Can Unions Survive?: The Rejuvenation of the American Labor Movement 9780814723715

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CAN UNION S SURVIVE ?

CAN UNION S SURVIVE ? The Rejuvenatio n o f the American Labo r Movemen t Charles B . Craver

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New Yor k Universit y Pres s New York and London

NEW YOR K UNIVERSIT Y PRES S New Yor k an d Londo n Copyright © 1993 , 199 5 b y Ne w Yor k Universit y All right s reserve d Library o f Congres s Cataloging-in-Publicatio n Dat a Craver, Charle s B . Can union s survive ? : the rejuvenatio n o f th e America n labo r movement / Charles B . Craver . p. cm . Includes bibliographica l reference s an d index . ISBN 0-8147-1498- 6 ISB N 0-8147-1512- 5 pb k 1. Trade-unions—Unite d States—History . 2 . Labo r movement — United States—History . 3 . Industria l relations—Unite d States — History. 4 . Labo r law s an d legislation—Unite d States—History . I. Title. HD6508.C739 199 3 92-4098 0 331.88'0973—dc20 CI P New Yor k Universit y Pres s book s ar e printe d o n acid-fre e paper , and thei r bindin g material s ar e chose n fo r strengt h an d durability . Manufactured i n th e Unite d State s o f Americ a 10

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Dedicated to American Workers, Many of Whom Need a Collective Voice to Counter th e Economi c Powe r of Their Corporate Employers.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments i x Part On e

1. Overvie w 1 2. Th e Historical Foundatio n o f American Labor 1 0 3. Th e Extent and Causes of the Decline o f the American Labor Movement 3 4 Part T w o

4. Th e Need for Labor Unions to Organize Traditionall y Nonunion Personnel 5 9 5. Enhancin g Organized Labor's Economic and Political Power 8 9 6. Th e Need to Reform the National Labo r Relations Act 12 6 Epilogue 15 6 Notes 15 9 Bibliography 18 9 Table of Cases 20 2 Index 20 7

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The foundation for this project began to develop while I was a graduate student a t the New Yor k Stat e School o f Industria l an d Labor Relations a t Cornell University . Th e outstandin g professor s a t that institution introduced me to the historical, economic, and sociological concept s tha t ar e relevan t t o a n understandin g o f th e curren t plight of labo r unions. I must particularly acknowledg e m y indebtedness t o Professor Jean McKelvey, who establishe d a learning environment tha t inspire d eac h studen t t o striv e fo r academi c excellence. I am greatl y indebte d t o Nik o Pfund , m y Ne w Yor k Universit y Press editor, who initially encouraged me to write this book and who provided man y suggestion s tha t significantl y improve d th e final product. An unnamed external reviewer also made many beneficia l suggestions. Din a Gold, my research assistant, provide d exemplar y editorial assistanc e tha t transcended anythin g I had the right to expect. Marion Crain, Paul Weiler, and David Silberman reviewed the entire manuscript an d made helpful comments . David Foss consci entiously mad e the editorial change s i n the final manuscript. I must finally thank my wife, Katey, who not only provided crucial encouragement, but also read each chapter and suggested important editorial changes .

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I. OVERVIE W

THE INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM , i t seem s clear , i s unfavorabl e t o th e union . Power passes to the technostructure and this lessens the conflict o f interest between employer and employee whic h gave the union much of its reason for existence …. Th e union belongs to a particular stage in the development of the industrial system . When that stage passes so does the union in anything like its original position of power. 1 [I]f ther e wer e no unions , worker s woul d merel y reinven t them . Withou t some kin d o f stron g institutiona l voic e t o represent them , million s o f in dividual worker s woul d b e completely a t the mercy of giant corporate bureaucracies whos e onl y interes t i s t o maximiz e profit s b y minimizing th e cost of labor. With all their shortcomings, the unions are the only organized voice i n America that working people have. 2 Every year, severa l hundre d thousan d unrepresente d America n em ployees ar e discharge d withou t goo d cause . Million s mor e ar e lai d off b y companie s tha t transfe r thei r productio n job s t o lowe r wag e facilities i n th e Sout h o r in Mexic o an d othe r developin g countries . When employee s a t firms like Greyhound an d Eastern Airlines wal k out t o protes t wag e an d benefi t reductions , the y ar e permanentl y replaced an d thei r representative labo r organization s ar e destroyed . Senior personne l wh o participat e i n strike s agains t firms lik e Tran s World Airlines hav e their hard-earned position s filled b y new work ers an d les s senio r co-worker s wh o cros s th e picke t lin e durin g th e labor dispute . Employee s wh o strik e technologicall y advance d cor porations lik e AT& T discove r tha t thei r employer s ca n continu e t o maintain basi c operation s withou t th e assistanc e o f thei r regula r workers. Th e wanin g economi c powe r o f organize d labo r make s i t increasingly difficult fo r unionized employee s to maintain beneficia l compensation level s and to preserve long-term employment security . I

2 Overvie w Most unorganized workers exercise no meaningful control over these critical areas. During the past decade, deregulation and government budget problems have led to a decrease in enforcement of health and safety laws. As a result, thousand s o f America n worker s ar e seriousl y injure d each yea r i n industria l accident s tha t coul d hav e bee n prevente d through mandate d periodi c safet y inspections . I n September 1991 , twenty-five worker s perishe d durin g a fire at a chicken processin g plant i n Hamlet , Nort h Carolina. 3 Thei r nonunio n facilit y ha d no t been inspected by safety and health officials fo r more than a decade. The locked fire exits that would have been easily discovered durin g a walk-through inspection prevented the escape of the persons trapped in the burning building. Conscientious shop stewards would not have permitted those safet y la w violations t o continue. Although the Employee Retirement Income Security Act4 requires private corporations to fund their pension plans in an actuarily sound manner, millions of workers are discovering that their bankrupt and dishonest employers did not make the requisite fund contributions. 5 Individuals who expected reasonable pension benefits ar e receiving substantially reduced retirement checks. If the retirement programs of these employees had been jointly administered by union and management trustees , i t i s mor e likel y tha t th e statutoril y prescribe d premiums would hav e been paid. As th e America n labo r movemen t begin s it s secon d century , i t i s confronted b y challenge s tha t threaten it s ver y existence . I n 1954 , union members constituted 35 percent of nonagricultural labor force participants.6 By 1980, this rate had declined t o 23 percent, and by 1991, union membership represented a mere 16 percent of nonagricultural workers.7 Labor organizations that had won 70 to 86 percent of representatio n election s conducte d b y th e Nationa l Labo r Relations Boar d durin g the 1940 s an d 6 1 to 7 5 percent o f th e election s held durin g the 1950s 8 prevailed in fewer than half o f the elections held durin g 1991. 9 I f thi s downwar d tren d continues , union s wil l represent a mere 5 percent o f privat e secto r personne l b y the yea r 2000.10 Many peopl e believ e tha t labo r institution s posses s to o muc h power, suppor t economicall y inefficien t wor k rules , an d provid e representational service s tha t ar e no t neede d b y individual s em ployed b y contemporar y busines s enterprises . Employer s dissemi nate information designed to convince white-collar and professional

Overview 3

employees tha t labo r organizations benefi t onl y workin g clas s per sons. I n "classless" American society, th e vast majority o f individ uals consider themselves par t of the ubiquitous "middl e class" ; no one wants to be characterized a s "working class." A significant facto r contributing to the erosion o f public suppor t for unions is the highly publicized disclosures of illegal behavior by some labor officials.11 A federal cour t recently placed the Teamsters Union in a trusteeship to root out corrupt officials; numerous union leaders hav e bee n tie d t o underworl d crim e families ; an d variou s business agents have been imprisoned for the embezzlement of union welfare funds. Whe n labor officials ar e involved, media stories frequently emplo y pejorativ e term s suc h a s "organize d crime " an d "racketeering" to describe their conduct. When business leaders misuse clien t o r compan y funds , however , th e les s opprobriou s ter m "white-collar crime " is generally used. The unconscionable sweatshop conditions that were pervasive in the early twentieth century have been substantially eliminated, and the labo r movemen t ha s directl y o r indirectly 12 establishe d funda mental industria l justic e i n th e workplace . A s a result , th e mora l fervor of the crusading union sympathizers of the past is rarely seen today.13 Th e charismatic instigator s o f socia l refor m an d economi c equality wh o previousl y inspire d million s o f worker s t o unit e i n progressive labor organizations are gone, and few current labor representatives ar e able to generate similar intensity. 14 Many contemporary union leaders exude a complacency typifie d by forme r AFL-CIO president Georg e Meany, wh o frequentl y indi cated tha t h e wa s no t overl y concerne d wit h th e leve l o f unio n membership: Why should we worry about organizing groups of people who do not want to be organized? If they prefer to have others speak for them and make the decisions which affect thei r lives, without effective participatio n on their part, that is their right— I used to worry about the size of the membership. But quite a few years ago I just stopped worrying about it, because to me it doesn't make any difference.15 Numerous lowe r leve l unio n representative s exhibi t a similar ide ological insouciance . Changing demographic , industrial , an d technologica l condition s have also undermined labo r cohesiveness and effectiveness. Durin g the past several decades , the composition an d location o f the labor

4 Overvie w force have dramatically changed. The participation rate for women, traditionally employed in unorganized occupations, has significantly expanded.16 The labor force participatio n rate for minority person s has also increased. 17 Labo r organizations tha t have not been historically responsiv e t o th e need s o f femal e an d minorit y employee s must modify their bargaining objectives to appeal to these new labor force entrants. One o f th e mos t strikin g demographi c trend s ove r th e pas t tw o decades ha s bee n th e migratio n o f employee s an d job s fro m th e Northeast an d North Central area s of th e countr y t o the Sout h an d Southwest. Th e population and industrial migratio n from the Rustbelt to the Sunbelt is likely to continue. More than half o f all union members presentl y resid e i n Rustbel t states. 18 Union s wil l hav e t o recruit members in other regions if they are to retain their economic viability. The increased incorporation of new technologies in the workplace has significantly altere d the structure of the American economy. The substitution o f capita l fo r labor in the manufacturin g are a has cos t many organize d blue-colla r personne l thei r job s an d generate d a concomitant increas e i n nonunio n white-colla r positions . Th e em ployees performing unskilled production functions lack the capacity to exert substantial economi c pressur e against their automated and diversified employers , and labor organizations have difficulty usin g traditional bargaining techniques to enhance the employment rights of those individuals. 19 The technological development s tha t have significantly modifie d the structur e o f the American economy hav e contributed greatl y to the internationalization o f the global economi c system . By the year 2000, severa l hundre d multinationa l corporation s wil l dominat e world trade . Th e develope d nation s provid e th e capital-intensiv e technologies, th e consume r markets , an d th e distributio n systems , while th e developin g countrie s provid e lo w cos t labor . The prolif eration of low cost "export platforms" has caused the export of many blue-collar production jobs. If labor organizations want to meaningfully influenc e th e employment policies of international businesses, they must coordinat e thei r efforts wit h union s locate d i n the othe r countries i n which those enterprise s operate. Demographic, industrial, an d technological change s do not entirely explain the declin e i n labor union membership ove r the past thirty years i n th e Unite d States . Man y o f th e sam e industria l an d tech -

Overview 5 nological phenomen a hav e als o occurre d i n Canada , ye t th e labo r movement ther e ha s no t suffere d a similar fate . Approximatel y 3 5 percent of Canadian employees are union members, and 45 percen t continue t o be covered by collective bargainin g agreements. 20 Even the membership rosters of industrial unions such as the Steelworkers and the Automobile Workers have continued to grow during the past twenty years. 21 A majo r distinctio n betwee n America n an d Canadia n busines s entities is the great antipathy United States employers have exhibited toward the organizational rights of their employees. A recent survey found that 95 percent of private sector companies in the United States actively resis t labo r organizin g efforts. 22 Corporation s hav e devel oped sophisticate d electio n appeal s designe d t o convinc e worker s that labo r organization s merel y exac t exorbitan t due s i n exchang e for minimal benefit s an d diminis h th e professiona l imag e o f thos e whom the y represent . Mor e aggressive anti-unio n technique s tran scend behavio r manipulatio n an d involv e overtl y unlawfu l tactic s in violation of federal labor law. Key union supporters are regularly discharged, an d expres s o r implied threat s ar e made regardin g the loss o f employmen t securit y that would resul t from unionization. 23 It has been estimated that legal and unlawful management opposition to employee organization accounts for as much as 40 percent of the declining succes s rat e of union s i n National Labo r Relations Board representation elections. 24 Is th e declin e o f th e America n labo r movemen t symptomati c o f a terminal condition ? Wil l th e countr y continu e it s inexorabl e tran sition toward th e en d o f th e unio n era ? As white-collar employee s and technological innovation s supplan t blue-collar workers and industrial behaviorists humanize employment environments, some observers conclud e tha t unio n representatio n wil l n o longe r b e necessary.25 Others, however, predict that labor organizations can be rejuvenated if they revolutionize their objectives and modernize their tactics.26 Befor e examinin g th e futur e viabilit y o f trad e unions , i t would b e beneficia l t o acknowledg e th e impac t union s hav e upo n the employment condition s an d rights of employees. When most peopl e thin k o f th e benefits provide d b y labo r organizations, the y generall y conside r th e economi c gain s achieve d b y unionized employees . Suc h a view i s reinforce d b y empirica l dat a demonstrating tha t organize d worker s ear n mor e tha n thei r unor ganized cohorts.27 Not only do represented personnel usually receive

6 Overvie w higher wages , bu t the y als o ten d t o b e covere d b y mor e generou s benefit programs . They are more likely to have health coverage and pension plans . Many have dental and eye coverage, and some eve n receive limite d lega l care . Th e abilit y o f labo r organization s t o in crease labo r costs abov e market levels i s normall y attribute d to the "monopoly" effec t tha t enable s union s t o restric t th e grou p o f in dividuals wh o may be employed b y a particular firm. Unorganized employees benefit indirectly from the successful bargaining activities of labor organizations. Their employers frequentl y provide compensatio n an d fringe benefit package s that are competitive with those enjoyed by unionized employee s t o dissuade the m from organizing.28 These employers recognize that if the benefits they pay their workers fall too far below those earned by unionized per sonnel, their employees ma y contemplate organizationa l activity . The economic gains achieved directl y and indirectly by labor organizations shoul d no t be overemphasized . Throug h th e collectiv e voice exerted by organized groups, workers are also able to advance nonmonetary interests. 29 Fo r example, collectiv e bargainin g agree ment provision s generall y preclud e disciplin e excep t fo r "jus t cause." In the absence of such a contractual restriction, private sector employers ar e fre e i n th e Unite d State s t o terminat e o r otherwis e discipline employee s fo r good cause , bad cause, o r no cause a t all, unless suc h actio n contravene s a specifi c statutor y proscription. 30 Because private corporations are not "state actors"—i.e., they do not function a s governmental entities—the y ar e not subjec t to the substantive an d procedura l limitation s impose d o n federal , state , an d municipal employer s unde r th e Unite d State s Constitution . A s a result, private sector employees enjoy no free speech or due process rights vis-&-vis their own employers. Contractual clause s typicall y establis h orderl y layof f an d recal l procedures. Specific terms often require the application of objective promotional criteria . Seniority provisions normally determine shift , transfer, and vacation preferences. Other employment rights and benefits that would normally be left to employer discretion may similarly be defined in collective bargaining agreements. When unionized employees are not satisfied with the manner in which contractual terms are interprete d an d applied , the y ma y see k redres s throug h griev ance-arbitration procedures. Business enterprise s depen d o n th e inpu t o f thre e fundamenta l groups: investors, managers , and workers . A s eac h o f thes e group s competes fo r a greate r shar e o f profit s an d fo r mor e contro l ove r

Overview 7 corporate decisio n making , individua l employee s ar e a t a distinc t disadvantage. Investment capital is a highly mobile commodity. For this reason, companies seeking investment capital provide prospective stoc k o r bond holder s wit h detaile d informatio n regardin g the proposed venture. 31 Federal and state securities statutes also protect investors b y mandatin g th e disclosur e o f relevan t financial data to anyone thinking of providing monetary support. When investors become disenchanted with the performance of a particular corporation, they can simply sell their shares and transfer the proceeds to different ventures. Professional manager s may similarly protec t their own interests. Those with relatively unique skills can negotiate long-term contracts that provide "golde n parachutes " in case the business relationshi p is terminate d prematurely . High-leve l executive s ar e normall y ac quainted with their counterparts at other business entities, and they can use thos e contact s to locate othe r employment opportunitie s if they decide to leave their current firms. Rank-and-file employee s d o no t enjo y suc h privileges . The y ar e fortunate t o hav e on e o r two jo b opportunitie s a t an y give n time . Prospective employers feel no need to give them detailed information regarding firm affairs. Once workers accept employment with a specific company , they enjo y minimal mobility . The y have limited in formation abou t othe r jo b opening s an d th e transactio n cost s associated with relocation may be substantial. When workers change jobs, they may lose some or all of their pension rights, and they must forfeit seniority, thus significantly jeopardizin g their future employment security. It i s ironi c tha t th e individual s wh o posses s th e leas t mobilit y normally exercise only marginal control over their employment destiny. Unorganized workers are generally powerless to negotiate with employers ove r thei r wages , hours , an d workin g conditions . The y must accept the terms offered o r look for alternative employment. If they are directed to submit to drug testing or to engage in particularly arduous tasks , the y hav e n o rea l choic e bu t t o submi t o r forsak e employment wit h tha t particula r employer . Thi s los s o f persona l freedom results directly from the considerable inequality of bargaining power that exists between the individual employee and corporate managers. The substantia l declin e i n unio n strengt h ove r th e pas t severa l decades has deprived mos t workers of meaningful collectiv e representation. I f labo r organization s becom e wholl y ineffective , man y

8 Overvie w employers will undoubtedly exploi t their employees by retaining an excessive portio n o f profits , maintainin g substandar d workin g con ditions, and subjecting low-level personnel to arbitrary treatment. In the absence of a viable labor movement, federal an d stat e legislator s will be less inclined t o support statute s protectin g worker interests . Although industria l democrac y restrict s manageria l freedom , i t can als o enhanc e economi c efficiency . Nonunionize d employee s who ar e dissatisfie d wit h thei r workin g condition s ca n onl y dem onstrate their displeasur e through resor t to the "exit voice.'* 32 When disenchanted peopl e voluntaril y terminat e thei r employment , thei r employer must assume the costs associated with recruiting and training other workers. In contrast, the collective bargaining process provides employee s wit h th e opportunit y t o modif y unsatisfactor y conditions.33 T o th e exten t individual s ar e permitte d t o influenc e employment condition s and business decision s that impact on thei r economic futures , the y ar e mor e likel y t o hav e a personal commit ment to the enterprise. They are more inclined to agree with the final determinations made , an d a s a resul t t o b e mor e cooperativ e an d productive workers . Unionizatio n no t onl y benefit s employee s an d employers, but als o societ y a s a whole. Although som e labo r organization s hav e no t alway s acte d a s re sponsible employe e representatives , mos t union s hav e worke d ap propriately t o advanc e th e right s o f workers . I f employe e organizations ca n n o longer enhanc e th e employmen t condition s of employees, w e wil l witnes s a retur n t o traditiona l master-servan t relationships. Individual employee s wil l b e unable t o influence th e terms o f thei r employment , an d employer s wil l b e abl e t o impos e arbitrary conditions. If the balance of power between labor and man agement i s to be maintained a t all, labor union s mus t b e preserved . This book explores the actions required i f labor organizations ar e to be rejuvenated . Chapter 2 traces the historical development o f labor organization s in the United State s from socia l and professiona l order s to busines s institutions. Thi s backgroun d provide s a broa d perspectiv e o n th e current plight of unions and an understanding of the measures labo r unions mus t tak e i f the y ar e t o functio n a s vita l force s i n th e 21s t century. Chapter 3 focuses o n the actual extent of union decline an d examines th e demographic , industrial , technological , sociological , and internationa l trend s contributin g t o that deterioration . Chapte r 4 discusse s th e nee d fo r union s t o improv e thei r publi c imag e an d

Overview 9

to develop innovativ e techniques to organize occupations that have traditionally bee n unreceptiv e t o unionization . Chapte r 5 analyze s the mean s b y whic h labo r organizations ma y increas e worke r em powerment an d advanc e thei r employmen t conditions . I t als o ex amines how internationa l unio n cooperatio n must be developed t o counterbalance th e activitie s o f transnationa l busines s enterprises . Finally, chapter 6 focuses on the National Labor Relations Act. Specifically, i t considers the need fo r congressional actio n to revitalize the NLRA by enhancing th e organization an d collective bargainin g rights of employees , deterrin g unlawfu l employe r conduct , an d reaffirming th e legislativ e objective s underlyin g th e origina l 193 5 enactment.

2. TH E HISTORICA L FOUNDATIO N OF AMERICAN LABO R

During the Colonial period , ther e were relatively fe w fre e workers. 1 The grea t majorit y o f laborer s wer e eithe r slave s o r indenture d ser vants. A s trad e an d commerc e expanded , ther e wa s a n increase d demand fo r unconstraine d workers . Skille d craftsme n wh o estab lished smal l store s preferre d t o hir e nonindenture d individual s whom the y coul d la y off whe n busines s slackened . A s the term s of indentured servant s expired and numerous craftsmen immigrate d t o the New World from Europe , lured by the comparatively high wages paid fo r skille d labor an d th e glowin g account s o f lif e i n America , the numbe r o f unencumbered wag e earner s steadil y increased . In most early shops, there was no well-defined distinctio n between the interests of the master and the other workers. Journeymen hope d to become maste r craftsmen , an d apprentice s looke d forwar d t o th e attainment o f journeyman status . The product marke t was localized , and the master bargained directl y with customers regarding produc t pricing. Becaus e o f th e relativ e scarcit y o f competen t skille d labor , masters could generally establish noncompetitive prices. As a result, wage rates tended t o exceed those available in Europe. This did not , however, guarante e beneficia l employmen t condition s fo r al l jour neymen an d apprentices . They stil l ha d t o be concerned wit h com petition fro m slave s an d indenture d workers . Whe n busines s declined, nonindenture d worker s wer e frequently lai d off . CRAFT GUILD S

Rudimentary labor organization s existe d i n th e colonie s a s early a s the seventeent h century . The y wer e primaril y guild s comprise d o f 10

The Historical Foundatio n of American Labor 1 I artisans who marketed their own products. They endeavored to preserve professiona l standard s b y regulatin g apprenticeshi p require ments and exerting control over wage rates and product pricing. The few work stoppages that occurred during the colonial period did not involve strikes by workers seeking improved compensation and employment conditions from masters, but protests by master craftsmen against local government regulations that relaxed apprenticeship requirements o r established pric e ceilings. The first genuine labo r strike occurred in 1786 , when a group of Philadelphia printer s "turne d out " i n favo r o f a minimu m wag e of $6.0 0 pe r week . Althoug h th e employer s initiall y resiste d their demand , th e printer s ultimatel y prevailed . Nonetheless , i t was no t unti l 179 2 tha t an y continuin g organizatio n o f wag e earners wa s formed . I n that year , the Philadelphi a shoemaker s create d a trade union that existed fo r approximately on e year. Othe r localized craf t union s wer e forme d throughou t th e country . Althoug h many functione d a s fraterna l socia l orders , the y sough t highe r wages, shorte r hours , th e enforcemen t o f stric t apprenticeshi p regulations, an d a closed sho p precludin g th e employment o f nonmembers. Initial Judicial Oppositio n t o Organize d Labo r

Early judicial decision s severel y restricted the ability of workers to engage i n concerte d activit y t o furthe r thei r economi c interests . Judges found that collective action by journeymen constituted either restraints upo n trad e in violation o f antitrus t doctrine s o r criminal conspiracies agains t publi c welfare . Eve n sympath y strike s an d peaceful consume r boycotts were considered illegal . The firs t majo r decisio n t o acknowledg e th e legitimac y o f con certed worke r actio n wa s Commonwealth v . Hunt. 2 Chie f Justic e Shaw o f th e Suprem e Judicia l Cour t o f Massachusett s refuse d t o permit application of the traditional criminal conspiracy doctrine to peaceful grou p conduc t seekin g enhance d employmen t terms . The Court found tha t allegations tha t the defendants ha d agreed amon g themselves no t t o wor k fo r an y maste r wh o employe d nonunio n workers were not alone sufficient t o establish criminal liability. The Court further ruled that the mere fact that this association had caused a loss o f wor k to nonunio n journeyme n wa s not illegal , s o lon g as inappropriate mean s wer e no t utilize d t o injur e suc h nonunio n individuals.

12 Th e Historical Foundatio n of American Labor Early Labo r Involvemen t i n the Politica l Aren a

In 1834 , th e Nationa l Trade s Unio n (NTU) , the firs t nationa l labo r organization i n th e Unite d States , wa s formed . Th e delegate s ap proved a platfor m i n favo r o f manua l schools , reduce d workin g hours, an d th e maintenanc e o f establishe d wag e rates , but the y op posed the employment of women outside the home. Most of the early craft guild s feare d tha t th e employmen t o f femal e worker s woul d undermine guild wage rates, and they generally discouraged the employment o f women . Althoug h th e NT U constitutio n expressl y ex cluded politica l action , i t becam e apparen t tha t man y o f th e organization's basic objectives coul d no t be achieved withou t direc t political activity . A s a result, member s forme d th e Workin g Men' s Party, th e first politica l part y o f workin g peopl e i n th e world . Th e new labo r party was not received warml y by established politician s who endeavore d t o diver t th e activis t laborer s int o conventiona l party channels. The party sought to maintain its own worker identity, but becam e defunc t b y 1931. Despite judicial hostilit y towar d worke r collectiv e action , strike s occurred repeatedly throughout the 1840s and 1850s . Some entailed spontaneous employe e walkout s protestin g unilatera l change s i n working conditions, while others were orchestrated b y labor group s seeking improved employmen t terms. These work stoppages usuall y involved skille d personnel . Som e achieve d limite d success , whil e others ende d i n failure .

EGALITARIAN ASSOCIATION S

In 1866, seventy-seven delegates from various craft organizations met in Baltimor e t o establis h th e Nationa l Labo r Unio n (NLU) . Th e NLU wa s a loosel y connecte d federatio n o f nationa l trad e unions , city trade s assemblies , loca l trad e unions , an d refor m organiza tions o f variou s kinds . Th e leader s o f th e ne w worke r associatio n opposed strikes , whic h the y sai d wer e "productiv e o f grea t injur y to laborin g classes,.. . have bee n injudiciou s an d ill-advised , an d the resul t o f impuls e rathe r tha n principle." 3 The y alternativel y recommended mor e frequen t relianc e upo n arbitratio n committee s to resolv e labor-managemen t controversies . Th e NL U sough t eight-hour statutes , equa l pa y fo r equa l wor k regardles s o f th e race o r gende r o f thos e performin g th e work , an d ful l employmen t

The Historical Foundation of American Labor 1 3 and organizational right s for both women an d blacks. Nonetheless, William Silvis , on e o f th e NL U founders, indicate d tha t whil e th e NLU wa s oblige d t o advanc e th e interest s o f femal e workers , h e did no t thin k tha t wome n belonge d i n th e labo r force . H e als o believed tha t wome n wh o wer e compelle d t o wor k outside th e home shoul d remai n i n traditiona l femal e occupations . Althoug h many NL U leader s supporte d a nationa l agenda , mos t member s were primaril y intereste d i n loca l issues . Followin g th e deat h o f William Silvis i n 1869 , the organization began to decline. By 1872, it had virtually disappeared .

The Knight s o f Labo r

The Panic of 187 3 ushered in a six-year period of economic depression that significantly undermined worker organizing. Many existing craft union s experience d bot h membershi p decline s an d financial hardships. The railroad strike s durin g the summer of 1877 , precipitated by wage reductions, were particularly violent. Federal troops and state militia were called out to restore order. These tumultuous work stoppage s provide d th e publi c wit h graphi c evidenc e o f th e dire consequence s associate d wit h deterioratin g labor-managemen t relationships. Americans began to recognize that they could no t escape the conflicts between labor and capital that had begun to challenge the governments o f various European nations. One of the important labo r organizations t o survive the 1873-7 9 depression was the Noble Order of the Knights of Labor, established by Philadelphi a tailor s i n 1869 . Th e leader s o f thi s ne w unio n realized that the lack of strength that trade unions had exhibited during the depression years was in large part attributable to the lack of real labor unity. The y believed tha t power would com e fro m a consolidation of all labor groups in a single organization that included both skilled an d unskille d workers . The y welcome d int o thei r ranks all working people , regardles s o f rac e or gender, eve n member s o f th e professions an d employers. The Knights established expansive objectives . They sought to secure for workers "a proper share of the wealth that they create; more leisure that belongs to them; more societary advantages; more of the benefits, privileges and emoluments of the world."4 The organization called for the establishment of producer and consumer cooperatives, and the creation of cultural orders. It proposed that arbitration pro-

14 The Historical Foundation of American Labor cedures be substituted for disruptive work stoppages and advocated eight-hour laws and regulations mandating equal pay for equal work regardless of gender. The Knight s o f Labo r was a highly structure d organizatio n tha t sought to achieve a n amalgam of loca l union s i n a nationwide fed eration. Since the local union assemblies included both skilled and unskilled workers , the y resemble d hybri d combination s o f craf t unions and industrial unions. The sympathy strike became a particularly poten t economi c weapon , wit h th e collectiv e powe r o f th e skilled trade s enhancin g th e clou t o f th e unskille d personnel . Th e Knights also employed consumer boycotts to further their objectives. When concerted economic action could not achieve more expansive goals, the Knights resorted to political action. They created various labor parties, which ultimately ran political candidates in thirtyfour o f th e nation' s thirty-fiv e states . Som e labo r part y candidate s were electe d t o various stat e and loca l offices . Th e individual s oc cupying suc h politica l position s wer e abl e t o exercis e a degree o f authority that transcended the influence possesse d by conventional labor union officials . Terence Powderl y succeede d Uria h Stephen s a s Gran d Maste r Workman in 1879 . One of his early accomplishments wa s an agreement with Cardinal Gibbons that acknowledged tha t the Knights of Labor was a bona fide labo r organization , an d no t a secret revolu tionary society that contravened the teachings of the Catholic church. This accor d preclude d a church ba n that woul d hav e severel y un dermined organizationa l membership . Not onl y di d Terenc e Powderl y lea d th e Knight s o f Labo r until 1893, but he also served three two-year terms as mayor of Scranton, Pennsylvania, fro m 187 9 to 1884 . After he steppe d dow n as Grand Master Workman, he was appointed by President William McKinley to a post i n the Unite d State s Department o f Commerce . Powderl y did not believe in traditional trade unions and considered the strike an ineffectua l an d detrimenta l device , bu t he worke d diligentl y t o enhance the rights of workers. When the Knights established fund s to support strike s conducte d b y loca l affiliates , despit e Powderly' s personal opposition to work stoppages, it was agreed that job actions would onl y b e employe d whe n labo r and managemen t difference s could no t be resolved throug h negotiation o r arbitration. A turning point for the Knights of Labor came when it negotiated employment terms with financierJay Gould, who operated the southwestern portio n o f th e Wabash Railroad. Goul d initiall y refuse d t o

The Historical Foundatio n of American Labo r 1 5 recognize the right of the Knights of Labor to speak for the workers. A strike commenced o n August 18 , 1885. By the end of the month, Gould ha d agree d t o mee t wit h Powderl y an d t o authoriz e hi s ex ecutives to negotiate a collective agreement. In early 1886, however, branches of the Gould railroad refused to honor the accord. A strike on th e Texa s Pacifi c bega n o n Marc h 1 , 1886 , bu t th e unio n wa s unable to achieve its objective. Gould refused to fulfill a commitment Powderly though t h e ha d mad e t o arbitrat e th e unresolve d issues . When the Knights sought to terminate the work stoppage, the railroad refused t o reinstate half th e strikers, including those who had been the mos t activ e strik e supporters . Th e unio n thereafte r trie d t o regenerate the work stoppage, but was ultimatel y force d t o acknowl edge that the job action had failed. The Knight s o f Labo r suffered a similar defea t i n th e anthracit e coal fields of Pennsylvania. Union leaders proposed a wage increase, but Lehig h operator s refuse d t o bargain ove r the worke r demands . A wor k stoppag e bega n i n Septembe r 1887 . Worker s a t nonstruc k mines provided sympathy support for the Lehigh strikers, and other coal operators assisted the Lehigh operators by supplying them with coal the y neede d t o satisf y custome r demands . Member s o f th e Knights o f Labo r working for Reading operators who wer e sending coal t o struc k Lehig h operator s refuse d t o loa d coa l ont o Lehig h barges. Railroa d employee s similarl y refuse d t o handl e coa l bein g sent from Reading mines to the Lehigh area. The sympathetic Reading miners and railroad workers were discharged, and the affected min e worker and railroad local unions were destroyed . Private security forces significantl y enhance d the ability o f companies to withstand strike activity. They ejected union sympathizers from plan t premise s an d employe d toug h tactic s t o suppres s con certed job actions. When major disturbances occurred , loca l polic e and eve n stat e militi a wer e calle d upo n t o protec t th e interest s o f the affecte d employer . Becaus e employee s di d no t hav e a legall y protected right to strike, companies affected b y work stoppages frequently terminated the strike participants. They used private security officers t o eject the discharged individual s from plant premises and to ensure that they would no t return. Haymarket Squar e an d th e Demis e o f th e Knight s

By 1886, membership i n the Knights of Labor began to decline. On May 4 o f that year, employee s o f the McCormick Reaper Company

16 Th e Historical Foundatio n of American Labo r went on strike seeking higher wages and reduced hours . Strike leaders called a mass meeting at Haymarket Squar e to protest police an d company tactics . A crow d o f 1,00 0 t o 3,00 0 unio n sympathizer s assembled to listen to various speakers. The Chicago police provided a force of 180 officers t o maintain control. After several people spoke and th e initia l crow d bega n t o depart, a police detachmen t inexpli cably marched toward the wagon on which anarchist Samuel Fielden was speaking. A bomb was tossed amon g the police by a bystander, causing the death of seven persons, including several police officers . Many well-know n anarchist s wer e arrested , wit h murde r indict ments being quickly returned agains t ten, including one person wh o was neve r apprehende d an d anothe r wh o agree d t o testif y fo r th e prosecution. Althoug h n o defendan t wa s directl y connecte d t o th e Haymarket Squar e bombing, all eigh t wer e convicted . Seve n defen dants received the death penalty, while the eighth was given a fifteenyear priso n term . Church leaders and newspaper editors condemned the Haymarket Square incident. Although th e person wh o actually threw the bomb was never identified, man y members of the general public attribute d the heinou s ac t t o labo r sympathizers . A s a result , publi c suppor t for organize d labo r decline d dramatically . B y the en d o f the 1880s , the Knight s o f Labo r was n o longer a viable organization . THE TRAD E UNIO N MOVEMEN T

By th e lat e 1870s , labo r leader s bega n t o recogniz e th e nee d fo r a national federatio n o f trad e unions . The y di d no t conside r th e Knights of Labor to be a true labor entity. Unlike most existing trade unions tha t wer e organized alon g narrow craf t lines , the Knight s of Labor wa s a n egalitaria n institutio n tha t admitte d bot h skille d an d unskilled workers . I n 1878 , President Josep h Bisho p o f th e Amal gamated Associatio n o f Iro n an d Stee l Worker s invite d othe r trad e unions to send delegate s to a special conferenc e tha t would explor e the manne r i n whic h suc h a trad e unio n federatio n coul d b e established. On Augus t 2 , 1881 , a convention o f Unite d State s an d Canadia n labor leader s wa s hel d i n Terr e Haute , Indiana , an d a follow-u p conference was conducted on November 15,1881, in Pittsburgh. The delegates who attende d hope d t o establish a trade unio n federatio n patterned afte r th e Trade s Unio n Congress i n England . Althoug h officials fro m variou s Knight s o f Labo r affiliate s attende d th e Pitts -

The Historical Foundatio n of American Labo r 1 7 burgh conference, the more conventional ideas of the trade unionists prevailed. The Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United State s and Canada was born. The preambl e fo r the ne w Federatio n containe d rhetori c typica l of labor institutions of the nineteenth century, declaring that "a struggle i s goin g o n i n th e nation s o f th e civilize d worl d betwee n op pressors an d oppresse d o f al l countries , a struggle betwee n capita l and labor, which must grow in intensity from year to year and work disastrous results to the toiling millions of all nations if not combined for mutual protection and benefit."5 The initial Federation objectives were traditional: restrictions on the use of child and immigrant labor; prohibitions agains t the use o f scri p instead o f cas h to compensat e workers; uniform apprentice regulations; eight-hour legislation; and endorsement o f protectiv e tariffs . The Federatio n initiall y experience d financial difficultie s an d minimal growth . Th e competitio n betwee n th e Federatio n an d th e Knights of Labo r continued. I n 1886, Federation leaders assemble d a group of national trad e union officials i n Philadelphia "t o protect our respective organizations from the malicious work of an element who openl y boast 'tha t trade unions mus t be destroyed.' " 6 A committee drafte d a "treaty" that was to be presented t o the Knights of Labor. It would have severely restricted the labor activities that could be conducte d b y the Knight s an d woul d hav e effectivel y rendere d that entity a social and educational order . The Knights did not take definitive actio n with respect to the Federation proposal . The America n Federatio n o f Labo r

On Novembe r 10 , 1886 , th e Federatio n convene d a conferenc e o f trade union s i n Columbus , Ohio . The delegate s passe d resolution s encouraging th e America n trad e unio n movemen t an d supportin g the establishment o f trad e assemblies an d councils. The y als o proposed transformin g th e Federation int o an American Federatio n of Labor (AFL), with Samue l Gomper s elected a s first president o f the new organization. Despite their previous interorganizational rivalry, the AFL convention paid tribute to the past accomplishments of the Knights of Labor. Gompers had a significant impac t upon the evolution of the AFL. With the exception of one year in the mid-1890s, he served as president fro m 188 6 unti l 1924 . Eve n thoug h h e neve r controlle d an y national trad e unio n an d face d constan t oppositio n t o his policie s

18 Th e Historical Foundatio n of American Labo r from other AFL officials an d members, Gompers dramatically influ enced th e developmen t o f business unionis m i n the United States . Gompers recognized that the United States economy was expanding and realize d tha t suc h circumstance s woul d permi t th e continue d elevation of real wages. He acknowledged tha t American social and political conditions were not supportive of open class hostility, and counseled relianc e o n politica l actio n an d traditiona l trad e unio n collective conduct . The early years of the AFL were not particularly auspicious. Some of th e affiliate d trad e union s feare d tha t th e ne w federatio n migh t expand it s powe r base at the expense o f membe r union autonomy . Other unions complained about the financial cost of AFL affiliation. Gompers attempte d t o assuag e thes e concern s b y emphasizin g th e degree o f organizationa l freedo m retaine d b y AF L affiliates . "Th e American Federation o f Labor avoids the fatal rock upon which al l previous attempts to affect the unity of the working class have split, by leaving to each body or affiliated organizatio n the complete management o f it s ow n affairs , especiall y it s ow n particula r trad e af fairs."7 H e als o agree d a t th e 188 7 conventio n t o recommen d a reduction i n the per capita tax contributed t o the AFL on behalf of affiliate members . Unlike th e Knight s o f Labor , the AF L refused t o admi t t o membership organizations that did not function primarily as trade unions. The AFL sought to preserve the craft exclusivity o f each affiliate, t o avoid injurious jurisdictional disputes . In addition, the AFL refused to endorse the People's Party, which the Knights of Labor supported. Despite th e reluctanc e o f AF L leaders t o suppor t a separate labo r party, the y wer e no t indifferen t t o th e politica l process . The y em ployed traditional lobbying techniques to obtain passage of laws that provided beneficia l employmen t conditions , an d the y endorse d Democratic an d Republica n candidate s wh o favore d legislatio n o f interest to organized labor. During th e 1890s , organize d labo r wa s activ e i n th e legislativ e arena. Through diligent lobbyin g efforts, th e AFL and other unions were able to achieve the enactment of various state and federal law s that were of significant benefit to workers. Some mandated a shorter work day, several sought to eliminate the worst sweatshops by prohibiting manufacturing i n tenement dwellings, others abolished the use of company scrip to compensate employees, and a few proscribed anti-union discrimination . Man y o f thes e legislativ e accomplish ments, however, were ephemeral. Corporation s expeditiousl y chal -

The Historical Foundation of American Labor 1 9 lenged th e propriet y o f suc h lega l restrictions , an d they frequentl y found a sympathetic judiciary. Relying upon such legal doctrines as "freedom o f contract " an d th e sanctit y o f "propert y rights, " stat e and federal court s struc k dow n approximatel y sixt y labo r and employment enactments by 1900. By the conclusion o f the nineteenth century , Gompers and other labor leader s ha d t o acknowledg e tha t politica l actio n coul d no t always provide lasting results. Even when they were able to prevail upon state or federal legislators to enact laws protecting fundamental employee interests , employer s coul d see k th e assistanc e o f a n accommodating judiciary. B y emphasizing the need to preserve complete freedo m o f contract , busines s entitie s wer e successfu l i n negating the effectiveness of labor lobbying efforts. AFL leaders could no longer rely upon the political proces s to subdue the "tyranny of capital." "Labor does not depend on legislation. It asks... no favors from the State. It wants to be let alone and to be allowed to exercise its rights."8 Trade union officials began to recognize that they would have to secure worker protections through the traditional collectiv e bargaining process. 9 Despite Gompers * pessimism wit h respec t t o th e efficac y o f po litical action, the AFL continued to seek legislation favorable to workers. I t als o continue d it s effor t t o convinc e court s tha t suc h enactments shoul d no t be considere d impermissibl e infringement s on contractua l freedom . I n 1916 , organize d labo r finally induce d Congress to adopt the Adamson Act, 10 which establishe d th e eighthour day principle. In Wilson v. New,11 the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionalit y o f tha t enactment . Yellow-do g contract s wer e successfully outlawe d i n th e Norris-LaGuardi a Act. 12 I n Phelp s Dodge Corp . v. NLRB, 13 the Suprem e Cour t acknowledged tha t th e freedom o f contrac t reasonin g employe d previousl y i n case s lik e Adair v. United States 14 could no longer withstand judicial scrutiny. Anti-Labor Response s to th e AF L

As AFL affiliates expande d their organizing activities, they encountered stiff oppositio n from both employers and government officials . Private guards , stat e militia , an d federa l troop s wer e employe d t o negate the impact of collective worker action. Judges and prosecutors were used to imprison those union leaders with the temerity to defy injunctive orders . Organized labo r began to realize ho w difficul t i t was to exert sustained economic pressure against major corporations.

20 Th e Historical Foundatio n of American Labo r By the earl y twentieth century , mos t privat e employer s were un alterably opposed to employee unionization. Many companies joined business organization s designe d t o preven t thei r worker s fro m be coming trade unio n members . Businesses wer e cautioned abou t th e economic powe r o f union s an d encourage d t o inhibi t th e sprea d o f organized labor . Many regiona l employe r association s wer e develope d t o assis t companies seekin g to prevent th e spread o f unionization. 15 A group of corporation s tryin g t o defea t organizin g drive s conducte d b y th e International Association of Machinists established the Independent Labor League of America. They enrolled machinist s wh o were willing t o ac t a s strikebreakers. 16 B y 1911 , their organizatio n ha d re cruited 6,60 0 machinist s i n Chicag o alone . Wit h th e assistanc e o f private security companies, Independent League members infiltrate d unions with spies. Other employer groups also utilized espionag e to ascertain secre t labo r plan s i n an effor t t o thwart organizationa l ob jectives. Companie s regularl y require d worker s t o sig n yellow-do g contracts barring membership in labor organizations. Individuals discharged as a result of their union membership often ha d their names placed o n "blac k lists* * that wer e circulate d t o othe r companie s i n the are a t o prevent thei r futur e employmen t wit h them . The America n Anti-Boycott Associatio n wa s formed fo r th e pur pose o f prosecutin g cour t case s agains t boycott s an d sympath y strikes.17 Member s routinel y sough t injunctiv e order s agains t suc h collective action , an d monetar y damage s agains t union s an d labo r leaders wh o disobeye d judicia l edicts . Businesses als o enliste d th e aid o f stat e an d loca l polic e forces . Trespass , disorderl y conduct , and traffi c obstructio n law s wer e frequentl y applie d t o strik e conduct.18 State and federal judges continued to apply antitrust and crimina l conspiracy doctrine s t o eve n peacefu l collectiv e action . Combina tions of workers were regularly found to interfere impermissibly with free trade and commerce. These groups openly endeavored to inhibit the associationa l freedo m tha t ha d alread y bee n recognize d a s a n inherent righ t o f al l free laborer s i n othe r industria l nations . AFL leader s continue d t o lobb y fo r legislatio n tha t woul d ac knowledge the legitimacy o f concerted worke r conduct an d preven t judicial interference wit h such activities. Organized labo r thought i t had finally achieved this objective when Congress adopted the Clayton Act 19 i n 1914 . Section 6 of that enactmen t provide d employee s

The Historical Foundatio n of American Labor 2 1 with what Samuel Gompers characterized a s the "Industrial Magna Carta."20 The labor of a human being is no t a commodity o r article of commerce. Nothing containe d i n th e antitrust law s shal l b e construed t o forbi d the existence and operation of labor... organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help... or to forbid or restrain individual member s of such organizations from lawfully carryin g out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, b e held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.21 Section 20 of the Clayton Act further provided that no federal court could issu e a restraining order or injunction i n any case involvin g a peaceful labo r dispute between an employer and employees. Although i t appeare d tha t Congress ha d finally emancipated or ganized labo r from the constraints o f the federal antitrus t laws , the United States Supreme Court did not entirely agree. In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 22 the Court severely restricted applicatio n of the immunity provided by Section 20 of the Clayton Act. It ruled that the antitrus t an d injunctiv e exemption s onl y applie d i n situa tions in which the disputing parties had a direct employer-employee relationship. Becaus e secondar y boycot t activit y necessaril y in volved participatio n b y person s employe d b y partie s no t involve d in the immediate labor-management dispute , such conduct was automatically beyond the scope of the Clayton Act exemption. The Wobblie s Challeng e Traditiona l Trad e Union s

Despite virulen t employe r oppositio n an d unfavorabl e judicia l de cisions, organize d labo r prospered. Betwee n 189 7 an d 1904 , union membership increased from 447,000 to over 2,000,000. At this point, the AFL craft unio n philosoph y wa s challenge d b y a radically dif ferent labo r institution . I n June 1905 , a group o f revolutionar y ac tivists, includin g Eugen e Debs , Willia m Haywood , Fathe r Thoma s Haggerty, and "Mother" Mary Jones, convened a Chicago conference attended by 203 delegates representing 43 associations. The convention voted to create the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). The opening lin e o f th e newl y drafte d IW W preamble bluntl y declare d that "[t]h e workin g clas s an d th e employin g clas s hav e nothin g i n common."23 The IWW endorsed both industrial and political action.

22 Th e Historical Foundatio n of American Labo r During the initia l year s o f it s existence , th e IW W abandoned th e most anarchisti c Socialist s i n it s ranks , suc h a s th e leader s o f th e Western Federatio n o f Miners. It did not , however, entirel y discar d its left-wing politica l ideals . It supported Socialis t part y candidates , including Debs, who received 900,000 votes in the 1912 presidential election.24 Th e Wobblie s als o employe d conventiona l labor tactics , such a s strikes . Nonetheless , the y foun d tha t thei r wor k stoppage s were less effective tha n those conducted by AFL affiliates. Thi s phenomenon wa s attribute d t o th e greate r degre e o f contro l exercise d by AF L trad e union s ove r thei r respectiv e crafts , th e mor e experi enced AF L union leadership , an d th e mor e substantial financia l re sources availabl e t o AF L organizations . B y 1915 , th e IW W ha d become mor e conventiona l i n it s approach . I t sough t t o organiz e agricultural laborers and other unskilled workers. It successfully un ionized far m personne l i n severa l states . During Worl d Wa r I , IW W wor k stoppage s i n th e lumbe r an d copper industries generated severe attacks from citizens ' groups and the federal government. Many persons accused the radical IWW leaders o f deliberatel y sabotagin g America' s wa r effort . Crimina l syndi calist statute s wer e enacte d i n variou s state s prohibitin g an y "doctrine which advocates crime, violence, sabotage or other unlawful method s a s a means o f industria l o r politica l reform." 25 Severa l thousand Wobbl y supporter s wer e imprisoned , an d severa l immi grant sympathizer s wer e even deported . This relentless prosecutio n of IWW members and the concomitant los s of public support greatl y diminished it s organizational strength . By the later 1920s , the IWW had cease d t o be a viable labo r entity . Women, Minorities , an d th e AF L

Although th e IW W diligentl y sough t t o organiz e wome n workers , most AF L affiliates di d no t vigorousl y represen t th e interest s o f fe male employees. From 189 0 until 1910 , the number o f female labo r force participant s gre w fro m 4,005,53 2 t o 8,075,772. 26 Despit e thi s dramatic increas e i n wome n workers , female s remaine d a n insig nificant proportio n o f unio n membership . B y 1910 , onl y 73,00 0 women wer e trad e unio n members. 27 I n 1914 , the AF L conventio n almost passe d a resolutio n deplorin g th e gainfu l employmen t o f women.28 AF L leader s bega n t o realiz e tha t unorganize d wome n workers pose d a threa t t o th e negotiate d wage s an d employmen t conditions enjoye d b y male union members . The 1918 AFL conven-

The Historical Foundation of American Labo r 2 3 tion thu s adopte d a resolution exhortin g affiliate d trad e union s "t o make ever y effor t t o bring... women int o th e organization s o f thei r respective crafts." 29 I n spit e o f thi s mor e affirmativ e position , th e AFL took n o action agains t gende r restriction s impose d b y membe r unions. The failure o f AFL affiliates t o unionize wome n worker s wa s no t based upo n an y apparen t femal e reluctanc e t o participat e i n labo r organizations. In fact, when female leaders recognized that most male trade unions were unwilling to admit women , they got together an d formed thei r ow n labo r organization . I n 1903 , representatives fro m the clerks, garment workers , and mea t cutter s union s drafte d a constitution at the AFL convention creating the separate Women's Trade Union League (WTUL). Over the next fifteen years, WTUL affiliates , composed primaril y o f women workers , grew appreciably . Unions quickl y foun d tha t wome n worker s wer e no t afrai d o f traditional labor-managemen t confrontation . I n Novembe r o f 1909 , 150 female employees of the Triangle Shirtwaist factory in New York City were locke d ou t afte r the y joine d th e International Ladie s Gar ment Worker s Union . Whe n th e wome n establishe d a picke t line , private securit y personne l hire d b y Triangl e Shirtwais t attacke d them. Afte r th e strikin g employee s wer e arrested , 20,00 0 unorga nized employee s responde d b y walking ou t o f ever y shirtwais t fac tory i n Manhatta n an d Brooklyn . Whe n th e Triangl e Shirtwais t jo b action commenced , no t a single Ne w Yor k garment sho p wa s orga nized. By the time the strike ended thirteen weeks later, 312 clothing factories ha d signe d unio n contracts . The AF L unions ' treatmen t o f minorit y worker s wa s simila r t o their treatmen t o f femal e employees . Despite effort s b y Gompers t o induce trade unions to eliminate constitutional provisions restricting membership t o whit e males , man y affiliate s continue d t o exclud e minority workers. In his report to the 1900 AFL convention, Gompers warned delegates that if blacks were not permitted to unionize, "they will not only be forced dow n in the economic scale and used agains t any effort mad e by us for our economic and social advancement, bu t race prejudice wil l be made more bitter an d [resul t in ] the injur y o f all."31 Th e followin g year , however , whe n a St . Loui s Trade s an d Labor Counci l officia l oppose d th e grantin g o f a n AF L organizer' s commission to a black individual, Gompers acquiesced. After Worl d War I , thousand s o f souther n blac k worker s migrate d t o norther n states. Becaus e the y wer e unabl e t o obtai n skille d job s wit h em ployers that ha d closed-sho p agreement s wit h trade unions that di d

24 Th e Historical Foundatio n of American Labo r not admit black members, many were forced t o work as strikebreak ers. AFL leaders finally sough t t o achieve a compromise b y issuin g separate charter s t o black unions . In 1934 , a proposa l wa s mad e a t th e AF L conventio n t o expe l international union s that were guilty of racial discrimination. Man y delegates argued tha t such action would contraven e the principle of affiliate autonom y tha t ha d bee n a traditiona l aspec t o f AF L exis tence, and thei r view prevailed. Eve n though mos t AFL unions voluntarily eliminated restrictions against minority membership, it was not unti l passag e o f th e Civi l Right s Ac t o f 196 4 tha t th e fe w re maining affiliate s relented . Time-Study Me n an d Compan y Union s

By th e 1920s , America n companie s realize d tha t yellow-do g con tracts, black lists, private security forces, and accommodating judges could no t alway s preven t labor organizing . The y bega n t o devis e more sophisticate d unio n avoidanc e techniques . "Th e emergin g professional middl e clas s stepped int o the fray i n the role of peacemakers. Their messag e t o the capitalist s wa s tha t nonviolen t socia l control woul d i n th e lon g ru n b e mor e effectiv e tha n bullet s an d billy clubs." 32 Acknowledgin g tha t " a cadr e o f professional s wa s cheaper than an army of Pinkertons" and fearing that skilled workers had assume d contro l ove r th e productio n process , many employer s implemented th e scientifi c managemen t principle s tha t ha d bee n developed b y Frederic k Taylor. 33 Ne w technolog y wa s introduce d and th e productio n proces s wa s broken dow n int o a series of repet itive tasks tha t coul d b e assigne d t o narrowly skille d workers . Corporations wer e n o longe r dependen t upo n highl y skille d artisan s who could no t be easily replaced durin g a labor dispute . They wer e now able to employ individuals who could promptly learn to perform limited jo b functions. Suc h semi-skille d operative s di d no t posses s the economi c influenc e o f th e artisan s who m the y replaced . I f the y contemplated unionization , the y coul d b e terminated an d replaced . During World War I, the Federal Government encouraged employers to adopt sho p committee s tha t woul d provid e employee s with a greater sense of corporate involvement. 34 Althoug h mos t companie s initially oppose d suc h worker participation schemes , some began to recognize that shop committees could be used to increase productivity and to convince production worker s that they did not need labor representation. Employee s coul d alway s rais e issue s o f concer n a t

The Historical Foundation of American Labor 2 5 shop committee meetings. Trade union officials quickly realized that such worker participation programs were being employed by many companies no t to provide rank-and-file productio n employee s wit h meaningful influence over their daily job functions, but as a means of manipulating worker feelings and discouraging unionization.35 The introduction of new technology and the adoption of scientific management programs greatly undermined unio n strength. Production companie s n o longe r employe d th e numerou s skille d artisan s who had historically been members of AFL craft unions. Trade union membership declined , an d th e narro w craf t jurisdiction s o f suc h labor unions mad e i t virtually impossibl e fo r them to organize th e semi-skilled employee s operatin g the new production machinery. 36 As the Great Depression began, many skilled and unskilled workers lost their jobs. By the early 1930s, industrial relations observers predicted the rapid demise o f the American labor movement. 37 The Railwa y Labo r Ac t

Railroad worker s wer e th e first segment o f th e America n econom y to be granted statutor y labo r relations protection . The rail industr y had been extensively unionized during the nineteenth century. Work stoppages in the 1880s demonstrated the devastating impact of railroad strikes on the public welfare. Congress decided that legislation was needed to funnel rail disputes into less disruptive channels. The Arbitration Ac t o f 1888 38 establishe d voluntar y arbitratio n proce dures, th e Erdma n Act o f 1898 39 provide d governmen t mediation , and the Newlands Ac t of 1913 40 created a permanent Boar d of Mediation and Conciliation. During World War I, the Federal Government assumed control of the railroad s t o guarante e th e continue d functionin g o f thi s vita l transportation system . A t th e conclusio n o f th e war , Congres s en acted Title III of the Transportation Act of 1920. 41 These provision s encouraged carrier s and railroad brotherhoods to resolve thei r controversies voluntarily. Whe n mutual accommodations coul d no t be achieved, disputes were sent to a bipartisan board of adjustment or to th e Railroa d Labo r Board. Despit e it s disput e resolutio n proce dures, the Transportation Act did not expressly protect the right of railroad employees to unionize. The Railway Labor Act of 192642 was the firstAmerican enactment to guarantee workers the right to organize and to bargain over their employment conditions . Bipartit e adjustmen t board s wer e estab -

26 The

Historical Foundatio n of American Labo r

lished t o resolve grievances that coul d no t be amicably settled. Voluntary arbitratio n wa s t o b e offere d t o partie s tha t ha d reache d a bargaining impasse , and th e Presiden t ha d th e authorit y t o appoin t emergency board s t o resolv e contrac t disputes . Th e Railwa y Labo r Act, as amended, still regulates railway labor-management relations . In 1936 , its coverag e wa s extende d t o air carriers. 43 Modern Federa l Labo r Legislatio n

In 1933 , Congres s enacte d th e Nationa l Industria l Recover y Ac t (NIRA).44 Section 7a specified tha t each code of fair competition shal l provide that " employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and shal l be fre e fro m th e interference , restraint , o r coercio n o f employers. " On August 5,1933, President Franklin Roosevelt created the National Labor Boar d an d appointe d Senato r Rober t Wagne r it s chairman . Many employer s refuse d t o compl y wit h Nationa l Labo r Boar d or ders, an d busines s group s quickl y challenge d th e constitutionalit y of the statute. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 45 a divided Supreme Court invalidated th e NIRA. The Court majority foun d tha t Congress ha d impermissibl y sough t t o us e it s authorit y t o regulat e interstate commerc e a s a vehicl e fo r prescribin g rule s governin g wholly intrastat e busines s activities . Following th e Schechte r Poultry decision , Senato r Wagne r intro duced legislatio n t o replac e th e nullifie d NIRA . O n Jul y 5 , 1935 , Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 46 Section 1 emphasized th e fact tha t "[t]h e denial by employers of the right of employees t o organiz e an d th e refusa l b y employer s t o accep t th e procedure o f collective bargaining lead t o strikes and othe r forms of industrial strif e an d unrest. " Tha t sectio n declare d i t th e polic y o f the United State s to eliminate such disruption s "b y encouraging th e practice an d procedur e o f collectiv e bargainin g an d b y protectin g the exercise by workers o f full freedo m o f association— " A threemember National Labor Relations Board (NLR B or Labor Board) was established t o administe r th e ne w law . Employer group s wer e con fident tha t th e NLR A woul d b e invalidate d b y the Suprem e Court . In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Stee J Corp., 47 however , th e Suprem e Court rejected the narrow Schechter Poultry reasoning and sustaine d the propriet y o f the NLRA. Section 7 of th e NLR A guarantee d employee s "th e righ t t o self organization, t o form , join , o r assis t labor organizations , t o bargai n

The Historical Foundation of American Labo r 2 7 collectively throug h representative s o f thei r ow n choosing , an d t o engage in concerted activities , for... mutua l ai d or protection. ,, Section 8 prohibite d employe r interferenc e wit h th e exercis e o f em ployee rights , proscribe d compan y controlle d labo r organizations , and mandate d goo d fait h negotiation s wit h labo r organization s se lected by a majority o f employees in an appropriate bargaining unit . This enactment finally provided private sector personnel outside the railroad industr y wit h statutoril y secure d organizationa l rights . The Congres s o f Industria l Organization s

The enactment of the NIRA and the NLRA coincided wit h an impor tant structural developmen t takin g place within th e American labo r movement tha t was intended t o enhance the ability o f unions to organize the emerging mass production industries . Instead o f limitin g membership to highly skilled artisans, organizations lik e the Unite d Mine Workers, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the Pacific Coast Longshoremen, an d th e Teamster s bega n t o unioniz e th e skilled , semi-skilled, and unskilled employees working in the coal, clothing, longshore, and trucking industries. 48 Other labor leaders recognize d that suc h a comprehensiv e progra m woul d hav e t o be employe d i f unions were going to successfully organiz e the individuals employe d in automobile, rubber, steel, chemical, glass, and other industries. The jurisdictiona l restriction s indigenou s t o conventiona l craf t unions made it virtually impossible for such entities to organize mass production industrie s employin g divers e group s o f skilled , semi skilled, an d unskille d workers . Whe n AF L affiliate s sough t t o or ganize suc h extensiv e industries , AF L official s usuall y establishe d a federa l labo r unio n tha t woul d conduc t a coordinate d campaign . After th e employee s ha d bee n induce d t o join th e federa l labo r or ganization, th e skille d worker s wer e assigne d t o th e trad e union s having jurisdiction ove r their respectiv e crafts . At th e 193 4 AF L convention , Willia m Gree n an d Joh n L . Lewi s proposed th e creatio n o f ne w industria l unions . Followin g heate d debate, however, thei r industria l unio n resolutio n wa s soundl y de feated. Th e issu e wa s reconsidere d a t th e 193 5 AF L convention , generating a n unusuall y acrimoniou s discussion . Whe n Carpenter s President Willia m Hutcheso n objecte d t o the presentatio n b y Min e Workers President Lewis in favor of industrial unionization, fisticuffs resulted. The industrial union proposal was again defeated. A month after th e 193 5 convention, however , officer s fro m th e Unite d Min e

