Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents Since World War II 9780755625529, 9781350165601

Citation preview

To my parents, Tina and David, my brother and sister, Leila and Adrian, my wife, Kalypso, and my children, Alice and David.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKEL EAM BHC CBFC CBFNE CENTO CO CRO DBPO DUSS DOPC EEC ELAS ELDYK EOKA ESBA FO FCO FRUS GCHQ HMG ICJ JIC MOD NATO NEAF PUS[S] PUSD

Progressive Working People’s Party National Liberation Front British High Commission Commander British Forces Cyprus Commander British Forces Near East Central Treaty Organisation Colonial Office Commonwealth Relations Office Documents on British Policy Overseas Deputy Under Secretary of State Defence and Oversea Policy Committee European Economic Community Greek People’s Liberation Army Hellenic Force in Cyprus National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters Eastern Sovereign Base Area Foreign Office Foreign and Commonwealth Office Foreign Relations of the United States Government Communications Headquarters His/Her Majesty’s Government International Court of Justice Joint Intelligence Committee Ministry of Defence North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Near East Air Force Permanent Under Secretary [of State] Permanent Under Secretary of State’s Department

x SBA SED UAR UNFICYP WOD WSBA

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS Sovereign Base Area Southern European Department United Arab Republic United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Western Organisations Department Western Sovereign Base Area

FOREWORD

Cyprus is a small island with a long history full of large controversies. In modern times these have related mainly to relations with its former rulers, Britain and Turkey, although during the 1974 crisis a major role was played by a new imperial power, the United States. Cyprus’s future remains equally contested. Some people hope that membership of the European Union will act like a deus ex machina, allowing the long-running international soap opera of Cyprus among the Powers to find a happy ending, although there are grounds for cynicism: if Turkey is refused membership of the EU, as seems likely, why should she relinquish her hold on Northern Cyprus? If she acquires full membership, then what is to stop Turks in future quite legally becoming a majority in Cyprus as EU citizens? Plus ça change…may be the more appropriate foreign phrase. Certainly, as Bill Mallinson points out in this absolutely indispensible collection of documents, there is a lot of continuity in the history of this island. Mallinson, moreover, is the best qualified person I can think of to guide one through the controversies of Cyprus’s history. He knows the archives better probably than anyone else. For fifteen years he has researched the latest discoveries among the British documents at Kew and he has now published his fourth book on his findings. It is a magnificent testament to a historian’s skills and is replete with good common sense about the historian’s task of evaluating documents, while avoiding the pitfalls of international relations’ theory. It will be a boon to students of international relations and imperial history; it will be a goldmine of information to political historians of Britain and the Mediterranean; it will be a challenge to international relations’ theorists. And it will, most of all, enable readers to discover the delight of studying primary sources – indeed, may even encourage them to visit national archives. For the historical documents as published here are the

xii

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

basic building blocks of any history. They are the bedrock on which monographs and textbooks are built. They are the best ammunition possible for student essays and any other form of historical analysis. So my advice is to use Mallinson’s erudite selection before you start arguing about Cyprus. There is no better aid on offer today. And Cyprus as an international problem is hardly likely to go away. Alan Sked

PREFACE

Foreign policy documents are usually published by governments, as a rule thirty years after the events, by competent historians working for the government concerned. Perhaps the best known to Anglophone students of diplomatic history and (if they have the time to read published source material) students of international relations, are Foreign Relations of the United States and Documents on British Policy Overseas [DBPO]. Problems can however arise. For example, between 1999 and 2002, the United States government withheld distribution of its already printed Foreign Relations of the United States: Greece 1964 to 1968, then releasing a heavily sanitised version, with some glaring gaps. According to one American journalist, the original publication ‘would have given the CIA heartburn’1. On the Cyprus conundrum, the Greek government is even more sensitive than the American: by law, documents covering Cyprus at crucial periods are simply closed. The British are rather more organised and forthcoming regarding the release of documents, but even with the Freedom of Information Act, there are sufficient exceptions, usually connected to ‘security’, as to render complete certitude difficult in certain cases. I have nevertheless had some success in squeezing blood from a stone, despite such apparent reasoning as ‘releasing the information you have requested would be likely to prejudice the United Kingdom’s relations with the United States and Cyprus’, and one document having gone missing. In fact, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) were even good enough to copy and send me, at the Information Commissioner’s behest, several files, extracts of which will appear in this book, while the Ministry of Defence eventually released some to the National Archives, having previously said that they had a storage problem with asbestos. At any rate, the documents released by the British government do, in my view, allow us to form a reasonably balanced picture of the themes about British-Greek-Cypriot relations until the year 1979, with

xiv

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

which I shall deal. Since then, there has been little substantial alteration in British policy, apart from that occasioned by the fairly new factor of Cyprus’ membership of the European Union. Perhaps the main reason for publishing this work is that its closest equivalent, DBPO Series III, Volume V, entitled The Southern Flank in Crisis, 1973–76, has subsumed the 1974 Cyprus crisis into a broader subject, without pinpointing some of the more embarrassing revelations. It does nevertheless succeed in leaving the reader under no illusions about the differences between the British and American Foreign Secretaries, James Callaghan and Henry Kissinger. Yet the devil often lies in the detail: there is no mention, for example, of Callaghan’s (see Chapter Four) disregard for the truth about his foreknowledge of the Turkish invasion and takeover plans. Whether this is because the FCO did not allow the authors access to the relevant papers, or whether they were overlooked, is of course a moot point. In the hope that the British government will produce an exhaustive volume on Greece and Cyprus, this book will at least serve as a vital and more up to date supplement to the DBPO one. The government historians will, if asked to produce a more specific volume, be able to include some of what I have excavated. I must state unequivocally that this book is not an attempt to emulate or substitute for official government publications. In contrast to most official publications of documents, which tend to deal with a period, often fairly short, and a broad theme accompanied by many documents, I have homed in on a number of specific themes, and provided a fair amount of analysis, evaluation and comment. Although the volumes of documents published by various governments are of great importance to historians and others in understanding what happened – and, crucially – what still happens, one can never avoid the sneaking suspicion that no government really allows serious skeletons to leave the cupboard. Hence this book, from an independent publisher, that will tackle the good, the bad and the ugly without quarter. Guicciardini wrote that things have always been the same, that the past sheds light on the future, and that the same things return with different colours. Like Machiavelli (notwithstanding some differences) and, later, Vico, he knew that understanding human nature is the key to understanding relations between states. The documents which I shall scrutinise here demonstrate par excellence that national interest (not easy to define) is the chief underlying factor in policy formulation, and that the basics do not alter much. Thus the situation today is only cosmetically different to that of thirty years ago, when the government buffers stopped the train of

PREFACE

xv

documents for the following year, as it does with anything that it considers remotely sensitive. Thirty years is however hardly a drop in the ocean of thousands of years of recorded history, and studying documents in the same field for a given period, in this case thirty four years, shows that the past really does illuminate the future: reading through the 1964 files, for example, makes one suspect that an invasion, or an attempted one, could be on the cards. The only question is when, rather than if, it will occur. By the time one reaches the 1974 files (having of course digested the previous nine years over a nine-year period), the invasion comes as no great surprise. One even occasionally suspects that a form of wishful thinking takes place in the minds of the policy-formulators, to the extent that planning for a contingency actually encourages something to happen, even if one does not wish it to happen. This is why the consistent chronological study of documents in a particular field can be so rewarding. I hope that some of my enthusiasm will transfer to the reader by default. Thanks to a small extent to the pressure I applied through the Information Commissioner’s Office, previously unknown facts emerge, such as the Secretary of State’s consciously denying to a parliamentary committee his foreknowledge of the Turkish invasion plans, Britain’s failed attempt in the face of American pressure to relinquish its Sovereign Base Areas, the FCO’s position being closer to the Greek than the Turkish one vis-à-vis Turkish claims on Greek areas, and its strong criticism of Turkey’s negotiating stance and tactics. There is no substitute for actually visiting archives and seeing the original documents, and in this sense this book is second best. In particular, some documents have comments made in the margin, which can be surprisingly snide and cynical, not to mention some quite bizarre handwriting. Nonetheless, I hope that readers will at least be encouraged to pursue their interest by seeking out the documents themselves. Even if they do not, scrutiny of this book should by default help the reader to gain a realistic understanding of the process of policy formulation that forms the essential backcloth to understanding relations between states, particularly how these relations are conducted. International relations theory alone, while being an interesting field of study, is inadequate in comprehending the complex day-to-day issues with which the world is faced. Sometimes, it is difficult to avoid the sneaking suspicion that some alleged international relations experts have latched on to one or other theory, more out of mental sloth than genuine intellectual curiosity to work things out for themselves through the painstaking documentary study of history. This

xvi

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

book should at any rate serve as a useful tool for students of international relations, as well as of history. I have done my best to go through all the relevant files, sometimes under considerable pressure. It may be that somebody knows of, or will find, files that he thinks I should have mentioned. My defence is that no individual can find and know everything in one lifetime. I have therefore selected, from what I have found, sufficient files to present as rounded and complete a picture as possible of the themes I have chosen.

1 BRIEF BACKGROUND TO CYPRUS

The exact bloodlines of those living in Cyprus ten thousand years ago is a bit of a moot point, although there were undoubtedly many Neolithic farmers. Like Crete, Cyprus has one of the world’s oldest recorded histories. Following the end of the Trojan Wars and of the Hittite Empire, Mycenaean Greeks settled in Cyprus, at a time of political and social turbulence and mass population movements, establishing the essentially Greek character of the island for posterity. Salamis and Paphos had become important city states by the time that a wave of Phoenician settlers hit, occasioned by the Assyrian push into the Lebanon. The city states of Cyprus subsequently came under Assyrian, Egyptian and Persian influence respectively, until Alexander the Great settled the argument. Following his untimely death, the island became the object of the ambitions of his generals, with the Ptolomaic dynasty winning the day in 294 BC. The ten kingdoms of Cyprus were abolished, and the island was ruled as a unitary state until the Romans formally took over in 30 BC, ushering in a period of peace and stability marred only by the ripple effect of the Jewish revolt in Palestine, Egypt and Cyrenaica, during which tens of thousands were killed before the emperor Hadrian decisively suppressed it in 269 AD. Cyprus’s Eastern Roman Byzantine period lasted from 330 to 1191. This period, which included the European Dark Ages, from which Cyprus suffered in the form of Arab Muslim attacks, consolidated the Greek and Orthodox Christian character of the island. One of the most significant developments was Constantinople’s granting in 488 of autocephalous church status to Cyprus. The Church of Cyprus was allowed self-government and the right to choose its own leader. The Archbishop could even carry a royal sceptre. This marked a unique and, for some, mildly idiosyncratic tradition of the Church’s central involvement in the island’s political affairs, that was to manifest itself most poignantly nearly

2

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

fifteen hundred years later with the (political) presidency of Archbishop Makarios, which could be seen as a veritable merging of Church and State. The Crusades and the concomitant weakening of the Eastern Roman Empire marked a dramatic turn in the fortunes of Cyprus. While before, the island had been ruled under Constantinople’s authority, with occasional bouts of independence, as under Isaac Comnenus, the Franks ruled from 1192 until 1489. The story of how Frankish rule came to pass is mildly farcical: in 1191, Richard Coeur de Lion captured Isaac Comnenus in revenge for the latter having treated Richard’s shipwrecked fiancée discourteously. Richard proceeded to sell Cyprus to the Knights Templar who, under attack from the local population, resold it to Richard, whereupon he sold it to another Crusader, Guy de Lusignan the following year. Clearly, the Crusades sometimes involved the acquisition of real estate as much as defending Christianity. Following almost three hundred years of Frankish rule, during which Italian commercial influence, mainly Venetian, Genoese, Amalfian and Pisan, increased, the former, through a dynastic tour d’adresse, took over in 1489. Despite some measure of economic hardship, the population doubled in eighty years. This was the age of manic Ottoman conquest following the fall of Constantinople and the end of the Eastern Roman Empire of Byzantium: in 1570, Nicosia succumbed to an Ottoman siege, with Famagusta falling the following year after a one-year siege. The end was somewhat distasteful since, although the Venetian commander, Bragadino, surrendered on condition that the defenders be allowed to leave, the Ottomans saw fit to kill the garrison and sever Bragadino’s nose and ears, skinning him alive a fortnight later, for good measure, and stuffing the skin with straw. Thus ended Italian influence, although it bequeathed an intellectual diaspora, in particular in Venice and at the University of Padua, where, in the seventeenth century, the statutes of a Cypriot nation were drawn up. The Ottomans brought in two measures which were to leave their mark until today. First was the importation of Anatolian settlers and Jannissaries (yeni çeri, or new soldier in Turkish), the latter being the élite guard of the sultan. They had been taken as young Christian children, proselytised and trained, and were predominantly of Greek and Serbian stock. The second measure was the millet system, whereby the Church, as elsewhere in the Ottoman domains, was able to run its own affairs. To a certain extent, this was a welcome relief from the constant pressure of the Roman Catholic Church, and when the British finally took over, they were to find a force whose power extended well beyond the purely spiritual.

BRIEF BACKGROUND TO CYPRUS

3

Ottoman rule was fairly uneventful for most of its three hundred and seven years, bar four events in particular, caused more by external than internal circumstances. First, in 1605, the Duke of Savoy invaded Cyprus, on the grounds of a dynastic connexion with Catherine Cornaro, who had married the last Lusignan ruler of Cyprus, James II. His forces were massacred. Second, in 1765, the Ottoman governor was hacked to pieces by Christian and Muslim alike, when he tried through violence to prevent a hearing, agreed by the Grand Vizier in Constantinople, to reduce taxes. Third, in 1804, Napoleonic France grew worried by what they saw as the Dragoman’s (a kind of referee between the subject population and the Sultan) pro-Russian policy, and aided and abetted a revolt against the Dragoman and the Archbishop. Although the Dragoman convinced the Sultan to suppress the revolt, the latter changed his mind, and had the former executed. The whole farrago showed how much of a cat’s paw of the ambitions of external powers Cyprus was. We may well conclude by the end of this book that it still is. Fourth, when the Greek war of independence against Ottoman occupation broke out in 1821, the forces of national consciousness set in train by the French Revolution and Napoleon, even if temporarily dampened in France itself, had spread like wildfire through the Balkans and to Greece. Cyprus, essentially Greek and Christian in character as it was, could hardly buck the trend. Despite the studied reticence of the Church of Cyprus, the Ottomans executed the archbishop and a number of leading churchmen, after which there was a round of more general killings. Like other parts of the Greek-populated world, Cyprus was to become part of the Megali Idea (Great Idea), the aim of which was to unite all Greeks. By this time, the Ottoman Empire was crumbling, but heavily supported by Britain, as a bulwark against Russia. By the time of the so-called Great Eastern Crisis in 1877–8, Cyprus was ripe for further exploitation. During the Congress of Berlin in 1878, held largely because Britain did not like the strengthening of Russia and concomitant weakening of the Ottoman Empire resulting from the Treaty of San Stefano the previous year, Britain indulged in some particularly secret diplomacy with Constantinople. The nub was essentially this: rent us Cyprus, or we shall not help you against the Russians. The flailing Ottomans succumbed to the pressure and, to the anger of the French in particular, Cyprus came under British administration. Although the novelty of British colonial administration detracted for a while from serious pressure from the Christians of Cyprus to unite with Greece, the Bishop of Kition had nevertheless put down a marker when,

4

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

in his speech of welcome to the British in 1878, he referred to the ceding of the Ionian Islands to Greece (some fourteen years previously). By early in the twentieth century, the colonialists were well aware of pressure for union, when the Colonial Secretary, one Winston Churchill, stated in 1907 that it was only rational that the Cypriot people who were of Greek descent should regard their incorporation with what could be called their mother country as an ideal to be earnestly, devoutly and fervently cherished. When Crete came under Greek administration following the Balkan Wars, pressure to unite with Greece again grew, and early in the Great War, after Britain’s annexation of the island following the Ottoman Empire’s siding with Germany, Britain even offered Cyprus to Greece, if the latter joined her in the war. But by the time that Greece had been dragged into the war, through the Anglophile Venizelos, the offer had been withdrawn. However, spurred on by Wilsonian dreams and the plethora of new states that hatched from the war, those pushing for union piled on the pressure, which finally manifested itself in violence in 1931, when Government House was burnt down, and the Colonial Constitution revoked, never to return. The socio-political bouleversements throughout Europe occasioned by the ending of the Fourth World War1 were the major factor in bringing back ever stronger calls for union from the eighty two per cent Christian Orthodox population of Cyprus.2 The background to the calls for union were the trend towards decolonisation, nurtured in particular by the USA and USSR, albeit for their own reasons, the Atlantic Charter, which laid emphasis on self-determination, Britain’s impending withdrawal from Palestine and India and, crucially, the handing back of the Dodecanese Islands to Greece by Italy via the British Military Administration. Although there were high-level calls in Britain for unifying Greece and Cyprus, thinking was also muddled: on the one hand, one reason for ceding Cyprus to Greece was to strengthen the Greek government’s position in its fight against the Communist-influenced opposition, while on the other, other senior officials argued that union would weaken the fight against Communism. The latter strand of thinking prevailed, but when the Greek Civil War came to an end, with defeat for the Communists and their supporters, Britain still refused to budge. Even a plebiscite of Greek Cypriots, showing that some 96 per cent favoured union, failed to influence the Colonial Office and British government, and when the British government refused to even discuss the question with the Greek government, who had by now become involved, frustration and incomprehension on the part of Cypriots and Greeks alike grew. On 1 April 1955, Colonel

BRIEF BACKGROUND TO CYPRUS

5

Grivas’ National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) began armed hostilities. The British government began to help the Turkish government, clandestinely, with its nationalist propaganda, and then called a tri-partite conference (Britain, Greece and Turkey) to discuss ‘political and defence questions, as concerning the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus’. The slightly contorted language of the title of the conference was to take the focus away from Cyprus, since the Treaty of Lausanne forbade Turkey from involvement in former Ottoman territories. The British government’s motive, as we shall see from the documents, was simply to divide Greece and Turkey, and Greek and Turkish Cypriots, to facilitate its continuing hold on Cyprus. As predicted, the conference quickly broke down, and was followed by some well co-ordinated anti-Greek (mainly) rioting in Istanbul and Izmir, marking the end of the cool but nevertheless reasonably correct GreekTurkish relations that had existed since the friendship treaties of 1930. It marked the beginning of the end of the presence of Greek nationals and of Christian Orthodox in Turkey, that was to gather pace in 1964, as we shall see. Meanwhile the struggle, now depicted by most Greeks, perhaps understandably, as anti-colonial, intensified. Following Makarios’ rejection of the so-called Macmillan Plan, he and some of his closest associates were exiled to the Seychelles. American power now began to make itself felt. The Suez debâcle had shown that the US would henceforth be the chief Western policy-maker in the Middle East. First, the British were obliged to free Makarios, although he was not allowed to return to Cyprus, and second, the US applied pressure on Britain to compromise, and find a solution for Cyprus involving independence. The US’s prime concern was that the longer the struggle continued, the likelier the chance of war between Greece and Turkey, which would benefit the US’ major bugbear, the Soviet Union. Turkish-Cypriot anti-Greek rioting in 1958, instigated by extremist forces, increased American pressure for a solution, and in February 1959, the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, Karamanlis and Menderes, agreed in principle to a plan for the independence of Cyprus under a Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot president and vice-president respectively, with Britain, Greece and Turkey guaranteeing Cyprus’s independence, and the British maintaining a presence. Having agreed, without Cypriot participation, upon the main traits of a solution (somewhat unique when compared to other de-colonisation processes, both before and after), the three governments then met in London. At this late stage, Makarios was allowed to attend, spending a large amount of energy on whittling down the size of the territories demanded by Britain, from 160

6

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

to 99 square miles, almost three per cent of Cypriot territory. Three treaties emerged. The 103-page Treaty of Establishment, between Cyprus and Britain, underpinned the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. More than half the text was devoted to Britain’s rights vis-à-vis the so-called Sovereign Base Areas, other sites on the island, rights of access and overflying rights. By this time, the Suez mess had resulted in the complete transfer of Britain’s Middle East electronic spying operations to Cyprus, something to which the US attached great importance. The constitution itself hid the seeds of division, based as it was on ethno-religious lines, according the Turkish Cypriots thirty per cent of Civil Service posts, and providing a Turkish Cypriot right of veto in foreign affairs, defence, security and taxation. This was disproportionate, since only eighteen per cent of the population was Turkish Cypriot. The Treaty of Alliance, between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, established permanent contingents of 950 Greek and 650 Turkish (again, disproportionate) troops on the island, while the Treaty of Guarantee, between Britain, Greece and Turkey on the one hand, and Cyprus on the other, forbade union with any country, as well as partition, and made Britain, Greece and Turkey jointly responsible for Cyprus’ independence, sovereignty and integrity. On Turkish insistence, article four of this treaty gave each of the guarantors the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the treaty, were the treaty to be breached, and if concerted action proved impossible. The intricacy of the whole somewhat convoluted arrangement reflected a compromise between a range of outside interests that had little to do with proper independence, even though Cyprus became a member of the United Nations. In many respects, the 1960 arrangement was a blueprint for further partition. Some of the most important details were left, irresponsibly and lazily, to the fledgling government to sort out: almost immediately, there was disagreement over the boundaries of the Turkish-speaking municipalities in the five largest towns. The vice-president also refused to agree to integrated armed forces, whereupon Makarios refused to create an army at all, relying on the police. It was difficult to resolve many of the grass-roots questions so vital to the smooth running of the two main communities if Cyprus. The British Foreign Office therefore encouraged Makarios to draft and present the so-called Thirteen Points, essentially intended to make the Cyprus constitution more workable. The Greek Cypriots were still smarting to some extent from the 1958 riots, while hidden extremist tensions were building up. The civil strife and auto-ghettoisation of large sections of the Turkish Cypriot community that resulted from

BRIEF BACKGROUND TO CYPRUS

7

the Turkish rejection of the Thirteen points gave expression to the pentup frustrations of a divide that had only been papered over by the 1960 arrangement, showing it to have been very much a halfway house. To Turkish irritation, Makarios put the problem to the UN, which appointed a mediator, placed peacekeeping forces on the island and confirmed the sovereignty and continuing existence of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkish aircraft bombed Cyprus, while the Soviet Union warned that it would help Cyprus to defend itself against foreign intervention. This Soviet threat occasioned the US to issue a stern warning to Greece and Turkey not to intervene. The crisis had also caused the Turkish government to unilaterally abrogate the 1930 Treaty of Establishment, on the spurious claim that the Turkish government had no time to appoint a delegation to study and renegotiate the treaty. The result was the expulsion of the twelve thousand Greek nationals of Turkey and most of the remaining sixty thousand Turkish citizens of Greek stock and religion. Makarios rejected the so-called Ball-Acheson plan, which would have entailed a form of double-union and the end of a unified island. To Turkish government anger, on 27 March 1964, a UN peacekeeping force was established in Cyprus. A report by the UN mediator for Cyprus, Galo Plaza, that rejected the idea of federation and called for a departure from the 1960 arrangement was rejected out of hand by Turkey. For the time being, tensions simmered under the surface, while irregular forces built up. By the time of the military coup in Greece, tensions were running high, and following failed Greek-Turkish talks, fighting again broke out in Cyprus. This time, however, the Soviet Union was not as unequivocal as in 1963–4, one reason being the anti-communist credentials of the Greek junta, the other that Grivas was himself a virulent anti-communist. The crisis was only resolved by the withdrawal of Grivas and twelve thousand troops to Greece. The Americans disliked Makarios for various reasons, the main one being that he refused to compromise on the question of a unitary state, and that he had good relations with the Soviet Union, but no longer with Grivas, with whom the Americans had been dealing secretly. This led to him being depicted, entirely wrongly, as pro-communist, when he was merely conducting skilful diplomacy to preserve the integrity of Cyprus, already badly damaged. In 1968, intercommunal negotiations began, and were to continue intermittently until the Turkish invasion of 1974. Relations between Makarios and the Athens junta were never good, and not helped by assassination attempts. It was the replacement of the junta leadership by a hard line and extremist group of officers, following the Polytechnic rioting of November 1973, that was to be the writing on the wall. Tensions between the new

8

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

junta and Makarios increased exponentially, particularly after the untimely death of Grivas, who had returned to Cyprus. A coup against Makarios organised by extremist elements in Athens and Nicosia, during which the British helped Makarios to escape, gave the Turkish government a pretext to invade (using the Treaty of Guarantee), after the British government refused to help. Although the Greek Cypriots restored constitutional order, with the putschist president, Nikos Sampson, being ousted within a few days, and although the Greek junta collapsed, the Turkish government continued to consolidate its military position during frenetic tri-partite talks in Geneva. Despite the talks, Turkey then suddenly took over almost forty per cent of the island. Makarios returned to Cyprus at the end of the year, to the irritation of the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who was clearly happy with the Turkish invasion, writing in his memoirs that the Cyprus problem had been solved in 1974. Around 180,000 Greek Cypriots had been expelled from their homes and fled to the unoccupied part of the island, with another 20,000 being ‘encouraged’ to leave later. Few Turkish Cypriots chose to remain in the free part of the island, many having moved into Turkish Cypriot enclaves in the 1960s. One of the effects of the invasion was its shocking the British government into wanting to relinquish its military lands on Cyprus, but Kissinger’s pressure proved too strong for the Wilson government. The Turkish government now began a policy of systematic (illegal) immigration: today, there are now over 160,000 illegal Anatolian (mainly) settlers in Cyprus, while the original Turkish Cypriots have dwindled to less than half their original number of 116,000, through emigration. Despite the Turkish occupation, Makarios agreed in early 1977 with the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denktash, on a set of guidelines based on a an independent, non-aligned and bi-communal federal republic. In summer of that year, he died. Since then, there has been no substantive progress on a solution, despite a constant series of UN-sponsored intercommunal negotiations. Around 43,000 Turkish occupation troops remain, while the number of original Turkish Cypriots continues to dwindle and be ineluctably replaced with illegal settlers, whom the Turkish authorities often refer to as ‘seasonal workers’. Throughout the whole negotiation process, the occupied zone has consolidated its separateness through various measures such as the declaration in 1983 of a ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, recognised only by Turkey. Tensions have risen and fallen: in 1996, two Greek Cypriots were murdered in public by Turkish extremists, one beaten to death and the other shot while trying to scale a Turkish flagpole.

BRIEF BACKGROUND TO CYPRUS

9

Perhaps the most telling recent development was Cyprus’ accession on 1 May 2004 to the European Union. The opening of accession negotiations between Cyprus and the EU in 1998 had been highly unwelcome to the Turkish government, since it was itself trying to gain entry, with the strong support of its main sponsors, Britain and the US. Pressure for a settlement increased, since it was obvious that Turkey was in an embarrassing position. A positive gesture was the opening by the occupation regime of some checkpoints, enabling Greek and Turkish Cypriots to cross the buffer zone. The so-called Annan Plan was put to a referendum in both free and occupied Cyprus shortly before Cyprus’ formal accession to the EU. The Greek Cypriots rejected it overwhelmingly, while the settlers and the dwindling group of Turkish Cypriots accepted it. It would, in the eyes of many, have legitimised the invasion and occupation, dissolved the republic without strict guarantees for a viable replacement, and have maintained the inefficient 1960 treaties.3 The situation today is somewhat surrealistic, since the whole island is a member of the EU, while the application of the acquis communautaire in occupied Cyprus is suspended until the latter is reunited legitimately with free Cyprus. Perhaps even more surrealistic is the fact that Turkey is eager to join the EU, while occupying part of it. This is not the place to embark on an analysis and evaluation of the external forces, interests and interference that have contributed to Cyprus’ anomalous situation. This I have already attempted in my Cyprus: A Modern History and Cyprus: Diplomatic History and the Clash of Theory in International Relations. Scrutiny of the documents, and extracts of documents, which we shall now present and consider should however go a long way towards understanding Cyprus by default, within both a historical and an international relations context, without relying too much on this or that fashionable theory. The chief underlying purpose of this book is, then, to understand relations between states through the serious perusal of documents. Where, for reasons of space, we have simply quoted extracts from documents, the reader can of course visit the National Archives to consult the whole document and/or file. At any rate, I hope that you, the reader, will benefit not only in understanding what has come to be termed by many ‘the Cyprus problem’, but also to better comprehend the causes of and, therefore, possible solutions to, the problems engendered by the external interference, pride, insecurity and greed with which today’s world seems to be afflicted more than ever.

2 THE STRUGGLE

Introduction ‘Struggle’ can be a rather dramatic word, but then the whole story of Cyprus is not without its dramatic elements. The attempt by the majority Greek Cypriot population to unite with Greece after the last war replicated to some extent that of the Cretans less than half a century earlier. In the case of Cyprus, the struggle became an armed one in 1955, lasting some four years. But at the end of the war and for a while thereafter, there was also an internecine struggle among British officialdom, with some people advocating the ceding of Cyprus to Greece, to strengthen Greece in the fight against communism, and others saying that it was too risky to do so, since Greece could yet become communist. The Greek civil war and the fate of Cyprus are, at any rate, intertwined, and some understanding of that spasm of violence is necessary to grasp the background to the struggle which we shall depict, a struggle that ended up with the colonial power doing its utmost to divide the population of Cyprus, and to create concomitant tension between Greece and Turkey, despite the US’s fear of war between Greece and Turkey, which would serve only to benefit the Soviet Union by weakening NATO, which both Greece and Turkey had simultaneously joined. Britain’s role in the Greek civil war is certainly not without controversy, particularly since Britain turned against its erstwhile resistance allies, the Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS), the armed wing of the National Liberation Front (EAM), ending up supporting those elements of the Greek political scene who had been somewhat equivocal about the German occupation, and who were also fanatically anti-communist. Britain’s main obsession was that the Soviet Union would gain influence in Greece, just as one of the main reasons for acquiring Cyprus in 1878 had been to combat Russian influence. This is a good point at which to kick off with extracts from our first document, a ‘Top Secret’

12

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

paper of 4 June 1944 by the Foreign Office, with a covering memorandum by the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, dated 7 June 1944.1 It betrays a certain amount of speculative, and even muddled, thinking, as well as deep suspicion of Britain’s Soviet ally, almost one year before the defeat of Germany, and some four months before the German occupiers left Greece. Soviet Policy in the Balkans MEMORANDUM BY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS In recent months I have become disturbed by developments which seem to indicate the Soviet Government’s intention to acquire a dominating influence in the Balkans. I accordingly asked my Department to assemble for me the evidence in their possession of this Soviet intention, and the manner in which the Soviet Government appeared to be carrying it out. I also asked them for their views as to whether Soviet policy in this direction should influence our own policy and our military plans in the latter phases of the war and if so in what manner. 2. My Department accordingly prepared the attached note on the subject which I now circulate for their consideration of our colleagues in the War cabinet. 3. In reading it, we should of course guard ourselves against the assumption that it is inevitable that, in the Balkans, there should be a direct clash of interests and sooner or later a conflict. If we make it clear that we think there is an irreconcilable clash of interests between the two Powers in the Balkans, the Russians, who hold so many cards there, will work on the same assumption. We should not hesitate to make our special interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and therefore in Greece and Turkey, and indeed our interests elsewhere in the Balkans, clear to the Russians: but in any steps we take to build up our influence, we must be most careful to avoid the impression of a direct challenge. Foreign Office, 7th June, 1944 A.E. ANNEX In discussing Soviet policy in the Balkans a clear distinction should be made at the outset between what is meant by “the Communisation of the Balkans” and the spread of Russian influence in those countries. It is doubtful whether in actual fact there is any deliberate “communising” of the Balkans at the present moment. It is true that the leaders of the Partisans, E.A.M and L.N.C (Albania) are Communists, and as such spread their ideological theories in the districts under their

THE STRUGGLE control: but this is very difficult from a systematic attempt on the part of some central organisation to “communise” the whole peninsula. Nor can any accusation be levelled against the Russians of organising the spread of communism in the Balkans. The spread of Russian influences, however, is a very different thing, and one which concerns us much closer. The Russians are, generally speaking, out for a predominant position in South-East Europe, and are using the Communist-led movements in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece as a means to an end, but not necessarily as an end in itself. The Soviet Government’s support of the Communist-led elements in these countries is not so much based on ideological grounds as on the fact that such elements are most responsive to their influence and are the most vigorous in resisting the Axis. 2. Furthermore, if anyone is to blame for the present situation in which the Communist-led movements are the most powerful elements in Yugoslavia and Greece, it is we ourselves. The Russians have merely sat back and watched us doing their work for them. […] 4. As regards our own policy for the future of South-East Europe our only constructive suggestion has been the formation of a confederation of these states. The Russians have made it clear, however, that they will have nothing to do with such a solution, basing their objection on he grounds that such a confederation would constitute a cordon sanitaire against them. 5. Russia’s historical interest in the Balkans has always manifested itself in a determination that no other Great Power shall dominate them as this would constitute a strategical threat to Russia. For instance, throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire was in dissolution, the previous alliance between Russia and Austro-Hungary turned into open rivalry in which each Power aimed at obtaining control in the Balkans. In particular, Russia’s scheme in 1878 for a “big Bulgaria” with access to the Aegean led to Great Britain and Austria combining to checkmate Russia’s extended influence in South-East Europe. Subsequent events, such as AustriaHungary’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, were all moves in the game in which Russia and the Central Powers were playing power politics in the Balkans. Now that, under influence of victory, the Soviet Government are reviving Russia’s traditional policy, it is only natural that they should start again to strive for a predominant influence in the Balkans – and they are no doubt still hoping to achieve it by the same means, i.e., by working for the formation of Governments who will be subservient to Russia. What is different is that, whereas in the nineteenth century we had Austro-Hungary as an ally to counter these Russian measures there is no one on whom we can count to support us this time. […] 11. As regards Greece, the Russians at first showed little interest in events in that country. Then about two months ago they began coming

13

14

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS out openly in support of E.A.M .and being critical of our policy. This caused us some concern, not only on account of the short-term difficulties which open Russian support for E.A.M. would cause us in our Greek policy, but also on account of the long-term danger of a linking up of the pro-Russian movements in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece. As a result of our approach to the Soviet Government, however, the latter have now agreed to let us take the lead in Greece, and we may hope that they will not hinder us in any way or openly give their support to E.A.M. […] We should therefore make the most of the present favourable atmosphere to organise some counterweight to the force of attraction which, no matter what happens to E.A.M., Russia is still likely to exercise in post-war Greece. […] 12. Apart from what has been done in the case of Greece, are there any general measures which we could take to prevent the spread of Russian influence in the Balkans? […] D. – (i) To focus our influence in the Balkans by consolidating our position in Greece and Turkey and to bring about and utilise TurcoGreek friendship as a fundamental factor in South-East Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. […] 17. A reorientation in the sense necessary to bring about an AngloGreek-Turkish association is therefore bound to involve us in various difficulties, but it seems to represent the only feasible and constructive method by which we can hope to counter the spread of Russian influence in the Balkans, if we really think it necessary that we should take special measures to do so.

Apart from Britain’s atavistic obsession with Russian power, which had been growing since the end of the eighteenth century, and which comes across in the technically incorrect use of the term ‘Russian’, as well as ‘Soviet’ throughout the text, the paper offered no precise evidence that the Soviets were bent on seeking a dominant position in South-East Europe (even if logic tells us that, historically, Russia would not countenance a hostile South-East Europe), even admitting that the Soviet Union had agreed to let Britain take the lead in Greece, and this some four months before the infamous ‘percentages agreement’ between Churchill and Stalin, whereby the latter agreed that Greece would be ninety per cent British.2 We see here that the origins of the Cold War can be found well before the Soviets walked out of the 1947 Paris conference, and that British policy was a major factor. As regards Greece and Turkey, we shall see that the Foreign Office’s reference to nurturing Greek-Turkish friendship was also inconsistent with the reality that, first, the Turkish-Greek relationship was fragile, having just emerged from the so-called Varlik Vergisi, a series of

THE STRUGGLE

15

punitive and unjust tax measures against non-Turkish residents of Turkey, who were of course mainly Greek, but more so, since only a few years later, as we shall also see, the British government was to expressly create tensions between Greece and Turkey, simply to make it easier – or less difficult – to hang on to Cyprus. Perhaps the most telling message from the above document is however the clear assumption that Greece would not be allowed to find its own way, despite having been Britain’s only ally for several months early in the war. On top of Britain’s keenness not to permit Greece to maintain a friendly posture towards the Soviet Union, Churchill’s obsession with ensuring the return of the king to Greece, against the majority will, was to prove one of the essential elements in the Greek civil war, that broke out in December 1944, and saw British troops fighting their erstwhile ELAS allies and bombing residential quarters of Athens.3 This was happening while the Cypriots were hoping that they would be able to unify with Greece, just as Crete had, notwithstanding its Moslem minority. There was an assumption in some quarters that Greece would be strengthened by the addition of Cyprus. On 13 September 1945, a prominent Labour Member of Parliament, Francis Noel-Baker, wrote to the Secretary of State, Ernest Bevin: 1. I attach proposals for a comprehensive policy that will make possible a new start in Greece. I believe the adoption of this policy would: i) kill Communist hopes of obtaining power by civil war; ii) render possible a fair election, in which all parties would take part, within a period of months; iii) give such impetus to democratic movements in Greece that a stable government would result from this election, so that the British troops could come away; iv) bring H.M.G. great success in the House of Commons, and the Labour Party outside; v) greatly strengthen your hands in your efforts to check Russian imperialist plans in the border countries; and vi) greatly raise the prestige of H.M.G. in the United States and help to secure their full co-operation in making the Peace Treaties. 2. I believe each of the ten measures I propose, including the return of Cyprus to Greece, will at some stage become a matter of practical necessity; but if each measure is taken separately, it may not produce any considerable political effect and may bring H.M.G. little, if any, credit. Done now and all together, the effect may be immense. […]

16

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS A NEW START IN GREECE The following measures if decided on together and put into operation simultaneously would give a hope of a real new start in Greece: […] 10. The return of Cyprus to Greece. There is no doubt that the population of Cyprus ardently desire to rejoin Greece, and that feeling is beginning to run high.4

The (joint) Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, Orme Sargent, agreed with all bar three of Noel Baker’s ten points. He raised no objection to ceding Cyprus. In the meantime, the situation in Greece deteriorated, while a cash-strapped and somewhat unpopular Britain realised that it would have to bring in the Americans who, up to then, had been somewhat reluctant bystanders. Cyprus remained very much on the agenda, with Deputy Under Secretary of State, Oliver Harvey, writing to Orme Sargent two years after Noel Baker’s proposals: We can do little materially to help Greece although it is of the first importance to maintain her confidence in Great Britain and in herself. I suggest therefore that further consideration be given to the question of the cession of Cyprus. 2. The action of H. M. Government in India and Burma has enormously impressed opinion throughout the world. Our proposed evacuation policy in Palestine and the possibility that we may propose independence for Cyrenaica, when coupled with what we have done in India and Burma, makes our continued presence in Cyprus indefensible. 3. I understand that Cyprus has been rejected by the Chiefs of Staff as unsuitable for a long-term strategic purpose. We have in fact never made use of the island for military purposes, and we have spent next to nothing on its material and social betterment. We have nothing to be proud of there. 4. It can hardly be questioned that Greece, who has long governed Crete effectively, and has now been given the Dodecanese, can equally well govern Cyprus. (There is a small Turkish minority whose rights would be secured). 5. British administration in the island is meeting difficulties owing to increasing Cypriot non-co-operation. Hitherto, serious violence has been avoided but with the examples of Palestine, Egypt and Greece itself, we cannot hope that this will last long. 6. It would be tragic if Anglo-Greek relations were now to be poisoned by an E. A. M. campaign of violence in Cyprus. Moreover, we are always

THE STRUGGLE

17

exposed to the risk of a member of the Slav bloc raising Cyprus at the United Nations for our embarrassment. What convincing defence we could make there I do not know. 7. Our own position for holding the United States to the necessity of assuming new responsibilities in Greece would be greatly strengthened if we ourselves had contributed Cyprus. 8. I do not know whether Cyprus would prove to be an economic asset to Greece but it would be the greatest possible contribution to Greek morale and British influence. (We are still living in Greece on the credit of Mr. Gladstone’s retrocession of the Ionian Isles). 9. For these different reasons I would strongly advocate that consideration be given to the very early cession of Cyprus to Greece, before the Cypriot campaign is embittered by violence and before cession can be represented as yielding to force. 10. (I had an opportunity of discussing this with Sir Clifford Norton5 in Switzerland in August. Although he has not seen this paper, I know he shares these views.6

Posterity tells us that Harvey’s reasoned arguments were not accepted, and were even dismissed somewhat speciously. For example, one senior FO official argued that the cession of Cyprus could not be ‘actively considered for the time being’, because of the danger of a communist regime in Greece by Christmas 1948. This was tactical and self-interested exaggeration, since Britain was already ‘handing over’ Greece to the Americans, and since the communists were very much on the defensive. Harvey’s written response of 3 November 1947 to the various arguments deployed against his arguments was both poignant and ominous: I confess I remain quite unmoved by the arguments in the minutes. The Chiefs of Staff will always object to evacuating anything where they have been for some time, just as they will always object to occupying anything where they have not hitherto been. The views of the Colonial Office are, of course, not worth having on the subject, which is essentially foreign affairs. When the Greeks in despair turn to the methods of the Irish, the Jews, the Hindus and the Egyptians, then, I suspect, the British people will rise and compel the Government to evacuate.7

Harvey was being perhaps a little sanguine about the British people’s sense of indignation at Britain’s wish to hang on to Cyprus in defiance of the wishes of the island’s vast majority. Indeed, the British people were at the time more concerned about whether their ration cards were sufficient to provide them with enough food, than with some Orwellian idea of

18

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

achieving justice overseas. He was however correct in his prognostication about the Greeks turning in despair to the methods of the Irish, Jews, Hindus and Egyptians. The British government’s intransigence helped to harden the attitude of both the Greek Cypriots and the Greek government, particularly when the British government even refused to discuss the matter, long after the arguments for hanging onto Cyprus had been invalidated by the defeat of the communists in 1949. Several months before the outbreak of the armed struggle in Cyprus, the British, perhaps knowing that a fight was on its hands, were already secretly colluding with, and helping, the Turkish government, whom they saw as its natural ally in helping them to hang on to Cyprus. In doing so, they were beginning to involve Turkey in one of the Ottoman Empire’s former possessions, something which was expressly forbidden in Article Sixteen of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. The collusion is well expressed in a letter of 15 February 1955 from the British Ambassador to Turkey, James Bowker, to a Deputy Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, William Young: My dear Young, I have been considering whether there is any action on Cyprus which, at this stage, we might usefully initiate or suggest from here.This falls under three heads: a) proper understanding of the Turkish point of view; b) consideration for opinion in Turkey; c) use of Turkish influence with the Greeks in our favour. 2. Under (a) I have the following suggestions to offer. First, Turkish representatives abroad, particularly in London and Washington, might be more active in their activity about the Turkish attitude in Cyprus. In the United Kingdom their efforts might be directed (in this order) to: (a)Members of Parliament, (b) the weekly press (e.g. the ECONOMIST, the SPECTATOR etc.), (c) the daily press (they have already been helped by the journalists’ visit last year). The same appears to be true in the United States and other countries. For example, the Turkish Press Attaché in London has done no good by distributing leaflets of the “Cyprus is Turkish” Association. 3. This has already been discussed in general terms with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; but I could, if you wished, take it up with the Secretary General or the Foreign Minister. 4. Second, the Department might be able to encourage a few selected Members of Parliament to come here on their own initiative, to learn something of Turkey generally and the Turkish attitude to Cyprus in particular. Alternatively, the Turks might be encouraged to invite a

THE STRUGGLE small party, in the same way as they invited the delegation of British journalists last autumn. The following have been suggested as suitable sort [sic] of people: Mr. C. F. Fletcher-Cooke (C) (whose brother is Colonial Secretary in Cyprus); Mr. Woodrow Wyatt (Lab.); Mr. J. Grimond (Liberal). 5. As regards (b), I am inclined to think that the Cyprus Government may not fully realise how much interested Turkish public opinion is in an early and reasonable settlement of the Evkaf question.8 This is of course primarily a matter of internal administration in Cyprus and I know that it bristles with difficulties, is much misrepresented by the Turks and that the Government of Cyprus have given it a good deal of study. But the subject is closely followed in Turkey; and there is a danger that if it remains in dispute much longer it may well adversely affect the whole Turkish attitude towards the British position in the island. I hesitate to make any suggestions about this difficult matter, but, as seen from here, there would be great advantage in getting it dealt with and allowing the dust to settle before embarking on detailed discussions about constitutional advance. 6. As for (c), I have considered the possibility of asking the Turks again to bring pressure on the Greeks to drop their claims. But from what the Head of the responsible Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (M. Kural) told the Head of Chancery, it is not likely that the Turks would want to do this during the meeting of the Balkan Alliance Foreign Ministers in Ankara at the end of this month. Moreover, I assume that the Department would wish any action of this kind to be co-ordinated with similar British and, if possible, American action at Athens. The Counsellor has also been told by his Greek colleague that the Greek Government would object if there were any suggestion that Cyprus might be discussed during the meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 7. Nevertheless the Turks will no doubt be glad to know in due course what policy H.M.G. propose to follow between now and the next meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, and Turkey’s policy is likely to be influenced by British views. As I said in my letter of February 1 to Jack Ward9 about the Secretary of State’s visit to Turkey, the Prime Minister may well want to discuss Cyprus policy in a general way during the visit. 8. I am sending copies of this letter to Peake10 at Athens and to Sterndale-Bennett at the B.M.E.O.11, and to the Governor of Cyprus: and enclose a spare in case you might wish to pass it to the Colonial Office.12

19

20

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

As the stand-off intensified, and the armed struggle broke out on April Fool’s Day, orchestrated by Colonel Grivas, and as Britain tried to keep the question out of the UN, someone high up had a brainwave that was to prove fateful for the future of Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations. The idea was to hold a conference on the question, essentially to divide Greece and Turkey, thus keeping the British finger in the Cyprus pie. An exchange of memoranda at the end of June 1955 at the very top of the Foreign Office explains better than any second hand report the emotions, mentality, methodologies and desires of the policy formulators at the time: CYPRUS: GREEK SUBMISSION TO UNITED NATIONS In his telegram no.1482 of June 25, Sir Roger Makins [Ambassador to the US] says that it will have a damaging effect on American official and public opinion if the Greek Government are able to re-submit their case to the United Nations before any new statement of British policy has been made. He thinks that the Greeks are trying to gain a technical advantage by getting in first. 2. No doubt the purpose of the Greek Government, in allowing their intentions to become known in Washington, has been to urge the United States Government to put pressure on H.M. Government.. Nonetheless, Sir R. Makins’ argument remains valid in so far as American public opinion is concerned; and any new British move, if it followed a Greek application to the United Nations, would be represented as a reluctant rather than a generous gesture. 3. The Minister of State [Nutting] may wish to ensure that Sir R. Makins’ views are considered at the meeting on Cyprus which the Prime Minister proposes to hold this afternoon. 4. It would not, I submit, be expedient for H.M.G. to try to persuade the Greek Government at this stage from renewing their application to the United Nations. (W.H.Young) June 27, 1955 I am sure it would be an error for us to try to bring direct influence or pressure to bear on the Greek Govt. to hold their hand. But Sir R. Makins’ telegram does underline the need for H. M. G. to make an early statement of policy. I think that it is important that any promises for the future should be accompanied by positive action to put down terrorism. The Services Command in Cyprus have urged on the Ministry of Defence the need for ‘repressive action’ and the

THE STRUGGLE

21

Governor has indicated that he may be asking for authority to declare a state of emergency. J.G.Ward 27/VI Permanent Under Secretary I have always been attracted by the idea of a 3 Power conference, simply because I believe that it would seriously embarrass the Greek Govt. And if such a conference were held, I should not produce any British plan or proposal until a Greek-Turkish deadlock has been defined. And then I should ask for a month’s adjournment in order to think out ways of solving the Greek-Turkish conflict. But I see the objections to going ahead with any project under the duress of terrorism. So I would suggest telling both Greek and Turkish Govts. that we had intended to propose a conference, that we could not do so whilst the terrorists were active, but that we should revert to the idea if/when peace is restored to the island. I prefer the above to the idea of making a statement because: 1. The statement will not really embarrass the Greeks. They will pull it to pieces and repeat parrot-wise that “self-determination for Cyprus” now is a minimum demand. (They cannot well respect a proposal for a conference on the grounds that their desideratum is not granted in advance). 2. It does rope the Turks in on our side. 3. If it fails, we revert at once to the present situation. Whereas a Conference can be spun out for some time and tempers would have time to cool. It is always difficult to restart a war after a long armistice. The plan I like least is that alleged to be ventilated by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd [Foreign Secretary] viz. an enquiry of the Greek and Turkish Governments whether – if the island reverts to them – they would guarantee us the necessary military facilities. This seems to imply that we are reconciled to handing over the island to one of them – and that it is up to them to decide the future of the island. And I repeat: I shd. not produce any British plan until the GreekTurkish difference has been exposed. I.Kirkpatrick

22

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS Mr. Nutting [Minister of State]

26.VI. [sic]

This question was discussed yesterday evening at a meeting over which the Prime Minister presided and which was attended by the Colonial Secretary and the Minister of Defence, as well as the Minister of State. Prime Minister to prepare an invitation to the Greek and Turkish Governments for an early conference in London. It was decided that things had gone too far to take the line that we could not do this under duress. At the same time, it would be made clear in reply to Questions in Parliament that we fully intended to carry out the first duty of government, namely to maintain law and order in the island by all necessary means. This proposal was put by the Prime Minister to the Cabinet this morning and in consequence the Foreign Office were directed to despatch telegrams on the lines of the attached drafts, which have been approved by the S of S. H. Caccia [?] June 28, 1955 I.K 28.6.13

On the same day that the Foreign Office was instructed to send invitations to Greece and Turkey, the Chiefs of Staff made their views known in no uncertain terms, in a ‘Top Secret’ letter to the General Headquarters of the Middle East Forces: CYPRUS The Chiefs of Staff took DCC (55)-17 yesterday afternoon and were in general agreement with its conclusions. In discussion, they agreed that British influence and prestige in the Middle East as a whole could not be maintained without the retention of our present military position in Cyprus which was therefore strategically essential. The denial of our present facilities in Cyprus would mean the complete breakdown of all plans for the development of any Middle East defence organisation and would prevent us fulfilling our treaty obligations to Iraq and Jordan. 2. The above views were brought to the attention of Ministers immediately after the Chiefs of Staff meeting.14

On 17 July, the Prime Minister commented on a telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara: Turks are behaving well. If we keep friendly with them, the Greeks will have to come along in the end. Therefore, we must not be parted from Turks, though we need not be ostentatious about this.15

THE STRUGGLE

23

By 23 July, British policy vis-à-vis the conference was, if crudely colonialist in nature, at least unequivocal, as the Foreign Secretary made clear to the Cabinet: Throughout the negotiations, our aim would be to bring the Greeks up against the Turkish refusal to accept enosis and so condition them to accept a solution, which would leave sovereignty in our hands. 16

The Foreign Office expected the conference to fail, and fail it did, in a dramatic fashion, which happened to include the anti-Greek rioting in Istanbul and elsewhere in Turkey that led to the breakdown of Greek-Turkish relations, souring them even to his day. The motives for holding the conference were first and foremost to enable Britain to hang on to Cyprus, to involve Turkey in Cyprus and to delay the internationalisation of the question for as long as possible. As well as coaching the Turkish government on its policy and public relations, the British government was able to play off Greece and Turkey against each other. In addition, despite increasing international, including American, pressure, Britain was able to emphasise Turkey’s strategic importance in a Cold War context, something that the US was now beginning to find vital, particularly following the Suez debâcle, when America began to take over British responsibilities in the Middle East. (Even before the debàcle, and some nine months before the conference, Britain had signed an agreement with Egypt to phase out its troops at Suez, thus making Cyprus more important strategically). Britain continued to work closely with Turkey. Even after the release from exile of Archbishop Makarios (but only a qualified release from exile, since he was not allowed into his homeland), the British were collaborating closely with the Turkish government, even to the point of conceiving and running the Turkish PR campaign on Cyprus.17 For example, on 13 July 1956, a Foreign Office official, Cox, wrote to an Embassy official in Bonn, Fisher: Our attitude to this question [Cyprus] is that we wish to assist the Turks as much as possible with the publicity for their case, but must at the same time be careful not to appear to be shielding behind them and to be instigating the statements.18

Conclusions It is no exaggeration to state that the radicalisation of the more nationalistminded of the Greek- and Turkish-speaking communities took place under the tutelage of the British, as did the increasing involvement of Greece and Turkey. The Turkish-sponsored anti-Greek rioting in the summer of 1958

24

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

that followed the announcement of the abortive ‘Macmillan Plan’ for a ‘tridominium’ – a tripartite condominium of Britain, Greece and Turkey - left a bitter taste in the mouths of even moderate Greek Cypriots, especially since some were forced out of their homes on the edge of Turkish Cypriot areas. The riots did however focus British and American minds, as well as angry Greek and Turkish ones, and US backstage diplomacy went into overdrive. The US was naturally more emotionally detached from Cyprus than the then gung-ho British, and were able to seek compromise more dispassionately than could the British, who were involved in a fullscale propaganda war with Greece, and in helping Turkey clandestinely. Something had to give. It came in the form of an American backstage push for an agreement which would be guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey. The formula was worked out in Zurich following a meeting of the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers in early 1959. It satisfied everyone, at least in terms of diplomatic face-saving. Greece gave up enosis, while Turkey gave up partition, at least nominally. The three countries would be co-responsible for Cyprus’ independence, the president would be Greek Cypriot, the vice-president Turkish Cypriot, with separate communal assemblies, but a joint national assembly, while 950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers would be stationed on the island. Britain was satisfied, since it kept, as sovereign British territory, almost three percent of the island in the form of two military bases. Significantly, Archbishop Makarios and the Cypriots were not even allowed to participate in the substantive negotiations, being brought in only late in the day. The archbishop spent much of his energy in whittling down the size of the territories that Britain was demanding. He was to write later that the least bad thing was to sign. In terms of a decolonisation arrangement, the granting of independence to Cyprus was unique, in that the arrangement was clearly divisive in nature, ignoring one of the fundamentals of democracy, namely the ‘one man, one vote’ principle. Moreover, the involvement of foreign powers and the rights of the British military detracted from any serious notion of sovereignty. In many ways, the whole complicated arrangement served as a blueprint for division, rather than a single unified state, particularly since it left unresolved some of the most basic but vital areas, in particular the demarcation of the boundaries of the Turkish-speaking municipalities in the largest towns. Although at the time, the British could hardly themselves voice doubts about the arrangement, the fact that the Foreign Office encouraged President Makarios to amend the constitution in 1963 speaks volumes, particularly when combined with the doubts expressed over the coming years, which we shall look at in the following chapter. That the

THE STRUGGLE

25

Foreign Office was itself prepared to encourage the president to introduce the very changes which he had advocated when he was allowed into the independence talks in London betrays a considerable degree of backtracking. That the publication of the proposals led to a violent Turkish reaction and Greek counter-reaction, which in turn made a mockery of the whole 1960 constitutional pack of cards is not our concern here so much as the British government’s views of the treaties which it had signed. Thus we move on to those very treaties.

