Black banners from the East, Vol. 2 9789652233882

Citation preview

REVOLT THE SOCIAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE ‘ABBASID REVOLUTION

THE MAX SCHLOESSINGER MEMORIAL SERIES

MONOGRAPHS V

The Max Schloessinger Memorial Series publishes texts and monographs in Arabic and Islamic studies. It was established at the Institute of Asian and African Studies

of the Hebrew University through the generosity of the late Mrs. Miriam S. Schloessinger in honour of her late husband, Professor Max Schloessinger.

Fditorial Board _ D. AYALON, J. BLAU, Y. FRIEDMANN, M.J. KISTER, M. MILSON, S. SHAKED, P. SHINAR

Institute of Asian and African Studies

BLACK BANNERS FROM THE EAST II

REVOLT THE SOCIAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE ‘ABBASID REVOLUTION

BY

MOSHE SHARON

1990 THE MAX SCHLOESSINGER MEMORIAL FUND THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY — JERUSALEM

© The Max Schloessinger Memorial Fund and M. Sharon The Hebrew University, 1990

This study was supported by the Research and Development

Fund of the Hebrew University |

ISBN 965-223-388-9

Printed in Israel Typeset by Quintin Gee The University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg Printed by Graph Press Ltd., Jerusalem

To Judy

CONTENTS

Foreword 9 REVOLT

Introduction 15 Chapter 1 Prelude to Revolt: Tribes at War 23

in the Open 49

Chapter 2 Hoisting the Black Banners — The Da‘ wah

Chapter 3 Foundation for a New Order 95

Chapter 4 The Strategy of Victory 143 Chapter 5 The Great March Westward 177

Abbasid Rule 223

Chapter 6 Death of The Imam and The Legitimacy of

Chapter 7 The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim,

Their Background and Consequences 261

Bibliography 303

Index 325 LIST OF MAPS I. The Caliphate in the East at the time of transition from

Umayyads to “Abbasids 321

II. The Expedition of the Da‘wah army under Qahtabah 323

Foreword

This volume was composed at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. The atmosphere of learning on Campus and a research grant by the university afforded me the suitable conditions to bring this work to completion. This book is based on many years of research on the revolutionary idea in Islam. It is the second in a trilogy dedicated to the first major revolution in Islam, a revolution which contributed the pattern and the main terminology to almost all the revolutionary movements that followed. The only manuscript of the third and last volume of this trilogy, dealing with the consolidation of the ‘Abbasid state, was stolen and destroyed on January 1, 1988, and I hope to be able to reconstruct it soon.

Many friends, colleagues and students contributed to this research in one way or another. Thanks are due to them all and especially to the Professors David Ayalon, Meir Jacob Kister, Bernard Lewis and Jacob Lassner and to Dr. Amikam El‘ad and Reuven Amitai.

Special gratitude is due to Mr. Quintin Gee from the Department

of Computer Science at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, who, with his amazing dexterity, professionalism and dedication, solved the complicated problems of setting the text of the book from the original computer discs. Mrs. Maryjane du Toit who typed the second half of the manuscript and proof-read and edited the early version of the whole work. Miss Idit Shmueli read, with talent and skill, the final draft, care-

fully checked the notes and made every effort to clean the manuscript from errors. Mrs. Roberta Saperstein and Mr.

Nkosinathi Gamedze also read through the whole book and made many suggestions regarding language and style, which were fully incorporated into the manuscript. Mrs. Linda EggerUys attended to the administrative matters connected with the production of the book in Johannesburg.

Nothing can be properly achieved without the support of the home for which I shall always be indebted to my wife Judith and to my children. May they all be blessed.

| M.S. Johannesburg, September 1987

REVOLT THE SOCIAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE ‘ABBASID REVOLUTION

Introduction This book is an independent volume as much as it is a sequel. It

tells the story of the decisive, military stage of the “Abbasid revolution. It is the story of the open revolt which defeated the Umayyad’s military establishment and placed the “Abbasids in power. As such, it is also a sequel, for it carries the theme of my Black Banners from the East — Incubation of a Revolt, one stage further. The topic of both volumes is revolution. Although they may be regarded as a detailed study of a particular revolution — the ‘Abbasid one — they nevertheless contribute to the understanding of the mechanism of revolution in general. Successful revolutions, not mere rebellions which exchange one ruler for

another, are not very numerous in human history. Abortive revolutions are abundant. Every revolution grows out of its own

particular socio-economic, cultural, military and other conditions. Every revolution develops within its own particular circumstances and follows its own particular course. However, all real revolutions, whether successful or abortive, have one feature in common. They all must have two stages: the stage of doctrinal preparation and the stage of military revolt.

The first stage usually stretches over a long period and 1s almost invariably carried out in a clandestine fashion. In a sense, the revolution is then in a stage of incubation during which the revolutionary ideas are disseminated and the public is patiently and persistently indoctrinated. Every revolution creates its own mechanisms of indoctrination in accordance with the circumstances, the time and the place of its activity. However, the ideas propagated among the target public are invariably simple; they emphasize the vices of the existing order and promise a perfect, ideal one instead.

16 Introduction The second stage of the revolution is the violent, militant and decisive one. During this stage the revolution must be able to create for itself a fighting force that can defeat the army of the existing regime. The military phase of the revolution becomes simpler and more assured of its success if the revolution is able to infiltrate the ranks of the standing army of the regime and attract it wholly or partially to its side.

The “Abbasid revolution featured the two revolutionary phases — the incubatory, long, clandestine one and the militant, violent one — very distinctly.

The first phase of the “Abbasid revolution stretched over a

period of almost two generations. During this period, the movement, operating from three major centres, formed its ideology and created the intricate methods and means to win as wide

a public support as possible for its cause. | In the volume dedicated to the incubation of the revolt, the story of the “Abbasid revolution was bound to start with the inception of Islam. The controversy over the identity of the leadership of the Islamic community and state is rooted somewhere in the very hazy beginnings of Islamic history. It left a lasting scar on Islam and was the source of most of the major schisms which tore it apart. Islamic tradition created the concept of the “unified beginning” for Islamic history. The Prophet received the divine revelation,

around which the initial community of believers, mu’ minin, grew and, during his lifetime and after his death, they carried the

divine message, which assumed the name Islam, to the four corners of the world. In spite of the fact that the Prophet apparently left no clear instructions about the nature of the leadership after him, the community found no difficulty in finding the suit-

able leaders to lead the young Islamic state on the way to the creation of an empire. Each one of these leaders was designated as the “Commander of the Faithful” — Amir al-mw’ minin.

The problems arose about a generation after the death of the Prophet. The third Caliph ‘Uthman was murdered and a civil war broke out which involved the three major provinces of the empire: Syria, Iraq and Hiyjaz. The war ended with the establishment of the Umayyad rule in Syria but also saw the beginning of a permanent rift within Islam

itself, which was destined to continue endlessly. The losing

_ Introduction 17 party in the war was the party which supported “Ali, found mainly in Iraq. This party, later known as the Shi‘ah, never accepted its defeat nor went back on its firm conviction that only ‘Ali and his descendants were the legitimate leaders of Islam. Since then, nothing could stop the Shi‘ah from evolving as the major schism in Islam and as a permanent political opposition.

The theory of the “unified beginning” sponsored by the Islamic tradition, which describes Islam as growing in and spreading from one centre in Arabia, was a theological necessity. It represented the ideal of unity born with one God and one Prophet. This ideal of unity represented not so much the facts about the nature of early Islamic history but rather the yearning of the later Islamic tradition for this ideal. Amid the internal strife

which divided Islam and shattered its political and social structures, the tradition created an ideal time of unity — the time of the Prophet and of his immediate companions-successors. The success of the tradition in creating a picture of this ideal time of unity was complete because the idealization of the Prophet’s era was particularly needed by the Shi‘ite opposition and its successor, the “Abbasid movement. While presenting the Umayyad rule as the unholy rule of a bunch of usurpers, the Shi‘ah offered the restoration of the ideal time of the Prophet under the rule of the latter’s beloved and divinely-elected and inspired relatives. By the “Prophet’s relatives,” or the ““Prophet’s family,” the Shi‘ah meant “Ali and his descendants but, once the idea was created, nothing could stop the machinery of tradition from widening the membership in the ‘“Prophet’s family” to his other immediate relatives and even his whole clan. The story of the birth and early development of Islam must have been significantly different from the one presented by the

tradition of the “unified beginning.” With a little effort, the sources may be searched for a fresh interpretation which yields a new picture of the beginnings of Islam.

In essence, it seems that what came to be known as Islam began with several groups or communities of mu’ miniin, who cherished Muhammad as their Prophet. They sprang up in Iraq, in Syria, in north-west Arabia and probably also in north-east Arabia. Each one of the communities of mu’minin was led by an amir, who was thus called amir al-mu’minitn. Each one of

18 Introduction these mu’ miniun communities developed separately under the in-

fluence of the surrounding Christian or Jewish culture. The various leaders of these communities of mu’ miniin strove concurrently for supreme leadership and claimed the right to this leadership on various grounds of legitimacy which could easily be supported by traditions that could be created on demand. It

was not until the end of the 7th century that Syria, under the leadership of the local amir al-mu’ minin, emerged as the winning province and the other mu’ miniin communities had to accept its supreme authority. Islam, therefore, did not begin as a unity which was threatened by an internal schism, but in inde-

pendent centres which were ultimately united by force. Naturally, each one of these major centres — notably Syria, Iraq and Hijaz — continued to nurture the memories of their particular independence and the hopes for future ascendancy under the rule of the family of their local amir al-muw’ minin. In time these old memories faded away in most of the provinces under the impact

of the traditions of the “unified beginning,” but not in Iraq. There, the tradition of the “unified beginning” was remoulded to suit the claim of the Shi‘ah to represent the only legitimate leadership of Islam. The Shi‘ah was born in violence. It was the product of a civil war, according to the scheme of the Islamic tradition, or of the

contest for supremacy between the mu’ miniin of Iraq and the

mu'minin of Syria, if one chooses to reject the traditional Islamic scheme. After a violent birth, the Shi‘ah’s growth and development was accompanied by a series of violent outbursts. of abortive rebellions against the Umayyads. In the process, the Shi‘ah formulated its elementary ideology, acquired its first martyrs and began to split up. One of these early subsections was the Hashimiyyah, the forerunner of the ‘Abbasid movement. The Hashimiyyah originated among the adherents of ‘Ali’s son, Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah, and those of the latter’s son, Aba Hashim. Though its birth was violent, in the great revolt of Mukhtar (685-687), the Hashimiyyah’s main characteristics were its political quietism, abandonment of the violent option and long-term clandestine activity. On the organizational side, the Hashimiyyah featured a rigid hierarchy of leadership and a strict code of secrecy. Although its inception was in Iraq, the Hashimiyyah made its real progress in the eastern

_ Introduction 19 provinces and especially in Khurasan. Towards the end of the first century, the Hashimiyyah was taken over by an “Abbasid leader, Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas. He and his family were then living in the village of Humaymah to the southeast of the Dead Sea on the main caravan and pilgrimage route from Damascus to the holy cities in Arabia. This location afforded the ‘Abbasids seclusion from the eyes of the Umayyad authorities, yet it also provided unlimited opportunities to create contacts with the pilgrims and travellers who passed through their village without arousing any suspicion. Muhammad b. ‘Ali reorganized the Hashimiyyah and turned it into a clandestine or-

ganization geared towards propagating the cause of the Prophet’s family. Eager to detach himself and his movement from the Shi‘ah in Iraq that tended to rush from time to time into unplanned, useless, suicidal rebellions, he chose Khurasan and its adjacent provinces as his main place of activity. This is how the Da‘wah came into being. The term da‘wah was chosen be-

cause of its association with the original call of the Prophet to Islam. As such the term symbolized the ideal of the Prophet’s time, which the tradition had already created. The new Da‘wah, that of Muhammad b. “Ali and the Hashimiyyah under his leadership, was to promise the re-institution of the Prophet’s time and the Prophet’s perfect order instead of the current tyrannical rule of the Umayyads. In other words, the Hashimite Da‘ wah was to propagate among the masses the idea of a true revolution, in which the wheel of history turns full-circle back to the ideal time of the Prophet. The term chosen for this idea of revolution was dawlah which literally means “a turn.” In the case of Islam, the Da‘wah was to teach that when the wheel of time comes fullcircle to the beginning point, where a new turn — a new dawlah —

should start, a member of the Prophet’s family will be there to lead Islam into the eternal ideal order until the end of days. For obvious reasons, the identity of this member of the Prophet’s family could not be revealed. He was to be presented by the

Da‘wah propagandists as “the one agreed upon from Muhammad’s family” or in short “the one agreed upon” — arrida. Besides the need to protect the future leader by keeping his identity secret, there was a logic behind the anonymity of the leader. Nobody could say who would be the leader at the appointed time of the dawlah when the wheel of history completes

20 Introduction its full turn. The tradition, however, was already put into circulation that the new era in which Islam must be rejuvenated — the era of renewal (tajdid) when the revolution should be expected —

would occur at the beginning of every new century. Whether Muhammad b. ‘Ali himself was behind the creation of this tradition, or not, is immaterial; the fact was that a new Islamic cen-

tury was at hand. The Hashimite Da‘wah began its systematic activity in the year 100 or thereabouts.

There were two main centres for this activity outside Humaymah: Kafah in Iraq and Marw in Khuras4n. The centre in

Kitfah was, on the whole, dormant. It was the seat of some of the veteran leaders of the Hashimiyyah and served as a linking post between Khurasan and Humaymah. It was only on rare occasions that the leader of the movement came to Humaymah to meet Muhammad b. ‘Ali, who had assumed the title of imam. This is a Qur’anic term which signifies a sign, a model, a perfect leader. As such, it was an ideal title for representing both temporal and spiritual leadership. When the ‘Abbasids came to power, imam was added to the regnal titles of the Caliph.

Special emissaries were sent from Kifah instructed by the

Imam to organize the centre of the Hashimite Da‘wah in Khurasan. The most important was Bukayr b. Mahan, who set the principles of the Da‘wah’s activity in the Eastern provinces and created the main institutions of the movement. Throughout Khurasan and its neighbouring provinces, he formed a strictly hierarchical body of leaders and propagandists, whose function was to indoctrinate the public and prepare the ground for the revolt, for which a time had not yet been specified.

The top leadership of the movement consisted of several nugaba’ (sing. naqib). Later ‘AbbAsid tradition puts their number at twelve. As the number of the leaders of the of the Israelite tribes and the number of Jesus’ disciples, this was appropriate for a movement with a prophetic message and background. The nugqaba’ were the supreme leaders of the movement, the only

ones who could meet with the Jmam. Most of them lived in Marw and its vicinity and were both Arabs and mawali of Arab tribes. Under the nuqaba’, there was a large body of propagandists — du ‘at (sing. da@‘i), who were scattered throughout the Eastern provinces and were responsible for the perpetuation of

day to day propaganda in these provinces. For twenty five

Introduction 21 years, this incredibly efficient propaganda machine uninterruptedly disseminated the ideas of the Hashimiyyah. The public was

urged to reject the Umayyad usurpatory rule and to await the coming of the leader of the family of the Prophet. The exact identity of the ideal leader was not known but many expected

him to be a descendant of ‘Ali. Nobody thought about the ‘Abbasids because until then, the main opposition to the Umayyads was led by ‘Alid pretenders. The “Abbasid leader did

not mind the fact that the public, and some of the nuqaba’ and many of the du ‘Gt, were led to believe that the movement served

an ‘Alid purpose. It kept the mam perfectly secure from the Umayyad reaction. But the time eventually came for the Da’ wah

to become ‘Abbasid. This happened in 125 after yet another abortive Shi‘ite attempt at revolt, the revolt of Zayd b. ‘Ali and his son Yahya b. Zayd. The failure of this revolt, in the course of which both Zayd and Yahya were killed, presented the ‘Abbasid leader of the Hashimiyyah with an opportunity to turn

the movement into a purely ‘Abbasid movement. The broken and disappointed Shi‘ah in Khurasan yearned for a member of the Prophet’s family to assume leadership and responsibility, to avenge the blood of the two new martyrs. The ‘Abbasids could then easily be presented as the only relatives of the Prophet fit for the task. _ Without revealing the exact identity of the leader, the ‘Alid Hashimite Da‘wah became an ‘Abbasid movement since its

leader was now identified as a descendant of ‘Abbas, the

Prophet’s uncle, and not of ‘Ali, the Prophet’s cousin. Nevertheless, the public continued to regard the Da‘wah as an ‘Alid movement and to expect the ‘Abbasid leaders to cherish the “Alid cause. In the subsequent history of the ‘Abbasids this public view of the ‘Abbasid role in the Hashimite Da‘wah was the cause of much trouble. Another important development occurred at about the same

time in the ‘Abbasid family in Humaymah: the Jmam Muhammad b. ‘Ali died and was succeeded by his son, Ibrahim, who came to be known as the Imam par excellence and has accordingly been called Ibrahim al-Jmam. In his time, under

his supreme leadership and following his direct orders, the Da‘wah moved from the first incubatory phase of clandestine activity into the phase of open and violent revolt.

22 Introduction Ibrahim chose Abi Muslim to prepare the Da‘wah for the decisive second phase. He could not have chosen a better person. Already as a young man in the service of some Shi‘ite sympa-

thizers in Kifah, Abi Muslim attracted the attention of Abi Salamah and other leaders of the Hashimiyyah. From the conflicting reports about Abu Muslim’s obscure origin and early history, one can only be sure of the fact that as a very young man, he entered the service of Abii Salamah, was initiated into the Da‘wah and was presented to Ibrahim. The latter, recognizing the unique qualities of Abii Muslim, sent him to lead the Da‘wah in Khurasan. His youth and the fact that he was a total Stranger made his task of assuming the leadership of the move-

ment in Khurasan particularly difficult. The veteran leader, Sulayman b. Kathir, who led the Da‘wah in Marw for many years, opposed Abu Muslim violently. However, patiently taking advantage of the internal competition among the leaders of the Da‘wah in Khurasan, Abii Muslim took over the movement and set upon turning it into a military force capable of crossing swords with the Umayyad armies. In one year Abi Muslim had created a large, well-trained revolutionary army and declared an open revolt. This book tells the story of that revolt.

I

PRELUDE TO REVOLT: TRIBES AT WAR

Prelude to Revolt: Tribes at War 25 ] TRIBAL LOYALTIES UNDER THE UMAYYADS

Caliph Mu‘awiyah, tradition tells us, had a natural gift for leadership and an outstanding ability to assess people and subtly to take advantage of their weaknesses. In a letter which he is supposed to have written to his brother Ziyad, the governor of Iraq, he made the following remarks on the tribes of Iraq: “You are surrounded by Mudar, Rabi‘ah and the Yaman. Now, as for Mudar nominate them to administrative posts and make them rule one over the other. As for Rabi‘ah, you should honour their noblemen, for they have the authority over the rank and file of the tribe. As for the Yaman show them respect overtly but loathe them

secretly.” .

It is not the problem, at this juncture, whether the Caliph wrote such a letter or not. The importance of this tradition, which is by no means unique, lies in the fact that it highlights the ever-existing tribal problem in the Islamic empire.

The tribal traditions, the tribal affiliations and loyalties, the tribal interests and inter-tribal jealousies were not abolished even after Islam was finally established as the religion of the state. The natural tribal loyalty (‘asabiyyah) proved to be far more concrete and practically meaningful in the political and social life

of the Empire. One may even say that the Empire provided a broader scope and more opportunities for the inter-tribal jealousies and contests to thrive on. The issues were no longer connected with the domination of desert tribal areas and caravan routes, but rather with wielding power and controlling the wealth of some of the most prosperous regions of the East. The Umayyad period was a period in which the Empire was created and consolidated. This was the period in which Islam assumed its independent Arab character. But the Umayyads were not interested in changing the traditional Arab tribal social order. This could not have been a priority, and in fact there should not have been a reason for them to attempt to supplant deeply rooted

1 Baladhuri, Ansab, IVA, p. 12

26 Chapter I tribal traditions. In the long run, the tribal tension formed an important component in their internal policy. In historical perspective, the individualistic nature of the tribal element in the Empire was one of the major causes for the Umayyad downfall. At the

time, most of the Umayyad caliphs and governors must have thought that the fomenting of inter-tribal hatred weakened the tribes, checked them and denied them the ability to endanger the Stability of the realm.

The Arab tribes took their tradition of inter-tribal struggle wherever they went. This struggle could have been contained in a limited area and among a limited number of tribes or individuals but it could also erupt into a full scale inter-tribal war which could comprise a whole province and have a shattering effect on the greater part of the Empire. From the outset the ‘Abbasid activity in Khurasan was conducted against a background of ruthless and continual inter-tribal struggle which centred around the alliance of Azd and Rabi‘ah,

(the Yaman) on the one hand and the tribes of Mudar on the other. The details of the vicissitudes of this struggle were reviewed and discussed in detail by Wellhausen.? The tribal strife seems to have been symptomatic of the permanent tendency that prevailed in Khurasan, as well as in Syria and Iraq, according to which the rise or fall of a particular group of tribes was directly connected with the tribal origin of the governor of the province. The appointment of a governor from one of the “northern”’ tribes resulted in the ascendancy of the “northern” tribal alliance or of a particular “northern” tribe and the suppression of the “southern” ones and vice versa. Since this was a regular process,’ it follows

that whenever we choose to begin our survey of the history of Khurasan, we shall be able to know with much certainty which groups of tribes were “up” and which were “down.” Ever since the final eclipse (in the year 99/717) of the family of Muhallab b. Abt Sufrah, the family which had raised the tribes of Azd to a strong and privileged position in Khurasan, and had indirectly strengthened the southern tribes in general — 2 Wellhausen, pp. 397-491. For the background of the inter-tribal strife in Khurasan see Banners, I, ch. 3. Cf., Gibb, Conquests, pp. 23, 27, 29, 73; Daniel, pp. 20f and note 12; Kennedy, pp. 36f.

3 Cf., Néldeke, p. 107.

Prelude to Revolt: Tribes at War 27 Khurasan was ruled, on the whole, by governors of northern origin who had humiliated the southern tribes and had turned them into a grumbling and disaffected opposition.4

When Asad b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri, the brother of Iraq’s governor Khalid b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri, was appointed for a second term of office as the governor of Khurasan in the year 117/735, the southern tribes rose from their lowly status for a short time

only.» Asad came to Khurasan after three governors from northern tribes had held office there in succession: Ashras b. ‘Abdallah as-Sulami (109/727-111/729), Junayd b. ‘Abd arRahman al-Murri (111/729-117/734) and ‘Asim b. ‘Abdallah al Hilali (116/734-117/735). This means that for nine years governors from northern tribes favoured the tribes of Mudar at the expense of the Yaman.°®

THE MOVEMENT OF HARITH B. SURAYJ

During the governorship of ‘Asim b. ‘Abdallah al-Hilali, another factor no less dangerous, and conducive to trouble, was added to the already tense socio-political scene. This was the issue of equality for the mawali that formed a central item in the program of a new movement led by Harith b. Surayj of Tamim. The Umayyad government in Khurasan made two attempts to

give the mawali equal status with the Arabs, especially by exempting those who accepted Islam from the payment of the jizyah. A first attempt was made by Caliph ‘Umar II and a sec-

ond by the governor of Khurasan, Ashras b. ‘Abdallah asSulami.’? Apart from the pious wish to abolish the injustice of discrimination between Arab and non-Arab Muslim, there was also the hope that through the unifying idea of Islam as well as 4 Tabari, II, 1346, 1350-1357; Wellhausen, pp. 448f, 48-52. Cf., Banners,

. Sf.

5 Asad was nominated governor of Khurasan for the first time in 106/724-5 and was dismissed by Caliph Hisham in 109/727. Wellhausen, pp. 455456, 467-473; Zambaur, Mu ‘jam, p. 77; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 142-143. 6 Wellhausen, pp. 456-467. Speaking about Junayd b. ‘Abd ar-Rahman, Ibn al-Athir says that he only nominated Mudarites in his administration. Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 157.

7 Ibid., pp. 51, 147.

28 Chapter 1 the exemption from taxes, it would be possible to pacify Transoxania and to strengthen the government’s hold on that region. These two attempts failed because, as a result of the great influx of converts to Islam, the income of the treasury declined and the government was forced to abandon the idea. The resentment aroused by this step reached the proportions of serious revolt, which broke out in Sughd in the years 110-111/728729.8 Opposed to these two attempts of the govern-ment, which aimed at bestowing rights on the mawdli from above, Harith b. Surayj] appeared with a demand for equal rights from below. Equal rights for the mawali was only a part of Harith’s general Weltanschauung. As far as can be judged from the sources, Harith was some kind of a religious revivalist whose aim was to re-establish a purified Islam based upon the Qur’an and the sunnah of the Prophet.?

The slogans demanding the re-institution of the “Book of Allah and the sunnah of the Prophet” as the only basis of guidance for the Muslim society and state were attributed by the sources to almost every rebel during and subsequent to the Umayyad period. Judging from the frequent appearance of these

slogans, which, as we shall later see, were supplemented by a call for righteousness and justice against tyranny and injustice, we should regard them not as an ideological platform but rather as a useful, convenient method to discredit the current rule at any

given time. Therefore it is not at all surprising to discover that

Harith’s slogans were identical to the slogans used by the ‘Abbasid propagandists. We are told that when he first appeared

in an open revolt in Balkh, he addressed the inhabitants of the city and “called upon them to follow the Qur’an and the sunnah

8 On this revolt and its circumstances, see ibid., pp. 147-149. Wellhausen, pp. 450-456. 9 Gardizi discusses at some length Harith b. Surayj’s teachings: “Harith b. Surayj revolted and captured Gizgan and Faryab. He summoned (the public

to support him M.S.) in the name of the Qur’4n and the sunnah of the

: Prophet. He openly opposed the Marwanids and gave orders that the dhimmah should be extended faithfully to ahl adh-dhimmah, that kharaj should not be demanded from Muslims and that injustice should not be committed (va-chunan namhd ki ahl-t-dhimmat ra bi-dhimmat wafa kunad va-az muslimanan kharaj na-sitanad va-bar kas bi dad nakunad)” Gardizi, p. 88. Cf. Gibb, Conquests, pp. 76f; Daniel, pp. 22, 43-45.

Prelude to Revolt: Tribes at War 29 and to give an oath of allegiance to the Rida’ (wa-da‘ahum ila alkitab wa-as-sunnah wa-al-bay‘ah li-ar-rida).'° The usage of the term “called upon them” should be understood to mean no more than a form of publicly presenting the credentials of the open revolt. The fact that Harith’s slogans were identical with the slogans of the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah, and that he even hoisted black banners

does not necessarily suggest any connection between the two

movements beyond the general aim to bring down the Umayyads.!! The oath of allegiance for ar-rida seems to be of a more specific nature. The term ar-rida belongs to the Shrite‘Abbasid nomenclature, and is usually understood to mean “he who is agreed upon from the family of Muhammad” (ar-rida min al Muhammad). Even if the term was really used by Harith and was not merely put there by the later tradition as a matter of

course, it should not surprise us. A rebellion against the Umayyads in the Eastern provinces of the Empire could hardly

have been envisaged without reference to the family of the Prophet.

By the beginning of the 2nd/8th century the special, even holy, status of the Prophet’s family had already been publicly established in the East. The idea of the existence of a divinely guided family, to which the Prophet had belonged and which was destined to rule Islam, was natural for the peoples of the Eastern provinces whose political culture was imbued with such concepts. There can hardly be a question that the early Muslims, or rather the mu’ miniin, in Iraq had been highly impressed with the position and prestige of the Jewish Exilarch or Head of the Diaspora (résh galithah). The fact that the Jews, without a state

10 Tabari, I, pp. 1567, 1582-1583; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 183. 11 From an isolated yet important account recorded by Gardizi, it is clear that some members of Da‘wah joined Harith b. Surayj. His movement was very

tempting: its slogans and symbols being so similar to those of the Da‘wah. After Harith’s defeat, many of his supporters fell to the hands of Asad b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri, the governor of Khurasan. Gardizi’s description of the event is instructive: “Asad captured a group of people who were propagandists of al ‘Abbas and killed them” (va-Asad gurohi mardoman-ra

ki-da‘iyan-i-al-‘Abbas budand bi-girift va bi-kusht)” Gardizi, p. 88. It should be noted that Harith’s supporters are identified in this account as “da‘iyan-i-al-‘Abbas.”

30 Chapter I of their own and far from their country in strange lands, honoured and obeyed a descendant of the House of David set the

model for these early mu’ miniin and was instrumental in the creation of the Shi‘ite version of Islam. A tradition recorded by Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi elucidates this idea and puts it in the proper perspective. It runs as follows: “Tbn Lahi‘ah, on the authority of Abu al-Aswad who said: “I met the Exilarch (ra’s al-jalut), and he said to me, ‘there are seventy fathers between me and David, but the Jews, whenever they see me, respect me, recognize my rights and they commit themselves to care for me. As for you, there is only one father between you and your Prophet and you have killed his son.’ ”!2

In an atmosphere where the leadership of Islam was connected with the idea of a divinely pre-ordained family, it was not difficult to present the Syrian version of the Islamic government,

represented by the Umayyads, as an illegal rule of usurpers. Rebels against this rule would naturally use a popular undefined figure as the ideal substitute for the current rulers. The term ar-

rida offered this much needed, unidentified, yet very popular figure of the Prophet’s family for Harith b. Surayj as well as for the ‘Abbasid propagandists.!3 Harith b. Surayj was an idealist.

In one tradition it is reported that he held the views of the murji’ ah,‘* an opinion which is corroborated by the fact that his secretary and the intellectual protagonist of his movement was

Jahm b. Safwan.'5 From the scraps of information we have concerning his ideology, it would still appear that he was nearer to the Khawéarij with respect to his idealistic aim of setting up the Divine Law in the place of the “oppression and injustice” of the

Umayyad regime. He differs from the Khawarij in that his movement was not as extreme as theirs. He did not put into practice the Azariqah’s principle of isti‘rad, nor did he ever claim to be amir al-mw’ minin, although, after his death, his opponents

12 ‘Iqd, IV, p. 383. 13 Banners, p. 147f. 14 Nawbakhti, Firaq, p. 27. Tabari, II, p. 1575. is Cf, “Djahm b. Safwan”, El’; Tabari, II, pp. 1918-1919.

Prelude to Revolt: Tribes at War 31 accused him of having done so.!6 Among his followers we hear

of some people called “ahl al-bas@ ir?” }7 i.e. men of deep religious conviction, whose counsel Harith used to seek. A further point which brings out the idealistic character of his movement, was his followers’ habit of trying to persuade their opponents to accept their ideas, using moral and religious arguments, while fighting against them.!8 His black banners were just an-

other expression of his desire to introduce the sunnah of the Prophet, whose banner, it is said, was black.!9 The father of Harith, b. Surayj (or ‘“Umayr), belonged to the

tribe of Mujashi‘ and was a native of Basrah. He received an honourable ‘ata’ of 700 dirham. Harith himself, is mentioned as having been a brave fighter in the battles against the Turkish Khaqan in the year 111/729. However, we are told that he was

flogged by the governor of Khurasan, Junayd b. “Abd arRahman al-Murri, for having opposed to the latter’s oppressive rule. From that time on — perhaps even before — he gathered many followers around him who supported his ideas. He was also joined by dihqdns and Persian villagers. Although it was alleged that he was the champion of the “ajam, the non-Arabs, and that a majority of his followers were recruited from their ranks,”° the sources make it quite clear that he rallied a large number of Arab fighters to his standard and they formed the backbone of his army. In the first place, many of his own tribe — the Tamim — hastened to join him, as did Azdite fighters and members of other tribes.2! In fact, his movement became a focus of attraction for all — both Arabs and mawadli — who felt aggrieved and dissatisfied with the existing order.

16 On this and on Harith b. Surayj’s movement in general, see Kister “Harith b. Surayj”; see also Wellhausen, p. 464. 17 Tabari, I, p. 1585, For a similar expression (dhuwt al-basa' ir) see Akhbar, . 200. 18 Kister, op.cit.; and see, for instance, Tabari, II, pp. 1583-1584. 19 Kister, op cit.; Akhbar, pp. 245ff; Ibn Kathir, X, p. 26.

20 Tabari, Il, p. 1591. 21 “wa-ma‘ahu fursan al-azd wa-tamim” — Tabari, II, p. 1569. See the list of the commanders in Harith b. Surayj’s army: al-Hattab b. Muhriz as-Sulami, Mansar b. ‘Umar as-Sulami, Hilal b. ‘Ulaym at-Tamimi, al-Ashhab alHanzali, Jarir b. Hamyan as-Sadisi. Only one of the commanders was a mawla: Mugatil b. Hayyan an-Nabati. Tabari, II, p. 1566.

32 Chapter I At this point, we must stress a general rule which applies not only to Harith’s movement and the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah, but to every movement which attempted to confront the Umayyad government. The rule is that for an oppositional movement to gain any Standing and have any success at all, it had to arise from the Arabs, among the Arabs, and its leaders had of necessity to be Arabs. During the Umayyad period the Arabs were the natural

ruling class. Under the social and political conditions of the time, it was impossible for any opposition whatsoever to exist unless it was made up of Arabs and upheld by them. The movement might include mawali, even in large numbers, but Arabs had to be its moving spirit. Incidentally, this was the case in all the Shi‘ite revolts and in all those of the Khawéarij.

In the year 116/734 Harith b. Surayj came out in an open rebellion and received help and support from the people of Jazjan, Farayab, Taliqan and others. In the same year he conquered Balkh.~ His force consequently grew to about several thousand men, with which he attacked Marw.?3 The defense of the city was organized by ‘Asim b. “Abdallah al-Hilali, the governor of Khurasan, who managed to defeat Harith before the city walls at the beginning of the year 117/735.% As a result of this defeat, the number of Harith’s supporters dwindled to about 3 000 men; meanwhile, the news came that Caliph Hisham had dismissed ‘Asim and had appointed Asad b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri as the governor of Khurasan in his place.”5 ‘Asim entered into negotiations with Harith and they came to an agreement, according to which

they would join forces and write a joint letter to the Caliph demanding that he should rule in the spirit of the Qur’an and the

sunnah. If the Caliph objected to this, they would unite their forces and rebel against him. This agreement proved to be valueless, as the new governor of Khurasan, Asad b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri, attacked Harith and 22 Ibid., pp. 1566f; cf., Kufi, VII, pp. 106f; and see Ibn Khaldin, ‘Jbar, II, . 197. 23 Tabari, OI, pp. 1569-1570; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 183-184, 187. Among the traditions there is one which says that Harith’s army in the battle on the river not far from Marw, numbered no more than 4 000 men. 24 ~=- Tabari, pp. 1571-1572; Ibn al-Athir, ult. loc. cit.; Wellhausen, p. 467.

25 ‘Tabari, I, pp. 1573-1574, 1582. 26 =: Ibid., p. 1577; Kister, op. cit.; Ibn al-Athir, ult. loc. cit.

Prelude to Revolt: Tribes at War 33 drove him away to Transoxania. Harith tried without success to besiege the city of Tirmidh and later withdrew to the fortress of Tabishkan. Asad sent against Harith the Azdite leader Juday’* b. ‘Ali al-Kirmani, who took Tabishkan and sold its women and children in the market of Balkh. Harith joined the forces of the Khaqan of the Turgesh,?7 and fought on the side of the Turks against the Muslims until he received an amnesty from Caliph

Yazid b. Walid in the year 126/744, when he returned to

Khurasan.?8 |

The historical importance of the movement of Harith b. Suray} is due to the fact that it reveals the extent of the opposition to the Umayyad rule in Khurasan. The fact that both mawali and Arabs (the latter coming from both tribal blocs) rallied to Harith’s stan-

dard in great numbers, with a battle-cry against “the oppression of Bani Marwan” and in favour of the revival of the rule of the Qur’an and the sunnah, proves that in Khurasan the ground was prepared for any movement which could offer similar ideas. The ‘Abbasid Da‘wah worked underground, alongside the move-

ment of Harith b. Surayj; it produced a similar abstract idea about the revival of the Qur’4n and the sunnah, but unlike Harith, it was not over-eager to appear publicly. It tended to keep its slogans vague rather than explain them and for a long time showed no desire to become a mass movement.”?

27 Kofi, VIII, p. 107. Van Vloten suggested that by doing so, Harith proved that the Umayyads were not better than the Turks whom he joined. See Van Vloten, p. 61.

28 On his activity until his death, see Kister, op. cit. 29 It has already been pointed out that both Harith b. Surayj and the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah spoke in their propaganda about ar-rida, a term which seems to have been in frequent use by almost every opposition to the government. The public understood this term in its old meaning which had been connected with the persons of Abu Bakr, ‘Umar and ‘Uthman and the method of their election to their caliphal office. In its early meaning the term arrida represented the legitimacy of authority expressed by the general consensus of the Muslim community, and therefore mirrored the ancient Arab ideal leadership. Abi Bakr, ‘Umar and ‘Uthman were all elected according to the principle of rida wa-jama‘ah namely, the general consensus. In the earliest debates between ‘Ali and his opponents, the latter claimed that ‘Ali’s election had not been done according to the principle of rida. As the Shi‘ah developed into a strong and popular movement, it needed to meet the challenge of this argument and it did so by introducing fresh ideas into the debate from which the Shi‘ite theory of the legitimacy of authority

34 Chapter 1 The slow and patient way in which the ‘Abbasid movement was allowed to incubate enabled it to observe the widening circle of resentment against the Umayyads and the intensifying feelings of opposition to the government. NASR B. SAYYAR AND THE YAMAN

Asad b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri died in 120/738 and escaped the fate of his brother, who was dismissed by Caliph Hisham later that year.*°

Asad’s sudden death left Khurasan without a governor for some time, and the ruling power was seized by Juday’* b. “Ali al

Kirmani,! the Azdite leader who had distinguished himself as one of the most able commanders in Asad’s army.*2 According to Mada’ini he was rated by one of Caliph Hisham’s advisors as the most prominent man in Khurasan.*? Kirmani belonged to Azd ‘Uman, the tribe of Muhallab b. Aba Sufrah. His father had been one of Muhallab’s warriors and had fought under the latter’s command against the Khawarj in Kirman. Juday’ himself was born at Jiruft in Kirman, hence gaining the surname of “Kirmani.’’34

The anti- Yaman policy inaugurated by Hisham with the dismissal of Khalid b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri tipped the scales against the appointment of a leader from Yaman or Rabi‘ah, as governor of Khurasan, and Hisham decided to appoint Nasr b. Sayyar to

this office.*

evolved. See Banners, ch. I. Besides the Shi‘ah, the many other oppositional movements to the Umayyads used, time and again, the rida argument against the Umayyads: The Da‘wah and the movement of Zayd b. “Ali added

to the slogan of ar-ridathe words al Muhammad. By so doing these two movements narrowed the potential eligible candidates to the ‘Alids (and later also the ‘Abbasids). See Sharon, “Ahl al-Bayt”; idem, “legitimacy.”

30 Tabari, II, pp. 1635-1638. 31. Ibid., p. 1659. 32. =: Ibid., pp. 1589-1590 and see below note 42. 33 Ibid., p. 1661: “amma rajul khurastn hazman wa-najdatan fa-al kirmani.”’

34 Anonyme, fol. 258b; Kofi, VIII, p. 146. 35 Of special significance is Mada’ini’s tradition about a consultation which Caliph Hisham is said to have held with one of his closest advisers and

friends over the question of the nomination of a new governor of

Prelude to Revolt: Tribes at War 35 When Nasr b. Sayyar was appointed governor of Khurasan in 120/738, he was already about 75 years old,*° “one of the very few old men who appeared in the history of that time. His age did not affect the freshness of his mind, as is testified not merely by his deeds, but also by the verses in which he gave expression to his feelings till the very end of his life.’’’ He had a record of many years of activity in Khurasan and in Transoxania. He was respected as a valiant fighter against the Turks, a brave man, an excellent statesman and an expert on all the problems of Khuras4n.38 Unfortunately for him, he belonged to the tribe of Layth from Kinanah, which was not represented

in Khurasan in sufficient numbers to give him a Strong tribal backing. In addition to this, his enemies alleged that he was not of noble stock in the tribe of Kinanah and used to call him by the contemptuous nickname ibn al-aqta‘ (son of the one whose hand

was cut off).2° The fact that Nasr was a man without a proper tribal backing was not unknown to Caliph Hisham,*° who must have found it convenient that Nasr should not feel too sure of himself and should be aware of his dependence on his master, the Caliph, rather than on the strength of his tribe. There is no doubt that Hisham had in mind the precedent of Qutaybah b. Muslim, of the tribe of Bahilah, who had been the governor of Khurasan from 86/705 to 96/714.4! Qutaybah too (like Nasr b. Sayyar) had lacked tribal backing, since the tribe of Bahilah, like that of Kinanah, was weak in Khurasan. In the year 96/715,

Khurasan. Whenever the name of a leader from Rabi‘ah was suggested, Hisham reportedly said: “rabi‘ah la tusadd biha ath-thughur — Rabi‘ah is useless for blocking up frontiers (or, filling up the gaps with).” The tradition proceeds to say that after Hisham had rejected the people who had been suggested to him from both Rabi‘ah and Yaman, his adviser said to himself: “he hates Rabi‘ah and Yaman let me throw to him (a name of one of) Mudar.” Tabari, II, p. 1662. 36 When he died in 131/748-9, he was said to have been 85 years old. Tabari, Ill, p. 2.

37 Wellhausen, p. 474. 38 See the evaluation of his personality, Dinawari, p. 342. Cf., Kofi, VII, p. 102; Tabari, II, p. 1662 (infra).

39 Dinawari, p. 352; Kafi, pp. 149-150. 40 When Nasr’s lack of tribal backing was pointed out to the Caliph, it is reported that Hisham remarked: “I am his tribe.” Tabari, II, p. 1662.

41 On his nomination, see Tabari, H, p. 1178-1179.

36 Chapter I when Qutaybah wanted to rebel against Caliph Sulayman (9699/715-717), he found himself alone against all the tribes in Khurasan which rose against him and killed him.4? Nasr was well aware of Qutaybah’s fate and decided to rely on the support

of the Mudar tribal bloc, to which Kinanah belonged, and especially to seek a reconciliation with Tamim. The Mudar tribes

were very strong in Khurasan, equalling all the tribes that formed the alliance of Azd and Rabi‘ah, in numbers. In Mudar the tribe of Tamim, located around the capital city of Marw, was particularly large and powerful, capable (according to Mada’ ini) of putting ten thousand fighters in the field.*3 Nasr b. Sayyar’s

decision to win the support of the tribes of Mudar was in accordance with the general tendency to prefer the northern to the southern tribes which had been so marked throughout the whole realm ever since the later part of Hisham’s caliphate.“ Not all the tribes of Mudar agreed to back Nasr b. Sayyar. Most of the tribes of Qays ‘Aylin, which were centred around Nishapir, refused to support him throughout nearly his whole term of office,*5 and he received his support mainly from the tribe of Tamim. The Yaman tribes, and chiefly the tribe of Azd justifiably feared that the status which they had succeeded in gaining for themselves under the rule of Asad might be impaired.*© They hoped that their honoured leader, Juday‘ b. “Ali al-Kirmani, would be the one to receive the appointment as governor of Khurasan, especially since he had already occupied this office for a short time after the death of Asad.*’ The sudden

42 ‘Tabari, II, pp. 1283f, is the best source for his rebellion. Cf., Wellhausen, p. 444.

43 Tabari, I, pp. 1289-1291; Banners, p. 58. Tamim as such and Kinanah both belonged to the group of Khindif. Nasr b. Sayyar’s choice of Tamim,

therefore, was not without a genealogical justification. Although both Tamim and Qays belonged to Mudar, when it came to particular loyalties however, the smaller the genealogical group was, the more concrete and meaningful these loyalties were. See Tabari, I, p. 1663.

44 Cf. Tabari, U, pp. 1662f. 45 Wellhausen, p. 488. 46 ~ Ibid., p. 455, where Asad’s pro-Yamanite policy is discussed. 47 ~—‘ Tabari, II, p. 1659: In 120/738 Yusuf b. ‘Umar, the governor of Iraq, nominated Kirmani as the governor of Khurasan; but when Caliph Hisham decided to bring Khurasan under his direct control, he dismissed Kirmani and nominated Nasr b. Sayyar to the post.

Prelude to Revolt: Tribes at War 37 swing of the balance in favour of Mudar in general and Tamim in particular reawakened feelings of resentment in the Yaman opposition, which now rallied around Juday* b. “Ali, whose

pride had been greatly hurt by his dismissal from office in favour of Nasr.’? In spite of Nasr’s marked pro-Mudar policy, which contrasted so sharply with that of Asad b. “Abdallah alQasri,©° internal calm was maintained in Khurasan for nearly six

successive years. There were several reasons for this: firstly, Nasr had the backing of Caliph Hisham and of his successor, Walid II (125-126/743-744); secondly, Nasr was an able leader who had learnt from his many years in Khurasan to walk the tightrope of tribal policy in the region; thirdly, he engaged the

Arab warriors in constant wars against the Turks in Transoxania, thus diverting their energies outward and away from the inter-tribal strife.5! By his prudent policy he brought to

Khurasan an internal and external security which was quite unprecedented and gave the region a period of stability and prosperity. In the words of Mada’ini: “Khurasan was built up as

it had never been before.’>? This state of affairs changed abruptly as a result of the events which occurred in Syria and Iraq.

MUDAR AND YAMAN IN SYRIA AND IRAQ

The tribal struggle in Khurasan was only a part of the struggle between the Arab tribes throughout the whole Empire. This struggle played a decisive part in the decline of the Umayyads which began after the death of Hisham (125-126/743-744). Hisham’s successor was unfit for his high office because of his

48 Baladhuri, Ansab, III, p. 129; Ya‘qabi, Ta’nkh, p. 399. 49 Baladhuri, loc. cit.; Gardizi, p. 90.

50 During the first 4 years of his governorship, Nasr nominated only Mudarites over the sub-districts of Khurasan. It is said that a Syrian Yamanite (belonging to ahl ash-sham) commented on this policy saying: “ma ra’ aytu ‘asabiyyah mithla hadhihi — have not seen such tribal prejudice,” to which the answer came: “the one that was before.” Tabari, II, Dp. 1664 (infra).

51 Wellhausen, pp. 475-477; Cf., Tabari, I, p. 1688f. 52. = Tabari, II, p. 1665 Cf., Wellhausen, pp. 477ff.

38 Chapter 1 impetuous and irresponsible nature. In addition, he managed to estrange the Yaman tribes in Syria, who contributed most of the loyal troops of the Umayyads (wa-hum ‘uzm ahl ash-sham).°3 He began to pursue an openly pro-Qaysite policy by giving preference to the northern tribes, who were his mother’s kinfolk.>4 The climax of his quarrel with the Yaman tribes of Syria and Iraq was the execution of Khalid b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri.

Khalid had been appointed by Caliph Hisham, about two months after the latter’s accession to power, as the governor of

Iraq and all the Eastern provinces of the Empire (Shawwal 105/March 724).°> He replaced ‘Umar b. Hubayrah of the northern tribe of Fazarah, who during his term of office had pursued a pro-Qays policy throughout the Eastern provinces of the Empire and had done much to harm the Azd tribe in particular and the Yaman tribes in general.5° Hisham’s intention in ap-

pointing Khalid was to break this power of the Qays tribes. Khalid was one of the greatest governors of Iraq and the East to serve under the Umayyads and his personal qualities were rated

by the Arabic sources as comparable with those of Ziyad b. Abihi and Hajjaj b. Yusuf. The fact that he came from the family of Qasr in the southern tribe of Bajilah may have helped him in maintaining a certain neutrality between the tribes. The tribe of

Bajilah was too divided and scattered to have any standing among the southern tribes, while Khalid’s family — the Qasr — was neither strong nor numerous enough for Khalid to rely on.*”

Although his intention had been to keep his neutrality in the tribal struggle, he was impelled towards the Yaman side by the tribes of Mudar. They regarded him as their enemy because he had reduced their favoured status by taking the place of ‘Umar

53 Tabari, II, pp. 1775f. See also poems expressing the Yamanites’ resentment of the Caliph’s policy, Dinawari, pp. 347, 365; Tabari, II, p. 17811783; Azdi, pp. 51f. Goitein correctly noted that the Umayyad state fell apart once the Syrian imperial army lost its esprit de corps when tribal conflicts seeped into its ranks. Goitein, Studies, p. 155 (note). 54 Yasuf b. ‘Umar ath-Thagafi, the governor of Iraq (from Jumada I, 120/May

738), was Caliph Walid II’s maternal uncle. Tabari, IJ, p. 1779; Wellhausen, pp. 333-334.

55 Tabari, II, pp. 1467f; Wellhausen, p. 326. 56 = [bid., pp. 319-320. 57 [bid., p. 328; Tabari, II, p. 1816; Ibn Qutaybah, Ma‘arif, p. 203.

Prelude to Revolt: Tribes at War 39 b. Hubayrah. As the sole representative of the southern tribes in the highest government post after the Caliph, he soon became

the figure on whom the Yaman focused their hopes and aspirations. Facing such hostility on the part of the northern tribes, Khalid had to secure the support of as many southern tribesmen as possible by favouring and befriending them. His dismissal by Hisham in 120/738 did not impair his standing among the tribes of Yaman; on the contrary, they continued to display their admiration for him and appear to have exaggerated the closeness of their connection and intimacy with him.°*® His fall also meant their fall, since his place was taken by Yusuf b.

‘Umar of the Qaysite tribe of Thaqif (Jumada I, 120/May, 738),°? who initiated a new period of pro-Qaysite and antiYamanite policy lasting until the fall of the Umayyads. , The exasperation and anger of the Yaman tribes in Syria and Iraq grew to the dimensions of an actual revolt when Caliph Walid II virtually sold Khalid b. “Abdallah al-Qasri to Yusuf b.

‘Umar, who tortured and executed al Qasri at Kifah in Muharram 126/October-November 743.© The Yaman considered the Caliph’s action as a sign of open contempt for them. At the same time they felt that they deserved this contempt because when Khalid was in Yusuf b. ‘Umar’s jail for a year and a half (from Jumada I, 120 to Shawwal 121/May 738 to September 739) they had done practically nothing to save him.®! With the idea of revenge in mind, a Yamamite poet derides his fellow-

tribesmen in a long poem, which he puts into the mouth of Caliph Walid II. Addressing the southern tribes, the Caliph is made to say: “We trampled the tribe of Ash‘ar under foot with the glory of Qays.

58 Wellhausen, pp. 328-329. Khalid’s pro-Yamanite and anti-Mudarite policy was summed up by Ibn Khallikan in one sentence: “wa-Khalid yamani muta‘assib ‘ala mudar.” Ibn Khallikan, V, p. 220.

59 Tabari, II, pp. 1641f; Wellhausen, pp. 333-334; Ibn Khaldiin, ‘/bar, I, p. 205. 60 According to one tradition, Ydsuf b. ‘Umar paid the Caliph 50 million dirham for having Khalid handed over to him. Tabari, II, pp. 1779-1783, 1812-1823; Ya‘qobi, p. 400; Kafi, VID, pp. 107-110; Wellhausen, pp. 358-359; Dinawari, pp 347-348; Dhahabi, ‘/Jbar, I, p. 162; Baladhuri, Ansab, Il, p. 88.

61 Tabari, II, p. 1812.

40 Chapter 1 O, what a punishment from which there is no deliverance. And this Khalid in our dungeon lies Let them protect him if true men they are. Their great man and leader in the past he was, But with disgrace, now we had him engulfed, For if truly they were honourable tribes His benevolent deeds would not have been in vain, And they would not have him in captivity denuded, Passing his vigilant nights in our ponderous chains.”

But what the Yaman tribes had not dared to do in the time of Hisham, they did in the time of Caliph Walid II. The feelings of

indignation and disillusionment which were shared by these tribes, both in Syria and Iraq, brought about a renewal of the bonds which had previously united them. The tradition of the Yamanite support for the Umayyad government in Syria was broken. It was mere coincidence that this agitation also gained a

tortured martyr in the person of Khalid b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri. The entire emotional charge of the struggles between Qays and Yaman, which dated from the first Marwanids, now re-emerged

and surfaced in full intensity. The Kalbite poet, ‘Imran b. Halba’, called upon the tribes of Himyar to prepare their swords and javelins, stressed the common fate and duty of all the southern tribes, reminded the tribes of Qays of their defeat at Marj

Rahit and promised them many more days like those of the Marj.©

In addition to this bitter quarrel with the southern tribes, Walid II also picked a quarrel with his own relatives, the sons of

his uncles, Hisham and Walid, who were the sons of “Abd alMalik. He insulted a few of them and imprisoned or banished others.“ A serious revolt soon broke out against him, this time 62 Ibid., p. 1781. A Kalbite poet rose to this challenge and composed a long poem in Khalid’s honour. In one of the verses he said: “We shall lament Khalid with our swords and his benevolence will not be in vain.”

Ibid., p. 1783. 63 Ibid., pp. 1782-1783. It is not accidental that the Kalbite poet addresses the tribes of Himyar for in doing so he also wishes to include the tribal confederation of Quda‘ah which comprised the tribe of Kalb, the traditional supporter of the Umayyads.

64 Ibid., pp. 1775-1776.

Prelude to Revolt: Tribes at War 41 originating in the Umayyad family and headed by Yazid b. Walid b. ‘Abd al-Malik. The insurgents were naturally supported by the tribes of Quda‘ah, by members of the southern tribes in Syria®® and by the sons and kinsfolk of Khalid b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri. The rebels defeated the Caliph and killed him

at the end of Jumada IJ in the year 126 (April 744) and enthroned Caliph Yazid III in his place.®’ The tribes of Yaman, and

in particular the tribe of Kalb, regarded the victory of Yazid Il as their victory and their revenge not only against Caliph Walid II but also against all the northern tribes. Carried away with the joy of victory, the Kalbite poet Asbagh b. Du’ alah boasted: “Inform Qays and all the tribes of Khindif and their masters from ‘Abd Shams and Hashim:

We killed the Caliph in revenge for Khalid and we sold the (Caliph’s) heir for a few dirhams.”®

Yazid III died on the last day of Dhu al-Qa‘dah 126/13th September 744.69 He was succeeded by his brother, Ibrahim, who was recognized only in southern Syria and was supported by the tribe of Kalb in Quda‘ah. He was opposed by Marwan b. Muhammad b. Marwan, the governor of Armenia, supported by the Mudar tribes, whose interests had suffered through the rise

of Yaman in the time of Yazid III.”° Marwan overpowered Ibrahim and received an oath of allegiance as Caliph in Safar 65 The whole affair was discussed and analyzed by Wellhausen, pp. 360f. Cf, Kofi, p. 140.

66 ‘Tabari, II, pp. 1778, 1783-1784 and especially pp. 1791-1793. In the poem which was composed in connection with the event, the following southern tribes are mentioned as supporting the rebellion: Sakasik, Kalb, Azd, ‘Abs, Lakhm, Ghassan, Taghlib (Rabi‘ah) and a few others.

67. Wellhausen, p. 365 and the references there; Cf., Ya‘qibi, p. 400; Kofi, pp. 140-141; Dinawari, p. 349. 68 See Tabari, I, pp. 1819f, and especially Azdi, pp. 53-55. Azdi, p. 55 (the poem). The tribal war which broke out after Walid’s murder had such grave consequences that the tradition calls it fitnah — a term which carries with it

a theological undertone. [bn al-Kalbi in his Jamharah, (fol. 90a) speaks about “ayyam al-fitnah haythu qutila al-Walid b. Yaztd...”

69 Ya‘qobi, p. 402. Kafi, VII, p. 141 gives the date of 10 Muharram/October 23. 70 According to Dinawari, Marwan’s supporters came from “Tamim, Qays, Kinanah and the rest of the tribes of Mudar.” Dinawari, p. 350.

42 Chapter I 127/December 744; Ibrahim himself submitted to him and renounced his claim to the crown.”! Marwan II (127-132/744-750) raised the status of his followers, the Mudar tribes and favoured

them most conspicuously by transferring his capital from Damascus to Harran in the Jazirah — the stronghold of the tribes

of Qays.7? Iraq, where a great Khiarijite rebellion started sometime after this,’”3 finally capitulated to Marwan’s comman-

der Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah from the tribe of Fazarah (Qays), who took Kifah in Ramadan 129/May-June 747. Yazid

was nominated the governor of Iraq — another unmistakable proof of the Caliph’s pro-Mudarite policy.” KHURAS AN: THE END OF AN ERA

While these events were deciding the fate of the Empire in Syria and Iraq, the situation in Khurasan was nearing a climax. A real war was in full sway in Khurasan between the Azd-Rabi‘ah alliance and Nasr b. Sayyar. It broke out immediately after the ac-

cession of Yazid II in the middle of 126/744. The Yaman in Khurasan identified themselves with the struggle of their brethren in Syria and Iraq and regarded the accession of the proYaman Caliph Yazid III as an excellent opportunity to regain the privileged status from which they had declined since Nasr had

assumed his office as the governor of Khurasan. When Yazid IT nominated Mansur b. Jumhir, the Kalbite, as the governor of Iraq?> (Rajab-Shawwal 126/April-July 744), their hopes soared and they also expected the Caliph to replace Nasr b. Sayyar with a Yamanite governor. Nasr b. Sayyar refused to recognize the rule of Caliph Yazid III. He remained loyal to the dead Caliph Walid II and waited to see how the struggle for power in Syria would turn out.

71 Ya‘qubi, p. 403; Wellhausen pp. 376f; Kifi p. 141; Anonyme (1967), fols. 231a-233b.

72 -Ya‘qnbi, p. 405. 73 See below ch.3 n.74; Advent, p. 193. 74 Wellhausen, p. 378f; and see Baladhuri III, p. 133. 75 Wellhausen, pp. 368-369; Tabari, II, pp. 1836f; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 295296.

Prelude to Revolt: Tribes at War 43 Faithful to his basic conviction that any internal Arab strife in Khurasan would throw open the door to the enemies of Islam, he tried to persuade the Arab tribes not to resume fighting among themselves. Meanwhile he asked the Arabs to swear allegiance

to him as amir of Khurasan until the political situation in the Empire was clarified. He seems to have been successful for some time, but it soon became evident that the Yaman tribesmen were not prepared to give up the rare opportunity of gaining political power which had offered itself so unexpectedly, and they

decided to oppose him. The first reason for this was a widespread rumour that Mansur b. Jumhir had sent a letter to alKirmani appointing him governor of Khurasan and that Nasr b. Sayyar had prevented the messenger from carrying out his mission.” The second reason was that Nasr tried to appease those Arab tribes which had not received ‘ata’ for a long time, yet had spent extensive periods fighting against the Turks, far from their

homes.”” He decided to pay them the ‘ata’, not in money but with some valuable articles which he had prepared as gifts for Caliph Walid II. When he eventually distributed ‘ata’ in the form of these articles, the southern tribes interpreted his decision as an arbitrary and deliberate measure to rob them of the money due to them, and they resolved to rebel.’? The rumour that their leader was denied the governorship of Khurasan increased their indignation still more and they rallied around Juday‘ al-Kirmani. Nagr tried in vain to dissuade Kirmani from revolting, remind-

ing him of their past friendship and brotherhood in arms. Consequently, Nasr made the fatal mistake of announcing that he was deposing Kirmani from his position as the leader of the tribe of Azd.”? He hoped that by appointing another leader for the tribe he would weaken the tribe by placing it in a conflict over leadership. The result was just the opposite: the Azdites and their allies from Rabi‘ah, intensified their support for Kirm4ni, who raised the level of revolt by a call to avenge the blood of the 76 Anonyme (1967) fol. 230a. Cf, Tabari, IH, pp. 1835-1836. 77 ‘Umar, “Ibrahim b. Muhammad,” EP.

78 Tabari, II, pp. 1855-1859; Anonyme (1967), fols. 229b-230a, Wellhausen, p. 484; Baladhuri, Ansab II, p. 129; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 302-303. 79 Anonyme (1967) fol. 230a, cf., Tabari, II, p. 1859; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 304.

44 Chapter I family of Muhallab b. Abi Sufrah. This particular battle-cry expressed the political aims of the Yamanites, which were to regain the status which they had enjoyed under the Muhallabids, when they had been able “to swallow up Khurasan.’’®° On 27th Ramadan 126/13th July 744 Nasr managed to capture

Kirmani, hoping that in this way he would stop the revolt without bloodshed.*®! Nasr was afraid that if civil war were to break out between the Arabs in Khurasan, it would result in the ruin of the whole Arab settlement there. Nasr’s political credo regarding the function of the Arab presence in Khurasan and its future was

recorded by Mada’ini in a tradition putting into the mouth of Nasr the following words: “IT envision one of you rising and slapping the face of his brother and of his cousin in a quarrel over a camel presented to him or a garment with which he was dressed ... I can see an unbearable mis-

chief emerging under your feet, and I can clearly imagine you thrown around in the marketplace like slaughtered animals. For you, O people of Khurasan, are an armed post at the throat of the enemy. Beware! Beware lest two of your swords cross each other! 82

If Nasr used these or similar impassioned words, he could not lessen the discontent of the southern tribes. On the contrary, the

capture of their leader offended their pride and provoked their indignation and hostility still further. As soon as Juday‘* b. ‘Ali al-Kirmani succeeded in escaping from the prison where he had been incarcerated for about a month,*® the tribes of Azd and Rabi‘ah, gathered around his banner and renewed the fight more violently than ever.®* Nasr tried once more, directly and through mediation, to dissuade Kirmani from fighting, but all attempts at

80 Wellhausen, loc. cit, Anonyme, fol 258b; Kafi, VIII, p. 146; Tabari, II p. 1858; Ibn al-Athir, loc. cit.

81 See interesting material on these events in the Anonyme (1967) fol. 230b; Tabari, II, p. 1860; Ibn al-Athir, p. 305. 82. ‘Tabari, II, p. 1856; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 303; Ibn Kathir, X, p. 15.

83 Tabari, II, pp. 1861-1862; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 305; Anonyme (1967) fol 231a; Ibn Kathir loc. cit., quotes a tradition according to which it was Nasr b. Sayyar himself who freed Kirmani from the prison.

84 Tabari, loc. cit., Baladhuri, Ansab III, p. 129.

Prelude to Revolt: Tribes at War 45 mediation between them failed.®° Rabi‘ah, could not agree to any

proposal for a compromise short of Nasr’s abdication from power, which, of course was impossible.** The suggestion that Nagr b. Sayyar and Kirmani be united by a tie of marriage also foundered because of the contemptuous attitude of Kirmani, who considered it degrading to link himself by marriage with a man of such undistinguished lineage as Nasr.®? Just at that time, Harith b. Surayj, who had hitherto been in exile among the Turks in Transoxania, appeared in Khurasan. He had received a pardon from Yazid III, and Nasr b. Sayyar invited him to return to Marw from Samarqand, where he had

settled after leaving the Turks. He appeared in Marw in Ramadan 127/beginning of July 745. Nasr sought an alliance with him because Harith had been a deadly enemy of Kirmani ever since the latter had fought against: him during the governorship of Asad b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri and had harassed him and his followers. Harith however rejected Nasr’s display of friendship

and even turned down the latter’s proposal to appoint him as a regional governor in Khurasan. As for the gifts which Nasr sent him, he distributed them among his supporters. He was welcomed enthusiastically by the inhabitants in Marw, especially by his fellow-tribesmen of Tamim, and resumed preaching his doctrine of the need to live according to the Qur’4n and the sunnah. Three thousand Tamimites gathered around him, and he soon left Marw and raised his black banner of revolt against Nasr b. Sayyar. In the month of Jumada II 128/March 746, he suddenly attacked Marw, but he was beaten back; his secretary, Jahm b. Safwan, fell into the hand of Nasr, who put him to death.®§ As a result of this defeat Harith made an alliance with his former enemy Juday‘ al-Kirmani. Kirmani now reappeared on the political scene in Khurasan after not being heard from 85 “T beseech thee by God — said Nasr to the Azdite leader — lest the destruc-

tion of this country be thy making.” Tabari, II, p. 1865 (ll. 16-17). However, the feelings of ‘asabiyyah seem to have been much stronger that the fear of the Turkish enemy across the border,

86 Dinawari, p. 355; Kafi, VIII, p. 150. 87 Dinawari. p. 356; Kafi, loc. cit. Cf., Tabari, II, p. 1858. 88 Salim b. Ahwaz at-Tamimi, Nasr’s head of the shurat, was the man who put Jahm to death. For a detailed tradition on the subject, see Ibn al-Kalbi, Jamharah, fol. 90b.

46 Chapter I since his escape from prison about one year and a half before. The joint forces of Kirmani and Harith attacked Marw, which fell to their hands at the end of 128/746. Nasr b. Sayyar withdrew to Nishaptr (Abrashahar), which was a stronghold of the

tribes of Qays. | The unnatural alliance between Harith b. Surayj and Kirmani

was bound to be short-lived and it was not long before their forces were arrayed against each other. Harith commanded a force consisting mostly of Tamimites, whom it would be difficult to imagine as allies of Juday*’s Azdite followers. Eventually

Kirmani defeated Harith, killed him and nailed his body to a cross.®9 After his victory Kirmani did something quite unusual in the inter-tribal warfare: he destroyed the Tamimite quarter of Marw and banished the tribe of Tamim from the city. By doing so he broke the unwritten tradition that the dwelling areas of the tribes were excluded from acts of inter-tribal hostilities as far as possible. As a result all the tribes of Mudar — Bani Tamim (including those who had fled from Marw) and the Qaysite tribes

of the Nishapir region, who had hitherto been disinclined to support Nasr — now rallied to his side. The danger of the Yaman alliance, which had been demonstrated by their capture of Marw, left no room for disagreement among the Mudar or between any

one their tribal blocs and Nasr b. Sayyar.” In spite of the considerable forces at his disposal, Nasr refrained from open hostilities against Kirmani until the second half of the year 129/747. Only when the political situation in Syria and Iraq was clarified —

Marwan II recognized as Caliph and Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah appointed governor of Iraq (Ramadan 129/May-June 747) — did Nasr set out to recapture Marw. After several attacks by his officers had been repelled by Kirmani’s supporters from Azd and Rabi‘ah, both sides transferred the fighting to the out-

skirts of the city, where they took up fortified positions (khandaq) facing each other. The site of these two camps, ap-

.89 For more details and analysis see Kister, “Harith b. Surayj;” Wellhausen, pp. 485-487; Tabari, I, p.1917-1935; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 342f. 90 ‘Tabari, II, pp. 1929-1936 (especially the poems), 1970; Wellhausen, p. 488; Van Vloten, p. 100. For detailed traditions on the last part of Harith b. Surayj’s affair see Tabari, II, pp. 1917-1935; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 327328, 342-346.

Prelude to Revolt: Tribes at War 47 propriately called “the two kandaqs” (“al-khandaqayn”), remained vivid in the memory of the local inhabitants for many years.”!

Fighting raged between the two sides for the rest of 129/June September 747 without any decisive result. It seems likely that in the final stage, Nasr b. Sayyar succeeded in persuading Kirmani to cease hostilities in view of what seemed to be a common danger — Abi Muslim. The vigorous new leader of the ‘Abbasid movement had already begun open and extensive activity in Khurasan. But just then one of Harith b. Surayj’s sons, who had been in Nasr’s camp, seized the opportunity to avenge his father’s death. He attacked Kirmani, who had come to conduct negotiations, and killed him. Tabari’s tradition relates that Nasr nailed Kirmani’s body to a cross with a fish beside it. This was an act of contempt and humiliation indicating that Kirmani’s tribe — Azd-‘Uman — was a tribe of fishermen. Wellhausen rightly points out that this tradition makes little sense since we find that immediately afterwards, ‘Ali, Kirmani’s son, who succeeded his father, continued the negotiations for peace with Nasr and for a short period even concluded a truce with him.92

Meanwhile Nasr b. Sayyar finally succeeded in retaking Marw (end of 129/August 747), but his control of the city was brief and could not reverse the trend of the tremendous upheaval that had already been set into motion. A few months later the city

fell to Aba Muslim and the fate of the Umayyad rule in Khurasan was sealed. * Ok Ok Ok

For over 30 years, clandestine, patient and persistent activity of dedicated propagandists prepared the ground for the final Stage of the revolution: the open revolt. Now the time seemed ripe.

91 Tabari, I, p. 1972f; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 363-364; Van Vloten, p. 107; Wellhausen, p. 489.

92 Wellhausen, p. 490 (and note 1); Tabari, Il, pp. 1975-1976; Kufi, III, pp. 163-167; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 368.

48 Chapter I The solidarity of the ruling dynasty was irreparably damaged,

the allegiance of its traditional tribal support melted away, the Eastern provinces were in chaos and local insurgents near home kept the Caliph’s hands full. Clever, imaginative, brave and ruthless, Abi Muslim had only to pick the correct moment. The stage was set for his active role in the history of Islam.

II

HOISTING THE BLACK BANNERS — THE DA’ WAH

IN THE OPEN

Hoisting the Black Banners 51 2 EXPLOITATION OF THE TRIBAL WAR

For more than a quarter of a century, the Da‘wah conducted its clandestine activity mainly among the villagers of Khurasan. It carefully steered away from the tribal struggle in the province, which involved mainly the mugdatilah — the Arab fighting force —

nor did it take sides with one tribal group or the other. It could therefore attract Arabs from all the major tribal groups to its ranks as is clearly attested by the detailed lists of the Da*‘wah leaders in Khurasan, carefully drawn out by the author of the Akhbar. They came from Tamim, Dabbah and Sulaym as well as from Rabi‘ah, Khuza‘ah and Azd.! When the Da‘wah was about to emerge into the open as a fighting revolutionary movement, it needed a large number of fighters. For, once the incubatory phase of the movement was over, the crossing of swords with the Umayyad regime — the final and decisive stage of the revolution — was unavoidable. In the prevailing social climate in Khurasan, with the great tribal blocs poised one against the other, the movement could not build its armed forces only from individual fighters haphazardly collected in the province. To build a significantly strong and efficient military power capable of being a match for the Umayyad army, the Da‘wah needed entire combat units made up of trained and highly experienced soldiers. The building of a sizable and efficient army in clandestine circumstances was an impossible task especially under the watchful eyes of the Umayyad government. Once the Da‘wah was out of its clandestine phase it only had a relatively short time for the preparation of its military power, and the circumstances were such that it needed to have a large army at its disposal almost immediately. The available fighting forces in Khurasan were predominantly

composed of Arabs. But the acute state of war, which had developed among the tribes just before the open appearance of the Da‘wah, made it far more difficult for the movement to proceed with its Islamic supra-tribal activity. Tribal ‘asabiyyah reached 1 Akhbar, pp. 215-220, Banners, pp. 191-196.

52 Chapter 2 its peak just at this time, and emotions of tribal loyalties, which

blazed up among the warriors of the great tribal blocs, thrust aside the unifying factors which Islam had been trying to offer. The fact that the very meaning of the Arab fighting forces and the justification for their existence, derived from their obligation to fight for Islam and in the name of Islam against the infidels on

their borders, became a secondary consideration. The Islamic obligation was forgotten in the face of the tribal hostility which broke out with great intensity just as the Da‘wah, which had propagated Islamic ideas and slogans, urgently needed Arab fighters. Under those circumstances it was obvious that what the Da‘wah had been able to offer to the mixed Persian-Arab villagers, whose feelings of ‘asabiyyah were either very blunt or non-existent, could not be offered to the Arab warriors with equal success. It was obliged to combine its doctrines of pure Islamic order and its demand for the just and legitimate rule of the Prophet’s family with a pragmatic political programme, which took into consideration the tribal conflicts throughout the whole Empire and particularly in Khurasan. In other words, the Da‘wah could no longer avoid identifying itself unequivocally with one of the rival sides in the tribal conflict. An expression of the dilemma in which the Da‘wah found itself and of its ultimate decision to identify itself with the Yaman

is to be found in a tradition quoted by Tabari. It also recurs, with slight textual variations, in other sources. The tradition deals with the directives which Ibrahim b. Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah b. “Abbas is said to have given Abi Muslim when he

sent him to lead the Da‘wah in Khurasan. Addressing Abi Muslim, Ibrahim supposedly said: “Pay attention to the tribes of Yaman, honour them? and dwell amongst them, because Allah will bring this matter to successful conclusion only through them. As to the tribes of Rabi‘ah, be suspicious of them; but the tribes of Mudar they are the enemy that lurks near.” (wa-unzur hadha al-hayy min al-yaman fa-akrimhum wa-hull bayna azhurihim fa-inna allah la yutimm hadha al-amr illa bihim. wa-unzur hadha al-hayy min rabt‘ah fa-ittahimhum fi amri-

2 In Ibn al-Athir’s tradition, V, p. 348: ilzamhum, cling unto them.

Hoisting the Black Banners 53 him, wa-unzur hadha al-hayy min mudar fa-innahum al-‘aduw algarib ad-dar).?

According to the tradition, Abi Muslim was ordered not only to beware of Mudar but also to kill every one of them who might arouse his suspicion. The tradition ends with the words: “and slay every man whom you suspect ... and if you can leave in Khurasan no Arabic speaking tongue, then do so. Every boy who reaches the size of five spans of the hand (khamsat ashbar) who shall arouse your suspicion — slay him.’ With regard to

this final portion of the tradition, Tabari also has two other parallel versions: in one he repeats the idea that Aba Muslim was

ordered to destroy every Arabic-speaker,°’ while the other expressly mentions that Abi Muslim was ordered “to slay every Arab in Khurasan” (alla yada‘ ‘arabi bi-khurdasan illa gatalahu).®

Even a superficial examination of this tradition is sufficient to show that its end contradicts its beginning. The tradition begins with Ibrahim commanding Abi Muslim to restrict his activity to the Yaman tribes, since they were going to be the instrument of

the ‘Abbasids’ success. It finishes with Aba Muslim being ordered to exterminate the Arabic speaking population of Khurasan. It is obvious that this tradition 1s a combined version of two different traditions. The first one deals with the order to

Abi Muslim to befriend the Yaman. Its aim is to crown the Da‘wah-Yaman alliance with the /ma@m’s approval and with a prophetic aura. It also intended to explain the well-known fact that the main fighting force of the ‘Abbasid Da*wah came from

the tribes of Yaman. It could also have been used by the Yamanites to consolidate their preferred status, at least under the early “Abbasids.

3 Tabari, I, p. 1973; Azdi, p.65; Ibn al-Athir, loc. cit. cf. Dinawari, p. 360, for Nasr's attitude to the Yaman alliance.

4 Tabari, loc. cit.; Ibn al-Athir, loc.cit.; Azdi, loc. cit.; Néldeke pp. 111, accepts this tradition verbatim and arrives at the conclusion that Aba Muslim threatened not only the Arab supremacy but “‘even the very life of the Arabs.” And cf., Wellhausen, p. 534.

5 Tabari, Ill, pp. 25, cf., Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, ‘Jgd, II, 298 (= 1944 edition, IV, p. 479).

6 Tabari, IJ, p. 1974.

54 Chapter 2 Before we proceed to deal with the second tradition or the last part of the combined tradition, it should be pointed out that, once involved in the tribal strife, the Da‘ wah set in motion a twofold

process. On the one hand, the discontented element of the Yaman tribes were driven into the arms of the Da‘wah by the

hope that through this they would find the solution to their problems. On the other hand, there were many people belonging to all the tribes, who objected to the purposeless tribal struggle in Khurasan and were attracted to the ideas of the Da‘wah, because they hoped that it would restore Islamic order to Khurasan

and to the empire as a whole. A striking example of the first aspect of the process occurs in a tradition in the Akhbar, which reports that men from the “villages of Khuza‘ah and others” rushed to Abia Muslim’s camp when it seemed to them that tribesmen from Tamim were about to attack their villages. This tradition indicates that some of them came to Abt Muslim because they had long been the supporters of the Da‘wah. Others either came to him to lend him support because he had come to live amongst them and thus, according to the Arab custom, they were obliged to defend him, or because they hoped that through him they would be given a chance to protect their honour and their families.’ The other side of the process, which had to do with the tiredness of many people of the anarchy caused by the futile and ab-

surd tribal wars, is also expressed in a unique tradition in the Akhbar. This tradition runs as follows: “The fitnah between Nasr b. Sayyar and ‘Ali b. al-Kirmani and those Arabs who took part in it, lasted a long me until it annoyed many of these two men’s supporters, who began to aspire for a situation different to the one in which they had been and for an issue

which may unite them. It was then that the Da‘wah stirred. The Yamanite who belonged to the Shi‘ah called over the Yamanite

(who did not belong); the man from Rabi‘ah called over his brethren from Rabi‘ah, and the man of Mudar called over the Mudarite, until those who answered these calls became numerous, as a consequence of which they ended the ‘asabiyyah warfare.” (wa-

ja‘alat nufusuhum tatatalla‘ illa ghayr ma hum fihi wa-illa amr

7 Akhbar, p. 276.

Hoisting the Black Banners 55 yajma‘uhum fa-taharrakat ad-da‘wah: yad‘i al-yamani min ashshi ‘ah al-yamani wa-ar-raba‘t ar-raba‘t wa-al-mudan al-mudari hatta-

kathura man istajaba lahum fa-kaffu bidhalika ‘an al-qital fi al‘asabiyyah).8

This tradition contains an important truth. In the state of anar-

chy and turmoil which prevailed throughout the Empire, and especially in Khurasan, there were many men from all the Arab tribes who aspired to the ideal of Islamic unity. The Da‘ wah could offer the only unifying idea — the idea of Islamic justice and legal leadership for the ummah. Voices in favour of Islamic unity instead of divisive tribal “asabiyyah, which had begun to be heard at this time in Khurasan, undoubtedly assisted the Da‘wah’s propaganda. The longing for Islamic loyalties, which should take the place of nasab, had been expressed long before by the Khurasanite poet Nahar b. Tawsi‘ah of the tribe of Bakr b. Wa’il, who declared: ‘My father is Islam; I have no other, When others boast with Bakr and Tamim.”?

