Black banners from the East, Vol. 1 9789652235015

Citation preview

BLACK BANNERS FROM THE EAST

And the Prophet said (a large group of his companions was present): “Lo, between you and the fitnah there is a gate which is shut. It shall surely break open to let the fitnah in to ravage you... until people appear from the East; their garments black and their banners black. None of their banners shall suffer a setback. Verily, Allah shall extinguish the fitnah with them!”

. Akhbar, p. 207

THE MAX SCHLOESSINGER MEMORIAL SERIES

MONOGRAPHS II

The Max Schloessinger Memorial Series publishes texts and monographs in Arabic and Islamic Studies. It was established at the Institute of Asian and African Studies of the Hebrew University through the generosity of the late Mrs.

Miriam S. Schloessinger in honour of her late husband, Professor Max Schloessinger.

Editorial Board D. AYALON, J. BLAU, Y. FRIEDMANN, M.J. KISTER, M. MILSON, S. PINES, S. SHAKED, P. SHINAR.

Institute of Asian and African Studies The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

BLACK BANNERS FROM THE EAST The Establishment of the ‘Abbasid StateIncubation of a Revolt

BY

MOSHE SHARON

1983 THE MAGNES PRESS- THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY - JERUSALEM E.J. BRILL, LEIDEN

Distributed by N.V. Boekhandle en Drukkerij V/H E.J. Brill Oude Rijn 33a Leiden~ Holland

©

The Max Schloessinger Memorial Fund c/o The Magnes Press The Hebrew University

Jerusalem 1983

ISBN 965-223-501-6 Printed in Israel Typesetting: Efrat, Jerusalem Plates: Art-Plus, Jerusalem Printing: Ahva Press, Jerusalem

CONTENTS

Author’s Note 9

Preface by David Ayalon 7

Prologue 13 INCUBATION OF A REVOLT

Chapter 1 Propaganda and Revolution 17 Chapter 2 A Question of Legitimacy 29 Chapter 3 The Sources of the ‘Abbasid Da‘wa— Geographical

and Human Setting 49

Chapter 4 The Sources of the ‘Abbasid Da‘wa—

Ideological Background 73

Chapter 5 The Hashimiyyah 101

Chapter 6 The Da'wa Underground 153

Epilogue 227 Chapter 7 Abt Muslim 201 Historiographical Note 231

Index 255

Bibliographical Abbreviations 239 LIST OF MAPS

I. The Caliphate in the East at the Time of Transition

from Umayyads to ‘Abbasids facing p. 16

II. Distribution of the Arab Tribes in Khurasan p. 59 II]. The Centres of the Da‘wa Activity in Khurasan p. 194

Technical Note 1. The word Da'wah is written with capital D when the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah is meant. Where the general Arabic term is intended the

word appears in italics and with a small d.

2. b. = Ibn. 3. bnt. = bint. 4. Abu appears always in the nominative case. Thus, Ali b. Abu Talib and not b. Abt Talib. 5. Quotations in Arabic in transliteration usually appear without tanwin except where it is deemed important to supply the quotation with tanwin, either fully or partially. 6. References are quoted, as arule, according toa special abbrevia-

tion of the source. The bibliographical listing is arranged according to the alphabetical order of these abbreviations.

7. Throughout this volume the adjective Hashimite is used to denote the Hashimiyyah movement and not the clan of Banu Hashim.

Preface There is no need to elaborate on the importance of the period of transition from the Umayyads to the ‘Abbasids. The study of that period constitutes the final part of Wellhausen’s monumental opus The Arab Kingdom and its Fall which revolutionized research into Islamic history, and which has guided the steps of the students of early Islam, including those critical of one or more of Wellhausen’s conclusions. Dr. Sharon’s present study is by far the best rectifica-

tion and continuation of the latter part of Wellhausen’s book. A number of studies on the same subject, some of them quite important, which have appeared in the last few years do not detract from the originality and great significance of Dr. Sharon's work. It would

be pointed out in this connection that his major conclusions appeared in his doctoral thesis, which was submitted in 1970. Dr. Sharon’s monograph on the ‘Abbasid Caliph al-Mansur, on which he has collected an immense amount of material, will soon appear as a separate study and will also be incorporated into the third volume of the present work. It promises to be a most revealing account of the transition between the two Caliphates and of the early and formative decades of ‘Abbasid rule. David Ayalon

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Author's Note Many people, teachers, colleagues, friends and pupils have contributed to the making of this book. I am indebted most of all to Prof. David Ayalon who has been guiding me since my first year in the Hebrew University, who supervised my Ph.D. Thesis which forms the basis of the present study, and who has always been a devoted teacher as well as a good friend in times of need. His dedication, guidance, support and constant encouragement have been above and beyond what is required or even expected when supervising doctoral

research. Prof. Ayalon introduced me to the exciting world of Islamic history and taught me the art of the professional and methodological reading of an Arabic text. In lectures as well as in private discussions, Prof. Ayalon always stimulated fresh investigation into

fields in Islamic history which already seemed to have been exhausted. Thus when I took my first steps in the study of classical Islam his pioneer research into the origins of the Mameluk sociomilitary institution became my guideline. The influence of Ayalon’s ideas and personal style in his research and lectures can easily be detected in my original Ph.D. thesis. His

work. ,

many contributions to that text proved invaluable to the present Professor M.J. Kister introduced me to the complex and highly rewarding field of Islamic tradition. He has supplied many referen-

ces to rare sources in this book. Thanks are also due to Prof. Bernard

Lewis with whom I studied in the School of Oriental and African

Studies, University of London and whose vast scholarship has helped me since I first began to study the ‘Abbasids; to Professor L.A. Udovitch of Princeton University, and Professor J. Lassner of Wayne State University who for many years encouraged me to finish this book. They both read the original manuscript in Hebrew and made many valuable comments.

10 Author's Note I take this opportunity to pay homage to the late Prof. Gaston Wiet who guided me in the field of Arabic epigraphy and shared with me _ his encyclopaedic knowledge of Arabic literature and Islamic history. I owe special thanks to Dr. Fartiq Umar of Baghdad, who besides extending me invaluable assistance when both of us were students in London was also a source of inspiration on many topics of mutual interest. The following institutions have made the research for this study possible: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, which enabled me to engage in research work in London and Paris; the British Library,

London; the Bibliothéque Nationale, Paris; the Chester Beatty Library, Dublin, Eire; the British Council and the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

Special thanks are due to Mr. Joseph Frank who translated the first version of the manuscript from Hebrew, to Dr. A. Altman who edited the whole book, to my student, Miss Rivka Gorodenchik who helped me in many ways to produce the original Hebrew version of this book, and to Mrs. Valerie Waller who typed the final English Cex.

And last, but not least, special gratitude is due to my wife, Judith, who in many ways was the driving force behind the completion of this work. Moshe Sharon

Jerusalem 1983

Les Révolutions, les véritables...cheminent longtemps invisibles

avant d éclater au grand jour sous l'effet de quelques circonstances fortuites. Mathiez, La Revolution Francaise.

Prologue The battle on the Zab was lost in the late afternoon Sunday, January

25, 750. To no avail, Caliph Marwan, the last Umayyad caliph, endeavored to rally round him his shattered army that was trapped between the deep ravine of the Zab and the spears of the black clad Easterners led by ‘Abdallah ibn “Alt. In the heat of battle, earlier in the day, they had dismounted from their horses as a sign of their determination to fight to the death, and now they drove hard into

the caliph’s crushed lines, black banners hoisted over the black human phalanxes. From his elevated position, Marwan could see that he had mis-

judged his enemy from the very beginning. Troubles within the ruling family, an irksome and dangerous revolt of the Khawarij in Mesopotamia and Iraq, tribal problems in Syria, the everexisting danger of the enemies of Islam from the north, his own personal problem of consolidating his rule — all these had kept his hands full. He had not paid the necessary attention to the alarming rumours from the eastern provinces, nor had he even bothered to answer the urgent messages of Nasr b. Sayyar, his old governor in Khurasan.

The experienced politician and veteran soldier had repeatedly warned him about the growing unrest in his province. He coded his messages in verse and the courier had, most probably, to add explanations if needed. “T see in the ashes the glimmer of burning coal, And I fear its flaring into flames. Fire needs only two twigs to kindle And war is preceded but by the exchange of words.

In wonder I say, Oh that I could know, Are they awake, the Umayyads all

14 Prologue Or perchance, sunk in slumber deep. If slumbering they are, of carelessness, Then say: ‘Arise! Awake! The time of soberness has arrived.’ ”

“The man on the spot’, he added, “sees what the absent one cannot’. When the sun set, the battle was over, Marwan ordered the bridge over the Zab to be cut, thus condemning many of his soldiers who had escaped the sword, to die by drowning. The fate of the kingdom hung now on his person alone and he still had some hope. He was a soldier who had spent most of his life in the field, sometimes against the most ferocious enemies the Muslims had ever encountered, in

the savage mountains of Armenia. He was accustomed both to victories and defeats. This, indeed, was a mighty blow which had destroyed his new army, an army into which he had just introduced new tactics and which he had been training in new battle formations. He had relaxed the rigidity of the classical combat formations of left

wing (maysarah), right wing (maymanah) and centre (qalb), by introducing the idea of the karddis. These were smaller and more independent cavalry units that could move more freely in the field. They had proved inadequate, however, when confronted with the bearers of the black banners, the warriors of Khurasan, who were

long used to similar tactics in their wars against the infidels in Transoxania. They called him Marwan al-Ja‘di, the frizzled haired, because of his curly black hair. He was also called Marwan al-Himar, the ass, and Himar al-Jazirah, the donkey of Mesopotamia. His stubborness and endurance had earned him this nickname. His name was connected with Mesopotamia, which he preferred to the more cultured and decadent Damascus, the seat of the Caliphs. From the city of Harran in Mesopotamia, he had conducted his military campaigns against Armenia before ascending the throne and had turned it into his capital when he assumed the supreme authority of caliph. In the first moments after the battle, Marwan still continued to misjudge his new situation. As a soldier, he would not even consider

| Prologue 15 the advice of his able secretary and chancellor, ‘Abd al-Hamid, who suggested that he take refuge with the Byzantine Emperor. Marwan would not hear of anything of the kind, if the story related to us by the chronicler is true. He, who had spent most of his life — he was at

least 62 years old — in the cause of Islam would not turn to its arch-enemy for help. Besides, although the rebels had had some outstanding victories, only Iraq and the eastern provinces had suc-

cumbed to them. Most of Syria, the Hijaz and all the western provinces of the Empire right up to the shores of the Atlantic were still his, or so he must have believed. His grandfather, Marwan — after whom he was named — and his uncle, ‘Abd al-Malik, had been in far worse situations. At a certain point, they had hardly held sway over more than one or two provinces in the entire Empire, while their

opponent, the counter-Caliph, ‘Abdallah b. Zubayr, ruled from Hijaz over the whole East. The dynasty had then been saved by the Imperial Syrian troops