3 THE 1960 TREATIES

Introduction The Republic of Cyprus was created by treaties. The euphoria over independence (insofar as it can be considered proper independence à la India et al), did not last long. As mentioned, there were disagreements over boundaries almost before the ink had dried on the paper, but also over the sacking of Turkish Cypriot policemen who had been hired by the British as auxiliaries during the EOKA campaign, and over the setting up of integrated armed forces (vetoed by the Turkish Cypriot vice-president). It appears that the Foreign Office agreed with President Makarios that amendments (which became known as the ‘Thirteen Points’) were necessary to make the constitution more workable. The amendments included the revision of the ratio of Greek to Turkish Cypriots in the public services and armed forces (although the Turkish Cypriots represented some eighteen per cent of the population, they had disproportionate weighting in the public services), abandonment of the right of veto for the president and vice-president, and the unification of the administration of justice. The British role in the attempted amendments is clear from the following, contained in a letter of 11 March 1971 from the head of Southern European Department, Reginald Secondé, to the High Commissioner to Cyprus, Peter Ramsbotham: Please refer to your letter of 22 February. We have been through the 1963 papers, which tend to confirm that the Thirteen Points were indeed framed with British help and encouragement; that the then High Commissioner [Clark] considered them to be reasonable proposals; and that our intention was to promote their acceptance by the Turks. Archbishop Makarios seems to have consulted Sir Arthur Clark closely on the form and manner of presentation of the proposals. […] I am tempted to add that since the presentation of those thirteen points was followed by the crisis of December 1963, this episode would seem

28

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS to provide an instructive example of the dangers of direct involvement in details of the intercommunal dispute.1

The troubles that began with the presentation of the Thirteen Points have yet to be resolved. They led to vicious fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the long-term auto-ghettoisation of most of the Turkish Cypriots. Perhaps the most immediate, but hidden result, was a shocked Ministry of Defence admission that the best solution should be based on enosis or a Greek Cypriot-dominated unitary state. It is clear from the documents that even the Ministry of Defence was prepared to abandon or at least radically alter the treaties in the interests of a solution, only four years after the British government had signed them. At the height of the crisis, with the threat of war between Greece and Turkey, as well as of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Ministry of Defence Deputy Secretary Frank Mottershead submitted on 27 April 1964 a secret briefing paper for the Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee: Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee D.O.(O)(64)26 Brief 1. This paper has been prepared at Ministry of Defence instigation in order that co-ordinated advice may be given to Ministers before Mr. Tuomioja, the UN Mediator in Cyprus, discusses the Cyprus problem with Mr. Sandys (Minister of State for the Colonies and for Commonwealth Relations) on Friday, 1st May. 2. A satisfactory solution of the Cyprus problem is of very great importance for Britain, and H.M.G. need urgently to consider what form of solution would best serve British interests, and what is the best means of seeking to obtain it. British Aims for Cyprus 3. Our first need is for a solution which will give Cyprus a stable and enduring form of government. It is essential that it be achieved without Greece and Turkey going to war. It is of vital concern go us, and to the West generally, that it be achieved without driving Turkey into an embittered isolation which would strike at NATO, at CENTO and at our ability to use the Northern Route (across Turkey) past the barrier to the Middle and Far East. 4. The issues are well set out in Despatch No.4 from the High Commissioner in Cyprus. His principal conclusions are:(a) The need for a solution is urgent. The United Nations force is barely holding its own. As time passes, it will become increasingly difficult to (and soon, impossible) to solve the problem by any means other than violence.

THE 1960 TREATIES (b) There is no hope of re-establishing the Constitution which was destroyed at Christmas. A radical change is inescapable. (c) None of the solutions favoured by the Turks is within the realms of practical politics. Somehow the Turks must be induced to understand this. (d) The only two solutions which could bring peace and order to Cyprus are enosis or the establishment of a unitary Republic dominated by its Greek-Cypriot majority. 5. The High Commissioner concludes that although enosis is in some way more attractive than the unitary state, Turkey’s objections to it are so strong that it may not be a practicable solution at present. He suggests, therefore, that effort should be concentrated on easing the path to the unitary state, e.g. by providing U.N. safeguards for the minority and by giving financial and other assistance for the resettling of those Turkish Cypriots to whom Cyprus may no longer appear a tolerable home. 6. From the defence point of view enosis, notwithstanding its obvious difficulties, has certain advantages over the unitary state. It seems more likely to achieve real stability in the island since the civil authority might be stronger and better able to check vendettas; the risk (a real one with the unitary state) of Cyprus falling under Russian or U.A.R. influence would be largely eliminated: and the retention of our Sovereign Base Areas and other defence facilities might be easier with Cyprus as a province of a NATO ally than with a Cyprus tempted to cash in on the benefits of neutralism. 7. Even from the Turkish point of view, the practical (as opposed to the emotional) considerations favour enosis rather than the unitary state. For several reasons Turkey could get better guarantees from Greece than she could ever get from a Makarios administration that this offshore island would not be developed as a menace to Turkish security or as an affront (through the maltreatment of Turkish Cypriots) to “racial” feeling in Turkey. 8. For these reasons we hope that the possibility of achieving enosis will not be too readily set aside. TACTICS 9. The paper under brief is principally concerned with the tactical handling of Mr. Tuomioja.2 It stresses, what is the firm belief of the Foreign Office, that anything said to him may leak. A leak of pro-Greek sentiments would have dangerous consequences in Ankara. Therefore “it would be premature to give any firm indication of what sort of solution we would favour”. Accordingly the “Talking points for use with Mr. Tuomioja”, which are annexed to the paper, are non-committal to the verge of inanity.

29

30

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS 10. This may be inevitable if it is true that nothing can be said in strict confidence to the mediator. But there are also dangers in withholding assistance from the mediator at this stage. Mr. Tuomioja, already oppressed by the conflicting and partisan views of Greeks and Turks, has made it clear that he hopes to receive well-considered and comparatively objective opinions from the British Government. If he does not, there may be a risk that he will wash his hands of the problem by merely listing the solutions theoretically possible and leaving others to choose between them. In the absence of any strong recommendation by the mediator, no solution is likely to be achieved by rational means. A solution by violence may be inescapable. 11. It must, therefore be in our interest that a non-violent solution be advocated (and some attempt made to deal with the difficulties) by someone other than ourselves, and someone who is recognised as a dispassionate and informed observer. When the mediator has gone – and there can be no guarantee that he will stay long – there will be no-one who can perform this function. 12. The opportunity of influencing the mediator towards a satisfactory recommendation may be a fleeting one. Although he is expected to return for a second round of discussions there is no reason to suppose that he will then be more receptive to suggestions or more capable of preserving a confidence. 13. If, therefore, we believe that a ‘pro-Greek’ solution is the only one with any chance of long-term success, it may be better to move the Mediator in that direction now (as diplomatically and unattributably as possible) than to risk being forced into open advocacy of such a course after the “cover” of the Mediator has been removed. The argument that we should not take this course yet seems to assume that it may be easier to take it later. All the evidence is that it will be more difficult, both because the U.N. presence may be removed and because the situation in Cyprus and Ankara is getting steadily worse. Conclusions 14. (a) If Mr. Tuomioja can be relied upon to keep what passes in the interview confidential he should be informed, in strict confidence, of the British Government’s view on the type of solution (enosis or GreekCypriot dominated unitary state) which offers the best hope of meeting the real interests of all the parties most directly concerned. (b) If it is considered too dangerous to give Mr. Tuomioja a positive indication of H.M.G’s view of the best solution he should be told what in our view are the possible solutions with some indication of the pros and cons of each (this would require some revision) and expansion of Appendix 1 to the Annex to the paper). The pros and cons should be given in such a way that we could hope that Mr. Tuomioja would draw the right conclusions, but H.M.G. would still

THE 1960 TREATIES

31

be enabled to say that they were not advocating any particular form of solution. (c) If Mr. Tuomioja and others reach the conclusion that a “proGreek” solution is the only possible one the main problem will be to bring the Turks to accept this conclusion. It would seem well for the political departments to begin to consider now how, with the Americans and other countries, we might best seek to bring this about.3

Appendix 1, mentioned in the above brief, listed eight possible solutions, each with their pros and cons: enosis with Greece; two-way enosis; condominium between Greece and Turkey; trusteeship; population exchange (removal of Turkish Cypriots to Turkey, to be replaced by ethnic Greeks from Turkey. Turkey was in any case forcing them to leave for Greece); status quo; unitary state (with majority rule); and separation of the two communities (partition/federation/fragmentation into cantons). It is quite clear from the above document that whatever the subtle tactical diplomatic gyrations, the British saw simple enosis with Greece as the most viable solution, particularly since it was seen as safeguarding the viability of the Sovereign Base Areas. This was a remarkable transmogrification, given that only a few years previously, Britain had been fighting a tough guerrilla war to prevent enosis. This about-turn begs the question as to why Britain had not pushed for an enosis solution in the first place, as the above-mentioned Francis Noel-Baker and Oliver Harvey had advocated. There was the precedent of Crete. The answer perhaps lies in a combination of diplomatic and national imperial pride, linked to the origins of the Cold War and fear of the Soviet Union. Whatever the debate about the causes of this U-turn in thinking, it suggests that Britain considered the 1960 treaties somewhat expediently. Certainly, the continuing lack of a solution was occasioned mainly by the US’s preferred policy of partition, which the British then reluctantly went along with,4 having little choice after the US had taken over the western lead on the Middle East following the Suez debâcle of 1956. By this time, with the threat of war between Greece and Turkey only narrowly averted, and with what was looking like becoming the permanent involvement of the UN, Cyprus had again become a headache for Britain, even if the tendency was now increasingly to hide behind the US, notwithstanding the latter’s having no legal locus standi vis-à-vis Cyprus. The US had by now decided that Turkey was too vital to its Middle East interests to be able to adopt the position that the British government had been contemplating. Moreover, in 1958, Israel and Turkey had begun military co-operation.

32

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

Britain now began to worry about its treaty commitments, and whether it might actually have to invoke them in the event of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The government’s attitude to Cyprus’s security is fascinatingly, if confusingly, encapsulated in an exchange of ‘Top Secret’ letters at the end of 1965 and in early 1966, between the Commonwealth Relations Office (the remnants of the Colonial Office) and the Cabinet Office about Britain’s putative defence of another Commonwealth country. We should point out at this stage that although Britain opposed Cyprus’s membership of NATO, it obviously had to support its membership of the Commonwealth, as a former colony. The interesting aspect of the correspondence which we shall now read is that there is no mention of the Treaty of Guarantee. If Britain had intended to honour the treaty, then it is logical to ask why upper echelons of government were bothering to look at ways of playing down (as we shall now see) Britain’s security obligations within a Commonwealth context. After all, if Britain (and Greece and Turkey) were obliged to defend Cyprus from external aggression under the Treaty of Guarantee, then it seems curious to look at the Commonwealth obligations. The answer probably lies in the fact that Britain had already agreed (in 1964) with the US that neither it nor the US Sixth Fleet would intervene in the case of a Turkish invasion.5 This left the problem of the Commonwealth obligation. On 30 December 1965, Neil Pritchard, Deputy Under Secretary of State at the Commonwealth Relations Office, wrote a ‘Top Secret’ letter to Philip Rogers, Deputy Secretary at the Cabinet Office: Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to John Lapsley6 of the 14 December about “our moral obligations to come to the defence of members of the Commonwealth who may be attacked”. I think that there is some danger of misunderstanding and I am glad that you raised the point. 2. In the discussions relating to the Defence Review we in the C.R.O. have been concerned to question phraseology suggesting that we have a general commitment to Commonwealth countries. Such phraseology would go too far and have too specific implications. At the same time it has been recognised, both in public statements and by our actions, that Britain has a general moral obligation to help a Commonwealth country which is attacked and, for some time to come, it would not be expected, in this country or in the Commonwealth country under threat or in the rest of the Commonwealth, that Britain would stand completely aside in such circumstances. Of course our response would be different depending on which Commonwealth country was under threat and what the particular circumstances were at the time. At one end of the spectrum there is [sic] Australia and New Zealand; we would be immediately involved if they were threatened. We acted promptly in

THE 1960 TREATIES aid of India in 1962, and would do so again in similar circumstances. And there are also at present certain specific commitments to particular Commonwealth countries. 3. Thus, so far as the general moral obligation is concerned, our view is that our Commonwealth position will inevitably be an important factor in deciding upon what sort of response we would make if a Commonwealth country is under attack; but that special capacity need not be made available for this purpose in the future size of our forces as they will emerge from the Defence Review. 4. I agree that the drafting of paragraph 11 of O.P.D.(O)81 is not quite right in that it lumps together the general moral obligation with our specific bilateral commitments. But the general sense is, I think, clear and does not conflict with the position indicated above. 5. I have noticed the phrase “we [by 1970] shall have no obligations to Cyprus” in the assumptions in paragraph 1(j) of O.P.D.(O)82. On the basis that Cyprus will remain in the Commonwealth, it would be better to say “no commitments”. 6. I am sending a copy of this letter to John Lapsley.7

Rogers replied on 4 January 1966: Thank you for your letter of 30 December about our obligations in respect of defence of members of the Commonwealth. I am grateful to you for clearing up the position as regards commitments to Commonwealth countries and I am sure that no one would question your view that our Commonwealth position would inevitably be an important factor in deciding what sort of response we would make if a Commonwealth country were attacked. It is also, as you say, agreed that special capacity need not be made available for this purpose in the future size and shape of our forces as they will emerge from the Defence Review. I wonder, however, if I might seek one further point of clarification from you on an aspect which might give rise to misunderstanding in future unless we can get it quite clear? I think it is solely a matter of wording. First of all am I correct in interpreting your differentiation between “commitment” and “moral” obligation as being in general terms a difference between a commitment by treaty or formal agreement which may, or may not, commit us to use armed force in all circumstances and a moral obligation which means no more than that we would do the best we could, given the circumstances of the Commonwealth country under threat or attack and the means available to us for intervention, with no automatic assumption that our intervention would take the form of military aid? I think what I am slightly troubled about here is the use of the word “moral”, for apart from the juridical aspect of the difference to which I have referred above, a moral

33

34

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS obligation could be interpreted as being very similar to a commitment. Certainly, I would have thought that it would imply that all of us would have a considerable sense of shame if we failed to come to the aid of a Commonwealth country when attacked. Looking at it in this sense, I wonder for example, whether we would have a moral obligation to go to the defence of Ghana if it were attacked by a neighbouring country because Ghana had fostered subversion there? If you think there is anything in my point, I wonder if it might perhaps be met by defining this more as a political obligation in respect of a Commonwealth country, which does not exist (short of special treaty commitments) in respect of foreign countries, to consider when such a country is attacked whether, in all the circumstances, we should assist them and if so, by what means i.e. implying not necessarily the use of armed force. I can well see a difficulty over this in that I think we would all agree that our obligations to Australia and New Zealand go substantially beyond this and amount in fact to a complete moral obligation to assist with armed force if necessary. At the other end of the spectrum, to use my Ghana analogy once again, there might be very little, if any, “obligation” in it, although even there, there is a political aspect to be considered. The problem is to devise a simple phrase which will span this spectrum – it may well be that no simple phrase can do it! I do apologise for labouring a point and the substance of it is not, of course, for me. I hope you will forgive me if I just seek to get the point clear, because I think it is important for future departmental discussions. If you would like me to come across and have a word with you to save further letters, I would of course be very ready to do so. As regards your paragraph 5, the phrase to which you refer has given rise to certain misunderstandings and indeed Lewis of your department raised it with me only the other day. I think there are three aspects which really need to be covered, looking at the document as a whole. These are that(a) the United Kingdom would have no commitments in respect of Libya to be met from a Cyprus base; (b) the United Kingdom would have no commitments to Cyprus in respect of the defence of Cyprus – and (c) the United Kingdom would have no obligation to Cyprus in respect of the continuation of the UNFICYP. If you or John Lapsley, to whom I am copying this letter, agree, we need not propose amending the paper but we could get the point clear in subsequent documents.8

Pritchard replied to Rogers on 25 January:

THE 1960 TREATIES

35

Thank you for your letter of 4 January on this difficult question of our position on defence matters vis-à-vis other Commonwealth countries. 2. I think we are all at one on the substance and that, as you say, it is only a matter of wording-or even I suggest of the nuances of particular words! You are right in suggesting that we are drawing a distinction between, on the one hand, a commitment as something of a formal nature, under which, in certain circumstances, we should be bound to do certain things (whether e.g. to contribute armed forces or at least to “consult together”; and, on the other, a situation in which, though not legally bound to take any steps at all, we could not avoid having regard to expectations that, as the leading country of the Commonwealth, we should try to do the best we could, whatever form our response might in fact take. What that response would be would depend on the place in the spectrum, ranging from nil to complete involvement. When in my letter of 30 December I talked about a Commonwealth country being attacked, I had in mind of course a country which was the victim of what in our view was unprovoked aggression: this would not extend to Ghana if we thought she had asked for it. 3. As you say it is extraordinarily difficult to find a short form of words to express this. “Political obligation” still seems to me to be suggesting something too clear-cut and positive. I think that, as a term of art, “moral obligation” gets rather nearer to the truth, just as in common parlance one speaks of being morally obliged to do something which one is not legally obliged to do. But I agree that it is not ideal. What do you think about “general obligations arising from common membership of the Commonwealth”? 4. It might help to clarify the distinction if the word “treaty” or “legal” were inserted before “commitment”, wherever it occurs. 5. I have the following comments on the particular point you raised about Cyprus in the final paragraph of your letter:(i) Your (a) agreed. (ii) & (iii). I would prefer to cover these in a general statement to the effect that the assumption is that a Cyprus settlement will have been achieved which would have relieved us of any treaty in respect of the defence of the Republic and of any obligations in regard to peace-keeping within the Republic. 6. I am sending a copy to John Lapsley.9

This extraordinary semantic swordsmanship between the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Cabinet Office, ‘Top Secret’ into the bargain, perhaps betrays a certain level of opaqueness and lack of clarity in Britain’s defence commitments at the time, at least in respect of some countries. Cyprus was not a member of NATO, nor involved with Britain in a

36

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

formal agreement in respect of electronic intelligence-gathering, as were Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Thus, she could not, in British eyes, claim to be in the same league as Australia or New Zealand, even if she was a member of the Commonwealth, but was more akin to Ghana. On the other hand, Britain was a co-guarantor of Cyprus’s independence, sovereignty and integrity. But the fact that Britain had no specific bi-lateral defence treaty with Cyprus muddied the waters. The somewhat convoluted correspondence that we have seen merely reflected reality. But if the above picture of policy formulation (although perhaps ‘convolution’ might appear a more apposite word to some) is instructive as to the British government’s view of its obligations at the time, this was nothing compared to the para-legalistic pirouetting that was to manifest itself after the next bout of tension, and invasion scare, in 1967. At the height of the crisis, at the end of November, the British government was again in a quandary as to what its defence obligations to Cyprus would be if Turkey, a fellow NATO member with Britain and a co-guarantor with Britain and Greece of Cyprus’s integrity, were to invade. On 24 November 1967, the Law Officers advised the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office legal advisers, Francis Vallat and James McPetrie, about Britain’s legal position in the case of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus. On 1 December, McPetrie sent to William Dale, Special Assistant to the Law Officers, a draft note with the advice given, asking whether the Officers had any amendments. The draft read as follows: Position of United Kingdom Government in international law to the threatened Turkish action against Cyprus Advice of Law Officers At a meeting on Friday 24 November 1967 attended by the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office Legal Advisers, the Law Officers were asked to advise whether the United Kingdom Government were under any obligation under the Treaty of Guarantee to take unilateral action in the current situation, that is to say, a threatened invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces, to protect the Republic of Cyprus from such an invasion. 2. The Law Officers were of the opinion that no such obligation was imposed by the Treaty. They considered that Article IV set out comprehensively the rights and obligations that were conferred and imposed on the guaranteeing Powers by the Treaty in the event of a breach and that the language of that article indicated that, while there would then be an obligation on the three Powers to consult together with respect to the possibility of concerted action, it did not purport to impose any

THE 1960 TREATIES obligation on any of the guaranteeing Powers to take unilateral action if such concerted action did not prove possible: instead it merely reserved to each of them the right to do so. 3. The Law Officers recognised that this interpretation of Article IV, though apparently required by the wording of the Article, might be said to produce a surprising result for the Treaty as a whole if the Treaty were to be regarded as a Treaty under which the Republic of Cyprus was accorded protection against action by any of the three guaranteeing Powers. However, bearing in mind the circumstances in which the Treaty was concluded and having regard also to the general form of the Treaty (see especially the preamble, which recites that the Treaty is concluded between the Republic of Cyprus of the one part and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of the other part), the Law Officers considered that the essence of the Treaty was really the undertaking by the Republic of Cyprus on the one hand to refrain from certain kinds of activities (namely, activities promoting enosis with Greece or partition) and to maintain the constitutional arrangements established simultaneously with the Treaty and the corresponding undertaking by the three guaranteeing Powers on the other hand to prohibit those activities so far as it concerned them and also to respect those constitutional arrangements. The Law Officers considered that, when the Treaty was viewed in this light, there was no reason to reject an interpretation of Article IV which accorded strictly with its actual wording and, indeed, that such an interpretation was reinforced by a consideration of the intention of the Treaty read as a whole. 4. The Law Officers considered what the United Kingdom Government’s position would be if the Government of the Republic of Cyprus invoked the Treaty of Guarantee in the present situation and requested action by the United Kingdom Government under it to protect the Republic against a Turkish attack. (It was explained that, in view of the past attitude of the Cyprus Government to the Treaty, such a request was not very probable.) The Law Officers were instructed that there were numerous instances of breaches of the Treaty having been committed by the Government of Cyprus, in particular by the passage of legislation which was contrary to the Basic Articles of the Constitution. On this footing and leaving aside the question whether the threatened invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces would in fact put the Turkish Government in breach of the Treaty so as to found the basis for action under Article IV, the Law Officers considered that it would be open to the United Kingdom Government, if Ministers thought fit, to adduce these breaches by the Government of Cyprus as a reason for rejecting the request of that Government for action by the United Kingdom Government. In adopting such an attitude, the United Kingdom Government would be entitled to place particular reliance on the fact that the guarantee given in Article II is expressed to be given “taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty”.

37

38

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS 5. The Law Officers also considered whether, if the threatened Turkish invasion took place, there was any obligation on the three guaranteeing Powers to institute the consultation provided for by Article IV, paragraph I and, indeed, whether even the imminent threat of such an invasion was sufficient to make that obligation operative. It was pointed out that the Turkish Government might well dispute that their invasion of Cyprus, at any rate in the present circumstances, would constitute a breach of the Treaty and it was accepted that there might be some force in their arguments to this effect. However, on the assumption that an invasion would in fact constitute such a breach, the Law Officers considered that it would then be the duty of the United Kingdom Government and also of the other guaranteeing Powers to consult together as provided for by the first paragraph of Article IV. They also considered that the language of that paragraph could reasonably support the argument that such a duty arose even when there was merely a threat of an imminent invasion. Accordingly, if the United Kingdom Government thought that there was any advantage in requesting such consultation in present circumstances and without waiting for an invasion to take place, the Law Officers considered that the United Kingdom Government could plausibly adduce the obligation imposed on them by the first paragraph of Article IV as the reason for making the request. The Law Officers pointed out, however, that the citing of the Turkish invasion or threatened invasion as the specific occasion for such a request might be thought to be undesirable as clearly implying that Turkey was or would be in breach of the Treaty. But since there were indisputably several respects in which there had been departures from the state of affairs guaranteed by the Treaty, the Law Officers considered that it should be possible to formulate a request for consultation under Article IV in general terms which did not specify which party was in breach of the Treaty and which therefore did not point the finger at Turkey specifically. 6. Finally, the Law Officers considered the possible bearing on all these questions on the Treaty of Establishment and the United Nations Charter. It was pointed out that the Cyprus Government had already contended that the Treaty of Guarantee was invalid as being inconsistent with the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and that, at least to the extent that it envisaged forcible intervention in Cypriot affairs without the consent of the Cyprus Government, was contrary to Article 2.4 of the Charter and was therefore overridden by virtue of Article 103 of the Charter. This argument was not without force and was certainly attractive to a substantial body of opinion in the United Nations. If it were correct, it would mean that neither Turkey nor the other guaranteeing Powers could rely on the Treaty of Guarantee as justification for action which could properly be described as “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence” of Cyprus. On the other hand, the use of force with the consent of the Government of Cyprus , either under the Treaty of

THE 1960 TREATIES

39

Guarantee or, for example, under Article 3 of the Treaty of Establishment, would not be contrary to Article 2.4 and might well amount to action of the sort expressly contemplated as legitimate by Article 51 of the Charter. In effect, therefore, the threatened Turkish invasion of Cyprus and any forcible intervention in Cyprus undertaken by the other guaranteeing Powers without the consent of the Cyprus Government might well be held to be forbidden by the Charter and thus to be unlawful, even though committed in reliance on the Treaty of Guarantee. But forcible intervention by the United Kingdom or Greece at the request of the Cyprus Government and to protect it against a Turkish invasion would not be contrary to the Charter.10

On 5 December, the Legal Secretary of the Law Officers’ Department, William Dale, replied, making it plain that they did not wish to look further at the question: Cyprus: Treaty of Guarantee Thank you for your letter of 1 December enclosing a Note made of the discussion with the Law Officers on 24 November. You will remember that the conference was held in the circumstances of extreme urgency prevailing that weekend, without a written reference of any kind, save a short statement of the issues in the Note of 25 November. It was to enable you to give immediate advice to Ministers as to our legal obligations, if any, under the Treaty, in the event of Turkish invasion of Cyprus. I fear that the Law Officers would be very reluctant to consider the matter, with all the difficult and far-reaching issues which could arise, in the form of a Note such as you have sent, especially since this crisis, we hope, has now passed. I have had a word with Francis Vallat and he also feels it difficult to deal with the matter in this way. I suggest, therefore, that we simply let the Note stand as your record of the discussion, and a useful one. This is, of course, on the understanding that you are free to refer any question to the Law Officers if future circumstances make this desirable. I am sending a copy of this to Francis Vallat.11

To drive in the nail of inaction, both the Commonwealth Office and Foreign Office legal advisers confirmed their agreement that no further action was necessary. The Commonwealth Office did not however immediately let go, and there was some internal correspondence, culminating in an Assistant Under Secretary of State at the Commonwealth Office, John Moreton, writing on 14 December to McPetrie, who had of course initiated the whole business by asking the Law Officers to approve the Commonwealth Office draft version of their advice:

40

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS With respect I do not find Sir William Dale’s letter very satisfactory. It seems to reserve the position of the Law Officers completely on the points at issue, on the grounds that there had been insufficient opportunity to consider them fully. 2. I realise that you may not wish to trouble the Law Officers with questions which are not of immediate urgency. On the other hand, while it is true that the immediate threat of an invasion of Cyprus is past, it is far from inconceivable that it will be revived. We should then be faced, again at short notice, with the need for definitive advice on the interpretation of the Treaties and again the Law Officers might feel they had insufficient time to consider the matter properly. I therefore wonder whether you would feel it wise to put these issues to them now. 3. What we need is confirmation of the opinions at A, B, C and D of the draft note attached to your letter of 1 December (in particular A and B). You may feel that Ministers can be advised to proceed on the assumption that these opinions are correct without further reference to the Law Officers; but I do think this is a matter which only you can judge.12

Perhaps somewhat bizarrely, it took McPetrie some ten weeks to reply to Moreton. One can only speculate about the motives and dealings among these Whitehall mandarins on a question as important as Britain’s military obligations, although we shall attempt this in our conclusions. At any rate, McPetrie’s discourteously late response of 1 March 1968 swept the whole matter under the carpet: Please refer to your minute of 14 December below. I do not think that we can go back to the Law Officers on this as you suggest. We consulted them in relation to a particular situation that existed on 24 November 1967 and they gave us such advice as they could in the time available. If we went back to them now, we should be asking them either (i) to advise on the application of the Treaty at large which, in the case of a Treaty like this, is not a satisfactory method of proceeding and would not avoid the necessity of seeking further advice if and when a particular case arose, or (2) to advise in relation to hypothetical cases, which they naturally dislike since the actual and the hypothetical rarely turn out to be the same. 2. Turning to the passages of the note to which you particularly refer in your minute – 3. The Law Officers were firm enough in the view at ‘A’, i.e. that we were under no obligation to take unilateral action in the situation then obtaining. This was the main point on which their advice was

THE 1960 TREATIES

41

sought and I have no reason to think that, if a similar situation arose in future, they would think otherwise. As regards ‘B’, I do not think that the Law Officers would be willing to advise in the abstract. There are two limbs to ‘C’, viz. (i) the duty to consult together under Article IV – that such a duty arises in the event of a breach of the Treaty is plain from the language of the Article but whether an invasion of Cyprus would amount to a breach of the Treaty is a question on which one could advise only in the context of a particular case and (iii) whether the duty to consult arises in the face of a mere threat of invasion – on this point as you will see from the note the Law Officers were very guarded and am sure they would go no further. As regards ‘D’ – On this issue, viz. whether forcible intervention under the Treaty without the consent of the Republic would be a breach of the Charter, the Law Officers were again very guarded and quite naturally so, for much might depend upon the circumstances in which the invasion took place. They would not, and I think could not, give any further advice in the abstract.13

There the matter rested, with Moreton simply writing: ‘Very well.’14 To add a vague hint of the absurd to this tale, it is necessary to mention that in the earlier crisis of 1964, the Law Officers had given advice which ‘substantially reversed’ the 1967 advice.15 Before our conclusions, let us look at the British government’s navel-gazing a few years later on the 1960 treaties as a whole, or ‘agreements’, as they came to be called, perhaps because somehow agreements demand less precise obligation than treaties, thus giving more room for manoeuvre. On 10 February 1971, a senior legal adviser at the FCO, Henry Steel, wrote to Patrick Fearn of Southern European Department: CYPRUS: VALIDITY OF THE 1960 AGREEMENTS […] Our rights in respect of the Sovereign Base Areas do not derive from the fact that we retain the sovereignty over these areas, having expressly excluded that sovereignty from the rest of the island of Cyprus which we gave up when the Republic was established. It is true that both the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee contain provisions which in effect constitute collateral undertakings about our “quiet enjoyment” of the Sovereign Base Areas, but even if all these agreements disappeared tomorrow, it would not affect our legal right to remain in the areas and to use and administer them in whatever way we thought fit. […] So much for our original position. Since the constitutional breakdown of 1963 and the intervention of the United Nations

42

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS in 1964, the Cyprus Government have taken the line that the Treaty of Guarantee is no longer valid: I think that they take the same line about the Treaty of Alliance.[…] I am sure that they purport to regard the Treaty of Guarantee as wholly void but it may be that they would accept that the Treaty of Alliance still has some effect, at any rate in relation to Greece. […] we have consistently taken the line that both the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee are still operative and we have from time to time gone on public record to that effect and have made formal representations to the Cyprus Government on that basis. (They have, of course, rejected those representations). […] we would not accept that any organ of the United Nations is competent to affect the validity of a Treaty in the way apparently suggested by the Cyprus Government and I imagine that we would not accept that the various Resolutions of the Security Council did in fact purport to have such an operation. 9. As you know, we have from time to time considered whether it is necessary to maintain our stand on the Treaty of Guarantee. We have so far concluded that it would be against our interests not to do so. I think that our reasons were the following : – a) To accept the views of the Cyprus Government would damage our general posture on the sanctity of treaties, i.e. on the question of the circumstances in which treaties can be repudiated or can be regarded as having been invalidated. b) the various 1960 agreements, deriving as they all did from the London and Zurich Agreements of 1959, constituted an integral settlement – in effect a package deal. The abandonment of our position on the Treaty of Guarantee would thus undermine our position on the rest of the 1960 settlement. In particular, it might one day be found to have prejudiced our position on the Treaty of Establishment as well. c) Even though our title to the Sovereign Base areas does not depend on the Treaty of Guarantee or the Treaty of Establishment, the express provisions in those Treaties concerning the Sovereign Base Areas may still be of value to us in ensuring our untroubled occupation and use of the Areas. Moreover, anything which called the 1960 settlement as a whole into question would expose us to pressure on our moral (as distinct from legal) right to hang on to the Areas. d) Whether or not we have a direct interest in maintaining the Treaty of Guarantee, we could not openly abandon it without gravely upsetting Turkey. […]16

Some of you readers may be champing at the bit to see what we can make of all this in our analysis and conclusions, especially since it seems that maintaining a stance on the Treaty of Guarantee depended – and likely

THE 1960 TREATIES

43

depends today – more on Britain’s perceived interests than on the actual words of the treaty. Let us look first at two more crucial documents. Two years later, on 8 February 1973, the Counsellor at the British High Commission in Nicosia, Derek Day, wrote to the Head of Western European Department, Alan Goodison: CYPRUS: BRITAIN’S FUTURE AS A GUARANTOR POWER 1. In paragraph 12 of my Annual Review for 1972 I said that if an international agreement were achieved in 1973, or a provisional agreement were reached pending settlement of the external aspects of the Cyprus problem, the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance might well come up for discussion. I added that this in turn could bring the status of the SBA’s into question. An intercommunal solution is not immediately in prospect, to say the least. But it would be as well for us to begin some contingency thinking about our future role as a Guarantor Power. I apologise in advance to those, particularly the legal advisers, into whose territory this letter will trespass. The Treaties 2. The retention of British Sovereignty over the SBAs was set out in the Treaty of Establishment which was signed by the United Kingdom, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.[…] 6. Our role as Guarantor Power is not particularly welcome here. The Cyprus Government dislike it, although they do not take it too seriously compared with the military threat from Turkey and Greece. The Turkish Cypriots do not care about us provided that they have a military guarantee from Turkey. The Greek and Turkish Governments probably consider British involvement in the Treaties marginally useful for contingencies, for example when one of them wishes to get a friend to lean on the other. But our position in the island would in any case make them tend to court our friendship. The US is not a Guarantor Power, but if anything has been even more closely embroiled in the affairs of the island than we (for example in 1964 and 1967). However, if the Cyprus Government are unable to have the Treaty of Guarantee abolished, they may prefer that we should remain a guarantor power rather than that they should be left alone with Greece and Turkey. […] d. We should be prepared to discuss the future of the Treaty of Guarantee with the other guarantor powers if that were their general wish. e. Provided any eventual constitutional settlement is fully acceptable to the two communities in Cyprus and to the Greek and Turkish Governments and provided all the other guarantor powers so wished, we should be prepared to reaffirm the existing Treaty of

44

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS Guarantee with the inclusion of a review clause if this were generally acceptable.17

It took Goodison eighty days to respond, suggesting that the question was indeed a vexed one, requiring much consultation and even semantic gymnastics: […] 2. Our principal concern in all this is of course the implications for the Sovereign Base Areas. The legal position is that British sovereignty over them does not depend on any of the Treaties of 1960. Out title to the SBAs goes back well beyond 1960 and is a sound one in law. The Treaties merely took account of our sovereignty over the SBAs, establishing the Republic of Cyprus in the remainder of the island (Treaty of Establishment, Article I). […] 3. The 1960 constitutional arrangements for Cyprus were of course unusual: a rigid constitution, a rôle for outside powers, Treaties of Establishment and Guarantee and guarantees for the constitutional order. Written constitutions have the disadvantage of rigidity. The Cyprus constitution ceased to work properly at the end of 1963. The factual situation in Cyprus has for a number of years been out of accord with the constitution but we have not seen advantage in taking “action with the sole aim of our establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty” (of Guarantee), as is permitted under Article IV, second paragraph. All we have done is formally to object to those Greek-Cypriot actions which in our view amounted to breaches of the constitution (using our locus standi under the Treaty of Guarantee) and reserve our position. 4. The Supreme Court of Cyprus considered the situation in 1964 and, applying the legal theory of necessity (developed in cases after the US Civil War), blessed the de facto situation which had arisen in 1964 and made it, as far as the Government of Cyprus was concerned, a de jure situation. But in the same way that the judicial committee of the Privy Council rejected the legal theory of necessity in relation to postUDI Rhodesia, so HMG have not recognised in the formal sense the de facto situation in Cyprus since December 1963. Instead we have sought a return to the state of affairs which prevailed there from 1960 to 1963 and have continued to proceed on the basis that the constitution of 1960 as well as the Treaties of Establishment and Guarantee are still in force despite everything that has happened. 5. If there is no solution of the intercommunal deadlock as years go by it will become progressively harder to maintain the credibility of this line, insofar as the constitution and our guarantee of it are concerned. Apart from an intercommunal settlement, or a violent change in the whole situation involving Greek and Turkish invasion, we can foresee no development which can be pointed to as signalling a change, even

THE 1960 TREATIES

45

assuming we wanted to abandon our previous position. It is understandable that the Cyprus Government, as you say in your paragraph 6, do not particularly welcome our rôle as guarantor power. That they reject our Notes of protest about breaches of the basic articles of the constitution illustrates our powerlessness to act in accordance with Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. Indeed, as you rightly point out, our political influence at moments of crisis as in 1964 and 1967 has been appreciably less than that of the United States. The gap between our position as defined in the Treaties and the influence we can exert in actual political circumstances may become greater with passing years. […]18

Conclusions Before we attempt to analyse and evaluate the above mass of words, sometimes obfuscatory, sometimes muddled, confusing, even, (Umberto Eco would have a field day), it is important to point out that, in the above two letters in particular, the weeders have omitted large chunks of text, quoting the Freedom of Information Act. The fact that so much has been ‘lifted’ demonstrates to what an extent events and official views, enunciated over thirty years ago, are still relevant (at least in the case of Cyprus) and worthy of being kept from the eyes of diplomatic historians. The fact that the British government is so coy makes a mockery of true freedom of information. In fairness, let it be said that the Greek government is far worse, at least over Cyprus. Most papers cannot even be seen at all, owing to a law passed by the Greek parliament. Thankfully, and despite the natural sense of suspicion that surrounds the partial emasculation of texts, we have enough to form reasonably solid conclusions. We can kick off with the reasonable assertion that the whole 1960s ‘package’ was a clumsily concocted pack of cards. The fact that the Foreign Office actually helped and encouraged President Makarios to improve the constitution (the cynic would say ‘aided and abetted’) shows that it agreed that the package was weak, and needed improvement, only three years after it was approved. Nor was the Foreign Office alone in its misgivings, a legal expert writing in the early sixties: Unique in its tortuous complexity and in the multiplicity of the safeguards that it provides for the principal minority, the constitution of Cyprus stands alone among the constitutions of the world.19

The result of the Foreign Office’s ‘help and encouragement’, however, was devastating. It is hardly surprising that it started to look for escape routes

46

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

from its commitments, after the 1963 breakdown, as the above letters show, even if it is harsh to say so. Let us take a closer look at the reasoning in the letters. We have already commented on the semantic gyrations around Cyprus’s membership of the Commonwealth, which suggest a marked inclination not to commit oneself willy-nilly to Cyprus’s defence, despite the treaties. The Law Officers’ advice, for its part, seemed to be sufficiently unclear in certain respects as to occasion the request for further clarification, which they then wriggled out of giving. They were however sufficiently clear in stating that any forcible intervention without the Cyprus government’s consent might well be held to be forbidden by the UN Charter and be unlawful. Yet McPetrie, in finally sweeping the question under the carpet, stated, on the contrary, that the Law Officers had been very reserved as to whether forcible intervention under the treaty without the consent of the Cyprus government would be forbidden by the Charter and be unlawful. The question arises as to whether McPetrie’s bizarre error of interpretation was accidental or not. Even more bizarre was Moreton’s simple ‘very well’. Despite his cogent arguments, he simply rolled over in the face of muddled thinking, or worse. The story of the debate by senior civil servants borders on surrealistic, or at least becomes somewhat theoretical, when one considers that the British government already had no intention of preventing a Turkish invasion, at least in 1964, and presumably later, as a telegram of 7 July 1964 from the British Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office makes eminently clear: The Americans have made it quite clear that there would be no question of using the 6th Fleet to prevent any possible Turkish invasion […] We have all along made it clear that we could not agree to UNFICYP’s being used for the purpose of repelling external invasion, and the standing orders to our troops outside UNFICYP are to withdraw to the sovereign base areas immediately any such intervention takes place.20

This was of course at the time of the so-called ‘Ball-Acheson Plan’, when the US was making the running, as it has increasingly done on the Cyprus question and the Middle East in general, with Britain tending to toe the line. The plan envisaged a form of double enosis for Cyprus, and was rejected out of hand by President Makarios. Britain clearly had problems with the commitments it had brought on itself, and was looking for ways out as early as 1963, understandably not wishing to be put in the international spotlight if Turkey invaded Cyprus.

THE 1960 TREATIES

47

The debate about the treaties continued behind the scenes, as we have seen, with some discrepancies in argumentation, or at least a measure of inconsistency, particularly regarding the relationship between the Sovereign Base Territories and the treaties. To state in one and the same breath that British sovereignty did not depend on the 1960 treaties; that they were a single package; that to abandon the British position on the Treaty of Guarantee would then undermine Britain’s position on the rest of the 1960 settlement; and that anything which called the 1960 settlement as a whole into question could expose Britain to pressure on her moral – as distinct from legal – right to hang on to the Areas all suggested considerable lack consistency in the argumentation, and a lack of confidence and certitude. Moreover, the term ‘to hang on to’, even if used in an internal document, hardly suggests that the Bases were considered truly British, in the full sense of the term. One cannot imagine a senior official writing about Britain’s rights to ‘hanging on to’ Ulster, Scotland or Cornwall. Even informally, the term ‘keeping’ would be used. Part of the reason for the lack of precision and sloppiness in the internal navel-gazing about Britain’s commitments must lie in the fact, firstly, that the whole 1960 arrangement was irresponsibly and inefficiently cobbled together to accommodate a range of external interests, some conflicting; and secondly, that Britain never really wanted to take on serious responsibility, and assumed that if it ever came to the crunch, it could bury its head in the sand and leave the running to the Americans. In the final analysis, this is what was happening, and, as we shall see in the following chapters, was to become the order of the day. The organisational upheavals that accompanied the transformation of much of the British Empire into the Commonwealth also needs to be taken into consideration when seeking the reasons for the occasional flaws in the mental meanderings of the officials involved in considering Britain’s commitments vis-à-vis Cyprus: in 1966, the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office merged into the Commonwealth Office. The latter only lasted until 1968, when it merged with the Foreign Office, thereby forming today’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Anyone familiar with the tension and confusion that can result from re-structuring and name-altering can only sympathise with those involved in the formulation of foreign policy at the time. Another factor in the story of the treaties is the fact that, for all the government’s protestations that the Sovereign Base Areas do not depend on the treaties, it is clear that they do. We have seen how many times the assertion has been made about the British territories not depending on the

48

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

treaties, but then being dragged willy-nilly into the debate about the treaties. An analogy would be John Cleese in his hotel, Fawlty Towers, saying that the war has nothing to do with his German hotel guests, but then being unable not to mention it. In the case of the treaties, one gains the impression that they are the de facto cause of the whole curious (or ‘unique’) constitutional quagmire surrounding the SBAs, unmentionable, yet always lurking in the background. This will become more apparent in our chapter on the Bases. Let us end this chapter with two quotes, which are sufficiently clear – and telling – as to require no comment. On 23 September 1970, the Head of Southern European Department, Reginald Secondé, wrote to the Assistant Under Secretary of State for Western Europe, the Deputy Under Secretary of State and the Private Secretary to the Permanent Under Secretary of State, David Bendall, Thomas Brimelow and Timothy Daunt respectively: In practice we rely on the cooperation of the Cyprus Government for the continued efficient use of the Bases and of the retained military sites and facilities in the Republic. In the last resort and whatever the legal position, the geographical position of the Bases (and even more of the sites and facilities in the Republic) make them hostages to Cypriot goodwill.21

On 17 February the following year, John Graham, Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, wrote to his homologue Peter Moon, the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary: If the Greek and Turkish Cypriots manage to reach agreement on constitutional issues in Cyprus, the question of revising the 1960 treaties will become actual. Meanwhile, we recommend that this is an issue best dodged if possible, at any rate at Prime Ministerial level.22

4 THE 1974 INVASION

Introduction On 27 August 1971, Robert Edmonds, the British High Commissioner in Cyprus, wrote to the Foreign Secretary thus: Although Makarios remains supremely self-confident and believes that time is on his side, the threat of a Turkish invasion remains. The backdrop of the intercommunal talks, which have been the symbol of the benign stalemate which has suited our interests so well for the past three years, obliges us to face the prospect that this stalemate may now be turning malignant.1

Only four days later, he wrote a lengthy, ‘secret and eclipse’2 dispatch to the Foreign Secretary which suggests a high level of insight and understanding. His dispatch is so informative, even betraying flashes of clairvoyancy, that it can substitute as the main body of our introduction to this chapter: […] Unfortunately, there are now a number of important new factors which point towards the possibility that a fresh Cyprus crisis will be of a different order and far more dangerous to British interests than the last, because it would radically altar the status quo in Cyprus which has suited them so well. These factors, not listed in order of importance, are the following: a. The centre of gravity of the Cyprus dispute has moved during the summer away from Nicosia to Athens and Ankara, who have embarked on a new dialogue about the Cyprus dispute. Judging from the effect that it has had on President Makarios, he takes the dialogue and the consequent rift between Athens and Nicosia in all seriousness. He is to visit Athens – at last – on the 3rd of September, but his Foreign Minister is uncharacteristically doubtful about the prospect of bridging the gap.

