Carter's Conversion: The Hardening of American Defense Policy 0826218164, 9780826218162

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Carter’s Conversion

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Carter’s Conversion The Hardening of American Defense Policy Brian J. Auten

University of Missouri Press Columbia and London

Copyright © 2008 by The Curators of the University of Missouri University of Missouri Press, Columbia, Missouri 65201 Printed and bound in the United States of America All rights reserved 5 4 3 2 1 12 11 10 09 08 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Auten, Brian J., 1969– Carter's conversion : the hardening of American defense policy / Brian J. Auten. p. cm. Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph. D.)—2004. Includes bibliographical references and index. Summary: “Examining Carter's dramatic shift from advocating defense budget cuts early in his administration to supporting development of the MX missile and modernization of NATO's LongRange Theater Nuclear Force by the end of his presidency, the author argues, counter to common interpretations, that the shift was a ‘self-correcting’ policy change in response to the prevailing international military environment”—Provided by publisher. ISBN 978-0-8262-1816-2 (alk. paper) 1. Carter, Jimmy, 1924– —Political and social views. 2. United States—Foreign relations— 1977–1981. 3. United States—Military policy—Decision making. 4. National security—United States—Decision making. 5. MX (Weapons system)—History. 6. North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Military policy. 7. Deterrence (Strategy)—United States—History. I. Title. E873.2.A98 2008 973.926092—dc22 2008036958 This paper meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48, 1984. Designer: Kristie Lee Typesetter: BookComp, Inc. Printer and binder: The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group Typefaces: Minion The University of Missouri Press offers its grateful acknowledgment to an anonymous donor whose generous grant in support of the publication of outstanding dissertations has assisted us with this volume.

To Linda

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Contents Acknowledgments ix Glossary xiii

One Introduction and Common Theoretical Explanations for Carter’s “Conversion” 1

Two The Strategic Environment of the 1970s 38

Three The Pre-Presidential Strategic Thought of Jimmy Carter 81

Four The Carter Administration’s First Year of Defense Policy: The Strategic Slowdown and the Conventional Emphasis 117

Five Carter’s FY1979 Defense Budget: Understanding Changes to the MX Missile and Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Programs, 1977–January 1978 174

Six Carter’s Adjustments to the MX and TNF Modernization Programs in 1978 219

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Seven Carter’s Conversion: Explaining MX and LRTNF Decision-Making in Early 1979 257

Eight Conclusion 305 Bibliography Index 333

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Acknowledgments This book originated as a doctoral thesis written between 2001 and 2004 and it reflects a long-time interest in Jimmy Carter’s presidency. As I was born in 1969, my earliest memories of national and international politics are from Carter’s years in office. The 1976 election is the first presidential race I can remember. In the summer of 1979, while staying with my grandparents near Los Angeles, I watched gas prices spike and went to bed concerned about where pieces of Skylab might fall. Throughout Friday nights in 1980, while waiting for late-night monster movies to begin on Boise’s ABC affiliate, I would tune in to The Iran Crisis: America Held Hostage and watch the tally of days steadily increase week after week. My sixth-grade class cheered when the teacher announced on January 20, 1981, that the hostages had been released. For many Americans, such political coming-of-age memories—particularly those of the annus horribilis of 1979—are, and always will be, Carter’s primary legacy. Consequently, Reagan’s election is typically cast in terms of national redemption. Keeping this legacy in mind, my research was undertaken to reevaluate my personal understanding of Carter’s presidency and his decisionmaking in the area of defense policy, particularly his administration’s approach toward strategic and theater nuclear weapons. It is not a work of crass revisionism. It does not ignore what I argue to be clear stumbling on the part of Carter and his team. At the same time, it does show how a focus on the events of 1979 and 1980 glosses over the ways in which the administration’s defense policy decisions actually helped to lay part of the foundation for the United States’ eventual victory in the Cold War. I would like to thank the archival staffs of the Gerald Ford Presidential Library (particularly Helmi Raaska), Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (Jim Yancey), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (Sherrie Fletcher), the Hoover Institution of War and Peace at Stanford University, and the Geisel Library at ix

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the University of California at San Diego. I also thank the historical staff at the U.S. Air Force Space Division, Los Angeles. I am in the debt of Christopher Bright (for pointing me in the direction of the Committee on the Present Danger’s papers), William Van Cleave (for granting me permission to use the Committee’s archive), and Justin Vaisse (for the just-in-time use of his personal Committee finding aid, as well as his comments on early draft material). I look forward to Justin Vaisse’s upcoming book on American neoconservatism and the Committee’s history. I thank the following people for interviews, emails, and/or permission for the use of their work: Harold Brown, Victor Utgoff, Michael May, Richard Betts, William Odom, Theodore Sorenson, Richard Gardner, Dotty Lynch, Terry Provance, Herbert York, Richard Garwin, Jeffrey Taliaferro, Randall Schweller, Anne Hessing Cahn, Robert Bovey, Joan Lowe, and John Edwards. Naturally, all mistakes, errors, and omissions in this work are my own. As I have explained many times to friends and family, a work of this type is often thought to be the ultimate example of individual achievement. I continue to submit humbly that this is not the case. While I have been the one reading and writing, the final product comes out of a larger, community effort. My doctoral supervisor, Colin Gray, showed extraordinary patience as I shifted back and forth between possible thesis topics. He and I often wondered if it would ever come to fruition. His comments on my original material were always helpful and, as my fellow University of Hull and University of Reading graduate students will heartily agree, all of us hope to train others to have the same understanding, respect, and reverence for strategy and statesmanship that Colin has. Three of my graduate school friends bear special mention: James Kiras, Lawrence Serewicz, and Wade Shol. James Kiras was present for some of the very first “white boarding” sessions in Hull and has been a constant encourager about getting my material to print. Lawrence Serewicz, the bête noire of many on the H-Diplo listserver, had wise comments and suggestions throughout my entire doctoral process. Over the years, I have enjoyed Wade Shol’s friendship and his always-intriguing conversations. Wade’s generosity when it came to air miles made my trip to the Jimmy Carter Library much more affordable. I would also like to acknowledge the abundant generosity of the Earhart Foundation, which provided full funding for my doctoral work. I have had two separate stints in the National Security Studies master’s degree program at California State University at San Bernardino. Prior to my doctoral work in England, I was a student in the department. Upon my return to the United States, my former professor and friend Mark Clark graciously asked if I would come and teach on an adjunct basis, which I did from 2001 to

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2004. I thank Mark and his wife, Mara, for their years of friendship, personal and professional counsel, and prayers. I also thank two other friends (and professional colleagues) at CSUSB: William Green and Ralph Salmi. I’m also appreciative of all of my undergraduate and graduate students at CSUSB—all of you probably heard enough Carter-era stories to last a lifetime. My parents, my siblings, and my extended family have continually encouraged and prayed for my work. Looking back, the constant questions and reminders about “getting it done” are much appreciated. I would especially like to thank my father-in-law, Eddie Gibbs, for his wisdom (both academic and publishing) over the years. My sister and brother-in-law opened their home to me for my visits to Stanford and UC–San Diego, while my closest friend and his wife, Bill and Natalie Stark, invited me to stay with them while I completed additional research at the Hoover Institution. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the deep friendship, steady encouragement, and constant prayers of Jared and Jennifer Derksen, as well as that of Derek and Jane French. I would also like to thank Lance and Ginny Otis, Rick and Shari Langer, Pam and Neil King, Melvin and Heather Tinker, Erik and Heather Larson, Ev Bruckner, the whole Trinity Church koinonia crowd, and our current church family at Sovereign Grace Church of Fairfax. The publication of one’s first book can be a daunting endeavor, but I have had the good fortune of having a very pleasurable experience with the University of Missouri Press. I would like to thank Beverly Jarrett, Gary Kass, Jane Lago, and John Brenner for their hard work on the manuscript and their friendly counsel through the process. Lastly, but most importantly, the original dissertation and the current book would not have been accomplished absent two things. As a scholar who is an evangelical Christian, I am of the firm belief that it is God who sustains me in my research and work. As a husband, I freely admit that my wife, Linda, is the unsung hero of this endeavor. This is as much her work as it is mine. I am a currently serving analyst in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. As such, I am required to declare, up front, that this book contains no FBI information. It is a historical study and it has no bearing upon my current work for the Bureau. It does not contain anything that upon publication would affect the FBI’s mission or reputation. Given this, the book does not fall within the Bureau’s prepublication review guidelines and has not been reviewed. All nonattributed views, opinions, and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the author and not those of the U.S. government, the FBI, or any other entity within the U.S. intelligence community.

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Glossary ABM AFSC AIMS ALCM ALPS ASBM CPD DSARC DSB ERDA ERW FALPIS GLCM HLG ICBM IRBM LRTNF LTDP MAP MARV MBFR MIRV MX NATO NIE NNP NPG

antiballistic missile Air Force Systems Command Alternative Integrated Military Strategies air-launched cruise missile alternative launch point system air-to-surface ballistic missile Committee on the Present Danger Defense Systems Acquisitions Review Council Defense Science Board Energy Research and Development Agency enhanced radiation warhead fixed alternative launch point system ground-launched cruise missile High Level Group (NATO) intercontinental ballistic missile intermediate-range ballistic missile long-range theater nuclear forces Long-Term Defense Program (NATO) multiple aim point manueverable reentry vehicle Mutual Balanced Force Reduction multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle Missile Experimental North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Intelligence Estimate non-nuclear Pershing Nuclear Planning Group (NATO) xiii

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NSC NSDM NSSM NTPR NUWEP OMB OSD OSTP PD PRC PRM QRA RV SALT SAMSO SIOP SLBM SLCM SNDV SCC SSBN TNF

Glossary

National Security Council National Security Directive Memorandum (Nixon/Ford) National Security Study Memorandum (Nixon/Ford) Nuclear Targeting Policy Review Nuclear Weapons Employment Plan Office of Management and Budget Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of Science and Technology Policy Presidential Directive (Carter) Policy Review Committee (Carter NSC) Presidential Review Memorandum (Carter) Quick Reaction Alert reentry vehicle Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Space and Missile Systems Organization single integrated operational plan submarine-launched ballistic missile sea-launched cruise missile strategic nuclear delivery vehicle Special Coordinating Committee (Carter NSC) fleet ballistic missile submarine theater nuclear forces

Carter’s Conversion

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One Introduction and Common Theoretical Explanations for Carter’s “Conversion”

Between 1977 and 1979, President Jimmy Carter experienced his own Damascus Road in the area of national security and defense policy. As a presidential candidate, the former Georgia governor had campaigned on defense budget cuts of somewhere in the neighborhood of $5 to $7 billion, a decrease that would trim what he called the “fat” from the Defense Department. With nuclear abolition as his ultimate goal and passion, Carter suggested the possibility of a submarinefocused nuclear offensive force—a “minimum deterrence” posture—and criticized nuclear war-fighting approaches and damage limitation as “destabilizing” to superpower deterrence. Over the course of the 1975 and 1976 campaign, Carter threw doubt on the existing level of ground forces on the Korean peninsula and also questioned the need for a new, manned penetrating bomber (the B-1). Once elected, the new president began to put these ideas (and more) into practice. In late February 1977, Carter sliced the Ford administration’s lame-duck fiscal-year 1978 defense budget by $2.8 billion, which significantly reduced funds for the Missile Experimental (MX) intercontinental ballistic missile and the B-1 bomber. Over the course of 1977 and early 1978, Carter tried to halt construction of Minuteman III ICBMs; ended the B-1 bomber program; cut naval shipbuilding funds, particularly funds for a new nuclear-powered carrier; began the process of removing U.S. ground forces and nuclear weapons from South Korea; and abruptly backed away from deploying the enhanced radiation warhead, or “neutron bomb,” in Western Europe. 1

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By the autumn of 1979, however, the landscape had altered radically. Earlier that January, Carter offered a substantially higher fiscal-year 1980 defense budget compared to his adjusted FY1978 and the FY1979 programs—although none of Carter’s budgets ever reached the future levels originally suggested in Ford’s lame-duck FY1978 budget. In early June 1979, Carter announced that the United States would start construction on the MX missile and would deploy it in a mobile mode. Over the course of 1979, Carter raised civil defense spending to keep pace with inflation, initiated both the reconfiguration of U.S. nuclear targeting policy (culminating in the 1980 Presidential Directive [PD] 59) and the improvement of nuclear command, control, and intelligence (C3I) to facilitate the actual waging of protracted nuclear conflict, increased spending for the Trident II nuclear submarine program, and convinced U.S. allies in NATO to allow the deployment of new, advanced theater nuclear forces on Western European territory. Many have argued (and continue to do so) that Carter’s “hardening” in the area of strategic policy—in particular, the administration’s decisions about its strategic and theater nuclear weapons programs—was primarily caused by domestic political pressures (what some foreign policy theorists describe as innenpolitik factors). These pressures include interest group activity, executivelegislative bargaining, and interbureaucratic conflict. This book is, at its heart, a neoclassical realist corrective to the existing (and popular) innenpolitik emphases found in many interpretations of Carter’s defense policy transformation. In so doing, it provides an alternative, realist argument about the end of superpower détente and the start of the “Second Cold War.”1 Carter’s strategic adjustment (and the end of superpower détente) was not created solely from the ingredients of American domestic politics. Nor was it the automatic consequence of systemic imperatives. Instead, it was the result of a prudent (albeit late) change in the assessment of the Soviet Union’s military power, and of its power projection capabilities and potential possession of

1. The “Second Cold War” covers the period of Cold War history immediately following the crumbling of détente. Others have referred to it as the “end of détente” or the “demise of détente.” It is typically dated from 1979 (the “crisis year” of Carter’s presidency) to 1984 or 1985 and the “thaw” in U.S.-Soviet relations during Reagan’s second term in office and the advent of the Gorbachev years. The term appears to have been coined by Fred Halliday in The Making of the Second Cold War. Simon Dalby uses Halliday’s phrase and accuses private individuals (namely, the Committee on the Present Danger) of helping to bring it about. Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics. See also Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941–1991, 4, 302. For the standard work on innenpolitik, see Eckart Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism and Foreign Policy.

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strategic geography relative to that of the United States. This change in assessment cannot be laid at the feet of private pressure groups or other innenpolitik variables. The lag between the expansion of Soviet power in the 1970s, Carter’s initial “soft” policy stance, and his apparent midterm defense “hardening”— what theorists have labeled “internal balancing”2—is attributable to the deflective power of particular strategic concepts (like assured vulnerability and minimum deterrence) and the problems associated with modernizing one’s arsenal while simultaneously negotiating its limitation. Carter’s policy shift is an example of “self-correcting policy change.” According to Charles Hermann, self-correcting policy change happens when a sitting administration “changes course” and moves in a new direction. Hermann distinguishes self-correcting policy change from the abrupt policy transformations that often occur with a switch-over in governments or presidential administration.3 Currently, there is an emphasis on domestic political explanations of strategic adjustment. The problem is this: theories and interpretations that identify innenpolitik factors as the main determinants of defense policy adjustment are, in a word, astrategic. They elevate the secondary over what is truly primary. Neoclassical realism—a relatively recent addition to the realist canon—attempts to integrate internal and external factors while keeping realism’s focus on the external strategic environment as the primary determinant of policy choice and transformation. It is a more effective tool for unraveling the debate over Carter’s change of heart, and perhaps also for answering some of the larger questions as to the causes of relatively abrupt “internal balancing.” This book was also precipitated by the highly charged ideological character of late Cold War strategic history, particularly the histories of the Carter and Reagan administrations. This is especially true when it comes to innenpolitik interpretations of Carter’s defense policy transformation. For those on the political right, it is often asserted that either conservative, defense-right pressure groups played a major part in the “hardening” or that Carter’s policy hand was forced by his need to woo “hawkish” defense-right senators in order to get SALT II ratified. In this viewpoint, it was activity by those on the defense-right 2. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 168. For policies that correspond with internal balancing, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 278n35. 3. Charles Hermann, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy,” 4. Beth Fischer’s analysis of an apparent shift in Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy in early 1984 makes use of Hermann’s concept and analytical approach. See Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, 7–9.

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that impressed upon Carter the need to change. If one is a member of the political left, the same arguments are made, but in an accusatory tone. Many on the political left blame Carter’s shift and détente’s collapse on U.S. domestic politics. As this author was unable to locate archive-based tests of these interpretations—tests that might temper strong ideological biases—this study fills that research gap.

Using Innenpolitik and Realism to Explain Strategic Adjustment How is “self-correcting change” in national security policy and defense policy traditionally outlined from a theoretical perspective? And, more specifically, what theories have been offered about Carter’s midcourse strategic adjustment? In essence, maps and theories do the same type of work. They simplify reality “out there” to make that reality more understandable.4 Political scientists who devote themselves to the analysis of strategic affairs tend to create and use two different sets of maps: theories of international politics (otherwise called international relations theory) and theories of policy (including diplomatic or foreign policy, economic policy, national security policy/grand strategy, and defense policy). Theories of international politics are used to provide insight into the dynamics and outcomes of state-to-state interactions. With their relational emphasis (hence international relations theory), these theories address ongoing historical and theoretical interstate puzzles such as war initiation, polarity, international stability, the creation of international order, bargaining, and even occasions of interstate cooperation.5 On the other hand, theories of national security or defense policy answer questions about an individual state’s behavior. They investigate the formation of a state’s preferences, the when, how, and why of its planning and subsequent actions. Such theories suggest how and why a particular state evaluates its external and internal circumstances, the way in which it ranks its interests and establishes its goals, how it balances its instruments and objectives, and how it gives flesh to these preferences, goals, and plans. More specifically, theories of national security policy (or grand strategy) and defense policy offer candidate explanations for the formation of a state’s preferences and plans toward the international political-military realm—the when, how, and why of its strate4. On maps and theories, see John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past, 31–34. 5. Jeffrey Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” 133.

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gic planning and its final defense policy decision-making. While a theory of international politics examines the effect of a state’s policy adjustment on interstate relations, a theory of grand strategy or defense policy looks at the effect interstate relations have on a policy adjustment. Theories of national security and defense policy cannot comprehensively explain the final outcome(s) of interactions between two or more states (again, such as war, peace, or order), just as theories of international politics on their own cannot explain the construction and subsequent adjustments of an individual state’s preferences, planning, and activity.6 To give a concrete example, one would not use a theory of national security policy and/or defense policy to try to explain the past, present, and (no doubt) future political rivalry between China and India. Because interstate rivalry is an interactive, relational process between the two states, one would use a theory of international politics like structural realism or perhaps a theory of geopolitics to explain the existence of the rivalry itself.7 However, if one wanted to explain how and why China and India settle upon their particular political objectives, how each combines the means and ends of statecraft, and how each finally chooses a respective defense configuration given the fact of their rivalry, then one would use a theory of national security and defense policy.

Innenpolitik An innenpolitik theory of national security policy and defense policy argues that a state’s preferences, the trajectories of its strategic planning and the course of subsequent policy actions, are largely, if not solely, the products of domestic-level determinants. For the United States, these internal determinants can include the pressure of mass public opinion, the influence of the media, or the clashing material power/interests and organizational (and/or strategic) cultures of the separate executive-level national security institutions (National Security Council, State Department, Defense Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Central Intelligence Agency), nonexecutive governmental institutions like Congress, its national security committees, and its 6. Though Colin Elman has offered a refutation of this point. See “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” 7–53. 7. For the relationship between geopolitics for statecraft, see Colin Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy and David Hansen, “The Immutable Importance of Geography,” 55–64. For a more skeptical view of the explanatory power of geopolitics, see Christopher Fettweis, “Revisiting Mackinder and Angell: The Obsolescence of Great Power Geopolitics,” 109–29 and Fettweis, “Sir Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics and Policymaking in the 21st Century,” 58–71.

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“national security intellectuals”8 or nongovernmental groups (including, but not limited to, political parties, mass movements, issue-based or countryspecific interest groups, or even think tanks). Most, if not all, innenpolitik explanations of change within U.S. national security policy hinge upon presidential decision-making, since in the American political system the executive branch sets the overall trajectory for national security policy and defense policy. Innenpolitik theories argue that this overarching trajectory is best explained by looking inward—to the material and nonmaterial pressures that bubble up from below, motivating the executive to action. The executive is in some way lobbied or pressured to make certain decisions. The direction of national security policy and defense policy is the result of that motivated lobbying and bargaining. However, the number of potentially vulnerable pressure points on the executive that innenpolitik theorists offer—not to mention the underlying motivations for such lobbying and bargaining—are legion. One popular innenpolitik example is found in executive-level advisers. It is a well-known and well-documented fact that presidential advisers lobby the executive to make adjustments in national security policy. The fact of such “pulling and hauling” between different presidential advisers over all types of policy is not new.9 But there continues to be substantial disagreement as to why advisers hold the given policy preferences that they do. In this, one sees the familiar question: in whose interest does the adviser advise? In the realist tradition, adviser-lobbying is strategic in character. It is done to enhance state power and interests—victory and survival. Institutional or bureaucratic theorists, on the other hand, deny that policy preferences arise from any objective assessment of state interests. Instead, presidential advisers derive their policy positions from the interests of the executive-level institutions they represent. But what motivates advisers to think first about their institutions? Some bureaucratic theorists argue that a process of enculturation is at work.10 An adviser adopts the organizational culture and “service pride” of his institution, both of which then subsequently act as primary fonts and filters for policy ideas. Many in the realist tradition deny this. They argue that organizational 8. Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC, 32–33. 9. The primary text on American foreign policy and bureaucratic politics (and the discussion of “pulling and hauling”) is Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis; see also Morton Halperin, National Security Policy-Making: Analyses, Cases, and Proposals, 3–16. 10. Halperin uses the term “essence” rather than “culture.” Halperin, National Security, 8–10.

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culture does not completely circumscribe an adviser’s policy preferences—it can be (and often is) transcended for strategic purposes (that is, for purposes of objective national interest). Of course, in the United States, Congress shares significant but limited powers with the executive branch in military-defense affairs. Specifically, it has the power to declare war, raise military forces, and ratify treaties (of which formal alliances, arms control treaties, and security assistance treaties are subsets). However, Congress’s primary point of entry into the everyday national security policy arena resides with the so-called power of the purse. The legislative branch is involved in the domestic politics surrounding the defense budget— and it is the budget that gives flesh to the military instruments that are used to carry out the statesman’s preferences and strategies.11 What, then, motivates the amount and degree of congressional involvement in the “structural” part of national security policy? Theorists offer various explanations. Some answers have included: reelection, the protection of Congress’s constitutional prerogatives, the parochial interests of individual “national security intellectuals” or members of national security committees (who are, according to Amy Zegart, usually motivated by their wish to attain higher office), or tactics to gain executive-branch concessions in other policy areas.12 Finally, any analysis of innenpolitik theories of national security policy, especially those theories that highlight the role of Congress, would be incomplete without reference to the influence of society and societal groups. Many scholars of American national security policy emphasize the role that the general public and lobbying organizations play in provoking change. For these theorists, Capitol Hill serves as the major access point or “transmission belt” for outsiders into the national policy process. Individual congressmen and women become motivated agents of change because the public—or the public organized into interest groups—ensures or threatens their prospects for reelection. The debate over the extent and influence of interest groups on policy has been and continues to be a contentious one. Traditionally, scholars have argued that when it comes to foreign policy, grand strategy, or defense policy, interest group lobbying is weak and ineffective. For example, in her analysis of what best explains the formation and evolution of U.S. national security agencies during the Cold War, Zegart makes a formidable case against any significant

11. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 3–6. 12. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 32.

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public or congressional participation in national security agency formation. She argues that the interest group environment for national security affairs has been historically small and weak compared to that for domestic policy interest groups. Moreover, she insists that the American public’s interest in national security policy is minor compared to its vested interests in domestic policy.13 Others, however, have been less dismissive of this type of influence on national security affairs. Yossi Shain has examined the political activities of ethnic lobbies and political diasporas in both foreign and national security policy and argues that in many situations, the electoral value of such groups is considerable enough to enable them to wield major policy clout.14 Daniel Wirls and others assert that during the Reagan administration, the size and perceived electoral strength of the peace and nuclear “freeze” movements had a very large impact on how the U.S. Congress (particularly its Democratic members) worked to change national security and defense policy.15 And it has been argued that if they are able to capture the attention of executive-level decision-makers, extra-administration policy elites, or “national security intellectuals” on Capitol Hill, then even societal groups with a very small electoral value can wield significant policy influence.16 It is clear that lobbying matters, but the current, cutting-edge internalist theorizing of national security policy adjustment still revolves around the questions of how extensive it is, how important it is, and what exactly motivates it (which would therefore be the root cause of any resulting policy change). A popular and hotly debated example of this type of theorizing on policy change is Jack Snyder’s Myths of Empire. In Myths, Snyder argues that a state often expands its power and interests abroad (shifting away from a status quo outlook) because of the material, ideological, and/or political interests of small groups of domestic elites. These elites rally other policy-makers and the public into action with their “myths of empire”—that is, with erroneous scenarios

13. Ibid., 22–26. 14. Yossi Shain, “Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy,” 813–14, 821. 15. For the relationship between the nuclear “freeze” movement and Congress, see Daniel Wirls, Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era, 102–32. Frances Fitzgerald argues that the “freeze” movement was a key influence on President Reagan’s March 23, 1983, Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech, which was intended to counter the movement. Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War, 199–209. 16. One example is the relationship between the U.S. Congress, the Iraqi National Congress, and the Iraqi diaspora in the late 1990s. Brian Auten, “Political Diasporas and Exiles as Instruments of Statecraft: The United States and the Iraqi Opposition, 1991–2001”; Auten, “Political Diasporas and Exiles as Instruments of Statecraft,” 329–41.

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woven around domino theories, the prevalence of international bandwagoning, and the perceived advantages that come to countries with offensively oriented force postures. They do this, Snyder says, because they or their constituencies benefit in various ways from militarization and state expansion. When these “myths” are accepted by those in charge of national security policy, they can cause increases of defense expenditures and unnecessary expansion. In short, these groups “hijack” a state’s national security policy for their own selfish preferences and objectives.17 Snyder’s work has a considerable normative component. He considers this “hijacking” of state policy (and the resulting military buildups, heavier defense spending, etc.) abnormal. In his view, these elite “hijackers” contribute to the existing “security dilemma” and as a result only serve to increase the overall perception of insecurity.18 Nevertheless, whether one is in agreement or not with its normative component and the “security dilemma” logic, Myths of Empire still draws important attention to how adjustments to national security policy can arise out of the domestic political scene. Other scholars have followed suit. Recently, the contributors to an innenpolitik volume titled The Politics of Strategic Adjustment have demanded a closer look at what they refer to as the “inward-directed face” or “second face” of strategy. In their book, they assert that “state policies must be understood as a response to internal imperatives and demands, rather than purely external ones” and that national security policy should be viewed in light of how it “help[s] manage and solve domestic problems—political, economic and social.”19 In short, adjustments and transformations in national security policy reflect shifts in (as well as government’s reactions to) the domestic political environment. National security and defense policy choices are often reactions to internal domestic puzzles and at the same time are wielded as instruments to solve those puzzles. 17. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, 6–13. 18. Ibid.; Snyder’s critics, particularly Fareed Zakaria, argue that Myths is deficient. First, the phenomenon Snyder looks to explain—overexpansion, or expansion that provokes other states to react— cannot be understood outside a theory of international politics, whereas Snyder tries to use a theory of foreign policy. Zakaria points out that Snyder does an adequate job of dissecting expansion, though he accuses him of overemphasizing innenpolitik, revisionist, or neo-Marxist explanations. Nevertheless, Zakaria concludes that a theory that makes state expansion understandable does not necessarily make other state reactions to said expansion equally clear. Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay,” 178, 184, 184n18, 185, 190, 196. Others have categorized Myths as an innenpolitik or a liberal theory of foreign policy. Elman, “Horses for Courses,” 21n38, and Jeffrey Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery, chapter 1. 19. Peter Trubowitz, Emily Goldman, and Edward Rhodes, eds., The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests, 6.

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In fact, a growing number of theorists have turned to political economy to explain national security and defense policy transformation. Benjamin Fordham, Peter Trubowitz (one of the editors of The Politics of Strategic Adjustment), and Kevin Narizny offer three examples of internalist theories that stress political economy as root causes of strategic transformation. All three assert that the United States’ choice of national security policy arises out of the deepseated economic interests of domestic societal groups and the electoral needs of government officials. Fordham addresses the differences over Democratic and Republican military strategy and force structure during the course of the Cold War. The two political parties, he argues, were composed of coalitions whose economic, and therefore political, values were reflected within and protected by specific military plans and force postures. For instance, the transition to Eisenhower’s less-expensive, nuclear-dominant “New Look” demonstrated the success of anti-inflation, Republican conservatives who represented a higher-income versus lower-income constituency—a constituency concerned with the impact that inflation would have on its economic well-being.20 Trubowitz’s work has a regional and a congressional focus. For him, geographic regions in the United States have international economic interests, so they apply pressure on Congress to work for changes in national security policy that will enhance their region’s economic standing.21 Narizny shifts the emphasis away from the legislative branch, which, he argues, is not the dominant player in national security policy, and instead examines how an executive transforms national security policy based upon the international economic interests of his largest supporting coalition. In doing this, Narizny, like Fordham, highlights political parties. He argues that domestic groups with similar economic opportunities and vulnerabilities in the international marketplace aggregate in political parties so that they might promote leaders who hold similar outlooks. Upon election to high office, these leaders, wishing to stay in office, adjust their state’s defense and national security policy to support their constituents’ international economic preferences.22 20. Benjamin Fordham, “Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the Allocation of Cold War Military Spending,” 65–69. 21. Trubowitz, et al., Politics of Strategic Adjustment, 106–7. Trubowitz’s book-length treatment of this idea is found in Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy. Recently, Trubowitz has looked to domestic political parties and factions to explain the historical rise and fall of American “liberal internationalism” as a foreign policy framework. Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz, “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States,” 7–44. 22. Kevin Narizny, “The New Debate: International Relations Theory and American Strategic Adjustment in the 1890s,” 170–72; Narizny, “The Political Economy of Alignment: Great Britain’s Commitments to Europe 1905–1939,” 190–91; Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy.

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Realism Unlike domestic political theories that look inward to find determinants of grand strategy and defense policy, realist theories argue that a state’s behavior with respect to those realms is best explained with reference to the international, external power environment. As was described previously, internalist theories use the preferences and interests (material and/or nonmaterial) of presidential advisers, bureaucrats, domestic economic constituencies, and/or societal interest groups to explain an administration’s policy decisions. On the other hand, realism argues that both a state’s grand strategy and its defense policy (as well any changes to them) are better understood and explained by looking to the relative power and interests of states. Realism has been the traditional way of explaining a state’s choices when it comes to national security and military affairs. The theory’s general principles have been articulated and rearticulated time and again: (a) states (particularly great powers) are the main players in world politics; (b) the international environment is antagonistic rather than cooperative in nature; (c) in the end, states have to help themselves because there is no overarching authority to which they can turn for ultimate justice or arbitration (in other words, the international environment is naturally anarchic); and (d) military power—that is, coercion and/or war—is the final arbiter when it comes to solving political differences.23 That said, realism is by no means a monolithic school of thought. Political realists agree that relative power and interest are the key concepts for comprehending international affairs. In contrast to innenpolitik theorizing, realism assumes that national security decision-making and defense planning are driven by considerations of interstate power and interest, not by personal interests, the interests of constituencies, or the interests of inside or outside organizations. However, realists disagree—sometimes stridently—over a litany of second-level questions. For example, some realists suggest that states (or statesmen) are concerned first and foremost with maximizing military and economic power relative to other states. Others argue that it is not necessarily power that states desire, but rather influence. Still others attribute a state’s defense choices to national honor or fear.24 For some realists, statesmen weigh 23. For a comprehensive overview on realism, see John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 90–108. 24. Michael Doyle actually posits four different “directions” of realism: complex, fundamentalist, structuralist, and constitutionalist. Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, especially 41–48. Hans

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the costs of their planned actions rationally and optimally, while others insist that human nature, bad intelligence, or misperception get in the way of optimization. All in all, these intrarealist debates revolve around: (a) the relative importance of the statesman and his art as compared to the impersonal dictates of the international environment; (b) the theory’s “scientific” status and its applicability to the analysis of policy decision-making; and (c) the ultimate motivations of states and statesmen—whether states are, at heart, revisionist or only motivated to hold on to what they already have. The first two of these are addressed in the movement from traditional (or classical) realism to a more social-scientific neo- or structural realism. In 1979, in an attempt to make classical realism more parsimonious and social-scientific, Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics postulated that international political outcomes (not foreign policy, as we will later see) are best explained by a combination of two factors: the self-help nature of the international system, and shifts in the relative power capabilities (military forces, population, industry) of the units that make up that system. By depersonalizing and depoliticizing international system outcomes like war, peace, and order, Waltz believed that he was improving realist theory. For him, classical realism was merely a theory of foreign policy rather than a theory of international politics. Earlier realism emphasized human nature, the art of statesmanship and diplomacy, and the crafting of foreign policy. International political outcomes like war and peace were explained as the extension and summation of foreign policy decisions. Waltz was dissatisfied with this, arguing that it was possible that the very best of statesmen could, through his actions, bring about the very worst of outcomes. Instead, structural realism explained outcomes without recourse to policy. In Waltz’s eyes, outcomes erupt automatically with changes in the relative capabilities of system units. In short, balances or “concerts” of power just happen—they bring an unbalanced system back into a state of equilibrium. They are not necessarily the brainchildren of statesmen. Outcomes, particularly those that are

Morgenthau argues that the maximization of power is one of three “patterns” that polities follow. The other two include the maintenance of power one already possesses and the “demonstrat[ion of] power” for reputational purposes. Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 40–41. John Mearsheimer, on the other hand, argues that all non-preponderant states seek to increase their power above all else. See The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 29. On influence maximization, see Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role, 19, 19n25. The fear/honor/profit triptych is from Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 36–37; William Chittick and Annette Freyberg-Inan, “‘Chiefly for Fear, Next for Honour and Lastly for Profit’: An Analysis of Foreign Policy Motivation in the Peloponnesian War,” 69–90, especially 73. On fear, see Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 42–43.

Introduction

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unplanned or inadvertent, have to be explained systemically rather than by what Waltz calls a “reductionist” “summing” of foreign policies.25 Waltz was adamant that structural realism could only explain international political outcomes, not policy transformation. Though it would seem to follow that a change in relative power capabilities among states in the international system precipitates changes in an individual state’s grand strategy and its respective defense policy, Waltz demurred. Policy adjustments are not explicable through structural realism; they involve domestic, unit-level variables. Structural realism has a purely systemic focus. As stated earlier, Waltz believed that using policy to explain international outcomes was “reductionist”—the application of structural realism to the analysis of policy was, for him, yet another error (but an “opposite” one).26 Meanwhile, Colin Elman, Waltz’s main antagonist when it comes to the relationship between neorealism and policy, argues that there are no solid methodological reasons that restrict structural realism from making predictions about a state’s policy or grand strategy. In fact, Elman believes that Waltz’s writings are extremely inconsistent on the issue. In his now-famous 1996 article in Security Studies, Elman lists numerous occasions in which Waltz offers explicit foreign policy explanations and/or predictions using neorealism—this despite the fact that Waltz has denied neorealism this type of explanatory power. Working through Theory of International Politics and much of Waltz’s later writings, Elman documents the retrodictive predictions (that is, a social scientist’s or historian’s use of theory to “predict” what happened historically) that Waltz makes about the policies of Greek city-states, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. Although Waltz has argued that it is a mistake to derive a state’s behavior (that is, its policy) directly from systemic change because of the influence of domestic variables, Elman shows that Waltz is very unwilling to forgo such predictions.27 Not all, however, are convinced by Elman’s arguments contra Waltz. For example, Beth Fischer agrees with Waltz and puts limits on neorealism’s explanatory power in her book The Reagan Reversal. In Reversal, Fischer suggests that a radical shift occurred in the Reagan administration’s Soviet policy between November 1983 and January 1984. She concludes that the policy adjustment is best explained by a transformation in Reagan’s personal psychology. However, structural realism is one of her main theoretical competitors. Fischer says that while 25. Kenneth Waltz, “Reductionist and Systemic Theories,” 47–51. 26. Ibid., 61. 27. Elman, “Horses for Courses,” 10. Waltz’s rejoinder was printed immediately after, as well as Elman’s surrejoinder. For retrodictive prediction, see ibid., 13n16.

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on the surface it makes logical sense that a change in capabilities augurs a change in policy, a given policy adjustment is underdetermined through neorealism. Neorealism only says that states react to systemic change. The theory gives zero clarity on the precise character or timing of that system-precipitated reaction. Waltz’s neorealism, argues Fischer, does not suggest a particular trajectory or time frame for a policy transformation. It cannot explain why, given a change in unit capabilities in the system, a state might choose concession or appeasement versus hostility and military buildup. It also cannot explain time lags in strategic adjustment. In her own example, Fischer asks why Washington’s Soviet policy changed when it did in the winter of 1983–1984, and why was it a “thaw” versus greater antagonism given that the relative power capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union fluctuated back and forth throughout the Cold War. Structural realism says that states will react to change by either balancing or bandwagoning, but it does not explain which the state will choose in a given scenario—it accounts only for policy change qua policy change. For Fischer, Waltzian neorealism is, at best, a partial theory of policy adjustment. And, despite Elman’s work, many others agree with her.28 The third of the intrarealist arguments addresses the distinction that is made between realism’s offensive and defensive variants. When it comes to contemporary realist thought, one must now be very clear about one’s particular shade. Regardless of whether one believes that realism is as applicable to state behavior as to international political outcomes, there is a rift in realism over (as Jeffrey Taliaferro has so aptly put it) “the implications of anarchy.”29 To repeat, one of realism’s primary tenets is the absence of an overarching authority that can adjudicate ultimate international disagreements. What do states learn from this fact? Realists argue that they learn self-help. But how do states best go about helping themselves so that they might survive internationally (and survive well)? At this point, offensive and defensive realists take different routes. Offensive realists assert that states do (and should) work toward the attainment of preponderant, hegemonic power in order to survive in the international arena. A state cannot afford to act satisfied, or actually be satisfied, with

28. Fischer, Reagan Reversal, 11–13. For scholars who, post-Elman, still label neorealism as a theory of international politics or international outcomes rather than a theory of foreign policy, see Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 15 and Taliaferro, “Security Seeking,” 132–35. Taliaferro gives a nod to Elman, agreeing that there is no methodological reason for why neorealism cannot “do” foreign policy. Nevertheless, he insists that neorealism is still a theory of international politics. Taliaferro, 133n15. 29. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking,” 130, 132. Snyder uses the term “aggressive realism” instead of “offensive realism.” Snyder, Myths, 12.

Introduction

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less-than-hegemonic power. According to John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics—the primary text of offensive realism—“states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system.”30 Without an ultimate authority, survival is best ensured by being the strongest state around—ultimate safety, says Mearsheimer, is found through global hegemony. He is careful to qualify this, however. Global hegemony is very difficult to achieve because of the problems of projecting military power over long distances and over water, so in reality, the best for which a state can hope is unchallenged regional hegemony. Since all great powers attempt regional hegemony, conflict is an endemic part of international life.31 On the other hand, defensive realists say that states act simply to keep what they already have, or else they should act that way but often choose against it. Following the theoretical work of Robert Jervis and Kenneth Waltz, defensive realists insist that the anarchic nature of international life does not (and should not) breed as much conflict or aggression as realists might otherwise suppose. Instead, conflict and aggression are often the result of misperception. Defensive realists place great credence in the idea of the “security dilemma” or the idea that a state’s attempts to make itself more secure can—because of misperception and action/reaction logic—inadvertently make one less secure over time.32 This is not to say that offensive realists do not highlight the security dilemma—they do.33 However, while offensive realists argue that the dilemma results in continued, unrelenting conflict, defensive realists believe that the dilemma’s effects can be mitigated or transcended through “structural modifiers”: geography, interstate communication and transparency, the adoption of stabilizing force postures (versus those that are offensively oriented and perceived to be destabilizing), and by a mutual understanding of how difficult and costly military conquest can be.34 30. Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 33. 31. Ibid., 40–42. 32. For the canonical works on the “security dilemma,” see John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, 230–43; Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 167–214; Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. See also Stephen Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy. 33. Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 35–36. 34. For an explanation of the effect of structural modifiers, see Taliaferro, “Security Seeking,” 136– 40. The idea of “structural modifiers” is Van Evera’s, but Richard Betts’s review of Causes of War shows just how nebulous the concept is. Betts insists that Van Evera adds so many ingredients to the concept of “structural variables” that it almost approaches the status of what traditional realists have labeled “relative power.” Betts, “Must War Find a Way,” 186–87.

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Because of the dangers of the “security dilemma” and their belief that most intentional attempts at expansion are eventually checked by counterbalancing power, defensive realists argue that states can best make themselves more secure by “communicat[ing] restraint” and not engaging in behavior that others might likely consider threatening. It makes more sense survival-wise, they say, for states to be satisfied with what they have. The international system is considerably safer than one might believe. Conflict is not necessarily endemic, and as Sean Lynn-Jones suggests, “in some cases limited means (i.e. less expansionist policies) are more likely to maximize security.” States that are not satisfied (or at least states that do not appear to act as if they are satisfied) must therefore suffer from some type of internal flaw that keeps them from realizing this fact of international life.35 It therefore makes sense that offensive and defensive realists analyze and explain state policy adjustment very differently. Offensive realists, Gideon Rose says, posit a very clear relationship—in opposition to Waltz—between capabilities, the international environment, and policy choice.36 If one knows the change in capability and understands the international environment, offensive realists argue that policy will follow suit. Indeed, Mearsheimer says that “policymakers usually have a good sense of the actual balance of power, although they occasionally miscalculate the power of rival states.”37 Defensive realism, however, has a different view of policy choice and policy transformation. When it comes to explaining policy, Rose insists that defensive realists will often use two different independent variables: (a) the international system, which explains “natural” policy action; and (b) domestic politics, which explain “unnatural” state behav-

35. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking,” 129. For more on the defensive realism claim that one can often “buy” security with restrained behavior, see Sean Lynn-Jones, “Realism and America’s Rise: A Review Essay,” 177–78. The argument that it makes more sense for states to be satisfied with what they have is why some insist that the defensive character of Waltzian neorealism (and its Van Evera and LynnJones variants) carries with it a “status-quo bias.” That is, Waltz and his followers are able to argue that the international system teaches that states should be satisfied because they live (and theorize) in states that already have their “place in the sun.” See Randall Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma,” 90–121. Betts takes Van Evera to task for the same thing. Betts, “Must War Find,” 194. Zakaria’s complaint against defensive realism is that it leads to the conclusion that since states should act satisfied, it must be due to some “deformity” within the state itself when they do not. Defensive realism, says Zakaria, makes domestic politics “do all the work in its theory.” Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics,” 192–93, and From Wealth to Power, 27–28. 36. Again, if Colin Elman is to be believed, Waltz’s own practice is not aligned with his assertions. See Elman, “Horses for Courses,” 10. Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 149. 37. Mearsheimer says this in reference to those who insist that it is more important to look at the balance of power “that policymakers have in their heads.” Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 422n2.

Introduction

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ior. If a given strategic adjustment fits with what defensive realists see as the proper dictates of the international system (i.e., moves toward self-restraint, maintenance of the status quo, movement away from an offensively oriented defense posture), then that policy adjustment is explained systemically. On the other hand, if a given policy change is not in accord with their ideas of what anarchy implies, then defensive realists often look to domestic politics or “structural modifiers” to understand what causes this “unnatural” behavior.38

Common Theoretical Interpretations of Carter’s Conversion One interpretation that has long been a favorite among journalists as well as with analysts and historians of Carter’s national security and defense policies involves his presidential advisers and bureaucratic politics. Carter’s policy conversion is laid at the feet of the much-reported policy split between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the president’s national security adviser. In this explanation, Carter’s early policies reflected the “dovish” Vance, while the midcourse hardening of defense policy represented the growing influence of Brzezinski’s views on the president’s decision-making. The reasons and motivations behind the Vance-Brzezinski split have been chalked up to many things: different foreign policy philosophies, divergent perspectives on the Soviet Union, institutional competition between the State Department and the National Security Council (and the problem of organizational enculturation), and, directly related to organizational conflict, different levels of access to Carter’s ear.39 Another regularly made argument involves the direct pressure of American public opinion on Carter’s defense policy choices. As a result of the rise of the “New Right” in American politics and the rightward shift in public opinion, this interpretation suggests that Carter succumbed to his dissatisfied and growing conservative flank. Carter, struggling with rampant inflation, dismal poll numbers, and concerns for his electoral prospects with the 1980 election on the horizon, reversed from his earlier, more “dovish” defense and national security 38. See Table 1 in Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 154. 39. For examples of the Brzezinski-Vance split during the administration, see Washington Post, June 2, 1978, and U.S. News and World Report (June 19, 1978): 37. Carter emphatically denied any “rift” between his two advisers on June 23, 1978. Jimmy Carter, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1977, 1159–60. For works that have continued this line of explanation, see Raymond Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, 563–65; Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years, 35, 245; Jerel Rosati, The Carter Administration’s Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior, 69, 75; Richard Thornton, The Carter Years: Toward a New Global Order, xv.

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positions to follow the changing public mood and shore up political support. Hence, he increased the defense budget over his initial (and lower) FY1978 baseline, started new strategic weapons programs, bolstered spending for NATO, and decided to introduce new theater nuclear weapons into Western Europe. In mapping out causation, this interpretation says that Carter’s defense policy conversion was the result of shifting American public opinion and Carter’s perception of his electoral vulnerability.40 Sometimes executive-legislative relations are added into the causal mix. In this case, Carter’s move toward “the Second Cold War” was neither an electoral gambit nor the result of the Vance-Brzezinski split. Instead, the Carter conversion is interpreted as an executive-legislative bargaining tactic. Carter wooed pro-defense legislators with new weapons programs and a “harder” defense policy line to get them to support current presidential preferences and policies—in particular, the ratification of the SALT II treaty. The self-correcting change in the Carter administration’s national security and defense policy was therefore a logrolling maneuver and thoroughly tactical in its character.41 An alternative to this is occasionally offered as well. In place of pro-defense legislators, it is suggested that the immediate recipient of a defense policy “back scratch” was actually the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Believing that the support of prodefense senators for SALT II was contingent upon the Joint Chiefs’ approval of the treaty language, Carter was put in a position where he had to placate the Joint Chiefs with new weapons programs to win their approval. Despite a different immediate “back scratching” target, at the close of the day the prodefense legislators were still Carter’s intended end target.42 For some analysts, however, these innenpolitik explanations have not reached down deep enough. If the conservative shift in public opinion made Carter nervous about his electoral prospects, then what was the root cause of that growing conservative flank? And, besides pork politics, what else might have been behind the pro-defense outlook of so many legislators—the outlook that made logrolling, and therefore Carter’s conversion, necessary? For some, these two questions can be tied together through one particular root cause: the political activity of private interest groups, particularly defense-right and/or ideologically conservative groups. 40. This is one part of David Skidmore’s argument in Reversing Course: Carter’s Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform, 101–3. 41. Dan Caldwell, The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate, 114–15; Skidmore, Reversing Course, 144. 42. Caldwell, Dynamics of Domestic Politics, 196–97.

Introduction

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The interest group story during the Carter administration is often told this way: the pressure applied from defense-right and ideologically conservative interest groups (typically listed as the Committee on the Present Danger, the American Security Council, or the Coalition for Peace through Strength, an umbrella group involving both entities) “militarized” Carter’s national security and defense policy. In the late 1970s, defense-right and conservative pressure groups were established by elites who were motivated by nonstrategic desires. These desires included: imperialist, “Cold War” (anti-Communist), or “hegemonic” beliefs; additional or continued domestic political power and influence; and, in some cases, plain monetary rewards (profits) from the anticipated increases in defense spending that a transformed defense policy would (theoretically) bring. Instead of being held up as purveyors of either objective strategic truth or a prudent strategic outlook, the sometimes-conservative, pro-defense interest groups are labeled as evangelists of Snyder’s “myths of empire.” The argument is that these groups intentionally exaggerated and widely broadcast their vision (believed by many to be false) of the Soviet Union’s offensive intentions and its military capabilities, so as to “hijack” U.S. national security policy for their own political (and, in some cases, personal) ends.43 How, precisely, are these interest groups purported to have brought about the “militarization” of Carter’s defense policy? The explanations have tended to come in three different iterations, and in each case there is some interaction among the interest group(s), American public opinion, and executivelegislative politics. Public opinion and the legislature serve as the “transmission belt” for interest group pressure on the presidency. In this first variant, private lobbying groups, through the use of educational campaigns and a media barrage, directly convinced the general public that the Soviet Union was a much more serious threat to national security than détente made it appear to be. This is then fit together with the previous explanation of electorally motivated, executive-led defense policy change. Interest group–precipitated transformation of public opinion spooked Carter enough to get him to change his administration’s defense policy or risk defeat in 1980. In its second iteration, the target of interest group lobbying was not necessarily the public at large, but rather elites—administration advisers, congressional figures, or those of the “chattering class.” Hence, Carter’s defense policy 43. Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment, 161–86, 197, 211, 222–23; Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War, 13; Skidmore, Reversing Course, 148. The argument is also found in Anne Hessing Cahn, Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA, 191. On “hijacking,” see Snyder, Myths, 1–2, 10, 14–15, 33–34.

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adjustment was the result of interest group–inspired elite pressure. That is, elites who were convinced by pro-defense, conservative lobbies of a growing Soviet strategic threat in turn swayed the executive branch. There are, of course, myriad ways that elites are suggested to have pressured the executive. Carter could have bent under the direct pressure from interest group–educated presidential advisers, bowed under to the pressure from public opinion manipulated by the “chattering class,” or, in the case of interest group–educated elites on Capitol Hill, been forced (again) to give in to pro-defense forces so as to achieve other desired legislative goals. All in all, this iteration says that prodefense interest groups educated a set of elites, who in turn applied pressure for defense policy change. The third variant combines the first two. In a political attack on the administration, elites and the public were targeted by interest groups simultaneously, and both then put increasing pressure on the president to change his earlier, “dovish” defense program decisions.44 Irrespective of the peculiar variant chosen, the interest group innenpolitik interpretation for Carter’s defense policy shift typically asserts that conservative and nonconservative-but-pro-defense groups engaged in concerted “public education campaigns” or “information campaigns” to convince the American public, or elites inside and outside the administration (and thereby the president himself), of an enormous (and false) strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union. Carter’s conversion was, at its heart, the result of externally driven perception management. It was the selling of the threat of the Soviet Union’s offensive power and a discounting of current U.S. military capabilities, both of which were combined with the exigencies of domestic politics. The shift away from his earlier, détente-like defense policies to the “Second Cold War” is best explained by the self-focused motivations of defense-right pressure groups, their “myths of empire” or intentional manipulation of “security discourse,” their use of scare tactics, and Carter’s own political vulnerability. There are significant drawbacks in using innenpolitik theories to explain and understand “self-correcting” strategic adjustment. One, despite the fact that such theories claim to uncover the root causes of changes to national security policy and defense policy, they are, at their core, distinctly astrategic in character. Statesmanship, in the classical strategic sense, is all about the art of relating military power to international, external political objectives.45 An explanation of national

44. Sanders, Peddlers, 197; Skidmore, Reversing Course, 146–47. 45. For the classical definition of strategy, “the use of engagements for the object of war,” see Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, 145–46.

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security policy or defense policy that relies solely on an internalist causal chain denigrates the value of (as well as the problems associated with) this art. The statesman, of course, maneuvers between the internal and the external environments, but in innenpolitik theories, the idea that policy-makers can be statesmen in this traditional sense is often rendered as ludicrous. Policy-makers are nothing more than self-interested pork maximizers and/or vote panderers. As Fareed Zakaria argues, innenpolitik policy analysis tends to work in tandem with economically oriented, revisionist historiography.46 Instead of decisions being made on the basis of rational, disinterested (and sometimes even honorable) costbenefit calculation, innenpolitikers paint national security and defense policymakers as weak or selfish individuals susceptible to the machinations of bureaucracies and special, powerful vested interests. In Carter’s case, innenpolitik analyses make him appear vote-hungry, legacy-hungry (in the form of SALT II), or simply soft in the face of bureaucratic or outside pressure. Take, for instance, David Skidmore’s book Reversing Course. The three central chapters of Skidmore’s book outline his own innenpolitik interpretation of Carter’s midcourse policy reversal. Carter’s “militarization,” according to Skidmore, was not at all due to the changes or pressures from the external environment, but “can be traced quite specifically to domestic constraints rather than external ones . . .”47 In his view, Carter’s conversion was the result of the president’s inability to sell his initial, liberal internationalist strategy; the propagation of a popular and sellable threat narrative by money-flush, pro-defense conservative lobbies; the lack of a viable liberal lobbying alternative; and the president’s electoral vulnerability. Skidmore insists that Carter’s initial approach toward foreign and defense policy represented a cohesive and realistic “strategy of adjustment”—that is, the administration’s recognition of the many limits faced by the United States in the changed military and economic environment of the 1970s. The rise of West Germany and Japan as industrial competitors, the advent of global economic interdependence, the oil shocks, and U.S.-Soviet military parity—each of these eroded U.S. national power as the 1970s progressed. According to Skidmore, the Carter administration correctly identified these trends and attempted to adjust American policy to fit them. The “strategy of adjustment” included cuts in defense spending, a “limited retrenchment” of U.S. military forces, an emphasis on diplomatic and economic instruments, and arms control.48 46. Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics”, 180–81, 184n18. 47. Skidmore, Reversing Course, 55. 48. Ibid., 30–33.

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Unfortunately, says Skidmore, Carter could not convince the American public that this adjustment strategy was wise and prudent. Skidmore offers two reasons for this. First, he argues that Carter’s “apolitical rhetorical style” and his pragmatic, case-specific approach to policy issues made domestic policy “legitimization” very difficult. This was not a failure of presidential leadership, he insists. Instead, the problem stemmed from Carter’s penchant for emphasizing the complexity and interconnectedness of issues. This approach clashed with the traditional, ideologically focused Cold War way of selling foreign and defense policy positions to the public using easy-to-understand “doctrines.” President Carter tried to change the way that national security policy was usually explained to the American public, but the public refused to go along with it.49 Second, the American public was not only wary of Carter’s approach but also undergoing perceptual attack by the administration’s conservative and/or pro-defense opponents. Although the Vietnam War had destroyed the American foreign policy consensus, Skidmore argues that there were still entrenched elements of the Cold War “old guard.” These remnants used their political acumen, access, money, and power to put pressure on the public and the administration. The public, reacting to the debate between the Carter administration and its critics, moved ever rightward and away from Carter’s liberal internationalist “strategy of adjustment.” Skidmore adds that liberal interest group activity was substantially weaker than conservative activity, so Carter was faced with little choice but to react with militarization—what Skidmore calls a “strategy of resistance.”50 But for what reasons did these conservative, pro-defense interest groups fight Carter’s “strategy of adjustment”? What were the underlying motivations? Skidmore refuses to address these questions in an explicit way. Instead, one must extrapolate his theory of interest group motivations and preferences from his descriptions of the group participants. He explains that the conservative and/or pro-defense pressure groups were made up of “figures from the military-industrial complex, managers of the national security apparatus and Cold War intellectuals.”51 Later, he gives a more detailed list: “former military officers, past State or Defense Department appointees, businessmen and union officials tied to large military contractors, and academic foreign policy or defense specialists.”52 Implicitly, then, the motivations behind interest group

49. Ibid., 66–69, 84–86. 50. Ibid., 102–3, 129–47. 51. Ibid., 108. 52. Ibid., 111.

Introduction

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preference were: profit, continued employment, political power, institutional bias, militarism, and anticommunism. For Skidmore, all of these motivations were domestic in origin and domestic in aim. Carter’s critics, therefore, “socially constructed” a national interest to serve their selfish internal goals and sold this vision to the public.53 Carter, concerned about his own political future, caved in to this “constructed” national interest and moved to appease the American public (and secure his own reelection) through militarization. What, then, about the use of realism as an explanatory framework? Interestingly, explanations of Carter’s policy transformation that would be considered realist in character (that is, those that highlight power and interest) are often atheoretical in their presentation. They are not often explicit as to the exact causal mechanism behind the administration’s policy adjustment. Realist culprits include: the push of international events, international crises, and Soviet military deployments. In summary, there was “something” that the Soviet Union did which increased its power relative to the United States (or at least something that made it appear to the Carter administration that its relative power had increased). This increase in power then “somehow” serves as the threat against which Carter reacts with his adjustments to American national security policy and defense policy. One realist argument highlights the role of geopolitical “shocks” that occurred at the end of 1979. That is, two discrete events in late 1979 brought about the hardening of U.S. policy: the student takeover of the American embassy in Tehran and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. The Afghanistan invasion is more often cited as a cause for changes in policy. President Carter himself admitted that the invasion had dashed his previous opinion of the Soviet leadership and opened his eyes as to the Soviets’ true essence.54 In January 1980, less than a month after the invasion, Carter announced what came to be labeled as the “Carter Doctrine,” which identified the Persian Gulf as an area of vital national interest and pledged the United States to use all means necessary to protect it from foreign encroachment.55 For those who subscribe to this interpretation, the Carter administration’s pre-Afghanistan

53. Ibid., 147–48. 54. See Carter’s statement to an ABC News correspondent immediately after the Soviet invasion: “My opinion of the Russians has changed more drastically in the last week than . . . in the previous two and a half years,” quoted in Bernard Weisberger, Cold War, Cold Peace: The United States and Russia since 1945, 291. 55. For a detailed explanation of the crafting of the Carter Doctrine, see Cecil Crabb, The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role, and Future, 325–70.

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period is considered dovish, while the months following the invasion (which also encompassed the 1980 presidential campaign) are thought of as hawkish and nonconciliatory. As a realist interpretation, this idea makes sense. Though the invasion would later be viewed as a dismal miscalculation on the part of Moscow, at the time it was believed by many to have increased the Soviet Union’s power and influence. This change in power and influence precipitated a change in threat, which in the end brought about Carter’s conversion.56 Unfortunately, the 1979 “geopolitical shocks” argument has two shortcomings. The first is methodological; the second and more damning is chronological. Methodologically speaking, those who hold to the belief that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused the shift in Carter’s policy often leave out a vital step in their analysis—the role of assessment. Assessment is the middle ground between the change in power and the change in threat. It is through assessment that an administration determines that an event actually represents an increase in power (whether military-operational or geostrategic) and whether that adjustment in power actually constitutes a change in threat. If it is indeed true that Carter adjusted American policy because of the threat caused by the Soviet invasion, then one would expect a detailed ranking of how and why Carter and his advisers saw the invasion as threatening. Instead, this ranking is often absent. Sometimes, the threat is couched in the language of superpower credibility. The invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated a willingness on the part of Moscow to apply the Brezhnev Doctrine in an area outside of Eastern Europe. The United States could “lose face” internationally if the Soviet action was left unaddressed. Hence, Carter changed his policy tack. More often, the threat to the United States is described in military-operational and geopolitical terms. The stationing of Soviet forces in western Afghanistan could serve as one thrust of a future pincer movement into Iran and the Persian Gulf, which would put the United States’ (and, more importantly, NATO’s) oil supplies at significant risk. Or—though a hotly debated point—the invasion presaged a military move into Pakistan and the acquisition of a warmwater outlet on the Indian Ocean (which would increase Soviet power

56. Examples of this abound in specialist texts as well as in general histories. Amos Jordan, William Taylor, and Michael Mazarr, eds., American National Security, 83–84. Jerel Rosati describes Robert McGeehan’s analysis of the Carter administration and how McGeehan gives pride of place to the “shocks of 1979.” Rosati, Quest for Global Community, 10. Dan Caldwell describes Iran and Afghanistan as the “unraveling of the Carter administration’s détente policy” and the return “to the Cold War strategy of containment by January 1980.” See Caldwell’s chapter in Odd Arne Westad, The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations during the Carter Years, 111.

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projection capabilities, especially against oil transport routes).57 Hence, Carter countered these military-operational and geopolitical threats with his policy transformation. But minus an explicit examination of assessment, an interpretation that relies solely on the statement that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan “caused” Carter’s conversion does not tell nearly enough. Which was more important: credibility, geopolitics, military-operational vulnerability, oil, or all four? For purposes of theory, it is overdetermined.58 However, this peculiar realist interpretation suffers from more than just overdetermination. A chronological examination of the Carter administration reveals what is probably the greatest roadblock to the late-1979 geopolitical “shocks” hypothesis: that of timing. The grand strategic and defense policy decisions that collectively represent Carter’s conversion in this study (MX, PD59, NATO defense buildup and the two-track decision, and the FY1980 defense budget) were all initiated well before the Soviet Union’s move into Afghanistan. The self-correcting policy change at issue in this study occurred months before the onset of the invasion; therefore it could not have been caused by it. One runs into the same problem if one attributes the policy shift to the hostage crisis in Iran. The embassy in Tehran was overrun by students in the first week of November 1979—well after Carter’s conversion. By November-December 1979, the policy transformation was well under way. Neither of the two Southwest Asian “shocks” were the catalysts or causes of the policy adjustment. Each merely accelerated a process that was well under way (most pointedly in the case of military contingency planning for the Persian Gulf and the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force).59 Keeping the issue of timing in mind, some scholars list other, pre-1979 geopolitical events as candidate causes for a change in U.S. behavior: Angola, the

57. Some claim that the push for a warm-water port was a “geopolitical myth” perpetrated by British and American geopolitical theorists. Early geopolitical analysts attributed their own fears about the security of trade routes and colonial possessions to the imperial Russian government. Many of the same arguments were then revived after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. William Green, “The Historic Russian Drive for a Warm Water Port: Anatomy of a Geopolitical Myth,” 80–102. 58. Military-operational, geopolitical, and credibility issues were, in fact, all mentioned as postinvasion concerns within the administration itself. “U.S. Response to Soviet Threat in Indian Ocean/Southwest Asia,” attachment to OSD Memorandum from Carl Smith to Peter Tarnoff and Leslie Denend, Subject: U.S. Military Responses in Southwest Asia, February 11, 1980, 1. Donated Brzezinski Material, Box 34, Meetings—Vance, Brown, Brzezinski 1/80–2/80, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library [hereafter cited as JCL]. 59. For two recent explorations of the Carter administration and the origins of CENTCOM, see William Odom, “The Cold War Origins of U.S. Central Command,” 52–82, and Olav Njolstad, “Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in U.S. Strategic Planning in the Carter Years,” 21–55.

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Shaba province conflict in Zaire, the war in the Ogaden between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the fighting between North and South Yemen.60 Again, though, the assessment part of the story is usually missing. It is argued that these points of Third World superpower contention eroded détente and caused the hardening of national security policy. But there is little explanation of exactly how each, or all of them together, constituted a threat to the United States. As with Afghanistan, were they geopolitical threats? Credibility threats? Militaryoperational threats? These Third World events might indeed be keys to understanding why American grand strategy and defense policy changed during Carter’s administration, but until scholars focus more intently on internal assessment, it remains unclear as to how the administration moved from international event to perceived threat to a (large-scale) change in state behavior. Other realist interpretations shy away from geopolitics and address the effects of Soviet weapon breakthroughs and Soviet military deployments on Carter’s policy conversion. In a 2002 article in Diplomacy and Statecraft, Thomas Nichols argues that the modernization of Soviet nuclear programs, particularly the deployment of the SS-18 and the SS-20, was a much greater influence on the Carter administration’s strategic thinking than any Soviet adventurism in the Third World. Many Russians themselves, says Nichols, have subsequently identified the SS-20 deployment as a “turning point” that provoked Carter’s ire.61 Nichols’s position is very similar to an earlier analysis by Robert Thornton. Thornton states that more than anything else, the detection of Soviet advancements in missile guidance revolutionized American policy during the Carter years. He concludes, “From the early spring of 1977, virtually every policy issue would be debated from the perspective of whether the Soviet breakthrough [in guidance technology] compromised the policy in question or permitted it to go forward.”62 The Soviet Union achieved ICBM hard-target kill capability faster than expected, which Thornton says had extensive repercussions for foreign and defense policy, both of which were predicated originally on the basis of no advances in Soviet hard-target kill until the mid-1980s.63 60. David Reynolds makes reference to the Horn of Africa and to Angola in his general history of the Cold War. One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945, 355, 362. 61. Thomas Nichols, “Carter and the Soviets: The Origins of the U.S. Return to a Strategy of Confrontation,” 28–29. 62. Thornton, Carter Years, xv. 63. Ibid. Thornton, however, subsequently backs away from using realism to explain policy change and turns to adviser warfare to explain the fluctuation. He says that the policy implications of the Soviet weapons breakthrough split the administration. In every policy case that was impacted by Soviet weapons breakthrough, Brzezinski would suggest “containment” while Vance would suggest more liberal policies. Carter could not make up his mind between the two.

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Thornton unfortunately exceeds his evidence and thus overstates his case. First, he makes the claim that the administration received new military intelligence about SS-18 guidance “within a week of Carter taking office” on the questionable evidentiary basis of a Fortune magazine article from 1980 as well as inferring it from a change in tone in Carter’s letters and meetings with Leonid Brezhnev and Anatoly Dobrynin between January 26, 1977, and February 1, 1977.64 More importantly, though, if Thornton’s interpretation is correct and this new intelligence on a Soviet breakthrough in ICBM guidance is what precipitated Carter’s conversion, then it is still unclear why that policy transformation did not occur until much later in the administration. The administration’s early defense decisions (the cuts in the MX missile program, the end of the B-1 bomber program) fly directly in the face of Thornton’s thesis. The Soviet missile guidance breakthrough, if it was the primary cause of the policy adjustment, should have hardened policy much more quickly than it apparently did. Updated intelligence on Soviet missile guidance cannot—by itself—explain the timing of the administration’s self-correcting policy change. As in the case of pre-1979 geopolitical events, there is much truth to these weapon-oriented interpretations. Soviet weapon developments and deployments were indeed key factors in Carter’s self-correcting policy adjustment. But again, without a closer examination into how the Carter administration actually assessed these weapon developments, there is no way to judge their precise causal impact. There were other Soviet military deployments and breakthroughs to consider: the Backfire bomber, Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional force increases and improvements, and Soviet naval improvements. Neither Nichols nor Thornton explain or demonstrate why the SS-18 or the SS-20 deployments were any more causal in Carter’s policy-hardening than these other weapon systems. A look at the administration’s internal assessment of Soviet military power would shed more interpretive light on this. Although it is proper that Skidmore’s Reversing Course was already discussed in light of his innenpolitik theory of policy change, it may be more accurate to label his book an example of defensive realism. Again, according to Gideon Rose, defensive realists often fall back on domestic politics when they consider the state behavior they wish to explain to be “unnatural” and counter to what the international system truly dictates.65 This is precisely what Skidmore does.

64. Ibid., 13. For the Fortune magazine citation, see ibid., 38n7. 65. Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 154.

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In his view, Carter’s early policies are best explained by realism, but the policy shift grew out of domestic, not external, roots. As explained earlier, the administration’s early, liberal-internationalist “strategy of adjustment,” as he calls it, resulted from what Skidmore says was Carter’s (and his advisers’) correct assessment of the external environment and their proper choice to follow its systemic dictates. In Carter’s early years, the administration faced its international limits honestly, and these systemic limits were reflected in policy. Skidmore denies the external realm any causal power whatsoever over Carter’s self-correcting policy change. Instead, he asserts that the strategic shift happened when Carter fell victim to false and exaggerated claims about the strategic environment propagated by domestic interest groups. Skidmore dismisses the possibility that the growing strategic power of the Soviet Union and its perceived effect on American national security may have brought about Carter’s midcourse policy transformation. Carter’s conversion ran against the systemic grain; therefore, its origin had to be domestic. The external environment, then, is thoroughly causal when it comes to explaining Carter’s initial, “dovish” security policies but completely noncausal in Carter’s “hawkish” strategic transformation. Skidmore supports this claim with three arguments. First, using articles from the early 1980s detailing the problem of inflated estimation by the CIA, he points out that Soviet military spending turned out to be significantly less in the latter part of the 1970s than it had been in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He claims that actual military growth had stagnated by the end of the decade.66 Moreover, there were poor estimates of Soviet strength in both Europe and the developing world. The strategic balance along the Central Front was not as one-sided as it was made out to be, and Soviet activity in the Third World was much less aggressive than many believed.67 Altogether, these three points are meant to convince Skidmore’s readers that Moscow was not the dire international threat that Carter’s critics made it out to be, and, therefore, should not (and could not) have compelled Carter to “militarize” American policy. These were, of course, oft-argued positions in Carter’s day (and they continue to be held widely) but Skidmore’s use of them is inadequate. In the first place, Skidmore ignores the issue of weapon lead-time. Even if readers were to accept his contention that Soviet military spending was actually higher in the late 1960s and early 1970s than it was in the late 1970s, military spending in and of itself is 66. Skidmore, Reversing Course, 60–61, 195n25. 67. Ibid., 61–66.

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never a strategic threat. Strategic threats arise from what a state is able to purchase with its military spending and, perhaps even more importantly, how, when, and where that state deploys its military purchases. The consequence of Soviet military spending in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the weapon systems that constituted the threat in the late 1970s and early to mid-1980s. The Soviet military systems and deployments faced by the Carter administration were the fruit of Moscow’s spending during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. To argue that a decrease in the growth of Soviet military spending during Carter’s watch should have stayed Carter’s policy hand is to miss that point altogether. Any purported decrease in Soviet military spending and weapon procurement during the late 1970s, a decrease Skidmore believes should have eased the administration’s fears, would not necessarily affect the overall threat matrix at that time, but would come to do so in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, over and above this criticism is Skidmore’s propensity for historical presentism. He insists that intelligence estimates of Soviet military spending, the Central Front military balance, Soviet military forces in general, and estimates of Soviet activity in the Third World were all exaggerated. The international strategic environment, it is now apparent, was not actually all that threatening. But for support, he offers a “now we know” argument, applying after-the-fact, post-Carter evaluations of both Soviet behavior and the accuracy of American estimative intelligence, to explain what Carter knew (or should have known) about the international strategic environment when he crafted and made the policy decisions he did. In short, Skidmore says that the international environment could not have been the cause of Carter’s defense policy conversion because, as subsequent evidence shows, it was not that objectively threatening at the time. As a defensive realist would argue, the true external environment logically suggested only two policy paths—caution and pullback.68 So since Carter acted differently than this later on in his administration, Skidmore, as a defensive realist, sets aside the issues of power, assessment, and prudent statecraft and turns his interpretive lens inward toward domestic political pathologies. As Zakaria and others have warned about defensive realists, Skidmore confuses what he thinks or believes Carter and his advisers should have known (or learned) about the international environment (in short, that it was less insecure) with what might have been known about it.69

68. Ibid., 65–66. 69. Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 31. It is important to note what intelligence estimates said at the time. For instance, in November 1975, the CIA provided Congressman Les Aspin with a “best-estimate”

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At face value, the previously referenced geopolitical and military-oriented analyses of Carter’s conversion actually seem to fit quite well with the theory of offensive realism. According to Mearsheimer, “status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs.”70 Great powers are interested in maximizing their power and securing regional hegemony. Offensive realism would therefore suggest that Soviet military developments, Moscow’s actions in the Third World (whether directly or through its proxies), and America’s post-Vietnam strategic doldrums resulted in a net increase in Soviet power and a greater opportunity for Moscow to achieve regional hegemony. Since according to Mearsheimer’s approach regional hegemons work to deny the same to others, the United States reacted by building up its own military strength.71 There is no need to look inside the state or government. Again, says Gideon Rose, offensive realism posits a fairly straight causal line from international environment and change in relative power to a change in state policy.72 Hence, Carter’s policy shift was natural—any great power faced with a similar circumstance would act in the same fashion. That said, this “straight line” from international environment to policy is precisely the main drawback of using Mearsheimer’s offensive realism as a theory of grand strategy or defense policy. As mentioned, Mearsheimer himself is ambivalent as to whether his theory is usable in analyzing policy. It is not at all clear that his offensive realism explains policy change (and therefore Carter’s conversion) very well all on its own. As a structural theory, Mearsheimer’s offensive realism gives some insights into the probable broad trajectory and direction of a policy shift—that is, offensive realism would predict that it was more probable that the United States would increase rather than decrease its military strength in the late 1970s in light of the increase of Soviet power relative to that of the United States and U.S. status as a great power. But as in Beth Fischer’s criticism of Waltzian neo-

breakdown of total Soviet military spending. Using 1973 dollars, the CIA showed that the Soviet Union overtook the United States in total defense spending in 1971 with that difference increasing every year after that (up through 1974, with another projected increase in 1975). Letter from CIA Legislative Counsel George Cary to the Honorable Les Aspin, November 28, 1975, 3, attached to “Comments on Foreign Policy Article, ‘Soviet Strength and U.S. Purpose,’” CIA Princeton Collection, http:// www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp?pageNumber=1&freqReqRecord=PrincetonCollection.txt (accessed January 19, 2008). 70. Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 21. 71. Ibid., 41–42. 72. Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 154.

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realism in The Reagan Reversal, Mearsheimer’s structural theory only provides a partial explanation of strategic adjustment. The overall path of Carter’s policy transformation fits with Mearsheimer’s “offensive” versus a “defensive” realist tone, but to understand the policy adjustment fully, something more than Mearsheimer’s structural approach is required.

Neoclassical Realism That “something more” is neoclassical realism—or what some have labeled “neotraditional” realism.73 Unlike Mearsheimer or Waltz’s structural realist theories of international politics, neoclassical realism is billed as a theory of state policy. Whereas innenpolitik theories give causal pride of place to the state’s internal environment (whether it be individual or group preferences, institutions, society, or culture) and structural realist theories highlight the pressures of the international system, neoclassical realism casts itself as a balancer between the two poles. The theory uses variables from both the external and internal environments, but instead of offering them in an ad hoc manner, it asserts that the state’s power vis-à-vis other states (“relative material power capabilities” as put by Gideon Rose)74 is always the first driver of grand strategy, foreign policy, and defense policy. Neoclassical realism says that relative power and innenpolitik both matter when it comes to understanding policy creation and policy transformation, but that analytically, domestic variables always rank second. On what authority has the choice been made to integrate variables but privilege relative material power? To start, neoclassical realists make no apologies about the theory’s realist identity. Being realist, they simply take at face value realism’s historical assumption that power and interests trump domestic factors in national security affairs.75 Second, however, both Gideon Rose and Randall Schweller have referred to Jennifer Sterling-Folker’s critique of liberal theorizing to buttress their shared claim that when neoclassical realism integrates external and internal factors, innenpolitik variables should be cast in secondary rather than primary roles.76 73. Randall Schweller mentions the term “neotraditional” in “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” 311–48, especially 316–20. Recently, Schweller has applied neoclassical realism in a booklength analysis of what he calls policy “underbalancing.” Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, 1–68. 74. Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 146. 75. Ibid. 76. Schweller, “Progressiveness,” 319–20; Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 164n39.

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Sterling-Folker points out what she believes is a major logical flaw when it comes to the use of domestic variables in liberal international relations theory. Liberal (innenpolitik) theories of policy and policy change locate causes in domestic preferences and processes. Liberal theorists, she says, claim that interests and identities are constituted from such processes.77 At the same time, many liberal theorists also insist that these domestic processes are often influenced by systemic processes—albeit liberal systemic ones such as international regimes or interdependence. When this happens, when liberal systemic processes affect domestic processes (such as when a central decision-maker embedded in a governmental political process is educated through an international regime or by an international norm), Sterling-Folker argues that the domestic-level processes that were thought to be wholly causal turn from dependent variables into independent variables. Something external to domestic processes suddenly becomes more causal. Or, as she puts it, “[l]iberal theory must ultimately smuggle something external into the equation to explain when processes are independent or dependent variables.”78 It is, in fact, realist theory, rather than liberal theory, that “provides a rigorous grounding for the inclusion of domestic causal variables.”79 There is a clear delineation between the causal influence of the external environment and the causal impact of domestic processes. “Both systemic environment and domestic process have causal impact,” Sterling-Folker insists, “because the former determines the ends to which actors strive but the latter is the means by which actors obtain those ends.”80 The warp and woof of liberal theory—domestic institutions, bureaucracies, and lobbies—are not ends in and of themselves, but are the instruments through which the anarchic environment “out there” is comprehended and mediated. Even though domestic processes are secondary to the outside environment, realism cannot dismiss or ignore them. Indeed, realism allows for their proper combination. Domestic processes directly affect the central decision makers’

77. Some liberal theorists go even further. Alexander Wendt, for example, argues that self-help is an agreed “social construction” and not a “logical” consequence of anarchy. States form their selfidentities and their relational identities upon self-help, but they need not do so. Instead, self-help is an institution that is formed by shared meaning and identity. Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 391–425, especially 394–99. A more detailed explanation of Wendt’s position is found in his Social Theory of International Politics. 78. Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realist Environment, Liberal Process and Domestic-Level Variables,” 11–12, 17. 79. Ibid., 3. 80. Ibid., 4, 16.

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assessments and judgments of the external environment, as well as their evaluations of the actions that other states take to ensure their own survival in that environment. Sterling-Folker says that in realism actors make choices based upon their contexts. In realist thought, the anarchic environment is the “prime mover” behind policy transformation, but that environment registers its causal effect through domestic processes. Both are causal, but as she concludes, “The anarchic environment remains primarily but indirectly causal, while process remains secondarily but directly causal.”81 The theory of neoclassical realism highlights the role played by statesmen or central decision-makers. “Statesmen, not states,” argues Zakaria, “are the primary actors in international affairs, and their perceptions of shifts in power, rather than objective measures, are critical.”82 Again, unlike structural theorists, neoclassical realists argue that balances or “concerts” of power do not arise automatically to return a systemic imbalance into a state of equilibrium. Statesmen weigh information and intelligence about relative material power, but many things “get in the way” of proper assessment (which means that there can sometimes be a significant disjunction between the “true” state of things and policy).83 One’s own relative material power and the potential threat brought about by shifts in relative material power have to be apprehended and assessed by central decision-makers. Assessment is therefore one of the key concepts in neoclassical realism. It is the nexus between system change and policy. The philosophy, structure, process, and politics behind assessment, then, must be thoroughly examined in any analysis of policy transformation. Theoretically, relative power comes first and is foremost, but the domestic environment filters and influences its assessment.84 The things that color assessment are many of the independent variables given top causal billing by innenpolitik scholars: issues like organizational interest and bias, personal or organizational preferences, or the impact of society and/or culture.85 These innenpolitik variables are neither ignored nor overemphasized in neoclassical realism. The theory does not say that statesmen are invulnerable to pressure. It says instead that such pressure, or the preferences at the foundation of that pressure, are not the primary determinants of a statesman’s policy decisions. Preferences and processes do not determine; they influence and woo. Innenpolitik 81. Ibid., 22. 82. Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 42. 83. Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 147. 84. Ibid., 152–53, 158. 85. Ibid. See also Schweller, “Progressiveness,” 336–40.

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theories invert this logic. Indeed, Kevin Narizny stands neoclassical realism on its head when he asserts in his political economy theory of strategic adjustment that “international variables cannot be ignored, but they should be treated only as constraints on the underlying domestic determinants of foreign policy.”86 In neoclassical realism, the reverse is held to be true. Besides its careful integration of external and internal variables and its emphasis on how changes in relative power are translated into policy through net assessment, neoclassical realism also addresses the politics associated in the conversion or transfer of a state’s latent power into military power.87 Central decision-makers seldom have the ability to mobilize what they believe is strategically required without some type of political fight, so neoclassical realists pay close attention to the structure of the state and the process involved in the mobilization or extraction of resources. Zakaria placed state structure at the forefront of his neoclassical realist theory of grand strategy, arguing that a state chooses to expand (or maximize) its influence abroad as its relative power increases and as the state apparatus becomes more robust (that is, more professional, centralized, less open to societal ‘hijacking’ and therefore more effective at extraction).88 Thomas Christensen looks at something similar in his discussion of what he calls “national political power.” In short, Christensen insists that mobilization is not a “given” or an automatic reaction to systemic changes. In his view, it is vital that theorists take into consideration the domestic politics and processes involved in the mobilization of state resources for grand strategic purposes. He explains that mobilization is rarely without controversy and hence must be sold to the public. For him, “national political power” is a measurement of the ease with which a statesman can extract or mobilize resources from the public.89 The question as to whether neoclassical realism is offensive or defensive in its tone is up for theoretical grabs. Gideon Rose distinguishes neoclassical real86. Narizny, “The New Debate,” 170. 87. Mearsheimer defines latent power as the “socio-economic ingredients” of military power. But he adds that when it comes to relations between states, “a state’s effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces.” Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 55. 88. For instance, Zakaria’s theory is labeled “offensive realism” by Taliaferro. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking,” 128n3. However, even though it may be offensive versus defensive realist in its tone, Zakaria’s “state-centered realism” would not be “offensive realism” in Mearsheimer’s sense since it is not a structural theory. Though it severely overcomplicates the issue, Zakaria’s “state-centered realism” would actually be an example of offensive neoclassical realism contra Taliaferro’s theory of defensive neoclassical realism. 89. Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and SinoAmerican Conflict, 1947–1958, 11–16.

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ism from offensive realism, but does so on the basis of Mearsheimer’s structuralism. Rose says that neoclassical realism offers three main “predictions”: (a) an increase in relative power leads to an increase in attempts to influence and shape the international environment, while a decrease has the opposite effect; (b) state behavior is not always quick to follow the change in relative power since that change is open to assessment; and (c) when it comes to increasing one’s influence and activity in foreign affairs, a weak state will have more difficulty in converting latent power to usable power.90 It would appear from the first of these predictions that Rose sees neoclassical realism as having an offensive rather than defensive flavor—when a state’s relative power increases, it increases that state’s desire for influence. Jeffrey Taliaferro, however, posits a more neutral theory, suggesting that neoclassical realism is neither offensive nor defensive by nature. Since the offensive/ defensive break in realism is over the “implications of anarchy,” neoclassical realists have to show their preference. Taliaferro outlines what he sees as “defensive neoclassical realism.” For example, the geography of one’s neighborhood (which he believes serves as a structural modifier) dampens a state’s desires. If a state has well-protected borders or weak neighbors, Taliaferro says that it will more likely pursue long-term economic policies than short-term military-oriented policies. On the other hand, if a state is faced with strong neighbors or porous borders, then defensive neoclassical realism would suggest that it will probably choose to maintain large military forces and offensive force postures and doctrines, especially in a context where there are significant first-move advantages.91 Taliaferro goes on to describe what he believes are other facets of defensive neoclassical realism (an emphasis on assessment and the problems of perception and miscalculation, the role that domestic politics play in the choices of state policy, and the methodological choice of looking at policy from the external-in), but these are characteristics common to neoclassical realism, not just one peculiar variant.92 Altogether, irrespective of one’s beliefs as to what exactly anarchy means for world politics, neoclassical realism focuses its explanatory energy on two political arenas when it comes to policy change: (a) the politics surrounding the proper assessment of the international environment; and (b) the politics involved in the extraction and mobilization of resources needed to address the changed external realm.

90. Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 167. 91. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking,” 140–41. 92. Ibid., 141–43.

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Chapter Outline This book does not explain what the Soviet Union was trying to accomplish in the 1970s and how its activity caused blowback (what Jack Snyder might call “overexpansion”) or unintended consequences. Such an approach would require an in-depth study of Soviet (now Russian) archives. This book is also not concerned with what Moscow’s motives “really” were or the Soviet Union’s expectations about possible U.S. reactions to its actions. That type of analysis moves quickly into the area of hypothesizing over what the Soviet Union could have done to moderate Washington’s reactions. In opposition to the innenpolitik interpretations mentioned earlier, this book does not look at “what we know now” about Soviet actions in the late 1970s in order to demonstrate how domestic pathologies (bureaucratic politics, interest group hijacking, cultural or institutional bias) kept the United States from understanding what the Soviet Union was “really” up to. Again, that type of work is astrategic. It denigrates the very serious problems associated with statecraft and readily moves into an argument about missed opportunities and normative judgments over what Carter should have done had he known what we know presently. It is the intellectual equivalent of postgame, armchair quarterbacking with the opponent’s playbook in your hand. Instead, using recently released material from the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, the National Security Archive at George Washington University, the CIA, and the Defense Department, along with memoir literature, newspapers, journalistic accounts, existing histories, and a number of private collections, this study applies neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework for analyzing Carter’s midcourse national security and defense policy conversion. Neoclassical realism provides a firm foundation for understanding Carter’s policy shift: the administration reacted to an increase in Soviet “relative material power capabilities” (military strength, intelligence power,93 inroads into areas of strategic geography) by “hardening” American policy, particularly nuclear weapons policy. The hardening was prudent. It was done with the (neoclassical realist) understanding that a decrease in American relative power would eventually—perhaps sooner rather than later—bring about a decrease in its ability to shape the international environment. The trajectory of Carter’s shift

93. Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 2, 2n6. Herman defines intelligence power as the effect brought about by the successful utilization of intelligence.

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is best explained by the desire to increase the United States’ relative power. The timing and exact character of Carter’s shift (the types of instruments chosen and how they were deployed) are best explained by the impact of three mediating variables on assessment and extraction: strategic thought, interallied relations, and arms control.

Two The Strategic Environment of the 1970s

An administration’s defense policy choices are unintelligible without a clear understanding of the general strategic context within which assessment is undertaken and decisions are made. To set the stage for the transformation of President Carter’s defense policy decision-making, this chapter provides a detailed examination of the strategic environment of the early to mid-1970s, paying very close attention to the nuclear part of the story. The first part of the chapter examines the influence of the Kennedy-era Pentagon, specifically its theory of assured vulnerability and the defense program choices that were made in the late 1960s in light of that theory. The following section discusses the late 1960s and early 1970s transformation of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact military-operational threat (both nuclear and conventional) and describes how these quantitative and qualitative changes resulted in new concerns over the credibility of the United States’ nuclear protection of Western Europe. The rest of the chapter details how Carter’s predecessors—specifically the Nixon and Ford administrations—attempted to finesse the related issues of credibility and extended deterrence in the late Cold War. It discusses in-depth the SALT arms control process and outlines the ways in which Nixon and Ford went about strategic modernization in light of the ongoing arms negotiations.

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The Legacy of Assured Vulnerability and Assured Destruction Theory The theory of assured vulnerability is most closely tied with Robert McNamara’s tenure as secretary of defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. In their book How Much Is Enough? Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith—two of the so-called McNamara whiz kids—explained the process by which McNamara established a “theory of requirements” to guide the individual services’ program decisions. This “theory of requirements” came to be known as assured destruction criteria; that is, McNamara and his coterie of defense analysts determined a level of devastation against urban/industrial and population targets that they believed represented what Soviet leadership would consider to be “intolerable punishment.”1 The punishment’s “intolerableness,” it was believed, “caused” deterrence. A state’s primary nuclear force–postural requirement, according to the theory, was therefore a retaliatory force that was secure (or invulnerable) enough to ride out an initial attack and then wreak “unacceptable” destruction on the attacker’s cities and industrial areas. This was all that was necessary for the purpose of deterrence. Once this criteria had been attained, any and all additional units were dismissed as “overkill.”2 Assured destruction and assured vulnerability went hand-in-hand. It was thought that the Soviet Union and the United States analyzed strategic costs and benefits in a similar, rational way. The theory suggested that both countries held similar humane values. Like the United States, the Soviet Union valued the survival of its cities and population above all else. The endgame most feared by Moscow was therefore the same one feared by Washington: the complete destruction of a large (or “unacceptable”) percentage of its population and industry. Hence, because “assured destruction” ascribed these target sets with the greatest value (humanely speaking), they were designated as the most important.3 In order to maintain deterrence, the United States had to protect its assured destruction force posture. Anything that the Soviet Union did to take the United States below its “assured destruction” capability had to be countered. At the same time, as Enthoven and Smith argue, the McNamara Pentagon concluded, using action-reaction logic, that the Soviet Union would also counter any attempts by the United States to negate its “assured destruction” capability. 1. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969, 174–76. 2. Keith Payne, Nuclear Deterrence in U.S.-Soviet Relations, 18–19. 3. Ibid., 12.

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Logically, this meant that neither side should engage in activities or programs that looked threatening to the other side’s assured destruction force posture.4 Instead, both sides had to maintain and emphasize an assured vulnerability stance. The theory cautioned against the deployment and use of damage-limiting systems such as missile defenses, antisubmarine warfare, preemptive strikes on nuclear delivery systems (counterforce attacks), and civil defenses.5 Damage-limiting systems were anathema for three reasons. First, it was believed that defenses were easily confounded or saturated. Second (and related to the first), it was argued that they were too expensive when compared with how much less it would cost the other side to overwhelm them—that is, they were cheap to offset.6 Most important, however, damage limitation destabilized the very essence of assured destruction/assured vulnerability by eroding the vulnerable status of the superpowers’ respective populations and industries. Invariably, damage limitation provoked what came to be known as crisis instability. Crisis instability is a term used to describe a scenario wherein the risk of preemption during a crisis is inordinately high because of a mutually held belief that damage-limiting systems have given one side an ultimate advantage. A state with effective damage limitation capabilities, so the theory goes, might first use its offensive forces in a surprise attack, thus (theoretically) destroying a large percentage of the other side’s retaliatory forces before they could be launched or deployed—a form of damage limitation using offensive forces. Then, if or when the opponent retaliated, the initial attacker’s other defensive systems (missile defenses, air defenses, and shelters) could destroy a percentage of the incoming weapons or protect a certain percentage of population, industry, and governmental functions from the opponent’s nuclear response. The theory of crisis instability states that if an opponent believed the attacker’s damage-limiting capabilities confer a significant after-exchange advantage, then there could be a temptation to preempt during a crisis—well before the attacker can begin its surprise attack. The resulting spiral logic is clear: in a period of high international tension, each side—fearful of the advantages obtained by preemption—races the other to be the first to do exactly that.7 4. Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough, 175–76. 5. Payne, Nuclear Deterrence, 12. 6. This critique originated with the work of Air Force General Glenn Kent, who worked under Carter’s future secretary of defense, Harold Brown, in the Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). McNamara reviewed Kent’s work in January 1964 and it allegedly played a large part in the decisions to delay a new bomber and cap Minuteman ICBM numbers. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, 320–25. 7. Payne, Nuclear Deterrence, 19–20, 35–39. For another description from a proponent’s perspective, see Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, 52–53.

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The assured vulnerability model had a number of strategic ramifications. First, it did not allow for limited nuclear war because of its assumption that escalation was “inevitable.” No conflict could remain limited once nuclear weapons were used. Escalation was believed to be virtually automatic in the assured vulnerability framework because (among other things) the theory’s proponents figured that intentions were difficult to communicate (for example, limited attacks could be perceived as something larger and more perilous) and also because states as a general rule seek to gain bargaining advantages through escalation. Finally, it was this near certainty of escalation and, consequently, the total destruction of valued urban and industrial assets that kept each party from engaging in either all-out military action or “limited yet highly provocative” behavior. Both parties would be deterred, the theory asserted, because (logically) neither party wished to risk the destruction that inevitable escalation would bring.8 This logic had implications for strategy in the late Cold War as well as for American nuclear force posture. For Payne and others, assured vulnerability was a thoroughly astrategic theory. If escalation, and therefore the “unacceptable” destruction to one’s valued urban and industrial targets, was really automatic or inevitable, then it could never be reasonable or rational to use nuclear weapons to attain one’s political objectives. The theory dismissed the militaryoperational aspects of nuclear weapons as insignificant. Again, if total escalation was the ultimate consequence of any nuclear use, then all nuclear weapons (regardless of their military-operational characteristics) were functionally alike and their particular military-operational aspects (which become vital when actually planning how to fight a war) were of little consequence.9 How did assured destruction/assured vulnerability impact McNamara’s nuclear program choices? While one cannot ignore McNamara’s desire to reign in defense costs given the escalating conflict in Vietnam, it is also important to note that between December 1963 and December 1967, assured destruction/ assured vulnerability also had significant consequences for American defense policy. Under McNamara, the United States limited the number of its ICBMs to one thousand. In late 1963 and all through 1964, in debates over the FY1966 defense budget, McNamara insisted that assured destruction only required a thousand ICBMs. The two hundred additional ICBMs requested by the Air Force at that time, in McNamara’s view, represented unnecessary and provocative damage-limitation capabilities. Second, McNamara canceled the B-70 and 8. Payne, Nuclear Deterrence, 12. 9. Ibid., 13–16.

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refused to budge on a new penetrating bomber. Instead of more ICBMs and a new bomber, McNamara offered multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) as a cheaper alternative and in 1965 approved the United States’ first MIRV ICBM, the Minuteman III. Third, once more in the name of assured destruction, McNamara limited the number of ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to 41, which resulted in a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force of 656 versus 720.10 Next, McNamara delayed work on a Minuteman successor. In the late 1960s, while the United States constructed and tested the Minuteman III, it also started work on a follow-on ICBM in order to keep up with technological change and anticipated shifts in the Soviet arsenal. The Minuteman’s successor was given the general label of an “advanced ICBM” and between 1966 and 1968 fell within the program known as WS-120A. The WS-120A program included studies on improved warhead design, a new larger missile, and less vulnerable basing options (including silo hardening). The new, larger missile (as it was envisioned) had the capacity for carrying many more reentry vehicles (RVs) than the Minuteman III—from ten to twenty. With improvements in RV accuracy and the addition of what were called “penetration aids,” it was believed that the WS120A would be able to foil any existing (and future) Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses and destroy hardened targets in Soviet territory. In December 1967, after the missile and preliminary basing studies had been completed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Defense Department fund the construction of the missile portion of the WS-120A in its FY1969 defense budget. Had it been funded in the FY1969 budget, the missile would have had an initial operating capability (IOC) of 1973 (that is, its initial components would “go online” in that year). Secretary McNamara, however, 10. For the Air Force’s request for 1,200 ICBMs, see Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Subject: Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY1969–71 (JSOP69), Part 6—Force Tabs and Analysis, March 20, 1964, Document 22 in U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS] 1964–1968: National Security Policy, vol. 10, http://www.state.gov/ r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/ (accessed January 19, 2008). For McNamara’s review of the JSOP-69 numbers and the decision to stick with 1,000 ICBMs, see Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Secretary of the Navy (Nitze), the Secretary of the Air Force (Zuckert), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor), Subject: Force Guidance for Submission of PCP’s on Strategic Retaliatory Forces, May 16, 1964, Document 31, in ibid. For explanation of the B-70 decision from an insider in the McNamara Pentagon, see Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough, 243–51; Nick Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder: Money, Politics, and the B-1 Bomber, 67–78. As of November 1965 (if not before), McNamara had decided that the number of SLBMs would reach 656 by 1967 and would remain at that level into the 1970s. See Draft Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, Subject: Recommended FY1967–71 Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces, November 1, 1965, Document 103, FRUS 1964–1968: National Security Policy, vol. 10.