Jund ahl-ash-Sham). Syria, with its ever ready army of faithful soldiers had always been the mainstay of the dynasty. However, things were no longer the same. Tribal rivalry had been infecting the Syrian military and the whole Syrian support for the Marwanids had already been long in decline. Marwan himself was no ‘Abd-al-Malik. He lacked his predecessor's political skill and had no faith in Syria, but he hoped that he could still fall back upon the western provinces: Egypt, North Africa and Spain. With a small company, composed mainly of his immediate family, wives and children and some slaves and freedmen, he began a swift retreat. Damascus, almost as anticipated, closed its gates. It had had very little to do with the Ass of Jazrrah and was, by now, weary of the latter sovereigns of the house of Marwan. It cherished the name of the great Mu‘awiyah, the son of Abt Sufy4n, and already toyed with the idea of and the desire for a new Sufydanid to replace the decayed and by now defeated Marwanids. There was nothing left to hope for from Syria, and Egypt was not the place for recruiting a new army. True, it was the granary of the Empire, but it had long ceased to be of any military significance. It was not a border country, and once the West was conquered it no longer even served as a way station onthe

16 Prologue route taken by the reinforcements that had been sent westwards during the previous century. Neither was there time to examine the possibilities in Egypt, nor to make a cool assessment of the situation. Close on his heels there was always a small detachment headed by an excellent soldier from Jurjan, ‘Amir b. Isma‘tl, an Arab of South Arabian ancestry, belonging to the tribe of Madhhij. This was most probably the idea of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali, the new caliph’s uncle, who understood that Marwan must not be given time to escape, let

alone muster a new army. When Damascus closed its gates in Marwan’s face, “Abdallah b. ‘Ali decided to remain in the subdistrict of Filastin with most of his army and to detach the light cavalry unit of “Amir for the pursuit. The latter was indeed swift, for the Caliph now had to run for his life. He tried to reach Nubia, but was overtaken in Upper Egypt. The dawn broke on the last Umayyad

in a small church in the little town of Busir. Soldier to the last moment of his life, sword in hand, Marwan went out of the church, where his family had found refuge, to meet his pursuers. He fought until he died and his head was cut off and sent to ‘Abdallah b. ‘Alt, who forwarded it to his nephew, the new Caliph ‘Abt al-’Abbas in

Kifah. A new era had begun. This time a revolution against the Umayyads had succeeded. The ‘Abbasid dynasty began its rule over the empire of Islam, save for Spain where a scion of the Umayyads

had established a separate kingdom to continue the rule of his family, never to be subjected to the East again. _ The rise of the ‘Abbasids to power was more than simply a change of dynasties. It was a revolution in many senses, political, cultural and social. In their time, whether they were the actual rulers or only

nominal figureheads of the empire, Islam reached maturity and began its decline. They came to power on the shoulders of one of the best organized revolutions in history. Their wheel of fortune, before it was brought to its final halt, was turned by a propaganda machine the like of which rarely appears in human history. This book aims to

examine this machine at work.

me “ i

xi:| SR sii east died eaEE | ooo peeeeree ONIN gEee naa inn ale IE| ogi oea0 ae IES eei Qo SES i, agin siiilienS 7aROR aye ee ata att aoa 7 Pa ae) eei fig WISIN sarin 3B yaeoe * ipeat, ‘iis, AIR asiFecugnwoisee: SNAG SARIS aeelbiouseisas 7 HN, isle: OG, itis: 2Bes arae-ala, te 2. on ow 2i—_—olh. an i‘a‘oe “aa. |gemaa iata|aeOe wefe en, imas Byq Tsinsatle &ym 4 "F me aw OK aSo Be esos. ae aioe a on ant ~ “mw a oan isis, ay te aA 4he AME 3 ee Uegmeon aee ee |aaa ae ied Vee ‘aWe ail? 2eee anos. [so ih a ie(aay i |OU oe aee[ee aA Ti oe ve .a_—" ,Meace gg Al a2 ae (_-ae Fs, ge9ee jou .ete: We itMe ve eee :ee OO ve Meese Ome aa. a. rr), OW we ugeail

4 ee F eitali iia LOMAS AS ASMA ASSL ANAT ARANDA H TESTO AIGNER TE OU LU RU GR IS OR RG ee UO GN RR ca i

iiig MB re 7 Oe VLU es iON csi Qe WigsPe 2 he 2 Umlltineg l e~ Ee“is esaasaeseeaes o Naaaiay sisi anfEE ee onsae SSOL argae a Fr Rearu SAE 2 Se RIS ES Ere ic Se oe I “ge | Sones EI :i RC ee RIA Ee Sl, GORI coos EE EE ae. | SOS CSE De EERE SE RSE RIC ECE OCOD eCaeepCa ERE Mis Bewle Siey on LO SEI Re silt i EE SEERA

44 WE a MeRE BaPaLANA Ago coet] Pr Sastre Raters CERRO NICeo RNY GUM Wee Cit SDSS NAD OUD APSHEE AY as aig Es 7ME Be oe Ge Wye : PD SE IEE: ere era ceeenert eR a oe eee arena Cece . SE ee IIE Lo Se te A A BSNE oe ynCa oO iae? eg eee Bn EE REE EE SEE SARS EERE ak llge aR eR ae2 Seer eee eee Ee CE ea ee eeSE Speer EOC Ee AS Se EOC FUEL 0ST ET 'i.(RMIT AE OSA Sed aPNR |SS ane GEES ES STS DU UM Mg SOS ON A a Meee een eee Ni gp ee Bo OR SES SE D iiygggit Se ee PPS I ES Be aEDSEES ateSSS igi| Dane, EeCnINmnenretaara,, i i NN |elalla ON SE SO JOE LE RE Sl

se Se ee ee

:Bi ie ee ee , we — . |:'//:q]:i“4yea“iok-.me eee ee .yoy oe me Wee ie my “tiie, ME ge , og vo . ag SN ee ee oe ;een SsEE |Dee eee ee , oe eeaee ier eee oe ‘s, ee~ok SS ee RANGE a aunt Sea Ma Rl i PO ea av a a DS SA AE A alii Se ERIE COPE SESPRREEEESS Pe EER URE RRSERESS 00001010107 Mihi eis ee

IGS ESADCEA RAAT CR. .ANION ORD SE. ue ES” Pee mete pI CeLSse Mey RASA SP A aSPCR Vesey ee IESE ay oe parece Corte woe ES . Bo Me cue ‘, . eyaR yas EE Oe A BARE eS parire ares fee ee 2

a

gg

SE

SES

SIM

SRO

Gk

Ses

SOE

SOE

OG

UE

SSO

D8

BES ON es rene Bee eat rae eC eg PR CC CE ET coer. aORR | ae 1Te ao2 |ESO ES RSC IEanes ECE IEC CCC SCAR CECE CAA RCSLT Wigs Se PS NCO ELE NESTOR SOSA SOLS AAA OEeee ECO AS EL Wh Sa a ae I GR | LTC CNS SSC EE IEE SR ELE SA See oe SE AEM SSE SSE ESS SRS OS aman SAE CellES al RRR eee ER ReOE SEO NN a ae ORR | TESS eee cee eres meme Tg oh SE SSREECE SE IS gg RR AFATER SS

Be Se SS aEAS ACS 8OEWie EE ee EE ee ee ESE SS Mg eee eeere Wg TR eeCA 2 EES SRM SEES: Mii es SEC SHCO USMies EO Re WgeeosMIG ee Ie eeSEES SNE SEAS aMy Sea ISaN SS A ae OO PEARSE ERE CESIUM” OgnS gcse IM SU ge EEE

:[i aaa Oe NY -_|) ere, Eee aaa, eer trer rien peamemeer rrNae merger i eee eae tae oe Ninian a eeeeR? i 1 Renee| au DSGS aE ESRI ERROR ae aiiue te ee is FA I ie EEE oe AEG | Fadl mar d hn cl ‘a r sie Se ee CAD lt lcaocr ay CON seogEES ES em 8 OG \ i eur 4 Fees... Savane oe é ca aed . rite. feo Ae Mo eh ene ae ia,/q xfA fav? ty oll MA | Bee ee eae at 1 EIRENE eRe Ay ago i |wy Seance iets ane aSfoASSET ENT OM agk sro |nn SRR SES Itneal Ree Oe. .att‘i.ef7iO Me Alii ESE SE :: how ial OO unpetl onl r ¢ et sy ff yo awe rn eae h EE GT Fearne CECE Se CEE CE OC EER Pee Ee RM LE EES PERE STE ETE. ee OE CCC CCR RRR a eee y ane an eee Tena Lane eanE RE RN te

4 WSO Pe ES

ii4ia:4,4ey ay 1 wh a ' i . r & | eee eee [ ee ® Wee chES Ng ;en eosin ii |qSoe cence eee sae os .Mi anLee sity, oi api MSS 2FE 825552 ili

= aad O bmn]

2

pa Oo S

=~ Oo FD Z, 24 3 — TY o> fw} try = > 1 tT a, o me ro) < © DN ac > > z > Oo DB > on a >: SB 1) O N & a > aCo a>! v2) Zz, ~ Ze } > Soa ae C7)

Seer ft °ay a _ = We eel $=. ny >

i=eZ,= 3>

S = a a 2 a we ch BB Z, >I a = A=. > os — > 3 5 < | — > DI “ > o> 5 oO — < a > ea > N TI 7 7) Q) rN = z ,ter eyiege GS ap ape ot CE go 4 “a aadil it rs it a ruin ener Yi. ee re” reo A % wm IMM ce ly iene” “ % ii:ape |iraiSone We EEN Ta eee can ytletetie at fleet esti eT at Tet ks ae vats EO e ol i” aEi “si ee iting aon hey Pentel Ne eTrere latpore ee et ates sel ohwe itrrTARE” ahr. eteeee tite ee ae aoo BU Le”oe refy biPe iaa ry 4 ge ; i, oo — Auaqulle oC rc Fee ee iat . kee tre Teron te eeee el nee oe oi 2 ay ee EF ive IF ses ' rm . et ee” ene” ae ag yee ae ee ors oe oo gt oie, a ao oe oe i a4 oT i | 4 " eat satel oe oof all ae \ an "9 ae fe ae fet te po a Ai a or mene as” A ;_. Bic F i F :iL j= qrere eutetoe ta ae area NEC GMeoe’ vials Ae ©Beg £ * Ae aoS Oett rte To aula! Tea, aed . &7ae& _i|i 3Cea Uva ;)TNE fel a) tees 2S : eae [ae aa Ye ee Otte .|eeaifoe er | Xa oe wy! oes ee eG he ce ee es se ae. ae coe. i:ae4*aaa: i'/i| re 2Bates Mt” neate Yoiaposte Peete piee) ee gp oy ee ere eR ee Bee ee ee aa eae »rn ok i oe eeetaRtnan, BeeB Bt: a” BeBe er ote | ee, oeen aeteheeers hte rere meeeeetticeeeett tHOE pee ety, ve mn

: ere: SS a,| Sterne See ae eT sil, ee Fi ‘ i.iiiq eee eee ee hy " : We | Bi 4 ail i ees, Seer My — eee Pome . , ii . F sharers ee oo nO Y De Ee ee | CEE Alng 4aoy =: , eee eee ee, ee a "i ti: ILE Pe "ii, sy se pnt be es eee een | iM ‘ae i .: | oc eeeee a:eewil : iini, pee eego

A on8 {4: : ieeee aanaetN ane rcs 3 ii i ae iia ott a eee oe wae ta a alee ate PMP lig. Wo a ee eae H EY vee a co oo an? er ns La gn aaa Hanson, iy att