28 Th e Historical Foundatio n of American Labo r Workers, the International Typographical Workers, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers , th e Internationa l Ladie s Garmen t Workers , th e United Textil e Workers, the Oil Field, Gas Well and Refining Work ers, th e Unite d Hatters , Ca p an d Milliner y Workers , an d th e Mine , Mill an d Smelte r Worker s me t i n Washington , D.C. , t o creat e th e Committee fo r Industria l Organization . The Committe e fo r Industria l Organizatio n promptl y establishe d a serie s o f organizin g committee s pertainin g t o th e steel , textile , automobile, rubber , chemical , shipping , an d electronic s industries . AFL President Gree n contacte d th e unio n official s participatin g i n this ne w committee . H e expresse d "feeling s o f apprehensio n ove r the grav e consequence s whic h migh t follo w fro m th e formatio n o f [such a n industria l union ] organizatio n withi n th e America n Fed eration of Labor." 49 Although the leaders of the new union indicate d that the y di d no t inten d t o infring e th e jurisdictiona l right s o f an y AFL affiliates, the y proposed t o continue their industrial organizin g efforts. The y subsequentl y ignore d Green' s deman d tha t the y dis solve their unauthorize d group . By the 1937 AFL convention, trade union leaders were concerne d about th e fac t tha t th e Committe e fo r Industria l Organizatio n wa s already grantin g charter s t o industrial unions . Delegates authorize d the Executive Committee to revoke the charters of any AFL affiliate s that engage d i n "dua l unionism " b y supportin g industria l organi zations. In November o f 1938 , the union s participatin g i n the Com mittee fo r Industria l Organizatio n formall y spli t fro m th e AF L an d formed th e Congres s o f Industria l Organization s (CIO) . During th e next two decades, AFL and CI O unions aggressivel y compete d wit h one another fo r the right to organize workers employe d i n the mas s production industries . Many o f th e industrie s organize d b y CI O union s employe d nu merous minorit y an d femal e workers . The CI O affiliates welcome d such employee s int o thei r rank s an d diligentl y labore d t o advanc e their employmen t interests . The Women' s Trad e Unio n Leagu e en thusiastically supporte d th e organizin g effort s o f thes e industria l unions, graphically demonstrating the desire of female employees to obtain unio n representation . Anti-Labor Response s to th e Expandin g Labo r Movemen t

Competition betwee n AF L an d CI O affiliates generate d substantia l representational gains. Union membership increased from 15 percent

The Historical Foundatio n of American Labor 2 9 of th e nonagricultura l labo r forc e whe n th e NLR A was enacte d i n 1935 to over 35 percent by the mid-1950s.50 Corporations, however, became increasingly concerned about diminishing profits caused by the increased labor costs associated with unionization.51 As a result, a greater number of unorganize d employer s redouble d thei r effort s to prevent unionization . Businesses also sought Labor Board and court rulings that would narrow the scop e o f NLR A protection. I n NLRB v. Fanstee l Metai lurgical Corp., 52 the Supreme Court held that sit-down strikes were not protected under the NLRA. Employees who participated in such trespassory jo b action s coul d thu s b e lawfull y discharged . Subse quent NLRB and court decisions ruled that employees did not have the protected right to engage in concerted work slowdowns53 or group refusals to work assigned overtime. 54 Nor could they utilize disruptive "quickie " strikes.55 In 1938 , th e Suprem e Cour t furthe r undermine d th e abilit y o f employees to engage in work stoppages.56 Although economic strikes were specifically protecte d by the NLRA, the Court determined that struck employers possesse d th e inherent right to hire "permanent " replacements fo r strikin g personnel . Th e Justices foun d tha t com panies had a legitimate desir e to maintain operations , an d they inexplicably concluded that the employment of such replacements had a relatively sligh t impac t upon striking workers. In NLRB v. IBEW Local 1229,57 the Supreme Court held that employees ow e a dut y o f loyalt y t o thei r employer s whe n the y ar e involved i n labor-managemen t controversies . Th e Cour t ruled tha t individuals who disparage the products or services provided by their employer los e the protection o f the NLRA. The Labor Board subsequently held that product disparagement durin g a work stoppage i s impermissible eve n whe n th e negativ e representation s ar e entirel y truthful.58 A further erosion of collective rights occurred when the Supreme Court decided tha t private property rights take precedence ove r the organizational rights of workers. In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,59 the Court ruled tha t businesses coul d lawfull y ba r solicitation an d literature distribution by nonemployee union organizers on company premises. Fearin g tha t suc h nonemploye e organizer s migh t creat e discipline o r theft problem s i f the y wer e given acces s to employe e parking lots, the Babcock & Wilcox Cour t ruled that private corporations only have to provide nonemployee organizers with access to company property in those rare circumstances when the labor union

30 The

Historica l Foundatio n of American Labo r

is wholly unabl e t o disseminat e it s organizationa l messag e throug h external channel s o f communication . In 1947 , th e busines s communit y enliste d th e assistanc e o f th e conservative Eightiet h Congress . I t successfull y lobbie d fo r signifi cant change s i n th e NLRA . Th e Labo r Managemen t Relation s Ac t (LMRA)60 amendments , whic h wer e adopte d ove r Presiden t Harr y Truman's veto, prohibited mos t forms o f secondary worker conduct . They directe d th e Labo r Boar d t o petitio n a Unite d State s Distric t Court for an immediate restraining order in any case in which a labor organization engaged in unlawful secondar y activity. The LMRA also provided partie s adversely affected b y proscribed secondar y activit y with the right to sue the responsible labor organization for damages . The NLRA was further modifie d t o provide employees with the protected righ t to cross a picket lin e to work durin g a strike, and mad e it a n unfai r labo r practic e fo r a labor unio n t o interfer e wit h tha t privilege. The LMR A amendment s restricte d th e abilit y o f labo r organiza tions t o contro l th e suppl y o f labor . Unde r th e origina l NLRA , representative labor organizations could obtain closed-shop agreements. Persons denie d unio n membershi p wer e simpl y ineligibl e fo r em ployment wit h thes e firms. Unde r th e LMRA , labo r organization s could merel y requir e worker s t o tende r thei r initiatio n fe e an d monthly dues within thirty days following their date of employment. This statutory modification shifted th e balance of power with respect to hiring decision s fro m trad e union s t o employers . The 194 7 Congress responde d similarl y t o an employe r desir e t o limit collectiv e bargainin g t o rank-and-fil e employees . I n Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 61 the Suprem e Cour t ha d sustaine d th e ex tension o f NLRA collective bargaining rights to supervisory person nel. Corporations were concerned that such organizational protection might induc e highe r managemen t official s t o unionize , an d the y asked Congres s t o aver t suc h a direct threa t t o supervisor-compan y relations. Legislator s responde d b y expressl y excludin g eve n low level supervisor s fro m th e statutor y definitio n o f "employee. " Employers induce d Congres s t o narro w worke r right s furthe r i n the 195 9 Labo r Managemen t Reportin g an d Disclosur e Ac t (LMRDA)62 amendments t o the NLRA. Greater restrictions wer e im posed upon secondary activity, and organizational and recognitiona l picketing wa s severel y limited . Congres s modifie d Sectio n 10(1 ) of the NLR A t o requir e Labo r Boar d attorney s t o see k immediat e re straining order s i n al l case s involvin g unlawfu l organizationa l o r

The Historical Foundatio n of American Labo r 3 1 recognitional picketing . These changes inhibited th e ability of labo r unions to engage in traditional concerte d activit y durin g organizin g campaigns. The LMRD A establishe d substantia l restriction s concernin g th e internal affair s o f unions . I t require d th e annua l filing o f detaile d financial reports , an d impose d fiduciary obligation s upo n labo r of ficials. It mandated fair and regular elections of union officers. Unio n members were provided with free speech protection, and guarantee d procedural du e process i n case s involving labor organizations seek ing to impose discipline. The LMRDA also limited the circumstances in which national or international unions could impose trusteeship s on loca l entities . The AFL-CI O Merge r an d Beyon d

Soon after th e Committee for Industrial Organizatio n lef t th e AFL to form th e CIO , AFL leaders realize d tha t a reunification o f th e labo r movement wa s necessar y t o preserv e organizationa l strength . Th e primary impedimen t t o consolidatio n involve d continue d AF L in sistence upon the concept o f exclusive jurisdiction unde r which th e CIO industria l union s woul d hav e bee n require d t o assig n skille d members to appropriate AFL craft entities . Despite their differences , AFL and CI O leaders continued t o explore this issue throughout th e 1940s. CI O President Murra y an d AF L Presiden t Gree n repeatedl y tried to formulate a plan that would reunite the two labor federations. In November of 1952, both Murray and Green died. George Meany became hea d o f the AFL, and Walte r Reuther ascende d t o the pres idency of the CIO. Both institutions redoubled their efforts to achieve a truce that would eliminate the interorganizational raiding that was benefiting neithe r group . The monetar y cost s associate d wit h inter organizational raidin g were substantial , an d th e actual membershi p gains wer e marginal . O n June 9 , 1954 , the AF L and CI O finally ex ecuted a no-raiding pact, 63 but certain AFL and CIO affiliates refuse d to honor this agreement. Meany and Reuther, however, worked con tinually t o achiev e complet e labo r unity . The y agree d tha t union s with overlappin g craft jurisdiction s shoul d be encouraged t o merge, and tha t independen t CI O industrial union s shoul d b e permitted t o maintain thei r separat e identities . I n Decembe r o f 1955 , th e AFL CIO merge r wa s achieved , reunitin g union s wit h ove r 1 5 millio n members.64 Al l o f th e constituen t union s wer e thereafte r boun d b y the no-raidin g provisio n se t fort h i n th e AFL-CIO constitution .

32 Th e Historical Foundation of American Labor During the lat e 1950s , th e percentag e o f labo r force participant s in labor organizations began to decline. Nonetheless, union political power expanded . Althoug h th e American labo r movement ha d decided no t t o creat e a n independen t worke r party , i t di d exer t con siderable politica l influence . Politica l actio n committee s provide d substantial financial support to friends o f labor. Union officials per sonally campaigned i n favor of pro-worker candidates. AFL-CIO affiliates lobbied fo r socia l legislatio n designe d t o protec t employe e interests. Some of the beneficial enactment s that received labor support include the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 65 mandating equal compensation for people performing substantially identical work regardless of gender , Titl e VI I o f th e Civi l Right s Ac t o f 1964, 66 proscribin g employment discrimination based upon race, color, religion, gender, or nationa l origin , th e Ag e Discriminatio n i n Employmen t Ac t o f 1967,67 prohibitin g employmen t discriminatio n agains t employee s forty an d older , th e Occupationa l Safet y an d Healt h Ac t o f 1970, 68 protecting the employment environment s o f American workers, the Employee Retiremen t Incom e Securit y Ac t o f 1974, 69 safeguardin g employee pensio n an d welfar e benefits , an d th e recentl y adopte d Americans Wit h Disabilitie s Act, 70 protectin g th e employmen t op portunities of disabled workers. Organized labor has also lobbied in favor of enhanced employee rights under worker and unemployment compensation statutes , an d a myriad o f othe r laws designe d t o enhance worker interests. Business organization s als o expande d thei r politica l influenc e during the past two decades . By the 1970s , corporate lobbyists had regained th e leverag e they ha d enjoyed durin g the 1920s , and the y developed th e capacity t o dominate the legislative process. 71 Labor leaders did not fully appreciat e the awesome political strengt h possessed by corporate America until the mid-1970s. In 1977, the AFLCIO sought change s i n the NLRA that would hav e provide d unio n organizers limited access to employer premises during unionization drives an d enhance d th e remedie s availabl e t o rectif y employers ' unfair labor practice violations.72 Labor leaders thought that business officials would not fightthese seemingly modest NLRA amendments. They were consequently shocke d b y the vehement oppositio n marshalled b y busines s institution s t o th e propose d legislation. 73 Th e lobbying effort s o f th e busines s communit y precipitate d a Senat e filibuster tha t prevented a vote on the merits of this bill. During th e inflationar y year s o f th e 1970s , cost-of-living adjustment clause s containe d i n man y collectiv e bargainin g agree -

The Historical Foundation of American Labor 3 3 ments cause d labo r cost s t o increas e rapidly . Employer s bega n t o consider way s o f reducin g employe e costs . Som e transferre d pro duction to lower wage areas of the United States or abroad, and some demanded compensatio n reductions . Other s decide d t o follo w th e example set by President Ronald Reagan when he discharged thousands o f strikin g ai r traffic controller s i n 1981 , by converting thei r unionized facilitie s int o unorganized plants . Simultaneously, labo r organizations wer e bein g challenge d b y significan t demographic , technological, industrial , an d internationa l changes , al l o f whic h hastened a decline i n union strength in America.

3. TH E EXTEN T AN D CAUSE S O F THE DECLIN E O F THE AMERICA N LABOR MOVEMEN T

Union membershi p figures hav e generall y fluctuate d ove r tim e du e to th e impac t o f economi c cycles , industria l changes , immigratio n patterns, an d othe r relevan t factors . Betwee n 189 7 an d 1904 , trad e union membershi p increase d fro m 447,00 0 t o ove r 2,000,000. 1 B y 1920, labor organizations had over 5,000,000 members, 2 but over the next thre e years , membershi p decline d substantiall y t o 3,500,000 . During th e remainde r o f tha t decade , however , unio n membershi p decreased a t a slower rat e to 3,401,000 , which constitute d 11. 6 per cent o f the 193 0 nonagricultural workforce. 3 The initia l year s o f th e Grea t Depressio n generate d significan t unemployment an d a corresponding decrease in union membership . By 1934 , trade union s ha d jus t ove r 3,088,00 0 members . The mem bership decreases of the early 1930s induced som e experts to predict the demis e o f th e America n labo r movemen t b y the en d o f tha t de cade.4 Nonetheless, by 1935, when the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) extended organizationa l an d collectiv e bargainin g right s t o most privat e secto r employees , trad e unio n membershi p ha d re bounded t o 3,584,000 , whic h represente d 13. 2 percen t o f nonagri cultural workforc e participants. 5 Following th e enactmen t o f th e NLRA , trade unio n membershi p grew steadily . B y 1940, there wer e 8,717,00 0 members , comprisin g 26.9 percent of nonagricultural workers. 6 At the conclusion of World War I I i n 1945 , labor organization s ha d 14,322,00 0 members , rep resenting 35. 5 percen t o f th e nonagricultura l workforce . B y 1954 , union membershi p exceede d 17,000,000 . Labo r organizatio n mem 34

The Extent and Causes of the Decline 3 5 bers still constituted approximately 35 percent of all nonagricultural workforce participants . From 1954 through 1980, the absolute number of union members continued to increase slightly. By 1970, union membership exceeded 19,000,000, an d b y 1980 , i t wa s approximatel y 22,000,000 / Thi s growth in union membership di d not, however, keep pace with the expansion o f th e nonagricultura l workforce . Ther e wer e onl y ap proximately 49,000,00 0 nonagricultura l worker s i n 1954 . B y 1970 , there were 70,880,000, and by 1980, that figure exceeded 90,000,000.8 As a result, the proportion of nonagricultural workforce participants in unions declined steadil y from 35 percent in 1954 to 27.3 percent in 1970 and to 23 percent in 1980. Labor organizations that had won 80 to 85 percent o f Labor Board representation elections durin g the 1940s an d early 1950 s wer e prevailing i n only abou t 5 0 percen t of such election s b y 1980. 9 Yet durin g the sam e 195 4 t o 198 0 period , Canadian trad e unio n membershi p gre w fro m 3 2 t o 3 6 percen t o f nonagricultural workers. 10 During the 1980s, the position of organized labor deteriorated from both a n absolute an d a relative perspective . B y 1984 , union mem bership comprised 18. 5 percent of the nonagricultural labo r force.11 By 1990 , ther e wer e onl y 16,740,00 0 trad e unio n member s i n th e United States. 12 The y represente d a mere 16. 1 percen t o f nonagri cultural workers. Although the decline in union membership during the 1980 s wa s substantial , th e actual situatio n toda y i s wors e tha n even these star k figures indicate. Throughou t th e 1970 s an d 1980s , there had been a relatively robust expansion of public sector unionization. A s o f 1990 , labo r organization s representin g federal , state , and loca l governmen t employee s ha d 6,480,00 0 members , consti tuting 36.5 percent of all government workers.13 Private sector unions only had 10,260,00 0 members, comprising a meager 12.1 percent of nonagricultural privat e secto r employees. 14 Eve n thoug h labo r or ganizations represent an additional 2,300,000 private sector workers who are not union members,15 it is obvious that private sector unions are in a moribund state. During 1990 , labo r organization s wo n onl y 47. 6 percen t o f th e 3,423 representatio n election s conducte d b y the NLRB. 16 Although the 199 0 percentag e wa s slightl y abov e th e 46. 7 percen t figure for 1986, it is important to acknowledge that the number of Labor Board representation elections declined during that same period from 3,923 to 3,423. 17 The union victor y rat e was inversel y relate d t o the siz e of the proposed units. While unions prevailed in 52 percent of 1990

36 Th e Extent an d Causes of the Declin e representation election s i n bargaining units containin g from 2 to 49 employees, they wo n onl y 37. 6 percent o f election s i n unit s o f 10 0 to 49 9 worker s an d 19. 3 percen t o f election s i n unit s wit h 50 0 o r more employees. 18 Recent NLR B electio n figures, however , provid e labo r organiza tions with some positive information. Th e number of decertificatio n elections, declined from 923 in 1986 to 558 in 1990. 19 The proportion of decertificatio n election s wo n b y labo r organization s increase d from 24. 3 percent i n 198 6 to 27. 2 percen t i n 1990 . Declining unio n membershi p ha s contribute d t o tw o othe r dis tressing phenomena . Th e first is the diminishin g politica l influenc e possessed b y organize d labor . Durin g th e 1950 s an d 1960s , unio n leaders exerte d significan t politica l power . Eve n thoug h the y wer e unable to prevent the enactment o f the Labor Management Relation s Act o f 194 7 an d th e Labo r Managemen t Reportin g an d Disclosur e Act of 1959 , both of which restricted labor' s politica l an d economi c activities, union s wer e abl e t o lobb y successfull y fo r statute s pro hibiting employment discrimination , enhancing employment healt h and safety , an d protectin g employe e pensio n an d welfar e funds . B y 1977, whe n unio n official s sough t modes t change s i n th e NLR A through the proposed Labor Law Reform Act, they began to encounter the immens e politica l strengt h possesse d b y corporat e entities. 20 Business organization s wer e abl e to prevent th e enactmen t o f thos e AFL-CIO backed amendment s t o the NLRA. The secon d phenomeno n associate d wit h th e decreas e i n union ized worker s i s th e diminishin g economi c clou t exercise d b y orga nized labor . A s fewer firms i n basic industrie s ar e unionized, labo r unions representin g worker s a t th e remainin g firms ar e n o longe r able to negotiat e industry-wid e patter n agreements . Thi s i s alread y apparent i n such traditional labo r strongholds a s steel and trucking . In 1982, the number of companies covered by the Basic Steel Agreement decline d fro m eigh t to six. The National Master Freight Agreement, whic h previousl y prescribe d th e employmen t condition s o f most lon g hau l truc k drivers , has bee n supplante d b y regional an d even firm supplements. 21 The decentralization o f collective bargaining makes it increasingly difficult fo r representative unions to compel unorganized businesse s t o maintai n employmen t condition s com mensurate wit h those set forth i n bargaining agreements i n an effor t to bloc k unionizatio n b y thei r ow n employees . I n fact , man y orga nized companie s have recently demanded compensatio n reduction s

The Extent and Causes of the Decline 3 7 and wor k rul e change s designe d t o enabl e the m t o compet e mor e effectively wit h nonunion companies. 22 The ability of labor organizations to employ the strike weapon has also declined . Wit h numerous nonunio n firms operating i n almos t every industry , union s ar e n o longe r abl e t o constric t productio n through a general work stoppage. This helps explain the substantial decrease in strike activity over the past fifteen years.23 As the economic powe r of labor unions has waned, the financial influence o f corporate America has expanded geometrically. During the 1980s, business mergers and acquisitions caused a concentration of capita l i n a fe w majo r conglomerates . "[T]h e centralizatio n o f power in the hands o f capita l owner s has resulted i n an unhealthy level o f economic dependence o f all employees on their employers. ... [T]his concentration of employer power poses a serious threat to 24 individual freedo m …. " Such larg e an d diversifie d busines s en terprises ar e frequently abl e to withstand th e pressure s indigenou s to work stoppages more easily than the employees. Not only do most striking workers lack the monetary resources to survive a prolonged lack o f employment , bu t the y fac e th e prospec t o f "permanen t replacement."25 By analyzing th e factor s tha t hav e contribute d t o th e declin e o f the American labor movement, one can determine which trends are likely t o continu e an d whic h wil l chang e i n th e comin g years . In addition, this analysis should suggest ways that organized labor may modify it s practice s t o retai n curren t member s an d t o attrac t ne w ones. If labor leaders simply regard these trends as insurmountabl e barriers to union growth, the American labor movement may indeed become defunc t b y th e yea r 2000 . If , however , the y modif y thei r conventional organizin g technique s an d develo p innovativ e con cepts that will appea l to the 90 percent of private sector employee s who ar e no t unio n members , ther e i s n o reaso n wh y the y canno t increase th e privat e secto r unio n participatio n rat e to the 3 5 t o 4 0 percent range enjoyed by their public secto r labor counterparts. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHI C CHARACTERISTIC S O F THE LABO R FORC E

The fluctuating compositio n an d geographica l distributio n o f th e labor force will greatly affect union strength and organizational ability durin g the coming decades . As increased employmen t opportu -

38 Th e Extent an d Causes of the Declin e nities an d changin g persona l expectation s encourag e greater femal e labor force involvement, the participation rate for women, who have traditionally remained unorganized, will continue to expand. Today, over 55,000,00 0 wome n compris e nearl y 4 5 percen t o f th e nation' s work force. 26 Almos t 6 0 percen t o f al l female s betwee n 1 8 an d 6 4 are labor force members. In 1950, only 24 percent of married wome n were labor force participants , but by the lat e 1970s , over 46 percen t were.27 Th e recen t increas e ha s bee n particularl y notabl e amon g mothers wit h school-ag e children. While only 3 0 percent o f wome n with childre n wer e labor forc e participant s i n I960, 28 6 3 percen t were by the late 1980s. 29 These changes have generated a n increase d need fo r da y car e center s fo r preschoo l childre n an d after-schoo l programs for older children. Economic pressure encourages marrie d couples t o maintain thei r dua l careers , and financial necessit y com pels most single women to work, resulting in a labor force containin g an even higher proportio n o f female participants . Between now an d the yea r 2000 , expert s estimat e tha t two-third s o f ne w labo r forc e entrants wil l b e women. 30 B y the en d o f the curren t decade , 61 percent o f al l adul t female s ar e expected t o be gainfully employed . The momentou s increas e i n femal e labo r forc e participatio n ha s not appreciabl y alleviate d gender-base d jo b segregation . Today , 8 0 percent o f wome n worker s ar e employe d i n fou r lower-wag e cate gories: clerical , healt h an d education , domesti c service , an d "pe ripheral industries," including light manufacturing and retail trade.31 Labor union s hav e no t achieve d substantia l organizationa l succes s in these occupational categories. They will have to do so if they want to meaningfully expan d femal e membership . Despite the increasin g labor forc e participatio n rate s o f women , earning s obtaine d b y fe males still la g behind thos e o f their mal e counterparts. The averag e full-time femal e employe e earn s approximatel y 6 0 to 6 5 percent o f the amoun t earne d b y he r mal e equivalent. 32 Labo r organization s must address this issue if they intend to attract women to their ranks. Another significan t labo r forc e tren d i s th e rapi d growt h o f mi nority participants . Minorit y participatio n rate s ar e expecte d t o in crease fro m 13. 6 percent i n 198 5 to 15. 7 percent b y the year 2000 33 due t o th e fac t tha t approximatel y 3 0 percen t o f al l labor forc e en trants ove r th e nex t decad e wil l b e minorities. Minorit y employee s have historically been segregated i n low wage occupations, and the y have generally earned far less than their nonminority counterparts. 34 Although man y minority workers have been organized by industria l unions representin g employee s i n th e mas s productio n industries ,

The Extent an d Cause s of the Decline 3 9 such a s automobile, steel, rubber, an d electrica l manufacturing , th e record o f mos t craf t union s ha s no t been ver y good . Over th e nex t severa l decades , declinin g birt h rate s an d th e en hanced longevit y o f the post-Worl d Wa r II "baby boom ,, generatio n will result in a considerable increase in the average age of labor force participants. Although fewer than 10 percent of Americans were fiftyfive and older in 1900 , 20 percent were by the late 1980s. 35 By 2030, such individuals will constitute almost one-third of the general population.36 People sixty-five and older will comprise about 1 4 percent of the populatio n b y 201 0 and ove r 2 0 percent b y 2030. 37 The economic status of older Americans is not commensurate with that o f younge r persons . Peopl e sixty-fiv e an d olde r hav e a lowe r average incom e tha n d o individual s unde r sixty-five . I n 1986 , th e median incom e fo r familie s heade d b y peopl e sixty-fiv e an d olde r was $19,932, 61.6 percent of the $32,368 median income enjoyed b y families heade d by persons twenty-five t o sixty-four. 38 Th e situatio n for unmarrie d senio r citizen s i s eve n worse . Th e $7,73 1 media n income received in 1986 by persons sixty-five and older in nonfamil y settings was only 45.8 percent o f the $16,880 median fo r nonfamil y individuals betwee n twenty-fiv e an d sixty-four . Marrie d elderl y women experienc e an even greater economic disadvantage. In 1986, the $5,25 3 media n incom e fo r marrie d female s sixty-fiv e an d olde r constituted a mer e 42. 8 percen t o f th e $12,26 5 receive d b y thei r married mal e cohorts. 39 Thi s economi c disparit y partiall y explain s the significant increase in labor force participation by older females. 40 Through the Age Discrimination i n Employment Amendment s of 1986,41 Congress altered the Age Discrimination i n Employment Ac t to prohibi t th e involuntar y retiremen t o f mos t employees . A s mor e individuals liv e past sixty-five , a n increasing numbe r wil l continu e to work either by personal choice or from economi c necessity. Many will see k part-tim e employmen t opportunitie s t o supplemen t thei r retirement income . Suc h older , part-tim e personne l hav e no t bee n historically inclined t o seek union representation. As a greater number o f thes e worker s vie w thei r position s a s permanent , the y ma y become mor e receptive t o appropriate unio n organizin g appeals . One o f th e mos t strikin g demographi c trend s ove r th e pas t tw o decades ha s bee n th e explosiv e growt h o f th e Sunbel t region . Th e migration o f workers and jobs from th e Northeast and North Centra l areas o f th e countr y t o th e Sout h an d Southwes t i s likel y t o con tinue.42 Businesses favor the Sunbelt states when making investment decisions concernin g relocatin g an d refurbishin g facilities , du e t o

40 Th e Extent and Causes of the Declin e lower labor costs and a less unionized labo r force.43 Over half o f all union member s currentl y resid e i n California , Illinois , Michigan , New York , Ohio , and Pennsylvania. 44 O f these traditiona l bastion s of labor support, only California is expected to experience sustained future employmen t growth . Labo r organization s wil l hav e t o see k converts i n th e Sout h an d Southwes t i f the y ar e t o expan d thei r membership rolls. INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICA L CHANGE S

Workers have historicall y exhibite d resistanc e t o technological ad vances. As early as 1663, employees in London attempted to destroy new mechanical sawmills that threatened their livelihoods.45 Ribbon workers implemente d simila r tactic s i n 1676 , an d i n 1710 , rioter s protested the introduction of novel stocking frame equipment. Probably the most notorious exampl e o f antitechnologica l advancemen t behavior occurre d i n 1811 , when th e so-calle d Luddite s destroye d new textile machines i n Nottingham. 46 Despite worke r efforts t o impede industria l evolution , extraordi nary developments have occurred over the past 150 years. The most remarkable aspec t o f thi s technologica l progressio n ha s concerne d the accelerating rate of change. Although it took fifty-sixyears (182076) t o develo p th e telephone , thirty-fiv e year s (1867-1902 ) t o generate the radio, and thirteen years (1923-36) to invent the television, it took onl y five years (1948-53 ) t o create the transistor. 47 This ex pedited developmenta l proces s wil l undoubtedl y continue . Uni magined technologica l advancement s wil l significantl y transfor m future employmen t environment s an d greatl y affec t th e organiza tional opportunitie s o f labor unions. Twenty-first centur y industrial settings will be highly automated, with compute r system s directin g th e wor k o f technologicall y ad vanced robots. The continued substitution of capital-intensive technology fo r traditiona l blue-colla r worker s i n mos t manufacturin g facilities wil l caus e significan t membershi p decline s amon g mas s production labor organizations. Membership in such basic industrial unions as the United Automobile Workers, the United Steel workers, and the International Association of Machinists has already declined precipitously. The pervasiv e utilizatio n o f technolog y i s dramaticall y alterin g the compositio n o f th e America n employmen t marke t and directl y affecting th e continue d vitalit y o f th e labo r movement . Th e swif t

The Extent and Causes of the Decline 4 1 introduction of new technology has been creating a "crisis of human obsolescence."48 As robots and computers supplant skilled and semiskilled employees , th e wor k forc e i s becomin g increasingl y bifur cated between sophisticated and highly educated managers and unskilled personne l performin g relatively menia l tasks. 49 The number of traditiona l blue-colla r productio n job s i s predicte d t o decreas e even more than it already has, causing a serious erosion among the occupations mos t supportive of labor organizations. The reduction i n blue-collar position s ha s seen a corresponding expansion i n white-colla r an d servic e occupations . Betwee n 190 0 and today, the proportion of the labor force consisting of white-collar positions grew from one-fourth t o three-fourths. 50 B y the beginning of the next century, approximately 9 0 percent of workforce partici pants will b e employed i n white-collar occupations. 51 Suc h white collar personnel wil l probabl y continu e t o reflect th e kind o f management philosoph y tha t ha s historicall y cause d the m t o b e unresponsive t o unio n organizin g appeals . Unles s thei r employmen t environments becom e sufficientl y onerou s tha t they op t fo r collectivization, o r labo r organization s develo p innovativ e program s t o persuade suc h management-oriente d employee s t o view union s a s positive factors , th e America n labo r movemen t wil l experienc e a continued decline . The increased use of computers and other labor-saving technology is als o likel y t o generate a surplus o f labor , necessitating a curtailment of the traditional forty-hour workweek.52 In addition, computer technology permit s th e creatio n of individualize d employmen t op portunities, with service personnel earning their income at home in "electronic cottag e industries." 53 Suc h employmen t arrangement s will b e particularl y advantageou s fo r parents—particularl y single parents—who enjo y the flexibility they need to care for young children at home. Other people who wish to avoid protracted commutes may be able to work in "neighborhood centers" that would provid e them with the requisite compute r equipment. 54 Because mos t white-colla r employee s hav e historicall y bee n unreceptive to unionization 55 an d self-employed person s working primarily fro m thei r ow n home s woul d b e difficul t t o organize , conventional union s ma y be unabl e t o cope wit h th e restructurin g of the American economy. O n the contrary, as high-technology service enterprises expand, they may establish more routinized job tasks for man y white-colla r worker s an d creat e highl y structure d mana gerial hierarchies. 56 Individual s employe d b y thes e type s o f busi -

42 Th e Extent an d Causes of the Decline nesses ma y experienc e a n increase d economi c an d psychologica l need fo r collectiv e behavior . The technolog y revolutio n make s i t possibl e fo r smalle r firms t o provide limited products or services designed to satisfy the demand s of specialized markets . Smaller companies are able to adapt quickl y to change d custome r needs , an d ca n thu s compet e effectivel y wit h ponderous corporat e enterprise s tha t find i t difficul t t o alte r thei r basic operatin g structure s i n respons e t o ne w custome r demands . While these specialty firms are economically efficient fro m a business perspective an d ar e more amenable t o unionization tha n larg e companies, labo r union s continu e t o experienc e diseconomie s o f scal e when the y attemp t t o organiz e them . Th e cos t pe r worke r fo r orga nizational campaign s involvin g small-scal e employer s generall y ex ceeds th e pe r capit a cos t associate d wit h large r enterprises . A s a result , man y labor leader s d o no t tr y t o collectiviz e smalle r companies. GLOBAL ECONOMI C AN D INDUSTRIA L TREND S

The sam e technological development s tha t hav e significantl y influ enced the structure o f the American econom y have also greatly con tributed t o th e internationalizatio n o f th e worl d economi c system . Although th e establishmen t o f multinationa l corporation s i s no t a recent phenomenon, 57 th e proliferatio n o f suc h enterprise s ha s reached extraordinar y level s ove r th e pas t tw o decades . Th e majo r impetus for the creation of transnational ventures has been the desire of business entities in industrialized nation s to control and cultivat e raw material s indigenou s t o variou s underdevelope d countries. 58 New technologies have greatly reduced transportation costs, enabling businesses t o mov e ra w materials , manufacturin g equipment , an d finished product s fro m countr y t o countr y i n a n economicall y effi cient manner . A s industrial leader s bega n t o appreciate th e benefit s from generatin g new market s and exploitin g inexpensiv e foreig n la bor, the growt h rat e of multinationa l institution s accelerated . By 1973, 140 American multinationa l corporation s ha d aggregat e annual sale s o f $38 0 billion , a su m exceedin g th e gros s nationa l product o f ever y natio n excep t th e Unite d State s an d th e Sovie t Union.59 Observer s consequentl y predicte d tha t b y 1990 , 30 0 im mense busines s entities , two-third s o f whic h woul d b e American , would dominat e non-Communist worl d trade. 60 At the present time, "USX Corp. imports steel ingot from Korea ; General Motors and Ford

The Exten t an d Causes of the Declin e 4

3

import car s from Korea; Chrysler imports car s from Mexico; General Electric import s variou s smal l appliance s fro m Asia ; an d IB M im ports dat a processin g equipmen t fro m Asia." 61 Man y Unite d State s business entitie s hav e becom e majo r shareholder s i n foreig n com panies. For d own s 2 5 percen t o f Mazda , Genera l Motor s own s 34. 4 percent o f Isuz u Motors , Chrysle r own s 1 5 percen t o f Mitsubishi , and Genera l Electri c own s 4 0 percen t o f Toshib a Electronics. 62 Today, substantia l proportion s o f automobiles , glassware , sewin g machines, shoe s an d textiles, an d cassettes , radios , and tape player s used i n th e Unite d State s ar e manufacture d i n foreig n nation s o n equipment exporte d fro m America. 63 Th e primar y stimulu s fo r th e transfer o f suc h productio n function s i s labo r cos t differentials . Clothing i s fabricate d i n Caribbea n nation s b y worker s earnin g 2 5 percent the wage s earne d b y their counterparts i n the United States , and in Mexico by persons earnin g 1 0 to 20 percent of American rate s of pay. 64 Electrica l good s ar e produced i n East Asia by workers wh o are pai d les s tha n 1 0 percen t o f Unite d State s employees ' wages . So man y o f th e component s installe d i n America n product s ar e being manufacture d abroa d tha t i t ha s becom e virtuall y impossibl e for consumers t o be fully awar e o f th e degre e to which the y suppor t United State s worker s whe n the y mak e a majo r purchase . Fo r ex ample, th e selectio n o f a Hond a Accor d buil t i n th e Unite d State s may b e mor e beneficia l t o America n employee s tha n th e purchas e of a traditionally "American " car . When an American buys a Pontiac Le Mans from General Motors,... he or she engages unwittingly in an international transaction. Of the $20,000 paid to GM , about $6,00 0 goe s t o Sout h Kore a for routin e labo r and assembl y operations, $3,500 t o Japan for advanced component s (engines , transaxles, and electronics), $1,500 to West Germany for styling and design engineering, $800 to Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan for small components, $500 to Britain for advertising and marketing services, and about $100 to Ireland and Barbados for data processing. The rest—less than $8,000—goes to strategists in Detroit, lawyers and bankers in New York, lobbyists in Washington, insurance and health-care workers all over the country, and General Motors shareholders—most of whom live in the United States, but an increasing number of whom are foreign nationals. 65 The government s o f developin g countrie s compet e fo r the oppor tunity t o generat e America n investment . The y emphasiz e thei r sig nificantly lowe r labo r costs , th e docilit y an d dependabilit y o f thei r impoverished workers , th e absenc e o f labo r organizations , an d th e minimal o r inapplicabl e employe e protectio n laws. 66 Som e nation s

44 Th e Extent and Causes of the Declin e even establish Free Trade Zones that exempt foreign investment firms employing local workers from export duties and employment taxes.67 The United States also encourages the creation of foreign "export platforms." It does not impose an import duty upon the total value of th e item s finished abroa d and returned t o America, but only o n the value added to the various components o n the foreign assembl y line.68 The recent free trade agreement with Canada and the proposed extension o f tha t agreemen t t o Mexic o woul d furthe r promot e th e development of such transnational productio n programs. Goods finished i n eithe r of those neighborin g countrie s coul d b e returned to the United State s for consumption withou t bein g subject to import duties. During th e pas t twent y years , th e worl d ha s witnesse d privat e enterprise colonization unmatche d i n this century . Larg e conglomerates fro m advance d industria l nation s ar e abl e t o dictat e basi c economic policy to developing nations desperately trying to enhance the economi c interest s o f thei r worker s throug h th e attractio n o f foreign investment . Whil e thes e countrie s generall y attemp t t o al leviate high unemployment rate s among male heads-of-households , the vast majority of multinational corporation s operating foreign export platforms emplo y women o f colo r who ar e willing to work for depressed wages. 69 These employees frequentl y wor k long hours i n unhealthy an d unsaf e employmen t environment s unde r stressfu l conditions generate d by high production demands. 70 Throughout the 1980s, American business enterprises accelerated their exploitation o f th e depresse d Mexica n economy . I n 1965, the Mexican governmen t establishe d th e Borde r Industrializatio n Pro gram to promote the maquilladora system involving factories located opposite one another along the United States-Mexico border. 71 The labor-intensive task s ar e performe d i n Mexica n facilitie s b y wor k forces consistin g primaril y o f female s earnin g les s tha n $0.8 0 pe r hour, whil e th e capital-intensiv e function s ar e carrie d ou t i n th e high-technology American plants. Multinational firms, such as General Electric, Chrysler, RCA, Xerox, United Technologies, ITT, General Instrument , Eastma n Kodak , an d IB M us e th e maquilladora program to save billions of dollars each year in aggregate labor costs.72 Such businesses take advantage of the fact that wage rates in Mexico are lower than they are in most other areas of the world, and benefit from th e minima l transportatio n cost s involved . A t thei r Mexica n production facilities, they do not have to comply with United States health an d safet y regulations , worke r and unemployment compen -

The Extent and Causes of the Decline 4 5 sation laws, minimum wag e and overtime provisions , an d the protections se t fort h i n collectiv e bargainin g agreements . Whe n a free trade agreement i s negotiate d wit h Mexico, the number o f maquiJladora arrangement s will increas e dramatically . The availabilit y o f foreig n productio n platform s ha s alread y caused a substantia l los s o f America n jobs . Fro m 196 9 t o 1976 , 1,200,000 Unite d State s manufacturin g job s wer e lost. 73 Betwee n 1980 and 1985 , America los t another 2,300,00 0 productio n jobs . A substantial proportio n of foreign-based productio n workers are employed b y Unite d State s corporation s o r their affiliates . Whirlpoo l Corporation currentl y employ s 43,50 0 peopl e i n forty-fiv e nations , with most of these individuals workin g outside the United States. 74 In 1990, 27,000 of the 40,000 persons employed by California-based Seagate Technology worked in Southeast Asian facilities. Forty percent of IBM's total work force resides in foreign countries, including 18,000 Japanes e employees . Genera l Electri c i s th e larges t privat e employer i n Singapore, an d it has recently complete d constructio n of a $15 0 millio n Hungaria n ligh t bul b factory. 75 Whil e busines s leaders ar e quick t o not e tha t thes e manufacturin g jo b losses wer e offset b y million s o f employmen t opportunitie s generate d i n othe r areas of th e economy, i t must be acknowledged tha t "the new job s are more likely to be less well paid, less skilled, less unionized, only part-time, an d locate d i n region s o f th e countr y othe r tha n thos e suffering mos t from job destruction and unemployment." 76 The continued export of manufacturing jobs from the United States to developing nations further reduces the number of blue-collar production worker s wh o hav e historicall y bee n represente d b y labo r organizations. While capital-intensive technology is a relatively mobile commodity, displace d employees are not easily transplanted to other geographica l area s o r integrate d int o ne w occupations. 77 In ternational busines s transaction s emasculat e th e jo b securit y tha t unions have diligently sought to obtain for their members. If American labor organizations are unwilling to accept significant compen sation reductions and more stressful productio n schedules, the jobs of their members will continu e to be transferred t o more hospitable foreign settings. In many cases, United States workers can do nothing to preserve their employment situations because their multinational employers prefe r t o hav e thei r productio n task s performe d b y in dividuals i n developin g nation s at wage rates equal to less than 20 percent of the $4.25 pe r hour American minimum wage. American multinational enterprises are not the only business con-

46 Th e Extent and Causes of the Decline cerns transferrin g productio n job s to othe r countries . Ove r the pas t decade, foreign corporations have greatly expanded their investmen t in Unite d State s productio n facilities . Fo r example, Japan's Bridge stone Tir e Compan y purchase d Firestone , an d Toyot a an d Genera l Motors established a joint venture to produce automobile s i n a Fremont, California, factory. 78 Japan's NEC is producing computer components i n California, Son y employs 1,50 0 worker s a t its San Diego facility, France's Thompson employs over 3,300 at its Indiana plants, and Dutch-owned Philips has 3,200 employees at its Greenville, Tennessee, factory. 79 Thes e foreign-owned operation s ar e subject t o th e NLRA becaus e the y ar e locate d i n th e Unite d States . Nonetheless , their foreign managers may not view labor-management relations the same wa y America n manager s do . The continued proliferatio n o f transnational busines s enterprise s is also challengin g th e efficac y an d practicalit y o f conventiona l na tion-states.80 Unite d State s statute s prescribin g minimu m employ ment standard s an d guaranteein g employee s organizationa l right s are becomin g increasingl y irrelevan t t o internationa l firms. Thes e enactments d o no t appl y t o th e oversea s operation s o f America n business enterprises . Although mos t American companie s hav e tra ditionally exhibited ethnocentric behavior, expanding multinationa l firms tend t o function i n a geocentric manner . The decision-makin g process o f transnational entitie s i s less likely to include factor s o f a local o r eve n nationa l nature . Whe n profit s ca n b e meaningfull y enhanced b y closin g a United State s factor y wit h 2,50 0 employee s and exportin g thos e productio n job s to a low-wage facilit y i n a developing country , corporat e manager s usuall y choos e th e profit maximizing strategy. 81 The fundamenta l structur e o f th e America n industria l relation s system ha s bee n undergoin g a n importan t transformatio n i n recen t years, with capital formations unitin g in ever larger entities. As conglomerates of multiproduct an d eve n multi-industry firms have proliferated, th e loci of decision-making authority have frequently bee n transferred fro m th e loca l t o th e corporat e o r conglomerat e level. 82 This tren d ha s bee n especiall y pronounce d wit h multinationa l en terprises tha t hav e concentrate d thei r manageria l authorit y i n cen tralized locations . These behemoth corporat e institution s hav e thu s garnered enormou s economi c superiorit y vis-a-vi s decentralize d la bor unions . Representative labor organizations have found i t increasingly dif ficult t o confron t suc h remot e manageria l centers . Mos t America n

The Extent and Causes of the Decline 4 7 bargaining relationship s ar e conducted o n a local o r regional basis . Few employer s an d union s negotiat e collectiv e contract s tha t ar e national i n scope , and almos t n o bargaining agreements hav e inter national applicabilit y beyon d th e Unite d State s an d Canada . A s a result, local and even national labor unions find it impossible to deal effectively wit h multinationa l enterprises . They cannot regulate th e employment standards followed b y American business firms at their production facilitie s i n developin g countries . When a work stoppage occurs at a United State s facility o f a multinational enterprise , th e affecte d corporatio n i s frequentl y abl e t o make u p th e los t productio n a t a foreign plant. 83 I f a United State s union negotiate s a collective contrac t tha t provide s bargainin g uni t employees with a fair proportio n o f firm profits, corporate manager s can simpl y clos e th e affecte d plant s an d permanentl y transfe r th e manufacturing function s t o low-cost production platform s i n devel oping nations.84 The use of such "runaway" facilities greatly reduces employment costs . I t als o diminishe s th e nee d t o dea l wit h labo r organizations becaus e organizationa l an d bargainin g right s ar e de nied i n man y developin g countries. 85 Thi s approac h appeal s t o American corporation s tha t d o not wish to interact with worker s o n a collectiv e basis . The radical reorganization of the production process in all Western countries is bein g orchestrate d b y enterprise s wit h avowe d anti-unio n sentiments . These corporations hav e evolved int o highly centralized an d planne d en tities, while unions continue to cling to the ideas of decentralization an d flexibility. Th e trade unions hav e not been able to reformulate thei r own decentralization and flexibilitystrategies (economic and industrial democracy) aimed at countering the big corporate interests.86 VIRULENT EMPLOYE R OPPOSITIO N T O ORGANIZATIONAL RIGHT S

United State s businesse s hav e no t bee n historicall y incline d t o ac knowledge th e righ t o f worker s t o organiz e an d t o influenc e thei r employment term s throug h collectiv e bargaining . I n fact, mos t cor porations hav e exhibite d a n over t hostilit y towar d concerte d em ployee behavior . Durin g th e nineteent h century , man y employer s required new personnel to sign yellow-dog contracts that barred them from joinin g labo r organizations . A numbe r o f busines s firms em ployed private security forces to spy on their employees. Companies frequently enliste d the assistance of police and the judiciary to retain

48 Th e Extent and Causes of the Decline their nonunio n status . Court s wer e quic k t o enjoi n concerte d em ployee conduct, an d they swiftly punishe d thos e who dared to disobey thei r proscriptiv e orders . Whe n stat e o r federa l legislature s enacted laws providing minimal employmen t protection s for workers, employe r group s successfull y challenge d th e constitutionalit y of those enactments. 87 In 1935, the Federa l Governmen t establishe d organizationa l an d negotiating right s fo r worker s unde r th e Nationa l Labo r Relation s Act.88 Afte r businesse s faile d i n thei r attemp t t o hav e thi s la w in validated,89 man y companie s resorte d t o unlawfu l tactics . Fo r ex ample, numerous firms created their own "labor organizations" and installed pro-management persons as the officers of those "company unions."90 Although such employer-dominated institutions contravened the specific prohibition contained in Section 8(2) of the NLRA, those devices enabled many employers to prevent employee unionization by independent labo r organizations fo r several years. As businesse s becam e accustome d t o th e right s an d obligation s set forth i n the NLRA, one might reasonably hav e anticipated a reduction i n illega l behavior . O n the contrary , th e numbe r o f unfai r labor practic e charge s filed agains t companie s unde r Sectio n 8(a)(1),91 whic h proscribe s employe r restrain t o r coercio n o f em ployees with respect to their concerted activity, rose from about 4,500 in 1955 to over 31,000 in 1980. 92 Even though the number of Section 8(a)(1) charge s decline d t o 22,50 0 i n 1985 , muc h o f thi s decreas e may be attribute d t o th e reductio n i n unio n organizin g campaign s during the 1980s . In 1980, the Labor Board conducted 7,29 6 representation elections , but in 1985 , it held onl y 3,749. 93 While no t all unfair labo r practic e charge s ar e sustaine d i n Labo r Board adjudi cations, a seven-fold increase in alleged violations between 1955 and 1980 is remarkable. Many of those cases undoubtedly involve d employer threat s t o tak e advers e actio n agains t worker s wh o eithe r engaged i n informa l collectiv e actio n o r contemplate d actua l unionization. The NLRB data with regard to retaliatory discharge s i n violatio n of Sectio n 8(a)(3) 94 are equally disturbing . Suc h discriminator y terminations, usuall y o f the most vocal labo r organization supporters, represent the most potent anti-union weapon available to employers. If a company is able to eliminate the key organizers during the early stages of a union campaign , the remaining employees generall y become extremely hesitant to exhibit enthusiasm for the selection of a bargaining representative. In 1957, the Labor Board directed the rein-

The Extent and Causes of the Decline 4 9 statement o f 92 2 individual s foun d t o have bee n discharge d i n vi olation o f Sectio n 8(a)(3). 95 B y 1970 , th e numbe r o f thos e discriminated against had risen to 3,779. In 1980, the number of such terminated workers exceeded 10,000 , and in 1985 , a year with onl y about hal f o f th e representatio n election s conducte d durin g 1980 , the Labor Board directed th e reinstatement o f 10,90 5 illegall y fired employees.96 By the late 1980s, unlawful employe e terminations occurred in one of every three Labor Board elections, with one of every thirty-six pro-union voters being illegally discharged. 97 Although it is certainly true that not all of the cited Section 8(a)(3) discharges occurre d durin g union organizin g drives , the NLR B figures suggest that most did.98 Furthermore, even when such unlawful dismissals tak e place whil e n o labo r organization i s activel y solic iting members, they d o diminish the likelihood o f future employe e organizing efforts . Individual s wh o hav e witnesse d th e illega l ter mination o f fello w worker s base d upo n thei r exercis e o f protecte d rights ten d t o b e afrai d t o provid e ope n suppor t fo r unionization . This would explai n why "illega l campaig n tactics... are a major, if not the major, determinant of NLRB election results. ,,99 Most American employers that do not employ unlawful tactic s to prevent unionizatio n clearl y indicat e thei r oppositio n t o labo r organizations. The y disseminat e literatur e an d mak e "captiv e audi ence" speeche s t o masse d assemblage s o f employee s statin g thei r unequivocal desir e t o remai n nonunion . The y emphasiz e th e fac t that onl y the y posses s th e powe r t o determin e wages , hours , an d working conditions, an d they frequently not e that if representativ e labor organizations strike to enforce union bargaining demands, the striking individuals ma y be permanently replaced. A number of employers retain the services of labor relations consultants who specialize in orchestrating anti-union campaigns. Most consultants develop company programs that involve representations that border on the unlawful. While business firms may lawfully misrepresent th e salarie s pai d t o union officials , th e manner i n whic h dues mone y i s expended , an d th e compensatio n an d benefit s re ceived b y employees o f othe r companies covere d by collective bargaining agreements,100 they may not promise workers special benefits if the y oppos e th e unio n o r threate n reprisal s agains t thos e wh o support it . Nonetheless , som e consultant s recommen d th e us e o f overt threats , an d a fe w propos e th e illega l discharg e o f primar y union supporters. A number of business firmsthat have had bargaining relationships

50 Th e Extent an d Causes of the Decline for many years have recently decided that they would prefer to regain their forme r nonunio n status . The y hav e take n increasingl y toug h stands a t th e bargainin g table , and have , i n man y cases , openly en couraged employee s dissatisfie d wit h thei r presen t unio n represen tatives to conduct decertification campaigns . This would explain the fact tha t th e annua l numbe r o f decertificatio n election s conducte d by the Labor Board grew from abou t 300 to 400 during the late 1960s and earl y 1970 s t o approximatel y 85 0 t o 90 0 durin g th e earl y 1980s.101 It i s als o significan t t o not e tha t incumben t union s los e a greater percentag e o f decertificatio n election s toda y tha n the y di d twenty years ago. The number of members lost through this maneuver now exceed s 20,00 0 pe r year. 102 Companies tha t hav e t o decid e whethe r t o refurbis h existin g fa cilities frequentl y conside r th e unio n statu s o f thei r plants . Dat a suggest tha t busines s firms ar e les s likel y t o inves t ne w capita l a t established location s i f th e employee s a t thos e facilitie s ar e orga nized.103 Numerou s decision s concernin g th e locatio n o f ne w fac tories ar e similarl y influence d b y unionizatio n factors. 104 Th e fac t that many new production plants have been constructed in the South and Southwes t ove r th e pas t twent y year s ca n b e a t leas t partiall y attributed to the fact that Sunbelt state workers have not traditionally been a s supportive o f labor organizations a s their norther n counter parts.105 This evidenc e demonstrate s tha t eve n basic investment de terminations ar e bein g influence d b y th e desir e o f mos t America n firms to avoid unionization . United State s corporation s hav e eve n forme d trad e association s designed i n larg e par t t o discourag e worke r unionization . Entitie s such a s th e Nationa l Associatio n o f Manufacturers , th e America n Hospital Association , th e Associate d Builder s an d Contractors , th e National Retai l Merchant s Association , an d th e Maste r Printers As sociation hav e all developed vigorou s open-shop programs. 106 They conduct specia l seminar s fo r member s t o demonstrat e technique s they ma y emplo y t o keep labor organization s out . The antipath y exhibite d b y mos t America n employer s towar d unionization i s especially disturbin g when one recognizes that business firms i n Wester n Europea n countrie s hav e generall y accepte d the legitimacy of labor organizations and have not employed simila r anti-union tactics.107 A major reason for the different attitude s toward unionization in America and Western Europe is the impact of unions on organize d firms. I n most Wester n Europea n countries , collectiv e bargaining is conducted on a regional or national basis covering most

The Extent and Causes of the Decline 5 1 corporations withi n th e relevan t industry. 108 Governmen t official s often participat e i n th e negotiations . Th e term s o f th e agreement s are usually applied to the workers of all industry firms in that region or nation, regardless of the percentage of employees of each company who are active union members. There is thus no significant advantage derived from maintaining a nonunion business. In th e Unite d States , onl y thos e corporation s tha t hav e forma l bargaining relationships with labor organizations representing a majority o f thei r respectiv e employee s mus t negotiat e collectiv e con tracts. More importantly, th e terms of suc h agreement s ar e applied exclusively t o work performed by individuals employe d withi n the specified bargainin g units . Companie s withou t labor-managemen t relationships remai n fre e t o unilaterall y establis h thei r ow n em ployment terms. Such firmsare constrained only by operative market factors. I f their wage rate s o r working condition s ar e unacceptabl y low, they will encounter difficulty attractin g and retaining qualified employees. Thei r dissatisfie d employee s ma y eve n contemplat e unionization. The cost o f unionizatio n i n th e Unite d State s ca n be quite high . Management official s mus t consul t thei r representative labo r organizations wit h respec t t o matter s meaningfull y affectin g employe e wages, hours , an d workin g conditions . Ther e i s als o a substantia l probability that overall labor costs for union shops will exceed those of unorganized competitors . Labo r economists estimat e that unionized firms hav e labo r cost s tha t ar e 1 0 t o 3 0 percen t highe r tha n nonunion employers. 109 In the late 1980s, the union-nonunion wage differential exceede d 2 0 percen t i n mos t industries. 110 Th e fring e benefit costs in organized facilities were over 50 percent above those in unorganized settings. 111 Even though some of this union premium is offset b y the greater worker productivity enjoye d by most unionized firms,112 an increasing proportion of the cost differential i s not. This fac t place s unionize d America n businesse s a t a distinc t dis advantage compared to their unorganized competitors . SOCIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION S

One of the great deceptions perpetrate d o n American workers over the pas t centur y i s th e allegedl y classles s natur e o f Unite d State s society.113 Childre n ar e taugh t tha t peopl e bor n i n lo g cabin s ca n grow up to be president. Horatio Alger stories are used to reinforc e the belief that even those individuals raised in the most humble and

52 Th e Extent and Causes of the Decline disadvantaged setting s ca n obtain higher educatio n an d rise to the top o f America n industry . Becaus e mos t individual s ca n cit e ex amples o f immigrant s an d first generatio n childre n wh o actuall y attained professiona l o r entrepreneurial status , i t i s eas y t o understand why many persons readily accept the egalitarian legend. This concept accounts for the fact that most working class parents dream of middle-class opportunities for their children.114 As a result of this myth, fe w peopl e attribut e th e succes s o f familie s wit h extrem e wealth and prominent lineage to the fortuity o f birth, considering it instead to be a result of individua l achievement . The America n belie f i n equa l opportunit y accomplishe s severa l important societa l objectives . I t induces thos e bor n int o disadvan taged environment s t o blame themselves fo r their failure t o escap e their surroundings , instea d o f focusin g upo n th e inequitabl e edu cational opportunitie s afforde d them. 115 I t help s t o delud e peopl e into believing that the disparate compensation and employment options available to women and minorities ar e not the result of invidious gende r an d racia l discrimination , bu t ar e th e natura l consequences of independent choices voluntarily made by those individuals.116 So long as people in lower socioeconomic circumstan ces can be made to accept responsibility fo r their own plights, i t is unlikely that the dispossessed masse s will revolt against the system that oppresses them. 117 Those individual s wh o accep t the notion that America ha s truly achieved the fundamental absence of social stratification should visit a high-technology productio n facilit y o r a university settin g a t the conclusion of the normal work day. The rank-and-file personnel will depart in overalls and a work shirt, with many carrying lunch buckets.118 An inordinate number will be overweight, and most will converse i n languag e suggestin g inadequat e education . The y wil l b e compensated o n a n hourly basi s an d b e require d t o punc h a time clock eac h time they ente r and leave the premises. Their departin g professional colleagues , on the other hand, will generally be dressed in clothing more associated with the middle class, and they will be unlikely to carry lunch boxes. They will receiv e salaries and not be obliged to account formally fo r their work time. They will probabl y speak in a more erudite manner. The classles s deceptio n generate s a docilit y amon g blue-colla r production worker s an d lower-leve l white-colla r personnel . Suc h individuals tend to accept their societal positions without questioning the reason for their relative inabilit y to transcend their working

The Extent and Causes of the Decline 5 3 class situations. This decreases the likelihood that they will become frustrated by their lack of occupational mobility. It is thus improbable that they will become angry with the limitations imposed upon them by the genera l America n economi c syste m an d by the hierarchica l structure of their particular employers. As a result, few will conclude that collective action might provide them with a meaningful degre e of worker empowerment. The medi a an d th e busines s communit y hav e consistentl y por trayed union members as "working class," with the implication that such statu s i s synonymou s wit h "lowe r class " rank. The y subtl y create th e impressio n tha t onl y th e "lowe r class " opt s fo r unio n representation.119 Rarely do movies depict labor leaders or organized employees i n a favorable light . Onl y a few films, suc h a s "Norm a Rae" an d "Matewan, " hav e provide d sympatheti c portrayals . Fa r more movies, suc h a s "America n Dream," "F.I.S.T.," "Hoffa," and "On the Waterfront," have characterize d unio n official s a s corrupt and uncaring , an d organize d worker s a s uneducate d an d violent . Television shows have provided a similar negative image. Most middle- and upper-class American s conside r Archie Bunker the archetypical unio n member . The y vie w suc h peopl e a s bigote d an d semiliterate. The depiction o f unio n peopl e i n newspaper s an d magazine s i s no more favorable. Instead of noting the thousands of collective bargaining agreements achieved each year without resort to work stoppages, reporters focus on the relatively few controversies culminating in strikes involvin g som e degre e of violence. The y usually give extensive coverage to instances of union corruption. Newspapers regularly publish photographs of the old, frequently overweight , cigarsmoking, white, male AFL-CIO leadership each time they gather for AFL-CIO conventions a t Bal Harbor, Florida. Media news reports generally treat wrongdoing by labor and business leaders differently. Unio n officials wh o misappropriate mone y from membe r pension an d welfare fund s ar e described a s "embez zlers." They ar e equated wit h organize d crim e figures, even whe n they act with no connection to any criminal syndicate . Whe n bank officers or brokerage firmagents divert client funds to their own use, they tend to be characterized as "white-collar offenders." The prison terms imposed upon people lik e Ivan Boesky, Michael Milken, and Charles Keating , eac h o f who m bilke d societ y ou t o f hundred s o f millions o f dollars , are usually muc h shorte r than th e term s give n to union officials wh o have "embezzled " much smaller sums. This

54 Th e Extent an d Causes of the Declin e type of distinction also fosters the public impression that more union officials ar e corrup t tha n busines s executives . The actua l dat a con tradict thi s stereotypical belief . They demonstrate that unio n agent s are actually les s likely to be involved i n criminal conduc t than thei r entrepreneurial counterparts. 120 It is especially ironi c that the movie and print media continue such stereotypes, because the vast majorit y of skille d peopl e employe d i n suc h informatio n field s ar e affiliate d with labo r organization s tha t functio n i n a professional an d lawfu l manner. The degre e t o whic h th e medi a an d businesse s hav e bee n suc cessful in creating the impression that organized employees are lower class ma y b e see n i n th e wa y i n whic h America n an d Canadia n citizens vie w themselves . Many Canadian s respon d t o public opin ion poll s b y acknowledgin g thei r "workin g class ,, membership . United State s respondents , o n th e othe r hand , rarel y acknowledg e this status . They have been taught t o equate suc h a characterizatio n with "lowe r class, " and fe w ar e willing to accep t th e fact tha t the y are not par t o f th e ubiquitou s "middl e class. " Most corporation s reinforc e thes e clas s notions amon g their low level employees. They try to convince blue-collar productio n work ers that union membership is a clear indication of lower class status. This image increases the likelihood that unorganized personne l wil l remain so , an d i t occasionall y induce s represente d employee s t o decertify thei r incumben t unions . Ove r th e pas t tw o decades , cor porate official s hav e learned tha t sophisticated appeal s to class consciousness wor k mor e effectivel y tha n crud e threats . Class-based propagand a has been particularly persuasiv e with respect to white-collar personnel. As the United State s has been transformed fro m a manufacturin g econom y int o a white-colla r servic e society, corporate executive s hav e been careful t o provide low-leve l management worker s wit h th e impressio n tha t the y hav e mor e i n common wit h thei r superior s tha n the y d o wit h thei r blue-colla r compatriots.121 They have been able to persuade most low level management employees to ignore the fact that they and their productio n colleagues resid e i n simila r dwelling s an d hav e comparabl e in comes.122 Whenever labo r union s begi n t o organiz e banking , insur ance, healt h care , compute r processing , an d simila r industries , th e affected employer s immediatel y disseminat e anti-unio n literatur e disingenuously suggestin g tha t person s employe d i n suc h white collar occupations will lose their professional statu s if they succum b to unionization .

