The experience gained by UNSCOM since it was established on 19 April 1991 in respect of the non-proliferation of such weapons has been unique. UNSCOM successfully carried out its remit during the next seven years in spite of the continuing refusal of Iraq to cooperate fully. However, the end of 1998 saw the suspension of the UNSCOM operations in Iraq and the on-site monitoring and verification regime effectively in abeyance. Iraq’s increasingly declamatory statements appeared to have successfully diverted the attention of the Secretary-General and at least some of the permanent members of the Security Council away from the inescapable fact that Iraq consistently and steadfastly defied the Security Council ever since the cease-fire resolution, SCR 687 (1991), was adopted in April 1991. Following Security Council Resolutions in late 1998 condemning Iraq’s decision to halt all UNSCOM disarmament work (SCR 1194 (1998) of 9 September) and to halt all monitoring (SCR 1205 (1998) of 5 November), the Security Council in January 1999 set up three panels chaired by the then President of the Security Council, Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil, to consider options which would lead to the full implementation of all relevant Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq. The first panel

Introduction 5

on the disarmament and the current and future monitoring and verification issues was required to make recommendations to the Security Council as to how to reestablish an effective disarmament/ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) regime in Iraq. The second panel was to consider humanitarian issues and the third prisoners of war and Kuwaiti property; all three panels were required to make their recommendations by 15 April 1999. On 27 March 1999, the final report of the disarmament panel was submitted to the Security Council. The report noted that the panel had concentrated on the technical feasibility of a reinforced OMV system capable of addressing, through integration, the remaining unresolved disarmament issues and concluded that such a reinforced OMV system, which should include intrusive inspections and investigations of past activities, was viable. However, the panel pointed out that even the best system would be useless if it were to remain a blueprint on paper only. To be effective, any system has to be deployed on the ground, which was impossible without Iraqi acceptance. The panel noted that how this acceptance would be obtained was the fundamental question before the Security Council. The report was presented to the Security Council on 7 April 1999. It, however, became clear that there was no meeting of minds among the five permanent members (known as the P5) of the Security Council with the United Kingdom and United States having one view and China, France and Russia another as to how to move the matter forward. Discussions continued in the Security Council during the next eight months based on alternative draft resolutions eventually culminating in SCR 1284 (1999) adopted in December 1999 by a vote of 11 for the resolution with four abstentions (China, France, Malaysia and Russia). This resolution established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) which retained UNSCOM’s mandate, rights, privileges, facilities and immunities. UNMOVIC was set up in early spring 2000 with the appointment of the Executive Chairman, the College of Commissioners and the drawing up of the organizational plan which was approved by the Security Council on 13 April 2000. Recruitment and training of UNMOVIC staff as well as planning and preparations for the resumption of inspections in Iraq then continued over the next two years with discussions eventually commencing with Iraq in March 2002. The result of these discussions led to Iraq’s statement on 16 September 2002 that inspectors could return to Iraq without conditions. The Security Council unanimously adopted SCR 1441 (2002) on 8 November 2002 which provided for a strengthened inspection regime. Inspections resumed in Iraq on 27 November 2002 just over four years since their suspension in November 1998. On 7 December 2002 Iraq submitted a declaration of some 12,000 pages that was required by SCR 1441 (2002) to be a ‘currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all

6 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and other means of delivery.’ UNMOVIC inspections and monitoring ceased on 18 March 2003 when the UN Secretary-General withdrew all UN staff from Iraq. Military action in Iraq commenced on the following day, 19 March 2003. During the period from 27 November 2002 until 18 March 2003, UNMOVIC carried out 731 inspections of 441 sites, 88 of which had not been inspected before. 22 per cent of these inspections were chemical, 28 per cent biological and 20 per cent multidisciplinary with the balance of 30 per cent being missile. Following the war in Iraq, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was set up in June 2003 with some 1,300 to 1,400 personnel drawn largely from the United States as well as some from Australia and the United Kingdom. An interim progress report was given to the US Congress on 2 October 2003 which said that the ISG had discovered dozens of WMD-related programme activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq had concealed from the United Nations during UNMOVIC inspections in Iraq. Early in 2004, David Kay, the deputy head of the ISG resigned for personal reasons and provided testimony before the US Senate Armed Services Committee in which he stated that he believed that ‘we were almost all wrong’ in regard to the assessments of Iraq’s WMD programmes and that what is needed ‘is to begin the fundamental analysis of how we got here, what led us here, and what we need to do in order to ensure that we are equipped with the best possible intelligence as we face these issues in the future.’ The ISG issued a Comprehensive Report of almost 1,000 pages dated 30 September 2004 which sets out to describe the Iraqi WMD programmes not in isolation, but in the context of the aims and objectives of the regime that created and used them. In this book I examine how, during the past two decades, the concepts of inspection, verification and non-proliferation have been developed in the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Inspection relates to onsite activities in Iraq carried out by the various UN specialist teams, verification to the validation of what is declared by Iraq, of what is discovered through the inspections in Iraq or provided from other sources, and non-proliferation relates to the activities undertaken to prevent the spread of capabilities which could be used for activities prohibited under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the BTWC and the CWC. I focus on chemical and biological weapons in four phases: the Iraq–Iran war, UNSCOM, UNMOVIC and the ISG. The book starts with successive chapters addressing the use of chemical weapons in the Iran/Iraq war; the events leading up to SCR 687 (1991) which established UNSCOM and the activities of UNSCOM; an analysis of UNSCOM; the Amorim Panel leading to the SCR 1284 (1999) and the establishment of UNMOVIC; the activities of UNMOVIC; and the developments leading to war in March 2003 and the subsequent work of

Introduction 7

the ISG. I provide a detailed, comprehensive and largely factual account, to the extent possible, of the activities in the four phases. I summarize the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons programmes and analyze the reasons why no stockpiles of these weapons have been found in Iraq. It is concluded that an aggressor state has no fundamental reason to have a stockpile as its interest is not in retaliation but rather in being able to launch an attack at a time of its choosing. In addition, the absence of a stockpile is likely to minimize the risk that unequivocal evidence of noncompliance will be found and presented to the Security Council. The aim of an aggressor state is likely to be to embed and conceal a weapons capability within its legitimate industry and it may well choose to use other chemical or biological materials than those traditionally regarded as agents by states whose interest was in a retaliatory capability. I then consider how effective the various inspection, verification and non-proliferation regimes have been in Iraq recognizing that these regimes were imposed on Iraq – and thus were uncooperative regimes – rather than permissive regimes that have been arrived at and agreed by international consensus. This leads to drawing lessons for inspection, verification and non-proliferation in uncooperative regimes for states of concern as well as for the international permissive regimes – such as those of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the BTWC and the CWC – for the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. Future possible roles for UNMOVIC and its expertise and capabilities are identified and discussed in a subsequent chapter. The role that is selected will depend on achieving consensus in the Security Council but there is no doubt that the capability currently vested in UNMOVIC should be maintained in order to promote international peace and security. Inspection, verification and non-proliferation are vital elements in the context of a web of reassurance that the total prohibition of chemical and biological weapons is being enforced and that the potential proliferation of such weapons is being effectively countered. This web of reassurance comprises comprehensive arms control totally banning chemical and biological weapons, broad export monitoring and controls making acquisition of such weapons harder, broad band defensive measures against chemical and biological weapons reducing their effectiveness, and determined national and international responses ranging from diplomatic action, through sanctions to armed intervention. No single measure would suffice. Together these measures are mutually reinforcing and should lead a would-be proliferator to judge that acquisition of chemical or biological weapons is not worthwhile. Overall, my aim in writing this book is to ensure that the experience gained from the search for WMD in Iraq is set in its context and thus that the conclusions drawn from that experience are soundly based and available to all those concerned with strengthening the norm that chemical and

8 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

biological weapons are totally prohibited. My objective is to ensure that the achievements of the various inspection and verification regimes are used to maximum benefit in the future strengthening of the regimes totally prohibiting chemical and biological weapons as well as of measures to counter chemical and biological proliferation and thereby promote international security, trade and prosperity.

2 The United Nations Secretary-General Investigations in Iran and Iraq

The Iran–Iraq war This chapter examines the events during the 1980s starting with the tension between Iran and Iraq, which developed into war from 1980 to 1988, during which the United Nations Secretary-General sent a number of specialist missions to investigate the allegations made primarily by Iran and also by Iraq that chemical weapons had been used in the conflict. There has been a long tradition of border disputes between Iraq and Iran concerning their boundaries.1 A particular issue related to the use of the southern waterway, known as Shatt-al-Arab, which was a strategic access route to oil terminals for both countries. Tension mounted and in 1980 the Security Council urged ‘Iran and Iraq to refrain immediately from any further use of force and to settle their dispute by peaceful means and in conformity with principles of justice and international law’.2 However, the situation continued to deteriorate and resulted in war. In September 1980, Iraq attacked Iran in order to capture the historically-contested territory of Shatt-el-Arab. With the outbreak of war, Iraq’s chemical weapons programme was reactivated. The inability of Iraq to achieve speedy victory, and a series of successful counteroffensives by Iran in early 1981 may have been an influencing factor.3 To an increasing extent, starting in 1981, chemical weapons were used, primarily by Iraq but also by Iran. Allegations of the use of chemical weapons were made in letters from both Iran and Iraq circulated at the United Nations and Figure 2.1 demonstrates the increasing frequency of these allegations. The number of such letters increased steadily from 1983 to 1987 and 1988, the year in which Iran and Iraq agreed a cease-fire on 20 August 1988. The great majority of these letters were from Iran concerning the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iranian targets; a few were from Iraq either refuting the Iranian allegations or more rarely, alleging use of chemical weapons by Iran against Iraqi targets. The UN Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, initiated a number of investigations4 into the alleged use of chemical weapons in Iran or Iraq 9

10 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

60

Iranian letters Iraqi letters

50

Other letters

40 N u m 30 b e r 20 10 0

1982 1983 1984

1985 1986

1987 1988 1989

Year Figure 2.1

Letters on chemical weapons to the Security Council 1982–9

(see Table 2.1). These investigations were initiated following requests initially from the Government of Iran to the Secretary-General for such an investigation and later from the Government of Iraq alleging that chemical weapons had been used against Iraq. These investigations by specialists appointed by Javier Pérez de Cuéllar generally visited the scene of the alleged attack and also examined casualties from the alleged attack.

Table 2.1

UN Secretary-General investigations during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s

Date

Location

Mandate

Conclusions

21–26 May 1983

Dezful, Andimeshk, Pole-Dokhtar, Musian, Dehloran, Abadan, Khorramshahr, Hoveyzeh, Susangerd, Sar-e-Pol-e-Zahab, Qasr-i-Shirin and Baneh, Iran

‘(a) to determine whether civilian areas had been subject to damage or destruction by military means… (b) to assess the extent of such damage and destruction as far as possible; (c) to indicate, where possible, the types of munitions used.’5

Separate reports are provided for each location visited setting out the observations made by the mission. In various locations fragments from Scud-B and Frog missiles were identified as well as fragments from aerial bombs, cluster bombs and artillery shells.

The United Nations Secretary-General Investigations in Iran and Iraq 11 Table 2.1 UN Secretary-General investigations during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s – continued Date

Location

Mandate

Conclusions

28–30 May 1983

Zurbatiyah, Mandali, Khanagin, Kirkuk, AzZubayr, Al-Faw and AbuAl-Khasib, Iraq

‘(a) to determine whether civilian areas had been subject to damage or destruction by military means… (b) to assess the extent of such damage and destruction as far as possible; (c) to indicate, where possible, the types munitions used.’6

Separate reports are provided for each location visited setting out the observations made by the mission. In various BM-21 rockets locations fragments from were identified as well as fragments from large of calibre (203mm) artillery shells.

13–19 Mar 1984

Shatt-e-Ali, Iran HoorUl-Huwazeih, Iran

‘to determine, to the extent possible, whether chemical weapons had been used in Iran, and if so, the type and extent of their use.’7

‘(a) Chemical weapons in the form of aerial bombs have been used in the areas inspected in Iran …’ ‘(b) The types of chemical agents used were … mustard gas and … a nerve agent known as Tabun.’ ‘The extent to which these chemical agents have been used could not be determined within the time and resources available to us.’

1–5 Apr 1985

Hospitals in Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom

‘to examine Iranian patients hospitalized in Europe.’8

‘1. Chemical weapons were used during March 1985 in in the war between Iran and Iraq. 2. Yperite [mustard] was used, affecting Iranian soldiers. 3. The attacks were made by means of bombs dropped from aircraft, according to the statements of most patients. 4. It is possible that hydro cyanic acid was used, alone or in combination with yperite.’ [Later addendum that tabun may have been used which would explain the presence of cyanide in some organic samples]

12 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 2.1 UN Secretary-General investigations during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s – continued Date

Location

Mandate

Conclusions

26 Feb– 3 Mar 1986

2 km NE of Abadan, Iran 15 km S of Abadan, Iran 40 km from Abadan – Hadhrat Fatima (AS) Field Hospital

‘to determine, to the extent possible, whether chemical weapons had been used in the conflict between Iran and Iraq, and if so, the type, extent and circumstances of their use.’9

‘(a) In areas around Abadan inspected by the mission, chemical weapons have been used against Iranian positions by Iraqi forces; (b) Based on medical examinations and testimony of Iranian and Iraqi casualties evacuated from the Al-Faw area, chemical weapons were also used in that war zone by Iraqi forces; (c) From the evidence examined by the specialists the type of weapons used was aerial bombs; (d) The chemical used was mustard gas (yperite) (e) The extent to which mustard gas was used could not be determined within the time and resources available to us. However, from the over 700 casualties actually seen in Tehran and Ahvaz it is our impression that the use of chemical weapons in 1986 appears more extensive than in 1984.’

22–29 Apr 1987

Khorramshahr area, Iran

‘to determine, to the extent possible, whether there had been renewed use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq, and if so, the extent and circumstances of their use.’10

‘(a) In the areas around Khorramshahr, Iran, inspected by the mission, chemical weapons have been used against Iranian positions. In addition to military personnel, civilians have also been injured in these attacks. The main chemical used was mustard gas (yperite), but nerve agents have probably been used on some occasions;

The United Nations Secretary-General Investigations in Iran and Iraq 13 Table 2.1 UN Secretary-General investigations during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s – continued Date

Location

Mandate

Conclusions (b) In the area around Baneh, Iran, military personnel as well as civilians have also been injured by mustard gas, as evidenced by the medical examination of casualties and interviews with witnesses; (c) from the examination of weapon fragments found in the Khorramshahr area, chemical bombs similar to those used in 1984 and 1986 have again been used against Iranian forces, indicating their continued deployment by Iraqi forces. In addition, it is most likely that chemical rockets have also been used against this area;’

29 April– 3 May 1987

East of Basra, Iraq

‘(d) In the areas around Basra, Iraq, inspected by the mission, Iraqi forces had been affected by mustard gas and a pulmonary irritant, possibly phosgene. In the absence of conclusive evidence of the weapons used, it could not be determined how the injuries were caused. (e) The extent of the use of chemical agents could not be determined due to constraints of time and resources and to the conditions under which the mission conducted its investigations.’

14 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 2.1 UN Secretary-General investigations during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s – continued Date

Location

28–31 Mar 1988

Three hospitals in ‘to dispatch a medical speTehran, Iran Villages cialist … to investigate alo f N o w d o s h e a n d legations by each GovernNejmal, Iran ment on the use by the other of chemical weapons in the conflict between the two countries… to determine, to the extent possible, whether such weapons had been used, and, if so, the type, extent and circumstances of their use.’11

‘(a) On the basis of the clinical examinations I conducted in the Islamic Republic of Iran, I was able to determine that patients had been affected by chemical weapons. A considerable number of those affected were civilians; (b) The main aggressive cases chemical used in these was yperite (mustard gas) but an acetylcholine esteraseinhibiting substance had also been used;’

8–11 April 1988

Hospital in Baghdad, Iraq As Sulaymaniyah, Iraq

‘(c) On the basis of clinical examinations I conducted in Iraq, I was able to determine that the patients – all military personnel – had been affected by chemical weapons; (d) The aggressive chemical used in these cases was yperite (mustard gas). There were some indications that an acetylcholine esterase-inhibiting substance may also have been used in small concentrations, but there was no conclusive evidence to that effect; (e) It was not possible to make an independent determination in either of the two phases of the investigation of the extent of the use of chemical warfare agents and the means by which the chemical agents had been delivered;’

‘

Mandate

Conclusions

The United Nations Secretary-General Investigations in Iran and Iraq 15 Table 2.1 UN Secretary-General investigations during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s – continued Date

Location

Mandate

Conclusions (f) Testimony furnished by the patients I examined in both countries regarding the dates on which they had suffered the effects of chemical weapons was generally consistent with the findings of my medical investigation.’

1–5 July 1988

40 km SW of Ahvaz, Iran

‘to dispatch a mission to … Iran … to investigate allegations by its Government of the use by Iraqi conflict between that country and Iraq … to determine, to the extent possible, whether such weapons had been used, and, if so, the type, extent and circumstances of their use.’12

‘(a) On the basis of the clinical examinations we conducted in the Islamic Republic of Iran, we were able to determine that patients had forces of chemical weapons in the been affected by chemical weapons; (b) The aggressive chemicals used in these cases were yperite (mustard gas) and an acetylcholine esterase-inhibiting substance; (c) In the Hamid area southwest of Ahvaz, inspected by the mission, chemical analysis of soil samples and weapon fragments showed that chemical weapons had been used against Iranian positions. The chemical agent present was mustard gas (yperite); (d) From the examination of weapon fragments it can be concluded that bombs similar to those used in 1984, 1986 and 1987 have again been used against Iranian forces on Iranian territory, indicating their repeated utilization by Iraqi forces;

16 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 2.1 UN Secretary-General investigations during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s – continued Date

Location

Mandate

Conclusions (e) While it has not been pos sible, owing to constraints of time and resources, to make a precise determination of the extent of use of chemical warfare agents, the findings of the present mission together with those of preceding missions support the conclusion that such use has become more intense and frequent.’

9–11 July 1988

As Sulaymaniyah, Iraq Tariq military camp, Baghdad, Iraq

‘to dispatch a mission to Iraq to investigate allegations by its Government of the use by Iranian forces of chemical weapons in the conflict between that country and … Iran … to determine, to the extent possible, whether such weapons had been used, and, if so, the type, extent and circumstances of their use.’13

‘(a) On the basis of the clinical examinations of nine Iraqi soldiers, we were able to determine conclusively that their injuries had been caused by yperite (mustard gas); (b) In an examination of fragments of mortar grenades found after an alleged Iranian attack in As Sulaymaniyah, these fragments were confirmed to contain yperite (mustard gas); (c) The CAM gave positive indication of the presence of a blister agent in the crates where grenades, said to have been captured from Iranian forces at Salamcha, east of Basra, were kept, but the analysis of the liquid samples from one of them could not confirm the presence of any chemical warfare agent; (d) The examination of mortar ammunition claimed to have been captured from Iranian forces confirmed that they were 81mm mortar grenades, designed to be filled

The United Nations Secretary-General Investigations in Iran and Iraq 17 Table 2.1 UN Secretary-General investigations during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s – continued Date

Location

Mandate

Conclusions with solid or liquid material, which could include chemical warfare agents. It should also be noted that 81mm grenades can be fired with 82mm mortars; (e) On the basis of the present investigation, the number of casualties and the extent of their injuries seemed less extensive than in previous investigations.’

12–14 Aug 1988

Oshnaviyeh, about ‘to dispatch a mission to … 65 km south of Oro- Iran … to investigate allegaumiyeh, Iran tions by its Government of the use by Iraqi forces of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq … to determine, to the extent possible, whether such weapons had been used, and, if so, the type, extent and circumstances of their use.’14

‘(a) Clinical examinations conducted in Oroumiyeh showed that patients had been affected by chemical attack, the symptoms of which are characteristic of mustard gas; (b) The results of the chemical analyses confirmed the presence of mustard gas in the area of the attack; (c) From the examination of a bottom plate and several splinters present in the area, it can be concluded that bombs similar to those found in 1984, 1986, 1987 and 1988 have been used against Iranian civilians, indicating their utilization during an Iraqi air attack on Oshnaviyeh.’

Although the intent was to use the same specialists for all these investigations of the alleged use of chemical weapons, the team composition varied (see Table 2.2).

18 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 2.2 1980s

Composition of investigation teams during the Iran–Iraq war in the

Date

Investigation Team Members

21–26 May and

Brigadier General Timothy K. Dibuana, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General

28–30 May 1983

Iqbal Riza, Office of Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs Dr Ake Persson, Swedish National Defence Research Institute, Sweden Lt Col Bertil Mattsson, Swedish Army, Sweden

13–19 Mar 1984

Dr Gustav Andersson, Umea, Sweden Dr Manuel Dominguez, Madrid, Spain Dr Peter Dunn, Melbourne, Australia Col Ulrich Imobersteg, Spiez, Switzerland

1–5 April 1984

Dr Manuel Dominguez, Madrid, Spain

26 Feb–3 Mar 1986

Dr Gustav Andersson, Umea, Sweden Dr Manuel Dominguez, Madrid, Spain Dr Peter Dunn, Melbourne, Australia Col Ulrich Imobersteg, Spiez, Switzerland [in Switzerland, not in Iran]

22–29 April 1987

Dr Gustav Andersson, Umea, Sweden

29 April–3 May 1987

Dr Manuel Dominguez, Madrid, Spain Dr Peter Dunn, Melbourne, Australia Col Ulrich Imobersteg, Spiez, Switzerland

28–31 Mar 1988 8–11 April 1988

Dr Manuel Dominguez, Madrid, Spain

1–5 July 1988

Dr Erik Dahlgren, Umea, Sweden (alternate to Dr Andersson) Dr Manuel Dominguez, Madrid, Spain

9–11 July 1988

Dr Erik Dahlgren, Umea, Sweden (alternate to Dr Andersson) Dr Manuel Dominguez, Madrid, Spain

12–14 Aug 1988

Dr Erik Dahlgren, Umea, Sweden (alternate to Dr Andersson) Col Ulrich Imobersteg, Spiez, Switzerland Dr A. N. P. van Heijst, Bosch en Duin, Netherlands (in lieu of Dr Manuel Dominguez)

There was a series of UN Security Council Resolutions and Presidential statements calling for cease-fires and a series of reports of investigations into the alleged use of chemical weapons by specialists appointed by the Secretary-General (see Table 2.3).

The United Nations Secretary-General Investigations in Iran and Iraq 19 Table 2.3 Security Council Resolutions and statements during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s Date

Event

28 Sept 1980

SCR 479 (1980) calling on Iraq and Iran to refrain from any further use of force.15

12 July 1982

SCR 487 (1981) ‘deeply concerned about the prolongation of the conflict between the two countries, resulting in heavy losses of human lives and considerable material damage and endangering of peace and security’ and called for a cease-fire and an immediate end to all military operations.16

4 Oct 1982

SCR 522 (1982) urgently called again for an immediate cease-fire and an end to all military operations.17

31 Oct 1983

SCR 540 (1983) deplored ‘once again the conflict between the two countries, resulting in heavy losses of civilian lives and extensive damage caused to cities, property and economic infrastructures’.18 The resolution condemned all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949 in all their aspects, and called for the immediate cessation of all military operations against civilian targets, including city and residential areas.

30 Mar 1984

Security Council considered the report of specialists appointed by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations by Iran that chemical weapons had been used.19 Specialists concluded that ‘chemical weapons in the form of aerial bombs have been used’ and that ‘the types of chemical agents used were … mustard gas and … a nerve agent known as tabun.’ The President of the Security Council strongly condemned the use of chemical weapons.20 The statement although referring to the allegation by Iran did not specifically name Iraq as the state using chemical weapons.

25 Apr 1985

Security Council considered the report of a further investigation into an allegation of use of chemical weapons.21 The specialist concluded that ‘chemical weapons were used during March 1985 in the war between Iran and Iraq; mustard was used, affecting Iranian soldiers; the attacks were made by means of bombs dropped from aircraft, … it is possible that hydrocyanic gas was used, alone or in combination with yperite.’ The President of the Security Council said that ‘the Security Council … are appalled that chemical weapons have been used against Iranian soldiers during the month of March 1985.’ [Emphasis added]22

24 Feb 1986

SCR 582 (1986) deplored ‘the escalation of the conflict, … and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol.’ [Emphasis added].23

21 Mar 1986

Security Council considered a further report on the alleged use of chemical weapons.24 The specialists concluded that ‘On many

20 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 2.3 Security Council resolutions and statements during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s – continued Date

Event occasions, Iraqi forces have used chemical weapons against Iranian forces.’ and that ‘the agents used have mainly been mustard gas although on some occasions nerve gas was also employed.’ The President stated that the Council were ‘Profoundly concerned by the unanimous conclusion of the specialists that chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian forces, most recently in the course of the Iranian offensive into Iraqi territory, the members of the Council strongly condemn this use of chemical weapons in clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons.’ [Emphasis added].25

8 Oct 1986

SCR 588 (1986) called26 upon Iran and Iraq to implement fully and without delay Resolution 582 (1986) which had deplored inter alia ‘in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol.’

14 May 1987

Security Council considered another report of the alleged use of chemical weapons.27 The specialists concluded that ‘There has been repeated use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces, employing aerial bombs and very probably rockets. The chemical agents used are mustard gas (yperite) and probably, on some occasions, nerve agents’ and ‘a new dimension is that civilians in Iran also have been injured by chemical weapons’ and that ‘Iraqi military personnel sustained injuries from chemical warfare agents, which are mustard gas (yperite) and a pulmonary irritant, possibly phosgene.’ The President said28 that the Council was ‘deeply dismayed by the unanimous conclusions of the specialists that there has been repeated use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces, that civilians in Iran also have been injured by chemical weapons, and that Iraqi military personnel have sustained injuries from chemical warfare agents they again strongly condemn the repeated use of chemical weapons in open violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in which the use of chemical weapons in war is clearly prohibited.’ [Emphasis added].

20 July 1987

SCR 598 (1987) deplored, ‘in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol’ and demanded that Iran and Iraq observe an immediate cease-fire and discontinue all military actions.29

9 May 1988

Security Council considered another report of the alleged use of chemical weapons.30 The specialist had concluded that chemical weapons had again been used in both Iran and Iraq. SCR 612 (1988) condemned vigorously the continued use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq contrary to the obligations under the Geneva Protocol and expected both sides

The United Nations Secretary-General Investigations in Iran and Iraq 21 Table 2.3 Security Council resolutions and statements during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s – continued Date

Event to refrain from the future use of chemical weapons in accordance with their obligations under the Geneva Protocol.31 The resolution called upon ‘all states to continue to apply or to establish strict control of the export to the parties to the conflict of chemical products serving for the production of chemical weapons.’

26 Aug 1988

Security Council considered reports of three missions investigating the alleged use of chemical weapons.32,33,34 The specialists had concluded that chemical weapons casualties were observed in both Iran and Iraq. SCR 620 (1988) condemned the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq in violation of the Geneva Protocol and called upon ‘all states to continue to apply, to establish or to strengthen strict control of the export of chemical products serving for the production of chemical weapons, in particular to parties to a conflict, when it is established or when there is substantial reason to believe that they have used chemical weapons in violation of international obligations.’35

It is thus clear that although chemical weapons were used in the war between Iran and Iraq, the Security Council took no action other than exhorting the two sides to desist and, in the latter years of the conflict, encouraging states not to export chemicals to either Iraq or Iran which might be used to produce chemical weapons.36 This call for chemicals not to be exported had followed the creation of the Australia Group37 by a group of like-minded countries who sought to harmonize their export controls. Apart from this action to harmonize export controls, there was little concerted international action to bring the war to an end or to prevent the use of chemical weapons.

The lessons of the Iran–Iraq war There has been widespread interest in the way in which chemical weapons were used in the Iran–Iraq war. Some commentators have questioned the effectiveness of the chemical combat arguing that chemical weapons proved no more decisive than when they were used in World War I and suggesting that they had a minimal impact on the course of the Iran–Iraq war largely because of the minimal number of casualties inflicted. However, others have maintained that the use of gas helped to contain the Iranian counter-offensive in 1984 and that it contributed to the subsequent breakthroughs on the Fao peninsula. Others agree that breakthroughs were regularly achieved after

22 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

chemical weapons were used in preparatory attacks as the initial stages in the Iraqi major offensives in the later stages of the war. There is evidence in the reports of the UN investigations that the chemical weapon attacks contributed to the demoralization of the Iranian forces. The effectiveness of chemical weapons cannot be measured solely in respect of the numbers of casualties; they can also have a significant effect through denying terrain and through deterring or demoralizing an enemy force. Just because they apparently failed to cause decisive breakthroughs, does not mean they were not effective weapons; moreover, in this war chemical weapons appear to have been used primarily in a defensive role. How useful chemical weapons were in this role and as instruments of terror is debateable, but Iraq undoubtedly perceived that chemical weapons were worthy of further investment. During the war Iraq substantially augmented her capabilities, improved methods of employment, and used chemical weapons much more extensively in the later stages of the conflict. Iraq’s declarations in recent years show that some 105,000 munitions were supplied to the Iraqi armed forces during the 1981–8 war and of these some 100,000 munitions filled with about 3,000 tons of chemical warfare agents were used in combat.38 Furthermore, Iraq continued to use chemical weapons despite the findings of the UN specialist reports and the condemnation of the Security Council. By 1988 it is reported that Iraqi spokesmen were admitting that Iraqi forces had used chemical weapons against Iran and in Kurdistan. Finally, despite these admissions and the widespread condemnation of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, Iraq did not incur any significant political penalty, possibly because states feared that it might prove counter productive. The absence of adverse political repercussions clearly undermined the credibility of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It was also evident that Iraq would not have felt that it should not resort to chemical weapons again should it decide to do so.

Inspection, verification and non-proliferation The experience gained from the UN Secretary-General investigations into the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s and the ensuing UN resolutions enable a number of lessons to be drawn in regard to inspection, verification and non-proliferation. Inspections The investigations were carried out by teams of experts on behalf of the UN Secretary-General. Members of the investigation team were selected by the UN Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and, in these investigations were individuals from four countries: Australia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.39 It is understood that about ten technically-competent, mid-level nations were approached and the four countries mentioned accepted the invitation to participate. In considering why these coun-

The United Nations Secretary-General Investigations in Iran and Iraq 23

tries were chosen, it needs to be recalled that in the 1980s the Cold War was still intense and both Sweden and Switzerland were seen as neutral states. It was also evident that the Secretary-General specifically requested that the same team should be used to make the investigations in order to provide continuity and credibility. Although this was the aim, the participants varied and the number was reduced on occasion because of the lack of availability of individuals. There was no prior training of the inspectors and no Chief Inspector was designated. The formats of the investigation reports whilst frequently similar varied depending on the participating individuals. The investigations could only be undertaken with the full cooperation of the state being inspected – and it needs to be recalled that they were on every occasion visiting the state which had invited the UN SecretaryGeneral to send an investigation team. Although the mandate for the inspection teams was drawn widely – to determine whether chemical weapons had been used … and, if so, the type and extent of their use – the locations visited were determined by the inspected state, which was generally Iran and occasionally Iraq. The inspected state organized the programme for the visiting mission to various hospitals and to the war zone as well as to see displays of recovered weapons. There was rarely inspection of locations or related facilities selected by the inspectors. Furthermore, the duration of the inspections was limited and predetermined. In general, the inspectors were allowed into the inspected state for less than one week at a time. These inspections were essentially ad hoc carried out by experts from four countries who learnt on the job. They were inspections that were made at the invitation of the inspected state to examine evidence that was presented by the inspected state. It should be noted that the team on the first visit to Iran in 1984 made it clear that the team all had a strong resolve to act in a technically competent and completely impartial manner. Iran pledged full support to the mission and also assured the team that they could photograph anything they wished throughout. It was also evident that the team were welcome to take any item with them that they wanted whether this was samples of agent or of metal components from inspected weapons. It is clear that the team was heavily guarded throughout and that armed escorts were provided when traveling by road or in the war zone. During the visit to Iraq in 1987 it was noted by the team that at no time was Iran named as being the aggressor in the alleged chemical attacks against Iraq nor was the team asked about their visit to Iran during the preceding week. In contrast, during the visits to Iran it was evident at least from slogans erected by the Iranians that Iraq and Saddam Hussein were regarded as the chemical aggressor. It was also noted that the team was not hindered in their duties in Iraq by media coverage which was very different from the persistent media coverage that the team received in Iran. This was to be a far cry from the inspections carried out in the next decade by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC in an inspection regime imposed upon Iraq.

24 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

Verification The investigations were limited to the examination of locations, materials and casualties offered by the inspected state. The investigation team was consequently limited to determining whether the evidence presented by the inspected state was consistent with the allegation made by the inspected state that chemical weapons had been used against it. Samples were generally taken in triplicate, with one sample being analyzed at the Swedish NBC Defence Laboratory at Umea and the second sample analyzed at the Swiss AC Laboratory at Spiez. Results at these two laboratories were similar and the third sample did not therefore need to be analyzed. However, the detailed procedures used in the two laboratories were different and no mention is made in the reports of control or blank samples. The difficulties of using a single laboratory is evident in the investigation of Iranian patients hospitalized in Europe when samples analyzed by Professor Heyndrickx at a single laboratory, which was not identified in the UN report, presented difficulties in interpretation and the issuing of an addenda to the investigation report. The methods used for sampling and analysis in the 1980s are in marked contrast to those used today by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons which uses validated analytical procedures in accredited laboratories evaluated by round robin testing using unknown samples. Verification was limited in these investigations to whether the evidence provided by the inspected state was consistent with the allegation that chemical weapons had been used against it. Sampling and analysis was carried out using, in most cases, two laboratories in different countries. Again, verification was very different from that which was carried out subsequently by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC in Iraq which sought to validate declarations made by Iraq and to achieve material balances for the agents and weapons. Non-proliferation The outcome of these investigations showed that chemical weapons had been used in the areas inspected during the Iraq–Iran war and that the extent of their use increased over time. This led to Security Council Resolutions and statements denouncing the use of chemical weapons in the Iraq–Iran war and emphatically demanding that the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol be strictly respected and observed. The increased international awareness of the use of chemical weapons provided additional impetus to the ongoing negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In addition, the use of CW in the Iran–Iraq war led to the creation40 in 1985 of the Australia Group by a group of like-minded states which sought to harmonize their export controls on chemicals and precursors. It is to be noted that the subsequent Security Council Resolutions on Iran–Iraq such as SCR 612 (1988) of 9 May 1988 included language that ‘Condemns vigorously the continued use of chemical weapons in the

The United Nations Secretary-General Investigations in Iran and Iraq 25

conflict between … Iran and Iraq contrary to the obligations under the Geneva Protocol’ and also ‘Calls upon all States to continue to apply or to establish strict control of the export to the parties to the conflict of chemical products serving for the production of chemical weapons.’ In a later resolution, SCR 620 (1988) of August 1988, this call is broadened to apply to any parties believed to have used CW in a conflict by language that ‘Calls upon all States to continue to apply, to establish or to strengthen strict control of chemical products serving for the production of chemical weapons, in particular to parties in a conflict, when it is established or when there is substantial reason to believe that they have used chemical weapons in violation of international obligations.’ The same resolution also encourages the UN Secretary-General ‘to carry out promptly investigations in response to allegations brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxic weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law, in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report the results.’ This resolution coupled with earlier resolutions in the General Assembly such as A/Res/42/37C adopted41 in 1987 requested the Secretary-General to conduct investigations in the alleged use of chemical and biological weapons in response to reports brought to his attention by Member States, as well as: …with the assistance of qualified experts provided by interested Member States, to develop further technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of such reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons which led to the issue of a report42 A/44/561 on 4 October 1989 setting out procedures and guidelines for the investigation of the possible use of chemical and biological weapons. These were subsequently endorsed43 by the General Assembly in A/Res/45/57C on 4 December 1990. These procedures had not subsequently been revised or updated by the end of 2004 – nor had they been used in any such investigation by the Secretary-General. The overall impact on non-proliferation was relatively modest with an impetus being given to the ongoing negotiations in Geneva to conclude the Chemical Weapons Convention which eventually led to the Convention being opened for signature in January 2003. It also served as the impetus to establish the Australia Group by a group of like-minded states which sought to harmonize their export controls on chemicals and precursors, and subsequently on biological agents and related technology. And, finally, it led to the issue of the UN Secretary-General’s procedures and guidelines for the investigation of the possible use of chemical and biological weapons.

3 The Decade of UNSCOM

This chapter starts with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990 which led to a coalition facing Iraq and using ‘all necessary means’ in accordance with SCR 678 (1990) first to wage the air war and then the ground war which was followed by the cease-fire SCR 687 (1991) adopted on 3 April 1991. It then examines the work of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq established by SCR 687 (1991) during the decade from 1991 to 2000. Unsurprisingly, the chapter draws from my earlier book,1 The UNSCOM Saga, which examined UNSCOM in some detail.

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq The territorial dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, like that between Iraq and Iran, had its origins in the history of the region during the Ottoman Empire. Between February and July 1990 Iraq advanced several political, territorial and financial claims against Kuwait and then, in the latter part of July, Iraq deployed military forces along its border with Kuwait. On 2 August at 1.00 am local time, Iraqi troops crossed the international frontier and began their invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Although the international community was not expecting such an invasion, within hours of the initial reports of Iraq’s invasion, the Security Council convened and unanimously adopted SCR 660 (1990)2 condemning the invasion, and demanding that Iraq immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its forces. Each of the P5 voiced strong opposition to the invasion3 and stressed the need for negotiation. Four days later, SCR 661 (1990) imposed 4 comprehensive mandatory sanctions on Iraq except for medical supplies and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs. These sanctions required all states to prevent import into their countries of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and to prevent the supply of any commodities or products other than the exceptions mentioned above. 26

The Decade of UNSCOM 27

When Iraq showed no intention to withdraw from Kuwait or otherwise comply with SCR 660 (1990) and 661 (1990), further resolutions were adopted. This included in November 1990 the adoption of SCR 678 (1990)5 which contained an ultimatum for Iraq. In its first paragraph the Council decided to allow Iraq ‘one final opportunity, as a cause of goodwill’ to fully implement on or before 15 January 1991 SCR 660 (1990) and all subsequent resolutions. Should Iraq fail to do so the Council said in the second paragraph, the Member States cooperating with the government of Kuwait were authorized ‘to use all necessary means’ – words understood to mean military force – to uphold and implement the resolutions and to ‘restore international peace and security in the area’. This was only the fourth time in the United Nations history that the Security Council had decided to authorize Member States to use military force – the previous occasions had been in 1950 in relation to the Korean situation, in 1966 when the UK was authorized to intercept tankers carrying oil to Southern Rhodesia and in 1990 in the authorization of measures to enforce the sanctions imposed on Iraq in SCR 665 (1990). The 45 day period between the adoption of SCR 678 (1990) and the deadline for Iraqi compliance saw a number of initiatives aimed at averting an outbreak of war. On 9 January 1991, the US Secretary of State, James Baker, and Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, held six hours of talks in Geneva. The meeting did not make any headway and the subsequent mission by the UN Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to Iraq in the days that followed was carried out amid dim prospects for a diplomatic breakthrough. Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz on 12 January and with President Saddam Hussein on 13 January 1991, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar urged full compliance with the relevant Security Council Resolutions. President Hussein reiterated his country’s positions on various issues, including its claims to Kuwait and its call for an Arab solution to the crisis and reaffirmed the linkage Iraq had made between the Iraq–Kuwait situation and other Middle East questions such as the Arab–Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issues. Returning to New York just before the 15 January deadline, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar stated that the talks in Iraq had been polite but unfortunately unsuccessful. On 15 January 1991, the international coalition under the leadership of President George H. W. Bush of the United States had amassed approximately 680,000 troops in the Gulf of which some 410,000 were from the US. Estimates of the number of Iraqi troops in occupied Kuwait ranged from 300,000 to 600,000. In a statement that day, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar noted that the ‘world stands poised between peace and war’ and he appealed to President Hussein ‘to turn the course of events away from catastrophe and towards a new era of justice and harmony based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ The Secretary-General also said that if Iraq signified its readiness to comply with the Security Council

28 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

Resolutions and took clear and substantial steps to implement them, a just peace would follow. On 17 January 1991, the United States reported6 the launching of the military offensive against Iraq, stating that further delay would only have prolonged the suffering of the Kuwaiti people and increased the risk to coalition military forces. The stated aim of the military action was ‘the liberation of Kuwait, not the destruction, occupation or dismemberment of Iraq. They are directed strictly at military and strategic targets and every effort has been made to minimize civilian casualties.’ During the initial six week air campaign, the coalition targeted Iraq’s air defence system, communications infrastructure, electricity delivery grid, military production and storage facilities and the bridges and supply lines running between the north and south of the country. With these damaged, disrupted or destroyed, coalition forces isolated the Kuwaiti theatre of operations and effectively achieved control of the air space over Iraq and Kuwait. However, Iraq launched dozens of surface to surface Scud missiles over the course of the Gulf war, mostly against Saudi Arabia and Israel, but also against Bahrain and Qatar. On 24 February 1991 at 4.00 am local time, coalition forces launched ground operations, moving hundreds of tanks and tens of thousands of troops from positions in Saudi Arabia into Iraq and Kuwait. Kuwait was liberated on 27 February 1991. On that day at 9.00 pm, Eastern Standard Time (EST), the United States announced that the coalition would suspend offensive combat operations as of midnight, EST. President Bush said that ‘The war is now behind us’ and that ‘Ahead of us is the difficult task of securing a potentially historic peace.’ With Iraq’s military routed from Kuwait, the Security Council awaited Iraq’s diplomatic response. That same day, Iraq said it would comply fully with SCR 660 (1990) and, subject to some conditions, with SCR 662 (1990) and 674 (1990). Iraq also said that its armed forces had started to withdraw to the positions they had held prior to 1 August 1990, and promised to release all prisoners of war immediately after a cease-fire was concluded. Later on 27 February 1991, Iraq informed the Council that all Iraqi forces had withdrawn from Kuwait. Offensive combat operations were suspended as scheduled at midnight EST on 27–8 February 1991. The Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, said that ‘We hope it is the beginning of the end of this terrible tragedy’. On the same day, 27 February, Iraq stated7 officially that it agreed to comply fully with SCR 660 (1990) and all the other Council resolutions. With this notification, the Security Council embarked on a month of intensive diplomatic consultations on the terms of a permanent cease-fire and other post-war arrangements. On 2 March 1991, the Security Council adopted SCR 686 (1991)8 which brought a provisional end to hostilities and reaffirmed that all 12 resolutions concerning the Iraq–Kuwait situation continued to have full force

The Decade of UNSCOM 29

and effect and set out a number of obligations for immediate implementation by Iraq. Paragraph 4 explicitly recognized that during the period required for Iraq to comply with the resolution’s demands, the provisions of SCR 678 (1990) authorizing Member States to use ‘all necessary means’ would ‘remain valid’. The following day, Iraq agreed to fulfil its obligations under SCR 686 (1991). The members of the Security Council began consultations aimed at agreeing a resolution setting the terms for a definitive cease-fire. The P5 members in their statements following the vote on SCR 686 (1991) noted that the United Nations faced a prodigious undertaking in shouldering its post-conflict responsibilities and that the international community had entered the most difficult and most important phase of the crisis. The definitive cease-fire resolution, SCR 687 (1991), drafted during the month of negotiations following the successful liberation of Kuwait, and adopted9 on 3 April 1991, was the fourteenth adopted by the Security Council in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait – see Appendix I. The 34 operative paragraphs of the resolution were divided into 9 parts and set out in great detail the terms for a formal cease-fire to end the conflict and restore security and stability to the area. Of particular relevance in respect of weapons of mass destruction was Section C which decreed that Iraq was to eliminate, under international supervision, its chemical and biological weapons stockpiles and its ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km. Section C requires the formation of a Special Commission – UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) – to implement these requirements. Iraq was to submit within 15 days a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of such weapons. Furthermore, a plan was required to ensure the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with the ban on these weapons and missiles. The prime responsibility for Iraq’s nuclear weapons rested with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Hans Blix, with the assistance and cooperation of UNSCOM.

The work of UNSCOM In the years between the end of the Gulf war in April 1991 and the end of UNSCOM’s operations in Iraq in 1998, there were significant developments both in the consideration of the situation in Iraq by the United Nations and in international non-proliferation regimes. UNSCOM was originally expected to complete its task within some three months because of the oil embargo and assuming that Iraq would cooperate fully by making full and complete disclosures of its proscribed weapons programmes and providing its remaining proscribed weapons and associated equipment for destruction under the supervision of UNSCOM. In the event, it became all too clear

30 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

within two months that Iraq was not cooperating and throughout the following years the Security Council necessarily had to address the situation in Iraq at rather frequent intervals. Although there was an early reluctant acceptance by Iraq of SCR 687 (1991) and of the privileges and responsibilities of UNSCOM and the IAEA, Iraq continually denied access or refused to provide the required information, which resulted in additional resolutions or statements from the Security Council admonishing Iraq and stressing the necessity of compliance with the requirements of the relevant resolutions. During the latter half of the 1990s it became clear that Saddam Hussein had not taken the political decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction – at least not publicly – and that Iraq had deliberately sought to conceal its capabilities thereby prolonging and making the work of UNSCOM and the IAEA very much more difficult. The overall success of UNSCOM through its dogged persistence in the face of so much outright obstruction by Iraq was all the greater. Indeed as UNSCOM acquired information and evidence of Iraq’s proscribed programmes, the shortcomings in the information provided by Iraq have become ever more compelling – and the obstructions introduced by Iraq yet more blatant. In the following account of UNSCOM’s work in Iraq, I draw on the reports that UNSCOM made to the Security Council. There were essentially two main series of six monthly reports: the first being reports on disarmament and destruction of Iraqi WMD and the second being reports on ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV). As might be expected, there was some overlap between the material reported in these two series which were eventually amalgamated into a single series of six monthly reports in 1996 following adoption of SCR 1051 (1996). In addition, other reports were made intermittently on particular events or high level visits to Baghdad. The chapter ends by examining what conclusions can be drawn from the UNSCOM experience in regard to inspection, verification and non-proliferation.

The establishment of UNSCOM and the initial inspections (1991) On 3 April 1991 the Security Council adopted Resolution 687 (1991) (see Appendix I) establishing detailed measures for a cease-fire which included several elements: deployment of a UN observer unit; arrangements for demarcating the Iraq–Kuwait border; the removal or destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and measures to prevent their reconstruction, under the supervision of a special commission (UNSCOM) and the Director General of the IAEA; and creation of a compensation fund to cover direct loss and damage resulting from Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

The Decade of UNSCOM 31

In considering inspection, verification and non-proliferation, these can be regarded as follows: the declarations made by Iraq and the inspections carried out by UNSCOM are relevant to inspection; the validation of the declarations and the supervised destruction of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction relate to verification; and the ongoing monitoring and verification plan relates to non-proliferation. Iraqi acceptance of SCR 687 (1991) The next day, 4 April 1991, Iraq ‘welcomed the adoption of this resolution … and that we undertake … scrupulously to comply with all its provisions and to cooperate with you with a view to ensuring its implementation.’10 However, two days later Iraq stated11 that it ‘has no choice but to accept this resolution.’ In respect of chemical and biological weapons, the letter stated that: Iraq’s position with regard to the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons is clear. It is indeed a party to the protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, signed at Geneva in 1925. In a statement issued in September 1988, Iraq reiterated its attachment and adherence to the provisions of that protocol. It also participated in the conference of State Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other interested states, held at Paris from 7–11 January 1989 and signed the declaration issued by the participating states. On that occasion, Iraq took a position which was unanimously shared by all the Arab countries, namely that all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, must be eliminated from the Middle East region. and went on to say that: Whereas the Resolution emphasises the importance of all states adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, of a Convention on the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons being drafted and of universal adherence thereto, it makes no mention whatsoever of the importance of universal adherence to the convention banning nuclear weapons or of the drafting of a convention on a universal prohibition of such weapons in the region. Five days later the President of the Security Council wrote12 to Iraq noting that Iraq’s letter had contained official notice of the irrevocable acceptance, without qualifying conditions, by Iraq of SCR 687 (1991), and hence that the cease-fire was therefore effective.

32 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

Setting-up of UNSCOM Two weeks later, the Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, reported13 on the setting up of a Special Commission (UNSCOM) which was to be an efficient and effective executive body with an Executive Chairman and a Deputy. Planning and operational direction would be carried out by five groups, each under a head with appropriate executive experience in the assigned field and each consisting of a small number of experts. The major areas of responsibility would be: biological and chemical weapons; ballistic missiles; nuclear weapons capabilities; future compliance; and operations support. Consequently the formal membership of UNSCOM would be about 20–25 persons. Although the specific timing of its activities had yet to be determined, most of the functions related to disarmament and thus the removal or destruction of Iraq’s proscribed programmes and were timelimited. When the tasks entrusted to four of the five groups were complete, those four groups would cease to exist. The fifth group would continue in order to carry out future compliance. UNSCOM would be assisted by a number of technical experts serving as inspectors, disposal teams and field support officers. These experts would be either specially engaged for this purpose or made available to UNSCOM by Member States. Their total number could only be fully assessed after the baseline field inspections had been completed. It was likely that the personnel involved would number in the several hundreds. Interestingly, the Secretary-General noted that the baseline field inspections and the subsequent implementation plan were predicated on full cooperation by the Iraqi authorities. UNSCOM would enjoy the relevant privileges and immunities provided for in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Members of UNSCOM, experts attached to it and other specialists assigned to assist it in the implementation of Section C of SCR 687 (1991) would be regarded as experts on mission within the meaning of Article 6 of this Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. On the following day, 19 April 1991, the plan was approved, and Rolf Ekeus of Sweden was appointed Executive Chairman. Special Commission Plan A month later, on 17 May 1991, a plan was submitted14 for immediate onsite inspections and for destruction, removal or the rendering harmless of relevant weapons and facilities. Twenty one experts had been appointed as members of UNSCOM; Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of Sweden had been asked to serve as its Executive Chairman and Dr Robert Gallucci of the United States as its Deputy Executive Chairman. The other members of UNSCOM were also identified and appointed; these were Dr Paal Aas (Norway), Lt Gen (Ret) Ken Adachi (Japan), Professor B. N. C. Agu (Nigeria),

The Decade of UNSCOM 33

Lt Col Andrzej Badek (Poland), Professor Bryan C. Barrass (UK), Mr Peter von Butler (Germany), Col Armando Caputo (Italy), Mr Ronald Cleminson (Canada), Dr John Gee (Australia), Professor Helmut Honig (Austria), Mr B. A. Kuvshinnikov (USSR), Dr A. J. J. Ooms (Netherlands), Dr Marjatta Rautio (Finland), Mr Michel Saint Mleux (France), Mr Roberto Sanchez (Venezuela), Lt Col B. Simandjuntak (Indonesia), Dr Miroslav Splino (Czechoslovakia), Mr Emile Vanden Bemden (Belgium), Dr Yuan Renfeng (China). The general concept was for UNSCOM to have a small staff at UN headquarters in New York to prepare detailed plans for field operations in Iraq for chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles related items, and, together with IAEA, for nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons usable materials. Iraq was responsible for providing information within 15 days of the adoption of SCR 687 (1991) on the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in that resolution which are to be destroyed, removed or rendered harmless. On 18 and 28 April and 4 May 1991 Iraq provided information relating to its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles and also accepted on-site inspections. The practical problems inherent in the destruction of chemical weapons, including possible safety and environmental hazards, were noted.15 Consequently UNSCOM, in consultation with WHO, focused its attention on determining the best methods for their disposal. Taking into account the paramount importance of maintaining acceptable safety standards for the disposal teams and for the local population, UNSCOM would identify and evaluate safe destruction techniques that could be made operable within stringent time frames. In the area of biological weapons, the report noted that Iraq had deposited its instrument of ratification in Moscow on 8 April 1991 and had thereby become a party to the BTWC. The following day, 18 May 1991, Iraq accepted the status agreement detailing the facilities, immunities and privileges to be afforded to UNSCOM and the IAEA in implementing their mandates. A month later, on 17 June 1991, the plan was approved16 confirming that UNSCOM had the authority to conduct activities under Section C of SCR 687 (1991) for the purpose of the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the items specified and determined that Iraq shall be liable for the full costs of carrying out the tasks authorized by Section C. First Iraqi access denials Less than three months after the adoption of SCR 687 (1991), Iraq for the first time obstructed the work of UNSCOM and the IAEA. This was to be the first of many such obstructions; those in 1991 are summarized in Table 3.1.

34 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 3.1

First Iraqi obstructions during 1991

Date

Event

Result

23 June 1991

Iraq obstructed the access of the inspection team on 23, 25 and 28 June 1991 to two sites; on the 28 June 1991 incident, small arms shots were fired by Iraqi personnel.

The Security Council stated17 on 28 June 1991 that ‘all these incidents constituted flagrant violations of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).’

5 July 1991

High level mission of Hans Blix, Rolf Ekeus and Yasushi Akashi (UN Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs) sent to Iraq to convey the urgent demand for unequivocal assurances that Iraq would ensure that no hindrances were placed in the way of UNSCOM.

SCR 707 (1991)18 on 15 November 1991 took note with dismay of the report19 of the high level mission and expressed grave concern at subsequent ‘statements and findings that Iraq’s notifications of 18 and 28 April 1991 were incomplete and that it had concealed activities, which both constituted material breaches of its obligations under Resolution 687 (1991).’ SCR 707 (1991) further condemned ‘Iraq’s serious violation of a number of its obligations under Section C of Resolution 687 (1991)…which constitutes a material breach of the relevant provisions of that Resolution which established a cease-fire.’ The Security Council demanded that Iraq: ‘a. Provide without further delay, full, final and complete disclosure … of all aspects of its programme to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, …; b. Allow the Special Commission, the International Atomic Energy Agency and their inspection teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect; c. Cease immediately any attempt to conceal, move or destroy any material or equipment relating to its nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or ballistic missile programmes, or material equipment

The Decade of UNSCOM 35 Table 3.1

First Iraqi obstructions during 1991 – continued

Date

Event

Result relating to its other nuclear activities, without notification to and prior consent of the Special Commission.’ Iraq wrote20,21 expressing its objections to SCR 707 (1991).

18 Aug 1991

Iraq provided strong opposition to the third ballistic missile inspection of Iraqi facilities, while carrying out an inventory of dual-capability equipment. In the fourth ballistic missile inspection on 6–13 September 1991, Iraq denied UNSCOM inspection teams the use of UN helicopters. Later, on 21–30 September 1991, the sixth IAEA team was detained in a parking lot for four days after having found documentation describing progress made in Iraq’s plan to build nuclear weapons.

The Security Council on 23 September 1991 demanded22 the inspectors be allowed to leave the site with the documents as Iraq was obliged to do so by Security Council Resolutions. A further statement23 on the following day reiterated that UNSCOM, acting under the authority of the Council, is the sole judge of the definition of the documents, sites or materials subject to inspection. The Council expressed its strong condemnation of the way the Iraqi authorities had repeatedly prevented the inspectors from carrying out their duty and in particular the Council considered unacceptable the fact that the inspectors are currently being prevented from leaving the premises that they had inspected that morning. Thirdly, the Council demanded that the inspection team be immediately allowed to leave the site without any conditions and in particular that they could take with them all the documents they deem appropriate.

Future monitoring and verification plans At the beginning of October 1991, the plan for the future monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance to its undertaking not to use, retain, possess, develop, construct or otherwise acquire any chemical or biological weapons or any ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km was transmitted24 to the Security Council. The plan required UNSCOM through inspections and through aerial overflights, as well as through the provision of information by Iraq, to monitor and verify that activities, sites, facilities, material and other items, both military and civilian, are not used by Iraq in contravention of its obligations. It required the regular provision by Iraq of

36 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

full, complete, correct and timely information on activities, sites, facilities, material and other items, both military and civilian, that might be used for proscribed purposes as well as similar information on any additional activities, sites, facilities, materials or other items that UNSCOM may designate. UNSCOM could designate for inspection any site, facility, activity, material or other item in Iraq, carry out inspections at any time and without hindrance of any site, facility, activity, material or other item in Iraq, conduct unannounced inspections and inspections at short notice and inspect any number of declared or designated sites or facilities simultaneously or sequentially. UNSCOM would also consider and decide upon requests by Iraq to move or destroy any material, equipment or item relating to its nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or ballistic missile programmes, or material, equipment or any item relating to its other nuclear activities. Detailed requirements for chemical and biological items and missiles were specified in Annexes 2, 3 and 4 of the plan respectively. Provision was also made for the Annexes to be updated and revised by UNSCOM in the light of experience. Should there be any instances of non-compliance, UNSCOM had the right to ‘take it into custody and shall provide for its disposal, as appropriate’ and ‘should the Special Commission discover any activity taking place in contravention of Resolution 687 (1991), 707 (1991) or of the plan, it shall have the right to call upon Iraq to halt the activity and to prevent its recurrence. The Special Commission shall also have the right to take any prohibited item involved, including any documentation, into custody and shall provide for its disposal as appropriate.’ SCR 715 (1991) adopted25 on 11 October 1991 demanded that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations under the plans approved by the resolution and cooperate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA. However, a month later, on 19 November 1991 Iraq rejected26 the OMV regime. First report by UNSCOM Rolf Ekeus in the first UNSCOM report27 on 25 October 1991 noted that the inspections undertaken have had to be ‘energetic, rigorous and intensive because of the failure of Iraq, particularly in a nuclear field, to adopt the candid and open approach to disclosure of its capabilities’ which was called for in SCR 687 (1991). While cooperation from Iraq had generally been forthcoming at the field level – most notably in the chemical and to a degree in the biological areas – in relation to the activities and resources declared by Iraq, a totally different attitude of non-co-operation, concealment and sometimes false information has emerged in relation to non-declared activities, resources and sites that have been designated by the Special

The Decade of UNSCOM 37

Commission on the basis of its own assessments or of data supplied to it by States.’ [Emphasis added]. This report noted that a number of serious incidents had occurred and went on to say that ‘The elements of misinformation, concealment, lack of co-operation, violation of the privileges and immunities of the Special Commission and the IAEA have not created any trust in Iraq’s intentions. They have had a negative impact on relations with Iraq and have engendered an atmosphere of profound scepticism, particularly in the nuclear area; this atmosphere has to some degree contaminated the other three areas.’ [Emphasis added]. Inspection teams had consisted of personnel made available by Governments, members of UNSCOM, the UN Secretariat, WHO and, in the nuclear field, by inspectors and staff of the IAEA. The selection of inspection teams had been principally based upon the technical qualifications and expertise of the inspectors whilst also paying due regard to drawing the members of inspection teams from as many Member States as possible within the range of available capabilities and experience. In addition to staff seconded by Governments, the total number of regular UN staff in UNSCOM when all posts have been filled would be 66: 13 professionals and 53 general service.

Difficulties in 1992 and 1993 In January 1992, a further report 28 noted that Iraq was required to provide, without further delay, its full, final and complete disclosure (FFCD) of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km. This range limit of 150 km had been included in SCR 687 (1991) so that Iraq could maintain surface-to-surface missiles for its national defence. Although Iraq had made a number of declarations, these had been far from complete. UNSCOM had had to make numerous designations of undeclared sites, and such designations were continuing in the absence of the FFCD. Many of these designations had resulted from information provided by supporting states which, especially in the early stages of the work of UNSCOM, had greatly facilitated that work. The report noted that ‘Since making its initial declaration, Iraq has consistently maintained that it has no further declaration to make except when confronted with evidence of the inadequacy of its prior declarations.’ [Emphasis added]. A special mission was sent to Iraq at the end of January 1992 to address its failure to provide its FFCDs. The outcome of that mission together with other developments and Iraqi obstructions during 1992 and 1993 are summarized in Table 3.2.

38 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 3.2

Iraqi obstructions during 1992 and 1993

Date

Event

Result

18 Feb 1992

An UNSCOM special mission had gone to Iraq on 27 January 1992 to seek information. A special report29 said provide information which was seen as being clearly tantamount to a rejection by Iraq of the obligations imposed on it by SCR 707 (1991) and 715 (1991). The report noted that ‘Instead, Iraq recognises only its own understanding of obligations imposed on it… which falls far short of what is necessary for the implementation of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved by Resolution 715 (1991).’ [Emphasis added].

The Security Council issued a statement30 that ‘Iraq’s failure to acknowledge its obligations under Iraq had failed to Resolution 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), its rejection up until now of the two plans for ongoing monitoring and verification and its failure to provide the full, final and complete disclosure (FFCD) of its weapons capabilities constitute a continuing material breach of the relevant provisions of Resolution 687 (1991).’ [Emphasis added].

28 Feb 1992

A special mission consisting of Rolf Ekeus and other members of UNSCOM dispatched by the Secretary-General to secure the unconditional agreement by Iraq to implement all its relevant obligations under SCR 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991).

The Security Council deplored and condemned 31 the failure of Iraq to provide the special mission with its FFCD of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km. Furthermore the Council equally deplored and condemned Iraq’s failure, within the time prescribed by UNSCOM, to commence destruction of ballistic missile-related equipment designated for destruction. The Council reaffirmed that it is for UNSCOM alone to determine which items must be destroyed.Consequently it stated that ‘Iraq’s refusal to implement the determinations of the Special Commission constitutes a further material breach of the relevant provisions of Resolution 687 (1991).’ [Emphasis added].

12 Mar 1992

Report on status of Iraqi compliance considered by Security Council

The Security Council said32 that Iraq had not yet complied fully and unconditionally with those obligations, must do so and must immediately take the appropriate actions in this regard. It was hoped that the goodwill expressed by the Deputy

The Decade of UNSCOM 39 Table 3.2 Date

Iraqi obstructions during 1992 and 1993 – continued Event

Result Prime Minister of Iraq would be matched by deeds. A week later, on 19 March 1992, Iraq declared the existence of previously undeclared ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and associated material. Iraq stated that most of these undeclared items had been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991 in violation of Resolution 687 (1991). Iraq also had stated that it was willing to carry out any necessary additional destruction.

9 Apr 1992

Iraq called for a halt to all of UNSCOM’s aerial surveillance flights, stating that the safety of the pilots and aircraft could be in danger, following the incursion of an Iranian aircraft into Iraqi air space.

The Security Council called33 on Iraq to take all necessary steps to ensure that Iraqi military forces would not interfere with or threaten the security of the flights concerned and would comply with its responsibilities to secure the safety of UNSCOM’s aircraft and personnel while flying over Iraq.

5 July 1992

UNSCOM inspection team refused access to Iraq’s Ministry of Agriculture.

The Security Council stated34 that ‘Iraq’s present refusal to permit access to the inspection team currently in Iraq to the premises designated by the Special Commission constituted a material and unacceptable breach by Iraq of a provision of Resolution 687 (1991)…’ [Emphasis added].

15 Oct 1992

UNSCOM informed the Security Council of actions endangering the safety and security of UNSCOM’s inspection teams in Iraq, including a systematic campaign of harassment, acts of violence, vandalism to property and verbal denunciations and threats at all levels.

The Security Council stressed35 the Council’s particular concern for the safety of the inspectors and expressed the wish that Iraq would fully cooperate with UNSCOM and demonstrate its willingness to comply fully with Council Resolutions.

7 Jan 1993

Iraq informed UNSCOM that the United Nations would no longer be permitted to use its own aircraft to transport personnel and equipment between Iraq and Bahrain.

The Security Council stated36 that the measures set out in the recent Iraqi communications would seriously impede the activities of UNSCOM and the IAEA. It noted that ‘Such restrictions constitute an unacceptable and material breach of the relevant provisions of Resolution 687 (1991)…’ [Emphasis added].

40 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 3.2

Iraqi obstructions during 1992 and 1993 – continued

Date

Event

Result

11 Jan 1993

Iraq implement ban on UNSCOM use of UN aircraft.

The Security Council stated37 that ‘These latest developments concerning the activities of…UNSCOM constitute further material breaches of Resolution 687 (1991)… The Council demands that Iraq co-operate fully with…UNSCOM… in carrying out their mandate and again warns Iraq of the serious consequences that will flow from such continued defiance.’ [Emphasis added].

13 Jan 1993

The United States, United Kingdom and France carried out air raids on Iraqi anti-missile and anti-aircraft sites and radar bases in southern Iraq. On 17 January 1993 the United States fired missiles at an industrial complex in suburban Baghdad. The following day the United States and the United Kingdom launched air raids against radar sites in southern and northern Iraq.

The following day, 19 January 1993, the Secretary-General reported that Iraq had agreed to a resumption of UNSCOM’s flights. This showed clearly that only the use of force, as a last resort, could reasonably be expected to achieve the requirements of the Security Council in some situations.

16 June 1993

UNSCOM reported on Iraq’s noncompliance with monitoring efforts, including its refusal to perm it helicopter surveillance during on-site inspections and the installation of monitoring cameras at test sites. The following day Iraqi authorities blocked the installation of monitoring cameras at two rocket test sites and refused to transport chemical weapons-related equipmentto a designated site for destruction under UNSCOM supervision.

The Security Council stated38 that Iraq must accept installation by UNSCOM of monitoring devices at the rocket test sites in question and transport the chemical weapons-related equipment concerned to a designated site for destruction. It went on to say that ‘Iraq’s refusal to comply with the decisions of the Special Commission, as set out in the report of the Executive Chairman, constituted a material and unacceptable breach of the relevant provisions of Resolution 687 (1991) as well as violations of Security Council Resolution 707 (1991) and 715 (1991)…’ [Emphasis added]. In this context, it warned Iraq of the serious consequences of material breaches of SCR 687 (1991) and violations of its obligations under SCR 715 (1991). The Council demanded that Iraq immediately comply with its obligations and cease its attempts to restrict the UNSCOM’s inspection rights and operational capabilities.

The Decade of UNSCOM 41

In June 1992, the third UNSCOM report39 noted an Information Assessment Unit (IAU) had been established for the systematic computerassisted storage, retrieval and assessment of information pertaining to UNSCOM’s mandate. The IAU would play an increasingly important role in the operations of UNSCOM, particularly in OMV and, with the benefit of hindsight, it was clear that such a unit should have been established from the outset. In an operation such as that carried out by UNSCOM, up to date and comprehensive information was critical. If information was not kept up to date – and if inspection reports were delayed – then it was often difficult to deal with any backlog and the overall efficiency and effectiveness was degraded. Some nine months later, on 19 April 1993, an UNSCOM report 40 on the implementation of the OMV plan made it clear that ‘Iraq has, through its conduct over recent months, consistently demonstrated its desire to limit the Commission’s inspection rights and operational capabilities through seeking to place restrictions on inspectors in the course of their work. While many of these Iraqi actions have taken place during the course of inspections under SCR 687 (1991), the Commission has no doubt that they form part of a long term campaign to establish a practice for the conduct of inspections which would severely restrict the rights provided in the plans and relevant Security Council Resolutions. Iraq is thus clearly seeking to assert for itself the right to interpret how the resolutions should be implemented.’ [Emphasis added]. Included in this campaign had been attempts by Iraq: to restrict the scope of inspections and information gathering; to restrict access and impose delays on inspections; to restrict the exercise of UNSCOM’s aerial rights; to impose limits on the duration, size and composition of inspections; to require advance notice of inspection activities; and to limit the right to take photography. The report noted that ‘Each incident has varied in seriousness. Some might not be significant were they not part of a general trend. However, when taken together, these incidents add up to a major impediment which would effectively impede credible long term monitoring and verification. This again underlined the need to obtain from Iraq as soon as possible its formal acknowledgement of its obligations under Resolution 715 (1991), so that the Council’s requirements laid down in that Resolution can be met.’ [Emphasis added]. It went on to note that ‘Iraq has also hindered access for inspection teams, sometimes seeking, on spurious grounds, completely to deny access. One team was initially denied access because inspection would “breach the sanctity of universities and would upset the students”. In each instance, the inspections eventually took place.’ [Emphasis added]. In the past six months, a total of eight inspection activities were seriously delayed, in one case by over four hours. One, an aerial surveillance mission on the outskirts of Baghdad, had been blocked.

42 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

The UNSCOM report 41 of 5 November 1993 stated that ‘During the period May to September 1993, UNSCOM experienced a continuing pattern of obstruction and intimidation from the Iraqi side. Iraq had tried to limit inspection activities, discussions and photography to its interpretation of what was “687-related”, i.e. to exclude what it considered to be monitoring activities under SCR 715 (1991) or to exclude sites it considered “civilian”. There were always weekly problems over the issue of the taking of photography by the aerial inspection team. In addition, there were sporadic incidents of attacks on the Commission’s property and that of inspectors.’ [Emphasis added]. Rolf Ekeus reported that the situation had greatly improved following the return to Iraq, in mid-September 1993, of the Iraqi delegation to the high level technical talks in New York and that ‘inspection activities since then, including the activation and operation of the remote controlled monitoring cameras, have proceeded smoothly without obstruction or delay and there have been no securityrelated incidents reported.’ Later that month, on 26 November 1993, Iraq advised 42 the Security Council that it would accept its obligations for the implementation of the OMV plans adopted under SCR 715 (1991). Iraq reaffirmed its request that in the implementation of the monitoring and verification measures set out in SCR 715 (1991), ‘respect should be ensured for the sovereignty and internal security and the dignity of the Iraqi people and state and for Iraq’s right to industrial, scientific and technological advancement and to development in all fields that are not covered by the prohibitions imposed by Resolution 687 (1991).’ It also reaffirmed its request that ‘the methods to be used in connection with the plans for monitoring and verification should be modified to bring them into line with those used under the international agreements and conventions currently in force.’

Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) The fifth OMV report43 on 22 April 1994 stated that UNSCOM was mobilizing its resources and those of supporting governments to ensure that an effective OMV system would be implemented as soon as feasible. Iraq had stated its intention to cooperate in order to expedite the establishment of OMV thereby enabling UNSCOM to report Iraq’s fulfilment of the terms of paragraph 22 of SCR 687 (1991) and thus the end of the oil embargo. However, during the round of high level talks between UNSCOM and Iraq, held in New York in March 1994, the report noted that ‘Iraq had expressed a lack of confidence in the impartiality of the Commission and implied that, unless the Commission reported immediately under paragraph 22 of Resolution 687 (1991), co-operation might be withdrawn.’ [Emphasis added]. Further difficulties arose in October 1994 (Table 3.3).

The Decade of UNSCOM 43 Table 3.3

Iraqi obstructions during 1994

Date

Event

Result

6 Oct 1994

Iraq threatened to cease cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA and moved troops towards the border with Kuwait.

Two days later, the Security Council stated44 that it ‘underlined the complete unacceptability of the implication therein that Iraq may withdraw co-operation with the United Nations Special Commission. The Security Council emphasised the necessity of full implementation of all its relevant resolutions, including full co-operation by Iraq, without interference, with the United Nations Special Commission’s vital mission.’ [Emphasis added]. A few days later, on 15 October 1994, SCR 949 (1994) was adopted45 concerning military deployments by Iraq in the direction of the border with Kuwait which demanded that Iraq immediately complete the withdrawal of all military units recently deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions. In addition the resolution demanded that Iraq cooperate fully with the United Nations Special Commission.

The report46 on 7 October 1994 on the status of the OMV plan stated that it was now provisionally operational. It noted that the establishment of an OMV regime was a highly complex and sizeable undertaking as it sought to monitor any relevant activities within Iraq that might be misused for proscribed purposes and this had been achieved but not without difficulty. However, the basic elements for a comprehensive system were now in place. In addition, technical additions would be made to the regime to improve its efficiency and convenience. The focus of effort had shifted to the building of protocols, the development of relevant databases and the analysis of information – written and visual. Additional technical expertise was requested from governments supporting UNSCOM in order to boost UNSCOM’s ability to cope with the additional workload. The total number of technical experts had been increased from 12 at the end of 1993 to 23 by early September 1994. The most dramatic increase had been in the biological area; UNSCOM had had only one biological expert in October 1993: a year later it had five. The next OMV report47 on 10 April 1995 confirmed that the OMV regime was now operational.

44 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

The developments of 1995 On 14 April 1995, SCR 986 (1995) was adopted48 which enabled the sales of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people as a temporary measure until Iraq had fulfilled the relevant Security Council Resolutions including notably SCR 687 (1991). The resolution recognized what it called the serious nutritional and health situation of the Iraqi population, and the risk of a further deterioration in this situation. It permitted Iraq to export petroleum products sufficient to produce a sum not exceeding a total of US $1 billion every 90 days. This became known as the ‘oil for food’ programme. An escrow account would be created and the funds used inter alia ‘to meet the current operating costs of the Special Commission, pending subsequent payment in full of the costs of carrying out the tasks authorized by Section C of Resolution 687’. However, a month later, Iraq informed the Secretary-General that it would not implement this resolution because it objected to the proportion of petroleum to be exported via the Kirkuk–Yumurtalik pipeline and to the modalities for distribution of humanitarian relief in three northern governates in Iraq.49 In June 1995, the ninth UNSCOM report50 reported on high level talks with Iraq carried out from 29 May to 1 June 1995 when Rolf Ekeus visited Baghdad. The report said that the Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, said that ‘Iraq required statements, on the one hand from the Special Commission that the chemical weapons and missile files were closed and the ongoing monitoring and verification system was operational, and on the other from IAEA that the nuclear file was closed. If Iraq thus deemed the prospects of reintegration to be positive, it would be ready in late June 1995 to address to the Special Commission’s satisfaction the sole outstanding issue of significance, the biological issue. If the prospects were not good, it would have to assess the situation again.’ [Emphasis added]. In response, the Chairman said that much had been achieved in the implementation of paragraphs 8 to 10 of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). However, those provisions were not related solely to the elimination of the named weapons, but also to associated major parts, subsystems and components of such weapons and to facilities for their research, development and production. The latter, because of Iraq’s incomplete and late declarations, had taken longer to identify and eliminate than had the weapons. Nevertheless, while there remained a major issue in the biological area concerning the extent of Iraq’s past programmes and hence the comprehensiveness of monitoring in the biological area, most of the work was now done. A system of OMV was operational in all areas. The export/import monitoring mechanism was available for early adoption and implementation. The report said that, in the missile and chemical areas, while technical issues remained outstanding, these related more to the level of technical ex-

The Decade of UNSCOM 45

pertise achieved by Iraq or to the accounting for components or materials than to the weapons themselves or to an operational weapon production capability. They were no longer significant, in the view of the Executive Chairman, for the evaluation of the fulfilment of the terms of paragraphs 8–10 of SCR 687 (1991), namely the assessment of whether Iraq’s proscribed ballistic missile and weapons capabilities had been eliminated and that current dual-purpose capabilities were being adequately monitored. However, he insisted that those issues still needed to be resolved and UNSCOM would continue to use its rights to do so under the relevant resolutions and the OMV regime. The next OMV report51 on 11 October 1995 noted that the previous six months had been amongst the most eventful in the history of UNSCOM, both in respect of relations with the Government of Iraq and of the progress made in obtaining information regarding Iraq’s programmes for production of weapons of mass destruction and missiles with a range greater than 150 km. In particular, the report noted that ‘Iraq has taken important decisions to acknowledge its offensive biological weapons programme and documents are being obtained in all areas. However, much of the new information contradicted earlier declarations by Iraq so that some assessments made earlier by UNSCOM must now be revised. A more enduring and coherent explanation of past activities must be provided by Iraq in the new full, final and complete disclosures which it is to submit in all areas.’ [Emphasis added]. This report also said that when Rolf Ekeus arrived in Baghdad on 30 June 1995, Iraq said it would now address the issue of its biological weapons programme. On the following day, on 1 July 1995, ‘Iraq made a brief oral presentation in the course of which it acknowledged an offensive biological weapons programme, including the production of a number of biological agents, but denied the weaponisation of such agents.’ [Emphasis added]. Iraq’s decision to disclose its offensive biological weapons programme appeared to indicate it was moving away from its warning of non-cooperation, expressed by Tariq Aziz during Rolf Ekeus’ visit to Baghdad at the end of May 1995. However, ‘this situation was abruptly reversed in July 1995. On 17 July, President Saddam Hussein made a speech in Baghdad in which he indicated that his government would cease cooperation with the Security Council if there were no progress in the Council toward the lifting of sanctions and the oil embargo. No deadline was given by the President for such progress. However, a few days later in Cairo the Foreign Minister of Iraq … made a speech in which he stated that 31 August 1995 was the deadline.’ [Emphasis added]. On 5 August 1995, the Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, confirmed to the Executive Chairman, Rolf Ekeus, that Iraq would cease cooperation if there was no progress by 31 August 1995. This was reported to the Security Council in an oral briefing on 10 August 1995.