50

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS b. This switch is the direct result of the arrival in power last March of a new Turkish Government, which has declared its determination to set a term to the Cyprus problem, partly for reasons of both domestic and foreign policy, and partly because it is not prepared to continue paying the Turkish Cypriot community an annual subsidy of ten million pounds, which, so I understand from my Turkish colleague, means that the Turkish Cypriots are receiving from Ankara a far larger subvention per head of the population than any province of mainland Turkey. (Mr. Denktash3 is already talking of asking for an extra three million pounds on top of this.) The Turkish Government have not only stiffened the Turkish Cypriot community, who realise in their heart of hearts that they cannot live out the rest of their lives shut into their present enclaves, but have also exerted pressure on the Greek Government by telling them loud and clear that good Graeco-Turkish relations depend on the Greek Government’s satisfactory handling of the Cyprus problem (i.e. that Athens must deliver Makarios). So far the Greek Government have responded to this pressure by agreeing to a meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister in New York at the end of September to review the position, and meanwhile by sending President Makarios blunt messages, expressed in military language, urging him to make concessions to the Turkish Cypriots (which he has flatly refused to do). […] Her Majesty’s Embassy in Moscow have recently expressed the opinion that in almost any foreseeable circumstances the Russians would put their interests in Cyprus before those in Turkey, if a choice became unavoidable; and that, faced with the danger of double Enosis, or of Cyprus coming under NATO control in some other way, the Russians would feel able to risk a break with the Turks in order to use all possible influence to preserve the independence and neutrality of Cyprus. The State Department’s latest Cyprus contingency paper does not rule out physical intervention in Cyprus by Soviet marines in certain circumstances. Bearing in mind that since his return from Moscow in June Archbishop Makarios has said publicly that he would be prepared to accept help from any quarter, I also would not rule out military action by the Soviet Union: but Soviet diplomacy will have some other options open to it, some of which could be exceedingly damaging to out position here. For example, the recently concluded Soviet-Indian Treaty could serve as a model for a treaty which the Soviet Union could offer Cyprus in a crisis. […] The Joker in the Pack 11. This heading covers the only effective action that in my view the Greek Government is capable of carrying out alone, namely the removal or assassination (whether by overt or clandestine means) of President Makarios. The removal of the Archbishop, together with the team of sycophants that surrounds him, would at least inject the element of movement that is lacking in the Cyprus situation at the moment. But it would be a colossal gamble. […]

THE 1974 INVASION

51

The Military Aspect 17. I now come to the most difficult question of all. What should we do if the Turks (with or without the Greeks) took the bit between their teeth, either before we had time to generate any momentum or while we were trying to do so? If the Turkish General Staff learnt anything from 1967, it must be that they should invade Cyprus while the going is good, without waiting for the international diplomatic machine to get into gear. I can see only one answer that would at least stand a chance of preserving our interests in Cyprus: to provide for a limited period a joint Anglo-American screen between Turkey and Cyprus. The object would be to allow saner counsels to prevail in Turkey, to mobilise world opinion and to mount a major diplomatic negotiation. […] I have written this dispatch now because I am convinced that we shall be making a grave mistake if we wait for events to unfold and then try to play the game off the cuff, as we did in 1967. If we are to prepare now, in consultation with our friends, the lines of action which we intend to follow in any of the contingencies described in paragraph 74 of this dispatch, based on the new Cyprus ground rules, I recommend that Her Majesty’s Government should first decide the principle whether the survival of the Republic of Cyprus, intimately linked as it is with our bases here, is a British interest sufficiently important to warrant the risks of a forward policy. What is at stake is the last remaining British outpost in the Middle East.5

The High Commissioner’s plea for Britain to take more decisive action was not taken, in particular his suggestion for an Anglo-American military screen between Cyprus and Turkey. One can legitimately ask whether the setting up of such a screen in the frenetic atmosphere in the weeks before the Turkish invasion might have led to a better fate for Cyprus, by preventing a Turkish invasion, notwithstanding Soviet sniping about dissension on NATO’s southeastern flank. We cannot of course prove that Edmond’s advice should have been taken, but hindsight certainly shows what not taking his advice led to. Relations between the Greek junta that had taken over Greece in 1967 and President Makarios were tense, particularly as calls for enosis among national-minded Greek officers grew. President Makarios did not fully trust the junta, particularly following an assassination attempt on him in March 1971. Matters had taken a turn for the worse with the death the previous summer of the tactile and experienced Greek foreign minister, Pipinelis, who had acted as a moderate counterweight to the nationalist head of the military police, Dimitris Ioannidis. Matters became increasingly volatile when President Makarios expelled the CIA head of station in Cyprus. The writing on the wall, however, came with the infamous

52

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

Polytechnic riots of November 17 1973 (only a month after the Yom Kippur war), when the government of the reasonably moderate civilian, Spiros Markezinis, was replaced by one that was as unstable as it was hard-line, and in which Ioannidis had a disproportionate amount of influence from behind the scenes. The death of George Grivas in January 1974 gave Ioannides a more direct entrée into Cypriot affairs, bringing yet more political instability into the equation. Matters were reaching breaking-point, and on 3 July, 1974, President Makarios accused the junta of plotting to overthrow him. The coup against him took place twelve days later. It was a Godsend from the nationalist Turkish viewpoint, and served as an initial pretext for Turkey to invade Cyprus on 20 July. The lack of precision within, and semantically amorphous official debate about, the 1960 treaty package, but particularly about the Treaty of Guarantee, was brought into sharp relief with the coup against Makarios. When it came to preserving the integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, the guarantor powers, but Britain in particular, were found to be wanting. Despite the treaties, and despite the failure of the coup against President Makarios (order was restored within a week), Turkey had the bit between its teeth and, even after a ceasefire on 22 July, continued to take territory and build up its forces, and then initiated the takeover of one third of the island on 14 August, despite going through the motions of negotiating with the British, Greeks and Cypriots in Geneva. Many books have been written about the coup and subsequent invasion, and still are, not all of them relying on painstaking documentary research, but the story is still controversial. Various so-called ‘conspiracy theories’ abound. Let us reproduce one, put on paper by Michael Perceval, Head of Chancery at the British High Commission in Nicosia, four years after the invasion: COUP AND COLLUSION 1. After years of assassination plots, why did the junta turn to the crudity of a full-scale coup, which justified Turkish intervention, and failed in practice to kill Makarios? Triantafyllidos [sic], President of the Supreme Court, and Anastassiou, Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior, have severally suggested to me that the coup aimed at the destruction of the Cyprus state, with a view presumably, to enosis. Not just the death of Makarios, who would have been succeeded by another President (probably Clerides) in the event of successful assassination. The change of command in Athens was an important factor, according to Anastassiou. General Papadopoulos, and probably Grivas himself, opposed such drastic action and shedding of Greek blood, and this was one reason why Brigadier Ioannides seized power at the time of the Polytechnic rising of November 1973. If so, it is another

THE 1974 INVASION irony that the heroic Polytechnic episode should have been another nail in Cyprus’ coffin. 2. It was noticeable that after November 1973, Ecevit’s attitude hardened in the inter-communal talks. According to Anastassiou, the Turks knew what was coming, for there was collusion between Athens and Ankara for a coup which would permit the Turks to land in Cyprus as a Guarantor Power, and occupy a small area of the island. Hence the surprise of many Turkish officers on 20 July, when they were fired on from an island supposedly under the junta’s control. Certainly, the performance of the National Guard was perplexing, with some Greek officers marching their men away from the action, and preventing the use of heavy weapons against the landing. Muddle, cowardice, or a scenario imperfectly prepared? For other units, including ELDYK, the small Greek contingent, fought fiercely. 3. Time will reveal whether Ioannides believed he had a deal with the Turks, and if so, why he believed. Karamanlis’ refusal to open the dossier of Cyprus leaves speculation rampant, but this may be better than the truth. When I asked Anastassiou for collateral to support his collusion theory, he did not reply in generalisatios [sic], but opened up his safe and produced an old and bulky blue folder, apparently containing secret reports. (He feared it would cost him his life in July 1974, but the Greek officers never got around to opening his safe). He read me a report, which he said was dated 10 August 1973, and which had been submitted to the President, the Foreign Minister, and the President of the House of Representatives. “Denktash expects from month to month action by ELDYK (not, as he previously thought, the National Guard) to eliminate Makarios. Denktash is also convinced that as soon as this happens, Turkey will invade Cyprus in the area of Maravas, extending this to Lapithos and the east of Kyrenia, but not proceeding to the hinterland. From this base, Turkey as a Guarantor Power, will demand a solution benefitting the Turkish Cypriot community.” 4. What to make of this report – a subsequent fabrication to support the Greek Cypriot allegations of Athens-Ankara (and CIA) collusion? But in front of me as I write is a minute by my predecessor, dated 1 August 1973, which records an Anastassiou scenario differing little from the above, and based presumably on an earlier report. Though intriguing, the reports do not actually demonstrate collusion; it could simply be that the Turks had as good sources of information about the junta’s thinking in Athens as Anastassiou had about Denktash. To his credit, Anastassiou refined his theory to the possibility that Athens and Ankara were deceiving each other – the junta hoping to seize all of Cyprus without paying the Turks their share, while the latter, with other thoughts in mind, encouraged Ioannides to make his fatal move. And Makarios, with his letter to General Gizikis of 3 July, losing patience for once, provoked the cataclysm with no protection other than the

53

54

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS publicity surrounding his catalogue of accusations against the junta. Thus were vindicated the prophetic words of Inonu (first quoted to me by Kyprianou) that the Greeks would solve the Cyprus problem in favour of the Turks. 5. What impelled Ioannides towards the coup? His own obsessions (he had served in Cyprus)? A desire to lure the Anatolian wolf away from the Aegean by throwing it the Cyprus bone? The hope of supporting his floundering regime with a bold stroke – the achievement of Cypriot enosis? If the latter, it was shelved abruptly when Makarios was revealed to be alive. This could explain why a makeshift substitute President had to be bundled into position – as it happened in the pathetically counter-productive person of Nicos Sampson. Ioannides’ action had the effect – as if he had been duped by the Delphic oracle – of overthrowing a hated regime, his own.6

At the time of writing, Turkey is still illegally occupying over one third of the island, and still importing settlers, having expelled almost all the Greek Cypriots. These settlers, currently numbering some 160,000, vastly outnumber the original Turkish Cypriots, many of whom have left. Before commenting more specifically on the skullduggery surrounding the invasion, let us tell the story through the documents. Clearly, we need to begin with the British reaction to the so-called ‘Sampson coup’, the British attitude to Makarios, and the American (or, rather, Henry Kissinger’s) view. On 16 July (the original date of 18 July was deleted!), Maureen Fairbrother, an FCO legal adviser, wrote to Robert Cornish of Southern European Department: The situation in Cyprus and its implications for HMG as a Guarantor of the 1960 Settlement Under the Treaty of Guarantee the Guarantor Powers, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom guarantee a) the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus. b) The state of affairs established by the Basic articles of the Cyprus Constitution, which were agreed at the Zurich conference of February 11 1959 by the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey and incorporated in the Cyprus Constitution in August 1960. 2. The present coup violates several basic articles of the Cyprus constitution, notably those relating to the democratic election and method of appointment of the President. In the past, HMG, as the guarantor of the 1960 Constitution, has made a series of protests to the Cyprus Government about infringements of basic articles, none of which

THE 1974 INVASION

55

appear to be as grave as the present infringements. The occasions of these protests are listed in the annex of RR 6/1 “Contravention of the 1960 Cyprus settlement by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot Communities”, which has been sent to you. 3. In the circumstances, therefore, the Turkish request for joint action by Turkey and the United Kingdom appears to be a legitimate one. Article 3 [sic: it should have read ‘IV’] of the Treaty of Guarantee authorizes Turkey to take unilateral action, if joint action is refused. 4. If the coup is successful the question of recognition will be complicated by Britain’s position as a Guarantor Power. If the usual criterion of having effective control of the country is applied, HMG will be placed in the position of recognizing a régime which has come to power by methods in flagrant violation of the settlement of which it is a guarantor. 5. Makarios has frequently declared the Cyprus Constitution dead, and it became unworkable after the 1963/64 crisis. It has never been replaced, however, and HMG has continued to recognise it as the legitimate constitution of Cyprus (viz. HMG’s insistence that British official visitors to Cyprus should call on the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, as well as the President). Likewise, despite statements by Makarios that the Treaty of Guarantee is void, HMG has continued to regard it as being in force.7

As we shall now see through extracts from correspondence, the practice only rarely corresponds to the theory, at least in the case of Britain’s contractual obligations vis-à-vis Cyprus. Despite a clear legal remit to do what the Treaty of Guarantee said should be done, and despite the clear advice that Britain could act with Turkey to restore constitutional order, the British government chose the path of indecision and submissiveness. First, however, there is the strange tale of how President Makarios was delayed. When the coup occurred, he was lifted out of danger by the British, and flown by helicopter to the base at Akrotiri. An intriguing secret ‘flash’ 8 telegram of 16 July from the FCO to Nicosia and Valletta sets the scene: 1. I agree that President Makarios can be flown to the Sovereign Base Areas on the terms set out in your tel under reference. We shall want to consider later today the question of his ultimate destination. Our thinking at the moment is that it might be convenient if he could be put on board a naval warship rather than being flown back to this country. 2. I realise that there is no suitable ship within helicopter range of Akrotiri at present. One possibility which occurs to me and on which I would welcome urgent advice from you and CBFNE9 is that the Presi-

56

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS dent should be flown to Malta and transferred, without delay, to HMS Hermes. 3. I shall be making a statement in the House this afternoon at 14.30 GMT. I would like to know before doing so whether or not Makarios is at that time physically in the SBA. Either you or CBFNE should make arrangements for my private office to be informed by telephone as soon as definite news is available. 4. Valletta should say nothing to Mintoff at this stage.10

Although not all the papers have been released, it certainly does appear that the British were in no hurry to let the president back into the real world too soon, where he could capitalise on Anglo-US fear of the Soviet Union, and turn the tide against the Turkish landing, while the US (Kissinger) did not even wish to recognise him as head of state. Nine minutes after the above telegram was sent, another one from Valletta went to the FCO: 1. As instructed this evening I told Mintoff, when I could get him out of the House of Representatives, that Makarios would be arriving in Malta tonight and that you thought it might be appropriate for him to stay in Malta for at least one night. […] 4. I conveyed your views to Makarios but he was adamant at first that he wanted to go straight on to London. The Governor General and Deputy Prime Minister were no help at all, and after a lot of discussion Makarios said that if the aircraft, waiting to take him to London, could get off the ground within an hour or so he would want to leave immediately, but if it would take longer he might be prepared to spend the night in Malta. At this point we discovered that the aircraft had one or two problems and could not leave for at least an hour or two. Makarios wavered at this point but still said that he wanted to go on to London tonight. 5. When Mintoff arrived he and I talked to the Archbishop and eventually persuaded him that it would be better all round for him to spend the night in Malta.11

An honest retired member of Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service was good enough to tell this author the truth, which we can in any case read between the lines of that correspondence that has been released: the FCO instructed their High Commissioner in Malta to delay Makarios’ arrival in London, and the problem with the engine was concocted. Makarios, as he was called off the aeroplane to stay the night, commented: ‘another triumph for British diplomacy!’ To have such reserves of humour after

THE 1974 INVASION

57

what he had gone through, and was still going through, speaks volumes about the man. While Makarios was trying to get to London, and thence to the UN in New York, Kissinger was pressurising the British to keep Makarios out of the limelight (this connects to the Malta story). A ‘Top Secret’ minute of 17 July from John Killick, the Deputy Under Secretary, to Alan Goodison, Head of Southern European Department, recording a meeting that morning between Callaghan and officials, suggests both British readiness to intervene militarily, but also a ‘wait and see’ attitude: […] On the operational side the MOD said the Greek [sic] National Guard was 10,000 strong with light tanks, artillery and heavy equipment. They could mobilise a further 30,000. Existing British forces in the SBAs could cope with them. In reply to questions however it was explained that this was a defensive assessment. If British forces were to be used offensively, it was thought the Chiefs of Staff would need reinforcements provided for under present plans – a Brigade Headquarters and two battalions (probably the spearhead battalion from the UK already at 72 hours notice and the Commando embarked in Hermes). In reply to the direct question whether it would be militarily possible to restore Makarios to power, the provisional answer was probably Yes if the only opposition was the National Guard, but the MOD would probably want to put in ‘a lot more’ as an insurance. 5. Much would depend on the attitude of the population and the extent of a possible internal security problem. This was difficult to assess. EOKA (B) had only 200 armed men at the last count. 6. There was some discussion of the degree of international political support which HMG might enjoy if we embarked on such action. This was generally favourable. The question was raised of the possible need for a UN umbrella. It was pointed out that it would have to be based on the establishment of a clear breach of the Treaty of Guarantee; that it was right to examine the possibility since the Turks might otherwise “go it alone”; that the return of Makarios would still leave us with an unstable situation, the need for him to make improved constitutional arrangements on the island and a possible demand from him for some kind of continuing military guarantee; the last consideration could affect the Defence Review. 7. The MOD were commissioned to produce an urgent military study before tonight’s meeting with Turkish ministers. For this they would need certain political assumptions and assessments which the FCO would provide. One complication would be how to fit in the evacuation of civilian dependents. The main point the Secretary of State wished to cover was an estimate of how bloody the operation might be. The politician’s delight would of course be a bloodless return with flowers.

58

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS A particular point to clarify would be whether the operation should be based on surprise and how this could be reconciled with the necessary establishment of international support, including the UN umbrella. Certainly the United States would need to be brought in very early and it would be no less crucial to ensure that the Soviet Union did not cause complications. 8. As regards Mr. Acland’s12 questions, it was pointed out that we were faced with a dilemma. Continued support for Makarios in circumstances in which we could not effectively restore him to power would prevent us from establishing the working relations with the regime effectively in control in Cyprus which we would need in order to maintain the SBAs. Makarios outside Cyprus might move closer to the Soviet Union and the latter would be in a position to exploit this situation in the Eastern Mediterranean area. There would also be difficulties for us all in Western Europe in face of what would be regarded as another extension of “fascism” with consequent demands for the adoption of hostile attitudes both to the regime in Cyprus and the Greek Government. Even if Sampson might continue to avoid enosis and maintain national Cypriot independence, the balance of things in Cyprus would shift markedly towards Athens. The question would arise how far and how long the Turkish Government could hold off in an internal situation in the Island which would be confused and unstable. d) At this point the Secretary of State had to leave for a meeting with the Prime Minister before all Mr. Acland’s questions could be covered. There was brief discussion of possible further action vis-à-vis the Greek Government today but it was agreed that consideration of this should be suspended until after discussion with Makarios and the Turks, in particular until it was clear what Makarios’s intentions were.13

The US (but essentially Kissinger) were intent on replacing Makarios and on delaying matters for as long as feasible, which had the effect of allowing Turkey more breathing space. In addition, the US were not in favour of pressure on the Greek government to withdraw the Greek officers from the Cypriot National Guard, many of whom were considered to have been involved in the coup. The following extract from a telegram of 17 July from the British Embassy in Washington reveals Kissinger’s tactics: Kissinger seemed puzzled as to why we were wanting to move so quickly and in such absolute support of Makarios. Was there not risk here of doing Makarios’s work for him, without tying his hands in any way? It was also surely a mistake to commit ourselves now to Makarios and thus narrow our options when it was far from certain that Makarios could return to power. Kissinger was also concerned at the line we were taking about the withdrawal of Greek officers in the National

THE 1974 INVASION

59

Guard. Whatever other role they had been playing, they had at least acted as a force against communist infiltration in Cyprus. Kissinger was clearly suspicious that Makarios, returned to power on those circumstances, would not hesitate to regard the Russians as his saviours and allow an already strong communist party14 to gain further strength.15

Still on 17 July, but before a meeting that evening in London between the British and Turkish Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and other government officials, the UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, weighed in, putting the British slightly on the spot, as can be inferred from a flash telegram from the British Mission to the UN in New York: 1. The Secretary-General asked to see me [Ivor Richard, British UN Representative] à deux today about the possibility of the Security Council deciding on enforcement action to restore Makarios’s government. 2. Waldheim said that he though it likely that the Council would, within the next 48 hours adopt unanimously a resolution calling for the restoration of the legal government. It might not deal with the means to enforce this action. But, at some stage, the council might go on to decide on such action. It was clear that, with only some 2,000 troops on the island, UNFICYP was in no position to take effective action on its own. The obvious place to look for reinforcement was the British Government, which already had troops in the Sovereign Base Area and could presumably reinforce them discreetly over the next few days. Following Security Council authorization, British troops could move from the SBA’s to reinforce UNFICYP in action to reverse the coup. They would be under UN command and probably under a non-British force commander. 3. It was however probable that the very threat of such action involving the promise of British military power being deployed would lead to a swift Greek withdrawal and probably the collapse of the Nicosia regime. […]16

An immediate withdrawal of the Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard and even the mere threat of military action under the Treaty of Guarantee was of course precisely what Kissinger was working against, using what some might construe as specious arguments, such as that the Greek officers had acted as a force against communist infiltration. Serious action would deprive the Turkish government of the excuse it was seeking in order to invade. Were constitutional normality restored, it would make an invasion impossible. Therefore, the longer the Sampson regime could be kept in power, the better from Turkey’s and Kissinger’s point of view.

60

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

All eyes were now focused on the British-Turkish meeting that night. It turned out to be a damp squib, but a dangerous one, since Britain actually refused to take joint action with the Turks, thereby giving the latter the excuse they were seeking to invade. Britain, quite rightly, sought a tripartite meeting, but the Turks clearly resisted this. The relevant extract of the record of the meeting reads: The Prime Minister asked if the problem for Mr. Ecevit [Turkish Prime Minister] was a political one with his own Parliament: that he could not sit down with the Greeks. Mr. Ecevit conceded that this was one factor.17

A ‘flash’ FCO telegram to Athens early on 18 July confirmed this: […] For your information, Ecevit refused to contemplate tripartite talks: for the time being at least, on the grounds that the Greeks were in breach of the 1960 Treaty, were impossible to deal with at present, for the Turks at least (witness the failure of the Brussels conversations) and that in present circumstances Turkish public opinion would simply not understand.18

Had a firm UN Security Council resolution been passed even on 18 July, it might well have prevented a Turkish invasion. Disagreement about the precise wording, and degree of firmness, however, prevented a resolution calling on the withdrawal of foreign military personnel otherwise than under the authority of international agreements (including those whose withdrawal had been requested by President Makarios) until it was too late. In fact, surrealistically, the resolution was passed on the same day that the Turkish army landed on Cyprus and fighting began. The British intelligence services and the FCO and Callaghan had known of the Turkish invasion plans at least a day before, and probably more. On 19 July, John Thomson, an Assistant Under Secretary, wrote to the Private Secretary: The situation envisaged below is an invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces in the next few days in accordance with the JIC19 expectation of the Turkish plan of operations.20

Extracts from the (secret) report of 15 May 1975 by the Commander of British Forces Near East add flesh to the above:

THE 1974 INVASION

61

[…] BACKGROUND TO THE TURKISH INVASION 36. Throughout the week of the Coup there had been evidence of Turkish impatience with Britain’s reluctance to restore the pre-coup situation […] 37. The prospect of Turkish military intervention continued to gather strength during 19 July. It began with an overnight flurry of telegrams reinforcing the view that Turkey was not prepared to tolerate, or even negotiate about the continuance of the Government of National Salvation and was fast talking herself into military intervention to protect the allegedly beleaguered Turkish Cypriot community. That they were in fact in no danger is well illustrated by Mr. Olver’s21 telegram at Annex P. 38. Meanwhile, military intelligence sources reported that the Turkish 39th Division, which had long been earmarked for possible intervention in Cyprus, was being brought to an increased state of readiness and at 1450Z on 19 July JIC London issued their remarkably accurate assessment , at annex Q, of the Turkish military capability for intervention and possible military objectives in Cyprus.22

Olver’s above-mentioned telegram to the FCO (of 18 July) read as follows: 1. I have no (no) evidence of any immediate threat to the Turkish Cypriot community. There have been no attacks on the community during the past few days. The Turkish Cypriot Minister of Defence, Mr Orek confirmed to a member of my staff this morning that the Greek Cypriot Community, and in particular the National Guard, had been behaving with admirable caution: there had been a few minor casualties through bullets straying inadvertently across the Green Line, but in general the Turkish Cypriot Community had no cause for complaint in this respect. 2. We have heard from two sources that the new Foreign Minister, Mr Dimitriou, has endeavoured to meet Mr Denktash to assure him of the desire of the new regime to maintain peaceful and amicable relations with the Turkish Community and to seek a solution to the intercommunal problem through the enlarged talks. Denktash in fact refused to see Dimitriou since any meeting could have been regarded as a form of recognition. In a press conference this afternoon, Sampson has given similar reassurances to the Turkish Cypriots and has said that they were in no danger: the mission of the new regime was to find a peaceful solution through the talks: there was no need therefore for Turkish intervention. 3. I have just seen a Reuter report of remarks in London by Mr Ecevit, claiming that Greece is sending military reinforcements to the island by air and sea and that there is no supervision. We (including NEAF) 23 have been keeping careful watch for reinforcement by sea – there is

62

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS absolutely no evidence that this has taken place. The vessel carrying new elements for the Greek National Contingent is proceeding along the south coast towards Famagusta where it is due tomorrow at 0300Z hours. UNFICYP are fully aware of the need to supervise the rotation. There have been two unscheduled flights by Olympic Airways to Nicosia in the past three days. They were not troop reinforcements: in each case a comparatively small number of individuals emerged. 4. On the basis of all our information there is no genuine pretext for Turkish military intervention.24

With the almost simultaneous fall of the junta in Athens and Nicosia on 22 July, a civilian government was established in Athens, while the previous government was re-established in Cyprus, with the President of the House of Representatives, Glafkos Cleridis, holding the reins in President Makarios’s absence. Despite the resolution calling for an end to the fighting, and an apparent ceasefire, the Turkish armed forces continued to advance until 22 July, whereupon they began what has come to be called ‘the creeping invasion’. The British, despite the Treaty of Guarantee, were not prepared to stick their necks out, without the support of the Americans.25 A tripartite conference was called in Geneva, lasting from 25 to 30 July. A joint declaration was issued at the end of the conference, whereby it was agreed that the areas already controlled by the opposing armed forces should not be extended and that all hostilities were to cease. This was followed by a second conference from 8 to 14 August, also attended by the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and, significantly, Arthur Hartman, an American observer. A ‘secret and eclipse’ FCO report of 14 January 1976 gives the true flavour: […] When the Turkish Prime Minister’s party left London [18 July], we did not know what action they would take. While Mr Ecevit and his Acting Foreign Minister had not given us an assurance that they would not use force, the Turkish Prime Minister had emphasized to us that this was the last thing he wished to do. […] The British delegation worked hard at the first Geneva conference: the Turks held most of the cards. If I was to secure their signature on a document designed to bring an end to the fighting I could not insist on all the safeguards and provisions which I and the Greeks would have liked it to include. My intention was to gain a breathing space but in retrospect the main significance of the Geneva Declaration of 30 July may be seen in the international cover which it gave to the consolidation of the Turkish position on the island. The other signatories did not know in the euphoric moment of signature, at the end of an exhausting series of negotiating sessions, that the Turks were going to break the cease-fire at once. […] The

THE 1974 INVASION Geneva Declaration provided that the three Foreign Ministers should meet again on 8 August for negotiations to secure the restoration of peace in the area and the re-establishment of constitutional government in Cyprus, and that representatives of the two Cypriot communities should, at an early stage, participate in the talks relating to the Constitution. I did not approach the second conference in any spirit of optimism. The parties had failed over the intervening week to implement any of the provisions of the Geneva Declaration. In particular, the Turks had placed great obstacles in the way of the considerable effort of your Defence Adviser to get the ceasefire lines quickly and fully demarcated, and the gradual expansion of the area they occupied had continued. My aim was to secure that the Declaration be fulfilled, even belatedly, and that those practical problems connected with a ceasefire which it had not covered should be disposed of. As for a settlement of the intercommunal tensions by new or revived constitutional provisions, this would require detailed discussion between representatives of the communities: the conference itself could not hope to do more than lay down a few guide-lines for such discussions; and the likelihood of agreement on such guide-lines was not great. The Turks were too flushed with relative military success, and the Greeks too weak to face the humiliation of abandoning their previous postures in the face of force. The Turks also were bound by twenty years of propaganda in the Turkish Cypriot cause, which must make them advocate separate administrations on lines hitherto unacceptable to the Greeks. At that point, I did not suspect, as I do now, that the Turks regarded the conference as little more than an opportunity to secure more time and diplomatic cover to prepare for a second attack. Above all, none of the participants had had time soberly to confront the basic problems in detail; each had been involved in three weeks or more of fast-moving diplomatic, military and political action. […] The Americans told my officials that they thought the British delegation should at an early stage in the second conference table a proposal on which a settlement could be based. They themselves temporarily induced the Turks to table a multi-cantonal proposal. I believed that it was best to leave time for the parties to make contacts. The intransigent tactics adopted by the Turks and the Greek reluctance to accept any form of geographical solution meant that a British plan would have been unlikely to succeed. As it was, the British Government had the advantage of committing ourselves formally to no solution, and of keeping our hands free for the future. 12. At this point, I should stress the disastrous effect of the manner in which the Turkish Foreign Minister approached his task. He behaved in an erratic and irresponsible way from time to time. The records do not, mercifully, give his speeches in full: they would be as intolerable to read as they were to hear. Nor do they draw attention to the weary hours of waiting in which no meetings took place, while the Turkish Cabinet deliberated or the Turks disputed a minor point of protocol and

63

64

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS Mr Günesh26 absented himself from the Palais des Nations , at, it was said a casino across the French border. He enjoyed the confidence neither of his staff, who complained to mine privately that he gave them no directives, nor of his Government, who regularly instructed him to repudiate commitments he had already undertaken. This meant, especially in the more informal exchanges with him, that I was frequently unable to assess the weight to be placed on what he said. In particular, it led to confusion in the last hours of the second Geneva conference, when discussion was prolonged in the expectation, which ultimately proved false, that Mr Günesh’s stance would be changed by instructions from Ankara. […] Mr Denktash it was who finally convinced me that only a geographical separation , in the form of a bi-regional federation, could ensure that the two communities could live at peace and thus assure the future of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent sovereign state. I was not surprised that Mr Mavros27 and Mr Clerides were not persuaded of this, though I did not despair that they might have come to such a conclusion had the Turks not roughly refused to allow the Conference to adjourn. Mr Clerides also convinced me by his wisdom and tolerance that here was a Greek Cypriot leader capable ultimately of reaching a durable understanding with the Turkish Cypriots.28

The invasion, or rather the completion of the plan to take over one third of the island, was, in a sense, a mere formality since, as we shall see in the next chapter, the Turkish government knew that it had considerable leeway from the Americans to continue their military action. The completion of the occupation of over a third of the island began early in the morning of 14 August, after Mavros and Cleridis had said they would continue to attend the conference, while Günesh walked out. It is not our purpose here to record the horrors of the invasion of a sovereign state and subsequent military occupation, gross human rights violations, destruction of property, ethnic cleansing, and replacement of the Greek Cypriot refugees, and partial replacement of the Turkish Cypriots, with settlers. Rather, we are seeking to ascertain through the judicious reproduction of official documents why and how the invasion occurred. We end this chapter with a rather unsavoury event, that of Mr. Callaghan’s appearance on 19 February 1976 before the Select Committee on Cyprus, that was to produce a report that embarrassed the FCO. Callaghan was accompanied by Alan Goodison, Head of Southern European Department, Derrick Burden, Head of Claims Department and John Freeland, Second Legal Adviser. We have seen how Callaghan and the FCO had had some indication that the Turkish armed forces were planning to invade

THE 1974 INVASION

65

Cyprus. What we have seen now needs to be compared with Callaghan’s and his ‘minders’ answers: Mr. Rees-Davies: […] That being so, Ecevit having left London and gone back, there was in fact the first Turkish invasion which took place on the 20th July at that time of what were described in that communiqué of yours as abortive discussions with the Turkish representatives. That having obtained, at least you recognized, did you not, that there was to be an immediate invasion by the Turks into at least northern Cyprus at that time and that that was imminent? Mr. Callaghan: No. […] Mr. Rees-Davies: When you had the first Geneva Conference and communiqués were signed on the 30th July, at that time there was no indication that the Turks were withdrawing because reports were still coming through that they were increasing their hold in Northern Cyprus; that is right, is it not? Mr. Goodison: It is true that immediately after the signature of the Geneva Declaration the Turks did move forward a little, but the substance of the Declaration was that they were going to stop, and it involved the delineation of the cease-fire lines which was to proceed between the two conferences. We expected that the lines would become stabilised after the first Geneva Conference. Mr. Rees-Davies: That is right. You expected it but, in fact, events did not turn out that way. They still continued to indicate that there was a real danger of further advance, did they not? Mr. Callaghan: No, I do not think that was indicated at all.29

A few days later, on 26 February, the FCO compounded the lie in a telegram to Nicosia: You may as necessary deny that HMG had any advance intelligence about the coup or the invasion and say that I denied this to the Select Committee.30

Apart from the JIC report of 19 July above, the clearest indication that Callaghan chose to deceive the Committee is clearly demonstrated by the content of a ‘Top Secret’ letter to him of 10 August 1974, at the height of the second Geneva conference, from Air Vice Marshall Francis Mellersh, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff, who was in Geneva:

66

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION Likely Turkish Plans 1. The Turkish army is looking for an excuse to continue operations. Their next likely objective is to increase the size of their area to take in the entire North-East of Cyprus, bounded by a line from five miles east of Morphou, through the southern suburbs of Nicosia and along the old Famagusta road to Famagusta. I consider that to achieve this they would launch ground attack from their present position in the West and in Nicosia, combined with a parachute landing by two battalions in the Chatos enclave and possibly a beach landing in the northern part of Famagusta Bay. At the same time they would mount an armoured thrust Eastwards from the Eastern positions to link up with Chatos. A landing in Morphou Bay is considered unlikely at this stage. […]31

The same day Mellersh sent a ‘flash’ telegram to the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, via the British Mission to the UN in Geneva: 1. Foreign Secretary is most concerned at hard line attitude being adopted by Turkish delegation at Geneva and the strong indications that they may soon attempt a major break out from the area at present under their control. MOD reps have been asked to offer advice in general terms on the likely form a break out would take and what UNFICYP suitably reinforced could do by interposing itself and making it quite clear to the Turks that they would have to take on a UN force in achieving their objectives. The force would have to be large enough and so armed as to give good account of itself, but I have emphasized that deterrence is all we could hope for and that any question of holding the Turks is out of the question with the estimated Turkish force levels and in the face of Turkish air [sic]. […]32

In terms of the tawdry side of national and international politics, it is not difficult to explain Callaghan and the FCO’s ethical lapse. First, during the Turkish invasion, which took place over a period of one month, Callaghan was simply slowly bludgeoned into toeing the Kissinger line, namely not to actually seek to take action against the Greek junta and the putschists in Cyprus as per the Treaty of Guarantee, then not to take action against Turkey. The independence that Britain had begun to demonstrate vis-àvis the US, and its increasing co-operation with and within the EEC had evaporated when the mildly Gaullist Prime Minister, Edward Heath (the only British Prime Minister to visit Cyprus, in the face of Turkish protests, into the bargain) had lost the elections in Spring 1974. If Callaghan had told the truth, critics of the Turkish invasion would have accused the British government of weakness and not daring to act without the Americans.

THE 1974 INVASION

67

Even if true, such facts were too embarrassing to release to Parliament. Second, but connected, was the fact that Callaghan was being groomed to take over the premiership from the ailing Harold Wilson. The truth would hardly have enhanced Callaghan’s image as an independent politician. Before now turning to our chapter on Kissinger and the US, the following record of a telephone conversation between Callaghan and Kissinger, and Callaghan and the new US President, at 2.45 p.m. on 14 August speaks volumes, with no pun intended: Foreign Secretary: Hello. Henry? Dr. Kissinger: Good morning. How are you? Foreign Secretary: It’s late night for you, isn’t it? Dr.Kissinger: No, no, it’s early in the morning. Foreign Secretary: Early in the morning. Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that’s right. Foreign Secretary: Oh, I see. I was suggesting to Harold that he might like to have a word with the President perhaps a bit later today, just to exchange views. [...] Dr. Kissinger: I think that’s a good idea. Foreign Secretary: All right, I will get him to do that then. Dr. Kissinger: Let me talk to the President for a minute about this. Foreign Secretary: Yes. Dr. Kissinger: He thinks that’s an excellent idea. Foreign Secretary: Right. Dr. Kissinger: Jim, what is your view on where we stand? Foreign Secretary: Well, I was thinking – I think in military terms, obviously the Turks will carry on until they have got this line that they have figured out on the map, and cynically, lets hope they get it quickly. Dr. Kissinger: I agree. Foreign Secretary: They will then stop, and there will be no political solution. We shall have a continuation of guerrilla warfare between EOKA B and the Turks. They will eventually pull their army back because they won’t be able to afford to keep it there. Now, in the meantime, NATO will be just that much weakened, and I think you ought to make a fresh assessment of the south east corner of NATO, because neither of them are of very much use to us at the moment.

68

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS Dr. Kissinger: Well do you think Jim – we were talking here about ways to move this negotiation – if you think it has any chance. Foreign Secretary: Not in the slightest. Dr. Kissinger: Do you think a NATO ministerial would be a good framework, or would be a possible framework to get them started again? Foreign Secretary: Henry, I don’t want to be negative, because it’s not my approach, but I really don’t. I think NATO would get itself embroiled in it with even more dire consequences for its future without being able to solve it because at the moment no Greek Cypriot can sit down with a Turkish Cypriot, or with a Turk. And by rushing into this, the Turks have made a settlement impossible. My own very strong view is that if I reproach myself with one thing it is that I didn’t put more pressure on the Greeks earlier than I did. Dr. Kissinger: I quite agree. Foreign Secretary: To try to get them to give way. I think if we’d had this thirty-six hours without military action – if the Turks hadn’t rushed into military action – we could have got it. But now, Henry, I don’t think there’s the slightest chance of them moving. Dr. Kissinger: ... and frankly I didn’t recommend myself, so we’re all wrong. Foreign Secretary: Well, that’s right. Well, if we want to excuse ourselves, Gunes didn’t put his plans forward until Monday night and then wanted a meeting that night in order to settle it. So none of us really knew what we were finally up against, even though we’d read it in the newspapers. However, that is no good looking back. But as to the future [...] Dr. Kissinger: You don’t think there would be any sense, Mavros has been eager to come over here – would there be any sense in doing that? Foreign Secretary: Well, yes there would because I think Greece needs massaging now. You’ve got to be careful, that you don’t give them more of an appearance of doing something without doing anything. Because they’ll turn on you very, very quickly, as they’ve begun to turn on us a bit. Dr. Kissinger: The Greeks? Foreign Secretary: The Greeks will, yes. Because they want some action, you see and they are not going to get any action. You’re not going to act, we’re not going to act unilaterally and the UN is going to get out of the way. Dr. Kissinger: O.K. Why don’t we let the thing sit then for a day and see how it looks tomorrow morning.

THE 1974 INVASION Foreign Secretary: I would. I don’t think it will look much better tomorrow morning except we may know how far the Turks have got, and where they are going to stop. But in terms of diplomatic action, Henry, we haven’t got a chance here unless something breaks that I can’t foresee for some weeks. That’s my feeling as of today. Dr. Kissinger: We will not do anything without consultation with you. Foreign Secretary: No Sir, very good. And likewise the same. Let me just put it in a nutshell. Dr. Kissinger: We won’t do anything today. Foreign Secretary: All right. Dr. Kissinger: Let me put the President on. He wanted to say hello to you. Foreign Secretary: That’s very kind of you, yes. President of the United States: Good morning Mr. Minister. Foreign Secretary: Mr. President, Sir, may offer my respectful congratulations? President: Well, thank you very much and I want you to know that we appreciate what you have been trying to do in a very difficult situation. Foreign Secretary: Well, that’s very kind of you. You know that Henry and I – well I have a great respect for him, and I hope we’ve got a great friendship together and Mr. President, I just want to say this to you, Sir, that in the end, when the chips are down it’s only the Unites States who can really pull the chestnuts out of the fire, and there are times when not even you can do that. This was one of them. President: I fully appreciate that, but we have to have good friends and allies like Great Britain to work with us and for that reason we are darn grateful for all that you have been trying to do. Foreign Secretary: Well, thank you Sir, very much, I look forward to meeting you I must say in the near future, and may I wish you the very best of good luck. You’ve got a hell of a job but it’s a wonderful challenge too, and we’ll all be rooting for you and hoping for great success for the United States. President: Thank you very much and give the Prime Minister my very best. Foreign Secretary: Yes, I will Sir. Shall he call you later? President: Yes, I would like to have him do so, Sir. Foreign Secretary: All right, I’ll do that Mr. President. Could I have just one more word with Henry?

69

70

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS Henry, if I can put the position in a nutshell, I think it comes to this: that the Turks have got a good case. In my view they can now only be resolved by the creation of a zone. A zone in which they will have autonomy within a federal republic. This could be got by negotiation but in the temper of today, no one can begin to get anything like this. And so you have a military solution for the time being, in which they will police their own boundary. You’ll have a great exchange of population with the Greeks moving out and then we’ll just let diplomacy take over when we see the opportunity once more, to see if we can get a peaceful solution in the island. Now as regards Greece and Turkey, it is Greece who will need massaging because the Turks are too jingoistic, indeed too close to Hitler for my liking. All right? Dr. Kissinger: I completely agree with you, Jim. And the tragedy is that it could have worked out that way through diplomacy [...] Foreign Secretary: I believe you. Well, goodbye old man and all my best to you with your preoccupations. Dr. Kissinger: Thank you Jim. You’ve been ... Foreign Secretary: Thank you goodbye.33

Conclusions The whole tone of the conversation shows that Britain, or at least its Foreign Secretary, simply had little capacity to use power in the powerresponsibility ratio, if indeed that power existed, as it undoubtedly once had. Claiming to guarantee the integrity and security of a country is one thing. Having the wherewithal to actually guarantee it is quite another. The US actually had no locus standi whatsoever in Cyprus, while Britain was a guarantor power. Yet it is clear that Britain would not even act militarily without the co-operation of the US, thus rendering the Treaty of Guarantee a paper tiger. Kissinger’s objective, as his words show, was to do nothing that would stop the Turkish army from achieving its objectives. We saw that Callaghan put the matter succinctly at the end of the conversation, saying that the Turks had a good case, that they would have autonomy within a federal republic, and that there would be a great exchange of population. Kissinger’s response (‘it could have worked out that way through diplomacy’) shows that he supported the Turkish view of separation. The fact that it did not work out ‘that way’ through diplomacy is an indictment of the small group of misguided Greeks and Cypriots who took a gamble, of the jingoistic side of the Turkish establishment, of Britain’s inability to act decisively at the beginning to nip the trouble in the bud (viz. Waldheim’s views above) and, crucially, Kissinger’s own Turkish agenda and antipathy towards President Makarios. At the end of the day, it became

THE 1974 INVASION

71

clear that the chief background culprit was the convoluted and selfish 1960 package which, curiously, has never gone away, since, as we have seen, it is connected to the viability of the Sovereign Base Areas. The invasion is of course still with us today, although it has since transmogrified into an occupation, with between 30,000 and 40,000 (depending on the political climate) Turkish troops still there, an inordinately large number for such a small population. The 1960 package is still there, not unlike a rat on the island’s back, with external interests still of major importance, whatever public relations lip-service is paid to the Cypriots working matters out for themselves. Having seen how the US played a backstage, but nevertheless major, role in the whole catastrophe of the invasion, with Britain continually consulting the Americans as if they could not act without them, we now look at some key documents on Kissinger and the US.

5 THE US AND KISSINGER

Introduction Since at least the Suez crisis, the US has set the Middle East agenda, at least in ‘western terms’, with Britain becoming the junior partner. It was, for example, US pressure that forced Britain to free Arbishop Makarios from captivity in the Seychelles. The US considered, and still considers, Cyprus vital in terms of the British electronic eavesdropping facilities, and could not countenance war between its NATO allies Greece and Turkey, because of fear of Russia. Thus as early as August 1956, and only three weeks after President Nasser’s decision to nationalise the Suez Canal, the State Department was elaborating plans to strengthen the Allied position in the area and to free the British forces tied down in Cyprus for general defence operations in the Middle East; to guarantee that the British bases would be at the ‘permanent disposal’ of Great Britain; and to provide the inhabitants with guarantees of their rights of self-determination with full protection of minorities. The plan included the calling of almost immediate elections and a plebiscite permitting union ten years later with Greece.1 The Cyprus issue became yet more poignant when American (and Soviet) pressure forced Britain, France and Israel to cease operations against Egypt, since Cyprus assumed increased importance militarily. The limited form of independence that Cyprus obtained in 1960 was to a large extent due to American pressure, although in the end Turkish pressure assured that there would be no union with Greece.2 Following the 1963 breakdown of the constitution, British policy was increasingly to let the US make the running. The problem was that Britain had nevertheless taken on serious commitments and responsibilities, which it was however unsure about honouring, as we have seen from internal government debate, and from Britain’s embarrassed reaction to the Turkish invasion. A look at some key documents makes matters much

74

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

clearer, even, than our comments. An extract from the above-quoted paper about British policy on Cyprus from July to September 1974 sets the scene: There are still obscurities about the rôle played in all this by the United States Government; but this is natural when throughout the crisis Dr Kissinger was preoccupied with the resignation of President Nixon (announced on 9 August); with accusations against himself about wire-tapping; and with the Middle East. I exchanged many telephone calls with Dr Kissinger; initially, indeed, it appeared that British and United States policy was identical; it gradually emerged, however, that our perceptions of the crisis were not identical. He has subsequently volunteered to me that his preoccupations with restraining President Nixon prevented him from giving his full attention to the problem and this must be responsible for some of the blanks in our knowledge. He had sent Mr Joseph Sisco to Athens and Ankara immediately before the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, with instructions to prevent it. He failed, but he was successful in securing Greek and Turkish agreement to a ceasefire on 22 July. Even though this, like all other such agreements during that period, was only partially observed, it was a notable diplomatic success. The new Greek Government bitterly mistrusted the United States Government, for reasons set out in Sir Brooks Richards’s very interesting dispatch of the 12th February 1975; it is not surprising that the Americans were careful thereafter to prevent the alienation from them of the Government of Turkey. Dr Kissinger was willing to support the British initiatives at Geneva, but, given his concern for the wider implications of the crisis, he was not prepared to use all the levers available in US/Turkish relations. In particular, he was reluctant to put the US bases in Turkey at risk. He was in frequent contact with the Turkish leaders during the first Geneva conference; the principal intervention he undertook was to secure Turkish concurrence in a version of paragraph 4 of the Geneva Declaration, which was decisive in securing the signature of the declaration; one of its virtues in American eyes was the exclusion of any reference to British withdrawal from the Sovereign Base Areas. During the second conference, the main effect of his activity was to persuade the Turkish Government to put forward a proposal for a multi-cantonal solution to the Cyprus question; this was, however, neither immediately acceptable to the Greek and Greek Cypriot side, nor of lasting acceptability to the Turks. Mr Günesh constantly reiterated that the Turkish Government would not wish to see the Island partitioned, and it might be thought that a multi-cantonal solution would have obviated that. Nor did the Turkish Cypriots wholeheartedly endorse it. The result was merely to blur the issue without leading to a solution. On the last night of the second conference, Dr Kissinger sent me repeated messages urging me to prolong discussion while he sought to secure Turkish assurances that that they would not prosecute their advance in Cyprus but concede the adjournment which I sought. My staff explained these tactics to

THE US AND KISSINGER

75

the Greeks, and both Greek and British disappointment at the failure of the American initiative was proportionate to the expectations of success which these messages had aroused. The Greek withdrawal from the military organisation of NATO was no doubt mainly seen by the Greek Government as a demonstration of independence preferable to the only alternative, war with Turkey, but, undoubtedly, it was also seen as an anti- American gesture in response to Dr Kissinger’s failure to restrain the Turks. On reflection, I do not think that any pressure on Turkey by the United States or by anyone else could have succeeded at that time. Sir H. Phillips3 has persuasively drawn attention to “the mentality of the Turk, which in moments of stress asserts itself in a stubborn and arrogant display of nationalistic fervour to which all other factors must take second place”. The Americans can therefore argue that Dr Kissinger was right not to use up his negotiating credit to no purpose; but this left the British delegation in Geneva in an exposed position. The Turks themselves seem to have concluded early on that American pressure would not be backed by anything stronger; this was no doubt a factor in their tactics at the second Geneva conference. It is certainly the case that Dr Kissinger was concerned with the maintenance of Turkish goodwill as a bulwark between the Soviet Union and the Arab States as well as with the continued use of US bases in Turkey. He was also concerned with the effects of United States policy over Cyprus on the resolution of the Arab/Israel problem, and he regarded this as more important than Greek hostility towards the United States, despite the effect of this dissension on the Southern Flank of the Alliance.4

We need to remember that this was written retrospectively, partly as an attempt to exonerate both the British and Kissinger, even if it was only for internal consumption. Despite the diplomatic gloss and omission of the fact that the Chiefs of Staff, Callaghan and the FCO were concerned at indications of a Turkish breakout, the report makes it clear, although rather coyly, that not only did Britain depend on the Americans in its policy formulation on Cyprus, but that the Americans had refused to act jointly with the British militarily. Significantly, the report suggests that the Turkish government were sure that the US would not physically try to prevent them from carrying out the invasion. Let us now turn to the documents produced during the actual crisis, which display more immediate factuality than does the Goodison-Callaghan retrospective record. They suggest that the British government appeared incapable of substantive action without asking the Americans what to do (the euphemistic term for seeking instructions was ‘consultations’!). On 8 August, just before Callaghan and his delegation flew to Geneva for the second round of negotiations, they met Arthur Hartman,

76

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

the US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, at the FCO for discussions. Hartman made it quite clear that the talks should continue in Geneva, even while the Turkish army was breaking the ceasefire. He said that the UK role should be that of a patient referee.5 This policy would obviously favour the Turkish plans, although no one said it. The reality was that, although the US had no official role in what should have been Britain’s affair, it was in fact calling the shots. Symptomatic of the UK-US relationship is that after the meeting, the two delegations, one official, one not, flew to Geneva together. On 12 August, two days after the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff’s warning about Callaghan’s concern about the impending breakout ( not copied, bizarrely, to the British embassy in Washington), and only two days before the Turkish breakout, the British ambassador in Washington, Peter Ramsbotham, sent Callaghan a telegram: During the conversation, Kissinger mentioned that Mavros [the Greek Foreign Minister] asked some time ago whether he could come to Washington to see him. Having your own problems at the negotiating table very much in mind, Kissinger had suggested that he delayed until this round of talks at Geneva was over, but came soon afterwards. I said that I thought there would be no objection to that on our part.6

Here again, we again see a tendency on Kissinger’s part not to do anything that might seriously irritate the Turkish government, or hold up its plans. It would hardly have been easy for the Turkish army to suddenly complete its invasion plans while the Greek Foreign Minister was seeing Kissinger in Washington. Hence Kissinger’s delaying tactics, with which the British Ambassador in Washington rather naively concurred. Delaying tactics apart, and crucial in terms of Turkish tactics, was the Turkish government’s assumption that the US, and therefore Britain, would not physically try to prevent the occupation of one third of Cyprus. A ‘flash’ telegram of 12 August from Callaghan to the FCO makes this clear, apart from providing an insight into Kissinger’s tactics: 1. Hartman saw a member of my staff this morning and described the latest American contacts with the Turks. These appear to have taken place earlier today. 2. Dr Kissinger had either spoken to or sent a message to Ecevit (Hartman was not sure which) urging on him the need for flexibility at the negotiating table and restraint in the island. Kissinger had emphasised to Ecevit that there were no American “proposals” for tackling the Cyprus problem. All that the Americans had done was to tell the Turks what they meant by “flexibility” and given them examples of what

THE US AND KISSINGER

77

flexibility might imply. Kissinger had said that he hoped there would be no more references to “American plans”. 3. Ecevit told Kissinger that he was considering proposals which the Turks might put forward in Geneva. These might include cantonal arrangements. Ecevit gave a further assurance that the Turks would take no military action “pending the outcome of the discussions in Geneva”. 4. Hartman also gave the answer to the question I put to him yesterday about the attitude the US Government would adopt in the event of a major Turkish infringement of the ceasefire line. According to Hartman: (A) Kissinger continues to support my efforts to solve the Cyprus problem diplomatically: (B) Kissinger has made it clear to the Turks that they will not support the Turks in the Security Council if the Turks take military action: (C) If the Turks do take military action, there will be a major US diplomatic effort in NATO and bilaterally to stop them (it is not clear in what terms this has been put to the Turks though Hartman said they could be under no illusions as to what would be involved): (D) The United States could not consider military action at a time when a new US administration was taking office: (E) Kissinger does not consider threats of military action are helpful in present circumstances. Such gestures tend to create problems for Ecevit with the extremists in Turkey. 5. It has been made clear to Hartman that I am not contemplating any further military action [building up forces, essentially to protect the British bases] at the moment and that all new action on reinforcements has been suspended since yesterday. Separate instructions (not to all) are being sent to HM Ambassador Washington to set the record straight with Kissinger later today.7

The telegram demonstrates why the above-quoted ‘Callaghan’ paper on British policy on Cyprus stated that the Turks had ‘concluded early on that American pressure would not be backed by anything stronger’. The Turkish government knew that their invasion and occupation would not be seriously resisted, even if they could expect some hostile diplomatic reactions. As regards Kissinger, not only was he against any form of military action, but wished to continue to supply Turkey with weaponry. A telegram of 14 August (just after the second Turkish attack) from Ramsbotham to the FCO lays bare Kissinger’s thinking:

78

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS 1. The last paragraph of TUR8 asks for information about American intentions and moves. You may find the following summary, based on my talks with Kissinger and previous telegrams not repeated to Bonn, useful. 2. At the forefront of Kissinger’s mind is the need to avoid giving the Soviet Union an opportunity to expand their influence and presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. He is therefore determined not to jeopardise the American position in Turkey, whose contribution to NATO he regards as more important than Greece’s. Also important in his mind, but of lesser priority, is the goal of reaching a settlement of the Cyprus problem. (As the State Department spokesman said yesterday, the United States supports Turkey’s desire for a greater degree of autonomy for the Turkish community in Cyprus). Kissinger would much rather this goal should be achieved by negotiation, and he is prepared to put pressure on the Turks to try to stop them fighting. But, in view of the long-term interests of the Alliance as he sees them, he has not been willing to threaten to cut off military assistance (nor, perhaps, could he be sure that this threat would be effective). 3. It follows that, while the Turks could not justifiably claim to have American approval for their position, particularly now that they have started fighting again, they could reasonably gamble that American disapproval would not be so forceful as to compel them to stop.9

Thus the documentary evidence demonstrates that although Kissinger did not actively promote the invasion of Cyprus (if he had blatantly done so, the very exposure would have meant failure), he did his subtle and procrastinating best to help the Turkish government achieve its objectives. For example, it appears that when the Turkish army attacked again on 14 August, he wished to delay a NATO meeting, as the following FCO record makes clear: DIARY: 14 AUGUST, 1974 2330 The Secretary of State spoke to Dr Kissinger on the telephone and asked whether he had received a request from the Greek Government to support their plans for a counter-attack on Cyprus. Dr Kissinger said he was unaware of these plans. He also said that they intended to invite Karamanlis to the United States for talks. At the Secretary of State’s suggestion Dr Kissinger agreed to telephone Mr Ecevit to ask how far south the Turks were planning to advance. The Secretary of State asked Dr Kissinger whether he would be prepared to attend a NATO Ministerial meeting if the Secretary of State called for one. Dr Kissinger agreed as long as it was not held before Monday (19 August).10

THE US AND KISSINGER

79

Although doubtless all manner of excuses could be wheeled out to explain Kissinger’s anxiousness to delay a NATO meeting (for example, not to emphasise NATO disunity to the Soviet Union), the fact remains that an immediate meeting would have made it more difficult for the Turkish army to continue its offensive operations. But by 19 August, Turkey had got what it wanted, rendering a NATO meeting essentially otiose. What can easily be interpreted as Kissinger’s delaying tactics, and his opposition to Makarios, went back to at least the ‘Sampson coup’, as a telegram of 17 July 1974 from the British embassy, Washington (set out in the previous chapter, but repeated here), to the FCO establishes: […] Kissinger seemed puzzled as to why we were working to move so quickly and in support of Makarios […] it was surely a mistake to commit ourselves now to Makarios and thus narrow our options when it was far from certain that Makarios could return to power. Kissinger was also concerned at the line we were taking about the withdrawal of Greek officers in the National Guard. Whatever role they had been playing, they had at least acted as a force against communist infiltration in Cyprus. Kissinger was clearly suspicious that Makarios, returned to power I those circumstances, would not hesitate to regard the Russians [sic] as his saviours and allow an already strong communist party to gain further strength […] he hoped we could agree to play the hand more slowly.11

The US role, and Kissinger’s in particular, has always been the object of dark speculation, and a rich field of research for those convinced of a conspiracy to neutralise President Makarios and achieve a version of double enosis, or even total annexation by Turkey. Certainly, Kissinger as much as admitted his distaste for President Makarios to Edward Heath at a lunch at the State Department on 10 September 1974, saying that Archbishop Makarios was unlikely ever to be acceptable again in Cyprus (he was totally wrong). He went on to claim that the reason that the Americans had not backed Makarios more clearly in the first days of the crisis was the fear that he might have ‘sought Soviet support in addition to their own’.12 Whatever view one holds, the British embassy in Athens certainly seems to have taken Greek suspicions about American complicity in the Sampson coup seriously, as a letter of 25 September 1974 from William Tomkys, Head of Chancery at the British embassy in Athens to Robert Cornish at the FCO, indicates:

80

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS 1. I called on Elias Gounaris, the Desk Officer in the Cyprus and Turkey Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 23 September, principally as a courtesy on my return to Greece after leave. 2. We had an interesting general discussion, some of which is reflected in our telno 568. Toward the end of the meeting, however, he raised one point in a manner which impressed me considerably. 3. He asked me what I considered to have been the basis of American policy during the summer and I gave him an account of my own view, which is essentially that at the beginning of the crisis, the US Administration had been determined to avoid playing the leading role; they had underestimated the risks and, after the Turkish invasion, though prepared to play a helpful supporting rôle, did not wish to take control of the crisis or to mediate directly between their two allies. I further suggested that the Soviet Union’s policy had mutatis mutandis been comparable. To this, Gounaris replied that he had attended all the significant meetings between the Foreign Ministry and the Greek military during the period of the Sampson coup and the Turkish invasion. He had “indications” which did not amount to proof, but which satisfied him that the Americans had allowed the Greek military to believe that the Sampson coup would be acceptable to them. They had made no protest after the fact and the Greek military had thought themselves safe from Turkish retaliation because of some implicit or explicit American assurances. 4. This view of American complicity is, of course, widespread outside the Greek Government. Gounaris admitted that his view was entirely personal and that he had got a very quick and hostile reaction from his Director, Metaxas, when he had spoken in these terms. I myself told him that, so far as I could see, what he was suggesting was that the US Embassy representatives in Greece had engaged in a policy which was directly contrary to US interests as perceived by the Administration as a whole. While one could not exclude the possibility that the junta believed themselves to have received some form of assurance through misunderstanding, I could not believe that the events of the summer (even without the Turkish invasion) had been planned by the US, and I was shocked to hear that he was himself so convinced. 5. What Gounaris said does, nevertheless, fit in with other impressions we have formed here. In particular, John Denson13 recalls the calm way in which the Greek military and some Americans in Athens played down the risk of any Turkish response to the Sampson coup (and it does seem to me that any Greeks who saw Sisco14 between 15 and 20 July might well have concluded that he also did not expect the Turks to go in). 6. There was an interesting article by Hoagland in the International Herald Tribune of 17 September, which is relevant. You will probably have seen it, but I enclose a copy for ease of reference. The American

THE US AND KISSINGER

81

Embassy here agree that it is not altogether misleading. The picture which emerges, we think, is that the intelligence-gathering aspect of the CIA’s work was misunderstood by the Greek junta and liaison maintained by the CIA was taken for US government assent to the coup of 15 July and an assurance that the US would restrain Turkey. 7. We do not suggest that this is the whole story, but I have set it out now because it is of rather more than historical significance here. If Gounaris is convinced of US complicity, then so, I think, must be the great majority of well-informed thinking Greeks and virtually all the rest. It will not be easy for Karamanlis to continue to mitigate anti-American feeling in the face of a Cyprus stalemate and one must doubt whether anyone other than Karamanlis could do as much as he has done. It need hardly be said that, from this parochial point of view, the recent revelations of CIA involvement on Chile are particularly ill-timed. 8. Clearly, Gounaris was expressing to me a personal opinion and it would do him considerable damage if it were to become known that he had spoken in this way. I should be grateful if you, and the other recipients of this letter, would protect it accordingly.15

Reading between the lines of this extraordinary letter, it seems clear that there was a large measure of skullduggery, which is by its very nature and definition, difficult to prove. Such letters are certainly legitimate material for conspiracy theorists. On receipt, the letter was deemed sufficiently important to be copied to, among others, a certain Major Nicol of D13(W) in the MOD, and the Cabinet Office. To ascertain more, one needs to see those parts of the State Department files that have not been released. It can be said, in a general sense, that the overseas activities of the CIA in the sixties and seventies are not known for having been being particularly savoury.16 Returning now specifically to Kissinger, the British ambassador described him as having been uncomplimentary about Makarios17 (which is pretty strong in diplomatic language). Extracts from a letter from Kissinger to Callaghan of 16 November make interesting reading: […] However, I did want you to have immediately my impressions of my meeting with Makarios here on November 13. As usual, he was full of benign charm and ambiguities. It was evident that he intends to return to Cyprus within the next few weeks, at least initially as President. I told him his return at this time would cause a setback in efforts to reach a negotiated settlement, and I urged him at least to delay his decision until we have a better idea of the new Turkish government. In our discussion of the future of Cyprus, I told Makarios that in my view any solution would have to be based on a geographical federation

82

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS and that only a bi-zonal arrangement would be acceptable. He is reluctantly beginning to accept the idea of a federation, but he insists that there must be a multiplicity of cantons under a strong central government. I understand that since our meeting, Makarios has let it be known that the United States still holds open the idea of a multi-cantonal arrangement. I want to assure you that we support the bi-zonal concept as being the only practicable arrangement and on this I think we are in complete agreement. It is clear that Makarios is not in touch with the realities of the situation on the island and I am not sure that there is very much we can do at this stage to open his eyes. […].18

Without needing to name the numerous books written about Henry Kissinger, there seems little doubt that history will record him as having had a negative and damaging effect on international relations, in particular in the Eastern Mediterranean. What happened in Greece and Cyprus is nevertheless dwarfed by events in Chile, Laos and Cambodia, at least when using a comparison of needless killings as the criterion. The needless killings resulted from hard and cynical backstage power politics, which Kissinger seems to have enjoyed. Before concluding this chapter, we now quote the written views of British diplomats, a German State Secretary, and a French Foreign Minister about Kissinger, to show that this author is not alone in his evaluation of the academic turned amateur diplomat. As early as 8 December 1971, the British ambassador to Germany, Roger Jackling, wrote to Charles Wiggin, the Head of America Department, about German State Secretary Frank’s views on Kissinger: […] Frank turned to the subject of Kissinger, with whom he had spent some time. He remarked that as officials, he and I were used to the minor role appropriate to our status. Kissinger was something else again. He saw himself as a policy-maker on the grand scale and whatever the degree of cooperation between the working level of the State Department and the White House might be, this made for considerable difficulties. He did not feel that he had obtained any concept of Kissinger’s inner-most thinking. He gave two examples of his utterances. He had said after making one statement that this represented his (Kissinger’s) personal view, but added “I can assure you that in two weeks’ time it will be White House policy”. As he parted from him, Frank had asked whether there were any particular points that he should bear in mind in advising Brandt preparatory to the latter’s meeting with President Nixon. Kissinger told him that the President should not be pressed with questions about his future policy. I felt that Frank regarded Kissinger with considerable misgivings. He thought he was far more in the mould of Metternich than a man with a full

THE US AND KISSINGER

83

understanding of the inter-dependence of a modern world. He was interested in where power resided and the exercise of power. Frank clearly feared that this 19th century approach was affecting White House thinking generally and perhaps the attitude of the President in particular.[…]19

The above letter was copied to the British embassy in Washington, giving the minister there, Donald Tebbit, the chance to weigh in, in a letter of 30 December to Wiggin: […] As you also know, we share Frank’s misgivings about the role of Dr Kissinger. In this connection you may like to arrange for Roger Jackling to be sent, on a personal basis for his own background information, a copy of Lord Cromer’s letter20 of 12 November to the PUS about the making of American foreign policy. Since this was written our misgivings have been further increased by the White House’s handling of the Indo-Pakistan crisis, where it seemed – and seems – to us impossible to square Kissinger’s expressed views with reality. But it is not as a rule so much the direction of Kissinger’s foreign policy ideas that upsets us; for example his late intervention in the monetary crisis seems to have been most helpful. It is rather his manner of conceiving and conducting foreign policy without reference to, or knowledge of, the State Department or anyone else which is most worrying. It leaves one with the fear that any day something could go seriously wrong because the normal sources of advice, restraint and execution are by-passed.[…]21

The French, too, had their misgivings, at the highest level: on 20 March 1972, the Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, Robert Armstrong, wrote a ‘secret & personal & eclipse’ letter to Denis Greenhill, the Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office: During the weekend when President Pompidou was at Chequers, the subject of Dr. Kissinger came up in the course of a conversation which I had with Jobert.22 It was clear that the French found his style and activities extremely distasteful. Jobert said that Kissinger was a “show off man”. When they were in the Azores President Nixon stayed at the American Air Base and President Pompidou at a hotel about 15 miles away, “and Kissinger seemed to spend most of his time in the car between the two places”. He insisted on coming to have breakfast with President Nixon, and constantly intervened in the talks between the two Presidents.23

Not to be outdone, even senior American policymakers had serious concerns about Kissinger’s lack of professionalism. On 14 September 1972, William Hyland, a senior CIA officer on loan to the White House Staff,

84

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

stopping over in London on his way back from Moscow with Kissinger’s party, asked to meet Malcolm Mackintosh, an Assistant Secretary at the Cabinet Office. The following day, Mackintosh reported thus on Hyland’s view of Kissinger: […] The relative disregard of important expertise from the State Department had gone too far. Hyland, whose parent organization was CIA, believes that Kissinger is needlessly depriving himself of the services of true professionals in the art of diplomacy and policy formulation. Although a number of people in the White House staff agree with Hyland’s views, there was little chance of changing Kissinger’s practice on this point.24

On 31 July 1973, there were still misgivings. The Head of Planning Staff, James Cable, wrote to the Secretary of State’s Principle Private Secretary, Antony Acland, about books by Kissinger, which the Prime Minister, Edward Heath, wished to study: […] the book I would recommend the Prime Minister to begin with is the most academic of these productions: “A World Restored”. I think it offers a clue to the deeper roots of Dr Kissinger’s strange personality. Incidentally, my reference to Kissinger as a “romantic” drew a qualification from our Embassy in Washington, who said: “If to be romantic is to admire great men who by cynical and ruthless action changed the course of history, then he is a romantic. He is also a romantic in the sense of seeing himself hopefully cutting as brilliant and successful a figure as those whom he admires. But it is quite clear for example from what we hear of his remarks in private that he enjoys making a cynical analysis of other people’s capacities and motives, and is introspective and aware of the fact that he may have an incipient folie de grandeur”.

The negative criticism continued. On 22 August 1973, the Minister at the British Embassy in Washington, Richard Sykes, wrote: […] a lot of the trouble we have run into must be attributed to Kissinger’s highly idiosyncratic way of doing business […] what I find difficult to judge is where the President ends and Kissinger begins.25

A month later, the Head of North Department, Hugh Overton, wrote: […] I said that I was a bit disturbed by Dr. Kissinger’s apparent difficulty in comprehending the procedures of the Community.26

THE US AND KISSINGER

85

Before we attempt to conclude on this morass of somewhat detrimental comment about Kissinger (this author could not locate positive comments), let us consider some comment from the British ambassador in Washington, Ramsbotham, in a telegram of 17 July 1974 to the FCO: My conversation with Kissinger was not apparently recorded in the State dept., and we have just received the somewhat bizarre request that we should give the gist of it to Sisco before he leaves for London. We have accordingly given Sisco the bulk of my tel. under reference omitting the last sentence of para. 3 and the second sentence of para. 6. We also stressed to Sisco our special position both as a Guarantor Power, and because of the existence of the Sovereign Base Areas. 2. Sisco was most grateful. He said that naturally he was aware of Kissinger’s views and that my conversation with Kissinger contained nothing new to him, but that it was also most useful to have such a concise summary. He also fully took the points about our special position. 3. I fear it is all too likely, given Kissinger’s idiosyncratic methods of working, that he may not record the telephonic conversations he has with the Secretary of State. I hope therefore that you can arrange for the gist of these to be telegraphed to me as soon as possible after they have taken place. Otherwise, improbable though it may seem, I fear there will be a danger of both the State Dept.’ and this embassy working in the dark with all the resultant risks of confusion and misunderstanding.27

Even American diplomats had considerable problems with Kissinger, particularly on Cyprus, which Kissinger appears to have hugged to himself in a somewhat personal and secretive manner, as the following extract from an FCO minute intimates: I had dinner last night with Mr Crawford, the US Ambassador in Nicosia. He said he was not going home specifically for the meeting between Dr Kissinger and the Archbishop, though he would of course attend that. He found, however, that the only way in which he could discover US policy on Cyprus was to go home every few months and talk with Dr Kissinger personally.28

Conclusions The negative and cold analytical comments of British diplomats about Kissinger carry much weight, particularly since they are backed up by three serious and high level German, French and American government officials. It needs to be remembered that Kissinger was never a trained diplomat. Normally, when a politician takes over a government department,

86

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

he is eased into the position, learning the ropes with the help of his permanent officials. In the case of Kissinger, it seems that he considered the correct diplomatic procedures largely irrelevant. The criticism ‘idiosyncratic methods of working’ is a diplomatic euphemism for ‘loose cannon’. The thought that Kissinger did not even bother to properly brief Sisco before his crucial trip to Greece and Turkey, to the extent that the British had to tell him what Kissinger had discussed with the British ambassador is, in the ambassador’s words, bizarre. More than that, it suggests considerable cynicism. One is led to wonder whether Sisco’s trip was simply windowdressing, and largely irrelevant to Turkey’s military preparations. Generally, we can conclude from the evidence above that Britain had no power of its own, or was not prepared to use what power it did have. Callaghan ended up going along with Kissinger, however irritated he was by Turkish behaviour. Kissinger’s objectives were to keep the Soviet Union from increasing its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, to keep the US military bases in Turkey, and to ensure that the British military presence was not threatened, particularly since he considered Cyprus important in the Arab/Israel dispute. Not only would Kissinger not take military action against Turkey, if they were to attack and expand their occupation, but was not in favour of cutting off military supplies. The following extract from a telegram of 12 August from Ramsbotham in Washington to Callaghan in Geneva shows this unequivocally: […] I saw Kissinger again later in the afternoon […] Our discussion was then interrupted by a phalanx of advisors from the U.S. Ambassador in Ankara that the Turks had delivered an ultimatum that, unless they were at once accorded the widely expanded zone across the north of Cyprus, they would leave Geneva. Kissinger asked what he should do. His advisors urged a message to Ecevit threatening to cut off military assistance. Kissinger said that on no account should he ever do this.29

It is eminently reasonable to assume that Kissinger knew of, and condoned, Turkey’s plans to occupy at least one third of Cyprus, that the British slowly and painfully became aware of this, but that they were not able to meet up to their treaty responsibilities without American support, which was of course not forthcoming, given Turkey’s perceived strategic importance. One does not need to be a so-called ‘conspiracy theorist’ to see the obvious. It is hardly surprising that in his memoirs, Kissinger wrote that the Cyprus problem was solved in 1974, and even less surprising that in 1957, he wrote of Cyprus as a staging areas for the Middle East.30 On this ‘strategic’ note, we turn now to the vexed question of the British Sovereign Territories.

6 BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS Introduction However much the British government has tried to play down the question of the bases, often emphasising, as we saw in Chapter Three, that Britain’s possession of the SBAs does not depend on the treaties of Guarantee and Establishment, this reasoning wears rather thin when one considers that over half the latter treaty is devoted to Britain’s rights. Moreover, in secret, the truth is admitted: in 1977, an FCO Deputy Under Secretary wrote that the existence of the SBAs was rooted in the treaties.1 It is no exaggeration to state that the nature of the Cyprus settlement of 1960 was largely predicated on perceived Anglo-American security needs, hence the convoluted package that we have seen in Chapter Three, a package that was so legally precarious and lacking in consistency, that it took only the announcement of some sensible amendments to the constitution to bring down the whole pack of cards in 1963. The 1963/4 crisis led to some thought in the British government about the future viability of the SBAs which, it should be remembered, were connected to a whole package of rights in Cyprus for the former colonial power, such as those of overflight, access and retained sites .On 18 June 1964, the British High Commission in Nicosia prepared a brief for the High Commissioner’s visit to London: The Future of the Bases A. Background In March Ministers gave consideration to the continued retention of the S.B.A’s and Retained Sites. Advice tendered to them included inter alia the following points (a) that total withdrawal from Cyprus would make it impossible for us to enjoy certain military advantages even if we could re-establish some of our facilities in other locations and (b) any surrender of sovereignty could have dangerous repercussions including those in respect of Bases elsewhere, such as Aden. Minister

88

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS [sic] accepted this advice and ruled that H.M.G. should take no initiative in suggesting (to the Mediator) that we are considering giving up any of our Sovereign rights or facilities (this was reiterated yesterday in the House of Commons by Mr. Butler2); at the same time they directed the Chiefs of Staff to consider how we could maintain our essential strategic interests if deprived of our defence facilities in Cyprus. Meanwhile an examination was also to be made in connection with military contracts due to be placed in Cyprus. B. Dependence of Bases on Cypriot co-operation Both the High Commissioner (in his letter of 11 May to Sir N. Pritchard) and Sir. N. Barnett in telegram CYPCOS 231 have emphasised on [sic] Cypriot co-operation because of need for labour, port facilities, road communications, telecommunications, power, water, petrol, local supplies and accommodation. Action has of course been taken to make the Bases less dependent, for example through plans for bringing in service labour, the building of an airfield and distillation plant at Dhekelia and the dispersal of standby generating units. However the retained sites remain vulnerable and in any event Cypriot co-operation remains essential for long-term pease-time [sic] maintenance of the bases. An up to date assessment of the extent to which the bases (and retained sites) could be actually used under present circumstances for the purposes for which they are intended is contained in JIC (Cyprus) 64–5 (Final). C. Present Cypriot Attitude to the Bases. There has been continued and virulent press criticism of the British presence in Cyprus and while much of this has been against our contribution to UNFICYP the presence of the bases (and retained sites) has not been immune from attack. While Greek Cypriot Ministers have given encouragement to recent harassments (e.g. by checks and searches of British vehicles) presumably to increase their domestic prestige and popularity and as a price for AKEL support for the Archbishop, there is no reason to suppose that the Cyprus Government as a whole has any intention of trying to evict us from the bases. Indeed in fact the majority of Ministers do not appear to wish at present to make the bases untenable because of their appreciation of their economic importance for the Island. However Makarios’ recent message to Kruschev shows that the Government would be likely to object to the use of the bases in any role which appears to have a “colonialist” flavour or to which the USSR (or UAR) might themselves object strongly. D. Future attitudes Future attitudes depend to a large extent on how long is delayed, and the eventual nature of, the political settlement. Delay in reaching a settlement will greatly assist the communists and neutralists in their campaign against the bases, and Makarios, particularly if he could obtain

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS compensatory economic support from the Bloc, U. A. R. or anywhere, may become increasingly tempted to commit his Government to take positive action against British interests as a price for wide internal political support. The U.S.S.R. and U. A. R. will meanwhile continue to assist the communists and neutralists to erode our position, and their influence is likely to be further enhanced if we are felt to be continuing to frustrate Greek Cypriot aims for a settlement, while they for their part are able to advertise their support for the Greek Cypriots at the U.N. and elsewhere. E. Possible solutions to the Cyprus problem and their effects on the bases, were considered in the High Commissioner’s dispatch No.4. (i) Unitary State or Enosis It was argued in the dispatch that in a Unitary State the influence of such persons as Dr. Lyssarides3, Nicos Sampson and communist bosses would be increased, and it might well prove difficult for the British to get back onto good terms with the Greek Cypriots. Under Enosis however, always assuming Greece remains stable and committed to the West, and that this position would not be significantly unbalanced by the addition of the Greek Cypriot electorate, our bases would be more secure. Other possibilities have recently been canvassed:(ii) ‘Natofication’ The Greek Prime Minister has hinted that the bases might be ‘Natofied’. This would almost certainly be strongly opposed in a Unitary State but under Enosis it might make the bases more immune from attack from Greek and Greek Cypriot opinion (other than communist). However the extent to which it would be practicable, politically and militarily to turn the bases into NATO bases would clearly need careful detailed study. (iii) Dhekelia to the Turks. It has been suggested that Dhekelia S.B.A. might be given to the Turks. The military consequences would need careful study but politically this would almost certainly raise strong objections from the Greek Cypriots, and in any case to allow the bases to become involved in any intercommunal settlement would risk prejudicing their existence as a whole. F. Conclusion The bases and retained sites, and their usefulness to us, depend in large measure upon Greek Cypriot co-operation or at least acquiescence. A ‘Guantanamo’4 position is out of the question. Their future therefore must depend on the extent to which we can retain Greek and/or Greek Cypriot goodwill and counter U. S. S. R. and U. A. R. pressures. There seems little doubt, however, that in the long term, our

89

90

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS sovereign rights in the S.B.A’s will be considered increasingly irksome by the Greek Cypriots and will be regarded as increasingly anachronistic by world public opinion. […]5

We saw in Chapter Three how steppenwolfish was, and surely still is, the relationship between the SBAs and the 1960 treaties, but in particular the Treaty of Establishment. As we have seen, the existence of the SBAs was, in the words of a senior FCO official, ‘rooted in the treaties’6. One could even be tempted to say that matters were vice versa, and that the treaties were rooted in the birth of the bases, in the sense that Britain’s main concern was more its military presence in Cyprus than good-naturedly giving Cyprus to its inhabitants, lock, stock and barrel. In other words, the bases horse pulled the ‘independence’ cart. If the 1963–4 crisis had already shaken British confidence in the longterm viability of the bases, then the 1974 invasion destroyed it, at least judging by some of the documents. Immediately after the first stage of the Turkish invasion, the FCO’s Head of Planning Staff, James Cable, wrote a paper for John Killick, Deputy Under Secretary: BRITISH OBJECTIVES IN A CYPRUS CONFERENCE 1. General Considerations In the long run British interests in Cyprus are the same as general Western interests: that the situation in the island should no longer disturb the peace and disrupt the Southern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance. Our particular interests are of lesser priority: [here, one and a half lines have been excised] Anglo-American relations, our military bases on the island have usually been more of a liability than an asset. We have in any case considered sacrificing them as part of the economies contemplated by the Defence Review and could afford to dispense with them if that would facilitate the attainment of wider objectives. In the short run, however, these bases, the presence of numerous British subjects on the island and our responsibilities under the 1960 Treaty give us a special interest not shared by our allies and partners. It should be a long term objective to eliminate liabilities and responsibilities disproportionate to our resources[…].7

Two months later, a ‘secret and eclipse’ FCO brief for discussions between Callaghan and Kissinger stated: […] The Secretary of State has decided not to raise the subject of British tenure of the Sovereign Base Areas. If Dr Kissinger raises it, he intends to be guarded. If necessary, he could say that, during the recent crisis, our presence in the Sovereign Base Areas proved to be

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

91

an embarrassment to us. If pressed to say what conclusions he draws from this, he could say that the future of the Bases will probably be discussed in the context of the Defence Review but that action on this has of course been suspended until after the election. As Dr Kissinger knows, we shall wish to talk to the Americans about plans on a worldwide basis before we talk to anyone else. […]8

By October of the invasion year, the FCO had decided that there was a strong link between a solution to the Cyprus problem and the question of the bases, as the Head of Planning Staff enunciated, perhaps somewhat tortuously, in a minute to the Head of Southern European Department, Alan Goodison: CYPRUS I am sorry to be rather late in commenting on your submission of 16 October about the relationship between our withdrawal from the Sovereign Base Areas and the promotion of an agreed settlement, but I would like to make a case for some additional contingency planning. 2. I entirely agree with the statement in paragraph 15 of your submission that for us “to stand any chance of securing an agreement on the disposal of the Sovereign Base Areas” we would have to “state convincingly that we should not withdraw from them without one.” I also agree with your argument that even then agreement is very unlikely except in the context of an overall settlement. 3. I suggest we need to make up our minds from the outset whether we are going to hang on indefinitely in the hope of promoting agreement or whether we are determined to withdraw anyway, because the choice we make will mean a radical difference in the nature of our planning. 4. If, for instance, we decide to withdraw whatever happens, then our intention will become obvious, whether or not it is expressly announced, well before withdrawal is completed. In that event – and in the absence of any agreement among Greeks, Turks and Cypriots – one or more of the parties may decide that they need to grab one or both Sovereign Base Areas for themselves or else to deny one or both to the other side. Preparatory military movements to this end would probably be made and might, as happened in Palestine in 1948, precipitate large-scale fighting in the vicinity of the SBAs before British forces had completed their withdrawal. It would thus be necessary for our withdrawal to be conducted on the same basis as that from Aden in 1967: that is to say, we would have to maintain up to the last minute a strong rear-guard capable of effective defence and to station a carrier task force off the island ready to deter any attempt at a coup de main against the Sovereign Base Areas before evacuation was completed. A potentially fighting withdrawal is a very different kind

92

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS of operation from the leisurely, methodical, agreed withdrawals that have taken place in recent years, eg., from Singapore. It would have to be definitely planned from the outset. 5. It seems to me, therefore, that we shall not be able to afford to play this one by ear for very long, but that a fairly early decision will be required between two objectives which are likely to be ultimately incompatible: retaining the Sovereign Base Areas unless and until there is agreement in Cyprus; or deciding to withdraw whether or not there is agreement.9

Thus it is clear that having decided to annex almost three per cent of its colony, and grant the rest a form of independence, underpinned by a complicated and legally precarious set of treaties, Britain was, only a few years later, looking for a way out of a maze largely of its own creation. It was the US, or rather Kissinger, who simplified matters for Britain. On 16 November, he wrote to Callaghan: Dear Jim, I appreciate your invitation to consult with us further on Cyprus in advance of what must be from all vantage points a difficult decision connected with the British Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus. I have asked Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, to head our group in discussions in London November 18 with Sir Geoffrey Arthur10 and his colleagues. I do want you to know of my very strong belief that elimination of the SBA’s in Cyprus could have a destabilizing affect on the region as a whole, encouraging the Soviet Union and others to believe that the strategic position of the West has been weakened in that area, and damage Western flexibility to react in unpredictable situations. I hope, therefore, that whatever decision you feel obliged to make can be flexible enough not to undermine our overall position in the Mediterranean. While the strategic situation alone argues most forcefully for the retention of the SBA’s, I believe it is also important to take no action at this time which could have a further unsettling effect on the situation in Cyprus. Mr. Stabler and his colleagues will be prepared to discuss these and other matters with you in greater depth in Brussels in early December. Warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger11

Following the 18 November discussions referred to above, Callaghan replied to Kissinger in what can be described as a submissive and slightly

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

93

frustrated tone, despite the diplomatic niceties. Like Kissinger’s letter, the originals have been retained in the FCO, with only sanitised copies put on the released file with, in the case of Callaghan’s reply, the penultimate paragraph actually being excised. Despite the censorship, the message of British subservience to US views seems plain: Dear Henry, In his message to the President of 20 November about the Defence Review, the Prime Minister said that I should be replying more fully to your message of 16 November about Cyprus, which Wells Stabler delivered in London. First, let me say that we greatly welcomed the visit of Mr Stabler and his colleagues. They gave our people a very clear presentation of the implications, as you saw them, of a decision by the British Government to withdraw from the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. The British participants in Monday’s discussions made an immediate report, and my Cabinet colleagues and I were thus able to take fully into account all your thoughts and concerns. Our conclusions with regard to Cyprus were that, although we shall embark almost at once on a rundown of our forces there – particularly Air Force units – on the lines indicated to you by John Hunt and his team in Washington on 12 November, we shall not in present circumstances proceed with our preferred policy of withdrawing from the Bases altogether. The fact that the US Administration and you personally attach such importance to our presence in Cyprus, together with your argument of the generally adverse effect of our withdrawal on the region as a whole, was the determining consideration. I would not pretend that we would accept without reservation each and every argument and point in your case, as presented by Mr Stabler and his colleagues: and our people may well be discussing some of them further with yours. In the specific context of Cyprus, I am not entirely happy with the prospect which our decision to stay in Cyprus entails. Throughout the recent crisis, the existence of the Sovereign Base areas has been a complicating factor in our efforts to discharge our role in relation to Cyprus and, as you know, I have been unhappy about my position of “responsibility without power”. Even if we succeed in the end in achieving a Cyprus settlement requiring no external guarantees, the mere fact of our continued presence in the island, albeit technically not in the Republic itself, is bound, whatever we may say, to imply some kind of continuing special role and responsibility for the British Government.

94

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS I hope that this outcome will give you satisfaction and the feeling that, in matters of this sort, we continue to give full weight to the views and interests of the United States wherever these can, even at some cost, be reconciled with our own.12

Britain was not of course so beholden to Kissinger’s desires that it would accept anything he wanted willy-nilly, and the debate was to continue, as it undoubtedly still does. In October 1975, the British High Commissioner to Cyprus, Stephen Olver, wrote (quoting the British Secretary of State for Defence) that the bases were not diamonds.13 A year later, a definite date for withdrawal had still not been set, although there had been a reduction in force levels. The US, perhaps aware of British navel-gazing about the bases, kept up the pressure. On 27 May 1976, the American ambassador to Cyprus, his Deputy Head of Mission and Defence Attaché visited the Headquarters of the British Forces in Cyprus. This occasioned the Head of Secretariat of British Forces Cyprus, Colonel Barton, to write to the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee: In summary, we find it difficult to understand why the visit was pressed on CBFC at such short notice and conclude that it was primarily with a view to assessing the future of the British presence in Cyprus with particular reference to intelligence gathering.14

By this time, there seemed to be a general assumption that at some point, the British would leave Cyprus. To some senior officials, however, the lack of a specific plan was frustrating, as a letter from John Hunt, Secretary to the Cabinet, to the FCO Permanent Under Secretary, Michael Palliser, shows: Cyprus At PSIS on 14 July we had some discussion of the planning assumptions about the duration of our stay in Cyprus and fortuitously the matter came up in the Cabinet’s discussion the following day when the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Defence, was asked to review the position. I have since seen John Mayne’s15 letter to Ewen Fergusson16 of 20th July saying that the MOD will be in touch with your people with the aim of bringing the results of the review back to Ministers for final decision in, say, late September or early October. I am well content with this. Much of the review will inevitably involve going over and updating existing material. For example, I understand that the JIC already have in hand an assessment of the value of the intelligence facilities in Cyprus

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

95

both to ourselves and to the Americans. Perhaps I could say however that I hope very much that the review will answer three questions which puzzle me: – (a) There is a link between how long we expect to stay in Cyprus and the measures we might take to concentrate and economise. Thus on one extreme, if we knew we could be out in three years we would leave things exactly as they are: and conversely, if we expected to be there indefinitely there are a number of changes it would be worth making. But I have never been clear where the balance of advantage crosses over and this seems to me highly relevant. And is there just one cross-over point? Or would we do some things if we thought we were going to be there for, say, four years and others if the planning assumption was, say, eight years? (b) What are the arguments for and against discussing our problems frankly with the Americans? I am not suggesting that we should appear to go back on the assurances given to them last year, but they know that we do not want to stay there indefinitely and it seems that we could reasonably probe their attitude, and whether they see any way of helping us, in the context of their own wish to expand their Over the Horizon radar. (c) Do we foresee any circumstances in which getting out or concentrating into one Sovereign Base Area would be a positive card to play politically, or is it just a question of waiting until the political constraints against getting out are removed? There is also a suggestion I would like to make. We all know how difficult this question of Cyprus is, and part of the difficulty is that there are separate political, economic, military and intelligence interests which have to be fitted into the jigsaw and if possible reconciled. I wonder therefore if you feel it would be helpful if I were to hold a meeting of yourself, Frank Cooper17, Mike Carver18 and Douglas Wass19 to discuss the results of the review before it is submitted to Ministers? I am not saying that we should necessarily have anything further to contribute to help Ministers reach a decision, but I would certainly find such a discussion helpful before I have to brief the Prime Minister and the rest of you might feel similarly. I am sending copies of this letter to Frank Cooper, Mike Carver and Douglas Wass.20

By October 1976, the situation seemed to be clarifying a little. The Cabinet asked the FCO to prepare a DOP21 paper, in consultation with the Treasury and the MOD:

96

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS CABINET DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY CYPRUS: HMG’S LONG-TERM POSITION IN THE SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS MEMORANDUM BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE Introduction 1. During the Defence Review Ministers decided that British forces should be withdrawn completely from Cyprus. In response to strong representations from the United States, however, we told Dr Kissinger that “we shall not on present circumstances proceed with our preferred policy of withdrawing from the Sovereign Base Areas altogether”. Since then we have reduced our forces in Cyprus to the minimum now necessary to occupy and protect the SBA’s and support the intelligence-gathering capacity, thus saving about two thirds of the former cost; even so the annual budgetary cost of our presence is still £36 million. This sum could be saved in full in the event of withdrawal provided it were possible in the circumstances at the time to reduce personnel establishments accordingly. Background 2. The considerations which led Ministers to agreeing in 1974 to stay in Cyprus for the time being were: a. The value of the bases to HMG and the United States in an East/West emergency or a renewed Middle East crisis; denial to the Soviet Union; and the destabilising effect of withdrawal on an already disrupted Southern flank. b. [paragraph blanked out by the MOD] c. The need not to disrupt Anglo-American political, defence and intelligence co-operation, which is a major contribution to British influence in international affairs. d. The likely effect on all parties to the Cyprus dispute of withdrawal except on terms agreed with them. HMG undertook in 1960 to relinquish the SBAs, if ever, to “the Republic of Cyprus”, ie, at present the Government of Archbishop Makarios. A handover in the absence of agreement would be likely to lead to Turkish occupation of the Eastern SBA at least, and quite possibly of the whole island. This could lead to the extinction of independent Cyprus, further disruption of NATO’s Southern Flank and possible war between Greece and Turkey. e. The dependence on the SBAs for logistic support of the UN force in Cyprus, the presence of which is essential for the observance of the cease-fire.

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS The Present Position 3. These considerations are still valid and are likely to remain so under a new US Administration. The current political situation in Cyprus is described in Annex B, from which it can be seen that no action which HMG could take unilaterally could secure a settlement; and that no settlement is likely over the next 5 years at least. Nevertheless, if the parties to a settlement sought a withdrawal, or if it appeared to HMG that the offer of such withdrawal would lead to a settlement, it might be agreed with the US Government that the advantages to the West would outweigh the considerations at paragraph 2a–c. 4. It is however unlikely, even in the event of a settlement, that the US Government would agree to our withdrawal. The likelihood is that the points a. to c. of paragraph 2 would remain valid even if there were a settlement in Cyprus. [Following four and a half lines blanked out by the MOD] The implications of this in the political and defence field is explained in Annex A. 5. Whereas the political implications of the above remain the same, the economic and financial considerations have changed for the worse. The prospects foreseen at the time of the Defence Review have not materialised. Industrial production and GDP fell during 1975 under the impact of world recession. Our balance of payments is in substantial deficit and the pound continues to be under pressure. In order to free resources for investment and exports, to prevent an insupportable tax burden, and to reduce public sector borrowing, public expenditure programmes have had to be substantially cut twice so that expenditure will be stabilized at about the 1976/77 level until the end of the decade. The Defence Budget has taken its share of expenditure cuts since 1974. Defence budget ceilings have been cut below the Defence Review level envisaged up to 1980 by sums ranging from £200 million to £300 million a year. These cuts inevitably are having adverse effects on our NATO capabilities and, if sustained, will increasingly limit our ability to maintain the present level of forces in Cyprus, which in addition to their budgetary cost of £36 million (see paragraphs 1 – 2 of Annex C) represent a substantial foreign exchange burden (£28 million) which we can ill-afford given our difficult balance of payments position. 6. The change in the financial situation strengthens the case for eliminating these costs by the earliest possible withdrawal. In keeping with Ministers’ preferred policy, MOD have hitherto assumed in their LongTerm Costings, and for other planning purposes, that we should have withdrawn completely by March 1979. There is thus no provision in the defence programme for a continuing presence in Cyprus after that date. If our forces remain beyond March 1979 provision will need to be made in the Defence Budget targets: otherwise this commitment could only be met at the expense of other tasks of higher priority which form part of our defence contribution to NATO. As Annex c paragraphs

97

98

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS 3–4 shows, if we maintain the present garrison after 1979 the costs are likely to rise beyond £36 million per annum. 7. The factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph argue for raising the question of our continuing presence with the Americans once again. We might take the line that the serious deterioration in our economic position has affected our ability to maintain our contribution to NATO itself, and that the pressures on public expenditure which have led to a substantial reduction in the Defence Budget below the level envisaged in the Defence Review and the need not to impair our frontline contribution to NATO now make it necessary for us to reconsider our decision to remain in Cyprus. However, we have to recognise that such an approach would be likely to produce a strong reaction from the Americans who would be quick to point out that none of the factors that led us in 1974 to accept their view that we should stay in Cyprus (paragraph 2a above) had changed. 8. We should therefore discuss with the US Government soon the best way of meeting requirements of strategy and intelligence-gathering at least cost to HMG. Although the present JIC assessment (Annex A) is that the intelligence gathering activities now being carried out in Cyprus can continue unaffected only if both SBAs are retained, it would, nonetheless be desirable to draw up with the United States joint plans for further economies and for a concentration of facilities so far as is feasible, and ensure that future capital expenditure was directed accordingly. For illustrative purposes Annex C in paragraphs 5 to 7 gives, on certain assumptions, broad estimates of the savings and costs of two possible options for concentrating the Cyprus garrison. 9. But there could be no withdrawal or substantial reduction in advance of progress towards a settlement. Any leak of such planning could encourage Turkey to precipitate action. Meanwhile, HMG should, in keeping with the assessment in paragraph 3, plan on the basis that we will remain in Cyprus for the next 5 years; and this assumption should be reviewed annually to ensure its continuing validity. Conclusions 10. Our policy should continue to be one of complete withdrawal of our military presence from Cyprus as soon as feasible. Whereas none of the considerations which led us in 1974 to accept the American view that we should remain in Cyprus for the time-being have changed, and in particular there has been no progress towards a solution of the Cyprus problem, our economic position and therefore our ability to maintain our military presence in Cyprus has significantly worsened. Our interest lies in the earliest possible solution and HMG should continue to take an active part in efforts to achieve a stable political settlement. But in my view such a settlement is nevertheless unlikely in the next five years. On the other hand, since 1974 the Defence Budget has been cut below the levels agreed in the Defence Review, and after

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

99

March 1979 there is no provision in the defence programme for a military presence in Cyprus, which at present costs £36 million a year. If our forces have to remain after that date, higher priority NATO tasks will have to be given up, unless provision is made in Defence Budget targets to accommodate the costs of this non-NATO commitment. 11. In the circumstances I think that we should make the Americans aware of our growing difficulty in continuing to provide a military presence in Cyprus while sustaining our main contribution to NATO. I invite my colleagues to agree that the basis for our approach should be on the lines of paragraph 8 above.22

It is clear from the above that policymakers felt influenced by American wishes. This would become increasingly apparent, as officials agonised over how to give up the bases. A month later, Reginald Hibbert wrote to the Private Secretary of the Minister of State, Dr. Owen, attaching a paper on the SBAs: CYPRUS 1. There has I am afraid been considerable delay while we have been preparing an answer to Dr Owen’s minute of 4 October. […] 2. The study has produced some conclusions which were not clearly foreseen at the beginning. In making the study an effort has been made to look at the problem solely on terms of a settlement between the Greeks and the Turks. The imperatives of the intelligence community and of the intelligence interests of the US have been left out. At the next stage these would have to be brought in. 3. However, I think that it is very interesting to see the arguments which emerge when we look at the sovereign base areas as nearly as possible in an exclusively Greco-Turkish context. The conclusions are striking and perhaps uncomfortable. First of all it appears that it may be impossible to find a way of getting rid of part of the sovereign base areas in any conceivable circumstances short of a full and far-reaching Greco-Turkish reconciliation on the widest scale. It looks as though Akrotiri airfield and the Ayios Nikolaos area would need to be retained as reduced or mini-sovereign base areas more or less indefinitely, until the golden age of Greco-Turkish reconciliation arrived. 4. It further emerges that while it might conceivably be possible to get rid of part of the sovereign base areas within a local settlement in Cyprus (in circumstances short of a major Greco-Turkish reconciliation) any hint of getting rid of territory would, if made prematurely, hinder rather than help the process of inter-communal settlement in Cyprus. In other words sovereign base areas territory could play a part only at a very late stage of any settlement.

100

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

5. Finally, the point emerges that HMG is hooked on the sovereign base areas, failing at least a local settlement between the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. This is because the existence of the sovereign base areas is rooted in the treaties. They cannot be given away except by revision of the treaties and revision of the treaties can be achieved only with Greek and Turkish assent. 6. My conclusion from all this would be that it points even more urgently to the desirability of seeing whether initiatives by friendly powers could do something to bring a settlement in Cyprus nearer. Possibilities in this direction are going to be discussed in a separate paper on options in the Cyprus dispute which SED is producing on the instructions of the Secretary of State. 7. In spite of the difficulties of the question, I would see merit in comparing notes with the State Department on the issues discussed in the attached paper, but before we get to that position it would be desirable to work through a further stage here in London. This stage would consist of bringing in the intelligence community and adding to the attached paper the intelligence dimension. I am not sure how this could best be done, whether inter departmentally between the FCO and the MOD in the first place, or by asking the Cabinet Office to organise an inter-departmental study. Perhaps the modalities could be considered if it is decided that the attached paper merits further development.23

The paper itself considered various options for giving up the bases, options which seem rather academic, since the British appeared bound to American policy, which was for Britain to keep the bases: AKROTIRI 2. The airfield in the Sovereign Base Area at Akrotiri could be shared with, or given to and possibly leased back from, the Greek Cypriots only in the context of a renegotiation of the 1960 Treaties. This must be part of a political settlement. In a settlement, the Greek Cypriots would probably regain access to Nicosia Airport (an airport of high international standards) and it is doubtful whether they would have any great commercial need for Akrotiri. They already operate from Larnaca which is not far from Akrotiri, and they have raised Larnaca to international airport standards. […] 3. There are also political and defence considerations. Akrotiri is one of the best military airports in the Eastern Mediterranean. If HMG permitted the use of it by the Greek Cypriots outside the context of a renegotiation of the Treaties (to which the Turkish Government’s agreement would be required), the Turks would take great exception and might even be tempted to take control of it themselves. Contrary to Turkish public statements in 1974, the primary reason for their military

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

101

intervention was not the protection of the Turkish Cypriots but denial of the island to Greek mainland forces. In Turkish eyes, the most dangerous piece of property which could fall into Greek hands is Akrotiri, which could provide the Greek Air Force with a forward strike base close to the Turkish mainland. […] POSSIBLE SURRENDER OF SBA TERRITORY OTHER THAN AKROTIRI 4. The existence of intelligence installations in the SBAs (namely Ayios Nikolaos in the ESBA, Akrotiri airfield, Cape Gata and Episkopi in the WSBA, and the UK-retained site on Mount Olympus) is a major obstacle to any attempt to consider possible concessions of SBA territory. […] As the WSBA is embedded in Greek Cypriot territory, anything given up there would have to go to the Greek Cypriots. […] 5. The ESBA presents a different problem. It adjoins Turkish-held territory to the North. Access to the Greek Cypriot-controlled Cape Greco can be gained only through the SBA. The Turks expect that, in any surrender of the SBAs, the ESBA would go to them. But this would in effect reduce Greek Cypriot-controlled territory by denying them Cape Greco. In theory, the Turks ought to be told to back down and leave the ESBA to the Greeks. But this would be very difficult. […] If circumstances arose in which it were possible to give up parts of the SBAs the advantage would lie in surrendering those parts completely. Besides the lack of political advantage in purely Cyprus terms it would be necessary to consider the disadvantages in terms of intelligence collection. The Americans’ recent serious difficulties over the use of their leased bases in Turkey and Greece for intelligence-gathering will not incline them to accept leasing as a reasonable alternative to sovereignty in the British bases in Cyprus. Dr Kissinger has frequently spoken of the value of this “real estate” and the necessity to keep it as a “British square on the chequer board”. Under a leasing arrangement Soviet and non-aligned pressure on the Cyprus Government to dislodge the British garrison would be less easily withstood than at present. The Cyprus Government would be in a position to deny use of the intelligence facilities to the Americans, which is impossible while HMG is sovereign in the base areas. If intelligence requirements were to continue to be met almost any surrender of territory would require a move of one or other of the intelligence installations from its present site to a new site in secure, “sovereign” British territory. A curious factor of the Cyprus problem is that all the parties have demonstrated over the years that they have been prepared, even during hostilities, to respect and even to prefer British sovereignty.24[…]

Certain significant points can be extrapolated from the above, points which are vital ingredients of FCO attempts to formulate a rational policy vis-à-vis the bases. First is the obvious fact that British policy was

102

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

predicated on American wishes. If the Suez crisis marked the end of a leading role for Britain in the Middle East, then the Cyprus problem rubbed salt into the national wound of Britain’s relinquishing of power to the US. De Gaulle’s well-known comment about Britain not having its own foreign policy has a certain relevance here, even if cruel; Edward Heath was not wrong to describe British foreign policy as piggy-backing that of the US. Second is the near obsession with intelligence-gathering, connected as it is to American wishes: in February 1976, the Chiefs of Staff directive to the Commander of the British Forces in Cyprus stated that the Joint Intelligence Group (Cyprus), subject to the overall direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee in London, was responsible to him and to the High Commissioner for providing intelligence assessments on Cyprus, and also Greece and Turkey insofar as the intelligence concerned Cyprus. 25 This suggests that spying operations, electronic and more down-to-earth, covered not only Cypriot questions (it would be naïve to think that the SBAs were procured simply to spy on Cyprus), but perhaps any Greek and Turkish government communications, since a whole range of intelligence would have to be sifted to identify what was relevant to Cyprus. Kissinger considered the intelligence gathering facilities as important in protecting Israel. The third point is the FCO’s disinclination to upset Turkey, even if ‘in theory the Turks ought to be told to back down’. In this connexion, it is worth recalling that in 1960 Britain agreed that were it ever to relinquish the bases, they would be returned to the Republic of Cyprus, and certainly not to illegal occupiers of part of the island. Another point is the placing of the word ‘sovereign’ in quotes. This suggests that the FCO did not privately consider the SBAs as sovereign British territory in the full sense of the term, whatever protestations made to external audiences about the bases being as British as Cornwall. At any event, the debate continued, with the Prime Minister requesting the MOD’s views on the question of a military withdrawal from Cyprus, however academic the question must have seemed to some officials, given the near automatic submission to American wishes. One could argue that it was a case of wishful thinking. The ‘secret’ paper is still deemed to be sufficiently sensitive as to have merited a good deal of excising. Important surviving extracts are: THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF AN EARLY MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM CYPRUS INTRODUCTION 1. The Prime Minister requested our views on the question of military withdrawal from Cyprus. We accordingly instructed (1) that a study

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

103

should be undertaken to provide the basis for a paper for the Secretary of State to table concurrently, if appropriate, with a Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) paper on Cyprus at a forthcoming Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (DOPC) meeting. Alternatively, the paper might serve as a basis for a brief for the Secretary of State at this meeting. AIM 2. To assess the defence implications of an early military withdrawal from Cyprus. ASSUMPTION 3. Although there is at present no indication of a political settlement in Cyprus, it is necessary for the purposes of this paper to assume that an early British military withdrawal would be politically acceptable. BACKGROUND 4. Although Ministers agreed in 1974 that United Kingdom forces should remain in Cyprus for the time being it remains HMG’s preferred policy to withdraw completely (2). Since 1974 the United Kingdom forces in Cyprus have been reduced to the minimum necessary to protect the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) and support the intelligence gathering facilities. 5. Ministers accepted (4) in 1974 that the costs of the reduced Cyprus garrison would be met from within the total Defence Budget, which excluded any specific provision for Cyprus; this commitment continues to absorb resources which would otherwise be used for the United Kingdom’s contribution to NATO. Since then there has been a further series of cuts in defence expenditure which has led to an urgent need to make financial savings particularly in the year 1978/9. NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF EARLY WITHDRAWAL Introduction 6. If a withdrawal from Cyprus were approved it would be sensible to aim to leave as early as possible commensurate with an orderly rundown. The method of evacuating in an unfavourable politico-military environment would require further examination beyond the scope of this paper. For various practical reasons the earliest possible date for withdrawal, assuming a decision were taken now, would be mid-1978. The implications discussed below assume that withdrawal would be completed by then. […] Implications for the Services 12. Royal Navy. If the Skynet terminal in Cyprus were withdrawn there could be some degradation in effectiveness of those Skynet-fitted

104

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

ships deployed in the Indian ocean and Western Pacific until alternative facilities become available in April 1978. It would therefore be desirable to retain the facility in Cyprus at least until then. 13. Army. […] The loss of the Cyprus training facilities would be serious and it is hoped that it will be possible to negotiate with the Cyprus Government for this training to continue. 14. Royal Air Force. Given one year’s notice of final withdrawal the Royal Air Force expects to be able to absorb Cyprus personnel elsewhere by adjustment of intakes and natural wastage.[…] 15. UK Based Civilians (UKBC). By 1 April 1978 there will be about 500 UKBCs in Cyprus. Given one year’s notice of withdrawal it should be possible to absorb many of these UKBCs into existing establishments elsewhere; some difficulty might be experienced, however, in achieving an early absorption of the 180 UKBCs employed by Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). 16. Locally Engaged Civilians (LEC). Withdrawal from Cyprus will involve the discharge of approximately 3800 LECs borne on the defence budget employed by the Ministry of Defence and Property Services Agency/Department of the Environment. About 1300 LECs were made redundant in 1976 as a result of the 1974 Defence Review. We believe that the Cypriot trade unions will vigorously oppose any further large scale redundancy and almost certainly lodge claims for further improvements in the already generous redundancy terms negotiated for the 1974 reductions. 17. Since it is unlikely that HMG would consider a military withdrawal from Cyprus while retaining sovereignty over the SBAs, any plan for a military withdrawal must take into account the need to transfer the sovereignty of the SBAs to the Government of Cyprus. […]26

Perhaps the most immediately striking thing about the above MOD paper is its lack of any consideration of American or Turkish wishes. As such, it contrasts vividly with the previous FCO paper, which leant over backwards to stress the difficulty of handing the bases to the Republic of Cyprus and/or leasing them back. One almost gains the impression that the FCO was writing about American, rather than British bases. Unlike the FCO, the MOD wrote that if the UK left, then sovereignty would be transferred to the Cypriot government (in line with what was agreed in 1960). In short, the MOD paper was essentially businesslike, not even mentioning American or Turkish interests, while the FCO one seemed almost intensely problematic. It is likely that the US and Kissinger concentrated their pressure more on the FCO than on the MOD. This would be more in line with protocol, in any case. When Kissinger stepped down

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

105

from his position as Secretary of State following Jimmy Carter’s defeat of Gerald Ford in the US presidential elections, there was some expectation in certain quarters that Britain would be able to give up its bases. However, as a record of a meeting in March 1977 in Washington, between the British Prime Minister and the American Secretary of Defence, Harold Brown, suggests, Kissinger’s policy did not die with his tenancy of his former position: Cyprus The Prime Minister asked whether the new Administration had yet been able to look at the Cyprus situation. Our presence on the Island involved us in a substantial expenditure on something which was not an exclusively British interest; on the contrary, it was in the interests of the whole Western world. Speaking frankly, if we looked at Cyprus through solely British eyes, we would have left before now. We had only stayed there 18 months ago because we were aware of the implications of our departure. It was however costing us between £35 and £40 million a year, and we would like to explore ways of sharing the costs. Dr. Brown said that he thought it would be very dangerous to pull out of Cyprus in the Turkish context. The Eastern Mediterranean was in a critical situation, and he would be glad to discuss the problem further, without commitment. He was not sanguine about the possibility of the United States participating in either a major or an open way. The Prime Minister said that he was not suggesting open participation. On the contrary, it was important for historical reasons that the presence in Cyprus should be seen to be a British one. Dr. Brown said that he had written yesterday to Mr. Mulley27 about upgrading the American involvement in Cyprus. Personally, he believed that the political interest in a continued presence on Cyprus was as great as either the military or intelligence interest. The Prime Minister said that for us our presence was largely symbolic since the presence of families in the Sovereign Base Areas meant that our presence could not easily be used in a military role. The real criterion for us was the intelligence and communications one, but he believed that we should continue to assess the situation.28

By 1978, while discussions between Britain and the US on the intelligence facilities were continuing, the British government’s objective was to give up the ESBA, leaving the WSBA until later, provide that a settlement was reached, as an FCO paper enunciated:

106

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

CYPRUS: THE ROLE OF THE SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS (SBAs) IN A TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT 1. The total area of the SBAs amounts to some 2.77% of the island of Cyprus: the Eastern and Western SBAs are of roughly the same size. In absolute territorial terms therefore, offering the surrender of part, or even the whole, of one or both SBAs would be unlikely to add sufficient area to one side or the other to make much difference in a negotiated territorial settlement. However, some parts of the SBAs, particularly the Eastern one, contain good cultivable land and valuable installations and might therefore have an attraction greater than their geographical size would justify. 2. Under the terms of the 1960 agreements any territory of the SBAs relinquished from British sovereignty must pass under the sovereignty of the Republic. Much of the land within the SBAs is owned by Cypriots (ownership, as distinct from sovereignty). In 1964–74 the tacit understanding was that, in the event of Britain relinquishing sovereignty, the Turks had some sort of claim on part or all of the ESBA, while the Greeks had a claim on the whole of the WSBA. The Turkish side consequently see it as a concession that they have let it be known that they no longer have territorial ambitions with regard to the SBAs. And the Turks would be wiling to give up ownership of properties within the SBAs. In present circumstances, however, they would not be indifferent to any cession of territory to Greek Cypriot sovereignty which was not made in the context of a settlement. They would be particularly sensitive over strategic installations such as the Akrotiri airfield. 3. Ministers decided in April that we should aim to reduce our presence in Cyprus, preferably by giving up the ESBA, hopefully in the context of a Cyprus settlement. Internal discussions and talks with the US Administration about the intelligence facilities in the SBAs are in train. One point to be determined is the length of time required to relocate essential intelligence facilities from the ESBA to the WSBA: a period of years, rather than months, is likely to be in question. 4. There has been no indication from any party to the dispute that it actively wishes to promote British withdrawal from either SBA, whether in the context of a settlement or otherwise. But both would doubtless concur in a negotiated withdrawal. Meanwhile the Cyprus Government seems anxious to ensure a continued British presence, if only for the economic benefits for the Greek Cypriots. 5. In the light of Ministerial decisions, it should be the aim to make cession of the ESBA to the Greek Cypriot region of Cyprus a part of the settlement. The WSBA, or at least the Akrotiri peninsula, should be retained for a period after a settlement – an early decision even in principle on the possibility of withdrawal from part of the WSBA is not required. Tactically, it would almost certainly be best, until the outlines of a settlement are very near agreement, to take the line that neither