As for the Iranian warriors in the Islamic army, an appeal with

a purely Islamic message was indeed real and intelligible to them. They regarded the inter-tribal struggle as incomprehensible madness, bordering on actual heresy: “They (the Arabs) are fighting for something that is not religion” (ha'ula’ yugatiluna ‘ala ghayr din)

the Iranians reportedly said.!° The Da‘wah also suited their hopes for social equality within the Islamic state. The very fact that the Da‘wah, even during its clandestine pe-

riod, had included Arabs of various tribal origins as well as Persian and other mawali, is a striking demonstration of the unifying power of its doctrines. Moreover, the tribal variation of its membership also had a practical application, as is stressed in our tradition: the du’at, themselves being members of a variety of tribes, could appeal to their own tribesmen — the Khuzi‘ite to the 8 Ibid, p. 248; cf., Anonyme, (1967), fol. 257b. 9 Mubarrad, Kamil, III, p. 179; Ibn Qutaybah, Shi‘r, p. 342, and see discussion of the subject in Goldziher, Muslim Studies, I, p. 81.

10 Tabari, Hl, p. 1291.

56 Chapter 2 Khuza‘ites, the Tamimite to the Tamimites and the Rabi‘aite to members of the Rabi‘ah tribe. However, it must be borne in mind that this was the action of individuals. As it now appears,

the official tribal policy of the Da‘wah was to appeal to the southern tribes en bloc and to identify with their political aims."! Let us now return to the latter part of the tradition with which we began this discussion, where it is stated that Aba Muslim intended to follow the /mam’s instructions to destroy all the Arabs

in Khurasan. From what has been said above and from what will follow later, it is clear that such a tradition was invented long after the “Abbasids had attained power. The sources of this invention were the opponents of the Da‘wah in disaffected Arab circles, when they had realized that non-Arabs — first Persians and later Turks — had been ousting them from their privileged positions in the army, in the administration and in society with the Caliphs’ support. This tradition was no doubt one of a series which later purported to prove that the “Abbasid Da‘wah was directed against the Arabs.!2 As far as the formative period of the Da‘wah 1s concerned, the opposite is the truth: the movement re-

lied first and foremost on Arab support. A parallel tradition quoted by Dinawari does not speak of “Slaying every Arab in Khurasan,”’ but rather says that Abi Muslim was commanded “to cut off the head of every Arab in Khurasan who would not join him.’’!3 This last tradition, which is more reasonable, fits at least one case in which the rule was put into practice: when the

11 Individuals of non-Yamanite tribes were active in the Da‘wah even long after it had identified itself with the Yaman. Ibn al-Kalbi reports about a certain Tamimite, Khaffaf (or Khufaf) b. Hubayrah b. Malik who was “the most warlike horseman ever to come out of Khurasan in the service of the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah.” Later Khufaf took part in the rebellion of ‘Abdallah b.

‘Ali against his nephew Caliph Abd Ja‘far al-Mansar. Ibn al-Kalbi, Jamharah, fol. 91a. He 1s also called Khufaf al-Marwarddhi, Tabari, I, p. 93; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 464.

12 For the description of the process in which the Arabs lost their exclusive Status in the Muslim army see Sharon, “Reforms”, pp. 136-143; A. Elad made a great (and not altogether convincing) effort to prove that the Arabs maintained their preferred status longer than is usually believed, cf., A. Elad, Characteristics of the Development of the ‘Abbasid Army, unpublished Ph.D thesis, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1986 (Hebrew), Chapter 3.

13 Dinawari, p. 358.

Hoisting the Black Banners 57 city of Nihawand fell to the army of the Da‘wah advancing westward towards Iraq (131/749), the Syrian and Iraqi soldiers in the fortress were granted aman, but the Khurasanites who had

fled from Khurasan and joined the Umayyads were put to death.'4

It was Abi Muslim’s preconceived policy to involve the Da‘wah in the inter-tribal struggle and in this way to convert it into a mass militant movement. From the evidence of the traditions it is difficult to know how great Ibrahim’s share in the actual planning of this policy was. It is possible that he may have laid down certain guiding principles for Abi Muslim, but the latter alone developed and applied them after a thorough study of the circumstances in Khurasan. Abii Muslim’s tribal policy is discussed in great detail in a long tradition in the Akhbar. According to this tradition Nasr b.

Sayyar, at least on two occasions, sent messengers to Abi Muslim, whose task was to find and expose publicly the weak points in his ideology and in the behaviour of his adherents. On one occasion Nasr attached to the regular messenger a person by the name of Hayyah b. ‘Abdallah al-Mar’i (from Tamim), who had been one of veteran members of the Da‘wah, listed among the 70 chief propagandists (du‘at) and the first to appear with the black colours of the Da‘wah in public. Hayyah seems to have been disappointed with Abt Muslim at some stage and he went over to Nasr. Another important side to Hayyah was that he was a somewhat holy man. The tradition in the Akhbar refers to him aS a pious person who devoted himself to God’s service and sometimes even indulged in public preaching of some kind (kana rajul yat’ allah wa-rubbama dhakkar wa-wa‘az). As we shall presently see, it is clear that Hayyah fell out with Abi Muslim because of the latter’s tribal policies. If our tradition has some truth in it and was not reconstructed as a framework to convey the Da*wah ideology, then it is understandable that a person like Fiayyah was an important asset for Nasr. On meeting Nasr’s delegation, Abi Muslim is supposed to have said to Hayyah: “Does not the oath of allegiance which you had given us still obligate you?” To which Hayyah answered: “I have given my oath 14 Tabari, TI, pp. 6-7.

58 Chapter 2 of allegiance on condition (that you keep) the Book of Allah and

the Sunnah of His Prophet and the Sunnah of ‘Ali b. Abi Talib.” Abi Muslim: “So what have you found wrong?”

Hayyah: “Is there anything in the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Prophet and the Sunnah of ‘Ali b. Aba Talib which allows you to take the slaves of the people of the qiblah (the Muslims) and incite them against their masters?” This was a reference to Abt Muslim’s policy to accept slaves who escaped to him from their masters, to manumit them and put them under the Da‘wah’s protection. When he had given his explanation to this charge, the other members of the delegation supposedly said to Abi Muslim: “We heard that you say that your master ordered you to take your abode with the people of Yaman to be on friendly relations with Rabi‘ah but to be on your guard against Mudar. Is this also in the Book of Allah? Don’t you know that the Prophet of Allah (s) belonged to Mudar?”’ The answer attributed to Abi Muslim is very significant to our discussion. Abt Muslim said: “Yes, the Jmam ordered me to take my abode with the people of Yaman and to befriend Rabi‘ah and not to forfeit my share of the

good people in Mudar, but that I should beware of the great majority of them, those who are the followers of Banu Umayyah; and that I should collect the Persians and make them my favourites ... and whosoever comes to join us from Mudar and we find out that his intentions are honest we accept him and we carry him over our heads, but whoever opposes us we shall ask Allah to help us against him and to be the Judge between us and him.”

The tradition concludes by saying that Abt Muslim’s explanation was favourably accepted by the Shi‘ah and Nasr’s messengers could only bring their sender bad news. “The words of Abi Muslim received much publicity and became a subject of popular discussion. Many of the Persians (or non-Arabs, aajim) rushed to join the Da‘wah as well as many of the people of Yaman and Rabi‘ah. Some came out of religious conviction, and some came seeking to achieve revenge and satisfaction through it (for a relative who had been killed but whose blood revenge was

Hoisting the Black Banners 59 still denied). Abi Muslim was also joined by some Mudarites from dhuwit al-basd ir from Mudar.”!>

The term dhuwital-basa@ ir which appears in this tradition, is an enigmatic term. We met ahl al-basa@ ir above in the camp of Harith b. Surayj. They must be identical with dhuwi al-basa ir. In all probability these are the people who were pure ideologists,

seekers of justice, possibly with some pro-‘Alid inclinations, who rejected the wars in the name of tribal ‘asabiyyah. Their ideology seems to me to have been best summed up by Bishr b. Jurmiiz ad-Dabbi, who became disenchanted with Harith b. Surayj after the latter allied himself with Juday*‘ b. “Ali alKirmani for a short period. When Bishr left Harith he reportedly said: “T fought with you in the quest of justice but once you joined alKirmani, it is clear to me that you fight so that it will be said: ‘alHarith is victorious;’ for these (namely the Yaman) are fighting for their own tribal interests (ha‘ula’ yugatilun ‘asabiyyatan) and I will not fight with you ... We are the just party (al-fi’ ah al-‘adilah) — we call for truth and we do not fight but against those who fight us.”16

It is true that this tradition does not explicitly say that Bishr represented the ideology of ahi al-basa@ ir, but it stands to reason

that he did. Later on, in the same tradition, Harith’s followers present their opponents with the principles of their belief and conduct saying: “We ask you to be pious and to obey Allah, to support out of choice the rightly guided imams, and to forbid the spilling of your

own blood, which Allah has forbidden. Allah created from our union with Harith a means to gain Allah’s favour and a method to give a sincere counsel to His servants. We have exposed ourselves to war, our blood to spilling and our property to destruction, and

all this seemed to us of a very little consequence when we considered Allah’s reward.”

And addressing their fellow Muslims from the Southern tribes, whom Harith was about to attack, they said:

1S. = Akhbar, pp. 217, 275 (For details on Hayyah), 284-285. 16 Tabari, H, 1931; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 345.

60 Chapter 2 ““We and you are brethren in religion; we are also allies against the (common) enemy, so fear Allah and follow the truth, because we do not want to spill blood which was not permitted.”

It was clear that they regarded war between Muslims a sin; for

the tradition goes on to tell us that once Harith was the first to open hostilities, “ahl al-bas@ ir left him and said ‘You committed

treachery’ (ghadarta).”'" In the tradition of the Akhbar, dhuwi al-basa@ ir are from Mudar. It does not seem to be a coincidence that ahl al-bas@ ir in Harith b. Surayj’s episode also came from

Mudar. It is possible that the term has a more concrete tribal meaning as well, denoting the pro-Shi‘ite idealists who came not from the traditional Yamanite supporters of the Shi‘ah but from

the Mudarites. |

It is evident that the tradition in the Akhbar, relating to Abi Muslim’s tribal policy, is more complete and more genuine than the accounts of Tabari, Azdi and Dinawari. Its great importance lies in the fact that here, for the first time, we have a detailed,

balanced and logical summary of the relation between the Da‘wah and the Arabs. The whole issue is shown in a clearer light compared with the distortions which Tabari’s accounts succeeded in introducing into the studies of Van Vloten and Wellhausen. It was not the Persians but rather the Arabs towards whom the Da‘wah orientated itself. Abi Muslim was prepared to

accept every Arab whose sincerity was not doubted, as a follower, but on the whole he was less concerned with individuals, and more interested in large units. For this reason he addressed himself primarily to the opposition to the Umayyads, which consisted mainly of the southern tribes. In presenting his movement as a revolt against an oppressive and illegal Umayyad rule, he offered a common political basis to himself and to all the other elements in Khurasan that formed,

either open or secret, opposition to the Umayyad government, primarily the Yaman and Rabi‘ah. The Persians, most of whom initially supported this opposition, were also happily welcomed, but one certainly cannot speak of them as a coherent body. There was no properly formed body of ‘ajam in Khurasan even re-

17 = [bid., pp. 1932-1933.

Hoisting the Black Banners 61 motely similar to the tribal formations of the Arab muqatilah (af we except the small units of Persian warriors who fought with the muqatilah forces). Many Persians were mawali of northern

Arab pro-Umayyad tribes and there can be no doubt that they kept their wala’ to their tribes, just as there were Persians who kept wala’ to the southern tribes opposing the Umayyads. I do not think that we should overestimate the significance of Abu Muslim’s statement that he welcomed “ajam into the Da’wah.'® The Da‘wah naturally allied itself with the opposition to the Umayyads and accepted every discontented individual. We have just mentioned that it also appealed to slaves and Abt Muslim is-

sued a proclamation that every slave who came to his camp would win his freedom.!? As a result slaves flocked to him in such vast numbers that he was compelled to set up a special camp for them. They were organized in a combatant unit and sent to be ready for action in the centres of the Da‘wah at Abiward and Nasa.2° The appeal to slaves to run away from their masters was perhaps the most extreme of all the measures

taken by Abi Muslim, which could have turned many supporters into opponents and provided the enemies of the Da‘wah with very effective arguments against the movement, as

it actually did. Inciting slaves to escape from their masters, giving shelter to slaves, promising them freedom and moreover putting weapons into their hands — these were acts which the society could not tolerate. In effect, the Da*wah was challenging basic social and economic principles which were all but sacred. The storm of indignation aroused by the slaves episode almost

18 There is no real basis for Wellhausen’s claim that “the majority of Abi Muslim’s adherents consisted of Iranian peasants and Mawali from the villages of Marw.” (Wellhausen, p. 532). Wellhausen, however, emphasizes the important role which the Arabs played in the Da‘wah, and points out

the fact that “the Arab opposition party” (as he calls it), namely the Yaman in Khuras4n and the Iraqis, were the first to become the allies of the Da'wah. Nevertheless, Wellhausen asserts more than once, unjustifiably,

that the Da'wah fought against Arab dominion and in general against Arabism in Islam, (/bid., p. 535-536; cf., Van Vloten, p. 104) though he makes it clear that “it was not the Arabs per se, but the ruling Arabs that were to be fought against.” (ibid.)

19 Akhbar, p. 280, Anonyme, fols. 264b-26Sa. 20 Tabari, II, pp. 1968-1969, Akhbar, p. 281, and cf., Wellhausen, p. 534.

62 Chapter 2 made Abii Muslim drop the whole idea and send the slaves back

to their masters. He finally decided to persist in his policy — perhaps because he saw that the slaves could supply him with a considerable fighting force and that he could overcome the bitter reaction to his action. He even had.to explain his motives to the

leaders of the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah. He presented his attitude toward the slaves as a part of the Islamic ideology of the Da* wah

which aimed at following in the footsteps of the Prophet. Had not the Prophet declared, when standing before the walls of the

city of Ta’if, that every slave who came out to him would become a free man??! “It is not the Da*wah that liberates the slave” —so Abi Muslim asserted — “God has set him free.’ He declared further: “Every slave who cometh unto us of his own free will to support our cause, we shall receive him, and his portion shall be as ours” (wa-ayyama ‘abd atana raghiban fi amrina qabilnah wa-kana lahu m4 lanad).3 His idea was that the Da‘wah did not give shelter to runaway slaves; it gave them new masters who were better and more noble than their previous owners. Their new masters were the kinfolk and heirs of the Prophet, since “the Prophet hath more right over the believers than they have right over themselves.” To sum up: the Da‘wah, that aspired to change the existing order in the name of a new Islamic politico-religious idea, received into its ranks every element which could claim to have been wronged through the Umayyad rule and the social and political irregularities related to it. However, the movement appealed primarily to Arabs; it was led by Arabs and derived most of its strength from the support of Arab tribes.> The two simple principles which it offered to its supporters were the opposition to Umayyad rule and the advancement of Islam. In presenting these ideas, the Da‘wah did not remain passive, waiting to see what influence they would have. On the contrary, these were

21 Waqidi, Maghazi, p. 931, Baladhuri, Ansab, I, p. 367. 22 + Akhbar, p. 280.

23 = Ibid. 24 After Q, 6:33, Akhbar, p. 281, Anonyme, fol. 265a. 25 Banners, pp. 69-71; Jahiz, Rasa’il, I, pp. 22-32 (on the decisive part played by the Arabs in the Da‘wah); cf., Dinawari, p. 359 and Wellhausen,

p. 536.

Hoisting the Black Banners 63 ideas to be propagated and principles for intensive and methodical activity. The Da‘wah propagandists were specially ordered to approach the opposition represented by the tribes of Yaman and

Rabi‘ah and to try to gain their co-operation. “Aba Muslim commanded the Shi‘ah” — so Tabari relates, quoting Abt alKhattab — “to choose Rabi‘ah and Qahtan because the ruling power rested in Mudar, who contributed the governors ap-

pointed by Marwan, and they are the killers of Yahya b. Zayd.’’26

THE ANTI-DA‘WAH REACTION

Nasr b. Sayyar was old and sufficiently experienced to fully comprehend the gravity of the situation in his province, especially when he became aware of the depth of the Da*wah’s penetration into the political and social life of Khurasan. He under-

stood that the only way to stop the Da’wah from gaining real political or military power was by preventing it from acquiring general tribal support. The political life of the time revolved around tribal politics; the real power lay with strong tribal support and tribal affiliations. Ideas and slogans were good as long as they were not put to the test in the arena of power-politics and military struggle. Nasr must have been quick to understand that the Da*wah was swiftly approaching the stage of practical testing. He saw how its leaders were steering it towards a political and military understanding with the Yaman and Rabi‘ah, and he

made a great effort to abort such an agreement. In a poem attributed to him, Nasr addressed the tribes of Yaman (a term denoting the alliance of Azd and Rabi‘ah) and tried to dissuade them from supporting the Da‘wah. “Tell Rabi‘ah in Marw and inform the Yaman: For your sake arise in fury before fury avails not. Why the war among yourselves you kindle,

26 Tabari, I, 1986, on another occasion, Mada’ ini reports that the Azd leader Kirmani and even the Kharijite Shayban were favourably disposed towards Abi Muslim because he called for the deposition of Marwan II. (li-anna da‘a ila-khal‘ marwan). Tabari, II, 1965, Ash‘ari, p. 98.

64 Chapter 2 As if men of wisdom for you have no counsel? And you leave alone an enemy who has encircled you — Multitude of rubble with no religion or pedigree. Not Arabs like you, known to us among the people, Not even mawali with pure pedigree to boast. If questioned we are of their faith, its foundation, We would answer: ‘Their faith is death to the Arabs.’ Strange ideas they utter, which I have never heard Either from the Prophet or read in the Holy Book.”27

The poem as preserved in the Akhbar has very significant variants that are more specific for the political situation in Khurasan. Addressing the Azd, Nasr says: “Where is the wisdom and judgment and good breeding? Unite! Forsake division and hatred! Let kinship and common lineage be the linking cord. If you withdraw the Azd away from us, we shall not agree; Until they join us again, from nearness, by all to be cherished.”

In addition to the open call to the Azd to cease from the ‘asabiyyah wars and to rally, together with the other Arab tribes, around the government for the common benefit of all, Nasr also attacked the Da‘wah, making two charges against it: first, that it

directed its efforts towards destroying the Arabs and second, that it preached doctrines contrary to Islam. From all that we know about the Da‘wah, its membership and

its doctrine, 1t is clear that this poem can only be regarded as partially describing an existing state of affairs.22 We know that the Da‘wah was supported throughout the whole of its activity by Arabs and by mawali of Arab tribes. We also know that the Da‘wah never deviated from the basic principle of loyalty to Islam, to the Qur’4n and to the Sunnah of the Prophet, whatever the Sunnah meant then. Nevertheless, the propaganda of its opponents, like that of Mukhtar’s opponents in his time, levelled charges against it which were likely to find an ear in the general

27 + ‘Translation based on Baladhuri, Ansab, II, p. 133 and Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 367-369; Magqrizi, Muqaffa, fol. 71a (=ed ‘Aql, pp. 112-113). Variants see: Akhbar pp. 313-314; Kofi, pp. 161-163; Dinawari, pp. 360-361; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, ‘/qd, (ed. 1944), IV, pp. 378-379.

28 Cf., Wellhausen, pp. 534-535.

Hoisting the Black Banners 65 public and the religious leadership. What could be more persua-

sive than slandering the movement as lacking nasab and religion? “The musawwidah — declared the government propagandists — ap-

peals to those who do not belong to our (Muslim) community. They follow not our Sunnah, they are not part of the people of our qiblah, they worship cats and heads (ya‘budina ar-ru'us), they are

uncouth barbarians, slaves, the scum of both the Arabs and the

| mawali.”29

When the supporters of the Da‘wah rejected these charges and

proved their loyalty to the Sunnah, one of Nasr b. Sayyar’s commanders assailed them saying:

“As for the Sunnah of the Prophet whereof you speak, what have you to do with it? Our right to it is greater than yours. We are the Arabs and the sons of Arabs, while you are base-born barbarians and worshipers of cats.’”° Reading the accounts of the attacks on the Da‘wah, it is easy to see that there was no limit to what its enemies could invent in order to defame it. This was the soil on which the tradition describing the Da‘wah supporters as both non-Arabs and nonMuslims grew years later. The distance was not too far from Nasr’s poem, in which he charged the Da‘wah with the wish to kill all the Arabs, until a tradition ascribing to Ibrahim al-Imam a premeditated policy along this line was put forward as a directive to Abu Muslim. In all probability, if Nasr b. Sayyar is in fact the genuine author of the poem ascribed to him, he must have used the verse speaking about the killing of the Arabs metaphorically. He expressed his views many times in his speeches. He always warned against any internal strife in Khurasan, for in such a strife he saw a great threat to the actual existence of the Arabs in Khurasan because of the pressure of the Turkish enemy on the

border. When he spoke about the killing of the Arabs in Khuras4n, he did not mean that this was the expressed policy of the Da‘wah, but rather that this was the inevitable outcome of its

29 . Akhbar, p. 290 and cf, ibid., p. 292. The term musawwidah, here used in a derogative sense was used to designate the supporters of the Da‘wah, because of the black colour which became its symbol.

30 Akhbar, p. 287.

66 Chapter 2 : mere existence as a political body conducive to disunity and mutiny against the orderly authority.*! THE DA‘WAH MILITANT

Abi Muslim should be regarded as the man responsible for the shaping of the ‘Abbasid revolt in its most decisive stage and for

securing the advent of the “Abbasid dynasty. In the Arabic sources, he 1s invariably mentioned as sahib ad-dawlah or sahib ad-da ‘wah, the “Master of the Turn” — he to whom the revolution, which brought about a new era in Islam, should be cred-

ited. He was initiated into the secrets of the Da‘wah in Kufah and was adopted by Ibrahim b. Muhammad, the leader of the ‘Abbasid family in Humaymah, and he assumed the status of a member of the family (min ahl al-bayt). Ibrahim chose him to be his emissary to Khurasan and entrusted him with the responsibility of organizing and leading the open revolt.* From that moment on, Abt Muslim revealed his unusual talent for organization and leadership. He first had to establish himself as a leader over the veteran leaders of the Da*wah in Khurasan, and this was not an easy task, given his obscure or1gin and his relatively young age.*4 Aba Muslim could prepare the military phase of the Da‘wah only after he had secured the consent of the local leaders of the movement. Aba Muslim arrived in Khurasan just as the conflict between Nasr b. Sayyar and al-Kirmani was at its height, perhaps even after Kirmani had captured Marw, removed Nasr b. Sayyar and killed Hanth

b. Surayj in the second half of the year 129/747. There are conflicting reports about his movements and activities until Ramadan 129/June 747. The Akhbar says nothing about this 31 Tabari, I, p. 1856. 32 Banners, pp. 199, 208 n.28, 230. 33 On Abia Muslim see ibid., pp. 203f; J. Lassner, “Aba Muslim, son of Salit: a skeleton in the ‘Abbasid closet?” in M. Sharon (ed.), Studies in Islamic History and Civilization, Jerusalem and Leiden, 1986, pp. 91-104. 34 One should not, however, accept Ibn al-Athir’s tradition which says that

he was only nineteen years old when Ibrahim al-Imam sent him to Khurasan. Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 347.

35 Tabari, I, 1949; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 342-348; Wellhausen, p. 519.

Hoisting the Black Banners 67 period. Its description of Abi Muslim’s activity in Khurasan only begins from 129.36 Van Vloten and Wellhausen made a great effort to trace Abii Muslim’s movements after his arrival at Marw. They compared Tabari’s three accounts on this issue — One anonymous and two by Mada‘ini and Abi al-Khattab.*’

The first encounter of Abi Muslim with Sulayman b. Kathir was almost disastrous. The old leader of the ‘Abbasid da‘ wah, who led it in times of fear and persecution, could not envisage that he was to give way to the youngster from Iraq. Sulayman was on the verge of disobeying the Imam, which could have destroyed the da‘wah on the eve of its success. At this point

Abi Muslim had to master his skills as a leader; a lonely stranger, far from the Jmam and in an apparently unfriendly environment, he managed to assert his authority. The account in

the Akhbar says that after his encounter with Sulayman b. Kathir, Abii Muslim went to the home of Abt Dawud Khalid b.

Ibrahim, the nagib from the tribe of Shayban (Rabi‘ah), who supported him against Sulayman b. Kathir. The tradition in the Akhbar is very revealing about the relations between Sulayman b. Kathir and the rest of the top leaders, the nugaba’ of the Da‘wah, and this explains why Abi Muslim’s task of taking over the leadership was made much easier. “The nugaba’ wanted to detract from the pomp of Sulayman b. Kathir. Even the leadership of a complete stranger was more convenient and more acceptable to them (than Sulayman’s leadership). The Shi‘ah agreed then to accept Abu Muslim as the leader. They dispensed with Sulayman b. Kathir and isolated him.”29

Next we learn that Abii Muslim made peace with Sulayman b.

Kathir, after promising him that his status as the head of the Da‘wah would not be affected in any way, whereupon they began to work together. This event appears to have occurred in the

36 One tradition in the Akhbar even says that Abd Muslim’s arrival at Marw was only on 129 and not earlier. See Akhbar, pp. 270, 275-276. 37 Van Vloten, pp. 76-82, Wellhausen, pp. 522-529.

38 Banners, pp. 220-222. 39 Akhbar, p. 271f. In the scheme of the Da‘wah leadership Aba Dawud was one of the twelve top leaders named nuqaba’. See Banners, pp. 192-193.

68 Chapter 2 year 129.4 Tabari’s anonymous tradition confirms the fact that Abi Dawud did indeed support Abt Muslim against Sulayman b. Kathir. However, it also relates that during the encounter between the two, Abi Dawud was not in Marw but in Balkh, and that when he returned to Marw he learned that Sulayman b. Kathir had sent Aba Muslim back to the Imam. Abit Dawud then delivered a long speech in which he condemned Sulayman’s action.4! Tabari’s tradition asserts further that Aba; Muslim had reached only as far as the border of the province of Qimis on his way westward, when the call of the Da‘wah leaders in Marw reached him, asking him to return. Influenced by Abi Dawud’s arguments, the Khurasdnite leaders waived their opposition to Abi Muslim and willingly “made him the leader of their cause, listened to him and obeyed him.’4? Although Aba Muslim outwardly patched up his disagreement with Sulayman b. Kathir, he did not relinquish his resentment towards the Khurasanite leader and made his feelings known to Abt Dawud. About the same time, the Jmam Ibrahim ordered Aba Muslim to meet him in Mecca during the Hajj ceremonies of that year (129/747). The annual pilgrimage had been used in the past as one of the methods of keeping personal contact between the leaders of the Da‘wah and the Imam. During the Hajj period, Mecca was the meeting place of multitudes of people from the four corners of

the empire, and the meeting of the ‘Abbasid leaders from Humaymah with pilgrims from Khurasan could not attract any attention. The meeting during the Hajj was only one of the precautions which the Da‘wah leaders took in order to safeguard the identity of the Jmam and to prevent the premature discovery of the movement by government agents. In their movement from place to place and especially on their way to their rare meetings with the Jmam, the leaders of the Da‘wah disguised themselves as merchants and travelled with their merchandise, genuinely

40 ° Akhbar, pp. 272-275. Baladhuri does not know anything about the incident between Abt Muslim and Ibn Kathir. On the contrary, according to Baladhuri’s tradition Ibn Kathir honoured AbO Muslim and co-operated with him from the moment Abd Muslim arrived in Khurasan. Baladhuri, Ansab, Ill, p. 121; cf., also Maqrizi, Muqaffa, fol. 67a (ed. ‘Aql, p. 70).

41 Tabari, I, pp. 1961-1962. 42 Ibid., p. 1962.

Hoisting the Black Banners 69 engaged in business until they reached their destination.** When

Ibrahim al-Imam’s letter reached Aba Muslim asking him to come to Mecca with Qahtabah b. Shabib, Aba Muslim took all the gold which had been collected for the /mam in Khurasan. He

bought expensive garments with part of it and melted the rest and molded it into blocks of gold. He concealed the gold in the garments, and set off for Mecca with three of the most important Khurasanite leaders — Qahtabah b. Shabib, Qasim b. Mujashi° and Talhah b. Ruzayq — and forty-one adherents of the movement, all disguised as merchants and pilgrims.¥

It is evident that this anonymous tradition, which was compiled many years after the ‘Abbasids came to power, anticipates future developments. The detail about the /mam’s instruction that Qahtabah should accompany Abi Muslim is a clear example of such anticipation, for the compiler of the tradition was already well aware of the major role which Qahtabah was about to play as the great commander and victorious leader of the Da‘wah army. Qahtabah belonged to a leading family (ahl bayt) in the tribe of Tay’ and was one of the veteran leaders of the Da‘ wah in Khurasan.45

Abi Muslim left Marw in the middle of Jumada IT 129/begin-

ning of March 747, but he never reached either Humaymah or Mecca. He received the /mam’s letter in Nasa, instructing him not to continue his journey but to return to Marw and to make the Da*wah public there.** Together with the letter, Abi Muslim also received a banner and a flag (liwa@’ wa-rayah) from the

Imam. He was to raise them as a sign for the open revolt. According to Abi al-Khattab’s tradition, the banner and the flag had symbolic names — the one was called “the shadow” (az-zill)

and the other was called “the cloud.” The tradition assures us that these names meant that “just as the cloud covers the earth, so would also the Da‘wah of Bani al-‘ Abbas,” and the meaning of the shadow is that just as the earth cannot be devoid of shad-

43 See Banners, p. 144. 44 ‘Tabari, loc. cit. 45 M. Sharon, “Kahtaba b. Shabib,” El’.

46 Tabari, I, p. 1963.

70 Chapter 2 Ows it cannot be devoid of the “Abbasid presence.*’ This tradition should not be taken at face value. It actually represents the official “Abbasid court history which endeavoured to surround

the ‘Abbasid rule with an apocalyptic aura and present the ‘Abbasid revolution as the final salvation.*

Mada’ini does not mention Abi Muslim’s first journey to Qimis, when he had been driven from Marw by Sulayman. b. Kathir, but he does relate that Aba Muslim actually departed in 129, together with “seventy men of the nugaba’”’ to meet the Imam. He had not gone far beyond Qumis when the /mam’s letter reached him, whereupon he sent his retinue, most probably

lead by Qahtabah, to Ibrahim and he returned to Marw.‘? Tabari’s anonymous tradition relates that he returned to the vil-

lage of Fanin in the vicinity of Marw secretly, concealing his identity (mutanakkiran). This was a village of Khuza‘ah and Abit Dawud’s place of residence.*° The date given for this event

by the anonymous tradition is 23rd of Ramadan 129, while according to Abii al-Khattab it was on the 9th Sha‘ban 129.5!

Let us now try to reconstruct the complete picture from the traditions of Tabari and the Akhbar. The points to which we must refer are: (a) The part played by Abt Dawud Khalid b. Ibrahim ash-Shaybani in the events surrounding Abit Muslim’s assumption of leadership in Khurasan, and (b) the dates relating to Abi Muslim’s journey to the /mam and his return to Fanin. With regard to the first point, we know from the tradition of the Akhbar that Abi Muslim went to Abi Dawud’s village after the break between him and Sulayman b. Kathir. However, since Tabari tells us that Abi Dawud was not present at the encounter, we must assume that Abi Muslim did not go to Fanin until after Abi Dawud’s return from Balkh. If this is so, it is possible that the Akhbar is, for some reason, silent about the period from the

47. _—‘[bid., pp. 1954, 1963; Ibn al-‘Ibri, p. 119, Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 356-358; cf., Van Vloten, p. 78. 48 See Banners, pp. 23-24; 87f. Later generations accepted the ‘Abbasid official history and the hadiths which had been bluntly invented to support it as historical facts. As an example see Suyati, Ta’rikh, pp. 256-257.

49 Tabari, II, pp. 1949-1951; Ibn al-Athir, loc. cit. 50 ‘Tabari, II, pp. 1953; 1964. 51 Tabari, II, p. 1953; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 357.

Hoisting the Black Banners 71 clash between Sulayman b. Kathir and Abi Muslim until the latter’s stay in Fanin. Incidentally, Aba Muslim was also supported in Fanin by Abi al-Hakam, ‘Isa b. A‘yan the nagib, who lived in the same village, and even stayed for some time in ‘Isa’s

home.*? Therefore, there is some support for the statement of Tabari’s anonymous tradition that Abi Muslim did indeed leave

the vicinity of Marw and did not return to it until after Abi Dawud ’s arrival from Balkh, when he persuaded his associates — especially those who were opposed to Sulayman’s leadership — to call Abi Muslim back. Meanwhile, Abi Muslim travelled in western Khurasan and (as Wellhausen rightly conjectured) tried to gain support for himself in the other centres of the Da‘wah,

which were to a great extent independent and not subject to

Sulayman b. Kathir. .

During the clandestine period, in which the Da‘wah concentrated on winning the public through propaganda activity, it created a network of propagandists or du‘at who acted away from the centre in Marw. Marw, being the heart of the political activity for the whole province, was naturally also the centre from which

the top leadership of the Da‘wah, the group of the nugaba’, monitored the Da‘wah activities. The nugaba’ occupied the high-

est status and the du ‘at a lower one in the Da‘wah hierarchy. Yet, in their regions of responsibility far from Marw, every da‘i had the status of a naqgib.*3 Thus, it seems plausible that Aba Muslim, rejected by the centre, attempted to win the periphery. This seems to be the meaning of Mada’ini’s tradition, which recounts Abi Muslim’s journey to meet the Jmam in 129.54 The journey Abt Muslim was forced to make in the Western regions of Khurasan must be regarded as part of his struggle to establish himself at the head of the movement.

Let us now pass to the second point — the determination of dates. According to Tabari’s anonymous tradition, it was on his second journey in Jumada II, 129, that Aba Muslim set out to meet Ibrahim. This tradition points out that the Jmam had summoned Abi Muslim to meet him during the Hajj, but Jumada II

52. Tabari, I, p. 1958. 53 Banners, p. 197; Akhbar, p. 215. 54 Tabari, II, p. 1949f.; Wellhausen, p. 521.

72 Chapter 2 would be too early a date for him to have set out in order to reach Makkah for the Hajj, which took place five or six months later. We must therefore exclude the possibility of any connection with the Hajj at this date. In addition, the anonymous tradi-

tion relates that Abii Muslim returned to Fanin on 23rd Ramadan, 129. This date is far too late since the Da‘wah came out into the open on 25th Ramadan, as we shall presently see. It

would have been impossible for Abi Muslim to be able to prepare and organize its emergence in two days. Even the date given in Abi al-Khattab’s tradition, according to which Abu Muslim returned to Marw on 9th Sha‘ban about 46 days before the public appearance of the Da‘wah, cuts the time needed for the preparations very fine.*> What then are the true facts? I suggest that the sequence of events was as follows:

After his clash with Sulayman b. Kathir in Marw in 128, Abi

Muslim left the city and travelled westward heading for Humaymah. This appears to have taken place in the month of Rajab 128. It is possible that he may have intended to meet the Imam at the Hajj of 128, not of 129 (the latter being impossible,

since at the time of the Hajj in 129 the Da‘wah, under Abi Muslim’s leadership, was already plunged into violent rebellion). In the meantime Abi Dawud returned from Balkh to Marw

and he and his followers brought Abi Muslim back, not to Marw, but to Abii Dawud’s village, Fanin. From this village, Aba Muslim pursued his negotiations with Sulayman b. Kathir,

which finally led to an understanding between the two. However, Abi Muslim’s headquarters remained in Fanin. Around the month of Jumada II 129, (according to Tabari’s anonymous tradition), Abi Muslim left for a last tour before the public emergence of the Da‘wah. He visited the peripheral cen-

tres in western Khurasan and sent a delegation of du‘at and nugaba’ to the Imam, headed by Qahtabah b. Shabib.°® The delegation carried gifts for the /mam and reported the preparations for the revolt to him. After this tour, Abad Muslim, who had now achieved recognition in various parts of Khurasan, re-

55 Tabari, I, p. 1953.

56 Ibid., p. 1964.

Hoisting the Black Banners 73 turned to Fanin in order to attend to the final preparations for the open emergence of the Da‘wah.>’

I believe we can now trace Abi Muslim’s activities and movements more easily. Peace having been restored between him and Sulayman, the chiefs of the Da‘wah met to draw up the plans for the next steps. Here we must accept the only date we have and assume that this event took place at the beginning of Sha‘ban 129/May 747, when Aba Muslim returned from the tour which he had started one or two months earlier in Jumada II of the same year. What we have said above explains the tradition of the Akhbar,

which reports that the chiefs of the Da‘wah met to discuss the question of the place in Khurasan in which to raise the flag of revolt. Such a question may well have been raised at the conclusion of their journey with Abi Muslim through the various centres in the eastern provinces; indeed we hear that there were diverse opinions about this matter. Like many traditions in the Akhbar, this tradition also has a unique nature. It runs as follows: “When they agreed on Abu Muslim, Sulayman said: “Think about

the first place in which you wish to appear in public.’ Abu anNajm (‘Imran b. Isma‘il, Abu Muslim’s father-in-law M.S.) and those who supported his views said: ‘We think that we should first appear in Khwarizm for this is a province totally isolated and detached from Nasr. By the time he sends his army against us, our brethren would by then have heard about us and would come to join

us; Our number will grow and this will enable us to overcome whoever might oppose us.” Musa b. Ka‘b and Lahiz (b. Qurayz) said: ‘Marw-ar-Rid (is the place to appear first M.S.) for it is in the middle between Marw and Balkh.’ Malik b. al-Haytham, al‘Ala’ b. Hurayth and Talhah b. Zurayq (or Ruzayq) added: ‘And many of our brethren live therein, and the authority of the government there has become weak. And whoever fights with us (against the government) will strengthen us, and at the same time will also

_ be strengthened by us. And when our cause prevails there (namely, in Marw-ar-Rud) it will also prevail elsewhere.’ And we learnt that

Abu Muslim said to Sulayman b. Kathir: ‘What do you say, O,

57 Wellhausen also reached the conclusion that Fanin must have been Abi Muslim’s first headquarters. See Wellhausen, p. 528.

74 Chapter 2 Abia Muhammad?’ Sulayman answered: ‘I agree with what has been said, our power there is greater while our enemy there is weaker.’

While this conversation was taking place, Kamil (b. al-Muzaffar) was quiet. Abu Muslim turned to him and said: ‘What do you say O Abu Salih?’ Kamil answered: ‘If the trunk of the tree is cut off there is no life for the branches. If you make the public appearance (of the Da*wah) anywhere outside Marw, you will leave the author-

ities free to turn their power against you and even to be aided by their own enemies in fighting you.’ Abu Muslim then said: ‘You spoke the truth, O Abu Salih, the right decision would be for us to rise in Marw.’ They all accepted this resolution and agreed on it.”°8

It is not difficult to see that this is a reconstructed tradition, which puts a problem which was historically genuine — the place

in which the black banners of the open revolt were first to be hoisted — into literary form.

It was a grave and fateful decision. An incorrect resolution about the place of the beginning of the revolt could be determinal

to the whole movement. The experience of the few Shi‘ite uprisings in the past made the ‘Abbasid movement extremely cautious when it came to the question of the place of its activity.

The choice of Khurasan for the activity of the clandestine Da‘wah was made after much thought. But now the decision was far more significant: there was no place for a mistake and our tradition wishes to convey the portent of the historical moment. The names of the nugaba’ who appear in this tradition are no

less important for understanding its contents. Misa b. Ka‘b and Lahiz b. Qurayz supported the idea to open the revolt in Marwar-Rid and were both from Tamim. Although they were dedicated to the idea of the Da‘wah, as we shall presently see, deep inside they harbored ‘asabiyyah for their own tribe — Tamim. This is probably the reason for their suggestion to start the revolt in Marw-ar-Rid, an area where their tribe was to be found in large numbers. They were supported by three Khuzia‘ites —

Malik b. al-Haytham, al-‘Ala’ b. Hurayth and Talhah b. Ruzaygq, whose tribe was also represented in Marw-ar-Riid. Abi

Muslim ultimately made the final decision and this fact is 58 Akhbar, pp. 273-274.

Hoisting the Black Banners 75 emphasized by our tradition in order to clarify that his authority was no longer questioned.

Immediately after the meeting, Abt Muslim ordered those who were present to contact their brethren each in his own region, and to advise them not to leave their places of residence until the beginning of Muharram 130/11 September, 747. This was the date eventually chosen for the declaration of the revolt.

The Akhbar tradition adds that Abt’ Muslim and Sulayman reached a rather quick understanding because they had both learned that Nasr b. Sayyar had resolved to capture them before they began their uprising. One may add that the choice of Marw, the seat of the government, as the first target of the open revolt suited Sulayman very well, because Marw and its vicinity were mainly populated by Azd. The choice of 1 Muharram, 130 for the opening of the revolt

gave Abi Muslim nearly five months, from Sha‘ban 129, to prepare for the uprising.*® Messengers went out to the various centres of the Da’wah in Balkh, Abiward, Nasa, Marw-ar-Rid and other places and alerted them to the prescribed date.© The choice of Marw as the first place for the public appearance of the Da‘wah meant that a major effort was to be directed towards capturing the seat of government from the very beginning of the revolt, but all the eastern provinces, as a whole, were simultaneously to burst into flames. Since there was no certainty that the plan would not be disrupted because of some unforeseen occurrence — as in fact did happen — the leaders of the Da‘ wah in the other centres were permitted to fight back in case of an attack on them.®!

According to Abi al-Khattab, shortly after the meeting in Fanin, Abi Muslim decided to transfer his headquarters to Sulayman b. Kathir’s village, Saqidhanj,*2 on 2nd Ramadan, 59 This is a more sensible tradition. Abd al-Khattab’s account that the open revolt was set for Ramadan 129 was retrospectively created after the events actually happened. Tabari, I, p. 1953f.

60 Akhbar, p. 274. 61. ‘Tabari, I, p. 1953. 62 The name of this village is very problematic. Tabari’s traditions call the village Saqidhanj (ibid., p. 1953 (1. 19)). Van Vloten, p. 82 (and passim), and Wellhausen p. 528 (and passim), call it Siqadanj. For Saqidhanj see

Barbier de Meynard, Dictionnaire, s.v. The author of al-‘Uyun wa-al-

76 Chapter 2 129. This date is quite a reasonable one, though it would seem more likely that the move took place later, towards the end of the

month of Ramadan.*? Abi Muslim’s move to Sulayman b. Kathir’s village was meant to symbolize the ending of all disagreement between the two leaders. The Da‘wah needed Arab warriors and Sulayman b. Kathir, the chief of the Khuza‘ah tribe, and himself a respectable warrior, could, and did, exert authority and rally the Khuza‘ah fighters around him.“ EARLY APPEARANCE

Contrary to the initial plans, the Da*wah was forced to declare open revolt long before the date which had been intended. Once Abi Muslim had arrived in Khurasan, his activities could no longer be kept secret. At this time Nasr b. Sayyar was outside Marvw, fighting rather indecisively against Juday* al-Kimrani in al-Khandaqayn. While he was engaged in this campaign against Azd and Rabi‘ah, his attention was drawn to the activity of Abi Muslim and Sulayman b. Kathir in the villages of Khuza‘ah

around Marw. Warriors from the tribes of Khuza‘ah began pouring into Sagidhanj, at first as a mere trickle but later in an ever-increasing stream.© Nasr b. Sayyar knew neither the exact nature nor the extent of this new gathering, but it was clear to him that another Yamanite force, opposing the government, was being raised just as he was occupied fighting the Yaman alliance of Azd and Rabi‘ah. The Akhbar relates that Salim b. Ahwaz, the commander of Nasr’s Tamimite army, proposed to him that they avert the coming danger by mounting a night attack on the Khuza‘ites in their villages and capturing their men and leaders

before Abi Muslim’s forces grew too strong. However this suggestion was turned down on the reasonable grounds that ‘Hada’ iq, Ill, p. 186, has the name Sifadhanj. Yaqit also speaks about Sifadhanj, a village 4 parasangs from Marw. In the Akhbar Shanfir is the name of Sulayman’s village, with variations such as Satqir and Sanfir. See Akhbar, p. 274 and Dari’s note 1 there.

63 See Van Vloten’s table, loc. cit. 64 On Sulayman’s military experience see Akhbar, p. 278.

65 Ibid., p. 274.

Hoisting the Black Banners 77 such an unusual act would instantaneously unite all the Yaman tribes against Nasr b. Sayyar. “If you do this” (said “Agil b. Ma‘qil), “the tribes of Yaman will rise against you, thinking that you wish to terrorize and humble them when you fall upon them in their homes.’ (in fa‘altum dhalika khalafatkum ahya’ al-yaman wa-ra’ aw annakum turidina hadmahum wa-idhlalahum bidukhilikum ‘alayhim fi manazilihim). It is reported that Abi Muslim’s spies brought him details about the discussions in Nasr b. Sayyar’s camp; the news spread around, presumably not without Abii Muslim’s initiative, which brought the tension already existing in Marw and its vicinity between Tamim and

Khuza‘ah to the point of explosion. This tension induced Sulayman b. Kathir to suggest that the preparations for the pub-

lic appearance of the Da‘wah should be speeded up so as to make its open appearance by ‘id al-fitr of the year 129. This meant assembling sufficient forces in Saqidhanj to be able to beat off an attack by Tamim if Nasr were to adopt such a suggestion as the one made by Salim b. Ahwaz.* Just then something fortuitous happened which compelled Abi Muslim to declare the revolt even before the last suggested date. One night, before 25th Ramadan 129, one of the leaders of Tamim, Hasan b. Yazid al-*Anbari, came out and set up camp not far from Saqidhanj. His men kindled a number of fires, either to provide warmth or for cooking at the end of the fast that day. These fires were seen in Saqidhanj and in view of the state of tension prevailing in the place, the Khuza‘ites thought that these fires had

been lit as a signal to Bani Tamim to assemble at Hasan b. Yazid’s camp for an attack on Khuza‘ah. In the war customs of the Arab tribes, the lighting of fires was a sign of a preparation for a battle.*® Abii Muslim and the leaders of Khuza‘ah in Saqidhanj declared a general mobilization. Abu Muslim gave an order to light a fire in the place where he was in

Shanfir (Saqidhanj) and all at once a huge number of warriors from the Khuza‘ite villages began to stream into Saqidhanj.

66 — Ibid., p. 275.

67 Ibid., p. 276. 68 See Qalqashandi, Subh al-A ‘sha, I, p. 409. The fire is called nar al-harb, the fire of battle; nivan al- ‘arab, the fires of the Arabs.

78 Chapter 2 Many of these fighters had nothing to do with the Da‘wah, but they all rallied to Abi Muslim on account of the common danger which threatened them, as well as because Abia Muslim was

now living amongst them and was thus entitled to their protection (idh halla baynahum wa-fi jiwarihim). Overnight the Da‘wah assembled an army made up of Arabs from the villages

around Marw and probably also of mawali who belonged to Arab tribes. The Arabs were mostly Khuza‘ites. The actual

declaration of the revolt was hardly necessary in the circumstances that developed. The open movements of such a great number of warriors and their concentration in one place, the rumours that spread around them and their association with Abt Muslim, manifested to Nasr the serious and dangerous character of the movement which seemed to have been instantly born. Meanwhile, the real function of the fires kindled by Tamim was discovered; nevertheless, what was done could not be undone. The Da‘wah had been publicly revealed before the date fixed for its emergence; Abi Muslim could not even wait until ‘Td al-fitr and he decided to raise the standard of revolt at once.

Fortifications (h@it hasin) were erected in the village of Saqgidhanj, and the black banners of the Da‘wah were raised on 25th Ramadan 129/17th September 747. Headed by the leaders of the Da‘wah, everybody in Saqidhanj put on black clothes.”

69 Akhbar, p. 276. 70 ‘There is an agreement of the major sources about this date. See Tabari, II, p. 1954; Akhbar, p. 277; Ibn Khaldin, ‘Jbar, Il, p. 252; Gardizi, p. 90. The Leiden anonymous chronicle says that open revolt was declared in ' Ramadan 130, after the news about the death of the /ma@m Ibrahim reached Abi Muslim. This anonymous chronicle however, is very mixed up, as far as the beginnings of the Da‘wah are concerned. The nature of the chronicle is that of a popular story which came from the circles of Abt?’ Muslim’s ad-

herents. In this chronicle Abt Muslim is presented as God’s chosen in-

strument to accomplish the divine historical plan of bringing the ‘Abbasids to power. See Anonyme, Leiden, fols. 5a-6b.

Hoisting the Black Banners 79 YELLOW SCROLL AND BLACK GARMENTS

The black colour became the symbol of the “Abbasid dynasty. Departure from this colour amounted to treason in later years. Caliph Ma’miim, who for some reason decided to nominate the ‘Alid ‘Ali ar-Rida as his heir and changed the official colour from black to green, faced very serious opposition in the ruling house itself and had to reverse his decision and go back to the

original black.?! It is very probable that the black colour of clothes was adopted as the distinctive colour of the Da*wah sup-

porters and the hoisting of the black banners as the sign of the open revolt already, during the clandestine period. At the beginning, black should have been chosen as a colour for clothes because it was an inconspicuous colour behind which the Da‘ wah activists could hide themselves. As usually happens in popular political and ideological movements, practical measures tend to be remoulded into symbols to which appropriate legends are attached in due time. In fact the Arabic verb sawwada and the verbal noun taswid, in the Arabic sources, refers to the Da‘wah more than it does to hoisting black banners or wearing black garments and headgear. Taswid became a synonymous term for the open ‘AbbAsid rebellion, just as tabyid (to wear white, to hoist white flags) came to mean anti-‘Abbasid, usually proUmayyad rising. The “Abbasid adherents, or rather the Da‘ wah supporters, were called musawwidah, a term which was used mainly by the Da‘wah’s enemies,” but also appears at least once as the honorific title of the Da‘wah rebels, in an apocalyptic tradition in the Leiden anonymous chronicle. The tradition deals with the close connection between the public appearance of the Da‘wah and the black colour which accompanied it. It points out that in the mysterious “yellow scroll,” which the ‘Abbasid leaders were supposed to have had in their possession, the term musawwidah was used for describing the ‘Abbasid followers.73

71 Tabari, II, pp. 1012f.; Cf. M. Rekaya, ‘“Ma’man” in EF. 72 Akhbar, pp. 290, 294-295, 306; and as a term without any negative connotations, describing the Da‘wah revolutionary army, ibid., p. 372. 73. Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 7b.

80 Chapter 2 I have dealt with the legend of the “yellow scroll” (sahifah safra’) elsewhere.”4 Here I wish to add that it seems that the whole idea of an esoteric knowledge going back to the Prophet and contained in some obscure document, must have been formed at the same time in which the legend about the meeting of the Prophet and the Christian hermit Bahira came into existence.

As is well known, the legend about the Bahira and the Prophet

belongs to the type of tradition dealing with the proofs of Muhammad’s prophecy, dala’ il an-nubuwwah. We are told that

Bahira possessed the true Book (kitab) which contained the ‘ilm, an esoteric knowledge, consisting of information about the appearance of Muhammad, among other things, and especially of detailed “signs” — ‘alamat — according to which he may be

recognized. When Bahira met Muhammad, who was about 12 years old, he found that the boy possessed all the “signs” which were contained in the Book and declared that Muhammad was the prophet whose coming had long been anticipated.”5 A legend

was created along the lines that ‘Ali b. Abi Talib possessed a “yellow scroll which contained the ‘ilm of the black banners of Khurasan, the time of their existence, the circumstances of their being and when (and how) these banners would appear. It also

contained the exact signs and evidence (of the banners’ appearance), which of the Arab tribes would support them, the names of the men who would lead the whole movement, their exact description (sifat) and the description of their aids and followers.’”¢ The scroll passed from ‘Ali b. Abia Talib into the

possession of his son, Muhammad Ibn al-Hanafiyyah, and eventually it was transferred to Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas, who gave it to his son, Ibrahim al-Jmam. The “yellow scroll” also contained the exact name, description

and “signs” of the first ‘Abbasid caliph, Abi al-‘Abbas. The similarity to the legend of the Prophet and the hermit, Bahira, cannot be accidental. In the legend of Bahira and the Prophet, the Christian hermit, after having been satisfied with all the “signs” which he had found in the Prophet, proceeded to look

74 Banners, pp. 139-140. 75 See Ibn Hisham, Sirah, I, pp. 180-182. “Bahira”, El, EP? and Shorter EI.

76 Akhbar, p. 185.

Hoisting the Black Banners 81 for the ultimate proof — the “seal of Prophethood” (kh&tim an-

nubuwwah) — which was supposed to be imprinted on the Prophet’s flesh “between his shoulders.” The existence of the “Seal of Prophethood” was for Bahira the decisive proof of Muhammad’s divine mission. Along similar lines, the “Abbasid legend describes the discovery of the first ‘Abbasid caliph. Later on we shall see why such a legend was needed; here, however, we are concerned with the similarities between this “Abbasid legend and the legends about the proofs of Muhammad’s prophethood. When the leader of the

Da‘wah army, Hasan b. Qahtabah, reached Kifah and found a large number of members of the ‘Abbasid family hiding there, he wanted to find out who the new amir al-mu’ minin was. His task was not very difficult because all the details about the new caliph were known to him: they were all in the “yellow scroll.”

In fact, one tradition tells us that in the “yellow scroll,” Muhammad b.‘Ali b. “Abdallah b. ‘Abbas found that the first ‘Abbasid caliph’s name would be ‘Abdallah’ and when Abi Ja‘far al-Mansur (eventually to become the second caliph) was born, Muhammad b.*Ali named him ‘Abdallah, in spite of the fact that the latter did not possess any of the “signs” mentioned

in the “yellow scroll.” These “signs” were all present in Muhammad b. ‘Ali’s youngest son, whom he also called ‘Abdallah. Since these “signs” had all been known to Hasan b.

Qahtabah, when he searched for his caliph, he could easily eliminate the members of the ‘Abbasid family present in Kifah

one by one until he eventually found young ‘Abdallah b. Muhammad, (Abi al-‘Abbas), who answered the description of the “yellow scroll.’ And just as in the case of Bahira and the Prophet, “Hasan b. Qahtabah says to Abii al-‘Abbas: “uncover

your back for I wish to see the sign” (al-‘alamah). Abi al‘Abbas uncovered his back and when Hasan saw it, he kissed it and said to the former “stretch out your hand so that I may give you the oath of allegiance for you are amir al-mu’ minin.”””7

There can be hardly any question that the legend of Bahira was the model for at least part of the legend of the “yellow scroll.” In the same way that the legend of Bahira was born out 77, Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 15a.

82 Chapter 2 of the necessity to establish the divine legitimacy of Muhammad’s prophecy, the “yellow scroll” was born out of a similar necessity to ascertain the ‘Abbasid legitimacy, and the divine designation of the first ‘Abbasid caliph. The official ‘Abbasid historians and traditionalists could have developed the stories of the strah, which was put into its final form by Ibn Ishaq during the reign of the second ‘Abbasid caliph after 755, as well as the tradition about the early ‘Abbasid history. The work of the “Abbasid court historian continually endeavoured to prove the close relationship between the ‘Abbasids and the Prophet. Along these lines, it is not surprising to find that the divine “signs” of the Prophet repeated themselves in the first

‘Abbasid caliph. :

The more pious circles in Islam were very critical of rebellions

and civil wars within the Muslim community. To keep the coherence and hence the strength of Islam, obedience was far more preferred to the anarchy of internal strife (fitnah). There had to be very good reasons to justify a rebellion against the authority which kept the Islamic fabric together. The major upheaval caused by the “Abbasid revolt necessitated a tremendous effort on the part of the ‘Abbasid propaganda to justify it. The “yellow scroll’ and similar traditions in which the Prophet was made to

predict the coming of the black banners was part of that ‘Abbasid effort to prove that the “Abbasid appearance, and their

“turn” — dawlah — was an essential part of the divinely prescribed necessity of the history of Islam and not a mere rebellion.”8

In the same spirit, the black colour and the black banners were presented as symbols with a historical depth. The variety of explanations concerning the origin of the black colour, means that traditions were created to suit ad hoc circumstances: a tradition presenting the black colour to pro-‘Alid circles could not be the

Same as a tradition putting across the same idea to pious nonShi‘ites. I have remarked above that the black garments might have been chosen by the early adherents of the Da‘wah because they were simple and inconspicuous, and that they may have ac78 See B. Lewis, “The quietist and activist traditions in Islamic political writing”, BSOAS, XLIX, 1, 1986, p. 14/f.

Hoisting the Black Banners 83 quired a symbolic meaning only later. As far as the black banners are concerned, we are told that the ‘Abbasids were not the only ones to hoist black banners as a sign of a revolt against the

Umayyads. Harith b. Surayj’s banners were also black. However, the ‘Abbasids made it clear that black was the colour of the Prophet. This was in line with the official “Abbasid presentation of their rule as the revivalism (ihya’) of the Prophet’s sunnah.) In one tradition which, according to Abu al-Khattab, preserved the sentiments of objection to the black colour as an innovation (bid‘ah) and not sunnah, it is said that a man stood up while Abi Muslim was delivering a speech (or a sermon) and said to him ‘what 1s this black which I see that you are wearing?’ Abi Muslim answered “I was told by Abu az-Zubayr, on the authority of Jabir b. ‘Abdallah, that the Prophet entered into Mecca on the day in which he conquered it, with black headgear and these are the garments of awe and the garments of the (new) Turn, (thiyab al-haybah wa-thiyab ad-dawlah).” Having given this answer, Abi Muslim ordered the man who was too inquisitive to be beheaded.*°

The importance attached by the “Abbasids to justifying the black colour of both garments and banners is attested to by the existence of a large body of traditions dealing with this issue. The Akhbar dedicates a long chapter to the subject. In a tradition attributed to Ibrahim, the mam, he says: “the Prophet’s banner was black and ‘Ali b. Abi Talib’s banner was also black. Adopt therefore the black colour for your garments.’®! The ‘Abbasids succeeded in their efforts to associate the black banners with the Prophet. Long before Baladhuri wrote his book on the conquests of Islam — Futith al-Buldan — the tradition about the Prophet’s black banner had already been well established. After

Khalid b. al-Walid had attacked a Ghassanid village near 79 ‘In a tradition describing the first sermon delivered by the first ‘Abbasid caliph, he is said to have delivered his sermon, khutbah, standing. “The * people were happy and they said ‘you have revived the sunnah (ahyayta assunnah) O, cousin of the Prophet.’ ” Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 15b. 80 Ta'rikh Baghdad, X, p. 208. On the headgear (‘amamah) of the Prophet being black, see Ibn Majah, sunan, nos. 2821, 2822, and see /bid.; no. 2816 on black banners. Cf, a popular tradition about the same, anonymous MS, BM Or. 1738 fol. 74a.

81 Akhbar, p. 245.

84 Chapter 2 Damascus sometime around Easter 634, “he went to Damascus and halted for some time in a narrow pass therein called ‘the Pass of the Banner,’ spreading his banner.”’ This was the very same banner of the Prophet (s), the colour.of which was black. From that day that narrow mountain pass was called ‘the Pass of the Banner’ (thaniyyat al-‘ugab).’®2 The Akhbar contains more traditions to prove that the first Muslims, as well as the holy men of the past, chose black to be their colour, thus presenting this colour as the sunnah of the ancestors (sunnat al-awwalin). We are told that David wore black when he fought Goliath, and ‘Abd al-Muttalib preferred black to the white of the rest of his

fellow Qurayshites. These traditions say that the Prophet adopted the black colour after the battle of Uhud. The Muslims having suffered a defeat at that particular battle clad themselves in black as a sign of mourning according to the Arab custom. At this point, Gabriel revealed himself to the Prophet and said to him: “... a time will come when your community will wear this (black) colour and in it there will be their glory.”83 The apocalyptic traditions explain nothing about the origin or the reason for the choice of black. The aim of these traditions is to legitimize the “Abbasid revolt and rule. There are, however, other traditions that give prosaic reasons for the choice of black. One says that it was adopted as a sign of mourning when Muhammad b. “Ali died.*4 Another tradition says that the adherents of the Da‘wah wore black when the Jmam Ibrahim b. Muhammad died.®> Ibn A‘tham al-Kiufi quotes an account which says that Abia Muslim ordered the supporters of the Da‘ wah to wear black in mourning for the violent death of Zayd b. “Ali and his son Yahya b. Zayd, the two ‘Alid rebels whose deaths had stirred up great Sympathy in Khurasan.*¢ The genuine identification of the Da‘wah leadership with the ‘Alid cause led, in 125, to the win-

82 Baladhuri, Futuh, (ed. De Goeje), p. 112.

83 Akhbar, pp. 246-247. 84 Dinawari, pp. 340-341.

ss Ibid., p. 359. 86 Kofi, p. 160; Akhbar, pp. 230-232; Tabari, II, pp. 1667f., 1770-1771. According to the Anonyme of Leiden (fol. 7b), the black was chosen as a sign of mourning because the leadership of the Islamic community was snatched away from those entitled to it.

Hoisting the Black Banners 85 ning over of the ‘Alids by the ‘Abbasids. This was the date (after both Zayd b. ‘Ali and his son Yahya had died), when the Shi‘ites in Khurasan came to think that nobody could defend the

‘Alid cause and avenge the ‘Alids’ blood better than the ‘Abbasid leader. This was the year in which the Da‘wah changed from an ‘Alid movement into a pure ‘Abbasid one.®’ The connecting of the choice of black to this important event, even indirectly, hardly needs explanation. However, the Da‘wah still retained its ‘Alid identity for many years to come and was referred to by its adherents and the earlier

‘Abbasid traditionalists, as hashimiyyah or simply shi‘ah. Therefore, the historian must always be aware of the fact that in the early ‘Abbasid context, the term shi‘ah might not carry the

usually accepted meaning of the term. . Wellhausen maintained, in line with his theory that the ‘Abbasid revolution was shouldered by Iranian mawali and was

fuelled by Iranian anti-Arab ‘national’ sentiments, that Abu Muslim borrowed the “black standards” from Harith b. Surayj “because they were very popular amongst the mawalli.’’®®

In a tradition recorded in the Aghdni, the black headgear was worn by the Arabs to symbolize revenge,*? which may explain the tradition mentioned above that the Prophet regarded black garments as the cloths of awe.

To sum up, the Da‘wah probably made the black garments and the black banners the symbols of its open rebellion for some

prosaic reason and the subsequent court historians and traditionalists later added the necessary ideological background, aims and reasons. Abt Muslim’s first objective after the public emer-

gence of the Da‘wah was to secure the maximum number of

fighters around him and to organize the Da‘wah centres throughout Khurasan on a war footing. The du‘at who had been scattered in various parts of Khur4san, especially in the vicinity of Marw, began to assemble their followers and to bring them over to Saqidhanj as soon as the emergence of the Da‘wah became publicly known. No doubt the emergence of the Da‘wah

87 See in detail, Banners, pp. 173-178. 88 Wellhausen, p. 534. 89 Aghani, VIII, p. 75 (1. 20).

86 Chapter 2 was greatly embellished in the “Abbasid traditions; but on the other hand there is no doubt that the movement of so many warriors coming from various places and concentrating around the banner of the Da’wah, must have made a great impression on the public. In an account quoted by Dinawari there is dramatic description of how in one day warriors arrived at Abi Muslim’s camp from various parts of Khurasan — from Herat, Bushanj, Marw-ar-Rid, Taliqan, Marw, Nasa, Abiward, Tus, Nishapir, Sarakhs, Balkh, Saghanin, Tukharistan, Khuttalan, Kashsh and Nasaf. They all came “clad in black garments and holding half blackened clubs ... which they called the ‘unbelievers clubs’ (kafir kibat).” They came on foot and riding on donkeys and horses.?! Julius Wellhausen attached much importance to the detail of the “unbelievers clubs” and found a close relation between these clubs and the planks of wood (khashab) used as weapons by Mukhtar’s followers.°2 In both cases, Wellhausen regards the clubs as the “national” weapons of the Iranian lower classes, which proves the “national” Iranian anti-Arab character of the ‘Abbasid da‘wah.%3 Here Wellhausen seems to have exaggerated by attributing too much importance to the kafir kubdat.

After all, the club is a cheap weapon, and it has been used as a popular weapon from the dawn of history to this very day not only by the Iranians. The Bedouins used it, as did every shepherd in the Middle East. The fact that the tradition relates that watriors came to Abi Muslim with kafir kubat, means nothing 90 See Abt al-Khattab’s description of the entrance of the fighters from the vicinity of Suqadim into the fortified camp in Saqidhanj, Tabari, II, p. 1955. Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 358-359 speaks about ahl at-tagadum. The word sugadim means obviously nothing to him. Akhbar has yet another version of the name, see below, note 96.

91 Dinawari, pp. 359-360. 92 Mukhtar rebelled in Iraq (685-687), seeking to avenge Husayn b. ‘AIi’s blood from the Umayyad. He succeeded in building a solid shi‘ite organization and forming a comprehensive messianic ideology around the person ' of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah. In spite of his eventual failure, in histori-

cal perspective, his movement gave birth to the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah, Banners, 104f. His followers are said to have been called khashabiyya, because they were armed with wooden clubs (khashab). There are conflicting reports as to the reasons and circumstances for the usage of this particular weapon by Mukhtar’s men. See Baladhuri, Ansab, V, p. 231.

93 Wellhausen, p. 505.

Hoisting the Black Banners 87 more than the fact that they had not yet received any money to arm themselves with better weapons. Swords, bows, arrows and other conventional arms were expensive and the soldier usually had to buy his arms in the market before the battle.°* We shall presently see that Aba Muslim saw to it that his troops were generously paid before going into battle so as to be able to arm and equip themselves properly. The number of men assembled in Sagidhanj up to ‘Jd al-fitr on 1 Shawwal 129 amounted to 4 000.9> About seven hundred warriors from the region of Suqadim from all the gusur (fortified villages?) of Khuza‘ah were the first to arrive in Saqidhanj. We do not know how many of these were mawali and how many were Arabs, but they included Arabs of Khuza‘ah and even a number of fighters from

the tribe of Tamim. :

At any rate a great camp was formed in Sagidhanj, and ‘Id alfitr prayers were led by Sulayman b. Kathir. For the first time —

so Abt al-Khattab relates — the ceremony was conducted according to a new ‘Abbasid and not the customary Umayyad practice.” Akhbar says nothing of any change in the order of prayer. It would appear that Abi al-Khattab’s tradition describes the ritual which the ‘Abbasids practiced after their accession to power, attributing the innovations retrospectively to Abi Muslim in order to stress the revolutionary character of the Da‘wah. It is difficult to imagine that a totally new order of prayer could have been agreed upon at a time when Abii Muslim was engaged in an ideological conflict with Nasr b. Sayyar, who was trying, in ev-

ery possible way, to prove that Abi Muslim and his followers were not behaving according to the Sunnah.°?

94 See for example how the tawwablin dedicated large sums of money to buy

weapons in the markets of Kofah. Baladhuri, vol. cit., pp. 205, 208; Banners, p. 103. 95 This is the number in the Akhbar. It seems exaggerated. According to Abi al-Khattab’s tradition, their number was a little above 2200; most of them infantry. See Wellhausen, p. 523. Cf., Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 358-359. 96 Akhbar, p. 274. This tradition has Yaqazim instead of Suqadim. None of

the names of this locality can be independently ascertained. Cf., Anonyme, fol. 263b. 97. Tabari, H, pp. 1955-1956; Ibn al-Athir, v, p. 359; Akhbar, p. 277.

98 Akhbar, p. 277.

88 Chapter 2 A different account about the first public prayer conducted by the Da‘wah is found in the Leiden anonymous chronicle: “On the day of ‘Id al-fitr they assembled and Qasim b. Mujashi‘ their fagih delivered the khutbah for Banu al-“Abbas in Marw. He invoked Allah’s mercy on those members of the ‘Abbasid family who had passed away, and blessed Ibrahim, cursed the Umayyads and called for God’s satisfaction with ‘Ali b. Abu Talib, May Allah be pleased with him. This was the first sermon (khutbah) in favour of the ‘Abbasids in the world (fa-kanat awwal khutbah li-bani al‘abbas fi ad-dunya).”””?

In this account, the main emphasis is on the khutbah, namely on the political aspect of the first “Abbasid prayer, and not the ritual. More than anything else, the khutbah, in which the name

of the Umayyads was exchanged for that of the ‘Abbasids, symbolized the open rebellion. On 9th of Dhi ad-Qa‘dah 129, forty-two days after the public appearance of the Da‘wah, Abi Muslim left Sagidhanj and went

over to the village of Makhuwan which also belonged to Khuza‘ah. This was the residence of Abi Ishaq Khalid b. ‘Uthman b. Mas‘iid, a mawla of Khuza‘ah, who appears in the list of the Akhbar as one of the seventy du‘at.!© Wellhausen assumes that Abi Muslim transferred his centre of operations

from Saqidhanj, the village of Sulayman b. Kathir, to Makhuwan because he felt that Sulayman was hampering his movements.!°! This assumption cannot be correct. Sulaym4n’s influence as the leader of Khuza‘ah was not restricted to his own village — he enjoyed an honoured status among the tribe and its mawali outside Saqidhanj as well; Aba Muslim could certainly

not have thought that he might escape from Sulayman’s influence by merely moving from one Khuza‘ite village to

another. The reason for his removal from Saqidhanj to Makhuwan was a different one. Sulayman b. Kathir himself suggested the move for strategic reasons. The Da‘wah was marching to war. As we have already seen, Abt Muslim had sent several important leaders of the movement to various 99 Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 7b. 100 Akhbar, p. 221. On Makhuwan, see Yagit, Buldan, IV, p. 380. 101 Wellhausen, p. 529.

Hoisting the Black Banners 89 centres in Khurasan to prepare them for the open rebellion. These were the centres which had to be restrained from action, as far as this was possible, until the beginning of the year 130. ‘Amr b. A‘yan and Abii Dawud, Khalid b. Ibrahim were sent to Tukharistan to wait there for the arrival of the signal to revolt in

the shape of a banner which Abi Muslim was to send them. Misa b. Ka‘b, the Tamimite, was sent to the centre at Nasa. Al-

‘Ala’ b. al-Hurayth returned to his centre of activity at Khwarizm immediately after the meeting of the Da‘ wah leaders at Fanin. He had to double his efforts in spreading propaganda

of the Da‘wah in Transoxania. Another leader, an-Nadr b. Subayh, was sent to Marw-ar-Riid. However, it seems likely that the nugaba’ in the other centres had decided to come into the open, as a result of the appearance of the Da*wah in Marw, even

before Abii Muslim’s messengers reached them. Thus, while Khalid b. Ibrahim and ‘Amr b. A‘yan were still on their way to Tukhari-stan, it became evident that the Da‘wah in Taliqan had appeared publicly and, following this, it was also revealed in Nasa, Marw-ar-Rtd and in Amul, the northernmost city of

Khurasan, on the Oxus (wa-kana zuhur ahl nasa wa-atTaliganwa-marw ar-rid wa-amul wa-nawahiha qariban ba‘duhu min ba‘d).'°2 These developments compelled Abt Muslim to act

swiftly. Saqidhanj was clearly no longer suitable as an operational centre. It was not adequately defended and Abi Muslim had to anticipate the possibility of an attack by the government forces and had to find some other place suitable for accomodating his growing number of warriors. This alone was the reason for his decision to leave Saqidhanj. Furthermore, he was not sufficiently well-acquainted with Khurasan to be able to choose the most suitable place for military preparations. He was

also not a military commander. At this juncture, Sulayman b. Kathir’s counsel and guidance was essential. Abi Muslim had no wish to escape from Sulayman b. Kathir; on the contrary, he was more closely dependent upon him than ever. The tradition in

the Akhbar is very clear about this point. The tradition relates that, at the arrival of the information about the latest development

1022 Akhbar, p. 278. Cf., Tabari, II, 1964.

90 Chapter 2 in the various centres of the Da‘wah in Khurasan, a council of war was held in order to discuss the situation. “Sulayman and some other people who had taken part in the mili-

tary expeditions in Khurasan (mimman kana yaghzi maghazi khurasan) and who had acquired exceptional military experience dis-

cussed the situation among themselves and decided to build for themselves a fortified position (khandagq). They met Abu Muslim and they advised him to do so. He said to them: ‘this is sound advice, for we were ordered to take such a step.’ (Following this discussion) Sulayman b. Kathir and Abi Muslim rode and searched for a suitable place for a fortified position in Shanfir (Saqidhanj). They could not find a more appropriate place than Makhuwan — the vil-

lage of Khalid b. ‘Uthman b. Mas‘ud. Abu Muslim built formidable fortifications there and moved to them on Thursday 8 Dhi al-Qa‘da (Saturday, 22 July 747),”!%

The sentence in this account in which Abt Muslim is supposed to have said that the Da*wah was ordered to build fortifications for itself, refers to another tradition in the Akhbar. This tradition relates that, some time before the decision to move into a fortified position was taken, a letter from Abi Salamah arrived

for Abt Muslim. Abi Salamah, the head of the Iraqi centre of the Da‘wah and Abi Muslim’s mentor,'!™ wrote: “when you appear in public do not neglect to erect a fortified posi-

tion for yourself and for your followers. This is the view of the Imam. In such a fortified position you will acquire your strength, because Nasr’s enemies and whoever fights him will come to you to be strengthened by you.”!

The idea is that Abi Muslim should put himself in a position of strength to convince potential allies, not necessarily Da‘ wah

Supporters, that unlike many rebels who had acted from a precarious position, he was acting confidently from a position of complete strength.

The message in these traditions — despite the fact that they were reconstructed many years after the events had taken place —

103 Ibid., pp. 277-278. The date corresponds to the date in Abd al-Khattab’s account. Tabari, II, pp. 1967(1. 18)-1968.

104 Banners, p. 212. 106 Akhbar, p. 277.

Hoisting the Black Banners 91 is that Abii Muslim’s move into a fortified position was a very important step (militarily and psychologically) in the develop-

ment of the military arm of the revolt. The need to turn the ‘Abbasid Da‘ wah into an attractive movement was crucial for its

military success. The followers of the old clandestine Da‘ wah were too few and too scattered for the great military operations ahead. A nucleus of an army had to be created and this could only be done by attracting everybody who opposed the government. Abt Muslim and the other leaders of the Da‘ wah correctly thought that nothing could be more attractive for the prospective supporters of the militant Da‘wah than the promise of sure success and complete security. The past experience of many abortive attempts at rebellion against the formidable Umayyad establishment rendered people very suspicious of every new adventurer. Aba Muslim must

have been regarded by many who knew nothing about the Da‘wah as an adventurer who could have no chance against Nasr, or even against a strong tribal leader such as ‘Ali b. Juday*‘ the leader of Azd. Abt’ Muslim had an obscure origin and no tribal background. This in itself was a tremendous drawback

for him, especially in the sensitive tribal political climate of Khurasan. His attempt to be over-wise by saying (when he was asked about his origin): “my deeds are more important than my pedigree’ was not appreciated. Mada’ini’s account of this conversation between Abt Muslim and some religious scholars from Marw, who sought to find out

who he was, adds that the scholars were also unimpressed by Abi Muslim’s statement: “we are occupied, and we need your help more than we need your enquiries.” They concluded: “by Allah, we know nothing about your tribal origin, and we do not think that you will remain long until you will be killed (by either

Nasr or Ibn al-Kirmani).”!% Abi Muslim, reportedly, curtly retorted: “No, but I shall kill them both.” This answer, even if it was given by the mind of the chronicler, is indicative of the psychological mood which Abt Muslim and veteran leaders of the Da‘ wah were attempting to create — a mood of confidence. Self confidence supported by the correct military moves, precaution106 Tabari, II, p. 1955; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 367.