46 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

However, three days previously, on 7 August 1995, General Hussein Kamel Hassan (referred to in later documents as Hussein Kamal), who had been the key manager of the Iraqi proscribed programmes, had left Baghdad arriving in Amman, Jordan the following day. On 13 August 1995 Rolf Ekeus was invited to return to Baghdad as Iraq had ascertained that General Hussein Kamel Hassan had been responsible for hiding important information about Iraq’s prohibited programmes from the Commission and IAEA by ordering the Iraqi technical personnel not to disclose such information and also not to inform Tariq Aziz or General Amer Rashid of these instructions. The following day, on 14 August 1995, Tariq Aziz advised that the deadline was no longer in effect. Rolf Ekeus arrived in Baghdad on 17 August 1995. In a meeting, Tariq Aziz made an initial statement in which he repeated that General Hussein Kamel Hassan had, unbeknown to the senior levels of the Iraqi leadership, hidden information on the prohibited programmes which Iraq would now disclose to UNSCOM and IAEA. The report stated that ‘Iraq had decided on a policy of co-operation and full transparency with the Commission and IAEA, without imposing any time limit, and also co-operation and good neighbourliness with the states of the region and elsewhere and of economic development in Iraq itself.’ [Emphasis added]. On 20 August 1995, Rolf Ekeus complained in a public statement that whilst significant new information had been provided, not a single document that could help in its verification had been handed over. Shortly after this statement, as he was preparing to leave Iraq, he received an invitation to visit a farm said to have belonged to General Hussein Kamel Hassan, where items of great interest to UNSCOM could be found. On arriving at the farm, Rolf Ekeus and his team found in a locked chicken house, numerous metal and wooden boxes which were packed with documentation, together with microfiches, computer diskettes, video tapes, and photographs of prohibited hardware components. This has become known as the ‘chicken farm’ also referred to as the Haidar Farm. A month later, on 29 September 1995, Rolf Ekeus arrived in Baghdad for a further visit. He expressed the view in various meetings with the Iraqi Government that it was in Iraq’s best interest to provide everything now, rather than to drag out the recovery of information which would have an increasingly negative impact. The report states that ‘Iraq undertook to do its best, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, pledged his government’s co-operation and full openness with regard to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).’ [Emphasis added]. The UNSCOM report52 on 17 December 1995 is unique in the degree of cooperation being provided by Iraq. The report noted that ‘UNSCOM has stepped up its activities in following up on and seeking to verify the very large amount of new information on Iraq’s proscribed programmes that has continued to be obtained since August 1995.’ However, concern was expressed that ‘certain of the most important documentation had not yet

The Decade of UNSCOM 47

been handed over, namely documentation in the possession of the central authorities, including the Military Industrialization Corporation and the Ministry of Defence.’ It was noted that various levels of the Iraqi establishment still found it difficult to cooperate fully in the voluntary provision of information. It added that ‘This attitude had to change to one of full transparency and a readiness to volunteer all relevant information, if the resolution of the remaining issues was to be expedited.’ The report noted that in a meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz stressed that ‘the leadership of Iraq had no interest in concealing information, weapons or materials for weapons, and that the objective was to finish with all issues relating to proscribed weapons of mass destruction so as to “see paragraph 22 of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) implemented.”’ [Emphasis added]. The export/import mechanism Earlier the same month, on 7 December 1995, the mechanism53 to monitor Iraq’s exports and imports of dual-purpose capabilities was forwarded to the Security Council. Such dual-use capabilities could be used for both permitted peaceful or prohibited military purposes. This mechanism, which was an essential component of the OMV plan, was required under SCR 715 (1991) to monitor any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of Section C of SCR 687 (1991) – the removal or destruction of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with ranges in excess of 150 km. It was made clear that the mechanism was not a regime for international licensing, but rather for the timely provision of information by states about national commercial companies which were contemplating sales or supplies to Iraq of items covered by the OMV plans. The aim was to establish an effective and credible mechanism which would be robust enough to deter Iraq and suppliers from potential breaches. This mechanism would be supported by unrestricted inspections throughout Iraq by UNSCOM and IAEA. It should be noted that no other existing export/ import control had such supplementary ground inspection rights. The United Nation’s aim was to encourage national governments to require companies to report all of relevance, while keeping the volume of data manageable for all concerned. Timely notification was required of the export to Iraq of any items identified in the OMV plans with both Iraq and the governments of suppliers providing such notification prior to shipment. These notifications would identify the supplier, give a description of the item or items (including the technology involved) and provide the name of the end-user or consignee and the expected date of dispatch of each shipping. The notifications were imperative, as they would make it possible to monitor the supply to Iraq of all items covered by the plans, both non-proscribed dedicated use items and dual-use items (i.e. those items that can be used for either permitted or proscribed purposes). Iraq would also report the export of items detailed in the OMV plans,

48 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

whether such items are in the original or modified form, so that UNSCOM and IAEA could maintain full accounting for all monitored items. If an undocumented item, which should have been notified, was found in Iraq, its importation would constitute a case of non-compliance with the monitoring regime established by the plans for OMV. The strong presumption would be that the item had been procured for prohibited purposes and so, as such, would be subject to disposal in accordance with the measures provided for in paragraphs 8 and 12 of SCR 687 (1991) although, in the event, this never happened. On 27 March 1996, SCR 1051 (1996) was adopted54 approving the export/import monitoring mechanism. The mechanism would enter into force for Iraq not later than 60 days after the adoption of the resolution. In addition, the resolution consolidated the periodic requirements for progress reports under Resolutions 699 (1991), 715 (1991) and this resolution into reports every six months to the Council commencing on 11 April 1996.

Continuing difficulties with Iraq (1996–7) The first consolidated report55 by UNSCOM on 11 April 1996 welcomed the large amount of weapons information which had been released in the months since August 1995 which had ‘confirmed many of UNSCOM’s earlier observations based on its analytical work.’ However, the report noted that ‘since mid-February 1996, the quality of the information provided by Iraq and the stream of documents have diminished.’ UNSCOM hoped that this and the recent problems in regard to the provision of access did ‘not indicate a return to the non-cooperative attitude demonstrated by Iraq prior to the summer of 1995.’ However, difficulties with Iraq resumed in March 1996 (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4

Iraqi obstructions during 1996

Date

Event

Result

9 Mar 1996

Iraq refused to allow immediate access to a site by an UNSCOM inspection team.56

The Security Council stated57 that it had followed with concern the incident when immediate access was not allowed by the Iraqi authorities to a site in Baghdad. The Council had also learned with concern of a further incident on 11 March 1996. In both cases access was subsequently granted only after unacceptable delays. The President said that ‘the members of the Council consider that Iraq’s delay in permitting the inspection team access to the sites oncerned constituted a clear violation by Iraq of the provisions of Resolution 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991).’ [Emphasis added].

The Decade of UNSCOM 49 Table 3.4

Iraqi obstructions during 1996 – continued

Date

Event

Result

14 Mar 1996 15 Mar 1996

Iraq refused to allow immediate access to sites. Access was granted only after unacceptable delays.

On 19 March 1996 the Security Council stated58 that it ‘considered that Iraq’s delays in permitting the inspection team access to the sites concerned constituted clear violations by Iraq of the provisions of Resolution 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991).’ [Emphasis added].

June 1996

Iraq denied an UNSCOM inspection team access to sites designated for inspection.

SCR 1060 (1996) was adopted59 which deplored ‘the refusal of the Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission which constituted a clear violation of the provisions of Security Council Resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991).’ [Emphasis added].

13 June 1996

Iraq denied UNSCOM access.

The Security Council on 14 June 1996 stated60 that ‘this new dimension of non-compliance marks a serious step backwards in Iraq’s co-operation with the Special Commission. The Council considers that these events constitute a clear and flagrant violation of its resolutions…’ [Emphasis added].

August 1996

Iraq denied UNSCOM access.

The Security Council stated61 that ‘The denial by Iraq, on repeated occasions, of immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites which they wished to inspect and the attempts made by the Government of Iraq to impose conditions on the conduct of interviews with Iraqi officials by the Special Commission constituted a gross violation of its obligations under Resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991).’ [Emphasis added].

Nov 1996

Iraq refused to allow UNSCOM to remove missile remnants from Iraq.

The Security Council stated62 that it deplored the refusal by Iraq to allow UNSCOM to remove missile remnants from Iraq for analysis by a team of international experts under UNSCOM and ‘reminded the Government of Iraq of its obligation to comply with the provisions of the relevant resolutions and the need to co-operate fully with the Special Commission in order to enable it to report that the requirements of Section C of Resolution 687 (1991) are met. In this respect, the Council affirms that Iraq is required to allow the Special Commission to remove the missile engines from its territory.’ [Emphasis added].

50 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

At the request of the Security Council, the Executive Chairman, Rolf Ekeus, visited Baghdad for discussions from 19–22 June 1996 in order to receive commitments from Iraq to ensure access to sites designated by UNSCOM for inspection. Rolf Ekeus reported 63 on 24 June 1996 enclosing a joint statement in which Iraq had reiterated its commitment to resume its cooperation with UNSCOM and undertook to secure their immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites which UNSCOM or the IAEA may wish to inspect. This included the modalities for the visits to sensitive sites in Iraq. Iraq and UNSCOM had agreed to step up their programme of work so that UNSCOM could report as soon as possible to the Security Council that Iraq had met its obligations under paragraph 22 of SCR 687 (1991). To achieve this, Iraq and UNSCOM had agreed to hold regular meetings at the political level i.e. between Rolf Ekeus and the Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, every two months in Baghdad to devote attention to fundamental issues, review progress and direct any further effort necessary to achieve this objective. The two sides also agreed a joint programme of action setting out four priority areas: unilateral undeclared destruction, the provision of documents, the Iraqi concealment measures, and the achievement of a material balance in each weapons area. The first of these meetings was held in Baghdad on 26–28 August 1996. In his report64 Rolf Ekeus said that Iraq and UNSCOM had reaffirmed their commitment to the joint statement and agreed to pursue the implementation of the joint programme of action. He very much hoped that these discussions would avoid a repeat of incidents which resulted from Iraq’s actions in the last few months and that real progress could be made in the coming months towards the objectives laid down in the joint statement. On 24 September 1996, the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, advised65 the Security Council that 1 October 1996 would be the effective date from which states shall provide notification of exports to Iraq as required under the export/import mechanism approved in SCR 1051 (1996). The third consolidated report66 by Rolf Ekeus on 11 April 1997 said that after accepting SCR 687 (1991), ‘the Government of Iraq initiated a policy of systematic concealment, denial and masking of the most important aspects of its proscribed weapons and related capabilities. In the face of this challenge, the Commission has had to field innovative and creative inspections, planned, organized and executed in a manner capable of defeating Iraqi countermeasures. The inspection activities and the integrated analytical work…have since 1991 led to the uncovering of the full dimensions of Iraq’s complex programmes of mass destruction. During the last two years only, the inspections have led to the unmasking of: a complete biological weapons development and production programme; highly sophisticated and advanced work on the extremely lethal chemical warfare nerve agent VX; and the multifaceted domestic development and production of

The Decade of UNSCOM 51

SCUD-type missile engines under Iraq’s project 1728.’ [Emphasis added]. The report went on to state that ‘these accomplishments demonstrate that international weapons inspections under the auspices of the United Nations, if applied with first-rate expertise and modern technology, can achieve effective results.’ [Emphasis added]. In an effort to expedite the verification process, an innovative approach had been agreed by Rolf Ekeus and Tariq Aziz, in which UNSCOM would present to Iraq, at the political level, its detailed findings and assessment of the outstanding problems. This process required both a detailed and systematic presentation on the part of UNSCOM and a similar and verifiable response by Iraq. UNSCOM believed that it would lead to a much clearer understanding by Iraq’s political leadership of the outstanding problems and what Iraq was required to do to resolve them. The Commission’s hope was that by creating this direct link between the political and technical levels, the lack of progress on essential technical issues might be overcome. In essence, the goal was to force Iraq’s political statements of full cooperation into becoming a reality at the technical level. Tangible results had already been achieved in the missile and chemical areas. Because of particular deficiencies in the biological weapons declaration made by Iraq, it had not yet been possible to apply the process in full to this area. A more serious development was in respect of the OMV regime. The April 1997 report had noted that a prerequisite for the implementation of paragraph 22 of SCR 687 (1991) was that UNSCOM is able to report that the monitoring of Iraq’s industrial, chemical and biological assets to prevent the acquisition of proscribed weapons and related capabilities, is fully operational. While the OMV system continued to function, the report noted that certain actions by Iraq, which sought to impede and limit inspection activities and endanger aerial operations, called into question Iraq’s longterm intentions and constituted a challenge to the OMV system as a whole. The report said ‘The Chairman warned that Iraq’s deteriorating performance called into question Iraq’s commitment to the monitoring process and that if the trend were not reversed it could result in a situation with political consequences whereby monitoring could no longer be considered operational.’ [Emphasis added]. However, the firm commitments made in early April 1997 by Tariq Aziz to maintain the monitoring system to the satisfaction of UNSCOM, the IAEA and the Security Council gave hope that the deterioration would be reversed and that the OMV system could again engender the confidence required to assure the international community that Iraq had not resumed prohibited weapons activities. The report concluded that a solid framework with tested procedures for effective work had been put into place by UNSCOM. It was now time for Iraq to make full use of this and to provide the material and data to give substance to its stated commitment of full cooperation. The remaining problems were stated to be such that ‘their solution requires the major

52 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

political decision by Iraq’s leadership to give up, once and for all, all capabilities and ambition to retain or acquire the proscribed weapons.’ [Emphasis added].

Increasing politicization There was a new development in May 1997 when Tariq Aziz, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, wrote67 to the President of the Security Council commenting on the UNSCOM report of 11 April 1997. Tariq Aziz noted that Iraq did not normally comment on UNSCOM reports and this letter was ‘intended to give a clearer and more precise picture of the reality of the situation, and not to provoke a dispute with the Special Commission.’ He noted that the UNSCOM report had been issued at a point marking six years since its work in Iraq began and went on to state that ‘the established facts, after six years of work by the Special Commission are as follows: 1. There are no proscribed weapons, nor components for or means to manufacture them, in Iraq. No proscribed activities are going on. The reference made by the Special Commission to the possible existence of some remaining problems, although slight, are merely unconfirmed suspicions and suppositions.’ The letter went on to provide detailed comments on specific paragraphs and statements in the UNSCOM report. In particular Tariq Aziz commented that ‘the statement made in the “Conclusions” section of the report (“requires… Iraq’s leadership…”) is preposterous.’ He added that ‘This reference in the report is absurd and should not appear.’ Detailed comments were made in respect to the missile and chemical areas although, interestingly, no mention was made of the biological area. On documentation he said that ‘The Iraqi side has surrendered to the Special Commission the documentation concealed by Hussein Kamil (sic) prior to August 1995 and has no hidden documentation in its possession… it has been asserted on several occasions to the Chairman of the Special Commission that the supply and surrender of documentation to the Special Commission serves Iraq’s objective of having the files closed. Iraq cannot therefore desist from furnishing the Commission with the available documentation, as to do so would not be in its interest.’ [Emphasis added]. The final sentence says that ‘Iraq’s decision to relinquish weapons of mass destruction and ensure that it does not possess them in the future is clear cut.’ With the benefit of hindsight Tariq Aziz’s letter was an early attempt by Iraq to influence the members of the Security Council by rhetoric, not based on evidence, and direct appeals. It may also reflect the change of UN SecretaryGeneral on 1 January 1997 from Boutros Boutros-Ghali to Kofi Annan. The fourth consolidated report68 on 6 October 1997 noted that Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia had been appointed as Executive Chairman from 1 July 1997 in succession to Ambassador Rolf Ekeus who had resigned. The new Executive Chairman had visited Baghdad from 21 to 25 July 1997

The Decade of UNSCOM 53

and had agreed a specific additional work programme in the missile, chemical and biological areas. In the main Richard Butler expressed satisfaction with the progress that had been achieved prior to his taking up his post and, in respect of future work, he proposed that the biological weapons FFCD (Full, Final and Complete Disclosure), which was delivered on 11 September 1997, and all other FFCDs in UNSCOM’s possession be regarded as final. The Commission would seek to verify them in accordance with its mandate. Tariq Aziz, again wrote69 to comment on the latest UNSCOM report. He complained that UNSCOM had ignored ‘the policy and methods it [UNSCOM] pursued over this long period … which is, in essence, a deliberate political approach aimed at maintaining the embargo on Iraq.’ The letter asserted that the United States in particular, together with Britain, had put great pressure on the Security Council as the US and Britain were doing their utmost to topple the Government of Iraq and that their participation was rendering the UNSCOM activities unbalanced instead of being neutral and international. Several specific detailed criticisms were made of US involvement in UNSCOM’s activities, both in general and of specific named individuals. In the letter Tariq Aziz claimed that UNSCOM had introduced a deliberate delay in its handling of the biological weapons area and suggested that the biological file could have been closed within a short time because of ‘three basic facts: 1. All the biological agents in Iraq’s possession, including what was loaded into warheads, have been completely destroyed. 2. All the sites, apparatuses and equipment used in the production of biological agents have been completely destroyed under the supervision of the Special Commission itself. 3. All the sites which the Special Commission consider engaged in biological activity that could be of dual use, and which up to now number 87, are under strict monitoring. Thus, there is no justification for keeping this file open in the way presented by the Special Commission in its latest report.’ He concluded that ‘Iraq is ready to continue work with the Special Commission in a serious, scientific and objective manner in order to close all these files in a very short time…’ Late October and early November 1997 saw a major stand-off between Iraq and the Security Council in which Iraq refused to allow US nationals to enter Iraq or carry out inspections (see Table 3.5). As a consequence, Richard Butler decided that the majority of UNSCOM personnel should withdraw temporarily from Iraq leaving a skeleton staff to maintain UNSCOM’s premises and equipment. Following intensive diplomatic activity between Tariq Aziz and Yevgeni Primakov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, an agreement70 was reached between Iraq and

54 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 3.5

Iraqi obstructions during 1997 and early 1998

Date

Event

Result

4–7 June 1997

Iraqi personnel interfered on four occasions with UNSCOM helicopter flights endangering the helicopters and their crews.

The Security Council on 18 June 1997 stated71 that it ‘deplores these incidents and underlines that Iraq must immediately take effective steps to put an end to all such actions.’

10 June 1997 12 June 1997

Iraq denied access to a site. Iraq denied access to two sites.

SCR 1115 (1997) was adopted72 on 21 June 1997 which ‘condemns the repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission, which constitutes a clear and flagrant violation of the provisions of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)…’ [Emphasis added]. The resolution went on to state that the Council had decided ‘not to conduct the reviews provided for in paragraphs 21 and 28 of Resolution 687 (1991) until after the next consolidated progress report of the Special Commission…’ i.e., the regular two monthly reviews of the sanction against Iraq were deferred.

13 Sept 1997

An Iraqi officer on board an UNSCOM helicopter manhandled an UNSCOM individual attempting to photograph unauthorized movement of Iraqi vehicles inside a site designated for inspection. Two days later, Iraq again failed to freeze movement within another site designated for inspection.

The Security Council deplored the incidents and urged Iraq to cooperate fully with UNSCOM.

23 Oct 1997

Further Iraqi denials of access to sites by UNSCOM.

SCR 1134 (1997) was adopted73 condemning ‘the repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities … to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission and especially Iraqi actions endangering the safety of Special Commission personnel, the removal and destruction of documents of interest to the Special Commission and interference with the freedom of movement of Special Commission personnel.’ It went on to state that ‘such refusals to cooperate constitute a flagrant violation of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)…’ [Emphasis added]. The resolution continued the suspension of the periodic sanctions reviews.

The Decade of UNSCOM 55 Table 3.5

Iraqi obstructions during 1997 and early 1998 – continued

Date

Event

Result

29 Oct 1997

Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, wrote74 again to the President of the Security Council advising of ‘the decision taken by to the Government of Iraq to the effect that it is ready to continue the cooperation with the Special Commission … provided that no individuals of American nationality shall participate in any activity of the Special Commission inside Iraq…’ [Emphasis added]. This decision would take effect from 1.00 am on the following day, 30 October 1997.

The Security Council on 29 October 1997 stated75 that it ‘condemns the decision of the Government of Iraq to try to dictate the terms of its compliance with its obligation to cooperate with the Special Commission. It demands that Iraq cooperate fully… The Security Council warns of the serious consequences of Iraq’s failure to comply immediately and fully with its obligations under the relevant resolutions. The Council is determined to ensure rapid and full Iraqi compliance with the relevant resolutions…’ [Emphasis added].

30 Oct 1997

Iraq refused to allow three UNSCOM and IAEA officials of US nationality to enter Iraq and they had therefore returned to Bahrain. The next few days saw several incidents in which Iraq blocked inspections by UNSCOM teams with Iraqi officials stating that the inspections could go ahead so long as no US nationals were part of the team. Iraq also implicitly threatened the safety of the U-2 overflights being carried out in support of UNSCOM. Furthermore dualpurpose equipment was moved out of the field of view of the UNSCOM remote monitoring camera.

SCR 1137 (1997) was adopted76 on 12 November 1997 which condemned ‘the continued violations by Iraq of its obligations under the relevant resolutions…’ and demanded that Iraq immediately rescind its unacceptable decision of 29 October 1997 which sought to impose conditions on cooperation with UNSCOM. The resolution imposed travel restrictions on Iraqi officials who were responsible for or participated in the instance of non-compliance. However, although a list was prepared by UNSCOM, the travel restrictions were never implemented by the Security Council.

13 Nov 1997

Iraq required that all US nationals working at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC) should leave Iraq immediately.

The same day the Security Council stated77 that it ‘condemns in the strongest terms the unacceptable decision of the Government of Iraq in expelling personnel of the Special Commission of a specified nationality… The Security Council demands the immediate and unequivocal revocation of this action…’

12 Dec 1997

Iraq stated that ‘presidential and sovereign sites’ which ‘included

On 22 December 1997, the Security Council stressed78 ‘that failure by the Government of Iraq

56 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 3.5 Date

13 Jan 1998

Iraqi obstructions during 1997 and early 1998 – continued Event

Result

headquarters but not branches of ministries’ would not be allowed to be inspected or overflown under any circumstances.

to provide the Special Commission with immediate, unconditional access to any site or category of sites is unacceptable and a clear violation of the relevant resolutions.’

Iraq had announced that it was withdrawing its cooperation with the inspection team on the grounds that the inspection team had too many individuals of US or UK nationality.79

The following day, the Security Council stated80 that failure to provide full, unconditional and immediate access to all sites was ‘unacceptable and a clear violation of the relevant resolutions.’

the Russian Federation ‘whereby Iraq will accept the return of the Special Commission with its full complement of members, to resume its regular work in Iraq as from 20 November 1997.’ The agreement went on to say that ‘The Russian Federation, for its part, will work actively, subject to Iraq’s implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, for a speedy lifting of the sanctions against Iraq… To that end, it will take active measures to enhance the effectiveness of the Special Commission, while respecting the sovereignty and security of Iraq.’ [Emphasis added]. On the same day, 20 November 1997, the experts of the Special Commission, for the first time, briefed the Security Council in informal consultations on the outstanding issues in the missile, chemical and biological weapons areas.81 Hitherto, all briefings of the Security Council had been carried out by the Executive Chairman. The following day, on 21 November 1997, the Special Commissioners met in emergency session at the request of the Security Council to discuss and advise ways to make the work of UNSCOM more effective on the basis of the resolutions of the Security Council. The emergency session recommended82 actions in each of the weapons areas as well as measures to enhance the fulfilment of the mandate of UNSCOM and IAEA. These were endorsed83 by the Security Council which reiterated its demand that Iraq fulfil all its obligations as set out in the relevant resolutions and stressed ‘that the effectiveness and speed with which UNSCOM may accomplish its responsibilities is, above all, determined by the degree to which the Government of Iraq cooperates in disclosing the full extent and disposition of its proscribed programmes and in granting UNSCOM unimpeded access to all sites, documents, records and individuals.’ [Emphasis added]. Richard Butler visited Baghdad again from 12 to 16 December 1997 to seek assurances from Iraq that they would grant UNSCOM immediate,

The Decade of UNSCOM 57

unconditional and unrestricted access to all the sites UNSCOM wished to inspect. He also sought agreement on an accelerated programme of work on the outstanding issues in the various proscribed weapons areas. His report84 said that Iraq claimed that they had either destroyed or no longer had any weapons of mass destruction. Richard Butler proposed that where there was disagreement between UNSCOM and Iraq on issues of substance there should be technical seminars with the participation of both international and Iraqi experts. Furthermore, ‘Iraq would not itself volunteer any new information. It preferred a situation where it would verify the information held by the Commission.’ [Emphasis added]. This approach completely inverted the relationship between the United Nations and Iraq and effectively put UNSCOM, not Iraq, in the dock! In regard to the technical seminars, Iraq proposed that these would involve ‘international experts to adjudicate Iraq’s position on its proscribed programmes, solely on the basis of extant information.’ Richard Butler made it clear that ‘no arrangement that called into question the responsibility of UNSCOM to the Security Council, its professionalism or objectivity would be acceptable’ and this was accepted by the Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz. Richard Butler stated that as part of the verification of specific issues, UNSCOM would be prepared to conduct technical evaluation meetings (TEMs) with the Iraqi side involving invited and objective international experts and the findings would be reported by him to the Security Council and to Iraq. It was agreed to schedule the first TEMs in the areas of missile warheads and the chemical agent VX in January 1998 and in the biological weapons area as soon as practicable thereafter. At the beginning of February 1998, the first TEMs on special missile warheads and on the chemical agent VX were held in Baghdad. In both areas it was unanimously concluded that Iraq had still not provided sufficient information to achieve a satisfactory level of verification.85 In the VX area, the UNSCOM international team concluded that ‘the retention of a VX capability by Iraq cannot be excluded.’ An oral briefing on the outcome was given to the Security Council by UNSCOM experts in March 1998. As there were continuing difficulties in gaining access to the ‘Presidential sites’, on 15 to 18 February 1998, a technical survey team visited Iraq to survey these sites to better define their size and perimeters. The sites included presidential palaces but extended to sizeable areas. The following week the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, visited Iraq and signed with Tariq Aziz a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the United Nations and Iraq.86 In this Iraq reconfirmed ‘its acceptance of all relevant resolutions’ and ‘further reiterates its undertaking to cooperate fully’ with UNSCOM and the IAEA. It also ‘undertakes to accord to UNSCOM and IAEA immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access’ in conformity with

58 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

the relevant resolutions. Special procedures were agreed for ‘the initial and subsequent entries for the performance of tasks mandated at the eight Presidential sites…’ which would be carried out by a Special Group headed by a Commissioner appointed by the Secretary-General and comprising senior diplomats appointed by the Secretary-General and experts drawn from UNSCOM and IAEA. The MOU stated that in order to ‘improve cooperation, and efficiency, effectiveness and transparency of work… the Government of Iraq and UNSCOM will implement the recommendations directed at them’ contained in the report of the emergency session of the Special Commission on 21 November 1997. Jayantha Dhanapala was appointed as Special Commissioner to head the Special Group by the Secretary-General thereby increasing the number of Special Commissioners to 22. SCR 1154 (1998)87 endorsed the MOU and stressed that ‘compliance by the Government of Iraq with its obligations… to accord immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to the Special Commission and the IAEA… is necessary for the implementation of Resolution 687 (1991), but that any violation would have severest consequences for Iraq’ [Emphasis added]. The biological weapons TEM was held in Vienna on 20 to 28 March 1998. This unanimously concluded88 that ‘No additional confidence in the veracity and expanse of the FFCD was derived from the TEM. Iraq did not provide any new technical information of substance to support its FFCD. Iraq’s FFCD is judged to be incomplete and inadequate …Additional aspects, such as the existence of dormant or additional BW programmes, remain unresolved.’ [Emphasis added]. The fifth UNSCOM consolidated report 89 on 16 April 1998 noted that throughout the recent crisis, ‘Iraq has claimed that it no longer has prohibited weapons “in the control of the Government of Iraq, in the territory of Iraq”. It has stated, further, that it has made available to the Commission all that is necessary to enable the Commission to verify that claim and that nothing further, of substance, will be made available by Iraq.’ It went on to state that ‘Iraq’s claim that it has no more prohibited weapons, which it has not been possible for the Commission to verify, does not in itself satisfy the three-step system the Council established in order to enable Iraq to fulfil its obligations under Resolution 687 (1991). Those three steps are full declaration by Iraq, verification by the Commission and destruction, removal or rendering harmless of any remaining weapons, equipment and facilities under international supervision. These three steps form the integrity of a whole process. They are not separable into individual parts. While Iraq’s present claim might be able to be interpreted as satisfying, at least partly, the first of these steps, its consistent refusal to provide the Commission with the information and materials needed to verify its claim, clearly fails to satisfy the second step. Taken together, these two circumstances make the third step

The Decade of UNSCOM 59

impossible. Thus, the integrity of the whole process has not yet been satisfied.’ For UNSCOM to make credible reports under paragraph 22 of UN SCR 687 (1991) ‘where prohibited weapons have existed, it must be able to verify positively that they have been destroyed, removed or rendered harmless. Where items and facilities for the potential manufacture or constitution of such weapons existed or exist, it must be able to verify negatively that prohibited weapons are not being created. This is the standard that was envisaged by the Security Council and is the standard routinely applied in all comparable disarmament and arms control regimes.’ [Emphasis added]. A useful insight was provided into the utility of the TEMs. These had been established by UNSCOM in January 1998, following representations by Iraq in December 1997. Since then repeated statements by Iraq have made clear that it places great importance on the technical evaluation meeting process as a major means of demonstrating the truth of its claim that it no longer has any prohibited weapons. Some salient facts have emerged from the first TEMs in each of the three areas in that the process failed to improve UNSCOM’s ability to verify positively Iraq’s claims about its prohibited weapons status, and, in each case, the process indicated further areas of lack of clarity and uncertainty and the need for further work in the field rather than at a conference table. It was also noted that the TEMs have become an extremely timeconsuming process for UNSCOM and have slowed down and, in some cases, led to the postponement of important field work. The question of the possible substitution of TEMs for more concrete work in the field, whether by accident or design, is a matter of concern to UNSCOM and, in its view, should also be a matter of concern to Iraq, given that the only way outstanding issues may be able to be resolved is by material results as against conceptual results established through argument and discussion, much of which has proven to be political in character rather than technical. These comments about the possible disutilities of the TEM process would not have been made had Iraq done what it said it would do, namely, brought to each of the TEMs new materials that would help explain and verify its claims with respect to its prohibited weapons programmes. As the reports of the TEMs have indicated, Iraq significantly failed to do this even though the process was created at Iraq’s request to enable it to prove its claims. This was particularly the case in the area of the TEM on biological weapons. On 14 May 1998, the Security Council issued a statement90 that welcomed the improved access provided to UNSCOM and the IAEA following the signing of the MOU. However, the Security Council expressed its concern that the most recent UNSCOM reports, including the reports of the TEMs ‘indicate that Iraq has not provided full disclosure in a number of

60 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

critical areas, in spite of repeated requests from the Special Commission, and calls upon Iraq to do so.’ [Emphasis added]. The following month at the request of the Security Council, UNSCOM experts again provided a technical briefing in informal session. This covered all three areas – missiles, chemical weapons and biological weapons as well as documents. At the conclusion of the meeting on 4 June 1998 the Executive Chairman circulated an informal paper91 to Council members of disarmament issues ‘the completion and verification of which are necessary’ to the formulation of a report by UNSCOM as required by paragraph 22 of SCR 687 (1991). This was an essential prerequisite to the lifting of the sanctions placed on Iraq. As agreed, another TEM was held in Baghdad on 10–15 July 1998 to present to and discuss with Iraq’s authorities the results of the analysis of samples, found to contain degradation products of VX, taken from remnants of special missile warheads that had been excavated from where Iraq said they had been unilaterally destroyed. At the same time, on 14 July, another TEM was held in Baghdad to review again Iraq’s biological weapons FFCD. This had concluded that this could not be verified on the basis of the information provided by Iraq and recommended that no further verification of Iraq’s current biological weapons FFCD be conducted at the senior international expert level ‘until Iraq commits itself to provide substantive, new information.’ The following week on 18 July 1998 an Iraqi official took from a Chief Inspector a document related to chemical weapons which had been found during an inspection of the headquarters of the Iraqi Air Force. The document had been reviewed briefly and was relevant to the work of the Commission as it contained information on the use of chemical weapons during the Iraq–Iran war. Iraq promised to review the document with the Executive Chairman during his next visit to Baghdad.

Iraqi withdrawal of cooperation Two weeks later, on 2 to 4 August 1998, Richard Butler addressed in Baghdad the progress made on the schedule of work agreed on 11 to 15 June in the three areas: ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and biological weapons.92 He proposed to Tariq Aziz that substantive disarmament issues such as VX, concealment and the document recently found be discussed and also proposed a further work programme for the immediate future aimed at bringing the remaining issues in the missile and chemical weapons areas to closure. Tariq Aziz rejected both proposals. Richard Butler reported that ‘Tariq Aziz insisted that I should report immediately to the Security Council that there were no more proscribed weapons and related materials in Iraq. He had replied to Tariq Aziz that UNSCOM could not do this as it did not yet have verifiable evidence. Tariq Aziz’s response was truculent as he saw no utility in continuing working with the Commission on these issues.

The Decade of UNSCOM 61

When asked if they should meet again on the following day Tariq Aziz said that that would only have point if I were prepared to agree to his demand that I report to the Council that Iraq had no proscribed weapons and related materials.’ [Emphasis added]. Richard Butler repeated that he was not in a position to agree to this and he had returned to report to the Security Council. Insofar as the document on the consumption of special munitions during the Iran–Iraq war was concerned, Tariq Aziz had stated that ‘the document was irrelevant to the work of the Commission… Iraq, he said, would never give it to the Commission.’ Iraq suspended cooperation on 5 August 1998 (see Table 3.6). It is interesting to note that the following day, 6 August 1998, the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, proposed to the Security Council the concept of a comprehensive review of Iraq’s compliance with the relevant resolutions. Following the Security Council statement on 18 August 1998, Richard Butler wrote93 to Tariq Aziz Table 3.6

The final Iraqi obstructions in 1998

Date

Event

Result

5 Aug 1998

Iraq adopted a resolution94 that ‘Iraq is totally suspending its cooperation with the Special Commission in its current form and with the International Atomic Energy Agency.’ UNSCOM should be moved to Geneva or Vienna to insulate it from the direct influence of the United States. Monitoring activities under UN SCR 715 (1991) could, however, continue.

The Executive Chairman on 12 August 1998 advised95 the Security Council that all disarmament work had had to be suspended and monitoring activities had also been restricted as Iraq was only permitting the monitoring of previously declared sites. Additional non-declared sites could not be inspected by UNSCOM. The President of the Security Council on 18 August 1998 stated96 that ‘Iraq’s announcement is totally unacceptable and contravenes the relevant Security Council Resolutions’ and the MOU.SCR 1194 (1998) was unanimously adopted97 on 9 September 1998 condemning ‘the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation with the Special Commission and IAEA, which constitutes a totally unacceptable contravention of its obligations under Resolution 687 (1991)…’ [Emphasis added].

31 Oct 1998

Iraq decided to suspend, stop and cease all activities of UNSCOM, including monitoring.

SCR 1205 (1998) was unanimously adopted98 on 5 November 1998 condemning ‘the decision by Iraq of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation with the Special Commission as a flagrant violation of Resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions’ and demanded that ‘Iraq rescind immediately and unconditionally the decision of 31 October 1998, as well as the decision of 5 August 1998, to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM…’ [Emphasis added].

62 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

proposing that Iraq and UNSCOM resume a full range of activities. No formal reply was received to this letter even though Richard Butler explicitly stated that resumption of dialogue ‘would re-establish movement towards presentation by the Commission to the Security Council of its report under paragraph 22 of Resolution 687 (1991).’ Press reports on 20 August 1998 made it clear that Tariq Aziz had rejected the approach by Richard Butler. Later the same month, on 26 August 1998, a US member of UNSCOM, Scott Ritter, resigned expressing major concern about recent developments in the Security Council and by the Secretary-General. His letter99 of resignation states that ‘Unfortunately, the recent decisions by the Security Council to downplay the significance of the recent Iraqi decision to cease cooperation with Commission inspectors clearly indicates that the organization which created the Special Commission in its Resolution 687 (1991) is no longer willing and/or capable of the implementation of its own law, in this case an enforceable resolution passed under Chapter VII of the United Nations charter. This abrogation of its most basic of responsibilities has made the Security Council a witting partner to an “overall Iraqi strategy” of weakening the Special Commission. The Secretary-General and his Special Representative have allowed the grand office of the Secretary-General to become a sounding board for Iraqi grievances, real or imagined. In fact, the Secretary-General himself has proposed a “comprehensive review” of the UNSCOM-Iraqi relationship, an action that would result in having the investigators becoming the investigated, all at the behest of Iraq. Such an action, in addition to being a farce, would create a clear distraction from the critical disarmament issues related to Iraq and its compliance with Security Council resolutions.’ [Emphasis added]. On 9 September 1998, SCR 1194 (1998)100 demanded that Iraq rescind its decision and cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the IAEA. The Security Council decided not to hold the sanctions review scheduled for October 1998 until Iraq rescinded its decision of 5 August 1998. The resolution in its preamble expressed the readiness of the Security Council ‘to consider, in a comprehensive review, Iraq’s compliance with its obligations under all relevant resolutions once Iraq has rescinded its above mentioned decision [of 5 August 1998] and demonstrated that it is prepared to fulfil all its obligations, including, in particular on disarmament issues, by resuming full cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA… and to that end welcoming the proposal of the Secretary-General for such a comprehensive review and inviting the Secretary-General to provide his views in that regard,…’ [Emphasis in original]. On 5 October 1998 the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, provided101 a possible basis for a comprehensive review which he said was based on his own views and had also benefited from helpful comments and suggestions offered by many members of the Council. The concept set out an essential prior condition that Iraq would have to rescind its decision of 5 August

The Decade of UNSCOM 63

1998 and ‘demonstrate that it had resumed full cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA’. The Secretary-General proposed that the ‘comprehensive review’ be carried out in ‘two main phases, the first being devoted to Iraq’s compliance with Section C of Resolution 687 (1991) and the second phase being concerned with Iraq’s compliance with all other requirements arising out of the relevant resolutions. The immediate purpose of the first phase…would be to define an agreed course of action and a timetable which, if followed, would lead to the earliest possible satisfaction of the disarmament-related requirements described in section C of Resolution 687 (1991)… In particular, the first phase would: – clearly determine if Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction or any equipment for its production; – clarify if Iraq is still undertaking attempts to restart the proscribed military programmes of production of any kind of proscribed weapons; – confirm on the basis of existing evidence the validity of any allegations of non-compliance by Iraq with regard to section C of Resolution 687 (1991); – establish a reasonable timetable for investigation of all remaining issues of the Iraqi proscribed military programmes; and – answer the question whether Iraq still constitutes a military threat to the region.’ The Secretary-General went on to propose that ‘For the purpose of enabling the Council to consider the issues mentioned earlier, UNSCOM and the IAEA would be requested by the Council to submit succinct reports detailing: – the achievements made by them in each of the four files (i.e. nuclear, missile, chemical and biological) in terms of the identification and destruction of WMDs and the elimination of Iraq’s capacity to manufacture or develop WMDs; – the work they judge remains to be done in each of the four areas in order to satisfy the requirements placed on UNSCOM and the IAEA under section C of Resolution 687 (1991) while indicating a tentative time frame for this purpose based on the assumption that Iraq will extend full cooperation; and – relevant evidence at the disposal of UNSCOM and the IAEA to substantiate non-fulfilment by Iraq of provisions of section C of Resolution 687 (1991) without revealing the source, if deemed inappropriate. Iraq would be invited to provide its own separate account of how it complied with the requirements of section C of Resolution 687 (1991) with an indication, whenever appropriate, of relevant evidence to substantiate its claim.’

64 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

This ‘comprehensive review’ proposed by the Secretary-General put the activities of UNSCOM and the IAEA into the dock and, amazingly, in the light of the past and continuing record of Iraq, did not place the onus on Iraq to do what it had consistently failed to do over the previous seven and a half years, provide a full, final and complete disclosure of its proscribed programme which could be verified by UNSCOM and the IAEA. It is indeed a sorry state of affairs when the Permanent Members of the Security Council lost their resolve to address the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction and the Secretary-General effectively put the UN organization, UNSCOM, in the dock rather than the non-compliant state, Iraq. It seems clear that the Secretary-General and members of the Security Council had lost sight of the importance of ensuring that Iraq retained no weapons of mass destruction and did not retain such a capability. Over seven years after the passage of SCR 687 (1991), there was no longer a common sense of purpose among the P5 members that the will of the Security Council should be respected. The following day, 6 October 1998, saw the submission of the next consolidated UNSCOM report102 to the Security Council. This reported on the current state of the priority issues in the areas of missiles, chemical weapons, biological weapons and concealment. It is concluded that the disarmament phase of the work of UNSCOM is ‘possibly near its end in the missile and chemical weapons area but not in the biological weapons area;… and full disclosure by Iraq of all necessary materials and information remains the crucial ingredient for both an end to the disarmament process and future monitoring.’ [Emphasis added]. The report notes that in the biological weapons area, Iraq has provided ‘a series of disclosure statements all of which have been found by international experts, on multiple occasions, to be neither credible nor verifiable.’ [Emphasis added]. On 30 October 1998, the President of the Security Council wrote103 to the Secretary-General with initial views as to ‘how the comprehensive review of Iraq’s compliance with its obligations under the relevant resolutions would proceed.’ The letter said the Council was ready to begin the comprehensive review as soon as the Secretary-General confirmed, on the basis of reports from UNSCOM and the IAEA, that they were receiving full cooperation from Iraq. The Council would then begin the review ‘by requesting through your office, succinct reports from UNSCOM, the IAEA and other relevant bodies as appropriate, setting out Iraqi compliance with the resolutions hitherto and identifying any task which still need to be undertaken to satisfy the remaining requirements of the relevant resolutions. These reports should give clear explanations of their reasoning.’ The letter goes on to say that ‘Iraq should be invited to contribute its own account of its compliance with its obligations, in the form of written reports and oral presentations, with a clear explanation of its reasoning.’

The Decade of UNSCOM 65

At the end of October, Iraq decided to cease all cooperation. Consequently, on the advice of the United States and the United Kingdom, the Executive Chairman, following consultation with the President of the Security Council and the office of the Secretary-General, withdrew on 11 November 1998 the entire UNSCOM team of 103 individuals to Bahrain.104 Two days later the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, wrote105 to Saddam Hussein making a personal appeal for Iraq to rescind its decisions of 5 August and 31 October 1998 not to cooperate with UNSCOM. A reply106 on the following day from Tariq Aziz, when the bombers were on the way said that ‘the Leadership of Iraq decided to resume working with the Special Commission and the IAEA and to allow them to perform their normal duties in accordance with the relevant resolutions…’ The same letter also expressed the view that several points which had been conveyed on 13 November 1998 to the Ambassadors of Russia, France and China should be adopted in carrying out the comprehensive review: these points included the proposal that ‘The comprehensive review should be carried out within a very short period of time (seven days for example), after the resumption of UNSCOM and the IAEA of their normal duties. This is to be without conditions, (like those mentioned formerly in regard to what is called the confirmation of Iraq’s cooperation).’ The next day, the President of the Security Council stated107 that ‘Iraq has decided, clearly and unconditionally, to cooperate fully with the Special Commission…and that Iraq’s cooperation with the Special Commission…will allow the return of inspectors to resume all their activities on an immediate, unconditional and unrestricted basis, in accordance with the relevant resolutions…’ The statement went on to state that ‘Taking note of past experience with Iraq, Council members underlined that their confidence in Iraq’s intentions needs to be established by unconditional and sustained cooperation with the Special Commission…in exercising the full range of their activities…’ [Emphasis added]. Finally, the statement noted that ‘Council members reaffirmed their readiness to proceed with a comprehensive review, once the Secretary-General has confirmed, on the basis of reports from the Special Commission and the IAEA, that Iraq has returned to full cooperation…’ Following the resumption by UNSCOM of their work in Iraq, the Executive Chairman sought108 documents and information from Iraq in respect of the three weapons areas. Three letters on 17, 18 and 19 November addressed points relating to chemical weapons, biological weapons and outstanding requests in the chemical weapons and missile areas. Iraq in its responses declined to provide further information stating instead, for example in respect of biological weapons, that ‘the comprehensive review will determine whether the disarmament phase has been completed, or whether steps in the biological file need to be taken to fulfill the requirements of the disarmament phase.’

66 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

A month later, on 15 December 1998, the Secretary-General forwarded 109 reports from the IAEA and from UNSCOM covering the period since 17 November 1998. The report from UNSCOM was described by the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, as one that ‘presents a mixed picture and concludes that UNSCOM did not receive full cooperation from Iraq.’ The actual conclusions reached in the UNSCOM report are much starker and state that ‘Iraq did not provide the full cooperation it promised on 14 November 1998. In addition, during the period under review, Iraq initiated new forms of restrictions upon the Commission’s work…Iraq’s conduct ensured that no progress was able to be made in either the fields of disarmament or accounting for its prohibited weapons programmes.’ [Emphasis added]. It appears that Kofi Annan failed to recognize the significance of the UNSCOM report in the context of the years of Iraqi obstruction and its increasing incalcitrance throughout the past year as Kofi Annan’s covering letter suggested that ‘the Council may wish to consider three possible options: 1. That the experience over the period since 17 November 1998 does not provide a sufficient basis to move forward with a comprehensive review at this time. 2. That Iraq has not provided full cooperation but that it should be permitted additional time to demonstrate its commitment to do so. 3. That the Council may wish to proceed with a comprehensive review on the premise that it is sufficiently important to know precisely what has been achieved in the area of disarmament over the entire period since 1991.’ These three options indicate a lack of appreciation by Kofi Annan of the way in which Iraq had consistently flouted the Security Council and its resolutions since 1991. It also fails to recognize the attempts made during 1997 and 1998 by Iraq to directly influence the members of the Security Council by declamatory statements not based on evidence arguing that UNSCOM had completed its work and thus the time had come to lift sanctions on Iraq. The following day, 16 December 1998, the inspectors were withdrawn and the United States and United Kingdom used military force against Iraq in Operation Desert Fox. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said110 that the UNSCOM report on Iraqi cooperation ‘is damning. It is a catalogue of obstruction. It shows quite clearly, one more time, that Saddam has no intention whatever of keeping to his word…And the reason for that obstruction is also clear: It is his desire to develop these weapons of mass destruction. He has not for one instant yielded up that malign intent. The threat is now, and it is a threat to his neighbours, to his people and to the security of the world.’ US President Clinton made

The Decade of UNSCOM 67

similar remarks111 noting that the conclusions of the UNSCOM report are ‘stark, sobering and profoundly disturbing.’ He went on to say that ‘This situation presents a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere. The international community gave Saddam one last chance to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. Saddam has failed to seize the chance.’ In a statement in the House of Commons on 17 December 1998, Tony Blair summarized the situation accurately by stating112 that ‘Anyone who has followed at all the pattern of events in Iraq in recent years must come to the same inescapable conclusion. Whatever the arguments about particular incidents, Saddam’s attitude to the inspectors and their work cannot remotely be described as full cooperation. It has instead been as much deliberate obstruction as he thought he could get away with. Moreover he has also consistently sought in the last 18 months to use this obstruction deliberately to try to blackmail the international community into lifting sanctions…’ [Emphasis added]. Three days later, following the cessation of air strikes against Iraq, the Prime Minister in a statement, 113 which both assessed Operation Desert Fox and considered forward strategy, said in respect of UNSCOM that ‘what we would not of course accept is UNSCOM returning in circumstances where the previous cat-and-mouse game simply resumed and we found ourselves with the same recurring crises. We would need a new and better regime and Iraq will therefore have to demonstrate in practical ways a completely different order of readiness to fulfill its obligations in future if the UNSCOM route is to have any part to play.’ A further two reports114 were issued by UNSCOM in 1999 prior to its replacement by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in SCR 1284 (1999) on 17 December 1999.

Summary It is thus clear that throughout the existence of UNSCOM, Iraq has regularly sought to impede the work of UNSCOM. There has been a continuous cycle of difficulties and denials which have resulted in Security Council Resolutions (Table 3.7) and statements by the President on behalf of the Council condemning Iraq’s actions as being material breaches of its obligations under SCR 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991). The overall picture can be summarized schematically as shown in Figure 3.1. The resolutions relating to the work of UNSCOM adopted by the Security Council since April 1991 have all been adopted unanimously with the exception of SCR 687 (1991) and of SCR 1134 (1997) (see Table 3.7).

68 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 3.7

Security Council resolutions relating to the work of UNSCOM

Resolution

Vote

Subject

687 (1991)

12 for, 1 against (Cuba) and 2 (Ecuador, Yemen)

Cease-fire resolution establishing UNSCOM abstentions

699 (1991)

Unanimous

Confirms authority of UNSCOM and IAEA

707 (1991)

Unanimous

Iraq to provide FFCDs without delay

715 (1991)

Unanimous

Approves OMV plans

949 (1994)

Unanimous

Iraq to cooperate fully with UNSCOM

986 (1995)

Unanimous

‘Food for oil’ resolution

1051 (1996)

Unanimous

Approves export/import mechanism

1060 (1996)

Unanimous

Iraq to grant immediate and unrestricted access

1115 (1997)

Unanimous

Iraq to allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access

1134 (1997)

10 for, none against and 5 abstentions (China, Egypt, France, Kenya, Russian Federation)

Iraq to fully cooperate. Suspends periodic sanctions reviews.

1137 (1997)

Unanimous

Condemns Iraq’s imposition of conditions on cooperation with UNSCOM. Imposes travel restrictions on Iraqi officials.

1154 (1998)

Unanimous

Endorses provisions of MOU

1194 (1998)

Unanimous

Iraq to rescind decision of 5 August not to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM

1205 (1998)

Unanimous

Iraq to rescind decisions of 31 October and 5 August not to cooperate with UNSCOM

The Decade of UNSCOM 69 UNSCR 687 3 April 91 United Nations

UNSCR OMV 1051 operational 10 Apr 95 27 Mar 96

Iraq accepts UNSCR 715 26 Nov 93

UNSCR 715 11 Oct 91

UNSCR 1154 UNSCR MOU 1134 23 Oct 97 2 Mar 98

CW Destruction UNSCOM Phases

AB C

1991

DE F G H

1992

I

1993

Withdrawal of cooperation

Continuing difficulties

Inaccurate accounts OMV denied

Iraqi Denials

Increasing Politicization

Inadequate disclosures OMV cooperation

Access denials

J

1994

KL

1995

MN P O

1996

Q RS

1997

TU

1998

DENIAL INCIDENTS A Nuclear access denied B Helicopter use denied C Parking lot detention —4 days D Information refused E Safety of aircraft flights F Access denied to M of Ag G Harrassment and threats H UNSCOM aircraft denied I Monitoring camera refusal J Threat to cease cooperation K Demand to close CW files

Figure 3.1

Iraqi denials 1991–8

L Ultimatum of 31 August year M Denial of access N Denial of access O Denial of access P Denial of missile fragments Q Denial of access R Denial of US nationals S Presidential sites denied T Cooperation suspended by Iraq U Iraq stops all UNSCOM activities

4 An Analysis of UNSCOM

Introduction Although UNSCOM functioned for over seven years, there was relatively little published analysis of the work of UNSCOM and what this meant for non-proliferation until after UNSCOM ceased to function in Iraq.1 In part, this was because in the early 1990s it would have been premature to jump to conclusions as it is only since 1995 that a fuller appreciation of the extent of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programmes have become clear. Another contributing factor in the early years of UNSCOM was the importance of maintaining confidentiality in the face of Iraqi non-cooperation when it was vitally important to maintain pressure on Iraq to make full, final and complete disclosures (FFCDs) of its proscribed programmes. In the later 1990s the approach changed, with UNSCOM making presentations to Iraq at the political level of what the Commission’s appreciation is of the proscribed programmes in an attempt to expedite the completion of the Commission’s work. In my previous book, The UNSCOM Saga2 I noted that there had also been an apparent and regrettable reluctance in some of the ongoing international arms control negotiations to draw upon the UNSCOM experience. For example, although the 1990s had seen continued negotiations to strengthen the BTWC, first through the VEREX (the meetings of governmental experts to consider possible verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint which became known as VEREX) process and, following the Special Conference in 1994, the AHG (Ad Hoc Group) process, there was little opportunity for UNSCOM to make direct inputs into that process. Even at the Fourth Review Conference of the BTWC in November/December 1996, the UNSCOM contribution3 was not listed as an official Review Conference document nor was it presented to the conference. Indeed the record4 of the Review Conference makes no reference to the UNSCOM contribution – in contrast to the mention in the summary record of the statements made in the Plenary Sessions by States Parties and 70

An Analysis of UNSCOM 71

Signatories even though those statements were not official Review Conference documents. During its period of operation from 1991 to 1998 UNSCOM gained a very significant experience of both inspections, with over 250 inspection missions being mounted from outside Iraq, and ongoing monitoring and verification as some thousands of monitoring inspections were made in each of the areas of the proscribed programmes and the export/import mechanism had started to function. The lessons learnt from the UNSCOM experience for inspection, verification and non-proliferation need to be identified so that they can be taken into account in the international efforts to strengthen the regimes for the prohibition and prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – and so contribute to the enhancement of the prospects for improved international security, trade and prosperity around the world. In this section the implications are considered for inspection, verification and non-proliferation, of the lessons learnt from the UNSCOM experience which were elaborated in The UNSCOM Saga. Organization lessons Mandate. The mandate for UNSCOM was clear and authoritative. No doubt was left in the mind of Iraq that the Security Council was firmly behind the work of UNSCOM and this was clearly demonstrated not only by SCR 687 (1991) but by a series of subsequent resolutions such as SCR 707 (1991). However, in the late 1990s, the tenor of Security Council statements became weaker with denouncements of ‘material breach’ being replaced by ‘clear violation’ and ‘demand’ replaced by ‘remind’. This weaker language indicated that the capitals of the Security Council members were becoming less involved. It is nevertheless evident that Iraq in its relationship with UNSCOM adopted a minimalist approach and had carefully monitored the actions taken and the language used by the United Nations. Consequently, any softening in the language used by the Security Council was seen by Iraq as an implicit toleration for them to be less cooperative with the Commission. It is vitally important for improved international security that the Security Council maintains a united and determined position in respect of all proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Any apparent weakening by the Security Council, and especially any abstentions by permanent members will send the wrong message to would-be proliferators. It is vital that any would-be proliferators realize that not only the wish and ability to prohibit weapons of mass destruction exists but the will and determination is also there to use all means, up to and including the use of force, to enforce the prohibitions. The organization and size of UNSCOM was envisaged from the outset of being small (20–25) divided into five sections which would cease to

72 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

exist once they had completed their tasks leaving a continuing OMV group – as it was assumed that Iraq would cooperate fully with UNSCOM. Although UNSCOM grew somewhat, it remained a relatively small and efficient organization. The daily morning meeting of the Executive Chairman and the professional staff was a highly effective management tool that ensured that all members of UNSCOM in New York had a shared perception of events. At this meeting, the Executive Chairman briefed staff on what he had been doing and was briefed on the work of the various teams and other developments. He then, together with the Deputy Executive Chairman and the Senior Legal Advisor, left and in the second part of the meeting the Director of Operations reviewed how missions in the field were progressing and any other operational developments. The total duration of the daily meeting was generally less than 30 minutes. The small size and physical location of the staff facilitated coordination and ensured that developments of information found in one area were shared with other areas. However, the cramped office space made available to UNSCOM in the UN headquarters building and the small size of the team meant that there was little opportunity for calm reflection of what had been achieved and where next UNSCOM’s efforts should be focused. This meant that UNSCOM was more reactive and less proactive with fewer opportunities for lateral thinking and coordination between the different disciplines. There were essentially three separate elements of UNSCOM which interacted closely. First, there were the Special Commissioners, who were primarily senior specialists and diplomats from 21 Member States; second, the staff of UNSCOM, which was largely made up of personnel provided by supporting governments to UNSCOM for three months or longer; and third, the members of inspection teams which were made up from UNSCOM staff and from individuals seconded from supporting governments for the duration of the specific inspection mission. The Special Commission The Secretary-General set up the Special Commission with its Executive Chairman and Deputy Executive Chairman; the formal membership of the Commission was envisaged as being some 20–25. In the event, 21 individuals were appointed as members of the Special Commission with Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of Sweden being asked to serve as its first Executive Chairman and Dr Robert Gallucci of the United States as its first Deputy Executive Chairman. In March 1998, an additional Commissioner was appointed by the Secretary-General to head the Special Group for visits to Presidential sites bringing the number to 22. The Commissioners were selected to bring together appropriate expertise from a wide geographical spread of Member States of the United Nations including the 5 permanent members of the Security Council. The other

An Analysis of UNSCOM 73

countries in addition to Sweden and the United States who provided Commissioners were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Finland, France, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom and Venezuela. When individual Commissioners resigned, they were replaced by another representative from the same country.5 Thus the United States has provided successive Deputy Executive Chairmen as individuals have resigned and been replaced. The Executive Chairman, Deputy Executive Chairman and Commissioners in 1999 along with their predecessors are listed in Table 4.1; those shown in bold have served since the creation of the Special Commission. In 1999, over half of the Commissioners had been appointed in 1991 thereby providing valuable continuity.

Table 4.1

Members of the Special Commission on Iraq 1991–9

Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of Sweden – Executive Chairman Ambassador Richard Butler (July 1997) Dr Robert Gallucci (United States of America) – Deputy Executive Chairman Mr Michael Newlin (June 1992) Dr Pierce S. Corden (Dec 1992) Mr Charles Duelfer (Dec 1993) Dr Paal Aas (Norway) Lt Gen (Ret) Ken Adachi (Japan) Maj Gen Hideyo Kurata (June 1992) Professor Benson N. C. Agu (Nigeria) Lt Col Andrzej Badek (Poland) Dr Lucjan J. Lukasik (Feb 1997) Ms Joanna Wronecka (Nov 1998) Professor Bryan C. Barrass (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) Mr Ron Manley (June 1993) Mr Terrence Taylor (Dec 1993) Mr Paul Hatt (July 1995) Mr Paul Schulte (Oct 1997) Mr Peter von Butler (Germany) Dr Helmut Frick (Dec 1992) Mr Herbert Salber (Oct 1995) Mr Wilfried Krug (Oct 1996) Mr Michael Biontino (Sept 1998) Col Armando Caputo (Italy) Lt Col Nicola Circelli (June 1993) Lt Col GianPiero Perrone (Nov 1997)

74 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 4.1

Members of the Special Commission on Iraq 1991–9 – continued

Mr Ronald Cleminson (Canada) Dr John Gee (Australia) Dr Peter Dunn (June 1993 to 1997) Ambassador Johan Molander (Sweden) (July 1997 – following change of Executive Chairman) Professor Helmut Honig (Austria) Mr B. A. Kuvshinnikov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) Mr A. Gorelik (Russian Federation) (April 1996) Mr Gennady Gatilov (Oct 1997) Dr A. J. Jack Ooms (Netherlands) (to 1999) Prof Marjatta Rautio (Finland) Mr Michel Saint Mleux (France) Mr Roberto Sanchez (Venezuela) Lt Col Baginda Simandjuntak (Indonesia) Vacant from (Nov 1997) Prof Miroslav Splino (Czech Republic) Mr Emile Vanden Bemden (Belgium) Dr Yuan Renfeng (China) Mr Zhou Fei (March 1997) Mr Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) (March 1998 – Special Group)

The role of the Commissioners developed and matured during the 8 years of UNSCOM. Initially, the Commissioners provided the nucleus of the expertise available to UNSCOM and individual Commissioners were directly involved in the planning and execution of UNSCOM operations in the field, often leading inspection missions. Over time as the numbers of seconded personnel provided by supporting governments to UNSCOM for extended periods increased, such involvement of Commissioners was reduced. In the latter half of the 1990s they met twice a year in Plenary Session when they were briefed by the Executive Chairman and the staff of UNSCOM on the overall policy and strategy being followed by UNSCOM, the progress made during the previous six months and on the aims and objectives for the coming period. They also participated in policy formulation suggesting targets and goals for the period ahead. With the change of the Executive Chairman in July 1997, the Commissioners met just before the consolidated six monthly reports were issued thus enabling the Commissioners to consider these reports in draft and provide advice

An Analysis of UNSCOM 75

thereon to the Executive Chairman. In addition, since July 1997 the Executive Chairman adopted the practice of taking two, three or four Commissioners with him on his visits every two months to Baghdad thus enabling them to experience at first hand the difficulties of working with Iraq. The Commissioners also could provide a valuable link to their countries through which informal requests for assistance to UNSCOM could be channeled or advance indications provided of some future requirements for people or equipment. Although sometimes described as the Board of Governors of UNSCOM, this was somewhat misleading and a more accurate description would be an Advisory Board enabling the Executive Chairman to benefit from some degree of peer review and the enhanced confidence arising from the knowledge that the approach, policy and strategy of UNSCOM had been endorsed and supported by the Commissioners. UNSCOM staff The staff of UNSCOM in the headquarters in New York, in Bahrain and the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre were made up largely of seconded personnel provided by supporting governments together with a small number of UN staff, both professional and support. The fact that UNSCOM was largely staffed by personnel from supporting governments, who were able to provide the necessary expertise, made UNSCOM an atypical UN organization as it enabled the Executive Chairman to request additional staff with specific skills very quickly from supporting governments without the necessity to follow the normal UN procedures for recruiting staff which are lengthy and require an appropriate geographical distribution. This inherent flexibility of UNSCOM was further augmented through the support in kind, such as equipment, provided by supporting governments which avoided the necessity for the normal UN bidding process for the purchase of equipment. In addition, especially in the early years of UNSCOM prior to the implementation of UNSCR 986 (1995), the financing of UNSCOM was through the release to the United Nations of Iraqi frozen assets held by certain Governments and voluntary contributions from supporting governments, mainly in the Gulf. All staff (including Commissioners, UNSCOM staff whether in New York or elsewhere and inspectors) received a UN form headed ‘UNSSA for Consultant’ (UN Special Services Agreement) for six month periods; these SSAs were for a work assignment specified as ‘to provide expert advice to the Special Commission pursuant to SCR 687 (1991) and 715 (1991), UNSCOM’ which were additionally annotated with the words ‘when actually employed’. This annotation meant that the SSA started to be effective from the moment when travel commenced from the home country of the individual member of staff, inspector or Commissioner.

76 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

A particularly important condition stated on the back of the Special Service Agreement was in respect of obligations which stated that: Consultants shall neither seek nor accept instructions regarding the services to be performed for the United Nations from any government or from any authority external to the United Nations. During the period of service for the United Nations, consultants may not engage in any activity that is incompatible with the discharge of their duties with the Organisation. Consultants are required to exercise the utmost discretion in all matters of official business of the Organisation. Consultants may not communicate at any time to any other person, government or authority external to the United Nations any information known to them by reason of their association with the United Nations which has not been made public, except in the course of their duties or by authorisation of the Secretary-General or his designate; nor shall consultants at any time use such information to private advantage. These obligations do not lapse upon cessation of their service with the United Nations. These obligations thereby strictly ensured that the individual was working for the United Nations and was not receiving instructions from any other source. The precise numbers of staff in UNSCOM constantly varied as individuals from supporting governments started or finished their periods of secondment. However, an indication of the order of magnitude of the numbers can be gained from the numbers in May 1997 and in November 1998 which were broadly similar (Table 4.2). The numbers of staff in UNSCOM were in the range from 160 to 180; of these 120 to 140 were seconded from supporting governments and 40–50 were UN staff (about one-third professional, two-thirds support staff). These were located at the New York headquarters, in the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre and in Bahrain. Table 4.2 Location

Numbers of UNSCOM staff in New York, Baghdad and Bahrain Seconded staff

UN Staff Professional

May 97 New York Baghdad Bahrain TOTALS

30 90 0 120

Nov 98 39 98 0 137

May 97 7 6 3 16

Support

Nov 98

May 97

Nov 98

9 6 3 18

14 12 0 26

14 14 0 28

An Analysis of UNSCOM 77

Of the professional UN staff, only five, including the Chief Administration Officer, were career UN staff members. The other professionals were specifically recruited to fill UNSCOM posts. The nationalities of the seconded staff in New York are shown in the Table 4.3 which provide an indication of the nationalities and numbers as the precise nationalities and numbers varied from day to day hence the figures given are effectively snapshots. Table 4.3

Nationalities of seconded personnel to UNSCOM in New York UNSCOM seconded personnel in New York

Country

Argentina Australia Austria Brazil Canada France Germany Netherlands New Zealand Russia Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States of America

No. of staff May 97

Nov 98

1 2 1 1 2 3 4 1 2 2 1 1 4 8

1 5 2 – 2 5 5 1 2 3 – – 6 7

In addition to the nationalities seconded to New York, seconded personnel in Baghdad at those times came also from a further 14 countries: Belarus, Belgium, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Poland, Romania and South Africa. The staff at the headquarters in New York in November 1998 were organized into three principal groups: a) Office of the Executive Chairman b) Operations Unit c) Information Assessment Unit and Export/Import Joint Unit. In the office of the Executive Chairman were the: Executive Chairman, Ambassador Richard Butler (Australia) Deputy Executive Chairman, Charles Duelfer (US)

78 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

Senior Legal Adviser, John Scott (UK) Political Advisers, Gustavo Zlauvinen (Argentina) Eric Fournier (France) Nikita Zhukov (Russia) External Relations Adviser, Ewen Buchanan (UK) together with support staff and the Administrative Unit headed by Ms Alice Hecht (UN). The Operations Unit was headed by the Director of Operations, Danny Rouse (US). The Operations Unit comprised three groups reflecting the various disciplines: Chief of Ballistic Missiles Section, Nikita Smidovitch (Russia) who was also Deputy Director of Operations Chief of Chemical Weapons Section, Horst Reeps (Germany) Chief of Biological Weapons Section, Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack (Germany) The Information Assessment Unit and Export/Import Joint Unit was under Rachel Davies (UK) which comprised a number of analysts, export/import experts and database handlers which input information on the various programmes into the database; in November 1998 these came from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States. UNSCOM missions An essential element of UNSCOM was the mounting of missions to Iraq to carry out on-site inspections and other activities associated with implementing SCR 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions. Missions ranged in size from small ones of a few people to very large ones of 50 or more; durations also varied from one day to several weeks or months in Iraq. The process by which missions are generated and carried out has developed during the lifetime of UNSCOM. The precise procedure for any specific mission can also be mission-dependent. The typical process was as follows. The initial idea for a future mission was generally developed within the various discipline groups (i.e. ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, biological weapons) in New York. This outline idea would then be discussed at the weekly operations meeting with the Director of Operations. Subsequent to that meeting, it would be assigned a mission number such as UNSCOM 174/BW47 i.e. the 174th UNSCOM mission and the 47th BW mission. In some discipline groups, an operation plan was then generated which would set out the aim of the mission, an itinerary within Iraq identifying the locations to be inspected, together with a potential Chief Inspector and a suggested composition of the team. Soundings as to the availability of the

An Analysis of UNSCOM 79

Chief Inspector might then be made informally and usually directly by the head of the discipline group with the individual concerned; this discussion was likely to also address the composition and membership of the team. Such informal soundings sometimes upset the official channels. This operational plan was then discussed with the Executive Chairman to determine that the proposed mission was acceptable. The formal Mission Statement document was then generated setting out the aims and objectives of the mission, the Chief Inspector and members of the team, the duration and plan of the mission. This Statement then went to the Director of Operations (or in his absence the Chief of the Information Assessment Unit) for signature, the Chief Administrative Officer for the addition of the cash costs for the mission and signature, before going to the Executive Chairman for his signature. Once the Mission Statement has been approved, the Executive Chairman would sign formal letters to the relevant ambassadors at the United Nations advising them in confidence that a mission was planned to Iraq on suchand-such dates for a particular purpose for which specific expertise was being sought such as for the Chief Inspector post for the mission or for particular team members. Sometimes, a further sentence in the letter would indicate that a named individual had the appropriate expertise and experience of UNSCOM work and went on to state that it would be very much appreciated if that individual’s services could be made available to UNSCOM for the period requested. When the availability of the particular individuals had been confirmed, the discipline groups then initiated travel requests for the individual inspectors in the particular mission to travel from their home country to Bahrain in accordance with the mission plan. A logistic fax would be sent to Bahrain to arrange for the UNSCOM L-100 plane to fly the mission team into and out of Iraq or the mission would be organized so as to fit the plane schedule. In addition, the Executive Chairman signed a formal letter of appointment for the Chief Inspector; this would frequently, in respect of Chief Inspectors external to UNSCOM, be hand-carried by a member of UNSCOM staff to Bahrain and there handed to the Chief Inspector. The whole process of appointment and Mission Statement was essential to ensure that the mission was conducted in accordance with UN rules and therefore conferred UN status, privileges and immunities on the mission. Missions generally assembled in Bahrain for one to three days before going into Iraq in order to enable the inspection team to be briefed and for the Chief Inspector to give specific instructions on how the mission was to be carried out. The team was also provided with money to cover expenditures in Iraq. It also allowed some time for some degree of acclimatization before going into Iraq and for any health and safety issues to be addressed. Familiarization was also possible with any particular inspection techniques or equipment.

80 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

The mission would then fly into Iraq and carry out their inspection plan. Large missions of 15 or more would generally have an Operations Officer in the command structure of the mission in addition to the Chief Inspector and Deputy Chief Inspector. The role of the Operations Officer was to make everything happen and essentially getting to the site being inspected and then to make sure the Chief Inspector did not have to divert his or her efforts into coordinating the various elements of the team. Typically, a large mission would be divided into elements of about three people each in a separate vehicle; the Operations Officer would coordinate the movements of these elements and, in missions with helicopter surveillance of the site, liaise with the aerial inspection team. Essentially, the Operations Officer solved any and all logistical problems within the team. The Chief Inspector in most cases addressed any problems encountered with the Iraqis. In the first two years of UNSCOM, mission team members provided their own national chemical and biological protection equipment. From 1992, UNSCOM procured stocks of industrial protective equipment as well as military protective equipment and issued these as appropriate to missions. The industrial protective equipment was procured as military equipment was not designed for industrial hazards. The one exception to the provision of protective equipment by UNSCOM was in the case of inspectors who normally wear glasses. Following completion of their mission, the team would then fly out to Bahrain for one to three days of report writing before the team dispersed. The executive summaries of the reports of missions were in the early years circulated by the Executive Chairman to Security Council members; this practice subsequently lapsed. The importance of immediately writing and completing reports on missions was vital: a failure to provide a timely report negated the benefits of the mission especially when the Chief Inspector had been seconded to UNSCOM for a specific mission. Inspection teams These were made up of persons either requested from supporting governments or members of the UNSCOM organization based in New York or Baghdad. All functioned under the ‘UN SSA for Consultants’ which not only laid down the obligations of the individual but also defined the legal status of the individuals as follows: Individuals engaged under Special Service Agreement as Consultants serve in their personal capacity and not as representatives of a government or of any other authority external to the United Nations. Consultants are neither ‘staff members’ under the Staff Regulations of the United Nations nor ‘officials’ for the purpose of the Convention of 13 February 1946 on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Consultants may, however, be given the status of ‘experts on

An Analysis of UNSCOM 81

mission’ in the sense of Section 22 of Article VI of the Convention. If consultants are required to travel on behalf of the United Nations, they may be given a United Nations Certificate in accordance with Section 26 of Article VII of the Convention. The Chief Inspectors came from many countries. Table 4.4 sets out the Chief Inspectors for the UNSCOM chemical weapons missions together with an indication, where available, of the numbers of inspectors and the number of countries from which the inspectors came for each mission. Table 4.4

Chief Inspectors for chemical weapons inspections

Inspection

Chief Inspector

Nationality

Nos.

States

UNSCOM 2/CW 1 UNSCOM 9/CW 2 UNSCOM 11/CW 3 UNSCOM 12/CW 4 UNSCOM 17/CW 5 UNSCOM 20/CW 6 UNSCOM 21/CBW 1 UNSCOM 26/CW 7 UNSCOM 29/CD 1 UNSCOM 32/CD 2 UNSCOM 35/CW 8 UNSCOM 38/CDG

Peter Dunn Jean Paul Peroz Johan Santesson James Knapp Marius Van Zelm Bernhard Brunner Karen Jansen Hans-Dieter Jopp Michel Desgranges Ron Manley James Knapp Garth Whitty Paul Brough Aarie Wijmaalen Cees Wolterbeek Jurgen Mihm Karen Jansen Mark Silver Achim Biermann Bernhard Brunner Johan Santesson Igor Mitrokhin Nikita Smidovitch Roger Hill Horst Reeps Gerald Brubaker Horst Reeps Rod Godfrey Richard Soilleux Ron Manley Cees Wolterbeek James Poarch Horst Reeps Cees Wolterbeek Igor Mitrokhin

Australia France Sweden Canada Netherlands Switzerland US Germany France UK Canada UK US Netherlands Netherlands Germany US US Germany Switzerland WHO/Sweden Russia Russia Australia Germany US Germany UK UK UK Netherlands US Germany Netherlands Russia

24 21 26 10 51 26 18 19 26 14 8/4 100

8 11 10

UNSCOM 39/CBW 2 UNSCOM 40A UNSCOM 40B UNSCOM 44/CW 9 UNSCOM 47/CBW 3 UNSCOM 55/CW 10 UNSCOM 59/CW 11 UNSCOM 65/CW 12 UNSCOM 67/CW 13 UNSCOM 70/CW 14 UNSCOM 74/CW 15 UNSCOM 75/CW 16 UNSCOM 76/CW 17 UNSCOM 77/CW 18 UNSCOM 89/CW 19 UNSCOM 91/CW 20 UNSCOM 94/CW 21 UNSCOM 107/CW 22 UNSCOM 108/CW 23

15 10 11 10 7 8 4 23

16 9 6 35 13

6 8 7

9 10 6 7 10

12 11

5

82 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 4.4

Chief Inspectors for chemical weapons inspections – continued

Inspection

Chief Inspector

Nationality

UNSCOM 124/CW 25 UNSCOM 129A/CW 26A UNSCOM 129B/CW 26 UNSCOM 135/CW 27 UNSCOM 138/CW 28 UNSCOM 140/CW 29 UNSCOM 161/CW 30 UNSCOM 153/CW 31 UNSCOM 170/CW 33 UNSCOM 171/CW 34 UNSCOM 172/CW 35 UNSCOM 183/CW 37 UNSCOM 190/CBW 4 UNSCOM 195/CW 38 UNSCOM 196/CW 39 UNSCOM 198/CW 40 UNSCOM 202/CW 41 UNSCOM 203/CW 42 UNSCOM 211/CBW-BM1 UNSCOM 221/CW 44 UNSCOM 229/CW 45 UNSCOM 238/CW 46 UNSCOM 239/CW 47 UNSCOM 210/CW 48 UNSCOM 246/CW 49 UNSCOM 248/CW 50 UNSCOM 251/CW 51 UNSCOM 257/CW 52

Horst Reeps Cees Wolterbeek Cees Wolterbeek Cees Wolterbeek Igor Mitrokhin Horst Reeps Igor Mitrokhin Horst Reeps Ake Sellstrom Horst Reeps Igor Mitrokhin Cees Wolterbeek Igor Mitrokhin Horst Reeps Rod Godfrey Cees Wolterbeek Ake Sellstrom Cees Wolterbeek Igor Mitrokhin Tim Blades Cees Wolterbeek Igor Mitrokhin Rod Godfrey Horst Reeps Horst Reeps Igor Mitrokhin Cees Wolterbeek Cees Wolterbeek

Germany Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Russia Germany Russia Germany Sweden Germany Russia Netherlands Russia Germany UK Netherlands Sweden Netherlands Russia US Netherlands Russia UK Germany Germany Russia Netherlands Netherlands

Nos.

States

19 24 8 6 10 9 11

5 8 3

The Chief Inspectors for the chemical weapons missions came from 10 countries: Australia Canada France Germany Netherlands Russian Federation Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States

2 2 2 13 14 10 4 2 6 7

An Analysis of UNSCOM 83

These initially reflected the countries which could make appropriate experts available who had the required necessary knowledge of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents and the necessary leadership skills. In the later years, the Chief Inspectors were increasingly drawn from the UNSCOM staff in New York mainly because of the need for continuity in t he conduct of ongoing investigations, particularly into the FFCDs, where the results of one inspection could feed into the next. It was, however, clear that UNSCOM benefited immensely from many of the leading world experts in chemical weapons being made available to lead chemical missions. In the case of the biological weapons inspections, the Chief Inspectors came from a smaller number of countries, reflecting the scarcity of states with the necessary understanding from national programmes to counter biological weapons to successfully lead such missions. The Chief Inspectors are listed in Table 4.5 for the UNSCOM biological weapons missions together with an indication, where available, of the numbers of inspectors and the number of countries from which the inspectors came for each mission. Table 4.5

Chief Inspectors for biological weapons inspections

Inspection

Chief Inspector

Nationality

UNSCOM 7/BW 1 UNSCOM 15/BW 2 UNSCOM 53/BW 3 UNSCOM 72/BW 4 UNSCOM 78/BW 5 UNSCOM 86/BW 6 UNSCOM 84/BW 7 UNSCOM 87/BW 8 UNSCOM 88/BW 9 UNSCOM 92/BW 10 UNSCOM 94/BW 11 UNSCOM 96/BW 12 UNSCOM 99/BW 13 UNSCOM 104/BW 15 UNSCOM 105/BW 16 UNSCOM 106/BW 17 UNSCOM 109/BW 18 UNSCOM 110/BW 19 UNSCOM 111/BW 20 UNSCOM 112/BW 21 UNSCOM 113/BW 22 UNSCOM 115/BW 23 UNSCOM 116/BW 24 UNSCOM 118/BW 25 UNSCOM 121/BW 26 UNSCOM 125/BW 27

David Kelly David Huxsoll David Franz Volker Beck David Franz Johan Santesson Geoffrey Mohr David Kelly Richard Spertzel David Huxsoll Ken Johnson Annick Paul-Henriot Ken Johnson Richard Spertzel David Kelly Terence Taylor Diane Seaman Geoffrey Mohr David Franz Patrice Binder Richard Spertzel Terence Taylor Hamish Killip Ken Johnson Richard Spertzel Richard Spertzel

UK US US Germany US Sweden US UK US US Canada France Canada US UK UK US US US France US UK UK Canada US US

Nos.

States

27 13 21 20 10 31 3 13 5 9 10 4 9 6 12 14 9 11 10 14 7 9 10 9 8 7

12 10 6 10 6 8 3 2 7 6 3 5 4 5 6 5 5 5 7 5 5 3 5 4 5

84 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 4.5

Chief Inspectors for biological weapons inspections – continued

Inspection

Chief Inspector

Nationality

Nos.

States

UNSCOM 126/BW 28 UNSCOM 127/BW 29 UNSCOM 133/BW 30 UNSCOM 134/BW 31

David Kelly Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack Richard Spertzel Terence Taylor Owen Hammond David Kelly Richard Spertzel Hamish Killip David Kelly Richard Spertzel Richard Spertzel Debra Krikorian Andrew Robertson Richard Spertzel Richard Spertzel Terence Taylor David Kelly Richard Spertzel Richard Spertzel Hamish Killip Richard Spertzel Terence Taylor Richard Spertzel Hamish Killip David Kelly Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack Richard Spertzel Hamish Killip Andrew Robertson Richard Spertzel Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack Richard Spertzel Ken Johnson Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack Johannes Rath Diane Seaman Ira Jacobs John Howell Jan Rozing Bob Henstridge David Kelly Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack Ake Sellstrom David Kelly David Kelly Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack Diane Seaman

UK Germany US UK Australia UK US UK UK US US US Australia US US UK UK US US UK US UK US UK UK Germany US UK Australia US Germany US Canada Germany Austria US Canada Australia Netherlands UK UK Germany Sweden UK UK Germany US

16 8 7

7 5 5

18 8 7 13 30 8 3 11 16 7 10 9 11 7 13 9 9

5 6 3 7 8 4 2 7 7 4 5 6 6 4 6 6 4

5 11

3 4

UNSCOM 136/BW 32 UNSCOM 139/BW 33 UNSCOM 142/BW 34 UNSCOM 145/BW 35 UNSCOM 146/BW 36 UNSCOM 151/BW 37 UNSCOM 152/BW 38 UNSCOM 154/BW 39 UNSCOM 157/BW 40 UNSCOM 159/BW 41 UNSCOM 160/BW 42 UNSCOM 163/BW 43 UNSCOM 167/BW 44 UNSCOM 169/BW 45 UNSCOM 173/BW 46 UNSCOM 174/BW 47 UNSCOM 180/BW 48 UNSCOM 184/BW 49 UNSCOM 187/BW 50 UNSCOM 189/BW 51 UNSCOM 192/BW 52 UNSCOM 193/BW 53 UNSCOM 197/BW 54 UNSCOM 199/BW 55 UNSCOM 200/BW 56 UNSCOM 212/BW 57 UNSCOM 213/BW 58 UNSCOM 214/BW 59 UNSCOM 215/BW 60 UNSCOM 222/BW 61 UNSCOM 223/BW 62 UNSCOM 224/BW 63 UNSCOM 225/BW 64 UNSCOM 226/BW 65 UNSCOM 230/BW 66 UNSCOM 231/BW 67 UNSCOM 244/CBW 7 UNSCOM 250/BW 69 UNSCOM 253/BW 70 UNSCOM 256/BW 72 UNSCOM 260/BW 73 UNSCOM 261/BW 74

An Analysis of UNSCOM 85

The Chief Inspectors for the biological weapons missions came from 9 countries: Australia Austria Canada France Germany Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom United States

4 1 5 2 7 1 2 22 29

The preponderance of Chief Inspectors from the United Kingdom and the United States reflected the expertise in those two countries relating to biological weapons. The absence of Chief Inspectors from the Russian Federation reflected the lack of availability of English-speaking Russian BW experts.