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refused. He kept the missile in “advanced development” (a research and development phase) and instead—together with the then secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown—moved forward on only one specific aspect of the WS-120A program: the development of super-hardened Hard Rock silos that would eventually house both the Minuteman III (in 1972) and, once it was completed, the advanced ICBM (now pushed back to 1974).11 McNamara’s defense decisions, including the WS-120A decision, must also be viewed in light of what was probably the most long-lasting consequence of assured destruction/assured vulnerability theory—the belief that arms control negotiations could serve as an important (if not the most important) means for managing the Soviet Union’s behavior and its force posture choices. Since it was assumed that both countries approached deterrence in the same frame of mind, it followed logically that bilateral negotiations could serve to fix any outstanding, “destabilizing” problems between the superpowers. Indeed, McNamara’s 1967 decision to reorient the Nike-X ABM system to the limited Sentinel program was directly related to his fear that a “thick” Soviet-oriented ABM system would jeopardize assured vulnerability and arms control negotiations.12 McNamara’s famous ABM speech in September 1967 to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco was followed by a flurry of calls by administration spokesmen asking Moscow to begin arms control negotiations with Washington.13 Preliminary work on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations began that same year, but that work was interrupted by the Soviet

11. Lauren Holland and Robert Hoover, The MX Decision: A New Direction in U.S. Weapons Procurement Policy? 125–26. Holland and Hoover make use of John Edwards’s analysis. Edwards, Superweapon: The Making of MX, 94, 102. Also see Draft Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, Subject: Defense Department Budget for FY 69, December 1, 1967, and Draft Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, Subject: Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces, January 15, 1968, Documents 195 and 200 respectively, FRUS 1964–1968: National Security Policy, vol. 10; Robert Hartunian, “Ballistic Missiles and Re-Entry Systems: The Critical Years.” 12. For a comprehensive look at the 1967 ABM decision, see Halperin, National Security PolicyMaking, 111–40. 13. Holland and Hoover insist that McNamara was concerned over the WS-120A’s large-yield warhead, which, absent better ICBM accuracy, would waste money as it would not be able to take out hardened Soviet silos. Holland and Hoover, MX Decision, 125. John Edwards argues that McNamara refused to even listen to a briefing on the large warhead idea. Edwards, Superweapon, 94. All three authors, however, leave out the arms control politics of late 1967 and early 1968. Given the arms control public relations blitz by the Johnson administration in the autumn of 1967, it is also possible that McNamara quashed the WS-120A because, like a large-scale ABM program, he believed that it could have a negative effect on desired arms control negotiations. For a short chronology of the 1967 blitz, see House Foreign Affairs Committee, Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple Warhead Missiles, 296.

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invasion of Czechoslovakia. The negotiations remained in abeyance until late in the first year of the Nixon administration.

The Challenge of Soviet and Warsaw Pact Military Improvements in the Late 1960s and Early 1970s During the same period, the Soviet Union approached its conventional and nuclear program choices rather differently. In Europe, the overall Soviet composition of the Warsaw Pact’s conventional forces underwent significant changes as a result of the assault on Czechoslovakia in late August 1968. The invasion was a strategic success for the Soviet Union. It ended the political threat represented by Czech dissidence and at the same time bolstered the Warsaw Pact’s forces (and its potential for future military-operational success) with the permanent stationing of five additional Soviet divisions in an area where they were able to put increased pressure on West Germany, Austria, and (via Austria) Yugoslavia. Later designated as the Soviet Central Group of Forces, it included two tank divisions, three motorized rifle divisions, and approximately one hundred aircraft. Soviet manpower increased by fifty thousand along the Central Front (East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) as an immediate result. According to Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger’s FY1974 annual report, by 1972–1973 there were twenty-seven immediately deployable Soviet divisions stationed on the Central Front alongside thirty-one non-Soviet divisions. However, an extra eighty to ninety Soviet divisions were also available for rapid reinforcement from the USSR’s western military districts. Writing in the mid-1970s, John Erickson claimed that the Soviet Union’s forces at that time constituted nearly 60 percent of the Warsaw Pact’s military capability as a whole.14 In the early 1980s, however, Johan Holst argued that when looking at post1968 changes to the Warsaw Pact, the big story was not the numerical increases in divisions and total manpower, but rather the modernization and techno14. Harold Rood, Kingdoms of the Blind: How the Great Democracies Have Resumed the Follies That So Nearly Cost Them Their Life, 83, 91–95, 228–29. For analysis of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Yugoslavia from Czechoslovakia through Austria, see the discussion of the SHIELD 72 exercise in John Erickson, “Soviet Military Posture and Policy in Europe,” 175. Harriet Scott and William Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, 208–9. Schlesinger’s FY1974 Annual Report to Congress is quoted in John Erickson, 177– 80. In Erickson’s article, Table 1, “Warsaw Pact Ground Forces in Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic, and Poland” (178), shows that the total of thirty-one non-Soviet divisions does not count one airborne and one amphibious division. Erickson also points out that Schlesinger’s report did not consider the possible use of the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary with its four divisions and three hundred aircraft. See also Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, 209. Erickson, “Soviet Military Posture,” 176.

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logical improvements that occurred during the early to mid-1970s within those divisions (as well as within their support units). Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces registered advances in areas such as tactical aircraft, artillery, logistics, and the application of unconventional forces and armor. Many believed that such modernization and improvement was aimed primarily at building up the Warsaw Pact’s ability to win a short, quick conflict in Europe. In the case of improved tactical aircraft, for instance, the Soviet Union began a movement in the 1970s away from its previous doctrinal emphasis on air defense to that of close ground support combined with early, penetrating attacks against NATO airfields and bases. Through the use of newly developed aircraft like the MiG23 (FLOGGER) and Su-19 (FENCER)—each carrying conventional and nuclear munitions—the Warsaw Pact sought the capability for knocking out NATO’s own tactical aircraft before the Alliance could apply them. And, doctrinal adjustments notwithstanding, the Warsaw Pact also had a total numerical advantage in tactical aircraft by the time of the 1976 presidential campaign—approximately two to one.15 Finally, there was the issue of armor. In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union had indeed increased the amount of tanks and armored carriers available for use against NATO forces. The Soviets also had put two new, improved battle tanks— the T-64 and T-72—in service. Both John Duffield and Holst argue that the Soviet Union increased the number of tanks in its motorized rifle divisions during this time by around 40 percent. Moreover, the number of armored personnel carriers in motorized rifle divisions increased by a staggering 81 percent (from 180 to 325 per division). In tank divisions, the numbers increased by 3 percent and 56 percent respectively. Holst indicates that on the Central Front, the total advantage over NATO was about three to one. Using the information provided by analysts John Collins and John Chwat in 1976 to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, the Soviet advantage in main battle tanks was 34,650 to 8,975; in armored carriers, 40,000 to 19,000. All in all, by the 1970s NATO was at a significant disadvantage when it came to armor in Central Europe.16

15. Johan Holst, “Deterrence and Stability in the NATO–Warsaw Pact Relationship,” 96. Erickson, “Soviet Military Posture,” 182–84, 187. John Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture, 207. 16. Duffield, Power Rules, 206; Holst, “Deterrence and Stability,” 96; John Collins and John Steven Chwat, “Table 5: Soviet Quantitative Superiority, Correlation between Like Forces Militarily Important (active forces only),” in “U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: A Reference for Congress,” 293. However, a subsequent chart (309) shows a ratio of 40,000 to 10,100 tanks for 1975. John Erickson uses the figure of 40,000 armored fighting vehicles (AFV). Erickson, “Soviet Military Posture,” 173–74.

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While the United States fought in Vietnam, the Soviet Union had also busied itself by building up and enhancing its naval capabilities. By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union had finally caught up with and surpassed the United States in total individual units. The war in Vietnam itself had contributed to the numerical reversal. Norman Polmar argues that the older, World War II–era vessels were run down by the war’s operational tempo and regular maintenance of these older ships was postponed to open up space for war repairs. The money that ordinarily would have been used for maintaining these older ships had been diverted into operations and maintenance.17 Many of these ships were subsequently decommissioned. Then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt had planned new (what some in today’s Pentagon might call “transformational”) naval construction based on smaller and faster vessels, but inflation and the debate over nuclear versus non-nuclear propulsion put Zumwalt’s ideas on ice.18 The Soviets meanwhile continued to build. In 1968–1969 the United States had somewhere between 400 to 500 more ships than the Soviets (1,000–1,100 U.S. to approximately 600 USSR). By 1975–1976—only six to eight years later—the superpowers had changed places and the Soviets now enjoyed a 500- to 700-unit advantage (500–514 U.S. to more than 1,000 USSR).19 In addition to these increases and improvements in conventional forces, there was also a huge expansion in the Soviet Union’s nuclear forces between 1965 and 1970—primarily in its number of ICBMs. In those five years, Soviet ICBM numbers shot up from 224 to 1,220.20 Two ICBMs—the SS-9 and the SS11—constituted the main part of this “second generation” of ICBMs. As with the United States’ transition from the Atlas and Titan to the Minuteman in the early 1960s, these next-generation Soviet missiles were identified by their increased accuracy, the hardness of their silos, and their higher alert status. The SS-9 carried a large-yield warhead (10–25 megatons) that could be used to destroy Minuteman silos and launch control centers in the United States. The

17. Norman Polmar, “The U.S.-Soviet Naval Balance,” 189–90; Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch: A Memoir, 85–122. 18. Polmar, “U.S.-Soviet Naval Balance,” 190. 19. Ibid. To see the Vietnam War era trends, see Zumwalt, On Watch, 519. The Soviet Union built 20 major combatants while the U.S. constructed 9. When it came to minor combatants, the Soviets built 138 while the United States built only 28. 20. Table C-7 in Robert Berman and John Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses, 138; Table 4.1 in Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 136; National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Table of USSR/Russian ICBM Forces: 1960–2002, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/ nudb/datab4.asp (accessed January 20, 2008). The NRDC’s figures show a jump from 281 to 1,472, while Podvig reports the growth from 226 to 1,434.

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SS-11 used a much smaller warhead (1.1 megatons) and served as one of the main instruments of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces because it was much cheaper to build and deploy.21 The advent of the SS-9 and SS-11 in wellprotected, hardened silos meant that the Soviet Union had achieved a level of nuclear capability that many considered to be in “parity” with that of the United States.

The Strategic Puzzle of the Late Cold War As is well known, the United States’ long-range nuclear forces had always been considered as the “balancer of the [regional, conventional] imbalances” in the classical, strategic sense—that is, U.S. intercontinental nuclear systems countered the Warsaw Pact’s local conventional advantage.22 Hence, Washington “extended deterrence” to its allies in Europe. Despite the large conventional force disparities, the credible threat of U.S. nuclear use kept the Soviet Union from moving farther west. That said, the strategic puzzle of the late Cold War was how the United States, while choosing to limit its own production of longrange nuclear missiles (because of assured destruction/assured vulnerability), could continue to extend that deterrence in the face of both the rapid expansion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and, as the world entered the 1970s, the growth and improvement of the Warsaw Pact’s conventional capabilities. In the face of a possible vulnerability to Soviet ICBMs and the preexisting (but growing) European conventional asymmetry, the question was: how was the United States’ threat to use nuclear weapons—the threat that (at least in theory) deterred—credible? There were four broad solution sets. First, the United States could develop and deploy damage-limitation systems. The United States could make its long-range missiles less vulnerable to a Soviet initial strike (i.e., by hardening silos). Related to this, it could enhance its ability to target the Soviet Union’s hardened silos— that is, to hit and destroy Soviet missiles preemptively. Finally, civil defense systems could be set up to protect population and industry to limit the threat of destruction. If U.S. urban/industrial assets were protected against retaliation, then the threat of a long-range strike against the Soviet Union would (theoretically) be more credible. Second, the United States could, using arms control negotiations, convince the Soviet Union to decrease and break down the most 21. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 127–28. For the SS-9 controversy, see David Dunn, The Politics of Threat: Minuteman Vulnerability in American National Security Policy, 20–28. 22. Peter Pry, The Strategic Nuclear Balance and Why It Matters, 17.

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threatening part of its own long-range missile force: its heavy throw-weight (or post-launch payload capacity) missiles housing multiple warheads that with MIRVs could destroy multiple U.S. silos with fewer total missiles expended. The other two alternatives involved the conventional side of the equation. Both focused on adjustments to the local imbalance so that (ideally) there was less likelihood of long-range nuclear forces ever being necessary. One option— again using negotiations—suggested that the United States could get Moscow and the Warsaw Pact to limit their extensive conventional forces, thus making it reasonably possible for NATO to stymie or defeat a Soviet conventional attack with only its own conventional forces. This solution formed the partial basis of what would be known as Mutual Balanced Forces Reduction (MBFR). And finally, one could also try the opposite. Rather than attempting to convince the Warsaw Pact to cut back, NATO could instead increase and enhance its own side of the European conventional imbalance, thereby “raising the nuclear threshold.” Like the other conventional-focused approach, military-operational improvements to NATO would (theoretically) make it either less likely that the Warsaw Pact could launch, or think it could launch, a successful strike into Western Europe, or—a step above—make it more likely that NATO might actually win a European conflict without recourse to U.S. nuclear systems. For the late Cold War, those that ascribed to assured vulnerability (President Carter included) focused on various combinations of the last three solutions— nuclear/MBFR negotiations and NATO conventional improvements—in conjunction with the enhancement of second-strike nuclear forces only (“slower-flying” and less accurate SLBMs and bombers versus the more “destabilizing” ICBM). The large-scale adoption of the assured vulnerability framework and assured retaliation by members of the American defense establishment from McNamara onward, however, meant that the first solution set was largely discarded. To reiterate, in the assured vulnerability model, damage limitation causes crisis instability. It is destabilizing and leads to preemption. Those that accepted assured vulnerability instead saw stalemate and overkill (and hence, deterrence) at the nuclear level. Theirs was actually a twotiered view of deterrence: deterrence at the nuclear level, and a separate deterrence at the conventional level. The first was guaranteed through assured vulnerability (together with arms control and reductions); something else had to be done to ensure the second. In contrast, those who did not ascribe to assured vulnerability viewed deterrence holistically and emphasized the first and last solution sets. The Soviet Union, they argued, reaped grand strategic rewards from its military-operational

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advantages at the nuclear and conventional levels. It was erroneous to distinguish between the deterrence of all-out nuclear war and the deterrence of conventional war in Europe. In the end, nuclear forces covered both. It was also just as wrong to differentiate too much between the ability to fight (and win) a war and the ability to deter one.23 If the United States’ long-range systems were vulnerable to preemption, if its nuclear systems were unable to hit and destroy Soviet silos, if the American public was left unprotected against attack—then the credibility of America’s “balancer of the imbalance” was significantly at risk. Moreover, it was argued, this state of affairs meant not only that the United States would be unable to deter a Soviet action but also that it would actually be self-deterred from responding altogether when push came to shove.24 Because of all of this, the United States had little choice but to improve its own nuclear systems (make them less vulnerable to attack and more able to destroy hardened Soviet silos), deploy defenses, and narrow the conventional gap in Europe by building up and improving NATO’s forces.

One Possible Solution? Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) How did the United States in the post-McNamara years approach the interconnected puzzle of Soviet nuclear modernization, Soviet/Warsaw Pact conventional improvements, and the credibility of the American promise to use nuclear weapons in aid of Western Europe? In the early 1970s, Washington used both conventional and nuclear solution sets. First, given the costs of the war in Vietnam, the administration held firm on a ninety-day defense of Europe, started exploratory MBFR talks (primarily to preempt calls for even greater troop draw-downs by Senator Mike Mansfield), and pressed European allies for greater contributions to NATO. Next, Nixon’s administration focused on the nuclear side of the equation, engaging in a limited amount of strategic modernization and strategic defense. In 1969, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird reversed McNamara’s position and authorized competitive bidding for the B-1. The Rockwell Corporation was awarded the airplane contract the following year.25 In early 1973, work also began in the Air Force’s Space and Mis-

23. For example, Colin Gray, “Warfighting for Deterrence,” 193–216. For the same principle applied to the present U.S. land power context, see Colin Gray, Maintaining Effective Deterrence, 35–44. 24. Paul Nitze, “Deterring Our Deterrent,” 195–210. 25. In 1975, Kissinger explained to President Ford that there were two reasons why the United States had entered MBFR. First, the Soviets had made “initiatives” in the Conference on Security and

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sile Systems Organization (SAMSO) on the Minuteman follow-on—renamed MX. And though the administration did not dismiss the assured vulnerability paradigm completely, it nonetheless kept strategic defenses intact as a possible credibility fix. With its newly renamed program—Safeguard—the Nixon administration reoriented McNamara’s Sentinel ABM system away from cities and used it to protect Minuteman ICBMs from incoming Soviet RVs (what was referred to as “point defense”). The administration also initiated the construction of a new missile-carrying submarine (Ohio-class) and research and development into two new SLBM variants (the Trident I C4 and Trident II D5). But above all, Washington looked to the arms control process. Through SALT, the United States believed that it could convince the Soviet Union to negotiate down the most “destabilizing” parts of its arsenal. Theoretically, this made it less possible for Moscow to combine its recently augmented nuclear striking power and its conventional advantage in Central Europe to pressure Western Europe. At the same time, it also (theoretically) made it possible to keep the United States from entering a conflict in Europe. SALT I, it should be recalled, was signed by Brezhnev and Nixon in late May 1972. It consisted of two separate but theoretically interrelated agreements: a permanent treaty that limited ABM systems to two sites each, and a temporary, five-year agreement (1972–1977) that restricted particular classes of offensive nuclear forces (what is known as the “Interim Agreement”).26 For members of the American defense-left, the fact that SALT I had been signed in the first place provoked widespread excitement. It appeared to validate a long-held hope that the United States and the Soviet Union could work together and negotiate issues involving national security. It also opened the door for additional limitations and future numerical reductions, both of which many believed would

Cooperation in Europe. Next, the Nixon administration needed to “counter” Mansfield’s continued legislative assault on the number of American forces in Europe. National Security Council Minutes [hereafter NSC Minutes], Subject: MBFR, January 23, 1975, 5–6, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library [hereafter GRFL]. Also see Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 115–17. Nick Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder, 84, 96. McNamara recommended against the full-scale development of the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) for FY1969 because of its cost. Citing the National Intelligence Estimate, he indicated that the present bomber force was adequate and that if a “greater than expected” threat arose, it would be just as effective to increase the number of B-52s with short-range attack missiles. Draft Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, Subject: Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces, January 15, 1968, Document 200, FRUS 1964–1968: National Security Policy, vol. 10. 26. For a comprehensive look at the SALT I negotiations, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. For an insider discussion of how Newhouse obtained the information for the book, see National Security Council Project, Arms Control Policy and the National Security Council, 36.

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result in yet more stability. For the defense-left, the ABM treaty was a landmark in superpower negotiation. It was celebrated as confirmation that both parties were finally convinced of the correctness of action/reaction-based, stabilityfocused (American) arms control theory.27 The Interim Agreement was not so readily praised. There were outstanding strategic puzzles that had been left unsolved. These included: the restriction of qualitative weapon improvements, the existence of numerical disparities between the parties, the limitation of deployments of MIRVs, the advent of new technology (cruise missiles), and the limitation of long-range nuclear bombers (the B-1 and the Backfire). To resolve these outstanding issues, SALT II negotiations began only months after the signing of SALT I. The 1974 Vladivostok “agreed framework” for SALT II would be the apex of nearly two years of these follow-on negotiations, but in the end it only settled two of the existing challenges: the problem of U.S.-Soviet numerical disparities, and limits on the total number of delivery vehicles that were allowed to house MIRVs. While the defense-left lauded the SALT I agreements, many on the defenseright (particularly Senator Henry Jackson of Washington state) were critical of them from the beginning. Those on the defense-right argued that the arms control community in the United States in general, and U.S. SALT negotiators in particular, were mistaken in their belief that the United States and the Soviet Union shared the same interests and objectives when it came to SALT. The agreements, they insisted, were not examples of superpower cooperation. Instead, the Soviet Union had used the negotiations in a considered, selfinterested, and classically grand-strategic manner. They were used intentionally as instruments of Soviet statecraft, the aim of which was to secure unilateral advantages and improve the Soviet Union’s relative power position.28 With this in mind, a large portion of the defense-right criticism was focused on the numerical asymmetries allowed by the Interim Agreement. The temporary agreement had left the Soviet Union with comparatively more ICBMs and SLBMs than the United States: for the United States, 1,054 ICBM launchers and 710 SLBM launchers, while for the Soviet Union, 1,618 and 950 respectively. Combining these totals, the Soviet Union was allowed to retain nearly 50 percent more launchers than the United States. And unlike the Soviet Union, the United States did not have heavy missiles—missiles with large throw-weight—that could

27. For a good example of defense-left perspective, see Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 183, 299. 28. William Van Cleave, “Political and Negotiating Asymmetries: Insult in SALT I,” 11.

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be launched from its existing Minuteman silos. Hence, defense-right critics argued that the Interim Agreement also gave the Soviet Union a 313–0 advantage in heavy missiles, thus solidifying its superiority in missile payload capacity.29 Prior to Vladivostok, the refrain against numerical asymmetries was continually repeated and the Nixon administration expended great energy to counter it. The administration suggested the existence of what were labeled “unequal aggregates/offsetting asymmetries”—a situation wherein it was acceptable for one party to retain larger numbers of units in one category while the other party was able to keep high numbers in different, “offsetting” categories. Hence, it was safe for the Soviet Union to keep a greater total number of launchers in SALT I while the United States retained a higher number of actual warheads. “Unequal aggregates/offsetting asymmetries” was an acceptable position according to the Nixon administration because the United States had three peculiar advantages: (a) it was still ahead when it came to the unrestricted category of bombers; (b) its systems were more accurate than Soviet ones; and (c) it was ahead of the Soviets in MIRVs and MIRV technology.30 The defense-right conceded the first, at least in part. SALT had indeed left the United States’ lead in intercontinental bombers untouched. However, the defense-right rebutted that the advantage meant little if the related issue of Soviet air defenses was left off the agenda. It was dangerous, they judged, to dismiss or ignore operational matters. To reach their targets, American bombers had to penetrate an effective and growing Soviet air defense system. The Soviet Union, especially in light of the ABM treaty, did not face the same hurdles in a missile attack against the United States. Moreover, if the Soviet Union ever chose to expand its intercontinental bomber force, it would not meet up against a similarly comprehensive U.S. air defense.31 In the eyes of SALT I critics, then, it was disingenuous to equate and “trade” U.S. numerical superiority 29. Robert Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics, 255–56. 30. See Kissinger’s explanation to President Ford, NSC Minutes, Subject: SALT, October 7, 1974, 5, GRFL. 31. This was an area that the defense-right believed had been underestimated by U.S. intelligence, particularly in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). The question was how well the Soviet Union could “net” or integrate its air-defense radars. For this reason, one of the three Team B studies (to be discussed) was a competitive analysis of Soviet air defense capabilities. Cahn, Killing Détente, 116–18, 141–44. Warner Schilling insisted that the United States’ choice not to deploy ABMs was the first decision against defenses in general. It would make no sense to protect U.S. territory against bombers if there would be no defense against the more probable threat of missiles. Furthermore, the refusal to deploy missile and air defenses also sunk the chances of strategically meaningful civil defenses. Schilling, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s: The Search for Sufficiently Equivalent Countervailing Parity,” 38.

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in bombers for Soviet superiority in ballistic missile launchers when there were such stark military-operational disparities between the two systems. The defense-right dismissed the administration’s two other supporting arguments for “unequal aggregates/offsetting asymmetries”: advantages in missile accuracy and in MIRVs. These advantages, they claimed, were timedependent. It would not be long before the Soviet Union improved its own missile accuracy and enhanced its own capabilities to adapt its missile force to MIRV technology. Once that happened, the Soviet Union could then use the tremendous payloads of its existing heavy missiles to pack on multiple warheads with better accuracy and reap greater (and perhaps more strategic) rewards. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union lent this scenario credence by performing MIRV tests on two of its new fourth-generation ICBMs (the SS-17 and the heavy SS-18).32 “Unequal aggregates/offsetting asymmetries” became the primary target of Senator Jackson and his staff during the ratification battle for SALT I. Jackson staffer Richard Perle, together with nuclear strategist Fred Ikle, developed the idea of using an amendment to the ratifying legislation as a way of assaulting the administration’s arms control policy and attacking the defense-left’s push for future reductions in SALT II.33 What was soon called “the Jackson amendment” demanded that the president refrain from agreeing to “levels of [U.S.] intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union” in future bilateral arms control negotiations.34 In short, the amendment stipulated that future agreements must result in nothing less than equal numbers of units for both parties (otherwise known as “equal aggregates”). In addition to its playing well with the American public, “equal aggregates”—in

32. Kaufman, Jackson, 255. The relationship between accuracy, yield, and the ability to destroy hardened targets is key. Hard-target kill capability is much more a function of accuracy than of yield. With improved accuracy (measured in smaller CEP), one can maintain or decrease yield and still achieve hard-target kill. With no change to accuracy, it takes higher yield to get the same level of hard-target kill. By improving accuracy, one is also able to shrink the size of one’s RVs and make them lighter— both of which increase the ability to add RVs to one’s missile force and save money by lowering production of special nuclear materials. Pry, The Strategic Nuclear Balance, 145. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 212–19. The SS-17 tests (four RVs) ran from December 1972 through December 1974, while the SS-18 flight tests (specifically the first three modifications, one of which—the Mod 2—carried eight RVs) went from February 1973 to October 1975. 33. Kaufman, Jackson, 256–57. 34. Ibid. This was a different “Jackson amendment” than the famous Jackson-Vanik amendment. Jackson-Vanik tied most favored nation status for the Soviet Union on Moscow’s willingness to loosen restrictions on Jewish emigration. On the Jackson-Vanik amendment, see Kaufmann, Jackson, 266– 83 and Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 309–10.

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contrast to “unequal aggregates/offsetting asymmetries”—was believed to be less likely to be mistaken by outside parties (allies and adversaries alike) for American weakness or vulnerability. It was argued by defense-right proponents that “equal aggregates,” as required by the Jackson amendment, did a better job of maintaining the appearance of strategic “balance” between the two superpowers, or what was called by some “essential equivalence.” Moreover, despite the hope that SALT I would somehow restrict or slow down Soviet strategic modernization (especially when it came to upgrading heavy missiles), modernization continued unabated. During and after SALT I, the Soviet Union pushed ahead on its fourth generation of ICBMs and constructed follow-on missiles to the SS-9 (SS-18), the SS-11 (SS-17 and SS-19), and the SS-13 (SS-16). Jackson and others had been concerned at the time of SALT I that the two agreements would have little effect on Soviet strategic modernization. For instance, Jackson and his staff claimed early on that one of the planned SS-11 upgrades, the SS-19, was in fact “heavy” on the basis of its greatly increased throw-weight (8,000 pounds versus 1,000–2,000 pounds). However, because the Interim Agreement had intentionally left out a mutually agreedupon definition of a “heavy,” the new missile fell well outside its strictures.35

35. The United States tried to secure an agreed definition on “heavy” ICBMs in order to clarify the restriction on converting “light” ICBM launchers to “heavy” ICBM launchers. Because it did not want to limit its upgrade of the SS-11 to the SS-19, the Soviet Union refused. In response, the United States released its definition as a nonbinding “unilateral statement.” When the SS-19 finally debuted, many on the defense-right suggested that either the United States had known about its size and characteristics beforehand and had signed the agreement anyway, or else that Moscow had intentionally hidden the SS-19’s size from the administration. Brezhnev made no attempt to clarify the SS-19’s size, but through a signals intelligence–gathering operation called GAMMA GUPPY, the United States listened to telephone calls between Brezhnev and Defense Minister Grechko, during which Brezhnev assured Grechko that the SS-19’s large size would not be restricted by SALT I. This information was passed to Nixon and Kissinger “a day or two before the signing.” Some have argued that “the single greatest intelligence failure of the 1970s relating to strategic nuclear capability” was this misjudgment of the Soviet Union’s fourth generation of ICBMs (which included the SS-19). Mark Schneider, “Intelligence in the Formation of Defense Policy,” 59. See also Memorandum from Roger Molander to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Subject: Bill Odom’s Memo on Soviet Decision-Making on SALT, April 13, 1978, 1, and Memorandum from Roger Molander to David Aaron, Subject: [portion redacted—likely reads David Sullivan’s] “The Soviet Strategic Planning Process and SALT,” June 14, 1978, 2. Both of these memos are found in Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 36, Folder Serial X 8/77–8/78, JCL. The sections about signals intelligence in the two Carter-era memos are redacted, but they nonetheless indicate that Nixon and Kissinger had an intelligence source prior to the signing. On GAMMA GUPPY, see Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 191–92. For the controversy about David Sullivan’s analysis, see Jay Winik, On the Brink: The Dramatic, Behind-the-Scenes Saga of the Reagan Era and the Men and Women Who Won the Cold War, 61–73, and Alan Weisman, Prince of Darkness: Richard Perle: The Kingdom, the Power and the End of Empire in America, 53–56.

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Therefore, as SALT II approached, there were two major issues at hand: the Soviet Union was engaged in its own strategic modernization, and it was unclear whether “equal aggregates” or “unequal aggregates/offsetting asymmetries” would rule the day in the anticipated SALT II agreement. The Soviet Union had reaped significant propaganda rewards from the numerical superiority resulting from “unequal aggregates/offsetting asymmetries.” These would disappear with “equal aggregates.” Moreover, the harder the United States pressed for “equal aggregates,” the more stridently the Soviets argued about what they called “forward-based systems” in Western Europe (i.e., British and French nuclear forces, as well as forward-deployed American systems). British and French assets, they insisted, could be used in conjunction with locally based U.S. strategic forces to strike the Soviet homeland in war. Therefore, it was necessary to count all of them under the U.S. allowance. The Soviet government argued that if the Western European nuclear forces were not counted within the totals, then it either would have to be “compensated” (allowed higher numbers in other categories, nullifying the whole idea of “equal aggregates”) or else those forces would have to be circumscribed in their scope and reach. For its part, the United States was loathe to add its allies’ national nuclear forces with its own for the purposes of limitation. It also was clear to Washington that Moscow was attempting to use bilateral negotiations and bilateral agreements to limit damage from arsenals of third, nonparticipating parties.36 In October 1974, a little over two months after Nixon’s resignation and Gerald Ford’s move to the Oval Office, Henry Kissinger, Andrei Gromyko, and Brezhnev met in Moscow to jump-start the flagging SALT II process. During this trip, the two sides tentatively agreed on the future treaty’s structure. Prior to this, Washington had continued to push some variation of the NixonKissinger “unequal aggregates/offsetting asymmetries” approach, but according to Kissinger’s own recollections, Ford was under a great amount of domestic pressure (particularly from Henry Jackson and others on the defenseright) not to settle for anything less than numerical equality. Ford requested that Kissinger try for “equal aggregates” in Moscow but hold the asymmetrical approach as backup. Brezhnev surprised the United States by accepting “equal aggregates” for a ten-year period. It was decided that at the end of ten years, neither party to the agreement would exceed 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs—a category that included ballistic missiles, submarines, and 36. See Kissinger’s and Schlesinger’s explanation to President Ford about “compensation,” NSC Minutes, October 7, 1974, 5, 13, GRFL.

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bombers). Meanwhile, out of that 2,400, there would be a separate subceiling on MIRV SNDVs, which would be somewhere around 1,300. An official commitment to this structure, along with any SALT-related issues (third-party arsenals, heavy missiles, bombers, and cruise missiles) was postponed until the two countries’ leaders met in Vladivostok a month later.37 On November 23–24, 1974, Ford met with Brezhnev at a small retreat center outside Vladivostok. There, the two leaders gave their imprimatur to the general parameters of an “agreed framework” for the future SALT II agreement— 2,400 SNDVs by 1985 (including bombers), out of which 1,320 could be used for MIRV ICBMs and SLBMs. The Soviet Union had tried in October to convince the United States to accept a side agreement whereby it had to stay at 2,200 SNDVs until the last eighteen months of the ten-year period—allowing a de facto Soviet advantage of 200 SNDVs until 1983. The idea was brought up again at Vladivostok (especially after the United States pressured the Soviets to limit MIRVs to only 180 of their 280 SS-18 ICBMs), but was finally laid to rest in lieu of simply allowing both parties to choose on their own when during the ten-year period they would reach the 2,400 limit. Vladivostok also settled one other issue. After Ford sweetened the deal by agreeing to stop the forward basing of U.S. submarines at Rota, Spain, by 1983, the Soviets eased up on their long-standing demand of “compensation” for “forward-based systems.”38 However, the summit did not clear up everything. First, unlike SALT I, the “agreed framework” for SALT II was not restricted to “land-based” and “fixed”

37. For information on the preparatory trip to Moscow in October 1974, see Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 444–45, and Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 277–79. The NSC debates over the negotiating positions taken by Kissinger to Moscow prior to the Vladivostok Summit (particularly October 7, 1974, and October 18, 1974) can be found in the NSC Minutes, GRFL. Kissinger’s discussion in Years of Renewal specifically references the October 7 NSC meeting, but he claims that that meeting was the “first” Ford administration meeting about SALT. The “first,” according to the Ford Library Web site, was on September 14, 1974. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 442–53. Kissinger, Renewal, 286–302. Also see Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II, 31–35. 38. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 443, 443n16. Garthoff says that the 1,320 MIRV sublimit was done to give room for the Trident submarine program. Before the summit, the United States suggested a total aggregate of 2,200 launchers. The subceiling took just 60 percent of that figure. In his memoirs, Kissinger says that the MIRV number reflected “two extra Trident submarines thrown in for safety” (Renewal, 277). Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 445n21; Kissinger, Renewal, 295–97. Garthoff and Kissinger discuss the October side agreement and its resurgence at Vladivostok. Kissinger laments how “theological” the debate had become. The United States was not planning to build up to 2,200 SNDVs, let alone 2,400 (Renewal, 295). Kissinger states that this was a throw-away because, by 1983, a longer-range SLBM meant that Poseidon and Trident would not need a forward base in Spain. Garthoff called the Soviet Union’s acceptance of equal aggregates without forward-based systems compensation to have been a “major concession” (Détente and Confrontation, 446).

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launchers. There was now the possibility of future limits on mobile SNDVs. Second, since “heavy” bombers were included under the total SNDV limit, the Soviets quickly rebuffed all suggestions that its Backfire bomber might fit the framework’s parameters. It argued that the bomber’s range (1,300 miles) was not long enough to fall under the cap.39 Additionally (and to the disappointment of the American side), there was no agreement either to reduce the number of Soviet heavy missiles writ large or to restrict the number of heavy missiles upon which the Soviets would be allowed to place MIRVs. The discussions at the summit had bypassed the issue of cruise missiles, but the puzzle reared its head during the joint preparation of an aide-memoire in the weeks after. Garthoff explains that the Soviets wanted to count under the 2,400 limit bombers that were able to carry any type of air-to-surface missile with a range greater than 600 kilometers (including air-launched cruise missiles, or ALCMs). The United States, on the other hand, wished to restrict the missile type to only those using ballistic trajectories. The Soviet side, so Garthoff claims, had brought up the issue back in October as well as during the summit itself, but the United States had mistakenly assumed that the conversation had been referring only to air-to-surface ballistic missiles. In the end, the United States conceded to the Soviet position, but insisted (unilaterally) that its understanding had always been (and would continue to be) that the limit was on ballistic rather than cruise missiles.40 Throughout 1975 and 1976, the SALT II negotiations went back and forth over these problems. The Soviet Union used the negotiations to try to negate the United States’ growing advantage in cruise missiles. To do this, Moscow used two different tactics in the post-Vladivostok negotiations. First, it pressed hard for cruise missile range limits. ALCM range limits forced the United States to move its ALCM-carrying aircraft closer to Soviet airspace—and therefore closer to Soviet air defense. The Soviet Union also worked on ground-launched cruise missile range limits in order to protect itself against attacks from the territory of U.S. allies. Finally, limits on sea-based cruise missiles restricted the area from which the United States could hit Soviet targets from ships or submarines. In addition to range limits, the Soviet Union also argued that all of the delivery vehicles that were able to carry cruise missiles had to be treated as if they were MIRV platforms and, therefore, countable under the Vladivostok

39. James Dougherty, “SALT: An Introduction to the Substance and Politics of the Negotiations,” 14– 15. 40. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 446–47, 447n24.

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MIRV sublimit of 1,320. With this, the United States would be forced to choose between cruise missiles (with their attendant range limits) and MIRV SLBMs or ICBMs. In January 1976, Brezhnev went as far as to suggest that each B-1 bomber be counted as three MIRV platforms.41 While the Soviet Union focused on cruise missiles, the United States used SALT II negotiations to secure (a) lower total SNDV aggregates, (b) a clearer definition of a heavy missile, (c) a standard for differentiating MIRV and nonMIRV launchers, and, probably most importantly, (d) the counting of the Backfire bomber under the SNDV aggregate. The Soviet Union insisted that the Backfire was a theater weapon and therefore outside the bounds of SALT II. The United States, on the other hand, argued that the plane’s range was such that it could strike the continental United States using one-way missions. In January 1976, Brezhnev provided data that purported to show that the Backfire’s operational radius was 2,200 kilometers, significantly less than what was considered “strategic” under SALT II. This was dismissed out of hand by Ford, who was told by his advisers that Brezhnev’s data was in error (perhaps even intentionally deceptive) and that U.S. intelligence had already tracked a longer flight taken by the plane. In that same January meeting in Moscow, Kissinger suggested the counting of Backfire bombers after October 1977, which would have given Moscow a number of “free” uncounted Backfires under SALT II. The following month, this position changed to an interim, five-year agreement that limited the construction of Backfire bombers to the Soviets’ current rate of production and prohibited any modifications to the planes that would make them more threatening to the United States. The Backfire represented two military problems (the vulnerability of the United States to one-way missions and the plane’s theater use), an alliance problem (Soviet insistence that if Backfire was counted, it meant that the “forward-based systems” that were able to strike Soviet territory in one-way missions also had to be counted), and a domestic political problem (SALT II would have great difficulty in the Senate if Backfire was not counted under the aggregate).42 No agreement on the Backfire was 41. On the January-February 1976 negotiations over SALT II, see Kissinger, Renewal, 845–61, and Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 540–44. Admiral James Holloway explained to Ford that with a limit of 2,500 kilometers on ship-launched cruise missiles, there were only two spots where ships could be “stationed” in order to hit targets in the Soviet Union. The first was “one small circle near Crete,” and the second was “another small circle near Iceland.” NSC Minutes, January 21, 1976, 5, GRFL. Ford called Brezhnev’s suggestion that each B-1 bomber be counted as three MIRV platforms a “gimmick.” Ibid., 2. 42. See CIA analyst Carl Duckett’s presentation on the Backfire bomber. NSC Minutes, February 11, 1976, 2–4, GRFL. Duckett explained that the United States gathered its intelligence on Backfire by col-

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reached under Ford and the issue remained “on the books” into the Carter administration. The defense-right and the defense-left both launched major criticisms of the Vladivostok “agreed framework” and the post-summit meetings. The defense-left (including Carter) lamented the summit simply as failed arms control. It had not gone far enough. Defense-right analysts decried the Soviet assault against cruise missiles and also registered strong disagreement with its assertions that the Backfire bomber was a theater rather than long-range system. Mostly, though, the defense-right argued that the United States had been outbargained again in the area of missile “carrying capacity,” or throw-weight. Vladivostok had done nothing to redress the military-operational advantage the Soviet Union gained as a result of having more missiles with larger throwweights than the United States.43 Paul Nitze asserted that the new Soviet SS-19 had three times the carrying capacity of the Minuteman III, while the SS-18 had seven times as much.44 While the “agreed framework” had limited each party to the same number of MIRV delivery vehicles (that is, missiles), it had not restricted the number of individual warheads. Logically, then, with its advantage in heavy missiles (or larger carrying capacity), the Soviets could pack more individual MIRVs on its allowed 1,320 missiles than the United States could on its missile arsenal. Taking all of this into account, the defense-right suggested that Vladivostok and SALT II facilitated the following military-operational logic. First, the reality of greater Soviet throw-weight allowed the Soviet Union (even under Vladivostok’s limits) to add more RVs on fewer missiles. Next, future improvements in RV guidance and accuracy granted the Soviet Union the ability to decrease its yields but still retain the ability to destroy hardened U.S. targets.45 Finally, with more accurate RVs and additional throw-weight, the Soviet Union could be in a better position to strike first and (possibly) disarm the United States

lecting telemetry from Soviet radars. NSC Minutes, July 30, 1976, 5, GRFL. Also, see “February 1976 Proposal,” attached to Memorandum from Roger Molander to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Subject: Critique of Richard Burt’s Foreign Affairs Article on SALT, June 29, 1978, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 36, Folder Serial X 8/77–8/78, JCL. Schlesinger argued that the “biggest problem on Backfire [was] political,” and that the administration would “draw criticism” if it allowed Backfires to be counted outside the 2,400 SNDV aggregate. NSC Minutes, September 17, 1975, 17–18, GRFL. 43. On “carrying capacity,” see Phyllis Schlafly and Chester Ward, Ambush at Vladivostok, 74. For a less polemical explanation and analysis, see Paul Nitze, “The Vladivostok Accord and SALT II,” 173, and Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente,” 193–94. 44. Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability,” 193. 45. Ibid., 194; Colin S. Gray, “The Strategic Forces Triad: End of the Road?” 778.

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should it choose to do so. Moreover, looking at the situation from a grandstrategic standpoint, it was possible that the mere knowledge of such a militaryoperational advantage might make the Soviet Union less hesitant about pushing its weight in other areas, particularly in Europe or the Middle East.46 With these concerns in mind, Jackson and others began calling for an “equal throw-weight” approach. And because he was faced as well with having to solidify his defense-left flank in his own Democratic presidential bid, Senator Jackson also started to push for reductions.47

The Modernization of U.S. Nuclear Forces in the Wake of SALT (1972–1976) The 1972 Jackson Amendment had also linked any future U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements to the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces. The amendment’s second clause suggested that Congress would withhold its support of any future arms limitation agreements without the modernization of U.S. strategic forces. To Jackson, this modernization was necessary to counter the Soviet Union’s own efforts. Even though some argued that the American public and Congress would not countenance the “unequal aggregates” approach and would push for strategic modernization after SALT I, Jackson believed differently. He was convinced that SALT I would be billed (and accepted) as a sign that détente was working and that the Soviet Union’s objectives and plans differed from those of the United States. As a result, Congress would refuse to fund the necessary improvements to U.S. strategic nuclear forces. The modernization clause was Jackson’s insurance against the American public’s failure to act upon the national interest.48 But, how did SALT I and ongoing SALT II negotiations affect the modernization of U.S. nuclear systems? Were Jackson’s concerns justified? The advent of superpower détente, SALT, and the anti-defense and defense-left perspective of what Kissinger named the “McGovernite” Congress all came together to cre-

46. Gray, “Strategic Forces Triad,” 773–75. 47. Kissinger says that Jackson wanted a Vladivostok total aggregate of 1,700, which, he adds, would have required a bigger cut from Moscow than Washington. What Kissinger leaves out (but perhaps infers by stating that Jackson was trying to appeal to traditional arms control advocates) is that Jackson was starting a presidential bid and had to shore up his left flank. Jackson’s concept of “equal throwweight,” says Kissinger, was “nearly equally unachievable in the short term” unless the United States decided to build up instead of trying to force Moscow down. It was not possible in the contemporary political climate, and Jackson knew it. Kissinger, Renewal, 300–301. 48. Kaufman, Jackson, 255–57.

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ate a climate in the 1970s wherein it was difficult to secure funding for any strategic modernization programs.49 In the wake of SALT I, defense-left senators like Mark Hatfield and William Proxmire reacted as Henry Jackson had predicted they would—they insisted that successful superpower arms control meant that the United States could slow down its own efforts at strategic modernization. At the same time, however, from 1974 to 1976 secretaries of defense James Schlesinger and Donald Rumsfeld placed tremendous emphasis on nuclear force modernization (particularly the B-1 program, the MX, and theater nuclear weapons). In fact, the strategic modernization programs that Carter faced when he entered the White House were those initiated under Schlesinger and Rumsfeld. B-1

As Nick Kotz relates, Congress was home to a massive lobbying competition over the B-1 from 1973 to 1976. The Rockwell Corporation and the Air Force teamed up to pressure skeptical representatives and senators into supporting the new bomber. Those opposing the new bomber—an amalgam of defenseleft congressmen and their staffs, peace church groups (like the American Friends Service Committee), and defense watchdog organizations—ran public educational campaigns, lobbied the undecided on Capitol Hill, and dogged Democratic presidential hopefuls throughout 1975 and 1976.50 B-1 opponents fought the new bomber with a number of arguments. They believed that the United States could drop the bomber component of its force, moving from a triad to a dyad, and still retain enough of its capability for deterrence purposes. Another choice involved the B-52 or the FB-111, both of which could be modified for less money. Finally, critics suggested that the same mission could be accomplished through stand-off attack—ALCMs launched from aircraft situated beyond the range of Soviet air defenses. In an article for International Security, B-1 opponent Archie Wood argued that the new plane was unnecessary because the United States already possessed a “militarily and politically sufficient deterrent.”51 He was convinced that missiles could take care of 49. Kissinger uses the term “McGovernite Congress” as shorthand for the anti-defense, defense-left Congress faced by Nixon and Ford. See Kissinger, Renewal, 35–36; Kissinger to Margaret Warner, Transcript of PBS Lehrer News Hour, March 23, 1999, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/janjune99/kissinger_3–23.html (accessed January 21, 2008). 50. Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder, 123–57. 51. Archie Wood, “Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force without Really Trying—a Case against the B-1,” 102.

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the United States’ deterrence needs—especially SLBMs, which, again, were less vulnerable because the submarines that carried them could maneuver underwater. He argued as well that land-based ICBMs were not as vulnerable as many believed or suggested.52 Moreover, with the new Trident submarine soon entering service, the United States had more than enough destructive power to hold Soviet urban/industrial centers at risk, which under the assured vulnerability framework was enough to deter Soviet action. The abundance of destructive power aside, if one still believed that bombers were a necessary part of the U.S. strategic force, then the bomber’s opponents insisted that there were other, less costly alternatives to the B-1. Existing aircraft—namely, the B-52 and the FB-111—could be modified to be more maneuverable and more difficult to destroy. These modifications would make those planes just as effective as the new penetrating bomber would be. Larger transport planes could also be modified to carry a larger number of ALCMs, which could then be launched against targets inside the Soviet Union from points beyond the reach of air defense.53 The bomber’s proponents argued that there were certain jobs that the new aircraft was able to do more effectively than existing alternatives.54 The B-1, its proponents insisted, used less predictable attack routes than did missiles with fixed silos and ballistic (and therefore computable) trajectories. As a manned aircraft, the B-1 could actively hunt military targets, making it an effective second-strike counterforce system.55 And in the event of error or late-breaking events, the manned B-1 could also be called back. These military-operational characteristics were impossible for an ICBM or SLBM. Additionally, it was

52. Ibid., 103–4. 53. In his discussion of B-1 opponents, John McCarthy lists the modified B-52 and the “stretched” FB-111 as two of the more popular alternatives. He dismissed a modification of the B-52 as less survivable and prohibitively expensive. For the FB-111, McCarthy argued that even if it was modified and extended, it would still not have the carrying capacity of the B-1 and would require payload trade-offs. McCarthy, “The Case for the B-1 Bomber,” 91–92. Wood, “Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force,” 114–16. Stand-off attack was one of the options that Wood, Alton Quanbeck, and Louisa Thoron had outlined in a monograph entitled Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force: Why and How, and Wood’s International Security article (as well as a letter by Quanbeck in the Spring 1977 issue) were derived from that monograph. McCarthy, however, insisted that stand-off attack was an option fraught with difficulty. In his view, B-52s had poorer prelaunch survival and the Soviet Union would try to restrict ALCMs through SALT II by counting ALCM-carrying aircraft under the MIRV sublimit. Lastly, standoff attack allowed Moscow to focus on fewer, slower-flying ALCM carriers instead of faster-flying penetrating bombers (which could launch ALCMs that would penetrate even farther). McCarthy, “The Case for the B-1,” 92–93. 54. McCarthy, “The Case for the B-1,” 78–97, especially 79–87. 55. Ibid., 83.

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argued that the B-1 could be dispersed quickly from air bases, which made Soviet attack planning much more difficult. The B-1 was more adaptable than other delivery systems. Its payloads could be mixed and matched, and it had space for defense-suppressive weapons. It was also argued that the new bomber was much more versatile than any of the proposed adjustments to the B-52 or FB-111—aircraft which might not be able to stand up against existing (or, more importantly, future) Soviet air defenses. Finally, the program had not only military-operational advantages but also a significant political component. The program created jobs. The bomber’s proponents made sure that they highlighted the fact that many of the bomber’s subassembly contracts had been doled out across congressional districts nationwide—a point not missed by members of Congress (or by presidential candidates).56 From 1974 through 1976, the opposition successfully delayed production of the bomber, despite the intense pressure placed on individual congressmen due to the sheer number of jobs at risk if the bomber was not constructed. In 1974, members of Congress passed a two-year postponement. When the election year of 1976 finally arrived and President Ford requested $1.9 billion for B-1 research and development and a production run of 244 bombers, the opposition once again came together and was able (initially through an amendment by Senator John Culver of Iowa, and later through a joint House-Senate compromise) to delay an authoritative B-1 production decision again—this time until February 1977, a month following the next presidential inauguration.57 Minuteman and MX

In the case of a follow-on to the Minuteman ICBM, the claim that SALT had a significant impact on the evolution of the Minuteman successor, and on secure ICBM basing as a whole, is a gross understatement. The two parts of the 1972 agreement actually worked in tandem to limit Washington’s choices for expanding or even maintaining the number of RVs housed on U.S. ICBMs that could survive an attack, penetrate Soviet territory, and destroy their planned targets. Article II of the Interim Agreement prohibited the “conver[sion of] land-based launchers for light ICBM, or older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy missiles of types deployed after that time

56. Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder, 127–29. Also see Carter’s own recollections about the B-1 issue in Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, 81. 57. Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder, 138, 146–50, 155–56.

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[that is, 1964].”58 In short, neither party could take a silo that currently housed a missile with a small throw-weight (that is, an older and “lighter” ICBM) and adjust it so that a missile with a larger throw-weight could fit in it. In order to keep this from happening, the parties agreed that an adjusted silo dimension could not exceed the old parameters by more than 10 to 15 percent.59 Granted, this did not restrict either party from increasing overall ICBM RV numbers by constructing additional missiles. But the fixed launcher restrictions meant that any newly built ICBMs had to replace old missiles (and fit within the physical restrictions established for silo reconfiguration), sit in warehouses, or be deployed in mobile launchers. Without the ability to construct more silos, there were only three strategic reasons for stockpiling: hedging against peacetime degradation, use in mobile launchers, and reloading. The first would not require large numbers of new ICBMs coming off the assembly line. The second was only advantageous to the Soviet Union as the United States had no available mobile systems. Critics claimed that the third was also a benefit to Moscow. The Soviet Union’s use of “cold” pop-up launch techniques might (theoretically) sidestep the new silo limitations. “Cold” launch techniques—the ejection of the ICBM up out of the silo prior to ignition—permitted the Soviet Union to use newer (and heavier) missiles in older, less-augmented silos.60 Unlike in the Soviet Union, U.S. silos had not been constructed with reloading in mind. For the United States, reloading—if it was possible—would be a time-consuming process under severe post-attack conditions. Moreover, the construction of new ICBMs (and, once the Interim Agreement expired, more fixed silos in which to house them) did not erase the problem of silo vulnerability. Even if one did construct new missiles and, after the Interim Agreement, new silos to protect the United States’ ICBM RV count, those missiles (and their RVs) would still be sitting in vulnerable silos. The United States was faced with having to improve ICBM basing, launch ICBMs early (or preemptively), or use active defenses. The last two were unpalatable choices. The third option was actually removed by the ABM treaty itself, which limited the use of ballistic missile defense for silo protection to a single Minuteman field, thereby effectively collapsing Nixon’s Safeguard ABM program.

58. Article II, Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. 59. Agreed Statement C and Common Understanding A, in ibid. 60. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 130, 161. For a more polemical discussion, see Phyllis Schlafly and Chester Ward, Kissinger on the Couch, 413.

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But was all of this really a problem? Some argued that it was not because, like the United States, Soviet silo construction and its own use of ABM silo defenses were restricted by SALT I. Under the Interim Agreement, there were now a finite number of allowable fixed silos. Moreover, the ABM treaty also restricted the Soviet Union to the protection of a single ICBM site. For the United States, this meant that there was no longer the need for large numbers of ICBM RVs to overcome the expected attrition from Soviet ABM systems. In light of arms control success, proponents of the negotiations argued that now both states could freely move the bulk of their RVs to more survivable, less-accurate submarines, as well as to recallable, slower-flying bombers. As the theory of assured vulnerability would have it, these two remaining legs of the triad would not be as “destabilizing” to the U.S.-Soviet relationship as were ICBMs. Others were less optimistic. Given the anticipated military-technological context of the mid to late 1970s and early 1980s, many argued that the United States’ need for greater numbers of surviving and accurate ICBM RVs would continue to be high. There were four reasons for the belief that greater numbers of ICBM RVs would be required in the late 1970s and beyond. First, as the Soviet Union continued its improvement of silo hardness, the United States would have to double up RVs to ensure that these silos could be destroyed.61 Second, it was thought that large numbers of ICBM RVs served as a prudent hedge against any cheating or breakout by the Soviet Union in the area of ballistic missile defense. Third, it was soon evident that the Soviet Union was not adhering to a major tenet of SALT logic—it did not shift its RVs in the direction of less “destabilizing” submarines and bombers. Instead, Moscow began an extensive modernization of its ICBM force. In August 1973, just over a year after the signing of SALT I, the Soviet Union tested its first MIRV ICBM. By the end of that year, the Soviet Union had four new ICBMs under development: the mobile SS-16, the SS-17, SS18, and SS-19.62 The latter three fell within SALT I’s fixed silo conversion limits but each of them were MIRVs or had MIRV variants. Plus, and this was the key problem, all had significantly larger throw-weights than the Minuteman. Many believed that these modernized Soviet ICBMs, with the larger number of RVs allowed by their larger throw-weight, would soon be very effective in quick,

61. Pry, The Strategic Nuclear Balance, 151–52. 62. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 211, 213, 218, 222. The ICBMs would enter combat duty in the following months: February 1976 (SS-16), May 1975 (SS-17), December 1974 (SS-18), and April 1975 (SS-19).

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surprise attacks against Minuteman silos or other military targets. In conjunction with SLBM attacks on U.S. bomber bases, the modernized ICBM gave Moscow formidable capabilities for destroying hardened targets promptly. Militarily, the most effective way for the United States to attack and destroy these newly modernized Soviet ICBMs in a prompt enough fashion was with the U.S. ICBM force (which, in the eyes of some, was also the best approach for deterring Moscow’s use of its ICBMs in the first place). Submarines and bombers were not accurate or fast enough for the task, and there was concern that the Soviet Union would improve countermeasures against them. Finally, a greater number of ICBM RVs was required because of adjustments that had been made to U.S. nuclear war planning. Between 1972 and 1974, defense experts from both inside and outside the government came together for two reviews aimed at reworking the United States’ nuclear targeting doctrine: the Defense Department’s National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel, otherwise known as the Foster Panel, and the National Security Council’s National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 169 nuclear weapons policy study. In light of MIRV technology, advances in miniaturization and accuracy, and the Soviet Union’s buildup and modernization of its own strategic offensive forces, the two reviews focused executive-level attention on the need to increase the number of nuclear options available to the president in wartime or in a crisis. The reviews also concluded that the United States required more flexible and adaptable targeting of its nuclear weapons. It was hoped that additional flexibility and the availability of more options would enhance deterrence by improving the ability of the United States to keep escalation under control (by making it clear that other choices were available besides a quick ascent—or descent—into urban-industrial attacks). With that in mind, the studies examined the viability of limited nuclear options and regional nuclear options—that is, the use of nuclear weapons against various Soviet and Warsaw Pact “nonstrategic” military assets (conventional and nuclear) to halt military advances into Western Europe or into the oil-rich areas of the Middle East.63 63. On the Foster Panel and NSSM 169, see Terry Terriff, The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 97–222; William Burr, “The Nixon Administration, the ‘Horror Strategy,’ and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972,” 34–78, especially 69–76. The SIOP is constructed from four smaller types of options—major attack options (MAO), selected attack options (SAO), regional nuclear options (RNO), and limited nuclear options (LNO). When these options were established, MAO were very broad in scope with large numbers of weapons, while SAO, according to Don Cotter, were configured in “packages” that could be adjusted to strike at very specific enemy target sets—for example, air defenses or oil wells. LNO had a much smaller number of weapons but were also aimed at fixed targets. MAO, SAO, and LNO were implemented with strategic forces. RNO, called

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In January 1974, the findings of these studies were formalized as presidential guidance in a document entitled National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242. NSDM 242 outlined how nuclear weapons planning would henceforth be related to national goal-setting. The reconciliation between these two realms would take place through another document known as the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP).64 According to Desmond Ball, the NUWEP was a joint military-civilian effort that established targeting and damage requirements for nuclear weapons in accordance with national objectives. The NUWEP’s requirements were operationalized in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) by targeting professionals at Strategic Air Command. SIOP 5, the first SIOP organized under NSDM 242 and the NUWEP process, went into effect in January 1976 and, though it was subject to many revisions, remained the basis for nuclear planning during Carter’s entire time in office. SIOP 5 had an expanded target list that was divided into four general groups of Soviet assets: nuclear forces, conventional forces, leadership (civilian and military), and economic/industrial targets.65 This expansion of targets under SIOP 5 put a premium on maintaining RV count and survivability. The important question—and the one directly related to the MX program—was whether the RVs required by the new SIOP had to be mostly ICBM RVs or could be RVs housed on the other two parts of the triad. Again, there were those who argued on behalf of submarines and bombers because of the ICBM’s “destabilizing” character. However, since most of the targets of interest were hardened and, in a conflict, might have to be destroyed earlier rather than later, ICBMs had military-operational advantages over the other two. They were more accurate, easier to keep on alert, and fasterflying. SLBMs could carry a large number of RVs, but due to communication Selective Employment Plans by NATO, aimed at nonfixed targets and were typically implemented with nonstrategic forces (though, in NATO’s case, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe had “strategic” Poseidon and Polaris SLBM RVs at his disposal). There were also limited nuclear options in the sense of sub-SIOP or non-SIOP options. Desmond Ball, “U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?” 31–60; University of Maryland Nuclear History Project, The Evolution of Selective Options Strategy, 29–30, 35–36, 41–46; Shaun Gregory, Nuclear Command and Control in NATO: Nuclear Weapons Operations and the Strategy of Flexible Response, 65–70. For non-SIOP or sub-SIOP options, see Schlesinger’s discussion of the use of ship-launched, nuclear-tipped cruise missiles for the purpose of “sub-SIOP” deterrence in areas where “[the United States has] no base structure.” He named Iran as an example. Later, he reiterated that SLCMs had been “intended” for sub-SIOP purposes. Once again he referenced Iran, adding that SLCM use meant that one could run limited nuclear options without risking attack on one’s air bases. NSC Minutes, August 9, 1975, 19; September 17, 1975, 19, 27–28, GRFL. 64. For a copy of NSDM 242, see Terriff, Nixon Administration, 237–41. On NUWEP, see Burr, “Horror Strategy,” 76 and Ball, “U.S. Strategic Forces,” 35–36. 65. Ball, “U.S. Strategic Forces,” 36–37.

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challenges and to the fact that the submarine’s position would be given away upon launch, it was thought wiser to withhold their use until the latter part of a conflict. Instead, SLBMs could be held back for the purpose of intrawar negotiation. In the case of bombers, their slower flight times and need to penetrate air defenses (either through evasion or the destruction of defenses) made them better for use in “mopping-up” operations against leftover nuclear forces or secondary conventional targets. In summary, it was argued that the United States needed (and would continue to need) large numbers of survivable and accurate ICBM RVs from 1975 onward when one considered the post–NSDM 242 nuclear targeting requirements in tandem with Moscow’s silo hardening program, the prudent need to hedge against possible Soviet ABM breakout, improvements to Soviet MIRVs and accuracy, and potential breakouts in Soviet air defenses and antisubmarine warfare. Furthermore, the “agreed framework” for SALT II signed by Ford and Brezhnev at Vladivostok did not alleviate the ICBM RV problem. Indeed, it only added to the military-technological pressure. Again, Vladivostok set total aggregates for SNDVs (2,400) and for MIRV SNDVs (1,320). With the knowledge that the United States was moving ahead briskly in cruise missile technology, the Soviet Union pushed strongly to include U.S. cruise missile–carrying heavy bombers under the 1,320 limit. In effect, this position would make Washington choose between ICBM RVs and warheads housed on other platforms. If the United States wanted more bombers with cruise missiles—the use of which would require the suppression of Soviet air defense—then it would have to cut into its number of its MIRV ICBMs (and SLBMs).66 If the 1,320 sublimit was set by treaty and the number of MIRV ICBMs in the U.S. arsenal was subsequently lowered, then all of the remaining ICBMs (and their RVs) would have a greater military-operational burden placed upon them. Keeping all of these things in mind, Secretaries of Defense Schlesinger and Rumsfeld initiated programs that ensured the survival and military effectiveness of ICBM RVs. One fix was the MK-12A RV program. The United States started development of the new RV in July 1974. The MK-12A was more accurate than its predecessor, the MK-12, and also carried a larger-yield warhead (the W78, with a yield of 335 to 350 kilotons). Its enhanced yield and improved accuracy gave the new RV more destructive power against hardened targets. Therefore, the problem of secure basing aside, each MK-12A that survived an 66. Stansfield Turner would make this very point to Carter in mid-1977. CIA Memorandum, Stansfield Turner to President Carter, Subject: An Assessment of Soviet Perceptions on SALT—May 1977, June 2, 1977, 3, USSR Vertical File, Folder: USSR Related Docs. Opened (I), JCL.

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attack had more counter-military potential than earlier RV variants. Once they were provided with a more protected basing mode, the Minuteman III and the MK-12A would make a formidable combination. There were problems with the new RV program, however. When enhancing an RV, one ideally looks to increase its yield and decrease its total weight (so as to fit more militarily effective RVs on a single platform). This was not the case with the MK-12A. Its heavier weight resulted in a loss of range, which kept the United States from replacing RVs across the board on its Minuteman III arsenal. If the United States wanted to replace all of its RVs and also retain its full target coverage, the MK-12A would require a heavier throw-weight missile.67 Another program experimented with the size of RVs and a different configuration of the RV housing or bus. On May 16, 1975, the United States ran its first PAVE PEPPER test. Through the Advanced Ballistic Reentry System program, PAVE PEPPER aimed at shrinking the size of RVs and adjusting the bus so that more RVs could be packed into a single Minuteman III (seven RVs per missile rather than three).68 Secure basing notwithstanding, increased numbers of RVs per missile meant that more would be available after an attack than were available before. These could destroy more targets, which meant that in the wake of SALT II MIRV sublimits, remaining U.S. MIRV ICBMs would “count” more with PAVE PEPPER than without it. Other programs used to protect ICBM RVs and ensure that they fulfilled their mission included what was known as the “integrated program”: improved guidance, increased silo hardening, protection of ICBMs against electromagnetic pulse and dust, and upgrades to the Minuteman’s targeting software.69

67. Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: An Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance, 217. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) constructed the W-78 warhead, adding about thirty-five pounds to the warhead. Walter Pincus argued that LANL and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) disagreed over its precise yield. LLNL was skeptical of the Pentagon’s requirement that the upgraded warhead have twice the yield of the old one but no change in the amount of nuclear material. Though LANL claimed success, there were allegations of testing failure and LLNL doubted whether the W-78 had actually achieved 350 kilotons. By the time the W-78 was readied for additional tests, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was in force, which kept all tests under 150 kilotons. See Washington Post, December 12, 1978, A1. 68. History Office Staff, Headquarters, Space Division, U.S. Air Force, Space and Missile Systems Organization: A Chronology, 1954–1979 [hereafter SAMSO History], 241. Also see Hartunian, “Ballistic Missiles and Re-Entry Systems.” Another PAVE PEPPER test took place on July 26, 1975. SAMSO History, 243; Encyclopedia Astronautica, “Minuteman III.” www.astronautix.com/lvs/mineman3.htm (accessed January 21, 2008). 69. SAMSO History, 244, 247, 255. The “integrated program” for Minuteman began at Grand Forks Air Force Base in October 1975, at Minot Air Force Base in February 1976, and at Malmstrom Air Force Base in November 1976.

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Besides these programs, the most logical way of making ICBMs “count” was to replace (or, subject to SALT limits, augment) the Minuteman with an entirely new, larger, and less vulnerable missile. It is no surprise, therefore, to find that the MX program experienced its renaissance during Schlesinger’s and Rumsfeld’s years at the Pentagon. In light of the Soviet Union’s military improvements and in the face of past (and anticipated) arms control limitations, the number and military effectiveness of the United States’ ICBM RVs would be best ensured by the deployment of a new, larger missile that carried a greater number of improved RVs (like the MK-12A), used cutting-edge instrumentation for accuracy (what was called the Advanced Inertial Reference Sphere or AIRS)70 to increase its capability against hardened military targets, and preferably used mobility for protection against attack. In Schlesinger’s FY1975 defense budget, which was presented to Congress in February 1974, $37 million was set aside for an advanced ICBM. That same February, the Air Force established a new Missile X Program Office at Norton Air Force Base under SAMSO. The research, development, and testing of new ICBM concepts—including the work on the MX—hit a rapid pace between 1974 and 1976. The Air Force ran a number of mobile basing tests throughout 1974 and 1975, which included the air-launching of Minuteman.71 All of these programs were criticized roundly by many in Congress as overindulgence in “counterforce.” Using assured vulnerability logic, Senators Thomas McIntyre and Edward Brooke, with the prompting of their professional staff members (Larry Smith and Alton Frye respectively), leveled charges that improvements to ICBMs were, unlike improvements to submarines and bombers, “destabilizing” to the superpower relationship. Throughout 1975 and 1976, McIntyre’s office led the fight against “counterforce”—attacking first the MK-12A and AIRS in 1975, and then, over the course of 1976, the MX. McIntyre’s fight against the MX was kindled in 1976 when he and his subcommittee were briefed on the results of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council’s (DSARC) meeting in March of that year. According to the analyses of John Edwards, Lauren Holland, and Robert Hoover, this March DSARC meeting was a key date for the MX. Its participants examined many of the potential solutions to the ICBM RV puzzle (PAVE PEPPER, a large throwweight MX, a “lighter” but more easily transportable MX, Minuteman silo upgrading) and determined that even though they would have to be deployed 70. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy, 217–31. 71. SAMSO History, 233, 237.

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for the near term in vulnerable Minuteman silos, the best “fix” was three hundred of the larger throw-weight missiles (which, questions of secure basing aside, would be able to house a greater number of RVs).72 However, because the March DSARC left open the issue of basing (which was the main selling point of the MX system for many on the defense-left, who considered it more acceptable than the ABM for limiting damage to Minuteman), McIntyre and his cohort viewed the DSARC’s decision as an Air Force (and a Rumsfeld Pentagon) gambit to bolster America’s “counterforce” capabilities. That summer, McIntyre went on the offensive against the MX and was able to convince the Senate to make its funding of the missile program contingent on a choice of other-than-silo basing. In effect, McIntyre pushed for the complete reversal of the March DSARC. Henceforth, with the Senate’s actions, basing would determine the missile rather than the converse. The requirement of other-than-silo basing made it more difficult for the Pentagon to choose automatically a missile with a substantially heavier throw-weight. This was McIntyre’s two-pronged attack—he would fight the numbers of missiles that the Air Force wanted, and also use other-than-silo basing as a way to limit the new ICBM’s capability to carry large numbers of very accurate RVs (since a larger missile would be unable to fit into many of the suggested other-than-silo basing options).73 By November 1976, the “MX question” as inherited by President-elect Carter had the following components: (a) a Pentagon (DSARC) decision to press ahead on a large throw-weight ICBM; (b) active skepticism from members of Congress and others on the defense-left over the real need for greater “counterforce” capabilities; (c) generalized concern over how a new, large ICBM would affect the ongoing SALT II negotiations; and (d) a continuing debate within defense circles over the most militarily effective (and costeffective) basing mode for a new missile. Theater Nuclear Forces

It was also under Schlesinger and Rumsfeld that the United States accelerated the modernization of its theater nuclear forces (TNF), specifically those forces slated for use in Europe, including surface-to-surface missiles, artillery, tactical air, SLBMs attached to NATO, and other systems like atomic demolition munitions and nuclear air defenses. The early Nixon administration saw 72. Edwards, Superweapon, 110–11, 118, 131–32; Alan Platt, The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy, 1969–1977, 71–96; Holland and Hoover, MX Decision, 133–34. 73. Edwards, Superweapon, 111, 117–21.

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the final fruition of TNF improvements authorized during McNamara’s tenure in the Pentagon. For example, between September 1969 and March 1970, Project SWAP replaced the U.S. Army’s Pershing I surface-to-surface missile with the Pershing IA. Beginning in March 1973, the United States began to convert its older Sergeant and Honest John short-range, surface-to-surface missiles with the Lance system; by 1975, six battalions had been replaced. The switch to Pershing IA had been authorized by McNamara in May 1965 after studies indicated that with adjustments to the Pershing I’s launcher numbers, road mobility, and reliability, the system could be used for quick-reaction alert (QRA)—an alert status that allowed the rapid destruction of time-urgent targets. The improved Pershing, it was argued, would also allow the United States to shift some of its tactical aircraft from QRA duty in Europe to the Far East, and would also cut down on the cost of manpower associated with keeping aircraft on QRA.74 As a follow-on system to the Sergeant and Honest John, Lance was deployed with multiple warhead options: conventional (high-explosive), chemical, and nuclear (including those with adjustable yields and “special effects”). The Lance system was not only more survivable than the older missile systems but also provided greater safety and security. It used two crews—one to “mate” the warhead with the missile and load the missile into a loader/transporter, and another to drop the missile into the launcher, “unlock” the warhead, insert the targeting information, and launch.75 The pace and character of theater nuclear force modernization under the Ford administration can only be explained by addressing a number of interrelated military-operational, technological, and political issues. To begin, there was a desire to modernize TNF in light of the cuts offered in the MBFR negotiations in the early 1970s in what was known as Option III. In June 1973, the United States had briefed the NATO Defense Planning Committee and the North Atlantic Council that the allies could offer 1,000 warheads, 54 F-4s, and

74. Michael Yaffe, “Origins of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Modernization Program: 1969–1979,” 215–16; U.S. Army, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, “The Pershing Weapon System and Its Elimination,” http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/systems/pershing/welcome.html (accessed January 21, 2008). On the “swinging” of QRA aircraft to Vietnam, see the statement of Lieutenant General Donald Keith in House Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Research and Development, 729. 75. Manuel Villanueva, a Lance crewman, has posted his experiences in West Germany (in Missile Maintenance) during the 1980s and provided a Power Point presentation on the Lance system. http://www.manuelsweb.com/lancemissile.htm; http://www.manuelsweb.com/lance_missile_files/ frame.htm (both accessed January 21, 2008).

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36 Pershing launchers in exchange for a tank army. In January 1975, Schlesinger told President Ford that the United States could actually offer up 1,000 more warheads than originally believed (2,000 out of the 5,000 deployed in the NATO Guidelines Area, or NGA). However, in order to do it safely, the remaining systems would have to be made to “count”; that is, they would have to be modernized. In the end the extra 1,000 warheads were not added to Option III, but in the face of reductions, modernization was still considered prudent. The Soviet Union rejected the Option III proposal in February 1976 and suggested its own variant, which the United States found unacceptable.76 Second, the United States and NATO needed survivable and preferably lower-yield theater nuclear forces with the advent of regional nuclear options (or regional attack options) under NSDM 242. With the new nuclear guidance, analysts at NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and Strategic Air Command matched theater nuclear weapons with targets for the execution of regional nuclear options—though there was some SIOP coverage of theater targets with “strategic” weapons over and above the SLBM RVs that were seconded to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. When it came to nuclear strikes against first- and second-echelon units, transportation hubs, mobile headquarters, and forward logistical bases, as well as the use of theater nuclear forces for deep interdiction of reinforcements, militarily effective but low-collateral-damage warheads were required. At the same time, the revived importance of TNF under the NSDM 242 targeting adjustments also meant that much greater consideration had to be given to system vulnerability and escalation control, not to mention the political ramifications of possible

76. Donald Rumsfeld briefed NATO allies on Option III in July 1973. See NSC Minutes, Subject: MBFR, January 23, 1975, 11–12, 15–17, GRFL. Schlesinger suggested the removal of the additional 1,000 warheads, but there was concern about the perception of a sudden jump in the number so soon after Vladivostok (and without anything briefed to allies beforehand). It would surprise them and could be interpreted, in Kissinger’s words, as a “secret agreement” forged at the summit. General Brown explained (15) that the Chiefs had originally only wanted to go to 1,600 warheads. He had “arm-twisted them” to Schlesinger’s figure. As of January 1975, they were willing to go up to 2,200 (after determining that in many cases NATO did not have good enough intelligence to warrant the numbers on the target lists). Yaffe, “Origins,” 497–98, 500. Yaffe explains that the forces removed under Option III were either obsolete or were heading that way. He argues that the 1,000 warheads were Honest John warheads, which were being phased out in light of Lance. The F-4s were being replaced, and the 36 Pershing Launchers set for removal would be offset by two new improvements to the weapon system. First, a “sequential launch adapter” allowed the firing of three Pershing IA in rapid succession. Second, the system was given an “automatic reference system” that removed the need to survey the site before actual launch. The “automatic reference system” meant a vast improvement in Pershing prelaunch survival, decreasing the time between movement and fire. Also Encyclopedia Astronautica, “Pershing.” http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/pershing.htm (accessed January 21, 2008).

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nuclear use on Allied soil. Indeed, the weapons themselves would be unavailable for regional nuclear options if they or their command and control elements fell to an initial strike. This, naturally, would not be the case if they were used first rather than second.77 Some also argued that TNF vulnerability could provoke undesired escalation because it could tempt opponents to “use or lose” their vulnerable TNF systems under tense circumstances. Hence, there was need for greater mobility, dispersal, hardening, or movement of TNF warheads to sea-based platforms. Related to this was the overall issue of collateral damage. Should one side cause significant collateral damage to an opponent (or an opponent’s territory) through the use of TNF, it might easily fuel escalation. And in the end, the inability to use TNF without provoking escalation might theoretically result in self-deterrence. One could be kept from using TNF in the first place because of the fear that such use could increase damage to one’s own territory and population; at that point, it became questionable as to whether one could, for purposes of deterrence, credibly threaten an opponent with TNF. One way of decreasing collateral damage, thereby lowering the chances of escalation and increasing credibility, was through accuracy improvement. The fine-tuning of accuracy allowed one to decrease the yield of one’s warheads and achieve target destruction with lower amounts of collateral damage. Other methods included adjustable-yield warheads, as well as those with so-called special effects—lower-yield, enhanced radiation warheads.78 Collateral damage was also one reason why increasing the number of SLBM RVs attached to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe was not necessarily a good fix for TNF vulnerability. Although the mobility of submarines protected SLBMs (and their RVs) from being destroyed prior to their launch, SLBM RVs were not

77. Ivo Daalder insists that Schlesinger’s approach toward TNF differed from Rumsfeld’s. Schlesinger saw “escalation control” rather than “warfighting” as the most important facet of TNF, which Daalder says explains why Schlesinger emphasized weapons with lower yield, special effects, and shorter ranges. Rumsfeld, on the other hand, saw TNF not only through the lens of “escalation control” but also as an important means of blunting and halting the Warsaw Pact’s blitzkrieg attack. Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967, 134–36. Schlesinger discussed TNF survivability in his 1975 report to Congress. See Schlesinger, The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe, 167–188, especially 183. In terms of firing first, Kissinger remarked to the NSC immediately after Vladivostok that “Our [NATO/U.S.] FBS [forward-based systems] might not be worth much in a second strike, but in a first strike, they could do a lot of damage to the Soviet Union.” Schlesinger replied, “I hope you will not use that argument publicly!” NSC Minutes, Subject: SALT, December 2, 1974, 5, GRFL. 78. Schlesinger, Theater Nuclear Force Posture, 184; Daalder, Nature and Practice, 137–38, 142–44; University of Maryland, Evolution of Selective Options, 71–72.

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as accurate and also had lower yields. To destroy hardened military targets, greater accuracy or greater yield was required.79 Hence, theater nuclear modernization under Schlesinger and Rumsfeld— the very programs inherited by Carter—reflected the need to reduce vulnerability, limit collateral damage, and control escalation, but retain military effectiveness. In early 1974, the deputy secretary of defense authorized advanced development on the Pershing IB (soon designated the Pershing II). The Pershing IB used what was called radar-area correlation guidance—RADAC, or sometimes called RADAG—to increase its accuracy. The weapon, using a preloaded radar picture of the target, took its own radar image as it reentered. Once the on-board system compared the two images, the RV corrected its own course and detonated. RADAC increased the Pershing’s accuracy, which facilitated a subsequent decrease in yield. The Pershing IB could also be armed with lowyield, adjustable-yield, and earth-penetrating warheads, the last of which could be used to destroy airfields, “canalize” an oncoming opponent by altering terrain, and alleviate some of the political problems associated with the preemplacement of atomic demolition munitions. Pershing IB also had an improved reaction time, which increased its survivability. It also was cheaper to keep on QRA because it could be operated with less manpower.80 In 1975, Schlesinger began to push the Army to take the Pershing IB and increase the missile’s range to around 1,800 kilometers so that it could strike targets in the Soviet Union’s western military districts, thereby degrading the forces adjacent to those at the front lines—the Forward Edge of Battle Area. According to Yaffe, the Army at first was not enthused over this and suggested that the Air Force could take it out of its own budget. Nevertheless, Schlesinger was able to convince the Army to put in seed money for an extended-range Pershing IB (II) in the FY1976 budget. Other improvement programs included the groundlaunched cruise missile, adjustable-yield and enhanced radiation warheads for the Lance system, improvements to nuclear artillery and the Nike-Hercules nuclear air defense system, and new tactical nuclear aircraft (the F-16).81 79. Schlesinger, Theater Nuclear Force Posture, 182. 80. Yaffe, “Origins,” 302, 469. 81. On the beginning of Pershing IB and early extended-range Pershing IB, see Yaffe, “Origins,” 553– 55; University of Maryland, Evolution of Selective Options, 55–60; Testimony of Asst. Sec. Army for Research, Development and Acquisition in House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Research and Development, Part 3, Book 1, March 3, 1978, 572–73; Testimony of William Perry in Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 1979 Supplemental Military Authorization, February 7, 1979, 71–72. Yaffe explains that Ford authorized the ERW for Lance and 8” AFAP on November 24, 1976. Additionally, he explains that Rumsfeld saw

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Additionally, one has to address the relationship between theater nuclear modernization during the Ford administration and the ongoing SALT II negotiations. Because the Soviet Union argued that the Backfire bomber was a theater weapon system, it would not fall within the post-Vladivostok 2,400 SNDV aggregate. This argument not only threatened U.S. allies and, potentially, U.S. territory, but also the administration feared that SALT critics would use it politically as a demonstration of how the United States had granted the Soviet Union a so-called free system.82 The administration knew that it had to do what was necessary to limit the Backfire, but when it came time to bargain for constraints, Ford and his advisers had only a single tool—U.S. cruise missile technology and programs. Unfortunately, the more that the United States made cruise missiles threatening to the Soviets (which it was hoped would drive them to limit Backfire), the harder Moscow worked to erode that advantage through range limits and counting rules in SALT. Also, the more that Washington emphasized the cruise missile as a remedy for its own military-operational (air defense and antiship) and arms control headaches, the more that NATO allies saw cruise missile technology as a possible candidate for the longer-range TNF modernization which the alliance required in light of the Warsaw Pact’s new conventional capabilities, its improved tactical air and—just on the horizon—the SS-20 Intermediate/Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (I/MRBM). Because of their longer range, very accurate cruise missiles could be launched farther back from the front or from the sea. Thus protected, their prelaunch survivability improved. Naturally, this also meant that if they were launched from areas closer to the front, they had ability to strike deeply into Soviet territory. For Great Britain, the sea-based cruise missile was one possible successor system for Polaris. In West Germany’s eyes, cruise missiles served as a hedge in the event that Schlesinger’s and Rumsfeld’s push for theater nuclear modernization turned out to be mere window-dressing for a larger “denuclearization” of continental Europe—especially any suggestions of increasing NATO’s allotment of SLBM RVs or decreasing the number of nuclear-capable tactical aircraft in Europe.83 In all, when Carter took office he inherited a num-

ground-launched cruise missiles as a way of replacing F-111 aircraft in Great Britain (despite the fact that the United States had just sent an additional wing of that aircraft to allay concerns about the removal of F-4 Phantoms through MBFR Option III). Yaffe, “Origins,” 558–60, 564–65, 568–69. 82. See, for example, Schlesinger’s comments in NSC Minutes, Subject: Middle East and SALT, August 9, 1975, 15, GRFL. 83. David Owen, Time to Declare, Part 3, 126–27, http://sca.lib.liv.ac.uk/collections/Owen/biog.htm (accessed January 25, 2008). Yaffe, “Origins,” 585–90. In large part, the decision to give the F-16 nuclear

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ber of intricate, interlocking puzzles that involved the modernization of theater nuclear forces in Europe, the need for effective counters to Soviet and Warsaw Pact military developments, post–NSDM 242 targeting adjustments, and arms control negotiations (MBFR and SALT II). Trident

The final type of pre-Carter nuclear force modernization involved the followon to both the Polaris and, as the 1970s progressed, the Poseidon SLBM weapon systems. In March 1971, the United States deployed its follow-on to the Polaris SLBM—the Poseidon C3. The Poseidon C3 SLBM, a McNamara program, was sized to fit inside the older Polaris launch tubes. Each Poseidon-carrying (formerly Polaris-carrying) submarine was able to carry sixteen Poseidon C3s, each with MIRV technology (topped with fourteen MK-3 RVs, each of which housed a 40- to 50-kiloton warhead). Though it was not accurate enough for the destruction of very hardened targets, the new MIRV SLBM had a quick flight time and could saturate Soviet ABM systems, striking at “softer” military units as well as urban/industrial centers. Eventually, thirty-one of the forty-one existing Polariscarrying submarines were “converted” to the Poseidon system during the 1970s. As more of these conversions took place, some of the Poseidon-carrying submarines were moved to QRA status and their RVs attached to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe for NATO theater use.84 Though the Poseidon C3 served as a less vulnerable theater nuclear weapon and helped the United States overcome the attrition of SLBM RVs by Soviet ABM systems, it still left the problem of submarine obsolescence unaddressed. Polaris-carrying (and therefore Poseidon-carrying) submarines used late capability was a reaction to West Germany’s fears that some in the Pentagon were looking to SLBMs to replace tactical aircraft for theater nuclear missions—a belief that some of Kissinger’s aides argued was well founded. U.S. State Department Action Memorandum from Arthur Hartman, et al. to Henry Kissinger, Subject: Nuclear Balance Issues at NPG Ministerial, October 18, 1976, 3–4. This memorandum is attached to U.S. State Department Action Memorandum from James Lowenstein, et al. to Henry Kissinger, Subject: NPG: Rumsfeld Briefing on Nuclear Balance, November 10, 1976, Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security, http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng =en&id=18792&navinfo=14968 (accessed January 25, 2008). 84. For information on the Poseidon C-3, the deployment program, and Polaris/Poseidon conversion, see Graham Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident: The Development of U.S. Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology, 86–109; Federation of American Scientists, “Poseidon C3.” http://www.fas.org/nuke/ guide/usa/slbm/c-3.htm (accessed January 23, 2008). For Trident C-3, National Resources Defense Council, Table of U.S. Ballistic Missile Submarine Forces, 1960–2012, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/ nudb/datab5.asp (accessed January 25, 2008); Albert Langer, “Accurate Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Strategy,” 46.

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1950s/early 1960s technology. Indeed, the forty-first submarine was deployed by 1967 and no additional vessels were slated for construction.85 So, as the first Poseidons were put to sea, the highest levels of the Nixon administration debated the question of whether to build a new, larger follow-on submarine (with a new SLBM to go along with it), some advanced variant of the smaller Polaris/Poseidon model, or simply a longer-range Poseidon missile. In light of SALT I, the administration decided to move forward on a brand-new followon submarine with a planned deployment date of 1978.86 The new, larger Ohioclass SSBN would carry either a longer-range and more accurate Poseidon SLBM, the Trident I C4, or a different, even larger, and incredibly accurate SLBM, the Trident II D5. There were a number of reasons why the decision was made in the early 1970s to move simultaneously on the Trident I C4 and the Trident II D5. While the Ohio-class SSBN was under construction, the smaller Trident I C4 SLBM could be “back-fitted” into the existing Poseidon-carrying submarine fleet. This had three benefits. First, the Trident I C4’s increased range (4,000 nautical miles versus 2,500 nautical miles) extended the submarine’s operational area. There were more “stations” from which the Trident C4 could be fired and still hit its target set. The increased number of “stations” meant that Soviet antisubmarine warfare platforms had much more ocean to cover. Second, and related to the first, the switch to the longer-range C4 increased the time that the submarine was at a position from which it could launch. A Trident C4-carrying submarine took less time to arrive at areas from which it was able to launch, and could launch from better-protected areas, a move similar to what the Soviet Union did in 1974 with its deployment of the longer-range SS-N-8.87 85. National Resources Defense Council, Table of U.S. Ballistic Missile Submarine Forces, 1960–2012. 86. Kissinger, Zumwalt, and Spinardi have all described the relationship between SALT I and the decision to move forward on the Trident submarine in December 1971–January 1972. In Kissinger’s view, a new submarine program was a key negotiating instrument, but the type of submarine chosen mattered immensely. If the Ohio-class submarine was chosen, the long lead time placed a heavier burden on SALT I to limit the number of SLBM launchers that the Soviet Union could construct in the interim. Henry Kissinger, White House Years, 1129–30. For Zumwalt, the new Ohio-class was vital if SALT I was only the first of many agreements. The United States could not afford to sit and watch the Soviet Union improve its own submarine capabilities without improving its own submarine technology. If the United States held itself back, then it would be at a disadvantage come any follow-up negotiations. Zumwalt, On Watch, 155–56. Spinardi’s assessment tracks with Kissinger and Zumwalt, though he adds the idea that SALT I would not have been ratified if the Ohio-class submarine had not been approved—something that Kissinger and Zumwalt do not address. Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 120, 127. 87. Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 126–28; Langer, “Accurate Submarine,” 49; Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 325–26; Encyclopedia Astronautica, “Trident C-4.” www.astronautix.com/

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The third benefit of “back-fitting” the Trident C4 into the existing fleet of Poseidon-carrying submarines was the C4’s accuracy. Unlike its predecessors, the C4’s RV was stellar-guided and had a larger-yield warhead (100 kilotons). It was therefore a better instrument against hardened targets (though, as McKenzie explains, by the time the Trident I C4 was deployed in 1979, Soviet hardening had surpassed its accuracy).88 Although congressional critics of “counterforce” attacked the Nixon and Ford administrations for any hints that the United States was enhancing accuracy for so-called war-fighting purposes, Schlesinger and Rumsfeld pushed through SLBM RV improvement programs much in the same way that they had with ICBM RVs and with theater nuclear forces. In 1974, Schlesinger established an Improved Accuracy Program. The Trident I C4 was tested with maneuverable (rather than independently targetable) reentry vehicle (MARV) technology—the MK-500 “evader” MARV. This “evading” RV was one hedge against the Soviet Union’s “breakout” from the ABM treaty. Because of its ability to evade, it required fewer RVs per SLBM, which again lowered the missile’s weight and extended its range. The system countered RV attrition through maneuver rather than through sheer numbers. Not only this, but analysts also have argued that MARV technology, particularly the addition of an inertial guidance system on individual SLBM RVs, helped to correct against a common operational problem—reentry error and deflection.89 Schlesinger and Rumsfeld ran into trouble with Congress over both the Trident C4 and D5. Zumwalt explains how, in the summer and fall of 1973, Congress actually used the idea of “back-fitting” Trident C4s into Poseidon submarines as a way of cutting funding to the new Ohio-class submarine. If the C4 improved the survivability of the Poseidon in a more cost-effective manner, then there was no reason for the follow-on submarine. While such attempts failed, the anti-”counterforce” crowd in Congress had greater success against the Trident II D5. The D5 was envisioned as a heavier, very accurate SLBM. It, like the MK-12A, PAVE PEPPER, and the MX, flowed logically from the anticipated MIRV subceiling in SALT II—if the numbers of MIRV ICBMs and SLBMs were to be limited by treaty, then those that remained had to be made lvs/trientc4.htm (accessed January 25, 2008). Also see McKenzie, Inventing Accuracy, 270–75. McKenzie explains (270) how an increase in range was possible in the Poseidon C-3, but only if the number of RVs on the SLBM were decreased or “downloaded.” In the Trident C-4, downloading was unnecessary—it increased range without losing target coverage. 88. McKenzie, Inventing Accuracy, 279. 89. Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 134–35; Langer, “Accurate Submarine,” 51–52.

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to count by being able to house larger numbers of more accurate RVs. Some argue that the D5’s (and for that matter the C4’s) larger yield may have even been a hedge against overestimation in U.S. assessments of its own accuracy. Nonetheless, the D5’s apparent “war-fighting” capability, as well as questions about its necessity in view of the MX, made it a prime target for cuts on Capitol Hill. In 1975 and 1976, the program flailed. Congress cut Trident II research and development funding for two years, while the Pentagon “slipped” its initial operating capability from FY1982 to FY1985 and, finally, to FY1987. The Ford administration’s final budget—FY1978—put forward only $5 million in research and development (but with a major jump to $110 million in FY1979).90 When it came to nuclear force modernization in each part of the triad, as well as modernization of theater nuclear forces, Carter inherited existing programs that were linked to the United States’ quest for survivable, penetrative, and militarily effective RVs in light of improved Soviet capabilities, new nuclear targeting changes, and the need to reconcile extended deterrence requirements with arms control. Given this comprehensive understanding of the overall military-operational context of the 1970s, the next chapter outlines the strategic concepts that Carter used to assess and analyze that very context.

90. Zumwalt, On Watch, 159; McKenzie, Inventing Accuracy, 283–84; Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 146; Federation of American Scientists, “Trident II D-5 Fleet Ballistic Missile,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/d-5.htm (accessed January 25, 2008). Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Personnel Strengths, Part 1: Authorizations, January 25, 1977, 141.

Three The Pre-Presidential Strategic Thought of Jimmy Carter

This chapter analyzes Carter’s pre-presidential strategic thought, or the strategic “intellectual capital” from which he drew during his single term in office.1 It defines strategic thought in reference to the theories and beliefs Carter held regarding the use of military instruments for the achievement of political objectives.2 The concept includes theories and beliefs about the use and control of nuclear weapons, the use of conventional forces to protect American interests abroad, and the physical incarnation of those theories and beliefs as expressed in defense spending and the U.S. defense budget. The examination of Carter’s pre-presidential strategic thought is accomplished by turning to the positions the former Georgia governor and his staff articulated throughout the 1975–1976 presidential campaign. While he did not outline his future administration’s defense policy in a single authoritative speech, interview, or campaign pamphlet, Carter continually discussed a host of defense-related themes on the road to the White House. Because of this, Carter’s pre-presidential strategic thought must be teased out and compiled from different sources, including published campaign speeches and interviews, material submitted by the Carter camp to the 1976 Democratic Party convention platform, personal papers and correspondence, and material from secondary 1. Kissinger warns that the duties of the Oval Office allow little time for concerted reflection and that a statesman brings with him the philosophy, worldview, and convictions which he will tap while in office. Kissinger, White House Years, 56. 2. Clausewitz, On War, 146–47.

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accounts. The chapter divides the future president’s strategic thought into five general categories or dimensions: (a) defense management, general defense spending, and strategic planning; (b) nuclear war, deterrence, and damage limitation; (c) arms control and nuclear weapons modernization; (d) U.S. defense commitments in Western Europe and East Asia; and (e) the growth of the Soviet Navy and the overall U.S.-Soviet naval balance.