]:) POV Go2 Dee eee eee en ear” rey |© Peer ne ae o** 8F|: Pind ah oan es |\SSL iese Nighy ar-Ra a , oa Y 1 ee a g ” , ki 4 Mis ae . I a eee Be Po lewoe om, iri wig gel Hog ge aight mee ane BNA 4 4 i q ; ee ee ? " . ae ane a : a C 4 “ i i) tat ™ | |iEa eee a Pe e 84% Ye | 4 ar a i an nn a ei ga 2 : sitio or:OO a Tocueeaatel ie et wo Few NEM oo a BD F: .iAsi;ont en) of ee re a ae Anoite, tlSie CU yyy s‘ od & & aFitna ayy ae By ane ae sie” a: a a oe Be agate, ee rn gy CGO o a 4 a eee ae i |1 ’Cae hoe ee ay BF ag & Fs Pe sneer Ale ee er ee tert eid aan oe a i &8 Re Ae aie r ale 4 Eg ® “couche ” san ee i ogg 8 98% A te rey ite om gy OO eee ' 4 Pag Me Fen et ra i o 2 Oe ow Se eer aw ae & ee EE Bes e q a\ic4|f;4 “an ge & 2 ape Sar ege " By Og LO et os agg ttt rt, rane t f Ree eae nn gat eee ‘ a 4 tyalll yee mone eee wn an st Syn gw BS . a re sence om 6 : °F paral (eon oe NE gay * ¥ & pre aoe “ Be oy ay ~ om 3 © 5 vee % a a” eS as ae ch re cl & hy ie a : eo oo Be Gillie a nal ele q mB ow < ro : 0, * 4 ii||ie 62 » o § ee oe ey rans ott | |Fly:EisiechKaa,sec oo a4 & BO ee ww? ; Be gy “ Re a Be Bk gy “8 a iad eet omit ia & ee oh ww ° Rpm ot ty 5 DW ery y 8 oe og o © oie he tt neta ? P eo sod 5 @ Yo eng 4 mman go ye Fo OO OT es rites iIi'i ; pe ge | Uo gitar : he ag Te Hey, aye il 8 By yen prc ee eae al io ta keh Ce eo poo og @ Naga eto Pr Bee Bhat A Sia “ oy BY gy” ae eee eral IN tN a a all Fast ei gg BOE gy BE ws ay he ier a aaa Lane 2. E eaeeenenees Mii ae A ate ee Ke eee ge Gy” ca atone (i a an i; Wee ia aywee ye ay eg £ON, Sy i,:|i:' ee eater |site ic OS EET »getate »ae li teeter rattan }See emer tees Ny TieH eee weeeh ORS, ogy “eng erage ee | he Suet on :|aera een neers = Rete on oa eee: pe EEG Me Me tee eS ee NSLS Dee Be eg EERE ee % Bad eH AS gaaGe 4‘yw Aq7'|aH aee Soe oySee, iaaretesttns terete Bearer eae eee. Re ge eG aEES *NO 7f’ii::}|i:i ee MG . RARE Lee etter ese 4 pearance ee ence are Si 5Reet Ee eeiy al AEE SOS ESE ee mH Ew BES Ree ee Renee Panaaeerererenenasecs | a ae 2 Oe ee oy eA ee a Oy Oe : i eee SES Lote pate Gye : ||FI Sees PEARS Tao EAST ee ehh OOF a& eH GE a, qPk Se em sy4 ee eee | eer eer ett .Se me aordan 5a eh VV atfe ‘Abd i|:/ :5: Le os Oo BI ge om .@ |aee Hod Gok Bh ekr Wve burt iq art, eet ; eG ‘ a ve Pd lL we | eH ee Fe 7% vy pees b os L Wig ee | PE aoe : ay ® } ( : ee ie ee | aegue® nes ial oe ee ee SEN Fa 0 von ee ee ‘ ) fk Coenen ST ana Seamer | 4 ‘ " 7 j ser ® i i HM Hegel 4 i. ee9... F7ee, feqF bY, fOei|e::i:' Ss A sie ON aan eBe |steno ata eater _4 EG ages = BSNS SeF TSmw “hs »4ie bathe oe ce IN Pe :§Ff Oe myon god ieee eee a, oer Ft pase fa & aa WSS eSee See mersh ||)LOW aeeerenentn Peat: SM i tayeua —_ iEMMI ,"tenets beceetiet of Peele oy Petey ra veetlseS. cor re ef, ED Hfesiteen ct re ehout EESerre HeedSeveTe 2 et gat ™eeet ten, oF eta gi" aS mm Xe eS 4 . wpe tete‘ tas wie‘ aturlets er aietoe arn: tet3Tit

t: ey eee rrrete gouty lag in vanes gee tt LCR gp Oo ey oo . 2°4i:‘ diltite, 8° ool. rereeae aDas pee Teetcarrer we, a aaBeh ereSTS ieT ERT TSBRAS ne SeTT REE. Beige ingwee a tha taewee ole OBere Pe Tee ned iene Tea RCE eTE eT. gy

oe BE aie Bb nly Bo sn eee ts A

q e pe ar re ee 4 @ ® 2 gee nen een aa oe 9. 8 @ & :

.i 4.iLr_ee :MySE : i oe bam | ; || Seas pare ieee eee ete Mi Eg OT A Ge OS He gH F OEIC IE EIS 4 PSE noc ernaneaera eaeEEE Sete4OT 3 ete . g& | eae Sian ae ane a areata raeae yete weEgy xy & e reqoe eS x{ P vigmsg fot ee - ‘+ - t: :i

244 Wee ee fieeeeEO —eeSagil : nny en :NECA aieee“Pe ]|: ee ee ee Mlee coe tee Parmer ete oh re eee SSS eeoe ne oer ee Fve aOILED aa}0: |} | eeeMe eae ES Ee ag | coer ees iiuk AERE

oa eaNigga i es REE SIS Gsaoa aA.Aagile can Sencar P t q TO at soPANT Vy SsVE ' Vv cyPAGE 7YO aesr oho4| i :i, 0nee ee SEE all | i Fa cg | i aBa porFANY AEs i Wes || eee teeee ease eae ceeMOOT: ean sot oe,pees eee earner DEE SEE ET ie (lee ] 8a 4( Apom j:s: MW Ge ae Mes Re comcaranne pcraeee i eeneres iota iaaetas ica: Herta aerate | A | ees pea nner | E Fa \ sweapanaaanonynnenisivannavinnMNil | Beer eee ceaeencaes eee ere ee cage eens Ce Ninna nol NRiano int eC iii[po lien eee ere ree ee eee cecal ittnen a0gilleS i Ny ail wml eee” ee in Seen ree ee eae a es anal Ninny, png goitgg hs eesa:\i

A Fie | |Bees ee Brcseminene | : ane eee eeeMiia GeO : Wee | ereeee eeneeSO 4EEeeinn eres ee AMOR a aSND erm. 4‘4 ‘Lncnncceven eeigoe

inno iene ec eee ey ee | ee4| : sie iiiciuiiiitataiuiiauaiiciencannbunaluiinnal : LNRM CERNING,

60 Chapter 3 the Arab muq@tilah. They were put under a separate command, and

although their commander was a mawld of the Shayban (Rabr ah) tribe, they did not regard themselves as obliged to support any one Arab tribe over another. According to Mada’ini, these mawalit warriors were Persians.”’ They were normally under the direct command of the governor of Khurdsan; nevertheless, as the revolt of Qutaybah b. Muslim proves, he could not always rely on their support. They

refused to turn their swords against rebellious Arab tribes and it would appear that they generally avoided interfering in inter-tribal conflicts.” Despite the arithmetical calculation which shows that the Yaman

tribes — the Azd and their allies — constituted a majority in Khurdasan, it should be noted that this alliance of three tribes could not counterbalance the powerful bloc of the Mudar tribes headed by

the Tamim. The result was that a precarious kind of balance of power was created within the Khurdsanite tribal system which was repeatedly upset with every change of policy on the part of the ruling authority towards the tribes. In other words, the rise or decline in influence of this or that tribe or bloc of tribes was connected with the origin and policy of the incumbent governor of Khurasan. What particularly exacerbated tribal conflicts in Khurasan was precisely this precarious balance which had been created in an area containing two powerful blocs of tribes, the northern and the southern, each of which had good grounds for demanding hegemony for itself. The Tamim, who made up the majority of the Mudar tribes, were among the original conquerors of Khurdsan in the time of ‘Uthman;”’ they regarded themselves as superior to the other warriors there and were not prepared to waive their right to pre-eminence in favour of the Azd, who were comparative newcomers.”° On the other hand, the 23 Tabari, loc. cit. 44 Baladhuri, Futah, pp. 423-424: Tabari, II, pp. 1294-1295; Ibn al-Athir, vol. cit. pp. 15ff. 5 Banu Tamim participated in the conquests of Tukharistan and Juzjan (Balkh, Marw, Taliqan, Faryab, and some other places). Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 407-

408. )

26 The problem was summarized by the leader of the Azd in 96/715 who said: ‘“Mudar in Khurdsan are equal to the other remaining three akhmds; and [within Mudar] Tamim form the majority. They are the heroes of Khurasan

Geographical and Human Setting 61 Azd and their allies, having tasted power in the time of Muhallab b. Abt Sufrah and his sons, were reluctant to relinquish their position,

after the fall of their patron, in favour of the Mudar.?’ This, basically, was the background to the tribal conflict in Khurasan, into the midst of which the ‘Abbasid Da‘ wah was plunged and which, as we shall see, it learned to exploit.”® Apart from this Arab fighting force of Iraqi origin which made up the majority of the muqatilah of Khuras4n, there was in the regiona

group of warriors from Syria, known as “Ahl ash-Sham.” It is not surprising that in Khuradsan they were a separate fighting force, since the “Ahl ash-Sham’”’ had existed in Iraq in a similar form and had performed similar functions. Although the fighting force of the

“Ahl ash-Sham” undoubtedly contained warriors whose tribal Origin was identical with or similar to that of the Iraqi fighting forces,’” it, nevertheless, preserved two inmportant distinguishing

features: a kind of Syrian local patriotism and loyalty to the government. Goitein calls the “Ahl ash-Sham” the “Imperial Army’’. It was the standing army unequivocally loyal to the Umayyad rulers and was stationed in fortified cities in sensitive areas where disturbances were expected to break out; it was maintained at the expense of the

local population.*° These loyal Syrian units were effectively employed in the provinces adjacent to Syria. At the close of the reign of Yazid I, they were sent to suppress a revolt in Madinah in support

of ‘Abdallah b. az-Zubayr; their commanders were Muslim b. ‘Uqbah of the Murrah tribe and Husayn b. Numayr of Sakiin. They did not hesitate to slaughter the Ansdr of Madinah and to plunder and they will never agree that the ruling power be outside Mudar’’. Tabari, II,

p. 1289; Ibn al-Athir, vol. cit., p. 14. 7 Wellhausen, pp. 448f. The last of the Muhallabids, Yazid b. al-Muhallab, was dismissed and thrown into prison by Caliph ‘Umar II in 99/717. His position was given to a Qaysite governor. Bayhaqi, Ta’rikh-i-Bayhaq, p. 151. The complicated tribal strife in Khurdsan was studied in detail by Wellhausen

pp. 397ff. We mention here only those details which are relevant to our discussion. -

*’ An Azdite commanding Ahl ash-Sham unit is mentioned by Tabari, Il, p. 1590, as well as one of Band ‘Abs, p. 1579. °° Goitein, Studies, pp. 154-155.