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

107

SBA is to be relinquished but that if the parties were to agree on all the main features of a settlement and to say to the British Government that cession of sovereignty over some part of the SBAs would clinch matters, the Government would consider the question carefully and sympathetically.29

A number of surprising points emerge from the above. First was the fact that the FCO was again referring to the 1960 agreement, whereby if Britain gave up the bases, they would have to be given to the Republic. Second is the revelation that there had nevertheless, and contrarily, been a tacit understanding that Turkey had ‘some sort of a claim on part or all of the ESBA’. This went against the grain of what was agreed in 1960. Third is the fact that the intelligence facilities and what to do with them were obviously hostage to US wishes. Fourth is the apparent revelation that Turkey had no designs on the SBAs, at least within the context of a settlement. This assumption by the FCO was perhaps a touch naive, since Turkish policy has generally been to ensure that the bases remain British. The assumption that both parties to the dispute would doubtless concur in a negotiated withdrawal is also rather simplistic in this connexion. Most intriguing is the assumption that neither party ‘actively wished to promote British withdrawal from either SBA’. Although the Cypriot government was loth to complicate a delicate situation by an active public campaign against what many already considered to be a meta-imperial annexation of territory that should belong to Cyprus, it is nevertheless true that former acting – and future – president Clerides, who was the Greek Cypriot negotiator in the intercommunal talks, had told the British of his doubts that anyone was ‘seriously worried about the SBAs, with the possible exception of Lyssarides’ party’. He also told the British Foreign Secretary that the bases were an important source of work for Cypriots.30 The British were, as we have seen, keen to give up what they could of their responsibilities as enshrined in the 1960 treaties, but particularly in the Treaty of Guarantee. As we have seen, possession of its Cypriot territories had proven to be an embarrassment, with Britain powerless and/or unwilling to honour its obligations. Thus it was prepared to try and use the bases to promote a settlement. This was nevertheless avoiding the central issues involved in reuniting Cyprus, and can be seen as cosmetic gestures more than substantive moves. After all, it is hard to see what difference the cession of one or more bases to the Republic of Cyprus would make to the question of reunification, unless of course it was an attempt to ‘buy off’ the Greek Cypriots by getting them to accept the Turkish view of federation, which was more akin to a form of partition than reunification. This

108

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

we shall look at more closely in the next chapter. Before we now turn to the question of ‘interests’, some documents have revealed that the British wanted the US to pay for Britain’s presence in the bases. The documents unearthed show that the idea of the US paying was taken seriously by the British and Americans, and, in the absence of further documents, raises questions about who is currently paying for the bases. The question was being discussed as early as 1975, as extracts from a memorandum by the Head of South East European Department, Michael Weston, to an Assistant Under Secretary of State, Hugh Morgan, intimate: 7. I had dinner last night with Mr Crawford, the US Ambassador in Nicosia. […] (c) He thought that the US Government should be prepared to contribute towards the cost of the SBAs if we were ever tempted to withdraw on financial grounds. He admitted that this view was not universally held in Washington but he thought that if ever the problem became actual, there would be no difficulty about producing the money, secretly if necessary. […]31

Morgan passed the memorandum to his Deputy Under Secretary, John Killick, who minuted: (c) is all very well, but even a secret arrangement would somehow have to be cleared with Congress, I think, and I see little chance of that in present circumstances. And I would expect strings to be attached about possible US use of the SBAs (with all the ME implications of this which were implicit in our bilateral talks with the Americans.32

Eighteen months later, the subject was still very much on the agenda. At an FCO meeting on Cyprus, the Foreign Secretary, Dr. Owen, said: […] There was also a serious financial problem, which also presented itself to the UK. The British policy decision to leave the Sovereign Base Areas was not being implemented while the hope of progress towards a settlement remained. But if there was a stalemate, perhaps the British should leave. Dr Owen asked about progress in the talks with the United States about financing the British presence in the SBAs. Mr Winchester33 said that the FCO were waiting to hear from the Americans and were pressing for an answer by the end of September. […]34

This author has not found further papers on the idea of the US paying for, or at least subsidising, the bases. The mere fact that the matter was being discussed would be annoying to the Cyprus government. A surprisingly large number of papers on Cyprus are of course withheld or severely

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

109

excised. At any event, it would not be in the least surprising if the US were financing the bases today, nor that they were gaining something from doing so. By 1979, the British government appears to have accepted whatever arrangement it came to with the Americans, and was seemingly no longer trying to relinquish the SBAs. The question of the bases did however remain sensitive, particularly in view of American interests, as the following ‘secret’ minute of 23 May 1979 from the Head of Southern European Department to the Permanent Under Secretary of State’s Department 35 makes clear: PUSD SALT 2:36 U2 FLIGHTS FROM CYPRUS […] 2. Mr Vest 37 said that he had been somewhat perturbed to hear it suggested that the United Kingdom would think it necessary to secure the permission of the Cyprus Government before acquiescing to an American request to place U2s at Akrotiri. There would be nothing in the 1960 agreements to necessitate this. […] I reminded Mr Vest that we had been in touch with the Cyprus Government about the stationing of a U2 at Akrotiri in connection with the verification of the Israeli/ Egyptian interim agreement; the likelihood was that we would wish to follow a very similar procedure in the event of the British Government wishing to acquiesce to an American request. There was no obligation to obtain the consent of the Cyprus Government but its interests were involved and we would wish to carry out consultations. Mr. Fergusson drew attention to the Akel campaign against the SBAs and to the remarks about the need for their removal made by Mr Denktash on 20 May. Mr Vest thanked us for these explanations and intimated that he found them entirely satisfactory. T L A Daunt Southern European Department 38

Another minute, of 24 May 1979, from a desk officer in Southern European Department, Henry Hogger, to PUS, Defence and News Department, suggests that Britain would have been quite happy to give up its bases in return for a settlement: CYPRUS SBAs 3. One such area is the question of whether HMG would be prepared to give up part or all of the bases to facilitate a settlement of the Cyprus

110

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

dispute. Hitherto we have taken the line, agreed by previous MOD and FCO Ministers, that this is a hypothetical question, but that were it to become clear that the final achievement of a settlement depended on the relinquishing by HMG of sovereignty over part or all of the SBAs, then we should be prepared to consider this. […].39

This seemingly altruistic hypothesis may appear rather naive in view of the fact that British foreign policy was, at least as regards the Eastern Mediterranean, now essentially in the hands of the USA which, as we have seen, was loth to allow Britain to get out of Cyprus. That the question was still very sensitive can be seen in a minute from the FCO Deputy Under Secretary of State for Europe to the Head of Southern European Department: CYPRUS: SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS (SBAs) 2. The history of recent decades is not encouraging for the future of the SBAs in Cyprus. Both “sovereignty” and “base” are nouns heavy with overtones. In other parts of the world we have seen how short can be the interval between Phase I, when the retention of British defence facilities in other countries appears unshakeably based on history and international law: Phase II, when its legal foundations still look unassailable but it is under attack by elements usually described as left wing agitators – this appears roughly the point reached at the moment in Cyprus, described in Mr Rhodes’ dispatch of 24 and 31 May, the latter enclosing Colonel Huxley’s valedictory report; Phase III when the banner of the same left wing agitators becomes the policy of an otherwise reasonable local government; Phase IV, when the military facilities in question have to be handed over to this government, preferably in good order, but sometimes in haste and confusion; and Phase V, when the whole episode is over and the outcome appears historically just and inevitable. 3. If the SBAs have survived in Cyprus, it could well be because of the Turkish occupation of the North, which is self evidently more of an infringement of Cypriot sovereignty and more damaging to Cypriot political and economic interests that the SBAs. The Turkish occupation thus provides the lightening conductor for the great part of the local population, the UN, the Soviet Union etc. But if a settlement in Cyprus were achieved, I agree with you that the SBAs would be under more and not less pressure. […] J L Bullard40

Thus, we see here the linkage between the question of the bases and the Turkish occupation. Clearly, anyone wishing Britain to hang on to its Cypriot territories would promote Turkish interests and work against a lasting

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

111

solution to the Cyprus conundrum. If the Turkish government is aware of this view, then clearly its more gung ho elements have, and do, exploit this, with US support. To round off this chapter, let us now reproduce a ‘bijoux’ paper on British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, the main first draft of which was presented for discussion and amendment in April 1975. Readers will note that this chapter is headed, seemingly perversely, ‘British Bases and American Interests’, rather than British interests. This is because although the (‘secret’) paper is ostensibly about British interests, it is very much influenced by US policy, and was drawn up because of the Cyprus question. It helps us to understand the British government’s steppenwolfish attitude towards the question of the SBAs: BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN INTRODUCTION 1. In July 1974 HMG assumed a leading role in the search for a settlement in the Cyprus dispute. Although we had no illusions about the difficulties, we did so largely because of our obligation as a guarantor power and because we saw the consequent sharp deterioration between Greece and Turkey as damaging to the North Atlantic Alliance and the stability of the area. 2. Subsequent events have confirmed our belief that the prospects of an agreed settlement in Cyprus are remote. Meanwhile, the crisis itself, and the absence of a settlement, have had unfortunate effects on the Alliance: Greece has withdrawn from the military side of NATO, because of NATO’s inability to hold off the Turks, and Turkey’s allegiance to the Alliance has been threatened by the US Congress’ suspension of military aid to Turkey as a result of Turkey’s armed intervention and continuing intransigence in Cyprus. 3. The current difficulties over Cyprus are not surprising in view of the long history of Greco/Turkish enmity. This is outlined at Annex A. 4. In order to preserve our potential role as mediator in an eventual Cyprus settlement, we have adopted a policy of refraining as far as possible from any action or reaction which would make it more difficult for the parties to negotiate such a settlement for themselves; this has imposed strains on both Anglo/Greek and Anglo/Turkish relations. It has proved impossible to satisfy all the parties involved. AIM 5. The purpose of this paper is to assess our real interests in the area, to determine how far they conflict and how far such conflict can be reconciled, and to draw conclusions to guide our future action.

112

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

INTERESTS Turkey 6. (a) Turkey’s pro-western alignment is important to us because: (i) it contributes to western security in the eastern Mediterranean by pre-empting an area of strategic deployment and political influence and by impeding Soviet communications with Syria and Iraq; (ii) it enables the West to enjoy some co-operation from Turkey in regulating the use of the sea route out of the Black Sea (the base area for Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean and in the future, perhaps, in the Indian Ocean) and in a pre-war situation it gives the West ultimate control of that route; (iii) it bolsters the pro-western alignment of Iran, who, despite Soviet pressure, is strongly anti-Soviet and is likely to provide increasingly the main counter to Soviet force in the area of the Persian Gulf and the North-West Indian Ocean; (iv) it enables us (with the goodwill of Iran) to enjoy over-flying rights to the Gulf, Indian Ocean and points eastward. Flights would otherwise have to make a long detour over Central and Eastern Africa. (b) Turkish membership of NATO provides an institutional framework for the benefits listed above and; (i) gives NATO the benefit of her large and, at least until the cutoff of American military aid, reasonably effective armed forces; (ii) provides NATO with a base for the gathering of intelligence from the southern USSR. Greece 7. (a) Her strategic importance derives largely from that of Turkey and from her geographical position as the link between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance. She too is in a position to help the West to restrict Soviet access to the Mediterranean. Her withdrawal from the military side of the Alliance does not affect her military importance to NATO in this respect, whilst her sympathies remain with the West. (b) Her permanent defection from NATO would leave Turkey isolated. (c) If her alignment shifted markedly towards the Soviet Union, the strategic threat to Yugoslavia (a sensitive problem in the West in the next few years) would be increased. Cyprus 8. (a) British strategic interests in Cyprus are now minimal. Cyprus has never figured in NATO strategy and our bases there have no direct

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

113

NATO role. The strategic value to us has declined sharply since our virtual withdrawal from east of Suez. This will remain the case when the Suez Canal has reopened. (b) The US Government are firmly attached to the view that withdrawal from our bases in Cyprus would have a destabilizing effect upon the Eastern Mediterranean, with implications for the Middle East. We do not believe that it would have any significant effect on Arab/Israel relations; its effect on the relations between Turkey, Greece and the Alliance would depend on the circumstances in which it took place. Dr Kissinger in particular is anxious that we should “continue to occupy this square of the world chess board”, we do not any longer seek such a world role. [The FCO has excised a sentence here, under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958] Although our preferred policy is for a complete British military withdrawal from Cyprus, we recognize that we cannot do so at present, given the global importance of working closely with the Americans. So long as this remains the case, it is important for us to avoid attempt [sic] by others to make us withdraw or to attach unacceptable conditions to our retention of the bases. (c) But our involvement in the Cyprus crisis has stemmed not so much from the question of the bases as from our role as a guarantor power. Given our decision not use military force in Cyprus and the relatively small amount of pressure we can bring to bear upon Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, this puts us in the invidious position of having responsibility without power. This has brought us no advantages whatsoever and it must be in British interests for us to work for a solution which will not involve Britain in any guarantee obligations or other lasting commitments over Cyprus. Such a solution is however remote and will be particularly difficult to achieve as long as we retain a physical presence in the Bases. (d) Sterling holdings. At the end of November 1974, the Cyprus Government’s holdings of sterling were approximately £38 million. The total amount of sterling held by overseas governments was £3,740 million. The Cyprus’ [sic] thus represented about 1 per cent of the total, which puts her in the same league as for example Jordan, Ghana, Jamaica or Trinidad. These sums are not entirely negligible, and in our present circumstances, we should certainly not wish them to be wholly withdrawn (nor is this likely; it would not be in the interests of holders). However, this is not a major factor in our political relationship with Cyprus, particularly in comparison with the now enormous sterling holdings of the oil producers. (e) British subjects and British property. There is no overriding reason why we should run any major risks, political or other, to safeguard the interests of those who choose to reside or do business in

114

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS Cyprus and this should not be regarded as an important reason for Britain’s maintaining a central role in Cyprus.

NATO WITHOUT GREECE OR TURKEY 9. A North Atlantic Alliance without the membership of Turkey or Greece might still be able to provide a credible deterrent and a visible strategy for defence. Indeed, it could be argued that so long as Greece and Turkey remained non-aligned and denied the Russians access to military facilities in their territories, it would be if anything easier for the rest of NATO to devote all its military resources to the defence of Central and Northern Europe. But this is not an issue which can be looked at in purely military terms. The departure of either Turkey or Greece from the Alliance would be likely to have severe repercussions on Alliance morale. This effect would be increased if Portugal, too, had left NATO. The Italians would feel very exposed on the southern tip of the remainder of the Alliance, and anti-NATO elements there might be encouraged to raise their voices. Even in other parts of the Alliance, the doubts about its value which are already being expressed in some quarters would probably gain currency from the loss of confidence caused by such defections. It could be difficult to stop a process of unraveling the Alliance if it were ever allowed to get underway. DANGERS TO BRITISH INTERESTS 10. The Soviet Union We should not underestimate the opportunities for the Soviet Union which might result from Turkish disenchantment with her western allies. Particularly in a confused internal situation, the Turks might not be invulnerable to Soviet blandishments and pressures. The Soviet position on Cyprus is sufficiently imprecise for the Russians to be able to paper over the difficulties if necessary. The prize of Turkish friendship might even lead the Russians to modify their position, as they did over the Arab/Israeli dispute in the 1960s as a result of their friendship with Egypt. A Turkish posture of potentially hostile neutrality would endanger all the British interests listed in paragraph 6 above. It would give the Russians clear lines of political and military communications through the Middle East and into the Mediterranean; it would cut us off from western outposts in the Gulf and Indian Ocean; it would make the Black Sea a Soviet lake and enable the Soviet Union to concentrate greater forces in Central Europe. 11. Turkey’s Allegiance to the West We cannot regard Turkey’s loyal alliance and co-operation with West as unshakeable. The Turks see little in it at the moment. They are denied US military aid; they have to fight US opinion, and indeed wider opinion in the West, in order to grow opium poppy on their own soil; they see themselves hemmed in and threatened in the Aegean; they are condemned for action in Cyprus which they regard as essential to their

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

115

national security and the liberties of the Turkish Cypriot community. This has created bitterness which is combined with stubborn pride in their own self reliance. Particularly in view of the unstable political situation in Turkey, it would not take much for the Turks to turn inward and look exclusively to their own national security and defence, leaving it to the Alliance to fend for itself. 12. Greece’s Allegiance to the West Greece’s allegiance to the Alliance is also questionable, since the Greeks now resent the failure of the Alliance, and particularly of the US, to take any action against the Greek military dictatorship in the years 1967 to 1974 or to prevent the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Like Turkey, Greece traditionally looks West rather than East, attaches importance to her links with Western Europe and aspires to join the EEC. It seems likely that her present Government would only widen the gap with NATO if domestic pressures forced them to do so. But such pressure would probably be irresistible if Greek public opinion identified a strong pro-Turkish bias among NATO members. BRITISH INTERESTS SUMMARIZED 13. A. Greece and Turkey It follows from the above that we have a firm interest in maintaining the pro-western alignment of both Turkey and Greece and in keeping both countries in the Alliance. We would, of course, like to see Greece bring her armed forces back into the military side of NATO, but this is clearly unlikely in the near future. It is much more important that Turkey should not be encouraged to follow the Greeks out of the military side, and that neither country should leave the Alliance completely. 14. B. Cyprus It is also in our interests to work for such a solution of the Cyprus problem as would enable us to withdraw from the Treaty of Guarantee. We should also work, as far as possible, for a change in US policy which would permit us to withdraw from the Cyprus Bases in circumstances which would endanger our relations neither with the US nor with Greece, nor Turkey. 15. Our interests in Cyprus, however, inevitably overlap our interests in Greece and Turkey since it is mainly the Cyprus crisis which has imposed the strains upon Greek and Turkish relations with the Alliance. It follows that our interest in a Cyprus settlement goes wider than the questions of our guarantor status and of the bases, since without such a settlement the risks for the Alliance and the opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence will continue. But the prospects of a settlement in Cyprus which would satisfy all parties are remote. The Turkish Government are determined on retaining, probably in one region, an area of geographical size and economic importance well in

116

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

excess of what the Greek Cypriots could bring themselves to accept. The Greeks will continue to try to whip up international support for their case while the Turks will continue to insist that they cannot negotiate under international pressure. OPTIONS OPEN TO HMG 16. Given this background and the difficulties we have experienced so far in the search for a settlement over the present Cyprus crisis, it is clear that serious risks are attached to any attempt by HMG or by any other party to impose a settlement either in Cyprus or over other Greco-Turkish disputes, principally the Aegean. We would be held responsible, if, as is all too likely, it proved impossible to get the agreement of the parties and, as is just as likely, if whatever agreement was reached came unstuck. We should also find it more difficult to avoid some kind of guarantor role or other lasting commitment. 17. While we have no locus standi over Greece’s and Turkey’s other problems, and no one has seriously suggested that we assume a role in, for example, the Aegean, we would have difficulties in washing our hands entirely of the Cyprus question. If we tried to do so we would face serious accusations from the parties themselves and from public and Parliamentary opinion in Britain that we had abandoned our Treaty obligations. The US Government would also be opposed to any such move on our part. If no other third party stepped forward, there would be a risk that, without an active restraining influence, Greco-Turkish relations might again deteriorate to the point of war, with a predictable increase in the strains on the Alliance. There seems therefore no viable alternative to our present policy of active and constant dialogue with all the parties designed to promote constructive moderation without any dramatic intervention by us in the areas of dispute. CONCLUSIONS 18. If, however, we are to maintain a leading role in Cyprus, we should bear well in mind the following: (a) that our primary interest in the area is to maintain the pro-western alignment and membership of NATO, of Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Greece; (b) that our primary interest in Cyprus is the effect that the situation there has on (a) above; (c) the importance of working for a solution which should enable us to bow out of our special position on Cyprus. Thus, in this connection, there is much to be said for encouraging others, for example the US, the Nine, and the Alliance, to take a more active role whenever this might be helpful. This would not be running away from our responsibilities: we have no more bargaining powers with the parties than do our partners and allies, and less than some of them.

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

117

It would enable the parties themselves to get used to the idea that they need not always look to Britain to take the lead. 19. Our general approach to the problems of Cyprus have so far been subject to the aim of avoiding any action either by ourselves or by the parties which would make it more difficult for the parties to enter into serious negotiations. In terms of a Cyprus settlement, this is undoubtedly right, and should be maintained a far as possible. 20. It is also the approach most likely to avoid a situation where we have in effect to choose between Greece and Turkey in the context of paragraph 18a. But, however hard we try to avoid it, issues may arise which do face the West with the choice of incurring serious Greek illwill by building up Turkey’s pro-western alignment, or further straining Turkish loyalty while keeping the Greeks sweet. 21. In such cases we should look beyond the immediate Cyprus considerations. We should aim to divorce Cyprus as much as possible from other issues affecting our relations with Greece and Turkey, although Greece particularly will be loathe [sic] to do so. We should also recognise that in the final analysis Turkey must be regarded as more important to Western strategic interests than Greece and that, if risks must be run, they should be risks of further straining Greek rather than Turkish relations with the West. ANNEX A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1. The history of Greco-Turkish enmity has deep roots going back to the struggle between Byzantine Christians and Turkish Muslims in the Middle Ages. Thereafter, until the foundation of the modern Greek state in 1830, Greece was occupied by the Turks. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, Greece enlarged its territory, primarily at the expense of the declining Ottoman Empire. From 1930 until 1955 there was however a marked improvement in relations between the two countries. 2. Following the defeat of Greece in Asia Minor in 1922, Greece appeared to have abandoned ambitions enshrined in the ‘Great Idea’, the dream of retaking Constantinople and restoring Byzantine Greece to its former territorial and cultural dimensions. The modern Turkish State under Ataturk turned its back on empire and most of the substantive points of friction between the two countries had been removed by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Nevertheless, latent popular hostility and suspicion remained and after the Second World War, major new issues arose between Greece and Turkey which were frequently exacerbated by the weakness of the governments. 3. The main cause of the deterioration of Greco-Turkish relations in the mid-1950s was Cyprus, where (partly as a result of British policy)

118

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

the EOKA campaign for union with Greece (ENOSIS) soured relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, resulting in 1960 in an unstable constitutional agreement which broke down within three years. For Greece, Cyprus was an emotive popular issue which few governments were either willing, or able to subordinate to wider national interests, and Athens was rarely able to control Archbishop Makarios. For the Turks, Cyprus became a matter of national prestige. While their interest was primarily strategic, the tough policy adopted by successive Turkish governments reflected also popular interest in the fate of the Turkish-Cypriot community and lingering suspicion of Greek irredentist ambitions, which the Cyprus question had reactivated. As a result, it has been impossible to confine the dispute over Cyprus to the Island itself. In 1955, Turkish government-inspired riots against the Greek-Cypriot41 minority in Istanbul got out of control. In 1958 serious intercommunal disturbances on Cyprus led to the withdrawal of Greek Staff Officers from the NATO Headquarters in Izmir. In 1964, there was further pressure on the Greek population in Istanbul and in November 1967, following the Turkish ultimatum for the removal of General Grivas from Cyprus, Greco-Turkish war seemed imminent. In both 1964 and 1967 the Turks threatened to intervene in Cyprus, and they actually did so in July 1974, claiming to act under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. It appears that in July 1974 the Greek Junta wished to take military action against Turkey including bombing the Bosphoros Bridge, but were restrained from doing so by other members of the General Staff. 4. Since 1974, a new substantive issue has arisen between the two countries. For 300 miles along the Turkish Aegean coast there is a string of densely populated Greek islands, two thirds of which are within 15 miles of the coast. There have, for some time, been minor difficulties over Greek fishermen arrested in Turkish waters and disagreements over the demilitarisation of several of these islands, but the Aegean only became a serious issue in 1974 when Turkish oil prospecting activities resulted in mobilisation by both Greek and Turkish armed forces in the area and talk in Athens of a revival of the ‘Great Idea’. These developments were, in part, a reflection of the weakness of the Greek Junta but they also reflected the explosiveness of the issue [sic] involved. These include sovereignty, strategic interests (particularly for the Turks) and oil. The dispute centres on the division of resources of the sea bed and continental shelf, and the extent of territorial waters around the many Greek islands. It is in one sense more dangerous than Cyprus in that in this area the armed forces of the two countries directly confront each other.42

The paper was slightly amended, mainly by Defence Department, but the amendments were more cosmetic than substantive, not altering the paper’s thrust or conclusions. The annex did not mention that well over one and

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

119

a quarter million Greeks were forced out of the Ottoman Empire in the 1922 defeat, nor that all the Greek nationals residing in Turkey, and most of the sixty thousand Turkish citizens of Greek stock, were forced to leave, and played down the British role in the deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations in 1955. The most obvious question that arises from the paper and, indeed, from later documents reproduced above is: if the bases were no longer considered useful (‘British strategic interests in Cyprus are now minimal’), why did Britain fight so hard in 1960 to keep some of Cyprus to itself, only to change its mind some fourteen years later? Another important observation is that the interests listed in the paper are essentially military: ‘strategic deployment’, ‘impeding Soviet communications’, ‘pre-war situation’, ‘over-flying rights’ and ‘gathering of intelligence from the southern USSR’ all suggest a preoccupation with military matters. The word ‘strategic’ is really a euphemism for ‘military’. The interests listed, although described as ‘western’, are essentially American and, as such Cold War anti-Soviet ones. As such, the paper is more about US interests than British ones per se. It does of course emerge that British interests were not (and are probably not today) necessarily commensurate with American interests, but that Britain felt constrained by the ‘global importance of working closely within the Americans’. Thus, although Britain presumably felt that it was in its interests to give up the bases, it did not dare to try, given its wish not to upset the US. The reader may see in this an inherent paradox at best, or a dangerous major foreign policy inconsistency at worst. We see a British desire to completely rid itself of any responsibility, but a resentful acceptance that its relationship with the US took priority. Also worthy of note is the admission in the annex that Britain was partly responsible for the souring of relations between Greece and Turkey, and that the 1960 constitutional agreement was unstable. There is however no mention of the FO’s role in promoting the constitutional amendments, to the point of helping the Cypriot government with drafting them, that led to an outbreak of Turkish rage and the subsequent intercommunal fighting. Perhaps the most obvious factor is that, despite the continuing Turkish occupation and expulsion of Greek Cypriots, Britain considered Turkey more important to western interests than Greece. The fact that the main paper ends on this note is highly significant, since it suggests that morality played, and plays, hardly any role in the hard-nosed considerations of the policy-formulators. Cold War military considerations took priority. The British government was not prepared to adopt measures to pressurise

120

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

Turkey into behaving reasonably over Cyprus: when the Parliamentary Select Committee on Cyprus (which was not even allowed by the Turkish army into occupied Cyprus) recommended that all further progress in Turkey’s developing relationship with the EEC should be withheld until an agreed solution of the Cyprus problem was arrived at, the brusque response was: The Government rejects this recommendation. It does not believe that a solution can be promoted by isolating Turkey.43

Conclusions The period of British possession and then part-possession of Cyprus straddles the end of British power and the rise of the USA. The documents we have seen and commented on provide tasty ingredients for a veritable case study of British foreign policy formulation, as well as show how the FCO handled the fact that Britain had lost, and was continuing to lose, power to the US. As diplomats readily admitted, it really was becoming a case of power without responsibility, or, perhaps more accurately, according oneself a position without the ability and wherewithal to hold it down. There is a strong argument that Britain spoiled Cyprus’ future and created instability by bringing Turkey into the equation from 1955, then compounding the problem by insisting on hanging on to part of Cyprus. The mere fact that over half the Treaty of Guarantee was devoted to Britain’s rights, and that the treaties constituted a package, with one bit affecting the other, suggests that the whole1960 package was about external interests, with only lip-service being paid to the people of Cyprus, who were not even brought into the arrangement until late in the day, and then told that part of their island would remain British. More specifically, the negotiations between Greece, Turkey, Britain and (‘informally’) the US were predicated on Anglo-American Cold War interests, and thus on the bases, with the constitutional arrangements following from there. Although it is of course a hypothetical question, it is eminently possible that without the bases, the treaties creating Cypriot independence might well have been more workable than they turned out to be. We have also seen how Britain almost literally tied itself up in knots by signing a treaty it could not honour, then agonising about its very legitimacy, and admitting ten years before the Turkish invasion that the bases would be regarded as increasingly anachronistic by world public opinion. Following the breakdown of the constitution, and as Britain became increasingly loth to take the initiative on a solution, she began to rely on

BRITISH BASES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

121

the US, and even to hide behind her. Thus, Britain found itself in the curious position of being a guarantor power, but having to toe the American line, to the point of not intervening to uphold the Treaty of Guarantee, and of not being able to relinquish its own bases. As we have seen, the US wanted the intelligence-gathering facilities, which were indeed considerable: one hundred and eighty UK-based secret GCHQ staff was a very serious spying commitment, enabling the British and, therefore their Echelon partners the US, to spy on not only much of the Middle East, but on the southern Soviet Union. Matters are unlikely to have changed dramatically since then, bar the major upgrading of spying facilities that has been taking place. One cannot yet state with certainty that the British bases are now financed by the US. Whatever view one holds about the usefulness or otherwise of the SBAs to Middle Eastern stability, their very continuing presence, at US insistence, underlines that Cyprus has been, and still is, at the epicentre of a tense geo-strategic merry-go-round, with various players jockeying for pre-eminence in a neo-Metternichian-Disraelian bout of political realism.

7 THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS Introduction This chapter does not aim to give a blow by blow account of the intercommunal talks/negotiations, which have been conducted under the auspices of the United Nations since 1968, but to look at them in their totality and consider why they have not yet proved successful. Had the Cypriot state of 1960 been a completely independent and unitary state, based on individual equality, then intercommunal negotiations might never have been needed. At the founding of the Cypriot state, as we have seen, various vital matters, in particular those concerning the municipal boundaries in the main cities, and the establishment of an integrated army, had still not been settled. The folly of not specifying and agreeing vital administrative measures before independence manifested itself ‘à une cadence de plus en plus accélérée’ from independence, culminating in the rioting and breakdown of the constitution. As this is being written, we are now in the forty sixth year of on-and-off negotiations, held variously in Nicosia, New York, Vienna and Zürich. During this time, the artificial divisions imposed by the Turkish invasion and occupation have solidified, although legal Cypriots from both sides of the occupation line have been able to visit the other side since 2003. The fact that illegal settlers (euphemistically and wrongly described as ‘seasonal workers’ by Turkey) in the occupied north of the island now outnumber the Turkish Cypriots, makes the recent negotiations somewhat surrealistic, particularly since these settlers, mostly Turks, have the same rights as the native Turkish Cypriots (for example, they were even allowed to vote in the Annan Plan in 2004). On the other hand, between 1964 and the invasion, the settler problem did not of course exist, whereas today it is clearly a major stumbling block in negotiations. The sheer force of numbers has helped to strengthen the Turkish stance, as well as the presence of around forty thousand occupation troops.

124

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

Looking at some of the more pertinent documents helps us to gauge the likelihood of a settlement, and the form it might take. In a sense, it could be argued that the intercommunal negotiations began in 1960, in the form of disagreements beginning almost the moment the Union Jack was run down. These disagreements were then modified by the role of the UN (backed up by a peacekeeping force which remains to this day), and given a structure in 1968, with mediators being appointed periodically. The central problem has always been the fact that Turkey, knowing full well that the Greek Cypriots were a large majority, plumped for geographical autonomy1 for the Turkish Cypriots, since this would ensure a separate Turkish Cypriot community which Turkey could claim to protect. This explains why the UN mediator, Gala Plaza’s, report of March 1965 was roundly rejected by Turkey: it rejected federation (often a public relations euphemism for partition), questioned the 1960 treaties, and suggested demilitarisation. This clearly detracted from Ankara’s separatist and military plans. A report of 11 March by the UN Secretary General stated that the Turkish Cypriot policy of self-isolation had led the community in the opposite direction from normality.2 If one adds to this the fact that the Turkish government looked upon the UN with considerable hostility, owing to its recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and concomitant refusal to recognise the evolving de facto administration of the self-isolated Turkish Cypriots, then it is hardy difficult to see that the years of negotiations and peacemaking efforts were to prove unsuccessful, and that the Turkish Cypriot community would become increasingly separate. Despite the mediation continuing even as the Turkish Cypriots were cutting themselves off more and more, the 1967 crisis occurred, to be followed by more mediation and intercommunal negotiations, which in turn were only broken off by the Turkish invasion. Yet the following year, after the unilateral declaration of the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’, negotiations resumed, again floundering in the petty power games and self-perceived interests of the power-brokers. Even after the declaration in 1983 of the (internationally unrecognised) ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, they resumed, and are continuing even as this is being proofread in September 2010. One of the clearest, most incisive and humbug-free appraisals (albeit cynical, occasionally supercilious, and disrespectful towards Archbishop Makarios) of the intercommunal talks was written by the Head of Chancery at the British High Commission, Michael Perceval 3, to Maeve Fort of Southern European Department in 1976. It is so perspicacious, even viciously so, that readers of this book will nevertheless understand the subsequent

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

125

documents, including those written before his appraisal, more readily. It serves as a very good introductory document: IN PRAISE OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS 1. As you, not to mention Perez and Waldheim, are presently making gallant efforts to refloat the Cyprus inter-communal talks, may I offer these – wholly personal – thoughts in praise of this somewhat tarnished institution? 2. In my view, the merit of the inter-communal talks is that there is no danger of their leading to a Cyprus constitutional settlement. There never has been any such danger, ever since the talks began in 1968, and if you think otherwise, I recommend a glance at the three enclosed telegrams, which date from January 1971. They could just as easily have been drafted in January 1976, when allowing for a certain mutatis mutandis and the fact that upper and under-dogs had changed places, we were still going round and round much the same mulberry bush as before. 3. The real as opposed to the formal purpose of the 1968–1971 and 1972–4 series of inter-communal talks was surely to further the international and more specifically Western aim – negative but highly important – of preventing the Cyprus problem of starting a war between Greece and Turkey. Thus, in the aftermath of the 1967 crisis, these negotiations were substituted for the muscle-flexing and brinkmanship of the 1964–7 period, and the protagonists were prevailed upon to: a) renounce (outwardly) their real objectives in order at least to stymie the adversary’s objective’s, and b) wait for a shift in the balance of forces before resuming the pursuit of real objectives. 4. However, the objectives of the two main parties concerned remained irreconcilable; the Cypriot Greeks sought to establish the unitary state denied them by the London-Zurich agreements, while the Turkish Government sought to enforce a bi-communal structure, and to give the Cypriot Turks a geographical basis to sustain this. 5. As negotiator of that marathon series, and also as leader of the “Western” party in Cyprus Greek politics, Clerides has claimed that golden opportunities for a Cyprus settlement were lost in 1973 when the Greek Cypriots (i.e. Makarios) failed to say snap to the new model constitution then all but agreed by Denktash. Between now and the elections, Clerides is likely to harp on this charge, which is a telling one; not least because his Western principals [sic?]4 have left him little else to sell on the Cyprus market. 6. Makarios is sensitive to the accusation, but as with all his ‘missed opportunities’ (Harding and Radcliffe proposals of 1956), not to

126

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

mention the opportunity he did not miss, but perhaps should have (the London-Zurich agreements), it transpires that somebody else was to blame. To a reporter only last week, he stated: “It would have indeed have been possible to reach agreement with the Turkish Cypriots before the coup. But the dictatorial regime in Athens, through its instruments in Cyprus – the Greek officers serving in the National Guard and the terrorist EOKA-B organisation – torpedoed the possibility of an agreement.” This diverges from another Palace line, namely that the Athens junta was trying to force Makarios into a settlement in order to provoke his overthrow by indignant Greek Cypriot nationalists! 7. To me, this is Makariite myth invented to counter Clerides myth. Reluctantly, even after reading Polys Polyviou’s vast tome on the Cyprus constitutional negotiations and proposals from 1960 to 1975 (“Cyprus in Search of a Constitution”), I cannot believe that a Cyprus solution – as opposed to merely another settlement – was really on the cards in those pre-coup inter-communal talks. 8. Rather, one reads of two able lawyers inserting ladders for their own community and snakes for the adversary’s into texts which combine but do not reconcile the incompatible objectives of each. And if Denktash at some point seems to relent in his efforts to consolidate his enclaves and legitimise his “provisional administration” under the guise of “local autonomy”: is it not really a tactical move returning the onus of decision to the Greeks, who in Inonu’s prophet [sic] – ie words – would solve the problem on behalf of the Turks? 9. Substitution of the 1973 model for the 1960 Constitution would, I fear, merely have given the combatants a new set of rules within which to resume their struggle. A 1976 model, I have little doubt, would do just the same. Clerides knows this, but believes that Cypriot Greek commercial dynamism would again enable them to dominate both parts of a Federal Cyprus. Furthermore, he would stand an excellent chance of becoming the Greek Cypriot leader. The pessimist school of Cypriot Greeks believe [sic] on the other hand that new federal links would only facilitate Turkey’s eventual political/military takeover of the whole island. Meanwhile Makarios, and this is surely the crucial point, knows perfectly well that there could be no place for an Ethnarch-President under a 1976 model constitution. 10. I leave the last word on this aspect to Polyviou, a Clerides supporter, who had free access to the negotiator’s files, and who as a lawyer, has a bread and butter interest in the search for constitutions: “...one should not be deluded into placing too much trust and confidence in the value and efficacy of constitutions as such. However well balanced, they are no panaceas; and no constitution in the world can artificially create social unity and political harmony if, in

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

127

fact, the operative currents are flowing too strongly in the opposite direction.” 11. If the inter-communal talks were in reality an instrument for achieving a Cyprus settlement, it should be enough for us to wish the participants good luck, and to ask the UN Special Representative to send us a summary of the eventual agreement as and when reached, in X number of weeks, months or years. We are all agreed, after all, that what is acceptable to the two Cyprus communities is also acceptable to the international community. 12. Yet the High Commission’s files on the talks, since they began in 1968, are approaching fifty parts, and a Cyprus “settlement” is not visibly closer. We well know, in fact, that without the simultaneous determination of the interested parties to reach “a” settlement as opposed to “their” settlement, the talks forum is an empty one. And were there pressing reasons for all parties to settle, (ie if all saw themselves genuinely threatened with something far nastier as the alternative to a settlement), they would need no forum, and the deal would be done expeditiously in capitals, even by telephone. 13. If this means that the talks are only by-play between the convulsions which really determine the fate of Cyprus, I am not thereby disillusioned. I do not regard the inter-communal talks as an inter-communal phenomenon, but rather as a device of real international and intra-communal political importance. 14. Seeing the astounding number of green diplomatic number plates in the Cyprus traffic, and recalling how often the place has featured in UN debate and newspaper headlines, one tends to think of Cyprus as the very epitome of international crisis – managed, at least until 1974, to their considerable financial gain by the Greek Cypriots. 15. In the process, one may forget the obvious, namely that the quintessential international crisis is the point where the protagonists’ domestic political conflicts are acted out at each other’s expense, the individual’s objectives being first and foremost the obtaining or preserving of personal power. 16. Ever since Brigadier Ioannides consulted the Delphic oracle in July 1974, to be told that by taking action in Cyprus, he would destroy a hated regime, the island has lived up to its reputation as the bananaskin of the Levant (rather than the navel of the world, as Cypriots believe), as Ecevit and even Dr Kissinger might agree. It was only appropriate that Makarios, who had for so long exploited Government/ Opposition rivalry in other countries over Cyprus, should also himself have come unstuck for a while. He will not risk doing so again. 17. To take the international aspect first, the inter-communal talks are a neat way for the United Nations to pass back to the Cypriot communities the responsibility for a Cyprus settlement. Which responsibility,

128

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

the leaders of the communities, for domestic political reasons, are determined to avoid. However, they cannot plausibly complain about a device which recognises, nay insists on their sovereign independence, for they have always denounced most virulently as “inadmissible interference” the international pressures they so assiduously solicit, should these by any chance be brought to bear upon themselves rather than their adversary. However, there will always be greater enthusiasm for these talks on the part of those who do not take part in them, than on the part of those who do. 18. If there were no inter-communal talks as a substitute for international action on Cyprus, there would be greater, even embarrassing pressure for the United Nations to do more than pass resolutions endorsing the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Which, as none of these attributes have [sic] existed since the 1960 Treaties, is much like hymning the cut, colour and texture of the Emperor’s clothes. 19. The Emperor/Archbishop is himself well aware of this, which is why this chorus is so important to him. If you are as young as you feel, you are as clothed as people say you are. For Makarios, the UN is literally a chorus as in Greek drama; he knows it will do no more than say ooh and aah as the protagonists relate the blood-curdling events which have happened off-stage. The chorus may go so far as to pluck a protagonist sleeve, and even, wearing expensive blue berets – by dint of numbers get in the protagonists’ way. But only if the latter are not absolutely determined. For Makarios, old trooper as he is, the UN is a stage, and as a performer on it, he hopes to influence the audience and get his contract renewed. 20. By the same token, simply because they are UN-sponsored, Makarios is stuck with the inter-communal talks. However, he can turn them to use in domestic political terms. First, to unhorse Clerides, and undermine his rival’s claim that only he (Clerides) could get a deal from the Turks and put the refugees back in (some of) their homes. In the process, Makarios was able to break up the tacit Clerides-AKEL alliance, and bring the party back chastened to the Presidential chasuble-tails. 21. Second, Makarios can allow the talks to hypnotise the refugees into a vain belief that they may get their homes back; this may inhibit the desperate anti-Turkish act which could escalate into renewed hostilities. By the time that the refugees come to realize that the present situation will not change for the better (at least, not this side of the “long haul”) they will for the most part have put down roots anew in Cyprus or abroad. With one part of their mind they may accept the situation, even though they might tear limb from limb any politician who formally wrote off their Kyrenia homes as part of a settlement. With the other part of their mind, these refugees can continue to cherish the idea that the inter-communal talks, or if these fail, the “long haul” (I prefer this to “long struggle”), will eventually set all to rights. Talks or

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

129

haul can have much the same psychological effect, and while yielding nothing, can, like lotteries or the football pools, comfort the deprived with an addictive delusion. 22. I admit that acquiescence in the present situation does not conjure the dangers of eventual Palestinisation of the Cyprus Greeks, and may even accelerate the approach of such tricky moments as Cypriot Turk UDI and subsequent enosis with Turkey. However, it is far from clear that a settlement would work well enough to prevent the latter. In other words, the “settlement” is more likely to be the act which rules out the return of the bulk of the refugees to their homes, rather than the act which is welcomed because it does allow some of them back. (This does not rule out refugee, particularly Famagusta refugee support for Clerides in the forthcoming elections). 23. Internationally, the Cyprus problem has been a squabble for the inheritance of a bit of the British Empire. There should, I think, be a pause before the intra-Cypriot Greek battle for the inheritance of Makarios is unleashed, if only because the greatest danger to the Greek-Turk truce here is precisely intra-Greek squabbling which spills over the border. Makarios (like Sihanouk) is best equipped to balance the factions and keep the lid on the cauldron. 24. The Cypriot Turks have always been a totally indigestible morsel for Makarios, and he is now rid of them. Admittedly, he has lost a good part of the island in the process, but happily for him and his relations with his community (always his main concern), this loss was visibly the fault of others in the cruel month of July 1974. Forced by Turkish aggression to rally round their Ethnarch-President, symbol of national survival, the Cypriot Greeks will not wish to look too closely at his long history of rash actions and ambiguous inactions which, as much as anything, have led Cyprus to its present plight. 25. Can we therefore recognise that the political forces native to this island in this area have finally sundered physically the two incompatible nationalities? In which case, let us not, in deference to doublethink about the island’s mythical sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, insist on re-complicating matters with constitutional structures. 26. Let us leave the Cyprus Greeks and Turks alone in a situation which has acquired a certain resentful stability. The fewer international factors they can introduce and exploit, the sooner they are likely to re-establish some kind of working relations, even co-operation for economic reasons. And if not, so be it. The fact that the Turks, for evident reasons of interest, say much the same as this, does not make it automatically false. Meanwhile, we should persevere with the intercommunal talks because we have nothing else to offer, but in the clear understanding of what they are – a part of post-operative therapy, and no more.5

130

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

Perceval’s analysis may seem for some to imply almost by default that a solution in the traditional sense, in other words the parties agreeing to participate in a single state, as a united people, is an unattainable dream, and that a form of permanent intercommunal negotiations is necessary as a permanent valve, to prevent dangerous outbursts. This may strike some as rather pessimistic. Perceval does not choose to point the finger at the role of the British in dividing the communities well before 1960, but then one could hardly expect a serving officer to attack his own employers too openly. Nor does he emphasise the inherent divisiveness of the constitution. He does nevertheless at least mention the island’s ‘mythical sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity’. This could be interpreted as indirect criticism of the 1960 arrangement. Before we continue by recording a series of British comments on the intercommunal negotiations, let us select relevant extracts from a long – and perhaps rather emotional but pithy– paper, written by the same Perceval two years after the above paper. It comes across very much as his parting shot, just before he left Cyprus to take up a post in London. The covering letter, to the Head of Southern European Department, Timothy Daunt, summarises his ideas: FAREWELL TO A PLACE OF ARMS 1. I enclose a lengthy paper whose primary purpose is to get some views off my chest, but which also enshrines, I hope, some perceptions about Cyprus. Boiled down, my thesis is basically that: A. The Cypriots are irresponsible but it is largely not their fault (nothing ever is) because they are an eternally colonised people, externally by the current strong power of the area, internally by their own Church, which has occupied much the same role as the Sicilian mafia, albeit with loftier tone. B. Internal political considerations (money as much as power) predominate absolutely, and condition Cypriot responses to external affairs, including the Cyprus problem. C. Though affected by historical Greek suspicion of Western motives and actions, the Cypriots (of both communities) are essentially a part of Europe, and thus have claims on us as well as on Greece, which we cannot easily ignore (not that their well oiled lobby would let us). D. The Cyprus problem is probably already settled, but one cannot altogether rule out some further disaster provoked by Greek Cypriot and/or Greek political rashness. […]6

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

131

The paper itself is fifty two paragraphs and some seventeen pages long. We now reproduce those sections which either deal directly with the negotiations, or which shed light on them, from Perceval’s viewpoint, which comes across as a curious mixture of emotional involvement and professional dispassion. 20. What is certain is that after their rejection of the Winster proposals,7 options foreclosed for the Greek Cypriots with each successive scheme – Harding Plan8 , Radcliffe Plan9, Macmillan Plan 10 - thanks to the Turkish reaction aroused by the Greek Cypriot action. Ever attentive to the internal factor, Makarios went back on his near-agreement with Harding in 1956 as a result of a challenge by his rival, the Bishop of Kyrenia, only to be “forced” (as he preferred) to accept the far less palatable London-Zurich Agreements as the only alternative to Macmillan’s Salomonic [sic] judgement. 21. And so, there was a settlement, after four years of conflict in which Britain resisted the enosis which in retrospect would have suited us and NATO well – if Turkey could have been bought off for a reasonable price. The agreements were not the enosis demanded by the (Greek) Cypriot majority, they were not the partition demanded by the (Turkish) Cypriot minority, nor, to complete the catalogue of negatives which alone can adequately describe them, were they remotely workable, given that they depended on a spirit of inter-communal co-operation which had been damaged beyond repair. The spatchcocked Republic was the product of Greece, Turkey and Britain splitting their differences, and looked it. […] 22. The Communists had lost ground during the struggle because Russian strategic interests (independent, non-NATO Cyprus) conflicted with the Greek Cypriots’ enotist aspirations. In so far as the inter-communal struggle continued unresolved after Independence, AKEL also lost out. Ethnic division in Cyprus had been exacerbated by the economic development of the 1930’s and 1940’s, for the Turkish Cypriots got left behind, failed to secure their share of the cake, and so, by 1960, the ex-Ottoman imperial race on the island, while some 18% of the population, represented only 5 per cent of commerce and 8% of national income. The main source of employment in the 1960’s [sic]11 was in the colonial government’s security forces, chasing EOKA, and this outlet ceased on Independence. Consequently, the lumpen proletariat12 was Turkish, and the employers Greek Cypriot. The haves/ have nots division was thus split vertically by ethnic group, and this prevented the Communists from exploiting it. Their return to influence in Cyprus (which is now considerable) was secured by the humiliating expedient of clinging to the Archbishop’s cassock, extending their perks and patronage, and in turn, providing him with propaganda support and rent-a-crowd on festive or ugly occasions.