Inspection The inspections carried out by UNSCOM were in a hostile and uncooperative environment. Consequently, the lessons to be drawn from the UNSCOM experience should be robust in the more normal permissive environment of multilateral arms control. A clear mandate was prepared for each UNSCOM inspection mission. This served to focus the effort of the mission and greatly enhanced its effectiveness. Such mandates were especially valuable when inspection teams were created by drawing upon individuals from a large number of Member States. These mandates were not disclosed to Iraq as it was evident that Iraq would then be keen to exploit them against the inspection. Role of Chief Inspectors. The tasks of the inspections carried out by UNSCOM varied enormously and the Chief Inspectors and the inspection teams varied widely from mission to mission. Nevertheless, it was clear that Chief Inspectors, particularly in the early inspections, varied in their approaches to carry out inspections. Some Chief Inspectors, aware that they alone had access to all available information about a particular site, functioned in a largely individual role, using the rest of the inspection team in a supporting role, and producing a primarily individual report on the inspection. Other Chief Inspectors worked more as part of the inspection team and produced a largely consensus report on the outcome of the inspection. There were benefits and disadvantages from both approaches – a team approach with multiple pairs of eyes and many people seeking the required information was more likely to succeed whereas a consensus report might be diluted to an unwarranted extent by a single dissenting

86 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

team member. It was clear that Chief Inspectors needed to be carefully selected to ensure that they had the necessary professional skills to lead and carry out the mission efficiently and effectively. The report should be the responsibility of the Chief Inspector rather than of the team. Chief Inspectors were increasingly appointed from the UNSCOM staff especially for FFCD verification missions. This greatly contributed to the effectiveness of such missions as such Chief Inspectors were intimately familiar with the nuances of the various situations of the Iraqi FFCDs and were likely to have also participated in the seminars with Iraqi personnel which had sought to clarify and augment the declarations. Nevertheless, the point that Chief Inspectors need to be selected for the mission – rather than just being available – needs to be emphasized. Experience. Chief Inspectors who had had experience of previous inspections – such as practice inspections for the CWC or the BTWC – were particularly effective. It was also clear that Chief Inspectors such as Peter Dunn were able to draw upon their previous experience as part of missions sent by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq war. Training. It was evident that UNSCOM Chief Inspectors and inspectors had little if any formal training prior to deployment to Iraq. They largely learnt on the job through experience. There would have been advantages in Chief Inspectors and inspectors having prior training and experience of working together before carrying out a mission in the hostile environment in Iraq. Advance notice. Notification letters were provided to Iraq, originally about a week in advance of the inspection and later about 48 hours in advance. These identified the Chief Inspector, the number of inspectors involved and the duration of the inspection. It is clear that the finite duration of some inspections was exploited by Iraq when it sought to conceal information. When the departure date of the inspection team was known then inspection activities could be delayed in many ways. A flexible duration enabled the inspection team to stay as long as necessary to obtain the information being sought. However, the scope for flexibility in UNSCOM’s operations was limited both because of the finite resources in Iraq which had to support both UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and because of the other commitments of the inspectors making up the individual inspection teams. Nevertheless some inspections were extended beyond their planned durations. In addition, Iraq had from time to time delayed access to sites whilst material had been removed from the site. Inspection teams. Many of the early inspection teams were made up at relatively short notice from individuals offered to UNSCOM by Member States of the United Nations. The qualifications and expertise of those individuals were extremely varied and consequently their ability to participate effectively in inspections aimed at determining the scope and extent of

An Analysis of UNSCOM 87

Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons programmes was distinctly variable. This was hardly surprising given that Iraq had pursued its own approach to chemical weapons and that most of the Member States providing experts to UNSCOM for the inspections had long since abandoned any offensive chemical weapons programmes of their own. Over time, many of these individuals gained experience from carrying out inspections, essentially learning on the job and the UNSCOM inspection missions became increasingly effective. It was evident that inspectors need to be trained. Western mind-set dangers. It was clear from the UNSCOM experience that Iraq sought to use any approaches available to them to produce their weapons of mass destruction. Consequently old techniques discarded and superseded in the West or alternative approaches regarded in the West as being inefficient were used successfully by Iraq. Chief Inspectors and inspection teams therefore need to be selected and trained so that those participating have technically open minds so that inspectors are prepared to look for and to be able to recognize non-standard routes of producing weapons of mass destruction. Seconded specialists. UNSCOM functioned through a small core group augmented by specialists provided by Member States for specific inspections or seconded to UNSCOM for periods generally ranging from 3 to 12 months. This worked well for UNSCOM because of its unique nature and focus on the activities of a single state. As the Executive Chairman had the ability to call on supporting states to make additional or specific personnel available at short notice, this enabled UNSCOM to react rapidly to developments and operate with much greater flexibility and speed than would have been possible for a fully UN staffed organization. Such an arrangement would be less likely to be acceptable for a multilaterally applicable regime. Continuity. A particular value and strength was the continuity of several members of UNSCOM and in particular of the Executive Chairman. There can be little doubt that the success of UNSCOM arose from the dogged tenacity over time with which the Executive Chairman maintained pressure on Iraq to comply with the Security Council Resolutions. Likewise the continuity of the heads of the various groups of UNSCOM over the past few years (such as Nikita Smidovitch from 1991, Horst Reeps from July 1993, Rachel Davies from Summer 1993, and Richard Spertzel from April 1994) as well as of individuals such as Igor Mitrokhin from September 1994 have contributed greatly to the success of UNSCOM. It has been equally clear that Iraq has been quick to exploit to the full any gaps in continuity, notably between successive inspections. It is all too easy, without being challenged, to say to one inspection team that the information being sought had been provided to the previous inspection or would be provided to the next inspection. It is thus evident that there is a vital need for continuity in the inspectorate charged with the effective implementation of a particular

88 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

treaty. There is also a need to maintain the professionalism of the inspectorate and to make provisions for bringing in new inspectors as existing ones leave. A mandatory rotation policy is not in the best interests of internationally effective regimes. Verification Verification had a central role to play in the work of UNSCOM. Iraq was required to provide declarations of its programmes of weapons of mass destruction and it was up to UNSCOM to verify these declarations. One of the difficulties encountered in Iraq was that the declarations submitted to UNSCOM were incomplete and inconsistent. Consequently, Iraq was required to provide Full, Final and Complete Disclosures (FFCDs). These were provided in numerous versions. For example, the Iraqi declarations of its chemical weapons programmes were as shown in Table 4.6 and the declarations of its biological weapons programmes as shown in Table 4.7. Table 4.6

Iraqi chemical weapons declarations

Date

Disclosure

Summary description

18 April 1991

Iraqi notification

Al Muthannah sole research, development, production and filling facility; some agent and munitions stored here Storage at Tammuz Air Base Dujayl Al Bakr Air Base Al Matasim Aerodrome Al Fallujah Proving Ground Agents: Mustard, GB/GF, Sarin, CS

19 and 28 March 1992

Full, final and complete reports

June 1992

Second FFCD

88 pages

25 March 1995

Third FFCD

Incorrect and incomplete VX programme only April 1987 to 1988 and then abandoned

7 October 1995

Revised chapters

November 1995

Draft FFCD

February 1996

Draft FFCD

22 June 1996

Fourth FFCD (440 pages)

Incomplete and inaccurate Summer 1991 – unilateral destruction Al Hussein warheads – unilateral destruction VX precursors

1 October 1996

Seven letters

Integral parts of Fourth FFCD

An Analysis of UNSCOM 89 Table 4.7

Iraqi biological weapons declarations

Date of declaration

Remarks

18 to 28 April 1991 February 1992 5 June 1992 March 1995 4 August 1995 27 June 1996 11 September 1997

Iraq notifications Draft FFCD Second FFCD Third FFCD Fourth FFCD Fifth FFCD Sixth FFCD

Analysis and verification of these declarations was thus a major part of the work of UNSCOM. Another major part of UNSCOM’s role was the establishment and maintenance of the OMV (Ongoing Monitoring and Verification) regime in Iraq which was designed to ensure that Iraq did not resume its prohibited programmes. As with the inspection lessons, the lessons for verification which can be drawn from the OMV programme in the uncooperative environment of Iraq should be robust for permissive multilateral regimes between cooperative States Parties to international arms control treaties. The lessons for verification can be summarized in the following paragraphs. Data collection and comparison was a particularly important component of UNSCOM’s activities. Information and data were provided to UNSCOM from a wide variety of sources ranging from information provided by Iraq, information obtained from inspection and from discussions with Iraqi personnel as well as information provided by Member States of the United Nations. In addition, the experts in UNSCOM were able to carry out internal analyses using the information to develop assessments of Iraq’s capabilities. The collation, comparison and analysis of this information and data was vital for the verification of Iraq’s disclosures and declarations. The use of a comprehensive computer-based data-handling system was a vital technical adjunct to UNSCOM. Sensitive information. UNSCOM developed an effective system for handling sensitive information provided by Member States or disclosed by Iraq. UNSCOM established its reliability and credibility in handling and using this information. In addition, individual experts working for UNSCOM were also able to draw on their own specialist expertise and knowledge to good effect. The ability to handle sensitive information, including commercially sensitive information, will be essential for any organization implementing an arms control treaty that addresses dual-purpose materials and equipment. The Information Assessment Unit and Export/Import Joint Unit. This unit was located in UNSCOM headquarters in New York. It was

90 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

responsible for inputting, handling and managing the immense amount of information collected by UNSCOM since it was established. For example, the information obtained from Iraq was greater than two million pages which needed to be input and systematically stored in the computer-based database to facilitate retrieval and assessment. This unit established effective procedures for handling of sensitive information provided by supporting governments, whether relating to supply information or to intelligence information. All such sensitive information was provided to the Executive Chairman who determined who should see the particular information and how it should be safeguarded within UNSCOM. Sensitive information was strictly compartmentalized. For example, in the export/import mechanism, separate communication systems were established between the supply governments and the joint (UNSCOM/ IAEA) unit located in the UNSCOM headquarters in New York as well as between the export/import unit in Baghdad and the New York unit. These secure communication links were separate from the normal UNSCOM secure communication links. The export/import mechanism showed that exports of sensitive dual-use items could be made to Iraq as the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) system provided UNSCOM and the exporting states with confidence that what had been exported was not being misused. UNSCOM demonstrated that it could be relied upon to protect commercial information so that commercial interests were not damaged, thereby providing suppliers with the confidence needed in order to cooperate through providing notifications of intended exports to Iraq to UNSCOM. Ongoing Monitoring and Verification. The core of the system for ensuring the compliance of Iraq with the requirements in SCR 687 (1991) that no proscribed programmes shall be carried out by Iraq was provided by the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) regime. This regime required that sites identified by UNSCOM for monitoring provide regular (six monthly – or, for sensitive sites – monthly) declarations which were checked by no-notice inspections carried out by resident teams located in the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC). Dual-purpose equipment was tagged so that movements, which should be notified in advance to UNSCOM, could be detected and their significance evaluated. A full understanding of the past proscribed programme was vital to ensure that the design of the OMV regime was comprehensive and all-embracing and that all relevant locations and activities were indeed being monitored. As the past proscribed programme was not fully disclosed by Iraq in any of the discipline areas – ballistic missiles, chemical weapons or biological weapons – the UNSCOM OMV regime was designed on the basis of what was known by UNSCOM. When further disclosures were made by Iraq, the OMV regime would be reviewed and consideration given to whether to include additional sites and activities.

An Analysis of UNSCOM 91

A particularly valuable tool in the OMV regime was the creation of protocols for every site being monitored. These protocols provided detailed information about a site and were updated regularly in the light of Iraqi declarations or of information gained by subsequent inspections of the site. The UNSCOM OMV regime covered some 300 sites in Iraq comprising some 86 biological sites and 150 chemical sites. The effectiveness of the OMV system was dependent on several factors – of particular importance were the completeness and accuracy of the regular declarations required from Iraq under the OMV regime. It became clear that problems with Iraq’s monitoring declarations were arising not from the facilities providing the raw data, but from Iraq’s national monitoring directorate which UNSCOM found had manipulated the accurate data provided by the facilities so that the monitoring declarations presented to UNSCOM were misleading and inaccurate. In addition, Iraq had failed to provide information, as it was required to do under UNSCR 715 (1991), about all sites and facilities where declarable equipment of a dual-use nature was located. For example, during a six month period, the Commission’s teams found several hundred pieces of dual-use equipment which had not been declared as it should. Whilst determination of Iraq’s proscribed programme is important to ensure that the OMV regime is comprehensive – and that some proscribed capabilities have not been successfully concealed – it became very apparent from UNSCOM’s experience that Iraq was seeking to reestablish its proscribed programmes and capabilities should it appear possible to do so. Consequently, as trade with Iraq resumed, as it had under the so-called ‘oil for food’ resolution, SCR 986 (1995), the OMV regime and its effective implementation with the cooperation of Iraq was of increasing importance. It was significant that in the April 1997 UNSCOM report to the Security Council, it was stated that UNSCOM had noticed efforts by Iraq to undercut the effectiveness of OMV through a variety of techniques. The report stated that the Executive Chairman had warned Iraq that Iraq’s deteriorating performance called into question Iraq’s commitment to the monitoring process and noted that if the trend was not reversed it could result in a situation with political consequences whereby monitoring could no longer be regarded as being operational. Such a development would be a clearly retrograde step which would significantly delay any hopes by Iraq that UNSCOM might report under paragraph 22 of UNSCR 687 (1991). Non-proliferation The UNSCOM experience is of particular relevance for situations in which the United Nations Security Council has, in effect, imposed a regime upon a non-compliant state. It demonstrates what steps can be taken by the Security Council acting in unison to address non-proliferation. After all, the Security Council when it met for the first time at the Head of State and Head of Government level on January 1992 had issued a Presidential statement that there were new favourable international circumstances

92 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

under which the Security Council had begun to fulfil more effectively its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In respect of weapons of mass destruction, the statement said6 that ‘The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat to international peace and security. The members of the Council commit themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end.’ [Emphasis added]. In addition, the UNSCOM experience demonstrated several lessons that are generally applicable to non-proliferation regimes as well as what can be achieved by the international community in regard to the export/import system for dual-use technologies and materials as the regime required that all Member States of the United Nations should provide information about proposed exports to Iraq prior to such exports taking place. Transparency in building confidence. A particularly outstanding lesson that emerged from the UNSCOM experience was the importance of transparency in building confidence. The overall confidence in the information provided by Iraq was built up from material from a wide variety of sources and its consistency, both internally and externally. The elements of this web of information were the Iraqi full, final and complete disclosures (FFCDs) (which had grown significantly over time – for example, the chemical FFCD had grown7 from 88 pages in 1992 to 440 pages on 22 June 1996), the responses made by Iraqi personnel in seminars as well as the information gained in inspections and that provided to the Special Commission by supporting states. It became readily apparent when evasive answers were being provided as the individual pieces of the information did not add up. The experience in Iraq has clearly shown the immense value of developing a web of information from which the UNSCOM specialists were able to judge quickly and accurately whether Iraq was indeed being open, as they had so often been encouraged to be, or evasive as they had so frequently been found to be. The export/import mechanism has resulted in indications that such a mechanism can actually promote trade as states which are exporting materials to Iraq could be more confident, because of the UNSCOM ongoing monitoring and verification system, that materials were not being diverted to a proscribed programme. The export/import mechanism was one of the particularly novel features of the UNSCOM regime for Iraq and one that has yet to be widely recognized. As a consequence, it was easier to export dual-purpose materials to Iraq under the export/import mechanism knowing that the OMV regime would ensure that the material and/or equipment once in Iraq would not be diverted to proscribed programmes than to make comparable exports to some other countries.8 In part, this facilitation of trade resulted from the clarity and comprehensiveness of the mechanism as it was clearer to companies as to what could and what could

An Analysis of UNSCOM 93

not be exported. The transparency in the end use of traded materials built confidence that the materials were not being used for prohibited purposes and thereby helped to assure States Parties to the BTWC and CWC that they were indeed complying with their obligations under those conventions. Such an export/import mechanism had therefore a positive effect on trade. The importance of national legislation. The BTWC and CWC both require States Parties to take appropriate national measures to implement the conventions; the CWC specifically requires that penal legislation be introduced. In several countries, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, national legislation has made it a criminal offence for any national of those countries to work with biological or chemical materials for prohibited purposes. It is, however, a concern that Iraq – although required under SCR 687 (1991) to enact such legislation – has yet to do so. Such legislation provides an essential framework which can be drawn upon to prosecute any individuals engaged in or supporting programmes for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This leads to a recognition of the importance of the international criminalization of work on weapons of mass destruction.9,10 It has become apparent that Iraq received assistance from companies and individuals from several other countries yet these companies and individuals appear to have not been engaged in illegal acts. There would be clear benefits in making any such provision of assistance to prohibited weapons of mass destruction programmes illegal. Secretary-General involvement. The Executive Chairman of UNSCOM reported directly to the Security Council and not through the SecretaryGeneral. This was a particular strength of UNSCOM as it meant that the Executive Chairman could speak with the authority of the Security Council and report directly to the Council. Attempts by Iraq to involve the Secretary-General and thereby seek to modify or dilute the authority of the Council did not succeed throughout the time that Rolf Ekeus was Executive Chairman. The situation changed when Richard Butler became Executive Chairman and the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, became involved in negotiations in Baghdad relating to access to Presidential sites. Eventually, the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, proposed the idea of a ‘comprehensive review’ which led to the burden of proof being placed on UNSCOM and the IAEA rather than, as specified by SCR 687 (1991), upon Iraq. The involvement of the Secretary-General in UNSCOM operations did not bring any benefits – it was evident that the direct reporting by UNSCOM to the Security Council was more effective. Security Council resolve. UNSCOM’s investigations clearly showed that there was an organized mechanism of concealment used by Iraq to deny access to proscribed documents and material retained since the adoption of SCR 687 (1991). Throughout these investigations Iraq sought to deflect or minimize the involvement of its Special Security Services in concealment

94 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

activities. Iraq has acknowledged that officially sanctioned false statements have been made to mislead UNSCOM in its investigation. It had resorted to delays and denials of access to sites designated by teams investigating concealment activities. Despite this behaviour, UNSCOM accumulated information which reinforced its assessment that the Iraqi concealment mechanism was established for the purpose of hiding and protecting proscribed material. Furthermore, the investigation revealed deficiencies in Iraq’s declaration concerning unilateral destruction of proscribed weapons, items and related documentation. Consequently, the fourth item in the programme of work agreed in 1996 enabled the Executive Chairman to address directly with the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq the steps which Iraq had taken to deliberately thwart the work of UNSCOM. UNSCOM was clearly successful in using the information that it had obtained from the Iraqi FFCDs and from successive inspections to demonstrate to the Deputy Prime Minister that Iraq was still concealing information and not cooperating with UNSCOM. The continued pressure on Iraq to provide the information needed to enable the FFCDs to be verified – and thereby enable UNSCOM to report under paragraph 22 of SCR 687 (1991) – led to the increasing stand-offs with Iraq during 1997 and 1998. It is particularly unfortunate that the permanent members of the Security Council other than the United Kingdom and the United States failed to recognize that UNSCOM was becoming increasingly successful in putting pressure on Iraq to provide the information needed to verify the FFCDs. UNSCOM had successfully limited Iraq’s options and, hardly surprisingly, Iraq chose to adopt an increasingly declamatory approach and to appeal over the heads of UNSCOM to the Security Council, to the SecretaryGeneral and the international community. Unfortunately, instead of standing united and firm, the Secretary-General and the permanent members of the Security Council other than the United Kingdom and the United States, appeared to have allowed themselves to be swayed and persuaded by the ever more strident and unsubstantiated Iraqi statements. The events since the establishment of UNSCOM in April 1991 have shown very clearly that Iraq had time and again sought in its obstructions to see how far it could push UNSCOM and the Security Council and thereby push back the constraints on what Iraq could do. In the early years, the very real danger that Iraq had posed during the 1990–91 war was still fresh to all members of the Security Council who adopted a united position. On several occasions, military action or the threat of military action was needed to force Iraq to step back and comply. Unfortunately, more recently the memories of the danger posed by Iraq have dimmed and the unity of the Security Council has been undermined. It was notable, however, that whilst, as late as February 1998, everyone including the Secretary-General recognized that it

An Analysis of UNSCOM 95

was the threat of imminent military action that forced Iraq to sign the Memorandum of Understanding and allow Presidential sites to be inspected, the eventual use of military force in December 1998 because of Iraq’s failure to cooperate with UNSCOM was not supported by all the permanent members of the Security Council. It seems apparent that had the permanent members of the Security Council been united and stood firm in December 1998 then Iraq would have backed down and been forced to cooperate enabling the OMV regime to continue. The prospects for future world security are dim indeed when some permanent members of the Security Council do not appear to appreciate the dangers that weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security if they are not united.

5 The Amorim Panel and the Creation of UNMOVIC

The setting up of the Amorim panel At the end of 1998 when the UNSCOM report of 15 December made it clear that ‘Iraq did not provide the full cooperation it promised on 14 November 1998’ [Emphasis added] and went on to add that ‘during the period under review Iraq initiated new forms of restriction upon Commission’s work… Iraq’s conduct ensured that no progress was able to be made in either the fields of disarmament or accounting for its prohibited weapons programmes.’ Military action in the form of aerial bombardment was taken by the United States and the United Kingdom against Iraq. In both countries the UNSCOM report was cited as demonstrating that Saddam Hussein had no intention of abandoning his weapons of mass destruction. Military action ceased after three days of bombing. The following day, 21 December 1998, saw reports that the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, had said that ‘The moment America and Britain launched missiles against Iraq they killed UNSCOM.’ In January 1999, there was debate in the Security Council as to how best to arrange for the weapons inspectors to return to Iraq with consideration being given to proposals made by a number of Security Council members. On 30 January 1999, the Security Council decided unanimously to establish three panels to compile reports by 15 April 1999 on the three main elements of Iraq’s compliance with the Security Council Resolutions: disarmament; humanitarian issues; and matters outstanding from Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The note 1 by the President of the Security Council states that it ‘continues to discuss options which would lead to the full implementation of all relevant Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq. While pursuing these discussions, the Security Council has decided that it would be useful to establish three separate panels and receive recommendations from them no later than 15 April 1999.’ The then President of the Security Council, Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil, 96

The Amorim Panel and the Creation of UNMOVIC 97

was invited to chair each of the panels and to maintain continuity by chairing the panels until they completed their work. This chapter considers the work of the disarmament panel. Insofar as the panel relating to disarmament was concerned, the decision stated that: 4. The first panel, on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues, would involve the participation and expertise from the United Nations Special Commission, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Secretariat, and any other relevant expertise. The panel would assess all the existing and relevant information available, including data from ongoing monitoring and verification, relating to the state of disarmament in Iraq. The panel would make recommendations to the Security Council on how, taking into account relevant Security Council Resolutions, to re-establish an effective disarmament/ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq. On 12 February 1999, the membership of the three panels was announced. The disarmament panel was to have 20 members of which 12 were associated with UNSCOM either as Commissioners or as UNSCOM personnel. The membership was as shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1

Membership of the Amorim panel on disarmament

Name

Country and affiliation

Comment

Ichiro Akiyama

Japan, OPCW

Director, Inspection Division

Jacques Baute

France, IAEA

Director, Iraq Nuclear Verification Office

Kaluba Chitumbo

Zambia, IAEA

Director, Safeguards Operations Division for Asia and Pacific

Ron Cleminson

Canada, UNSCOM

Special Commissioner

Rachel Davies

UK, UNSCOM

Head, Information Assessment and Export/Import Unit

Jayantha Dhanapala Sri Lanka, UN Under Secretary-General Disarmament Charles Duelfer

US, UNSCOM

Roberto Garcia Moritan

Argentina, unaffiliated expert

Guennady Gatilov

Russia, UNSCOM

Deputy Executive Chairman

Special Commissioner

98 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 5.1

Membership of the Amorim panel on disarmament – continued

Name

Country and affiliation

Comment

Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack

Germany, UNSCOM

Chief Biological Weapons Section

Hideyo Kurata

Japan, UNSCOM

Special Commissioner

Liu Jieya

China, unaffiliated expert

Johan Molander

Sweden, UNSCOM

Special Commissioner

Jack Ooms

Netherlands, UNSCOM

Special Commissioner

Daniel Parfait

France, unaffiliated expert

GianPerro Perrone

Italy, UNSCOM

Special Commissioner

Horst Reeps

Germany, UNSCOM

Chief Chemical Weapons Section

Paul Schulte

UK, UNSCOM

Special Commissioner

Tom Shea

US, IAEA

Head, Trilateral Initiative Office, IAEA Department of Safeguards

Nikita Smidovitch

Russia, UNSCOM

Deputy Director Operations

Of the 20 panel members, seven were UNSCOM Special Commissioners, four were members of UNSCOM, three were associated with the IAEA, one was from the OPCW, one the UN Under Secretary-General for Disarmament and three were unaffiliated experts.

The work of the Amorim disarmament panel The disarmament panel met from 23 to 27 February 1999 and from 22 to 27 March 1999 and issued its report2 on 27 March 1999. The panel decided that it should assess from a technical point of view and a broad perspective, the work of the United Nations and the IAEA in Iraq in the area of disarmament/ongoing monitoring and verification of proscribed weapons. The main objective of the panel was to ‘make recommendations to the Security Council on how, taking into account relevant Security Council Resolutions, to re-establish an effective disarmament/ ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq.’ reflecting the Security Council assessment that an effective presence of inspectors on the ground remains the most effective way to provide assurance that Iraq does not retain, acquire or rebuild its proscribed weapons. The panel report states that it decided first to achieve an understanding of the current status of disarmament/ongoing monitoring and verification

The Amorim Panel and the Creation of UNMOVIC 99

(OMV) in the country through a broad overview of the work undertaken by the United Nations and the IAEA. It then evaluated the possibility of addressing the remaining disarmament issues/areas of uncertainty through integrating these issues into a reinforced OMV regime. The report went on to say that the panel considered that ‘by providing a satisfactory answer to the fundamental question of whether it is feasible to factor those outstanding issues into an OMV developed to its full potentiality, while avoiding policy judgements, the panel might be enlarging the scope of options for the Security Council.’ With regard to disarmament, the panel report makes it clear that ‘it was not the objective to evaluate in its minute detail, every single aspect of each particular proscribed weapons area.’ It was noted that such assessments had been made on a number of occasions by the competent institutions in reports to the Security Council which had been made available to the panel as part of the ‘existing and relevant information available.’ The panel also heard briefings by experts from UNSCOM and the IAEA on the current status of disarmament and OMV in the four proscribed weapons areas (nuclear, missiles, chemical, biological). These briefings were focused on specific priority disarmament issues. In the case of UNSCOM this reflected its understanding of the desire of the Council to focus on selected important parts of its resolutions. It was recognized that the satisfactory resolution of these priority questions would increase considerably the level of confidence of UNSCOM’s overall verification. A 280-page report3 prepared by UNSCOM in January 1999 addressing the current state of affairs with respect to disarmament of Iraq’s proscribed weapons and on the ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq was circulated to the Security Council. Chemical weapons. The panel report noted that with regard to chemical weapons, UNSCOM had supervised or had been able to certify the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of large quantities of chemical weapons, their components and major chemical weapons production equipment. However, the panel pointed out that ‘UNSCOM has been able to establish material balances of major weapon-related elements of Iraq’s CW programme only on the basis of parameters as declared by Iraq but not fully verified by UNSCOM.’ The panel stated that UNSCOM had been able to make considerable progress in the verification of other CW-related activities in Iraq, among them the uncovering of Iraq’s VX project, CW research and development projects, Iraq’s procurement network and efforts for its CW programme. On the basis of all these findings, UNSCOM had obtained a good understanding of the major parameters of Iraq’s CW programme. The panel report then considered the outstanding issues in the chemical weapons area and noted that satisfactory resolution is required especially for the topics set out in Table 5.2.

100 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 5.2

Outstanding issues relating to chemical weapons Outstanding issues relating to chemical weapons

A

Discrepancies with Iraq’s declarations on the expenditure of CW munitions in the 80s, as indicated by figures contained in a document detailing consumption of special munitions by Iraq;

B

Evidence of 550 artillery shells filled with mustard declared to have been lost shortly after the Gulf war;

C

Accounting for 500 R-400 bombs, which could be done through the verification of the disposition of the parachute tail sections of those bombs;

D

Iraqi declarations on the production and weaponization of the chemical agent VX, in particular with regard to the military plans for the use of VX during various periods, the different precursors available and the synthetic routes pursued;

E

The material balance of CW production equipment.

Biological weapons. The panel report noted that with regard to biological weapons, UNSCOM had uncovered the proscribed biological weapons programme of Iraq, whose existence had been concealed completely by Iraq until 1995. The panel said that this and subsequent work had permitted UNSCOM to obtain significant insights into Iraq’s biological warfare capabilities, including a broad understanding of the main delivery systems. UNSCOM had also gained a detailed, albeit incomplete, picture of Iraq’s procurement activities for its biological warfare programme. The panel also noted that UNSCOM had ordered and supervised ‘the destruction of Iraq’s main declared BW production and development facility, Al Hakam. Some 60 pieces of equipment from three other facilities involved in proscribed BW activities as well as some 22 tonnes of growth media for BW production collected from four other facilities were also destroyed. As a result, the panel noted that the declared facilities of Iraq’s BW programme have been destroyed and rendered harmless.’ [Emphasis added]. The panel then considered the outstanding issues in the biological weapons area and noted that in this area, Iraq’s Full Final and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) had not been accepted by UNSCOM as a full account of Iraq’s BW programme. A full disclosure of the scope and nature of the programme was considered outstanding by UNSCOM. The briefing given to the panel indicated that this evaluation was corroborated by technical evaluation meetings called by UNSCOM and at the request of Iraq. This briefing also indicated that critical gaps needed to be filled in order to achieve a reasonably complete picture. It was also recognized that because BW agents can be produced using simple technology and equipment, generally dual-use, Iraq possesses the capability and knowledge base to produce biological warfare agents quickly and in volume.

The Amorim Panel and the Creation of UNMOVIC 101

Nuclear weapons. The panel report said that the IAEA had been able, in the course of its eight years of extensive inspection activities, to develop a technically coherent picture of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme covering the stages from the production and procurement of natural uranium compounds, through Iraq’s development of enrichment processes, to the design and experimental work for the eventual weaponization of highly enriched uranium. Questions remained in regard to Iraq’s abandonment of its nuclear programme. Proscribed Missiles. The panel report stated that UNSCOM had obtained a broad understanding of Iraq’s efforts to develop a missile delivery system for its nuclear weapons and a detailed picture of Iraq’s procurement effort for its proscribed missile programmes. A satisfactory material balance had yet to be achieved. Overall assessment. The panel noted that, in spite of well-known difficult circumstances, UNSCOM and IAEA had been effective in uncovering and destroying many elements of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes in accordance with the mandate provided by the Security Council. The panel stated that the IAEA had been able to devise a technically coherent picture of Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM had achieved considerable progress in establishing material balances of Iraq’s proscribed weapons. Although important elements were still to be resolved, the bulk of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes had been eliminated. The panel went on to note that although there were differences in the panel members’ perception and understanding of remaining issues, including their relevance to the overall verification process, it was evident that ‘a satisfactory resolution of certain areas, in particular those identified as priority, would contribute to the overall assurance that any disarmament and/or monitoring and verification mechanism could provide. Or, in other words, there seems to be an inverse correlation between resolution of those issues by Iraq and the overall degree of intrusiveness of the regime to be implemented.’ The panel examined an integrated approach to disarmament and to ongoing monitoring and verification. They noted that although disarmament and monitoring and verification address different dimensions of the broader problem of disarmament/reacquisition of proscribed weapons, ‘both can be achieved, in an integrated fashion, through the use of on-site inspections with full access, including no-notice inspections, sample analysis, aerial surveillance, evaluation of documentation, interviews, installed monitoring equipment, or, most effectively, a combination of them.’ The panel also recognized that, due to the different degrees of confidence, ‘more effort should be placed in areas which have caused the greater concern, as seem to be the case in the biological and some chemical weapons areas.’ [Emphasis added]. It was noted that the original OMV plan had assumed that a fairly complete picture of Iraq’s previous activities would have been obtained and

102 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

therefore the OMV plan had not been designed to resolve explicitly the remaining disarmament issues. Panel members agreed that the adoption of a reinforced OMV might represent a refocusing and evolution of the patterns of work as pursued by UNSCOM. The panel stated that ‘the reinforced OMV system should make maximum use of synergies, cross checks and cross fertilizations between the activities of the four disciplines (nuclear, biological, chemical, missile) and the Export/import Monitoring Mechanism in order to ensure confidence in the continuing absence of proscribed activities as well as clarification and progressive resolution of disarmament issues.’ It was pointed out that the benefit of the integrated approach would be that all information gathered from these concurrent activities would be analyzed systematically, considered against other data and examined in a multidisciplinary context. The panel concluded that the net effect could be to enable rapid and effective work towards confirmation of Iraq’s disarmament status, provided the rights set out in SCR 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1051 (1996) were fully respected. General observations. The panel also included in its report various suggestions for adjustments in current practices and procedures without prejudice to any future Security Council decision. Suggestions were made also for the restructuring of the Special Commission as a collegiate body. The Commission could provide independent advice, guidance and general oversight, both at expert and diplomatic levels, on carrying out activities under the monitoring and verification plan and any problems, referred to it, that might arise in that connection. It would carry out functions entrusted to it by the Security Council, possibly including: a. Consideration of any matter relating to the execution of the monitoring plan referred to it by the Security Council for advice; b. Consideration of regular reports from the Executive Chairman on the conduct of operations; c. Consideration of particular issues referred to it by the Executive Chairman with a view to their resolution or to a recommendation to the Security Council; d. Consideration of complaints by Iraq regarding the conduct of inspections; e. Establishment of rosters of experts for possible selection to serve on monitoring operations; and f. Advice on personnel policy. The panel report went on to suggest that the Commission’s composition should also be reviewed by the Security Council so that it would include ‘a core of technical experts; representatives from among Security Council members; the Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and possibly other members of the Secretariat. It is thought that among the tech-

The Amorim Panel and the Creation of UNMOVIC 103

nical experts a representative of the IAEA and of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) might also be included. In order to ensure the proper liaison of the collegiate body with the Security Council, the meetings of the Commission might be presided over by a representative of a non-permanent member of the Security Council.’ The panel concluded that the Commission should meet every three months, except for emergency meetings. The panel report stated that ‘the renovated UNSCOM should ensure a clear United Nations identity and be guided by the principles of full independence, rigour and transparency in order to ensure the effectiveness of its work and credibility of its results.’ In regard to recruitment, the panel noted that ‘a central component in ensuring an effective and credible system is the recruiting of staff who are technically competent, committed to the objectives of the Security Council Resolutions, impartial, and if possible have some experience of inspections.’ The panel also recognized that the personnel management strategy should ensure the optimum mix of qualifications, background and of long-term and short-term staff. In addition, they noted that ‘Without prejudice to these requirements, staff selection should also reflect the desirability of establishing broad national representation to the extent possible’. The panel also noted that cost efficiency and technical effectiveness could be promoted by complementing permanent staff with temporary staff selected, to the extent possible, with a roster of specialists. In addition, the panel also stated that ‘Taking into account United Nations policy, recourse to cost-free personnel should be limited.’ In regard to conducting inspections and monitoring operations, the panel stated that ‘effectiveness should be the primary consideration. A rigorous and comprehensive approach should be adopted to planning and in-field activities and should take into account the difficulties encountered in the past in Iraq, including instances of obstruction and/or deception. At the same time unnecessary confrontation or disproportionate reactions should be avoided.’ The panel’s conclusions The panel concluded that the effectiveness of the monitoring and verification system depends on it being comprehensive and intrusive. Rigorous implementation is critically dependent on the full exercise of the rights of full and free access set forth in relevant Security Council Resolutions. The monitoring and verification system is an integral whole that can be meaningfully implemented only in its entirety. At the same time, its implementation needs to be carried out objectively in a technically competent and through manner having regard to Iraqi sovereignty, dignity and sensitivities, including religious and cultural ones, as well as those related to commercial confidentiality. The panel went on to state that ‘given the

104 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

difficulties experienced in the past, this will require firm and active support by the Security Council for the implementation of the reinforced OMV system’ and thus that Iraq will have to be engaged by the Security Council sooner rather than later as the ‘reinforced OMV would be, if anything, more intrusive than the one so far practised.’ Consequently, the panel point out that it is up to the Security Council to devise ways of ensuring that Iraq accepts such monitoring and verification. Finally, the panel report states that in summary, ‘the panel agreed on the possibility of an integrated system that is a reinforced OMV within the existing legal framework of resolutions SCR 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1051 (1996) as well as the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 February 1998, which would be capable of addressing the outstanding disarmament issues.’ The report notes that ‘to be effective, any system has to be deployed on the ground, which is impossible without Iraqi acceptance. How this acceptance will be obtained is the fundamental question before the Security Council.’

Subsequent Security Council deliberations The Amorim disarmament panel report was issued on 27 March 1999. Iraq responded on 6 April 1999 with 24 pages of comment saying that the disarmament panel report was based on false premises and that the opportunity had been missed for the panel to consult an ‘untainted, independent and professional group of experts.’ The Security Council began its consideration of the report on 7 April 1999 when it heard a summary of the panel’s assessments and recommendations from the Chairman of the Panel, Celso Amorim. Within a couple of weeks, it was clear that there were tensions within the Security Council when Britain and Russia put forward rather different draft resolutions. It was reported that the British resolution co-sponsored by the Netherlands, Argentina and Slovakia, called for a new United Nations Commission on Inspection and Monitoring (UNCIM) to replace UNSCOM and that UNCIM should have ‘immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect … as well as to all officials and other persons under the authority of the Iraqi Government whom UNCIM wishes to interview so that UNCIM may fully discharge its mandate.’ The Russian resolution co-sponsored by China and France endorsed ‘the conclusion of the disarmament panel that it is technically feasible to address, through integration, remaining unresolved disarmament issues of the Iraqi past military programs in the context of a reinforced OMV [ongoing monitoring and verification] system and that such a system is viable.’ The two resolutions are sharply different in regard to when the UN sanctions against Iraq should be lifted with the British resolution retaining the sanctions until UNCIM certify to the Council that

The Amorim Panel and the Creation of UNMOVIC 105

Iraq is essentially a WMD-free zone whereas the Russian resolution would lift the sanctions as soon as the reinforced OMV system in Iraq has become effectively and efficiently operational. As the lifting of sanctions would remove a key incentive for Iraq to cooperate, the Russian, Chinese and French proposal appeared to put a greater priority on the reopening of commercial trade than on international security considerations. It was to take several months before there were any signs that the Security Council was nearing agreement. Towards the end of 1999, it was reported that attention was focusing on a British/Netherlands draft on the one hand and on a French draft which drew upon elements of the earlier British/Netherlands and Russian drafts. It was not, however, until 17 December 1999 that the Security Council adopted a new Resolution 1284 (1999)4 which established a UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace the Special Commission. This resolution was approved by 11 votes (Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, Gabon, Gambia, Namibia, Netherlands, Slovenia, United Kingdom and United States) to 0 with 4 abstentions (China, France, Malaysia and Russia). The resolution states that the Security Council: 2. Decides also that UNMOVIC will undertake the responsibilities mandated to the Special Commission by the Council with regard to the verification of compliance by Iraq with its obligations under paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of Resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, that UNMOVIC will establish and operate, as was recommended by the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues, a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, which will implement the plan approved by the Council in Resolution 715 (1991) and address unresolved disarmament issues, and that UNMOVIC will identify, as necessary in accordance with its mandate, additional sites in Iraq to be covered by the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification; [Emphasis added]. The resolution goes on to state that the Security Council: 4. Reaffirms its Resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 1051 (1996), 1154 (1998) and all other relevant resolutions and statements of its President, which establish the criteria for Iraqi compliance, affirms that the obligations of Iraq referred to in those resolutions and statements with regard to cooperation with the Special Commission, unrestricted access and provision of information will apply in respect of UNMOVIC, and decides in particular that Iraq shall allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport which they wish to inspect in accordance with the mandate of UNMOVIC, as well

106 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

as to all officials and other persons under the authority of the Iraqi Government whom UNMOVIC wishes to interview so that UNMOVIC may fully discharge its mandate. [Emphasis added]. The resolution required the Secretary-General to appoint, subject to the approval of the Council, within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution an Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and also, in consultation with the Executive Chairman and the Council members, to appoint suitably qualified experts as a College of Commissioners for UNMOVIC who were to meet regularly to review the implementation of this and other relevant resolutions, to provide professional advice and guidance to the Executive Chairman, including on significant policy decisions and on written reports to be submitted to the Council through the Secretary-General. The resolution also requested the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, within 45 days of his appointment, to submit a plan to the Council, for the structure and staffing of UNMOVIC which was to incorporate ‘as appropriate the recommendations of the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues.’ Staffing was to be with ‘suitably qualified and experienced personnel, who would be regarded as international civil servants subject to Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations, drawn from the broadest possible geographical base, including as he deems necessary from international arms control organizations, and for the provision of high quality technical and cultural training.’ In addition, the resolution: 7. Decides that UNMOVIC and IAEA, not later than 60 days after they have both started work in Iraq, will each draw up, for approval by the Council, a work programme for the discharge of their mandates, which will include both the implementation of the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, and the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq pursuant to its obligations to comply with the disarmament requirements of Resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance and further decides that what is required of Iraq for the implementation of each task shall be clearly defined and precise; [Emphasis added]. Finally the resolution sets out the intention of the Security Council to lift the embargo on sales to and from Iraq, once reports have been received from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and from the Director General of the IAEA advising that Iraq has cooperated in all respects with UNMOVIC and the IAEA in particular in fulfiling the work programmes in all the aspects referred to in paragraph 7 above, for a period of 120 days after the date on which the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification is fully operational.

The Amorim Panel and the Creation of UNMOVIC 107

In contrast to the earlier SCR 687 (1991), which established UNSCOM by simply calling upon the Secretary-General to form a Special Commission to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s biological, chemical and missiles capabilities, SCR 1284 (1999) establishing UNMOVIC sets out in much greater detail the requirements of the Security Council in regard to the staffing of UNMOVIC. It also sets out much more clearly, for understandable reasons in the light of Iraq’s obstruction of UNSCOM, the requirements on Iraq for provision of ‘immediate, unconditional and unrestricted’ access for UNMOVIC. Although SCR 1284 (1999) set the scene for the resumption of inspections in Iraq, three permanent members of the Security Council – France, Russia and China – abstained thus sending a mixed message to Iraq. It was hardly surprising that the Iraq Deputy Foreign Minister Nizar Hamdoon was reported as saying that Iraq had major reservations on the SCR 1284 (1999) and its conditions.

6 The Years of UNMOVIC

The formation of UNMOVIC On 17 January 2000, the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, nominated Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of Sweden, the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM from 1991 to 1997, as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC. However, although the United Kingdom and United States enthusiastically endorsed the choice, Russia, France and China were unwilling to agree. Consequently, on 26 January 2000, the Secretary-General nominated1 Dr Hans Blix of Sweden, the Director General of the IAEA from 1981 to 1997, as Executive Chairman and this nomination was approved2 by the Security Council on the following day. Dr Blix took up his post as Executive Chairman on 1 March 2000.3 Two months later, on 10 March 2000, the Secretary-General wrote4 to the President of the Security Council to say that following consultation with Hans Blix and with the members of the Security Council he had appointed the Commissioners for UNMOVIC (Table 6.1). He also said that Dr Hans Blix, in his capacity as Executive Chairman, would chair meetings of the UNMOVIC College of Commissioners. The 16 Commissioners came from 15 countries and from the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs. This was a smaller number than the UNSCOM Commissioners which had been initially envisaged as being some 20 to 25 in number and were in fact 21 strong including both the Executive and Deputy Executive Chairman of UNSCOM. Two of the UNMOVIC Commissioners – Ron Cleminson of Canada and Marjatta Rautio of Finland – were original UNSCOM Commissioners appointed in 1991 and one UNSCOM Commissioner prior to the termination of UNSCOM – Paul Schulte of the United Kingdom – continued as an UNMOVIC Commissioner. The other UNMOVIC Commissioners were new with several new countries (Argentina, Brazil, India, Senegal and Ukraine) providing Commissioners whilst some countries (Austria, Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Indonesia, Italy, Netherlands, Poland 108

The Years of UNMOVIC 109 Table 6.1

Commissioners for UNMOVIC appointed on 10 March 2000

Name

Country

Adigun Ade Abiodun Reinhard Bohm Ron Cleminson Cong Guang Therese Delpech Robert Einhorn Yuriy V. Federov Konstantyn Gryschenko Gunterio G. Heineken Hannelore Hoppe Takanori Kazuhara Roque Monteleone-Neto Annaswamy Narayana Prasad Marjatta Rautio Paul Schulte Cheikh Sylla

Nigeria Germany Canada China France United States Russian Federation Ukraine Argentina UN Department for Disarmament Affairs Japan Brazil India Finland United Kingdom Senegal

and Venezuela) which had provided Commissioners to UNSCOM did not to UNMOVIC. Two of the UNMOVIC Commissioners, Heineken and Monteleone-Neto had worked in UNSCOM. A month later, on 6 April 2000, the Secretary-General forwarded5 to the Security Council the draft organizational plan prepared by Hans Blix in consultation with the Secretary-General. This plan states that it ‘aims, first of all, to secure for UNMOVIC the capacity, staffing, and management that will enable it to fulfil the tasks mandated by the Security Council. At the same time, it endeavours to keep the Commission ‘’lean’’, in the sense of keeping the staffing level no higher than is strictly necessary for the performance of its responsibilities and as experience in the field dictates.’ The organizational plan includes the structure of UNMOVIC as an Annex. This is reproduced in Figure 6.1. The majority of staff were to be in four divisions and an administrative service, each headed by a senior official. The staff would be paid by the United Nations from Iraqi oil sale funds and serve under the appropriate UN conditions of employment. The plan also stated that ‘rosters will be prepared with the names of persons with special skills and expertise to supplement UNMOVIC staff on inspection teams as required. Such persons will have gone through the training programmes established within UNMOVIC before being included in the rosters. When called upon to serve, they will be given United Nations contracts. Cost-free experts may be engaged only in special circumstances and with the express approval of the Executive Chairman.’

110 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

Executive Chairman

College of Commissioners Secretary

External Relations

Legal Advisor

Public Information

Divison of Technical Support and Training

Administrative Service

Budget and Finance

Personnel, Recruitment, Health and Safety

Translation and Interpretation

Division of Planning and Operations

Divison of Analysis and Assessment

Division of Information

Equipment, Analytical Services, Procurement

Biological Weapons

Biological Weapons

Export/Import Joint Unit

Communications, Transportation, Security

Chemical Weapons

Chemical Weapons

Outside Information Sources

Training

Missiles

Missiles

Imagery

Bahrein Field Office

Multidiciplinary Inspections

Multidisciplinary Inspections

Data Processing and Archives

Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Centre

Figure 6.1

Organizational structure of UNMOVIC

The plan makes it very clear that unlike UNSCOM, most staff of UNMOVIC will be UN employees. The plan states that: While the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) relied mainly on staff seconded from and paid by national Governments, the present plan envisages that most staff will be United Nations employees subject to Article 100 of the Charter, which requires that they shall neither seek nor receive instructions from any Government and that Member States shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. The plan addresses the question of what to do about staff who had been in UNSCOM. It was noted that about two-thirds of the professional staff of UNSCOM have left and some more may do so. Although there will be no automatic transition to United Nations employment contracts for previous

The Years of UNMOVIC 111

UNSCOM staff, they will be free to apply for the new United Nations positions in competition with other candidates as it was recognized that their previous work will have given them ‘valuable experience and knowledge that could usefully be passed on to new UNMOVIC staff. A combination of renewal and continuity would minimize the loss of momentum and knowledge that has inevitably occurred during the long absence of inspection and monitoring.’ The plan goes on to state that ‘staff recruitment will take place with the aim of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity, in accordance with Article 101 of the Charter, and staff, including the staff of inspection teams, will be drawn from the broadest possible geographical base.’ It then goes on to adopt a pragmatic two-step approach to recruitment beginning with prompt action to fill the core needs of UNMOVIC followed by full recruitment to make UNMOVIC fully operational. The plan then addresses the responsibilities of the Commission and of Iraq. This sets out what is entailed in the ‘verification of compliance by Iraq with its obligations’ and the ‘reinforced system of ongoing monitoring, verification and inspection’. In regard to the former, UNMOVIC has the responsibility to verify Iraq’s compliance, with its obligations to: (a) Unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents, all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto, and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts and repair and production facilities; (b) Declare all of its holdings of the foregoing items, agree to immediate on-site inspection of its biological, chemical and missile capabilities and accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of those items; (c) Unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items referred to above. The responsibilities of UNMOVIC, in connection with paragraphs 8 and 9 of Resolution 687 (1991), are generally referred to, in Resolution 1284 (1999), as ‘disarmament tasks’, while the responsibilities under paragraph 10 of Resolution 687 (1991) relate to implementing the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. As already noted, the report of the Amorim panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues recommended that those two tasks be merged and that a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification capable of addressing, through integration, remaining unresolved disarmament issues be carried out. The plan recognizes that ‘the organization and management of UNMOVIC must be tailored to implement this system – preparing it, directing it and reporting on it.’ The plan sets out what the reinforced OMV system requires UNMOVIC to do. In particular, UNMOVIC must be able to verify Iraq’s declarations

112 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

regarding its proscribed programmes, its periodic reporting on sites subject to monitoring and its notifications under the export/import regime of dualuse items both before and after importation. It must designate sites for inspection and undertake on-site inspections, including no-notice inspections, throughout Iraq. It must be able to conduct interviews with officials and other persons under the authority of the Government of Iraq and analyze documentation provided by or found in Iraq. It must also be prepared to take samples to be analyzed inside or outside Iraq. The plan also sets out the organizational structure of UNMOVIC and provides useful insight into the planned functions of the four Divisions: • Division of Planning and Operations – Four functional units: • Biological weapons, • Chemical weapons, • Ballistic missiles, and • Multidisciplinary inspections and operations. – Planning, directing and performing all monitoring, verification and inspection activities; – Overall planning of monitoring, verification and inspection; – Propose the sites, objectives and timing of inspections and monitoring; – Decide upon the composition of inspection teams in the light of the objectives of each mission; – Propose to the Executive Chairman the appointment of each Chief Inspector for field duty. • Division of Analysis and Assessment – Four functional units for analysis and assessment: • Biological weapons, • Chemical weapons, • Missiles, and • Multidisciplinary inspections. – Analyzing and assessing information available to UNMOVIC, including information from other sources, such as information about export/ import activities, overhead imagery and outside information; – Providing to the Executive Chairman a draft quarterly report on UNMOVIC activities for his consideration and for subsequent submission by him to the College of Commissioners; – Compiling, with the cooperation of the Division of Information and the Division of Planning and Operations, a list of remaining disarmament issues from which key issues can be identified. • Division of Information will include – The Export/Import Joint Unit – A unit to gather and process overhead imagery.

The Years of UNMOVIC 113

– Continuously integrate new information received from inspections and other sources with relevant existing information; – Operate the UNMOVIC database; – Be in charge of the archives; – Be the sole entrance point for intelligence provided by Governments which must be one way only. • Division of Technical Support and Training – Plan and provide training and logistical support for inspection and monitoring operations and other missions; – Develop, organize and run technical and cultural training programmes; – Obtain equipment and supplies; – Responsible for the installation and maintenance of all such equipment; – Provide the international and field system of communications; – Arrange for the ground and air transport facilities necessary for field missions; – Establish and accredit a network of analytical laboratories; – Arrange for transportation of samples and hazardous material. A week later, on 13 April 2000, the Security Council approved6 the organizational plan.

UNMOVIC preparations for operations in Iraq The first quarterly report of UNMOVIC was submitted7 on 1 June 2000. This was mainly concerned with staffing and training issues. It noted that the College of Commissioners had its first meeting on 23 and 24 May 2000 which had been attended by observers from the IAEA (Jacques Baute, Team Leader of the IAEA–Iraq Action Team) and the OPCW (Ruth Mohlenkamp, Head of the Policy and Review Branch, Verification Division). The report states that the UNMOVIC training is to ‘include historical, legal, administrative and political issues related to weapons inspections and monitoring activities in Iraq, as well as the historical and cultural background of Iraq. Lessons from past inspection and monitoring activities are included. … Additionally, there will be discipline-specific (ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, biological weapons and export/import) training.’ The first UNMOVIC training course was planned to run for four weeks starting in July 2000. The next report was submitted8 on 28 August 2000 which addressed the operating procedures under a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, including those for ‘sensitive sites’, and recognized the importance of guidelines and standard operating procedures which would assist Chief Inspectors. There was also discussion of a draft action plan for the resumption of activities in Iraq and of sampling procedures. Progress had been made in recruitment of staff with the headquarters-based core staff being almost filled with 42 persons in posts drawn from 20 states and the

114 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

first training programme involving 44 persons from 19 states had been held in July. In addition, UNMOVIC had begun a systematic review of the Commission’s databases as well as of inspection procedures and of inspection plans to reestablish the baseline in Iraq once activities in Iraq resume. For the next two years, the quarterly reports continue to indicate that further progress was being made in preparation for carrying out activities in Iraq. These are summarized in Table 6.2. The eighth report mentioned that Hans Blix had been with Kofi Annan when Amr Moussa, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States conveyed a message that Iraq was ready to resume, without any preconditions, the dialogue with the United Nations concerning its relation with the UN on several aspects. The report said that it is understood that the SecretaryGeneral will take up the issue of implementation of Security Council Resolutions relevant to Iraq and that Hans Blix will be available to join Kofi Annan in such a dialogue with Iraq. The ninth report17 on 31 May 2002 noted that Hans Blix had participated in the dialogue between Kofi Annan and the Foreign Minister of Iraq on 7 March and again on 1 and 3 May 2002 on the relationship between Iraq and the Security Council on issues such as sanctions and the non-fly zone. In addition, Hans Blix had chaired technical talks concerning the disarmament and inspection issues on 2 May with an Iraqi delegation led by General Amir Al-Sa’adi. With the possibility that UNMOVIC might be able to start inspection work in Iraq, the Commission started to prepare by recruiting additional staff. New posts were established to cover the extra work given to UNMOVIC under SCR 1409 (2002) which accepted the revised Goods Review List. Consequently, at the end of May 2002 UNMOVIC was composed of 58 persons (including four on short-term contracts) from 24 states. In addition, there were 230 experts from 44 states on the roster of trained experts available to serve the Commission in Iraq or at the headquarters in New York. UNMOVIC reported that the new revised formats for the declaration of the holdings and disposition of dual-use items and materials required from Iraq under Resolution 715 (1991) were being finalized as part of the reinforced OMV system. Three months later, the tenth report18 on 3 September 2002 noted that Hans Blix had participated in the dialogue between Kofi Annan and Naji Sabri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq in Vienna on 4 and 5 July 2002. In addition to the plenary meetings Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBareidi led discussions at the expert level with an Iraqi team headed by General Amir AlSa’adi, who had been the main Iraqi point of contact of UNSCOM for chemical and biological issues and Dr Jaafar Dh. Jaafar, the high-level Iraqi contact on nuclear weapons. In these expert level talks, UNMOVIC noted that Iraq had sought to focus them on a review of the activities of UNSCOM and IAEA during May 1991 to December 1998, a joint assessment of the unresolved dis-

The Years of UNMOVIC 115 Table 6.2

UNMOVIC Quarterly Reports prior to inspections in Iraq

Date

Report Pages

Topics mentioned

Training

No. of Staff

1 June 2000 S/2000/5169

1st

5

Operational procedures, recruitment and training.

28 Aug 2000 S/2000/83510

2nd

4

Operating procedures, sampling procedures, draft action plan.

July 2000 44 (19 states)

42 (20 states)

1 Dec 2000 S/2000/113411

3rd

4

Preparations for activities in Iraq, sampling and analysis principles.

Nov 2000 58 (23 states)

43 (20 states) + 23 on roster

27 Feb 2001 S/2001/17712

4th

4

Unresolved disarmament issues, revision and updating of dual list items subject to export/import monitoring mechanism, draft UNMOVIC handbook.

Feb 2001 52 (24 states)

44 (21 states) + 72 on roster

24 May 2001 S/2001/51513

5th

5

Unresolved disarmament May 2001 issues and how they may 61 (26 states) be resolved, draft UNMOVIC handbook. UNMOVIC now ready to take up full tasks mandated to it.

45 (22 states) + > 120 on roster

30 Aug 2001 S/2001/83314

6th

4

Unresolved disarmament issues and how they may be resolved, planning for reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification.

Specialized courses being planned

178 on roster

29 Nov 2001 S/2001/112615

7th

4

Preparation of draft inventory of unresolved disarmament issues, merging of these issues into interrelated clusters. Entry into force of new list of materials and items for export/ import system.

Advanced training course

46 (22 states) + 180 on roster (36 states)

26 Feb 2002 S/2002/19516

8th

4

Refinement and clustering of unresolved disarmament issues. Preparation for implementation of Resolution 1382 (2001).

February 2002 54 (28 states)

50 (26 states) + 180 on roster (36 states)

116 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

armament issues at the end of that period, and ways and means to resolve them. This approach was deemed unacceptable by UNMOVIC as SCR 1284 (1999) requires UNMOVIC ‘to identify and assess the key remaining disarmament tasks after it has had the opportunity to work for some time in Iraq.’ [Emphasis added]. The expert talks had nevertheless included as a first item a point giving Iraq an opportunity to put forward its position on unresolved disarmament issues as they appeared at the end of 1998 and on ways and means to resolve them. UNMOVIC explained, as they had done in the earlier round of talks, that the descriptions of unresolved issues in the Amorim report and the UNSCOM document, S/1999/94, were used by UNMOVIC only as input into the analytical work of the Commission. It was pointed out that conclusions and assessments by UNSCOM and the Amorim panel, while valuable, would have to be used in conjunction with other available information, notably that which will be obtained through the future submissions of Iraq of the backlog of biannual declarations and observations made in Iraq by UNMOVIC when they would be reestablishing the baselines, after the resumption of inspection work. It was nevertheless made clear that UNMOVIC would be ready to transmit to Iraq for comment the list of key remaining disarmament tasks, which the Commission would draft after having resumed inspection work in Iraq and before the list is sent to the College of Commissioners and submitted to the Security Council. UNMOVIC emphasized the importance of addressing practical arrangements for the resumption of activities in Iraq. There was a list of issues that UNMOVIC noted was mostly in line with past UNSCOM procedures on which UNMOVIC wished to reach an understanding with the Iraqi side prior to the deployment of inspectors in Iraq in order to avoid unnecessary problems when inspections resumed. However, no agreement was reached on the resumption of inspections. At the end of the talks in Geneva, Kofi Annan said that, although he had no intention of remaining involved personally, the two sides had agreed to maintain contacts and that these would include continuing discussion of technical matters. On 1 August 2002, Naji Sabri wrote to the Secretary-General to indicate that the Iraqi Government wanted to conduct a round of technical talks between Iraqi experts and Hans Blix and experts of UNMOVIC in Baghdad to review what had been accomplished between May 1991 and December 1998, to look into the remaining issues as viewed by the former UNSCOM, to study and assess the importance of these issues and to decide upon the measures to resolve them when the inspection regime returns to Iraq. The Minister asked that his letter be conveyed to members of the Security Council. The letter was discussed informally by the Secretary-General and the Security Council on 5 August 2002. In his reply on the following day, the Secretary-General noted that UNMOVIC was guided by, and must act in accordance with, Security Council resolutions and recalled that, in Vienna, the Executive Chairman had suggested to the Foreign Minister of Iraq that the most direct and appropriate way to resume the inspection process would be by holding talks at the expert level on practical arrange-

The Years of UNMOVIC 117

ments for inspections, in compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Council. The letter drew attention to the SCR 1284 (1999) and its requirements for UNMOVIC to draw up, no later than 60 days after it has started work in Iraq, a work programme which is to include, inter alia, the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq. Finally the Secretary-General requested the Government of Iraq to confirm that it accepted the sequence of steps outlined in the letter and send a formal invitation to UNMOVIC. In his reply of 15 August 2002, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq did not include the formal invitation to UNMOVIC or an acceptance by Iraq of the sequence of steps outlined by the Secretary-General. The letter did, however, reaffirm the offer of Iraq to take part in a further series of technical discussions. The UNMOVIC report noted that its strength was 63 persons from 27 states. In addition, there were 220 experts from 44 states on the roster of trained experts available to serve the Commission in Iraq. UNMOVIC was continuing to prepare for the implementation of the reinforced ongoing monitoring and verification. UNMOVIC had visited 11 international laboratories that might offer assistance in sample analysis and proposals had so far been received from six of them. Technical evaluations of these facilities was being carried out by UNMOVIC experts. Other activities being carried out by UNMOVIC included the completion of a glossary of terms and definitions aimed at achieving consistency and standardization in written reporting within UNMOVIC and efforts to utilize other non-inspection sources of information both to augment the assessments of UNMOVIC and to plan for the resumption of inspections. Table 6.3 summarizes the further UNMOVIC quarterly reports prior to the start of UNMOVIC inspections in Iraq.

Table 6.3

Further UNMOVIC Quarterly Reports prior to inspections in Iraq

Date

Report Pages

Topics mentioned

Training

No. of Staff

31 May 2002 S/2002/606

9th

4

A first draft had been Specialized completed of a list of training cluster issues of unresolved disarmament issues. Implementation of Resolution 1409 (2002) and revised Goods Review List.

58 (24 states) + 230 on roster (44 states)

1 Sept 2002 S/2002/981

10th

6

Participation in UN/ Specialized Iraq dialogue. Plann- training ing for system of reinforced ongoing monitoring and verification.

63 (27 states) + 220 on roster (44 states)

118 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

UNMOVIC: Inspections in Iraq The next report,19 the eleventh, on 27 November 2002 noted that the past three months had been one of intense activity in preparation for the resumption of inspections and monitoring in Iraq following the letter20 of Naji Sabri, Foreign Minister of Iraq to Kofi Annan dated 16 September 2002 in which the Government of Iraq had agreed to the return of UN inspectors without conditions and said that Iraq was ready to discuss the practical arrangements necessary for the resumption of inspections. Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBareidi met with an Iraqi team headed by General Amir Al-Sa’adi in Vienna on 30 September and 1 October to examine the practical arrangements required for the resumption of inspections. At the conclusion of these talks Iraq provided UNMOVIC and the IAEA with the backlog of semi-annual monitoring declarations of Iraq’s holdings of dual-use equipment and related materials as required under Resolution 715 (1991). Following a report to the Security Council, Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBareidi sent a joint letter on 8 October 2002 to General Amir Al-Sa’adi listing the conclusions they had drawn from the talks in Vienna and seeking Iraqi confirmation thereof. This joint UNMOVIC/IAEA letter21 of 8 October were endorsed by the Security Council and made binding on Iraq through the unanimous adoption on 8 November of Resolution 1441 (2002)22 to which the letter of 8 October was annexed. This resolution provided a strengthened inspection regime by conferring revised and additional authorities to the UN weapons inspectors and also set out a timeline for the resumption of inspections in Iraq of not later than 45 days after adoption of the resolution and that UNMOVIC update the Security Council 60 days thereafter. The resolution also includes the requirement that Iraq shall provide, within 30 days of the resolution: a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, subcomponents, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapons production or material. Unlike the earlier requirements for declarations during the UNSCOM period, Resolution 1441 (2002) stated that Iraq shall provide this declaration ‘to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council.’ [Emphasis added]. It was this requirement that copies go to members of the Security Council that led to the situation in December when the permanent members received a different version from those received by the other members. Moreover, the

The Years of UNMOVIC 119

resolution also required that Iraq confirm within 7 days that it intended to comply fully with the resolution. Naji Sabri, the Foreign Minister of Iraq wrote23 on 13 November to the Secretary-General to say that Iraq would ‘deal with the resolution despite its iniquitous contents’ and that ‘we are ready to receive the inspectors so that they can perform their duties.’ A week later, on 18 November, Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBareidi arrived in Baghdad with an advance team of about 30 persons from UNMOVIC and IAEA. Discussions were held with senior Iraqi personnel on the practical implementation of inspections and in particular, of Resolution 1441 (2002). The vital importance of the declaration to be submitted by Iraq before 8 December was emphasized to Iraq. Naji Sabri wrote a further letter24 on 23 November 2002 setting out in some 10 pages Iraq’s views on Resolution 1441 (2002). The first team of UNSCOM inspectors arrived in Iraq on 25 November comprising 11 experts from UNMOVIC in New York covering the three areas (biological, chemical and missiles) for which UNMOVIC is responsible. The report stated that the first inspection was scheduled for 27 November 2002 and that UNMOVIC expected to have about 100 inspectors plus support staff in Iraq by the end of December. The report notes that at the end of November 2002, the UNMOVIC core staff was 73 persons from 29 states and there were 267 experts on the roster. Work had also continued on the compilation of clusters of unresolved disarmament issues which would also serve as part of the reference basis in the analysis that would be undertaken of the declaration to be made by Iraq under Resolution 1441 (2002). The draft handbook for inspectors was being revised to take account of the new authority given to UNMOVIC in its conduct of inspections by Resolution 1441 (2002). The three month period between the report of 27 November 2002 and the next report on 28 February 2003 saw intense political activity in the Unites States and in the capitals of the other P5 members of the Security Council as increasing attention was focused on Iraq. This followed on from the unanimous adoption of SCR 1441 (2002) on 8 November with its requirement for a complete and accurate declaration by Iraq within 30 days and that any omissions or false statements in this declaration ‘shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations.’ The declaration was submitted by Iraq on 7 December 2002 and at a Security Council meeting25 on 27 January 2003, an update as required by SCR 1441 (2002) was provided by Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBareidi. Hans Blix in his statement set the scene by recalling that Iraq had often withheld its cooperation or given it grudgingly and went on to say that ‘Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance – not even today – of the disarmament that was demanded of it and that it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace.’ In regard to the declaration by Iraq, Hans Blix said that ‘regrettably, the 12,000 page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence

120 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number.’ He also addressed several other aspects reported in the next UNMOVIC report a month later on 28 February 2003. After the presentations to the Security Council by Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBareidi, the public session of the Security Council closed with informal discussions continuing in private. A Security Council meeting26 at Foreign Minister level was held on 5 February 2003 at which Kofi Annan, Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBareidi were present. At this meeting the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, made a presentation first ‘to support the core assessments made’ at the Security Council meeting of 27 January 2003 by Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBareidi and secondly to share with the Security Council what the US knows about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. This presentation was then followed by statements by the Foreign Ministers present with China, France and Russia urging that the inspections be allowed more time whilst the UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, pointed out that this is a moment of choice for Saddam and the Iraqi regime and also a moment of choice for the United Nations. Recalling the failure of the League of Nations, Jack Straw noted that small evils went unchecked, tyrants became emboldened and greater evils were unleashed. He concluded by saying that ‘we owe it to history, as well as to our future, not to make that mistake again.’ A further Security Council meeting,27 again at Foreign Minister level, was held some 10 days later, on 14 February 2003. Briefings were again given by Hans Blix and by Mohamed ElBareidi. Hans Blix noted that a key question is how much, if any is left of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and related proscribed items and programmes. He said that so far, UNMOVIC has found no such weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions which should have been declared and destroyed. He went on to say that ‘another matter – and one of great significance – is that many proscribed weapons and items are not accounted for. To take an example, a document which Iraq provided suggested to us that some 1,000 tons of chemical agent were unaccounted for. One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist. However, that possibility is also not excluded. If they exist, they should be presented for destruction. If they do not exist, credible evidence to that effect should be presented.’ Hans Blix concluded by noting that ‘if Iraq had provided the necessary cooperation in 1991, the phase of disarmament under resolution 687 (1991) could have been short, and a decade of sanctions could have been avoided. Today, three months after the adoption of resolution 1441 (2002), the period of disarmament through inspection could still be short if immediate, active and unconditional cooperation with UNMOVIC and IAEA were to be forthcoming.’ Following the presentations, statements were again made by the Foreign Ministers with Colin Powell pointing out that Iraq was still not cooperating and stressing that the serious consequences in SCR 1441 (2002) – the threat of force – must remain although always as a last resort. He concluded by saying that ‘the security of the region, the hopes for the people of Iraq

The Years of UNMOVIC 121

themselves, and our security rest upon us meeting our responsibilities and, if it comes to it, invoking the serious consequences called for in resolution 1441 (2002).’ Two weeks later, the twelfth quarterly report28 on 28 February 2003 reported that since the arrival of the first inspectors in Iraq on 27 November 2002, UNMOVIC has conducted more than 550 inspections covering about 350 sites. Of these 44 sites were new. The report states that the period had been one of intense activity for the Commission as it had required a rapid build-up of inspection and support staff. The UNMOVIC core staff was now 75 persons from 30 countries. In New York the analysis of Iraq’s declaration and unresolved disarmament issues had gone along with intense planning of inspections. As already noted above, Resolution 1441 (2002) required Iraq to provide ‘a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of the programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and other systems.’ On 7 December 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration to UNMOVIC, the IAEA and, through its President, to the Security Council. This declaration, including supporting documents, comprised more than 12,000 pages. However, UNMOVIC found little new significant information in the declaration about Iraq’s proscribed weapons programme, nor much new supporting documentation or other evidence. There was, however, new material concerning non-weapons-related activities during the period from the end of 1998 to the present, especially in the biological field and on missile development. UNMOVIC found that the declaration on biological weapons was ‘essentially a reorganized version of a previous declaration provided by Iraq to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in September 1997.’ In the chemical weapons area, the current declaration was based on ‘a declaration submitted by Iraq in 1996 with subsequent updates and explanations.’ Some new information was included: for example, in the chemical weapons area, Iraq had further explained its account of the material balance of precursors for chemical warfare agents, ‘although it did not resolve unresolved issues on this subject.’ The UNMOVIC report concluded that ‘as there is little new substantive information in the weapons part of Iraq’s declaration, or new supporting documentation, the issues that were identified as unresolved in the Amorim report (S/1999/356) and in the UNSCOM’s report (S/1999/94) remain. In most cases the issues remain unresolved because there is a lack of supporting evidence. Such supporting evidence, in the form of documentation, testimony by individuals who took part in the activities, or physical evidence, would be required.’ [Emphasis added]. The report stated that all inspections in Iraq were carried out without prior notice and that access was in virtually all cases provided promptly. At no point in these inspections had UNMOVIC seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side was aware of their impending arrival. The inspections

122 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

took place throughout Iraq at industrial sites, ammunition depots, research centres, universities, Presidential sites, mobile laboratories, private houses, missile production facilities, military camps and agricultural sites. All the sites previously inspected by UNSCOM before 1998, were reinspected. This included the identification of the function and contents of each building, new or old, at a site. It also included verification of previously tagged equipment, application of seals and tags, evaluation of locations for the future installation of cameras and other monitors, as well as taking samples and discussions with site personnel regarding past and present activities. More than 200 chemical samples and more than 100 biological samples were collected at different sites. Three-quarters of these have been screened using UNMOVIC’s own analytical laboratory capabilities at the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Centre (BOMVIC). The report noted that ‘the results to date have been consistent with Iraq’s declaration.’ The UNMOVIC report also noted that the inspectors have started the destruction of approximately 50 litres of mustard declared by Iraq which had been placed under UNSCOM supervision and seal at the Muthanna site in 1998. A laboratory quantity (1 litre) of thiodiglycol, a mustard precursor, which had been found at another site, had also been destroyed. It was also reported that on 16 January 2003, UNMOVIC chemical experts inspecting the Al Ukhaidir military stores, discovered a number of empty 122 mm chemical munitions which were tagged pending their destruction. Following this discovery, Iraq appointed a commission of inquiry to undertake investigations and comprehensive searches for similar munitions at all locations. Four more empty 122 mm chemical munitions were found by that commission at the Al Taji munitions stores. Subsequently, UNMOVIC inspectors found two more such munitions at the same site. These eighteen munitions would also be destroyed. Later in January 2003, Iraq expanded the mandate of the commission to search for any remaining proscribed items on Iraqi territory as well as related documents. On 21 and 25 February 2003, Iraq informed UNMOVIC that two complete R-400 aerial bombs (one of which had liquid contents) plus remnants of what Iraq stated were 118 R-400 aerial bombs, had been excavated at Azzizziyah, the declared unilateral destruction site of BW-filled aerial bombs, along with some related components and remnants of other destroyed munitions. It was said that UNMOVIC was currently investigating these finds. Further high level meetings had been held in Baghdad by Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBareidi. The first meetings on 19 and 20 January 2003 were devoted to stocktaking of the inspections which had taken place and to resolving operational issues, which included the clarification of the 7 December 2002 declaration, provision of documents, the conduct of interviews and other aspects such as access. At a meeting on 8 and 9 February 2003, the Iraqi side addressed some of the important out-

The Years of UNMOVIC 123

standing disarmament issues. A number of papers were handed over to UNMOVIC regarding unresolved issues in all three disarmament fields. Expert discussions were held to clarify the contents of these papers. The report notes that, ‘however, they did not contain new evidence, nor did they resolve any of the open issues.’ [Emphasis added]. Other matters discussed included whether it was possible to verify, through technical and analytical methods, the quantities of biological agents and chemical precursors, which had been declared unilaterally destroyed, the establishment of Iraqi commissions to search for proscribed items and relevant documents, the necessity for private interviews, and the enactment by Iraq of national legislation in accordance with the monitoring plan approved by the Security Council in Resolution 715 (1991). The report concluded by drawing some observations after three months of inspections in regard to whether UNMOVIC had fulfilled its objectives, whether Iraq, as required, had cooperated, and whether disarmament had been achieved. In regard to UNMOVIC the report states that: • UNMOVIC has, in most areas, more resources and more advanced tools at its disposal than did UNSCOM, and in several respects, UNMOVIC has developed a capacity that goes beyond what was contemplated in its initial planning, e.g., in the number of personnel, number of teams in the field, number of sites visited. Yet, it could certainly further expand and strengthen its activity, e.g., in some form of controls of vehicles. Member States could also provide further support and assistance, notably in the field of information. • UNMOVIC is presently finalizing an internal document of some importance, namely, a list of the disarmament issues, which it considers currently unresolved, and of the measures which Iraq could take to resolve them, either by presenting proscribing stocks or items or by providing convincing evidence that such stocks or items no longer exist. The list, which in condensed form traces the history of clusters of weapons issues, has been prepared with a view to allowing UNMOVIC to perform its tasks under resolution 1284 (1999) to ‘address unresolved disarmament issues’ and to identify ‘key remaining disarmament tasks’. It could also serve as a yardstick against which Iraq’s disarmament actions under resolution 1441 (2002) may be measured. In regard to Iraqi cooperation, the report makes a distinction between ‘cooperation on ‘’process’’ and cooperation on ‘’substance’’’. It is stated that UNMOVIC has reported that, in general, Iraq has been helpful on ‘process’ meaning, first of all, that Iraq has from the outset, once inspections began in Iraq, satisfied the demand for prompt access to any site, whether or not it had been previously declared or inspected. There have

124 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

thus been no sanctuaries in space. Nor have there been any in time, as inspections have taken place on holidays as on weekdays. The report notes that ‘while such cooperation should be a matter of course, it must be recalled that UNSCOM frequently met with a different Iraqi attitude.’ In regard to cooperation on ‘substance’, the report states that: a. The declaration of 7 December, despite the hopes attached to it and despite its large volume, has not been found to provide new evidence or data that may help to resolve outstanding disarmament issues. As has been mentioned above [in the report], it did, however, usefully shed light on the developments in the missile sector and in the sector of non-prescribed biological activities in the period 1998–2002; b. The destruction of some items, e.g., small known quantities of mustard, is taking place under UNMOVIC supervision and further such action will take place, e.g., as regards the empty 122-mm chemical munitions; c. Iraq has identified two aerial R-400 bombs, as well as remnants of what it states to be 118 R-400 bombs, at Al Azaziyah; d. The destruction of Al Samoud 2 missiles and related items declared by Iraq but found proscribed under the relevant resolutions has been requested and is due to commence on 1 March. Iraqi cooperation is essential. e. The presidential decree, which was issued on 14 February and which prohibits private Iraqi citizens and mixed companies from engaging in work relating to weapons of mass destruction, standing alone, is not adequate to meet the United Nations requirements. UNMOVIC has enquired whether a comprehensive regulation is being prepared in line with several years of discussions between Iraq and UNSCOM/ UNMOVIC. The report concludes with a final paragraph which sets out what opportunities Iraq had and what it could have done: During the period of time covered by the present report, Iraq could have made greater efforts to find any remaining proscribed items or provide credible evidence showing the absence of such items. The results in terms of disarmament have been very limited so far. The destruction of missiles, which is an important operation, has not yet begun. Iraq could have made full use of the declaration, which was submitted on 7 December. It is hard to understand why a number of the measures, which are now being taken, could not have been initiated earlier. If they had been taken earlier, they might have borne fruit by now. It is only by the middle of January and thereafter that Iraq has taken a number of steps, which have the potential of resulting either in the presentation for destruction of stocks of

The Years of UNMOVIC 125

items that are proscribed or the presentation of relevant evidence solving long-standing unresolved disarmament issues. [Emphasis added]. The next quarterly report,29 the thirteenth, on 30 May 2003 is much larger than the previous reports as it is some 43 pages long and was the last report by Hans Blix. It covered an eventful period as on 18 March 2003 UNMOVIC suspended its inspection activities following the decision of the Secretary-General to withdraw all UN staff from Iraq. As the report states ‘armed action started on 19 March 2003, and the Coalition has organized units to identify any Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and other proscribed items and to engage in the task of disarming Iraq, which was formerly pursued by UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).’ The report notes that since UNMOVIC’s work on disarmament in Iraq has been suspended and ‘since a significant phase of that work has been concluded’, the present report provides more detail than previous reports. In addition, the report does not restrict itself to reviewing information from the three month period 1 March to 31 May 2003, as in a number of places, it adopts a wider perspective. During the period from the first inspection by UNMOVIC in Iraq on 27 November 2002 until the day when all UN personnel were withdrawn on 18 March 2003, UNMOVIC carried out 731 inspections, covering 411 sites, of which 88 had not been inspected before. There were 354 experts from 55 states on the roster with a detailed breakdown of the trained inspectors shown in Table 6.4.