62 Chapter 3 the city of the Prophet for three whole days,” nor did they recoil from besieging Mecca and burning the Ka‘bah 64/683.” In the final attack launched against ‘Abdallah b. az-Zubayr, who had fortified himself in Mecca in 73/692, it was these men of the Ah ash-Sham who laid seige to the holy city, bombarded the Ka‘bah with ballistae

and burned it for the second time.” After the Umayyads rose to power, they had been forced to contend continuously with problems which arose in Iraq, where a great military potential was concentrated, consisting of Arab wartiors dwelling mainly in the twin capitals of Kufah and Basrah. These warriors had proven their fighting ability in the expeditions of conquest in the East and in the battles against the Khawarij. To the Umayyad dynasty, however, they presented a great danger, because

Iraq had never acquiesced to Syrian and Umayyad assumption of hegemony over the Muslim empire.** Throughout the whole period of the Umayyad dynasty, hostility between Iraq and Syria intensified; in fact, one of the main preoccupations of the Umayyad rulers was how to maintain their authority in Iraq. This authority was preserved by the most able governors the Umayyads could find” and

by a Syrian army normally stationed in Hirah and in Wasit. The 31 Tabari, II, pp. 405f; Baladhuri, Ansab, IVb, pp. 32-42; Ibn Sa‘d, Tabaqat, V.

p. 167; Dinawarl, pp. 277-278; Wellhausen, pp. 156-157. 32, Tabari, loc. cit. and pp. 442f.; Baladhuni, vol. cit. pp. 46-55; Ibn al-Athir, IV,

pp. 123-124. 33 On a large army of Ah! ash-Sham, sent in 72/691-2 to Mecca by ‘Abd al-Malik against Ibn az-Zubayr, see Tabari, II, pp. 829-830; Ibn Sa‘d, V, pp. 169-170; Ibn al-Athir, vol. cit. p. 348. On the siege of Mecca and bombardment of the Ka‘bah, see Tabari, II, pp. 844f. Ibn al-Athir, vol. cit. pp. 349350. On the role which the Syrian troops played in quelling the revolt of Zayd b. ‘Ali in Kdfah in 122/740 see Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 242f.; Wellhausen, pp. 337-338. 34 The Syrian loyalty to the Umayyads compared with the hatred and disloyalty of the Iraqis is emphasized in a tradition which relates that Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah, the last Umayyad governor of Iraq, said to Caliph Marwan II: “the warriors of Syria are better than the warriors of Iraq because the Arabs of Iraq feel no loyalty towards the Umayyad caliphs and their hearts are full of

hate’. Dinawari, p. 359. 35 Some of the greatest provincial governors under the Umayyads were the governors of Iraq. Ziyad b. Abt Sufyadn and his son ‘Ubaydallah held Iraq for Mu‘awiyah and Yazid I with an iron hand. Hajjaj b. Yusuf performed the same task with similar firmness for ‘Abd al-Malik and Khalid b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri

held the post with no less efficiency for Hisham. To this list one may add

Geographical and Human Setting 63 latter had been an outpost of Syrian armies since the time of Hajjaj b. Yusuf who had built the town of Wasit at a spot midway between Kufah and Basrah,*® his motive clearly being to be able to deploy his

loyal forces against either of these two cities in case of revolt. The

existence of foreign Syrian troops in Iraq and their threatening presence in their fortresses served only to sharpen Iraqi hostility against Syria and the Syrians and increased the Iraqi sense of injustice while heightening the feelings of local Iraqi patriotism.*’

These sentiments of Iraqi identity and antagonism towards the Syrians were transferred by the Arabs who migrated from Iraq to Khurasan. In the course of time, their Iraqi origin led to expressions of independence, which were particularly stressed on occasions of rebellion against the Umayyad rule. Concerning the abortive rising of Qutaybah b. Muslim in Khurdsan, records of which preserve a wealth of information on the Arab population in this region, we find a tradition preserved by Mada ’ini which contains a speech delivered by Qutaybah to the Arab tribes in Khurdas4n, in the course of which he said: ‘How long will the AhI ash-Sham continue to spread abroad in your homes and courtyards, O Ahl Khurasan? If you investigate my ancestry, you will find that Iam an Iraqi on my mother’s and on my father’s side, Iraqi in respect of my birthplace, my inclination,

my thoughts and my religion...’’*

By these words Qutaybah tried to persuade the Arabs in Khurasan to support him. He could find no better appeal than to stress that in

every respect he was of Iraqi origin, to display this as the highest Yazid b. ‘Umar b. Hubayrah, during the reign of Marwan II.

6 In 83/702 or 84/703. Wellhausen, p. 240; Le Strange, pp. 39-40. *7 The Syrians for their part regarded the Iraqis as enemies and thought that the ‘Ata should be withdrawn from them, Wellhausen, pp. 383-384. In a tradition reported by Tabari, II, 1854, the officers of the Syrian Army in Iraq are reported to have said to ‘Abdallah b. ‘Umar, the governor of Iraq, when he distributed the ‘Ata’ to the Iraqis: “Do you distribute our fay’ among these? Surely, they are our enemies’. Ibn al-Muqaffa’ noted that the Syrian soldiers obtained the fay’ which originally belonged to others. It is clear that he was referring to tribesmen of Kufah and Basrah, see Ibn al-Mugqaffa’, Risalah fi

as-Sahabah, p. 128.

8 Tabari, II, p. 1288; Ibn al-Athir, vol. cit. p. 14.

64 Chapter 3 : nasab value and to set himself up as one who sided with the rest of the Arabs in opposing the government and its most conspicuous and odious representatives, the units of Ahl ash-Sham. In Khurdsan, unlike Iraq, the number of Ah! ash-Sham troops was smaller. Their scope of activity was incomparably more restricted than in Iraq; the main reason for this being simply that in Khurasan the Arab population was dispersed among a great number

of towns and villages and not, as in Iraq, concentrated in the environs of two great cities. To the extent that there was animosity towards the Ahl ash-Sham in Khurasan (which Qutaybah was try-

ing to kindle), it was directed, in fact, against what these troops symbolized: a Syrian foreign rule. From the crumbs of information which can be gathered about the Ahl ash-Sham units in Khurasan, it can be inferred that they neither remained there permanently, nor settled in the province. Generally they came to Khurasan from Iraq with the governor, serving under him throughout his term of office, or perhaps only during its initial stages’ as long as he needed them in order to maintain order, and later returned to their base in Iraq. In certain cases, they acted not as an arm of the governor but rather as a curb on his authority; this occurred whenever for one reason or another, it seemed to them that he was likely to damage the interests of the realm.*° In this way they

proved that in Khurasan, as well as in Iraq, they were first and foremost loyal defenders of the Umayyad dynasty. Whenever they are found in Khurasan, they are always organized into a separate

unit, subordinate to their own commander and invariably prove themselves excellent fighters.**

As far as the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah is concerned, one can draw the following interim conclusions from the above account of Khurasan: ° — Tabari. Il, pp. 1579-1582.

0 [bid., p. 1581. " Tbid.. pp. 1583, 1585, 1590. When Nasr b. Sayyar, the last Umayyad governor of Khurasan felt the earth trembling beneath his feet as a result of the tribal strife and intensive activity of the Hashimiyyah in the province, he turned to the governor of Iraq for help. The only thing he asked for to restore order was, “One thousand Syrian headgears — alf ‘amdmah shamiyyah’. Kiifi, VII, p. 158. It indicates the degree of trust accorded to the Syrian troops and the great hope attached to their loyalty and military ability.

Geographical and Human Setting 65 (a) The Arab element in Khurdsan, being of Iraqi origin, cherished feelings of opposition to the Umayyads; these feelings were shared by all the tribes without distinction. (b) Unlike their brethren in Iraq, who in the course of time lost their military qualities and their fighting capacity for lack of combat, the Khurdsanites became excellent fighters as a result of their continual campaigns against the enemies of Islam, on

the north-eastern front. (c) For this reason, Khurasan was the only province in the empire which could supply fighting forces capable of defeating the military might of the Umayyads’ Syrian warriors.*” (d) Although the number of Arabs in Khuras4n was relatively

small, they were a decisive political and military factor; no political action could be undertaken, nor was there hope for its successful conclusion, without their participation. (e) Since Ktfah, as compared with Basrah, was poorly represented among the Arab population of Khurasan, the “Alid Shr ah in Khurasan was not based on the Kifite model.

The Arab Settlement in Khurasan We have concentrated in the foregoing on the Arab combatant force in Khurasan (the muqatilah) and, although there is not much addi-

tional evidence available, one may assume that the conservative figure of 47,000 warriors accurately represents the total Arab fighting force in Khurasan and must have been based on the register of

the local diwan. Wellhausen estimates, accepting the figure of 40,000 as the number of soldiers belonging to the akhmas, that the Arab population in the whole of Khurdsan cannot have exceeded 200,000.** This estimate does not include the 7,000 Kifite warriors,** who, according to the ratio of 1:5 laid down by Wellhausen, would add a further 35,000 to the Arab population of the region.

One may conclude, with great reservation, that the total Arab * Cf. Frye, “ ‘Abbasids’, p. 13. ** Wellhausen, p. 427, n. 3.

4 Tabari, Il, p. 1281.

66 Chapter 3 population in Khurasan at the zenith of the Umayyad period could not have exceeded a quarter of a million. The non-combatant Arab population preserved its tribal structure in regard to everything relating to inter-tribal relations; however, it established permanent settlements in the towns and villages of Khurasan which the tribal warriors had reached in the course of their campaigns.*? The Qays ‘Aylan clans settled in the western district of Khurasan, the central city of which was Nishapur (Naysabur, Nisabur, Abarshahr);*° adjacent to them, a part of the tribe of Tamim lived in the neighboring district of Tus.*’ In eastern Khurasan, there was a mixed settlement of Tamimites and members of the tribe of Bakr b. Wa’il. When the Azdites came to Khurdasan, they

apparently settled down mainly in the villages surrounding the capital city of Marw.* Arab settlement in Khurasan was unique in that the Arab tribesmen were dispersed among the local population. Unlike in Iraq, they were not concentrated in special garrison towns, nor even inside the

great cities of Khurasan. On the contrary, Arab settlement was rather a rural affair, each tribe having its own villages in the area it controlled. Thus, we hear about the Khuza‘ah villages, the Tamim villages, the Kindah villages, the Rabi ah villages or about the villages of Arab tribal leaders.*’ Arab dispersion in villages meant that the Arab minority soon was assimilated to the local Iranian majority. During the Umayyad period,

the Arabs in Khurasan still preserved their tribal affiliations and were continually engaged in fighting wars of ‘asabiyyah. But let us not forget that this preoccupation with ‘asabiyyah was an insepara4 The establishment of a permanent Arab settlement in Khurasan was part of a premeditated policy of the Muslims almost from the very beginning of the conquest. Ar-Rabr b. Ziyad al-Harithi, who was nominated governor of Khurasan in 51/671 by Ziyad b. Abt’ Sufyan, was accompanied by some 50,000 Arabs from Kufah and Basrah, (the warriors and their families) who settled in Khurasan. Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 410. Wellhausen, p. 415. 46 Wellhausen, p. 413, after Tabart, IJ, p. 1929. 47 | infer this fact from Tabari’s remark concerning Nasr b. Sayyar’s deputy in Tus who was the leader of Bant Tamim. It is hardly probable that he was there without at least a section of his tribe. Tabari, IH, 1771.