The Extent an d Cause s of the Decline 5 5 One o f th e mos t strikin g development s ove r th e pas t severa l de cades has been the increased concentration of economic and politica l influence i n th e hands o f a diminishing numbe r o f plutocrats. 123 In the earl y nineteent h century , approximatel y 8 0 percen t o f worker s were self-employe d entrepreneurs . B y th e mid-twentiet h century , most individuals earned their livings by working for the 2 to 3 percent of th e populatio n wh o owne d abou t hal f o f al l privat e property. 124 During the 1980s , wealth becam e eve n mor e concentrated . Th e relatively few members of the ruling class have been unwilling to share their power with their subordinates, and sociologica l circumstance s have not favored th e development of a united working class. Current labor official s find i t difficul t t o confron t th e inequitie s indigenou s to th e America n capitalis t syste m becaus e mos t o f the m ar e una bashedly procapitalist. 125 The y ar e willin g t o acknowledg e th e su perior right s possesse d b y corporat e owner s an d thei r manageria l officials. A somewhat differen t sociologica l phenomeno n ha s involved th e historical effor t o f man y companie s t o divid e worker s alon g racia l and gender lines. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, companie s regularl y employe d minorit y an d femal e em ployees durin g wor k stoppages . Becaus e suc h person s coul d no t obtain membershi p i n man y AF L craft unions , they wer e receptiv e to strikebreakin g overtures. 126 Corporat e executive s als o use d th e lower compensatio n acceptabl e t o minorit y an d femal e worker s a s a mean s o f moderatin g unio n demand s fo r highe r rate s o f pa y fo r white male employees.127 This attempt to exacerbate such intergrou p divisions continue s today . Man y employer s disingenuousl y blam e race-conscious an d gender-consciou s affirmativ e actio n program s when the y fai l t o offe r employmen t opportunitie s t o whit e males , and the y conversel y antagoniz e minorit y an d femal e applicant s when the y selec t whit e male s fo r vacan t positions .

4. TH E NEE D FO R LABOR UNION S TO ORGANIZ E TRADITIONALL Y NONUNION PERSONNE L

The America n labo r movemen t ha s historicall y derive d it s organi zational strength from northern blue-collar workers. As demographic and structural changes continue to deplete the ranks of these workers and to expand the traditionally unorganized sectors of the workforce, labor unions will be compelled t o modify thei r organizational focu s if the y wis h t o retai n an d broade n thei r economi c vitalit y i n th e rapidly approachin g post-industria l society . I f labo r leader s canno t develop programs that appeal to white-collar and service personnel , private sector unions will become increasingly unimportant outsid e of the shrinkin g manufacturin g sector . It will not be easy for labor organizations to unionize unorganize d occupations. Various factors have combined to discourage collectiv e behavior b y worker s i n thes e positions . Man y nonunio n worker s are satisfie d wit h thei r employmen t circumstance s becaus e o f th e diligent effort s o f thei r employer s t o avoi d th e type s o f employe e disapprobation tha t frequentl y precipitat e collectiv e action . Corporations generall y provid e unorganize d white-colla r personne l with compensatio n an d benefi t increase s a s generou s a s thos e ob tained for their production worker s through the bargaining process. 1 Unorganized manufacturin g enterprise s similarl y retai n thei r unfet tered manageria l discretio n b y insurin g tha t thei r employee s ar e a s well-off a s their unionize d counterparts. 2 I f labor organization s ar e to significantl y enhanc e th e employmen t interest s o f nonunio n in dividuals, the y wil l hav e t o provid e mor e tha n conventiona l eco nomic gains . The y wil l hav e t o establis h goal s tha t wil l increas e 59

60 Th e Need for Labor Unions to Organiz e employee participation i n managerial decisio n making and enhanc e worker dignity . Although labor organization s ma y b e necessar y t o preserv e pre viously achieved economic objectives, the critical function o f unions in th e futur e wil l b e t o preven t th e noneconomi c exploitatio n o f individuals that results from the inhumane proliferation o f industrial technology. White-colla r an d servic e personne l wil l deman d a greater degre e o f influenc e ove r thei r basi c terms an d condition s of employment, and unions will have to create programs to satisfy suc h worker expectations . Legislativel y prescribe d an d union-negotiate d worker participatio n plan s ma y provid e employee s wit h a greate r degree o f contro l ove r managemen t decision s affectin g thei r employment. According to some observers, labor unions no longer control their own destiny, because most of the forces that normally increase union membership, suc h a s industria l expansio n an d norther n workforc e growth, ar e no w beyon d th e influenc e o f labo r organizations. 3 I f unions accept this fatalistic prognosis , they need simply await thei r predicted demis e wit h uncharacteristi c tranquility . I f labo r leader s recognize, however, that they still exercise considerable control over their fat e an d exchang e thei r outmode d method s an d attitude s fo r sophisticated organizationa l technique s an d farsighte d objectives , they ma y engende r a n organizationa l renaissanc e i n th e comin g decades. ESTABLISHING A POSITIV E PUBLI C IMAG E

Many member s o f th e publi c thin k tha t unio n official s ar e corrupt , that bargainin g agreement s establis h inefficien t wor k rule s tha t in hibit worke r productivity , an d tha t th e wages and benefit s receive d by organized employee s exceed the value of their services. Although 72 percent o f person s questione d b y the Gallup organizatio n i n th e late 1930s expressed thei r approval o f labor organizations, less tha n 60 percen t o f th e publi c approve d o f union s b y th e mid-1980s. 4 American business leaders and the news media reinforce the negative perception o f labo r organizations b y emphasizing th e criminal con victions o f unio n official s an d depictin g organize d worker s a s un ambitious an d overpaid . Rarel y d o medi a storie s indicat e th e continuing nee d fo r collectiv e worke r action . Labor leaders must acknowledge the negative view of unions held by an increasing percentage of the public and work to actively coun -

The Need for Labor Unions to Organize 6 1 teract thes e negativ e stereotypes . A positiv e imag e i s th e first step to increasing membership and enhancing union power vis-&-vis employers and Congress. Labor organizations must utilize the media to disseminate a pro-unio n message . Th e recen t "loo k fo r th e unio n label" campaign, designed to encourage people to purchase garments manufactured in unionized American shops, and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employee s advertisements , showing th e variou s importan t governmen t function s bein g per formed b y organize d personnel , wer e ver y effective . Th e AFL-CIO recently conducted a "Union Yes" media campaign to demonstrat e how labo r organization s respon d t o contemporar y employmen t issues.5 By encouraging news reporters at both the national and local level to disseminat e storie s abou t industrie s tha t exploi t unrepresente d employees, organized labor will graphically demonstrate the continuing nee d fo r worke r representation . Fo r example , th e sweatsho p conditions indigenous to most apparel manufacturers should be exposed. Unlicense d garmen t shop s i n citie s lik e Ne w York , Boston , Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco regularly employ legal and illegal immigrant s who ar e forced t o work in unconscionable envi ronments for inadequate wages.6 Unions need to emphasize that people employed in organized garment factories earn a living wage and toil i n relatively health y and safe surroundings . Unions shoul d suppl y medi a expert s wit h informatio n an d sta tistics abou t th e thousand s o f conscientiou s worker s wh o ar e discharged eac h year in the Unite d State s for no vali d reason . Peopl e are fired for looking a t a supervisor th e wrong way, havin g the audacity t o questio n a seemingly irrationa l compan y policy , o r eve n complaining t o stat e o r federal official s abou t unhealth y o r unsaf e employment conditions . Th e publi c shoul d b e informe d tha t suc h incidents occur frequently. They need to know that unsubstantiated discharges are not permitted under collective bargaining agreements that contain provisions prohibiting discipline except for "just cause" and grievance-arbitration procedure s that ensure a fair resolution of controverted employe e claims . Many people blame the significant Unite d States trade imbalance on high wage unionized industries. They believe that exorbitant labor costs make it difficult for American businesses to compete effectivel y in a global economy. Labor leaders must educate the public regarding the higher productivity indigenou s to organized firms. They should also poin t ou t the fact tha t recent studie s indicat e tha t heavily un-

62 Th e Need for Labor Unions to Organize ionized industrie s hav e not contributed mor e to the American trad e imbalance tha n unorganize d industries. 7 Members of the general publi c have received th e distinct impres sion fro m th e medi a tha t unio n official s ar e regularl y convicte d o f criminal activity and that labor unions have connections to organized crime. Most people are unaware that the available data indicate tha t the conviction rate for union officials i s no higher than the conviction rate fo r thei r busines s counterparts. 8 Labo r organization s nee d t o improve thei r publi c imag e i n thi s are a i f the y ar e to ear n th e trus t of the public and potentia l members. By demanding fair media cov erage demonstratin g tha t relativel y fe w unio n agent s engag e i n un lawful activit y an d comparin g th e convictio n rate s o f labor leader s with thos e o f busines s executives , union s wil l b e abl e t o begi n t o persuade th e publi c o f their beneficia l rol e i n society . While workin g t o sho w th e publi c th e relativel y lo w amoun t o f illegal activit y i n labo r unions, union leader s mus t als o reduce cor ruption amon g labo r representative s an d preven t individual s wh o have violated thei r fiduciary obligatio n towar d member s from hold ing union office . To o frequently, AFL-CI O lobbyists see k to preven t the adoption of statutory provisions barring persons guilty of abusing their position s fro m holdin g electiv e unio n positions . Eve n thoug h Congress ofte n fail s t o enac t simila r prohibition s coverin g busines s executives convicte d o f "white colla r offenses, " unio n leader s mus t recognize tha t thei r effort s i n thi s regar d undermin e publi c confi dence in organized labor . AFL-CIO decision makers must stop viewing Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act provisions that bar persons convicte d o f certai n seriou s crime s from holdin g unio n office9 a s unfair t o union agents . They should recogniz e that preclu sive laws actually benefit labo r organizations by making it clear that unions wil l no t condon e th e activitie s o f those individual s wh o ig nore their legal obligations. Union supporters should cooperate full y with federal an d state investigative efforts t o discover and prosecut e the relativel y fe w leader s wh o hav e breache d thei r fiduciary obli gations toward members as a means of assuring the public that illegal activities within the labor movement will not be tolerated. Only then will the y convinc e th e publi c o f thei r anticorruptio n stance . Labo r lobbyists could even support legislation that would similarly prevent business executive s convicte d o f seriou s crime s fro m holdin g re sponsible corporat e positions . Organized labo r should als o sever any connections between loca l or nationa l union s an d organize d crim e an d utiliz e th e medi a t o

The Need for Labor Unions to Organize 6 3 dispel the public perception that unions are mob-controlled. Hones t labor leader s shoul d welcom e prosecution s agains t dishones t per sons as a means of strengthening the entire movement. If labor could eliminate thi s negativ e publi c image , i t wil l b e abl e t o approac h organizing campaign s wit h mor e power , unburdene d b y erroneou s public perceptions . By publicizin g th e fac t tha t thousand s o f unio n official s wor k conscientiously t o furthe r th e employmen t interest s o f represente d workers, at salarie s substantiall y les s than thei r managemen t coun terparts, organize d labo r coul d focu s th e attentio n o f th e publi c o n who is really getting rich on the backs of American workers. In most instances, union representatives in a particular industry are fortunate to earn 1 0 to 2 0 percent o f the compensatio n obtaine d b y corporat e managers in the same industry. The most highly paid union official s have traditionally bee n member s o f th e Teamsters . Under previou s Teamsters constitutions , leader s coul d hol d national , regional , an d local offices simultaneously , thus enabling many leaders to earn over $100,000 an d som e t o ear n ove r $500,000 . A t it s 199 1 convention , the Teamster s Unio n amende d it s constitutio n t o plac e a $225,00 0 per year limit on total compensation earned by any Teamster officer. 10 In addition, Teamsters activities from 198 9 to 1992 were conducte d under th e supervisio n o f a court-appointe d monito r wh o worke d diligently t o eliminat e corruptio n withi n th e union . I n lat e 1991 , Teamsters electe d a s thei r presiden t refor m candidat e Ro n Carey , who has since moved quickl y to remove corrupt unio n official s an d restore membershi p democracy. 11 Even the limited number of union officers wh o earn over $100,000 per year pale in comparison to the multimillion dollar compensatio n packages give n t o countles s busines s executives . In 1960 , the chie f executive officers o f the 100 largest corporations received gross compensation abou t forty times the average wage of their respective fac tory workers , an d thei r after-ta x earning s wer e abou t twelv e time s the after-ta x earning s o f productio n workers. 12 B y th e lat e 1980s , however, th e sam e CEO s receive d gros s compensatio n tha t wa s ninety-three time s the averag e wag e earned b y their factor y person nel, an d thei r after-ta x earning s wer e a n astonishin g sevent y time s the after-tax earning s of production employees. 13 The disseminatio n of this information has already caused some people to shift the blame for the lack of competitiveness o f American industr y from union s to management. Unions could enhance their own public image by proposing legislatio n tha t woul d prohibi t corporation s fro m providin g

64 Th e Need for Labor Unions to Organiz e executives wit h compensatio n package s tha t ar e mor e tha n fifteen or twent y time s th e compensatio n level s o f thei r respectiv e rank and-file personnel . In it s effor t t o increas e power , prestige , an d membership , orga nized labo r could sponso r television program s and movies that por tray union s an d unio n member s i n a positive light . Documentarie s depicting the effective effort s o f union leaders or the beneficial wor k of particula r labo r organizations woul d simultaneousl y enhanc e la bor's imag e an d educat e th e public . Portrayin g th e live s o f peopl e from divers e backgrounds whos e job s have been improve d throug h the collectiv e bargainin g proces s woul d als o hel p clos e the ga p between th e perception s o f organize d an d unorganize d individuals . Surveys hav e foun d tha t mor e unio n member s vie w labor organi zations a s positiv e factor s tha n d o thei r nonunio n cohorts, 14 an d members hav e greater confidenc e i n labor officials. 15 Onc e labo r or ganizations educat e nonmember s abou t th e benefit s availabl e through representation , the y wil l b e bette r abl e t o organiz e tradi tionally unorganize d sector s o f the workforce . Despite the recent decline in union membership, there is evidence to suggest that man y unorganize d employee s woul d b e receptive t o appropriate unionization appeals . Even though the persistent effort s of busines s leader s t o depic t labo r organization s a s antiquate d an d unnecessary hav e ha d a n impac t o n organizatio n efforts , ove r 8 0 percent of Americans continue to believe that "workers should hav e the right to join unions," and between 50 and 75 percent of the public still thin k tha t "virtuall y al l member s o f th e wor k forc e woul d b e better off if they were unionized."16 Almost 70 percent of respondents in a 1984 Harris poll rejected th e notion that labor organizations ar e only relevant to blue-collar workers. 17 Nonetheless, only about onethird o f labo r forc e participant s expresse d a willingnes s t o vot e i n favor o f unionizatio n i f offere d th e opportunit y t o d o so. 18 Labo r organizations mus t work to encourage the pro-union beliefs hel d b y most Americans and counteract the negative perceptions emphasized by the business community . Enhancing th e Employmen t Right s of Al l Worker s throug h the Legislativ e Proces s

The labor movemen t ca n greatly enhanc e it s publi c imag e throug h legislative activity . AFL-CI O affiliate s hav e generall y bee n consid ered "busines s unions " tha t ar e primaril y intereste d i n enhancin g

The Need for Labor Unions to Organize 6 5 member benefits an d protection s throug h collectiv e bargaining . A s a result, unorganize d personne l ofte n believ e tha t labor unions are not concerned abou t their employment situations . AFL-CIO affiliates hav e lobbied in favor of civil right s laws, legislation establishin g minimu m wages , maximu m hours , workplac e health an d safet y standards , worke r an d unemploymen t compen sation programs, family leave policies, and statutes protecting worker pension and benefit plans . Most, however, have not worked to provide unorganize d employee s wit h right s an d protection s commen surate wit h thos e enjoye d b y unio n member s unde r collectiv e bargaining agreements. This provincial philosophy can be attributed to the belie f tha t th e legislativ e enhancemen t o f employmen t con ditions for all workers would diminish the need for traditional union representation.19 Labo r leaders wh o cate r to this perspectiv e fai l t o recognize that conventional bargaining procedures are no longer adequate to dea l wit h man y o f th e comple x problem s create d by th e inexorable transformatio n o f the American economi c syste m int o a post-industrial society and the increasing internationalization of the business world. Corporations in highly competitive market s cannot agree to contractual obligations that would disadvantag e them with respect t o unconstrained companies . I t should thu s be apparen t to labor leader s tha t the y canno t rel y exclusivel y o n collectiv e bar gaining t o further employe e interests . Onl y legislatio n coverin g al l workers can provide industry-wide protections . The economi c pligh t o f unorganize d worker s negativel y affect s unionized employees. The availability of nonunion individuals, particularly durin g period s o f unemployment , meaningfull y threaten s the employmen t standard s an d jo b securit y enjoye d b y unionize d personnel.20 Thi s threa t i s exacerbate d b y th e abilit y o f employer s to permanentl y replac e strikin g workers . Unio n leader s concerne d that legislatively furthering the interests of all employees would undermine th e popularit y o f labo r organization s nee d onl y conside r the fac t tha t Europea n trad e unions , whic h hav e historicall y bee n substantially involve d i n th e politica l process , hav e membershi p rates three , four , an d eve n five time s th e moribun d rat e o f thei r politically inactiv e American counterparts. Even within the United States, the most rapid union expansion in the past three decades has occurred i n th e publi c sector , wher e employee s ar e provided wit h pervasive statutor y protections. By pursuing legislatio n tha t woul d benefi t al l workers , whethe r or not the y ar e unionized, labo r organization s woul d furthe r thei r

66 Th e Need for Labor Unions to Organiz e objectives i n two important ways. To the extent that modern union s demonstrate thei r dedicatio n t o the improvement o f the rights of all employees, the y wil l develo p a positive publi c imag e an d increas e the likelihood tha t workers who have traditionally been unreceptiv e to unionization wil l reconsider. Furthermore, if unions could obtai n statutory provision s definin g basi c employmen t term s fo r al l work ers, they woul d substantiall y decreas e th e diseconomie s associate d with unionization. As generally applicabl e legislative safeguards re duce th e artificia l labor cos t differential s betwee n unio n an d non union business enterprises, companies would be less likely to oppose employee organization . Th e impac t o f thi s facto r i s discernibl e i n Western Europea n countrie s tha t appl y negotiate d employmen t rights t o al l worker s withi n a particular industry , regardles s o f th e degree o f unio n suppor t a t specific plants . Suc h a reduction i n em ployer antipath y towar d labo r organization s woul d mak e i t easie r for union s t o recruit ne w members . Unorganized employee s ar e frequently mor e devastate d b y auto mation, subcontracting, and productio n relocatio n tha n their union ized cohorts . Eve n worker s covere d b y conventiona l bargainin g agreements find i t difficul t t o adjus t t o suc h changes . Politicall y astute labor leaders recently lobbie d successfull y i n favor o f federa l legislation providin g employee s wit h sixt y day s advanc e notic e o f mass layoff s an d plan t closures. 21 In som e instances , the personne l threatened wit h layof f ma y be able to respond t o company concern s by reducin g labor cost s o r increasin g productivit y an d obviat e th e need fo r suc h dislocations . Where such a result canno t be achieved, advance notificatio n enable s worker s t o conside r alternativ e em ployment opportunitie s an d retrainin g option s whil e the y ar e stil l gainfully employed . Labor organization s coul d mee t thi s emergin g nee d o f contem porary worker s b y seekin g legislatio n tha t woul d establis h retraining22 an d relocatio n fund s analogou s t o unemployment com pensation plan s tha t woul d provid e employee s wit h portabl e right s based upo n thei r previou s attachmen t t o the labo r market . Individ uals facing long-ter m layoff s woul d b e able to utilize these financial resources to learn new skills and/or relocate to geographic areas with greater employment opportunities. Unions could also serve the needs of unorganized employee s by supporting statute s tha t mandat e sev erance pay and/or special unemployment compensatio n for employ ees displace d b y a n econom y movin g towar d a post-industria l environment. Thes e benefit s shoul d definitel y b e availabl e t o indi -

The Need for Labor Unions to Organize 6 7 viduals dislocate d b y th e transfe r o f domesti c productio n job s t o foreign expor t platforms . Another way to appeal to today's workforce as a means of ensuring the continued vitality of the labor movement is for unions to address issues of employee dignity. Legislation requiring parental leave, employer- o r government-sponsored chil d care , job sharing, an d flextime programs would benefi t parents . Increasing numbers o f single parents an d dual-incom e household s hav e mad e thes e "options " essential, and yet employers have failed to provide them unilaterally. Unions coul d enhanc e thei r popularit y amon g traditionall y unor ganized workers by helping them attain these economic necessities . Job-sharing plans would obviat e the need fo r layoffs durin g economic recession s an d would permi t union s t o work for the benefi t of employees instead of sacrificing th e jobs of some to retain a semblance of power. Labor organizations should therefor e promote legislation tha t woul d allo w worker s t o reduce thei r weekly hour s t o thirty o r thirty-five, an d enabl e a greater number o f individual s t o retain their jobs. Supporting this type of legislation would enhanc e labor's image with respect to the millions o f workers who regularly fear that they are going to lose their jobs. Union official s mus t continu e t o suppor t comprehensiv e healt h insurance coverage for all Americans. Approximately 3 7 million individuals currentl y lac k basi c healt h coverage , an d a national pro gram would diminish the financial pressures encountered by private employers in providing such coverage. By lobbying for broad health care coverage , labo r organization s ca n significantl y enhanc e thei r image among older workers. In addition, unions will be seen by the American publi c a s supporting an issue o f vital an d increasing national importance . Labor organizations nee d to lobby in favor of laws restricting intrusive dru g testing. They must seek amendment s t o the Drug Free Workplace Ac t o f 1988 23 tha t woul d limi t rando m dru g testin g t o persons holding safety-sensitive positions. This would enable unions to garner the support o f individual s wh o feel tha t management ha s invaded thei r privacy, while the y simultaneousl y acknowledg e th e serious natur e o f th e dru g problem an d th e nee d fo r employer s t o protect th e safet y o f thei r worker s an d clientele . Demandin g tha t individual dru g testing be based o n articulable fact s that provide a reasonable suspicio n o f dru g o r alcohol abus e woul d preven t em ployers from abusing drug testing, and help to maintain the dignity of employees.

68 Th e Need for Labo r Union s to Organiz e Many corporation s currentl y rel y solel y upo n th e les s expensiv e and les s accurat e enzym e multiplie d immunoassa y techniqu e (EMIT). Companies obtainin g positiv e EMI T result s shoul d b e sta tutorily obligated to perform th e more accurate gas chromatography/ mass spectrometry (GC/MS) test before taking adverse actions against workers wh o tes t positive. 24 B y workin g t o lowe r th e ris k o f fals e positives, unions wil l sho w employee s tha t the y hav e the powe r t o protect the m agains t jo b los s fo r arbitrar y o r unfounde d reasons . Unions should encourag e federal an d local governments to establish more rehabilitatio n program s t o assist alcoho l an d dru g abusers, so that eve n thes e worker s fee l tha t the y ar e importan t t o th e labo r movement. The y shoul d lobb y fo r a n amendmen t t o th e Dru g Fre e Workplace Act that would mandat e rehabilitation fo r first tim e abu sers t o encourag e thes e individual s t o becom e ful l contributor s t o American industry. 25 Labor organization s shoul d cooperat e wit h companie s an d gov ernment agencie s t o enhanc e th e educationa l program s availabl e a t work and through high schools and communit y colleges . Employers are finding it increasingly difficul t t o obtain well-educate d workers . Approximately 2 5 percent o f high school student s leav e before the y graduate,26 and man y o f th e individual s wh o d o obtai n hig h schoo l diplomas lac k th e basi c verba l an d mat h skill s require d b y mos t companies. Thirtee n percen t o f America n adult s ar e considere d "functionally illiterate " due to their inability to perform rudimentar y mental tasks. 27 Hal f o f al l seventeen-year-ol d student s canno t cal culate percentage s o r solv e simpl e equations. 28 Man y worker s ar e unable t o comprehen d verba l o r written instructions . Busines s an d labor leader s shoul d jointl y lobb y federal , state , an d loca l official s to expan d th e educationa l an d trainin g opportunitie s availabl e t o future labor forc e participant s an d t o worker s wh o currentl y nee d to lear n th e skill s require d fo r ne w occupation s an d existin g occu pations affecte d b y technological changes . In addition , the y shoul d jointly encourag e th e adoptio n o f minima l competenc y standard s that wil l preven t th e continue d graduatio n o f functionally illiterat e individuals. Thi s investmen t i n huma n capita l woul d increas e pro ductivity an d decreas e unemployment . Probably the most significant benefit employees derive from unio n representation i s the "just cause " limitation o n discipline expressl y or implicitl y containe d i n mos t bargainin g agreements. 29 In th e absence o f suc h a restrictio n an d th e accompanyin g grievance arbitration procedure s through whic h tha t right i s usually enforced ,

The Need for Labor Unions to Organiz e 6 9 most persons are employed "a t will," and can be terminated at any time fo r an y reaso n tha t doe s no t contraven e a specifi c statutor y prohibition.30 Althoug h man y stat e court s hav e evidence d a will ingness to impose limited restrictions on unconscionable employe e discharges, mos t judicial edict s hav e continued t o follow th e common law "at will" doctrine. They have upheld employers' unfettered ability t o terminat e employee s fo r eve n arbitrar y an d capriciou s reasons.31 "Some 60 million U.S. employees are subject to the employmentat-will doctrin e an d abou t 2 millio n o f the m ar e discharge d eac h year…. Abou t 150,00 0 o f thes e workers would hav e been found t o have been discharged without just cause and reinstated to their former jobs if they had had the right to appeal to an impartial arbitrator as d o almos t al l unionize d workers." 32 Th e America n labo r move ment should lobby in favor of state and federal legislation that would provide al l privat e secto r worker s wit h protectio n agains t unjus t discipline an d termination 33 simila r t o th e contractua l safeguard s available t o unionize d employees . Union s nee d no t b e concerne d that th e availabilit y o f legislativ e protection s woul d diminis h em ployee enthusias m fo r unions , becaus e labo r organization s woul d provide valuabl e assistanc e t o individual s force d t o invok e thei r statutory rights. They would also insure that wrongfully discharge d persons who have been reinstated do not suffer further employmen t recriminations. Unions that continue to focus narrowly on the interests of bargaining unit personne l ar e destined fo r extinction. Th e decreasin g numbe r of unionize d employer s wil l fight mor e zealousl y t o decertif y in cumbent bargaining agents they believe are putting them at a critical disadvantage in relation to their unorganized competitors. Labor organizations need to return to their heritage. During the latter part of the nineteent h century , group s lik e th e Knight s o f Labo r an d th e National Labo r Union functione d lik e socia l movement s dedicate d to the advancemen t o f th e right s o f al l workers . AFL-CIO affiliate s have generally operated like "business unions" primarily interested in th e enhancemen t o f th e employmen t condition s o f dues-payin g members. A s a result, unorganize d personne l hav e ofte n believe d that modern labor unions are not concerned with their employment situations. For the American labor movement to reestablish the social movement approach indigenous to its roots, it must revitalize its alliances

70 Th e Need for Labor Unions to Organiz e with other activist groups. Unions must work more closely with civil rights groups, such as the National Association for the Advancemen t of Colore d People , the Mexican-America n Lega l and Educatio n De fense Fund , th e America n Associatio n o f Retire d Persons , an d th e National Organization for Women. They should also strengthen their ties with group s concerne d wit h healt h an d safety , th e adequacy of worker an d unemploymen t compensatio n scheme s an d Socia l Se curity benefits, the fairness o f tax laws on lower income individuals , the lack of basic health coverage for millions of Americans, and other issues o f concer n t o worker s an d thei r families . I f these group s co ordinate thei r efforts , the y wil l b e able to achieve greater economi c and political influence. 34 Unions will be able to utilize their increased power to increase membership and remain a vital force in the American economy . If labo r organization s induc e Congres s an d stat e legislature s t o enact statutes providing all workers with pervasive employment protections, unio n strengt h wil l b e enhanced , no t diminished. 35 Th e role o f labor organization s woul d shif t t o on e o f providin g advic e and assistanc e t o individual s challengin g discriminator y practices , improper layoffs , o r unjus t discipline , o r t o thos e seekin g unpai d wages o r overtim e pay , th e protectio n o f thei r pensio n o r fring e benefit rights , worke r o r unemploymen t compensation , o r th e en forcement o f applicabl e healt h an d safet y regulations. 36 Th e activ e participation o f union representatives would provide both organized and unorganize d personne l wit h th e influenc e tha t ca n onl y b e achieved throug h collectiv e action . Becaus e mos t lowe r leve l em ployees lac k th e financial resource s t o retai n lega l representatio n with respect to such basic employment issues , they would welcom e the assistance of labor organization specialists . The costs associate d with thi s representatio n woul d b e offse t b y membershi p due s o r service fees imposed upon nonmembers who request such assistance. Enhancing th e Publi c Perceptio n o f Union s throug h th e Collective Bargainin g Proces s

Unions functioning a s exclusive bargaining agents must continue t o provide bargaining unit personne l wit h substantiv e rights that tran scend th e protection s afforde d b y stat e an d federa l enactment s o r risk losin g th e suppor t o f thei r members . B y providing represente d employees wit h benefit s no t availabl e t o nonunio n workers , labo r organizations wil l mak e themselve s mor e attractiv e t o unorganize d

The Need for Labor Unions to Organize 7 1 personnel an d increas e thei r ranks . Fo r example , negotiate d wag e rates continu e t o excee d th e statutoril y prescribe d minimu m wage . In addition, eve n i f some form o f universal healt h coverag e is eventually provided b y federal law , unions and employer s will negotiat e supplementary benefits and claims handling procedures. Prior to the availability o f statutor y coverage , privat e partie s wil l discus s cost containment mechanism s tha t wil l enabl e busines s entitie s t o pro vide affordabl e healt h insurance . Labor organizations should see k bargaining agreement provision s covering a myria d o f employment-relate d topic s t o assis t th e em ployees the y currentl y represen t an d t o attrac t t o collectivizatio n those employee s no t ye t organized . Fring e benefit plan s coul d pro vide lega l care , ey e care , denta l care , chil d care , car e fo r th e agin g parents of employees, and parental leave for workers having or adopting children. These programs can be cost-efficient. Fo r example, employers have discovered that the cost of providing child care coverage is outweighed by the savings achieved through reduced absenteeism , improved employe e morale , and th e enhanced abilit y to attract an d retain qualifie d workers. 37 Individual s wit h satisfactor y persona l lives are generally more productive than those experiencing personal problems. During th e comin g years , representativ e labo r organization s should utiliz e collectiv e bargainin g t o protec t bargainin g uni t em ployees fro m th e vicissitude s associate d wit h th e introductio n o f new technology , productio n transfers , an d plan t closures . Nonun ionized employee s wil l quickl y se e th e benefi t o f representatio n i f labor organization s ar e successfu l i n thi s area . Labo r leader s hav e recognized th e nee d fo r moder n productio n techniques, 38 an d the y have th e righ t t o deman d tha t busines s firms reciprocat e wit h th e establishment o f educationa l program s tha t woul d prepar e affecte d bargaining uni t personne l fo r futur e occupationa l demands. 39 Indi viduals displace d b y automatio n shoul d b e entitle d t o continue d compensation durin g th e perio d o f thei r retraining. 40 Th e ongoin g employment o f suc h worker s woul d b e benevolent , woul d greatl y increase employe e loyalt y t o th e firm, an d woul d diminis h costl y employee turnover and guarantee a highly skilled future workforce. 41 Unions shoul d deman d contractua l restriction s aime d a t dimin ishing th e likelihoo d o f suc h busines s transactions . Economicall y powerful labo r organization s wil l b e abl e t o induc e employer s t o accept clauses expressly precludin g the relocation o r elimination of bargaining unit jobs. 42 Alternatively, agreements should permi t suc h

72 Th e Need for Labor Unions to Organiz e job changes , bu t ensur e displace d worker s continue d employmen t security through guaranteed annual wages or some form of job tenure similar t o tha t presentl y enjoye d b y man y Japanes e workers. 43 Jo b security program s d o no t simpl y benefi t th e affecte d employees . When suc h tenur e plan s ar e i n effect , worker s ar e les s resistan t t o operational change . This provide s manager s with greater flexibility , and compan y loyalt y t o workers ofte n enhance s employe e morale . Unions should demand provisions requiring employers to provide advance notic e of contemplated decision s that would directl y affec t the jo b securit y o f uni t personne l an d a n opportunit y t o discus s proposed changes . Eve n whe n labo r organization s canno t preven t the introductio n o f labor-savin g technology o r production transfers , they may be able to protect the interests of adversely affected worker s through provision s guaranteeing them intraplant o r interplant trans fer privileges , retraining opportunities , o r severance pay . The availability o f thes e benefit s fo r unionize d personne l wil l encourag e collectivization amon g unorganized workers . Corporations and union s can jointly establish remedial educatio n programs to improve the basic skills of employees. They could schedule classes before o r after work , and emplo y teachers on a part-time basis t o develo p th e necessar y skill s o f thes e personnel . Worker s who reac h highe r level s o f competenc e shoul d receiv e greate r ad vancement opportunities . Th e extr a fund s neede d t o suppor t suc h programs woul d b e offse t b y th e increase d employe e productivit y associated wit h a more educated workforce . Union s could negotiat e the creation of special funds designe d to finance worker retraining. 44 Employees could be reimbursed for the expense of attending relevant classes offere d a t educationa l institutions . Bargainin g agreement s could authorize reimbursement for the cost of attending professiona l meetings that would enhance personal skills. Investment i n "huma n capital" i s as important a s investment i n ne w technology. 45 Union s should induc e federa l an d stat e government s t o encourag e th e de velopment o f suc h educationa l scheme s throug h th e availabilit y o f tax credit s fo r participatin g busines s firms. Unrepresente d worker s may see k unionizatio n a s a mean s o f obtainin g acces s t o thes e programs. To provid e a sufficien t financial bas e fo r educationa l program s and to prevent generous employers from assuming a disproportionate share o f retrainin g cost s a t the expens e o f competitiveness , compa nies withi n a particula r industr y shoul d b e encourage d t o creat e industry-supported program s simila r t o thos e tha t hav e bee n sue -

The Need for Labor Unions to Organize 7 3 cessfully establishe d i n Germany. 46 Suc h expansive trainin g inure s to th e benefi t o f al l industr y participants . Individual s choosin g t o remain wit h thei r presen t companie s lear n ne w skill s tha t enabl e them t o perfor m broade r job tasks an d t o assume greate r decision making responsibility . Worker s wh o decid e t o leav e thei r curren t employers would likel y take their enhanced skill s to other industry firms tha t were equally responsible for the costs of the training. More competent employees would enjoy greater professional mobility and higher future earnin g capacities. 47 DEVELOPING INNOVATIV E ORGANIZIN G TECHNIQUE S

As th e Unite d State s continue s it s transformatio n int o a post industrial society , th e number of white-collar and service position s increases an d th e numbe r o f blue-colla r productio n job s shrinks . Corporations ar e opening a disproportionate percentag e o f ne w fa cilities i n Sunbel t areas , more wome n an d minoritie s ar e enterin g the labor force, and the average age of workers is increasing. If labor organizations ar e to survive i n the comin g decades, they must find new way s t o entic e white-collar , southern , female , minority , an d elderly individuals t o recognize the benefits associate d with collectivization. I f the y canno t achiev e rea l gain s i n thes e areas , privat e sector union s wil l becom e anemi c institution s wit h limite d eco nomic and political influence beyond the contracting manufacturing sector. Despite the continued decreas e in union membership, labor entities have devoted fewer resources to organizing efforts during recent years.48 Membership declines have left unions with fewer resources to commi t t o organizin g activity . Corporat e executive s hav e begu n to envision th e total demis e of American unions. If union membership continue s t o declin e throughou t th e 1990s , thes e executive s may b e abl e t o generat e a busines s environmen t i n whic h labo r unions wil l n o longe r be relevant . Managemen t official s woul d b e able t o determin e al l employmen t condition s unilaterally , becaus e individual employee s woul d hav e no significant influenc e ove r the terms of their employment. Business leaders are not likely to decrease their opposition toward unions. Whe n the Suprem e Cour t recently sustaine d th e authorit y of the Labor Board to promulgate rules defining the bargaining units for health care institutions,49 the American Hospital Association immediately pledged to fight union organizing efforts on all fronts.50 A

74 The

Nee d for Labor Unions to Organiz e

prominent managemen t attorne y suggeste d tha t "employer s shoul d use every waking moment to assess their vulnerability t o organizing and begin the process of 'hardening the target/ " 51 Labor entities will have to devise novel methods of countering such management tactics and appealin g t o worker s wh o migh t b e contemplatin g collectiv e action t o retai n thei r curren t strengt h an d buil d a foundation fro m which t o grow. The American labor movement wil l also have to cope with recen t Labor Board and cour t decision s that have made it more difficult fo r unions t o organiz e workers . I n NLR B v . Yeshiv a University, 52 th e Supreme Cour t hel d tha t person s wh o meaningfull y influenc e cor porate policie s constitut e "manageria l employees " exclude d fro m NLRA coverage. Although the university professors i n that case possessed th e authorit y t o formulate an d implemen t institutiona l poli cies, the y lacke d an y rea l contro l ove r thei r wages , hours , an d working conditions . Th e Cour t thu s ignore d th e fac t tha t unioniza tion would hav e provided thes e "managerial " personne l wit h inpu t regarding thei r fundamenta l employmen t conditions . Followin g Yeshiva, th e Labo r Boar d rule d tha t whe n a representativ e labo r organization negotiate s a bargaining agreemen t providin g nonman agerial workers with significant influenc e over management policies, the worker s becom e "managerial " personne l an d forfei t thei r sta tutory right to continued representation. 53 This type of decision wil l make it increasingly difficul t fo r union s t o organize nonsupervisor y persons. 54 In recen t years , managemen t labor relation s specialist s hav e sig nificantly modifie d thei r method s o f discouragin g employe e union ization. The overt threats and palpable economic intimidation o f the past hav e bee n replace d wit h highl y sophisticate d technique s de veloped by professional behaviorists. 55 Corporations hav e combined more aestheti c employmen t environment s wit h subtl e appeal s t o workers' clas s consciousnes s t o convinc e employee s o f th e obso lescence and lowe r class nature o f union representation . Employer s urge tha t wage s an d workin g condition s wil l no t b e improve d through collectiv e bargaining , becaus e employee s ca n onl y obtai n what employer s ar e willin g t o provide. 56 The y emphasiz e tha t th e NLRA doe s no t oblig e the m t o agre e t o an y unio n proposals , an d they not e tha t employee s wh o decid e t o engage i n a work stoppag e in support of bargaining demands may be permanently replaced. The success of these measures can be attributed, i n large part, to the fac t that man y unio n organizer s continu e t o utilize th e provincia l pros -

The Need for Labor Unions to Organiz e 7 5 elytizing techniques tha t wer e develope d durin g the lat e 1930 s an d early 1940 s t o appea l t o blue-colla r productio n personnel. 57 Whil e the traditiona l approache s ma y stil l appea l t o unskille d an d semi skilled servic e secto r workers , the y ar e unlikel y t o appea l t o mor e educated, white-colla r personnel . Union s mus t modif y thei r organ izing technique s t o successfull y respon d t o th e onslaugh t o f management. American labo r unions mus t revitaliz e thei r organizin g practice s if the y ar e t o expan d thei r membershi p an d remai n a vital forc e i n the American economy . They must reconsider their sources of lead ership an d ac t upo n statistica l trend s i n organizin g data . Tailorin g their organizin g effort s t o particula r group s o f worker s wil l slowl y but surely enable labor to capture the power it needs to successfull y propound it s new agenda . Union Leadershi p

Unions hav e historicall y recruite d thei r leader s fro m th e rank-and file membershi p t o ensur e tha t suc h official s woul d identif y wit h and understan d th e concern s o f th e worker s the y represent . Thi s politically sagaciou s practic e unfortunatel y fail s t o guarante e th e selection o f the well-educated an d charismati c personne l necessar y to counte r management' s innovativ e anti-unio n techniques. 58 Th e minimal financial remuneration and relatively low prestige accorded most trad e unio n official s b y society, however , mak e i t difficul t fo r labor organization s t o attract ne w talent . Thi s syndrom e frequentl y causes th e protege s o f agin g former leader s t o continu e establishe d practices withou t regar d t o their curren t efficacy . The established union leadership has not been adept at organizing recent labor force entrants. 59 Many labor officials hav e failed t o comprehend th e problem s an d aspiration s o f burgeonin g white-colla r occupations.60 A s labor official s encounte r mor e affluen t an d bette r educated workers , the y mus t b e abl e t o understan d an d reflec t th e concerns o f thos e individuals . Vas t technological, educational , an d societal changes have pervasively influenced mos t occupations ove r the past several decades. Organizers must also recognize the impac t of the dramati c increas e i n labo r forc e participatio n b y women an d minorities. Unions mus t emplo y energeti c an d charismati c individual s wh o are committe d t o th e advancemen t o f worke r rights . The y shoul d hire some people who have obtained degree s in industrial relation s

76 Th e Nee d for Labor Unions to Organiz e and hav e studie d organizationa l behavior . Thes e peopl e wil l brin g new strategie s t o th e labo r movemen t an d wil l b e abl e t o enhanc e the organizin g skill s o f representative s promote d fro m th e ran k an d file. Ne w organizer s shoul d b e provide d wit h specia l trainin g t o familiarize the m wit h the uniqu e need s o f the union's member s an d the behaviors of the business entity at issue. Some labor organizations may hav e sufficien t resource s t o develop thei r own educationa l pro grams. Othe r union s ma y tak e advantag e o f course s taugh t a t th e George Mean y Cente r fo r Labo r Studies , whic h wa s establishe d fo r this purpos e b y th e AFL-CI O i n 1968. 61 Specia l classe s ar e als o of fered a t universit y institute s o f industria l relations . Th e type s o f training availabl e ar e diverse : Organizer training has shifted fro m informatio n givin g (abou t the law and merits of unionization) t o in-depth practice skills required for effective en listment o f members—speaking , planning , interpersona l an d grou p rela tionships. How to cope with "union-busters" is another feature. Case studies and simulation s immers e trainee s i n proble m solvin g an d interpersona l skills development. 62 Trained organizers must be able to empathize with the occupation s being targeted . I t i s generall y beneficia l fo r th e organizer s o r thei r families t o hav e worke d i n th e industrie s involved . Thi s increase s the likelihoo d tha t th e organizer s wil l b e respecte d b y th e grou p being organized . I t als o make s i t easie r fo r th e organizer s t o reflec t the concern s o f thos e people . During th e formativ e stag e o f a campaign, unio n organizer s mus t determine whic h worker s ar e most respected b y their colleagues. B y enlisting th e suppor t an d assistanc e o f thes e individuals , thei r tas k will b e greatl y facilitated . Thes e leader s ca n distribut e unio n liter ature an d proselytiz e effectivel y i n favo r o f collectivizatio n du e t o their influenc e amon g thei r peers . Thei r co-worker s woul d b e mor e likely t o liste n t o thei r appeal s tha n t o th e claim s o f outsid e organizers. Focusing on th e Need s o f Targete d Employee s

Labor unions mus t acknowledge tha t collectivization i s a grass-roots movement involvin g rank-and-fil e personnel . Successfu l organizer s are generall y abl e t o elici t th e view s an d assistanc e o f worker s i n the propose d bargainin g uni t becaus e "[e]mployee s hav e stron g views abou t thei r job s tha t the y ar e eage r t o tel l t o someon e the y

The Need for Labor Unions to Organize 7 7 think really cares."63 Individuals generally contemplate unionization because o f thei r lac k o f influenc e wit h respec t t o thei r basi c em ployment terms. Organizers must understand these frustrations and indicate t o al l worker s th e degre e t o whic h the y ca n gain empow erment through a collective voice. Organizers must also realize that many employee s ar e more concerne d toda y wit h issue s pertainin g to employment dignity than with traditional economic matters. They need t o emphasiz e th e wa y i n whic h worker s ca n enhanc e thei r feelings o f self-worth throug h collectivization . Organizers must spend substantial time in the communities being organized t o sho w prospectiv e member s tha t the y ar e personall y concerned abou t the employees involve d and are readily accessibl e to them . A stud y conducte d b y th e AFL-CI O Department o f Orga nization and Field Services recently found that unions prevail in 78 percent of elections in which regular house call s are made to target employees.64 Th e victor y rat e i s onl y 4 0 percen t whe n communi cation is carried out primarily through telephone calls and 39 percent when mass mailings are employed.65 The use of house visits is likely to stimulate grass-root s enthusiasm . B y taking the tim e t o liste n t o each employee's concerns, organizers can demonstrate a respect for each person's viewpoint an d formulate collectiv e objectives that reflect th e actual desire s of bargaining unit personnel . AFL-CIO dat a similarl y indicat e tha t othe r "rank-and-fil e inten sive" organizing technique s significantl y increas e the likelihoo d of union victory. For example, the conducting of small group meetings involving bargaining unit personnel, the establishment o f representation committee s comprise d primaril y o f uni t workers , an d othe r regular involvemen t o f rank-and-fil e employee s i n th e organizin g campaign greatly increase the union success rate. 66 "Solidarity demonstrations" are also beneficial. I f organizers induce bargaining unit workers to wear union buttons o r T-shirts o r to participate i n campaign rallies, they increas e the probability o f a n election victory . The recen t organizin g succes s o f th e Harvar d Unio n o f Clerica l and Technica l Worker s (HUCTW ) provide s a model tha t coul d b e emulated b y othe r labo r entities . HUCT W sough t worke r suppor t through one-on-one persona l contacts, and it carefully recruited organizing leader s fro m withi n th e targete d wor k force. 67 Althoug h HUCTW focused upo n economic concerns, it also stressed issues of power an d self-respect. 68 I t recognized th e nee d t o imbu e clerica l personnel wit h a sense o f dignity . Th e individual s wh o supporte d HUCTW concluded that they could only enhance their employment

78 Th e Need for Labor Unions to Organiz e interests in a unified manner . One HUCTW member eloquently summarized th e feeling s o f many : 'The underlyin g issu e i s our righ t t o a voice in decisions which affect ou r lives. Individually we can only whisper, togethe r a s a union w e ca n roar." 69 Developing Organizin g Strategie s Before a labor union begins an organizing drive, it must confirm tha t the targeted group is amenable to unionization. The union must look for employers with unsatisfactory personnel practices and employees who are not pleased with their existing employment circumstances. 70 Formal or informal preliminar y surveys can be conducted to identif y units likel y t o vot e i n favo r o f unio n representation . I f labo r orga nizations carefull y choos e worke r aggregation s tha t ar e incline d t o collectivize, they wil l significantl y increas e electio n victor y rates . Too many labor unions limit their organizing efforts t o large units because o f economie s o f scale . Th e proble m wit h thi s approac h i s that unions prevail in only 28 percent of the representation election s carried ou t i n unit s wit h ove r 50 0 employees, while the y wi n ove r 50 percen t o f th e election s hel d i n unit s wit h unde r 5 0 people. 71 This disparity may be attributed to several factors. Corporations with large units ar e more likely to have the financial resource s necessar y to conduct aggressive anti-union campaigns. In addition, it is difficul t for organizer s t o personall y contac t a significan t numbe r o f th e in dividuals in a large unit. They instead resort to less successful tactic s such a s pamphlet s o r telephone calls . Future employmen t setting s wil l no t b e likel y t o includ e larg e numbers o f worker s i n singl e locations. 72 A n increasin g numbe r o f firms will b e service-oriented . Thes e businesse s ten d t o b e smalle r than thei r manufacturin g counterparts . Althoug h i t wil l cos t mor e per employe e t o organiz e smal l units , th e additiona l cos t i s out weighed b y th e highe r succes s rate . A s mor e unit s ar e organized , unions will benefit from the increased dues received from new members tha t wil l provid e the m wit h greate r economi c an d politica l power, an d enabl e the m t o develo p mor e extensiv e organizin g programs. When severa l labo r organization s compet e fo r th e righ t t o repre sent the same group of employees, it is likely that these workers will be unionized a t the en d o f th e campaign . Th e unio n victor y rat e i n contested election s i s almost 7 5 percent. 73 Whil e this phenomeno n may reflec t th e fac t tha t th e targe t grou p i s especiall y receptiv e t o

The Need for Labor Unions to Organize 7 9 unionization, AFL-CI O affiliates shoul d conside r th e benefit s t o be achieved fro m coordinate d campaign s conducte d b y differen t unions. Join t effort s ma y increas e th e probabilit y o f a pro-unio n result, an d th e prevailin g organizatio n coul d shar e som e o f it s ad ditional dues revenues wit h the losing union. Although AFL-CI O members ar e not permitte d t o organiz e indi viduals already represented by another AFL-CIO affiliate,74 there are times when such conduct should not be proscribed. If an incumbent union i s inadequatel y representin g bargainin g uni t personnel , i t i s likely to be decertified. B y allowing another union to organize such disaffected worker s before decertificatio n o f the existing union, the AFL-CIO may preven t a decertification campaig n tha t would prob ably preclude unionizatio n o f that unit in the near future. ADAPTING T O DEMOGRAPHI C CHANGE S The Shif t from the Rustbel t to the Sunbel t

The continue d migratio n o f worker s t o th e Sunbel t states 75 an d t o rural areas 76 wil l forc e union s t o devis e ne w organizin g strategie s that wil l appea l t o th e need s o f peopl e residin g i n thes e environ ments. Althoug h i t ma y be more expensiv e fo r labor organization s to seek rural converts, collectivization coul d enhance the economic circumstances o f rura l workers , an d sociall y activ e labo r union s could provid e the kinds o f persona l service s associate d wit h traditional fraternal organizations . Unions hav e historicall y foun d th e souther n an d southwester n regions o f th e countr y difficul t t o organize. 77 Recen t trends , how ever, indicat e tha t thi s situatio n i s changing. 78 A s mor e norther n workers who hav e traditionally supporte d th e labo r movement mi grate to the Sunbelt and discuss the benefits of union representation with thei r new co-workers , unio n organizin g shoul d b e facilitated . During the late 1980s, unions that had the assistance of the AFL-CIO Industrial Unio n Department achieve d highl y respectable certifica tion results i n southern states . Those labo r organizations prevaile d in a remarkable 63 percent of representation elections conducted i n Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, and Tennessee.79 The union s assiste d b y th e AFL-CI O committe d substantia l re sources to the southern organizing campaign.80 They established employee committee s withi n eac h targete d plant , an d secure d a

80 Th e Need for Labor Unions to Organiz e substantial degre e of worker participation. The greatest impedimen t to organizatio n involve d worke r ignoranc e o f thei r lega l right s an d fear o f employe r reprisals . Throug h carefull y structure d educatio n programs, unio n organizer s apprise d individual s o f thei r statutor y prerogatives an d dispelle d thei r unfounde d apprehensions . Labo r organizations ca n develop similar programs that would enabl e them to unionize a greater proportio n o f Sunbel t employees . Changes i n Workforc e Compositio n

Approximately two-thirds of the labor force entrants during the next decade wil l b e women, an d almos t 3 0 percent wil l b e minorities. 81 By 2030, one-third o f Americans will be fifty-five and older. 82 Labo r unions will have to expand their appeals to these individuals i f they are to achieve sustained growth . Even though labor unions have no t historically achieve d significan t organizationa l succes s with femal e and minorit y workers , there i s reason fo r unio n official s t o be mor e optimistic today. Recent AFL-CIO statistics indicate that unions prevail in 60 to 66 percent of Labor Board elections involving bargaining units comprise d primaril y o f female and/o r minorit y employees. 83 Women Workers . Th e recor d o f organize d labor wit h respec t t o female employee s ha s certainl y bee n undistinguished. Althoug h 3 0 percent of organized workers are women, only 12 percent of national union leadershi p position s ar e hel d b y females. 84 I n 1980 , Joyc e Miller, Presiden t o f th e Coalitio n o f Labo r Unio n Women , becam e the first woma n t o serv e a s a membe r o f th e AFL-CI O Executiv e Council.85 Despite the dearth of female union officials, the proportion of wome n unio n member s ha s actuall y increase d sinc e th e mid 1950s.86 I n addition , 4 1 percen t o f wome n worker s hav e indicate d that the y woul d suppor t a union i f the y ha d th e chanc e t o d o so. 87 AFL-CIO affiliates mus t encourag e th e electio n an d appointmen t o f more femal e officials , emplo y mor e wome n organizers, 88 an d wor k more closel y wit h th e Coalitio n o f Labo r Unio n Women, 89 9 t o 5 , and othe r group s o f workin g wome n t o broaden thei r appea l t o th e increasing number o f organizable women enterin g the labor force. 90 The labor movement needs to confront issue s important to femal e workers to attract them to unions. Labor organizations must continue to seek legislation an d bargaining agreement provision s designe d t o eliminate gender-base d compensatio n differentials 91 an d challeng e artificial barriers to the advancement of qualified women. In addition,

The Need for Labor Unions to Organize 8 1 union officials shoul d support parental leave programs and flexibl e hour plans, and strive to obtain government and/or employer sponsored day-care centers to facilitate the movement of women into the labor force . I f union s ar e responsive t o th e need s o f women , the y will benefi t fro m th e membershi p due s o f million s o f he w labo r market participants. 92 Many wome n continu e t o b e segregate d i n traditionall y femal e occupations,93 and earn substantially less than their male cohorts in equivalent positions. 94 The y regularl y experienc e a lac k o f mean ingful control over their employment situations. Unions should make female employees aware that women workers who have collectivized earn 39 percent more than their nonunion cohorts95 and tend to have a greate r sens e o f occupationa l empowerment. 96 Thi s facto r ma y induce th e million s o f wome n employe d i n traditionall y femal e occupations t o contemplat e th e benefit s t o b e derive d fro m unionization. Minority Workers. Black s and other minorities were responsive to organizing effort s durin g th e lat e 1930s , particularl y i n heav y in dustries bein g collectivize d b y industria l unions , bu t thei r enthu siasm subsequently wane d du e to the vestiges of discriminatio n i n many craf t unions. 97 The enactmen t o f Title VII of th e Civil Right s Act of 1964 98 required the offending labo r organizations to abandon their discriminatory practices and impelled recalcitrant union leaders to recogniz e thei r lega l an d mora l obligation s towar d minorit y employees. I f labo r organization s ca n affirmativel y ac t t o ensur e equal employmen t opportunitie s fo r all person s regardles s o f thei r race or nationality, minority workers could become a cornerstone in the rebirth of the labor movement. A recent survey disclosed that 69 percent o f minorit y employee s woul d suppor t a union i f the y ha d the opportunity. 99 Thi s propensit y shoul d facilitat e organizin g mi nority workers in all sectors of the economy . AFL-CIO affiliates shoul d emphasize to potential minorit y unio n members that most labor organizations hav e historically supporte d equal rights for minority workers. Representative labor organizations must continue to seek and enforce bargaining agreement provision s proscribing discrimination . The y shoul d continu e thei r effort s t o eliminate race-base d wag e an d jo b disparities. Union s shoul d hir e more minorit y organizer s t o demonstrat e thei r unequivoca l com mitment to equal employmen t opportunity . Durin g new organizin g campaigns, they should emphasize the fact that the average earnings

82 Th e Need for Labor Unions t o Organiz e of unionize d minorit y worker s excee d thos e o f thei r unorganize d counterparts b y approximatel y 3 0 percent. 100 Union s tha t ar e com mitted t o the eradication o f all forms o f employment discriminatio n will b e abl e t o appea l t o th e increasin g numbe r o f minorit y labo r force participants . Older Workers. A s the American labor force continues to age, labor unions wil l hav e to formulate ne w bargaining objectives tha t reflec t the interest s o f olde r worker s o r els e foreg o a growin g sourc e o f members. Labor organizations ca n attract these workers by strengthening pension plan s and negotiatin g supplemental healt h insuranc e to protec t retiree s fro m expense s no t covere d b y Medicare . Man y individuals fear that their employment opportunities will be reduced as they age, but bargaining agents can win the support of these workers b y seekin g provision s guaranteein g qualifie d senio r employee s the advancemen t right s the y deserve. 101 Some olde r worker s wan t th e chanc e t o move towar d retiremen t on a phase d basis . Labo r union s shoul d negotiat e contractua l pro visions with employer s tha t permi t senio r personne l t o opt for part time employment on a two-thirds or half-time basis as they approach retirement. Union s ca n counse l managemen t t o develo p work sharing program s tha t woul d enabl e tw o olde r employee s t o shar e the same position. This arrangement woul d allo w employers to benefit from experience d workers , and th e individual employee s woul d work the flexible schedules suited to their employment needs. Senior workers hav e generally been enthusiasti c unio n supporters . If labo r organizations continu e t o protect th e employment interest s o f olde r persons, they will retain their support and even increase their power as this segmen t o f th e labo r forc e increases . THE ABILIT Y T O ORGANIZ E WHITE-COLLA R AN D SERVICE PERSONNE L

To enhanc e thei r economi c an d politica l vitalit y i n th e comin g de cades, labor organization s wil l hav e t o develo p program s designe d to appea l t o th e burgeonin g rank s o f white-colla r an d servic e per sonnel. Only about 1 0 percent of service industry and office worker s have been organized. 102 Union officials mus t concentrate their effort s on th e majo r white-colla r an d servic e industries : insurance , healt h care, bankin g an d finance, an d retail . T o reac h thes e workers , th e labor movement wil l need t o undergo an organizing revolution sim -

The Need for Labor Unions to Organize 8 3 ilar t o th e industria l unio n movemen t o f th e lat e 1930 s an d earl y 1940s103 an d th e publi c secto r movemen t durin g th e 1960 s an d 1970s.104 Becaus e man y governmen t union s hav e successfull y or ganized white-colla r an d servic e employees, 105 the y ca n provid e a model fo r privat e secto r unions . Th e AFL-CI O shoul d establis h a Professional an d Service Employee Department that would includ e new organization s i n eac h o f th e targete d industries . Existin g unions—such as the Retail Clerks International Association (RCIA), the Office and Professional Employees International Union (OPEIU), and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), all of which have alread y demonstrate d th e abilit y t o collectiviz e retail , office , and healt h car e workers—shoul d b e charte r member s o f th e ne w department. Service employees ar e generally locked into low-paying and routinized jobs with minimal opportunitie s for personal advancement . Although worker turnover is usually high, thus negating a perceived need amon g employees fo r unionization, servic e personne l ar e optimal target s for collectivization becaus e of th e poor economic an d environmental conditions associated with their positions. Union representation coul d enhanc e thei r economi c circumstance s an d im prove their employment surroundings. Labor organizations could be less concerne d wit h significan t foreig n competition , becaus e mos t service jobs are necessarily performed in the United States. AFL-CIO affiliates shoul d learn from unions like the RCIA and the SEIU, and develop programs that will appeal to service personnel who wish to improve their employment circumstances regardless of whether they view thei r jobs as short-term or long-term. White-collar workers have not been inclined toward union membership primarily because of their perceptions of the labor movement and thei r ow n employmen t situations . Thes e worker s historicall y enjoyed an upward mobility that induced them to identify more with the interest s o f thei r employer s tha n wit h thos e o f thei r rank-andfile colleagues. 106 Thei r middle-clas s socioeconomi c statu s cause d many white-colla r worker s t o questio n th e benefit s t o b e derive d from membership in blue-collar trade unions.107 Manipulative managers determined to convince their white-collar employees that labor union participatio n woul d b e bot h unprofessiona l an d personall y demeaning. As the United States has moved toward a post-industrial society , white-collar position s hav e significantl y changed . Businesse s hav e become mor e bureaucratized. Globa l firms control loca l operation s