Defense Management, General Defense Spending, and Strategic Planning Carter held three main beliefs about defense spending and the defense budget. First, he argued that the budget was higher than it really needed to be and could (and should) be decreased. Second, this excessive spending reflected existing waste and inefficiencies within the Defense Department, not to mention unnecessary weapon platforms. Next, such runaway spending could be cut through a combination of organizational quick fixes, the termination of selected big-ticket military programs, and, importantly, through long-term strategic planning. However, to accomplish these repairs in an effective manner, and also to get a handle over the executive-legislative politics of the defense budget, Carter and his staff felt that the White House had to exert a much greater influence and control over the defense budgeting process as a whole. Executive control over both the defense budget process and long-term defense planning would, in Carter’s mind, result in significant cost savings. A qualification about Carter’s interest in executive-centered defense planning, indeed, about planning in general, is in order. There were two other sources for Carter’s predilection for government planning. Carter had a strong desire to transplant his experience with governmental reorganization from Georgia to the federal level, specifically “zero-based budgeting” and the institutional melding of planning and budgeting functions. Additionally, the theories of Trilateralism and “world order politics”—of which Carter was in agreement—suggested that the global environment of the 1970s was much more complex and interconnected. This, then, necessitated concerted, statesman-level management. Throughout the campaign, Carter harped on what he viewed as Ford’s excessive defense spending. Very early on, Carter stated that significant decreases in the defense budget were feasible. He argued that Ford’s spending could be safely cut by $15 billion. That figure shrank following meetings with defense advisers and members of the Brookings Institution later in 1975, so

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when talking to Brewster Rhodes of the Coalition for a New Foreign Policy in November of that same year, Carter suggested a smaller cut of about $7 to $8 billion. By mid-1976, Carter had again reevaluated this position and had settled upon a cut of 5 percent—a total somewhere between $5 and $7 billion. That was the range suggested in the Democratic Party’s platform, and it remained constant for the duration of the campaign season.3 Carter was insistent that a multibillion-dollar defense budget cut would not adversely affect U.S. national security and he wanted the public to know it. Therefore, in conjunction with his calls for spending cuts, he usually emphasized two additional themes. First, as a candidate, he understood and agreed that one of a president’s main responsibilities was that of ensuring national security, and second, it was possible to cut “fat” rather than “muscle” from the defense budget. On March 15, 1976, in a speech to the Chicago Council on 3. Carter’s $15 billion figure would come back to haunt him. It was used extensively by the Ford White House during the campaign. In the second presidential debate in San Francisco on October 6, 1976, Ford brought it up again and Carter flatly denied it. Carter either forgot or was being dishonest. See Commission on Presidential Debates, Transcript, Second Ford-Carter Debate, October 6, 1976, http://www.debates.org/pages/trans76b.html (accessed February 17, 2008). Ten days later, Carter sent Ford a telegram asking for a retraction of many of Ford’s statements, of which one was the $15 billion cut. At a press conference about the telegram, Carter was asked about the $15 billion claim and stated that he “[didn’t] recall ever making that statement.” Ken Rich, a reporter close to the campaign, reminded him that he had, in fact, made that statement “in San Diego, in a casual exchange.” See House Administration Committee, The Presidential Campaign 1976 I, Part 2 [hereafter Presidential Campaign Part 2], 1018. In response, the Ford camp actually provided evidence for their claim—Carter’s published comments to the Savannah Rotary Club on March 18, 1975, and to the Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1975 (Presidential Campaign Part 2, 1024). Altogether, it is clear that Carter did in fact make the statement, but it is also clear that Ford was trying to score political points off of a Carter position that had clearly been dropped or changed nearly a year earlier. For the Brookings Institution meetings, see Democratic National Issues Conference, November 1975, in House Administration Committee, The Presidential Campaign 1976, vol. 1, Part 1 [hereafter Presidential Campaign Part 1], 86. This author was unable to locate any documents at the Jimmy Carter Library regarding Carter’s 1975 meeting with analysts and defense advisers at the Brookings Institution. Upon request, the staff at Brookings went through Henry Owen’s 1975–1977 memos (Owen had been Carter’s contact at Brookings) but could find nothing about a visit in 1975. The staff indicated that if there was indeed a meeting, it was likely informal. Sarah Chilton, Brookings archivist, email communication with author, August 27, 2002. Carter mentioned an untitled Brookings defense budget study at the Democratic National Issues Conference in November 1975. Later, in a statement on NBC’s Meet the Press in July 1976, Carter stated that they [the campaign] did a “careful analysis a year and a half ago” that came up with the 5 percent figure. “Meet the Press, July 11, 1976,” Presidential Campaign Part 1, 87, 305. For Carter’s mid-1976 position, see U.S. News and World Report, May 24, 1976; Meet the Press, July 11, 1976; Question and Answer session on defense policy outside Pond House, July 27, 1976 [hereafter Pond House Defense Q&A, July 27, 1976]; Hearst Newspapers, July 22, 1976; Carter’s statement to SANE, September 18, 1976—all found in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 202, 305, 356–57, 438, 695. Also see Association for Cooperation in Engineering, October 1976; Armed Forces Journal, October 1976; Carter’s telegram to President Ford, October 16, 1976—all found in Presidential Campaign Part 2, 856, 872, 1018–19.

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Foreign Relations, Carter explained that the “prime responsibility” of the presidency was to ensure America’s national security. To U.S. News and World Report two months later, Carter talked about the $5 to $7 billion cut, adding that “the No. 1 responsibility of any President [was] to guarantee the security of our country.”4 “I would never,” he continued in the magazine, “permit our nation to be subjected to successful attack, threat of attack or blackmail. And I would keep our defense capabilities adequate to carry out a legitimate foreign policy.”5 This formula—with its implicit questioning of the morality of NixonFord-Kissinger foreign policy—was repeated, often word for word, over the course of the campaign.6 Carter’s next “sound bite” formula—trimming military fat instead of muscle—clearly reflected his second belief about U.S. defense spending, namely that waste and inefficiency were to blame for America’s excessive spending. In late 1975, Carter told fellow Democrats that even after sizable defense spending cuts the United States could still enjoy a “tough, muscular, simply organized, effective fighting force.”7 In conjunction with his insistence that the president was ultimately the one responsible for national security, Carter reiterated “fat-trimming” in the defense budget over the course of the following campaign year.8 When giving examples of the kinds of Pentagon waste and inefficiency he had in mind, Carter selected one or more from the following: too many U.S. troops stationed overseas, particularly in South Korea; too many U.S. military bases overseas; too few military trainees per instructor; excessive training periods; an excessively large Pentagon bureaucracy—particularly the numbers of high-ranking officers with large salaries—and a refusal to outsource civilian functions; too many support troops per combat unit; short assignment times,

4. See Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, March 15, 1976; U.S. News and World Report, May 24, 1976—in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 109, 202. 5. U.S. News and World Report, May 24, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 202. 6. Rapid City campaign rally, May 31, 1976; Meet the Press, July 11, 1976—both in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 208, 304; Commission on Presidential Debates, Transcript, Second Ford-Carter Debate, October 6, 1976, http://www.debates.org/pages/trans76b.html (accessed February 17, 2008). 7. Democratic National Issues Conference, November 23, 1975, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 86. 8. See, for instance, Rapid City campaign rally, May 31, 1976; Meet the Press, July 11, 1976; Statement to SANE, September 18, 1976—all in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 208, 304, 695. To SANE, Carter stated that he was “committed to trimming away the fat so that this country has a lean, supple, and muscular defense.” In his Chicago Council on Foreign Relations speech, Carter had combined his two themes into a single statement, “The prime responsibility of any President is to guarantee the security of our nation, with a tough, muscular, well-organized and effective fighting force.” Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, March 15, 1976, in ibid., 109.

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which required too much money for moving allowances; unnecessary weapon systems; cost overruns by defense contractors on weapon systems; and unnecessary U.S. Army Corps of Engineers projects. It was because of these examples of Pentagon “fat” that Carter believed his 5 percent, $5 to $7 billion defense cut was both feasible and safe.9 Carter was particularly concerned over military-bureaucratic wastage. On many occasions he expressed personal frustration with the number of generals, admirals, and their high-ranking support officers. The campaign’s platform proposal argued that the United States currently had more generals and admirals in military service than during World War II. This problem—what he referred to as “grade-creep”—was a main topic of discussion at the postconvention, defense advisory session at Pond House in Georgia. Carter also identified other organizational inefficiencies involving military personnel. Quick assignment rotations not only meant lost time because of transitions between posts but also required additional money spent in transporting families and household items. Soldiers were spending too much time enrolled in training programs, and the training class sizes were too small.10 Of course, such organizational inefficiencies only represented a small fraction of the “fat” targeted by Carter. He and his staff identified other, more expensive culprits such as overseas-based military forces and new weapons programs. Though careful not to malign existing forces or weapons programs as “waste,” he labeled them rather as potentially “unnecessary.” Two issues—the status of ground forces in South Korea and the B-1 penetrating bomber—were big-budget items that were put into this category. Carter’s solutions for excessive defense spending can be organized into three separate categories: organizational quick fixes (mainly personnel restructuring), cuts in high-priced programs, such as the B-1 bomber, and long-term strategic planning and White House control. With respect to the first, Carter believed that once the organizational inefficiencies were identified, most of the

9. Democratic National Issues Conference, November 23, 1975; Face the Nation, March 14, 1976; U.S. News and World Report, May 24, 1976; Rapid City campaign rally, May 31, 1976; Carter’s platform proposal to the Democratic Platform Committee, June 16, 1976, entitled A New Beginning [hereafter A New Beginning]; Meet the Press, July 11, 1976; Hearst Newspapers, July 22, 1976; Pond House Defense Q&A, July 27, 1976; American Legion Annual Convention, August 24, 1976—all in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 86–87, 108, 201–2, 208, 248, 305, 355, 437–38, 513–14. Also see Association for Cooperation in Engineering, October 1976—in Presidential Campaign Part 2, 856. 10. For these references on military-bureaucratic wastage, see Face the Nation, March 14, 1976; Rapid City campaign rally, May 31, 1976; A New Beginning, June 16, 1976; Meet the Press, July 11, 1976; Pond House Defense Q&A, July 27, 1976—all in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 108, 208, 248, 305, 355.

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solutions were relatively obvious. While one could do what one could to limit the number of high-ranking officers, there were other options in the area of human resources. By decreasing training times and increasing trainee class size, the number of required instructors could be cut back, thereby reducing the expense of instructor salaries. It was thought that by extending the length of assignments, the number (and therefore the costs) of family moves might be cut. Moreover, there needed to be sizable reductions in support troops—at one point, Carter remarked that the United States had nearly twice as many support troops to combat units as did the Soviet Union.11 His military “fat” versus “muscle” distinction firmly in mind, Carter was much less detailed when it came to suggesting larger-scale reductions. He insisted the United States had too much manpower and too many bases located overseas; however, except for American forces in South Korea, he was not very forthcoming as to where cuts should be made.12 He made vague statements about reforming the procedural rules for defense contractors, but did not provide his audiences with any specific blueprints for action in that area.13 Besides decreasing the American presence in South Korea, the other large-scale military program Carter wanted to cut back was the B-1 bomber. Carter’s B-1 position, which will be discussed in greater detail later, was inconsistent as well. It evolved over the course of the campaign, sometimes waffling between an allout cut and mere production delays. All in all, rather than provide the American public with a detailed plan for slicing some of the larger military programs, the pre-presidential Carter was more comfortable calling for new studies and assessments to figure out whether the programs were, in fact, necessary, and whether they really “comported” with American foreign policy.14 Finally, Carter suggested that strategic planning and better White House control over the defense budget process would result in increased efficiencies and overall cost savings. Carter had on his mind executive-led grand strategy. Strategic planning had to take into consideration nonmilitary tools such as commerce, information operations, and foreign aid. For effective and costeffective statecraft, each of these had to be brought together into a cohesive,

11. Rapid City campaign rally, May 31, 1976; American Legion Annual Convention, August 24, 1976—in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 208, 514. 12. A New Beginning, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 248. 13. Meet the Press, July 11, 1976; American Legion Annual Convention, August 24, 1976—in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 305, 512. Also see Association for Cooperation in Engineering, October 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 2, 856. 14. A New Beginning, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 248.

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coordinated policy. This very subject, as Carter himself pointed out, was the “major overall objective” of his July 1976 meeting with defense advisers at Pond House—a future Carter White House needed to “coordinate much more clearly the preparation of the overall budget . . . with defense policy.”15 Some political scientists have suggested that executive-level strategic planning exercises, particularly those performed early in an administration, can be used to get all parties “singing off of the same song sheet” policy-wise.16 Such an exercise, if properly managed from the top, becomes one means by which the executive shares his vision and identifies and prioritizes long-range goals, as well as the plans with which to reach them. Strategic planning, therefore, is transformed into a method of executive control over the policy-making bureaucracy. One gets a sense that at least part of Carter’s reasons for emphasizing planning came from this very issue. When questioned by the staff of the National Journal in July 1976 about his Democratic Party platform suggestion of “policy-making machinery that transcend[ed] narrow [bureaucratic] perspectives,” Carter replied that coordination was imperative between economic policy and foreign policy and that such coordination “has got to come from the President, I would say within the structure of the National Security Council . . . or perhaps some other Cabinet structure.”17 As a side note, throughout the campaign Carter extolled the virtues of planning but sometimes called it “strategic” and, on other occasions, labeled it “long-range” planning. The juxtaposition of “strategic” and “long-range” betrays the fact that Carter did not always view the term “strategic” in its pure, classical sense, that is, as the rational and planned use of military means for the attainment of political objectives. He did not, however, completely dismiss this classical rationale either. In fact, he often made mention of an earlier, very classical, strategic planning exercise—the Truman-era joint State-Defense Department study known as NSC-68. It will be recalled that NSC-68 was a reevaluation of American Cold War military strategy which called for large-scale increases in the U.S. defense budget in light of the “shocks of 1949”: the Soviet Union’s first atomic test, the newly formed NATO alliance, and the loss of China. NSC-68 was clearly Carter’s template; he made reference, albeit sometimes obliquely, to the exercise throughout

15. Democratic National Issues Conference, November 1975; Pond House Defense Q&A, July 27, 1976—in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 86, 353. 16. Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Making of American National Strategy, 1948–1988,” 67–68. 17. National Journal, July 17, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 414.

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the campaign. While in the midst of remarks to U.S. News and World Report on the general subject of government planning, Carter was thrown a question about his defense concerns. Immediately, he tied the question back to planning and, specifically, to NSC-68. “I don’t believe,” Carter said, “that our basic strategic interests have been reassessed since 1950.” In his view, NSC-68 had been the last time that the government had attempted a full-scale review of national military strategy, and a follow-up study was in order. Later, once more to U.S. News and World Report, Carter reiterated the point, stating that the United States had not had a “substantive reassessment of strategic deployment since President Truman’s time,” adding that the time was ripe for a Carter-era NSC-68—a largescale review of “non-nuclear weapons and delivery systems” (particularly those in the Far East and Western Pacific) as well as naval planning.18 Strategic, or long-range, planning—the combination of economic, agricultural, diplomatic, informational, and military policies (and budgets) for the purposes of statecraft—would help Carter to eradicate waste in the Pentagon and facilitate desired cuts in the defense budget. He hyped the relationship between planning and cost-effectiveness from the early days of his campaign. Indeed, one of his pet projects was governmental reorganization, particularly the concept of zero-based budgeting and the merging of planning and budgeting departments. As he explained, with zero-based budgeting no line item in a given department’s budget was automatically carried over into the following year; nothing would be considered untouchable or sacrosanct. Carter had introduced zero-based budgeting in Georgia and had made a point to meld the state’s separate planning and budget departments into a single analytical unit.19 Arguably, this had resulted in significant cost savings to the state’s 18. For more on NSC-68, see Ernest May, American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC-68. There is an argument that NSC-68 was great rhetoric, but not ever really put into practice. Marc Trachtenberg, “Making Grand Strategy: The Early Cold War Experience in Retrospect,” 33–40. U.S. News and World Report, May 24, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 201. Carter was incorrect that national strategy had not been reviewed since NSC-68. The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nixon administrations all performed their own national strategic reviews. For the Solarium and NSC 162/2 exercises during the Eisenhower administration, see Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy. For Kennedy’s Basic National Security Policy (BNSP), see U.S. State Department, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963: National Security Policy, vol. 7. For Nixon’s NSSM-3, see Robert Bovey and James Thomason, National Security Study Memorandum 3 (NSSM-3): A Pivotal Initiative in U.S. Defense Policy Development. U.S. News and World Report, September 13, 1976; Armed Forces Journal, October 1976—in Presidential Campaign Part 2, 744, 873. 19. Speech to the National Governors Conference, “Planning a Budget from Zero,” June 1974; U.S. News and World Report, May 24, 1976; A New Beginning—in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 17–23, 203, 243–44.

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budget.20 He often repeated that he had similar plans for the federal government upon reaching the Oval Office. When it came to national security in a future Carter administration, budgeting and strategic planning would march hand-in-hand and (in theory) would result in savings. In addition to expressing his expertise in governmental reorganization and a desire for efficiency, Carter’s interest in strategic planning was also a reflection of his thoughts about the global political-military environment. At the Democratic National Issues Conference in November 1975, Carter explicitly called for the party to acknowledge the heretofore-ignored “interrelationship between economic policy and political policy and military policy.”21 This type of holistic (or grand strategic) thinking was simply realistic in Carter’s mind in light of what he saw as recent, large-scale transformations in international politics. And it is here—in Carter’s belief in the transformation of international politics and, consequently, the need for holistic planning—that one most clearly sees how much of an influence the theories of the Trilateral Commission as well as those of “world order politics” had on Carter’s worldview. Carter’s short-term association with and foreign policy tutelage under the Trilateral Commission is, of course, well-traversed intellectual territory. Carter himself attributed much of his knowledge of foreign policy to his time with the organization, and many of his future advisers were members, particularly his national security triumvirate of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cyrus Vance, and Harold Brown. In short, Carter, following the Trilateral Commission’s line, believed that the Cold War world was rapidly shifting into an increasingly complex but interconnected community because new information and communication technology fostered information sharing and global cooperation—especially among the advanced industrial states of Western Europe, North America, and Japan. Again, this perspective can be traced relatively easily to Trilateralism, and particularly, as Brian Klunk shows, to Brzezinski’s 1970 book, Between Two Ages. It also reflected newly developed ideas by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye about “complex interdependence” and, as Richard Melanson asserts, may have also entered Carter’s strategic thinking through Stanley Hoffman’s concept of “world order politics.” While each of these theories have their peculiar nuances, they share common assumptions about the blending of foreign and domestic issue 20. Robert Novak attacked Carter’s reorganization record as governor of Georgia, arguing that although Carter had consolidated agencies, he had refused to cut payroll. Face the Nation, March 14, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 101–2. 21. Democratic National Issues Conference, November 23, 1975, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 79. He repeated the same sentiment in A New Beginning. Ibid., 245.

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areas, information technology’s “webbing” effect on international relations, the expanding influence of nonstate actors on global politics, and a strong focus on nonmilitary-related security problems (like food, international trade, the environment). In this new context, the primary task of the statesman was “complexity-management”; hence, Carter’s pre-presidential (and as will be shown, presidential) emphasis on coordinated, long-range planning.22

Nuclear War, Deterrence and Damage Limitation It is clear from an analysis of Carter’s campaign speeches and his pre-presidential interviews that his thoughts and beliefs about nuclear war and deterrence fit comfortably within the assured vulnerability model and “traditional U.S. understanding” of nuclear deterrence. Again, the heart of this deterrence model was the assumption that the belief in mutual societal vulnerability was shared by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Each was (theoretically) deterred by the knowledge that should it strike first, its cities, industries, and populations would still be vulnerable to the other side’s surviving retaliatory forces. Carter and his running mate were both proponents of assured vulnerability and assured retaliation. At numerous points during the presidential campaign, 22. The literature about the Trilateral Commission’s influence on Carter’s worldview and his subsequent foreign policy is voluminous. Examples include: Richard Melanson, “Carter, the Cold War and ‘World Order Politics’”; Lawrence Shoup, “Jimmy Carter and the Trilateralists: Presidential Roots”; Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, especially 37–38; Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981, especially 5–7; Brian Klunk, Consensus and the American Mission: The Credibility of Institutions, Policies and Leadership, especially 117–18. For an explicit reference to the Trilateral Commission, see Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, March 15, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 109–19, especially 112–13. Three months later, in a speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York City, Carter did not refer to Trilateralism by name, but used many of the organization’s ideas. See Foreign Policy Association, June 23, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 266–75. The speech was written by Brzezinski and fellow Trilateral colleague Richard Gardner. In a campaign memo written three weeks before the speech, Brzezinski referred to it as “your [Carter’s] forthcoming Trilateral speech.” In meetings with Daniel Moynihan over the Democratic Party platform, Brzezinski used draft material from the Foreign Policy Association speech as well as Carter’s earlier address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. See Memorandum from Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, June, 3, 1976, 1, Brzezinski Donated Material, Trilateral Commission information, Box 6, Zbig Chron File, 5/1/76–12/31/76, JCL. Also see Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 7–8. For a list of the twentysix Carter administration officials who were members of the Trilateral Commission, see Holly Sklar and Ros Everdell, “Who’s Who on the Trilateral Commission,” 91–92. One of Carter’s strongest, Trilateral-influenced speeches was given in Japan. See American Chamber of Commerce in Tokyo, Japan, May 28, 1975, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 68–70. Klunk, Consensus, 117–21. Melanson, “Carter, the Cold War,” especially 144–51. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, “Realism and Complex Interdependence,” 401–21. See Skidmore’s discussion of Carter as complexity manager in “Carter and the Failure of Foreign Policy Reform,” especially 712–14; also Skidmore, Reversing Course, 88–89.

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one finds crystal-clear expressions of the theory’s underlying premise that deterrence arises through the mutual possession of a secure and effective retaliatory force that is able to cause “unacceptable” damage to an opponent’s illprotected population and industry. Carter, a former submariner, continually suggested a dominant role for submarines. For him, the ballistic missile submarine fleet was the key military instrument. Submarines were the “most important strategic element in the entire defense mechanism of our country,” he said to Hearst Newspapers in July 1976.23 It is not a far stretch to describe Carter as a believer in what was known as minimum deterrence. Ever since the creation and deployment of the Polaris system in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S. Navy had touted nuclear submarines as the least vulnerable, and therefore most effective, system for the purposes of assured retaliation or assured second strike. Some naval proponents and defense analysts even went so far as to assert that there could arise a future situation of submarine-only, minimum or “finite” deterrence.24 It appears that Carter agreed with this minimalist position; he remarked that nuclear submarines were an “adequate deterrent”— even a “superb” one.25 Submarines were an “adequate” or “superb” deterrent in Carter’s (perhaps service-biased) mind because of the belief that they packed enough survivable firepower on their own to fulfill assured vulnerability’s deterrent criteria, not to mention the belief that neither country had, nor would have in the future, effective enough damage limitation capabilities to either destroy prelaunched or in-flight SLBMs or protect urban and industrial assets from SLBM attack. Carter’s argument for submarine-only or “minimum” deterrence, then, was directly related to his position on damage-limiting systems. He held that assured vulnerability’s case against damage limitation was correct. Damage limitation was a chimera, and the quest for it was destabilizing. Neither superpower, he insisted, had the ability, or would have the ability in the future, to limit its damage to any strategically relevant degree. As an aside, damage-limiting systems were not the hot-button defense policy issues in 1975–1976 that they were before and would be later. Unlike the ABM debate of 1968–1969 or the intense, partisan warfare that would be waged 23. Hearst Newspapers, July 22, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 438. 24. On the early battle between the Air Force and the Navy over the “finite deterrence” concept, see David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945– 1960,” 56–61. 25. For “adequate deterrent,” see Johns Hopkins University, April 2, 1975; for “superb,” see Hearst Newspapers, July 22, 1976—in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 50, 438.

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in the mid-1980s over the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), damage limitation as a subject in its own right remained well out of the general public’s eye during the Ford-Carter presidential race. Granted, there were those specialists who had continued to carry the torch for the enhancement of U.S. damage limitation capabilities in the wake of the 1972 ABM treaty and who also kept their eyes peeled for possible Soviet violations of the treaty’s restrictions. However, despite the strategic reality that the concepts are intricately connected, damage limitation as a discrete strategic puzzle took a back seat to the more popular topics of arms control and nuclear disarmament. This fact should not, however, lead one to think that damage limitation played an insignificant part in Carter’s pre-presidential thinking about nuclear weapons, war, and deterrence. To reiterate, Carter was convinced that each superpower would always have nuclear submarines and SLBMs left over after an initial strike. The physical security of submarines was all but guaranteed by their ability to hide and maneuver underwater. Consequently, nuclear submarines on both sides could ride out an initial attack more easily than ICBMs or bombers. They could then retaliate, firing off their (albeit less-accurate) missiles into the attacker’s urban and industrial centers—the ultimate deterrent threat according to the theory of assured vulnerability. One specific type of damage-limiting system was strongly disputed by Carter: American and Soviet antisubmarine warfare. “There is no way,” he explained to a group of reporters after the meeting with his defense advisers in late July 1976, “for us to detect or destroy the Soviet Union’s atomic submarines. And neither is there an ability that the Soviet’s [sic] have to detect or destroy ours.” Carter had made similar statements at Johns Hopkins University the previous year. He told students then that “. . . ultimately our major route of protecting this nation’s existence has got to be the nuclear submarine program where, with a submerged platform, we can remain invulnerable to attack, even detection almost.”26

26. The counterarguments to an SLBM emphasis include: (a) it eased the Soviet’s defense problem by allowing Moscow to focus its energies on antisubmarine warfare “breakthroughs”; (b) it did not address the number and vulnerability of submarines that were not out at sea; and (c) it left out the fact that with respect to SSBNs that would be left over after a Soviet attack, SLBM RVs were less accurate and of a lower yield (which meant that they were only good for attacking cities and industries, the very targets that would likely cause escalation). For some, a SLBM-only force was considered a “selfdeterring” force in the face of a Soviet attack. Payne, Nuclear Deterrence, 176–78. Pond House Defense Q&A, July 27, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 357. In July, Carter held two days of defenserelated meetings with advisers at Pond House in Plains, Georgia. The following people attended: Paul Warnke, Cyrus Vance, Paul Nitze, Harold Brown, Jim Woolsey, Walter Slocombe, Lynn Davis, and Barry Blechman. Most descriptions of this meeting focus on Paul Nitze’s disagreements with Brown

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His confidence in the invulnerability of nuclear submarines was unshakable. There was no possibility that this invulnerability would be eroded through damage limitation. Carter said that damage limitation had been impossible “. . . for 15–20 years, since atomic submarines ha[d] been available to both sides.” Because of this, there was “no possibility under the sun” that the United States or the Soviet Union could significantly protect their respective homelands from a retaliatory strike by the other. This was not, however, a situation to lament. As discussed earlier, the absence of effective damage-limiting systems is the key to mutual deterrence in the assured vulnerability theory. Carter admitted as much to the New York Times’s Leslie Gelb in a July 1976 interview on defense issues, announcing that “[t]he inability of either nation to defend itself against a first strike is probably the greatest deterrent to nuclear war.” For Carter, the argument against damage limitation was clear. Each superpower would always have nuclear submarines left over after an initial attack, and he suggested that 60 to 70 percent of U.S. bombers would still be “in the air” as well. In point of fact, Carter thought both sides’ total weapon numbers were so large as to be “overkill.”27 Even with attrition, these leftover platforms were still numerous enough and powerful enough to fulfill assured vulnerability’s societal destruction criteria (which again, according to the theory, is what both superpowers feared most). Carter also expressed concerns about the feasibility of limited nuclear war. He bluntly told Leslie Gelb that he did not think limited nuclear conflict was possible. Escalation, he continued, was apt to be automatic once any nuclear weapons were used.28 He repeated this refrain to different audiences throughout the summer of 1976. To one set of reporters, Carter asserted that it was very unwise to presume that nuclear attacks could be kept from population centers once war started—such a scenario was “possibl[e],” he conceded, but “doubtful.” Moreover, this skepticism was not restricted to Washington; he said that the Soviets believed the same thing. In the same Q&A session, he explained that Soviet statements led him to believe Moscow’s “commitment” to limited

as well as Nitze’s “intens[e]” presentation of his (and T. K. Jones’s) work on the overall nuclear balance and civil defense. Many argue that Nitze lost any chance of working within the administration after the Pond House meeting. Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace, 147–50; Gregg Herken, Counsels of War, 280–81; New York Times, July 27, 1976, A17. Johns Hopkins University, April 2, 1975, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 50. 27. Pond House Defense Q&A, July 27, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 357, 358. New York Times, July 7, 1976, A1, A12. Hearst Newspapers, July 22, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 429. 28. New York Times, July 7, 1976, A1, A12.

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nuclear conflict was (like his own) “doubtful.”29 Neither party, it would seem, could control escalation. And even if the control of escalation was possible, Carter was still horrified by the expected death toll from a limited nuclear exchange. In the press conference following his meeting with defense advisers at Pond House, Carter’s opening remarks about nuclear weapons policy centered on the estimated fatalities from a limited nuclear conflict. As he had on other occasions, he emphasized that the United States could expect nearly ten million deaths from a limited exchange. Any exchange that was contained to Europe would likely be worse; its inhabitants could probably expect the same or probably even higher numbers.30 In the end, Carter thought the precise scope of a nuclear conflict irrelevant. He was convinced instead that there was only one real result from any and all use of nuclear weapons—”holocaust,” “massive destruction,” and “massive mutual devastation.”31

Arms Control and Strategic Systems Modernization Over the course of the race, Carter called for the reduction and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. He insisted that agreements which left out major, bilateral reductions were not indicative of true arms control. True arms control resulted in large numerical cuts, not just freezes and restricted buildups. Carter gave three reasons for his strong support of reductions. First, arms reductions released money for other, nondefense-oriented projects. By reducing their nuclear arsenals, the United States and the Soviet Union could redirect funds into civilian, nonmilitary programs.32 Second, Carter insisted that international tensions decreased in line with the reduction of nuclear arsenals. The former governor ascribed to two popularly held views about the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship. One, any buildup of nuclear weapons was inherently destabilizing due to the action-reaction logic of arms racing, and conversely, any movement

29. Hearst Newspapers, July 22, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 429–30. 30. Pond House Defense Q&A, July 27, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 355. 31. Ibid., 355–56. Later, Carter explained that “[i]n a world where massive mutual devastation is the likely result of any use of nuclear weapons, such strategic forces cannot solely be relied upon to deter a vast range of threats to our interests and the interests of our allies.” American Legion Annual Convention, August 24, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 513. 32. Carter, Keeping Faith, 215; Johns Hopkins University, April 2, 1975, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 50.

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in the opposite direction (toward lower numbers of nuclear weapons) made for a safer and more secure international environment.33 Third and perhaps most importantly, Carter was a nuclear abolitionist. He found the sheer number of nuclear weapons possessed by both sides morally disagreeable.34 Their destructive and apparently indiscriminate power made them objectionable as instruments of statecraft. When taken together with Carter’s perspective on deterrence and limited nuclear war, characterized as it was by doubt of damage-limiting systems, the impossibility of escalation control, and the likelihood of unpalatable numbers of casualties from even a limited exchange, it was only logical—and morally imperative—to Carter that all governments, including the United States, pursue the future goal of abolishing such weapons. The most effective initial step on the abolitionist path, he argued, was numerical reductions. Any arms control agreements that allowed for an overall increase in the total number of weapons was inconsistent with this goal. Carter believed that superpowers could not increase their respective arsenals and expect at the same time to achieve the goal of abolition. For many inside and outside of defense circles, this eliminationist argument was utopian and naive. Nevertheless, it was a serious goal for the former governor. Nuclear abolitionism was prominent from the very beginning of Carter’s presidential campaign. In announcing his candidacy to the National Press Club in December 1974, Carter declared that the ultimate goal of any future U.S. administration was the “eventual elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.”35 And this was not just stump rhetoric. He repeated this call just as strongly more than two years later in his inaugural address.36 Since he believed that reductions, rather than limitations, were the key to future nuclear abolition, Carter spent a great amount of time during his

33. Carter, Keeping Faith, 215. 34. In his memoirs, Carter uses the popular but militarily reductionist “overkill” argument. “It was always obvious,” he writes, “that both nations had far more weapons than would ever be needed to destroy every significant military installation and civilian population center in the lands of its potential enemies, and in the process kill tens of millions—perhaps a hundred million—people on each side.” He adds that “[t]hat horror was constantly on my mind.” Ibid., 212. 35. National Press Club, Washington, D.C., December 14, 1974, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 9– 10. 36. Carter, Keeping Faith, 215; “And we will move this year towards the ultimate goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth,” Inaugural Address of Jimmy Carter, January 20, 1977, http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/inaugadd.phtml (accessed February 17, 2008).

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campaign criticizing the arms control records of his predecessors, particularly President Ford’s. He was especially disappointed by the 1974 SALT II “agreed framework” signed at Vladivostok. Vladivostok, Carter argued many times, was not true arms control. Rather, the “agreed framework” had done exactly the opposite of what should be expected from real arms control. In his memoirs, Kissinger relates the extremely negative reactions that liberal/ defense-left entities such as the Arms Control Association and the New York Times editorial staff had to the SALT II agreed framework.37 As a whole, members of the defense-left insisted that all the agreement had done was to allow the two countries to build up to the new, higher levels which each already planned to reach in the future. After the summit, Ford was pressured by liberal, defense-left senators. During the Senate’s review of the “agreed framework,” Senators Mondale, Edward Kennedy, and Charles Mathias put forward a resolution that supported Vladivostok but at the same time insisted that all future work in arms control would have to address reductions.38 Throwweight and military-operational concerns notwithstanding, the defense-left’s primary focus was on each country’s raw numbers and, occasionally, total explosive power. Using either of these yardsticks, one could then argue the existence of an egregious amount of “overkill.” To the defense-left, Vladivostok had allowed raw numbers to grow and stay much too high for the purposes of international peace and stability. Carter agreed. The summit had been a disappointment. Ford and Brezhnev had allowed the two countries to keep what he saw as unnecessarily and immorally high numbers of nuclear weapons. The “agreed framework,” he argued, was nothing but an arms buildup. In an early campaign speech at Johns Hopkins University, Carter lamented that Vladivostok allowed the United States to increase its arsenal from 10,000 nuclear weapons to 18,000, with the qualification that this total did not include tactical nuclear weapons. Also, under Vladivostok the United States could legitimately increase the number of its MIRV missiles from a current level of 800 up to the 1,320 sub-ceiling. This was a state of affairs that Carter believed to be incompatible with “what the American people are or want to be.” He criticized the planned SALT II ceilings for the rest of his campaign and well into the first months of his own administration. Arms reductions, he asserted, were the “core of détente,” and therefore the limits on weapons established by Ford and Brezhnev in Vladivostok were too high. Unless 37. Kissinger, Renewal, 299. 38. Ibid., 302.

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the ceilings themselves were reduced, he believed that the two governments would provoke a new arms race as they tested and deployed new missile systems and increased their arsenals to reach the new, higher maximums.39 Interestingly, despite his twin concerns over Vladivostok’s high ceilings and the risk of an arms race to reach those ceilings, Carter was unwilling to reject out of hand the use of an intentional threat to increase one’s military forces as a tool in arms control negotiations. To Leslie Gelb, Carter expressed ambivalence toward this “bargaining chip” approach. He remarked that it was not necessarily a good “general principle” to threaten one’s opponent with a buildup in order to get an agreement on ceilings and reductions, but he was nonetheless hesitant to limit a president’s options by discarding the bargaining tactic out of hand.40 What about Carter’s pre-presidential thoughts about the modernization and improvement of the nuclear triad? His position on the B-1 bomber, for example, evolved over the course of the presidential race. Early on, while campaigning in the midst of the B-1 lobbying frenzy, Carter appeared hesitant about coming down too hard on either side of the debate. Nick Kotz tells of a 1975 interaction in Iowa between Carter and Bob Brammer, an anti-B-1 activist working with the American Friends Service Committee. At the time, Carter explained to Brammer that he thought the B-1 was “an exceedingly expensive weapon system.” But instead of dismissing the program altogether, Carter told Brammer that he would have to “look closely” at the issue once he became president so that he could make a reasoned decision on the bomber’s production.41 In early 1976, however, Carter seemed to drop this reticence. He hardened his stance against the bomber in his campaign’s June proposal to the Democratic Party platform. The proposal included a strident attack against the plane,

39. Johns Hopkins University, April 2, 1975, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 46–47. Later that year, Carter stated that levels were increasing from 11,000 to 21,000. See Democratic National Issues Conference, November 23, 1975, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 84. It is unclear where Carter’s figures originated. He was certainly confusing “weapons” with warheads, and as a result he grossly exaggerated the numbers. The United States never made it close to 18,000 warheads. The top year for warhead numbers was 1987 (13,685). From 1974 to 1976, the number grew by 903 (10,195 to 11,098). See National Resources Defense Council, Table of US Strategic Offensive Force Loadings, 1945–2012, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab1.asp (accessed February 17, 2008). In the same November speech, Carter also claimed that the Soviet Union had no MIRVs. He was misinformed here as well. The Soviet Union was testing MIRV missiles by 1973. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 218, 222. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, March 15, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 116. Also see A New Beginning, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 248–49. 40. New York Times, July 7, 1976, A1, A12. 41. Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder, 140.

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dismissing both its rationale and its cost. New weapon systems, Carter explained, had to “comport with our foreign policy objectives.” The proposal continued, “Exotic weapons which serve no real function do not contribute to the defense of this country. The B-1 bomber is an example of a proposed system that should not be funded and would be wasteful of taxpayers’ dollars.”42 Though the platform proposal did not provide arguments in support of this position, it was nonetheless a clear repudiation of the new manned bomber. Granted, there may have been other, more political motives for such a strongly worded platform proposal. To be sure, it was one way to score political points in an area where Ford looked to be in trouble with Congress. Additionally, it was a way for Carter to shore up his hard anti-defense left flank going into the convention.43 This last rationale is given additional credence by Kotz because, as he explains, Carter actually started to moderate himself after the convention was over. The stronger line on the B-1 was needed to placate the defense skeptics on the left, but as Carter saw a need to sway more pro-defense constituencies after the convention, he backtracked.44 Following the example of the bomber’s opponents inside Congress, Carter backed away from a complete rejection of the new weapon system and instead suggested a delay in production. Speaking to Hearst Newspapers in late July 1976, Carter stated that he did not “personally favor the construction of the B-1 bomber at this point” [emphasis added].45 These caveats regarding the production of the B-1 (“not at this point,” “not at this time”) remained consistent throughout the postconvention campaign season; he repeated them until Election Day. In addition to his calls for a delay, Carter threw open the question as to whether the new bomber was, in fact, necessary at all. When asked about B-1 research and development (R&D) after Pond House, he stated that he would support an ongoing R&D program “if it [the plane] should become necessary in the future.” In the same press conference, he added that the plane should be kept “as a potential weapon” but not constructed until “obviously” required. Carter then dropped any such caveats in a later B-1 position paper.46

42. A New Beginning, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 248; also Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder, 152. 43. Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder, 152. 44. Ibid., 157. 45. Hearst Newspapers, July 22, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 438. 46. Other interpretations are possible. For instance, Carter and his advisers wanted to kill the B-1 bomber, but knew that it had to be done in stages (the first stage being delay). He was inconsistent about the B-1 research and development. For example, in late July 1976 he suggested that he would “keep the project [B-1] alive in the research and development stage,” but would not fund production.

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Carter’s public arguments for his position on the B-1 were, and still remain, woefully underdeveloped. Again, the platform proposal is a good example of this. There was a four-part logic to the proposal’s statement regarding the B-1. As a foundation, the statement indicated that U.S. foreign policy objectives and weapon systems had to “fit” together. If they did not, then such systems were considered “wasteful.” The statement then argued that the “exotic” B-1 did not “fit” with U.S. foreign policy goals; hence, it was unnecessary and a misuse of funds.47 What was missing was the strategic explanation of exactly why the B-1 was not a proper “fit” with American foreign policy. The usual focal point instead was the bomber’s price tag. To the antinuclear group SANE, Carter tied his personal opposition to the bomber to what he identified as runaway defense costs.48 Years later, ruminating upon the importance of the B-1 during his campaign, Carter again chose to highlight employment and costs instead of strategy. He described the tensions between the number of jobs that the B-1 program created, the money it took to create each of those jobs, and the program’s overall costs. Those in favor of the new manned bomber, remarked Carter in his memoirs, had done a splendid job at highlighting the local-level employment issues, “[b]ut I knew that it took more than $1 million in taxpayer money to create each job in the B-1 program . . .” Moreover, he envisioned that the overall costs of the bomber would undoubtedly run in excess of $100 million per plane.49 It was obvious, then, that defense budget cuts and employment were major factors for Carter, but the strategic and military-operational issues (such as the role of the B-1 in deterrence, actual war fighting, and arms control) were often left out of the equation. The public record is nearly silent when it comes to arguments in support of Carter’s B-1 position that address strategy. The Pond House news conference on defense is one public statement where strategy did rear its head with respect to the B-1, albeit in a brief and confused manner. During the conference, Carter publicly acknowledged his agreement with Mondale’s assessment of the B-1. The newly designated vice presidential candidate had just explained to reporters that he supported the new bomber in

Ibid.; also see Pond House Defense Q&A, July 27, 1976; Statement to SANE, September 18, 1976; and Campaign Position Paper on the B-1—in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 360, 695–97. 47. A New Beginning, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 248. 48. “I recognize that spending for new weapons systems can develop a momentum of their own. That’s why I have made it clear that I oppose the production of the B-1 bomber at this time,” Statement to SANE, September 18, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 695–96. 49. Carter, Keeping Faith, 81.

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Congress because he believed that the United States needed an “assured retaliatory force.”50 Mondale continued: “. . . for example, last year I voted for the B-1 bomber, not because I was for that particular bomber, but because I felt that it made a lot more sense to follow on with an advanced sophisticated bomber that was maneuverable than it was to proceed on a publicly acknowledged policy of counterforce which I think inevitably puts a hair trigger on nuclear warfare, and scares the Russians—as does their technology scare us.”51 Mondale’s opinion of the B-1 was as a second-strike retaliatory system, as contrasted with a counterforce “policy.” This was a peculiar distinction. Granted, a bomber’s slower speed made it easier to detect and defend against than a ballistic missile, which meant that it was less effective for a surprise first strike. But the B-1 was still very much a “counterforce” system—it would be used to hunt and destroy military (especially mobile) targets.52 Looking closely at Mondale’s explanation, it is clear that he used “counterforce” as shorthand for quick hard-target attack or the ability to preempt. In short, Mondale, and Carter by his own verbal assent during the same news conference, viewed the B-1 as the better of two evils when compared with other capabilities and policies that they believed might allow the United States the option for a preemptive strike (or what might be convincing enough for the Soviet Union to believe that the United States had such a capability). Hence, a new manned, penetrating bomber was not as bad as a “counterforce” policy because—again, fitting within the assured vulnerability framework—a slower, detectable bomber was not as likely to promote crisis instability. Like its connection to deterrence, the B-1’s relationship to arms control was not expounded by Carter in great detail. It appears that he might have had the new bomber in mind as a bargaining chip in SALT II negotiations with Moscow. As mentioned above, Carter claimed that even though its production should be delayed, the bomber might still be kept as a “potential weapon.” Taken alone, this comment is wide open for interpretation. However, it immediately followed and preceded comments he made on arms control and SALT II. The B-1, Carter said outside Pond House, was a “complicated question” that involved not only the bomber itself but also existing aircraft (the B-52 and FB111), cruise missiles, the Soviet Backfire bomber, and the ongoing SALT II process. Suggesting that the new bomber might be retained as a potential 50. Pond House Defense Q&A, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 358. 51. Ibid. 52. One of the B-1’s intended (and most difficult) missions was second-strike counterforce attacks against road and rail mobile missile launchers. Colin S. Gray, email correspondence, August 20, 2004.

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weapon, Carter finished his comments on arms control by stating that he “personally [would] like to see all weapon systems that are capable of delivering nuclear arms [of which the B-1 was an example] included in the SALT talks, including the Backfire and the cruise missile.”53

U.S. Defense Commitments to Western Europe and East Asia In large part, Carter’s thinking on regional military security was informed by and ran parallel to his Trilateral Commission/”world order politics”inspired worldview. Since in Trilateralism the new, complex world required enhanced political-economic cooperation between the three advanced industrial areas of North America, Western Europe, and Japan, it was only natural that their military security was intertwined as well.54 The United States’ own physical geography was also an important factor. In one of the main foreign policy addresses during the campaign, Carter asserted that the United States’ geography made it “both an Atlantic and a Pacific power” and, because of this, American national security was “inseparable” from that of Western Europe and Japan.55 Regarding the first, Carter focused his attention on the current state of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe; the connection between conventional conflict, nuclear war, and deterrence; and potential avenues of NATO military-operational improvement. In the case of East Asian security, Carter assured Japan of continued military support, called for a reevaluation of U.S. force levels, including nuclear weapons, in South Korea, and reiterated America’s protection of Taiwan. As a believer in assured vulnerability, Carter was faced with one of the theory’s main drawbacks when it came to the possibility of conflict in and over Europe. The framework had little to offer the practitioner in the way of making sure that an opponent was unable or unwilling to escalate (or threaten to 53. Pond House Defense Q&A, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 361. 54. The Trilateral Commission’s breakdown of world power into three centers was actually not all that new. Applying the geopolitical theories of Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman at the beginning of the Cold War, George Kennan identified five centers of power—the United States, Japan, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and Central Europe. The Trilateral Commission focused its attention on the political-economic relationship between the three most industrially advanced of those five. For Kennan’s geopolitical worldview, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, 30–31. For the influence of Mackinder and Spykman on postwar geopolitics (and on Kennan), see Geoffrey R. Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890–1987, 127–42. 55. Foreign Policy Association, June 23, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 271.

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escalate) for advantage, or ensuring that one was able to do the same for oneself in order to gain advantages. The first was known as escalation control; the second, escalation dominance.56 Logically, of course, the two are related— effective escalation dominance grants the ability to control an opponent’s escalation. Recall, however, that in assured vulnerability, once any nuclear weapons were used, escalation to all-out destruction was considered inevitable and automatic.57 How, then, did one keep one’s nuclear-armed opponent from using whatever weapon was available in his arsenal once the going got tough in a conflict? The separation of nuclear from conventional conflict, the division of nuclear and conventional deterrence, and the focus on reducing conventional NATO-Warsaw Pact asymmetries, either through negotiations like Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) or by building up and improving NATO forces, only finessed that problem. None of them solved it. If the nuclear side of the problem was left unaddressed, one was still faced with the issues of escalation dominance and escalation control. Indeed, if one could not control an opponent’s escalation by believably threatening to escalate at all points—up to and including the final, nuclear level (and in the assured vulnerability framework, this last one was deemed impossible and irrational)—then there were questions as to whether any level of conflict could be deterred. Pre-presidentially, Carter addressed the problem of escalation in a conventional European war not by calling for improvements to American long-range nuclear forces, but rather by suggesting two other options. First, he argued that closer conventional symmetry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was (or would be) enough to convince the Soviet Union that an attack on Western Europe was futile, which therefore negated the need for movement up to the nuclear level. Second, if for some reason the existing balance was actually not enough, Carter suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union could sign a no-nuclear-use pledge. Such an agreement would serve as a hedge if conventional symmetry failed to keep the parties from considering escalation. Carter often referred to the two in tandem, even though the former relied upon a faith in the escalation-stopping power of the conventional balance whereas the latter was based firmly upon an acknowledgment that that same faith was untenable. Seemingly convinced that a closer match between NATO and the Warsaw Pact at the conventional level was (probably) enough to keep the peace, Carter

56. For a discussion of these two concepts, as well as Herman Kahn, the strategist behind them, see Lawrence Freedman, “Flexible Response and the Concept of Escalation,” 132–36. 57. Payne, Nuclear Deterrence, 62–68.

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was inconsistent about the state of each side’s conventional forces. On some occasions during the campaign, Carter said that NATO’s forces were already strong enough to make the Soviet Union think twice about a move west. “There was general agreement yesterday,” Carter said to reporters outside Pond House, “and I think it is one that our nation’s leaders have assumed for a long time, that we do have that sort of combined strength [in order to stop Soviet Union from thinking it could successfully attack] in Western Europe.”58 At other times, however, he was not so adamant. Both prior to and after the July 1976 Pond House meeting, Carter told audiences of the stark asymmetries in Central Europe. The week before, Carter had stated that “we can’t equal the Soviet Union now in the number of troops or tanks or airplanes in Europe, and never have since the Second World War was over,” while a month later, the former governor warned American veterans that NATO had to “increase its combat readiness and adapt its forces to new military technology if it [was] to offset steady improvements in Warsaw Pact forces.”59 Though one could make the argument that Carter’s thinking was that NATO’s forces were strong enough to do the job but yet could always be improved, his emphasis on NATO militaryoperational modernization throughout the campaign seems to belie his claim that there was enough existing balance to convince the Soviet leadership that conflict would be too costly. And in the event that the existing balance was not enough to keep a European conflict from erupting, there was for Carter an alternate way of controlling escalation during that conflict—a global or mutual no-nuclear-use (conventional-only) pledge. “I think that what the Soviet Union and we both would prefer,” said Carter after Pond House, “is a general understanding by the world, including us, that any altercation in any region would be settled by nonnuclear forces.” Later in the same session, Carter again referred to a “mutual commitment along with the Soviet Union to avoid using atomic weapons at all.”60 Deterrence, then, would be based upon conventional forces, and a conventional-only pledge would be used to control escalation in case deterrence failed. Interestingly, while proponents of assured vulnerability like Carter dismissed the military-operational characteristics of nuclear weaponry as irrelevant to deterrence, Carter was quite keen to remark that the combination of a conventional-only pledge and conventional-based deterrence meant that in 58. Pond House Defense Q&A, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 359. 59. Hearst Newspapers, July 22, 1976; American Legion Annual Convention, August 24, 1976—in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 429, 513. 60. Pond House Defense Q&A, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 359.

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order to deter, NATO’s military-operational capabilities were important and had to be competitive.61 Nevertheless, Carter was no less ambivalent about the conventional-only pledge itself. In fact, he was quite unwilling to discount publicly the use of nuclear preemption. When questioned as to the circumstances in which, as president, he might launch a nuclear first strike, Carter replied that while he would not share in detail how and when he might use nuclear weapons, he could say that he would use them “if [he] was convinced that the security or existence of our own nation was threatened.” In the same newspaper interview, Carter talked about the long-standing agreements with European allies that committed the United States “to the balance of power being maintained with nuclear weapons as a major factor.”62 This, naturally, contradicts the very nature of a conventional-only pledge—one cannot agree to eschew the use of nuclear weapons and then hold out the possibility of using them for the purpose of preemption. In his campaign, Carter offered four solutions for NATO’s ills: more integration of new technology, improved cooperation and military administration, manpower adjustments, and continued participation in negotiations over mutual force reductions. Additionally, he suggested all four needed to be addressed within the context of strategic planning, particularly through a new NATO strategic review. Air defense and anti-tank systems were areas ripe for the integration of high technology, and Carter looked to newly developed, precision-guidance technology and miniaturization for a way that the NATO alliance might trump the Warsaw Pact’s military-operational advantages. New technology, he told audiences, “was changing the face of land warfare” and could counter Soviet/Warsaw Pact advances in tactical air and armor. Carter also fell back on his theme of better defense management. He suggested, as he had about the Pentagon, that NATO could gain from targeted administrative overhauls. The alliance, he argued, had to look closely at the way that it “shar[ed] responsibilities.” There were outstanding disagreements about equipment stockpiling, as well as standardization among the different national entities within the alliance, that had to be settled.63 Alongside such adminis61. American Legion Annual Convention, August 24, 1976; Associated Press, September 17, 1976— in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 513, 776–77. 62. Hearst Newspapers, July 22, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 429. In the same interview, Carter stated that “he couldn’t imagine” using nuclear weapons in Europe without obtaining the approval of Germany, Austria, “and perhaps France.” 63. Military administration is defined as “the activities of military preparation that eventually provide suitably armed forces ready to be moved by the logisticians so that the generals can exercise com-

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trative quick fixes, Carter added a third solution—that of shifting around existing manpower and increasing the United States’ manpower contribution. The redeployment of manpower was one of two decidedly administrative prescriptions for NATO that Carter gave in an interview with L’Express in late August 1976. Carter told the French news magazine that alongside standardization, NATO had to think seriously about redeployments as another way of keeping strong and competitive. (The two nonadministrative ideas suggested to L’Express were, respectively, weapon modernization and improved diplomacy with others outside the alliance).64 Although Carter did not offer L’Express details on how many or which forces would need to be moved around, a month later he at least shared from whence the idea came. As with his views on the need to integrate new high-technology weapons for conventional conflict in Europe, it is likely that Carter’s thoughts on manpower redeployment as a strength multiplier also came in large part from the work of former Kennedyera Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Maxwell Taylor, particularly Taylor’s book Precarious Security. Carter had already told the Associated Press that he was in agreement with Taylor’s recommendations when it came to the use of high technology in NATO’s defense. Now he added that he also agreed with Taylor’s argument that as one component out of many, “better deployment of existing manpower” would go a long way in assisting NATO’s defense of Western Europe without having to resort to the use of nuclear weapons.65 A related issue was the deployment of NATO reserves. Earlier, Carter had indicated that restructuring, or at least some new thinking about reserve structure, was needed for the alliance to ensure its rapid entrance into the theater of operations.66 Carter was far less certain when it came to the issue of increasing, or, for that matter, decreasing America’s contribution of manpower to Europe. In Carter’s perspective, the number of U.S. servicemen attached to NATO was intimately tied to the state of U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations and the overall notion of “equivalence.” In the same Associated Press interview, Carter said that he was mand,” of which there are three subcategories: “recruitment, training and armament”; Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, 34. Foreign Policy Association, June 23, 1976; American Legion Annual Convention, August 24, 1976—in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 271–72, 513. Also see Associated Press, September 17, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 2, 776–77. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the application of high technology to NATO was one of the underlying ideas for what William Perry, looking back over the late 1970s, has labeled the “offset strategy.” Pond House Defense Q&A, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 354. Foreign Policy Association, June 23, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 271–72. 64. L’Express, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 545. 65. Associated Press, September 17, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 2, 776–77. 66. Foreign Policy Association, June 23, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 272.

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not going to adjust force levels “for the foreseeable future.” Instead, “when we can move with the Soviet Union to reduce atomic weapons, I would be willing to increase ground forces or conventional forces if necessary—if that is what it took to give us equivalent strength.”67 Equivalence was Carter’s standard for making adjustments to the level of contributions—whether adjusted upward or downward. If both sides reduced the number of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, Carter’s logic dictated that the United States and NATO would need to increase conventional forces to maintain “equivalent strength” and therefore deterrence. However, it was also possible in Carter’s view to decrease troop levels—so long as NATO continued to be as strong as it was and “equivalence” was thereby maintained.68 The fourth and final NATO fix was that of negotiating mutual force reductions. If the United States could convince the Soviet Union to cut the local conventional asymmetry, then NATO was thought to have a better chance of countering, and therefore deterring, a Soviet move west without “going nuclear.” The Soviet Union, however, was not passive in the face of such attempts and (as with negotiations over nuclear arms) worked to secure its own security interests by requiring any reductions to be mutual and “balanced” instead of being focused solely on the Soviet side. Carter’s main campaign statement on MBFR came in his speech to the Foreign Policy Association. For him, MBFR was a NATO fix and a key facet of European security. Although he said that the “balanced” requirement of the negotiations meant continued “complica[tions],” anything that cut the conventional force asymmetry in Central Europe made the conventional-only defense of Western Europe that much more easier and feasible.69 These fixes were all to be done in the context of strategic planning and a new NATO strategic review. Carter insisted that NATO was long overdue for a reevaluation of its strategy—one “had not been done since 1967.” Here, Carter makes reference to NATO’s acceptance of MC 14/3, the strategy document for “flexible response.”70 The review would ideally address other problematic issues 67. Associated Press, September 17, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 2, 777. 68. Ford and Carter were asked a set of identical questions by Reader’s Digest in October 1976. Their responses were printed in the magazine as a running debate of sorts. Ford indicated that he had no plans for removing troops from Western Europe, while Carter gave a qualified response, stating that he would not cut forces “except in an evolutionary way” and only if “NATO defense was equal to or better than it is now.” Reader’s Digest, October 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 2, 991. 69. Foreign Policy Association, June 23, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 272. 70. Ibid. For the reference to 1967, see Pond House Defense Q&A, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 354. For an overview of MC 14/3, see Richard Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How the Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War, 169–90.

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like those of intelligence and perhaps solve the question as to whether a conflict in Europe would be a long or short one.71 Much depended upon a conclusion as to the latter; a war’s anticipated duration affected decision-making in all manner of subjects, including logistics (how much materiel to stockpile, how much to emphasize airlift versus sealift), mobilization, the role of sea power (how much of an influence would naval forces have on a short continental conflict), force configuration (NATO’s need to deploy its forces differently if it thought that the war would be a long one), and nuclear use. A strategic review and strategic planning would go a long way toward answering these and other questions and, at the same time, would ensure that any fixes would be done cost-effectively. As a last aside, Carter also pointed out that the United States and NATO had other offsets to the Warsaw Pact’s conventional force advantages along the Central Front. He offered four. First, hearkening back to the “unequal aggregates/ offsetting asymmetries” arms control argument, Carter said that NATO’s advances in high-tech weaponry went far in balancing out the Warsaw Pact’s numbers. Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States’ geography also afforded it secure borders. In contrast, the Soviet Union faced NATO in the west and China in the east. As U.S.-Chinese relations improved, NATO reaped the benefit. China’s forces could (in theory) be used to pin down Soviet forces needed for reinforcement in Central Europe. Third, America’s access to the sea gave it advantages in movement that were unavailable to, or at least more difficult for, the largely land-locked Soviet Union. Lastly, the two alliances had a “cooperation asymmetry.” The Soviet Union’s allies had been taken by force, whereas NATO was a voluntary organization. Carter argued that if it came to war, NATO would be served by this fact. Not only would the Warsaw Pact come face-to-face with NATO military forces, but the Soviet Union would also have to factor in civil uprisings, sabotage, and the activity of underground movements.72 Turning to East Asia, Japan was an integral part of the Trilateral Commission’s vision for world order, so it is not surprising to see that Carter took great pains to reassure Tokyo that he considered Japanese security to be an extension of American security. One notes, however, a distinct lack of similarly strong 71. Foreign Policy Association, June 23, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 271–72. While Carter was careful to say that there was not yet any agreement over the duration of a European conflict, he had put forward his own position earlier in the same speech. He believed that the Warsaw Pact was set up for “an all-out conflict of short duration and great intensity.” 72. American Legion Annual Convention, August 24, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 512. Carter’s discussion of the “trustworthiness” of U.S. allies in Europe in contrast to the Soviet Union’s has been taken as a back-handed way of addressing the “cooperation asymmetry” issue.

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statements from the former governor regarding America’s commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. This undoubtedly reflected both the thawing of relations between the United States and China under Nixon and Ford, as well as Carter’s own desire for diplomatic normalization to occur on his watch. Most of Carter’s focus on East Asian defense during the campaign, however, was not centered on either Japan or Taiwan, but on the Korean peninsula and the overall level of American forces deployed there. Indeed, South Korea was the arena for two of Carter’s most contentious campaign positions. Convinced that the threat to South Korea was changing, Carter called for a sizable withdrawal of U.S. ground forces and the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the peninsula. By the mid-1970s, Japan, like West Germany, had become an international economic force and was considered a pillar in Trilateralism’s three-pronged economic order. Japan’s geographic vulnerability to China and the Soviet Union, together with its economic power, made it an obvious target in a regional and global conflict. Seeing this vulnerability in light of three major events of the 1970s—America’s withdrawal from Vietnam (coupled with Nixon’s Guam Doctrine),73 the softening of U.S.-Chinese relations, and the expansion of the Soviet Union’s blue-water navy—Carter wanted to reassure Japan that the United States would remain steadfast in both its friendship and its commitment to defense. He did this in three ways. Most importantly, he emphasized that there would be no changes to the military relationship when he took office. “The security of Japan,” Carter told a Tokyo audience very early on in his campaign, “is vital to the United States and we will maintain our commitment to [its] defense.”74 He made it clear that under his administration the level of U.S. forces stationed on the Japanese mainland and Okinawa would not be cut without extensive bilateral “dialogue,” and not unless it was desired by both the Japanese government and people.75 Carter also made sure that Japan understood that the United States (and more importantly, he) was fully aware of Japan’s peculiar vulnerability in the energy sector, telling one television interviewer that Japan

73. The “Guam Doctrine” is also called the “Nixon Doctrine.” It was announced by Nixon in July 1969 and was organized around the idea that the United States would continue to support its regional allies, particularly in Asia, but in cases where such allies were under threat by a nonnuclear power, they would have to provide the lion’s share of manpower. Kissinger, White House Years, 223–25. 74. American Chamber of Commerce, May 28, 1975, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 68. 75. Ibid. Also see Foreign Policy Association, June 23, 1976; Pond House Defense Q&A; American Legion Annual Convention, August 24, 1976—all in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 271, 354, 513.

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imported about 98 percent of its oil and that if the Arab states were to engage in an embargo, then Japan would bear a huge cost. Japan therefore had to be protected against warfare in which an oil embargo was used as a weapon or against military operations aimed at cutting off its oil supplies.76 Finally, Carter talked up Trilateralism. He insisted upon the construction of a much stronger relationship between the advanced industrial states of North America, Japan, and Western Europe. This partnership would, in the Trilateral view, provide a unified political-economic front against noncapitalist and revisionist states. Japan could rest in the knowledge that its security was tied closely together with the security of other industrial powers. Carter was less forceful about the defense of Taiwan. He did not go into much detail as to how exactly the United States would continue to protect the Taiwanese government in light of continuing U.S. rapprochement with Beijing. The United States had, of course, agreed to come to Taiwan’s defense early in the Cold War; however, the pull of diplomatic normalization was making that stance much more difficult. Carter saw normalization as an “ultimate goal” but very well understood that with the Sino-Soviet split and the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam, a closer relationship with China had much larger grand strategic effects. Yet, Carter was still unwilling to brush aside America’s security guarantee. “I wouldn’t go back on the commitment that we’ve had to assure that Taiwan is protected from military takeover,” Carter promised to an audience in Kansas City in October 1976, “[b]ut I would like to see us obtain from the PRC [People’s Republic of China] a pledge that there would be no military reaction against Taiwan.” Carter had spelled out such a pledge back in August, stating that he wanted “assurances” that Taiwan would be safe from “military persuasion” and “domination” by the PRC. Without such a pledge, he said that he would be “reluctant” to drop the defense commitment.77 The most contentious position Carter held regarding East Asian security, however, was over U.S. forces in South Korea. In short, Carter called for a significant reduction of American military strength on the peninsula. Carter’s stance on the U.S. defense commitment to Seoul is best understood as reevaluation, reconfiguration, and, with respect to tactical nuclear weapons, removal. 76. American Chamber of Commerce, May 28, 1975; Meet the Press, July 11, 1976—in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 70, 306. 77. Foreign Policy Association, June 23, 1976; Time, August 2, 1976—in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 271, 447. In the Time article, note the use of hedging language with the term “reluctant.” Carter did not say that he would, in fact, end it. Kansas City Q&A, October 16, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 2, 1020.

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The first two, reevaluation and reconfiguration, worked hand in hand. In the era of superpower negotiation and the thawing of U.S.-China relations, Carter believed it was possible to think seriously about removing U.S. forces from South Korea. Prior to the July 1976 convention, Carter told television journalist Bill Moyers that he would like to see the removal of “all of our troops and land forces” from South Korea over a period of a few years. William Gleysteen, Carter’s future ambassador to South Korea, has explained that Carter considered this course of action desirable in large part because of the repressive character of South Korea’s domestic political environment. Indeed, as Gleysteen reports, throughout 1976 Democratic members of Congress, particularly Senator Ted Kennedy and Representative Don Fraser, worked hard to pressure the Ford administration over U.S. military support to the South Korean government. Carter subscribed to this as well, suggesting that the United States “need[ed] to let South Korea know that we’re disgusted by its internal repression and that it hurts our ability to continue our commitment.”78 As with the B-1 bomber, however, Carter’s position on the reconfiguration of U.S. troops in South Korea evolved as the presidential campaign progressed. Earlier, Carter suggested full withdrawal. However, when pressed about the removal of military units from the peninsula immediately prior to (and after) the convention, the forces he slated for withdrawal were exclusively ground forces. Over time, said Carter, ground forces could be safely removed so long as there remained “adequate” tactical air coverage, the South Korean infantry continued to remain superior to the North’s, and the United States built up and enhanced South Korea’s armored units. He also made sure to emphasize that all withdrawals would be done over an extended period (four to five years, though earlier, in talking with Bill Moyers, it had been three to four) and only after full public disclosure, “consultation,” and agreement with South Korea and Japan.79 78. Public Broadcasting Service, May 6, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 171. William Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Crisis in Korea, 17, 21–22. In 1976, Gleysteen was a senior staff member to the Ford NSC on East Asia. After the election, he was asked to join Richard Holbrooke’s staff in the State Department, and in 1978 he became Carter’s ambassador to South Korea. Foreign Policy Association, June 23, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 271. 79. Carter referred to “all of our troops and land forces” when speaking with Moyers in May 1976. However, in the Foreign Policy Association speech a month later, Carter specifically said “ground forces.” Public Broadcasting Service, May 6, 1976; Foreign Policy Association, June 23, 1976; also Pond House Defense Q&A, July 27, 1976—all in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 171, 271, 354. See also Reader’s Digest, October 1976, and Kansas City Q&A, October 16, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 2, 991, 1020. Strangely, Gleysteen argues that the issue of U.S. forces in South Korea was not a major issue between the convention and the election. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, 17. He is simply

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Finally, there was the issue over whether to remove tactical nuclear weapons deployed on the peninsula. Carter asserted that the 600-plus weapons had to go. He gave two reasons. First, there was the problem of their vulnerability in wartime. In the event of a North Korean invasion, Carter was very concerned that the tactical nuclear weapons would quickly fall into enemy hands. Although it might be argued that in the event of an invasion, the weapons would probably be used before they were captured, Carter’s adherence to assured vulnerability also meant that he believed that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a limited conflict invited escalation. Since they were vulnerable and (under assured vulnerability thinking) unusable, the best course of action was removal. And though there were those who believed that the removal of nuclear weapons from South Korea would pressure Japan into becoming a nuclear power itself, Carter brushed aside these concerns, stating that such a scenario was unlikely.80

The Growth of the Soviet Navy and the U.S.-Soviet Naval Balance Carter expressed great concern over the expansion and modernization of the Soviet blue-water navy and the effects of that expansion on U.S. and NATO defense policy. He explained to audiences around the country that while the United States had been fighting in Vietnam, the Soviet Union had been busy building up and enhancing its naval capabilities. Soviet numerical preponderance, he suggested, could very easily erode the United States’ ability to exert and maintain sea control in periods of crisis or war. Carter drew attention to strategic problems of sea control, stating that the “rapid escalation” of the Soviet Navy in the early 1970s was aimed at denying the United States access to and control over its sea lanes of communication. Once a conflict or international crisis flared, Carter insisted that the Soviet Union could use its quantitative, and even some of its qualitative, advantages in a number of ways. These included the disruption of the United States’ ability to transport military units across water (like blocking the transatlantic reinforcement of NATO forces, which could shorten the length of a NATO/Warsaw Pact war and turn it in the Soviets’ favor); the

incorrect. All of the above-referenced comments, save to Moyers and the Foreign Policy Association, occurred after the convention and during the main thrust of the campaign. Based upon this author’s reading of the evidence, the removal of American forces from South Korea was very much a major issue up to November 1976. 80. Kansas City Q&A, October 16, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 2, 1020.

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cutting of the United States’ oil and raw minerals supplies (or, for that matter, NATO’s or Japan’s as well); an attack on U.S. trade by sea; or the application of pressure against America’s more vulnerable, regional allies (such as Israel or Japan). By focusing its newly expanded fleet on the mission of “sea denial,” the Soviet Union could (in war or crisis) turn North America’s own geography against itself.81 Though these sea denial scenarios flowed logically from the Soviet Union’s naval expansion and the resulting force disparities, Carter nonetheless maintained a relaxed view of the motivations underlying the Soviet naval buildup. He did not contest the fact of Soviet numerical preponderance. He was just unconvinced that the Soviets meant war by it. In a printed debate with Ford in Reader’s Digest in October 1976, Carter suggested, “[t]he Soviets have made an extraordinary increase in naval strength in order to extend their influence throughout the world. But I don’t think it necessarily means a commitment toward belligerency. It may be that they have decided that, in the absence of war, their emphasis should be on influence through peaceful means and the assertion of military strength.” Later, in the same forum, he bluntly concluded: “. . . I don’t think that they are making their naval build-up with plans to start a war.”82 Even though it can be demonstrated that the two are intimately connected, it appears Carter believed that Soviet “influence-seeking” by way of an expanded navy could be distinguished from war preparation. He kept the two separated in his own strategic thought, arguing for a less martial interpretation of the naval imbalance. Occasionally, Carter even seemed to lapse into apologia—at one point in the campaign, he suggested that the Soviet Union needed more naval units than the United States as a result of its peculiar geography and coverage requirements.83 Less troubled over the Soviet Union’s ultimate reasons for expanding its blue-water fleet yet concerned about the effects that its expansion might have on U.S. sea control, Carter offered a number of future naval policy ideas. Once more, his first thought concerned the need for strategic planning. He told the Armed Forces Journal in October 1976 that a comprehensive review of Ameri-

81. For a definition of sea denial, see Sam Tangredi, “Sea Power: Theory and Practice,” 123. For Carter’s discussion of the “rapid escalation” of the Soviet Navy, see Hearst Newspapers, July 22, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 438. Also see Democratic National Issues Conference, November 23, 1975; speech in Elizabeth, New Jersey, June 6, 1976 [regarding the relationship between sea control, Israeli security, and the Eastern Mediterranean]—both in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 87, 219. 82. Reader’s Digest, October 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 2, 991. 83. Hearst Newspapers, July 22, 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 438.

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can naval strategy was long overdue; the last such review to have been performed, he argued, was done in 1950—another reference to NSC-68.84 Second, ostensibly in order to counter Soviet capabilities and plans, he emphasized the need for increased mobility and maneuverability. He kept his own mind as to whether the best method of propulsion for surface ships was nuclear or nonnuclear—a debate that some argue helped to keep the United States from immediately increasing its own force so as to counter the Soviet Union’s numerical advantage.85 But he was not at all shy about his preference for smaller, quick surface vessels (as opposed to larger and slower aircraft carriers) as well as for fast-attack submarines.86 Third, Carter pushed for a stronger, U.S.-flagged merchant fleet. Due to North America’s physical geography and the cost effectiveness of water transport, oceans are the primary carrying routes for U.S. imports and exports, not to mention for the movement of military equipment to Eurasian, Middle Eastern, or Asian theaters. In a position paper released by the campaign, Carter argued that the United States could not risk economic dependence, especially in time of war, upon foreign-flagged merchant vessels. A U.S.-flagged fleet would ensure the free flow of goods to and from the United States in the event foreign-flagged shipping was attacked or else pressured not to deliver to North America. Because of the national security consequences of merchant shipping, Carter argued that a national maritime policy was required. One additional component of this national maritime policy would be the creation of a maritime adviser to the National Security Council.87 While they are not mentioned at all in the position paper, it is not hard to imagine that Carter’s desire for a more robust, U.S.-flagged merchant fleet was related to two other issues: the utility of the Soviet Union’s own merchant fleet and the deterrent value of the U.S. flag. In their analysis of the Soviet armed forces, Harriet and William Scott suggest that the Soviet merchant fleet’s relationship to the Soviet Navy was analogous to that of Aeroflot’s to the Soviet Air Force. In times of war or crisis, these state-run commercial branches were available for military support in ways that the United States, with its strict demarcation between the government and private sectors, was not able to match.88

84. Armed Forces Journal, October 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 2, 873. 85. Polmar, “U.S.-Soviet Naval Balance,” 190. 86. Armed Forces Journal, October 1976, in Presidential Campaign Part 2, 873. 87. Position Paper on Maritime Policy, in Presidential Campaign Part 1, 697–98. 88. Polmar, “U.S.-Soviet Naval Balance,” 196; Scott and Scott, Armed Forces of the USSR, 166–67.

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Though specialists debated the full extent of its role, it was agreed the Soviet merchant fleet was a significant logistical asset for the Soviet Navy. Norman Polmar posits that the merchant fleet probably performed about 70 percent of Soviet at-sea refueling. Others have also highlighted the role of the Soviet merchant fleet in providing lift capabilities for land warfare.89 Theoretically, then, Carter may have thought that a strong (albeit privately owned) U.S. merchant fleet could be used in a similar but much more limited fashion. Lastly, there was the deterrent effect of a domestically flagged fleet. Logically, there was a much greater chance that an attack upon a U.S. vessel would result in escalation and might therefore keep an opponent from striking altogether, whereas an attack upon a foreign-flagged merchant ship might not have had the same deterrent effect.

89. Polmar, “U.S.-Soviet Naval Balance,” 196. Polmar has his detractors. A 1985 U.S. Marine Corps University Command and Staff College study suggested that the Soviet merchant fleet actually faced competing missions—a competition that limited the fleet’s effectiveness in the area of refueling. The report highlights two particular roles: sealift for land operations (in support of Soviet or Sovietsponsored forces) as well as the delivery of fresh water to naval vessels. These missions degraded the merchant fleet’s refueling capabilities. No author listed, “The Impact of Logistics on the Soviet ‘Blue Water’ Navy,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1985/DHM.htm (accessed February 18, 2008).

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Table 1: Summary of the Pre-Presidential Strategic Thought of Jimmy Carter Category

Main Pre-Presidential Positions

•

$5 to 7 billion cut  Ability to trim “fat” from “muscle”  Need for organizational restructuring  Cut big-ticket items  Cost savings realized by strategic planning, but only with firm White House control

•

Submarine-emphasis “minimum” deterrence

•

Damage limitation impossible to a strategically relevant degree

•

Limited nuclear war is not possible  Inevitable escalation  Mutual devastation

•

“Deep” cuts are the only “true” form of arms control  Allows rerouting of limited funds  Lessens international tension  Leads to nuclear abolition  Vladivostok failed  Ambivalent about building up forces as “bargaining chips” in negotiation Hesitant about B-1 bomber  Price of the system  Jobs

Defense Planning and Management

Deterrence and Damage Limitation

Arms Control and Strategic Systems Modernization •

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Table 1: (continued) •

Western Europe  Raise nuclear threshold; deter through conventional “symmetry”  Mutual agreement not to use nuclear weapons  Leverage U.S. high technology for conventional battle  Better defense management  Focus on MBFR  New strategic planning

•

East Asia  Reassure Japan  Maintain security commitment to Taiwan, but work for normalization  Reconfigure U.S. forces in South Korea; replace with airpower  Remove tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea

•

Fight over sea control and sea denial

•

Need more mobility, maneuverability

•

Better strategic planning and improved U.S. merchant fleet

U.S. Defense Commitments in Western Europe and East Asia

U.S.-USSR Naval Balance

Four The Carter Administration’s First Year of Defense Policy The Strategic Slowdown and the Conventional Emphasis

In February 1977, Carter made a significant cut to the final defense budget of the Ford administration. Four months later, he canceled the B-1 penetrating bomber program. These early actions set the tone and trajectory of nuclear force modernization for the remainder of the administration’s first year of defense planning—a year highlighted by one of the most comprehensive NSClevel national security planning exercises, as well as the crafting of Carter’s first personalized defense budget (FY1979). In many ways, nuclear weapons took a back seat throughout 1977 and early 1978 as the administration’s attention and energy were focused on conventional force modernization in the NATO alliance. Using the 1977 defense “baseline,” one can better examine, using neoclassical realist logic, the administration’s self-correcting policy change.

Carter’s Inheritance: The Release of the Ford Administration’s Final Defense Budget The Ford administration completed and released its final defense program, the Fiscal Year 1978 (FY1978) budget, in the period immediately after the November 1976 election, right in the middle of the presidential transition. Ford previewed the budget during his final State of the Union address on January 12, 117

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1977, and, five days later, Rumsfeld presented it to Congress. There are three things to note about this final budget. First, it carried through with most of the nuclear force modernization programs discussed in chapter 2. Second, it was influenced by a late-term strategic review, NSSM 246. Third, media leaks in late December 1976 about the infamous Team A/Team B competitive intelligence exercise meant that the budget was finalized, released, and subsequently changed by Carter in an atmosphere already superheated over the state of American defense policy, particularly nuclear policy. NSSM 246 was a rare example of a late-term strategic review. It had been authorized in September 1976, but was not completed and briefed to President Ford until after the election. In the original tasking, Ford had asked for an analysis of “a range of alternative strategies,” which included potential force postures. The review was meant to examine how these alternative strategies and force postures would affect current arms control negotiations and the defense budget. The study derived eight or so “key issues” from an evaluation of strategic nuclear forces. It suggested eight or so more from its examination of general purpose forces. Then, it took all of those “key issues” and used them to craft six notional or illustrative strategies. The reasoning behind this approach was twofold. It was hoped that the six strategies would provoke (rather than limit) NSC-level discussion of the larger military challenges at hand, and the strategies gave President Ford options from which he could pick and choose cafeteria-style.1 The review was used in the formation of the FY1978 budget and was turned into a policy directive for the incoming president. Ford signed NSDM 348, the final NSDM of his presidency, on the morning of the inauguration.2 The directive argued that the current strategic environment was such that: (a) all legs of the nuclear triad were necessary and had to be modernized; (b) the United 1. Friedberg, “The Making of American National Strategy,” 66–67; Friedberg, “History of U.S. Strategic Planning Efforts,” 164–84. National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 246, National Defense Policy and Military Posture, September 2, 1976, 1; Table of Contents for National Security Council Study on U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements, November 16, 1976, and Memorandum for President Ford from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Subject: Response to NSSM 246—US Defense Policy and Military Posture, November 20, 1976 [both located in National Security Council Meeting File dated December 2, 1976]; NSC Minutes, December 15, 1976, Subject: NSSM 246—US Defense Policy and Military Posture, 11–12; NSDM 348, U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture, January 20, 1977, 2, GRFL. NSC Minutes, Subject: U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture, December 15, 1976, 6–7, GRFL. 2. NSC Minutes, Subject: U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture, December 15, 1976, 13–14, GRFL. The timing of an NSDM was discussed at the NSC, as it was considered that a public release of the directive could be used to push President-elect Carter.

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States had to build up its second-strike counter-silo capability; (c) the United States had to fix ICBM vulnerability quickly; (d) an increase in strategic forces was required to get Moscow to bargain in SALT II; and (e) a number of changes to NATO forces and NATO planning were required, including but not limited to a reevaluation of warning time, greater amounts of prepositioned equipment, theater nuclear improvements, and a push for interoperability.3 The budget, with its emphasis on nuclear force modernization, was released into an atmosphere already primed for debate over U.S. national security policy. The history of the Team A/Team B exercise is well known. The idea for the competitive assessment originated in 1975 with the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). PFIAB, an intelligence review panel composed of private citizens, feared that the CIA had underestimated the Soviet Union’s military capabilities and its intentions in its regular National Intelligence Estimate series on Soviet strategic forces—its NIE 11–3/8 series. The group lobbied Ford’s national security staff and the CIA throughout 1975 and early 1976, asking that an outside group be allowed to go head-to-head against the official estimators on two subjects: the Soviet Union’s strategic objectives and its damage limitation capabilities (air defense, antisubmarine warfare, and ICBM accuracy). Initially, the CIA balked, but with the replacement of William Colby by George Bush as the director of Central Intelligence in November 1975 and the continued defense-right electoral challenge of Ronald Reagan, Langley relented and, together with PFIAB, approved three competitive teams looking at ICBM accuracy, air defense, and strategic objectives.4 The different teams met throughout the summer and fall of 1976, queried a host of regional and functional experts, and on the day after the presidential election began a three-day face-off with the CIA estimators at Langley. With respect to air defense, Anne Hessing Cahn explains that the main difference between the two teams was that CIA estimators had concluded that—on the 3. NSDM 348, U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture, January 20, 1977, 1–4, GRFL. 4. Cahn argues that antisubmarine warfare was removed from the agenda because the director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Bobby Inman, did not want to share operational intelligence on U.S. submarine patrols. Cahn, Killing Détente, 126–27. On June 26, 2004, Inman, in response to a question posed by the author, told a group of diplomatic historians that he had been reticent about sharing U.S. submarine information with Team B because there were rumors afloat that one of its members might have been sharing information with the Soviets. He did not name names. Inman, “Reflections on Intelligence Support for US Foreign Relations”, June 26, 2004, luncheon address at the Annual Conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Regarding Cahn’s book, it is important to note that her analysis is different from most analyses of the Team A/Team B competitive exercise in that she makes use of participant interviews and declassified CIA documents. That said, Killing Détente is still skewed to the defense-left position.

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basis of observation—the Soviet Union was not presently networking its air defense nodes and would therefore be less capable of countering a low-altitude bomber attack, while Team B argued from Soviet documents that the potential for air defense networking was there and perhaps intentionally hidden from view. In the case of ICBM accuracy, Team B insisted that Soviet accuracies were likely to be higher than was previously believed, but were dependent upon Moscow’s ability to secure high technology and precision instrumentation. The most contentious of the three competitions, and the one that received—and has continued to receive—the lion’s share of attention, however, was the examination of Moscow’s strategic objectives. Using Soviet military literature, statements of Soviet military and political figures, and U.S. intelligence products, Team B’s Strategic Objectives Panel argued that the CIA had consistently underestimated the pace and trajectory of Soviet weapons programs and military spending and had ignored the Soviet Union’s focus on achieving military victory should deterrence fail. Team A asserted that Moscow understood superiority was unachievable except perhaps “at the margins.” Information from both of the teams was integrated into NIE 11-3/8–76, the 11-3/8 product for 1976. The NIE was released on December 21, 1976; President-elect Carter had been briefed on the final product and the entire competitive exercise the week prior. A follow-up estimate, NIE 11-4-77—Soviet Strategic Objectives, was released on January 12, 1977. It outlined in depth the differences between Team A’s results and the conclusions of the Team B Strategic Objectives Panel.5 Since 1977, defense-left critics like Cahn have argued that Team B, especially the Strategic Objectives Panel, was stacked with right-wing ideologues whose only interest was the dismantlement of détente. Many on the defense-right have insisted otherwise, emphasizing that the exercise righted a wrong, invigorated the estimative process, and made for a better intelligence product. George Bush himself was much more even-handed, stating in January 1977 that the experi-

5. Cahn, Killing Détente, 140–84; Lawrence Freedman, “The CIA and the Soviet Threat: The Politicization of Estimates, 1966–1977,” 122, 134–39; Matthew Evangelista, “Second-Guessing the Experts: Citizens’ Group Criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Estimates of Soviet Military Policy,” 583–89. Memorandum from Richard Lehman to President-Elect Carter, Subject: Report on the Origin, Procedures, and Status of the Experiment in Competitive Analysis on National Intelligence Issues, December 13, 1976, USSR Vertical File, Folder: USSR n.d. 6/77, JCL; Richard Kovar, “Mr. Current Intelligence: An Interview with Richard Lehman,” Studies in Intelligence. NIE 11-4-77 used NIE 113/8–76 and a host of other estimates. The “Key Judgments” section outlined the conclusions of the CIA’s Team A as well as the findings of Team B, and merely stated that these were two “line[s] of arguments” about Soviet behavior. NIE 11-4-77, Soviet Strategic Objectives, January 12, 1977, 2–3, in Jeffrey Richelson et al., The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Analysis of the Soviet Union: 1947–1991 (microfiche).

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ence had been a mixed bag. It had helped in the more specialized, quantifiable subjects, but he thought it less useful in the realm of intentions and objectives.6 Unlike air defense “networking” or ICBM accuracy testing, the conclusions of the Strategic Objectives Panel—when leaked—made for much more exciting newspaper copy. The two teams had indeed been the subject of a few tiny leaks in October and November of 1976. However, interest in the exercise grew quickly (along with accusations about the politicization of intelligence) following a front-page New York Times article the day after Christmas. Further fuel was added by the public statements in early January of retired USAF Major General George Keegan, the former head of U.S. Air Force Intelligence and a Team B participant.7 The leaks provoked widespread debate among the public and on Capitol Hill throughout early 1977 over nuclear weapons policy, the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, appropriate levels of American defense spending, and the influence of ideology on intelligence analysis. Even Brezhnev himself joined in the fray with a defense policy speech of his own in Tula two days before Carter’s inauguration. Some interpreted Brezhnev’s move as a “fig-leaf ” for the new administration, while many at the time argued (and some still claim) that it was aimed at injecting the Politburo’s “line” into the American public sphere in an attempt to complicate the defense debate.8

Nuclear Force Modernization in Ford’s Final Defense Budget Though Ford’s FY1978 budget addressed each piece of the nuclear triad and the modernization of theater nuclear systems, Rumsfeld believed that “the most significant strategic initiative being proposed in [the FY1978] budget request” was the MX missile. The Minuteman was no longer the ICBM of the future. Most of the major improvements to the Minuteman would be completed in FY1977 or, by the very latest, FY1978. These included the “integrated program”; new missile guidance packages, such as the NS-20 software system; and the replacement of some, but not all, Minuteman III RVs with newer MK-12A 6. NSC Minutes, Subject: Semiannual Review of the Intelligence Community, January 13, 1977, 7– 8, GRFL. 7. Cahn, Killing Détente, 176–79. For Keegan’s public interview immediately following his retirement, see New York Times, January 3, 1977, 3. Keegan and Air Force Intelligence had been a thorn in the side of the CIA, especially in the NIE 11-3/8-76 exercise. An internal memorandum sent to the National Foreign Intelligence Board’s CIA representative in anticipation of the Team A/Team B “faceoff ” in late December 1976 refers to the Air Force’s (and Keegan’s) “extremism” and “egregious” number of dissenting footnotes. CIA Memorandum from unnamed to CIA Member of the NFIB, Subject: NIE 11-3/8-76, December 15, 1976, 1, 3, CIA Princeton Collection. 8. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 585–86.

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warheads. To improve flexibility, Rumsfeld also increased the funding for two programs that aided Minuteman command, control, and intelligence (C3I) and rapid retargeting in wartime: the Advanced Airborne Command Post and the Airborne Launch Control System. Ford’s budget the previous year had called for producing sixty additional Minuteman IIIs. While these had already been approved by Congress, in light of the acceleration of the MX program, the administration decided to delay using them to replace Minuteman IIs. It was apparent by the numbers in the new budget that the Minuteman ICBM program was on the wane—while funding for flexibility was on the rise, the administration did not provide for any new missile production. Anticipated FY1979 spending for the Minuteman III dropped precipitously ($770 million in FY1977 planned funding; $338 million proposed funding for FY1978; and in FY1979, $146 million).9 Though the older ICBM system would remain in force, it had been improved as much as possible in the eyes of the Ford administration. It was time to replace it with the MX. In obvious opposition to Senator McIntyre and other so-called counterforce skeptics, it is evidenced by the FY1978 budget material and also by declassified Pentagon documents provided to Carter’s defense transition team that the MX was clearly regarded as a large MIRV ICBM able to destroy very hard Soviet military targets. The MX, one transition memo outlined, would be a large (170,000 lbs.) and highly accurate MIRV missile. Another such memo, in countering the accusation that the MX was a “first-strike” weapon, explained that the MX and its hard-target capabilities were necessary for two reasons: it would keep the Soviet Union from using leftover ICBMs for political blackmail, and it would cut into Moscow’s war-waging capability after a conflict had started. Rumsfeld himself highlighted the need for MX’s improved hard-target capabilities. He explained that a crossover point would occur in 1983, at which time the Soviet Union’s capacity for hard-target destruction would surpass that of the United States. With or without the MX, the Soviet Union’s ability to destroy hardened targets would remain superior after 1983, but without the MX, the spread of Soviet advantage took on dangerous proportions. The MX’s initial operating capability was therefore scheduled for that precise crossover year. Another point made explicit both in transition memoranda and the FY1978 budget was that the MX system would be defended through a combination of

9. Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Personnel Strengths (hereafter FY1978 Authorization), January 25, 1977, 134, 136, 139.

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mobility and multiple aim points (that is, points that would be targeted by Soviet forces because they were possible launch locations). These aim points would, theoretically, be built at a price less expensive than what the Soviets would spend on additional offensive forces. Each aim point would be as “credible” a launch site as any other, and Rumsfeld made the point that the Soviets would be unsure whether any given aim point held an MX or not.10 Rumsfeld acknowledged that submarines and bombers were of great importance, but because of advances in Soviet antisubmarine warfare, air defense, and the possible use of surprise SLBM attacks against American air bases, he believed that the need for a new ICBM was incalculable. So, as spending for Minuteman shrank, MX funding increased—and did so quickly. The FY1978 line item for “advanced ICBM technology, including MX” was $294 million, a jump of $225 million from the previous year. But in FY1979, that figure bolted to $1,533 million, over ten times the amount slated in that year for the Minuteman program. As a nod to the Senate’s concerns about silo vulnerability, $49 million of the $294 million was set aside for mobile MX basing. However, with the full knowledge that the Senate’s emphasis on basing modes was a not-so-veiled attack on the new “counterforce” missile itself, Rumsfeld directed the remainder of FY1978 MX money toward “full-scale engineering development” of the missile, including construction and testing of its propulsion, guidance, and RV bus.11 Following the lines set down in NSSM 246 and NSDM 348, Ford’s lame-duck defense budget also emphasized modernizing the other two legs of the nuclear triad. As explained earlier, even though Congress had decided during the election year to authorize a buy of three test aircraft, it had placed a hold on a fullfunding decision for the B-1 bomber until February 1977. This February deadline was later extended until June 30, 1977, to allow the new administration

10. No author provided, “What Should the MX Development Pace Be?” memorandum to Carter transition team from DDR&E, November 30, 1976, DOD-FOIA, Carter and Reagan Transition Materials 02-F-1273, CD-ROM provided by DOD to author, file name 8.7.pdf, 80. No author provided, “To Describe Weapons Systems under Development . . . ,” memorandum to Carter transition team from DDR&E, in ibid., 84–88. Chart I-1, FY 1978 Authorization, January 25, 1977, 135. Colin Gray, The MX ICBM and National Security, 57. Rumsfeld’s FY1978 annual report does not give the MX initial operating capacity date, but in answers to written questions from Strom Thurmond in February, the Pentagon confirmed that the program inherited by Carter had the date as 1983. Senate Armed Services Committee, FY1978 Authorization, Part 2: Authorizations, February 1, 1977, 895. FY 1978 Authorization, January 25, 1977, 140. 11. FY1978 Authorization, January 25, 1977, 132, 134, 136, 140. Earlier (132), Rumsfeld wrote, “In the longer term, however, I share the reservations expressed in the Conference Report on the FY1977 Budget Authorizations regarding the survivability of a silo-based replacement for the Minuteman force.”

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time to review the program. In the FY1978 budget, Rumsfeld argued that these delays were unnecessary. The plane was ready for production. It had been reviewed by an independent body, approved by the Pentagon’s DSARC, and undergone preproduction testing to an extent unmatched in American Cold War military aviation. Rumsfeld insisted that the plane was long overdue, especially given the growing threat of Soviet SLBM attacks against aircraft bases and the need to offset the Soviet Union’s attrition of bomber-carried RVs by means of its air defense network. The United States needed a state-of-the-art penetrating bomber that could be flushed quickly upon alert and was hardened against nuclear effects. The FY1978 budget set aside $443 million for B-1 research and development and $1,711 million for the purchase of eight aircraft. This was the beginning of a total anticipated program of 240 planes—244 if one counted the test units.12 NSSM 246 had also addressed the United States’ five-year fleet ballistic missile submarine construction plan. Its conclusions were outlined in a separate NSDM, NSDM 344, which Ford signed two days before he left the White House. NSDM 344 set the pace of three Ohio-class submarines every two fiscal years. Two Trident submarines were slated for construction in FY1978 and one was set for FY1979. In order to reach a total of eight by FY1982, two would be built in fiscal years 1980 and 1982, while one would be constructed in FY1981. The anticipated initial operating capability for the first Ohio-class submarine was FY1979, but as Rumsfeld explained, shipyard problems and missile flight-test glitches were pushing back that date to September 1979, the fiscal year’s very edge.13 When it came to the conversion of Polaris submarines to the Poseidon system and the “back-fitting” of Trident I C4 SLBMs into ten Poseidon submarines, FY1978 was an “in-between” year. As of the final month of the Ford presidency, twenty-six of the thirty-one Polaris submarines that had been converted were deployed, while the five remaining boats were somewhere along the process. The first flight test of the Trident I C4 SLBM took place two days before Carter’s inauguration, but “back-fitting” was not scheduled until FY1980. The 12. Ibid., 144; Ford’s secretary of the Air Force, Thomas Reed, had asked Paul Nitze, Michael May, and Edward E. David to do an independent review of the B-1. Their October 1976 letter to Secretary Reed can be found in House of Representatives, Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 and Review of U.S. Strategic Forces, September 15, 1977, 355–56. The independent review called for a mixed force of B-1s and B-52s. FY1978 Authorization, January 25, 1977, 133, 144. Also see testimony by David C. Jones in FY1978 Authorization, Part 2: Authorizations, February 1, 1977, 854. 13. NSDM 344, Navy Shipbuilding Program, January 18, 1977, 2, GRFL. FY1978 Authorization, January 25, 1977, 141.

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FY1978 budget did, however, continue with the SLBM enhancements that former Defense Secretary Schlesinger had begun. It continued funding for the MK-500 “evader” MARV and it put forward a “modest” amount of funding for the Trident II D5 SLBM and the Improved Accuracy Program. In the next fiscal year, the D5’s funding was scheduled to jump from $5 million to $110 million—a significant increase over the course of a single fiscal year, but still not an extensive amount relative to the entire budget. Rumsfeld argued that while the United States expected, due to obsolescence, to have fewer submarines by the late 1980s, the Trident D5’s accuracy and hard-target kill capability would improve the target coverage of those submarines that were left. The program was also considered insurance should the MX program run into trouble.14 Even though executive-legislative relations, alliance politics, and, perhaps most of all, arms control negotiations complicated the whole issue of TNF modernization, the Ford administration nevertheless handed over a series of TNF improvement programs to the new president. Michael Yaffe explains how, on the final day of the Ford administration, Rumsfeld initiated a brand-new TNF survivability research and testing program and placed his own assistant for Atomic Energy, Don Cotter, in charge of it. As the incoming secretary of defense, Harold Brown, agreed to keep Cotter on, Yaffe suggests that Rumsfeld’s move was a way of maintaining continuity in not just terms of the people involved with TNF modernization but also programs as well.15 In the FY1978 budget, Rumsfeld proposed funds for both the Pershing IA and the Pershing IB (II). The line-item for Pershing was $48 million and the money was split between Pershing II development money, particularly its more accurate RV, and funds to restart the production line of Pershing IA. This was done in the hopes that the Pershing II’s terminally guided RV could be inserted into both existing and newly constructed Pershing IAs. Any money for the extendedrange Pershing II, which was still undergoing evaluation, would have fallen within the budget for the Pershing II. In FY1979, the Pershing total jumped to $140 million, of which most ($85 million) was for the purchase of more Pershing IAs. The FY1978 funds for a new Pershing II warhead, like all funding for special nuclear materials, did not fall within the Defense Department’s budget, but under the aegis of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). ERDA’s budget, therefore, included money for experimental work on

14. FY1978 Authorization, 132–33, 141–42. Also see testimony by Vice Admiral Long in FY1978 Authorization, Part 2: Authorizations, February 1, 1977, 821–27; MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy, 289. 15. Yaffe, Origins, 573–74.