8 Wellhausen, loc. cit., Tabari, If, 1952 (Il. 5, 10-12). Tabari, Il, pp. 1579, 1952 (Il. 5-12), 1957, 1969, Akhbar, p. 275.

Geographical and Human Setting 67 ble part of political life during the Umayyad period. Still, dispersion in villages led in time to a disintegration of the Arab tribal structure,

which was replaced by local village forms of organization. The outward expression of this change appears in Hamadhanis account, which says of the people of Khurasan “ansabuhum alqura — their

pedigree is traced back merely to their villages.” By degrees, Arabic virtually disappeared as the language of everyday speech among the second-generation Arabs, who had been born in Khurasan. Its place was taken by a Persian-Arabic dialect, which

is probably what the sources call — “‘lughat ahl Khurdsan” and “‘lisan ahl Khurasan — the language of the people of Khuradsan.”’”’ In addition, the Arab population in Khurasan was effectively cut off

from Iraq, the country of its origin. Pride in its Iraqi origin lacked any real meaning, because no substantial fresh reinforcements of

Arab settlers reached Khurasan after the great migration of the Azdites inthe time of Muhallab. The fact was that the Arab settlement

in Khurasan was restricted and stable, and that the settlers were scattered throughout the region; the immediate result was that intermarriage between Arabs and Iranians reached vast proportions. In consequence of this, not only did the Arab language disappear as an everyday means of communication, not only did the heritage of Arab customs gradually vanish among the second and third generations born in Khuradsan, most of them of Iranian mothers, but the Arab physical type also tended to disappear. From the second generation on, the Arabs in Khurasan came more and more to resemble the local residents rather than their Iraqi brethren, not to speak of

© Hamadhani, p. 315; Akhbar, p. 206. True, it is a late tradition; however, the fact that Abu Muslim abolished the tribal pedigree as the standard basis for registration in the diwan, shows that the nasab lost its importance in matters which were outside the intertribal political strife. See Tabari, loc. cit. >t The leader of the Azd in Khurasan, Juday’ b. “All who was born in Kirman, speaks Persian with his slave. Dinawarl, p. 351. On the language of the people of Khurasan (lisdn or lughat ahl Khurdsan) see Jahiz, Bukhala’, 1, p. 99 (I. 8): Tabari, II, pp. 16 (1. 12), 50 (IL 4-6); Kati, VHT, p. 164 (1. 10); Idrisi, Opus Geographicum, p. 468 (1. 6). The term “Ahl Khurdsan™, indi-

cated only the Arab tribsmen of the province and not its inhabitants in general. Similarly the terms “Ahl ash-Sham” and “Ahl al-'‘Ira@q” denote the Arabs in those provinces respectively.

68 Chapter 3 the inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula.” It is not altogether surprising that the sense of solidarity between the Arabs and the Persians in Khurasan, which gradually deepened in each succeeding

generation, became manifestly stronger and more real than the artificial bond which connected these Arabs with their original fellow-tribesmen in Iraq. Hence also the Iraqi traditions, which speak of the ‘Abbasid armies coming from Khurasan, do not distinguish between soldiers of Arab extraction and the others. It would seem that no such distinction was made in the rolls of these armies themselves.”* After all, these men appeared to the Iraqis or Syrians

as foreigners in their speech, their dress, their customs and very often in their outward appearance. The process of assimilation of the Arab community in Khurasan was faster and more intense among the non-fighting population. A distinction must be drawn between the group of Arab warriors, the muqatilah, who were enrolled in the diwan, and the Arab civilian population. The muqatilah preserved their tribal organization and were subordinated to their tribal leaders.’* They were, it is true, bound to their kinsmen in the villages, but the simple fact that overa long period they were engaged in warlike expeditions or in wars waged by the tribesmen among themselves enabled them to preserve their Arabism. It was just these inter-tribal wars that helped them to maintain a link with the Arab past. “Ayyam al-‘arab” of the Jahiliyyah persisted in Khurasan and continued to inspire the creation of poetry and legend on the model of the poems of glory, derision,

heroism, victory and mourning produced by the tribal conflicts during the Jahiliyyah.®? Wellhausen speaks of Khurasan as having become “‘a second Arabia’, meaning that the Arab tribes continued 52 Speaking of the Arabs who settled in Khurasan, Jahiz says: **...and thus when you look at the sons of the Arabs and Bedouins who settled in Khurasan, you can not distinguish between the one whose father had resided in Farghanah and the (original) native of Farghanah. You are unable to detect any differ-

ence between them, for they both have yellow moustaches, fair (reddish) faces, thick necks and Farghani attire..."’. Jahiz, ““Manaqib at-Turk’’, Ras@il,

I, pp. 63-64. Cf. Ayalon, p. 44 and n. 9. > See Sharon, Advent, pp. 177, 271. 54 See one example out of many: Tabari, II], pp. 1970-1971. > Wellhausen, pp. 412-413.

Geographical and Human Setting 69 to wage their struggles there. This is true of the Arab muqatilah who, paradoxically, performed a double function, fighting against the enemies of Islam who surrounded them and in the intervals fighting among themselves. In these conflicts one can observe an interesting phenomenon, namely, that there was a sort of unwritten

agreement between the two sides not to involve the permanent settlements in war; villages and towns were excluded from the combat area. The warring tribes did not “conquer’’ one another's villages, but fought among themselves for hegemony outside them. As an emergency measure in case of prolonged battles, both sides established fortresses or trenches (khanadiq), which they used as bases for their operations in preference to their towns or villages.” The existence of a clear division between the Arab village settlers and the forces of Arab muqatilah was of great significance for the

‘Abbasid Da'wah. The Da‘wah had two stages. The first was a prolonged stage of clandestine activity within the villages and among the urban population by local Arab leaders and mawali of Arab tribes who were neither warriors nor directly involved in the armed conflicts.’’ It was through their efforts that the Da’ wah was able to penetrate the mixed Arab-Iranian population in Khurasan.

The second stage — that of short but decisive armed revolt — required attracting the muqatilah, the fighting force, to the Da’ wah. This was achieved by exploiting two factors, first, the link which had 6 ~The city of Marw, being the capital of the province and the seat of government, from time to time was drawn into the conflict, but even in Marw, the struggling parties, as in the case of Nasr b. Sayyar and his Tamimite supporters and Juday’ al-Kirmani the Azdite leader, preferred to fight each other outside its walls. The two fortresses which the warriors of Juday’ and Nasr

built during their prolonged conflict came to be known by the name of al- Khandaqayn. Kufi, VIII, p. 153; Tabari, II, p. 1972. A suggestion made to Nasr b. Sayyar that he attack the tribe of Khuzaah (Azd) in its villages was

firmly rejected lest such and unusual deed cause the whole tribe to rebel. Akhbar, p. 275. >” One fact stands out clearly from the sources: There was no identity between the tribal leaders in Khurasan engaged in the inter-tribal struggle and those leaders who participated in the activity of the Da‘wah in the rural and urban settlements. Sulayman b. Kathir, for instance, was a leader of Khuza‘ah (Azd)., but he had nothing to do with the struggle of the Azd which was conducted at the same time by the leaders of the Azd warriors (muqdatilah) Juday* b. “Ah

and later his son ‘Ali b. Juday’. See Sharon, Advent, pp. 150f.

70 Chapter 3 been forged between the Da‘wah and the relatives of the fighting men in the villages, and second, the political situation created by the

existence among these fighting men of an opposition to the Umayyads, an opposition prepared to join hands with the Da’ wah. A number of general conclusions derive from the above: (a) While secretly carrying on propaganda among the village settlers, where the feeling of ‘asabiyyah was limited, the Da’ wah

could attract to its ranks supporters of various tribes. Evidence for this is to be found in the list of names of the movement's earliest propagandists who represent a wide spectrum of Arabs and mawali.*8 From an ideological standpoint these propagandists could easily present the din’, that is, Islam, as a supreme

value, instead of ‘asabiyyah.”’ |

(b) In the second stage, that in which the Da wah became warlike and had to rely on Arab muqatilah forces, feelings which

had grown up in consequence of the prolonged tribal struggle obliged the Da‘wah to identify itself with one of the two rival factions. This was one of the important reasons why, in the

second stage, the Da'wah drew most of its Arab fighting strength from the Yaman tribes who formed an opposition to the Umayyad regime.®°

(c) The last and decisive phase of the Dawah was that which determined its Arab character. The latter stemmed from the special complexion of the Arab population in Khurasan: Arabs

who had preserved their Arabism were the majority of the 8 Tabari, H, pp. 1358, 1988. On the idea of Islam replacing ‘Asabiyyah see Goldziher, Muslim Studies, I, p. 81. Of special interest are the verses of the Khurdsanite poet Nahar b. Taw-

siah on this subject: “My father is Islam, I have no other father/when they cry out: O Bakr! O Tamim!” The poet himself was a member of the tribe of Bakr b. Wa'il. Ibn Qutaybah,

Shir, p. 342. 6° Opposition to the government among other tribes, fatigue and disappointment with the aimless and fruitless intertribal struggle brought to the Da'wah warriors from Northern tribes as well. For detailed discussion see Sharon, op. cit.. pp. 155f.: cf. also Tabari, IH, p. 1985. For the Azdite leader al-Kirmani, the mere fact that Abu Muslim rebelled against the Umayyads was a suffi-

cient basis for cooperation with the Da‘wah. Tabari, II, p. 1965.

Geographical and Human Setting 71 fighting force, and on this fighting force, more than on any other single element in the population, the popularity, military strength and final victory of the movement depended..

ee IV

THE SOURCES OF THE ~ “ABBASID DA WAH — IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Jabir b. ‘Abdallah said: ‘The Prophet spoke unto us and I heard him saying: ‘He who hates us, ahl al-bayt, God will resurrect him at the End of Days ina form of a Jew’. I said:‘O Messenger of Allah, even if he fasts _ and prays and claims to be a Muslim?’ ‘Yes — he said — even if he fasts and prays and claims to be a Muslim’ .”

Ibn al-Jawzi, Mawdu‘at, Il, p. 6

Ideological Background 75 4

The Family — Ahl al-Bayt In the previous pages the frequent reference to the ‘Abbasid Da’ wah may have given the impression that as soon as the ‘Abbasids entered

the competition for the leadership of Islam they immediately and openly propagated their own cause, and advanced the legitimacy of their candidateship under their own name. But this was not the case. We shall see that the Da‘wah became only in its latest stages openly ‘Abbasid. Before they could enter the contest for power and rule in their own name, the ‘Abbasids needed legitimacy for their claim, and ideological grounds to rest it on. Islamic politics by the end of the first century was already charged with ideological argumentation to

such degree that it became virtually impossible to conduct any political activity without first defining its ideology in Islamic terms. This requirement was determined by the very nature of Islam, which has always combined theology and politics. At the end of the first century and the begining of the second, the

‘Abbasids were not yet considered eligible for the leadership of Islam. Despite their kinship to the Prophet’s family, they were not

regarded as its representatives. The only ones who came to be recognized as THE FAMILY (“Ahl al-Bayt’’) or more precisely, the

Family of the Prophet (Al Muhammad, Ahl Bayt an-Nabi) and identified with the rights and merits which the concept of the Family carried with it in the public mind, were the descendants of ‘Alt.’ For they were the only ones who had been making a prolonged and active effort to seize political power. However, the term ahl al-bayt underwent an intensive development until it came to be used mainly by the

Shiah to describe the ‘Alids (or the Talibids in general). Its origin and evolution need elucidation. The term appears three times in the Qur’an, but never in connection with the Prophet’s family. On one occasion (Q, XXVIII/12) it has the general meaning of “‘family’’. In the other two cases (Q,

XI/73; XXXIII/33), the word bayt most probably means the ' See Akhbar, pp. 100-101; Baladhuri, Ansab, V, p. 228 (I. 12).