84 Th e Need for Labor Unions to Organiz e through th e concentratio n o f manageria l authorit y i n centralize d administrations tha t functio n o n a strictl y hierarchica l basis . A s a result o f thes e changes , man y lower-leve l managemen t employee s have ha d thei r discretionar y authorit y circumscribed . The y receiv e directives from regional , national, or even international officer s wh o tell the m th e exac t manne r i n whic h the y ar e t o carr y ou t thei r managerial tasks. 108 The employmen t situatio n fo r nonmanageria l professional s ha s similarly deteriorated . Restrictiv e corporat e policie s hav e reduce d their autonom y an d limite d thei r exercis e o f professiona l discre tion.109 The computer revolution ha s also curtailed white-colla r em ployee freedom. A s the United State s has evolved int o an advance d information-processing economy , th e individual s performin g th e requisite computer functions hav e experienced less occupational autonomy. Supervisor s ca n electronicall y monito r employe e key strokes, break periods, and erro r rates. 110 Even the work of problem solving analysts has become routinized, and scientists and engineer s find themselves subjecte d t o greater business constraints. 111 The economi c circumstance s o f white-colla r personne l hav e eroded durin g th e pas t decade . Betwee n 197 7 an d 1990 , the remu neration receive d b y uppe r executive s ros e b y a n astonishin g 22 0 percent, while the compensation level s for mid-level managerial employees an d hourl y worker s increase d a t a muc h mor e moderat e rate.112 To p corporat e official s n o longe r preten d tha t the y shar e a common bon d wit h lower-leve l white-colla r personnel . Busines s leaders believe that they deserve to receive financial rewards reflect ing th e profit s generate d b y thei r efforts . Becaus e the y n o longe r provide manageria l employee s a t the plant an d regiona l level s wit h full autonomy , uppe r managemen t i s n o longe r willin g t o attribut e enterprise gain s t o the decision-makin g function s o f those people . Corporate executive s no w regar d lower-leve l white-colla r em ployees a s analogous t o blue-collar productio n workers . When eco nomic condition s deteriorate , suc h white-colla r professional s become as disposable as their production colleagues. 113 This reduced job security makes it more difficult fo r companies to convince whitecollar personne l t o identif y wit h long-ter m enterpris e interest s an d weakens the belief o f lower and middle management i n their poten tial fo r upwar d corporat e mobility . As white-collar employee s increasingl y find thei r situation s sim ilar t o thei r blue-colla r compatriots, 114 the y ma y contemplat e th e benefits o f collectivization . Labo r union s mus t recogniz e tha t thes e

The Need for Labor Unions to Organize 8 5 individuals ar e no t concerne d solel y wit h economi c issues . The y want t o participate i n the decision-makin g proces s o f th e firm and to enhance their employment dignity. 115 Many no longer believe that corporate employers respond to their interests, exhibit concern about their job security, or provide employment environments as pleasant as those they previously experienced. 116 The baby-boom generation has experienced a n additional barrier to upward mobility. Althoug h the number of well-educated profes sionals has increased dramatically, the number of desirable corporate positions ha s not. Individual s i n their late thirties an d early fortie s thus have fewer opportunitie s fo r advancement. A study o f techni cians an d engineer s i n the Frenc h electrica l industr y reveale d tha t union militanc y wa s directl y relate d t o diminishe d employe e mo bility.117 As American professional worker s react to similar barriers, they ma y begin t o identif y mor e closel y wit h thei r blue-collar col leagues than with the corporate managers who have contributed to their declining employment status. This development may persuade growing numbers of white-collar employees to yield to unionization entreaties.118 United States labor organizations should be encouraged by the fact that white-collar personnel i n other industrial countrie s have been unionized fo r many years. 119 If labor unions want to successfully organiz e white-collar personnel, they must devise strategies that will specifically appea l to them. Their campaign materials must be drafted to interest highly educated people wh o ar e a s concerne d wit h self-actualizatio n a s wit h eco nomic gain. Labor unions must employ erudite organizers who can relate effectively wit h professional employees . Organizers must emphasize issue s pertainin g to worker dignity. The y should formulat e bargaining objectives that involve employee autonomy, worker participation i n manageria l decisio n making , an d th e opportunit y fo r professional advancement. 120 Campaign literature might include demands for paid educational leave and greater opportunities to attend professional conferences. 121 The unionization rate for white-collar professionals no w exceeds the rat e fo r nonprofessiona l workers. 122 Thi s indicate s tha t man y white-collar personnel want to enhance their employment influenc e and view unionization as an appropriate vehicle to accomplish this objective. Even though a substantial share of organized white-collar people ar e governmen t employees , labo r organization s shoul d b e able to similarly advance the employment interests of private sector professionals. As the American industrial system becomes more au-

86 Th e Need for Labor Unions to Organiz e tomated an d professiona l job s become mor e routinized , highl y ed ucated bu t underutilize d employee s wil l increasingl y experienc e dampened aspiration s an d professiona l dissatisfaction . T o counter act thei r los s o f individua l autonom y an d regai n th e respec t an d dignity erode d b y organizationa l change s an d technologica l ad vances, many privat e secto r white-colla r worker s ma y resort t o collective action . A s mor e professionals , suc h a s physicians , lawyers , and accountants , experienc e a similar los s of control ove r their em ployment destinies , they to o will contemplat e unionization. 123 During the pas t severa l decades , the socioeconomi c situation s of blue-collar an d white-colla r employee s hav e becom e intertwined . Changing employment circumstance s have caused the simultaneou s "embourgeoisement" o f blue-colla r worker s an d th e "proletariani zation" o f professionals. 124 White-colla r worker s wh o previousl y viewed themselve s a s "upper-middle class " are more likel y t o con sider themselves "middle class" today, while blue-collar employee s who formerly sa w themselves as "working class" now think of themselves a s "middl e class." 125 Bot h group s shar e a feelin g o f power lessness tha t ma y b e alleviate d throug h collectiv e action. 126 I f American labor organizations can demonstrate their capacity to preserve professiona l value s whil e advancin g join t employmen t inter ests, the y wil l experienc e significan t growt h amon g white-colla r personnel. THE ASSOCIATIONS . APPROAC H

One of the unique aspects of the American industrial relations system is the exclusivity doctrine. Under Section 9(a) of the NLRA,127 a labor organization ma y only become the statutory bargaining agent for th e employees i n a proposed uni t i f a majority o f the individuals i n that unit indicate their wish to be represented by that union.128 The NLRA does no t requir e employer s t o recogniz e labo r entitie s tha t d o no t enjoy suc h majorit y support . A s a result, million s o f worker s wh o support union s remain unrepresented becaus e they are employed i n settings in which a majority o f their colleagues do not presently want a bargainin g representative . I f labo r organization s ca n provid e tan gible benefit s fo r unio n adherent s wh o ar e employe d i n thes e en vironments, man y o f thes e sympathizer s wil l formaliz e thei r relationship wit h union s an d expan d thei r economi c an d politica l strength. A s th e fello w worker s o f suc h individual s notic e an d ap preciate th e service s provide d b y labo r organizations , they ma y ul -

The Need for Labor Unions to Organize 8 7 timately decid e t o suppor t unionization . I f union s reestablis h th e associational approach initiated by the early worker guilds, they will enhance their institutional influenc e ove r the employment relationship, regardless of the representational status of any given employee. American worker s hav e consistentl y recognize d th e benefits de rived fro m associationa l endeavor s b y joining occupationa l guild s and formin g socia l an d fraterna l entitie s suc h a s th e Workmen' s Circle an d th e Germa n Workmen's Benefi t Fund. 129 Contemporar y professional employee s join organizations such as the American Bar Association (ABA) , th e America n Denta l Associatio n (ADA) , th e American Medical Associatio n (AMA) , the American Nurses Association (ANA), the National Education Association (NEA), the American Associatio n o f Universit y Professor s (AAUP) , an d variou s scientific and technical groups. These institutions have promulgated rules governin g professiona l standards , an d create d caree r devel opment program s an d continuin g educatio n curricula . The y hav e lobbied successfull y fo r licensing requirements designe d t o restrict occupational entry. 130 Their control over the supply of labor in their respective fields has enabled mos t of their members to realize considerable financial reward for their efforts. Some of the traditional professiona l entitie s have become formal labor organizations over the past several decades. The NEA, the ANA, the AAUP, an d simila r groups ar e now th e lega l bargaining agent s for millions o f professiona l employees . Othe r professional associa tions are likely to move in a similar direction. Thousands o f American lawyer s an d physician s ar e alread y represente d b y labo r organizations tha t serv e federal , state , an d loca l governmen t personnel. In 1985, a special committe e establishe d b y the AFL-CI O to ex plore innovative technique s t o enhance worke r involvement i n the labor movemen t recommende d th e creatio n o f associationa l mem berships fo r individual s no t include d i n traditiona l bargainin g units.131 Th e AFL-CI O accepte d thi s suggestio n an d institute d a n "associate membership" program. 132 Associate member s pay an annual fee and receive institutional benefits. The AFL-CIO established the Union Privilege Benefits Corporatio n to provide associate members with discount-rate credit cards, reduced-cost investment assistance, an d group-rate healt h an d lif e insurance. 133 I t also create d a home financing pla n i n partnershi p wit h th e Federa l Hom e Loa n Mortgage Corporation that makes it easier for members to qualify for advantageous federall y backe d mortgag e terms. 134 Th e AFL-CI O

88 Th e Need for Labor Unions to Organiz e could offe r additiona l benefit s t o associationa l members . Fo r ex ample, it could provide legal services to associate members who wish to challeng e discriminator y personne l policie s o r unjus t disci pline.135 It could assist associate members with property transactions, marital dissolutions , o r the developmen t o f estat e plans . The AFL-CI O hope s t o appea l t o th e 2 8 millio n forme r unio n members wh o ar e currentl y employe d i n unorganize d wor k environments136 an d t o othe r individual s wh o hav e neve r experi enced unio n representation . If the associate membership progra m i s successful, million s o f employees ma y take advantage o f the oppor tunity t o becom e affiliate d wit h th e AFL-CIO . Onc e the y discove r the economi c benefit s an d collectiv e strengt h attainabl e throug h la bor organizations, they ma y vie w labor unions mor e positively . Associate member s wh o acknowledg e th e persona l an d occupationa l gains tha t ca n b e achieve d throug h th e collectiv e bargainin g process137 may decid e t o support unio n organizin g efforts . Unfortunately, the judicial branch has already begun to undermine the viabilit y o f th e AFL-CI O associat e membershi p approach . I n American Postal Workers Unio n v . United States, 138 the court rule d that th e annua l $3 5 "dues" payment mad e by associate members t o the tax-exempt America n Posta l Worker s Union constitute d taxabl e income t o that entit y becaus e Sectio n 511(a)(1 ) o f the Interna l Rev enue Code 139 impose s a tax o n th e "unrelate d busines s taxabl e in come" of otherwis e tax-exemp t organizations . The cour t foun d tha t the associat e membe r payment s wer e "no t substantiall y relate d (other tha n throug h th e productio n o f funds ) t o th e organization' s performance o f it s exemp t functions." 140 Althoug h th e annua l fee s paid b y associat e member s directl y qualifie d the m fo r grou p insur ance coverage, those contributions also indirectly enhanced th e economic vitalit y o f th e unio n an d increase d it s capacit y t o lobb y fo r legislation promotin g th e employmen t interest s o f th e associat e members. I t i s thu s questionabl e whethe r th e cour t shoul d hav e viewed thos e payment s a s "unrelate d busines s taxabl e income. " If this decisio n i s no t reverse d b y th e Suprem e Court , th e AFL-CI O should seek an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code that woul d specifically exempt from the taxable income of a union the reasonable fees charge d t o associat e members . This amendmen t woul d enabl e unorganized employee s t o obtain som e o f the advantage s o f union ization, an d increas e th e capacit y o f AFL-CI O affiliate s t o advanc e the interest s o f al l workers.

5. ENHANCIN G ORGANIZE D LABOR' S ECONOMIC AN D POLITICA L POWE R

Employees who select a bargaining agent under the NLRA are guaranteed negotiating rights with respect to issues pertaining to wages, hours, an d condition s o f employment . Whil e thei r representativ e labor organizatio n ma y insis t upo n negotiation s concernin g thes e "mandatory" topics, th e NLRA expressly provide s tha t the dut y to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the makin g o f a concession. ,,1 I t is generall y impermissibl e fo r a n employer t o modif y workin g condition s unilaterally . Nonetheless , once a good fait h impass e i s reached , a company ma y unilaterall y implement term s that it has offered th e representative unio n a t the bargaining table. 2 The NLRA merely protects the right of employees to select a bargaining agent and engage in collective bargaining. It does not regulate the substantiv e term s tha t wil l gover n th e negotiations . Th e Labor Board is only empowered to regulate the bargaining process. It lacks the authority to review the merits of substantive proposals advanced by the participants. 3 The Labor Board may not require either side to agree t o a specifi c ter m o r t o mak e a particula r concession , eve n when it determines that a party has failed to satisfy it s obligation to engage in good faith bargaining. 4 Private sector employees enjoy a statutory right to engage in work stoppages. Nonetheless, while individuals may not be discharged by their employe r a s a resul t o f thei r protecte d concerte d conduct, 5 economic strikers may be "permanently replaced*' by other workers.6 Replaced striker s ar e not entitle d t o automati c reinstatemen t onc e the work stoppage concludes, but only receive preferential recal l as vacancies occur. 7 An increasing number of employers are willing to 89

90 Organize d Labor's Economic and Political Powe r hire permanent replacements for striking workers. A recent AFL-CIO study found that 11 percent of the 243,300 American employees who participated in major work stoppages during 1990 were permanently replaced.8 Such corporate action significantly undermine s the willingness o f workers to support strikes. Even i f employer s di d no t hav e th e righ t t o hir e permanen t re placements fo r economic strikers , increasingly divers e an d technologically advance d business enterprises ar e now finding it easier to withstand th e impact of wor k stoppages. Managerial personne l ca n frequently maintain minimal levels of output by keeping automated equipment functioning . Fo r example , whe n th e Communication s Workers Union strikes American Telephone & Telegraph, most telephone users hardly notice any attenuation in service. Computerized equipment handle s mos t loca l an d lon g distanc e calls . Onl y thos e few individual s wh o requir e operato r assistanc e o r technical staf f services suffer an inconvenience, and managerial personnel are able to satisfy mos t of their needs. When one facility of a complex business is shut down, operations can ofte n b e transferre d t o anothe r location . Eve n i f al l o f a firm's employees locate d i n th e Unite d State s decid e t o participat e i n a work stoppage , a growing numbe r o f multinationa l enterprise s ar e able to recover lost production at foreign plants.9 When service workers decide to strike, their functions ca n be performed either by temporary replacements or by temporary employment agency personnel who ar e retained durin g the work stoppage. Revenue s los t throug h a partial or total shutdown at one location or division can frequently be offset b y profits earne d by other corporations. The hierarchica l structure s o f variegate d busines s organization s also affec t th e bargainin g process . Althoug h representativ e labo r unions can generally obtain relevant information regarding local operations, they are frequently unable to procure pertinent information concerning overall enterprise profitability.10 Decisions affecting local employment condition s are frequently mad e at corporate headquarters by managers with n o persona l knowledg e o f th e operativ e circumstances. Furthermore , labo r organization s find i t difficul t t o engage i n meaningfu l negotiation s regardin g bargainin g unit term s of employment when the participating company representatives lack the authority to make agreements that conflict with overall corporate employment policies . As th e efficac y o f th e conventiona l strik e weapo n continue s t o decline, organize d labo r will hav e t o develo p ne w technique s tha t

Organized Labor's Economic an d Political Powe r 9 1 will enhanc e it s economic an d political power . Labor unions mus t resort t o corporat e an d communit y campaign s t o exer t pressur e against targe t firms. Employee influenc e ma y b e greatl y enhance d through negotiated and legislated worker participation programs that provide rank-and-fil e personne l wit h th e righ t t o b e meaningfull y involved i n th e managemen t decision-makin g process . Labo r organizations ca n als o us e th e billion s o f dollar s i n pensio n fund s t o reward employers with beneficent employment conditions and penalize companies tha t do not treat their workers decently. America n labor organization s mus t increas e thei r politica l activity , i n recog nition of the fact that statutory protections are generally more lasting than negotiated benefits. Because national unions can no longer regulate the global operations of transnational business enterprises, they must form international federations tha t can counterbalance the increased powe r of multinational firms. CORPORATE AN D COMMUNIT Y CAMPAIGN S

Most companies ar e concerned abou t the disseminatio n o f advers e information regardin g thei r business activities . The y fea r tha t prospective customers may decide to do business with their competitors, and are afraid that creditors will hesitat e t o provide them with additional financial support . Consequently , tactic s tha t generate neg ative publicity about a target business can often be quite effective i n accomplishing bargaining goals. 11 Unions should enlist the assistance of local media representatives at the onset of a labor dispute. The labor organization needs to prepare press release s an d make spokespersons availabl e t o forcefull y and succinctly explain the underlying issues. Union representatives who are fortunate to receive sixty seconds on an evening news program must be able to summarize their position and demonstrate that their demands are reasonable and easily satisfied by the recalcitrant employer. A unio n o n strik e shoul d conve y it s messag e throug h newspaper, radio , an d televisio n advertisements . B y placin g th e company on the defensive, labo r representatives wil l enhanc e their bargaining situation. During a strike, unions can use publicity picketing and consumer handbilling to inform the public about their cause. Striking employees should picket their employer with placards concisely explainin g the circumstance s o f th e controversy . Leaflet s describin g th e em ployment disput e shoul d b e distribute d t o al l person s enterin g o r

92 Organize d Labor' s Economi c an d Political Powe r leaving th e employer' s premises . Picketer s ma y lawfull y as k truc k drivers, delivery persons , and servic e personnel t o honor the picke t line,12 an d the y ma y generall y reques t prospectiv e customer s t o refrain fro m dealing s wit h th e offendin g employe r durin g th e labo r dispute.13 The disruptio n o f deliverie s o r loss of customer s t o com petitors will put economic pressure on the struck employer. Publicity picketing ca n be employed t o generate publi c sympath y eve n i f th e union doe s no t g o s o fa r a s t o strik e th e employer . Placard s an d leaflets should clearly indicate the basis of the dispute and encourage people t o compe l th e affecte d busines s entit y t o accep t th e labo r organization's demands . Labor organization s shoul d no t hesitat e t o utilize tactic s tha t ha rass uncooperativ e employers . Fo r example , recalcitran t corpora tions should b e charged wit h failing t o bargain i n good faith. Unio n officials shoul d file complaint s wit h stat e an d federa l authoritie s regarding possibl e healt h an d safet y ac t violations . Employmen t discrimination claim s shoul d b e referre d t o stat e fai r employmen t practice agencie s o r th e federa l Equa l Employmen t Opportunit y Commission. Businesses that might be violating state or federal pol lution regulation s shoul d b e cited . Th e cos t t o the employe r o f de fending such claims is high, and the monetary sanctions and advers e publicity tha t resul t fro m establishe d violation s ca n b e significant . These lega l mean s ca n b e effectivel y utilize d b y employee s t o pe nalize employer s tha t trea t thei r employee s unfairly . Labor organizations dissatisfied wit h particular companies should isolate those firms from th e business community by asking corporate leaders t o resig n fro m th e board s o f director s o f th e offendin g en terprises, and inducin g financial institution s t o sever their ties wit h those companies . Regiona l AFL-CI O affiliates ca n threate n t o with draw healt h an d pensio n fun d mone y fro m bank s tha t continu e t o support the targeted businesses. Union officials coul d purchase stock in the offending corporation s an d pu t th e relevant issue s before th e shareholders a t stockholde r meetings . A public relation s campaig n of thi s typ e wa s successfull y conducte d b y th e AFL-CI O agains t Litton Industries during the early 1980s when Litton refused t o honor its obligations unde r th e NLRA. 14 Labor unions nee d t o reestablish their ties with othe r communit y organizations to enhance their power in the community. By working closely wit h civi l right s entities , environmenta l groups , religiou s bodies, and other similar institutions, unions will be able to engender crucial publi c suppor t durin g employmen t controversie s an d pro -

Organized Labor' s Economi c an d Politica l Powe r 9 3 duce effective consume r boycotts. 15 The threat o f a community boy cott during the 1980s motivated General Motors to retain a Van Nuys, California, plan t i t had planne d t o close. 16 If these communit y coa litions ca n enlis t th e assistanc e o f medi a representatives , the y ca n increase th e pressur e exerte d agains t targe t companies . INCREASED EMPLOYE E PARTICIPATIO N I N CORPORATE MANAGEMEN T

In a technologically advance d societ y i n whic h employee s exercis e little discretio n i n their jobs , employers ca n easil y regulate th e em ployment environmen t t o discourag e worke r initiativ e an d auton omy.17 Highl y traine d an d educate d employees , however , desir e t o participate i n managerial decisio n making . Sophisticate d personne l are reluctant t o accept supervisor y directive s without question , an d are not satisfie d wit h mer e financial remuneration. 18 A s real wage s rise an d worker s fee l relativel y secure , th e margina l utilit y o f ad ditional incom e decline s an d employee s becom e mor e concerne d with persona l jo b satisfaction. 19 Worker s wan t meaningfu l occupa tional challenge s an d th e opportunit y t o exercis e contro l ove r thei r employment destinies . Workers hav e historicall y participate d i n America n industr y in directly throug h th e collectiv e bargainin g process , bu t employee s attempting t o affec t thei r employmen t circumstance s i n thi s wa y have neve r bee n considere d manageria l partners. 20 Som e observer s have noted tha t bargainin g ca n b e a mere facade tha t onl y provide s workers wit h "pseudo-participation, " becaus e final determination s regarding fundamenta l matter s continu e t o be made unilaterall y b y corporate officials. 21 Other s have noted that collective bargaining has become overburdene d b y a myria d o f issue s constantl y addresse d on a confrontational basis. 22 Labor organizations an d employer s i n the United State s have traditionally regarded collective bargaining as a confrontational, rathe r than cooperative , process. 23 Each considers a victory for th e other a loss for their ow n cause. 24 Through resort t o such antediluvian eco nomic weapon s a s strike s an d lockouts , union s an d corporation s have fought t o achieve bargaining supremac y ove r each other . Onl y during dir e economi c circumstance s threatenin g th e continue d vi ability o f busines s enterprise s hav e worker s an d managemen t uti lized cooperativ e system s tha t hav e permitte d mor e direc t labo r involvement.25

94 Organize d Labor' s Economic an d Political Powe r American labor leaders have generally been unsupportive o f and even hostile to arrangements designed to provide workers with more direct participatio n i n corporat e management, 26 believin g tha t i t i s the function of managerial officials t o manage the enterprise and the duty o f trad e union representative s t o ac t a s responsible adversar ies.27 Unio n leader s als o fea r tha t labor-managemen t venture s ar e designed by business enterprises to surreptitiously increase productivity.28 Employers disingenuously convey the impression to workers that their views are important in exchange for greater productivity.29 In addition, labor-management committees created to regulate employment environment s an d employee jo b tasks could rende r sho p stewards an d othe r loca l unio n official s obsolete. 30 I f worker s ar e induced to substitute joint committees for conventional trade unions, the nee d fo r employee s t o join an d suppor t wha t appea r to be su perfluous labo r organization s wil l b e diminished. 31 Corporation s could utiliz e suc h "humanistic " device s t o convinc e worker s tha t management is concerned about their employment circumstances to the extent that labor representation i s no longer necessary. 32 Many manager s ar e equall y unenthusiasti c abou t employer employee cooperative programs, believing that such ventures permit workers to encroach inappropriately upon management prerogatives. They fear that workers may ultimately us e suc h join t plans to take over the entire managerial function.33 Business enterprises see union and employe e involvemen t i n th e decision-makin g proces s a s a concession o f power . The y believ e tha t thes e scheme s wil l under mine the ability of business firms to compete successfully . Despite th e recalcitrance o f labo r and management officials , i t is likely tha t increase d labor-managemen t cooperatio n wil l occur . American business firms must maximize productivity and efficienc y to compete successfully i n a global economic system. Corporate executives hav e begun to recognize tha t innovativ e idea s ca n be provided b y shop-leve l employee s wh o ar e intimatel y familia r wit h basic operations. 34 Businesses can enhance productivity in two critical way s b y developin g forma l program s encouragin g worke r participation i n th e decision-makin g process . First , the y ca n increas e the likelihoo d tha t operation s ar e being conducte d i n th e mos t ef ficient fashion. Second, they can improve employee morale by demonstrating thei r respec t fo r th e menta l capabilitie s o f rank-and-fil e personnel, thereb y increasin g worke r effor t an d reducin g turnove r and absenteeism.35 To be truly effective, employe e involvement programs mus t establis h a genuin e inten t t o redistribut e manageria l

Organized Labor's Economic and Political Power 9 5 authority.36 Companie s tha t creat e illusor y employe e participatio n committees wil l a t best se e no change i n the efficacy o f their operations an d at worst wil l undermin e wha t positiv e moral e ha d previously existe d amon g their employees. There is no evidence that agreements by labor organizations and corporations to establish cooperative worker participation programs will lead to the eventual demis e of employee associations as feared by union leaders. Although the relationship between representativ e unions and management is certainly altered when the parties progress from the antiquated era of direct confrontation to the enlightened era of cooperation, the need for traditional employe e representatio n will no t disappear. The trade union is not superfluous i n a factory with a system of workers' management, because the two bodies, though both representing the worker, represent differen t function s an d differen t interest s o f th e workers . The function of the trade union is to protect the worker as employee; the function of the (worker self-management) council is to protect the worker as producer. Insofar as these functions ar e distinct, two organizations are justified and neither is redundant; insofar as these functions conflict with one another— as they must at times—there is room for negotiations, for "labor-management negotiations."37 Labor and managemen t official s a t companie s includin g AT&T, Honeywell, Xerox , an d Helen e Curti s have foun d tha t cooperativ e programs have enhanced, rather than detracted from, collective bargaining relationships. 38 Simila r experiences hav e occurre d a t automobile plants. 39 Direc t labor-managemen t confrontatio n ha s bee n replaced b y mutua l problem-solvin g system s tha t provid e a mor e efficient and harmonious method for resolving industrial disputes. 40 Worker-manager communication has greatly improved, and employees have the opportunity to participate directly in the structuring of their daily job functions. 41 Conventional collectiv e bargainin g has primarily been a reactive process, with representative labor organizations reacting to employer initiatives.42 If workers are to influence management decisions before they are formulated, direct input is necessary. Increased worker participation in corporate management may begin with shop level committees, exten d t o semi-autonomou s wor k groups , an d culminat e with labo r representatio n o n board s o f directors. 43 Thes e system s should provid e employee s wit h complet e informatio n concernin g corporate affairs , th e ability to influence th e manner in whic h job s

96 Organize d Labor' s Economi c an d Political Powe r are structured , an d eve n th e righ t t o vote o n fundamenta l busines s decisions.44 Shop Leve l Cooperatio n

Contemporary America n workers are better educated, more affluent , and mor e mobil e tha n thei r predecessors. 45 Thes e factor s hav e in duced moder n employee s t o become increasingl y independen t an d individualistic. The y ar e les s toleran t o f jo b boredo m an d uncom fortable employmen t environments. 46 The majority o f today's whitecollar personnel believe that they should have the right to participate directly i n managemen t deliberation s tha t wil l affec t thei r dail y working conditions. 47 Employees i n mos t Japanes e companie s hav e lon g enjoye d th e opportunity t o participat e i n corporat e decisio n making . Worker s and supervisor y personne l hav e eschewe d th e adversaria l labor management relationshi p indigenou s t o Unite d State s employmen t settings i n favo r o f a cooperative syste m o f consensu s managemen t that permit s employee s to directly influenc e shop-leve l decisions. 48 Japanese manager s wor k diligentl y t o maintai n harmoniou s em ployer-employee relations based upon joint respect.49 Both labor and management representatives striv e for mutually beneficial result s i n recognition o f thei r symbioti c circumstances . Business enterprise s i n man y Wester n Europea n nation s provid e their employee s wit h simila r form s o f participator y management , either voluntaril y o r pursuan t t o statutor y obligations. 50 I n 1891 , Germany enacte d th e Arbeiterschutzgesetz , whic h provide d com pany owner s wit h th e right to unilaterally establis h wor k rules. If a permanent workers ' committee existed, however, the owners had t o conduct a hearing on proposed rules before that committee.51 In 1900, Article 91 of the Bayrisches Berggeset z created statutoril y mandate d worker committees , bu t require d the m onl y fo r mine s wit h mor e than twenty employees. 52 The Betriebstategesetz, or Works Councils Act o f 1920 , directe d th e electio n o f employe e representative s o n supervisory boards , and provide d fo r th e us e o f worker committee s throughout Germa n industry. 53 I n 1972 , Th e Federa l Republi c o f Germany enacte d th e Work s Constitutio n Act , whic h directe d th e election o f work s council s i n al l enterprise s wit h five or mor e per manent employees. 54 The works councils are entitled to informatio n regarding contemplated managemen t changes affecting employe e interests. Company officials ar e encouraged to achieve mutual accord s

Organized Labor's Economic and Political Power 9 7 with respec t t o worker terminations an d the consequence s o f reorganizations, partia l o r total plan t closures , an d th e introductio n o f new technology. Impasse s ar e resolved throug h mediation by a tripartite conciliation board or the labor court. 55 Corporate law s i n the Netherlands mandat e employe e participa tion i n work-relate d deliberation s throug h bot h lowe r leve l work s councils an d higher level managemen t boards. 56 Before makin g decisions tha t coul d meaningfull y affec t th e wor k environment , jo b security, or other areas of employee concern, Dutch managers must consult wit h th e relevan t work s councils. 57 Labor-managemen t relationships i n Austria , Denmark , Norway , an d Swede n provid e employees wit h simila r form s o f plan t leve l participator y management.58 Some Europea n companie s hav e gon e beyon d th e forma l coop erative system s mandate d b y statutory provision s an d hav e volun tarily established sho p floor production groups that determine ho w day-to-day operations are to be managed. In various Saab and Volvo manufacturing facilities , fo r example , conventiona l assembl y line s have bee n replace d b y wor k station s wher e individua l employee s decide ho w th e requisit e jo b tasks ar e t o b e accomplished. 59 Saa b and Volvo workers exercise significant contro l over their fundamental employmen t circumstances , minimizin g thei r boredom an d en hancing their feelings o f self-worth . An increasin g numbe r o f America n corporation s hav e begu n t o acknowledge th e benefits o f cooperativ e managemen t schemes . Al though sho p floor labor-management committee s wer e establishe d in some United States industries in the 1930s,60 most of the American developments in this regard have occurred more recently.61 General Foods,62 Harmo n Industries, 63 Rushto n Mining, 64 an d AT&T, 65 a s examples, have "humanized" their production facilities by providing workers with a considerable degree of job autonomy. They have also created system s tha t enabl e individua l employee s t o influenc e di rectly th e manne r i n whic h thei r work i s structure d throug h com mittees i n whic h worker s participat e i n manageria l deliberations . Such cooperativ e venture s shoul d eventuall y replac e man y o f th e traditional confrontationa l method s o f labor-managemen t relation s still use d i n other business enterprises . The reorganization o f wor k environment s throug h th e establish ment of joint employee-management committees can evoke substantial anxiet y amon g supervisor y personne l wh o ar e accustome d t o conventional superior-subordinat e relationship s betwee n them -

98 Organize d Labor' s Economic an d Politica l Powe r selves an d rank-and-fil e workers. 66 Manager s mus t develo p a ne w style that will motivat e employee s to accept their leadership out of respect for their professional expertise rather than out of fear of their disciplinary authority. 67 Cooperative job enrichment or "quality of work life" programs are beneficial fo r both worker s an d employer s becaus e the y ope n ne w channels of communication between employees and managerial personnel, and enable labor representatives to expand the scope of issues over whic h the y ca n exercis e meaningfu l influence. 68 Thes e plan s insure tha t th e "huma n aspects " of th e wor k proces s wil l b e con sidered durin g managemen t deliberations , an d the y provid e em ployees with the enhanced sense of dignity associated with industrial democracy an d th e satisfactio n o f havin g influence d decision s di rectly bearing upon their existence. 69 United States corporations that have instituted labor-management codetermination program s hav e generall y experience d positiv e re sults.70 Job satisfaction usually improves, and employee absenteeism and turnover decline. 71 Cooperativ e system s als o make it easier for businesses to respond optimally to economic crises, because worker input frequentl y provide s manager s with idea s they migh t not otherwise consider. 72 Employe e participatio n i n decisio n makin g in creases worker support for final decisions. If a business enterpris e want s a harmonious an d productive employment atmosphere, i t should adopt policies that provide for employee involvement in decision making. Labor organizations should support employer-employee programs, understanding that they continue to perform important functions fo r members who work in settings wit h suc h cooperativ e arrangements . Union s ca n provid e workers with the information and expertise they need to participate meaningfully i n cooperativ e labor-managemen t schemes . I n addi tion, unions must continue to utilize collective bargaining to enhance employee interest s with respect to matters not subject to resolution through employer-employe e committees. 73 Labo r officials mus t realize that cooperative industrial-relation plan s can beneficially sup plant many of the inefficient practice s associated with conventiona l adversarial labor-managemen t relationships . Representation o n Corporat e Board s

Fundamental corporat e policies have traditionally been determine d in American business enterprises by professional manager s who are

Organized Labor's Economic and Political Powe r 9 9 directly responsible to the shareholder/owners, but not to the rankand-file employees . Som e contemporar y observer s hav e appropri ately suggested that corporate managers should have a responsibility toward worker s simila r to that owe d t o stockholders. 74 "[N] o company ca n functio n withou t worker s an y mor e tha n i t ca n operat e without capital. Capitalists contribute money to the company; workers contribut e hal f thei r wakin g lives." 75 Rank-and-fil e employee s are less able to protect themselves against business vicissitudes than are shareholders, who can diversify thei r investment portfolios. 76 If employees are to participate meaningfully i n decisions that affect thei r employmen t destinies , the y mus t alte r th e conventiona l labor-management relationship. Representative unions can no longer simply respond t o the employment ramification s o f business deter minations that have already been formulated, as they do through the collective bargainin g process. 77 Worker s wh o ar e inextricabl y in volved wit h th e generatio n o f busines s profit s deserv e th e oppor tunity to have their interests understood and considered prior to the development o f crucial corporat e policies. 78 Joint sovereignty, if it is to mean anything at all, must mean a redefinition of the incidents of ownership, which entails both an attack on private property and a rejection of technological determinism . It must involve a relinquishment by management of what it has heretofore regarded as its exclusive decisionmaking prerogatives, even in such "vital" areas as investment decisions. Giving unions a voice in matters like wages and hours is of limited value if they have no say in matters that affect the competitive position of the firm,for that is what ensures the firm'sability to pay any wage at all. For the union to participate meaningfully in any matter that concerns workers, it must address issues that lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.79 Many Western European nations have already acknowledged the right o f worker s t o participat e o n corporat e boards . I n Germany , business enterprises are controlled by a management board (the Vorstand) and a supervisory board (the Aufsichtsrat).60 Daily managerial functions ar e performed by the management board. The supervisory board i s responsibl e fo r overseein g th e managemen t board , an d i t directly appoints and may remove members of that body. Under the Mitbestimmung (Codetermination ) Act of 1976, 81 one-half o f the supervisory board members in a large corporation [Aktiengesellschaft) must b e electe d b y th e employee s o f th e enterprise . Eac h clas s o f personnel is entitled to at least one representative on the supervisory board, with seats reserved for separate blue-collar, white-collar, and middle-management delegates . The codetermination systems foun d

100 Organize d Labor' s Economi c an d Political Powe r in most Western European corporation s guarante e worke r represen tatives th e opportunit y t o participat e i n manageria l deliberation s affecting no t onl y wage s an d workin g conditions , bu t als o funda mental busines s matter s tha t coul d affec t thei r jo b function s an d future employmen t security. 82 Employees could achieve participation on corporate boards in the United State s i n thre e ways. 83 First, a worker representativ e ca n b e elected t o a board o f director s o n a n a d ho c basis. Second, a representative labo r organizatio n migh t accomplis h a simila r resul t through the collective bargaining process , as recently occurred wit h respect t o the appointment o f UAW President Dougla s Fraser to the board o f th e Chrysle r Corporation. 84 Finally , stat e o r federa l legis lation coul d provid e fo r employe e delegate s o n corporat e boards . Employee representation o n managerial board s provide s worker s with vita l informatio n no t traditionall y availabl e t o them, an d per mits the m t o discus s thei r interest s directl y wit h shareholders. 85 Management official s receiv e greate r inpu t tha n the y woul d other wise with respec t t o employee concern s an d ideas . Communicatio n channels ar e enhance d throughou t th e corporat e hierarch y du e t o employee participatio n i n decisio n making. 86 Direct worke r participatio n ma y alte r th e conventiona l rol e per formed by labor organizations. "If unions have members on company operational board s o f director s an d th e management an d worke r di rectors jointl y decid e o n a policy , ho w ca n th e union s the n objec t to th e polic y an d wit h who m d o the y negotiate? ,,a7 Representativ e labor organization s ca n minimiz e suc h problem s b y eithe r electin g union-sponsored person s t o corporat e board s o r coordinatin g thei r efforts wit h worke r delegate s servin g o n corporat e boards . Unio n officials an d employe e delegate s ca n shar e informatio n an d idea s before critical issues are debated and decided by management boards. Both approache s enabl e unio n leader s t o includ e manageria l boar d deliberations i n th e bargaining process . Worker representatio n o n corporat e board s blur s th e shar p dis tinction between labo r and management. 88 International Associatio n of Machinists President William Winpisinger ha s suggested that "a s worker representative s o n directin g board s becom e mor e an d mor e involved i n management' s problems , they ar e likely to become les s and les s responsiv e t o th e need s o f thos e the y represent. ,,B9 Thi s pessimistic view assumes that worker delegates will fail to remember their rank-and-file roots . If employee directors continue in their jobs, they wil l continu e t o provid e worke r perspective s t o managemen t

Organized Labor' s Economi c an d Politica l Powe r 10 1 that migh t induc e shareholde r director s t o reasses s thei r ow n predilections.90 Employee representatio n o n corporat e board s doe s no t supplan t conventional collective bargaining but complements negotiations by providing workers with input and influence no t found i n traditiona l adversarial labor-managemen t relationships . Collective negotiation s are stil l necessar y t o defin e an d protec t basi c employmen t terms , and grievance-arbitration procedure s must continue to be employe d to ensur e managemen t complianc e wit h contractua l obligations . Worker participatio n o n corporat e board s shoul d actuall y facilitat e the collective bargaining process , because i t stimulates harmoniou s employer-employee relationships . Legal and Practical Ramification s Labor proposal s fo r worke r representative s o n corporat e board s o r shop-level committee s rais e lega l question s unde r severa l labo r re lations statutes, the antitrust laws, and corporate enactments. Federal legislation mandatin g th e establishmen t o f codeterminatio n pro grams would eliminate any legal impediments to employee delegates on managerial boards or works councils. Even in the absence of such enabling provisions , however , voluntaril y adopte d worke r partici pation plan s shoul d b e sustained . Corporate boards are empowered to select and remove managerial officials wh o are responsible for employer collective bargaining an d grievance adjustment . I f worker-electe d director s wer e abl e t o im permissibly influenc e thi s process, problems might arise under Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the NLRA,91 which makes it an unfair labo r practice for a labo r organizatio n o r it s agent s "t o restrai n o r coerce " an em ployer wit h respec t t o it s selectio n o f representative s fo r collectiv e bargaining or grievance adjustment purposes . Because this provision only preclude s labo r organizatio n interferenc e accomplishe d b y restraint or coercion, it should not be held to apply to board of director deliberations. I f worke r delegate s ar e selecte d directl y b y th e em ployees themselves, they would no t be acting as union agent s whe n they perform thei r managerial duties . Their conduct woul d thus no t be attributabl e t o a labo r entity . Eve n i f th e delegate s ar e chose n through labor organization procedures, the proselytizing that worker directors would engag e in during board meetings would b e unlikely to be sufficiently outrageou s to constitute restraint or coercion within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1). 92 So long as such individuals did not

102 Organize d Labor' s Economic an d Politica l Powe r resort t o threat s o r similarl y opprobriou s behavior , thei r action s would be beyond the scope of Section 8(b)(1)(B). A labor organization would onl y subjec t itself t o Section 8(b)(1)(B ) liability i f its officer s threatened a corporate director with respect to the board's selection of bargaining or grievance adjustment representatives, or if it sought to disciplin e unio n member s because o f the manner in which the y voted on such matters. A union may not impose sanctions on members as a result of the way in which they carry out their managerial functions.93 Codetermination program s migh t b e challenge d unde r Sectio n 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 94 which makes it unlawful fo r an employer "to dominate o r interfere wit h th e formatio n o r administration o f an y labor organization...." The potential proble m is caused by the fact that Section 2(5) of the NLRA95 broadly defines "labor organization" to include "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committe e o r plan, i n whic h employee s participat e and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, o r conditions of work." If the Labor Board or courts were to decide that joint employer-employee committees constitute "labor organizations" under Section 2(5), the presence of management representative s o n suc h committee s migh t b e considere d unlawful dominatio n unde r Sectio n 8(a)(2) . Eve n thoug h Sectio n 14(a)96 permit s supervisor y personne l t o b e member s o f represent ative labo r organizations, suc h management agent s are not allowe d to hold union office. 97 S o long as worker participation programs are conducted o n a n egalitaria n basi s withou t bein g subjec t t o super visory control, Section 8(a)(2) should not preclude such cooperative ventures. Section 8(a)(2 ) wa s primaril y designe d t o outla w "compan y unions" that had been established b y business firms to prevent the selection of independent bargaining agents. 98 Early Labor Board decisions concluded that Congress not only intended in Section 8(a)(2) to outlaw company unions, but also to proscribe employee committees tha t wer e create d t o enabl e worker s t o participat e i n th e ad justment o f individua l grievances . I n NLR B v . Newpor t News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 99 the Suprem e Cour t sustaine d thi s statutory interpretation. Although the employer-assisted worker representation pla n operate d t o th e apparen t satisfactio n o f th e em ployees, th e Cour t conclude d tha t Congres s require d a stric t separation between workers an d management. 100 Th e Court further

Organized Labor's Economic and Political Power 10 3 found that the employer's motivation when it created the shop-level committee wa s not controlling. In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,101 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles tha t ha d bee n adopte d i n Newpor t News Shipbuilding . Cabot Carbon had established employee committees at various plants for the expres s purpos e o f meetin g regularl y wit h managemen t of ficials to discuss problem s an d handle grievances . The committee s also considered "seniority , job classifications, jo b bidding, makeu p time, overtime records, time cards, a merit system, wage corrections, working schedules, holidays, vacations, sick leave, and improvement of working facilities an d conditions." 102 Even though the employe e committees di d no t "bargai n with " Cabo t Carbo n wit h respec t t o these basic employment issues , the Supreme Court found that they existed fo r th e purpos e o f "dealin g with " the compan y regardin g such matter s and that this factor was sufficien t t o render the plan s "labor organizations" within the meaning of Section 2(5).103 Because the committee s ha d bee n create d b y managemen t personnel , the y were employer-dominated entitie s that contravened Sectio n 8(a)(2). If the Newport News Shipbuildin g an d Cabot Carbon rationales are applie d t o contemporar y worke r participatio n programs , eve n egalitarian shop-level committees would be rendered unlawful. Fortunately, more recent Labor Board and court decisions hav e appropriately recognize d tha t Congres s coul d no t hav e intende d t o preclude enlightened forms of employer-employee cooperatio n that are not designe d t o discourag e worke r unionization. Fo r example, in Hertzka & KnowJes v. NLRB, 104 the Ninth Circui t decide d tha t a Section 8(a)(2) violation must "rest on a showing that the employees' free choice.. . is stifle d b y th e degre e o f employe r involvemen t a t issue."105 Th e cour t wen t o n t o observ e tha t th e condemnatio n o f innovative forms of codetermination involving worker participation "would mar k approval o f a purely adversaria l mode l o f labo r relations. Wher e a cooperative arrangemen t reflect s a choice freel y arrived at and where the organization is capable of being a meaningful avenue fo r th e expressio n o f employe e wishes,.. . it [is ] unobjec tionable under the Act."106 A similar rationale was employed by the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Streamway Division of the Scott & Fetzer Co.107 to uphold the legality of "in-plant representation committees" that were designe d "t o provide a n informal ye t orderly process fo r communicating Compan y plan s an d programs ; definin g an d identifying proble m area s an d elicitin g suggestion s an d idea s fo r improving operations." 108 Rathe r tha n constitutin g "labo r

104 Organize d Labor's Economic an d Political Powe r organizations" tha t wer e "dealin g with " th e employer , th e cour t decided that the committees were merely a "communicative device" through which employees and managers could discuss issues of mutual interest. 109 In Mercy-Memorial Hospital Corp., 110 the Labor Board found that a joint employer-employee committee was not a "labor organization" within the meaning of Sectio n 2(5) , even though it made grievance determinations and actually made recommendations regarding working conditions. The Board concluded that the committee existed not to "deal with" management but to provide workers with a voice i n the resolution of grievances raised by fellow employees. 111 The NLRB expanded th e legitimac y o f worke r participatio n plan s i n it s sub sequent General Foods Corp.112 decision. General Foods had created a "job enrichment program" that divided employees into four teams. Each team operate d o n a consensus basi s t o determin e jo b assignments, job rotations, and the scheduling of overtime work. Although the teams did not possess disciplinary authority , they did occasionally conduct job interviews. First line supervisors usuall y attende d team meetings, and they often accepted team recommendations. The Board found tha t the teams were "nothing more nor less than work crews established... as administrative subdivisions of the entire employee complement" and that they "were not established to head off incipient organizing drives by outside unions nor did they come into existence i n respons e t o an y unres t i n th e bargainin g uni t …. " 113 Finding tha t th e team s wer e merel y intende d t o facilitat e commu nication between workers and management, the Board held that the company's delegatio n o f manageria l function s an d responsibilitie s to employees di d "no t involve an y dealin g with the employer o n a group basis within the meaning of Section 2(5)."114 In the more recent Anamag case, 115 th e NLR B followed th e Mercy-Memoria l Hospital and General Foods approach, and sustained the legality of employerestablished wor k team s tha t wer e intende d t o reflec t th e Japanes e "team concept" of management. The Board emphasized the fact that because committe e decision s wer e jointl y made , ther e wa s n o evi dence of managerial domination. 116 The Labo r Boar d an d th e court s shoul d generall y accep t shop level worke r participatio n program s tha t hav e bee n create d i n or ganized busines s environment s an d assume that the representativ e unions wil l b e able to preven t inappropriat e employe r dominatio n of employe e committees . A violation shoul d onl y b e foun d wher e the evidenc e demonstrate s tha t a dominant employe r ha s impose d

Organized Labor's Economic an d Political Powe r 10 5 a shop floor program on an anemic union and completely controlle d the wor k o f tha t group . Cooperativ e arrangement s unilaterall y de veloped in unorganized settings should be subject to greater scrutiny. If employe e participatio n scheme s hav e bee n create d i n goo d fait h to provide worker s wit h th e opportunity t o influence thei r employ ment conditions and there is no indication that management official s are effectivel y regulatin g th e deliberativ e process , th e committee s should b e sustained . The appointmen t o f employe e o r labo r delegate s t o corporat e boards should no t raise problems unde r Sectio n 8(a)(2) . The partic ipation of one or two employee representatives on a managerial board having man y member s woul d no t conver t tha t managemen t entit y into a "labor organization " under Sectio n 2(5) . Even though worke r directors could raise issues of interest to rank-and-file personnel , the board would not exist for the purpose of "dealing with" the employer with respec t t o such matters . It would instea d exis t as a manageria l entity responsibl e fo r th e developmen t o f corporat e policy . Whe n unionized companie s agre e t o plac e labo r delegate s o n manageria l boards, this shoul d similarl y be found lawfu l unde r the NLRA. The participation o f unio n representative s o n suc h board s woul d no t create circumstance s involvin g an y meaningfu l ris k o f employe r domination o f th e representativ e labo r organizations . Although th e other board directors could certainly outvote the labor members, they would no t normall y b e abl e t o contro l interna l unio n affair s o r th e conduct o f unio n agent s a t the collectiv e bargainin g table . Section 202(a)(5) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) 117 requires ever y officer an d employe e o f a labor organization to file reports with the Secretary of Labor regarding "any direct or indirect business transaction or arrangement" between them and an y employer s whos e worker s thei r unio n represents . The Department o f Labo r ha s indicate d tha t th e filing o f annua l report s describing unio n participatio n o n manageria l board s woul d satisf y the Section 202(a)(5 ) requirement.118 The Labor Department has also stated119 tha t s o lon g as suc h employe e delegate s d o no t accep t re muneration from the relevant corporations for their board of director services, no problem s would aris e under eithe r Sectio n 302(b)(1 ) of the Labor-Managemen t Relation s Ac t (LMRA), 120 whic h prohibit s officers an d employee s o f labo r organization s fro m acceptin g pay ments fro m employer s whos e worker s ar e represente d b y thei r re spective unions, or Section 501(a) of the LMRDA,121 which preclude s union officer s o r agent s fro m acquirin g an y pecuniar y o r persona l

106 Organize d Labor' s Economic an d Politica l Powe r interest i n employers that would conflic t wit h the interests of their respective unions. 122 LMRA Sectio n 302(c)(1 ) exclude s fro m th e coverag e o f Sectio n 302(b)(1) compensatio n receive d fo r wor k performe d i n one' s ca pacity as an employee of the company involved, but it is not certain that remuneration offered fo r service on a corporate board would be covered by this provision . Becaus e corporate director s are not normally considered "employees" of those business firms, it is possible that the Sectio n 302(c)(1 ) exemptio n woul d no t be applicable. Sec tion 302(c)(3) 123 similarl y exempt s payment s "wit h respec t t o th e sale or purchase of an article or commodity at the prevailing market price in the regular course of business." Even though the services of a director are not "a n article or commodity" in the ordinary sense, a Department of Labor official has suggested that this provision might permit union officials serving on corporate boards to accept the same compensation give n t o other directors. 124 To avoid unexpecte d lia bility unde r Sectio n 302(b)(1) , unio n agent s servin g o n manageria l boards may wish to reject compensation for those activities. Some expert s hav e suggeste d tha t labo r representatio n o n cor porate board s migh t creat e difficultie s unde r federa l antitrus t stat utes.125 Whil e labo r organization s tha t ente r int o combination s o r agreements wit h employer s enjo y a rathe r substantia l exemptio n from antitrust liability arising under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,126 which proscribe s contracts , combinations , an d conspiracie s i n re straint o f trade , this immunit y i s no t absolute . I f unions ente r int o contractual arrangements with business enterprises not to further the legitimate employmen t interest s of their respective member s but to further anticompetitiv e objective s i n th e produc t market , thei r ex emption i s forfeited. 127 Becaus e trad e union s initiatin g and/o r participating in jointly established labor-managemen t codeterminatio n programs usuall y ac t solel y t o enhanc e th e jo b securit y an d em ployment right s o f thei r employee-members , an d suc h cooperativ e ventures constitut e a direc t mean s o f achievin g appropriat e labo r objectives, immunit y unde r th e so-calle d nonstatutor y exemptio n should preclud e Sherma n Act liability. 128 Another potential lega l impediment to board level worker participation is Section 8 of the Clayton Act,129 which provides that "[n]o person a t th e sam e tim e shal l b e a directo r i n an y tw o o r mor e corporations... if suc h corporation s ar e or shall hav e been theretofore ... competitors." 130 Although the Federal Trade Commission has indicated in an advisory opinion that Section 8 was not intended to

Organized Labor's Economic and Political Powe r 10 7 apply to labor unions that negotiate seats on the managerial boards of competin g companies, 131 th e Justice Department has declined t o endorse this interpretation unequivocally. 132 Because this provisio n was almost certainly not designed to preclude labor participation on the boards of competing corporations, the more carefully considere d view of the Federal Trade Commission shoul d be accorded judicia l acceptance. Until this controversy is finally resolved, however, labor organizations can circumvent the potential difficulty by ensuring that the same individuals are not selected to sit on the managerial boards of competitor firms.133 The director s o f a publicl y hel d corporatio n hav e traditionall y been unde r a fiduciary obligation t o represen t th e interest s o f th e corporation an d it s shareholders. 134 Eve n thoug h on e migh t argu e that worker delegates on managerial boards would no t violate their fiduciary duty t o stockholder s merel y becaus e the y advanc e em ployee interest s t o th e apparen t detrimen t o f shareholders, 135 th e possibility tha t such behavior migh t be found t o contravene th e fiduciary obligation of such representatives canno t be ignored. Employee delegates can avoid fiduciary duty problems by merely posing worke r view s abou t issue s wit h th e potentia l t o engende r conflicts betwee n th e desire s o f worker s an d the interest s o f stock holders. They do not have to vote on those matters. This approach, however, would not wholly satisfy eithe r the employees o r the corporate owners . T o accommodate th e change s associate d wit h transition fro m confrontationa l labor-managemen t relationship s t o cooperative arrangements, the historical fiduciaryobligations should be judicially or legislatively modified with respect to labor delegates on corporate boards. They need to acknowledge that these representatives are appointed to managerial bodies with the expectation that they wil l advanc e th e interest s o f th e employee s bein g served. 136 This approac h woul d provid e worker s wit h th e opportunit y t o achieve meaningfu l codetermination , an d shareholde r concern s would continu e t o be adequatel y protecte d throug h th e remainin g directors wh o woul d stil l hav e a fiduciary obligatio n t o th e stockholders. As stat e corporat e la w doctrine s ar e altered t o permit labo r representatives o n managerial boards to be responsive to worker interests, ne w principle s shoul d b e develope d recognizin g tha t suc h delegates ow e a fiduciary dut y t o th e employee s fo r who m the y speak.137 If labor directors breach this obligation, injured employee s should be able to obtain redress against them similar to that available

108 Organize d Labor' s Economi c an d Politica l Powe r to shareholders aggrieve d b y fiduciary violation s b y ordinary boar d members unde r existin g corporat e lega l rules . Unionize d worker s could als o argu e tha t manageria l boar d member s selecte d b y thei r representative labo r organizatio n ow e them a duty o f fai r represen tation unde r th e NLRA with respec t t o the action s the y take as cor porate directors. 138 Courts should recognize, however, that "[a] wide range o f reasonablenes s mus t b e allowe d a statutor y bargainin g representative i n servin g th e uni t i t represents , subjec t alway s t o complete goo d fait h an d honest y o f purpos e i n th e exercis e o f it s discretion."139 The inclusion o f worker representatives o n corporate boards wil l create som e practica l problem s becaus e o f th e inheren t conflicts o f interest tha t exis t between labo r and management . Whe n collectiv e bargaining procedure s supplemen t codeterminatio n systems , em ployee directors should certainly not participate in managerial board deliberations pertainin g t o th e formulatio n o f compan y bargainin g strategy.140 Thi s dilemm a ca n b e easil y resolved , a s i t ha s bee n b y Chrysler Corporatio n an d th e UAW , b y excludin g th e labo r dele gate^) fro m meeting s a t whic h suc h matter s ar e to be discussed. 141 Furthermore, because the collective bargaining process will probably remain confrontational, and participatory management arrangements are adopted t o achiev e cooperativ e results , expedienc y militate s i n favor o f a rule barring the appointment t o managerial board s o f an y individual wh o i s directl y involve d i n th e negotiatio n o f collectiv e contracts.142 Thi s practic e woul d minimiz e th e ris k tha t someon e would attempt to act as both a cooperative director and an adversarial negotiator. Worker appointees o n corporat e boards must be denied acces s to information tha t woul d compromis e managemen t bargainin g posi tions. Even though union negotiators are entitled to review compan y financial record s i n thos e rar e situation s whe n managemen t bar gainers rel y upo n a n inability-to-pa y theor y t o suppor t thei r lo w offers,143 labo r representative s generall y d o no t hav e th e righ t t o inspect suc h busines s records . I f employee-selecte d director s wer e denied acces s t o confidentia l information , th e integrit y o f th e con ventional bargainin g proces s woul d b e preserved , an d labo r repre sentatives woul d no t b e deprive d o f financial dat a t o whic h the y would otherwis e hav e a legitimate claim . Worker delegate s o n manageria l board s shoul d b e entitle d t o review material of substantial interest to business competitors. Because the sam e labo r organizatio n migh t b e th e bargainin g agen t fo r th e

Organized Labor' s Economic an d PoJiticaJ Power 10 9 employees o f competing firms, management officials migh t initiall y fear the improper disclosur e o f trade secrets to other enterprises. 144 Experiences i n Wester n Europea n countrie s tha t hav e codetermi nation system s indicat e tha t thi s employe r concer n i s unfounded . Employee board members, recognizing the fiduciaryobligation owed to their immediate corporation and their concomitant dut y to avoid behavior that might disadvantage the workers they represent on the board, have maintained the confidentiality of secret business data.145 People who are skeptical regardin g the benefits o f worker participation o n manageria l board s not e tha t suc h representative s migh t not suppor t th e acquisitio n an d retentio n o f efficien t manager s o r the introduction of labor-saving technology. Evidence obtained from business enterprise s tha t hav e adopte d participator y managemen t programs indicates that these trepidations are unsubstantiated. German observers have discovered that labor representatives are as eager as shareholder director s t o retain highl y qualifie d supervisor y per sonnel, and researchers have found that codetermination systems do not necessaril y imped e technologica l progress. 146 Worker-selecte d directors mus t recogniz e th e nee d t o maintai n corporat e competi tiveness if job security and beneficial compensatio n levels are to be preserved. EXPANDING TH E INFLUENC E O F WORKER CAPITA L

Employment relationship s hav e traditionall y involve d employee s working fo r corporat e enterprise s owne d b y outsid e shareholder s who select the managerial personnel. Although working class people historically hav e not possessed economi c powe r vis-a-vis thei r employers, employees ar e beginning to recognize that they are able to wield financial influence. Throug h pensio n fun d leverag e an d employee stoc k ownershi p plans , worker s ma y eventuall y b e abl e t o seize contro l ove r the business enterprise s that employ them. Pension Fund Leverage

During the pas t thirty years, worker pension program s have grow n geometrically. Employee pension funds currently constitute the largest single source of investment capital in the American economy and represent the greatest source of private wealth in the world.147 There are presently over 500,000 private pension plans in the United States, with aggregat e asset s o f approximatel y $ 2 trillion . Thi s su m i s ex -

110 Organize d Labor's Economic an d Political Powe r pected to exceed $3 trillion by the mid-1990s.148 Pension funds currently own twenty t o twenty-five percen t o f th e stock of the corporations liste d o n th e Ne w Yor k an d America n Stoc k Exchanges. 149 The mone y availabl e i n America n pensio n fund s alread y exceed s the combine d gros s nationa l produc t o f th e Unite d Kingdo m an d France.150 Most employee s covere d b y retiremen t program s hav e n o ide a where thei r pensio n fund s ar e invested, an d hav e evidence d littl e interest in the management of such assets.151 In actuality, substantial portions o f retiremen t investment s ar e use d t o finance anti-unio n companies and transnational business enterprises that use such capital to expand their foreign operations to the detriment of their American employees . O f the twenty-fiv e corporation s i n whic h pensio n funds hav e bee n mos t extensivel y invested , sixtee n ar e primaril y nonunion entities. 152 It is therefor e apparen t tha t if employee s an d representative labor organizations became directly involved with the management o f their pension fund s an d the manner in which suc h economic leverag e i s being used, they could significantl y influenc e the policies o f man y corporat e employers . Th e 197 7 AFL-CI O convention adopte d a resolution urgin g that "th e substantia l financial power of [unio n negotiated pensio n funds] be entrusted to financial institutions whose investment policies are not inimical to the welfare of working men and women." 153 Pension fund managers have begun to acknowledge the propriety of considerin g th e socia l benefit s t o b e derive d fro m prospectiv e investments. In Hawaii, public employee pension money is partially used to financelow interest mortgages for state workers.154 The Building an d Constructio n Trade s Departmen t o f th e AFL-CI O ha s ap proved a new pension fund investment strategy aimed at the creation of construction jobs for unemployed union workers. 155 In 1987, Carpenters Unio n Loca l 3 3 becam e th e first labor organizatio n i n th e United State s to use its pension fun d dollar s to open a full-service, federally chartere d bank providing financial services to members as well a s the general public. 156 Through th e exercis e o f pensio n fun d power , union s an d thei r members can influence the election of corporate management boards to ensure the selection of benevolent business leaders. Workers can use their leverage to influence corporate board decisions that concern matters of interes t to employees. 157 Eve n though unorganized busi nesses woul d probabl y objec t strenuousl y t o suc h unio n "interfer ence* ' in interna l managemen t affairs , man y unionize d companie s