Table 6.4

Composition of the roster of trained inspectors as of May 2003

Country Algeria Argentina Australia Austria Bangladesh Belarus Belgium Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Cambodia Canada Chile China Croatia Denmark Ethiopia

Headquarters inspectors 1 2 2

1

1 3

Outside inspectors 4 13 21 11 7 3 3 3 1 1 1 4 3 9 2 1 7

Total 4 14 23 13 7 3 3 4 1 1 1 4 4 12 2 1 7

126 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 6.4 Composition of the roster of trained inspectors as of May 2003 – continued Country

Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Japan Jordan Kenya Lebanon Mexico Morocco Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Peru Poland Qatar Republic of Korea Republic of Moldova Romania Russian Federation Serbia and Montenegro Slovakia Spain Sweden Switzerland Thailand Tunisia Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom United States Zambia Zimbabwe

Headquarters inspectors 1 5

Outside inspectors 9 30 10

1 2 5 3 4 1 9 1 12 20 1 7 1 5 2 5 1 4 6 11 39 4 1

10 35 10 1 5 2 4 3 6 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 2 5 3 6 1 9 1 14 23 1 8 1 6 2 5 1 4 7 14 46 4 1

1

2

5 2 4 1 6 1 1 2 1 3

1

2

2 3 1 1

1 3 7

Total

Grand total

40

314

354

Countries

17

53

55

Number of inspectors who served in Iraq

28

106

134

The Years of UNMOVIC 127

The report notes that during this period UNMOVIC had continued preparing an internal working document of clusters of unresolved disarmament issues as part of the process required under paragraph 7 of Resolution 1284 (1999) to identify key remaining disarmament tasks for Iraq to complete. The first stage of the process had been the creation of an inventory of all unresolved disarmament issues using a number of sources such as the UNSCOM (S/1999/94) and Amorim (S/1999/356) reports, UNSCOM reports and various declarations and documents of Iraq, including those from the Haidar farm. Account had also been taken of the information supplied by Iraq in its declaration of 7 December 2002 and other documents it provided prior to and subsequent to the resumption of inspections. The results of these inspections and of UNMOVIC’s rebaselining activities had also been taken into account. The working document with clusters of unresolved disarmament issues was designed to combine individual unresolved disarmament issues already identified so as to assess their interrelationships and significance. In response to requests from several members of the Security Council, the document30 was declassified and made available on 6 March 2003. The report also recalls that paragraph 7 of Resolution 1284 (1999) decided that ‘UNMOVIC and the IAEA, not later than 60 days after they have both started work in Iraq, will each draw up, for approval by the Council, a work programme for the discharge of their mandates.’ It states that in response to requests by several Council members, UNMOVIC agreed to submit the draft work programme before the deadline. This was submitted31 to the Council on 17 March 2003, the day before the suspension of UNMOVIC activities in Iraq, and a copy was also provided to Iraq. It is noteworthy that that the report shows that during the 3.5 months that UNMOVIC was active in Iraq, no significant WMD were found nor were any of the results of sample analyses at variance with the declarations made by Iraq yet none of the unresolved disarmament issues were resolved despite the UNMOVIC inspections and the documents, interviews and efforts to explain made by Iraq. Table 6.5 lists the UNMOVIC reports covering the period when inspections took place in Iraq.

Table 6.5 UNMOVIC Quarterly Reports covering the period when inspections took place in Iraq Date

Report Pages Topics mentioned

27 Nov 2002 S/2002/1303

11th

7

Intense activity for resumption of inspections following Iraq’s statement of

Training

No of Staff

October 2002 73 (29 states) + 54 267 inspectors on roster

128 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 6.5 UNMOVIC Quarterly Reports covering the period when inspections took place in Iraq – continued Date

Report Pages Topics mentioned

Training

No of Staff

16 September that inspectors could return to Iraq with-out conditions. Preparing for implementation of Resolution 1441(2002). 28 Feb 2003 S/2003/232

12th

13

More than 550 inspections covering approximately 350 sites since resumption on 27 November 2002. Forty-four new sites. Observations on three months of inspection – on both ‘process’ and ‘substance’.

January 2003 59 (22 states)

75 (30 states) + 354 from 55 states on roster

30 May 2003 S/2003/580

13th

43

Inspection activities suspended in Iraq on 18 March 2003. Working document of unresolved disarmament issued on 6 March 2003. Draft work programme issued 17 March 2003.

Specialized training

76 (31 states) + 354 (53 states) on roster

UNMOVIC: After suspension of inspection activities in Iraq The thirteenth report32 already mentioned above included a section on the readiness of UNMOVIC to resume inspections in Iraq. This noted that at the request of the President of the Council, the Executive Chairman had briefed the Security Council on 22 April 2003 on ‘the practical matter of how UNMOVIC should maintain a readiness to resume work in Iraq should the Council so decide.’ A month later on 22 May 2003 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 (2003)33 which in paragraph 11 stated that the Security Council: 11. Reaffirms that Iraq must meet its disarmament obligations, encourages the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the

The Years of UNMOVIC 129

United States of America to keep the Council informed of their activities in this regard, and underlines the intention of the Council to revisit the mandates of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency as set forth in resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and 1441 (2002) of 8 November 2002. The UNMOVIC report in analyzing the effect of Resolution 1483 (2003) – which recognizes that the activities of UNMOVIC have effectively been suspended, the United Kingdom and United States have taken military action and shows that the mandate for UNMOVIC is to be revisited – states in a key paragraph that effectively sets out the current role of UNMOVIC that: It may be taken as a general rule that where two resolutions adopted by the Security Council cannot be reconciled the later resolution prevails over and supersedes the earlier. To the extent, however, that earlier resolutions can be reconciled with a newer resolution, they remain in force and are applicable. It is concluded accordingly, that the Council is retaining UNMOVIC as a subsidiary organ until any other decision is taken. It is also concluded that while Iraq remains obliged to disarm, the Security Council is looking to the United Kingdom and the United States to keep the Council informed about their activities. By implication, it follows that their engagement in the disarmament process has the acceptance and support of the Council. Nothing is said in resolution 1483 (2003) about ongoing monitoring and verification. Since that was an important part of earlier resolutions and it does not seem incompatible with the new resolution, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the Council has not intended to rescind it. The UNMOVIC report goes on to address the readiness of UNMOVIC to resume operations in Iraq should the Security Council so decide. It points out that as a result of the experience gained in the field in terms of inspection work and the infrastructure built in connection with such inspections, both in the analysis and logistic areas, UNMOVIC is currently capable of forming teams of inspectors with experience and up-todate knowledge on a vast range of dual-use sites in Iraq and the capabilities of those sites, including material and equipment that existed on-site until March 2003. Within two weeks after a decision on resumption of work, UNMOVIC would be able to start the necessary activities. The report also points out that UNMOVIC maintains a large database of sites, material and equipment of dual-use nature previously subject to monitoring. Furthermore, the personnel of UNMOVIC who have experience in Iraq or have served on its headquarters staff also have a great deal of knowledge of the Iraqi individuals involved in proscribed programmes and also in declared permitted activities at universities,

130 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

research institutions, industrial and military organizations. Finally, UNMOVIC has interacted with many Governments in the area of export control and in particular in finding practical solutions to such matters as defining material as dual-use and finding the appropriate balance between the non-proliferation goals and legitimate commerce. Consequently, the experience gained by UNMOVIC in this regard will be invaluable if it is decided to maintain an export/import monitoring mechanism for certain exports to Iraq. In regard to the meeting of the College of Commissioners held on 28 May 2003, the report noted that ‘the view was expressed that a compendium encompassing the knowledge and experience gained by UNMOVIC and its predecessor over the years would be useful as an objective record.’ Furthermore, the College noted ‘the experience gained by and available within UNMOVIC and the usefulness of those assets being maintained for the benefit of non-proliferation in the future.’ The thirteenth report includes as a useful Appendix an account of the ‘destruction, removal or rendering harmless of proscribed items and materials in Iraq, 1991 to 1998’. In this separate sections address ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and biological weapons. These provide useful succinct summaries of what chemical weapons, agents and equipment was destroyed in 1991 to 1994 and after 1994 and likewise in the biological weapons field in 1991 to 1995 and after 1995. The fourteenth UNMOVIC 34 report on 28 August 2003 noted that the revisiting of the mandates of UNMOVIC and the IAEA set out in Resolution 1483 (2003) had not happened and thus UNMOVIC has continued with those parts of its mandate that remain operable. There had been some downsizing of staff as a result of the adoption of Resolution 1483 (2003): the headquarters core staff was now 57 from 25 states, down from the 76 staff from 31 states at the end of May 2003, and the roster still consisted of 354 individuals from 55 states, the same as at the end of May. In addition it was reported that on 30 June 2003 Hans Blix had ended his assignment as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and that the Secretary-General had appointed the Deputy Executive Chairman, Demetrios Perricos, as Acting Executive Chairman, effective 1 July 2003. The report stated that a number of activities were being carried out by UNMOVIC. These included work on a project to develop the requirements for a new monitoring plan to fit the altered environment in Iraq following the war. Another project was to chart: what is known and understood of the extent and nature (financing, staffing, management, structure, subordination, overseas procurement activities, etc.) of Iraq’s programmes of weapons of mass destruction. A comprehensive evaluation of some of these programmes would require

The Years of UNMOVIC 131

access to additional information, including interviews with personnel from the programme. The work includes updating and expanding the Commission’s database of Iraqi personnel once engaged in, or otherwise associated with, the past proscribed activities. The overall objective is to form a compendium as an objective record encompassing the knowledge and experience gained by UNMOVIC and its predecessor the United Nations Special Commission over the years, in line with the recommendations of the College of Commissioners at their meeting in May. The report included an appendix with information on the destruction of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles during the period from 1991 to 1998 and limited information regarding biological weapons and their destruction The fifteenth UNMOVIC report35 on 26 November 2003 noted that no information had been made available to UNMOVIC on the results of the investigations of the US-led Iraq Survey Group (ISG), other than the testimony released to the public on the interim progress report made by the ISG to the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The actual report was not provided to UNMOVIC or to the IAEA. The headquarters core staff would by the end of the year be 51 from 24 states, a further 10 per cent reduction on the numbers reported in the previous report, whilst the roster remained at the level of about 350 from 55 states as none of the experts on the roster had asked to be removed from the list. Various activities were being undertaken by UNMOVIC such as the development of monitoring requirements to fit the new environment in Iraq and the charting of what is known and understood by UNMOVIC of the nature and extent of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes. It is noted that ‘recently, attention has focussed on Iraq’s past biological weapons programme and the possibility that the programme, or remnants of it, may still exist.’ An appendix sets out a detailed account of the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of relevant items and materials in the biological weapons area. The next UNMOVIC report36 on 27 February 2004 again noted that during the past three months, no official information had been made available to UNMOVIC on either the work of, or the results of, the investigations of the US-led ISG in Iraq. Nor had the ISG requested any information from UNMOVIC. The report goes on to note the testimony of David Kay, the former head of the ISG, before the US Armed Services Committee on 28 January 2004 when he said inter alia that ‘the efforts that had been directed to this point [of time] have been sufficiently intense that it is unlikely that there were large stockpiles of deployed militarized chemical or biological weapons there [in Iraq].’ The headquarters core staff of UNMOVIC had remained stable at 51 from 24 states. No information was included in this report on the number on the roster even though the

132 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

previous report had said that a survey regarding the continued availability of the experts on the roster would be conducted during the reporting period covered by the sixteenth report. The report noted that although the list of items and materials subject to the export/import mechanism had been updated in June 2001, the annexes to the monitoring plan approved in Resolution 715 (1991) had not been updated since 1995. UNMOVIC had therefore carried out a critical assessment of the merit and practicality of monitoring the items included in the current annexes to the plan. The report stated that this had resulted in a sharper focus on monitoring items that are associated with ‘choke-points’ within the processes of dual-use facilities with potential for the production of proscribed items and materials. The report also noted in the context of the further analysis being carried out by UNMOVIC of Iraq’s past proscribed weapons and programmes, that while Iraq had followed the same general routes and experiences as other states, it did adopt some unique methods and activities which it was essential to understand if wider non-proliferation efforts are to be strengthened. The report went to outline a number of other areas in which such UNMOVIC studies of the Iraqi past programmes can contribute to the strengthening of non-proliferation regimes. These included the following: a. The utilization by Iraq of developments in the fields of military and civilian science and technology for its now proscribed programme. The transition from defensive to offensive activities is examined and illustrated in the report by reference to the contribution of the Iraqi chemical defence laboratory developed in 1971 to 1973 to the subsequent offensive programme. b. The contribution of Iraq’s industrial and conventional weapons projects to its chemical and biological weapons programmes and their means of delivery. Iraq’s chemical weapons programme was first established in the State Establishment for Pesticide Production and other parts of Iraq’s legitimate industry contributed significant elements to the various chemical and biological programmes and some parts were taken over and their capabilities changed to chemical and biological weapons production. c. Specific signatures and indicators of activities relating to weapons of mass destruction and the identification of related facilities will be examined to analyse how the detection of those signs could be applied to future monitoring. d. Iraq converted or adapted conventional arms as the basis for the delivery of chemical and biological agents even though they may

The Years of UNMOVIC 133

not have been the most suited or effective. The extent to which the signatures of conventional munitions should be monitored in order to detect possible activities relating to weapons of mass destruction will be examined. e. The extent of assistance and supplies from outside Iraq and the methods used by Iraq to hide the true purpose of some of the procurement and the importance of this in certain programmes will be examined. In several instances, Iraq created ‘cover stories’ or actual parallel projects to ensure that suppliers and those providing technical assistance would not become aware of the true nature of the facilities where their equipment or expertise was to be used. Iraq also established networks of front companies to obtain materials. These and the financial and organizational infrastructure established to support the networks both inside and outside Iraq will be charted as such an understanding may be useful and applicable in other nonproliferation contexts. The sixteenth report continued the practice of providing valuable appendices containing summaries of the information known to UNMOVIC. One appendix provided a summary of Iraq’s chemical and biological munitions and a second describes the UNMOVIC network of international laboratories which were used for the three-tiered analysis protocol applied to samples collected in Iraq. In the first tier, samples were checked on-site for immediate hazards using military and industrial safety monitors. This information was used to help determine sample handling procedures and to prioritize analyses. The second tier comprised screening at the UNMOVIC laboratories in Baghdad. If that evaluation gave ambiguous results or the results required further verification, it was UNMOVIC policy to send sample aliquots to at least two of the Commission’s network of laboratories for the final, third stage of analysis. Each laboratory was required to perform analyses as specified by UNMOVIC with the results being delivered to the Commission for assessment and comparison. UNMOVIC also ensured that contractually UNMOVIC was the proprietor of both the samples and any information related to them. At the time of the UNMOVIC inspections in Iraq, UNMOVIC had contracts with seven qualifying laboratories around the world and since March 2003, the Commission has been in the process of expanding this network to 11 facilities. These are listed in Table 6.6. The sixteenth report also provides further information in the form of chronological charts to complement the information already provided in the thirteenth and fifteenth reports about the weapons and associated production equipment destroyed, removed or rendered harmless in Iraq from 1991 onwards.

134 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 6.6

UNMOVIC network of laboratories for chemical and biological analysis

Laboratory

Analyses

ABC Schutz, (WIS) Munster/Oertze, Germany

Biological analysis

Centre for Applied Microbiology & Research, Porton Down, United Kingdom

Biological analysis

Centre de Reserche du Service de Santé des Armées, La Tronche, France

Biological analysis

Centre des Etudes du Bouchet (CEB), Vert le Petit, France

Chemical and biological analysis

Chemical Defence Laboratory, Beijing, China

Chemical analysis

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Porton Down, United Kingdom

Chemical analysis

Finnish Verification Institute (VERIFIN), Helsinki, Finland

Chemical analysis

GosNIIOKht, Moscow, Russia

Chemical analysis

Laboratorium Spiez, Switzerland

Chemical analysis

Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Umea, Sweden

Chemical and biological analysis

TNO – Prins Maurits Laboratory, Rijswijk, Netherlands

Chemical and biological analysis

The seventeenth and eighteenth UNMOVIC reports on 28 May 200437 and 27 August 200438 report the continued work by UNMOVIC which included the continuation of specialized training courses and the development of the ongoing, monitoring and verification programme for the altered environment in Iraq after the war. Useful appendices are attached to both reports: the seventeenth report has an Appendix on UNMOVIC imagery and remote-sensing capabilities which continue to be used to monitor facilities in Iraq and the eighteenth report has an Appendix on past storage, handling and deployment of chemical and biological munitions by Iraq, as this can assist in the verification and material balances of such munitions and an Appendix providing an assessment of Iraq’s remotely piloted and unmanned aerial vehicles programmes, which concluded that UNMOVIC found no technical evidence that Iraq had achieved prohibited ranges or of the development of RPV/UAV systems for the delivery of chemical and biological warfare agents. The nineteenth UNMOVIC report on 26 November 200439 noted that the ISG Comprehensive Report40 had been issued on 6 October 2004 and that Charles Duelfer and a team from the ISG had visited UNMOVIC on 8

The Years of UNMOVIC 135

October 2004 to present their findings, the scope of their work and the methodology that the ISG had used. An appendix provides initial comments by UNMOVIC on the specific findings of the ISG report whilst noting that UNMOVIC does not have access to any ISG material additional to that in the ISG report. The appendix points out that the scope of the Comprehensive Report is broader than the scope of Iraq’s obligations related to WMD under the SCRs and the report addresses many issues outside the UNMOVIC mandate. However, the report presents some information new to UNMOVIC in all of the WMD areas and in varying degrees of detail and this supports UNMOVIC’s understanding of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes. In regard to biological weapons, the ISG report largely confirms the understanding of UNMOVIC. The most significant new information related to the bulk production and disposal of anthrax that substantiated the claim that greater quantities were produced than declared at Al Hakam. On chemical weapons, the appendix examines a number of detailed points including unaccounted for mustard filled artillery shells, the Iraqi programme relating to the agent VX and the covert laboratories maintained by the Iraqi Intelligence Service. The UNMOVIC report also continues to use commercial satellite imagery to assess the status of key sites in Iraq. A summary is provided on changes observed at the Muthanna State Establishment and Al Qaa Qaa State Establishment. Work has also been continued by UNMOVIC to update and revise the ongoing monitoring and verification plan and to work on its compendium of Iraq’s proscribed weapons and programmes with an emphasis on lessons learned. The UNMOVIC reports since the suspension of UNMOVIC inspections in Iraq up to November 2004 are summarized in Table 6.7.

Table 6.7 UNMOVIC Quarterly Reports covering the period since the suspension of inspections in Iraq Date

Report Pages Topics mentioned

28 Aug 2003 14th S/2003/844

7

Development of a new monitoring plan for the altered environment in Iraq after the war. Charting of what is known and understood of the extent and nature of Iraq’s programmes of weapons of mass destruction.

Training

Staff Number

Specialized 73 (29 states) + training 267 on roster

136 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 6.7 UNMOVIC Quarterly Reports covering the period since the suspension of inspections in Iraq – continued Date

Report Pages Topics mentioned

Training

Staff Number 51 (24 states) + about 350 (55 states) on roster

26 Nov 2003 15th S/2003/1135

19

Continued development of the monitoring plan and charting of Iraqi programmes. Appendix on destruction related to Iraq’s biological weapons programme. Appendix on Iraq’s missile capabilities.

Specialized training. Appendix with overview of training.

27 Feb 2004 S/2004/160

16th

17

Continued development of the monitoring plan and charting of Iraqi programmes. Appendix on Iraq’s chemical and biological munitions. Appendix on UNMOVIC laboratory network.

Specialized 51 (24 states) training

28 May 2004 17th S/2004/435

15

Continued development of the monitoring plan. Preparation of compendium of Iraq’s proscribed weapons and programmes. Appendix on UNMOVIC imagery and remote-sensing capabilities.

Biological 51 (24 states) experts course. Dual-use CB equipment course. Multidisciplinary course.

27 Aug 2004 S/2004/693

18th

14

Continued development of the monitoring plan. Investigations into scrap material found outside Iraq. Appendix on past storage, handling and deployment of chemical and biological munitions by Iraq. Appendix on Iraq’s remotely piloted and unmanned aerial vehicles programmes.

Advanced training course for experts on roster

50 (24 states)

26 Nov 2004 19th S/2004/924

19

Appendix providing initial comments on the Comprehensive Report by the ISG.

Biotechnology training course

51 (25 states)

The Years of UNMOVIC 137 Table 6.7 UNMOVIC Quarterly Reports covering the period since the suspension of inspections in Iraq – continued Date

Report Pages Topics mentioned Analysis of changes at the Muthanna and Al Qaa Qaa establishments using commercial satellite imagery. Continued development of monitoring plan and work on the compendium.

Training

Staff Number

(16 experts from 15 states)

Analysis Organization lessons Mandate. The mandate for UNMOVIC was clearly set out in SCR 1284 (1999). However, the abstention of four members of the Security Council – France, China, Malaysia and Russia – in the vote to adopt this resolution sent a mixed signal to Iraq. It consequently was to take almost three years – until 27 November 2002 – before UNMOVIC was able to start inspections in Iraq. The Security Council three weeks earlier had unanimously adopted SCR 1441 (2002) thus once again sending a united signal to Iraq about the importance of complying with Security Council resolutions. The organization and operational size of UNMOVIC was envisaged from the outset as being small and efficient. At its largest, just before operations in Iraq were suspended in March 2003 there were 76 persons from 31 states together with a roster of 354 qualified and trained inspectors from 53 States that UNMOVIC could call upon. The organization was from the outset designed to separate planning and operations from analysis and assessment although these separate divisions were co-located. This division worked well as it enabled information obtained in Iraq to be analyzed and assessed rapidly and effectively. The training and technical support division was, however, located in a separate building outside of the main UN building in New York as sufficient space was not available in the UN HQ building. College of Commissioners. UNMOVIC had a College of Commissioners whose membership is shown in Table 6.8. 11 of the 16 were, in September 2004, those appointed in March 2000 thereby providing valuable continuity. The

138 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 6.8 UNMOVIC College of Commissioners from 10 March 2000 unless indicated otherwise. [The original Commissioners are in Bold] Name

Country

Adigun Ade Abiodun

Nigeria

Reinhard Bohm

Germany

Ron Cleminson

Canada

Cong Guang Li Junhua Chen Weixiong

China (from 16 November 2001) (from 20 November 2003)

Therese Delpech

France

Robert Einhorn John S. Wolf Susan Burk

United States (from 31 October 2001) (from 20 November 2003)

Yuriy V. Federov

Russian Federation

Konstantyn Gryschenko Anatoliy Scherba

Ukraine (from 19 January 2004)

Gunterio G. Heineken

Argentina

Hannelore Hoppe

UN Department for Disarmament Affairs

Takanori Kazuhara

Japan

Roque Monteleone-Neto

Brazil

Annaswamy Narayana Prasad

India

Marjatta Rautio Olga Pellicer

Finland Mexico (from 13 December 2002)

Paul Schulte Brian Wells

United Kingdom (from 17 October 2002)

Cheikh Sylla

Senegal

Commissioners were primarily used to review the Quarterly Reports prior to their release and provide advice to the Executive Chairman thereby providing a pre-Security Council sounding board on policy. Unlike the UNSCOM Special Commissioners, they did not become involved directly in the daily operations of UNMOVIC. UNMOVIC Staff. The UNMOVIC staff were recruited from as wide a geographic distribution as possible – some 31 nationalities were represented in March 2003. In November 2004, some 25 nationalities were represented.

The Years of UNMOVIC 139

The staff in New York in November 2004 were organized into six groups: a. Office of the Executive Chairman b. Four Divisions – Division of Planning and Operations – Division of Analysis and Assessment – Division of Information – Division of Technical Support and Training c. Administrative Service In the office of the Executive Chairman were the: Acting Executive Chairman – Demetrius Perricos Legal Adviser – Salwa Berberi Secretary to the College of Commissioners – Multusamy Sanmuganatan External Relations – Nikita Zhukov Activity Evaluation – Sen Pang Public Information – Ewen Buchanan The four Divisions were headed by Demetrius Perricos (Planning and Operations), Jean-Louis Rolland (Analysis and Assessment), James Corcoran (Information) and Brian Mullady (Technical Support and Training) with the Administrative Service headed by Rachel Davies. A particular strength of UNMOVIC was in the separation of the Analysis and Assessment Division from the Planning and Operations Division. The changes in the staffing of these Divisions from when UNMOVIC was established in 2000 through to September 2004 is shown in Table 6.9

Table 6.9 Staffing of Planning and Operations (DPO) and of Analysis and Assessment (DAA) Divisions from September 2000 to September 2004 Staffing of DPO and DAA – September 2000 Division of Planning and Operations

Division of Analysis and Assessment

Director: Demetrius Perricos

Director: Gregoire Diamantides

Biological Section Chief: Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack (until Sept 01) [Arkadii Anisimov]

Biological Section Chief: Ake Bovallius Martin Fosbrook

Chemical Section Chief: [Vacant] Svetlana Utkina Ioan Roman

Chemical Section Chief: William Maurits Alexander Coker [Sergey Ilin]

140 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 6.9 Staffing of Planning and Operations (DPO) and of Analysis and Assessment (DAA) Divisions from September 2000 to September 2004 – continued Staffing of DPO and DAA – September 2000 – continued Division of Planning and Operations

Division of Analysis and Assessment

Missile Section Chief: [Vacant] Corinne Heraud Anatolly Lynnyk

Missile Section Chief: [Patrice Palanque] Paul Clifford [Naoto Sato]

Multidisciplinary Section Chief: [Kay Mereish] Franz Kolar [Jose Salinas]

Multidisciplinary Section Chief: [Vacant] Jean Jano [Jean-Philippe Morange]

Staffing of DPO and DAA – September 2001 Division of Planning and Operations

Division of Analysis and Assessment

Director: Demetrius Perricos

Director: Gregoire Diamantides

Biological Section Chief: Kay Mereish (from Nov 00) Philippe Michel (from Dec 01) Harvey McGeorge (from Dec 01)

Biological Section Chief: Ake Bovallius (until Dec 01) Martin Fosbrook Arkadii Anisimov

Chemical Section Chief: Krzystof Strelau (from Mar 01) Svetlana Utkina Ioan Roman

Chemical Section Chief: William Maurits Alexander Coker Sergey Ilin

Missile Section Chief: William Jolley (from May 01) Corinne Heraud Gang Wu (from end 01) Anatolly Lynnyk

Missile Section Chief: Patrice Palanque Paul Clifford Naoto Sato

Multidisciplinary Section Chief: Paulo Barretto (from Dec 01) Franz Kolar Jose Salinas

Multidisciplinary Section Chief: Geoffrey Forden Jean Jano Jean-Philippe Morange

Staffing of DPO and DAA – September 2002 Division of Planning and Operations

Division of Analysis and Assessment

Director: Demetrius Perricos

Director: Jean-Louis Rolland (from Sept 02)

The Years of UNMOVIC 141 Table 6.9 Staffing of Planning and Operations (DPO) and of Analysis and Assessment (DAA) Divisions from September 2000 to September 2004 – continued Staffing of DPO and DAA – September 2002 – continued Division of Planning and Operations

Division of Analysis and Assessment

Biological Section Chief: Kay Mereish Philippe Michel Roman Mezencev (from Sept 02) Jan Rozing (from Jan 03) Kevin O’Connell (from March 03)

Biological Section Chief: Peter Prosser (from Dec 01) Arkadii Anisimov Olli Haikala Martin Fosbrook (until Aug 03)

Chemical Section Chief: Krzystof Strelau (until Nov 02) Harald Marhold (from Sep 02) Dawson Cagle (from Dec 02)

Chemical Section Chief: Krzystof Strelau (from Nov 02) Sergey Ilin Vadim Zoubrilin (from Oct/Nov 02) Ingrid Fangmark (Aug 02–Aug 03) Jaroslaw Szulc (from Sept 02) Alexander Coker

Missile Section Chief: William Jolley Corinne Heraud Gang Wu Michael Ellerman (from end 02)

Missile Section Chief: Patrice Palanque Octavian Ionescu Tetsuya Takehira

Multidisciplinary Section Chief: Paulo Barretto (from Nov 02) Jose Salinas Harvey McGeorge (from Jun 02)

Multidisciplinary Section Chief: Goeffrey Forden Jean-Philippe Morange

Central Planning: Svetlana Utkina Staffing of DPO and DAA – September 2003 Division of Planning and Operations

Division of Analysis and Assessment

Director: Demetrius Perricos

Director: Jean-Louis Rolland

Biological Section Chief: Kay Mereish Philippe Michel Jan Rozing Kevin O’Connell

Biological Section Chief: Peter Prosser Arkadii Anisimov Olli Haikala Roman Mezencev

Chemical Section Chief: Harald Marhold Vadim Zoubrilin (from Aug 03) Dawson Cagle

Chemical Section Chief: Krzystof Strelau Sergey Ilin Jaroslaw Szulc Alexander Coker (until Dec 03)

142 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 6.9 Staffing of Planning and Operations (DPO) and of Analysis and Assessment (DAA) Divisions from September 2000 to September 2004 – continued Staffing of DPO and DAA – September 2003 – continued Division of Planning and Operations

Division of Analysis and Assessment

Missile Section Chief: William Jolley Corinne Heraud Gang Wu Michael Ellerman

Missile Section Chief: Patrice Palanque Octavian Ionescu Tetsuya Takehira

Multidisciplinary Section Chief: Paulo Barretto Jose Salinas Harvey McGeorge

Multidisciplinary Section Chief: Igor Mitrokhin (from summer 03) Jean-Philippe Morange

Central Planning: Svetlana Utkina Staffing of DPO and DAA – September 2004 Division of Planning and Operations

Division of Analysis and Assessment

Director: Demetrius Perricos

Director: Jean-Louis Rolland

Biological Section Chief: Kay Mereish Kevin O’Connell Herbert Loret

Biological Section Chief: Peter Prosser Arkadii Anisimov Roman Mezencev Karin Hjalmarsson

Chemical Section Chief: Harald Marhold Vadim Zoubrilin Dawson Cagle

Chemical Section Chief: Krzystof Strelau Sergey Ilin Jaroslaw Szulc

Missile Section Chief: J. Grunenwald Mark Silver Zhibo Zou

Missile Section Chief: William Jolley Octavian Ionescu Tetsuya Takehira

Multidisciplinary Section Chief: Paulo Barretto Corinne Heraud Michael Avenell

Multidisciplinary Section Chief: Igor Mitrokhin Jean-Philippe Morange

Central Planning: Svetlana Utkina

The Years of UNMOVIC 143

Information Hans Blix, in line with the recommendation of the Amorim panel that ‘any information should be assessed strictly on the basis of its credibility and relevance to the mandate. The substantive relationship with intelligence providers should be one-way only, even if it is recognized that dialogue with providers may be necessary for clarifications and refinement of assessments,’ took steps to ensure that information coming into UNMOVIC was one way as there had been concerns with UNSCOM that some national intelligence agencies had been too close to the operational elements of UNSCOM. A recent analysis 41 has also noted that Blix appeared determined to ensure that some of the key players in UNSCOM were not dominant players in UNMOVIC. As a result, some long-established links at the working level between individual inspectors and intelligence analysts were lost and UNMOVIC apparently had no channel by which he might discover the views of specialist intelligence analysts, as distinct from high-level political projections of intelligence assessments. The analysis concludes that those involved noted a significant reduction in the degree of interaction compared to that which took place with UNSCOM. Once UNMOVIC inspections began and the political stakes grew, the insights that might have come from working-level contact between individual inspectors and their national intelligence organizations could have better informed the UNMOVIC leadership. Training A particular strength of UNMOVIC has been the quality of its training for nearly all members of staff as well as those who made up the roster of inspectors. Training was the responsibility of the Training Section Chief, Nikita Smidovitch, in the Division of Technical Support and Training. As Nikita Smidovitch had been the Chief of the Ballistic Missile Section as well as Deputy Director of Operations in UNSCOM, this meant that UNMOVIC was able to benefit directly from his wealth of experience of operations in Iraq. It was mandatory for everyone on the roster to have been qualified by taking the basic training course as this included mock inspections so that UNMOVIC headquarters staff who would be Chief Inspectors and roster members would gain experience of working together as a team. In addition, many staff and members of the roster have participated in specialist follow-up training courses. There was also ongoing training for Chief Inspectors on an ad hoc basis. The training courses held by UNMOVIC along with the numbers of participants are shown in Table 6.10 (basic training) and 6.11 (follow-up training).

144 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 6.10

UNMOVIC basic training courses

Location

Course

Date

Participants

States

New York, USA Paris, France Vienna, Austria Ottawa, Canada Geneva, Switzerland Vienna, Austria Vienna, Austria

TC 1 TC 2 TC 3 TC 4 TC 5 TC 6 TC 7

June 2000 Nov 2000 Feb 2001 June 2001 March 2002 Oct 2002 Jan 2003

44 58 52 59 54 54 59

19 23 24 24 28 25 22

Table 6.11

UNMOVIC follow-up training courses

Type of course

Course

Date

Participants

States

Sampling specialized course

SSC1

Missile advanced course

Location

April 2001

30

17

MAC 1

May 2001

20

9

Biological advanced course

BAC 1

Nov 2001

19

15

UK

Missile advanced course

MAC 2

Dec 2001

22

13

Argentina

Chemical advanced course

CAC 1

Jan 2002

22

15

UK

Laboratory equipment specialized course

LESC1

Feb 2002

13

11

US

Missile enhanced course

MEC 1

May 2002

20

15

New York

Biological enhanced course

BEC 1

June 2002

20

18

New York

Biological advanced course

BAC 2

July 2002

15

12

UK

Chemical advanced course

CAC 2

June 2002

19

14

Finland

Chemical advanced course

CAC 3

Sept 2002

15

12

China

Chemical enhanced course

CEC 1

Nov 2002

20

17

New York

Missile advanced course

MAC 3

Dec 2002

15

11

Argentina

USA Argentina

The Years of UNMOVIC 145 Table 6.11

UNMOVIC follow-up training courses – continued

Type of course

Course

Date

Participants

States

Location

Biological/Chemical enhanced course

BCEC 1 Mar 2003

13

9

New York

Biotechnology course

BTC 1

Apr 2003

10

9

Brazil

Biological instruments course

SBIC1

Dec 2003

12

9

New York

Hazardous material shipment course

IATA2

Jan 2004

15

HQ staff

New York

Biological advanced course

BAC 3

Feb 2004

13

13

Dual-use items enhanced course

BCEC2

April 2004

17

9

Multidisciplinary course

MD 1

May 2004

22

14

Vienna

Missile advanced course

MAC 4

Jun/ Jul 2004

17

14

Argentina

Biotechnology course

BTC 2

Oct 2004

16

15

Brazil

UK New York

UNMOVIC inspections The central element of UNMOVIC was the mounting of inspections in Iraq during the just over three month period from 27 November 2002 until 18 March 2003. Chief Inspectors were always selected from UNMOVIC headquarters staff because they could be briefed by the Executive Chairman before going to Iraq, knew the culture of the UNMOVIC organization, had trained with those on the roster who would be making up the inspection teams and thus already had worked together as a team. UNMOVIC put much effort into creating inspection teams that would be effective in Iraq. The plan was for inspection team members from the roster to be in Iraq for about three months and to have a Chief Inspector from each discipline (biological, chemical, missiles and multidisciplinary) in Iraq at the same time. The aim would be for each Chief Inspector to be in Iraq for a month at a time. In carrying out inspections in Iraq, each Chief Inspector would decide whether to split his or her inspection team into subteams under individual team leaders which might go to different sites or to the same site. The aim was to provide flexibility so that Iraq would not know in advance which site might be visited on any particular day. The Chief Inspectors for the period that UNMOVIC was in Iraq are shown in Table 6.12.

146 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 6.12 Chief Inspectors for UNMOVIC missions from 27 November 2002 to 17 March 2003 [MD = Multidisciplinary] Mission

Chief Inspector

Country

Duration of mission

UNMOVIC 1/MD UNMOVIC 2/MD-Missile UNMOVIC 3/Bio UNMOVIC 4/Chem

Demetrius Perricos William Jolley Kay Mereish Krzystof Strelau

Greece Australia USA Poland

UNMOVIC 5/MD

Jose Salinas

Chile

UNMOVIC 6/ Missile

Corinne Heraud

France

UNMOVIC 7/Bio

Olli Haikala

Finland

UNMOVIC 8/Chem UNMOVIC 9/MD UNMOVIC 10/MD UNMOVIC 11/MD UNMOVIC 12/Bio UNMOVIC 13/Missile UNMOVIC 14/Chem UNMOVIC 15/Bio UNMOVIC 16/MD UNMOVIC 17/Missile UNMOVIC 18/Chem UNMOVIC 19/Missile UNMOVIC 20/MD UNMOVIC 21/Bio UNMOVIC 22/Chem

Alexander Coker Franz Kolar Demetrius Perricos Timothy Williams Peter Prosser Paul Clifford Harald Marhold Jan Rozing Paulo Barretto Corinne Heraud Krzystof Strelau William Jolley Jose Salinas Philippe Michel Jaroslaw Szulc

UK Austria Greece USA Australia UK Austria Netherlands Brazil France Poland Australia Chile France Poland

25 Nov–4 Dec 2002 5 Dec–22 Dec 2002 10 Dec–28 Dec 2002 10 Dec 2002– 1 Jan 2003 18 Dec 2002– 4 Jan 2003 23 Dec 2002– 29 Jan 2003 29 Dec 2002– 26 Jan 2003 2 Jan–31 Jan 2003 4 Jan–14 Jan 2003 15 Jan–20 Jan 2003 21 Jan–11 Feb 2003 27 Jan–5 Feb 2003 30 Jan–28 Feb 2003 1 Feb–1 Mar 2003 6 Feb–10 Mar 2003 12 Feb–4 Mar 2003 1 Mar–6 Mar 2003 2 Mar–16 Mar 2003 7 Mar–17 Mar 2003 5 Mar–17 Mar 2003 11 Mar–17 Mar 2003 17 Mar 2003

An analysis of the above shows that the Chief Inspectors for the chemical and biological missions came from the following countries: Chemical missions Austria 1 mission Poland 3 missions UK 1 mission Biological missions Australia 1 mission Finland 1 mission France 1 mission Netherlands 1 mission USA 1 mission The plan prepared in New York by UNMOVIC prior to each mission included the sites to be visited but it was left to the Chief Inspector in Iraq to decide how best to achieve the mission and thus which subteams to

The Years of UNMOVIC 147

send to which site. Each inspection site visited by UNMOVIC resulted in a separate inspection report. The sites in Iraq were assigned to the various UNMOVIC disciplines – biological, chemical, missile and multidisciplinary – and also divided into various broad categories as shown in Table 6.13. The category ‘other sites’ are sites which did not fall into the other categories. Table 6.13

Numbers of types of sites by discipline in Iraq

Types of site

Number

Biological

Chemical

Missile

Multidisciplinary

Military site

129

7

16

26

80

Industrial/ manufacturing site

176

60

63

45

8

R & D site

66

43

7

9

7

Administration/ management

52

19

5

1

27

Support/store site

78

20

51

5

2

College/education

71

59

10

–

2

Export/import/ trading companies/ customs offices, etc.

73

–

–

–

73

Health/hospital site

89

89

–

–

–

477

78

70

172

157

1211

375

222

258

356

Other sites Total

A significant number of sites were inspected by UNMOVIC during the just over three month period that it was in Iraq as shown in Table 6.14. Table 6.14 Types and numbers of sites inspected by discipline in Iraq from 27 November 2002 to 18 March 2003 Type of site inspected

Number Biological

Chemical

Missile

Multidisciplinary

Military site

129

7

16

26

80

Industrial/ manufacturing site

172

60

63

45

4

R & D site

66

43

7

9

7

Support/store site

78

20

51

5

2

Total

445

130

137

85

93

Total number of inspections by discipline

731

205

161

219

146

148 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

Sampling and analysis UNMOVIC developed a procedure for the carrying out of sampling and analysis. The right to take and analyze samples of any kind, as well as to remove them for off-site analyses was expressly provided for in the original exchange of letters of 6 May 1991 between the UN Secretary-General and the Foreign Minister of Iraq. In addition, in the Blix/ElBareidi letter annexed to UNSCR 1441 (2002) the following provision is included that ‘with respect to samples, UNMOVIC and IAEA will, where feasible, split samples so that Iraq may receive a portion while another portion is kept for reference purposes. Where appropriate, the organizations will send the samples to more than one laboratory for analysis.’ The UNMOVIC procedure noted that the taking of samples was useful in order to achieve unambiguous identification of items and materials and therefore provided a powerful tool in monitoring and verification activities in the biological, chemical and missile areas. Many specific issues could be resolved through sampling and analysis, which could also increase the level of confidence in and objectivity of the monitoring process. The aim of UNMOVIC was, as far as possible, to adopt practical arrangements for such analysis which would be similar, but not identical, to the arrangements employed by the WHO, OPCW and the IAEA. For complex analyses, UNMOVIC depended upon laboratories outside Iraq making the utmost use of existing international experience and arrangements for outside analyses and established its own procedures for the selection of outside laboratories in the biological, chemical and missile areas. All samples taken by UNMOVIC in Iraq were formally documented and would, whenever technically possible (except, for example, in the case of automated sampling equipment) be taken in the presence of Iraqi personnel. Splitting of samples would be carried out as this corresponded to internationally accepted practice and aimed to increase the level of confidence in the analytical results generated by the analysis. When samples were sent outside Iraq for analysis, they would, normally, be sent to at least two international laboratories for analysis. Sample transportation was to be in accordance with IATA regulations on the shipment of dangerous goods. The UNMOVIC procedure required that a documented chain of custody had to be ensured for all samples originating in Iraq during the entire period of their collection, preparation, handling, transportation and analysis. Laboratory network. An advanced and proven analytical capability would be the main criteria for the selection of such laboratories (which are listed in Table 6.6 above). Analyses at selected laboratories could be performed on the basis of an agreement with UNMOVIC. UNMOVIC would formulate

The Years of UNMOVIC 149

specific requests for analysis for each participating laboratory, including specifications for analyses, and would ensure anonymity of samples. Requests for Proposal (RFP) were issued by the UN Procurement Division to the candidate laboratory selected by UNMOVIC for the network of laboratories. The Statement of Work set out in considerable detail what was required for the analysis of both biological and chemical samples. In respect of biological agents, analytical capabilities were required for two lists of agents: List A

List B

Bacterial agents Cl. Botulinum Cl. Perfringens B. Anthracis Yersinia Pestis

Bacterial agents Francisella tularensis Brucella spp. Salmonella spp. Burkholderia mallei and pseudomallei

Toxins Ricin Aflatoxin T2 Toxin Botulinum Toxin A, B, C, D, E

Viruses Alphaviruses (VEE, EEE, WEE) Smallpox

In respect of chemicals, analytical capabilities were required for the chemicals listed in the revised Annex II of the Plan for ongoing monitoring and verification set out in S/2001/560 of 15 October 2001. In regard to confidentiality, the agreement includes a standard UN contract confidentiality provision that states: 13.2 The Contractor may not communicate at any time to any other person, Government or authority external to the United Nations, any information known to it by reason of its association with the United Nations which has not been made public except with the authorization of the United Nations; nor shall the Contractor at any time use such information to private advantage. These obligations do not lapse upon termination of this Contract. The types and numbers of samples collected and analyzed by UNMOVIC are summarized in Table 6.15. The two samples sent to the UNMOVIC laboratory network were samples taken from two liquid fill intact R-400 bombs which were analyzed for both biological and chemical agents.

150 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 6.15 Chemical and biological samples collected in Iraq from 27 November 2002 to 18 March 2003 Chemical: Type of Sample

Number

Biological: Type of sample

Number

Stored chemicals

16

R & D sites

10

Reaction liquors

41

Industrial/manufacturing sites

41

Equipment wipes

83

Quality control labs in Iraq

10

Mustard agent

14

Munitions

33

Munitions

40

Infrastructure

53

Environmental samples Total

14 254

Number of sites sampled

25

Number of samples analyzed by UNMOVIC laboratory network

2

Total Number of sites sampled Number of samples analyzed by UNMOVIC laboratory network

101 17 2

Export/import mechanism It will be recalled that UNSCOM had developed a mechanism to monitor Iraq’s exports and imports of dual-purpose equipment and materials which was an essential component of the OMV plan, and UNSCOM was required under SCR 715 (1991) to monitor any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of Section C of Resolution 687 (1991). This mechanism was not a regime for international licensing, but rather for the timely provision of information by states in which companies are located which were contemplating sales or supplies to Iraq of items covered by the OMV plans. The aim was to establish an effective and credible mechanism which would be robust enough to deter Iraq and suppliers from potential breaches. This mechanism was augmented by the ability of UNSCOM and later, UNMOVIC, and IAEA to conduct unrestricted inspections throughout Iraq. This export/import mechanism that was developed for Iraq is of particular importance as it provided an example of how such a mechanism could be implemented globally. There are particular lessons for non-proliferation regimes from this mechanism given that the value of export monitoring is so frequently disputed by some countries. The aim of the export/import mechanism was to encourage governments to require companies to report all of relevance, while keeping data volume manageable for all concerned. Timely notification was sought of

The Years of UNMOVIC 151

the export to Iraq of any items identified in the OMV plans with both Iraq and the governments of suppliers providing such notifications prior to shipment. These notifications would identify the supplier, give a description of the item or items (including the technology) and provide the name of the end-user or consignee and the expected date of despatch of each shipping. The notifications were imperative, as they would make it possible to monitor the supply to Iraq of all items covered by the plans, both non-prescribed dedicated use items and dual-use items (those items that can be used for either permitted or prescribed purposes). Iraq would also report the export of items subject to the plans, whether such items are in the original or modified form, so that UNSCOM and IAEA could maintain full accounting for all monitored items. If an item, the import of which should have been notified under the mechanism but was not, is found in Iraq, the import would constitute a case of noncompliance with the monitoring regime established by the plans for OMV. The strong presumption would be that the item had been procured for prohibited purposes and so, as such, would be subject to disposal in accordance with the measures provided for in paragraphs 8 and 12 of SCR 687 (1991). However, this was never done. The export/import monitoring mechanism was approved on 27 March 1996 when SCR 1051 (1996) 42 was adopted. This resolution recognized that the export/import mechanism required the timely provision of information by states in which companies were located which were contemplating sales of supplies to Iraq of items covered by the OMV plans. The mechanism would not impede Iraq’s legitimate right to import and export for non-proscribed purposes, items and technology necessary for the promotion of its economic and social development. The resolution also affirmed that the mechanism approved was without prejudice to and shall not impair the operation of existing or future non-proliferation agreements or regimes on the international or regional level including arrangements referred to in Resolution 687 (1991), nor shall such agreements or regimes impair the operation of the mechanism. The mechanism would enter into force for Iraq not later than 60 days after the adoption of the resolution. The monitoring lists that formed the basis of the export/import mechanism were very generic. These had been revised by UNSCOM in 1995. UNMOVIC, as was provided for in UNSCR 1051 (1996), undertook a further revision of the lists. This was done in October 2001 with the submission to the Security Council by the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC of document S/2001/560 with its three annexes listing chemical, biological and missile-related items and by the simultaneous submission by the Director General of the IAEA of S/2001/561 with its revision of the nuclear-related items. These revised lists came into effect 30 days after submission. In the revision of the lists, some items were removed which had been difficult to

152 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

implement, such as chlorine, as were some items with very low proliferation risks and in the biological area, thresholds were set for growth media. Previously, ‘any’ growth media had to be declared which had made the regime unduly onerous. In practice, during the UNSCOM period, virtually any Oil for Food contract which included an item listed in the UNSCR 1051 (1996) annex was not approved or put on hold by a member of the UN Sanctions Committee. UNMOVIC reviewed all the Oil for Food contracts as a technical assessor acting as the ‘UN secretariat non-proliferation experts’ in regard to the 1051 items. This led to more and more pressure being put on the United States as the US put more and more contracts ‘on hold’ because of having a 1051 item. This led to a new approach outlined in Resolution 1382 (2001)43 in which the Security Council noted the proposed Goods Review List (as contained in Annex 1 to this Resolution) and the procedures for its application would be adopted, subject to any refinements to them agreed by the Council in light of further consultations, with implementation beginning on 30 May 2002. The list in Annex 1 is very short amounting to a page and a half. Further consultations led to a revised Goods Review List being submitted44 on 3 May 2002 comprising some 419 pages. This states that: Military goods and services are prohibited for sale or supply to Iraq under paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) and are not subject to review under the Goods Review List. For consideration of dual-use goods and services referred to under paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), UNMOVIC and IAEA should review these goods and services pursuant to the procedures enumerated in the Procedures for the Implementation of the Goods Review List. Some 11 days later the Security Council adopted Resolution 1409 (2002)45 which adopted the revised Goods Review List (S/2002/515) and the revised procedures annexed to the resolution for application for implementation with effect from 30 May 2002. These procedures require: 4 – After OIP [Office of the Iraq Programme] registration of the application, each application will be evaluated by technical experts from UNMOVIC and IAEA in order to determine whether the application contains any item referred to in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) as it relates to military commodities and products, or military related commodities or products covered by the GRL (‘GRL item(s)’). In addition, the procedures included a requirement for all the contracts currently on hold to be reviewed. The procedure stated that: 18 – OIP will divide contracts currently on hold into two categories – category A and category B. Category A will contain contracts on hold

The Years of UNMOVIC 153

that have been designated by UNMOVIC as containing item(s) on one or more of the UNSCR resolution 1051 lists. Category A will also contain contracts that were both processed before the Security Council adopted UNSCR resolution 1284 and assessed by one or more members of the Sanctions Committee as containing item(s) on one or more of the UNSCR resolution 1051 lists. OIP will consider contracts in category A to be ‘returned to the submitting Mission or United Nations agency’ and will notify the submitting Mission or United Nations agency accordingly, including national comments if possible. The submitting Mission or United Nations agency may submit a contract in category A as a new application under the GRL procedures. In category B will be all other contracts currently on hold. Contracts in category B will be recirculated by OIP under the GRL procedures. OIP will append the original committee registration number and national comments, for information purposes only, to any recirculated contracts. OIP should start this recirculation procedure within 60 days of adoption of this resolution and should complete the recirculation process within 60 days thereafter. This significantly increased the workload for UNMOVIC requiring an increase in the number of technical assessors from three to eight. Under SCR 1409 (2002) some 8,000 contract assessments were made of new contracts and some 3,000 assessments of old contracts on hold. A comparison of the SCR 1051 (1996) notification mechanism and the GRL contract review system is provided in Table 6.16. Following the military action in early 2003, Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003)46 adopted on 22 May 2003 included the provision: 10. Decides that, with the exception of the prohibitions related to the sale or supply to Iraq of arms and related material other than those arms and related material required by the Authority to serve the purposes of this and other related resolutions, all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq and the provision of financial and economic resources to Iraq established by resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions including resolution 778 (1992) of 2 October 1992, shall no longer apply; This consequently revoked the Goods Review List and its procedures whilst leaving the requirements of SCR 1051 (1996) still in place in regard to the export/import of its related items although in November 2004 there had been no notifications for over a year. It should be noted that SCR 1051 (1996) was more onerous on Iraq as any item found to have been imported into Iraq and not notified to UNSCOM/UNMOVIC was deemed to be for illicit purposes and could therefore be destroyed by UNSCOM/UNMOVIC than the earlier resolution

154 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 6.16 Comparison of the SCR 1051 (1996) notification mechanism and the GRL contract review system 1051 notification mechanism

GRL contract review system

UNSCOM/IAEA required under SCR 715 (1991) to monitor any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq relevant to the implementation of Section C of SCR 687 (1991).

The GRL contains an expanded 1051 list (expanded from S/1995/208), Wassenaar military dual-use list and additional items of potential military dual-use.

Export/import mechanism approved by SCR 1051(1996).

Goods Review List concept approved by SCR 1382 (2001).

Joint Unit is a legal entity constituted from UNSCOM/IAEA (and later UNMOVIC/ IAEA) personnel.

Goods Review List implemented by SCR 1409 (2002).

GRL drawn up by Security Council with no formal input from UNMOVIC/IAEA.

Lists of monitorable items (chemical, biological and missile-related) set out initially by UNSCOM in S/22871/Rev.1 Lists of monitorable items (nuclearrelated) set out initially by IAEA in S/22872/Rev.1. Lists revised by UNSCOM as S/1995/ 208 – revised monitoring list (715) and ExIm (1051) list. Lists revised by IAEA as S/1995/215 – revised monitoring and 1051 list. ExIm (1051) lists revised in 2001 S/2001/ 560* (chemical, biological and missilerelated) and S/2001/561 (nuclear-related).

Goods Review List revised (S/2002/515).

If the ‘Oil for Food’ contract contained a GRL item it would be submitted to the Sanctions Committee (the 661 Committee) for review. Usually the Sanctions Committee would not approve the contract unless the GRL item was deleted by amendment. Should the ‘Oil for Food’ contract not contain a GRL item then the Oil for Food Secretariat was empowered to approve the contract (providing all other aspects of the contract were compliant) and inform the Sanctions Committee members of the decision.

The Years of UNMOVIC 155 Table 6.16 Comparison of the SCR 1051 (1996) notification mechanism and the GRL contract review system – continued 1051 notification mechanism

GRL contract review system Technical assessment of ‘Oil for Food’ contracts undertaken by UNMOVIC/IAEA technical experts in parallel. GRL procedures called for a review of all contracts previously put ‘on hold’. Goods Review List and procedures revised by SCR 1454 (2002) including adopting supply thresholds for certain chemicals.

SCR 1483 (2003) underlines the intention of the Security Council to revisit the mandates of UNMOVIC and IAEA.

SCR 1483 (2003) revoked sanctions on civil goods. Goods Review List and its procedures ceased to be operational forthwith, and the Office of Iraq Programmes (‘Oil for Food’ Programme) to terminate within six months.

UNMOVIC currently considering revision of monitoring lists (S/2001/208) for the new situation in Iraq. This would result in new ExIm lists.

SCR 715 (1991) which approved the original UNSCOM ongoing monitoring and verification plan set out in S/22871/Rev.1. That plan included annexes with lists of items relevant to the implementation in Iraq of monitoring and verification and noted also that these lists ‘should be taken into account in the development of a mechanism related to the sale or supply of items to Iraq by other countries.’ These lists were revised and reissued as document S/1995/208 as it had become clear that for the annexes to serve, as intended, the lists of items to be reported by the exporting countries to UNSCOM and the IAEA, it was necessary to elaborate upon the generic descriptions in the original annexes so that customs and control authorities would know precisely what items would be subject to notification. The revised annexes in S/1995/208 are not materially different from the original annexes but they have been elaborated to produce a precise listing of items to be notified under the export/import mechanism. UNMOVIC is currently reviewing the monitoring lists in S/1995/208 as these have not been revised for 9 years with a view to bringing the monitoring lists in line with the SCR 1051 (1996) lists, as revised by S/2001/560.

156 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

Consideration is also being given to how the monitoring annexes might be made less onerous whilst still being effective so that they would be applicable for the new situation in Iraq where partnership rather than an adversarial relationship was more likely. Future role of UNMOVIC As noted above, SCR 1483 (2003) of 22 May 2003 included provision for the Security Council to revisit the mandate of UNMOVIC. Some possible options for the future role of UNMOVIC are set out and addressed in Chapter 10.

7 The Developments Leading to War in March 2003 and the Iraq Survey Group

The lead up to military action in March 2003 In both the United Kingdom and the United States, unclassified documents were issued in September and October 2002 respectively by the two governments setting out why action needed to be taken against Iraq. The UK Government issued a 53 page dossier1 entitled ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government’ and the Central Intelligence Agency of the US Government issued a 28 page report2 entitled ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs.’ These two documents reached largely similar conclusions about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (see Table 7.1). The foreword to the UK dossier signed by Prime Minister Tony Blair stated: What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme. I also believe that, as stated in the document, Saddam will now do his utmost to try to conceal his weapons from UN inspectors. The Executive Summary said that ‘as a result of intelligence we judge that Iraq has: • continued to produce chemical and biological agents; • military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them; • command and control arrangements in place to use chemical and biological weapons. Authority ultimately resides with Saddam Hussein. (There is intelligence that he may have delegated this authority to his son Qusai); 157

158 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 7.1 Comparison of UK Government Dossier of September 2002 and the US CIA Report of October 2002. [Emphasis as in original]. As the treatment in the two documents is different, the comparison is divided into a number of different topics: first, the overall WMD programme, then delivery means, followed by chemical weapons programmes and biological weapons programmes and finally a summary on chemical and biological weapons. UK Government Dossier September 2002

US CIA Report October 2002

Recent intelligence 5. Subsequently, intelligence has become available from reliable sources which complements and adds to previous intelligence and confirms the JIC assessment that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons. The intelligence also shows that that the Iraqi leadership has been discussing a number of issues related to these weapons. This intelligence covers:

Baghdad’s determination to hold onto a sizeable remnant of its WMD arsenal, agents, equipment, and expertise has led to years of dissembling and obstruction of UN inspections. Elite Iraqi security services orchestrated an extensive concealment and deception campaign to hide incriminating documents and material that precluded resolution of key issues pertaining to its WMD programs. • Iraqi obstructions prompted the Security Council to pass several subsequent resolutions demanding that Baghdad comply with its obligations to cooperate with the inspection process and to provide United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and IAEA officials immediate and unrestricted access to any site they wished to inspect. • Although outwardly maintaining the facade of cooperation, Iraqi officials frequently denied or substantially delayed access to facilities, personnel, and documents in an effort to conceal critical information about Iraq’s WMD programs. Successive Iraqi declarations on Baghdad’s pre-Gulf war WMD programs gradually became more accurate between 1991 and 1998, but only because of sustained pressure from UN sanctions, Coalition military force, and vigorous and robust inspections facilitated by information from cooperative countries. Nevertheless, Iraq never has fully accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in its declarations and has provided no credible proof that it has completely destroyed its weapons stockpiles and production infrastructure. • UNSCOM inspection activities and Coalition military strikes destroyed most of its

• Confirmation that chemical and biological weapons play an important role in Iraqi military thinking: intelligence shows that Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of chemical and biological weapons which he regards as being the basis for Iraqi regional power. He believes that respect for Iraq rests on its possession of these weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them. Intelligence indicates that Saddam is determined to retain this capability and recognises that Iraqi political weight would be diminished if Iraq’s military power rested solely on its conventional military forces. • Iraqi attempts to retain its existing banned weapons systems: Iraq is already taking steps to prevent UN weapons inspectors finding evidence of its chemical and biological weapons programme. Intelligence indicates that Saddam has learnt lessons from previous weapons inspections, has identified possible weak points in the inspections process and knows how to exploit them. Sensitive equipment and papers can easily be concealed and in some cases this is already happening. The possession of mobile biological agent production facilities will also aid concealment efforts. Saddam is determined not to lose the capabilities that he has been able to develop further in the four years since inspectors left.

The Developments Leading to War in March 2003 and the Iraq Survey Group 159 Table 7.1 Comparison of UK Government Dossier of September 2002 and the US CIA Report of October 2002. [Emphasis as in original]. – continued UK Government Dossier September 2002

US CIA Report October 2002

• Saddam’s willingness to use chemical and biological weapons: intelligence indicates that as part of Iraq’s military planning Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons, including against his own Shia population. Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so.

prohibited ballistic missiles and some Gulf war-era chemical and biological munitions, but Iraq still has a small force of extendedrange Scud-variant missiles, chemical precursors, biological seed stock, and thousands of munitions suitable for chemical and biological agents. • Iraq has preserved and in some cases enhanced the infrastructure and expertise necessary for WMD production and has used that capability to maintain a stockpile of WMD and to increase its size and sophistication in some areas. Since December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow UN inspectors into Iraq as required by the Security Council resolutions. Technical monitoring systems installed by the UN at known and suspected WMD and missile facilities in Iraq no longer operate. Baghdad prohibits Security Council-mandated monitoring overflights of Iraqi facilities by UN aircraft and helicopters. Similarly, Iraq has curtailed most IAEA inspections since 1998, allowing the IAEA to visit annually only a very small number of sites to safeguard Iraq’s stockpile of uranium oxide. In the absence of inspectors, Baghdad’s already considerable ability to work on prohibited programs without risk of discovery has increased, and there is substantial evidence that Iraq is reconstituting prohibited programs. Baghdad’s vigorous concealment efforts have meant that specific information on many aspects of Iraq’s WMD programs is yet to be uncovered. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. • Limited insight into activities since 1998 clearly show that Baghdad has used the absence of UN inspectors to repair and expand dual-use and dedicated missile development facilities and to increase its ability to produce WMD.

160 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 7.1 Comparison of UK Government Dossier of September 2002 and the US CIA Report of October 2002. [Emphasis as in original]. – continued UK Government Dossier September 2002

US CIA Report October 2002

Chemical and biological agents: delivery mean 14. Iraq has a variety of delivery means available for both chemical and biological agents. These include • free-fall bombs: Iraq acknowledged to UNSCOM the deployment to two sites of freefall bombs filled with biological agent during 1990–1. These bombs were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also acknowledged possession of four types of aerial bomb with various chemical agent fills including sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin and cyclosarin; • artillery shells and rockets: Iraq made extensive use of artillery munitions filled with chemical agents during the Iran–Iraq War. Mortars can also be used for chemical agent delivery. Iraq is known to have tested the use of shells and rockets filled with biological agents. Over 20,000 artillery munitions remain unaccounted for by UNSCOM; • helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers: Iraq carried out studies into aerosol dissemination of biological agent using these platforms prior to 1991. UNSCOM was unable to account for many of these devices. It is probable that Iraq retains a capability for aerosol dispersal of both chemical and biological agent over a large area; • al-Hussein ballistic missiles (range 650 km): Iraq told UNSCOM that it filled 25 warheads with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also developed chemical agent warheads for al-Hussein. Iraq admitted to producing 50 chemical warheads for al-Hussein which were intended for the delivery of a mixture of sarin and cyclosarin. However, technical analysis of warhead remnants has shown traces of VX degradation product which indicate that some additional warheads were made and filled with VX; • al-Samoud/Ababil-100 ballistic missiles (range 150 km plus): it is unclear if chemical and and biological warheads have been developed for these systems, but given the Iraqi exper-

Ballistic Missile Program Iraq has developed a ballistic missile capability that exceeds the 150 km range limitation established under UNSCR 687. During the 1980s, Iraq purchased 819 Scud B missiles from the USSR. Hundreds of these 300 km range missiles were used to attack Iranian cities during the Iran–Iraq War. Beginning in 1987, Iraq converted many of these Soviet Scuds into extended-range variants, some of which were fired at Tehran; some were launched during the Gulf war, and others remained in Iraq’s inventory at war’s end. Iraq admitted filling at least 75 of its Scud warheads with chemical or biological agents and deployed these weapons for use against Coalition forces and regional opponents, including Israel in 1991. Baghdad was developing other longer-range missiles based on Scud technology, including the 900 km alAbbas. Iraq was designing follow-on multistage and clustered medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) concepts with intended ranges up to 3,000 km. Iraq also had a program to develop a two-stage missile, called the Badr-2000, using solid propellants with an estimated range of 750 to 1,000 km. • Iraq never fully accounted for its existing missile programmes. Discrepancies in Baghdad’s declarations suggest that Iraq retains a small force of extended-range Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program and Other Aircraft Iraq is continuing to develop other platforms which most analysts believe probably are intended for delivering biological warfare agents. Immediately before the Gulf war, Baghdad attempted to convert a MiG-21 into an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to carry spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical or biological agents. UNSCOM assessed that the programme to develop the spray system

The Developments Leading to War in March 2003 and the Iraq Survey Group 161 Table 7.1 Comparison of UK Government Dossier of September 2002 and the US CIA Report of October 2002. [Emphasis as in original]. – continued UK Government Dossier September 2002

US CIA Report October 2002

ience on other missile systems, we judge that Iraq has the technical expertise for doing so; • L-29 remotely piloted vehicle programme: we know from intelligence that Iraq has attempted to modify the L-29 jet trainer to allow it to be used as an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) which is potentially capable of delivering chemical and biological agents over a large area. Chemical and biological warfare: command and control 15. The authority to use chemical and biological weapons ultimately resides with Saddam but intelligence indicates that he may have also delegated this authority to his son Qusai. Special Security Organisation (SSO) and Special Republican Guard (SRG) units would be involved in the movement of any chemical and biological weapons to military units. The Iraqi military holds artillery and missile systems at Corps level throughout the Armed Forces and conducts regular training with them. The Directorate of Rocket Forces has operational control of strategic missile systems and some Multiple Launcher Rocket Systems.

was successful, but the conversion of the MiG-21 was not. More recently, Baghdad has attempted to convert some of its L-29 jet trainer aircraft into UAVs that can be fitted with chemical and biological warfare (CBW) spray tanks, most likely a continuation of previous efforts with the MiG-21. Although much less sophisticated than ballistic missiles as a delivery platform, an aircraft – manned or unmanned – is the most efficient way to disseminate chemical and biological weapons over a large, distant area. • Iraq already has produced modified drop-tanks that can disperse biological or chemical agents effectively. Before the Gulf war, the Iraqis successfully experimented with aircraft-mounted spray tanks capable of releasing up to 2,000 liter of an anthrax simulant over a target area. Iraq also has modified commercial crop sprayers successfully and tested them with an anthrax simulant delivered by helicopters. • Baghdad has a history of experimenting with a variety of unmanned platforms. Iraq’s use of newer, more capable airframes would increase range and payload, while smaller platforms might be harder to detect and therefore more survivable. This capability represents a serious threat to Iraq’s neighbors and to international military forces in the region. • Iraq used tactical fighter aircraft and helicopters to deliver chemical agents, loaded in bombs and rockets, during the Iran–Iraq War. Baghdad probably is considering again using manned aircraft as delivery platforms depending on the operational scenario.

Chemical agent: production capabilities 8. Intelligence shows that Iraq has continued to produce chemical agent. During the Gulf war a number of facilities which intelligence reporting indicated were directly or indirectly associated

Chemical Warfare Programme Iraq has the ability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents within its chemical industry, although it probably depends on external sources for some precursors.

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with Iraq’s chemical weapons effort were attacked and damaged. Following the cease-fire UNSCOM destroyed or rendered harmless facilities and equipment used in Iraq’s chemical weapons programme. Other equipment was released for civilian use either in industry or academic institutes, where it was tagged and regularly inspected and monitored, or else placed under camera monitoring, to ensure that it was not being misused. This monitoring ceased when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq in 1998. However, capabilities remain and, although the main chemical weapon production facility at al-Muthanna was completely destroyed by UNSCOM and has not been rebuilt, other plants formerly associated with the chemical warfare program have been rebuilt. These include the chlorine and phenol plant at Fallujah 2 near Habbaniyah. In addition to their civilian uses, chlorine and phenol are used for precursor chemicals which contribute to the production of chemical agents. 9. Other dual-use facilities, which are capable of being used to support the production of chemical agent and precursors, have been rebuilt and reequipped. New chemical facilities have been built, some with illegal foreign assistance, and are probably fully operational or ready for production. These include the Ibn Sina Company at Tarmiyah (see figure 1), which is a chemical research centre. It undertakes research, development and production of chemicals previously imported but not now available and which are needed for Iraq’s civil industry. The Director-General of the research centre is Hikmat Na’im al-Jalu who prior to the Gulf war worked in Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme and after the war was responsible for preserving Iraq’s chemical expertise. 10. Parts of the al-Qa’qa’ chemical complex damaged in the Gulf war have also been repaired and are operational. Of particular concern are elements of the phosgene production plant at al-Qa’qa’. These were severely damaged during

Baghdad is expanding its infrastructure, under cover of civilian industries, that it could use to advance its CW agent production capability. During the 1980s Saddam had a formidable CW capability that he used against Iranians and against Iraq’s Kurdish population. Iraqi forces killed or injured more than 20,000 people in multiple attacks, delivering chemical agents (including mustard agent and the nerve agents sarin and tabun) in aerial bombs, 122mm rockets, and artillery shells against both tactical military targets and segments of Iraq’s Kurdish population. Before the 1991 Gulf war, Baghdad had a large stockpile of chemical munitions and a robust indigenous production capacity. • UNSCOM supervised the destruction of more than 40,000 chemical munitions, nearly 500,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of chemical precursors, and seven different types of delivery systems, including ballistic missile war-heads. More than 10 years after the Gulf war, gaps in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains a stockpile of chemical agents, probably VX, sarin, cyclosarin, and mustard. • Iraq probably has concealed precursors, production equipment, documentation, and other items necessary for continuing its CW effort. Baghdad never supplied adequate evidence to support its claims that it destroyed all of its CW agents and munitions. Thousands of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled munitions, including Scud-variant missile warheads, remain unaccounted for. • UNSCOM discovered a document at Iraqi Air Force headquarters in July 1998 showing that Iraq overstated by at least 6,000 the number of chemical bombs it told the

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the Gulf war, and dismantled under UNSCOM supervision, but have since been rebuilt. While phosgene does have industrial uses it can also be used by itself as a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent. 11. Iraq has retained the expertise for chemical warfare research, agent production and weaponization. Most of the personnel previously involved in the programme remain in the country. While UNSCOM found a number of technical manuals (so called ‘cook books’) for the production of chemical agents and critical precursors, Iraq’s claim to have unilaterally destroyed the bulk of the documentation cannot be confirmed and is almost certainly untrue. Recent intelligence indicates that Iraq is still discussing methods of concealing such documentation in order to and ensure that it is not discovered by any future UN inspections.

UN it had used during the Iran–Iraq War – bombs that remain are unaccounted for. • Iraq has not accounted for 15,000 artillery rockets that in the past were its preferred means for delivering nerve agents, nor has it accounted for about 550 artillery shells filled with mustard agent. • Iraq probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents. Baghdad continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could divert quickly to CW production. The best examples are the chlorine and phenol plants at the Fallujah II facility. Both chemicals have legitimate civilian uses but also are raw materials for the synthesis of precursor chemicals used to produce blister and nerve agents. Iraq has three other chlorine plants that have much higher capacity for civilian production; these plants and Iraqi imports are more than sufficient to meet Iraq’s civilian needs for water treatment. Of the 15 million kg of chlorine imported under the UN Oilfor-Food Program since 1997, Baghdad used only 10 million kg and has 5 million kg in stock, suggesting that some domestically produced chlorine has been diverted to such proscribed activities as CW agent production. • Fallujah II was one of Iraq’s principal CW precursor production facilities before the Gulf war. In the last two years the Iraqis have upgraded the facility and brought in new chemical reactor vessels and shipping containers with a large amount of production equipment. They have expanded chlorine output far beyond pre-Gulf war production levels – capabilities that can be diverted quickly to CW production. Iraq is seeking to purchase CW agent precursors and applicable production equipment and is trying to hide the activities of the Fallujah plant.

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Biological agent: production capabilities 12. We know from intelligence that Iraq has continued to produce biological warfare agents. As with some chemical equipment, UNSCOM only destroyed equipment that could be directly linked to biological weapons production. Iraq also has its own engineering capability to design and construct biological agent associated fermenters, centrifuges, sprayer dryers and other equipment and is judged to be self-sufficient in the technology required to produce biological weapons. The experienced personnel who were active in the programme have largely remained in the country. Some dual-use equipment has also been purchased, but without monitoring by UN inspectors Iraq could have diverted it to their biological weapons programme. This newly purchased equipment and other equipment previously subject to monitoring could be used in a resurgent biological warfare programme. Facilities of concern include: • the Castor Oil Production Plant at Fallujah: this was damaged in UK/US air attacks in 1998 (Operation Desert Fox) but has been rebuilt. The residue from the castor bean pulp can be used in the production of the biological agent ricin; • the al-Dawrah Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute: which was involved in biological agent production and research before the Gulf war; • the Amariyah Sera and Vaccine Plant at Abu Ghraib: UNSCOM established that this facility was used to store biological agents, seed stocks and conduct biological warfare associated genetic research prior to the Gulf war. It has now expanded its storage capacity. 13. UNSCOM established that Iraq considered the use of mobile biological agent production facilities. In the past two years evidence from defectors has indicated the existence of such facilities. Recent intelligence confirms that the Iraqi military have developed mobile facilities. These would help Iraq conceal and protect biological agent production from military attack or UN inspection.

Biological Warfare Program Iraq has the capability to convert quickly legitimate vaccine and biopesticide plants to biological warfare (BW) production and already may have done so. This capability is particularly troublesome because Iraq has a record of concealing its BW activities and lying about the existence of its offensive BW program. After four years of claiming that they had conducted only ‘small-scale, defensive’ research, Iraqi officials finally admitted to inspectors in 1995 to production and weaponization of biological agents. The Iraqis admitted this only after being faced with evidence of their procurement of a large volume of growth media and the defection of Husayn Kamil (sic), former director of Iraq’s military industries. • Iraq admitted producing thousands of liters of the BW agents anthrax, botulinum toxin (which paralyzes respiratory muscles and can be fatal within 24 to 36 hours), and aflatoxin (a potent carcinogen that can attack the liver, killing years after ingestion), and preparing BW-filled Scudvariant missile warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks before the Gulf war. Baghdad did not provide persuasive evidence to support its claims hat it unilaterally destroyed its BW agents and munitions. Experts from UNSCOM assessed that Baghdad’s declarations vastly understated he production of biological agents and estimated that Iraq actually produced two-to-four times the amount of agent that it acknowledged producing, including Bacillus anthracis – the causative agent of anthrax – and botulinum toxin. The improvement or expansion of a number of nominally ‘civilian’ facilities that were directly associated with biological weapons indicates that key key aspects of Iraq’s offensive BW programme are active and most elements more advanced and larger than before the 1990–1991 Gulf war. • The al-Dawrah Foot-and-Mouth Disease

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Chemical and biological agents: surviving stocks 6. When confronted with questions about the unaccounted stocks, Iraq has claimed repeatedly that if it had retained any chemical agents from before the Gulf war they would have deteriorated sufficiently to render them harmless. But Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM to having the knowledge and capability to add stabilizer to nerve agent and other chemical warfare agents which would prevent such decomposition. In 1997 UNSCOM also examined some munitions which had been filled with mustard gas prior to 1991 and found that they remained very toxic and showed little sign of deterioration. 7. Iraq has claimed that all its biological agents and weapons have been destroyed. No convincing proof of any kind has been produced to support this claim. In particular, Iraq could not discrepancies between the amount of growth media explain large (nutrients required for the specialized growth of agent) it procured before 1991 and the amounts of agent it admits to having manufactured. The discrepancy is enough to produce more than three times the amount of anthrax allegedly manufactured. The Problem of Dual-Use Facilities Almost all components and supplies used in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes are dual-use. For example, any major petrochemical or biotech industry, as well as public health organisations, will have legitimate need for most materials and equipment required manufacture chemical and biological weapons. Without UN weapons inspectors it is very difficult therefore to be sure about the true nature of many of Iraq’s facilities. For example, Iraq has built a large new chemical complex, Project Baiji, in the desert in north west Iraq at al-Sharqat. This site is a former uranium enrichment facility which was damaged during the Gulf war and rendered harmless under supervision of the IAEA. Part of the site has been rebuilt, with work starting in 1992, as a chemical production complex. Despite the site being far away from populated

(FMD) Vaccine Facility is one of two known Biocontainment Level-3 – facilities in Iraq with an extensive air handling and filtering system. Iraq admitted that before the Gulf war al-Dawrah had been a BW agent production facility. UNSCOM attempted to render it useless for BW agent production in 1996 but left some production equipment in place because UNSCOM could not prove it was connected to previous BW work. In 2001, Iraq announced it would begin renovating the plant without UN approval, ostensibly to produce a vaccine to combat an FMD outbreak. In fact, Iraq easily can import all the foot-and-mouth vaccine it needs through the UN. • The Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute is an ideal cover location for BW research, testing, production, and storage. UN inspectors discovered documents related to BW research at this facility, some showing that BW cultures, agents, and equipment were stored there during the Gulf war. Of particular concern is the plant’s new storage capacity, which greatly exceeds Iraq’s needs for legitimate medical storage. • The Fallujah III Castor Oil Production Plant is situated on a large complex with an historical connection to Iraq’s CW program. Of immediate BW concern is the potential production of ricin toxin. Castor bean pulp, left over from castor oil production, can be used to extract ricin to toxin. Iraq admitted to UNSCOM that it manufactured ricin and field-tested it in artillery shells before the Gulf war. Iraq operated this plant for legitimate purposes under UNSCOM scrutiny before 1998 when UN inspectors left the country. Since 1999, Iraq has rebuilt major structures destroyed during Operation Desert Fox. Iraqi officials claim they are making castor oil for brake fluid, but verifying such claims without UN inspections is impossible.

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areas it is surrounded by a high wall with watch towers and guarded by armed guards. Intelligence reports indicate that it will produce nitric acid which can be used in explosives, missile fuel and in the purification of uranium.

In addition to questions about activity at known facilities, there are compelling reasons to be concerned about BW activity at other sites and in mobile production units and laboratories. Baghdad has pursued a mobile BW research and production capability to better conceal its programme. • UNSCOM uncovered a document on Iraqi Military Industrial Commission letterhead indicating that Iraq was interested in developing mobile fermentation units, and an Iraqi scientist admitted to UN inspectors that Iraq was trying to move in the direction of mobile BW production. • Iraq has now established large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capabilities based on mobile BW facilities.

Chemical and biological weapons: summary 16. Intelligence shows that Iraq has covert chemical and biological weapons programmes, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687 and has continued to produce chemical and biological agents. Iraq has: • chemical and biological agents and weapons available, both from pre-Gulf war stocks and more recent production; • the capability to produce the chemical agents mustard gas, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX capable of producing mass casualties; • a biological agent production capability and can produce at least anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. Iraq has also developed mobile facilities to produce biological agents; • a variety of delivery means available; • military forces, which maintain the capability to use these weapons with command, control and logistical arrangements in place.

• Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq’s WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. • Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile programme, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. • Iraq’s growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad’s capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled. • Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production. • Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is

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•

• •

•

•

•

working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents. Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. Its capability was reduced during the UNSCOM inspections and is probably more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved. Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents. The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles, and probably possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a limited number of covertly stored, extended-range Scuds. All key aspects – R&D, production, and weaponization – of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war. Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland. Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war.

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• developed mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents; • pursued illegal programmes to procure controlled materials of potential use in the production of chemical and biological weapons programmes.’ The US CIA Report makes the following Key Judgements: • Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. • Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq’s WMD efforts. • Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. • Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. • All key aspects – R&D, production, and weaponization – of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war. The comparison shows that the main points made in the United Kingdom and the United States were largely similar. It is also clear that both documents were developed from classified intelligence assessments. In the United Kingdom, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) provides intelligence assessments to the UK government whilst in the United States the comparable material is provided by the US National Intelligence Estimates. In an extract released3 on 18 July 2003 from the classified version of the US National Intelligence Estimate, confidence levels are quoted for selected Key Judgements as shown in Table 7.2. Table 7.2 Confidence levels for Key Judgements in extracts from classified US National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002 High Confidence: • Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions. • We are not detecting portions of those programs. • Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles. Low Confidence • When Saddam would use weapons of mass destruction. • Whether Saddam would engage in clandestine attacks against the US Homeland. • Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or biological weapons with Al Quaida.