76 Chapter 4 Ka‘bah; thus ahl al-bayt would seem to mean the tribe of Quraysh or the Islamic community in general.’ The tribe of Quraysh was explicitly called ahl al-bayt in an early tradition recorded by Ibn Sa‘d. According to this tradition, Qusayy, the man responsible for unifying the tribe of Quraysh and establishing Mecca as a religious and commercial center, said to his fellow tribesmen, “You are the neighbours of Allah and people of his house” (innakum jiran allah wa-ahl baytihi).> In this sense the term has an even wider meaning: it included all those who venerated the Ka‘bah in Mecca.‘ The Shr ite

tradition, however, interpreted verse 33 in sura XXXIII: “Allah simply wishes to take the pollution from you, O people of the house and to purify you thoroughly, * as referring exclusively to the ‘Alids and more particularly to the descendants of ‘Ali through Fatimah. Thus in a series of traditions the Prophet is described as wrapping

his robe around ‘Alt, Fatimah, Hasan and Husayn and saying (according to one version), ““O, Allah, These are my Family (ahl bayti) whom I have selected; take the pollution from them and purify them thoroughly.’® This Shiite interpretation of the Our anic verse

was ultimately accepted by the Islamic orthodoxy in general and came to be known as hadith al-kisa’.’ Under the ‘Abbasids, the boundaries of ahl al-bayt, according to this interpretation, were extended to include the descendants of ‘Abbas as well. Following the already existing model, the ‘Abbasids

spread their own version of ahl al-bayt. In their tradition, the Prophet “came to ‘Abbas and his sons and said: ‘Come nearer to me. 2 This last interpretation was suggested by R. Paret, Festschrift Enno Littman, p. 130 (quoted in Bell’s translation to Q, XXXIII/33, p. 414, n. 3).

> Ibn Sa‘d, I, 1, p. 41 (I. 16). 4 Ibn Habib, Munammag, p. 68 (I. 6). Members of Kinadnah are described as nafar min ahl bayt al-‘arab. Cf. Ibn Hisham, Sirah, I, p. 45.

> Translation, R. Bell. 6 Ibn Kathir, Tafstr (on Q, XXXIII/33), V, pp. 453-455, where the main traditions are quoted. Cf. also Tadhkirat al-Khawass, p. 198; ‘Abd al-Jabbar, Dal@il, 1, p. 222, n. 1; Karajaki, Kanz al-Fawd'id, Mashhad, 1322, pp. 21-22% Nasal, Khasais, pp. 48-49; Fad@il al-Khamsah, I, pp. 219-222; al-Hakim

an-Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak, Hyderabad, 1354, III, p. 116; Aba Nu‘aym al-Isbahani, Hilyat al-Awliya’, Cairo, 1351, IV, p. 356. Cf. Inafa, p. 254 (no. 39).

7 Fad@ il al-Khamsah, |, p. 219.

Ideological Background 77 They all pushed against each other. He then wrapped them in his robe and said: ‘O, Allah, this is my uncle and the brother of my father, these are my family (ahl bayti), shelter them from the Fire in

the same manner that I shelter them with my robe...’’’ Once the model was set, traditions were developed which further extended the boundaries of ahl al-bayt to include all the Prophet’s relatives in the male line as well as his wives.® The Shi‘ah reacted by stressing the divine providence behind the

exclusive identification of the ‘Alids as ahl al-bayt. The Shrite tradition went so far as to assert that Allah created Muhammad and his family even before creating Adam. In his right hand Allah took clay and made them. Then they returned to clay, whereupon Allah took some more clay in his left hand, and from the mixture of both clays he created Adam. After the First Sin, when Adam learnt about his punishment, he invoked Allah’s mercy by saying: “For the sake of Muhammad, ‘Ali, Hasan and Husayn, pardon me.’”’ In this way the existence of ahl al-bayt in its very specific meaning was made the foundation of the divine cosmic order: the selection of Muham> Baladhuri, vol. cit. p. 5 (ll. 1-3); Ibn Kathir, vol. cit., p. 456 and especially p. 457: According to a tradition quoted on the authority of Zayd b. Arqam (the Prophet’s companion) the family included ‘‘Al ‘Ali, Al ‘Aqil (b. Abia Talib), Al Jafar (b. Abt Talib), and Al ‘Abbas’’. Cf. Lisdn al-‘Arab, (Beirut), II, p. 15b; Musannaf Ibn Abu Shaybah, III, p. 241; Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad, III, p. 477.

ash-Sharif ar-Radiyy, al-Majazat an-Nabawiyyah, Cairo, 1937, p. 162 no. 175.

On the ‘Abbasids as ahl al-bayt see for example, Baladhuri, Ansab, III, (ed, Duri), p. 2 (1. 17) and passim. Akhbar, pp. 43-44, 83. More than anybody else, Caliph al-Mahdi was responsible for spreading the concept of the ‘Abbasids as ahl al-bayt as part of the official propaganda which he conceived for establishing the exclusive ‘Abbasid legitimacy. The poet Bashshar b. Burd helped to translate the Caliph’s policy into poetry. See Diwan Bashshar b. Burd, Cairo, 1950, Il, pp. 298 (1. 5), 299 (I. 2). The political aim behind the ‘Abbasid interpretation of the Qur'adnic verse stirred up heated debates among the Muslim ‘Ulama’, the traces of which survived in long traditions about imaginary debates between Caliph Mu‘awiyah and ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas. Although clearly of ‘Abbasid origin, these traditions preserve the spirit of the main arguments against politicising Quranic exegesis. The official ‘Abbasid propaganda responded by claiming that the Qur'an descended on ahl al-bayt, whereupon they became its most authoritative interpreters. Akhbar, pp. 46f.

> Mas‘tidi, Wasiyyah, pp. 12-14.

78 Chapter 4 mad, Fatimah, ‘Ali, Hasan and Husayn was predestined when the world was created.!° Originally, the term ahl bayt or ahl al-bayt, had nothing to do with the Prophet or his family. In Arabic this term simply means the

noble and influential family in the tribe. In a broader sense, it referred to the members of any ruling or noble family, Arab or non-Arab alike. In this sense, the term is pre-Islamic, but it was used extensively in this meaning by Muslim writers. Thus, referring to Nubatah b. Hanzalah, the famous Umayyad general, Ibn al-Kalbi states that he belonged to noble stock in Qays ‘Aylan, using the term ahl bayt (‘wa-hum ahl bayt lahum ba’s wa-sharaf’’). Ibn ‘Asakir,

when discussing Byzantine dynasties, speaks about ten ahl abyat (wa-malaka min ar-Rim ‘asharat ahl abydat).'! Hutay’ah, the celebrated radwiyah of the renowned poet Zuhayr b. Abt Sulma calls the

family of the latter “ ahl al-bayt’’.'? Referring to the ruling Arab dynasty of Hirah and to an influential Christian Arab family in the Sasanid court, old traditions quoted in the Aghani call them ahl bayt, and ahl bayt nasara (Christian) respectively.” Accordingly, under Islam, the members of the caliphs’ families were called ahl al-bayt. ‘Abdallah the son of Caliph ‘Umar, referring to young ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, who was his sister’s son, says, He 10 Ibid, p. 16. Tanzth ash-Shartah, 1, p. 410 (no. 8); Rubin, “Prophets and progenitors’, pp. 55-59. "Ibn ‘Asakir, Ta’rikh Madinat Dimashq, (ed. Munajjid), 1, p. 13. The Barmakids are referred to as “minahl buydtat balkh — from the noble families of Balkh”, Maadisi, al-Bad’ wa-at-Tarikh, VI, p. 104. Fihi al-bayt, is a term used to describe the head of the noblest family in the clan, Magrizi, Muga/fa, fol. 61a (ed. ‘Aql. p. 6). For more references to ahl al-bayt as a term signifying tribal nobility see also Lisdn al-'Arab, Beirut, 1968, XI, p. 268b (infra); Mubarrad. al-Kamil, p. 429; Dha ar-Rummah, Diwan (ed. Macarthney), Cambridge, 1919, pp. 191 (XXV, 41), 442 (LVI, 58): Aghani, XI, p. 170 (I. 18): Sim al-La alt, Cairo, 1935-6, I, p. 290, I, p. 648; Suraqah b. Mirdas, JRAS. 1936, p. 488. Qayrawant in Zahr al-Adab, I, p. 6 uses the term in an interesting variation: “wa-bantt al-Ahtam ahlu bayti baldaghatin fi al-jahiliyyati wa-alislami’’. Cf. Istakhri, pp. 142, 147 (where ahl al-buyutat are mentioned).

2 In an account about a discussion Between Hutay'ah and the poet Ka’b b. Zuhayr, the son of Zuhayr b. Aba Sulma, Hutay’ah is reported as saying: © You

know my rivdyah to you ahl al-bayt...°. Ibn Qutaybah, Shir, p. 69: Aghant, XV. p. 147.

's Aghant, Il, pp. 21. (1. 19), 22 (I 11).

Ideological Background 79 resembles us, ahl al-bayt, most.’ In accordance with the accepted usage of the term, the Umayyads referred to themselves as ahl al-bayt. Thus, when Hajjaj, the famous general and governor of Iraq died, he was referred to by ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz as “one of us, ahl al-bayt’’."” It may be concluded that once the Caliphate was established, it

became the practice to call the families of each of the first four Caliphs ahl al-bayt. But since ‘Ali’s Caliphate was a controversial one, the definition of his family as ahl bayt was not shared by the whole Muslim community. The Umayyads and their Syrian supporters questioned the legality of ‘Alt’s rule with the result that his Iraqi partisans and the Shi ah not only emphasised the ahl al-bayt status of “Ali's descendants, but also gave the term a specific and exclusive meaning. In this way ahl al-bayt acquired a religious overtone and in time lost its general meaning. Once the term was attached to the person of the Prophet, the road was opened to Qur’anic exegesis, originating in Shiite circles, to establish its origin in the Word of God.*® The problem remains to establish at what stage the term acquired its exclusive Shiite interpretation. There is no doubt that around the year A.H. 100 the term was already used to refer exclusively to the house of ‘Alt. By that time, this interpretation was being

buttressed by the major traditions emphasising ‘Ali's exclusive rights to succeed to the Prophet, the traditions of the kisd@ and of Ghadir Khumm. Even the interpretation of verse 33 in Surah XX XIII as referring to the Alid family was already well established, at least in Iraq. The Katite poet, Kumayt b. Zayd of the tribe of Asad (60/681-

126/745), who represents the moderate pro-‘Alid idea as it was around the year 100, has all these elements in his Hashimiyyat. Following the ideology of the ““moderate”’ Shi'ah, Kumayt regarded

the first three Caliphs as usurpers who had denied ‘Alt his divine rights, but he refrained from cursing them.” According to him, the first Caliphs had acted wrongly because they knew of the Prophet’s promise to Ali in Ghadir Khumm, when he said: ““Whomsoever I am 4 Tbn ‘Abd al-Hakam, Sirat ‘Umar, p. 24. '? Ibid, p. 28; see also, El? s.v. “Ahl al-Bayt”’. ‘© See examples in Ibn Shahrashtib, Manaqib, III. pp. 206-208, 226-227, 237ft. 7 Hashimiyyat, ed. Horovitz, VI, verse 10.