132

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

D: THE POST-INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE 23. The exasperated God-Motherlands attending the birth of the Republic failed to give it certain important attributes; sovereignty (basic articles of the Constitution were unalterable), independence (Turkish and Greek troops were stationed in Nicosia to maintain the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee), and territorial integrity (there were 99 square miles of British Sovereign Base Areas). In the new, post-“independence” stage of their struggle, Makarios and the Greek Cypriots pursued the unitary state denied them by the London-Zurich Agreements on two fronts. At the United Nations, they propagated the slogan of “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity”, while to match this on the ground, they strove to reduce the Turkish Cypriot fifth of the population from the status of partner to that of minority. […] 26. The 1967 Kophinou clashes (which brought in “Cyprus” Vance to mediate away another Turkish invasion threat) stirred the world to add a “positive” factor, inter-communal talks, to the “negative” factor represented by UNFICYP thus far whose role had been merely to keep the lid on Cyprus. And so from 1968 to 1974 (from 1974 onwards as well, with rather different basic data), the two negotiators, Clerides and Denktash, elaborated and exchanged detailed documents for the diversion of diplomats – inserting like the skilled lawyers they were, ladders for their own side and snakes for the adversary’s in texts which sought to combine but quite failed to reconcile the incompatible objectives of each. The talks existed for the international opinion which had created them, but were without political solidity, and waxed and waned according to the internal political realities of the moment. Clerides would dispute this interpretation of the talks, which he pursued with sincerity – but I believe that he deludes himself if he thought Makarios would give up anything he already had.13 For Denktash, of course, the talks were a means of focussing world attention on his threatened community, and of possibly achieving a stronger position on the ground before the next heave. 27. Turning from the external and inter-communal symptoms to the Greek Cypriot intra-communal causes, one must admit that Makarios faced incredible difficulties. His survival alone is remarkable, his grip on the affection of most of his community, even more so. […] 31. The Colonels’ attempts to remove Makarios varied from the subtle to the brutal. An example of the former was the move by his Cypriot bishop rivals to “de-frock” him in 1973, so separating him, it was hoped, from his most effective base, the Archbishopric. Makarios turned the tables, and de-frocked them. Of the direct assassination attempts, the most spectacular was the machine-gunning of the Archbishop’s helicopter in 1970 by Yorgadhjis’14 men under instruction from Greek officers. Having played back Yorgadhjis, having seen him fail, and be [sic] placed under house-arrest by Makarios, the Greeks killed him to shut his mouth. […]

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

133

F. PARTITION 35. My reaction, when POD15 told me of the Turkish landings, was to comment “ah. Partition at last. The only question remaining, is how long it takes everyone to accept the fact”. After four years, the answer is that acceptance is making good progress, even if the public statements of the two parties politely proclaim the contrary. Northern Cyprus may be suspended awkwardly between confederation with the South, “independence”, and annexation by Turkey, but its embryonic statelet organs continue to grow, and achieve creeping, de facto recognition. It will take a further shake of the kaleidoscope (not too violent, one hopes) to decide which option is eventually applied. The great majority of Turkish Cypriots wanted to come north, not to enjoy camping in a luxurious Greek villa, but to lose their fear of the shot in the night; whether fired by Greek or Turkish activist was irrelevant if the last shot hit the innocent family. Physical security was their paramount concern. 36. Against this must be set the fact that after four years of security, the old fears fade, and nostalgia for homes in the South revives. The problems of living with Turkish soldiers, inefficiency, inflation and Anatolian scavenger-immigrants, bulk larger, and the South may seem a haven of prosperity. The Turkish Cypriots are discovering (as the Greek Cypriots did earlier with mainland Greeks) that Cypriots may have more in common with each other than with their ethnic motherland. For the plain fact is that the Turkish invasion of 1974 was a case of the hungry third world taking a bite out of the complacent capitalist first world; Turkish Cypriots may have cause to wonder whether they were not better off in second place in the first world, than first in the third world. 37. The Greek Cypriots make great play with the rumbles of Turkish Cypriot discontent. They proclaim the virtues of brotherhood, like the spider which has lost its fly. They even manufacture bright new Cyprus flags for use at rallies and congresses when foreign journalists are present. (Hitherto, the despised Cyprus flag was seen only atop bulletpocked public buildings, looking like an egg-stain on a dirty dishcloth). Morally, the Greek Cypriot “brotherhood” campaign reminds me of the duelist who takes first shot, misses, and says “How I hate violence! Why don’t we sit down and reason this thing out.” The reply is predictable. Such nostalgia as there may be on one side, and change of heart on the other, is no longer relevant. Once Cypriots, Turkish and Greek, have realised the error of their ways, the error is by definition irremediable. The two communities are still linked by smuggling, water and electricity, but that is all, and how long even that will last, depends on infrastructure costs. 38. There may be further inter-communal talks, and discussion of possible constitutions, but the two sides are so far apart that it is hard to see any territorial bribe bringing them together, given that the Turks insist on a confederation tantamount to loose partition (realistic in the

134

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

circumstances) and the Greeks on a restoration of the unitary state – which has never existed. Denktash has pointed out that in fact there is little incentive for the Greek Cypriots to launch any new constitutional partnership with the Turkish Cypriots. They are doing well economically; they might like Varosha but do not need it; they enjoy the recognition accorded to the Republic. Why hazard all that in some confederal adventure which might give Turkey new excuse for intervention in the South? Why indeed? The outlook is therefore the Greek Cypriots going it alone as they are, with Turkey granting the Turkish Cypriots some slightly less amorphous international status than they have now. Perhaps this after all, is the Cyprus settlement, which we have had since 1974, without realising it. The official view however, is that there must be a proper constitutional settlement, less worse befall. I buy only half of this. Worse may well befall, but not via a constitutional settlement. […] 43. Badly handled, as it almost certainly would be, a double enosis bid might attract that Turkish Third Round to take the rest of the island, which the Greek Cypriots claim greatly to fear. It is hard to see what else could give the Turks the necessary excuse or provocation, apart from border hostilities. Not even the Greek Cypriot effort to beggar the North and build up the South as a glittering prize (so convincing the Turks that they took the wrong bit) is in itself enough, I think, to get the tanks moving towards Larnaca and Limassol. Besides the Turkish crocodile is patient, and awaits the false move; expects, in short, the Greek to solve the Cyprus problem on behalf of the Turk. 44. If the Greek Cypriots/Greeks bring further disaster upon themselves, should this concern us, so long as the SBA’s are untouched? Given the Greek Cypriot tendency to play for high stakes, to pocket their winnings but howl for others to make good their losses, it is tempting to answer, no. Their exploitation of lobbies, their belief that other people forget their offences just because they forget them, their rapacity under the charm, their use of ingratitude as a tool to extort yet more (if people have a bad enough conscience to give them something, this can be squeezed still further), their petulant demands on those they deem well-disposed contrasting with their flattery of the indifferent and cringing before the ill-disposed or dangerous – all these things make it easy to love the Greek Cypriots but little. 45. And yet, though the Greek Cypriots have matched the Turks in cruelties past (the one, personalised, vindictive, European? – the other massive, indifferent, Asiatic?), it is not simply a case of six of one and half a dozen of the other. The Greeks of Cyprus may have managed to reduce their share of the island, but this does not mean that their share of right and reason is similarly reduced. Turkish concern for minority rights, so acute in Cyprus, is not visible in their present dealings with Kurds, or past dealings with Armenians, nor may it be in

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

135

Western Thrace once the Turkish community there has outnumbered the Greek. 46. In short, Turkey has cashed in her share of the 1960 Treaties, and cannot be permitted to invoke them for any further interference in the affairs of the South. […]

Perceval’s paper was the most extraordinary official analysis by a serving diplomat that this author has ever read, whether in archives, or when he was himself serving. Even Perceval himself describes his paper as peculiar. For all its avoidance of the style and conventional language of internal diplomatic communication, the messages that come across are at least clearer than the norm, reflecting perhaps the author’s days in journalism. There is no semantic shilly-shallying and beating about the bush. Some Cypriot government people who read this book may well be irritated at some of Percival’s perceptions of Greek Cypriots. But they will be fascinated at Perceval’s statement that enosis would have suited NATO and Britain well, with the implication that it was wrong to resist it by fighting Grivas. Generally, the paper should be useful to them in understanding critics of Cypriot government policies. Perceval shows the hypocrisy of claiming that the 1960 treaties created sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and even states that the agreements were not ‘remotely workable’, something which FCO officials only tended to admit through gritted teeth. His outspokenness is also useful in giving extra angles through which to consider the Turkish invasion, in particular the idea of an underdeveloped country invading a developed one, and that of a hungry third world taking a bite out of a complacent capitalist first world. Controversially, Perceval also suggests that the Cyprus problem may have already been solved, with the Greek Cypriots going it alone, and ‘Turkey granting the Turkish Cypriots a less amorphous international status than they have now’. This extremely realistic view, while lacking both morality and legality, is nevertheless attractive to some, who see the de facto situation developing into a de jure one, whatever the degree of expediency and immorality required. Of course, as we shall consider later, Cyprus’ EU membership has put a very different complexion on matters, where law is once more of the essence. In that connexion, it is perhaps surprising that Perceval did not try and prognosticate a little about the future role of the then EEC. The most ominous and worrying (for the Greek and Cypriot governments) part of Perceval’s analysis comes with his view that a double enosis bid could provide Turkey with an opportunity to take the whole island, and that the ‘Turkish crocodile is patient.’

136

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

Having been primed by Perceval’s musings, let us now look at the question of the intercommunal talks in a more chronological way. In 1969, nine years before Percival’s ‘parting shot’, the High Commissioner, Norman Costar, wrote his valedictory dispatch to the Secretary of State: […] The people of Cyprus are charming, intelligent and hospitable. But they are too narrowly concerned with their own political problem whose solution is not made easier by their love of hard bargaining for its own sake and their tendency to reach firmly held convictions on inadequate and unverified premises often emotional in genesis. The two Cypruses 2. The first fact that needs to be grasped about Cyprus is that although there is a Cyprus state and a Government of Cyprus which is a member of the United Nations and of the Commonwealth, there is no Cypriot nation and there are in fact two Cypriot Administrations. Each of these regards the other as illegal and with both of them the British Government has to deal. General de Gaulle, in a typically Delphic utterance about Cyprus, said that in his view Greeks should be Greeks and Turks should be Turks. As an expression of what is desirable the General’s view may be deplored. But it accurately describes the situation in the island as it is. In practice Cyprus is partitioned in the most haphazard and intricate way between intermingled areas controlled by the Greek Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot Administration respectively, making the communal map of Cyprus look like the latter day Holy Roman Empire. As if this were not enough, yet other still more fragmentary areas exist under various gradations of intermediate control between the Greeks and Turks. It is the constant endeavour of both Greeks and Turks to enlarge the area or degree of their control, and the primary function of UNFICYP to prevent a recurrence of fighting by preserving the status quo left after the troubles of 1963–1964. The division between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus is historical, religious, linguistic but not racial. To the outside observer, it is difficult on sight to tell a Greek from a Turk. The division is unhappily also becoming geographical and economic. The de facto division of Cyprus now in its sixth year means that there is a danger of perpetuating the segregation of Turkish Cypriots into urban ghettos and rural slums as second class citizens politically and economically, with the minimum of intermixing. This in turn means that the younger generation of Greeks and Turks are educated separately and brought up to regard one another as enemies waiting to commit genocide. The political problem 3. Nevertheless, during my two years here certain decisions about the Cyprus problem have in practice emerged. The Greek Cypriots finally realised as a result of the reaction to the attack by General Grivas on the Turkish villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou in November

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

137

196716 , that the Government of Turkey will not permit the reduction of the Turkish Cypriots by force. Archbishop Makarios also recognised in March 1968 that the four-year effort which he had made to reduce the Turkish Cypriots by economic blockade had also failed, largely as a result of a flourishing smuggling trade in which Greeks and Turks had co-operated. The Archbishop therefore removed the economic restrictions on goods entering the Turkish enclaves and permitted Turks freedom of movement in Greek areas, though not quite of resettlement in the Greek-controlled areas from which many Turks had fled. These improvements and the departure of most of the Greek mainland troops from Cyprus in early 1968 followed by the opening of direct talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in June of that year, have meant that the island has enjoyed 16 months, almost, but not quite, free of inter-communal incidents. […] 4. The basic cause of the failure of the two sides to make more rapid progress towards coming together, despite a general weariness of the long struggle and despite the resumption of direct discussions, is mutual distrust between the leaders on the two sides. […] Archbishop Makarios 5. The character of the Archbishop is indeed one of the main factors in the Cyprus situation. He has one guiding principle: to ensure a Greek Cyprus in which the Turks, if they survive at all, will be reduced to the position of a politically powerless minority. He will concede them autonomy in religious, cultural and educational matters only. […] 7. Another element in the local scene is the problem of outside interference. In the last resort the authorities in Ankara undoubtedly run the Turkish Cypriot Administration in both its civilian and military aspects (though these may not always pull the same way). The Turkish Government underpins the Turkish Cypriot Administration by supplying armed forces and subsidies of about £7 million a year. Without the standing threat of invasion if the Greek Cypriots push their pressure too far, the Turkish cause would collapse. The Government of Greece also has considerable influence on the Greek Cypriots, though it is less unimpeded than that of the Government of Turkey on the other side.17[…]

For all the criticism we have seen directed at Makarios, it seems that the Turkish Cypriots, controlled from Ankara, did not wish for normalisation of relations. An FCO record of Anglo-Canadian-American talks on 18 November 1969 reveals the situation: Mr. Brockwell18 agreed that the Turkish Cypriots had not responded to the significant moves made by the Cyprus Government towards normalisation. The Turks could do something more towards opening up the Kyrenia Road and there were other gestures they could make. But the momentum towards normalisation had been halted.19

138

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

Whatever the level of distrust that remained, it does therefore appear that the Turkish government did not want reconciliation, since this would detract from its partitionist policies. Those in control of the Turkish Cypriots do not seem to have commanded much respect, as a letter from Walter Prendergast, Second Secretary at the High Commission Nicosia to the FCO, intimates: Dissatisfaction with the Turkish Cypriot Leadership […] Secondly, there is a feeling on the part of many that the present leadership are [sic] insensitive to the sufferings of the community and have even profited from the intercommunal strife. This is at least partly true. In paragraph 18 of the paper on “Vested Interests and the Cyprus Problem”, enclosed with Sir N. Costar’s letter 11 September 1968, to Edmonds, it is made clear that most of the leadership “are closely identified with the ‘siege’ policy of the Turkish Cypriot community and, in some cases, so discredited by their personal financial dealings over the past four years, that it seems doubtful whether many of them could continue in office following an intercommunal settlement.”20

By early 1970, little had happened to herald any positive agreement between the communities, as extracts from the new High Commissioner’s annual review show: The Cyprus Problem 3. The somewhat uneasy peace, established in the year following the 1967 Cyprus crisis, took on a more permanent look. Despite the fact that military confrontation in many areas continued and United Nations efforts to reduce it all failed, Turkish-Cypriots could circulate without fear in Greek areas of Cyprus, commercial exchanges between the communities increased and co-operation in practical matters, such as the provision of public services, was expanded. This progress was just sufficient to offset the adverse effect of the stalemate in the intercommunal talks and of the consolidation of positions and institutions which the very passage of time involved. It also consolidated sentiment on both sides, most noticeably in business circles, against a return to intercommunal strife: this somewhat intangible factor was perhaps the main gain of 1969. 4. On the Cyprus problem itself and the intercommunal talks, Archbishop Makarios would have been justified in ending the year, as he began it, by stating that they were “in a state of stagnation”. […] 5. On both sides, official attitudes remained static. In January, the Archbishop declared that he would never accept the “federal or partitionary solutions” for which the Turks were allegedly working. In November

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

139

he said that acceptance of Turkish demands would lead to the creation of” a state within a state” and could never be accepted. […]21

The lack of serious movement was certainly frustrating to some, in particular to the more hawkish elements in the US, Greece and Turkey. Although the talks continued, they appeared to some extent window-dressing, without substantive progress being made. In the words of the Acting High Commissioner, Derek Day, in January 1973: 12. The issues still to be faced in the intercommunal talks are nevertheless so great that it would be rash to predict success. It is inconceivable that Archbishop Makarios will accept a solution which will seriously restrict the power of the Greek majority to run Cyprus. It is equally hard to see the Turkish Cypriots putting themselves in any way at the mercy of the Greek Cypriots. They will insist on a continued guarantee of Turkish military support. Neither side has yet shown any evidence of the trust which would be necessary to make a solution work after agreement had been reached.22

The first half of 1973 was dominated by violent acts by Grivas supporters, which fizzled out when the Greek President denounced Grivas’ activities. The High Commissioner, Stephen Olver, predicted that in 1974, Grivas would disappear ‘effectively from the scene’, but go out ‘with a bang, not a whimper’. In fact, he simply died. About the intercommunal negotiations, Olver wrote: 6. It has been a disappointing year for the talks. Some details have been resolved, but the central issue, on which all others depend, is virtually untouched. The Turks and Turkish Cypriots demand the renunciation of Enosis and cast-iron guarantees of their physical, and even economic, security. They see local autonomy as the only such guarantee, but may be prepared to be flexible over the constitutional form which it would take. The Greek Cypriots, although mostly content with independence, are not prepared to sign away Enosis, nor to give the Turkish Cypriot minority a privileged position. The talks seem, once again, to be approaching stalemate, but no one has done any constructive thinking about the alternatives. It is likely that the status quo will continue for some time. I do not see any immediate danger in this, provided that Athens and Ankara continue in their resolve not to allow a military confrontation on the island. However, there will be internal pressures on the Cyprus Government to reassert its authority, and on the Turkish Cypriot community to move further along the road of separatism. And the economic gap between the two communities will widen, with all the dangers which that eventually implies for the stability of this small island.23

140

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

As we have seen, the negotiations were unable to prevent the invasion and vivisection of Cyprus. Powerful external backstage forces proved stronger than the overt attempt to agree on the mechanics of living together. One could nevertheless argue that the talks were to be as important as before, if not more so, from at least a NATO viewpoint, if only to prevent war between two NATO members (the word ‘allies’ sounds rather hypocritical). The new High Commissioner summed up the situation well in a diplomatic report at the end of 1975: 5. The essential point is easy enough to identify. The earliest settlers in Cyprus, the Mycenaean Greeks and the Phoenicians, eventually blended to form the basic stock of the present inhabitants. Subsequent arrivals – Assyrians, Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Crusaders, Venetians, Turks and British – came and governed, but with the exception of the Turks, eventually left when their period of rule came to an end. The Turks, however, left behind a minority on the island who do not appear susceptible of assimilation but are too numerous to be ejected or dominated. They have lived for years in fear of a Greek Cypriot attempt to do just that, and now that they hold most, if not all, of the cards, have every intention of ensuring that this will never happen again. 6. If both sides accept the realities of the situation, a workable arrangement is not inconceivable. Partition has since the days of Solomon represented the ultimate resort, and if Greeks and Turks cannot live together then they may have to live apart – not in separate sovereign states, for this would raise a whole crop of new problems, but under some bi-zonal arrangement. Both sides will have to accept that this is the best that they are going to get. But the Turkish Cypriots doubt whether the other side really admit that Cyprus will have to be a Greco-Turk island and the Greek Cypriots hesitate to concede publicly bi-zonalism with all the sacrifices it must imply. One almost suspects at times that they have lived with tragedy so long – and it is in their tradition – that it has become for them a tradition of mind to which they have formed a perverse attachment. There is also a body of opinion which believes that it might be better to soldier on rather than accept an unsatisfactory settlement. […] 13. A settlement will not necessarily bring peace to Cyprus. On the Greek Cypriot side, once common resistance to the Turk is removed as a unifying force, old internal hostilities may be revived. On the Turkish Cypriot side, there are already the makings of a political opposition to Denktash. But a negotiated settlement must be the first step and it may, with luck, mean that future dissensions will have less far-reaching repercussions outside the island.24[…]

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

141

Perhaps the most depressing (at least for some) thing about the new High Commissioner’s brief analysis is the acceptance of partition as a potential solution, and even then, only a half-way-house one, where the communities would live apart, but not as two sovereign states, since ‘this would raise a whole crop of new problems’. The ‘new problems’ of course meant the spectre of double-enosis, since two genuinely sovereign states would have the right to unite with Greece and Turkey respectively, and if they did not, would possibly be at loggerheads, and themselves draw Greece and Turkey into their problems. The very question of partition, and why it is dangerous in the case of Cyprus, is itself worth another book.25 At any event, while pundits mused, and conflict-resolution ‘experts’ came up with suggestion after suggestion for a solution, the talks continued, now in Vienna, from April 1975 to February 1976. Perhaps not very helpfully, the Turkish Cypriot leadership’s prelude to the UN Security Council resolution asking for a resumption of the talks was the announcement of the establishment of a ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’. Two days before the talks began, the Cyprus government spokesman, Manolis Christophides, said that he was not very optimistic, but that he did not expect a breakdown. The American ambassador, for his part, quoted Makarios as saying that the Turks would never agree to a settlement which he or any other Greek, except ‘that traitor Clerides’, could sign.26 Clerides did indeed agree with Kissinger that the way forward was for the Cyprus government to be willing to accept a bi-zonal federation. The Greek ambassador to Britain even stated that Makarios would be willing to withdraw from the government (as the Turks insisted), if that meant a solution.27 It quite possible that the Turkish government never wished for a hard and fast solution for Cyprus, since that would mean that it would be more difficult for it to use Cyprus as a lever for its other foreign policy objectives in the Aegean (see Chapters Eight and Nine) and vis-à-vis the EEC, and later the EC and EU. A statement by Callaghan to the Cabinet in October 1975 is certainly fairly damning, even if he was still smarting from his treatment at the hands of the Turkish negotiators in Geneva: The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that, although nothing could be said publicly at this stage, he was engaged in very active exchanges with the Greek and Turkish Governments on the Cyprus issue. He had proposed to both sides a package containing three elements: a bi-zonal federation; boundary adjustments; and a central government with weak powers. The Greek Government were ready to accept in principle, subject to clarification of details, particularly on the boundaries. The Turkish Government response was less satisfactory:

142

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

they were being deliberately vague about boundary adjustments and were demanding that in the central government the Turkish community should have equal rights with the Greek community. He was continuing his mediation with the object of reaching a sufficient measure of understanding to allow the Clerides/Denktash talks to be resumed with good prospects of success. He could not exclude the possibility that the Turks were playing a double game with us in these negotiations since in parallel discussions with the Federal German Government they had suggested not a bi-zonal federation but three zones, the central zone to be jointly administered. He was keeping in close touch with the Federal German Foreign Minister, Herr Genscher. The American Secretary of State, Dr Kissinger, was also pressing both sides to move to a solution. So were the 9 European Economic Community countries acting as a whole, but the Turks seemed disinclined to pay much attention to the representations of the Community Presidency.28

The negotiations stuttered to a temporary halt at the end of February 1976. The FCO tried to get the Greek government to become more involved in the search for a solution, even to the point of writing that it was adopting a ‘supine rôle’.29 The low profile Greek stance was hardly surprising, given the recent result of Greek involvement in Cyprus! The FCO also thought that the Turkish side should be made aware that there was little international understanding for their constant procrastination in avoiding discussions of substance.30 In the meantime, while the stuttering, procrastination and semantic gyrations and pirouetting continued, the British ambassador to Turkey weighed in with a dispatch on the possibility of partition, of which we now give the summary: CYPRUS: TOWARDS PARTITION? A VIEW FROM ANKARA (Summary) 1. In the two years since the Turkish military operations in Cyprus there has been minimal progress in the negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots towards the formation of a federal government. With attitudes on both sides hardening, the possibility cannot be ignored of partition of the island as the eventual outcome. (Paragraphs 1–6). 2. This would probably be initiated by the Turks, with or without a unilateral declaration of independence beforehand. Provided it came about without violence and was matched by parallel albeit reluctant Greek action, it would not necessarily be contrary to the United Kingdom interest. It would have the merit of being a solution of some sort, as against the present uncertainty. And it would enable us to dispose of the sovereign base areas in Cyprus if we wished to. (Paragraphs 7–9).

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

143

3. For the Turks partition would be a means of holding on to what they already have in the island. The Greeks would not like it, but for them also there might be an attraction in being assured of their present holding. The Cypriots themselves might at heart prefer to belong to two independent states than part of a federal state, far less provinces of the metropolitan countries. (Paragraphs 10–16). 4. The attitude of the Americans, Russians, United Nations and EEC to partition would vary according to their own interests. None would be likely to welcome it warmly. But if it looked like coming about they would have to face up to the possibility. So too should the United Kingdom, which, while continuing to encourage the resumption of the intercommunal talks with an eye to a federal solution, should not be reluctant to discuss partition as an alternative if that solution cannot be achieved. (Paragraphs 17–22).31

Clearly, the ambassador’s perceptions were diametrically opposed in one vital respect to those of the High Commissioner to Cyprus (see above): namely that while the latter, Gordon, had written that while two separate sovereign states would raise a whole crop of new problems (and that ‘some bi-zonal arrangement’ was therefore necessary), Phillips was putting forward the idea of two independent states. This would of course cause many problems, not least that if properly independent, then the new states would have the right to unite with Greece and/or Turkey. If this were not done with Graeco-Turkish agreement, Turkey would claim that it would have a hostile Greece on its southern flank, and take measures, such as trying to occupy the whole island. And if it were done with Greek and Turkish agreement, the Soviet Union would resist such a development strenuously, given that NATO’s southern flank would have been strengthened. Given the diplomatic scurrying around Cyprus, and the British even considering both a bi-zonal solution and two sovereign states, the reality was that the Greek Cypriots wanted a state where the majority decided on central government responsibilities such as foreign policy, which been denied in 1960, while the Turkish Cypriots wanted both separation, total autonomy and a veto over central government policy. In September 1976, shortly before he left office, Kissinger weighed in with the so-called ‘Principles Initiative’, which was to serve as a basis for future negotiations. After consulting the FCO, he suggested that the set of principles should be tabled by the US government, the Nine, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the Greek and Turkish governments, in an attempt to ‘overcome the procedural impasse in the intercommunal talks’.32 The initiative was typically vague, thus giving both Greek and Turkish Cypriots plenty of leeway to disagree on matters of substance. The initiative could easily be

144

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

interpreted as partitionist in nature, since it mentioned territorial arrangements, and as the seed of the so-called Annan Plan of 2004 (see Chapter One): ANNEX: THE PRINCIPLES INITIATIVE 1. The parties will agree to negotiate all aspects of the Cyprus problem with a view to arriving at a package arrangement which preserves the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. 2. The parties will agree to negotiate a territorial arrangement which takes into account the economic requirements and self-respect of the two communities, recognising that the present dividing lines must be modified to reduce the area currently controlled by the Turkish side to provide for the return of Greek Cypriot displaced persons. 3. Simultaneously with agreement on territorial modifications, the parties will agree on constitutional arrangements for the establishment of a federal system on a bizonal basis with relatively autonomous zones which will provide the conditions under which the two communities will be able to live in freedom and to have a large voice in their own affairs, and will agree on the powers and functions of a central government. 4. The parties will agree to negotiate the withdrawal of all foreign military forces other than those present under the authority of international agreements. They will agree to negotiate at the same time all the necessary arrangements which will guarantee the security of both communities. 5. The parties will agree to discuss the conditions under which persons can be re-settled in safety and conditions under which free circulation of persons on the Island may be assured.33

It was at this point that the most unlikely figure of them all, Archbishop Makarios, bit the bullet, and broke the mould of the static and frustrating negotiations, by agreeing personally with Denktash in January 1977 on an independent, non-aligned and bicommunal federal republic. Let us quote from the High Commissioner’s report: ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS CHANGES HORSES Sir, Until last year, Archbishop Makarios was regarded by many observers as the major obstacle to a settlement of the Cyprus problem. He now appears to represent the best hope of realising a settlement: and his continued presence on the political scene would seem essential if an agreement is to be achieved with the Turkish Cypriots, and if the Greek Cypriots are to be persuaded to accept. How has this radical change come about?

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

145

2. In the elections of September 1976, Makarios was successful in eliminating the political challenge of Cleridis and in establishing himself in the strongest political position he has enjoyed since the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960. […] I suggested that it remained possible that having established a position of unchallenged political supremacy in the Greek Cypriot part of the island, Makarios might from this position move to an attempt to reach a settlement with the other side. 3. The first indication that he intended to do so came in January of this year when Denktash sent him a letter proposing that he and the Archbishop should meet to see whether progress towards a settlement might be made. Denktash had made similar proposals on various occasions before, to which the Archbishop had not responded. Denktash’s offers had appeared to be primarily tactical and designed to create for himself an appearance of equality with Makarios, rather than representing a serious willingness to try to reach a solution. His letter of January was drafted in notably courteous and reasonable terms. Nevertheless, there was no reason to believe that Makarios would react any differently than he had to earlier proposals of this nature. In the event, however, after a short period of deliberation, he accepted: and the historic meeting between himself and Denktash on 27 January at UNFICYP Headquarters in Nicosia Airport, their first meeting for 13 years, was the consequence. 4. With hindsight, it seems probable that Makarios reached the conclusion that his own interests would be best served by a reasonable compromise, if he could get one, rather than in a deliberate decision to opt for the long struggle. He probably calculated that from his point of view the conditions for this were more favourable than they had been under the Ford/Kissinger era or than they were likely to be thereafter when American interest in and sympathy for Cyprus might be expected to wane. […] 5. In this Makarios has no easy task. He is probably the only person who can sell a realistic settlement to the Greek Cypriots: but even for him, it will be a major achievement to do so. In some respects, educating his own people to accept the necessity of such a settlement is at least as difficult as negotiating with the Turkish Cypriots to achieve one. He has long, in his public statements, maintained that a settlement must enable all refugees to go home. He has been criticized in the past by Clerides for raising hopes of this nature which cannot in the event be expected to be realised. His task in putting across the new realism will be that much more difficult: but he has made a beginning, notably in allowing the publication in the newspapers here of the map presented by the Greek Cypriot negotiator at Vienna in April. Although the Turkish Cypriots may cavil, to any unbiased observer this map indicates a bizonal settlement, with a Turkish zone in the north of the island and a Greek zone in the south. Again, the Turkish Cypriots may

146

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

protest that the area allocated to them is unacceptably small: but to those Greek Cypriot refugees formerly resident in this area, the bitter message is that they have no chance of going home unless they are prepared top live under the Turkish Cypriot administration. […] 8. A new element of urgency has been introduced into this whole matter as a consequence of Makarios’s recent heart attack. Although he is now recovering satisfactorily, the attack was serious and both he and other leaders in this country must now allow for the possibility that there must now be a repetition. […] 9. I have left to last the most important factor: whether the Turks, for their part, want or are able to reach agreement on a settlement in Cyprus. The hopes that they would make substantial progress towards this at Vienna in April were largely disappointed.34[…]

As so often in the past and present, the devil was in the detail, and to compound matters, Archbishop Makarios suddenly died from a second heart attack on 3 August, to be replaced by a compromise candidate, Spyros Kyprianou. In spite of the fact that the Turkish Cypriot community constituted only eighteen per cent of the population (not counting the expanding illegal imports of Anatolian settlers), it wanted not only autonomy in everyday matters, which the Greek Cypriots were willing to countenance, but an equal say in matters of central policy, such as foreign policy. An FCO paper commented: The basic problem of the choice between equality, which is not acceptable to the Greeks and can result in deadlock, and majority control for the Greeks, which is not acceptable to the Turks, is difficult to resolve.35

In September 1977, FCO Minister of State Frank Judd visited Ankara to discuss the possibilities of a settlement in Cyprus. The resulting meeting at the FCO does not suggest that the Turkish government was overly keen to definitively settle the Cyprus issue, as the record of the meeting, in which the Secretary of State, David Owen, and other senior officials, participated: 1. Dr Owen invited Mr Judd to comment in the light of his recent visit to Ankara on the possibilities for promoting a settlement in Cyprus. Mr Judd said that in Ankara the Turks had been, not surprisingly, very obdurate. They had repeatedly complained about the unfair treatment the Turkish Cypriots had received over the years. They had stated very firmly that it was impossible to talk about territorial concessions at the beginning of negotiations; such concessions must come out of negotiations. There should be secret negotiations, out of which a package

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

147

would emerge containing something specific on territory. Mr Judd had queried whether negotiations could in practice be kept secret, but the Turkish Foreign Minister was adamant that they could. […] 4. Mr Hibbert said that one fundamental flaw in Mr Caglayangil’s36 thesis was that the Greek Government could not become involved in the way he seemed to require. No Greek Government could afford to be accused of giving away part of Cyprus. The Greeks could nudge the Cyprus Government to take up certain positions, but could not become directly involved. The Turks must know this, and so the fact that they were calling for direct Greek involvement indicated they did not wish to see progress. 5. Dr Owen commented that the Turkish position was evidently not negotiable. Mr Hibbert said that Mr Caglayangil’s statement that a settlement would emerge in ten or fifteen years was most illuminating. Mr Judd commented that there was a ludicrous contradiction in what Mr Caglayangil had said; he had claimed that before 1963 many Greek and Turkish Cypriots had lived happily together, that things had gone wrong since they had started living apart, but after another 10 or 15 years they would be able to get along with each other again. 6. Dr Owen invited suggestions as to what the British Government should do. Mr Hibbert suggested that the Government should wait for Turkey to go bankrupt. Dr Owen asked when the International Monetary Fund was going to have to bail Turkey out. Mr Hibbert said that this was expected by the end of the year. […] 8. Mr Gordon said that both sides were tedious, and had in the past obstructed a settlement. Now it was particularly the Turkish side which was holding up progress. It was therefore necessary to persuade Ankara to give some sort of indication that they seriously wanted a settlement. This need not be detailed. The Greek Cypriots had said that there was no shortage of ways in which the Turkish side could give such a signal. In the absence of such a signal, they concluded that the Turks were not serious. If there was a signal, it would be necessary to lean hard on the Greek Cypriots to make them respond, but at present there was nothing for the Greek Cypriots to respond to. […] 10. Dr Owen […] The key lever was economic. If one accepted this thesis, the Germans became a crucial factor – they had the money and they had influence in Ankara. […] 11. Before the Turkish economy collapsed, the western powers should know what they wanted from Turkey. A US/UK plan for a settlement should be put to the other western countries. This meant putting a proposed constitutional and territorial settlement on the table. When the IMF became involved, a tacit linkage between an IMF loan and desirable developments, such as a grand coalition in Turkey, should be

148

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

established. The western powers should be very ruthless and use this lever quite strongly. […] 12. A crash in Turkey might come rapidly. The western powers must therefore be ready. Dr Owen was in favour of the Presidential election in Cyprus being held against the background of fairly public western proposals. The Cyprus situation could not be left any longer; Varosha was dynamite and there should be no settlement if it was re-occupied. Dr Owen was therefore in favour of early action. […]37

It is easy to construe from this meeting that both FCO ministers were prepared to contemplate putting pressure on Turkey to show some flexibility. They had not however reckoned with the Americans, who were not prepared to compromise their relationship with Turkey, and were loth to ‘use Turkey’s financial difficulties in order to apply direct political pressure’.38 Not very long afterwards, the US was to lift its arms embargo on Turkey, while the IMF came to Turkey’s rescue in 1978. In March 1980 the US and Turkey signed an important defence and economic co-operation agreement. American disinclination to apply pressure on Turkey became patently clear at a meeting at the FCO in December 1977 between Mr. Judd and FCO officials, and State Department officials.39 The US simply appeared keen to push ahead with the idea of negotiations per se, and to try and involve outside parties, in particular Greece, even though the latter did not wish to pressurise Cyprus or become closely involved in its affairs. Turkey was trying to involve Greece in direct talks on Cyprus, because of its Aegean claims (see next Chapter). Cyprus was a useful bargaining tool, hence the Greek disinclination to become involved. Matters are essentially the same today. To understand the Cyprus irritant from a Greek angle, an extract from the British ambassador to Greece, Brooks Richards’, annual review for 1977 is useful: GRECO-TURKISH RELATIONS 2. Greece is small and foreign relations loom large. Turkey, four times its size, casts a big shadow. Differences over Cyprus and the Aegean have severely damaged the Venizelos-Ataturk Settlement of 1923. Yet Cyprus has long since ceased to be a matter for bilateral Greco-Turkish resolution and Greeks, for whom the dispute over the Aegean Continental Shelf and airspace is now greater cause for concern, fear that Turkey’s longer-term objective is to challenge Greek sovereignty over the islands adjacent to Asia Minor. Turkish claims to condominium over the intervening seabed are viewed in this light.40

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

149

Extracts from the annual review by Richards’ homologue in Nicosia are a useful complement to the above: Sir, Looking back over the year, three events stand out: the Makarios/ Denktash talks in January/February, the Archbishop’s death in August and the kidnapping in December of the son of President Kyprianou. 2. The Makarios/Denktash talks resulted from an initiative by Denktash, who proposed, with unusual imagination and reasonableness, that he and the Archbishop should make one final attempt to reach a settlement before accepting that a generation must grow up who would know only a divided Cyprus. His motives were never entirely clear. At least in part his action was probably intended, in agreement with Ankara, to pre-empt pressure from the new American Administration for action on Cyprus. The affair demonstrated, amongst other things, that it is perfectly possible to maintain secrecy in Cyprus if both parties concerned want this; the news of the meeting was a well-kept secret until the morning of the day in question. It also confirmed in me my belief that if there is ever a breakthrough on Cyprus, it could come a good deal more quickly than most observers assume. A condition of euphoria prevailed for a couple of weeks and refugees were packing their bags in preparation for an imminent return home. It was remarkable to what degree Makarios and Denktash, face to face, were able to establish a working relationship and take account of each other’s point of view. 3. In the event, sadly, all this ran into the sands, as so often before, when the follow-up meeting in Vienna failed to consolidate progress made. However, one development of great potential significance remained on the record. Makarios tabled a map which made clear that he envisaged an essentially bizonal settlement, and offered 20 per cent of the territory of the island for the Turkish Cypriot zone. The actual percentage was actually an opening bid. The significance lay in the fact that, for the first time, not all Greek Cypriot refugees would be able in the context of a settlement to return home under Greek Cypriot administration. Refugees from Kyrenia, for example, if they exercised their right to return, would have to face up to living under the Turkish Cypriots. 4. This was a courageous and realistic step forward, and it came as a considerable shock to opinion in the South. Subsequent statements by Greek Cypriot leaders sometimes gave the impression that the step had never been taken. I keep in my office a copy of the newspaper of 3 April with the map and the 20 per cent offer, to persuade myself that I did not dream the whole episode. 5. Perhaps symbolically, it was on 3 April that Makarios suffered a severe heart attack. Taken unawares, extremists on both Left and

150

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

Right looked to their weapons. But the Cabinet and the security force soon took a grip on the situation and there was no clash. 6. After the failure at Vienna in April until his death in August, Makarios seemed to be continuing his realistic line although he was increasingly disheartened by the lack of any real Turkish response. His death in August did not therefore remove a major obstacle to a Cyprus settlement, as at one time might have seemed to be the case, but rather reduced the chances of such a settlement. […] 16. On the key question of a settlement, the position at the end of the year remained that first of all the Turkish Cypriots (which means in practice the Turks) must somehow be persuaded that it is in their own best interests to make a realistic offer: and the Greek Cypriots must be convinced that they should take it up.41

It must by now be increasingly apparent to the reader that intransigence and hidden agendas were proving to be stronger than goodwill. The fact was that Turkey, and not the Turkish Cypriots, decided. Anything that the Turkish government perceived as potentially inimical to its military interests received short shrift, particularly the thought of democracy by majority at the central government level. The Turkish government wanted to retain the 1960 Turkish Cypriot veto over matters of state, but in particular foreign and military policy. By late 1978, President Kyprianou was complaining to Mr.Owen that Mr. Ecevit was refusing to meet him, and that Britain should exercise its role as a guarantor power and occupy Cyprus again, staying on for five years as a colonial power, if it wanted to.42 A USled initiative, supported by Britain and Canada, foundered on the same old problem of the Turkish government being unable to accept the possibility of majority rule at federal level, while the Greek Cypriots saw the Turkish view of federation as confederation. At the same time as the initiative was being introduced, the Cypriot Foreign Minister called at the UN for economic sanctions against Turkey, while the Head of Southern European Department, Timothy Daunt, commented that reactions to the initiative made it clear that the Turkish side was going to be ‘very difficult to handle’43. A senior FCO official, Reginald Hibbert, advised that ‘nothing would be lost and something gained by resisting these Cypriot manoeuvres squarely’44. Although the US-UK-Canadian initiative foundered in a sea of mutual recriminations, it continued in a transmogrified form, one idea being that of using Varosha as a ‘confidence-building measure’. The plan had stated that to promote confidence and goodwill between the two communities, the resettlement of Varosha would take place under UN auspices. Although it clearly irritated the Turkish government, which

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

151

even had problems with the earlier Makarios-Denktash agreement,45 it was taken up in a joint statement of 19 May 1979 by Denktash and President Kyprianou: TEXT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU AND MR DENKTASH READ OUT BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AT A PRESS CONFERENCE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FROM NICOSIA AIRPORT ON 19 MAY 1979 1. It was agreed to resume the intercommunal talks on 15 June 1979. 2. The basis for the talks will be the Makarios/Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the UN resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question. 3. There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic. 4. The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects. 5. Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the territorial and constitutional aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached, it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem. 6. It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions. 7. The demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating thereto will be discussed. 8. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union, in whole or in part, with any other country and against any form of partition or secession. 9. The intercommunal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding any delay. 10. The intercommunal talks will take place in Nicosia.46

As the above-mentioned Perceval would surely agree, things are never as simple as a text might suggest. Extracts from a minute of 22 May from Timothy Daunt to Ewen Fergusson show some of the backstage reality:

152

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

3. With contradictory statements being made from the two sides, there is some danger of the talks being undermined before intercommunal talks resume on 15 June. […] 4. When negotiations proper start, the difficulties will be formidable. There is nothing in the agreement reached on 19 May to suggest that the Greek side is even prepared to contemplate major concessions over autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots which are essential if the Turks are to be brought to settle; and there is little to indicate that the Turkish Cypriots are prepared to give up major amounts of territory. The scope for disagreement over almost every paragraph of the text of the agreement seems considerable: the reference to the “UN resolutions relevant to the Cyprus problem” as one of the bases for talks is an example and the wording on the timing of resettlement of Varosha (a major issue for both sides) is highly ambiguous even though the Turkish side evidently made a concession. Both leaders are likely to be under pressures to reinterpret their agreement in principle and neither is very strongly placed to resist. 5. The prospect for real progress towards a Cyprus settlement remains poor. […]47

And so it would remain: on 19 June, a meeting between British and Turkish officials at the Foreign and Commonwealth through matters into relief: 11. Resuming talks after lunch, Mr Bullard asked whether the Turkish Government shared the British assessment that the resumption of intercommunal talks allowed for some optimism. Mr Yigit said that the attitude of the Greek Cypriot side allowed for little optimism. The Turkish Government had not welcomed the US/UK/Canada framework paper, which was evidently a device for handing over Varosha and part of Famagusta to the Greeks without any recompense to the Turkish Cypriots. All the concessions in the 19 May 10-point agreement came from the Turkish side. But there was a limit to the concessions that the Turkish side could make as a means of boosting Mr Kyprianou’s political position. Mr Bullard said that the Turkish side were misinterpreting the content of the framework paper and the intentions of its authors. Mr Yigit replied that one did not expect an ally to put forward such a paper without any consultations. Mr Daunt said that British intentions had been made very clear to the Turkish Government in the discussions Dr Owen had had with Mr Ockun in October; the idea that there should be no outside initiative had been firmly rejected. 12. In reply to questions about paragraph 5 of the 19 May agreement, Mr Yigit said that the Turkish side would not give up Varosha in order to please Congress. […]48

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

153

On 16 July, the UK mission to the UN sent a pessimistic assessment to the FCO: 2. The Secretariat mood remains gloomy.[…] Nor do the Secretariat expect much improvement after the partial Turkish elections in October. Their assessment is that Ecevit would be unlikely to make the sort of gains which would allow him to make concessions on Varosha, while if Demirel returned to power, particularly in coalition with Erbakan and Turkes things would be even worse. Meanwhile they have heard that Onhon and Denktash were given severe dressings down in Ankara by Ecevit and the Turkish military for giving away too much at the Nicosia high level meeting. […] 4. Secretariat attention is now turning to the possibility of a probe of the Turkish phobia about discussing Varosha. They suspect that it may stem from the mistaken impression that the Turks are being asked to give up Varosha without getting anything in return, eg dismantlement of the economic restrictions. […]49

The main problem seems to have been that the 19 May agreement between President Kyprianou and Mr Denktash seems to have irritated the Turkish government, first because of the clear implication that Varosha should be handed back separately from any putative overall agreement, but second, because of the reference to UN resolutions, which the Turkish government had been ignoring, particularly since the invasion. Before concluding, let us quote from a dispatch of 24 September from the British High Commissioner to Cyprus, Peregrine Rhodes: 2. The main recent developments are : – a) The agreement of 19 May reached between President Kyprianou and Mr Denktash largely as a result of pressure on both sides by the Secretary General of the United Nations; b) The increasing evidence that the 19 May Agreement was not welcome to the mainland Turkish Government which since apparently sought ways of preventing any chance that resumed intercommunal talks might make progress. The result has been a suspension of the talks after four short sessions during which there was a sterile discussion on the meaning of certain concepts to which the Turkish Cypriots attach importance. The outcome so far is a failure to get down to any discussion of substance; c) The Greek Cypriots have used the opportunity of the Commonwealth Conference at Lusaka and the Havana summit of the nonaligned movement to secure strong declarations in support of their case; and President Kyprianou is on his way to New York for the first

154

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS stage of the Greek Cypriot recourse to the UN. I do not think that Mr Denktash is inclined to take the Lusaka and Havana declarations too seriously. He has hinted to me that he realizes the inevitability and indeed the futility of these in practical terms. But they have provided him with the necessary pretext for his present negative attitude. […]

4. There is no sign that the weak but obstinate President Kyprianou is prepared to abandon the cocoon of doctrine woven by his public statements from within which he can give the appearance of strength. […] 6. […] The Turkish side’s negative approach has helped the Cyprus Government to appear flexible. The Greek Cypriots have had nothing to lose by showing willingness to negotiate in a sustained and continuous manner as called for in the 19 May Agreement. Their recourse to international bodies has not seriously undermined this image. […] 7. As seen from Nicosia there is little to be said of the influence of the mainland Greeks. They appear to wish to stand back from the Cyprus problem so far as this is feasible. […] 8. On the Turkish side Denktash is clever, quick and superficially tough but he has an inferiority complex. […] […] any solution of the Cyprus problem must start from recognition that the two communities are of equal status and there can be no immediate freedom of movement between the two areas controlled by these two communities. The main question is the extent of the (necessarily weak) powers to be allowed to any central government. […]50

Thus we see, at least from the British view, that while the Turkish government was not interested in a solution as agreed by the UN, the Cyprus government and the Turkish Cypriot leader, matters were not helped by President Kyprianou’s insistence on the letter of the law. On the other hand, since he must have known that the Turkish government was simply intransigent, it would be better to be pedantically correct, rather than make concessions which would likely have led to an emasculated state, serving as little more than a shell for two de facto states, in other words partition. The above despatch also suggests (paragraph 8) that the High Commissioner himself was advocating de facto partition. Conclusions The history of the intercommunal negotiations is for this author a slightly surrealistic cocktail of external interests (and, therefore) interference, internal bickering, pride, cynicism, anger and greed on the one hand, and a certain amount of goodwill on the other, with the latter no match for the

THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

155

former cocktail. Simple reason, diplomatic protocol and planning seem to be barely relevant in the story, whereas sheer power politics was and is. The two main religious and linguistic communities of Cyprus were given their political identity by the British from 1925 onwards (and arguably earlier), an identity based increasingly on division, particularly after 1955. From 1960, the writing of unnatural, externally provoked division was on the wall, and when the US and then Britain became worried that a properly united Cyprus would be too Soviet-friendly, they opted for the lowest common denominator of co-existence, namely separation. Credence is lent to this by the British Naval Intelligence Commander Martin Packard who, having been sent to Cyprus to help to bring the communities back together, was suddenly withdrawn. Packard notes that the State Department’s George Ball, who was trying to promote a double-enosis plan, told him: ‘Very impressive, but you’ve got it all wrong, son. Hasn’t anyone told you that our objective here is partition, not re-integration?’51 Two significant things have happened since 1979: the fall of the Berlin wall-inspired alleged end of the Cold War, and the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the European Union. Despite these celebrated events, neither a settlement nor a solution has been found for Cyprus; or if one has, certain powers are loth to allow it to be applied. But we shall leave such attempts at evaluation until the end of the book. In the meantime, it is fair to say, from what we have seen, that Turkey used or abused the Cyprus problem to further its claims on Greek territory, hence Greece’s disinclination to involve itself in bilateral talks with Turkey over Cyprus. Let us now turn to the Aegean Sea.

8 THE AEGEAN CONNEXION

Introduction Turkey’s claims on Greek islands, continental shelf and airspace in the Aegean Sea have surfaced and become increasingly strident at the same time as disagreements over Cyprus have become more bitter, to the point where Turkey seems to be using Cyprus as a political hostage to gain advantage vis-à-vis both its Aegean and EU membership claims. Greece, pointing to the Treaty of Lausanne, the Italo-Turkish Convention of 1932, the Montreux Convention on the Straits, and the Peace Treaty of Paris of 1947, is only prepared to discuss the continental shelf, as it cannot discuss what it considers to be its own territory and airspace. In May 1975, the Greek and Turkish premiers agreed to submit their differences over the continental shelf to the International Court of Justice. Turkey, however, then withdrew, and said that it would not recognise the court’s jurisdiction. To further compound the problem, Turkey is not a party to the Law of the Sea Convention, and does not therefore recognise Greece’s twelvemile maritime borders (although it imposes its own in the Black Sea). Its parliament has even passed a resolution that Greece’s application of its twelve-mile limit would constitute a casus belli. It can hardly be coincidental that the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was preceded by infringements of Greek airspace by Turkish military aircraft, by the dispatch of a Turkish survey ship and thirty warships to Greek waters, the granting of oil exploration rights and the claiming of sovereignty over the whole continental shelf east of the median line between the Greek and Turkish mainlands, regardless of the location of Greek islands.1 Turkey has even claimed the islands of Gavdos and Galopoulou, off the southern coast of Crete, and nowhere near Turkey’s Continental Shelf. This is not however the place to discuss and analyse Turkey’s claims per se, nor Greece’s reactions to these claims. This can be done virtually

158

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

by default by reproducing some of the British diplomatic documents. We begin by quoting a Greek document from the FCO archives, which Themos Stoforopoulos, First Secretary at the Greek Embassy, delivered to Brian Hitch, the Assistant Head of Southern European Department, on 7 September 1972 (it could have been yesterday): Speaking Notes 1. Turkey seems to be following in NATO a policy which, if pursued, might jeopardize the implementation of NATO defence plans in the Aegean. 2. An example of this policy is furnished by the objections raised by Brigadier General Cemal Kahraran, Turkish Representative, when AIRSOUTH External Air Reinforcement’s Plan 1173/APP S-85/72, dated 4th April 1972, was discussed at AIRSOUTH Headquarters, Naples, in May, 1972. Brig. Kahraman opposed a Greek proposal that the Island of Limnos be used as a forward base for external air reinforcements deployed in support of Southern Region operations, on the grounds that the “Convention relating to the Régime of the Straits” signed at Lausanne on 24th July, 1923, designated Limnos as one of the islands to be demilitarized. In his reply, Brigadier General Constantinos Vassilakis, Greek Representative, reminded his colleagues at Airsouth Headquarters that in 1936 the Turkish Government, acting through the Secretary General of the League of Nations, invited the parties to the 1923 Convention to consider its revision and that, to this end, a conference was held at Montreux between the 22nd of June and the 20th of July, 1936, when the Montreux Convention Concerning the Régime of the Straits was signed. According to Article 4 of the Lausanne Convention, the islands of Limnos, Samothraki, Imbros, Tenedos and Lagoussae (Rabbit Islands), as well as certain other zones, were to be demilitarized. It should be stressed, however, that the Montreux Convention which is still in force specifically states in its preamble that it replaces the Lausanne Convention […], a fact Turkey herself has recognized via facti by building military fortifications on the island of Imbros. […] In spite of this fact, AFSOUTH seems to envisage the exclusion of Limnos from the External Air Reinforcements Plan, a decision that would have adverse effects on the development of NATO forces in the Aegean. It should perhaps be added that Limnos already serves NATO defence: a radar station which was built on the island with national funds and for national defence purposes, has been integrated into the NATO radar network. In spite of this, Turkey has not failed to object to the existence of this station on Limnos. 3. As stated above, the case of Limnos is only an example of a Turkish policy which, if pursued, may put in jeopardy NATO defence interests. This policy is indefensible from a NATO military view point and violates general principles of International Law. Such a policy may also have

THE AEGEAN CONNEXION

159

serious political disadvantages. If NATO authorities at a Regional Command level should take decisions contrary to NATO and Greek defence interests, only because of Turkish objections and in complete disregard of Greek views, such questions would come to be discussed at Defence Planning Committee level, or even in the Council, with obvious adverse effects on the political solidarity of the Southern Region. It is true that a further improvement of Greek-Turkish relations would facilitate the finding of solutions to such NATO questions. It is equally true that NATO can contribute to this improvement by following a firm policy which would stress that, in spite of the existence of problems such as the Cyprus question, Greece and Turkey belong to the same defence alliance and, more generally, to the Western world, and that this identity of interests, loyalties and beliefs should transcend any unsolved problems still existing between the two countries. 4. The Greek Government would be grateful if Great Britain, a major member of NATO and a party to the Lausanne and Montreux Conventions, would use her influence to persuade Turkey not to pursue a policy which might impair NATO defence and solidarity and if British Representatives to NATO Councils and Commands would be instructed to object to decisions based only on groundless Turkish objections.2

Mr. Hitch’s immediate response was to consult Western Organisations Department (WOD) about what looked ‘prima facie like a strong Greek case in law’.3 WOD’s response was that this ‘incipient Greek/Turkish dispute’ was ‘something that we should handle extremely carefully, and that ‘the last thing that we want to do is to find ourselves playing any part in it’.4 WOD continued: […] I believe that Mr Hitch’s reply to Mr Stoforopoulos should be to the effect that we are naturally concerned that such differences of opinion between the Greek [sic] and Turks should risk impairing NATO’s overall military capability on the Southern Flank. But we are confident that both parties are aware of the importance of ensuring that both NATO’s military effectiveness and political unity are maintained, and that between them an amicable solution can be found. We should add that we hope very much that the Greeks would not attempt to bring such a dispute into a NATO Ministerial Meeting. The Allies have no power to adjudicate any matters of this sort: we rely on the good sense of the parties concerned to reach a satisfactory solution.