Organized Labor's Economic and Political Powe r 11 1 might welcom e investmen t strategie s tha t favore d employer s tha t maintain humane employment environments. 158 Only 4 0 percen t o f negotiate d retiremen t program s hav e jointl y administered trus t fund s unde r Sectio n 302(c)(5 ) o f th e LMRA. 159 The remaining 60 percent involve funds that are managed solely by the employer s o f th e covere d workers. 160 If labo r organization s ar e to meaningfully expan d thei r influence i n this area , they mus t us e the collectiv e bargainin g proces s t o obtai n contro l ove r th e asset s currently managed by the companies. Unions should also encourage unorganized employee s covere d b y pensio n plan s t o deman d tha t their employer s appoin t fun d trustee s wh o wil l mak e sociall y re sponsible investment s tha t wil l rewar d corporation s maintainin g beneficial employmen t situations . Labor organizations attempting to influence the investments being made by pension fun d manager s must be careful no t to violate th e fiduciary obligations impose d upo n fund trustee s by the Employe e Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).161 Section 404(a)(1) of ERIS A mandates that (1 ) pension fun d asset s be utilized fo r the exclusive benefit o f plan beneficiaries, an d (2) investments be made in a prudent manner. 162 I f pension fun d trustee s mak e investmen t decisions i n a manne r intende d t o enhanc e th e right s o f worker s generally, the y arguabl y ar e n o longe r actin g solel y t o furthe r th e interests o f th e pla n beneficiaries. 163 Suc h conduc t migh t similarl y be viewe d a s contravenin g th e fiduciary duty impose d upo n fun d managers. Nonetheless , "[a] s lon g a s th e principle s o f maximu m return and prudent investment are faithfully followed, there is nothing to preclude the trustees from exercising other considerations i n their investment strategies."164 When fund managers consider several investment options involving relatively equal risks and financial returns, they can select the alternative tha t would optimall y advanc e the interest s o f workin g peopl e withou t concer n that they are contravening the mandates of ERISA. The NLRA restricts the ability of labor organizations to negotiate agreements tha t preclude th e us e o f pensio n fund s t o finance nonunion business firms. Such an accord would constitute a "hot cargo" agreement i n violation o f Sectio n 8(e), 165 which make s i t an unfai r labor practice for a union and an employer "to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer... agrees ... to ceas e doin g busines s wit h an y othe r perso n…. " So lon g a s unions merel y see k t o preven t th e us e o f pensio n fun d mone y t o support busines s entitie s tha t hav e ignore d th e statutor y right s o f

112 Organize d Labor' s Economi c an d Politica l Powe r their employees or maintained substandard employment conditions, and d o not merel y try to preclude al l investmen t i n nonunion com panies, they wil l no t violat e Sectio n 8(e ) of the NLRA. Union leader s mus t recogniz e th e substantia l powe r associate d with th e contro l o f pensio n fun d resource s an d anticipat e th e in creased importanc e o f thi s strateg y i n th e comin g decades . Unio n officials ca n significantly advanc e the rights of organized workers by inducing fun d trustee s t o mak e investmen t decision s tha t d o no t unnecessarily assis t anti-unio n corporation s t o obtai n competitiv e advantages a t the expens e o f their members . Obtaining Corporat e Contro l

In 1847, following a n unsuccessful wor k stoppage, twenty member s of a Cincinnati iro n molder s unio n establishe d on e o f th e first in dustrial cooperative s i n the United States. 166 Since that early exper iment wit h worke r ownership , othe r group s o f employee s hav e decided that it is preferable to work for establishments that are owned and operate d b y th e peopl e wh o perfor m th e requisit e productio n or service tasks than for traditional employers . During the 1920s and 1930s, cooperatives were created in Oregon and Washington by plywood workers , and man y o f those enterprise s stil l flourish today. 167 Similar venture s hav e bee n launche d b y th e Vermon t Asbesto s Group,168 th e Saratog a Knittin g Mill, 169 Sout h Ben d Lathe, 170 Rat h Packing,171 an d th e Chicag o an d Nort h Wester n Railway. 172 Although the primary motivation for early industrial cooperative s was th e desir e o f individual s t o wor k fo r themselves , othe r factor s have provide d th e impetu s fo r mor e recen t employe e ownershi p developments. Corporations facin g financial difficultie s hav e begu n to recognize that their ow n labor forces ca n provid e crucia l source s of operatin g capital . Workers threatened wit h layoff s an d plan t clo sures hav e realize d tha t partia l o r tota l employe e buyout s o f th e affected facilitie s ar e the optima l mean s o f guaranteein g continue d job security . Throug h th e us e o f employe e stoc k ownershi p plan s (ESOPs), Chrysler, 173 Pa n America n Worl d Airlines, 174 Acm e Mar kets,175 Wierto n Steel, 176 Wester n Airlines, 177 an d variou s over-the road truckin g concerns, 178 fo r example , hav e generate d th e fund s necessary t o remai n i n operatio n whil e simultaneousl y extendin g limited entrepreneuria l contro l t o their respectiv e employees . In 1974 , Congress concluded tha t specifi c legislatio n wa s neede d

Organized Labor's Economic and PoJiticaJ Power 11 3 to regulat e th e establishmen t an d operation s o f ESOPs . Sectio n 407(d)(6) of ERISA179 articulates the basic rules regarding such plans. Congress realize d tha t the Sectio n 404(a)(1)(B ) pruden t investmen t requirement180 an d th e Sectio n 404(a)(1)(C ) diversifie d portfoli o mandate o f ERIS A woul d substantiall y imped e ESO P develop ment.181 A s a result, Congres s designe d Sectio n 404(a)(2) 182 t o ex pressly exemp t investment s i n ESOP s fro m th e pruden t fiduciary and diversification requirement s of ERISA. 183 The enactment of this provision an d th e ta x benefit s associate d wit h th e creatio n an d financing of ESOPs have provided the impetus for the establishmen t of greater numbers of worker stock ownership programs. ESOPs may encounter legal impediments under labor statutes. The Labor Boar d ha s recognize d tha t th e decisio n t o creat e a n ESO P constitutes a mandatory subjec t for collective bargainin g under the NLRA.184 Employers and representative labor organizations are thus obliged to negotiate the creation of such programs. Once parties agree to establish som e form of worker ownership, however, other NLRA issues are raised. Should individuals who own part of their employer be entitle d t o th e right s o f "employees, " an d b e include d i n bar gaining units with employees who are not stockholders? The NLRB has appropriatel y resolve d th e first inquir y b y determinin g tha t shareholder-workers ar e t o b e regarde d a s protecte d "employees " under the NLRA, except i n those unusual situation s i n which thei r ownership interests are so substantial that it gives them an "effective voice" i n th e formulatio n o f corporat e policy. 185 Th e Labo r Board has als o acknowledge d th e propriet y o f includin g stockholder employees an d nonstockholder-employee s i n th e sam e bargainin g unit, so long as no preferential treatment is accorded the stockholderemployees because o f their shareholder status. 186 When workers effectively ow n the enterprise that employs them, questions may arise under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA187 concerning possible owne r domination o f the employee member s of th e managerial body that determines compensatio n level s an d working conditions. ESOPs could be considered "labor organizations" within the meaning of Section 2(5).188 Section 8(a)(2), however, was enacted for the purpos e o f precludin g externa l managemen t interferenc e wit h worker representational organization s and not to inhibit the right of employees to participate in industrial cooperatives that permit them to influence their employment circumstances. Based on this purpose, bona fide worker ownership program s should no t constitut e a vio-

114 Organize d Labor' s Economi c an d Politica l Powe r lation o f Sectio n 8(a)(2). 189 I f th e Labo r Boar d o r a cour t decisio n were t o reject thi s analysis , Congress shoul d amen d Sectio n 8(a)(2 ) to clarif y tha t i t doe s no t appl y t o ESOPs. Section 501(a ) o f th e LMRDA 190 impose s certai n fiduciary obli gations upo n unio n officer s an d agent s an d provide s tha t suc h in dividuals mus t neithe r hol d no r acquir e an y pecuniar y o r persona l interest which conflicts with the interests of their labor organization. It further require s such people to account for any profits they receive from transaction s conducte d b y the m o r unde r thei r directio n o n behalf o f their union . S o long as such individual s carefull y transac t business wit h th e manager s o f employe e cooperative s i n a profes sional manne r an d appropriatel y repor t an y profit s the y migh t per sonally deriv e fro m stoc k owne d b y them a s worker participant s i n the cooperativ e tha t employ s them , thes e official s shoul d no t b e hindered b y Section 501(a). 191 Worker control over industrial cooperative s has often diminishe d or eliminate d th e hierarchie s an d inequalitie s tha t separat e rank and-file employee s an d manageria l personne l i n conventiona l em ployment environments.192 These ventures have frequently enhance d job securit y throug h th e institutio n o f cost-savin g measure s imple mented withou t layoffs. 193 Mos t individuals workin g in cooperativ e businesses hav e evidence d increase d jo b satisfaction , bette r com munication betwee n manager s an d workers , an d enhance d enthu siasm for their tasks.194 As a result of these factors, employee turnover has decline d an d productivit y ha s increased. 195 Some observer s hav e questioned th e actua l degre e o f contro l ex ercised b y rank-and-file personne l i n corporation s tha t ar e partiall y or even wholly owned by the employees themselves, suggesting that professional manager s continu e t o operat e suc h businesses. 196 Em pirical research, however, refute s thi s notion. One study found tha t 36 percen t o f ESO P enterprise s hav e employe e representative s o n their manageria l boards , whil e 77 percen t o f worke r cooperative s have suc h direc t employe e participation. 197 Although worker s suppor t employe e ownershi p schemes , mos t labor leaders lack enthusiasm toward such ventures fearing that these programs wil l ultimatel y b e detrimenta l t o employe e interests : "[sjooner or later the workers will become managers themselves, and they'll star t actin g lik e managers . I t [wil l pit ] worke r agains t worker."198 Thi s pessimisti c perspectiv e ha s no t bee n born e ou t i n actuality. For example, the plywood cooperative personnel have not found suc h worke r transformation s t o b e a problem . I n thos e rar e

Organized Labor's Economic and Political Power 11 5 instances whe n selecte d director s d o no t fulfil l constituen t expec tations, they simply are not reelected. 199 Some union officials have equated ESOPs and worker cooperatives with antilabo r environments , an d maintai n tha t thes e system s ar e instituted by employers in an effort to reduce employee support for union representation. 200 Commentator s hav e als o pointe d ou t tha t most of the plywood cooperative workers are not union members,201 but this condition is probably attributable to the fact that those enterprises wer e establishe d prio r t o th e enactmen t o f th e NLR A i n 1935. Th e Vermon t Asbesto s Grou p employees , wh o di d no t for m their cooperative until 1975, have maintained their union solidarity and becom e mor e involve d wit h thei r representativ e labo r organi zation since their company's metamorphosis. 202 Even wher e worker s posses s th e righ t t o participat e directl y i n the selection of management officials, the y continue to require supplemental unio n representation . Man y crucia l busines s decision s must b e mad e fro m amon g competin g alternatives . Employee s ar e not monolithic. They have diverse needs and aspirations that cannot always be simultaneously satisfied. Through their representative bargaining agents, competing worker groups can express their concerns to managemen t an d endeavo r t o obtai n beneficia l results. 203 Labor organizations can also improve employee attitudes by teaching them to understand the difference between worker and manager functions, and by educating supervisor y personnel abou t humanistic management techniques.204 Thus, instead of being rendered obsolete by employee ownershi p programs , labor unions wil l continu e t o perfor m an important role. This fact explain s wh y it is highly unlikel y tha t workers a t employee-owne d firms will vot e t o decertif y thei r representative labo r organizations. 205 INCREASED POLITICA L ACTIVIT Y

The American labo r movement mus t recognize the need t o expand its political influenc e i f i t is t o retain its vitality i n the comin g decades. During the 1980s , the business communit y seize d contro l of two o f th e thre e branche s o f th e federa l government . Busines s ex pends substantial sum s of mone y through direct contributions, political action committees, and indirect support to ensure the election of pro-business presidents. By controlling the White House, the business communit y i s als o abl e t o influenc e th e developmen t o f a judicial branc h favorably dispose d towar d business interests . B y the

116 Organize d Labor' s Economic an d Political Powe r end o f th e Bus h administration , approximatel y three-fourth s o f al l federal judge s will have been appointed by conservative Republica n presidents. The Suprem e Cour t ma y no longe r hav e a single justic e who coul d reasonabl y b e characterized a s "liberal. " By controllin g th e executiv e branch , entrepreneur s preven t th e enactment o f legislatio n tha t would benefi t rank-and-fil e employee s at cos t t o employers . Th e presiden t ca n b e depende d upo n t o vet o any law s tha t ar e unacceptabl e t o busines s executives , an d i t ha s been rare for Democrats to obtain the votes needed i n the House and Senate t o overrid e suc h presidentia l action . Eve n i f a pro-worke r statute were enacted, the business communit y ca n be confident tha t an ultra-conservativ e judiciar y wil l narrowl y interpre t th e legisla tion, negatin g th e impac t o f suc h a law . Fo r example , durin g th e 1988 Term , th e Suprem e Cour t eviscerate d Titl e VI I o f th e Civi l Rights Ac t o f 1964 206 an d Sectio n 198 1 o f th e Reconstructio n Er a Civil Rights Act. 207 The Court made it significantly mor e difficult fo r plaintiffs challengin g discriminator y personne l practice s t o prevai l under Title VII than it had been before its decisions,208 and effectivel y rendered Sectio n 198 1 irrelevan t excep t fo r case s involvin g inten tional hirin g discrimination. 209 Organized labo r mus t sho w worker s tha t the y have been harme d by th e pro-busines s environmen t tha t ha s prevaile d i n th e Unite d States sinc e 1981 , when Ronal d Reaga n becam e president . Union s must demonstrat e tha t neithe r workers ' collectiv e employmen t sit uations nor their individual economi c interests have been advance d by conservativ e politician s wh o ar e primaril y beholde n t o wealth y corporate contributors . During the past decade, the effective ta x rate for th e affluen t ha s decline d appreciably , whil e th e overal l rat e fo r most lower- and middle-income people has either remained constan t or grow n du e t o increase s i n regressiv e sales , gasoline , an d socia l security taxes. Union officials mus t persuade working class individ uals, includin g lower-leve l manager s an d professiona l employee s who lac k meaningfu l contro l ove r thei r jo b functions , t o suppor t politicians who are likely to strengthen laws protecting worker rights, guarantee an equitable tax structure, vote in favor o f comprehensiv e medical coverag e for all Americans, and suppor t othe r policie s tha t will enhanc e th e economi c circumstance s o f lower - an d middle income Americans. "If unions take the lead in articulating these new interests, an d d o s o i n a fashion tha t present s a clea r visio n an d a role for workers in the governance of the American corporatio n an d

Organized Labor' s Economic an d Political Powe r 11 7 in the future economi c strategie s o f the nation, employees ma y see new and compelling reasons to join Unions." 210 Although th e AFL-CI O and it s variou s affiliate s hav e supporte d pro-worker legislatio n an d politician s sympatheti c t o labo r goals , they have not been sufficiently active politically. Labor officials must acknowledge that conservative, pro-business representatives are not going t o vot e fo r law s tha t woul d trul y enhanc e th e interest s o f working class people and campaign for the election of more liberal, pro-employee candidates . Union s shoul d contemplat e formin g o r supporting a third party, perhaps a Workers party, that would nominate individuals to run in elections in which neither the Republican nor the Democratic candidat e ha s shown an y respect fo r the rights of the working class. The mor e tha n 1 6 millio n unio n member s i n Americ a today 211 and th e million s o f unorganize d employee s ar e likel y t o suppor t political candidates inclined to advance their employment and economic interests. The AFL-CIO and its affiliates mus t mobilize thes e people t o proselytiz e i n favo r o f pro-employe e nominees . Whil e workers most likely do not possess the economic wealth of corporate executives, they clearly outnumber them. By providing personal services, these campaigner s can offset th e financial advantage enjoye d by pro-business candidates.212 Union members can become campaign workers, operate telephone banks, run copy machines, and conduct get-out-the-vote drives. 213 Labo r organization s ca n maintai n com puter lists on a district-by-district basi s of members willing to work for appropriate candidates , s o tha t people i n relevant geographica l areas ca n b e mobilize d efficiently. 214 The y shoul d als o encourag e employees to vote in all elections, because high worker turnouts can counterbalance th e economi c advantag e possesse d b y business backed candidates. Union leader s mus t rais e fund s t o suppor t an d reward th e politicians whom they support. Only those groups providing meaningful financial support to political candidate s ca n obtain effective acces s to elected officials, becaus e in elections in the United States, "votes are not as important in campaigns as money." 215 The fact that labor political actio n committee s (PACs ) hav e existe d fo r almos t fifty years216 attests to the fact that organized labor has already been aware of this reality. Despite th e declinin g membershi p figures ove r th e pas t thirt y years, labo r politica l actio n committee s hav e succeede d i n raisin g

118 Organize d Labor' s Economic an d Politica l Powe r significant amount s o f mone y i n recen t years . Actual contribution s from unio n member s rose from $1.4 3 million i n 196 0 to $11.82 million in 1987. 217 Even after inflation is taken into account, real political contributions rose approximately 2. 5 times over that same period. 218 To accomplish this objective, labor organizations were forced to raise membership dues , assessments, and fees . Even though this measur e enabled labo r unions t o increase their political expenditure s durin g a perio d o f declinin g enrollment , i t cause d the m t o becom e les s attractive to prospective members and provide d employer s with an other negativ e facto r t o be utilized durin g anti-unio n campaigns . If labor organizations double their membership ranks over the next ten to twent y year s throug h mor e diligen t an d innovativ e organizin g techniques, they will be able to double the amount o f political con tributions receive d fro m member s withou t increasin g dues , assess ments, an d fees . I f union s simultaneousl y convinc e unorganize d employees to provide monetary support for pro-worker political candidates, the economi c powe r o f working individual s wil l be greatl y enhanced. Labor leaders should no t be afraid o f offending incumben t office holders b y supportin g thei r opponents . Ultra-conservative , pro business incumbents are unlikely to support pro-labor or pro-worker legislation tha t i s oppose d b y corporat e executives . B y organizin g grass-root suppor t fo r the opponents o f such politicians, unions ca n intimidate incumbent s int o moderatin g thei r view s o r succee d i n getting their choic e o f candidate s int o office . COUNTERACTING TH E POWE R OF MULTINATIONA L BUSINESS ENTERPRISE S

During the past several decades, hundreds of transnational busines s entities hav e bee n created . Thi s economi c phenomeno n ha s chal lenged the ability of domestic labor organizations to protect the rights of individual s employe d b y suc h corporat e institution s an d th e ca pacity o f traditiona l nation-state s t o regulat e th e globa l operation s of such firms. American union leaders consider many multinationa l manufacturers t o be "runaway" businesses that are ceaselessly seeking inexpensiv e labor i n developin g countries. 219 Thes e globa l en terprises maintain that their activities have not caused a diminution in employmen t i n th e Unite d States , becaus e thei r technologica l developments and market planning have generated new white-collar jobs to replace the manufacturing position s being exported to foreign

Organized Labor' s Economic and Political Powe r 11 9 nations.220 Multinational businesses also contend that if they did not establish foreig n productio n facilities , busines s firms fro m othe r countries would fill the void and prevent American institutions and workers fro m benefiting fro m expandin g foreig n markets. 221 To the extent tha t America n firms develop productio n facilitie s abroa d to supply market s tha t would probabl y no t be served throug h the exportation o f good s produce d i n th e Unite d States , du e t o impor t barriers o r other cos t factors , suc h endeavor s d o no t decreas e em ployment opportunitie s fo r America n workers . However , wher e products that would otherwise be manufactured in the United States for domestic consumptio n ar e produced i n low-wage foreign countries b y America n subsidiarie s fo r importatio n bac k t o th e Unite d States, such business activities generally reduce the number of American production jobs. To counteract these economic developments, some myopic unionists may attempt to limit transnational expansion through legislation designed to prevent such global institutions from reaping the benefits of their foreign operations. Although protectionist legislatio n might generate short-ter m benefit s fo r America n workers , th e long-ter m ramifications woul d likel y be negative. International trad e conflict s among historically interdependen t nation s coul d easil y precipitat e a nationalistic world environment that would culminate in a Pyrrhic victory for organized labor. The United States would have difficult y obtaining needed ra w materials, including petroleum , from abroad, and conventiona l America n expor t market s coul d b e elimin ated. Union officials shoul d consider remedial measures that would have les s devastatin g international , an d ultimatel y domestic , consequences. A possibl e solutio n i s "content " legislatio n tha t woul d requir e foreign manufacturers that wish to sell their products in the United States to have a certain percentage of those goods produced in America.222 Even though suc h conten t requirement s woul d no t b e as restrictive a s impor t quota s o r substantial impor t tariffs , the y coul d similarly limit the importation of goods manufactured by other than American workers . Foreig n companie s servin g America n market s would be forced eithe r to establish new productio n facilities i n the United States or associate themselves with American manufacturers. This practice has already occurred in both the automotive and electronics industries. Labor leader s shoul d accep t th e inevitabilit y o f a n interrelate d and symbioti c internationa l economi c system . Instea d o f tryin g t o

120 Organize d Labor' s Economi c an d Political Powe r prevent th e developmen t o f foreig n productio n facilitie s tha t migh t erode America n jo b security, labo r organization s shoul d see k legislation tha t woul d directl y assis t displace d workers . Fo r example , taxes imposed on transnational enterprises that export jobs and monies obtaine d fro m conventiona l impor t dutie s coul d b e use d t o finance special adjustment assistanc e programs. In addition, Congress could provid e training that would enabl e displace d blue-colla r per sonnel t o lear n th e hig h technolog y skill s associate d wit h th e job s created b y multinationa l expansion . Union s shoul d suppor t legis lation tha t establishe s relocatio n fund s t o assis t individual s wh o have had to move to other geographic areas to find work. Labor organizations shoul d wor k fo r unemploymen t benefit s t o b e give n t o displaced individual s unti l the y ar e abl e t o procur e position s commensurate wit h thei r capabilities . International Labo r Cooperation Despite the Malthusian proliferation of multinational enterprises and the increasingly significant impac t of such institutions upon the employment condition s of many American workers, most labor leader s have evidenced little enthusiasm for internationally coordinated collective bargainin g tactics. 223 Union s hav e ignore d th e star k labor management powe r imbalanc e create d b y transnationa l firms. B y operating o n a globa l basis , corporat e structure s ca n minimiz e th e efficacy o f wholly domestic labor organizations.224 To counteract this trend, propheti c unionist s hav e emphasized th e necessit y fo r trans national labor cooperation. 225 The movemen t towar d internationa l unio n cooperatio n wil l en counter many obstacles. During the developmental stages of a global labor federation , corporation s ma y exploi t organizationa l weak nesses. Union strength will vary substantially from countr y to country, making it difficult t o sustain unified job actions which transcen d national borders. 226 If labo r representative s pres s to o vigorously fo r bargaining concessions in one geographic area, management official s may decide to relocate the enterprise to a national environment tha t is less supportive o f worker solidarity. 227 Union leader s ma y find i t arduous t o maintain transnationa l em ployee unity . Professor s Northru p an d Rowa n hav e suggeste d tha t "[t]he idea that workers in one country will enthusiastically, or even reluctantly, support the cause of their brothers and sisters in another country i s a figment o f th e intelligentsi a imaginatio n tha t persist s

Organized Labor*s Economic and Politica l Power 12 1 over the years without either occurring to or permeating the thoughts of those who are expected to lose pay to make it come true."228 Some evidence, however , indicate s tha t this cynicis m i s no t entirely justified. Labo r organizations fro m differen t nation s hav e alread y en gaged in limited international cooperation. For example, in February 1971, Frenc h Micheli n worker s demonstrate d an d cease d wor k i n support o f a strike by Michelin's Germa n employees. 229 Tha t same year, workers in Belgium, Holland, Germany, and Italy collaborated to preven t Ai r Liquid e fro m divertin g productio n fro m a struc k French plan t t o th e facilitie s a t which thes e individual s wer e em ployed. Simila r unio n solidarit y wa s demonstrate d b y Britis h an d German employees to enhance the position of striking French Kodak personnel.230 Probably th e mos t dramati c inciden t o f transnationa l unio n co operation occurre d i n 196 9 agains t th e French-base d internationa l glass manufacturer, St. Gobain. The International Chemical and General Workers Federation (I.C.F.) established a committee comprise d of labor leaders from each of the twelve countries in which St. Gobain operated. Thes e representative s decide d tha t n o nationa l unio n would execute a bargaining agreement with any subsidiary withou t committee approval . Informatio n concernin g th e variou s negotia tions was shared, a mutual strike fund wa s created, and each of the labor organizations agreed that none would perform any overtime to compensate fo r production los t because o f work stoppages i n other plants.231 The I.C.F. unions als o asserted tha t local worker s shoul d not have thei r compensation level s determine d solel y b y referenc e to th e recen t profitabilit y o f thei r respectiv e facilities , bu t shoul d instead shar e in the overall prosperit y o f St . Gobain's global operations. Eve n thoug h a few observer s hav e questione d th e degre e of success actuall y achieve d throug h internationa l unio n efforts, 232 these endeavor s demonstrat e tha t transnationa l labo r cooperatio n can b e successfull y carrie d out . I f trad e union s hop e t o influenc e meaningfully the operations of multinational enterprises , they must establish transnational organizations that can confront multinational companies o n an international basis . Despite th e obviou s nee d fo r expande d labo r coordination , th e growth o f transnationa l collectiv e bargainin g ha s no t occurre d a s rapidly a s man y observer s initiall y anticipated. 233 Th e variou s dif ferences in ideology and practice among labor movements that must be overcom e befor e union s ca n establis h successfu l join t venture s primarily explain s thi s undistinguishe d recor d o f trad e unio n col -

122 Organize d Labor s Economic an d Political Powe r laboration. Whil e America n labo r organization s hav e generall y ac cepted th e capitalis t system , man y o f thei r Europea n counterpart s have embrace d a socialist philosophy. 234 Furthermore , union s tha t principally represen t workers employed b y parent corporations ex pected t o expor t job s t o foreig n countrie s d o no t shar e th e sam e protectionist interest s a s the organization s whos e member s will b e the beneficiaries of such job relocations. Some transnational facilities will be located in highly organized areas of the world, while other s will functio n i n basically nonunio n environments . America n labo r organizations operat e i n a highly decentralize d industria l environ ment i n whic h mos t plan t rule s ar e determine d a t the loca l level , whereas mos t Europea n trad e union s functio n i n mor e centralize d economies in which fundamental employmen t conditions are established through industry-wide collective bargaining.235 Transnational union cooperatio n wil l als o hav e t o accommodat e th e differenc e between exclusiv e representatio n right s availabl e i n th e Unite d States and the nonexclusive representatio n in most European countries, wher e employee s ar e generally fre e t o selec t thei r ow n nego tiating agent s regardles s o f th e representationa l preference s evidenced by their fellow workers.236 Despite these differences, however, the need for unified labo r action to counterbalance the increasing power of multinationa l enterprise s shoul d impe l unio n leader s all over the world to emphasize thei r common interest s while minimizing their dissimilarities . Labor organizations tha t represen t worker s o f multinationa l en terprises mus t realiz e tha t domesti c bargainin g wil l no t effectivel y regulate the transnational operations of such firms. These employe e associations mus t joi n togethe r wit h thei r foreig n counterpart s t o create forma l an d informa l labo r confederation s t o achiev e basi c objectives. Union s i n industrialize d countrie s nee d t o cooperate t o avoid whipsa w tactic s b y globa l busines s institution s designe d t o induce workers in different nation s to compete against one another. Information exchanges will enable labor leaders to know what unions and employers in various areas of the world are doing.237 Electronic databases ca n provid e immediat e knowledg e concernin g th e pro duction figures, wage rates, fringe benefits, an d working condition s of internationa l employers . Suc h network s als o enabl e labo r organizations t o preven t transnational productio n transfer s intende d t o thwart job actions conducted by workers at particular facilities. 238 Unions desiring to reduce the exportation of jobs from developed to developing nation s must organize the workers in the developin g

Organized Labor's Economic and Political Powe r 12 3 countries. In this way, unions ca n ensure that such individuals are not denied employmen t dignit y or forced t o accept unconscionabl e working conditions. As such labor movements develop, international worker federations should seek the harmonization of compensation, fringe benefits , an d workin g condition s throughou t multinationa l enterprises. Such a long-term objective may currently appear naively optimistic give n th e extremel y heterogeneou s natur e o f th e worl d economy.239 Nonetheless , a s developin g nation s becom e mor e in dustrialized this goal will become attainable. International worker organizations can create information clearing houses. The International Chemical and General Workers Federation and the International Metalworker s Federatio n alread y provide ex tensive research and database services for their transnational member unions to facilitate employment condition comparisons among subsidiary companies , betwee n subsidiarie s an d paren t corporations , and among global business ventures. 240 Worker associations such as the International Conferenc e o f Free Trade Unions, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the International Federatio n o f Christian Trad e Union s shoul d b e encourage d t o provid e busines s information on a worldwide basis.241 Intelligence networks like these would enable national unions to engage in traditional collective bargaining o n a highl y informe d basis , i n additio n t o providin g th e foundation fo r a system o f coordinated transnationa l bargaining . Unions fro m differen t countrie s representin g worker s i n relate d industries shoul d consul t wit h on e anothe r t o maximiz e thei r ne gotiating effectiveness an d strive toward greater uniformity of wages and employment conditions . Cooperatio n shoul d includ e commo n contract termination dates within each industry and guarantees that work that would otherwis e b e performed a t struck facilities canno t be transferred to other locations, 242 to enable labor organizations t o coordinate their bargaining techniques on a transnational scale . Labor officials shoul d simultaneously demand consultation rights with multinational enterpris e manager s concernin g al l o f thei r interna tional operations , with the ultimate objective of truly global collec tive bargaining. 243 Employee s coul d the n confron t multinationa l business institution s o n a relatively equa l basis and counteract th e ability o f transnationa l employer s t o induc e worker s i n differen t countries to engage in internecine competition with one another in a frequently futil e effor t t o achieve job security and reasonable employment terms. The maturation of the European Community (EC) will provide the

124 Organize d Labor's Economic an d Political Powe r impetus and structure for coordinated collective bargaining by labor unions withi n th e EC . Although variou s Europea n labo r organiza tions have conducted a "social dialogue " with employers for many years and negotiated informa l agreements pertaining to diverse topics of mutual interest, 244 the unified EC should presage formal transnational bargaining.245 The new EC procedures will affect the foreign operations o f many United State s corporations. As the emergence of the EC fosters cooperatio n among European labor organizations, changin g circumstances withi n Nort h America militate in favor of regional labor cooperation. Once the United States and Mexic o conclud e a free-trad e agreement , a relativel y unifie d Canadian-United States-Mexica n free-trad e zon e wil l b e estab lished. A s mor e corporation s establis h maquilJador a arrangement s in Mexico to take advantage of reduced labo r costs, labor organizations representing United States and Canadian workers will need to develop close r tie s wit h thei r Mexican counterparts . AFL-CI O offi cials have already initiated discussions with Mexican union leaders to formulat e a join t strateg y designe d t o protec t th e employmen t rights o f America n an d Mexica n employees. 246 B y th e earl y 21s t century, Nort h America n labo r institution s shoul d becom e closel y aligned with the European entities functioning within the EC countries. Suc h internationa l labo r cooperation woul d enabl e union s to effectively challeng e th e awesom e economi c powe r possesse d b y global corporat e enterprises. International Government Regulatio n

Although parent nations have occasionally sought to prevent or limit the exportation o f jobs and technology an d some host nations have adopted policie s t o enhanc e thei r ow n interests, 247 politica l unit s with limited jurisdictional scop e lack the authority to govern meaningfully th e transnational operation s of nationless institutions . Corporations ca n easil y circumven t lega l restraint s impose d b y on e country throug h th e transfe r o f existin g o r futur e investment s t o regions without suc h restrictions. 248 Multinational corporation s are geocentric entities that do not owe allegiance to any particular country.249 I f globa l entitie s ar e to b e effectivel y regulated , governmen t organizations with international jurisdiction will have to be utilized. Nations in developed regions are in the best position to formulate uniform labo r codes applicabl e t o transnational busines s establish ments. Labo r organization s ma y initiat e multinationa l regulatio n

Organized Labor's Economic an d Political Powe r 12 5 through devices presently available, such as the EC or through treaties similar to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).250 EC nations previousl y attempte d t o impos e informatio n an d con sultation obligation s upo n transnational companie s wit h respect to various employmen t matter s through th e Vredling Directive. 251 Al though that directive generated substantial opposition from business firms and wa s neve r formall y adopted, 252 i t i s likel y tha t simila r duties will ultimately be prescribed through the EC Social Charter.253 By the time a unified E C is established , ther e will undoubtedl y b e uniform regulations governing the operations of transnational firms and mandating collective bargaining rights for the employees of such enterprises. As Canada, the United States, and Mexico create a North American free-trad e region , the y wil l b e force d t o develo p a joint governing bod y tha t ca n prescrib e th e organizationa l right s o f em ployees. By the early 21st century, labor organizations should be able to negotiate o n behalf o f the individuals employe d b y corporations doing business i n all three countries.

6. TH E NEE D TO REFOR M TH E NATIONAL LABO R RELATION S AC T

Throughout th e first 15 0 year s o f it s existence , th e Unite d State s officially discourage d collective worker action. When individual employees joine d force s wit h othe r workers, the y wer e subjec t t o antitrust o r crimina l conspirac y liability. 1 Court s di d no t hesitat e t o enjoin such collective efforts. 2 On those infrequent occasion s whe n judicial edict s faile d t o preven t concerte d employe e conduct , af fected employers might employ the national guard, the state militia, or private securit y force s t o pu t a n en d t o the employees ' efforts. 3 When stat e legislature s attempte d t o pass law s proscribin g yellow dog contracts, which required employees to promise that they would not join unions, or provisions guaranteeing individuals more healthful wor k environments , pro-busines s court s invalidate d thos e stat utes a s impermissibl e infringement s upo n th e freedo m o f contrac t of both employers and employees. 4 When Congres s attempte d i n th e Clayto n Ac t o f 1914 5 to dives t federal court s of jurisdiction to issue injunctive orders pertaining to peaceful labo r disputes, the Supreme Court narrowly construed that enactment t o prevent striking employees fro m enlisting the sympathetic suppor t of other workers by limiting the statutory exemptio n to disputants in direct employer-employee relationships. 6 It was not until 1932 , when the Norris-LaGuardia Act 7 finally deprived federal judges o f th e authorit y t o enjoin eve n sympath y actio n indigenou s to labo r disputes , tha t th e federa l governmen t provide d lastin g af firmative suppor t fo r collective worke r behavior. In 1933, Congress tried to grant employees organizational rights through the enactment of Sectio n 7 a of th e National Industria l Recover y Act, 8 but the Su 126

Need to Reform the National Labo r Relations Act 12 7 preme Cour t foun d tha t ac t unconstitutiona l base d o n th e imper missible legislativ e attemp t t o regulat e intrastat e commerce. 9 Con gress responded in 1935 by passing the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),10 whic h successfull y provide d privat e secto r personne l with organizationa l an d collective bargainin g rights. Congress specificall y indicate d i n Sectio n 1 o f th e NLR A tha t "[t]he denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal b y employers t o accept th e procedur e o f collectiv e bargaining lea d t o strike s an d othe r forms o f industria l strif e an d unrest…. " " Congres s furthe r emphasize d "[t]h e inequalit y o f bargaining power between employees wh o do not possess ful l free ….and employers wh o are organized i n the cordom of association... porate [form] …. " 12 Congress sought to alleviate these problems "by encouraging the practice and procedure o f collective bargaining." 13 The propriety of this theme was acknowledged by the Supreme Court when it sustained the constitutionality o f the NLRA. 14 The NLRA has provided significant rights for millions of American workers. Ove r thirty-thre e millio n employee s hav e vote d i n th e 345,000 representation elections conducted by the Labor Board since 1935.15 The NLRB has processed almost 800,000 unfair labor practice charges and has issued more than 46,000 decisions.16 During the past fifty-seven years, million s o f worker s hav e take n advantag e o f th e NLRA right t o influenc e thei r wages, hours , and employmen t con ditions throug h th e collectiv e bargainin g process . Million s o f col lective agreement s hav e bee n negotiated—mos t withou t resor t t o work interruptions. Even though the duty to bargain does not compel either party to agree to any proposal o r make any concession, 17 unionized employer s an d representativ e labo r organization s hav e achieved innumerable accommodations of their competing interests pertaining to a multitude o f topics. During th e first several decade s o f th e NLRA , Labo r Boar d an d court decisions judiciously protecte d the Section 7 right of employees to form, join, and assist labor organizations and to select exclusive bargaining agents. The NLRA covered individuals with tenuous employment relationship s wh o neede d collectiv e strengt h t o counter balance corporat e power . Worke r participatio n i n managemen t decision makin g throug h th e bargainin g proces s wa s expande d t o include mos t relevan t subject s pertainin g t o th e employmen t rela tionship. Remedial orders were devised to rectify the effects of unfair labor practic e violations . A s th e NLR A becam e mor e established ,

128 Nee d to Reform the National Labor Relation s Act however, employe r groups lobbied i n favor of amendments designe d to curtai l employe e rights , an d cour t decision s bega n t o erod e im portant statutor y protections . THE EARL Y EXPANSIO N O F STATUTOR Y RIGHT S AND PROTECTION S NLRA coverage wa s initiall y extende d t o diverse groups o f workers . In NLR B v . Hears t Publications , Inc., 18 fo r example , th e Suprem e Court uphel d th e extensio n o f collectiv e bargainin g right s t o news paper seller s wh o woul d hav e bee n considere d "independen t con tractors" unde r traditiona l lega l principles . I n Packar d Moto r Ca r Co. v . NLRB, 19 the Cour t sustaine d th e authorit y o f th e Labo r Boar d to provide statutor y right s fo r supervisory personnel . I n Hearst Pub lications, th e Cour t adopte d th e "economi c realities ,, tes t t o deter mine whic h individual s reall y neede d organizationa l strengt h t o counterbalance th e economi c powe r possesse d b y thos e fo r who m they worked . Unless the common-law tests are to be imported and made exclusively controlling, without regard to the statute's purposes, it cannot be irrelevant that the particula r worker s i n thes e case s ar e subject, a s a matter of economi c fact, to the evils the statute was designed to eradicate and that the remedies it affords ar e appropriate for preventing them …. Interruptio n of commerce through strike s an d unres t ma y stem a s well fro m labo r disputes betwee n some who , fo r othe r purposes , ar e technicall y "independen t contractors " and their employers as from disputes between persons who, for those purposes, ar e "employees " an d thei r employers…. — Inequality o f bargainin g power i n controversies ove r wages, hour s an d working conditions ma y as well characteriz e th e statu s o f th e on e grou p a s o f th e other . Th e former , when actin g alone , ma y be as "helples s i n dealin g wit h a n employer," as "dependent.. .on his dail y wage" and as "unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrar y and unfair treatment" as the latter…. I n short, when the particular situatio n o f employmen t combine s thes e characteristics , s o that the economic fact s of the relation make it more nearly one of employmen t than of independent business enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished by the legislation, those characteristics may outweigh technical lega l classificatio n fo r purpose s unrelate d t o th e statute' s objective s and bring the relation within it s protections. 20 The Suprem e Cour t thu s conclude d tha t seemingl y independen t newspaper seller s an d lowe r level supervisor s wer e entitled t o "em ployee" statu s unde r th e NLRA .

Need to Reform the National Labor Relations Act 12 9 During the formative years of the NLRA, the Labor Board and the courts promptly define d an d enforced basi c substantive rights. Employers began to refrain from overt forms of intimidation as the NLRA proscribed coerciv e threats and discriminatory treatment. Labo r organizations quickl y use d Sectio n 8(a)(2 ) to challenge management dominated employee committees, and the Labor Board directed these "company unions" to be disestablished. 21 The NLRB and the courts developed lega l doctrine s t o protec t th e unfettere d choic e o f em ployees wh o wer e th e target s o f unio n organizin g campaigns . Th e Labor Board determined that even conduct not constituting an unfair labor practice could provide the basis for setting aside election results where the challenged action may have prevented a fair representation election.22 Under the Hollywood Ceramics 23 doctrine, elections that may have been influenced b y pre-election distortions were nullifie d when materia l misrepresentation s o f fac t emanate d fro m partie s i n positions t o know the correc t facts an d the opposin g part y did no t have sufficient time to correct the misstatements before the balloting. As the NLRA matured, the NLRB and the courts prohibited more subtle forms of employer restraint on employee collective action. For example, pre-election benefit increases that might induce workers to vote agains t representatio n wer e proscribed , eve n whe n ther e wa s no evidence that the employer intended to impermissibly influenc e the electio n process. 24 Companie s wer e als o prohibite d fro m dis charging union supporters for alleged misconduct that occurred during organizin g campaign s wher e n o unprotecte d behavio r actuall y occurred. Becaus e th e allege d misconduc t wa s inextricabl y inter twined wit h the privileged organizin g activities, the Court believed that those erroneous terminations would have a chilling effect upo n other employees who desired to exercise their protected organizin g rights.25 When employers rejected union requests for voluntary recognition based on claims of majority support and then engaged in unfair labor practices designe d t o dilute the majority suppor t that had been obtained b y th e organizin g unions , remedia l bargainin g order s wer e generally issued. 26 The Supreme Court subsequently intimate d that where "outrageous" and "pervasive" employer unfair labor practices had significantl y deterre d employe e organizin g efforts , th e NLR B could, in extraordinary circumstances, issue remedial bargaining orders even in the absence of evidence that the organizing labor entities had ever achieved majority support.27 The Court theorized that these labor organization s woul d hav e attaine d majorit y strengt h bu t fo r

130 Nee d to Reform the National Labor Relations Act the chilling effect o f the employer's conduct. The Labor Board issued bargaining orders in favor of minority unions only in cases involving extraordinary circumstances, 28 becaus e o f th e nee d t o balanc e a n efficacious deterren t t o flagrant employe r unfai r labor practice s against the right of employees to be free from representatio n by nonmajority unions. 29 The Labor Board expanded th e definition o f protected "concerte d activity" t o includ e individua l conduc t tha t wa s foun d t o advanc e the employmen t interest s o f othe r employees . Thus , a n individua l employee assertin g a right containe d i n a collective contrac t woul d automatically be considered to be acting on behalf o f the other workers covered by that agreement. 30 In Alleluia Cushion Co., 31 the Labor Board extende d thi s doctrine , ruling that a n individual' s complain t under a safet y an d healt h statut e constitute d "concerted " activit y even withou t a bargainin g agreemen t o r evidenc e o f co-worke r support. In NLR B v. Weingarten , Inc., 32 the Suprem e Court sustaine d th e extension o f Sectio n 7 protectio n t o employee s requestin g unio n representation durin g employer-initiate d investigator y interview s that worker s reasonabl y fea r migh t resul t i n disciplinar y action . Whenever individua l employee s ar e calle d i n fo r investigator y in terviews tha t the y believ e ma y culminat e i n discipline , the y ma y lawfully insis t that a shop steward be present before any questioning may occur. The Labor Board subsequently extende d th e right t o coworker assistanc e a t suc h investigator y interview s t o person s em ployed i n nonunio n setting s i n Materials Researc h Corp. 33 Even though Section 10(c) of the NLRA, as amended by the LaborManagement Relation s Ac t (LMRA) , provides tha t th e Labo r Boar d shall no t orde r th e reinstatemen t o f an y employe e wh o ha s bee n terminated fo r cause , th e NLR B appropriately recognize d tha t thi s rule should no t preclude reinstatement order s in all cases of worker misconduct. Whe n significan t employe r unfai r labo r practice s pro voked act s of unprotected misbehavio r b y employees protestin g th e unlawful employe r actions , th e Boar d balance d th e seriousnes s o f the proteste r misconduc t agains t th e seriousnes s o f th e employe r violations. If the antecedent employer unfair labo r practices were far more seriou s tha n th e unprotecte d employe e responses , th e Boar d directed reinstatement. 34 Section 8(d ) expressl y provide d employee s wh o selecte d a n ex clusive bargainin g agen t wit h th e righ t t o negotiat e ove r "wages , hours, and othe r terms an d condition s o f employment." 35 Althoug h

Need to Reform the National Labor Relations Act 13 1 the NLRA does no t includ e a specific definitio n o f mandator y bargaining topics, administrative and judicial decisions recognized the prerogative of representative labo r organizations to insist upo n discussions pertainin g t o suc h fring e benefit s a s vacations, 36 pensio n plans,37 grou p insuranc e programs, 38 an d pai d sic k leav e provi sions.39 Other areas determined to be obligatory subjects of bargaining covere d employe e discounts, 40 safet y rules, 41 employe e workloads,42 grievanc e procedures, 43 layof f an d recall rights, 44 an d certain subcontractin g decisions. 45 B y the lat e 1960s , labo r organizations expected to negotiate about most topics that had any meaningful impac t upon worker interests. 46 The Suprem e Cour t acknowledge d th e nee d fo r representativ e unions to maintain bargaining unit solidarity durin g labor disputes in NLRB v . AHis-Chalmer s Manufacturin g Co., 47 by sustainin g th e right o f labo r organization s t o impos e judiciall y enforceabl e fines upon member s wh o cros s picke t line s t o work durin g lawfu l wor k stoppages. The Allis-Chalmers Court reviewed the legislative history underlying the LMRA amendments to the NLRA and concluded that Congress did not intend the Section 8(b)(1)(A) 48 proscription against union restraint and coercion to preclude the enforcement of internal union disciplinary rules against strike-breaking members: Integral to [the] federal labor policy has been the power in the chosen union to protect against erosion [of] its status... through reasonable discipline of members who violate rules and regulations governin g membership. That power is particularly vital when the members engage in strikes. The economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms, and "[t]he power to fine or expel strike-breakers i s essentia l i f th e unio n i s t o b e a n effectiv e bargainin g agent.... " 49 In NLRB v. Boein g Co. t50 th e Suprem e Cour t held tha t th e magnitude o f the penalties impose d b y labor organizations upo n members who violate legitimate union rules does not affect the propriety of suc h action s unde r the NLRA. Even though a n excessiv e fine i s more coercive than a reasonable assessment, the Court believed that Congress did not authorize the Labor Board to regulate such internal union matters. The NLRB employed simila r logic to find that it did not posses s th e powe r unde r th e NLR A to evaluat e th e fairnes s o f the internal union procedures through which a fine is imposed.51 By the earl y 1970s , i t wa s clea r tha t th e Labo r Boar d an d th e court s would no t interfer e wit h the right of labo r organizations t o impos e discipline upo n members who violated legitimat e unio n rules.

132 Nee d to Reform the National Labo r Relations Act Representative labo r organization s wer e als o provide d wit h sig nificant discretio n wit h respec t t o th e expenditur e o f due s mone y collected from employees pursuan t to lawful unio n security arrange ments. Althoug h th e Suprem e Cour t hel d i n Railwa y Employee s Dep't. v . Hanson 52 an d Machinist s v . Street 53 tha t union s provide d with exclusiv e bargainin g rights under federal enactment s coul d no t constitutionally expen d th e compelled due s mone y o f objectin g bargaining uni t member s fo r politica l o r ideologica l causes , th e scop e of thes e holding s wa s limited . THE EROSIO N O F NLR A PROTECTION S Judicial Limitations on Union Activitie s The NLR A wa s enacte d durin g th e depth s o f th e Grea t Depression . The Suprem e Cour t ha d recentl y invalidate d th e extensio n o f bar gaining rights to workers under the National Industrial Recovery Act, but i t finally acknowledge d th e nee d fo r specia l legislatio n t o hel p bring th e countr y ou t o f th e depression . Althoug h th e Cour t bega n to sustai n th e constitutionalit y o f various enactment s tha t advance d the right s o f workin g people , includin g th e NLRA , i t remaine d a conservative institutio n tha t di d no t believ e tha t rank-and-fil e em ployees shoul d b e permitte d t o exer t undu e influenc e agains t thei r respective employers . In NLR B v . Macka y Radi o & Telegraph Co., 54 th e Cour t decide d to limit the primary economic weapo n availabl e to employees. Eve n though th e Macka y Radi o cas e directl y concerne d th e propriet y o f an employer's refusa l t o reinstate alon g with other returning striker s several individual s wh o ha d bee n particularl y activ e unio n sup porters, the Cour t too k th e opportunit y t o addres s a n issu e tha t ha d not bee n raise d b y th e parties . Nor was i t a n unfair labo r practice t o replace th e strikin g employees wit h others in an effort to carry on the business. Although §13 provides, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike,'* it does not follow tha t an employer, guilt y of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to discharge thos e hired to fill the places of th e strikers, upon the electio n of the latter to resume their employment, in order to create places for them.55 The Cour t decide d tha t a n employer' s nee d t o continu e operation s during an economic strik e outweighed th e rather slight impact upo n

Need to Reform the National Labor Relations Act 13 3 the permanentl y replace d strikers . This opinio n wa s a devastatin g infringement on the statutorily protected right to engage in concerted activity and clearly illustrated the Court's determination to provide businesses wit h th e leverag e the y neede d t o neutraliz e th e strik e weapon that Congress had granted to workers. The Supreme Court was not willing, however, to allow employers to use an y device t o negate the efficacy o f a lawful wor k stoppage . Economic striker s coul d no t b e terminated, because the y wer e en gaged in protecte d concerte d activity. 56 Eve n when the y wer e law fully replaced , economi c striker s retaine d thei r "employee " statu s under th e NLR A an d enjoye d preferentia l recal l right s a s soo n a s positions fo r which they were qualified becam e vacant. 57 Nonetheless, i n 1959 , Congres s amende d Sectio n 9(c)(3 ) o f th e NLRA 58 t o provide that permanently replaced economic strikers may only vote in representatio n election s conducte d withi n twelv e month s fro m the date the strike commenced. This statutory change made it easier for a business firm that had broken a work stoppage to decertify th e incumbent unio n on e yea r after th e strik e began, because onl y th e replacement personnel and reinstated strikers, parties not necessarily amenable to unionization, coul d vote in that election. In the 196 3 Erie Resistor case, 59 the Supreme Court held tha t an employer could not offer striker replacements twenty years of "super seniority'' to use in future years during layoffs to displace reinstated strikers wit h greate r actua l seniority . I n Gidding s & Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB,60 however , th e Sevent h Circui t completel y ignore d th e Erie Resistor rationale . I t decided tha t an employe r tha t had hire d per manent replacements durin g an economic strike did not violate the NLRA whe n i t promulgate d a rule providin g tha t member s o f th e existing workforce would be recalled in the order of their seniority, ahead of more senior, unreinstated strikers, in the event of a layoff.61 This practic e effectivel y provide d replacemen t personne l wit h th e "super seniority " tha t th e Eri e Resistor Cour t ha d foun d impermissible. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n. of Flight Attendants*2 th e Suprem e Cour t establishe d a new rul e tha t furthe r undermines worker solidarity during strikes. A closely divided Court held tha t les s senio r "crossover " employee s wh o eithe r refus e t o honor the initia l strik e cal l o r decide t o return to work durin g the work stoppag e ma y retai n th e highe r position s the y obtai n whil e their more senio r colleague s remai n o n strike, eve n afte r th e labor dispute has been resolved. This decision encourages less senior per-

134 Nee d to Reform the National Labor Relations Act sonnel t o wor k durin g a strike t o obtai n a n employmen t advantag e over more senior employees wh o choose to strike, and cause s mor e senior workers to fear that their participation i n a lawful wor k stoppage ma y jeopardiz e th e jo b statu s the y previousl y earne d throug h years o f seniority . Congressional Restriction s o n Labo r Organizatio n Strengt h

Businesses als o petitione d Congres s fo r relie f fro m th e economi c weapons made available to employees under the NLRA. For example, the NLRA had allowe d labor organizations t o utilize secondar y tac tics to further worke r interests . A union involve d i n a labor disput e could lawfully picke t a supplier or customer of the affected employe r even i f th e supplie r o r custome r wa s no t directl y involve d i n th e labor discord , t o pressur e th e affecte d employer . Th e LMRA 63 amended th e NLR A i n 194 7 t o prohibi t mos t form s o f secondar y activity. Ne w Sectio n 10(1) 64 directed th e Labo r Boar d t o see k im mediate injunctive relief against unions employing secondary tactics to preven t th e continuatio n o f th e secondar y conduc t durin g th e pendency o f NLR B unfai r labor practic e proceedings . Th e LMR A also provide d primar y an d secondar y employer s tha t wer e affecte d by unlawfu l secondar y boycott s wit h th e righ t t o see k monetar y damages i n federal court. 65 Congress furthe r expande d th e are a o f proscribe d secondar y ac tivity i n the 195 9 Labor Management Reportin g an d Disclosur e Ac t amendments t o the NLRA. 66 One provision outlawe d peacefull y ob tained "ho t cargo " agreements i n whic h a secondary employe r an d a union agree that the employer will not do business with a business firm directl y involve d i n a labo r dispute. 67 Th e 195 9 amendment s also impose d sever e restriction s o n peacefu l picketin g designe d t o organize employee s o r t o obtai n voluntar y recognitio n o f a repre sentative labo r organizatio n fro m th e employer, 68 makin g i t mor e difficult fo r labo r entitie s to unionize ne w workers . N a r r o w i n g t h e Scop e o f NLR A Coverag e

In 1947, businesses induced Congress to amend the NLRA definitio n of "employee " to exclude both "independen t contractors " and "su pervisors."69 Congres s thu s rejecte d th e "economi c realities " tes t formulated i n Hearst Publication s t o determin e thos e individual s most i n nee d o f NLR A protection. Th e Suprem e Cour t furthe r nar -

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rowed th e statutor y definitio n o f "employee " i n Allie d Chemical & Alkali Worker s Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 70 At issu e was whethe r retire d individual s continue d t o enjo y "employee " status followin g thei r retiremen t t o th e exten t the y wishe d t o bar gain ove r thei r pensio n rights . Th e Court rule d tha t thes e peopl e were no t "employees " withi n th e meanin g o f th e NLRA , becaus e they wer e n o longe r activel y seekin g reemploymen t wit h thei r former employer . In Yeshiva University, 71 the Supreme Court substantially reduce d the NLRA protection availabl e to white-collar personnel . The Court noted tha t "managerial " employees , wh o "formulat e an d effectuat e management policie s b y expressin g an d makin g operativ e th e de cisions o f thei r employer," 72 hav e historicall y bee n exclude d fro m NLRA coverage by Labor Board decisions due to their close alignment with corporat e management . Sinc e th e universit y professor s wh o sought t o organiz e fo r collectiv e bargainin g purpose s fit thi s defi nition o f "managerial" employees, despite their lack of control ove r their "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," they wer e foun d ineligibl e fo r NLR A coverage. In College of Osteopathic Medicine & Surgery, 73 th e Labo r Boar d extende d Yeshiva University b y finding tha t organize d colleg e facult y member s wh o obtain meaningful contro l over academic matters through collectiv e bargaining become "managerial" personnel and thus, ironically, forfeit thei r negotiatio n right s unde r th e NLRA. Thwarting Organizational Tactic s Over th e pas t tw o decades , th e Labo r Boar d an d th e court s hav e made i t easie r fo r corporation s t o preven t th e unionizatio n o f thei r employees. Unde r th e traditiona l Hollywood Ceramics 74 approach , the NLRB refused t o permit employer s to use material misrepresen tations to adversely affec t th e manner i n which employee s vote d i n representation elections . Following the publication o f a limited em pirical stud y that suggeste d tha t employe e votin g was not meaning fully influence d b y employe r misrepresentation s o r threats, 75 th e Labor Board abandoned th e Hollywood Ceramics doctrine. In Shopping Kart Food Market, 76 th e NLR B announce d tha t electio n rule s "must b e based o n a view o f employees a s mature individual s wh o are capabl e o f recognizin g campaig n propagand a fo r wha t i t i s an d discounting it." 77 A s a result , th e Boar d n o longe r evaluate s th e impact of misleading campaign statements upon worker free choice .