80 Chapter 4 the patron, Ali is his patron”: ‘And in the Day of the Tree, the Tree of Ghadir Khumm, he (the Prophet) revealed to him (‘Ali) the patronhood

(wilayah) would that he had been obeyed!”’ } (wa-yawmu ad-dawhi, dawhi ghadiri khummin abana lahu al-wildyata law utira).¥

Kumayt emphasises in the subsequent verses that the first Caliphs had ignored the Prophet and taken the bay ah to themselves. In Kumayt’s poetry we also meet the first use in poetry of the term al

an-nabi as referring to the ‘Alids.’? The poem in which the term appears was composed (according to Horovitz) between 96 and 99,

long before any other claimant to the ahl al-bayt status had appeared on the Islamic political scene.”° Another poet whose poetry proves that the main ideas concerning

‘Alid predominance were well established in early Shiite theological- political thought was Kuthayyir ‘Azzah (died 105/723). The Muslim heresiographers classify him as Kaysant, adherent of Muhammad b. ‘Ali (Ibn al-Hanafiyyah), of whom we shall hear more later. At this stage of the discussion, we mention Kuthayyir because in his poetry he clearly defines the Family and stresses its exclusive right to lead the Islamic community: “The imams from Quraysh The true patrons are four and equal, They are our patrons to whom we owe 18 bid, VI, verse 9. See there (p. 152 Il. 15-18) the interpretation of Abu Riyash, Ahmad b. Ibrahim al-Qayst who emphasized that ‘Umar heard the Prophet's words and said to ‘Alt: ““How fortunate you are, O ‘Ali, you became the patron of all the believers, men and‘ women alike”. 19 The term al Muhammad appears in Ibn Qutaybah’s account of the verses sent by the poet Ka’b b. Zuhayr to his brother Bujayr after the latter had gone over to

the Prophet and embraced Islam (Ibn Qutaybah, Shir, p. 60). There is no question, however, that the term was introduced ina later editing of the verses.

See Aghani, XV, p. 149. (I am indebted to Professor M. Zwettler for this elucidation). 20 Ibid, I], verse 19. It has been long established that the basic terminology used by the Shrah is amply reflected in Kumayt’s poetry including the idea and practice of the taqiyyah. See Goldziher in ZDMG, LX, p. 219.

Ideological Background 81 by God’s decree faithfulness of action and fidelity: ‘Alt and three of his sons they are clearly the Grandsons (of the prophet)’’.**

The poetry of Kuthayyir and Kumayt represents contemporary Shiite ideology as it had become crystallised, at least in Kufah by the end of the first century. The beginning of the process which led to the crystallisation of

this ideology may be traced to Mukhtar’s revolt (65/68567/687). Mukhtar’s usage of the term ahl al-bayt in an exclusive ‘Alid context grew naturally out of his dedication to revenge ‘the blood of Husayn and the blood of his family’ (at-talab bi-dam al-Husayn wa-dimad’ ahl baytihi).?’ Acting on behalf of the ‘Alid family, Mukhtar developed his mahdism, in the course of which the

term ahl al-bayt was taken out of its geneological context and assumed the divine nature which we encounter at the end of the first century. Some time during this period the Umayyads also put forward the claim of being ahl al-bayt. They based it on their descent

from ‘Abd Manaf, the clan which combined the Prophet, the Umayyads, the ‘Alids and the ‘Abbasids. This Umayyad claim, being

of geneological nature, could in no way compete with the divine character, which the ‘Alid ahl al-bayt idea assumed from Mukhtar’s

time onwards.” In summary, therefore, it may be said that around the year 70 the ‘Alid status as the sole representatives of ahl al-bayt was accepted “ala inna al-aimmata min qurayshin / wuldata al-haqqi arbadatun sawd'u mawalina al-ladhina lahum ‘alayna / min al-lahian-nasthatu wa-al-wafa u. ‘Aliyyun wa-ath-thalathtu min banthi / humu al-asbatu laysa bihim khafa u. See Aghant, IX, p. 14; an-Nashi’ al-Akbar, p. 26 (Il. 14-16) and the editor’s notes there. 2 See particularly Akhbar, pp. 100 ff. where the term is repeated many times by Mukhtar and his followers in connection with Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah in particular and ‘Ali's family in general. It is highly possible that this usage of the term originates in the movement of the Tawwabin. See also Baladhurt, Ansab, V, pp. 228f. Rubin, op. cit. pp. 62-63; and below p. 103. ** ~~ Madaiint in Bihar, XLV, p. 333.

“4 The Umayyad*claim to the title of ahl al-bayt in its exclusive meaning of the Prophet's family is reported by Kuff, VIII, p. 195 and Baladhuri, Ansab, III, p. 160. The reference to the Umayyads as ahl al-bayt in Akhtal’s poetry is highly significant, for the poct uses the term in its Jahili context as signifying nobility:

82 Chapter 4 in pro- Alid circles in Iraq. But if we bear in mind the persistent activity of the early Shiah of ‘Alt in Kufah, the abortive risings and the public debates which accompanied them, it is not unreasonable

to assume that these ideas did not remain confined to the limited circles of those dedicated to the memory of ‘Ali or Husayn. The prolonged and unabated Shi‘ah propaganda led to the acceptance of many strands of Shi ah theory and ideology by the most orthodox of Islamic theologians. [t is against this background that the ‘Abbasids’ actions should be examined and their propaganda evaluated.

Establishing The ‘Abbasid Legitimacy | ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas, the most prominent personality in the “Abbasid family, did not achieve fame by any outstanding political activity. His honoured and revered status as one of Islam’s earliest scholars was attained by reason of the many hadiths connected with his name

and his being regarded as the father of Qur’anic exegesis and, as such, one of the founders of the Muslim shart ah.’’ His biography has undoubtedly been distorted beyond recognition, while the part he played in the political life of his time has been exaggerated out of all proportion by Muslim historians and biographers who recast the events of his lifetime in a manner considered befitting the founder of the ‘Abbasid dynasty.”° The author of Akhbar al-‘Abbas, for exam‘“wa-antum ahlu baytin la yuwadzinuhum / baytun idhd ‘uddat al-ahsabu wa-al-‘adadu — You are a family of leaders unequaled by any other family when pedigree and number are considered”. Shir al-Akhtal, (ed. Anttn Salhant) Beirut, 1892, p. 175 (I. 3). 25 See detailed traditions in Baladhuri, Ansab, III, pp. 27f. and especially pp. 32, 48 (infra). 26 “For 3-4 years during ‘Ali's Caliphate, he held certain political and administrative posts. He was the governor of Basrah until 38/658, and took part in the agreement on the arbitration between ‘Alt and Mu‘awiyah although he did not represent ‘Alt officially in the actual arbitration. He also participated in the negotiations which led to the agreement between Hasan b. ‘Alt and Mu‘awiyah in which Hasan agreed to relinquish his claim to the Caliphate in favour of Mu‘awiyah. See L. Veccia Vaglieri, ““‘Abdallah b. “Abbas” E/* and the references there. European orientalists (Caetani, Lammens, Noldeke, Wellhausen) suspected

Ideological Background 8 3 ple, devoted most of the opening hundred pages, or nearly a quarter of his book, to ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas’ biography. He is represented as a proud man of such great courage that he does not hesitate to defy Mu‘awiyah and his son Yazid, whom he rebukes in the strongest possible terms. In lengthy disputations which he is alleged to have carried on with Mu‘awiyah, he is shown as valiantly opposing the illegality of the Umayyad government and championing the right of the Prophet’s kinsmen to rule the Islamic state. These disputations represent him as anexpert and eloquent debater and particularly as a

person aware of his own worth and status. The historical truth, however, is that this picture of “Abdallah b. ‘Abbas as an opponent of the Umayyads is entirely a later fabrication

and self-contradictory. The fact that ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas swore allegiance to Mu‘awiyah who perhaps even rewarded him (in the shape of the Basrah treasury) for his role in reaching agreement with Hasan, the fact that ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas refused to recognize Abdal-

lah b. az-Zubayr and that he apparently remained loyal to the Umayyads?’ and, above all, the fact (as we shall see later) that he his integrity, and issued their verdict against him, a verdict which Veccia Vaglieri deems unjustified. Noldeke (p. 108) calls him “a crafty liar’, and Wellhausen, somewhat less harshly (p. 501, n. 1), “the pious manufacturer of tradition”. The official ‘Abbasid propaganda spread a tradition which related that the Prophet personally administered his tahntk, that is, that he rubbed his palate with a date which he had chewed and mixed with his saliva and then blessed him saying: “O Allah, instruct him in the laws of religion and teach him the exegesis (of the Qur'an)”. (“allahumma faqqihhu fi ad-din wa-‘allimhu at-ta wil’). The tradition goes on to say that the Prophet's prayer was fufilled. Anonyme Leiden, fol. 1b. See also Akhbar pp. 66-69 where a typical tradition is quoted, which emphasizes {bn ‘Abbas’ extraordinary wisdom. *” The sources preserve a letter written by Yazid b. Mu‘awiyah to ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas during ‘Abdallah b. az-Zubayr’s revolt. In it, Yazid thanks Ibn ‘Abbas

for his loyalty to the Umayyads and asks him to stir up opposition to Ibn Zubayr in Hijaz. See Akhbar, pp. 85-86; Baladhuri, Ansab, IVb, p. 18. Ibn ‘Abbas reply to this letter is unknown, but it may be assumed that he acted against ‘Abdallah b. Zubayr, since the latter threw him into prison. The sources, Clearly under the influence of the ‘Abbasid official propaganda, could not accept the bare facts which might blemish the idealized image created for Ibn ‘Abbas. The sources, therefore, quote a letter in reply which was supposedly sent to Caliph-Yazid, in which Ibn ‘Abbas attacks both the caliph himself and the Umayyads in general, in the harshest words possible. It is highly improbable that ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas the clever and practical politician, who could no doubt sense the ultimate bad end of Ibn Zubayr’s rebellion

84 Chapter 4 enjoined upon his sons to leave Hijaz and join ‘Abd al-Malik?® — all these facts make it abundantly clear that ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas could

not have been the sworn opponent of the Umayyads that the tradi-

tions make him out to be. |

Notwithstanding the extreme anti-Umayyad sentiments which the traditions attribute to ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas, they do not connect him to the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah. The latter is, in fact, linked to the name

of its founder and first leader, Muhammad b. ‘Ali, grandson of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas. However, a systematic scrutiny of the manner in

which the ‘Abbasids entered the power struggle reveals that the Da'wah’s earliest origins can be detected in the special relationship between ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas and Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah. We shall deal with this relationship when we discuss in detail the chain of events leading to the movement's inception. We have already pointed out that in order to enter the struggle for power the ‘Abbasids needed legitimacy. They created such legitimacy by identifying themselves with an existing movement, namely, the faction of the ‘Alid Shi‘ah which was associated with the name of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah, a son of ‘Alt b. Abt Talib by a woman

of the Banu Hanifah tribe. After Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah’s death, his Shiah transferred its allegiance to his son, Abi Hashim, and hence became known as the Hashimiyyah.*’ This movement, unlike other factions of the ‘Alid Shirah, was notable in that it had established a permanent organization. From the little known about

it, one can infer that it rested not on the ad hoc support of the Kufites from whose ranks the Shiah had generally drawn its backers, but on a firm foundation of prolonged activity which the Hashimiyyah itself had created. When the ‘Abbasids took over — (especially when nobody could have known that Caliph Yazid’s death was near) — would have exposed himself to the Umayyad wrath without having previously created a tic with another political power. It is unlikely that a practical man like Ibn ‘Abbas would have sought political isolation. 78 See below ch.V note 73.