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a new low-yield, high-accuracy unit for the Pershing II—a replacement for the existing 400-kiloton W-50 warhead.16 Ford’s final budget took the Lance system in two different directions. First, the outgoing administration authorized the adoption of the W-70 Mod 3 enhanced radiation warhead (ERW) for Lance in late November 1976. ERDA’s FY1978 budget contained money for continued W-70 research and development, while $12 million out of the $95 million slated for Lance in the defense budget modified existing Lance missiles so that the new warhead would fit on them. The second direction—and the one that represented the rest of that $95 million—emphasized the use of Lance for conventional land attack. Lance, as Yaffe explains, was one of a number of shorter-ranged systems Schlesinger had in mind for dual-purpose use, especially given that the range of the Warsaw Pact’s artillery had improved to the point that NATO’s regular artillery was vulnerable. The longer range of non-nuclear Lance missiles, though they were still considerably shorter than that of nuclear-tipped Lance missiles, was thought to be enough to make up for this asymmetry. The Rumsfeld Pentagon had also begun work with newer conventional submunitions that would be used in conjunction with the Lance system—fragmentation and automatically arming munitions like the BLU-63 cluster munition that would help to suppress enemy surface-to-air missiles. In the end, however, despite such adjustments and modifications, FY1978 appeared to be the last year of significant Lance modernization as its anticipated FY1979 authorization dropped to a mere $9 million.17

The Carter Administration’s Adjustment of Ford’s FY1978 Defense Budget President Carter, like any newly elected nonincumbent—especially one from an opposing party—was faced with the immediate and daunting task of making changes to his predecessor’s defense program. While always a difficult 16. FY1978 Authorization, January 25, 1977, 171, 182; FY1978 Authorization, Part 2: Authorizations, February 1, 1977, 1210-11. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Energy Research and Development Administration [ERDA] Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, March 25, 1977, 28–31; Encyclopedia Astronautica, “Pershing.” 17. The unclassified Arms Control Impact Statement for the Lance W-70 is found in Robert Pranger and Roger Labrie, eds., Nuclear Strategy and National Security: Points of View, 359–63; Senate Armed Services Committee, Energy Research and Development Administration [ERDA] Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, March 25, 1977, 28–31; also see FY1978 Authorization, January 25, 1977, 171, 182. Yaffe, Origins, 562–63; also see comments by Senator Dewey Bartlett to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown about non-nuclear Lance, FY1978 Authorization, Part 1: Authorizations, February 24, 1977, 623–24; FY1978 Authorization, Part 2: Authorizations, February 8, 1977, 1209.

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maneuver, it was perhaps harder than usual in 1977. Not only were Carter and his national security team under intense scrutiny from those on the defenseright who were in agreement with Team B’s analysis and who were also very concerned over Carter’s campaign promises of defense budget cuts, but also he was being watched by those on the defense-left who were scared that he might break those very promises as a result of the competitive exercise. New Ford-era legislation had also altered congressional budgeting rules. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 went into effect during Ford’s presidency and had established March 15 as the day by which the specialized committees (in this case, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees) had to provide their respective House and Senate Budget Committees with suggested estimates for that particular fiscal year. Not only that, but the 1974 act also stated that a given year’s military authorization bill had to be submitted to Congress no later than May 15. This meant that if Carter wanted to make his mark quickly on Ford’s last defense budget, he and his advisers had only until late February or early March—no more than four to six weeks—to evaluate the overall program, make their changes, and report any such adjustments to the proper congressional committees. As it turned out, Carter did not need a lot of time to make his own distinctive mark. The adjustment came in two phases. The first part came a little over a month after the inauguration. On February 22, Carter announced that he had revised the FY1978 budget from $123.2 billion to $120.4 billion, a total of $2.8 billion in total obligational authority. On the whole, it represented a cut of only 2.3 percent. This was considerably less than the campaign promise to cut $5 to $7 billion, and the administration did its best to describe it less as a cut than a deceleration in the previous administration’s anticipated growth. Carter’s new secretary of defense, Harold Brown, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the revised figures still represented a net increase over FY1977 and that there was only a $400 million difference in outlays between Ford’s budget and Carter’s adjustment.18 18. In the defense budget, there is a difference between total obligational authority and outlays. In any fiscal year, an outlay is money that will be spent that year, while total obligational authority is the money that is requested for that year but not necessarily spent. For example, outlays for FY1978 were those funds that would be spent from October 1, 1977, to September 30, 1978 (which included some money that was obligated in previous years). Total obligational authority for FY1978 would be the total amount of money requested for the period between October 1977 and September 1978—some of which would be spent in the future. For more details, see Lawrence Korb, “The Policy Impacts of the Carter Defense Program,” 141–42. FY1978 Authorization, Part 1: Authorizations, February 24, 1977, 588.

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Nonetheless, despite its small percentage, the cut was quite hard on Ford’s nuclear modernization program—to the point that through the rest of the administration, many referred to it as a strategic forces “slowdown.” The “slowdown” included a delay in the “full-scale engineering development” of the MX missile, a decrease in the number of B-1 bombers constructed in FY1978, the cancellation of two Polaris submarine overhauls, and the rerouting of FY1977 Minuteman III money away from purchasing complete ICBMs and toward purchasing missile components. The cut also made changes to Lance. Carter cut the MX program by $160 million—from $294 million to $134 million. This effectively removed the program from Ford’s plans for “full-scale engineering development” in FY1978. Instead, the new administration kept the missile in an “advanced development” holding pattern (a research-only phase) until the following fiscal year. This had one very serious consequence. It caused the MX’s initial operating capability to be pushed back “up to eighteen months” from December 1983 to FY1986, which meant an even greater delay of full operational capability—the date at which the entire system would be ready and working.19 The MX cut was not that much of a surprise. The president-elect’s transition team, in response to Rumsfeld’s budget announcement, had told the New York Times that a postponement of the missile program was a very real possibility. Secretary Brown repeated this claim in his first interview at the Pentagon. Three weeks before the release of Carter’s FY1978 revision, he outlined the upcoming MX proposal in Senate testimony. In answers to Senator Strom Thurmond’s written interrogatories, he said that the plan was to postpone “engineering development” for the missile. Yes, the secretary conceded, this would result in an initial operating capability delay, but he assured the senator that this “slip” would neither damage U.S. capabilities in the mid-1980s nor hurt the U.S. position vis-à-vis Moscow in SALT II negotiations. Brown told Thurmond that in contrast to Ford’s approach, the delay was warranted so as to give the Pentagon enough time to complete its basing studies. Later, at the public release of the FY1978 budget adjustment, Brown explained to Senator Jake Garn that basing had to come first because it would easily affect the missile’s specifications. Though Garn responded that one particular basing mode—buried trench—was ready and waiting for “validation,” Brown replied

19. FY1978 Authorization, 686. Also see Harold Brown’s answers to submitted questions in House Armed Services Committee, Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 and Review of the State of U.S. Strategic Forces, August 2, 1977, 202–3.

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that additional “balanced validation” work was needed on a multiple missile shelter system as a “high-confidence back-up.”20 In fact, Brown added, his department was really just following the wishes of the Senate Armed Services Committee itself. He reminded them that the year before they had restricted the Pentagon to mobile rather than fixed launchers for the MX. The $160 million cut, he told Senator Robert Byrd, was money slated for what Congress had not wanted in the first place—MX deployments in vulnerable Minuteman silos.21 Indeed, Brown had explained earlier to Thurmond that while the deployment of MX missiles in Minuteman silos would certainly boost ICBM RV count, the benefits would be very short-lived given anticipated Soviet improvements. And because the administration had decided to “slip” the new ICBM’s initial operating capability, the deployment of the MX in Minuteman silos was an even worse option since those silos would be that much more vulnerable by 1985–1986.22 Ford’s budget had no money for new Minuteman III construction, so the issue over Minuteman was about the previous year’s (FY1977) funding that Congress and President Ford had approved in late 1976 for the construction of the sixty additional missiles. The Ford administration thought of the additional ICBMs as insurance. They would keep the production lines open and would give the United States a greater number of ICBM RVs in the event that SALT II collapsed. Carter and his advisers argued that it made more sense to use the FY1977 money for components rather than for the purchase of complete ICBMs as it was more expensive to build the missiles, not to mention the fact that Minuteman silos were vulnerable. Also, Secretary Brown argued, if the Vladivostok 1,320 MIRV sublimit held, the replacement of Minuteman II with Minuteman III without any improvements in silo basing would only eat up RVs that could be better housed in a less vulnerable system. The United States could use newly built components to upgrade and fix Minuteman IIs and repair damaged Minuteman IIIs. Moreover, in Brown’s eyes, there was little need to build more Minuteman IIIs at present. They were expensive, vulnerable, and unnecessary in light of MX (“MX in a survivable mode,” Brown qualified). He also believed that the United States would have enough warning to restart Minuteman production if it was deemed necessary.23 20. New York Times, January 18, 1977, 19, and January 27, 1977, 6. FY1978 Authorization, Part 2: Authorizations, February 1, 1977, 895. FY1978 Authorization, Part 1: Authorizations, February 24, 1977, 691. 21. FY1978 Authorization, Part 1: Authorizations, February 24, 1977, 636. 22. FY1978 Authorization, Part 2: Authorizations, February 1, 1977, 895. 23. FY1978 Authorization, Part 1: Authorizations, February 24, 1977, 656, 673, 688–91.

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The administration could not just alter the previous administration’s FY1977 Minuteman program by fiat, however. It had to go back to Congress to ask for amendment or rescission of the money. Early in 1977, while the White House plotted a legislative strategy, Carter decided to build only ten of the sixty ICBMs and keep open the possibility of building more missiles or components. Between February and May, Brown floated different options—all of which were combinations of full or partial Minuteman III purchases with total (or near total) closures of the production lines. On July 6, Brown announced that the administration had decided to stick with its original plan to close the production line after only ten more Minuteman IIIs and that it would also terminate production of the Minuteman III guidance packages. Not only that, but Brown determined on the same day that it was much too costly and made very little strategic sense to modernize the Minuteman II. The addition of new technology to the Minuteman II took too much time and the Soviet Union was likely to improve its capability against hardened targets in the meantime. Following this, the president submitted his request for the rescission of the FY1977 Minuteman funding ($105 million). Unfortunately for the White House, this legislative strategy (which would also be used against the purchase of B-1 test planes with FY1977 money) quickly failed. Unable to secure the rescission’s passage by the required deadline of October 4, Carter was forced to keep the production line open.24 While his administration made no cuts to Ford’s Ohio-class submarine or Trident missile plans, there was absolutely no surprise over Carter’s adjustment to the B-1 program. Carter cut three B-1s from the planned FY1978 procurement—a savings of approximately $280 million. Some of this $280 million was 24. Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: Minuteman III Production Options, May 25, 1977, and Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: Significant Actions, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense (June [sic], 21–26, 1977), May 26, 1977, Office of the Staff Secretary—Handwriting File, 6/3/77 (I), Box 28, Folder 6/1/77 (2)—6/3/77 (1), JCL. Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: Significant Actions, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense (Week of July 2–8, 1977), July 8, 1977, WHCF—FG 13 (Confidential), Box FG106, Folder 1/20/77–1/20/81; Letter from Harold Brown to Senator Jennings Randolph, July 15, 1977, WHCF-ND, Box ND-48, Folder ND-17 1/20/77–12/31/79, JCL. Representative Jack Kemp (R-NY), a strong defense-right proponent of ICBMs, led the fight on the Minuteman III production line. For Kemp, his position not only made strategic sense but also was politically prudent since Bell Aerospace’s plant in Wheatfield, New York, handled the system’s propulsion. For details of the rescission fight, see, for example, Memorandum from Jerry Schecter to Brzezinski, Subject: Congressional Problems for Your Meeting with Harold Brown and the President on September 20th, September 19, 1977, WHCF-FG, Box FG-26, Folder FG 6–141 Brz., 9/1/77–9/30/77, JCL. Also see Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 2, 1977, 23; Washington Post, September 29, 1977, A1 and September 30, 1977, A19, D9.

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“long-lead” funding for the following fiscal year, which meant fewer planes would be purchased in FY1979 as well. Consequently, the plane’s initial operating capability was put back by five months. The administration also deferred production of the Short Range Attack Missile B (SRAM-B), the air-to-surface missile that would be carried by the new bomber. The SRAM-B, explained Brown, was to be reevaluated and flown against a different SRAM version and against new ALCM technology.25 As it had with the MX missile, Carter’s transition team had told the New York Times that the new president would probably decrease the number of B-1s. An actual number (three) was floated in congressional testimony a mere five days after the inauguration. The cut was billed as a fiscally prudent move while the new president, skeptical as he was about the B-1 bomber, reassessed the entire program. Indeed, a brand-new review of the B-1 program was one of Carter’s top priorities. On January 29, following the first official NSC meeting, Brown initiated the Strategic Bomber Force Modernization Study. The study was a combined effort of defense establishment “insiders” in addition to a panel of three “outsiders,” Herbert York, Ivan Selin, and Paul Ignatius, whose job was “[to] see to it that the insiders [asked] the right questions.”26 The Strategic Bomber Force Modernization Study examined bomber alternatives and different force-mix options—for example, a force composed purely of penetrating bombers versus those that combined penetrators with stand-off attack planes, like modified B-52s or wide-body planes converted into cruise missile carriers—all in light of changes to Soviet air defenses, new U.S. technology, and cost trade-offs. In the end, the review narrowed upon two “illustrative alternatives.” Both alternatives included the production and deployment of large numbers of ALCMs on B-52s, but the first pushed for greater B-1 production while the other concluded that production was unnecessary. The second pictured only a limited amount of money for the B-1 in order to keep options open for the future. In a personal letter to Brown written shortly after the study was completed, Herbert York insisted that much of the debate boiled down to the relative penetrative capabilities of the B-1 versus ALCMs. Though additional analysis of this problem was required, York 25. FY1978 Authorization, Part 1: Authorizations, February 24, 1977, 604, 656, 679, 688. 26. New York Times, January 18, 1977, 19. FY1978 Authorization, January 25, 1977, 498–99. No author mentioned, Memo to the File, “Herbert York will be involved . . . ,” February 11, 1977, Box 13, Folder 1, Herbert York Collection, UC San Diego [hereafter Herbert York Papers]. A heavily redacted version of the Strategic Bomber Force Modernization Study can be found in Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 1978 Supplemental Military Authorization, July 28, 1977, 111–37.

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believed that Soviet attrition would stay below 50 percent for either system regardless. Taking that into consideration, York concluded that either the B-1 or the ALCM would “suffice” and if the ALCM (which the study assumed would be deployed in large numbers) “[was] indeed a foregone conclusion, then we don’t need the B-1.” Granted, he added, there were good strategic and political reasons for going with both systems. A mix would make the task of Soviet air defense that much more difficult, and one also had to consider the B-1 program’s domestic effects in the way of jobs. Nevertheless, in the end the United States could accomplish what it needed to militarily with a mixed force of ALCM-carrying B-52s and stand-off cruise missile carriers.27 Carter waited until the last possible moment before the congressional deadline to publicize his decision on the bomber. On June 30, in a move many considered surprising (considering the fact that three days earlier, the House of Representatives had approved the FY1978 money for five B-1 bombers), Carter announced that his administration was canceling production of the bomber altogether—a cut of about $1.5 billion. In his press conference, Carter criticized the overall price tag of the B-1, extolled the cruise missile’s virtues, and emphasized that the B-52 would remain a militarily effective platform through the 1980s. He added that the United States would continue B-1 research and development that was already underway, especially in the area of electronic countermeasures, but that construction would end after the fourth test plane was finished.28 In lieu of a new penetrating bomber, Carter and Brown explained that the United States was going to focus its energies on improving the B-52’s electronic countermeasure capabilities, its range, and its carrying capacity. The administration would also explore the adaptation of a wide-body jet for use as a cruise missile carrier and would work to enhance cruise missile performance. This tracked closely with the Strategic Bomber Force Modernization Study’s second “illustrative alternative”: a push in the area of cruise missile (ALCM) develop-

27. Fiscal Year 1978 Supplemental Military Authorization, July 28, 1977, 127–28; also see Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder, 161–64. Letter from Herbert York to Harold Brown, Subject: Re: The B-1, March 25, 1977, 4–5, Herbert York Papers. York was less nuanced in his published memoirs. In the chapter in which he discusses the B-1, York states that he believed “the ALCM and the B-1 were both much to be preferred to either the MX or launch on warning [emphasis added].” He continues in the very next paragraph, “That [the danger of the MX and launch on warning] left the other two options [ALCM and B-1], and I recommended that they both be pursued.” Herbert York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist’s Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva, 265–66. 28. Jimmy Carter, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1977, vol. 1, 1197–1200; Washington Post, July 1, 1977, A1.

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ment combined with the deferral of B-1 production. The day after the decision was made public, Brown told reporters that the administration would soon submit a FY1978 supplemental that outlined these changes programmatically. This supplemental was presented to Congress on July 27. The administration, as it had with the Minuteman III, also tried to push through a rescission of FY1977 B-1 funds. In order to answer lingering questions about the ALCM’s penetrative ability vis-à-vis Soviet defenses, Brown tasked the Defense Science Board to run a summer study on the subject.29 Carter’s February cut did not affect the nuclear portions of the FY1978 Lance or Pershing programs. In fact, until Walter Pincus’s infamous June 6 Washington Post article on what would thereafter be called the “neutron bomb,” the administration made no changes to the nuclear facets of either theater nuclear program. The non-nuclear side of the story was very different. In the case of Lance, Carter’s adjustment took out all of the money that Rumsfeld had set aside for procurement of non-nuclear components—approximately $78 million for 360 missiles and non-nuclear warhead purchases. The new administration left the money allotted for modifying existing Lance battalions, the funding for the research and development of Lance nuclear warheads (including those of adjustable yield or enhanced radiation), and the development money for the anti-personnel submunition warhead. While conceding to his critics that nonnuclear Lance was certainly a way of countering the Warsaw Pact’s relative advantage in artillery range, Brown argued that it was not the best way of doing it. Non-nuclear use gave away the launcher’s position so that it could be targeted before it could be switched to nuclear munitions. A nuclear warhead on a Lance missile also had a greater lethal radius than a non-nuclear warhead, which could make up for imprecise intelligence of the target’s location. Finally, since conventional warheads were heavier than nuclear ones, non-nuclear Lance had to be deployed closer to the forward edge of battle if one wanted to strike deeper into enemy territory (which made the launchers that much more vulnerable). Nonnuclear Lance was therefore only a “makeshift” solution.30 29. Carter, Public Papers 1977, vol. 1, 1199; Washington Post, July 2, 1977, A1. Fiscal Year 1978 Supplemental Military Authorization, July 28, 1977, 127–28. A short list of the Air Force Science Advisory Board Summer Study’s conclusions, as well as a more detailed VU-Graph presentation of same, can be found in Box 34, Folder 4, Herbert York Papers. 30. Washington Post, June 6, 1977, A1. FY1978 Authorization, Part 1: Authorizations, February 24, 1977, 589, 604, 623–24, 678; Energy Research and Development Administration [ERDA] Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, March 25, 1977, 28–31; Washington Post, July 8, 1977, A3. One of the main alternatives to using non-nuclear Lance against Warsaw Pact artillery, according to Brown, was the new General Support Rocket System. For the weight issue of the non-nuclear Lance warhead, see Yaffe, Origins, 562.

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One of the alternatives to non-nuclear Lance included using Pershing in a non-nuclear role or what was designated non-nuclear Pershing (NNP). NNP could be used to strike into Warsaw Pact territory, either destroying or disabling airfields. Non-nuclear Lance, Brown insisted, did not have the necessary range for this type of mission. The new administration put forward new money for a “technology demonstration” of a new warhead for NNP—one optimized for cratering runways. Moreover, with the enhanced accuracy brought about through the Pershing’s use of radar area correlation guidance, NNP could be a viable option against hardened targets, whereas before, such destruction likely required a nuclear-tipped missile. In the end, Brown emphasized that the administration was only testing the NNP concept. No firm decision had been made on its development, never mind its deployment.31 For the first six months of the administration, the Lance missile—nuclear or non-nuclear—remained a concern for specialists only. However, the frontpage Washington Post article about the “neutron bomb,” which was released only two days before a NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Ottawa, brought the Lance’s nuclear aspects (and the larger subject of theater nuclear modernization) into full global view. The “neutron bomb” story is a popular one when it comes to histories of the Carter administration.32 Suffice it here to say that the episode clearly took the White House by surprise. While it was not shocked by the content of the episode (as the ERW had been a main facet of the Schlesinger and Rumsfeld TNF modernization programs), the Pentagon was taken aback by the intensity of the public reaction. Until the Pincus article, the warhead had not been a very controversial issue outside of defense circles. In the weeks following the Post story, Carter asked for evaluations of the warhead’s military impact from the Defense Department and ERDA, as well as an Arms Control Impact Statement from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In mid-August, the Pentagon/ERDA report came back bullish on the production and deployment of the warhead. Brzezinski counseled the president to make a two-part “produce and consult” decision, but at some point between August 11 and 17, Carter chose instead to postpone any decision on ERW production pending further discussions with NATO allies.33 31. FY1978 Authorization, Part 1: Authorizations, February 24, 1977, 661, 678. 32. There are single-chapter narratives as well as full books devoted to the “neutron bomb” episode. For example, see Robert Strong, Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 123–52; Sherri Wasserman, The Neutron Bomb Controversy: A Study in Alliance Politics; and Vincent Auger, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy: The Carter Administration and the Neutron Bomb. 33. Pranger and Labrie, Nuclear Strategy, 347; Auger, Dynamics of Foreign Policy, 54.

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Table 2: Summary of Carter’s Adjustment of Ford’s Nuclear Modernization (February to August 1977) System

Adjustment •

MX ICBM

• • •

Minuteman ICBM

•

• Polaris and Trident • • • • B-1 Bomber

• •

Funding cut and delay of full-scale engineering development Postponement of IOC from late 1983 to FY1986 Additional basing analysis required Continued Ford’s decision for no new Minuteman production in FY1978 Pushed rescission of Ford’s FY1977 money for Minuteman in order to close production line and end production of guidance packages No immediate changes to Ohio-class SSBN or Trident SLBM programs Postponement of two Polaris overhauls Early February cut in the number of planes from 8 to 5 Defer production of SRAM-B in February until final disposition of plane After completion of Strategic Bomber Force Modernization Study, production of B-1 canceled in lieu of mixed force of ALCMcarrying B-52s and cruise missile carriers, but continue test planes and ECM R&D Pushed rescission of Ford’s FY1977 money for the B-1 and SRAM-B Set up DSB Summer Study to evaluate penetrative capability of cruise missiles vs. Soviet air defenses

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Table 2: (continued) • • • Theater Nuclear Forces •

No changes to Ford nuclear program in Carter’s February cut Decided that there was little use for Lance in non-nuclear role Continued research and development of Pershing in nuclear and non-nuclear role But after Washington Post article on “neutron bomb,” administration-wide reevaluation and subsequent postponement of enhanced radiation warhead for Lance and 8-inch artillery

Using Theory to Explain Carter’s Adjustment of Ford’s FY1978 Defense Budget What theoretical approach best explains Carter’s strategic “slowdown” and, in some cases, reversal? How is it that the outgoing Ford administration determined that strategic nuclear modernization, particularly the MX ICBM and the B-1 bomber, was an immediate requirement, while the new president’s initial defense program choices moved in the opposite direction? One popular, nonrealist explanation says that Carter made the cuts in strategic forces primarily to make good on his pledge to decrease defense spending quickly. Again, Carter campaigned on the position that the United States could afford to cut $5 to $7 billion from the defense budget. Once he became president, he promised to ferret out defense waste and inefficiency and get rid of unnecessary weapons programs. Clearly, Carter did have cost savings in mind when he cut into the FY1978 strategic modernization programs—especially when he canceled the B-1 bomber—but should that reason be held up as a complete explanation? The cost of the B-1 program was indeed foremost in the new administration’s mind. In transition briefing papers, Anthony Lake and Matthew Schaffer wrote to Carter that cost was the “primary argument” against the new airplane and that billions could be saved by either slowing the rate of production or by cutting the plane altogether ($4 billion and $10 billion respectively between FY1978 and FY1982). Kotz claims that in one of the very first meetings between

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President Carter and his national security team, the president pushed Brown to reevaluate the B-1 program since it was one program that was sure to reap massive defense savings. The preliminary cut of the B-1 program in February 1977 was done in part because it would save money while Brown completed the review Carter had ordered. One of the main reasons for the Strategic Bomber Force Modernization Study was to provide the White House with cost comparisons between an all–B-1 force, an all–B-52 force, and a mixed force. Carter highlighted the bomber’s price tag when he announced the cancellation of the program, and he explained much later in his memoirs that at the time he believed cruise missiles were more cost-effective than the B-1. It was his understanding that “more than a hundred” cruise missiles could have been built for the price of a single B-1 bomber.34 Other cuts in strategic systems—for example, the postponement of two Polaris submarine overhauls—were also couched in the language of cost effectiveness. In the case of the MX, Brown explained that the delay in “full-scale engineering development” allowed for a $160 million cut and provided additional time to locate the most cost-effective system. What would happen, he asked rhetorically, if the administration went through with “full-scale engineering development” of the new ICBM in FY1978, only to discover that the missile did not fit inside the most effective and secure basing mode? The final price of the MX system, and the final determination as to whether the system would “break the bank,” was tied directly to basing. Ultimately, Brown insisted—as had Carter during the campaign—that defense efficiency was one of the new administration’s key virtues. Though many painted Carter’s early program decisions as the erosion of national security in fulfillment of a campaign pledge, Brown dismissed this, saying that the administration was searching for more efficient ways of doing business.35 David Skidmore emphasizes the role of cost in his analysis of Carter’s initial “strategy of adjustment” (of which the cuts in nuclear modernization were one part). He claims that Carter and his advisers followed the dictates of the international economic environment when they decided to cut Ford’s budget. The

34. Anthony Lake and Matthew Schaffer, Options Paper, “DRAFT: The Defense Budget and the US Military Posture,” section 3: “Strategic Nuclear Forces,” 30–31. The paper was one of the many attached to a cover memorandum from Jack Watson to President-elect Jimmy Carter, dated November 3, 1976. Plains File, Box 41, Subject File: C. Pres. Papers, Transition: State and Defense Options Papers [I], 11/76, JCL. Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder, 159, 161–64; FY1978 Authorization, January 25, 1977, 135–37. Carter, Public Papers 1977, vol. 1, 1199; Carter, Keeping Faith, 82–83. 35. FY1978 Authorization, Part 1: Authorizations, February 24, 1977, 590, 604, 673, 688, 691.

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new president realized that the United States faced long-term economic problems and, therefore, the country had to retrench.36 It would be unfair to Skidmore to suggest that this point is completely without its merits—U.S. economic health in the mid- to late 1970s was indeed less than stellar. Unfortunately, what Skidmore leaves out in his analysis of this “strategy of adjustment” is how the Carter White House apprehended a so-called proper or logical defense program response to the economic dictates of the international system while Ford and his advisers—with just as clear a picture—determined that strategic nuclear modernization should be a top priority. Skidmore’s assertions notwithstanding, the short time between Ford’s FY1978 budget and Carter’s changes to that budget, as well as the types of programs Carter chose to cut, demonstrates that (at least in this case) the “dictates” of the international system were probably less causal than the assessment of precisely what those dictates were and what could (and should) be done about them. Skidmore is able to declare Carter’s “strategy of adjustment” the better and most logical policy response vis-à-vis Ford’s (and vis-à-vis what he calls Carter’s later “strategy of resistance”) only by dismissing the military aspects of the international system, the objective growth in Soviet military power, and any perception of threat therein. What is peculiar about interpretations of Carter’s behavior that focus on cost savings, however, is that other than the money projected to be saved in future years by the B-1’s cancellation, the other cuts in strategic systems totaled very little savings and probably gave Carter more domestic political trouble than they were worth. Even if one accepts Skidmore’s claim that U.S. economic health warranted defense cuts, it is difficult to see why the administration chose to enrage its defense-right critics by going after strategic nuclear modernization when those systems represented only a small fraction of anticipated total savings. In Carter’s early $2.8 billion adjustment, strategic forces added up to 18.5 percent ($517 million)—a sizable percentage of the adjustment itself, but only 18.5 percent of a mere 2.3 percent decrease in the Ford budget as a whole. And even taking into account that the June 30 B-1 decision added a sizable $1.5 billion to that smaller February total, one should not forget that much of that was reprogrammed in the administration’s FY1978 defense supplemental.37 The money that was saved carried a steep domestic political price. Throughout the spring and summer of 1977, Carter’s defense-right critics in Congress 36. Skidmore, Reversing Course, 30–33, 55–59. 37. FY1978 Authorization, Part 1: Authorizations, February 24, 1977, 604.

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had been clear about keeping Ford’s defense priorities. Indeed, in the week before the FY1978 adjustment was announced, Carter received a memorandum from Senator Henry Jackson that among other things strongly warned him against limiting American strategic systems prior to finalizing SALT II.38 It is also very hard to believe that Carter thought his February cuts in nuclear modernization could do anything but harm what was, at the time, his biggest battle with the Senate: the fight over Paul Warnke’s confirmation as the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and top SALT II negotiator. The changes to Ford’s FY1978 program did not win over any of the administration’s skeptics in the Warnke confirmation—a fight and subsequent vote that many believed were indicative of how a future SALT II ratification process might fare. In 1977, Jackson’s office was leading the charge against Warnke. His staff asked Paul Nitze to determine whether the Committee on the Present Danger would come out against the Warnke nomination. In turn, Nitze and Eugene Rostow both sent letters to Senate Armed Services chairman John Stennis questioning Warnke’s fitness. Rostow claims that when it came to writing his letter, the procedure for sending a supporting letter had been “suggested by Dorothy Fosdick [Jackson’s assistant].”39 In the end, the cost savings realized from Carter’s 1977 adjustments to nuclear modernization were relatively negligible while the political costs were rather high. Another explanation for Carter’s 1977 defense decision-making could involve the influence of interest groups. There are two ways that interest group pressure might have affected Carter’s calculus. First, it is possible that Carter could have bent under pressure from antinuclear and/or defense-left groups. Nick Kotz and Terry Provance, the American Friends Service Committee’s 38. The memorandum was written by Jackson and Perle after Jackson met with Carter about SALT II on February 4, 1977. Strobe Talbott, Dan Caldwell, and Robert Kaufman each mention the memo, but the most detailed discussion of it is found in Kaufman, Jackson, 361–63. 39. For the Warnke vote, see Kaufman, Jackson, 358–61, and Strong, “Lining up a Team: The Warnke Nomination,” in Working in the World, 10–44. Also see Letter from Paul Nitze to Charles Tyroler, February 8, 1977, Box 103; Letter from Eugene Rostow to Senator John Stennis, February 17, 1977, Box 169, and Letter from Eugene Rostow to Paul Nitze, February 18, 1977, also Box 169, Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger [hereafter CPD Papers], Hoover Institution of War and Peace, Stanford University. I would again thank Justin Vaisse for the generous use of his personal finding aid in August 2003 (as well as a copy of Vaisse’s now-completed dissertation). Vaisse’s dissertation—a history of American neoconservatism, the CPD, and the Coalition for a Democratic Majority—is much broader in scope than this author’s work, as it encompasses the genesis, evolution, and interrelationship of the two private organizations. Where the two analyses overlap, specifically the Carter administration’s relationship with the Committee, readers will find references to the same documents. Vaisse, Le Mouvement neoconservateur aux Etais-Unis: Le deuxieme age neoconservatisme a travers l’histoire de la Coalition for a Democratic Majority et du Committee on the Present Danger, 1972–1992.

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director of the anti–B-1 campaign, both describe the political activities of the “Stop the B-1 Bomber” campaign during Carter’s first months in the Oval Office. The campaign’s activities included a vigil outside of Carter’s home in Plains following the election (in which the president-elect came out, walked the line, and pocketed a handwritten note from Provance), a 145-city vigil during President Carter’s first weekend in office, a sit-in at the White House driveway (which blocked Secretary Vance’s limousine), as well as tactical support of the cruise missile in lieu of the aircraft. The campaign received letters of support from First Lady Rosalynn Carter and had two meetings inside the White House with “key staff,” including Hamilton Jordan, a “member of Brzezinski’s staff ” and “someone from the [Office of Management and Budget].”40 It is difficult, however, to determine precisely how much weight the anti– B-1 campaign carried with the administration in its first months. According to Provance, the above-mentioned activities, coupled with the fact that—in the end—“it [the B-1] was the only weapon system he [President Carter] canned,” are indicative of the fact that the campaign had “a direct role” in the B-1 decision. Indeed, Provance adds that Carter may have chosen the date of his B-1 announcement because of a suggestion from the campaign (via letter) that June 30 would be the three-year anniversary of the aircraft’s “roll-out” in California.41 There is no doubt that Carter’s B-1 decision “fit” with the campaign’s desires and goals. Yet one is also faced with the problem of correspondence versus causation. Neither of the campaign’s two meetings at the White House involved the president or any of the national security or defense principals. This author could find no internal administration correspondence tying the B-1 decision directly to the campaign’s letter-writing, vigils, or lobbying. While the campaign was influential in Congress, particularly so during Ford’s presidency, it is less clear how much importance one should give it when looking at President Carter’s final determination. The precise effect of defense-left groups on Carter’s other 1977 defense decisions is also uncertain. For instance, it is unlikely that the slowdown of the MX is attributable to antinuclear or defense-left groups. There was no anti-MX pressure in 1977, and the anti-MX work of SANE and Mobilization for Survival did not start until 1978 and 1979. In fact, Mobilization for Survival was started by Provance himself to keep up the antinuclear momentum following Carter’s

40. Terry Provance, telephone interview, January 7, 2004, and email, September 1, 2004; Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder, 157–59. 41. Terry Provance, telephone interview, January 7, 2004; email, September 1, 2004.

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B-1 decision. It may have been different in the case of the ERW. In their discussion of propaganda campaigns, David Martin and John Rees claim that Carter’s decision to delay the ERW in order to consult with European allies was the result of pressure from a concerted Soviet media campaign and an international “week of action” sponsored by the World Peace Council that ran over the second week of August. One cannot deny the temporal correlation. Between August 11 and 15, Brzezinski, the Pentagon, and ERDA all counseled Carter to move forward with ERW production, but by August 16 the Washington Post had reported that Carter had decided to postpone. Again, however, coincidence is not causation. It is possible that West German domestic political concerns were front and center, particularly when one considers that relations between the United States and West Germany were already under strain in early August over a leaked report about the administration’s national strategic review and its impact on West German defense.42 Of course, there is also the possibility that European defense-left pressure groups caused Carter’s hesitancy indirectly because of the pressure they exerted on Bonn and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, but this then moves the interpretation away from the interest group pressure on Carter himself. Is the 1977 adjustment explicable based upon changes in the international environment? A realist looking at Carter’s adjustments, particularly an offensive realist, would hypothesize that the cut in funding for strategic nuclear forces should have arisen only out of some objective weakening of Soviet military power. A realist would argue that states do not “self-weaken” in the face of a powerful opponent because by doing so, they place their own survival at risk. As it stands, Carter’s decision does not accord with traditional realist logic. The objective strategic environment faced by Ford (and newly elected Carter) during the presidential transition was the same one Carter faced from January to August 1977. There was no objective weakening of Soviet military power— nuclear or conventional—in that time. Indeed, when one examines internal memoranda written immediately prior to Carter’s February FY1978 adjustment, it is not hard to discern the new administration’s concerns about Soviet power and U.S. weakness in such varied areas as the potential danger of depressed trajectory SLBM attacks on the United States, a identified lack of 42. Terry Provance, telephone interview, January 7, 2004. David Martin and John Rees, “Soviet Deception in the United States,” 150–51. Auger, Dynamics of Foreign Policy, 54. Also see Washington Post, August 16, 1977, A6; August 3, 1977, A19; August 4, 1977, A12; August 5, 1977, A16 and A20. Also see the discussion between Senator Sam Nunn and Secretary Brown on the morning of the leak in Senate Armed Services Committee, NATO Postures and Initiatives, August 3, 1977, 12–15.

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integration between Central Front war planning and Atlantic war planning and logistics, and the expansion and modernization of Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe.43 It is difficult to make the case that Carter’s cut of nuclear modernization programs was some type of automatic reaction to objective changes in Soviet military power. Furthermore, if, like Robert Thornton claims, Carter was to have hardened his defense policies very early on because of new intelligence on Soviet military power, specifically ICBM accuracy, purportedly received in the administration’s first weeks, the immediate cuts in strategic weapons funding and the attendant delay of the new missile system’s initial operating capability in late February 1977 make little sense. In the standard realist framework, decreases would not be a logical next step. If new intelligence of this sort was uncovered in the administration’s first month, then realism—particularly offensive realism—would suggest no downward alterations of Ford’s FY1978 program.44 A better explanation is found using a neoclassical realist framework that logically integrates the international environment and the administration’s assessment of that environment. The “slowdown” was a deflection from what the international military-operational environment suggested. How did such a deflection come about? First, though Carter and his advisers were very aware of the overall military trends, they were at the same time skeptical of the previous administration’s strategic assumptions. Second, they were convinced, based on assured vulnerability theory, that certain types of weapons systems—namely, so-called counterforce systems—were more escalatory in character than others and could therefore easily derail ongoing arms control negotiations. The new administration questioned whether its predecessor had the most accurate picture of the international environment, especially considering the Team A/Team B exercise. It also held that the quest for “superiority” was illusory and dangerous to the bilateral relationship. Carter and his team believed they could manage the risk to U.S. strategic nuclear systems until they had the opportunity to conduct their own strategic review or, even better, were able to negotiate the risk away through SALT II. The evidence for this belief can be 43. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: JCS Briefings: NSC Action Implications, undated [but between January 20, 1977, and January 26, 1977] and Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Brzezinski and Harold Brown regarding the President’s responses to Brzezinski’s early memo, January 26, 1977. Both located in Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 21, Folder: Jimmy Carter, Sensitive, 1/77–9/78, JCL. See also Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Summary of Conclusions of SCC Meeting on MBFR, February 7, 1977, 2–3. Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 26, Folder SCC 3 2/7/77, JCL. 44. Thornton, Carter Years, 13, 38n7.

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found in the open and publicly stated doubts about reigning assessments of Soviet objectives, the similarities between the strategic cuts and the anticounterforce advice provided during the transition, and finally the expressed concerns about “first strike,” “superiority,” and the need for “deep cuts” in presidential correspondence and in documented conversations. The New York Times had leaked the existence of the Team A/Team B exercise right in the middle of the presidential transition. This leak, together with interviews and speeches by Team B participants, unleashed a torrent of public argument (which still continues to this day) about U.S. and Soviet military capabilities. President Carter and many of his advisers were less convinced by NSSM 246, NSDM 348, or Team B. Team B’s analysis was thought to be too ideologically motivated; in the opinion of Victor Utgoff, the NSC’s staff director for defense coordination, it was “a little too hard over.”45 Yes, the new administration argued, it was true that the Soviet Union had made significant militaryoperational gains, but that did not mean that its military or strategic posture was necessarily superior. In his inaugural address Carter had emphasized this point, reminding his audience that American strength was not based completely on its military arsenal.46 In the administration’s first week, Brown explained to reporters that the two countries were in “rough parity” and that intelligence assessments of Moscow’s future programs varied widely. Regardless, he added, the United States would have the information and the time to “speed up” its response if necessary. Less than a week later, he testified on the Hill that there was no “immediate grave alarm” over the U.S.-Soviet military situation. Granted, he continued, if nuclear and conventional arms control negotiations fell through and the Soviet Union continued its trend, then the United States might be faced with the need for “selective” building—to ensure equality, or, at least for credibility’s sake, to maintain the semblance of equality. Very early on, Carter expressed concerns to both Brezhnev and Ambassador Dobrynin about American bids for “superiority” and the need to “reduc[e] the possibility of pre-emptive strike.” In short, there was time—the administration believed it could do its own, less ideologically motivated strategic review and could “go slow” on the MX and other strategic programs. It is important to note that Carter’s FY1978 adjustment was not based on the administration’s own NSSM 246–like study. The

45. Victor Utgoff, telephone interview, June 30, 2003. 46. Carter’s Inaugural Address, www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/inaugadd. phtml (accessed February 2, 2008).

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changes made to Ford’s final budget were completed well before the Terms of Reference for Carter’s own strategic study were even disseminated to the participating departments.47 The February cuts had been on the policy docket early on. Carter and his advisers also had their own perspectives on counterforce. During the transition, Anthony Lake and Matthew Schaffer told Carter that he had three choices when it came to America’s need for counterforce options which might deter Soviet military activity or mitigate the consequences of deterrence failure. He could follow Ford’s strategic trajectory and continue to improve targeting flexibility and the ability to destroy hardened Soviet targets—transformations which would (theoretically) degrade the Soviet Union’s second and third nuclear salvos as well as its conventional military strength. Or he could turn his back on the previous administration’s approach altogether. He could end all improvements to flexibility and hard-target kill on the basis that such activity actually made nuclear conflict “more thinkable, acceptable and respectable.” Finally, Carter could take the middle route. He could separate flexibility and the problem of hard-target kill. The Soviet Union would not put at risk the weapon platforms that held most of its nuclear firepower; therefore any improvement in the United States’ ability to destroy hardened silos would be unduly threatening, causing Moscow to shift to a more dangerous alert posture such as “launch on warning” or “launch under attack.” The two advisers argued against hard-target kill, but suggested the pursuit of flexibility, the improvement of U.S. targeting plans, enhanced nuclear C3I, and perhaps also the construction of a new, smaller-yield warhead. For them, counterforce would be a nonissue unless the United States solved its own vulnerability problem—a solution which, they concluded, was dependent upon negotiating down the Soviet Union’s own counterforce arsenal.48 47. New York Times, January 27, 1977, 6. See Brown’s testimony in Senate Appropriations Committee, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978, Part 1: Posture Statements, February 1, 1977, 190. Carter reacted to Brezhnev’s speech in Tula by stating that “[t]he United States does not want anything less or more [than a defense strong enough to deter any potential enemy] for itself either.” Letter from Carter to Brezhnev, January 26, 1977, reprinted in Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5: 145. Also see Carter’s arms control views as told to Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin. Memorandum of Conversation, Dobrynin meeting with President Carter, Cyrus Vance, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, February 1, 1977, 5, Declassified Documents Reference Service [hereafter DDRS], CK3100048704. The NSC distributed the Terms of Reference on March 2, 1977. Memorandum from DCI (Designate) Admiral Stansfield Turner to Brzezinski, Subject: PRM-10, March 4, 1977, Central Intelligence Agency, FOIA by author, F-2002–01941. 48. Lake and Schaffer, Options Paper, “DRAFT: The Defense Budget and the US Military Posture,” section 3: “Strategic Nuclear Forces,” 27, 28.

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Of course, each of these choices had consequences for the strategic systems under review in early 1977. With regard to the MX, Lake and Schaffer insisted that the Air Force only wanted the new ICBM in order to build up its ability to destroy hard targets. In light of this, they suggested that as “an alternative approach” Carter could learn from Senator McIntyre’s example and focus attention on Minuteman basing rather than on a follow-on ICBM. The new administration could also ignore the basing issue altogether and deploy the biggest possible MIRV ICBM that could fit into existing and vulnerable Minuteman silos (though it would run the risk of catastrophe after a successful surprise attack and might also leave the United States with fewer total launchers under potential SALT II MIRV sublimits). A second option was a new and “lighter” ICBM with two variants: a MIRV missile, or one with a single, largeryield warhead. The “lightness” of this new missile, Lake and Schaffer suggested, would appear less threatening to Soviet ICBMs because (adding honestly) its throw-weight would make little overall difference. In conclusion, they offered two final scenarios that dismissed plans for a new ICBM altogether. Instead, as had been argued in the past, ICBM RVs could either be moved to submarines, or the United States could sit tight and do nothing. The two advisers made it clear that if Carter picked a more “radical” approach, explicitly turning away from counterforce—or even if he made slight changes to the Ford program— then he would have to move fast to alter the FY1978 budget. If not, his changes would have to wait, likely until the following January and his FY1979 defense program announcement.49 As the Lake and Schaffer “alternative approach” suggested, Carter in fact did delay the MX program and focused attention on basing. Another of their concerns—flexibility—was certainly on Carter’s mind (and Brzezinski’s) from the first days of the administration. After Carter’s introduction to the SIOP with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1977, Brzezinski argued that there were still not enough limited options for the president in a crisis, that Carter needed training in the use of limited strikes, and that the regional nuclear options and limited nuclear options in the SIOP were not properly “integrated” and could not be quickly retargeted.50 49. Ibid., 32–33. Lake’s and Schaffer’s idea of a smaller, single-warhead missile appears in the first Carter-Dobrynin meeting when Carter suggested that both countries could de-MIRV and move to an ICBM force of one thousand single-warhead (100 kiloton) missiles. Memorandum of Conversation, Dobrynin meeting with President Carter et al., February 1, 1977, 2, DDRS, CK3100048704. Lake and Schaffer, Options Paper, “Section III: Strategic Nuclear Forces,” 29. 50. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: JCS Briefings: NSC Action Implications, undated [but between January 20, 1977, and January 26, 1977] and Memorandum of Telephone

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It is also possible that Carter’s 1977 adjustments to strategic nuclear forces were influenced by the so-called deep cuts study that Carter requested in the administration’s first days. Carter wanted “real” reductions and “true” arms control, and in one of his first meetings with the Joint Chiefs in January 1977 he reiterated this desire. He asked whether it was possible to “scale down deterrence levels” and requested a quick analysis of the effect on deterrence if the total numbers of launchers on both sides were cut to 200–250. Carter had a submarine-and-SLBM-focused arsenal in mind, but the study showed that very low launcher numbers did two things: they necessitated a mix in U.S. forces since, with fewer numbers, the Soviet Union could better focus its defense efforts, and they required greater use of MIRVs to hedge against any clandestine deployment of ABM systems. The study determined that ICBMs would still be necessary and “asymmetries” in throw-weight and MIRVs would take on greater importance. One might think that this should have pointed in Rumsfeld’s direction (the deployment of a new, heavy ICBM and new penetrating bomber), but the main thrust of the study was that a world of lower launcher numbers revolved around defenses and platform survivability. Very low numbers only worked if one had survivable basing, limits on antisubmarine warfare and air defense, and intrusive inspection regimes. With inspections, one could hopefully verify limits and detect any ABM cheating. At low numbers, accuracy was important (because one wanted remaining RVs to be militarily effective), but launcher survival was paramount.51 One sees this logic carried over into Carter’s early defense decisions. The most important thing about a new follow-on ICBM was not necessarily hardtarget kill, but survivable basing. Similarly, while a new penetrating bomber

Conversation between Brzezinski and Harold Brown regarding the President’s responses to Brzezinski’s early memo, January 26, 1977. Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 21, Folder: Jimmy Carter, Sensitive, 1/77–9/78, JCL. 51. Brzezinski stated that Carter was “aggressive” in the meeting about getting launcher numbers down. In a handwritten note next to Brzezinski’s summary memo, Carter said that “an early brief analysis is needed” in “2 or 3 days.” Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: JCS Briefings: NSC Action Implications, undated [but between January 20, 1977, and January 26, 1977], 3. Also see the cover memo to the study, “Implications of Major Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Forces.” Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: Implications of Major Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Forces, January 28, 1977, USSR-US Conference (1994) Briefing Book (II), IV-9. USSR Vertical File, JCL. “Implications of Major Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Forces,” IV-15, IV-16, IV-14–15, IV-18, IV-16–18. The report demonstrated that a low-number world opened a strategic Pandora’s box, including, but not limited to, the problems associated with pacing and phasing of cuts, third-party arsenals, verifiability, forward-based systems, “gray-area” systems, and the role of conventional forces.

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like the B-1 might be optimized for survival through rapid “flushing” under alert, nuclear hardening, and electronic countermeasures, there was a still a measurable (and costly per unit) risk of launcher attrition by Soviet air defense. Carter’s push for stand-off attack can be viewed through the prism of “deep cuts.” If the alert levels, capability, and endurance of the B-52 could be improved and if cruise missiles did the actual work of swarming and penetrating Soviet air space, it could decrease the total number of launchers lost to Soviet air defense (at a lower cost than the B-1 system) and facilitate the future “deep cuts” that Carter so very much desired. Cost effectiveness and interest group pressure are partial explanations of Carter’s 1977 defense decisions. They add fuel to the causal fire, perhaps more so in the case of the B-1 bomber cancellation, but they do not explain enough on their own. Carter’s adjustment to the FY1978 defense budget—the strategic “slowdown”—demonstrates the power of an incoming administration’s strategic beliefs on assessment. Neoclassical realism emphasizes the way that perception and beliefs can move an administration in a policy direction that is in opposition to what the international strategic environment suggests. Looking at Carter and his team, their assessment of Soviet military power was colored by their ideas about the “real” meaning of the Soviet buildup; the intellectual legacy of assured vulnerability thinking, particularly the theory’s pessimism about counterforce; and the present and future course of SALT— perhaps even a mutual future of “deep cuts” and very low numbers of survivable launchers. How does this neoclassical realist argument relate to the popular accusation that Carter’s early defense decisions were meant as unilateral arms control “signals” to the Soviet Union? Many in 1977 (and later) argued that the administration decreased its spending on strategic nuclear forces to show Moscow that the new president was serious about moving ahead on SALT II. The White House, so goes the argument, assumed that the Soviets would react to American “preemptive” restraint with cooperation, restraint, or concessions of their own.52 In this light, the MX cut and the delay of the missile’s initial operating capability was actually a “deposit” or sign of good faith in anticipation of a ban on new ICBM and mobile missile systems that would be offered in a SALT II “comprehensive proposal” which Secretary of State Vance would take to

52. See, for example, discussions about this in reference to the FY1978 adjustment. New York Times, February 21, 1977, 1; Business Week, February 28, 1977, 36.

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Moscow the following month. In the same way, the B-1 decision was also meant to show that the United States was serious about limiting nuclear systems. The administration flatly denied these claims. Brown repeatedly did so in his testimony on the cuts to the FY1978 budget. Some in the administration heard internal talk about the use of the MX delay as an arms control “signal,” but Utgoff has stated that that justification was less important than the administration’s desire to reevaluate the Ford administration’s assessment of the international strategic environment, concerns about cost control, and technological skepticism about the current basing plans. Appearances aside, it is probably more accurate to say that the MX cut was not conceived first and foremost as a SALT II negotiating instrument. The positions in the “comprehensive proposal” were not solidified until mid-March—well after the FY1978 MX cut. In the case of the B-1, Carter mentioned the “bargaining chip” aspect of his June decision himself, but did not claim that the cancellation per se was meant to show restraint. The plane was not canceled for SALT II. Instead, Carter argued that his decision not to stop construction of the test planes or end electronic countermeasures research and development signaled to the Soviets that the administration could restart its efforts if their cooperation in SALT II was not forthcoming. Carter’s argument was not without its critics inside the White House and the Pentagon, but in the president’s view, the B-1 cut itself was not the most important arms control “signal.”53 Rather, its benefit as a “bargaining chip” derived from the fact that there were parts of the penetrating bomber program that were still on the table. In short, Carter’s 1977 strategic “slowdown” was related to and definitely affected SALT II, but the negotiations were not the cause of it.

53. FY1978 Authorization, Part 1: Authorizations, February 24, 1977, 656, 673. Victor Utgoff, telephone interview, June 30, 2003. The SALT II comprehensive proposal was worked out over the course of late February and early March 1977 and was solidified in a “rump” and “principals-only” SCC meeting on March 12, 1977: Talbott, Endgame, 58–59. Carter, Public Papers 1977, vol. 1, 1200; Business Week, June 20, 1977, 127. Brzezinski’s military assistant William Odom, for instance, believed at the time that it was “mysterious” and made “no sense” to think that the B-1 decision made the Soviet Union any more likely to show restraint in SALT II than if the United States had actually moved ahead to build the plane. Indeed, Odom argued that the cancellation threw a wrench into the negotiations. Oral History (Brzezinski, Albright, Denend, and Odom), Miller Center Interviews, Carter Presidency Project, vol. 15 [hereafter Miller Center NSC Oral History], February 18, 1982, 50, JCL. Though Odom does not explain in the interview how the decision hurt the United States in the negotiations, it did so by immediately channeling the Soviet Union’s energies toward limiting the penetrative capabilities of the remaining delivery systems (for example, ALCM range limits and range definitions and limits on the number of cruise missiles allowed per heavy bomber). For other criticisms of the decision from the Pentagon, specifically by William Perry’s assistant Seymour Zeiberg, see Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder, 182–83.

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Conventional Forces, Presidential Review Memorandum 10 (PRM-10), Presidential Directive 18 (PD-18) and Carter’s FY1979 Defense Budget The argument that the Carter administration’s strategic ideas and beliefs— in neoclassical realist fashion—“deflected” an accurate assessment of what was required of the United States would be incomplete if it only focused on the administration’s critique of Team B, NSSM 246, and its ideas about counterforce, stability, and arms control. One must also examine how the incoming president’s team viewed conventional forces and the conventional “balance” in Europe. The new administration understood that the Warsaw Pact’s qualitative and quantitative improvements, particularly the disparity in armor, put NATO at a distinct disadvantage along the Central Front. And this, in its eyes, was a greater cause for concern than any possible asymmetry in strategic nuclear forces. In its view, the deterrence of conflict in Europe was not first and foremost a problem that required new strategic system solutions, but one that required NATO to have credible conventional defenses and militarily effective theater nuclear capabilities. If at all possible, it also necessitated the “equalization” of conventional forces through MBFR. The administration’s main defense program effort in 1977 was not nuclear in its emphasis, but conventional. With one hand, it cut and delayed nuclear programs that it saw as escalatory, antithetical to future arms limitation, and— particularly with the B-1 bomber—just plain expensive. With the other hand, the administration began the process of revamping NATO’s conventional capabilities. Using the results of the Nunn-Bartlett report in addition to the work of Robert Komer at RAND, the White House and Pentagon struggled from January to May 1977 to construct a blueprint that would guide the improvement of both NATO’s conventional capabilities and the alliance’s mechanisms for planning and programming those enhancements. This blueprint became what was called the Long-Term Defense Program. Moreover, despite it having addressed both nuclear and conventional forces, Carter’s first-year strategic review, PRM-10, and its resulting Presidential Directive 18 (PD-18) was heavily weighted toward the European conventional conflict. In turn, PD-18 formed the basis of the president’s first personalized defense budget (FY1979) and the administration’s initial Five Year Defense Program. It is therefore not without reason that many in the winter of 1977–1978 referred to Carter’s FY1979 budget as the “NATO budget.”54 54. Washington Post, January 15, 1978, A6, January 24, 1978, A15, January 27, 1978, A1; Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 30, 1978, 18, 33.

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NATO was on the White House’s front burner from the moment Carter took the oath of office. Many in NATO had registered concern over Carter’s campaign pledge to cut U.S. defense spending. Even though Carter had couched his plans in terms of cutting away “fat” versus “muscle,” allies in Europe were nonetheless unnerved about American credibility and deterrence. For this reason, Vice President Walter Mondale was dispatched on a whirlwind trip to Europe the Sunday following the inauguration. Immediately after, Senator Sam Nunn and fellow Senator Dewey Bartlett released to the public a report that had already been briefed to the new president and vice president—a study entitled NATO and the New Soviet Threat (known unofficially as the Nunn-Bartlett report).55 Nunn had built up a reputation as one of the Senate’s resident experts on NATO and European defense. In April 1974 he had written a report (Policy, Troops and the NATO Alliance) that called for better coordination between conventional and nuclear operations, in addition to decreasing the number of American forces in Europe by restructuring the ratio of combat troops to combat-support units.56 Yaffe argues that this 1974 report so intrigued Defense Secretary Schlesinger that he and Nunn joined forces later that same year to get Congress to request an official report on theater nuclear weapons in order that Schlesinger could turn around and use it in his battles on the Hill over TNF modernization programs.57 Nunn had other NATO-related concerns as well. He and others were fearful that NATO operational planning had not taken Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional improvements seriously enough. The alliance, Nunn believed, was under the erroneous impression that it would have adequate warning of an attack and that the war would last long enough to allow for war-winning reinforcement across the Atlantic. Using the analyses of retired General James Hollingsworth, who had done his own study of the Army’s conventional war-fighting capabilities in the spring of 1976, Nunn worked to raise awareness of NATO’s shortcomings on 55. New York Times, November 15, 1976, January 25, 1977. The Nunn-Bartlett report (and the Hollingsworth Report) was a big part of the agenda of Carter’s and Brown’s introductory meeting with NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe Alexander Haig on January 28, 1977. They wanted Haig’s criticisms of the two reports. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, January 28, 1977, [N]ational [S]ecurity [A]dviser Agency File, Box 11, NATO 2–3/1977, JCL. 56. Yaffe, Origins, 517–18. 57. Ibid., 517–20. Nunn, in cooperation with Schlesinger, asked for a report on theater nuclear forces. The report, “The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe,” was released in April 1975. The unclassified version can be found in Pranger and Labrie, Nuclear Strategy, 167–88; Christoph Bluth, Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy, 209, 209n24; University of Maryland, The Evolution of Selective Options Strategy, 47–48, 52.

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the Hill. In late 1976 he and Bartlett visited Europe on a fact-finding tour, and upon their return they cowrote a report that reinforced Hollingsworth’s work. In short, the Nunn-Bartlett report argued that Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces along the Central Front were optimized for a blitzkrieg-type of strike against NATO. There would be little warning of an attack. The ensuing conflict would be fast-paced and the Warsaw Pact’s military objectives (and the Soviet Union’s political objectives) would probably be achieved before NATO had time to reinforce. Given this scenario, NATO would have little choice but to use nuclear weapons. However, even this was questioned given the expected speed of the assault. Either NATO would have to use nuclear weapons immediately or else they would be used with Pact forces operating deep in allied territory. Each choice was politically unpalatable; the first was probably escalatory. Nunn and Bartlett’s prescriptions paralleled those in Ford’s NSSM 246 and NSDM 348, albeit in more general language: conventional force modernization (improved antitank weaponry, better artillery, new fire control systems—all of which included the integration of new communications and information processing technology), a reassessment of warning time, redeployments and improved prepositioning of equipment, continued modernization of theater nuclear weapons, and more focused interoperability of U.S. and NATO forces.58 Of course, these problems had not suddenly materialized at the time of Carter’s inauguration. One important goal of theater nuclear modernization under Nixon and Ford had always been the (credible) blunting of this fast-paced blitzkrieg, even to the point of being able to strike at an enemy’s logistics and any reinforcements moving up to the front. That said, the Schlesinger and Ford theater nuclear programs were not done to the exclusion of other military approaches. Indeed, 1975 and 1976 were very busy years within the U.S. defense establishment when it came to envisioning the destruction of the Warsaw Pact blitzkrieg with conventional instead of nuclear means. According to Richard Van Atta and others, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Tactical Technology Office during 1974 and 1975 had begun to explore the integration of moving target indicator radar and terminal-guided submunitions in order to destroy tanks sans line-of-sight. In parallel, the U.S. Air Force was examining the use of submunitions through its Wide-Area Anti-Tank Munitions program. In 1976, the Defense Science Board used its annual summer study to look at the 58. For a short discussion of Nunn-Bartlett, see Yaffe, Origins, 603–6, and Richard Stachurski, “The Nunn-Bartlett Report: A Realistic Prescription for NATO?” The eight recommendations of the NunnBartlett Report can be found in the questions submitted to Brown by Senator Bartlett in FY1978 Authorization, Part 1: Authorizations, February 24, 1977, 682–83.

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challenges associated with the use of conventional “counterforce” in Europe.59 Hence, with the release of the Nunn-Bartlett report in January 1977, Nunn had performed a service similar to what he had done in 1974. He put the preexisting challenge of NATO’s military effectiveness up for congressional and public debate, and at the same time provided a voice for those in the military who gave him information but who were unable to speak out themselves. The new administration was receptive to Nunn and Bartlett’s arguments and the need for NATO conventional modernization in general. In their first private meeting on February 1, 1977, Carter warned Dobrynin that he would be placing “more emphasis” on NATO. Secretary Brown was already convinced upon taking office of the need for conventional modernization in NATO, testifying that same morning to the Senate that the defense of Western Europe was the administration’s first geopolitical priority and that improved conventional forces were needed if the United States expected to stop (and therefore deter) a Soviet land-grab in Western Europe. According to recent claims by William Perry, who served under Brown as the director of Defense Research and Engineering, it was during these same first weeks that he and Brown sat down, took stock of the many conventional “counterforce” programs that were already under investigation, considered new avenues of research, and formulated what he says the two of them called the “offset strategy”—an explicit, three-component plan that used new sensor technology, precision guidance, and stealth capabilities to “offset” the tank asymmetry in Central Europe. Herbert York’s papers and letters would seem to confirm Perry’s narrative. In addition to his work on the Strategic Bomber Force Modernization Study, York was tasked by the Pentagon (reporting to Ambassador Robert Komer) to examine the ways in which NATO’s conventional capabilities could be made “more realistic” (that is, more credible) through the use of high technology, with the goal of “raising the nuclear threshold to ‘infinity.’” York states that he used Carter’s policy statement that “the right number of nuclear weapons is none at all” as his yardstick and determined that his job was to investigate the technical possibility of “conventional-only” defense (and, by extension, conventional-only deterrence) in Europe.60 59. Richard Van Atta, Jack Nunn, and Alethia Cook, “Assault Breaker,” in Van Atta et al., Transformation and Transition: DARPA’s Role in Fostering an Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs, Volume 2—Detailed Assessments (IDA Paper-P-3698), November 2003, IV-6 to IV-10. The author would like to thank Richard Van Atta for providing preview copies of chapters from their second volume. 60. Memorandum of Conversation with President Carter, Anatoli Dobrynin et al., February 1, 1977, 6, DDRS, CK3100048704. See the testimony by Secretary Brown and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

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From February until Carter’s speech to the North Atlantic Council in London on May 10, the administration approached the issue of NATO conventional modernization from a number of directions. The “offset strategy” accelerated the tempo of research into conventional “counterforce.” Second, whereas strategic forces were cut in FY1978 budget adjustment, money was added for immediate conventional improvements and maintenance, some of which had been highlighted by the Nunn-Bartlett report. The February 1977 adjustment put forward some NATO “quick-fixes”—an increase of the number of aircraft shelters, more Civil Reserve Aircraft Fleet planes, improvements to storage sites for prepositioned equipment, and funds with which to decrease the current overhaul and maintenance “backlog.”61 Keeping in mind the “offset strategy,” Brown and Komer, who had been brought into the Pentagon as special assistant for NATO Affairs, also worked to craft “initiatives” that as a set would form the basis of a new NATO reform package. Nearly all of these “initiatives” were taken from Komer’s November 1976 RAND study, Alliance Defense in the Eighties (AD-80). John Duffield explains that while AD-80 added little that was innovative to the debate over modernizing NATO hardware, the report was much stronger and “novel” in its examination of coalition force planning and “procedural” reform. The report suggested institutional changes that would move NATO past the point of creating strategy through the simple combination of alliance members’ national plans and force postures to a place where strategy was constructed through true, alliancewide analysis and prioritization.62 During the spring of 1977, Komer distilled George Brown in Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978, February 1, 1977, 181, 184–85. For some of Perry’s earliest use and explanation of the term “offset strategy” and its relationship to victory in the first Gulf War, see William Perry, “Desert Storm and Deterrence,” 66–82. Also see Ashton Carter and William Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America, 179–80; Perry, “Civil-Military Affairs and US Diplomacy: The Changing Roles of Regional Commanders-inChief,” speech to the Open Forum on May 1, 2001, http://www.state.gov/s/p/of/proc/tr/10840.htm (accessed February 2, 2008). For Perry’s discussion of the same concept during the Carter era, see “The Role of Technology in Strengthening NATO,” speech to the 15th International Wehrkunde Meeting, January 28, 1978, in Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Research and Development, Part 9, April 13, 1978, 6649–54. No author mentioned, Memo to the File, February 11, 1977, p. 1, Box 13, Folder 1; Letter from Herbert York to Harold Brown, March 23, 1977, pp. 1–2, Box 13, Folder 3, all in the Herbert York Papers. In the March 23 letter, York explained that in the “middle-term” there would have to be some balance between “redesign[ed] and redeploy[ed]” theater nuclear forces with new, high-tech conventional weapons. However, over time, he said that one would hopefully reach the point where one could pull all tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe. 61. This money had the added benefit of creating about 9,800 short-term and 4,900 long-term jobs. FY1978 Authorization, Part 1: Authorizations, February 24, 1977, 603–4, 660. 62. Duffield, Power Rules, 213–14.

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much of what he had written in AD-80 into a shorter report, which Brzezinski passed (in abbreviated form) to the Oval Office in mid-April.63 Lastly, spurred into action by the Nunn-Bartlett report, the NSC and U.S. intelligence community launched their own studies into the minutiae of NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict and conventional force modernization. In the administration’s first weeks, Carter signed into action three NSC PRMs that dealt directly with these issues: PRM-6 (MBFR), PRM-9 (Comprehensive Review of European Issues), and the PRM-10 strategic review. Given the Warsaw Pact’s new qualitative advantages on the Central Front, the interagency participants in PRM-6 concluded that MBFR would have to take more than just “manpower and tanks” into consideration.64 The NATO section of PRM9 called for analyses of warning time (including warning of an attack launched from a standing-still position), current force posture, interoperability of forces, standardization of equipment, appropriate levels of U.S. investment in (and purchase of) European defense materiel, and the desirability of a large-scale NATO strategy review.65 Many of these topics would be folded into the Force Posture and Contingency Assessments portions of PRM-10. Some of them mirrored Komer’s own work and one of them—warning time—ended up in the form of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 4-1-78—Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Going to War: Implications for NATO Warning of War). These were not tension-free exercises. There was concern from the very beginning as to whether the United States should initiate yet another “NATO strategy debate,” particularly one performed by a “Wise Men” group (as had been done in the mid-1950s). Carter demonstrated interest in the idea early on, but by the time February and March rolled around, Brzezinski had quashed the idea. Brzezinski believed that a U.S.-initiated “Wise Men” reevaluation of NATO strategy would only reopen questions about extended deterrence or else—if the group suggested new NATO machinery—would give allies heart63. Draft Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Ambassador Komer’s Program for Revamping NATO’s Defense Posture, undated, attached to memorandum with same title from James Thomson and Greg Treverton to Brzezinski (through Victor Utgoff), April 15, 1977. Also attached to these memoranda is Harold Brown’s one-page transmittal memorandum to President Carter on Robert Komer’s report, dated April 11, 1977. All are found in NSA Agency File, Box 11–21, Folder NATO 4-5/77, JCL. In the transmittal memo, Brown referred to his previewing of these initiatives for Carter back in late February. 64. Summary of Conclusions of SCC Meeting on MBFR (February 7), 2, attached to Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Summary of Conclusions of SCC Meeting on MBFR (February 7), February 10, 1977, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 26, Folder SCC 3, 2/7/77, JCL. 65. Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 9, Comprehensive Review of European Issues, February 1, 1977, 2.

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burn about American dominance. From Brzezinski’s perspective, the United States could suggest NATO “initiatives,” but it had to be done in such a way that it minimized any chance of repeating McNamara’s 1962 experience. It would be better all around if NATO reform was organic in flavor. Even though the “offset strategy” and especially (if York is to be believed) its apotheosis in “conventional-only” defense would mean a strategy debate sooner or later, Brzezinski wanted to assure NATO allies that when it came to the 1977 “initiatives,” the United States was “not embarking upon a great reassessment of either our involvement or basic NATO doctrine.”66 In addition, Brzezinski and his staff did not consider Brown and Komer as having the final word on the NATO package. Komer’s report, the NSC believed, was most helpful in the area of general principles, but since its recommendations had not been prioritized or evaluated in terms of cost, there was a limit as to how many of those recommendations could be brought to fruition. Even after Carter’s May 10 speech, Utgoff and Jim Thomson, who carried the NSC’s portfolio on European security, warned Brzezinski that Komer’s conclusions needed a great deal more analysis and evaluation and should not be granted more than just a “general endorsement.”67 On May 10, Carter gave a twenty-minute speech to the North Atlantic Council. In it, he addressed human rights and the West’s relationship with Eastern Europe, but capped it by stating that NATO was still the “heart” of U.S. foreign policy and that the growth of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces required adjustments on NATO’s part. He emphasized that the Soviet Union’s actions were far and above what was required for defense and that while the current economic situation made large increases in NATO defense spending difficult, the United States would lead the alliance with its own “major effort.” The speech, as planned, did not set a certain level of defense spending for each member state, but in the most general of terms proposed that NATO consider

66. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: The NATO Meeting in May, February 28, 1977, 1, NSA-Agency File, Box 11–21, Folder: NATO 2-3/77, JCL; Draft Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: May NATO Meeting, undated, attached as Tab I to Memorandum from Brzezinski to Robert Hunter, Subject: Henry Owen’s Memorandum on a NATO Summit, March 4, 1977, NSA-Agency File, Box 11–21, Folder: NATO 2-3/77, JCL. 67. Draft Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Ambassador Komer’s Program for Revamping NATO’s Defense Posture, undated, attached to memorandum with same title from James Thomson and Greg Treverton to Brzezinski (through Victor Utgoff), April 15, 1977, 1. NSA Agency File, Box 11-21, Folder NATO 4-5/77, JCL. Memorandum from James Thomson and Victor Utgoff to Brezinski, Subject: The Komer Report and Preparing for the Long-Range NATO Defense Study, May 13, 1977, 1. NSA Agency File, Box 11-21, Folder NATO 4-5/77, JCL.

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a comprehensive improvement of NATO’s capabilities—what would come to be called the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP).68 A week after Carter’s speech, Brown delivered the administration’s package of “initiatives” to NATO’s Defense Planning Committee. In response, the Defense Planning Committee designed nine separate task forces to look at the specific “initiative” areas. These included (among others): readiness, reinforcement, mobilization, command and control, electronic warfare, and air defense.69 An additional task force on theater nuclear forces, which became more important for the overall nuclear story, was added later. Next, the defense ministers agreed that the task force reports would be reviewed by the committee and that the conclusions would be transmitted, as a full program, to the Heads of Government at a summit in Washington, D.C., in May 1978. Finally, the committee approved the 1977 Ministerial Guidance, the Defense Planning Committee’s biannual strategic planning document. In very general language, the Guidance highlighted the growth of the Warsaw Pact threat, reiterated NATO’s reliance on flexible response and forward defense, but also insisted that conventional modernization was required to “avoid” the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict. The document expressed the need for more centralized planning and outlined (again, generally) the topics taken up by the LTDP task force panels. The Defense Planning Committee’s Final Communiqué explained that the LTDP would actually be the means by which the alliance would implement the requirements outlined in the new Ministerial Guidance. The Guidance, however, went one step further. Whereas Carter’s speech had shied away from concrete numbers, the Guidance proclaimed that all NATO members agreed on annual real defense spending increases (adjusted for inflation) somewhere “in the region of 3%.”70 Despite the agreement about the 1977 Ministerial Guidance and the 3 percent defense spending increase, none of it became official U.S. policy until after the completion of the administration’s strategic study (PRM-10) and the subsequent presidential directive, PD-18. As mentioned earlier, the idea of a new, large-scale strategic review had been discussed very early on. Carter had talked

68. Carter, Public Papers 1977, vol. 1, 848–52; Washington Post, May 11, 1977, A18. 69. For a full list of the LTDP Task Force reports, see House Armed Services Committee, NATO Standardization, Interoperability and Readiness, March 14, 1978, 1495–96. 70. NATO Defense Planning Committee Final Communiqué, May 17–18, 1977, http://www.nato. int/docu/comm/49–95/c770517a.htm (accessed February 2, 2008); NATO 1977 Ministerial Guidance, Annex to the Defense Planning Committee Final Communiqué, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/ 49-95/c770517b.htm (accessed February 2, 2008).

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throughout his campaign about doing his own NSC-68, and a strategic review was one of the subjects discussed at a “nonofficial NSC” meeting held in the weeks before the inauguration.71 PRM-10 was approved in mid-February. Its division into two separate parts reflected internal complaints that the NSC was stealing turf which rightfully belonged to the State Department and the Pentagon. The first part, a Comprehensive Net Assessment, was run under the authority of the Brzezinski-chaired NSC Special Coordination Committee. The second was a military strategy and force posture study organized under the Brown-chaired NSC Policy Review Committee. Brzezinski asked his longtime friend, Samuel Huntington, to come and direct the net assessment. Three others assisted Huntington: Richard Betts, William Odom, and Catherine Kelleher. Together, they became known during the PRM-10 exercise as the “Gang of Four.” Harold Brown assigned the task of the force posture and military strategy review to Lynn Davis and Utgoff was asked to run the “contingency assessments” portion of the exercise, the findings of which were published as an annex to the final PRM-10 Force Posture report.72 PRM-10 was one of the largest strategic reviews of the Cold War—if not the largest. The Comprehensive Net Assessment was constructed from eleven separate task force panels. Six of these were geographic in character, while the remainder focused on functional topics like Intelligence Capabilities, Political Institutions, and Strategic Policy. Additionally, there were smaller “special analyses” done on issues such as covert action and “crisis confrontations.” Each of these task forces had representation from the major agencies, and their final reports ranged somewhere between 25 and 100 pages. Richard Betts explains that the “gang of four” then took these task force reports and used them to write a 300- to 400-page Overview Report. The Overview Report, he added, was not “constrained” by the task forces’ submissions, but Huntington and his assistants used them to stimulate their own thinking and writing.73 In the Overview Report, Huntington suggested that with the Soviet Union’s achievement of nuclear parity and the growth of its military power through the late 1960s and 1970s, the U.S.-Soviet competition had now entered a new “era” 71. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 51–52. 72. PRM-10, Comprehensive Net Assessment and Force Posture Review, February 18, 1977; Lawrence Korb, “National Security Organization and Process in the Carter Administration,” 124; Washington Post, July 6, 1977, A1; Richard Betts, email communication, December 10, 2003. 73. Odom, Miller Center NSC Oral History, 30–33. Neither the PRM-10 task force reports nor the Overview Report have been declassified. For additional information on the role of PRM-10 “crisis confrontations” (specifically involving U.S.-Soviet competition in Iran), see Odom, “The Cold War Origins of the US Central Command,” 59. Betts, email, December 10, 2003.

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(what he deemed Era II). This new era was defined as well by the post-1973 importance of the Persian Gulf for NATO and the United States, the SinoSoviet split (and triangular diplomacy allowed by that rift), and the fact emphasized in Trilateralism that international economic strength was “diffuse.” The Overview Report stated that militarily, the superpowers were now “asymmetrical[ly] equivalen[t].” To be sure, the report admitted that the late 1960s and 1970s had been lean years—overly lean—when it came to U.S. defense spending. In Europe, the Warsaw Pact had conventional advantages and there were gaps in the United States’ knowledge about Soviet strategic systems. Yet, Huntington and his staff insisted that there was still “essential equivalence” between the two sides, and that when it came to European conflict the Soviet Union had no guarantee of success. There were regions of potential near-term military and political crisis, particularly Iran and the Persian Gulf, but the United States also had advantages of its own that it could exploit—technology, as well as economic, informational, and ideological power (what Joseph Nye would later refer to as “soft power”). These, said the Overview Report, were some of the Soviet Union’s weakest spots.74 Not unlike its sister study, the PRM-10 Military Strategy and Force Posture Report was another immense interagency and interservice undertaking. The report was constructed in a building-block format and centered on five warfighting categories: U.S.-Soviet conflict in Europe, out-of-area operations in support of European war, war in East Asia, peacekeeping/local wars, and superpower nuclear conflict. For each of these war-fighting categories, Davis’s group put together anywhere from three to five alternate “substrategies.” These substrategies were organized along a continuum of light to heavy involvement— for example, in the European conflict category the substrategies ranged from “tripwire” to “counteroffensive”; for local wars they ranged from “proxy reliance” to “heavy intervention.” In the strategic nuclear realm, each of the substrategies offered different levels of hard-target kill. With three to five substrategies established in each war-fighting category, the report mixed and matched the substrategies to create eight separate Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS). Each of the AIMS, designated by the letters E, F, F(variant), G, H, I, J, and M, was given a projected five-year cost. AIMS E, F, and G (collectively known as “Group One”) were the cheaper approaches; F(variant) 74. Odom, Miller Center NSC Oral History, 30–33. Memorandum from Brzezinski to Secretary of State et al., Subject: Summary of Conclusions: SCC Meeting on PRM-10 for July 7, 1977, July 25, 1977, 1–4, DDRS, CK3100004489. For Joseph Nye’s explanation of “soft power,” see The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone.

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was the so-called middle ground; the remainder (“Group Two”) were the more expensive and, for some, more escalatory options. The report analyzed the budgetary, foreign policy, and arms control implications of each AIMS. Finally, the Joint Chiefs added their own review of the AIMS in light of current Defense Guidance.75 According to Utgoff, the Contingency Assessments section of the PRM-10 report was a comparative study of U.S./NATO (FY1978) and Soviet/Warsaw Pact capabilities for mobilization, power projection, and war fighting. The report evaluated seven different scenarios—Central Front war, simultaneous war along the Central Front and NATO’s flanks, war outside Europe, superpower nuclear war, Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Korea. When it came to nuclear conflict, Utgoff ’s team ran three simulations and concluded that no matter the first mover, the amount of available warning, or the targeting policy used, each side could expect more than 110 million fatalities (113 million for the Soviet Union, 140 million for the United States) and the loss of more than 70 percent of “economic recovery resources.” An attack on one component of the triad, they argued, would alert the other two; even after a strike against bomber bases by SLBMs, the United States would still have enough bombers on alert. In short, should nuclear war occur, “neither [side] could conceivably be described as a ‘winner.’”76 With respect to the conventional “balance,” Europe was the one place in which Utgoff ’s team was “least confident” about whether the United States could achieve its war aims. In fact, the team’s report argued the chances that NATO could stop a Warsaw Pact attack with “minimal loss” of territory and take back all territory lost were “remote.” Other than nuclear use, the assessment suggested that the only thing which kept the Pact from moving across the line in Central Europe was the improbability that its forces could push all the way to France and the North Sea. The report highlighted NATO’s reliance on tactical air and emphasized the alliance’s dire need for larger reserve stocks, but admitted that there simply was not enough solid intelligence on (a) the Warsaw Pact’s ability to launch an attack with less than fourteen days of warning, 75. PRM-10 Military Strategy and Force Posture Review Final Report [hereafter PRM-10 Force Posture Report], June 8, 1977, DDRS, CK3100056945. For a list of the five categories and a list of the substrategies for each category, see the Executive Summary, 1–2. For an explanation of each of the AIMS and their cost, see 3–7. For policy implications (foreign, arms control, etc.), III-27 to III-34, and for “Military Implications of PRM-10 AIMS,” A-1 to A-6. 76. The complete Contingency Assessments portion (Annex A) has not been declassified, but some of the contingencies were summarized in the final report in the section titled “Current Capabilities.” PRM-10 Force Posture Report, II-1 to II-9. For the nuclear scenario, see II-5 and II-6.

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(b) sustainability and reinforcement (particularly the Soviet Union’s ability to move reserves from its western districts or more distant regions), or (c) the general effect of theater nuclear forces, which, according to Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner’s review of the assessment, was the “biggest imponderable of all.” Finally, the report analyzed the level to which (and the speed with which) the superpowers were able to increase forces in global “hotspots.” The United States, it concluded, could project power into more regions than the Soviet Union, but the Middle East (including the Persian Gulf) would be the “area of greatest difficulty.”77 Unlike the Comprehensive Net Assessment, which offered explicit conclusions about the state of the world and the superpower relationship, the PRM10 Force Posture Study was done to give the president discrete defense program options (or, at least from the Defense Department’s perspective, to provide Carter with an intellectual springboard from which he could craft guidance that the Pentagon could use). Throughout the exercise, the NSC, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Defense Department, Joint Staff, and the individual services were all at blows over whether the president could (or should) select one of the PRM-10 AIMS as the U.S. force posture. Brown was skeptical at the time and claims that the Joint Staff had been reticent about the whole project. Some in the NSC and OMB believed that the AIMS were useful for cost control and that the Pentagon’s hesitancy was simply turf-related—in Utgoff ’s view, the Navy had been particularly truculent. It did not help that the director of the Force Posture study, Lynn Davis, was not well liked within Pentagon circles.78 77. Ibid., II-1 to II-9. Also CIA Memorandum from DCI Turner to Brzezinski, Subject: Comments on Contingency Assessment Portion of PRM-10, June 15, 1977, TS#771545, Central Intelligence Agency, FOIA by author, Reference F-2002–01941; NSC Memorandum from James Thomson and Victor Utgoff to Brzezinski, Subject: PRC Meeting on PRM-10—Friday, July 8, 1977 at 10:00 A.M., July 6, 1977, 7–8, DDRS, CK3100144176; Victor Utgoff, telephone interview, June 30, 2003. 78. Brown, in his cover memo for the PRM-10 Force Posture study, stated that he did not believe any of the AIMS were “completely satisfactory” and that the report was just a “first step.” OSD Memorandum from Brown to Cyrus Vance et al., Subject: PRM-10 Force Posture Study, June 8, 1977, DDRS, CK3100056945. To this author, Harold Brown indicated that one of his frustrations with the PRM-10 exercise was military-civilian clashes within the Pentagon, particularly with the Joint Staff. Brown also remarked that he did not recall much bureaucratic strife between the NSC and the DOD, but the NSC staff ’s concern about Brown and the services comes through very clearly in internal documentation. With Brown’s cover memo in mind, Utgoff and Thomson warned Brzezinski against any moves by the Pentagon away from the AIMS and talk about general “guidance.” In discussions with this author, Utgoff highlighted the Navy’s hesitancy about the AIMS most of all. See NSC Memorandum from James Thomson and Victor Utgoff to Brzezinski, Subject: PRC Meeting on PRM-10—Friday, July 8, 1977 at 10:00 A.M., July 6, 1977, 3, DDRS, CK31000144176; Victor Utgoff, telephone interview, June 30, 2003; Harold Brown, telephone interview, January 10, 2004.

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Despite all of this, the study nevertheless focused the administration’s attention on the “big issues” surrounding U.S. nuclear policy, American conventional strength, and the NATO alliance. The PRM-10 analysis of U.S. strategic forces had a significant impact on the MX missile program in the FY1979 budget. For the topic at hand—European conventional modernization—the report’s division between Group One and Group Two AIMS highlighted the puzzles Washington faced in Europe. Group One AIMS (E, F, and G) were affordable, acceptable to European allies (who were faced with economic problems of their own), and also—in line with what Brzezinski had warned against early on—would not open up a new “NATO strategy debate.” The problem, however, was that they were not militarily effective; they “[did] not allow for favorable conflict termination” and would not “preserve or restore territorial integrity.” These particular AIMS, the Joint Chiefs added, meant early nuclear use or else Soviet victory in Europe. Though it was denied publicly, Group Two AIMS (H, I, J, and M) also accepted West German territorial loss, but because they increased force sizes, they improved the chances, once such forces were deployed, that the territory could be recovered and that the Pact might even be stopped without the use of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the Group Two AIMS were also more expensive, required larger allied defense budgets, reopened debates on extended deterrence and forward defense, and would likely be viewed by the East as “escalatory.”79 During the White House review of PRM-10, Brzezinski and the NSC staff argued that the Group Two AIMS carried too high a price tag for European allies. A more acceptable path, a middle path, needed to be found wherein the United States and NATO could work to improve its intelligence on Pact war fighting and at the same time implement a strategy of “stalemate.” To the best of the West’s ability, the rush of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces would have to be slowed in order to buy time for continental U.S.-based mobilization and transporting war materiel across the Atlantic. Program-wise, this meant (a) increased equipment stocks in Europe, (b) a confirmation of NATO’s 1977 May Ministerial—the entire LTDP and especially the 3 percent real increase, (c) airlift and sealift improvements, (f) a new look at power projection into the Middle East to protect NATO’s oil supply, and (g) a closer look at TNF, particularly ground-launched cruise missiles (but only after work had started on fixing the conventional gaps). Finally, Brzezinski agreed with PRM-10’s conclusion that the United States would have 79. For the discussion of Group One vs. Group Two AIMS, see PRM-10 Force Posture Report, I-11 to I-18. For specific passages on the opening of the NATO strategy debate and the Joint Chiefs’ comments, see I-17 and I-18.

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to “bluff” politically. Regardless of the level of procurement, it would still be necessary to push a much stronger declaratory position since every one of the AIMS allowed West German territorial loss and there was “no way” that the United States could admit that acceptance publicly.80 How was PRM-10 turned into policy? Typically, a presidential directive was signed after a PRM was completed, reviewed, and debated. A signed directive provided executive-authorized guidance with which departments were able to build and fund programs. A single PRM might result in a Presidential Directive (PD), more than one PD, or perhaps none at all. In the case of PRM-10, it took nearly two months to move from the PRM review stage to a final signature. Considering the sheer size of the sister studies, the number of institutions involved, and the internal tensions among the participants, much of the delay is explicable through simple bureaucracy. However, media leaks of the exercise did not help matters—particularly the August 3 Evans and Novak column detailing PRM-10’s conclusions about West German territorial loss and the “bluff ” strategy. Citing what appears to have been the Summary of Conclusions from the White House review of the conventional forces AIMS, the columnists reported that the administration’s military strategy “concede[d] defeat” and “gave up” a third of West Germany. The claim was immediately denied by the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department. Brown, in testimony before Nunn’s subcommittee that very morning, insisted that “conceding defeat” was not the administration’s policy, soft-pedaling accusations of a “stalemate” and “bluff ” by stating that the United States’ strategy in Europe was still forward defense and that the Pentagon was “aiming to meet [that] strategy.”81 The Evans and Novak column not only put the administration on the defensive but also aggravated U.S.-West German relations at a pivotal moment in the “neutron bomb” controversy, reinforcing fears in Bonn about how well the United States would look after West German interests in SALT II. On August 24, following these weeks of controversy, Carter signed PD-18, “U.S. National Strategy.” In the directive, Carter approved a selection of conclusions and prescriptions out of the PRM-10 sister studies. PD-18 was five pages

80. NSC Memorandum (no author mentioned), Policy Review Committee [July 6, 1977] Summary of Conclusions, Subject: PRM-10 Military Strategy and Force Posture, July 8, 1977, 1–2, DDRS, CK3100144176. The PRM-10 Force Posture report kept out special analyses of TNF for follow-on work, but this did not stop the authors from making suggestions about TNF use. For example, the report refers to the use of TNF targeting policy, like withholding attacks against non-Soviet forces, as a means of fracturing the Pact politically. PRM-10 Force Posture Report, I-15, I-14, I-17. 81. Senate Armed Services Committee, NATO Postures and Initiatives, August 3, 1977, 12–15.

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long, but only three and a half pages have been declassified to date. The largest declassified portion is a list of policy statements derived from the Comprehensive Net Assessment. With PRM-10 language that would resurface in Carter’s speech at Annapolis in June 1978, PD-18 asserted that the relationship between the two superpowers was one of “competition and cooperation.” The directive explained how the United States and its allies would pool together their military and nonmilitary assets in three main geographic regions (Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia) to “counterbalance” the Soviet Union and its allies. The document stated that there would be no retreat on the president’s human rights stance since such rights and the idea of “national independence” were “basic” American values. Lastly, the new directive reiterated the Comprehensive Net Assessment’s emphasis on the United States’ nonmilitary advantages (“soft power,” technology, and economy) and at the same time highlighted points of possible collaboration between Washington and Moscow, specifically in arms control, peaceful solutions to regional conflict, and “nonstrategic” trade.82 The rest of PD-18—the sections still mostly classified—outlined the military backbone for this strategy of “competition and cooperation.” In the directive, the administration declared that there had to remain “an overall balance of military power” between the superpower blocs that was “at least as favorable as that that now exists.” In actual program terms, it appears that this yardstick meant that the United States and its allies could not drop below the force ratios of August 1977 (which were considered “essentially equivalent”). To ensure this, PD-18 confirmed the 1977 Ministerial Guidance 3 percent decision as U.S. policy. In addition, it outlined other defense policy prescriptions derived from the PRM-10 Military Strategy and Force Posture study. These included the defense of lines of communication and “access to raw materials,” a “priority to initial combat capability,” and the maintenance of forward defense in Europe, with the policy of “minimum loss of territory” as well as the recovery of prewar borders “as soon as possible.” With respect to strategic nuclear forces, it outlined the need to build up a secure reserve force, improve U.S. ability to engage in “limited employment options,” avoid a “disarming first strike capability” against the Soviet Union unless it pursued one first, develop additional early warning and attack intelligence, and find a means of ending a nuclear conflict “on most favorable terms to U.S. and allies.”83

82. PD-18, U.S. National Strategy, 1–2. 83. Ibid., 2. For the explanation of PD-18 and August 1977 force ratios, see NSC Memorandum from Victor Utgoff and Jake Stewart to Brzezinski and Aaron, Subject: Consolidated Guidance PRC, May

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The document also outlined a new, rapidly deployable force for “global contingencies.” The wording of the section, particularly the call for “moderate naval and tactical air forces” and “limited land combat forces,” is identical to the language in AIMS F, F(variant), and I, so it may be the case that PD-18’s entire military strategy portion is taken from one of those AIMS.84 The next chapter highlights the way in which the language of the nuclear portion of PD-18 would seem to confirm this interpretation. The directive concluded with a list of approved PD-18 follow-on studies, which include evaluations of nuclear targeting policy (what was eventually called the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review), ICBM modernization, strategic nuclear reserves, and sustainability for global war.85 Save for its amendment by PD-62 in January 1981 in the area of power projection and security assistance for the Persian Gulf, PD-18 served as Carter’s “national security strategy document” for the rest of his administration. Two days after the directive was approved, the White House announced that the administration’s upcoming FY1979 defense budget, in accordance with PD18, would reflect the first of four annual 3 percent increases. When critics immediately started to question exactly how Carter reconciled the increases with his campaign promise to cut defense spending, the White House responded by explaining that the increases were not as large as those put forward by his predecessor. There would be no real cut, just a smaller increase in the amount of growth. The White House also began a limited public campaign 10, 1979, 1–2. Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 25, Folder PRC 106 5/14/79, JCL. The information on the still-classified portion of PD-18 is taken (and cross-checked) from the following sources: New York Times, August 26, 1977; Washington Post, August 27, 1977, A6; Transcript of speech by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown at the National Security Industrial Association, September 15, 1977, 4–8, White House Speechwriters Chronological File, Box 20, Folder: 3/17/78 Wake Forest Defense Speech (Original File), JCL; U.S. Strategic Air Command, “Current US Strategic Targeting Doctrine,” prepared by Colonels Kearl and Locke, December 3, 1979, 1, 6, Document 20 in William Burr, ed., Launch on Warning: The Development of U.S. Capabilities, 1959–1979. Lastly, see NSC Memorandum from Allan Myer to William P. Clark (through Richard Boverie), Subject: Basic Differences between Reagan Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSDD-32) and Carter Administration’s Strategy (PD18 and PD-62), October 5, 1982, 3–4. Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Box 91311, Folder NSDD32 1–4, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. For additional information on nuclear portions of PD-18, see Desmond Ball, “The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983,” 76. 84. Compare “light intervention,” PRM-10 Force Posture Report, I-25 with “Global Contingencies,” PD-18, 4. 85. PD-18, U.S. National Strategy, 5; Ball, “The Development of the SIOP,” 76. Other PD-18 followon studies included the TNF Modernization Study (discussed in the next chapter), a naval forces study, and the Limited Contingency Study. For information on the Limited Contingency Study, which addressed Persian Gulf security matters and was directed by Paul Wolfowitz, see James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet, 80–83, 87–88.

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to “sell” the new national strategy. On the evening of September 15, Brown outlined the PRM-10 exercise and PD-18—though without mentioning the directive’s actual title—in a speech to the National Security Industrial Association. The following day, Samuel Huntington met over lunch with the executive committee of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) to explain PRM-10 and PD-18, this time by name. It is important to note that the attempt to get Carter’s defense-right critics on board with the administration’s defense policy had actually begun before PD-18. Earlier in the year, the White House staff had suggested—and the president had approved—a meeting with his defense-right critics that was to be scheduled “by mid-July” with follow-up meetings “alone” with Brown over two- to three-month intervals. The White House staff envisioned this as part of an “equal opportunity” public relations effort. According to the CPD’s own files, the invitations came down from Brown’s office in early August and a thirty-minute “summit” meeting was set for August 4. Many in the Committee’s leadership believed that Carter was not interested in a sincere debate of the issues, but just wanted political cover as he moved into continued SALT II negotiations—that the Committee was “being used, in the sense that the President wanted to be able to say that he had consulted some hawks, or at least listened to them, before taking his next steps in SALT.”86 The August 4 “summit” was a disappointment all around. The CPD delegation, which included Eugene Rostow, Paul Nitze, and six other members, tried to convince the president that he was on the wrong path and that the following were true: (1) the Soviet Union would use its nuclear superiority to coerce the United States and its allies, (2) Moscow would bargain in SALT II only to the extent that it faced growing U.S. military capabilities, and (3) military trends were not in the United States’ favor (especially hard-target kill), a fact that would hurt the U.S. in any future SALT III. 86. portion of memo, undated, no author listed, top part starts with “Harold Brown should invite . . .”, WHCF-FO, Box 40, Folder FO-6–1, 7/1/77–12/19/77, JCL. The president gave his approval of a mid-July meeting with a check mark on the memo. An unidentified person remarked “doubt need” next to the passage about a subsequent briefing to “progressive” individuals. Memo, Confidential, from Eugene Rostow to the CPD Board of Directors, August 10, 1977. In the memo, Rostow states that the invitations were “a complete surprise” and that the meeting had not been initiated by the Committee. Box 337, Folder: Memos to Board, 1976–1981, and Minutes, Executive Committee Meeting, August 3, 1977, Box 334, Folder CPD Executive Committee Minutes, CPD Papers. For Vaisse’s discussion of the August 4 “summit,” see Le Mouvement neoconservateur aux Etais-Unis, 618–25. EVR [Eugene V. Rostow], Memorandum for the Files, Subject: Meeting with President Carter, Secretary of Defense Brown, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser (August 4, 1977, The White House), undated, 1, Box 288, Folder CPD: SALT White House Conf. 8/4/77, CPD Papers.