136 Nee d t o Reform the National Labor Relations Act It simpl y assume s tha t individual s whos e employmen t destin y i s substantially controlled by their employer are not influenced by employer campaign recitations suggesting that unionization may cause a loss of business an d jobs.78 The Labo r Boar d recentl y decide d tha t i t wil l n o longe r issu e bargaining directive s i n favo r o f nonmajorit y union s unde r Gissel Packing.79 A labor entity seekin g suc h a n order must no w demon strate that i t actually achieve d majorit y support . A n employe r tha t quickly thwarts an incipient organizing campaign through unlawful threats and discharge s ma y thus be able to chill th e organizationa l propensities o f th e remainin g worker s sufficientl y t o preven t th e campaigning unio n fro m attainin g majorit y support . Eve n thoug h this employe r woul d incu r backpa y liabilit y fo r th e unlawfu l dis charges, i t woul d succee d i n avoidin g th e dut y t o recogniz e an d bargain with a labor union. In its 1984 Meyers Industries decision,80 the Labor Board narrowed the Section 7 protection afforded to individuals who protest adverse employment conditions. The NLRB determined that individuals who question safet y condition s o r fil e complaint s wit h stat e o r federa l regulatory agencies are no longer insulated from retaliatory employer discipline unde r the NLRA, unless the y either act in direct concert with othe r worker s o r asser t right s codifie d i n existin g bargainin g agreements. Personnel wh o are not covered by a collective contrac t or do no t associat e themselve s wit h othe r workers ar e thus unabl e to challenge resulting discharges under the NLRA. In 1985, the NLRB decided tha t the right of employee s t o request representation a t investigatory interview s woul d no longer be available to unorganized employees despit e th e absenc e o f languag e i n Sectio n 7 restricting the definition o f concerte d activitie s to those in which formally organized employees participate. 81 The NLR A protectio n afforde d t o individua l employee s wa s eroded further in Clear Pine Mouldings.82 The Labor Board discarded the "provocation " doctrin e tha t ha d preserve d th e reinstatemen t rights o f employee s wh o engage d i n nonflagran t misconduc t i n response to serious employer unfair labor practices. Strikers who protest extrem e employe r unfai r labor practices no w forfei t thei r right to reinstatement i f they engage in "excessive" behavior. When th e doctrin e enunciate d i n Clea r Pine Moulding s i s com bined wit h th e remedia l rul e establishe d i n Gourme t Foods , i t becomes clea r tha t immora l employer s willin g t o ignor e thei r lega l obligations unde r th e NLR A ca n significantl y disenfranchis e em -

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ployees exercising their protecte d righ t to organize. A company ca n instruct it s supervisor y personne l t o alert i t to incipient organizin g efforts. I t ca n readil y ascertai n th e name s o f th e primar y unio n or ganizers and terminate the m i n a public and humiliatin g manner . If the employe r i s fortunate, it s openl y provocativ e metho d o f termi nation ma y precipitat e unprotecte d response s fro m thos e discrimi nated against , causin g the m t o forfei t thei r righ t t o reinstatemen t under Clea r Pin e Mouldings . Suc h overtl y intimidatin g conduc t would discourage further organizin g activity by the remaining workers. Thi s woul d probabl y preven t th e campaignin g unio n fro m at taining majorit y support . Th e Gourme t Foods doctrin e woul d thu s preclude issuanc e o f any remedial bargainin g order . Restricting the Issue s Subject to Bargainin g Currently organize d employee s ma y n o longe r influenc e thei r em ployment circumstance s t o th e exten t unionize d worker s coul d i n the past , du e t o recen t Labo r Boar d an d cour t decision s tha t hav e narrowed th e scope of mandatory collectiv e bargaining. In First National Maintenance Corp . v. NLRB,83 the Supreme Court held tha t a company decisio n t o clos e par t o f a business doe s no t constitut e a mandatory subject for bargaining. The Court used language that could potentially preclude employee participation in many other important management decision s affectin g term s an d condition s o f employment: Management must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business. It also must have some degree of certaint y beforehan d a s to when i t may proceed t o reach decisions withou t fea r o f late r evaluation s labelin g it s conduc t a n unfai r labor practice— [I]n view of an employer's need for unencumbered deci sionmaking, bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.84 The Cour t no w require s collectiv e bargainin g o f managemen t deci sions havin g a significan t impac t upo n employmen t securit y onl y when i t i s likel y tha t th e representativ e labo r organizatio n wil l b e able to satisfy employe r concern s a t the bargaining table . In Dubuque Packin g Co., 65 the Labo r Boar d hel d tha t a busines s entity i s onl y obligate d t o bargai n abou t a prospectiv e decisio n t o

138 Nee d to Reform the Nationa l Labo r Relations Act relocate productio n fro m on e facilit y t o another whe n (1 ) the man agement decisio n doe s no t involv e a change i n th e basi c operatio n of th e business ; (2 ) th e wor k t o b e performe d a t th e ne w locatio n will not differ substantiall y from that performed a t the existing plant; (3) labor costs are a significant facto r wit h respec t to the company' s proposed relocation; (4) the representative union may be able to offe r concessions tha t will satisf y th e employer's financial concerns ; an d (5) ther e ar e n o unusua l circumstance s tha t requir e a promp t cor porate decisio n tha t woul d b e undul y delaye d b y collectiv e negotiations. Intrusions int o Interna l Unio n Affair s

Recent Labo r Boar d an d Cour t decision s hav e erode d unio n disci plinary authority . I n NLR B v . Textil e Worker s Granit e Stat e Join t Board,86 th e Suprem e Cour t hel d tha t a union coul d no t disciplin e individuals wh o ha d crosse d a lawful picke t lin e to return t o wor k during a strik e whe n the y ha d resigne d fro m th e labo r unio n prio r to thei r strike-breakin g activities . Followin g thi s decision , severa l labor organization s amende d thei r constitution s t o restrict th e righ t of members to resign during ongoing labor disputes. In Pattern Makers' League of North America v. NLRB,87 however, the Supreme Court held tha t th e provis o t o Sectio n 8(b)(1)(A) , which give s union s th e right "t o prescrib e [their ] own rule s wit h respec t t o the acquisitio n and retentio n o f membership," 88 di d no t indicat e a congressiona l intent to permit labo r organizations t o restrict member resignations . The Court further determine d that the Section 7 right of an employee to cros s a picke t lin e t o wor k durin g a strik e coul d no t b e limite d by union provision s limitin g membershi p withdrawals . In Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airlin e & Steamship Clerks, 89 the Suprem e Cour t hel d tha t whil e union s coul d expen d th e due s money received fro m objectin g bargaining unit member s to suppor t conventions and socia l activities, they could no t use such resource s to organiz e othe r group s o f worker s o r t o prosecut e civi l suit s tha t did no t directl y involv e member s o f the bargaining unit . Th e Cour t simply ignore d th e fac t tha t a union's capacit y t o organiz e th e em ployees of competitor firms directly affect s th e job security and em ployment benefit s enjoye d b y organize d personnel . I t als o disregarded th e fac t tha t tes t litigatio n prosecute d o n behal f o f on e bargaining unit may inure to the direct benefit o f employees in other units. Fo r example , a victor y unde r th e wag e an d hou r laws , th e

Need to Reform the National Labor Relations Act 13 9 health an d safet y statutes , o r the civi l right s act s coul d establis h a precedent tha t would greatl y advance the employment right s of all employees. Lehnert v . Ferri s Faculty Ass'n. 90 furthe r restricte d th e righ t o f labor organization s t o us e th e fund s receive d fro m objectin g bar gaining uni t members . Th e Cour t determine d tha t fo r challenge d activities to constitute properly chargeable endeavors, they must (1) be "germane " to collectiv e bargaining ; (2 ) b e justifie d b y th e gov ernment's vita l interes t i n labor peace while avoidin g "fre e riders" who benefit fro m representational effort s withou t payin g for unio n services; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech inherent in the allowance of a union security agreement. The Court disallowed expenditure of compelled dues money for lobbying, electoral, or other political activities . In 1992, President Bush increased the pressure on labor organizations through Executive Order 12,800 that requires federal contractors to post notices apprising employees of their right to object to the impermissible expenditure of their union dues.91 Propose d Departmen t o f Labo r regulation s wil l requir e unions to break down the expenditures contained in annual LMRDA reporting form s int o distinc t categories : contrac t negotiatio n an d administration, organizing , safet y an d health , strik e activities , po litical maneuvers , lobbying, promotional efforts , an d other. 92 These rules are designed t o make it easier for workers to challenge unio n dues expenditures, and they will create expensive accounting problems for many labor organizations. NECESSARY LABO R LA W REFORM S

Over the pas t several decades , busines s an d government antipath y toward union s hav e combine d wit h demographic , industrial , an d global factor s t o threate n th e continue d viabilit y o f th e America n labor movement . I f thi s negativ e tren d i s no t reverse d i n th e nea r future, labo r organization s wil l becom e relativel y insignifican t in stitutions by the beginning of the 21st century. Union officials nee d to modify thei r organizing techniques to appeal to white-collar employees, women, minorities, and managerial personnel . Labo r leaders mus t als o develo p technique s tha t wil l increas e th e economi c and political strengt h of their organizations. Union leaders cannot revitalize organized labor without th e crucial assistance of Congress, the White House, and the judiciary. Organized labo r shoul d us e it s new-foun d economi c an d politica l

140 Nee d to Reform the National Labor Relations Act power t o persuad e Congres s t o amend th e NLRA to provide affirm ative support for trade unions. The United States must reconfirm th e congressional objective s underlyin g th e origina l Wagne r Ac t i f i t seriously believe s tha t vita l labo r organization s constitut e a n im portant componen t o f a stron g democracy . Th e amende d NLR A should expan d th e rights of employees, protect employe e choic e i n representation elections , enhance the economic options available to representative unions , broaden th e scope of bargaining, and modif y the remedial provision s o f the NLRA to discourage illega l employe r opposition t o employee organization . Substantive Change s

Statutory Coverage . Congres s mus t amen d Sectio n 2(3 ) o f th e NLRA,93 which define s th e term "employee" to reflect th e economi c realities characteristic o f the post-industrial societ y America has become. Individual s wh o perfor m service s fo r businesse s an d migh t constitute "independen t contractors " unde r archai c lega l doctrine s should b e provide d wit h statutor y coverag e t o reflec t th e tru e eco nomic relationshi p betwee n the m an d th e entitie s fo r who m the y work. Modifying Sectio n 2(3 ) to incorporate the Hearst Publications "economic realities " test woul d enabl e individual s wh o d o not fal l within th e traditional definitio n o f "employee " but nevertheles s retain littl e o r n o contro l ove r th e term s an d condition s o f thei r em ployment t o benefit fro m th e protection s o f th e NLRA. Congress mus t als o amen d Sectio n 2 t o limi t th e scop e o f th e supervisory exclusion . The Labor Board presentl y finds supervisor y status in individuals who possess the authority to influence the terms and conditions of other employees, even when that authority is rarely exercised.94 Th e statutor y definitio n shoul d b e altere d t o exclud e only thos e person s wh o actuall y mak e determination s wit h respec t to th e employmen t o f othe r employee s an d wh o d o s o regularly . Lower leve l "supervisors " wh o exercis e suc h power s infrequentl y or merel y mak e recommendation s t o highe r managemen t official s should no t b e exclude d fro m NLR A coverage . Thei r employmen t interests are more closely aligned with their rank-and-file colleague s than with corporat e managers, 95 and they require collectivization t o advance thei r employmen t rights. 96 Section 2(3 ) should explicitl y exclud e "manageria l officials, " de fined to include only those persons "who regularly and meaningfull y participate i n th e formulatio n o r effectuatio n o f fundamenta l labo r

Need t o Reform the National Labor Relations Act 14 1 or personnel policie s directl y pertainin g t o wages , hours , o r other terms and conditions of employment." Employees who may be able to influenc e compan y rule s no t immediatel y relate d t o basi c em ployment conditions should not be excluded from NLRA coverage.97 Because suc h individual s lac k th e capacit y t o decid e thos e issue s that would be the subject of collective bargaining, they should have the statutor y righ t t o advanc e thei r employmen t interest s throug h organized efforts . Representation Elections. Th e statutor y righ t o f employee s t o organize is meaningless withou t the opportunity to participate in fair representation elections. The Labor Board should prohibit tactics by employer o r union agent s that are likely t o infring e employe e fre e choice. Employer s shoul d b e prohibite d fro m disseminatin g infor mation that even intimates to employees that if they vote in favor of unionization, they may endanger their job security. Individuals who depend o n their employers fo r their continued economi c existenc e are unlikely to ignore suggestions that their continued employmen t security is in jeopardy. The NLRB should require that company representations regarding possible adverse effects o f collectivization be based upo n objectiv e factua l circumstance s an d b e limite d t o as sessments concerning demonstrably probable consequences beyond the control o f the firm. 98 Intentional misrepresentation s shoul d b e similarl y proscribed . The Midland National Life Insurance Co." doctrine that permits the dissemination o f pre-electio n misrepresentation s i s based upon the naive premis e tha t employee s ar e not meaningfull y influence d b y such factors. Employers would not use these techniques i f they did not believ e the y coul d influenc e th e electio n outcome . Th e Labo r Board shoul d retur n t o th e Hollywood Ceramics 100 approac h an d refuse t o allo w representatio n electio n outcome s t o be determine d by the ability of either business or labor entities to distort the truth. If workers are to vote intelligently in representation elections, they must hav e th e opportunit y t o become familia r wit h th e argument s for and against unionization. Employers presently enjoy a clear advantage i n thi s regard . They ma y promulgate rule s preventin g employees from proselytizing during work time, while their supervisors inform employees about the negative aspects of unionization during the same work time. 101 Employers can lawfully addres s the issue of unionization at captive audience sessions that workers are required to attend , rea d anti-unio n statement s ove r interco m systems , pos t

142 Nee d to Reform the Nationa l Labo r Relations Ac t election propagand a o n compan y bulleti n boards , includ e negativ e information about unionization in employee pay envelopes, and mail campaign materia l t o worke r homes . Labo r organization s ar e gen erally unabl e t o emplo y an y o f thes e form s o f communicatio n t o provide employee s wit h a balanced perspective . Proposals that this communication imbalanc e be reduced b y providing unio n organizer s wit h limite d acces s t o compan y premise s during electio n drives 102 hav e bee n countere d b y understandabl e employer concerns with theft, sabotage , and drug usage. A less drastic mean s o f lessenin g th e communicatio n advantag e enjoye d b y employers would be to provide union organizers with access to prominently displaye d bulleti n boards . Unions shoul d als o be permitte d to include information i n employee pay envelopes and to mail campaign materia l t o worke r home s i f employer s utiliz e thes e commu nication channels . Whe n compan y official s giv e captiv e audienc e speeches i n perso n o r throug h publi c addres s systems , employee s who suppor t th e unio n organizin g driv e shoul d b e provide d wit h the opportunity t o respond t o the employer's anti-unio n message . If these channels o f communication ar e available to union supporters , the likelihoo d o f informe d votin g would increase . Union official s shoul d b e give n th e name s an d addresse s o f em ployees i n th e uni t bein g organize d a t a reasonabl y earl y date . Al though union s ar e currentl y provide d wit h thi s informatio n after a Labor Board electio n ha s been directed, 103 the names and addresse s of unit personnel should be made available in a more timely manner. This approach woul d enabl e organizer s t o make home visits and t o mail campaign literatur e to worker homes. To ensure that employe e privacy woul d onl y b e compromise d durin g seriou s organizin g drives, the Labor Board could limit the disclosure of this informatio n to case s i n whic h unio n agent s ca n demonstrat e tha t the y hav e obtained signe d authorizatio n card s from 2 0 or 30 percent of the workers in th e propose d unit . To increas e th e probabilit y o f fai r balloting , th e Labo r Boar d should mandat e tha t election s b e held withi n tw o week s afte r rep resentation petition s hav e bee n filed. NLR B notice s coul d b e im mediately posted to apprise affected employee s of their rights unde r the NLRA , an d Regiona l Office s coul d swiftl y determin e vote r eli gibility. I n mos t case s i n whic h th e employe r contest s th e appro priateness of the bargaining unit proposed b y the petitioning union , Regional Directors could decide the possible combinations and direct immediate elections . The vote s o f differen t employe e group s coul d

Need to Reform the National Labor Relations Act 14 3 be segregated until the Regional Directors resolve the unit questions, and the Labor Board would then aggregate the votes of the relevant groups and certify the results. Because employers are generally aware of union organizing drives well befor e an y election petitio n i s filed from supervisors who inform managers of incipient campaign efforts, company officials woul d have ample time to disseminate their antiunion message before the election. The statutor y righ t o f employee s t o organiz e fo r collectiv e bar gaining purposes is meaningless if workers lack the economic power to support their negotiating demands. Without some degree of meaningful empowerment , unionize d personne l ar e forced t o engag e i n collective begging , rathe r than collectiv e bargaining . Th e Suprem e Court decision in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.104 severely undermined the statutorily protected right of employees to strike.105 The Macka y Radi o permanen t replacemen t doctrin e i s bein g em ployed wit h greate r frequenc y sinc e Presiden t Reaga n decide d i n 1981 to terminate 11,00 0 air traffic controller s wh o illegall y struc k against the federal government . A recent AFL-CIO study found that approximately 1 1 percent of the 243,30 0 worker s who participate d in majo r strike s durin g 199 0 wer e permanentl y replaced. 106 Mos t were forced to seek other employment, and their representative labor organizations cease d to function a s viable bargaining agents for the new personnel . The Mackay Radio holding ignored two crucial propositions embodied i n th e NLRA—"tha t th e la w shoul d protec t th e individua l worker a s th e weake r party , an d tha t th e bes t protectio n agains t individual weaknes s [is ] collectiv e action." 107 B y permittin g em ployers to hire permanent replacements for striking employees, the Court effectively destroye d th e economic balanc e tha t Congress established i n the NLRA. The Strike Weapon. Som e commentator s argu e tha t struc k em ployers shoul d no t b e permitte d t o hir e temporar y o r permanen t replacements fo r striking employees , becaus e the retention o f suc h replacements woul d impermissibl y interfer e wit h th e unfettere d right o f worker s t o resor t t o wor k stoppages. 108 A complet e prohi bition against the employment o f any replacement personnel, how ever, would unduly prevent companies from protecting themselve s against truly excessive union demands. A policy that would balance the interest s o f bot h struc k employer s an d strikin g employee s i s necessary to resolve these competing issues. For example, the NLRA

144 Nee d to Reform the National Labo r Relations Act could b e amended t o bar the hiring of an y replacements durin g th e first one , two , o r thre e month s o f a n economi c strike . The affecte d employer coul d continu e t o functio n wit h regula r manageria l em ployees, but could not employ replacement workers during the specified period . Afte r th e designate d interva l elapsed , th e struc k firm would b e permitte d t o emplo y temporar y o r permanen t replace ments. This typ e o f restriction woul d preclud e th e displacemen t o f striking employee s durin g th e initia l perio d o f a jo b action , bu t i t could create major problem s for business entities unable to maintain minimal operation s throug h th e us e o f manageria l personnel . A mor e reasonabl e alternativ e woul d involv e th e balancin g ap proach frequentl y utilize d t o determin e th e degre e t o whic h em ployers ma y curtai l protecte d employe e right s du e t o busines s exigencies.109 Struck employers could b e allowed t o continue to operate throug h th e hirin g o f temporar y replacemen t worker s wh o would be laid off a s soon as the striking employees terminated thei r job actions. In most situations, struck companies desiring to maintain operations woul d b e able t o locat e a sufficient numbe r o f qualifie d temporary replacement s t o reduce the economic impac t of the wor k stoppages. Struc k employer s woul d onl y b e permitte d t o hir e per manent replacement s whe n the y coul d demonstrat e b y clea r an d convincing evidence that local labor market conditions preclude th e employment o f qualifie d temporar y workers . T o preven t th e Labo r Board o r courts fro m permittin g the prematur e hirin g o f permanen t replacements, Congress could enact a statutory provision proscribing the employmen t o f permanen t replacement s durin g th e first mont h or two o f an y work stoppage . A rule preventin g o r restricting th e hirin g o f permanen t replace ments woul d preven t struc k businesse s fro m usin g employe e jo b actions as an excuse to eliminate the jobs of individuals who engage in concerted activit y o r to decertify incumben t bargainin g represen tatives throug h th e employmen t o f permanen t replacemen t person nel. Suc h a rul e woul d als o depriv e firms counterin g unio n organizing campaigns of the ability to caution employees that if their selected bargainin g agen t call s a work stoppage , worker s wh o par ticipate ca n b e permanentl y replaced. 110 Disallowin g permanen t strike replacements woul d simultaneousl y preven t "crossover " em ployees o f th e existin g bargainin g unit—wh o refus e t o strik e wit h their fello w worker s o r wh o retur n t o wor k durin g a n ongoin g jo b action—from retainin g th e position s the y obtaine d ahea d o f mor e senior striker s who m the y replaced . A rule prohibitin g permanen t

Need to Reform the National Labor Relations Act 14 5 replacements would enabl e all of the individuals wh o engaged in a strike to displace temporary replacements, including crossover personnel, who momentarily occupie d thei r positions. In 1991, bills were introduced in Congress that would have either prohibited the hiring of permanen t replacement workers or limited the employmen t o f suc h person s t o circumstance s i n whic h tem porary replacements coul d no t be retained. Althoug h th e Hous e of Representatives voted to adopt H.R. 5, which would have barred the employment of permanent replacements,111 congressional supporters were unable t o overcom e busines s an d Whit e House oppositio n t o the proposed legislation . Secondary Labo r Activities. I n enacting th e NLRA , Congress rec ognized tha t worker s coul d onl y effectivel y counte r th e economi c power of corporate entities through concerted action. At the present time, employees involved in a labor dispute against an employer are only permitted to direct economic pressure toward that firm.Section 8(b)(4)(B) prohibits workers from inducing employees o f secondar y business entities to cease handling products going to or coming from the struck company, or from threatening or coercing secondary parties to convince them to cease doing business with the primary company.112 Employees may engage in consumer picketing at retail stores that request customers not to purchase goods produced by the struck business,113 so long as the struck goods do not constitute the principal items carried by the secondary retail establishment.114 They may also distribute handbill s askin g prospectiv e customer s t o refrai n fro m patronizing thos e shop s i f the y continu e t o carr y the struc k good s during th e labo r dispute, 115 bu t the y ma y no t precipitat e an y ces sation of work by the individuals employe d b y secondary retail establishments. Thes e restrictions o n the use of secondary actions by employees in labor disputes severely curtail the economic weapon s available to unionized personnel . The NLRA should be amended to permit some forms of secondary activity. Congres s mus t acknowledg e th e significan t imbalanc e i n bargaining powe r that has develope d ove r the past two decade s a s a result of industrial and technological changes that have diminished the efficacy o f conventional work stoppages and the ability of struck business enterprises to hire temporary and permanent replacements. Congress must also recognize that a strike at one firm generally has an impact o n other unrelated entities . A successful work stoppage shuts down the operations of the target

146 Nee d to Reform th e National Labor Relations Act company. A s a result , th e busines s ma y b e force d t o suspen d it s purchases o f ra w material s an d t o reduc e it s shipmen t o f finished goods. When strikin g employee s ar e unabl e t o generat e a complet e cessation of primary operations through a strike, they should be able to expan d thei r concerte d activitie s t o reac h secondar y companie s that deal directly with the struck employer as suppliers or customers. Workers engage d i n a wor k stoppag e shoul d b e abl e t o induc e th e employees o f secondar y firms to refuse t o handle th e raw material s destined fo r th e struc k firm or the finished good s coming from tha t establishment durin g th e controversy . I f a n employe r attempt s t o limit primar y employe e picketin g of supplier s o r customers b y creating a n artificia l middl e enterpris e throug h whic h i t funnel s ra w materials o r finished goods , the firms dealing directl y wit h tha t en terprise shoul d b e susceptible t o primary employe e picketing . Con gress shoul d als o amen d Sectio n 8(e) 116 o f th e NLR A t o permi t primary employee s an d thei r union t o ask secondary partie s havin g direct relationship s wit h th e primar y employe r t o ente r int o agree ments i n which the y promis e to ceas e doin g business wit h th e pri mary compan y durin g lawfu l wor k stoppages . Congress shoul d amen d Sectio n 8(b)(4)(B ) t o permi t strikin g in dividuals to appeal to customers of secondary retail stores. If a struck firm is unable t o produce durin g an industria l dispute , retail store s are unabl e t o obtai n th e product s normall y manufacture d b y tha t company. Striker s shoul d b e abl e t o us e placard s o r handbill s t o induce prospectiv e customer s to cease shopping a t retail stores tha t continue to carry the products o f the struck firm during the existin g labor controversy. No distinction should be drawn between peacefu l consumer picketing and peaceful consume r handbilling. Nor should the amount o f revenue derive d fro m sale s of the struck goods affec t the legalit y o f suc h consume r appeals , sinc e a complete shutdow n of the struck company would force the retail establishment to explore the availabilit y o f product s fro m alternativ e firms regardles s o f th e profits los t du e t o th e unavailabilit y o f th e good s a t issue . I f th e secondary retai l stor e is a direct custome r o f the primary employer , the striking employees should be permitted t o ask the retail worker s to cease handling the primary party's goods. If there is no immediate relationship betwee n th e tw o entities , th e consume r picketin g an d handbilling woul d los e it s statutor y protectio n i f th e participant s cause secondar y retai l employee s t o stop work . Were corporate leaders concerned about production losses caused

Need to Reform the National Labor Relations Act 14 7 by mor e effectiv e wor k stoppages , the y coul d suppor t othe r inno vative alternatives . Fo r example , a n NLRA amendment coul d pro hibit economi c strikes , bu t mandat e th e resolutio n o f collectiv e bargaining impasses through binding interest arbitration procedures. Tri-partite arbitra l panel s coul d b e empowere d t o selec t th e mor e reasonable final offe r made by the employer or the union, either on an "issue-by-issue" or a "total package " basis. Various state publi c sector bargaining laws hav e successfully employe d interes t arbitration procedures a s a substitute for proscribed strik e activity. 117 Employers coul d alternativel y suppor t a n amendmen t t o th e NLRA tha t woul d permi t onl y "statutor y strikes " tha t woul d no t involve actua l wor k stoppages. 118 Afte r a bargaining impass e wa s reached, th e employe r o r th e labo r organizatio n coul d declar e a "strike." Production and services would continue as usual, but employee wage s woul d b e reduced b y a specific amoun t (e.g. , 2 5 percent) an d compan y revenue s woul d b e reduce d b y th e sam e percentage. If the parties resolved their dispute promptly, the withheld compensation an d revenues would be returned to the workers and the firm. If the controvers y wer e not settled quickly , however , the withheld funds woul d be permanently transferred to the public treasury. The financial incentives associated with "statutory strikes" would encourag e labo r and managemen t representative s t o resolv e their bargaining impasses expeditiously without disrupting production or depriving worker s of their livelihood . Protections for Nonunion Personnel under the NLRA. Individual s who question safety conditions or filecomplaints with state or federal regulatory agencies are not insulated from retaliatory employer discipline under the NLRA unless they either act in direct concert with other workers o r assert rights codified i n existing bargaining agreements.119 Congress should amen d the NLRA to clearly provid e that unorganized individuals who raise issues of obvious interest to other employees wit h thei r employe r o r with regulator y bodie s shal l b e considered engage d i n "constructive concerte d activity" and be entitled to protection under Section 7. 120 The distinctio n betwee n unio n an d nonunio n personne l estab lished by the Labor Board in Sears , Roebuck & Co.,121 with respec t to employees who request the assistance of fellow employees during investigative interview s the y reasonabl y fea r ma y resul t i n disci pline, ha s n o foundatio n i n th e languag e o f Sectio n 7 . Congres s

148 Nee d to Reform the National Labor Relations Act should amen d tha t provisio n t o indicat e tha t bot h organize d an d unorganized employees have the right to ask for the support of other persons durin g such investigator y interviews . The Scope of Bargaining. Th e Supreme Court and the Labor Board have undul y restricte d th e scop e o f bargainin g availabl e t o repre sentative labo r organizations . Th e NLR A wa s designe d t o enabl e represented personne l t o deprive corporat e official s o f thei r abilit y to mak e unilatera l determination s wit h respec t t o issue s o f direc t relevance t o bargainin g uni t members. 122 Congres s shoul d amen d Section 8(d) 123 t o mak e i t clea r tha t designate d bargainin g agent s possess the statutory prerogative to expect negotiations over all company decision s tha t wil l meaningfull y impac t employe e "wages , hours, an d othe r term s an d condition s o f employment. " Propose d decisions pertainin g t o suc h topic s a s subcontracting , productio n transfers, partia l closures , an d th e introductio n o f ne w technolog y should al l be subject to mandatory bargaining. The inconvenience of such negotiations to employers is irrelevant, because th e relativel y sligh t infringemen t o f manageria l authorit y associated with mandatory bargaining is outweighed by the need for unionized employee s t o participate i n the decision-makin g proces s that bear s directl y o n thei r continue d economi c well-being . Thi s expanded scope of bargaining would no t enable labor organizations to preven t managemen t decision s tha t simpl y displeas e bargainin g unit personnel , bu t would merel y obligat e employers to notify representative union s o f propose d change s an d provide them with the opportunity t o discus s th e pertinen t issues . Businesse s woul d no t be required to make any concessions or to agree to any proposals. 124 Management woul d b e fre e t o implemen t th e positio n rejecte d b y union leader s a t th e bargainin g table , i f employe e representative s refused t o accommodat e employe r need s an d a good-faith impass e were reached. 125 The ability of representative labor organizations to obtain beneficial contract term s i s directl y relate d t o thei r capacit y t o preserv e bargaining uni t solidarity . Congres s shoul d recogniz e tha t labo r organizations ar e democratic institution s an d that while member s ma y oppose proposed concerted activity, they should not be able to ignore the affirmativ e vot e o f a majority o f thei r fello w members . Union s should be permitted to impose reasonable restrictions upon the right of member s t o resig n durin g ongoin g jo b actions , t o preserv e th e

Need to Reform the National Labor Relations Act 14 9 concerted strength of those organizations. Congress can achieve this end by amending the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) 126 to provide that member resignation s woul d no t tak e effec t unti l thirt y day s afte r their submission to the union. Such a rule would preserve the worker solidarity that is essential during the early stages of economic strikes, and woul d reasonabl y allo w dissenter s t o escap e th e disciplinar y authority of their labor entities after thirty days. Labor organization solidarit y ha s been similarl y undermine d b y Supreme Court decisions restrictin g the right of such entities to expend dues money received from nonmember employees covere d by lawful unio n security agreements. Even though private sector labor organizations deriv e thei r representationa l statu s fro m th e NLRA , they ar e no t governmenta l entities . Th e NLR A shoul d thu s b e amended t o permi t union s t o expen d due s mone y fo r nonpolitica l and nonideologica l purpose s tha t advanc e worke r rights , suc h a s union organizing, litigation not related to the immediate bargaining unit, or lobbying efforts, eve n if these purposes do not immediately concern the negotiation and administration of the collective contract covering the instant unit of employees. Representative union s shoul d certainl y b e abl e t o us e th e due s money received from objecting members to organize new groups of workers. Th e jo b security , compensatio n levels , an d employmen t terms enjoyed by unionized personnel are directly threatened by the ability of unorganized companies to obtain a competitive advantage through the availabilit y o f reduce d labo r costs. To the extent labo r organizations are able to organize most or all members of an industry, they greatly protect the job security and working conditions provided to employees covere d by collective contracts. Litigation involving external bargaining units may similarly inure to th e benefi t o f individual s i n th e immediat e unit . Tes t case s in volving wag e an d hou r laws , healt h an d safet y regulations , civi l rights statutes , an d othe r employment-relate d enactment s generat e judicial precedents that will assis t all workers. This indirect benefi t makes it appropriate to permit representative labor unions to expend dues money received from one bargaining unit to finance litigation involving the employment rights of other groups of workers. In most, if not all, such cases, the labor union would merely attempt to obtain through litigation benefits an d protections i t would otherwis e hav e to achieve through the collective bargainin g process. Unions shoul d als o be allowed t o spend due s mone y t o suppor t lobbying effort s designe d t o advanc e th e employmen t right s o f al l

150 Nee d to Reform the National Labor Relations Ac t workers. Whil e i t woul d b e imprope r unde r th e Firs t Amendmen t to permit labo r entitie s to expen d th e due s mone y o f objectin g em ployees t o finance politica l partie s o r particula r candidates , o r t o proselytize fo r o r against suc h ideologica l issue s a s abortio n o r ai d to parochial schools , unions shoul d be able to utilize dues revenue s to support lobbyin g intende d t o enhance th e employmen t interest s of al l workers . Effort s t o increas e th e minimu m wage , t o improv e health an d safet y protections , t o exten d unemploymen t compensa tion coverage , t o proscrib e discrimination , o r to protec t employee s displaced b y ne w technolog y o r job relocations ar e germane t o collective bargaining. To the exten t labor organizations ca n obtai n leg islation t o cove r thes e employment-relate d topics , representativ e unions wil l b e abl e t o focu s o n th e advancemen t o f othe r worke r objectives throug h th e bargaining process . Remedial Changes

The Nee d for Mor e Balance d NLR A Remedies . Th e remedia l scheme o f th e NLRA favors employers . The primary reaso n fo r thi s statutory imbalanc e i s tha t th e mos t poten t unfai r labo r practic e remedies wer e adde d t o th e NLR A i n 194 7 b y a n extremel y pro business Congress . Mos t o f th e ne w remedia l provision s adde d b y the LMRA pertained t o violations committed by labor organizations, not employers. For example, the new Sectio n 10(1) 127 specified tha t charges involvin g secondary unio n activit y unde r Sectio n 8(b)(4 ) or 8(e) or regarding organizational or recognitional picketing under Section 8(b)(7 ) shall be handled o n a priority basis . Whenever a charge alleging a violatio n o f on e o f thos e provision s i s filed, th e Labo r Board i s directe d t o seek an immediat e injunctiv e orde r against th e offending union , t o protec t th e employer' s interest s whil e th e sub sequent unfair labor practice proceedings are conducted. If the NLRB fails to seek a restraining order against the proscribed union activity, the affecte d busines s firm ma y petitio n a district cour t fo r a writ of mandate orderin g the Board to do so. 128 Section 30 3 of the LMRA 129 provided employer s wit h additiona l protectio n agains t secondar y conduct b y authorizin g federa l court s t o awar d damage s t o partie s injured b y Sectio n 8(b)(4 ) violations . Employers tha t commi t unfai r labo r practice s ar e no t subjec t t o mandatory injunctiv e orders . If a union files a charge allegin g a violation o f Section 8(a ) by a business entity and th e NLRB decides to issue a complaint , th e Boar d ma y see k a preliminar y injunctio n

Need to Reform the National Labor Relations Act 15 1 against th e offendin g conduc t unde r Sectio n 10(j). 130 The Boar d i s not statutoril y obligated , however , t o see k injunctiv e relief , an d i f the NLR B decline s t o pursu e a n injunction , th e adversel y affecte d employees or labor organization cannot compel that agency to do so. The Labor Board rarely seeks injunctive relief against employer unfair labor practices under Section 10(j). The number of employer unfair labor practices has increased dramatically over the past ten to fifteenyears.131 It has become relatively common fo r companie s counteractin g unio n organizin g drive s t o discharge the employees leading the collectivization efforts. If firms terminate such individuals publicly and flagrantly, they may be able to provok e a n unprotected respons e fro m th e fired employees an d avoid the obligation to reinstate them,132 thus dampening union support amon g th e remainin g workers . I f th e labo r entit y i s thu s pre vented from attaining majority status, the company does not have to worry abou t an y remedia l bargainin g order , n o matte r ho w outra geous its violations. 133 Corporations that ignore the rights of their employees unde r the NLRA are generally motivated by the fact that the relatively minimal costs associate d wit h unfai r labor practice liabilit y ar e outweighe d by the overall costs associated with worker unionization. These corporations ignor e th e mora l an d systemi c ramification s o f thei r unlawful conduct , an d tak e advantag e o f th e fac t tha t Labo r Boar d remedies with respect to discriminatory terminations are wholly inadequate. Th e sol e monetar y remed y availabl e t o unlawfull y dis charged employees is a Board order requiring the offending part y to make whole those who have been discriminated against for the compensation they have lost. Unlawfull y fired individuals ar e even required to seek interim employment to mitigate their economic losses during the pendency of the NLRB proceedings.134 Furthermore, Labor Board reinstatement orders are not particularly effective. Onl y about 40 percen t o f thos e discriminate d agains t actuall y accep t offer s o f reemployment, and, of those who do, approximately 80 percent leave their employer within two years. 135 Companies that commit serious unfair labor practices durin g organizing drive s ma y find themselves encumbere d b y remedial bargaining orders , i f th e adversel y affecte d labo r organization s ca n demonstrate tha t they obtaine d majorit y suppor t fro m th e worker s despite the employer violations. Even these remedial directive s are often ineffectual . Onl y about 35 to 40 percent of unions that obtain remedial bargaining orders ever achieve collective contracts. 136 The

152 Nee d to Re/orm the National Labo r Relations Act more vigorousl y employer s oppos e suc h remedia l order s throug h judicial appeals, the less likely the chance that the labor union wil l be able to achieve a n initial bargaining agreement. 137 Even when companies do not employ coercive tactics and unions successfully obtain Labor Board certification, fruitful negotiations do not always result. Recalcitrant employers can simply refuse to accede to worker demands. A good faith bargaining impasse is unactionable under the NLRA. Even if employers refuse to agree to union demands in bad faith, the most they need fear from the NLRB is a cease-anddesist orde r tha t wil l tak e severa l year s fo r th e petitionin g labo r organization t o obtai n an d have judiciall y enforced. 138 B y the tim e meaningful relie f i s provided, crucial organizin g momentum i s lost and union effectiveness i s irretrievably diluted . If the proliferatin g negatio n o f NLR A rights by business entitie s is to be reversed, Congress must provide more efficacious remedies . To deter the crippling impact of Section 8(a)(3) discharges, Congress should adopt a liquidated damages provision similar to Section 16(b) of th e Fai r Labor Standard s Act 139 tha t authorize s doubl e backpa y awards to employees whos e right s have been violated. I f the Labor Board were empowere d t o award doubl e o r triple backpay to indi viduals terminate d unlawfull y durin g organizin g campaigns , thi s would increas e the cost of employer noncompliance . To minimiz e th e los s o f organizin g momentu m associate d wit h the illega l terminatio n o f ke y unio n supporters , Congres s shoul d amend Sectio n 10(1 ) t o mak e mandator y injunction s applicabl e t o Section 8(a)(3 ) discharge s tha t occu r durin g organizing campaigns. As soo n a s a meritorious charg e i s filed, th e NLR B shoul d b e sta tutorily obligate d t o see k a n immediat e injunctiv e orde r directin g the offendin g employe r t o reinstate th e adversel y affecte d individ uals. I f suc h person s wer e promptl y returne d t o thei r former posi tions, th e negativ e impac t o f th e employer' s violation s woul d b e minimized. Congress shoul d amen d th e NLR A to authorize th e Labo r Board to issu e remedia l bargainin g order s i n favo r o f labo r organization s that were unlawfully prevente d from obtaining majority support because of extreme employer unfair labor practices. To avoid imposing an exclusive bargaining agent on employees who do not desire such representation, remedial bargaining orders should only be employed in extraordinary situations. Nonetheless, when the Board is satisfied that majorit y statu s woul d almos t certainl y hav e bee n achieve d i n the absenc e o f th e company' s egregiou s violation s o f th e NLRA , i t

Need to Reform the National Labor Relations Act 15 3 should be empowered to protect the rights of the discouraged union supporters through the issuance o f a bargaining directive. 140 When employers indefensibly refuse to bargain in good faith with newly certified unions or labor organizations that will clearly become the recipients of remedial bargaining orders precipitated by flagrant company unfair labor practices, the Labor Board should be similarly directed unde r Section 10(1 ) to seek preliminar y injunctiv e orders. These would force the recalcitrant business firmsto bargain with the designated labor organizations durin g the unfair labor practice proceedings. Business enterprises would thus be denied the opportunity to disregard the collective rights of their employees during the several years it takes under current law to obtain a judicially enforced Labor Board order. When employers unjustifiably refuse to bargain, make-whole relief should be available to place the unlawfully disenfranchised workers in the economi c positio n the y woul d hav e attaine d i n the absenc e of the company's outrageous disregard for their NLRA rights. Because the NLRB has decided that it lacks the statutory authority to provide such relief, 141 Congress should amen d Section 10(c ) of the NLRA 142 to empowe r th e Boar d t o requir e compensator y relief . Petitionin g labor organizations coul d present Bureau of Labor Statistics dat a to support their requests for make-whole compensation . Limiting Labor Board Deferral to Arbitral Procedures. Althoug h the NLRB is empowered in Section 10(a) of the NLRA143 to resolve unfair labor practice disputes , an d tha t provisio n state s tha t it s powe r i n this regard "shall not be affected b y any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise," the Labor Board has increasingly declined to perform this function . I n Spielber g Manufacturing, 144 th e Labo r Boar d de cided that in unfair labor practice cases it would defer to previously issued arbitra l determination s tha t involve d th e sam e factua l cir cumstances an d effectivel y resolve d th e issues raise d i n th e unfai r labor practice case. The NLRB would accept the prior arbitral results where the proceedings were "fair and regular, all parties had agreed to b e bound , an d th e decisio n o f th e arbitratio n pane l [was J no t clearly repugnan t t o th e purpose s an d policie s o f th e [NLRA]." 145 The party that sought NLRB deferral to a prior arbitral decision was obliged t o demonstrat e tha t th e Spielberg prerequisite s wer e satisfied. The Spielberg deferral policy was significantly expande d in Olin

154 Nee d to Re/or m th e Nationa l Labo r Relations Act Corp.,146 wherei n th e Labo r Boar d enunciate d ne w standard s t o b e applied whe n decidin g whethe r t o accep t a previous arbitra l deter mination i n a current unfai r labo r practic e proceeding : We would find that an arbitrator has adequately considered the unfair labor practice i f (1 ) the contractua l issu e i s factuall y paralle l t o the unfai r labor practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice …. [W]it h regard to the inquiry into the "clearly repugnant" standard, we would not require an arbitrator's award t o be totally consisten t with Boar d precedent . Unles s th e awar d i s "palpably wrong," i.e., unless the arbitrator's decision is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent wit h the Act, we will defer . Finally, we would require that the party seeking to have the Board reject deferral and consider the merits of a given case show that the above standards for deferral hav e no t been met . Thus, the part y seekin g to have the Board ignore th e determinatio n o f a n arbitrato r ha s th e burde n o f affirmativel y demonstrating the defects i n the arbitral process or award.147 The OJi n formulation make s i t exceedingly difficul t fo r parties t o challenge prio r arbitration decisions tha t are not entirely compatibl e with NLRA policies. The burden of proof has been inexplicably transferred fro m th e part y seekin g acceptanc e o f th e previou s arbitra l findings t o the party opposing such acceptance. So long as the arbitral determination wa s no t "palpabl y wrong, " i t i s entitle d t o NLR B af firmation. I n addition , court s reviewin g arbitra l decision s ar e obli gated t o enforc e suc h award s s o lon g a s the y "dra w thei r essence " from th e bargainin g agreemen t an d ar e not clearl y repugnan t t o la w or publi c policy. 148 Suc h judicia l deferenc e i s fa r greate r tha n tha t accorded t o th e revie w o f Labo r Boar d unfai r labo r practic e deter minations. 149 Th e expansiv e Labo r Boar d deferenc e t o arbitra l de cisions ha s cause d th e developmen t o f inconsisten t lega l principle s that d o no t provid e individua l employee s wit h protectio n a s broa d as tha t envisione d b y Congres s whe n i t enacte d th e NLRA . Spielberg deferral i s appropriat e wher e purel y factua l issue s ar e in dispute , becaus e i t reasonabl y enhance s th e federa l labo r polic y favoring the private resolution of labor controversies 150 and prevent s unnecessarily duplicativ e litigation . To ensure that the prior arbitral proceedings wer e trul y "fai r an d regular " and tha t th e awar d i s no t "repugnant t o th e purpose s an d policie s o f th e [NLRA], " however, deferral shoul d onl y b e employe d wher e th e part y seekin g deferral can demonstrat e tha t th e traditiona l Spielber g prerequisite s hav e been satisfied . Congres s shoul d amen d Sectio n 10(a ) t o codif y th e original Spielber g standards , and t o reject the overl y expansiv e Oli n

Need to Reform the National Labor Relations Act 15 5 Corp. approach , makin g i t clea r tha t th e Labo r Boar d shoul d no t accept a prior arbitral award if there is any reason to believe that the Spielberg criteria have not been completely met . The NLR B frequentl y refuse s t o conside r unfai r labo r practic e claims where no previous arbitral determinations have been issued, if the charge s raise issues tha t might be resolved throug h availabl e contractual grievance-arbitratio n procedures . Unde r the Collyer Insulated Wire 151 doctrine , i f th e responden t i s willin g t o hav e th e controversy submitted to the arbitral process, the Board usually withholds it s statutor y authorit y an d direct s th e partie s t o utiliz e tha t means of adjudication. In General American Transportation Corp.,152 the NLRB appropriately acknowledge d tha t such a pre-unfair labo r practice hearin g deferra l i s prope r where Sectio n 8(a)(5 ) o r 8(b)(3 ) refusal t o bargain charges are involved. In these cases, the rights of the representative labo r organization a s an institution ar e to be determined, and the resolution of the underlying contractual question, which will simultaneously dispose of the unfair labor practice issue, will b e mad e i n th e foru m tha t th e partie s specificall y establishe d to hear such controversies. Where individual rights are raised under provisions such as Section 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A), or 8(b)(2), however, the interests of the aggrieved employee may not coincide with those of either the employer or the representative union which control th e arbitra l process . Applicatio n o f th e Collye r deferral polic y to suc h case s effectivel y deprive s allegedl y coerce d individual s o f access to the administrative agenc y that Congress created to resolve unfair labor practice cases. Congress should amend Section 10(a ) to codify the General American Transportation approach and limit prearbitration deferral to cases involving refusal-to-bargain allegations . Such an amendment would guarantee individual employees the right to have their claims presented by independent Labor Board attorneys before th e tribuna l tha t possesse s substantia l NLR A expertis e an d whose member s hav e no t bee n selecte d b y th e employe r an d th e labor organization involved .

EPILOGUE

Over the past two centuries, the American labor movement has demonstrated remarkable resiliency. Throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries , craf t guild s flourished despite th e absence of legislative support. During the second half of the nineteenth century, social an d politica l institution s lik e th e National Labo r Union an d the Knights of Labor advanced the employment rights of all workers. After those groups declined, the American Federation of Labor created the business union movement. Although AFL affiliates encoun tered vehement employer and judicial opposition, they were able to organize millions o f skilled craf t personnel . Once th e federa l governmen t establishe d th e statutor y righ t o f workers to organize for collective bargaining purposes in the NLRA, union membership expanded rapidly. The creation of the industrial union movement through the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations i n the late 1930 s led to the organization of mass production industries. Competition between AFL and CIO affiliates generated significant unio n growth throughout the 1940s and 1950s. By the tim e o f th e AFL-CI O merge r i n th e mid-1950s , union s repre sented approximatel y 3 5 percent o f the nonagricultural labo r force. Even though the private sector union participation rate has declined over the pas t three decades , publi c secto r labor organizations hav e convinced 35 percent of government personnel that they will benefit from collectivization . As the American labor movement continue s to lose membershi p and conservativ e president s appoin t mor e pro-business judges , the likelihood of a private sector union renaissance seems remote. Nonetheless, ther e i s reason fo r hope. Changin g demographics wil l pro vide creative union organizers with new sources for membership. In addition, mor e an d mor e white-colla r an d professiona l employee s 156

Epilogue 15 7 are becomin g disenchante d wit h thei r routin e jo b tasks , thei r di minished employmen t security , an d th e increasingl y rigi d hierar chical structure s of their corporate employers. If the dissatisfactio n of suc h individual s continue s t o grow, man y wil l contemplat e th e possible benefit s o f unionization . Labo r leader s mus t devis e inno vative organizin g techniques an d develo p insightfu l collectiv e bargaining objectives that will appea l to such people. Even if labo r leaders d o not mak e the change s necessar y t o precipitate increase d worke r interes t i n unions , over-confiden t man agement officials will probably do so. As American executives decide that labor organizations ar e moribund entitie s tha t will becom e in significant factor s b y the en d o f th e curren t decade , many wil l fai l to heed Lord Acton's admonition that "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Managers will ignore industrial history and themselves create the circumstances that originally precipitated concerte d worke r actio n b y abusin g thei r unilatera l au thority to the detriment of subordinate employees. They will recreate the environments mos t indigenous t o union growth . Their workers will rediscove r the reason collective strengt h is required to counter the excessive economi c powe r possessed b y corporate firms. Public opinion surveys demonstrate that most American workers continue t o believ e tha t employmen t interest s ca n b e advance d through unionization, an d numerous nonunio n personne l hav e in dicated that they would be inclined to collectivize under appropriate circumstances. Despit e th e disadvantageou s industria l an d globa l trends, ther e continue s t o b e a nee d fo r worke r representation . I f American labo r organizations ca n offer dissatisfie d employee s representational services that will enhance their employment situations and their personal dignity, they should be able to generate sustained union growth.

NOTES

I. OVERVIE W

275.

1. Joh n Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston : Houghton Mifflin , 1971) ,

2. Jerem y Rifkin & Rand y Barber , Th e North Wil l Ris e Again (Boston : Beacon Press, 1978) , 26. 3. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 172 (Sept. 5, 1991): A-3. 4. Pub . L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) ("ERISA"). 5. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 165 (Aug . 26, 1991): A-2. 6. Michae l Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 10 Table 1. 7. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 28 (Feb. 11, 1992): B-l . 8. Michae l Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States, 90. 9. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 46 (Mar. 9, 1992): A-10. 10. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 241 (Dec. 18, 1989): A-l . 11. Thoma s Edsall , Th e New Politics of Inequalit y (Ne w York : W. W . Norton, 1984), 173. 12. Labo r organizations indirectl y affec t workin g conditions i n nonunion shop s because many employers provide benefits and working conditions comparable to those of organize d busines s entitie s i n a n effor t t o preven t unionizatio n b y thei r ow n employees. 13. Pau l Jacobs, Old Before Its Time: Collective Bargaining at 28 (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Center for the Stud y o f Democrati c Institutions , 1963) , 14 ; Albert Rees , The Economics of Trade Unions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 190. 14. Se e generally Thomas Geoghegan, Which Side Are You On? (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1991). 15. Intervie w wit h George Meany in U.S. News & World Report (Feb. 21, 1972), 28. 16. Howar d Fullerton , "Th e 199 5 Labo r Force : A Firs t Look, " Monthl y Labo r Review 10 3 (Dec. 1980): 11. 17. Jame s Jordan, "Trends in the Work Force: Individualism, Inflation, an d Productivity," Working in the Twenty-First Century (C. Stewart Shepard & Donald Carroll eds.) (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980), 71. 18. Sanfor d Cohen, Labor in the United States (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill Publishing, 5th ed. 1979), 97. 159

160 2. The Historical Foundation of American Labor 19. Charle s Heckscher, The New Unionism: Employee Involvement in the Chang ing Corporation (Ne w York : Basic Books , 1988) , 60-61; Gil Green, What's Happenin g to Labor (Ne w York : International Publishers , 1976) , 92 . 20. Pau l Weiler , "Mileston e o r Millstone : Th e Wagne r Ac t a t Fifty, " Arbitratio n 1985: La w and Practice (Walte r Gershenfel d ed. ) (Washington , D.C. : Bureau o f Na tional Affairs , 1986) , 40 . 21. Ibid., 43 . 22. AFL-CI O Committe e o n th e Evolutio n o f Work , The Changin g Situatio n of Workers an d Thei r Union s (Washington , D.C. : AFL-CIO, 1985) , 10 . 23. Pau l Weiler , Governin g the Workplace (Cambridge : Harvard University Press , 1990), 238-39 . 24. B.N.A. , Union s Today: New Tactics to Tackle Toug h Times (Washington, D.C.: Bureau o f Nationa l Affairs , 1985) , 12 . 25. E.g. , Rober t Schrank , "Ar e Union s a n Anachronism?" , Harvar d Busines s Review 5 7 (Sept.-Oct . 1970) : 107-8 . 26. E.g. , Eugene Forsey, "Trade Unions in 2020?", Visions 2020 (Stephe n Clarkson ed.) (Edmonton : M . G . Hurtig , 1970) , 94 . 27. Richar d Freema n & James Medoff , Wha t Do Union s Do ? (Ne w York : Basi c Books, 1984) , 43-77 . 28. Ibid. , 150-53 . 29. Ibid. , 94-110 . 30. Charle s Craver , "Th e Inquisitoria l Proces s i n Privat e Employment, " Cornel l Law Review 6 3 (1977) : 6 . 31. Danie l Fischel, "Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Markets and Corporat e Law, " Universit y of Chicago Law Review 5 1 (1984) : 1062 . 32. Richar d Freema n & Jame s Medoff , What Do Union s Do? t 7 . 33. Mario n Crain, "Buildin g Solidarit y Throug h Expansio n o f NLR A Coverage: A Blueprint fo r Worke r Empowerment, " Minnesot a Law Review 7 4 (1990) : 968-69 . 2. THE HISTORICA L FOUNDATIO N O F AMERICAN LABO R 1. Th e genera l informatio n discusse d i n thi s chapte r i s take n fro m variou s sources: Joh n Common s & Associates, History of Labor in the Unite d States (Ne w York: Macmillan , 1918) ; Alber t Blum , A History of the American Labor Movement (Washington, D.C. : American Historica l Association , 1972) ; Foste r Dulle s & Melvyn Dubofsky, Labo r in Americ a (Arlingto n Heights , 111. : Harlan Davidson , 4t h ed . 1984) ; Philip Foner , Wome n an d th e America n Labo r Movemen t (Ne w York : Fre e Press , 1982); Willia m Forbath , "Th e Shapin g o f th e America n Labo r Movement, " Harvar d Law Review 10 2 (1989) : 1109 ; Samue l Gompers , Sevent y Year s of Life and Labor (New York : E . P . Dutton , 1925) ; Richar d Morris , Governmen t an d Labo r i n Earl y America (Ne w York : Columbia Universit y Press , 1946) ; Seli g Perlman , A History of Trade Unionis m i n the United States (Ne w York : Macmillan, 1935) ; Selig Perlma n & Philip Taft, History of Labor i n the United States , 1896-193 2 (Ne w York : Macmillan, 1935); Phili p Taft , Organize d Labo r i n America n History (Ne w York : Harper & Row, 1964); Lloy d Ulman , Th e Rise of the National Trade Unio n (Cambridge : Harvar d University Press , 1955) . 2. 4 5 Mass . ( 4 Met. ) I l l , 3 8 Am . Dec . 34 6 (1842) . Thi s landmar k decisio n i s extensively explore d i n Walte r Nelles , "Commonwealt h v . Hunt, " Columbi a La w Review 3 2 (1932) : 1128 .

2. Th e Historical Foundatio n of American Labor 16 1 3. Phili p Foner , Wome n an d the America n Labor Movemen t (Ne w York : Fre e Press, 1982) , 61. 4. Ibid., 87 . 5. Seli g Perlman, A History of Trade Unionism i n the United States (Ne w York : Macmillan, 1935) , 95 . 6. Ibid. , 111 . 7. Phili p Taft , Organize d Labor i n America n History (Ne w York : Harper & Row, 1964), 117 . 8. Samue l Gompers , "Judicia l Vindicatio n o f Labor' s Claims, " America n Federationist 7 (1901) : 284 . 9. Ibid. , 1136 . 10. 3 9 Stat . 72 1 (1916) . 11. 24 3 U.S . 33 2 (1917) . 12. 4 7 Stat . 7 0 (1932) . 13. 31 3 U.S . 177 , 18 7 (1941) . 14. 20 8 U.S . 16 1 (1908) . 15. Davi d Montgomery , The Fall of the House of Labor (Ne w York : Cambridg e University Press , 1987) , 270 . 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid., 271. 18. Ibid. 19. 38 Stat. 730 (1914). 20. Samue l Gompers , "Th e Charte r o f Industria l Freedom, " American Federa tionist 2 1 (1914) : 971. 21. 3 8 Stat . 73 1 (1914) , codifie d a t 1 5 U.S.C . § 17 . 22. 25 4 U.S . 44 3 (1921) . 23. Phili p Taft , Organize d Labor in American History, 290 . 24. Barbar a Ehrenreich, Fea r of Falling (Ne w York : Harper Perennial, 1990) , 134 . 25. Phili p Taft , Organize d Labo r in America n History, 336 . 26. Donn a Va n Raaphorst, Unio n Maid s Not Wanted: Organizing Domestic Workers 1870-1940 (Ne w York : Praeger, 1988) , 165 . 27. Ibid . 28. Ibid. , 166 . 29. Phili p Foner , Wome n an d the America n Labo r Movement, 247 . 30. Alic e Kessler-Harris , Ou t to Work (Ne w York : Oxford Universit y Press , 1982) , 157. 31. Phili p Taft , Organize d Labo r in America n History, 668 . 32. Barbar a Ehrenreich , Fea r of Falling, 134 . 33. Ibid., 135 . 34. Davi d Montgomery , The Fall of the House of Labor, 416 . 35. Ibid., 419-20 . 36. Donn a Va n Raaphorst, Unio n Maids Not Wanted: Organizin g Domestic Work ers 1870-1940, 177 . 37. Georg e Barnett, "American Trade Unionism an d Socia l Insurance, " American Economic Revie w 2 3 (Mar . 1933) : 6 . 38. 2 5 Stat . 50 1 (1888) . 39. 3 0 Stat . 42 4 (1898) . 40. 3 8 Stat . 10 3 (1913) . 41. 4 1 Stat . 45 6 (1920) .

162 3. The Extent and Causes of the Decline 42. 4 4 Stat . 57 7 (1926) . 43. 4 9 Stat . 118 9 (1936) . 44. 4 8 Stat . 19 8 (1933) . 45. 29 5 U.S . 49 5 (1935) . 46. 4 9 Stat . 44 9 (1935) . Th e NLR A i s codifie d a t 2 9 U.S.C . § § 151-69 . 47. 30 1 U.S . 1 (1937) . 48. Th e industrial union s generally ignore d th e female clerica l personne l workin g in thes e industries . 49. Phili p Taft , Organize d Labo r i n America n History, 472 . 50. Pau l Weiler , Governin g the Workplac e (Cambridge : Harvard Universit y Press , 1990), 9 . 51. Busines s expert s hav e estimate d tha t th e enactmen t o f th e NLR A cause d a 15.9 percen t declin e i n shareholde r wealth . Crai g Olson & Brian Becker, "Th e Effect s of th e NLR A o n Stockholde r Wealt h i n th e 1930s, " Industria l & Labo r Relation s Review 4 4 (Oct . 1990) : 116 . 52. 30 6 U.S . 24 0 (1939) . 53. NLRB v . Montgomer y War d & Co., 15 7 F.2 d 48 6 (8t h Cir . 1946) ; Elk Lumbe r Co., 9 1 N.L.R.B . 33 3 (1950) . 54. C . G . Conn , Ltd. v. NLRB, 10 8 F.2 d 39 0 (7t h Cir . 1939) . 55. UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsi n Employmen t Relations Board, 33 6 U.S . 24 5 (1949). 56. NLR B v . Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 30 4 U.S . 33 3 (1938) . 57. 34 6 U.S . 46 4 (1953) . 58. Patterson Sargen t Co., 11 5 N.L.R.B . 162 7 (1956) . 59. 35 1 U.S . 10 5 (1956) . 60. 6 1 Stat . 13 6 (1947) . 61. 33 0 U.S . 48 5 (1947) . 62. 7 3 Stat . 51 9 (1959) . 63. Phili p Taft , Organize d Labor in American History, 658 . 64. Ibid., 661 . 65. 77 Stat . 5 6 (1963) . 66. 7 8 Stat . 25 3 (1964) . 67. 8 1 Stat . 60 2 (1967) . 68. 8 4 Stat . 159 0 (1970) . 69. 8 8 Stat . 83 2 (1974) . 70. 10 4 Stat . 32 7 (1990) . 71. Thoma s Edsall , Th e New Politics of Inequalit y (Ne w York : W . W . Norton , 1984), 107-8 . 72. Charle s Morris , Th e Developin g Labo r Law (Washington , D.C. : Bureau o f Na tional Affairs , 2 d ed . 1983) , 66-67 . 73. Thoma s Edsall , Th e New Politics of Inequality , 156 . 3. THE EXTEN T AN D CAUSE S OF THE DECLIN E 1. Phili p Taft , Organize d Labor in American History (Ne w York : Harper & Row , 1964), 162 . 2. Michae l Goldfield , The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States (Chi cago: Universit y o f Chicag o Press , 1987) , 8 . 3. Ibid., 1 0 Table 1 . 4. Georg e Barnett, "American Trade Unionism an d Social Insurance, " America n

3. The Extent and Causes of the Decline 16 3 Economic Revie w 2 3 (Marc h 1933) : 6; Lyle Coop r • , "The American Labo r Movemen t in Prosperit y an d Depression, " America n Economic Review 2 2 (Dec . 1932) , 653-54 . 5. Michae l Goldfield , The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States, 1 0 Table 1 . 6. Ibid . 7. Ibid. , 1 1 Tabl e 2 . 8. Ibid . 9. Ibid., 2 3 Figur e 4 . 10. Ibid., 1 6 Tabl e 3 . 11. Michae l Curme , Barry Hirsch & David MacPherson , "Unio n Membershi p an d Contract Coverag e i n th e Unite d States , 1983-1988, " Industria l & Labor Relations Review 4 4 (Oct . 1990) : 8 . 12. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 2 6 (Feb . 7 , 1991) : B-8 . 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., B-1 0 Tabl e 2 . 15. Ibid. , B-8 . 16. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 6 9 (Apr . 10 , 1991) : A - l . 17. Ibid. , D - l . 18. Ibid., A - 2 . 19. Ibid. , D-2 . 20. Richar d Freema n & James Medoff , Wha t Do Unions Do? (Ne w York : Basi c Books, 1984) , 202-3 . 21. Thoma s Kochan, Harry Katz & Robert McKersie, The Transformation of American Industria l Relation s (Ne w York : Basic Books , 1986) , 128-29 . 22. Barbar a Ehrenreich, The Worst Years of Our Lives (Ne w York: Pantheon Books, 1990), 203 . 23. Sheen a McConnell , "Cyclica l Fluctuation s i n Strik e Activity, " Industria l & Labor Relations Review 4 4 (Oct . 1990) : 130 . 24. Mario n Crain , "Building Solidarit y Throug h Expansio n o f NLR A Coverage: A Blueprint fo r Worke r Empowerment, " Minnesota Law Review 7 4 (1990) : 956 . 25. Charle s Heckscher, The New Unionism: Employee Involvemen t i n the Chang ing Corporatio n (Ne w York : Basic Books , 1988) , 30 . 26. Unite d State s Departmen t o f Labor , Employment in Perspective: Wome n i n the Labor Force (Firs t Quarte r 1990) . 27. Pete r Morrison , "Beyon d th e Bab y Boom, " The Futuris t 1 3 (Apr . 1979) : 133 . 28. Ibid. 29. Commissio n o n Workforc e Qualit y an d Labo r Market Efficiency , Investin g i n People (Washington , D.C. : U.S. Departmen t o f Labor , 1989) , 26 . 30. Willia m Johnsto n & Arnold Packer , Workforce 2000 (Indianapolis : Hudso n Institute, 1987) , xx . 31. Dian e Balser , Sisterhood and Solidarity (Boston : South En d Press , 1987) , 21 . 32. Danie l Hamermes h & Albert Rees , The Economics of Work and Pay (Ne w York: Harper & Row, 4t h ed . 1988) , 367-76 . 33. Willia m Johnsto n & Arnol d Packer , Workforce 2000, 89 . 34. Danie l Hamermes h & Albert Rees , The Economics of Work and Pay, 347-59 . 35. Staf f of Senate Special Committee on Aging, 101st Congress, 1st Session, Aging America: Trend s an d Projections (Committe e Print , 1988) , 8 . 36. B.N.A. , Olde r Americans in the Workforce: Challenges and Solutions (Wash ington, D.C. : Bureau o f Nationa l Affairs , 1987) , 5 . 37. Ibid., 15 .