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In the following month, on 11 August 2003, the Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, issued a statement4 on the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002 in which he said that the CIA stood by the judgements made in the NIE. The statement said that ‘The history of our judgments on Iraq’s weapons programs is clear and consistent. On biological weapons and missiles our data got stronger in recent years. We have had a solid historical foundation and new data that have allowed us to make judgments and attribute high confidence in specific areas.’ In respect of biological weapons, chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, the statement said that: Biological Weapons. All agencies of the Intelligence Community since 1995 have judged that Iraq retained biological weapons and that the BW program continued. In 1999 we assessed Iraq had revitalized its program. New intelligence acquired in 2000 provided compelling information about Iraq’s ongoing offensive BW activities, describing construction of mobile BW agent production plants – reportedly designed to evade detection – with the potential to turn out several hundred tons of unconcentrated BW agent per year. Thus, it was not a new story in 2002 when all agencies judged in the NIE that Iraq had biological weapons – that it had some lethal and incapacitating BW agents – and was capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax. We judged that most of the key aspects of Iraq’s offensive BW program were more advanced than before the Gulf war. Chemical Weapons. As early as 1994, all agencies assessed that Iraq could begin limited production of chemical agents almost immediately after UN sanctions, inspections and monitoring efforts were ended. By 1997, the Intelligence Community judged that Iraq was protecting a breakout capability to produce more weapons and agent quickly. We further assessed in 1997, that within months Iraq could restart full-scale production of sarin and that pre-Desert Storm agent production levels – including production of VX – could be achieved in two to three years. And so it was not a surprising story when all agencies judged in the NIE in 2002 that Baghdad possessed chemical weapons, had begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX and probably had at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents, much of it added in the last year. Delivery Systems. The Intelligence Community’s assessment on the possibility of Iraq having a few covert Scuds has been consistent since at least 1995. As Iraq continued to develop its short-range missiles, we collected more data and by 1999 were able to begin determining that both missiles were capable of flying over 150 km. Also by 1999 we had noted that according to multiple sources, Iraq was conducting a high-priority program to convert jet trainer aircraft to lethal UAVs, likely intended for

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delivering biological agents. Again, not a new story for the NIE to judge that Iraq maintained a small missile force and several development programs, including an UAV that could deliver a biological warfare agent. During the period leading up to the commencement of military action in March 2003, further statements were made regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. One was a talk5 by Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense on 23 January 2003 which considered what disarmament should look like in Iraq. This considered what real disarmament looked like by taking three examples from the recent past: South Africa, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. It is pointed out that ‘Each of these cases was different but the end result was the same: the countries disarmed while disclosing their programs fully and voluntarily. In each case, high-level political commitment to disarmament was accompanied by the active participation of national institutions to carry out that process. In each case, the responsible countries created a transparent process in which decisions and actions could be verified and audited by the international community.’ The contrast is then drawn with Iraq by noting that ‘Instead of a high-level commitment to disarmament, Iraq has a high-level commitment to concealing its weapons of mass terror. Instead of charging national institutions with the responsibility to dismantle programs, key Iraqi organizations operate a concealment effort that targets inspectors and thwarts their efforts. Instead of the full cooperation and transparency that is evident in each of those disarmament success stories, Iraq has started the process by openly defying the requirement of Resolution 1441, and I quote, “to provide a currently accurate, full and complete” declaration of all of its programs.’ In the United Kingdom a report was issued6 on 3 February 2003 on the Prime Minister’s website entitled ‘Iraq – Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation’ which outlines the Iraqi network of intelligence and security organizations and how they are engaged in a campaign of obstruction of the United Nations Weapons Inspectors. Another particular example was the presentation7 made by the US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the United Nations Security Council on 5 February 2003. In respect of biological weapons, he said that: Let me now turn to those deadly weapons programmes and describe why they are real and present dangers to the region and to the world. First, biological weapons. We have talked frequently here about biological weapons. By way of introduction and history, I think there are just three quick points I need to make. First, you will recall that it took UNSCOM four long and frustrating years to pry – to pry – an admission out of Iraq that it had biological weapons. Secondly, when Iraq finally admitted having these weapons in 1995, the quantities were vast. Less than a teaspoonful of dry anthrax

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in an envelope shut down the United States Senate in the fall of 2001. This forced several hundred people to undergo emergency medical treatment and killed two postal workers, just from that amount – just the quantity I am indicating – that was inside an envelope. Iraq declared 8,500 litres of anthrax, but UNSCOM estimates that Saddam Hussain (sic) could have produced 25,000 litres. If concentrated into this dry form, that amount would be enough to fill tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of teaspoons – and Saddam Hussain has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoonful of this deadly material. That is my third point, and it is key. The Iraqis have never accounted for all of the biological agents they admitted they had and we know they had. They have never accounted for all the organic material used to make them. They have not accounted for many of the weapons filled with these agents, such as their R-400 bombs. This is evidence, not conjecture. This is true. This is all well documented. Mr. Blix told the Council that Iraq has provided little evidence to verify anthrax production and no convincing evidence of its destruction. It should come as no shock, then, that since Saddam Hussain forced out the last inspectors in 1998, we have amassed much intelligence indicating that Iraq is continuing to make these weapons. In addition, the statement addressed mobile biological production facilities:8 One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq’s biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents. … We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile biological agent factories. In regard to chemical weapons, he said that: If biological weapons seem too terrible to contemplate, chemical weapons are equally chilling. UNMOVIC already laid out much of this, and it is documented for all of us to read in UNSCOM’s 1999 report on the subject. Let me set the stage with three key points that all of us need to keep in mind. First, Saddam Hussain has used these horrific weapons – on another country and on his own people. In fact, in the history of chemical warfare no country has had more battlefield experience with chemical weapons since the First World War than Saddam Hussain’s Iraq. Secondly, as with biological weapons, Saddam Hussain has never accounted for vast amounts of chemical weaponry: 550 artillery shells with mustard, 30,000 empty munitions and enough precursors to increase his stockpile to as much as 500 tons of chemical agents. If we

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consider just one category of missing weaponry – 6,500 bombs from the Iran–Iraq war – UNMOVIC says the amount of chemical agent in them would be on the order of 1,000 tons. These quantities of chemical weapons are now unaccounted for. Mr Blix has quipped that ‘Mustard gas is not marmalade. You are supposed to know what you did with it.’ We believe Saddam Hussain knows what he did with it, and he has not come clean with the international community. We have evidence that these weapons existed. What we do not have is evidence from Iraq that they have been destroyed or where they are. That is what we are still waiting for. The third point: Iraq’s record on chemical weapons is replete with lies. It took years for Iraq finally to admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve agent VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes. Four tons. The admission came out only after inspectors collected documentation as a result of the defection of Hussain (sic) Kamal, Saddam Hussain’s late son-in-law. UNSCOM also gained forensic evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put it into weapons for delivery. Yet to this day, Iraq denies it had ever weaponized VX. And on 27 January, UNMOVIC told this Council that it has information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX programme. The Secretary of State concluded by saying that: We know that Saddam Hussain is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction. He is determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussain’s history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing – at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond? The United States will not, and cannot, run that risk to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussain in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option – not in a post-11-September world. Over three months ago, the Council recognized that Iraq continued to pose a threat to international peace and security and that Iraq had been, and remained in material breach of its disarmament obligations. Today Iraq still poses a threat, and Iraq still remains in material breach. Indeed, by its failure to seize its one last opportunity to come clean and disarm, Iraq has put itself in deeper material breach and closer to the day when it will face serious consequences for its continued defiance of the Council. We have an obligation to our citizens – we have an obligation to this body – to see that our resolutions are complied with.

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The UK Foreign Minister, Jack Straw, following the presentation by Colin Powell, said9 that ‘We have just heard a most powerful and authoritative case against the Iraqi regime set out by United States Secretary of State Powell. The international community owes him its thanks for laying bare the deceit practised by the regime of Saddam Hussain – and worse, the very great danger which that regime represents.’ His statement went on to add that ‘Sadly, the inspectors’ reports last week, and Secretary Powell’s presentation today, can leave us under no illusions about Saddam Hussain’s response. Saddam Hussain holds United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) in the same contempt as all previous resolutions in respect of Iraq. Let us reflect on what that means: Saddam is defying every one of us, every nation here represented. He questions our resolve and is gambling that we will lose our nerve rather than enforce our will.’ After reviewing the situation in regard to UNSCR 1441 (2002), Jack Straw said that ‘There is only one possible conclusion from all of this, which is that Iraq is in further material breach, as set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002). I believe that all colleagues here, all members, will share our deep sense of frustration that Iraq is choosing to spurn this final opportunity to achieve a peaceful outcome. Given what has to follow, and the difficult choice now facing us, it would be easy to turn a blind eye to the wording of Resolution 1441 (2002) and hope for a change of heart by Iraq. Easy, but wrong, because if we did so we would be repeating the mistakes of the past 12 years and empowering a dictator who believes that his diseases and poison gases are essential weapons to suppress his own people and to threaten his neighbours, and that by defiance of the United Nations he can indefinitely hoodwink the world.’ Jack Straw concluded by saying that: This is a moment of choice for Saddam and for the Iraqi regime. But it is also a moment of choice for this institution, the United Nations. The pre-war predecessor of the United Nations – the League of Nations – had the same fine ideals as the United Nations. But the League failed because it could not create actions from its words. It could not back diplomacy with a credible threat and, where necessary, the use of force, so small evils went unchecked. Tyrants became emboldened, and then greater evils were unleashed. At each stage, good men said, ‘Wait. The evil is not big enough to challenge’. Then, before their eyes, the evil became too big to challenge. We slipped slowly down a slope, never noticing how far we had gone until it was too late. We owe it to our history, as well as to our future, not to make the same mistake again.

Military action in March 2003 On 19 March 2003, President Bush announced10 that ‘American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to

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free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.’ He went on to say that ‘Our nation enters this conflict reluctantly – yet, our purpose is sure. The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder. We will meet the threat now, with our Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines, so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of fire fighters and police and doctors on the streets of our cities.’ The following day, 20 March 2003, the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair announced11 that the order had been given for British forces to take part in military action in Iraq. He went on to say that ‘this new world faces a new threat: of disorder and chaos born either of brutal states like Iraq, armed with weapons of mass destruction; or of extreme terrorist groups. Both hate our way of life, our freedom, our democracy.’ He then added that ‘My judgment, as Prime Minister, is that this threat is real, growing and of an entirely different nature to any conventional threat that Britain has faced before. For 12 years, the world tried to disarm Saddam; after his wars in which hundreds of thousands died. UN weapons inspectors say vast amounts of chemical and biological poisons, such as anthrax, VX nerve agent, and mustard agent remain unaccounted for in Iraq. So our choice is clear; back down and leave Saddam hugely strengthened; or proceed to disarm him by force. Retreat might give us a moment of respite but years of repentance at our weakness would I believe follow.’ Coincidentally, the US House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities met on 19 March 2003 to take evidence on the US Department of Defense’s efforts to combat chemical and biological weapons. The Subcommittee Chairman in his opening statement12 said that ‘This hearing could not be more timely. War with Iraq is imminent and our armed forces and those of our allies will fight under the threat of possible use of chemical and biological weapons by our adversary.’ In testimony, the Program Executive Officer for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program said13 that ‘The equipment I will highlight is in use in the Gulf region today protecting our men and women from weapons of mass destruction and enabling them to accomplish their mission.’ In the United Kingdom, the Defence Secretary made a statement14 in the House of Commons when he said that ‘On our most important campaign objective – to deny Iraq use of its weapons of mass destruction – our efforts have centred on disabling the command and control facilities through which the Iraqi regime would order the use of such weapons. Our experts have already begun to investigate potential weapons sites in coalitioncontrolled areas. To date, we have no evidence of Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction during this campaign, but it is impossible to know whether this is the result of successful military operations or a deliberate

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tactical judgment of the Iraqi regime. Indeed, we do know from prisoners of war that protective equipment was issued to southern Iraqi divisions.’ It was thus evident in both the United States and the United Kingdom that the risk that Iraq might utilize its weapons of mass destruction was anticipated. It also became clear as the military operations progressed that weapons of mass destruction were not used by Iraq and that stockpiles of such weapons were not being found by the coalition forces. In a statement15 to the House of Commons on 14 April 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair said ‘On weapons of mass destruction, of 146 possible sites known to us, investigations have begun in seven but, in any event, we know that for six months before the return of UN inspectors, Saddam put in place a systematic campaign of concealment of weapons of mass destruction. Until we are able to interrogate the scientists and experts who worked on the programmes, and the UN has a list of some 5,000 names, progress is bound to be slow. A specialised team, however, is beginning work and we are in discussion with allies and the UN as to what the future role of the UN in such a process may be.’ On 1 May 2003 when President Bush announced16 that ‘major combat operations in Iraq have ended’, his statement went on to add that ‘we’ve begun the search for hidden chemical and biological weapons and already know of hundreds of sites that will be investigated.’

The subsequent post-mortem: where were Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction? By the time of the 1 May 2003 announcement, it was already clear as noted above from statements made by President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair that a search was being made for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and its hidden chemical and biological weapons. A week later in a joint letter17 by the United Kingdom and United States to the President of the Security Council, the US, the UK and coalition partners said that they would ‘continue to act together to ensure the complete disarmament of Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions’ and undertook to provide for security in Iraq including by ‘securing, and removing, disabling, rendering harmless, eliminating or destroying (a) all of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and all other chemical, biological and nuclear delivery systems and (b) all elements of Iraq’s programme to research, develop, design, manufacture, produce, support, assemble and employ such weapons and delivery systems and subsystems and components thereof, including but not limited to stocks of chemical and biological agents, nuclear-weaponusable material, and other related materials, technology, equipment, facilities and intellectual property that have been used in or can materially contribute to these programmes.’

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A useful summary of the WMD search teams provided in a January 2004 report18 of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace shows four different teams operating in Iraq subsequent to March 2003 (see Table 7.3). Table 7.3 Weapons of mass destruction search teams in Iraq post March 2003 (information taken from reference)19 WMD search team

Dates

Estimated personnel

Description

Task Force 20 (US)

March to Summer 2003

Not known (classified)

Covert special forces teams to find and destroy WMD

Site Survey Teams (US)

March–June 2003

100 (8 to 24 WMD experts)

Four teams tasked to initially examine and evaluate suspect WMD sites

75th Exploitation Task Force (XTF) (US)

March–June 2003

600 (25–120 actively searching)

Charged with uncovering and documenting WMD

Iraq Survey Group (US, UK, Australia)

June 2003– present

1,300–1,400 (200–300 actively searching)

Military and civilian specialists to uncover WMD

The Iraq Survey Group was set up by the United States with United Kingdom and Australian participation to significantly expand the effort in the hunt for WMD and build upon the previous ongoing efforts. The ISG took over from the 75th Exploitation Task Force in a two week period commencing 7 June 2003.20 At the end of May 2003, the Exploitation Task Force had visited over 300 sensitive sites in Iraq and operations had taken place in Iraq in the areas of document exploitation and collection, captured materiel exploitation as well as interrogations and debriefings. The first priority for the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was stated to be the search for and elimination of weapons of mass destruction although the ISG would also have responsibilities relating to terrorism, war crimes, prisoners of war and other aspects of the former Iraqi regime. In addition the ISG represented a major change in the search for WMD in Iraq which would build on the work already done by the Exploitation Task Force as it would have a robust analytical capability in Iraq and would consolidate the various intelligence disciplines operating in Iraq under a single command in Iraq. Consequently, it was expected that the ISG would be ‘well positioned to achieve some real synergy’ in the hunt for weapons of mass destruction. The overall lead for the ISG has been provided by the Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programmes who was initially from 11 June 2003, Dr David Kay who, working for IAEA

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and UNSCOM, had led three nuclear weapons inspections in Iraq in 1991 to 1992, until 23 January 2004 when he was replaced by Charles A. Duelfer who had been Deputy Executive Chairman of UNSCOM from 1993 until its termination in 2000. Reports on the progress of the ISG have come from two sources. First from testimony made by David Kay and later Charles Duelfer to the US Congress and secondly from reports to the Security Council following the adoption of SCR 1483 (2003)21 on 22 May 2003 which included the following: 11. Reaffirms that Iraq must meet its disarmament obligations, encourages the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to keep the Council informed of their activities in this regard, and underlines the intention of the Council to revisit the mandates of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency as set forth in Resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and 1441 (2002) of 8 November 2002. As noted above the United Kingdom and United States in a joint letter22 to the Security Council on 8 May 2003 undertook to ‘continue to act together to ensure the complete disarmament of Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions.’ The United States and United Kingdom made joint reports to the Security Council on progress made under SCR 1483 (2003) on 21 November 2003, 24 February 2004 and finally on 19 May 2004. The reports to the Security Council tend to be less detailed than those made previously by UNSCOM or by UNMOVIC but do contain some information not provided elsewhere. The progress of the ISG is followed chronologically in this chapter. An interim progress report23 on the ISG was made by Dr David Kay in October 2003 following the initial three months of its investigation into Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programmes. This stated that ‘We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our only task is to find where they have gone.’ However, it went on to say that: We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002. The discovery of these deliberate concealment efforts have come about both through the admissions of Iraqi scientists and officials concerning information they deliberately withheld and through physical

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evidence of equipment and activities that ISG has discovered that should have been declared to the UN. … a few examples of these concealment efforts … : • A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research. • A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of BW agents, that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN. • Reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientist’s home, one of which can be used to produce biological weapons. • New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN. • Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists’ homes, that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS). • A line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared production facility and an admission that they had tested one of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 km, 350 km beyond the permissible limit. • Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles, a capability that was maintained at least until the end of 2001 and that cooperating Iraqi scientists have said they were told to conceal from the UN. • Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges up to at least 1,000 km – well beyond the 150 km range limit imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1,000 km range would have allowed Iraq to threaten targets throughout the Middle East, including Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi. • Clandestine attempts between late-1999 and 2002 to obtain from North Korea technology related to 1,300 km range ballistic missiles – probably the No Dong – 300 km range anti-ship cruise missiles, and other prohibited military equipment. In addition to the discovery of extensive concealment efforts, we have been faced with a systematic sanitization of documentary and computer evidence in a wide range of offices, laboratories, and companies suspected of WMD work. The pattern of these efforts to erase evidence – hard drives destroyed, specific files burned, equipment cleaned of all traces of use – are ones of deliberate, rather than random, acts.’ The interim report went on in regard to biological weapons to say that: With regard to biological warfare activities, which has been one of our two initial areas of focus, ISG teams are uncovering significant informa-

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tion – including research and development of BW-applicable organisms, the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities, and deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents. Insofar as chemical weapons are concerned, the report noted that: Let me turn now to chemical weapons (CW). In searching for retained stocks of chemical munitions, ISG has had to contend with the almost unbelievable scale of Iraq’s conventional weapons armory, which dwarfs by orders of magnitude the physical size of any conceivable stock of chemical weapons. For example, there are approximately 130 known Iraqi Ammunition Storage Points (ASP), many of which exceed 50 square miles in size and hold an estimated 600,000 tons of artillery shells, rockets, aviation bombs and other ordinance. Of these 130 ASPs, approximately 120 still remain unexamined. As Iraqi practice was not to mark much of their chemical ordinance and to store it at the same ASPs that held conventional rounds, the size of the required search effort is enormous. While searching for retained weapons, ISG teams have developed multiple sources that indicate that Iraq explored the possibility of CW production in recent years, possibly as late as 2003. Although the report resisted drawing conclusions, it was pointed out that a number of things had become clearer including: • Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other insiders who worked in his military-industrial programs, had not given up his aspirations and intentions to continue to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even those senior officials we have interviewed who claim no direct knowledge of any on-going prohibited activities readily acknowledge that Saddam intended to resume these programs whenever the external restrictions were removed. Several of these officials acknowledge receiving inquiries since 2000 from Saddam or his sons about how long it would take to either restart CW production or make available chemical weapons. • In the chemical and biological weapons area we have confidence that there were at a minimum clandestine on-going research and development activities that were embedded in the Iraqi Intelligence Service. While we have much yet to learn about the exact work programs and capabilities of these activities, it is already apparent that these undeclared activities would have at a minimum facilitated chemical and biological weapons activities and provided a technically trained cadre.

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The joint US and UK report to the Security Council on 21 November 200324 noted that the ISG had assumed responsibility on 16 June 2003 for ‘the mission of searching for and eliminating Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, prohibited missile delivery systems, and related infrastructure.’ The ISG was led by Dr David Kay and US Army Major General Keith Dayton, and is made up of military and civilian personnel. This includes personnel from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, as well as former UN Special Commission or UNSCOM Iraq experts with direct experience on the ground in Iraq. The ISG consisted of two task forces – one for exploitation, led by the US Defense Intelligence Agency, and another for disablement and elimination, led by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The ISG had consolidated the WMD-related efforts of the individual intelligence collection operations previously operating in Iraq under one national-level headquarters in order to better exploit developing intelligence. Using quick reaction teams, the ISG had investigated suspect sites based on leads derived from debriefings, interrogations and tips by Iraqi civilians. The ISG was systematically reviewing existing sites already identified by intelligence. The report to the Security Council went on to note that an interim report in October on the activities of the ISG to date had: detailed numerous violations by Iraq of its UNSCR-mandated obligations. These include deliberate efforts to conceal equipment and WMD-related program activities from the United Nations during the inspections beginning late 2002, clandestine laboratories and safe houses within the security service apparatus that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing chemical and biological weapons research, and plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges up to at least 1000 km – well beyond the 150 km range limit imposed by the United Nations. A large body of information has been developed through debriefings, site visits, and exploitation of captured Iraqi documents that confirms that Iraq deliberately concealed equipment and materials from United Nations inspectors when they returned in 2002. Some two months later, on 23 January 2004 Dr David Kay resigned from his post as Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programmes and was replaced by Charles Duelfer. Five days later, David Kay appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee. In his testimony,25 in his opening remarks he said that ‘Let me begin by saying we were almost all wrong. And I certainly include myself here. … I would also point out that many governments that chose not to support the war – certainly the French – President Chirac, as I recall, in April of last year referred to Iraq’s possession of WMD. The Germans, certainly

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the intelligence service believed that there were WMD. It turns out we were all wrong, probably, in my judgment, and that is most disturbing.’ Nevertheless he went on to say that: based on the work that has been done to this point of the Iraq Survey Group, and in fact that I reported to you in October, Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441 required that Iraq report all of its activities, one last chance to come clean about what it had. We have discovered hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical evidence and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial UN Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the UN about this, they were instructed not to do it, and they hid material. In the subsequent question and answer session Dr Kay said that ‘I believe that the effort that has been directed to this point has been sufficiently intense that it is highly unlikely that there were large stockpiles of deployed militarized chemical and biological weapons there.’ February 2004 saw the launch by the CIA of the Iraqi rewards programme which said that rewards would be available for ‘specific and verifiable information on: • The location of stocks of recently made chemical or biological weapons, munitions, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, or their component parts; • The location of chemical or biological laboratories and factories, development and production sites, and test sites associated with WMD, or sites where these materials were secretly disposed of; • Weapon system plans, military orders, or other relevant documents about biological and chemical weapons, missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles; • Iraqis who are able and willing to provide detailed information on Iraq’s WMD programs and efforts to hide them.’ The next joint US and UK report to the Security Council on 24 February 200426 noted that in January 2004, Charles Duelfer, formerly Deputy Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, had assumed leadership of the ISG, replacing Dr David Kay. The report said that Dr Kay had reported that the ISG had been unable to confirm some pre-war intelligence assessments by the United States and other nations about Iraq’s weapons stockpiles. Additional work remained to be done before the question of Iraq’s stockpiles can be fully and completely addressed. The report also said that the ISG had ‘discovered clear evidence

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that Saddam’s regime hid ongoing WMD-program activities from UNMOVIC, and concluded that Iraq was in violation of previous Security Council Resolutions. It is clear that Saddam Hussein’s regime was intent on and continued to deceive the international community.’ The report noted that the ISG maintained ‘a sizable number of specialists dedicated to the following three disarmament activities: (1) interviewing individuals connected with Iraq’s WMD programs; (2) obtaining and analyzing documents, computer hard-drives, and other materials; and (3) assessing and exploiting potential WMD-related sites.’ The report concluded by observing that some Iraqis were cooperating in this effort; however, fear of reprisals may be inhibiting cooperation by others. Some officials with close ties to Saddam’s regime seem determined to avoid cooperating in any way. In addition, document analysis has been obstructed by the methodical destruction of documents and computers in the immediate post-conflict period at some Iraqi facilities. Further insight became available in April 2004 through published interviews27 with David Kay, the initial leader of the ISG. The interviews with David Kay indicated that the ISG had gained an improved insight into the Iraqi perceptions of the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC inspections and the deception and denial programme carried out by Iraq. It was becoming evident that the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC inspections were feared by the Iraqi people because of the effectiveness of these inspections in spite of the Iraqi attempts to deceive the inspectors and deny them information. Furthermore, it was becoming clear that Iraq had destroyed most of their stockpiles in the summer of 1991 in a variety of ways, some of which Iraq didn’t wish to disclose such as the burial of anthrax some 4 km from the main presidential palace, although what was not yet clear was whether Iraq sought to retain the capability to produce chemical and biological weapons. The impression was given that senior Iraqi personnel believed that the chemical and biological programmes could be restarted quickly. Charles Duelfer in his March 2004 testimony28 to the US Congress stated that the ISG had found that the Iraqi deception efforts continued until the onset of military operations in March 2003. He also said that ‘the ISG has developed new information regarding Iraq’s dual-use facilities and ongoing work suitable for a capability to produce biological or chemical agents on short notice. Iraq did have facilities suitable for the production of biological and chemical agents needed for weapons. It had plans to improve and expand and even build new facilities.’ As examples, he mentioned work being carried out at the Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological Research Centre, which has equipment suitable for the production of biological agents, on Bacillus thuringiensis which can be used as a surrogate for anthrax for production and weapons development purposes and work on single cell proteins. In regard to chemical production, he said that Iraq was

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working up to March 2003 to construct new facilities for the production of chemicals involving a ‘crash programme’ under a leading nuclear scientist/WMD programme manager to construct plants capable of making a variety of chemicals and producing a year’s supply of any chemical in a month. Some of these chemicals are considered ‘dual-use’ such as a chemical, N,N-dicyclohexyl carbodiimide, used by Iraq before 1991 as a stabilizing agent for the nerve agent, VX. He emphasized that the ISG is focusing on developing an integrated picture of Iraq WMD programmes and intentions with the aim of enabling an overall description to be provided of the Iraqi WMD programme. The final joint US and UK report to the Security Council under 1483 (2003) on 19 May 200429 noted that the ISG was continuing its work to search for and eliminate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, prohibited missile delivery systems, and related infrastructure. The report said that ‘it remains premature to draw final conclusions. The ISG still has much work to do, including following up on continuing and frequent reports of hidden weapons caches.’ The report went on to say that the ISG had already noted numerous violations of UN sanctions and activities that Saddam Hussein’s regime should have reported to the UN under the requirements of Security Council Resolutions, but did not. The ISG had uncovered illicit Iraqi procurement efforts aimed at obtaining dual-use material in contravention of UN sanctions and has noted extensive efforts, continuing into 2003, to deceive UN inspectors. The ISG had also identified Iraqi research programmes with potential applications in a variety of WMD programmes. Finally, the report said that the ISG was working to determine Saddam’s strategic intentions with respect to weapons of mass destruction and the UN inspections regime. In October 2004, Charles Duelfer issued a Comprehensive Report30 of over 960 pages in three volumes. In this he made it clear in the Key Findings that: Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted. • Saddam totally dominated the Regime’s strategic decision making. He initiated most of the strategic thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait), maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international community. • Saddam’s primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections – to gain support for lifting sanctions – with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual

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capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring. In addition, another Key Finding was that: Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability – which was essentially destroyed in 1991 – after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability – in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks – but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities. • Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq’s principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, but secondary. • Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s belief in the value of WMD. In Saddam’s view, WMD helped to save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during the Iran–Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role in crushing the Shi’a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fire. • The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them. In the discussion31 on 12 October 2004 of the ISG Comprehensive Report in the UK House of Commons, Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, noted that the United Kingdom had taken steps to cross-check the contents of the UK dossier of September 2002 on Iraq’s WMD with a number of agencies which had included Hans Blix. It was said that in regard to section 6 on Iraqi chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, a UK official had reported that ‘On the whole, Blix liked section 6 – he felt it did not exaggerate the facts, nor revert to rhetoric, probably both desirable for its credibility.’ Jack Straw concluded by pointing out that ‘it is important that the House fully understands that the evidence that we put forward was

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a view that was widely shared at the time by other foreign intelligence agencies, as well, as it happened, by Dr Blix.’ In addition, the UK official had reported32 that ‘Blix also thought the section risked understating Iraq’s indigenous capability to produce WMD (i.e. meaning that, even if it held low stocks of WMD, it could quickly produce more.’

National inquiries into the accuracy of intelligence on Iraqi WMD When it became evident in mid-2003 that there were no immediate finds of large stockpiles of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, national inquiries were launched into the accuracy of the intelligence on Iraqi WMD. These national inquiries took place in the United States, the United Kingdom and in Australia. United States. In the United States, in June 2003, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said that ‘the Committee will continue to examine – • the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs …; • the objectivity, reasonableness, independence and accuracy of the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community; …’ In its report33 issued on 7 July 2004, the Committee stated that it had been able to ‘develop a full understanding of the quantity and quality of intelligence reporting on Iraq’s WMD program’ and consequently, with the exception of the question of accuracy which was deferred until the ISG had reported, the above points were addressed in their report. The first Overall Conclusion stated that ‘Most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting.’ It went on to make it clear that the ‘major key judgments in the NIE, particularly that Iraq “has chemical and biological weapons,” was developing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) “probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents,” and that “all key aspects – research & development (R&D), production and weaponization – of Iraq’s offensive biological weapons (BW) program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War,” either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting provided to the Committee.’ The report made the following points: The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that ‘Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons’ overstated both what was known and what intelligence analysts judged about Iraq’s chemical and biological

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weapons holdings. The intelligence reporting did support the conclusion that chemical and biological weapons were within Iraq’s technological capability, that Iraq was trying to procure dual-use materials that could have been used to produce these weapons, and that uncertainties existed about whether Iraq had fully destroyed its pre-Gulf war stocks of weapons and precursors. Iraq’s efforts to deceive and evade United Nations weapons inspectors and its inability or unwillingness to fully account for pre-Gulf war chemical and biological weapons and precursors could have led analysts to the reasonable conclusion that Iraq may have retained these materials, but intelligence analysts did not have enough information to state with certainty that Iraq ‘has’ these weapons. Similarly, the assessment that ‘all key aspects – R & D, production, weaponization – of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War’ was not supported by the underlying intelligence provided to the Committee. Intelligence showed that Iraq was renovating or expanding facilities that had been associated with Iraq’s past BW program and was engaged in research that had BW applications, but few reports suggested specifically that the activity was related to BW. Intelligence reports did indicate that Iraq may have a mobile biological weapons program, but most of the reporting was from a single human intelligence (HUMINT) source to whom the Intelligence Community never had direct access. It was reasonable for intelligence analysts to be concerned about the potential weapons applications of Iraq’s dual use activities and capabilities. The intelligence reporting did not substantiate an assessment that all aspects of Iraq’s BW program ‘are’ larger and more advanced than before the Gulf war, however. United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, in February 2004, the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, decided to establish a committee to review intelligence on weapons of mass destruction. This would have the following terms of reference:34 To investigate the intelligence coverage available in respect of WMD programmes in countries of concern and on the global trade in WMD, taking into account what is now known about these programmes; as part of this work, to investigate the accuracy of intelligence on Iraqi WMD up to March 2003, and to examine any discrepancies between the intelligence gathered, evaluated and used by the Government before the conflict, and between that intelligence and what has been discovered by the Iraq Survey Group since the end of the conflict; and to make recommendations to the Prime Minister for the future on the gathering, evaluation and use of intelligence on WMD, in the light of the difficulties of operating in countries of concern.

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This committee chaired by Lord Butler, a retired Secretary to the Cabinet, published its report35 on 14 July 2004. In its introduction, it noted that the Iraq Survey Group with whose findings the Butler committee’s terms of reference required comparison has not yet produced a publicly available report. Nevertheless the committee had access to the ISG’s interim report of September 2003 and the status report of March 2004 and were briefed by Major General Keith Dayton and by Charles Duelfer. The report noted that ‘we have undertaken not to anticipate their findings but, on the basis of the information they gave us, we believe that our conclusions are not inconsistent with what they have discovered so far.’ [Paragraph 5 on page 2]. The report prudently pointed out that: 49. The most important limitation on intelligence is its incompleteness….In fact, it is often, when first acquired, sporadic and patchy, and even after analysis may still be at best inferential. [Page 14]. It also noted in regard to chemical and biological weapons that: 209. We recognise that assessments in the chemical and biological weapons fields are intrinsically more difficult, and that analysis draws on different intelligence techniques. We are conscious in particular that, because chemical and biological weapons programmes can draw heavily on ‘dual use’ materials, it is easier for a proliferating state to keep its programmes covert. The intelligence community will also have had in mind that Iraq had used its chemical weapons in the past, and was engaged in a sustained programme to try to deceive the United Nations inspectors and to conceal from them evidence of its prohibited programmes. Even so, we have found JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee] assessments in these areas less assured. Our impression is that they were less complete, especially in their consideration of alternative hypotheses; used a different ‘burden of proof’ in testing Iraqi declarations; and hence inclined towards over-cautious or worst case estimates, carrying with them a greater sense of suspicion and an accompanying propensity to disbelieve. [Page 53]. In a footnote relating to the JIC choice of worst case estimates, the report states that: In particular, in relation to chemical and biological weapons it would have been irresponsible in the highest degree to send armed forces into battle on the assumption that Iraq did not have chemical or biological weapons. [Footnote 20 on page 112]. The report examined in considerable detail the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessments relating to Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, biological

188 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

and missile programmes during the periods; 1990–1998, 1998–March 2002, March–September 2002 and September 2002–March 2003. The report stated that: 457. We have also noted in the papers we have read that the broad conclusions of the UK intelligence community (although not some particular details) were widely-shared by other countries, especially the assessment that it was likely that Iraq had, or could produce, chemical and biological weapons which it might use in circumstances of extremity. We note that Dr Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, has said 36 that: ‘My gut feelings, which I kept to myself, suggested that Iraq still engaged in prohibited activities and retained prohibited items, and that it had the documents to prove it.’ Where doubts existed, they were about the extent to which intelligence amounted to proof, as opposed to the balance of probability. [Emphasis in original] [Page 112]. Finally, in its summary of conclusions the report included this appraisal of Iraq’s prohibited weapons saying that: 41. Even now it would be premature to reach conclusions about Iraq’s prohibited weapons. Much potential evidence may have been destroyed in the looting and disorder that followed the cessation of hostilities. Other material may be hidden in the sand, including stocks of agent and weapons. We believe that it would be a rash person who asserted at this stage that evidence of Iraqi possession of biological or chemical agents, or even of banned missiles, does not exist or will never be found. But as a result of our Review, and taking into account the evidence that has been found by the ISG and debriefing of Iraqi personnel, we have reached the conclusion that prior to the war the Iraqi regime: a. Had the strategic intention of resuming the pursuit of prohibited weapons programmes, including if possible its nuclear weapons programme, when United Nations inspection regimes were relaxed and sanctions were eroded or lifted. b. In support of that goal, was carrying out illicit research and development, and procurement, activities, to seek to sustain its indigenous capabilities. c. Was developing ballistic missiles with a range longer than permitted under relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions; but did not have significant – if any – stocks of chemical or biological weapons in a state fit for deployment, or developed plans for using them. [Pages 155–6]

The Developments Leading to War in March 2003 and the Iraq Survey Group 189

Australia. In Australia, the Senate on 18 June 2003 agreed a motion that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO (Australian Security and Intelligence Organization), ASIS (Australian Secret Intelligence Service) and DSD (Defence Signals Directorate) should inquire into and report by 2 December 2003 on: a. The nature and accuracy of intelligence received by Australia’s intelligence services in relation to: i. The existence of ii. The capacity and willingness to use, and iii. The immediacy of the threat posed by, weapons of mass destruction (WMD). b. The nature, accuracy and independence of the assessments made by Australia’s intelligence services of subparagraphs a.i, a.ii and a.iii above; c. Whether the Commonwealth Government as a whole presented accurate and complete information to Parliament and the Australian public on subparagraphs a.i, a.ii and a.iii above during, or since the military action in Iraq; and d. Whether Australia’s pre-conflict assessments of Iraq’s WMD capability were as accurate and comprehensive as should be expected of information relied on in decisions regarding the participation of the Australian Defence Forces in military conflict. The report37 was tabled on 1 March 2004 and said that the Committee considered that it was necessary to establish a set of figures that set out as accurately as possible, the estimated level of the WMD holdings by Iraq at the time of the cessation of inspections by UNSCOM. The detailed tables in Annex D to the report are stated to be derived from the UNSCOM material balance information contained in S/1999/94. The summary provided for chemical and biological weapons is reproduced in Table 7.4 and 7.5 respec-

13,660 0 200

103,764 127,941 411 412.5 3,833 3,915

Shortfall

34,000 0 823

Declared

56,104 411 2,810

Totals

Lesser degree of confidence

Special munitions Bulk CW Agents (tonnes) Key precursors (tonnes)

Moderate degree of confidence

Chemical Weapons

High degree of confidence

Table 7.4 Summary of chemical weapon accounting and shortfalls (taken from Annex D of the Australian Joint Committee report)

24,177 1.5 82

190 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

Shortfall

Declared

Totals

Little or no degree of confidence

Lesser degree of confidence

Moderate degree of confidence

Biological Weapons

High degree of confidence

Table 7.5 Summary of biological weapon accounting and shortfalls (taken from Annex D of the Australian Joint Committee report)

BW munitions/systems

0

0

4

253

257

288

31

Bulk BW agents (litres)

0

0

0

30,175

30,175

30,175

0

244.6

30,000

0

0

30,244.6

32,160

1,915.4

Growth media (kg)

Note (as in Annex D of the original): While the above Summary Table attempts to quantify the state of Iraq’s BW programme, the range of uncertainties involved, as evidenced by only one entry against elements with high or moderate confidence, makes these figures all but meaningless. However, greater value can be obtained from the following qualitative extract from the UNSCOM report38 dated 2539 January 1999: In its accounting for the various BW weapons-programme related elements, the Commission has achieved various levels of confidence, depending on the quality of information; documentary, physical and personal testimony provided by Iraq; and the correlation of this information with other information derived from Iraq, information provided by its former suppliers, or otherwise obtained by the Commission. The Commission has a degree of confidence in the accounting for some of the proscribed items which were presented by Iraq for verification and disposal. This includes, for example: the destruction of buildings, and equipment at Al-Hakam, the destruction of large quantities of growth media acquired for the programme; and evidence that R-400 aerial bombs and Al-Hussein warheads contained BW agents and consequently that bacillus anthracis spores and botulinum toxin were indeed weaponized. The Commission has less confidence in the accounting for proscribed items declared by Iraq as having been unilaterally destroyed. These include, for example: the number and fill of R-400 aerial bombs destroyed at Al-Azzizziyah (sic); the number and fill of BW Al-Hussein warheads destroyed; and the fate of the agent to be used with drop tanks. The Commission has little or no confidence in the accounting for proscribed items for which physical evidence is lacking or inconclusive, documentation is sparse or non-existent, and coherence and consistency is lacking. These include, for example: quantities and types of munitions available for BW filling; quantities and types of munitions filled with BW agents; quantities and type of bulk agents produced; quantities of bulk agent used in filling; quantities of bulk agents destroyed; quantities of growth media used/consumed; and when or whether the programme ended. In addition the Commission has no confidence that all bulk agents have been destroyed; that no BW munitions or weapons remain in Iraq; and that a BW capability does not exist in Iraq.

tively. The report included a section which addressed the UNMOVIC update to the material balance figures. In regard to the chemical weapons material balance the report stated that: In an overall sense the numbers of additional chemical munitions discovered by UNMOVIC was considered to be small and therefore did not result in any change to the material balance figures produced by UNSCOM. … These additional figures are not reflected in Part 2 of

The Developments Leading to War in March 2003 and the Iraq Survey Group 191

Annex D to this report as they are relatively small and can be considered as included in the discrepancies accepted in deriving the original figures for chemical weapons. And in regard to the biological weapons material balance, the report noted that: Of the 157 R-400 aerial bombs previously declared by Iraq as having been filled with BW agents and unilaterally destroyed in 1991, UNMOVIC inspections were able to confirm the destruction of 128 of these bombs. In addition, 244.6 kg of declared but expired growth media was destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. These new figures are included in Part 3 of Annex D to this report. Consequently, Tables 7.4 and 7.5, although based on the UNSCOM material balances, were updated to take into account the findings of UNMOVIC. Unlike the US and UK reports considered earlier, the Australian Joint Committee report did not draw any conclusions as to what the Committee considers was the situation regarding the existence of WMD in Iraq. Rather the report focused on making recommendations in regard to how Australia could ensure independent assessments, how their accuracy could be addressed and that an independent assessment should be made into the performance of the Australian intelligence agencies.

Conclusions Whilst it is tempting with the benefit of hindsight to be critical of the steps taken by the United States, the United Kingdom and the coalition to launch military action against Iraq in March 2003, it has to be recalled that Iraq had used chemical weapons on an extensive basis during the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s and had been shown, through the diligent efforts of UNSCOM and the IAEA during the years from 1991 to 1998, to have had significant WMD programmes – nuclear, chemical, biological and their delivery means. It was also evident that Iraq was not cooperating with UNSCOM and the IAEA and was seeking to conceal and deceive the inspection teams as to the true capabilities and situation in regard to the WMD programmes of Iraq. It also needs to be recalled that the early unanimity of the Security Council in considering Iraq during the early 1990s had been eroded and the authority of the Security Council and of the SecretaryGeneral were being diluted by Iraq’s increasingly declamatory statements to the Security Council. Against this background, it would have been a brave government that concluded that Iraq presented no danger from its WMD programme.

192 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

It is also too often forgotten that intelligence agencies have to work from the available information which is frequently wisps of information gleaned from all available sources that are uncorroborated or unconfirmed. Moreover, the assessments made by intelligence agencies need to be based on worst case assumptions – because they are developed from wisps of information – and there can be no certainty that the information collected is complete or accurate. It is also important, especially in regard to chemical and biological weapons, to recognize that the Iraq requirement was different from that which historically had been the requirement in the United States and the United Kingdom. Iraq’s objective was to have a CW and BW capability that it could use at a time of Iraq’s choice – and not, as was the case with the United States and the United Kingdom, to have a capability that could be used to retaliate in kind – and, consequently, the approach taken as well as the agents selected could be different as there was no requirement for extended storage capabilities as is the case when retaliation in kind is the objective. The consequences of this difference in approach are significant in drawing lessons for the future from the experience gained in Iraq – and this is addressed in subsequent chapters.

8 Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Programmes

Introduction An appreciation is given in this chapter of what is now known about the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons programmes. There is little public information about Iraq’s programmes other than that elucidated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq and its successor, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and then more recently the information in the ISG Comprehensive Report of 30 September 2004. Nevertheless, the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons programmes are in many respects more comprehensively described than are comparable programmes for other countries. The starting point for the following account of Iraq’s proscribed programmes is the United Nation’s account of the series of declarations made by Iraq. After the defection of Lieutenant General Hussein Kamal in August 1995, Iraq provided new chemical, biological and missile declarations. And on 7 December 2002, Iraq provided a further declaration that UNMOVIC said in essence repeated the information in the earlier declarations. Little of the detail in these declarations, such as production quantities, dates of events and unilateral destruction activities, could be confirmed although such information was critical to an assessment of the status of disarmament. Furthermore, in some instances, UNMOVIC had information that conflicted with the information in the declaration. Additional detail was provided in the ISG Comprehensive Report of 30 September 2004. The information in this chapter is drawn from the material collected and presented by UNMOVIC and UNSCOM augmented by the information collected and presented by the ISG. Where possible, an indication is given of where there are uncertainties. However, phrases such as ‘Iraq said’, ‘Iraq stated’ or ‘according to Iraq’ should be taken as indicating that the Iraqi statement is largely unsubstantiated and unverified. Caution also needs to be taken over the use of the word ‘research’ as this should frequently be more accurately regarded as ‘activities’ rather than as an accurate indica193

194 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

tion of ‘research’ or ‘development’. It is also evident that Iraq could well choose to use the word ‘research’ whenever possible as it then enables the argument to be made that research is not explicitly prohibited by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Whilst this chapter is based largely on information provided by Iraq, it is evident that Iraq had gone to considerable lengths to conceal its weapons of mass destruction programmes which had included the fabrication of false documents. The UNMOVIC Working Document1 of 6 March 2003 included as an Appendix a historical account of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes. Additional information was provided in the UNSCOM report circulated as a Security Council document2 on 29 January 1999 which set out the priority issues in disarmament and provided three appendices covering the status of verification of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes. The ISG Comprehensive Report3 of 30 September 2004 of over 960 pages in three volumes considered the overall WMD programme in the first volume, delivery systems and nuclear weapons in the second volume and both chemical and biological weapons in the third volume.

Historical background The State of Iraq was created in 1921, following World War I, when Iraq became a mandate under the League of Nations and was administered by the United Kingdom until gaining its independence in 1932. In 1945, Iraq became one of the original members of the United Nations. The monarchy was overthrown in 1958 and a republic was established. In 1968, the Arab Baath Socialist party seized power in Iraq and embarked on modernizing the country, including its industrial sector. Saddam Hussein became Chief of the Revolutionary Command Council, as well as head of government, the party and the armed forces. The development of weapons of mass destruction began in the late 1960s or early 1970s at about the same time as the change in the Iraqi leadership. The rationale for the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction came primarily from the perceived threat from Iran as Iraq had always seen itself as a gatekeeper to protect the Arabic nations in the Gulf from the Persians.4,5 In the Iraq–Iran war of the 1980s chemical weapons were seen as a vital means of countering the Iranian ‘human wave’ attacks and enabled Iraq to survive that war.6 A further rationale was to counter the perceived threat from Israel.

The Iraqi chemical weapons programme Both in its size and maturity, Iraq’s chemical weapons (CW) programme was the most advanced of all its proscribed weapons programmes. This started probably in the late 1960s, and progressed steadily from basic

Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Programmes 195

research on simple agents, to large scale production of a variety of agents and the design and manufacture of a range of delivery systems. Iraq imported thousands of tons of chemicals as well as complete chemical plants. It constructed industrial-sized production facilities where CW agents and some of their precursors were synthesized. By the end of the Iran–Iraq war in 1988, Iraq’s CW programme had advanced to the point where a variety of chemical weapons, including mustard and nerve gas bombs, were being manufactured. It has subsequently been shown by the ISG that Iraq weaponized aerial bombs with VX and dropped three VX filled bombs on an Iranian target.7 World attention was drawn to these developments when Iraq used CW against Iranian forces in that war. Further development continued after the Iran–Iraq war, including the production of the highly toxic nerve agent, VX, and the design and production of a wider range of munitions. By the time of the Gulf war in 1991, Iraq had amassed a sizable CW arsenal comprising tens of thousands of short-range rockets, artillery shells and bombs, and hundreds of tonnes of bulk agent. It had also produced at least 50 special warheads to be filled with nerve agent ready for use with the 650 km range Al Hussein missile.

The initiation of the Iraqi chemical weapons programme The beginnings of Iraq’s chemical weapons (CW) programme are uncertain, but it appears to have had its origins in the 1960s, when a number of Iraqi army officers were trained overseas in nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defence and these formed the basis of the Iraqi Chemical Corps which was established on 14 January 1964. The primary interest at that time appeared to be in chemical defence but, sometime in the late 1960s, at about the time of the change in the Iraqi leadership, an interest in the offensive aspects of chemicals developed. Iraq stated that, in 1971, a group of Chemical Corps officers proposed that research work be conducted on chemical agents – mustard, tabun and CS. It is not clear what the objectives of this work were, nor under which authority it was conducted. However, from the available evidence, a laboratory was built at Al Rashad village on the north east outskirts of Baghdad and small quantities of chemical agents were synthesized. Three years later, Iraq’s CW efforts became more formalized. Iraq has stated that, in response to a rising threat from Israel and Iran, a government decree was issued to look at ‘scientific, academic and applied researches in the fields of chemistry, physics and micro-organisms.’ However, no copy of this decree was provided to UNSCOM or to UNMOVIC. Nor is there any elaboration of what type of work was envisaged by the term ‘researches’. This decree led to a new scientific organization under the Al Hazen Ibn Al Haitham Institute being established in 1974. Iraq has stated that, although it was officially under the auspices of the State

196 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

Security Apparatus, representatives from various government ministries were on its board of directors, and its head was a military officer from the Chemical Corps. Iraqi officials have indicated that its objectives were to gain a familiarization with chemical agents and eventually to develop weapons. There were also reports in 1975 that Iraq was using or preparing to use chemical weapons against Kurdish insurgents. The Al Hazen Institute was organized into three or four divisions, or ‘Centres’, and the laboratories associated with these were scattered around the Baghdad area. The CW development work became the responsibility of the ‘First Centre’ which located its laboratories at the former CW site at Al Rashad. New laboratories were built there and were equipped with modern equipment; according to one scientist at Al Rashad ‘no one in Iraq had any better.’ Iraq has stated that, in 1975, further CW facilities were planned at a remote site in the desert near Al Samarra, 85 km north west of Baghdad. Al Rashad. According to interview testimony, the work was divided into four sections dealing with nerve agents, vesicants such as mustard gas, incapacitants, and defoliants. Iraq has declared that pilot scale production equipment was purchased, and mustard gas and the nerve agent tabun, as well as several herbicides, were successfully synthesized in laboratory scale quantities. Scientists there have said that the advanced nerve agent, VX, and its precursors, were also investigated on the laboratory scale at Al Rashad. Iraq declared that, in 1978, the Al Hazen Institute was abolished because of mis-management and financial fraud, and its Director General and some leading staff members were jailed. There is some evidence to support this, but there is also evidence to indicate that the institute continued, in some form, for several years. Iraq has stated that the State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI), which came under the authority of the Ministry of Industry, inherited the assets at Al Rashad in 1978. However, Iraq has said that SOTI was not responsible for the continuation of the programme and that work ceased in 1978. UNMOVIC has limited information for this period and cannot be sure that work ceased, but some scientists have stated that, at that time, they were assigned to other duties. On the other hand, the then head of the Chemical Corps said that, in 1978, he submitted to the Ministry of Industry a five year plan for a CW programme that envisaged the production of weapons, and some work continued. Iraq has acknowledged that research on chemical agents relating to chemical defence and synthesis studies continued at Al Rashad from 1979 until 1981.

The Iran–Iraq war Project 922. With the outbreak of the war with Iran, in September 1980, Iraq’s CW programme was reactivated. The inability of Iraq to achieve

Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Programmes 197

speedy victory, and a series of successful counter-offensives by Iran in early 1981, may have influenced Iraqi decisions on a CW programme. Thus, on 8 June 1981, under the code-name Project 922, the CW programme came under the control of the Ministry of Defence and assumed a new urgency. Initially Project 922 was located at Al Rashad while a new site was being sought. Iraq has stated that further expansion of the Al Rashad site occurred and equipment that had been previously acquired, but not used, was installed. Iraq has stated that during that time further research into production methods, including the synthesis of mustard gas and tabun, was conducted and pilot scale quantities produced. The ISG has stated that the objective was to produce CW agents – mustard, tabun, sarin and VX, chemical munitions and white phosphorus munitions. Project 922 also included BW research and development after 1985 and pesticide research and development from 1984 to 1987. Al Muthanna State Establishment. Later in 1981, construction work was resumed on the CW site selected in 1975, near Al Samarra. Initial engineering work started that year and, in the following year, contracts were agreed for the construction of the first four buildings. These buildings were small production facilities that were built underground to protect them from air attack. A laboratory and an inhalation chamber where toxic chemicals could be tested on laboratory animals were also built. This was the start of what was to become Iraq’s main CW production and research centre, eventually known as the Muthanna State Establishment (MSE). In 1982, contracts were signed for the acquisition of production equipment and raw materials. UNMOVIC estimates that, in that year, over 800 tonnes of chemicals were purchased, mainly for the production of mustard gas and tabun. Most of the equipment for the plant was ordered from foreign suppliers but, in 1983, immediate requirements were satisfied by the acquisition of second-hand reactors and equipment from Samarra Drug Industries. The ISG noted that when Muthanna was created it was then the world’s most modern and best-planned CW facility under the cover of pesticide production. Insofar as a suitable delivery system for CW agents was concerned, Iraq purchased bombs designed for white phosphorus (an incendiary and smoke bomb) and then, by simple modification, made them suitable for the delivery of CW agent. Construction activity, in 1982 and 1983, at Al Muthanna was intense. Five large laboratories, an administrative centre, and eight large underground bunkers for the storage of chemical munitions were built. By early 1983, the first production buildings were completed at Al Muthanna and equipment installed. Iraq has declared that, in the summer of 1983, the staff and equipment from Project 922 were relocated to the Muthanna site. The Al Rashad site closed shortly thereafter. Mustard gas. Production began as soon as the first pilot scale plants were completed. Iraq has stated that, in 1983, 150 tonnes of mustard gas

198 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

were produced at Al Muthanna; this was in addition to about 85 tonnes of the agent produced in the previous years at Al Rashad. Although UNMOVIC cannot confirm these figures, they would appear consistent with Iraq’s capability at that time. At the same time as Al Muthanna was coming into production, the casualties in the Iran–Iraq war were mounting on both sides. Iran had begun ‘human wave’ attacks in 1982 and continued with similar offensives in 1983. Iraq was first reported to have used chemicals to counter such attacks in that year. A group of specialists sent to Iran in March 1984 by the UN Secretary-General concluded that mustard had been used (see Chapter 2). The mustard bombs that the team found were later identified as the converted white phosphorus bombs that Iraq had imported in 1982. The nerve agent, tabun GA. In 1984, further production plants were built and large scale production equipment installed. Iraq stated that production of tabun began at Al Muthanna in 1984 and, by the end of the year, a total of 60 tonnes had been produced. The use of tabun by Iraq in its war with Iran was also reported that year and this was also confirmed by a group of specialists sent to Iran by the UN Secretary-General. CW munitions. Iraq also extended the range of weapons it used to deliver CW agents. In 1983 and 1984, large scale purchases of artillery shells, rockets and bombs were made. For example, Iraq has declared that, in 1983 alone, it purchased 40,000 artillery shells and 7,500 bomb casings. Iraq said that, in 1984, contracts were signed for the supply of 20,000 short-range rockets which were to be modified for the delivery of chemicals. Iraq from 1984 onwards purchased machinery and components to manufacture its own munitions so as to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers. The concept adopted was that munitions that had already been imported would be reverse engineered and small modifications made to the design, to make the weapons suitable for CW purposes. Extensive weapons trials were conducted to further develop the design. Eventually, such weapons would form a substantial part of the Iraqi CW arsenal. For example, Iraq declared that, by 1988, it had manufactured 10,000 CW bomb casings based on the reverse engineered white phosphorus bomb it originally had imported in 1982. Also by 1989, Iraq had manufactured 18,500 rocket warheads which were based on designs that had been imported in the early to mid-1980s. The nerve agents, sarin GB and cyclosarin GF. With the expansion of the facilities and staff at Al Muthanna, the production of other CW agents became practical. Iraq had been having continuing problems with the purity of tabun as typically the product was only 50 to 60 per cent pure and contained by-products which, in turn, adversely affected its stability. As part of a policy of diversification, Iraq started to explore the production of other nerve agents. Accordingly, pilot scale production of the nerve agent sarin commenced at Al Muthanna in early 1984. By December, with the completion of new production facilities, larger scale production began.

Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Programmes 199

Iraq declared that, in 1985, it produced 30 tonnes but was experiencing problems with the process. According to Iraq, in 1986, only another 40 tonnes were produced and it was not until later that year that the problems were overcome. Iraq declared that, in 1987, it stopped the production of tabun, and concentrated on the production of sarin, which by this stage it said it was successfully producing. About 200 tonnes were produced in that year and 390 tonnes in 1988. UNMOVIC has some evidence to support these figures. However, according to documents recovered by UNSCOM from Iraq, the purity of this product was only 40 to 60 per cent and the stability and storability was not good. The shelf-life of the agent, as produced by Iraq at that time, is assessed by UNMOVIC to be in the order of only several months. As the production of sarin increased, so did its use by Iraq in the war with Iran. Reflecting the urgency of the war with Iran, the agent was used almost as quickly as it was produced. The fact that the agent could not be stored for long periods, therefore, was not an important consideration at the time. Iraq declared that almost all of 1985’s production (30 tonnes) was ‘consumed’ that year. In the following years the pattern was similar. Initially, the agent was used in bombs but, later, sarin filled rockets were used. For example, Iraq stated that, in 1986, about 1,200 sarin rockets were ‘consumed’. The following year, as more agent became available, the consumption of rockets jumped to 15,000. Sarin, in contrast to tabun, is very volatile: at high temperatures it disperses quickly in the atmosphere and, hence, is only effective in the open for a short period of time. From the earliest days, Iraq had been studying other nerve agents at Al Muthanna. It settled on an analogue of sarin, cyclosarin known as GF, for production, probably because the volatility of this agent was more suited to a hot climate and its toxicity, by both skin and inhalation routes, is greater. Furthermore, the production process for cyclosarin was similar to that of sarin, requiring just the substitution of one alcohol for another, and the same equipment could be used. According to Iraq’s declarations, the production of cyclosarin only began in 1988. It was often produced in conjunction with sarin to create a mixture of agents. UNMOVIC has documentation indicating that Iraq had determined that this mixture of agents was more toxic than either component separately. The nerve agent, VX. For Iraq, the peak of its development work on CW agents was the nerve agent VX. This is one of the most toxic man-made substances known and, with its low volatility, is also one of the most persistent nerve agents. In a top secret letter, written in 1987 by the Director General of Al Muthanna to senior government officials, the importance of the agent to Iraq was recognized. In the letter, VX was compared to a nuclear weapon: ‘two tonnes carried by an aircraft compare with a medium nuclear bomb of 20 kilotons.’ The letter continued that its possession ‘…ushers us into the [field] of armament of advanced countries’.

200 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

Iraq has stated that serious work on the nerve agent VX did not begin until 1985, although it has acknowledged that some preliminary investigations had been conducted earlier, including at Al Rashad. The 1987 letter mentioned above stated that the work on nerve agents focused on VX after the problems with sarin production were solved in 1986, and that VX was considered as an agent to supplement sarin. Iraq has declared that it experienced many problems with the production of VX, both with the equipment and the process for its production. A number of different routes for its synthesis were tried but there is evidence to indicate that, by the end of the Iran–Iraq war, only small quantities had been made. Iraq declared that, in 1988, in five production trials it had produced only 2.4 tonnes of VX and that this was unstable and had degraded rapidly. Three aerial bombs were filled with VX and dropped on an Iranian target in 1988. Further work on the agent continued after the war. Research into other agents. From its beginning, Al Muthanna had an active research programme. One of the objectives appeared to be to diversify the range of agents Iraq had available to it. Novelty was also considered to be important. According to a 1988 Iraqi research paper, ‘new highly toxic agents as substitutes for the present agents’ were to be investigated as these would have ‘the element of surprise when using them on the battlefront because of the lack of information on the part of the enemy and the difficulty of detecting them’. As a consequence, a range of nerve agents, mostly analogues of sarin and VX, were studied, as were nerve agents such as soman and Tammelin esters. More exotic chemicals were also investigated, such as PCP, a hallucinogenic compound known as ‘angel dust’, as well as incapacitants such as BZ and its analogues. In addition to these agents, Iraq also studied synthesis techniques for better known agents such as cyanogen chloride, lewisite, nitrogen mustard and adamsite. There is no evidence that any of these were produced beyond the laboratory scale. Efforts were directed towards solving the stability problems of the nerve agents. An approach that was adopted for sarin was to synthesize an immediate precursor (MPF) that is relatively stable. Immediately before use this precursor would be mixed with the appropriate alcohol to produce sarin. This was referred to as ‘binary sarin’. A similar approach was investigated in 1988 for VX. In addition, stabilizers for nerve agents were studied. Tear gases. Little information is provided in the reports of UNSCOM, UNMOVIC and the ISG on Iraq’s programme to develop tear gases such as CS and CN. The UNSCOM report S/1999/94 includes the information shown in Table 8.1. However, no information on CS is included in the tabulations of bulk agent quantities in S/1999/94 although it is made clear elsewhere in that report that CS was regarded along with mustard, tabun and sarin as being CW agents. CS and CN are both mentioned in the context of trials with

Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Programmes 201 Table 8.1

Information on Iraqi weaponization of CS (from S/1999/94)

Munition

Number

UNSCOM comment

250 gauge aerial bombs (CS)

125

Remnants of bombs consistent with the declared quantity were seen by UNSCOM.

500 gauge aerial bombs (CS)

116

1) No remnants of destroyed bombs have been found. 2) In 1995, documentary evidence was provided by Iraq that 116 bombs filled with CS had been stored at a facility destroyed during the Gulf war.

20,000

Destroyed in storage during the 1991 Gulf war

Mortar bombs (CS)

aflatoxin. This is also the only mention of CS or CN in the UNMOVIC Working Document of 6 March 2003. The ISG Comprehensive Report includes mention of CS and nerve agent as having been used against the popular uprising in southern Iraq in March 1991. New facilities, Al Fallujah. As production increased at Al Muthanna, so did the requirement for raw materials and precursor chemicals. At the start of the programme all the chemicals Iraq required for the production of its CW agents had been imported. Iraq has declared that, in 1985, it decided to reduce this dependency by building three chemical plants outside of the Muthanna complex to provide precursors for the CW programme. The plants were near the town of Al Fallujah, 50 km west of Baghdad, and were named Fallujah I, II and III. Iraq said that intention was that the plants would also support the civilian chemical sector in the provision of chemicals. Construction of the first plant, Fallujah II, began in 1986 and was designed for the production of the key chlorinating agent thionyl choride, a precursor for the production of mustard and sarin. Iraq stated that Fallujah II was intended to start production in 1987, but equipment problems delayed production until 1988 when, according to Iraq, 70 tonnes of thionyl chloride were produced. UNMOVIC has evidence that actual production was almost twice this amount. The achievement was quite significant because the plant was completely indigenously designed and constructed. However, problems were said to have stopped production in 1988. In 1987, Fallujah III began construction. This plant was intended for the production of precursors mainly for nerve agents, but Iraq said that it did not become operational because of equipment problems. UNMOVIC is unable to confirm this. In addition, at Al Muthanna, a number of plants were also built in the mid-1980s, to synthesize precursor chemicals. In addition, other Iraqi

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agencies, including the Al Qaim phospate plant and Al Qaa Qaa munitions factory, were instructed to provide chemicals. UNMOVIC’s assessment is that Iraq’s CW programme, prior to the end of the Iran–Iraq war, was not significantly hindered by international controls: the controls probably came too late and Iraqi stockpiles of raw materials at that time were still quite significant. After the war though, the controls seemed to cause major problems and, in 1990, Iraq set up a ministerial committee to address measures to overcome them. Reorganization. Project 922 was set up in 1981 under the Ministry of Defence. In order to disguise the end-user for chemicals and equipment, the cover name for the purchasing arm went under the name of the State Establishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP). Gradually the cover name became compromised and, in 1985, administrative and commercial matters became the responsibility of the Ministry of Industries, under the State Organization for Technical Industries. In effect, the Director General of Al Muthanna then reported jointly to both Ministers. The purchasing authority then became the State Organization for Chemical Industries, although other fronts were also used, including the State Organization for Refinery and Gas Industries (SORGI). In 1987, in a general reorganization of government departments, the formal ties between Al Muthanna and the Ministry of Defence were cut. Al Muthanna then came solely under the Military Industrial Commission, which was then headed by the newly appointed Lieutenant General Hussein Kamal. It was at this time that Project 922 officially became Al Muthanna State Establishment. This was also a time of peak production for Al Muthanna, with the establishment employing a staff of about 1,000 workers.

The end of the Iran–Iraq war The use of CW. The war with Iran ended in August 1988. According to Iraq, it consumed almost 19,500 chemical bombs, over 54,000 chemical artillery shells and 27,000 short-range chemical rockets between 1983 and 1988. Iraq declared that about 1,800 tonnes of mustard, 140 tonnes of tabun and over 600 tonnes of sarin had been consumed during these years. Almost two-thirds of the CW weapons used, were used in the last 18 months of the war. In March 1988, unidentified chemicals were also used in attack against civilians in the Kurdish city of Halabja in north east Iraq. This was the largest of many chemical attacks against civil locations in Iraqi Kurdistan. UNMOVIC has little information to confirm the types and quantities of CW weapons that Iraq declared were consumed from 1983 to 1988. Specialists on UN fact-finding missions, from 1984 to 1988, simply concluded that bombs and rockets carrying mustard and tabun had been used. However a document that Iraq provided to UNMOVIC in December 2002

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indicates that fewer chemical bombs than declared were used. The document, from Iraq’s Air Force headquarters, showed that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped during the war. This was less than the 19,500 declared by Iraq suggesting that Iraq had concealed 6,500 chemical bombs. Post war activities. Iraq has declared that, after the Iran–Iraq war, the production of CW agents stopped as there was no longer an immediate need for the products: UNMOVIC has some limited information to support this. Also, given the short shelf-life of the nerve agents and the possibility that stockpiles of relatively stable mustard existed at that time, (possibly about 700 tonnes), it is logical that further production did not proceed. The evidence available to UNMOVIC indicates that much of the effort at Al Muthanna, at the end of 1988 and in 1989, was directed towards production to assist the civilian sector. Thus, production was turned to the manufacture of chlorine-based disinfectants and insecticides. Such chemicals still required the continued operation of some of the precursor plants at Al Muthanna. In addition, work continued at the Fallujah sites with the installation of chemical production equipment, including a chlorine plant. Although Al Muthanna was involved in the production of civilian products after the Iran–Iraq War, the facility was still a military one under the control of MIC. In August 1989, the Director General wrote to senior government officials that ‘research on munitions and chemical weapons are very important in war conditions. We must always be ready and prepared and must follow up every new development in this domain. The other face of the coin is pesticide research.’ In accordance with this edict, development of CW agents and weapons continued. In particular, there is evidence to indicate that, in early 1989, efforts were directed towards the testing of binary sarin agents and investigating various munitions including ‘a binary system for 122 mm rockets’ and a chemical cluster bomb.

Enhancement of the Iraqi chemical weapons programme In April 1990, President Saddam Hussein stated that, if Israel attacked Iraq, ‘we will make the fire eat half of Israel’ and went on to say ‘Let them hear, here and now, that we do possess binary chemical weapons which only the United States and Soviet Union have.’ There is strong evidence to indicate that the CW programme was reactivated at this time. Iraq stated that the instruction for this came from MIC, headed at that time by Lieutenant General Hussein Kamal. UNMOVIC, however, cannot discount the possibility that there was not also some renewed activity before this. One major new project started in April 1990, and said by Iraq to be in response to the President’s statement, was the development of a new CW bomb. This was based on a reverse-engineered imported, parachute-retarded bomb and was intended for low-level release from an aircraft. There is evidence to show that engineering drawings were completed by 16 April, and proto-

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types fabricated in April/May 1990. The first trials of the bomb were conducted on 22 May 1990, and production began soon thereafter. The initial order of 1,000 bombs, eventually designated the R-400, was delivered to Al Muthanna in July 1990. Another project, also initiated in April 1990, was the development of Al Hussein warheads for CW use. Modified warheads, with internal containers for liquid agent, were designed and manufactured. Iraq said that these were tested in two static trials held in April and May 1990. Iraq stated that two flight tests, one using an inert liquid (oil and water) and one using spoiled sarin, were conducted in April 1990. Iraq declared that, by June 1990, the first batch of ‘special’ warheads had been manufactured and delivered to Al Muthanna, and that 50 such warheads were eventually manufactured for CW purposes. UNMOVIC is unable to confirm this figure. Both of the above munitions projects had a sense of urgency. In conjunction with these munitions projects, there were renewed efforts to increase agent production. In a December 1990 report to Lieutenant General Hussein Kamal, the Director General of Al Muthanna wrote ‘following the tense military situation after 2 April 1990, there arose the importance of finding substitutes to resume nerve agent production.’ The report indicated that Al Muthanna had had some success in overcoming shortages due to international controls on chemicals. Indeed, according to Iraq’s declarations, production of sarin for 1990 was 117 tonnes. Iraq stated that 280 tonnes of mustard was also manufactured that year. There is evidence that attention was also focused on VX immediately prior to the Gulf war. In December 1990, Lieutenant General Hussein Kamal ordered the Director General of Al Muthanna to ‘concentrate on producing the intermediate substances as well as on producing VX as a final product.’ However, Iraq has stated that it only managed to produce 1.5 tonnes of VX in 1990. Iraq declared that the filling of the new R-400 bombs and the Al Hussein warheads began in June 1990 as the first munitions were delivered to Al Muthanna. In all, over 1,000 R-400 bombs and 50 Al Hussein warheads were said to have been filled. The agents said to be selected were sarin and cyclosarin, either as the agent or in binary form (when only the alcohol was placed in the munition and the precursor was stored alongside in containers). UNMOVIC cannot be certain of the fill for these weapons but notes that, on some destroyed warheads recovered by UNSCOM, degradation products of VX were found, implying that at least some of these weapons were filled with that agent. In addition to these weapons, Iraq stated that it filled many thousands of other CW munitions in 1990. For example, in that year, 12,500 artillery shells were filled with mustard and 8,500 rockets were filled with sarin. By 15 January 1991, the CW weapons were dispersed to airfields and other locations. Iraq has stated that its policy was to use these weapons

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only if Baghdad was attacked with nuclear weapons and then field commanders had the authority to use them at their discretion. UNMOVIC has no evidence to indicate that any CW weapons were used in the Gulf war.

Destruction of Iraqi chemical weapons and facilities Following the invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf war started on 17 January 1991. During the bombing campaign the main CW facilities at Al Muthanna and Al Fallujah were heavily damaged. In addition, some of the CW weapons stored at airfields and other locations were also destroyed. However, Iraq had evacuated much of its strategic materials and equipment prior to the war. For example much of the bomb-casing manufacturing equipment from Al Muthanna, had been relocated to a sugar factory at Al Mosul in the far north of the country. Iraq has stated that in 1990, consideration was given to using this equipment to set up an alternative CW bomb factory at this site, although it said this plan was not carried through. Some of the CW agents were stored in bulk in containers, including large (20 cubic metre) transportable tanks to be buried for safe-keeping. In this way several hundreds of tonnes of mustard and sarin were buried in the desert surrounding Al Muthanna during the war and survived the bombing. This agent was subsequently destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision. UNSCOM in early June 1991 inspected the Muthanna CW plant which it found had been severely disabled, but not completely destroyed. In August 1991, UNSCOM visited the precursor plants at Al Fallujah and observed similar destruction levels. UNSCOM then started planning the elimination of remaining CW assets and the safe deactivation of weapons and agents. Before UNSCOM could begin its work on the elimination of the remaining CW capabilities, Iraq secretly began its own unilateral destruction. Iraq has declared that, in July 1991, under instruction from Lieutenant General Hussein Kamal, it began the unilateral destruction of selected chemicals and munitions; this activity was not disclosed to UNSCOM at the time. Iraq has stated that the rationale for this activity was not to deceive UNSCOM but that the disclosure of certain items ‘would complicate matters and prolong the process with UNSCOM.’ It is probable that one of the reasons for this unilateral destruction was an effort to bring what UNSCOM might find more into line with the serious inadequacies in Iraq’s initial declaration of its holdings of proscribed weapons and materials. There was said to be no criteria for what was to be destroyed and that there was ‘no obvious logic governing the choice of items concealed.’ Vast quantities of CW weapons were said to have been destroyed by Iraq in the summer of 1991. In all, Iraq declared that it had destroyed over 28,000 filled and unfilled munitions, about 30 tonnes of bulk chemical precursors for sarin and cyclosarin, and over 200 tonnes of key precursors relating to VX.

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The remaining weapons, materials and equipment declared by Iraq, that could be identified and located by UNSCOM, were destroyed under its supervision, mainly between 1992 and 1994. In this way, over 28,000 munitions, 480 tonnes of CW agent and 100,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals were disposed of. About 400 major pieces of chemical processing equipment and some hundreds of items of other equipment, such as bomb-making machinery, were also destroyed under UNSCOM supervision.

Dual-use capabilities to 1998 Although much of the infrastructure associated with Iraq’s CW programme had been damaged by bombing during the 1991 Gulf war, other civilian chemical plants had remained untouched. The petrochemical, fertilizer and pesticide production plants remained intact, and continued to operate after the 1991 war. Iraq gradually added to these by expansion or the construction of new facilities. In addition, one of the former CW precursor plants at Al Fallujah was refurbished and configured to produce chlorine for the purification of water. Much of this civilian chemical industry used dualcapable technology and was being monitored by UNSCOM until the end of 1998. In November 2002, UNMOVIC returned to Iraq to begin to monitor these plants again.

Conclusions UNMOVIC had a good understanding of the nature and scope of Iraq’s CW programme. Information on bulk CW agent produced by Iraq is summarized in Table 8.2 and on CW munitions declared by Iraq as Table 8.2

Information on Iraqi bulk CW agent (from S/1999/94)

Bulk CW Agent

Quantity (tonnes)

UNSCOM comment

Mustard (20 m3/1 m3 containers)

295

295 tonnes destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision

Tabun (2 m3 containers)

76

76 tonnes destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision

Sarin and its mixtures (2 m3 containers)

40

40 tonnes destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision

VX (1 m3 containers) Total

1.5

According to Iraq 1.5 tonnes destroyed unilaterally

412.5

411 tonnes destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision

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remaining after the 1991 Gulf war in Table 8.3. The areas of greatest uncertainty relate to questions of material balance and whether there may be items still remaining. In this regard, Iraq’s unilateral destruction of large quantities of chemicals and weapons in July 1991, and failure to fully disclose the extent of its programmes complicated the accountancy problem. Table 8.3 Information on Iraqi CW munitions declared by Iraq as remaining after the 1991 Gulf war (from S/1999/94) Munition type

Quantity

UNSCOM comment

250 gauge aerial bombs (mustard)

1,243

1,233 destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision

250 gauge aerial bombs (unfilled)

8,122

7,627 destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision

500 gauge aerial bombs (mustard)

1,426

980 destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision

500 gauge aerial bombs (unfilled)

422

331 destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision

R-400 aerial bombs (binary components of sarin)

337

336 destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision, 1 removed by UNSCOM for analysis outside Iraq

R-400 aerial bombs (unfilled)

58

58 destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision

DB-2 aerial bombs (unfilled)

1,203

1,203 destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision

122 mm rockets (sarin)

6,610

6,434 destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision

122 mm rockets (unfilled)

6,880

7,305 destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision

155 mm artillery shells (mustard)

13,000

12,792 destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision

155 mm artillery shells (unfilled)

16,950

1,700 destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision. Iraq provided documentation for conversion of 15,616 to conventional munitions – of these UNSCOM accounted for 1,779 converted munitions

30

29 destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision, 1 warhead removed by of UNSCOM for analysis outside Iraq

Missile warheads (sarin/ binary components sarin) Total

56,281

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Similar information is provided in S/1999/94 for munitions declared by Iraq as having been destroyed during the 1991 Gulf war and for munitions declared by Iraq as having been unilaterally destroyed. However, as shown in Table 7.4 the shortfall in respect of agent is assessed as being 1.5 tonnes with a considerably greater shortfall for precursors (82 tonnes) and for special munitions (24,177). The questions of uncertainty relating to chemical weapons listed in the Clusters of Unresolved Disarmament Issues section of the 6 March 2003 document are: a. b. c. d. e. f. g.

tabun, sarin and cyclosarin, mustard, VX, major chemical process equipment, soman, BZ analogues (psychoactive compounds).

The Key Remaining Disarmament Tasks8 identified by UNMOVIC in the draft work programme of 17 March 2003 included the following chemical weapons related topics: a. b. c. d. e.

Scud Missiles and associated biological and chemical warheads, Munitions for chemical and biological agent fill, VX and its precursors, mustard and its precursors, sarin, cyclosarin and their precursors.

It is, however, regretted that neither UNMOVIC nor the ISG appear to have given much attention to the Iraqi programmes into the tear gases such as CS and CN although it was evident from the UNSCOM report S/1999/94 that Iraq intended to use CS as a chemical warfare agent in both aerial bombs and mortar bombs. There is no doubt that any such use is totally prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention. The ISG concluded that ‘Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable: • Saddam and many Iraqis regarded CW as a proven weapon against an enemy’s superior numerical strength, a weapon that had saved the nation at least once already – during the Iran–Iraq war – and contributed to deterring the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad.’ Furthermore, the ISG judged that the longstanding intent of the regime was to restart WMD production once UN sanctions were lifted. The way

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Iraq organized its chemical industry in the late 1990s provided an infrastructure from which it could restart a CW programme. The domestic chemical industrial base would also allow concealment of CW-related elements or indeed a CW production capacity amidst a tangle of legitimate civilian production. Site visits and debriefs by the ISG revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfiguring and ‘making-do’ with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items. Based on an investigation of facilities, materials, and production outputs, the ISG judged that Iraq had a break-out capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard CW agent, but not nerve agents, within months of a decision to proceed.

The Iraqi biological weapons programme It should be noted that UNMOVIC in describing the Iraqi biological weapons programme has said9 that ‘Of all its proscribed weapons programmes, Iraq’s biological warfare (BW) programme was perhaps the most secretive. Iraq has stated that knowledge of the programme was kept to a select few officials and that, to maintain secrecy, special measures were taken.’ Consequently it was unsurprising that UNMOVIC noted that Iraq’s efforts to conceal the programme had complicated UNMOVIC’s task of piecing together a coherent and accurate account of its BW programme.