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The delegation offered its assistance and cooperation, but the entire incident rubbed Carter the wrong way. It appears that one of his main sticking points with the delegation was over the question of whether the American public and Congress would put up with the budget increases that he believed were required if he followed their prescriptions. It was over this issue that an oftrepeated Nitze-Carter exchange occurred. As originally reported by Evans and Novak, Carter and Nitze clashed when it came to the public’s support for increased defense expenditures. As Carter started to argue that the public would not be forthcoming, Nitze allegedly stopped the president with a stream of “no’s”—an interruption for which he was quickly rebuked by Carter.87 Nitze was not the only one who made the point. Writing to cochair Charles Tyroler immediately after the meeting, Rostow said that former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had argued in the Oval Office that “there was no political defense expenditure ceiling now” [emphasis in the original]. Rostow expressed frustration with the entire summit meeting and with Carter’s performance in particular. His arguments, he said, were naive and at times just plain contradictory. In one part of the meeting, Carter suggested that NATO and the United States were inferior in Western Europe and that the United States had overemphasized deterrence by way of strategic systems, but later claimed that the United States was “militarily superior” and that despite the poor trends, the adjusted FY1978 budget was “sufficient” for what was needed. Rostow continued to make his case to Brzezinski in the weeks that followed, suggesting that if the CPD’s analyses turned out to be incorrect then it would only cost the United States “a couple of billion dollars,” but that if the administration’s analyses were mistaken, “President Carter [would] be the last free President of the United States.”88 Huntington was sent to the CPD in mid-September as a follow-up to the White House “summit.” In his presentation, he outlined PRM-10 subjects— the two “eras,” warning time in Western Europe, the view that Asia was “relatively stable,” Latin American human rights, industrial mobilization, and Soviet approaches to global competition. He told the Committee leadership 87. Talbott, Master of the Game, 135. 88. Handwritten letter from EVR [Eugene V. Rostow] to Charley [Charles Tyroler], dated “Friday” [immediately after the August 4, 1977 meeting], Box 288, Folder CPD: SALT White House Conf. 8/4/77, CPD Papers. EVR [Eugene V. Rostow], Memorandum for the Files, Undated “Meeting with President Carter, Secretary of Defense Brown, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser, August 4, 1977, The White House,” 2, Box 288, Folder CPD: SALT White House Conf. 8/4/77, CPD Papers. Handwritten note from Rostow to Brzezinski, August 24, 1977, 2–3, WHCF-FG, 6-11Brzezinski, Box FG 31, Folder 8/1/77–8/31/77, JCL.

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that the Soviet Union was expansionist and “unless deterred by unacceptable risk,” Moscow looked for unilateral advantage whenever possible. The reaction to Huntington was mixed. While there were no criticisms of PD-18’s picture of the Cold War and its take on Soviet behavior, the Committee felt that there was a significant disconnect between the character of the policy guidance (the “thrust and tenor” which they thought was “promising” based on Huntington’s words) and the administration’s policy actions to date (including South Korea, Taiwan, SALT II, the MX, and the overall cut in the FY1978 budget). Privately, these fears were expressed much more starkly—“Thanks for everything,” an unnamed Committee member who took notes during the Huntington’s presentation wrote, “I’m going home to pray.” The Committee insisted that the administration was foolish not to make a public (and global) case for PD-18. It called for a public full-court press on the directive. Newspaper leaks and Brown’s speech to the National Security Industrial Association aside, it felt that the directive should be announced in a major presidential address and argued that the American people and America’s allies needed to hear what Carter insisted on keeping classified.89 If studies, NATO communiqués, Ministerial Guidance, strategic reviews, or presidential directives are to take effect, their concepts or conclusions have to be embodied. This is done by way of the annual defense budget. FY1979 was Carter’s first “personalized” defense budget. Given his penchant for detail and his gubernatorial experience in zero-based budgeting, Carter had demanded that the White House be involved with the defense budget process early and in force. In typical fashion, this request ignited skirmishes between the NSC and the Pentagon; the latter out of the fear of unnecessary civilian interference, the former out of worries that the Defense Department might move too far out in front of the Oval Office. According to Brzezinski’s memoirs and internal NSC

89. Handwritten notes, no author mentioned, entitled “9/16/77 with Dr. Huntington,” 1–2, Box 334, Folder CPD Executive Committee Minutes, CPD Papers; also see Letter from Eugene Rostow to President Carter, September 19, 1977, 1–2, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, 10/31/77(2)–11/4/77, Box 57, Folder 11/2/77(2), JCL. When it seemed he had made little ground with Brzezinski, Rostow turned to Landon Butler and told him that PD-18 had to be marketed. See Letter from Rostow to Landon Butler, October 19, 1977, Eugene Rostow Name File, JCL. What Rostow did not realize was that Brzezinski had in fact listened and that the Committee’s September 19 letter to Carter was actually a major impetus for the “hard-nosed” defense policy speech that Carter eventually gave at Wake Forest University in March 1978. Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, “Speech on Defense Policy,” October 31, 1977, 1, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, 10/31/77(2)–11/4/77, Box 57, Folder 11/2/77(2), JCL. Rostow’s September 19 letter was highlighted by Brzezinski in his memo and was attached to it for the president’s perusal.

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documents, these bureaucratic battles had been settled, at least tenuously, by the time of the FY1979 budget review in December 1977. The FY1979 budget was the apotheosis of Carter’s first year of defense policy-making. The new budget brought together the administration’s 1977 strategic nuclear “slowdown,” the NATO conventional emphasis, PRM-10, and PD-18 into a single framework. When it was released on January 23, 1978, many analysts and pundits referred to it as the “NATO budget” or the “conventional forces budget.” In contrast to Carter’s campaign promise of defense budget cuts, the FY1979 budget followed PD-18 and increased defense spending by about 3 percent—a total of $126 billion. Though a particular AIMS may not have been chosen as the U.S. force posture, the budget confirmed the strategic direction of PRM-10 and PD-18. In fact, large portions of the strategic review and the directive were inserted directly into Brown’s report to Congress. The superpowers were in a state of “strategic equilibrium” with respect to nuclear forces, but were mismatched in conventional strength. Hence, the budget emphasized the following policy approaches: (a) quick fixes to shore up major deficiencies in readiness, materiel, and transportation; (b) the introduction of longer-term conventional modernization so as to fulfill the 1977 Ministerial Guidance, including programs that fit under the LTDP as well as the development and introduction of new, high-tech conventional “counterforce”; (c) a devaluation of prompt hard-target kill ICBMs and SLBMs and a postponement of ICBM modernization altogether; (d) an emphasis on SSBNs and B-52s with ALCMs for nuclear attack; and (e) stasis in theater nuclear forces pending additional TNF analyses, with a decrease in funding for the Pershing program.90 Strategic nuclear forces took a major hit in the first “personalized” Carter budget, especially when compared to what Ford’s FY1978 budget had estimated for such systems in FY1979. The new budget cemented the earlier B-1 cancellation and maintained a comparatively paltry amount for research and development. Rumsfeld had estimated $2.9 billion for the B-1 for FY1979; Brown’s total 90. Washington Post, January 15, 1978, A6, January 27, 1978, A1; Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 30, 1978, 33. The mismatch in conventional strength is especially notable in Brown’s summary, which refers to American “competition and cooperation” with the Soviet Union, the U.S. nonmilitary advantages, the questionable unity of the Warsaw Pact, and the use of arms control. He also outlines, using broad brushstrokes, the contingencies put forward in the Contingency Assessments portion of the PRM-10 Force Posture Study. Also see Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 1: Authorization and Posture Statement, February 7, 1978, 9–19; for “strategic equilibrium,” 12. Brown’s annual report covers strategic nuclear policy (51–74), theater nuclear policy (75–81), and conventional approaches (81–101). The same division is made for program choices—strategic nuclear (111–28), theater nuclear (138–44), and conventional (145–71).

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was only $105 million—a hedge in the event that the administration decided to reverse itself. The Ford administration had anticipated FY1979 to be a banner year for the MX ICBM, but in Carter’s budget, the missile system was delayed yet again. Its funding dropped from Ford’s estimate of $1.5 billion to a mere $158 million. One important reason for the MX delay had been PRM-10’s deemphasis of hard-target kill capabilities, which was also why the Trident II SLBM program was cut by $94 million. The new budget decreased funding levels for Minuteman modernization by $23 million, the reason being that Minuteman III improvements had been completed and that further upgrades to the Minuteman II were unjustified given existing silo vulnerabilities.91 There was a similar—though not identical—pattern when it came to theater nuclear forces in the FY1979 budget. Rumsfeld had estimated $140 million for the Pershing IA and II program for FY1979, $85 million for the procurement of Pershing IA missiles. Under Carter and Brown, this dropped to $88 million total ($66 million for IA). This Pershing cut reflected “budgetary priorities” as it was described to Congress in March 1978, as well as the fact that after PRM10 the administration wanted to do further study of the entire TNF issue.92 Cruise missiles, especially GLCMs, would play a major role in TNF, but it was not yet clear how dominant of a role that might be versus the Pershing. Indeed, out of all nuclear systems (theater and strategic) in the FY1979 budget, cruise missile development was one of the two largest net increases from Ford’s FY1979 estimates. (The other, B-52 modernization, was directly related to the B-1 cancellation and the administration’s reliance on stand-off attack for the bomber leg of the triad). Most of the cruise missile money in FY1979 went into the development of sea- and air-launched Tomahawks, though a smaller amount was established for the GLCM’s transporter-erectorlauncher and command/control modules. The budget also cut total theater nuclear weapons R&D from FY1978, but raised TNF procurement (though there was still no decision yet on the fate of the enhanced radiation warhead or “neutron bomb”).93 91. Ibid., 116, 127, and Table IA-1, “Acquisition Costs of Major Strategic Forces Modernization and Improvement Programs,” 136–37. 92. Ibid., 160, 161, 170. For the “budget priorities” comment about the Pershing cut, see Lt. General (Army) Donald Keith in House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Research and Development, Part 3, March 2, 1978, 729–30. 93. Ibid., 127–28. For comparisons between Ford FY1978 and Carter FY1979, see chart labeled “Theater Nuclear Forces Budget,” in Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Research and Development, Part 9, April 13, 1978, 6601.

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In the FY1979 budget (and the FY1979–83 Future Years Defense Program), the administration’s focus was the conventional force deficiencies that PRM10 and the pre-LTDP analyses had highlighted. Brown’s annual report outlined the critical areas: readiness, improved equipment, the ability to reinforce quickly, plans and capabilities for sustaining conflict over the course of a “long” versus “short” war, and efficiencies. Out of these five, the first three received the lion’s share of attention. During the final review of the FY1979 budget, Brown had been even more specific. He wrote the president that the choice to “accelerate” the United States’ reinforcement plans was the “single most important decision made this year [in 1977]”. He went on to explain in this memo and in his annual report that by replenishing prepositioned equipment and improving airlift and sealift, the United States would increase its available Army divisions by about five by the tenth day after mobilization commenced (M+10) and by about ten or eleven divisions by M+30. Moreover, if the United States used the money that it saved from the B-1 cancellation to buy more aerial tankers, Brown added that the United States would be able, by FY1983, to move about sixty USAF squadrons to Europe in a week instead of only forty. While Brown confessed that he did not believe the Soviet Union was able to reinforce into East Germany as fast as many believed, there were still far too many unknowns to be lax when it came to transatlantic resupply. The budget also increased the amount of funds to other transportation programs: the conversion of C-141 and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, in addition to the purchase of advanced tanker/cargo aircraft (though in some cases—particularly the C-141 and advanced tanker/cargo programs—the money budgeted by Brown was less than that estimated by Rumsfeld for FY1979).94 In the areas of readiness and modernization, the FY1979 budget outlined both quick fixes and longer-term solutions. Though it was clear in internal discussions over PRM-10 that territorial loss would be a fact of life if the Warsaw 94. Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: NATO Initiatives and Improvements, December 10, 1977, 2–3. This memo was written in anticipation of the December 1977 review of the FY1979 budget. It was summarized for Carter by James Thomson and Victor Utgoff, but apparently still did not make it to the president’s desk once David Aaron suggested it was extraneous. Brown’s memo is an attachment to it. Memorandum from Jim Thomson and Victor Utgoff to Brzezinski, Subject: Brown’s Memo on NATO Improvements, December 15, 1977, NSA Agency, Box 11–21, NATO 12/77–5/78, JCL. For Brown’s comments on Soviet reinforcement speed, see Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 1: Authorization and Posture Statement, February 7, 1978, 92. Brown’s FY1979 program for air mobility is found in ibid., 233–39. For Rumsfeld’s projected FY1979 figures for air mobility, Table II-7, “Acquisition Costs of Major Mobility Forces Modernization and Improvement Programs,” in FY1978 Authorization, January 25, 1977, 242–43.

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Pact moved west, Brown repeated yet again that U.S. and NATO strategy was still forward defense—and in light of Soviet and Warsaw Pact improvements, forward defense relied upon readiness and equipment modernization. At the beginning of January 1978, prior to the budget’s transmission to Congress, Carter announced that one of his administration’s responses to the readiness crisis was an immediate increase of more than eight thousand U.S. troops for forward deployment in the European theater. The new budget added others to this: more money for operations and maintenance, more and better training, a change in ammunition “loads” on vehicles, increases in the number of tank crewmen per tank, and increased reserve stocks all around, especially antitank guided missiles and artillery rounds. Near- to medium-term modernization included such programs as the XM-1 tank (which, in Brown’s eyes, could be built at a rate of thirty per month by FY1980), the Copperhead guided projectile, and the Blackhawk helicopter, as well as improvements to air defense systems (including Improved Hawk, Improved Chaparral, and the Stinger).95 Lastly, the new budget addressed longer-term modernization, some of which included inroads into Brown, Perry, and York’s high-technology conventional “counterforce.” When Percy Pierre, the Army assistant secretary for Research and Development and Acquisition, testified to the House on the new budget, he shared the vision of not-so-future war that directed its medium- to long-term R&D components. There were four points to this vision: (1) “hit them [the Warsaw Pact] hard, as far out as possible”; (2) strike the enemy “constantly” with a “variety of weapons”; (3) protect one’s own antitank capabilities until the enemy’s tanks were within range; and (4) suppress the opponent’s tactical air power.96 To accomplish these points, the FY1979 budget expanded funding into what in the 1990s would be labeled (using the Soviet term) “reconnaissancestrike complexes”—programs that mated long-range Air Force surveillance, ground sensors (delivered by air or by artillery), artillery radar, and remotely piloted vehicles with computer-assisted target acquisition systems. Using networked communication systems, the target data would be distributed to aircraft (which would scatter terminally guided, antiarmor submunitions) as well

95. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 1: Authorization and Posture Statement, February 7, 1978, 90, 146–64. Carter, Public Papers 1978, vol. 1, 37; Washington Post, January 7, 1978, A1. Memorandum from Victor Utgoff and James Thomson to David Aaron, Subject: Talking Points on FY1979 Defense Budget for Use in European Security Bilaterals, January 25, 1978, 1–2, WHCF-FI, Box FI-13, FI4/FG 13 1/1/78–6/30/78, JCL. 96. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Research and Development, Part 3, March 1, 1978, 556–57.

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as to artillery, the General Support Rocket System, or to non-nuclear Lance. Each of these systems might also use homing or laser-guided munitions (Copperhead) or submunitions. Many believed that this surveillance/communication/ computer-directed fire network, if successful, would blunt and destroy the Warsaw Pact line as deep as the third echelon. In the FY1979 budget, the “Assault Breaker” program brought together the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Army, and the Air Force for a Joint Armor Engagement Demonstration using these types of technology to destroy multiple second-echelon tanks with single aircraft passes. These conventional “counterforce” systems would be protected against Soviet tactical air units through the introduction of new U.S. air defense technology, namely Patriot, Roland, and Stinger—all with improved electronic countermeasures.97

Conclusion This chapter provides a picture of Carter’s defense policy baseline. In order to understand Carter’s so-called defense conversion, a firm grasp of the defense program choices and policies that immediately preceded the midterm transformation is vital. In giving the reader this picture, the chapter looks at why Carter chose an initial “softer” and conventionally focused stance, especially considering the heavy emphasis on strategic nuclear modernization in Ford’s FY1978 defense budget. Two popular suggestions—program cost and defenseleft interest group pressure—have serious shortcomings. Carter’s early decision-making alienated many on the defense-right, and because the administration’s choices did not follow an objective weakening in Soviet militaryoperational power, especially Soviet strategic nuclear strength, the strategic “slowdown” is hard to explain using standard realist logic. Carter’s adjustments to Ford’s budget as well as the conventional emphasis of his first “personalized” budget are better understood using the interpretative framework of neoclassical realism. The external military environment in 1976 and 1977 suggested the Ford administration’s FY1978 approach, but four issues intervened. The incoming administration was very skeptical of the previous administration’s strategic assumptions. Carter and his team also held to a strategic belief that suggested some weapons systems were more escalatory than others. Added to this, Carter saw the “slowdown” in light of his desire for “deep cuts” in nuclear forces—a “slowdown” allowed the administration to 97. Ibid., 549–53, 571–80, 606–10, 726–27, 797.

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focus its attention on secure basing and launcher survival rather than hard-target kill capability. And though SALT II was not the primary impetus for the “slowdown,” it was believed by some within the administration that a “softer” stance might signal the United States’ seriousness in arms control. In the end, Carter and his national security team were convinced that conventional conflict in Europe was a much bigger strategic problem than the nuclear “balance.” This perspective came to be reflected in the NATO LTDP programs and “conventional counterforce” in the FY1979 budget—the baseline program for the president’s eventual midterm policy correction. The following chapter outlines in greater detail the state of the MX ICBM and theater nuclear forces in Carter’s FY1979 budget.

Five Carter’s FY1979 Defense Budget Understanding Changes to the MX Missile and Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Programs, 1977–January 1978

While Carter’s FY1979 defense budget enhanced U.S. spending on conventional forces and new high technology for conventional “counterforce,” the new budget continued the strategic and theater nuclear “slowdown” that the administration had started the year before. In a complete reversal of what he had promised when cutting Ford’s budget the previous year—and in complete opposition to what he had reiterated no more than six months earlier—Carter’s team delivered a defense budget to Congress on January 23, 1978, that kept the MX ICBM program in “advanced development” for yet another fiscal year. In light of Carter’s B-1 decision, his first “personalized” defense budget cut into the U.S. Army’s Pershing missile program but increased money for cruise missiles, particularly ALCMs and SLCMs. It also provided funds for additional Lance missiles and nuclear-capable projectiles, but it did not answer the question of whether the warheads that were to be mated to those additional units would have enhanced radiation capabilities. By examining in detail the nuclear components of the FY1979 defense budget, this chapter argues that strategic thought, arms control negotiations, and allied relations all had a stronger influence on the administration’s continuation of its “slowdown” of strategic and theater nuclear modernization than did external events or domestic political variables. 174

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MX Missile and TNF Modernization in Carter’s FY1979 Defense Budget In August 1977, five months before the release of Carter’s FY1979 budget, Brown testified to the House Armed Services Committee that the MX program was still on track for a development decision in FY1979. It was true that as a consequence of the February 1977 cut the missile’s IOC had been rescheduled for 1986 and full deployment was not planned until the early 1990s. At the same time, Brown explained to the committee that it was possible for the IOC to be moved up to 1984 if, in FY1978, the administration threw an additional $250 million into the program (as well as $930 million more during the following year). This all changed with the new defense budget. Five months to the day of Brown’s August testimony, Aviation Week and Space Technology leaked the story that the administration had chosen once again to keep the MX in an “advanced development” research and development phase. This was confirmed three weeks later when the new budget was formally presented to Congress. In his annual report, Brown explained that the administration would only add $24.2 million to the prior year’s funding (which, after the February adjustment, amounted to $134 million). For FY1979, this brought the total for the MX program to $158.2 million. Though the administration advertised this as an increase over previous years’ budgets, when the February 1977 cut and the new FY1979 figure were compared with Rumsfeld’s plans for the MX—particularly his FY1979 projection of $1,533 million—it was quickly apparent that Carter and his team had moved the program in a very different direction. The FY1979 funding for the MX paid for “missile-related elements”: “pre-prototyping” of the guidance system, along with evaluations of the missile’s propulsion system and the canisters in which the missiles would be housed prior to launch. The budget also allotted money for the continued testing of one particular type of missile basing—what was known as trench basing.1 Apologetically, Brown offered Congress three reasons for reversing what had been promised the previous year: program costs, new questions about the system’s survivability, and challenges in finding available land.2 He also explained 1. House Armed Services Committee, Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 and Review of the State of U.S. Strategic Forces, August 2, 1977, 202–3. Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 2, 1978, 13. Table IA-1, “Acquisition Costs of Major Strategic Forces Modernization and Improvement Programs,” Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 1: Authorization and Posture Statement, February 7, 1978, 117, 136. 2. Ibid. The land-use issue was a 180-degree turn from what Brown had told Congress in August 1977. Then, Brown had stated that there was “sufficient, suitable land for any reasonably sized M-X

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that the administration had not yet come to a firm conclusion about the survivability of any MX basing system, let alone the Air Force’s preferred configuration (which was known as buried trench). Since none of the other modes had been examined in as much detail as the Air Force’s preferred mode, Brown argued that it was impossible to know which of the many possible basing systems would be the most survivable, cost-effective, and—in light of the problems of land use—publicly acceptable. Nonetheless, he was intent on the administration finalizing a decision on the MX by no later than FY1979. If it took any longer, the missile’s initial operating capability would be delayed another full year. Indeed, Brown admitted that even if the MX decision did go through in FY1979, he was still going to have to reprogram funds or submit a supplemental defense bill to maintain the 1986 IOC as it stood. And in a surprise turnaround from the previous February he also hinted that barring a firm MX basing decision, the administration could consider deploying the new missile in already existing Minuteman silos. In written questions, he was even asked if an entirely new ICBM was really necessary and whether the United States could instead turn its Minuteman III force into a mobile system. Brown replied that there was no firm decision on the size of the missile, and though the missile “baseline” was a large, heavy ICBM, the administration would not dismiss other, smaller versions (including a Minuteman III that if redesigned could be mobile.)3 When compared to Ford’s plans for FY1979, Carter’s first personalized defense budget was also a “slowdown” in the area of theater nuclear forces. Out of the two components of the U.S. Army’s Pershing program, Pershing IA and Pershing II (IB), most of the money in the FY1979 budget (75 percent of $88 million) was dedicated to the purchase of extra IA missiles. The remainder was committed for Pershing II research and development, particularly the construction of an adjustable-yield warhead and an earth-penetrating RV variant, which could be used to destroy hardened command bunkers, underground storage facilities, and airplane shelters, and to reduce collateral damage and help phase out politically unpalatable atomic demolition munitions. The Pershing II was scheduled for initial “engineering development” sometime during FY1979, but the new budget did not give it “full scale engineering” approval.

deployment.” Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 and Review of the State of U.S. Strategic Forces, August 2, 1977, 202. 3. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 1: Authorization and Posture Statement, February 7, 1978, 538–39, 618.

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And although conceptual studies had already been performed on an extendedrange version of the Pershing II (known as PIIXR), no money was set aside for it in the FY1979 budget.4 In lieu of increasing the funding for Pershing, Brown argued that airlaunched cruise missiles were the United States’ “highest national priority.”5 Now that the B-1 bomber had been canceled, the “air-breathing” leg of the triad firmly rested upon the survival of ALCM-carrying aircraft and the ability of ALCMs to penetrate Soviet air space. Consequently, most of the money for cruise missiles in the budget was slated for ALCM development. ALCMs would carry a larger load for “strategic” (or intercontinental) nuclear missions, while for theater contingencies, interest was focused on ground-launched and sealaunched variants. The SLCM, which was moved into “full-scale development,” was to be used for antiship missions as well as ship-to-shore conventional and nuclear attacks (including sub-SIOP nuclear attacks). The GLCM program had been authorized in January 1977. Though work had just started in October of that same year, Carter’s FY1979 budget provided the system with limited funding. Other reasons were at work as well, but the administration justified the smaller line item for GLCMs ($40 million) in part because all three cruise missile variants would share some components and design work. The funding for GLCMs in the FY1979 budget ensured an initial operating capability sometime in FY1983 and allowed work to continue on the missile’s launcher and its command and control system. The hesitancy over the GLCM in early 1978 was also demonstrated in that the Pentagon had not yet asked the Energy Research and Development Agency to initiate any work on a new warhead for it. This was no small hurdle. Because of long-standing nuclear weapon yield restrictions in the NATO Guidelines Area and the need for GLCMs to have enhanced safety features (namely, a more stringent type of Permissive Action Link), questions remained as to whether it would be able to use the same warhead as its sea and air counterparts.6

4. House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Research and Development, Part 3, March 1, 1978, 572–73, 728; Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 9: Research and Development, April 13, 1978, 6613, 6632. 5. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 1: Authorization and Posture Statement, February 7, 1978, 127. 6. Ibid., 128; Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 9: Research and Development, April 13, 1978, 6632. There is confusion surrounding the precise initial operating capacity date for the GLCM. A chart enclosed with Cyrus Vance’s September 1977 briefing book materials indicated that it was 1980. In October 1978, David Aaron wrote a memorandum

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The numbers in the new budget showed that no decision had yet been made on the deployment of the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW) for either the Lance short-range missile or for battlefield artillery. Instead, the FY1979 money for Lance was dedicated to two things. First, Brown insisted that the funds would allow the administration to complete the ongoing Lance improvement program during FY1979. Second, even though the issue of the ERW had not yet been decided, the new budget provided $64 million to construct additional Lance missiles. These would be nuclear-tipped and, if Carter so decided, they would be armed with ERW. Interestingly, the total for these two categories ($78 million) was the precise amount that the administration had deleted in its February adjustment of the FY1978 budget. Indeed, when one compares Ford’s and Carter’s numbers for Lance in FY1979, it appears that Carter’s FY1978 adjustment and the FY1979 money had the combined effect of stringing out the Lance program for an additional year. The new budget also addressed the use of Lance in a nonnuclear role. Though Brown explicitly belittled the system’s conventional application, he still offered a small sum for research and development of a warhead that released miniaturized mines and submunitions. That way, if Lance was to have a conventional role, it would be better integrated into the larger conventional “counterforce” picture. For nuclear artillery, the budget provided funds for new 8-inch and 155-mm rounds. As with nuclear-tipped Lance, the artillery could be equipped with enhanced radiation capabilities, but that decision would only be made once Carter settled the entire “neutron bomb” question.7

wherein he compared the Pershing II extended-range (PIIXR) initial operating capacity to the GLCM’s. Aaron claimed that the PIIXR’s December 1984 date was “more than two years later than GLCM.” This would place the GLCM initial operating capacity sometime in 1982 (and possibly in FY1983). However, on April 2, 1979, the director of the Joint Cruise Missile Project, Rear Admiral Walter Locke, notified the House Armed Services Committee that the GLCM’s initial operating capacity was definitely May 1983. So, between September 1977 and April 1979, it is possible that the GLCM’s initial operating capacity slipped a full three years—from 1980 to 1983. U.S. Department of State, chart titled “US Cruise Missile Programs,” circa September 1977, 2, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance Briefing Book (for meeting with Gromyko), http://foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/27b2.PDF (accessed February 2, 2008); Memorandum from David Aaron to President Carter, Subject: Consultations on Gray Area Issues, October 26, 1978, 2, NSA Agency, Box 11–21, NATO 10/78–2/79, JCL; House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Research and Development, Part 3, Book 2, April 2, 1979, 2526–27. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 9: Research and Development, April 13, 1978, 6628. 7. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 1: Authorization and Posture Statement, February 7, 1978, 139–40, 161.

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Possible Theoretical Explanations for the FY1979 MX and TNF Decisions How should this defense policy behavior best be explained? Using the traditional realist framework, can one attribute it to a noticeable shift in relative power between the two superpowers during 1977 and early 1978? Or, if one applies domestic political theories to the administration’s FY1979 MX and TNF decision-making, perhaps the “slowdown” is best understood as a cost savings method, a consequence of executive-legislative bargaining, or the effect of pressure on the administration by public opinion and/or interest group activity? As in the case of the administration’s earlier adjustment of strategic and theater nuclear modernization in Ford’s FY1978 budget, the continued “slowdown” in the FY1979 budget does not appear to comport with traditional realist logic. A traditional realist could interpret the administration’s MX and TNF slowdown as “self-weakening” and accordingly would attach such decision-making to either an objective growth of American power or an objective waning of Soviet power in the months immediately preceding the release of the new budget. Neither was the case here. One can see this using any number of indicators in 1977 alone. Take, for example, the momentum of Soviet nuclear weapons programs, which included: continued Soviet ICBM and SLBM test flights throughout 1977; the ongoing construction of bases for the intermediate-range SS-20; the introduction of four Delta 3 SSBNs into the Soviet fleet in 1977, a move which significantly increased the Soviet Union’s SLBM RV count; no change to its numbers of strategic bombers; and a 40.7 percent increase in available Soviet ICBM RVs between 1977 and 1978. These developments, in conjunction with expanded Soviet (or alleged Soviet proxy) activity in places like Ethiopia, Zaire, and Rhodesia over the course of 1977, make it difficult to demonstrate that the Soviet Union was flagging strategically when the administration continued the nuclear “slowdown.”8 8. According to Secretary Vance’s briefing materials, between January and July 1977 alone, there were thirty Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and ICBM tests and thirty-six SLBM tests. See chart titled U.S. Department of State, “Soviet Ballistic Missile Testing Program,” circa September 1977, 2, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance Briefing Book, http://foia.state.gov/documents/ foiadocs/27b8.PDF (accessed February 2, 2008). Also Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 217–18, 221–23, 327–35. As of early November 1977, the Soviet Union was constructing four SS-20 bases in the western part of the USSR and another three bases closer to the Soviet border with China. According to Brown, no missiles had yet been deployed. Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: Getting Something for the Neutron Bomb: ER for SS-20, November 8, 1977, 1. Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 27, Folder SCC 41 (11/16/77), JCL. In the fall of 1977, it was also unclear as to whether the Soviet Union would be able to launch its SS-16 ICBM from SS-20 IRBM

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In light of the implications that the Soviet Union’s ICBM tests in late 1977 had on the vulnerability of U.S. ICBM silos, one would think that those tests should have provoked the administration to accelerate, not decelerate, nuclear weapons spending in the new budget. On October 26, the Soviet Union began to test the SS-19 Mod 3, the third modification of its SS-19 ICBM. Five days later, the Soviets began a series of tests on the fourth modification of the large SS-18—the SS-18 Mod 4. These tests, which continued over the next several weeks, signaled a transformation in the Soviet Union’s ICBM capabilities. The tests on both new modifications demonstrated advances in their MIRV bus designs, their guidance software, and in the manner of RV release—specifically, the “spinning” of the RV while it was still in the bus to increase its in-flight accuracy. Prior to these tests, the U.S. intelligence community had been under the impression that such breakthroughs were years down the road for the Soviet Union and would only materialize in their next generation of ICBMs. This no longer held. With these modifications, Soviet ICBM accuracies neared 0.1 nautical miles circular error probable, which meant that U.S. Minuteman ICBM silos were even less secure than originally believed.9 In the face of this, one would expect to have seen a concerted push for “full-scale development” of the MX as soon as possible—either in FY1979 or (if it could be arranged) even earlier. Yet, in the face of this, the Carter administration went against what one might consider traditional realist logic.

launchers. Vance’s September 1977 briefing book materials state that the launch equipment of the SS20 “thus far appears also capable of being used with the SS-X-16 ICBM” and that the CIA believed the Soviets might deploy SS-16s at Plesetsk. U.S. Department of State, “Soviet Mobile ICBM Program,” circa September 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance Briefing Book, http://foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/27b6.PDF (accessed February 2, 2008). National Resources Defense Council, Table of USSR/Russian Ballistic Missile Submarine Forces: 1958–2002, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/ datab6.asp (accessed February 2, 2008). National Resources Defense Council, Table of USSR/Russian Strategic Bomber Forces: 1956–2002, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab8.asp (accessed February 2, 2008). National Resources Defense Council, Table of USSR/Russian ICBM Forces: 1960–2002, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab4.asp (accessed February 2, 2008). The number of Soviet ICBM RVs increased from 2,183 to 3,071 from 1977 to 1978. Comparing Soviet RV numbers in 1978 to 1976, there is a 50.3 percent increase. Jeffrey Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991, 169–82; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 578–79. For declassified documents and participant discussion about the 1977–1978 events in the Horn of Africa, particularly from NSC member Paul Henze, see James Hershberg et al., “Anatomy of a Third World Cold War Crisis: New East-Bloc Evidence on the Horn of Africa, 1977–1978,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 8–9, 38–102. 9. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 218, 222. The first deployment of SS-18 Mod 4 occurred on September 18, 1979, while the first regiment of SS-19 Mod 3 was deployed on November 6, 1979. For information on the 1977 tests, see Dunn, Politics of Threat, 112–13; Edwards, Superweapon, 143– 44; Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 3, 1978, 14.

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What about nonrealist theories? Did the administration continue its “slowdown” as a way of saving money in the defense budget? The FY1979 cost estimates for the MX began to leak out of the Pentagon in late August 1977. Based on information derived from internal Program Objective Memoranda, Aviation Week and Space Technology reported that the MX request for the upcoming budget was $260 million—about double the adjusted FY1978 figure.10 Though this figure was far less than Rumsfeld’s projections for that fiscal year, the request nonetheless aggravated the Office of Management and Budget as well as a number of senators. The Senate quickly struck back. In early October, in the midst of two separate defense budget fights—a debate over add-ons to a FY1978 supplemental bill and a battle over the rescission of money appropriated in FY1977 for additional B-1 bombers and Minuteman III ICBMs—Senators Ted Kennedy and Thomas McIntyre attacked the administration over the upcoming MX estimate.11 They argued that the program was too expensive and dangerous. McIntyre, who remained convinced that the MX missile promoted crisis instability, rounded against Brown for “tentatively approving” $245 million without having first provided the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee for Research and Development a report on the relationship between ICBMs and U.S. national strategy that had been promised well before Carter’s election.12 While Kennedy and McIntyre criticized the MX’s cost and its strategic rationale, the Office of Management and Budget was purely concerned with holding down U.S. defense spending as a whole. The OMB wanted Carter’s first budget kept at about $125 billion, which was approximately $10 billion less than Brown and the military services had requested. According to Aviation Week, most of OMB’s criticism of the early FY1979 estimates was aimed at NATO and the 1977 Ministerial Guidance benchmark of 3 percent annual growth in defense spending. The OMB viewed this promise, as well as any additional money for large-scale strategic modernization, as a betrayal of Carter’s campaign promises.13 In the OMB’s eyes, defense spending and domestic programs were in direct competition with one another. At first glance, there would appear to be a clear causal link between the OMB’s concerns and the form that 10. Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 29, 1977, 12. 11. Washington Post, October 8, 1977, A2. 12. In truth, the figure was not $245 million but $260 million. The $245 million was slated for “fullscale MX development” while another $15 million was established for “advanced ICBM technology.” Washington Post, October 9, 1977, A4; Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 10, 1977, 16. 13. Washington Post, November 18, 1977, A3.

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the MX program actually took in the FY1979 budget. The OMB’s numbers did win the day. Early leaked stories about the defense budget indicated that James McIntyre, the director of the OMB, had deleted $100 million from the original MX request, cutting it to $160 million, which, in the end, was the precise final figure.14 Yet, as will be explained in detail, cost savings was not the full picture. The OMB’s figures were only accepted after they had been reinforced by the strategic conclusions that arose out of the PRM-10 study and from work done within the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).15 Cost was a factor in the Pershing II and GLCM FY1979 funding decisions, but not the dominant one. In early 1977 the Senate had authorized $27.9 million for the GLCM program, but the House Appropriations Committee cut that down to $14 million, demanding a cost comparison of the GLCM and the Pershing II. During conference in August 1977, the House and Senate agreed to raise GLCM funding by another $4 million to begin “engineering development” in FY1978 but made it clear that the administration would need stronger justification for any additional money come the following fiscal year.16 The Pentagon wrapped a cost-effectiveness study into its regular DSARC process and initiated a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Report comparing the “regular” Pershing II, the extended-range Pershing II, and the GLCM. This analysis, however, was not completed before the release of the FY1979 defense budget, so those numbers reflected, in part, a “go slow” approach given that the administration was unsure about which system it would eventually choose, or, in the case of the Pershing II, which variant it would eventually settle upon.17 If cost savings is, at best, an incomplete explanation for Carter’s FY1979 nuclear program “slowdown,” perhaps the theory of executive-legislative “logrolling” might shed better interpretive light. The problem with this argument is one of evidence. Absent any overt, confirming statements or documents, since executive-legislative horse-trading is often performed on an informal basis, one can only offer a bit of logical guesswork. One possible can-

14. Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 2, 1978, 13. 15. Also Edwards, Superweapon, 143. Edwards states that OMB actually used OSTP findings as ammunition for cutting the MX in September 1977 budget meetings. However, Brzezinski and Aaron were not briefed on the panel’s findings until mid-November. Naturally, it is always possible that OMB used the panel’s preliminary findings to support its budget position. 16. Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 15, 1977, 14. 17. Ibid.; the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Report was not ready until mid-April 1978. See statement by Peter Haas, Deputy Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 9: Research and Development, April 13, 1978, 6589.

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didate—an exchange of the MX and TNF funding “slowdown” for a smooth ratification of SALT II in the near future—can be dismissed outright. It is preposterous to think that the administration believed another delay of the missile system or a “go slow” approach to theater nuclear modernization could have had a positive impact on the future SALT II ratification battle. Brzezinski had already warned Carter in mid-November 1977 that in light of the Committee on the Present Danger’s November 1 press conference, the White House had to kick-start its own public relations campaign for SALT II right away.18 The ratification fight for SALT II and the Panama Canal treaties, Brzezinski wrote to Carter a week later, hinged on whether his national security policy looked “soft” or “hard” to Republicans and conservative Democrats in the Senate.19 And at that moment, Carter looked very soft in the eyes of his defenseright critics. When word of the administration’s current SALT positions leaked, particularly the decision in September to give up attempts to limit the Soviet Union’s arsenal of heavy ICBMs and accept three-year interim limits on GLCMs and SLCMs, Jackson and others in his camp became aggravated. In a December memo to Carter on SALT II, Jackson and Perle accused the president of ignoring their February guidelines—one of which had been the need for rapid and concerted nuclear force modernization.20 If Carter had wanted to secure the votes of his SALT II adversaries early on, the FY1979 budget was a prime opportunity for him to prove his defense policy “hardness.” He did not pursue the opportunity. Carter’s delays and slowdowns make a SALT II bargaining interpretation unlikely. Though it suffers from a lack of direct evidence, one can suggest a hypothesis connecting the MX delay with executive-legislative bargaining over the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties. The timing itself is close; the Panama Canal ratification battle began right as the administration had begun its internal debate over the final shape of the FY1979 defense budget. In late November, Arizona’s junior senator, Dennis DeConcini, who within six months would become the administration’s main adversary on the Canal issue, warned Carter that polls in the Southwest and western mountain states were tracking largely against the treaties.21 These states were the intended recipients of the MX 18. NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NSC Weekly Report, #36, November 11, 1977, 2, DDRS, CK3100099284. 19. NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NSC Weekly Report #37, November 18, 1977, 1–2, DDRS, CK3100099390. 20. Talbott, Endgame, 135–38; Caldwell, Dynamics of Domestic Politics, 45, 54n58. 21. Strong, Working in the World, 161.

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system, so one can see the administration’s interest in delaying a possible MX land-use fight until it was able to secure the approval of the Panama Canal agreements by western senators. Moreover, Senator McIntyre’s home of New Hampshire was one of ten key states in the ratification of the Canal treaties.22 It could not have been overlooked that some of the most vociferous, public attacks on the MX in late 1977 came not just from Kennedy, Carter’s biggest rival in the Democratic Party, but also from McIntyre, whose constituency was key for the Canal issue and whose support, as chairman of the subcommittee with authority over new NATO and cruise missile programs, was vital. Could the administration have tailored its FY1979 nuclear weapons decisions to address the public’s wish for a “softer” defense stance? Clearly, the decision was not commensurate with the American public’s continuing interest in greater military spending. According to Dan Caldwell, the number of people who stated that the United States was spending “too little” on defense grew steadily from around 10 percent in 1973 to nearly 30 percent in 1978 (with a spike to 60 percent in 1979).23 Actually, there was little public pressure on Carter to “harden” or “soften” national security policy in late 1977 (as distinct from the congressional pressure that so worried Brzezinski). Caldwell demonstrates that while the overall trend was downward, Carter’s popularity rating stayed well above 50 percent during the period in question.24 And up until the beginning of 1979, Carter’s SALT II approval numbers remained constant— around 40 percent (Roper Poll), 37–39 percent (Pat Caddell’s Cambridge Research) and, strangely, 70–75 percent (Harris Poll).25 It is hard to see how public opinion might have influenced the FY1979 slowdown, especially since it appears that polling on defense spending would suggest accelerated defense construction rather than delay. Of course, the argument could be made that considering the relatively stable SALT II public opinion numbers, the administration was wary of doing anything that might jeopardize the negotiations (such as full-scale MX or extensive cruise missile development) and thereby hurt its standing with the American public. The difficulty of such a hypothesis is that in the end, as will be explained shortly, it rests less on public opinion than on the administration’s internal assessment about what was and what was not destabilizing to bilateral arms control. 22. Ibid., 157n10. 23. Figure 4–1, “Support for Defense Spending, 1973–1982,” in Caldwell, Dynamics of Domestic Politics, 81. 24. Figure 4–4, “President Carter’s Popularity,” in ibid., 91. 25. Figure 4–2, “Public Opinion Polls on SALT II,” in ibid., 84.

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Finally, it is difficult to argue that the FY1979 MX and TNF decisions were the result of interest group pressure. There was no significant anti-MX interest group activity during the period of internal debate over the new budget. The primary anti-TNF interest group activity was that of the “neutron bomb” campaign, which, though it exerted pressure regarding the ERW, did not address other TNF systems like GLCMs and Pershing II. A lone few of the defense-left in Congress, like Ron Dellums and Patricia Schroeder in the House and Mark Hatfield in the Senate, launched “pinprick” legislative strikes against MX funding throughout 1977 and into 1978, but to no avail.26 There was little reason for Carter to have decided to delay the MX and TNF funding because of pressure from anti-nuclear lobbying. In fact, the interest group that put the greatest amount of pressure on Carter’s administration in late 1977 was not against nuclear modernization, but strongly for it. By the time the final touches were being put to the new defense budget in December, the CPD had already held two major press conferences in which Paul Nitze had criticized Carter’s SALT II stance and emphasized the need for the MX. The first press briefing on July 6 heralded the release of Where We Stand on SALT, the Committee’s first pamphlet on SALT II. In it, the Committee examined parts of the March 1977 “comprehensive proposal” and compared them to the administration’s current negotiating stance: the three-part “May proposal” of an eight-year treaty, a three-year interim protocol, and a set of agreed principles for negotiating SALT III. The pamphlet did not address TNF, mentioning only in passing the anticipated restrictions of GLCMs and SLCMs in the interim protocol. Most of it was devoted to the Committee’s positions on the MX. The Committee argued that the MX needed to be deployed “in a mobile, multiple aim point mode” to secure “bargaining leverage” with the Soviets. It had to survive a Soviet first strike, and its surviving RVs had to “neutralize” the delivery systems that the Soviet Union held in reserve. Because of this, the Committee insisted that the administration could ill afford any limits on the testing and deployment of new ICBMs and could definitely not accept a prohibition of mobile missiles.27 26. Washington Post, April 26, 1977, A1; Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 2, 1977, 23. 27. Committee on the Present Danger, “Where We Stand on SALT,” July 6, 1977, reprinted in Charles Tyroler II, ed., Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger, 20–21. About cruise missiles, see 18–19. See also Vaisse, Le Mouvement neoconservateur, chapter 9. Brown, in his weekly report to Carter, was actually relieved that Nitze’s emphasis had been on the MX rather than on the B-1 cancellation and the order to stop Minuteman III production. OSD Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: Significant Actions, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense (Week of July 2–8, 1977), July 8, 1977, 1, WHCF-FG, FG-13, Box FG-106, Folder 1/20/77– 1/20/81 (Confidential), JCL.

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Nitze’s November 1 press conference was even more controversial. That press conference, it should be noted, occurred in the wake of the failed August 4 “summit” between Carter and the CPD. In the “summit,” Nitze had warned Carter explicitly that a SALT II ban on mobile missiles—even if it was only during the three-year protocol—would jeopardize the MX program, which, he argued, was necessary because it ensured “survivable and efficient hard-target kill capability.”28 Carter remained unconvinced. The administration cemented the three-part structure of SALT II in late September, but kept its details from the public. No doubt frustrated by their failed White House tête-à-tête and the lukewarm responses to their follow-up correspondence, the Committee used the November press conference to release information about the state of SALT II negotiations in Geneva. The Soviets, Nitze argued, were holding out for higher total aggregates, a less stringent declaration on the Backfire bomber, and a later expiration date on the three-year protocol. More importantly for the MX debate, Nitze told the public that 90 percent of the Minuteman ICBM arsenal would be vulnerable to Soviet attack before 1985.29 He also addressed the problem of cruise missile limitations, arguing that it was unclear how effective a range limit of twenty-five hundred kilometers would be against Soviet defenses in the early 1980s. And, in an argument that he and others would reiterate over the course of 1978 and 1979, Nitze attacked the protocol’s “stickiness.” The administration might believe that it would be able to extricate the United States from protocol restrictions after three years were up, but Nitze insisted that it was naive to think so. There would be intense political pressure to maintain the restrictions already in existence.30 As had occurred after the July press conference, Nitze was once again on the front page of the Washington Post. In early newspaper reports, administration spokesmen accused Nitze and the CPD of hijacking SALT II. The following Sunday, Brown confirmed Nitze’s revelations about the Minuteman threat on network television, but made sure to emphasize the capabilities of other strategic systems. He also downplayed any suggestion that Nitze’s release of information had derailed the negotiations. Carter repeated this point. He called Nitze’s actions “ill-advised,” but admitted that while the Soviet side had complained about the Committee’s actions, the Committee had not done any longterm damage. Nevertheless, the press conference caused a huge rift in relations 28. Nitze, “Committee on the Present Danger—Private,” August 4, 1977, 3, Box 288, Folder CPD: SALT White House Conf. 8/4/77, CPD Papers. 29. Washington Post, November 2, 1977, A2 and November 7, 1977, A6. 30. Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 7, 1977, 18.

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between the Committee and the administration. Philip Habib, Carter’s undersecretary of state for Political Affairs, allegedly told Committee cochairman Eugene Rostow that the administration considered Nitze’s actions a “declar[ation of] war.”31 In this atmosphere, any pressure the CPD exerted on the administration in late 1977 was wholly negative. As already noted, Brzezinski saw it all as one more reason to get the administration’s own SALT II campaign going. The FY1979 decisions on the MX and TNF were definitely not concessions to the Committee. Indeed, if the Committee had any effect at all on the MX and TNF in the FY1979 budget, it was to anger and frustrate the administration to the point of cementing Carter’s course of action once he became convinced that delays were necessary. In this way, the Committee’s actions may have had an unintended and opposite consequence. Carter delayed the MX and hesitated on TNF in the FY1979 budget despite adverse military-operational and geopolitical trends, little reason for executivelegislative logrolling, little to no pressure from the defense-left, no discernible antidefense public demands, and intense (and building) pressure from his defense-right critics. If the administration’s decision-making cannot be reasonably explained with traditional realist logic and if domestic interpretations also fall flat (save, in a limited way, cost savings), then one has to look elsewhere for causation.

Using the Neoclassical Realist Framework to Understand MX and TNF in the FY1979 Defense Budget The neoclassical realist framework combines external and internal variables in a way that shows how foreign and national security policy is often deflected away from the path that the international environment’s military-operational logic might otherwise suggest.32 The international power environment in 1977 and early 1978 would seem to have posited the need for a more rapid and concerted modernization of American nuclear capabilities. In the case of the MX and TNF modernization in the FY1979 budget, there were three variables that caused such a deflection. First, and especially with reference to TNF modernization, there was the influence that U.S. allies in Europe had on the direction 31. Washington Post, November 7, 1977, A6. Carter, Public Papers 1977, vol. 2, 2017–18. Eugene Rostow to the Committee on the Present Danger Board of Directors (written transcript entitled, “The Committee on the Present Danger: Of the Board of Directors,” November 11, 1977, 66–67, Box 166, no folder (in cardboard box), CPD Papers; Vaisse, Le Mouvement neoconservateur, chapter 9. 32. Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 158, 168.

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of policy. Second, it is important to outline, once again, the impact and effect of strategic thought on assessment, particularly the state of the administration’s internal strategic dialogue as reflected in ongoing reviews and studies. Finally—and related to the other two—one must examine the deflecting power of ongoing arms control negotiations and reigning arms control concepts. While U.S. allies in Western Europe had minimal influence over the trajectory of the MX program, they played a very significant role when it came to Pershing II, GLCMs/SLCMs, and ERWs in the FY1979 budget. Theoretically, the MX added credibility to the U.S. threat to go nuclear if required for purposes of extended deterrence, yet there was little allied concern over the follow-on ICBM. The MX was going to be deployed on American, not European, soil, so save for its importance as the escalating “instrument of last resort” in support of NATO should Central Front war occur, allied interest and influence over the Minuteman follow-on was generally weak. This, of course, was not the case when it came to TNF modernization in the budget. To begin, it is important to note that while Carter and his team were completing their work on the new defense budget in November and December, the “neutron bomb” controversy was in full swing on both sides of the Atlantic. The debate over the ERW in the American press and in the Senate during the summer of 1977 had galvanized antinuclear forces in Western Europe. By the end of that year, President Carter’s European partners—particularly West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt—were under intense pressure from defense-left and antinuclear elements in and out of their own political parties. Carter’s choice—against the judgments of both Brzezinski and Brown—to postpone an official U.S. decision on ERW production in mid-August pending intra-NATO “consultations” meant that anti-”neutron bomb” campaigners in Europe (and, many believe, their Soviet sponsors) were given many more months to build opposition to ERWs. The Evans-Novak leak about PRM-10’s movement away from the forward defense of West Germany had not made matters any easier. In preparation for an upcoming NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting in Bari, Italy, in October, Brown sent an interagency delegation to brief West Germany and the NPG Permanent Representatives on the ERW on September 12–13.33 The meeting at Bari did not resolve the ERW

33. OSD Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: Significant Actions, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense (Week of September 3–9, 1977), September 9, 1977, WHCFFG-13 (Confidential), Box FG-106, 1/20/77–1/20/81, JCL.

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issue; indeed, the administration instead started to push the use of the ERW as an arms control instrument. All of this meant that the “consultations” over the ERW were not yet completed as the budget was undergoing a final review in late 1977. And because Carter refused to move ahead on the warhead’s production until West Germany and other European allies agreed that they would in fact deploy it, there was no acceleration of Lance and artillery ERWs in the FY1979 budget.34 Such difficulties were not just limited to the “neutron bomb.” Alliance politics also had much to do with the status of Pershing II and GLCMs in the FY1979 budget. It was still not clear to the administration by November and December whether TNF modernization should be pursued through one, both, or neither of the two systems. Indeed, from the final days of Ford’s administration onward, the United States had not seen eye-to-eye with Bonn over longer-range systems. In West Germany’s eyes, Washington’s desire appeared to be, if not the plain “denuclearization” of the continent, then at least a slide in that general direction. In late 1976 the U.S. suggested that West Germany’s fears were legitimate, especially given its willingness to countenance even greater warhead cuts in MBFR Option III, replace the nuclear-capable F-4 with a nonnuclear variant, and highlight to European allies about how many Warsaw Pact targets could be effectively covered by Poseidon SLBM RVs. In late 1977 and early 1978, the anticipated capabilities and the deployment schedule of the SS20 had Bonn spooked even more.35 In addition to West Germany’s fears, Great Britain had anxieties of its own about the most effective and politically acceptable replacement for the Polaris SLBM system. Concerned about overall manpower costs, both U.S. allies gave serious consideration to cruise missiles as possible solutions for their defense challenges (though some insist that American defense intellectuals and “Cold War” strategists helped to “evangelize” Bonn and London by overhyping the cruise missile’s theoretical benefits). For the first year of Carter’s presidency, debate raged as to whether London would replace Polaris with SLCMs, whether GLCMs might replace F-111s stationed in Great Britain, and whether West Germany 34. Auger, Dynamics of Foreign Policy, 60–66, 71–77; Wasserman, Neutron Bomb Controversy, 78–99. 35. U.S. State Department Action Memorandum from Arthur Hartman et al. to Henry Kissinger, Subject: Nuclear Balance Issues at NPG Ministerial, October 18, 1976, 3–4, 5–6. Hartman’s memo (5– 6) talks about how, in the 1960s, Bonn had been convinced to accept participation in a “consultational” answer to Soviet medium/intermediate-range ballistic missiles (that is, the NPG) rather than respond with its own “hardware” answer. The SS-20’s mobility now added a new dimension; it was much more difficult to target with U.S. strategic forces. This, in Hartman’s view, could sow doubts in West Germany’s mind as to whether it should stick with mere “consultational” participation.

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might opt for its very own longer-range cruise missile arsenal. The latter option was the most controversial. The concern was that even if Bonn settled on (and advertised) a conventional-only cruise missile force, it could prove so “unsettling” that the Soviet Union—not to mention West Germany’s other European neighbors—might call into question “German intentions” and raise doubts as to the precise payloads carried by those delivery vehicles.36 In the first week of June 1977, before the first NATO NPG meeting held under the Carter administration opened in Ottawa, Brown argued to a NSC committee that the United States “would have to follow a careful line” in Ontario. The United States could neither afford to give any “guarantees” to NATO allies at the NPG about cruise missiles, nor could it afford to shut the GLCM/SLCM door completely.37 At Ottawa, Brown reiterated the oft-used argument about relying upon SLBMs for longer-range TNF, and, as Daalder explains, the secretary sent David Aaron and Walt Slocombe to the continent afterwards to convince U.S. allies that target coverage with U.S. strategic systems was more than adequate and that a Western European voice in targeting was assured by allied representation on the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff.38 According to James Thomson, a joint State-Defense paper that was briefed to allies during the summer reiterated Aaron’s and Slocombe’s points. The paper explained that the use of cruise missiles for TNF modernization was likely to infuriate Moscow and argued, following the position the State Department had held since Bonn began to express interest in cruise missiles, that any talk about a separate European-based “hardware” answer to Soviet theater nuclear modernization ran the risk of “decoupling” the U.S. strategic arsenal from conflict on the continent.39 The reaction by allies to this campaign was less than excited. British Defense Secretary Fred Mulley told Brown in August that 36. Yaffe highlights the work of the European-American Workshop, which he claims was tied to American strategists and defense analysts involved with the “ARPA/Defense Nuclear Agency LongRange Research and Development Project.” Yaffe concludes that the Workshop held discussions and panels that over time “create[d] a trans-Atlantic constituency for new weapons particularly the cruise missile.” Yaffe, Origins, 580–84 (quoted material on 584). U.S. State Department Action Memorandum from Arthur Hartman et al. to Henry Kissinger, Subject: Nuclear Balance Issues at NPG Ministerial, October 18, 1976, 5. 37. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Summary Report for Your Information and Reaction of the Special Coordinating Committee, June 7, 1977, 3, DDRS, CK3100044841. 38. Daalder, Nature and Practice, 172–73; Bluth, Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy, 230. 39. James A. Thomson, “The LRTNF Decision: Evolution of US Theater Nuclear Policy, 1975–9,” 604.

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neither SLBMs nor F-111s alone would suffice.40 West Germany’s response— which will be discussed later in light of the state of SALT II negotiations that fall—was equally negative. Given the growing tension between the United States and West Germany, the decision was made to fold the TNF modernization problem into NATO’s LongTerm Defense Program (LTDP). A separate TNF modernization task force— Task Force 10—was added to the nine other panels already in existence. It was soon clear, however, that even an LTDP Task Force panel did not have enough authority on its own. According to Yaffe, Don Cotter, Brown’s assistant for Atomic Energy, pushed for a group that would be made up of people with stronger connections to those involved in the actual deployment of any new TNF hardware.41 As a result, at the Bari NPG in October it was agreed that Task Force 10 would become what was called a High Level Group (HLG). It would be chaired by David McGiffert, assistant secretary of defense for National Security Affairs (ASD-ISA), and it would examine possible long-range TNF hardware options.42 Interallied tension—particularly between the United States and West Germany—is therefore one mediating variable that helps to explain why the administration, in the face of an unchanging Soviet military-operational threat, chose to continue its nuclear “slowdown” in the FY1979 budget. Because of the need to establish the NATO HLG, and since the HLG’s first meeting did not occur until the last month of 1977, there was no allied consensus about the type, range, or yield of new TNF at the time of the final review of the defense budget. Consequently, the longer-range systems in the FY1979 budget, Pershing II and GLCMs, were kept at subdued funding levels.43 Yet, the decision to delay the MX and ERW and “go slow” on TNF in spite of the international strategic environment must also be viewed in light of strongly held strategic beliefs that were at play within the administration regarding the place of nuclear modernization in national strategy. Take, for example, Brown’s ideas about the MX. After the failure of the SALT II “comprehensive proposal” in March 1977, Brown insisted that the United States had no choice but to bolster its own offensive forces. It was not a question of whether the United States 40. Bluth, Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy, 230. 41. Yaffe, Origins, 620–22. 42. Ibid., 620–21; Daalder, Nature and Practice, 175; Bluth, Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy, 229. 43. One other long-range option, an Air Force medium-range ballistic missile, was provided with study money in FY1979, but nothing more. Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 31, 1978, 16.

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had enough forces to fulfill damage criteria (and therefore, in the assured vulnerability framework, to fulfill deterrence criteria also). It had. Instead, Brown was concerned about the ability to “hedge” against Soviet technological advances as well as about how other countries would react given the belief (which he personally believed to be inaccurate) that the United States’ strategic arsenal was second to Moscow’s.44 The United States needed large numbers of accurate RVs that could survive an attack and penetrate Soviet defenses. One way to try to bolster its survivable RV count was through non-MX ICBMs, but without some type of basing fix, such a method was plainly ephemeral. The replacement of Minuteman IIs with IIIs would also fall flat. With every additional Minuteman III, still deployed in vulnerable silos, Washington would bump ever more closely to the 1,320 MIRV sublimit, but with relatively fewer MIRVs compared to the number that the Soviet Union could field while still sticking to the sublimit.45 This, combined with the B-1 cancellation and the new focus on cruise missiles, pushed the administration to stop production of the Minuteman III and quash the Minuteman II improvement program.46 Despite the need for viable RVs, Brown himself was of two minds about how well a brand-new ICBM would solve America’s strategic quandary. In his perspective, the best way to “hedge” against Soviet technology and protect against negative perceptions was with “air-breathing” systems—that is, bombers and cruise missiles—and SLBMs, but not ICBMs. Unlike ICBMs, he believed that “air-breathing” systems and SLBMs would not appear as threatening to Soviet leadership because of their inherent military-operational limitations. They were too slow and inaccurate to take out Soviet silos promptly, and thus preemptively or preventively. In fact, Brown argued that the future belonged to submarines. By 1986, he explained to Congress, five out of every six “penetrating RV” would originate from SLBMs. Hence, something had to be done to ensure their pre- and postlaunch survivability. The United States needed improved countermeasures against Soviet antisubmarine warfare and against

44. Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 and Review of the State of U.S. Strategic Forces, August 2, 1977, 160. 45. Ibid., 163. 46. For the Minuteman III decision, OSD Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: Significant Actions, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense (Week of July 2–8, 1977), July 8, 1977, 1, WHCF-FG, FG-13, Box FG-106, Folder 1/20/77–1/20/81 (Confidential), JCL. For the Minuteman II decision, see letter from Brown to Senator Jennings Randolph, July 15, 1977, WHCF-ND, ND-17, Box ND-48, Folder 1/20/77–12/31/79, JCL.

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clandestine ABM construction and deployment. The best “hedge” against both of these, Brown insisted, was “air-breathing” systems.47 It is here that one most clearly notices Brown’s ambivalence toward a brandnew ICBM. Of course, he admitted, a securely based MX could also serve as a “hedge” against Soviet antisubmarine warfare, and—especially if a heavy MIRV missile was used—the MX’s larger RV count would mitigate an ABM breakout by the Soviet Union. It is clear, looking at documented NSC criticism, that Brown, at least until November or December 1977, supported (or was at least believed to support) the Air Force’s desire to move the MX into “full-scale development” in FY1979. Nevertheless, he knew that the MX came with the same set of problems that those who believed in assured vulnerability associated with all ICBMs: it looked menacing, and unless it was securely based it tempted preemption. It was not a quick fix; there were land-use and arms control verification hurdles. Moreover, the MX system might force the Soviet Union to “go mobile” or else reroute their RVs to submarines, which, though it would move Moscow away from its SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs, could still cause a serious targeting problem for the United States.48 The situation was not hopeless, however. The administration insisted that the MX was only one of a number of possible fixes in late 1977. The United States could adjust the alert status of its nuclear offensive forces and it could also do whatever was possible to ensure that the Soviet Union remained uncertain as to whether Washington could (and would) launch on warning or while under attack. In the first case, improvements to alert status meant that—theoretically—fewer RVs would be caught on the ground in a Soviet surprise attack. In August testimony, Brown insisted that the after-exchange situation in 1979 would be “about equal” if the Soviet Union struck when the United States was on a heightened day-to-day alert. But, if the United States could maintain what was known as “generated alert,” the postattack situation would look better through 1981 or 1982. With launch on warning/launch under attack, the numbers of surviving RVs appeared even more favorable.49 47. Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 and Review of the State of U.S. Strategic Forces, August 2, 1977, 160–63. 48. NSC Memorandum from Victor Utgoff to Brzezinski, Subject: Monitoring the Defense Department, October 19, 1977, 1–2, WHCF-FG, Box FG-106, Folder FG-13 10/1/77–12/31/77 (Executive), JCL. Utgoff (2) expressed concern that the president had been taken by surprise by the extensive press over Brown’s “apparent ratification” of MX full-scale development. Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 and Review of the State of U.S. Strategic Forces, August 2, 1977, 160– 63; Dunn, Politics of Threat, 120. 49. Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 and Review of the State of U.S. Strategic Forces, August 2, 1977, 178.

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In October, Brown spelled out all of this for Carter in greater detail—and in much more dire terms. There were, Brown confessed, absolutely no quick programmatic options available to the United States should the Soviets dramatically increase their nuclear forces upon a nonrenewal of the SALT I Interim Agreement, which was scheduled to lapse that very month. Unless certain programs were accelerated, he explained that nothing of any numerical significance would come on-line before the Trident in January 1981. Given a quick-fix choice of moving to “fully generated alert,” raising day-to-day SSBN and B-52 alerts, or increasing the number of forward-based nuclear aircraft, Brown recommended the second. It was a costly option, but the first one was much too expensive, hard to maintain over time, and too “provocative,” while the third one was also provocative, added little operational value, and would be controversial considering Soviet sensitivities about forward-based systems in SALT.50 The United States was helped by the fact that the Soviet Union could never be sure whether or not it would launch ICBMs upon detecting a Soviet missile launch (launch on warning), or, wishing to hedge against faulty intelligence, launch upon first detonation on American soil (launch under attack). This, the argument went, forced the Soviet Union to be extra cautious. It was not an opinion that Brown had arrived at recently. Evidence suggests that he had been arguing for it at least since the early 1970s. In a recently declassified 1971 letter to Henry Kissinger, Brown suggested that with a strong U.S. launch on warning/ launch under attack capability (not, he emphasized, a doctrine), the Soviet Union could not be guaranteed favorable results. Targeted U.S. silos would— theoretically—be emptied of their contents before their destruction and— again theoretically—the contents of those emptied silos would destroy the Soviet Union’s air bases. The Soviet Union would, in effect, trade a large number of its ICBMs (not all, but a large number) for empty U.S. silos, at the cost of destroyed Soviet bomber bases. He argued that Soviet nuclear war planners could not ignore this contingency, which in turn added to deterrence and the survivability of U.S. ICBM RVs. In late 1977, this opinion was by no means limited to Brown. That August, Herbert York wrote to Brown that during his participation with the Air Force Science Advisory Board’s 1977 MX Summer Study, the Defense Science Board’s 1977 Cruise Missile Summer Study, and the JASON scientists, “the matter of LOW/LUA [launch on warning/launch under

50. OSD Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: Military Options in the Event the Interim Agreement has Expired and a Soviet “Violation” Occurs, October 29, 1977, 1–2, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 36, Folder Serial X 8/77–8/78, JCL.

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attack] arose more frequently and with greater force than ever before in my experience.”51 No such ambivalence existed when it came to the modernization of theater nuclear systems. In his analysis, Yaffe argues that the “military rationale” or “war-fighting” perspective that originally drove Schlesinger’s vision for TNF modernization was “suppressed” as a result of the Carter administration’s conventional emphasis, but this argument exceeds the evidence.52 Yes, it is true that the administration saw conventional force modernization as the highest defense policy priority. Brown repeated this throughout 1977 and during the release of the FY1979 budget. The Warsaw Pact buildup, coupled with the conclusions of the Hollingsworth and Nunn-Bartlett reports, convinced the White House and the Pentagon that the United States had to make adjustments to NATO’s conventional posture, and had to do so quickly. It is also true that there was skepticism about either superpower’s ability to keep the use of nuclear weapons limited; that is, it was difficult to envision using theater nuclear capabilities without an escalation that would be near—if not completely—automatic.53 This did not mean, however, that the administration completely dismissed or “suppressed” all military-operational justification for new and improved TNF. As stated earlier, at the Ottawa NPG, Brown reiterated the oft-made American point that the problem of longer-range TNF modernization could be solved by designating additional SLBM RVs to NATO. Allied fears about “denuclearization” notwithstanding, it appears that this argument was made first and foremost because of concerns about the connection between TNF survivability and credibility—for purposes of deterrence—as a viable “war-fighting” threat. Brown came out strong in his briefings on the FY1979 budget on the need for TNF to have a solid second-strike capability. In the same way as strategic nuclear forces, if NATO’s theater nuclear capabilities were unable to “ride

51. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part I: Authorization and Posture Statement, February 7, 1978, 70–72, 115. He also reiterated this position during questioning. Ibid., 539. Letter from Harold Brown to Henry Kissinger, White House, May 3, 1971, 2, attachment to Document 16 of Burr, ed., Launch on Warning. Letter from Herbert York to Harold Brown, August 16, 1977, 2, Box 14, Folder 1, Herbert York Papers. York confirmed to this author that Brown indeed held the position that the United States derived a strategic benefit from the fact that the Soviet Union could not be sure that the United States would not engage in launch on warning/launch under attack. Herbert York, email communication, September 10, 2003. 52. Yaffe, Origins, 593. 53. For example, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 1: Authorization and Posture Statement, February 7, 1978, 31, 81.

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out” a Soviet surprise attack, they were—theoretically—less credible as a tool for deterrence. Unlike continental U.S.-based strategic nuclear forces, however, the geographic proximity of NATO TNF to Warsaw Pact and Soviet forces meant that preemptive or preventive strikes could happen with mere minutes of warning. This explains Brown’s call (one that was no different from Schlesinger’s and Rumsfeld’s) for enhanced TNF field mobility, hardened command and control, and systems that could be better concealed.54 This also explains why submarines were highlighted as longer-range TNF. They were simply harder to target and therefore more difficult to destroy either in a crisis or in the opening minutes of a war. For the administration, theater nuclear forces were just one facet of the overall deterrence picture in Western Europe. Together with strategic nuclear and conventional forces, they worked to keep the Warsaw Pact from “crossing the line” on the Central Front. With TNF one could threaten escalation, and because of this, parties were apt to be more cautious since no one could predict where such escalation might lead. However, to be a credible escalation threat, TNF had to be usable and, importantly, be seen to be usable. They had to be able to survive and to destroy targets that the enemy valued, some of which would be hardened and time-urgent—which is why, despite the preference for SLBMs, Brown was also careful to add in the FY1979 annual report that “major land-based deployments” had to be kept intact and that any changes to land-based systems had to be done only “after careful consideration.”55 The administration also noted a clear connection between theater nuclear capabilities and the move toward conventional “counterforce,” but not a connection that suggested the latter in any way replaced the former. Instead, the threat of militarily effective TNF (which was a vital caveat) forced the Warsaw Pact to disperse its armored forces. In turn, that armor could be targeted and destroyed with future, high-technology conventional firepower.56 The credibility of theater nuclear use (and therefore the likelihood of deterrence) was also tied to anticipated levels of civilian devastation and the issue of damage limitation. It was quite conceivable that the Soviet Union’s leadership could be much less deterred by a NATO threat to use TNF if it was common 54. Ibid., 78–81. 55. Ibid., 76. 56. Ibid., 79–80. Yaffe accuses Brown of gaming the post-PD-18 TNF Modernization Study on this very point. According to Yaffe, in the memorandum outlining the terms of reference for the PD-18 TNF follow-on study, Brown stated that “a feasible and affordable conventional defense” was unattainable unless it was coupled with significant TNF hardware modernization. Yaffe, Origins, 622.

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knowledge that the consequence of such use would be overwhelming civilian, industrial, and environmental destruction in NATO’s own territory. This is why the administration continued the push for adjustable yields, yields that were “tailored to targets,” as well as an earth-penetrating warhead for Pershing II. It is also why Brown was so positive about the ERW.57 The ERW limited largescale collateral damage. Its radius of effect was much smaller compared to other warheads, so it minimized—comparatively—civilian and structural ruin. Actually, the ERW bolstered deterrence in the administration’s eyes for two reasons. First, the warhead’s limitation of collateral damage meant that NATO’s threat to use it was theoretically less empty. Second, it was thought that the warhead’s effectiveness against what the administration saw as the dominant military problem facing NATO in Europe—numerical asymmetry in tanks— might cause the Warsaw Pact to think twice about whether it would be able to achieve its military and political objectives. These overarching beliefs were given concrete form in strategic reviews and studies performed during mid- to late 1977. These included PRM-10, the PD18 follow-on study on TNF, the Defense Department’s MBFR Task Force, and, specifically in the case of the MX, the OSTP Missile Vulnerability Panel. In turn, the conclusions of these studies were used by the administration in its assessment of the international environment and in its FY1979 defense budget decision-making. PRM-10 and PD-18 confirmed the existing ambivalence about whether the MX program was the best solution for Minuteman vulnerability. John Edwards and David Dunn have both highlighted PRM-10’s impact on the follow-on to Minuteman. Edwards asserts that PRM-10 concluded Minuteman silos were not as vulnerable as previously thought and that the MX could be delayed.58 Dunn, quoting Desmond Ball, says the PRM-10 study showed the absolute futility of any attempt at a disarming, counter-silo strike and therefore determined that the MX was unnecessary.59 Edwards and Dunn are indeed correct, but it is now possible, using declassified documents, to tell the PRM-10 and MX story in much greater detail. The strategic nuclear forces portion of the PRM-10 Military Strategy and Force Posture Study offered four possible nuclear force substrategies. Each of 57. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 1: Authorization and Posture Statement, February 7, 1978, 80, 140. 58. Edwards, Superweapon, 140. Unfortunately, Edwards does not provide a citation for this assertion. 59. Dunn, Politics of Threat, 108–9.

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these substrategies had a different take on what the United States should do about its own hard-target kill capabilities. The first, Substrategy 1, was a pure assured retaliation posture that was aimed at the destruction of the Soviet Union’s population and its industrial recovery targets. It was a force with little to no countermilitary capability, no strategic modernization, and scant concern about any perceptions of asymmetry or the consequences of those perceptions. Substrategy 2 added the destruction of military recovery targets, but suggested that the United States keep its counter-silo capability at current levels. Substrategy 2 offered a small amount of modernization, namely one or more of the B-1, ALCM, or MX, and, importantly, a “deci[sion] not to pursue a highly effective hard-target kill capability against Soviet silos and associated launch control facilities.” The biggest difference between the second and third substrategies, other than the third’s emphasis on the need to “maint[ain] some current areas of U.S. advantage in the strategic balance,” was that the third substrategy also called for a “matching” of Soviet hard-target kill capability. Substrategy 4 was nearly identical to the third one, except that it called on the United States to pursue strategic nuclear superiority. It defined “political sufficiency” as the possession of superior forces whether one used static or dynamic (that is, exchange) models.60 Each of these four nuclear substrategies was added to other, conventional substrategies (Central Front, East Asia, and Rapid Reaction) in creating Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS). As stated earlier, PD-18—the presidential directive that arose out of the PRM-10 exercise—is still a heavily redacted document, so it is uncertain which of the nuclear substrategies was officially adopted.61 Extrapolating strictly from press accounts, Substrategy 3 appears to be the best candidate. Two days before Carter signed the guidance, Newsweek published a small blurb that revealed information about MX and PD-18. The magazine reported that Carter, in a “top secret, six-page document” (which more accurately describes PD-18, though Newsweek referred to it as PRM-10) had stated that hard-target kill capability should be “determined at a later date” but that research and development would continue. At first glance, this looks more like the Substrategy 2 finding of no hard-target kill, but as the Newsweek story continued, the final document was apparently a victory for the Joint Chiefs over others who had

60. PRM-10 Force Posture Report, June 8, 1977, I-39-I-40, DDRS, CK3100056945. 61. PD-18, US National Strategy, August 24, 1977. The precise language, which upon comparison with the PRM-10 Force Posture Study would identify the precise AIMS used, is still classified. It is somewhere on pages 2, 3, or 4 of the document.

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desired the end of the MX altogether.62 Since the first two substrategies dismissed the MX completely and the fourth required much faster movement on hard-target kill, this leaves the third—the “matching” strategy. This strategy easily facilitated a delay or postponement of the MX if the administration determined that the Soviet Union’s hard-target capability was already “matched” with existing U.S. forces. Admittedly, a Newsweek story is evidence of the most circumstantial quality. However, there are other signs that also point to the adoption of Substrategy 3 in PD-18. As explained previously, the declassified, military strategy portion of PD-18 entitled “Global Contingencies” parallels the wording of three specific PRM-10 AIMS: AIMS F, F(variant), and I. Substrategy 3 was the nuclear component of all three of those particular AIMS. If, as the declassified “Global Contingencies” section of PD-18 seems to indicate, the document was built using one of these three AIMS, then one can make a reasonable—though not rock-solid—conclusion that its still-classified nuclear portion came from those AIMS as well. Brown’s speech to the National Security Industrial Association about the PRM-10 and PD-18 lends additional support to this idea. The United States, Brown told his audience, would not build up “a first-strike, disarming capability” if the Soviet Union refrained from doing so itself. His unspoken warning fits with the “matching” approach. If the Soviet Union did not “show similar restraint,” then the United States would rise to the challenge. This same “matching” language was also provided to Senator McIntyre’s Research and Development Subcommittee in April 1978 via a chart labeled “Presidential Policy on Strategic Deterrence.”63 A good case can be made that within a year of Rumsfeld’s striking call for the MX in his FY1978 defense budget, the Carter administration’s interagency strategic review and subsequent national security strategy document determined that hard-target kill capabilities were not as essential for American national security. Unlike the MX, the subject of theater nuclear forces was intentionally left out of PRM-10. Why that decision was made—whether or not it was SALT II– related or was due to the fear of reopening another NATO “strategy debate”—

62. Newsweek, August 22, 1977, 13. 63. PRM 10 Force Posture Report, I-2-I-5. Remarks by Harold Brown to National Security Industrial Association (Transcript), September 15, 1977, 6, White House Speechwriters Chronological File, Box 20, Folder 3/17/78, Wake Forest Defense Speech (Original File), Wake Forest, Winston-Salem, NC, JCL. This precise phrase was repeated in Brown’s annual report to Congress for the FY1979 budget. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1979, Part 9: Research and Development, April 10, 1978, 6557.

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is unclear. None of the PRM-10 AIMS required TNF cuts, but in an assertion similar to one made in the January 1977 “deep cuts” study, the final PRM-10 Force Posture report suggested that the Soviets would likely balk at lowering total strategic nuclear delivery vehicle aggregates too much in SALT absent clear TNF adjustments—especially adjustments to those systems that had enough range to hit Soviet territory.64 The lack of in-depth analysis of TNF in PRM-10 aggravated some who had tried to construct the best possible picture for the review of the entire “balance” in Central Europe. In his comments to Brzezinski on the Contingency Assessment portion of PRM-10, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner rattled off a number of TNF-related issues that he believed required more examination. These included range asymmetries, the extent to which West Germany was urbanized, and the differences between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in training for military operations in a nuclear environment. Utgoff, commenting on Turner’s criticisms, reminded Brzezinski that the final PRM10 report would highlight the need for a follow-on TNF study. That followon study, Utgoff added later, would be part of an NSC-led “initiative.” Indeed, it seemed to everyone involved in the NSC’s review of PRM-10’s conclusions that TNF was a topic that had to be addressed in much greater detail. Given the state of the Central Front, all agreed that it made sense for the administration to focus the lion’s share of its attention—at least for the near term—on conventional quick fixes. It was also clear to those involved in the process that the Soviet Union was not simply sitting still when it came to its own TNF improvements and that NATO would need to decide upon new TNF “hardware” (particularly the GLCM) sooner rather than later.65 In the end, however, the

64. Compare PRM 10 Force Posture Report, III-33 and “Implications of Major Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Forces,” January 28, 1977, IV-17. 65. CIA Memorandum from DCI Turner to Brzezinski, Subject: Comments on Contingency Assessment Portion of PRM-10, June 15, 1977, TS#771545, 1, Central Intelligence Agency, FOIA by author, F-2002–01941. On the copy of the memo, Utgoff, in his own handwriting, reacted to Turner’s TNF concerns with the following note: “Agree with seriousness of the problem but its solution is beyond the scope of this paper. PRM-10 final report will suggest this as an area for further study.” Thomson explained that “[S]uch a [TNF] review should be a high priority follow-on to this study and will be the subject of an initiative that we will provide for you,” NSC Memorandum from James Thomson and Victor Utgoff to Brzezinski, Subject: PRC Meeting on PRM-10—Friday, July 8, 1977 at 10:00 A.M., July 6, 1977, 5 (footnote), DDRS, CK3100144176. Memorandum from Brzezinski to Secretary of State et al., Subject: Summary of Conclusions: SCC Meeting on PRM-10 for July 7, 1977, July 25, 1977, 2, DDRS, CK3100004489; NSC Memorandum (no author mentioned), Policy Review Committee [July 6, 1977] Summary of Conclusions, Subject: PRM-10 Military Strategy and Force Posture, July 8, 1977, 2, DDRS, CK3100144176.

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decision not to address TNF in PRM-10 at all meant that none of the “hardware” solutions had been comprehensively staffed out in time for the new budget. The need for new, improved cruise missile “hardware” in Europe was reinforced by other analyses under way at the same time that PRM-10 was undergoing review. In one example, the Defense Department’s MBFR Task Force hired an outside contractor study on the role of cruise missiles (especially GLCMs) in NATO’s defense. The study, written by Richard Burt and Philip Padgett, was completed in June and forwarded to the Pentagon at the end of July. It concluded that cruise missiles gave West Germany a clear conventional capability against Soviet territory, freed up airpower for interdiction missions, and enhanced NATO’s air defenses. Additionally, the study examined the effects of cruise missiles on arms control. It commented on how cruise missiles brought about the convergence of MBFR and SALT. It was now unreasonable to think that the two arms control regimes could remain separate. When it came to ranges, NATO would not be able to afford a 600-kilometer restriction but could achieve what it needed to with a limit of 1,000 kilometers. Specifically, a 1,000-kilometer limit did not allow strikes against the Soviet Union’s western military districts and was therefore considered less escalatory. However, since military forces housed in that area would have to be moved to the front at some point, the range was enough to allow attacks on communication and logistics. The two authors were also careful to explain that it mattered a great deal whether that range was measured with a heavier, conventional warhead or a lighter, nuclear one.66 The Defense Department was tasked by PD-18 to do a number of followon studies of nuclear weapon–oriented issues, including the Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Study. Brown signed off on the TNF study at the beginning of November 1977. According to Yaffe—who was the first scholar to refer to the study, though it is now possible to place it within the PRM-10 and PD18 context—this study was established in large part to provide data and analysis to what would soon become the NATO High Level Group. The goal of the Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Study was to determine TNF requirements, review weapon security and C3I, suggest deployment options, and

66. Richard Burt and Philip Padgett, PSR Note 144: Cruise Missiles and East-West Arms Control, 3– 4, 8–9, 16. The report was forwarded to the DOD MBFR Task Force on July 29, 1977. A copy of the report is located in Box 22, Folder 1, Gerald Johnson Collection, UC San Diego [hereafter Gerald Johnson Papers].

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hypothesize about how different deployment options might affect the overall deterrence picture.67 While the Pentagon was busy with its PD-18 TNF follow-on study, the NSC itself was apparently involved in its own “close-hold” analysis of the same issue. Brzezinski told Carter in mid-November that his staff was already looking at an early “initiative” on “gray area systems” that would address TNF in the context of allied relations and SALT II ratification. Brzezinski explained that this “initiative” would establish guidelines for an upcoming “four-power meeting”—a meeting that, according to Brzezinski, West Germany had requested by démarche that same day. This “four-power meeting,” in Bonn’s eyes, was needed to go over the role of TNF and forward-based systems in SALT III. This would appear to be a very early reference to what would eventually become the January 1979 Guadeloupe summit. In what also reads like a bureaucratic gambit against Brown’s own work, Brzezinski warned Carter that because of allied and domestic sensitivities, there had to be “tight WH-NSC control” over these issues. Any study should be “NSC-led” and the NSC Special Coordinating Committee (SCC), the NSC subcommittee chaired by Brzezinski himself, should “vet” such a study.68 The last major study that affected nuclear weapon decision-making in the FY1979 budget—and the one that landed the fatal blow against “full-scale engineering development” for the MX in the budget—was the OSTP Missile Vulnerability Panel. The initial rationale for this panel is unclear. It is uncertain whether Carter asked Frank Press, his science adviser, to become involved in the MX issue once he had been named to that position or whether Press simply volunteered his office’s services. Gregg Herken’s chapter about science advising in the Carter administration is silent on the issue. John Edwards argues for the latter. He claims that Press asked Carter early in 1977 if he could set up a panel to look at the problem of Minuteman vulnerability and the viability of the Air Force’s MX basing design. Press, in a cover memo to Carter, claimed the former. He stated that the president had requested his involvement in “military technology issues” and that he convened the Missile Vulnerability Panel upon receiving Brzezinski’s approval. Edwards’s contention that there was tension between the panel and the Air Force over the “arms control theology” of many of the panel’s members, like Richard Garwin, Jack Ruina, and Wolfgang Panovsky,

67. Yaffe, Origins, 621–23. 68. NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NSC Weekly Report, #36, November 11, 1977, 3, DDRS, CK3100099284.

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gives a much more adversarial flavor to either interpretation. That is, from wherever or whomever the impetus came, it is very possible that it originated from Carter’s (or Press’s) desire to “check” the Air Force’s MX position.69 The panel judged, like Senator McIntyre and others had before it, that the question of a new, hard-target-capable ICBM had to be detached from the issue of improved ICBM basing. Tying the two together, the report began, was “unfortunate” and “counterproductive.” Although it conceded that its work was not an in-depth examination of the missile issue, the panel came down hard against a new, heavy, and highly accurate Minuteman follow-on. It would prove too expensive. It would require the United States to restart the production of “special nuclear materials.” The panel also said that a new, hard-target kill missile could derail SALT II and would most likely contribute to crisis instability by making Moscow nervous since most of the Soviet Union’s RVs were carried on ICBMs. Finally, the report argued that the United States was fooling itself if it believed it could limit the collateral damage caused by using a high-yield ICBM—“even [if the missile was only used] against counterforce targets.”70

69. Gregg Herken only says that Frank Press “convened” the Panel to figure out “where and how to base the MX.” Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI, 187. Edwards, Superweapon, 142. OSTP Memorandum from Frank Press to President Carter, Subject: M-X Weapons System, December 2, 1977, 1, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Box 6, Folder MX Weapon System (12/12/77), JCL. Other members of the Panel included Solomon Buchsbaum, Daniel Fink, Marvin Goldberger, and John Deutch. Herken, Cardinal Choices, 324n14 and NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NSC Weekly Report, #36, November 11, 1977, 1, DDRS, CK3100099284. 70. OSTP Missile Vulnerability Panel, Analysis of the MX System—General Considerations for Follow-On Land-Based Systems [hereafter OSTP Panel Report I], undated, 1, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Box 6, Folder MX Weapon System (12/12/77), JCL. The nuclear materials issue, specifically the shortage of Oak Ridge alloy (Oralloy)—enriched uranium or uranium that is mostly U-235 and therefore optimal for weaponization—receives little attention in analyses of nuclear weapons policy in the Carter administration. In 1977 there were signs of an impending supply crisis. The higher-yield warhead in the MK-12A RV, to be placed on the Minuteman III, used a greater amount of Oralloy than older warheads. Oralloy was also needed for warheads for cruise missiles, Trident I C-4, and the MX. However, the United States had cut Oralloy production in the 1960s, thinking that it had more than enough stockpiled. Now the new demand was rapidly outpacing the available supply. Besides new production of special nuclear materials, one obvious way to fix the shortage was to construct warheads that used less of the isotope. However, the ability to build militarily effective warheads that used less Oralloy was stymied by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and would continue to be in the event of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 23, 1977, 16 and October 10, 1977, 16; Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 153, 234n54. For more on Oralloy production cuts in the Johnson administration, see Thomas Cochran, William Arkin et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume II: U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production, 78n110. This portion of the book can be found at National Resources Defense Council, http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/nuc_87010103b_ 65c.pdf (accessed February 2, 2008). OSTP Panel Report I, pages unnumbered—but appears to be 4– 5 working backwards from first numbered page (8).

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The threat of Minuteman vulnerability was “[n]either imminent [n]or certain.” The panel gave five reasons for this assessment. First, the ongoing silo hardening program for the Minuteman III was almost finished.71 The silo hardening program would force the Soviet Union to “double-up” the number of RVs it allotted for every targeted Minuteman silo. This is why the report highlighted “fratricide” as Minuteman’s second line of protection. The immediate physical effects of the first RV detonation—effects that would last anywhere from seconds to hours—would decrease the second RV’s military effectiveness, as well as the effectiveness of those RVs aimed at different, nearby targets. The panel offered three other potential “helps” for the Minuteman system. First, the United States had not fully taken into account the operational “friction” that the Soviet side might face in the heat of battle. Next, Moscow would not have deployed all of its next generation of missiles, which would have the necessary accuracy for hard-target kill, until the late 1980s. And finally, as Brown and others had been arguing, the Soviet Union would not be able to dismiss the possibility of launch on warning/launch under attack. The panel argued that Soviet war planners had to assume the United States would follow this approach.72 In examining alternative ICBM basing modes, the OSTP dismissed the idea of “unprotected mobile deployment” because the American public would not approve of such a system unless it was limited geographically. At the same time, geographic limitation made any basing system that much more susceptible to a “barrage attack.”73 The panel report mentioned other modes like lakes and Multiple Aim Point but did not cover them in any detail. Instead, it focused on the Air Force’s desired trench system wherein a missile was moved along underground tracks, breaking through to the surface in order to launch. The OSTP report identified multiple problems with this system. It was unclear to what extent the construction and the geology of underground tunnels would amplify blast and heat effects and thereby increase the system’s “vulnerability radius.” Also, one did not necessarily need super-accurate RVs to do extensive damage to the system. The panel argued that four thousand Soviet RVs “only 71. Ibid., 8. The Minuteman III program was completed as of mid-December 1977, while the Minuteman II’s hardening program was not scheduled for completion until September 1979. In December 1977, Brown reported that all 550 Minuteman III silos were done, as well as 180 of 450 Minuteman II. OSD Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: IVORY ITEM and Surprise Attack Response Procedures, December 18, 1977, 1–2, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 21, Jimmy Carter Sensitive 1/77–9/78, JCL. 72. OSTP Panel Report I, 5–8; Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 24, 1978, 16. 73. OSTP Panel Report I, 10.

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of moderate accuracy” could knock out two hundred MX missiles in a fourthousand-mile-long trench. And, while acknowledging the work of the Air Force Science Advisory Board’s 1977 MX Summer Study, the panel concluded that much more analytical effort was required on MX C3I, especially in a postattack setting.74 The OSTP also highlighted the problem of what some referred to as presentation-of-location uncertainty.75 The major benefits of the underground trench system—concealment and mobility—would be negated if an opponent was to discover and target a missile’s precise location. A trench system would require robust countermeasures against an opponent’s attempt to collect signals intelligence or measurement and signatures intelligence on the missile’s exact location. One could not also discount the threat of “pin-down” attacks. In terms of square mileage, the MX trench system was much smaller than the Minuteman ICBM system. As a result, it was possible for the Soviet Union to launch an “area attack” against it—that is, the Soviet Union could use its ICBMs and SLBMs in a “protracted bombardment” at a fast enough rate to keep the United States from launching MX ICBMs, but at a pace slow enough to mitigate fratricide. The report admitted that the MX system would complicate Soviet targeting calculations by forcing Moscow to expend greater RV numbers; however, the panel also expressed its doubts that the trench system was any better for accomplishing this task than the existing Minuteman.76 The OSTP panel made a big impression on Brzezinski. Upon being briefed of its conclusions, he wrote immediately to Carter—in the same memorandum in which he discussed the West German TNF démarche and the NSC’s “close-hold” study on theater nuclear forces—that the United States had until the late 1980s before the Minuteman system was “significantly vulnerable” (versus what he said was the “widespread assumption” that it would occur earlier in the decade). The Air Force’s buried trench concept, reported Brzezinski, was no more secure than the existing silo-based system in light of “barrage attacks.” The report, he explained, had shown that all the Soviet Union needed to take out a trench system was large-yield warheads—and this, he added, was precisely the direction in which Moscow was headed. The MX “[was] not a good counterforce weapon”; it was vulnerable to “carefully timed shots” that precluded its prompt launch against Soviet silos. The decision for a new, heavy 74. Ibid., 10–12. 75. The OSTP Panel Report did not use this term, but it would be used later to describe the problem. Edwards, Superweapon, 166. 76. OSTP Panel Report I, 12–13.

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ICBM was therefore “separable” from the survivability problem and had to be kept that way, which was a point that Frank Press would reiterate to Carter in the cover memo for the panel report.77 In short, the United States had time. Carter could safely postpone “full-scale development” for MX and therefore should do so. The administration could afford to examine the different basing possibilities more closely, including nonMX options. Indeed, the panel report suggested that everything needed closer examination: the basing, the missile—even the whole subject of ICBM survivability. Of course, when it came to the MX, Press conceded that there were “political considerations” to keep in mind. He suggested two: future SALT II ratification and perceptions of U.S. strength. From a technological perspective, however, there was little reason to increase MX spending above the level of the earlier FY1978 adjustment—“about $150 [million]” as indicated by Press. And should Carter desire more help from the OSTP, Press said that his office would be more than willing to do additional analyses regarding ICBM survivability, including work on subissues like targeting, Minuteman program life, and “political perceptions.”78 The OSTP Missile Vulnerability Panel was useful to the administration in a number of ways. First, its conclusions reinforced technologically what PD-18 had already determined to be the right course of action strategically—that is, the adoption of PRM-10 Substrategy 3’s postponing of hard-target kill capability. However, it is also important to note that the OSTP made it clear from the very first pages of its report that its focus was on basing, not the missile per se. As had happened under Senator McIntyre in 1976, funding for a new hardtarget kill missile was cut in part due to doubts cast about the viability of basing. The very beginning of the panel’s report offered a litany of criticisms about a new counterforce missile, after which it focused its attention on basing. However, despite this emphasis on basing, most of the MX funding that Press pushed Carter to cut in the FY1979 budget—using the OSTP’s conclusions to support his argument—was money that had been slated for missile development rather than basing. The basing issue became the hammer that was used to delay work on the missile. Prior to the panel, Brown testified that “full-scale development” of the missile components could start before basing work began

77. NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NSC Weekly Report, #36, November 11, 1977, 1. 78. OSTP Memorandum from Frank Press to President Carter, Subject: M-X Weapons System, December 2, 1977, 1–2.

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since missile development took more time. Now, in the wake of the panel’s report, the catchword became “synchronization.” The “full-scale development” of the missile and basing were to be delayed in FY1979 because they would have to be “synchronized.”79 Second, the OSTP’s findings reinforced the Office of Management and Budget’s call for decreased defense spending. Up front, the panel suggested that an “alternate basing system” could be built for much less using either an ICBM that was considerably smaller than the one planned for the MX or else the Minuteman III.80 As stated previously, newspaper leaks about the FY1979 defense program placed much of the responsibility for the $100 million MX cut, which was the precise figure that Press suggested to Carter, on James McIntyre and the OMB. If the leaks were true about OMB’s responsibility, then it would seem that the OSTP’s conclusions either influenced the OMB’s position or vice versa. The panel’s report also put new pressures on the already ambivalent secretary of defense. Again, the NSC was convinced that Brown’s uncritical adoption of the Air Force’s MX position had put him too far out in front of the White House. The report’s technological criticism of the Air Force’s “buried trench” and the attacks launched in October by Senators Kennedy and McIntyre were useful against Brown bureaucratically. It may have been believed that the attacks could convince Brown to moderate his stance. Regardless, all of it demonstrated—at least to the NSC—the need for closer White House (i.e., NSC) “watch-dogging” of the Department of Defense. The OSTP’s report might also explain an apparent flip-flop by Brown on the question of MX land use. In his August 1977 testimony, Brown had told Congress that there was enough DOD-controlled land for the MX system. By the following February, he was less certain that the MX would fit “entirely within a military reservation.”81 This may be best understood in light of the OSTP’s conclusion that— unless they were expanded geographically—the current MX basing options were susceptible to Soviet ICBM “barrage” or “area attacks.” Using the neoclassical realist framework, allied relations and strategic beliefs wielded significant “deflecting” power over the place of the MX and TNF 79. Ibid.; OSTP Panel Report I, 5. Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 and Review of the State of U.S. Strategic Forces, August 2, 1977, 209. Dunn, Politics of Threat, 109. 80. OSTP Panel Report I, 4. 81. NSC Memorandum from Victor Utgoff to Brzezinski, Subject: Monitoring the Defense Department, October 19, 1977, 1–2. On the NSC’s negotiations with Brown’s office, Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 45. Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 and Review of the State of U.S. Strategic Forces, August 2, 1977, 202. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 1: Authorization and Posture Statement, February 7, 1978, 538.