92 Chapter 2 ary defensive measures and proper timing were the secret of Abi Muslim‘s success in building up military power for the Da‘wah. We dwelt at length on this question because, in a revolutionary movement, the mechanism of creating and maintaining the military aim is of the utmost importance for understanding the ultimate success of the revolution. Wellhausen, who seeks to stress the antagonism between Abi Muslim, the mawla, and Sulayman b. Kathir, the noble Arab of Khuza‘ah, appears to have underestimated the meaning of Abi Muslim’s move from Saqidhanj to Makhuwan. This move was a most important event and marked a turning-point in the history of the Da‘wah.

In Makhuwan, the Da‘wah formed the organized nucleus of its army for the first time and laid the foundations of its administrative system. We can see this clearly from the passages just quoted. Sulayman b. Kathir still held a central and much esteemed position in the Da*wah: Abt Muslim did not wish to get rid of Sulayman b. Kathir at this stage, or to diminish his influence. On the contrary, he was closely dependent on Sulayman’s advice and made the best of the latter’s authority and experience. Abia Muslim’s move to the fortified camp in Makhuwan was made just in time, since about a month later Nasr b. Sayyar suc-

ceeded in capturing Marw after killing Juday‘ al-Kirmani. The Azdites, who had lost their leader, rallied around Juday‘’s son, ‘Ali b. Juday* al-Kirmani. However, at least for some time, he did not show any intention of continuing the war against Nasr and was even inclined to enter into negotiations for peace with him.!” This created a most dangerous situation for Abi Muslim since Nasr b. Sayyar’s hands were now free to turn against the

Da‘wah.!% The position would have become still more dangerous had the peace talks between Nasr and ‘Ali b. Juday‘ al-Kirmani ended in an agreement. This would have led to the formation of a Mudarite-Azdite coalition directed, primarily, 107 [bid., pp. 1970-1975; Baladhuri, Ansab, III, p. 130; Dinawari, p. 361; Maarizi, Muqaffa, fol. 70 (ed. ‘Aql, p. 106). 108 § The sources agree that the struggle between Juday‘ al-Kirmani and Nasr made it easier for Ab0 Muslim to organize the Da‘wah. Dinawari, p. 354; Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 129; Magqrizi, op. cit., fol. 69a (ed. ‘Aql) pp. 95-

99.

Hoisting the Black Banners 93 against the Da‘wah. Furthermore, Abi Muslim aspired to combine the fighters of Azd with the warriors of Khuza‘ah, who

were genealogically Azd’s relatives, as well as with the other fighters who continued to pour into his camp, especially from the vicinity of Marw. Soon after Nasr captured Marw — perhaps even sometime be-

fore that — Abt Muslim, who was already in Makhuwan, took an important step. He sent the da‘i, Muhriz b. Ibrahim, to set up

a camp at Jiranj which was south of Marw. One thousand fighting men were concentrated in the camp that lay on the high road connecting Marw with the important city of Marw-ar-Rid, the crossroads which joined Herat with Balkh and Marw. There were two reasons for setting up the camp in Jiranj. The first was to be in a position to cut Nasr b. Sayyar’s supply routes between

Marw and Marw-ar-Riid, Balkh and other parts of Tukharistan,!© The second was to use it as a rallying centre for the reserve forces, recruited from the region between Marw and Marw-ar-Riid. Remaining true to these objectives, Muhriz did not stir from his fortified camp in Jiranj until Aba Muslim captured Marw in the year 130. Only when the revolutionary army was about to set out for the march westward, did Muhriz leave his position in Jiranj and join forces with the main body of the Da‘wah army in Marw.?!°

From this time on, the Da‘wah stands out as a vibrant and amazingly well organized body. It was full of vitality, and acted with precision under the faultless guidance of talented political leaders, military commanders and professional administrators. In addition to the long preparatory stage, it was also this professionalism to which the ultimate success of the Da‘wah should be attributed.

109 See Wellhausen, p. 524.

110 Akhbar, p. 279.

Il FOUNDATION FOR A NEW ORDER

Foundation for a New Order 97 3

MILITARY REFORMS

Once the Da‘wah came into the open, Abi Muslim proceeded to give the movement a proper administrative machinery. For him, the publicly revealed Da‘wah was not only a tool of rebellion against the existing regime, but also the foundation on which the

new order was to rise. He must have thought beyond the destruction of the Umayyads and envisaged the building of the new state, for the Da‘wah was already on its way to become a dawlah.! In the fortified camp of Makhuwan, Abii Muslim formed the first administrative bodies of the Da‘wah which were to become

the cornerstone of the “Abbasid state administration. Leaving nothing to chance, he understood the necessity of equipping the revolutionary movement with an inherent capacity to transform itself instantly into a fully operative government. The ‘Abbasid Da‘wah should be in a position to assume its full ruling responsibilities without going through a period of anarchy. Aba Muslim first attended to the administration of the army, into which he introduced meaningful reforms. A clue to Abi Muslim’s military reforms is found in a rather unusual apocalyptic tradition which presents the advent of the ‘Abbasids as the ultimate Messianic Time. This also belongs to a group of traditions dedicated to the praises (fadz@ il) of the Khurasanites. According to this tradition, which was put into the

mouth of Qahtabah b. Shabib, the great commander of the

Da‘*wah army and the architect of its military success, Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas, reportedly said: “From Khurasan shall come forth in future time, seventy thousand men with drawn swords; their hearts like iron bars; their names are patronymics and their lineages are the villages (of origin) (innahu

yakhruju min khurasan sab‘un alf sayf mashhir, qulibuhum kazubur al-hadid, asma’ uhum al-kuna wa-ansabuhum al-qura).”2

1 On the pair of terms, da‘wah-dawlah, see Banners, pp. 19-27. 2 Hamadhani, Buldan, p. 35 (Il. 18-20); Yaqot, Buldan, s.v. “Khurasan”, II, p. 413; Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 3b, where the expression “their lineage is the villages” was changed to “they live in the villages” (suknahum alqura), which a later copiest or editor thought to be more comprehensive.

98 Chapter 3 In addition to the Khurasanites’ highly praised bravery and warlike qualities, the tradition contains two particularly important details, both dealing with the way in which the Khurasanites were identified. Instead of personal names they were known by their kKunyahs (patronymics) and instead of the usual nisbah to an Arab tribe, they assumed a lineage derived from their villages of origin. Despite its ostensibly apocalyptic setting and style, this tradi-

tion has much to say about the practices introduced by the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah. From its very inception, the movement made

great efforts to remain clandestine and to keep secret the real identity of its members. One of the methods for keeping their anonymity was assuming kunyahs which were not their real patronymics. Thus, one of the early “Abbasid emissaries to Khurasan whose real kunyah was Abi ‘Ikrimah, was ordered by Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah b. “Abbas to call himself by a less conspicuous kunyah, Abt Muhammad, before he left for Khurasan. The practice of using patronymics instead of real

names became so widespread among the members of the Da‘wah that it has become one of its distinctive characteristics, and the apocalyptic tradition was created in order to give this peculiarity a prophetic ratification.?

The detail about the nisbah according to the villages of origin (instead of tribes) is far more important because it relates to Abii

Muslim’s profound reform of the registration system of the revolutionary “Abbasid army.

A great number of warriors assembled in Makhuwan, and Abi Muslim’s prime concern was to assure their pay. From the outset he realized that only a satisfied, well paid army could enSure the ultimate success of Da‘wah. It was indeed possible, as well as customary, to promise the soldiers a share in the spoils of victory, but the well-organized character of the Da‘wah and the past experience of Shi‘ite rebellions had taught Aba Muslim

that fighting forces must at all costs be contented with their conditions. Here again, it must be stressed that most of the warriors who gathered in Abt Muslim’s camp had known nothing about the Da‘wah and were initiated into the secrets of the revolt only after it had been publicly revealed. It was therefore necesSary to set up an organizational body to look after the material 3 Banners, p. 156. There was no difference between Arabs and mawali as far as the assumption of a new kunyah was concemed. See Akhbar, pp. 216f.

Foundation for a New Order 99 needs of the army as well as to care for its quick and proper indoctrination. The simple but highly significant reforms which Abi Muslim introduced and applied in the organization of the army, had extremely far-reaching historical consequences. He established a

new army register (diwadn al-jund) which abolished the Umayyad diwan. This register should be regarded as the first ‘Abbasid diwan al-jund. There was nothing new in the fact that the Da‘wah wished to have its own diw@n; in this regard it was no different from any previous well organized rebellious force.‘ The novelty was in the method of enrollment in the new diwan. Unlike the Umayyad system, the soldiers of the Da*wah were not registered in the diw@n according to their tribal origins. The registration following the tribal origin was a system which em-

phasized the segregation between Arabs and non-Arabs and sharpened the sense of tribal awareness and tribal loyalties in the army. Instead, all the warriors who had joined the Da‘wah were registered in the new diw4Gn without reference to their tribal affillations or ethnic origin. In this way an outstanding reform took

place: Abi Muslim gave equal nghts to maw4li and Arabs, which meant that they were both entitled to the same payment of ‘ata’. By introducing his reforms to the system of the army registration, Abii Muslim unintentionally dealt a serious blow to the

Arab supremacy and predominance in the Islamic state. From this time on, the Arabs began to lose, albeit very slowly, the

privileged status which they had enjoyed to the end of the Umayyad period.> What then was the system of registration in the new diwan of the Da‘wah? The language of the sources is perfectly clear on this point.

Tabari quoted a tradition by Abi al-Khattab relating to the establishment of the Da‘wah stronghold in Jiranj. Abii Muslim sent Muhriz b. Ibrahim to build a fortified camp (khandaq) in Jiranj, the main function of which was to “cut Nasr’s line of supply from Marw-ar-Rid, Balkh and from the various parts of Tukharistan.” After the building of the khandaq and the concentration of some thousand men in it, there came the order of Abi Muslim to register these warriors in the diwdan.

4 See for example, the usage of the term dlwan in the case of the tawwabun, Baladhuri, Ansab, V, p. 208 (1. 12).

5 On Aba Muslim’s military reforms and their historical consequences, see Sharon, “Reforms” and Ch. 7 below.

100 Chapter 3 The chief secretary or chancellor of the Da‘wah was Abi Salih, Kamil b. Muzaffar, who was mainly concerned with forming of orderly administrative procedure for the movement.

“Aba Muslim ordered him,” said Abii al-Khattab, “to send a man to Muhriz b. Ibrahim’s camp to review the troops therein and to list them in a register (daftar) according to their names, the names of their fathers and their villages (bi-asma’ ihim waasma’ aba’ him wa-qurahum).®

The account adds that Kamil b. Muzaffar sent Aba Salih Humayd al-Azraq, who was a professional clerk (katib), to carry out the registration. “He counted (and wrote down) in Muhriz’s camp eight hundred (new) men and four veteran members of the

movement (ahl al-kaff).”’ Here the account mentions a few names of well-known military leaders (quwwad ma'‘rifin), Arabs and non Arabs, and makes a point of mentioning the name of the village (garyah) from which they came, in each case.

Incidentally, this account contains an important piece of information which shows that the Da‘wah became a mass movement after its public appearance. Its veteran supporters gradually became an insignificant minority among the multitudes of war-

riors who joined it. It was on these vast numbers that Abi Muslim’s strength and influence were based. The pattern for the new system of registration was set in Aba

Muslim’s main camp, in Makhuwan. In another tradition, Abt al-Khattab reports that: “Aba Muslim ordered Kamil b. Muzaffar to review the troops in the fortress and (to list them in a register) according to their names, the names of their fathers and to establish their nisbah according to their villages (bi-asma’ ihim wa-asma’ aba’ ihim fa-yansubuhum ila al-qura).”8

Hoenerbach, who devoted an extensive study to the adminis-

tration of the ‘Abbasid army, spotted the second of Abi al6 Tabarl, II, p. 1957. 7. AAl al-kaff, the “quietists” was a title given to the veteran adherents of the Da‘wah who were ordered not to draw a sword, even in self defence, before the time arrived for the public appearance of the movement. The fact that

they had to exercise abstention (kaff) from war, even in cases of danger while being active in the clandestine Da‘wah, earned them the title a@hl alkaff which later became a title of honour. See Banners, pp. 224-226, Elad; ‘Abbasid Army, pp. 43-44.

g Tabari, I, pp. 1968-1969.

Foundation for a New Order 101 Khaft4b’s two traditions but failed to grasp the full meaning of the nisbah determined according to villages. In Hoenerbach’s translation of the main part of the tradition, the words fa-yan-

subuhum ila al-qura were lost in the phrase “nach Name, Vatersname ynd Herkunftsort.’® The registration of each individual soldier in the new diwdan according to a nisbah deter-

mined by the soldier’s village of origin was the core of Abt Muslim’s reform. This new system of registration meant a departure from the traditional determination of the nisbah according to tribal origin where Arab individuals were concerned. By offi-

cially identifying the warriors of the Da‘wah according to the place of origin, Arabs and non-Arabs were put on the same basis into the new diwan. As if to illustrate the meaning of the change, Abit al-Khattab’s tradition has this list of “well known commanders”’: Arabs with the indication of their tribes and nonArabs, after whose names the place of origin is carefully indicated.!° The most revolutionary thing in Abi al-Khatta4b’s report is the

fact that in the roll of the army, the men’s nasab (i.e. any indication of their tribal origin) is completely omitted; instead, the roll

was arranged according to their villages of origin. This is particularly important because the tribal identity of the Arabs who resided in, or were connected with, villages was known. The intentional omission of the soldiers’ proper tribal nisbah from the diwan was bound to minimize, and ultimately obliterate, the privileges hitherto acquired because of the individual’s Arab

origin. According to the new system a mawia residing in a Khuza‘ite village appears in the new diwdn together with an Arab residing in the same village.!! Aba Muslim’s reform elucidates the meaning of the apocalyptic tradition quoted above by depicting the Khurasanites as people “whose nisbahs are the villages.” In the eyes of the ‘Abbasid court historians and propagandists, the abolition of the tribal key for registration and ‘ata’ payments and its replacement by a new one based on villages of origin, was a revolution worthy of an apocalyptic vision

9 Hoenerbach, p. 263. 10 Some Arabs are listed in the tradition without the indication of the tribes, but in every case the locality is referred to in detail. Tabari, II, 1957: Sharon, “Reforms”, pp. 117-118. 11 On Arabs and most probably non-Arabs arriving at Abi Muslim’s camp from various villages, see Akhbar, p. 274; Anonyme, fol. 263b-264a.

102 Chapter 3 by no less than the first “Abbasid im@m and the founder of the dynasty. It is surprising that Wellhausen treats Abit al-Khattab’s account in Tabari very casually.!2 He fails to see its far-reaching

implications as proof of his theory “that the majority of Abu Muslim’s adherents consisted of Iranian peasants and of the mawali of the villages of Marw.”!3 Even if he were correct on this point, he still would not have been able to explain why the Arabs did not have to be registered in the diwa@n according to their tribal origin, especially since he correctly points out that there were Arab warriors in the Da‘wah army, many of whom occupied high commanding positions. ADMINISTRATION

The new diwan al-jund of the Da‘wah followed the pattern of the same diwa@n of the Umayyads. It was headed by Aba Salih

Kamil b. al-Muzaffar, the mawla of Hamdan, who was in charge of setting up and managing the whole administrative machinery. From the traditions quoted above, it is clear that the warriors enlisted in the new diwdn received equal pay. When Kamil b. al-

Muzaffar drew up the first register in Makhuwan, he enlisted seven thousand men in it. “He paid them ‘ata’ of three dirhams each and then four dirhams.”'4 However, true to his wish to attract as large a number of Arab professional soldiers as possible to the ranks of the Da*wah army, Abi Muslim resolved to retain for those Arab soldiers who joined him and who had previously been registered in the Umayyad diw@n both their original status and original ‘ata’, if it had been higher than the new ‘ata’ which he offered. This is why we find Arab warriors who received a very high ‘ata’ of 60, 80 and even of 100 dirhams in the army advancing westward (wa-kani fi sittin wa-fi thamanin wa-fi mi’ ah min al-‘ata’ ).' 12 Wellhausen, p. 532f. 13. = [bid., p. 532. 14 ~ Tabari, II, p. 1969 (ll. 2-6). Abad Muslim’s payment of an equal ‘ai’ to Arabs and mawali, was preceded by Harith b. Surayj who followed the same pattern of equal payment in his diwan. Harith is said to have paid each man a dinar and then three dinars. [bid., pp. 1569-1570.

15 Baladhuri, Ansab, III, p. 135.

Foundation for a New Order 103 The creation of the new diwdn al jund, which was new in its nature and the regulations which governed its management, was only one of several administrative issues to which Abt Muslim attended. In Makhuwan, he organized the administrative mechanism of the Da‘wah around four principal offices. 1. Chief of the diwan. This was undoubtedly the central function in the new

administration. As we have already seen, it was entrusted to Abi Salih, Kamil b. al-Muzaffar, one of the earliest activists of the Da‘wah from Marw. Kamil b. al-

Muzaffar was a mawla of the tribe of Hamdan and a member of the top seventy propagandists of the movement (du ‘at).

In Khurasan, he was regarded as the second in command to Abii Muslim himself. After the. “Abbasids came to power, when Abii Muslim was absent, Kamil acted in his place.!® As the chief of the diwan, he was in charge of the following:

(a) Supervising the whole administrative system (tadbir al-umir) and probably directing the propaganda and devising the Da‘wah’s political stratagems (yali amr maka’ idihim).

(b) The official correspondence of the Da‘wah (yaktub kutubahum)." (c) Collection, management and distribution of booty (wa-ilayhi tujma‘ al-amwal wa-al-ghana@’im waqgismatuha).

(d) The payment of the army (i‘ta’ al-jund). (e) The guarding of the movement’s secret affairs (wahuwa sahib sirrihim) — a function which may be compared to that of a secretary general if secretary is understood in the original meaning of the word.!8

16 Jahshiy ari, Wuzara’, p. 94; Akhbar, p. 219. 17 Ibid., p. 279, in the continuation of this tradition it is said that the rasa‘il, the correspondence, was the responsibility of a special official by the name of Aslam b. Subayh, who must have been subordinate to Kamil b. Muzaffar, Tabari, I, p. 1968 (1. 9). Jahshiyari, op. cit., p. 85. It stands to reason that in time Kamil’s office expanded to include several professional clerks.

18 Akhbar, loc. cit.; Tabari, pp. 1968 (Il. 9-10), 1989 (Il. 13-14); Jahshiyari, op. cit., p. 85.

104 Chapter 3 2. The Shurtah — the camp police.

This was a standing force which was at the disposal of Abi Muslim. The function of the shurtah was to main-

tain order in the camp, following the pattern of the shurtah which was at the disposal of the Umayyad governor in his capital. The command of this body was entrusted to Abii Nasr Malik b. al-Haytham of Khuza‘ah. Malik was one of the very first adherents of the Da’wah

in Khurasan. He later became one of the very small group of the top leaders of the movement, which tradition designates as the twelve nuqaba’. His important position in the Da‘wah 1s attested to by the fact that he is said to have been one of the few Khurasanite leaders al-

lowed to see the /mam.'9 ,

A tradition in the Akhb@r attributes the definition of Malik’s functions and the responsibilities of the shurtah to Sulayman b. Kathir. According to this tradition, when

the organization of the camp in Makhuwan was discussed, Sulayman b. Kathir made the following suggestion: “Let us,” he said “choose several men who will be guards or similar to guards. They will serve as Abu Muslim’s bodyguards, and if we need to send somebody with our confidential affairs, we shall select the messenger from among them. They will also watch over our possessions and the booty (which we may capture). And we should choose a person to look after our camp, to organize its defence, administer justice to the camp’s dwellers, and expel from it suspicious people (wa-yanfi ahl ar-rayb minhu).”

Sulayman’s suggestion was accepted and the leaders who were present took a unanimous decision in accor-

dance with it. They agreed to nominate Malik b. alHaytham to look after the camp’s internal affairs on the model of the head of the (Umayyad) shurtah (ka-hay’ at sahib ash-shurat), and they nominated Nasr b. Malik to be his deputy and Abii Muslim’s personal adjutant when

Abi Muslim appeared riding in public.” Nasr was the : son of Malik b. Haytham, but he also occupied an inde-

19 SeeTabari, I, pp. 1358, 1968 (ll. 7-8); 1988, 1989 (1. 12); Akhbar, pp. 216, 279; Banners, pp. 115, 186, 192, 210.

20 Akhbar, pp. 279-280.

Foundation for a New Order 105 pendent high position in the Da‘wah as a member of the select body of the (seventy) propagandists — du‘at.?!

In the large camp at Makhuwan, the shurtah was an essential institution. It not only dealt with disputes and quarrels among the soldiers, which were unavoidable among 7 000 men concentrated in one place, but also took care of internal security measures against the government spies and other suspicious persons.”? In this camp, Abi Muslim had already created special ceremonial procedures to stress his personal status as Supreme Leader of the Da‘wah. Here we are told that when he went out riding, he was preceded by an adjutant who was the deputy commander of the shurtah. The dispensing of justice in the camp, which is mentioned as one of the functions of the head of the shurtah, would appear to mean settling trivial disputes and preserving discipline. The judicial function came under the authority of the camp qadi. 3. The gadi. Qasim b. Mujashi‘ of the tribe of Tamim was appointed to the office of gadi; he was also one of the top veteran leaders of the Da‘wah and a member of the chosen body of the twelve nugaba’ . His functions are defined by the Akhbar as follows: “He served as the leader of public prayers for Abu Muslim and the people who were with him for the whole duration of their stay in the fortified camp. After the afternoon prayer, he held his court of

justice. (In his sermons) he pointed out the injustice of the Umayyads and their deficiencies and extolled the merits of Banu Hashim and their rights.”

21 Ibid., p. 221. 22 OnNasr b. Sayyar’s spies who penetrated Abd Muslim's camp, see ibid., . 292. 23 On him see Tabari, II, pp. 1358, 1952, 1962, 1964, 1968 (1. 10), 1970, - 1988, 1993, 2000, 2002, HI, p. 532; Baladhuri, Ansad, III, p. 115 where his patronymic (kunyah) is Abt Hamid. In the Akhbar, p. 217 his kunyah is Abt Sahl. The fact that he might have had more than one kunyah should not surprise us, since, as we have already seen, the leaders and supporters of the Da‘wah used the kunyah as a disguising measure. See also Jahiz,

Rasa'il, I, p. 22; Ibn Habib, Muhabbar, p. 465; Azdi, p. 26; Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 7b.

2 Akhbar, p. 280; cf., Tabari, II, p. 1968 (ll. 13-14).

106 Chapter 3 The g@di thus combined various functions. In addition

to his function as judge, he was the imam as well as the camp ideologist and political indoctrinator. This last function was of the greatest significance, as the majority of the soldiers were new to the Da‘wah and its aims. The gadi — the man who by virtue of his office was invested with a high religious authority — was also the person best Suited to preach the basic principles of the Da‘ wah and its political aims. The emphasis on Umayyad misrule, which the Da‘wah promised to replace by the rule of law and justice, appealed to all those who were opposed to the government. It appealed especially to the Yaman tribesmen, the mawali, and all who were disgusted by

the turmoil in Khurasan. |

4. The haras. The haras was Abi Muslim’s personal bodyguard and formed a part of the household staff which made up his court. The ceremonial system which Abi Muslim had created about his person gave his image a quality which distinguished him from his predecessors in the Da’ wah leadership. Tabari relates that his court was magnificent

and sumptuous by the standard of the courts of the Persian rulers. A Persian mawla, named ‘Abdallah b. Bistam, was responsible for the elegant planning of the court, which was furnished with decorated screens, special tents, “kitchens, mangers for the cattle and leather

water-containers.”25 Aba Muslim no longer regarded himself as a chief of some small band of chosen clandestine devotees, but as a leader with a great military record behind him — a leader who presented himself as the governor of Khurasan by the choice of the imam. The splendour of the court, the ceremonies and the etiquette connected with it, gave Aba Muslim an aura of authority; in the eyes of the public, power is often measured accord-

ing to its displayed trappings. The haras was commanded by Abi Ishaq Khalid b. ‘Uthman, a mawla of | Khuza‘ah, who was also one of the first du‘at.26 As we can learn from the passage quoted above (regarding the shurtah), the function of the haras was not restricted to 25 Tabari, I, p. 1968 (il. 16-17). 26 Akhbar, p. 218; Tabari, I, pp. 1968 (1. 8); 1989 (1. 12).

Foundation for a New Order 107 guarding Aba Muslim. The emissaries and confidential messengers of the Da‘wah were chosen from the haras, and perhaps its most important function was to guard the treasury in which the revenue and the spoils of war were

collected. When it was formed, the haras numbered

eighty-two men, all recruited from the village of Nawshan.?? Each of the chiefs of these four offices received an annual salary of four thousand dirhams.”8

The entire camp was well fortified and had two gates, guarded by special guard-units. One gate was guarded by a unit under the command of Mus‘ab b. Qays of the tribe of Bani Hanifah and Bahdal b. Iyas of the tribe of Dabbah. Another unit, commanded by Aba Sharahil and Abi Ishaq al-A‘jami, guarded the second gate.?9 ON THE EVE OF CAPTURING KHURAS AN

At the beginning of the year 130/September 747 there were four contenders for power in Khur4asan:

1. Nasr b. Sayyar, heading most of the tribes of Mudar. He had, it will be remembered, returned to Marw after the killing of Juday‘ al-Kirmani. 2. Shayban b. Salamah the leader of the khawarij, who had previously been active in Khurasan. He originally came

from Rabi‘ah, a tribe from which the majority of the khawarij came throughout most of the Umayyad period. He was known by the nickname Shayban “the lesser” (assaghir).°°

3. ‘Ali b. Kirmani, who had taken his father’s place as leader of the Azd and gathered around him many warriors from his tribe and from Rabi‘ah.

27 ‘Akhbar, p. 279 (on the various functions of the haras), Tabari, II, p. 1968 (ll. 11-12). 28° = Ibid., p. 1989 (1. 14).

29 Ibid., p. 1968. 30 Baladhuri; Ansab, II, p. 130, mistakenly calls him Shayban b. ‘Abd al‘Aziz and confuses him with another kharijite leader in Syria and Iraq called by this name. The same confusion appears in Abt Mikhnaf’s tradition. Tabari, I, p. 1948, but see clearly his name ibid., pp. 1995 (1. 16)1997 (1. 3) and see Wellhausen, p. 395 note 1.

108 Chapter 3 4. Abi Muslim, who, until the beginning of 130, had on the whole been a passive observer of the fighting between the government and its opponents, but whenever possible had fanned the flames of conflict between them.*!

Two political aims guided Abii Muslim’s political activity, once he established himself as the leader of the open Da‘wah: to prevent peace through alliance between the various political-mili-

tary forces active in the province, and to attract the great tribal blocs of Azd and Rabi‘ah (namely, the Yaman traditional alliance) to support the Da‘wah. Regarding the first point, Abii Muslim understood that continuing active hostilities between the various dissident groups and the government would keep his potential enemies busy and give him a free hand to prepare the revolt. The conflict between

Ibn al-Kirmani, Shayban and Nasr b. Sayyar was gradually weakening them and at the same time enabled the Da‘wah to consolidate its forces and organize itself without disturbance for its first objective: the capture of Khurasan. All this was known

to Nasr b. Sayyar, who made desperate efforts to stop the war and enter into a pact with his opponents, or at least to conclude an armistice with them. He tried to convince them to adopt a re-

sponsible attitude in the face of the growing power of the Da‘wah, which he presented as the enemy of Arabism as well as of Islam.

Old Nasr, famous no less for his poetic talents than for his Statesmanship, cast his anxieties and his political frustrations into verse: “Inform Rabi‘ah in Marw and its brothers: Show your anger before anger will avail no more Why do you kindle war among yourselves As if people of wisdom lost sight of your deeds And you ignore an enemy who had you encircled A mixed mob, neither religion they have nor pure descent. They are neither Arab like you whom people may know Nor even a mawali of any noted pedigree Whoever asks me about the origin of their faith

: (I'll tell him), their faith is the death of the Arabs. These are people who profess ideas never heard before

31 Tabari, I, p. 1972.

Foundation for a New Order 109 Nor have they been written in the Holy Books.”32

By depicting the Da‘wah as an ideological and political movement which threatened the Arabs, he hoped to attract Azd and Rabi’ah to his side; by stressing its anti-Islamic tendency, he imagined that he could influence the extreme Khawarij group led by Shayban.*?

Abi Muslim does not appear to have been perturbed by Nasgr’s allegations of his anti-Arabism — if indeed such allega-

tions were actually made and not invented by later traditions. The large number of Arabs among both the followers of the Da‘wah and its leadership sufficed to prove the contrary. Quite different was the charge that the Da‘wah was heretical and antiMuslim. Such an accusation could easily gain currency among the masses, and such tales as that of Abi Muslim and his companions holding religious ceremonies in which cats were worshiped could easily capture the public imagination.* In order to disprove this propaganda, Aba Muslim had to demonstrate the Strict adherence of the Da‘wah to Islam and particularly to Islamic ritual. To achieve this end he held a noisy and ostentatious public display in his camp, in which he presented the principles of the Da‘wah. The show was a masterpiece of publicity

and propaganda. All the Da‘wah warriors, headed by Abi Muslim and the rest of the leaders, assembled for a special pompous ceremony of oath, in which each one swore to be faithful to the principles of the movement. The first to give the oath was Abi Muslim himself. Sulayman b. Kathir acted as the receiver of the oath. Touching Sulayman’s hand, Abi Muslim reportedly said: “I am the first to pledge my-

self to uphold the Book of Allah and the sunnah of Allah’s prophet, to act truthfully and justly, to drive away injustice from the weak and to extract whatever is due from the strong. Take my oath of allegiance (in accordance with these principles), O Abi Muhammad (Sulayman b. Kathir).” The tradition goes on to tell us that after Abii Muslim, the oath was given by the rest of

32 Baladhuri, Ansab, II, pp. 132-133; Akhbar, p. 313; Kufi, pp. 161-163; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 367-368. Dinawari, pp. 360-362; Magqrizi, Muqaffa, fol. 71a (=ed. ‘Aql, pp. 112-113). 33 The context of our study at this stage calls for a repetition of information already mentioned above. See Tabari, II, p. 1965f and Akhbar, pp. 282283, 287. 290-292; Anonyme, fols. 267a-267b.

34 See especially Akhbar, pp. 281-283.

110 Chapter 3 the leaders and each one of the soldiers, “until there remained not one person who did not give his oath.” The ceremony lasted the whole day, and made a tremendous impression. “The news spread and the event became a topic of public discussion.” It is said that Nasr b. Sayyar had sent his spies to attend the ceremony hoping that they might bring him information about some strange conduct of Aba Muslim which could then be used to question his, or the Da*wah’s, Islamic faithfulness. But the spies’ report, so the Akhbar tells us, disappointed Nasr, who was unable to resume his propaganda against Abt Muslim. The public display of the strict adherents of the Da‘wah to the fundamentals of Islam was so convincing that even those who had

previously tended to accept Nasr’s accusations against the Da‘wah, revoked their former views and even contemplated supporting Abi Muslim, “because the latter’s support for the Qur’an and the sunnah was far stronger that that of Nasr.” The tradition concludes with an evaluation of the outcome of the propaganda war between Nasr and the head of the Da‘wah. “Nasr’s stratagem against the supporters of the Da’wah collapsed, and the artful machinations which he had prepared for them were debilitated. Ideological awareness grew in the public, causing people who had previously kept away from the Da‘ wah to move towards it and to reflect on its affairs.’> Soon it became clear to Nasr that he would not be able to fight Abt Muslim on his own. He witnessed the daily swelling of Abi Muslim’s army with growing numbers of warriors. Some of these warriors had deserted Nasr, some came from the city of Marw itself, and Nasr was unable to stop them.*¢ At the end of 129 he still thought that he would be able to destroy Abt Muslim with a small force, but he very rapidly realized his mistake. He sent a small company of cavalry under the leadership of Yazid, his own mawila, to fight Abt Muslim. Malik b. Haytham, Abia Muslim’s commander of the shurtah, quickly defeated Yazid and took him prisoner. Abi Muslim cared for Yazid as if he were a guest and not a prisoner, he healed his wounds and gave him the choice to either go back to Nasr or to join the Da‘wah. 35 ‘Ibid., pp. 292-293. 36 =» Tabari, II, p. 1965. The unusually quick growth of Abt Muslim's body of supporters seemed amazing to Yahya b. Nu‘aym, the leader of Rabi‘ah who reportedly said to the members of his tribe: “This man had appeared only a month ago and he has as many warriors as you have in your camp.” Tabari, II, p. 1966.

Foundation for a New Order 111 Yazid eventually decided to go back to Nasr. His faithfulness to his master who had freed him outweighed his strong inclination to join Abi Muslim. The tradition assures us that Yazid later had a change of heart and became a supporter of the Da‘wah. Abi Muslim was not a man who could miss such an opportunity to further his cause. He took great care that Yazid should see in his camp exactly what he wished to be reported in Marw

and among Nasr b. Sayyar’s men: that the Da‘wah was not merely a movement based on justice and equity but also one whose members observed punctiliously all the precepts of Islam. ‘““Were you not my master, who set me free from slavery,” said

Yazid to Nasr, “I would not have returned to you but tarried with them.’’3” At this stage of his activity, when he sought popularity and public legitimacy for the Da‘wah, Aba Muslim followed the same compassionate method when dealing with other prisoners as well. These prisoners, like Yazid, impressed by Abi Muslim’s treatment and by what they witnessed in his camp, became Da‘wah sympathizers.” Van Vloten casts doubt on the adherence of the Da‘wah to the

precepts of Islam. Nasr’s mawld, he says, did not speak the truth when he reported that Abi’ Muslim’s men observed the adhan and kept the prayer. Already in this stage, the open veneration of the Jma@m led to negligence in the strict observance of prayer.*? There is no textual proof to prove Van Vloten’s suggestion. On the contrary, the detailed tradition in the Akhbar about Abii Muslim’s insistence on the public display of the Da‘wah’s strict adherence to Islam proves that Abii Muslim was fully aware of how crucial the Islamic issue was for him. He must have gone overboard in the display of piety if only to disprove the accusations of his opponents. If Nasr b. Sayyar needed further proof of the military and ideological strength of the Da‘wah, it is possible that he received it from this episode. Abii Muslim did not allow small success to divert him from his purpose, nor was he prematurely drawn into war against Nasr b. Sayyar. He understood that he was required to fight the decisive battles in Iraq and in Syria. Furthermore, in -view of the weakness of Nasr b. Sayyar, who had hitherto failed to maintain an effective presence even in the region of Marw,

37 ~—s [bid., p. 1959 (ll. 7-9) for the whole affair see pp. 1957-1959.

38 Akhbar, p. 300 (ll. 7-11). 39 Van Vloten, pp. 106f.

112 Chapter 3 Aba Muslim resolved to gain control of Herat, the central city of southern Khurasan. Before the end of the year 129, he sent anNadr b. Nu‘aym of the tribe of Dabbah there, who without any difficulty succeeded in gaining control of the city and expelling Nasr b. Sayyar’s governor, ‘Isa b. ‘Aqil al-Laythi.*° In this way the city of Marw ar-Rid, which was already virtually controlled by Da‘wah adherents, was brought between the camp in Jiranj

and the Da‘wah forces in Herat. The whole of southern

Khurasan was effectively cut off from Marw and the supply routes and communications linking the capital with the south and

east of the province were controlled by the Da‘wah. Nasr b. Sayyar’s government was now restricted to the city of Marw, where propagandists were also active. The only route for supplies and communications still open to Nasr was the road westward to Tis and Nishaptr — which passed through a territory where his supporters from Tamim and Qays were numerous. Early in the year 130, the possibility of an alliance between ‘Ali b. Juday‘ al-Kirmani and Nasr b. Sayy4r arose — an alliance which Shayban, the Khawarj leader, and Yahya b. Nu‘aym, the

leader of Rabi‘ah, were also prepared to join. Abi Muslim dreaded such an alliance, which would unite all the warring powers in Khurasan around the government and against him. THE ALLIANCE WITH AZD

We have already mentioned that one of Abi Muslim’s two most important political aims at this period was to prevent the formation of such an alliance, not only because it was in his interest that the internal struggle in Khurasan should continue but also because he had set himself a second political target connected with the first: to attract the warriors of Azd and later also of Rabi‘ah to support the Da‘wah. He realised that the Azd, un-

der the leadership of ‘Ali b. al-Kirmani, would form the cornerstone of any alliance or peace arrangements in Khurasan. Therefore, he employed all his political sagacity to bring the Azd over to his side. Tabari tells us that Abi: Muslim sent Sulayman b. Kathir to ‘Ali b. al-Kirmfni to dissuade him from making an agreement with Nasr b. Sayyar, since the latter had taken part in

the murder of Juday‘, his father, and was indeed the one who 40 Tabari, I, p. 1966.

Foundation for a New Order 113 had nailed him to a cross.4! The compiler of the Akhbar adds to

this, in one of his traditions, that Sulayman b. Kathir assured Ibn al-Kirmani that the Da‘wah was seeking to avenge his father’s blood. It seems that these statements persuaded Ibn alKirmani to break off negotiations with Nasr and to join forces with Abt Muslim.*2 Although these accounts contain a certain element of logic, they are not entirely convincing: it is difficult to

assume that Kirmani waited for Sulayman b. Kathir to tell him that Nasr b. Sayyar was guilty of having murdered his father. The fact that he had agreed to enter into negotiations with Nasr proves that the story about Nasr’s involvement in Juday‘’s murder might have been fabricated. Granted, Sulayman b. Kathir was the right man to negotiate with ‘Ali b. al-Kirm4ni, since he was the chief of the Khuza‘ah, who in their genealogy were a part of Azd. The Da‘wah still had to come up with far more convincing arguments to persuade the Azdite leader to join it with his forces. One must bear in mind that the tribe of Azd, under the leadership of Juday* al-Kirmani and his son, “Ali, had fought to attain the leading role in Khurasan. If Aba Muslim wished to attract the Azd to his side, and this was indeed his earnest desire, he had to identify himself with the Azd political aims and aspirations. As a potential ally, he also needed to assure the leader and members of this tribal bloc that these aims were only attainable

with the Da‘wah’s help. In two separate traditions, in the Akhbar and in Baladhuri’s Ansab al-Ashraf, Aba Muslim promised ‘Ali b. al-Kirmani the governorship of Khurasan, called him “Amir” and offered to send governors of ‘Ali’s choice to various parts of the province.*? Furthermore, the Akhbar relates that Abi Muslim offered Kirmiani a position of leadership in the Da‘wah and gave him and the tribe of Azd an important ideological reason for joining it by saying, “We have

4} Ibid., pp. 1984-1985, Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 367 Dinawari, p. 361; Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 9b; Maqrizi, Muqaffa, fol. 69a (=ed. ‘Aql pp. 9697); see above end of ch. I. 42 Akhbar, p. 288; Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 9b; see Wellhausen, pp. 490-491. Wellhausen thought that ‘Ali was convinced by Ibn Kathir but as we shall presently see, the reasons were far deeper. 43 Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 130 (ll. 6-7); Akhbar, pp. 301-302. These two traditions are supported by a third one in Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 9a. According to this tradition Aba Muslim wrote to ‘Ali b. al-Kirmani “inviting him to join the Da‘wah as a commander and a leader.”

114 Chapter 3 been commanded to wage a holy war; you and your men were the helpers of justice (ansar al-haqq) in the past, since you gave a refuge to the Prophet and helped him (fa-antum awaytum rasil-allah (s) wa-nasartumuhu). My Leader bids me to join forces with you and to entrust his affairs unto your hands. Now Nasr has been displaying enmity towards me, but if you accept my offer and will agree to ally with me in order to uphold the truth of the Messenger of Allah, I will appoint you Amir over me and over everyone that shall join me. I shall support your cause and I shall fight against your enemy. You shall have the splendour of this matter and the glory that is bound up therewith.” The tradition goes on to relate that ‘Ali accepted these conditions and decided to make a united front with Abt Muslim,

who greatly rejoiced at his decision (fa‘azuma sururahu).“ This political move of Abi Muslim’s was crucial for the future success of the Da‘wah. Throughout history, many revolutionary ideas and movements collapsed when faced with the reality of the unavoidable military clash. As we have already pointed out, the stage of the preparation and the indoctrination in the revolution is based on quality and is, by nature not intended to attract the multitudes; the second stage — that of the revolt —

requires quantity far more than ideological quality. The more soldiers the revolution could muster, the better were its chances of success. Many revolutionary leaders failed because they did not appreciate the difference between the two stages of the revolution. They over-estimated the power behind the revolutionary enthusiasm which they thought could outweigh the military power of the regime. Abii Muslim, with his unique sense of reality, could discern between the two stages very well. He understood that in the stage of the revolt, the Da‘wah needed many warriors and less ideology. His main concern was therefore directed at finding and recruiting these warriors. The quantity of fighters was the most significant element in his eyes, since the supreme aim of that movement was to secure victory over the Umayyad enemy and not to dispense with the ideologies and doctrines of the revolution. For this reason, Abi Muslim was prepared to minimize the significance of the Da‘wah’s revolutionary idea and to emphasize the need to take an active part in the political game. The aim justified the means for him, and the 44 Akhbar, loc. cit.

Foundation for a New Order 115 aim was a very large army which was organized, trained and motivated to fight the government of the Umayyads, more than to enlarge the circle of the ‘Abbasid /mam followers. The detailed tradition in the Akhbar is thus unique, for it recounts in detail, the political thought that was behind the political

move to attract the fighters of the Azd en bloc to the Da‘wah. The ‘Abbasid historians could not ignore the obvious comparison between the Aws and the Khazraj (genealogically the relatives of the Azd), who supported the Prophet in Madinah and

the Azd of Khurasan, who supported the Prophet’s family. Since the whole history of the advent of the ‘Abbasids was presented as the renewal of the Prophet’s time, it is not difficult to see why the tradition puts into the mouth of Abi Muslim, “the master of the Turn” (sahib ad-dawlah), the comparison between the Azd and the ansar, which furnishes the Da‘wah-Azd alliance with the much needed ideological dimensions. For as we shall see, the hard core veteran members of the Da‘wah were reluctant to accept any compromise on the part of the movement dictated by mundane political necessities. Aba Muslim approached “Ali and the tribe of Azd with con-

crete proposals which were based on common interests. The Da‘wah was seeking to overthrow the government — so were the

Azd. The Azd and their allies from Rabi‘ah aimed at regaining power in Khurasan and the Da‘*wah was ready to promise them this; therefore, they saw no political reason why they should not support it in preference to collaborating with Nasr. Abii Muslim thus attained his two main objectives since his arrival in Khurasan — the Yaman militant anti- Umayyad opposition fell into his hands completely and a unified front of the various parties in the province was prevented. ‘Ali b. al-Kirmani did not join forces with Abi Muslim immediately; he continued to keep his independent camp not far from Marw, where his fighters and those of Rabi‘ah were concentrated;* but from this moment on, the ultimate union of their forces was only a matter of time. The co-operation between the two became progressively Closer. “ ‘Ali b. al-Kirmani started to re-enforce Abii Muslim

45 It was Abd Muslim’s intention at this stage that ‘Ali should not join him, but remain in his camp with his supporters and prevent people from joining Nasr b. Sayyar. See Akhbar, p. 298: wa-aqama ‘ala mawdi‘ihi waagamat ‘ashiratuhu wa-rabi‘ah ma‘ahu — “‘he stayed in his place and his tribe and Rabi‘ah stayed with him.”

116 Chapter 3 with men and to strengthen him with arms (wa-ja‘ala ‘ali

weapons.

yammuduhu bi-ar-rijal_ wa-yuqawwihi bi-as-silah).”46 This was

precisely what Aba Muslim needed: trained Arab fighters and For several reasons, it suited the interests of the Da‘wah that

Kirmani kept his own camp and did not merge with Abi Muslim’s at once. To begin with, Kirmani’s Azdites were unacquainted with the Da‘wah and its aims. Secondly, the appear-

ance of Kirmani in Abi Muslim’s camp would have imposed upon the latter a test of his intention to fulfill the promises he had

made in connection with the pact between them — and Abi Muslim did not intend to carry these promises out.*7 Thirdly, Abi Muslim would have had to explain to his followers — many

of whom came from Mudar — the meaning of the partnership between the Da‘wah and Azd, the details of which must have been kept secret for a while. The identification of the Da‘wah with the political interests of the Azd was one of Abii Muslim’s tactical master strokes, yet it was unpopular with some of the leaders and supporters of the movement. Prior to the decision to conclude the alliance with the Azd, Aba Muslim steered the Da‘wah, to the centre of the political life in Khurasan with a few brilliant political moves. He made all the other parties, who were engaged in the power struggle in the province, realize that none of them would be able to attain political and military superiority without the Da‘wah’s support. The tradition of Abi al-Khattab in Tabari is very instructive in this regard. The tradition begins by describing how Aba Muslim and Sulayman b. Kathir managed to prevent “the peace of the Arabs” (sulh al-‘arab) by detracting Ibn Kirmani from entering into alliance with the Mudar and Nasr b. Sayyar, and then goes on to report that: “Once the peace was shattered Nasr sent to Abii Muslim offering him an alliance with Mudar. At the same time Rabi‘ah and Qahtan

46 Akhbar, p. 297, cf., Gardizi, pp. 90-91. 47 Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 130, recounts that ‘Ali Ibn al-Kirmani did send, in - accordance with Abt Muslim’s suggestion and the terms of their agreement, commissioners of his to take over several of Khurasan’s districts, but Aba Muslim had already sent instructions to the Da‘wah leaders in each

of these districts to stir the population against ‘Ali’s men. After the conquest of Marw, Aba Muslim continued to give ‘Ali the impression that he was a senior partner in the government, when the inhabitants of Marw were asked to give their oath of allegiance to both leaders. Akhbar, p. 31b (ll, 15-17).

Foundation for a New Order 117 (namely, the Yaman tribes, M.S.) also sent to Abu Muslim with a

similar offer from their side. For a few days the parties corresponded with each other about the matter.”**

At that moment Abi Muslim was already in a position where he could dictate the rules of the game and pick up his choice.

Naturally, the swift transformation of the Da‘wah from a purely ideological movement to a political power, involved in the mundane political struggle in Khurasan and motivated by practi-

cal considerations, was not easily accepted by some of the veteran leaders and supporters of the movement. Abt Muslim’s decision to identify the Da‘wah with the political interests of the Yaman, though a tactical master stroke, had to be explained to

his supporters, some of whom came from Mudar. Abi alKhattab’s tradition goes on to relate that when Abi Muslim “gave an order to the Shi‘ah to choose Rabi‘ah and Qahtan”’ he explained that the government was in Mudar and that the members of this tribal bloc were the officials of Caliph Marwan II, the major target of the revolt, and they were also responsible for the murder of Yahya b. Zayd.*? In order to add further weight to

the decision to side with the Yaman, Abi Muslim also had to refer to the authority of the /mam himself saying that it was the Imam who gave the order that the Da‘wah should seek the

48 Tabari, II, pp. 1985-1986. For a condensed version of Ibn al-Kirmani’s role in the occupation of Marw, see Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 9b (infra). 49 ~ Ibid., pp. 1984-1985. There was tremendous sympathy for the ‘Alid family and especially for Zayd b. ‘Ali b. Husayn and for his son Yahya in Khurasan. After the collapse of Zayd’s revolt in Kafah in 122/740, Yahya b. Zayd fled to Khurasan and was concealed by the Shi‘ites there for over three years. He ever.tually was captured by Nasr b. Sayyar’s men, put to death and crucified. His cruel death brought forward a wave of sympathy for the Shi‘ite cause in Khurasan and was one of the main reasons for the suc-

cess of the ‘Abbasid Jmam in convincing the Khurasanite Shi‘ites to accept him as the only eligible representative of the Prophet’s family. We have seen above that one of the reasons given to the Da‘wah’s choice of the black colour as the colour of the revolution was that the people of Khurasan wore black garments as a sign of mourning for Zayd and his son Yahya. See Banners, pp. 177-178. Aba Muslim, with his healthy political

sense, could not fail to see the opportunity of exploiting the popular sympathy for Yahya b. Zayd. By implying that the Mudar could be blamed for the murder of Yahya b. Zayd, he added a very weighty argument for the choice of the Yaman as the Da‘wah’s allies.

118 Chapter 3 friendship of the Yaman (gad amaranda al-imam bi-ikhtisas alyaman),>°

The famous tradition containing the details of Ibrahim alImam’s testimony to Abt: Muslim, on the eve of the latter’s trip

to Khurasan to head the Da‘wah,*! may well be a later historian’s reconstruction based partly on the accounts about Abi Muslim ’s tactics of giving Imamate legitimacy to his practical policies.

Abi al-Khattab’s tradition (around which we have been weaving our discussion about Abi Muslim’s manoeuvering of the Da*wah into a favourable position in Khurasan) describes the

arrival of the two tribal delegations in Abt Muslim’s camp to present their cases, each wishing to win the support of the Da‘wah. Alert to the importance of the occasion, Aba Muslim carefully prepared the setting for his little drama, which took place in a certain house in Alin called the Muhtafiz Court (dar al-

muhtafiz). Uthman b. al-Kirm4ni, representing the Yaman, arrived with his people and was shown to his place in the garden; Abi Muslim sat in a room waiting for the delegation of Mudar surrounded by seventy elders of the Da‘wah. Led by ‘Aqil b. Ma’‘qil of the tribe of Layth, the tribe of Nasr b. Sayyar, the Mudarite delegation, was ushered into Abii Muslim’s presence. Someone read a letter which Abi Muslim had written to the leaders of the Da*wah (identified in the tradition as the shi‘ah, a term invariably used to denote the “Alid Shi‘ah in Khurasan that had turned ‘Abbasid in 125).*2 In this letter the Da‘ wah leaders were asked to choose between the Mudar and the Yaman parties. (gara‘a ‘ala ash-shi‘ah kitaban katabahu abi muslim li-yakhtari bayna al-farigayn). Once the letter was read, the various actors commenced reading their well-rehearsed lines. First Sulayman b. Kathir stood and made his choice in an eloquent speech; he chose ‘Ali b. al-Kirmani. Then Aba Mansur Talhah b. Ruzaygq,

the veteran nagib from Khuza‘ah, stood up and seconded Sulayman’s choice. The final blow came from Mazyad (or Marthad) b. Shafiq, a member of the prestigious group of “the seventy” du‘Gt — propa-

50 Akhbar, p. 285. 51 See Tabari, I, p. 1937. This is the tradition which contains the detail that Ibrahim ordered Abi Muslim to exterminate all the speakers of Arabic in Khurasan. See above p.5 3

52 See Banners, p. 178.

Foundation for a New Order 119 gandists.*3 Unlike the former two, who belonged to Yaman, Mazyad b. Shafiq was a Mudarite from the tribe of Sulaym. He is supposed to have said: ‘“Mudar are the killers of the Prophet’s family, may Allah bless him and give him peace; they are the supporters of Banu Umayyah and the partisans of the woolly haired Marwan (Marwan II nicknamed al-ja‘di). They are responsible for the spilling of our blood, for the plundering of our properties and they shall bear the consequences. Nasr b. Sayyar, Marwan’s governor over Khurasan, executes the latter’s orders, blesses him from the pulpit and calls him amir al-mu’ minin; but we wash our hands clean in front of Allah

from all this and we neither recognize Marwan as amir almu’ minin, nor concede that Nasr is correct and right is his behaviour. We have therefore chosen (as our allies) “Ali b. alKirmani and his supporters from Qahtan and Rabi‘ah.”™4

Whether or not the Mudarite da ‘i actually said what the tradition attributes to him is uncertain. It is very possible that the proYamanite historian put the grave accusation of Mudar responsibility for the murder of the Prophet’s family into the mouth of a

Mudarite. Whatever the case may be, the outcome of Abi Muslim’s political game was clear: by the beginning of 130 the enlisting of the Yaman active participation in the revolt was fully secured. Nasr tried to break the understanding between ‘Ali b. al-Kirmani and Abt Muslim but to no avail. Even the support of some Qur’an readers and other Muslim scholars for Nasr and the government could no longer affect the solid front of the Yaman and the Da‘wah. It should not be forgotten that even among the veteran adher-

ents of the Da‘wah, feelings of tribal ‘asabiyyah were still strong. This aspect of the process which led to the YamanDa‘wah alliance is elucidated in a parallel account in the Akhbar. According to this account, Sulayman b. Kathir, experienced in the affairs of Khurasan, suggested to Abii Muslim that he send a

delegation to offer the Da‘wah to Nasr b. Sayyar and his Mudarite followers. When Abi Muslim argued that he could not see the logic in the suggestion, Sulaym4n reportedly said, “By offering the Da‘wah to Nasr (who will not accept it, M.S.) you will have grounds for complaint against him, and the Mudarites 53. Akhbar, p. 217. 54 Tabari, II, p. 1986.

120 Chapter 3 who are with you will be satisfied” (wa-irsGlika tlayhi hujjatan laka ‘alayhi wa-fihi rida man ma‘aka min mudar).5 Aba Muslim was so impressed by this argument that he sent two delegations to Nasr and to Mudar both of which returned empty-handed. An interesting detail concerning these delegations is that on the first occasion, the person sent was Lahiz b. Qurayz, the naqgib from Tamim, who, as we shall see later, was not free from feelings of ‘asabiyyah towards his fellow-tribesmen. By cleverly exploiting the frustration of the Yaman, and perhaps also the desire to avenge the blood of Juday*, Aba Muslim succeeded in foiling Nasr b. Sayyar’s plan to form a MuddarYamanite coalition against the Da‘wah. All that Nasr managed to achieve was a doubtful armistice for one year (“until the end of 130’) between himself and Shayban, the Kharijite leader. From

the details of the agreement it is evident that Nasr b. Sayyar agreed to recognize Shayban’s rule over the areas which the latter had controlled at the time of the armistice, and that Shayban agreed to co-operate with Nasr in the war against the mushrikin (it is not clear if the Da‘wah or the Turks are intended).°© Nasr

gained no real advantage from this pact, which left him completely isolated against the Da‘wah- Yaman alliance. Aba Muslim continued to increase his forces. According to the Akhbar, at the beginning of the year 130 about ten thousand men were assembled around him, apart from those who were sent to him by “Ali

b. Juday‘*.5? Warriors continued to pour into his camp, even from far-off Jurjan (so one of the traditions relates**) notwithstanding Nasr b. Sayy4ar’s attempt to incapacitate the Da*wah leadership there.*? A call went out from Abi Muslim’s camp to the Da‘wah centres in Taligan, Balkh and Marw-ar-Rid, to send warriors; these began to arrive openly. ‘Amr b. A*yan, who had gone to Tukharistan with Abi Dawud immediately after the meeting of the Da‘wah chiefs with Aba Muslim in Fanin, arrived from Taliqan at the head of 1 500 fighters; “Abdallah b. Shu‘bah came leading a thousand men with a large quantity of

55 Akhbar, p. 286 (Il. 1-2). 56 = Ibid., pp. 295-296.

51 Ibid., p. 281.

5s Ibid., p. 293. 59 Nasr wrote to the governor of Jurjan and to the Mudar leaders there, to imprison the leaders of the Shi‘ah in Jurjan. /bid., p. 294; Azdi, p. 135.

Foundation for a New Order 121 supplies and riding-animals from Marw-ar-Rid, which had already been completely taken over by the Da‘wah, like Herat.®°

Nasr made a desperate effort to stop the reinforcements from reaching Abii Muslim; but, since he was afraid to venture outside Marw, he tried to persuade Shayban, the Kharijite, to do the job for him. However, Shayban refused, and all that Nasr could

now do was to send armed guards to patrol the area between Marw and Abii Muslim’s camp in Makhuwan.°*! These guards (masalih) began to harass the villagers in the areas through which they passed and to live off the inhabitants’ herds and the produce of their fields. At this time, the public status which Abu Muslim had acquired became evident to all. The oppressed farm-

ers turned to him for help against the depredations of the government troops and he was only too happy ‘to offer it. His men sallied forth against these armed guards, defeated them, and took many prisoners, some of them wounded. Abi Muslim had them treated and sent back to their master, but this time not all of them went. Some preferred to join the revolt. The last tradition is of particular importance. The fact that people who felt oppressed by the government turned to Abi Muslim for help means that law and order in the province had collapsed. It is only in a state of lawlessness that protection is sought from possessors of power. In the law of the desert, a leader of a strong tribe would extend protection to weaker tribes, to villages, to travellers and to individuals in distress, but there is no need for private protection where a proper governmental body exists. The collapse of the systems of law and order is one of the prime conditions for a revolution, and these conditions

had developed in Khur4san by the beginning of 130. Abi 60 Akhbar, p. 297. 61 The account in the Akhbar says that Shayban was supposed to cut the routes of the reinforcements to Abii Muslim. ‘Ali b. al-Kirmani convinced

him to abandon the plan, saying: “You know that if you were to move against AbQ Muslim, you would have to traverse the territories of tribes other than your tribes, your supply could then easily be cut, while Nasr will continue to stay where he is in his own tribal territory where the food and fodder are assured for him by these tribes while you will become gradually weaker.” Akhbar, p. 297. 62 We have mentioned the incident above as an example of Abd Muslim’s tac-

tics to gain popularity. Akhbar, p. 300; Tabari, II, pp. 1969-1970, reports this incident under the event of the year 129, but it seems that it should be postponed to the first months of 130, when Abid Muslim was in Alin; see Tabari, II, p. 1986.

122 Chapter 3 Muslim came to be regarded as a great tribal leader in the desert, or a great Persian dihgan, who would be the sole source of order in the case of the breakdown of the central authority. Looking at Khurasan on the eve of the great expedition of the

revolutionary army westward, the picture is one of a large province which had already disintegrated. It seems that the Da‘wah was already in command in a few districts by 128. A coin struck in Jayy, which formed part of Isfahan, reflects the fragmentation of the Eastern Territories. S. Lane-Poole identified the coin as a revolutionary issue and attributed it to Abia Muslim. The coin is very similar to the usual Umayyad post ‘Abd al-Malik coins in that it bears the standard Islamic formulae

which had been introduced by ‘Abd al-Malik. On the obverse: ‘There is no God but Allah alone, He has no companion;” on the reverse: “Allah is one, Allah the eternal, brought not forth nor hath He been brought forth.’ The two margin inscriptions on the obverse give the coin its unique character. The inner one reads: “I ask you for no reward in return for it except love towards the kinfolk;’’® the outer inscription reads: “In the name of Allah; minted in Jayy, the year one hundred and twenty eight.’’6 The place, the date, and especially the Qur’4nic message on the inner margin are the unique features of this coin. The part of the Qur’anic verse chosen differs from the usual Qur’anic formula used on the Umayyad coins, “Muhammad is the messenger of Allah; He sent him with the right guidance and the true religion in order to make him overcome all the other religions ...’’& This formula was used by ‘Abd al-Malik when he gave Islam its final form and made it a state religion with an imperial and universal

message. Considering the fact that Qur’anic verses were carefully chosen for both coins and inscriptions to convey a specific message, the Qur’anic verse on the coin minted in Jayy

in 128 should be viewed with this principle in mind. In the verse, the Muslim believers are urged to treat the “kinfolk”’ kindly and the kinfolk were understood to be the Prophet’s fam-

ily. One may assume, therefore, that the coin could not have been minted by the Umayyad authorities. It could have origi-

63 Q/112:1-3. 64 Q/42:23 = Bell translation, II, p. 487. 65 S. Lane-Poole, Catalogue of Arabic Coins in the Khedivial Library, Cairo, London, 1897, p. 26 no. 246.

66 Q/61:9.

Foundation for a New Order 123 nated only in Shi‘ite circles. The coin was identified as a “revolutionary issue” and attributed to Abt’ Muslim and the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah. This identification seems very improbable, mainly because the date 128 is too early for such a revolutionary

action on the part of Aba Muslim, who was still battling to establish his authority over the movement in Khurasan in 128, and did not appear in public before the end of 129. The coin seems not to have been minted by Abia Muslim, but by another Shi‘ite rebel and this could only be “Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah, who, as we Shall presently see, established a proper government of his own in part of the province east of Iraq in 128. In addition to its origin, the minting of the coin is in itself significant for our discussion. Minting (sikkah) and the public sermon on Friday (khutbah) were the two most important expressions of authority. The minting of coins by others shows that the Umayyad authority had already been shattered in the Eastern provinces. Abii Muslim issued his own revolutionary coins, but this was much later, in 132, on the eve of, or immediately after the final victory of the revolution. On his coins Abt’ Muslim used the same Qur’anic verse (Q. 43:23) which “Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah had used on his revolutionary issues and this must have created the impression among scholars that all the coins with this verse were minted by Abi Muslim.*” Long before minting coins, however, the Da‘wah under Abi Muslim had first to establish itself in Khuras4n. Its emergence as a major political and military power and Abii Muslim’s achievements may be summed up against this background of increasing anarchy. Abi Muslim was very successful in gradually isolating Nasr b. Sayyar while acquiring an honourable public image for himself and building up a large army of several thousand warriors

67 Another coin with the same verse was issued in 128 in Ramhurmuz. The Kharijite rebel ad-Dahhak b. Qays also issued his own coins after gaining : control ever the Jazirah and capturing Kifah. Sometime after writing that the coins of 128 and 129 from Jayy were issued by the Ja‘farid rebel ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah, I saw that Edward von Zambaur had already suggested the same idea. See Zambaur, Muentz., pp. 101, 125; Lane-Poole, Coins, I, p. 33; Muhammad, pp. 344-345, 427. Miles erroneously attributed ad-Dahhak’s coin also to ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah in spite of the fact that this particular coin bears a typical Kharijite formula. See Miles, Rare Coins, p. 26; Muhammad, pp. 368-369, and cf. Lavoix, I, p. 132 and Guest, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1932, pp. 54-56.

124 Chapter 3

walriors. |

who recognized his authority. His greatest achievement was the attraction to the Da‘wah of the great blocs of Yaman and Rabi‘ah

Nasr made one final attempt to amass his forces and those of

Shayban to engage Abt Muslim in battle. When this news reached Makhuwéan it caused fear and concern among the occupants of the camp. Abi Muslim opened the gates of his khandaq and, like Gideon in his time, ordered all who were fainthearted

to depart from him. “We have no need of men who harbour doubts in their hearts,” he said; ““whoever wishes to leave let him leave.”” Two thousand men left the camp and in the evening the gates were Closed.® Those troops who were left were drawn up

and Abi Muslim went out with them to Alin and called troops from Tukharistan and the last Da‘wah warriors from Marw arRid to join him, but he soon returned because Nasr had decided at the last moment to join battle with him. Abi Muslim and Ibn al-Kirm4ani now tightened the siege on Marw, and Nasr’s isolation was complete when Ibn al-Kirmani

succeeded in convincing Shayban, the Khariyite leader, to forsake Nasr.®9

CALIPH MARWAN’S PROBLEMS

Nasr’s only hope of regaining control of Khurasan was to receive help from Caliph Marwan II or from Yazid b. “Umar b. Hubayrah, the governor of Iraq. But the Caliph could not help him since, from the moment of his accession, he had been deeply involved in conflict against various insurgents in Syria and Iraq. In the year 127, immediately after Marwan had seized power, three insurrections broke out in Hims, Damascus and Palestine; they all originated among the disgruntled southern tribes. These uprisings were crushed with comparative ease.”° A more serious revolt — a Kharijite one — broke out in the Jazirah in the same year. Led by Ad-Dahhak b. Qays, of Shayban (Rabi‘ah), it was the most extensive and dangerous of all the Kharijite revolts to

take place during the Umayyad period. Its unique feature was 68 Akhbar, p. 298. 69 Ibid., p. 299. 70 ‘Tabari, I, pp. 1892-1897.

Foundation for a New Order 125 that on this occasion the Khawarij admitted into their ranks everyone who wished to join them without questioning the ideo-

logical soundness of his beliefs, provided that he was opposed to the Umayyads.”! They succeeded in taking Kifah and Wasit in the year 127/744, while Marwan was occupied with the revolt in Hims. When this was suppressed, the Caliph was free to deal with Dahhak b. Qays, who had meanwhile returned to the areas occupied by Rabi‘ah in the Jazirah and had gained control of the city of Mawsil (Misul). Marwan succeeded in defeating and killing Dahhak after heavy fighting which took place towards the

end of the year 128 (about September 746). The defeat of Dahhak did not mean the end of his movement and Marwan was compelled to fight against his successor, al-Khaybari, whom the

caliph defeated and killed in the same year.’?? However, the Khawéarij, were still strong and numerous and continued to be

active. They rallied around Shayban b. ‘Abd al-*Aziz alYashkuri (of Rabi‘ah) and fought against Marwan, first around Mawsil and later with the ‘Alid rebel, “Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah. After defeating the latter they were forced southward to Fars and later moved to ‘Uman, where Shayban was killed in 134 — two years after the accession of the “Abbasids to power.”3 The remnants of other Khawarij movements continued to be active in the Jazirah, in Jibal, in Iraq, in Fars, in Kirman and in Khurasan until the actual accession of the ‘Abbasids.”4

The large number of serious rebellions and insurrections, which shook the empire until the time of Marwan II, did not escape the sensitive eye of the author of the Akhbar, who, in a language resembling that of a modern historian, evaluated these unusual circumstances as one of the main reasons for the success of the Da*wah. 71 Wellhausen, Khawarij, p. 136. 72 ~__—«~*For a detailed description of this Kharijite revolt see Tabari, II, pp. 1989-

1941; Azdi, pp. 70-72. 73 Tabari, II, p. 1940-1979; II, p. 78; Azdi, pp. 76f; Wellhausen, Khawariy,

- pp. 134-135. 74 On the continual activity of the Khawarij after their suppression in Iraq and the Kharijite rebellion in the Hijaz (130/747-748) which troubled Marwan II and drew much of his army’s blood, see also Tabari, II, pp. 1981-1983, 2007-2116; Ya‘qobi, II, pp. 404-406; Ibn Khaldan, ‘bar, III, pp. 350-353, 356-358; Wellhausen, pp. 388ff; Mas‘adi, Murky (Pellat), IV, p. 80. Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1st and 2nd editions s.v. “Khawarij”, “Dahhak, b. Kais.” On other rebellions in Marwan’s time in Adharbayjan and Armenia, see Kifi, VIII, pp. 142-145; Daniel, pp. 41f.

126 Chapter 3 Still before the public appearance of the Da‘wah, disturbing information about the growing anarchy in Khurasan reached the Caliph, who resolved to send a delegation to enquire about the

Situation in the province (fa-ba‘atha ‘inda dhalika ila ahl khurasan wafdan). The members of the delegation represented the entire tribal spectrum in Qahftaén, Mudar and Rabi‘ah. The delegation arrived in Khurasan when hostilities had already begun between Nasr and the Yaman tribes. According to our tradition, the delegation demanded only the removal of Nasr and pledged their allegiance to the Caliph. At that time, the Caliph was too busy to pay attention to his delegation’s report. The account in the Akhbar at this point is very instructive; referring to

Marwan, it reads as follows: |

“And he was preoccupied with the wars in which he had already been engaged. It was not until the month of Shawwal 129/June 747) that the wars between him and the Khawarij came to an end, and he could return to his home in Harman. By then the Da‘wah had already made its public appearance (wa-qad zaharat ad-da‘wah), yet Marwan had to fight the people of Hims and the people of Filastin and the Khawarij, Dahhak, b. Qays and Shayban b. ‘Abd al-‘ Aziz.

Marwan attended to them all, for they had become strong and amassed many followers. He sent the armies to Iraq, which had also

rebelled against him: Sulayman b. Habib b. Muhallab came out against him in Ahwaz, ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah b. Ja‘far b. Abu Talib took over Fars, Isbahan and Rayy, and Mansur b. Jumhur of the tribe of Kalb subdued the Mountain (al-jabal = Media).’° Marwan wrote to Ibn Hubayrah that he should send armies to Khurasan once Iraq was pacified. But Ibn Hubayrah was so preoccupied with the pacification of Iraq that he could spare no troops for Khurasan. All this constituted the powerful means (for the success)

of the Da‘wah and the establishment of the dawlah. Then Allah fore-ordained Abii Muslim, in whom the goal was finally achieved,

and he eliminated whoever aspired to it and coveted it (the dawlah),’””’®

For the pious Muslim author of the Akhbar, only God’s inter-

vention in the course of history could bring together so many circumstances to ensure the success of the Da‘wah and to effect

75 See Yaqit, Buldan, s.v.; Anonyme, fol. 259b, Ya‘quib!, Buldan, p. 269; Ibn Khurdadhbih, p. 20.

16 Akhbar, pp. 251-252; Anonyme, fol. 259a.

Foundation for a New Order 127 a major turn in the wheel of time (dawlah), which brought the ‘Abbasids to power. The presentation of Abt Muslim as a divine tool is a historical thought which the ‘Abbasid court was unable to change after Abii Muslim had fallen out of favour. THE REVOLT OF ‘ABDALLAH B. MU‘AWIYAH

The revolt of ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah b. ‘Abdallah b. Ja‘far b. Abi Talib has special significance for the history of the Da*wah. This rebellion contributed greatly to the weakening of Marwan and his Iraqi provincial governor, but it also had another aspect. It broke out in the period when the Da‘wah appeared publicly under Abii Muslim’s leadership. It even had an “Abbasid side to it because of the personal involvement of Abi Ja‘far, later the second ‘Abbasid Caliph al-Mansur, in the rebellion. The fact that ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah rebelled in the name of the Prophet’s family while the Da‘wah was using similar slogans in Khurasan compelled the Da‘wah leadership to clarify their attitude to the ‘Alid cause.

Wellhausen was correct in stating that, as a personality, ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah was of no importance whatsoever. He was not a descendant of “Ali b. Abi Talib, but the great-grandson of ‘Ali’s brother Ja‘far. He was also infamous for his cruelty and bad manners and some sources accuse him of being a zindiq. (This term does not necessarily mean that he was actually a Manichaean, but rather that he was not particularly careful

about his religious duties). Because of ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah’s bad reputation (and no less because he was not ‘Ali’s direct descendant), Abi Faraj the great martyrologist of the Talibids apologizes for mentioning him, saying “had it not been for fear that one may come to think that the information about him had not reached us, we would not have mentioned him altogether.”” However, Ibn Mu‘awiyah’s rebellion was the most powerful of all the ‘Alid rebellions originating in Kifah. From the accounts in the sources, it is clear that it was mere coincidence that ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah happened to be the only member of the Family present in Kifah at the right moment. It

128 Chapter 3 was in those special circumstances that he was pushed to lead the rebellion.” These were the turbulent days after the death of Caliph Walid II at the hands of rebels. The new Caliph YazidfI nominated ‘Abdallah, the son of Caliph ‘Umar II, a governor of Kifah, instead of Mansur b. Jumhir, a notable from the tribe of Kalb who had been highly regarded in Kifah. The Caliph thought that by nominating the son of the pious ‘Umar IT he would secure the

support of Kifites,’® but since he had to discharge Mansur b. Jumhir in the process, he achieved the opposite. The humiliated Mansur turned into an enemy and the Kutfites showed open dissatisfaction with the Caliph’s decision. ‘Abdallah b. “Umar tried to win the Iraqis over by the distribution of ‘ata’, but this only raised the resentment of the troops of ahl ash-sham, who had to be stationed as a garrison in Hirah and who had enjoyed the privileged status of a corps d’ elite. These troops claimed that the new governor was giving away their ‘ata’ to Iraqis who knew only how to rebel. When the Iraqis heard this they were ready to rise in revolt; they only calmed down slightly after the soldiers of ahl ash-sham had retracted their words, whereupon “Abdallah b. ‘Umar distributed ‘ata’ allocating a specially high rate to Mudar and Rabi‘ah. Since he could not satisfy everyone with his largesse, there were some discontented leaders of Rabi‘ah who alleged that they had received nothing. They left Hirah, where they had held a meeting with the governor of Kifah, intending to incite their fellow-tribesmen to revolt. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Umar was compelled to appeal to them and to appease them with huge sums of money to keep them from stirring up trouble.”? ‘Abdallah b. “Umar seems to have been a sincerely pious man but he was the least suitable person to deal with Iraq, which was a troublesome and rebellious region even in normal times not to mention in this period of blazing passions. The Iraqis saw his desperate attempts to satisfy all sides as clear evidence of weakness, especially as these events occurred at a time when the 17 Magitil, p.162; Sa‘id al-Qummi, pp. 39-40; Wellhausen, pp. 393-394; idem., Khawarij, pp. 262-264. For a summary of Ibn Mu‘awiyah’s affair see Tucker; and Daniel, pp. 42-43, 80, who with good insight remarks that Ibn Mu‘awiyah’s affair may be regarded as a “dress rehearsal for the revolt in Khurasan.” See also Kennedy, pp. 40-41 and Lassner, Revolution, pp. 96-97.

78 ‘Tabari, I, p. 1854. 79 + Ibid., pp. 1833, 1882; Wellhausen, pp. 383-384.

Foundation for a New Order 129 supreme authority in the realm was once again being undermined after the death of Yazid II in Dhi-al-Hijjah 126/September 744.

Yazid’s successor, his brother Ibrahim b. Walid, was challenged by Marwan II b. Muhammad, who advanced from his home in Harran. Helped by Mudar tribes, he seized power in Damascus, deposed Ibrahim and received the oath of allegiance as the Caliph in Safar 127/December 744.°° The Shi‘ah in Kiifah — especially those elements who had suffered pangs of remorse for not having kept their promise to assist the revolt of Zayd b. ‘Ali in 122 — sought to take advantage of the weakness of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Umar, who was present in Iraq after the fall of Ibrahim but had no official appointment from the new Caliph.®! The moving spirit in the circles of the Shi‘ah in Kifah was the clan of ‘Ijl, many members of which were loyal Shi‘ites-Hashimites who maintained close ties with the ‘Abbasid

du‘at in their city. According to most traditions, Aba Muslim grew up in this clan as a mawla and absorbed his initial Shi‘iteHAashimite, and later ‘Abbasid, indoctrination there.’2 Abi alWard appeared as the leader of the Shi‘ite revival in the city.® It was mere chance that “Abdallah b. Mu’awiyah b. “Abdallah b. Ja‘far b. Abii Talib was in Kifah at the same time. He had come there after the appointment of “Abdallah b. “Umar as governor,

hoping that he might be able to gain some advantage from Ibn

‘Umar’s kindnesses. According to the tradition of Abit ‘Ubaydah, ‘Abdallah was accompanied by his two brothers, Hasan and Yazid, the sons of Mu‘awiyah, and they all stayed at

the home of their mawla among the Nasr tribe in Kifah.* ‘Abdallah b. ‘Umar treated them well, lavishing abundant gifts on them. It is said that he made them a daily allowance of 300 dirhams to defray their expenses.® When the Shi‘ite agitation began in Kifah, as a consequence of the disturbances which were rocking the Empire at this pe-

80 Tabari, I, pp. 1881, 1890-1892; Wellhausen, p. 369; cf., Kafi, VIII, pp. , 141-142 the date given by Kofi for Marwan’s accession is Rabi‘ I, 127; but see Mas‘idi, Muri (Pellat), IV, p. 71.

81 The term “Zaydiyyah” is used to denote the Shi‘ites in Kifah who supported ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah. Tabari, II, pp. 1885, 1887.

82 Banners, pp. 204f; Dinawari, pp. 337-338. 83 Tabari, I, p. 1883; on the participation of Mawali in the insurrection see Wellhausen, p. 384.