164 3 . The Extent and Causes of the Decline 38. Staf f of Senate Special Committee on Aging, 101st Congress, 1st Session, Agin g America: Trend s an d Projections, 3 9 Tabl e 2 - 1 . 39. Ibid. , 47-4 8 Tabl e 2-5 . 40. Dian e Herz , "Employmen t Characteristic s o f Olde r Women, " Monthl y Labo r Review 11 1 (Sept . 1988) : 4. 41. 10 0 Stat . 334 2 (1986) , codifie d a t 2 9 U.S.C . § 631(a) . 42. Jerem y Rifki n & Randy Barber , Th e North Will Rise Again (Boston : Beaco n Press, 1978) , 59-68 . 43. Thoma s Kochan, Harry Katz & Robert McKersie, The Transformation of American Industria l Relations , 67-68 . 44. Sanfor d Cohen , Labor in the United States (Columbus , Ohio : Merrill Publish ing, 5t h ed . 1979) , 97 . 45. Alvi n Toffler , Th e Thir d Wave (Ne w York : William Morrow , 1980) , 139 . 46. Ibid . 47. Gile s Radice , The Industria l Democrats (Boston : Allen & Unwin, 1978) , 34 . 48. Richar d Barnet & Ronald Miiller, Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations (Ne w York : Simo n & Schuster, 1974) , 323 . 49. Willia m Johnston & Arnold Packer, Workforce 2000, 96-97 ; Viktor Kosolapov, Mankind an d th e Yea r 2000 (Moscow : Progress , 1976) , 156 . 50. Ronal d Kutsche r & Valerie Personick , "Deindustrializatio n an d th e Shif t t o Services," Monthly Labo r Review 10 9 (Jun e 1986) : 4. 51. "Career s fo r th e Lon g Haul, " Newsweek o n Campu s (Sept . 1986) , 17 . 52. Willia m Johnsto n & Arnol d Packer , Workforce 2000, 61 ; Burnham Beckwith , The Next 500 Years (Ne w York : Exposition Press , 1967) , 86-87 . 53. Alvi n Toffler , The Third Wave, 181-83 , 190-92 . 54. Swast i Mitter , Common Fate, Commo n Bon d (Oxford : Pluto Press, 1986), 136 . 55. Georg e Hildebrand, American Unionism : An Historical and Analytical Surve y (Reading, Mass. : Addison Wesley , 1979) , 118-19 . 56. Gar y Gappert, "Post-Affluence : Th e Turbulen t Transitio n t o a Post-Industria l Society," Futuris t 8 (Oct . 1974) : 214 . 57. G . B . J. Bomers, Multinationa l Corporation s an d Industria l Relation s (Assen , Netherlands: Va n Gorcum , 1976) , 9-10 . 58. Rober t Cox , "Labo r an d th e Multinationals, " Foreig n Affairs 5 4 (Jan . 1976) : 345-47. 59. Gile s Radice , Th e Industria l Democrats, 40 . 60. Loui s Turner , Invisibl e Empires : Multinationa l Companie s an d th e Moder n World (Ne w York : Harcourt Brac e Jovanovich, 1970) , 191 . 61. Terrenc e Collingsworth , "America n Labo r Policy an d th e Internationa l Econ omy: Clarifyin g Policie s an d Interests, " Boston College Law Review 3 1 (1989) : 91. 62. Ibid. 63. Richar d Barnet & Ronald Miiller, Global Reach : The Power of the Multinationa l Corporations, 304 ; Jeremy Rifki n & Rand y Barber , The North Will Rise Again , 31 . 64. Internationa l Labou r Office, Multinationa l Enterprise s an d Socia l Policy (Ge neva: International Labou r Office , 1973) , 77. 65. Rober t Reich , Th e Wor k of Nations (Ne w York : Alfred Knopf , 1991) , 113 . 66. Swast i Mitter , Commo n Fate, Commo n Bond , 38-40 ; Annett e Fuente s & Bar bara Ehrenreich, Wome n in the Global Factory (Boston : South En d Press , 1983) , 1 6 17. 67. Swast i Mitter , Common Fate, Common Bond, 38-39 . 68. Unite d State s International Trad e Commission, Tariff Schedules of the Unite d

3. The Extent and Causes of the Decline 16 5 States Annotated (1986) , Item 800.00; Terrence Collingsworth, "America n Labo r Policy and the International Economy : Clarifying Policie s an d Interests," Boston College Law Review 3 1 (1989) : 80-81 . 69. Swast i Mitter , Commo n Fate, Common Bond, 23 ; Annette Fuente s & Barbar a Ehrenreich, Wome n i n the Global Factory, 12-13 . 70. Swast i Mitter , Common Fate, Common Bond, 54 . 71. Annett e Fuente s & Barbara Ehrenreich, Women in the Global Factory, 27-29 . 72. Sand y Tolan , "Hop e an d Heartbreak, " New York Times Magazin e (Jul y 1 , 1990), 19 . 73. Lawrenc e Rothstein, Plant Closings (Dover , Mass.: Auburn House Publishing , 1986), 14 . 74. Rober t Reich , The Work of Nations, 120 . 75. Ibid., 122 . 76. Ibid. 77. Nathanie l Goldfinger , "A n American Trade Union View of International Trad e and Investment, " i n American Labo r and the Multinationa l Corporation (Duan e Ku jawa ed. ) (Ne w York : Praeger, 1973) , 34 . 78. Rober t Reich , "Wh o I s Us?" , Harvard Business Review 6 8 (Jan.-Feb . 1990) , 59. 79. Ibid. , 61-62 . 80. Swast i Mitter , Commo n Fate, Common Bond, 8-9 . 81. Rober t Reich , "Wh o I s Us?" , Harvard Business Review 6 8 (Jan.-Feb . 1990) , 58. 82. Charle s Levinson , International Trade Unionism (London : Alle n & Unwin, 1972), 222 . 83. Jame s Atleson, "Reflections on Labor, Power & Society," Maryland Law Review 44 (1985) : 845 . 84. Ibid., 842-45 . 85. Terrenc e Collingsworth , "America n Labo r Policy an d th e Internationa l Econ omy: Clarifying Policie s an d Interests, " Boston College Law Review 3 1 (1989) : 62. 86. Brun o Amoroso , " A Danis h Perspective : Th e Impac t o f th e Interna l Marke t on th e Labou r Union s an d th e Welfar e State, " Comparative Labor Law Journal 1 1 (1990): 485. 87. E.g. , In re Jacobs, 9 8 N.Y . 9 8 (1885 ) (strikin g down Ne w Yor k law prohibitin g cigar manufacturin g i n tenemen t dwellings) ; Ritchie v. People, 15 5 111 . 98, 4 0 N.E . 454 (1895 ) (invalidatin g Illinois eight-hou r law); Adair v. United States, 20 8 U.S. 16 1 (1908) (voidin g federa l la w proscribin g yellow-do g contracts) . 88. 4 9 Stat . 44 9 (1935) . 89. Th e constitutionality o f the NLRA was sustaine d i n NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin SteeJ Corp. , 30 1 U.S . 1 (1937) . 90. Phili p Taft , Organized Labo r in American History, 452-55 . 91. 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(a)(1) . 92. Pau l Weiler, Governing the Workplace (Cambridge : Harvard University Press , 1990), 238 . 93. Ibid. , 23 8 n . 18 . 94. 2 9 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) prohibits employer discrimination intended to encourage or discourag e suppor t fo r labo r organizations . 95. Pau l Weiler, "Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organizatio n Under th e NLRA, " Harvard Law Review 9 6 (1983) : 1780-81 . 96. Pau l Weiler , Governin g the Workplace, 238-39 .

166 3 . The Extent and Cause s of the Decline 97. Rober t LaLond e & Bernar d Meltzer , "Har d Time s fo r Unions : Anothe r Loo k at th e Significanc e o f Employe r Illegalities, " University of Chicago Law Review 5 8 (1991): 994 Tabl e 7 . 98. Pau l Weiler , Governin g the Workplace, 23 9 n . 19 . 99. Richar d Freema n & Jame s Medoff , What Do Union s Do?, 233 . 100. Midlan d National Life Insurance Co., 26 3 N.L.R.B . 12 7 (1982) . 101. Michae l Goldfield , The Declin e of Organize d Labor in the United States, 5 2 Table 10 . 102. Ibid . 103. Thoma s Kochan , Harr y Kat z & Rober t McKersie , The Transformation of American Industria l Relations , 66-73 . 104. Ibid. , 69-75 . 105. Jonatha n Axelrod, "Common Obstacles to Organizing Under the NLRA: Combatting th e Souther n Strategy, " Nort h Carolin a Lai v Review 5 9 (1980) : 147 . 106. Michae l Goldfield , The Decline of Organize d Labo r i n the United States , 190-91. 107. Ibid., 190 . 108. Davi d Blanchflowe r & Richard Freeman , Goin g Different Ways: Unionis m i n the U.S. and Other Advanced O.E.C.D. Countries (Cambridge , Mass.: National Burea u of Economi c Researc h Workin g Pape r 3342 , Apr . 1990) , 9-10 . 109. Richar d Freema n & James Medoff , What Do Union s Do?, 43-54 . 110. B.N.A. , Daily Labo r Report 16 1 (Aug . 20 , 1990) : A - 4 . 111. Ani l Verm a & Thomas Kochan , "Th e Growt h an d Natur e o f th e Nonunio n Sector Withi n a Firm, " Challenges and Choices Facin g America n Labor (Thoma s Kochan, ed. ) (Cambridge : MI T Press, 1985) , 101 . 112. Richar d Freema n & Jame s Medoff , What Do Union s Do?, 162-69 . 113. C . Wrigh t Mills , White Collar (Ne w York : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1951) , 294; Benjamin DeMott , The Imperia l Middl e (Ne w York : William Morrow, 1990) , 4 142, 130-31 . 114. Stanle y Aronowitz, False Promises (Ne w York: McGraw-Hill, 1973) , 141; Lyle Cooper, "Th e America n Labo r Movemen t i n Prosperit y an d Depression, " American Economic Review 2 2 (Dec . 1932) : 646 . 115. Michae l Mann, Consciousness and Action Amon g the Western Working Class (Atlantic Highlands , N.J. : Humanities Press , 1973) , 30-31 . 116. Se e generall y Willia m Ryan , Blaming the Victim (Ne w York : Vintage Books , 1976). 117. Ibid. , 10-11 . 118. Barbar a Ehrenreich , Fea r of Failin g (Ne w York : Harpe r Perennial , 1990) , 108-9. 119. Ibid. , 140-41 . 120. Richar d Freema n & Jame s Medoff , What Do Union s Do?, 214-17 . 121. C . Wright Mills, White Collar, 319 ; Stanley Aronowitz , False Promises, 2 9 2 93. 122. C . Wright Mills, White Collar, 297 ; Elizabeth Jelin, "The Concept of WorkingClass Embourgeoisement," The America n Working Class (Irvin g Horowitz, Joh n Leggett & Martin Oppenheimer , eds. ) (Ne w Brunswick , N.J. : Transactio n Books , 1979) , 247-51. 123. Barbar a Ehrenreich , Th e Worst Years of Our Lives, 196-97 . 124. C . Wright Mills , Whit e Collar , 63 .

4. The Need for Labor Unions 16 7 125. Michae l Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States, 50. 126. Edn a Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market," The American Working Class (Irving Horowitz, John Leggett & Martin Oppenheimer, eds.), 82. 127. Rober t Bibb , "Blue-Colla r Wome n i n Low-Wag e Industries : A Dua l Labo r Market Interpretation," The American Working Class (Irving Horowitz, John Leggett & Martin Oppenheimer, eds.), 132-33. 4. THE NEE D FO R LABOR UNION S

1. Jerem y Rifkin & Randy Barber, The North Will Rise Again (Boston : Beacon Press, 1978), 20. 2. Joh n Dunlop , "Pas t an d Futur e Tendencie s o f America n Labo r Organiza tions," Daedalus (Winter 1978): 84. 3. Georg e Hardbeck, "Unionism Again at a Crossroads," Critical Issues in Labor (Max Wortman, Jr., ed.) (Ne w York : Macmillan, 1969) , 67-68 ; Julius Shister , "Th e Outlook for Union Growth," The AnnaJs 350 (1963): 56-57. 4. Michae l Goldfield , The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 35. 5. B.N.A. , Labor Relations Reporter 130 (Feb. 27, 1989): 244. 6. Annett e Fuentes & Barbara Ehrenreich, Women in the Global Factory (Boston: South End Press, 1983), 48-53. 7. Thoma s Karier , "Unions an d the U.S . Comparative Advantage, " Industrial Relations 30 (Winter 1991): 1. See generally Lawrence Mishel & Paula Voos, Unions and Economic Competitiveness (Armonk , N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1992). 8. Richar d Freema n & James Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (New York : Basic Books, 1984), 214-15. 9. Se e 29 U.S.C. § 504(a). 10. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 124 (June 27, 1991): A-12. 11. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 10 1 (Ma y 26 , 1992) : A-l; B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 240 (Dec. 13, 1991): A - l l . 12. Rober t Reich, The Work of Nations (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1991) , 7. 13. Ibid . 14. Richar d Freeman & James Medoff, What Do Unions Do?, 145 . 15. Ibid. 16. B.N.A. , Union s Today: New Tactics to Tackle Toug h Times (Washington , D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1985) , 11. 17. Thomas - Kochan, Harr y Kat z & Robert McKersie , The Transformation of American Industrial Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 216. 18. Ibid., 217. 19. Richar d Barnet, "A Reporter at Large," New Yorker (Apr. 7, 1980), 78. 20. Solomo n Barkin, "A New Agenda for Labor," Fortune (Nov. 1960) , 250-52. 21. Worke r Adjustment an d Retraining Notification Act , Pub . L. 100-379, 10 2 Stat. 890 (1988). 22. Se e generally Paul Osterman, "Elements of a National Training Policy," New Developments in Worker Training: A Legacy for the 1990s (Louis Ferman, Michele Hoyman, Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Ernest Savoie, eds.) (Madison, Wis.: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1990) , 257. 23. Pub . L. 100-690, 10 2 Stat. 4304 (1988).

168 4 . The Need for Labor Unions 24. Se e generally Mark Rothstein, "Workplace Drug Testing: A Case Study in the Misapplication o f Technology," Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 5 (1991): 65. 25. Th e Drug Free Workplace Act currently indicates that rehabilitation may constitute a "sanction" for worker s foun d t o be abusin g drug s o r alcohol. 4 1 U.S.C . § 702(a)(1)(F). Thi s provisio n coul d b e modified t o requir e rehabilitatio n fo r all first time abusers. 26. Commissio n on Workforce Quality and Labor Market Efficiency, Investin g in People (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1989), 2. 27. Sa r Levitan & Frank Gallo, "Uncle Sam's Helping Hand: Educating, Training, and Employing the Disadvantaged," New Developments in Worker Training: A Legacy for the 1990s (Louis Ferman , Michel e Hoyman , Joe l Cutcher-Gershenfel d & Ernes t Savoie, eds.), 226. 28. Ibid . 29. Fran k Elkour i & Edna Elkouri , How Arbitration Works (Washington, D.C. : Bureau of National Affairs , 1985) , 650-53. 30. Howar d Specte r & Matthe w Finkin , Individua l Employmen t La w an d Liti gation (Charlottesville , Va.: Michie Co., 1989), 1: 188-89. 31. Se e generally Cornelius Peck, "Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law," Ohio State Law journal 40 (1979): 1. 32. Jac k Stieber, "Recent Developments in Employment-at-Will," Labor Law Journal 36 (1985): 558. 33. Se e generall y Theodor e St . Antoine , " A Seed Germinates : Unjust Discharg e Reform Heads Toward Full Flower," Nebraska Law Review 67 (1988): 56. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recently adopted a Model Uniform Employment Termination Act that should encourag e state s to act in this area. B.N.A., Daily Labor Report 156 (Aug. 13, 1991): D-l . 34. Rober t Rabin, "The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace," University of San Francisco Law Review 2 5 (1991): 171. 35. Kar l Klare, "Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform," Catholic University Law Review 3 8 (1988): 58. 36. Ibid. , 206-7. 37. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 39 (Feb. 28, 1984): A-5. 38. Jeffre y Keefe, "Do Unions Influence the Diffusion o f Technology?" Industrial & Labor Relations Review 44 (1991): 261. 39. Josep h Coates, Jennifer Jarratt & John Mahaffie, "Futur e Work/' The Futurist 25 (May-June 1991) : 15. 40. Gu s Tyler, The Labor Revolution (Ne w York: Viking Press, 1967), 126-27. 41. "Wher e You Can't Get Fired," U.S. News St World Report 110 (Jan. 14,1991): 46. 42. Lawrenc e Rothstein, Plant Closings (Dover, Mass.: Auburn Publishing, 1986), 16. 43. Lloy d Ulman , "Multinationa l Unionism : Incentives , Barriers , an d Alterna tives," Industrial Relation s 1 4 (1975): 27. 44. Loui s Ferman , Michel e Hoyma n & Joe l Cutcher-Gershenfeld , "Join t Union Management Training Programs: A Synthesis in the Evolution of Jointism and Training," New Developments in Worker Training: A Legacy for the 1990s (Louis Ferman, Michele Hoyman, Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Ernest Savoie, eds.), 157; Thomas Pascoe & Richar d Collins , "UAW-For d Employe e Developmen t an d Training Program: Overview of Operations and Structure," Labor Law Journal 3 6 (1985): 519.

4. The Need for Labor Unions 16 9 45. Commissio n of Workforce Quality and Labor Market Efficiency, Investin g in People (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1989), 16. 46. Margare t Hilton, "Shared Training: Learning from Germany," Monthly Labor Review 11 4 (March 1991): 34. 47. Anthon y Carnevale & Harold Goldstein, "Schooling and Training for Work in America: An Overview," New Developments in Worker Training: A Legacy for the 1990s (Louis Ferman , Michele Hoyman , Joel Cutcher-Gershenfel d & Ernes t Savoie , eds.), 30. 48. Richar d Freema n & Jame s Medoff , Wha t Do Union s Do? , 228-29 ; Michae l Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States, 206. 49. America n Hospital Assn. v. NLRB, 11 1 S. Ct. 1539 (1991). 50. B.N.A. , Labor Relations Reporter 136 (April 29, 1991): 497. 51. Ibid . 52. 44 4 U.S. 672 (1980). 53. College of Osteopathic Medicine & Surgery, 265 N.L.R.B. 295 (1982). 54. Th e inappropriatenes s o f th e Yeshiva decisio n i s discusse d i n Chapte r 6 , below. 55. Se e generally Jule s Bernstein, "Union-Busting : From Benign Neglect t o Malignant Growth," University of California, Davis Law Review 1 4 (1980): 1. 56. Juliu s Getman , "Rumination s o n Unio n Organizin g i n th e Privat e Sector, " University of Chicago Law Review 53 (1986): 50. 57. Solomo n Barkin , The Decline of the Labor Movement (Sant a Barbara , Cal.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1961) , 58. 58. Dere k Bok & John Dunlop, Labor and the American Community (Ne w York: Simon & Schuster, 1970) , 469. 59. Gu s Tyler, The Labor Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1967), 9. 60. Everet t Kassalow, "White-Collar Unionism in the United States," White-Collar Trade Unions (Adolph Sturmthal, ed.) (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1966), 362. 61. Loi s Gray & Joyce Kornbluh, "New Directions in Labor Education," New Developments in Worke r Training : A Legacy for the 1990s (Loui s Ferman , Michel e Hoyman, Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Ernest Savoie, eds.), 95. 62. Ibid., 112 . 63. Juliu s Getman , "Rumination s o n Unio n Organizin g i n th e Privat e Sector, " University of Chicago Law Review 5 3 (1986): 60. 64. Hoy t Wheele r & Joh n McClendon, "Th e Individua l Decisio n t o Unionize, " The State of the Unions (George Strauss, Daniel Gallagher & Jack Fiorito, eds.) (Madison, Wis.: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1991) , 66. 65. Ibid. 66. B.N.A. , Labor Relations Reporter 138 (Dec . 9, 1991) : 475, citing the unpublished work of Professor Kate Bronfenbrenner. 67. Phili p Foner , Wome n an d the American Labor Movement (Ne w York : Free Press, 1982), 265. 68. Ibid., 270-72. 69. Ibid., 260, quoting Yuri Kuwahara. 70. AFL-CI O Committee o n th e Evolutio n o f Work , The Changing Situation of Workers and Their Unions (1985), 28. 71. B.N.A. , Union s Today: New Tactics to Tackle Tough Times, 100-101.

170 4 . The Need for Labor Unions 72. Willia m Johnsto n & Arnold Packer , Workforc e 2000 (Indianapolis : Hudso n Institute, 1987) , 59 . 73. Richar d Freeman , "Wh y Ar e Union s Farin g Poorl y i n NLR B Representatio n Elections?" ChaJJenge s an d Choice s Facin g America n Labo r (Thoma s Kochan , ed. ) (Cambridge: MI T Press, 1985) , 51 . 74. Articl e X X o f th e AFL-CI O Constitution . Se e generall y Le a Vaughn , "Articl e XX o f th e AFL-CI O Constitution : Managin g an d Resolvin g Inter-Unio n Disputes, " Wayne La w Review 3 7 (1990) : 1 . 75. Man y employer s hav e intentionall y transferre d productio n t o souther n state s or hav e opene d ne w facilitie s i n tha t regio n becaus e o f th e limite d degre e o f union ization among southern workers. Jonathan Axelrod, "Common Obstacles to Organizing Under the NLRA: Combatting the Souther n Strategy, " North Carolin a Law Review 5 9 (1980): 148 . 76. Calvi n Beale , "Renewe d Growt h i n Rura l Communities, " Futuris t 9 (Aug . 1975): 196 . 77. "Union s Still Find the South a Tough Row to Hoe," U.S. News & World Report (June 21 , 1982) : 62. 78. Michae l Goldfield , The Declin e of Organized Labor in the Unite d States , 1 4 0 42. 79. B.N.A. , Labo r Relations Reporte r 12 9 (Nov . 7 , 1988) : 302 . 80. Ibid., 303-4 . 81. Willia m Johnsto n & Arnol d Packer , Workforce 2000, xx . 82. B.N.A. , Olde r Americans i n the Workforce: Challenge s an d Solution s (Wash ington, D.C. : Bureau o f Nationa l Affairs , 1987) , 5 . 83. B.N.A. , Labo r Relations Reporte r 13 8 (Dec . 9 , 1991) : 476 , citin g th e unpub lished wor k o f Professo r Kat e Bronfenbrenner . 84. U.S . Departmen t o f Labor , Time of Change: 198 3 Handbook o n Women Work ers (Washington , D.C. : U.S. Governmen t Printin g Office , 1983) : 50. 85. Ibid. 86. Ibid. , 48 . 87. Jame s Medoff , "AFL-CI O Stud y o n Publi c Imag e o f Unions, " B.N.A. , Dail y Labor Report 24 7 (Dec . 24 , 1984) : D-2 . 88. Phili p Foner , Wome n an d the America n Labo r Movement, 492-93 . 89. Se e generall y Dian e Balser , Sisterhoo d an d Solidarit y (Boston : Sout h En d Press, 1987) , 151-61 . 90. Ibid. , 43-51; Arthur Shostak, Robus t Unionis m (Ithaca , N.Y.: ILR Press, 1991): 85-87. 91. Edn a Raphael , "Workin g Wome n an d Thei r Membershi p i n Labo r Unions, " The America n Workin g Class (Irvin g Horowitz, Joh n Legget t & Martin Oppenheimer , eds.) (Ne w Brunswick , N.J. : Transaction Books , 1979) , 114 ; Roberta Goldberg, Organ izing Wome n Offic e Worker s (Ne w York : Praeger , 1983) , 22-25 . 92. Willia m Johnsto n & Arnol d Packer , Workforc e 2000 , 112-13 . 93. U.S . Department o f Labor , Time of Change: 1983 Handbook on Wome n Work ers, 54 . 94. Se e generall y Danie l Hamermes h & Alber t Rees , The Economics of Work and Pay (Ne w York : Harper & Row , 1988) : 367-76 . 95. Note , "Findin g a Voic e Throug h th e Union : Th e Harvar d Unio n o f Clerica l and Technica l Worker s an d Wome n Workers, " Harvar d Women's Law Journal 1 2 (1989): 274-75 .

4. The Need for Labor Unions 17 1 96. Ibid. , 275 ; Mario n Crain , "Feminizin g Unions : Challengin g th e Gendere d Structure o f Wag e Labor, " Michigan Law Review 8 9 (1991) : 1155 ; Diane Balser , Sisterhood an d Solidarity, 16-17 . 97. Solomo n Barkin , " A New Agend a fo r Labor," Fortune (Nov . 1960) : 255. Se e generally Willia m Gould , Black Worker s in White Unions : Job Discrimination in the United States (Ithaca : Cornel l Universit y Press , 1977) ; F . Ra y Marshall , The Negr o and Organize d Labor (Ne w York : John Wile y & Sons , 1965) . 98. Pub . L . 88-352, 7 8 Stat . 25 3 (1964) . 99. Jame s Medoff , "AFL-CI O Stud y o n Publi c Imag e o f Unions, " B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 24 7 (Dec . 24 , 1984) : D-2 . 100. Stev e Askin , "Turmoi l i n th e Ranks, " Black Enterprise (Sept . 1982) : 59-60 . 101. Unde r th e Ag e Discriminatio n i n Employmen t Act , a s amended , companie s may no longer require the involuntary retirement of employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). See generall y Charle s Craver , "Th e Applicatio n o f th e Ag e Discriminatio n i n Em ployment Ac t t o Person s Ove r Seventy, " Georg e Washingto n Law Review 5 8 (1989) : 52. 102. B.N.A. , Union s Today: New Tactics to Tackle Tough Times, 124 . 103. Davi d Rabban , "Distinguishin g Exclude d Manager s Fro m Covere d Profes sionals Unde r th e NLRA, " Columbia Law Review 8 9 (1989) : 1777 . 104. Se e generall y Harr y Edwards , R . Theodor e Clar k & Charles Craver , Labo r Relations Law in the Public Sector (Charlottesville , Va. : Michie Co. , 1991) , 1-32 . 105. Michae l Piore , "Th e Futur e o f Unions, " The State of the Union s (Georg e Strauss, Daniel Gallaghe r & Jack Fiorito, eds.) , 406 . 106. Seymou r Lipset , "Whit e Colla r Workers an d Professionals—Thei r Attitude s and Behavio r Toward s Unions, " Readings in Industrial Sociology (Willia m Faunce , ed.) (Ne w York : Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967) , 530-31 . 107. Ibid., 525 , 534-35 . 108. Davi d Rabban , "Distinguishin g Exclude d Manager s Fro m Covere d Profes sionals Unde r th e NLRA, " Columbia Law Review 8 9 (1989) : 1832 . 109. Alic e Kessler-Harris , "Educatio n i n Working-Clas s Solidarity : Th e Summe r School fo r Office Workers, " Sisterhood and Solidarity (Joyc e Kornbluh & Mary Fred erickson, eds.) (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984), 225-26; C. Wright Mills, White Collar (Ne w York : Oxford Universit y Press , 1951) , 204-5 . 110. Alvi n Toffler , Power Shift (Ne w York : Bantam Books , 1990) , 209 . 111. Rober t Reich , The Work of Nations, 177-78 . 112. Ibid., 204 . 113. Ibid. , 214 . 114. Donn a Sockell , "Th e Futur e o f Labo r Law : A Mismatc h Betwee n Statutor y Interpretation an d Industria l Reality, " Boston College Law Review 3 0 (1989) : 997 . 115. Michae l Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States, 147 . 116. Charle s Heckscher, The New Unionism : Employee Involvemen t i n the Chang ing Corporation (Ne w York : Basic Books , 1988) , 240 . 117. Michae l Mann, Consciousness and Action Among the Wester n Working Class (Atlantic Highlands , N.J. : Humanities Press , 1981) , 66 . 118. Everet t Kassalow , "White-Colla r Unionis m i n th e Unite d States, " WhiteCollar Trade Unions (Adolp h Sturmthal , ed.) , 317-30 , 351-55 ; Ronal d Miller , "Col lective Bargainin g i n Financia l Institutions, " Employee Relations Law Journal 7 (1981-82): 389 . 119. Anthon y Giddens, The Class Structur e of the Advance d Societies (Ne w York:

172 4 . The Need for Labor Unions Barnes & Noble, 1973) , 188-92 ; Everet t Kassalow , Trad e Union s an d Industria l Relations: An Internationa l Compariso n (Ne w York : Rando m House , 1969) , 208-16 . Regarding th e unionizatio n o f white-colla r worker s i n specifi c countries , se e K . F . Walker, "White-Colla r Unionis m i n Australia, " White-Colla r Trad e Union s (Adolp h Sturmthal, ed.) , 1; Guy Routh, "White-Collar Union s i n the United Kingdom, " WhiteCollar Trade Unions (Adolph Sturmthal, ed.), 165; Giinter Hartfiel, "Germany," WhiteCollar Trade Union s (Adolp h Sturmthal , ed.) , 127 ; Arn e Nilstein , "White-Colla r Unionism i n Sweden, " White-Colla r Trad e Union s (Adolp h Sturmthal , ed.) , 261 ; Solomon Levine , "Unionizatio n o f White-Colla r Employee s i n Japan, " White-Collar Trade Unions (Adolp h Sturmthal , ed.) , 205 . 120. Davi d Rabban , "Can American Labo r Law Accommodate Collectiv e Bargain ing by Professiona l Employees? " Yale Law journal 9 9 (1990) : 691; Paul Jarle y & Jack Fiorito, "Unionis m an d Changin g Employe e View s Towar d Work, " Journal of Labor Research 1 2 (1991) : 226. See generally Davi d Rabban , "I s Unionism Compatibl e wit h Professionalism?" Industria l & Labor Relations Revie w 4 5 (Oct . 1991) : 97 . 121. Mario n Crain , "Buildin g Solidarit y Throug h Expansio n o f NLR A Coverage : A Blueprin t fo r Worke r Empowerment, " Minnesota Law Review 7 4 (1990) : 994 . 122. Sa r Levitan & Fran k Gallo, "Collectiv e Bargainin g an d Privat e Secto r Profes sionals," Monthly Labo r Review 11 2 (Sept . 1989) : 24. 123. Marin a Angel , "Professional s an d Unionization, " Minnesota La w Review 6 6 (1982): 383 . 124. Danie l Gallaghe r & Georg e Strauss , "Unio n Membershi p Attitude s an d Par ticipation," Th e State of the Union s (Georg e Strauss , Daniel Gallaghe r & Jack Fiorito, eds.), 143 ; Michae l Mann , Consciousnes s an d Actio n Amon g the Western Workin g Class, 25 . 125. C . Wright Mills , Whit e Collar, 301-2 , 312 . 126. Stanle y Aronowitz , False Promises (Ne w York : McGraw-Hill, 1973) , 312-13 . 127. 2 9 U.S.C . § 159(a ) provide s tha t "(representative s designate d o r selected.. . by th e majorit y o f th e employee s i n a u n i t . . . shal l b e th e exclusiv e representative s of al l th e employee s i n suc h uni t fo r the purpose s o f collectiv e bargaining — " 128. See , e.g. , Internationa l Ladies Garmen t Worker s Unio n v . NLRB , 36 6 U.S . 731 (1961) ; /.I. Cas e Co. v. NLRR, 32 1 U.S . 33 2 (1944) . 129. Stanle y Aronowitz , False Promises (Ne w York : McGraw-Hill, 1973) , 151-52 . 130. C . Wright Mills , Whit e Collar , 139 . 131. AFL-CI O Committe e o n th e Evolutio n o f Work , The Changin g Situatio n of Workers an d Thei r Unions , 18-20 . 132. Rober t Rabin , "Th e Rol e o f Union s i n th e Rights-Base d Workplace, " University of San Francisco Law Review 2 5 (1991) : 208-9 . 133. Jac k Fiorito , Cynthi a Gram m & Wallac e Hendricks , "Unio n Structura l Choices," The State of the Union s (Georg e Strauss , Danie l Gallaghe r & Jac k Fiorito , eds.), 126-27 . 134. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 12 3 (Jun e 26 , 1991) : A-15 . 135. Charle s Heckscher, The New Unionism : Employee Involvement i n the Changing Corporatio n (Ne w York : Basic Books , 1988) , 188 . 136. B.N.A. , Labo r Relations Reporte r 12 4 (Jan . 19 , 1987) : 40 . 137. Se e generall y Sa r Levita n & Frank Gallo , "Ca n Employe e Association s Ne gotiate Ne w Growth? " Monthly Labor Review 11 2 (Jul y 1989) : 5 . 138. 92 5 F.2 d 48 0 (D.C . Cir. 1991) .

4. Th e Need for Labor Unions 17 3 139. 2 6 U.S.C . § 511(a)(1) . 140. 92 5 F.2 d a t 481. 5. ENHANCING ORGANIZE D LABOR' S POWE R 1. Sectio n 8(d) , 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(d) . 2. NLRB v. Katz, 36 9 U.S . 736 , 741-4 3 (1962) . See generall y Floria n Bartosi c & Roger Hartley , Labor Relations Law in the Private Secto r (Philadelphia : America n Law Institute , 1986) , 301-6 . 3. NLRB v. American National Insuranc e Co., 34 3 U.S . 395 , 4 0 2 -9 (1952) . Se e generally Archibal d Cox , "Th e Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, " Harvard Law Review 71 (1958) : 1418-28 . 4. H . K . Porter Co. v. NLRB, 39 7 U.S . 99 , 10 8 (1970) . 5. NLRB v. Internationa l Va n Lines , 40 9 U.S . 48 , 52-5 3 (1972) . 6. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 30 4 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) . Unfai r labor practic e strikers , wh o wal k ou t i n protes t agains t unlawfu l conduc t b y thei r employer, ma y no t b e permanentl y replace d an d ar e entitle d t o reinstatemen t whe n they apply for reemployment. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270,278 (1956) . 7. Laidlaw Corp., 17 1 N.L.R.B . 1366 , 136 8 (1968) , enforced, 41 4 F.2 d 9 9 (7t h Cir. 1969) , cert , denied , 39 7 U.S . 92 0 (1970) . 8. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 11 4 (Jun e 13 , 1991) : A - 3 . 9. Stephe n Smith , "Nationa l Labo r Union s v . Multinationa l Companies : Th e Dilemma o f Unequa l Bargainin g Power, " Columbia Journal of Transnationa l La w 1 1 (1972): 148-53 . 10. Han s Gunter , "Erosio n o f Trad e Unio n Powe r Through Multinationa l Enter prises?" Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 9 (1976) : 778 . 11. Arthu r Shostak, Robust Unionism (Ithaca , N.Y. : ILR Press, 1991) : 8 - 1 1 . 12. NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 34 1 U.S . 665 , 672-7 3 (1951) . Thi s aspect o f the International Rice Milling decisio n i s now codifie d i n Section 8(b)(4)(B ) of th e NLRA , 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(b)(4)(B) . 13. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades Council , 485 U.S . 568 , 578-8 8 (1988) . 14. Thoma s Kochan , Harr y Kat z & Rober t McKersie , The Transformation of American Industria l Relations (Ne w York : Basic Books , 1986) , 195-97 . 15. Se e generall y Jame s Pope , "Labor-Communit y Coalition s an d Boycotts : Th e Old Labo r Law, the New Unionism , an d th e Living Constitution," Texas Law Review 69 (1991) : 889 . 16. Ibid., 891-94 . 17. Michae l Poole , Workers' Participation in Industry (Boston : Routledge & Ke gan Paul , 1975) , 24-25 . 18. Joh n Schmidman , Union s in Postindustrial Society (Universit y Park , Pa. : Pennsylvania Stat e Universit y Press , 1979) , 118 . 19. Georg e Strauss, "Quality of Worklife an d Participation as Bargaining Issues," The Shrinkin g Perimete r (Herve y Juri s & Myron Roomkin , eds. ) (Lexington , Mass. : Lexington Books , 1980) , 122 . 20. Solomo n Barkin , The Decline of the Labor Movemen t (Sant a Barbara , Calif. : Center fo r th e Stud y o f Democrati c Institutions , 1961) , 17 . 21. Michae l Poole , Workers' Participation in Industry, 26 .

174 5 . Enhancing Organize d Labor' s Power 22. O.E.C.D. , Worker s Participation (Paris : Organization fo r Economic Cooperation and Development, 1975) , 57-58. 23. Clyd e Summers , "Worke r Participatio n i n th e U.S . an d Wes t Germany : A Comparative Study from an American Perspective," American JournaJ of Comparative Law 28 (1980): 371, 384. 24. Rober t Simison , "UA W Struggle s Wit h a Ne w Idea : Cooperation, " Wai l Street Journa l (Apr . 14 , 1981) : p . 30, col . 3 , quotin g UA W Vic e Presiden t Donal d Ephlin. 25. Rober t McCormick, "Union Representatives as Corporate Directors: The Challenge to the Adversarial Mode l of Labor Relations," University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 15 (1982): 222-24. 26. Joh n Dunlop, "Past and Future Tendencies of American Labor Organizations," Daedalus (Winte r 1978): 84. 27. Pete r Drucker, The Unseen Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 140; Giles Radice, The Industrial Democrats (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1978) , 124. 28. Danie l Zwerdling , Workplace Democracy (New York: Harper & Row , 1980) , 168. 29. Sa r Levitan & Clifford Johnson , "Labor and Management: The Illusion of Cooperation," Harvard Business Review 61 (Sept.-Oct. 1983) : 3. 30. Danie l Zwerdling, Workplace Democracy, 180. 31. Jame s Furlong , Labo r in the Boardroo m (Princeton , N.J. : Dow Jones Books, 1977), 108-11. 32. Danie l Zwerdling , Workplace Democracy, 171. 33. Ibid. , 181 ; Sar Levitan & Diane Werneke, "Worker Participation and Productivity Change," Monthly Labor Review 10 7 (Sept . 1984): 32. 34. B.N.A. , Labor Relations Reporter 127 (Apr. 18, 1988): 493. 35. F . Ray Marshall, "The Future of the American Labor Movement: The Role of Federal Law," Chicago-Kent Law Review 57 (1981): 530. 36. Katherin e Stone, "Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities," University of Chicago Law Review 5 5 (1988): 171. 37. Danie l Zwerdling , Workplace Democracy, 176 , quotin g researche r Pau l Blumberg. 38. B.N.A. , Labor Relations Reporter 119 (July 8,1985): 188-91; Thomas Kochan, Harry Katz & Robert McKersie, The Transformation of American Industrial Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 162-71. 39. Comment , "The Saturnization of American Plants: Infringement or Expansion of Workers' Rights?" Minnesota Law Review 72 (1987): 173; U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation (Burea u of LaborManagement Relations Report 104, 1986), 3-6 . 40. Danie l Zwerdling , Workplace Democracy, 175; James Furlong, Labo r in the Boardroom, 30 . 41. Thoma s Kochan , Harr y Kat z & Nancy Mower , "Worke r Participatio n an d American Unions," Challenges and Choices Facing American Labor (Thomas Kochan, ed.) (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 277-78. 42. Gile s Radice, The Industrial Democrats, 123. 43. Danie l Zwerdling , Workplace Democracy, 2-3. 44. He m Jain, Worker Participation (Ne w York: Praeger, 1980), 324-25. 45. Joh n Schmidman, Union s in Postindustrial Society, 143. 46. He m Jain, Worker Participation, 3.

5. Enhancing Organizin g Labor's Power 17 5 47. Ibid., 8; Bennett Abramowitz, "Broadenin g the Board: Labor Participation in Corporate Governance," Southwestern Law Journal 3 4 (1980): 981. 48. Note , "Alternative s t o the United State s System o f Labor Relations: A Comparative Analysis of the Labor Relations Systems in the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and Sweden," Vanderbilt Law Review 41 (1988): 644-46; Shin-ichi Takezawa, "The Quality of Working Life: The Japanese Experience," Worker Participation (Hem Jain, ed.), 233. 49. Christophe r Byron, "An Attractive Japanese Export," Time (Mar. 2,1981): 74. 50. Se e generally Hem Jain, Worker Participation. 51. Richar d Richardi, "Worker Participation in Decisions Within Undertakings in the Federal Republic of Germany," Comparative Labor Law 5 (1982): 25. 52. Ibid . 53. Note , "Alternative s t o the Unite d State s System of Labo r Relations: A Comparative Analysis of the Labor Relations Systems in the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and Sweden," Vanderbilt Law Review 41 (1988): 631. 54. Herber t Wiedemann, "Codeterminatio n by Workers in German Enterprises," American Journal of Comparative Law 28 (1980): 81. 55. Laurenc e Zakson , "Worke r Participation : Industria l Democrac y an d Mana gerial Prerogative in the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden and the United States," Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 8 (1984): 115-16; Manfred Weiss, "Labor Law and Industrial Relations in Europe 1992: A German Perspective," Comparative Labor Law Journal 1 1 (1990): 418-21. 56. To m Ottervanger & Ralph Pais, "Employee Participation in Corporate Decision Making: The Dutch Model," International Law 15 (1981): 395-405. 57. Ibid., 400-401 . 58. Josep h Mire, "Trade Unions and Worker Participation in Management," The Quality of Working Life, Volume One: Problems, Prospects and the State of the Art (Louis Davis, Albert Cherms & Associates, eds.) (Ne w York: Free Press, 1975), 41833. 59. Sigvar d Rabenowitz, "Experiences of Autonomous Working Groups in a Swedish Car Factory," Worker Participation (He m Jain, ed.), 224. 60. Willia m Bat t & Edga r Weinberg , "Labor-Managemen t Cooperatio n Today, " Harvard Business Review 5 6 (Jan.-Feb. 1978): 102. 61. Se e generall y Nationa l Cente r fo r Productivit y & Quality o f Workin g Life , Recent Initiatives in Labor-Management Cooperation (Washington , D.C. : National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life, 1976). 62. Danie l Zwerdling, Workplace Democracy, 19-30. 63. Ibid., 41-51. 64. Ibid., 31-40. 65. B.N.A. , Labor Relations Reporter 110 (1982): 14-16. 66. He m Jain, Worker Participation, 191; William Batt & Edgar Weinberg, "LaborManagement Cooperation Today," Harvard Business Review 56 (Jan.-Feb. 1978): 103. 67. Willia m Whyte, "Organizations for the Future," The Next Twenty-Five Years of Industrial Relations (Gerald Somers, ed.) (Madison, Wis.: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1973) : 132. 68. B.N.A. , Labor Relations Reporter 110 (1982): 15. 69. Jame s Furlong, Labor in the Boardroom, 91; A. H. Raskin, "Towar d a More Participative Work Force," Working in the Twenty-First Century (Stewart Shepard & Donald Carroll, eds.) (New York: John Wiley, 1980) , 97.

176 5 . Enhancing Organize d Labor s Power 70. Michae l Poole , Workers ' Participation in Industry, 58 ; Stephe n Doyle , "Im proving Productivit y an d Qualit y o f Workin g Life : Th e U.S . Experience, " Worke r Participation (He m Jain , ed.), 255-56 . 71. He m Jain , Worke r Participation, 190 . 72. Ibid. , 34 . 73. Danie l Zwerdling, Workplace Democracy, 176-77 ; William Batt & Edgar Weinberg, "Labor-Managemen t Cooperatio n Today, " Harvard Business Reviei v 5 6 (Jan. Feb. 1978) : 98. 74. Joh n Blackburn, "Worke r Participation o n Corporate Directorates : Is Americ a Ready fo r Industria l Democracy? " Houston Law Review 1 8 (1981) : 358 . 75. Jame s Furlong , Labo r in the Boardroom, 29 . 76. Comment , "A n Economi c an d Lega l Analysi s o f Unio n Representatio n o n Corporate Board s o f Directors, " University of Pennsylvani a La w Review 13 0 (1982) : 928. 77. Pau l Davies, "Employee Representation on Company Boards and Participatio n in Corporat e Planning, " Moder n La w Review 3 8 (1975) : 254 . 78. Ibid. , 269; Robert McCormick, "Unio n Representatives a s Corporate Directors: The Challeng e t o th e Adversaria l Mode l o f Labo r Relations," Universit y of Michiga n Journal of Law Reform 1 5 (1982) : 226-27 , 233 . 79. Katherin e Stone, "The Post-War Paradigm i n American Labor Law," Yale Law Journal 9 0 (1981) : 1558 . 80. Bennet t Abramowitz, "Broadenin g the Board: Labor Participation in Corporate Governance," Southwestern Law Journal 3 4 (1980): 982-86; John Blackburn, "Worke r Participation on Corporate Directorates: Is America Ready for Industrial Democracy? " Houston La w Review 1 8 (1981) : 359-61 . 81. Ac t on Codetermination b y Jobholders o f May 4,1976,1 BGB L 1153 (W . Ger.). 82. Se e generall y Note , "Alternative s t o th e Unite d State s Syste m o f Labo r Rela tions: A Comparative Analysis of the Labor Relations Systems in the Federal Republi c of Germany , Japan , an d Sweden, " VanderbiJ t La w Review 4 1 (1988) : 627 . 83. Bennet t Abramowitz, "Broadening the Board: Labor Participation i n Corporate Governance," Southwester n La w Journal 3 4 (1980) : 987-90 . 84. Rober t McCormick, "Unio n Representative s a s Corporate Directors: The Chal lenge t o th e Adversaria l Mode l o f Labo r Relations, " University of Michiga n Journa l of Law Reform 1 5 (1982) : 21 9 n . 4 . 85. Jame s Furlong , Labo r in th e Boardroom , 97 . 86. Comment , "A n Economi c an d Lega l Analysi s o f Unio n Representatio n o n Corporate Board s o f Directors, " Universit y of Pennsylvani a La w Revie w 13 0 (1982) : 940-41. 87. Ton y Eccles, "Control i n the Democratized Enterprise : The Case of KME," The Control of Work (Joh n Purcel l & Robin Smith , eds. ) (Ne w York : Holme s & Meier, 1979), 159 . 88. Danie l Zwerdling , Workplace Democracy, 172 . 89. Rober t McCormick, "Unio n Representative s a s Corporate Directors: The Chal lenge t o th e Adversaria l Mode l o f Labo r Relations, " University of Michiga n Journa l of Law Reform 1 5 (1982) : 259 . 90. Bennet t Abramowitz, "Broadening the Board: Labor Participation in Corporate Governance," Southwester n Law Journal 3 4 (1980) : 978 . 91. 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(b)(1)(B) .

5. Enhancing Organizin g Labor's Power 17 7 92. Compar e NLR B v . Drivers , Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local 639, 36 2 U.S . 27 4 (1960) (peacefu l organizationa l picketin g not coercive unde r Section 8(b)(1)) ; Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v . Florida Gulf Coast Buildin g Trades Council, 48 5 U.S . 568 (1988 ) and NLRB v . Frui t & Vegetabl e Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 37 7 U.S . 5 8 (1964) (peacefu l consume r picketin g no t coerciv e unde r Section 8(b)(4)(ii) , 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(b)(4)(ii)) . 93. America n Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 43 7 U.S. 41 1 (1978) . 94. 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(a)(2) . 95. 2 9 U.S.C . § 152(5) . 96. 2 9 U.S.C . § 164(a) . 97. NLRB v. General Steel Erectors, 93 3 F.2d 568 (7th Cir. 1991); Nassau Br Suffolk Contractors' Assn., 11 8 N.L.R.B . 174 , 18 7 (1957) . 98. Shau n Clarke , "Rethinkin g th e Adversaria l Mode l i n Labo r Relations : A n Argument for Repeal of Section 8(a)(2)," Yale Law Journal 9 6 (1987): 2023-25; Thomas Kohler, "Model s o f Worke r Participation : Th e Uncertai n Significanc e o f Sectio n 8(a)(2)," Boston College Law Review 2 7 (1986) : 518-30; Philip Taft , Organized Labor in American History (Ne w York : Harper & Row , 1964) , 452-55 . 99. 30 8 U.S . 24 1 (1939) . 100. 30 8 U.S . a t 251 . 101. 36 0 U.S . 20 3 (1959) . 102. 36 0 U.S . a t 204 . 103. 36 0 U.S . a t 211-14 . 104. 50 3 F.2 d 62 5 (9t h Cir . 1974) . 105. 50 3 F.2 d a t 630 . 106. 50 3 F.2 d a t 631 . 107. 69 1 F.2 d 28 8 (6t h Cir . 1982) . 108. 69 1 F.2 d a t 289 . 109. 69 1 F.2 d a t 295 . 110. 23 1 N.L.R.B . 110 8 (1977) . 111. 23 1 N.L.R.B . a t 1121 . 112. 23 1 N.L.R.B . 123 2 (1977) . 113. 23 1 N.L.R.B . a t 1234 . 114. 23 1 N.L.R.B . a t 1235 . 115. 28 4 N.L.R.B . 62 1 (1987) . 116. 28 4 N.L.R.B . a t 622-23 . 117. 2 9 U.S.C . § 432(a)(5) . 118. B.N.A. , Labo r Relations Reporter 10 6 (1981) : 147 . 119. Ibid., 147-48 . 120. 2 9 U.S.C . § 186(b)(1) . 121. 2 9 U.S.C . § 501(a) . 122. Sectio n 501(a ) als o oblige s unio n officer s an d agent s t o accoun t t o thei r respective labor organizations for any profits received i n connection wit h transaction s conducted o n behal f o f thei r respectiv e unions . Se e generall y Comment , "Servin g Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards of Directors," Columbia Law Review 8 1 (1981) : 642-44 . 123. 2 9 U.S.C . § 186(c)(3) . 124. U.S . Departmen t o f Labor , U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-

178 5 . Enhancing Organize d Labor' s Power Management Cooperatio n (Burea u of Labor-Management Relation s Report 113,1987) , 70-72, quotin g lette r from Georg e Salem t o unidentifie d addresse e (date d Septembe r 12, 1986) . 125. E.g. , Bennet t Abramowitz , "Broadenin g th e Board : Labo r Participatio n i n Corporate Governance, " Southwester n Law Journal 3 4 (1980) : 970-75 . 126. 1 5 U.S.C . § 1 . E.g. , America n Federation of Musician s v . CarroJJ , 39 1 U.S . 99 (1968) ; Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workme n v . Jewel Tea Co., 38 1 U.S . 676 (1965) . Se e generall y Archibal d Cox , "Labo r and th e Antitrus t Laws : Penningto n and Jewel Tea," Boston University Law Review 4 6 (1966): 317; Bernard Meltzer, "Labor Unions, Collectiv e Bargaining , an d th e Antitrus t Laws, " Universit y of Chicago Law Review 3 2 (1965) : 659 . 127. E.g. , United Min e Worker s v . Pennington , 38 1 U.S . 65 7 (1965) ; Local 626, Meat & Provision Drivers v. United States, 37 1 U.S . 9 4 (1962) . 128. E.g. , H . A . Artist s& • Associates, Inc. v. Actors' Equit y Assn. , 45 1 U.S . 70 4 (1981); Amalgamate d Mea t Cutter s & Butcher Workme n v . Jewel Tea Co., 38 1 U.S . 676 (1965) . 129. 1 5 U.S.C . § 19 . 130. Se e generall y Richar d Steuer , "Employe e Representatio n o n th e Board : In dustrial Democrac y o r Interlocking Directorate? " Columbia Journa l o n Transnationa l Law 1 6 (1977) : 255 . 131. U.S . Departmen t o f Labor , U.S. Labor Law and the Futur e of Labor Management Cooperatio n (Burea u of Labor-Management Relation s Report 104,1986) , 28, quotin g lette r fro m Federa l Trad e Commissio n t o UA W Genera l Counse l Joh n Fillion (date d Ma y 1 , 1981) . 132. Ibid. , quoting letter from Assistant Attorney General Sanford Litvac k to UAW General Counse l Joh n Fillio n (date d Februar y 26 , 1981) . 133. Richar d Steuer , "Employe e Representatio n o n th e Board : Industrial Democ racy or Interlocking Directorate? " Columbia Journa l o n Transnational Law 1 6 (1977) : 277-79. 134. Comment , "A n Economi c an d Lega l Analysi s o f Unio n Representatio n o f Corporate Board s o f Directors, " University of Pennsylvani a La w Review 13 0 (1982) : 920-22; Comment, "Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Board s of Directors, " Columbia La w Review 8 1 (1981) : 652-60 . 135. Comment , "Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards of Directors, " Columbi a Law Review 8 1 (1981) : 652-60 . 136. Comment , "A n Economi c an d Lega l Analysi s o f Unio n Representatio n o n Corporate Board s o f Directors, " University of Pennsylvani a La w Review 13 0 (1982) : 921-22, 948-49 . 137. Ibid., 948-49 . 138. E.g. , Ai r Lin e Pilots Assn. v. O'Neill, 11 1 S . Ct . 112 7 (1991) . 139. For d Moto r Co. v. Huffman, 34 5 U.S . 330 , 33 8 (1953) . 140. Comment , "A n Economi c an d Lega l Analysi s o f Unio n Representatio n o n Corporate Board s o f Directors, " University of Pennsylvani a La w Review 13 0 (1982) : 954. 141. Rober t McCormick, "Union Representatives as Corporate Directors: The Challenge t o th e Adversaria l Mode l o f Labo r Relations, " University of Michiga n Journa l of Law Reform 1 5 (1982) : 247 , 252-53 . 142. Michae l Murphy, "Workers on the Board: Borrowing a European Idea," Labor Law Journal 2 7 (1976) : 760-61 .

5. Enhancing Organizin g Labor's Power 17 9 143. NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturin g Co., 35 1 U.S . 14 9 (1956) . 144. Joh n Blackburn, "Worker Participation on Corporate Directorates: Is America Ready fo r Industria l Democracy? " Houston Law Review 1 8 (1981) : 366 . 145. Gile s Radice , The Industrial Democrats, 131 . 146. Jame s Furlong , Labor in the Boardroom, 45 , 131 . 147. Jerem y Rifki n & Randy Barber , The North Will Rise Again (Boston : Beaco n Press, 1978) , 10-11 ; W . Michae l Kaiser , "Labor' s Ne w Weapon : Pensio n Fun d Le verage—Can Labo r Legall y Bea t It s Plowshare s int o Swords? " Rutger s Law Revie w 34 (1982) : 409. 148. Georg e Borhas, Unio n Contro J of Pension Funds : WiJI the North Rise Again ? (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies , 1979) , 19-20 ; W. Michael Kaiser , "Labor's Ne w Weapon : Pensio n Fun d Leverage—Ca n Labo r Legall y Bea t It s Plows hares int o Swords? " Rutgers Law Review 3 4 (1982) : 409-10; "Union s Bi d fo r Bigge r Voice i n Pensio n Funds, " U.S. News & World Report (Jun e 8 , 1981) : 85. 149. Jerem y Rifki n & Rand y Barber , The North Will Rise Again, 81 . 150. Ibid. , 84 . 151. Ibid. , 147 . 152. Ibid., 149 . 153. W . Michae l Kaiser , "Labor' s Ne w Weapon : Pensio n Fun d Leverage—Ca n Labor Legally Bea t Its Plowshares int o Swords? " Rutgers Law Review 3 4 (1982) : 412. 154. Jerem y Rifki n & Rand y Barber , The North Will Rise Again, 179 . 155. B.N.A. , Labor Relations Reporter 10 9 (1982) : 192 ; B.N.A. , Labor Relations Reporter 10 9 (1982) : 150 . 156. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 6 3 (Apr . 2 , 1991) : A - l l . B y 1991 , th e Union' s initial $1 2 millio n investmen t ha d grow n t o ove r $30 5 millio n i n assets . 157. Jayn e Zanglein , "Pensions , Proxie s an d Power : Recent Development s i n th e Use of Proxy Voting to Influence Corporate Governance," Labor Lawyer 7 (1991): 7 7 176. 158. Jerem y Rifki n & Rand y Barber , Th e Nort h Will Rise Again, 150-51 . 159. 2 9 U.S.C . § 186(c)(5) . 160. W . Michae l Kaiser , "Labor' s Ne w Weapon : Pensio n Fun d Leverage—Ca n Labor Legally Beat Its Plowshares int o Swords? " Rutgers Law Review 3 4 (1982) : 415. 161. Pub . L. No. 93-406 , 8 8 Stat . 82 9 (1974) , codified i n various section s o f 5,18 , 26, 29 , 3 1 & 4 2 U.S.C . 162. 2 9 U.S.C . § 1104(a)(1) . 163. W . Michae l Kaiser , "Labor' s Ne w Weapon : Pensio n Fun d Leverage—Ca n Labor Legally Beat Its Plowshares int o Swords?" Rutgers Law Review 3 4 (1982) : 4 2 124, 429 . 164. Jerem y Rifki n & Rand y Barber , The North Will Rise Again, 186 . 165. 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(e) . 166. Michae l Gurdon , "A n America n Approac h t o Self-Management, " Worke r Participation (He m Jain, ed.) 295 . 167. Danie l Zwerdling , Workplace Democracy, 95-96 ; Debora h Olson , "Unio n Experiences wit h Worke r Ownership : Lega l an d Practica l Issue s Raise d b y ESOPS , TRASOPS, Stock Purchases an d Co-Operatives," Wisconsin Law Review 198 2 (1982) : 769-72. 168. Danie l Zwerdling , Workplace Democracy, 53-63 . 169. Ibid., 71-74 . 170. Ibid., 66-71 .

180 5 . Enhancing Organize d Labor' s Power 171. Debora h Olson, "Union Experiences with Worker Ownership: Legal and Practical Issue s Raise d b y ESOPS , TRASOPS, Stoc k Purchase s an d Co-Operatives, " Wisconsin Law Review 198 2 (1982) : 753-60 . 172. Ibid. , 739-42 . 173. Ibid. , 775-77. 174. Ibid. , 778-80 . 175. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 6 4 (Apr . 3 , 1991) : A - 4 . 176. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report (Sept . 26 , 1983) : A - 3 . 177. Thoma s Kochan , Harr y Kat z & Rober t McKersie , Th e Transformatio n of American Industria l Relation s (Ne w York : Basi c Books , 1986) , 191-93 . 178. Ibid. , 193-94 . 179. 2 9 U.S.C . § 1107(d)(6) . 180. 2 9 U.S.C . § 1104(a)(1)(B) . 181. 2 9 U.S.C . § 1104(a)(1)(C) . 182. 2 9 U.S.C . § 1104(a)(2) . 183. Regardin g th e lega l regulation s applicabl e t o th e creatio n an d operatio n o f ESOPs, see generall y Note , "Employe e Stoc k Ownershi p Plans : A Ste p Toward Dem ocratic Capitalism, " Boston Universit y Law Review 5 5 (1975) : 195 ; Debora h Olson , "Union Experience s wit h Worke r Ownership : Lega l an d Practica l Issue s Raise d b y ESOPS, TRASOPS, Stock Purchases and Co-Operatives/* Wisconsin Law Review 198 2 (1982): 732-37 . Se e als o ibid , a t 73 3 n . 2 , fo r a descriptio n o f TRASOPs , a typ e o f ESOP created b y the Tax Reduction Ac t of 1975 , Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 301(d) , 89 Stat . 26 (1975) , 2 6 U.S.C . § § 46 , 48 , an d th e Tax Refor m Ac t o f 1976 , Pub . L. No. 94-455 , 90 Stat . 152 5 (1976) . 184. Richfield Oil Corp., 11 0 N.L.R.B . 35 6 (1954) , enforced, 23 1 F.2 d 71 7 (D.C . Cir.), cert , denied , 35 1 U.S . 90 9 (1956) . 185. Brooking s Plywood Corp. , 9 8 N.L.R.B . 794 , 79 8 (1952) . 186. Coastal Plywood, 10 2 N.L.R.B. 300 (1953); Mutual Rough Hat Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 440 (1949) ; Muskogee Dairy Products Co., 8 5 N.L.R.B . 52 0 (1949) . 187. 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(a)(2) . 188. 2 9 U.S.C . § 152(5) . 189. Note , "Worker Ownership and Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act," Yal e Law Journal 9 1 (1982) : 615. 190. 2 9 U.S.C . § 501(a) . 191. Debora h Olson, "Union Experiences with Worker Ownership: Legal and Practical Issue s Raise d b y ESOPS , TRASOPS, Stoc k Purchase s an d Co-Operatives, " Wisconsin La w Review 198 2 (1982) : 801-2 . I f representativ e labo r organization s an d worker-owned enterprise s ac t i n goo d fait h t o furthe r th e legitimat e interest s o f th e employees an d d o no t ente r int o collectiv e bargainin g arrangement s designe d t o re strain trade, their cooperative conduct should be exempt from antitrust liability. Ibid., 803-8. 192. Danie l Zwerdling , Workplace Democracy, 100 . 193. Ibid. , 101 . 194. Richar d Long , "Th e Effects o f Employe e Ownershi p o n Organizational Iden tification, Employe e Jo b Attitudes , an d Organizationa l Performance : A Tentativ e Framework an d Empirica l Findings, " Human Relation s 3 1 (1978) : 39-40 . 195. Ibid. , 47 ; Michae l Cont e & Arnold Tannenbaum , "Employee-Owne d Com panies: I s th e Differenc e Measurable? " Monthly Labor Review 10 1 (Jul y 1978) : 2 5 26.