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modernization in Carter’s FY1979 defense budget. It is also important to note the deflective power of SALT II, and the anticipated character of SALT III and MBFR on strategic and theater nuclear modernization. The administration had nearly given the MX away completely in the SALT II “comprehensive proposal” of March 1977. From the very beginning, Brown suffered no illusions that Soviet advancements in both MIRVs and accuracy jeopardized the survival of U.S. ICBM RVs. Initially, he thought of SALT II as one way of extending their life. Strobe Talbott and others claim that it was Brown who convinced Carter that the “comprehensive proposal” had to address Minuteman survivability. Talbott asserts that during White House debates over the “comprehensive proposal,” Brown led the charge to use SALT II to get the Soviet Union to decrease its numbers of large ICBMs or, at the very least, agree to constraints on ICBM testing. The logic behind Brown’s push for testing restrictions was straightforward—since a given number of tests (Talbott indicates fifteen or more) was required to improve ICBM accuracy, limitations on the number of annual tests of the Soviet Union’s largest existing ICBM would “string out” any breakthroughs in accuracy, thereby lengthening the life of U.S. ICBM RVs.82 The “comprehensive proposal” also offered a ban on the production and deployment of mobile ICBMs, which would have included the MX, in conjunction with a sublimit of 150 Soviet heavy missiles (MLBMs), a freeze on the production and deployment of new types of ICBMs, and a similar lock on missile tests. Days before the March summit, Secretary of State Vance previewed this proposal for Dobrynin. During their meeting, Vance explained that the MX offer was “compensation” for Moscow’s willingness to agree to the heavy ICBM sublimit. Yet, this “compensation” was short-lived. When the “comprehensive proposal” was eventually scuttled, a full ban on the MX was immediately taken off the table. Two weeks after the March summit, Brzezinski wrote to Carter that there would be “no agreement to ban mobile ICBM development or deployment as a part of SALT II.”83 Therefore, as the two sides fought from April to September 1977 over what eventually became SALT II’s three-tier structure, the Soviet side tried hard to 82. Talbott, Endgame, 54–55, 59; Alexander Moens, Foreign Policy under Carter: Testing Multiple Advocacy Decision-Making, 68–69. 83. See Dobrynin’s Record of Conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, March 21, 1977, reprinted in Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5: 154. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Defining the U.S. Position for SALT Negotiations, April 15, 1977, 3, DDRS, CK3100048720.

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restrict the United States’ ability to produce and test mobile ICBM launchers (the MX) during the agreed three-year protocol period. For its part, the United States—backing away slightly from Brzezinski’s assertion—would only agree to a limit on MX deployment (although declassified documents show that during the first session of their September 1977 talks, Vance actually told Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko the U.S. would be willing to ban both mobile ICBM launcher production and deployment during the protocol). By the end of the September talks between Gromyko, Vance, and Carter, both parties were working on two possible restrictions, each of which would extend for three years: no mobile ICBM launcher deployment and no testing or deployment of “new” ICBM types. When it came to the latter, the United States pushed for a ban on all ICBM types (MIRV and non-MIRV), while the Soviet Union wanted to restrict only new MIRV ICBM testing.84 Considering these anticipated SALT II protocol restrictions, some clear connections can be drawn between the state of SALT II in late 1977 and the course of the MX in the FY1979 defense budget. Though the MX’s initial operating capacity was scheduled well after the protocol’s expiration date, the planned 84. The big problem for the United States was how to capture the Soviet SS-16 ICBM without damaging the future prospects for the MX. In April 1977, Dobyrnin said that Moscow would “go either way” if Washington wanted a ban on deployment of mobile ICBMs. By June, though, a three-year ban on mobile ICBM production was under debate in the NSC because of “the difficulties posed by the SS-20” (that is, the fact that it was not clear if the SS-16 could be inserted and launched from the SS20 launcher). The June NSC SCC minutes read as if a production ban was just being introduced and Vance told the SCC a month later that the United States had only offered a deployment ban to the Soviets in Geneva in May. This does not appear to have been the case. In their September 1977 talks, Vance reminded Gromyko that the two sides had tentatively agreed in Geneva in May that there would be a ban on both deployment and production of mobile ICBMs. When Gromyko immediately asked Vance to confirm whether “produce and deploy” was the U.S. position, Vance did so. Then, two months later, there was an apparent change as Vance told Senator Jackson’s subcommittee that the United States would indeed have the ability “to develop and test the [MX] mobile launcher” during the three-year protocol. All this while, the Soviets pressed for a protocol testing ban for mobile ICBM launchers (which the United States would have liked with respect to the SS-16, but not the MX). Memorandum from Cyrus Vance and Paul Warnke to President Carter, no subject mentioned, April 27, 1977, 4, DDRS, CK3100062466; Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Summary Report for your Information and Reaction of the Special Coordinating Committee, June 7, 1977, 4, DDRS, CK3100044841; Summary of Conclusions, Special Coordination Committee Meeting, July 11, 1977, 2, 5, DDRS, CK3100073267; U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation [U.S. and USSR SALT II delegations], September 22, 1977 [morning session], 4, http://foia.state.gov/documents/ foiadocs/27e8.PDF (accessed February 2, 2008); Transcript, Secretary Vance’s Testimony to Senate Armed Services subcommittee, November 7, 1977, 20, http://foia.state.gov/documents/ foiadocs/27f2.PDF (accessed February 2, 2008). U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation [U.S. and USSR SALT II delegations], September 22, 1977 [morning session], 16, 18; U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation [US and USSR SALT II delegations], September 30, 1977, 13–14, http://foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/27f0.PDF (accessed February 2, 2008).

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three-year ban on mobile ICBM launchers cemented the administration’s “go slow” approach. Even if it had tried to accelerate the follow-on ICBM program, the administration’s position on mobile launchers in the SALT II protocol might have still restricted any actual deployment of the new system. There was additional uncertainty as to how the protocol ban on “new types” of ICBMs would affect the MX. Between September 1977 and mid-1978, the Soviets argued that the MX had to be put into that very category. The delay of the MX in the FY1979 budget fits well with the reigning ambivalence about the place of the new missile system in SALT II. And ambivalence it was. In November 1977, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Paul Warnke told the House Armed Services Committee that the deployment of any mobile system was a “nightmare” for arms control, but nonetheless conceded that the United States had to keep a mobile system of its own in development since the Soviet Union had the SS-16. The OSTP report only added to this fray. Despite John Edwards’s claim that the OSTP examined verifiability under SALT II, the panel report clearly states that it did not look at “policy issues inherent to deceptive basing or mobile deployment, particularly in a SALT context.” Rather, the report’s more relaxed conclusions about ICBM vulnerability and its skepticism of current basing schemes lent technological support to the idea that the United States could live with a three-year ban on mobile ICBM systems.85 Arms control negotiations not only influenced the MX program in the FY1979 budget but also wielded significant power over theater nuclear forces, particularly GLCMs and the ERW. The United States viewed its conventional and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles—especially those with longer ranges—as cutting-edge military technology. Used in stand-off air attacks against Warsaw Pact and Soviet territory, they extended the operational and lethal range of U.S. naval and ground forces. The Soviet Union understood these high-technology advantages as well, so it looked to SALT II as a way of blocking Washington’s plans. It pressed for range limits on all cruise missile variants. It also tried to establish special ALCM counting rules. For example, Moscow first worked to 85. Compare Edwards, Superweapon, 143 and OSTP Panel Report I, 9. Warnke responses to Representative Ron Dellums and Staff Director John Ford, Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy Subcommittee, May 6, 1977, in “SALT II Briefing,” Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 and Review of the State of U.S. Strategic Forces, August 2, 1977, 450, 458. In the end, Warnke actually had to backtrack in his testimony. To Dellums, he said that neither country should develop or deploy mobile systems. Later when questioned, he stated that he had “intended to say” that the United States should develop a mobile system, but not deploy one (that is, the United States’ then-current SALT II negotiating position).

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have all ALCM-carrying heavy bombers tallied under the 1,320 MIRV strategic nuclear delivery vehicle ceiling. Later, it pushed for both parties to agree upon a maximum number of ALCMs that a single heavy bomber would be allowed to carry. For GLCMs and SLCMs in SALT II, Moscow’s preference was to keep their respective ranges at or under 600 kilometers. In mid-1977, Director of Central Intelligence Turner explained that this yardstick was based on Soviet naval requirements, particularly antiship capabilities. In their very first meeting on February 1, 1977, Carter had told Dobrynin that a 600-kilometer SLCM range was far too threatening for the United States due to the coastal location of its major cities. He suggested limits well below that figure. In much the same way, the Soviet Union insisted that GLCM ranges had to be kept to a minimum in order to protect its own territory against deep, ground-to-ground strikes launched from NATO territory. The 600-kilometer range limit for both SLCMs and GLCMs was therefore an inspired negotiating stance for Moscow. It restricted long-range GLCM use by NATO, while at the same time protecting the SLCM range required by the Soviet Navy.86 The March 1977 “comprehensive proposal” had tried to work around these suggested cruise missile range restrictions, but to no avail. The administration put forward an alternative that differentiated between “strategic” and “nonstrategic” cruise missiles (using a 2,500-kilometer range as the dividing line between the two). This, Vance explained to Dobrynin, would be akin to the situation with the Backfire bomber, which was a platform that Moscow considered “nonstrategic.”87 However, like the limits on Soviet heavy ICBMs, the categorization of “strategic” and “nonstrategic” cruise missiles were dismissed along with the “comprehensive proposal” as nonstarters by Moscow.88 86. CIA Memorandum from Stansfield Turner to President Carter, Subject: An Assessment of Soviet Perceptions on SALT—May 1977, June 2, 1977, 3, USSR Vertical File, Folder: USSR Related Docs. Opened (I), JCL. Memorandum of Conversation, Dobrynin meeting with President Carter, Cyrus Vance, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, February 1, 1977, 2, DDRS, CK3100048704. In addition, Moscow also demanded that cruise missiles deployed on tactical aircraft be kept to the same 600-kilometer limit. Letter from Brezhnev to Carter, March 15, 1977, reprinted in Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5: 153. In August 1979, former SALT II negotiator Edward Rowny made a similar point about range limitations in response to a question from Senator Strom Thurmond. Senate Armed Services Committee, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty), Part 2, 703. 87. Dobrynin’s Record of Conversation between him and U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, March 21, 1977, reprinted in Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5: 154. 88. An “elaboration” was apparently made during the March 1977 summit whereby the United States gave ground to the Soviet Union’s desire for a 600-kilometer range limit for ALCMs carried on tactical aircraft. When Senator Jackson caught word of this and accused Brzezinski of prejudicing

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With the collapse of the March 1977 summit and the end of the “comprehensive proposal,” the United States entered the late spring and summer of 1977 with a desire to push longer-range SLCMs and GLCMs (those with ranges greater than 600 kilometers) out of SALT II and into SALT III or to create a temporary “holding ground” for them in the current talks. For example, after the March summit, Vance and Warnke suggested a short, two-year ban on the deployment of long-range SLCMs and GLCMs.89 From May to September, as SALT II’s eventual tripartite form took shape, the range limits for GLCMs and SLCMs ended up in the same place as the restrictions on “new types” of ICBMs and mobile ICBM launchers—in the three-year interim protocol. Yet, until Gromyko’s visit to the United States in late September for talks with Carter and Vance, the two countries remained locked over the exact protocol rules for the two cruise missile variants. The United States expressed a willingness to agree to the Soviet 600-kilometer limit for deployed SLCMs and GLCMs (conventional and nuclear-tipped) for three years, but only if the United States retained the ability to test all cruise missiles up to a 2,500-kilometer limit and only if it was also able to produce missiles during the protocol. In order to aid Soviet verification, Washington said that it would restrict itself to the use of air launches for all cruise missile tests during the three-year protocol.90

NATO’s military options, NSC staff member William Hyland told Richard Perle that the administration had done so because it was worried about the sheer numbers of Soviet medium-range bombers that would be able to carry future Soviet cruise missiles. Regarding this “elaboration,” see correspondence from Senator Henry Jackson to Brzezinski, April 22, 1977, and April 27, 1977, and Memorandum from William Hyland to Brzezinski, Subject: Briefing of Dick Perle on SALT, undated, 1. All of these are found in Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 40, SALT [Jackson, Sen. Henry M.] 3/77–6/77, JCL. 89. In this case, long-range was defined as greater than 2,000 kilometers. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Defining the U.S. Position for SALT Negotiations, April 15, 1977, 2, 4, DDRS, CK3100048720. 90. The 2,500-kilometer limit for the three-year protocol was adopted despite internal administration questioning as to whether that range would—especially if maintained beyond three years—be enough for future stand-off strikes with ALCMs. In light of the B-1 decision, the Defense Science Board met during the summer of 1977 to discuss the penetrability of cruise missiles against current and future Soviet air defenses. Its main conclusion was that should the Soviet Union improve its “obvious radar and fuzing problems,” then U.S. cruise missiles in their present state would lose military effectiveness. To keep that from happening, the United States would have to decrease ALCM and Tomahawk radar cross-section, cut “radar altimeter power,” determine the extent to which the Soviet military anticipated possible cruise missile flight paths, and most importantly improve the B-52’s electronic countermeasures. The report concluded that a range limit of 2,500 kilometers was not enough against current Soviet air defenses when one considered operational planning. Indeed, it said that in some cases the “effective operational range” for 2,500 kilometers was actually cut to “under 1000 [nautical miles]” or “as low as 1000 kilometers” [which converted to 540 nautical miles]. A 2,000-

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Moscow, on the other hand, was convinced that the three-year protocol only delayed what it believed was inevitable—the production and deployment of large numbers of cruise missiles by the United States. Gromyko argued in his meetings with Carter that once the protocol expired, American factories would pump out cruise missiles like they were “pancakes.” Because of this, the Soviet side insisted that it would accept the U.S. position, but only if GLCM and SLCM testing during the protocol kept to ranges of 600 kilometers or below. Theoretically, this would extend the time it took the United States and NATO to deploy longer-range SLCMs and GLCMs—an argument that ran along the same lines as Brown’s suggestion that ICBM testing limits would “string out” Soviet ICBM modernization. However, the Soviet Union added one more condition. The United States would have to give in on the MIRV counting rule for ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. That is, all of the United States’ ALCMcarrying bombers would have to be counted under the 1320 MIRV sublimit.91 This was an especially difficult proposition for Washington. It forced the United States to choose between ALCM carriers and MIRV ICBMs and SLBMs. And, as mentioned earlier, the B-1 decision had placed a much greater burden on ALCMs as the dominant, “air-breathing” part of the nuclear triad. Within two months of Gromyko’s September visit, the Soviet Union had tentatively agreed to allow the production and air-testing during the protocol of all types of cruise missiles up to a range of 2,500 kilometers. At the same time, all deployed GLCMs and SLCMs (and ALCMs carried on tactical aircraft) would be restricted for the duration of the protocol to 600 kilometers. The United States also conceded on the counting rule for ALCM-carrying heavy

nautical-mile range was merely “sufficient.” In spite of this analysis, Perry told a group of reporters on October 31, 1977, that a 2,500-kilometer limit was “sufficient” against current Soviet air defenses. For the Defense Science Board study information, see “Preliminary Major Conclusions: DSB-77 Summer Study,” 1–2, and chart labeled “SALT Points” (the last page of what appears to be a complete set of VUGraph slides from the DSB Summer Study), both of which are in Box 34, Folder 4, Herbert York Papers. For Perry’s comment about the 2,500-kilometer limit, see “Edited Version, Background Briefing, Pentagon,” October 31, 1977, 18, Box 27, Folder 5, Gerald Johnson Papers. Though Perry is not identified by name in the briefing, there are enough textual clues to make the identification. 91. Record of Conversation between Gromyko and Carter, September 23, 1977, reprinted in Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8–9: 111. After his meeting with Carter, Gromyko reiterated this to Vance, suggesting that if testing of GLCMs and SLCMs during the protocol was allowed, they “could come off the conveyor belt in large numbers.” U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation [U.S. and USSR SALT II delegations], September 23, 1977 [afternoon session], 6, http://foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/27ec.PDF (accessed February 2, 2008). U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation [U.S. and USSR SALT II delegations], September 22, 1977 [morning session], 14–15, http://foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/27e8.PDF (accessed February 2, 2008).

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bombers.92 In its late 1977 form, therefore, the anticipated SALT II protocol banned the deployment of longer-range GLCM and SLCM options (both nuclear and conventional) for at least three years. If the protocol was renewed upon its expiration, then that ban would continue. The Soviet Union could also try to “string out” the expiration date, and thereby extend the GLCM and SLCM ban, by delaying the protocol’s actual start date. The expected shape of the three-year protocol and the restrictive noncircumvention and nontransfer clauses that the Soviet Union wanted to have inserted in the final treaty go far in explaining why there was little pressure on the administration to accelerate or even push the GLCM program in the FY1979 defense budget. With the prospects of a three-year (or possibly longer) ban on longer-range cruise missiles and the application of strict nontransfer rules for European allies, the long-range TNF systems that were not captured under SALT II, specifically Pershing II and its extended range variant, appeared more and more desirous. Cruise missiles were not the only theater nuclear systems in the FY1979 budget that were deflected because of arms control negotiations. In the late summer and early autumn of 1977, as the “neutron bomb” campaign grew and NATO governments found themselves in politically difficult waters with defense-left and antinuclear groups, many in Europe, particularly West Germany, began to consider ways of folding the ERW into existing arms control negotiations. From the perspective of Western European leaders under siege, the ERW’s movement into an arms control regime made perfect sense. It placated domestic antinuclear sentiment and bolstered their left-wing credentials because it expressed a willingness to limit or perhaps even forgo a weapon that many on the left believed particularly vicious and horrible. It was also assumed that since the Soviet Union was so vocal about the “neutron bomb,” it had to be worth something valuable in a trade. In light of the latter, the West German government pressed in late 1977 to have the ERW introduced into the ongoing MBFR negotiations. In MBFR, the warhead’s deployment could be traded for additional tanks along the Central Front.93 This was the position communicated to the White House by Bonn after West Germany’s Security Council met

92. Talbott, Endgame, 130–31; U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation [U.S. and USSR SALT II delegations], September 30, 1977, 11; Transcript, Secretary Vance’s Testimony to Senate Armed Services subcommittee, November 7, 1977, 7. 93. Auger, Dynamics of Foreign Policy, 62, 65–66; Wasserman, Neutron Bomb Controversy, 88–92.

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on November 10. The Western allies could exchange the warhead for a larger number of tanks, over and above the current MBFR proposal of 1,700.94 Within the administration, there was a great deal of skepticism over any ERWMBFR connection. When Brzezinski related Bonn’s November proposal to Carter, he cautioned that the Soviet Union would dismiss the notion altogether if, when the time came to make the exchange, there was still as much hesitancy about the warhead’s deployment as had already been registered, like, for instance, at the NATO NPG meeting in Bari. There would be little reason for Moscow to trade tanks for a promise not to deploy the ERW if the Soviet Union believed that the chances were relatively slim that it would ever have to face the warhead in the field. In fact, Brzezinski put it in much stronger terms. The use of the ERW in MBFR would be “an empty ploy” if there were any questions in the minds of Soviet leadership about the warhead’s deployment. Carter concurred.95 This warning did not mean that the door was shut completely on the use of the ERW in arms control; there were other ideas afloat. Two days before West Germany’s Security Council had settled on the ERW-MBFR proposal, Brown wrote a memorandum to Carter wherein he suggested yet another possible trade for the ERW. Instead of exchanging ERW deployment for “600 tanks,” Brown took aim at another Soviet program—the SS-20. The United States and the Soviet Union could make a simple bargain. There would be no deployment of the warhead if the Soviets held off on the SS-20. Brown, probably thinking of the revolutionary possibilities of new conventional “counterforce” options, insisted that the political liabilities of both the SS-20 and the ERW far outweighed their overall military potential.96 In his eyes, an ERW-for-SS-20 trade performed outside current arms control talks could be a straightforward one. It would not be as easy with MBFR, where there was a good chance that an ERW option would take years to 94. NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NSC Weekly Report, #36, November 11, 1977, 3–4. 95. Ibid., 4. On the copy of this memorandum, along the right-hand margin on page 4 (next to Brzezinski’s comment about “the empty ploy”), Carter wrote, “I agree.” 96. Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, “Getting Something for the Neutron Bomb: ER for SS-20,” November 8, 1977, 1, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 27, Folder SCC 41 (11/16/77), JCL. Auger and Wasserman argue that Walter Slocombe, McGiffert’s deputy at DOD-ISA and the director of the DOD SALT Task Force, is the one who came up with the idea of the ERW for SS-20 trade. Wasserman claims this (93), but provides no supporting evidence. Auger (69n67) cites Wasserman and another secondary source, David Whitman’s The Press and the Neutron Bomb, arguing that these two sources “firmly establish that Slocombe first proposed this linkage in a memo to Harold Brown the day before the November 16 [SCC] meeting.” Brown’s memo predates this by a week, so at present, it is not clear who in the Pentagon actually came up with the idea first.

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construct because of the way that allied decision-making was done. As there were no SS-20s or ERWs in the field in early November 1977, Brown figured that both parties could simply trade deployment for deployment. If the United States detected SS-20 deployments—a feat Brown claimed would be relatively easy—then NATO would respond by introducing the warhead operationally. If the Soviet Union pressed for a ban on ERW production, then Washington would demand the same for the SS-20, which, if implemented, would also counter the threat to the United States from the SS-16 ICBM—the three-stage version of the SS-20. Best of all, Brown concluded, the trade put the Soviet Union on the political defensive. The Soviet Union had invested a large amount of political capital emphasizing the evils of the ERW. If the ERW was nearly as appalling and powerful as Moscow had made it out to be, then the decision not to deploy it had to be of more value than the movement of a few hundred tanks back into Soviet territory (where they could still be used in second and third echelons). And if the Soviets chose to argue that the ERW was somehow worse than the SS-20, then the United States could publicly highlight the ways in which the SS-20 (with its multiple warheads) was a comparatively less humane weapon system.97 On November 16, the NSC SCC met to discuss and debate the different arms control options for the ERW. There, it was decided that the administration would move forward on Brown’s SS-20 idea. Brzezinski states that he forwarded the idea to Carter that very day. From then until the following March, the administration worked to convince its European allies that the better arms control option for the ERW was its use in capturing the SS-20. It was not an easy position to sell, particularly with West Germany. As part of its campaign to convince skeptics within NATO, it was decided in late January 1978 that along with the standard bilaterals on the U.S. defense budget typically provided early in the year to European allies, Deputy National Security Adviser David Aaron would lead an interagency team to brief them on the status of SALT II and the ERW. Even with this extra effort, Bonn still held out for the ERW’s use in MBFR until mid-March 1978, at which time the West German Security Council voted to

97. Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, “Getting Something for the Neutron Bomb: ER for SS-20,” November 8, 1977, 1–2. Because of the way the sentence reads, this author makes the assumption that the still-classified words on page 2 are in reference to the SS-20’s militaryoperational characteristics. The entire sentence reads: “If (as is more likely) they argue that the SS-20 is a less dangerous weapon which should not be linked to the ‘horrible’ neutron bomb, they lay themselves open to us pointing out that the [redacted partial sentence] are far more effective than ER weapons at destroying both people and buildings—and for that matter, tanks.”

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accept the ERW-for-SS-20 exchange—but only once the Callaghan government agreed to accept the warhead’s deployment on British territory.98 The idea of exchanging the ERW for the SS-20 still suffered from the same vulnerability as had all of the other options involving the ERW: the warhead’s credibility as a “bargaining chip” was contingent on its future deployment. If there was any hesitancy about deployment on the part of its continental European allies, then the United States could have a very difficult time convincing Moscow to deal for the SS-20. And the “continental” part of that was a vital piece of the puzzle. Great Britain could offer its territory for the ERW, but since the warhead’s most militarily useful mission was against tank formations, the Soviet Union would not likely view UK deployment as overly threatening. The United States could produce the warhead, but without its credible deployment it was doubtful that the Soviet Union could be convinced or forced to give up a system of its own. This is why, in preparing for the late January 1978 “bilaterals,” the NSC SCC concluded that an allied deployment decision must precede a U.S. production decision. And, in an early example of the “two track” approach that would later be used for long-range theater nuclear systems, the NSC SCC also agreed that an arms control component would help the Europeans make that necessary deployment decision.99 All of this meant that it was not possible to move forward quickly on the ERW in the FY1979 budget. As of March 1977, the delivery of the ERW for Lance had been planned for early 1979, while production of the ERW for 8-inch artillery had been scheduled for October 1979.100 Now, given the state of affairs, production would start only after there had been agreement on deployment.

98. Later, in a January 1978 memorandum, Brzezinski refers to the ERW-for-SS-20 idea as “your [Carter’s] idea” but unless Carter suggested it to Brown prior to Brown’s early November 1977 memo, this statement appears to be a case of revisionism. See Auger, Dynamics of Foreign Policy, 66, 71, 72, 78; Wasserman, Neutron Bomb Controversy, 94–95, 106–7. Regarding Brzezinski’s revisionism, Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Meeting of the SCC on Allied Consultations and SALT, January 23, 1978, 2, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 28, SCC 53 (1/23/78), JCL. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Meeting of the SCC on Allied Consultations and SALT, January 23, 1978, 1. Aaron’s team briefed the British on January 31, 1978, and according to U.S. Ambassador Kingman Brewster the visit was “highly successful” and had “crystallized” the idea of the ERW-SS-20 trade—an approach that Brewster believed would be a good political tool for the Callaghan government to use against the Labour Party’s defense-left. Correspondence from U.S. Ambassador Kingman Brewster to Brzezinski, February 6, 1978, 1, 3, DDRS, CK3100475258. 99. On the comparison between the future “two-track” decision, Wasserman, Neutron Bomb Controversy, 95. For a plain statement about the production-deployment decision linkage, see Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Meeting of the SCC on Allied Consultations and SALT, January 23, 1978, 2. 100. Washington Post, July 8, 1977, A3.

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Even then, if a pact was made to exchange the warhead for the SS-20, it was unclear precisely how much production would actually be allowed or needed in light of zero deployment. The modernization of Lance and artillery continued apace in the FY1979 budget so that they would be ready for ERW insertion once a decision had been made. The absence of a deployment decision in early 1978 in light of the burgeoning ERW “two track” approach, however, helps to explain the warhead’s status in the FY1979 budget.

Conclusion When it came to U.S. strategic and theater nuclear modernization in the FY1979 budget, the Carter administration chose to “go slow,” maintaining enough money in the programs to keep up research, but not enough to move them into “full-scale development.” From a traditional realist point of view, there was little justification for this path as there had been no objective weakening in Soviet military strength or power projection over the course of 1977 and 1978. Looking at specific, domestic political variables, it is clear that cost was a serious consideration, but fiscal concerns alone cannot explain away the state of strategic and theater systems. Nor are they best explained by executivelegislative logrolling, shifts in public opinion, or interest group pressure. Indeed, when it came to outside group influence, the administration was under a greater amount of pressure (on Capitol Hill and in private) to move in the very opposite direction. Applying neoclassical realism as an explanatory framework for Carter’s MX and TNF decision-making in the FY1979 budget, three main “deflectors” (allies, strategic beliefs, and arms control) influenced the administration’s assessment of its international military environment. These three “deflectors” moved the administration away from defense policy prescriptions that the international environment would seem to have indicated to be prudent (and away from strategic and theater nuclear program decisions that the outgoing Ford administration had, in late 1976 and early 1977, actually considered necessary).

Six Carter’s Adjustments to the MX and TNF Modernization Programs in 1978

By mid-1978, the Carter administration appeared to have arrived at a consensus on the best basing mode for the MX missile. By December, however, that consensus had disappeared and the Air Force was called upon to look at a thoroughly different option, delaying the new ICBM program once again. That same year, Carter shocked his entire national security team by canceling U.S. production of the enhanced radiation warhead, yet the administration also moved to adopt the NATO High Level Group’s position on the deployment of new, longer-range TNF systems in Western Europe. In none of these cases, however, did the administration move at a pace that fit with the then-current military-operational environment.

The MX Missile Program in 1978 The delay of the MX ICBM program in the FY1979 budget had had two immediate consequences. It raised the status of the Office of Science and Technology Policy Missile Vulnerability Panel to that of a defense-left “Team B” within the administration. In 1978 and into 1979, the OSTP continued to be a major player in the debate over the MX. The delay also set off a run of brandnew MX studies that lasted for nearly the entire first half of 1978. Most of these new studies centered on basing and included evaluations by the JASON scientists, the Defense Science Board (DSB), the Space and Missile Systems 219

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Organization (SAMSO) ICBM Program Office, Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), and more analysis by the OSTP. The concept of the missile itself was also reexamined in a joint Navy–Air Force “common missile” study. The conclusions of the JASON study apparently paralleled those of the OSTP panel report. The JASON scientists dismissed the idea that the Soviet Union posed a current threat to Minuteman, supporting their position by highlighting the problem of fratricide. Given its weapons systems accuracies, the Soviet Union would have to “double-up” on Minuteman silos, and there was no guarantee that the secondary RV would have the needed military effect. The threat to Minuteman could be a problem in the long term, but for the time being, the United States could instead try to adjust the Soviet arsenal through SALT II. Even better in their eyes, the United States could increase its capabilities for launching its ICBM force while under attack and make that capability and policy known to Soviet leadership. A large, highly accurate MIRV MX ICBM, they insisted, would only disrupt SALT II and provoke the Soviet Union.1 In the wake of PD-18, the work of the OSTP and the Air Force’s Science Advisory Board Summer Study on MX command and control, Brown turned to the DSB and asked it to run its own alternative basing study and also act as a forum wherein the whole MX basing issue could be debated. Under the direction of Michael May, the DSB proceeded with its own study and at the same time turned to SAMSO and AFSC, asking them to approach their own respective contractors for brand-new MX basing evaluations. The general hope was that a consensus position would arise from this competition. The contractors for SAMSO and AFSC were asked to look at four basing possibilities: horizontally positioned missile shelters, vertically positioned shelters, shelters covered by water (pools or lakes), and—despite the OSTP’s conclusions—a buried trench system with hardened missile shelters connected by nonhardened sections.2

1. Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 24, 1978, 16. 2. Perry discusses the Air Force Science Advisory Board Summer Study and claims that because it had not provided a “preferred solution,” the DSB had been asked to do its study. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 9: Research and Development, 6505. While there is material about the 1977 Air Force Science Advisory Board MX summer study in Herbert York’s papers (membership lists, terms of reference, and planned papers), the author could not locate any material on its conclusions. See Box 34, Folder 5, Herbert York Papers. Edwards refers to the SAMSO report as a study done by the Ballistic Missile Office at Norton Air Force Base. Aviation Week refers to it as the SAMSO/TRW study. While Aviation Week refers to the AFSC study, Edwards refers to the same thing as the “Tiger Team” study or the “Toomay study” (for the director of the study, General John Toomay). Edwards, Superweapon, 146–47, 150–52; Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 20, 1978, 14, June 19, 1978, 22.

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The available, open-source information about the studies and their conclusions is limited and fragmentary, but two of the studies—the DSB and the AFSC (otherwise known as the “Toomay” or MX “Tiger Team” study)—have been described in greater detail by John Edwards. If Edwards’s narrative is accurate, then the DSB study was indeed comprehensive. In addition to tunnel or trench variants, it examined air-based, road-mobile, and submarine-based MX ICBM systems. Edwards claims that Michael May’s favorite basing mode was a lighter, road-mobile system, but also that May believed this type of system was politically untenable because of the sensitivities likely to arise from keeping road-mobile missiles on domestic highways. On the one hand, the DSB argued that tunnel variants were too expensive and vulnerable to secondary effects like blast and electromagnetic pulse. On the other hand, air- and submarine-based basing modes were vulnerable to surprise attacks, alert problems, barrage attacks, and, specifically in the case of submarines, technological breakthroughs in antisubmarine warfare. At the end of the day, the DSB and AFSC both dismissed tunneling schemes and concluded that the best option was to deploy a large missile in a cluster of vertically positioned shelters. They argued that vertical shelters would not have to be hardened to the same level of existing ICBM silos because there would be about twenty to twenty-five of them for every deployed MX. In contrast, the SAMSO ICBM Program Office pushed for horizontal basing modes. Aviation Week and Edwards both assert that even though horizontal shelters were not able to be hardened to the same degree as vertical ones, SAMSO held that vertically positioned shelters made missile loading and unloading much more difficult to do. The studies were debated at an Air Force Science Advisory Board meeting on April 25–26 and were briefed to the DSB on May 2–3. The DSB, in turn, worked through the disagreements between all three reports and offered a consensus basing scheme—the use of multiple, vertically positioned shelters.3 This basing consensus notwithstanding, the precise type of missile that would eventually be housed in those vertically positioned shelters was still up in the air. The Air Force’s position was firm; it believed that the United States 3. Edwards, Superweapon, 147–50, 152; Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 19, 1978, 22. Perry touched on the AFSC study very briefly in congressional testimony. He provided the dates of the study and stated that it concluded there were “physics and engineering advantages” to the vertical silo concept. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1979, Part 9: Research and Development, 6506. SAMSO History, 280, 284, 286. SAMSO’s history appears to contradict Aviation Week and Edwards, stating that its missile basing study first pushed for vertical silos, then for horizontal shelters. Michael May recalled that the DSB study and the Toomay report may have convinced SAMSO to change its perspective. Michael May, email communication, September 15, 2003.

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needed a large, heavy MIRV missile. If it was deemed necessary, the Minuteman III could be used, but only as an interim measure. Other, more radical plans were also afloat. A joint Navy–Air Force “common missile” assessment, known as the Hepfer-Clark study, suggested that one common missile, as it was initially conceived, could be shared by the Trident II D-5 SLBM and the MX ICBM. This, in the administration’s eyes, had a number of benefits. With Carter’s continued push for efficiency, a common missile could cut costs by streamlining the production process and erasing unnecessary duplication. And, since it would have to fit in submarine tubes, a common missile would not have to be as large. As Edwards describes it, the line of this common missile debate was drawn between those who were for it—namely William Perry and the Navy—versus the Air Force and Perry’s own deputy, Seymour Zeiberg. The Air Force, concerned about how the common missile might increase the Navy’s power, argued that it would be unable to fulfill its requirements using a common weapons platform. The Air Force was skeptical that a common missile would result in significant cost savings and insisted that a smaller, shared system would unduly limit the number of RVs carried per unit. The Navy suggested that the Air Force’s requirements were self-serving, and to this, Perry added that the smaller common missile would be able to hold as many RVs as would be allowed under the SALT II agreement presently under negotiation. Perry was briefed on the Hepfer-Clark study sometime during July-August 1978, but no decisions about the new missile were made at that time.4 Despite the arguments over whether a future ICBM system would use the Minuteman III, the Trident C-4 on an interim basis, a common Trident II-sized vehicle, or a new, heavy MX, the DSB, the Air Force and—importantly— Secretary Brown all believed that ICBMs in any future system would best be housed within and transported between newly built clusters of vertically positioned missile shelters.5 This concept would be referred to in the strategic literature and in the media, inconsistently, as multiple aim point (MAP), multiple aim point-vertical silo (MAP-vertical) or multiple vertical protective shelters. Beginning in June, it looked as if MAP-vertical would eventually come out the winner of the basing mode fight. The United States used multiple channels 4. Edwards, Superweapon, 159–61. In these pages, Edwards refers to the DSB meeting in May 1978 as the “spring Defense Systems Acquisitions Review Committee.” SAMSO History, 284, 287–88; Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 24, 1978, 16, and June 19, 1978, 22. 5. For mention of a “growing enthusiasm” for the use of the Trident C-4 in a MAP configuration, see Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 28, 1978, 18.

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to preview MAP-vertical to the Soviet side in anticipation of Vance’s mid-July visit to the SALT II negotiations in Geneva. In Geneva, Paul Warnke officially presented this position to the Soviet delegation and put Moscow on notice that the United States reserved its right to base a new ICBM in a MAP-vertical configuration. Just weeks after Geneva, in a speech to the American Legion’s national convention on August 22, Brown publicly reiterated the same stance on MAP-vertical.6 Yet, in a peculiar twist, the fortune of vertical basing would be completely reversed within the space of only four months. On November 21, at a meeting of the Air Force’s Systems Acquisition Review Council, SAMSO representatives and others reiterated the Air Force’s long-standing position to build a new, large (92-inch diameter) MIRV ICBM and deploy it in a cluster of vertically positioned silos.7 In his role as chairman of the Defense Science Acquisitions Review Council, however, Perry requested that the Air Force put aside that determination and run a quick, three-month study of air-mobile ICBM basing—a mode that the DSB had dismissed back in the spring of 1978 as being much less effective and more prone to surprise attack.8 This “air-mobile interlude,” lasting from the end of 1978 to March 1979, meant that as the administration released a FY1979 supplemental defense bill and solidified its FY1980 defense budget, there were no firm decisions on what missile would be used in the new ICBM system or how a new ICBM would be housed and protected.

The Modernization of NATO LRTNF in 1978 As with the MX, the administration was firmly convinced by the end of 1978 that the NATO alliance needed new, longer-range theater nuclear capabilities, but no conclusions were reached as to the exact character of these capabilities. Though there was movement toward consensus on LRTNF systems—namely, extended-range Pershing IIs and GLCMs—the year finished without a concrete decision on either a system type or a deployment mode. The twelve months that fell between the decision in the FY1979 budget to “go slow” on TNF and the December 7, 1978, announcement of the four-power Guadeloupe summit are best described as a period of intensified study and work toward internal administration consensus.

6. Talbott, Endgame, 173–74. 7. SAMSO History, 293. 8. Ibid., 294; Edwards, Superweapon, 169–70.

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As previously noted, PRM-10 and PD-18 had not addressed TNF modernization. The subject had been left for further study. The follow-on work, the TNF Modernization Study, was initiated by Brown at the beginning of November 1977 and was meant to provide information and assessments to the newly formed NATO High Level Group. Specifically, the TNF Modernization Study was to provide analysis on possible TNF “hardware” options and, more broadly, on the relationship between conventional war and theater nuclear use. This report was directed by Donald Cotter and followed PD-18’s nuclear employment criteria. It was not completed until right before the HLG meeting at Los Alamos in February 1978, so when the HLG met for the first time in December 1977, follow-on PD-18 TNF work was still in progress.9 Daalder and—most recently—Henry Gaffney, a staff member in the OSDISA (Office of the Secretary of Defense–International Security Affairs) during the period in question, have provided glimpses into the inner workings of the HLG’s meetings, particularly those held in December 1977 and February 1978. In the December meeting, the HLG was briefed on the current state of NATO and Soviet theater nuclear forces. David McGiffert, the director of OSD-ISA and the designated chair of the group, asked for opinions about exactly how the SS-20 posed a threat to Western Europe—what Gaffney, in his description, called “the forbidden question.” For London and Bonn, the SS-20 had altered the militaryoperational dynamic on the continent to the point that something had to be done. Indeed, Michael Quinlan, Great Britain’s HLG representative, reiterated to the group the same argument he had made to Brown over the course of 1977 (at the Ottawa NPG meeting as well as in personal correspondence). The United States, he insisted, had to deploy longer-range systems, but the insertion of new aircraft or additional Poseidon SLBM RVs would no longer suffice.10 The February 1978 HLG meeting was organized around a “background” paper that, according to Gaffney, he himself wrote. Taking material from the follow-on PD-18 TNF study, the HLG reviewed Gaffney’s four TNF modernization options. There was a “do-nothing” approach; NATO could “let the current weapons just decay away.” Both Daalder and Gaffney explain that this was impossible. It was a “non-starter” in Gaffney’s words. Faced with Soviet improvements, the alliance could ill afford from a military or reputational standpoint to let its theater capabilities lapse. Second, the allies could focus

9. Yaffe, Origins, 620–22. Yaffe lists the nuclear employment criteria, stating that it was taken from Nixon’s NSDM 242. However, in August 1977, PD-18 superseded NSDM 242. 10. Daalder, Nature and Practice, 166, 175–77; Henry Gaffney, “The History of the Euromissiles.”

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their attention on the improvement of shorter-range systems. This approach, Daalder argues, was dismissed outright by European allies because of its “warfighting implications.” Gaffney goes one step further. He insists that he never meant it as a serious option in the first place and that the Europeans were never supposed to accept it. Rather, it had been offered in order to placate “nuclear crazies” back in the Pentagon. Yaffe, on the other hand, has offered his own interpretation for the rejection of the second option: redundancy. In this view, the HLG had no reason to spend time on short-range TNF capabilities because NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was already doing so.11 Gaffney and Daalder differ in their explanations of the final two options that were on the table at the February 1978 HLG meeting. Daalder states that the third option provided a “modest” enhancement of longer-range systems. It included improvements that allowed for a limited number of “in-depth” attacks. In the fourth option, these improvements and the total number of forces increased to the point that—theoretically—war could be waged without the SIOP (and therefore without U.S. strategic forces) coming into play. Gaffney, on the other hand, addresses the third and fourth options purely in terms of weapon range. He states that his third option involved systems that were restricted because of their range to targets short of the Soviet Union’s borders (that is, targets in Eastern Europe only). The fourth option was defined as systems that were able to strike Soviet territory. Daalder argues that the group settled on the third option because of concerns that the fourth would have a decoupling effect, but Gaffney insists that the final decision actually rested somewhere between the third and fourth approaches—namely, the deployment of a land-based, longer-range TNF able to hit targets well within the Soviet Union’s borders, but unable for reasons of escalation to reach Moscow proper. This was an acceptable solution for the group. Bonn, Gaffney adds, desired something a bit stronger than just more weapons with which to hit the Central Front. Many on the HLG also argued that it was repugnant that the Soviet Union would remain immune from attack while Eastern European states struggling under Moscow’s domination were explicitly targeted.12 11. Gaffney, “History of the Euromissiles.” Gaffney’s claim to have been the author of the “background paper” fits with Daalder’s attribution of the paper to the staff of the OSD-ISA. Daalder, Nature and Practice, 177. Though speculative on the part of this author, it is possible that Gaffney had Don Cotter in mind when he used the term “nuclear crazies.” Yaffe describes how Cotter lost influence in the period around the Los Alamos HLG meeting and makes reference to the tension between Cotter, David McGiffert, and Lynn Davis. Yaffe, Origins, 624, 625–26. 12. On the options, see Gaffney, “History of the Euromissiles,” and Daalder, Nature and Practice, 175–77. On targeting the Soviet Union versus Eastern Europe, Gaffney states that when he asked the

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According to nearly all who have written on the LRTNF issue, the consensus that arose from the February 1978 HLG meeting for an “evolutionary upward adjustment” to NATO TNF was a jolt to the Carter administration. Gaffney admits it was a surprise, and, as will be described in more detail, internal memoranda show that the NSC was thoroughly unprepared. After Los Alamos, as Brown explained it to Carter in a memo written right before he left for the April 1978 NPG meeting in Frederikshavn, Denmark (where the HLG was scheduled to report its consensus), the HLG was looking “presumably [at] GLCM or MRBMs” for longer-range attack against the Soviet Union. Brown told Carter that a 1,500-kilometer range might work best. Again, it was long enough to hit points in Western Russia, but would fall short of the Soviet capital. He also explained to the president that given the range restriction GLCMs and MRBMs were about equal when it came to price and mobility. The only difference between the two (but a major one at that) was that it would take ten years or so for the MRBM to reach operational status.13 To the NSC, all of this was sheer optimism on Brown’s part. Everyone had assumed that an alliance position would arise out of the HLG’s discussions, but the NSC’s expectation was that the United States would play the key role in constructing that position and that it would occur over a longer period. Now, after Los Alamos, Brown appeared to the NSC staff as the one led rather than the one leading. Jim Thomson complained to Brzezinski that the OSD-ISA staff ignored his ideas for the HLG and cautioned that the NSC could lose its control over the LRTNF issue. This was in stark contrast to the “close-hold” and “NSC-led” initiative on “gray area” issues that Utgoff and Brzezinski had mentioned back in late 1977. In a cover to Brown’s earlier April memorandum for Carter, Brzezinski warned that it was too risky to have the secretary of defense operating out in front of the White House on LRTNF. In light of the potentially negative international consequences—particularly given allied skepticism about SALT II and the then-current mess over Carter’s abrupt change of heart on the “neutron bomb”—the United States could ill afford an explosion over

Belgian representative to the HLG in 1978 why the group was focused on systems that could reach into the Soviet Union rather than only into Eastern Europe, the Belgian representative said that “we [Belgians] considered the Poles to be victims, too.” 13. On the Carter administration’s reaction to the February HLG meeting, see for example Daalder, Nature and Practice, 178; Yaffe, Origins, 629–30; Thomson, “The LRTNF Decision,” 605; Raymond Garthoff, “The NATO Decision on Theater Nuclear Forces,” 202. Gaffney, “History of the Euromissiles.” Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: NATO Nuclear Planning Group, April 9, 1978, p. 2, NSA Agency, Box 11-21, NATO 12/77–5/28, JCL.

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TNF modernization. Granted, the February 1978 HLG consensus could not be ignored, but Brzezinski insisted that the process needed to be slowed in order to give the White House time to retake the policy helm.14 Jim Thomson, Daalder, and others have remarked on the impact that Carter’s 1978 decision to defer ERW production also had on the administration’s subsequent LRTNF decision-making.15 Carter surprised his advisers and U.S. allies alike when he reversed his position on the ERW over the course of a fishing-trip weekend to Georgia in mid-March 1978. After rushed consultations during the last two weeks of March and the first week of April with his national security team, European allies, and Capitol Hill, Carter announced his decision on April 7. The United States, he explained, would press ahead with Lance and artillery modernization, but it would not produce the controversial warhead right away. Instead, it would wait and exercise that option if the Soviet Union was less forthcoming in arms control. To this date, no one is really positive about Carter’s exact reasoning for choosing deferral. Most scholars center their analysis on Carter’s moral hesitancy or the fear that once the United States produced the warhead, European allies would balk at deployment, thus making Carter appear to be weak or a warmonger. The administration tried to convince its NATO allies that the ERW decision was a safe one because there were alternative, high-technology, conventional means for tank-breaking coming on the horizon. Though Brown himself believed that new, conventional methods—while not available anytime soon—would be effective and more politically palatable in Europe, he has argued that Carter’s ERW decision was not actually based on conventional “counterforce.” Instead, the line to European allies about upcoming conventional methods was, at its core, a political cover and was done to paper over the administration’s fumbling of the warhead decision. The administration also used the HLG’s Los Alamos consensus as a justification for its deferral of the

14. Memorandum from Jim Thomson to Brzezinski (through Victor Utgoff), Subject: NATO NPG Meeting, April 13, 1978, 1. Thomson’s memo is a cover of Brown’s April 9, 1978, memo to Carter. On the NSC TNF “initiative,” see NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NSC Weekly Report, #36, November 11, 1977, 3. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) Meeting, April 17, 1978, 1, NSA Agency, Box 11–21, NATO 12/77–5/28, JCL. Brzezinski and his staff may have been involved in a bit of bureaucratic stonewalling with Brown’s April 9 memo. In a note dated April 18, 1978, handwritten on Brown’s April 9 memo, Carter castigated Brzezinski for taking nine days to get Brown’s information to him. By the time Carter received Brown’s memo, the first day of the NPG meeting in Frederickshavn was already underway. 15. Thomson, “The LRTNF Decision,” 605–6; Daalder, Nature and Practice, 178–79; Yaffe, Origins, 626–30; Garthoff, “NATO Decision,” 203; David N. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, 223–24.

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warhead. Both Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Brown told allies that instead of focusing on shorter-range options (which included the ERW), the United States would move ahead on long-range TNF. In his discussions at the NPG meeting in Denmark, Brown promised Carter he would focus attention on longer-range systems.16 The use of the Los Alamos consensus as a reason for the ERW decision meant that over time the United States would actually have to see that consensus through. In the spring of 1978, however, the administration was not in harmony about the HLG’s conclusions. This need for harmony, together with the NSC’s desire to reclaim control over “gray area” issues, the White House’s wish to slow down LRTNF discussions in light of SALT II negotiations, and Carter’s need to demonstrate leadership after the “neutron bomb” debacle contributed to a new NSC-led, interagency study of long-range TNF—just as Brzezinski had suggested to the president earlier in April. On June 22, 1978, Carter signed PRM-38. In very precise language, PRM-38 outlined why a new study on TNF had been launched, who was in charge of the study, and what the study would address. It was meant to provide guidance for all further U.S. actions with the HLG. Being that PRM-38 was to be organized and directed by the NSC SCC— the subcommittee chaired by Brzezinski himself—it set the NSC back in the driver’s seat. PRM-38 was also supposed to sketch approaches for future arms control negotiations over theater nuclear forces. The final PRM report would be the administration’s blueprint for any future allied consultations over the role of TNF in a future SALT III. In contrast to the Los Alamos consensus, however, PRM-38’s terms of reference only referred to “possible” increases to LRTNF and the “possible” placement of LRTNF in arms control talks. In fact, the study explicitly stated that “illustrative force posture and arms control options” would include alternatives wherein there were absolutely no increases to LRTNF and no arms control negotiations involving them. Other topics that were to be addressed in the study included an outline of the effects of Soviet TNF improvement on NATO’s ability to achieve its military and political goals, explanations of what “adding significantly” to NATO’s 16. Auger, Dynamics of Foreign Policy, 95, 109–10; Wasserman, Neutron Bomb Controversy, 112–16. Brown told this author that Carter made the decision for both political and personal reasons. Harold Brown, telephone interview, January 10, 2004. For mention of the other ways of doing the ERW’s job, see the discussion of the talking points provided to Warren Christopher for his discussions with European allies at the end of March 1978. Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: NATO Nuclear Planning Group, April 9, 1978, 2.

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LRTNF would do for Western objectives, an account of how greater amounts of LRTNF affected limited nuclear options and regional nuclear options, and an investigation into possible European and Soviet diplomatic and military responses. When it came to arms control, the study was set up to evaluate the use of LRTNF as leverage, the different types of verification regimes that would be required for LRTNF agreements, and the connections between future SALT negotiations (SALT III and beyond) and MBFR.17 Neither the analyses written for PRM-38 nor its final summary report are yet available to the public; however, some information about the exercise has made it into the secondary literature. Schwartz and Daalder insist that four major agencies worked on the exercise: State, Defense, ACDA, and the CIA. Carter, in the initial tasking memorandum, requested that the final report “give some historical perspective on past issues of nuclear strategy and sharing.” This was supposedly provided by Assistant Secretary of State Leslie Gelb’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. David McGiffert produced the study’s military analyses. The CIA provided up-to-date evaluations of Soviet and Warsaw Pact TNF capabilities, while ACDA took the lead when it came to the relationships between SALT, MBFR, and LRTNF. The whole study was completed in August 1978, debated within the NSC SCC, and then briefed to Carter that same month or sometime in the next. In this briefing, according to Jim Thomson, Carter was provided with two policy options. Either the United States could agree to the HLG’s Los Alamos conclusions and begin the selection of systems that would be used to implement that consensus, or the administration could try to solve the problem by offering NATO a greater number of “strategic” RVs. The president chose the first.18 In the final three months of 1978, the administration began the work of taking PRM-38 to NATO. During this period, Brzezinski hired Fritz Ermarth, a RAND specialist on nuclear systems and arms control, to take over the post– PRM-38 LRTNF, SALT III, and MBFR portfolios. Brzezinski also asked, in light of Samuel Huntington’s return to Harvard University, if Ermarth would direct an update to PRM-10, or what would later be called Comprehensive Net

17. PRM-38, Long-Range Theater Nuclear Capabilities and Arms Control, June 22, 1978, 1–3. 18. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, 224–25; Daalder, Nature and Practice, 179–80. PRM-38, Long-Range Theater Nuclear Capabilities and Arms Control, June 22, 1978, 2. There are three meetings that fit the time frame from the briefing of PRM-38: August 15, 1978, September 1, 1978, or September 2, 1978. “National Security Council Meetings,” http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/ jec/nscmeet.phtml (accessed February 3, 2008). Thomson, “The LRTNF Decision,” 606; Bluth, Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy, 232.

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Assessment 1978 (CNA-78). The SCC LRTNF Working Group, the interagency group set up by the NSC SCC to organize PRM-38, authorized the submission of the study’s military analyses to the HLG. Schwartz, Thomson, and Daalder all insist that this involved five “hardware” options: GLCMs, SLCMs, MRBMs, extended-range Pershing IIs, and ALCM-carrying bombers. All five options were debated through the last months of 1978, although GLCMs and Pershing IIs received the lion’s share of attention early in the deliberations, particularly extended-range Pershing IIs. The HLG did not formally recommend the GLCM and Pershing II until February 1979, but it was reasonably clear as early as November and December that those two systems were the prime candidates. At the same time, neither did the HLG settle upon the numbers or locations of LRTNF deployments in 1978. Those were left until early 1979.19 The MX “air mobile interlude” and the post–PRM-38 discussions and consultations over future NATO LRTNF modernization overlapped with the administration’s final review of its next yearly budget (FY1980) and the construction of a supplemental bill to the FY1979 defense budget. Earlier in the year, the administration had actually warned Capitol Hill to expect a supplemental bill if the MX situation ripened, though the new ICBM was not the chief impetus behind the White House’s request for extra funds.20 Instead, the origin of the supplemental was Carter’s veto of HR 10929—the House of Representative’s amendment of the FY1979 defense budget. In August, the House rerouted approximately $2 billion from the FY1979 budget to pay for a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Congress passed the budget and sent the amended bill to the Oval Office. Carter quickly vetoed it. The House’s attempt to override the veto failed, but in the rewrite that followed (which was done while Carter was firmly ensconced in the Camp David negotiations), it retali-

19. Washington Post, September 7, 1978, A2. CNA-78 will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. Daalder, Nature and Practice, 189–96; Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, 225–27; Bluth, Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy, 232–33. David Aaron reported to Carter in October that the allies in Europe were showing much more enthusiasm about extended-range Pershing IIs rather than GLCMs. Memorandum from David Aaron to President Carter, Subject: Consultations on Gray Area Issues, October 26, 1978, p. 2, NSA Agency, Box 11–21, NATO 10/78–2/79, JCL. British Prime Minister James Callaghan remarked in his memoirs that the two systems Carter discussed upon arrival at the Guadeloupe summit in January 1979 were Pershing II and GLCMs. James Callaghan, Time and Change, 548. Daalder explains (Nature and Practice, 196) that the HLG evaluated a paper in November 1978 which suggested a deployment of somewhere between 200 and 600 missiles. The month before, David Aaron reported to Carter that the HLG was looking at numbers in the “low-side of the mid-hundreds.” See above-referenced Aaron to Carter, October 26, 1978, 2. 20. See Perry’s comments in Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 9: Research and Development, 6898.

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ated by removing the carrier money in toto instead of reinserting the funds back into the budget. As a result, this $2 billion cut brought the total FY1979 budget under the 3 percent promise to NATO and also under the guidelines set by PD-18. As a consequence, the administration immediately began work on a supplemental bill. On September 29, the administration held its midterm defense review, which was a meeting held in large part to determine the size and scope of the supplemental. There is little available information about the midterm review; however, a few items on the agenda can be reverse-engineered through declassified documents. The review addressed (or, at the very least, was scheduled to address) the current and future state of Soviet ICBM hard-target kill capability, the need for greater U.S. hard-target capability, U.S. civil defenses, the need to enhance capabilities for detecting launches and attacks, and a timetable for strategic nuclear modernization including the MX, cruise missiles, and the Trident II. Some in the NSC had thought that the midterm review might also be used as a springboard for a “public campaign” to explain how the administration was planning to solve Minuteman vulnerability, but no announcements were forthcoming. Instead, the contents of the supplemental, particularly its MX and Pershing II components, simply trickled out into the media during the months of November and December.21

21. On September 29 the president met with the SCC, followed by a late afternoon and early evening meeting to “review defense appropriations in the 1979 Budget of the US.” President’s Daily Diary, September 29, 1978, 3, http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/diary/1978/d092978t.pdf (accessed February 3, 2008). The agenda of the midterm defense review has been derived the following sources: Draft Memorandum from David Aaron to Charles Duncan [ghostwritten by Victor Utgoff], Subject: Defense Planning and SALT, undated [probably September 5, 1978, the date of Utgoff ’s cover memo to Aaron], 1; Memorandum from Harold Brown to Carter, Subject: ICBM Vulnerability, MAPS and Verification, October 28, 1978, 1. Both of these memos are located in Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 36, Folder: Serial X, 9/78–12/78, JCL. Carter signed PD-41, a directive on civil defense, the very same day. PD-41, US Civil Defense Policy, September 29, 1978. See abovereferenced Aaron to Duncan [ghostwritten by Utgoff], undated [probably September 5, 1978], 1. Washington Post, November 8, 1978, A29; Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 20, 1978, 20. By mid-January 1979, weeks before its actual transmission to Congress, parts of the FY1979 supplemental were even under closed-door discussion by Carter’s defense-right critics in the so-called Abington Group. The Abington Group (or SALT Working Group) was a nonofficial “arm” of the CPD whose members met on a regular basis at the offices of the Abington Corporation beginning in late November 1978. The group came together to craft legislative and lobbying strategies against SALT II ratification and against the administration’s defense policy as a whole. Charles Kupperman, a graduate student of CPD Executive Committee member William Van Cleave, served as a note-taker for each of the group’s meetings. See the notes of the Abington Group Meetings [hereafter Abington Notes], January 16, 1979, 1, Box 370, Folder “Notes,” CPD Papers.

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That fall, Carter and his team had reached two firm conclusions, both of which were given flesh through the FY1979 supplemental and the FY1980 budget. First, there was no question that the United States needed a new followon ICBM system. From mid- to late 1978 onward, it became apparent to Brown and—to a lesser extent—Brzezinski and the NSC that the external strategic environment necessitated a new ICBM basing mode, and more likely than not a brand-new hard-target ICBM.22 Second, the NATO alliance required new LRTNF capabilities. Yet, in both cases, the exact form that each decision would eventually take was still up for grabs—more so for the MX, less for LRTNF. MAP-vertical basing for the MX was pushed aside in lieu of an “air-mobile interlude,” which meant that the missile’s final size, accuracy, lethality, and vulnerability remained unclear. The administration demonstrated comparatively less hesitancy in the area of LRTNF. With the completion of PRM-38, Washington had come to accept the Los Alamos consensus for an “upward evolutionary adjustment,” and though firm decisions about hardware had not yet been made, the focus seemed to be on GLCMs and extended-range Pershing IIs as the instruments of choice.

Possible Theoretical Explanations for the FY1979 MX and TNF Decisions How is it that the administration discarded the agreement between the Air Force, the DSB, and the Secretary of Defense on MAP-vertical and, instead, revisited air-mobile basing? Moreover, why did the administration hesitate in making a firm, public stance on LRTNF as early as late 1978? In both cases, the administration had concluded by the end of the year that both MX and LRTNF modernization were necessary, but it still acted tentatively about moving those programs ahead in a rapid way. What provoked the indecision? Could there have been alterations in the international setting or the superpower relationship that suggested to the administration that such hesitancy was acceptable or prudent? As with the administration’s initial adjustment to Ford’s FY1978 budget and the creation of Carter’s first personalized budget, there had been no objective change in the character of the Soviet military-operational threat to the United States throughout 1978. Indeed, if one was to derive U.S. defense policy decision-making solely upon the character of the international 22. Brzezinski states that he started the process to “force a decision on the MX” beginning in “late August [1978].” Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 333. This point will be discussed in the next chapter in greater detail.

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military environment, that environment would have been more likely to dictate a decision to move much more rapidly on both “full-scale development” of the MX, as well as clear and quick LRTNF announcements and deployments. The trend in Soviet strategic modernization over the course of the year shifted in the direction of increased numbers of SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, all of which were MIRVs or had MIRV variants. In 1978 alone, the Soviet Union fielded the following: (a) 100 additional SS-18 Mod 2, from 40 to 140 (each of which could hold 8 RVs); (b) 50 new SS-17 Mod 1, from 30 to 80 (each of which was able to carry 4 RVs); (c) 30 single-warhead SS-17s; (d) 20 SS-19 Mod 1s, from 100 to 120 (each of which could house 6 RVs); and (e) 40 SS-19 Mod 2 ICBMs, from 20 to 60 (all of which were single-warhead). In total, the Soviet Union registered a net increase of 888 ICBM RVs in its arsenal between 1977 and 1978. In the same period, the United States added none. In that same year, Moscow also deployed four more Delta 3 submarines, which were able to carry 16 MIRV SLBMs each (with a maximum of 7 RVs per SLBM). Given the removal of older Soviet SSBN from service, the Soviet Union had a net increase of two nuclear submarines, a net loss of 19 SLBMs, but a net increase of 211 SLBM RVs. In contrast to the absence of growth in ICBM RVs, the United States experienced a net increase of 288 SLBM RVs in the same period. This occurred, however, with no change to its total number of SSBNs and SLBMs; two older SSBNs were taken out of service and two were added.23 It is quite clear that while the Soviet Union added significantly to its ICBM and SLBM RV count, the United States was building up its SLBM RV count only. If one looks at the two sides in terms of total percentage change over the previous year, the United States had a 6 percent increase in SLBM RVs, while the Soviet Union’s change registered just over 16 percent. Judged in terms of increased effort, the Soviet Union’s trends looked very different, and much more ominous, than those of the United States. Moreover, Minuteman silos were not becoming any less vulnerable. In 1978, the United States officially adjusted its figures on Soviet ICBM RV accuracy. In early 1979 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Perry explained that the increase in accuracy to which he had testified the year before had finally come to fruition. The spate of Soviet missile tests over the course of 1977 and 23. National Resources Defense Council, Table of USSR/Russian ICBM Forces, http:// www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab4.asp, Table of USSR/Russian Ballistic Missile Submarine Forces, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab6.asp, Table of U.S. ICBM Forces, http://www.nrdc.org/ nuclear/nudb/datab3.asp, Table of U.S. Ballistic Missile Submarine Forces, http://www.nrdc.org/ nuclear/nudb/datab5.asp (all accessed February 3, 2008).

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1978 had demonstrated better-than-anticipated accuracies. As the Soviet Union increased its ICBM RV count, this underestimation, which some in the Senate Armed Services Committee called “intelligence failure,” meant that hardened U.S. strategic offensive forces were at a higher risk.24 The balance of theater nuclear deployments was lopsided as well. In 1978, the Soviet Union pressed forward with its modernization of I/MRBM. It removed 60 SS-4s and 10 SS-5s and began the first wide-scale introduction of SS-20s (60 in total). The SS-4 and SS-5 had been liquid-fueled, single-warhead missiles, each with a yield of one megaton. The SS-20 was solid-fueled, which meant it could be kept on alert for longer periods than the older models. It carried three warheads, and although they were of a much smaller yield than those carried by the SS-4 and SS-5, there had been little attendant drop in lethality because of the SS-20’s improved accuracy. There were also concerns that the Soviet Union might extend the SS-20’s range by attaching clandestinely stockpiled third stages to the missile (thereby creating an SS-16 ICBM) or by decreasing the missile’s weight through removing or “downloading” a warhead or two. Altogether, the Soviet Union’s I/MRBM count in 1978 was 560, while the United States had no comparable system.25 There had been other changes made to Soviet TNF. The number of deployed Backfire bombers rose by 20 (from 30 to 50) between 1977 and 1978, while the U.S. deployment of FB-111s remained constant at 60. The Soviet Union also increased its short- to medium-range fighter-bomber aircraft, especially the new MIG-23 Flogger, by 50 in 1978 (adding to the 50 it had deployed in 1977). One discerns the same trend in surface-to-surface missiles. In 1978, the Soviet Union introduced 10 of its new short-range missile, the SS-21. It also added 30 more SCUD-Bs, which completed Moscow’s SCUD range-improvement program, along with 10 more FROG missiles. In all, the Soviet Union added 50 new surface-to-surface missiles over the course of the year. The United States, in contrast, added no new deployed Pershing, Lance, and Honest John missiles.26 It had been a year of major additions to Soviet nuclear forces, both strategic and theater systems. The administration’s overall conclusion that the MX and new LRTNF were necessary makes logical and prudent sense when viewed 24. Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 1979 Supplemental Military Authorization, March 19, 1979, 136, 175–76. 25. “Table 9, Intermediate/Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles,” in John Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960–1980, 460–61. For the yield and accuracy of the SS-20 versus the SS-4 and SS-5, see Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 185, 188, 225. 26. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, 454–55, 474.

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strictly on the realist basis of compared capabilities. It also makes realist sense when viewed in conjunction with geopolitical challenges like Afghanistan or Iran wherein Moscow appeared to be gaining in relative power and influence in 1978. However, this overall picture makes the administration’s choice to force another MX air-mobile study and hesitate—if ever so slightly—in the LRTNF sphere that much more inexplicable under straight realist logic. If they cannot be effectively explained using strict realist logic, perhaps the administration’s MX “air-mobile interlude” and the hesitancy over LRTNF are better understood by looking to domestic political theories. Take interest group pressure, for instance. It would be logical to assume that if interest group pressure was at play, then demands for additional delays in the MX and LRTNF programs would have originated from the defense-left rather than the defenseright, but there is little to suggest that the MX “air-mobile interlude” was the result of defense-left interest group pressure. The defense-left’s lobbying presence was minimal in late 1978, especially when compared with the activities of defense-right groups. Mobilization for Survival, which Terry Provance argues was a “countercultural” rather than a lobbying group, was active in 1978, but it was not focused on the MX per se. Instead, it focused on building and educating a cadre of activists in a number of larger issue areas (nuclear weapon systems, the arms race, superpower relations) during and after the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament. The public education group that was later billed as the defense-left’s answer to the Committee on the Present Danger, Americans for SALT, could also not have been an influence on the administration’s late-1978 MX decision-making as it did not debut until January of the following year.27 Outside defense-left pressure was not completely absent, however. On October 31, in reaction to news reports about the upcoming FY1979 defense supplemental (with its money for the MX) and Carter’s decision to move ahead with the modernization of Lance and 8-inch artillery warheads (without enhanced radiation components), four defense-left organizations—Union of Concerned Scientists, American Committee for East-West Accord, Council for a Livable World, and New Directions—drafted a joint letter to Carter. In it, they accused him of pandering to “hawkish” elements in the Senate to purchase the 27. Beginning in 1980, this Mobilization for Survival cadre would be merged into the nascent nuclear freeze movement. Provance explained that the freeze movement’s first organizing meeting was in March 1979, but the movement did not start to take off until after NATO’s official announcement of the two-track decision in December of that year. Terry Provance, telephone interview, January 7, 2004. Washington Post, January 21, 1979, A22.

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ratification of SALT II. They argued that such “tougher” defense program decisions would “undermine” the administration’s arms control approach and would bolster the Soviet Union’s claims that Washington was only interested in “unilateral advantages.” By the end of the following month, the major news outlets had received copies of the joint letter and were using it to question Carter.28 Nonetheless, one gets little sense that the letter or its publicity had any bearing on internal MX decision-making as the White House waited a full three months before even responding to it. There is a stronger argument to be made that the administration’s caution about LRTNF in late 1978 was influenced by defense-left pressure in Western Europe, or, more accurately, that it was influenced by the fear of continued and future defense-left pressure there. The intensity of the 1977–1978 anti-“neutron bomb” campaign in Western Europe, especially in the Netherlands and West Germany, had shocked leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. The campaign demonstrated that antinuclear sentiment was alive and well within NATO member countries. Perhaps ominously for some, it also seemed that the campaign had provided an opening for covert participation by the Soviet Union and elements of the European hard-left. Though the anti-“neutron bomb” campaign was composed of many different ideological entities, including many progressive church groups, Provance openly described one specific participant—the World Peace Council—as a “Soviet government organization” that put a great deal of its energy into the European movement.29 As early as April of 1978, Brzezinski cautioned Carter against adopting the Los Alamos consensus too quickly, warning that the deployment of new LRTNF risked even greater public contempt in Europe than had the “neutron bomb.” Western European–deployed capabilities that were able to strike into Soviet territory, he argued, would be “thornier politically than [the] ER.” This is one of the reasons why the administration tied TNF modernization together with new arms control proposals. The planned ERW for SS-20 trade was con-

28. Letter from Henry Kendall, George Kistiakowsky, Carl Marcy, and Charles Whalen to President Carter, October 31, 1978, 1–2, WHCF-ND, ND-18, Box ND-51, Folder 12/1/78–2/28/79, JCL. Carter’s response, dated February 5, 1979, is attached to the original joint letter. Compare the language of the Marcy et al. letter to the questions asked at the November 30, 1978, Presidential News Conference and a Q&A with newspaper editors and news directors on December 1, 1978. Carter, Public Papers 1978, vol. 2, 2098, 2155–56. 29. Terry Provance, email, September 1, 2004. Provance emphasized that in his own view, Christian groups such as the Evangelische Kirken group of churches as well as the British Committee for Nuclear Disarmament should be given pride-of-place when evaluating the antinuclear movement in Europe in the late 1970s and 1980s.

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sidered helpful to NATO allies in that it provided visible proof for their respective defense-left constituencies that modernization did not mean the demise of arms control or détente. This, then, carried over into the LRTNF issue. PRM38 concluded that the only way to get NATO allies firmly on board with LRTNF modernization was by offering arms control along with it. This was definitely the case with West Germany. David Aaron reported in October that Bonn was “anxious to introduce theater systems into SALT III” though it was less so with London or Paris.30 The West Germans not only wanted the SS-20 captured in a future arms control regime but also believed that an arms control track would help to mollify defense-left protest that would inevitably arise in the face of an LRTNF decision. Hence, this need for an agreed-upon LRTNF arms control component, in light of Western European (instead of American) defense-left interest group influence, is one possible explanation for the administration’s LRTNF hesitancy in late 1978. It is doubtful that the administration was very concerned about defenseright interest group pressure when it came to its MX and LRTNF decisionmaking in late 1978. The CPD pressed throughout 1978 for the rapid deployment of a vertical shelter ICBM basing mode, accelerated theater nuclear modernization (including ERW), and the removal of all cruise missile restrictions in SALT II, especially for GLCMs and SLCMs. The “air-mobile interlude,” the hesitancy in determining precise LRTNF systems, the SALT II protocol limitations, and the anticipated involvement of TNF in a future SALT III all ran completely counter to the group’s policy prescriptions. While scholars like Skidmore insist that the administration’s late 1978 consensus about the necessity of a new ICBM and new NATO LRTNF seems to fit with Committeeinspired “militarization” of American defense policy, this is a surface reading of what the defense-right group was actually calling for at the time. In May, Paul Nitze drafted a paper on an ICBM basing system he called “fixed alternative launch point ICBM system,” or FALPIS. The paper on FALPIS, which he renamed “alternative launch-point system” (ALPS) because of the SALT I connotations involved with the word “fixed,” appears to have

30. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) Meeting, April 17, 1978, 1. It was thought that the connection tying arms control measures and theater nuclear modernization could be helpful for Callaghan’s relationship with “the left wing of the Labour Party,” which would have included the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament. Kingman Brewster to Brzezinski, February 6, 1978, 3. Daalder, Nature and Practice, 180. Memorandum from David Aaron to President Carter, Subject: Consultations on Gray Area Issues, October 26, 1978, 1, NSA Agency, Box 11-21, NATO 10/78–2/79, JCL.

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been an attempt at popularizing the work of Michael May and the DSB. In his drafts on FALPIS/ALPS, Nitze argued that the United States should construct silos that were able to hold hardened canisters. One canister would house a single ICBM. For every one canister, there would be a “complex” or “cluster” of multiple silos. New silos could be built around existing ones, which would add to the number of distinct aim points. He argued that if all the components were properly hardened, then one could construct between eight and twenty-four silos per existing Minuteman silo. In a later draft, he included the idea of using ABM point defense to add aim points (even though the number of ABM interceptors was limited by the 1972 treaty and 1974 protocol). Since the MX would not be ready until the late 1980s and the cost of canisters and transporters increased with the missile’s size, Nitze believed it would be quicker and cheaper to adapt Minuteman III for the job.31 Nitze insisted that the Soviet Union had little to complain about in FALPIS/ALPS. If the Soviets argued that canister and transporter use was restricted under SALT II’s three-year ban on mobile missile deployments, the United States could remind them that their SS-17, 18, and 19 were also canister and transporter-based. Should Moscow insist that new vertical shelters were actually new “fixed” silos, Washington could revisit the Soviet Union’s use of socalled X-type silos—silos which the Soviets had insisted only housed launchcontrol equipment. If a cluster held only one missile, Nitze argued that it should

31. Talbott claims that the DSB got its ideas from Nitze’s FALPIS paper and argues that the DSB “expropriated” Nitze’s work and “tailored it for the MX.” Talbott, Endgame, 169. The earliest draft of Nitze’s FALPIS paper that this author has seen is dated May 17, 1978—months after the DSB study. Paul Nitze, “The FALPIS Concept,” [hereafter Nitze FALPIS paper], May 17, 1978, Box 103, Folder Nitze— “The FALPIS Concept” 17 May 1978, CPD Papers. On FALPIS/ALPS, also see Vaisse, Le Mouvement neoconservateur, 635–41. Regardless of whether Nitze’s work came before or after the DSB study, both of them focused on MAP-vertical basing. When asked about which came first, Michael May could not recall, but he said that it was very likely that he would have briefed Nitze on the DSB’s results. He said that the two of them were close and that it would not have been strange to have done so. Michael May, email, September 15, 2003. Nitze FALPIS paper, 1–4; Nitze, “The ALPS Concept,” [hereafter Nitze ALPS paper], June 1, 1978, 1–4. Box 28, Folder 1, Gerald Johnson Papers. There are additional drafts dated June 22, 1978, and July 6, 1978, in Box 103 of the CPD Papers. The use of adapted Minuteman IIIs was a sticking point between Nitze and the CPD and the U.S. Air Force. The Air Force wanted a bigger missile and Nitze argued that this was so because the Air Force feared that a future SALT III would limit it to 200 missiles (and because the Air Force wanted any ICBM that survived able to hold a large number of RVs). See, for instance, Nitze’s comments at the Committee’s Annual Board Meeting, November 10, 1978, “The Committee on the Present Danger—Sulgrave Club, 2nd Annual Meeting of the Board,” [hereafter CPD 2nd Annual Board Meeting Transcripts], Cassette #4 Transcript, 4, Box 164, no folder, CPD Papers. Moreover, there was also a potential missile range problem. If a given MAP system was located in the desert southwest, then the ICBM used would have to be larger to hit the necessary Soviet targets. See Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 28, 1978, 17.

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be considered as a single “launcher” under SALT counting rules. In later drafts, he added a discussion about SALT verification and the fear that the Soviet Union would move to its own ALPS-like system. He concluded that with all of the cuts and delays in U.S. strategic modernization, the Soviet Union had no need to do so. The United States did not have the numbers of offensive forces needed to place enough of the Soviet Union’s capabilities at risk. Moreover, these delays actually made Soviet verification much easier because Moscow would be able to detect any future burst of strategic nuclear force construction.32 Through the summer and fall, Nitze and the CPD pressed FALPIS/ALPS. Nitze’s drafts, which included other papers that dealt with more specialized topics, such as his evaluation of Soviet RV costs compared to the expenses associated with the construction of vertical shelters, were circulated around the entire American arms control and defense community as well as to journalists. Nitze and William Graham presented the FALPIS/ALPS concept to the Belmont Conference, a two-day meeting of defense intellectuals and defense-beat journalists at the end of June. Although it was not a Committee-sponsored event, the Belmont Conference was organized and attended by many who were involved with the group. This conference kicked off a high period of media attention on MAP-vertical silo, which was quickly labeled the MX “shell game.” Nitze and the Committee never wavered in the case for ALPS. It was argued in the group’s October 1978 pamphlet, “Is America Becoming No. 2,” and in front of the Committee’s annual board meeting in mid-November 1978. Nitze also brought it in front of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in early December. And when the nonorganizational, congressional-lobbying “arm” of the Committee, the so-called Abington Group, moved into battle against the upcoming ratification of SALT II in November, one of the many amendments the group crafted to derail the upcoming treaty required the deployment of any new ICBM in vertical shelters.33 32. Nitze FALPIS paper, 4–5; Nitze ALPS paper, 6–7. 33. In some cases, Nitze’s work was inserted verbatim into the media. Compare Clarence Robinson, Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 20, 1978, 20, paragraph starting “The Soviet Union could respond to a multiple aim point . . .” with Nitze, “The Comparative Costs of MAPS/ALPS Incremental Aim Points Additions Versus Soviet Warhead Fractionization,” August 16, 1978, 2–3, Box 103, Folder Nitze—Papers, Statements, Articles, CPD Papers. Nitze told the 1978 board meeting that his papers had been given “to every important part of the Executive Branch that works on SALT matters,” CPD 2nd Annual Board Meeting Transcripts, Cassette #5 Transcript, 6, Box 164, no folder, CPD Papers. The Belmont Conference was sponsored by the National Strategy Information Center. The papers presented at the conference, the names of the individual participants, and transcripts of the discussions were put together in a single book. See William Van Cleave and W. Scott Thompson, eds., Strategic Options for the Early Eighties: What Can Be Done, particularly “Viable U.S. Strategic Missile Forces for

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The CPD addressed theater nuclear forces, but not to the same extent as it had done for the MX issue. The group commented on cruise missiles, the SS20, and the ERW, but there were no internal discussions or published papers during 1977 and 1978 in which the Committee made specific LRTNF proposals. In its first pamphlet about SALT II, the Committee outlined the agreement’s three-tiered structure and warned that the anticipated treaty and protocol limits for cruise missiles harmed Washington’s ability to deploy them in the period that the MX remained in development. The same paper insisted that the Soviet Union was tabling SALT III guidelines (the third tier of the agreement) that limited so-called forward-based systems but exempted the Backfire bomber and SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The Committee railed against the SS-20, especially its breakout potential as an ICBM and its enhanced military-operational capabilities. It also pushed over the course of 1978 for ERW deployment, viewing the warhead as a vital tool because of the armor asymmetry in Europe.34 Finally, the Committee criticized SALT II (and future SALT III) cruise missile limits. It argued that Western European allies were unduly constrained in their ability to defend themselves because of the protocol’s restriction of GLCMs and SLCMs to 600 kilometers—not to mention the fact that this same restriction also allowed the Soviet Union to “outrange” the U.S. Navy. The Committee attacked the administration’s claims that these range limits would evaporate after the protocol expired and that the threat of cruise missiles “running free” after the protocol could be used as a bargaining tactic for SALT III. The Committee was very doubtful that the protocol’s range limits would escape capture in SALT III. Indeed, Perle suggested to the Abington Group in late 1978 that such a capture might be prevented if the protocol’s limits were removed completely via treaty amendments.35 the Early 1980s” and subsequent discussion, 127–52. Washington Post, June 30, 1978, A1, July 13, 1978, A10, July 24, 1978, A4, and July 26, 1978, A7; U.S. News and World Report, August 21, 1978, 28. Committee on the Present Danger, “Is America Becoming Number Two,” July 6, 1977, in Charles Tyroler, ed., Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger, 65; CPD 2nd Annual Board Meeting Transcripts, Cassette #3 Transcript, 6–21 ff., Box 164, no folder, CPD Papers; Washington Post, December 6, 1978, A14. On the possibility of a vertical shelter amendment, see Perle’s suggestions to the Abington Group, Abington Notes, November 27, 1978, 2, Box 370, Folder “Notes”, CPD Papers. 34. Committee on the Present Danger, “Where We Stand on SALT,” July 6, 1977, in Tyroler, ed., Alerting America, 20. See also pp. 52, 76. Also see Richard Pipes’s comments in “What Is the Soviet Union Up To,” March 14, 1978, and “Does the Official Case for the SALT II Treaty Hold Up under Analysis,” March 14, 1979, in Tyroler, ed., Alerting America, 76 and 114 respectively. 35. Tyroler, ed., Alerting America, 55, 109–10. About the range asymmetry between the U.S. and the Soviet navies in light of SALT II restrictions and the removal of the protocol’s range limits, see Perle

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Did Carter’s team reverse its earlier position on MAP-vertical silo basing or hesitate on the LRTNF issue because it saw that these issues might cause trouble on the Hill for SALT II ratification? Again, this argument falls flat if one suggests that the administration thought either position might help to woo its defense-right critics in Congress. Senators Jackson and Nunn—the latter identified by the administration as a key person for SALT II ratification—both had strong opinions when it came to providing European allies with the best possible means for conventional and nuclear defense. In late August, the House Republican Task Force requested that the White House move ahead quickly on MAP basing for the Minuteman III, and after that to press forward on a brandnew ICBM.36 Many on the defense-right in Congress expressed great disappointment, frustration, and even disgust when the new air-mobile basing study was announced. If Carter had wanted to bolster his chances of winning over the defense-right in Congress for SALT II ratification, going slow on LRTNF and pushing the “air-mobile interlude” was not the way to achieve it. There is some evidence suggesting that Carter had begun to receive defenseleft congressional pressure against MAP-vertical silo basing in late 1978. In September, a group of fifty-one representatives asked Carter to convene a joint civilian-military panel to look at MAP basing. Specifically, the letter asked for an examination of the costs associated with MAP, the moral issues associated with increasing the number of potential targets on U.S. territory, and MAP’s effect on arms control.37 This was certainly pressure, but it is difficult to make a case that it was the type of pressure that provoked the administration’s reexamination of air-mobile basing. Indeed, the issues brought up by the representatives’ September letter were already being addressed internally. Even if it was meant to signal a threat to the ratification of SALT II, the letter merely reiterated points with which Carter was already familiar and which were currently under debate within the administration for other, nonlogrolling reasons. to the CPD Executive Committee, Abington Notes, November 22, 1978, 2, Box 370, Folder “Notes,” CPD Papers. 36. For instance, Senator Jackson told Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Duncan in mid-April 1978 that if the SALT II protocol limits were simply “dropped,” SALT II ratification would be made much easier. Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: Significant Actions, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense (Week of April 15–21, 1978), April 21, 1978, 1, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Box 82, 4/20/78–4/28/78 (2), Folder 4/26/78, JCL. On the identification of Senator Nunn as the “hinge factor” on SALT II ratification, see Memorandum from Frank Moore and Bob Beckel to SALT Working Group, Subject: Congressional Planning and Outlook, October 12, 1978, 4, Office of the Congressional Liaison—Beckel, Box 225, Folder SALT II Correspondence File 4/19/78–3/5/79, JCL. Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 4, 1978, 17. 37. Washington Post, September 23, 1978, A11.

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One domestic political issue may have played a rather important role in MX and LRTNF decision-making in late 1978—defense economics. The MX airmobile option kept two defense commonalities on the front burner: a common missile and the possibility of a common aircraft. Perry admitted to Congress that one reason for his decision to look again at the air-mobile basing option for the MX was the creation of “economies.” Following the Hepfer-Clark study, Perry believed that a smaller, 83-inch-diameter missile could be deployed in an airplane and could serve as the basis for the new Trident II SLBM. At the very least, the two could share major components. He favored the smaller, common missile in looking at it from an economic angle, and since the physical restrictions of alternatives like air-mobile or road-mobile forced the use of a smaller missile, one can see a relationship between economics and the “air-mobile interlude.” Perry had a second commonality or “cross-force savings” in mind as well— the use of a shared, nuclear-hardened airplane. The United States had a current need for cruise missile carriers and nuclear C3I aircraft that were sufficiently hardened to survive and operate in nuclear environments. Since an MXcarrying airplane would also require that capability, it was worth another look at air-mobile MX basing to see if a single plane would work for all three duties. If air-mobile basing was found to be feasible, the fact that weight restrictions would necessitate a smaller missile meant that the United States would reap financial benefits from a combination of commonalities, both in the missile and the airplane.38 The LRTNF issue had its own cost effectiveness angle. Part of the administration’s post–PRM-38 hesitancy about which LRTNF systems to deploy in Europe was probably based on cost comparison. In terms of price alone, the GLCM was a much better deal. It used less manpower than Pershing, its basing was comparatively less expensive, and it carried four missiles for every one mobile launcher. There were also “cross-force savings” that derived from the GLCM’s commonality with the other types of cruise missiles. According to one statistic, GLCMs were either three or ten times more cost-effective than the Pershing II, depending upon whether one wanted GLCMs to deliver nuclear or conventional munitions, respectively. The Pentagon’s cost-comparison study in early 1978 suggested that the deployment of either Pershing II or GLCMs would be beneficial. Both systems had enhanced accuracies, which allowed 38. Fiscal Year 1979 Supplemental Military Authorization, March 7, 1979, 92–93, and March 19, 1979, 143–44, 149, 160. When asked about the part commonalities played in the decision to revisit the airmobile option, Brown agreed that it was a factor, but nevertheless he still emphasized other issues, particularly SALT II and pressure from OSTP. Harold Brown, telephone interview, January 10, 2004.

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lower yields and less collateral damage, particularly if an earth-penetrating warhead was used with Pershing II. However, Pershing II had a faster flight time than GLCMs and was more effective for time-urgent attacks. GLCM effectiveness was, in a much greater way, a function of how capable Soviet air defense was. Lastly, there were also doubts about the survivability of both systems. In assessments comparing the prelaunch survivability of Pershing II and GLCMs, the results ranged the gamut from “scenario dependent” or “about the same” to the Pershing II being “likely more survivable.” The Pentagon’s comparative cost analysis concluded that the United States could achieve “synergism” by deploying both the GLCM and shorter-range Pershing II (no money had been put in the FY1979 budget for extended-range Pershings because no decision had yet been made about which Pershing version would eventually be fielded). One system’s strengths would make up for any weaknesses or vulnerabilities in the other. And though this approach was more expensive, part of the reason behind it was also service amity. In the end, neither the Army nor the Air Force would lose a weapon system.39 All of this caused immense frustration on the Hill during the review and amendment of the defense budget. Demanding that the White House and Pentagon construct an “integrated” plan for theater-range missiles, Congress shuffled, and in some cases cut, the FY1979 funding of GLCMs, Pershing IIs, and a new Air Force mobile missile in the first days of August. Earlier, the House had deleted all FY1979 funding for GLCMs, but in conference, a portion of it was returned while the rest—together with some money from the Army’s Pershing II program—was rerouted into the Air Force’s mobile missile. Brown tried to remove some of this friction. The Pershing II Defense Science Acquisitions Review Council on August 17 determined that the United States would only develop the extended-range version. NATO allies also tried to clear the air. During talks in October, Western European allies told David Aaron and his team that they much preferred extended-range Pershing IIs 39. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 9: Research and Development, 6590; Testimony of Rear Admiral Walter Locke, Director of the Joint Cruise Missiles Project in House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Research and Development, Part 3, Book 2, 2527, 2531–32; Daalder, Nature and Practice, 193. Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 19, 1978, 24. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 9: Research and Development, 6590–91, 6597, 6623, 6589. See Lt. General Thomas Stafford’s comments regarding the use of Pershing IIs for “defense suppression” and the use of GLCMs for “low altitude attacks” in Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Research and Development, Part 3, Book 2, 2531. The Air Force actually suggested both systems. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 9: Research and Development, 6625.

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over GLCMs—a fact that suggested to Aaron that Carter needed to ratchet up its funding in the FY1979 supplemental.40 NATO allies were willing to go with the more expensive of the two systems because the costs would be shared.

Using the Neoclassical Realist Framework to Understand the MX “Air-Mobile Interlude” and LRTNF “Hesitancy” in 1978 Domestic political theories—with the limited exception of defense economics—come up short in their ability to explain Carter’s MX and LRTNF decision-making in late 1978. And while the growth of Soviet militaryoperational power does explain the general trajectory of the administration’s MX and LRTNF policy, that is, to build or not to build the particular weapon systems, the expansion of Soviet power suggested a path of rapid strategic and theater nuclear modernization. The administration’s actual pace would seem to beg further explanation. Using a neoclassical realist framework, the rest of the chapter examines how the pull of strategic beliefs, the role of allies, and, most importantly, the ways in which SALT II and the anticipated character of SALT III all colored the administration’s assessments of the strategic environment and reoriented its nuclear program choices. Many in the administration argued against a MAP-vertical basing mode for the MX on the basis of strategic, not to mention moral, beliefs. Utgoff, for example, suggested that the idea of turning the continental United States into a “target magnet” or a “sponge” for Soviet RVs was ethically questionable— indeed, he commented, it was “more than a little perverse.” The letter delivered to Carter from fifty-one representatives in September had called on the White House and Pentagon to explore the RV “sponge” concept in greater detail. The Pentagon even found itself on the defensive against “sponging,” but in response, it insisted that the target set created through MAP-vertical basing was so large that it would force Soviet nuclear war planners to go after other U.S. capabilities. It “canalized” Soviet efforts into other target sets. In short, it was argued that it was not actually an unethical or an immoral basing arrangement because, by virtue of its total scope, the Soviet Union was not likely to target it.41 40. Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 7, 1978, 19. On the decision to go with the extendedrange Pershing II versus the regular Pershing II in August 1978, see Daalder, Nature and Practice, 189. Again, there had been no funding of the extended-range Pershing II in the FY1979 budget. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 9: Research and Development, 6632. Memorandum from David Aaron to President Carter, Subject: Consultations on Gray Area Issues, October 26, 1978, 1. 41. NSC Memorandum from Victor Utgoff to Brzezinski, Subject: [Colin] Gray’s Article in Foreign Affairs, “The Strategic Forces Triad: End of the Road,” November 27, 1978, 4, Name File: Colin S. Gray,

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In mid-1978, the OSTP once again inserted its own strategic viewpoint into the MX basing fray and launched its own critique of the MAP-vertical consensus. Indeed, many—though not all—of the above-referenced concerns about the morality, feasibility, and security of MAP-vertical basing likely originated with a second, follow-on OSTP Missile Vulnerability report. Edwards explains how this second report was reviewed in an important (alleged) August 1978 meeting between the president, his national security principals, and some deputies that was held at Camp David on the MX issue. Despite Brown’s support for MAP-vertical, the OSTP’s subsequent work, together with arguments from David Aaron and Brzezinski, allegedly added to Carter’s overall skepticism of the basing scheme. MAP-vertical, the panel argued, was not a flawless option. The United States would have to sink two or three thousand holes before the new basing system would make enough of an impact on Soviet planners, and the report warned of insurmountable land-use issues. It was not clear whether the United States would be able to build additional missile shelters more cheaply than the Soviet Union would be able to build and deploy additional RVs to overwhelm them. The OSTP also insisted that unless the administration improved the other parts of the triad or moved forward on defenses, it made no sense to focus on “holes” while Moscow built new weapons. And, the report added, there would always be questions about the system’s security. The system’s vulnerability to Soviet collection of human intelligence, electronic intelligence, and/or measurement and signature intelligence was still unclear. Once the United States discovered, or even feared, that Soviet targeters knew the precise silo location of the missile, it would take too long to shuffle missiles under MAP-vertical. As Brown explained to reporters the following year, if the Soviet Union ever targeted a MAP-vertical system with an RV count that was greater than the total number of U.S. missiles but less than the total number of missile shelters, then the United States could only “pray” that the Soviet Union had not broken the system’s security.42

JCL. On page 4, Utgoff suggested that there were other “largely untargetable” (and assumingly more moral) deployment alternatives like air-mobile and land-mobile, though he did not provide any support as to why he believed that those two were any less “targetable” than MAP. Washington Post, September 23, 1978, A11. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Research and Development, Part 3, Book 2, 2497. 42. Edwards, Superweapon, 165–69. Edwards’s recounting of the Camp David meeting is an invaluable resource, but he appears to be in error with respect to its date. According to the Jimmy Carter Library, there were no presidential visits to Camp David in August 1978. It is unclear precisely when this meeting occurred though it most likely falls sometime between September and November 1978. “President Carter’s visits to Camp David,” http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/jec/ trips.phtml (accessed February 3, 2008). The second OSTP report is mentioned (in very general terms)

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Differing views of strategy, feasibility, security, and morality also had a braking effect on LRTNF in 1978. The fact that these modernized theater weapons would be deployed on NATO territory also meant that unlike the debate over the MX, the administration faced the added variable of interalliance relations. According to Daalder and others, PRM-38 had concluded that more so than ever before the deployment of new and improved LRTNF was vital to show NATO and the rest of the world that the United States would not sit idle while the Soviet Union improved its own theater capabilities. Despite the administration’s fears about just how closely the NATO High Level Group’s members represented their respective governments’ official policy positions, the HLG— using data and analysis from PRM-38—established requirements, debated different system parameters, and between September 1978 and February 1979 settled on a final weapons mix (though actual numbers and deployment areas were not spelled out precisely until the middle of 1979).43 This did not mean that it was easy for the NATO allies to come to an agreement over which systems to use and how they should be used. Pershing II and GLCMs received the greatest amount attention in late 1978 as the other three options opened up too many complications. The MRBM, an Air Force favorite, was taken off the table quickly because it would have taken five years or longer to reach its initial operating capacity. If NATO settled on ALCM-carrying bombers, then the new aircraft would be just as vulnerable as older nuclear aircraft. Sea-launched options created difficulties of their own. They were certainly more survivable—survivability being one of the LRTNF “modernization guidelines” the HLG had established for itself in the post–PRM-38 environment. However, those same guidelines, according to Daalder, also expressed a in Edwards, Superweapon, 167, and Herken, Cardinal Choices, 193. This author was unable to locate the second OSTP panel report; however, the third OSTP panel report is available in Office of Science and Technology Policy, “MX Panel Report” [hereafter OSTP Panel Report III], May 1979, Office of Science and Technology Policy—Press, Box 6, Folder: Missile and Basing Option, MX 6/1/79, JCL. In the third report, on page 2, the panel claims that it “continue[s] to be concerned about the shortcomings of MPS” and then, on pages 9–11, the shortcomings are listed in detail. This author assumes that the use of the word “continue” means that the shortcomings listed in the third report are likely similar to those provided in the second. OSTP Panel Report III, 9–10; Edwards, Superweapon, 166–67. See also transcript of Pentagon Background Briefing [hereafter MX June 8th Pentagon Briefing], June 8, 1979, 7, Office of the Congressional Liaison—Beckel, Box 226, Folder: MX Correspondence 5/9/79–7/1/79, JCL. The briefing was done by two unidentified “senior officials.” Although the names are redacted, it is not difficult to see that Brown and Perry were the two officials. One redaction (p. 20) is partial and Perry’s name can be seen. On page 2, Brown uses the exact phrasing on Minuteman vulnerability that he had used in prior congressional testimony. 43. Daalder, Nature and Practice, 180–81; Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, 224–28; Yaffe, Origins, 630–32.