Thus began a British policy of non-involvement, regardless of the FCO’s perception of the rights and wrongs of the question. There was a brief flurry of inter-departmental memoranda, which showed that the FCO realised that the law was on Greece’s side:

160

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

[…] I have been unable to trace any previous legal advice on this issue. 4. My preliminary view is that I agree with the Greek contention that when the Montreux Convention entered into force the provisions of the Lausanne Straits Convention concerning the de-militarization of Lemnos terminated. I am of this opinion5 because of the plain words of the two treaties in their context and in the light of their object and purpose. But there may of course be bilateral Greek-Turkish arrangements the issue of which we are unaware.6

By the time of the invasion of Cyprus, Turkish claims had expanded from mere protests about demilitarisation to a larger range of claims. An FCO paper (see Chapter Six) stated in 1975 : 4. Since 1974, a new substantive issue has arisen between the two countries. For 300 miles along the Turkish Aegean coast there is a string of densely populated Greek islands, two thirds of which are within 15 miles of the coast. There have, for some time, been minor difficulties over Greek fishermen arrested in Turkish waters and disagreements over the demilitarisation of several of these islands, but the Aegean only became a serious issue in 1974 when Turkish oil prospecting activities resulted in mobilisation by both Greek and Turkish armed forces in the area and talk in Athens of a revival of the ‘Great Idea’. These developments were, in part, a reflection of the weakness of the Greek Junta but they also reflected the explosiveness of the issue involved. These include sovereignty, strategic interests (particularly for the Turks) and oil. The dispute centres on the division of resources of the sea bed and continental shelf, and the extent of territorial waters around the many Greek Islands [sic]. It is in one sense more dangerous than Cyprus in that in this area the armed forces of the two countries directly confront each other.7 […]

To try and understand the nature of the thinking behind the Turkish government’s stance on its claims, the following letter of 28 September 1975 from the Head of Chancery at the British Embassy in Ankara, William Fullerton, to Georgina Wright of Southern European Department, is at least incipiently illuminating: AEGEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF 1. Please refer to Athens telegram number 460 of 25 September to FCO. Süleymez, the Head of the relevant department in the Foreign Ministry has told David Lane that it had been agreed confidentially between the Greek and Turkish Governments to hold bilateral talks on this subject in Paris. They were designed both to see whether a solution could be found, and to draw up a compromis as a submission

THE AEGEAN CONNEXION

161

to the International Court. The Greeks had suddenly proposed that a communiqué be issued before the talks took place as well as afterwards. The Turks were prepared to have a communiqué but did not want one beforehand. Accordingly the talks had been postponed. 2. Süleymez had gone on to say that really the Greeks did not want any publicity at all because it would not help the Cypriot case in the United Nations. The inference from what he said was that the Greeks thus deliberately sabotaged the arrangements for holding the talks. 3. Another example of perhaps typically Turkish thinking on this occurred when I was discussing this subject with Mr Dag, a First Secretary who works to Mr Süleymez. Dag said that everything depended on bilateral discussions between the two sides and that after such discussions the matter would either be completely solved in itself or there would be an agreed approach to the International Court or there would be no progress at all. I asked Dag for his views on the likelihood of progress in bilateral discussion. He said that all that was needed for progress was that the Greeks should give in! I was left with the impression that reference to the International Court was still seen as something rather irrelevant and that the Turks hankered firmly, however unrealistically, for a bilateral solution. This is perhaps not surprising as they can presumably not have very much confidence in winning their case at the Court on its merits alone. In other words, the agreement on principle earlier this year to refer the matter to the ICJ was probably seen by the Turks as a convenient means of cooling the situation at that time, not as a means of actually finding a solution to the problem.8

We see in this letter both the Turkish efforts to link the issue to Cyprus, and the Turkish fear of independent arbitration, not to mention a strong degree of inflexibility. The following year, Turkey upped the ante, and sent a seismic research ship, the ‘Hora’, later renamed the ‘Sismik 1’, into waters above the continental shelf of some Greek islands. Greece took the matter to the UN Security Council, but US pressure resulted in an anodine decision without teeth. Greece also took the matter to the ICJ, which was unable to properly adjudicate, since Turkey refused to accept its jurisdiction. In early August, the situation was tense. The FCO wrote: (c) THE AEGEAN 7. The situation after the sailing into the Aegean of the seismic survey ship “Sismik” is tense, and HMG continue to watch it with close concern. The Greeks have several times asked us to make representations to the Turks but we are convinced that it would be a serious mistake for third parties to become involved in this dispute and certainly for them to give the impression of taking sides. We are therefore confining ourselves to taking opportunities to urge calm, moderation

162

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

and caution on both sides. We believe that our EEC partners generally take the same view. It seems clear that, after initial hysterics from both the Greek and the Turkish Press, the two Governments are now anxious to avoid a conflict. Although the bilateral negotiations about the “Sismik” are deadlocked, there seems a fair chance that in the event both sides will be able to claim that they have adequately defended their claimed rights without incident – especially as the area where the Turks have announced the “Sismik” will operate until 20 August is largely undisputed. […]9

Kissinger was worried about a UN resolution that would irritate Turkey, and therefore, in an extraordinary telephone conversation, prevailed on the British Prime Minister, Callaghan, to try and water it down: Dr. Kissinger: […] One is that Greek/Turkish voting in the UN. The Greeks are trying to run a resolution through with a lot of support from Europeans. And my fear is that once that resolution is through and if the Turks violently object we still have the problem of the ship. And I wondered whether we shouldn’t aim for a resolution that’s more balanced. Prime Minister: I see. I’m out of touch with it really, Henry. What’s the present position on the resolution? Is it going through tonight or what? Dr. Kissinger: No, no. It’s not going to come up till tomorrow. Are you in London? Prime Minister: I’m in Sussex. I’m on holiday really. Dr. Kissinger: I’m sorry. Prime Minister: No. It’s all right. I am in touch all right. But I haven’t been following this one in particular except in the newspapers. Dr. Kissinger: Well let me get you to 10 Downing Street what the state of the play in New York is, to supplement the African thing. Prime Minister: I’ll get No. 10 to tell me what it is. And what is it you would like to do? Do you want a more moderate resolution? Dr. Kissinger: I want our two sides to work together, either on a more moderate resolution or on a consensus if we could get negotiations between the Greeks and Turks started. Prime Minister: Is there any chance of that? Dr.Kissinger: I think so. Prime Minister: What help have we got anywhere? Is it the EEC countries who are being difficult or what? Dr. Kissinger: It’s the French who are pushing a very pro-Greek line.

THE AEGEAN CONNEXION

163

Prime Minister: Ah, yes. Well they would, of course. Yes, I see. And what about the others? Dr.Kissinger: We are not anti-Greek. We just don’t see any point in humiliating the Turks right now. Prime Minister: No. There’s certainly no point in doing that. On the other hand the Greeks have been humiliated often enough. Dr. Kissinger: We don’t want to humiliate either of them. Prime Minister: I agree. Dr. Kissinger: What we would like is to get negotiations started, the ship to stop and some sort of formula where things can go forward. Prime Minister: What’s the line up? This is within the Security Council, is it? Dr. Kissinger: That’s right. Prime Minister: What’s the line up at the moment then? Anybody with the French? Dr.Kissinger: You and the Italians. Prime Minister: We’re with French, are we, at the moment? Dr. Kissinger: That’s right. But not in an aggressive way. Prime Minister: No, I see. And what about the other members of the Security Council. Where do they stand? Dr. Kissinger: Well I think they all would prefer that this thing would go away. Prime Minister: The Soviet Union? Dr.Kissinger: The Soviet Union is urging restraint on both sides. Prime Minister: Well that’s helpful. Now, I’m not sure what answer it is you want me to give you. Do you want me to instruct Ivor Richard10 or someone to, or get the Foreign Office to instruct Ivor Richard? Dr.Kissinger: With our people on a more moderate resolution. Prime Minister: I see, all right. Dr.Kissinger: Or at least make an effort to see whether we can get a resolution acceptable to both the Greeks and the Turks. And if we can’t, we may still have to choose. Prime Minister: Yes. Well, I’ll get his view taken of it. Ivor Richard is pretty able about these things. Dr. Kissinger: He’s very good.

164

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

Prime Minister: And he’ll know. Politically he’s got good tips to his fingers. He’ll know what can be done. And I’m sure he’s got a general intention to work with you on these things. Dr. Kissinger: No, we have no problem in New York. Prime Minister: This problem of the Greeks and the Turks is a difficult one because none of us in the European Community likes to look as though we are opposing the Greeks. You know, we all go round saying that we want them very badly as part of the Community. Everybody goes on on these lines. Dr. Kissinger: But they do have a tendency to overplay their hands. Prime Minister: That’s right. Well I know they always did from 1945 onwards, and indeed before then. Righto Henry. […]11

As four years previously, the FCO looked at the legal aspects of the question again, ending up with similar conclusions (following some misunderstanding about the difference between the Lausanne Treaty and the Lausanne Convention).12 In 1976, according to the High Commissioner in Nicosia, the Aegean replaced Cyprus as a focus of Greek-Turkish tension.13 It was becoming increasingly obvious that the Turkish government knew that its case on the Aegean was legally weak, hence its marked disinclination to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ. The following extract from an FCO brief for a bilateral meeting between the British and Greek Prime Ministers on the fringes of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in May 1977 puts matters plainly: The Aegean 9. There are disputes between Greece and Turkey over the delimitation of the continental shelf: territorial waters and territorial air space: Flight Information Regions: and the militarisation of the Aegean islands. Of these the continental shelf dispute is by far the most important. 10. The two sides are currently attempting to reach agreement by negotiation, and separate series of talks are being held on the continental shelf dispute and the Flight Information Region problems. On the continental shelf the main difference between the two sides is that the Greeks claim that all islands generate their own continental shelf as laid down in the 1958 Geneva Convention (which Greece has ratified). Since there are over 3,000 Greek islands in the Aegean, including a chain very close to Turkey, this would mean that almost all the Aegean shelf is Greek,14 Turkey is not a party to the Convention, and argues that most of the eastern half of the Aegean, including the islands, is geologically part of the Anatolian plateau and therefore Turkish. There is a similar dispute over the procedure to be adopted in the

THE AEGEAN CONNEXION

165

negotiations: the Greeks wish to study the practice of other states and the principles of international law (which at present very much favour Greece) as a preliminary to substantive discussions. The Turks prefer to stress the notion of equity as opposed to legal precedents and wish to proceed immediately to substantive negotiations. In short what the Greeks want is a legal settlement while the Turks want a political one. The last round of talks in London from 31 January to 4 February 1977 made no progress, and a further round planned for 31 March did not materialize as a result of heightened tension in the Aegean in March. However, Mr Bitsios and Mr Caglayangil met in Strasbourg on 28 April and agreed to a resumption at the end of May. 11. In 1976 a crisis arose as a result of the activities of the Turkish research vessel Sismik over disputed areas of the Aegean continental shelf. Greece appealed (unsuccessfully) to the International Court of Justice for an injunction against the Sismik’s activities, and called on the UN Security Council to demand that Turkey should withdraw the Sismik from the disputed areas on the grounds that her activities there were a threat to the peace. After intensive negotiations the four15 Western members of the Security Council devised a resolution calling on both sides to refrain from inflammatory actions and to resume negotiations. This was disappointing to Greece at the time but seemed to have a useful effect in calming her down. 12. In March this year tension again mounted in the Aegean, partly because of Greek protests against Turkish sea and air exercises in the area from 21 – 28 March, and partly because of reports that the Sismik would recommence exploration activities in late April or May. But the Turkish exercises passed off without incident, and the Turkish MFA gave the British Ambassador in Ankara an assurance that the Sismik would operate only in Turkish territorial waters. The level of tension is at present somewhat reduced but it may rise again if and when Sismik reappears in the Aegean (latest reports predict that its operations will begin from 1 May), particularly if the Greeks arrange military exercises in the area to coincide with Sismik’s operations. 13. It happens that the British Government’s view of the issues is much closer to the Greek than the Turkish view. In particular, Britain supports the entitlement of islands to have a continental shelf. The Greeks have lobbied hard for an expression of British support for the Greek position, but we have insisted that these are bilateral disputes which must be resolved by bilateral negotiations. […]16

An explicit clue to Britain’s (private) support for, but public distance from, the Greek position comes in FCO briefing for the ambassador designate to the US:

166

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

The British Government’s view of the Continental Shelf issues is much closer to the Greek than the Turkish view (in particular Britain supports the entitlement of islands to have a Continental Shelf). However we do not wish to prejudice our position in our own Continental Shelf disputes with France and Ireland and have avoided getting involved in the substance of the Greek/Turkish disputes, confining ourselves to moderation on both sides.17

Apart from Britain’s position tending strongly towards the Greek position, in 1977, Greece signed an agreement with Italy on the delimitation of the continental shelf. The British ambassador to Greece wrote that the agreement ‘was a tactical success for Greek diplomacy, in that it involved recognition of the median-line principle and the view that islands have continental shelves – both under challenge by the Turks in the Aegean’.18 Apart from FCO recognition that the Turkish case was weak was its recognition that Turkey was exploiting the Cyprus issue to gain tactical advantages in the Aegean, as the following (‘secret’) minute at the end of 1978 from the Head of Southern European Department to the Assistant Under Secretary of State makes abundantly clear: CYPRUS INITIATIVE 1. In my submission of 30 November, the PUS spoke again to Mr Elekdag19 on 1 December. The outcome is recorded in the PUS’s minute of 1 December; he asked that I should devise speaking notes and submit them early next week. I have already discussed the matter with Mr Hibbert 20 and with Mr Kerr.21 2. There are two difficulties over handling this matter. First, Mr Hibbert feels even more strongly than I do that it will be unproductive, and even dangerous, to get involved in promoting talk about Cyprus between the Greek and Turkish Governments at summit level; the Turks would look for concessions in the Aegean from the Greek Government to match concessions by Turkey in Cyprus; this would be impossible for the Greek Government; the Turks would be able to blame the Greeks for the lack of progress; the initiative would be run into the sand. Mr Hibbert thinks it not unlikely that this was Mr Elekdag’s motive. Second, the most significant point about Mr Elekdag’s conversation with the PUS is that he was showing a flexibility not so far exhibited by any other representative of the Turkish Government. Either this was a cynical show (attempting to get British support for cornering the Greeks into linkage) or his remarks need to be treated with the discretion which he urged. One of those to whom they probably should, in the latter case, not be revealed is Mr Okcun.22 In that case there is not a great deal more for the Secretary of State to say to Mr Okcun than he is in

THE AEGEAN CONNEXION

167

any case briefed to say. The attached submission is, in consequence, not very substantial. 4. Mr Kerr told me that the PUS would not have time to look at papers on this subject; anything going to the Private Office should be copied to him, rather than sent via him.23

Conclusions Given the myriad of treaties and other related international bi- and multilateral agreements, some hundreds of years old, and their relationship with the United Nations Charter and related conventions, it is no exaggeration to state that international law can be a minefield. Take the case of the Treaty of Utrecht, under which Britain obtained Gibraltar from Spain, in perpetuity. Britain still uses this three-hundred year old treaty to justify its hanging onto the colony. Yet Article 109 states: Her Britannic Majesty, on the demand of the Catholic King, consents and agrees to not allowing for any motives, Jews or Moors to live in and have their domicile in the said town of Gibraltar.

Since there are undoubtedly a fair number of, at least, Jews, and probably descendants of Moors, domiciled in Gibraltar, then Britain has broken the terms of the treaty, unless subsequent human rights legislation specifically overrides it. Such are the intricacies of international law. In the case of Turkey, one gains the impression that the Turkish government will latch onto anything even only tenuously legal, emphasising the law, while at the same time seeking a political solution. This is contradictory. For example, in claiming the island of Imia, Turkey says that the Italo-Turkish Convention of 4 January 1932 and a Procès Verbale of 28 December the same year stipulating that Imia was Italian, is invalid ‘because of the particular political situation of the pre-Second World War era’. It adds that the Procès Verbale was not registered with the League of Nations. The Greek view is that the Procès Verbale did not need to be registered, since it was a supplement of the main agreement. The point about this legalistic wrangling is that the whole question of Turkey’s Aegean claims only came up a posteriori and because of the Cyprus issue. The seeming paradox is that although the Turkish government knows that its case on the continental shelf is weak, and therefore seeks a so-called ‘political’ – in other words non-legal – solution, it can still be legalistic. Detractors from the Turkish stance will say that it is obfuscatory, contradictory and illegal (rather than merely non-legal), citing as evidence Turkey’s refusal to seriously countenance ICJ arbitration.

168

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

Apart from the ‘legal versus political’ factor in Turkey’s claims, is the one of linkage. The Cyprus problem began first, and is thus considered by many to be responsible for Turkey’s unilateral creation of a ‘second front’ in its policy towards Greece from the early seventies onwards, a policy which has tended to be aggressive, even leading to threats of war. Certainly, the highest echelons of the FCO thought that Turkey was seeking linkage, as we have just seen in Timothy Daunt’s minute of 4 December to Ewen Fergusson. Another factor in the volatile Eastern Mediterranean cocktail of Britain, the US, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus is that Britain’s position, despite its private recognition that the Turkish case on the Turkish-instigated Aegean problem is weak, is closer to the Greek than the Turkish one. This is hardly surprising, given, for example, its agreement with France over the Channel Islands, which are of course far closer to France the Britain. In the mid-seventies, Britain was involved in intense negotiations on the demarcation lines vis-à-vis the continental shelf. A final factor is the evidence that Turkey has used Cyprus as a tool to make aggressive claims in the Aegean, but that Britain considers Turkey too important to seriously irritate, unlike Greece. Let us repeat the final sentence from the paper set out in Chapter Six, entitled ‘British Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean’: We should also recognise that in the final analysis Turkey must be regarded as more important to Western strategic interests than Greece and that, if risks must be run, they should be risks of further straining Greek rather than Turkish relations with the West.24

If one adds to this Britain’s recognition that, in the Eastern Mediterranean at least, it has decided that it must toe the American line, then to write more in this chapter would be linguistically bulimic. Let us now turn to British diplomats’ views of Turkey and the Turks, insofar as they are relevant to the preceding chapters, and enhance and deepen understanding of the Cyprus merry-go-round.

9 BRITISH VIEWS OF THE TURKISH STANCE Introduction In the preceding chapters, we have seen plenty of comments on both the Greek and Turkish positions. The aim here is to provide a more focused look at British diplomats’ comments and views on the Turkish stance, to try and better understand the whole process of policy formulation, but specifically the more human factors behind the Cyprus problem. I considered ‘balancing’ this chapter with one on British views of the Greek stance, but decided against it on the grounds that Britain’s relationship with Greece has been dealt with in considerable depth by several well-known authors. In addition, some British views about Greece and Greek Cypriots come across by default in previous chapters, and some will automatically slip out in this chapter. The main reason for this chapter is that Britain acquired Cyprus from Turkey’s predecessor, the Porte, and then helped to involve Turkey in Cyprus in the fifties. Turkey thus deserves some comment from its friends, the British. We shall stick to key years. By 1960, with the problem of Cyprus’ independence ostensibly solved, Britain nevertheless began, as we have seen, to have various doubts about the treaties and the Cyprus constitution, hence the help and encouragement of the Foreign Office to amend the constitution and make it more manageable and balanced, which favoured the Greek Cypriot position, but which sparked off the rioting and separation. Given the fact that Turkey now had a perceived strategic interest in Cyprus, the amendments, far from working, gave the former an excuse to begin its desired partition. From then on, British diplomats, for all their occasional frustration with Archbishop Makarios, sometimes tended to look somewhat askance, and critically, at the Turkish position. Let us begin in 1964, with the British Consul General, George Warr’s, comments about Turkey’s treatment of

170

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

the twelve thousand Greek nationals and sixty thousand Turkish citizens of Greek stock and religion. Many thanks for your letter 1904/6/64 of May 30 about Cosmadopoulos coming here as Greek Consul-General. I had heard the same thing from John Satterthwaite. 2. Plans must meanwhile have changed because the present Greek Consul-General told me on June 10 that he would not now be leaving. I think that the decision must have been reached that it would be better after all not to make a change at the present time and to leave Chrysanthopoulos1 to see his flock through their troubles. 3. He has worked very hard for them and he has had as you say a very difficult job. There has been trouble here with the Greek community many times before. This time I have not heard of any physical brutality but short of that there is no doubt that the Turkish authorities are by all available legal and illegal means persecuting the Greek community. The Turks are simply getting their own back for the sufferings of their compatriots in Cyprus. Apart from the measures and deportations described in Morgan Man’s letter to Dodson of June 8, the currently favourite form of vexation is to exact from Greeks income tax payments in advance of deportation for the year ahead instead of the year in arrears as is customary. Failure to comply means confiscation and/or immediate deportation. Sometimes Greeks are made to pay twice before being deported. This is little more than organised robbery and there are I am glad to say a few, but only a very few, Turks who are ashamed of their Government in this regard. 4. There is no sign yet that the campaign is abating. It is undoubtedly organised from Ankara and it reveals an ugly side to the Turkish character. Possibly one of the reasons for it is as described in paragraph 3 of Man’s letter, namely to induce the Greek community to condemn Makarios, but I doubt this being the whole or indeed the chief explanation. There has always been an element in any Turkish Government which always wants to get rid of the Greek minority here. Cyprus is an excuse but only an excuse for prosecuting such a campaign. Secondly, and also independently of Cyprus, the Turkish Government find it convenient for home political purposes to encourage the latent chauvinism of their people. This particularly applies at the present time when the Government finds itself in a weak position both at home and abroad. Thirdly, the Turks hope that the Greek Government will react and so give them a bargaining counter over Cyprus. But on this last point the Turkish Government are likely to be disappointed if it is still the Greek Government’s policy, as you earlier reported, not to react over their Istanbul community’s troubles but on the other hand to treat very seriously any renewed threat against the Patriarch.

BRITISH VIEWS OF THE TURKISH STANCE

171

5. It still looks as if the Turkish Government may have called off for the present any renewed campaign against the Patriarch. Considerable dejection reigns in the Patriarchate but I have not heard of any new vexations since the scandalous measure last month when a Church orphanage for 200 children was closed down at 48 hours notice. The Patriarch himself is still not well, and he fainted in Church a few days ago. Chrysanthopoulos said that his doctors are not worried: they had told the Patriarch that he must rest in bed for ten days and that he would then be quite all right. It remains to be seen whether he will rest because he is not the best of patients. 6. With all this you can imagine that Chrysanthopoulos has had his hands full. He has his own community and its troubles and he has in addition to act as sort of Foreign Minister to the Patriarch. Chrysanthopoulos has done his best for his people and personally I think highly of him. He is intelligent, agreeable and very had [sic] working. He has a tendency however to be almost too active, and possibly sometimes he passes the limit of discretion. He has the habit for instance of distributing to his friends (not Turks) leaflets describing the sufferings of his people here, and I have often wondered what would happen if any of these found their way to a Turkish journalist. The American Consul, who doesn’t like Chrysanthopoulos, told me recently that he thought that the Turkish Government might soon declare him persona non grata for going beyond the recognised limits in trying to protect his people. I suppose that this may yet come, and the Greek Government may have had wind of the possibility and have decided that it would be imprudent to make things easier for the Turks by replacing him now. Anyway I am quite glad that he seems to be staying, but I shall be pleased to see and do what I can for Cosmadopoulos if he does in the end come. 7. I am sending a copy of this letter to H.M. Ambassador at Ankara and to Derek Dodson in the Foreign Office.2

Today, there are less than two thousand Turks of Greek stock left, while no measures were taken against the large Turkish-speaking Moslem community of Western Thrace and the Dodecanese.3 It is of course possible that reciprocal action against the Moslems of Thrace would have increased the likelihood of Turkey invading Greek Thrace. Turkey had, after all, bombed Cyprus. Talking of armed force, this is a suitable moment to quote from the British Military Attaché’s report for 1968 on the Turkish armed forces. Although written prosaically, it is surprisingly unflattering, and insulting:

172

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

ARMY […] But they only serve for two years, of which a large number spend their first few months learning to read, write and in many cases even to speak Turkish. […] 37. Personal bravery they would not lack, but other traits widely accepted to be found in their character are: a) An awe of their superiors that amounts almost to an abject servility. b) A lack of readiness to ever take a decision, or conversely to delegate responsibility. In particular this stems from a) above and it results in the smallest questions being referred right to the top for decision, which entails overloading at the top levels, and marked lack of initiative in those lower down. […] c) Laziness and/or just plain lack of ability. Thus in CENTO4 and NATO we see most of the detailed stag work having to be done by the foreign officers though often signed by a Turk, the foreign officers not wishing to be part and parcel of the muddle that would otherwise ensue. […] They would certainly fight on as individuals and units, but not for long as a cohesive modern army. NAVY […] 34. The basic reasons that ships of the Turkish Navy can seldom be persuaded to proceed further than 24 hours steaming distance away from the Turkish coast are: a) fear of a Cyprus crisis. b) the extra cost in allowances to personnel. c) a certain navigational indifference.5

Criticism of, and mild irritation with, the Turks was not confined to the military sphere, or just to mainland Turks. In 1970, the Cypriot Vice-President, Küçük, complained that the British were favouring the Greek Cypriots in their employment policies at the bases. The Second Secretary at the High Commission, Kieran Prendergast, wrote to Robin Fearn of Southern European Department: 3. As you will see from the attached table setting out in detail the employment set-up in the Bases, this is far from the case.[…] the true figure for Turkish Cypriots employed by the RAF is over 40%. More important, the overall percentage of Turkish Cypriots employed by the

BRITISH VIEWS OF THE TURKISH STANCE

173

Bases, in relation to Greek Cypriots, is almost 27%. It is therefore the Cyprus Government, if anyone, who have valid grounds for complaint that employment does not “have regard to the proportionate number of the communities in Cyprus”. […] 6. It is tiresome that the Turkish Cypriots are behaving in this aggressive and pettifogging way. (Their obsession with percentages is perhaps illuminating in connection with the causes of the breakdown in intercommunal relations 1960–63!) […]6

A report from the High Commissioner in Nicosia in 1972 made it plain that the Turkish Cypriots were not their own masters: 5. […] Apart from strong ties of every kind with the Motherland, and the Pro-Consular position of the Turkish Embassy here, this relationship has a more mysterious side. In the Administration’s laws, operational control of the armed forces, the police, the civil defence forces etc., is attributed to a shadowy individual with a variety of code names and cover names – the Standard Bearer (Bayraktar), the Grey Wolf (Bozkurt) or even the Competent Authority (Ilgili Makam). This individual is not appointed by the Administration but is a serving Turkish Officer introduced into Cyprus by the Turkish General Staff under diplomatic cover. His existence is never officially admitted by the Turkish Embassy or by the Turkish Cypriots. It is for this reason that both we and the UN peacekeeping force find negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots so frustrating; however hard they are pressed, no one can be found to take ultimate responsibility for any military question, whether it be the posting of armed Turkish Cypriot fighters in a disputed area or the painting of offensive slogans on the bunker opposite my residence. In all military and security matters the Bozkurt’s word is law. How his responsibilities are defined and how far his power extends are obscure, both to us and perhaps even to the Turkish Cypriots themselves.7

Bozkurt, Bayraktar or Ilgili Makam notwithstanding, the Turkish invasion does not seem to have stemmed British criticism. In 1975, the High Commissioner, Stephen Olver, wrote: […] One implication of the current Turkish Cypriot constitutional moves, and specifically of Denktash’s confirmation to me that they regard the posts of President and Vice-President as having lapsed, is the extent to which the whole 1960 Treaty apparatus be held to have lapsed[…] we […] continue to regard the 1960 constitution as still in practice operative, despite the various derogations by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots since 1963, But the Turkish side is in effect saying that the

174

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

1960 constitution is defunct. They are, of course, freely having their cake and eating it by applying the view only when it suits them.8

Less than three weeks later, an FCO legal adviser wrote: […] 3. It is not, however, open to the Turkish Government to pick and choose between the various parts of the 1960 Treaty apparatus as it suits their purposes. There may be, and I put it no higher than this, an argument that in view of the collapse of the Constitution the Turkish Government is released of its obligation under Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee to recognise and guarantee the state of affairs established by the basic Articles of the Constitution. But if they take that position, the Turkish Government cannot claim the right of unilateral action under the second part of Article IV. The right of unilateral action under that Article is limited to action taken “with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty”. In other words the Turks cannot rely on the collapse of the Constitution in order to justify intervention for the purpose of re-establishing the state of affairs by the basic Articles of the Constitution and, having intervened with that aim, then ignore that aim because the Constitution has lapsed.9[…]

As part of their continuing consolidation in the late seventies, while going through the motions of negotiating, in May 1977, the Turkish Cypriots published a propaganda booklet purporting to show that the Greek Cypriot National Guard had prepared a plan in April 1974 to exterminate the Turkish Cypriots. This was denied by the Cyprus government, while the High Commission saw through the charade: “GREEK EXTERMINATION PLANS” 1. In the last paragraph of his letter of today’s date Nick Smith promised you separate comments on the Turkish Cypriot propaganda document entitled “The Cyprus Question and Greek Extermination Plans”. I now enclose, for you only, a copy of that document and of the statement by the Cyprus Government commenting on it. 2. I am writing this letter to catch the bag and without having completed my comparison of the English text with the Greek documents. However I have gone sufficiently far to be reasonably sure that the documents themselves are genuine, but that the quotations from them, and indeed the passages of the documents actually reproduced, are highly selective. The key question, as the Cyprus Government spokesman recognised, is the exact translation of the phrase represented by the Turks as “extermination”. The word literally means “cleaning out”,

BRITISH VIEWS OF THE TURKISH STANCE

175

and in the context refers I think simply to the flushing out of pockets of resistance, whether military or guerilla, but with no specific reference to the civilian population. 3. The Defence Adviser has been carefully through the whole document and has discussed it at length with the US Embassy. His conclusion and theirs is that the documents are indeed genuine, that the Greek units named correspond with the order of battle which obtained at the date in question, and that the whole plan is no more than contingency planning in the event of an outbreak initiated by the Turks. The Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriots will doubtless make the most of their propaganda effort, possibly in the Strasbourg context, but it may not make all that much impact. (My personal suspicion is that we shall hear a good deal more of this, however).10 4. I enclose a spare copy of the document: could you kindly pass it and a copy of this letter on to D13 West in the Ministry of Defence?11

This was a far cry from only twenty years previously, when the British were using black propaganda against the Cypriots,12 and, as we saw in Chapter Two, helping the Turkish government with its propaganda. Let us now turn to the British ambassador to Turkey’s views on Ataturkism, the socio-political ideological glue that created, and still maintains, the structure of the modern Turkish state, since it might by default provide us with some insight into some of the emotions and thinking behind the Turkish stance on Cyprus and Greece after 1955. ATATURKISM: 1977 SUMMARY Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was not only the founder of the Republic of Turkey but the driving force behind it until he died, in 1938. Since then the aura surrounding his name has diminished little. But today’s Turkey faces a very different world from Ataturk’s, and it is opportune to consider to what extent his six principles are still in effect in the country. 2. Republicanism and nationalism are today still not in question. Etatism, in the sense of a dirigiste economic concept, still prevails; but side by side with a high degree of patriarchal state control of the heights of the economy there is considerable private enterprise. Populism remains a striking feature of life in Turkey: the absence of any class system gives opportunity to all – and in the gradual emergence of working-class power there seems no contradiction with Ataturk’s philosophy. 3. It is perhaps his principle of secularism that offers most scope today for controversy. While not interfering with religion as a matter of personal belief he ruthlessly did away with all outward symbols of Islam.

176

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

The resulting deep confusion of personal values, particularly in the vast country areas, still lingers, and politicians have always been alive to the opportunities. Consequently the appeal to religious feeling is an inescapable part of the democratic process in Turkey. But even so it is difficult to imagine this being ultimately any real threat to the structure of working of Ataturk’s secular state. 4. In parallel with his six principles of internal conduct his foreign policy of peace at home, peace in the world, still prevails. This envisaged friendly relations with neighbours but it left open the question of political alignment: and Turkey’s now traditional inclination to the West stems as much from pragmatic self-interest as anything. If the current difficult relations with the US and The Nine so decided her, there is nothing in the Ataturkist canon to prevent a shift back to alternative alignments, neutrality, or even isolationism. The Western ethic is a fundamental principle; the Western connexion is not. […] Conclusion 23. The very qualities for which the Turk is perhaps most renowned – tenacity, stubbornness, lack of imagination, and that curious mixture of inferiority and superiority complex – have helped to preserve Ataturkism. But now a state of development has been reached at which, with the general basis of the State sufficiently secure, the restraints of past doctrine may to some extent be dispensed with and new initiatives undertaken. The wish among the younger and more educated sectors of society to break out and associate more with contemporary political and cultural developments elsewhere is increasingly expressed, though this does not mean any lack of the basic feeling of Turkishness on their part. New social factors such as the move from country to town, the return of workers from Germany, attempts at industrialisation, and the breakdown of traditional values, are making themselves felt. Ataturk himself had of course an approach to social and political development anything but conservative and he was a constant proponent of dynamic change. It would presumably not have been against his wishes that further development of this sort should take place, though some of the directions it is taking, such as increase in the power of the extreme Left and Right and among others who themselves deny democracy, would not be to his taste. 24. The legislators of his day were of insufficient quality for his requirements. I imagine he might not have found those of today much better. He would hardly have tolerated such serious disunity, disharmony and lack of progress as that which characterises the present Coalition Government. Nor, one imagines, would he have allowed a situation like the present in which political factions could cause universities to be closed at will by violence; or the air of the capital he chose to be among the most polluted in the world. In foreign affairs it is difficult to imagine

BRITISH VIEWS OF THE TURKISH STANCE

177

that he would have allowed the Aegean and Cyprus problems to arise in their present form. But Ataturk was always able to dissolve Parliament and go his own way in a manner in which no Turkish President or Government today could do. And the Armed Forces, upon which Ataturk could have relied for support, now see their rôle in public life as much more of a purely military one and can only be expected to move, either on their own account, or in support of the Government, if the situation appears to them to be getting quite out of hand. 25. […] It is a pity, though not perhaps surprising, that the Turks postAtaturk have not yet acquired much of the subtler art of compromise among themselves any more than they have in foreign affairs. 26. In sum, 38 years after Ataturk’s death the Republic he founded is still in essentials on the course he set for it, however imperfectly government is at present being conducted. […]13

Although the ambassador made a number of valid points, perceptive into the bargain, not all would agree on the way he has played down the role of the armed forces. Apart from military coups in 1960 and 197114, there was to be another one in 1980. In 1997, the military in the National Security Council forced the Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, out of power. The role of the armed forces is still pre-eminent, even if studiously discreet, as this is being written. Second, his policy of peace at home and peace in the world hardly prevailed in the case of the invasion of Cyprus. If we quote some admittedly rumbustious comment by a famous journalist forty years earlier, then what the ambassador so sanguinely describes looks perhaps slightly mellowed and influenced by the passage of time: […] At one of his own receptions Kamal, slightly exhilarated, publicly slapped the Egyptian minister, when he observed the hapless diplomat wearing the forbidden fez. […] In 1926, following a not very professional attempt on his life, he hanged the entire leadership of the opposition. Among those he allowed to be sentenced and executed were Colonel Arif, who had been his comrade-at-arms in the Greek campaign, and Djavid Bey, the best financial mind in Turkey. Kamal had a champagne party in his lonely farm-house at Chankaya, near Ankara, to celebrate the occasion, and invited all the diplomats. Returning home at dawn, they saw the corpses hanging in the town square. […] (in 1930 Kamal decided that totalitarian rule to the extremity which he carried it was a bore, and, uniquely among dictators, he proceeded to create an opposition, naming various men to be its leaders. Somewhat timidly, they accepted. Kamal wanted to see if western democratic methods would work; he wanted an opposition bench to argue with in parliament. The system didn’t work. The Turks, with the memory of 1926 in mind, didn’t quite seem to understand…) […]

178

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

The general programme of westernisation was planned by the Young Turks and he simply appropriated it. The Greeks were destroyed by the defection of the allies, also by their own incapacity, not by Kamal’s armies. Sultan and Kaliph were doomed in any case, and it is no tribute to Kamal that he ejected them. […] The Turkish dictator differs from almost all others in that he had no socialist period in youth and even in maturity betrays not the faintest interest in socio-economic stresses. His only policy was Turkey for the Turks.15

Many people would at least agree with the last statement. Returning now to the ambassador to Turkey, a few months after his report on Ataturkism, he wrote a powerful valedictory despatch, from which we quote: TURKEY: VALEDICTORY DESPATCH SUMMARY […] 4. The embargo encourages Greece in its several disputes with Turkey. The result is a weakening of the Western Alliance in an area vital to the Soviet Union. While the Turks will in their own interests not go over to the Russians, they might well change their attitude to the West if the arms embargo is not fully lifted. Largely to please Greece the US Congress is playing a game that could eventually achieve for the Kremlin what the Kremlin has not been able to achieve for itself. […] 2. Leaving aside Istanbul and Izmir and the Aegean littoral, for my money Turkey is more of the Near East and Asia than Europe. Not just physically, with 97 per cent of its territory in Asia, but temperamentally. Politically of course, so far as the central direction of affairs is concerned, it looks to Europe and sees itself as Europe and wants others to see it so – which indeed they have done: what British schoolboy has not heard of the Sick Man of Europe? Atatürk taught that the European West was the only civilisation; and whatever the erosion of his influence since his death nearly 40 years ago, that precept has continued to govern Turkish national policies. Perhaps this deliberate cultivation of a Western outlook, with all that it means in education, has led the ruling circles and intellectuals and industrialists to regard themselves as truly European, and Turkey in general as Western. Admittedly there are European ethnic strains in the people, but not so strong as the Asian. And their singular language is Central Asian in origin. There is no natural reason why Turks should be so insistent on their European connexion. It is largely the dictum of Kemal Atatürk that makes them. […]

BRITISH VIEWS OF THE TURKISH STANCE

179

11. Times and Governments change; and with them world attitudes. The Turks went into Cyprus unilaterally quite legally, having first duly sought (and, as expected, failed to obtain) the support of the UK, their co-guarantor of the island. They went in ostensibly to safeguard the Constitution when Makarios was overthrown – temporarily as it turned out – and to ensure that his gangster successor did nor allow the junta in Athens to annex the island. But it was too good an opportunity to miss to rescue the Turkish Cypriots from their eleven years under the heel of their Greek compatriots. Turkey made a hero of Ecevit. The world gave him some restrained applause as Sampson in Nicosia and the junta in Athens collapsed. But as months and years have worn on and Turkey has refused to withdraw its troops from Cyprus unless the freedom and security it fought for for the Turkish Cypriots is assured by a political settlement with the Greek Cypriots in a new federal Cyprus, so world opinion renames the Turkish operation of 1974 an invasion followed by occupation. […]16

A close reading of the whole report shows that the ambassador was somewhat partial to the views of the government to which he was accredited, despite some critical and cutting analysis of Turkish characteristics and of the country’s European aspirations. It is not uncommon for some ambassadors to ‘go native’, to put it in a risqué way. Unprecedentedly, it drew a response from his homologue across the Aegean, Brooks Richards who, conversely, appears to have been partial to the views of his host government. Since both ambassadors were KCBEs, one can talk of a semantic battle of the knights, albeit a graceful one: […] Sir Horace Phillips’s views on Turkey command respect; it was with close attention that I read his valedictory dispatch from Ankara. But I see that he has rounded off an interesting review of the state of Turkey with a volley of characteristically pungent Parthian shots at Greek attitudes and Greek policy: these are matters on which I am reluctant to allow him the last word since his perception of them differs somewhat from my own. 2. Sir Horace, brushing aside “without difficulty” the temptation to plead the case for Turkey, expresses his concern in terms of the larger Western interest of keeping Turkey a strong and reliable ally. […] 5. I dare say that Sir Horace Phillips would agree with me thus far. Where I part company with him is that I think it misleading and unhelpful to an understanding of the present situation to lump together, as he does, three distinct, if related, factors: the Greek Government; the Government of Cyprus; and the so-called Greek lobby in the US. The

180

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

Greek Government of Mr. Karamanlis is the only one of these three elements whose attitudes I can observe at first hand. I am convinced that they do not automatically equate their interests either with those of their Cypriot cousins or with the line pursued by Congressman Brademas and Senator Sarbanis in the US. They are, of course, careful not to say this publicly, because to do so would expose them to domestic attack and to charges of disloyalty to the theoretically indivisible cause of Hellenism. But one cannot have been here over the past two years without becoming conscious of the fact that metropolitan Greek opinion has to an extent become bored and disillusioned with the affairs of Cyprus: an editor of a large Athens daily newspaper told me some months ago that his sales suffered quite severely every time he gives headline treatment to news about Cyprus. There was, moreover, prior to 1976 a period of some months in which Makarios was manifestly intriguing over the Heads of the Athens Government with Opposition leaders because he felt that the Government was not giving him the support he deserved. Since then a truce has been observed by both parties, but the head of Mr. Karamanlis’ diplomatic and political office told me in October last year that his master would be perfectly ready at an appropriate moment to twist the Archbishop’s arm if he felt that the latter was failing to a prospect of an acceptable settlement, though he knew he would incur domestic unpopularity by doing so. This precise contingency has not yet arisen, but I suspect that Karamanlis was not consulted and somewhat taken off balance when Makarios finally decided to meet Denktash. 6. The fact that there are three and a half million voters of Greek descent in the US, is a fact of political life: it led Mr. Carter to make promises during his campaign which he now finds hard to redeem. Greek officials here were quite clear at the time that his public statements could not be read as a blueprint of future US policy and thought the Greek Cypriots naïve in their over-enthusiastic reaction. […] 7. The present Greek Government does not want to drive Turkey out of NATO, even though sometimes the Turks behave in NATO as though they would like to drive Greece wholly out of the organisation. […] 8. Mr. Karamanlis is 70 this year. I believe that one of his most cherished political ambitions is to conclude a reasonable and honourable settlement of outstanding Greco-Turkish differences and that, far from welcoming the weakness of successive Turkish Government coalitions, he has felt deeply frustrated by the absence of any Turkish interlocuteur valable. Though Mr. Ecevit’s past pronouncements on the Aegean have led him and Greek officials to fear that Ecevit may on this issue prove a highly nationalistic defender of Turkish claims, I think thoughtful observers here regard the inconclusive outcome of the recent Turkish election as an even greater potential problem. They see in Turkish nationalism something even newer and brasher than their own; and those nearest the centre of the Aegean talks begin to wonder

BRITISH VIEWS OF THE TURKISH STANCE

181

whether Turkish national ambition may not have set its sights firmly on a condominium in the Aegean that will never be freely accepted by a Greek Government, because it would in their view undermine their sovereignty over many of the three thousand islands that are part of modern Greece. If the Turks mean to use the big stick in pursuit of such an objective at the expense of another member of the NATO Alliance, I venture to suggest that this would hardly be compatible with the broader interest of the Alliance as a whole, which is as much my concern as it is that of my friend Sir Horace Phillips.17[…]

Apart from the ‘going native’ factor of diplomacy, we see a certain amount of emotion coming to the surface in the extraordinary correspondence above. Before concluding, let us look at the British ambassador to Turkey’s view of Turkish behaviour towards the Greek ambassador to Turkey towards the end of 1979: 1. The Turks appear to be on the point of causing a new and entirely unnecessary irritant in Greek-Turkish relations. 2. The Greek Ambassador, who came to my house last night for a dinner which I gave for Perry and Margaret Rhodes, told me that he had been summoned that morning to see Kamel, the new Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Papoulias said that Kamel had informed him that the house in which he lives, and which has been the Greek Ambassador’s Residence here for many years, had been requisitioned by the Turkish Government. They hoped Papoulias could move out of it as quickly as possible, preferably within two months but in any case within four. Papoulias told me that in reply he had confined himself to saying that the house was not his but an official residence leased by the Greek Government from a private Turkish land lady. The current lease ran until July of next year. He would transmit the Turkish request to his Government. […] 5. By any standards the Turks seem to have behaved in a very heavyhanded manner. Papoulias, normally the most urbane of men, was clearly much annoyed by the Turkish request and also by the fact that it had been transmitted to him by Kamel. Papoulias does not believe that the landlady has yet been compensated for the compulsory acquisition of her house. He said that under Greek law (he did not know what the position might be under Turkish law) acquisition would not be legal until compensation had been agreed and paid. When he had pointed out to Kamel that, in accordance with local practice, the rent had been paid in advance until the expiry of the current lease, Kamel

182

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

had replied that it would be up to him to recover the balance from the landlady. Papoulias was clearly angered by the short notice. He said that had the Turks told him that when the lease fell in next July they would not be prepared to renew it, that might have been a different matter. I said that I thought that most Governments would in a matter of this sort have given an Ambassador considerably more notice than that. 6. I asked Papoulias how he thought his Government would react. He said he had no idea but that the Turkish request could potentially do a lot of damage. I would be only too well aware of what the likely reaction in Greece would be if the Turkish demand became public knowledge.18

Conclusions Perhaps the most significant lesson to be drawn from the material in this chapter is the difference between the front and backstage actions of British policy-formulation on the Cyprus question, and towards Turkey. Clearly, FCO awareness of the bad treatment of Greeks and of Turkish citizens of Greek stock in Turkey, irritation with the Turkish negotiating stance vis-à-vis the 1960 treaties, and recognition that Turkey’s case regarding its Aegean claims was weak, and that the British position was close to the Greek one meant – and mean – little, when it comes to the evaluation of national interest. Defining national interest is not easy, particularly since different interest groups have differing perceptions of what that interest is. In the case of British views on Turkey, the British interest is clearly to follow the American/‘Western’ one, to be sufficiently friendly to Turkey to keep it in the camp. This means, whatever the rights and wrongs of Turkey’s Aegean claims, or of its negotiating stance on Cyprus, and even if Britain recognises that Turkey is using Cyprus to further its Aegean claims, that Britain will not support Greece in its problems with Turkey. With France, matters have been rather different, and we write our last chapter before the conclusions, by suggesting that not all Britain’s allies consistently support it over the Cyprus question.

10 FRANCO-BRITISH TENSIONS

Introduction It was not only the Ottoman-friendly Benjamin Disraeli who turned his imperial eyes towards Cyprus in 1878 and earlier, but Napoleon III, who is reported to have ‘recognised Cyprus as an important observatory over the provinces of Turkey in Asia and Africa’.1 France was certainly irritated.2 In 1916, the Franco-British Sykes-Picot agreement carving up the Middle East included a clause whereby the British government agreed to consult the French in the event of the former wishing to give up the island. Obviously, although thereafter Cyprus was not a serious irritant in FrancoBritish relations, various French initiatives have irritated the British government from time to time, as well as the Turkish one. For example, in 1971, France took the same line as the USSR against double-enosis, while the British government was irritated at French plans to set up a broadcasting station on Cyprus. The French government was also irritated at FCO secrecy in the two days before the Turkish invasion. Let us look a little more closely at some of the documents, to get the flavour. In May 1964, Michael Butler of the British embassy in Paris wrote to Derek Dodson, Head of Central Department, about French views on the UN efforts to solve the Cyprus crisis: […] 4. The official concerned in the Quai d’Orsay, speaking in confidence, commented that the proposed solution was miles away from the ideas which General de Gaulle was known to nurture. The general thought that Cyprus was not properly speaking a state at all and that it should be returned to Greece. Moreover he himself wanted to play an independent role in solving the problem if he possibly could. There seemed very little hope that he would respond to an appeal to join with the Anglo-Saxons in putting pressure on the Greeks and Turks in favour

184

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

of Tuomioja’s3 solution. I should be grateful if this confidence could be respected. […]4

Less than two years later, the Foreign Secretary wrote: We must remember that in the long run the French are natural if difficult allies. But I am afraid that we must face the fact that we are for the present dealing with a régime under the control of a man whose attitude and intentions are in most cases hostile to our own.5

A few days later, de Gaulle took France out of NATO’s integrated military structure, thereby underlining that, unlike Britain, which has become increasingly part and parcel of US strategy, his country would be independent. Two years later, the British embassy in Athens suspected that the French were involving themselves with the junta in Athens. In a ‘secret’ telegram to the FCO, the British ambassador wrote: […] 2. I also asked Mr. Talbot6 whether he attached any credence to rumours circulating here that de Gaulle had sent a special emissary in Athens to make contact with the present Government. Talbot said he believed these stories to be true. He also said that, according to his information, the emissary had been in contact with Hadjipetros, the Head of the Greek Central Intelligence Agency and one of the Triumvirate’s closest collaborators and that the former had invited Papadopoulos to Paris and had given an undertaking that France would back Greece if Papadopoulos followed the French line in relation to NATO. The story of the French emissary is now circulating fairly widely in Athens, and while I cannot discount the possibility that such reports are deliberately fostered by Papadopoulos to promote earlier recognition by other NATO countries, I think the story must now be regarded as well established. […]7

It is important to remember that former Prime Minister of Greece, Constantine Karamanlis, who had left Greece in a fit of pique after losing the elections in November 1963 (almost exactly forty three years after his greater, but no less controversial homologue, Eleftherios Venizelos), was living in Paris and planning his return at whatever moment might be appropriate. The other well-known exile was of course Andreas Papandreou, who was more vociferous in his criticism of the junta. Karamanlis adopted a different line. For example, according to the British ambassador in Athens, a Greek-American tycoon (Tom Pappas, who held the Esso franchise in Greece and other profitable franchises, and illegally transferred money

FRANCO-BRITISH TENSIONS

185

from the junta to Nixon’s election campaign fund8) had told the American Ambassador in Athens that he had seen Karamanlis in London, and that Karamanlis had told him that he entirely approved of Markezinis (a civilian appointed by the junta as Prime Minister) and wished him luck.9 That the Paris-based Karamanlis should even see the likes of Pappas (who was despised by the anti-American Greek Left) suggests that he was involved in the politics of the junta, even if only at arm’s length. He was also influenced by the French government: when he returned to Greece as Prime Minister in July 1974, he emulated de Gaulle in taking Greece out of the integrated military structure of NATO, following the Turkish invasion. It can at any rate be reasonably maintained that Karamanlis’ French sojourn was exploited to some extent by the French government. Apart from French activities in Greece, the British were particularly irritated at the setting up of a French radio station in Cyprus, because of its proximity to the British electronic spying installations. A minute of 15 December 1971 from Robin Fearn of Southern European Department to his assistant head and head of department, William Wilberforce and Reginald Secondé, and to John Leahy, Head of Personnel Services, explains: […] 2. Our differences with the Cyprus Government over the establishment of this relay station have a potential to seriously damage Anglo-Cypriot relations. According to the strict letter of the Treaty of Establishment we can refuse to allow the introduction of such a station if we consider that its functions would impair the operation of our own installations in the Republic. In the opinion of our technicians in Cyprus, this station could be tolerated. But M.O.D. engineers in London have been taking an obstructive line. Meanwhile, the Cyprus Government have committed themselves publicly and will suffer serious loss of face if we now refused to permit it. The High Commission (and Mr. Scott10 in particular) have been the main channel for negotiations with the Cyprus Government. 3. Mr. Scott and Mr. Carruthers, the Chief Officer in the Sovereign Base Areas, attended the meeting on 14 December, at which I was also present. They were largely responsible for persuading the meeting to take a positive attitude towards the establishment of the relay station. The chances of conflict with the Cyprus Government have thereby been reduced. Mr. Scott’s first hand knowledge was essential. […]11

There was clearly a discrepancy of interpretation between the FCO and the MOD, as the MOD ‘secret’ record of the above-mentioned meeting

186

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

of 14 December suggests a strong rearguard action by the MOD, even if it was merely to save face: […] 1. THE CHAIRMAN said that the meeting had been convened at the request of the SBA and Air Force Authorities in Cyprus to discuss the Cyprus Government’s intention to permit (subject to certain safeguards) the installation of a CBC (French) Broadcast Station at Cape Greco. Recent meetings in Cyprus had considered to what extent the Broadcast station might interfere with our operations at Ayios Nikolaos. The purpose of the MOD meeting was to take note of the findings of the earlier technical meetings and to decide on the next step in our discussion with the Cypriot Authorities. […] 4. Decision. The meeting decided that the BHC NICOSIA should inform the Cyprus authorities of our doubts and difficulties of [sic] the proposal and request that formal technical discussions be arranged between CEE HQNEAF and representatives of the CBC and French engineers. The discussion should be aimed at obtaining, in writing, sufficient details of the proposed French design to enable the UK to reach a firm final opinion as to the technical acceptability of Cape Greco, and to define any constraints or controls which might be necessary on the design, construction and mode of operation of the French Station12 . Elect Eng 5a (RAF) would supply a list of points on which design in information was required and which would form the basis for discussion.13

In his annual report for 1970, the High Commissioner expressed a certain amount of pique: […] The Greek Cypriots have given way to pressure and blandishments from the French for the setting up of a powerful radio relay station for the Eastern Mediterranean which might, if allowed to proceed, prejudice important installations of our own nearby. […]14

The installation went ahead. Whether the French provided the British Government with the details requested is a moot point, but hardly likely. And whether the Cypriot government were subjected to pressure and blandishments is equally unlikely. The French did not lose their interest in Greek affairs just because of President de Gaulle’s resignation at the end of 1969, and death the following year. Indeed, by the time of the coup in Cyprus, the French government were just as suspicious of the Anglo-Saxon

FRANCO-BRITISH TENSIONS

187

special relationship as during the Gaullist years. The French Foreign Minister, Sauvagnargues, told Callaghan that although the Americans had told them that they wished to avoid unilateral Turkish action, they were not putting pressure on the Greek government to withdraw their National Guard Officers from Cyprus (see Chapter Five). Sauvagnargues also complained to Callaghan that the British Embassy had not provided them with information on the situation in Cyprus which they had requested in the two days preceding the invasion.15 Greece’s understandable disappointment in the British government’s behaviour before and during the Turkish invasion translated itself almost automatically into a penchant for all things French, as had indeed once been the case to a certain extent under Ioannis Kolettis in the 1840s. The British ambassador to Greece considered that France was ‘capitalising on her advantage’: […] Anglo-Greek Relations […] 13. The conviction that we failed as a guarantor Power in Cyprus lingers. Our wider responsibilities there, together with the need to maintain tolerable relations with Turkey both intrinsically and in the Anglo-American context have made us less popular among Greece’s Western friends and allies than some less actively engaged, notably France. The spurious charge of collusion with the Turks, which in the dying hours of the Junta was the pretext for the inspired attack on the Chancery, was never effectively nailed; and we are still suffering from the effects, mainly with the Hellenic Navy. A further effort to clear the air will be necessary. Over the EEC, France has again emerged as Greece’s major champion and is losing no time in capitalising on her advantage.16

Here, of course, business interests, particularly arms sales, played a strong role, with the ambassador writing that the Cyprus crisis could only have seemed to have swelled the numbers of those who considered that Greece could stand alone, ‘perhaps with France as arms supplier’.17 In April 1975, an FCO official wrote that the FCO’s conclusion that Turkey was more important to Western strategic interests than Greece was ‘diametrically opposed to that which the French appeared to have reached’18, while in September of that year, at European ministerial meeting level, the British were pursuing a pro-Turkish line, with the French tending to support the Greek position19. At the end of the year, the perception from the British Embassy in Athens, (tinged, perhaps with a miniminipinny amount of

188

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

envy) was that the French could do no wrong, and that the ‘slightest thing they did was given wide and sympathetic coverage in the Greek media’.20 By year’s end, both the French Foreign Minister and President had visited Athens. Notwithstanding the epithet of Germany as an economic giant and a political dwarf, and the strength of the Franco-German axis, an extract from an FCO brief gives us an intriguing glimpse of Franco-German differences over Cyprus: […] 10. It is becoming more difficult to keep the Nine together over Cyprus. The French have, since the summer of 1974, seen themselves as the principal protectors of the Greeks. The Germans have always been sympathetic to the Turks, but their partisanship for Turkish views has increased considerably since the beginning of 1976 when Herr Leber21 visited Turkey. The German attitude is not easy to understand and not easy to argue about, since it appears to be based on a conviction of Turkish good intention to reach a settlement. The FCO finds this German attitude unrealistic. The dialogue between the Nine and the Turkish Government has never been prosecuted effectively because of the reluctance of successive representatives of the Presidency in Ankara to say anything unpalatable to the Turks. The same difficulty has not arisen in talking to Mr Denktash.22[…]

Perhaps the most succinct summing up of the French position was given by the ambassador in Athens: […] France continues to pose as Greece’s national champion and has taken up positions in the UN over Cyprus and in the EEC divergent from its European partners. She is the only EEC country prepared to take an unequivocally pro-Greek policy in Graeco-Turkish disputes. It may now be beginning to sink into the Greek mind that one special friend cannot outweigh or out-vote eight somewhat disgruntled friends and the result may be to halt progress, as recently happened with the division of EEC financial resources between Greece and Turkey. As negotiations in the EEC get under way, practical bilateral problems will also assert themselves. We can nevertheless expect the French to try to maintain a special relationship and be prepared to tread on their partners’ corns in the process, though as regards Greece’s military relations with NATO we have no reason to suspect that France is playing a malign role. The tendency of Greece to look for a champion will mean that they will remain receptive to French blandishments and Karamanlis’s long stay in France must still continue to influence his attitude.