The initiation of the Iraqi biological weapons programme Iraq acceded to the 1925 Geneva Protocol on 7 April 1931 with a reservation: On condition that the Iraq government shall be bound by the provisions of the Protocol only towards those States which have both signed and ratified it or have acceded thereto, and that it shall not be bound by the Protocol towards any State at enmity with Iraq whose armed forces, or the forces of whose allies, do not respect the provisions of the Protocol. As noted earlier in this chapter, the development of weapons of mass destruction began in the late 1960s or early 1970s at about the same time as the change in the Iraqi leadership when chemical weapons were first studied. Iraq stated that in 1974 in response to a rising threat from Iran and Israel a government decree was issued to look at ‘scientific, academic and applied researches in the fields of chemistry, physics and micro-organisms.’ [Emphasis added]. However, no copy of this decree was provided to UNSCOM or to UNMOVIC. Nor is there any elaboration of what type of work was envisaged by the term ‘researches’. Although Iraq has stated that the motivation for this work was in response to the threat from Iraq’s enemies, it is noted that the BTWC opened for signature on 10 April 1972

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and was signed by Iraq on 11 May 1972. There was thus an external reason for Iraq to have at least been aware of the international moves to totally prohibit biological weapons and thus to have considered its national position in relation to such weapons.

The Iraqi biological weapons programme Ibn Sina Centre. Iraq has stated that the response to the decree of 1974 was to construct a facility, the Ibn Sina Centre, at a site on the Al Salman peninsula, 30 km south of Baghdad. The Centre came under the auspices of a newly created organization, Al Hazen Ibn Al Haitham Institute. Although Iraq declared that construction began in 1974, given the sophistication of the design of the Centre, it seems likely that planning for it would have begun in 1973, or perhaps even earlier. The Al Hazen Institute was ostensibly part of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, but Iraq has acknowledged that, in reality, it was under the influence of the State Security Apparatus. The work carried out at the Centre was stated by Iraq to be basic and that little was actually achieved because of poor direction and management. It is not certain that this was the case and, in fact, from the testimony of some of the scientists at the Centre, it was possible that more was achieved than has been declared. Iraq has declared that activities at the Al Hazen Institute were terminated in 1978, when its director and some of the leading scientists were jailed for both scientific and perhaps financial fraud; Iraq provided documentary evidence to support this. However, it would also appear that the Centre itself did not close and that activities, stated by Iraq to be unrelated to BW, continued for some time into the 1980s. From interview testimony, UNMOVIC said that the actual nature of the continued work was not apparent. Whilst the dates of the start and closure of Ibn Sina Centre may not be particularly important, its objectives and achievements are. The achievements, particularly those that were more military related, could possibly have provided a sound basis for developments that were to come, and hence shorten the lead-time to the production of biological weapons. In this regard, UNMOVIC observed that it was noteworthy that at least five of the workers at the Centre went on to make contributions later in the BW programme. The ISG noted that the generation of scientists trained and employed at Al Hazen formed the backbone of Iraq’s later CW and BW programmes. Al Muthanna State Establishment. War with Iran broke out in September 1980, and in the 1980s Iraq’s BW programme was restarted. According to Iraq, after the closure of the Ibn Sina Centre, no practical work in the BW field was conducted until 1985. The 1985 restart of the BW programme was

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said by Iraq to have taken place after the Director General of Iraq’s CW facility at Al Muthanna State Establishment (MSE) wrote, in the preamble of his 1983 annual report to the Minister of Defence, that his mandate covered both chemical and biological agents. Since the Minister did not dispute this assertion, the Director General assumed he had authorization to conduct work in the BW field. The Director General’s report also coincided with a 1983 letter from a senior Iraqi microbiologist to the Baath Party, suggesting that Iraq could defend itself from Iran by the development and use of BW weapons. However, no copy has been provided of the 1983 annual report or of the letter to UNSCOM or to UNMOVIC. The ISG stated that a militarily relevant BW programme restarted at Al Muthanna in 1983 and furthermore, in 1986, a five-year plan was drawn up that would lead to biological agent weaponization. No action was said to have taken place until early 1985, when the first biologists were recruited for which documentary evidence has been provided. The Director General of MSE stated that he informed the Minister of Defence, in 1985, that within five years the first biological weapons would be produced. UNMOVIC states that there is documentation to show that bacterial strains and basic laboratory supplies were obtained in late 1985 and early 1986. According to Iraq, two agents, botulinum toxin and anthrax were selected as candidate BW agents. The basis for their selection was said by Iraq to be that other countries had produced them for BW purposes and that they were relatively easy to make. Work on these agents, in 1986, was, according to Iraq, restricted to pathogenicity and toxicity studies, their characteristics, and methods of production at the laboratory scale. Al Salman. As a separate stream to the BW activities at MSE, it appears that BW activities were also being conducted under the auspices of the State Security Apparatus at Al Salman. UNMOVIC has no clear understanding of what the stimulus for the initiation of this work was. According to Iraq’s statements this work began, in 1984, with the investigation of wheat smut. Initial interest was said to have been to prevent crop infection, but by 1987 the investigations had shifted to the use of the disease as an economic weapon. No other BW activities are acknowledged by Iraq during this period (1984–1986) although it is noted that an inhalation chamber was installed at Al Salman, probably in 1984, and was later used in the BW programme. Iraq has stated that, towards the end of 1986, MSE put forward a proposal to scale up the production of botulinum toxin from laboratory to pilot scale. To this end, the takeover of a facility at Al Taji was sought. However, before this could occur, a new Director General of MSE was appointed in early 1987 and, according to Iraq, he considered the expansion of BW activities at MSE to be incompatible with the site and wanted the BW group to move from his establishment. Documentary evidence

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shows that there was, indeed, a transfer of the BW personnel from MSE to the Forensic Research Department at Al Salman in the first half of 1987. At Al Salman, the research came under the control of the Technical Research Centre (TRC) which, at that time, was part of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. Senior Iraqi officials have stated that, in early 1987, there was dissatisfaction with progress in the BW field: in its two years of operation, the programme was, according to Iraq, still involved with basic laboratory research and the promise of weapons in five years seemed unrealistic. Accordingly, following the transfer of staff to TRC, there was an acceleration of the programme. Additional laboratory supplies and equipment were acquired in 1987 and 1988, and new staff was recruited. Iraq has declared that a new building to house a pilot scale fermenter and to allow other expansion, was designed at the end of 1987. Construction of the new building at Al Salman was said to have begun in 1988. The remains of such a building had been inspected by UNSCOM. Also, some time in 1987 (Iraq has declared from mid-1987), further development work on botulinum toxin and anthrax began. This work involved production of these agents in bench top fermenters and experimentation on a range of animals, including sheep, donkeys and monkeys, to study inhalation and other effects. Another bacterial agent, Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene), was added to the programme, probably in 1987. There is evidence to show that work into certain fungal toxins (trichothecene mycotoxins) also began at the end of 1987. And, in May 1988, a mycologist was recruited for the development of other fungal toxins, in particular aflatoxin. Al Taji. UNMOVIC says that it would appear that the Taji facility came under the control of the TRC in 1987. Iraq has declared that the fermenter at that facility was refurbished and botulinum toxin produced there by TRC, from January to October 1988. Although the dates cannot be confirmed there is some evidence to suggest that botulinum toxin was indeed produced at the Al Taji facility, although possibly starting earlier than declared by Iraq. Weapons developments. The first field trial of a crude BW dissemination device was said by Iraq to have commenced in February 1988, and to have been followed by relatively more sophisticated trials of LD-250 bombs filled with biological agent or simulant in April/May 1988. UNMOVIC has supporting evidence for at least some of these trials, which were conducted using the expertise of the weapons engineers from MSE. In addition to the above weapons, there was the development, according to Iraq, of an aerosol spray device, in 1987 and 1988, at Al Salman. The device, a modification of an agricultural crop-duster, was intended for the spraying of bacteria and was tested with an anthrax simulant.

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Enhancement of the Iraqi biological weapons programme Iraq has stated that, towards the end of 1987, the head of TRC submitted a report on the success of the BW work at Al Salman. Iraq has said that, as a consequence of this report, Lieutenant General Hussein Kamal (then the new head of the Military Industrialization Commission), instructed that the BW programme should proceed towards the production of BW agent. Although Iraq stated that it was the success of the work in 1987 that stimulated the decision for production, UNMOVIC questions whether very much could have been achieved in the few months the BW team had been at Al Salman. On the other hand, there is evidence that initial preparations for large scale production did begin in late 1987. At the end of 1987, Iraq placed the first of a series of orders to purchase large quantities of bacterial growth media which eventually totalled over 40 tonnes. In April 1988, an equipment requirement list, apparently in response to Lieutenant General Hussein Kamal’s instruction, was prepared. The list included three sizeable (5,000 litre) fermenters, two for botulinum toxin and one for anthrax production. Dryers and other processing equipment for anthrax were also specified. Al Hakam. At about the same time as the enquiries for materials and equipment were being made, the search for a suitable production site was conducted. Iraq has stated that the Al Salman site was considered unsuitable for safety reasons, because of its proximity to Baghdad. A search for an alternative site was, therefore, made in early 1988. According to one account given by a senior Iraqi official, one of the early considerations for production was a mobile facility that could be moved from site to site. This was said to have been rejected as being impractical. Eventually a production site was selected, in March 1988, at a remote desert location about 55 km south west of Baghdad and its acquisition is documented by Iraq. Iraqi officials have said that, in commemoration of the date of founding of the site (March 24), it was initially named Project 324. The site later was known as Al Hakam and was to become Iraq’s main BW production facility. Al Hakam was constructed rapidly and in secrecy. Priority was given to the completion of the production buildings and, by the end of 1988, the first such buildings were said to have been completed and equipment installed. Transfer of staff and functions was stated by Iraq to have begun towards the end of 1988, and to have been completed by late 1990. The acquisition of fermenters was critical for the production of agent. UNMOVIC states that in a submission to senior officials, the options available to Iraq for their acquisition were considered. The submission argued that manufacture in Iraq was, at that time, not considered to be technically feasible, and, in any case, it was argued this would take a long time. The recommended action was to purchase fermenters from overseas and, subsequently, several foreign companies were contacted in early 1988. A contract

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with a supplier for three 5,000 litre fermenters was agreed in July 1988 and, at Iraq’s insistence, the first unit was scheduled for delivery later that year. The supplier could not meet the schedule and delivery was postponed to 1989. Since no foreign supplier was permitted to visit Al Hakam, Iraq modified another facility at Al Latifyah, 50 km west of Baghdad, and presented this to the manufacturer as the plant where the fermenters were to be installed. Iraq also falsified the end-user certificate to indicate the fermenters were for civilian use. Iraqi officials have stated that the plan was that, after the fermenters had been installed and commissioned by the company, they would be relocated to Al Hakam. However, in the end, the supplier could not obtain an export licence and the contract was finally cancelled in late 1989. However, such was the priority on production in 1988, that another option for fermenters was also pursued. TRC became aware that a line of fermenters was available at the Veterinary Research Laboratories at Al Kindi. Consideration was given to producing botulinum toxin in these fermenters at Al Kindi. Iraq has stated that this option was not taken up and instead, Al Kindi fermenters were compulsorily acquired and transferred to Al Hakam in late 1988. UNMOVIC can confirm the acquisition but not the exact date of transfer. According to Iraq, the fermenter from Al Taji was also transferred to Al Hakam at the end of 1988. Thus, by the end of 1988, Al Hakam, after a rushed construction and acquisition programme, was ready to produce agent. However, the war with Iran finished in August 1988 and, therefore, it might have been expected that there would have been a slowing of pace. However, the evidence provided to UNMOVIC indicates the contrary. In the two years following the end of the war the momentum continued as no one was sure at the time that the Iran–Iraq war would not restart. Activities included BW agent production, new research projects, and weapons testing and development. Botulinum toxin production. Production of botulinum toxin was stated by Iraq to have begun at Al Hakam, first in the fermenter from Al Taji, in January 1989, and then in the veterinary fermenter line in February 1989. Iraq has declared that, from the start of production at Al Hakam in January 1989 to August 1990, 13,600 litres of concentrated botulinum toxin were produced. In addition, 5,000 litres of botulinum toxin were produced at the FMDV vaccine plant Al Manal at Daura (also known as Al Dawrah) in late 1990. Anthrax production. Iraq has declared that, in early 1989, Al Hakam did not produce anthrax. However pilot scale production of anthrax was started at Al Salman in March 1989, and continued there for four months. Anthrax production at Al Hakam was said to have started in June 1990. Up to August 1990, total production of (concentrated) anthrax was stated to be

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170 litres, a relatively small amount compared with the amount of botulinum toxin produced up to this time. In addition, UNSCOM had some evidence that anthrax was produced at Al Manal at Daura. Aflatoxin production. Aflatoxin production was stated by Iraq to have begun at Al Salman in January 1989 and to have continued there until July 1990 and then at Al Fudhaliyah from October 1990 to January 1991, during which time about 400 litres of aflatoxin were produced. The Al Hakam report for 1990 reports that 2,200 litres were made without specifying the location. UNMOVIC is unable to confirm these locations and quantities but accept it was produced at both locations with most at Fudhaliyah. Iraq has declared that, during this period (1988–August 1990), studies on botulinum toxin, anthrax, gas gangrene and aflatoxin continued, although UNMOVIC is uncertain of the precise nature, timing and scope of this work. This work included investigation of the best growth conditions, effects on animals and other studies, such as the determination of the optimum storage parameters. Iraq has also declared that, in the first half of 1990, research into Clostridium botulinum spores (as opposed to the toxin), as a potential infectious agent, was conducted; UNMOVIC cannot confirm this. Other agents. Work on new agents also began during this period. Work on the BW agent ricin (extracted from castor oil beans), was probably commenced in the latter half of 1988. Studies included production and identification of the toxin protein and toxicity effects, including inhalation studies. A decision to study viruses as potential BW agents was probably made in May 1990, or earlier. In any event, in July 1990, a virologist was recruited to begin work on viral BW agents. Iraq has stated that the laboratories at Al Hakam were considered unsuitable for viral research and actual BW work on viruses only commenced in December 1990. In March 1990, a genetic engineering unit was established under the auspices of Al Hakam. A senior Iraqi official said that one aim of the unit was to produce antibiotic resistant anthrax. Another genetic engineering unit, apparently connected to the viral programme, was also planned, but was said not to have been established. UNMOVIC is not entirely clear what the objectives of these BW genetic engineering projects were, but assesses that, in reality, probably very little was achieved. Other work during the period included experiments into the drying of anthrax. Spray dryers for anthrax were included on Iraq’s equipment requirement list in April 1988. In 1989, Iraq signed a contract for the supply from a foreign company of a suitable dryer for this purpose. At the end of that year, a visit to the company by a senior Iraqi scientist was made, and a small sample of anthrax simulant dried during a demonstration of the company’s equipment. UNMOVIC has evidence that, in anticipation of receiving the dryer, Iraq conducted a series of experiments on a

216 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

laboratory scale at Al Hakam, in 1990, to determine the best compounds to add to anthrax spores to assist in the drying process. However, in March 1990, the company withdrew from the contract because an export licence for the special dryer could not be obtained. UNMOVIC has evidence that the drying experiments at Al Hakam then stopped (at least for 1990). Field trials of BW weapons. UNMOVIC states that from documentation it appears that field trials of 122 mm rockets as a BW delivery system were conducted, possibly in November or December 1989. No test of any other BW weapon systems is declared by Iraq for 1989.

Further enhancement of the Iraqi biological weapons programme In April 1990, President Saddam Hussein declared: I say that if Israel dares to hit even one piece of steel on any industrial site, we will make the fire eat half of Israel. (…) Let them hear, here and now, that we do possess binary chemical weapons which only the United States and Soviet Union have. The statement by the President stimulated a number of WMD developments. Iraq has stated that, along with other military establishments, Al Hakam was required to respond to this new perceived threat. Consequently, a series of hurriedly organized dynamic tests of 122 mm BW rockets was conducted in May 1990. UNMOVIC has evidence that dynamic firings of such rockets containing botulinum toxin, anthrax simulant10 and aflatoxin took place at some time in 1990. UNMOVIC has not been able to identify any other BW activity that might be specifically in response to the Presidential statement. The ISG stated that following the President’s statement, the BW programme was ordered to go all out for weaponization. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 also accelerated and changed the direction of its WMD programmes. The emphasis was now on production and weaponization for the coming Gulf war. Projects that had direct relevance to the war effort had priority and longer term developments were put on hold. Decisions on what munitions would be deployed during the war were also made. For example, in the BW field, it was decided that the R-400 bomb, which had been developed for CW purposes, would also be deployed as a BW bomb, and that BW agent would also be deployed in Al Hussein missile warheads. At the time of these decisions neither of the munitions had been tested with BW agent. According to one senior Iraqi general, the BW programme at this time headed down a ‘hasty, unplanned and badly conceived course.’ However, it was inevitable that the coming war would have had a profound effect on the direction and nature of Iraq’s

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WMD programmes. The ISG noted that the BW programme had moved into high gear with the aim of fielding filled weapons as quickly as possible. Iraq has declared that weaponization of BW agents took place in December 1990 and January 1991. However, the ordering and timing of weapons filling and deployment remains unclear as do precisely which agents were filled into which weapon systems. R-400 bomb and Al Hussein missile warhead remnants confirm that BW agents were filled into these weapons. Iraq has also declared that weapons filled with biological weapons were deployed in January to July 1991 although ambiguities remain on the numbers and locations of the agents deployed. Iraq had declared to UNSCOM in 1995 that authority to launch chemical and biological warheads had been predelegated in the event that Baghdad was attacked by nuclear weapons during the Gulf war. UNSCOM pointed out that this predelegation did not exclude the alternative use of such a capability and therefore did not constitute proof of intentions concerning second use. UNSCOM emphasized that it must have a complete understanding for all proscribed weapon systems of their intended and actual deployment plans.

The Iraqi biological weapons programme: agents, weapons and facilities The Iraqi biological agents are summarized in Table 8.4 although the quantities could not be verified.

Table 8.4

Iraqi biological agents

Code

Agent

Summary

Agent A

Clostridium botulinum toxin

19,000 litre concentrated toxin (10,000 litre into munitions)

Agent B

Bacillus anthracis spores

8,500 litre (5,000 litre into munitions)

Agent C

Aflatoxin

2,200 litre concentrated (1,120 litre into munitions)

Agent D

Wheat cover smut

Considerable quantities

Agent G

Clostridium perfringens toxin

340 litre concentrated

–

Ricin

10 litre trials failed

–

Trichothecene mycotoxins (such as t-2 and DAS)

Research

–

Haemorrhagic conjunctivitis

Research

–

Rotavirus

Research

–

Camel pox virus

Research

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Iraqi facilities engaged in their biological weapons programme include those in Table 8.5 although the stated capabilities are unconfirmed: Table 8.5

Iraqi facilities engaged in the biological weapons programme

Facility

Description

Al Salman

1975 R & D programme at Al Hazen Institute May 1987 BW programme under TRC 7 litre and 14 litre laboratory fermenters 150 litre fermenter from Al Muthannah (Aug 1990 to Al Hakam) 1989 Aflatoxin production

Al Hakam

March 1988 research and BW production November 1988 2 × 1,850 litre fermenters ex-VRL 7 × 1,480 litre fermenters ex-VRL

Al Muthanna

1985 research and production 150 litre fermenter Dec 1990 weaponization on large scale

Al Manal (FMDV Daura)

Nov 1990–Jan 1991 Botulinum production Also evidence of anthrax spores

Al Safah (Fudhaliyah)

Aug 1990 Aflatoxin production

Al Taji

Single cell protein plant Production of botulinum toxin 1 × 450 litre fermenter (to Al Hakam Oct 1988)

Near Mosul

1987–1988 Wheat cover smut production under TRC

The Iraqi biological weapons delivery means are in Table 8.6. Table 8.6

Iraqi biological weapons delivery means

Delivery Means

Comment

Al Hussein missile warheads

25 BW warheads declared by Iraq – 16 filled with botulinum toxin – 5 filled with anthrax – 4 filled with aflatoxin. Numbers later adjusted by Iraq several times, last stated to be 5, 16 and 4 respectively.

R-400 aerial bombs

Iraq declared 200 produced. – 100 filled with botulinum toxin – 50 filled with anthrax – 7 filled with aflatoxin. Numbers impossible to verify.

Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Programmes 219 Table 8.6

Iraqi biological weapons delivery means – continued

Delivery Means

Comment

Aircraft drop tanks – Mirage F-1

Plan for 12 modified drop tanks. Iraq claimed for use with anthrax and then said with botulinum toxin.

Pilotless aircraft project MiG 21 with drop tank

Iraq’s account very brief.

Aerosol generators/helicopter spray system (the Zubaidy device)

12 devices produced. Successful field testing of bacillus subtilis in August 1988.

Parallel system for drones

Little information known to UNSCOM.

122 mm rocket warheads

Successful trials and recommended for Agents A, B, C and D.

155 mm artillery shell

Four used in trial with ricin.

LD-250 aerial bomb

Static trials of agent dispersion conducted in 1988.

Fragmentation weapons

Said to have been trialled with Clostridium perfringens.

The Iraq biological weapons programme post-1991 SCR 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 established UNSCOM and required Iraq to ‘unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision’ of its weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missiles over 150 km range, and all associated facilities, equipment and materials. The same resolution required that Iraq ratify the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention – and Iraq deposited its instrument of ratification in June 1991. It is now well known that Iraq did not cooperate with UNSCOM or later with UNMOVIC taking steps to conceal information and capabilities relating to its weapons of mass destruction programmes. Indeed, Iraq has acknowledged in statements to UNSCOM that, in the biological field, its approach to ending the programme was different from that in the chemical, missiles and nuclear fields. It has been stated by Iraq that, although Iraq’s BW weapons and agents were unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991, a decision was taken to conceal other aspects of its BW programme from UNSCOM. Thus, for example, its main BW production facility at Al Hakam was converted to a civilian plant to disguise its true nature.

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UNMOVIC in its 6 March 2003 paper on unresolved issues stated that: Of all its proscribed weapons programmes, Iraq’s biological warfare (BW) programme was perhaps the most secretive. Iraq has stated that knowledge of the programme was kept to a select few officials and that, to maintain secrecy, special measures were taken. This secrecy was maintained after the Gulf War when Iraq went to considerable lengths, including the destruction of documents and the forging of other documents, to conceal its BW efforts from UNSCOM. The UNSCOM document in 1999 inter alia summarizing its work on the Iraqi biological weapons programme points out many still unresolved discrepancies in the Iraqi declarations. Of particular relevance, is the absence of an adequate account of the military involvement in the programme and thus of the military objectives and requirements for such weapons. UNSCOM pointed out that the contention by Iraq that the Ministry of Defence remained wholly unaware of Iraq’s BW programme was implausible as Iraq acknowledged that the MOD was involved from 1983 to 1987. It was unlikely that the programme was not visible to senior MOD personnel after 1987 as programming for the adoption of BW would have been part of the strategic planning of Iraq’s military development along with its nuclear and chemical capabilities. Indeed, UNSCOM argued that such strategic planning would have developed the requirement for a militarily significant capability of biological weapons in 1987/88 or possibly earlier. This would in turn have defined the technical scope of the programme and the necessary funding. Furthermore, UNSCOM pointed out that BW would have been integrated into Iraq’s strategic capability and that the military objectives, concepts of use and mechanisms for releasing these weapons must have been defined. This would require extensive planning which Iraq denies. UNMOVIC in March 2003 identified the issues of greatest importance in regard to the Iraqi biological weapons programme as relating to agent production, weaponization and unilateral destruction. In the clusters of unresolved disarmament issues produced by UNMOVIC in March 2003, there are six clusters relating to delivery means and eleven clusters relating to biological agents. The ISG established after the military action in 2003 made an interim report in October 2003. David Kay in testimony11 to the US Congress on 2 October 2003 on this interim report has said that the ISG has ‘discovered dozens of WMD-related programme activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in 2002’ and went on in regard to biological weapons to say that the ISG has ‘begun to unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus. This network was never

Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Programmes 221

declared to the UN and was previously unknown. … this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R & D – all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production.’ The ISG Comprehensive Report said that the state security apparatus (or Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)) had a series of laboratories that conducted biological work including work on BW agents for assassination purposes until the mid-1990s. The ISG had not been able to establish the scope and nature of the work at these laboratories or determine whether any of the work was related to military development of BW agent. In its Comprehensive Report in September 2004, the ISG reported that ‘Depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to a few months of a decision to do so, but ISG discovered no indications that the regime was pursuing such a course.’ The major conclusion reached by the ISG as to why Iraq continued to provide a confused message regarding its WMD capabilities was that: From the evidence available through the actions and statements of a range of Iraqis, it seems clear that the guiding theme for WMD was to sustain the intellectual capacity achieved over so many years at such a great cost and to be in a position to produce again with as short a lead time as possible – within the vital constraint that no action should threaten the prime objective of ending international sanctions and constraints. Saddam continued to see the utility of WMD. He explained that he purposely gave an ambiguous impression about possession as a deterrent to Iran. He gave explicit direction to maintain the intellectual capabilities. As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation. He directed that ballistic missile work continue that would support long-range missile development. Virtually no senior Iraqi believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever. Evidence suggests that, as resources became available and the constraints of sanctions decayed, there was a direct expansion of activity that would have the effect of supporting future WMD reconstitution. Despite all of these indications of long-term intentions to maintain the capability to restart a BW programme, it seems clear that in reality, after the mid-1990s Iraq had neither stockpiles of BW nor an ongoing programme to directly develop BW. As the ISG Comprehensive Report put it, ‘…with the destruction of the Al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambitions to obtain advanced BW weapons quickly. ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes. Indeed, from the mid1990s, despite evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and chemical weapons, there appears to be a complete absence of discussion or even interest in BW at the Presidential level.’

9 The Absence of WMD Stockpiles in Iraq

In the run up to the start in March 2003 of the war in Iraq, there appeared, as outlined in Chapter 7, to be little doubt in the United States and the United Kingdom that Iraq possessed stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. It was made equally clear in both countries after the war that a search was being mounted for these stockpiles. Now, some two years later, there are no signs of any stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons and it is increasingly unlikely that any will be found. In this chapter consideration is given first to the views expressed by UNMOVIC and the ISG and then to an explanation as to why there were no stockpiles.

UNMOVIC and ISG UNMOVIC. In June 2003, Hans Blix was asked in an interview1 if he was surprised that weapons of mass destruction had not been found in Iraq. In his response, he said that he was not and that he would not have been surprised if some had been found. He pointed out that the UNMOVIC position had always been that there was a great deal that was unaccounted for. However, UNMOVIC had warned specifically against equating ‘not accounted for’ with ‘existing.’ Nevertheless if Iraq could not provide evidence that the weapons had been destroyed then UNMOVIC could not have confidence that they did not exist. In answering the question as to why Iraq had not made a complete declaration, Hans Blix noted one speculation that it is possible that Iraq did not mind a deliberate ambiguity as to whether or not they still possessed something and perhaps there was a certain mystique in possibly possessing some biological weapons. But it was unclear why such a mystique might be pursued to the point that Iraq was invaded. Another speculation related to pride. Hans Blix said that the Iraqis are very proud and felt that whilst they had accepted the Security Council resolutions, they would not accept any intrusion more than necessary and they were very legalistic in this regard. He felt this was the only 222

The Absence of WMD Stockpiles in Iraq 223

reason for Iraq on occasions in the 1990s quibbling about the number of inspectors prior to the inspection of a totally empty building. Hans Blix in Disarming Iraq 2 in early 2004 entitled his final chapter ‘After War: Weapons of Mass Disappearance’ and said that ‘After the war, it is becoming clear that inspection and monitoring by the IAEA, UNMOVIC and its predecessor UNSCOM, backed by military, political and economic pressure, had indeed worked for years, achieving Iraqi disarmament and deterring Saddam from rearming.’ He goes on to consider why the Iraqi regime allowed the impression to arise that it was keeping weapons of mass destruction as that impression supported years of sanctions, which crippled Iraq’s economy and ruined its people’s standard of living. He identified that ‘the following elements may have been relevant: • Better cooperation with the inspectors was not expected to lead to a lifting of sanctions. Saddam Hussein had heard again and again from the US that only his own disappearance would achieve it. Why should he make an effort at greater cooperation? • A sense of humiliation may have led the Iraqis to balk at giving access in some cases, especially to various sites they associated with the sovereignty of their country. Saddam Hussein … had enormous pride in himself and Iraq. … • The Iraqi regime demanded that the UN should lift sanctions, claiming that Iraq had eliminated all prohibited weapons and fulfilled all obligations. Yet … perhaps the Iraqi regime did not mind inspiring in others the thought that it had weapons of mass destruction and was still dangerous. • The Iraqi regime may have wanted to maintain secrecy about facilities harboring conventional military forces and weapons. While such facilities were clearly subject to inspection … the close relations which existed up to the end of 1998 between some UNSCOM inspectors and the military and intelligence authorities of countries that were bombing targets in Iraq might have led the regime to obstruct visits to some such sites. As already noted earlier, Hans Blix had been reported3 in September 2002 as saying that he believed that the section in the UK Government dossier on Iraq’s WMD ‘risked understating Iraq’s indigenous capability to produce WMD (i.e. meaning that, even if it held low stocks of WMD, it could quickly produce more.’ Iraq Survey Group. David Kay in October 2003 in a statement4 on the interim progress report of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) said that ‘We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist

224 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

or that they existed before the war and our only task is to find where they have gone. We are actively engaged in searching for such weapons based on information being supplied to us by Iraqis.’ He went on to add that the ISG’s search efforts were being ‘hampered by six factors: 1. From birth all of Iraq’s WMD activities were highly compartmentalized within a regime that ruled and kept i ts secrets through fear and terror and with deception and denial built into each program; 2. Deliberate dispersal and destruction of material and documentation related to weapons programs began pre-conflict and ran trans-to-post conflict; 3. Post-OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] looting destroyed or dispersed important and easily collectable material and forensic evidence concerning Iraq’s WMD program. As the report covers in detail, significant elements of this looting were carried out in a systematic and deliberate manner, with the clear aim of concealing pre-OIF activities of Saddam’s regime; 4. Some WMD personnel crossed borders in the pre/trans conflict period and may have taken evidence and even weapons-related materials with them; 5. Any actual WMD weapons or material is likely to be small in relation to the total conventional armaments footprint and difficult to near impossible to identify with normal search procedures. It is important to keep in mind that even the bulkiest materials we are searching for, in the quantities we would expect to find, can be concealed in spaces not much larger than a two car garage; 6. The environment in Iraq remains far from permissive for our activities, with many Iraqis that we talk to reporting threats and overt acts of intimidation and our own personnel being the subject of threats and attacks. …’ Later in the statement in a concluding remark, it is noted that one thing that has already become clearer is that: 1. Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other insiders who worked in his military-industrial programs, had not given up his aspirations and intentions to continue to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even those senior officials we have interviewed who claim no direct knowledge of any on-going prohibited activities readily acknowledge that Saddam intended to resume these programs whenever the external restrictions were removed. Several of these officials acknowledge receiving inquiries since 2000 from Saddam or his sons about how long it would take to either restart CW production or make available chemical weapons.

The Absence of WMD Stockpiles in Iraq 225

In January 2004, David Kay, shortly after resigning from the ISG, in testimony5 to the US Senate Armed Services Committee said that he had tried to find an explanation for Iraqi, and particularly Saddam Hussein’s, behaviour when his regime was at stake and why he had not done more to provide evidence regarding his weapons of mass destruction. David Kay believed there were two essential reasons: first, that Saddam Hussein did not want to appear to the rest of the Arab world as having caved in to the United States and the United Nations, hence maintaining an ambiguity in regard to WMD was important to him and his view of Iraq, and of the rest of the world. The second reason was domestic politics as he had used chemical weapons against the Kurds and the Shi’a who were seen as a continuing threat to him. David Kay said that he believed that Iraq had ‘a weapons program, but it was a program activity designed to allow future production at some time.’ He believed that following the defection of Hussein Kamal in 1995, Iraq: decided to reduce the thing that they were most vulnerable to and that’s large retained stocks, knowing that at some point they’d get rid of us, they thought, and they could restart production. So they kept the scientists and they kept the technology, but they didn’t – they came to what I think is a fair conclusion: Why keep stockpiles of weapons that are vulnerable to inspectors when you’ve lost your delivery capability? Wait till you have your delivery capability and then it’s a relatively short order. He went on to note that ‘We have documentary evidence and testimony that Saddam and Uday and Qusay ask[ed] in both 2000 and 2001 how long it would take to restart production of mustard and VX nerve gas. This was a key point … When you get senior officials asking how long will it take you to produce these agents, that tells you at least to be awake to the possibility that they didn’t have those agents.’ In response to further questions, David Kay said that his suspicion is that Saddam Hussein ‘probably thought he was closer to getting it to restart faster than it – than the scientists and engineers actually knew it would take. So when it really came down, these – these requests, one in 2000 and I think it’s two in 2001, in which they gave him estimates that were longer than he obviously had expected them to be was when they were confronting the truth. I think he knew – he had been told they got rid of it all, but that we could really turn the tap on very quickly, and it turned out they lied about how quickly – it was quick, but it wasn’t as quick as he anticipated.’ In March 2004 in an interview,6 David Kay said that he expected that the ISG in their next report would be able to put together a pretty convincing case that says most of the amounts in the WMD material balances are accounted for and did not go into new weapons. In regard to what hap-

226 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

pened to the Iraqi weapons, he said that some had been destroyed in ways that the Iraqis were embarrassed to admit. One major example involved disposal of weapons material and biological agents in ways that were not only not approved, but thought to be dangerous to the health of people in Baghdad. Consequently, the Iraqis just covered it up, and weren’t going to tell anyone just how they had disposed of that agent. Charles Duelfer took over from David Kay in January 2004. At the end of March 2004 he provided testimony7 to the US Congress providing a status report on the ISG which he said was not a preliminary assessment of its findings. In this testimony, he states that the ISG continued to look for weapons of mass destruction and noted that the ISG did not look just for stockpiles of weapons that could be hidden in the country as it is the mission of the ISG to determine all that was potentially being done related to WMD and the delivery systems for WMD. Later in the testimony he noted that: The ISG has developed new information regarding Iraq’s dual-use facilities and on-going research suitable for a capability to produce biological or chemical agents on short notice. Iraq did have facilities suitable for the production of biological and chemical agents needed for weapons. It had plans to improve and expand and even build new facilities. Duelfer also said that he had initiated a new focus for the ISG of regime intent and that one question being addressed was ‘Was there a plan for a break out production capability?’ In the ISG Comprehensive Report8 in September 2004, a Key Finding was that Saddam Hussein wanted to end sanctions while ‘preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted.’ It was evident that Saddam’s intention was to preserve Iraq’s intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Furthermore, the way Iraq organized its chemical industry in the late 1990s provided an infrastructure from which it could restart a CW programme. The domestic chemical industrial base would also allow concealment of CW-related elements or indeed a CW production capacity amidst a tangle of legitimate civilian production. Site visits and debriefs by the ISG revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfiguring and ‘making-do’ with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items. The ISG judged, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefings, that Iraq probably could produce large quantities of sulphur mustard within months of a decision to produce. In regard to biological weapons, the ISG judged that Iraq had a BW capability ready to function and Iraq could have reinstituted a rudimentary BW programme within a few weeks or months of a decision to do so.

The Absence of WMD Stockpiles in Iraq 227

Why there were no stockpiles In The UNSCOM Saga I pointed out that although large quantities of mustard, sarin and other nerve agents had been produced during the war against Iran, these had been produced for immediate use in the war as longterm storage was not a requirement. This was significantly different from past Western chemical weapons programmes which had required a retaliatory capability that could be stored until needed. This indicated that Iraq might well have adopted a different concept in regard to chemical and biological weapons. Because there was no suggestion that Iraq was seeking chemical or biological weapons as a means of retaliation in kind or as a deterrent capability, but rather that in the Iraq–Iran war of the 1980s Iraq had simply produced its chemical agents to immediately fill into weapons and use them hence avoiding stability and storage problems, it followed that there would be no requirement to have stockpiles of filled weapons but instead to have a production capability that could be used whenever required i.e. a mobilization capability. Although there was some stockpile of chemical weapons after the 1991 Gulf war, it is possible that this was simply a stockpile that had been left over from the Iran–Iraq war as there was no certainty when it ended in 1988 that it might not restart. Such a mobilization capacity approach would have particular advantages for a country such as Iraq that was being subject to ongoing monitoring and verification. There would be little sense in trying to produce covert stockpiles of agent – first, because Iraq had not followed this approach of building large stockpiles, and second, because there would always be the risk that such a stockpile would be found by UNSCOM/UNMOVIC with ensuing Security Council action – and far more sense in simply trying to maintain a capability that could produce agent at a later date when the UNSCOM/UNMOVIC OMV regime had been discontinued and chemical weapons were needed for some future Iraqi military action. It would be much easier for Iraq to successfully conceal such a capability within the dual-purpose technology industry associated with so many chemicals and biological materials. This explanation is consistent with observations from two areas. First, it has gradually become known following the US/UK/Russian trilateral agreement9 and the subsequent trilateral process,10 that the approach adopted by the former Soviet Union in regard to its biological weapons was to have a large mobilization capability hidden by embedding it in a civilian dualpurpose capability ‘Biopreparat’ that could produce biological agent when required rather than to maintain stockpiles of biological agents and filled weapons. This mobilization capability would be exercised from time to time so as to maintain the capability and prevent it from atrophying.11 In one example it has been stated12 that 10 to 14 days would be enough to produce sufficient anthrax to arm Soviet SS-18 missile warheads. In 2001, Michael Moodie noted13 that in the early 1970s, the Kremlin leadership

228 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

decided to initiate a second BW programme which would ‘create a dual infrastructure that, while producing civilian products, could also be mobilized at any time to produce BW.’ He went on to point out that following the trilateral agreement and process, subsequent US statements of concern about Russian compliance with the BTWC were careful not to claim that Russia was engaged in producing or weaponizing biological agents but were primarily in terms of Russia’s maintenance of a BW production capability that could be mobilized if Kremlin leaders so decided. One example is the US Department of Defense ‘Proliferation: Threat and Response’ issued14 in 2001 which states that ‘some key components of the former Soviet program may remain largely intact and may support a possible future mobilization capability for the production of biological agents and delivery systems.’ Identical language is used in the US State Department annual report15 to Congress for the period 1 December 2000 to 31 December 2001, the latest such report available. It is known that the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia had links with Iraq16 and consequently Iraq could have been aware of the Soviet Union/Russian approach to mobilization rather than stockpiles of filled weapons. Secondly, Rolf Ekeus, the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM from 1991 to 1997, when interviewed17 on 23 February 2000 said that ‘in my view, there are no large quantities of weapons. I don’t think that Iraq is especially eager in the biological and chemical area to produce such weapons for storage. Iraq views those weapons as tactical assets instead of strategic assets, which would require long-term storage of those elements, which is difficult. Rather, Iraq has been aiming to keep the capability to start up production immediately should it need to.’[Emphasis added]. Some three years later after the war in Iraq in June 2003, Rolf Ekeus set out18 the reasoning why ‘the Iraqi policy after the Gulf war was to halt all production of warfare agents and to focus on design and engineering, with the purpose of activating production and shipping of warfare agents and munitions directly to the battlefield in the event of war’ and that in regard to chemical weapons ‘such work could be blended into ordinary civilian production facilities and activities, e.g., for agricultural purposes, where batches of nerve agents could be produced during short interruptions of the production of ordinary chemicals.’ He makes the point clearly that ‘the rather bizarre political focus on the search for rusting drums and pieces of munitions containing low-quality chemicals has tended to distort the important question of WMD in Iraq and exposed the American and British administrations to unjustified criticism.’ and that this ‘criticism is a distortion and trivialization of a major threat to international peace and security.’ This view was reaffirmed19 in September 2003 as Rolf Ekeus when asked why no WMD had been found since the end of the war said that his feeling ‘is very clearly that the Iraqi policy long before the war was to build capability to develop its capabilities to produce weapons for the situation, for the conflict situation, not to produce for

The Absence of WMD Stockpiles in Iraq 229

storage and create a problem of storage management.’ Another article20 some two weeks later reported that ‘Ekeus theorizes that [Saddam] Hussein decided years ago that it was unwise to store mustard gas and other unstable and corrosive poisons in barrels, and also difficult to conceal them. Therefore, rather than store large stocks of weapons of mass destruction, he would adapt the program to retain an infrastructure (laboratories, equipment, trained scientists, detailed plans) that could “break-out” and ramp up production when required. The model is Japanese “just in time” manufacturing, where you save on inventory by making and delivering stuff in immediate response to orders.’ In summer 2004, Rolf Ekeus in an evaluation21 of Iraq’s WMD emphasized that ‘the Iraqi policy, as reported by UNSCOM to the Security Council, [was] that after its WMD-arsenals had been destroyed in the mid1990s, Iraq was not interested in producing biological and chemical weapons for storage. Iraq viewed these weapons as tactical rather than strategic assets – only the latter would have required long-term storage. Instead, Iraq was aiming to keep the capability to start up production immediately, should the need arise.’ He went on to note in his conclusions that ‘the continued [ISG] inspections, especially as they are led by an experienced UNSCOM-expert, may shed light on what Iraq’s sizeable teams of weapon scientists and experts had been doing from 1998 up to the war. Could the ramshackle civil agriculture and health industries have contained capabilities for production of fresh biological and chemical warfare agents to be brought out “just in time” in case of a renewed conflict with Iran or the need for a repression of internal opposition?’

Analysis It is becoming evident that the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC regimes in Iraq were effective and that Iraq, whilst taking steps to conceal its capabilities, was being effectively contained. It was, however, equally clear that Iraq was not behaving in such a way as to build confidence in UNSCOM and UNMOVIC and hence in the Security Council that it had given up its aspirations in regard to weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, it seems probable that Saddam Hussein saw the possession of such weapons as being important in regard to the position of Iraq within the region and the threats perceived to be posed to Iraq by states such as Iran and Israel as well as being needed internally for use if necessary against the Kurds and the Shi’a. It is consequently clear that the widespread focus, both politically and in the media, on whether there are stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons to be found in Iraq is misplaced. Such a focus fails to recognize that in an aggressor state, there is no requirement to have such stockpiles as the national strategy is not one of having an ability to retaliate in kind

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but rather one that is able to deploy and use chemical and biological weapons at a time of its choosing. Such an approach avoids problems associated with the stability and storage of chemical and biological agents and, furthermore, means that there is no stockpile to unequivocally demonstrate non-compliance with the international prohibition regimes of the BTWC and the CWC. In addition, because storage and stability are no longer as important, it means that different chemical and biological materials may be utilized rather than those materials traditionally regarded as agents by states whose primary interest was in a retaliatory or deterrent capability. Such an extension to different chemical and biological materials underlines the importance of the general purpose criterion in the prohibitions of both the BTWC and the CWC as it is this that ensures the prohibition of all past, present and future agents. The general purpose criterion in the BTWC is highlighted below in the basic prohibition in Article I which states that: Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; [Emphasis added]. Similarly in the CWC, the general purpose criterion is highlighted below in the definition in Article II of chemical weapons as being: Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes; [Emphasis added]. The real danger and threat is thus of a mobilization capability that is concealed within legitimate civil industrial capabilities for chemical and biological materials. This danger of concealment in respect of the chemical industry was highlighted by the Scientific Advisory Board of the CWC in its report22 to the First Review Conference in April 2003 when it stated that: The chemical industry has developed a range of highly flexible manufacturing facilities designed to respond rapidly to changing market demands. Many of these facilities also have extremely effective safety and containment features. Thus, it is to be expected that a small percentage of these industrial facilities will have the potential to be used directly, or to be easily converted, for the production of scheduled and unscheduled chemical warfare agents.

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Furthermore, the Scientific Advisory Board emphasized the potential danger from different chemicals by stating that: Some of the chemicals listed in Schedule 1 were developed during the 1940s and 1950s, while certain binary components were developed during the 1960s and 1970s. Other Schedule 1 chemicals are even older than that. In any case, all the chemicals listed in Schedule 1 have been in the public domain for more than 20 years. Consequently, the Schedules in their current shape do not contain any new CW agents that may have conceivably emerged during the past decades. They also take no account of any other highly toxic chemicals that could possibly be considered as candidates for CW purposes, and that have been discovered over the past two decades. The approach of including chemicals (and their homologues) in Schedule 1 only when their past weaponisation and/or stockpiling is a known fact, or when highly toxic compounds have no legitimate uses, carries the inherent risk that the OPCW and its States Parties could be caught entirely by surprise, should any unscheduled chemical(s) be used as CW. [Emphasis added]. In its final report,23 the First Review Conference ducked the issue about the danger from unscheduled chemicals as it referred consideration to its Executive Council: 7.30 The First Review Conference noted the Note by the Director General conveying to the States Parties the observations of the Scientific Advisory Board in relation to developments in science and technology that are relevant to the review of the operation of the Convention … The First Review Conference requested the Council … to study these recommendations and observations with a view to preparing recommendations to the Conference on them. although it did address the point about developments in the chemical industry by stating that: 7.64 The First Review Conference considered scientific and technological developments in regard to activities not prohibited under the Convention, and recognised that the chemical industry is subject to change over time. The OPCW should therefore adapt its verification regime for the chemical industry so as to maintain its effectiveness and relevance, and its consistency with the inspection procedures established by the Convention. [Emphasis in original]. A similar less than satisfactory situation applies to biological agents. At successive Review Conferences the States Parties have agreed Final

232 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

Declarations which have in the Article I section reaffirmed that all advances in science and technology are covered by the prohibitions in Article I of the Convention. Thus at the Fourth Review Conference in 1996, the Final Declaration24 included the following: 6. The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, molecular biology, genetic engineering, and any applications resulting from genome studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments. Although a similar reaffirmation was being considered at the Fifth Review Conference in 2001, a disagreement on the final day meant that the Review Conference had to be suspended for a year. When it resumed in December 2002, the States Parties were unable to agree a Final Declaration and consequently there was no reaffirmation by the Fifth Review Conference that all further relevant scientific and technological advances in the life sciences were covered by the prohibition in Article I.25

Conclusions The conclusion reached above about the real danger and threat has important consequences for the global prohibition regimes for biological and chemical weapons. The focus needs increasingly to be upon all states to improve transparency of their activities and thereby to build international confidence that their activities are indeed in compliance with the BTWC, CWC and other multilateral regimes. Whilst the adage that ‘absence of evidence is not evidence of absence’ has been said on several occasions in the context of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, it needs to be recognized internationally that the more evidence that is provided that a country’s activities are in compliance with the prohibition regimes, the greater the confidence that other states gain that a state is indeed in compliance especially when the evidence provided by a country is found to be both internally consistent with other information provided by the country and externally consistent with information available to or provided by other countries or by intergovernmental organizations. There is also a real need to ensure that politicians and the media are better informed about the nature of the real threat from chemical and biological materials. Namely that whilst traditional chemical or biological agents may be chosen by a state wishing to use such weapons, they may increasingly choose to use some alternative chemical or biological materials

The Absence of WMD Stockpiles in Iraq 233

although such a choice will increase uncertainty as to the effectiveness of the attack. Secondly, that an aggressor state has no need to have a stockpile of chemical or biological weapons but rather that such a state will seek to have a capability to produce the chemical and biological agents when it wishes to use them thereby reducing the risk that the international community will detect its possession of such prohibited materials. Furthermore, the capability to produce such chemical or biological materials is increasingly likely to be concealed within the dual-purpose capability of the civil industry.

10 Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation: Lessons Learned

The experience gained from the United Nations’ activities in respect of inspection, verification and non-proliferation over the past 20 years searching for WMD in Iraq is extensive. Iraq was essentially, apart from the initial Secretary-General investigations, uncooperative. However, lessons can and should be drawn from this experience in Iraq for the international permissive regimes prohibiting biological and chemical weapons – for the Geneva Protocol, for the BTWC and for the CWC – and for the future strengthening of these regimes.

Searching for WMD in Iraq UN Secretary-General investigations The first engagement of the United Nations in regard to WMD in Iraq was in the Secretary-General investigations into the alleged use of chemical weapons initially in Iran and then later in Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s (Chapter 2). These investigations were at the request of the country concerned and the inspections made within the country visited were limited essentially to what that country wished to show to the specialists in the Secretary-General’s team. Verification was consequently limited to what the UN team was shown and was able to sample and analyze. Nevertheless, it was possible to verify that chemical weapons had indeed been used in Iran and then later in Iraq. The UN team was also able to verify which chemical agents had been used – insofar as the UN team was able to take samples and have these analyzed in the laboratories of two countries – Sweden and Switzerland. There was less certain verification of the weapons being used to deliver the chemical weapons as the UN team had to depend on what was shown to them and what they were told by the country being visited. The consequences for non-proliferation of these Secretary-General investigations were much less tangible. The Security Council condemned the use of chemical weapons either in Council resolutions or in statements 234

Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation: Lessons Learned 235

by the President of the Security Council. It was not until the end of August 1988, almost at the end of the Iran–Iraq war, that the Security Council in SCR 620 (1988)1 called upon ‘all states to continue to apply, to establish or to strengthen strict control of the export of chemical products serving for the production of chemical weapons, in particular to parties to a conflict, when it is established or when there is substantial reason to believe that they have used chemical weapons in violation of international obligations.’ [Emphasis added]. It needs to be recalled when noting the qualifying clause ‘when it is established or when there is substantial reason,’ that this resolution was adopted in 1988 some five years before the Chemical Weapons Convention totally prohibiting chemical weapons was opened for signature in 1993. This call for export controls reinforced the informal action that had been taken in 1985 when a number of like-minded states had established the Australia Group2 to harmonize export controls relevant to chemical weapons. Resolution SCR 620 (1988) also included encouragement for the Secretary-General ‘to carry out promptly investigations in response to allegations brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxic weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law, in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report the results.’ A similar call for the Secretary-General to carry out investigations had been included in a series of General Assembly resolutions from 1980 onwards which by 1982 requested3 ‘the Secretary-General to investigate, with the assistance of qualified experts, information that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning activities that may constitute a violation of the [1925 Geneva] Protocol or of the relevant rules of customary international law in order to ascertain thereby the facts of the matter, and promptly to report the results of any such investigation to all Member States and to the General Assembly.’ These resolutions resulted from an earlier General Assembly Resolution 35/144C in 1980 which noted reports alleging that ‘chemical weapons had been used in recent wars and certain military operations in various regions of the world’ and consequently predated the use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq war. The key language in the series of General Assembly resolutions during the period from 1980 through to 1990 is summarized in Table 10.1. This eventually culminated in October 1989 with a report4 to the General Assembly including, as an annex, guidelines and procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons. These guidelines and procedures were endorsed by the General Assembly in a resolution5 adopted the following year. These guidelines and procedures represented a modest step forward at the time of the late 1980s prior to the completion of the CWC as

236 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 10.1 General Assembly Resolutions from 1980 to 1990 relating to investigations of alleged use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons UN General Assembly Resolution & Date

Text relevant to investigations

A/RES/35/144 C6 12 December 1980

4. Decides to carry out an impartial investigation to ascertain the facts pertaining to the reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and to assess the extent of damage caused by the use of such weapons. 5. Request the Secretary-General to carry out such investigation, inter alia, taking into account proposals advanced by the States on whose territories the use of chemical weapons has been reported with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts who shall: (a) Seek relevant information from all concerned Governments, international organizations and other sources necessary; (b) Collect and examine evidence, including on-site with the consent of the countries concerned, to the extent relevant to the purposes of the investigation;

A/RES/36/96 C7 9 December 1981

Recalling its resolution 35/144 C in which, inter alia, it decided to carry out an impartial investigation to ascertain the facts pertaining to reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and requested the Secretary-General to carry out such an investigation with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts, … 2. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, to continue his investigations pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/144 C and to report to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

A/RES/37/98 D8 13 December 1982

4. Requests the Secretary-General to investigate, with the assistance of qualified experts, information that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning activities that may constitute a violation of the Protocol or of the relevant rules of customary international law in order to ascertain thereby the facts of the matter, and promptly to report the results of any such investigation to all Member States and to the General Assembly; 5. Requests the Secretary-General, with the co-operation of Member States, to compile, as a matter of priority, and maintain lists of qualified experts whose services could be made available at short notice to undertake such investigations, and of laboratories with the capability to undertake testing for the presence of agents the use of which is prohibited; 6. Requests the Secretary-General, in meeting the objectives of paragraph 3 above: (a) To appoint, as necessary, groups of experts selected from the above-mentioned list to undertake urgent investigation of possible violations;

Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation: Lessons Learned 237 Table 10.1 General Assembly Resolutions from 1980 to 1990 relating to investigations of alleged use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons – continued UN General Assembly Resolution & Date

Text relevant to investigations

(b) To make the necessary arrangements for the experts to collect and examine evidence, including on-site, with the co-operation of the countries concerned, to the extent relevant to the investigation, and for such testing as may be required; (c) To seek, in any such investigation, appropriate assistance and relevant information from all Governments and international organizations concerned, as well as from other appropriate sources; 7. Further requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, to devise procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of information concerning activities that may constitute a violation of the Geneva Protocol or the relevant rules of customary international law and to assemble and organize systematically documentation relating to the identification of signs and symptoms associated with the use of such agents as a means of facilitating such investigations and the medical treatment that may be required; A/RES/38/187 C9 20 December 1983

2. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his action to this end and, in particular, to complete during 1984, with the assistance of the group of qualified consultant experts established by him, the task entrusted to him under the terms of paragraph 7 of resolution 37/98 D and to submit his report on the work of the group;

A/RES/39/65 E10 12 December 1984

1. Takes note of the report by the Secretary-General, to which is annexed the report of the Consultant Experts designated by him concerning the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 7 of resolution 37/98 D and of resolution 38/187 C; 2. Notes with satisfaction that with the submission of the report of the Group of Consultant Experts the provisions for the implementation of resolution 37/98 D are completed.

A/RES/42/37 C11 30 November 1987 Adopted without vote

4. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States; 5. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts provided by interested Member States, to develop further technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of such reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons;

238 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 10.1 General Assembly Resolutions from 1980 to 1990 relating to investigations of alleged use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons – continued UN General Assembly Resolution & Date

Text relevant to investigations

6. Also requests the Secretary-General, in meeting the objectives set forth in paragraph 4 above, to compile and maintain lists of qualified experts provided by Member States whose services could be made available at short notice to undertake such investigations, and of laboratories with the capability to undertake testing for the presence of agents the use of which is prohibited; 7. Further requests the Secretary-General, in meeting the objectives of paragraph 4 above: (a) To appoint experts to undertake investigation of the reported activities; (b) Where appropriate, to make the necessary arrangements for experts to collect and examine evidence and to undertake such testing as may be required; (c) To seek, in any such investigation, assistance as appropriate from Member States and the relevant international organizations; A/RES/43/74 A12 7 December 1988 Adopted without vote

5. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out promptly investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the Geneva Protocol or other rules of customary international law in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States, in accordance with the procedures established by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/37 C; 6. Also requests the Secretary-General, pursuant to resolution 42/37 C, with the assistance of the group of qualified experts provided by interested Member States, to continue his efforts to develop further technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of such reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons, and to report to Member States as soon as possible;

A/RES/44/115 B13 15 December 1989 Adopted without vote

4. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out promptly investigation in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States;

239

Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation: Lessons Learned 239

Table 10.1 General Assembly Resolutions from 1980 to 1990 relating to investigations of alleged use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons – continued UN General Assembly Resolution & Date

Text relevant to investigations

5. Welcomes, in that regard, the proposals of the group of qualified experts concerning technical guidelines and procedures to guide the Secretary-General in the conduct of timely and efficient investigation of the reports of use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons; 6. Calls upon all States to consider the implementation of those guidelines and procedures for investigation, inter alia, by putting at the disposal of the Secretary-General qualified experts and/or consultants as well as laboratories for analysis; A/RES/45/57 C14 4 December 1990 Adopted without vote

3. Endorses the proposals of the group of qualified experts established in pursuance of its resolution 42/37 C of 30 November 1987 concerning technical guidelines and procedures to guide the Secretary-General in the conduct of timely and efficient investigation of the reports of use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons; 4. Notes the continuing significance of the Security Council decision to consider immediately, taking into account the investigations of the Secretary-General, appropriate and effective measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, should there be any future use of chemical weapons in violation of international law.

it meant that states which believed they had been attacked by chemical, biological or toxin weapons could invite the Secretary-General to send a team of experts to carry out an investigation. However, it was, and is, an instrument of limited utility as it depends upon an invitation by a state to the Secretary-General to carry out such an investigation. Furthermore, it is limited to an investigation of an allegation of use and has little utility in regard to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons contained in the BTWC and the CWC.

United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) The second engagement of the United Nations in regard to WMD in Iraq was through the missions mounted by UNSCOM during the period from 1991 when UNSCOM was established through to late 1998 when Iraq withdrew its cooperation. The mandate for UNSCOM and the IAEA was provided by SCR 687 (1991) – the ‘cease-fire’ resolution ending the 1990/91 war – which

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required that ‘Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of: (a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities; (b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;’ In addition, Iraq was required to submit, within 15 days of the adoption of SCR 687, a declaration on the location, amounts and types of all the items specified in (a) and (b) above and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as detailed in the resolution. Furthermore, Iraq was required to ‘unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or reacquire any of the items specified,’ and the Secretary-General, in consultation with UNSCOM, was to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with this undertaking. In considering the work of UNSCOM it is important to recognize that in the early years the onus was clearly placed on Iraq to submit its declarations and accept urgent on-site inspection. The mandate for UNSCOM was clear and authoritative. No doubt was left in the mind of Iraq that the Security Council was clearly and firmly behind the work of UNSCOM and this was demonstrated not only by SCR 687 (1991) but also by a series of subsequent resolutions such as SCR 707 (1991). However, in the late 1990s, the tenor of Security Council statements became weaker with denouncements of ‘material breach’ being replaced by ‘clear violation’ and ‘demand’ replaced by ‘remind.’ This weaker language indicated that capitals of the P5 Security Council members were becoming less involved or that other factors had come into consideration. It was nevertheless evident that Iraq in its relationship with UNSCOM had adopted a minimalist approach and had carefully monitored the actions taken and the language used by the UN Security Council. Consequently, any mitigation in the language used by the Security Council was seen by Iraq as an implicit toleration for them to be less cooperative with the Commission. UNSCOM’s investigations clearly showed that there was an organized mechanism of concealment used by Iraq to deny access to proscribed documents and material retained since the adoption of Resolution 687 (1991). Iraq has acknowledged that officially sanctioned false statements were made to mislead UNSCOM in its investigations. It resorted to delays and denials of access to sites designated by teams investigating concealment activities. Despite this behaviour, UNSCOM accumulated information which reinforced its assessment that the Iraqi concealment mechanism had been established for the purpose of hiding and protecting proscribed material. Furthermore, the investigation revealed deficiencies in Iraq’s declara-

Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation: Lessons Learned 241

tion concerning unilateral destruction of proscribed weapons, items and related documentation. Consequently, the fourth item in the programme of work agreed in June 1996 following a series of access denials enabled Rolf Ekeus to address directly with Tariq Aziz, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq the steps which Iraq had taken to deliberately thwart the work of UNSCOM. UNSCOM was clearly successful in using the information that it had obtained from the Iraqi FFCDs and from successive inspections to demonstrate to Tariq Aziz, the Deputy Prime Minister that Iraq was still concealing information and not cooperating with UNSCOM. The continued pressure on Iraq to provide the information needed to enable the FFCDs to be verified – and thereby enable UNSCOM to report under paragraph 22 of SCR 687 (1991) – led to the increasing stand-offs with Iraq during 1997 and 1998. It is particularly unfortunate that the permanent members of the Security Council other than the United Kingdom and the United States failed to recognize that UNSCOM was becoming increasingly successful in putting pressure on Iraq to provide the information needed to verify the FFCDs. UNSCOM had successfully limited Iraq’s options and, hardly surprisingly, Iraq chose to adopt an increasingly declamatory approach and to appeal over the heads of UNSCOM to the Security Council, to the SecretaryGeneral and the international community. Regrettably, instead of standing firm, the Secretary-General and the permanent members of the Security Council (China, France and Russia) other than the United Kingdom and the United States, appeared to have allowed themselves to be swayed and persuaded by the ever more strident and unsubstantiated Iraqi statements. The events since the establishment of UNSCOM in April 1991 have shown very clearly that Iraq has time and again sought in its obstructions to see how far it could push UNSCOM and the Security Council and thereby push back the constraints on what it could do. In the early years, the very real danger that Iraq might have advanced beyond Kuwait and might have used chemical or biological weapons in its missile attacks of Saudi Arabia and Israel during the 1990/91 war was still fresh to all members of the Security Council who stood firm. On several occasions, military action or the threat of military action was needed to force Iraq to step back and comply. Unfortunately, more recently the memories of the dangers posed by Iraq have dimmed and the unity of the Security Council has been undermined. It was notable, however, that whilst, as late as February 1998, everyone, including the Secretary-General, recognized that it was the threat of imminent military action that forced Iraq to sign the Memorandum of Understanding and allow Presidential sites to be inspected, the eventual use of military force in December 1998 because of Iraq’s failure to cooperate with UNSCOM was not supported by all the permanent members of the Security Council.

242 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

UNSCOM reported that Iraq in December 1997 had stated15 that ‘Iraq would not itself volunteer any new information. It preferred a situation where it would verify the information held by the Commission’ [Emphasis added] thereby completely inverting the relationship between the United Nations and Iraq and effectively putting UNSCOM, not Iraq, in the dock. Surprisingly, this proposal by Iraq appears to have found favour with the UN Secretary-General as in October 1998 he proposed16 that a ‘comprehensive review’ be carried out which would be ‘divided into two main phases, the first being devoted to Iraq’s compliance with Section C of resolution 687 (1991) and the second phase being concerned with Iraq’s compliance with all other requirements arising out of the relevant resolutions.’ This ‘comprehensive review’ proposed by the Secretary-General put the activities of UNSCOM and the IAEA into the dock and, amazingly, in the light of the past and continuing record of Iraq, did not place the onus on Iraq to do what it had consistently failed to do over the previous seven and a half years, namely to provide a full, final and complete disclosure of its proscribed programme which could be verified by UNSCOM and the IAEA. It is indeed a sorry state of affairs when the Permanent Members of the Security Council lose their resolve to address the dangers posed by a state which seeks to maintain a weapons of mass destruction capability and the Secretary-General effectively puts the UN organizations, UNSCOM and the IAEA, in the dock rather than the uncooperative and noncompliant state, Iraq. This led to the problems with Iraq being protracted and, it can be argued, to the eventual war in 2003 as had the Security Council being resolute and firm throughout and prepared to take military action in the last resort, it is possible that Iraq would have cooperated with the United Nations as it was intended to do throughout. The lack of unanimity of the Permanent Members of the Security Council directly endangers international peace and security as other states considering the acquisition of WMD may judge that if, like Iraq, they are resolute, then the Security Council will, over time, lose its resolve and they may succeed in retaining such weapons. Inspection, verification and non-proliferation In considering inspection, verification and non-proliferation, it is important to recognize that the UNSCOM experience relates to an uncooperative regime – very different from the normal permissive regime associated with the implementation of multilaterally agreed international treaties such as the NPT and the CWC. It is, however, recognized, that in an uncooperative situation such as that which applied in Iraq, the regime requirements for declarations and inspections may well need to be more extensive and onerous than they would need to be in a permissive regime. However, if a regime is effective in an uncooperative situation then a parallel regime will certainly be effective in a permissive situation. Consequently, in most

Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation: Lessons Learned 243

respects the observations that can be drawn from an uncooperative regime will be even more robust when applied to a permissive regime. The fundamental elements under SCR 687 (1991) can be regarded essentially as follows: the declarations made by Iraq and the inspections carried out by UNSCOM are relevant to inspection, the validation of the declarations and the supervised destruction of the Iraqi declared weapons of mass destruction relate to verification and the ongoing monitoring and verification plan together with the export/import mechanism relates to non-proliferation. Inspection. The UNSCOM inspections demonstrate the central importance of comprehensive declarations made by the state being inspected and the inspections made to both declared and undeclared facilities to ensure that the declarations made are indeed complete and comprehensive. There is little doubt that the requirement for Iraq to make comprehensive declarations and the inspections made by UNSCOM to both declared and undeclared facilities were effective. Verification. The declarations made by Iraq had to be verified through inspections of the declared facilities to ensure that the declarations were both accurate and comprehensive. Confirmation of the accuracy of the declared information was also achieved through sampling and analysis providing confirmation that the materials declared were indeed as declared. The experience of UNSCOM showed that the process of validating declarations through inspections and comparison with other information available to UNSCOM was highly effective in that the Iraqi declarations were found to be inconsistent both internally with other information declared by Iraq and externally with information provided by other Member States. Likewise in regard to the destruction of Iraqi declared weapons of mass destruction, verification that Iraq had made accurate declarations of the weapons submitted to be destroyed under UNSCOM supervision was effective. It was also evident that when Iraq alleged that it had carried out unilateral destruction and was unable to provide any evidence and documentation to validate its claims, the consequent uncertainties in regard to the material balance continued to be highlighted by UNSCOM and could not be satisfactorily resolved. Non-proliferation. The ongoing monitoring and verification regime devised by UNSCOM including the export/import mechanism were shown to be effective in implementing the Security Council decision that Iraq ‘unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or reacquire any of the items specified’ which, in regard to chemical and biological weapons, were specified as being ‘all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research,

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development, support and manufacturing facilities.’ It is particularly notable that the export/import mechanism required all Member States to advise the United Nations of any exports from any Member State to Iraq so that the proposed exports could be monitored by UNSCOM on the ground in Iraq. This effectively introduced an international global export monitoring and control system for weapons of mass destruction materials in respect of exports to one State – Iraq. Key findings A key observation that emerges from the work of UNSCOM is that a state which decides to be an aggressor may choose to produce and use its chemical or biological weapons at a time of its choosing – and it may well, consequently, not possess any stockpiles of filled weapons or of agent and furthermore, because a stockpile of agent is not required, a material may be selected as an agent that would not have the stability or storage capabilities that would be necessary for a stockpile of agent such as has been traditionally required by states seeking a retaliatory or deterrent capability. Consequently, the inspectors engaged in the implementation of any future non-proliferation regime need to be trained to be aware not only of traditional chemical or biological agents but also be alert to the possibility that the non-compliant state may well have chosen to use alternative chemical or biological materials that may have poor stability or storage characteristics. A second key observation that emerges from the work of UNSCOM is that there is no indication throughout the work of UNSCOM that inspection, verification and non-proliferation of biological weapons was different from that of the inspections, verification and non-proliferation of chemical weapons. The same approaches were taken to deal with both chemical and biological weapons – as with missiles – and all were effective under the uncooperative regime that UNSCOM was able to operate in Iraq from 1991 to 1998. Whilst the United States has suggested that the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention cannot be verified17 and that the sort of regime that works for chemical weapons under the CWC is inappropriate for biological weapons,18 there is no evidence to support this from the work of UNSCOM in Iraq.

United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) The third search for WMD in Iraq was through the missions mounted by UNMOVIC during the just over three month period from 27 November 2002 until 18 March 2003. The mandate for UNMOVIC in SCR 1284 (1999)19 was that it would ‘undertake the responsibilities mandated to the Special Commission by the Council with regard to the verification of compliance by Iraq with its obligations under paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolu-

Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation: Lessons Learned 245

tion 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, that UNMOVIC will establish and operate, as was recommended by the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues, a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, which will implement the plan approved by the Council in resolution 715 (1991) and address unresolved disarmament issues, and that UNMOVIC will identify, as necessary in accordance with its mandate, additional sites in Iraq to be covered by the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification.’ Thus the mandate for UNMOVIC was identical to that for UNSCOM in regard to SCR 687 (1991) and to SCR 715 (1991). In addition, UNMOVIC was required to operate a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification and address unresolved disarmament issues. However, because UNMOVIC replaced UNSCOM and therefore picked up from where UNSCOM had finished, from the outset the onus was placed on UNMOVIC to set out what the unresolved issues20 were and for UNMOVIC to set out a programme21 by which these issues might be resolved. The onus was not clearly placed on Iraq as it had been in the early years of UNSCOM. There were, as might be expected, differences between UNMOVIC (Chapter 6) and UNSCOM (Chapter 3 and 4). Throughout it needs to be recalled that both UNMOVIC and UNSCOM were required to operate an uncooperative regime. These differences are summarized in Table 10.2.

Table 10.2

Comparison of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC

UNSCOM Advantages

UNMOVIC Advantages

In the early years, the Executive Chairman reported directly to the Security Council

Two year delay before Iraq accepted UNMOVIC inspections gave UNMOVIC time to prepare and train all staff

World expert Chief Inspectors for CW, BW and missile missions

Training of all inspectors on roster

Executive Chairman daily meetings – particularly effective with Rolf Ekeus as he listened, whilst Richard Butler made speeches

Chief Inspectors always selected from UNMOVIC HQ staff providing continuity

Lack of formal hierarchy enhanced integration of individual capabilities

Multidisciplinary teams Separate Assessment and Analysis Division Sampling and analysis procedures and network of laboratories Equipment procured and purchased as required

246 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 10.2

Comparison of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC – continued

UNSCOM Disadvantages

UNMOVIC Disadvantages

Lack of separate analysis division Security Council although Executive

Reported through Secretary-General to the Chairman briefings were direct to Security Council

Lack of training – learning on job

More bureaucratic approach

Lack of continuity between successive Chief Inspectors and UNSCOM HQ staff in early years. In later years, Chief Inspectors increasingly drawn from HQ staff

UN focus on geographic spread Blix ‘UNMOVIC may not be the best, but not fools and were in nobody’s pocket.’

Sampling and analysis procedures poor Inability to mount simultaneous missions in Iraq in early years Equipment dependent on supporting Member States UNSCOM Other aspects

UNMOVIC Other aspects

OMV in Iraq established

OMV not really established because of military action

Resident teams established in all areas in Iraq for OMV

UNMOVIC not able to establish resident teams in all areas in Iraq for OMV

Export/import mechanism established – import depends on Iraqi provision of data which was poor

Export/import mechanism continued – import depends on Iraqi provision of data which was poor

Special Commissioners – initially directly involved in UNSCOM operations and later less so although Special Commissioners were involved in missions to Iraq

College of Commissioners – much more formal. Prime focus on review of quarterly reports prior to submission. Also some consideration of policies and procedures

Security Council lack of sustained focus and divergence of views amongst P5 notably in later years

Security Council divergence of views among P5 more pronounced and lack of sustained focus

UN Secretary-General involvement in later years confused authority of Security Council and of Executive Chairman

UN Secretary-General involvement diluted authority of Security Council and of Executive Chairman but such SecretaryGeneral involvement was encouraged by the Security Council

Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation: Lessons Learned 247

For an optimum organization to operate an uncooperative regime, the best features of both UNSCOM and UNMOVIC need to be adopted such as reporting directly to the Security Council, the use of world experts as Chief Inspectors trained with a separate analysis division in the organization and for sampling and analysis, a proven chain of custody leading to analysis in accredited and validated laboratories in more than one country. Inspection, verification and non-proliferation In considering inspection, verification and non-proliferation, it is important to recognize that the UNMOVIC experience like that of UNSCOM relates to an uncooperative regime – very different from the normal permissive regime associated with the implementation of multilaterally agreed international treaties such as the NPT and the CWC. It is again recognized, that in an uncooperative situation such as that which applied in Iraq, the regime requirements for declarations and inspections may well need to be more extensive and onerous than they would need to be in a permissive regime. However, if a regime is effective in an uncooperative situation then a parallel regime will certainly be effective in a permissive situation. Consequently, in most respects the observations that can be drawn from an uncooperative regime will be even more robust when applied to a permissive regime. The fundamental elements under SCR 687 (1991) and SCR 1284 (1999) can be regarded essentially as follows: the declarations made by Iraq and the inspections carried out by UNMOVIC are relevant to inspection, the validation of the declarations relate to verification and the reinforced ongoing monitoring and verification plan together with the export/ import mechanism relates to non-proliferation. The observations that can be made in regard to the UNMOVIC inspection, verification and non-proliferation activities are closely similar to those for UNSCOM. Indeed, the short duration in which UNMOVIC was able to operate in Iraq meant that there was insufficient time for significantly different observations to be developed based on the UNMOVIC experience in Iraq. It is, however, recognized that the separate Assessment and Analysis Division in UNMOVIC considerably enhanced the verification capability as the findings of inspections in Iraq could be analyzed and compared more quickly to the Iraqi declarations and to other information held by UNMOVIC including notably the UNSCOM developed information. Furthermore, the UNMOVIC practice of always selecting Chief Inspectors from HQ staff meant that there was better continuity and improved cohesion of effort in Iraq. However, whilst UNSCOM could select the world’s leading experts as Chief Inspectors, the UNMOVIC Chief Inspectors were

248 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

not necessarily the best. The short duration of UNMOVIC in Iraq also meant that there was not time for the Chief Inspectors and inspectors to gain experience and confidence on the job. The significance of this difference depends on the nature of the inspection regime – whether it was an uncooperative regime or a permissive regime. For an uncooperative regime, there is a danger that if the Chief Inspectors are not the best, they may fail to detect indications of non-compliant activity – particularly, if the state concerned has chosen not to create a stockpile and consequently to choose a chemical or biological material not widely perceived to have utility as a chemical or biological weapon. It is also evident from the subsequent work of the ISG,22 that Iraqi scientists and engineers have told the ISG that when they had been interviewed by UNMOVIC, they had not told UNMOVIC the truth and had taken the ISG to ‘documents and equipment and records that they had sequestered away.’ In the final chapter of The UNSCOM Saga I noted that ‘although at the outset, it was thought that UNSCOM would complete its mission within a matter of months, this was based on the incorrect assumption that Iraq would cooperate with UNSCOM. It also seems likely that Iraq had anticipated a UN body that would accept what it was told and not search diligently for the truth.’ David Kay in testimony23 to the US Congress in January 2004 said that Iraqis had told him personally in 1991 that ‘You’re not behaving like we thought a U.N. inspector would behave.’ He had taken this as a compliment that the inspections were intrusive. It seems probable that Iraq was expecting the UN body created by SCR 687 (1991) to be similar to its experience of the IAEA in the years from 1972 to 1991. Iraq became a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 29 October 1969 24 and on 29 February 1972 Iraq entered into an agreement 25 with the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the NPT. This regime would fall into the permissive category. However, given the nature of the rules for such inspections at the time, these IAEA inspections did not discover any proscribed Iraqi nuclear programme, prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent UNSCOM/IAEA inspections under SCR 687 (1991). It was this situation that led the IAEA to make efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system 26 through what was known as the 93 + 2 programme which led to the Additional Protocol approved in 1997 by the IAEA Governing Council. It cannot have been easy for the IAEA accustomed to operating its usual permissive regime to adjust after 1991 to operating an uncooperative regime. This difference between a permissive and an uncooperative regime has to be borne in mind in considering both the operations in Iraq of the IAEA and of UNMOVIC with its IAEA-like culture. Hans Blix has noted27 that at the end of October 1997, the Iraqi government informed the Security Council of several decisions, one being that it would no longer deal with inspec-

Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation: Lessons Learned 249

tors of US nationality working for UNSCOM. UNSCOM and the IAEA suspended all operations. Blix goes on to say that ‘interestingly, both on this occasion and in a crisis about one year later, the Iraqi measures were directed against UNSCOM but not the IAEA. It was made clear to the IAEA in October 1997 that Iraq had no objection to working with inspectors of US nationality on its teams: “All IAEA staff, inspectors and experts will be welcome as usual.” The relations with the IAEA were, indeed, less confrontational.’ However, it is unclear to what extent the IAEA recognized at the time the difference between the uncooperative regime in Iraq and the more usual IAEA permissive regime. It is also to be noted that the IAEA pointed out in its report28 to the Security Council in October 1997 in a percipient comment that ‘Some uncertainty is inevitable in any country-wide technical verification process which aims to prove the absence of readily concealable objects or activities. The extent to which such uncertainty is a policy judgment.’ It is clear that there were tensions between the IAEA and UNSCOM. Under SCR 687 (1991), UNSCOM was to be responsible for all logistics and to provide ‘assistance and cooperation’ to IAEA and UNSCOM was to designate sites for the IAEA to inspect beyond those declared to the Agency by Iraq. Hans Blix has said29 that ‘a good deal of friction developed when we at IAEA felt that UNSCOM sought to treat the agency as a dog on a leash. … An even more serious matter was the difference in inspection style between the organizations: To UNSCOM, the IAEA inspectors seemed too much like proper civil servants; to the IAEA, some of the UNSCOM inspectors seemed to act Rambo-style.’ More recently, Hans Blix has said30 that ‘much has been written about the importance that UNSCOM reported directly to the Security Council and was not dependent upon the Secretary-General and the big – allegedly bureaucratic – UN secretariat. For my part I would rather underline that UNMOVIC, unlike UNSCOM, was not dependent upon member governments to provide gratis personnel, equipment and services. … This … allowed the commission [UNMOVIC] to hire its own staff as international civil servants and do so on the wide geographic basis that the Security Council had prescribed.’ [Emphasis in original]. Some doubts about the effectiveness of the IAEA approach have been expressed by the United States. Thus, Colin Powell, Secretary of State, on 7 March 2003 in the Security Council said31 ‘as we all know, in 1991 the IAEA was just days away from determining that Iraq did not have a nuclear programme. We soon found out otherwise. IAEA is now reaching a similar conclusion, but we have to be very cautious. We have to make sure that we keep the books open …’ A few days later, a similar statement was made32 by Condoleeza Rice, US National Security Advisor who said ‘… the IAEA of course missed the program in 1991, missed the program in 1995, missed it in 1998. We need to be careful about drawing those

250 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

conclusions particularly in a totalitarian state like Iraq.’ Even though these statements may not be wholly accurate, it is clear that such doubts relate to operations in an uncooperative regime. Rolf Ekeus in a recent evaluation33 of the IISS dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction noted that ‘It is frequently ignored that Iraq’s nuclear weapons capability was never fully accounted for by the IAEA.’ And goes on to observe that the writers of the IISS dossier ‘appear to have been impressed by Iraq’s cooperation with the IAEA, which stands in favourable contrast to the Iraqi relationship with UNSCOM. “Iraq set out to cultivate a good relationship with the IAEA” the [IISS] dossier states. Personally, I should have taken such Iraqi behaviour as a reason to be skeptical and alert against possible deception. The sometimes-friendly relationship between the IAEA Chief Inspector, himself once a designer of one of the reactors at the Tuwaitha nuclear site, and the Iraqi scientists, with many jokes at the expense of UNSCOM’s intrusive inspection practices, was somewhat shaken when Iraq’s secret crash nuclear weapons programme was detected after the defection in August 1995 of Hussein Kamel (sic).’ The above comments underline the importance of discriminating between operating an uncooperative regime and a permissive regime. It cannot be safely assumed that what is effective in a permissive regime will be effective in an uncooperative regime – and indeed, it could be dangerous to draw conclusions from an organization accustomed to operating in a permissive regime when it has to operate in an uncooperative regime.