84 Tabari, I, p. 1881. 85 — Ibid., and cf., ibid., pp. 1879-1880.

130 Chapter 3 riod, these men appealed to Ibn Mu‘awiyah and invited him to lead a rebellion since, although he was not a direct descendant of ‘Ali, he was the only representative of the ‘Alid family in the city. AS on previous occasions, the Zaydite members of the Shi‘ah swore allegiance to him; they were joined by many of the inhabitants of Kufah, including the deposed governor, Mansur b. Jumhir. This was in Muharram 127/October-November 744, when the governor, “Abdallah b. Umar, was in the fortress of Hirah with the troops of ahl ash-sham.*6

In spite of their initial enthusiasm, when it came to the prospect of a confrontation with “Abdallah b. ‘Umar and the forces of ahl ash-sham, the Kifites fled to their city. Even Ibn Mu‘awiyah, who had set out to capture Hirah, would certainly have met with an end similar to that of the rebels who preceded

him. As it happened, ‘Abdallah b. ‘Umar preferred not to prolong the state of war in Kifah and entered into negotiations with the insurgent. The negotiations ended in an agreement by which ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah left Kifah with a tiny band of his supporters and retired to the Jibal region via Mada’in.®’ Compared with the subsequent development of ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah’s revolt, the incidents in Kifah and in Hirah were quite unimportant episodes in the rebellion. It was only after Ibn

Mu’awiyah shifted his activity to Jibal, and succeeded in strengthening his forces, that his personal importance increased

and his revolt assumed serious proportions. He initially stationed his headquarters at Isfahan; however in the year 128/747-

746, when his followers had become numerous and men were pouring out of Ktfah and other places to fight under his banner, he moved to Istakhr in the province of Fars. His power spread

rapidly over important parts of the Jibal, Ahwaz, Fars and Kirman. His status in these regions was so greatly enhanced that

he could appoint local governors of his own choice and levy taxes. He appointed his brother Hasan as governor of Istakhr, his brother Yazid over Shiraz, his brother ‘Ali over Kirman and

86 6©=>.-—s_bid., pp. 1880, 1883. The Kifites who swore allegiance to ‘Abdallah b.

Mu‘awiyah were joined by supporters from Mada’in and other places. According to one tradition, it was “Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah himself who initiated the rebellion. See Aghani, XI, pp. 73f. 87 Tabari, II, p. 1887; Azdi, pp. 66-67; Aghani, loc. cit.; Maqatil, pp. 165f; Wellhausen, p. 385; idem., Khawarij, p. 262; cf., Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 370-373.

Foundation for a New Order 131 his brother Salih over Qumm and its environs.®8 His revolt did not have a specifically Shi‘ite character at this stage; he did not

appear as a representative of the Family but claimed political power in his own right.89 Men gradually gathered around ‘Abdallah; most of them had nothing in common except the hope

to gain some personal advantage by supporting him. These included some Umayyads who were aggrieved by the conflicts within their family, such as Sulayman b. Hisham b. ‘Abd al-

Malik and ‘Umar b. Suhayl b. ‘Abd al-*Aziz b. Marwan. Members of the ‘Abbasid family also joined him — “Abdallah b.

Muhammad (later Caliph Saffah), Abt Ja‘far (later Caliph Mansiir), ‘Abdallah and ‘Isa, who were the sons of “Ali and the uncles of Saffah and Mansur. Others who allied with him were: Mansir b. Jumhir, the Kalbite leader who had been bitterly offended when he was dismissed by Yazid III from his office as the governor of Iraq; Shayban b. ‘Abd al-*Aziz ash-Shaybani, one of the leaders of the surviving Khawarij who had been ex-

pelled from Iraq and the Jazirah by Marwan and by Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah, the governor of Iraq; Sulayman b. Habib, the Umayyad governor of Ahwaz; and a mawla named Muharib b. Misa, one of the notables of Fars.9! Ibn Mu‘awiyah thus found himself at the head of a strange coalition of Shi‘ites, Khawéarij of various tribes, mawali, ‘Abbasids and Umayyads, each of whom were seeking their own advantage. For the most part, “Abdallah did not disappoint them: he gave office to those

who sought office, while upon those who sought gifts he bestowed gifts liberally.22 The common hatred of Marwan II

88 Aghant, loc. cit., Tabari, Hl, p. 1977; Anonyme, fol. 293b-294a; Mas‘ddi Murij, loc. cit., Azdi, p. 107. 89 Aghani, loc. cit., yad ‘is ila nafsihi la ila ar-rida min al muhammad, “He

called for allegiance to himself not to the one agreed upon from Muhammad’s family.” This tradition makes it clear that the term ar-rida min al muhammad was a very ambiguous term; as such it was in common usage among the Shi‘ites and was then borrowed by the Da‘wah. With the help of such a vague and just sufficiently noncommittal expression it was possible to postpone the decision about the exact identity of the member of the Prophet family to whom the right to rule the Islamic community belongs. See Wellhausen, p. 517; Crone, Festschrift, pp. 95-111.

90 On him see Tabari, II, pp. 1944-1946, 1977 (ll. 12-13); Azdi, p. 107; Wellhausen, p. 393; idem., Khawarij, p. 263.

91 Tabari, II, p. 1976; Wellhausen, p. 385. 92 Aghani, XI, p. 74: fa-man arada minhum ‘amalan qalladahu wa-man arada minhum silatan wasalahu.

132 Chapter 3 afforded no more than a temporary bridge over the wide Spectrum of views and ambitions among ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah’s followers. When, in the year 130, Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah, opened his offensive, Ibn Mu‘awiyah was beaten

back, his men scattered, and he himself fled in panic to Khurasan (fa-kharaja ‘ala dahsh huwa wa-ikhwatuhu qasidina li-Khurasan).° Abt Muslim, who had meanwhile gained control of Marw and was on the verge of seizing power throughout the whole province, did not view Ibn Mu‘awiyah’s arrival with favour; on the contrary, he considered Ibn Mu‘awiyah’s presence in Khurasan as likely to spoil his own plans. We must not forget that at this period the ‘Abbasid Da‘ wah

was still pursuing the old line of propaganda on behalf of “someone from the family of the Prophet.” This propaganda did not differ from that of Ibn Mu‘awiyah,™ at least not in its early stages. All that the masses knew was that the Da‘wah “wanted the wilayah of the Prophet (yuridiina wilayat rasil allah). The

ambiguity of the terms used by the Da‘wah could sometimes prove counterproductive. The compiler of the Akhbar illustrated

such a possibility in an anecdote relating to the way in which Marwan’s spy supposedly uncovered Ibrahim al-Imam’s identity. We are told that this spy arrived in the camp of Qahtabah b. Shabib, the military commander of the Da‘wah, and said to Qahtabah: “ “IT came tc give you the oath of allegiance.’ Qahtabah said, ‘give the oath.’ ‘To whom’ said the man.

93 Ibid. When Ibn Hubayrah’s forces, commanded by ‘Amir b. Dubarah and Nubatah b. Hanzalah, drew near to Ibn Mu‘awiyah, his men refused to fight

them. Tabari, II, pp. 1978-1979; Wellhausen, Khawarij, pp. 263-264; Van Vloten suggested that ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah went to Khurasan to join Shayban the Kharijite. Van Vloten, p. 111. 94 Akhbar, p. 391: Ibrahim ordered Abd Muslim and the nuqaba’ to keep his name secret. When Abad Muslim summarized the principles of the move-

- ment in public, he reportedly said what almost any other rebel had said against the existing authority: “We call you to follow the Book of Allah and the sunnah of His prophet. Sustain what the Qur’&an ordered to be sustained and destroy what the Qur’&an destroyed, and support the one agreed

upon from the Prophet’s family (ar-rida min al muhammaad).” See also Anonyme, fol. 265b and compare in connection with Ibn Mu‘awiyah’s propaganda, Maqatil, pp. 165-167.

95 Tabari, II, p. 1959.

Foundation for a New Order 133 ‘To ar-rida min al muhammad’ said Qahtbah. ‘This is an anonymous oath of allegiance (bay‘ah majhulah)’ Said the man, ‘it cannot be accepted as binding.’ ‘Why?’ asked Qahtabah. ‘Consider,’ said the man, ‘if the inhabitants of each town were to take a person from Muhammad’s family and say “we have ar-rida in our hands,” to which one of all of them should I consider to have

given my bay‘ah?’ Qahtabah scolded him and said, “Give your bay‘ah or else!’

But the man said, ‘I shall not give the bay‘ah but to the leader whose name I know!’ The army regarded this as a praiseworthy attitude, and Qahtabah refrained from pressing the issue any further for fear that it might harm him and demoralize his army.””°

The term “da‘wah majhilah”, which in this anecdote was put into the mouth of Marwan’s spy, was not invented for the sake of the story for the term must have been used by the Da'wah leaders themselves. The Leiden Anonyme contains an account which states that Abi Muslim made a great effort not to reveal the true identity of the movement even after it appeared in public: “he revealed the Da‘wah for Bani al-‘Abbas, an anonymous Da‘wah and mentioned no name.”%”

Because of the anonymous nature of the “Abbasid movement, it is not difficult to understand Abii Muslim’s apprehension at the arrival of ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah in Khurasan. Theoretical-

ly, he could win over to his side many of those whom the Da‘wah had taught, in ambiguous terms, to support the leadership of the Prophet’s family. It was not impossible that they might see Ibn Mu‘awiyah as the same person whom the Da’ wah

had fostered as the “agreed upon” from the family of the Prophet. The account in the Aghd@ni relates that [bn Mu‘awiyah did in fact attempt to attract Abi: Muslim. But even if we doubt the veracity of this tradition — which may have been fabricated to

explain the allegation that Ibn Mu‘awiyah was killed on the orders of Abi Muslim — it contains a clue to the atmosphere which prevailed in Khurasan upon Ibn Mu‘awiyah’s arrival there.

The account in the Aghani is echoed in another tradition which says that Abi: Hashim, the son of Muhammad b. al96 Anonyme, fol. 285b, Akhbar, loc. cit. 97 Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 7a.

98 Aghani, loc. cit.

134 Chapter 3 Hanafiyyah, transferred by testimony his imamah not to Muhammad b. “Ali b. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas but to ‘Abdallah b. Mu ‘awiyah, and that on the basis of this testimony (wastyyah) he decided to rebel. Such a tradition could easily be accepted by at least a few of the supporters of the Da‘wah, for the tradition goes on to relate that after the death of “Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah, some of his disappointed followers transferred their allegiance to the ‘Abbasids. The failure of ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah convinced

them that the wasiyyah was given by Abii Hashim only to Muhammad b. ‘Ali; their conviction was so strong that they later

joined the most ardent supporters of the “Abbasids — the Rawandtyyah.* In this context, the testament of Abt’ Hashim — the meaning and nature of which are analyzed elsewhere!™ — is only impor-

tant as a concept that could easily have been used by the ‘Abbasids as well as by the opponents of the Da‘ wah with equal success. Abt Muslim feared, and with good reason, that at this decisive moment when the Da‘wah was on the verge of success,

the whole plan might be ruined through the intervention of ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah. Dead “Alids were far more convenient and advantageous to the Da’wah than the living ones. Where the dead were concerned, Abt Muslim could appear before his followers of all Shi‘ite affiliations and claim that the fight against the Umayyads was a fight against those who had murdered the ‘Alids, and tortured and abused them. We have seen, in the case

of Yahya b. Zayd, how intense emotions were aroused in Khurasan by the memory of the “Alids, and Abi Muslim knew

how to exploit these emotions very well. Immediately after gaining control of Marw, Abi Muslim sent men to Jurjan to take the body of Yahya b. Zayd down from the cross on which it had hung since the year 126 and to arrange a public funeral with full honours.!°! Later Abi Muslim proclaimed that the aman granted

by the Da‘wah was retrospectively annulled for all who had

99 Nawbakhti, Firaq, pp. 53-55; cf., Ibn Hayyian, fols. 49b-50a. 100 See Banners, pp. 121f. For an earlier interpretation see also Moscati, “Abt Hashim,” and Nagel, pp. 63-69. 101 Kafi, VIII, p. 160. The story seems incredible, for it means that Yahya‘s body was on the cross for three years, but the idea is clear: the Da‘wah had no need for living “Alids, but 1t could very well do with dead ones. Cf., Wellhausen, p. 500.

Foundation for a New Order 135 taken part in the killing of Yahya b. Zayd!° and he began to track down and put to death all those suspected of complicity in his murder.'® This “Alid martyr was a valuable political asset, and Abu Muslim took full advantage of it. He turned the feelings

of remorse, grief and indignation prevalent among the Khurasanite Shi‘ah which had gathered around him, against the Umayyads and their supporters.!

For many years to come, the main line of ‘Abbasid propaganda, and the major basis for their claim to be the true legitimate leaders of Islam, was to derive from their self-

presentation as the senior survivors of the Prophet’ s family, responsible for avenging the blood of any of their relatives who had been murdered by the Umayyads.

By placing themselves in the position of the blood avengers for the entire family, including its ‘Alid part, they sought to neutralize the ‘Alids’ claim to leadership. Even more, from the initial stages of their revolt and for many years after they came to power, the ‘Abbasids wished to convince the powerful and ideologically motivated Shi‘ah that they were the best protagonists of the ‘Alid cause. They stripped the ‘Alid cause of its political connotations and presented it as a family affair: spilt blood which had long been awaiting avengers. The Shi ‘ah itself unintentionally helped the ‘Abbasid scheme. It was the Shi‘ah that laid tremendous emphasis on the

idea of ‘Alid martyrdom, and as early as the year 65/685, developed the avenging of Husayn’s blood, and the expression of remorse for not coming to his aid in time, into major religious duties. Every new ‘Alid martyr only intensified the feelings of frustration among the Shi ‘ites. But as much as this frustration was connected with the aspiration for an ideal Islamic order under one

of the offsprings of ‘Ali, it originated mainly in the

1022 Anonyme, fol. 272b. Similar to Mukhtar who had ruled out any compassion for those who were suspected of participating in the murder of Husayn. Baladhuri, Ansab, V, p. 237 (Il. 5-6).

103. = Tabari, I, p. 506, Wellhausen, Khawarij, p. 261; Wellhausen, p. 500; cf., Ibn Sa‘d, Tabaqat, V, p. 240.

104 Abd Muslim argued that the Da‘wah should support the Yaman against Mudar because the latter took part in the murder of Yahya b. Zayd, Tabari,

Il, p. 1985.

136 Chapter 3

family.

burning desire to punish those responsible, or those held to be responsible, for the death of the members of ‘Ali's Because of the centrality of blood vengeance in Shi'ite

thought, the ‘Abbasids could assume the role of blood

avengers, and for quite a while they convinced the Shi‘ites that they were the only survivors of the family having the right and the ability to carry out the obliga-

tion. By putting themselves in this position, the ‘Abbasids assumed patronage and seniority over the ‘Alids, with all the political consequences attached to such a position of seniority. It took the Shi'ites many years to understand the ‘Abbasid manoeuvre, but after over a decade of ‘Abbasid self-entrenchment, this realisation came far too late.

The extensive use which the ‘Abbasids made of the Shi‘ite aspiration for vengeance was convincingly presented in a poem by Shibl b. ‘Abdallah, “the mawla of

Bani Hashim.” The main theme in this poem is the praise of the ‘Abbasids as the blood avengers of Bani Hashim: “They sought to avenge the blood of Bani Hashim, and accomplished (the task) after the passage of much time and despair.” The poet identifies the party responsible for the spilling of the Hashimite blood not as

Banu Umayyah, but as ‘Abd Shams, the larger clan to which the Umayyads belonged. The identification of the ‘Abbasids as the leaders responsible for the entire clan of

Hashim is far from accidental. The clan of Hashim included both the ‘Alids and the ‘Abbasids, as well as the Prophet himself and all his uncles. By placing Bani al‘Abbas in the leadership position of this wide framework

of kinship, the ‘Alids were pushed into a secondary place: they became one family among several clan mem-

bers and not, as they claimed, an independent unit of kinship, the only one worthy of succeeding the Prophet. To make sure that the idea is fully understood, the poet enumerates the martyrs from the various branches of the

Hashimite clan: ‘Abd al-Muttalib, Abu Talib and ‘Abbas. He mentions the violent deaths of Husayn, and

Zayd b. ‘Ali, Hamzah b. ‘Abd al-Muttalib, the Prophet's uncle killed in the battle of Uhud in 625, and

finally Ibrahim, al-Imam b. Muhammad b. ‘Ali b.

Foundation for a New Order 137 ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas (supposedly killed by Marwan IT) 195

The role of the ‘Abbasids as the patrons of the ‘Alids and the blood avengers on their behalf is demonstrated in

an anecdote which must have been circulated by the ‘Abbasid court soon after the ‘Abbasids came to power.

Sometime after the defeat of Marwan II, ‘Abdallah b.

‘Ali resolved to exterminate the remnants of the

Umayyad ruling house. He summoned eighty Umayyad notables to Antipatris (Abit Futrus), and set up the stage

for their dramatic execution. “When everybody was assembled, unaware of the hideous scheme, Abdallah's herald went out of the room and called in a loud voice: ‘Where is Hamzah b. ‘Abd al-Muttalib? Let him come in.’ At that moment the assembled Umayyads were convinced of their certain death. Then the herald went out again and called: ‘Where is Husayn the son of ‘Ali? Let

him enter.’ He then went out for the third time and called: ‘Where is Zayd b. ‘Ali b. Husayn? Let him come

in.’ He then went out for the fourth time and called: ‘Where is Yahya the son of Zayd? (Let him come in).’ The climax of the drama came when the poet was called

in to recite the above-mentioned poem, at the end of which the Khurasanite soldiers were called in to hack down the Umayyad victims.” 1%

Although all the signs point to the fact that this specific anec-

dote and the poem were created after the “Abbasids came to power, the notion of their being the “Alid protectors was no doubt prominent in their propaganda at least from the year 125,

105 See Mubarrad, Kamil, IV, p. 8. For the introduction of the concept of Band

Hashim by the ‘Abbasids see Banners, pp. 84f., and for a detailed - discussion of the idea behind the widening of the framework of kinship to Hashim and ‘Abd Shams, see Sharon, “Umayyads as ahi al-bayt.” The circumstances of the death of [brahim b. Muhammad will be discussed separately below. 1066 Ibn Qutaybah, ‘Uyun, I, pp. 206-208. In this version, it is Abd Ja‘far alMansur, who was later to become the second ‘Abbasid Caliph who enacts

the whole drama, but the circumstances and parallel traditions call for ‘Abdallah b. ‘All. See also Kifi, VIII, pp. 196ff, Muir, Caliphate, p. 438; Baladhun, Ansab, III, pp. 103-104.

138 Chapter 3 when the Da‘wah turned from a “Alid movement into a purely ‘Abbasid one.!° Against this background, the following account assumes a special significance. When Nasr was urged to enter into negotiations with Abi Muslim, he remarked bitterly: “In their eyes I am the killer of Yahya b. Zayd, for whom they weep and mourn, morning and evening” (ana ‘inadahum qatil Yahya b. Zayd, wahum yabkin ‘alayhi wa-yandubin sabahan wa-masd@’ an).'®

In contrast, the living ‘Alids were a thorn in the side of Abi Muslim and the Da‘wah. By their very appearance in Khurasan, they gained an advantage over the Da*wah, which had kept the identity of its leader a secret. Abii) Muslim had good reason to fear that “Abdallah b. Mu*awiyah might attract Da‘wah followers

to his side and being a far-sighted man he did not allow the Talibid fugitive to move about freely. He arrested him as soon as he arrived in Khurasan, and must have secretly put him to death, and then sent his head to the Umayyad commander, ‘Amir Ibn Dubarah, who sent it on to Marwan.?%?

‘ABBASIDS IN THE REVOLT OF ‘ABDALLAH B. MU‘AWIYAH

The behaviour of several members of the “Abbasid family in this episode of Ibn Mu‘awiyah is far from clear. As we have already observed, Tabari relates that Abi Ja*far (al-Manstr), “Abdallah b. ‘Ali and his brother, “Isa b. ‘Ali, all joined the rebel.!!° The compiler of the Aghdani adds that the future Caliph as-Saffah also

joined him.!! |

Ibn Mu ‘awiyah entrusted to Abi Ja‘far the governorship of the city of Idhaj and its environs, together with the collection of

107 Banners, pp. 178ff. 1088 Akhbar, p. 288 = Anonyme, fol. 266a.

10 Aghani, loc. cit.; Wellhausen, p. 506. Nawbakhti, p. 541; Ibn Hayyin, loc. cit. 110 Tabari, Ui, p. 1977 (il. 11-12). 111 Aghdani, loc. cit. This detail cannot be verified from another source and it

seems that the transmitter of the tradition confused as-Saffah with al-Mansir, who were both called ‘Abdallah b. Muhammad, and thought that the two of them took part in the revolt.

Foundation for a New Order 139 taxes of the area.!!2 Abu Ja‘far did indeed collect the taxes but he did not transfer the money to Ibn Mu‘awiyah but to someone in

Basrah who would keep it for him. Abi Ja‘far had friends in Basrah and even while his father Muhammad was alive he used

to go as his father’s messenger to friends of the family who lived in the city. He had particularly good relations with “Amr b.

‘Ubayd, one of the early Mu‘tazilites, a disciple of Hasan of Basrah and a friend of Wasil b. ‘Ata’. According to the account of Baladhuri, he had also been a disciple of “Umar b. “Ubayd, very much to the dismay of his father Muhammad.!"? After a period in the service of ‘Abdallah b. Mu*awiyah, Abi

Ja‘*far relinquished his post and went to Basrah by way of

Ahwaz. The governor of Ahwaz, Sulayman b. Habib b. Muhallab, set ambushes on the roads to catch intruders from the

area controlled by Ibn Mu‘awiyah. Abi Ja‘far was caught by one of the ambushes and brought before Sulayman, who knew the identities of the collaborators with Ibn Mu‘awiyah, having himself been at one time in the rebels’ camp. Sulayman demanded the money that Abi Ja‘far collected in Idhaj. When Abi Ja‘far denied that he had any with him, Sulayman ordered him to

be lashed. He received forty-two lashes and his torture would have been still greater but for the intervention and efforts of Abi Ayyub al-Miuriyani, the secretary of Sulayman b. Habib, who with great difficulty persuaded his master to stop the flogging. Abi Ja*far remembered this kindness of Aba Ayyib and when he came to power he appointed him as his wazir and confidante.!!4 After the flogging, Abt Ja‘far was put into prison, but the Mudarites, infuriated by the way in which Abi Ja‘far was treated, gathered in force, broke into the prison and set the him free.!15 He escaped to Basrah and remained there at the home of his mentor and friend, ‘Amr b. ‘Ubayd, for some time, after which he returned secretly to Humaymah.!!6

112. Idhaj was one of the major cities of Khizistan. See Le Strange, p. 245; Yaqait, Buldan, s.v. “Idhaj”, Tabari, index; Mas‘idi, Murij (Pellat), V, p. 270; Mzik, p. 59. For Aba Ja‘far’s nomination see Jahshiyari, Wuzara’, p. 98; Baladhuri, Ansab, II, p. 183. See also Kennedy, p. 57.

113. Baladhuri, ibid. (11. 10-11); “Mu‘tazila”, EJ (written by Nyberg); Brockelmann, p. 128; Shahrastani, Milal, p. 33. 114 = Jahshiyari, loc. cit; Sourdel, Vizirat, p. 79. 115 Here ends Jahshiyari’s tradition, ibid., p. 98-99. 116 Baladhuri, vol. cif., p. 183.

140 Chapter 3 As for the other members of the “Abbasid family who took part in the revolt, we only know that “Abdallah b. “Ali remained with Ibn Mu‘awiyah until the decisive battle, and was taken prisoner by Marwan’s commander, ‘Amir b. Dubarah. He saved his life by speaking disparagingly about Ibn Mu‘awiyah and by giving the Umayyads information about him. He was taken to Kufah and then brought before Marwan in Syria.!!7 What were these ‘Abbasids doing in Ibn Mu‘awiyah’s camp?

They were certainly well-informed about the extent of the progress which their movement had made in Khurasan. Wellhausen proposes the suggestion that not all the members of the ‘Abbasid family were united under the leadership of the Imam Ibrahim and that some were engaged in independent ac-

tivity. There were others who did not live in Humaymah at all but in Kifah; these were not reckoned as belonging to the circle

of the Jmam’s confidants.!!8 Cahen suggests that these ‘Abbasids thought simply that there was no logic in refraining from the support of any reasonably powerful anti-Umayyad movement.!!9 In order to resolve this problem, one must distinguish between the attitude of the Da‘wah toward the Shi‘ah and the attitude of private members of the ‘Abbasid family toward individual members of the “Alid family. No doubt the family relationship between the ‘Alids and the ‘Abbasids led to close connections between some members of the two families, as was normal and accepted in Arab society. There were very close ties between “Abdallah b. ‘Abbas and Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah and between Abi Hashim and

Muhammad b. ‘Ali. Dawud b. ‘Ali b. “Abdallah b. ‘Abbas sided with Zayd b. ‘Ali b. Husayn in Kufah; and when in the year 121 the Kafites proposed that the Zayd should revolt, the ‘Abbasids advised him to refrain from open rebellion since one

could not rely on the Kiafites, who had never fulfilled their promise to support ‘Ali or his sons.!2° There can be no doubt that this advice given by Dawud b. “Ali to his kinsman was correct and reliable. !2! 117. Tabari, OH, pp. 1980-1981.

118 Wellhausen, p. 544 note 1. 119 Cahen, p. 329. 120 Akhbar, p. 231; Anonyme fol. 207a, Tabari, II, pp. 1668, 1679; Kafi, p. 111; cf., Wellhausen, p. 517. 121 A similar advice was given to Zayd by Muhammad b. ‘Umar b. ‘Ali b. Aba Talib. Kofi, VIL, p. 111.

Foundation for a New Order 141 The attitude of the Da‘wah toward the ‘Alids may be summarised as follows: while preaching vengeance for the ‘Alids’ blood and attracting many of the ‘Alids’ followers by allowing them to interpret the idea of “supporting the Family of the

Prophet” as they wished, the Da‘wah always regarded the ‘Alids’ followers as potential opponents. The movement had to deal with the difficult internal problem of explaining a paradox to the satisfaction of its adherents. On the one hand, the Da’ wah presented itself as the protector of the ‘Alids, but on the other

hand, when it needed to identify itself with members of this family and to defend the “Alids publicly, it refrained from doing

so. This was the case when Zayd was defeated and killed and also when his son, Yahya, was slain. Even the senior du ‘at found this paradox difficult to explain. The compiler of the Akhbar has preserved for us a tradition in which the du ‘Gt are said to have appealed to Ibrahim in the following words: “How long shall the birds of heaven eat the flesh of thy kinsfolk? How long shall their blood be shed? We abandoned Zayd crucified in the Kunasah (of Kufah), and his son pursued over the face of the earth. Terror encompasses you, and the rule of the evil family has lasted too long.”!22

The Da‘wah managed to overcome this internal problem. It persuaded its adherents and sympathizers that nothing but evil and injustice against the family of the Prophet could be expected from the cruel and violent enemy, and that one must therefore avoid any ill-considered act which might prove to be suicidal.}23

It represented the slain ‘Alids as a clear example of the consequences of rushed and unplanned actions. The ‘Abbasid Imam used his authority to dissuade his people from identifying themselves with the ‘Alids or assisting them — not because the movement did not sympathize with them but because it was impossible to help them without causing the whole work of the Da‘wah to collapse.!4 The movement thus followed the in122 Hatta mata ta’ kul at-tayr luhien ahl baytika wa-tusfak dima' uhum? tarakna zaydan masluban bi-al-kunasah wa-ibnuhu mutarradan fi-al-bilad, wa qad shamalakum al-khawf wa-talat ‘alaykum muddat ahl bayt as-saw’, Akhbar, . 241.

123 Cf. Van Vioten, pp. 60-61. 124 Muhammad b. ‘Ali is supposed to have ordered Bukayr b. Mahan, the real founder of the Da‘wah on Khurasan (see Banners pp. 147f) not to rush into any premature activity against the Umayyads. He added: “and warn our

142 Chapter 3 variable rule which guided it from its inception until its ultimate victory: not to become involved in the political activity of the ‘Alids. This rule, which had generally been observed by the move-

ment’s propagandists throughout Khurasan, was less binding for members of the “Abbasid family, who regarded themselves as free to mix with their “Alid relatives and perhaps to aid them with good advice or with more substantial service. In the case of ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah there was also, no doubt, the impetus of the adventure and the prospect of making easy profits.

His revolt was one more sign of the chaotic period which followed upon the death of Hisham and especially upon the death of Yazid HI. Amid the great turmoil caused by the uprisings of Iraq and the Jazirah, “Abdallah b. Mu‘4wiyah seemed to offer a more promising outlook; many thought that they stood to gain by his success, even if only a partial gain. A supporter who

belonged to this class was clearly not prepared to fight to the death on Ibn Mu‘awiyah’s behalf. Abu Ja‘far (al-Mansur) left ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah, after collecting a sizeable sum of money, when he felt the ground beginning to burn under his feet. We have no such detailed accounts about other members of

the ‘Abbasid family, apart from the fact that “Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah suddenly found himself without supporters when he needed them most; it is not difficult to infer that others also went Abi Ja‘far’s way. The “ “Abbasid” episode of Ibn Mu‘awiyah’s rebellion should be seen as no more than a little display of family sympathy, a little desire for adventure and a little easy moneymaking. His adventure was only circumstantially connected, if at all, with the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah. For this reason it appears to me that the conclusions of Wellhausen and Claude Cahen somewhat

exaggerate the political importance which they attach to this episode.

shiah not to take part in any activity initiated by our cousins from the family of Abd Talib, because any rebel of theirs will surely be killed ...” Akhbar, p. 200. The tradition belongs to the group of the apocalyptic traditions connected with the name of Muhammad b. ‘Ali, but it is based on a solid fact. See also ibid, p. 241.

IV THE —

STRATEGY OF VICTORY

The Strategy of Victory 145 4 MASTER OF KHURAS AN

The year 130 began on 11th September 747. Winter was approaching. In the middle of Safar 130/end of October 747, Abu Muslim ordered his men to build themselves winter quarters;! he began preparing his forces to seize control of the capital city of Marw. At the same time, he kept up intensive political activity to strengthen his alliance with Azd and Rabi‘ah and to get Shayban

and the Khawarij further away from the vicinity of Marw. He feared that when news of the victories in Syria and Iraq by Marwan and his commanders, ‘Amir b. Dubarah and Nubatah b.

Hanzalah, reached Khurasan, the situation might change fundamentally and Nasr’s former enemies might wish to make a fresh rapprochement with him. His propagandists, working in the very midst of Nasr’s camp, succeeded in attracting from it many of the leaders of Yaman, Rabi‘ah and Mudar. They came to Abii Muslim and gave him their oath of allegiance (bay‘ah).”

The link with ‘Ali b. al-Kirmani was also tightened: Abi Muslim spared no effort to develop and extend this alliance. There were frequent consultations between the two, and Abi Muslim repeatedly stressed that he regarded “Ali as the amir of the Da‘wah. ‘Ali also began to regard himself more and more as a part of the Da‘wah, especially when Aba Muslim made it clear to him and to the leaders of Yaman and Rabi‘ah that he considered them as partners, sharing the political aim of the Da‘wah, to

support the family of the Prophet.3 The leaders visited each other’s camps, and ‘Ali b. al-Kirmani began to take part in joint political and military planning. He suggested that Abi Muslim try to win Shayban, the Kh§4riite leader, over to his side, since the latter was the only one left in Khurds4n liable to show active

Opposition to the Da‘wah. The forces controlled by Shayban were by no means insignificant. As previously mentioned, when 1 Tabari, II, p. 1986.

2 Akhbar, p. 307.

3 [bid.: Kirmani reportedly said to Abi Muslim: “I and you are one hand in this Da‘wah (ana wa-anta yad wahidah ft hadhihi ad-da‘wah).” Abd Muslim

is said to have made the following statement to ‘Ali “You undertook to support the Da‘wah of the Prophet’s family, and I wish that Allah combines for you the benefits of this world and the world to come. You have authority over us and we have the obligation to obey you.” /bid., p. 308.

146 Chapter 4 Nasr b. Sayyar made an armistice with Shayban, he agreed to recognize the latter’s rule over the areas which he was holding at the time: these areas extended over the region between Nishapur and Herat, namely over the entire south-west of Khurasan. Abi Muslim did indeed make a subsequent attempt to enter into negotiations with Shayban and even addressed him by the title of amir, but he explained to “Ali b. al-Kirmani that, for ideological reasons, there was no room for co-operation between them. The very basis of the Khawary leader’s politico-religious ideas rested upon opposition to ‘Ali b. Aba Talib and total dissociation from him (bara’ ah) — a principle which precluded any kind of collaboration with the Da‘wah.* Abia Muslim suggested that, instead of

this, “Ali b. al-Kirmani should take advantage of his good relations with the Khawary leader (who was from Rabi‘ah) to persuade him to evacuate the region of Marw. He thought that in this way the ground could be cleared for the freer activity of the

Da‘wah, and any renewal of ties between Nasr and Shayban would be more difficult to effect. “Ali accepted the suggestion and persuaded Shayban to leave Marw for Sarakhs. “God has turned Nasr’s mind away from us and from you by preoccupying him with these people (of the Da‘ wah).” “Ali told him, “And

as for these regions which are in your hands, from here to Nishapur, Herat and Bishanj,° I am not sure that you do not weaken your followers in them by remaining here. I think that you should depart for Sarakhs and send your officers there to gather the taxes. In this way, you will strengthen those who are obedient to you, for I see that many of these who were with you have forsaken you little by little because of this.’ Before leaving for Sarakhs and abandoning Marw and its environs to Abia Muslim and his supporters, Shayban made an agreement of nonbelligerency (musGlamah) with Abi Muslim, in which each side undertook not to attack the other.’ In the month of Rabi‘ II 130, Shayban left Marw and moved to Sarakhs “taking with him

those of his tribe who supported him and subscribed to his 4 Ibid.; Tabari, II, 1993 (Il. 1-7). 5 Yaqit, Buldan, I, p. 508; Tabari, Il, p. 79; Akhbar, p. 309 n. 1. 6 Akhbar, p. 309. Living in peace with the government, which implied the approval the existing order, was contrary to the Khawarij‘s principles and aspirations. ‘Ali pointed out to Shayban, that by being obliged to keep his agreement with Nasr while remaining in Marw, he was destroying his own movement.

7 Ibid., pp. 309-310.

The Strategy of Victory 147 Opinions.” The way was completely cleared for the Da‘wah, which now appeared with the strongest and best organized military and political power in Khurasan. The next objective was Marw.®

Nasr b. Sayyar, now effectively imprisoned within the walls of the city, continued in his desperate efforts to obtain help from Caliph Marwan. As long as Marwan was occupied, pacifying Syria and Iraq, he could not accede to Nasr’s plea for assistance. However, these two areas had by now been subdued and most of the rebels crushed; only at scattered points in the Persian region did isolated Khawarij bands keep up their resistance. Yet the Caliph’s help to Nasr was delayed.’ In his predicament, Nasr b. Sayyar also turned to the governor of Iraq, Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah. He tried to convince the Caliph and his commissioner that the Da‘wah in Khurasan should not be regarded as a local phenomenon. Both the Caliph and the governor of Iraq regarded the situation in Khur4san as being of marginal importance and

tended to blame the continual disturbances there on the inefficiency of Nasr. The desperate calls for help by Nasr were treated almost with contempt: the old governor of Khurasan was

repeatedly reminded of the order of priorities which put the affairs at Iraq and Syria first on the Caliph’s agenda. Experience and fine political sense taught Nasr to recognize the gravity of the situation in Khurasan and its detrimental repercussions for

the realm as a whole. Nasr made a great effort to convey his anxiety to the Caliph in numerous detailed reports that failed to

convince the sovereign of the seriousness of the situation and made the loyal governor look like a nuisance. Nasr’s letters to the Caliph and to the governor of Iraq, quoted in sources, could only be later reconstructions. Nasr’s ideas, however, were partly preserved in his verses, which seem to have been left in their original form. In one of the letters, attributed to Nasr b. Sayyar, Nasr is said to have written to the Caliph: “Those who appeared here, if their aim was only to take over Khurasan, their danger would have been easy to ward off, but what they really want is the grand goal (al-ghayah al-kubra), to take over every single province in the Islamic lands. The issue around which

8 [bid.; Anonyme, fols. 269a(infra)-269b(supra).

148 Chapter 4 they concentrate their incitement is the taking of revenge for Muhammad’s family upon the Umayyads. They remind each other about it in their discussions and they invoke (God to grant its accomplishment) at the end of their prayer services.”!°

In a poem which accompanied this or another letter, Nasr summed up the grave development in the Eastern provinces: “Amid the ashes I see sparks of glowing embers And I fear its flaring into flames Fire needs only two twigs to kindle And war is preceded by the exchange of words.

In wonder I say, Oh, that I could know, | Are they awake, the Umayyads all, Or perchance, sunk in slumber deep, If slumbering they are, of carelessness, Then say: ‘Arise, Awake! The time of soberness has arrived.’ ”!!

The response of the Caliph totally disheartened Nasr: “The man on the spot tends to exaggerate, he sees more than there really is to see and lacks the perspective of the one who is far away from the scene.” And as if to make sure that the old man understood that the Caliph did not share his evaluation of the situation in Khurasan, Marwan is said to have concluded, “Cut the wart yourself.” Nasr nghtly concluded that caliphal help was out

of the question.'!* The last resort was Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah, the governor of Iraq and Nasr’s arch-enemy. 9 Tabari, I, p. 1973; Baladhuri, Ansab, I, pp. 133-136. For more details see Akhbar, pp. 304f. Anonyme, fols. 258b-259a.

10 Akhbar, p. 305. 11 These verses of Nasr are very famous and they illustrate almost every tradi-

tion which describes the circumstances which led to the fall of the Umayyads. The sources are in disagreement about the identity of the Caliph to whom they were addressed. See, /bid., pp. 304, 305; Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 134, Tabari, II, p. 1973; Kafi, VII, pp. 156-157; Dinawari, p. 356; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, ‘Iqd, I, p. 297 (=1944 ed. IV, p. 478); Mas‘adi, Murij (Pellat), IV, p. 79 adds two verses to this poem: “And if sleeping they are our people / Then say: ‘arise! the time has arrived, run away from

your dwellings and call out: / ‘farewell to the Arabs and to Islam!’” Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 8a; Azdi, p. 106; Fakhri, p. 194; Magrizi, Mugaffa,

fol. 71a (=ed. ‘Aql, p. 117); Ibn Khallikan, HI, p. 150; Ibn Kathir, Bidz ))yah, X, p. 32; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 365(1. 20)-366(1. 1); Fragmenta, p. 189 (ll. 5-7); Aghani, VI, p. 128; Banners, pp. 13-14. 12 Tabari, loc. cit., Mas‘tdi, Murisj (Pellat), IV, p. 80.

The Strategy of Victory 149 However, his verses of despair, in which he spoke about birds of war about to fly free over his province, made no impression on the governor, who seems to have enjoyed the old man’s suffering. “I do not have even one man to spare for him,”

he reportedly said.!3 He refused to help Nasr, not because he was still harassed by problems of maintaining law and order in Iraq and the surrounding regions, but mainly because of the personal rancour he felt towards the governor of Khurasan. He tried to convince Marwan that Nasr was not fit for his post and

that his personality was the cause of the ‘asabiyyah in Khurasan.'4 He is said to have kept back a number of Nasr’s letters from being brought to the Caliph’s notice so as to minimize the extent of the danger described by the aged governor of Marw. Jahiz blames Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah for having contributed materially to the downfall of the Umayyads by deliberately preventing the Caliph from receiving proper information about the conditions in Khurasan. The system of the akhbar (interior intelligence) had been de-

veloped by the Umayyads and was essential for maintaining their power throughout the Empire. Any interference with the regular and normal functioning of this institution (tadyi‘ alakhbar in the language of Jahiz) must inevitably bring about a decline in the ability of the central government to cope, while there was still time, with the dangers looming up in the various provinces. The fact that Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah allowed his personal feelings to outweigh the interest of the state finally caused the ruin of the dynasty.!> It would appear that Marwan accepted the views of Yazid on the conditions in Khurasan, and instead of sending Nasr masSive reinforcements he sent a delegation consisting of a man of

Tay’, one of Tamim and one of Shayban. The delegation re13. =‘ Tabari, II, p. 1974; Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 134. According to Kafi (VII, p. 159), Ibn Hubayrah made it clear that Iraq should be the main focus of his attention and not Khurasan.

14 See Akhbar, p. 251. Yazid is said to have written to the Caliph that if he wanted to save Khurasan, he should replace Nasr with a person who would be a source of unity for the people of the province.

15 Jahiz, Kitab al-Bighal, Rasa'il, U, pp. 265-266; cf., Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, op. cit., II, p. 297 (1944 ed. IV, p. 477) Fakhri, p. 148. Commenting on the relations between Yazid and Nasr, Maqrizi regards the tension between the two as a divine intervention in favour of Abii Muslim and the Da‘wah. Maarizi, Mugaffa, fol. 71a (=ed. ‘Aql, p. 114).

150 Chapter 4 garded as its main function not to help Nasr but to try to mediate between him and the Yaman in accordance with the instructions of Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah. When the delegation’s efforts at mediation failed, it returned to Marwan.!6

Nasr continued to write, imploring help. His demands were modest: “‘a thousand Syrian cavalry, a thousand Syrian turbans, they will suffice to destroy the horde of culprits.” But then the situation became desperate. The Da‘wah was already openly active in Marw, much to the dismay of the helpless Nasr. After the repeated rejections of his calls for help, he could only outline

doom: ,

to the governor of Iraq the picture of the future in terms of “When I was driven out of my home to an adjacent enclosure, I called upon you for help; but when you were slow to respond and your reinforcement was delayed, I was driven out from my encloSure into the courtyard of my home. Now, if you continue to put me off, I shall be thrown completely out of my home. And once I am driven out of my home, your home shall be invaded and the homes of many others, and even if you were to hide yourself in a hole, you would be followed into it, until you and your like will be done away with (hatta yu’ ta ‘alayka wa-‘ala ghayrika).”}®

These last two desperate appeals to Marwan and Ibn Hubayrah elicited no positive response. In a tradition recorded by the author of the (Leiden) anonymous chronicle, Marwan is said to have explained to Nasr his refusal to send a detachment of the Syrian army to Khurasan. “If we were to be surprised by some unforeseeable crisis in this land (Syria, Iraq M.S.), we would have to rely on the army of ahl ash-sham. Therefore, you should be satisfied with whatever you have. Be strong and deal with your problems with sharp resolution.” This tradition corresponds very well with another one recorded by Kufi, according to which Marwan contemplated going to Khurasan himself but abandoned the idea “lest Syria and the Jazirah slip away from his hands.’”!9

It is nevertheless clear from all Marwan’s reactions that he did

not attach serious importance to Nasr’s appeals for help, con16 Akhbar, p. 251; Anonyme, fol. 258b. 17. Akhbar, p. 311; Anonyme. fol. 269b; Kafi, VII, p. 158.

18 Akhbar, p. 310. 19 Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 8b (infra); Kifi, p. 153.

The Strategy of Victory 151 vinced that Nasr, with the help of his followers in Khurasan, could easily overcome the “wart” of his internal problems while leaving him — Marwan — free to operate on what seemed to him to be the central and most vital front. Marwan possessed the characteristics of a great ruler. He was

a great strategist but he failed to evaluate the virulence of the danger in Khurasan properly. Relying on past experience, which taught him that Iraq and the Jazirah were the vulnerable points for the security of the Empire, he completely neglected the front in Khurasan. It may well be that his complacent attitude was due in part to the mission which visited Khurasan and seems to have reported that fighting in Khurasan was only concerned with the

usual tribal jealousies. Such an account would agree with the opinions of Marwan and the governor of Iraq. A major contribution to the success of the revolution was the government’s failure to recognize the revolutionaries in time and to estimate their power correctly. When the rulers against whom a revolt is brewing underestimate the power of the revolutionar-

ies, they are slow to take preventive action against them. As a result they enable them to build up their power unhindered. The historian should be careful not to indulge in retrospective speculations, but in this case one cannot escape the temptation to work out a scenario in which the Da‘wah fails totally or at least where its success is very doubtful. What if, instead of ignoring Nasr’s warning verses, the Caliph were to move into Khurasan at the head of two expeditionary forces — a Syrian one made up of the elite corps of jund ahl ash-sham, and an Iraqi one? The Mudar of Khurasan would then have joined him and the crushing of Aba Muslim and the Da‘wah would only have been a

matter of time. With the identity of the /mam known, the ‘Abbasid family could have been destroyed, and history would have been markedly different. In the case of revolutions, and these are rather few in history, there is always a point at which the scales turn: success and failure sometimes hang on a single event or on a practical combination of circumstances. After all the social, economic, political and military conditions are taken into consideration, it is the human element that usually counts: the judgment of the individual and the various manifestations of the intricacies of the human character. Many details contribute to create the conditions and circumstances of the great historical event, but it is the single individual or a few individuals who, in the end, bring the histor-

152 Chapter 4 ical event into being by taking decisions based entirely on their own judgment. “No great man lives in vain.” Thomas Carlyle wrote “the history of the world is but the biography of great men.” In our times, when history is becoming more and more an investigation of impersonal socio-economic-political factors, it should not be forgotten that the main actor in history is man himself. Carlyle was fascinated by the hero, the “great man.” In certain circumstances, it took an ordinary man or a few men who happened to be in a certain juncture of time and place to become the hero or heroes of a great historical upheaval. The “Abbasid revolution reached the moment in its development when the human element began to play a decisive part. The Caliph, in his early sixties,?° was a man of tremendous military experience and a soldier with a record of valour from years of wars in the mountains of Armenia. He had the properties necessary for a good leader: decisiveness, courage, administrative and military ability. In retrospect, he made an error of judgment, for nothing threatened the realm more than the Da‘wah led by Abi Muslim in Khurasan. The insurrections of the Khawarj troubled him, especially the one of the Ibadiyyah that originated in Yemen in 129. True, they set up their amir al-mu’ minin in Yemen. A certain Talib al-Haqq, and a group of them led by Aba Hamza and Balj b. ‘Uqbah entered Mecca and Madinah, but they could easily have been ignored for the time being. Instead, the Caliph used the excellent units of his Syrian army on a long and costly expedition to the Hijaz and thence to Yemen to put down a rebellion which essentially constituted no real danger. In such crucial times, he considerably reduced his best military power.?! Second on the scene was Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah, the governor of Iraq. He was an able general of about forty-two

years old, originally from Syria from the northern tribe of Fazarah. He was the governor of Qinnasrin for Caliph Walid b.

Yazid (125/743-126/744) for a short time and when Marwan came to power, he nominated him to the governorship of Iraq. The nomination fitted in well with the Caliph’s pro-Qaysite policy. Traditionally, Khurasan and the Eastern provinces in general came under the jurisdiction of the governor of Iraq, who 20 There are several accounts about Marwan’s age. See Mas‘ddi, Murty (Pellat), IV, p. 71. 21 = ‘Ibid., p. 72.

The Strategy of Victory 153 usually had the prerogative of sending his own man to govern Khurasan. In this case however, the Caliph ratified Nasr in his position independently. As a result, the proud Yazid made every possible effort to discredit Nasr and to make him fail. Helping Nasr in his difficult situation was out of the question for Yazid.

The hatred and contempt for the old governor of Khurasan blurred the sight of the young nobleman of Fazarah, who, instead of evaluating the situation, enjoyed his little revenge on Nasr. When he reluctantly reacted to the Caliph’s command, it was already too late. In Khurasan, Nasr and Abi Muslim stood one against the other. Nasr, devoid of power, could only try and stop the quick progress of the revolution by playing for time. He used every possible stratagem to create an anti-Da‘wah coalition, but to no avail. He tried to divide and rule by playing the various parties in his province against each other and even to reach an agreement with Abi Muslim, while making great efforts to discredit him and his movement. Abt. Muslim, powerful and no less shrewd, could see through Nasr. He stepped aside when the various parties fought each other, but moved into action on the political scene when the slightest danger of any anti-Da*wah coalition loomed to prevent it in its early stages. He dreaded the Caliph’s direct intervention and respected the power and ability of the governor of Iraq. He carefully monitored both men and made his decisive move only when he was sure of Nasr’s helplessness and isolation. In the month of Rabi‘ IJ, 130, the situation seemed quite clear to Abi Muslim and very favourable for his final move to capture

the capital. In Marw, part of the city was in the hands of ‘Ali b. Juday‘ al-Kirmani. The leader of the Azd, like his father, lacked political sophistication and shrewdness but he seemed to have been haughty and a power seeker, which made him easy prey for Abt Muslim. Although “Ali b. al-Kirmani was officially a

senior ally, Abii Muslim would not enter into Marw before preparing the ground for himself. He sent a group of his propagandists into the city, headed by Shibl b. Tahman, one of the first leaders of the Da’wah, mawla of Rabi‘ah.?? These propagandists are described by the Akhbar as mutakallimin and their function is described as follows:

22 Banners, p. 193 (and note).

154 Chapter 4 “They were to enter into Marw and give publicity to their cause and

call the people to support their views: stating to the public their pledge to follow the sunnah and to base their action on justice. They entered into the cities and propagated their views and convinced many people who left the city and joined Abi Muslim.”

The term mutakallimin in this tradition is particularly interesting because it appears here 1n its old and, most probably, original meaning. The mutakallimiin were professional orators and

public speakers, experts in the art of public debate, with great ability to convince.“ The extensive use of professional propagandists in order to lure away government supporters is another, and hitherto unknown, facet of Aba Muslim’s perfect understanding of the nature of the revolt. The attraction of support from the government to the rebels is one of the principal causes for the success of a revolt. The activity of the mutakallimitn had far reaching effects; for beyond their success in convincing people to change camps, they also created a favourable atmosphere in the city for the takeover by the Da*wah.

Nasr b. Sayyar was powerless; he had lost hope of obtaining any assistance from Iraq or Syria and, seeing that even his closest supporters could not agree on a line of action, it may well be that he had no alternative but to try political juggling by entering into negotiations with Aba Muslim.” This is perhaps the true significance of Baladhuri’s account which relates that Nasr, of his own accord, invited Abi Muslim to enter Marw.” But at this stage Abu Muslim did not need Nagr. Tribal conflict broke out with renewed intensity inside Marw itself, apparently at the instigation of Aba Muslim’s men at the beginning of Rabi* II 130/December 747. On the seventh of the month and immediately on hearing news of the fighting, Abi Muslim proceeded to Marw with his troops and made a surprise entry into the city on the ninth. There are conflicting reports as to the exact date of this crucial event in the history of the revolution. Baladhuri puts in Rabi‘

23 Akhbar, p. 310. 2A See S. Pines, “Note on an ancient meaning of the term mutakallim,” ‘Ulama’ and Problems of Religions in the Islamic World, (ed. G. Baer), Jerusalem, 1971, pp. 18f. (Hebrew).

25 Akhbar, p. 311. 26 Baladhuri, Ansab, III, p. 130.

The Strategy of Victory 155 I/November-December 747, Abi al-Khattab delays it until Jumada I/January 748, but Mada’ini and the Akhbar both insist on 7 or 9 Rabi‘ II. This is the most probable date for the event, as Wellhausen proved on the basis of a very careful study of Tabari’s traditions. The confusion of the sources between Rabi‘ I and Rabi‘ II is hardly surprising, as is the mix-up between 7 and 9, which are orthographically identical and can only be differentiated from each other by the position of the diacritical dots.” Tradition preserved the ceremonial nature of Abi Muslim’s entry into Marw. The fact that the capture of the seat of govern-

ment was effected without battle, found expression in the Qur’anic verse which Abi Muslim is said to have chosen to recite on his entry to the city. “He entered the city at a time when its people were not paying attention ...”. The verse forms part of the story of Moses and its continuation is no less significant.?8 Moses finds in the city “two men fighting, one belonging to his Section and the other to his enemies; the one who belonged to his section called him to help against the one who belonged to his enemies, so Moses struck him and finished him ...”” The choice of this verse by the chroniclers of the Da‘wah is not accidental. The association of the Umayyad rule with the wicked rule of Pharaoh and the ‘Abbasids with the God-sent Prophet and deliv-

erer, Moses, was a common theme in the repertoire of the ‘Abbasid propagandists. In this case, the quarreling in the city described in the Qur’an could easily be superimposed on the sit-

uation in Marw before the entry of the new Moses, Abi Muslim.”

27 Akhbar, p. 315; Tabari, II, pp. 1989-1990; cf. ibid., p. 1984: Wellhausen, pp. 526-527. The Anonyme fol. 270b, speaks about Rabi‘ I, but it is not clear from the identical sentence in the Akhbar, whether it is a copyist mistake. Maqrizi copied Baladhuri (Rabi‘ I), Mugaffa, fol. 70a (ed. ‘Aq! pp. 105-106 and note); Ibn al-Athir V, pp. 379(II. 11-20)-380(1. 4); Khalifah, Ta’rikh, Damascus, 1968, II, p. 590. - 28 Qur’an, XXVIII: 15 = Bell, II, p. 375, the first part of the verse is quoted by all the authorities that describe Aba Muslim’s entry into Marw (See note 27). The Leiden Anonyme, (fol. 10a) and Ibn al-Athir (V, pp. 379380) also quote the subsequent part of the verse which describes the two men quarreling. 29 The idea that the Da‘wah follows the sunnah of Mtsa, Moses’ example and

precedence, appears already in the early organizational phase of the movement. Bukayr b. Mahan the real organizer of the early Da‘wah in Khurasan, presented Moses’ precedence as the ideal model for the organi-

156 Chapter 4 Nasr remained in Marw for almost a whole month after Abi Muslim entered it.*° During this period, Abi Muslim, who had received the oath of allegiance from the city’s inhabitants in the first few days, pressed Nasr to give his oath of allegiance also to the “qa@’im” from the Prophet’s family, which Nasr refused to do. Remaining loyal to his principles, to his last breath, he refused to take a step which could benefit him personally or the party of Mudar which relied on him, and which would be no less than clear-cut, shameful treason. He also refused to meet Abii Muslim “TI shall meet him,” the old warrior said, “‘at the head of a tough military formation.” He remained in Marw until the last moment, and only when he felt that he could no longer

defy Abi Muslim, he escaped from the city with his son, Tamim, his wife and about forty of his closest Mudar supporters, who also had withheld their bay‘ah from Abi Muslim.?! Nasr’s escape from Marw could be presented publicly as the abandonment of his post. Abt’ Muslim moved fast, not only to take over the treasury and the administrative records, but also to eliminate some of Nasr’s best helpers and military commanders — some twenty-four of them including Nasr’s secretary and

Salim b. Ahwaz of Tamim, the head of his shurtah, and a staunch enemy of the Da‘ wah — were executed. They are all de-

scribed as belonging to the nobility of Mudar.32 At the same time, Abi Muslim transferred the governmental institutions which he had created in Makhuwan, to Marw.*3

Nasr fled to Nishapir, the Qaysite stronghold, by way of Sarakhs and Tis. His hasty flight aroused terror in the hearts of the Mudar tribesmen whose homes lay on his route. Many of them abandoned their villages and fled westward with him — a fact which later facilitated Abii Muslim’s conquest of the Qays areas in northern Khurasan .*4

zation of the movement. Akhbar, pp. 214-215; Banners, pp. 191-192; Q, VII: 155. 30 Until 10 Jumada I/January 16, 748, and not one day as in Abi al-Khattab’s accounts. Tabari, I, 1987. See Wellhausen, p. 525. 31 Akhbar, p. 318; Baladhuri, vol. cit., pp. 130-131; Magqrizi, Muqaffa, fol. 70a (ed. ‘Aql, pp. 108-109); Dinawari, p. 362; Kofi, VII, pp. 168-169.

32 Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 10a (infra). 33. Ibid. (supra): The chiefs of the four governmental arms: “haras, shurtah, gada’, dawawin and kitabah, received a salary of 1000 dirham”’ a year.

34 Tabari, II, pp. 1990-1991; Anonyme, fol. 271a (1. 17) f.

The Strategy of Victory 157 Nasr again displayed his amazing personality, which compels

us to speculate as to what he could have done had he had the support which he needed at the right moment. He did not regard his escape as an abandonment of his province but rather as a tactical retreat to a better position. In Nishapir, in the midst of the

Qays land, he planned the regrouping and reforming of a new army, made up of local Mudarites and fugitives who kept on ar-

riving from the region controlled by Abi Muslim. His rear flank, between Nishapir and Iraq, seemed to him totally secure; “this meant power for him; for he and his followers were there-

fore free to concentrate their efforts against the

Hashimiyyah,”» The circumstances of Nasr b. Sayyar’s flight from Marw are described in one tradition which recurs in several sources. It relates the following: Aba Muslim sent a mission to Nasr, headed by Lahiz b. Qurayz, the nagib from Tamim, with instructions to entice Nasr into a meeting with him and into giving his oath of allegiance. In reality it was a trap. Although Lahiz was one of the most important veteran leaders of the Da‘wah,*¢ he did not stand up to the test: he let Nasr know that Abi Muslim was not so interested in his bay‘ah as in his life. Since he could not tell him this openly, he gave him a hint by quoting part of a Qur’Anic verse: “O Moses, the nobles are taking counsel against thee ...’’” According to the tradition in the Leiden anonymous chronicle, Lahiz cited nothing beyond the words “O Moses ... (va Misa),”

which makes the story more credible. Even with these two words it should not have been difficult for Nasr to continue the verse: “... the nobles are taking counsel against thee to kill thee;

so go forth, verily I am one of those who give thee good advice.”’ And Nasr did take the hint and the advice to mean that he must depart from Marw if he held his life dear. Abi: Muslim was informed of this act of Lahiz b. Qurayz and the latter paid for it with his life. Abii: Muslim did not take into consideration

his past record nor his position in the movement, but ordered him to be decapitated.** Lahiz’s action was one of ‘asabiyyah:

35 Akhbar, p. 319. 36 Tabarl, II. pp. 1358, 1988; Anonyme, fol. 254a; Akhbar, p. 217 (and note 1); Banners, pp. 193, 210. 37 Q, XXVIII: 20 = Bell, I, p. 375. 38 = Tabari, I, pp. 1990, 1994-1995; Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 131; Kiafi, vol. cit., p. 169; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 381 (similar to other cases, he quotes most

158 Chapter 4 his tribal loyalty outweighed his loyalty to Abia Muslim. According to the tribal code, had he so openly and bluntly betrayed a member of his own tribal group, it would have brought eternal shame upon him. } He must have thought that no harm could reach the Da‘ wah by saving the old man’s life. Yet Abt: Muslim regarded Lahiz’s act as an act of treachery. “O Lahiz,” he is reported to say, “is there ‘asabiyyah in the religion?” No interest, and particularly no tribal interest, should be put above the interest of the Da‘ wah.” This tradition does not appear either in the Akhbar, or in the Anonyme — a fact which cannot be accidental. The tradition in the Akhbar is factual and to the point. Lahiz did come to summon Nasr to Abi Muslim and Nasr, who understood that he could find no more excuses, escaped under the nose of Lahiz and his men. There is no trace of the story, which the two chief authorities, Baladhuri and Tabari, recorded in such great detail. Not a word is said about the execution of Lahiz. It seems that Lahiz b. Qurayz was executed at a certain stage by Abi Muslim and the incredible incident in connection with

the escape of Nasr b. Sayyar was invented to discredit the Tamimite nagib and to justify his execution. It is possible that the reason for Lahiz’s death is connected with another incident recorded this time only in the Akhbar, according to which, one of Marwan II’s spies was a Tamimite by the name of Qurayz b. Majaj b. al-Mustawrid. He succeeded in striking a friendship with Lahiz b. Qurayz and Qasim b. Mujashi’, the other naqib from Tamim,” and through them he was introduced into the secrets of the Da‘wah and came to know the identity of the Imam, which he later divulged to the Caliph.*! Be that as it may, the fact remains that Lahiz b. Qurayz seems

to disappear from the records, which renders the account about his execution as plausible (though not the reasoning behind it). The fact that Abii Muslim could put to death one of the senior du‘at and one of the most important nugaba’ (who was, inciden-

of the verse); Anonyme (Leiden), fol. 10a (supra); Magqrizi, op. cit., fol. 70b (= ed. ‘Aql, p. 108).

39 For another variation see Tabari, II, p. 1995 (ll. 14-15). Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 382 (1. 9).

40 Banners, p. 193. 41 Akhbar, pp. 389-390.

The Strategy of Victory 159 tally, also the son-in-law of Sulayman b. Kathir)* at a time when he needed maximum support, indicates how his power had increased and how firmly based his position in the movement was. The Da‘wah had now spread and embraced vast numbers. The leading du ‘Gt and the veterans of the movement, enjoyed the respectable status of those who had endured suffering in the service of the movement but were ordered to refrain

from premature fighting. They retained their privileges while their real influence was weakened.” This story also emphasizes

the fact that the Da‘wah had taken on more of a southern

character in respect to its relations with the tribal alliances. Abi Muslim would not have dared to execute a Tamimite without the

full support of Azd and Rabi‘ah. On the personal level, Abia Muslim revealed himself once again as a strong and uncompromising leader. The Da*wah’s great hour was approaching and he

understood that there was no longer any room for manoeuvre. Any display of insubordination from any element within the Da‘wah had to be eradicated. The case of Lahiz was only a start in the suppression of every attempt at independent action by the veteran leaders of the Da‘wah, which could injure the movement or question the absolute authority of Abi Muslim. From the moment Marw was taken, it was only a matter of time until Abi Muslim’s forces reached Iraq. The flight of Nasr

b. Sayyar to Nishaptr and thence westward to Rayy and Sawah, left Khurasan without any official representative of the Umayyads and the province fell into the hands of the best organized and most efficient political and military power — the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah and its army. PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT MARCH WESTWARD

Once Eastern Khurasan was secured in his hands, Abi Muslim could turn his full attention to the preparation of the army for the

42 Ibid., p. 220 (1. 4). 43 The veteran leaders and active supporters of the Da‘wah were known by the name of kuffiyyah. This name which later became a honorific title, signified seniority as well as sacrifice in the service of the movement. The word itself derives from the verb kaffa, to abstain from any reaction to the oppression so as not to reveal the movement prematurely. See Banners, pp. 225-226.

160 Chapter 4 westward expedition and for the decisive military operations against the Umayyads. Until this time, over a period of more than half a year, warriors had flocked to Abii Muslim’s camps from various parts of Khurasan — from Herat, Balkh, Marw-ar-

Rid and even from Jurjan. They were both Arabs and mawall. These were joined by a great number of soldiers who had deserted the camp of Nasr b. Sayyar shortly before the capture of Marv, and by the great body of warriors from Azd and Rabi‘ah. Within this vast force there were many — especially the warriors from Azd and Rabi‘ah — to whom the Da‘wah and its aims were

entirely new. The army had to be consolidated, first by the formation of an officer cadre of high quality and second by an intensive campaign of indoctrination. Propagandists belonging to the tribes which made up the fighting forces were not lacking among the original Da‘wah activists, and these were unremitting in their work of preaching and education. More important was the formation of the officer body and the military high command. Abi Muslim did not assume command of the army. He was an excellent administrator and a leader of distinction, but he was not a military commander. The army of the Da‘wah needed a commander-in-chief, a strategist who would be a match for Marwan’s distinguished generals, Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah and ‘Amir b. Dubarah, as well as for Marwan himself, a veteran

fighter and an experienced general. The choice fell upon Qahtabah b. Shabib of the Tay’ tribe, who possessed all the necessary qualifications: he came from a leading family (ahl bayt) in a respected southern tribe and was therefore acceptable to the southern tribesmen who made up the main fighting force of the movement. Although nothing is known of his past military record, it is clear from his later achievements that he was an excellent fighter and a first-rate strategist; he was one of the ear-

liest supporters of the Da‘wah and had been appointed to the highest and most honoured group of the nuqaba’. He was one of the selected few privileged to meet the /mams, both Muhammad and Ibrahim, and he went to see them several times on missions for the movement. The last time he went on such a mission was toward the end of the year 129, when he travelled westward to meet the Jmam, as he usually did during the Hajj.“ It is said that on that occasion Ibrahim appointed him to command the military

44 ‘Tabari, I, p. 1964.

The Strategy of Victory 161 forces of the Da‘wah.* He is said to have returned to Khurasan with a special banner which had been given to him by Ibrahim at the close of the Hajj of 129, and we can assume that he reached Marw shortly after Abii Muslim had taken it. The tradition which

relates that it was Ibrahim who appointed Qahtabah as commander of the army is of no real significance since, as we Shall see, Qahtabah would ultimately receive his appointment from Abi Muslim, to whom he was subordinate throughout all his westward expeditions, until the forces of the Da‘wah entered Ktfah where Abi Salamah, the head of the old Kifite centre of the Hashimiyyah, was in authority.*6 If special stress was laid on Qahtabah’s appointment by Ibrahim, this was done in order to lend double validity to his position as leader of the army and

to indicate the divine source of his outstanding military successes. When Abt Muslim presented Qahtabah in public, he reportedly said: “The Jmam wrote to me that he had already nominated Qahtabah to lead the army to Iraq.’ Winter was over and spring was in the air. The snow on the mountains of Jurjan and Media began to melt. The road to Iraq opened. In this part of the world, winter is not the best time for military activity; wars are usually fought in spring and summer. The moment of truth for the revolution had finally arrived, the campaign which was to decide the fate of over three score years of preparations was at hand, and the grand army of the Da‘wah was ready to march on Iraq. The unique importance of the moment could not escape Abii Muslim’s keen historical sense and he made the most of it. Just before the army started to march

westward, Abi Muslim organized an impressive display of power in Marw. The army was paraded and then assembled to publicly give its oath of allegiance. We are told that the entire

army was there which seems unrealistic. At any rate, Abi Muslim was interested in its core, the main indoctrinated nucleus, which retained the original name of the movement “alHashimiyyah,” and was called in full “‘jund al-Hashimiyyah.”

The name suggests that these were the hand-picked units of the army which belonged to the circle of the original champions of the Da‘wah. The ceremony of receiving the oath from the 4s Ibid., p. 2000; Akhbar, p. 321. 46 Cf. Wellhausen, p. 538. 47 “The [mam knows that Allah will break through him one of the devil’s horns.” Akhbar, p. 321.

162 Chapter 4 whole army, and especially from the Hashimiyyah, was admin-

istered by Abt Mansir, Talhah b. Ruzayq of Khuza‘ah, who was not only one of the most important nuqaba’, but also a

renowned warrior. “He fought with ‘Abd ar-Rahman b. Muhammad b. al-Ash‘ath, and accompanied Muhallab b. Abi Sufrah and took part in his expeditions.” He was also one of the intimate counselors of Abi: Muslim, “who would consult him on various issues and would ask his advice about the wars and expeditions in which he took part. He used to ask him about the meaning of the patronymic “Aba Mansir” and to say “O Abi Manstr, what do you say? what is your opinion?’’48 Tabari says further that “he was an expert in the complex arguments and secret doctrines” of the Hashimiyyah.*? This means that he was the chief ideologist of the movement, and being also a man of sharp mind and tongue, he could best defend its ideas in the debates with its opponents. All in all, nobody could have been better fitted than Talhah to direct the ceremony which was to mark the moment of the historic plunge into the realization of the movement’s aspirations and hopes.

The text of the bay‘ah of the army has been preserved for us in the tradition of Abt al-Khattab; it runs as follows: (Talhah b. Ruzayq would say:)

“You give the oath of allegiance (bay‘ah) to act according to the Book of Allah, may He be praised and exalted, and the sunnah of His prophet, may Allah bless him and give him peace, and to obey the Prophet’s family who shall be agreed upon. Allah’s covenant and His binding obligations are incumbent upon you. And if you violate the oath, you shall have to divorce your wives, free your slaves and walk to the house of God (at Mecca). (You undertake) not to ask for pension nor for your pay until your commanders shall give them to you first.” And even if one of you shall have his enemy beneath his foot, you are forbidden to engage in fight with him without the order of your officers.”5°

If this is indeed an authentic document — and to judge from its precise wording and its content it appears to be — then this is a 48 Abd al-Khattab in Tabart, I, p. 1988. 49 Idem., p. 1987 (infra). 50 Tabari, I, p. 1989. See Wellhausen, p. 532.

The Strategy of Victory 163 further link in the chain of evidence which goes on to emphasize the orderly character and the strict discipline of the Da‘wah. The army was not a mob force of rebels but a body of fighters which was bound by stringent oaths with the politico-religious organi-

zation of the Da‘wah and established upon a system of strict disciplinary rules. The army was no longer constructed on the traditional model in which tribal leaders were usually also commanders of military units in the field. Instead it had a hierarchy of officers (wulat), to whom the soldiers owed absolute obedience even when they were not engaged in battle. This was in effect the beginning of the professional army which was to be de-

veloped under the “Abbasids. The soldiers were forbidden to demand their pay and had to wait for their officers to pay them. This provision in the text of the oath is of particular significance because its aim was to prevent the repetition of the phenomenon

of soldiers rising in defiance of the province governor crying: “al-‘ata’ , al-‘ata’ ! — payment! payment!”’5!

In order to prevent personal feuds from developing into tribal

vendettas similar to the ones which rent the Umayyad army apart, a strict code of behaviour was issued to the army. The soldiers were forbidden to settle their accounts with their enemies privately, but had to lay their cases in front of their officers. This was an unusually advanced code of military discipline, which would pay off extremely well during the campaigns

that lay ahead. The idea of establishing the code of discipline might have been just a logical decision taken in the course of organizing the army. It is possible, however, that the code was based on the precedents set by the sunnah of the Prophet, invoked frequently by the Da‘wah. For it was the Prophet who

laid down an identical rule in the agreements between the muhayjirun and the various social groups in Yathrib (Madinah) with the intention of establishing peace and order in the city. The relevant clause to our discussion in these agreements reads as

follows: “In whatever thing you are at variance, its reference

back (maradd) is to Allah, Great and Glorious, and to Muhammad, Allah bless and honour him.” R.B. Serjeant, who

51 See Anonyme (1967), fol. 229 (1. 17). Ibn Kathir says: “Groups from the people of Khurasan used to despise Nasr b. Sayyar and neglected paying him the respect due to him; they pressed him for their pensions, and they spoke to him in a language which he could not bear, while he was on the minbar (thus humiliating him in public).” Ibn Kathir, X, p. 15.

164 Chapter 4 analyzed the documents, which came to be known in modern research as the “Constitution of Madinah,” showed that this clause that instituted Muhammad as a supreme arbitrator and judge, re-

sembled a Qur’anic verse (Q, XLII: 8 10): “If in anything ye have differed, the decision of it (goes) to Allah; that is Allah my Lord, upon whom I have set my trust and to whom I turn penitently.’’>2

Serjeant argued that the so-called “constitution of Madinah” comprised eight documents (which he numbered A to H) that Muhammad issued during the first seven years of his stay in Yathrib-Madinah. The first two are the longest documents and they regulate the inter-tribal relations in the city and the AnsarMuhijiriin relations, which Serjeant identifies as “al-sunnah al-

jami‘ah” cited in the arbitration treaty between ‘Ali and Mu ‘awiyah.°*3

Ignoring, for the moment, the on-going argument relating to the construction of the “Constitution,” Serjeant’s suggestions of-

fer some very interesting possibilities. Can one say, for instance, that assuming the sunnah jami‘ah really was a concrete document (part of the “Constitution” or an independent document), the term sunnah which appears in the slogans of some rebels, especially Shi‘ites, as well as the Da‘wah, could have 52 ~Bell, I, p. 484, (verse 8). Serjeant, “Sunnah”, p. 24 (for the translation) and p. 25 for the comments. Serjeant sees the similarity between the Qur’anic verse and the Prophet’s document in the fact that “Muhammad as Allah’s representative on earth” is the person best qualified to deal with disputes in the name of Allah. Serjeant’s views have been contested by Gil, “Constitution” pp. 47f.; Lecker, pp. 61f.; Rubin, “Constitution” pp.

pp. 5-23; and see Denny, pp. 39f. The text of the ‘Constitution’: Ibn Hisham, Sirah, I, pp. 501-504. 53 Ibid., pp. 8-9; idem., “Constitution”. For al-sunnah al-jami‘ah in the context of ‘Ali-Mu‘awiyah dispute see Wagq‘at Siffin, pp. 505, 510. The fact that the well known ‘Jewish’ tribes of Madinah were not mentioned in the document could not be accidental. It is because the document has nothing to do with them, but rather with some local, and far less important, clans or families who professed, in part, some kind of Judaism or, at least were known to be yahid, whatever this term meant. Waqidi’s tradition about the population of Madinah at the time of the Prophet’s arrival is defective, as shown by Lecker who proved that there is a difference between the three major Jewish tribes and the local Jewish families of some Arab clans in Madinah. Wagqidi’s tradition (Maghaz1, I, p. 184) may be supplemented by the tradition in the Aghani, XIX, p. 106. Lecker loc. cit.; Rubin, loc. cit., _ but especially idem, “The ‘Constitution of Medina’ some notes,” Studia Islamica, LXII, 1985, pp. 5-23.

The Strategy of Victory 165 had a concrete meaning. That like the Qur’4n, the term sunnah is not a vague concept but a written document (or documents) embodying a set of specific regulations relating to some important aspects of conduct of the Muslim wnmah. The frequent usage in the sources of the pair of terms Qur'an and the Prophet’ s sunnah in relation to political activity, already in the first century of Islam, raises a major question as to what exactly was meant by sunnah. The fact that through the usage of the technique of the hadith, various parties and individuals in Islam could

claim to represent the true and original sunnah of the Prophet, means either that the term had no concrete meaning or that its meaning was lost. Yet the political activists in the Umayyad period used the pair of terms Qur’an-sunnah, in a specific manner. In the

same way that there was no question as to the identity of the Qur'an, it seems that there was no problem as to the exact meaning of ‘the Prophet's sunnah.’ Serjeant’ s suggestion that the term sunnah jami‘ah in the early years of Islam could have meant one doc-

ument or more of a general nature, which the Prophet drew in Madinah, and about the authenticity of which there seems to be no

question; this suggestion could be extended beyond the context of the ‘Ali-Mu‘awiyah strife. This was, most probably, the sunnah, mentioned as the exemplary method of conduct for the Muslims next to the Qur'an. In an interesting way, this discussion leads us

back to the legend of the famous “yellow scroll,” which the ‘Abbasid Muhammad b. ‘Ali “inherited” from the ‘Alids. The word sahifah (“scroll,” “sheet” ) means a written document, and, as shown by Gil, is a synonym of kitab. The term appears in the second half

of the ‘conStitution’ in a very Significant context relating to the “people of this sahifah,” probably those who accepted the condi-

tions laid down in the document (aqarra bi-ma fi hadhihi assahifah). Against those who regard the ‘Constitution’ as a cohesive document, Serjeant argues that the term ‘sahifah’ describes various parts of the ‘Constitution’, especially the parts designated by him as B, C, E, F and G. The major elements in the second half of the

. ‘Constitution’ (or in these documents) are: the confirmation of the tribal principle of the retaliation for murder within the community of the mu’minun - life for life or the acceptance of ransom by the

victim's relatives, the responsibility of the whole mu’minin community for avenging the blood of an innocent mu’min, the affirmation of the principle of parity, as far as the din is concerned, between the Muslims and those parts of the local Arab clans who professed some kind of Jewish faith (‘yahtd bani‘awf, yahid bani

166 Chapter 4 sa‘idah etc ... lilyahad dinuhum wa-lilmuslimin dinuhum...), and the undertaking by these Jews to co-operate financially with the mu’minin in time of war. Otherwise, the Jews are responsible for their own expenses and the Muslims are responsible for theirs; but the two parties were to support each other against the enemies of the “people of the sahifah,” and, the most important two clauses, that Madinah is haram and that the Prophet is a supreme judge and arbitrator for the signatories of the sahifah.

It should be noted that the ‘Jews’ mentioned in the ‘Constitution’ clearly represent Judaized parts of some clans of the local inhabitants of Madinah and not the three ‘Jewish tribes’ — Bani Nadir, Banu Qaynuqa‘ and Banu Qurayzah. The usage of the term “yahud Bani ‘Awf” etc. is similar to the usage, for instance,

of the term, “na sara bani taghlib” which simply means, the Christians of Banu Taghlib.

According to a tradition in the Aghani, the sahifah, which may mean one of these documents or all of them, was entrusted after the. Prophet's death to ‘Alt b. Abu Talib (wa-kanat ba‘da an-nabiyy ‘inda ‘alib. abifilib radiya allah ‘anhu).*4 At first glance, one tends to dispose of such traditions off-hand as yet another piece of Shi‘ite propaganda. In this case, however, it seems that the tradition about this particular sahifah seems to have a specific and fairly plausible historical foundation.

After the ‘Abbasids came to power, their court historians and traditionalists filled the sahifah (then conveniently lost) with the contents that were useful for the new dynasty. The sahifah was made to contain ‘“‘ilm,’ a vague term that could be interpreted at will, to mean esoteric, divine and prophetic knowledge, which could only be at the disposal of the elect. The ‘Abbasid tradition about the sahifah in its legendary form was naturally put into the mouth of a descendent of ‘Ali and it runs as follows: “Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. Husayn b. ‘Alt b. Abu Talib was asked, concerning the ‘Abbasid family: ‘do they possess anything of the knowledge (‘ilm)?’ He answered: ‘Yes, they possess a yellow scroll (sahifah safra’) which had belonged to ‘Ali b. Abu Talib. The latter left the sahifah to Hasan who then abdicated and went to Mu‘awiyah in 54 Serjeant “Sunnah”, pp. 23, 33, 35, 37 (for the sahifah), and Aghani, XIX, p. 107. For a discussion concerning the ‘preservation’ of the document see, Gil, op. cit. pp. 46-47, where most of the available documentation is cited.