FRANCO-BRITISH TENSIONS

189

We must do what we can to mitigate the effects on our own relations, particularly in the commercial field. The tendency to look to France as a model of independence from the US is probably even greater among the Opposition than in the Government though the stronger institutional links exist between the Union of the Democratic Centre and the Federal Republic in particular with the SDP, which the left of the Party might wish to take as a model.23[…]

The French stance seems to have provided some dividends for the French, if only in terms of business, as the ambassador in Athens noted in early 1978: […] the French connection24 has, in the eyes of Greeks the merits of being a western link free of the taint of subservience to Washington and NATO; or of any underlying preference for Turkey. France’s proclaimed Mediterranean vocation is a further asset in her hands and for these reasons French bilateral interests have not suffered unduly; indeed they reap hard-nosed advantage from an implied Greek acceptance that French goodwill must be bought. Mr. Barre25 took the trouble to stop over at Athens airport for three hour of talks with Karamanlis in June, French consultants have won contracts for the preliminary studies for the new Athens airport and underground.26[…]

Before concluding this chapter, let us look at one of the French gripes about Greece, one which one suspects some other countries also had, and probably still do: […] Villemur 27 was preparing a study on the subject and was gravely handicapped by the extraordinary lack of statistics. He agreed […] that when the Greeks produced what they said were the facts and what they said were the statistics that backed them up, it was difficult to see how we could double check. M. Villemur wondered if in fact certain statistics existed at all. The French had noticed that when they tried to extract statistical information the Greeks became very secretive.28

Conclusions The Cyprus situation serves as an atavistic latter-day sting in the tail of traditional Anglo-French rivalry, which is based on hundreds of years of outright hostility. Indeed, the very coming into existence of the English and French bodies politic is predicated to a certain extent on the One Hundred Years’ War, itself partly the result of the Norman invasion of England, and later dynastic and territorial rivalry between the Anglo-Normans and the French. The fighting continued, on and off, until 1815, only stopping with the defeat of Napoleon Buonaparte, which nevertheless bequeathed a

190

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

certain sense of mutual distrust, most clearly epitomised by Gaullism and his blocking British entry into the EEC, since he did not want a ‘worm in the European’ apple or an ‘American Trojan horse’. Britain’s fear, after it had gained entry, was of French leadership in Europe, which it has always sought to dissipate, one method being to push for enlargement willy-nilly. Within the context of the Cyprus problem, Anglo-French tension manifests itself most clearly in De Gaulle’s view that Cyprus should simply have been given back to Greece, in France’s position vis-à-vis the Eastern Mediterranean being ‘diametrically opposed’ to Britain’s, as we have seen above, in France helping Greece more than Britain in the Council of Europe, and in France championing Greece over Turkey. The residue of these policies is there now, with France being essentially against Turkey’s full membership of the EU. Most relevantly, in March 2007, France and Cyprus signed a military co-operation agreement which will enable France to use a military airfield, involve training for Cypriot officers in France, and which could lead to an upgraded French presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, in line with President Sarkozy’s Mediterranean policy. Although France has now rejoined NATO’s integrated military structure, this does not mean that it has suddenly started toeing the Anglo-American line. Quite the contrary, since one of France’s objectives, perhaps its main one, is to radically transform NATO from inside, and not leave the running to the Anglo-Saxons. Moreover, unlike Britain, its nuclear forces are entirely independent. To conclude this chapter, we see how the study of documents from the sixties and seventies can help to understand the present situation. We turn now to our final – and brief – chapter, brief because it will be ‘documentfree’, where we shall attempt to evaluate the usefulness of the documents that we have seen, in understanding the Cyprus problem (from a British documentary standpoint, at least) and to demonstrate how indispensable the applied study of history is to those wishing to understand relations between states.

SOME FINAL WORDS

Guicciardini thought that things have always been the same, that the past sheds light on the future, and that the same things return with different colours. He was of course writing before the days of fashionable international relations theories, social science-driven ‘theoretical paradigms’ and ‘conceptual frameworks’, with their accompanying baggage of jargon such as ‘window of opportunity’ (opportunity), ‘state-actor’(state), ‘period of time’ (period), ‘road map’ (plan) and various other linguistically bulimic expressions. Like any solid historian (a Plutarchian into the bargain), he based his ideas on facts rather than theory and fashion. He was not imprisoned in a self-built mental cage of paradigms, frameworks, models and approaches, and could therefore think reasonably freely. We have tried to adopt a similar, or at least connected, approach here. The documents are themselves ‘physical facts’, even if their content can sometimes be open to interpretation. The only proviso is the extent to which they can be taken as absolutely accurate. Some of them depend on the interpretative faculties of their authors, and as such we simply have to hope that they were telling the truth. Generally, they were, although we need to be aware that they were conditioned by their own professional ambitions: the only questions are really about emphasis and omission. A prime example of this is the debate in Chapter Nine between Her Majesty’s ambassadors in Ankara and Athens, which shows how important is the oft ignored human factor in international relations. Here one learns more from Giambattista Vico, in particular, than from various of the international relations theories which have exploded onto the world since the last world war. We see two ambassadors with markedly differing perceptions, possibly partially emotionally based, of Graeco-Turkish relations. International relations theorists, whether trying to explain or advocate, tend to avoid the nitty-gritty reality of factors such as greed, love, hate, fear,

192

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

insecurity and pride, in their search for respectable-sounding theoretical frameworks and paradigms. Whatever the consistencies and inconsistencies in policy formulation that we have seen in the documents we have looked at, they display a continuity of method, particularly since they are predicated on perceived national interest, even where there is internal disagreement. Thus, in the mid- to late forties, both the pro- and anti-enosist groups in the FO were claiming that it was in British interests to give Cyprus to Greece, or to hang on to it, respectively. Then, in the mid- to late sixties, some diplomats were advocating enosis in order to keep the bases. By 1974, the British government was trying to relinquish its territories and military bases. Although there is clearly a strong element of inconsistency, one can also fall back, perhaps expediently, on ‘the national interest’, however difficult it can sometimes be to define. At the risk of sounding trite, let us again quote Palmerston: We have no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.

This sort of thinking can of course serve as an expedient justification for chopping and changing, some of which we have seen through the documents in this book. Yet even if some of the documents sometimes display flawed argumentation, inconsistency in policy-formulation, and the occasional hint of snideness, they are nevertheless steeped in a tradition of coherence and continuity that once placed His and Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service head and shoulders above most of its rivals. The first thing a diplomat usually does when writing anything official is to call for the file to see what the position is. He will then base his judgment and advice on what has gone before. Rarely will he take the risk of throwing away his compass. Once a firm decision has been made, it can be difficult to alter, whatever the subsequent wriggling. The most obvious example was the decision to keep Cyprus British after the last war, and then, when the going got tough, to allow a measure of independence: although there was much soul-searching, particularly about the bases, and although various decisions were taken to relinquish these bases, they were never precise enough, and had to remain in Britain’s hands, owing to American insistence. Thus we really do see the same things returning with different colours. On the one hand, the Ottomans never completely let go of Cyprus, and are now back with a vengeance, and on the other, Britain remained in partial control, and is indeed still struggling with its post-imperial power-responsibility ratio.

SOME FINAL WORDS

193

Perhaps the most useful lesson from studying documents, and not just newspapers, articles and theories, is that one not only sees what is being decided, but how. In many cases, one can even see why, although the reasons are rarely found in an intellectually free manner, having to take perceived interests and the file into account, and, in Britain’s case, American interests, more than any other. Intellectual freedom, in absolute terms, can never exist in policy formulation, since the constraints of national interest and alliances are all too clear, not to mention the almost permanent mutual scrutiny that understandably pervades foreign ministries and embassies. This is an important lesson to be drawn from the documents. Another interesting lesson that, at least, this author has learnt, is the dichotomy between the oft stressed dispassion of professional diplomats (a dispassion that is drilled into them from the word go, usually shrouded in the word ‘detachment’) and the human reality. This often comes through in ambassador’s reports, particularly valedictory dispatches, but not exclusively. Perceval’s letter ‘Farewell to a Place of Arms’ (see Chapter Seven) is an example. International relations analysts often ignore human emotions and frailties. And if they allude to mistakes, they will rarely attempt to analyse the human reasons behind the mistakes, preferring to hide behind this or that theory. Yet often, when something goes wrong between two countries, it can be the result of mistakes resulting from human factors such as greed, pride and ambition. This book is the result of research over seventeen years in the same area, broadly speaking Anglo-Greek relations, with Cyprus (understandably) as a focal point. Although the latest documents here cover the years up to 1979, it has become increasingly obvious to this author over the years that the following year’s files will not differ dramatically. Even the 1974 invasion hardly came as a surprise, given the various diplomatic reports about the tensions between the Athens junta, the American government and President Makarios. Going through the files in the early seventies, one senses that something will give, but does not know exactly what will happen, or when. It is not unlike a Racinian drama, where one senses the result, but does not know how things will happen. Finally, I have set out this book in such a way that as more documents are unearthed, the book can be easily updated and improved without its balance being upset. In an ideal world, one could produce similar ‘themedocument’ books, based on, for example, Russian, French, Turkish and German archives and, if the Greek government ever has the gumption to release more documents on Cyprus, on Greek ones.

NOTES

Preface 1.

Athens News, 24 August 2001, article by George Lardner, syndicated from the Washington Post. Chapter One

1. 2. 3.

I consider the Seven Years’ War to have been the First World War, the Napoleonic Wars the second, and the Great War the third. This includes a very small Armenian and Christian Maronite population. See Mallinson, William, Cyprus, A Modern History, I.B.Tauris, London and New York, 2005 and 2009, Chapter Fifteen. Chapter Two

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9.

FCO 371/43646, file R 9092. Mallinson, William, Cyprus, A Modern History, op. cit., p. 17. See Mallinson, William, Cyprus: Diplomatic History and the Clash of Theory in International Relations, I.B.Tauris, London and New York, 2010, Chapter Four. FO 371/48280, file R 16249/19 British Ambassador to Greece. FO 371/67084, file R13462/G. Ibid. Evkaf (pious charitable trust) was and is a (Moslem) religious foundation in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey respectively, which was weakened and made subservient to the state (although some would disagree) by Ataturk. In Cyprus, the British appointed its representatives, but in 1955, returned Evkaf land and property to the Turkish Cypriot Community, plus one million pounds sterling. The whole question was sensitive, indeed, can still be, since the Moslems of Turkey and Cyprus, although mainly Sunni, have different traditions. Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office

196

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

British ambassador to Greece British Middle East Office. FO 371/117625, file RG 1081/120. FO 371/117640, file RG 1081/535. FO 371/117640, file RG 1081/536. Prime Minister’s Private Secretary to Rumbold, FO 371/117644, file RG 1081/692. 16. CP 55 94, 27.7.55. I have taken this from O’Malley, Brendan and Craig, Ian, The Cyprus Conspiracy, I.B.Tauris,London and New York 1999, p. 21. 17. The writer Lawrence Durrell was a central cog in the British propaganda campaign. 18. FO 953/1694, file G 11926/23. Chapter Three 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16.

FCO 9/1353, file WSC 1/1. UN mediator for Cyprus. FO 371/174770, file CE 2254. For a fascinating and down-to-earth account of how the US, and then Britain, decided to plump for division in Cyprus, see Packard, Martin, Getting it Wrong, AuthorHouse, Milton Keynes, 2008. On 7 July 1964, the British embassy in Washington wrote to the Foreign Office : ‘The Americans have made it quite clear that there would be no question of using the 6th Fleet to prevent any possible Turkish invasion […] We have all along made it clear to the United Nations that we could not agree to UNFICYP’s being used for the purpose of repelling external intervention, and the standing orders to our troops outside UNFICYP are to withdraw to the sovereign base areas immediately any such intervention takes place.’ FO 371/174766, file C 1205/2/G. Secretary to Chiefs of Staff Committee and Director of Defence Operations Staff. CAB 164/1043, 47/1. Ibid. Ibid. FCO 27/166, file MF 10/41. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Although I have not been able to locate this earlier advice, Henry Darwin, an FO assistant legal adviser wrote at the end of February:’ But the questions on Art 103 of the Charter & the Treaty of Guarantee are very difficult and the answer is not always favourable to our case. Certainly we could not expect posts to handle an argument on these questions successfully and our instructions would have to be to keep off legal points & to press practical ones […]’. FO 371/174768, file C 2251/1. FCO 9/1374, file WSC 3/548/5

NOTES

197

17. FCO 9/1684, file WSC 3/548/6 18. Ibid. 19. de Smith, S.A., The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions, Stevens and Sons, London, 1964, p.296. 20. FO 371/174766, file C 1205/2/G. 21. FCO 9/1178, file WSC 10/14. 22. FCO 9/1374, file WSC 3/548/5. Chapter Four 1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

FCO 9/1355, file WSC 1/1. ‘Eclipse’ means ‘Do not show to the Americans’. The leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, and then Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. Double Enosis/Partition; de facto partition; Turkish occupation of part of Cyprus, as a bargaining base for partition; partition enforced by Turkey, or the proclamation of a Turkish mini-state; and Turkish occupation of the whole of Cyprus, which could again be a bargaining base for partition. FCO 9/1372, file WSC 3/548/2, part B. FCO 9/2712, file WSC 014/3, Annex to paper entitled ‘FAREWELL TO A PLACE OF ARMS’, sent under cover of letter of 25 July 1978 from Perceval to Daunt. See also Chapter Seven. FCO 9/1953, file WSC 3/548/13. ‘Flash’ is the highest category of immediacy for a telegram. Commander, British Forces Near East. FCO 9/1891, file WC 1/10, part B, FCO (Callaghan) telno. 145. Ibid. Valletta telno. 207. Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State. FCO 9/1915, file WSC 1/10, Annex. Makarios was not in any way a communist; yet Kissinger was prepared to use this McCarthyist slur for the sake of expediency. The ‘communist’ party in question was the Progressive People’s Working Party (AKEL). It is perhaps ironic that the current Cypriot president is a member of that party. Plus ça change. FCO 9/1892, file WSC 1/10, part C, Washington telno. 2414. Ibid., UKMIS New York telno. 786. FCO 9/1892, WSC 1/10, part C. Ibid., FCO telno. 138. Joint Intelligence Committee. FCO 9/1894, file WSC 1/10, part E. Stephen Olver, the British High Commissioner to Cyprus. WO/386/21. Near East Air Force. WO 386/1, Annex P to BFNE/1500/24. ‘British Policy on Cyprus: July to September 1974’, paragraph 4, FCO 9/2379, file WSC 020/548/1. The report was not prepared until eighteen months after the invasion, perhaps because of the work of the Parliamentary Select

198

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS Committee on Cyprus, which was shortly to interview Callaghan and question him about his foreknowledge of the invasion (he wrongly said that he had had no foreknowledge). Needless to say, the report does not even hint at Callaghan’s and the FCO’s advance knowledge. The report was prepared by the head of Southern European Department, Alan Goodison. It is in the first person, because it is meant to represent Callaghan’s views (he did amend it). Goodison accompanied Callaghan when he was questioned by the Select Committee on Cyprus, and did not contradict Callaghan’s inability to tell the truth about having prior indication about the Turkish invasion. Turan Günesh, Turkish Foreign Minister. George Mavros, Greek Foreign Minister. Op. cit., ‘British Policy on Cyprus: July to September 1974’. The Select Committee on Cyprus: Minutes of Evidence, Thursday, 19th February, 1976, FCO 9/2192, file WSC 3/548/10, part C. DEFE 11/833, ?33B FCO 9/1915, file WSC 1/10. Ibid. The word ‘power’ or ‘support’ should presumably have been added. PREM 16/20 Chapter Five

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

See Mallinson, William, Cyprus, A Modern History, I.B.Tauris, London and New York 2005 and 2009, p. 29, Rountree to Secretary of State, paper, 13 August 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, pp.384-392. The Soviets were of course also opposed to Cyprus uniting with Greece, since this would have strengthened NATO. Horace Phillips, British Ambassador to Turkey. Op. cit., ‘British Policy on Cyprus: July to September 1974’. Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Mr Arthur Hartman, USAssistant Secretary for European Affairs at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at 10.00 A.M. on Thurday 8 August 1974. FCO 9/1947, file WSC 3/304/2, part A. FCO 9/1947, file WSC 3/304/2 FCO 9/1947, file WSC 3/304/2, telegram 2693 of 14 August 1974 from British Embassy, Washington to FCO. Telegram under reference. FCO 9/1947, file WSC 3/304/2. FCO 9/1909, file WSC/10, part T. FCO 9/1915, file WSC 1/10, part C. FCO 9/1947, file WSC 3/303/2. Counsellor and Consul-General, British Embassy, Athens. Joseph Sisco, appointed by Kissinger to shuttle between Athens and Ankara to resolve the crisis engendered by the ‘Sampson coup’. Proved to be useless, or at least to have had no proper authority. FCO 9/1947, file WSG 3/304/2. Students of the CIA should read Agee, Philip, On the Run, Bloomsbury, London, 1987.

NOTES

199

17. FCO 9/1947, file WSC 3/304/2, Washington telno. 3729 of 16 November 1974. 18. FCO 9/1948, file WSC 3/304/2, part B. 19. FCO 82/63, file AMU 3/548/10. 20. British ambassador to the USA. I have not located this letter. 21. FCO 83/63, file AMU 3/548/10. 22. Michel Jobert, French Foreign Minister. 23. PREM 15/1272. 24. FCO 82/197, file AMU 3/548/15. ( John) Malcolm Mackintosh seems to have arrived at the Cabinet Office in a somewhat unconventional manner, as a programme organiser at the BBC and then as being ‘engaged on research’ at the Foreign Office. He was probably well connected to the security services. 25. FCO 82/286, file AMU 3/507/1 part F, Sykes to Brimelow, 22 August 1973. 26. FCO 82/304, file AMU 3/548/9, Overton to Hankey, no date, but received in registry on 1 October 1973. 27. FCO 9/1915, file WSC 1/10, part C. 28. FCO 9/2152, file WSC 1/5, part C, Weston to Morgan, 28 April 1975. 29. FCO 9/1947, file WSC 3/304/2, part A. 30. Kissinger, Henry A., Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1957, p. 165. Chapter Six 1. 2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

FCO 9/2388, file WSC 023/1, part H, Hibbert to Private Secretary, 27 October 1977. Rab Butler, (Conservative) Secretary of State. Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, who took an active part in the anti-colonial struggle, founded EDEK (Movement of Social Democrats of Cyprus) in 1969. He was president of the House of Representatives from 1985 to 1991, remaining president of his party until 2002, then being elected as honorary president. In 1964, Cuba cut off water supplies to the American base at Guantanamo Bay, since the US refused to return it to Cuba, as a result of which it took measures to become self-sufficient. Such a state of affairs would be embarrassing to Britain, and it is presumably to this that the brief is referring. DO/220/ 170, file MED 193/105/2, part A. Op.cit., Hibbert to Private Secretary. FCO 9/1916, file WSC 1/11, paper of 22 July 1974. FCO 82/446, file AMU 3/548/8, part B. FCO 46/1178, file DP 13/441/2, part C, Cable to Goodison, 22 October 1974. Deputy Under Secretary of State. FCO 46/1178, file DP 13/441/2, part C. FCO 46/1178, file DP 12/441, part C, telegram 2427 of 26 November 1974 from FCO to Washington. A. FCO 9/2169, file WSC 1/12, Olver to Secretary of State, Valedictory Dispatch, Diplomatic Report No. 353/75, 10 October 1975.

200

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

14. DEFE 11/832, file BFC/1120/21, Barton to Secretary, C of C Committee, 8 June 1976. 15. Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence. 16. Private Secretary to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 17. Permanent Under Secretary of State, MOD. 18. Chief of Defence Staff. 19. Permanent Secretary to the Treasury. 20. Letter from Hunt to Palliser, 22 July 1976, DEFE 68/373, file D/DPS (C) 103, part 8. 21. Defence and Overseas Policy. 22. DEFE 68/373, file D/DPS (C) 103, part 8. 29 September 1976. 23. FCO 9/2388, file WSC 023/1, part H, Hibbert to Minister of State’s Private Secretary, minute, 27 October 1976. 24. Ibid. , paper by Southern European Department, 27 October 1976. 25. DEFE 11/875, file D/COS 733 VOL 19, Stanford to Commander British Forces Cyprus, covering letter, 24 February 1976, enclosing new directive. 26. DEFE 24/1525, file D/DS8/24/2, part 36, Group Captain Bliss (Acting Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee), covering note of 28 January 1977 attaching MOD paper on the defence implications of an early military withdrawal from Cyprus (Annex A to COS5/77). 27. Fred Mulley, Secretary of State for Defence. 28. FCO 82/759, file AMU 026/2 Annexe, Note of a meeting between the Prime Minister and the United States Secretary of Defense at Blair House, Washington, on Thursday, 10 March 1977 at 17.05. 29. FCO 9/2724, file WSC 023/3, part A. 30. FCO 9/2547, file WSG 026/2, meeting at FCO between Dr. Owen and Glafkos Clerides, 2 February 1977. 31. FCO 9/2152, file WSC 1/5, part C, Weston to Morgan, 26 April 1975. 32. Ibid. , 29 April 1975. 33. Ian Winchester, Head of Southern European Department. 34. FCO 9/2505, file WSC 014/4, Record of a meeting held in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at 4.15 PM on 19 September 1977. 35. PUSD is the FCO department responsible for liaison with the Special Intelligence Service. 36. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 37. An Assistant Secretary in the State Department. 38. FCO 9/2828, file WSC 063/1, part A. 39. Ibid. 40. FCO 9/2827, file WSC 063/1, part A. 41. A bizarre error. There were twelve thousand Greek nationals in Istanbul, and some sixty thousand Turkish citizens of Greek stock and religion. 42. FCO 46/1248, file DPI/516/1, draft paper presented on 11 April 1975. 43. DEFE 13/1251, file D/MIN/WR/10/1, part 4, Weston to Wright, 8 July 1976, ‘Report from Select Committee on Cyprus’, covering letter attaching ‘Observations by the Government’.

NOTES

201

Chapter Seven 1. 2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19.

Before 1974, of course, the Turkish Cypriots were not a single geographical entity, as they became after the invasion, but smaller groups distributed throughout the island. UN Doc. S/6228, 11 March 1965, para. 17, in Mirbagheri, Farid, Cyprus and International Peacekeeping, Hurst & Company, London, 1998, p. 48. Michael Perceval entered diplomatic life by a route considerably less conventional than the norm: after Oxford, he served for four years in the Royal Air Force in Cyprus, was a film production assistant in Athens for a few months in 1960, and then a freelance journalist in Madrid until 1969, only joining the FCO in 1970 at the age of thirty-four. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that some of his work was unconventional. I assume that Perceval means ‘principles’. If not, then he would be subtly suggesting that Clerides was a yes-man of the West. Various Greek Cypriots have accused Clerides of being pro-British and not sufficiently robust vis-àvis the Turkish Cypriots, but the claims have not been entirely substantiated. FCO9/2386, file WSC 023/1, part F, letter of 29 July 1976. FCO 9/2712, file WSC 014/3, letter of 25 July 1978 from Perceval to Daunt, enclosing paper. Proposals for a measure of self-government, but excluding self-determination. Proposals for a measure of self-rule. Proposals for a constitution under British sovereignty, with Britain responsible for defence, foreign affairs and internal security, with mention of selfdetermination., but no specific commitment. Proposals for the division of the island between Greek and Turkish Cypriots for seven years, to be followed by joint sovereignty of Britain, Greece and Turkey. This should obviously read ‘1950’s’. A silly slip. Should be one word, ‘lumpenproletariat’. This is a little unfair, since the year before this was written, Makarios agreed to a bicommunal solution, as we shall shortly see. Cypriot Minister of the Interior, anti-communist, with, it was said, some dangerous contacts in Greece. Personnel Operations Department. Now inanely re-labelled ‘Human Resources Directorate”. The High Commissioner was misinformed: Ayios Theodoros was a mixed village, where the Greek Cypriot police wished to resume patrols, so as to ensure free and safe passage. They were aware that if the Greek Cypriots were forced out of the village, this would enable the Turkish Cypriots to form an enclave, thereby blockading the road between Nicosia and Limassol. According to the UNFICYP report, the Turkish Cypriots had started the shooting. See United Nations Security Council Document 5/8248 of 16 November 1967, and op. cit., Mirbagheri, p.54. FCO 9/785/1, file WSC 1/9. Valedictory dispatch, 28 April 1969. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, State Department. FCO 9/790, file WSC 2/4 (SE), record of a meeting held at the State Department on Tuesday, 18 November, at 9.45 a.m.

202

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

20. FCO9/786/1, file WSC 1/9 (S.E.), Prendergast to Tyler, 19 November 1969. 21. FCO 9/1146, file WSC 1/1, Ramsbotham to Secretary of State, 13 January 1970, Cyprus: Annual Review for 1969. 22. FCO 9/1667, file WSC 1/3, Day to Secretary of State, 1 January 1973, Cyprus: Annual Review for 1972. 23. FCO 9/1883, file WSC 1/1, Olver to Secretary of State, 3 January 1974, Cyprus: Annual Review for 1973. 24. FCO 9/2170, WSC 1/3, Gordon to Secretary of State, 4 December 1975, First Impressions of Cyprus. 25. See Mallinson, William, Partition through Foreign Aggression: The Case of Turkey in Cyprus, Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 2010. 26. FCO 9/2145, file WSC 1/3, Weston to Morgan, minute of 28 April 1975. 27. FCO 9/2194, file WSC 4/2, Goodison to Morgan, minute of 20 June 1975. 28. FCO 9/ 2156, file WSC 1/5, part G. extract from CC (75), 45th Meeting, held 30 October 1975. 29. FCO 82/666, file AMU 020/548/7, part C, FCO briefing for Dr. Kissinger’s visit, 4–5 August 1976, breakfast with the Prime Minister. 30. Ibid. 31. FCO 9/2376, file WSC 011/7, dispatch of 24 August 1976 from Horace Phillips, British ambassador to Turkey, to Secretary of State. 32. FCO 82/667, file AMU 020/548/7, part D, Annex to FCO briefing for Dr. Kissinger’s call on the Prime Minister, 10 December 1976. 33. Ibid. 34. FCO 9/2501, file WSC 14/2, part A, Gordon to Secretary of State, 18 May 1977, Diplomatic Report No. 232/77. 35. FCO 9/2539, file WSC 023/1, part C, FCO paper of 19 July 1977, entitled ‘Cyprus: models for a constitutional settlement’. 36. Turkish Foreign Minister. 37. FCO 9/2505, file WSC 014/4, Record of a meeting held in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at 4.15 p.m. on 19 September 1977. 38. FCO 9/2540, file WSC 013/1, memorandum of 4 October 1977 from Hibbert to Private Secretary. 39. FCO 9/2541, file WSC 023/3, part E, Record of a meeting held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 8 December 1977 at 5 p.m. 40. FCO 9/2735, file WSG 014/2, Richards to Secretary of State, Greece: Annual Review for 1977. 41. FCO 9/2709, file WSC 014/2, Gordon to Secretary of State, 3 January 1978, Cyprus: Annual Review for 1977. 42. FCO 9/2722, file WSC 023/2, Record of meeting between the Secretary of State and Mr Spyros Kyprianou in New York on 29 September at 2.30 p.m. 43. FCO 9/2715, file WSC 022/522/1, part B, Daunt to Fergusson, minute of 16 November 1978. 44. Ibid., comment at bottom of minute. 45. FCO 9/2820, file WSC 023/1, Record of conversation between the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at 11.45 a.m. 0n 8 February 1979.

NOTES

203

46. DEFE 11/833 and FCO 9/ 2823, file WSC 023/1, part D, Nicosia telegram 169 of 19 May 1979 to FCO. 47. FCO 9/2823/1, file WSC 023,part D, minute of 22 May 1979 from Daunt to Fergusson. 48. FCO 9/2893, file WST 026/1, summary record of talks between Mr O Yigit, Deputy Secretary-General of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mr J L Bullard at the FCO on 19 June 1979. 49. DEFE/ 1183, file C.O.S./733/1, vol. 2, telegram 746 of 16 July 1979 to FCO. 50. FCO 9/2824, file WSC 023/1, part E, Rhodes to Carrington, 24 September 1979, despatch, ‘ The Current State of the Cyprus Problem’. 51. Packard, Martin, Getting it Wrong: Fragments from a Cyprus Diary 1964, AuthorHouse UK Ltd, Central Milton Keynes, 2008, p. 1. Chapter Eight 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

O’Malley, Brendan and Craig, Ian, The Cyprus Conspiracy, IB Tauris, London and New York, 1999, p.153. See also FCO 9/2234, file WSG 3/318/2, telegram FOG 472 of 4 April 1975, from Defence Attaché, British Embassy, Athens, reporting further violations of Greek airspace by Turkish aircraft over Chios, and Greece’s rush to obtain military equipment. FCO 9/1525, file WSG 3/318/1. Ibid., Hitch to McLaren, minute of 7 September 1972. Ibid., Ramsay to McLaren, minute of 13 September 1972. A good FCO drafter of the time would have considered the phrase ‘ I am of this opinion…’ too long-winded and pompous, and substituted it with ‘I think this…’. Op. cit., FCO 9/1525, minute from Wood (Legal Advisers) to Hitch, 28 September 1972. FCO 46/1248, ‘British Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean’, paper prepared by SED in April 1975. FCO 9/2233, file WSG 3/318/1, letter of 28 September 1975 from Fullerton to Wright. FCO 082/666, AMU 020/548/7, part C, FCO brief for visit of Dr. Kissinger, 4–5 August: Prime Minister’s breakfast. British Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. PREM 16/1157. FCO9/2442, file WST 014/2. FCO 9/2500, file WSC 014/1, Gordon to Secretary of State, Cyprus: Annual Review for 1976. Should be a full stop. Apart from the three western permanent members, in 1976, Italy, Japan and Sweden were elected members. Presumably, the FCO only considered Italy a western member. PREM 16/1624, FCO brief for bilateral meeting between the Greek and British Prime Ministers at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London, 10–11 May 1977. FCO 9/2568, file WSG 020/1, part A.

204

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

18. FCO 9/2735, file WSG 015/2, Brook Richards to Secretary of State, 11 January 1978, Greece: Annual Review for 1977. 19. Sükrü Elekdag, Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. 20. Reginald Hibbert, Deputy Under Secretary. 21. John Kerr, Private Secretary to Permanent Under Secretary. 22. Ahmet Ökçün, Turkish Foreign Minister. 23. FCO 9/2728, file WSC 023/3, Daunt to Fergusson, minute of 4 December 1978. 24. FCO 46/1248. Chapter Nine 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Themistocles Chrysanthopoulos, Greek Consul General in Istanbul. Began his career at the Paris Peace Conference, and ended it as Ambassador to China. Until his death in 2004, he was the grand old man of the Greek Diplomatic Service. FO 371/147813, file CE 103144/28, Warr to Murray (British ambassador, Athens), letter of 15 June 1964. FO 371/180004, file CE 1011/1, Sykes to Walker, Greece: Annual Report for 1965. Central Treaty Organisation, founded in 1955, and comprising Britain, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus made it essentially moribund, and the fall of the Shah in 1979 finished it off. FCO 9/1109, file WST 10/11, Turkey: Defence Attaché’s Annual Review for 1968, 15 February 1969. FCO 9/1178, file WSC 10/14, letter of 30 September 1970 from Prendergast to Fearn. FCO 9/1499, file WSC 1/12, Diplomatic Report No. 503/72 on the Turkish Cypriot Administration, 25 October 1972, Edmonds to Secretary of State. FCO 9/2159, file WSC 1/7, part B, letter of 4 March 1975 from Olver to Goodison. Ibid., minute of 21 March 1975 from Batstone to Jones. The European Court of Human Rights, where the Cypriot government had initiated a number of legal actions against the Turkish government. Most of the actions were eventually successful, and are indeed still going through the court. FCO 9/ 2503, file WSC014/3, part A, letter of 19 May 1977 from Elliott to Short. See FO 371/117652, file RG 1081/900, letter of 12 August 1955 from Harding to Secretary of State for the Colonies. FCO 9/2668, file WST 014/1, part A, Diplomatic Report No.156/77 of 23 February 1977, from Horace Phillips to Secretary of State. Doubtless, detractors would say that the military merely intervened to save Turkish democracy. Gunther, John, Inside Europe, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1936 (May 1936), pp. 400–404.

NOTES

205

16. FCO 9/2669, file WST 014/1, part B, Diplomatic Report No. 215/77 of 31 May 1977, from Horace Phillips to Secretary of State. 17. Ibid., Richards to Secretary of State, 28June 1977, Horace Phillips’ Valedictory Dispatch, Diplomatic Report No. 237/77. 18. FCO 9/2834, file WSG 020/4, letter from Dodson to Daunt, 3 October 1979. Chapter Ten 1.

2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15.

Litsas, Spiros, ‘The Origins of the Enosis Question in Cyprus’, Defensor Pacis, issue 17, Athens, July 2005, pp. 118–119. Litsas quotes R. H. Lang’s article ‘Cyprus’, in Macmillan’s Magazine, but gives no further details. He also mentions German interest in Cyprus. Coughlan, Reed, ‘Enosis and the British: British Official Documents 1878– 1950’, Sources for the History of Cyprus, vol. XII, edited by Wallace, Paul W. and Orpanides, G., Greece and Cyprus Research Centre, Altamont, New York, 2004, p. 178. Coughlan quotes from Arnold Toynbee’s celebrated article ‘Cyprus, the British Empire and Greece’. Sakari Tuomioja, UN mediator for Cyprus. Suddenly died on 9 September 1964. Replaced by Galo Plaza. FO 371/174750, C1015/1400, letter of 4 May 1964 from Butler to Dodson. CAB 128/41, C (66) 16 of 28 January 1966, memorandum of 25 January 1966 by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Phillips Talbot, the American ambassador to Greece. RAIL 358/9, file CE 3/22, telegram of 22 January 1968 from Stewart to FCO. Elias Demetracopoulos, a heavyweight Greek journalist working in Washington, ascertained, through sheer tenacity, that Pappas had illegally transferred $549,000 from the Greek junta to Nixon’s campaign fund. So frightened were certain corrupt officials in the US, that they tried to harass and ridicule the journalist. See, for example, Anthony Powers, The Arrogance of Power, Penguin Books, New York, 2001, pp. 284–7, and article by Joseph Spear in Editor and Publisher, ‘After 20 Years, Watergate persists’, 16 June 1993. FCO 9/1725, file WSG 3/304/1, letter of 18 October from Hooper to Goodison. Michael Scott, Counsellor at the British High Commission in Nicosia. FCO 9/1160, file WSC 3/312/1, minute of 15 December 1971 from Fearn to Wilberforce, Secondé and Leahy. Leahy was involved because of the costs of Scott’s trip. The MOD drafter seems to have had a penchant for (unnecessary) capital letters. Op. cit., FCO 9/1160, Kilburn to those present, 18 December 1970, Minutes of a Meeting at the Ministry of Defence, London on 14 December 1970 to discuss the proposed installation of a French Broadcast Station at Cape Greco, Cyprus. FCO 9/1358, file WSC 1/2, Ramsbotham to Secretary of State, 1 January 1970, Cyprus: Annual Review for 1970. FCO 9/ 1894, file WSC 1/10, part E, Callaghan and Sauvagnargues, 19 July 1974, Record of Conversation.

206

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

16. FCO9/2226, file WSG 1/3, Richards to Secretary of State, 7 January 1975, Greece: Annual Review for 1974. 17. FCO 9/1946, file WSC 3/303/1, letter of 9 September from Richards to Killick. 18. FCO 9/1248, file DPI/516/1, letter from Weston to Lane, 11 April 1975. 19. FCO 9/2184, file WSG/2598/2, part A, FCO Brief No.4: European Political Co-operation Meeting, Venice, 11–12 September 1975. 20. FCO 9/2230, file WSG 3/304/1, letter of 11 December 1975 from Wainwright to Cornish. 21. Georg Leber, German Minister of Defence from 1972 until his resignation in1978 in a telephone eavesdropping scandal.Like most Defence Ministers of arms-manufacturing countries, he tried to sell arms abroad, hence his trip to Turkey. It is also noteworthy that Germany had far more Turkish immigrants than any other country. 22. FCO 9/2397, file WSG 020/318/1, FCO brief for Political Committee, Luxembourg, 23/24 April 1976, item 6(b). 23. FCO 9/2399, file WSG 021/1, Richards to Secretary of State, 14 July 1976, ‘Greece and the Western Connexion’, Diplomatic Report No. 292/76. See also FCO 9/2534, WSC 022/542/2, Winchester to Sutherland’s minute of 10 February 1977, where the FCO’s helpfulness to Turkey vis-à-vis Cyprus’ case against the former is evident, contrasting with France’s ‘ harsher line against Turkey’ at the Council of Europe. 24. Greeks have a tendency, at all levels of society, to prefer foreign ideas and products to their own, considering them more sophisticated. This is not unlike the more educated Turks, who love western things. 25. Raymond Barre, French Prime Minister. 26. FCO 9/2735, file WSG 014/2, Richards to Secretary of State, 11 January 1978, Greece: Annual Review for 1978. 27. A senior French Foreign Ministry official. 28. FCO 9/2401, file WSG 022/598/1, minute of 13 July 1976 from Vereker to Ambassador [Paris].

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Files of: Commonwealth Relations Office Colonial Office Foreign Office Foreign and Commonwealth Office Cabinet Office Prime Minister’s Office War Office Ministry of Defence Agee, Philip, On the Run, Bloomsbury, London, 1987. Coughlan, Reed, ‘Enosis and the British: British Official Documents 1878–1950’, Sources for the History of Cyprus, vol. XII, edited by Wallace, Paul W. and Orpanides, G., Greece and Cyprus Research Centre, Altamont, New York, 2004. Kissinger, Henry A., Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1957. Litsas, Spiros, ‘The Origins of the Enosis Question in Cyprus’, Defensor Pacis, issue 17, Athens, July 2005. Mallinson, William, Cyprus, A Modern History, I.B.Tauris, London and New York, 2005 and 2009. Mallinson, William, Cyprus: Diplomatic History and the Clash of Theory in International Relations, I.B.Tauris, London and New York, 2010. Mallinson, William, Partition through Foreign Aggression: The Case of Turkey in Cyprus, Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 2010. Mirbagheri, Farid, Cyprus and International Peacekeeping, Hurst & Company, London, 1998.

208

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

O’Malley, Brendan and Craig, Ian, The Cyprus Conspiracy, I.B.Tauris, London and New York 1999. Powers, Anthony, The Arrogance of Power, Penguin Books, New York, 2001. Packard, Martin, Getting it Wrong, AuthorHouse, Milton Keynes, 2008. Spear, Joseph, ‘After 20 Years, Watergate persists’, Editor and Publisher, 16 June 1993.

INDEX

Acland, Anthony 58, 84 Aegean ix, 13, 54, 114, 116, 118, 141, 148, 155, 157, 158, 160, 161, 164–168, 177–182 AKEL (Progressive Working People’s Party) ix, 88, 109, 128, 131 Albania 12, 13, 14 America 23, 82 Annan Plan 9, 123, 144 Arthur, Geoffrey 92 Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal 117, 148, 175–177 Atlantic Charter 4 Austria 13 Austro-Hungary 13 Balkan Wars 4, 13 Balkans 3, 12–14 Ball, George 155 Ball-Acheson Plan 7, 46 Barre, Raymond 189 Bayraktar 173 Bendall, David 48 Bevin, Ernest 15 BHC (British High Commission) ix, 186 Bitsios, Dimitrios 165

Bosnia-Herzegovina 13 Bowker, James 18 Bozkurt 173 Bragadino, Marco Antonio 2 Brimelow, Thomas 48 British Military Administration 4 Brown, Harold 105 Bulgaria 13 Bullard, Julian 110, 152 Burden, Derrick 64 Burma 16 Butler, Michael 183 Butler, Rab 88 Cable, James 84, 90 Caccia, Harold 22 Caglayangil, Ihsan 147, 165 Callaghan, James xiv, 57, 60, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 75, 76, 77, 81, 86, 90, 92, 93, 141, 162, 187 Carter, Jimmy 104, 180 Carver, Mike 95 CBFC (Commander British Forces Cyprus) ix, 94 CBFNE (Commander British Forces Near East) ix, 56 CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) ix, 28, 172

210

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

Chrysanthopoulos, Themistocles 170, 171 Churchill, Winston 4, 14, 15 Clark, Arthur 27 Clerides, Glafkos 52, 64, 107, 125, 126, 128, 129, 132, 141, 142, 145 CO (Colonial Office) ix, 4, 17, 19, 32, 47 Cold War 14, 23, 31, 119, 120, 155 Colonial Office ix, 4, 17, 20, 32, 47 Comnenus, Isaac 2 Congress of Berlin 3 Constantinople 1, 2, 3, 117 Cooper, Frank 95 Cornaro, Catherine 3 Cornish, Robert 54, 79 Cosmadopoulos, Dimitris 170, 171 Costar, Norman 136, 138 Crawford, William 85, 108 Crete 1, 4, 15, 16, 31, 157 CRO (Commonwealth Relations Office) ix, 32, 35, 47 Cromer, Earl of 83 Crusades 2 Cyrenaica 1, 16 Dale, William 36, 39, 40 Daunt, Timothy 48, 109, 130, 150, 151, 152, 168 Day, Derek 43, 139 DBPO (Documents on British Policy Overseas) ix, xiii, xiv Demirel, Süleyman 153 Denktash, Rauf 8, 53, 61, 64, 109, 125, 126, 132, 134, 140, 142, 144, 145, 149, 151, 153, 154, 173, 180, 188 Denson, John 80 Dimitriou, Demis 61

Disraeli, Benjamin 183 Dodecanese 4, 16, 171 Dodson, Derek 170, 171, 183 DOPC (Defence and Oversea Policy Committee) ix, 103 DUSS (Deputy Under Secretary of State) ix, 16, 18, 32, 48, 110 EAM (National Liberation Front) ix, 11 Eastern Roman Empire 2 Eçevit, Bulent 53, 60, 61, 62, 65, 76, 77, 78, 86, 127, 150, 153, 179, 180 Edmonds, Robert 49, 138 EEC (European Economic Community) ix, 66, 115, 120, 135, 141, 143, 162, 187, 188, 190 Egypt 1, 16, 23, 73, 114 ELAS (Greek People’s Liberation Army) ix, 11, 15 ELDYK (Hellenic Force in Cyprus) ix, 53 Elekdag, Sükrü 166 EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) ix, 5, 27, 57, 67, 118, 126, 131 Erbakan, Necmettin 153, 177 ESBA (Eastern Sovereign Base Area) ix, 101, 105, 106, 107 EU (European Union) xi, xiv, 9, 135, 141, 155, 157, 190 Fairbrother, Maureen 54 Famagusta 2, 62, 66, 129, 152 FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) ix, xiii, xiv, xv, 41, 47, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 85,

INDEX 87, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 113, 120, 135, 137, 138, 142, 143, 146, 148, 150, 153, 158, 159, 160, 161, 164, 165, 166, 168, 174, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188 Fearn, Patrick 41 Fearn, Robin 172, 185 Fergusson, Ewen 109, 151, 168 FO (Foreign Office) ix, 6, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 36, 39, 45, 46, 47, 83, 119, 163, 169, 171, 192 Ford, Gerald 105, 145 Fort, Maeve 124 France 3, 73, 166, 168, 182, 183, 184, 187, 188, 189, 190 Freeland, John 64 French Revolution 3 FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) ix, xiii Fullerton, William 160 Galo Plaza 7 GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) ix, 104, 121 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 142 Germany 4, 12, 82, 176, 188 Gizikis, Phaedon 53 Goodison, Alan 43, 44, 57, 64, 65, 75, 91 Gordon, Donald 143, 147 Graham, John 48 Great Eastern Crisis 3 Greek Civil War 4, 11, 15 Greenhill, Dennis 83 Grivas, George 5, 7, 8, 20, 52, 118, 135, 136, 139 Guicciardini, Francesco xiv, 191

211

Günesh, Turan 64 Guy de Lusignan 2 Hartman, Arthur 62, 75, 76, 77 Harvey, Oliver 16, 17, 31 Heath, Edward 66, 79, 84, 102 Hibbert, Reginald 99, 147, 150, 166 Hitch, Brian 158, 159 HMG (His/Her Majesty’s Government) ix, 44, 51, 54, 55, 57, 65, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104, 109, 111, 116, 161 Hunt, John 93, 94 Hyland, William 83 ICJ (International Court of Justice) ix, 157, 161, 164, 165, 167 Ilgili Makam 173 Imbros 158 India 4, 16, 27, 33 Inonü, Mustafa Ismet 54, 126 Ioannides, Dimitris 52, 53, 54, 127 Iraq 22, 112 Istanbul 5, 23, 118, 170, 178 Izmir 5, 118, 178 Jackling, Roger 82, 83 Jannissaries 2 JIC ( Joint Intelligence Committee) ix, 60, 61, 65, 88, 94, 98, 102 Jobert, Michel 83 Judd, Frank 146, 147, 148 Kahraran, Cernal 158 Karamanlis, Constantinos 5, 53, 78, 81, 180, 184, 185, 188, 189 Kerr, John 166, 167 Killick, John 57, 90, 108 Kirkpatrick, Ivone 21

212

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

Kissinger, Henry xiv, 8, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 66–71, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 101, 102, 104, 105, 113, 127, 141, 142, 143, 145, 162–164 Knights Templar 2 Kolettis, Ioannis 187 Kyprianou, Spiros 54, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154 Lagoussae (Rabbit Islands) 158 Lapsley, John 32, 33, 34, 35 Larnaca 100, 134 Lausanne Convention 158, 164 Leahy, John 185 Lebanon 1 Leber, Georg 188 Limassol 134 Limnos 158 Lloyd, John Selwyn Brooke 21 Lyssarides, Vassos 89, 107 Machiavelli, Niccolo xiv Mackintosh, Malcolm 84 Macmillan Plan 5, 24, 131 Makarios, Archbishop 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 23, 24, 27, 29, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 70, 73, 79, 81, 82, 88, 96, 118, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 137, 138, 139, 141, 144, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151, 169, 170, 179, 180, 193 Makins, Roger 20 Man, Morgan 170 Markezinis, Spyros 52, 185 Mavros, George 64, 68, 76 Mayne, John 94

McPetrie, James 36, 39, 46 Mellersh, Francis 65, 66 Menderes, Adnan 5 Mintoff, Dom 56 MOD (Ministry of Defence) ix, xiii, 21, 28, 57, 66, 81, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 102, 104, 110, 175, 185, 186 Montreux Convention 157, 158, 159, 160 Moon, Peter 48 Moreton, John 39, 41, 46 Morgan, Hugh 108 Mottershead, Frank 28 Mulley, Fred 105 Napoleon 3, 183, 189 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) ix, 11, 28, 29, 32, 35, 50, 51, 67, 68, 73, 75, 77, 78, 79, 89, 96, 97, 98, 99, 103, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 131, 135, 140, 143, 158, 159, 172, 180, 181, 184, 185, 188, 189, 190 NEAF (Near East Air Force) ix, 61 Noel-Baker, Francis 15, 16, 31 Norton, Clifford 17 Nutting, Anthony 20, 22 Ökçün, Ahmet 166 Olver, Stephen 61, 94, 139, 173 Ottoman Empire 3, 4, 13, 18, 117, 119 Overton, Hugh 84, 110 Owen, David 99, 108, 146, 147, 148, 150, 152 Packard, Martin 155

INDEX Palestine 1, 4, 16, 91 Palliser, Michael 94 Papadopoulos, George 52, 184 Papandreou, Andreas 184 Paphos 1 Papoulias, Karolos 181, 182 Pappas, Tom 184, 185 Perceval, Michael 52, 124, 130, 131, 135, 136, 151, 193 Perez de Cuellar, Javier 125 Phillips, Horace 75, 143, 179, 181 Prendergast, Kieran 138, 172 Pritchard, Neil 32, 34, 88 PUS[S] (Permanent Under Secretary [of State]) ix, 16, 21, 83, 94 PUSD (Permanent Under Secretary of State’s Department) 109 Ramsbotham, Peter 27, 76, 77, 85, 86 Rhodes, Peregrine 110, 153, 181 Rhodes, Margaret 181 Richard Coeur de Lion 2 Richard, Ivor 59, 163 Richards, Brooks 74, 148, 149, 179 Rogers, Philip 32, 33, 35 Roman Catholic Church 2 Russia 3, 13, 14, 73 Salamis 1 Samothraki 158 Sampson, Nikos 8, 54, 58, 59, 61, 79, 80, 89, 179 Sandys, Duncan 28 Sargent, Orme 16 Satterthwaite, John 170 Sauvagnargues, Jean 187 Savoy, Duke of 3

213

SBA (Sovereign Base Area) x, xv, 6, 29, 31, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 55, 56, 59, 71, 74, 85, 87, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 121, 132, 134, 142, 185, 186 Scott, Michael 185 Secondé, Reginald 27, 48, 185 SED (Southern European Department) x, 27, 41, 48, 54, 57, 64, 91, 100, 109, 110, 124, 130, 150, 158, 160, 166, 172, 185 Sisco, Joseph 74, 80, 85, 86 Smith, Nick 174 Soviet Union 5, 7, 11, 14, 15, 31, 50, 56, 58, 75, 78, 79, 80, 86, 92, 96, 110, 112, 114, 121, 143, 163, 178 Stabler, Wells 92, 93 Steel, Henry 41 Stoforopoulos, Themos 158, 159 Suez 5, 6, 23, 31, 73, 102, 113 Sykes, Richard 84, 183 Syria 112 Talbot, Phillips 184 Tenedos 158 Thirteen Points 6, 7, 27, 28 Thomson, John 60 Tomkys, William 79 Treaty of Alliance 6, 42 Treaty of Establishment 6, 7, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 90, 185 Treaty of Guarantee 6, 8, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 52, 54, 55, 57, 59, 62, 66, 70, 107, 115, 118, 120, 121, 174

214

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS

Treaty of Lausanne 5, 18, 117, 157 Treaty of San Stefano 3 Tuomioja,Sakari 28, 29, 30, 31, 184 Türkeş, Alparslan 153 UAR (United Arab Republic) x, 88 UN (United Nations) 6, 7, 8, 17, 19, 20, 28, 31, 38, 41, 46, 57, 58, 59, 60, 66, 68, 96, 110, 123, 124, 127, 128, 132, 136, 138, 141, 143, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 161, 162, 165, 167, 173, 183, 188 UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) x, 34, 46, 59, 62, 66, 88, 132, 136, 145 USA 4, 110, 120 USSR 4, 88, 112, 119, 183 Vallat, Francis 36, 39 Vance, Cyrus 132 Varlik Vergisi 14 Varosha 134, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153 Vassilakis, Constantinos 158 Venizelos, Eleftherios 4, 148, 184 Vest, George 109 Vico, Giambattista xiv, 191 Waldheim, Kurt 59, 70, 125 Ward, Jack 19, 21 Warr, George 169 Wass, Douglas 95 Weston, Michael 108 Wiggin, Charles 82, 83 Wilberforce, William 185 Winchester, Ian 108 WOD (Western Organisations Department) x, 159

Wright, Georgina 160 WSBA (Western Sovereign Base Area) x, 101, 105, 106 Yigit, Alpoğan 152 Young, William 18, 20 Yugoslavia 13, 14, 112