Iraq Survey Group The fourth search for WMD in Iraq was through the missions mounted by the ISG and its precursor military units during the period after the war in Iraq finished. The initial search for WMD by military units during the period from March to June 2003 was primarily focused on evaluation of suspect WMD sites. The ISG took over from other US military units the task of searching for Iraq’s WMD in June 2003. The ISG involved a quite different group of inspectors and analysts from those who had been engaged in the UN searches first by teams of experts on behalf of the SecretaryGeneral, next by UNSCOM and then by UNMOVIC. Although little information is yet available on the staffing or structure of the ISG, it is evident that it was drawn from nationals of three countries: the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. It was a primarily military unit under the command of Major General Keith Dayton although it clearly had civilian members as well as military personnel. The total number of persons in the ISG were initially in the range of 1,300 to 1,400 which increased to 1,750 by October 200434 of which 750 were working in Iraq and the other 1,000 in Qatar. In January 2004, David Kay indicated35 that there were around 110 to 130 analysts, 30 to 40 case officers and 300 to 400 translators and

Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation: Lessons Learned 251

interpreters. He also added that he had had a fair number of former UN inspectors working for the ISG. These personnel numbers were clearly incomplete as information provided to the UK Parliament on 24 May 2004 stated36 that there were 1,270 people employed in the ISG on 13 May 2004. Information provided to the UK Parliament indicated that initially in June 200337 there were about 55 UK servicemen and women attached to the ISG and these were expected to increase to about 90 to 100 UK military and civilian personnel. It was later stated that the peak number was 76 in October 2003. In October 2003 it was stated38 that the second in command of the ISG was a British brigadier and by January 2004 the UK contingent39 numbered some 55 civilian and military personnel. Of the 140 British representatives who had served in the ISG, 94 had been Service personnel and 46 civilians. The UK contribution40 was in headquarters Staff, interviewers/interpreters and scientific and technical specialists. Information provided41 to the Australian Parliament states that the Australian contribution to the ISG is up to 15 analysts and technical experts with the senior Australian representative being a Lieutenant Colonel working in the ISG operational headquarters. It has become apparent that the ISG has largely followed an independent approach in its search for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction as no approach was made to UNMOVIC for access to the information held by UNMOVIC which included the information held by UNSCOM on Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction. In addition, there has been a report42 in late June 2003 that despite seeking advice on a list of UNSCOM experienced biological weapons inspectors – a so-called A team – that had made multiple inspections to Iraq from the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, none of these individuals went to Iraq. Nevertheless, the ISG has stated43 that former Australian, UK and US inspectors from UNSCOM and UNMOVIC are part of the ISG. In October 2004, the ISG Comprehensive Report44 of over 960 pages was issued. This has provided considerable detail particularly on the question of Iraq’s intention to produce weapons of mass destruction if UN sanctions were weakened or lifted. The key findings of this ISG report have been examined in earlier chapters of this book – notably in Chapters 7 and 8. The UNMOVIC quarterly report on 26 November 200445 provided initial comments on the specific findings of the ISG Comprehensive Report in an eight page appendix. In this, UNMOVIC points out that the ISG report addresses many issues, such as the role of Saddam Hussein, the structure of the former Government of Iraq, regime decision making process, foreign policy, finance and budgeting and use of oil revenues by the regime, that are outside the mandate of UNMOVIC. UNMOVIC states that the ISG report presents some information new to UNMOVIC in all of the weapons of mass destruction areas and in varying degrees of detail. Some of this new information has added to the Commission’s knowledge, and supports its understanding of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes. UNMOVIC notes

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that the report does acknowledge on several occasions the efficacy of UN inspections in preventing the possible re-acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. In any event, it is evident that the ISG was established in the aftermath of the war in Iraq and, as such, is not representative of any organization that might be implementing an uncooperative or permissive regime. Indeed, the regime within Iraq in which the ISG was operating was particularly difficult and unique to the particular circumstances in post-war Iraq. Consequently, any lessons learnt in regard to the method of operation of the ISG are unlikely to be relevant to the implementation of international regimes for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction – the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the NPT, the BTWC and the CWC.

11 Future Roles for UNMOVIC and its Expertise

UNMOVIC currently exists as a small and effective headquarters organization with chemical, biological, missiles and multidisciplinary capabilities together with a roster of trained and qualified inspectors. Its annual cost is in the region of US$ 10 to 15 million a year. It is not currently engaged in activities within Iraq and its staff are now analyzing the information that it holds both from UNSCOM as well as from monitoring developments, using commercial satellite imagery, at sites in Iraq known previously to have had dual-use equipment and maintaining a state of readiness to resume operations in Iraq at such time as the Security Council decides that it should do so. It is consequently timely to consider what future role might be undertaken by UNMOVIC or by its expertise and capabilities. There are a number of different alternatives which are explored below.

Option 1 The current mandate for UNMOVIC continues to be as detailed mainly in SCR 687 (1991), SCR 707 (1991), SCR 715 (1991), SCR 1051 (1996), SCR 1284 (1999) and SCR 1441 (2002). The relevant Security Council resolutions on Iraq after the 2003 war are SCR 1483 (2003) and SCR 1546 (2004). In resolution SCR 1483 (2003) on 22 May 2003, the Security Council states in its preamble that: Reaffirming also the importance of the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and of eventual confirmation of the disarmament of Iraq, [Emphasis in original]. And goes on to state that: 11. Reaffirms that Iraq must meet its disarmament obligations, encourages the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 253

254 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

United States of America to keep the Council informed of their activities in this regard, and underlines the intention of the Council to revisit the mandates of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency as set forth in resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and 1441 (2002) of 8 November 2002; [Emphasis in original]. The preamble to SCR 1483 (2003) recognizes the importance of the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and of eventual confirmation of the disarmament of Iraq. Furthermore, the resolution encourages the United Kingdom and the United States to keep the Security Council informed of their activities in this regard. In resolution SCR 1546 (2004) of 8 June 2004, the Security Council states that it: 22. Notes that nothing in the preceding paragraphs affects the prohibitions on or obligations of States related to items specified in paragraphs 8 and 12 of resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 or activities described in paragraph 3(f) of resolution 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, and reaffirms its intention to revisit the mandates of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency; [Emphasis in original]. Resolution SCR 1546 (2004) in the annexed letters from the Prime Minister of Iraq and from the US Secretary of State to the President of the Security Council makes it clear that one of the tasks of the multinational force will be ‘the continued search and securing of weapons that threaten Iraq’s security.’ The resolution also includes a ‘request that the United States, on behalf of the multinational force, report to the Council within three months from the date of this resolution on the efforts and progress of this force, and on a quarterly basis thereafter.’ The Security Council meeting which adopted SCR 1546 (2004) included the following statement1 by the representative of the Russian Federation that: The resolution confirms the need for a final clarification of issues related to proscribed Iraqi military programmes. Given the fact that the problem of weapons of mass destruction was the reason for starting the war against Iraq, it cannot be left unattended. We expect that, in the very near future, the Security Council will begin work on adapting the mandates of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency to these new conditions. We hope that the interim Government will actively cooperate with the international inspection machinery.

Future Roles for UNMOVIC and its Expertise 255

There is thus one option for the future involvement of UNMOVIC and IAEA in Iraq which is to continue an ongoing monitoring and verification regime following the completion of the work of the Iraq Survey Group. Although the aim should undoubtedly be that Iraq should become a Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and should enter into an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, there will be a transitional period during which the international community needs to be assured that the proscribed programmes in Iraq have been completely terminated. There have been recent indications that the Governing Council of Iraq has indeed abandoned its weapons of mass destruction. Iraq made a statement at the Meeting of States Parties of the BTWC in Geneva on 10 November 2003 that said that ‘Iraq signed this Convention in 1972. We ratified it in 1991 but circumstances have not allowed us to implement the Convention sufficiently effectively nor to work to ensure the success of principles to rid ourselves of this most severe of weapons of mass destruction, biological weapons.’ The statement continued to say that ‘Last year Iraq drafted a first set of legislative norms at international level prohibiting the development of weapons of mass destruction. However, circumstances have not allowed Iraq to complete all measures related to this endeavour. The Governing Council is engaged in ensuring respect for all international treaties and conventions signed by Iraq and as soon as circumstances allow the Council will seriously consider further development of national legislation to prohibit all forms of production of weapons of mass destruction.’ Whilst the US announcement2 in December 2003 of a two year programme to support the peaceful, civilian employment of Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers formerly working on weapons of mass destruction programmes is welcomed, it is recognized that there will be a transition period of uncertain duration in Iraq and that such a programme is only an element in the process whereby Iraq regains its place in the international community. It is also unclear yet whether the information in the final report of the ISG will provide sufficient detail to be internationally accepted. Given the intensive involvement of the intelligence services in the activities of the ISG, there must be some doubts as to whether the information in the final report will be sufficient to be internationally accepted. There would be advantage in UNMOVIC and the IAEA being provided with access to the fullest possible information about the ISG activities and for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to then produce their own assessments of the situation in Iraq based on both the final report of the ISG and on the information held by UNMOVIC and the IAEA. This could result in UNMOVIC in due course being able to confirm that Iraq has been disarmed of its proscribed weapons of mass destruction – in line with the statement in the preamble to SCR 1483 (2003). In summary, Option 1 for UNMOVIC and the IAEA would be to return to Iraq to implement an ongoing monitoring and verification regime until

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such time as Iraq has become a Party to the CWC and has entered into the Additional Protocol with the IAEA. In addition, UNMOVIC and the IAEA should be required to prepare an evaluation of the final report of the ISG drawing upon all available information. Furthermore, UNMOVIC should in due course be able to confirm the disarmament of Iraq. This option would appear to be entirely compatible with the existing mandate of UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

Option 2 SCR 687 (1991) also includes in its preamble the words: Conscious of the threat which all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons, [Emphasis in original], and furthermore, in section C of the resolution dealing with Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, the final paragraph states that: 14. Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of this resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons; [Emphasis in original]. The resolution SCR 1284 (1999) establishing UNMOVIC reiterates this in its preamble by stating that: Recalling the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons as referred to in paragraph 14 of resolution 687 (1991), [Emphasis in original]. Recent developments in the Middle East with Libya abandoning its pursuit of WMD and Iraq following the 2003 war likewise committed to abandoning WMD provides an opportunity to pursue a Middle East WMD free-zone. The establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East has long been the subject of UN General Assembly resolutions with the most recent one3 being adopted without a vote in December 2003 which in its preamble includes: Welcoming all initiatives leading to general and complete disarmament, including in the region of the Middle East, and in particular on the

Future Roles for UNMOVIC and its Expertise 257

establishment therein of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. This resolution goes on to invite the countries concerned in the region to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, a related resolution4 on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East which called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons was adopted by a vote of 162 in favour to 4 against (Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, Marshall Islands, United States), with 10 abstentions. ElBareidi and Rotblat have argued5 in February 2004 that the time is now ripe to act as the WMD programmes of several countries are being neutralized. They state that such a zone would need ‘several elements: a clear definition of the geographic zone of application; universal membership by countries in the region; an international system of verification and control to monitor compliance; a regional mechanism for mutual verification and cooperation; and security assurances from the UN Security Council to assist any country in the region whose security is threatened.’ [Emphasis added]. They rightly identify one element as being an international system of verification and control to monitor compliance. Table 11.1 summarizes the situation in December 2004 with regard to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the BTWC, the CWC, the NPT and the Additional Protocol in respect of countries within or adjacent to the Middle East. Iraq in July 2004 has stated that it would renounce weapons of mass destruction and comply with the NPT, BTWC and CWC. Libya has also abandoned its weapons of mass destruction programmes. There would be significant benefits from the few remaining countries in the Middle East that are not States Parties to the BTWC – Israel – or have yet to ratify the BTWC – Egypt, Syria and the United Arab Emirates – to do so and for those countries which are not States Parties to the CWC – Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria – or have yet to ratify the CWC – Israel – to do so. The remaining reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol should be withdrawn.6 Success in making the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction would be a powerful catalyst for making similar progress in other areas of the world. The question can therefore be asked as to whether UNMOVIC or its expertise and capabilities could play such a role in achieving such a zone in the Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction. UNMOVIC has the capabilities to carry out such a role and has a proven track record of working effectively with the IAEA. It is an advantage that UNMOVIC has the capabilities required for all areas of WMD other than nuclear weapons and is thus well suited to this task. As there are no international organizations comparable to the OPCW in regard to the BTWC or to the Missile

258 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 11.1 WMD Treaty status for states within or adjacent to the Middle East in December 2004 State

Geneva Protocol

BTWC

CWC

NPT

Additional Protocol

Bahrein

Reservation

State Party

State Party

State Party

XXXXX

Egypt

State Party

State Signatory

XXXXXX

State Party

XXXXX

Ethiopia

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

XXXXX

Iran

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Yes

Iraq

Reservation

State Party

XXXXXX

State Party

XXXXX

Israel

State Party

XXXXXX

State Signatory

XXXXXX

XXXXX

Jordan

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Yes

Kuwait

Reservation

State Party

State Party

State Party

Yes

Lebanon

State Party

State Party

XXXXXX

State Party

XXXXX

Libya

Reservation

State Party

State Party

State Party

Yes

Oman

XXXXXX

State Party

State Party

State Party

XXXXX

Qatar

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

XXXXX

Saudi Arabia

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

XXXXX

Sudan

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

XXXXX

Syria

Reservation

State Signatory

XXXXXX

State Party

XXXXX

Tunisia

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

XXXXX

Turkey

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

Yes

United Arab Emirates

XXXXXX

State Signatory

State Party

State Party

XXXXX

Yemen

State Party

State Party

State Party

State Party

XXXXX

Technology Control Regime, UNMOVIC could fill this gap in the Middle East WMD-free zone context. The key is to engage both Israel and the other states in the Middle East to move forward towards achievement of a Middle East free from WMD. In summary, Option 2 would be for the expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC together with the IAEA to provide the necessary international system of verification and control for a Middle East WMD-free zone. UNMOVIC has the necessary capabilities for all areas of WMD other than nuclear and has a proven track record of working effectively with the IAEA.

Future Roles for UNMOVIC and its Expertise 259

Option 3 The UN Secretary-General has been mandated by General Assembly resolutions and by Security Council Resolution 620 (1988) to investigate, with the assistance of qualified experts, the alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons. The guidelines and procedures for carrying out such investigations were detailed in a report7 to the General Assembly in October 1989. In response to requests from the Secretary-General to Member States for lists of qualified national experts and of laboratories with the capability to undertake testing for the presence of agents, lists of such experts and facilities have been issued in 1983, 1984, 1988, 1989 and 1990. Since 1990 there has been no further reports from the SecretaryGeneral of qualified national experts and facilities. Moreover, the experience of the past decade has shown the vital necessity for the training of any such experts to be used in the investigation of alleged use and also for the validation and accreditation of laboratories used in the analysis of such agents. It is also necessary to recognize that the Chemical Weapons Convention which entered into force in 1997 includes provisions in its Articles IX and X to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons, or of the alleged use of riot control agents as a method of warfare. As in December 2004, the number of States Parties to the CWC has reached 167, it can be assumed that any investigation of an alleged use of a chemical (or toxin, as toxins are chemicals) weapon will be carried out by the OPCW rather than through the UN Secretary-General’s procedure especially when it is recalled that the UN Secretary-General can only make an investigation if invited to do so by the state upon whose territory the alleged use has taken place. Consequently, the future use, until such time as the BTWC has an organization capable of carrying out such investigations, of the UN SecretaryGeneral’s procedure will be limited to instances where it is alleged that biological weapons have been used. Although an alleged use of toxin weapons would probably be investigated by the OPCW, it would be prudent not to exclude toxin weapons from any investigation of the alleged use of biological weapons. After all, it will be far from clear in any alleged use, what type of agent has been used as this will only emerge from an investigation. The expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC undoubtedly are able to carry out such investigations and have the advantage that their capability to mount a multidisciplinary investigation could well be more effective than limiting their capability to mounting a purely biological investigation. It would, however, be reasonable for UNMOVIC under this option to be focused much more on biological capabilities and to retain only a modest supplementary multidisciplinary capability. UNMOVIC not only have trained inspectors capable of carrying out such an investigation on their roster, who would need to continue to be kept trained so that they

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would be effective when called upon to carry out an investigation, but also have a network of laboratories and a proven chain of custody and analysis in laboratories in more than one country for any samples obtained in such an investigation. There is little doubt that a report by the experts with the capabilities of UNMOVIC on an investigation of an alleged use of biological or toxin weapons would have international credibility. In summary, Option 3 would be for the expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC to be retained as a capability that could be used by the UN Secretary-General should a request be made to him for an investigation of an alleged use of biological or toxin weapons.

Option 4 In considering WMD and their means of delivery, it is evident that in regard to nuclear weapons and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) there is an international organization, the IAEA, that is in place to implement the NPT and in regard to chemical weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the OPCW which is in place to implement the CWC. In contrast, there is no organization in place to implement the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Australia Group or the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Negotiations took place during the 1990s to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BTWC. These were very close to completion of a legally binding instrument that would have included the establishment of an organization to implement a regime of declarations, visits and investigations when in July 2001, the United States said that it could not support the proposed protocol to the Convention and, moreover, that the approach in which the US along with all other States Parties had been engaged for six years was not viable. This sudden change of direction effectively plunged the BTWC into crisis and the Fifth Review Conference in November 2001 had to be suspended for 12 months. When it resumed, in December 2002, the Review Conference was unable to conclude a Final Declaration and was only able to agree a modest process of one week annual meetings prepared by a two week meeting of experts to consider five specific topics in 2003, 2004 and 2005. Although many States Parties continue to urge the resumption of negotiations, it is clear that the present US administration will not accept any such resumption. There will consequently and very regrettably not be an organization to implement the BTWC for some years. Compelling arguments8 have been made for several years that the BTWC needs at the least a modest organization to nurture and sustain the Convention. Consequently, there is a clear role that the expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC could perform to help nurture and sustain the BTWC pending the eventual negotiation of a strengthened regime and an organization to implement the strengthened regime.

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The Australia Group was established in 1985 as a result of CW use in the Iran–Iraq war by a number of like-minded states who sought to harmonize their export controls of materials and equipment relevant to chemical weapons and later extended this to export controls relevant to biological weapons. This has no secretariat. The expertise of the group in UNMOVIC which administered the export/import monitoring regime in Iraq is highly relevant to that needed to make the Australia Group regime more effective. Whilst some NAM states take every opportunity to attack the Australia Group, the reality is that states around the world are increasingly concerned about what is being exported and imported – and SCR 1540 (2004) decides that all states shall take and enforce effective measures to prevent proliferation. Furthermore, there are export/import control regimes in existence for the prior informed consent of chemicals, the advance informed agreement of genetically modified organisms and materials related to proscribed drugs. It is in the interests of all states to monitor and control exports and imports of dual-use materials and technology that might be misused in prohibited weapons of mass destruction programmes. The expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC are well placed to facilitate the work of the Australia Group in respect of the harmonization and implementation of export controls. The situation in regard to missiles is more complicated. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)9 is an informal and voluntary association of countries which share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. It was originally established in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Since then, by July 2004, the number of MTCR partners has increased to 34. In addition, there are three unilateral adherents to the MTCR (Israel, Romania and Slovakia).10 The MTCR has no secretariat with the Foreign Ministry of France acting as a central point of contact. As one of the MTCR initiatives to reduce global ballistic missile proliferation, the Hague Code of Conduct has been negotiated which was launched in the Hague in November 2002 and has now over 110 subscribing partners. As the first multilateral arrangement on missiles, the Hague Code of Conduct complements the work of the MTCR. In addition, the UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions on missiles because of the long concern of the international community about the accumulation, proliferation, technical refinement and threat and use of ballistic and other types of missiles. Nonetheless, there is no universally accepted norm or instrument specifically governing the development, testing, production, acquisition, transfer, deployment or use of missiles. This led to the adoption11 by 97 in favour, none against and 65 abstentions in November 2000 of General Assembly Resolution 55/33A12 which in its preamble said: Expressing its support for the international efforts against the development and proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction,

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and went on to Also requests the Secretary-General with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts to be established in 2001 on the basis of equitable geographic distribution, to prepare a report for the consideration of the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session on the issue of missiles in all its aspects. This led to the preparation of a report A/57/22913 on 23 July 2002 which in its foreword by the Secretary-General noted that was the first effort by the United Nations to address the issue of missiles in all its aspects. The report provided an overview giving the background and current situation in the field of missiles. It also identified a number of areas of concerns. The conclusions include: Issues related to missiles in all aspects … are regarded as serious concerns for international peace and security in the world today. These concerns are both a regional and global order. They go on to note that: While noting the existence of international measures in the field of missiles … it is acknowledged that at present no universally accepted norms or instruments to deal specifically with missile-related concerns in all their aspects exist. In this respect the report noted that the Russian Federation had proposed a Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies which had been considered at two international meetings of experts in Moscow in March 2000 with 47 states taking part and in February 2001 with 71 states taking part. Furthermore, the Russian Federation had submitted a memorandum of intent, based on this global control system, aimed at a negotiated multilateral, legally binding agreement on a global regime of missile non-proliferation under the auspices of the United Nations. The report also noted that a draft International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation was initially developed by the members of the Missile Technology Control Regime. This draft code was released to the international community with the recommendation by the MTCR that it be universalized through an ad hoc process entirely separate from the MTCR and open to all States Parties. The draft code was discussed at an international meeting in Paris in February 2002 with 86 states present and again in June 2002 with 96 states present. The code is to be a politically-binding arrangement intended to provide for global principles, commitments as well as transparency

Future Roles for UNMOVIC and its Expertise 263

and other confidence-building measures to address the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles14 was adopted by an international conference in The Hague, Netherlands in November 2002. As of 14 June 2004, 114 states have subscribed to the Code. Austria serves as the central point of contact for the Code and coordinates the information exchange under the Code. The Secretary-General’s report on missiles was considered by the General Assembly which adopted Resolution A/RES/58/3715 in December 2003 which took note of the report and went on to: Also requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a Panel of Governmental Experts, to be established in 2004 on the basis of equable geographical distribution, to explore further the issue of missiles in all its aspects and to submit a report for consideration by the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session. It is thus evident that there are various international activities in progress in regard to the proliferation of missiles which include the UN General Assembly, the MTCR and the Hague Code of Conduct. There is no secretariat associated with any of these activities and consequently, as was the case in regard to the BTWC, there could be advantage in the expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC being used as a secretariat in relation to multilateral steps taken in relation to missiles used to deliver weapons of mass destruction. In summary, Option 4 would be for the expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC to be retained as a secretariat to nurture and sustain the BTWC and likewise to support ongoing multilateral initiatives in relation to export controls relevant to chemical and biological weapons and to missiles used to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

Option 5 There have long been concerns that some States may continue to be actively engaged in the prohibited weapons of mass destruction programmes involving nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and their means of delivery. As of April 2005, the latest US State Department Report on ‘Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments’ covers the period from 1 December 2000 through to 31 December 2001. This makes the following statements in regard to the compliance of various states with the BTWC and the CWC as of the end of 2001: • China continues to maintain some elements of an offensive biological warfare program it is believed to have started in the 1950s.

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China maintains an active offensive R&D CW program, a possible undeclared CW stockpile, and CW-related facilities that were not declared. Such activities are inconsistent with the CWC. • Cuba has at least a limited, developmental offensive biological warfare research and development effort. • Iran has an offensive biological weapons program in violation of the BWC. Iran is technically capable of producing at least rudimentary biological warheads for a variety of delivery systems, including missiles. Iran has not submitted a complete and accurate declaration, and in fact is acting to retain and modernize key elements of its CW program. Some of these elements include an offensive R&D CW program, an undeclared stockpile and an offensive production capability. Such activities are inconsistent with the CWC. • Iraq has biological weapons and a significant offensive biological weapons program in violation of its obligations under the BWC. • Libya has acceded to the BWC, but it has continued a biological warfare program. • North Korea has a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a BW capability and that it has developed and produced, and may have weaponized for use, BW agents in violation of the Convention. • Russia continues to maintain an offensive BW program in violation of the BWC. The Russian Federation has not divulged the full extent of its chemical agent and weapon inventory. The United States believes its declaration to be incomplete with respect to CW production, development facilities and chemical agent and weapons stockpiles. Such activities are inconsistent with the CWC. • Sudan has established a CW R&D program with the goal of indigenously producing CW. • Syria is pursuing the development of biological weapons that would constitute a violation of the BWC if Syria were a State Party. Without taking a view on whether or not these US assessments are accurate – and some such as those for Iraq and Libya are now clearly out of date – it is evident that there are a number of states about which the United States has expressed concern in regard to their compliance with the BTWC and the CWC. It is conceivable that a situation may arise under which the compliance of one or more of these countries might be brought to the attention of the Security Council and that this might result in a situation in which the UN Security Council decides that a team of qualified experts should visit the country of concern in order to inspect appropriate facilities so as to determine whether or not the country is in non-compliance with the BTWC and the CWC.

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The expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC would be able to mount such inspections and to carry out such analysis. It has, however, to be recognized that such inspections of countries of concern are likely to be carried out in a hostile and uncooperative atmosphere not dissimilar from that encountered by UNMOVIC in Iraq. Under such hostile circumstances, it has to be considered whether the Chief Inspectors used by UNMOVIC who were not the best in the world would indeed be good enough to arrive at an accurate assessment of the compliance of a country of concern. As the requirement will be to detect whether a country of concern is non-compliant in circumstances when the country may well have adopted a novel approach to acquiring its chemical or biological weapons capability, it can be argued that the Chief Inspectors should be selected from the best in the world. It is noticeable that the Chief Inspectors used by UNMOVIC in regard to biological and chemical inspections have been far more geographically spread than those used by UNSCOM who came largely from the United States and the United Kingdom. It is, however, also true that the Chief Inspectors used by UNSCOM are now some six years out of date in regard to the latest technology and techniques to be used in carrying out inspections. There is much to be said for Chief Inspectors who are trained in the latest technology and techniques and who are the best in the world being used in any such future inspections. It is noted that in regard to Libya, the inspections in Libya have been carried out by US and UK experts and not by UNMOVIC. This is hardly surprising given that it was pressure by the United States and the United Kingdom on Libya which led to Libya taking the decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction. A similar approach was taken at the time in the early 1990s when South Africa abandoned its programmes of weapons of mass destruction with US and UK personnel making visits to South Africa. Consequently, it needs to be considered whether inspections to countries of concern are always likely to take place involving the nationals of whichever country has brought pressure upon the country concerned to abandon its weapons of mass destruction. If it were to be decided that there would be merit in retaining an international team as an instrument of the Security Council based on UNMOVIC, it would be possible to modify UNMOVIC so that the international team could be structured so as to contain the best features of both UNSCOM and UNMOVIC – and thus the best inspectors in the world without regard to which countries they came from. This would have the advantage that the inspections would be carried out by an international team reporting to the Security Council. In summary, Option 5 would be for the expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC to be retained to serve on behalf of the Security Council as a qualified team of experts to visit countries of concern to determine whether

266 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

activities and facilities are engaged in activities prohibited under the international conventions such as the BTWC and the CWC. Such a use of the expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC might well require modification to ensure that in such a role the best Chief Inspectors in the world would be used without regard to geographical distribution.

Option 6 SCR 1540 (2004) was adopted16 by the Security Council on 28 April 2004. In the preamble the Security Council affirmed that ‘proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.’ In this resolution, the Security Council: Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as accomplice, assist or finance them; Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall: (a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage and transport; (b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures; … The resolution goes on to establish a Committee of the Security Council ‘which will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation of this resolution,…’ [Emphasis added]. The resolution also recognizes that some states may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution and invites states in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests. It is evident that the expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC with regard to chemical and biological weapons and missiles as well as the multidisciplinary area and the export/import mechanism that UNMOVIC has operated successfully is well equipped to be a part of the other expertise upon which the Committee of the Security Council could call to assist in reporting on the implementation of SCR 1540 (2004). Furthermore, it would not

Future Roles for UNMOVIC and its Expertise 267

be difficult for the expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC to also become involved in the provision of assistance to those states requiring assistance in the implementation of this resolution. However, as the resolution also includes language calling upon all states: To renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of nonproliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes; a judgment would need to be taken as to whether it would be more appropriate to utilize the IAEA and the OPCW to provide assistance to their Member States rather than to call upon the expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC. Nevertheless the multidisciplinary capabilities and experience of UNMOVIC in administering the export/import regime in Iraq is rather well qualified to assist the Security Council in the implementation of SCR 1540 (2004). In summary, Option 6 would be for the expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC to assist the Security Council in the implementation of SCR 1540 (2004).

Conclusions The various options for utilizing the expertise and capabilities developed by UNMOVIC which are directly relevant to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means are summarized in Table 11.2. There is no doubt that the expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC which have no parallel should be maintained and utilized in the ongoing initiatives to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. However, the decision as to which option is adopted will depend on which option finds consensus among the members of the Security Council.

268 The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Table 11.2

Options for the future use of UNMOVIC capabilities

Option

Summary

Comment

1

UNMOVIC and the IAEA to implement an ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq until such time as Iraq has become a Party to the CWC and has entered into the Additional Protocol with the IAEA. UNMOVIC and the IAEA to confirm that Iraq has been disarmed.

Essentially a continuation of the current role of UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

2

The expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC together with the IAEA to provide the necessary international system of verification and control for a Middle East WMD-free zone.

Depends on acceptance by countries in the region.

3

The expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC to be used by the UN Secretary-General should a request be made to him for an investigation of an alleged use of biological or toxin weapons.

Pending the eventual negotiation of a strengthened BTWC regime.

4

The expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC to be retained as a secretariat to nurture and sustain the BTWC and likewise to support ongoing multilateral initiatives in relation to export controls relevant to chemical and biological weapons and to missiles used to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

Pending the eventual negotiation of a strengthened BTWC regime and of a chemical and biological weapons export control regime and a missile regime.

5

The expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC to serve on behalf of the Security Council to inspect countries of concern to determine whether activities and facilities are engaged in activities prohibited under the international conventions such as the BTWC and the CWC.

Depends on whether such inspections are more likely to be carried out bilaterally.

6

The expertise and capabilities of UNMOVIC to assist Security Council in implementation of non-proliferation SCR 1540 (2004).

Might be limited to those areas related to biological weapons and to missiles.

12 Prospects for the Future

The promise of the early 1990s There have been immense developments over the two decades since chemical weapons were first used in the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s. Today we live in a very different world. The Cold War has come to an end and there is now much cooperation across Europe and Russia. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 raised the world’s awareness of the real dangers posed by the possible use of chemical and biological weapons by Iraq against the coalition forces. Following the war, UNSCOM despite the intransigence of Iraq successfully demonstrated the magnitude of the Iraqi offensive chemical and biological weapons programmes and oversaw the destruction of such stockpiles and capabilities and the introduction of ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq. There were high hopes in the early 1990s for a new world order of peace and stability. This was underlined through the Security Council meeting for the first time at Heads of State and Heads of Government level in January 1992 to consider ‘The responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security’ which agreed1 that: The members of the Council underline the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament; to prevent the proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction; … They emphasize the importance of the early ratification and implementation by the States concerned of all international and regional arms control agreements, … The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The members of the Council commit themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end. … 269

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In conclusion, the members of the Security Council affirm their determination to build on the initiative of their meeting in order to secure positive advances in promoting international peace and security. … The members of the Council agree that the world now has the best chance of achieving international peace and security since the foundation of the United Nations. There were expectations that the promise demonstrated by the unanimity and cohesion of the Security Council statement would be translated into multilateral action to strengthen the treaty regimes addressing weapons of mass destruction. Initially, there were encouraging signs with the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention totally banning chemical weapons being completed during 1992 and the Convention opened for signature in January 1993. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention totally prohibiting all biological and toxin weapons had been in force since 1975. At its Third Review Conference in 1991 the States Parties in the Final Declaration stated2 that: The Conference, determined to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention and recognizing that effective verification could reinforce the Convention, decides to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts open to all States Parties to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. This Ad Hoc Group known as VEREX met in 1992 and 1993 producing a report which was considered by a Special Conference in September 1994. The Special Conference in its Final Declaration3 agreed that: … the Conference determined to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention and recognizing that effective verification could reinforce the Convention, decides to establish an Ad Hoc Group, open to all States Parties. The objective of this Ad Hoc Group shall be to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be submitted for the consideration of the States Parties. There were also steps forward in regard to the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibited the use in war of ‘asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare’ in that the Final Declaration4 of the Paris Conference of 1989 stated that; 2. The participating States recognise the importance and continuing validity of the Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating,

Prospects for the Future 271

poisonous and other gases and bacteriological methods of warfare, signed on 17 June 1925 in Geneva. The States Parties to the Protocol solemnly reaffirm the prohibition as established in it. They call upon all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol. Although this Final Declaration did not include language calling upon those States Parties which had entered reservations to lift these reservations, the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1991 included language in its Final Declaration stating that ‘The Conference stresses the importance of the withdrawal of all reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.’ This led to a number of States Parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 lifting their reservations in the early 1990s. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had entered into force in 1970 with IAEA safeguards being applied to provide confidence that all States Parties are honouring their treaty obligations. The aim of safeguards was initially to verify the correctness of nuclear activities declared by the State Party. Following the 1991 Gulf war, the shortcomings of the safeguards system in regard to its failure to address whether undeclared nuclear activities were being carried out by a State Party – or, in other words, whether a State Party had made a comprehensive and complete declaration – was recognized. This resulted in the early 1990s in a major review being undertaken by the IAEA to strengthen the safeguards system. This led to the approval in May 1997 by the IAEA Board of Governors of the Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements.5

The developments in the mid-1990s Progress continued to be made. Russia in 1992 admitted that the former Soviet Union had continued a sizeable biological weapons programme after the entry into force of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and entered into a Trilateral Agreement with the United Kingdom and United States intended to build confidence that the former Soviet Union programme had been terminated. The mid-1990s saw also the decision by South Africa to abandon its nuclear programme as well as its chemical and biological weapons programmes. The Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1994 to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention through negotiation of a legally binding instrument had commenced negotiations in 1995 and by 1997 had developed a ‘rolling text’ for a protocol to the Convention. The Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force in 1997 and made an excellent start on the destruction of chemical weapons

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declared by States Parties and the implementation of the inspection and verification regime for scheduled chemicals. International public awareness of weapons of mass destruction and in particular of chemical and biological weapons was heightened further by the events in Japan in 1994 and 1995 when the Aum Shinrikyo sect carried out attacks in Matsumoto and Tokyo using the nerve agent sarin. It subsequently became apparent that the sect had also attempted to carry out biological attacks but without success. These attacks triggered international attention on how to counter the possible terrorist use of chemical or biological weapons and the importance of national penal legislation to implement the BTWC and the CWC. There were, however, indications that the commitment and unanimity of the Security Council to countering weapons of mass destruction was beginning to waiver as the language in their statements on Iraq became softer. It was clear by 1998 that Iraq’s increasingly declamatory statements had succeeded in diverting the attention of the Secretary-General and at least some of the permanent members of the Security Council – China, France and Russia – away from the inescapable fact that Iraq had consistently and steadily defied the Security Council ever since the cease-fire resolution, SCR 687 (1991) had been adopted on 3 April 1991. The Secretary-General in October 1998 proposed a ‘comprehensive review’ which effectively put the activities of UNSCOM and the IAEA into the dock and remarkably did not place the onus on Iraq to do what it had consistently failed to do since 1991, provide a full, final and complete disclosure of its proscribed programme. It was thus clear that the Security Council had lost sight of its commitment, stated in January 1992, to counter weapons of mass destruction and had run out of steam with several of the permanent members of the Security Council – China, France and Russia – no longer showing the determination and unanimity to ensure that a rogue state such as Iraq does not acquire and retain a WMD capability.

The 21st century The high hopes of the early 1990s of a new world order of peace and stability have regrettably failed to be realized. Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in the early 1990s there was a change from a bipolar to a unipolar world and greater instability around the globe. There is a greater fear at the start of the 21st century that states or non-state actors might seek to acquire chemical and biological weapons. The Russian/US/UK trilateral process ceased without reaching clear conclusions. Visits to military facilities in Russia did not take place and suspicions continue to be expressed that some elements of the former Soviet Union programme may not have been terminated. Although the Ad Hoc Group of the BTWC continued to make progress and reached the stage of a

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Chairman’s composite text in spring 2001 which was acceptable to almost all of the States Parties engaged in the negotiations, these efforts failed in July 2001 when the United States rejected the draft instrument. Even though the anthrax attacks in the United States in late September/early October 2001 triggered immense public attention around the world with many countries being subject to hoax attacks and led to huge resources being devoted in the US to countering bioterrorism, there were no indications of any reconsideration by the US as to whether the draft instrument to strengthen the Convention would indeed be in the interests of the US and of international peace and security. The Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC in November 2001 had to be suspended for a year to prevent failure and when it resumed in November 2002, it was only able to agree a modest programme of annual meetings focused on five specific topics primarily relating to national implementation of the Convention. The Chemical Weapons Convention held its first Review Conference in April 2003. Two priorities were identified: the development of an action plan to encourage universality and of an action plan to achieve full and effective national implementation measures. However, the Review Conference failed to address the issue of ‘non-lethal’ agents and law enforcement even though this has been identified as being the issue most likely to jeopardize the long-term future of the CWC regime. This danger arises from the potential erosion of the general purpose criterion in the CWC which ensures that all chemical weapons, past, present and future, are totally prohibited. The lack of unanimity in the Security Council was evident during 1999 when the Security Council attempted to grapple with the Amorim report and eventually adopted SCR 1284 (1999) establishing UNMOVIC with four abstentions – China, France, Malaysia and Russia. Although unanimity in the Security Council reappeared by the time that Iraq had agreed to accept inspections by UNMOVIC and IAEA in 2002 when SCR 1441 (2002) was adopted unanimously, it was evident during 2003 that there was no agreement among the P5 as to how best to deal with Iraq. The situation in Iraq and its refusal to accept the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors until November 2002 saw increasing attention being given around the world and especially in the United States and the United Kingdom to the dangers posed by the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programmes. This led to the war in Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent attention around the world to the accuracy of intelligence estimates about the Iraqi programmes as most countries appeared to agree prior to the war in 2003 that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction programmes.

Conclusions Two key lessons emerge from the experience relating to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. First, that an aggressor state seeking to use chemical or

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biological weapons is likely to choose to develop a mobilization capability based on and embedded in dual-purpose technology and equipment. It likewise follows that, by adopting such a mobilization approach when agents will be produced as required to be used so obviating the need for storage and stability characteristics, chemical or biological materials may well be chosen that are not normally regarded as candidate chemical or biological agents. This lesson has important consequences for any future inspection regime in that the organization engaged in such inspections has to be trained to look out for indications of unusual chemical or biological materials of types and quantities that are inconsistent with peaceful permitted purposes. Furthermore, it underlines the importance of the national implementation measures to implement the general purpose criteria within all states as it is the implementation of the general purpose criterion that ensures that all chemical and biological materials used as agents are totally prohibited both now and in the future. It is also important that the political consideration of the dangers posed by states seeking chemical or biological weapons is not sidetracked by a search for stockpiles of weapons as such stockpiles will not exist if a mobilization capability has been adopted so that weapons are produced only as and when required for use. The second lesson comes from the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq which was effective in ensuring that Iraq did not resume production of proscribed weapons. There was no indication in either the UNSCOM or the UNMOVIC reports that the OMV regime was ineffective for any one of the various types of proscribed weapons programmes – and in particular, no suggestion that it could not work and was not working for biological materials and equipment. This has important implications in regard to the prohibition regimes for weapons of mass destruction where it has long been evident that the regime for biological and toxin weapons is the weakest of all. The BTWC regime is the weakest element in dealing with weapons of mass destruction and it was recognition of this that led to the Ad Hoc Group negotiations of a legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention from 1995 to 2001. The United States rejection in July 2001 of the draft legally binding instrument was a huge mistake and was inexplicable. Although the United States argued that the draft instrument would have harmed its national interests and security, it was evident that virtually all the other States Parties engaged in the negotiations were satisfied that the draft instrument would bring greater advantages than disadvantages. The experience of the OMV regime in Iraq shows that a compliance monitoring regime can be effective – and that the US decision was not soundly based. The failure of the Security Council to continue to act unanimously and with determination was successfully exploited by Iraq. Any future noncompliant state is likely to seek to divide the Security Council which seems

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to be unable to recapture the vision that it expressed when it met at the Heads of State and Heads of Government level in January 1992. Consequently, some attention needs to be given to how to revitalize the Security Council so that it acts unanimously to achieve its vision of a safer and more secure world. The Security Council rarely meets at the Heads of State and Heads of Government level so consideration needs to be given to whether there are other opportunities when the Heads of State and Heads of Government of the permanent members of the Security Council – China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States – meet. There is already an annual occasion when the Heads of State and Heads of Government of four of the five permanent members of the Security Council – France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States – meet – and at which significant declarations are made and initiatives launched to address global issues relating to international peace and security such as countering weapons of mass destruction. This is the annual meeting of the G8 and there is a logical case for inviting China to join the group in a similar way to that in which Russia was invited to join. Interestingly, in September 2004 China has for the first time joined a meeting of G7 finance ministers. Moving towards a G9 could well serve to be an effective way to revitalize the Security Council and its initiatives for international peace and security. There is also a real opportunity now to take decisive steps towards creating a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq in July 2004 has stated that it would renounce weapons of mass destruction and comply with the NPT, BTWC and CWC. Libya has also abandoned its weapons of mass destruction programmes. There would be significant benefits from the few remaining countries in the Middle East that are not States Parties to the BTWC – Israel – or have yet to ratify the BTWC – Egypt, Syria and the United Arab Emirates – to do so and for those countries which are not States Parties to the CWC – Egypt, Lebanon and Syria – or have yet to ratify the CWC – Israel – to do so. Success in making the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction would be a powerful catalyst for making similar progress in other areas of the world such as in Asia. Further attention needs to be given to strengthening the BTWC through a legally binding instrument. The recent report6 of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change said that “the longstanding impasse over a verification mechanism for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which has undermined confidence in the overall regime, should be overcome” and made a specific recommendation that: 27. States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry.

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Although the recommendations of this Panel have yet to be considered internationally, it was notable at the Meeting of the States Parties7 to the BTWC held on 6 to 10 December 2004 that the Chairman had, in his opening remarks, drawn attention to the Panel’s report and Norway had specifically quoted the above recommendation, which had also been alluded to by New Zealand. At this Meeting, the statement made on behalf of the NAM had called for multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory legally binding agreement to strengthen the Convention; a point that was underlined by several of the NAM countries in their subsequent individual statements. The statement on behalf of the EU attached high priority to the reinforcement of the BTWC which is the cornerstone of the efforts to prevent biological agents and toxins being developed as weapons and the EU remained committed to develop measures to verify compliance with the BTWC. Whilst there is clearly much to be considered before there are any decisions on whether to implement the recommendations, there was little doubt that future statements on behalf of the NAM and by individual NAM States would not miss any opportunity to cite recommendation 27 as being in support of the NAM position for multilateral negotiations of a legally binding instrument to strengthen the Convention. If no remedial action is taken, it is probable that there could all too easily be a situation at the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 that is a repeat of that at the Fifth Review Conference with the States Parties other than the NAM Group being portrayed as those that have prevented progress. As it is unlikely that the United States is going to recognize the benefits of a multilaterally negotiated strengthening of the Convention in the near future – despite President Bush telling8 the General Assembly in September 2004 that ‘Each of us alone can only do so much. Together, we can accomplish so much more’ and also saying that Every nation that wants peace will share the benefits of a freer world. And every nation that seeks peace has an obligation to help build that world. Eventually, there is no safe isolation from terror networks, or failed states that shelter them, or outlaw regimes, or weapons of mass destruction. Eventually, there is no safety in looking away, seeking the quiet life by ignoring the struggles and oppression of others. – consideration needs to be given to alternative ways forward. It needs to be recognized that there are several other international agreements to which the United States is not a party – the International Criminal Court, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the Ottawa Convention on Land Mines) and the Kyoto Protocol. It seems evident that the United States view on these

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international instruments is simply different from that of the rest of the world but this has not prevented the rest of the world from working together to make the world a better place for all of us. A significant political commitment to the draft Protocol to the BTWC was made by the Australian initiative in September 1998 that led to an informal Ministerial meeting of 57 States Parties stating9 that ‘The Ministers are determined to see this essential negotiation brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.’ A possible way to move forward would be for a troika of likeminded States Parties to arrange a meeting at which to agree a political commitment to restart negotiations of a legally binding instrument. Such a troika could be made up of Australia (which had taken the earlier initiative in 1998), South Africa (as a NAM State which has put an immense amount of effort into ensuring that the draft Protocol was soundly based and effective) and Norway (as a State which has experience with the Ottawa Land Mines Convention of successfully negotiating and agreeing a treaty without United States participation). An alternative approach would be for the EU as a coherent political group to devise a package of measures that will together strengthen the Convention that can attract broad support and, should consensus not be forthcoming, can be taken forward by a coalition of the willing on as wide an international basis as possible or perhaps on a regional basis in one or more regions. This would offer the prospect of a successful outcome to the Sixth Review Conference one way or another – either by consensus or by a coalition of the willing. The BTWC is the weakest element in the regimes to prohibit weapons of mass destruction and it is simply too dangerous for the international community to leave the BTWC becalmed in the doldrums until such time as the United States decides the BTWC needs to be strengthened through a legally binding instrument. In considering the future threat from chemical and biological weapons, the key is to realistically assess the danger from such weapons and to act accordingly. Prevention – the total prohibition of both biological and chemical weapons with effective regimes to verify compliance – should be the goal of all countries around the world. Both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions are continuing to increase the number of States Parties and thus to minimize the numbers that have yet to become Party. The First Review Conference of the CWC agreed an Action Plan for Universality and in March 2004 the OPCW reported10 that there were now 161 States Parties, 21 Signatory States and 12 Non-signatory States. The BTWC at the last Meeting of the States Parties in December 2004 had 153 States Parties and 16 Signatory States. Given the comprehensive nature of both Conventions and their relevance and applicability both to States and to sub-State actors, universality for the Conventions and for the national implementing legislation within each State Party has to be the goal.

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The past decade has shown that intelligence assessments can be successful and can be flawed. It has to be recognized that the intelligence agencies of all countries exist to make worst case assessments based on straws of information gleaned from any sources. It is too little recognized that the compliance regimes associated with the CWC and the BTWC contribute significantly to the creation of more accurate assessments of capabilities and activities within States than is possible in the absence of such regimes. It is equally important in assessing the dangers posed by chemical or biological weapons to avoid overstatement and hype as credibility will be the first casualty. It has to be recognized that chemical or biological weapons need not be the weapons of choice as their effectiveness depends on the delivery system and the micrometeorology at the instant of release. Their effects can be far less certain or predictable than high explosives. It also has to be appreciated that other toxic materials may be used to wage chemical or biological warfare and that much of our knowledge of such weapons is based on those developed in the last century when retaliation in kind was frequently the guiding principle. This assumption is unlikely to be applicable today. It is, however, equally true that novel agents, whether biological or chemical, are unproven and hence present greater uncertainties. Nevertheless, the risks from novel agents need to be taken into account whilst the principal preparedness efforts need to be focused on those that are well known and judged to be likely to present the danger. There is a real danger, however, that the general purpose criteria embodied in both the BTWC and the CWC and which ensure that the prohibitions are truly comprehensive embracing all agents both present and future, could be eroded through the current interest in non-lethal or less than lethal agent programmes. There is no other issue that has as much potential for jeopardizing the long-term future of the CWC and the BTWC. The States Parties to those Conventions need to be alert to this very real and present danger – and take action before it is too late to prevent this potential erosion. There continues to be a vital need in every country for all the elements of the web of assurance – to assure the public that all reasonable steps have been taken both nationally and internationally. The web of assurance is made up of the following elements: a. International and national regimes that totally prohibit chemical and biological weapons. – Universality of the BTWC and CWC and the 1925 Geneva Protocol – Withdrawal of all reservations to the Geneva Protocol – Legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness of the BTWC

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– National implementing legislation for BTWC and CWC in all States Parties – Penal sanctions upon individuals who engage in activities prohibited to states under the BTWC, CWC and the Geneva Protocol b. Controls of dangerous pathogens and chemicals – Addressing handling, use, storage and transfer both nationally and internationally c. Broadband protective measures – Preparedness, detection, diagnosis and medical countermeasures – Preparedness before and after release d. Determined national and international response to use or threat of use – Diplomatic actions, sanctions, military intervention – Security Council P5 need to recognize their responsibilities A strong public commitment to such a web of assurance both nationally and internationally provides two immense benefits – first to deter the would-be user and second to reassure the public both nationally and internationally that all reasonable steps are being taken to ensure their safety and security.

Appendix 1: United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) 3 April 1991

RESOLUTION 687 (1991) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting on 3 April 1991.* The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 and 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government, Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of resolution 686 (1991), Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq’s peaceful intentions in light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait, Taking note of the letter sent by the Foreign Minister of Iraq on 27 February 1991 (S/22275) and those sent pursuant to resolution 686 (1991), (S/22273, S/22276, S/22320, S/22321 and S/22330), Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 “Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters”, thereby recognizing formally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United Nations in accordance with

*

It should be noted that there are two versions of Resolution 687. This version is that issued by the United Nations in 1991 and available on the UN website and on the UNSCOM website. A slightly modified, largely edited, version appears in the ‘Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1991, Security Council Official Record: 46th Year’, S/INF/47, 1993 and in the UN ‘blue book’ entitled ‘The United Nations and the Iraq–Kuwait Conflict 1990–1996’ published in 1996.

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Appendix 1 281 Article 102 of the Charter and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait within its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932, Conscious of the need for demarcation of the said boundary, Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons, Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Declaration adopted by all States participating in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held at Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons, Recalling further that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972, Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this Convention, Noting moreover the importance of all States adhering to this Convention and encouraging its forthcoming Review Conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of the Convention, Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on a Convention on the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of universal adherence thereto, Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq, Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, Conscious of the threat which all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons, Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region, Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using all available means, including a dialogue among the States of the region,

282 Appendix 1 Noting that resolution 686 (1991) marked the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 661 (1990) in so far as they applied to Kuwait, Noting that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of resolution 686 (1991), many Kuwaiti and third country nationals are still not accounted for and property remains unreturned, Recalling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of international terrorism, Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq, Taking note with grave concern of the reports of the Secretary-General of 20 March 1991 (S/22366) and 28 March 1991 (S/22409), and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq, Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in recent Security Council resolutions, Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 1. Affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire; A 2. Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the “Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters”, signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 7063, United Nations Treaty Series, 1964; 3. Calls on the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate material, including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month; 4. Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter; B 5. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a

Appendix 1 283 demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the “Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters” of 4 October 1963; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State to the other; and for the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Council on the operations of the unit, and immediately if there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace; 6. Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Council of the completion of the deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 (1991); C 7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972; 8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of; (a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities; (b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities; 9. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following: (a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adopting of this resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below; (b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), within forty-five days of the passage of this resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days of such approval: (i) The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s biological, chemical and missiles capabilities, based on Iraq’s declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself;

284 Appendix 1 (ii) The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8 (a) above, including items at the additional locations designated by the Special Commission under paragraph 9 (b) (i) above and the destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all its missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified under paragraph 8 (b) above; (iii) The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and cooperation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) required in paragraphs 12 and 13 below; 10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with this paragraph, to be submitted to the Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of this resolution; 11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968; 12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director General of the IAEA within fifteen days of the adoption of this resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the IAEA, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings; 13. Requests the Director General of the IAEA, through the Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in paragraph 9 (b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities based on Iraq’s declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency’s verification and inspections to confirm that IAEA safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution;

Appendix 1 285 14. Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of this resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons; D 15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property which Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact; E 16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait; 17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq scrupulously adhere to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt; 18. Decides to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund; 19. Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Council for decision, no later than thirty days following the adoption of this resolution, recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a programme to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including: administration of the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq’s contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq’s payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid, appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq’s liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the Commission designated above; F 20. Decides, effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products, other than medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) or, with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and accelerated “no-objection” procedure, to materials and supplies for

286 Appendix 1 essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 March 1991 (S/22366), and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee; 21. Decides that the Council shall review the provisions of paragraph 20 above every sixty days in light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein; 22. Decides that upon the approval by the Council of the programme called for in paragraph 19 above and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above, the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect; 23. Decides that, pending action by the Council under paragraph 22 above, the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) shall be empowered to approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities under paragraph 20 above, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq; 24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Council, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, or promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of; (a) Arms and related matériel of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment; (b) Items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above not otherwise covered above; (c) Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above; (d) Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above; 25. Calls upon all States and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 above, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licences or any other arrangements; 26. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate Governments, to develop within sixty days, for the approval of the Council, guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 above and paragraph 27

Appendix 1 287 below, and to make them available to all States and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines periodically; 27. Calls upon all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance; 28. Agrees to review its decisions in paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 above, except for the items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and in any case one hundred and twenty days following passage of this resolution, taking into account Iraq’s compliance with the resolution and general progress towards the control of armaments in the region; 29. Decides that all States, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iraq, or of any person or body in Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions; G 30. Decides that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti and third country nationals still unaccounted for; 31. Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the SecretaryGeneral apprised as appropriate of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990. H 32. Requires Iraq to inform the Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism; I 33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990);

288 Appendix 1 34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of this resolution and to secure peace and security in the area. (Adopted by a vote of 12 in favour, 1 against (Cuba) and 2 abstentions (Ecuador, Yemen) Sponsors: Belgium, France, Romania, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire)

Appendix 2: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999) 17 December 1999

RESOLUTION 1284 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4084th meeting on 17 December 1999 The Security Council, Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 699 (1991) of 17 June 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996, 1153 (1998) of 20 February 1998, 1175 (1998) of 19 June 1998, 1242 (1999) of 21 May 1999 and 1266 (1999) of 4 October 1999, Recalling the approval by the Council in its resolution 715 (1991) of the plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in pursuance of paragraphs 10 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991), Welcoming the reports of the three panels on Iraq (S/1999/356), and having held a comprehensive consideration of them and the recommendations contained in them, Stressing the importance of a comprehensive approach to the full implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq and the need for Iraqi compliance with these resolutions, Recalling the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons as referred to in paragraph 14 of resolution 687 (1991), Concerned at the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and determined to improve that situation, Recalling with concern that the repatriation and return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains, present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990, pursuant to paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991 and paragraph 30 of resolution 687 (1991), have not yet been fully carried out by Iraq, Recalling that in its resolutions 686 (1991) and 687 (1991) the Council demanded that Iraq return in the shortest possible time all Kuwaiti property it had seized, and noting with regret that Iraq has still not complied fully with this demand, 289

290 Appendix 2 Acknowledging the progress made by Iraq towards compliance with the provisions of resolution 687 (1991), but noting that, as a result of its failure to implement the relevant Council resolutions fully, the conditions do not exist which would enable the Council to take a decision pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) to lift the prohibitions referred to in that resolution, Reiterating the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait, Iraq and the neighbouring States, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking into account that operative provisions of this resolution relate to previous resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, A 1. Decides to establish, as a subsidiary body of the Council, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) which replaces the Special Commission established pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) of resolution 687 (1991); 2. Decides also that UNMOVIC will undertake the responsibilities mandated to the Special Commission by the Council with regard to the verification of compliance by Iraq with its obligations under paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, that UNMOVIC will establish and operate, as was recommended by the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues, a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, which will implement the plan approved by the Council in resolution 715 (1991) and address unresolved disarmament issues, and that UNMOVIC will identify, as necessary in accordance with its mandate, additional sites in Iraq to be covered by the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification; 3. Reaffirms the provisions of the relevant resolutions with regard to the role of the IAEA in addressing compliance by Iraq with paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, and requests the Director General of the IAEA to maintain this role with the assistance and cooperation of UNMOVIC; 4. Reaffirms its resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 1051 (1996), 1154 (1998) and all other relevant resolutions and statements of its President, which establish the criteria for Iraqi compliance, affirms that the obligations of Iraq referred to in those resolutions and statements with regard to cooperation with the Special Commission, unrestricted access and provision of information will apply in respect of UNMOVIC, and decides in particular that Iraq shall allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport which they wish to inspect in accordance with the mandate of UNMOVIC, as well as to all officials and other persons under the authority of the Iraqi Government whom UNMOVIC wishes to interview so that UNMOVIC may fully discharge its mandate; 5. Requests the Secretary-General, within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, to appoint, after consultation with and subject to the approval of the Council, an Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC who will take up his mandated tasks as soon as

Appendix 2 291 possible, and, in consultation with the Executive Chairman and the Council members, to appoint suitably qualified experts as a College of Commissioners for UNMOVIC which will meet regularly to review the implementation of this and other relevant resolutions and provide professional advice and guidance to the Executive Chairman, including on significant policy decisions and on written reports to be submitted to the Council through the Secretary-General; 6. Requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, within 45 days of his appointment, to submit to the Council, in consultation with and through the Secretary-General, for its approval an organizational plan for UNMOVIC, including its structure, staffing requirements, management guidelines, recruitment and training procedures, incorporating as appropriate the recommendations of the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues, and recognizing in particular the need for an effective, cooperative management structure for the new organization, for staffing with suitably qualified and experienced personnel, who would be regarded as international civil servants subject to Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations, drawn from the broadest possible geographical base, including as he deems necessary from international arms control organizations, and for the provision of high quality technical and cultural training; 7. Decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA, not later than 60 days after they have both started work in Iraq, will each draw up, for approval by the Council, a work programme for the discharge of their mandates, which will include both the implementation of the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, and the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq pursuant to its obligations to comply with the disarmament requirements of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance, and further decides that what is required of Iraq for the implementation of each task shall be clearly defined and precise; 8. Requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA, drawing on the expertise of other international organizations as appropriate, to establish a unit which will have the responsibilities of the joint unit constituted by the Special Commission and the Director General of the IAEA under paragraph 16 of the export/import mechanism approved by resolution 1051 (1996), and also requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, in consultation with the Director General of the IAEA, to resume the revision and updating of the lists of items and technology to which the mechanism applies; 9. Decides that the Government of Iraq shall be liable for the full costs of UNMOVIC and the IAEA in relation to their work under this and other related resolutions on Iraq; 10. Requests Member States to give full cooperation to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates; 11. Decides that UNMOVIC shall take over all assets, liabilities and archives of the Special Commission, and that it shall assume the Special Commission’s part in agreements existing between the Special Commission and Iraq and between the United Nations and Iraq, and affirms that the Executive Chairman, the Commissioners

292 Appendix 2 and the personnel serving with UNMOVIC shall have the rights, privileges, facilities and immunities of the Special Commission; 12. Requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC to report, through the Secretary-General, to the Council, following consultation with the Commissioners, every three months on the work of UNMOVIC, pending submission of the first reports referred to in paragraph 33 below, and to report immediately when the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification is fully operational in Iraq; B 13. Reiterates the obligation of Iraq, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals referred to in paragraph 30 of resolution 687 (1991), to extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and calls upon the Government of Iraq to resume cooperation with the Tripartite Commission and Technical Subcommittee established to facilitate work on this issue; 14. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every four months on compliance by Iraq with its obligations regarding the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains, to report every six months on the return of all Kuwaiti property, including archives, seized by Iraq, and to appoint a high-level coordinator for these issues; C 15. Authorizes States, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 (a), 3 (b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions, to permit the import of any volume of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including financial and other essential transactions directly relating thereto, as required for the purposes and on the conditions set out in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) and subsequent provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions; 16. Underlines, in this context, its intention to take further action, including permitting the use of additional export routes for petroleum and petroleum products, under appropriate conditions otherwise consistent with the purpose and provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions; 17. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to approve, on the basis of proposals from the Secretary-General, lists of humanitarian items, including foodstuffs, pharmaceutical and medical supplies, as well as basic or standard medical and agricultural equipment and basic or standard educational items, decides, notwithstanding paragraph 3 of resolution 661 (1990) and paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), that supplies of these items will not be submitted for approval of that Committee, except for items subject to the provisions of resolution 1051 (1996), and will be notified to the Secretary-General and financed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995), and requests the Secretary-General to inform the Committee in a timely manner of all such notifications received and actions taken;

Appendix 2 293 18. Requests the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to appoint, in accordance with resolutions 1175 (1998) and 1210 (1998), a group of experts, including independent inspection agents appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 986 (1995), decides that this group will be mandated to approve speedily contracts for the parts and the equipments necessary to enable Iraq to increase its exports of petroleum and petroleum products, according to lists of parts and equipments approved by that Committee for each individual project, and requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide for the monitoring of these parts and equipments inside Iraq; 19. Encourages Member States and international organizations to provide supplementary humanitarian assistance to Iraq and published material of an educational character to Iraq; 20. Decides to suspend, for an initial period of six months from the date of the adoption of this resolution and subject to review, the implementation of paragraph 8 (g) of resolution 986 (1995); 21. Requests the Secretary-General to take steps to maximize, drawing as necessary on the advice of specialists, including representatives of international humanitarian organizations, the effectiveness of the arrangements set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions including the humanitarian benefit to the Iraqi population in all areas of the country, and further requests the Secretary-General to continue to enhance as necessary the United Nations observation process in Iraq, ensuring that all supplies under the humanitarian programme are utilized as authorized, to bring to the attention of the Council any circumstances preventing or impeding effective and equitable distribution and to keep the Council informed of the steps taken towards the implementation of this paragraph; 22. Requests also the Secretary-General to minimize the cost of the United Nations activities associated with the implementation of resolution 986 (1995) as well as the cost of the independent inspection agents and the certified public accountants appointed by him, in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 986 (1995); 23. Requests further the Secretary-General to provide Iraq and the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) with a daily statement of the status of the escrow account established by paragraph 7 of resolution 986 (1995); 24. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements, subject to Security Council approval, to allow funds deposited in the escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995) to be used for the purchase of locally produced goods and to meet the local cost for essential civilian needs which have been funded in accordance with the provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions, including, where appropriate, the cost of installation and training services; 25. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to take a decision on all applications in respect of humanitarian and essential civilian needs within a target of two working days of receipt of these applications from the SecretaryGeneral, and to ensure that all approval and notification letters issued by the Committee stipulate delivery within a specified time, according to the nature of

294 Appendix 2 the items to be supplied, and requests the Secretary-General to notify the Committee of all applications for humanitarian items which are included in the list to which the export/import mechanism approved by resolution 1051 (1996) applies; 26. Decides that Hajj pilgrimage flights which do not transport cargo into or out of Iraq are exempt from the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 661 (1990) and resolution 670 (1990), provided timely notification of each flight is made to the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), and requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements, for approval by the Security Council, to provide for reasonable expenses related to the Hajj pilgrimage to be met by funds in the escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995); 27. Calls upon the Government of Iraq: (i) to take all steps to ensure the timely and equitable distribution of all humanitarian goods, in particular medical supplies, and to remove and avoid delays at its warehouses; (ii) to address effectively the needs of vulnerable groups, including children, pregnant women, the disabled, the elderly and the mentally ill among others, and to allow freer access, without any discrimination, including on the basis of religion or nationality, by United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations to all areas and sections of the population for evaluation of their nutritional and humanitarian condition; (iii) to prioritize applications for humanitarian goods under the arrangements set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions; (iv) to ensure that those involuntarily displaced receive humanitarian assistance without the need to demonstrate that they have resided for six months in their places of temporary residence; (v) to extend full cooperation to the United Nations Office for Project Services mineclearance programme in the three northern Governorates of Iraq and to consider the initiation of the demining efforts in other Governorates; 28. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the progress made in meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people and on the revenues necessary to meet those needs, including recommendations on necessary additions to the current allocation for oil spare parts and equipment, on the basis of a comprehensive survey of the condition of the Iraqi oil production sector, not later than 60 days from the date of the adoption of this resolution and updated thereafter as necessary; 29. Expresses its readiness to authorize additions to the current allocation for oil spare parts and equipment, on the basis of the report and recommendations requested in paragraph 28 above, in order to meet the humanitarian purposes set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions; 30. Requests the Secretary-General to establish a group of experts, including oil industry experts, to report within 100 days of the date of adoption of this resolution on Iraq’s existing petroleum production and export capacity and to make recom-

Appendix 2 295 mendations, to be updated as necessary, on alternatives for increasing Iraq’s petroleum production and export capacity in a manner consistent with the purposes of relevant resolutions, and on the options for involving foreign oil companies in Iraq’s oil sector, including investments, subject to appropriate monitoring and controls; 31. Notes that in the event of the Council acting as provided for in paragraph 33 of this resolution to suspend the prohibitions referred to in that paragraph, appropriate arrangements and procedures will need, subject to paragraph 35 below, to be agreed by the Council in good time beforehand, including suspension of provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions; 32. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of paragraphs 15 to 30 of this resolution within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution; D 33. Expresses its intention, upon receipt of reports from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and from the Director General of the IAEA that Iraq has cooperated in all respects with UNMOVIC and the IAEA in particular in fulfilling the work programmes in all the aspects referred to in paragraph 7 above, for a period of 120 days after the date on which the Council is in receipt of reports from both UNMOVIC and the IAEA that the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification is fully operational, to suspend with the fundamental objective of improving the humanitarian situation in Iraq and securing the implementation of the Council’s resolutions, for a period of 120 days renewable by the Council, and subject to the elaboration of effective financial and other operational measures to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited items, prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq, and prohibitions against the sale, supply and delivery to Iraq of civilian commodities and products other than those referred to in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) or those to which the mechanism established by resolution 1051 (1996) applies; 34. Decides that in reporting to the Council for the purposes of paragraph 33 above, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC will include as a basis for his assessment the progress made in completing the tasks referred to in paragraph 7 above; 35. Decides that if at any time the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC or the Director General of the IAEA reports that Iraq is not cooperating in all respects with UNMOVIC or the IAEA or if Iraq is in the process of acquiring any prohibited items, the suspension of the prohibitions referred to in paragraph 33 above shall terminate on the fifth working day following the report, unless the Council decides to the contrary; 36. Expresses its intention to approve arrangements for effective financial and other operational measures, including on the delivery of and payment for authorized civilian commodities and products to be sold or supplied to Iraq, in order to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited items in the event of suspension of the prohibitions referred to in paragraph 33 above, to begin the elaboration of such measures not later than the date of the receipt of the initial reports referred to in paragraph 33 above, and to approve such arrangements before the Council decision in accordance with that paragraph;

296 Appendix 2 37. Further expresses its intention to take steps, based on the report and recommendations requested in paragraph 30 above, and consistent with the purpose of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions, to enable Iraq to increase its petroleum production and export capacity, upon receipt of the reports relating to the cooperation in all respects with UNMOVIC and the IAEA referred to in paragraph 33 above; 38. Reaffirms its intention to act in accordance with the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991) on the termination of prohibitions referred to in that resolution; 39. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and expresses its intention to consider action in accordance with paragraph 33 above no later than 12 months from the date of the adoption of this resolution provided the conditions set out in paragraph 33 above have been satisfied by Iraq. (Adopted by a vote of 11 in favour, none against and 4 abstentions (France, China, Malaysia and the Russian Federation))

Appendix 3: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) 8 November 2002

RESOLUTION 1441 (2002) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th meeting on 8 November 2002 The Security Council, Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President, Recalling also its resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its intention to implement it fully, Recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security, Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area, Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area, Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material, Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998, 297

298 Appendix 3 Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council’s repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people, Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq, Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a cease-fire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein, Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance, Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, Noting that the letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General is a necessary first step toward rectifying Iraq’s continued failure to comply with relevant Council resolutions, Noting further the letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq laying out the practical arrangements, as a follow-up to their meeting in Vienna, that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and expressing the gravest concern at the continued failure by the Government of Iraq to provide confirmation of the arrangements as laid out in that letter, Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring States, Commending the Secretary-General and members of the League of Arab States and its Secretary-General for their efforts in this regard, Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Appendix 3 299 1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991); 2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council; 3. Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, subcomponents, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material; 4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below; 5. Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC’s or the IAEA’s choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter; 6. Endorses the 8 October 2002 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq, which is annexed hereto, and decides that the contents of the letter shall be binding upon Iraq; 7. Decides further that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the presence of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks

300 Appendix 3 set forth in this resolution and all previous relevant resolutions and notwithstanding prior understandings, the Council hereby establishes the following revised or additional authorities, which shall be binding upon Iraq, to facilitate their work in Iraq: –

–

–

–

– –

–

–

–

UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall determine the composition of their inspection teams and ensure that these teams are composed of the most qualified and experienced experts available; All UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel shall enjoy the privileges and immunities, corresponding to those of experts on mission, provided in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA; UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have unrestricted rights of entry into and out of Iraq, the right to free, unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to Presidential Sites equal to that at other sites, notwithstanding the provisions of resolution 1154 (1998) of 2 March 1998; UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programmes and the associated research, development, and production facilities; Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient United Nations security guards; UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to declare, for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones, including surrounding areas and transit corridors, in which Iraq will suspend ground and aerial movement so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site being inspected; UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles; UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof; and UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to free import and use of equipment or materials for inspections and to seize and export any equipment, materials, or documents taken during inspections, without search of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or official or personal baggage;

8. Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution; 9. Requests the Secretary-General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

Appendix 3 301 10. Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA; 11. Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution; 12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security; 13. Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations; 14. Decides to remain seized of the matter. ANNEX (Not reproduced) (Adopted unanimously)

Notes Chapter 2 1 See, for example, United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 11 July 1969 from the representative of Iraq to the President of the Security Council concerning relations between Iraq and Iran, S/9323, 11 July 1969. 2 United Nations Security Council, 2248th Meeting, S/PV 2248, 28 September 1980. 3 United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Unresolved Disarmament Issues Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes 6 March 2003, UNMOVIC Working Document, 6 March 2003. 4 The first investigation in May 1983, included in Table 2.1 for completeness, to both Iran and Iraq was to investigate whether civilian areas had been attacked and not to investigate an alleged use of chemical weapons. 5 United Nations Security Council, Mission to Inspect Civilian Areas in Iran and Iraq which have been subject to Military Attack, S/15834, 20 June 1983. 6 United Nations Security Council, Mission to Inspect Civilian Areas in Iran and Iraq which have been subject to Military Attack, S/15834, 20 June 1983. 7 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Specialists Appointed by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran Concerning the Use of Chemical Weapons, S/16433, 26 March 1984. 8 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 17 April 1985 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, S/17127, 26 April 1985 and S/17127/Add.1, 30 April 1985. 9 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission Dispatched by the SecretaryGeneral to Investigate Allegations of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/17911, 12 March 1986. 10 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission Dispatched by the SecretaryGeneral to Investigate Allegations of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/18852, 8 May 1987. 11 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission Dispatched by the SecretaryGeneral to Investigate Allegations of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/19823, 25 April 1988. 12 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission Dispatched by the SecretaryGeneral to Investigate Allegations of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/20060, 20 July 1988. 13 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission Dispatched by the SecretaryGeneral to Investigate Allegations of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/20063, 25 July 1988. 14 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission Dispatched by the SecretaryGeneral to Investigate Allegations of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/20134, 19 August 1988. 15 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 479 (1980) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2248th meeting, on 28 September 1980, S/RES/479 (1980), 28 September 1980. 16 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 487 (1981) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2288th meeting, on 19 June 1981, S/RES/487 (1981), 19 June 1981. 302

Notes 303 17 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 522 (1982) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2399th meeting, on 4 October 1982, S/RES/522 (1982), 4 October 1982. 18 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 540 (1983) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2493rd meeting, on 31 October 1983, S/RES/540 (1983), 31 October 1983. 19 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Specialists Appointed by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran Concerning the Use of Chemical Weapons, S/16433, 26 March 1984. 20 United Nations Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, S/16454, 30 March 1984. 21 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 17 April 1985 from the SecretaryGeneral to the President of the Security Council, S/17127 and S/17127/Add. 1, 17 April 1985 and 30 April 1985. 22 United Nations Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, S/17130, 25 April 1985. 23 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 582 (1986) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2666th meeting, on 24 February 1986, S/RES/522 (1986), 24 February 1986. 24 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission Despatched by the SecretaryGeneral to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/17911, 12 March 1986. 25 United Nations Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, S/17932, 21 March 1986. 26 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 588 (1986) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2713th meeting, on 8 October 1986, S/RES/588 (1986), 4 October 1986. 27 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission Dispatched by the SecretaryGeneral to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/18852, 8 May 1987. 28 United Nations Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, S/18863, 14 May 1987. 29 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 598 (1987) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2750th meeting, on 20 July 1987, S/RES/598 (1987), 20 July 1987. 30 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission Dispatched by the SecretaryGeneral to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/19823, 25 April 1988. 31 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 612 (1988) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2812th meeting, on 9 May 1988, S/RES/612 (1988), 9 May 1988. 32 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission Dispatched by the SecretaryGeneral to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/20060, 20 July 1988. 33 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission Dispatched by the SecretaryGeneral to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/20063, 25 July 1988. 34 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Mission Dispatched by the SecretaryGeneral to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, S/20134, 19 August 1988. 35 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 620 (1988) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2825th meeting, on 26 August 1988, S/RES/620 (1988), 26 August 1988.

304 Notes 36 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 620 (1988) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2825th meeting, on 26 August 1988, S/RES/620 (1988), 26 August 1988. 37 Australia Group, The Australia Group’s Origins. Available at http://www.australiagroup.net/en/origins.htm. 38 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2004/693, 27 August 2004. However, this report states that these numbers do not include tens of thousands of mortar bombs filled with riot-control agents and smoke munitions. 39 Considerable insight into the conduct of these investigations is available from personal accounts in Peter Dunn, Chemical Aspects of the Gulf war 1984–1987 Investigations by the United Nations, Materials Research Laboratories, 30 November 1987. Modified versions of the 1984 and 1986 personal accounts were published in Peter Dunn, The Chemical War: Journey to Iran, NBC Defense & Technology International, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1986, pp. 28–35 and Peter Dunn, The Chemical War: Iran Revisited – 1986, NBC Defense & Technology International, Vol. 1, No. 3, June 1986, pp. 32–9 respectively. 40 The Australia Group was so-named because the meetings of the like-minded states who wished to harmonize their export controls took place at the Australian Embassy in Paris, France. For more information see Australia Group, The Australia Group’s Origins. Available at http://www.australiagroup.net/en/origins.htm. 41 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/42/37 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons C Measures to Uphold the Authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to Support the Conclusion of a Chemical Weapons Convention, A/Res/42/37 C, 30 November 1987. 42 United Nations General Assembly, Chemical and (Bacteriological) Biological Weapons, Report by Secretary-General, A/44/561, 4 October 1989. 43 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/45/57 Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons C Measures to Uphold the Authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, A/Res/45/57 C, 4 December 1990.

Chapter 3 1 2

3 4

5

6

7

Graham S. Pearson, The UNSCOM Saga: Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation, Macmillan Press Ltd./St. Martin’s Press Inc., 1999. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 660 (1990) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2932nd meeting, on 2 August 1990, S/RES/660 (1990), 2 August 1990. United Nations Security Council, 2932nd meeting, S/PV.2932, 2 August 1990. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 661 (1990) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2932nd meeting, on 6 August 1990, S/RES/661 (1990), 6 August 1990. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 678 (1990) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2963rd meeting, on 29 November 1990, S/RES/678 (1990), 29 November 1990. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 17 January 1991 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/22090, 17 January 1991. United Nations Security Council, Identical letters from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the President of the Security Council and

Notes 305

8

9 10

11

12

13

14

15

16 17

18

19 20

21

22

to the Secretary-General stating that Iraq agrees to comply fully with all Security Council resolutions, S/22275, 27 February 1991 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 686 (1991) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2978th meeting, on 2 March 1991, S/RES/686 (1991), 2 March 1991. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 687 (1991) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting, on 3 April 1991, S/RES/687 (1991), 3 April 1991. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 4 April 1991 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary-General accepting the provisions of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), S/22457, 8 April 1991. United Nations Security Council, Identical letters from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General stating that Iraq has no choice but to accept the provisions of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), S/22456, 6 April 1991. United Nations Security Council, Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Permanent Representative of Iraq acknowledging receipt of Iraq’s communication of 6 April 1991 and, noting, this precondition having been met, that the formal cease-fire is therefore in effect, S/22485, 11 April 1991. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on setting up a Special Commission (UNSCOM) to carry out on-site inspection of Iraq’s biological, chemical and missile capabilities, S/22508, 18 April 1991. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General submitting a plan for immediate on-site inspection by the Special Commission (UNSCOM) and for destruction, removal or rendering harmless of relevant weapons and facilities, S/22614, 17 May 1991. For an account of the issues relating to the destruction of chemical weapons see Graham S. Pearson and Richard S. Magee, Critical Evaluation of Proven Chemical Weapons Destruction Technologies, IUPAC Technical Report, Pure Appl. Chem, Vol. 74, No. 2, 187–316 (2002). United Nations Security Council, Resolution 699 (1991) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2994th meeting, on 17 June 1991, S/RES/699 (1991), 17 June 1991. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council deploring Iraq’s denial of access to an inspection site and asking the Secretary-General to send a high level mission to Baghdad immediately, S/22746, 28 June 1991. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 707 (1991) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3004th meeting, on 15 August 1991, S/RES/707 (1991), 15 August 1991. United Nations Security Council, Report of a high-level mission sent to Iraq from 30 June to 3 July 1991, S/22761, 5 July 1991. United Nations Security Council, Letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the President of the Security Council concerning Iraq’s views on Security Council Resolutions 705 (1991) and 707 (1991), S/22957, 16 August 1991. United Nations Security Council, Letter from the Charge d’Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations to the Secretary-General transmitting a letter dated 28 August 1991 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq concerning Iraq’s views on Security Council resolution 707 (1991), S/22998, 3 September 1991. United Nations Security Council, Statement to the press by the President of the Security Council concerning implementation of Resolution 707 (1991) and the

306 Notes

23

24

25

26

27 28

29 30

31

32

33

34

35

36 37

38

activities of a UNSCOM inspection team in Iraq, UN Press Release SC/5306-IK/54, 23 September 1991. United Nations Security Council, Statement to the press by the President of the Security Council concerning the activities of a UNSCOM inspection team in Iraq, UN Press Release SC/5307-IK/61, 24 September 1991. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General submitting the plan, revised pursuant to the adoption of Security Council Resolution 707 (1991), for future monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with the destruction or removal of weapons specified in Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), S/22871/ Rev.1, 2 October 1991. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 715 (1991) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3012th meeting, on 11 October 1991, S/RES/715 (1991), 11 October 1991. Iraq rejection of OMV plan as reported in paragraphs 12 and 13 of United Nations Security Council, Special Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, S/23606, 18 February 1992. United Nations Security Council, First Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, S/23165, 25 October 1991. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the status of compliance by Iraq with the obligations placed upon it under certain of the Security Council resolutions relating to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, S/23514, 25 January 1992. United Nations Security Council, Special Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, S/23606, 18 February 1992. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning Iraq’s compliance with relevant resolutions of the Council, S/23609, 19 February 1992. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning UNSCOM’s special mission to Baghdad, 21–24 February 1992, and Iraq’s compliance with relevant resolutions of the Council, S/23663, 28 February 1992. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning Iraq’s compliance with the relevant Council resolutions, S/23709, 12 March 1992. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning the safety and security of UNSCOM’s aerial surveillance flights over Iraq, S/23813, 15 April 1992. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning the refusal by Iraq to permit a team of UNSCOM inspectors to enter certain premises, S/24240, 6 July 1992. United Nations Security Council, Statement to the press by the President of the Security Council concerning the activities of UNSCOM, UN Press Release SC/5484-IK/ 125, 15 October 1992. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning United Nations flights into Iraqi territory, S/25081, 8 January 1993. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning various actions by Iraq vis-a-vis UNIKOM and UNSCOM, S/25091, 11 January 1993. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning the installation of monitoring devices by UNSCOM, S/25970, 18 June 1993.