The Strategy of Victory 167 Syria. Hasan, Husayn and Muhammad, the sons of ‘Ali b. Abu Talib, accompanied each other and Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah applied himself to Hasan and Husayn and said to them “you alone inherited my father excluding me; for even if the Prophet was not my

progenitor, I am still the son of your father ... give me something of my father to adorn myself with it, since you know very well his love which he reserved for me.” Hasan said to Husayn: “O my brother, he is our brother and the son of our father so give him something from our fathers’s knowledge (‘ilm).”’ Husayn then gave Muhammad a yellow scroll (sahifah Safra’) which contained the knowledge about the black banners of Khurasan, their time and the method of their appearance; their marks and signs as well as the identity of the Arab tribal group which would support them, the names and the exact description of the people who would stand up for them, and their helpers and followers. That scroll remained with Muhammad b. ‘Ali Ibn al-Hanafiyyah until he died. Before his

death he gave it to his son, ‘Abdallah b. Muhammad, who is known by his patronymic Abi Hashim. It remained in his (Abu Hashim’ s) possession until his death, when he was on his way back (to the Hijaz) from (Caliph) Walid b. ‘Abd al-Malik. He was

then passing through Humaymah and he gave (just before his death) the scroll to Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas ...

and before he (Muhammad) died he handed it over to his son Ibrahim b. Muhammad.”* The tradition of the Akhbar ends at this

point, but it may be continued from the long account in Sharh Nahj al-Balaghah, which relates how the ‘Abbasids buried the sahifah “in a small copper chest under some olive trees in the Shant.” When the Abbasids came to power they dug under all the

olive trees ... but they did not find the chest containing the sahifah.5°

Elsewhere, I wrote that “the fantasy which invented the sahifah also provided for its disappearance.”>' This statement is certainly true as far as the legend about the sahifah goes, which originated in the ‘Abbasid court circles. The features of the crude ‘Abbasid (and Fatimid-shi‘ite) propaganda are too transparent to be missed.*® Yet this particular legend does not seem to have been entirely baseless.

5S Akhbar, pp. 184-185. 56 Ibn Abd al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balaghah, VY, p. 149.

57 Banners, p. 140. 58 Pro-Abia Muslim circles in Khurasan must have found it very convenient to attribute to this sahifah the exact information about Aba Muslim and the

168 Chapter 4 In a tradition which must have had wide circulation, the following is related: “‘Alt was asked: ‘has the Messenger of Allah given

you especially something to the exclusion of the people in general?’ ‘Ali answered: ‘the Messenger of Allah gave us nothing spe-

cial (to the exclusion of the rest) except for what I have in this sheath of my sword.’ He then took out a scroll which contained some information about the ages of camels. It was also (written) in it that Madinah is an inviolate (holy) area, (haram) between Thawr

and ‘Ir and whoever committed a crime in it or gave refuge to a criminal in it, the curse of Allah and the angels and all the people is upon him. On the Day of Resurrection, no intercession or propitiatory gift will be accepted from him.°° (It was also written that) The protection of the Muslim (dhimmah) is one and whoever betrays a Muslim will be cursed by Allah and the angels and all men, on the day of judgment, and neither intercession nor any act of justice on his part will be accepted from him.” ©

The unusual thing about this tradition is the close resemblance between it and some parts of the documents of the “constitution of Madinah.” In document B, according to Serjeant’ s division we read the following: “It is not lawful to (any) mu’ min who has affirmed what is on this sahifah and trusts (amana) in Allah and the Last Day, to support or shelter a criminal (muhdith). Whosoever supports him or shelters him shall have upon him the curse of Allah and His wrath on the Day of Resurrection. No intercession or propitiatory gift will be accepted from him.” ©!

This part of the sahifah (Serjeant: document B) corresponds al-

most verbatim with the middle part of the above tradition. Document F corresponds with the beginning of the tradition and runs as follows “The jawf of Yathrib ts an inviolate | a sacred enclave for the people of this sahifah.”®2 The end of the tradition crucial part that he was to play in bringing about the ‘Abbasid success. Anonyme (Leiden) fol. 6a.

59 Here I follow Serjeant’s translation for the cliche of sarf wa-‘adl; op.cit., pp. 24-25. 60 Kanzal-'Ummal, V, p. 445 (and his sources). In the translation of the last sentence I am offering a slightly different translation for sarf wa-‘adl. See Gil, op. cit. p. 54. He refers to sarf as ‘indemnity’ and ‘adl as ‘atonement’.

61 Serjeant, op. cit., p. 24. 62. Ibid., p. 35. Serjeant translates sahifah as sheet, but I left the Arabic term because of its importance for the subject of our discussion, the legend of the “yellow sahifah”’.

The Strategy of Victory 169 speaks about the dhimmah (protection, or covenant of protection)

of the mu’mintn being one and that the betrayal of a Muslim! mu'min incurs the wrath of Allah, His angels and all men. This passage corresponds in part to clause 6 in Serjeant's document A and clause 2a of document B.

The passage in the tradition dealing with the establishment of Madinah as an inviolate enclave, is more detailed than the same passage in the “Constitution.” Our tradition actually gives the delineation of the sacred area (haram) “between Thawr and ‘Ir’ whereas the constitution speaks only about the “jawf of Yathrib” which is the flat area of Yathrib lying between the mountains and the lava-tracts.™

There can hardly be any question that the sahifah which ‘Ali is said to have possessed, according to tradition, contained a few of the documents of the “Constitution” or all of them. The fact that only three documents, or parts are quoted, means only that the tradition used concise language. The tradition can be ascribed to antiShi ‘ite circles, for, it negates the fundamental Shi‘ite idea that ‘Ali was nominated by the Prophet to be his heir, and that ‘Ali inherited

the Prophet's knowledge or part of it. Yet even if the tradition found its way into the Shi‘ite-sunnite debate, it seems to have originated in neutral circles. For, after all, it contains a very important

fact: ‘Ali's possession of the only written document outside the Revelations which originated with Muhammad. In the debate around the question of the legitimacy of authority in Islam, a tradi-

tion which bestowed on ‘Ali the custodianship of the Prophet's

sunnah had tremendous value for ‘Ali’ s camp. , The existence of such a tradition constitutes a most valuable support for Serjeant’ s theory that the first two and longest documents of the Constitution are the sunnah jami‘ah of the Prophet. However, as we have shown, our tradition affirms that this sunnah contained at least another one document (document F) if not more.

This long digression from our main discussion was necessary in

, order to examine the concrete meaning of the term “sunnah of the Prophet.” Before assuming its vague connotation and becoming the subject of the traditionalist’ s toil, it seems possible that at the very beginning, the term ‘sunnah of the Prophet’ referred to some polit-

63 Ibid., p. 34.

170 Chapter 4 ical or legal documents said to have been issued by the Prophet in Madinah.

When the code of conduct was promulgated for the army of the Da‘wah, it followed the Prophet’s example in this sunnah, namely that those who are bound by the Da‘wah code of discipline were to refer their disputes to their superiors, just as those who accepted the Prophet’s sahifah were obliged to refer their disputes to the Prophet. The Da‘wah still continued to follow the principle of keeping the Jmam’s identity secret. Even the troops of the Hashimiyyah knew no more than what the Da‘wah preached publicly throughout the whole period of its clandestine activity: they swore to uphold the principles of Islam according to the Qur’an and the ‘“Prophet’s sunnah” and to fight for the unknown personage concealed behind the title ar-rida min Gl Muhammad. The army of the Da‘wah was not to know the identity of its Caliph until the moment when Abi al-‘Abbas as-Saffah, the first of the “Abbasid dynasty, would rise to receive the oath of allegiance on the min-

bar at Kifah! Qahtabah b. Shabib, the appointed Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, received from Abt Muslim wide-ranging authority “to appoint and dismiss” (wa-damma ilayhi al-jaysh waja‘al lahu al-‘azl wa-al-isti‘mal).©* Under his command, prepa-

rations began for the westward march in pursuit of Nasr b. Sayyar, who had meanwhile reached Nishapir. In order to perfect the organization of the army, Qahfabah was joined by Abi Muslim’s confidant, Abi al-Jahm b. ‘Atiyyah, who was appointed in charge of diwdn al-jund. He had to arrange for the punctual payment of the army and perhaps also for the enrollment of the additional troops who joined it on the way.© The army’s pay was at first financed by the vast sums of money

which Abi Jahm had taken with him when the fighters left Marv; later, when the period of conquest began, the army was financed by the taxes collected from the conquered territories. The important rule, which was consistently followed, was that

64 Tabari, I, p. 2000. 65 Ibid., p. 2001. Abia al-Jahm appeared in the lists of the Da‘wah leaders among the nuzara’ an-nuqaba’, Akhbar, p. 220.

The Strategy of Victory 171 the soldiers received their pay punctually and according to the conditions of their enrollment in the diwan.®

As for the commanders in the army of the Da‘wah, many of them are known to us by name. Tabari, in an anonymous tradition, gives the following names: 1. Abia “Awn ‘Abd al-Malik b. Yazid, of the tribe of Azd® 2. Mugqatil b. Hakim of the tribe of ‘Akk (Azd)® 3. Khazim b. Khuzaymah, of the tribe of Tamim®

4. ‘Uthman b. Nahik, of the tribe of ‘Akk (Azd)’° 5. Abia Ghanim ‘Abd al-Hamid b. Rib‘i, of the tribe of Tay’’! 6. Salamah b. Muhammad, of the tribe of Tay’’? 7. Jahwar b. Marrar of the tribe of ‘Ijl (Rabi‘ah)73 8. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Uthman, of the tribe of Tay’ 9. Abi al-“Abbas, al-Fadl b. Sulayman, at-

Tusi”* 10. Al-Mundhir b. ‘Abd ar-Rahman 11. Khalid b. Barmak® 12. Abt. Hamid, (or Humayd) Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Himyari.76

66 Baladhuri, Ansab, II, p. 135, says that the Arab commanders who joined Aba Muslim’s army were paid according to their ranks in the Umayyad diwan — between 60 to 100 dirham, about twenty to twenty-five times more than the soldiers registered in the new diwan (which seems to me very unlikely). 67 Abi “Awn belonged to the top leadership of the Da‘wah, and appears in the lists of nuzara' an-nuqaba’, Akhbar, p. 219. He, together with Qahtabah b. Shabib seems to have been among the few people whom Abd Muslim trusted. See Tabari, I], p. 1964; cf., Baladhuri, loc. cit.

68 He was one of the du‘at from Nasa, and as such he had the position of naqib. (Every da‘i outside the group of the du ‘at of Marw held the rank of

naqib as well. Banners, p. 197). Akhbar, p. 218. He also appears in the lists of nuzara’ an-nuqaba’, but was also referred to as “one of the seventy” (du‘at), which proves that the rank of nuzara’ an-nugaba’ was not necessarily a lower rank; ibid., p. 220; Ma‘arif, p. 188; Baladhuri, loc. cit. 69 He also appears in the list of nuzara’ an-nugaba’, Akhbar, p. 219. 70 One of the du ‘at from Abiward, and as such with a rank of nagib as well. He also appears in the lists of nuzara’ an-nuqaba’. Akhbar, pp. 218, 220.

71 He was one of the main group of du ‘at from Marw itself. [bid., pp. 218, 221. 72 His name also appears among the seventy du ‘at. Ibid., p. 221. 73 Later he will play an important part as one of Abd Ja‘far al-Mansar’s commanders. Baladhuri, vol. cit., pp. 107, 246-248. He was responsible for quelling the rebellion of Sunfad (Sinbadh, Simpadh) in Nishapir in 136. Mas‘idi, Murisj (Pellat), IV, pp. 144-145; Tabari, II], p. 119; Baladhuri, Futhh, p. 339; Ya‘qubi, Ta’rikh (Beirut), I, p. 368. 74 His name appears in the list of the seventy du‘at. Akhbar, p. 221. 75 The father of the Barmakid family, he was also one of the veteran supporters of the Da‘wah in Jurjan. His name appears in the lists of nuzaa’ annugqaba' . Ibid., p. 220. The first wazir of the ‘Abbasids under the first three

172 Chapter 4 We definitely know that eight of these twelve commanders came from the Arab tribes of Azd, Tay’, and Rabi‘ah; Khazim b. Khuzaymah was the sole representative of Tamim. The majority of them belonged to the veterans of the Da‘wah. We have here additional proof that the backbone of command in the revolutionary army came from the Arabs and especially from the Yaman tribes which made up the bulk of the army. It is difficult to know what positions in the military command were occupied by the few mawali who are included in the list of commanders, but we do know about Khalid b. Barmak that he, together with Abi Jahm b. “Atiyyah (who was also a mawld), was engaged

on the administrative side to deal with pay for the troops. According to Jahshiyari, he was appointed to collect the taxes of all the territory conquered by Qahtabah. He also dealt with the collection of booty and its distribution among the soldiers. While

the army was on the march, the responsibility for paying the troops became one of his duties, since the amounts disbursed were, as we have already mentioned, raised from the proceeds of taxation. (Wa-kana Khalid b. Barmak fi ‘askar Qahtabah yataqallad kharaj kul ma iftatahahu Qahtabah min al-kuwar, wataqallada al-ghana@’ im, wa-qasamaha bayna al-jund).”

This was an efficiently organized army, mostly comprised of well-trained and experienced fighters, led by a cadre of excellent Arab commanders and backed by an efficient administration.

Caliphs, the governor of the Eastern provinces and of Mawsil (Azdi, p. 207); died 163/780. See Zirikli, A ‘lam, II, 295 and the relevant bibliogra-

phy. See also EP, s. v. “Baramika.” ,

76 Tabari, Il, p. 36; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 410; Mas‘adi, IV (Pellat), p. 98, calls him Abd Hamid (or Humayd) at-Tisi, Jahshiyari, p. 86 (ll. 20-21) calls him “al-Himyari as-Samarqandi;” Tabari, III, pp. 47 (1. 18), 105 (J. 17) refers to him as “al-Marwartdhi.” On the important part he played in the enthroning of Saffah, see ibid., pp.

27-28, 35-37; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 410-414, 471-473; Jahshiyari, p. 86; Anonyme, Russian part, p. 168 note 277. The full list appears in Tabari, II, p. 2001, but not always with the person’s tribal origin. However, the tribal origin of most of the people may be identified from the lists in the Akhbar, where the position of each one of them in the Da‘wah is also stated. The name of Qasim b. Mujashi‘ of Tamim who belonged to a group of “the twelve nugaba’” should be added to this list; Tabari, II, p. 2000; cf., [bid., pp. 1358, 1988. See also another list of eight military com-

manders, seven of whom were Arabs, Baladhuri, Ansab, III, pp. 134 (infra)-135 and Diri’s notes there.

77 Jahshiyari, p. 87.

The Strategy of Victory 173 One of the secrets of the military success of the Da‘wah lies in its army which was a satisfied and well-equipped army, one in which the soldiers felt that they received constant care and support from the commanders. The saying attributed to Napoleon more than a thousand years later, that an army marches on its stomach, was practically implemented by Abi Muslim. We must not, however, forget the ideological factor. From an examination of the names of the generals (to which, incidentally, Qahtabah’s two sons, Hasan and Hamid, must be added) we learn that most if not all of them were also prominent propagandists for the Da‘wah; no doubt, in addition to the military duties they discharged, they also continued to instill the ideas of the Da‘wah into the ranks of their troops. KHURASAN RECEIVES ‘ABBASID GOVERNMENT

Let us now turn to conditions in Khurasan. Abt Muslim controlled the central zone of the province, i.e. the cities of Marw, Marw-ar-Rid and Herat, and had thus cut off the eastern part of

Khurasan from the west. To the west of this central zone, Shayban b. Salamah, the Kh§rijite, controlled the city of Sarakhs and its environs, while further to the west, Nasr b. Sayyar’s Qaysite forces were drawn up in the city of Nishapir.

Before he could send his army westward against Nasr, Aba Muslim had to secure his rear in the east. We have seen above that during the stages of organizing the Da‘wah army before the capture of Marw, Abii Muslim was joined by the last of his followers from the city of Balkh. After capturing Marv, he had to gain control of Balkh, which was the capital of the Tukharistan

region, sO as to complete and ensure the rule of the Da‘wah throughout eastern Khurasan. Abt Dawud, Khalid b. Ibrahim, the experienced da@‘i of the Balkh region, was sent back to Balkh. He succeeded in gaining control of the city without any difficulty and in dislodging from it Nasr b. Sayyar’s governor, Ziyad b. ‘Abd ar-Rahman of the tribe of Qushayr (Qays). After this, Abia Muslim summoned Abt: Dawud to return to Marw, replacing him as governor of Balkh by the Rabi‘ah leader Yahya

b. Nu‘aym, an ally of ‘Ali b. al-Kirmani. He had joined the Da‘wah in consequence of the agreement between ‘Ali and Aba

Muslim and the appointment as governor of Balkh must have been in the nature of a reward for him. However, he was never

174 Chapter 4 in full agreement with Abi Muslim and the Da‘wah; he had been drawn into the pact with Abii Muslim largely against his will, by

‘Ali b. al-Kirmani. On the appearance of the Da‘wah, he had been one of the foremost spokesmen in favour of the creation of an anti-Da‘wah league by all the warring parties in Khurasan.78 It is not surprising then that, once in Balkh, he immediately entered into negotiations with Ziyad b. “Abd ar-Rahman, Nasr b.

Sayyar’s displaced governor, and established a grand antiDa‘wah league of all the Arabs in the region. This league was joined by the bloc of non-Arab (Persians?) pro-Umayyad warriors under the command of Mugatil b. Hayyan an-Nabati.79 Tabari, describing this league, writes that all the inhabitants of the Balkh region “formed a united band — the Mudar the Yaman, the Rabi‘ah and the Persians who were with them — to fight the musawwidah.’’® In order to prevent disagreements between the three tribal blocs of which the anti-Da‘wah alliance was made up, the mawla Muqatil b. Hayyan was appointed commander of this force. Abi Muslim sent Abt Dawud to Balkh for a second time; the latter was successful in defeating the allies in a brief engagement at the river Sirjinan and in recapturing the city of Balkh. Ziyad b. ‘Abd ar-Rahman and Yahya b. Nu‘aym fled to the town of Tirmidh.®! A short time after Abad Dawud’s return to

Marw, following his recapture of Balkh, another attempt was made by the tribesmen of the area to gain control of it, and Abu Dawud was sent there a third time and captured the city.®? This time it was evident that Abi Dawud would have to stay in Balkh to hold the eastern districts of Khurasan while Abi Muslim was on the point of marching westward to Nishapir with his army.*?

78 ‘Tabari, HI, p. 1966. 79 His father, Hayyan an-Nabati, was the commander of the Mawali unit in the Umayyad army in Khurasan. Tabari remarks that Hayyan was nicknamed Nabati (usually a derogatory description of a non-Arab or nonArabic speaker) because he had an accent when he spoke Arabic. Tabari, II,

p. 1291; cf., Banners, p. 58. Wellhausen, pp. 442f., 496.

80 Tabari, I, p. 1988. 81 About the whole affair see Tabari, II, pp. 1997-1998.

82 Ibid., pp. 1999-2000. 83. See also Wellhausen, pp. 536-537.

The Strategy of Victory 175 ELIMINATING THE OLD ARAB LEADERSHIP

The Balkh revolts strengthened Abii Muslim’s resolve that he would have to dispense with the veteran leaders of the Arab tribes in his camp. They still cherished aspirations to rule and feelings of ‘asabiyyah, and he had no assurance that these feelings would not prevail over the obligations contained in the agreement they had made with him. When he had rid himself of Yahyab. Nu‘aym, the leader of Rabi‘ah, it still remained for him to force ‘Ali b. al-Kirmani and his brother, ‘Uthman, out of his way. He planned this move with the radical, uncompromising thoroughness which characterized all his actions. In order to know which of the followers of ‘Ali and ‘Uthman were likely to appear some day as their avengers, he asked ‘Ali to give him a list of all his followers on the pretext that he wished to present them with gifts. Next he separated the two brothers. He sent ‘Uthman, together with Abi Dawud, to Balkh as governor and took ‘Ali with him, in Safar 131,84 to Nishapir in the wake of the Da‘wah army, which had already overrun Qumis and was advancing on Isfahan, ostensibly to help him (Abu Muslim) in his campaign against the remains of Nasr b. Sayyar’s forces. Meanwhile he arranged for both brothers to be assassinated on the same day. Abi Dawud was to kill “‘Uthm4n in Balkh, while Abi Muslim took upon himself the assassination of “Ali. The two brothers were executed in one day, and at the same time all their sympathizers were arrested according to the list and were also put to death.® After gaining control of the territory of Khurasan to the east of the line Marw — Marw-ar-Rid — Herat, Abi Muslim sent out his commissioners to establish Da‘wah rule in the central cities. Abt

Dawud was sent to try his luck in subjugating Transoxania,*® while the army of the Da‘wah was free to set out westward.

84 October 748. Akhbar, pp. 337(infra)-338. 85 Tabari, II, pp. 1999-2000; Baladhuri, Ansab, III, p. 131 Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 383-385. 86 Baladhuri, loc. cit.; Tabari, I, p. 2001 Dinawari, p. 362.

V

THE WESTWARD MARCH TO VICTORY

The Westward March to Victory 179 5 INITIAL STAGES OF THE EXPEDITION TO IRAQ

Shayban, the leader of the Khawarij, still occupied a position between the forces of the Da‘wah in Marw and those of Nasr b. Sayyar in Nishapir. Shayban was still bound by the truce which he had concluded with each of the two sides: he had agreed, as we have seen, not to take up arms against Nasr b. Sayyar until the end of 130, and a similar agreement between him and Abt Muslim was still in force.

Aba Muslim could not take the truce into consideration; Qahtabah’s vanguard, commanded by Khazim b. Khuzaymah and Bassam b. Ibrahim, easily defeated Shayban’s forces near Sarakhs or Abiward, killing him and destroying most of his army. Those who survived fled westward and joined Nasr b. Sayyar in Nishaptr. The occupation of Sarakhs happened before the middle of Sha‘ban 130/second half of April 748. In the annals of the Da‘wah, the victory at Sarakhs, effected by a subsidiary unit of the Da‘wah’s army, was regarded by the move-

ment as a good omen. The tradition says that Nasr b. Sayyar was extremely depressed by the news, and he is supposed to have said: “Today, Marwan’s disaster became certain.” The old

Statesman expected more opposition from the inhabitants of Sarakhs “who unanimously opposed the Hashimiyyah.””!

Qahtabah’s expedition started out from the army’s last big camp in Watihan in the vicinity of Abiward. The delay in starting the expedition until this time was also planned. Qahtabah was prevented from opening his military expedition during the snowy and rainy winter of 748 and preferred to wait until “the rainy season was over and the roads became fit for travelling.” He used the intervening period to perfect the organization of his forces and to assist Abi Muslim in securing his rear flank in Khurasan. In his crucial expedition westward, Qahtabah displayed extraordinary military talents. His strategic movements combined speed and cautiousness. He took no unnecessary risks and never missed an opportunity to take full advantage of successes. In 1 Akhbar, pp. 321-322; Tabari, I, p. 1995(1. 16)-1997(1. 3); Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 383.

2 Akhbar, p. 321.

180 Chapter 5 order to understand Qahtabah’s strategy, it is necessary to devote a few words to describe the forces arrayed against him. First among them was Nasr b. Sayyar in Nishapir, who did not present a particularly formidable obstacle. Beyond him, in the

region of Isfahan, the vast Syrian and Iraqi forces of the Umayyads were concentrated. Up to this time they had fought

under the command of ‘Amir b. Dubarah and Nubatah b. Hanzalah, against various rebels in the southern Jibal and in Fars.? Another large fighting force was stationed in Iraq, commanded by the governor of Iraq, Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah. Qahtabah’s strategy was based on the strict principle of protecting the flanks of the advancing army. He therefore decided to move along the main road of northern Khurasan, which led from Marw, through Tis, Nishaptr and Damaghan, to Rayy. This route offered two important advantages: first, it skirted the border of the Great Desert of central Iran, which stretched to the south and thus served as a natural protection for the army’s left (southern) flank as far as the borders of the Jibal; second, the route passed through districts in which there were old, established centres of the Da‘wah. The strategy of protecting his flanks compelled Qahtabah to deviate from his line of march in two places: once, as we shall see later, in Jurjan where he had to destroy an Umayyad force under the command of Nubatah b. Hanzalah that threatened his right (northern) flank. A second time, he digressed southward after he had reached Rayy, and fought in Isfahan and Nihawand in order to dispose of the threat to his left flank from ‘Amir b. Dubarah. Qahtabah’s march from

Rayy to Iraq was not, therefore, made by the shortest route which normally would have led him through Hamadhan — Kirmanshah — Hulwan, but by the longer route: Rayy — Isfahan — Nihawand — Hamadhan — Hulwan. This circuitous march of Qahtabah not only enabled the Da‘wah army to advance with its flanks and rear safely covered but also led to the conquest of the Jibal region before the attack on Iraq (see maps 1, 2).

FIRST GAINS: SARAKHS, TUS, NISHAPUR

Once the armies of the Da*wah began their march westward, their advance was rapid. Their first major gain was the city of 3 See Ma‘arif, pp. 187, 213; Baladhuri, Ansab, II, p. 136.

The Westward March to Victory 181 Tis.4 The city of Tis was about 180km away from Sarakhs and stood on a very important road junction. The main road to the

west led directly to Nishaptr and the road southward led to Mashhad and, via the north eastern corner of the province of Quhistan, to Herat. To reach Tis, Qahtabah’s army had to cross the Mashhad river, which seems not to have presented a major obstacle. The ability to produce quick and effective engineering

solutions to problems of river crossing would prove to be of crucial strategic importance once the revolutionary army entered the final stages of its campaign in Iraq. Already, during the battle of Sarakhs, the Da‘*wah units, fighting there under the command of Bassam b. Ibrahim and Khazim b. Khuzaymah, overcame the problem of crossing the Herat river to meet their enemies without much trouble. The Akhbar tradition assures us that the river was “abundant with water” (nahr kathir al-ma@’ ).5

After the fall of Sarakhs, the military activity in Khurasan became highly intensive. All the parties involved were poised for the crucial encounter at the city of Nishaptr which was to decide the fate of the Eastern province of the Empire. Two roads led to Nishapir, one from the north, which came down from Abiward via Nasa, and the other which connected Nishapir to Tis in the east. The northern road from Abiward was also connected to the

city of Tis from the north. Tis was therefore the key to Nishapir, in addition to being an important strategic position. The military forces of the Da‘wah were at that time divided between Abiward and Sarakhs. The main body of the army was in Abiward with Qahtabah and his general staff, and the units that had just conquered Sarakhs remained in that city under the command of Bassam b. Ibrahim and Khazim b. Khuzaymah. The Akhbar tradition, which systematically describes the various Stages of the campaign, says that Abi Muslim took advantage of

the fact that his army controlled the two main roads leading to Tus and gave orders to attack this city with a pincer-like move: Qahtabah was to attack from the north, advancing with the main army from Abiward, while Bassam and Khazim were to assault Tus from south-east, advancing from Sarakhs via Mazdaran.° 4 Akhbar, pp. 323-324; Tabari, II, pp. 2001-2003; Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 106.

Ss Akhbar, p. 322. 6 This part in the tradition of the Akhbar corresponds, more or less, to one of Tabari’s, otherwise confused, traditions. See Tabari, II, p. 2000; Cf. Le Strange, Lands, p. 431.

182 Chapter 5 By that time, Nasr b. Sayyar realized that he must at least try to delay the movement of the Da‘wah army by making an effort to

defend Tus. He sent to Tis a contingent which he had rapidly recruited from the tribes of Mudar and some of the inhabitants of

the city of Nishapur. He put this force under the command of his own son, Tamim. The subsequent events prove that Tamim and his relatively small force could not have created a serious problem for Qahtabah. However, another Umayyad military power was simultaneously advancing into the area under the

command of Nubatah, a veteran military leader from the “northern” tribe of Kilab. At the head of this “large and strong force,’” Nubatah had just entered the city of Rayy on his way to Jurjan. According to the account of the Akhbar, his task was to

rally the pro-government fugitives who had escaped from Sarakhs and other places which had been taken by the Da‘wah.

It is doubtful whether Nubatah could do much to defend Tis, but he could definitely have joined Nasr in the defense of the key

city of Nishapur. Nasr was desperate for this help. He wrote to his arch-enemy, Yazid b. “Umar b. Hubayrah, the governor of Iraq, again, begging the latter to order Nub&atah and his army to come to his aid. Once again, the personal hatred towards Nasr blinded Ibn Hubayrah from assessing the situation correctly and he refused to help Nasr. Nubatah moved quickly to Jurjan, thus sealing the fate of both Tus and Nishapur. A heavy battle took place outside Tus in which Nasr’s son, Tamim, was killed, and the remnants of his army found refuge in the citadel of Tis. When Qahtabah laid siege on the citadel, the besieged warriors tried to escape by opening a hole in one of the citadel’s walls which their besiegers had not yet reached. Little did these scared soldiers in the citadel know that the wall which they opened was on the edge of a sheer cliff overlooking a deep ravine. In their hurry to escape at night, they ran through the hole to certain death. By the time they realized what had happened not very many of them were left. Those remaining met their deaths too at the hand of Qahtabah’s soldiers who broke into the citadel the next morning.’ The fall of Tus sealed the fate of Nishaptr. Before the outcome of the battle of Tis was known, Nasr prepared the defense of the city with a few thousand (“ten thousand”) tribesmen of 7 Akhbar, pp. 323-324; Tabari, II, 2002-2003; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 386387.

The Westward March to Victory 183 Qays and other supporters of the Umayyads who had joined him. At first, he thought of creating a defense line outside the walls of the city, but after the news about the defeat at Tus and

the death of his son reached him, he decided to abandon Nishapir. Heartbroken by the death of his son, whom he lamented in verses that became immortal, the old statesman-poet left the city which was drowned in sorrow, confused and help-

less. “He left amid the cries of the wailing women of Naysabir who were weeping their slain men, and went to Qumis. Naysabur was abandoned by all the Umayyad forces and by all the other warriors who had come to help them.’” Still loyal to the Caliph, Nasr made a final attempt to receive imperial help by writing directly to Marw4n II. Having received

Nasr’s letter, it seems that Marwan eventually understood the gravity of the situation in the Eastern provinces. He himself was still busy establishing his authority in Syria and reforming his army and could not send one single Syrian soldier to Khurasan, but the governor of Iraq, he thought, could and should assist Nasr. The Akhbar preserved a long letter which Marwan II supposedly wrote to Ibn Hubayrah and which is worth quoting here, if only to illustrate the mood of the time. The Caliph wrote: “Nasr b. Sayyar wrote to amir al-mu' minin informing him about the gathering of God’s enemies: some wicked Persians and Arab rabble, and about the fact that you had not responded to his pleas, and abstained from assisting him. Yet, amir al-mu' minin expects much more from you in whatever he orders you to do. Therefore, when you read this letter of amir al-mu’ minin, dispatch the troops to Nasr successively, one force after the other, send the worthiest of all your sons, and cleverest and the most motivated, to the war against the enemies of amir al-mu’ minin. Nominate this son of yours to lead the army and order him to pursue in his conduct of the troops a wise policy and gentleness. He should behave towards them like a compassionate father or gentle educator ... Moreover, you should favour them when it comes to the distribution of the

| income which you gather (from the areas which had become a Muslim property), for they deserve this money more than those who stay behind and do not have to endure the fire of war. For the 8 Akhbar, pp. 324-325. Let us not forget that Nasr was about 84 years old at the time of these events. As much as he was a stubborn warrior, his son’s death hit him very badly. Cf., Kifi, VII, p. 167.

184 Chapter 5 situation in Khurasan has become very grave, and those (rebels) who gathered there have gained much strength. The base-born overpowered the nobles, and ruled over religious leaders and the people of virtue, because of the disunity and discord with which God had inflicted them. For this reason, God transformed the position of the

men of leadership and subjected them to the humiliation of the lordship of slaves. Now, by rushing the army (to Khurasan), you will be encouraging the obedient people and humiliating the rebels. This is an opportunity for you to rectify your former negligence, especially since Iraq is a ready source for any (necessary) military re-enforcement and since you have free access to large amounts of money, which there is nothing to stop you from spending.”?

Unfortunately, it is impossible to verify whether Caliph Marwan II was the author of this letter; but even if it is only the invention of a diligent traditionalist, it fits into the atmosphere of the period in such a way that it could have been written by the Caliph. The latter, at long last alert to the grave development in

the east, was still unaware of the personal motives which affected Ibn Hubayrah’s attitude towards Nasr, and distorted his entire political judgement. No letter from the Caliph could change Ibn Hubayrah’s burning desire to see Nasr utterly humil-

iated, even if this were to mean the loss of the entire Eastern provinces of the Empire.

The subsequent developments may serve as a fairly good indication of Ibn Hubayrah’s intentions. After the complete failure of Nasr, and after the whole east was lost, he would appear

as the saviour of the realm. Khurasan, which he had been denied, although traditionally it should have been under his direct jurisdiction, would be saved and restored to the Empire, not by the useless old Nasr b. Sayyar, but by him, Yazid b. “Umar b. Hubayrah. For the latter to shine, there would have to be a full eclipse of the former. In order to follow such policy, Ibn Hubayrah must have had full confidence that, when the time came to recover Khurasan, he would be able to accomplish the task without much effort. The road to Ibn Hubayrah’s failure, and consequently to the Umayyad disaster, was paved with misjudgments. The governor of Iraq underestimated the power of the Da‘ wah and obviously treated Nasr’s reports with the same contempt

9 Akhbar, pp. 325-326.

The Westward March to Victory 185 which he felt for the old man, and dismissed the latter’s desperate descriptions of the growth and spread of the rebellion as the hysterical over-reaction of a useless and terrified official. Two large armies were awaiting Ibn Hubayrah’s order to march on Khurasan once Nasr was driven out of the province in degrada-

tion. “We shall rectify that which Nasr had destroyed,” Ibn Hubayrah is reported to have said. One of the two Iraqi armies under the command of Nubatah b. Hanzalah was on its way to Jurjan, a small but strategically important province on the south eastern corner of the Caspian sea

(Bahr al-Khazar). Jurjan was also the name of the provincial capital that was situated some 120 km to the north of the highway from Khurasan to Iraq. It was obvious that Nubatah’s task was to establish an Umayyad stronghold in Jurjan, which would block the main route from Khurasdn to the west as well serve as a springboard for the recapture of Khurasan. Nubatah must have received strict orders from Ibn Hubayrah not to cooperate with

Nasr. Moreover, Nasr’s name and the names of all the

Khurasanite warriors who were with him, were dropped from the (Umayyad) army register. The much-needed unification of the local government forces with the Iraqi army did not take place. Nubatah, fortified himself in the city of Jurjan and the annoyed Nasr remained in Qimis.!° Qahtabah entered Nishaptr, unopposed, on the last day of Sha*ban 130/4 May 738 no more than fifteen days after the beginning of his march.!! The attitude which he adopted toward the inhabitants of the conquered areas was that of a co-patriot and not of a victorious enemy. Immediately after his entrance into Nishapir, he issued a declaration insuring the security (aman) of the inhabitants. At the beginning, he is said to have excluded from his declaration of security, those people who had taken part in the killing of Yahya b. Zayd, the great grandson of ‘Ali b.

Abi Talib. Later, he let himself be influenced pardoning everybody, making his declaration of security general and allencompassing. 10 [bid., p. 328; Tabari, II, pp. 2003-2004, 2016-2017; Wellhausen, p. 539; Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 136. 11 Akhbar, p. 327; Tabari, II, p. 2003; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 386. Baladhuri’s tradition (Ansab, III, p. 131) postpones the beginning of Qahtabah’s expedition to Dha al-Qa‘dah 130/July 748. This means that for no good reason, Qahtabah and Abi Muslim delayed their military operations until the second half of the summer.

186 Chapter 5 The leaders of the Da*wah regarded the capture of Nishapir (Arabic: Naysabir) as a great success; a good omen for the future. The city was the capital of the Qays territory in western Khurasan and the fact that it fell into the hands of Qahtabah without a struggle caused much happiness in Abi Muslim’s

headquarters. |

Qahtabah remained in Nishapir for almost two months

(Ramadan and Shawwéal), carefully establishing the authority of

the Da‘wah in the city and its environs. He promised security and demanded an oath of allegiance to the movement and its leader. At the same time, Qahtabah, being aware of the military situa-

tion, made sure that Nasr would not be able to return to Khurasan unobstructed. He sent a force to Bayhaq led by Muhriz b. Ibrahim to block Nasr just in case he decided to make a return.

Nasr could not have been regarded as a military threat to Qahtabah, but the latter left nothing to chance: during the whole

of his campaign, he never left any part of his army exposed. This is why he changed his initial plans at this point, and instead of pushing westwards, he turned to the north. According to the tradition of the Akhbar, Abi Muslim was in

constant contact with the advancing forces, and issued commands concerning the actual operations. However, the further the army advanced, away from the headquarters in Marw, the less he could influence the strategy and tactics of the campaign. He himself seemed to have realized that the military part of the rebellion must be left to Qahtabah and the commanders in the field. He came to this conclusion after the conquest of Nishapur. He wrote to Qahtabah urging him to proceed and attack Nasr b. Sayyar in Quimis, but Qahtabah refused and wrote back, report-

edly saying: “I shall not follow Nasr, who is now in a process of withdrawal, and leave Nubatah behind me with the warriors of ahl ash-sham and of Khurasan. I would rather go to Jurjan and, if Allah gives me victory over Nubatah, Nasr should not pose any problem.” Abi Muslim, upon receiving this letter, reportedly answered: “It is your opinion which counts, do whatever you deem appropriate.’’!2 Even if this is not the exact wording of the letter, the tradition definitely reflects Qahtabah’s

12 Akhbar, p. 328.

The Westward March to Victory 187 major role in deciding the pace and the character of the military operations. ARABS AND PERSIANS: RETROSPECTIVE TRADITIONS

In Jurjan, the Da‘wah army was about to meet a proper Umayyad force for the first time. Nubatah headed an army com-

posed of a nucleus of ahl ash-sham warmiors, Qaysites who joined him on his way from Rayy to Jurjan, some Khurasanite fugitives and local pro-Umayyad sympathizers. In haste, he had prepared fortifications which were not very effective but, in time of need, he did have the wall of the city of Jurjan itself.!3 All the traditions regard this first meeting between Qahtabah and this large Umayyad army as a very important event and as the first proper test of the ability of the Da‘wah army and its leadership. According to Mada’ini, Qahtabah made a speech before the beginning of the decisive battle to boost the morale of his soldiers and to excite them. From this speech it might be inferred that most of the soldiers in Qahtabah’s army were Persians: “O people of Khurasan” — Qahtabah is made to say — “this country

used to belong to your forefathers, who were victorious over the enemies because of their justice and their proper behaviour. Only after they changed their ways and began to act unjustly, did Allah become angry with them, robbed them of their authority and put them under the rule of people which in their eyes had been regarded

as the most despised on earth. (adhallu ummatin kanat fi al-ard ‘Indahum). These people stripped them of their land, took possession of their wives and enslaved their children. (These victorious people) ruled with justice and helped the oppressed. Later, however, they changed their behaviour and altered their ways: They established a tyrannical rule, they terrorized the righteous and pious men who belonged to the Prophet’s family. Allah then gave you victory

13 Mada’ int’s report that Nubatah’s khandaq in Jurjan was one farsakh long is a gross exaggeration. Mada’ ini or his source wished to point out in the description of the building of this khandaq, its ineffectiveness. See Tabari,

I, p. 2004.

188 Chapter 5 over them, for through you He wishes to take revenge on them and to use you as his worst punishment ...”!4

The message of this speech is obvious. Qahtabah encouraged the Khurasanites to regain their lordship over the land of their

forefathers by destroying the Arabs who had previously conquered it. The Arabs are described as people whom the Persians used to despise. That Qahtabah could not have made such a speech is clear from the wording and contents of the speech, besides the fact that it does not appear in the Akhbar. Qahtabah was a proud Arab leader, speaking to an army that was composed mainly of Arabs and commanded, on the whole, by Arab commanders.

Although Qahfabah could never have made the speech attributed to him by Mada’ ini’s sources, the speech itself is impor-

tant for evaluating the early ‘Abbasid historiography. The fact that the speech does not appear in the Akhbdar’s very detailed traditions about Qahfabah’s campaign cannot be accidental. It means that the tradition reported by Mada’ini must have been created very near the beginning of the 9th century, and thoroughly influenced by the Persian character attributed to the Da‘wah and by the beginnings of the shu ‘itbiyyah. However, as far as the evaluation of the event is concerned, it is of little consequence whether Qahtabah made the speech or not. The fact is that Mada’ini or his sources regarded the battle of Jurjan as so important that they deemed it necessary to introduce the battle with such a programmatic speech. Accordingly, Mada’ini’s description of the battle is completely different from

the Akhbar’s description. Mada’ini’s report speaks about a proper battle at the end of which Qahtabah defeated Nubatah, killed him and sent his head to Abi Muslim.

JURJAN: FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH IMPERIAL UMAYYAD ARMY

There is very little that can be learnt from Mada’ini’s tradition (quoted by Tabari and Kuafi) about the circumstances of the bat-

14 ‘Tabari, II, pp. 2004(infra)-2005; Kofi, VIII, pp. 170-171. Cf., Ibn Qutaybah, Ma‘arif, p. 188. Surprisingly, Daniel (p. 74) seems to accept the authenticity of this speech. See below ch. 6, n. 84.

The Westward March to Victory 189 tle of Jurjan. In fact this, and most of the other military engagements throughout the campaign, assumed a stereotyped nature. The Akhbar, with its independent sources, supplies the necessary information for the reconstruction of the social, political and military environments in which the actual military operations of Qahfabah took place. From the Akhbar, we immediately gather that Jurjan was far from loyal to the Umayyads. To begin with, Jurjan was an old centre of the Da‘wah. It was in Jurjan that the Da‘wah was first established, in its earliest form, by Bukayr b. Mahan, a mawla who was completely adopted by the southern clan of Bani Musliyyah and was responsible for the original organization of the movement in the Eastern provinces.!> After his

time, Jurjan became one of the main centres of the Da‘wah’s clandestine activity and a vital link between the centres deeper in Khurasan and the imam in Syria.

When Nubatah arrived in Jurjan with his Syrian or Iraqi army, he found there, at best, only very limited support. He was joined by Mudarite tribesmen, some of whom fled with Nasr b. Sayyar when the Da‘wah came to power.

However, the relations between his army and these Khurasanite fugitives (fullal khurasan) could not have been ami-

able. With Qahtabah was ‘Amir b. Isma‘il, the leader of the Da‘wah in Jurjan, who was well-acquainted with the province!®

and could use the Da‘wah supporters there to undermine Nubatah’s position.

Before moving with the main body of the army to Jurjan, Qahtabah sent his son, Hasan, to attack some of Nubatah’s frontal posts, and while Hasan successfully eliminated these posts, Qahtabah joined him with the main army. On approaching the city of Jurjan, Qahtabah was joined by many of the Da‘wah supporters who “wore black” and came out to meet him. Acting

upon ‘Amir b. Isma‘il’s advice, he issued a declaration that whoever remained in his home behind closed doors, would not be harmed. This declaration resulted in many local Jurjanites, not necessarily Da‘wah supporters, stealing themselves away

from Nubatah’s camp and finding refuge in their homes. Nubatah, who realized that he was being deserted, withdrew with his original Syrian-Iraqi troops into the city, abandoning

most of the Khurasanite fugitives who had joined him. 15 Banners, pp. 136, 147-149. 16 Akhbar, p. 240.

190 Chapter 5 However, Qahtabah was quick on Nub§atah’s heels. He broke into the city and, in spite of some resistance, succeeded in killing both Nubatah and his son. He then forthrightly called upon the people of Jurjan to join his army and to take part in the “jihad of Muhammad’s family.” The response, according to the Akhbar’s

tradition, was overwhelming: some 5 O00 men joined Qahtabah’s army. They were enrolled into the diwan immediately and began to receive their payment from Qahtabah’s army paymaster, Khalid b. Barmak, (later the first “Abbasid wazir), who was himself a native of Jurjan.'? The military success was

followed by the establishment of the civil authority of the Da‘wah in the province and the collection of the kharaj.

We dwelt at length on the episode of Jurjan in order to illustrate the nature of the information supplied by the Akhbar.'8 Without this information, it is difficult to evaluate the nature of the second phase of the Da‘wah correctly. The usual information about this second military phase, as recorded by Tabari mainly from Mada’ ini’s traditions, was stylized to fit into a more or less stereotyped battle description, and it therefore becomes difficult for the historian to decide when the literary model of ayyam al‘arab ends and the historical hard facts begin. For example, Mada’ ini reports that in the battle of Jurjan “the people of Syria (ahl ash-sham) were defeated and ten thousand of them were killed.” It is almost certain that the whole army of Nubatah could not have numbered 10 OOO but, turned into a battle story, the tradition is no longer interested in the information but in fitting it into a pattern in which numbers are used to impress the listener or the reader. The tradition goes on to describe the valour of one of the heroes of Tamim, Salim b. Rawiyah, who had previously run away from Abi Muslim’s camp. Salim chose to fight alone to the end. The description of his single-handed battle could come from any legend of the ayyam and is worth quoting to illustrate the point which I am trying to make. “(Salim b. Rawiyah) fought alone. He faced ‘Abdallah atTa’i, who was one of Qahtabah’s heroes. Salim dealt a blow to the

latter’s face and did away with his eye. He went on fighting | (Qahtabah’s) soldiers until he was obliged to enter into the mosque followed by his enemies. Alone, he attacked them and put to flight any of their parties against whom he chose to charge. He kept on

17 Jahshiyari, p. 87; Akhbar, Ibid. 18 Akhbar, pp. 328-331.

The Westward March to Victory 191 shouting (his battle cry): Sharbah! By Allah, I shall soak for them

a disaster today. They eventually had to burn the roof of the mosque over his head and to throw rocks on him; only in this way did they succeed to kill him and bring his head to Qahtabah. There

was not one part in his head or face which had not been with a wound, and Qahtabah (admiringly) said: ‘I have never seen such a thing’.”!?

The tradition of the Akhbar is far less romantic and more factual. Not only is the battle reduced in scale and the number of the casualties not even mentioned, but the tradition also makes clear a very important fact — that the Da‘wah army was fighting in a sympathetic arena. The long period of indoctrination during the first, clandestine phase of the Da‘wah, created for its army the necessary environment for its initial military successes.

These initial successes were particularly important for the movement that presented its cause in terms invoking and assuring divine support.” The uninterrupted, successful march of the revolutionary army westward could only strengthen the Da‘wah supporters in their faith and widen the circle of the movement’s followers, as is clearly attested to by the Akhbar.

As the army proceeded in its march westward, its numbers swelled constantly. The well-organized system of indoctrination

took care of implanting into every new soldier motivation and the feeling of participation in a good cause of a divine nature. There was also a process of selection and, as much as it was possible, the revolutionary army was not infiltrated by elements which could endanger its ideological coherence and dedication. The army was constantly encouraged to feel that the spirit of the imam was hovering over it and that the imam’s divine wisdom

was accompanying and guiding the army’s commanders. Numbers, good leadership, perfect administration, sufficient fi-

nancial support, deep motivation and ideological conviction

19 Tabari, II, p. 2006. 20 This doctrine of ultimate success through divine support must have been part of the active process of indoctrination carried out by the professional propagandists in Qahtabah’s army. Mada’ini’s tradition put the following sentences into the mouth of Qahtabah in his speech to his army which may serve as a typical example for this idea: “The imam entrusted to me that you will meet them (your enemies), numerous as they are, and Allah, may he be praised and exalted, will grant you victory over them. You shall defeat them and slay them.” Tabari, I, p. 2005 (ll. 7-9).

192 Chapter 5 characterized Qahtabah’s army. The combination of spirit and matter gave this army tremendous power. Immediately after the capture of Jurjan, the whole province was put under the administrative cadre of Qahtabah’s army. This was in accordance with the systematic attempt on the part of Qahtabah to present the overall function of his campaign as the major stage in the replacement of the old regime with a new one. The setting of a new administration in the occupied areas was meant to give the occupation an air of permanence. On the one hand, the quick restoration of normal life strength-

ened the population’s confidence in the new rulers and, on the other hand, enabled the Da‘wah to benefit from the resources of the newly acquired territories without harming their inhabitants. The main source of income was from taxes. Qahtabah’s administrators installed the machinery necessary for the collection of the taxes, part of which they used for the current expenses of the

Campaign; the rest they sent to Abt’ Muslim’s treasury in Marw.?!

THE DEATH OF THE OLD WARRIOR

Once the threat to the right flank of the army was removed, Qahtabah resumed his advance westward. On 1 Muharram, 132/31 August, 749 he sent his son, Hasan, at the head of a vanguard unit to the next province of Qiamis. This was in line with his strategy of never moving with the main body of the army into a new front before testing his enemy. The annihilation of Nubatah and his army once again left Nasr b. Sayyar and his followers as Qahtabah’s main opponents. The determination of Nasr not to give in was amazing.

Nasr was an old man mourning his son, a fugitive forsaken by his senior colleague in Iraq and forgotten by his Caliph. He never laid down the sword and never lost hope. He must have known that he could not withstand an attack by Qahtabah, yet he was poised to cause trouble for Qahtabah’s vanguard. Hasan b. Qahtabah advanced on Bistam, the provincial town of Qimis.”? The city had already been captured by a small unit of the Da*wah army, commanded by Muhriz b. Ibrahim. Muhriz 21 + Kifi, VII, p. 172 (Il. 3-4); Akhbar, p. 333. 22 Yaqut, Buldan, s.v., “Bistém,” Istakhri, p. 124.

The Westward March to Victory 193 was one of the central leaders of the Da‘wah; his name appears in the lists of the seventy du ‘at and he was famous as an ardent and dedicated propagandist. After the conquest of Nishapir, Qahtabah sent him, together with a certain Abi Kamil, to establish a front post in Bayhaq. Once the news about the victory in Jurjan reached Muhriz, he left Bayhaq and captured Bistam and sent his associate, Abii Kamil, to Simnan.”4 The events that followed expose a weakness in Qahtabah’s army on the whole. The traditions of the Akhbar and Mada’ini agree, broadly speaking, with each other. The differences in details are immaterial for our discussion. According to these traditions, Abii Kamil, in accordance with what seems to be a preplanned move, deserted and, at the head of the unit under his command, joined Nasr b. Sayyar to whom he was able to give valuable information about the position of the rest of the contingent which he had left. Nasr took the initiative and attacked what must have been a small company and took its men captive. In the end, this success of Nasr came to nothing because the Da‘ wah

prisoners managed to escape from Nasr’s prison camp and brought the information to Hasan b. Qahtabah. This event is of little significance on its own, but it shows that once the Da‘wah army expanded to include a wide range of elements, it was inevitable that it would be infiltrated by traitors or

opportunists. Although the main body of the army was composed of Yamanite tribes, it was also joined by tribesmen from Mudar and these were more inclined to retain their natural tribal

allegiances and their political predisposition towards the Umayyads. A clear case of this kind was the case of Ziyad b. Zurarah of

the tribe of Qushayr (from the great Mudarite tribal group of ‘Amir b. Sa‘sa‘ah). Mada’ ini said: ““Ziyad regretted that he had followed Abi Muslim. (When Qahtabah moved towards Qtimis) Ziyad broke away from Qahtabah and took the road to Isbahan intending to join ‘Amir b. Dubarah there.” Qahtabah reacted by sending after Ziyad one of his able commanders who managed to catch up with the deserters and kill most of them.25 From this incident onwards, Qahtabah followed a policy of no mercy and

23 Akhbar, pp. 218, 279. 2A [bid., pp. 327, 331. On simnan see Yaqit, Buldan, s.v. “simnan”; Istakhri, p. 124; Ibn Khurrada dhbih, p. 23.

25 Tabari, ID, pp. 2-3.

194 Chapter 5 harsh punishment for Khurasanites who crossed the lines to the enemy camp. He also took more precautions to prevent even a small and insignificant setback such as the one which occurred in the case of Abi Kamil.

Meanwhile, the small danger of Nasr b. Sayyar was also eliminated. The old man had withdrawn to Rayy where he fell ill

and had to be carried in his bed. On hearing that Hasan b. Qahtabah was swiftly approaching Rayy, Nasr decided to withdraw to Hamadhan. In the cold weather of the early winter, his illness and his 85 years eventually broke Nasr and he died in a little town called Sawah between Rayy and Hamadhan, on 12 Rabi‘ I 131/9 November, 748.” Nasr was a rare combination of a chivalrous poet, a gallant warrior, and a man of honour. He was put into such a situation that all his personal qualities were to no avail. He was the only Statesman in the whole Empire who correctly understood the danger that the Da‘wah held for the realm, yet he could convince neither his Caliph nor the governor of Iraq to take this danger seriously. He was left to deal on his own with a problem far beyond his capacity. He suffered one setback after the other but he never lost his resolve and readiness to fight. He never contemplated surrender and, being a man of honour, he remained loyal

to the Caliph, and to the Umayyads in general, until his last breath. If one looks for symbols, there is nothing that can symbolize the end of an era and the irreversible termination of the Umayyad rule in the east, better than the death of this old warrior. Immediately after Nasr’s death, his followers scattered: one

group went to Basrah in Iraq where the tribes of Mudar were represented in large numbers, some joined the great army of ‘Amir b. Dubarah in Isfahan (Isbahan) and only a few remained with Nasr’s son, Sayyar, and played no significant role in the future events.??

26 ~=6 Tbid., p. 2; Azdi, p. 116; Baladhuri, Ansab, p. 136; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 395-396; Akhbar, p. 334; Wellhausen, p. 540 (n. 1); Ma‘arif, pp. 208209. 27 Sayyar b. Nasr and the warriors who remained with him are mentioned in the Akhbar only once more when they join a reinforcement from Syria, commanded by Malik b. Adham. Akhbar, p. 335; Tabari, loc. cit.

The Westward March to Victory 195 CONSOLIDATING THE GAINS TO THE EAST OF THE JIBAL

Although the victory in Jurjan secured the right flank of Qahtabah’s army, the province of Tabaristan to the south of the Caspian Sea could not be ignored once the army advanced on Rayy. The rugged and hilly province of Tabaristan was still not

completely subdued by Islam. It was ruled by a local Iranian prince, the /sfahbadh, who was now approached to keep at least his neutrality. Khalid b. Barmak, himself a Persian, the founder of the most famous family of viziers in Islamic history, was sent to conduct the negotiations. Khalid’s noble and priestly family background must have helped him to find a common language

with the /sfahbadh who signed an agreement that secured Tabaristan’s neutrality. The success of the negotiations no doubt, contributed to the consolidation of Khalid’s status in the front line of the Da‘wah leadership. With a unique sense of history, the traditionalist in the Akhbar commented: “This was the first event which began the movement of KhAalid’s affair” (in direction of future glory M. S.). The agreement with the /sfahbadh turned out to be far more

significant than a mere neutrality pact. The local ruler of Tabaristan recognized the supreme authority of the Da‘wah, and

this was already a great political achievement of which Abi Muslim was immediately informed.” The road to Rayy was now clear. The city, which was one of the most important crossroads in the Eastern provinces, had al-

ready been evacuated by the Umayyad troops, most of whom withdrew to Hamadhan, the capital of the Jibal. The city capitulated peacefully to Hasan b. Qahtabah, who was immediately followed by his father with the main army. By now it must have been past the middle of November. The snowy season had already begun. In this part of the world, military activity during the winter is virtually impossible. The normal traffic on the snowy roads in all four directions from Rayy almost comes to a standstill from December until March. _ Rayy was a good place for the winter halt before the final of-

fensive on Iraq and Qahtabah stayed in the city for five months

28 Akhbar, p. 333. On Khalid b. Barmak (without these details about his activity in Qahtabah‘s campaign) see W. Barthold “Barmakids”, E/: D. Sourdel, “Baramika,” E/’; Bouvat, pp. 37f; Ibn Khallikan, VI, p. 220.

196 Chapter 5 until the beginning of spring 749. During this period, he firmly established his authority in the city and its environs. “Nobody left Rayy or entered into the city without his permission.’ Now that the whole of Khurasan and the bordering provinces

on its west side were under the control of the Da‘wah, Abt Muslim decided to move his headquarters westward as well. Immediately after Qahtabah’s entry into Rayy, Abii Muslim moved to Nishapir with a large body of warriors.*° There were two aims behind Abia Muslim’s move. Firstly, he wanted to be in a position to support Qahtabah with reinforcements, especially in the case of a military setback; and secondly, he wanted to

detach the Azdite leader, ‘Ali b. al-Kirmani, from the Azddominated region of Marw — the environment of the latter’s

natural support. |

‘Ali b. al-Kirmani was nominally the head of the Da*wah after the agreement which Abi Muslim had reached with him. Outwardly, Abi Muslim continued to show the Yamanite leader

respect and, in the public prayers, he prayed behind him — an act

which amounted to Abi’ Muslim’s public recognition of Kirmani’s leadership. Secretly, however, Abi Muslim was carefully planning the elimination of “Ali b. al-Kirmani.3! Qahtabah utilized the period of his stay in Rayy to strengthen

the authority of the Da‘wah and to emphasize its responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. When he heard that criminals and Khawarij were causing anarchy in a certain region, he immediately sent a military force to suppress them. The episode allows us a glimpse into the operational structure of the Da‘wah army after the Abii Muslim’s reforms. The reader may remember that one of the main features of these reforms was the registration of the warriors in the army diwan according to their places of origins and not according to their tribal origin (as had been customary). As a result, instead of military units made up of warriors who belonged to the same tribe, the army now consisted of units made up of warriors who came from the same town or the same region.

Reporting about the expedition against the criminals and khawarij, the Akhbar says that Qahtabah decided to “send

29 Akhbar, p. 334; Tabari, UI, pp. 3-4. 30 Tabart, Ill, p. 3; Akhbar, p. 337. The number of “about 40 000 men” mentioned in the Akhbar seems very exaggerated.

31. Akhbar, p. 337.

The Westward March to Victory 197 against them Abi al-‘Awn at the head of ahl jurjan.”>? Abu al‘Awn, ‘Abd al-Malik b. Yazid belonged to the tribe of Azd and

was a native of Jurjan. During the clandestine period of the Da‘wah, he was the head of the movement in Jurjan (wa-huwa yawma idhin ra’is al-qawm)*® and one of the members of the inner circle of its leaders.44 Once the Da‘wah appeared in the open, he was apparently made the commander of the unit of the Jurjanite warriors. The unit as a whole was then sent to get rid

of the sa‘aliq and khawarij. Abi al-‘Awn and his men succeeded, “after a heavy battle, to defeat the khawarij and their al-

lies” and caused most of them to scatter and disperse among their villages and towns of origin. For unspecified reasons, some of them asked to join the army of the Da‘wah. They were accepted and were even allotted a pension like the rest of the watriors.*5

“THE ARMY OF ARMIES”

By now, the full danger of the Da‘wah was recognized by the Caliph and his governor in Iraq, and a military reinforcement commanded by Malik b. Adham was sent to join remnants of Nasr b. Sayyar’s soldiers and to try to block the advance of Qahtabah in Hamadhan. Anticipating such a move, Qahtabah sent his son, Hasan, at the head of a unit made up of warriors that came from Marw-ar-Rid that got to Hamadhan ahead of the government unit. Malik b. Adham was obliged to change direction and to fortify himself in Nihawand. Qahfabah, anxious not to allow his enemy to have a breathing space, reinforced Hasan

with some 1 300 warriors and ordered him to lay siege on Nihawand. Qahtabah himself, with the main body of the army, was now able to move towards his greatest challenge to date — the great army of ‘Amir b. Dubarah that had been stationed in Isfahan for some time. 32. The area in which the sa‘“&lig and khawarij were active was Dastabia, see

Yaqit, Buldan, s.v.; Marasid, Il, p. 526; Le Strange, Lands, p. 220; Akhbar, p. 335. 33 =: [bid., pp. 247(infra)-248.

34 [bid., pp. 219-220, 224, 240; Tabari, II, p. 1964. 35 It is impossible to verify whether they might have shared the same places of origin with Abi al-‘Awn’s men, or whether they were impressed by the Da‘wah ideology. See Akhbar, p. 335 (ll. 4-5).

198 Chapter 5 Originally, Ibn Dubarah had been sent to follow the ‘Alid rebel, “Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah, after the latter had already been defeated and escaped to Khurasan via Kirman. It was only after

the swift victories of the Da‘wah became known, that Ibn Hubayrah, the governor of Iraq, understood that he had sent a huge army against the wrong enemy, and he ordered ‘Amir Ibn Dubarah to rush back to Isfahan. This was a grave strategical mistake. ‘Amir b. Dubarah was in an excellent position to push forward from Kirm4an eastwards and to take Marw and re-establish the Umayyad government in the capital of Khurasan. This could have been a tremendous psychological blow to the Da‘wah. Abia Muslim, who had left Marw for Nishapir in Safar 131/October 748, fully understood the danger posed by Ibn Dubarah’s army in Kirman. Had Ibn

Dubarah wanted, he could have advanced from Kirman to Sijistan and invaded central Khurasan from the south-east. Abt Muslim, therefore, left Nishapir in haste and rushed back to Marw, where he was relieved to learn that his enemy had turned back north-westwardly to Isfahan.%®

During the winter months of 748-749, both Qahtabah and Ibn Dubarah made efforts to improve their positions in anticipation

of the decisive battle. While Hasan b. Qahtabah was pinning down the Umayyad reinforcement to Ibn Dubarah, Qahtabah sent a small unit to take the city of Qumm on the main road from

Rayy to Isfahan, and spend the winter there. Other small units were sent to guard the roads between Rayy and Hamadhan. Abi Muslim was later asked to send his own men to patrol the main hajj and commerce routes between Marw and the borders of Iraq and to free every single man of Qahtabah’s army for the encounter in Isfahan.?’

At the end of February 749, Qahtabah decided to resume the military initiative. The movement of armies on the routes to the west of Rayy across the mountains must still have been difficult, but there should not have been any problem with the roads to the south. Abi al-Jahm b. ‘Atiyyah, one of Abii Muslim’s right-hand ‘men in Qahtabah’s army, reviewed the troops. The tradition again emphasizes that the army was composed of units based on common localities: “the people of Nasa, Abiward, Jurjan and 36. «=: Ibid., pp. 337-338; Tabari, IL, p. 4; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 398.

37 Akhbar, pp. 338-339.

The Westward March to Victory 199 Marw-ar-Rid.’’38 Each soldier was paid in advance: the combination of material satisfaction and ideological motivation was one of the main recipes for the success of the Da‘wah military forces.*?

With his rear and right (western) flank totally secure, and with

the weather warming-up towards the middle of March 749, Qahtabah decided to march on Isfahan. On Saturday 23 Rajab 131/Wednesday 18 March 749, the two armies met on the battlefield of Jabaliq — not far from Isfahan. Ibn Dubarah’s army was completely routed and he himself was

slain. This was one of the greatest and most decisive military successes of the Da‘ wah.” Qahtabah had hitherto never encountered any large, organized

Umayyad forces as numerically strong and well-equipped as those of Ibn Dubarah. Ibn Dubarah’s army had, by its size and strength, earned the title of “‘askar al ‘asakir.’’*' It was mainly composed of warriors from Syria and the Jazirah — perhaps the best troops Marwan could have sent.” The tradition in the Akhbar describes the great anxiety concerning the outcome of the battle in Aba Muslim’s camp until the

news about the victory came. In fact, the tradition emphasizes that the battle of Jabaliq was regarded as a decisive battle by practically everybody: “Abu Muslim and the chiefs of the Hashimiyyah were full of apprehension and they impatiently awaited the news about the encounter between Qahtabah and Ibn Dubarah. They regarded it as the

decisive battle between themselves and the people of Syria. Likewise, the people of Iraq also awaited the news, saying: if Ibn Dubarah is victorious, the government will remain as it is but if Qahtabah is the victor, Banu Hashim will take over.”

Qahtabah’s letter with the news about the victory reached Abi Muslim, accompanied by Ibn Dubarah’s head. Tradition assures us that the Da‘wah leader was overcome with joy. In one verse of poetry, he described the victory as a divine reward for the pi38 Ibid., p. 339. 39 Ibid., p. 340 (1. 1). 40. Tabari, DI, pp. 4-6; Azdi, p. 116; Akhbar, pp. 343-350; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 398-399.

41 Tabari, II, p. 4 (1. 13). 42 Akhbar, pp. 341(infra)-342.

43 Ibid., p. 349.

200 Chapter 5 ety of those associated with the Da‘wah and as punishment for the impiety of their enemies. “Unto our Lord we were obedient,

But the others obeyed Him not. | Therefore, we drank the full sweet cup; And for disobedience the bitter one was their lot.”“4

The victory of the Da‘wah army at Jabaliq led to the fall of Isfahan. The next target facing Qahtabah was the capture of the second central city in the Jibal — Nihawand.* The vanguard of the Da’wah army had already arrived there from Hamadhan, under the command of Hasan b. Qahtabah. They layed siege to the town and prevented the Umayyad reinforcements, under Malik b. Adham, from joining Ibn Dubarah. Qahtabah only stayed in Isfahan for twenty days after his victory. Here, the administrative branch of the army also began to work without delay under the direction of Khalid b. Barmak, who collected the taxes and forwarded the income to Abi Muslim.“ The booty found in Ibn Dubarah’s camp was, according to the traditions, exceptionally lavish. The ‘Abbdsid account, following the line of presenting Ibn Dubarah’s army as an army of sin-

ners worthy of God’s punishment, assures us that in every house or tent the Da*wah soldiers found a wine skin. The large number of women and musical instruments also captured in the Umayyad camp complete the picture of the unholiness of Ibn Dubarah’s crowd.*” There are another two more details that should be emphasized in connection with this battle which may throw some light on the mood of the time. The first is the fact that, in part of the poetry which was naturally born as a result of the event, the battle is described, in a tribal context, as the victory of the Yaman over

44 Ibid., p. 350. 45 For parallel traditions on Qahtabah’s campaign and the battle of Jabaliq, see Maqrizi, Muqaffa, fol. 71b (ed. ‘Aql pp. 119f and the documentation

| there).

46 Kofi, VID, p. 173. 47 Tabari, III, p. 6; Akhbar, p. 346. According to the Akhbar, there were over 10 000 women in Ibn Dubarah’s camp (!) most of them were women of noble descent (Ha@a' ir), who had been kidnapped from the various towns and villages through which Ibn Dubarah’s army passed. Qahtabah freed them

all and sent them to their families. Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 11b; Ibn alAthir, V, pp. 398-399.

The Westward March to Victory 201 Mudar. Ibn Dubarah, who belonged to the Mudarite tribe of Murrah, was vanquished by Qahtabah, who belonged to the Yamanite tribe of Tay’.48 Secondly, Tabari’s main tradition about the battle presents it as the battle of Siffin re-enacted. Just like in the battle of Siffin, Qur’4ns were raised on the top of the spears, only this time, unlike in the case of Siffin, it was not the

Umayyads who raised the Holy Books but Qahtabah’s men. And, unlike the battle of Siffin when the raising of the Qur’an caused the pious adherents of ‘Ali to stop the fighting, in the case of Ibn Dubarah’s men, the raising of the Holy Books resulted in the scornful reaction of the Umayyad soldiers. Not much imagination is needed to see that the “Abbasid historian used the decisive battle of Jabaliq as an opportunity to settle an outstanding historical score.*?

COMMENCING THE FINAL MARCH

Nihawand was the last refuge of the remnants of the various Umayyad armies which had been defeated by Qahtabah in his

victorious progress. Among them were many of Nasr b. Sayyar’s men who had fled with him from Khurasan, and these must surely have included many of those who had deserted from Abi Muslim’s camp. The defense of the city was organized by Malik b. Adham of the tribe of Bahilah, who commanded the garrison there; it was made up mainly of Syrian warriors (ahl ash-sham) who had initially been sent to reinforce Ibn Dubarah but had never reached their destination. While Qahtabah moved with the main body of the army to secure his left (southern) flank and rear for the future advance on Iraq and eliminated Ibn Dubarah’s threat, his son, Hasan, besieged Nihawand to protect the rear of his father’s army. At the Same time, almost accidentally, he pinned down Ibn Adham’s Syrian troops inside the walls of Nihawand, rendering them totally immobile and militarily useless. Nihawand (Nihavand), lying some 65 kilometers south of Hamadhan, was one of the largest and most important places of

48 Tabari, III, p. 6; Akhbar, p. 348. 49 Tabari, II, p. 5; Ibn Kathir, X, p.38 (It is interesting that from a distance of over 600 years, Ibn Kathir (died 774/1373) was far less impressed by the battle than his 9th and 10th centuries predecessors).

202 Chapter 5 the Jibal since the time of the Sassanids. It had resisted the attacks of the Arabs and, only after the year 21/642, accepted the Arabs’ rule and signed a sulh agreement with them. Because it had been occupied by warriors whose base had been in Kifah,

the revenue from the city should have gone to the Kifites. However, it was allotted to the Bagrites as compensation for Dinawar, which had initially been occupied by the Basrites but allotted to the Kifites. For this reason, Nihawand was known also as Mah al-Basrah. According to the standard Arabic traditions on the Islamic conquests, the vicinity of Nihawand was the site of the decisive battle between the invading Arabs and the Persian royal army. The Arab victory was of such magnitude that the elated Arabs called it “the victory of victories” (fath al-futih). It signified the end of any meaningful Persian resistance from then on. The ancient citadel in the middle of the town and other antiquities in it, the snowy mountains around it and a special black mud which was collected on the banks of its river, captured the imagination of its Arab conquerors who surrounded its name with many legends.°° Nihawand controlled the main route to the southern provinces of Persia that branched at Hamadhan from the principal road that led to Iraq from the east. With Hamadhan already under the

control of the Da‘wah, the occupation of Nihawand meant putting Qahtabah in complete control of all the major mountain passes into Iraq. At the end of Sha*ban, 131/22 April 749, some twenty days after the occupation of Isfahan, Qahtabah moved with the main army to Nihawand and took over the siege from his son, Hasan.

Meanwhile Abi Muslim assembled a large army in Khurasan which he sent to reinforce Qahtabah. Qahtabah’s other son, Humayd, who stayed behind with Abt Muslim, was also among the commanders of this army. Now he joined his father but declined to accept the latter’s offer to take the place of his brother, Hasan, as the commander of the vanguard.*! Inside Nihawand itself, tension mounted between the permanent garrison and all the remnants of the fighters from Khurasan

50 Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 306; Yaqoit, Buldan, s.v. “Nihawand”; Maqdisi, p. 393; Marasid, Ul, pp. 1397-1398; Hamadhani, Buldan, pp. 258-260; Le Strange, Lands, pp. 196-197.

51 Akhbar, p. 351.

The Westward March to Victory 203 who had taken refuge there.52 The dispute was over the question

whether they should capitulate at once or risk being besieged, while waiting for the arrival of reinforcements from Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah. The city commandant decided to risk a siege, claiming to have received explicit instructions from Ibn Hubayrah to await reinforcements in Nihawand. According to one tradition, tension also mounted between the cavalry and the infantry in the city. The former were all for getting out of the city before the arrival of Qahtabah’s main army and breaking through Hasan’s siege. The infantry regarded this idea as a preconceived plan to abandon them. In spite of this, once Malik b. Adham resolved on risking a siege, he and his soldiers were able to put up a very strong resistance. For almost two months, Qahtabah’s besieging army was unable to come even near to breaking the city defenses. This was an unexpected delay which worried the leaders of the Da*wah. Abu Salamah, the veteran head of the clandestine Da‘wah in Kifah, urged Qahtabah to end the siege as soon as he could. Until they reached Nihawand, the Da‘wah warriors were regarded as almost invincible. The victory over Ibn Dubarah had a very deep psychological effect on Ibn Hubayrah, the governor of Iraq. During the long siege of Nihawand, Qahtabah’s psychological advantage began to wear out and Abi Salamah is said to have advised Qahtabah to offer the assurance of safety, protection and indemnity to the defenders of the city and to convince

them to evacuate it. The city had already been abandoned by most of its civilian inhabitants and the besieged soldiers were already reduced to eating carcasses. Qahtabah first appealed to the

Khurasanite soldiers in the city to join him. He offered them complete amnesty and immediate absorption into his army. His appeal was scornfully refused. When he offered the same conditions to the Syrian warriors, most of whom came from Palestine and belonged to the tribe of Lakhm, they accepted the offer but made it clear that they would not betray their Caliph and would not join the army of the Da‘wah. This stipulation was fully acceptable to Qahtabah.*

52 Tabari, II, pp. 6-7; Ma‘arif, p. 188. 53 This 1s the tradition of the Akhbar, loc. cit. Mada’ ini’s version is different

for it does not report about any contacts between Qahtabah and the Khurasanites at all. Cf., Tabari, Ill, p. 7. Cf. Ibn Kathir, ult. loc. cit.

204 Chapter 5 One must account for Qahtabah’s long delay before Nihawand by referring to another two causes. Firstly, he could not leave in his rear, the entire force of an enemy who might cut his long supply lines and his communications with Khurasan. Secondly, the month of Ramadan began during the course of the siege. It was the beginning of summer. The fast during the long and hot days of May must undoubtedly have led to some slackening in the rigorous prosecution of the siege. One must also take into consideration the fact that Qahtabah’s army was not equipped with siege machines and it took some time before he could obtain giant catapults with which to bombard the city. However, once Qahtabah obtained the catapults and set them up to bombard the town. Malik was finally convinced that he

should conclude the capitulation agreement. According to Mada’ini, the negotiations between Malik b. Adham and Qahtabah were conducted without the knowledge of the Khurasanite warriors in the city. Qahtabah, while agreeing with the governor of the city that Syrian troops be allowed to leave, was not prepared to grant aman to the Khurasanite soldiers. The

fact that Malik b. Adham agreed to these terms proves how strong the antagonism between the Syrian troops and the refugees from Khurasan was. Following upon the signing of the agreement, the gates of the city were opened on 5 Dhi al-Qa‘dah

131/26th June 749. The Syrian troops left the city for their homes in Syria and Iraq, but the Khurasanites were seized by Qahtabah’s men and were all put to death. An anonymous tradi-

tion, preserved by Tabari, summarizes this episode in the following words: “Of those who had fled from Abi Muslim and were in the fortress, not a man escaped death save for only ah/ ash-sham; the latter were set free and went on their way.’»4 From the standpoint of the Da‘wah, the Khurasanites in the

54 The episode of Nihawand is well documented and, although the reports vary in some details, the overall picture is the same. See Tabari, loc. cit., Akhbar, pp. 351f.; Baladhuri, Ansab, If, p. 137. Baladhuri refutes the report that one or several of Nasr b. Sayyar’s sons were also among those killed in Nihawand. They were all killed with Ibn Dubarah in Isfahan. See

also Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 399-400; Kafi, VIII, p. 173; Azdi, p. 116; Khalifah, II, p. 601-602; Fragmenta, p. 194; Maqrizi, Muqaffa fol. 72a, (ed. ‘Aql, pp. 130-131).

The Westward March to Victory 205 fortress were traitors and deserters to whom the rules of aman did not apply.* The fall of Nihawand opened up for Qahtabah the way to Iraq. His rear was completely protected; ‘Abbasid administration was soon organized in the conquered territories, and this in turn afforded the constant financing, equipping and provisioning of the army. INTO IRAQ: THE STRATEGY OF THE FINAL STAGES

Up to this time, the “Abbasid shi‘ah in Iraq was still an underground movement and had shown no sign of overt action; but as soon as news came through about the latest decisive victories of the Khurasanite army, this was a signal to Abia Salamah to start operations at the rear of the Umayyads in Iraq and the Jazirah. As soon as the defeat of Ibn Dubarah became generally known, Ibn Hubayrah left Kifah with the greater part of his forces and

set about organizing the defense of Iraq at Mada’in.5¢ Abi Salamah, taking advantage of the fact that Kifah and Basrah were free from the watchful eye of their governor, sent his propagandists to incite all the Bedouins who lived in the environs of these two cities to revolt. In addition to this, he also sent propagandists to Mawsil to stir up the people of the Jazirah to rebellion. The propagandists in these areas found no difficulty in convincing the various troublesome elements to revolt. Soon Iraq was in total turmoil. Local tribal leaders and adventurers raised standards of rebellion practically everywhere. A certain Misa b. as-Sari, from the southern tribe of Hamdan, rebelled in the strategic city of Hulwan, drove away its Umayyad

governor and demonstrated publicly his sympathy for the Da‘wah by raising the black banners and canvassing support for

the Prophet’s family. He even went as far as sending a small

group of warriors to control the main road to Iraq, at Khanigin.>”

55 Richard N. Frye’s argument that, in Nihawand, Qahtabah set free the Arabs and executed the mawali, cannot be correct. Qahtabah punished the warriors of ahl khurasan — a term which indicated the Arab tribesmen of Khurasan and not its local population. See Banners, p. 67, note 51.