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need for “visibility.” In Bonn’s eyes, sea-launched capabilities did not appear as ominous to the Soviets. Great Britain agreed, insisting that land-deployed options were better counter to Soviet TNF modernization.44 Moreover, submarine-launched cruise missile options posed many of the same challenges as Poseidon SLBM deployments. They were susceptible to Soviet antisubmarine warfare, expensive, and reliant upon greater yield to overcome poor accuracy. This last point also meant that they were not as useful with respect to NATO selective employment plans—NATO’s term for regional nuclear options—as their use courted heavier collateral damage.45 The HLG was also adamant that regardless of the final system choice there could be no LRTNF targeting of the Soviet capital because it carried a higher risk of escalation. The targeting of Moscow was a job that had to be left to the U.S. SIOP. Strategic ideas, strategic reviews, and allied interests on policy notwithstanding, the most important force behind the pacing of MX and LRTNF decisionmaking in 1978 was SALT II and the anticipated character of SALT III. Indeed, what worried Carter and his team most about the MAP-vertical concept—and what played the largest role in rerouting interest toward air-mobile basing—was how the different MX basing options related to current and future SALT negotiations, particularly when it came to verification. The administration was just as concerned about arms control implications of modernized LRTNF. PRM-38 had concluded not only that the United States and NATO had to move forward on new LRTNF deployments but also that arms control was a necessary facet of all future modernization plans. It was not just about providing domestic political cover for the West German government. The administration believed—as it had insisted when it suggested an ERW for SS-20 trade—that Moscow would be more willing to negotiate away its own theater nuclear systems in a future SALT III once it saw that NATO was modernizing its own arsenal.46 The administration feared from very early on that the Soviet Union would consider vertical shelter basing for the MX as just another label for “new fixed launchers,” a class prohibited under SALT I. When Warnke notified the Soviet delegation in Geneva in July 1978 that the United States maintained the option of basing its new ICBM in a MAP configuration, Vladimir Semenov, the Soviet 44. Daalder, Nature and Practice, 192. 45. Ibid., 190–91. As David Aaron explained to Carter in October 1978, the HLG was not as interested in “beefing up the NATO general nuclear response (the NATO contribution to SIOP)” as it was desirous that the alliance have a greater number of “selective employment options.” Memorandum from David Aaron to President Carter, Subject: Consultations on Gray Area Issues, October 26, 1978, 2. 46. Daalder, Nature and Practice, 180; Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, 225.

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Union’s SALT II negotiator, told him that Moscow’s position was that MAP was counter to both the precise treaty language (“no new fixed launchers” and “no deliberate concealment”) as well as the spirit of the accord. Semenov passed along to Warnke Moscow’s “grave reservations” about the legality and the verifiability of the MAP basing mode. It was not a blunt rejection, but its tone was strong enough to give the administration pause. Brown’s speech to the American Legion the following month was expressly worded to counter the Soviet Union’s complaints. In it, Brown emphasized that MAP configuration was legal under the treaty’s language since the system allowed the Soviet Union to verify the exact number of deployed launchers. Brown added that if the Soviet Union decided to deploy its own MAP system, the United States would naturally require the same standard of verification.47 Brown’s speech aside, the Soviet Union’s questions about “deliberate concealment” and verification caused a scramble to find ICBM deployment modes that would not unnecessarily aggravate superpower relations. Carter demanded assurances in late 1978 that the Soviet Union would be able to verify the total number of launchers in a MAP system using its “national technical means” so that the United States could not be accused of flouting any “deliberate concealment” language. In October, Brown told Carter that he did not believe it was a problem. It was a situation similar to that of verifying submarines. The MX launchers could be assembled in an area open to space-based surveillance and then moved into the MAP deployment area. Once in a while, all but one of the shelters in a given cluster could then be opened for viewing by helicopter or by Soviet satellites. Naturally, this opened up the issue of security. There would be trade-offs between verification and MAP system security, but there was disagreement as to the extent. Brown argued that the trade-off was minimal, while Brzezinski insisted that tighter MAP security could require the use of decoys—a solution which caused troubles of its own.48 47. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Research and Development, Part 9: Research and Development, 6498–99. Talbott, Endgame, 172–73. Endgame was published in 1979 and it tracks with descriptions provided by Nitze in the fall of 1978. See, for example, the copy of Nitze’s letter to Senator Frank Church, September 28, 1978, printed in Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol thereto (SALT II Treaty), Part 3, 918–19. In November 1978, Nitze told the CPD’s Annual Board Meeting that the administration had been shaken by the Soviet reaction, pulled back, and ran to its “science friends” [assume OSTP] to see if a more acceptable basing mode could be found. CPD 2nd Annual Board Meeting Transcripts, Cassette #3 Transcript, 12–13, Box 164, no folder, CPD Papers. Talbott, Endgame, 173–74; Washington Post, August 23, 1978, A11. 48. OSD Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: ICBM Vulnerability, MAPS and Verification, October 28, 1978, 3–4, and NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President

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This hand-wringing over “deliberate concealment” and “no new fixed launchers” in light of the intended use of MAP as an MX basing mode constituted only half of what William Perry later called SALT’s “two-sided verification problem.”49 The United States always had to keep Soviet breakout in mind. Moscow could try to combat a U.S. MAP MX system by inserting additional MIRV missiles into a MAP system of its own. To be sure, not everyone believed that the Soviets would ever build a MAP system; Brzezinski and Brown both thought it unlikely.50 For Brown, the threat of breakout was just one more aspect (what he called “a special case”) of a much bigger U.S. intelligence collection problem: the detection of Soviet delivery vehicles and RV numbers in toto. Brown was optimistic that at least when it came to delivery vehicles, the United States would see any strategically meaningful levels of breakout. In order to make a “serious” difference, he argued that more than a thousand ICBMs would have to be built, stored, transported, and deployed in a Soviet MAP system. This would require added command, control, and support units in the field. Such activity would be very difficult to hide given current U.S. intelligence capabilities (and would be so even if the Soviet Union did not go to a MAP system).51 But the Soviet Union could also fight a MAP deployment plan using another method. It could “fractionate” its arsenal (increasing the number of RVs per delivery vehicle) and do whatever it could to make it difficult—if not impossible—to track its RV count in a precise way. Hence, it is no coincidence that the battle over telemetry encryption and missile fractionation limits in SALT II intensified immediately after the Soviet Union’s July 1978 démarche on MAP deployment. The two issues went hand-in-hand: assuming the Soviets adhered to limits on missile fractionation, such limits allowed the United States to hedge against telemetry collection failure, estimate the Soviet Union’s deployed RV count, and respond by adjusting the number of aim points in a MAP MX system. While fractionation limits were also aimed at offsetting the larger carrying capacity of the Soviet Union’s ICBM arsenal, the cost and military effectiveness of a MAP system were closely tied to the United States’ ability to limit the number of

Carter, Subject: Memo from Harold Brown on ICBM Vulnerability, MAPS, and SALT Verification, November 15, 1978, 2. Brzezinski’s is the cover memo, with Brown’s attached to it. Both are located in Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 36, Folder: Serial X, 9/78–12/78, JCL. 49. Fiscal Year 1979 Supplemental Military Authorization, 189. 50. See previously mentioned memos from Brown to President Carter, October 28, 1978, 4, and Brzezinski to President Carter, November 15, 1978, 2. 51. Brown to President Carter, October 28, 1978, 5–6.

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RVs per Soviet delivery vehicle. During September and October 1978, the United States tried to keep the Soviets to four RVs per SS-17 and six RVs per SS-19, but to no avail. When Soviet negotiators threatened to apply similar fractionation limits to the MX, Washington balked. In the end, to keep the allowed number of MX RVs at ten, the United States was forced to agree to bump up the number of RVs allowed on the SS-17 and SS-19 to ten as well.52 To verify such fractionation limits, and to maintain an accurate picture of Soviet ICBM capabilities irrespective of any limits, the United States depended upon successful intelligence collection—specifically telemetry retrieval and analysis. Unfortunately, between 1975 and 1978, the United States’ physical capabilities in this area had been significantly degraded. In 1975, in response to the United States’ arms embargo over Cyprus, Turkey shut down key listening stations on its territory. Jeffrey Richelson states that in 1977 it was determined that about one quarter of the “hard information” the United States gathered on Soviet missile launches had come from listening stations on Turkish territory. The following year, TRW Corporation employee Christopher Boyce and his friend, Andrew Daulton Lee, provided the KGB with information on the RHYOLITE/AQUACADE surveillance program. Allegedly, one function of this satellite system was telemetry interception. Like Turkey, Iran’s geographic proximity to Soviet air space made it a vital spot for listening stations and telemetry data collection. In late 1978, the future of these sites was under jeopardy as Iran’s internal political environment deteriorated. The administration worked frantically to fix these intelligence shortcomings. The pressure put on Congress by the administration in late 1978 to lift the arms embargo against Turkey was in large part telemetry-related. Richelson indicates that many (but not all) of the stations in Turkey were reopened in October 1978. As an alternative to Turkey and Iran, the United States also began talks with China about the possible establishment of signals intelligence and electronic intelligence facilities in its far western province of Xinjiang.53 52. Brzezinski was less optimistic than Brown about the number and cost of aim points that it would take to hedge against Soviet breakout but emphasized that SALT II limits on fractionation made MAP “more attractive.” The United States, in his view, had the choice of increasing the number of aim points and the cost, accepting lower levels of surviving forces or securing fractionation limits. See previously mentioned Brzezinski to Carter, November 15, 1978, 2–3. Regarding estimating the RV count, see comments by Walter Slocombe about how SALT II would help “ease” the United States’ “judgment” on Soviet RV count in Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Research and Development, Part 6, 3541. Talbott, Endgame, 220; Thornton, Carter Years, 236–37. 53. Jeffrey Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target, 85–92, 226; Jeffrey Richelson, A Century Of Spies: Intelligence in the 20th Century, 344–46; Encyclopedia Astronautica, http://www. astronautix.com/craft/rhyolite.htm (accessed February 3, 2008).

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Not only did geopolitical instability and espionage make telemetry interception difficult, but also the Soviet Union made the detection of missile fractionation (and therefore the protection of a possible MAP MX deployment) even harder by encrypting whatever telemetry could be collected. In the last weekend of July 1978, the Soviet Union ran a battery of SS-18 Mod 4 tests that used encryption. In response, the United States worked hard to limit the use of such countermeasures.54 Either on its own or, more effectively, in conjunction with concrete limits on missile fractionation, a restriction on any telemetry encryption that “deliberat[ely] den[ied]” verification was helpful for the United States because, like fractionation limits, it allowed Washington to estimate the Soviet Union’s RV count, restrict the ways in which Moscow could take advantage of the carrying capacity of its larger missiles, and adjust accordingly the number of aim points (and the proper distance between them) in a MAP system. Unfortunately, the more vehemently that the administration pushed against the Soviet Union’s “deliberate denial” and “impediment” of verification by its use of encryption, the bigger the stick it provided the Soviet Union to beat down what Moscow claimed was the identical verification hurdle in the form of MAP MX basing. In November, Brzezinski warned that the Soviet Union might link the United States’ focus on “impediment to verification” language— the purpose of which was to combat telemetry encryption—with MAP. This linkage would be especially acute if, as mentioned above, the United States had to use decoys to maintain MAP system security.55 One sees a direct connection between this impasse and the MX “air-mobile interlude.” With all of its assorted telemetry collection problems, the United States needed a brake on Soviet encryption. This meant removing MAP-vertical from the table completely or, at the very least, drawing attention to a different, non-MAP-vertical deployment system like air-mobile until it was able to secure a mutual agreement on encryption. The “air-mobile interlude” was also connected to the future SALT III regime. The OSTP addressed this very point. In its view, air-mobile was a better choice than MAP (particularly MAP-vertical) if one kept SALT III in mind. For 54. Talbott, Endgame, 200–201. The tests occurred over July 29–30, 1978. Near the end of 1978, Perle told the CPD’s Executive Committee that the Soviet Union had encrypted “all aspects” of these SS-18 Mod 4 tests. Abington Notes, November 22, 1978, 1. 55. “We are pressing at SALT for a strict construction of the word ‘impede’ in connection with telemetry encryption, which the Soviets would surely seek to apply against a MAPS.” See previously mentioned Brzezinski to Carter, November 15, 1978, 2.

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instance, if the United States wanted a full SALT III ban on mobile missiles following the three-year SALT II protocol—especially considering the Soviet Union’s mobile SS-16 ICBM, the SS-20 I/MRBM, and its ability to hide mobiles across a much larger and politically closed land mass—then MAP deployment would probably sink its chances.56 And if intelligence collection and verification were difficult now, they would be even more problematic once the follow-on SALT III negotiations began to address both strategic and theater forces. Perry and Seymour Zeiberg testified after the “air-mobile interlude” that one of the administration’s goals in SALT III was the construction of “cooperative standards of verification,” particularly since SALT III would probably involve “gray area and mobile systems.”57 By the end of 1978, the administration began to fear that MAP deployment for the MX would muddy the verification waters of SALT II and could easily contribute to a distrustful atmosphere come SALT III. With PRM-38, the administration concluded that LRTNF modernization also went hand-in-hand with SALT II and III. It was believed that NATO governments would be unwilling to accept new LRTNF systems unless they were able to show their citizens that they had not dismissed arms control negotiations completely. The deployment of new LRTNF systems, or the threat of their deployment, was the key to achieving limits in SALT III on those weapons that concerned Western Europe most—namely, the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber (and perhaps the SS-4 and SS-5). However, absent clear movement toward modernization, the Soviet Union would feel little pressure to offer any concessions. In the immediate post–PRM-38 atmosphere, the administration was therefore not just embroiled in the discussions and debate over possible types and numbers of future LRTNF systems; it was also busy trying to ensure that everyone was of one mind when it came to arms control. From the time it was announced, the three-year SALT II protocol had aggravated those in Western Europe who were convinced that its cruise missile limits would serve as the base or precedent from which the superpowers would begin their SALT III negotiations. There were also doubts about how the two sides understood noncircumvention and nontransfer rules. Indeed, as late as January 1979—well after the mid-1978 meetings in Geneva at which the administration believed the two parties had settled the noncircumvention and nontransfer issues—Brezhnev told a visiting Senator John Tower, in no uncertain terms, that the Soviet Union would not accept any sharing of cruise mis56. OSTP Panel Report III, 11. 57. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Part 3, 1437.

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sile technology between the United States and its allies.58 It did not help matters that by the end of 1978 the United States had also softened to the Soviet argument that SALT II had to limit conventional ALCMs in addition to any nuclear-tipped variants. Even though there was European interest in deploying shorter-range, conventional ALCMs on tactical aircraft, Carter argued that if the United States did not agree to a such a limit, he would be open to defenseright (and public) criticism that there was no way to verify what type of cruise missile the Soviet Union had deployed on the Backfire.59 In spite of how the ongoing SALT II negotiations were playing out, European allies were being asked to put their faith in the expected ability of the followon SALT agreement to restrict Soviet TNF systems sometime in the future. The administration had folded the initial “principles” for SALT III into the overall framework for SALT II. The fact that these “principles” were now an inseparable part of SALT II meant that for all intents SALT III was already under negotiation and its trajectory would be codified once the current agreement was signed. While Carter’s team hyped the anticipated benefits of SALT III, the overall feeling of European allies was nervousness. West Germany thought more of SALT III’s potential than did France or Great Britain, but all three powers argued against any “separate” theater and intercontinental limits in a followon agreement, which, they felt, would break the connection between European-based systems and U.S. strategic forces. For their part, France and Great Britain were concerned SALT III might spoil the upgrading of their own nuclear arsenals. In October 1978, David Aaron reported that Paris and London were skeptical about SALT III’s prospects. They pictured cruise missiles as

58. According to John [or Christopher] Lehman, when Senator Tower asked Brezhnev whether the Soviet Union would approve the transfer of cruise missile technology to allies, Brezhnev responded with something akin to “the hell with that.” Abington Notes, January 16, 1979, 2, Box 370, Folder “Notes”, CPD Papers. 59. President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski et al., Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Summary of the Meeting between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on SALT TWO and the FY80 Defense Program, December 19, 1978, 2–3, 5 (quote on page 5), Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 36, Serial X 9/78–12/78, JCL. The Joint Chiefs feared that the Soviet push to limit conventional ALCMs was the first move in an overall ploy to restrict conventionally tipped GLCMs and SLCMs. In the end, the administration conceded, Carter having explained to the Chiefs that the Soviets had all but promised that if the United States agreed to limit conventionally tipped ALCM, they “would be willing to give on everything else.” Carter insisted as well that cruise missiles were too expensive to arm conventionally, and that he was skeptical about the military use of conventionally armed cruise missiles. A few days after his meeting with the Chiefs, the United States agreed to the Soviet formulation in talks between Vance and Gromyko in Geneva.

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serious options for improving their own aging systems, and each thought that arms control would complicate the introduction of any new LRTNF. Faced with strong, defense-left opposition within the Labour Party to the modernization of Polaris, British Prime Minister James Callaghan had earlier in the year ordered a review of replacement options. He was briefed on this study’s results, which included the deployment of SLCMs, in December 1978. Overall, Callaghan’s concern was that whichever way its nuclear arsenal was modernized, Great Britain had to have a say in how SALT III was to be negotiated. France, according to Callaghan’s memoirs, was firm that it would not allow SALT III to preclude its own future deployment of cruise missiles, and Alexander Haig, NATO’s retired Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, later testified that it was his understanding the French were “violently opposed” to the follow-on negotiations.60 The United States and its European allies were faced with a paradoxical logic. To get the Soviet Union to bargain over TNF come SALT III, the United States and NATO had to pose a credible military threat. That is, the alliance had to be willing to improve its own LRTNF. However, if LRTNF modernization was to be used as an instrument to secure limits on Soviet TNF in SALT III, then there was the increased chance that that same agreement might limit the very modernization required to get the Soviets to play ball in the first place. Yaffe has identified this problem best. Beginning with Schlesinger’s tenure in the Pentagon, LRTNF modernization had always been viewed in light of the asymmetry in conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Now, by late 1978, LRTNF modernization was beginning to carry two loads—a militaryoperational load and an arms control one. And the latter was starting to overwhelm the former.61 In fact, it was feared that the latter gave the Soviet Union openings whereby in the not-too-far future it could feasibly interfere with and, from the Soviet perspective, hopefully negate, the former.

60. Memorandum from David Aaron to President Carter, Subject: Consultations on Gray Area Issues, October 26, 1978, 1. Callaghan, Time and Change, 549, 552–58; Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan: A Life, 619–20. In his memoirs, David Owen mentions that a “meeting on nuclear questions” was held on December 12, 1978. David Owen, Time to Declare, 128. Also see General Alexander Haig’s comments to Senator Robert Byrd, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol thereto (SALT II Treaty), Part 1, 373–74. 61. Yaffe, Origins, 634–35; Gaffney, “History of the Euromissiles.” Indeed, Gaffney goes as far as to claim that the HLG never went into extensive enough detail to pick particular military-operational targets for LRTNF. He states that the group meetings “never touched on specific targets at all—just the broad geographic areas to be threatened.”

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Conclusion The number of MX studies that filled the first part of the year led to a consensus on one particular type of basing: MAP-vertical. By the end of the year, however, that consensus had disappeared and the new ICBM system was once again thrown into turmoil. With respect to TNF modernization, Carter chose against the use of the ERW but moved ahead on the general concept of new LRTNF deployment in Europe. However, there had still been no firm settlement as to the final number, type, and location of new LRTNF hardware. It is difficult to attribute the administration’s pacing in 1978 to realism’s traditional “change in relative power” framework. There had been no objective weakening in Soviet power. Especially in strategic and theater nuclear systems, the Soviet Union continued its upward building trend, while the United States stayed still. Domestic political interpretations of the administration’s actions are also problematic. Though there were concerns about how defense-left pressure on European governments would impact the LRTNF issue, there was little to no defense-left interest group pressure on the administration itself. Defense-right groups—first and foremost the CPD—tried to get the administration to move quickly, not slowly, on the MX and LRTNF. The administration’s policy choices in 1978 are also hard to explain from a logrolling perspective. Carter’s defense-right critics in Congress wanted more rapid nuclear weapons modernization, and while there was a growing defense-left voice on Capitol Hill, it was very small in size in 1978. One domestic explanation, defense cost savings, does provide insight into the administration’s MX and LRTNF choices, but the evidence suggests that this is not a comprehensive explanation. The neoclassical realist framework sheds greater interpretative light on the pacing of the administration’s defense policy. The international environment suggested a path of rapid strategic and theater nuclear modernization, but strategic thought, allies, and arms control negotiations reoriented the consensus on the MX and perpetuated disagreement over the character of future LRTNF. Fears about the morality of the MX “sponging” concept, together with the reigning strategic perspective of the OSTP, worked to erode the consensus over MAP-vertical. The lack of allied agreement on LRTNF hardware, deployment areas, and targeting caused the hesitation that was apparent even after the administration completed its PRM-38 study. Most of all, present and future arms control negotiations slowed the administration’s actions in 1978. Carter and his team were worried that MAP-vertical would aggravate superpower

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relations and make it nearly impossible to secure limits on encryption of telemetry in SALT II and achieve a mobile launcher ban and cooperative verification standards in SALT III. The administration also worried about moving too quickly on LRTNF given that there were still outstanding issues involving the SALT II protocol and the SALT III principles that were embedded in the current agreement. The character of SALT II and the anticipated form of the future SALT III agreement served to deflect the administration’s policy behavior away from what the international strategic environment required.

Seven Carter’s Conversion Explaining MX and LRTNF Decision-Making in Early 1979

From January through June of 1979, the defense debate in the United States was framed in light of two separate budget packages. The first, Carter’s FY1980 budget, was released on January 22. It totaled $135.5 billion in total obligational authority, keeping intact the 1977 NATO Ministerial Guidance (and PD18) standard of a 3 percent real annual increase. A few weeks later, on February 7, the administration sent to Congress a supplemental of its previous FY1979 budget. In both packages, Carter requested additional money for U.S. strategic and theater nuclear systems. The supplemental provided $265 million for the “full-scale development” of the MX. It also kick-started the extended-range Pershing II (PIIXR) with $52 million, and it added back $20 million that Congress had earlier cut from the Trident II system. Carter’s FY1980 budget outlined $670 million for the MX, in addition to $41 million for Trident II D-5 and $144.8 million for Pershing II.1 The administration’s defense policy conversion would come to fruition as these two defense budget packages—the FY1979 supplemental being the more time-critical—were evaluated and assessed. In the space of about four weeks in May and June, Carter finally settled two defense issues that many analysts highlight as examples of a midterm policy 1. Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 1979 Supplemental Military Authorization, February 7, 1979, 7–8; Washington Post, January 23, 1979, A14.

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hardening, a distinct turnaround from the adjustments that he and his team had made during the two previous years. On June 8, in a brief aside to a reporter during the daily press briefing, Deputy Press Secretary Rex Granum declared that the president had, at long last, decided to build a “full-scale” MX missile. Three weeks before, on May 17, Carter had approved an LRTNF “action plan” that had been drawn up earlier that same month by both Vance and Brown. This “action plan” was an executive-level blueprint that outlined precisely how the administration and, most importantly, Carter himself would lead NATO to a final “two-track” decision by December. As Vance and Brown had hoped when they penned the memorandum, Carter’s approval of the plan left no doubts as to the United States’ position on LRTNF modernization. The deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs to Western Europe had moved, officially and concretely, from the realm of theory and study to that of presidentially mandated policy. These decisions stand in contrast to Carter’s earlier policy deflections. The administration’s MX and LRTNF decision-making between the latter part of 1978 and the spring of 1979 was a “course correction” or readjustment to fit more closely with the international environment’s military-operational character. Why did Carter’s defense policy shift during this time? The evidence shows that the administration became convinced of this “course correction” based on changes (albeit late) in assessment. Using the neoclassical realist framework, this chapter continues the book’s overall analysis of strategic thought, allies, and arms control as mediating variables for understanding policy transformation. Studies that followed on the heels of PRM-10 and PD-18, though they continued to denigrate MAP-vertical basing for the MX, helped to convince the administration of the reality of Soviet power in the international military-operational environment. When it came to LRTNF modernization, the United States and its European allies established an arms control forum for SALT III issues and finally arrived at an agreement as to which particular LRTNF systems were going to be used. Lastly, the settlement of SALT II had a significant impact on the policy shift, but not primarily because the agreement required a so-called harder defense policy in order to sell it on Capitol Hill. Rather, the settlement of SALT II lessened the fear that reorienting strategic and theater programs in line with the international environment would likely derail the entire agreement and damage any future negotiations.

The MX Missile Program—January to June 1979 Carter gave his final approval on the MX either during or immediately following a two-day NSC marathon session held on June 4–5. His decision was

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announced days after. The announcement indicated that while the administration would move ahead on the missile program, it was still in the process of choosing the “final characteristics” of a basing mode. A final decision regarding basing would be made by the end of the summer. Though short, the statement was precisely crafted and emphasized the following points. With respect to general strategic nuclear policy, the United States would not shift from a triad to a dyad. To calm fears about the MX and SALT II, the statement said that the new missile was not prohibited under the new agreement. The missile’s military-operational capabilities would not be inferior to any ICBM the Soviets might choose to field—that is, the two sides were still “equivalent.” Once settled upon, the basing system would be verifiable, well protected, and publicly acceptable. Finally, the statement made it clear that the new system would facilitate numerical reductions and “serious negotiations” come SALT III.2 Within hours after the White House’s announcement, Brown and Perry explained to reporters that United States would build 200 MX launchers as part of an overall ten-year “strategic force modernization” and that all of the launchers would be operational by 1989. The administration had picked the largest MX missile variant—a 92-inch diameter with a total weight of 190,000 pounds. Each MX would carry ten RVs, the maximum number allowed under SALT II’s fractionation limits. Each of those ten RVs would in turn carry a 335kiloton warhead. The new missile, Brown and Perry added, would demonstrate accuracies better than those of the Minuteman III and comparable to those expected with the Soviet Union’s SS-18 once 1989 arrived. Though the MX’s final basing mode had not yet been settled, it was obvious that two previous ideas, MAP-vertical and air-mobile, were no longer in the running. Instead, the “baseline” design was now one that moved a single MX transporter/launcher between multiple horizontally positioned shelters, either by road or rail, and either above or below ground. All in all, there would be about 8,000 to 9,000 shelters. The system, which would use Defense Department and Bureau of Land Management land in Nevada and Utah, did not have 2. For the MX statement, see Carter, Public Papers 1979, vol. 1, 1016. The White House’s Office of Congressional Liaison had put together a list of points, dated May 31, 1979, that outlined some of the themes and counterarguments to be used once a decision on the missile had been made. Some of them were aimed at the defense-right—for example, an emphasis on how the new ICBM “reassert[ed]” American power, and also, interestingly, a concerted effort to use the term “MPS” regardless of whatever basing system was picked so that it would “make it harder for vertical shelter fans to say they want ‘MPS’ instead.” For the defense-left, the statement was supposed to explain how the entire decision was contingent upon how the Soviet Union acted in the future and that the public would have to approve any new system. Unknown author, “Checklist on MX Statement,” May 31, 1979, 1, Office of Congressional Liaison, Box 230, SALT II Information 12/1/78–9/4/80, JCL.

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to be super-hardened at a higher cost since for every ICBM there would be a large number of well-spaced shelters. The final number of horizontal shelters, as well as the distance between them, would be a function of expected Soviet fractionation absent limits put in place by SALT II with some conservative hedging added in. In terms of total cost, newspaper accounts suggested a figure somewhere in the neighborhood of $30 billion.3 It is important to note that the situation for the MX had looked very different at the beginning of the year. In an “air-mobile interlude,” the administration had divided the MX portion of the FY1979 supplemental into two components: 72 percent of the money was for “multiple protective shelters” (MPS) development, with the remaining 28 percent designated for air-mobile basing should the administration choose that option in the end. The use of the term MPS, however, did not necessarily mean that the shelters would be vertically positioned. If MPS basing was chosen, then the FY1979 supplemental money ensured an MX initial operating capacity in 1986, perhaps even an accelerated capacity of March 1985. On the other hand, if Carter settled on airmobile basing, the supplemental maintained the 1986 initial operating capacity. If the FY1979 supplemental failed, Perry warned, then the administration would have little choice but to boost the FY1980 budget to keep on target for all of these dates. The supplemental also allowed for “synchronism” or the possible use of a common missile for both the MX and the Trident II D-5.4 Upon presenting the supplemental to Congress in early February, Perry announced to the Senate Armed Services Committee that a presidential decision on the MX and MX basing would not occur before April 1, which was the day after DSARC was scheduled to reconvene to discuss the Air Force’s findings on air-mobile basing. In fact, he explained, the decision was not likely to be made until May or even June.5 Meanwhile, since Congress was being asked via the FY1979 supplemental to authorize additional MX funding before the airmobile study was completed and before the administration had made any firm decisions, Carter’s critics on the Hill had the opportunity to tweak the MX pro3. Transcript of Pentagon Background Briefing [hereafter MX June 8 Pentagon Briefing], June 8, 1979, 8–12, 16–17, Office of the Congressional Liaison—Beckel, Box 226, Folder: MX Correspondence 5/9/79–7/1/79, JCL. Washington Post, June 8, 1979, A1. 4. Fiscal Year 1979 Supplemental Military Authorization, March 7, 1979, and March 19, 1979, 100– 101, 146, 180; Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Research and Development, Part 6, April 11, 1979, 3485; Edwards, Superweapon, 183. Fiscal Year 1979 Supplemental Military Authorization, February 7, 1979, 4–8. 5. Fiscal Year 1979 Supplemental Military Authorization, February 7, 1979, and March 7, 1979, 34, 60–61, 69, 94.

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gram by offering amendments to the supplemental. They wasted little time in doing so. That March, Senator Jackson offered an amendment that required the administration to build the MX with the maximum throw-weight allowed under SALT II. This specifically targeted both the air-mobile basing option as well as the common missile, since the diameter of the largest possible missile would be too big for the Trident submarine program, and since such a large missile was not an optimal choice for an air-mobile system either as a very large and prohibitively expensive airplane would be needed to carry it. The “largest possible missile” requirement also gave the United States a hedge in case there was an abrogation or nonrenewal of SALT fractionation limits. In the same month, Senator John Tower, another administration critic, put forward an amendment requiring a final basing decision by May 15. This, at least in Perry’s view, was one more strike at the air-mobile system since the deadline would not give the White House enough time to examine that option with enough depth.6 Before its members could be briefed on the results of the air-mobile study, the Senate Armed Services Committee moved the supplemental to the full Senate and did it with both amendments intact, though Tower’s amendment was eventually softened to a requirement that the administration report by the deadline not on its “final basing decision” but on its “best judgment.” By the end of March, the “air-mobile interlude” came to a close. The Air Force completed its “quick study” of air-mobile and repeated the same process that had occurred back in November and December. The Air Force Systems Acquisition Review Council convened and put together a summary of its findings for DSARC. On March 31, the DSARC IIB heard the Air Force’s presentation. With no hesitation, the Air Force concluded that air-mobile basing was a much poorer option than multiple vertically positioned shelters. It relied too heavily on warning, which was an especially dangerous proposition if the Soviet Union fractionated its SLBM force and used it for surprise attacks against air bases. There were concerns about public safety. In the face of an attack, an air-mobile system called for scattering MX-carrying planes to local airfields across the United States, many of which would be located near populated areas. The Air Force did concede that air-mobile might not be as taxing or troublesome for SALT verification. It was thought that Moscow might consider airmobile basing more “conventional” as it could be monitored with methods 6. Ibid., 148, 151–52, 186, 200–201.

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with which the Soviet side was already familiar, like the use of satellites to look at aircraft for functionally related observable differences (FROD). Yet, such arms control comfort came with a steep price tag. The study insisted that an air-mobile MX could not be built and deployed in the amount of time that many were arguing it could, and that in the end it would be much more expensive. The analysis showed that compared to MPS, air-mobile cost 50 percent more to purchase, 250 percent more to operate, and required nearly double the amount of manpower. It would be cheaper to build additional aim points in the face of Soviet fractionation than it would be to construct new planes. After considering all of these points, the Air Force stuck by the earlier consensus— MAP-vertical.7 Despite the Air Force’s conclusion, the administration never returned to MAP-vertical basing. Instead, throughout April and May, the NSC’s two major subcommittees took on the subjects of the MX, nuclear targeting, and strategic nuclear modernization as a whole. By mid-May, the NSC Policy Review Committee (PRC) had five strategic modernization programs under review. Four of these retained a triad, but one took the United States out of the ICBM business altogether. Under Option One, the United States would stop its pursuit of a new, less-vulnerable, land-based missile and would no longer try to fix the problem of ICBM basing. Come the late 1980s and 1990s, the United States would maintain a strategic dyad composed of Trident I SLBMs—not the Trident II, which would be dropped—and a force of 3,000 ALCMs on specially designed cruise missile carriers. In the interim, B-52s would serve as carriers. Options Two through Four kept a Trident I and cruise missile carrier dyad, but added some form of MX ICBM. For basing, Option Two looked to a combination of MPS and regular Minuteman silo deployment, Option Three used road-mobile launchers, and Option Four suggested a hybrid of limited airmobile basing and existing silos. The final option, Option Five, increased the number of cruise missiles to 5,000, built fewer numbers of Trident-carrying

7. House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Research and Development, Part 3, Book 2, April 2, 1979, 2492–95, 2498, 2501. The DSARC II-B presentation was given in declassified form to the House Armed Services Committee, R&D Subcommittee and many of the slides from that presentation can be found on 2377–2487. See also SAMSO History, 301, and Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Research and Development, Part 6, April 11, 1979, 3514, 3523, 3531–32, 3551–52. For the earlier warnings about trade-off between price and verifiability, see Fiscal Year 1979 Supplemental Military Authorization, March 19, 1979, 158–61. For co-location concerns, see Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Research and Development, Part 6, April 11, 1979, 3531–32.

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submarines, and inside housed a common Trident II/MX missile. The administration argued that the missile’s longer range meant that one could live with fewer numbers of them. The fifth option deployed a common missile in Minuteman silos as well.8 By the middle of May, these five options had been compressed down to two, but the only aspect that was completely removed from consideration was a road-mobile variant of the MX.9 The two triad modernization programs that were eventually reviewed at the full NSC marathon meeting on June 4–5 were constructed in a mix-and-match style from selected parts of Options One, Two, Four, and Five (See Table 3). The gambit in all of this was clear—the administration was looking to forgo separate MX and Trident II missiles. In one of the two final modernization options, the administration could fix the silo vulnerability problem with a noncommon MX missile, but it would at the same time execute a brand-new, non-MAP-vertical basing scheme, slow down submarine construction, and give up the extra hard-target capability of the Trident II. Alternatively, the United States could choose a common missile in order to get new hard-target capability. With this option there would be more rapid SSBN construction, but the search for invulnerable land basing would have to end. Perry explained that since the first option contained the MX missile in a new land-based mode, it allowed for “independence of survivability” for each part of the nuclear triad. The second, however, had greater capabilities in terms of hard-target kill and “survivable megatonnage,” but Perry admitted that the absence of that new land-based deployment meant the program leaned more heavily on sea- and air-based components.10

The Modernization of NATO LRTNF from January to June 1979 In late 1978, since PRM-38 had centered the administration’s theater nuclear weapons policy around the NATO HLG’s Los Alamos consensus, Brzezinski made a quick trip to London, Paris, and Bonn in the first week of October, apparently without the State Department’s knowledge, to discuss the possibility of a four-power summit on LRTNF, SALT II, and SALT III. As

8. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Part 3, May 15, 1979, 1406–7; Edwards, Superweapon, 186. 9. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Part 3, May 15, 1979, 1410–11. 10. Ibid., 1431, 1441.

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explained earlier, the idea for this summit was not a new one. In November 1977, West Germany’s démarche had suggested something akin to it. In January 1978, Brzezinski had asked his staff to outline the political consequences of meetings with “smaller groupings in NATO for the purposes of consultations” rather than with the alliance as a whole.11 Brzezinski, according to British Prime Minister James Callaghan, pitched the four-power meeting during his October visit because the White House was worried about the state of U.S.–West German relations in light of the LRTNF issue and the current play of SALT II. Brzezinski thought it would be helpful if Great Britain and France could be brought in to help the situation.12 All four leaders could converse at the grand strategic level about the goings-on in the HLG and discuss the connection between new LRTNF deployments and the future of SALT. Not only this, but Carter wanted assurances that when he eventually met with Brezhnev to sign SALT II and discuss SALT III, the Soviet Union would not be able to take advantage of any perceived divisions between NATO members regarding European-based theater systems and arms control.13 On December 7, Carter announced at a White House breakfast that at France’s invitation the four powers would meet in early January on the island of Guadeloupe. In Brzezinski’s view, Guadeloupe was a golden opportunity for the United States. Carter would be able to explain his “strategic direction,” demonstrate America’s global leadership, and put to rest any fears that the administration was floundering.14 With the SALT II negotiations nearly finished, and with an eye 11. For the West German 1977 démarche, see NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NSC Weekly Report, #36, November 11, 1977, 3. On January 31, 1978, Brzezinski asked his staff for an evaluation of US-NATO consultations. In the State Department’s input to the analysis, it indicated that “on balance” smaller groups had actually served the alliance fairly well but that there was no reason to change the existing system in any radical way. The NSC staff ’s comments suggested that State’s view was probably right, but that SALT III was going to require the “adapt[ation of] current conditions to changing circumstances.” Memorandum from Gregory Treverton and Robert Hunter to David Aaron, Subject: Consultations with NATO Allies, July 27, 1978, 1–2, NSA Agency File, Box 11–21, Folder NATO 6–9/78, JCL. 12. On Brzezinski’s October visit to Great Britain, see Callaghan, Time and Change, 541. 13. Ibid., 543. 14. Carter, Public Papers 1978, vol. 2, 2180; Washington Post, December 8, 1978, A17. The Post indicated that France had organized the four-power summit, but again, the idea does not appear to have originated with Paris. At the end of December, Brzezinski explained to Carter that “one of the major concerns of the other leaders present at Guadeloupe will be to obtain from you a sense of your strategic direction. In part, this is due to some anxiety that this Administration does not have any overall scheme, and that the United States is no longer prepared to use its power to protect its interests or to impose its will on the flow of history,” in NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NSC Weekly Report, \#83, December 28, 1978, 1, DDRS, CK3100092647. The tone, and even the some of the language of Brzezinski’s report, is quite similar to that given by NSC staff member Robert Hunter upon his return from the December 1978 North Atlantic Council Ministerial. Indeed, in a passage that Brzezinski him-

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Table 3: Chart Summary of Carter’s Triad Modernization Options — May-June 1979 (13) Triad Option One

Land-Based Components

• 200 MX using a new basing option: trackmobile (not MAP-vertical)

Triad Option Two

• 300 “common” Trident II/MX as replacements for all Minuteman IIIs

• 300 Minuteman IIIs in silos

• Trident C-4 “back fits” on Poseidon Sea-Based Components

• Construct 1.5 Ohioclass every year starting in 1984, deploy them with Trident C-4s

• 3,000 ALCMs in new, hardened cruise missile carrier Air-Based Components

• Interim deployment of ALCMs on B-52 • B-52H serves as penetrating bomber

• Trident C-4 “back fits” on Poseidon • Construct 2 Ohioclass every year starting in 1981, deploy them with common Trident II/MX.

• 5,000 ALCMs in new, hardened cruise missile carrier • Interim deployment of ALCMs on B-52 • Small number of “common” Trident II/MX on air-mobile system • B-52H serves as penetrating bomber

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toward SALT III, it was thought that Guadeloupe could provide a show of allied unity. It was not unnoticed that a clear expression of allied support would also be very useful in the upcoming ratification battle in the Senate. Guadeloupe allowed Carter and his team to canvass opinions about new LRTNF deployments. In their opening discussions, Chancellor Schmidt reiterated points that Bonn had been making in the HLG and during bilateral consultations. He explained that the alliance could not ignore the military and political threat posed by the SS-20. The SALT II protocol restrictions on cruise missiles, if it was extended into SALT III, would impair West Germany’s ability to protect itself. West Germany needed the option of cruise missiles in the future. When it came to new LRTNF deployments, Schmidt repeated that Bonn would accept them if another continental NATO member also did, if the systems were not “two-key,” and if they came hand-in-hand with an arms control proposal that provided him with the domestic political cover he needed. Though it was not unexpected, Schmidt’s hesitancy aggravated Carter, who believed that a much stronger West German commitment was needed to protect his own political flanks and push LRTNF funding through the defense budget process.15 Concerned as they were about new alliance LRTNF, Great Britain and France were even more worried about the implications of SALT III for their own nuclear arsenals. France, in particular, was adamant that the follow-on negotiations could not limit systems it needed for self-defense. For this reason, French President Giscard d’Estaing insisted that no “gray area” systems be included in SALT III. Later, in a statement made after Guadeloupe, the French self highlighted on the memo, Hunter writes, “. . . there seems to be a deeper questioning about the extent to which we are prepared to play an active role in the world. I suspect that gaining a clearer understanding of our intentions on this point will be a central concern for both Schmidt and Giscard at Guadeloupe, and as a general question may be more important than specific issues like TNF, EMS, etc. Are we prepared to lead and, if so, where[,] seemed to be the questions in the air in Brussels . . .” Memorandum from Robert Hunter to Brzezinski, Subject: North Atlantic Council, December 12, 1979, 2, NSA Agency File, Box 11–21, Folder NATO 10/78–2/79, JCL. 15. Callaghan, Time and Change, 548; Morgan, Callaghan, 617–18; Thomson, “The LRTNF Decision,” 607. On West Germany’s hesitancy on “two-key” systems, see Memorandum from David Aaron to President Carter, Subject: Consultations on Gray Area Issues, October 26, 1978, 2, in addition to Brzezinski’s mention of the consistent West German position that it not be a “user-nation” in Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Correspondence with Chancellor Schmidt on TNF, May 31, 1979, 1–2, DDRS, CK3100473881. Daalder explains that Schmidt, frustrated with Carter and worried about being pressured in the area of new TNF deployments, brought a Dutch-crafted arms control scheme with him to Guadeloupe. See Daalder, Nature and Practice, 182, 185. Interestingly, others suggest that it was not Schmidt, but French President Giscard d’Estaing who came up with the two-track concept. See the citation of President Giscard’s memoirs in Leopoldo Nuti, “Italy and the Battle of the Euromissiles: The Deployment of the US BGM-109 G ‘Gryphon,’ 1979–83,” 337, 356n18.

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government made it clear that it would not let future arms control negotiations interfere with Paris’ freedom of action with respect to its own arsenal.16 Great Britain, skeptical about the role of arms control for theater nuclear systems yet mindful of West Germany’s fear that France not be the only Western European nuclear power, agreed that it would support the United States in SALT III, but only if it had a direct, participatory role in the negotiations. This added requirement was a fundamental British interest. Since the upgrading or replacement of Polaris was under review within Callaghan’s government, Guadeloupe was important because it gave Callaghan a chance to discuss with Carter the problems associated with British nuclear modernization. Callaghan arrived at the summit with divisions in his own cabinet and inside his party over how (and even whether) to improve Britain’s sea-based nuclear force. One of his main tasks was to sound out U.S. assistance in the matter. To this end, Callaghan and Carter took their famous “walk on the beach” on January 5, during which they decided that the two countries would begin “exploratory talks” about Britain’s purchase of the Trident C-4 SLBM.17 The summit concluded with the participants having decided on some negotiating “principles” but no firm position about new LRTNF deployments or a precise outline of how SALT III would operate. Carter told his colleagues that the next time he talked with Brezhnev he would explain that the United States wanted the SS-20 on the table in the next round of negotiations. He assured them that discussions of U.S. and NATO forward-based systems would be “exploratory” only, and in light of British and French concerns, “European-owned” systems would not be open for debate. In addition, according to Callaghan’s recollections of what he told the House of Commons upon his return, it had been agreed that Great Britain would participate directly in SALT III.18 The expectation following Guadeloupe—again, based in large part on West Germany’s domestic political landscape—was that future LRTNF modernization and arms control would occur together and that SALT III would start sooner 16. Callaghan, Time and Change, 549. For France’s statement after the summit, see Associated Press, January 10, 1979. 17. Callaghan, Time and Change, 552–58; Morgan, Callaghan, 619–20. 18. Callgahan, Time and Change, 551. The administration was able to use Guadeloupe as a grandstrategic tool of its own regarding the LRTNF issue. Olav Njolstad and others have detailed how in the months after the summit, the threat of being excluded from future “Guadeloupes” so troubled the Italian government that it softened to LRTNF deployment on Italian territory. On the issue of Italy and Guadeloupe, see Njolstad, “The Carter Administration and Italy: Keeping the Communists out of Power without Interfering,” 89–90, and Nuti, “Italy and the Battle of the Euromissiles,” 337, 343–46. Also see Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, 229–30.

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rather than later. The latter point turned out to be a very short-lived one. It became obvious that while LRTNF deployments had to go forward, Carter and his team would have little time for SALT III if most of its energy in 1979 would be devoted to the ratification fight for SALT II.19 Moreover, since the principles for SALT III were an integrated part of the SALT II agreement, the administration actually had no foundation upon which to begin the follow-on negotiations prior to the treaty’s ratification. And more and more, it appeared that the ratification battle was not going to be a short or easy one. This was the message delivered by David Aaron on his post-Guadeloupe trips to Europe. As the NATO HLG continued to meet during the spring of 1979, Aaron “previewed” the United States’ LRTNF and SALT positions to European leaders, ensuring that everyone was kept informed and unsurprised.20 During these visits in January and March 1979, Aaron was reminded by West Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands that domestic, defense-left political pressure and the general fear that new LRTNF deployments jeopardized the future of détente meant that the United States could not simply brush aside the arms control aspect to LRTNF.21 Carter’s postponement of SALT III in light of the upcoming SALT II ratification battle had aggravated West Germany and the Low Countries so much that they advocated during February and March for the establishment of a “special forum” within NATO to deal specifically with TNF arms control. On April 6, the North Atlantic Council responded with the NATO Special Group on Arms Control and Related Matters.22 The Special Group was initially chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Leslie Gelb and was tasked with the crafting of “objectives and principles” for a TNF component in SALT III. For the rest of 1979, and well into the 1980s, the Special Group served as a clearinghouse, a “sounding board,” and a debating society for different U.S. and Western European TNF arms control guidelines, options, and packages.23 Less than three weeks later, on April 24–25, the NATO NPG met at Homestead Air Force Base in Florida. There, it reviewed the HLG’s final LRTNF system recommendations. Since the previous October, the HLG had evaluated the

19. Callaghan, Time and Change, 551–52. 20. Thomson, “The NATO Decision,” 608. 21. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, 229–30. 22. Daalder says that Schmidt “pressed Aaron” for the forum; however, Bluth insists that the Special Group was “a result” of Guadeloupe itself. Daalder, Nature and Practice, 186–87; Bluth, Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy, 235. 23. Thomson, “The NATO Decision,” 609; Daalder, Nature and Practice, 198–99.

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different LRTNF types, numbers and deployment areas. In that time, it had quickly focused its attention on Pershing II and GLCM, but it was not until its meeting in Colorado Springs in February 1979 that the two systems were passed ahead for NPG approval. Held in an atmosphere that was super-charged by preemptive SALT II maneuvering by the administration and its critics, the NATO NPG gave its imprimatur to the HLG’s weapon choices. At the same time, its approval was not to be taken as an official NATO decision for deployment. The NPG joint communiqué explained that while the alliance surely needed new LRTNF, no alliance-wide decision for deployment had yet been made. For that to occur there would have to be more movement in the arms control arena (and on that note, the communiqué endorsed the work of the newly formed Special Group). At the NPG at Homestead, Brown reiterated to reporters that LRTNF modernization was necessary, but an official alliance declaration was not likely to happen until the end of the year.24 Brown and Vance prepared their TNF “action plan” in the wake of the North Atlantic Council and Homestead AFB NPG meetings and the memorandum was drafted in the days immediately following the NPG. Summarizing the HLG and NPG’s most recent recommendations, it outlined a LRTNF “road map” for the rest of the year. Vance and Brown explained to Carter what the NPG had just approved. There would be a total deployment of between 200 to 600 added warheads on the Pershing IIs, GLCMs, or a mix of both. Other systems, particularly sea-based options, were still not beyond the realm of the possible should the alliance not achieve consensus, but, they explained, Pershing IIs and GLCMs lessened the risk to U.S-European relations and to the United States’ (and the administration’s) international reputation.25 They attached two working draft documents to the memo: a “decision/consultation track” and an

24. Daalder, Nature and Practice, 193–94. In reaction to what was going on in Florida, Alexander Haig commented that the alliance should not limit itself to two types of LRTNF, but should possess an arsenal made up of multiple and varied systems. Washington Post, April 26, 1979, A19. The NPG communiqué’s language was vague—intentionally so, as Brown had suggested to Carter back in April 1978. It stated that (a) the NPG was “continuing its consideration” of LRTNF; (b) there had not yet been any firm decisions; and (c) “consideration of modernization” had to take “full account” of arms control. With the last in mind, the communiqué “noted with approval” the creation of the Special Group. The April 1979 NPG communiqué can be found at NATO’s Web site, accessed April 30, 2004, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c790424a.htm. For Brown’s suggestion of keeping NPG communiqués “low-key” and “nonspecific,” see Memorandum from Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: NATO Nuclear Planning Group, April 9, 1978, 3. 25. Memorandum from Cyrus Vance and Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: TNF Modernization—U.S. Diplomacy, Your Role and the Schmidt Visit, May 9, 1979, 1, 3–4. Brzezinski Donated Material/Alpha Channel, Box 20, Alpha Channel (Misc.), 5/79–8/79, JCL.

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“illustrative deployment program.” The first suggested the ways in which, come December, NATO’s official announcement could be framed to signal the maximum amount of alliance unity. Among other things, it outlined how the addition of new LRTNF warheads would be accompanied by the removal of warheads currently housed on short-range weapons, perhaps as part of MBFR. It also provided a list of NSC, HLG, and Special Group activities that had to be accomplished before December, including a September deadline for the Special Group’s SALT III TNF arms control component.26 The “illustrative deployment program,” which is still a heavily redacted document, particularly in its reference to names of specific countries, addressed how the United States had to explain to its allies the costs, manpower requirements, and security of deploying new LRTNF. Using the HLG’s and, after Homestead, the NPG’s recommendations, Vance and Brown explained that an “illustrative” full deployment could consist of 108 Pershing II launchers and 112 GLCM launchers. In this scenario, the alliance would field a grand total of 200 Pershing IIs and 448 GLCMs. Though the aggregate of these totals was slightly above the NPG’s upper warhead limit (648 rather than 600), the two advisers argued that this could be easily addressed by retiring some of the United Kingdom’s Vulcan aircraft.27 To Vance and Brown, the single most important issue at hand for Carter, more than just his authorization of these two working documents—indeed, as Brzezinski put it in his cover note, the very reason that the two of them were writing in the first place—was the belief that strong and clear presidential leadership of the alliance was needed from that point forward. Brown, who had told reporters at the NPG in Florida just days before that the Soviet Union’s propaganda machine would soon be aimed at LRTNF, wanted Carter to understand that European allies were likely to buckle in the absence of firm American leadership. Granted, Carter would have to approve the “action plan” in order to task the NSC to start the next run of internal studies that would serve as the basis for the United States’ position in the HLG and Special Group through the remainder of the year, but in the end, this was of secondary importance. Carter’s signature on the “action plan” signified his understanding of just how seriously the “neutron bomb” affair had hurt his standing in Europe and how, when it came to new LRTNF deployments, there could be no repeat. On May 26. “TNF Decision/Deployment Track”, 1–3, attached to previously referenced Vance/Brown to Carter, May 9, 1979. 27. “Illustrative Deployment Program,” 1–2, attached to previously referenced Vance/Brown to Carter, May 9, 1979. On warhead numbers and Vulcan aircraft removal, see 2.

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17, Carter initialed Brzezinski’s cover memo, authorizing the “action plan,” additional NSC studies, and the drafting of an initial letter to Schmidt that explained the plan in detail.28

Possible Theoretical Explanations for Carter’s Conversion What brought the administration to conclude in the spring of 1979 that strategic and theater nuclear modernization could wait no longer? Had there been an abrupt change in the international military environment or a sudden shift in Soviet military capabilities from late 1978 to early 1979 that pushed the White House to engage in what some theorists refer to as “internal balancing?” It is hard to make the case that the military-operational environment was any worse in this period. There had been no changes to the trajectory of Soviet strategic modernization. Throughout late 1978 and 1979, Moscow added to its number of SS-18 Mod 3s, continued its flight tests of the SS-18 Mod 4 in anticipation of its eventual deployment in September 1979—including tests in December that once again used telemetry encryption—and kept up tests of its new, improved-guidance SS-19 Mod 3. Though it is unclear whether it fell earlier or later in the year, the Soviet Union added another Delta 3 submarine to its arsenal sometime in 1979, bringing its total to nine (which included 16 SLBMs on every submarine, each carrying one, three, or seven RVs). Meanwhile, the United States had no new deployments of ICBMs or bombers. The first back-fit of Trident C-4 SLBMs into Poseidon was not scheduled to occur until October 1979, and the initial operating capacity of the Ohio-class SSBN remained 1981.29

28. See previously referenced Vance/Brown to Carter, 3. In his cover memo, Brzezinski explained to President Carter that he had to take the helm on LRTNF in the alliance and that “[b]ecause they are uncertain that you are willing to take that lead, Cy and Harold are seeking your guidance [hence, their memo].” Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Vance/Brown Memo on TNF, May 17, 1979, 2, Brzezinski Donated Material/Alpha Channel, Box 20, Alpha Channel (Misc.), 5/79– 8/79, JCL. Carter’s check mark and initial can be found on page 3 of the previously referenced Brzezinski to Carter, May 17, 1979. The following day, Brzezinski wrote Vance and Brown to tell them that the president had approved the action plan. The draft letter for Schmidt was ready by May 31, 1979. Memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance and Brown, Subject TNF Modernization, May 18, 1979, 1, Brzezinski Donated Material/Alpha Channel, Box 20, Alpha Channel (Misc.), 5/79–8/79, JCL; Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Correspondence with Chancellor Schmidt on TNF, May 31, 1979, 1–2. 29. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 217–23; Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, 449–50; see relevant charts at National Resources Defense Council, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/ datainx.asp (accessed February 16, 2008). On the December 1978 tests, see Talbott, Endgame, 238–45.

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Though Soviet strategic modernization tracked along the same path, one might be able to reasonably claim a net gain in Moscow’s geopolitical influence between late 1978 and June 1979. Consider the following: * After the Great Saur Revolution in April 1978, Soviet military and intelligence advisers began to pour into Afghanistan in the second half of that year. The new regime’s ties to the Soviet Union, its collectivizing activities in rural areas, and its simultaneous clamp-down on Islamists provoked the rise of mujahideen. In December, Moscow and Kabul signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. On February 14, 1979, Adolph Dubs, the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, was kidnapped and, under still-mysterious circumstances, killed during the rescue attempt. In response, the CIA was immediately tasked with examining covert operations in Afghanistan, and options for covert support to the mujahideen were provided to the NSC SCC as early as March 5.30 * The domestic situation inside Iran, already tense during the summer months of 1978, quickly deteriorated in November and December to the point that in December Brzezinski briefed Carter on the insertion of U.S. military forces into Iran’s southern areas to protect the Persian Gulf—this after Brezhnev had already warned Carter against American intervention. In early January, the United States sent a military team to Tehran to try to convince Iran’s military to accept the newly established Bakhtiar government and at the same time moved a squadron of F-15s to Saudi Arabia. By the end of February, the Shah had fled the country, the Ayatollah Khomeini had returned from exile, the American embassy had been temporary taken by “Marxist guerrillas” (but quickly returned), and American signals intelligence and electronic intelligence stations had been shut down.31 * In the same week in February 1979 in which Ambassador Dubs was killed in Afghanistan and the U.S. embassy in Tehran was overrun by guerrillas, China invaded Vietnam. The previous November, Vietnam and the Soviet Union had 30. Appendix II in Rosanne Klass, ed., Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited, 369–91, especially 384–88. For information from a knowledgeable (now-deceased) KGB defector on KGB activity and the involvement of the Soviet government immediately prior to the December 1979 invasion, see Vasili Mitrokhin’s paper for the Cold War International History Project, The KGB in Afghanistan. Mitrokhin talks about the Dubs incident on pages 156–58. Mitrokhin’s paper previewed his chapters on Afghanistan in the second volume of Mitrokhin’s work on the KGB with British intelligence historian Christopher Andrew, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World. For information on CIA and NSC covert action planning on Afghanistan in the spring of 1979, see former CIA director Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War, 131–32, 143–45. 31. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 361–93; Carter, Keeping Faith, 438–52. On the loss of signals intelligence, see Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, 442–43.

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signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, so the administration was very worried about how Moscow might come to Hanoi’s aid (for example, providing military equipment or threatening conflict along the Sino-Soviet border). The NSC was concerned lest the Soviet Union use the Sino-Vietnamese war as a pretext for building up its naval presence at Cam Rahn Bay—a move that would improve Soviet power projection into the Indian Ocean and bolster its ability to strike at Japan’s oil imports.32 * At the end of that same February, the pro-Soviet People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) invaded the pro-Saudi, pro-U.S. Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). Newspaper accounts at the time put as many as 1,000 Soviet advisers and 800 Cuban advisers in South Yemen. In addition to the obvious pressure that this put on Saudi oil fields, many in the administration believed that this was yet another Soviet move—like Moscow’s military support to Ethiopia—to threaten oil transit into the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and, should Central Front war ever occur, to NATO itself. Within two weeks the Arab League had brokered a cease-fire between the two states, but the White House nonetheless ordered the movement of Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft to Saudi Arabia and the USS Constellation into the Arabian Sea. In late March, the CIA was able to confirm the withdrawal of South Yemen’s forces with a special SR-71 GIANT REACH surveillance mission, but the same mission also confirmed the movement of additional Soviet arms to Ethiopia. After the cease-fire, the NSC began to consider options for “creating dissension” in South Yemen, as well as U.S. security assistance (overt and clandestine) to North Yemen and Oman.33 * Closer to the United States, Maurice Bishop’s New Jewel Movement overthrew the government of the island nation of Grenada in a revolution on March 13. Whether or not Bishop’s (and New Jewel’s) ties with Fidel Castro were provoked by the heavy-handedness of Grenada’s former Prime Minister Eric Gairy, 32. NSC Special Coordination Committee (SCC) Minutes, February 18, 1979, 5, DDRS, CK3100095005; NSC Memorandum from Odom, Gates, Ermarth et al. to Brzezinski, Subject: Contingency Planning for Soviet Military Presence in Indochina, February 23, 1979, 2, DDRS, CK3100162385. 33. Washington Post, February 27, 1979, A9, and March 9, 1979, A22. For more information on the Yemeni conflict and the use of the SR-71 for GIANT REACH, see Strategic Air Command, History of SAC Reconniassance Operations: 1978, 1979, and 1980, June 1982, 143–49, 154. The pages are redacted and pages 150 through 153 were not released. The document can be downloaded from the National Security Archive, Document 45 of Jeffrey Richelson’s The U-2, OXCART and the SR-71: U.S. Aerial Espionage in the Cold War and Beyond, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB74 (accessed February 16, 2008). For CIA and NSC covert action planning on Yemen, see Gates, From the Shadows, 149–50.

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the Cuban connection was enough to unnerve the administration, particularly given Cuba’s continued military involvement in Africa and in the Yemeni conflict. According to Robert Gates, the CIA detected the movement of Cuban military advisers and equipment to the island no more than a month after the revolution. On July 3, at the same time he signed covert action findings to support Afghan mujahideen and Yemeni dissidents, Carter also approved a finding for covert assistance to political opposition forces on Grenada.34 In less than a year, the Soviet Union and states either perceived or known to be Soviet proxies had made, or were in a better position to make, major inroads into areas of high geopolitical value—the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea/Suez Canal, the area between the Indian Ocean and the East Asian coastline, and along a Caribbean outlet for Panama Canal traffic. Did the cumulative effect of such events in a short period of time equal a shift in power capabilities that in Waltzian fashion automatically led the United States to engage in “internal balancing” as exemplified, in part, by the strategic and theater nuclear modernization decisions? It is hard to know whether these external events should be construed as structural change. Moreover, as has been argued throughout this book, it is always difficult methodologically to tie policy choice directly to environmental or structural change. If one agrees that taken cumulatively, these geopolitical events and Soviet military trends were a net gain for Soviet power capabilities, then environment-to-policy realist logic works as an explanation for Carter’s more “hawkish” decisions like the MX and LRTNF. Pure and simple, the administration reacted to a growth in Soviet power. The problem, however, is that international changes—political and military—have to be assessed and evaluated by a statesman and his team, and as previous chapters have shown, the early years of the administration provide examples wherein the actual growth of Soviet military capabilities resulted in a policy softening rather than a hardening. A rapid change in military capabilities does not always result in a dramatic policy swing. What about a domestic politics interpretation? Given the administration’s earlier delays and taking into consideration the SALT II and defense budget contexts in the spring of 1979, there is a strong prima facie case for a domestic politics explanation for the administration’s decisions. Take, for example, the timing of the White House’s MX announcement. On May 9, the United States and the Soviet Union announced that the two sides had settled all of their out34. Gates, From the Shadows, 143. Also see Washington Post, March 14, 1979, A20, and March 24, 1979, A18.

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standing SALT II issues and that Carter and Brezhnev would sign the agreement at an upcoming summit in Vienna. The June 8 announcement came a mere week before the two leaders were scheduled to sign the treaty in Vienna. This has led many to conclude that the White House settled the MX issue in order to win over Senate defense-right critics in anticipation of the upcoming fight over ratification. Moreover, the announcement also fell right in the middle of the debate in Congress over the administration’s FY1979 defense supplemental. The Senate had already approved the supplemental (and the MX money in it) on May 3, but when it was delivered to the House at the end of the month, the House immediately called for a conference to reconcile the differences. Before the conference began, the MX announcement addressed the White House’s position on what was probably the defense supplemental’s most contentious program. It is difficult to know the extent to which executive-legislative bargaining affected the administration’s decision-making. The accusation that Carter was trying to purchase the treaty’s ratification with new defense programs began to fly as soon as hints leaked about the FY1980 increase and the FY1979 supplemental. When the budget packages were released in January and February 1979, Carter’s defense-left critics made the charge with even greater vehemence. Senators George McGovern, Ted Kennedy, Mark Hatfield, and William Proxmire each warned the administration that they, and those in the Senate who followed them, would not sit still and allow an exchange of greater defense spending and additional strategic nuclear forces for ratification of SALT II. They argued that SALT II would be poor arms control if ratifying it meant accepting newer, and, in their view, more lethal, arsenals. And those in the fight against SALT II were just as terrified about a possible quid pro quo. The participants in the Abington Group were apprehensive in late 1978 and throughout 1979 that Carter might use the defense budget and new nuclear hardware to woo his defense-right opponents in the Senate, particularly Jackson and Nunn.35

35. For Kennedy, see Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 29, 1979, 15. For the other three, see their joint letter to President Carter dated March 2, 1979, Office of the Congressional Liaison, Box 229, Folder: SALT II Congressional Correspondence 10/17/78–10/9/79, JCL. For an example of the apprehension about a quid pro quo felt by opponents of SALT II, in December 1978 Fred Ikle reported to the Abington Group that the GOP was very worried about any condominium between Carter and Senator Jackson. See Abington Notes, December 18, 1978, 1, Box 370, Folder “Notes,” CPD Papers. This fear did not dissipate. The following June, Jackson attended an Abington Group meeting during which Richard Allen asked him point-blank whether the administration could offer a defense package that would get him to ratify SALT II. Jackson replied that there was “absolutely no way.” Abington Notes, June 27, 1979, 3, Box 370, Folder “Notes,” CPD Papers.

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It is undeniable that Carter and his team had SALT II ratification in their sights when they decided to press ahead on the new ICBM and LRTNF. Writing in preparation for Carter’s midterm defense review in September 1978, Victor Utgoff told Deputy Defense Secretary Charles Duncan that if the administration wanted to secure ratification, it had to make sure that it did not allow the situation with strategic nuclear forces, particularly ICBMs, to remain “unremedied.” The White House’s Congressional Liaison staff made a similar point, arguing three months later that SALT skeptics in the Senate would be more likely to “reward” the administration for specific weapons programs—especially strategic systems—than for increases in the total level of defense spending.36 The argument that the administration pressed for new LRTNF deployments in order to win SALT II ratification is admittedly a strong one as well. Many analysts and historians alike have highlighted the connection between LRTNF modernization and the White House’s desire to secure European support for SALT II. As early as January 1978, Brzezinski suggested to Carter that allied agreement was vital when it came to essential NATO TNF adjustments and future arms control parameters in order that “[the U.S. and Western Europe] can go into SALT ratification and SALT III in harmony.” Brzezinski claims that he had doubts about the military-operational need for new theater nuclear systems, but insists that he came around to the idea to get the Europeans behind SALT II. Jim Thomson, one of the NSC staff members who was closely involved in the LRTNF issue, and who evidently had a personal impact on how Brzezinski thought about the political aspects of LRTNF, insists that it is “naive” to think that the administration’s adoption of the HLG’s Los Alamos consensus is attributable first and foremost to PRM-38. Instead, he has argued that the administration saw new LRTNF deployments as an effective way of stemming the influence of West Germany’s “private criticism” of SALT II on Capitol Hill.37 36. Draft NSC Memorandum to Charles Duncan, undated, attached to Memorandum from Victor Utgoff to David Aaron, Subject: Defense Planning and SALT, September 5, 1978, 1, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 36, Folder: Serial X, 9/78–12/78, JCL. Utgoff wrote the memo for Aaron to send to Duncan. The draft was not used in the end, but it nonetheless reflects NSC opinion. See also Memorandum from Bob Beckel to Frank Moore, Subject: Defense Spending and SALT, December 8, 1978, 1–2, Office of the Congressional Liaison, Box 225, Folder: SALT II Correspondence File 4/19/78–3/5/79, JCL. 37. Daalder, Nature and Practice, 181. For more on discussions about European support for SALT II ratification at Guadeloupe, see Morgan, Callaghan, 618, and Callaghan, Time and Change, 547. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Meeting of the SCC on Allied Consultations and SALT, January 23, 1978, 1. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 307–8. Also see the relevant LRTNF portion of Brzezinski’s 1982 article reprinted in Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control, 33. Thomson, “The NATO Decision,” 607. For mention of Thomson and Aaron as major influences on Brzezinski, see Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 307–8.

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It is vital to note the connection between new LRTNF deployments, European support for SALT II, and the administration’s use of that support as a tool for the ratification fight. To their detractors in Western Europe, Carter and his team argued that SALT II would not mortgage anyone’s safety. They insisted that the protocol limits were only temporary and that the United States had agreed it would support new LRTNF. The current agreement also included the introductory guidelines for SALT III, which the allies had insisted was a critical part of any new LRTNF deployment. Indeed, from the administration’s perspective, the folding of SALT III principles into the SALT II agreement had been a master stroke. If Western European countries wanted new LRTNF but, for domestic reasons, were demanding arms control in parallel, then the White House had made sure that SALT II ratification was the only available path to any future negotiations. The administration was then able to turn around and use this very fact to pressure Senate hawks. Turning to its Senate critics, the White House argued that since European allies required arms control in tandem with new LRTNF deployments, ratification was necessary in order for them to obtain SALT III. A vote against SALT II ratification, therefore, became a vote against new LRTNF and could be declared to be a vote against the alliance as a whole. NATO, therefore, became the “hammer” with which to strike at the Senate. Furthermore, using what the Office of the Vice President would later refer to as the “Sam Nunn blackmail,” the administration argued that in the absence of ratification, the United States would be forced to spend more money on additional strategic nuclear forces. Should this occur, less money would therefore be available for NATO LRTNF or, for that matter, conventional improvements.38 That the administration tactically exploited this connection is evidenced by three things: (a) the lengths to which SALT II opponents and skeptics tried to secure overt criticism of the agreement from defense-right European opposition figures, particularly those connected to the British conservative camp; (b) the administration’s push following the NPG meeting at Homestead Air Force Base to convince Helmut Schmidt to come out publicly in support of SALT II; and (c) the explicit highlighting of the connection between SALT II and European security by Brown and Vance in front of NATO’s Defense Planning Committee and the North Atlantic Council. The Abington Group’s minutes from March and April 1979 refer to a meeting between John (or Christopher) 38. On the “Sam Nunn Blackmail,” see Office of the Vice President, Memorandum from Bill Smith to Bob Beckel, Subject: Some Thoughts on SALT Strategy and Tactics, August 2, 1979, 1, Office of Congressional Liaison, Box 320, SALT II Memos 7/30/79–8/1/79, JCL.

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Lehman and Lord Chalfont, a friend of Margaret Thatcher’s, as well as a twohour discussion between Chalfont and Henry Kissinger. A number of the group’s members argued that the Tories were “strong” and that they “could be quite helpful in [the] SALT debate.” Lehman expressed excitement about his talk with Chalfont, stating that it was “highly successful” and that Chalfont needed to be added to the Committee on the Present Danger’s mailing list. Chalfont later told Kissinger that a “conservative [British] gov[ernment] would be critical [of the agreement]” but that it was unlikely to oppose it outright.39 The administration, on the other hand, saw Helmut Schmidt as the key figure in its plan to tie Western European security to SALT II ratification. One of the first points in the Brown/Vance TNF “action plan” was the immediate drafting of a letter to Schmidt. The letter, within which Carter detailed the United States’ LRTNF approach for the rest of 1979, was to be delivered before Schmidt’s visit to the United States in early June, right before the signing of SALT II in Vienna. When Brzezinski sent the draft of this letter to Carter on May 31, he explained that it would make Schmidt’s support of SALT II “all the easier” because it showed that the administration understood West German concerns about the need to have LRTNF deployed on one other continental power’s territory as well as the protection of Bonn’s cruise missile options. These assurances worked. When Schmidt came to the United States on June 6, he lent the agreement his government’s restrained (although clear) approval.40 Finally, while Carter’s letter to Schmidt was being drafted, Vance and Brown also reinforced the connection between Europe and SALT II ratification in front of multiple NATO audiences. In mid-May, Brown spoke in front of the NATO Defense Planning Committee, warning that if the Senate refused to ratify SALT II, it would complicate America’s relations with its European allies. NATO defense ministers, by way of that meeting’s final communiqué, approved the SALT II agreement “in principle” since they had not yet had the chance to review the full text. Less than two weeks later, Vance repeated the same warning at the North Atlantic Council, insisting that the consequences of nonratification would be “disastrous” for the United States and the NATO alliance.41 39. On discussion about British conservatives, see Paul Nitze and Seymour Weiss’s comments to Abington Group in Abington Notes, March 28, 1979, 2; and for Lehman’s visit with Lord Chalfont, Abington Notes, April 4, 1979, 1, both in Box 370, Folder: “Notes,” CPD Papers. In October 1979, Lord Chalfont published an article that called on the U.S. Senate to reject the treaty. Lord Chalfont, “SALT II and America’s European Allies,” 559–64. 40. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Correspondence with Chancellor Schmidt on TNF, May 31, 1979, 1–2. Washington Post, June 7, 1979, A2. 41. For a story on the NATO defense minister’s approval, see Washington Post, May 16, 1979, A20. For Brown’s speech to the Defense Planning Committee, see Washington Post, May 17, 1979; A22. Also

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Looking from the administration’s point of view, these actions were not without their merits. Indeed, many hard Senate skeptics—and even some who were less so—made it known from very early on that their support of SALT II depended largely upon whether or not Carter modernized strategic and theater forces. One should, however, be very cautious about equating political calculus and causation. If one is to take the administration’s public statements at face value, the programs in FY1980 budget and the FY1979 supplemental were not part of any “SALT dance” (as Carter himself put it). In a backgrounder that immediately followed the White House’s MX announcement, Brown was asked up-front if Carter had made the decision in order to get the treaty ratified. Brown responded that the decision was not made for that reason, but at the same time admitted that it was likely to aid the ratification process. On the question of whether Carter would have approved the MX absent SALT II, Brown and the Chiefs all later testified that the answer was unquestionably yes. Yet, one also finds strong after-the-fact evidence that supports the executivelegislative bargaining interpretation. Senator Robert Byrd, for instance, told the Washington Post after the MX announcement that SALT II would have failed without the new ICBM, while ABC News reported in the days after that thirty-five senators—enough to have derailed the treaty—would have withheld their “yes” vote if Carter had not authorized the new ICBM. There is a reasonable amount of correlation and ex post facto support for the MX and LRTNF-as-logrolling argument—perhaps even more evidence for the latter than the former—but in each case, these still must be weighed against the administration’s own denials of the same.42

see final NATO Defense Planning Committee communiqué, May 15–16, 1979, www.nato.int/docu/ comm/49–95/c790515a.htm (accessed February 16, 2008). Washington Post, May 31, 1979, A20, and June 1, 1979, A21. 42. ACDA Memorandum for the Record from Thomas Graham, Jr., Subject: Summary of Major Issues Discussed in Meetings between the Director, ACDA, and U.S. Senators on the Subject of SALT, February 6, 1979, 2, Office of Congressional Liaison, Box 230, SALT II Information 12/1/78–9/4/80, JCL. See Carter’s comments on November 30, 1978, in Carter, Public Papers 1978, vol. 2, 2098. MX June 8 Pentagon Briefing, 5–6. Senate Armed Services Committee, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty), Part 1, July 23, 1979, 52. See ibid., 216, for Admiral Hayward’s testimony. Washington Post, June 10, 1979, A11; U.S. News and World Report, June 25, 1979, 21. Brzezinski, Power and Priniciple, 336. While it is true that Brzezinski himself connects the MX to SALT II ratification in his memoirs, upon close reading it is apparent that he does it in a way that does not support the logrolling interpretation per se. Unlike his more explicit tie between LRTNF and SALT II ratification, he does not state that he pushed the MX program to secure SALT II. Instead, he says that the upcoming ratification fight was the reason why he supported, upon the MX program’s approval, the largest ICBM possible (that is, it was a nod to Senator Jackson’s amendment of the FY1979 supplemental, which is discussed in more detail later).

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Did Carter authorize the TNF “action plan” and full scale development of the MX because he was under the influence of lobbying organizations? No defenseleft organizations would have pressured Carter for new nuclear systems, so if there had been lobbying for any new weapons, it would have come from the defense-right. And indeed, many insist that the MX and LRTNF decisions were made not just with SALT II ratification in mind, but also as a result of defenseright pressure group influence on the administration’s policy—particularly the CPD’s effect on Brzezinski and the NSC staff. Skidmore and Sanders, for example, explicitly tie the MX decision to the Committee’s “militarizing” influence on the White House, Sanders adding LRTNF to the mix. David Dunn insists that a Committee-influenced Brzezinski and NSC ran a “Trojan-horse like operation” to convince Carter and Brown of the need for the MX.43 It is true that from 1977 onward the CPD sounded the klaxon on Minuteman vulnerability and was not shy in its advocacy for a new ICBM. And although there was comparatively less discussion about theater nuclear systems in public, it is true that the Committee, on occasion, addressed the importance of the ERW and also the problems that SALT II’s noncircumvention, nontransfer, and cruise missile range restrictions posed for U.S. allies in Europe. The Committee thought it very likely that the administration would fold the SALT II protocol restrictions on GLCMs and SLCMs into SALT III and extend the limits past their three-year date. It decried cruise missile restrictions in the face of Moscow’s freedom to deploy Backfire and the SS-20.44 It should also be noted that in the months immediately preceding the administration’s MX and LRTNF decisions, the Committee’s star was on the rise. The number of the Committee’s contributors ballooned while Carter’s popularity rapidly deflated. Between February and June 1979, the Committee’s contributor total grew from 343 to 764. It was the largest period of contributor expansion during Carter’s entire administration. For the rest of 1979, that total only grew by another 179. At the same time, according to Dan Caldwell,

43. Skidmore, Reversing Course, 146; Sanders, Peddlers, 258–59, 263 (for LRTNF); Dunn, Politics of Threat, 115. 44. Committee on the Present Danger, “Looking for Eggs in a Cuckoo Clock: Observations on SALT II,” January 22, 1979, and “Does the Official Case for the SALT II Treaty Hold Up under Analysis,” March 14, 1979, reprinted in Tyroler, Alerting America, 96, 109–11, respectively. For suggested amendments to SALT II that would remove cruise missile limits and protocol restrictions, see Perle’s suggestions to the Abington Group, November 27, 1978, 2. Regarding an amendment to SALT II that would place zero restrictions on “aircraft armaments” (which included cruise missiles) absent restrictions on the Soviet Union’s air defenses, see correspondence from William Van Cleave to Paul Nitze, December 22, 1978, 2, Box 370, Folder: Working Group, CPD Papers.

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from early January 1979 to early March 1979, Carter’s approval/disapproval numbers dropped from 50/36 to 39/48. Despite a small bump in mid-March (47/39), by the beginning of June the numbers had plummeted to 29/56— among the lowest of Carter’s entire presidency.45 When taken together, the CPD’s long-held positions on the MX and TNF, the growth in the Committee’s rolls in the spring of 1979, and Carter’s flagging approval ratings lend credence to the argument that Carter hardened policy in reaction to intense domestic political pressure, waning polls, and the growing might of the Committee. Such assertions notwithstanding, the Committee actually had little influence—if any at all—on the defense policy paths eventually approved by Carter in the spring of 1979. The content of Carter’s final decisions actually missed the Committee’s policy mark by a wide margin. As one example, given the fact that the administration’s delays of the MX in 1977 and 1978 had pushed the program’s initial operating capacity into the late 1980s and its full operating capacity into the 1990s, the Committee believed by June 1979 that “quick fixes” using Minuteman were much more time-critical than a new ICBM. Such “quick fixes” could be implemented best by killing the SALT II treaty and deploying Minuteman in MAP-vertical basing. MAPvertical was the Committee’s basing mode of choice, but after the “air-mobile interlude” of late 1978 and early 1979, the administration’s attention was focused on basing modes that the Committee believed to be ill-conceived, wholly driven by arms control considerations, and incompatible with Minuteman “quick fixes.” Certainly, the MX was very important to the Committee as a next-generation ICBM and in its role as a formidable tool against Soviet silos and hardened command and control bunkers. Nevertheless, the administration’s past actions meant that the new ICBM was not going to be available in the near term, and regardless of when it finally entered service, the Committee still had its own doubts about the viability of Carter’s post-”air-mobile interlude” road/rail basing scheme. Indeed, it believed that by burying MAP-vertical, the “new” road/rail MX scheme redirected attention from what the United States should have been doing with all possible speed—multiplying the number of aim points by sinking more holes in existing Minuteman fields.46 45. The change in CPD contributor totals was calculated from figures provided in the minutes of its Executive Committee meetings, February 16, 1979, through January 10, 1980, Box 334, Folder: CPD Executive Committee Minutes, CPD Papers. See also Table 4–2, “Carter Approval Ratings and Major Foreign Policy Events,” in Caldwell, Dynamics of Domestic Politics, 89. 46. Committee on the Present Danger 3rd Annual Board Meeting, Sulgrave Club, November 8–9, 1979, Cassette #3 Transcript, 4–5, Box 166, no folder, loose in box, CPD Papers. For earlier discussion of “quick fixes,” see Rostow and Max Kampelman’s mention of the need to create a “quick fix programs

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In the Committee’s eyes, Carter’s defense effort in the spring of 1979 was too little, too late. The FY1979 supplemental, including its money for the MX and LRTNF, was, in Eugene Rostow’s words, a “good idea, but not enough.” Though Western Europe needed TNF modernization, the Committee insisted that the administration’s SLCM and GLCM development was heavily influenced by its plans for SALT III. In closed-door Abington Group discussions, and in a letter written to Brown two months before the June decision, Nitze railed against the air-mobile concept, the administration’s unwillingness to fight the Soviets for MAP-vertical, and what he saw as Brown’s unwarranted optimism when it came to the MX’s deployment schedule and a renewal of SALT II fractionation limits in SALT III. And despite the administration’s insistence that SALT II allowed a total of 820 MIRV MXs, Nitze and the Committee also argued that there was no way for the United States to reach that number within the treaty period. In their analysis of the MX decision, the Abington Group concluded that Carter had allowed arms control to trump “military logic and utility” and drive a deployment scheme that was much more expensive than MAPvertical.47 The Committee certainly desired the deployment of the MX and the modernization of LRTNF, but Carter’s program choices, connected as they were to SALT II and SALT III, looked absolutely nothing like what it would have liked. In the case of the MX, there is one additional domestic political angle that is vital for one’s understanding of the shape of the nuclear triad options in June 1979—the issue of cost. Perry refused to drop the air-mobile concept even after the Air Force dismissed it because of the possible “commonalities” or “crossforce savings” he believed could be achieved through it. Both of the triad

standard to measure [the] administration’s effort [in 1979]” in Abington Notes, CPD Executive Committee Meeting, November 22, 1978, 6. Also see discussion of “quick fixes” and the Strategic Alternatives Team in Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 5, 1979, 11. 47. Abington Notes, CPD Executive Committee Meeting, November 22, 1978, 5. On the Committee’s insistence that the Carter administration’s SLCM and GLCM development was influenced by SALT III plans, see, for example, John (or Christopher) Lehman’s comments about SLCM funding in the FY1979 supplemental and SALT III in Abington Notes, January 16, 1979, 1, Box 370, Folder “Notes,” CPD Papers. William Van Cleave’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee pointed out the relationship between the R&D schedule for cruise missiles and SALT III. Senate Armed Services Committee, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty), Part 3, October 9, 1979, 1232. Letter from Paul Nitze to Harold Brown, April 13, 1979, 3, Box 103, Folder: Nitze-Correspondence, CPD Papers. Transcripts of CPD’s Conference on National Security, Shoream Hotel, November 9, 1978, Cassette #4 Transcript, 1–2, Box 164, no folder, loose in box, CPD Papers. See comments by Seymour Weiss in Abington Notes, June 5, 1979, 1, Box 370, Folder “Notes,” CPD Papers.

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options provided to Carter for the June 4–5 NSC contained hardened cruise missile carriers and C3I aircraft. The second option also left in a limited airmobile deployment of a common Trident/MX missile. The hope was that one plane could be used for all three functions, while the same missile could be based on land, in air, and at sea. The government, Perry insisted, needed to figure out how to do things more efficiently so that it did not build “two different types of missiles or three different types of planes.” This was why, even after it was clear that air-mobile was prohibitively expensive, he insisted that the $75 million not allocated for MX MPS be kept in the FY1979 supplemental. That way, it could be used for the design of a common plane. This was also why Perry was so cross over Jackson’s throw-weight amendment and the defense-right’s push for the larger-diameter missile. He argued that one did not need the largest possible missile to carry the maximum number of RVs allowed under SALT. Instead, the use of multiple types of deployment schemes for a new ICBM would make things difficult for Soviet targeters, and a large missile limited the number of possible basing modes and the “cross-force savings” that were possible through the use of a common missile in air-mobile basing.48

Using the Neoclassical Realist Framework to Understand Carter’s Conversion Traditional realist and innenpolitik theories, therefore, only provide a partial explanation of Carter’s policy conversion. The use of neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework, however, allows one to focus on the ways in which the international power arena was assessed by Carter and his team. As has been described, up through late 1978 and early 1979, the administration’s comprehension of the international environment was deflected as a result of three mediating variables: strategic thought, interallied politics, and arms control. By the middle of Carter’s third full year in office, adjustments to those same variables brought about a radical change in how the administration assessed its situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Take, for example, the changing character of the administration’s strategic thought. Just three weeks after Carter’s approval of the TNF “action plan” and mere days before the White House’s MX announcement, the NSC convened to discuss U.S. strategic nuclear modernization, nuclear targeting, the global 48. Fiscal Year 1979 Supplemental Military Authorization, March 19, 1979, 144. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Research and Development, Part 6, April 11, 1979, 3511–13, 3554–55, 3560.

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military environment, the Defense Department’s Consolidated Guidance, and the FY1981 defense budget—all in the immediate political context of Carter’s upcoming SALT II summit with Brezhnev and the subsequent treaty ratification battle. Brzezinski organized the June 4–5 meetings around a single NSC study—Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978, or CNA-78. CNA-78 was completed under the direction of Fritz Ermarth, who had been hired in September 1978 in part to “periodically updat[e]” the PRM-10 analysis.49 CNA-78 was a much more pessimistic document than its predecessor had been. The study reflected new concerns about current and future Soviet behavior and highlighted the strategic shift within the NSC and Pentagon that had by that time come to be called the “countervailing strategy.” The “countervailing strategy” had made headlines in January 1979 after it was referenced in the FY1980 Defense Department Annual Report, but its genesis is actually dated to mid-1978 and the completion of PD-18 follow-on studies, particularly the working draft of the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review (NTPR).50 PD-18 had necessitated a number of nuclear-oriented follow-up reports: nuclear targeting, ICBM modernization, TNF modernization, nuclear C3I improvement, and an analysis of strategic reserve forces. Some of these, like the TNF study, were finished in the early months of 1978. In the case of the NTPR, it is believed that Brown received the final report in December 1978. It is known that the study’s preliminary conclusions were forwarded to the NSC seven months earlier. Early NTPR draft work was debated within the administration over the course of 1978 and into early 1979. Its initial findings were considered in the midterm defense review in September 1978, integrated into the planning for the FY1980 and FY1981 defense budgets, and used by the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff in its construction of SIOP 5D, which was released in October 1979.51 49. Washington Post, September 7, 1978, A2. 50. Washington Post, February 11, 1979, A1. 51. The initial draft, according to Brzezinski, was sent to the NSC in May 1978. Brown, in a statement to Senator Carl Levin in January 1979, stated that the Sloss Panel work was done, but that it still had to go through White House–level review. NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NSC Weekly Report, #150, August 22, 1980, 2, DDRS, CK3100152570; Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Part 1, January 25, 1979, 101; Walter Slocombe, “The Countervailing Strategy,” 20–21. NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NSC Weekly Report, #150, August 22, 1980, 2. On the introduction of NTPR draft ideas into SIOP 5D, including the placement of a select number of Minuteman IIIs on LUA status, see U.S. Strategic Air Command, “Current U.S. Strategic Targeting Doctrine,” December 3, 1979, 7–8, Document 20, Burr, ed., Launch on Warning, http://www.gwu.edu/ ~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB43 (accessed February 16, 2008).

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The NTPR, directed by Leon Sloss (which is why it is often referred to as the “Sloss Panel”), examined, among other things, the connection and relationship between deterrence, nuclear target selection, and the effects of target destruction. According to those who have written on the NTPR, one of the study’s primary concerns was the danger that the United States had up to then attributed its own values to Soviet leadership as it tried to determine how to go about using nuclear threats to modify Moscow’s behavior (i.e., deterring Soviet advances into Western Europe and the developing world). A more prudent approach, the study argued, was to make a determination of Soviet values through a closer examination of Soviet (and imperial Russian) history and society. Second, the NTPR looked at the implications of technological change for the feasibility of smaller, more flexible and rapidly retargetable nuclear strikes extended out over the course of a conflict, especially innovations like increased computing power, enhanced accuracy, and a move to real-time, digital transmission of satellite imagery intelligence. Taken together, these led the panel to press for new targeting options. For instance, Brzezinski had shown interest from the administration’s first days in office in the direct and overt targeting of the Soviet Union’s population. The NTPR addressed this possibility, including attacks on population “relocation areas” or agricultural stocks. Another of Brzezinski’s interests, and one that would be added to the SIOP, was countercontrol targeting. Erroneously referred to as “ethnic targeting,” the idea behind countercontrol targeting was the belief that the application of small, accurate, and therefore low-collateral-damage strikes against the Soviet state instruments which perpetuated Brezhnev’s and his coterie’s influence over the Soviet republics (like regional KGB headquarters offices, Communist Party facilities, and local militia stations) would, in the event of war, “regionalize” the Soviet Union and undermine Moscow’s power. By aiming at the Kremlin’s most deep-seated fear—the loss of imperial political power—countercontrol targeting was considered a (theoretically) more credible threat for the purposes of deterrence. Finally, with the advent of new technology, the United States could also locate and destroy mobile targets like SS-20 and “second echelon ground forces in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union” using limited nuclear attacks with strategic forces rather than theater forces.52 52. Desmond Ball, “The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983,” 76–77; Colin S. Gray, “Nuclear Strategy: the Case for a Theory of Victory,” 54–87, especially 67–69; “Current U.S. Strategic Targeting Doctrine,” 7. William Odom, “The Origins and Design of Presidential Directive 59: A Memoir,” 184–88. This author would like to acknowledge and thank the late General Odom for his permission to cite from an earlier, draft copy of this chapter. Also see Ball, “The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983,” 77–79. The

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In the fall of 1978, the NTPR draft material, PD-18 follow-on nuclear studies, the conventional improvements outlined in NATO’s LTDP, and the Brown– Perry–York–Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency study of high-technology, nonnuclear counterforce alternatives were all brought together to form the core of the “countervailing strategy.” Taking his language directly from the wording of PD-59, the administration’s directive that in part gave flesh to the strategy, Walter Slocombe later explained that the “countervailing strategy” centered on the United States’ improved ability to threaten and wage war so that in “applying its own standards and models, [the Soviet Union] would recognize that no plausible outcome of aggression would represent victory on any plausible definition of victory.”53

concept of computer and real-time intelligence-assisted rapid-retargeting continues to evolve with the present-day ideas of the “living SIOP” and “adaptive planning.” See Hans Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s: A Working Paper,” 5, 12–14. For very early Brzezinski interest in population targeting, see Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: JCS Briefings: NSC Action Implications, undated [but between January 20, 1977, and January 26, 1977], 1 (especially the section entitled “Deterrence and Parity”), Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 2, Jimmy Carter (Sensitive), 1/77–9/78, JCL. Granted, most of this section is redacted, but the declassified portions (1) address “the moral repugnance that such a specific option [unspecified] entails” and that “the other options, even if not so deliberately designed [as the unspecified new option], nonetheless involve staggering population losses.” Four months later, Brzezinski reported to Carter that he had spoken with Brown about changing the SIOP to target Soviet population intentionally. Accordingly, SIOP gaming (using Major Attack Option [MAO] 1) had estimated 33 percent (84.5 million Soviet dead). The movement to direct population targeting, including the shift of SLBM RVs used for NATO and redirection of other RVs, increased that number to 44 percent (114 million killed). NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NSC Weekly Report, #13, May 20, 1977, 2, DDRS, CK3100470163. On “ethnic targeting,” see Herken, Counsels of War, 297. For “regionalization” and attacks on countercontrol targets, see Ball, “The Development of the SIOP,” 76–77, and Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, 123. In conversation with this author, Harold Brown confirmed the targeting of KGB headquarters and militia stations, and he also commented about how (with respect to “regionalization” concepts), Brzezinski was one of the first to have seen the fragile character of the outlying Soviet republics. Harold Brown, telephone interview, January 10, 2004. Odom, “The Origins and Design of PD-59,” 187–88. Odom argues that a “Copernican” revolution had occurred with digital image intelligence and computing power. One did not have to rely upon preplanned targeting. Instead, one could approach flexible targeting in such a way that it was “analogous to that for artillery and tactical air support to maneuver forces on the ground.” See especially page 7. The quote about “second echelon forces” is taken from Odom’s comments in September 2002, at which time he described PD-59’s relevance for European conflict. Odom, commenting on General Tuczapski’s statement re: “Plan Vistula”, at Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security, http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_polgen/nuclear _delusions.cfm (accessed February 16, 2008). 53. Slocombe, “The Countervailing Strategy,” 21. Slocombe took these words straight from PD-59. At present, the first five paragraphs of PD-59 have been declassified. PD-59, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy, July 25, 1980, 1. It is important to note, however, that PD-59 does not equal the countervailing strategy. Brown indicated to this author that PD-59 was only one facet of the construction of the “countervailing strategy.” Harold Brown, telephone interview, January 10, 2004.

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This was the concept that began to drive changes in American defense policy as early as September 1978. Indeed, when Utgoff suggested in the weeks running up to the administration’s midterm defense review that Brzezinski give a speech to outline what the United States was doing to protect and improve its strategic forces—a public relations move, Utgoff remarked, that would prepare the ground for the SALT II ratification battle—Brzezinski turned to Ermarth for draft material and Ermarth, in response, turned to “countervailing” concepts.54 Though in the end Ermarth’s contributions to Brzezinski’s October 1978 speech were watered down to innocuous references to PRM-10 and PD-18, his draft material nonetheless sheds important light on how the NSC and the Pentagon at midterm envisioned the coming strategic transformation. The United States, he wrote, faced “[t]he modernization and augmentation of Soviet strategic forces” as Moscow “continue[d] a vigorous, broad-gauged weapons development program.” Ermarth gave a nod to the consequence of “imminent” silo vulnerability and then moved into a more detailed discussion about recent adjustments to the United States’ understanding of Soviet plans and doctrine. Soviet doctrine was not what the United States had expected—the Soviet Union’s leaders were interested in achieving capabilities “to wage, to survive and in some elusive sense to prevail in a nuclear war should one occur.” This, he said, in a section completely removed by Brzezinski on the draft, led them to build up their hard-target capability, their air and civil defenses, as well as augment “[their] capabilities to target Europe and the Middle East with nuclear weapons from their homeland.” Now the United States had to take a page from the Soviet Union’s playbook. It could no longer afford to distinguish deterrence from the ability to wage war effectively. And since the evidence suggested that Moscow believed nuclear war would not end after the first salvo, Ermarth argued—in another section Brzezinski deleted—that the United States would have to think seriously about such things as protracted conflict, “the role of

54. The ratification issue did not “cause” the changing strategic concept, but the administration saw the political potential of making those strategic changes public. On Utgoff ’s suggestion for a Brzezinski defense policy speech, see Draft Memorandum from David Aaron to Charles Duncan [ghostwritten by Victor Utgoff], Subject: Defense Planning and SALT, undated [probably September 5, 1978, the date of Utgoff ’s cover memo to Aaron], 2. When Brzezinski wrote to Ermarth, he asked for draft language that would give an overview of PRM-10 and PD-18, calm the public’s nerves about the state of U.S. military capabilities, and yet also open up some questions about the future state of deterrence in light of Soviet war-fighting doctrine and the growth of Soviet military power. Memorandum from Brzezinski to Fritz Ermarth, Subject: Weizmann Institute Speech, September 21, 1978, 1–2, WHCFFG, Box FG-28, FG6-1-1/Brzezinski (9/1/78–11/15/78), JCL.