Notes 307 39 40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50 51

52 53

United Nations Security Council, Third Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, S/24108, 16 June 1992. United Nations Security Council, Third Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with relevant parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687(1991), S/25620, 19 April 1993. United National Security Council, Fourth Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM on the status of the implementation of the plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with the relevant parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), S/26684, 5 November 1993. United Nations Security Council, Letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the President of the Security Council transmitting a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq conveying Iraq’s acceptance of its obligations under Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), S/26811, 26 November 1993. United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with relevant parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), S/1994/489, 22 April 1994. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning cooperation by Iraq with UNSCOM and reports of movements of Iraqi troops, S/PRST/1994/58, 8 October 1994. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 949 (1994) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3438th meeting, on 15 October 1994, S/RES/949 (1994), 15 October 1994. United Nations Security Council, Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with relevant parts of Section C of Security Council Resolutions 687 (1991), S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994. United Nations Security Council, Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with relevant parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), S/1995/284, 10 April 1995. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 986 (1995) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3519th meeting, on 14 April 1995, S/RES/986 (1995), 14 April 1995. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 1 June 1995 from the SecretaryGeneral to the President of the Security Council concerning Resolution 986 (1995), S/1995/495, 19 June 1995. United Nations Security Council, Ninth Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, S/1995/494, 20 June 1995. United Nations Security Council, Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with relevant parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), S/1995/864, 11 October 1995. United Nations Security Council, Tenth Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, S/1995/1038, 17 December 1995. United Nations Security Council, Letter from the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee to the President of the Security Council forwarding a proposal for a mechanism to monitor Iraq’s exports and imports of dual-purpose capabilities, S/1995/ 1017, 7 December 1995.

308 Notes 54

55

56

57

58 59

60 61 62 63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1051 (1996) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3644th meeting, on 27 March 1996, S/RES/1051 (1996), 27 March 1996. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Resolution 687 (1991), S/1996/258, 11 April 1996. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 9 March 1996 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1996/182, 12 March 1996. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 12 March 1996 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), S/1996/183, 12 March 1996. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1996/11, 19 March 1996. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1060 (1996) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3672nd meeting, on 12 June 1996, S/RES/1060 (1996), 12 June 1996. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1996/28, 14 June 1996. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1996/36, 23 August 1996. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1996/49, 30 December 1996. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 24 June 1996 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1996/463, 24 June 1996. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 3 September 1996 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1996/714, 3 September 1996. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 24 September 1996 from the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the President of the Security Council, S/1996/805, 30 September 1996. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Resolution 687 (1991), S/1997/301, 11 April 1997. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 22 April 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1997/361, 8 May 1997. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Resolution 687 (1991), S/1997/774, 6 October 1997. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 12 October 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1997/789, 13 October 1997. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 20 November 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1997/908, 20 November 1997.

Notes 309 71 72

73

74

75 76

77 78 79

80 81 82

83 84

85

86

87

88

United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1997/33, 18 June 1997. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1115 (1997) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3792nd meeting, on 21 June 1997, S/RES/1115 (1997), 21 June 1997. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1134 (1997) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3826th meeting, on 23 October 1997, S/RES/1134 (1997), 23 October 1997. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 29 October 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1997/829, 29 October 1997. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1997/49, 29 October 1997. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1137 (1997) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3831st meeting, on 12 November 1997, S/RES/1137 (1997), 12 November 1997. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1997/51, 13 November 1997. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1997/56, 22 December 1997. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 12 January 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/27, 13 January 1998. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1998/1, 14 January 1998. United Nations Special Commission, Letter dated 24 November from the Executive Chairman to the President of the Security Council, 24 November 1997. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 24 November 1997 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1997/922, 24 November 1997. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1997/54, 3 December 1997. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 17 December 1997 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1997/987, 17 December 1997. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 19 February 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/176, 27 February 1998. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 27 February 1998 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/166, 27 February 1998. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1154 (1998) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3858th meeting, on 2 March 1998, S/RES/1154 (1997), 2 March 1998. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 8 April 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/308, 8 April 1998.

310 Notes 89

90 91

92

93 94

95

96

97

98

99 100

101 102

103 104

105

United Nations Security Council, Report of the Executive Chairman on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Resolution 687 (1991), S/1998/332, 16 April 1998. United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1998/11, 14 May 1998. Provided as Annex I to United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 16 June 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/529, 17 June 1998. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 5 August 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/719, 5 August 1998. United Nations Special Commission, Letter dated 19 August 1998 the Executive Chairman addressed to the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, 19 August 1998. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 5 August 1998 from the Charge D’Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/718, 14 August 1998. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 12 August 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/767, 18 August 1998. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 18 August 1998 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), S/1998/769, 18 August 1998. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1194 (1998) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3924th meeting, on 9 September 1998, S/RES/1194 (1997), 9 September 1998. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1205 (1998) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3939th meeting, on 5 November 1998, S/RES/1205 (1998), 5 November 1998. United Nations Special Commission, Letter dated 26 August 1998 from the Executive Chairman, 26 August 1998. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1194 (1998) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3924th meeting, on 9 September 1998, S/RES/1194 (1998), 9 September 1998. United Nations Secretary-General, Letter dated 5 October 1998 addressed to the President of the Security Council, 5 October 1998. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Executive Chairman on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Resolution 687 (1991), S/1998/920, 6 October 1998. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 30 October 1998 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General, 30 October 1998. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 11 November 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/1059, 11 November 1998. Secretary-General, Letter dated 13 November 1998 addressed to the President of the Republic of Iraq. Available as Annex I to United Nations Security Council, Letter

Notes 311

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107 108

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110 111 112 113 114

dated 14 November 1998 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/1077, 14 November 1998. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 14 November 1998 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/1077, 14 November 1998. United Nations Security Council, Press Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Press Release SC/6596-IK/258, 15 November 1998. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 20 November 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the SecretaryGeneral pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/1106, 20 November 1998. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 15 December 1998 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/1172, 15 December 1998. Prime Minister Tony Blair, Use of military force against Iraq, 10, Downing Street, London, 16 December 1998. Available on http://www.number-10.gov.uk. President Bill Clinton, Statement by the President, 16 December 1998. Available on http:// www.pub.whitehouse.gov. Prime Minister Tony Blair, Statement on Iraq, House of Commons, London, 17 December 1998. Available on http://www.number-10.gov.uk. Prime Minister Tony Blair, Assessment of Operation Desert Fox and Forward Strategy, London, 20 December 1998. Available on http://www.fco.gov.uk. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Executive Chairman on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Resolution 687 (1991), S/1999/401, 9 April 1999 and United Nations Security Council, Report of the Executive Chairman on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Resolution 687 (1991), S/1999/1037, 8 October 1999.

Chapter 4 1 Graham S. Pearson, The UNSCOM Saga: Chemical and Biological Weapons NonProliferation, Macmillan Press Ltd./St. Martin’s Press Inc., 1999. 2 Graham S. Pearson, The UNSCOM Saga: Chemical and Biological Weapons NonProliferation, Macmillan Press Ltd./St. Martin’s Press Inc., 1999. 3 Memorandum by Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission, Iraq’s … Biological Weapons Programme: UNSCOM’s experiences, 20 November 1996, circulated to States Parties at the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996. 4 United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 25 November– 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva 1996. 5 The exception to this was in respect of the Executive Chairman. This was initially Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of Sweden who was replaced on 1 July 1998 by Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia. At the same time, Ambassador Johan Molander of Sweden became a Special Commissioner. The previous Special Commissioner for Australia was replaced by Ambassador Butler.

312 Notes 6 United Nations Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, S/23500 dated 31 January 1992. 7 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Resolution 687 (1991), S/1996/848, 11 October 1996. 8 Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 January 1997, said that the director of the Department of Trade and Industry in London had told him that ‘if you put this regime into place, it will be easy for us to trade with Iraq on relatively sensitive items than it would be for us to trade with another country’. Because an export to Iraq will be declared, the export/import mechanism will ensure that the exported item is not used for prohibited purposes. Consequently licenses can be more readily given and in that sense trade on sensitive material can be expanded. 9 Chemical Weapons Conventions Bulletin, Criminalizing BW, CWCB Issue No. 31, March 1996. 10 CBW Conventions Bulletin, A Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical Weapons under International Criminal Law, CWCB Issue No. 42, December 1998. See also editorial International criminal law and sanctions to reinforce the BWC in CBW Conventions Bulletin, CBWCB Issue No. 54, December 2001.

Chapter 5 1 United Nations Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, S/1999/100, 30 January 1999. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/ unscmdoc.htm 2 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 27 March 1999, from the Chairman of the Panels established pursuant to the Note by the President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1999/356, 30 March 1999. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/ documents/docslist.htm 3 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 27 January 1999 from the Permanent Representatives of the Netherlands and Slovenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1999/94, 29 January 1999. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscmdoc.htm 4 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1284 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4084th meeting, on 17 December 1999, S/RES/1284 (1999), 17 December 1999. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/docslist.htm

Chapter 6 1 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 26 January 2000 from the SecretaryGeneral addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2000/60, 27 January 2000. 2 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 27 January 2000 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, S/2000/61, 27 January 2000. 3 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 7 February 2000 from the SecretaryGeneral addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2000/90, 7 February 2000. 4 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 10 March 2000 from the SecretaryGeneral addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2000/207, 10 March 2000.

Notes 313 5 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2000/292, 6 April 2000. 6 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 13 April 2000 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, S/2000/311, 13 April 2000. 7 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2000/516, 1 June 2000. 8 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2000/835, 28 August 2000. 9 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2000/516, 1 June 2000. 10 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2000/835, 28 August 2000. 11 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2000/1134, 1 December 2000. 12 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2000/177, 27 February 2001. 13 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2001/515, 24 May 2001. 14 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2001/833, 30 August 2001. 15 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2001/1126, 29 November 2001. 16 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2002/195, 26 February 2002. 17 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2002/606, 31 May 2002. 18 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2002/981, 3 September 2002. 19 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2002/1303, 27 November 2002. 20 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2002/1034, 16 September 2002. 21 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1441 (2002) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th meeting, on 8 November 2002, S/RES/1441 (2002), 8 November 2002. 22 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1441 (2002) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th meeting, on 8 November 2002, S/RES/1441 (2002), 8 November 2002. 23 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 13 November 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2002/1242, 13 November 2002. 24 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 25 November 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2002/1294, 25 November 2002. 25 United Nations Security Council, 4692nd Meeting, S/PV.4692, 27 January 2003. 26 United Nations Security Council, 4701th Meeting, S/PV.4701, 5 February 2003. 27 United Nations Security Council, 4707th Meeting, S/PV.4707, 14 February 2003. 28 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2003/232, 28 February 2003. 29 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2003/580, 30 May 2003.

314 Notes 30 United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Unresolved Disarmament Issues Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes 6 March 2003, UNMOVIC Working Document, 6 March 2003. 31 United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Draft Work Programme, UNMOVIC Document, 17 March 2003. 32 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2003/580, 30 May 2003. 33 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1483 (2003) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4761st meeting, on 22 May 2003, S/RES/1483 (2003), 22 May 2003. 34 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2003/844, 28 August 2003. 35 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2003/1135, 26 November 2003. 36 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2004/160, 27 February 2004. 37 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2004/435, 28 May 2004. 38 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2004/693, 27 August 2004. 39 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2004/924, 26 November 2004. 40 Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Three Volumes, 30 September 2004. 41 Brian Jones, Intelligence, Verification and Iraq’s WMD, VERTIC Yearbook, 2004, Chapter 10, 18pp. 42 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1051 (1996) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3644th meeting, on 27 March 1996, S/RES/1051(1996), 27 March 1996. 43 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1382 (2001) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4431st meeting, on 29 November 2001, S/RES/1382(2001), 29 November 2001. 44 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 3 May 2002 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2002/515, 3 May 2002. 45 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1409 (2002) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4531st meeting, on 14 May 2002, S/RES/1409(2002), 14 May 2002. 46 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1483 (2003) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4761st meeting, on 22 May 2003, S/RES/1483(2003), 22 May 2003.

Chapter 7 1 UK Government, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, September 2002. Available at http://www.pm.gov.uk 2 United States Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programmes, October 2002 (28 pages). Available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/ reports/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm. An 8 page summary of the Key Judgments from the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2003/07/wh071803.html and at http://www.global security.org/intell/library/news/2003/intell-030718-wh.htm. A subsequent statement by Stu Cohen, Iraq’s WMD Programmes: Culling Hard Facts from Soft Myths, 28 November 2003 available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/

Notes 315

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4

5

6

7

8

9 10

11 12

13

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press_release/2003/pr11282003.html makes it clear that the original October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate was a 90 page document. White House, Senior Administration Official Holds Background Briefing on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq, as Released by the White House, July 18, 2003. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2003/07/wh071803.html and at http:// www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/2003/intell-030718-wh.htm. Central Intelligence Agency, Director of Central Intelligence, Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet on the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s Continuing Programmes for Weapons of Mass Destruction, 11 August 2003. Available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/ 2003/pr08112003.htm. Department of Defense, IRAQ: What Does Disarmament Look Like?, Remarks as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, NY, Thursday, January 23, 2003. Available at http:// www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/s20030123-depsecdef2.html. A shorter version was also circulated by the White House, What Does Disarmament Look Like, 23 January 2003. Available at http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/16820.htm. 10 Downing Street, Iraq – its infrastructure of concealment, deception and intimidation, January 2003 issued 3 February 2003. Available at http:// www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page1470.asp. Although the statement and presentation made by Secretary of State Colin Powell are available on http://www.state.gov and elsewhere, the United Nations record of the Security Council meeting provides also the remarks made by the other members of the Security Council following the presentation. United Nations Security Council, 4701st Meeting, S/PV.4701, 5 February 2003. Available at http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact2003.htm. These mobile biological production facilities were described in greater detail in May 2003 in a CIA/DIA publication. Central Intelligence Agency/Defence Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants, 28 May 2003. Available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraqi_mobile_plants/ index.html. United Nations Security Council, 4701st Meeting, S/PV.4701, 5 February 2003. The White House, President Bush Addresses the Nation, 10.16pm EST, 19 March 2003. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/2003031917.html. 10 Downing Street, Prime Minister’s Address to the Nation, 20 March 2003. Available at http://www.pm.gov.uk/print/page3327.asp. House Armed Services Committee, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, Statement of the Honorable Jim Saxton, 19 March 2003. Available at http://www.house.gov/hasc/pressreleases/2003/03-03-19saxton.htm. House Armed Services Committee, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, Statement by Brigadier General Stephen V. Reeves, Programme Executive Officer for the Chemical and Biological Defense Programme, 19 March 2003. Available at http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/ 08thcongress/03-03-19reeves.html. House of Commons, Iraq (Military Operations), Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon), 26 March 2003. Available at http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030326/debtext/ 30326-05.htm#30326-05_head0. House of Commons, Iraq and the Middle East, Statement by the Prime Minister (Mr. Tony Blair), 14 April 2003. Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030414/debtext/30414-05.htm#30414-05_head0.

316 Notes 16 The White House, President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended, Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln at sea off the coast of San Diego, California, 1 May 2003. Available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html. 17 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2003/538, 8 May 2003. 18 Joseph Cirincone, Jessica T. Mathews, George Perkovich with Alexis Orton, WMD in Iraq Evidence and Implications, January 2004, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at http://www.ceip.org. 19 Joseph Cirincone, Jessica T. Mathews, George Perkovich with Alexis Orton, WMD in Iraq Evidence and Implications, January 2004, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Table 1, p. 19. Available at http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/ Iraq3table1.pdf. 20 Department of Defense, Briefing on the Iraq Survey Group, 30 May 2003. Available at http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/2003/tr20030530-0231.html. 21 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1483 (2003) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4761st meeting, on 22 May 2003, S/RES/1483 (2003), 22 May 2003. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2003.htm. 22 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2003/538, 8 May 2003. 23 Central Intelligence Agency, Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, The House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2 October 2003. Available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/ 2003/david_kay_10022003.html. 24 United Nations Security Council, 4869th Meeting, S/PV.4869, 21 November 2003. 25 United States Senate Armed Services Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programmes, Hearing, 28 January 2004. 26 United Nations Security Council, 4914th Meeting, S/PV.4914, 24 February 2004. 27 Arms Control Association, Searching for the Truth About Iraq’s WMD An interview with David Kay, March 5, 2004. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/ aca/midmonth/2004March/Kay.asp. Also David Kay : Il faut reconnaître nos erreurs pour restaurer notre crédibilité, Le Figaro, 19 March 2004. Available at http:// www.lefigaro.fr/. 28 Charles Duelfer, Testimony to the US Congress by Mr. Charles Duelfer, Director of Central Intelligence Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programmes, March 30, 2004. Available at http:// www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/tenet_testimony_03302004.html. 29 United Nations Security Council, 4971st Meeting, S/PV.4971, 19 May 2004. 30 United States Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, 30 September 2004. 31 House of Commons, Iraq, Statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Jack Straw), 12 October 2004. Available at http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/cm041012/debtext/ 41012-09.htm.

Notes 317 32 Adam Bye, Iraq: The Dossier, UK Mission New York letter to Mark Sedwill, PS to Foreign Secretary dated 12 September 2002. 33 United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 7 July 2004. Available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/iraqreport2.pdf. 34 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terms of Reference. Available at http://www.butlerreview.org.uk/terms-of-reference/index.asp. 35 The Stationery Office, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of a Committee of Privy Councillors, 14 July 2004. Available at http:// www.butlerreview.org.uk/report/index.asp. 36 Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Bloomsbury, London, 2004, p. 112. 37 Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Inquiry into Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Parliamentary Paper No. 47/2004; Tabled 1 March 2004. Available at http:// www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pjcaad/WMD/report.htm. 38 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 27 January 1999 from the Permanent Representatives of the Netherlands and Slovenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1999/94, 29 January 1999, pp. 148–9. 39 This date is shown incorrectly in the Australian Senate report and should read 29 January 1999.

Chapter 8 1 UNMOVIC Working Document, Unresolved Disarmament Issues Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons, 6 March 2003, Appendix A Historical Account of Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes, pp. 135–73. Available at http://www.unmovic.org. 2 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 27 January 1999 from the Permanent Representatives of the Netherlands and Slovenia to the President of the Security Council, 29 January 1999, S/1999/94. Available at http://www.unscom.org. 3 Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, three volumes, 30 September 2004. 4 Rolf Ekeus, private communication, 25 September 2004. 5 Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Vol. I, 30 September 2004, p. 30. 6 Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Vol. I, 30 September 2004, p. 9. 7 Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Vol. III, 30 September 2004, p. 33. 8 UNMOVIC Draft Work Programme, 17 March 2003. Available at http:// www.unmovic.org. 9 UNMOVIC Working Document, Unresolved Disarmament Issues Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons, 6 March 2003, p. 151. Available at http://www.unmovic.org. 10 It is understood from UNMOVIC that their evidence about dynamic firings relates to the use of anthrax simulant and not to anthrax itself. 11 David Kay, Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, The House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, October 2, 2003. Available at www.cia.gov/cia/public_affaris/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html.

318 Notes

Chapter 9 1 Arms Control Today, An Interview with Hans Blix, 16 June 2003. Available at http://www. armscontrol.org/events/blixinterview_june03.asp. 2 Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Bloomsbury, London, 2004. 3 Adam Bye, Iraq: The Dossier, UK Mission New York letter to Mark Sedwill, PS to Foreign Secretary dated 12 September 2002. 4 Central Intelligence Agency, Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, The House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2 October 2003. Available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html. 5 David Kay, Former Head of the Iraq Survey Group, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 28 January 2004. Available at: http://www.ceip.org/ files/projects/ npp/pdf/Iraq/kaytestimony.pdf. 6 Arms Control Association, Searching for the Truth About Iraq’s WMD An interview with David Kay, March 5, 2004. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/ aca/midmonth/March/Kay.asp. 7 Charles Duelfer, Testimony to the US Congress by Mr. Charles Duelfer, Director of Central Intelligence Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programmes, 30 March 2004. Available at http://www.cia.gov/ cia/ public_affairs/speeches/2004/tenet_testimony03302004.html. 8 Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, three volumes, 30 September 2004. 9 US Department of State, Joint U.S./UK/Russian Statement on Biological Weapons, 14 September 1992. Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/ joint_bio_weapons.htm. 10 Accounts of the trilateral process are provided in David Kelly, The Trilateral Agreement: lessons for biological weapons verification, VERTIC Verification Yearbook 2002. Available at http://www.vertic.org/assets/VY_02Kelly.pdf and in Michael Moodie, The Soviet Union, Russia and the Biological Weapons Convention, The Non-Proliferation Review, Spring 2001, pp. 61–69. Available at http://www. cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol08/81/81moodie.pdf. 11 The Biopreparat organization is described in detail in Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard, 1999, Hutchinson, London. 12 Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard, 1999, Hutchinson, London, pp. 5–7. 13 Michael Moodie, The Soviet Union, Russia and the Biological Weapons Convention, The Non-Proliferation Review, Spring 2001, pp. 61–69. Available at http://www. cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol08/81/81moodie.pdf. 14 US Department of Defense, Office of Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 57. Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ pubs/ptr20010110.pdf. 15 US State Department, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments, 1 December 2000 to 31 December 2001, July 2003. Available at http://www.state.gov/t/vc/rls/rpt/22322.htm. 16 Ken Alibek in Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard, 1999, Hutchinson, London, mentions that he heard that several specialists in the Soviet Union biological warfare programme went to Iraq and that Russia had opened negotiations with Iraq in June 1995 for the sale of large industrial fermentation vessels similar

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24

25

to those used in Russia to develop and manufacture biological weapons; these negotiations were later called off. Arms Control Today, Shifting Priorities: UNMOVIC and the Future of Inspections in Iraq: An Interview With Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, 23 February 2000. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_03/remr00.asp. Rolf Ekeus, Iraq’s Real Weapons Threat, The Washington Post, 29 June 2003. Available at http://www.un.int/usa/03ekeus0629.htm. PBS (Public Broadcasting Service) Online NewsHour, A NewsHour Transcript with Jim Lehrer, Weapons Search, Rolf Ekeus, a United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1997, offers his views on the continuing failure to find banned weapons in Iraq, 22 September 2003. Available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ bb/middle_east/ july-dec03/ekeus_9-22.html. Charles Krauthammer, WMD in Haystack, The Washington Post, 10 October 2003, p. A27. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/ A6320-2003Oct9? language=printer. Rolf Ekeus, Reassessment: The IISS Strategic Dossier on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, Survival, Vol. 46, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 73–88. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference of the States Parties, Note by the Director-General Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on Developments in Science and Technology, RC-1/DG.2, 23 April 2003. Available at http://www.opcw.org. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference of the States Parties, Report of the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (First Review Conference), 28 April–9 May 2003, RC-1/5, 9 May 2003. Available at http:// www.opcw.org. United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Final Declaration, Geneva, 1996. Available at http://www.opbw.org. Graham S. Pearson, The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference, Report from Geneva, Review No. 18, CBW Conventions Bulletin, 58, December 2002, pp. 19–26.

Chapter 10 1 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 620 (1988) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2825th meeting, on 26 August 1988, S/RES/620 (1988), 26 August 1988. 2 Australia Group, The Australia Group’s Origins. Available at http:// www.australiagroup.net/en/origins.htm. 3 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/37/98 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons D Provisional procedures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, A/Res/37/98 D, 13 December 1982. Available at http:// www.un.org/ documents/ga/res/37/a37r098.htm. 4 United Nations General Assembly, Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, Report by the Secretary-General, A/44/561, 4 October 1989. 5 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/45/57 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons C Measures to Uphold the Authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, A/Res/45/57 C, 4 December 1990. Available at http://www.un.org/ documents/ga/res/45/a45r057.htm.

320 Notes 6 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/35/144 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons C, A/Res/35/144 C, 12 December 1980. Available at http://www.un.org/ documents/ga/res/35/a35r144.pdf. 7 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/36/96 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons C, A/Res/36/96 C, 9 December 1981. Available at http://www.un.org/ documents/ga/res/36/a36r096.htm. 8 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/37/98 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons D Provisional procedures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, A/Res/37/98 D, 13 December 1982. Available at http:// www.un.org/ documents/ga/res/37/a37r098.htm. 9 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/38/187 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons C Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, A/Res/38/187 C, 20 December 1983. Available at http://www.un.org/documents/ ga/res/38/a38r187.htm. 10 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/39/65 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons E Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, A/Res/39/65 E, 12 December 1984. Available at http://www.un.org/documents/ ga/res/39/a39r065.htm. 11 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/42/37 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons C Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, A/Res/42/ 37 C, 30 November 1987. Available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/ a42r037.htm. 12 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/43/74 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons A Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, A/Res/43/74 A, 7 December 1988. Available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r074.htm. 13 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/44/115 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons B Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, A/Res/44/115 B, 15 December 1989. Available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r115.htm. 14 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/45/57 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons C Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, A/Res/45/57 C, 4 December 1990. Available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r057.htm. 15 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 17 December 1997 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1997/987, 17 December 1997. 16 United Nations Secretary-General, Letter dated 5 October 1998 addressed to the President of the Security Council, 5 October 1998. 17 Stephen Rademaker quoted by Wendy Lubetkin, U.S. Welcomes Biological Weapons Convention Work Plan, Washington File, 15 November 2002. Available at http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2002/021115/epf511.htm. This states that ‘Rademaker said the United States is committed to the BWC because it establishes the important norm in international law that the possession of biological weapons is “immoral and illegal.” But he added that the U.S. has long believed that the BWC is “inherently unverifiable.”’ 18 United States Department of State, New Ways to Strengthen the International Regime Against Biological Weapons, Fact Sheet, Bureau of Arms Control, 19 October 2001.

Notes 321

19

20

21 22

23 24 25

26

27 28

29 30

31 32

33

Available at: http://www.state.gov/t/ac/bw/fs/2001/7909.htm. This fact sheet includes the following: ‘Conventional wisdom has held that the only meaningful way to strengthen the BWC is through verification measures, such as those which accompany treaties controlling other weapon types. But the changing nature of the BW threat and the dual-use and nondescript nature of BW-capable facilities make it impossible to determine a reasonably bounded set of facilities that would be subject to mandatory declaration and inspection. Efforts to inspect large numbers of facilities in countries whose activities are not in question will only place a burden on industry, academia, and biodefense programmes without providing meaningful verification gains. In this respect, biological weapons differ from traditional chemical weapons, and the verification model of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) does not appropriately address the threat that the BWC seeks to eliminate.’ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1284 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4084th meeting, on 17 December 1999, S/RES/1284 (1999), 17 December 1999. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/docslist.htm. United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Unresolved Disarmament Issues Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes 6 March 2003, UNMOVIC Working Document, 6 March 2003. United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Draft Work Programme, UNMOVIC Document, 17 March 2003. David Kay, Searching for the Truth about Iraq’s WMD An Interview with David Kay, 15 March 2004. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/aca/midmonth/March/ Kay.asp. David Kay, Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, 28 January 2004. United Nations, NPT Status. Available at http://disarmament.un.org:8080/ TreatyStatus.nsf. International Atomic Energy Agency, The Text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/172, 22 February 1973. Available at http:// www.iaea.org/Publications/ Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc172.pdf. International Atomic Energy Agency, The Safeguards System Of The International Atomic Energy Agency (‘The Agency’). Available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf. Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2004, Bloomsbury, London. p. 34. United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 6 October 1997 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy to the Secretary-General, S/1997/779, 8 October 1997. Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2004, Bloomsbury, London. pp. 22–3. Hans Blix, The Value of Inspections through International Organizations, Eighth International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Gothenburg, 3 June 2004. Colin Powell, United Nations Security Council, 4714th meeting, S/PV.4714, 7 March 2003. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2003.htm. Condoleeza Rice, 9 March 2003, as quoted in footnote 3 to Arms Control Today, An Interview with Hans Blix, 16 June 2003, Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/ events/blixinterview_june03.asp. Rolf Ekeus, Reassessment: The IISS Strategic Dossier on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, Survival, Vol. 46, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 73–88.

322 Notes 34 Joseph J. McMenamin, Statement for the Record, United States Senate Armed Services Committee, 6 October 2004. Available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/ testimony.cfm?wit_id=3882&id=1328. 35 David Kay, Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, 28 January 2004. 36 Geoff Hoon, Secretary of Defence, Answer to Parliamentary Question, 24 May 2004, Hansard column 1348W. Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk. 37 Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of Defence, Answer to Parliamentary Question, 23 June 2003, Hansard column 539W. Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk. 38 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, Answer to Parliamentary Question, 16 October 2003, Lords Hansard column 1096. Available at http:// www.publications.parliament.uk. 39 Geoff Hoon, Secretary of Defence, Answer to Parliamentary Question, 12 February 2004, Hansard column 1636W. Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk. 40 Geoff Hoon, Secretary of Defence, Answer to Parliamentary Question, 12 February 2004, Hansard column 1637W. Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk. 41 Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, 18 February 2004. Available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/ s7319.pdf. 42 Richard Spertzel, The Politics of Mass Destruction, Wall Street Journal, 29 June 2003. Available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110003688. 43 David Kay, Searching for the Truth about Iraq’s WMD An Interview with David Kay, 15 March 2004. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/aca/midmonth/March/ Kay.asp. 44 Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, 30 September 2004, three volumes. 45 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary-General, S/2004/924, 26 November 2004.

Chapter 11 1 United Nations Security Council, 4987th meeting, S/PV.4987 8 June 2004. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2004.htm. 2 US Department of State, Redirection of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Experts, Press Statement, 18 December 2003. Available at http://www.state.gov/r/ pa /prs/ps/2003/27408.htm See also, US Department of State, Redirection of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Experts Short-term Programme, Fact Sheet, 18 December 2003. Available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/27409.htm. 3 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/58/34 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, A/Res/58/34, 19 December 2003. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r58.htm. 4 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/58/68 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, A/Res/58/68, 19 December 2003. Available at http:// www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r58.htm. 5 Mohamed ElBareidi and Joseph Rotblat, Time is Ripe to Act on Middle East Weapons, Financial Times, 3 February 2004. Available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/ 0402/ doc01.htm. 6 It is unfortunate that Israel and the United States abstained from the Geneva Assembly resolution calling upon all States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw any remaining reservations. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/57/62. Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,

Notes 323

7 8

9 10 11

12

13 14 15 16

A/Res/57/62 30 December 2002. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/ resguide/r57.htm. United Nations General Assembly, Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, Report by the Secretary-General, A/44/561, 4 October 1989. See, for example, Nicholas A. Sims, The Case for a BWC Committee of Oversight: Draft Commentary and Mandate, Disarmament Diplomacy 60, September 2001, pp. 13–9 and Nicholas A. Sims, Organizational aspects with regard to possible verification measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, in S. J. Lundin (ed.), Views on Possible Verification Measures for the Biological Weapons Convention, SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies No. 12, Oxford: OUP, 1991, pp. 37–48. Missile Technology Control Regime, The Missile Technology Control Regime. undated. Available at http://www.mtcr.info/english/. United States Department of State, Missile Technology Control Regime, Fact Sheet, 2 August 2004. Available at http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/27514.htm. United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fifth session, 69th Plenary Meeting, A/55/PV.69, 20 November 2004. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/ resguide/r55.htm. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/55/33 General and Complete Disarmament A Missiles, A/Res/55/33, 12 January 2001. Available at http:// www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r55.htm. United Nations General Assembly, The issue of missiles in all its aspects, Report by the Secretary-General, A/57/229, 23 July 2002. The Austrian Foreign Ministry, Ballistic Missiles – HCOC, undated. Available at http://www.bmaa.gv.at/view.php3?f_id=54&LNG=en&version=. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/58/37. Missiles, A/Res/58/37, 17 December 2003. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/ resguide/r58.htm. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1540(2004) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540 (2004), 28 April 2004. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact2004.htm.

Chapter 12 1 United Nations Security Council, Note by President of the Security Council, S/23500 dated 31 January 1992. 2 United Nations, Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Final Declaration, Geneva, 9–27 September 1991, BWC/CONF.III/23, 1991. Available at http:// www.opbw.org. 3 United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Final Declaration, Geneva, 19–30 September 1994, BWC/SP/CONF/1, 1994. Available at http://www.opbw.org. 4 United Nations General Assembly, Letter dated 19 January 1989 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, A/44/88, 20 January 1989. 5 International Atomic Energy Agency, Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), September 1997. Available at http:// www.iaea.org.

324 Notes 6 United Nations General Assembly, Note by the Secretary-General, A/59/565, 2 December 2004. 7 For a report on this Meeting of States Parties see Graham S. Pearson, The Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties, Review No. 22, The CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue No. 66, December 2004, pp. 21–34. 8 The White House, President Speaks to the General Assembly, 21 September 2004. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040921-3.html. 9 Australia, Declaration of the Informal Ministerial Meeting on the Negotiation Towards Conclusion of the Protocol to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, BWC/ AD HOC GROUP/WP.324, 9 October 1998. Available at http://www.opbw.org. 10 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Status Report: Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Chemical Disarmament, March 2004, pp. 15–17.

Index Note: Page numbers in italics refer to tables and figures Aas, Pal, 32, 73 ABC Schutz (Germany), 134 Abiodun, Adigun Ade, 109, 138 absence of stockpiles, xxvi, xxvii, 7, 175, 181, 185, 221, 222, 227–30, 232–3, 244, 274 ISG, 223–6 UNMOVIC, 222–3 acetylcholine esterase-inhibiting substance, 14, 15 AC Laboratory (Spiez, Switzerland), 24 Adachi, Ken, 32, 73 adamsite, 200 Ad Hoc Group (AHG), 70, 271, 272–3, 274 advance notice of inspections, 41, 86 see also unannounced inspections aerial bombs, see biological weapons; chemical weapons aerial surveillance, see reconnaissance flights aerosol generators, see biological weapons aflatoxin, 149, 160, 164, 166, 178, 201, 212, 215, 216, 217, 218 Agu, Benson, N. C. 73 aircraft borne sprayers, see biological weapons, helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers air raids on Iraq, 28, 40 Akashi, Yasushi, 34 Akiyama, Ichiro, 97 Al Azzizziyah, 122, 190 Al-Dawrah, 164–5, 214, 215, 218 Al Fallujah, viii, 88, 162, 163, 164, 165, 201, 203, 205, 206 Al Hakam, viii, 100, 135, 190, 213–14, 215, 216, 218, 219, 221 Al Hazen Ibn Al Haitham Institute, viii, 195–6, 210, 218 Al Hussein missiles, see biological weapons; chemical weapons

Al Kindi, 214 Al Manal, viii, 214, 215, 218 Al Muthanna State Establishment, viii, 135, 137, 197–8, 199, 200, 201–2, 203, 204, 205, 210–11, 218 see also Project 922 Al-Qa’qa’, 162 Al Rashad, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200 Al-Sa’adi, Amir, 114, 118 Al Safah, see Fudhaliyah Al Salman, viii, 211–12, 213, 214, 215, 218 Al-Samoud/Ababil-100 ballistic missiles, 160–1 Al Taji, viii, 122, 211, 212, 214, 218 Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, 165 Amorim, Celso, 4, 96, 104 Amorim disarmament panel, 2, 3, 4–5, 6, 96, 97, 98–104, 111, 116 establishment, 96–8 membership, 97–8 report and recommendations, 5, 102–4, 116, 121, 127, 143, 273 report, objections by Iraq, 104 subsequent UN Security Council deliberations, 104–7 Andersson, Gustav, 18 Anisimov, Arkadii, 139, 140, 141, 142 Annan, Kofi, 52, 57, 61, 62, 65, 66, 93, 108, 114, 116, 118, 120 anthrax, xxv, 1, 135, 160, 161, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 174, 182, 190, 211, 212, 213, 214–15, 216, 217, 218, 219, 227, 317 n.10 attacks, 1, 273 simulant, 161, 212, 215, 216, 317 n.10 arms control, xxi, xxii, 7, 59, 70, 85, 89, 106, 263, 269, 291 artillery shells, see biological weapons; chemical weapons

325

326 Index Aum Shinrikyo, 272 Australia national inquiry into intelligence reporting on Iraq, 189–91 Australia Group, 21, 24, 25, 235, 260, 261, 304 n.40 Avenell, Michael, 142 Aziz, Tariq, xv, 4, 27, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 57, 60, 61, 62, 65, 96, 241 Azzizziyah, see Al Azzizziyah Bacillus anthracis, see anthrax Bacillus subtilis, 219 Badek, Andrzej, 33, 73 Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC), 55, 75, 76, 90 Baker, James, xv, 4, 27 ballistic missiles, xviii, xx, 4, 6, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 45, 47, 60, 78, 90, 111, 112, 113, 118, 121, 130, 131, 157, 159, 160, 162, 165, 166, 169, 175, 178, 184, 188, 219, 221, 240, 261, 262, 263, 281, 283, 297–9, 300 see also Al-Samoud/Ababil-100 ballistic missiles destruction of, 131, 158–9 opposition to inspection, 35 Iraqi programme, 160–1 Barrass, Bryan C., 33, 73 Barretto, Paulo, 140, 141, 142, 146 Baute, Jacques, 97, 113 Beck, Volker, 83 Biermann, Achim, 81 binary GB/GF, see GB/GF binary mixture binary sarin, 200, 203, 204, 207 Binder, Patrice, 83 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) (1972), xxi, xxv, xxvi, xxvii–xxviii, 1, 6, 7, 33, 70, 86, 93, 209–10, 228, 230, 232, 234, 239, 252, 255, 257, 258, 259, 260, 263, 264, 266, 268, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278–9 see also Ad Hoc Group (AHG); VEREX national legislation, xxvii, 93, 272, 277, 279 strengthening of, xxvi, 3, 8, 132, 234, 260, 275–7

biological weapons see also weapons of mass destruction aerosol generators, 219 agents, 100, 149, 215–16, 217, 231–2; see also aflatoxin; anthrax; botulinum toxin; brucella; camel pox virus; Clostridium botulinum spores; Clostridium perfringens toxin (gas gangrene); Congo Crimean hemorrhagic fever (CCHF); hemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus; ricin; rotavirus; trichothecene mycotoxins, T–2 and DAS agents, production capabilities, 164–5, 166, 167, 226, 228 agents, surviving stocks, 165 Al Hussein warheads, 160, 190, 216, 217, 218 artillery shells, 160, 161, 165, 219 bombs, aerial, 122, 164, 190, 219 bombs, free-fall, 160 bombs, R-400, 216, 217 countries with active programmes, 263–4, 271 declarations by Iraq, 33, 45, 89, 121, 204 delivery means, 160–1, 169–70, 218–19 destruction of, 100, 190, 191, 219 enhancement, Iraq’s programme, 213–17 facilities, Iraqi, viii, 182, 213–14, 218 field trials, 212, 216 growth media, 100, 152, 164, 165, 190, 213 growth media destruction, 190, 191 helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers, 160, 161 initiation, Iraq’s programme, 209–10 inspections by UNMOVIC, 6, 119, 121–2, 146, 147 inspections by UNSCOM, 83–5 Iraq’s programme, xvi, 166–7, 169, 193, 209, 217–19 Iraq’s programme post-1991, 219–21 material balance, 24, 50, 101, 134, 189, 190, 191, 225, 243 missile warheads, 164 mobile production facilities, 158, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171

Index 327 munitions, 216 outstanding issues, 100, 220 possible use by terrorists, xxv, 1, 4, 172, 266, 272 potential dangers of, 231–2, 278 prevention of, 71, 277–9 recent intelligence, 158–9 reports, Amorim panel, 100 reports, ISG, 135, 178–9, 220–1 reports, UK, 160–1, 164–5, 166 reports, UNMOVIC, 220 reports, UNSCOM, 44, 45, 220, 244 reports, US CIA, 160–1, 164–7 rockets, 160, 216 unaccounted stock of agents, 165–7 US National Intelligence Estimates, 168, 169, 185 US presentation to UN Security Council, 170–1 Biontino, Michael, 73 biopesticide plants, 164 bioterrorism, xxv, 273 Blades, Tim, 82 Blair, Tony, 66–7, 157, 174, 175, 186 report on website on Iraq, 170 blister agents, 16, 163 see also mustard agent (H) Blix, Hans, 29, 34, 108, 109, 114, 116, 118, 119, 120, 122, 125, 130, 143, 148, 171, 172, 184, 185, 188, 222–3, 246, 248, 249 Bohm, Reinhard, 109, 138 botulinum toxin, 149, 160, 164, 166, 190, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 50, 52 Bovallius, Ake, 139, 140 broadband protective measures, 279 Brough, Paul, 81 Brubaker, Gerald, 81 brucella, 149, 178 Brunner, Bernhard, 81 BTWC, see Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Buchanan, Ewen, 78, 139 Burk, Susan, 138 Bush, George H. W., xv, 3–4, 27, 28 Bush, George W., 173, 175, 276 Butler, Robin, 187 Butler, Peter von, 33, 73

Butler, Richard, 52, 53, 56–7, 60, 61, 62, 73, 77, 93, 245, 311 n.5 BZ, 200, 208 Cagle, Dawson, 141, 142 camel pox virus, 217 Caputo, Armando, 33, 73 CCHF, see Congo Crimean hemorrhagic fever Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (US) Iraqi rewards programme, 181 report on Iraq (2002), 157, 168 delivery means of agents, 160–1 dual use facilities, 165–6 production capabilities of agents, 161–5 recent intelligence, 158–61 summary, 166–7 Centre de Reserche du Service de Santé des Armées (France), 134 Centre des Etudes du Bouchet (CEB) (France), 134 Centre for Applied Microbiology & Research (United Kingdom), 134 Chemical Defence Laboratory (China), 134 chemical industry, civil, xix, 161, 206, 209, 226, 230, 231 chemicals export controls, 3, 21, 24, 25, 235 samples collected in Iraq, 122, 133, 150 Schedule I list, 231 chemical weapons see also weapons of mass destruction agents, 13, 16–17, 19, 20, 22, 120, 167, 197, 200, 203, 208, 234; see also adamsite; binary sarin; BZ; CN agent; CS agent; cyanogen chloride; cyclosarin (GF); GB/GF binary mixture; hydrogen cyanide; lewisite; mustard agent (H); nerve agents; nitrogen mustard; phosgene; sarin (GB); soman; tabun (GA); tammelin esters; tear gases agents, production capabilities, 45, 161–3, 166, 226, 227, 264 agents, surviving stocks, 165 Al Hussein warheads, 88, 160, 195, 204

328 Index chemical weapons – continued artillery shells, 10, 11, 100, 135, 160, 161, 162, 163, 171, 179, 195, 198, 202, 207 bombs, aerial, 11, 12, 19, 20, 162, 195, 200, 208 bombs, aerial, 250 gauge, 201, 207 bombs, aerial, 500 gauge, 201, 207 bombs, cluster, 10, 203 bombs, mortar, 16, 17, 160, 201, 208, 304 n.38 bombs, R-400, 100, 122, 124, 149, 171, 190, 191, 203–4, 207, 218 bombs, reverse engineered, 198, 203 bombs, white phosphorus, 197, 198 bulk agents, 190, 195, 200, 206 countries with active programmes, 264 declarations by Iraq, 6, 22, 33, 39, 88, 199 declarations on munitions by Iraq, 208–9 delivery means, 160–1, 167 destruction of, 33, 122, 124, 131, 162, 205–6 effectiveness of, 7, 21–2 enhancement, Iraqi programme, 203–5 facilities, Iraqi, viii, 162–3, 165–6, 182–3, 201–2 initiation, Iraqi programme, 195–6 inspections by UNMOVIC, 6, 119, 121–2, 146, 147 inspections by UNSCOM, 81–3 investigations by UN Secretary-General experts, 9–18, 234–5 Iraq’s programme, 166–7, 169, 193, 194–5 Iraq’s programme during Iran–Iraq war, 196–202 material balance, 24, 50, 99, 100, 101, 121, 134, 189, 190–1, 207, 225, 243 missile warheads, 57, 60, 164, 207 munitions, 198, 206–8 outstanding issues, 100 precursor chemicals, 24, 25, 88, 100, 121, 122, 123, 161, 162, 163, 171, 186, 189, 195, 196, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 230 possible use by terrorists, xxv, 1, 4, 22, 172, 266, 272

potential dangers of, 231–2, 278 prevention of, 71, 277–9 recent intelligence, 158–9 reports, Amorim panel, 99 reports, ISG, 179, 208–9 reports, UK, 160–3, 165–6 reports, US CIA, 160–3, 166–7 research into other agents, 200 rockets, 13, 20, 162, 163, 167, 179, 195, 198, 199, 202, 203, 204, 207 rockets, BM-21, 11 unaccounted stock, 162–3, 171–2 unaccounted stock of agents, 165–7 use in Iran–Iraq war, xv, xix, xxvi, 1, 3, 9, 10, 19–21, 22, 24, 60, 86, 191, 198, 199, 202–3, 227, 234, 235 US National Intelligence Estimates, 168, 169, 185 US presentation to UN Security Council, 171–2 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (1993), xxi, xxv, xxvi, xxvii–xviii, 1, 6, 7, 24, 25, 86, 194, 208, 230, 232, 234, 235, 239, 242, 244, 247, 252, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 263, 264, 266, 268, 270–1, 272, 273, 275, 277, 278–9 national legislation, xxvii, 93, 272, 279 ‘chicken farm’, see Haidar farm chief inspectors of UNMOVIC, 145, 146, 247–8, 265, 266 training of, 143 chief inspectors of UNSCOM, 81 biological weapons missions, 83–5 chemical weapons missions, 81–2, 83 experience of, 86 role of, 85–6 training of, 86 Chitumbo, Kaluba, 97 CIA, see Central Intelligence Agency (US) Circelli, Nicola, 73 Cleminson, Ronald, 33, 74, 97, 108, 109, 138 Clifford, Paul, 140, 146 Clinton, Bill, 66 Clostridium botulinum spores, 215 see also botulinum toxin Clostridium perfringens toxin (gas gangrene), 212, 215, 217, 219

Index 329 cluster bombs, see chemical weapons CN agent, 200–1, 208 coercive disarmament, xvi Coker, Alexander, 139, 140, 141, 146 College of Commissioners, see Commissioners for UNMOVIC Commissioners for UNMOVIC, 5, 106, 108–9, 112, 113, 116, 130, 131, 137, 138, 246, 291, 292 meetings, 113, 130, 131 for UNSCOM, xxvi, 32–3, 56, 58, 72, 73–4, 74–5, 97, 98, 108, 109, 138, 246 emergency session, 56, 58 comprehensive review of Iraqi compliance, 61, 62–4, 65, 66, 93, 242, 272 concealment measures, xviii–xix, 7, 30, 34, 36–7, 50, 93–4, 158, 162–3, 177–8, 181–2, 226, 230, 240 Congo Crimean hemorrhagic fever (CCHF), 178 Corcoran, James, 139 Corden, Pierce S., 73 criminalization, international, of work on weapons of mass destruction, 93 crop sprayers, 161 CS agent, 88, 195, 200, 201, 208 CWC, see Chemical Weapons Convention cyanogen chloride, 200 cyclosarin (GF) (nerve agent), 160, 162, 166, 167, 168, 169, 198, 199, 204, 205, 208 Dahlgren, Erik, 18 databases UNMOVIC, 113, 129 UNSCOM, 90, 114, 131 data collection and comparison, UNSCOM, 89 Daura, see Al-Dawrah Davies, Rachel, 78, 87, 97, 139 Dayton, Keith, 180, 187, 250 Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (United Kingdom), 134 Delpech, Therese, 109, 138 denial of access, 33–5, 39, 41, 48–9, 54–5, 69, 94, 158, 240, 241 Desert Fox, Operation, 2, 66, 67, 164, 165, 166

Desert Storm, xv, 2, 184 Desgranges, Michel, 81 Dhanapala, Jayantha, 58, 74, 97 Diamantides, Gregoire, 139, 140 Dibuana, Timothy K., 18 documentation destruction of, 163 surrender of, 52 Dominguez, Manuel, 18 drop tanks, 161, 190, 219 dual-use capabilities/facilities, 47, 53, 129, 132, 159, 162, 163, 165–6, 182, 186, 206, 226, 233, 321 n.18 dual-use chemicals, 183 dual-use materials and equipment, 47, 90, 91, 92, 100, 114, 118, 129, 130, 136, 145, 151, 152, 154 164, 183, 186, 187, 253, 261 Duelfer, Charles, xxiii, 73, 77, 97, 134, 177, 180, 181, 182, 183, 187, 226 Dunn, Peter, 18, 74, 81, 86 Einhorn, Robert, 109, 138 Ekeus, Rolf, 32, 34, 36, 38, 42, 44, 45, 46, 50, 51, 52, 72, 73, 93, 108, 228, 229, 241, 245, 250, 311 n.5, 312 n.8 ElBareidi, Mohamed, 114, 118, 119, 120, 122, 148, 257 Ellerman, Michael, 141, 142 European Union (EU), 276, 277 Exploitation Task Force, 176 export controls on chemical and biological weapons technology, 3, 7, 21, 24, 25, 130, 235, 261, 263, 268, 304 n.40 export/import mechanism, 50, 68, 71, 243, 246, 261, 312 n.8 SCR 1051 (1996), 154 UNMOVIC, 132, 150–6, 246, 247, 266, 291, 294 UNSCOM, 47–8, 90, 92–3 Fangmark, Ingrid, 141 Federov, Yuriy V., 109, 138 Fei, Zhou, 74 fermenters, 212, 213–14, 218 FFCD, see full, final and complete disclosure Finnish Verification Institute (VERIFIN) (Finland), 134 FMD, see Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility

330 Index Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Vaccine Facility, 164–5, 214, 218 Forden, Geoffrey, 140, 141 Fosbrook, Martin, 139, 140, 141 Fournier, Eric, 78 France abstainment, 107 air raids on Iraq, 40 Franz, David, 83 free-fall bombs, see biological weapons Frick, Helmut, 73 FROG missiles, 10 frozen Iraqi assets, 75 Fudhaliyah, 215, 218 full, final and complete disclosure (FFCD), 5–6, 34, 37, 38, 45, 53, 58, 60, 64, 68, 70, 83, 86, 88–9, 92, 94, 118, 241, 242, 272, 297 inadequacy of Iraqi responses, 58, 60 on biological weapons, 53, 60, 100 Vienna meeting on March 1998, 58 G7 countries, see Group of Seven countries G8 countries, see Group of Eight countries GA, see tabun Gallucci, Robert, 32, 72, 73 gas gangrene, see Clostridium perfringens toxin Gatilov, Gennady, 74, 97 GB, see sarin GB/GF binary mixture, 88 Gee, John, 33, 74 General Assembly, 25, 256, 259, 263, 276 resolutions on missiles, 261–2, 263 resolutions on WMD investigations, 235–9 genetic engineering unit, 215 Geneva Protocol (1925), xxvii, xxviii, 1, 6, 7, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 31, 209, 234, 235, 237, 238, 252, 257, 270–1, 278, 279, 281, 283, 323 n.6 Iraq’s accedance, 209 GF, see cyclosarin Godfrey, Rod, 81, 82 Goods Review List, 114, 117, 152–3 versus SCR 1051 (1996) notification mechanism, 154–5 Gorelik, A., 74 GosNIIOKht (Russia), 134

Group of Eight (G8) countries, xxi, 275 Group of Seven (G7) countries, 275 growth media, see biological weapons Grunenwald, J., 142 Gryschenko, Konstantyn, 109, 138 Guang, Cong, 109, 138 Gulf War (1990–91), 26–9 destruction of weapons and facilities by Allies, 161–2, 204 destruction of weapons and facilities by Iraq, 204–5 weapons claimed to have been destroyed in, 201, 208 Hague Code of Conduct against Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles, 261, 263 Haidar farm, 46, 127 Haikala, Olli, 141, 146 Hamdoon, Nizar, 107 Hammond, Owen, 84 harassment of UNSCOM personnel, 39 Hassan, Hussein Kamel, see Hussein, Kamal Hatt, Paul, 73 Heineken, Gunterio G., 109, 138 helicopter borne sprayers, see biological weapons hemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus, 217 Henstridge, Bob, 84 Heraud, Corinne, 140, 141, 142, 146 Heyndrickx, Aubin, 24 Hill, Roger, 81 Hjalmarsson, Karin, 142 Honig, Helmut, 33, 74 Hoppe, Hannelore, 109, 138 Howell, John, 84 humanitarian relief for Iraqi people, 26, 44, 292, 293–4 Hussein, Kamal, 46, 172, 193, 202, 203, 204, 205, 213, 225 Hussein, Qusay, 157, 161, 225 Hussein, Saddam, xv, xvi–xix, xx, xxi, 4, 23, 27, 30, 45, 65, 66, 67, 96, 120, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 167, 168, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 179, 182, 183–4, 194, 203, 208, 216, 221, 223, 224–5, 226, 229, 251 Hussein, Uday, 225 Huxsoll, David, 83 hydrogen cyanide, 11, 19

Index 331 IAEA, see International Atomic Energy Agency IAU, see Information Assessment Unit Ibn Sina Centre, 210 IIS, see Iraqi Intelligence Service Ilin, Sergey, 139, 140, 141, 142 Imobersteg, Ulrich, 18 Information Assessment Unit (IAU), 41 Information Assessment Unit and Export/ Import Joint Unit, 77, 78, 89–90, 97 information channel in UNMOVIC, 143 inspection regimes, 5, 23, 116, 118, 188, 248, 274, 299 permissive, xxi, 7, 85, 89, 242–3, 224, 234, 242–3, 247, 248–9, 250, 252 uncooperative, xxi, 7, 85, 89, 234, 242–3, 244, 245, 247, 248–9, 250, 252, 265 inspections, xvi, xxii, xxvi, xxvii, 6–7, 273–4 Iran–Iraq war, 2, 3, 9–10, 11–17, 22–3, 234–5 team composition, 18, 22–3 UN Security Council Resolutions and statements, 19–21 UNMOVIC, 5, 6, 118–25, 127–8, 145–7, 247–8 future role, 265–6 missions, 146 sites, 122, 146–7 UNSCOM, 85, 87–8, 243 missions, 78–80 teams, 37, 80–5, 86–7 intelligence reporting, 161, 185, 186, 192, 278 Australian inquiry, 189–91 United Kingdom inquiry, 186–8 United States inquiry, 185–6 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), xx, 4, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 55, 56, 57–8, 59, 61, 62, 63–4, 65, 66, 68, 86, 90, 93, 97, 98, 99, 101, 103, 106, 108, 113, 114, 118, 119, 120, 121, 125, 127, 129, 130, 131, 148, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 158, 159, 165, 176, 177, 191, 223, 239, 242, 248–9, 250, 254, 255–6, 257, 258, 260, 267, 268, 271, 272, 273, 284, 289, 290, 291, 295, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301 curtailment of inspections, 159

doubts about effectiveness of, 249–50 obstructions by Iraq, 33, 35, 55 and UNSCOM, 249 International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 262–3 Ionescu, Octavian, 141, 142 Iran–Iraq war (1980–88), xvi, xxv, 3, 6, 9–22, 26, 160, 210, 214 Iraqi chemical weapons programmes, 195, 196–203, 227 Security Council resolutions and statements, 19–21, 235 use of chemical weapons, xv, xix, xxvi, 1, 3, 9, 10, 19–21, 22, 24, 60, 86, 160–3, 172, 184, 191, 194, 198, 199, 202–3, 208, 227, 234, 235, 261, 269 UN General Assembly resolutions, 235–9 UN Secretary-General investigations, xxvii, 2, 9–10, 10–18, 22–5, 86, 234–5, 239, 302 n.4 Iraq accedance to Geneva Protocol, 209 acceptance of SCR 687, 31 agreement with Russia (1997), 53, 56 Anglo-American military action (1998), 96 chronology of events, 2, 3 cooperation with IAEA, 250 cooperation with UNMOVIC, 123–4 cooperation with UNSCOM, 36, 46–7, 50, 51, 55, 62, 65, 66, 96, 250 declarations to UNMOVIC, 119–20, 121, 122–3, 124, 127, 193, 248 declarations to UNSCOM, 37, 44, 45, 88–9, 91, 94, 100, 205, 243 historical background, 194 invasion of Kuwait, xvi, 3, 26–9 memorandum of understanding with UN, 57–8, 241 ratification of BTWC, 33, 219, 255, 281, 283 Iraqi Chemical Corps, 195 Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), 135, 178, 179, 212, 221 Iraq Survey Group (ISG), xv–xvi, xix, xx, xxi, xxvi, xxvii, 2, 3, 6, 7, 131–2, 134, 135, 136, 157, 176–7, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186,

332 Index Iraq Survey Group (ISG) – continued 187, 188, 193, 194, 195, 197, 200, 201, 208, 209, 210, 211, 216, 217, 220, 221, 222, 223–6, 229, 248, 250–2, 255, 256 Duelfer’s testimony, 182–3, 226 Kay’s testimony, 131, 177, 180–1, 220–1, 225, 248 reports, 177, 208–9 October 2003, 6, 177–9, 220–1, 223 September 2004 (Comprehensive Report), 6, 134, 135, 183–5, 193, 194, 201, 221, 226, 251, 255 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (US CIA report), 157, 168, 185 command and control, 161 delivery means, 160–1 dual use facilities, 165–6 production capabilities, 161–5 recent intelligence, 158–61 summary, 166–7 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government (UK government report), 157, 168, 223 command and control, 161 delivery means, 160–1 dual use facilities, 165–6 production capabilities, 161–4 recent intelligence, 158–9 summary, 166 ISG, see Iraq Survey Group Jaafar, Jaafar Dh, 114 Jacobs, Ira, 84 Jano, Jean, 140 Jansen, Karen, 81 Jieya, Liu, 98 Johnson, Ken, 83, 84 Jolley, William, 140, 141, 142, 146 Jopp, Hans-Dieter, 81 Junhua, Li, 138 Kay, David, 6, 131, 176, 177, 180, 181, 182, 220, 223–4, 225–6, 248, 250 Kazuhara, Takanori, 109, 138 Kelly, David, 83, 84 key remaining disarmament tasks, 106, 116, 117, 123, 127, 208, 291

Killip, Hamish, 83, 84 Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, 44 Knapp, James, 81 Kolar, Franz, 140, 146 Kraatz-Wadsack, Gabriele, 78, 84, 98, 139 Krikorian, Debra, 84 Krug, Wilfried, 73 Kurata, Hideyo, 73, 98 Kurdistan, 22, 202 Kuvshinnikov, B. A., 33, 74 Kuwait invasion by Iraq, xvi, 2, 3, 26–9, 30, 96, 205, 216, 248, 269, 280, 285 L-29 remotely piloted vehicle programme, 161 laboratories, Iraqi, 166, 178, 180, 181, 196, 197, 214, 215, 220–1, 238 Laboratorium Spiez (Switzerland), 134 laboratory network, UNMOVIC, 133, 134, 136, 148–9, 150, legal status of UNSCOM personnel, 80–1 legislation, national, xxviii, 93, 123, 255, 272, 277, 279 lewisite, 200 long-range missiles, 178, 180, 221, 297 Loret, Herbert, 142 Lukasik, Lucjan J., 73 Lynnyk, Anatolly, 140 McGeorge, Harvey, 140, 141, 142 mandate UNMOVIC, 105–6, 129, 130, 135, 137, 156, 244, 245, 251, 253–4, 256, 290 UNCIM, 104 UNSCOM, 41, 56, 71, 85, 239, 240 Manley, Ron, 73, 81 Marhold, Harald, 141, 142, 146 material balance, see biological weapons; chemical weapons Matsumoto, 272 Mattsson, Bertil, 18 Maurits, William, 139, 140 Mereish, Kay, 140, 141, 142, 146 Mezencev, Roman, 141, 142 MIC, see Military Industrialization Corporation Michel, Philippe, 140, 141, 146 Mihm, Jurgen, 81

Index 333 Military Industrial Corporation (MIC), xvii, 47, 203, 213 Ministry of Agriculture, Iraqi, 39 Ministry of Defence, Iraqi, 47, 197, 202, 220 Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Iraqi, 210 Ministry of Industry, Iraqi, 196, 202 missile parts and warheads, 49, 57, 60, 160, 161, 164, 207, 217 missiles see also Al-Samoud/Ababil-100 ballistic missiles; ballistic missiles; FROG missiles; long-range missiles; proscribed missiles; scud missiles; surface to surface missiles UN General Assembly Resolutions, 261–2, 263 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 260, 261 draft code of conduct, 262–3 missile warheads, see missile parts and warheads missions, 78–80, 146 Mitrokhin, Igor, 81, 82, 87, 142 Mleux, Michel Saint, 33, 74 Mohlenkamp, Ruth, 113 Mohr, Geoffrey, 83 Molander, Johan, 74, 98 monitoring cameras, 42, 55, 69, 122, 162 obstructions to installation of, 40 Monteleone-Neto, Roque, 109, 138 Moodie, Michael, 227 Morange, Jean-Philippe, 140, 141, 142 Moritan, Roberto Garcia, 97 mortar bombs, see chemical weapons Moussa, Amr, 114 MTCR, see Missile Technology Control Regime Mullady, Brian, 139 munitions, see biological weapons; chemical weapons mustard agent (H), xix, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 88, 100, 122, 124, 135, 150, 160, 162, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 174, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 225, 226, 227, 229

Muthanna State Establishment (MSE), see Al Muthanna State Establishment NAM, see Non-Aligned Movement NBC Defence Laboratory (Umea, Sweden), 24 nerve agents, 12, 19, 20, 50, 162, 163, 165, 172, 174, 183, 195, 196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 209, 227, 228, 272 see also cyclosarin (GF); GB/GF binary mixture; sarin (GB); soman; tabun (GA); tammelin esters Newlin, Michael, 73 new world order, 269–70, 272 New York meeting in March 1994, 42 UNSCOM staff in, 33, 75, 76, 83 UNMOVIC staff in, 139 UNSCOM seconded personnel in, 77 nitrogen mustard, 200 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 261, 276, 277 no-notice inspections, see unannounced inspections non-proliferation, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 24–5, 29, 30, 31, 70, 71, 91–2, 130, 132, 150, 151, 234–5, 242–3, 243–4, 247, 261, 262, 268, 281, 284 norms against chemical and biological weapons, 1, 7–8 NPT, see Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 242, 247, 248, 252, 257, 258, 260, 271, 275 nuclear weapons, 6, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 101, 114, 118, 121, 157, 162, 166, 168, 177, 188, 194, 205, 217, 250, 257, 260 O’Connell, Kevin, 141, 142 OIF, see Operation Iraqi Freedom ‘oil for food’ programme, xviii, xx, 44, 68, 91, 152, 154–5, 16 OMV, see ongoing monitoring and verification ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV), xxi, 4, 5, 29, 30, 31, 36, 38, 41, 42–3, 44, 45, 47, 48, 51, 68, 69,

334 Index ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) – continued 71, 72, 89, 90–1, 92, 95, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 111–12, 113, 114, 117, 129, 134, 135, 149, 150, 151, 155, 227, 240, 243, 245, 246, 247, 268, 269, 274, 284, 289, 290, 291, 292, 295 1991 plans of UNSCOM, 35–6 future involvement of UNMOVIC, 255–6 protocols, 91 reinforcing of, 5, 99, 102, 103–4, 111, 114 report, Amorim panel, 101–2 on-site inspections, 4, 33, 40, 78, 101, 107, 111, 112, 240, 283, 284 Ooms, A. J. J., 33, 74, 98 OPCW, see Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 2, 224 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 97, 98, 103, 113, 148, 231, 257, 259, 260, 267, 277 Palanque, Patrice, 140, 141, 142 Parfait, Daniel, 98 Paris Conference (1989), 31, 281 final declaration of, 270–1 Paul-Henriot, Annick, 83 Pellicer, Olga, 138 Pérez De Cuéllar, Javier, 9, 10, 22, 27–8, 32 Peroz, Jean Paul, 81 Perricos, Demetrius, 130, 139, 140, 141, 142, 146 Perrone, GianPerro, 73, 98 Persson, Ake, 18 petroleum sales by Iraq, 44, 285 phosgene, 13, 20, 162–3 Poarch, James, 81 Powell, Colin, 120, 170–3, 249 Prasad, Annaswamy Narayana, 109, 138 presidential sites, 57–8, 69, 72, 93, 95, 122, 241, 300 Primakov, Yevgeni, 53 prisoners of war, 4, 28, 175, 176 Project 922, 196–7, 202 Project Baiji, 165–6 proscribed missiles, 101

Prosser, Peter, 141, 142, 146 protective equipment for team members, 80 R-400 bombs, see chemical weapons Rashid, Amer, 46 Rath, Johannes, 84 Rautio, Marjatta, 33, 74, 108, 109, 138 reconnaissance flights, 39, 41, 101, 300 Reeps, Horst, 78, 81, 82, 87, 98 Renfeng, Yuan, 33, 74 ricin, 149, 164, 165, 166, 178, 215, 217, 219 Ritter, Scott, 62 Riza, Iqbal, 18 Robertson, Andrew, 84 rockets, see biological weapons; chemical weapons rocket test sites, 40 Rolland, Jean-Louis, 139, 140, 141, 142 Roman, Ioan, 139, 140 rotavirus, 217 Rotblat, Joseph, 257 Rozing, Jan, 84, 141, 146 Russia agreement with Iraq (1997), 53, 56, 57 biological weapons programme, 227–8, 264, 271 global control system for missiles proposal, 262 Sabri, Naji, 114, 116, 118, 119 safe destruction techniques, 33 Salber, Herbert, 73 Salinas, Jose, 140, 141, 142, 146 sampling and analysis, 24, 148–50, 243, 245, 246, 247 Sanchez, Roberto, 33, 74 sanctions against Iraq, xvi, xvii, xviii, 26, 27, 114, 120, 115 lifting of, 45, 56, 60, 62, 66, 67, 104–5, 183–4, 188, 208, 221, 223, 226, 251 violations of, 183 Santesson, Johan, 81, 83 sarin (GB) (nerve agent), 88, 160, 162, 166, 167, 168, 169, 197, 198–9, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 227, 272 Sato, Naoto, 140 Scherba, Anatoliy, 138

Index 335 Schulte, Paul, 73, 98, 108, 109, 138 Scott, John, 78 scud missiles, 10, 28, 159, 160, 162, 164, 167, 169, 178, 208 SCUD-type missile engines, 51 Seaman, Diane, 83, 84 seconded specialists, 87 seconded staff, 37, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 110 nationalities of, 77 Secretary-General, 235, 239, 259 see also comprehensive review investigations during Iran–Iraq war, 9–10, 11–17, 22–5, 234–5, 239 Security Council, 62, 64, 274–5 deliberations on Amorim panel report, 104–7 disunity in, 5, 94–5, 104–5, 137, 241, 242, 272, 273, 274 Iraqi defiance of, 40, 66, 168, 172, 272 maintenance of international peace and security, 269–70 presentation by US 5 February 2003, 170–3 reports by UK/US 21 November 2003, 177, 180 24 February 2004, 177, 181–2 19 May 2004, 177, 183 resolutions and statements during Iran–Iraq war, 19–21 resolutions relating to UNSCOM, 68 SCR 479 (1980), 19 SCR 487 (1981), 19 SCR 522 (1982), 19 SCR 540 (1983), 19 SCR 582 (1986), 19 SCR 588 (1986), 20 SCR 598 (1987), 20 SCR 612 (1988), 20–1, 24–5 SCR 620 (1966), 21, 25, 235, 259 SCR 660 (1990), 26, 27, 28 SCR 661 (1990), 26, 27, 153 SCR 665 (1990), 27 SCR 678 (1990), 26, 27, 29 SCR 686 (1991), 28–9, 280, 282, 283, 289, 297, 298 SCR 687 (1991), xvi, xx, 2, 4, 6, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 71, 75, 78, 90, 91, 93, 94, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107,

111, 120, 129, 150, 151, 152, 154, 160, 166, 177, 181, 219, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 247, 248, 249, 253, 254, 256, 272, 280, 289, 290, 291, 292, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299 acceptance by Iraq, 31 text of, 280–8 SCR 707 (1991), 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 48, 49, 67, 68, 71, 102, 104, 105, 240, 253, 254, 289, 290, 297 SCR 715 (1991), 38, 38, 40, 41, 42, 47, 48, 49, 61, 67, 68, 69, 75, 91, 102, 104, 105, 114, 118, 123, 132, 150, 154, 155, 245, 253, 289, 290, 297 SCR 986 (1995), 44, 68, 75, 91, 289, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297 SCR 1051 (1996), 30, 48, 50, 68, 69, 102, 104, 105, 151–2, 153, 155–6, 253, 289, 290, 291, 292, 294, 295 versus Goods Review List, 154–5 SCR 1115 (1997), 54, 68 SCR 1134 (1997), 54–5, 67 SCR 1137 (1997), 57 SCR 1154 (1998), 55, 68, 290, 300 SCR 1194 (1998), 4, 61, 62, 68 SCR 1205 (1998), 4, 61, 68 SCR 1284 (1999), 2, 5, 6, 67, 105–7, 111, 116, 117, 123, 127, 129, 137, 153, 177, 244, 247, 253, 254, 256–7, 273, 289, 297, 298 text of, 289–96 SCR 1382 (2001), 115, 152, 154, 297 SCR 1409 (2002), 114, 117, 152, 153 SCR 1441 (2002), 5, 118, 119, 120–1, 123, 128, 129, 137, 148, 170, 173, 177, 181, 253, 254, 273, 297 text of, 297–301 SCR 1483 (2003), 128–9, 130, 153, 155, 156, 177, 183, 253–4, 255 SCR 1540 (2004), xxi, 261, 266–7, 268 SCR 1546 (2004), 253, 254 softening of language in, 71, 240, 272 voting on resolutions, 5, 68, 105, 137 Sellstrom, Ake, 82, 84 seminars with Iraqi experts, 57, 86, 92 sensitive information, 89, 90 sensitive sites, 50, 90, 113, 176 see also presidential sites SEPP, see State Establishment for Pesticide Production Shea, Tom, 98 Silver, Mark, 81, 142

336 Index Simandjuntak, Baginda, 33, 74 single cell proteins, 182, 218 Smidovitch, Nikita, 78, 81, 87, 98, 143 Soilleux, Richard, 81 soman (nerve agent), 200, 208 SOTI, see State Organization for Technical Industries Soviet Union, see Russia Special Commission, see Commissioners for UNSCOM special missile warheads, 57, 60 Spertzel, Richard, 83, 84, 87 Splino, Miroslav, 33, 74 spray dryers, 215 spray tanks, 160, 161, 164 State Establishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP), 132, 202 State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI) (Iraq), 196, 202 Straw, Jack, 120, 173, 184 Strelau, Krzystof, 140, 141, 142, 146 surface to surface missiles, 28, 37 Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) (Sweden), 134 Sylla, Cheikh, 109, 138 Szulc, Jaroslaw, 141, 142, 146 tabun (GA) (nerve agent), 11, 19, 160, 162, 166, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 206, 208 Takehira, Tetsuya, 141, 142 tammelin esters (nerve agent), 200 Taylor, Terence, 73, 83, 84 tear gases, 200–1, 208 see also CN agent; CS agent technical briefings, 60, 99, 100, 120 technical evaluation meetings (TEMs), 57, 59, 100 on biological weapons, 58, 60, 100 on special missile warheads, 60 utility of, 59 on VX, 57, 60 Technical Research Centre (TRC), 212, 213, 214, 218 technical seminars, see seminars with Iraqi experts; technical evaluation meetings (TEMs) Tenet, George J., 169 terror, 22, 170, 224, 276 terrorism, xxi, 174, 176, 282, 287, 298 see also bioterrorism

thiodiglycol, 122 TNO – Prins Maurits Laboratory (Netherlands), 134 Tokyo subway attack, 272 trade controls of hazardous chemicals, 21 trained inspectors, 125–6, 137, 259 training, UNMOVIC, 143 UNSCOM, 86 training courses, UNMOVIC, 143, 144–5 transparency in building confidence, 92, 93, 232, 262–3 travel restrictions on Iraqi officials, 55, 68 TRC, see Technical Research Centre trichothecene mycotoxins, T–2 and DAS, 212, 217 Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological Research Centre, 182 unannounced inspections, 36, 90, 101, 112, 121–2 UNCIM, see United Nations Commission on Inspection and Monitoring United Kingdom air raids on Iraq, 28, 40, 164 government dossier on Iraq (2002), 157, 158–67, 223 military action against Iraq (2003), 173–5, 191 national inquiry into intelligence reporting on Iraq, 186–8 report on Prime Minister’s website on Iraq, 170 United Nations see also General Assembly; Secretary-General; Security Council memorandum of understanding with Iraq, 57–8, 95, 104, 241 United Nations Commission on Inspection and Monitoring (UNCIM), 104 United Nations General Assembly, see General Assembly United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), xx, xxvi, xxvii, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 23, 24, 67, 105, 106, 107, 108–56, 171, 172, 177, 182, 188, 190, 191, 193–99, 200, 201, 202,

Index 337 203, 204–13, 214, 215, 216, 219, 220, 222–3, 227, 229, 244–5, 247–51, 253–67, 268, 273, 274 290–92, 295, 296, 298–301 see also chief inspectors of UNMOVIC; Commissioners for UNMOVIC; inspections divisions of, 112–13, 139–42 establishment of, 5, 104–6, 108 future roles for, 7, 156, 253–68 mandate, 105, 106, 109, 122, 127, 129, 130, 135, 137, 143, 155, 156, 177, 244, 245, 251, 253–4, 256, 290, 291, 299, 301 operational size, 137 organizational structure, 109, 110, 112–13 preparations for operations, 113–17 reports, 2, 115, 117, 127–8, 135–7 June 2000, 113, 115 August 2000, 113–14, 115 February 2002, 114, 115 May 2002, 114, 117 September 2002, 114, 116–17 November 2002, 118, 119, 127 February 2003, 121–5, 128 May 2003, 125, 127, 128–30 August 2003, 130–1, 135 November 2003, 131, 136 February 2004, 131–3, 136 May 2004, 134, 136 August 2004, 134, 136 November 2004, 134–5, 136 responsibilities, 111–12 staff, 109–11, 113–14, 115, 138–42 trained inspectors, 125–6 training, 5, 106, 109, 113, 118, 143, 245, 291 training courses, 114, 115, 117, 127–8, 134, 135–7, 143, 144–5 versus UNSCOM, 245–6 United Nations Secretary-General, see Secretary-General United Nations Security Council, see Security Council United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), xvi, xx, xxii, xxvi, xxvii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 23, 24, 26, 29–33, 34–5, 36–69, 70–95, 96, 97–8, 99, 100, 101, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 116, 118, 119,

122, 123, 124, 127, 138, 143, 150–3, 154, 155, 158, 160, 162–7, 170–2, 177, 180, 181, 182, 189, 190, 191, 193–5, 199, 200, 201, 204–5, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212, 215, 217, 219, 220, 223, 227, 228, 229, 239–44, 245–6, 247–50, 251, 253, 265, 269, 274, 297, 298 see also chief inspectors of UNSCOM; Commissioners for UNSCOM; inspections denial of access, see denial of access developments of, 1995, 44–8 difficulties in 1992 & 1993, 37–42 emergency session, 56, 58 establishment of, 30–1, 32–3 and IAEA, 249 mandate, 5, 33, 40, 41, 53, 56, 71, 239, 240, obstructions by Iraq, 69 in 1991, 33, 34–5 in 1992–93, 38–40 in 1994, 43 in 1996–97, 48–52 in 1997–98, 54–6 in 1998, 60–1 organization and size, 71–2 recommendations by Amorim panel, 102–3 reports, 2, 59–60, 67, 194, 200, 201 October 1991, 36–7 January 1992, 37 June 1992, 41 April 1993, 41 November 1993, 42 April 1994, 42 October 1994, 42, 43 April 1995, 43, 44 June 1995, 44–5 October 1995, 45 December 1995, 46–7 April 1996, 48 April 1997, 50–2, 91 October 1997, 52–3 April 1998, 58–9 October 1998, 64 December 1998, 66 reports, objections by Iraq, 52, 53 staff, 33, 72, 75–8, 110–11 training, 86, 246 versus UNMOVIC, 245–6

338 Index United States air raids on Iraq, 28, 40, 164 commitment to multilateral peace and security treaties, 276–7 military action against Iraq (1991), 28 military action against Iraq (2003), 173–5, 191 national inquiry into intelligence reporting on Iraq, 185–6 National Intelligence Estimates of Iraq’s WMD programmes, 168–70, 185–6 United States House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, 174 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), xx, 118, 134, 136, 160–1, 167, 169–70, 175, 178, 181, 185, 299 UNMOVIC, see United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission UNMOVIC/IAEA letter, 118–19 UNSCOM, see United Nations Special Commission on Iraq Utkina, Svetlana, 139, 140, 141, 142 Vanden Bemden, Emile, 33, 74 van Heijst, A. N. P., 18 van Zelm, Marius, 81 VEREX, 70, 270 verification, 6, 7, 24, 31, 51, 88–9, 234, 243, 247 verification and control for a Middle East WMD free-zone, 256–8, 268, 275, 289 VX (nerve agent), 50, 57, 60, 88, 99, 100, 135, 160, 162, 166, 167, 168,

169, 172, 174, 183, 195, 196, 197, 199–200, 204, 205, 206, 208, 225 warhead remnants, see missile parts and warheads weapons of mass destruction (WMD), xv, xxii, xxiii, xxvii, 1 see also biological weapons; chemical weapons absence of stockpiles, see absence of stockpiles Iraqi programmes and activities, xvi–xx, 166–7, 192 post-March 2003 search in Iraq, 175–85 treaty regimes, xxi–xxiii, xxv–xxvi, 1, 232, 257–8, 260–1 Weixiong, Chen, 138 Wells, Brian, 138 Wheat cover smut, 211, 217, 218 Whitty, Garth, 81 WHO, see World Health Organization Wijmaalen, Aarie, 81 WMD, see weapons of mass destruction Wolf, John S., 138 Wolfowitz, Paul, 170 Wolterbeek, Cees, 81, 82 World Health Organization (WHO), 33, 37, 81, 148, 283 Wronecka, Joanna, 73 Wu, Gang, 140, 141, 142 yperite, see mustard agent (H) Zhukov, Nikita, 78, 139 Zlauvinen, Gustavo, 78 Zoubrilin, Vadim, 141, 142 Zou, Zhibo, 142