56 Akhbar, p. 355. 57s [bid. See Yaqit, Buldan, s.v. Khaniqin and Ibn Khurradadhbih, p. 19.

206 Chapter 5 Three or four rebels, each on his own, appeared in the vicini-

ties of Kifah and Basrah, and unopposed “took control of the whole lower region of the Euphrates” (wa-akhadh as@fil al-furat kullaha). Each one of them raised the black banners and individually wrote to Qahtabah that Ibn Hubayrah had already lost the countryside and that he retained control only of the major urban centres Basrah and Kufah (lam yabqa fi yad ibn hubayrah illa al-

amsar). : The anarchy which began to prevail at Ibn Hubayrah’s rear Suited Qahtabah perfectly. To his delight, news also came from the Jazirah about an uprising in the territory of Rabi‘ah. A leader from the tribe of Taghlib (Rabi‘ah) led the rebellion in Takrit, an important town to the right of the Tigris at the meeting point between the deep valley of the Tharthar and the Tigris.

An attempt by Qahtabah to stir an uprising of two Shi‘ite Sympathizers in Basrah, proved to be premature and the rebel leaders were compelled to flee from the city.*8

Meanwhile Qahtabah proceeded with his campaign, advanc-

ing along the main road to the heart of Iraq. While still in Nihawand, he sent his son, Hasan, with the vanguard to QirmAésin (or QarmAasin, Qirmisin, Qirmashin) — an ancient im-

portant town on the main road between Hamadhan and Hulwan, that came to be known by the Persian name: KirmanShahan (today: Kirmanshah). Hasan was accompanied by the able general from Tamim, Khazim Ibn Khuzaymah, one of the veteran leaders of the clandestine Da‘wah in Khurasan. Qahtabah now advanced with the main army to Qirmasin while Hasan and Khazim moved forward to Hulwan. The advancing armies met no resistance in this area, which had already been controlled by the local rebel, Musa b. as-Sari. The latter was now incorporated, with his men, into the advancing army and was sent to capture Khanigin. By then, Ibn Hubayrah’s vanguard, commanded by ‘Ubaydallah b. ‘Abbas of Kindah, reached Baraz-ar-Rtz between Mada’in and Khaniqin. The battle in Iraq began with a setback for the Da‘wah. Misa b. as-Sari, being too sure of himself, ignored the orders to re-

main in Khanigin, and unwisely moved south-westwards against Ibn Hubayrah’s vanguard, completely unaware of the latter’s strength and, apparently, with only a small unit. He and most of his men paid for their hasty move with their lives. 58 Akhbar, pp. 355-357, for details on these events and what follows.

The Westward March to Victory 207 ‘Ubaydallah sent against them a strong contingent of some 1 000 Syrian horsemen, who virtually wiped out Misa and his men. This was the first real success of the government in over two years and even the Caliph was informed of it. The fact that Musa and his men constituted a small irregular unit which operated independently, was probably not known to Ibn Hubayrah’s com-

mander. The year 131 came to an end with Qahtabah and his army in Hulwan and his vanguard under Hasan and Khazim in Khaniqin. Ibn Hubayrah massed his army in Mada’in, and his vanguard was moving towards Jalula’ .

At this point, and quite unexpectedly, Caliph Marwan resolved to move onto the scene. Reports about the successive defeats of the government forces in the east and the swift advance

of the rebels to a position from which they could threaten the Jazirah, convinced Marwan of the severity of the military situation. In order to gain control over one of the main entrances into the Jazirah, he instructed his son, ‘Abdallah b. Marwan, the governor of the Jazirah, to establish an Umayyad position in Shahrazir. Such a position would enable him to control the road into the heart of the Jazirah from the east and south-east, and check Qahtabah if the latter decided to move northwards. It is also very likely that on a much larger scale, Marwan’s plan was to hit Qahtabah from the north simultaneously with Ibn Hubayrah’s attack from the south.

Either the Caliph or ‘Abdallah b. Marwan, acting on his father’s instructions, sent a force under ‘Uthman b. Sufyan to

capture Shahraztr. The town was fortified and situated in a fertile district on the border between the Jibal and the Jazirah. The Persians called it “Nim Rah” — “Half Way” because of its situation midway between the two fire temples in Ctesiphon and Shiz. The establishment of the government position in Shahrazir

was perceived by Qahtabah as a direct threat to his right (northern) flank. Following his strategic principal never to advance without cover, he turned first to deal with the new danger from the north. He must have thought that ‘Uthm4an’s forces were rather small; however he grasped that the Caliph’s initiative was strategically very significant because it involved the control of an area from which Qahtabah’s lines of supply and communication could be cut. He therefore sent Abi al-‘Awn ‘Abd al-Malik b. Yazid, a veteran Da‘wah leader from Jurjan

208 Chapter 5 and a foremost military commander, to abort the Umayyad move.

Abi al-"Awn was well acquainted with the area, and he moved very swiftly at the head of a relatively small unit and took position in the fortress of the “Small Eagle” (qal‘at an-nusayr),

awaiting further instructions and reinforcements. Meanwhile Qahtabah ordered ‘Amir b. Isma‘il, Abi al-‘Awn’s colleague from Jurjan, who had been busy quelling some local Khariyite rebellion near Dinawar, to join Abii al-‘Awn. The two forces met at Sinn Sumayrah and proceeded together to Shahrazir.>° Abi al-“Awn, wishing to surprise his enemy, left the main road and moved through a very difficult terrain, but when he arrived

at Shahrazir, he realized that his forces were numerically inferior to his enemy. Voices in his camp called for withdrawal, a decision which Abi al-“Awn made every effort to avoid. He was aware, however, that psychologically and morally he had a

decisive advantage over his enemy and he resolved to make good use of this advantage. On 20 Dhii al-Hijjah 131/10 August 749, and after some hesitation, he and ‘Amir, re-inforced by a local tribal leader, attacked “Uthman b. Sufyan and routed his army. Some say that “Uthm4n b. Sufyan himself was killed in the battle; the city of Shahraziir capitulated and a base was set up there for an “Abbasid garrison, which remained until the decisive campaign fought against Marwan on the Zab after the accession

of Abi al-‘Abbas to the Caliphate.©° Marwan and his son, ‘Abdallah, did not try to recover Shahrazir although Abi al‘Awn’s army constituted a threat to the Jazirah from the southeast. Nor did they try to advance further southward from the Jazirah into Iraq. Instead, Marwan decided to rally around him all the fighting men he could muster — including members of the 59: [bid., p. 358. Abii al-‘Awn’s initial force could not have numbered more than a thousand men. ‘Amir is said to have joined him with three thousand men. Later it is reported that, in the battle of the Zab, Abi al-‘Awn joined in the battle with some 4 000 men. Tabari, III, p. 9. The report about an army of 30 000 under Abd al-‘Awn’s command is a gross exaggeration. Akhbar loc. cit.; Azdi, p. 117; Kafi, VIII, p. 174. Tabari speaks later about some 5 000 soldiers to whom Abi al-‘Awn paid salaries. Tabari, III, p. 10.

On Abi al-‘Awn, see Akhbar, p. 219 (and note); Tabari, II, pp. 1964, 2001. On Qal‘at an-nusayr and Sinn Sumayrah see Yaqit, Buldan (Dar

Sadir, Beirut, 1955-1957), V, p. 285, III, p. 267. See also Ibn Khurradadhbih, p.119.

60 Akhbar, pp. 357-359; Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 137; Anonyme, Leiden, fol.

lla; Dinawari, p. 363; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 400-401; Azdi, loc. cit.; Wellhausen, p. 542.

The Westward March to Victory 209 Umayyad family themselves — and to prepare for battle in the neighbourhood of Mawsil on the Upper Zab.°®!

It is difficult to understand Marwan’s strategy in making this move, which later turned out to be a fateful and decisive one. By

not joining forces with Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah against Qahtabah, he enabled the army of the Da‘wah to inflict crushing blows separately: first on the armies of Iraq, and afterwards on those of Syria. Is it possible that he may have overestimated the

strength of the Da‘wah forces in Shahrazir? This is hard to imagine, since his spies could have given him exact information about the size of the forces at the disposal of Abit al-‘Awn. It may be that he intended to organize, calmly and at leisure, the

defense of his strongholds in the Jazirah. He hoped that Ibn Hubayrah would finally succeed in checking Qahtabah, or at least in wearing down his forces by a protracted campaign, whereupon he (Marwan) would be able to appear and deliver the

decisive blow. Ibn Hubayrah must have had a similar idea in mind when, in the last days of the year 131/August 749, he collected all his troops together and set out to block Qahtabah’s march westward from Hulwan. He also hoped that he would manage to draw the Da*wah commander into a lengthy and selfdestructive war, fought from fortified positions. As the Akhbar

puts it, “he thought that the war would last a long time” (wazanna an al-harb satatil). TWO LETTERS

It is clear that both the Caliph and Ibn Hubayrah understood at last the gravity of their situation. There were, however, differences of opinion as to the strategy that should be followed for Checking Qahtabah. In a long and unique report the Akhbar describes these differences of opinion which enable us to arrive at a better evaluation of the causes which led to the Umayyad military disaster. Ibn Hubayrah wished to draw Qahtabah into a protracted campaign by making an intensive usage of major fortresses. Not ruling out a possibility that the enemy may break into the heart of Iraq, he prepared Wasit, the major Umayyad fortress in the province, for a long siege. As it turned out, he was not wrong. Wasit held out against the ‘Abbasids long after 61 Tabari, III, p. 10; Azdi, pp. 117, 126; Anonyme, Leiden, loc. cit.

210 Chapter 5 the final collapse of the Umayyads, and its eventual capitulation was due to an agreement which the “Abbasid Mansur seems to have kept not much longer than the time it took for the ink on the

agreement to dry. , Marwan was not very happy with Ibn Hubayrah’s strategy.

The Caliph was a veteran soldier and seems to have read Qahtabah’s tactics well. He was all for a perpetual attack on the

enemy’s advancing forces. He made himself clear in a letter which he wrote to Ibn Hubayrah. The letter and Ibn Hubayrah’s reply even if they represent historian reconstructions are documents of utmost importance for understanding the mood of the time 1n which the final stages of the revolution took place.

At that moment in time, the Caliph was very apprehensive about the defense of Iraq. It was fully clear to him that this defense would have to rely mainly on the warriors of ahl ashsham. He sent, therefore, a reinforcement of “a huge number of ahl ash-sham commanded by Hawtharah b. Sahl (or, Suhayl)

from the tribe of Bahilah, who arrived at Iraq when Ibn Hubayrah was busy preparing Wasit for a long siege. In his long letter which followed, Marwan wrote: “Amir almu’ minin nominated you to the position of governor of Iraq because of the expectations which he had concerning your compe-

tence. You have disappointed him in many ways, notably by being slack in assisting the loyalists (ahl at-ta‘ah) in Khurasan who had cried for your help until they weakened and their enemy got the upper hand over them. You also prepared yourself for the siege long before there was any need for such preparations. By so doing, you put fear into the hearts of your men and made it easy for them to expect defeats. For the stage of siege comes only after a protracted combat and long battle.” The Caliph goes on to point out that Ibn Hubayrah refrained from killing the members of the Muhallab family in reaction to the abortive rebellion in Basrah of two members of the Muhallab family, Sufyan b. Mu’awiyah b. Yazid b. Muhallab and Rawh b. Hatim al-Muhallabi. Marwan also accused his governor for not purging the army of those elements whose loyalty was questionable, and not “cutting the tongues of these men from ahl ashsham that speak about matters detestable to amir al-muw’ minin,”

and that he distributed the state treasury money among his friends in Qinnasrin. “By God, O Yazid,” the Caliph continued, “amir al-mu’ minin has turned a blind eye, now and before, to

many cases in which you have contradicted his opinion.”

The Westward March to Victory 211 Marwan, however, finished his letter on conciliatory terms urg-

ing Yazid to rally around himself the fugitives of Ibn Dubarah’s army and, with the re-enforcement of Hawtharah, to open an offensive and meet his enemy in the open. Ibn Hubayrah’s reply to the Caliph’s letter is no less instructive. He wrote that he understood very well the meaning behind the Caliph’s letter, but that he did not in any time think of contradicting the ruler or diverting himself from the path of truth and decisiveness. As for the accusations of Marwan that he had in-

tentionally withdrawn help from the loyalists in Khurasan, Yazid said that being occupied with the problems in Iraq, it was impossible for him to set aside forces for Khurasan. “A mir almw’ minin knows that when J arrived in Iraq the province was in a state of general war, therefore the most important thing for me then was to attend to that which was in my proximity. I had to use all the soldiers of ahl ash-sham one time after the other to fight the Kharijites and then to fight (‘Abdallah) b. Mu‘awiyah, and then send them against Sulayman b. Habib. I intentionally refrained from re-inforcing myself with the people of Iraq, since amir al-mu’ minin knows very well the extent of their deceit as far as amir al-mw’ minin himself and his rule are concerned. Had

I sent them to Khurasan to help those who cried for help, I would not have been confident that they would not have joined, instead, amir al-mu’ minin‘s enemies, and in such case I could

have been accused of bad judgment.” As for his premature preparation for a siege, Yazid points out that in comparison to the power of his enemy, he felt that his warriors were weaker, not motivated and lacked determination (da‘ufat niyyatuhum fi-

jihad ‘aduwwihim) and therefore he took the precaution of preparing for a siege. A preparation of this kind is very useful in case of need and there is no harm in it otherwise. “I spared the

family of Muhallab my sword because they occupy a very important position among the tribes of the Yaman, and I thought that it would be unwise to agitate them. I was not at all sure that, had I done so (kill the Muhallabids), I would not have found myself facing a coalition of the people of Iraq and ahl ash-sham that were with me ... I also refrained from being harsh on ahl ash-sham, in spite of their bad behaviour, because I saw that the bad behaviour was a general feature among them, and I did not want to punish them all, for they are my only power against my enemy. (In case of a harsh reaction against them) they could turn their enmity against me in addition to that of my already existing

212 Chapter 5 enemies.” Ibn Hubayrah then addresses a rhetorical question of great significance for the evaluation of Marwan’s personality. “Isn’t it possible” he said, “that the exaggeration of amir almu’ minin in his punishments and disciplinary measures, turned the hearts of his subjects against him and induced them to withdraw their support from him?” After answering the rest of the Caliph’s accusations, Yazid again repeats, this time affirmatively, the idea that the Caliph is his own worst enemy for he is suspicious of each and every one of his aids, “‘and I think that there is nobody of these aids and the rest of the Caliph’s subjects who is not disturbed by the (Caliph’s) behaviour and afraid of the Caliph’s wrath and heavy hand.” The letters, even as a historian’s reconstruction, shed light on the human side of the last days of the Umayyads. Instead of a charismatic statesman, the Umayyads were led in that crucial moment by a rough soldier who demanded military discipline where fatherly leadership was needed. In general, the letters attest to a situation of complete instability and turmoil especially among the ranks of the hitherto loyal Syrian army and a confidence crisis between the Caliph and his governor in the key

province of Iraq. THE FALL OF IRAQ

From Hulwan to the heart of Iraq, the long route, known as the

Hajj route, passes through Qasr Shirin, Khaniqin, Jalula’, Daskarah, Nahrawan Bridge (later Baghdad) and Mada’in. At this point, the road branches off northward to the Jazirah and southward to Kiifah, Basrah and Wasit. Ibn Hubayrah assumed that Qahtabah would advance into the interior of Iraq by this route, which was the easiest and most convenient for the movement of a large army. Therefore he rallied together all the troops at his disposal and advanced by the same route to Jalila’, where fortified positions and trenches still existed from the days of the Sassanids. He renovated these fortifications and prepared to defend the route both in Jalila’ and at Daskarah.

62 Akhbar, pp. 360-362 (for the letters), and p. 363. See also Tabari, Il, p. 13 (for Marwan‘s reinforcement), and p. 22 (for the abortive rebellion of the Muhallabids). Cf. Elad, “Wasit”

The Westward March to Victory 213 Meanwhile Qahtabah’s forces arrived at Khanigqin, whence

they could reconnoiter the movements of Ibn Hubayrah’s army.®3 Qahtabah perceived Ibn Hubayrah’s intentions. Furthermore, he undoubtedly understood his enemy’s sudden simulated retreat from Jalila’ to Daskarah as an attempt to lure him into a trap. He did not act according to his opponent’s expectations. Instead, he planned a rapid march, which would bring him to Ibn Hubayrah’s rear in the very heart of Iraq. According to the detailed account in the Akhbar, it was Abi Salamah, who advised Qahtabah not to risk a premature and un-

necessary battle with Ibn Hubayrah. In a letter which Abu Salamah is said to have sent to the general, the Kifite leader of the Da‘wah wrote: “Ibn Hubayrah has massed a huge army in Jalala’, and though I am sure that God will bestow success on our Da‘wah, I think, however, that you should avoid the army of Ibn Hubayrah altogether and hurry up to Kifah, for the people of Kifah as a whole are in agreement with you, and they all share in their hatred of the Umayyads ... Cross, therefore, the rivers which are between you and Kifah and race into the city

before Ibn Hubayrah. For, if Kifah falls into our hands, we shall surely have the upper hand over him, and we shall be joined by many who would wish to fight him with us.’ It is very probable that, at this advanced stage of his campaign, Qahtabah kept close contacts with Abi Salamah, the veteran and venerated leader in Kifah. Whether his strategic moves were influenced by Aba Salamah or not is immaterial. At any

rate, Qahtabah had no intention whatsoever of letting Ibn Hubayrah take the initiative in dictating the subsequent stages of

the war. He could not miss the opportunity offered to him by Ibn Hubayrah’s decision to concentrate most of his fighting force in fortifications far away from Kifah. The appearance of the Da‘wah army in the capital at the rear of Ibn Hubayrah could be decisive: it would certainly give the Da‘wah a great strategic and psychological advantage.

— “Does anybody know a route that will bring us to Kifah

without our having to encounter Ibn Hubayrah?” asked Qahtabah. An inhabitant of Hamadhan from the tribe of Tamim, who was very well acquainted with the area, said that he knew

63 Tabart, Il, p. 12; Azdi, loc. cit.; Akhbar, pp. 364-365; Ibn al-Athir, V, p. 401.

64 Akhbar, pp. 363-364.

214 Chapter 5 an alternative way to Kifah which avoided the main route.® Ibn Hubayrah expected Qahtabah to follow this main route, which would oblige the Da‘wah general to pass through Jalila’, where

Ibn Hubayrah was well-fortified and fully prepared for a decisive battle. It may be added that both sides had been operating a tight net of intelligence. Ibn Hubayrah, who was on the defense, was desperate to learn about Qahfabah’s intentions and future moves. The latter used his own intelligence service to feed his adversary with false information, and much of the success of the final and decisive stage of Qahtabah’s campaign was due to the fact that he won first the disinformation war. When Qahtabah realized the possibility of circumventing Ibn

Hubayrah from the north by avoiding the main highway, he planned his operation. He first announced his intention of mak-

ing for Mada’in (ancient Ctesiphon), thereby confusing Ibn Hubayrah and forcing him to allocate some troops for the defense of this city. Meanwhile, he made preparations to ford the Tamarra Canal (the southern part of the Great Qarul Canal, near the little town of Bajisra).© Ibn Hubayrah’s spies, who brought

him news of this, convinced him that Qahtabah was indeed intending to make for Mada’in and he therefore hastily retired from Jalila’ to Daskarah. Qahtabah sent the greater number of his troops across the Tamarra Canal; with those he had left, he swiftly raided and plundered Ibn Hubayrah’s abandoned camp at

Jalila’ and whatever booty he could not carry away, he destroyed by fire.®’

In the meantime his main forces had crossed the Tamarra

Canal and were massed on the Tigris, near the village of Awana,

south of ‘Ukbara. His “Corps of Engineers,” from the town of Hamadhan,*®* crossed the Tigris and quickly made ready a number of boats and pontoons, south of Awana. Qahtabah himself crossed the Tigris there and began to advance rapidly towards Anbar on the left bank of the Euphrates, so as to cover the

difficult terrain between the two rivers as quickly as possible.

28 1a. .

65 Tabari, II, p. 12; Kafi, VIL, p. 175; Azdi, p. 118. 66 Le Strange, Lands, p. 59; Marasid, I, p.14; Akhbar, p. 365; Anonyme, fol.

67 Akhbar, p. 366.

68 By mistake, they are referred to in the Akhbar as “Hamdaniyyln” instead of ‘“Hamadhaniy yun.” The same mistake was made in the name of the city which was spelt “Hamdan” (which is the name of the great southern tribe) instead of “Hamadhan,” Akhbar, pp. 335, 366.

The Westward March to Victory 215 This area was divided by the Dujayl Canal which, at that period, still joined the Euphrates and the Tigris and ran from Anbar to the site on which the city of Baghdad was later built. Only now did Ibn Hubayrah understand that Qahtabah had fooled him and

was not making for Mada’in but for Kifah. While Qahtabah was already advancing at a rapid rate, Ibn Hubayrah was forced to move more slowly with his large army, all the more so since he still did not know just what his opponent’s ultimate destination was and therefore kept rushing his forces from one place to

the other according to the various rumours spread around by Qahtabah. Instead of advancing with the main army to Anbar, Qahtabah sent the famous commander, Khazim b. Khuzaymah, there. Khazim occupied the city and killed the Umayyad governor. He then collected together as many boats as he could find and floated them down the Euphrates to Dimimma which lies south of Anbar. Qahtabah advanced at great speed to Dimimma, where he immediately used these boats to cross the Euphrates on Sth Muharram 132/25th August 749.7° He was now Safe in the dry region west of the Euphrates and could advance southward towards Kutfah without any difficulty.

Only after Qahtabah had already crossed the Euphrates did Ibn Hubayrah succeed in reaching the river from the eastern side. He moved southward to a place which was known as

“Fam al-Furat” or “Fam al-Fallijah” — the “Mouth of the Euphrates” — where the river branches into the two streams which disappear about a hundred kilometres further south in the

great marshes which extend between Kifah and Basrah. The 69 Ibid., p. 366; Le Strange, Lands, p. 51. The canal ceased to exist as a link between the two great rivers at the beginning of the 4th/10th century, when its western part had become silted up.

70 Akhbar, pp. 366-367; Dinawari, p. 366; According to Azdi, Qahtabah crossed the Euphrates on 8 Muharram/28 August. Azdi’s account is quoted from a man who had himself participated in Qahtabah’s campaign. The man describes the difficulties encountered by the army that had to cover

long distances in the hottest part of the summer. Azdi, p. 118; see also Tabari, II, pp. 12-13; Kufi, pp. 175-176; Anonyme, fol. 281b. According to Kafi and Tabari, some of Ibn Hubayrah’s men suggested to him to stop following Qahtabah and attack Khurasan instead. Ibn Hubayrah tumed the

suggestion down saying that an attack on Khurasan would not force Qahtabah to change his plans to conquer Kifah. Besides, Ab0 Muslim, at the head of a large army, was able to defend Khurasan. On Qahtabah’s campaign, see also, ‘Jqd, I, p. 299; (1944 edition, IV, pp. 480-481); Ibn al-

Athir, V, pp. 401f. -

216 Chapter 5 area between the two streams of the Euphrates is called “Ard alFallijah.’”!

The city of Kifah was situated on the western stream of the Euphrates. The eastern stream (today the main course of the river) was called Nahr Sara or Nahr Saran. From the northern part of Nahr Stra, at the point where it branches off the main river at Fam al-Furat, a canal began which, after flowing in a semicircular course, poured back into the eastern stream of the Euphrates. That was the Sira Canal. Half way along the canal, Ibn Hubayrah started (but never completed) to build a town which he called Qasr Ibn Hubayrah after himself. The new town lay on the main caravan route to Kifah which crossed the Sura Canal on a pontoon bridge. When Ibn Hubayrah saw that Qahtabah was continuing to advance southward along the west bank of the western branch of the Euphrates (the branch on which Kifah stands), he crossed over to the Fallijah area (between the two streams) and moved southward on the east bank parallel to Qahtabah. Only the wide stream separated the two armies. Ibn Hubayrah sent an advance party under the command of Hawtharah b. Suhayl al-Bahili

ahead to Kifah. Qahtabah decided to join battle with Ibn Hubayrah’s main force about the 10th Muharram 132/29 August 749. While advancing southward, he looked for a shallow place to ford the Euphrates. A tribal legend of Tay’, Qahtabah’s tribe, relates that at the right moment the general met a bedouin from his own tribe of Tay’, who showed him the nearest ford. When it appeared to Qahtabah that he had found the right place not far from Fam al-Falliijah, he crossed the Euphrates and mounted a

surprise attack on Ibn Hubayrah’s camp on the night of 8 Muharram 132/27 August 749, and inflicted a crushing defeat on him. Ibn Hubayrah was forced to withdraw to the eastern side of

the Sira stream, not far from the place where the Nil Canal branches off from it, and retreated to the city of WaAsit. Hawtharah, who had been sent to Kifah, did not continue his march after the defeat of Ibn Hubayrah but linked up with the latter’s retreating forces on the Nil Canal.’ Two days after the

71 Marasid, Tl, p. 1043; Le Strange, Lands, pp. 70, 74. 72 Onthe Nil Canal see ibid., pp. 72f. The description of the battle is highly confused in Tabari’s traditions. Tabari, II, pp. 13-18. For a short and clear description see Azdi, p. 119 and Kafi, VIII, p. 176; Akhbar, pp. 369-370; Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 137; Ibn Khaldin, ‘Jbar, Il,p. 127.

The Westward March to Victory 217 battle, on 10 Muharram 132/29 August 749, Kifah opened its gates to the ‘Abbasid forces and surrendered without resistance.” Qahtabah did not live to see the capture of Kifah. He fell fighting in mysterious circumstances. Apparently, during the crossing of the river, he had an accident and was drowned in the Euphrates.” His place as commander of the Da‘wah forces was taken by his son, Hasan, who had commanded his father’s vanguard during the whole course of the campaign.” Qahtabah’s contribution to the victory of the “Abbasids was decisive. On the battlefield, he showed himself to be a genius in Strategy, gifted with uncommon imagination and courage. The rare combination of Abu Muslim’s political and administrative talents and of Qahtabah’s military ability, constituted the most important factors in bringing about the rapid and brilliant victory of the militant Da‘wah at the most crucial period of its development as a revolutionary movement.” KUFAH: SURFACING OF LOCAL ACTIVISTS

The conquest of Kifah was facilitated by a rebellion in which the black banners of the Da‘wah were raised in the city under the leadership of Muhammad b. Khalid b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri. Muhammad b. Khalid was one of the leaders of the rebellion against Caliph Walid Il, whom Muhammad, and the Yaman tribes in general, held responsible for the cruel death of Khalid b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri. In this rebellion, Muhammad was in actual fact the leader of the Yaman tribes. When Walid II was 73 Wellhausen, pp. 541-542, prefers the later date of 14 Muharram/2 September. See for details Akhbar, pp. 369-372 (The legend about the man from Tay’, p. 369); Tabari, III, pp. 12-18. Mada’ini’s account (pp. 13-14) has more details about the Bedouin from Tay’. According to this tradition the A ‘rab was of course from Band Nabhan, Qahtabah‘s clan; Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 138; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 403f.

714 Akhbar, pp. 370-371; Dinawari, p. 367; For the various accounts on Qahtabah’s death see Tabari, III, pp. 14-18. See also Azdi, loc. cit.: Wellhausen, p. 542. 75 According to one tradition Humayd b. Qahtabah was the first to be nominated to replace his father, Akhbar, p. 371; Tabari, III, pp. 15-17; Azadi, loc. cit.

76 Cf., Wellhausen, p. 542 and the introduction to this volume; Sharon, "Kahtabah," EJ (New Edition).

218 Chapter 5 killed and Yazid III seized power, Muhammad acquired a very respectable and influential position in Syria and became one of the central political figures in the province. This position, however, he only enjoyed for a short while. When Yazid III, who followed a pro-Yamanite policy, died (126/744), the new Caliph Marwan II re-instituted a pro-Qays policy. Muhammad was compelled to escape to Kifah and live there in hiding for over four years in the home of a relative from the tribe of Bajilah.”” The scene in Kifah had already been prepared long before Aba Salamah had received a letter from Qahtabah, which the ‘Abbasid general sent immediately after the revolutionary army had crossed the Euphrates at the final stage of its advance on Kifah. Abi Salamah then approached Kh§alid and said: “You

have been hoping for this day, and you have lived to see it. Reveal therefore, the black colours!’’”®

Yaman tribesmen from Kifah and its environs, who had deserted from the Umayyad army, joined the rebel and augmented

his strength.7? Khalid and his family were united with the ‘Abbasids not only by their common hatred of the Umayyads

but also by ties of friendship which had existed for many years.8° Muhammad b. Khalid had been initiated into the secrets of the Da‘wah at a certain point and, when he decided to stage his revolt in Kifah, he saw to it that he planned it and carried it out in close consultation with Abi Salamah.*! The timing of the

revolt was not fixed haphazardly; it broke out either shortly

before Qahtabah’s battle against Ibn Hubayrah or else immediately after the battle, but before the full details of its result had reached Kufah.*

The aim of Muhammad b. Khalid’s rebellion was to prevent Ibn Hubayrah from returning to Kifah and this he succeeded in attaining. Ziyad b. Salih, who was Ibn Hubayrah’s deputy in

77 Dinawari, pp. 348-350; Tabari, II, pp. 18f.

78 Akhbar, p. 367. 79 Abo Mikhnaf in Tabari, III, p. 19. Cf., Dinawari, p. 365. 80 According to Baladhuri’s tradition, Khalid was very generous to Dawud b. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas and to some of the latter’s brothers. He also used to send money to the /mam Muhammad. Baladhuri, Ansab, III, pp. 81, 87. Cf., Dinawarl, pp. 345-346. On the bitter reaction of the Yaman tribes in Syria to Khalid’s execution, see Tabarl, II, pp. 1775, 1816, 1819. 81 Tabari, I, pp. 19-20; Akhbar, p. 367; Azdi, p. 119. g2 According to the Akhbar, the rebellion broke out on 6 Muharram 132. Akhbar, p. 368; see also Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 138.

The Westward March to Victory 219 Kifah, was forced to flee from the city and to abandon the governor’s residence to the rebels, together with its offices and treasury. Kifah — the capital city and throbbing heart of Iraq and the first and most important centre of the Da*wah — was thus presented to the ‘Abbasids on a silver platter. Perhaps more than any other event, the fall of the capital city of Iraq betokened the fall of the Umayyads. From that moment on, the final liquidation of their rule was only a matter of time — and a short time at that.

Once Kifah was captured, the Da‘wah forces came under the

sphere of Aba Salamah’s authority. For reasons of prudence, Aba Salamah remained underground until the actual capture of the city and did not reveal his identity in public until Hasan b. Qahtabah and the chief commanders of the Khurasanite army were standing at the door of his house. Mada’ini’s tradition, which describes the episode of the Da‘wah army’s entry into

Kifah, stresses the honourable position occupied by Abi Salamah in the administrative cadre of the Da‘wah and the respect paid to him by the Khurasanite leaders: “Hasan b. Qahtabah came to Ktfah — together with his followers, all clothed in black. They asked about Abi Salamah, wazir al muhammad. They showed them his house and he came

out to them. They offered him one of Hasan b. Qahtabah’s horses, and he rode on it until he stood at Jabbanat as-Sabi‘ (in Kufah). The Khurasanites swore allegiance to him and so did the others. After this, Abii Salamah sent Hasan b. Qahtabah against Ibn Hubayrah, who had marched to Wasit.’’83 From this tradition, it is clear that the Khurasanites had an address in Kifah, to which they were to hand over the leadership of their subsequent activities, upon their arrival in the city. This address was none other than Abi Salamah. Mada’ini relates that Qahtabah used to tell his men: “When you reach Kifah, (you must remember that) the wazir of the Imam is Abi Salamah, to whom you are to entrust the leadership (of your affairs).’84 For

the Khurasanites, as soon as they left the sphere of Abia Muslim’s authority in Khurasan (he was amin (or amir) al muhammad), the title “wazir 4l muhammad’ represented the next highest authority in the Da‘wah. They recognized no higher authority than that of Abii Salamah and there was no question but that all of them — from the rank and file to the senior officers —

83 Baladhuri, loc. cit., Tabari, III, p. 20.

84 Tabari, III, p. 16.

220 Chapter 5 | would place themselves at his disposal and accept his leadership.85 It was he who, as the /ma@m’s representative, had received the bay‘ah (oath of allegiance) of the whole army and, from this time on, he determined the future course of the military operations. He had the power to appoint commanders at his own discretion and he actually issued operational instructions to the

supreme commander of the army.®* The greater part of the

Khurasanite army left Kifah and pitched camp nearby at Hammam A‘yan. Abi Salamah also left the city and set up his headquarters at the same place.*”? He immediately assumed the authority of government in the conquered territories, to which he sent governors of his own choice and established garrisons in the central strongholds in Iraq and Ahwaz. During the period which preceded the coronation of Abi al‘Abbas as the first “Abbasid caliph, Aba Salamah wielded unlimited authority. He was known in the army by his titles “amir” and “wazir al muhammad,” the administrative echelon of the army came under his direct purview and “despatches went forth in his name and were addressed to him.’’®* In order to give his image greater prestige, he appeared in public wearing weapons though he did not adorn himself with any special garments. He set up his own court inside the camp as Abi Muslim had done in Khurasan and his kitchen supplied a midday and an evening meal.8? There is no question that, in the eyes of the soldiers, he represented the /mam, the leader for whose sake they made the long march from Khuras4n in order to crown him as their amir al-mwu’ minin.

But in that decisive hour — at the moment of victory — there

was nobody to crown. Ibrahim the /mam was not present in Kifah; he seems indeed not to have been alive. Nor was there any other member of the “Abbasid family in Kifah who unquesg5 Kifi relates that when Hasan b. Qahtabah first saw Aba Salamah, he rushed to him “kissed his hands and made Ab? Salamah take his own seat. He then said: ‘O wazir, the amir Abt Muslim ordered us to obey you, what do you order us to do?’ ” Kofi, VII, p. 177; cf., Ma‘arif, p. 188. 86 According to Mada’ini, Aba Salamah attached to Hasan b. Qahtabah six-

| teen commanders, some of whom were veteran Khurasanite military leaders. The source indicates very clearly that their special nomination was issued by Abd Salamah. Tabari, Il, pp. 20-21; Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 138.

87. Jahshiyari, pp. 85-86. Hammam A‘yan is said to be called after A‘yan a mawla of Sa‘d b. Aba Wagas, Yaqat, Buldan, s. v.; Marasid, I, p. 423.

gs lbid., Tabari, I, p. 21. 89 Jahshiy ari, loc. cit.

The Westward March to Victory 221 tionably possessed Ibrahim’s authority. Abii Salamah had no definite information about the Jmam’s fate nor about that of his successors to the leadership.”

90 This explains Jahshiyari’s tradition which says that immediately after the conquest of Kifah, Abi Salamah announced the Hashimite imamah but did not mention the name of any specific leader. Jahshiyari, p. 84.

VI

THE MOMENT OF VICTORY: DEATH OF THE IMAM AND THE LEGITIMACY OF ‘ABBASID RULE

The Moment of Victory 225 6 MURDER OR NATURAL DEATH?

Where was Ibrahim, the Jmam, during this decisive period when the battle for Iraq took place? From the traditions we learn that

shortly before the invasion of Iraq by the Khurasanite army,

Caliph Marwan II had arrested Ibrahim, brought him to Damascus, and later taken him to Harran, where he died. Ibrahim’s death occurred in the month of Muharram 132/ August-September 749, i.e. at the very time of the decisive battle

between Qahtabah and Ibn Hubayrah, after which Kifah was taken.! A large variety of traditions claim to record the causes and cir-

cumstances of [brahim’s imprisonment. It was necessary to explain how Marwan II had discovered the identity of the Jmam, in

spite of the stringent precautionary measures taken by the Da‘wah. Tabari relates that correspondence between Ibrahim and Abii Muslim was discovered by Marwan’s men, whereupon Marwan ordered his commissioner in Balq4a’ to arrest [brahim

and to bring him into his presence.? According to Azdi’s account, [brahim was imprisoned by Marwan twice: the first time in 129, but he was released after a short period, and the second time after the pilgrimage of 131.3 Other traditions favourable to

the “Abbasids but clearly opposed to the Shi‘ah, accuse ‘Abdallah b. Hasan b. Hasan b. ‘Ali b. Aba Talib of having revealed [brahim’s identity to Marwan and thus having brought about his arrest. There is a very good reason to suspect that this particular tradition was invented at the orders of Caliph Abi

Ja‘far al Mansdr during the course of the Hasanid revolt of Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah (an-nafs az-zakiyyah). It represents the efforts of the ‘Abbasid court propaganda to disqualify the ‘Alids

1 Akhbar, p. 396. Other traditions in the Akhbar (pp. 357, 363) relate that Marwan arrested Ibrahim just before Qahtabah decided to avoid the encounter with Ibn Hubayrah in Jalila’, namely at the end of 131 or the beginning of 132. Azdi states that Ibrahim was arrested after the hajj of 131 which could well be Muharram 132. Cf, Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 121. Kafi’s

tradition, however, insists that Ibrahim was still alive when Abd al‘Abbas was crowned Caliph in Rabi‘ I, 132. Kafi, VII, p. 180 (supra).

2 Tabari, I, p. 1974; I, p. 25 (Il. 5-7); Akhbar, pp. 389-391; Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 7a.

3 Azdi, pp. 107, 118 and especially p. 120.

226 Chapter 6 in general, and the Hasanids in particular.4 Another tradition relates that a tribesman from Tamim, who had fled from his tribe on account of a murder and had joined the Da‘wah, had revealed the secret to Marwan.° Yet another tradition tells us that Marwan sent one of his spies, who joined the Da‘wah in Khurasan, and would not rest until he had discovered the Jmam’s identity.® If anything at all can be learned from these traditions, it is that the circumstances of Ibrahim’s imprisonment — if indeed the word “imprisonment” applies to the case — were far from clear. Just as the circumstances of his imprisonment were a subject for speculation and the fabrication of traditions, which tended to settle ac-.

counts with the ‘Alids or with the tribe of Tamim, so also the circumstances of his death were a fertile field for the creation of various traditions. One relates that Marwan ordered that [brahim be suffocated by having his head thrust into a sack of lime (fi jirab nirah).’ A variation on this turns the bag of lime into a heavy velvet garment with which Marwan used to cover the faces of his opponents and choke them to death.’ According to another account, Marwan poisoned Ibrahim by means of drugged milk. The story of the poisoning contains all the necessary melodramatic elements befitting the encounter between the unscrupulous, cunning Umayyad and the virtuous Jmam. “When Marwan heard about Ibn Hubayrah’s defeat, he schemed to have a vessel with poisoned milk served to Ibrahim. The jailer gave him the milk and on drinking it he immediately felt the poison and understood that he was being assassinated. Turning to the jailer he said: “You have gotten your way in the end.’ Then he asked for his wife Lubabah the daughter of Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. “Abdallah b. Ja‘far b. Abu Talib to be brought to him and his wish was granted. Lubabah said: “The whole night he writhed with pain holding my

4 Akhbar, pp. 387-389, 390, 393-394; Anonyme, fol. 284b. ‘Abdallah b. Hasan was the driving force behind the revolt of his son Muhammad (annafs az-zakiyyah) against Caliph Mansdir which tums him into a natural suspect in Ibrahim’s affair. One report in the Akhbar relates that “when Abi Ja‘far arrested ‘Abdallah b. Hasan he said to him: ‘you killed my brother’.” /bid. p. 395 (Il. 9-10).

5 Akhbar, pp. 389-390; Anonyme, fols. 285a-285b. 6 Akhbar, loc. cit. For a variation on this tradition, see Baladhuri, op. cit., . 121. 7 Akhbar. pp. 392-396; Anonyme, fol. 286a; ‘Iqd, II, p. 298 (1944 ed.) IV, p. 480.

The Moment of Victory 227 hand to his heart. He died that night. The jailer informed Caliph Marwan of his death and the Caliph ordered the body to be washed and that a qadi be present when the ritual washing took place. This

was done, and Ibrahim was washed with the chains still on him. The chains where taken off his feet only after the washing of his body.”?

‘Ali b. ‘Isa b. Misa related, according to another tradition, that Marwan killed Ibrahim by causing a house to collapse upon him.?° It is not difficult to rmagine the source from which ‘Ali b.

‘Isa b. Misa drew this story, since he must have heard the already current report in his days that Mansur had killed his own uncle ‘Abdallah b. “Ali by this very method.!! All of these traditions (the details of which are of little value for this discussion) vie with one another in the degree of cruelty which they attribute

to Marwan with regard to the actual execution of Ibrahim. But there are other traditions which do not speak of Ibrahim’s murder at all. One tradition, originating inside the ‘Abbasid family

and transmitted by Balj b. Zakariyyah, a mawla of Raytah, mother of Abi al-‘Abbas as-Saffah, begins by reporting that it was “Ali b. “Abdallah b. Hasan who volunteered the information

about Ibrahim to Marwan. The tradition continues to say that Ibrahim died in Marwan’s prison twenty days after his arrival there, but the tradition certainly does not suggest murder.!” Tabari sums up the whole matter in one sentence: “ikhtalafa ahl as-Styar fi amr Ibrahim b. Muhammad fa-qala ba‘duhum lam yugtal wa-lakinnahu mata fi sijn Marwan bi-at-ta‘in.” — “The historians differ in their opinions regarding the case of Ibrahim b. Muhammad; there are some of them who say that he was not slain but died in the plague in MarwAan’s prison.”!3 We learn from a tradition of Azdi about a plague (1@‘iin) which broke out in the year 131 in Basrah, and there is no reason why it may not have spread to other parts of Iraq and the Jazirah by 132.'4 8 Akhbar, p. 397; Azdi, p. 121. 9 Akhbar, p. 396; Tabari, III, p. 44. 10 Akhbar, p. 397 (supra); the same tradition appears in Tabari, III, p. 43. Additional traditions see Baladhuri, vol. cit., pp. 121(infra)-122.

11 Tabari, II, p. 330; Lassner, Shaping, pp. 40f. 12 In the language of the account: “‘He remained in prison about twenty days and died.” Akhbar, p. 395 (supra).

13 Tabari, III, pp. 42-43. 14 Azdi, p. 118. Plagues in the large cities were very common in the Middle Ages. Syria was particularly notorious for its frequent plagues and was

228 Chapter 6 We would not have discussed this matter of Ibrahim’s imprisonment and death were it not for the many conclusions that might be drawn from it concerning important problems connected with the accession of the “Abbasids. Among these problems one may mention the issue of Ibrahim’s own inheritance, the question of Abii Salamah’s behaviour in Kufah — he was accused of having, at the last moment, betrayed the ‘Abbasid cause

and of scheming to place an ‘Alid leader on the throne of the Caliphs!5 — the question whether the right to rule was hereditary

in the ‘Abbasid family after Saffah, and lastly, the question of the relations between the “Abbasids and the “Alids, especially the members of Hasan’s family. All these questions are related, in One way or another, to the circumstances of Ibrahim’s death and it is, therefore, necessary to examine this issue in detail. THE IMAM AND AMIR AL-MU’ MININ

The Akhbar recorded an interesting tradition about a conversation which is said to have taken place between Marwan and his secretary, ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Katib. The tradition is attributed to “Uthman b. ‘Urwah b. Muhammad b. ‘Ammar b. Yasir, and the time of the events referred to is after the “Abbasid forces had invaded Iraq,'6 and after Marwan had ascertained that Ibrahim was the leader of the Da‘wah. In order to decide on the method of dealing with the Da‘wah which had now become dangerously active, Marwan summoned his kinsmen and counselors and asked their opinions. After he had heard their various suggestions, he discussed the matter in private with ‘Abd al-Hamid, who made the following proposal: Since Ibrahim was a man of honourable and noble descent and a kinsman of the Prophet, it would be more proper if the Caliph, instead of fighting against him, were to try to win him over to his own side and neutralize him as well as his followers.!? This Marw4n could do by invitnicknamed balad at-tawa‘in -— “the country of plagues.” . Baladhuri, [Va, p.224. Cf., Fariq ‘Umar, “Ibrahim.” Another tradition in the Akhbar mentions Ibrahim’s death in a very casual manner: fa-lamma gada ibrahim nahbahu — “when Ibrahim died.” Akhbar, p. 410 (supra).

15 Baladhuri, Ansab, Hl, p. 139; Tabari, DI, p. 27; Azdi, pp. 120-121; Jashiyari, p. 57.

16 Anonyme, fol. 286b. 17. Akhbar, p. 398; Anonyme, fol. 288a.

The Moment of Victory 229 ing Ibrahim to come and meet him, renew his oath of allegiance (bay‘ah), give the ‘Abbasid leader one of his daughters in mar-

riage and finally, appoint him a governor over the Jazirah. In this way Marwan could win Ibrahim’s affection, attach him to the Umayyad family by marriage, and keep a watchful eye over him at all times (since the Caliph’s capital was in the Jazirah). Through his proximity to the throne and by having got a taste of power, Ibrahim would no longer wish to continue on his present course, and his adherents would also disperse. The tradition goes on to relate that Marwan liked the proposal but said that it had come too late. War had already begun and the ‘Abbasid forces were just about to conquer Iraq, “and besides, much blood has been spilt because of him.”'§ ‘Abd al-Hamid did not give way but pointed out that any act of kindness shown to Ibrahim would bring praise to Marwan for being magnanimous

to his relative and would enable him to appear before the Almighty with clean hands, even if Ibrahim continued to fight against him. To this Marwan replied: “I do not reject your proposal, but the time is too short. If I were to act as you have suggested, his (Ibrahim’s) case would be strengthened even more, and his prestige would rise still higher in the eyes of the Syrians. They would come closer to him and be estranged from us. They would join him out of fear of his army and they would be attracted to him by reason of the honour we were bestowing on him.”!9

What is the significance of this tradition? As it stands, it represents the traditionalist’s reconstruction of a scene in the drama of the last days of the last Umayyad Caliph. It is possible that it contains some material intended to clear the reputation of ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Katib, who, during the initial stages of the “Abbasid rule, served in an administrative capacity similar to that which he had held at the court of Marw4n; but there is nevertheless a nucleus of truth in its content. As it stands, the report about a conversation between Marwan and his secretary ‘Abd al-Hamid, is no more than an accepted literary form used to lend an air of authenticity and credibility to the tradition. It is very instructive to

note, however, that the tradition, as it stands with regard to content and atmosphere, is not hostile to the Umayyads or to Marwan. It comes indeed from an ‘Abbasid source; ‘Uthman 18 Akhbar, ibid.; Anonyme, fols. 288b-289a. 19 Akhbar, p. 399; Anonyme, fol. 289a, cf. fol 286a; cf., Tabari, Ill, p. 26.

230 Chapter 6 b.“Urwah, who is quoted as its source, formed part of the ‘Abbasid household and occupied a rather important administrative positions after the accession of the first ‘Abbasid Caliph to the throne. But still Marwan does not appear in it as the arch-enemy and murderer of the ‘Abbasids as other ‘Abbasid traditions

represent him. In fact, he is represented in quite a sympathetic light. He is powerless to resist the course of events. Had the situation been somewhat different, he would willingly have accepted “Abd al-Hamid’s suggestion.?°

The whole episode of Ibrahim’s end should, therefore, be viewed in a different light. The ‘Abbasid forces were at the gates

of Kifah; it is possible that they were already in control of the

city and had forced Ibn Hubayrah to withdraw to Wasit. Alarmed by the perpetual military successes of the revolutionary army, of which he was at long last fully informed, Marwan decided to enter into negotiations with Ibrahim. Such a move is not unusual. After all was it not Mu‘awiyah, the first Umayyad amir al-mu’ minin, who followed similar tactics in the face of a difficult military situation? The traditions which describe Ibrahim’s alleged imprisonment actually corroborate this. I propose, therefore, that Ibrahim was never really imprisoned at all; indeed his journey northward from Humaymah to Damascus is described more as an excursion for pleasure than as the transport of a pris-

oner. According to a detailed tradition originating in the ‘Abbasid household, Ibrahim did not leave Humaymah alone, but was accompanied by a full escort made up of members of his family including ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali, ‘Isa b. Misa and Abi al‘Abbas.?2! If the information in this tradition is true, then one should regard Ibrahim’s companions as a very high ranking representation of the ‘Abbasid family. Abii al-‘Abbas, was to become the first ‘Abbasid caliph, and the other two were pretenders to the Caliphate: “Abdallah b. “Ali claimed the throne after the death of Saffah and was forcibly subdued by Mansir, while ‘Isa b. Misa should have succeeded Abi Ja‘far al-Mansur according to the rules of succession which seem to have been 20 See an echo to this tradition in another account in which Marwan is said to have suggested to ‘Abd al-Hamid to go over to the “Abbasid side and help the former and his family from within the ‘Abbasid administrative establishment. Jahshiyari, p. 79; cf., Ibn Qutaybah, ‘Uyan, I, pp. 26-27. On ‘Uthman b. ‘Urwah, a great grandson of ‘Ammar b. Yasir, the venerated companion of the Prophet, see Tabari, III, pp. 25, 37.

21 Akhbar, pp. 399-401.

The Moment of Victory 231 laid down in the family. This means that it was not by chance that these men were named as having accompanied Ibrahim on his journey to Syria — they were the central figures in the family

and, together with Ibrahim, they went as a delegation for a meeting with Marwan. With them went two of their most promi-

nent mawali: Muhalhil b. Safwan and YA4sir. The journey northward to Syria is described in the tradition as follows: “The man who took Ibrahim to Damascus escorted him in the most

pleasant manner, ministered to his needs, spoke agreeably to him and paid him honour.’?* True, the traditionalist, who seemed to have sensed the absurdity of the idyllic description of the event, related the good treatment of Ibrahim and his compan-

ions to the personal initiative of the officer in charge of Ibrahim’s transfer from Humaymah to Damascus. This officer had already known that his Umayyads masters were about to lose and he wanted to secure his future with the new lords. It is exactly this explanatory, tendentious, part of the tradition which gives the main information relating to Ibrahim’s journey its credibility.

If this is how the journey from Humaymah to Damascus was,

let us now examine the account about the alleged arrest of Ibrahim in Humaymah. Tayfir, a mawla of the “Abbasids and, according to his own account, an eye-witness of the events, tells

how Umayyad cavalry came to Humaymah and asked for Ibrahim at his home when he happened to be in the mosque. When they were told that he was in the mosque, they took Abi al-* Abbas in his place; but just then Ibrahim appeared and said “‘I am Ibrahim,”’ whereupon they released Abii al-‘Abbas and took Ibrahim. Ibrahim then asked their permission to take leave of the

members of his family, and they allowed him to do so. He took leave of his kinfolk and the members of his household and set Out with the horsemen for Damascus.” This tradition already contains the kernels of the facts which were amplified by various ‘Abbasid traditions about the sudden arrest of Ibrahim and the divine intervention which saved Abi al-‘Abbas as-Saffah from death at the last moment. A tradition was evolved according to which Marwan possessed a description of the leader of the Da‘wah, which he gave to the soldiers

22 ~=I[bid., p. 400. For the whole problem of succession in the ‘Abbasid family see Lassner, Shaping, pp. 22f. 23. ss Ibid., pp. 399(infra)-400(supra).

232 Chapter 6 whom he sent to arrest Ibrahim. The physical marks according to which they were supposed to recognize the prisoner, were those of Abi al-‘Abbas. The latter was arrested and only at the last moment was exchanged for Ibrahim. Abii al-‘Abbas miraculously escaped death for he was destined to become the first ‘Abbasid Caliph.% The absurdity of this tradition is exposed in the sequel, where it is related that Abi al-‘Abbas was one of the members of [brahim’s family who had travelled to Damascus with him and stayed there for a considerable time. If there was

any grain of truth in this story, who could have prevented

Marwan from arresting Abi al-‘Abbas in Damascus? Furthermore, while this tradition speaks about cavalry (khay/l) who came to arrest Ibrahim, another narrative attributed to ‘Ali b. ‘Isa b. Misa (and not ‘Ali b. Misa as it appears in Tabari’s

account) related by ‘Umar b. Shabbah,?> does not speak of cavalry at all, but merely says: “Marwan b. Muhammad sent an

agent to Humaymah to bring Ibrahim b. Muhammad to him, giving the agent a description of the man he was to bring; the agent came and found that the description fitted Abi al-‘ Abbas.” The story goes on to tell how Ibrahim convinced the agent of his

error and set out for Damascus with him, accompanied by a great band of members of the ‘Abbasid family. During the journey, the members of the family suggested to Ibrahim that they should murder the agent and flee to Iraq. [brahim at first consented to the plan but was finally dissuaded from carrying it out

(by a concubine whom he loved), lest Marwan should wreak

vengeance on the ‘Abbasids who were left behind in Humaymah.” MESSIANIC IMAGE FOR ABU AL-‘ABBAS

Like the preceding narrative, this one also contains some seeds of the legend which was developed later, according to which Marwan found in some books a description of the man destined to put an end to the rule of the Umayyads; the description was

2A Ibid., pp. 400-401; Baladhurl, vol. cit., p. 121; Tabari, OI, p. 25; Lassner, op. cit., pp. 25-26. 25 ‘Tabari, III, p. 26; Akhbar, p. 401, and note 1 in which Dor! and Muttalibi, the editors of the Akhbar, noticed Tabari’s mistake.

26 See also Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 121.

The Moment of Victory 233 that of Abi al-‘Abbas. When Marwan was informed of Ibrahim’s name, he sent someone to bring the latter before him but mistakenly gave his agent the description of Abi al-‘Abbas; as a result of this confusion, Abi al-‘ Abbas escaped death.”’ The sequence of events in this short tradition is more logical. The

Umayyad agents take only Ibrahim away and leave Abi al‘Abbas in Humaymah. This allows Abt al-‘ Abbas and the other

members of his family to escape to Iraq. This version of the story was obviously intended to invest the figure of Abi al‘Abbas with some sort of divine aura, suggesting that the finger of God had intervened to save him. After all, Abii al-‘Abbas ascended to the throne without the divine halo of the Jmamah; furthermore, as we shall see later, his right to succeed Ibrahim and

to assume the leadership of the movement was by no means clear to the members of the Da‘wah. In order to enhance his personal image, a tradition was later invented in the pattern of those connected with the names of many leaders, to the effect that he had been saved from death at the last moment in order to benefit the Muslim world with his leadership. It is difficult to think of

any great leader in ancient history who was not the subject of such a legend. Muhammad’s father was saved from death by a miracle from being slaughtered by his father in order to bring the Prophet of Islam into the world.?® It is not coincidental, of course, that the circumstances of the Prophet’s father miraculous deliverance resemble those of the narrow escape of the Patriarch Isaac from a very similar fate. Romulus and Remus were saved by the she-wolf which suckled them in order that they might be able to found Rome. Moses, according to the Jewish midrash, was saved from death by choosing the red-hot coal instead of gold when his wisdom as a baby was tested by Pharaoh. The finger of God was manifested in the deliverance of Abraham from the fiery furnace, and lastly, to return to the ‘Abbasids, we have seen how Abii Ja‘far al-Manstr was saved from certain death following upon his complicity in the revolt of ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah. An important detail in this story about Ibrahim’s arrest is that which speaks about the solitary agent who was sent to fetch the Imam. There is not even a hint here to the cavalry units mentioned in the other traditions. This solitary agent did not come to 27. ~—s- Tabari, I, p. 25 (infra).

28 Baladhuri, Ansab, I, pp. 78-79; Ibn Hisham, Sirah, I, pp. 151-152.

234 Chapter 6 arrest Ibrahim, since the tradition continues correctly (and logically) that with the such a large gathering of Ibrahim’s kinsmen present, there should have been no difficulty in disposing of the agent and escaping to Iraq or some other destination. This reasoning, however, was a retrospective invention. Only after the death of Ibrahim was it necessary to explain why he went of his own free will to Marwan’s prison in order to die there, and how it was that all his entourage, consisting of members of his family and their maw4@li, were unable to save him. The true circum-

stances surrounding the events were quite different. [brahim went to Marwan because he wished to go. It is possible that he even expected an invitation from Marwan and he may even have

been previously engaged in negotiations with him. When Marwan’s agent arrived, Ibrahim presented himself to him, not because he wished to save Abi al-‘Abbas (how could he know that this was the future Caliph?), but because the agent had really come to invite him to a conference with the Caliph. He took leave of his family in the normal manner as one would naturally do before starting on a long journey and even took with him one of his wives, who was his special favourite, to accompany him on his way.”? Is this how a man would depart on a journey from

which he was uncertain whether he would ever return?

Furthermore, he took with him a considerable number of his Closest relatives, evidently to assist him in the coming negotiations.

SECRET DECISIONS ON THE LINE OF SUCCESSION What happened afterwards in Damascus? The tradition goes on to relate that when Ibrahim’s party arrived there, Ibrahim was put under arrest by Walid b. Mu‘awiyah b. ‘Abd al-Malik, the

governor of Damascus, but his kinfolk and their mawadli remained in the city for some time. While they were there, one of their friends, a resident of Damascus named ‘Abdah b. Rabah alGhassani, sent a word to tell them that it was not prudent that all of them stayed in Damascus within Marwan’s reach, and that it would be better for them to leave Damascus before the Caliph got the idea of putting them all under arrest. They discussed the matter with Ibrahim who advised them to return to Humaymah. 29 Tabari, I, p. 26; Akhbar, pp. 400-402.

The Moment of Victory 235 Only the two mawali, Muhalhil b. Safwan and YAsir, stayed with Ibrahim and accompanied him to the Caliph residence in Harran.?°

Why were the plans suddenly changed? Why did the three central figures of the “Abbasid family leave Damascus and return

to Humaymah? It is quite possible that when the “‘Abbasids reached Damascus, the military position of the Umayyads had already deteriorated as a consequence of the fall of Kafah. It was

therefore decided, for reasons of prudence (as the tradition re-

marks) not to risk leaving all the leaders of the family in Damascus. Ibrahim, with his sturdy common sense, could find no good reason to justify this gathering of leading members of the family remaining within the easy reach of Marwan, and so he sent them back home. I propose that on this occasion, or perhaps even earlier, Ibrahim and these members of the family that were with him resolved upon the hierarchy of leaders, and the line of succession after Ibrahim fixing their order as follows: Abi al-‘Abbas as-Saffah — ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali and ‘Isa b. Misa. It was not by accident that ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali claimed the throne after the death of Saffah and that ‘Isa b. Misa, having no other alternative, claimed the throne of Mansiir. This internal arrangement was known only to the innermost members of the ‘Abbasid family; it was not known to the leaders of the Da‘wah and cer-

tainly not to Abi Salamah and to the commanders of the Khurasanite army. Commenting on this theory, J. Lassner casts some doubts on its plausibility. “If this line of succession — he writes — was, in

fact, agreed upon, but, for reasons of security, lacked binding written documents, what was to prevent Abi-al-‘Abbas from drawing up a full bill of particulars, once the ‘Abbasids were fully established in power?” Lassner further suggests that it

would have been in the interest of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali, the Caliph’s uncle, to put a pressure on Abi al-‘Abbas for the full disclosure of the agreement thus securing an orderly succession. “Moreover, why did neither ‘Abdallah nor ‘Isa b. Misa themselves press any claims on the basis of such proposed list?” — asks Lassner. The claims of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali — Lassner suggests — were based not on an agreement reached in Ibrahim’s presence but on an explicit promise of Abi al-‘Abbas, who declared on the eve 30 Akhbar, p. 401.

236 Chapter 6 of the decisive battle against Caliph Marwan II that whoever leads the army in this battle would be the Caliph’s successor. Lassner remarks, however, that “it is unlikely that the Caliph actually made a public declaration of this sort’ and that “the texts describing Abi al-‘Abbas’s pledge seem to indicate that it was

made in the presence of a small group of notables.” In spite of all that, Lassner’s sharp senses of a critical historian alert him to doubt also the validity of this tradition about the Caliph’s pledge, and he concludes that “‘based on the record of service in military

and political affairs, ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali was the most logical choice as a successor to Abi al-‘Abbas from the inner circle of the ruling family.” (Lassner, Shaping, pp. 31-33). There are few difficulties with Lassner’s analysis. The major one stems from the fact that Da‘wah’s theory and practice of succession were based not on choice, but on an explicit act of testament. Had ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali been simply elected because of his excellence as a soldier and politician, the senior members of

the family should have supported him as well as the senior members of the Khurasanite leaders. The truth of the matter is that even Humayd b.Qahtabah left him, and Abt Muslim led the loyal troops against him once the explicit will of the deceased Caliph became known. This is why I still propose that “Abdallah b. ‘Ali’s revolt as well as his defeat and death can be understood only within the framework of the movement that considered the succession of leadership only on the basis of a direct transmission by will and testament from one leader to the other. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali regarded himself a legitimate heir to the ‘Abbasid throne on the basis of the understanding with [brahim as I proposed, but failed to accept the fact that Ibrahim’s testament, once executed with the accession of Abi al-‘Abbas, could be modified by the current leader of the movement. The revolt of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali represents, therefore, an important ideological dilemma: the clash between two wills that of the former leader and that of the immediate leader. The answer that was eventually

found was that the immediate leader’s will overruled, so to speak, the former leader’s testament. Ibrahim’s testament was crucially important for the acceptance of Abi al-"Abbas as the new leader of the movement and the new Caliph but, once he was accepted, the prerogative of nominating his heir was vested only in him. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali failed to change this rule. Later

historians, who had no idea about the secret deals within the ‘Abbasid family, tended to accept the argument, made public by

The Moment of Victory 237 ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali’s propagandists or sympathizers, that he had earned the Caliphate for leading the final battle against Marwan. A long anecdote quoted by Ibn Abii al-Hadid may shed some light on the issue. The anecdote describes an incident in which Sa‘id b. ‘Umar b. Ja‘dah b. Hubayrah al-Makhziimi, a distant

relative of the ‘Abbasids on his grandmother side, praised Caliph Marwan II in the presence of Abi al-‘Abbas. He regained the Caliph’s sympathy (and probably also saved his own head),

when he gave Abi al-‘Abbas the correct advice in connection with the claims of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali. In the anecdote Sa‘id b. Ja‘dah b. Hubayrah relates the following discussion between himself and the Caliph: “(Abi al-‘Abbas) said to me: ‘O Ibn Hubayrah, I am going to tell you something about which you should never speak to anybody.’ I said, ‘Yes.’ Said he: ‘You are aware that we have promised this

matter and the succession to the throne to he who would kill Marwan. It was my uncle ‘Abdallah who killed him with his army and with his followers, employing his personal ability and initiative. I am, However, very much in favour of my brother Abu Ja‘far because of his merits, his intelligence, his age, and his preference for this affair. How can I go back on the promise to ‘Abdallah b.

‘Ali ?’ I answered: ‘May Allah bestow blessing on Amir alMw’ minin! Let me tell you something which you might find useful, and which could save you the need for my advice.’ “Let me hear’ said the Caliph.

— “We were with Maslamah b. ‘Abd al-Malik in the year of the siege of Constantinople when the letter of ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz arrived with the news about the death of (Caliph) Sulayman and the

transfer of power to ‘Umar’s hands. When I entered to see Maslamah, he handed the letter over to me, and when I read it I was taken aback. He then wept for a long time and I said to him: “May Allah bless the emir and grant him long life! Weeping because of something that had already taken place is a sign of weakness. Death is a spring which nobody can escape from drinking its water.” To

this he answered: “My friend, I am not weeping because of my brother’s death; I am weeping because the power has been trans, ferred from the hands of my father’s children to the children of my paternal uncle.” ’ ‘It is enough!,’ said the Caliph (Abi al-‘Abbas), ‘I have understood’.” (Ibn Abu al-Hadid, Sharh, VII, pp.137-138).

The moral of this story is very clear. In spite of former agreements, Abi al-‘Abbas looked for an opportunity to let

238 Chapter 6 power stay in his own immediate family. The traditionalists who sympathized with ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali connected his demand to inherit Abi al-*Abbas not with a secret agreement about which nobody knew, but with his own personal merits as a great general and courageous man. THE QUESTION OF ABU AL-‘ABBAS’S SUCCESSION

Hence also, come the wealth of traditions which speak about Ibrahim’s “wasiyyah.” These traditions try to prove that Ibrahim nominated Abi al-‘Abbas by an explicit testamentary act as his heir in the event of his death.3! That these traditions represent the

early “Abbasid court history is proved by the fact that the ‘Abbasid court poet, Ibrahim b. Haramah wrote a poem lament-

ing Ibrahim and praising Aba al-‘Abbas in which he said that

Ibrahim the /mam transferred his right to the caliphate “to ‘Abdallah” (b. Muhammad — Abii al-“Abbas).32 Had this fact been unquestionably known to the main leaders of the Da*wah

and accepted by them, there would have been no need for so many conflicting traditions concerning the matter. One tradition, which is common to Ansd@b al-Ashraf and the Akhbar, reports that Ibrahim, while on his way to Harran, wrote a letter in which he nominated Abt al-‘Abbas as his heir and that this was in accordance with the express instructions of his father, Muhammad

b. “Ali. He handed this letter to his mawla, Sabiq, so that he should pass it on to Abi al-‘Abbas.*3 This tradition is connected with another detailed tradition, which relates that Muhammad b. ‘Ali, the father of Ibrahim, informed Bukayr b. Mahan in Kifah

that his son, ‘Abdallah b. Muhammad as-Saffah, was the man destined to become “al-qa@’ im” and “al-mahdi”, who should lead the movement in the hour of its victory, and not, as “Abdallah b.

Hasan the ‘Alid asserts his own son, Muhammad.** This 31 Azdi, p. 120; Tabari, II, pp. 27, 35; Jahshiyari, p. 85; Akhbar, p. 409. 32 Akhbar, pp. 408-409, Cf. Ibn ‘Asakir, Tahdhib, II, p. 393. 33 Akhbar, pp. 402-403; Anonyme, fol. 287b; Mas‘idi, Murisj, (Beirut), II, p. 252. Sabiq the Khwarizmian occupies, in the traditions concerning Ibrahim’s testament, the place of Yasir, whom we met earlier.

34 Akhbar, p. 238. Another famous tradition relates that Muhammad b. ‘Ali presented Abd al-‘Abbas — a baby in his diapers — to the Khurasanite du ‘at

and informed them that he would be their leader when the time of victory came. Ibn Khaldin, ‘/bar, I, p. 215; Baladhuri, Ansab, Il, p. 82 (supra).

The Moment of Victory 239 tradition was undoubtedly fabricated during the caliphate of Mansir at the time of the revolt of Muhammad b. “Abdallah b. Hasan, who claimed to be the true mahdi. It was also meant to prove to the last remaining opponents within the leadership of

the Da‘wah, that Abi al-‘Abbas had gained his power legitimately according to his father’s instructions and that the truth was known to one of the principal leaders of the Da‘ wah, Bukayr b. Mahan. In order to corroborate the theory that the leaders of the Da‘wah were privy to the plans of the succession to Ibrahim, yet another tradition was created according to which Ibrahim wrote a letter in triplicate, sending one copy to Abu Salamah with his mawla, Muhalhil b. Safwan; the second was sent to Qahtabah with Ibrahim b. Salamah and the third to Abu Muslim with ‘Abdallah b. Hilal, the mawla of “Abdallah b. ‘Abbas. These missives contained Ibrahim’s will wherein it was

mentioned that on his death the Imamah should pass to “ ‘Abdallah al-asghar Ibn al-harithiyyah.”* This tradition is an obvious forgery. Its aim, like that of the one previously quoted, was to prove that Abi Salamah knew of Abi al-‘Abbas’s mght to succeed Ibrahim and yet deliberately wished to prevent his accession to the throne, thus deserving the death-penalty for his treachery.*©

To deepen the inquiry into this subject of the wasiyyah, let us examine a further detailed tradition from an ‘Abbasid source, dealing with the same issue. This tradition was transmitted by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. ar-Rabi‘ah, who traced it back to his father and grandfather as well as by Husayn b. Muhammad al-Hashimi, who heard it from his teachers. They reported that Ibrahim b. Muhammad entrusted the carrying out of the revolution (algiyam bi-ad-dawlah) to Abi al-“Abbas, charging him to exert the most strenuous efforts in performing the duties of his office. He also urged him cut short his stay in Humaymah and proceed forthwith to Kifah. Ibrahim gave Abi al-‘Abb§as precise instructions for carrying on the work and bade that he follow them In order to strengthen the shaky position of Abi al-‘Abbas, a hadith was put into the mouth of no less than the Prophet himself, in which the latter prophesies the accession of Abi al-‘Abbas to the Caliphate. See Azdi, p. 123. The official regnal Messianic title al-qa’ im was introduced in the time

of al-Saffah himself. The Poet, as-Sayyid al-Himyari, refers to as-Saffah by this title “al-qa'im” as a matter of fact. Kofi, VII, p. 206 (1. 6). 35 Akhbar, pp. 393-394; Anonyme, fols. 286a-286b.

36 Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 88.

240 Chapter 6 strictly (wa-rasama lahu rusiiman wa-amarahu an ya‘mal ‘alayha

wa-la yata‘addaha). He handed this written will (wasiyyah) to

his mawla, Sabiq, also giving him further oral instructions which he charged him to pass on to Abii al-‘Abbas (wa-shafahahu bi-ashya’ amarahu an yushafiha aba al-‘abbas biha).37 The written will and the additional oral instructions were sent after the members of the ‘Abbasid family had left Damascus and returned to Humaymah. Sabiq stayed in Harran until after the death of Ibrahim and was present at his burial together with Muhalhil b. Safwan.*® Only afterwards did he leave Harran and

go to join Abi al-‘Abbas in Humaymah. He carried out Ibrahim’s instructions punctiliously, delivering to Abi al‘Abbas his brother’s letter and the further matters which he had been ordered to impart to him orally. When Abi al-‘Abbas received this information, including the news of Ibrahim’s death,

he bade Sabiq inform the members of the family about the demise of the Jmam but told him to keep them in ignorance about the the wasiyyah (wa-amara sabiq an yu‘limahum mawtahu wa-

yatwi ‘anhum amr al-wasiyyah, fa-fa‘al).*® After this, Abi al‘Abbas himself revealed the matter of the wasiyyah to the following persons: 1. Abi Ja‘far ‘Abdallah b. Muhammad (al-Mansiir). 2. ‘Isa b. Misa. 3. ‘Abdallah b. “Ali. 4. Ja*far b. Yahya. 5. Qutham b. al-‘Abbas. He asked them all to keep the matter secret and urged them to set out for Kifah with him. He also revealed the matter of the wasiyyah to a number of mawali including Muhalhil, forbidding them also to divulge the matter. Sabiq was ordered to reveal the secret only to one more person: Ibrahim b. Salamah. The latter and his maternal uncle, Hayyan, both leaders of the du‘at, members of the centre of the Da‘wah at Kifah, resided at ash-Sharat and served as a channel of communication between the centre in Humaymah and the one in Kifah. These two were also ordered to keep the matter secret.” 37 Akhbar p. 409, and cf., Jahshiyari, p. 85, where the tradition states that Ibrahim nominated Abt al-‘Abbas to be his heir the moment he was arrested. 38 ~«=©6© Akhbar, p. 395.

39 ~— [bid., p. 410 (supra).

40 Ibid.

The Moment of Victory 241 Without delving too deeply into this tradition, one can learn, at first glance, that the matter of the wasiyyah was kept a secret within a restricted circle of intimates and that the subject of the succession to the leadership of the Jmam Ibrahim was not made known to any of the heads of the Da‘wah. According to this tradition, Abi’ Salamah in Kifah could not have known about either the death of Ibrahim or about the order of succession after his death. If the matter was really so straightforward and if there was a written wasiyyah in existence, what was to prevent Abia al-“Abbas from making a public appearance in Kifah (since the city had already been taken by the ‘Abbasid forces) and presenting his credentials before the leadership of the Da‘wah there? But what seems almost certain is, that no such wasiyyah existed in writing; everything depended on the evidence of the mawila, Sabiq, which could not satisfy the leaders of the Da‘wah.*! The whole matter of the succession was arranged and regulated by agreement between the main leaders of the family, especially three or four of them — Abii al-‘Abbas, ‘Isa b. Misa, ‘Abdallah b. “Ali and Abi Ja‘far. Of these, we have seen how the first three went with Ibrahim’s delegation to confer with Marwan. Why was the whole matter kept so closely secret? The reason seems to be that, since the death of Ibrahim occurred suddenly and not all the arrangements had been fixed for the succession to his leadership, the small band of leaders, who were to settle the matter among themselves, were apprehensive lest additional claimants suddenly appear from inside the family or perhaps even from outside it.42

At this point, we may conjecture about what may have happened when the members of the small ‘Abbasid party returned to Humaymah from Damascus, after parting from Ibrahim when he

set out for Harran to confer with Marwan. They waited in Humaymah for news from Ibrahim, which was to reach them through the agency of the two mawali who had remained with 41 Mas‘ddi, Muruj, II, p. 255; Jahshiyart, p. 87. 42 We read about fears that Dawud b. ‘Ali, Saffah’s and Mansir’s uncle, who had always lived in Kifah and not in Humaymah, would demand the Caliphate for himself. Dawud was famous for his rhetoric and eloquence. Until the very moment of Abo al-‘Abbas’ bay‘ah, there were members of the family who did not exclude the possibility that at the last moment, Dawud, with his sweet tongue, might convince the public to give the bay‘ah to him instead of to his nephew. See isolated traditions on the subject, Baladhuri, vol. cit., pp. 87(infra)-88(supra).

242 Chapter 6 him for this purpose. The news reached them through Sabiq, the

Khwarizmian mawla. Since these men were a sort of inner council of the most prominent leaders, they met to decide on the

next steps to be taken. Without any shade of doubt, it was

known to all of them that Abi al-“Abbas was Ibrahim’s heir. It would otherwise be impossible to understand how he could ascend to the throne without any rival claimants, unanimously backed by the whole family. The fact that Abi al-“Abbas was the legitimate heir apparent must have been known to the members of the family even before Sabiq arrived, and it is clear from the wording of the tradition that when Abi al-‘Abbas assembled his kinsmen for a meeting, they recognized his authority and accepted his opinion. I suggest, therefore, that at the same meeting they ratified an unwritten agreement which already existed inside the family, concerning the order of succession. The order was: ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali, Abi Ja‘far, ‘Isa b. Misa. It is possible, as we have observed above, that ‘Isa b. Miisé should have succeeded ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali. All the problems which arose later in connection with the succession — problems with which Abi Ja‘far alMansur had to cope — resulted entirely from this agreement. The secret of the agreement was also imparted to two members of the centre of the Da‘wah at Kifah — Ibrahim b. Salamah and his maternal uncle, Hayyan — in order that they might be able to testify to it retrospectively when the time came. It was also decided at the same meeting — and this agrees with our tradition — that Abi al-‘Abbas should head the group, bring it to Kifah and assume the leadership of the rebellion against the Umayyads there. Dawud b. ‘Ali, Abi al-‘Abbas’ uncle, was conspiciuous by his absence from this crucial meeting of the family. He appears later as one of the most important followers of Abi al-‘Abbas, and when these events took place he had been in Kifah and was on his way back to Humaymah with his son. From the sequel to this tradition, it can be inferred that he left Kifah before the capture of the town had been effected, and that he was far from

optimistic regarding the prospect of victory for the Da‘wah forces.”