5. Enhancing Organizing Labor's Power 18 1 196. Jame s OToole , "Th e Uneve n Recor d o f Employe e Ownership, " Harvar d Business Review 5 7 (Nov.-Dec . 1979) : 194 . 197. Michae l Conte & Arnold Tannenbaum, "Employee-Owned Companies : Is the Difference Measurable? " Monthly Labo r Review 10 1 (Jul y 1978) : 24. 198. Danie l Zwerdling , Workplac e Democracy, 167-68 , quotin g Willia m Burns , Assistant Researc h Directo r fo r th e Amalgamate d Mea t Cutters . 199. Ibid., 98 . 200. Debora h Olson, "Union Experiences with Worker Ownership: Legal and Practical Issue s Raise d b y ESOPS , TRASOPS, Stoc k Purchase s an d Co-Operatiyes, " Wisconsin Law Review 198 2 (1982) : 753. 201. Danie l Zwerdling , Workplac e Democracy, 103 . 202. Debora h Olson, "Union Experiences with Worker Ownership: Legal and Practical Issue s Raise d b y ESOPS , TRASOPS, Stoc k Purchase s an d Co-Operatives, " Wisconsin Law Review 198 2 (1982) : 744-46 . 203. Pete r Drucker , The Unseen Revolution, 146-47 . 204. Jame s OToole , "Th e Uneve n Recor d o f Employe e Ownership, " Harvar d Business Review 5 7 (Nov.-Dec . 1979) : 193. 205. Roge r McElrat h & Richard Rowan , "Th e America n Labo r Movemen t an d Employee Ownership : Objections t o and Use s o f Employe e Stoc k Ownership Plans, " Journal of Labor Research 1 3 (Winte r 1992) : 106 . 206. 4 2 U.S.C . § 2000 e e t seq . 207. 4 2 U.S.C . § 1981 , whic h guarantee s al l person s th e sam e righ t t o mak e and enforc e contracts , includin g contract s o f employment , a s i s enjoye d b y whit e citizens. 208. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 49 0 U.S . 64 2 (1989) . 209. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 49 1 U.S . 16 4 (1989) . Fortunatel y fo r th e victims o f employmen t discrimination , organize d labo r an d othe r group s wer e abl e to induc e Congres s t o statutoril y revers e thi s conservativ e grou p o f Suprem e Cour t decisions throug h th e enactmen t o f th e Civi l Right s Ac t o f 1991 . Pub. Law No . 1 0 2 166, 10 5 Stat . 107 1 (1991) . 210. Thoma s Kocha n & Kirsten Wever , "America n Union s an d th e Futur e o f Worker Representation, " The State of the Unions (George Strauss , Danie l Gallaghe r & Jack Fiorito, eds.) (Madison , Wis. : Industrial Relation s Research Association, 1991) , 381. 211. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 2 6 (Feb . 7 , 1991) : B-9 . 212. Joh n Delaney & Marick Masters, "Union s an d Politica l Action, " The State of the Unions (George Strauss , Danie l Gallaghe r & Jack Fiorito , eds. ) (Madison , Wis. : Industrial Relation s Researc h Association , 1991) , 318 . 213. Joh n Delaney , "Th e Futur e o f Union s a s Political Organizations, " ]ournal of Labor Research 1 2 (Fal l 1991) : 374 . 214. Thoma s Edsall , Th e New Politics of Inequalit y (Ne w York : W . W . Norton , 1984), 167 . 215. Jame s Bennett , "Privat e Secto r Unions : Th e Myt h o f Decline, " Journa l of Labor Research 1 2 (Winte r 1991) : 6 . 216. Ibid. , 7 . 217. Ibid. , 3 . 218. Ibid. 219. Lloy d Ulman , "Multinationa l Unionism : Incentives , Barriers , an d Alterna tives," Industria l Relation s 1 4 (1975) : 4-5 .

182 5 . Enhancing Organize d Labor's Power 220. Internationa l Labou r Office, Employment Effects of Multinational Enterprise s in Industrial Countries (Geneva : Internationa l Labou r Office , 1981) , 17 . 221. Stanle y Ruttenberg , "Th e Union Vie w o f Multinationals: An Interpretation, " Bargaining Without Boundarie s (Rober t Flanaga n & Arnold Weber , eds. ) (Chicago : University o f Chicag o Press , 1974) : 181-84 . 222. B.N.A. , Daily Labo r Report (Dec . 16 , 1982) : A - 4 . 223. Herber t Northru p & Richard Rowan , Multinationa l Collective Bargainin g Attempts (Philadelphia : Industria l Researc h Unit , Wharto n School , Universit y o f Pennsylvania, 1979) , 540 . 224. Internationa l Labou r Office, Multinationa l Enterprise s and Social Polic y (Geneva: International Labou r Office , 1973) , 95 . 225. Ibid. , 67 , quotin g Walte r Reuther, "World-Wid e Labo r Solidarity—Essentia l for Developin g Internationa l Co-operation, " Internationa l Metalworker s Federation Bulletin (Nov . 1964) : 12 . 226. Willia m Curtin , "Th e Multinationa l Corporatio n an d Transnationa l Collec tive Bargaining," American Labo r and the Multinational Corporation (Duan e Kujawa, ed.) (Ne w York : Praeger, 1973) , 212 . 227. Jerom e Rosow , "Internationa l Relation s an d th e Multinationa l Corporation : The Managemen t Approach , Bargainin g Withou t Boundarie s (Rober t Flanaga n & Ar nold Weber , eds.) , 152-53 . 228. Herber t Northru p & Richard Rowan , Multinationa l Collective Bargainin g Attempts, 544 . 229. Richar d Barne t & Ronald Muller , Globa l Reach : The Power of the Multina tional Corporation s (Ne w York : Simo n & Schuster, 1974) , 314-18 . 230. Charle s Levinson , Internationa l Trad e Unionis m (London : Alle n & Unwin, 1972), 115 . 231. Hug h Stephenson , The Comin g Clash (Ne w York : Saturda y Revie w Press , 1972), 161-65 ; Loui s Turner , Invisibl e Empires : Multinational Companie s an d th e Modern Worl d (Ne w York : Harcourt Brac e Jovanovich, 1970) , 98-102 . 232. Herber t Northrup , "Wh y Multinationa l Bargainin g Neithe r Exist s No r i s De sirable," Labor Law Journa l 2 9 (1978) : 330 . 233. Lloy d Ulman , "Multinationa l Unionism : Incentives , Barriers , an d Alterna tives," Industrial Relations 1 4 (1975) : 1 . 234. Willia m Curtin , "Th e Multinationa l Corporatio n an d Transnationa l Collec tive Bargaining, " i n America n Labo r and th e Multinationa l Corporatio n (Duan e Ku jawa, ed.) , 203 . 235. Ibid. , 205-6 ; G. B. J. Bomers, Multinational Corporation s an d Industrial Relations (Assen , Netherlands : Va n Gorcum , 1976) , 27 . 236. Benjami n Aaron , "Labo r Relations i n the Unite d State s Fro m a Comparativ e Perspective," Washington & Lee Law Review 3 9 (1982) : 1252-53 . 237. Davi d Blake , "Internationa l Labo r an d th e Regulatio n o f Multinationa l Cor porations: Proposals an d Prospects, " Sa n Dieg o Law Review 1 1 (1973) : 184-85 . 238. Rober t Cox, "Labor and Transnational Relations," International Organizatio n 25 (1971) : 568 . 239. Ibid. , 560 . 240. Internationa l Labou r Office, Multinationa l Enterprise s and Socia l Policy, 68 . 241. Joh n Windmuller , "Internationa l Trad e Unio n Organizations : Structure , Functions, Limitations," International Labo r (Solomon Barkin, ed.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1967) , 82-87 .

6. The Need to Reform 18 3 242. Charle s Levinson, International Trade Unionism, 132-33 . 243. G . B. J. Bomers, Multinational Corporations and Industrial Relations, 34-36. 244. Roge r Blanpain, "1992 and Beyond: The Impact of the European Community on the Labour Law Systems of the Member Countries,*' Comparative Labor Law Journal 11 (1990): 409. 245. Tizian o Treu, "European Unification an d Italian Labor Relations," Comparative Labor Law Journal 1 1 (1990): 450-53. 246. B.N.A. , Labor Relations Reporter 127 (Feb. 1, 1988): 147. 247. Rober t Cox, "Labor and the Multinationals," Foreign Affairs 54 (Jan. 1976): 362. 248. Davi d Blake, "International Labo r and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations: Proposals and Prospects," San Diego Law Review 1 1 (1973): 190. 249. Fran k Tannenbaum, "The Survival of the Fittest," Columbia Journal of World Business 3 (Mar.-Apr. 1968) : 18-19. 250. Rober t Cox, "Labor and the Multinationals," Foreign Affairs 54 (Jan. 1976): 360. 251. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report (Jan. 27,1983): A-5; B.N.A., Daily Labor Report (June 21, 1983): A-l, D-l . 252. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 242 (Dec . 17 , 1990) : A-5. Se e generall y Note , "The Vredling Directive: The EEC's Failed Attempt to Regulate Multinational Enterprises and Organize Collective Bargaining," Journal of International Law and Politics 20 (1988): 967. 253. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 123 (Jun e 26, 1991): A-5. Se e generally George Kraw, "The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers," Hastings International an d Comparative Law Review 1 3 (1990) : 467; Donald Dowling , "Worker Rights in the Post-1992 European Communities: What 'Social Europe' Means to United States-Based Multinational Employers," Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 11 (1991): 564. 6. THE NEE D TO REFOR M

1. E.g. , Commonwealth v. PuIJis, 3 Doc. Hist, of Am. Ind. Soc. 59 (2d ed. Commons 1910) (Philadelphia Mayor's Court 1806). See generally William Forbath, "The Shaping of the American Labor Movement," Harvard Law Review 102 (1989): 114853. 2. Feli x Frankfurter & Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction (Ne w York: Macmillan, 1930). 3. Phili p Taft, Organized Labor in American History (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 136-58. 4. E.g. , Adair v. United States, 20 8 U.S. 16 1 (1908) (yellow-dog contracts); In re Jacobs, 9 8 N.Y. 98 (1885) (voiding New York law precluding production of cigars in tenement dwellings). 5. 3 8 Stat. 730 (1914). 6. Duple x Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 25 4 U.S. 443 (1921). 7. 4 7 Stat. 70 (1932). 8. 4 8 Stat. 198 (1933). 9. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 10. 4 9 Stat. 449 (1935). 11. 4 9 Stat. 449 (1935) . The NLRA, as amended by the Labor-Management Re-

184 6 . The Need t o Reform lations Act [Pub. L. No. 101,61 Stat . 136 (1947)], and the Labor Management Reportin g and Disclosur e Ac t [Pub . L. No. 257 , 7 3 Stat . 51 9 (1959)] , is se t fort h i n 2 9 U.S.C . § § 151-69. 12. Ibid . 13. Ibid . 14. NLR B v . Jones & LaughJin Stee l Corp. , 30 1 U.S . 1 , 3 3 (1937) . 15. N.L.R.B. , NLRB : The Firs t 5 0 Year s (Washington , D.C. : National Labo r Rela tions Board , 1985) , vi . 16. Ibid. 17. Sectio n 8(d) , 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(d) . 18. 32 2 U.S . I l l (1944) . 19. 33 0 U.S . 48 5 (1947) . 20. 32 2 U.S . a t 127-28 . 21. Rober t Gorman, Labor Law: Basic Text (St . Paul: West Publishing, 1976) , 1 9 7 98. 22. E.g. , DaJ-Te x Optical Co., 13 7 N.L.R.B . 178 2 (1962) . 23. 14 0 N.L.R.B. 22 1 (1962) . 24. NLR B v . Exchang e Part s Co. , 37 5 U.S . 40 5 (1964) . 25. NLR B v. Burnu p & Sims, Inc. , 37 9 U.S . 2 1 (1964) . 26. E.g. , Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 8 5 N.L.R.B. 126 3 (1949) , enforced, 18 5 F.2d 73 2 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Sno w fr Sons , 13 4 N.L.R.B . 70 9 (1961) , enforced, 30 8 F.2 d 68 7 (9t h Cir . 1962). 27. NLR B v . Gissel Packing Co. , 39 5 U.S . 575 , 613-1 4 (1969) . 28. E.g. , Conai r Corp. , 26 1 N.L.R.B. 118 9 (1982) . Th e D.C . Circui t Cour t refuse d to enforc e thi s portio n o f th e Board' s remedia l order , sinc e i t conclude d tha t an y departure from the principle o f majorit y rul e should b e left to Congress. Conair Corp. v. NLRB , 72 1 F.2 d 135 5 (D.C . Cir. 1983) , cert , denied , 46 7 U.S . 124 1 (1984) . 29. Int'l . Ladies Garmen t Worker s Unio n v . NLRB, 366 U.S. 73 1 (1961 ) (voluntar y extension o f representatio n statu s t o minorit y unio n pe r s e unfai r labo r practic e re gardless o f goo d o r bad fait h o f employe r an d labo r organization) . 30. Interbor o Contractors, 15 7 N.L.R.B . 129 5 (1966) , enforced, 38 8 F.2 d 49 5 (2 d Cir. 1967). This doctrine was sustained by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 46 5 U.S . 82 2 (1984) . 31. 22 1 N.L.R.B . 99 9 (1975) . 32. 42 0 U.S . 25 1 (1975) . 33. 26 2 N.L.R.B. 101 0 (1982) . 34. E.g. , KohJe r Co., 14 8 N.L.R.B . 143 4 (1964) , affirmed , 34 5 F.2 d 74 8 (D.C . Cir.), cert, denied , 38 2 U.S . 83 6 (1965) . 35. 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(d) . 36. Phelp s Dodg e Coppe r Corp. , 10 1 N.L.R.B. 36 0 (1952) . 37. Inlan d Stee l Co. v. NLRB , 17 0 F.2 d 24 7 (7t h Cir. 1948) , cert, denied , 33 6 U.S . 960 (1949) . 38. W . W . Cross Er Co. v . NLRB , 17 4 F.2 d 87 5 (1s t Cir . 1949) . 39. Singe r M/gr . Co. , 2 4 N.L.R.B . 44 4 (1940) , enforced, 11 9 F.2 d 13 1 (7t h Cir.) , cert, denied , 31 3 U.S . 59 5 (1941) . 40. Centra l Illinois Public Service Co., 13 9 N.L.R.B . 140 7 (1962) , enforced, 32 4 F.2d 91 6 (7t h Cir . 1963) . 41. NLR B v . Gulf Power Co. , 38 4 F.2 d 82 2 (5t h Cir . 1967) . 42. Beaco n Piece Dyeing fr Finishin g Co., 12 1 N.L.R.B . 95 3 (1958) .

6. Th e Need to Reform 18 5 43. NLRB v. Boss M/gr . Co., 11 8 F.2 d 18 7 (7t h Cir . 1941) . 44. United States Gypsum Co., 9 4 N.L.R.B. 112, amended, 9 7 N.L.R.B. 889 (1951) , modified on other grounds , 20 6 F.2 d 41 0 (5t h Cir . 1953) , cert , denied , 34 7 U.S . 91 2 (1954). 45. Fibreboar d Pape r Products Corp. v. NLRB, 37 9 U.S . 20 3 (1964) . 46. Comment , "Subject s Include d Withi n Management' s Dut y t o Bargai n Collec tively," Louisian a Law Review 2 6 (1966) : 634 . 47. 38 8 U.S . 17 5 (1967) . 48. 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(b)(1)(A) . 49. 38 8 U.S . a t 181 . 50. 41 2 U.S . 6 7 (1973) . 51. Unio n of Electrical Workers, Local 1012, 18 7 N.L.R.B . 37 5 (1970) . 52. 35 1 U.S . 22 5 (1956) . 53. 36 7 U.S . 74 0 (I960) . 54. 30 4 U.S . 33 3 (1938) . 55. 30 4 U.S . a t 345-46 . 56. NLRB v. International Van Lines, 40 9 U.S . 4 8 (1972) . 57. Laidlaw Corp., 17 1 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 41 4 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert, denied , 39 7 U.S . 92 0 (1970) . 58. 2 9 U.S.C . § 159(c)(3) . 59. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 37 3 U.S . 22 1 (1963) . 60. 67 5 F.2 d 92 6 (7t h Cir . 1982) . 61. Th e Giddings Br Lewis approac h continue s t o be followed today . Aqua-Chem , Inc. v. NLRB, 910 F.2d 148 7 (7t h Cir. 1990), rehearing denied, 922 F.2d 40 3 (7t h Cir.), cert, denied , 11 1 S . Ct . 287 1 (1991) . 62. 48 9 U.S . 42 6 (1989) . 63. Pub . L . No. 101 , 61 Stat . 14 0 (1947) . 64. 2 9 U.S.C . § 160(1) . 65. Sectio n 30 3 o f th e LMRA , 2 9 U.S.C . § 187 . 66. Pub . L . No. 86-257 , 7 3 Stat . 525 , 54 2 (1959) . 67. Sectio n 8(e ) o f th e NLRA , 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(e) . 68. 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(b)(7) . 69. 6 1 Stat . 13 7 (1947) , codifie d a t 2 9 U.S.C . § 152(3) . 70. 40 4 U.S . 15 7 (1971) . 71. NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 44 4 U.S . 67 2 (1980) . 72. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 41 6 U.S . 267 , 28 8 (1974) . 73. 26 5 N.L.R.B . 29 5 (1982) . 74. 14 0 N.L.R.B . 22 1 (1962) . 75. Juliu s Getman , Stephe n Goldber g & Jeanne Herman , Unio n Representation Elections: Law and Reality (Ne w York : Russell Sag e Foundation , 1976) . 76. 22 8 N.L.R.B . 131 1 (1977) . 77. 22 8 N.L.R.B . a t 1313 . I n Genera l Kni t of California, Inc., 23 9 N.L.R.B . 61 9 (1978), a ne w 3- 2 Boar d majorit y overrule d Shoppin g Kar t an d reinstate d th e Hollywood Ceramics test , bu t fou r year s later , anothe r 3 - 2 majorit y overrule d Genera l Knit an d returne d t o th e "soun d rule " tha t ha d bee n enunciate d i n Shopping Kart. Midland Natl. Life Insurance Co., 26 3 N.L.R.B . 12 7 (1982) . 78. E.g. , Fiber-Lam , Inc. , 30 1 N.L.R.B . No . 9 , 13 6 L.R.R.M . 114 7 (1991) ; Tri-Cast, Inc., 27 4 N.L.R.B . 37 7 (1985) . 79. Gourme t Foods, Inc., 27 0 N.L.R.B . 57 8 (1984) .

186 6 . The Need t o Reform 80. 26 8 N.L.R.B . 49 3 (1984) . 81. Sears , Roebuck & Co., 27 4 N.L.R.B. 23 0 (1985) . 82. 26 8 N.L.R.B . 104 4 (1984) , atfirmed , 76 5 F.2 d 14 8 (9t h Cir . 1985) . 83. 45 2 U.S . 66 6 (1981) . 84. 45 2 U.S . a t 678-79 . 85. 30 3 N.L.R.B . No . 66 , 13 7 L.R.R.M . 118 5 (1991) . 86. 40 9 U.S . 21 3 (1972) . 87. 47 3 U.S . 9 5 (1985) . 88. 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(b)(1)(A) . 89. 46 6 U.S . 43 5 (1984) . 90. I l l S . Ct. 1950 (1991). Even though the Lehnert case involved a public secto r union, the parameters set forth in that decision will undoubtedl y be applied to private sector labo r organizations . 91. B.N.A. , Daily Labo r Report 7 2 (Apr . 14 , 1992) : D - l . 92. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Repor t 7 3 (Apr . 15 , 1992) : A - 9, D - l . 93. 2 9 U.S.C . § 152(3) . 94. E.g. , Yamada Transfer, 11 5 N.L.R.B . 133 0 (1956) ; America n Cabl e & Radio Corp., 12 1 N.L.R.B . 25 8 (1958) . 95. C . Wrigh t Mills , White Collar (Ne w York : Oxfor d Universit y Press , 1951) , 86-89. 96. Mario n Crain , "Buildin g Solidarit y Throug h Expansio n o f NLR A Coverage : A Blueprin t fo r Worke r Empowerment, " Minnesot a La w Review 7 4 (1990) : 1006-8 . 97. Compar e NLR B v . Hendricks Count y Rura J Electric Membership Corp., 45 4 U.S. 17 0 (1981) , wherein th e Supreme Court limited th e Labor Board's "confidential " employee exclusio n t o thos e individual s wh o actuall y hav e acces s t o confidentia l labor relation s information . Th e Cour t refuse d t o permi t th e exclusio n t o b e applie d to individual s wh o hav e acces s t o othe r form s o f confidentia l compan y information . 98. NLR B v . Gissel Packing Co., 39 5 U.S . 575 , 618-1 9 (1969) . 99. 26 3 N.L.R.B . 12 7 (1982) . 100. 14 0 N.L.R.B . 22 1 (1962) . 101. NLR B v . United Steelworkers , 35 7 U.S . 35 7 (1958) . 102. Kar l Klare, "Workplace Democrac y & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda fo r Legal Reform, " Catholic University Law Review 3 8 (1988) : 45-51 . 103. Excelsior Underwear , Inc. , 15 6 N.L.R.B . 123 6 (1966) . 104. 30 4 U.S . 33 3 (1938) . 105. Danie l Pollitt , 4t Mackay Radio: Tur n I t Off, Tun e I t Out," University of San Francisco Law Revie w 2 5 (1991) : 296-97 . 106. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Report 11 4 (Jun e 13 , 1991) : A - 3 . 107. Clyd e Summers, "Past Premises, Present Failures, and Future Needs in Labor Legislation," Buffalo Law Review 3 1 (1982) : 10 . 108. Matthe w Finkin , "Labo r Policy an d The Enervation of the Economic Strike, " University of Illinois Law Review 1990 : 569-70 . 109. See , e.g., NLR B v. Great Dane Trailers , Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) . See generall y Thomas Christense n & Andrea Svanoe , "Motiv e an d Inten t i n th e Commissio n o f Unfair Labor Practices," Yale Law Journal 77 (1968): 1269; Walter Oberer, "The Scienter Facto r i n Section s 8(a)(1 ) an d (3 ) o f th e Labo r Act : Of Balancin g Hostil e Motive , Dogs an d Tails, " CorneJJ Law Quarterly 5 2 (1967) : 491. 110. Danie l Pollitt , tl Mackay Radio: Tur n I t Off, Tun e I t Out," University of San Francisco Law Review 2 5 (1991) : 306-7 .

6. The Need to Reform 18 7 111. B.N.A. , Daily Labor Repor t 13 8 (Jul y 18 , 1991) : A - l l . 112. 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(b)(4)(B) . 113. NLR B v . Frui t & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 , 37 7 U.S . 58 (1964) . 114. NLRB v. Retail Stor e Employees Union , Local 1001 , 447 U.S . 60 7 (1980) . 115. Edward DeBartolo Corp. v . Florida Gulf Coast Buildin g & Construction Trades Council, 48 5 U.S . 56 8 (1988) . 116. 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(e) . 117. Charle s Craver , "Publi c Secto r Impass e Resolutio n Procedures, " ChicagoKent Law Review 6 0 (1984) : 783-85 . 118. Se e generall y Georg e Goble , "Th e Non-Stoppage Strike, " Labor Law Journal 2 (1951): 105; Howard Marshall & Natalie Marshall, "Nonstoppage Strik e Proposals— A Critique," Labor Law Journal 7 (1956): 299. David McCalmont , "Th e Semi-Strike, " Industrial & Labor Relations Revie w 1 5 (1962) : 191. 119. Meyer s Industries, 26 8 N.L.R.B . 49 3 (1984) . 120. Se e generall y Richar d Fischl , "Self , Others , an d Sectio n 7 : Mutualism an d Protected Protes t Activities Unde r th e Nationa l Labo r Relations Act, " Columbia Law Review 89 (1989): 789; Charles Morris, "NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace : A Glimps e a t a Genera l Theor y o f Sectio n 7 Conduct, " University of Pennsylvania Law Review 13 7 (1989) : 1673 . 121. 27 4 N.L.R.B . 23 0 (1985) . 122. Katherin e Stone , "Th e Post-Wa r Paradig m i n America n Labo r Law, " Yale Law Journal 9 0 (1981) : 1558 . 123. 2 9 U.S.C . § 8(d) . 124. Katherin e Stone , "Labo r an d th e Corporat e Structure : Changin g Concep tions an d Emergin g Possibilities, " University of Chicago Law Review 5 5 (1988) : 86-87. 125. NLRB v . Katz , 36 9 U.S . 73 6 (1962) . 126. 2 9 U.S.C . § 158(b)(1)(A) . 127. 2 9 U.S.C . § 160(1) . 128. Terminal Freight Handling Co. v. Solien, 44 4 F.2 d 69 9 (8t h Cir. 1971) , cert , denied, 40 5 U.S . 99 6 (1972) . 129. 2 9 U.S.C . § 187 . 130. 2 9 U.S.C . § 160(j) . 131. Pau l Weiler, Governing the Workplace (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1990), 238-39 . 132. Clea r Pine Mouldings, 26 8 N.L.R.B. 104 4 (1984) , affirmed, 76 5 F.2 d 14 8 (9t h Cir. 1985) . 133. Gourme t Foods, Inc., 27 0 N.L.R.B . 57 8 (1984) . 134. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 31 3 U.S . 17 7 (1941) . 135. Pau l Weiler , "Promise s t o Keep : Securin g Workers ' Right s t o Self Organization Unde r th e NLRA, " Harvard Law Review 9 6 (1983) : 1792 . 136. Ibid., 179 5 & n. 94 . 137. Se e generall y Benjami n Wolkinson , "Th e Remedia l Efficac y o f NLR B Rem edies i n Joy Sil k Cases, " Cornell La w Review 5 5 (1969) : 1 . 138. Onc e suc h Labo r Board bargainin g orders are judicially enforced , continue d contumacy b y employer s woul d subjec t the m t o contemp t liability . 139. 2 9 U.S.C . § 216(b) . 140. Se e generall y Note , "Nonmajorit y Bargainin g Orders : Th e Onl y Effectiv e

188 6 . The Need to Reform Remedy fo r Pervasiv e Employe r Unfai r Labo r Practice s Durin g Unio n Organizin g Campaigns," Journal of Law Reform 2 0 (1987) : 617 . 141. Ex-CeII- 0 Corp. , 18 5 N.L.R.B. 10 7 (1970) , affirmed , 44 9 F.2 d 105 8 (D.C . Cir. 1971). 142. 2 9 U.S.C . § 160(c ) empower s th e Labo r Boar d t o issu e remedia l order s tha t will effectuat e th e policie s o f th e NLRA . 143. 2 9 U.S.C . § 160(a) . 144. 11 2 N.L.R.B . 108 0 (1955) . 145. 11 2 N.L.R.B. a t 1082 . 146. 26 8 N.L.R.B. 57 3 (1984) . 147. 26 8 N.L.R.B . a t 574 . 148. Unite d Steelworker s v . Enterpris e Wheel & Car Corp., 36 3 U.S . 59 3 (1960) . 149. Universa l Camer a Corp . v . NLRB, 34 0 U.S . 47 4 (1951) . 150. Sectio n 203(d ) o f th e LMRA , 2 9 U.S.C . § 173(d) , provide s tha t "[fjina l ad justment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable metho d for settlemen t o f grievanc e dispute s arisin g ove r th e applicatio n o r interpretation o f an existin g collective-bargainin g agreement. " 151. 19 2 N.L.R.B . 83 7 (1971) . 152. 22 8 N.L.R.B . 80 8 (1977) .

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TABLE O F CASE S

Adair v. United States, 20 8 U.S . 16 1 (1908) . Air Lin e Pilots Assn . v . O'Neill, 11 1 S . Ct . 112 7 (1991) . Alleluia Cushio n Co. , 22 1 N.L.R.B . 99 9 (1975) . Allied Chemical fr Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburg h Plat e Glass Co., 404 U.S . 15 7 (1971). Amalgamated Mea t Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. ]ewel Tea Co., 38 1 U.S. 676 (1965). American Broadcastin g Cos . v . Writer s Guil d of America, West, Inc., 43 7 U.S . 41 1 (1978). American Cabl e 6 - Radio Corp., 12 1 N.L.R.B. 25 8 (1958) . American Federation of Musician s v . Carroll, 39 1 U.S . 9 9 (1968) . American Hospital Assn . v . NLRB , 11 1 S . Ct . 153 9 (1991) . American Postal Worker s Unio n v . United States, 92 5 F.2 d 48 0 (D.C . Cir. 1991) . Anamag, 28 4 N.L.R.B . 62 1 (1987) . Aqua-Chem, Inc . v. NLRB, 91 0 F.2 d 148 7 (7t h Cir. 1990) , rehearing denied , 92 2 F.2 d 403 (7t h Cir.) , cert, denied , 11 1 S . Ct . 287 1 (1991) . Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 12 1 N.L.R.B . 95 3 (1958) . Brookings Plywood Corp., 9 8 N.L.R.B . 79 4 (1952) . Central Illinoi s Publi c Servic e Co., 13 9 N.L.R.B. 140 7 (1962) , enforced, 32 4 F.2 d 91 6 (7th Cir . 1963) . C.G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 10 8 F.2 d 39 0 (7t h Cir . 1939) . Clear Pin e Mouldings , 26 8 N.L.R.B . 104 4 (1984) , atfirmed , 76 5 F.2 d 14 8 (9t h Cir . 1985). Coastal Plywood , 10 2 N.L.R.B. 30 0 (1953) . College of Osteopathic Medicin e & Surgery, 26 5 N.L.R.B . 29 5 (1982) . Collyer Insulated Wire, 19 2 N.L.R.B . 83 7 (1971) . Commonwealth v . Hunt , 4 5 Mass . ( 4 Met. ) I l l , 3 8 Am . Dec . 34 6 (1842) . Commonwealth v . PuIIis , 3 Doc . Hist , o f Am . Ind . Soc . 5 9 (2 d ed . Common s 1910 ) (Philadelphia Mayor' s Cour t 1806) . Conair Corp. , 26 1 N.L.R.B . 118 9 (1982) , enforcemen t denie d i n relevan t part , 72 1 F.2d 135 5 (D.C . Cir. 1983) , cert , denied , 46 7 U.S . 124 1 (1984) . Dal-Tex Optica l Co., 13 7 N.L.R.B. 178 2 (1962) . Dubuque Packin g Co., 30 3 N.L.R.B . No . 66 , 13 7 L.R.R.M . 118 5 (1991) . Duplex Printin g Co . v . Deering , 25 4 U.S . 44 3 (1921) . Edward J . DeBartolo Corp . v . Florid a Gulf Coas t Buildin g Trades Council , 48 5 U.S . 568 (1988) .

202

Table of Cases 20 3 Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950). Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984). Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), affirmed, 449 F.2d 105 8 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). Fiber-Lam, Inc., 301 N.L.R.B. No. 9. 136 L.R.R.M. 1147 (1991). Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 37 9 U.S. 203 (1964). First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 45 2 U.S. 666 (1981). Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 34 5 U.S. 330 (1953). General American Transportation Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (19/7). General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969). General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977). General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978). Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 67 5 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1982). Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., I ll S . Ct. 1647 (1991). Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984). H.A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actors' Equity Assn., 451 U.S. 704 (1981). Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 50 3 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974). Hitchman Coal Br Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917). H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 39 7 U.S. 99 (1970). Hollywood Ceramics, 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). Hoover & Co. v. NLRB, 19 1 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951). Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 17 0 F.2 d 24 7 (7t h Cir . 1948) , cert, denied , 33 6 U.S . 96 0 (1949). In re Jacobs, 9 8 N.Y. 98 (1885). Interboro Contractors, 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 36 6 U.S. 731 (1961). /.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 32 1 U.S. 332 (1944). )oy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949). enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Kohler Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1964), affirmed, 34 5 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 836 (1965). Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969). cert. denied, 39 7 U.S. 920 (1970). Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., I l l S . Ct. 1950 (1991). Local 626, Meat & Provision Drivers v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962). Local 833, UAW v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962). Machinists Local 1327, 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982), en/orcement denied, 72 5 F.2d 121 2 (9th Cir. 1984). Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1960). Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 35 0 U.S. 270 (1956). Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982). Mercy-Memorial Hospital Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977). Meyers Industries, 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984). Midland National Life Insurance Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982). Muskogee Dairy Products Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 520 (1949). Mutual Rough Hat Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 440 (1949). Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Assn., 11 8 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957). National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972). NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).

204 Tabl e of Cases NLRB v . Bahcock & Wilcox Co., 35 1 U.S . 10 5 (1956) . NLRB v . Bell Aerospac e Co., 41 6 U.S . 26 7 (1974) . NLRB v. Boeing Co., 41 2 U.S . 6 7 (1973) . NLRB v. Boss Mfgr. Co., 11 8 F.2 d 18 7 (7t h Cir . 1941) . NLRB v. Burnu p fr Sims , Inc. , 37 9 U.S . 2 1 (1964) . NLRB v. Cabo t Carbo n Co., 36 0 U.S . 20 3 (1959) . NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 46 5 U.S . 82 2 (1984) . NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local 639, 36 2 U.S . 27 4 (1960) . NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 37 3 U.S . 22 1 (1963) . NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 37 5 U.S . 40 5 (1964) . NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 30 6 U.S . 24 0 (1939) . NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 37 7 U.S . 5 8 (1964) . NLRB v. General Steel Erectors, 93 3 F.2 d 56 8 (7t h Cir . 1991) . NLRB v . Gissel Packin g Co., 39 5 U.S . 57 5 (1969) . NLRB v . Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 38 8 U.S . 2 6 (1967) . NLRB v . Gulf Power Co., 38 4 F.2 d 82 2 (5t h Cir . 1967) . NLRB v . Hearst Publications , Inc. , 32 2 U.S . I l l (1944) . NLRB v. Hendrick s Count y Rura l Electri c Membershi p Corp. , 45 4 U.S . 17 0 (1981) . NLRB v. IBEW Local 1229, 34 6 U.S . 46 4 (1953) . NLRB v . Internationa l Rice Millin g Co. , 34 1 U.S . 66 5 (1951) . NLRB v . Internationa l Va n Lines , 40 9 U.S . 4 8 (1972) . NLRB v . Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. , 30 1 U.S . 1 (1937) . NLRB v . Katz , 36 9 U.S . 73 6 (1962) . NLRB v . Macka y Radi o& • Telegrap h Co. , 30 4 U.S . 33 3 (1938) . NLRB v . Montgomer y War d fr Co., 15 7 F.2 d 48 6 (8t h Cir . 1946) . NLRB v. Newpor t New s Shipbuildin g & Dry Dock Co. , 30 8 U.S . 24 1 (1939) . NLRB v . Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 , 447 U.S . 60 7 (1980) . NLRB v . Streamway Division of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 69 1 F.2 d 28 8 (6t h Cir . 1982) . NLRB v . Textil e Workers Granit e State Join t Board , 40 9 U.S . 21 3 (1972) . NLRB v . Truit t Manufacturin g Co. , 35 1 U.S . 14 9 (1956) . NLRB v . Unite d Steelworkers, 35 7 U.S . 35 7 (1958) . NLRB v . Weingarten , Inc. , 42 0 U.S . 25 1 (1975) . NLRB v . Yeshiva University, 44 4 U.S . 67 2 (1980) . Oiin Corp. , 26 8 N.L.R.B . 57 3 (1984) . Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 33 0 U.S . 48 5 (1947) . Pattern Makers ' League of North Americ a v . NLRB, 47 3 U.S . 9 5 (1985) . Patterson Sargen t Co. , 11 5 N.L.R.B . 162 7 (1956) . Patterson v. McLea n Credit Union, 49 1 U.S . 16 4 (1989) . Phelps Dodge Copper Corp., 10 1 N.L.R.B . 36 0 (1952) . Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 31 3 U.S . 17 7 (1941) . Railway Employees Dep't . v. Hanson, 35 1 U.S . 22 5 (1956) . Richfield Oil Corp., 11 0 N.L.R.B . 35 6 (1954) , enforced, 23 1 F.2 d 71 7 (D.C . Cir.), cert. denied, 35 1 U.S . 90 9 (1956) . Ritchie v. People, 15 5 111 . 98, 4 0 N.E . 45 4 (1895) . Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 29 5 U.S . 49 5 (1935) . Sears, Roebuc k & Co., 27 4 N.L.R.B . 23 0 (1985) . Shopping Kar t Food Market , 22 8 N.L.R.B. 131 1 (1977) . Singer Mfgr. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444 (1940), enforced, 11 9 F.2d 13 1 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 313 U.S . 59 5 (1941) .

Table of Cases 20 5 Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962). Spielberg Manufacturing, 11 2 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). Terminal Freight Handling Co. v. Solien, 444 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 996 (1972). Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n. of Flight Attendants, 48 9 U.S. 426 (1989). Tri-Cast, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 377 (1985). UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 33 6 U.S. 245 (1949). Union of Electrical Workers, Local 1012, 187 N.L.R.B. 375 (1970). United Beef Co., 272 N.L.R.B. 66 (1984). United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 38 1 U.S. 657 (1965). United States Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112, amended, 97 N.L.R.B. 889 (1951), modified, 206 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1953), cert, denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954). United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel Br Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984). Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 34 0 U.S. 474 (1951). Vegelahn v. Guntner, 16 7 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896). Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 49 0 U.S. 642 (1989). Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917). W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 17 4 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949). Yamada Transfer, 11 5 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1956).

INDEX

Adamson Act , 1 9 AFL-CIO, 31 , 32 , 61 , 62, 64 , 65 , 87 , 8 8 AFL-CIO Buildin g an d Constructio n Trades Department , 11 0 AFL-CIO Department o f Organizatio n and Fiel d Services , 77 AFL-CIO Industrial Unio n Department , 79 AFL-CIO Professional an d Servic e Em ployee Department , 8 3 AFL-CIO Unio n Privileg e Benefit s Cor poration, 8 7 After-school care , 3 8 Age Discriminatio n i n Employmen t Ac t of 1967 , 32 , 39 ; amendments o f 1986 , 39 Air carriers , Railway Labo r Act cover age of , 2 6 Air traffic controllers , 33 , 14 3 Aktiengesellschaft, 9 9 Alger, Horatio , 5 1 Amalgamated Associatio n o f Iron an d Steel Workers , 1 6 Amalgamated Clothin g Workers , 27 , 2 8 American Anti-Boycot t Association , 2 0 American Associatio n o f Universit y Professors (AAUP) , 8 7 American Ba r Association (ABA) , 8 7 American Denta l Associatio n (ADA) , 8 7 "American Dream, " 5 3 American Federatio n o f Labo r (AFL), 17, 18 , 19 , 20 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 27 , 28 , 31

American Federatio n o f State , County , and Municipa l Employees , 6 1 American Hospita l Association , 50 , 7 3 American Medica l Associatio n (AMA) , 87 American Nurse s Associatio n (ANA) , 87 American Posta l Worker s Union , 8 8 Americans wit h Disabilitie s Act , 3 2 Anarchists, 16 , 2 2 Anthracite coa l strike , 1 5 Antitrust law , 11 , 20, 10 1 Anti-union campaigns , 5 , 4 9 Apprentices, 1 0 Apprenticeship regulations , 11 , 1 7 Arbeiterschutzgesetz, 9 6 Arbitration, 13 , 25 , 26 ; deference to , b y NLRB, 153-5 5 Arbitration Ac t o f 1888 , 2 5 Arbitration committees , 1 2 Artisans, 1 1 Associated Builder s an d Contractors , 5 0 Associational freedom , 20 , 2 6 Associational memberships , 86-8 8 At-will employment , 6 9 Aufsichtsrat, 9 9 Automation, 9 0 Baby-boom generation , 39 , 8 5 Backpay, agains t employer , 15 2 Bargaining: power, 7 ; scope of , 14 8 Basic Stee l Agreement , 3 6 Bayrisches Berggesetz, 9 6

207

208 Inde x Benefit programs , 6 Betriebstategesetz (Work s Counci l Ac t of 1920) , 9 6 Binding interes t arbitration , 14 7 Bishop, Joseph , 1 6 Black lists , 20 , 2 4 Board o f Mediatio n an d Conciliation , 25 Boards o f directors , labo r representatio n on, 95-96 , 98-101 , 105- 9 Boesky, Ivan , 5 3 Border Industrializatio n Program , 4 4 Boycotts, 2 0 Bunker, Archie , 5 3 Bureau o f Labo r Statistics , 15 3 Bush, George , 139 ; administration of , 116 Business unions , 18 , 6 4 Campaign literature , 14 2 Canada: Automobile Workers , 5 ; clas s consciousness, 54 ; free trad e agree ment, 44 ; international collectiv e bar gaining agreements , 47 ; Steelworkers , 5; trade unio n membership , 3 5 Captive audienc e speeches , 49 , 14 1 Carey, Ron , 6 3 Carpenters Unio n Local , 33 , 11 0 Catholic church , 1 4 Certification, o f unio n b y Labo r Board , 152 Child care , 6 7 Child labor , 1 7 CIO. Se e Congres s o f Industria l Organizations City trad e assemblies , 1 2 Civil Right s Ac t o f 1964 , 24 , 32 , 81 , 11 6 Class consciousness , 3 , 51-52 , 54 , 74 , 83, 8 6 Clayton Ac t o f 1914 , 20 , 21 , 106 , 12 6 Closed-shop agreements , 11 , 23 , 3 0 Coalition o f Labo r Unio n Women , 8 0 Codetermination programs , 10 2 Collective bargaining , 8 , 26 , 30 , 36 , 47 , 65, 70-73 , 74 , 89 , 93 , 95 , 98 , 101 , 108, 111 , 143 ; agreements, 6 , 19 , 3 2 33, 47 , 61 ; international, 120-24 ; i n Western Europe , 50-5 1 Collective voice , 6 , 77

Colonial period , 1 0 Committee fo r Industria l Organization , 28, 3 1 Communication Worker s Union , 9 0 Community: campaigns , 91 ; organizations, 9 2 Commuting, 4 1 Company unions , 48 , 102 , 12 9 Compensatory relie f agains t employer , 153 Computers, 40 , 41 , 8 4 Concerted activity , 136 ; constructive , 147; individua l conduct , 13 0 Conglomerates, 4 6 Congress o f Industria l Organization s (CIO), 28 , 3 1 Consumer activity : boycotts , 11 , 14 , 93 ; handbilling, 146 ; picketing, 145-4 6 "Content" legislation , 11 9 Continuing education , 8 7 Cooperatives, 13 , 9 4 Coordinated campaigns , 7 9 Corporate campaigns , 9 1 Corruption, 6 2 Cost-of-living-adjustment clause s (COLAs), 3 2 Craft unions , 11 , 13 , 21 , 25 , 39 . Se e also Trad e union s Criminal conspirac y law , 11 , 20 ; syndi calist statutes , 2 2 Crossover employees , 133 , 14 4 Cultural organizations , 1 3 Day care , 38 , 8 1 Debs, Eugene , 21 , 2 2 Decertification elections , 36 , 50 , 69 , 7 9 Decision-making process , employe e in volvement in , 7 , 60 , 85 , 91 , 93, 98 , 148 Democrats, 18 , 116 , 11 7 Department o f Labor , 13 9 Deregulation, 2 Developing countries , 1 , 42-47 , 122-2 3 Dignity o f employees , 67 , 77, 85 , 86 , 9 8 Discharge o f unio n supporters , 12 9 Discrimination, 52 , 88 ; anti-union, 18 , 129; employment , 36 ; racial, 24 , 8 1 Disorderly conduct , 2 0

Index 20 9 Drug-Free Workplac e Ac t o f 1988 , 67 , 68 Drug rehabilitation programs , 6 8 Drug testing , 7 , 6 7 Dual unionism , 2 8 Duty o f loyalty , 29 , 71 , 7 2 Economic realitie s test , 128 , 134 , 14 0 Economic strikes , 29 , 13 2 Educational programs , 68 , 7 1 Eight-hour da y legislation , 12 , 14 , 17 , 18, 1 9 Electronic cottag e industries , 4 1 Electronic monitorin g o f employees , 8 4 Employee Retiremen t Incom e Securit y Act o f 197 4 (ERISA) , 2 , 32 , 111 , 11 3 Employee stoc k ownershi p plan s (ESOPs), 109 , 112-1 5 Employer associations , 2 0 Enzyme multiplie d immunoassa y tech nique (EMIT) , 6 8 Equal Employmen t Opportunit y Com mission, 9 2 Equal Pa y Ac t o f 1963 , 3 2 Equal pa y fo r equa l work , 12 , 1 4 Erdman Ac t o f 1898 , 2 5 ERISA. Se e Employe e Retiremen t In come Securit y Ac t o f 197 4 European Communit y (EC) , 123-24 , 125; Socia l Charte r of , 12 5 Exclusivity doctrine , 8 6 Executive compensation , 63-64 , 8 4 Executive Orde r 12,800,13 9 "Exit voice, " 8 Export duties , 4 4 Export platforms , 4 , 4 4 Fair Labor Standards Ac t (FLSA) , 15 2 Family leave , 6 5 Federal Hom e Loa n Mortgage Corpora tion, 8 7 Federal Trad e Commission , 106- 7 Federal troops , us e of , agains t unions , 13, 1 9 Federation o f Organize d Trade s an d La bor Unions o f th e Unite d State s an d Canada, 1 7 Fielden, Samuel , 1 6 First Amendment , 15 0

"F.I.S.T.," 5 3 Flex-time programs , 67 , 81 , 8 2 Foreign competition , 8 3 Forty-hour workweek , 4 1 Fraser, Douglas , 10 0 Fraternal socia l orders , 11 , 8 7 Freedom o f contract , 1 9 Free trade : agreement betwee n Canada , the Unite d States , an d Mexico , 124 ; agreements i n general , 44 ; and com merce, 2 0 Free trad e zones , 4 4 Fringe benefi t plans , 7 1 Gas chromatography/mas s spectrometr y (GC/MS), 6 8 General Agreemen t o n Tariff s an d Trade (GATT) , 12 5 George Mean y Cente r fo r Labo r Studies , 76 German Workmen' s Benefi t Fund , 8 7 Gibbons, Cardinal , 1 4 "Give-backs," 3 6 Global economy , 4 , 42-4 7 Golden parachutes , 7 Gompers, Samuel , 17 , 18 , 19 , 21 , 2 3 Gould, Jay , 1 4 Government unions , 8 3 Great Depression , 25 , 34 , 13 2 Green, William , 27 , 28 , 3 1 Grievance-arbitration procedures , 6 , 61 , 101 Grievances, 2 6 Group meetings , 77 Guilds, 1 0 Haggerty, Fathe r Thomas , 2 1 Handbilling, 9 1 Harvard Unio n o f Clerica l an d Techni cal Worker s (HUCTW) , 77-7 8 Haymarket Square , 1 6 Haywood, William , 2 1 Health an d safety , 2 , 36 , 65 , 7 0 Health care , 6 ; dental coverage , 6 ; ey e coverage, 6 ; insurance, 67 , 70 , 8 2 "Hoffa," 5 3 Home visits , 77 ', 142 Hot carg o agreements , 13 4 Hours, 11 , 12 , 16 , 6 7

210 Inde x H.R. 5 (199 1 Congress) , 14 5 Hutcheson, William , 2 7 Immigrant labor , 17 , 6 1 Impasse, 89 , 15 2 Imports: barriers, 119 ; duties, 44 ; quotas, 119 ; tariffs, 11 9 Indentured servants , 1 0 Independent contractors , 128 , 134 , 14 0 Independent Internationa l Associatio n of Machinists , 2 0 Independent Labo r Leagu e o f America , 20 "Industrial Magn a Carta, " 2 1 Industrial unions , 27 , 3 8 Industrial Worker s o f th e Worl d (IW W or Wobblies), 21 , 22 ; and agricultura l and unskille d workers , 22 ; and cop per industry , 22 ; and lumbe r indus try, 2 2 Industry-supported trainin g programs , 72-73 Information clearin g houses , 12 3 Injunctions: agains t employers , 151 ; against unions , 2 0 Intelligence networks , 12 3 Internal Revenu e Code , 8 8 Internal unio n matters , 13 1 International Associatio n o f Machinists , 40, 10 0 International Chemica l an d Genera l Workers Federatio n (I.C.F.) , 121 , 12 3 International Conferenc e o f Fre e Trad e Unions, 12 3 International Federatio n o f Christia n Trade Unions , 12 3 International federations , 9 1 International governmen t regulation , 124-25 International Ladie s Garmen t Worker s Union, 23 , 2 8 International Metalworker s Federation , 123 International Typographica l Workers , 28 International worke r federations , 12 3 Investigatory interviews , 147-48 ; co worker assistance , 13 0 Investment capital , 7

Job security programs , 72 , 14 1 Job sharing, 6 7 Jones, "Mother " Mary, 2 1 Journeymen, 1 0 Just cause , 1 , 6 , 61 , 6 8 Keating, Charles , 5 3 Knights o f Labor , 13-18 , 6 9 Labor costs, 4 , 33 , 40, 51 , 6 6 Labor La w Refor m Act , 3 6 Labor Management Relation s Ac t (LMRA), 30 , 36 , 105 , 106 , 111 , 130 , 131, 15 0 Labor Management Reportin g an d Dis closure Ac t o f 195 9 (LMRDA) , 30 , 31 , 36, 62 , 105 , 114 , 134 , 13 9 Labor relations consultants , 4 9 Layoff an d recal l procedures , 6 Leadership o f unions , 3 , 75-7 6 Leaflets, 91 , 9 2 Legal services , 6 , 8 8 Lewis, Joh n L. , 2 7 Licensing requirements , 8 7 Literature distribution , 2 9 LMRA. Se e Labo r Management Rela tions Ac t LMRDA. Se e Labo r Managemen t Re porting an d Disclosur e Ac t o f 195 9 Lobbying, 18 , 20 , 32 , 64-7 0 "Look fo r th e unio n label, " 6 1 Luddites, 4 0 McCormick Reape r Company , 15-1 6 McKinley, William , 1 4 Managerial employees , 74 , 135 , 13 9 Mandatory bargainin g subjects , 89 , 1 3 7 38; employee stoc k ownershi p plan s (ESOPs), 113 ; fringe benefits , 13 1 Mandatory injunction s agains t employ ers, 15 2 Manual schools , 1 2 MaquiJladora system , 44 , 45 , 12 4 Mass-production industries , 2 7 Master craftsmen , 1 0 Master Printer s Association , 5 0 "Matewan," 5 3 Maximum-hours legislation , 6 5 Meany, George , 3 , 3 1

Index 21 1 Media: treatment o f unions . 53-54 ; us e of b y unions , 60-64 , 9 1 Mediation, 2 5 Medicare, 8 2 Mergers an d acquisitions , 3 7 Mexican-American Lega l an d Educatio n Defense Fund , 7 0 Mexico, fre e trad e agreemen t with , 44 , 45 Migration: blacks, fro m sout h t o north , 23; t o Sunbelt , 4 , 39 , 7 9 Milken, Michael , 5 3 Miller, Joyce , 8 0 Mine, Mil l an d Smelte r Workers , 2 8 Minimal competenc y standards , 6 8 Minimum-wage legislation , 6 5 Minorities, 4 , 13 , 23 , 24 , 28 , 38 , 52 , 55 , 73, 80 , 81-82 , 13 9 Mitbestimmung (Codetermination ) Ac t of 1976 , 9 9 Monetary damage s agains t union , 20 , 3 0 "Monopoly" effect , 6 Multinational corporations , 4 , 42-47 , 91, 118-2 0 Murray, Philip , 3 1 National Associatio n fo r th e Advance ment o f Colore d Peopl e (NAACP) , 7 0 National Associatio n o f Manufacturers , 50 National Educatio n Associatio n (NEA) , 87 National guard , us e of , agains t unions , 126 National Industria l Recover y Ac t (NIRA), 26 , 27 , 126 , 13 2 National Labo r Relations Ac t (NLRA) , 26-27, 29 , 30 , 32 , 34 , 36 , 46 , 48 , 74 , 86, 89 , 101 , 102 , 105 , 108 , 111 , 112 , 126-55 National Labo r Relations Boar d (NLRB) , 2. 26 , 35 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 89 , 113 , 114 , 150; deferenc e t o arbitra l decisions , 153-55 National Labo r Unio n (NLU) , 1 2 National Maste r Freigh t Agreement , 3 6 National Organizatio n fo r Wome n (NOW), 7 0

National Retai l Merchant s Association , 50 National Trade s Unio n (NTU) , 1 2 Neighborhood centers , 4 1 Newlands Ac t o f 1913 , 2 5 9 to 5, 80 NIRA. Se e Nationa l Industria l Recover y Act NLRA. Se e Nationa l Labo r Relation s Act NLRB. Se e Nationa l Labo r Relation s Board Noble Orde r o f th e Knight s o f Labor . See Knight s o f Labo r No-raiding pact , 3 1 "Norma Rae, " 5 3 Norris-LaGuardia Act , 19 , 12 6 North Carolin a chicke n processin g plant fire , 2 Occupational guilds , 8 7 Occupational Safet y an d Healt h Ac t o f 1970 (OSHA) , 3 2 Office an d Professiona l Employee s In ternational Unio n (OPEIU) , 8 3 Oil Field , Ga s Well an d Refinin g Work ers, 2 8 Older workers , 67 , 73 , 8 2 Open-shop programs , 5 0 Organizational rights , 2 9 Organized crime , 3 , 53 , 62-6 3 Organizing campaigns , 48 , 4 9 Pacific Coas t Longshoremen , 2 7 Panic o f 1873 , 1 3 Parental leave , 67 , 8 1 Parents, 4 1 Participatory management , 96-9 7 Pattern agreements , 3 6 Pensions: leverag e o f funds , 109-12 ; plans, i n general , 6 , 65 , 82 ; right to , 7; statutory protectio n o f fund s in , 36 ; withdrawal o f fund s in , 9 2 People's Party , 1 8 Permanent replacements , 1 , 29 , 37 , 65 , 89-90, 133 , 143 , 145 . Se e als o Tem porary replacement s Philadelphia: printers , 11 ; shoemakers, 11; tailors , 1 3

212 Inde x Picketing, 23 , 30 , 91 , 9 2 Pinkertons, 2 4 Placards, 9 2 Plant closings , 66 , 7 1 Plant refurbishment , 39 , 5 0 Plant relocation , 39 , 50 , 66 , 71 , 138 ; funds, 12 0 Police, us e of , agains t unions , 15 , 20 , 4 7 Political actio n committees , 32 , 11 7 Political activity , 12 , 14 , 18 , 21 , 32 , 91, 115-18 Powderly, Terence , 14 , 1 5 Pre-election benefi t increases , 12 9 Preliminary surveys , 7 8 Press releases , 9 1 Privacy o f employees , 6 7 Private securit y personnel , us e of , against unions , 15 , 19 , 23 , 24 , 47 , 12 6 Production platforms , 4 5 Production transfers , 33 , 7 1 Product pricing , 1 1 Professional standards , 11 , 8 7 Profits, 6 , 8 Promotions, 6 Property rights , 19 , 2 9 Provocation doctrine , 13 6 Publicity picketing , 9 2 Quality circle s o f Japan , 9 6 "Quality o f wor k life " programs , 9 8 "Quickie" strikes , 2 9 Racketeering, 3 Railroad Labo r Board , 2 5 Railroad strikes , 13 , 2 5 Railway Labo r Act o f 1926 , 25-26 ; ai r carriers covered , 2 6 Reagan, Ronald , 33 , 116 , 14 3 Reform organizations , 1 2 Remedial bargainin g orders , 15 2 Representation committees , 77 Representation elections , 2 , 5 , 35 , 36 , 49, 129 , 141-43 ; employe r misrepre sentations, 13 5 Republicans, 18 , 116 , 11 7 Resignation fro m union s durin g strikes , right of , 148-4 9 Restraining orders , 3 0

Retail Clerk s Internationa l Associatio n (RCIA), 8 3 Retaliation, 48 , 6 9 Retraining, 6 6 Reuther, Walter , 3 1 Robots, 4 1 Roosevelt, Franklin , 2 6 Runaway facilities , 47 , 11 8 St. Loui s Trade s an d Labo r Council, 2 3 Scientific management , 24 , 2 5 Scrip, 17 , 1 8 Secondary activities , 134 ; boycotts, 21 ; worker conduct , 3 0 Section 198 1 o f th e Reconstructio n Er a Civil Right s Act , 11 6 Semi-autonomous wor k groups , 9 5 Seniority, 6 , 7 Service Employee s Internationa l Unio n (SEIU), 8 3 Service industry , 7 3 Service personnel , 82-8 6 Severance pay , 66 , 7 2 Shaw, Chie f Justic e o f th e Suprem e Judicial Cour t o f Massachusetts , 1 1 Sherman Act , 10 6 Shop-level committees , 24 , 95 , 9 6 Silvis, William , 1 3 Sit-down strikes , 2 9 Slavery, 1 0 Slowdowns, 2 9 Small firms, 4 2 Socialists, 2 2 Social organizations , 8 7 Social Security , 7 0 Solicitation, 2 9 Solidarity demonstrations , 77 Spokespersons, 9 1 State militia , us e of , agains t unions , 13 , 15, 19 , 12 6 Statutory strikes , 14 7 Stevens, Uriah , 1 4 Stock purchases , 9 2 Strikebreakers, 20 , 24 , 5 5 Strikes: funds, 14 ; right to , 15 ; strengthening effectivenes s of , 143-4 5 Substitution o f capita l fo r labor , 4 , 4 0 Sunbelt, 50 , 7 3 Super seniority , 13 3

Index 21 3 Supervisory employees , 30 , 128 , 134 , 140-41 Supreme Judicia l Cour t o f Massachu setts, 1 1 Sweatshops, 18 , 6 1 Sympathy strikes , 11 , 14 , 2 0 Sympathy support , 1 5 Tariffs, 1 7 Tax credit s fo r trainin g programs , 7 2 Tax laws , 7 0 Taylor, Frederick , 2 4 Teamsters, 3 , 27 , 6 3 Technological advances , 3 , 4, 25 , 40 , 41, 42 , 60 , 66 , 71 , 72 , 8 6 Temporary replacements , 144-4 5 Terms an d condition s o f employment , 12, 6 0 Texas Pacifi c Railroad , 1 5 Title VI I of th e Civi l Right s Ac t o f 1964 . See Civi l Right s Ac t o f 196 4 Trade associations , 5 0 Trade imbalance , 6 1 Trades Unio n Congres s o f England , 1 6 Trade unions , 11 , 12 , 13 , 17 , 18 , 22 , 23 , 34. Se e also Craf t union s Traffic obstructio n laws , 2 0 Transfer o f jobs , 1 Transfer privileges , 7 2 Transportation Ac t o f 1920 , 2 5 Trespass, 20 , 2 9 Triangle Shirtwais t Factory , 2 3 Tri-partite arbitra l panels , 14 7 Truman, Harry , 3 0 Trust funds , jointl y administered , 11 1 Unemployment compensation , 65 , 6 6 Unfair labo r practices , 30 , 129 , 150-51 ; charges, 48 ; disputes , 15 3 Union discipline , 13 8 Union dues , 132 , 138 , 14 9 Union membership , 2 , 3 , 21 , 34-36 , 40 , 70; i n Europe , 6 5 Union organizin g campaigns , 12 9 "Union Yes, " 6 1

United Automobil e Workers , 40 , 100 , 108 United Hatters , Cap and Milliner y Workers, 2 8 United Min e Workers , 27-2 8 United State s Departmen t o f Commerce , 14 United Steelworkers , 4 0 United Textil e Workers , 2 8 Unskilled jobs , 4 Value added , 4 4 Vermont Asbesto s Group , 11 5 Vorstand, 9 9 Vredling Directive , 12 5 Wabash Railroad , 1 4 Wages, 6 , 7 , 11 , 12 , 15 , 16 , 7 4 Wagner, Robert , 2 6 Welfare funds , 3 6 Western Federatio n o f Miners , 2 2 White-collar crime , 3 White-collar workers , 4 , 41 , 73 , 82-86 , 139 Winpisinger, William , 10 0 Wobblies. See Industria l Worker s o f th e World Women, 4 , 12 , 13 , 22 , 23 , 28 , 38 , 52 , 55, 73 , 80-81, 13 9 Women's Trad e Unio n Leagu e (WTUL) , 23, 2 8 Worker compensation , 6 5 Worker participatio n programs , 25 , 91 , 102-5 Workers party , 11 7 Working conditions , 8 , 12 , 7 4 Working Men' s Party , 1 2 Workmen's Circle , 8 7 Work rules , 3 7 Works Constitutio n Ac t (Federa l Repub lic o f Germany) , 9 6 World Federatio n o f Trad e Unions , 12 3 World Wa r I, 22-2 5 World Wa r II, 3 4 Yellow-dog contracts , 19 , 20 , 24 , 47 , 126

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