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conventional and naval forces even in a nuclear war,” and improved countersilo capability (which, he added, would enhance America’s “war-fighting strength” cheaply and in a way that would not necessarily disrupt SALT II).55 The eight-month period of September 1978 to May 1979 should be viewed as a time of intense strategic ferment within the administration as the NSC and Pentagon debated the different aspects of the “countervailing strategy.” As already mentioned, Carter was briefed on the NTPR draft material and other “countervailing” concepts, as well as Minuteman vulnerability and the MX, at the midterm defense review in September. For the rest of 1978, the “countervailing strategy” remained in rough copy form, with substantial disagreement about some of the means by which it would be implemented, particularly the need for increased counter-silo capability. For example, Utgoff expressed skepticism in late November over whether the United States needed more “timeurgent hard-target kill” capability, especially in the form of the MX. Should the United States pursue greater amounts of hard-target kill, then he insisted that the Soviet Union would quickly react by shifting to a launch-under-attack posture, which would increase the chances of accidental Soviet launches—this in spite of Ermarth’s points about hard-target kill in his draft of the Weizmann Institute speech.56 In January 1979, Brown gave a short overview of the “countervailing strategy” in his release of the FY1980 Defense Department Annual Report. A small furor erupted the following month when unidentified defense officials told reporters that Brown’s summary had been made with the president’s full approval and, most importantly, that it had represented the administration’s policy. Because the NTPR report and the strategy had not been officially vet-

55. Memorandum from Ermarth to Brzezinski, Subject: 8 October Speech, September 25, 1978, 1, WHCF-FG, Box FG-28, FG6–1-1/Brzezinski (9/1/78–11/15/78), JCL. There are actually two different Ermarth to Brzezinski September 25 cover memos. On the bottom of the first, Ermarth warned Brzezinski’s speechwriting staff that the defense concepts outlined in the speech made it the “wrong [one] for the occasion.” In the second draft of the memo, the bottom note was changed to note that Ermarth was not the only person worried about the speech—”Vic[tor Utgoff], Roger [Molander], Jim T[homson] and Bill O[dom] agree that a sharp ‘questioning’ on strategic doctrine right now is something you should not engage in.” Nearly the whole of Brzezinski’s NSC defense team was against a public airing of the “countervailing strategy” coming so soon after Camp David and the September SALT II meetings with Gromyko. Subsequently, the remarks were pulled. See Ermarth’s draft language, attached to the previously referenced Ermarth to Brzezinski, September 25, 1978, 4, 5. Brzezinski’s editorial marks and editions are clearly seen on the draft language. 56. NSC Memorandum from Victor Utgoff to Brzezinski, Subject: [Colin] Gray’s Article in Foreign Affairs, “The Strategic Forces Triad: End of the Road?” November 27, 1978, 1, Name File: Colin S. Gray, JCL.

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ted by the NSC staff and since Brown’s statement had given the appearance that the administration had settled the MX and hard-target kill issues when, in fact, the “air-mobile interlude” was still underway, the White House quickly insisted that Carter had not yet made any decisions about strategic forces and clarified that although the NSC staff had seen earlier versions of Brown’s preview, the strategy had not yet been given presidential endorsement.57 The official White House review of the “countervailing strategy” did not begin until April 4, a week after the Senate Armed Services Committee approved the MX money in the FY1979 supplemental and days after the Air Force presented its case against air-mobile basing to the DSARC IIB. This was the first of three NSC SCC meetings devoted to nuclear targeting, the NTPR, and the “countervailing strategy.” After the third and last SCC meeting on nuclear targeting was held on April 26, the NSC PRC began its May meetings on the MX that were described earlier (the meetings wherein the assorted triad options were debated).58 According to Utgoff, since the new ICBM and additional counter-silo capabilities were elements of the same puzzle (what instruments should be used to implement the “countervailing strategy”), the MX issue was a major part of the discussions in both sets of NSC committee meetings.59 That same spring, there were two other internal analyses under review: the NSC’s CNA-78 and the Pentagon’s Consolidated Guidance. The drafting of CNA-78 looks to have started in the late summer of 1978. According to a recent history of the origins of CENTCOM, Samuel Huntington completed a first draft in August. Ermarth continued work on CNA-78 in the weeks immediately following the president’s midterm defense review, and by March 1979 a summary of the study had been presented to Carter and draft reports had been forwarded to State and Defense for their respective comments. The updated assessment painted a much different (and dire) picture of the international environment than had its earlier version. It repeated what Brown had told to Carter at the midterm review: the Minuteman vulnerability problem was much more severe than the administration had originally believed. It placed the blame for the current “adverse strategic trends” squarely on the United States 57. Washington Post, February 11, 1979, A1. On the same day, the Post ran a story about the contractor studies that had been used in the NTPR, highlighting the counterleadership and “regionalization” reports in particular. Washington Post, February 11, 1979, A21. 58. For a list of these meetings, see “PD-59 Chronology: Phase I—Work on Targeting Policy,” NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NSC Weekly Report, #150, August 22, 1980, 2. 59. Victor Utgoff, telephone interview, June 30, 2003. The minutes and/or summaries from the nuclear targeting SCCs and the MX PRCs are not yet available to the public.

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and claimed that it was a consequence of the zero- to slow growth in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The new assessment went on to explain that over the past two years, the Soviet Union had demonstrated power projection capabilities superior to those of the United States, reaped the diplomatic benefits (the report called it a “pro-Soviet trend in international diplomacy”) of a comparatively stronger defense posture, made inroads into the Middle East and Persian Gulf; and held out the promise of ostpolitik to play Bonn against Washington (what the assessment called the Soviet “German Card”). Now, the study indicated, it was time for the administration to move to offense. Besides nuclear triad modernization (and especially the MX), the United States needed to boost limited nuclear options, increase and improve its contingency forces, craft a regional security strategy for the Middle East, amplify its use of covert action, and figure out how best to use the U.S. economy and American technology as a coercive instrument.60 The concept of the second internal analytical product under consideration, the Consolidated Guidance, reflected Carter’s long-standing desire for “early presidential participation in the [defense budget] process.”61 Prior to Carter’s presidency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had submitted two sets of recommendations, called Joint Strategic Objectives Plan I and II, at staggered intervals to help the Office of the Secretary of Defense craft—at the beginning of the budget process—Defense Planning Guidance and, later, Planning and Programming Guidance as well as Fiscal Guidance. Beginning in the fall of 1977, 60. Odom, “The Cold War Origins of the U.S. Central Command,” 62–64. The precise origin of CNA-78 is still murky territory. It is possible that Brzezinski and Huntington had planned for the PRM-10 Net Assessment to be an evolving document. Nonetheless, one tentative hypothesis—offered by this author—stems from the initiation of a new PRM on August 15, 1978 (PRM-43). In PRM-43, United States Global Military Presence, the NSC was tasked to direct an interagency analysis of “examining the U.S. military presence abroad from the standpoint of maintaining and enhancing our political and military position vis-à-vis the Soviets and of providing reassurance and confidence to key countries of concern to us.” Ermarth was asked to join the NSC while PRM-43 work was just getting started, and as there is no subsequent directive that followed the PRM, it is possible that some of this work may have been carried into CNA-78. For other information (albeit brief) on PRM-43, see Gates, From the Shadows, 74–76. The full CNA-78 document has not been released. Once declassified, the material can be found in Box 15 of the National Security Adviser Odom File, and in a folder listed “11/78 update” located in Box 34 of the National Security Adviser Staff collection, PRM-10 materials, JCL. The CNA-78 information provided above was “reverse-engineered” from the State Department’s critical evaluation of the new net assessment. U.S. Department of State Memorandum from Peter Tarnoff to Brzezinski, Subject: Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978 (CNA-78), May 1, 1979, 1–5, DDRS, CK3100109544. 61. Unknown author, “Planning, Programming and Budgeting System Improvements,” 1, undated, DOD-FOIA, DFOISR—Unclassified, DOD-FOIA, Carter and Reagan Transition Materials 02-F-1273, CD-ROM provided by DOD to author, file name 8.7.pdf.

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Brown streamlined this system of budget planning. The next year, the process began with a single initial report from the Joint Chiefs to the secretary of defense—the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD). In it, the Chiefs outlined the military’s perspective on threats, objectives, plans, and force posture. With the JSPD, the Office of the Secretary of Defense put together a single integrated or “consolidated” draft planning guidance document that all parties, military and civilian (including the White House), would then use to reach consensus on overarching strategic logic, costs, and potential pitfalls. As in the former system, once a consensus was achieved, an official Consolidated Guidance was released and the military services referred to it as they constructed their respective Program Objective Memoranda.62 The 1979 Consolidated Guidance, which the NSC PRC reviewed on May 14, was even blunter about the international strategic environment than CNA-78 was. CNA-78 had concluded that the United States had to keep “the broad lines” of PD-18 as a strategic yardstick.63 Brzezinski, likely using early draft material from CNA-78, had made the same point to Carter before Guadeloupe. The president’s foreign policy approach (what Brzezinski coined “reciprocal accommodation”) meant that the PD-18 would have to be operationalized “with or without SALT.”64 CNA-78 and the May 1979 Consolidated Guidance agreed that the two PD-18 mainstays—the maintenance of essential equivalence as well as the conventional capabilities that were necessary to halt a Warsaw Pact advance and quickly force it back to status quo ante bellum—were inviolate. However, now there was one serious problem: the Consolidated Guidance showed that it was impossible for the United States to achieve, in the short run, the capabilities that were necessary to fulfill PD-18’s requirements. According to the Consolidated Guidance there were deficiencies across the board, but they were very acute when it came to strategic forces, the ability of NATO to stop a blitzkrieg attack “much less restore prewar boundaries,” and the ability to wage war simultaneously (either NATO/Persian Gulf or NATO/Korea). Things were particularly bad in the nuclear categories. The United States was going to enter “a nadir of relative [strategic nuclear] capability” until the mid1980s (and the situation would only improve at that point with the introduction of ALCMs and the MX). Moreover, the Defense Department argued that 62. Ibid., 2–4, 6. 63. U.S. Department of State Memorandum from Peter Tarnoff to Brzezinski, Subject: Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978 (CNA-78), May 1, 1979, 1. 64. NSC Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: NSC Weekly Report, #83, December 28, 1978, 3–4.

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because of SALT II restrictions, the administration could no longer hold the position that essential equivalence meant the United States had to keep the same ratio of warheads that had existed at the time PD-18 was signed. Brzezinski explained it to the president in terms of international reputation rather than strict capabilities. “No matter what program decisions we make to modernize our strategic forces,” he stated to Carter, “in the early 1980s we are likely to be perceived as having less than essential equivalence with the Soviets”—a situation, he added, that could bring about, in the early 1980s, a “Cuba-in-reverse— from which we may not recover.”65 Things were no better in the area of theater nuclear forces. The Soviet Union continued to add to its short-range theater nuclear capabilities like the SS-21, which was eating into the United States’ advantage in short-range systems. And though the Pentagon was correct in arguing that the introduction of Pershing IIs and GLCMs along the NPG’s lines “may shift [the balance] slightly towards NATO,” Utgoff and Jake Stewart warned that the Defense Department was forgetting that LRTNF deployment might not ever occur (as a result of European domestic politics or in light of an arms control trade for Soviet systems). Moreover, there had been little improvement in the conventional scene in Europe, and the situation on the Korean peninsula had actually deteriorated in light of new intelligence.66 With respect to Western European security and NATO, Brzezinski repeated to the NSC PRC (and also to Carter) what he had said during the NSC PRC’s review of the PRM-10 Force Posture Study in July 1977: when it came to Central Front conflict, the United States had to “declar[e] this strategy [PD-18] before we have the capability to carry it out”—that is, the United States had to bluff.67 How had this state of affairs come about, and what could be done about it? In the area of strategic forces, Utgoff and Stewart admitted that PD-18’s shortterm plans were unachievable from the beginning “[b]ecause the Soviets were moving in [19]77 and we were not.” When it came to conventional forces, the 65. NSC/PRC Summary of Conclusions, Subject: Consolidated Guidance, May 14, 1979, 2, DDRS, CK3100147800. Memorandum from Victor Utgoff and Jake Stewart to Brzezinski and Aaron, Subject: Consolidated Guidance PRC, May 10, 1979, 2, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 25, PRC 106 5/14/79, JCL. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: PRC on DOD Consolidated Guidance, undated [though likely May 14, 1979], 1, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 25, PRC 106 5/14/79, JCL. The wording for this memo is lifted directly from the previously referenced NSC/PRC Summary of Conclusions for May 14, 1979, 2. 66. Memorandum from Victor Utgoff and Jake Stewart to Brzezinski and Aaron, Subject: Consolidated Guidance PRC, May 10, 1979, 2–3. 67. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: PRC on DOD Consolidated Guidance, undated [though likely May 14, 1979], 1.

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Consolidated Guidance reported that the 1977 NATO Ministerial Guidance and PD-18 standard—the 3 percent real annual increase—had helped, but not at a pace that made a relevant dent in the preexisting numerical asymmetry. In short, at 3 percent, the Warsaw Pact was still able to keep up. Finally, in theater nuclear forces, the Soviet Union had the SS-20 and Backfire, in addition to increases in its number of nuclear artillery.68 CNA-78 and the Consolidated Guidance’s assessments of the international environment were mutually reinforcing, and together justified approval of the “countervailing strategy” and the means with which to implement it. This meant, however, drastically higher defense budgets, perhaps even higher than the increases the Consolidated Guidance suggested were necessary just to achieve the PD-18 levels set down in 1977. To get to that level by 1990, the Defense Department argued, its budget would have to jump to 5 percent annual increases—a percentage that the administration viewed as politically untenable.69 This was the strategic-ideational context within which Carter signed the Vance/Brown LRTNF “action plan” and entered into final discussions with his team about the development of the MX. Brzezinski gathered up all of the internal strategic discussion of this period—the NSC SCC’s review of the NTPR, the MX, and hard-target kill, the NSC PRC’s review of the MX and triad alternatives, and the Consolidated Guidance—and, using CNA-78 as an intellectual “springboard,” established the agenda for a two-day NSC defense policy “summit” with the president. Brzezinski’s agenda centered on the present and near

68. See previously referenced Utgoff/Stewart to Brzezinski/Aaron, 2. 69. See previously referenced Brzezinski to Carter, 2, as well as the NSC/PRC Summary of Conclusions, 1, 3. In the Summary of Conclusions and in his memo, Brzezinski told Carter that because the Pentagon had both underestimated inflation and overpriced much of its equipment, it was going to take “$40B +” to get the programmed forces through 1984–1985. Brzezinski was giving a much rosier picture. Utgoff and Stewart, looking closely at the Department of Defense’s information, had told Brzezinski before the meeting that underestimated inflation was going to cost about $65 billion and the overpricing about $5.5 billion—a total not of “$40B +” but of more than $70 billion. See Utgoff/Stewart to Brzezinski/Aaron, 3. Everyone at the PRC meeting was in agreement about how difficult it would be to secure 5 percent real annual increases. Carter had told the Joint Chiefs the previous December that they could not fathom exactly how much fiscal pressure he was under, and in May, the OMB added to this woe. Its supporting material for the Consolidated Guidance predicted a major recession in the works for 1981—a recession that would require a second Carter administration to cut taxes significantly. In that atmosphere, the administration would have a difficult enough time securing the 1977 Ministerial Guidance/PD-18 3 percent real increase promise, let alone 5 percent. A 5 percent jump in the OMB’s eyes only made 1981 that much uglier fiscally. On Carter and the Chiefs, see Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Summary of the Meeting between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on SALT TWO and the FY80 Defense Program, December 19, 1978, 7, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 36, Serial X 9/78–12/78, JCL. For the OMB’s information, see previously mentioned Utgoff/Stewart to Brzezinski/Aaron, 3.

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term (defined as five to seven years) for “stable deterrence,” “stable crisis bargaining,” and “effective war management with defined political purposes”— three core elements of the “countervailing strategy.”70 Though he does not refer to them by name in his memoirs, Brzezinski opened the June 4 meeting by summarizing the conclusions from CNA-78 and the Consolidated Guidance. Vance, in a surprise to Brzezinski, stated that he agreed with the conclusions, save perhaps that he thought the strategic forces “nadir” might have been overstated. For his part, Brown agreed with Vance’s qualification, but added that as a whole he felt the studies may have actually been too optimistic—according to Brzezinski, Brown said that by 1985 the Soviet Union would be ahead “in almost every military category.”71 At first, Carter was frustrated by the tenor of the new studies. Hearkening back to Samuel Huntington’s earlier PRM-10 language, Carter argued that “this group” (the NSC) was now building up the Soviet military threat, ignoring the United States’ advantages in economics and soft power, and dismissing the fact that the Soviet Union had weaker allies and a long border with China. As the summit continued, however, he became more and more convinced, and over time the group settled on a plan for the MX missile. The common missile idea was ruled out because its smaller size would run it up against Jackson’s amendment to the supplemental, hurt ratification, probably provoke interservice rivalry, and cause more adjustments to the date of the system’s initial operating capability. Out of Carter’s team at the meetings, James McIntyre (OMB) and Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner were in opposition to the new missile because of their belief that a race between the construction of additional Soviet RVs versus U.S. aim points was not in the United States’ favor.72 70. For a list of the three elements, see Memorandum from Brzezinski to Brown, Subject: CNA-78, May 1, 1979, 1, Brzezinski Donated Material/Alpha Channel, Box 20, Alpha Channel (Misc.), 5/79– 8/79, JCL. They can also be found in truncated form in the acknowledgments of Victor Utgoff, “In Defense of Counterforce,” 44. The TNF “action memo” was signed prior to this NSC summit. Considering the fact that Brown, Vance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Brzezinski were all on the record as being in agreement with the Vance/Brown memorandum as it had been crafted, it is likely that there was nothing left in it that required debate in this particular set of NSC meetings. On the last page of the Vance/Brown TNF memo, they indicated that the Joint Chiefs “concur[red] with the thrust of this memorandum.” Memorandum from Cyrus Vance and Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: TNF Modernization—U.S. Diplomacy, Your Role and the Schmidt Visit, May 9, 1979, 5. 71. In his memoirs, Brzezinski outlines “seven basic conclusions drawn from our previous work,” all of which were taken from CNA-78 and the Department of Defense’s Consolidated Guidance. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 335. 72. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 336. There was also talk about how the larger MX might serve as “a backup space booster.” See William Perry’s comments to Senator Strom Thurmond in Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year

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The final tally for the MX put Brown, Vance, Brzezinski, Mondale, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David Jones, and ACDA Director George Seignious on the side of choosing the largest possible missile option.73 It was here that Carter decided that the “countervailing strategy” would be implemented partially through Triad Modernization Option One (see again Table 3). The largest possible MX would be built, and though a firm decision on the basing mode had not been made, it would likely be the road/rail mobile option. In line with Triad Modernization Option One, and in a move that would again frustrate his defenseright critics, Carter simultaneously slowed down work on the Trident II D-5 in order to save money.74 Convinced of the need for the “countervailing strategy” and the MX missile largely as a result of the strategic picture that arose out of the NTPR exercise, CNA-78, and Consolidated Guidance, the administration’s assessment shifted in line with international military-operational environment. One should also not dismiss the impact of the OSTP in the spring of 1979. In May, it provided yet one more report on the MX system. The panel evaluated and critiqued the missile and basing ideas that had been investigated to date, up to and including the horizontal shelter concept that Perry’s office threw its weight behind after the collapse of the “air-mobile interlude.” Out of the three most looked-at basing types (MAP-vertical, highway mobile, or airmobile), the OSTP concluded that its 1978 recommendation still held: airmobile basing or perhaps a mix of air-mobile and existing Minuteman silos was the best near-term and long-term option. Ground-mobile plans always ran into what some called the “Jane Fonda” problem, or what the OSTP referred to as the “public interface” issue.75 The dispersal of the MX on American highways, so the argument went, would lead to a greater chance of accidents, public danger, and protest. If road-mobile was to be politically acceptable, then its operational area had to be limited, which, the OSTP argued, meant that it was opened up to large-scale “barrage attacks.” MAP-vertical had 1980, Part 3, May 15, 1979, 1423–24; also MX June 8 Pentagon Briefing, June 8, 1979, 21. Turner pushed for additional Trident II SLBMs and a smaller, road-mobile option in Alaska. See Edwards, Superweapon, 191, 193–94. 73. Edwards, Superweapon, 189–99; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 336. 74. According to Edwards, the administration chose to slow down the Trident II D-5 because it would have been too much of an effort (too expensive) to run the MX and Trident II concurrently, particularly given the greater effort it took to achieve higher accuracies in SLBMs. Edwards, Superweapon, 201–2. A development decision on the Trident II D-5 did not occur until October 1981, at which time the D-5 was slated to have an initial operating capability of 1989. Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 151. 75. For the “Jane Fonda” comment, see Senator Tower’s comments in Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Part 3, May 15, 1979, 1419.

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not improved in the OSTP’s eyes either. There were the same concerns about environmental effects, system security, the Soviet Union’s ability to saturate aim points for less cost, and future verification. Finally, the panel was worried that MAP-vertical could very well derail the attempt to secure a ban on mobile launchers after the three-year SALT II protocol expired.76 The OSTP insisted that the Air Force had dismissed air-mobile basing much too quickly. Indeed, it came very close to accusing the Air Force of having gamed its “quick study” against air-mobile. It agreed that if one used the Air Force’s assumptions, then air-mobile basing was prohibitively expensive. However, it criticized the Air Force because it had not accounted for what Perry was calling “cross-force savings” and because it had focused on “dashing” and landing MX aircraft at dispersed, secondary airfields upon warning. In the panel’s view, the transporter plane’s costs could be spread out among different programs, such as nuclear C3I and the delivery of cruise missiles. Moreover, the manpower and operational costs of the secondary and tertiary airfields in the Air Force’s dispersal plan could be cut by enhancing the aircraft’s ability to remain aloft and mobile, increasing the plane’s “load-carrying capacity” (which would lessen the need to land and reload) and improving nuclear command and control across the board.77 Naturally, this led into discussions about missile characteristics. As a “quick fix” air-mobile system, the OSTP suggested that the United States could alter jumbo aircraft to carry two Minuteman ICBMs per plane. In the future, the airmobile system could carry a new ICBM, but one much smaller than that desired by the Air Force. The OSTP might have been less sanguine about the common missile concept than Perry, but it agreed that air-mobile basing, or joint air-mobile/Minuteman silo basing, required less than the heavy, 92-inch diameter variant. While a smaller missile would not be able to carry as many RVs allowed for a new ICBM under SALT II fractionation limits, the panel thought it possible to rearrange the post-boost vehicle so that air-mobile MX could carry ICBM and SLBM RVs at the same time. Since ICBM and SLBM RV sizes were different, the reconfiguration would allow ten RVs per missile, the limit under SALT II. Lastly, and most importantly for the panel, if the new ICBM was going to be land-deployed in any fashion, then it had to have enhanced nuclear hardening.78

76. OSTP Panel Report III, 9–12. 77. Ibid., 7–9. 78. Ibid., 4–6, 7, 14, 15. The OSTP pushed the idea of nuclear hardening because of its fears of a Soviet pin-down attack. The OSTP envisioned a situation whereby, using SLBMs, the U.S. Minuteman

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In an addendum to its May report, the OSTP also offered a preliminary analysis of the road/rail “dash” horizontal-shelter scheme that had been put forward by Perry’s office after the Air Force dismissed the air-mobile basing idea. The new basing concept, the brainchild of Perry and Zeiberg, combined aspects from non-MAP-vertical basing modes that had been evaluated in the past, including open trenches (or closed trenches with sections that could be opened for verification), thousands of hardened horizontal shelters with “sliding roofs,” road or rail connections between the shelters, and the capability to “dash” the missile to a different shelter on a random basis or if necessary because of attack warning or a potential security breach.79 The OSTP, cautioning that Perry and Zeiberg’s idea was a recent one and therefore needed additional investigation, reiterated that horizontal shelters were not as easy to harden as those that were vertically positioned. It suggested that the verification benefits that derived from this approach—the primary reason, in the OSTP’s eyes, for why the basing mode was being offered in the first place—depended upon how long the trench was open to technological surveillance and how sure an opponent could be that there were no additional hidden, underground connectors between the separate trench lines. The addendum concluded that this so-called hybrid system was merely the Pentagon’s attempt to make MPS more verifiable and that it was questionable as to whether it was any better verification-wise than MAP-vertical.80 In the end, the third and final OSTP report had two major impacts upon the administration’s MX decision-making. First, its advocacy of interim airmobile/ Minuteman basing and a common aircraft reinforced Perry’s own views, and as a consequence it was introduced into the NSC’s discussion of Triad Modernization Option Two. Perhaps more importantly, it helped to ensure that MAP-vertical remained out of the running as an MX basing option even after the Air Force returned to it following the “air-mobile interlude.” Although Carter did not heed the OSTP’s positions regarding the MX’s size

force could be kept from launching by “a series of high-altitude nuclear bursts” (“about 3MT [megatons] per minute over each Minuteman wing”). While the United States’ ICBMs were kept in their silos, Soviet ICBMs could be launched. This concept, according to the OSTP, helped to overcome the flight timing problem between ICBMs and SLBMs. To counter the pin-down scenario, the new ICBM needed to be hardened in order to survive a launch into the “pin-down” nuclear environment. 79. For the first description of the new “dash” system, see Perry’s description in Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Part 3, May 15, 1979, 1413–15; also see MX June 8 Pentagon Briefing, June 8, 1979, 11–14. There was a rumor that Carter had advocated a completely open trench system during the June 4–5 NSC summit; however, Perry would not confirm this. MX June 8 Pentagon Briefing, 20–24. 80. “Open Trench MPS System,” 1–5, attached addendum to OSTP Panel Report III.

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and basing, the panel’s questioning of the “hybrid” horizontal trench concept lent credence to the idea of waiting just a little longer to make a final basing decision. Outside of shifts in the administration’s strategic worldview, there were two other mediating variables that precipitated Carter’s policy conversion in the spring of 1979: allied relations and arms control. As has already been argued, allied relations had comparatively less influence on the MX issue than on LRTNF for the simple fact that new LRTNF deployments would occur on European soil, while the MX was an American-only system. One would be hard-pressed to find evidence to support the argument that Carter eventually approved the MX system, and triad modernization as a whole, because of any direct allied pressure. The administration’s MX decision was certainly influenced by allies in the sense that the new ICBM was necessary to protect America’s reputation and maintain the viability of essential equivalence and extended deterrence. It was, of course, very different in the case of LRTNF. Before, the lack of allied unity had had a braking effect on new LRTNF for Western Europe, but now the administration could look on the two seminal NATO events of April 1979—the creation of the Special Group and the NPG’s official adoption of the Pershing II and GLCMs—as a sure signal that it could begin to accelerate the process. Up into early 1979, Western European allies, especially West Germany and the Low Countries, insisted that it would be impossible for them to support new LRTNF deployments sans concurrent work in TNF arms control. As evidence for this, Daalder and others take note of the intense debate that took place in the Bundestag during March over TNF deployments and how, as a result of that debate, it became even more obvious that Schmidt would need arms control for domestic political cover. An “integrated” approach with a “serious” TNF arms control component therefore became one of the two German “red-lines” when it came to LRTNF modernization, the second being “nonsingularity,” or the requirement that another continental power take LRTNF as well.81

81. Daalder, Nature and Practice, 187; Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, 230. It is unclear how long-lasting of an impact the March debate had. In May, Brzezinski reported to Carter that the March “uncertainties” in the Bundestag had transitioned into “a more constructive attitude” about new LRTNF deployments. Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Vance/Brown Memo on TNF, May 17, 1979, 2. Memorandum from Cyrus Vance and Harold Brown to President Carter, Subject: TNF Modernization—U.S. Diplomacy, Your Role and the Schmidt Visit, May 9, 1979, 4–5; Memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter, Subject: Correspondence with Chancellor Schmidt on TNF, May 31, 1979, 1–2.

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With this political requirement in mind, the creation of the NATO Special Group (in conjunction with the NPG’s adoption of the High Level Group’s recommendation of Pershing II and GLCMs) has to be viewed as a, if not the, major catalyst for the Vance/Brown TNF “action plan” and a statement of firm presidential leadership in the LRTNF issue. Whereas interallied discussions about TNF arms control had been nebulous in the months immediately following the Guadeloupe summit, the Special Group was something substantial and therefore served as a door-opener for the Brown/Vance memorandum. It made it possible for the administration to press ahead with a concrete deployment timetable because, if questioned by allies, it could point to the Special Group as unambiguous evidence that the United States was taking European concerns about TNF arms control to heart. At the same time, Schmidt and other European leaders could also point to the Special Group to show their domestic critics that the White House was serious about the arms control requirement. How did SALT II and SALT III affect Carter’s MX and LRTNF decisionmaking from January to June of 1979? In the three previous chapters, it has been demonstrated that SALT, both its present and anticipated character, significantly deflected the administration’s conception of and funding for its strategic and theater nuclear systems. From the beginning of Carter’s presidency to the end of 1978, the administration had delayed and hesitated. If the earlier delays were in large part due to arms control, might it be that the reversal or conversion in the spring of 1979 can also be explained with reference to arms control? SALT II had a big role in bringing about the collapse of the MX “air-mobile interlude.” It is true that the Air Force’s “quick study” highlighted air-mobile’s exorbitant costs. It was also the case that air-mobile MX might not have been any more capable of a delivery system than the B-52. In the end, however, it was not these, but the expectation of SALT II constraints on air-launched strategic ballistic missiles (ASBM) that brought air-mobile down. In Article II of the final treaty, ASBMs were defined as air-to-surface missiles with ranges greater than 600 kilometers—a definition which would have included air-mobile MX. In Article III, the United States agreed to count ASBM as part of the overall 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicle aggregate. The treaty also stated that during the three-year protocol both countries were prohibited from flight tests or deployments of ASBMs. Furthermore, during the treaty period, neither was allowed to have more than sixteen nonheavy bombers from which it could flight-test ASBMs after the protocol had expired. This meant two things for

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air-mobile MX. First, there could be no testing of it during the protocol. Second, after the protocol was over, the United States would be restricted in its testing of air-mobile MX to the 600-kilometer range and would only be able to launch them from those sixteen bombers. And because individual ASBMs were counted the same as individual launchers under the total SALT II SNDV aggregate, the greater the number of air-mobile MX missiles the United States deployed in the future, the more it would have to give up in other launchers. It was the trajectory of SALT II ASBM negotiations, Brown insists, which sealed the fate of air-mobile MX.82 But did SALT II or SALT III actually “cause” Carter’s large-scale MX and LRTNF decision-making in the fateful spring of 1979? Regarding SALT II’s impact, there are two avenues that must be evaluated. First, some have argued that the MX and LRTNF decisions in May and June, particularly the timing of the MX announcement, was motivated by SALT II in the sense that the program decisions provided Washington with bargaining leverage for the upcoming summit in Vienna. In the MX announcement, the White House emphasized that the new ICBM erased any perceptions that the Soviet Union had an advantage over the United States, and therefore the development of the missile facilitated “serious discussions” about arms limitations—though it is unclear whether the statement was referring to Vienna or the future SALT III. This author could find no documentary evidence to support the idea that the administration planned the announcement to bolster its negotiating position going into Vienna.83 Even if it was not intended to influence the summit, however, Brezhnev chose to accept the announcement in that way, telling Carter at their second plenary session that “[h]e wanted to say quite candidly that adoption of that 82. Harold Brown, telephone interview, January 10, 2004. In Brown’s mind, air-mobile MX also faced the same attack and countermeasure problems as strategic bombers. For the first time, a SALT aggregate included launchers (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) as well as actual missiles in the form of ASBMs, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/salt2/text/salt2-2.htm. The protocol restrictions on ASBMs are found in Article III, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/salt2/text/salt2–3.htm (both accessed on February 16, 2008). It is important to note that each side was allowed the sixteen “free” nonheavy bomber test planes for ASBMs only if the party had added functionally related observable differences (FROD) to them within the first six months of the treaty. Article III of the treaty did address double counting. If one had an ASBM-carrying heavy bomber, then it was the individual ASBM that was counted under the aggregate, not the heavy bomber itself. 83. Carter, Public Papers 1979, vol. 1, 1016; Washington Post, June 9, 1979, A1. The MX “checklist” from the Office of Congressional Liaison only gave one reason why the administration should announce its decision prior to the summit in Vienna—that way, the White House could “undercut opponent’s arguments” that signing the SALT II treaty injured the United States’ ability to deploy a new ICBM in MPS basing. Unknown author, “Checklist on MX Statement,” May 31, 1979, 1.

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decision [the MX], especially on the eve of signing the SALT II Treaty, could hardly be viewed as promoting the objectives of that [t]reaty.”84 The verifiability of the final basing mode aside, Brezhnev said that the development of the MX ran counter to the spirit of the agreement. Immediately thereafter, in order to bring his own pressure to bear against Carter, Brezhnev warned that any MX basing mode that was not verifiable would derail SALT III, and, upping the ante, that Moscow would expect SALT III to address not only U.S. forwardbased systems but also the arsenals of Great Britain, France, and China.85 The second influence that SALT II had in May and June, namely the use of the two programs as tools for securing the treaty’s ratification, has already been discussed and qualified in detail. Again, there is solid documentary evidence that the administration understood early on that these weapons programs were going to be useful politically. Brzezinski himself admitted that European support for SALT II motivated the United States’ adoption of the Los Alamos consensus, and he confirmed that the anticipated ratification debate in the Senate was firmly in mind when it came to choosing a larger MX missile. However, it is not so clear whether this also should be taken to mean that given a counterfactual in which SALT II ratification was not at issue, the systems would never have seen the light of day. The administration consistently denied such a hypothetical, and it is important as well not to make light of the fact that there were very real, grand strategic and military-operational problems (as highlighted through the “countervailing strategy”) that these weapons were meant to fix. It is probably more accurate to argue that SALT II had a stronger impact on the characteristics that the systems took, but not necessarily on their actual existence. It is also irrefutable that the administration saw both strategic and theater nuclear modernization as an instrument for achieving arms control goals in future SALT negotiations. This claim should not be taken to mean that the two decisions were made solely or even primarily for SALT III purposes (though one can find some intriguing but very vague statements from late 1978 and mid-1979 that allude to the idea that the United States might be able to secure unspecified political or arms control goals by starting, but not necessarily having to finish, certain unspecified weapons programs). Earlier chapters have already highlighted the administration’s (and NATO’s) plans for using the deployments, or the threat of new deployments, to achieve cuts in Soviet theater nuclear forces in SALT III. Mere days after Carter and Brezhnev signed 84. Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: SALT II [Second Plenary Session in Vienna], June 16, 1979, 5, DDRS, CK3100073502. 85. Ibid., 5–6.

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SALT II, Nitze reported to the Abington Group that the administration was not going to waste any time moving ahead on this front. Discussing the most recent Ditchley Conference, Nitze repeated the words of an official State Department spokesman who had told the conference members that SALT III would start “right away,” would use the three-year protocol as its foundation, and would offer up GLCM range for limits on the SS-20.86 The “countervailing strategy” and PD-59, the directive that enshrined the nuclear targeting aspects of that strategy, had important implications for LRTNF and SALT III, though it must remain in the realm of conjecture until the directive is declassified in full. If, as William Odom has stated, the combination of information technology and digital, real-time satellite imagery intelligence made it possible for the United States to strike quickly at conventional Warsaw Pact targets using strategic rather than theater nuclear forces, then an official presidential declaration to this effect—articulated via PD-59—may have served as a comfort to European allies who were concerned lest a future SALT III impose onerous restrictions on LRTNF or ban longer-range capabilities completely. In this case, PD-59 would have been one method to reassure Western Europe that the United States still had it protected if SALT III meant that they would have to accept stricter GLCM and/or Pershing II range limits, or even if it meant the removal of theater nuclear forces altogether.87 86. Regarding the value of starting if not finishing certain weapons programs, two sentences stand out. When meeting with the Joint Chiefs in December 1978, General Lew Allen apparently remarked that “the security of the country is inextricably bound with our [d]efense programs and that success in SALT III may mean that some of the programs that we need to begin now will not have to be finished.” He immediately added that triad modernization “is pertinent to actions needed in the next 3–4 months and that there needs to be some conjunction between these programs and our actions on SALT.” The first part explicitly mentions SALT III and indicated the United States might be able to achieve what it needed to in SALT III without going the distance on certain programs. The second part, however, seems to be in reference to SALT II ratification, though it is unclear. President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski et al., Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Summary of the Meeting between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on SALT TWO and the FY80 Defense Program, December 19, 1978, 5–6. Later, in May, Perry said something very similar to General Allen. When answering questions in the Senate Armed Services Committee, Perry said that he hoped SALT III reductions could be had by moving forward on triad modernization, “but without committing to the large-scale production and deployment of some of these systems.” Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Part 3, May 15, 1979, 1425. On Nitze’s discussion of the Ditchley Conference, see Abington Notes, June 20, 1979, 2, Box 370, Folder “Notes,” CPD Papers. Nitze identifies the administration spokesman as “Dobbins”—this author has assumed that this is James Dobbins, a career State Department official and current director of RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center. 87. When queried about the alliance and TNF implications of PD-59, Brown stated to this author that he could not recall anything about that particular point; however, he did remark that different government entities looked to the directive to solve very different goals. Harold Brown, telephone interview, January 10, 2004.

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The administration also thought that the MX had SALT III value of its own. Outside contractor studies, together with official statements by Brown and Vance in the summer of 1979, shed light on precisely how the administration pictured its utility in follow-on SALT negotiations. First, because the Minuteman follow-on was larger than its predecessor and held a greater number of RVs, the United States could push for larger reductions in the overall SALT aggregate but still keep a high enough RV count for proper target coverage. Second, the MX shelter system was adaptable. In the future, the United States could adjust the number of missiles and shelters (and perhaps even add point defenses) in response to Soviet actions or as a way of pressuring Moscow to make concessions in arms control. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in July, Brown suggested a range of 100 to 400 deployed MX depending upon how SALT II and SALT III progressed. Once the new system was operational, it would also threaten the Soviet Union’s fixed silos to the point that Moscow might move to SLBMs or to road- or rail-mobile basing. If that happened, it would not only play to the United States’ antisubmarine warfare capabilities but also force the Soviet Union to lower throw-weight missiles, which in turn would limit the number of RVs per missile and drop the number of Soviet RVs that might be targeting the MX system in the first place.88

Conclusion This chapter evaluated and weighed traditional realist, innenpolitik, and neoclassical realist arguments for Carter’s strategic and theater nuclear policy decisions in the spring of 1979—two examples of a midcourse policy conversion. Using relative power as a yardstick, Soviet military capabilities in 1979 tracked along the same upward path that had been witnessed from the beginning of the Carter administration. There was also positive change in Soviet power projection by the beginning of 1979. This power differential might 88. Lee Q. Niemela, TRW Corporation, “A Strategy for MX/MPS in SALT III,” February 14, 1979, 2–3, Box 11, Folder 9, Gerald Johnson Papers. Senate Armed Services Committee, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty), Part I, July 23, 1979, 91–92. The “once the MX was operational” qualification was critical. Senator Tower and others criticized this logic. First, SALT III negotiations were going to start immediately but the MX’s initial operating capability was 1986. Second, there were questions as to why the administration expected the Soviet Union would not make its cooperation in SALT III contingent upon the continuation of the protocol limits and the “capture” of the MX. See Senator Tower’s comments to Secretary Vance, as well as Tower’s and Edward Rowny’s comments in Senate Armed Services Committee, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty), Part II, July 30, 1979, 529–30, and 695, respectively.

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explain Carter’s MX and LRTNF choices; however, since it has been shown throughout the book that the growth in relative power between 1977 and 1979 resulted in both a policy weakening and a hardening, it is not a precise enough cause of Carter’s transformation. Interpretations that focus solely on domestic politics are also incomplete. While there is strong evidence supporting the idea that Carter hardened for the purpose of securing SALT II ratification, or at least timed the hardening to do so, one also has to weigh the administration’s constant denials on this very point. Moreover, the popular argument that Carter turned more hawkish because of the influence of defense-right pressure groups, the main culprit being the CPD, has been shown to be superficial. Carter’s MX and LRTNF decisions in 1979 bore no resemblance to the policy paths desired by Rostow and Nitze’s group. Instead, this chapter has argued that Carter’s conversion is better understood using a neoclassical realist framework. Throughout the first two and a half years of Carter’s presidency, the international military-operational environment suggested a “harder” defense stance, but prior to the winter of 1978– 1979, the variables of strategic thought, interallied relations, and arms control negotiations deflected the administration’s strategic and theater nuclear policy. Between late 1978 and early 1979, a redirection in each of these three areas facilitated a defense policy more in line with what the international context required.

Eight Conclusion

On May 7, 1979, Madeleine Albright, the NSC’s congressional relations officer and future U.S. secretary of state, sat down to draft a memo to Brzezinski which presented her view, as well as that of Victor Utgoff and Fritz Ermarth, on a speech that Senator Sam Nunn had delivered to the National Chamber of Commerce the week before. On April 30, Senator Nunn had attacked the administration’s entire defense record since the inauguration. He criticized the continued program delays, the administration’s emphasis on arms control as a tool for managing political competition with the Soviet Union, and its acceptance of the assured vulnerability paradigm. Albright, in preparing her boss for an upcoming lunch discussion with Nunn about the defense budget and SALT II ratification, turned to the “countervailing strategy.” Suggesting ways that Brzezinski could talk to Nunn about the NTPR findings and the move to a “war-fighting” strategy, Albright ended with an amazing admission: The paradox is that SALT [II] doesn’t do much in the way of strategic stabilization and arms control. In fact, it will, if passed, usher us into a period of strategic anxiety not experienced since the early 1960s. Yet SALT is one of the few remaining strands of détente and thereby bears a heavy political load . . . too heavy, despite the efforts of the President to make clear that SALT will not mean far-reaching improvements in U.S.-Soviet political relations. In the future, we must both invigorate our efforts to compete with and to contain Soviet power, and broaden the base of dialogue in some way that keeps the fragile enterprise of

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arms control from having to bear these heavy loads.1 [emphasis in the original] Granted, the administration’s early admiration of arms control had done much to bring about the situation that Albright was now lamenting. It had placed too much faith in SALT to solve the larger political problem of superpower competition. Albright’s call for “invigoration” was nevertheless a far cry from the administration’s early days of defense program delays and hesitancy. Now, in the spring of 1979, it appeared that Carter and his team had finally come to accept the character of the international strategic environment that they had actually faced since they entered office. At the end of his overview of neoclassical realist theory, Gideon Rose invites future scholars to investigate “the ways intervening unit-level variables can deflect foreign policy away from what pure structural theories might predict.” He also suggests fruitful areas where one could look for such “deflections,” such as culture and the realm of ideas.2 This study has taken up Rose’s challenge, and in explaining the reasons behind Carter’s midterm defense policy transformation it suggested three policy deflectors—strategic ideas/studies, allies and, maybe most importantly of all, arms control. The fact that ideas, internal studies, one’s friends, and arms control have the power to influence and redirect policy are by no means new, but as a “historical explanatory” project, this study aimed at applying explicit political science theory and historical documentation to test long-standing realist and innenpolitik interpretations of Carter’s policy adjustment.3 Using the MX and LRTNF as examples of this conversion, this book concludes that in 1977 and 1978, strategic thought, allies, and the SALT process moved the administration away from an accurate assessment and understanding of its international environment. In the autumn of 1978, the administration began to address the need for a “countervailing strategy.” As this process accelerated and entered the official interagency review process in the spring of 1979, it was coupled with allied agreement on GLCMs and Pershing IIs through

1. Memorandum from Madeleine Albright to Brzezinski, Subject: Your Lunch with Senator Sam Nunn [on] Tuesday, May 8, May 7, 1979, 3–4, WHCF-FG, Box FG-28, FG 6-1-1 Brz, 4/1/79–5/15/78, JCL. 2. Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 168. 3. For example, Colin Gray has argued that arms control “tempts” policy-makers into making weapon choices and plans in a way that ignores strategic realities. See Colin Gray, House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail, 151. For a description of “historical explanatory” studies, see Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 91–92.

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the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, the establishment of the Special Group, the settlement of SALT II, and the anticipation of SALT III. These things changed Carter’s “softer” defense focus and led him and his team to develop the MX and lead the alliance’s charge on LRTNF. Chapter 1 provided an outline of foreign policy and defense policy theory, showing how and why traditional realist theory often falls short when it comes to explaining a state’s policy behavior and also demonstrating some of the weaknesses of domestic politics models, which are often astrategic in their outlook. It also looked at how Carter’s strategic transformation has been traditionally evaluated using realism, executive-legislative bargaining, pressure groups, and innenpolitik approaches. It argued that these explanations often suffer from overdetermination, a poor use of history, or incorrect assumptions. As an alternative, the chapter offered neoclassical realism as a better explanatory model. The next two chapters set the stage for a holistic examination of the Carter administration’s defense policy. To show the international environment inherited by the new president on January 20, 1977, the second chapter described the strategic environment of the 1970s. It explained the growth of Soviet conventional and nuclear power, as well as the influence of SALT I and the Vladivostok summit on U.S. defense policy. The third chapter used Carter’s campaign speeches and his pre-presidential statements, both written and oral, to craft a picture of his personal strategic thought. As the beginning of that chapter emphasized, presidents do not enter office with a blank intellectual slate. It is vital to understand the “strategic capital” that presidents bring with them into the Oval Office. The rest of the book divided Carter’s defense policy decision-making— specifically his work on the MX and theater nuclear forces—into four periods. Chapter 4 analyzed the first period, that is, the year between Carter’s February 1977 adjustment of Ford’s FY1978 budget up to the creation of his first personalized budget. Chapter 5 examined why the administration delayed the MX and TNF in the FY1979 budget, while the following chapter looked at the evolution of MX and TNF policy up through December 1978. In each of these three chapters, the administration’s delays and hesitations were first evaluated through the lenses of traditional realism and domestic politics theories. Each time, the weaknesses found in realist-dominant or innenpolitik-dominant interpretations were overcome by investigating how three deflectors—strategic studies, allies, and arms control—kept the administration from reacting in accordance to the dictates of the international system, characterized as it was by the expansion of Soviet power.

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In the end, the seventh chapter evaluated the actual period of policy conversion or transformation—from the winter of 1978–1979 to June 1979. It showed how shifts in strategic thought, allied cooperation in TNF, the end of the SALT II process, and the beginning of SALT III led the administration to harden its existing defense stance. The chapter also argued that while it is undeniable that concern about SALT II ratification played an important part in Carter’s final calculus, it is more appropriate to label it as a secondary versus a primary cause. One key point of this study was an investigation, using archival sources, of the precise influence that the Committee on the Present Danger had on the administration. Many on the defense-left, and even some on the defense-right, have given the Committee pride of place when it comes to Carter’s midterm policy transformation. Those on the defense-left have demonized the Committee as a “militarizing” cabal that infected the minds of those in the administration who should have been more level-headed in their evaluation of Soviet capabilities and intentions. Indeed, the logic that the defense-left has used when it talks about the CPD is similar to how it discusses the so-called neoconservative hijacking of the Bush administration (with some of the same people allegedly involved in both “militarizing” instances). On the defense-right, there are those who have also suggested that the Committee hardened Carter’s defense program choices—a claim that is often made with a triumphal tone. The evidence provided by this book shows a less clear-cut connection. If one was to identify the breaking point for Carter’s defense policy, it would be the period of strategic ferment that occurred between the September 1978 midterm defense review and the June 1979 NSC “summit.” On the other hand, the arena of greatest Committee influence was not with the executive branch, but on Capitol Hill and in its involvement in the Senate SALT II ratification debate during the summer and fall of 1979. David Skidmore, David Dunn, and Jerry Sanders notwithstanding, the administration’s shift on the MX and LRTNF, and by extension the “hardening” of American defense policy as a whole, did not come about through Committee pressure, but rather because of internal strategic evaluation and analysis. Future strategic historians and political scientists wishing to test this book’s use of the neoclassical realist framework and its attendant periodization will want to look closely at any declassified material from the September 29, 1978, midterm defense review, the NSC SCC material on nuclear targeting, and the MX PRC meetings. Should it ever occur, the release of the administration’s Nuclear Targeting Posture Review (NTPR) should also be useful for evaluating

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the merits of this work. Other scholars interested in the American defense policy of the late Cold War period might also wish to use this study as a springboard for a document-based exploration of the “countervailing strategy’s” evolution from Carter’s final year in office to the first years of the Reagan presidency. Reagan’s defense buildup had its genesis in the strategic thinking of previous administrations, and it is important to know to what extent scholars should—and, for that matter, should not—look to Carter and his team to understand the strategic foundation behind the military effort billed by many, in this author’s view rightfully so, as the accelerant to the end of the Cold War.

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Index

Aaron, David, 170n94, 177n6, 182n15, 190, 217n98, 230n19, 243–45, 247n44, 253, 268, 268n22, 276n36, 276n37 Abington [Corporation] Group, 231n21, 239, 240, 275, 275n35, 277–78, 280n44, 282, 302 Accuracy, missile: assessments of Soviet capabilities, 119–21, 233; connection to U.S. foreign and defense policy, 26; improvements to U.S. capabilities (late 1960s), 42, 43n13; improvements to U.S. capabilities (1970s and beyond), 66, 68, 70, 74, 75, 79, 80, 125, 126, 134, 146, 252, 247, 285; relationship to yield, 53n32, 59; Soviet Union, actual or anticipated improvements by, 46, 53, 59, 68, 142, 180, 204, 205, 208, 234. See also Advanced Inertial Reference Sphere (AIRS); Radar Area Correlation Guidance (RADAG); Team A/Team B exercise Advanced Airborne Command Post, 122 Advanced Inertial Reference Sphere (AIRS), 70. See also Accuracy, missile Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA), 49n25 Aeroflot, 113 Afghanistan, 23–26, 235, 272 Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS), 122 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), 273 Aircraft. See B-1; B-52; B-70; Backfire; FB111; MiG 23; SR-71; Su-19, Vulcan Air defense: general issue of, 40, 66n63, 76, 146; Soviet use of, 45, 52, 52n31, 57, 61– 63, 68, 119–21, 123, 124, 131, 132, 135, 147, 212n90, 243; U.S. and NATO use of, 52, 71, 75, 104, 156, 171, 172, 201 Air Force, Soviet, 113

Air Force, U.S: and B-1 bomber, 61, 124; and bases—Grand Forks, 69n69; Homestead, 268, 269; Malmstrom, 69n69; Minot, 69n69; Norton, 70; common missile (with U.S. Navy), 220, 222; and European conflict, 151, 170–72; and intelligence, 121; and minimum deterrence, 91n24; and MX, 49, 70–71, 145, 176, 193, 202, 204, 205, 207, 219, 221–23, 232, 238n31, 260– 62, 282, 289, 296, 297, 299; and Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), 202, 203; and theater nuclear force modernization, 75, 191n43, 243, 246; under McNamara Pentagon, 41, 42n10, 43. See also Air Force Science Advisory Board (AFSAB), Air Force Systems Acquisition Review Council (AFSARC); B-1; MX; Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) Air Force Science Advisory Board (AFSAB), 133n29, 194, 205, 220, 220n2, 221 Air Force Systems Acquisition Review Council (AFSARC), 223, 261 Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), 220 Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). See Cruise missiles, air-launched Albright, Madeleine, 305, 306 Allen, Lew, 302n86 Allen, Richard, 275n35 Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS), 158–60, 160n78, 161, 162, 164, 168, 198–200. See also Presidential Review Memorandum, PRM-10 Alternative Launch Point System (ALPS), 237–39. See also Fixed Alternative Launch Point System (FALPIS) American Committee for East-West Accord, 235

333

334

Index

American Friends Service Committee, 61, 97, 139–40 American Security Council, 19 Angola, 25–26 Antiballistic missile (ABM) systems, 42, 52n31, 71, 91; McNamara’s Commonwealth Club speech (1967), 43; MX, use with, 238; Nike-X, 43; Safeguard, 50, 64; Sentinel, 43, 50; Soviet Union, feared or anticipated use by, 43, 65, 68, 77, 79, 146, 193. See also Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 50–52, 64, 65, 79, 92. See also Antiballistic missile systems Antisubmarine warfare (ASW), 40, 146, 221; Soviet Union, feared or anticipated use by, 68, 78, 92, 119, 123, 192, 193, 247; United States, use by, 92, 119n4, 303 AQUACADE (RHYOLITE), 250 Arab League, 273 Arms control. See Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; MBFR; SALT I; SALT II Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 134, 139, 210, 229, 295 Arms Control Association, 96 Arms Control Impact Statement (ACIS), 126n17, 134 Army, U.S., 85; ability to fight in Europe, evaluation of, 150; ability to fight in Europe, improvements to, 170–72; theater nuclear capabilities, improvements to, 72, 75, 169, 174, 176, 243. See also Assault Breaker; Hollingsworth Report; NunnBartlett Report Aspin, Les, 29n69 Assault Breaker, 172 Assured destruction. See Deterrence, assured destruction criteria Assured vulnerability. See Deterrence, assured vulnerability paradigm Atlas, 46 Austria, 44, 44n14, 104n62 Aviation Week and Space Technology, 175, 181, 221 Ayatollah Khomeini, 272 B-1: and Carter’s presidential campaign, 85, 86, 97–101, 115; and Rockwell Corporation, 49; and SALT I, 51; and SALT II, 58, 148, 148n53; campaign against, 139–41; Carter’s cancellation, 130–33, 135–38, 146, 147, 170, 177, 192,

212, 213; during Ford administration, 61– 63, 123, 124; in FY1979 budget, 168, 169; in PRM-10, 198; rescission of FY1977 money, 181 B-52, 49n25, 61–63, 100, 124n12, 131, 132, 135, 137, 168, 169, 194, 212n90, 262, 265, 299 B-70, 41, 42n10 Backfire, 27, 51, 57–59, 76, 100, 101, 186, 211, 234, 240, 252, 253, 280, 293 Bakhtiar, Shapour, 272 Ballistic missiles, air-based: air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBM), 57, 131, 299, 300, 300n82. See also MX Ballistic missiles, land-based. See Atlas; Minuteman (I and II); Minuteman III; MX; SS-4; SS-5; SS-9; SS-11; SS-13; SS-16; SS-17; SS-18; SS-19; SS-20; Titan Ballistic missiles, sea-based. See Poseidon; SS-N-8; Trident I C4; Trident II D5 Bari. See Nuclear Planning Group Bartlett, Dewey, 126n17, 150–52. See also Nunn-Bartlett Report Basic National Security Policy (Kennedy), 88n18 Belgium, 225n12, 268 Belmont Conference (1978), 239, 239n33 Betts, Richard, 15n34, 16n35, 157 Bishop, Maurice, 273 Blackhawk, 171 Blechman, Barry, 92n26 Boyce, Christopher, 250 Brammer, Bob, 97 Brezhnev, Leonid, 121, 143, 144n47, 252, 253n58, 264, 267, 272, 275, 284, 285, 300– 302 Brezhnev Doctrine, 24 Brooke, Edward, 70 Brookings Institution, 82, 83n3 Brown, Harold: advising Carter during presidential campaign, 92n26; and B-1 bomber, 131–33, 137, 148, 168, 169; and changes to defense budget planning, 291, 293; and conventional force modernization, 152, 153, 155, 156, 170, 171, 227, 286; and cruise missiles, 131–33, 177, 190, 193; involvement with Trilateral Commission, 89; and Minuteman III, 129, 130; and MX, 127–29, 137, 175, 176, 181, 191–93, 204, 206–8, 220, 222, 223, 232, 245, 248, 249, 259, 269, 279, 280, 282, 293, 295, 300, 303; and nuclear targeting policy, 284–86, 288, 289, 293, 302n87; policy

Index differences with National Security Adviser’s staff, 155, 157, 193n48, 202, 207n81, 226, 227n14; pre-Carter employment, 40n6, 43; on PRM-10/PD18, 157, 162, 165–68, 199; and SALT II negotiations, 148, 186, 208, 213, 223, 242n38, 248, 279, 300; and SALT III negotiations, 303; on Soviet strategic threat, 143, 194, 289, 294; and theater nuclear force modernization, 125, 126n17, 133, 134, 169, 177, 178, 188–91, 195–97, 201, 202, 215, 216, 224, 226–28, 243, 258, 270, 277, 278, 282, 293, 299 Brzezinski, Zbigniew: and activity of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), 187; advising Carter during the campaign, 89, 90, 90n22; and the countervailing strategy, 284, 285, 287, 288, 291–94, 305; and debate on enhanced radiation warhead (ERW), 134, 141, 188, 215–17; and Guadeloupe meeting, 263–66; and Iran, 272; and MX, 232, 249, 250n52, 251, 294, 295; and NATO, 154, 155, 161; and U.S. nuclear targeting policy, 285, 285n52; and Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), 205–6; and PRM-10/PD18, 161–62, 167n89; and SALT II negotiations, 208, 209; and SALT II ratification, 183, 184, 276, 278, 305; and theater nuclear forces, 202, 226–30, 236, 237, 278; and the Trilateral Commission, 89, 90, 90n22. See also National Security Council (NSC); Policy Review Committee (PRC); Special Coordinating Committee (SCC); Utgoff, Victor Buchsbaum, Solomon, 203n69 Bundestag, 298, 298n81 Bureau of Land Management (BLM), 259 Burt, Richard, 201 Bush, George, as director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 119–20 Byrd, Robert, 129, 254n60, 279 Caddell, Pat, 184 Callaghan, James, 217, 217n98, 230n19, 237n30, 254, 264, 267 Cam Rahn Bay, 273 Camp David, 230, 245, 245n42, 288n55 Carter, Jimmy: and Afghanistan, 23–25; and Africa, 25, 26; and B-1, 86, 97–101, 130– 33, 140, 148, 168; and Brezhnev, 144n47, 300, 301; and Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978 (CNA-78), 289, 293–95;

335

and Consolidated Guidance, 291–95; and cruise missile decision-making, 169, 177, 212, 213, 236, 237, 257, 265, 269–71, 276, 278, 279; and deterrence, 90–94; and Dobrynin, 144n47, 145n49, 152; and East Asian security, 107–11; and enhanced radiation warhead (ERW) decisionmaking, 133, 134, 141, 188, 189, 214–17, 227, 228; and FY1979 defense supplemental, 230, 231; and Guadeloupe, 264, 266–68; and Gromyko, 212, 213; influence of Congress (general) upon, 18; influence of interest groups (general) upon, 18–20, 22, 23, 139–41; influence of presidential advisers (general) upon, 17; influence of public opinion upon, 17, 18, 22, 184, 280, 281; and Iran, 23–25, 272; and Minuteman ICBM decision-making, 129–30, 169; and MX decision-making, 128, 129, 169, 175, 176, 205, 206, 241, 245, 248, 257–59, 262, 263, 265, 279, 293–95; and NATO decision-making, 101–7, 152– 56, 168, 170–72; and Nixon-Ford arms control record, 96, 97; and Nixon-Ford defense record, 82–86; and nuclear abolition, 95; and Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), 202, 203, 205, 206, 245; and Panama Canal, 183, 184; and PD-18, 162–64, 293–95; and Pershing II decision-making, 109, 176, 236, 237, 253n59, 257, 269–71, 276, 278, 279; and relationship with Committee on the Present Danger, 164–66, 185–87, 280–82; and relationship with Henry Jackson, 139, 183; and relationship with Sam Nunn, 241n36, 305, 306; and SALT II negotiating positions, 212, 213, 300, 301; and SALT II ratification, 268, 274–79, 300–302; and SALT III, 268, 276, 277, 300–302; and Soviet conventional force modernization, 103; and Soviet nuclear force modernization, 26, 27; and Soviet seapower, 111–14; and submarines, 91–93; and Trident SLBM decision-making, 130, 257, 260, 262, 263, 265; and Trilateral Commission, 89–90; and U.S. seapower, 91, 111–14; zero-based budgeting, 88–89. See also Brown, Harold; Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Schmidt, Helmut; and Vance, Cyrus Carter, Jimmy, major presidential speeches: Inaugural Address (January 1977), 143; North Atlantic Council (May 1977), 155–

336

Index

56; Wake Forest University (March 1978), 167n89 Carter Doctrine, 23. See also Iran and Persian Gulf Castro, Fidel, 273. See also Cuba Central Command, U.S. (CENTCOM), 25, 25n59, 289. See also Iran and Persian Gulf Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): estimation of Soviet threat and capabilities, 28, 29n69, 58n42, 121, 179n8, 229; involvement in covert action operations, 272–74; involvement in Team A/Team B exercise, 119–20. See also Covert action; Duckett, Carl; Intelligence; National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Chalfont, Lord, 278, 278n39 Chaparral, 171 China (People’s Republic), 5, 87, 107–10, 179n8, 250, 272, 273, 294, 301 Christensen, Thomas, 34 Christopher, Warren, 228, 228n16 Civil Reserve Aircraft Fleet (CRAF), 153, 170 Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 139n39 Coalition for Peace through Strength, 19 Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), 2n1; 1977 meeting with Samuel Huntington, 166, 167; 1977 White House summit, 165, 166; as purported influence on Carter’s shift in defense policy, 18–20, 22–23; involvement in fight over Warnke nomination, 139, 139n39; growth in membership, 278, 280, 281; lobbying against SALT II, 231n21, 248n47, 251n54; perspective on Carter’s shift in defense policy, 281, 282, 304, 308; press conferences, 183, 185–87; published material on SALT II, 237–40, 280. See also Abington [Corporation] Group; Nitze, Paul; Perle, Richard; Rostow, Eugene Common missile. See Air Force, U.S.; Hepfer-Clark study; Navy, U.S. Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978 (CNA78), 230, 284, 289, 290, 290n60, 291, 293–95 Congress, U.S.: Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, 127; House Appropriations Committee, 182; House Armed Services Committee, 175, 177n6, 210; House Budget Committee, 127; innenpolitik theories involving, 5, 7, 8, 10, 18–20; ratification of SALT II, 139, 183, 202, 206, 231n21, 235, 236, 239, 241, 266, 268, 275–80, 284, 287, 294, 301, 302n86,

304, 305, 308; reaction to veto of HR 10929 (amendment to FY1979 budget), 230–31; Senate Appropriations Committee, 144n47; Senate Armed Services Committee, 45, 75n81, 127, 129, 139, 141n42, 181, 209n84, 211n86, 214n92, 233, 234, 260, 261, 289, 294n72, 302n86, 303; Senate Budget Committee, 127 Consolidated Guidance (CG), 291–95 Copperhead, 171, 172 Cotter, Donald, 66n63, 125, 191, 224, 225n11 Council for a Livable World, 235 Counterforce, 40, 62, 70, 71, 79, 100, 122, 123, 142–45, 147, 149, 152, 153, 168, 171– 74, 178, 196, 203, 205, 206, 215, 227, 286 Countervailing strategy, 284, 286–89, 293– 95, 301, 302, 305, 306, 309 Covert action, 157, 236, 272–74, 290 Crisis instability, 40, 48, 100, 181, 203 Cruise missiles, air-launched (ALCM), 57, 61, 62, 131–33, 135, 147, 148n53, 168, 174, 177, 192, 198, 210–13, 230, 246, 253, 262, 265, 291 Cruise missiles, ground-launched (GLCM), 57, 76n81, 161, 169, 177, 177n6, 182, 183, 185, 188–90, 200, 201, 210–14, 223, 226, 230, 232, 237, 240, 242–44, 246, 253n59, 258, 269, 270, 280, 282, 292, 298, 299, 302, 306 Cruise missiles, sea-launched (SLCM), 57, 58n41, 66n63, 76, 174, 177, 183, 185, 188– 90, 211–14, 230, 237, 240, 253n59, 254, 280, 282 Cuba, 273–74, 292. See also Castro, Fidel Culver, John, 63 Cyprus, 250 Czechoslovakia, 44 Daalder, Ivo, 74n77, 190, 224, 225, 227, 229, 230, 246, 247, 266n15, 268n22, 298 Damage limitation, 1, 40, 41, 47, 48, 82, 91– 93, 115, 119, 196. See also Crisis instability Davis, Lynn, 92n26, 157, 160, 225n11 DeConcini, Dennis, 183 “Deep Cuts” study (1977), 146–47, 200 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 151, 152, 172, 286 Defense budget: Carter campaign, concerns over, 81–90; FY1977, 121, 122, 128–30, 133, 135, 181; FY1978, 117, 118, 121–26; FY1978 (adjustment by Carter), 126–36; FY1979, 168–72, 175–78; FY1979

Index supplemental, 230, 231, 257, 260, 274, 275, 282, 284, 289; FY1980, 257, 260, 274, 275, 284, 288; FY1981, 284 Defense Nuclear Agency, 182n17, 190n36 Defense Planning Committee (DPC), 72, 156, 277, 278. See also NATO Defense Planning Guidance, 290. See also Consolidated Guidance Defense Science Board (DSB), 133, 135, 151, 194, 212n90, 219–23, 232, 238 Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), 70, 71, 124, 182, 222n4, 260, 261, 262n7, 289 Defensive realism, 14–17, 27, 29, 31, 34n88. See also Realism Dellums, Ronald, 185, 210n85 Delta. See Submarines Democratic Party, 8, 10, 60, 61, 81, 83, 84, 87, 89, 90n22, 97, 110, 183, 184 Denmark, 226, 228 d’Estaing, Giscard, 265n14, 266, 266n15 Detente, 2, 4, 19, 20, 24n56, 26, 60, 96, 120, 237, 268, 305 Deterrence: assured destruction, paradigm of, 39, 90, 91, 93, 192; assured vulnerability, paradigm of, 39, 90, 91, 93, 192; Carter campaign and administration views on, 90–94, 99, 100, 102, 103, 106, 115, 146, 149, 166, 285, 287, 294, 298; conventional-only, 152; damage limitation, relationship to, 40, 41, 93; extended, 38, 47, 48, 49, 80, 154, 161, 188, 298; finite or minimum, 1, 3, 61, 62, 91, 146; relationship to credibility, 74, 149, 150, 188, 195, 196, 197; relationship to flexibility, 66, 66n63, 197; self, 74; Soviet views on, 43, 194, 287. See also Crisis instability; Damage limitation Deutch, John, 203n69 Ditchley Conference, 302 Dobrynin, Anatoli, 27, 143–45, 152, 208, 211 Domestic politics. See Innenpolitik Dubs, Adolph, 272. See also Afghanistan Duckett, Carl, 58n42 Duncan, Charles, 241n36, 276 East Germany, 44, 170 Eisenhower administration, 10, 88n18 Elman, Colin, 9n18, 13–14 Encryption, 249, 251, 256, 271. See also Telemetry; Verification Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA), 125, 126, 134, 141, 177

337

Enhanced radiation warhead (ERW), 1, 74, 75, 126, 133, 134, 136, 141, 169, 174, 178, 185, 188, 189, 191, 197, 210, 214–19, 227, 228, 235–37, 240, 247, 255, 280 Enthoven, Alain C., 39–40 Ermarth, Fritz, 229, 284, 287–90, 305 Ethiopia, 26, 179, 273 Evangelische Kirken, 236n29 Evans and Novak, 162, 166, 188 FB-111, 61–63, 100, 234 Fink, Daniel, 203n69 Fiscal Guidance, 290. See also Consolidated Guidance Fischer, Beth, 13–14, 30 Fixed Alternative Launch Point System (FALPIS), 237–39. See also Alternative Launch Point System (ALPS) Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine. See Submarines Fonda, Jane, 295 Ford, Gerald R., administration: and modernization of nuclear weapons, 60–80, 121–26; arms control negotiations, 55–60, 96–97; lame-duck FY1978 defense budget, 121–26; strategic planning, 118, 119, 123, 124. See also National Security Directive Memorandum (NSDM); National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) Ford, John, 210n85 Fordham, Benjamin, 10 Foreign policy theory. See Innenpolitik; Realism Forward Edge of Battle Area (FEBA), 75, 133 Foster Panel, 66 Fractionation, 249, 250, 251, 259–62, 282, 296 France, 104n62, 105, 159, 237, 253, 254, 263, 264, 266, 267, 301 Fraser, Donald, 110 Frederikshavn. See Nuclear Planning Group Gaffney, Henry, 224–26, 254n61 Gairy, Eric, 273 GAMMA GUPPY, 54n35 Garn, Jake, 128 Garthoff, Raymond, 56, 57 Garwin, Richard, 202 Gates, Robert, 273n32, 274 Gelb, Leslie, 93, 97, 229, 268 Generated alert, 193, 194 Geneva, 186, 209n84, 223, 247, 252, 253n59 Geopolitics, 5, 25, 26, 101n54

338

Index

GIANT REACH, 273 Gleysteen, William, 110 Goldberger, Marvin, 203n69 Granum, Rex, 258 Grechko, Andrei, 54n35 Grenada, 273, 274 Gromyko, Andrei, 55, 209, 209n84, 212, 213, 253n59, 288n55 Ground-launched cruise missile. See Cruise missiles, ground-launched Guadeloupe, 202, 223, 230n19, 264, 266–68, 276n37, 291, 299 Guam Doctrine, 108 Guidance. See Accuracy, missile Habib, Philip, 187 Haig, Alexander, 150n55, 254, 269n24 Hatfield, Mark, 61, 185, 275 Hawk, 171 Henze, Paul, 179n8 Hepfer-Clark study, 222, 242. See also Air Force, U.S.; Navy, U.S. Herken, Gregg, 202, 203n69 Hermann, Charles, 3 High Level Group, 191, 201, 219, 224–30, 246, 247, 254n61, 263, 264, 266, 268–70, 276, 299. See also NATO Hoffman, Stanley, 89 Holbrooke, Richard, 110n78 Hollingsworth, James, 150–51, 195. See also Army, U.S. Holloway, James, 58n41 Homestead Air Force Base. See Air Force, U.S., bases; Nuclear Planning Group Hungary, 44n14 Hunter, Robert, 264n14 Huntington, Samuel, 157, 158, 165, 166, 167, 229, 289, 290n60, 294 Hyland, William, 211n88 Iceland, 58n41 Ignatius, Paul, 131 Ikle, Fred, 53, 275n35 Illustrative Deployment Program, 270. See also NATO Improved Accuracy Program, 79, 125. See also Accuracy, missile Indian Ocean, 24, 25, 273, 274 Inman, Bobby, 119n4 Innenpolitik, 2–10, 17–23, 31–33, 36 Intelligence: director of Central Intelligence, 119, 160, 200, 211, 294; electronic (ELINT), 249, 250, 252, 272; estimative,

29, 49n25, 52n31, 118–21, 154; general, 12, 27, 33, 36, 73n76, 107, 122, 133, 142, 143, 157, 159, 161, 163, 180, 194, 292; human (HUMINT), 234; imagery (IMINT), 285, 302; measurement and signatures (MASINT), 205, 234; signals (SIGINT), 54n35, 58, 205, 234, 272; Soviet, 272. See also Bush, George; Team A/Team B exercise; Telemetry; Turner, Stansfield Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. See Ballistic missiles, land-based Interim Agreement. See SALT I Intermediate/Medium Range Ballistic Missile (I/MRBM). See Ballistic missiles, land-based International relations theory, 4–5. See also Innenpolitik; Realism; Structural Realism; Neoclassical Realism Interoperability, 119, 151, 154. See also NATO Iran, 24, 25, 66n63, 157n73, 158, 235, 250, 272 Israel, 112 Italy, 188, 267n18 IVORY ITEM, 204n71 Jackson, Henry, 51–55, 60, 61, 139, 183, 209n84, 211n88, 241, 261, 275, 279n42, 283, 294 Japan, 21, 89, 90n22, 101, 107–12, 116, 273 Jervis, Robert, 15 Johnson, Lyndon B., administration, 29, 39, 41–43, 49, 50 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 5, 18, 42, 105, 145, 146, 159, 161, 198, 253n59, 290, 291, 293n69, 294n70, 295, 302n86 Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), 42n10, 290. See also Consolidated Guidance Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff (JSTPS), 190, 284 Jones, David C., 124n12, 295 Jones, T. K., 92n26 Kampelman, Max, 281n46 Keegan, George, 121 Kelleher, Catherine, 157 Kemp, Jack, 130n24 Kendall, Henry, 236n28 Kennan, George, 101n54 Kennedy, Edward, 96, 110, 181, 184, 207, 275 Kennedy, John F., administration, 38, 39, 88n18, 105

Index Kent, Glenn, 40n6 Keohane, Robert, 89, 90n22 KGB, 250, 272n30, 285, 285n52 Kissinger, Henry, 49n25, 52n30, 54–56, 58, 60, 61, 73n76, 74n77, 76n83, 78n86, 81n1, 84, 96, 194, 278 Kistiakowsky, George, 236n28 Komer, Robert, 149, 152–55. See also NATO Kupperman, Charles, 231n21. See also Abington [Corporation] Group Labour Party, 217n98, 237n30, 254 Laird, Melvin, 49, 166 Lake, Anthony, 136, 144–45 Lance, 72, 73n76, 75, 126, 128, 133, 134, 136, 172, 178, 189, 217, 218, 227, 234, 235 Launch on warning (LOW), 132n77, 144, 193, 194, 195n51, 204 Launch under attack (LUA), 144, 193, 194, 195n51, 204, 284n51, 288 Launchers. See Ballistic missiles; Cruise missiles; SALT I; SALT II; Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDV) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), 69n67 Lee, Andrew Daulton, 250 Lehman, Christopher, 253n58, 277, 278, 282n47 Lehman, John, 253n58, 277, 278, 282n47 Lehman, Richard, 120n5 Liberal international relations theory. See Innenpolitik Limited Nuclear Options (LNO), 66, 66n63, 145, 229, 285 Logistics, 107, 170. See also NATO Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP), 149, 156, 161, 168, 170, 173, 191, 286. See also NATO Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), 69n67. See also High Level Group Lynn-Jones, Sean, 16 Mackinder, Halford, 5n7, 101n54 Major Attack Options (MAO), 66n63 Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle (MARV). See Reentry Vehicle Marcy, Carl, 236n28 Mathias, Charles, 96 May, Michael, 124n12, 220, 221, 238 McGiffert, David, 191, 215n96, 224, 225n11, 229 McGovern, George, 60, 61n49, 275 McIntyre, James, 182, 207, 294

339

McIntyre, Thomas, 70, 71, 122, 145, 181, 184, 199, 203, 206, 207 McNamara, Robert, 39–43, 48–50, 72, 77, 155 Mearsheimer, John, 11n24, 15, 16, 30, 31, 24n87, 35 MiG 23 (FLOGGER), 45 Militarization, 9, 19, 21–23, 237, 308 Ministerial Guidance (1977), 156, 161, 163, 168, 181, 257, 293. See also NATO Minot Air Force Base. See Air Force, U.S., bases Minuteman (I and II), 40n6, 46, 129, 130, 169, 192, 204n71 Minuteman III, 1, 42, 43, 59, 69, 121, 122, 128–30, 133, 169, 176, 181, 185n27, 192, 203n70, 204, 207, 222, 238, 241, 259, 265, 284n51 Missile Experimental. See MX Missile Vulnerability Panel. See Office of Science and Technology Policy Missiles. See Ballistic missiles; Cruise missiles Mitrokhin, Vasili, 272n30 Mobilization for Survival, 140, 235 Molander, Roger, 288n55 Mondale, Walter, 96, 99, 100, 150, 295 Morgenthau, Hans, 11n24 Moyers, Bill, 110 Moynihan, Daniel, 90n22 Mulley, Fred, 190–91 Multiple Aim Point (MAP), 123, 185, 204, 222, 223, 231n21, 232, 238n31, 239, 241, 244, 245, 247–52, 255, 258, 259, 262, 263, 265, 281, 282, 295–97 Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV). See Reentry Vehicle Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR), 48, 49, 72, 75n81, 77, 102, 106, 116, 149, 154, 189, 197, 201, 208, 214–16, 229, 270 MX: air-mobile basing, 220, 221, 223, 251, 252, 259–62, 282, 283, 295–300; and arms control negotiations, 70, 126, 148, 207–10, 237–39, 247–52, 259–62, 274–76, 299–301, 303; buried trench basing, 128, 175, 204–7, 220, 221, 259–62, 295–98; and Carter administration defense budgets, 128, 129, 175, 176, 257, 258, 260, 261, 257–63; and Carter administration strategic planning, 144–47, 192–94, 197–99, 202–10, 219–23, 231, 232, 258–63, 288–91, 293–98; and Carter campaign, 144, 145; and Committee on the Present Danger, 165– 67, 185–87, 237–39, 280–82; counterforce

340

Index

criticism, 70, 71; and Ford administration, 70, 71, 121–23; initial research, 42, 43; multiple aim point, 185, 220–23, 237–39, 241, 244, 245, 247–52, 295–98; roadmobile basing, 204, 220, 221, 295; and Senate, 181, 183–84, 207, 274–76, 279, 299–301; underwater basing, 204, 220, 22 Narizny, Kevin, 10, 34 National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), 121n7 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), 49n25, 52, 119, 120, 121n7, 154. See also Team A/Team B exercise National Security Council (NSC): and Carter administration, 131, 143, 144n47, 154, 155, 157, 160, 160n78, 161, 167, 168, 190, 193, 200, 202, 205, 207, 226, 228, 231, 232, 258, 284, 289, 293–95; and Ford administration, 118; ideas about reform during Carter’s presidential campaign, 87, 113; and innenpolitik theory, 5, 17. See also Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Policy Review Committee (PRC); Special Coordinating Committee (SCC); Utgoff, Victor National Security Directive Memorandum (NSDM): NSDM 242 (Nixon), 67, 68, 73, 77; NSDM 344 (Ford), 124; NSDM 348 (Ford), 118, 123, 143, 151 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM): NSSM 3 (Nixon), 88n18; NSSM 169 (Nixon), 66; NSSM 246 (Ford), 118, 119, 123, 124, 143, 149, 151 National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel. See Foster Panel NATO: and assignment of SLBM RVs for nuclear conflict, 66n63, 71, 73, 189, 190, 195, 224, 247, 285n52; and asymmetries with Warsaw Pact, 44–45, 48, 103; and Carter administration strategic planning, 152–56, 158–63, 291–93; and Carter’s FY1979 budget, 168, 170–72; and conventional counterforce, 151, 152, 168, 171, 172, 178, 196, 227, 286; and debate over warning time, 119, 150, 151, 154, 166; and Ford administration strategic planning, 118, 119; and the May 1977 Ministerial Guidance, 156, 161, 163, 168, 181, 293; and Mike Mansfield, 49, 49n25; and Sam Nunn, 150–52, 275, 277; and short war versus long war debate, 150, 151, 170, 291; suggested policy changes by Carter during presidential campaign, 101–

7. See also Counterforce; Defense Planning Committee (DPC); Enhanced radiation warhead (ERW); High Level Group; Komer, Robert; Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP); Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR); Nuclear Planning Group (NPG); Nunn-Bartlett Report; Presidential Directive; Presidential Review Memorandum Navy, Soviet, expansion and capabilities of, 27, 46, 108, 111, 112, 211, 240, 273. See also Cam Rahn Bay Navy, U.S.: common missile (with U.S. Air Force), 220, 222; decreased capabilities in 1970s, 46, 111–13; finite deterrence, 91; and NSDM 344, 124; policy prescriptions by Carter’s presidential campaign, 88, 107, 111–14; and PRM-10/PD-18, 160, 160n78, 164, 164n85, 288. See also Hepfer-Clark study Neoclassical realism, 3, 31–36. See also Realism Neorealism. See Structural realism Netherlands, 236, 266n15, 268 Neutron bomb. See Enhanced radiation warhead (ERW) New Directions, 235 New Jewel Movement, 273–74. See also Bishop, Maurice; Grenada Nike-Hercules. See Antiballistic missile systems Nike-X. See Antiballistic missile systems Nitze, Paul, 42n10, 59, 92n26, 124n12, 139, 165, 166, 185–87, 237–39, 248n47, 278n39, 280n44, 282, 302, 304. See also Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) Nixon administration, 50–55, 64, 66, 67, 71, 72, 78, 79, 84, 88n18, 108, 151 Non-Nuclear Pershing (NNP), 134 North Atlantic Council, 72, 153, 155, 264n14, 268, 269, 277, 278. See also NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See NATO North Korea, 111 North Yemen, 26, 273, 274 Norton Air Force Base. See Air Force, U.S., bases Nuclear Planning Group: Bari, Italy (October 1977), 188, 189, 191, 215; Frederikshavn, Denmark (April 1978), 226–28; Homestead Air Force Base, United States (April 1979), 268–70, 277, 292, 298, 299; in general, 76n83, 225,

Index 269n24; Ottawa, Canada (June 1977), 190, 195, 224. See also NATO Nuclear Targeting Policy Review (NTPR). See Sloss Panel Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP), 67 Nunn, Sam, 141n42, 149–54, 162, 241, 275, 277, 305. See also NATO and NunnBartlett Report Nunn-Bartlett Report, 149–54, 195. See also Bartlett, Dewey; NATO; Nunn, Sam Nye, Joseph, 89, 90n22, 158 Oak Ridge Alloy. See Oralloy Odom, William, 148n53, 157, 255n52, 302 Offensive realism, 14–16, 30, 34n88, 35, 141, 142. See also Realism Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 140, 160, 181, 182, 207, 293n69, 294 Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): Missile Vulnerability Panel, 197, 202–7, 210, 219, 220, 242n38, 245, 248n47, 251, 255, 295–98; use of findings by OMB, 182, 207. See also Office of Management and Budget (OMB); Press, Frank Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 160n78, 224–26, 290, 291 Ogaden, 26. See also Ethiopia and Somalia Ohio-class submarine. See Submarines Okinawa, 108 Oman, 273 Oralloy, 203n70 Ottawa. See Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) Outlay, 127n18 Owen, David, 76n83, 254n60 Owen, Henry, 83n3, 155n66 Padgett, Philip, 201 Pakistan, 24 Panama Canal, 183, 184, 274 Panovsky, Wolfgang, 202 PAVE PEPPER, 69, 70, 79 Payne, Keith, 41, 92n26 Perle, Richard, 53, 139n38, 183, 211n88, 240, 251n54, 280n44 Perry, William, 75n81, 152, 153, 171, 212n90, 220–23, 233, 242, 245n42, 249, 252, 259– 61, 263, 282, 283, 286, 295–97, 302n86 Persian Gulf, 23–25, 158, 160, 164, 272, 274, 290, 291. See also Carter Doctrine and Central Command, U.S. (CENTCOM) Planning and Programming Guidance, 290. See also Consolidated Guidance

341

Policy Review Committee (PRC), 157, 262, 289, 291–93, 308. See also National Security Council (NSC) Poseidon, 56n38, 66n63, 77–79, 124, 189, 224, 247, 254, 265, 267, 271 Presidential Directive (PD): PD-18, 149, 156, 162–68, 196–202, 206, 220, 224, 231, 257, 258, 284, 286, 287, 291–93; PD-41, 231n21; PD-59, 25, 285n52, 286, 302; PD62, 164 Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM): PRM-6, 154; PRM-9, 154; PRM-10, 149, 154, 156, 157–63, 165, 166, 168–70, 182, 188, 197–201, 206, 224, 229, 258, 284, 287, 290n60, 292, 294; PRM-38, 228–30, 232, 237, 242, 246, 247, 252, 255, 263, 276; PRM-43, 290n60 President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), 119. See also Team A/Team B exercise Press, Frank, 202, 203, 206, 207. See also Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) Program Objective Memoranda (POM), 181, 291 Provance, Terry, 140, 141, 235, 236 Proxmire, William, 61, 275 Quick Reaction Alert (QRA), 72, 75, 77 Quinlan, Michael, 224 Radar Area Correlation Guidance (RADAC or RADAG), 75. See also Accuracy, missile Randolph, Jennings, 130n24, 192n46 Ratification. See Congress, U.S.; SALT I; SALT II Reagan, Ronald W., administration, 2n1, 3, 8, 13–14, 30, 31, 163n83, 309 Realism, 5, 11–17, 23–35. See also Defensive realism; Offensive realism; Structural realism Red Sea, 273, 274 Reentry vehicle: 1974 Vladivostok sublimit on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), 56, 57, 58, 79, 96, 129, 145, 192, 211, 213; accuracy of, 42, 59, 208, 233, 234; and MX, 71, 122, 123, 129, 145, 185, 193, 220, 222, 223, 250, 259, 282, 283, 296, 303; and SLBM, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78n87, 79, 92n26, 145, 179, 189, 192, 193, 195, 224, 229, 233, 271, 284n52, 296; and theater nuclear forces, 75, 125, 176; configuration of bus, 69, 123; creation of MIRV, 42; de-

342

Index

MIRVing, 145n49; effect of U.S. nuclear targeting policy on the need for, 66–68; effect of SALT I negotiations on the need for, 63–65; hedge vs. Soviet ABM, 146, 193; maneuverable reentry vehicle (MARV), 79, 125; MK-12A, 68, 69, 121, 122, 203n70; negotiations over MIRVs after 1974 Vladivostok meeting, 58, 62n53, 68–70; negotiations over MIRVs prior to 1974 Vladivostok meeting, 51, 52, 53, 56; Soviet use of, 48, 50, 57, 59, 65–66, 97n39, 179, 180, 203–5, 208, 220, 233, 234, 239, 244, 245, 249–51, 294; survival and alert status, 193, 194; WS-120A, 42. See also Accuracy, missile; Fractionation; PAVE PEPPER; SALT I; SALT II Regional Nuclear Options (RNO), 66, 66n63, 73, 74, 145, 229, 247 Republican Party, 10, 183, 241, 275n35 Reversing Course, 18n40, 21–23, 27–29 Rhodes, Brewster, 83 Rhodesia, 179 Roland, 172 Rose, Gideon, 34–35, 306 Rostow, Eugene, 139, 165, 166, 167n89, 187, 282, 304 Rowny, Edward, 211n86, 303n88 Rumsfeld, Donald, 61, 68, 70, 71, 73–76, 79, 118, 121–26, 128, 133, 134, 146, 168, 169, 170, 175, 181, 196, 199 Russia. See Soviet Union Safeguard. See Antiballistic missile systems SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks): and cruise missiles, 51; and “equal aggregates,” 53–55, 56n38; initial talks under Johnson administration, 43, 44; Interim Agreement, 50–52, 63–65, 194; reaction by defense-left, 50–51; reaction by defense-right, 51–54; and restriction of antiballistic missile (ABM) systems, 51, 52, 64, 65; signing under Nixon administration, 50; and “unequal aggregates/offsetting asymmetries,” 52–55, 107; and U.S. intelligence, 54n35. See also Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; GAMMA GUPPY; Jackson, Henry; Perle, Richard SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks): and B-1, 58, 100, 101, 147, 148; and Backfire, 58, 59, 76; and ballistic missile testing limits, 208–10, 299–301; and Committee on the Present Danger, 165,

167, 185–87, 237–40, 275, 277, 278, 280– 82; and cruise missile limits, 57, 76, 183, 210–14, 266; effects on U.S. nuclear modernization, 68, 69, 70, 145, 192; and heavy missile limits, 58, 59, 183; and MX, 70, 128, 145, 147, 148, 206, 208–10, 222, 223, 247–52, 259, 274–75, 296, 299–301; political reactions to Vladivostok (Carter), 96, 97; political reactions to Vladivostok (general), 59, 96; pre-Vladivostok negotiations, 51–56; and SALT III, 247, 251–54, 276, 277, 282, 301–3; and Senate ratification, 18, 58, 138, 139, 182, 183, 206, 241, 268, 274–79, 301; and telemetry encryption, 247–52; and Vienna summit, 274, 275, 300, 301; Vladivostok “agreed framework,” 56, 57; and Western Europe, 252–54, 263, 264, 266–68, 276–78 SANE, 84n8, 99, 140 Saudi Arabia, 109, 272, 273 Schaffer, Matthew, 126, 144, 145 Schlesinger, James, 44, 55n36, 58n42, 61, 66n63, 68–76, 79, 125, 126, 134, 150, 151, 195, 196, 254 Schmidt, Helmut, 141, 188, 264n14, 266, 268n22, 271, 277, 278, 298, 299. See also West Germany Schroeder, Patricia, 185 Schweller, Randall, 16n35, 31 Sea-launched cruise missiles. See Cruise missiles, sea-launched Seignious, George, 295 Selected Attack Options (SAO), 66n63 Selective Employment Plans (SEP), 66n63 Selin, Ivan, 131 Semenov, Vladimir, 247–48 Sergeant, 72 Shain, Yossi, 8 Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM), 131, 135 Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), 66n63, 67, 73, 145, 177, 225, 247, 284, 285, 285n52 Sino-Vietnamese War, 272, 273 Skidmore, David. See Reversing Course Slocombe, Walter, 92n26, 190, 215n96, 250n52, 286, 286n53 Sloss, Leon. See Sloss Panel Sloss Panel, 284–86, 288, 289, 293, 295, 305, 308 Smith, K. Wayne, 39 Smith, Larry, 70 Snyder, Jack. See Myths of Empire

Index Solarium (Eisenhower), 88n18 South Korea, 84, 85, 86, 101, 108–11, 116, 159, 167, 291, 292 South Yemen, 26, 273, 274 Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO), 50, 70, 220, 221, 223. See also Air Force, U.S. Spain, 56 Special Coordinating Committee (SCC), 148n53, 202, 209n84, 216, 217, 228–30, 231n21, 272, 289, 293, 308. See also National Security Council (NSC) Special Group on Arms Control and Related Matters, 268–70, 298, 299, 307. See also NATO Special Session on Disarmament (United Nations), 235 Spykman, Nicholas, 5n7, 101n54 SR-71, 273 SS-4, 234, 252 SS-5, 234, 252 SS-9, 46, 47, 54 SS-11, 46, 47, 54 SS-13, 54 SS-16, 54, 65, 179n8, 209n84, 210, 216, 234, 252 SS-17, 53, 54, 65, 233, 238, 250 SS-18, 26, 27, 53, 54, 56, 59, 65, 180, 193, 233, 251, 259, 271 SS-19, 54, 54n35, 59, 65, 180, 193, 233, 250, 271 SS-20, 26, 27, 76, 179, 189, 209n84, 215–18, 224, 234, 236, 237, 240, 247, 252, 266, 267, 280, 285, 293, 302 SS-N-8, 78 Sterling-Folker, Jennifer, 31–33 Stewart, Jake, 292, 293n69 Stinger, 171, 172 Strategic Air Command (SAC), 67, 73, 163n83 Strategic Alternatives Team, 281n46 Strategic Bomber Force Modernization Study, 131, 132, 135, 137, 152. See also B-1 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 8n15, 92 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDV), 55–58, 68, 76, 300. See also SALT II Strategic Objectives Panel. See Team A/ Team B Structural realism, 5, 12–14 Su-19 (FENCER), 45 Sublimits. See SALT I; SALT II Submarines: Delta, 179, 233, 271; Ohio class, 50, 78, 79, 124, 130, 135, 265, 271; Polaris,

343

91, 124, 128, 135, 137. See also Ballistic missiles, sea-based Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). See Ballistic missiles, sea-based Suez Canal, 273, 274 Sullivan, David, 54n35 Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), 66n63, 73, 74, 77, 150n55, 254. See also Haig, Alexander; NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 73. See also NATO; Supreme Allied Commander in Europe Tactical Technology Office. See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Taiwan, 101, 108, 109, 116, 167 Talbott, Strobe, 208, 238n31 Taliaferro, Jeffrey, 14, 34n88, 35 Tarnoff, Peter, 290n60, 291n63 Task Force 10. See High Level Group Taylor, Maxwell, 42n10, 105 Team A/Team B exercise, 52n31, 118–21, 127, 142, 143, 149, 219 Telemetry, 58n42, 249–51, 256, 271. See also Encryption; Verification Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Study, 201, 202 Thomson, Jim, 155, 160n78, 190, 200n65, 226, 227, 229, 230, 276 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), 69n67, 203n70 Thurmond, Strom, 128, 129, 211n86, 294n72 Titan, 46 Tomahawk. See Cruise missiles Toomay study, 220n2, 221 Total obligational authority (TOA), 127n18 Tower, John, 252, 253, 261, 295n75, 303n88 Trident I C4, 50, 56n38, 62, 78–80, 124, 135, 169, 194, 203n70, 222, 261–63, 265, 267, 271, 283 Trident II D5, 2, 50, 78–80, 125, 169, 222, 231, 242, 257, 260, 262, 263, 265, 295, 295n74 Trilateral Commission, 82, 89, 90, 101, 107– 9, 158. See also Carter, Jimmy (presidential campaign) Trubowitz, Peter, 10 Tula, Brezhnev’s speech at, 121, 144n47 Turkey, 250 Turner, Stansfield, 68n66, 160, 200, 211, 294, 294n72. See also Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

344

Index

Tyroler, Charles, 166 Union of Concerned Scientists, 235 United Nations. See Special Session on Disarmament (United Nations) Utgoff, Victor, 143, 148, 155, 157, 159, 160, 193n48, 200, 226, 244, 276, 287–89, 292, 293n69, 305 Vaisse, Justin, 139n39, 165n86 Van Cleave, William, 231n21, 280n44, 292n47 Van Evera, Stephen, 15n34, 16n35, 306n3 Vance, Cyrus: advising Carter during presidential campaign, 92; and B-1 bomber, 140; and MX, 295, 303; and SALT II negotiations, 147, 208, 209, 209n84, 211, 212, 213n91, 223, 253n59; and theater nuclear force modernization, 258, 269, 270, 277, 278, 293, 294, 299; involvement with Trilateral Commission, 89; policy split with Brzezinski, 17, 18, 26n63 Verification, 193, 212, 229, 239, 247–49, 251, 252, 256, 261, 296, 297. See also Encryption; Telemetry Vienna, 275, 278, 300, 301. See also SALT II Vietnam War, 41, 46, 49, 72n74, 108, 109, 111

Vladivostok. See SALT II Vulcan, 270 Waltz, Kenneth, 12–16, 30, 31, 274 Warnke, Paul, 92n26, 139, 210, 212, 223, 247, 248 Weiss, Seymour, 278n39, 282n47 West Germany, 21, 44, 76, 104n62, 108, 141, 162, 188–91, 200–202, 214–16, 224, 225, 236, 237, 247, 253, 263, 264, 266–68, 276, 278, 290, 298. See also Schmidt, Helmut Whalen, Charles, 236n28 Wide-Area Anti-Tank Munitions, 151 World Peace Council, 141, 236 Xinjiang Province, 250 Yaffe, Michael, 75, 125, 126, 150, 190n36, 191, 195, 196n56, 201, 225, 254 York, Herbert, 131, 132n27, 152, 152n60, 194, 195n51 Yugoslavia, 44 Zaire, 26, 179 Zakaria, Fareed, 9n18, 16n35, 21, 29, 33, 34 Zegart, Amy, 7, 8 Zeiberg, Seymour, 148n53, 222, 252, 297 Zumwalt, Elmo, 46, 78n86, 79