43 Akhbar, pp. 410-411; Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 128.

The Moment of Victory 243 THE AWAKENING OF DORMANT SHI ‘ITE ASPIRATIONS The ‘Abbasid leaders around Abi al-‘Abbas viewed the question of the succession to Ibrahim’s Jmamah as an internal, family, is-

sue. They were most apprehensive about possible opposition and tried to keep the whole subject under strictest secrecy. The reason for this was that the Khurasanite and Kifite leaders of the

Da‘wah were linked directly with Ibrahim by ties of loyalty. They owed their allegiance only to him, since he alone had received their bay‘ah. They were released from their bay‘ah by his

death and they did not owe it to anyone else who had not, to their knowledge, been authorized personally by the mam by the explicit act of wasiyyah to receive it. We have seen that Abi al‘Abbas had no other evidence for his claim to the /mamah except the testimony of Sabiq, Ibrahim’s Khwarizmian mawla. Abi al‘Abbas feared, and with good reason, that the premature revealing of the details of Ibrahim’s wasiyyah might mean letting the caliphate slip out of his hands and perhaps out of the hands of the ‘Abbasids altogether. Within the rigid and ordered frame-

work of internal discipline which existed in the “Abbasid Da‘wah, it was impossible that the chiefs of the Da‘wah, who exercised great power, did not know the order of succession. Just as the Prophet in his time had died suddenly, without leaving express instructions about the succession, thus giving rise to grave problems concerning the legitimacy of the leadership after his death, so too did Ibrahim’s sudden death. He left his followers no clear instructions — hence, once more, all the questions of the succession to the leadership arose, with which the ‘Abbasid movement and state, as well as the Muslim community at large, had to grapple with at the very outset of the new era. The narrow circle of members of the ‘Abbasid family was indeed finally successful in putting Abi al-‘Abbas on the throne, and thus enabling the family to reap the fruits of the many years of labour by the Da*wah. However, the basic problems were thereby shelved rather than solved. Grave problems concerning the succession arose within the family immediately after the death of Saffah. But no less dangerous were the implications raised by the problem of the legitimacy of the ‘Abbasids’ rule — from the viewpoint of the Da‘wah itself. For immediately after Ibrahim’ s death, a split occurred in the Da‘wah which resulted in an oppositional movement to the ‘Abbasids which bore a clear Shi‘iteFatimid character. This splinter-group had been in existence

244 Chapter 6 within the Da‘wah all the time but it had been dormant until now. However, when the right conditions were created, it beCame a militant group and turned its sharp edge against the ‘Abbasids. The great ambition of the “Abbasids was to lead the

Islamic community by a twofold right: the mystical right of ‘Ali’s inheritance and the actual right of kinship to the Prophet. This ambition not only failed to materialize but actually added a further division to the list of those already existing in Islam. The death of Ibrahim had the effect of shuffling all the cards held by the ‘Abbasid movement, and this at the decisive hour of its his-

tory. Until then, its propaganda machine had been, on the whole, tuned up to work with great precision and with great

success. Its simple (but vague) slogans which spoke of “supporting the House of the Prophet,” paying allegiance to “the one agreed upon from the family of Muhammad” had the potent charge of legitimacy which appealed to the rank and file. Even

the veteran Shi‘ites, could not find any fault in such slogans, especially since they had no clear notion as to who the personalities behind them were. From the time the legend was created

about the passing of the wasiyyah from Abi Hashim to Muhammad b. ‘Ali, the movement was assured (at least in theory) of the support of many Shiites. In order to clarify these matters, we must return to a tradition which we have mentioned elsewhere in connection with the episode of Khidash.“ This tradition relates that after the death of Ibrahim, “‘the Shi‘ah of Bani al-‘Abbds was divided, and one party within it declared that the wasiyyah and the Imamah had

reverted to the family of ‘Ali.” We have also shown that throughout a very long period — the entire period during which Khidash was active and even after his death — the Hashimiyyah developed in Khurasan on the basis of the identification of ahl

al-bayt with the “Alids. The ‘Alid tendencies within the “Abbasid movement which had originated, mainly but not only, in the close ideological link between the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah and the legacy of the Hashimiyyah in Kifah — did not disappear, but were only temporarily suppressed by the authority of Ibrahim and Abi Muslim. It is no wonder that on the death of Ibrahim these pure Shi‘ite tendencies reappeared. His death had severed the mystical thread which had joined the Hashimiyyah and the ‘Abbasids by means of the wasiyyah of Abii Hashim. There was 44 Banners, pp. 165-173; Sharon, “Khidash,” EF.

The Moment of Victory 245 no reason why voices should not be raised inside the Da’wah demanding a return to the original ‘Alid H @shimiyyah and claiming the renewal of direct contacts with one of “Ali’s living descendants. Let us now return for a moment to the beginning of our discussion about the possibility of negotiations between Marwan and Ibrahim in Harran. Several meetings took place in Harran between Marwan and Ibrahim — this we learn from a number of traditions recorded by the compiler of the Akhbar.“ According to one account,” Ibrahim tried to clear himself of all connections

with the movement and to assert that it was headed by the ‘Alids. Unfortunately, we do not possess, at present, any Umayyad tradition on this episode, and without such a tradition we Cannot arrive at even a plausible idea of what actually happened in Harran. What is clear is that Ibrahim died while staying

with Marwan, and as we have seen, the several traditions vie with one another in inventing various ways in which he may have met his death. It is very likely that Marwan did not really wish Ibrahim to die. It was preferable to have a living leader in his power rather than a dead one in circumstances sure to turn him immediately into a martyr. Ibrahim, with his unique status, could have served both as a distinguished hostage and as a personality with whom to negotiate. The narratives which describe the conditions of his alleged imprisonment do not convince us that he was in fact harshly treated. He stayed at the court of Marwan together with a number of Umayyad notables, with whom he was soon on friendly terms. Two of these are mentioned by their names: ‘Abdallah b. ‘Umar b. ‘Abd. al-‘Aziz and

Sharahil b. Mu‘awiyah b. Hisham b. ‘Abd al-Malik. He had with him three mawédli as well as the most beloved of all his wives, who waited on him and ministered to his needs; and we are told that when he died, ‘Abdallah b. ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was greatly distressed at his passing.‘ It is reasonable to assume that Marwan also grieved at Ibrahim’s sudden death, since the decisive conflict between him and the ‘Abbasid armies now became inevitable.

45 Akhbar, pp. 390, 394. 46 ~=6©[bid., p. 394.

47 Ibid., pp. 394-395, in contradiction to the tradition which states that Marwan murdered Ibrahim and ‘Abdallah b. ‘Umar on the same day. Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 121 (infra); Akhbar, p. 390; Anonyme, fol. 286a.

246 Chapter 6 THE DILEMMA OF ABU SALAMAH

Meanwhile, what was happening in Kifah? After the capture of the city, Abi Salamah became, almost instantly, the supreme

commander of the Da‘wah forces. As yet, he did not know anything about either the death of Ibrahim or about any further developments at Humaymah. At this stage, when the Da‘wah in Kufah emerged from clandestine activity into the open, he was expecting a sign from the Jmam, instead of which he received unconfirmed reports of the latter’s death. There was, as we have already mentioned, no member of the ‘Abbasid family present in Kifah, nor had Abt Salamah any standing instructions to guide him in such a case as this. The Khurasanite army swore allegiance to him in his capacity as the highest in the echelon of the Da‘wah leadership in Iraq, but it demanded the presence of the Imam. The conditions prevailing at this time are described in one unique tradition preserved in the Akhbar, which runs as follows: “wa-qad gila inna aba salamah lamma ja’ ahu na‘ya ibrahim tahay-. yara washakka fi amrihi wa-bagqiya muqim ala dhikr al-imam wagarraba li-ahl khurasan zuhurahu wa-rubbama qara’a ‘alayhim alkitab yafta‘iluhu bayyinatan wa-kana kadhalika hatta qadima abi all‘abbas wa-ahl baytihi al-kufah.*® And it is said that Aba Salamah, when news of the Imam’s death reached him, was perplexed and doubted the validity of the information. He continued to speak of the Imam (as if he were still alive M. S.) and told the Khurasanites that his appearance was imminent. Sometimes he would read out to

them a letter of his own making (as if it were a letter from the Imam M. S.) as a proof. Thus he was wont to act until Abu al“Abbas and his family arrived in Kufah.”

This tradition begins with the conventional opening: “‘it is said,” (wa qad qila) used to draw attention to a tradition which contradicted other or earlier traditions; it was indeed meant to oppose all those narratives according to which Abi Salamah knew of Ibrahim’s death and of his wasiyyah but deliberately tried to prevent the accession of Abi al-‘Abbas to the throne.*? This anonymous tradition bears clear signs of authenticity and is

4g Akhbar, p. 404 (infra). 49 Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 139; Tabari, III, p. 34; Azdi, p. 123.

The Moment of Victory 2A7 supported by a further tradition in Jahshiyari which implies that,

for some time, Abi Salamah was not convinced of the /mam’s death and that only when he felt sure of the facts (amma sahha ‘indahu mawt ibrahim al-imam),°° did he begin to work for the appointment of a new Imam. Abii Salamah’s behaviour, as it 1s presented in the tradition of the Akhbar, is very human and natural, even pathetic. The news of Ibrahim’s death moved him deeply; he was perplexed and reluctant to believe it. Was it possible that such a calamity as this could have befallen the Da‘wah just at the decisive hour of victory? Everything was prepared for Ibrahim’s coronation and the army was demanding to see him in person. The publication of news of the /mam’s death among the victorious army was liable to deal a crushing blow to the entire Da‘wah, and might bring to naught the toil of many years. This army had marched westward from Khurasan, full of enthusiasm with the overpowering desire in their hearts of finally meeting the mysterious [mam, the kinsman of the Prophet, the chosen of God and the bearer of the occult wisdom, residing with the Prophet’s family. What could Abi Salamah do? One can well understand the words of the tradition which tells that his first aim was to avoid spreading the news among the Khuras&anites at any cost and to gain time in which to verify the report and to examine the new Situation which had been created. But how long could he keep this up? The Khurasanites could not be put off indefinitely. He was continually asked about the Jmam. The suspicions of the soldiers and their leaders gradually became stronger. “O, Abi Salamah” they said — “not for your sake did we set out from the heart of Khurasan; not for your sake have we made propaganda; you are not our mam.’ He tried to satisfy them with all kinds of evasive answers: “We are expecting him” — this was his excuse — “but the time has not yet come for him to make his appearance.” “Do not be over-hasty” (“Ja ta‘jaliv’”’).52 When they continued to press him, he evaded the issue by saying that the delay in the appearance of the mam was due to the fact that Wasit had not yet been captured.*? Against this background, we

can also understand the tradition according to which Abi 50 Jahshiyari, p. 86. 51 ‘Ibid. (Il. 18-19) 52. Tabari, HI, pp. 27, 34; Baladhuni, loc. cit. 53. Tabari, III, p. 28.

248 Chapter 6 Salamah was reduced to forging letters in the Jmam’s name in order to calm the passions of the Khurds4nites. Just then, Abi al-‘Abbas appeared in Ktfah together with a band of members of the ‘Abbasid family;** this was at the beginning of the month of Safar 132/September 749.55 There are conflicting traditions about the manner in which Abt Salamah received them when they entered Kiifah. Some are only concerned with blackening his image and demonstrating his disloyalty to the ‘Abbasids: these relate that he did not favour the entrance of the ‘Abbasids into Kifah and would not give them any money — not even to pay the camel-drivers who had brought them.°¢ At first he even refused to admit them into the city, and

when he finally admitted them it was with undisguised reluctance.5? When they entered the town, he concealed them among the Bani Awd, a clan belonging to the Yaman tribes at the house of al-Walid b. Sa*id, a mawla of Banti Hashim.** As expected, other traditions do not contain any such charges against Abi Salamah; On the contrary, they report that he gave the “Abbasids a cordial reception and provided for their needs,*® but even these traditions mention the fact that he kept them concealed in Kifah

for a long time. There can be no doubt that the majority of the

54 Among those who came to Kiafah were: Aba Ja‘far, the brother of Aba al‘Abbas and the latter’s uncles: Dawud, ‘Isa, Salih, Isma‘il, ‘Abdallah and ‘Abd as-Samad, the sons of ‘Ali, as well as Yahya b. Muhammad, ‘Isa b. Misa b. Muhammad b. ‘Ali; ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad, Ibrahim’s sons, Misa b. Dawud and others. Tabari, OI, p. 27; Jahshiyari, p. 85; Baladhuri’s traditions about the arrival of Aba al-‘Abbas and his family in Kifah before the city was conquered by the Da‘wah, cannot be correct.

Similarly Tabari’s account (III, p. 27) that the ‘Abbasid family fled Humaymah for Kofah when [brahim was arrested, was not borne out by the evidence of the majority of the above-mentioned traditions.

55 Tabari, loc. cit.; Mas‘tdi, Muri (Beirut), UI, p. 253. At least forty days elapsed between the arrival of the “Abbasid family in Kifah and the accession of Abd al-‘Abbas on 13 Rabi‘ I. Therefore, they must have arrived in Kifah at the beginning of Safar, some 20 days after the conquest of Kdfah. Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 139; cf., Jahshiyari, pp. 85-86.

56 Tabari, II, p. 35. 57 Ibid.; Azdi, p. 120; Jahshiyari, loc. cit. 58 Jahshiyari, ibid.; Tabari, III, pp. 27, 34; Mas‘idi, loc. cit. Referring to Band Awd, Mas‘ddi says that they were ardent supporters of the Umayyads and bitter enemies of ‘Ali and his family. See also ibid., p. 144; Azdi, loc.

cil.

59 Fakhri, p. 196. See also about Abi Salamah’s behaviour, Kiafi, VID, p. 177; Dinawari, pp. 357-358.

The Moment of Victory 249 traditions dealing with this episode originated, in one way or another, in the ‘Abbasid court. They must have been invented after the murder of Abi Salamah by the ‘Abbasids. In order to explain away this murder, these traditions thus vie with one another in describing him as an enemy to the “Abbasids.® The tradition quoted by Baladhuri goes further. It relates the events as follows: ‘The Khurasanites asked Abii Salamah about the Jmam and he told them ‘We are still waiting for his appearance but the time for it has not yet come.’ Thereupon Abu al-‘Abbas sent to Abu Salamah saying: ‘I am going to come to you tonight, and I know that I am the

one with a rightful claim to this (i.e. the Caliphate M. S.).’ Abu

Salamah told Salm, the mawla of Qahtabah, and Asad b. alMarzuban: ‘Someone is coming to me tonight; when I rise and leave him alone, you should slay him, for he wishes to frustrate our work.’ When Abi al-‘Abbas came to him and began to dispute with him, Abu Salamah became angry and wished to rise; Abu al‘Abbas seized him by his garment and placated him, after which he went out and rode away unharmed.”

When Abi al-‘Abbas met the members of his household, he told them how he had escaped from Abi Salamah and said: “I think he decided to remove this matter (the Caliphate) from our family (to somebody else).’’®! The tendency of this tradition, and

of others, is clear. In one way or another they all stress the fact that, in spite of their military victory, the “Abbasids very nearly had to give up the Caliphate in favour of “others,” namely, the ‘Alid descendants of Fatimah® or the Talibids in general.® These traditions cannot be taken at face value. They not only contain an element of “Abbasid apologetics intended to explain 60 ‘Iqd, I, p. 299; (1944 ed.), IV, p. 482. 61 Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 139.

62 Ibid. Jahshiyari does not state, and correctly so, the descendants of Fatimah but merely says that Abt Salamah wanted to transfer the leader-

ship to ‘Ali’s family. Jahshiyari, loc. cit.; Mas‘idi, vol. cit., pp. 253254. 63 Tabari, TI, p. 34, quotes an anonymous tradition according to which Abia Salamah wanted to transfer the leadership “to others.” Earlier, however, Tabari reported that Ab0 Salamah wanted to transfer the rule to the family of Abd Talib. See Tabari, I], p. 27. Wellhausen (p. 546) accepts the view that Abo Salamah was in reality pro-‘Alid. Azdi adds an explanation that

Abi Salamah’s actions were influenced by the fact that he actually belonged “to the shi‘ah of amir al-mu' minin (i.e. ‘Ali).” Azdi, p. 120.

250 Chapter 6 the reason for the killing of Abia Salamah, but also some ideas which originated later (in the time of Mansir) as a result of the struggle between the ‘Abbasids and the “Alids during which the latter stressed their descent from Fafimah. The very fact that

there was such a wealth of variations on the theme of Abi Salamah’s intentions, proves that a systematic attempt was made to blur the true facts in this episode. As against all these narra-

tives, there exists an isolated tradition related by Kdufi. According to this tradition, not only did Abt Salamah not intend to hand over power to the “Alids, but he personally brought Abu

al-‘Abbas out of his hiding-place and, in a magnificent ceremony, presented him to the people of Kifah as the chosen Caliph, in opposition to the expectations of the many ‘AlIidShi‘ites in Kifah, who had hoped that the new Caliph would be

a member of the house of *Ali.% |

The truth must lie somewhere between these extremes. One fact stands out prominently in all these traditions: For quite a long time, Abia Salamah kept the ‘Abbasids concealed in Kifah and did not present them publicly before the supporters of the Da‘wah. Why did he do this? Any danger from the Umayyads was past. Kufah had been captured and the KhurAsanites, already in control of the city and its environs, were about to conquer Basrah and Wasit. The whole eastern part of the Empire was in the hands of the Da‘wah forces. From whom were the ‘Abbasids being kept hidden? One cannot escape the conclusion that they were being kept from the Khurasanites and from the people of Ktfah. One can conjecture that there were several reasons for this: Firstly, so long as the report of Ibrahim’s death was unconfirmed, it was impossible to nominate another Caliph from among the members of his family.® Secondly, now that the moment of truth had come and the followers of the Da‘ wah were about to learn that the mysterious figure of ar-rida min al

64 Kofi, pp. 177-179. There are still some scholars who believe the story that Abd Salamah wanted to transfer the Caliphate to the ‘Alids. Even if one ignores the obvious reason for the invention of such a tradition by the

‘Abbasids, one cannot ignore the fact that, throughout his career, Abi Salamah had nothing to do with the Hasanid or the Husaynid branches of the ‘Alid family. If at all, he was under the clear instruction of his Jmam to keep away from them, as much as possible. Banners, p. 145; see Rekaya, “Ma’mon,” El’; Kennedy, p. 45.

65 According to Kifi, Ibrahim was still active at the time of Abi al-‘Abbas’ accession to the throne. Kafi, p. 180.

The Moment of Victory 251 muhammad came not from ‘Ali’s family but was a descendant of

‘Abbas, it was necessary to prepare the ground for this announcement.© Thirdly, even when the fact of Ibrahim’s death was known, Abi Salamah could not appoint an heir on his own authority. As for the allegation that Aba Salamah had decided to nominate an “Alid as successor to the Caliphate, even though we

hear that in this matter he applied to Ja‘far (as-Sadiq) b. Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. Husayn and to ‘Abdallah b. Hasan b. Hasan, this cannot possibly be correct.*? The tradition simply chose these names because these two men were at the head of the two main branches of the ‘Alid family at the time of the accession to power of Abi al-‘Abbas. As for Abt Salamah, it is difficult to imagine that a man who

had grown up with the “Abbasid Da‘wah from its inception, from the time when Muhammad b. ‘Ali took over the leadership

of the Hashimiyyah, a man whose loyalty to the two ‘Abbasid imams was beyond all doubt, a man who had had many opportunities to support the ‘Alids and had never done so, would suddenly transfer his allegiance to them. At the same time, it is clear that he could not have endorsed the claim of Abii al-‘ Abbas

to succeed his brother. Azdi preserves a tradition in which Abi Salamah says to Abi al-‘Abbas: “T think that the Jmam to whom we owe obedience is dead.’ This one sentence of Abii Salamah reveals the dilemma in which he was involved. Within the rigid and complex framework of the organization and ideology of the

Da‘wah, he was not free to decide who should succeed the Imam. And not only this — such a decision at that moment was a most fateful one, since the successor to the Jmam was to be the

future Caliph of Islam. It is difficult to imagine that Abi Salamah would have been prepared to take upon himself such a risk and responsibility. The ‘Abbasid traditions which explain

his hesitations by assuming that he wished to wrest from the ‘Abbasids the fruit of their labour and hopes, do him an injustice. He was loyal to the Da‘wah and to the Jmam but he owed no loyalty to the ‘Abbasids as such. The /mam was not just the leader of a political movement, nor had he been chosen as Imam because he was a member of the ‘Abbasid family. In the eyes of the faithful, his Imamah was connected with, and depended on,

66 Ibid. 67 Mas‘idi, op. cit., p. 254; and see note 64 above.

68 Azdi, loc. cit.

252 Chapter 6 secret spiritual, even Messianic, factors. His /mamah had been conveyed to him by what was universally believed to be a legal

act of bequest, and his authority over the followers of the movement was derived first and foremost, from this act. It is hard to know exactly when the ideology about the divine origin of the Jmamah took shape, but there can be no doubt that, in the course of the thirty years of activity of the Hashimite-‘ Abbasid movement, the theoretical basis on which to attribute to the Imam the possession of ‘i/m — esoteric wisdom — was already in

existence. This wisdom was supposed to have passed from the Prophet to “Ali, from ‘Ali to Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah, from him to Abt Hashim, from him to Muhammad b. ‘AIi (the ‘Abbasid) and from the latter to his son, Ibrahim. In the same way, the /mamah and the ““ilm” associated with it had to pass to the next /mam in order to render him worthy to be regarded as a legitimate /mam.® The legend of “the Yellow Scroll” (“assahifah as-safra’”), which contains the story of how the “‘ilm” passed from [mam to Imam, breaks off at the death of Ibrahim. No ‘Abbasid tradition can tell anything about the later history of the “scroll” except that the ‘Abb4sids buried it in the Sharat, after which it could no longer be found.” This legend embodies

an important truth, namely that according to the systematic ideology of the Da*wah, the “Abbasid caliphs had no legal

proof of their right to succeed the /mam Ibrahim. Strictly speaking, from the point of view of the Da‘wah and of Abi Salamah, its leader in Kiifah, the chain of the Jmams had been broken.7!

The fact is that Abii al-“Abbas did finally ascend to the throne

of the Caliphate. According to most of the traditions, the 69 Ta'rikh Qumm, p. 236. 70 Ibn Abi al-Hadid, VII, p. 149. On the various views regarding Abu Hashim’s testament see Lassner, Revolution, pp. 55f., Moscati, “Abi Hashim,” Omar, pp. 59f., idem, “Succession,” Nagel. pp. 45-55.

71 This weakness of the early ‘Abbasid traditions was repaired in a later period by the official ‘Abbasid propaganda. A new tradition was created which gave a new content to the “Yellow Scroll.” According to this tradition, Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah himself, and not his son, Abt Hashim, was the one who nominated Muhammad b. ‘Ali to inherit his position. The “Yellow Scroll” contained, as expected, a description of the advent of the

‘Abbasids and a statement that identified “ ‘Abdallah” as the one who would attain the leadership. It is of course a desperate attempt to legitimize

the position of as-Saffah. Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 3b; see Lassner, Revolution, pp. 55f.

The Moment of Victory 253 ‘Abbasids did manage to make contact, behind Abi Salamah’s back, with the chiefs of the Khurasanites at Kifah and in the army camp at Hammam A‘yan, especially with Abi Jahm b.

‘Atiyyah, Abi Muslim’s confidant and right-hand man, and with Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Himyari, known as Abi Hamid as-Samarqandi. They achieved this through the agency of their faithful Khwarizmian mawla, Sabiq. Sabiq met Abt Hamid and

informed him of Ibrahim’s death and of Abi al-‘Abbas’ appointment to succeed him; Abi Hamid passed the news on to Abi Jahm. A number of the Khurasanite leaders immediately met together and started a kind of small-scale coup in Kufah: Girded with their weapons, they appeared in the ‘Abbasids’ hiding-place, swore allegiance to Abi al-‘Abbas and thus left Abi Salamah no alternative but to accept the verdict and swear allegiance to Abi al-‘Abbas as well. On 13 Rabi‘ I, 132/30th October 749, after Abii Salamah had been leading the Da’ wah

forces in Kifah for nearly two and a half months, Abi al‘Abbas received the bay‘ah, in the great mosque at Kifah, as the first Caliph of the House of ‘Abbas.72 From these traditions it is to be understood that the ‘Abbasids took advantage of the fact

that the Khurasanite leaders, who were more loyal to Abi Muslim than to Abi Salamah, had begun to protest more and more about the latter’s exercise of his authority. Many of them knew about the existence of an ‘Abbasid imam — Abt Jahm undoubtedly did. He was the leader of those who came out openly

against the leadership of Abi Salamah. We know, indeed, that he was virtually Aba Muslim’s representative in Iraq before the ‘Abbasid accession as well as during the caliphate of Abi al-. ‘Abbas.73 During the period of more than two months, tension in

the army was intensified by the expectation of the /mam’s appearance and the Khurasanite leaders were no longer prepared to listen to Abi Salamah’s excuses and resolved to take the initiative. The “Abbasids kept track of these developments through their mawali who could move freely in Kifah and, at the appropriate moment, they decided to reveal themselves. It was thus

the Khurasanites who in effect brought Abi al-‘Abbas into

72 Jahshiyari, pp. 86-87; Tabari, II, pp. 23, 27-28, 34-37; Azdi, p. 121; Mas‘ddi, vol. cit., p. 255; Baladhuri, vol. cit. pp. 139, 140-141. Dinawari’s date for Abd al-‘Abbas’ bay‘ah — Rajab 132 — cannot be correct; cf, ‘Iqd, III, p. 299, (1944 ed.), IV, p. 481; Ibn al-Athir, V, AH132.

73 Jahshiyari, p. 87 and especially p. 93.

254 Chapter 6 power, thereby once again demonstrating their independence of the Kufite centre of the Da’wah. Have we any means of knowing exactly what Aba Salamah intended to do after he had ascertained that the mam was dead? The manuscript of the Akhbar breaks off near the end of f.202b, but the Anonyme continues to describe developments until the accession to power of as-Saffah. In an anonymous tradition, the writer tells that Abi Salamah wished to submit the question of the Imamah to the decision of a shina (wa-‘azama an yaj‘alaha shina) between the ‘Alids and the “Abbasids. In other words, to let the entire “Prophet’s family” decide for itself. Later, however, when he went into the matter more deeply, he feared that the shia might perhaps not arrive at a decision and therefore he

decided to allow the Imamah to pass, either to the family of Hasan, or to that of Husayn. He wrote letters to three persons: to Ja‘far b. Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. Husayn, to ‘Umar b. “Ali b. Husayn b. ‘Ali and to ‘Abdallah b. Hasan b. Hasan b. ‘Ali. He sent these letters by a messenger to these three persons.”* The messenger went first to Ja‘far (as-sadiq), who, on hearing who had sent the letter, burned it unread and told the messenger: “You see my answer.” ‘Abdallah b. Hasan was most enthusiastic when he received the letter and immediately hastened to Ja‘far to tell him about it. “Here is a letter from Abi Salamah,” he said. “He calls upon me to accept the office; he thinks I am the man most deserving of it; and behold! Our shi‘ah has arrived from Khurasan.” But Ja‘far cooled his cousin’s enthusiasm: “Since

when these are your shi‘ah?” he asked. “Did you send Aba Muslim to Khurasan? did you bid him put on black garments? Do you know Sulayman b. Kathir or Qahtabah b. Shabib or any of them by his name or his nasab? How is it that they are your shi‘ah when you do not know them nor they you?” ‘Abdallah b. Hasan shook his sleeve and said: “You say these words only because you have an interest in the matter.” Said Ja‘far: “God knows that I do not withhold good counsel from any person who belongs to the community of Muhammad; how should I withhold it from you who are my uncle? Do not deceive yourself

with idle words. This power will belong only to them (the ‘Abbasids), and not to anyone of the family of Aba Talib ...”

74 See also Dustir al-Wuzara’, p. 26; cf., Mas‘idi, vol. cit., pp. 254-255 and Jahshiy4ri, p. 86.

The Moment of Victory 255 ‘Abdallah left him without receiving any satisfaction.75 “Umar b. ‘Ali b. al-Husayn did not receive the letter at all as he was not in

al-Madinah at that time.7© The messenger was delayed on returning to Abi Salamah and arrived about forty days after the arrival of the ‘Abbasid family in Kifah. This period was sufficient for them to contact the leaders of the army behind Abu Salamah’s back and to appear in public with Abi al-°Abbas at their head and to crown him as Caliph.” This tradition consists of two parts: the latter part is a later ‘Abbasid fabrication dating from the time of al-Mansur and his war against ‘Abdallah b. Hasan. It is entirely concerned with proving that, even a man like Ja‘far as-Sadig, one of the most honoured members of the “Alid family, recognized the right of the ‘Abbasids to rule and stressed that they were the founders of the movement in Khur4san, and that no other person or family could claim any rights to it. There can hardly be any question that this part of the tradition was invented by court historians who, towards the end of Manstr’s reign and especially during the reign of his son, Mahdi, were ordered to rewrite the history of the Da‘wah, eliminating completely the Hashimiyyah part in it and stressing that it originated with “Abbas, the Prophet’s uncle, and had nothing to do with ‘Ali and his descendants.’® The former part of the tradition, however, seems reasonable enough and states that Abu Salamah wished to submit the question of the Caliphate to the arbitration of a shiu7a.79 The shiva was an ideal. This concept emerged on the scene whenever problems arose concerning the legitimacy of the government. Attributed to no less than ‘Umar b. al-Khattab, it was the ideal and inspiration of all good Muslims when they were faced with fitnah — a split within Islam caused by strife, especially over the question of the leadership of Islam. The shiva was an ideal that had never been put into practice after the first and only time following ‘Umar’s

death. The main weakness of the idea of the shia stemmed from the fact that only a legitimate Caliph could name its members. But since the problem with which the shia was supposed 75 Anonyme, fols. 290a-29 1a. 76 =: [bid., fol. 291a. 77. ~—s [bid., fol. 291a-292a.

78 Banners, pp. 86f. 79 As if to say: The Da‘wah propagated the cause of the Prophet's family and now that the leader is dead let the whole of the Prophet’s family assemble and decide for itself.

256 Chapter 6 to deal was exactly that of who the legitimate Caliph was, it is easy to see how the ideal had a built-in condition which prevented its being put into practice.

We can easily imagine that Abi Salamah also sincerely believed that only by means of shiva would he be able to solve the problem which confronted him, while the movement, and with it the whole Islamic world, was without any authorized ruler. The fact that there was nobody who could authorize the convening of the shiima seems not to have occurred to him or to anybody who came with the same idea. It does not seem, however, that he actually applied to any “Alid to take part in such a shim. Be that as it may, the ‘Abbasids were too quick for him and far more practical and realistic. It is evident that, from their point of view, Abi Salamah had become their enemy. During the earliest stages of his rule, Abi al-‘Abbas could not reveal his hostility towards the veteran and venerable leader; Abii Salamah was still strong. As far as legitimacy was concerned, his status was even stronger than that of Abt al-‘Abbas himself, both because of his position as senior and chief of the living leaders of the Da‘wah, and also by virtue of the wide powers of government which had been conferred on him directly by Ibrahim. Abi al-‘Abbas had no alternative but to extend a warm welcome to Abii Salamah and to pay him respect, but at the same time he began to prepare the ground for his removal.®° It was necessary that Abi Salamah should vanish — should die — because he was one of the few who knew just how shaky the constitutional basis for the rule of Abi al-‘Abbas was. The ‘Abbasid Caliphate had come into existence. It claimed to have brought salvation to Islam. After nearly a hundred years of what the Da‘wah persistently presented as an illegal rule, the dawlah had appeared — a new period of rebirth for the Islamic community.®! The tradition relates that in the coronation speech which Abi al-‘Abbas was unable to finish because of illness, his uncle, Dawud b. ‘Ali, standing two steps below him on the minbar in Kifah, said: “O men, never since the Prophet has a Caliph stood upon your minbar save only amir al-mu’ minin ‘Ali b. Aba Talib and the present amir al-mu’ minin,” — pointing

to Aba al-‘Abbas. “Know ye that this government will remain

80 Azdi, p. 123; Jahshiyari, p. 87; Baladhurt, vol. cit., p. 140; Wellhausen, . 546.

81 Ibid. p. 556 and n. 2.

The Moment of Victory 257 with us and will not depart from us until we shall render it up to Jesus, the son of Mary ...”82 These words undoubtedly express the atmosphere of the scene and the aspirations of the “Abbasids.

From their very first moment in power, they endeavoured to pass themselves as the Mahdis whom Islam had been awaiting to bring its salvation. Nor was it by chance that the “Abbasid

Caliphs were the first to assume regnal titles with a clear Messianic connotation — al-Mansur, al-Mahdi, al-Hadi, arRashid, al-Amin, etc. The important innovation of the ‘Abbasid dawlah lay in the fact that it shifted the centre of government to Iraq, nearer to the source of its power in Khurasan. This meant that Syria was demoted from the position of primacy it had always enjoyed in the Islamic empire. Henceforth, the “Abbasids expanded all their en-

ergies and gave all their attention to Iraq and the Eastern

provinces of their realm. :

For a long time, Syria retained its loyalty to the Umayyads to such an extent that a special brand of Syrian Messianism devel-

oped around the figure of the sufydani, a descendant of Mu'‘awiyah b. Aba Sufyan. The new dynasty deliberately neglected this province.®3 However, the ‘Abbasids decided not to move to Khurasan. Khurasan had indeed supplied the forces which had brought them into power. But Khurasan was foreign, not Arab. The “Abbasid Caliphate was an Arab Caliphate and

favoured Arab Iraq in preference to Iranian Khurasan. Nevertheless, by neglecting Syria the ‘Abbasids neglected the real Arab hinterland and, although they lived in Iraq among an Arab population, their policy was deliberately designed to undermine the privileged status of the Arab element in the state. This process began, as we have already seen, when Abi Muslim drew up the diwan of his army, not according to the soldiers’ tribal origin, but according to the villages in which they resided.

This process acquired considerable momentum after the ‘Abbasids consolidated their power, as we shall see in the following chapter. To sum up, the ‘Abbasid revolution was essentially Arab in character; it replaced one Arab aristocracy with another. Whereas the Umayyad aristocracy was an original preIslamic aristocracy, the ‘Abbasid aristocracy based its claim not

82 Anonyme, fols. 292b-293a; Tabari, III, p. 33; Azdi, p. 124; Kafi, p. 179. 83 See Ibn al-Mugqaffa*’s advice to Mansir not to neglect the Syrians. Ibn alMugqaffa'’, Risalah fi as-Sahabah, pp. 127-128; see also Madelung, pp. 5f.

258 Chapter 6 on genealogy, but on its status in Islam. The genealogical component in the ‘Abbasid official history (traced to Hashim b. “Abd

Manaf) only appeared after the “Abbasid dynasty had been firmly established from the time of Caliph al-Mahdi onwards. The Islamic nature of the ‘Abbasid state obviously weakened its leaning towards Arabism. While the Umayyads had stressed the basic, original Arab character of Islam, allowing the state to become embroiled in the endless conflicts between the Arab tribes,

the ‘Abbasids with their stress on Islamism gradually emancipated themselves from the malaise of ‘asabiyyah. By demoting the Arabs from their privileged social and political status, they opened the door wide for the talents of other peoples to come and enrich Islam and its culture. * OK kk O&K

In this volume, we have proved beyond all doubt that in the decisive stage, the Da‘wah was a movement based primarily on the support of the Arabs who formed the bulk of its army and comprised the backbone of its command. The theory evolved by Van Vloten and Wellhausen that the Da‘wah expressed the national aspirations of the Iranians and that most of its active supporters were of Iranian origin, has no factual basis. Our fundamental conclusion is that the Da‘wah was primarily an Arab movement since, at this period, it was impossible for any opposition to the Arab rule to arise from any other than an Arab source. Later developments, after the rise of the “Abbasids to power, brought about a situation in which the deliberate policy of the ‘Abbasids caused the Arabs to decline from most of their privileged positions in the state.84 This process was most marked in 84 See Lassner, Shaping, p.91. It is this change, which took place during the 9th century, that caused some historians to stress the non-Arab nature of the Da‘wah. Denys of Tell Mahre speaks about “the Persians (who) invaded the land of Syria, subjugated the Arabs and reigned in their place.” He proceeds to describe the “Persian invasion” in Armageddonian terms. Denys

de Tell Mahre, pp. 48f. (Syriac text), 43f. (French translation). Theophanes, however, does not speak about Persians but, similar to the

Arab sources, about Khorasanitai and Mauroforoi — clad in black. Chronographia anno mundi 6240. See also a straightforward description Eliae Nisibeni, pp. 171-172. Lately, it is possible to detect a tendency, among certain scholars, to revive the theory about the non-Arab, or even anti-Arab, character of the revolution. They enumerate the non-Arabs who

The Moment of Victory 259 the army. Here the ‘Abbasids developed a policy, the aim of which was to establish a loyal, well-ordered and professional fighting force in contrast to their predecessors’ tribal army which

had brought itself and the state to ruin through the internecine struggles among the various tribal units. A change in the structure of the army began in the time of Abi Muslim with the introduction of the registration in the diwan, thereby opening up unlimited possibilities for the admission of non-Arab elements into the army. The ‘Abbasids appreciated the ability and trustworthiness of these elements, so that they gradually displaced the Arabs. In this way, the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah, contrary to its original aims and intentions, led to an ending of the hereditary privileged status of the Arabs in the Islamic state and hence also to a decline

in their importance as a creative force in the various fields of Islamic culture.

took part in it and even reached the status of leadership therein. Names of non-Arabs, as many as they may be, can not obscure the fact that they were subordinate to Arab officers in the field and to Arab leaders who served the cause of an Arab dynasty. See Daniel pp. 26, 35, 73-74.

VI APPENDIX: THE MILITARY REFORMS OF ABU MUSLIM, THEIR BACKGROUND AND CONSEQUENCES

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 263 7 INTRODUCTION

Throughout Islamic history, the army emerged as the most predominant institution in the state. Its importance was due to the fact that, almost from the very inception of the Islamic empire, it was the army which decided the identity of the rulers and the duration of their rule. The ideological and juristic arguments, in favour of the rulers or against them, came not in the course of the strife over the rule between the various pretenders, but rather after the military had its say. Thus, the debate over the legitimacy of authority in early Islam did not precede the establishment of the Umayyad or ‘Abbasid ruling houses, but rather ensued after their assuming power by the force of arms.1

Because of the commanding position of the army in the Muslim political and social life, it is no wonder that it has remained the most organized and the most influential institution in the Arab and Muslim world to this very day. In modern times, the armies in most of the Arab States have been responsible for the rapid transformation of the short-lived civilian political systems into military regimes. In the Middle Ages, the military institution reached such a degree of independence, that it was easily

able to assume power and establish itself in the form of the Mamlik military society of Egypt (and Syria). - Naturally, the beginning and organization of the military institution in Islam are of great interest, particularly since these beginnings are inseparable from the birth of the Islamic state as a

whole.? David Ayalon, who was the first to grasp the tremendous historical importance of the Mamluk military society for comprehending the major trends of Islamic history, also understood the great need to go back in time, in order to search for the Origins of the professional non-Arab military institution in

Islam.

Twenty five years ago he presented his major conclusions on the subject to the Congress of Orientalists in New Delhi (1964). 1 On the debate over the legitimacy of authority in Islam, see M. Sharon, “Debate,” pp. 121-142; Banners, p. 297.

2 For a detailed study on the development of the administration of the Muslim army see W. Hoenerbach, “Zur Heeresverwaltung der ‘Abbasiden,” Der Islam, 29/3 (1950), pp. 257-290.

3 Ayalon, “Preliminary Remarks,” pp. 42-58.

264 Chapter 7 His long study, entitled The Military Reforms of Caliph alMu‘tasim, Their Background and Consequences, has never been published but has been cited since — from the provisional type-

script — by almost every scholar who dealt with the ‘Abbasids or the Muslim armies. Ayalon’s study of the military reforms of Caliph al-Mu‘tasim (218/833-227/842), the Caliph who was responsible for the first serious systematic attempt to replace the Arabs by Turks in the ‘Abbasid army), deals with the Arab element in the Muslim army in the early days of the ‘Abbasids, and examines the reasons and

circumstances which led to its replacement by non-Arabs, notably Turks. The latter rose to outstanding predominance from

the time of Caliph Ma’min (198/813-218/833) onwards. Beginning in the middle of the ninth century, the history of the central Muslim empire is completely predominated by the Turks, who eventually established two great empires, the Mamlik and the Ottoman. These empires dominated the Muslim scene for almost seven hundred years. To be sure, save for the first two centuries of Islamic history in which the Arabs occupied the foreground, the rest of the time non-Arabs have played the major role in the military as well as the political, administrative and even cultural life of the Islamic states.* Although a considerable amount of information is available for reconstructing a picture of the early armies of Islam, it is doubtful whether this picture is at all accurate in its details. The Arab sources are all relatively late and, on the whole, too influenced by the internal strife among the various Muslim religiopolitical factions, to allow for the reconstruction of a reliable

picture of the early stages of either the Muslim state or the Muslim army.

4 Ayalon, The Military Reforms, p. 45, quotes the penetrating observation of Mas‘tdi, Murij (Pellat), V, p. 211, that as a result of a premeditated pol-

icy of Caliph Mansar, who preferred his mawali to the Arabs, the latter lost their military and social predominance (fa-saqalat qiyadat al- ‘arab wazalat riyasatuha wa-dhahabat maritibuha).

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 265 THE FOUNDATION OF THE UMAYYAD MILITARY POWER

The Arab-Islamic expansion into the Byzantine and Sassanian territories in the first half of the 7th century produced, generally speaking, a minimal degree of violence. When the wars ended, two facts stood out. The first was that most of Syria was captured by sulh agreements, and the second was that the Arab armies in Syria were put under the command of a member of the Umayyad family (Yazid and then Mu‘awiyah), who was soon to rule Syria and thenceforth to take over the leadership of the Muslim state. The traditionalists and chroniclers, in many cases, managed to

create a standard character for the su/h agreements? and thus paved the road for the jurists in their turn to form the precedents needed for the compilation of the detailed codes of taxation, especially the land tax and the poll tax. In Iraq and Egypt the local sulh agreements brought about the

confinement of the Arabs in camps in certain areas outside the cultivable land. In time, these camps, or “military towns,” were given the name amsar and their establishment was attributed to a preconceived caliphal system of military settlements.®

5 Baladhuri, Fut&h, pp. 113, 116, 130-131; Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam, Futuh, pp. 84f. For the summary of the traditional scheme of the Arab campaigns and

their consequences, see Hill, Termination of Hostilities and Donner, Conquests, Ch. Ul (for Syria) and Ch. IV (for Iraq).

6 Cf., Baladhuri, Futzh, p. 275. Cf., Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam, op. cit., p. 162. The exclusion of the Arab nomads from the cultivated lands of the Fertile Crescent and Egypt was made into a caliphal order and used by the Muslim

jurists for the development of the general theory of fay’ (cf., El’ s.v. “‘fay’”’). Needless to say that the theory and its practical institution were attributed almost automatically to ‘Umar. The Caliph is said to have decided that the occupied territory of Iraq should remain a constant source of income for the Muslims wherever they may be. The nomads were to be barred from these lands, which should be left in the hands of their original cultivators. “Allah has made these who will come after you partners in this fay’. Were I to divide the land among you (who are present) now, nothing will be left for them,” the Caliph reportedly said. “Even a shepherd boy in the remote land of San‘a’ in Yemen is entitled to his share in the fay’,” said he; Abd Yosuf, Kharaj, pp. 23-24. Needless to say that this tradition was created to provide an authoritative foundation for an existing situation which stemmed from the special relations which had traditionally developed between the sedentary populations and the Arab nomads. It has nothing to do with ‘Umar’s preconceived decision the like of which the over-

266 Chapter 7 In Syria, however, no such camps were established. The reason is that the Byzantine heritage in Syria was almost unaffected by the Arab takeover. The professional Byzantine bureaucracy carried on its duties corresponding and reporting in Greek (to

whom?) The currency remained the same and the Emperor, Heraclius, who is said to have relinquished Syria to the Arab conquerors after the Battle of the Yarmik, was far too busy defending his capital from the Avars, the Bulgarians and the Slavs who had broken through the Blakans, to be able to deal with the local Arab leader that took over from the Ghassanids, and became the “King of the Arabs” in Syria.’ Mu‘awiyah was this leader. While one Arab leader in Iraq, ‘Ali b. Aba Talib, fought against other Arab leaders from the Hyaz (Zubayr, Talhah), Mu‘awiyah, who came from a family

long established in Syria, the Umayyads, managed to crown himself as a supreme ruler (malik) of the Arab tribes in Syria.® His success was due to the fact that he truly succeeded in forming a standing army that was professional, disciplined and loyal. This army was made up of warriors belonging to the old, estab-

lished Arab tribes of Syria who must have served under the Byzantines, either directly as auxiliaries, or as part of the Ghassanid forces. They were used to the existence of an imperial sovereign, central government and a hierarchical military command. They must have also had a certain kind of uniform

enthusiastic awa’ il literature attributed to him. Surprisingly, some modern

scholars still give credibility to the tradition which glorifies ‘Umar in connection with the conquest of Jerusalem, the establishment of the administrative order in occupied Syria and the provisions for “the stipends paid to the troops (‘aia’) and for their rations (rizq).” Donner, op. cit., pp. 151-152. See also Gill, I, p. 42f.

7 The best expression appears in Baladhuri, Futih, p. 137: “Adieu Syria! What an excellent land it is for the enemy.” C/., Ibn al-‘Ibri, Ta’rikh Mukhtasar ad-Duwal, ed. A. Salhhani, Beirut, 1958, p. 102. See, Ostrogorsky, pp. 95-104; J. Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire, London, 1968, p. 320. 8 The title malik which the later pious ‘Abbasid tradition used as a derogatory title to disparage the Umayyads, was the most important honorific title of leadership among the Arabs, at least in Syria, as can be learned from the inscription of Imru’ al-Qays dated A.D. 328 in which Imru’ al-Qays boasts that he is the “King (malik) of all the Arabs.” See R. Dussaud in Revue Archeologique, 3. Ser., XLI (1902), p. 411; Wiet, Repertoire, No. 1.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 267 known as “a Syrian headgear” (‘amamah shamiyyah).? With such an army, so utterly different from the tribal, capricious, ‘asabiyyah stricken followers of ‘Ali and the Zubayrids, it was no wonder that Mu‘awiyah and his immediate successors were able to consolidate their rule in Syria and extend it to Egypt, Iraq and the Hijaz. The consolidation of the Arab territorial gains in the former Byzantine domains was a prolonged process, the description of which is outside the scope of this study. It is suffi-

cient to say that until the time of ‘Abd al-Malik (685-705), Mu‘awiyah and his successors paid, from time to time, tribute to

the Byzantine Emperor and conformed to the rules of the Byzantine bureaucratic machine.!° We tend to agree with the

conclusions of Crone and Cook!! and, lately, of Suliman Bashear,’2 that “Abd al-Malik (685-705) should be held responsible for the consolidation of independent Islam and its establishment as a State religion. Through the efficient usage of

his loyal army, ‘Abd al-Malik put an end to the rule of the Zubayrids in Hijaz and Iraq,'? and united the empire on the 9 Kofi, VOI, p. 158. On Jund ahl ash-sham, see Banners, pp. 61-64. Cf., for details, Hasson, p. 261f. In the Byzantine sources, notably the Notitia Dignitatum (c. A.D. 420) there is detailed information about the local, Arab and other “indigenous” auxiliaries and ordinary units in the service of the Byzantines. Thus in Provincia Arabia and Southern Palestine, which is the most relevant province of Syria for our discussion, the following units are mentioned by name: Equites Sagitarii indigenae (few units), Equites Promoti indigenae (few units), Cohors III Felix Arabum (ordinary unit), Equites I Felices Sagitariit indigenae Palaestinii. See details in M. Avi-

Yonah, Historical Geography of Palestine (Hebrew), 3rd edition, Jerusalem, 1963, pp. 172-178, and notes. Cf., F. E. Peters, “Byzantium and the Arabs of Syria,” Annales Archeologiques Arabes Syriennes, vol. XXVU, (1977-1978), p. 99f.

10 Mu‘awiyah most probably tried to encroach upon the Byzantine domains in Asia Minor, and the Arabic sources even speak about the Arab army reaching the Byzantine capital itself. At the end of his life, however, the general situation in the East did not change very much, at least as far as the Byzantines were concerned. The aged Mu‘awiyah had “to pay the Emperor 3 000 gold pieces annually and to send in addition fifty prisoners and fifty horses.” Ostrogorsky, pp. 124-125.

11 P. Crone and M. Cook, op. cit., passim. Cook, Dogma, p. 154.

12 S. Bashear, op. cit., p. 8. 13. The conquest of Mecca from the hands of ‘Abdallah Ibn Zubayr was of particular importance for the establishment of Islam as an independent religion. ‘Abd al-Malik destroyed the old Ka‘bah, and built a new one. This new Ka‘bah was officially fixed as the grand sanctuary of the state religion — Islam. It was then that the pilgrimage to Mecca became the prime inter-

268 Chapter 7 model of his predecessor Mu‘awiyah. He took advantage of the problems of the Byzantines in their European provinces, to stop the payment of tribute to the Emperor and abolish the Byzantine administration and the Byzantine currency. He created, instead, an Arab bureaucracy in Arabic, minted his own Arab coins, with Clear Muslim formulae, and established Islam as the religion of the state.!4

As far as the early Arab army is concerned, the picture that emerges from the above description is of a disciplined and loyal Standing army in the service of the Umayyads in Syria, and many tribal groups whom the Madinian and Iraqi leadership tried to keep in check, or appease, through a crude system of payments called ‘ata’. Some of the tribes in Syria who were not included in the professional units of jund ahl ash-sham were also pacified by ‘ata’ payments. The later Muslim chroniclers and bureaucrats sensed the tribal nature behind the ‘ata’ system, which must have been far from being an orderly affair. But, striving to put early Islamic history in order, the chroniclers attributed to ‘Umar the establishment of a special register where all the recipients of the ‘ata’ were neatly enlisted according to their tribal affiliation (and their seniority in Islam.)!*

Having mentioned the semi-legendary origin of the tradition of ‘Umar’s diwan, we may use it as a Starting point for discussing the transformations which befell the Arab military establishment. This transformation can best be examined against the background of the reforms introduced by Abi Muslim at the initial stages of the “Abbasid revolution in Khurasan. A PECULIAR DESIGNATION OF THE KHURAS ANITES

An apocalyptic tradition aimed at presenting the advent of the ‘Abbasids as the ultimate Messianic salvation, contains a clue to Abi Muslim’s military reforms. The tradition, which belongs to a large body of traditions dealing with the praises (fadd@ il) of the est of the state and it was then that Mecca officially took the place of Jerusalem, and Islam was thus completely liberated from both its Jewish and Christian connections. On the building of the Ka‘bah by Hajjaj for ‘Abd al-Malik, see Tabari, II, p. 854; Baladhuri, Ansab, IVB, p. 56.

14 Tabari, II, pp. 939-940. Jahshiyari, Wuzara’, p. 40; Walker, p. 30.

15 Cf., Baladhuri, Futih, p. 448f.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 269 people of Khurasan, was put into the mouth of Qahtabah b. Shabib. Quoting Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah b. “Abbas, Qahtabah reportedly said: “From Khurasan shall come forth in future time seventy thousand men with drawn swords, their hearts like iron bars; their names are patronymics and their lineage is the villages (innahu yakhruju min khurasan sab‘in alf sayf mashhur, qulubuhum ka-zubur al-hadid asma’ uhum al-kuna wa-ansabuhum al-qura.)?'®

In addition to the Khurasanites’ highly praised bravery and warlike qualities, this tradition contains two particularly impor-

gin. |

tant details, both dealing with the designation of the Khurasanites. Instead of personal names they were known by their kunyahs (patronymics) and instead of the usual nisbah to an Arab tribe, their “lineage” derived from their villages of ori-

In spite of its ostensible apocalyptic setting and style, this tradition has much to say about the practices introduced by the ‘Abbasid da‘wah. From its very inception, the movement made great efforts to remain clandestine and conceal the real identity of its members. This anonymity was achieved by the assumption of kunyahs which were not the real patronymics of the Da‘wah activists. Thus, one of the early ‘Abbasid emissaries to Khurasan,

whose real kunyah was Abi ‘Ikrimah, was ordered by Muhammad b. “Ali b. “Abdallah b. ‘Abbas to call himself by a less conspicuous kunyah, Abi Muhammad, before he left for Khurasan. The practice of using patronymics, instead of real names, must have been so widespread among the members of the Da‘wah, that it has become one of its distinctive characteristics, and the apocalyptic tradition was created in order to give

this peculiarity a prophetic ratification.!” | The detail about the nisbah according to the villages of origin (instead of tribes) is far more important, because it relates to Abi

Muslim’s profound reform of the registration system of the revolutionary “Abbasid Army. 16 Hamadhani, Buldan, p. 315 (ll. 18-20); Yaqit, Buldan, s.v. “Khurasan”; Anonyme, Leiden, (Dhikr Bani al-‘Abbas) fol. 3b has a variant on this tradition clearly to elucidate the ambiguous expression of “their lineage is

the villages”; instead, the author of the Anonyme has “they live in villages” (suknahum al-qura).

17 Banners, p. 156. As far as the assumption of new kunyahs is concerned, there was no difference between Arabs and mawali. Cf., Akhbar, p. 216f.

270 Chapter 7 ABU MUSLIM’S NEW DIWAN

We have seen that at the end of the year 129/747, Abi Muslim,

having successfully established himself at the head of the Da‘wah in Khurasan, proclaimed the open revolt.!8 He established his headquarters in Makhuwan and proceeded to organize the main administrative bodies of the movement. Naturally, he turned his attention first to the army. Under his

command, in Makhuwan, were already a few thousand men who had to be properly registered and paid. Abi: Muslim introduced a new system of registration which, in the course of time, proved to be one of the major revolutions of the Da‘wah. Abu Muslim decided to establish a new register — diwan — for the

army, the first “Abbasid diwan which was to replace the Umayyad diwan. The novelty in Abt Muslim’s diwdn was in the system of enrollment: the warriors were not enrolled in the diwGn according to their tribal origin, but all the soldiers, regardless of their origin, could be registered in the new diwan on an equal basis and receive equal pay. In this way, Abi Muslim matched the rights of the mawali to those of the Arabs as far as the payment of the ‘ata’ was concerned. In taking this step, Abi Muslim was the first to deal a death blow to the Arab supremacy in the Muslim army and Muslim society. The “Abbasids, once in power, proceeded to develop, as we shall see below, this system and stripped from the Arabs almost all the privileges which they

had enjoyed, at least nominally, until the end of the Umayyad period. What was the key to the enrollment in the new diwan? The language of the source on this matter is perfectly clear:

Abi Muslim ordered Kamil b. Muzaffar to review the troops in the fortress (of Makhuw4n) and to list them in a register according to their names, the names of their fathers and to establish their nisbah according to their villages.!9 Abii Muslim also instructed Kamil b. Muzaffar to send an emissary to Muhriz b. Ibrahim, the commander of the second camp of the revolutionary army in Jiranj, in order to apply the Same system of registration there. “To enlist the men according to their names, the names of their fathers and their villages.”

18 Tabari, II, p. 1954; Akhbar, p. 277. 19 Tabari, II, pp. 1968-1969. 20 Tabari, II, p. 1957.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 271 Hoenerbach, who dedicated an extensive study to the administration of the ‘Abbasid army, spotted this tradition, but failed to relate the detail about the nisbah to the villages which appears

in it, to the new code of registration. In his translation of the main part of the tradition, the words fa-yansubuhum ila al-qura

are lost in the phrase “nach Name, Vatersname und

Herkunftsort.”! The military reform of Abi Muslim elucidates the meaning of the seemingly apocalyptic tradition depicting the Khurasanites as

people whose nisbahs are the villages. In the eyes of the ‘Abbasid court historians and propagandists, the abolition of tribal key for registration and ‘ata’ payment and its replacement by a new one according to the villages of origin, was a revolution worthy of an apocalyptic vision. TRADITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CLASSICAL DIWAN

We have already pointed out the legendary origins of what may be called the classical army register or diwa@n al-jund. Like many other novelties in Islam, this diw@n was also attributed to Caliph

‘Umar. However, for our discussion, this detail, which belongs more to the awa’ il literature than to historical fact, is of minor importance.” We shall therefore discuss the classical diwdn as it is commonly known, stressing only the points relating to the part played by Arabs and non-Arabs in the military establishment which developed in the Muslim Empire. The sources, which tell us about the formation of the diwan “in the time of ‘Umar’ and describe its character, explain that it was drawn up according to kinship with the Prophet, seniority in, and service to, Islam and Arab origin.”

21 Hoenerbach, p. 263. 22 Hoenerbach, pp. 260-261 has remarked that the preoccupation of the awa' il literature with conferring titles of primacy on various persons of the past, notwithstanding the Prophet and first Caliphs, prevents the arrival at a clear notion as to the time, the origins or the process by which the diwan al-jund was introduced to Islam.

23 Baladhurl, Futuh, p. 44ff.; Ibn Khaldan, Muqaddimah, I, p. 613; Abad ‘Ubayd, Amwal, pp. 223-224: fa-man asra‘a ila al-hijrah asra‘a bihi al-‘ata ))’ wa-man abta'a ‘an al-hijrah abta’a ‘anhu al-‘ata’ fa-la yalimanna rajul illa munakh rahilatihi (“One who hurries to the hijrah (i.e. going out to

272 Chapter 7 There is some disagreement concerning the amount of the ‘ata’ which was laid down for members of the three most important tribal blocs — Yaman, Mudar and Rabi‘ah. It is, however, presented by the tradition as an undisputed fact that the system

of enrollment was based on tribal origin. One of the traditions which mentions the distribution of the ‘ata’ in the time of ‘Umar says: wa-farada li-ahl al-yaman fi arba‘imi’ ah wa-li-mudar fi thalathimi’ ah wa-li-rabi‘ah fi mi’ atayn. “He assigned (‘ata’) to the Yaman tribesmen at the rate of four hundred (dirhams), to Mudar at the rate of three hundred and to Rabi‘ah at the rate of two hundred.” Three persons, experts in matters of nasab —

‘Agil b. Aba Talib, Makhramah b. Nawfal and Zubayr b. Mut‘im b. Nawfal b. ‘Abd Manaf, all members of Quraysh — were commanded by the Caliph as follows: uktubi an-nas ‘ala manazilihim — “Enrol the men according to their tribal origins.”

MAWALI IN THE DIWAN

There were also, as early as “the time of “Umar,” some nonArabs, mainly Persians, who were enrolled among the recipients

of ‘ata’. These, however, were isolated cases, men who could claim special rights in Islam or had performed important services to Muslims. Thus we hear of mawali, and even slaves who, having taken part in the battle of Badr, were included by “Umar in the diwan.% The inclusion of these mawdli among those en-

the holy war outside of Arabia) the ‘aa’ quickly comes to him, and one who lingers from going out to the hijrah, the ‘aia’ lingers from coming to him. A man should not blame but the resting place of his camel.”) On the basis of this principle, the bedouins (a‘7a@b), who continued to roam in their traditional lands, did not receive the ‘ai’. See also ibid., pp. 227-8; Baladhuri, Futish, p. 458; Cahen, EP, s.v. “‘ata’.” On the privileged position of Arab warriors (muqdatilah), see Wellhausen, p. 25 and nn. 1, 2. 2% @= Ya‘qabi, Ta’rikh, I, p. 175. Cf., for the amounts distributed, Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 451; wa-farada li-ahl al-yaman wa-qays bi-ash-sham li-kull rajul ma bayn al-alfayn ila alf ila tis‘imi'ah ila thalathimi'ah wa-lam yanqus ahad ‘an thalathimi’ ah (“He granted to the tribes of Yaman and Qays in Syria, to every man between 2 000 to 1 000, to 900 and (even) to 300, and to no-one less than 300.”) 25 Baladhurl, Futhh, pp. 449, 457; Ya‘qoabi, Ta’rikh, Ul, p. 175. 26 Baladhuri, Futhh, p. 455: wa-‘amma ‘umar bi-faridatihi kull sahth wa-halif wa-mawla shahida badr, fa-lam yufaddil ‘alaa had (““‘Umar included in the framework of this distribution every pure Arab, ally (halif) or mawla, who

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 273 titled to receive the ‘ata’ was made in accordance with the rule, which existed already in the pre-Islamic times, to give mawali

the same rights and impose on them the same obligations as those of the Arab tribesmen themselves. As Goldziher writes: “Generally speaking, the rule of the equality of the mawali with other tribesmen was observed, and in this respect the following principles were operative: al-wala’ luhmah ka-luhmat an-nasab

and al-wala’ nasab thabit. This means: ‘The relations of the wala’ are regarded as the blood-kinship of common origin and the relations of the wala’ are equivalent to proven nasab.’ ”’?

Whenever it was a question of individual mawali, according to the Jahili formula,”8 one could apply those general rules also with regard to the right to receive ‘ata’. But when, as a result of the Arab conquests, a great influx of mawali began, it was no longer possible to continue this policy.” We hear, from time to time, of the continued inclusion of non-Arab individuals within. the framework of the diwan — most likely because of political considerations. Thus it is related that the Hurmuzan and also a number of Persian Dihqans obtained the right to be included in the lists of the diwan and to receive a considerably high ‘ata’ .3° In addition to this, we find, as early as the very beginning of Islam, a clearly marked trend to reinforce the ranks of the Arab army with high-grade auxiliary forces recruited from among the peoples with whom the Arabs came into contact in the course of their expeditions. One important group of such warriors, called Asawirah, was integrated into the Arab forces almost immediately after the taking over of Iraq. The Asawirah served as auxillary forces within the Sassanian army, and joined the Arabs as fought at Badr and he did not favour one over the other’’). See ibid., for an

additional tradition on the same theme and in the same spirit. See also ibid., pp. 457, 460; Aba ‘Ubayd, op. cit., p. 235, and p. 243, for the ‘ata’ for slaves that were at Badr.

27, «I. Goldziher, Muslim Studies, I, p. 103 and nn. 5,6. See also Jahiz, Rasa il, I, p. 12 and nn. 5, 6.

28 Goldziher, op. cit., I, p. 101 ff. 29 Ibid., p. 194. Abi ‘Ubayd, Amwal, p. 286, casts doubts on the veracity of the story according to which ‘Umar ordered that the ‘aia’ be given to con-

verts to Islam as it was to Arabs. On the other hand, the report that ‘Umar’s representative refused to grant the ‘ai’ to mawall is apparently true.

30. Baladhuri, Futih, pp. 457-8; Ya‘qabi, Ta’rikh, Il, pp. 143-4; Aba‘ Ubayd, op. cit., p. 236. On ‘Ali, it is told that he gave equal ‘ata’ to both mawali and Arabs. See Ya‘qibi, Ta’rikh, II, p. 213.

274 Chapter 7 soon as it became clear to them that luck had turned against their

former masters. They were enrolled in the diwan in a place of honour and had the right to a high rate of pay in the category of sharaf al-‘ata’ >! They settled among the Arabs in Basrah in a special quarter of the town, near a special canal which they dug for themselves and which was known as “Nahr al-Asawirah,”’ and they entered into an alliance with the tribe of Tamim in the city.32 After the end of the battles for conquest in Fars, the Asawirah were joined by warriors from the routed Persian army, who had no landed property. They accepted Islam and, accord-

ing to Baladhuri, they gained a status equal to that of the Asawirah. Warriors of three other ethnic groups, Zutt, Sayabijah and Andaghan (or Andaghar), who, according to Baladhuri, originated from Sind, also joined the Muslim. army and obtained a rank similar to that of the Asawirah. These three groups of fighters had also belonged to the Persian army as auxiliary forces.33 The soldiers of these ethnic groups were considered first-rate fighters. The Asawirah, for example, were renowned for their great skill in the use of the bow. Tabari relates that four hundred of their archers, fighting alongside their Tamimite allies in the tribal war at Basrah in the year 64/684, shot salvos of two thousand arrows simultaneously, each soldier shooting a volley of five arrows from his bow.* Picked men were taken from the Sayabijah and the Zutt to serve on special guard duties in Basrah; thus we find forty of them assigned to

“bayt al-mal,” i.e. the treasury of Basrah, in the time of ‘Uthman.* The first troops from Transoxania were also brought to Basrah at the same period; ‘Ubaydallah b. Ziyad brought with him a group of prisoners from Bukh&arah whom he set free and settled in Basrah.*° They served in the city as a first-class auxil31 Baladhuri, Futih, pp. 372-3, and thereafter another tradition until p. 376.

32 Ibid.; Tabari, II, p. 454, 461; Wellhausen, op. cit., p. 397. In time, the Asawirah began to represent a threat to the authorities. Basrah was already known for its disturbances and the Asawirah, who identified more and more

with the political aspirations of the tribe of Tamim, only made the situation worse. Hajjaj decided finally that he had had enough trouble with them, so he had their houses destroyed, along with those of their dependents, abolished their ‘at’ and scattered them; Baladhuri, Futih, p. 374. 33. ~=— [bid., pp. 373-5. See also Baladhurl, Ansab, Il, p. 92.

34 The Persian term that they used was panjgan — “groups of fives”; Tabari, Il, p. 376.

35 Baladhuri, Futzh, p. 376. 360—sdL bi.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 275 lary force under the governor of Basrah and were described as khassat as-sultan, i.e. the governor’s private police force. The Bukharan troops — the Bukhdariyyah — retained a high degree of

independence and regarded themselves as subject primarily to their immediate superiors and only secondarily to the governor.2’

This tendency to admit non-Arabs into the Arab army existed, therefore, as early as the time of the first Caliphs, even though it

is not always explicitly mentioned whether their pay was included in the budget of the diwan. Baladhuri relates that among the conquering raids in Khurasan which were undertaken in the reign of Caliph ‘Uthman from the base in Basrah, several expeditions were sent eastward. One of these forces, made up of

five thousand Muslim warriors, included among its ranks one thousand Persian Muslims (arba’ at alaf min al-‘arab wa-alf min muslimi al-‘ajam — “Four thousand Arabs and a thousand Persian Muslims.”’)?8

ARABS AND NON-ARABS IN THE UMAYYAD ARMY

In the Umayyad period the registration of the diwan continued

and was brought up to date in the capital, where the central diwan was kept, as well as in the capital cities of all the important provinces, beginning with Iraq, according to the rules laid down by ‘Umar, viz. enrollment according to Arab nasab.29 Baladhuri refers to the Iraqi diwan by the name diwan jund al‘arab and specifies that the lists in it were al-‘arab mugatilat alkitfah and al-‘arab muqatilat al-basrah.* But we also hear in the Umayyad period about the existence, within the framework of the Muslim army, of non-Arab auxiliary forces who drew pay for their service from the government treasury. “ “Abd al-Malik ordered payment to be authorized for men from the

inhabitants of Antioch and the non-Arabs therein, and they were made armed guard-posts which were joined with the forces (which

37. Tabari, I, p. 439, 444, 464; Wellhausen, p. 403. 38 Baladhuri, Futkh, p. 407. 39 See EF’, s.v. “diwan.” 40 Baladhuri, Futzh, p. 350; Tabari, I, pp. 1290-1. In Khurasan they were called muqatilat ahl al-Basrah and muqatilat ahl al-Kifah.

276 Chapter 7 fought) in the sawa’if ... he paid eight dinars to each one of them.”4!

It is difficult to understand from the wording of the text whether this payment was made within the framework of the diwan or not, although the verb — farada — which is used to denote the allotment of monies within the framework of the diwan

al-jund, may perhaps indicate that this group of warriors also was enrolled, in one way or another, in the diwdn. The attempt at equalizing the rights of the mawali and the Arabs is associated with the name of ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. This involved not only remission of the taxes, which had been levied in a manner which discriminated against the mawali, but also raising up the rank of mawali soldiers to that of the Arab soldiers in the diwan. Thus one tradition tells us that ‘Umar gave an order to raise the ‘ata’ of both Arabs and mawali by ten dirhams.* It is also said that he allotted (farada) money, in the same manner, to pay the non-Arab Khurasanites who had adopted Islam. According to the wording of our source, it seems highly probable that these men were indeed also included in the diwan. The words of the narrative are: wa-rafa‘a ‘Umar (b.‘Abd al-*Aziz) al-kharaj ‘ala man aslama bi-khurasan wa-farada li-man aslama ...** “Umar abolished the kharaj for everyone who had been converted to Islam in Khurasan and made an allotment of money to those who had adopted Islam.’’*3 We do indeed find in Khurasan the phenomenon, already observed above, that there

existed in the Muslim army, directly linked with the governor and subject to his command, military units organized separately inside the army and composed purely of “ajam. These units were commanded by a special officer “in charge of the Persians” (wahuwa ‘ala al-‘ajam). We hear of them at the beginning of the

2nd/8th century, during the governorship of Qutaybah b. Muslim in Khurasan. Furthermore, in this specific case, Qutaybah tried to employ the Persian unit to quell a mutiny of

41 Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 162. 42. = Ibn al-Jawzi, Manaqib, p. 53. Cf., the tradition in Ibn Sa‘d, Tabaqat, V, p. 254 (Il. 25-28), where it is told that ‘Umar b. ‘Abd ‘Aziz ordered the equalization of the ‘aia’ of all the fighters (“everybody who is not a merchant’). On the attempt to abolish the jizyah in his reign, see ibid., p. 254. 43 Baladhuri, Futhkh, p. 426; cf., Wellhausen, p. 451. This policy of ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz brought about such a large wave of conversions to Islam and a correspondingly steep drop in revenues, that it was quickly rescinded.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 277 Arab forces against him.“ It was at this period also that the first forerunners of the Turkish troops appeared in the Muslim army — those who were later to supplant and replace the Arabs, as well as the Persians. With Qutaybah himself fought a contingent of Soghdians (min abna’ mulitk as-sughd). Unlike the Persians, who were unfaithful to him in his hour of need, and refused to

fight against the Arabs who had rebelled against him, the Soghdians remained loyal to him until the end.* The introduction of these non-Arab elements into the Muslim army, even during the earliest periods of Islam, started a process which in the course of time led to the non-Arabs becoming the

most decisive and important military, and later even political, factor in the Muslim state. This process was of course at the expense of the Arabs, who gradually lost the important and privileged positions they had occupied until the end of the Umayyad period. Indeed, notwithstanding the isolated and exceptional cases of non-Arabs serving in the Umayyad army and being included among the recipients of ‘ata’, there is no doubt that the diwan was then Arab and that the great bulk of the army was likewise Arab.

DEFECTS OF THE ARAB FIGHTING FORCE

The Arab army, however, based as it was on tribal origins and, furthermore, on the preservation of the tribal structure within its combatant units, contained the seeds of its own weakness and disintegration. The Arab tribal tradition, with its troublesome characteristic of ‘asabiyyah — the entire culture of tribal disputes, enmities, petty vendettas, conflicts and wars — was drawn into the body of the muqdatilah and fermented within it. Since every Arab was considered to be, at least theoretically, a fighting man,

44 Baladhuri, Futih, p. 424. Mada’ini tells that this mawalli fighting force (afterwards he says that they were Persian) numbered 7 000 fighters. They were under the command of a man called Hayyan, a mawla of Shayban, who, because of the tremendous military power at his disposal, was able to interfere in the ongoing bitter political conflicts in Khurasan. See Tabari,

II, pp. 1290-1. Mada’ini describes this mawall force with the term mugatilah, which was the name used for the Arab forces who originated from Basrah and Kofah. Still, it is not explicitly stated that these mawali were registered in the diwan; see ibid.

45 Baladhuri, Futih, p. 424.

278 Chapter 7 the Muslim army came to be identified with the Arab population. The Umayyads made no serious attempt to cope with the problem of tribal ‘asabiyyah; on the contrary, through their policy of giving preference to one or the other tribal blocs according to the inclination of the Caliph or his local governors, the unity, relia-

bility, loyalty and strength of the Arab army were bound to be impaired by never-ending struggles. The Arabs lost much of their pristine warlike qualities, as a result of being dispersed amidst a non-Arab population, and because of their ever-increasing assimilation with the new and more highly developed cultures with which they came into contact. The end result was that, although theoretically all the Arab warriors were at the disposal of the Head of the Islamic State, in practice, there was no real Standing army existing in such numbers that could even approach the lists of the diwan. It was Syria which was, on the whole, loyal to the Umayyads, that produced their standing army called ahl ash-sham. Some of these Syrian forces were

Stationed in special garrison towns (Hirah and Wasit) and served, more than once, to crush Shi‘ite and other rebellions which were quite common in Iraq.“ The internal divisions within the fighting forces compelled the provincial governors, even if they did not wish to do so, to rely each on the tribal bloc to which he belonged.*’ The result was 46 See also Goitein, Studies, p. 155. Goitein called the regiments of ahl ashsham “the imperial army.” These guaranteed the rule of the Caliph and security in the provinces. They lived at the expense of the local populace in

the various provinces and were concentrated in special city-camps. In Goitein’s opinion, the local forces were used mostly for the jihad. One of the reasons behind the disintegration of the Umayyad state was the loss of the esprit de corps by the Syrian imperial regiments, as a result of the tribal ‘asabiyyah and other internal contradictions. It seems to me that we are still lacking a detailed study of the army, its structure and position in early Islam. The preferred position of the Arabs in Syria, who were written

in the diwan, over those of Iraq, because of the former’s loyalty to the rulers, is emphasized in an interesting tradition in Dinawari. Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah, the last Umayyad governor of Iraq, compared the Syrian units with the Iraqis in a letter to Marwan: inna fard ash-sham afdal min fard al-‘iraq li-anna ‘arab al-‘iraq laysat lahum nasihah li-al-khulafa’ min bani umayyah wa-fi qulubihim than (‘The Syrian soldiers of the diwan are better than the Iraqi soldiers of the diwan because the Arabs of Iraq are

not loyal to the Umayyad Caliphs and their hearts are full of enmity”). Dinawari, p. 359. 47 One of the outstanding examples of a governor who did not want to identify himself with the inter-tribal conflict but was forced to do so by cir-

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 279 that every change of governor led to a new shift in the system of

inter-tribal relations: the group of tribes whose governor was currently serving would immediately range itself on his side against the tribal group which opposed him.” Abii Muslim did not fail to see that this archaic military set-up

was inefficient and dangerous. He undoubtedly, recognized these problems from the time when he had lived in Iraq, and experienced them at close range when he witnessed the purposeless tribal struggle in Khurasan which was waged, for at least two years, before his eyes. He understood that in order to form a solid and reliable fighting force, he would have to abrogate the meaning and value of nasab, 1.e. of tribal pedigree. This he actually did when he abolished the importance of the nasab as the essential qualification for the membership in the military society. He established a new military force which included, alongside the Arabs, a very large element of non-Arabs and half-Arabs. This was not an army of Tamim, Khuza‘ah, Azd and Rabi‘ah; it was an army of ahl khurdsan — a force recruited from a certain region.*? Every man in the army received a pay varying with his activity and effort, and was entitled to be enrolled in the diwan

regardless of his ethnic and tribal origin. The novelty of this reform influenced the whole character of the “Abbasid da‘wah, since the Da‘wah did after all set up a dawlah — a new order in Islam. It began everything afresh and set out to end all that was evil in the old dispensation.5®° Within the framework of this

army, as we have already seen, the veterans of the Umayyad diwan in Khurasan retained their privileged status and continued to receive the special pay to which they were entitled. This fact did not, however, impair the position of the Khurasanite force in

the state, since, without regard to its ethnic make-up, it was cumstances, is Khalid b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri, Hisham’s governor in Iraq. See Banners, p. 62 n. 48 Tabari, II, p. 1993 (Il. 19-20): Nasr feels himself under heavy pressure because of the hostility of “the Yamanites, the tribes of Rabi‘ah and the nonArabs (‘ajam).”

49 There is no doubt that, at the beginning of the ‘Abbasid period, the expression ahl khurasan had no ethnic connotation and only referred to all

the fighters that belonged to the units coming from Khurasan; see Baladhuri, Ansab, Il, p. 139. It is very possible that the expression ahl khurasan came about in Iraq after large numbers of Khurasanites came and settled there, especially in Baghdad. This is often the impression from the descriptions of the Khurasanites in Baghdad in Jahiz, Bukhala’, I, p. 45ff.

50. On this see Wellhausen, p. 556; Banners, p. 23.

200 Chapter 7 considered as a separate loyalist military body which had been, purposely, detached from the traditional Arab units and was given preference over them. KHURASANITES AND ARABS

The last sentence touches on the problem which arose immediately upon the accession of the ‘Abbasids to power, namely the relations between the Khurasanite forces and the Arab warriors who were enrolled in the Umayyad diwan. This problem had two aspects: social and political. It was a social problem which

had arisen in consequence of the contact between the Khurasanites and the Arab inhabitants of Iraq, and to a lesser degree, in Syria. It was also a political problem which was bound to occupy the attention of the new rulers since, from the time when the “Abbasids took over from the Umayyads, they had at their disposal, in theory and 1n fact, military forces comprising two very different elements: 1. The imperial standing army of the Umayyads (the units of

ahl ash-sham which, after the fall of the Umayyads, went over to the victorious side), and the Arab warriors in the various

provinces who were enrolled in the traditional (Umayyad) diwan. 2. The Khurasanite warriors (ahl khurasan), who were enrolled in the new ‘Abbasid diwan al-jund. At the outset of their reign, the “Abbasids preserved this Structure of the army, complex and even dangerous though it was, and appear to have paid the ‘ata’ according to the lists of both diwans. We do indeed find all these units combined in military operations at the beginning of the “Abbasid period. Thus Tabari relates that ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali, an uncle of Saffah and Manstr, headed a great army which set out to wage a sa@ifah

against the Byzantines. This force was made up of the Khurasanites, of the Syrians, and of the men of the Jazirah and Misul (ah! khuradsan wa-ahl ash-sham wa-al-jazirah wa-almawsil),5!

But, although the policy of the “Abb4sids had originally been to maintain the status quo and to accept all who agreed to co-operate with them, they evolved at the same time a policy whose 51 Tabari, III, p. 91 (il. 5-8).

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 281 aim, even in its initial stages, was firstly, to abolish the units of the Syrian standing army (ahl ash-sham) who, by their very na-

ture, were loyal to the Umayyads, while replace them with Khurasanite units, loyal to themselves;5? and secondly, to manifest a preference for the Arabs of Iraq over those of the other regions, especially over those of Syria and the Jazirah. The ultimate aim of this policy — perhaps not consciously ac-

knowledged — was to abolish the disorganized units of the diwan and to base the security of the state mainly upon the per-

manent Khurasanite forces. As for the payment of the ‘ara’, I conjecture that in the initial stages of their reign, the “Abbasids paid it to the Arabs in a selective manner, according to the lists of the regional diwan. This gave them the opportunity to develop the discriminatory policy in favour of the Iraqis, to whom the ‘ata’ was paid according to the diwan lists kept in Kifah or Basrah. During the initial stages of their rule, the ‘Abbdsids kept playing on the chord of the antagonism which existed between Syria and Iraq. They used every opportunity to demonstrate their preference for the Iraqis and stressed their firm decision to trans-

fer the centre of government and political life from Umayyad Syria to Iraq. By so doing they hoped to win over the sympathies of the Iraqis to their side. The latter were indeed gratified at this change of policy, which ended the traditional preference for Syria — a preference which had persisted throughout the entire Umayyad period (except for the reign of Marwan II, who had transferred his centre of government to the Jazirah). The policy of preference for Iraq and the Iraqis found its first expression in the coronation speech of Abit al-‘ Abbas, in which the new Caliph told the people of Kifah: li-kull ahl bayt — misr 52. The Syrians lost all vestiges of their previous status in the reign of Mansir, apparently in the aftermath of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali’s rebellion. Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ — who thought that in spite of their being the worst enemies of the regime, they should be treated with a certain amount of justice — described their situation thus: “As for ahl ash-sham, they treated them in the manner of an eye for an eye: They forbad from them what they had forbidden from others (i.e. during the Umayyad period), and they gave their fay’ to others just as they had previously taken the fay’ of others.” It becomes evident from the continuation of his description that the army of aAl ash-

sham was broken up, and that either the inhabitants of Syria did not receive any ‘aia’ or the Umayyad diwan al-jund was abolished and the ‘ai’ was given in an arbitrary manner to those individuals who had served the ‘Abbasids; Ibn al-Mugqaffa‘, Risalah fi as-Sahabah, p. 128.

282 Chapter 7 wa-antum misruna “Every ruling family have a centre of power (misr) and ye are our centre.’*4 In other words, we have here a declaration of policy indicating the community of interests which existed between the “Abbasids and the Iraqis. The “Abbasids not only liberated the Iraqis from the Syrian yoke, but also restored

to Kifah the seat of government of the Islamic Empire. The conflict between Iraq and Syria which had lasted more than 90 years, ended in the victory of Iraq.* As for the ‘ata’ paid to Iraqis, it seems that the payments to the Kufites, and perhaps also to the rest of the Iraqis, were made according to the lists of the Umayyad diwdan, in the absence of any other. This we may learn from the tradition about the coro-

nation address, in which Abi al-‘Abbas promised the Kifites that he would raise their ‘ata’ by one hundred dirhams per head.°° He thereby continued the custom of making a one-time increase in the ‘ata’ as a special gesture, as was often done by a new Caliph on his accession to power.?’ THE PREFERENCE FOR KHURAS AN

In addition to the desire to keep the goodwill and support of the Arabs in Iraq, it was clear that it was the Khurasanites in particu-

lar, who earned the undisguised preference of the “Abbasids from the very beginning of their rule. The Caliphs stressed on many occasions that they were giving them preference on account of their zealous loyalty to the “Abbasid cause. Once in 53 Tabari, III, p. 33. When Hamadhani speaks of the Khurasanites and their

contribution to the fall of the Umayyads he emphasizes that they “transferred the regime from Syria to Iraq.” Hamadhani, p. 318.

54 See the exact translation by Wellhausen, Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz (Berlin, 1902), p. 340 where the word misr is rendered by the German Centrale.

55 Wellhausen, p. 545. The tradition presents the ‘Abbasids as possessing pro-Iraqi tendencies and ambitions from the beginning of their movement. Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah ‘Abbas was supposedly called, by Khalid b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri “‘Jraqi al-hawa’’; Tabari, II, p. 816; see also Ibn alMugaffa‘, op. cit., p. 124.

56 Tabari, II, p. 30. 57 Yazid III received the obloquy al-nagqis (“The Lacking One”), because he abolished the addition to the ‘a’ which Walid II had ordered upon his accession to the throne; Wellhausen, op. cit., pp. 353, 367; Tabari, II, p. 1874.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 283 Iraq, the ‘Abbasid authorities strengthened the position of the Khurasanites by forming them into separate military units. They detached them from the local Iraqi population by settling them in special, separate localities.*®

Even the first Khurasanite units — the ones which defeated the Umayyads and in which the Arab element was predominant°? —

were viewed by the Iraqis as foreigners. Although it stands to reason that these Khurasanites must have had relatives in Basrah and Kifah, it is evident, as we shall see later, that the contact between them and the Arabs of Iraq was minimal. In the eyes of the Iraqi Arabs, these Khurasanites had already lost two important Arab characteristics; first, they had lost the pride in nasab

and the sense of nasab and, through the influence of the ‘Abbasid da‘wah, they had developed ties with their place of origin instead of with their tribe of origin; second, their language

of everyday speech, at least among themselves, was no longer

pure Arabic. The matter of the language seems to have come as a great surprise to the Iraqis. It is very likely that we must look here for the source of the Iraqi, anti-‘ Abbasid, tradition in which Ibrahim b. Muhammad b. ‘Ali (al-imam) is supposed to have ordered Abi Muslim to kill all the Arabs in Khurasan. But does this tradition

really speak of killing all the Arabs in Khurasan? In the two variants of the tradition given by Tabari it is stated that Ibrahim

commanded Abi Muslim to destroy every Arabic-speaker in Khurasan.®! I can, therefore, imagine that their encounter with

58 After the construction of Baghdad, the Khurasanites were settled in a special quarter, the Harbiyya; Le Strange, Baghdad, pp. 127-8. Wellhausen’s statement (p. 558) that Baghdad was only established as a camp for the Khurasanites is exaggerated. See Ya‘quibi, Buldan, p. 21, for the concentra-

tion of the Khurasanites and Turks in permanent quarters in Baghdad. When Mansir built Rafiqah in 155/772, he established a garrison made up of Khurasanite units Yaqit, Buldan, ed. F. Wuestenfeld, Leipzig, 1866-73,

II, pp. 234-5; Hamadhani, p. 136 (ll. 9-11). The isolation of the Khurasanites from the Iraqi population in the days of the Caliph Mansar is emphasized by Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ (op. cit., pp. 124-5), who encouraged the

Caliph to reconcile the Arabs of Kifah and Basrah to him, even if this would bring about their mixing with the Khur4s4nites.

59 See the explicit report of Jahiz, Rasa’il, I, pp. 22-23.

60 See Banners, p. 68. 61 wa-amarahu bi-qatl kull man yatakallam bi-al-‘arabiyyah bi-khurasan (“He ordered him to kill everyone who speaks Arabic in Khurasan”; Tabari, III, p. 25); wa-in istata‘ta an la tada‘a bi-khurasan lisan ‘arabi, fa-if‘al (‘And if

284 Chapter 7 the Persian-speaking Khurdsanite troops caused Arabs in Iraq and Syria to speculate that perhaps the ‘Abb4sids had “killed off” all the Arabic-speakers in Khurasan. The “Abbasids did not lack enemies who could transform such a story into an explicit

tradition. |

ARABS AND KHURASANITES IN THE EARLY ‘ABBASID ARMY

In the earlier stages of their rule, the “Abbasids set up units of picked Khurasanites alongside the Arab tribal units, and for this purpose they kept two separate diwdans. This fact is attested to by an amusing story which purports to explain the reasons for

the building of Rus&fah by Caliph Aba Ja‘far al-Mansur (136/754-158/775). We are told that al-Mansir complained to Qutham b. al-‘Abbas b. “Ubaydallah b. ‘Abbas, who was an old man and greatly respected, that he feared his army might unite and rebel against him. Qutham asked the Caliph to allow him to devise a scheme which would prevent any possibility of agreement among the troops, but he refused to give the Caliph details of the scheme. After some hesitation, Manstir gave his consent. Qutham went home and bade one of his slaves ask him a certain question on the following day, at the Caliph’s court, in the presence of the assembled multitude. The question was: “Which is more honourable — Yaman or Mudar?” He promised to give the slave his freedom once he had asked the question and received the answer. On the next day, when all the nobles and courtiers, tribal leaders and army chiefs, were assembled in the Caliph’s court, the slave got up, seized the rein of his master’s horse and put his question to him. Qutham affected to evade answering, but when the slave kept urging him and would not let him go, he replied: “Mudar (are more honourable because) the Prophet came

from them; the Qur’an is among them; the House of Allah (the Ka‘bah) is in their midst and from them comes the Caliph of Allah (!).’6 This answer provoked a storm of anger among the Yaman tribesmen and the commanders of the Yaman units who

you can forbid (lit., not permit) the Arabic language in Khurasan, do so!”; ibid., II, 1937). See also Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, ‘Igd, Cairo, 1940-53, IV, p.

479.

62 Tabari, Il, p. 366.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 285 were present, and caused much tension between the two tribal blocs. The tradition concludes the narrative with the following sentence: | “The army was divided: a Mudar faction, a Yaman faction, a faction of the Khurasanites and a faction of Rabi‘ah.” (wa-iftaraqa al-jund: fa sarat mudar — firgah, wa-al-yaman — firqah, wa-al-khurasaniyyah — firgah, wa-rabi‘ah —firgah ...)©

The veracity of the various details in this anecdote is not im-

portant; what is important is the basic fact which it reveals, namely that in the time of Manstir the Khurasanite units were separately organized alongside the Arab units, which preserved

their structure according to tribes. This story also stresses the known fact that tribal “asabiyyah must necessarily have weakened the Arab fighting force from within. It is no wonder that, in face of past experience and current facts, the ‘Abbasids preferred

to rely more and more on their Khur4sanite units, which were untouched by the ‘asabiyyah.“ There was no way the Khurasanites could have anything in common with the Arabs of Syria, or even the Arabs of Iraq. Both sides were on a constant collision course from the moment the army of the Da‘wah began its march westwards. From the very first confrontation between the Khurasanite army and the Umayyad forces, the Khurasanites had taken the field against an army made up mainly of Arab warriors from Syria and Iraq. Such was the army of Nubatah b. Hanzalah; such was that of ‘Amir b. Dub&arah; such were the military forces of Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah and, above all, the armies of Marwan II, which were known as “the cavalry of the Arabs and their men” (khayl al-‘arab wa-rijaluha).© The army of the last Umayyad

63 The entire tradition is in ibid., pp. 365-7. 64 With this in mind, the tradition which opens ch. 3 of Banners (pp. 51-2) can be better understood. This tradition states why Khurasan was chosen as the centre for the activity of the ‘Abbasid da‘wah. Among other things, it explains that the Khurasanites did not have ‘asabiyyah like the Arabs. We have seen that this was the case, and it was one of the main factors which made them more loyal to their masters.

65 Baladhuri, Ansab, II], p. 128.

286 Chapter 7 caliph was chiefly drawn from “Tamim, Qays, Kinanah and the

other Mudar tribes.’ The sources stress the fact that these were Khurasanites opposing Arabs, while the possibility of the Arab origin of the “people of Khurasan” did not affect the attitude of those sources. Indeed, even though we have proved that the Khurasanites had Arab blood in their veins, this made no difference at all to their contacts with the Arabs of their original mother-provinces. The later traditions treat the term ahl khurdasd@n as identical with ‘ajam,

thereby describing a state of affairs which came into being in the ninth century when the Khurasanite armies were believed to be composed mainly of Persians.® But even in the earliest stage of

the contact between the Khurasanites and the Arabs, the latter regarded the former as ‘ajam, notwithstanding the fact that there were among them a large number of soldiers (and a majority of the commanders) who could trace their descent back to Arab

66 Dinawari, p. 350. In Marwan’s army there were also non-Arab soldiers, but most of the army was Arab. Baladhuri, Ansab, IJ, p. 121, mentions the mawall of Marwan who came from the Khazars, Slavs and Greeks.

67 It seems that this identification between the Khuras4nites and the ‘ajam already existed in Mansur’s reign. See Ibn al-Mugqaffa‘’s statement in n. 58 above. See Arazi-El‘ad, “Armee 1”, pp. 52f. and notes 51, 52; “Armee 2”, pp. 29ff. Arazi and El‘ad produce many examples to prove that, also in Ma’non’s time, “Ahl Khurasan” were essentially Arabs. The sources are very confused regarding this particular issue. There is a considerable amount of information to support the view about the Arab character of the

Khurasanites in Ma’miin’s time, and no less information about their Persian origin. However, even if one could conclusively prove “on paper” the Arab origin of the bulk of Ma’min’s army, this “Arabism” would be

only nominal. If already at the time of the advent of the ‘Abbasids, the Arabs in Khurasan had already lost many of their Arab characteristics (although not their tribal ‘Asabiyyah), three generations later, the majority of them could not have been less Iranized. One should remember, however, that when the sources speak about Persians or Khuras4nites, they refer more to the region from which they came and not to their ethnic origin. This seems to be the meaning of Dionysos of Tell Mahre’s reference to the Da‘wah army as ‘amma dflursayeh — “Persian people.” (Denys de Tell Mahre, p. 48 (text)). There was something in the structure of the Islamic empire which must have been responsible for the preservation of the re-

gional identity in it, from the very beginning. Syria, Iraq, the Jazirah, Khurasan and Egypt were the major regions which played main roles in the history of the empire in the East, and they are, usually, dealt with as separate social, cultural and political entities by the Arab historians and geographers. Not long after they had been taken over by the Arabs, these regions also became a focus of identity for their conquerors.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 287 tribes.6* The gap was widest on the battlefield: “It was the Khurasanites who smote the Arabs with their swords, in their zeal for the faith of Allah, and because of their resentment of the

Umayyads’ mode of government.” At the coronation ceremony of Abi al-*Abbas in the mosque at Kifah — so one of the traditions tells us — Dawud b. “Ali, the Caliph’s uncle, stood up and said: “The Arabs combined together to deny our right and to help the Umayyad oppressors, until God offered us this army from among the people of Khurasan, who answered our call and came to our help.”

This tradition emphasizes the political-religious dimension which the ‘Abbasids attributed to the tension, and even hatred, which existed between the Khurasanites and the Arabs. It depicts the Arabs, in general, as the supporters of the oppressor and the infidel, and praises the Khurasanites for helping the righteous, represented by members of the Prophet’s family. The favourite comparison between the rise of the ‘Abbasids and the history of the Prophet after the hijrah cannot be missed: the Arab supporters of the Umayyads represent the Arabs of Mecca, who supported Abi Sufyan, while the Khurasanites represent the Ansar. “The Ansar are two — one tradition explains —

the tribes of Aws and Khazraj, who helped the Prophet at the beginning of time (fi awwal az-zaman) and the Khurasanites who helped him at the end of time (fi @khir az-zaman).’”° The ideological power of this tradition is in its simple comparison between the “Abbasids and the Prophet, and between the Ansar and the Khurasanites. The gulf between the Arabs and the KhurAsanites was further deepened, in consequence of the rebellion of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali 68 Hamadhani, p. 318 (ll. 1-2). There this writer also identifies ahl khurasan with the ‘ajam, although on p. 317 he includes among them the family of Qahtabah b. Shabib from the tribe of Tay’.

69 Ibid.

70 Jahiz, Rasa’ il, I, p. 15. The comparison here is also important for an understanding of both the ‘Abbasid revolution and regime. This is 2khir azzaman, “the end of time.” As Muhammad’s hijrah to Madinah symbolizes the victory of Islam and the truth of monotheism over disbelief, so the ac-

cession of the ‘Abbasids shows the victory of truth and justice in the Islamic world over oppression and injustice to which it was hitherto subject. The Prophet established a new, monotheistic order, and the ‘Abbasids completed his work.

288 Chapter 7 against Mansir. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali, uncle of the first two ‘Abbasid caliphs, claimed to be the rightful heir to the caliphate after Abi al-°Abbas. As soon as he was informed that the Caliph had died and that Abu Ja‘far al-Manstir had succeeded him, he proclaimed a rebellion in the Jazirah. He was supported by the Arabs, especially those of Syria and the Jazirah, who hoped that through him they would regain the political supremacy which they had lost on the accession of the ‘Abbasids. His camp also

contained a Khurasdnite unit, but the greater part of the Khurasanite forces, under the command of the Abi: Muslim, op-

posed him. Those Khurasanites who were originally with ‘Abdallah b. “Ali showed a tendency to desert him, and he put to

death many of these when they subsequently fell into his hands.”! By so doing, he created an unbridgeable rift between himself and the Khurasanites and identified himself with the Arab forces. In the decisive battle with Abi Muslim (137/755) Khurasanites fought against Arabs.” The Khurasanite victory, with all the bloodshed it involved, widened still more the deep gulf between Khurasanite and Arab and increased the inter-dependence between the Caliph and the Khurdsanites.73 The favourable status of the Khurasanites in comparison with the Arabs at the very beginning of the “Abbasid caliphate, 1s il-

lustrated by a tradition about the revolt which broke out in

134/751-2 against Abi al-‘Abbas. It was organized by a Khurasanite officer, Bassam b. Ibrahim b. Bassam, who mustered his followers at Mada’in or in its environs.”4 Abi al-‘Abbas sent his Khurdsanite troops, under the command of one of their

most capable leaders, Khazim b. Khuzaymah, of the tribe of Tamim, a veteran commander in the Da‘wah, to oppose the rebel. Khazim quelled the revolt, without difficulty, and also struck at those who had collaborated with, or given shelter to the

rebel. He executed, among others, a considerable number of men from the family of “Abd al-Mad4n, of the southern tribe of

71 Tabari, III, pp. 94-7; Baladhurt, Ansab, I, p. 108; Ya‘qibi, Ta’rikh, O, pp. 438-9. 72 For all the affairs, see Tabari, I, pp. 92ff.; Baladhuri, Ansab, III, p. 106, 108; Ya‘qubi, loc. cit.

73 An expression of this mutual dependence is seen in the tradition put into the mouth of Muhammad b. ‘Ali: “Allah wants that our party (shl‘ah) will be only from the Khurasanites; only with them will we be victorious and only with us will they gain victory.” Hamadhani, p. 315. 74 Azdi, p. 140, says that this was a pro-‘Alid uprising.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 289 Bani al-Harith b. Ka‘b. This was the family of the Caliph’s mother and those put to death could be considered as his maternal uncles (akhwal).?> To complicate the matter further, there

was the additional fact, that Khazim, who was himself a Tamimite, killed Arabs of southern origin, an act which caused great resentment among the Yaman tribes.” A deputation from Bani al-Harith came to Abi al-‘Abbas, complaining of this action and pointing out that Khazim had done a deed which not even the Caliph’s “nearest of kin” would have dared to do: strike down the brothers of the Caliph’s mother, without having properly established their guilt, lay their houses in ruins and plunder their possessions. When Abi al-‘Abbas heard this, he considered executing Khazim b. Khuzaymah, but his intention became known to two of the important leaders of the Da*wah, Misa b. Ka‘b (a Tamimite) and Abi al-Jahm b. “Atiyyah (a mawla of Bahilah).” They hastened to the Caliph and dissuaded him from Carrying out his intention. They argued on two grounds: their first contention was that Khazim had a brilliant record in the ‘Abbasid da‘wah, and his loyalty in the past had been beyond reproach. This fact alone should suffice to gain him pardon for what he had done. More important and interesting to us, how-

ever, is their second argument: they explained why the Khurasanites were entitled to special treatment. “The adherents of your Shi‘ah among the Khurasfnites,” they said, “gave you preference to their own kinsfolk — to their fathers, children and

brothers. They slew everyone who opposed you.” (fa-inna shi‘atakum min ahl khurasan gad atharikum ‘ala al-agarib min al-aba’ wa-al-awlad wa-al-ukhwan wa-qatali man khdalafakum).78 In other words, the ‘Abbasids must regard their connection with, and their debt to the KhurAsanites as more important than their ties and obligations to their own family, just as the Khur4sanites have set aside their family ties for the sake of the ideal represented by the ‘Abbasids. This tradition includes also a further idea: the loyalty of the Khurasanites, which bound them to the ‘Abbasid Caliphs and

the Caliphs to them, soon became a two-edged sword. By 75 See Ibn Hazm, Jamharah, p. 391; Mas‘ddi, Tanbih, pp. 337(1. 19)-338(. A).

76 Taber, Il, p. 76 (1. 16). 7 On Abd al-Jahm, see e.g., Tabari, II, pp. 67, 88; Wellhausen, p. 547. Misa b. Ka‘b was one of the 12 nugaba'; Tabari, II, p. 1358. 78 ~~ ‘Ibid., WI, p. 77 (il. 10-12).

290 Chapter 7 showing such a degree of preference for the Khurasanites and turning them into the main support of the regime, the ‘Abbasid Caliphs, with their own hands, undermined their own strength and weakened their position as a governing power. LOYALTY OF THE KHURASANITES

The loyalty of the Khurasanites to the ‘Abbasid da‘wah and the imam was never in doubt. We can understand that the influence of the Da‘wah was so strong that it elevated the virtue of loyalty to the ideal, and to those who represented it, above all tribal or family loyalties. There was a difference between the loyalty of the Syrians to the Umayyads, and that of the Khurasanites to the

‘Abbasids. The traditional Syrians ties with the Umayyads rested on social and political interest. The KhurAsanites were different; they were bound to the “Abbasids by religious conviction

instilled into them by the propaganda of the Da‘wah. The bond between the “Abbasid Caliph and his army was one which originated in a deep and mystical religious conviction.” The character, significance and implications of this loyalty, and the advantages and disadvantages of the link between the Caliph and his army have been discussed and analyzed by Ibn al-Mugaffa‘ in a special epistle entitled “Risalah (Kitab) fi asS ahabah.’’®°

This work was written during the earliest years of Caliph Mansir’s rule. It was meant for him, although his name is not mentioned in it.®! Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ analysed in it a series of important issues affecting the administration of the State. These were political, social and religious problems, current in his time, and of which he was very much aware. He discussed the privi79 Goitein, p. 155. Among the praise which Jahiz, Rasa’il, p. 15, heaps upon the Khurasanites, is their loyalty to the Caliph which is almost an act of faith: “Our faith” they say, “is obedience (t4‘ah) for the sake of which we are killed, and for it (we) die.”

80 Ibn al-Mugqaffa‘, op. cit., pp. 117-34. 81 Goitein proved that the Risalah was composed between the year 136/754, the year Mansur came to power, and the year 142/759, the year Ibn alMugqaffa‘ was executed. The passages which analyze the problematic issues of the state, and especially the one which discusses the caliphate and those

factors which limit it (p. 121), aroused Mansar’s suspicions against the author and may have contributed to his execution. Goitein, pp. 153-4; see also Gabrielli, s.v. “Ibn al-Mugqaffa‘,” E/?, II, p. 884b.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 291 leged Khur4sanite army and its relations with the Caliph, the se-

lection of high-ranking officers and courtiers, the status of Syrians and Iraqis at the beginning of the ‘Abbasid period and so on. The importance of this risdlah lies not only in the original discussion itself and in Ibn al-Mugqaffa‘’s brilliant analysis, but chiefly in the clear picture it gives of the problems peculiar to the period — the period in which the institutions of “Abbasid government were formed. The work has an even greater importance because of the personality of its author, who was deeply rooted in the social and political life of his time, closely connected with the government, a man of acute intelligence and imbued with the culture of the age.*?

In his account of the Khurasanite army (al-jund min ahl Khurdsan) he does not conceal his admiration. “This is an army the like of which has never been seen in Islam” he says. With evident amazement, he describes the discipline and good order of the Khurasanite troops, which was manifested in the care they

took to respect the lives, property and dignity of the civilian population. “We do not know anything like this among any other (body of warriors)” (fa-hadha hal la na‘lamuha titjad ‘ind ahad ghayrihim).® He devotes the rest of his account to the description of their religious, mystical loyalty to the Caliph and Stresses the dangers which this could involve. In order to illustrate how dangerous this exaggerated loyalty could be, he relates that many officers of the Khurasanite army held such extreme

ideas as these: “that if the Caliph were to order mountains to move, they would move; if he were to command that one must turn one’s back towards the giblah during prayer, one would have to do so.”’®4 Such notions as these might give rise to ideo-

logical clashes in the army and impair unity within its ranks. Exaggerated faith, lacking any direction or guidance, might spell greater danger to the Caliph than to his enemies. It is like riding

a lion — others are afraid, but the rider himself is still more frightened.® 82 Ibid., Goitein, loc. cit.; Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ (op. cit., p. 118) states himself that he wrote the Risalah at his own initiative, as he knew that the Caliph encouraged wise people to bring him useful information without him having to request it from them beforehand. 83 © Ibid., p. 119.

84 Ibid., p. 120. 85 Ibid. A manifestation of this is in the revolt of the Rawandiyyah against

Mansir that erupted in 140/757-8, when this extreme group of

292 Chapter 7 The Khurasanite army needed to have principles of faith officially laid down for it by the Caliph. Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ suggested that a short book should be written in clear style including every-

thing that the soldiers “should do or refrain from doing.” Officers of the army should be obliged to study this book in order to command their troops in accordance with its instructions. In this way any clash of doctrine among the soldiers would be avoided, and the army would gain ideological solidarity which was no less important than professional skill.® This clear description by Ibn al-Mugqaffa‘ gives us a sharply defined image of the Khurasanite army: an army well-disciplined, professional and, especially, a loyal army. Its loyalty — somewhat exaggerated at times — was what gave it its character and made it the main support of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate from its very inception.®*’

DECLINE OF THE ARABS

The many advantages which the ‘Abbasids discovered in Khurasan opened their eyes to the benefits they might derive by

Khurasanites was dissatisfied when the Caliph strongly opposed its attempt to worship him as a god. In this revolt the Caliph had a near-escape from death. Tabari, II, p. 129-32: Nawbakht, p. 54; Ash‘ari, p. 21. This shows that Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ was describing real events.

86 =: Ibn _al-Mugqaffa‘, op. cit., pp. 119-20. The author uses the expression: taqwim aydihim wa-ra'yihim wa-kalamihim (“the straightening of the hands, thoughts and words (of the soldiers)”). This is the goal of the pro-

posed “Book of Faith.” Goitein, op. cit., p. 155f. As far as the guide which Ibn al-Mugqaffa‘ proposed for the army, it seems that his idea was put

into practice at least by Ma’min in his “Risdlat al-Khamis.” See AraziEl‘ad, Risalat al-Khamis. 87. Apparently Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ understood the danger of total dependence on the Khur&asanites and thus he suggested to the Caliph that he also attract

the Iraqis to his side, because “after the Khurasanites they are the most suitable to be his supporters and associates.” (Ibn al-Mugaffa‘, op. cit., p. 124). While he was aware that this would create the possibility that the exclusivity of the Khurasanites would be abolished, because this would bring about the “mixing of the Khurasanites with the people of Kifah and

Basrah” (ibid., p. 125), he still felt that the usefulness of this policy outweighed the dangers. Ibn al-Mugqaffa‘’s opinions were not accepted and

the Caliphs widened the gap and isolation between their professional troops, the Khurasanites and the Turks, and the Arab units of their army and the local population.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 293 exploiting the abilities of non-Arab mawali, Persians, Turks and others. They were not indeed the first Caliphs to admit mawali

to their services. The Umayyads, as we have already shown, had done so before them.®* But whereas the Umayyads were limited in their employment of mawali, chiefly because of their dependence on the Arabs, with the advent of the ‘Abbasids, as early as the time of their first Caliphs, the extent of this limitation

was reduced and soon vanished altogether. They admitted men of non-Arab origin, not only to their army and their personal body guard, but also to various high positions in the administration of the state.®?

Mas‘idi quotes this assessment in the name of a historian who, in the time of Caliph al-Qahir (320/932-322/934) enumerated the principal factors which had characterized: the earlier ‘Caliphs. It describes the clearly marked process which began immediately upon the accession of the ‘Abbasids: a steady reduction in the part played by the Arabs in the life of the state. The Arabs were affected not only by losing power and office in the administration, in the army and at court, but also by being

deprived of their privileged social position in favour of the mawali,9°

The ever-increasing preference for Khurasanites over Arabs, especially in the army, gave rise to an interesting phenomenon:

there were Arabs who began to disguise themselves as Khurasanites in order to qualify for entry into the diwan. This is perhaps one of the most extreme forms in which the change in the structure and character of the diwan expressed itself in the social field. The first mention of this phenomenon comes from the time of Caliph Ma’min (198/813-218/833), in whose reign,

as we Shall see later, the Khurasanite units began to be com88 See Mujir ad-Din, p. 251; see also n. 66 and n. 79 above. 89 «=Suyiti, Ta’rikh, pp. 24, 269. Tha‘alibi adds that Mansir was the first to employ Turks in his service; Tha‘alibi, Laa@’if, p. 15. See also Ya‘qabi, Mushakalat an-Nas li-Zamanihim, Beirut, 1962, p. 23. 90 It was said that Saffah’s bodyguard was composed of Khurasanites. See Kutubi, Ghurar al-Khasa’ is al-Wadihah wa-‘Urar an-Naqa' is al-Fadihah, Cairo, 1299, p. 89; this fact is not surprising. The author of al-Aghani tells how an important Arab leader sat before Mansir’s gate and requested to be received by him. However, the Caliph preferred the Khurasanites over him. They went in one after the other bypassing the Arab and insulting him; Aghant, XVIII, p. 148. On the criticism of the religious establishment of this trend of preference of mawali over Arabs, see the analysis of Goldziher, op. cit., I, p. 139.

294 Chapter 7 posed predominantly of non-Arab soldiers. The tradition, describing the period in which Ma’miin succeeded in defeating his brother Amin (193/809-198/813), runs as follows:

When Ma’min entered Baghdad, after all the passions were calmed and the tumult had been quelled, Hamid b. ‘Abd alHamid protested to him and told him that there was much confusion in the army caused by men who had infiltrated into it as a result of the wars in the time of the ajnad (fi ayam al-ajnad — the

war between Amin and Ma’miin?). These men were not Khurasanites (wa-hum qawm min ghayr ahl khurasan), but they appeared to be like them and claimed to belong to them; they came from bedouin (a‘rab) tribes,°! from the du ‘at (those who claimed Arab origin ?) and from those who had no right to be enrolled in the diwan. And (among them there were also men) of

Khurasan who had the right to hold places of honour without any past record of toil or trouble, which would have qualified them to win such positions. He added that the treasury (bayt almal) could not afford this.% The first thing that stands out in this narrative is that the right

to be enrolled in the diwan was the prerogative of the Khurasanites, that persons of different origin were not eligible — certainly not Bedouin tribesmen who were still nomads. We also

learn that, over a period of years, a certain system of degrees

had been introduced into the diwan, also among the Khurasanites, and that a man’s status in it was determined according to his past services or, in the words of the text, according to his toil and efforts (‘anda’).

Another account, from the time of Ma’min, clarifies the politico-ideological background to the preference enjoyed by the Khurasanites: Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. Salih as-Sarakhsi: One man repeatedly

appealed to Ma’miin in Syria, saying to him: “O Amir of the Faithful, look upon the men of Syria with the same eye with which thou lookest upon the Persians of the people of Khurasan (‘ajam ahl khurasan).” Said (Ma’min): “You have asked too much, O brother of the sons of Syria. By God! I can not bring

91 The Bedouins (a‘rab) did not receive the ‘aia’ even in the diwan attributed to ‘Umar; Aba‘ Ubayd, op. cit., p. 227: EF, s.v. “‘ata’.” Possibly the word du‘at here should be read ru‘at (shepherds), as it appears in one of the manuscripts. 92 Jahiz, Thalath Rasa’ il, Cairo, 1926, pp. 49-50.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 295 down a Qaysite from his horse without finding even a single dirham left in my treasury. As to the Yaman, lo by God! I have never loved them nor they me. As to Quda‘ah, the leaders of that tribe hope for the Sufyani and his revolt (or appearance) and are waiting to join his supporters. As to Rabi‘ah, that tribe is angry (even) with God ever since He sent His Prophet from amidst the tribes of Mudar. There are not amongst the tribe of Rabi‘ah two men who can appear without one of them being a Kharijite rebel. Let me be, and may God smite thee!’ Two points emerge from this tradition: First, the discrimination against the Arabs, which as we have seen in the preceding account, has become part of the considered policy of the government; second, the Khurasanites, who are here called “‘ajam, are specifically contrasted with the Arabs.%* They are given preference over the Arabs because they are cheaper to keep, more loyal

and untouched by the tribal and doctrinal partisanship of the Arab tribes. Since Ma’min fully appreciated the advantages of employing

men of non-Arab origin, he proceeded consistently and systematically, first, while governor of Khurasan and later, after

becoming Caliph, to increase their numbers in the army. Baladhuri relates that ““Ma’miin was wont to write to his governors in Khurasan that they should organize expeditions against those peoples in Transoxania who had not yet accepted the authority of the (‘Abbasid) government and embraced Islam. Next, he would send his agents to them, who would disburse ‘ata’ and grant enrollment in the diwan to whatever men of those regions desired it, as well as to their princes. By means of these tempting offers, he would attract them to his side. When they arrived at the gate of his court, he would give them honour, costly gifts

and high pensions.” By this policy Ma’min opened the door not only for the admission to the diwan of Persians from Khurasan in vast num-

bers (they had been admitted since the accession of the ‘Abbasids), but especially of Turks from Transoxania, whom Ma’min had known while he was governor of Khurasan and was thoroughly convinced of their military prowess and of the

93 Tabari, Ill, p. 1142. On the Sufyani and his identification as an Umayyad or a Syrian Messianic figure, see Madelung, pp. 6-7, 13ff.

94 See n. 123 below. 95 Baladhuri, Futih, p. 431.

296 Chapter 7 contribution they could make towards strengthening the Islamic

Army.

The process whereby the non-Arabs gained ascendancy in the Islamic army and its penetration by the Turks reached its peak

during the reign of Mu‘tasim (218/833-227/842). He, like his brother Ma’min, was full of admiration for the ability of the Turks and concentrated his efforts on acquiring them. This he did not only, as Ma’min had done, by persuasion and bestowing favours but by outright purchase. In this way, he evolved a new means of forming military units, which were made up of slaves or freedmen, and was thus the first to set up, in an organized and orderly fashion, a Mamluk army in Islam.” It is said of him that, even before he was enthroned as Caliph, he had an army of 3 000 Turks whom he had bought in Transoxania.%® After becoming Caliph, he continued to buy them in greater

numbers “until the majority of his army consisted of Transoxanians, Soghdians, Farghanites, Ushrisanites, men of Shash and others.’ THE DA‘WAH ARMY AND MA’MUN’S ARMY

In his study on the military reforms of Caliph Mu‘tasim,! Ayalon draws a comparison between Abii Muslim’s Khurasanite army which fought against the Umayyads at the end of the first

half of the eighth century and the one which accompanied Ma’min and fought against Amin at the beginning of the ninth century. Abii Muslim’s army, as we have already mentioned, contained a very high proportion of Arabs and was commanded in the main by Arab officers. In Ma’miin’s army it is scarcely possible to identify the Arabs. The great majority of the force was composed of non-Arab elements — Bukharians, Khwariz-

96 Jahiz, Rasa’il, I, p. 56. 97 See below n. 118. 98 Ya‘qubi, Buldan, p. 29.

99 Baladhuri, Futih, p. 431. Jahiz, Rasa’il, I, pp. 61-62, has a story that shows the endurance and loyalty of the Turks, which were the reasons that Mu‘tasim went to the trouble of gathering them. For more on the Turks of Mu‘tasim, see Ibn Qutaybah, Ma ‘arif, p.199; Jahiz, Rasa’il, I, p. 41. On

their excellent horsemanship, see ibid., pp. 49, 53. On their being defenders of Islam and the Caliph, see ibid., p. 75. 10 Ayalon, The Military Reforms of Caliph al-Mu‘tasim, mentioned above.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 297 mis and Turks — these latter are repeatedly mentioned.'®! Abi

Muslim’s army, the unique feature of which lay in its Khurasdnite composition, fought against the Umayyad army whose distinguishing mark was its tribal formation. Whereas Ma’miin’s army, which was characterized by its non-Arab content, fought against the army of abna@’ khurdsan, which supported Amin and whose special quality lay in its being made up of descendants of the veterans of the Da‘wah army.

The victory of Ma’miin’s army over the descendants of the Khurasanite veterans greatly weakened the military standing of the Arabs in the ‘Abbasid State. In his study Ayalon makes clear the interesting development which took place in the Da‘wah army — the army of Abii Muslim’s diwan — within the ‘Abbasid

State down to the time of Ma’min. From the sources which report about the war between Amin and Ma’mian, we learn that the main part of Amin’s troops were quartered in Baghdad and had earned the nickname of ahl baghdad or jund ahl baghdad. This force was enrolled in the diwa@n and, if we accept Tabari’s figures, Amin was able to put 50 000 soldiers into the field for the decisive battle — cavalry and infantry, all enrolled in the diwan and all drawn from ahl baghdad.'2 THE ABNA’

The essential and most important nucleus of ahl baghdad consisted of a great and distinguished band of warriors which was

called, in short, “abna’” and sometimes by such names as: “abna’ ad-dawlah,” “abna@’ ad-da‘wah” or even “abna’ ashshi‘ah.” There is no doubt that these men were the descendants

of Abi Muslim’s Khurasanite troops. The compiler of the

101 Jbid., p. 5. When Ma’min’s army is discussed, it is no longer described only as jund ahl khurasan but as ‘ajam ahl khurasan; Tayfar, al-Juz’ asSadis min Kitab Baghdad, Leipzig, 1908, p. 143. See above n. 115. Jahiz (Rasa'il, I, p. 36), who states that he was writing in the days of Mu‘tasim about events which happened during the reign of Ma’min, has a report on the structure of jund al-khalifah (“the army of the Caliph”), and said that this army was composed of five groups: Khurasanites, Turkish, mawla, Arab and banawi (ibid., 1. 25). For a different view on the subject, see, Aazi-El‘ad, op. cit.

102 Tabari, HI, p. 817; Ayalon, op. cit., p. 6. For the ahl baghdad as a fighting force, see Tabari, I], pp. 831, 858, 865, 1001, 1006, 1013.

298 Chapter 7 Aghani calls them “abnda’ ash-shi‘ah al-khurasaniyyah” and “abna’ al-jund al-khurasaniyyah.”) Tayfiar calls them “abna’ khurasan al-muwalladin’'™ or simply “abna’ ,” adding the explanation: “‘and their fathers were those who had led the dawlah.”

(wa-aba’ uhum al-ladhina qadu ad-dawlah).'° Whoever belonged to this group of the abnd@’ was called “banawi” or

“abnaw 1’ 106 | Although the first appearance of the abnd’ in the sources is

during the period of the conflict between Amin and Ma’min, and although we have no earlier record of them, one basic fact 1s

nevertheless clear, namely that the “Abbasids, who had linked their destiny with Khurasan, surrounded themselves with their Khurasanite military forces after their rise to power. This was inevitable, since by establishing their residence in Iraq, which was subject to agitation and rebellion, they were bound to need a loyal and powerful fighting force such as was represented by the Khurasanites and their descendants, the abna’.'!*’ After Baghdad had been built as the capital — perhaps it might be better to say

the stronghold — of the Empire, the Khurasanites were transferred there and became the most important nucleus of the garrison. This is also the reason why we find them concentrated in Baghdad during the conflict between Amin and Ma’min.!% There is no doubt that the Khuras&anites maintained their attachment to their place of origin — Khurasan, and even the abna’

did not sever their tie, at least their emotional tie, with their ancestral homeland. Khurasanite origin became their recognized sign of a special, privileged status,’ and they regarded Baghdad as a sort of Khurasanite territory belonging to them. “Baghdad is

the Khurasan of Iraq,” boasted one of them,!!° while another said: ana asli khuradsan ... wa-far‘i baghdad'"' (“My original 103 Aghani, XVII, pp. 61 (ll. 9-11), 100 (1. 26-27). See the expression abna’ ad-da‘wah in Jahiz, Rasa’ il, I, p. 8.

104 Tayfor, op. cit., p. 143 (1. 16). .

16 Ibid., p. 144 (1. 9); Jahiz, ult. op. cit., pp. 53, 62. 106 Ibid., pp. 9, 25, 31, 34. 107 ‘Tayfir, op. cit., pp. 143-4; Ayalon, op. cit., pp. 34-35. Jahiz, ult. op.

cit., pp. 31, 34, defines the banawi as follows: The banawi is a Khurasanite according to birth.

108 Ayalon, op. cit., p. 8. 109 See above under “The preference for Khurasan.” For Ibn al-Muqaffa‘’s remarks, see note 58. 110 Jahiz, ult. op. cit., p. 26; Ayalon, p. 8. 111 Jahiz, ult. op. cit., p. 25-6.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 299 home is Khurasan ... and my branch is Baghdad”). He added: “Baghdad is ours: when we rest, it rests and when we awake, it

awakes. We were raised by the Caliphs and we are the neighbours of the wazirs.”!!2 These words sum up the special status of the Khurasanites and of the abnd’ — their preponderant influence in Baghdad, their special proximity to the Caliphs and their pride in their Khurasanite origin.'3 SUMMARY

Abi Muslim’s revolution, which changed the system of enrollment in the diw@n, brought to the fore a new military aristocracy which bore two distinctive marks: Khur4sanite origin and participation in the wars of the Da‘wah,'!4 just as the Arab military aristocracy was based on Arab origin and seniority in Islam. From the time when this Khurasanite army was formed, the qualitative factor began to become the determining factor in the military thinking of the “Abbasids. Islam began, for the first time, to appreciate the efficiency, loyalty and strength of a professional army: the KhurasAanites and the abnd’ were given preference, not merely in recognition of their origin and of their record of past service to the Da‘wah, but mainly because they were excellent soldiers.!!> Tayfir quotes a long anecdote which describes an imaginary conversation, supposed to have taken place in the presence of Ma’min, about the military prowess of the various elements in the army, including the abnd’ .!'6 The Caliph is finally convinced that the abnda’ are the best troops that there could be.!!” The value of this story lies not so much in the rather exaggerated estimate of the abnd’, as in the special stress which is laid of quality in the fighting forces.

112 Ibid., p. 28. 113. Ayalon, op. cit., p. 8. 114“ Participation in the wars of the Da‘wah was not only an important class distinction but a source of pride among the Khurasanites; Jahiz, ult. op. cit., p. 21.

115 Ibid., pp. 18-20. 116 See above n. 121. 117 Tayfoar, op. cit., pp. 143-4. Jahiz, ult. op. cit., p. 56, has a similar story in order to prove that the Turks are the best fighters, even better than the anbi’ .

300 Chapter 7 As soon as the ‘Abbasids were not bound, as their Umayyad predecessors had been, by any tribal obligations or connections,

and had detached themselves from the stifling power of the Classical Arab diwan, and their army had become a living organism in its own right having attained professional standing, they were free to improve it by tapping new reservoirs of manpower. Their choice fell upon the inhabitants of the Eastern provinces of the Empire — Khurasan and Transoxania. The inevitable conse-

quence was the gradual disappearance of the Arabs from the fighting forces. This disappearance had two principal stages:

(1) From the accession of the ‘Abbasids until the time of Ma’min; at this stage the Khurasanite units and those of the abna’, both containing a strong Arab element, took shape

alongside purely Arab units. |

(2) From the time of Ma’min and Mu‘tasim onward — when the non-Arab elements determined the character of the army. The

final blow to the status of the Arabs in the army was dealt by Mu‘tasim, who contrived to achieve the ultimate elimination of whatever Arabs still remained in the diw@n.'!8 In fact, when Jahiz mentions the composition of the fighting forces in the time

of Mu‘tasim, he speaks of only three elements: ahl khurasan, abna’ and the Turks.!!9 * kK Ke O&K

The ‘Abbasid da‘wah had risen indeed on the shoulders of Arab leaders and raised an Arab dynasty to power; nevertheless it was responsible for laying the foundations for the elimination of the Arab pre-eminence from the Islamic State. This foundation was 118 Kindi, Wulat, p. 193. There it is told that, immediately upon his accession to the throne (218/833), Mu'‘tasim sent instructions to the governor of Egypt “and he ordered him to erase from the diwan all the Arabs, and to discontinue their ‘a&@’”; see also ibid., pp. 188-9. Maqrizi complains bitterly about this Caliph for both having eliminated the Arabs from the diwan and having raised the non-Arabs (‘ajam) in their place, against whom the Prophet had originally ordered the Muslims to fight. The Arabs, the nation of the Prophet and by whom Islam was consolidated, lost their position and supremacy in Mu‘tasim’s reign and because of him. Maarizi,

an-Niza‘ wa-at-Takhasum, p. 63. For the reaction of the Arabs to Mu'tasim’s policy, see Kindi, p. 194. For a detailed discussion of the complete process, which has been described briefly above, see Ayalon op. cit. passim. 119 Jahiz, Rasa’il, I, p. 62. Khurasan.

The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim 301 laid in Khurasan, in the earliest days of the movement, in the new diwa@n al-jund of Abt Muslim.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Abel

F. M. Abel, Histoire de la Palestine, Paris, 1952. Abia‘ Ubayd, Amwal

Abi‘ Ubayd al-Qasim b. Salam, Kitab al-Amwal, Cairo, 1353.

Abi Yusuf, Kharaj Abi Yisuf Ya‘qib b. Ibrahim, Kitab al-Kharaj, Cairo, 1352. Advent

M. Sharon, The Advent of the ‘Abbasids, Ph.D. Thesis (Hebrew), The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1970. Aghani

‘Ali b. Husayn, Abi al-Faraj al-Isfahani, Kitab al-Aghani, Bulag, 1284-1285. Akhbar

Akhbar ad-Dawlah al-‘Abbasiyyah, wa-fihi Akhbar al‘Abbas wa-Waladihi (ed. ‘A. ‘A. Duri and ‘A. J. Muttalibi), Beirut, 1971. Anonyme Nubdhah min kitab at-Ta’ rikh li-al-Mw allif al-Majhil min alQarn al-Hadi ‘ashar (ed. P. A. Griaznevich), Moscow, 1960. Anonyme (1967) Ta’ rikh al-Khulafa’ li-Mwu’allif Majhil min al-Qarn al-Hadi ‘ashar (ed. P. A. Griaznevich), Moscow, 1967. Anonyme Leiden

Dhikr Bani al-‘Abbas, wa-Sabab Zuhirihim, Ms. Leiden, Cod. or. 14.023. (see P. S. van Koningsveld in Bibliotheca Orientalis, Nos. 5-6, Sept.-Nov., 1973, pp. 370-385). ‘Aqil

N. ‘Aqil, “Sulla natura “araba” della rivoluzione abbaside e le sue implicazioni’, Tr. A. Arioli, // Veltro, XXVIII, 1984, pp. 353-364. Arazi-Elad, “Armée 1”, Armée 2”

A. Arazi and A. Elad, “L’epitre a l’armée, al-Ma’min et la second da‘wa’”, premiere partie, Studia Islamica, LXVI, 1987, pp. 27-70; deuxiéme partie ibid, LX VII, 1988, pp. 2973. Ashfari

‘Ali b. Isma‘il al-Ash‘ari, Kitab Maqalat al-Islamiyyin (ed. Ritter), Istanbul, 1929-1933.

304 Bibliography Ayalon D. Ayalon, The Military Reforms of Caliph al-Mu‘tasim, their

Jerusalem, 1963. ,

Background and Consequences (provisional publication), Ayalon, “Preliminary remarks” D. Ayalon, “Preliminary remarks on the Mamlik military in-

Stitution in Islam’, in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, London, 1975, pp. 44-58. Avi- Yonah

M. Avi- Yonah, Historical Geography of Palestine (Hebrew), 3rd edition, Jerusalem, 1963. Azdi

Abi Zakariyya Yazid b. Muhammad al-Azdi, Ta’ rikh alMawsil (ed. ‘Ali Habibah), Cairo, 1387/1967.

M. Azizi, La Domination Arabe et l’Epanouissement du Sentiment National en Iran, Paris, 1938. Baladhuri, Ansab

Ahmad b. Yahya b. Jabir al-Baladhuri, Kitab Ansab alAshraf, Vol. I (ed. M. Hamidullah), Cairo, 1959.

Vol. II (Mahmidi), (ed. Muhammad Bagir al-Mahmidi), Beirut, 1397/1977. Vol. III (ed. ‘A. ‘A. Duiri), Beirut, 1978.

Vol. IVA (ed. M. Schloessinger and M. J. Kister), Jerusalem, 1971. Vol. IVB (ed. M. Schloessinger), Jerusalem, 1938. Vol. V (ed. S. D. Goitein), Jerusalem, 1936. Baladhuri, Futith Ahmad b. Yahya b. Jabir al-Baladhuri, Kitab Futith al-Buldan (ed. M. J. De Goeje), Leiden, 1863-1866; (ed. Munajjid), Cairo, 1956. Banners M. Sharon, Black Banners from the East, Leiden, 1983. Barbier de Meynard, Dictionnaire

C. Barbier de Meynard, Dictionnaire Géographique, Historique et Litteraire de la Perse et des Contrées adjacentes,

Paris, 1861. Barthold, Turkestan

V. Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, (Translation by H. A. R. Gibb), London, 1948.

Bibliography 305 Bashear S. Bashear, Muqaddimah fi at-Ta’ rikh al-Akhar, Jerusalem,

1984. Bell, Translation R. Bell, The Qur’ Gn translated, with a critical re-arrangement

of the Sirahs, Edinburgh, 1937. Bosworth, Sistan C. E., Bosworth, Sistan under the Arabs, Rome, 1968. Bouvat, Les Barmecides L. Bouvat, Les Barmecides da’ apres les Historiens Arabes et Persans (ed. E. Leroux), Paris, 1912. Brockelmann C. Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, London,

1940. ,

Cahen C. Cahen, “Points de vue sur la révolution ‘abbaside”’, Revue

Historique, 1963, pp. 295-338. Cahen, “Fiscalité”

C. Cahen, “Fiscalité, propriété, antagonismes sociaux en Haute-Mesopotamie au temps des premiers *‘Abbasides d’aprés Denys de Tell-Mahre’’, Arabica, I, 1954, pp. 136152. Chejne

A. G. Chejne, Succession to the Rule in Islam, Lahore, 1960. Cook, Dogma M. A. Cook, Early Muslim Dogma, Cambridge, 1981. Crone P. Crone, Slaves on Horses, Cambridge, 1980. Crone, Festschrift P. Crone, “The meaning of the ‘Abbasid call to al-Rida,” E.

Bosworth (et al.), The Islamic World from Classical to Modern Times, Princeton and New York, 1989, pp. 95-111. Daniel

E. L. Daniel, The Political and Social History of Khurasan Under ‘Abbasid Rule, 747-820, Minneapolis and Chicago, 1979...

Daniel, “Anonymous”

E. L. Daniel, “The anonymous ‘History of the ‘Abbasid Family’ and its place in Islamic historiography”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, XIV, 1982, pp. 419-434.

306 Bibliography Dennet D. C. Dennet, “Marwan b. Muhammad”, unpublished disser-

tation, Harvard, 1939. Dennet, Conversion D. C. Dennet, Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam, Cambridge, 1950. Denny, “Umma’”’

F. M. Denny, “Umma in the Constitution of Medina’, Journal of Near Eastern Studies, XXXVI, 1977, pp. 39-47. Denys de Tell-Mahre Chronologique de Denys de Tell-Mahre (publiée et traduite par J. B. Chabot), Paris, 1895.

Dhahbi, ‘Jbar |

Muhammad b. Ahmad adh-Dhahbi, Kitab al-‘Tbar fi Khabar man Ghabar, Kuwait, 1960. Dinawari

Abii Hanifah Ahmad b. Dawud ad-Dinawari, Kitab alAkhbar at-Tiwal (ed. V. Guirgass), Leiden, 1888. Donner, Conquests

F. M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, Princeton, 1981. Dussaud

R. Dussaud, Revue Archeologique, 3, Ser. XLI, 1902. EI The Encyclopaedia of Islam.

Ef

The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition. Elad

A. Elad, Characteristics of the Development of the ‘Abbasid Army, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1986. Elad, “Wasit”’

A. Elad, “The siege of al-Wasit (132/749): Some aspects of ‘Abbasid and ‘Alid relations at the beginning of ‘Abbasid rule” Studies in Islamic History and Civilization in Honour of

Professor David Ayalon (ed. M. Sharon), Jerusalem and Leiden, 1986, pp. 59-90. Eliae Nisibeni Eliae Metropolitae Nisibeni, Opus Chronologicum (ed. E. W. Brooks), Louvain, 1954.

Bibliography 307 Eph‘al

I. Eph‘al, The Ancient Arabs on the Borders of the Fertile Crescent, Jerusalem, 1984. Fakhri Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. Tabataba (Ibn at-Tiqtaqa), al-Fakhri fi

al-Adab as-Sultaniyyah wa-ad-Duwal al-Islamiyyah, Greifswald, 1858. Fragmenta Anon., al-‘Uyiin wa-al-Hada’ iq fi Akhbar al-Haqa’ iq (ed. M. J. De Goeje), Leiden, 1869. Gardizi

Abi Sa‘id ‘Abd al-Hayy b. ad-Dahhak b. Mahmid Gardizi, Zayn al-Akhbar (ed. Nafisi). Ghurar al-Khas@ is

Abi Ishaq Burhan ad-Din Ibrahim b. Yahyaal-Kutubi (alWatwat), Ghurar al-Khasa@ is al-Wadihah wa-‘Urar anNagq@’ is al-Fadihah, Cairo, 1299.

Gibb, Conquests

H. A. R. Gibb, The Arab Conquests in Central Asia,

London, 1923. Gibb, “Government”

H. A. R. Gibb, “Government and Islam under the early ‘Abbasids, the political collapse of Islam’, L’ Elaboration de l’ Islam, Paris, 1961. Gil, “Constitution”

M. Gil, “The constitution of Medina: a reconsideration”, Israel Oriental Studies, Tel-Aviv, 1974, pp. 44-66. Gil M. Gil, Palestine during the First Muslim Period (634-1099) (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1983. Goitein, Studies

S. D. Goitein, Studies in Islamic History and Institutions, Leiden, 1966. Goitein, “Turning Point” S. D. Goitein, “A turning point in the history of the Muslim

state ...”, Islamic Culture, XXIII, 1945, pp. 120-135. Reprinted in his Studies in Islamic History and Institution, Leiden, 1966. Goltein, ““Vizirate”’

S. D. Goitein, “The origin of the vizirate”, /slamic Culture, XVI, 1942.

308 Bibliography

Grabar |

Goldziher, Muslim Studies

I. Goldziher, Muslim Studies (ed. S. M. Stern), London, 1967-1971.

O. Grabar, “The Umayyads palace and the ‘Abbasid revolution”, Studia Islamica, XVII, 1963, pp. 5-18. Guest

R. Guest, “A coin of Abi Muslim”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1932, pp. 554-556. Hagarism P. Crone and M. Cook, Hagarism: The Making of Islamic World, Cambridge, 1977. Hamadhani, Buldan

Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Hamadhani (Ibn al-Faqih), (Mukhtasar) Kitab al-Buldan, Leiden, 1885. Hasan

S. Hasan, “A survey of the expansion of Islam into Central

Asia during the Umayyad Caliphate”, Islamic Culture, XLVIII, 1974, pp. 177-186. Hasson

I. Hasson, Recherches sur Mu‘awiyah Ibn Abi Sufyan (Hebrew), unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Jerusalem, 1982. Hassuri A. Hassuri, “On the epithet of the “Abbasid caliphs’, Der Islam, LIX, 1982, pp. 111-113. Hill, Termination of Hostilities D. R. Hill, The Termination of Hostilities in the Early Arab Conquests, London, 1971. Hoenerbach W. Hoenerbach, “Zur Heeresverwaltung der ‘Abbasiden’”’, Der Islam, XXIX, 1950, pp. 257-290. Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam, Futith Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam, Futith Misr, Leiden, 1920. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, ‘7qd

Shihab ad-Din Ahmad b. ‘Abd Rabbihi, al-‘Igd al-Farid, Cairo, 1321; 1944 ed., vols. I-VI (ed. Amin, Zayn, Abyari), Cairo, 1940-1953. Ibn Abi al-Hadid ‘Abd al-Hamid b. Hibat Allah Ibn Abi al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balaghah (ed. Abi al-Fadl Ibrahim), Cairo, 1378/19591383/1964.

Bibliography 309 Ibn ‘Asakir, Tahdhib Abi al-Qasim ‘Ali b. Hasan Ibn ‘Asakir, at-Ta’ rikh al-Kabir (Tahdhib Ta’ rikh Madinat Dimashq), Damascus, 1329-1332.

Ibn al-Athir ,

‘Izz ad-Din ‘Ali b. Muhammad Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil fi at-

Ta’ rikh (ed. Torenberg), Leiden, 1863-1871, re-edited, Beirut, 1385/1965-1386/1966 Ibn Habib, Muhabbar Abi Ja‘far Muhammad b. Habib, Kitab al-Muhabbar (ed. Ilse Lichtenstaedter), Hyderabad, 1361/1942.

Ibn Hayyin an-Nu‘man b. Muhammad b. Mansur Ibn Hayytn, Sharh alAkhbar fi Fad@ il al-A’immah al-Abrar, MS. SOAS, No. 25732.

Ibn Hazm, Jamharah : Abit Muhammad ‘Ali b. Sa‘id b. Hazm, Jamharat Ansab al‘Arab, Cairo, 1948. Ibn Hisham, Sirah

Aba Muhammad ‘Abd al-Malik b. Hisham, as-Sirah anNabawiyyah (ed. Shibli, Saq4, Abyari), Cairo, 1375/1955. Ibn al-‘Ibri Gregorius Abi al-Faraj Ibn al-‘Ibri, Ta’ rikh Mukhtasar adDuwal (ed. A. Salhani), Beirut, 1958. Ibn al-Jawzi, Managqib

‘Ali Ibn al-Jawzi, Manaqib ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, Leipzig, 1899. Ibn al-Kalbi, Jamharah Abi al-Mundhir Hisham b. Muhammad b. as-Sa’ib al-Kalbi,

al-Juz’ al-Awwal min Jamharat an-Nasab, BM. Ms. add. 23.297. Ibn Kathir, Bidayah Abi al-Fida’ Isma‘il b. Kathir ad-Dimashdi, al-Bidayah waan-Nihayah, Cairo, 1351/1932-1358/1939. Ibn Kathir, Nihayat al-Bidayah

Abi al-Fida’ Isma‘il b. Kathir, Nihayat al-Bidayah wa-anNihayah, Beirut, 1968. Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Abi al-Fida’ Isma‘il b. Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur'an al-‘Azim, Beirut, 1966. Ibn Khaldin, ‘Jbar ‘Abd ar-Rahman b. Muhammad Ibn Khaldin, Kitab al-‘Tbar wa-Diwan al-Mubtada wa-al-Khabar, Beirut, 1957.

310 Bibliography Ibn Khaldin, Mugaddimah ‘Abd ar-Rahman b. Muhammad Ibn Khaldiin, Mugaddimat Ibn Khaldin (ed. ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Wahid Wafi), Cairo, 19571962

Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat Shams ad-Din Ahmad b. Muhammad Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat

al-A‘yan wa-Anba’ Abn@’ az-Zaman, Cairo, 1882. (New Edition by Ihsan ‘Abbas, Beirut, 1969). Ibn Khurradadhbih ‘Ubaydallah Ibn Khurradadhbih, Kitab al-Masdalik wa-alMamialik, Leiden, 1306. Ibn Majah, Sunan

Sunan, 1372/1952.

Muhammad b. Yazid Aba ‘Abdallah b. Majah al-Qazwini,

Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, Risalah fi as-Sahabah

‘Abdallah b. al-Mugaffa‘, “Risalat Ibn al-Mugaffa‘ fi asSahabah”, Rasa’ il al-Bulagha’ (ed. Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali), Cairo, 1946, pp. 117-134. Ibn Qutaybah, Ma ‘arif

Abia Muhammad ‘Abdallah b. Muslim Ibn Qutaybah, Kitab al-Ma‘arif, Goattingen, 1850. Ibn Qutaybah, Shi'r Abi Muhammad ‘Abdallah b. Muslim Ibn Qutaybah, Kitab ash-Shi‘r wa-ash-Shu‘ara’ , Leiden, 1902. Ibn Qutaybah, ‘Uyiin (al-Akhbar) Abi Muhammad ‘Abdallah b. Muslim Ibn Qutaybah, Kitab ‘Uyin al-Akhbar, Cairo, 1925-1930. Ibn Sa‘d, Tabagat

Muhammad b. Sa‘d, Kitab at-Tabaqat al-Kabir (ed. E. Sachau), vol. V, Leiden, 1322/1905. ‘Iqd

see Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, ‘7qd Ismail O. S. S. A. Ismail, “Mu ‘tasim and the Turks”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXIX, 1966, pp. 1224.

Istakhri | Abi Ishag Ibrahim b Muhammad al-Istakhri (al-Karkhi), Kitab Masalik al-Mamalik (ed. M. J. De Goeje), Leiden, 1927.

Bibliography 311 Ivanov

V. V. Ivanov, “Early shi‘ite movements”, Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, N. Ser. XVII, 1941, p. 1-23. Jafri S. M. Jafri, Origins and Early Development of Shi‘a Islam, London, 1979. Jahiz, Bukhala’

Aba ‘Uthman ‘Amr b. Bahr al-Jahiz, Kitab al-Bukhala , Cairo 1938-1939. Jahiz, Rasa il

Aba ‘Uthman ‘Amr b. Bahr al-Jahiz, Ras@ il al-Jahiz (ed. Sandibi), Cairo, 1964.

Jahiz, Thalath Ras@ il | Aba ‘Uthman ‘Amr b. Bahr al-Jahiz, Thalath Rasa il (ed. Finkel), Cairo, 1344/1926. Jahshiyari, Wuzarda’

Abi ‘Abdallah Muhammad b. ‘Abdis al-Jahshiyari, Kitab alWuzara’ wa-al-Kuttab (ed. Saqa, Abyari, Shalabi), Cairo, 1357/1938. Jazari

Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Jazari, Asna al-Matalib fi managqib ‘Ali b. Abi Talib, Mecca, 1324. Kaabi

M. Kaabi, “Les origin Tahirides dans la da‘wa ‘Abbaside’’, Arabica, XIX, 1972, pp. 145-164. Kanz al-‘Ummal “Ali b. ‘Abd al-Malik al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, Kanz al-‘Ummal, Hyderabad, 1945-1958.

Kennedy |

H. Kennedy, The Early ‘Abbasid Caliphate, London, 1981. Kennedy, “Disputes”

H. Kennedy, “Succession disputes in the early ‘Abbasid caliphate (132/749-193/809)”, Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants 10th Congress, Edinburgh, 1980, Proceedings (ed. R. Hillenbrand), Edinburgh, 1982, pp. 2933. Kennedy, “Government” H. Kennedy, “Central government and provincial elites in the early ‘Abbasid Caliphate”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XLIV, 1981, pp. 26-38.

312 Bibliography

1955. ,

Khadduri, War and Peace M. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore, Khalifah

Khalifah b. Khayyat al-‘Usfuri, Ta’ rikh, (ed. al-‘Umari), Najaf, 1967. Kindi, Wulat Abi ‘Umar Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Kindi, Kitab al-Wulat wa-Kitab al-Qudat, Beirut, 1908-Leiden, 1912.

Kutubi :

Kiafi

Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. A‘tham al-Kifi, Kitab al-Futuh (MS. Saray Ahmet, iii, 2956), Hyderabad, 1388/1968-1395/1975.

see Ghurar al-Khasa is. Lane-Poole

S. Lane-Poole, Catalogue of Arabic Coins in the Khedivial Library, Cairo, London, 1897. Lane-Poole, Coins S. Lane-Poole, Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British

Museum, I, The Coins of the Eastern Khaleefehs in the British Museum (ed. R. S. Poole), London, 1875. Lassner, “Abi Muslim”

J. Lassner, “Abii Muslim, son of Salit: A skeleton in the ‘Abbasid closet ?”, Studies in Islamic History and Civilization

in Honour of Professor David Ayalon (ed. M. Sharon), Jerusalem and Leiden, 1986, pp. 91-104. Lassner, “Aba Mushm al-Khuraésani’

J. Lassner, “Abi Muslim al-Khurasani: the emergence of a secret agent from Khurasan, Iraq, or was it Isfahan?’’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, CIV, 1984, pp. 165-175. Lassner, “Propaganda” J. Lassner, “Propaganda in early Islam; the ‘Abbasids in the

post-revolutionary age”, Israel Oriental Studies, 1980, pp. 74-85. Lassner, Revolution J. Lassner, Islamic Revolution and Historical Memory, New Haven, 1986. Lassner, Shaping J. Lassner, The Shaping of the ‘Abbasid Rule, Princeton, 1980.

Bibliography 313 Lavoix

H. Lavoix, Catalogue de Monnaies musulmanes de la Bibliothéque Nationale, Paris, 1891-1986. Lecker M. Lecker, On the Prophet Muhammad's Activity in Madina (Hebrew), Ph. D. Thesis, Hebrew University, 1982. Le Quien

H. Le Quien, Oriens Christianum, Paris, 1740. Le Strange, Lands

Guy Le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, London, 1905. Le Strange, Baghdad Guy Le Strange, Baghdad during the ‘Abbasid Caliphate, Oxford, 1900.

Madelung ,

W. Madelung, “The Sufyani between tradition and history”, Studia Islamica, LXII, 1986, pp. 5-48. Maqatl

‘Ali b. Husayn Abi al-Faraj al-Isfahani, Maqatil atTalibiyyin, Cairo, 1949. Maarizi, an-Niza* wa-at-Takhasum Ahmad b. ‘Ali al-Magrizi, Kitab an-Niza@‘ wa-at-Takhasum fima bayna Bani Umayyah wa-Bani Hashim, Cairo, 1937. Magrizi, Muqaffa Ahmad b. ‘Ali al-Magrizi, at-Ta’ rikh al-Kabir al-Muqaffa fi

1978. |

Tarajim Ahl Misr wa-al-Waridin ilayha (MS. Paris, 2144Bibliothéque Nationale), The Biography of Abi al-‘Abbas asSaffah, edited and annotated by Muhammad ‘Aql, unpublished M. A. Thesis, University of Bar Ilan, Ramat Gan, Marasid Safiyy ad-Din ‘Abd al-Mu’min b. ‘Abd al-Haqq al-Baghdadi, Marasid al-Ittila‘ ‘ala Asma’ al-Amkinah wa-al-Biqa‘, Cairo, 1945-55. Mas‘udi, Muritj

‘Ali b. Husayn b. “Ali al-Mas‘iidi, Muritj adh-Dhahab waMa‘adin al-Jawhar (Dar al-Andalus), Beirut, 1965-66. Mas‘idi, Tanbih ‘Ali b. Husayn b. “Ali al-Mas‘tdi, Kitab at-Tanbih wa-alIshraf, Leiden, 1893-1894.

314 Bibliography

1962. ,

Melikoff

I. Melikoff-Sayar, Abu Muslim le “Porte-Hache” du

Khurasan dans la Tradition Epique Turco-Iranienne, Paris, Morimoto K. Morimoto, The Fiscal Administration of Egypt in the Early Islamic Period, Dohosha, 1981. Mubarrad, Kamil

Abi al-‘Abbas Muhammad b. Yazid al-Mubarrad, al-Kamil, Leipzig, 1864-1882. Muhammad ‘Abd ar-Rahman Fahmi Muhammad, Mawsi‘at an-Nugid al‘Arabiyyah, I, Fajr as-Sikkah al-‘Arabiyyah, Cairo, 1965.

Murr, Caliphate |

W. Muir, The Caliphate, Edinburgh, 1924. Mujir ad-Din ‘Abd ar-Rahman b. Muhammad Mujir ad-Din al-*Ulaymi, alUns al-Jalil bi-Ta’ rikh al-Quds wa-al-Khalil, Bulag, 1283. Musil A. Musil, Northern Negd, New York, 1928. Mzik

H. Von Mzik, Al-Istakhri und seine Landkarten im Buch Suwar al-Akalim, Wien, 1965. Nagel T. Nagel, Unterschungen zur Entstehung des Abbasidischen Kalifates, Bonn, 1972. Nawbakhti, Firaq

Aba Muhammad Hasan b. Musa an-Nawbakhtl, Firaq asShi‘ah, Najaf, 1959.

Néldeke |

Theodore No6ldeke, Sketches from Eastern History, Translated by John Sutherland Black, London, 1892.

Omar

F. Omar, The ‘Abbasid Caliphate, Baghdad, 1969. Omar, “Succession” F. Omar, “Politics and the problems of succession in the early

‘Abbasid caliphate’, Islamic Culture, XLVI, 1974, pp. 3143. Ostrogorsky G. Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, Oxford, 1980.

Bibliography 315 Peters

F. E. Peters, “Byzantium and the Arabs of Syria’, Annales Archéologiques Arabes Syriennes, XXVII, 1977-1978. Pines S. Pines, “Note on an ancient meaning of term Mutakallim”, The ‘Ulama’ and Problems of Religion in the Muslim World (Hebrew) (ed. G. Baer), Jerusalem, 1971, pp. 18-30. Qalqashandi, Subh al-A‘sha Abi al-‘Abbas Ahmad b. ‘Ali al-Qalqashandi, Subh al-A‘sha fi Sina ‘at al-Insha Rasa@ il

see Jahiz, Ras@ il.

Rubin, “Constitution”

U. Rubin, “The “constitution of Madina”: some notes”, Studia Islamica, LXII, 1985, pp. 5-23. Sa‘d al-Qummi Sa‘d al-Qummii b. ‘Abdallah al-Ash‘ari, Kitab al-Maqalat waal-Firaq (ed. Mashkir), Tehran, 1963. Saunders J. J. Saunders, A History of Medieval Islam, London, 1965. Schonborn Schonborn, Sophrone de Jerusalem, Paris, 1972. Serjeant, “Constitution” R. B. Serjeant, “The constitution of Medina”, The Islamic Quarterly, VIII, 1964, pp. 3-16. Serjeant, “Sunnah” R. B. Serjeant, “The sunnah Jami‘ah, pacts with the Yathrib Jews, and the tahrim of Yathrib: Analysis and translation of the documents comprised in the so-called ‘Constitution of Medina’ ”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XLI, 1978, pp. 1-42. Shaban M. A. Shaban, The ‘Abbasid Revolution, Cambridge, 1970. Shaban, ““Khurasan”’

M. A. Shaban, “The political geography of Khurasan and the

east at the time of the Arab conquests” in C. E. Bosworth (ed.), Iran and Islam, Edinburgh, 1971. Shahrastani, Milal

Abi al-Fath Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Karim b. Ahmad ashShahrastani, al-Milal wa-an-Nihal (ed. W. Cureton), London, 1846 (Rep. Leipzig, 1923)

316 Bibliography Sharon, “Ahl al-bayt’”

M. Sharon, “Ahl al-bayt-people of the house”, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, VIII, 1986, pp. 169-184. Sharon, “Debate” M. Sharon, “The development of the debate around the legit-

imacy of authority in early Islam”, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, V, 1984, pp. 121-142. Sharon, “Legitimacy”’

M. Sharon, “Notes on the question of the legitimacy of government in Islam’, Jsrael Oriental Studies, X, 1980, pp. 116123. Sharon, Reforms M. Sharon, “The military reforms of Aba Muslim and their consequences”, Studies in Islamic History and Civilization in

Honour of Professor David Ayalon (ed. M. Sharon), Jerusalem and Leiden, 1986, pp. 105-143. Sharon, “Umayyads as ahl al-bayt’

M. Sharon, “The Umayyads as ahl al-bayt’, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, XI, 1989. Shorter El Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (ed. H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers), Leiden, 1953. Sourdel, Vizirat D. Sourdel, Le vizirat ‘Abbaside, Damascus, 1959. Suyuti, Ta’ rikh Jalal ad-Din ‘Abd ar-Rahman b. Aba Bakr as-Suyiti, Ta’ rikh al-Khulafa’ , 3rd edition, Cairo, 1383/1964. Tabari Muhammad b. Jarir at-Tabari, Ta’ rikh ar-Rusul wa-al-Mulik (ed. M. J. De Goeje), Leiden, 1879-1901. Ta’ rikh Baghdad Aba Bakr Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, Ta’ rikh Baghdad, Cairo, 1349/1931.

Tayfir Ahmad b. Abi Tahir Tayfir, al-Juz’ as-Sadis min Kitab Baghdad, Leipzig, 1908. Tha‘alibi, Lata’ if ‘Abd al-Malik b. Muhammad ath-Tha ‘alibi, Lata’ if al-Ma‘arif (ed. De Jong), Leiden, 1867.

Bibliography 317 Tueker

W. F. Tueker, “‘Abd Allah Ibn Mu‘awiyah and the Janahiyah: rebels and ideologues of the late Umayyad period”, Studies in Islam, 51, 1980, pp. 39-57. al-‘Uyitn wa-al-Hada’ iq See Fragmenta. Van Vloten

G. Van Vloten, De Opkomst der Abbasiden in Chorasan, Leiden, 1890. Van Vioten, “Miinzen” G. Van Vloten, “Uber einzige bis jetzt nicht erkannte Miinzen

Walker |

aus der letzten Omeijadenzeit”, Zeitschrift fur Deutsche

Morgenlands Geselschaft, XLVI, 1892, p. 554.

J. Walker, A Catalogue of the Arab-Byzantine and Post-

Reform Umayyad Coins, London, 1958. Wagq ‘at Siffin

Nasr b. Muzahim al-Mingari, Wagq ‘at Siffin, Cairo, 1962. Waaidi, Maghazi

Muhammad b. ‘Umar b. Wagid (al-Wagqidi), Kitab alMaghazi (ed. Marsden Jones), London, 1966. Wellhausen J. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall (Translated by M. G. Weir), reprint, Beirut, 1963. Wellhausen, Das arabische Reich J. Wellhausen, Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz, Berlin, 1902. Wellhausen, Khawarij

J. Wellhausen, A hzab al-Mu‘aradah as-Siyasiyyah adDiniyyah fi Sadr al-Islam, al-Khawarij wa-ash-Shi‘ah, Translated from the German by ‘Abd ar-Rahman Badawi, Cairo, 1967. Wiet, Repertoire G. Wiet, Repertoire chronologique d’ épigraphie arabe, Cairo, 1931-1964. Wilkinson -

J. Wilkinson, Jerusalem Pilgrims before the Crusades, Jerusalem, 1977. Ya‘qubi, Buldan Ahmad b. Abii Ya‘qiib Ishaq b. Wadih al-Ya‘qibi, Kitab alBuldan (ed. M. J. De Goeje), Leiden, 1860-1861.

318 Bibliography Ya‘qubi, Mushakalat an-Nas

Ahmad b. Aba Ya‘qib Ishaq b. WaAadih al-Ya‘qibi, Mushakalat an-Nas li-Zamanihim, Beirut, 1962. Ya‘qubi, Ta’ rikh

Ahmad b. Abi Ya‘qib Ishaq b. Wadih al-Ya‘qibi, Ta’ rikh (ed. Houtsma), Leiden, 1882. Yaqut, Buldan

Shihab ad-Din YAaqit b. ‘Abdallah ar-Rimi, Mu‘jam alBuldan (ed. Wuiastenfeld), Leipzig, 1866-1873. Zambaur, Manuel

Eduard von Zambaur, Manuel de Généalogie et de

Zambaur, Mu‘jam | Chronologie pour I’ Histoire de l Islam, Hanover, 1927.

Eduard von Zambaur, al-Ansadb wa-al-Usurat al-Hakimah, Cairo, 1951.

Zirikli, A ‘lam

Khair ad-Din az-Zirikli, al-A ‘lam, Beirut, 1980.

MAPS

‘S \ | ‘eG ZY 3 é>