22 Unlike Shahrastani, I, p. 150, who mentions the Hashimiyyah by name, an-Nashi’ al- Akbar (d. 293/906) and Baghdadi (d. 429/1036-7) describe it as a branch of the Kaysdniyyah or Mukhtar’s Movement, associating it with Abu

Hashim, Ibn al-Hanafiyyah’s son, without specifying it by name. Cf. anNashi’ al-Akbar, p. 30; Baghdadi, pp. 27-28. No doubt the name Hashimiyyah

Ideological Background 85 leadership of the movement, it was at a low ebb following the suppression of Mukhtar b. Abd ‘Ubayd’s revolt in Kufahin 67/687. Nevertheless, unlike the movement of Husayn b. ‘All (if, indeed, one may call Husayn’s affair a movement), which disintegrated after his downfall in 680 without trace except for the ideological ferment in

Kufah, the Hashimiyyah was affected only insofar as its military strength was shaken. Its organizational base remained unimpaired and this base, supported by a small body of propagandists, was remarkable for the way in which it developed principles for discrete, clandestine activity after Mukhtar’s collapse. The ‘Abbasids, therefore, took over an existing movement, with

limited scope, breathed life into it and used it for their own purposes.*? By assuming control of an existing, although dormant movement, the ‘Abbasids saved themselves long and tedious preliminary spadework, without which they would not have been able to emerge from anonymity and take their place among the contenders for power. By becoming the legally recognized leaders of a Shriite movement the ‘Abbasids acquired a legitimate basis to their power, not only in their struggles against their Umayyad opponents, but also against their Alid rivals, who had hitherto claimed the exclusive right to represent the Prophet’s family. Of the two, neutralisation of the generally accepted ‘Alid claim was far more important, as far as the contest for popular favour was concerned, than the formulation of a theoretical structure of legitimacy vis-a-vis the Umayyads and

their supporters. By representing themselves as the bearers and was given to the movement in some later period, but this fact is of minor importance, since there is no question that Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah and his son Abt Hashim were the sources of legitimacy for the ‘Abbasids during the first generation of their rule, as we shall presently see. It is certain that the term Hashimiyyah as representing the clan of Hashim b. “Abd Mandaf was not widely

used before Caliph Mahdi's reign. W. Montgomery Watt not knowing of Caliph Mahdi's reshaping of the official ‘Abbasid propaganda, concluded, on the basis of Kumayt’s Hashimiyyat, that the Hashimiyyah as representing Abu Hashim’s group of partisans was a term born out of the Hasanid — ‘Abbasid controversy (which is possible) after the term had already been used to denote the clan of Band Hashim (which is impossible). Watt, Islamic Thought, p. 39.

We shall show that a long period intervened between the time when the ‘Abbasids regarded themselves as candidates for leadership and their actual acceptance as such by the partisans of the Hashimiyyah.

86 Chapter 4 executors of Abt Hashim’s testament, the Abbasids made it impos-

sible for anyone else to deny their right to carry into effect the principle that the leadership of Islam belonged to the Prophet's family. It was not until the caliphate of Mahdr(158/775-169/785) that this view was officially modified and the ‘Abbasids began to assert the legitimacy of their rule on the strength of their descent from ‘Abbas. This assertion is emphasized in a detailed tradition, unique of its kind, recorded by Akhbar al-'Abbas which runs as follows: “The Kaysaniyyah believed in the imdmah of Muhammad b. ‘Ali (Ibn al-Hanafiyyah, M.S.) and asserted that his father (Alt) had appointed him as his successor. The Kaysaniyyah were associated with Mukhtar b. Abi ‘Ubayd, otherwise known as Kaysan, who was the first to believe in the ima@mah of Muhammad b. ‘Alt. This view was held (also) by ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah (b. ‘Abbas) and his descendants down to the time of al-Mahdt. The organization of the

‘Abbasid Shiah originated (therefore) in Muhammad b. alHanafiyyah, and on this Abt Muslim based his propaganda. This went on until the time of al-Mahdi. Al-Mahdi bade them, however, to link the imamah (literally: to establish the imamah, M.S.)

to the name of ‘Abbas b. ‘Abd al-Muttalib, telling them: the imamah belonged to ‘Abbas, the Prophet’s paternal uncle...since he was the most worthy of all men to succeed him and was his nearest kinsman. After him the imamah passed on to ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas, after him to ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah, after him to Muhammad b.

‘Ali, after him to Ibrahim b. Muhammad, after him to Abt al‘Abbas, after him to Abd Ja‘far, and after him to al-Mahdr...”"”?

The very fact that a tradition such as this has been preserved in

such an outstandingly pro-‘Abbasid historical document as the Akhbar al-‘Abbas is sufficient to convince us that the information it

contains is historically valid. This tradition stresses the degree to which the bond between the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah and the Hashimiyyah was basic and essential. Even many years after their rise to power, the ‘Abbasids continued to base their propaganda on it, since it was only by virtue of this bond that they could win supporters. Not until 31 Akhbar, pp. 165-166; Anonyme, fols. 245b-246a.

Ideological Background 87 the reign of the Caliph Manstr (136/754-158/775), when their rule had been firmly established and their ‘Alid rivals soundly defeated, did the official propaganda begin to change: the ‘Abbasids

began to speak of themselves as being the Prophet’s sole heirs, through their ancestor ‘Abbas b. ‘Abd al-Muttalib. They meant to convey that they did not need the ‘Alids in order to establish their own claim as successors to the Prophet and to prove that their blood relationship to him was no less close, perhaps even closer, than that of the “Alids. The official propaganda machine which the ‘Abbasid court had

created and directed towards the end of Mansir’s reign began to circulate traditions which included “‘prophecies’’ concerning the ‘Abbasid rule. Within a very short time the mystic legitimacy of the ‘Abbasid dynasty was formulated. ‘Ali b. “Abdallah b. ‘Abbas was made to possess ‘ilm, esoteric knowledge, which indicated that the first Abbasid caliph will come from the village of Humaymah and that his name will be “Abdallah. *?

Another tradition went even further, saying that the Prophet himself had “informed his uncle al-‘Abbas that the caliphate will pass to his descendants.”’** Poets were engaged to praise the ‘Abbas-

ids and to denigrate the “Alids.* Despite the persistent ‘Abbasid endeavour to give currency to their propaganda, they were not always successful. The intellectuals

of the time as well as many of the ‘ulama either were inclined towards the ‘Alids, or at least were aware of the methods being used by the ‘Abbasid propaganda. They developed a suspicious or even hostile attitude towards it. Even among the ‘Abbasids’ most ardent

supporters, the Khurdsanites, there was much sympathy with the ‘Alids, which the ‘Abbasids were unable to supplant. In a unique tradition, the author of al-’ Uyin wa-al-Hada ig reports a discussion said to have taken place between the second ‘Abbasid Caliph, Abu Ja‘far al-Munsiur, and his cousin, ‘Isa b. Misa, concerning the ‘Alid rebellion of Muhammad and Ibrahim, sons of ‘Abdallah b. *2 see Anonyme Leiden, fol. 3a.

> Fragmenta, p. 180. *4 See Baladhuri, Ansab, III, pp. 265-266 (the verses are put in Caliph Manstr’s mouth). Cf. note 38 below.

88 Chapter 4 Hasan b. Hasan b. ‘Ali b. Abt Talib. ‘Isa suggested to send up to Madinah (the center of the rebellion) a Khurdsanite governor, to which al-Mansir reportedly replied: “In the hearts of the people of Khurasan, the love for the family of Abt Talib is mingled with their love for us...”’* The methods by which the ‘Abbasids dispensed “traditions” and

“proofs” of their legitimacy were too transparent not to draw a reaction from highly suspicious intellectuals and ‘ulama’, whose attitude to the official “Abbasid line was summarized by ‘Abd alJabbar (d. 415/1025) in the following words: ‘‘in Islam, it has already happened that people related themselves to events in the past, composed poems about them and attributed these poems to persons who had lived (before the actual events) and said that these persons had a knowledge of the events even before they occurred. In such manner a gasidah was attributed to one, Ibn Abu al-‘Aqab, in which he mentioned the dynasties of

Bani Umayyah and of Bant al-‘Abbas, and described how the latter began. He also mentioned several of its caliphs, even their deaths and the places of their graves. It was also claimed that he (i.e., Ibn Abu al-‘Aqab) had received esoteric knowledge from the imams and from the possessors of the hidden knowledge. These claims have no basis whatsoever and are no doubt outright lies.’’*°

The inventive talents of the official propagandists had no limits. They created this fictive poet, Ibn Abt al-‘Aqab, into whose mouth they put a long gasidah which bears the impressive and messianically charged name gasidat al-malahim. Abd al-Faraj al-Isfahant, who quoted three verses from it which describe the victory of the ‘Abbasids over the Umayyads, clearly knew, just as did “Abd alJabbar, that the whole thing was cut out of whole cloth.*’ But even when the poets were real flesh and blood persons hired to extol the new rulers and denigrate the ‘Alids, there was no certainty 5 Fragmenta, p. 180. See Narshakhi, p. 62, where an Arab from Bukharah reportedly says: ““We are now free from the affliction of the Marwanids. The

plague of the house of ‘Abbas is not necessary for us. The children of the Prophet must be the successors of the Prophet.” © Dal@il, I, p. 75. 7 Aghani, I, p. 169 (Il. 21-30); VI,p. 135 (Il. 23-25).

Ideological Background 89 that they identified themselves with the official line which they had been employed to serve. A good example is a poet by the name of Mansur b. Salamah b. az-Zibirqan (or Zabarqan) an-Namari, who was a Shr ite by conviction, but made his living by placing his talents in the service of the official anti-Shrah line. However, he revealed his true feelings in two highly eloquent and emotional poems concerning Husayn’s murder and the fear of the Prophet’s family (.e., the ‘Alids) to appear in public because of the ‘Abbasids.**

Even in non-Shrite ‘ulama’ circles, not all were in agreement about the “‘blessed nature”’ of the new ‘Abbasid dawlah (ad-dawlah

al-mubarakah). The suspicion lingered that the advent of the ‘Abbasids was the outcome of bloody strife which disintegrated the Islamic community and which shattered Muslim unity. Against the sacredness of the revolution and the sanctity of the dawlah, these circles placed the idea of the fitnah: ““When two Muslims oppose

each other sword in hand, then both the slain and the slayer are consigned to Gehenna.”’*”

A tradition attributed to the Prophet mentions seven fitan which will tear the Muslim community apart, the seventh being the “fitnah of the East’’. To make sure that the meaning is fully understood, a comment was added to the tradition, stating that the “‘fitnah of the

East’ is the fitnah of “those” (wa-fitnatu al-mashrig hiya fitnat ha ula’), namely, the ‘Abbasids.*° In the early stages of ‘Abbasid rule, however, the main ideological

opponents were still the ‘Alids. Against the ‘Alid claims that the ‘Abbasids had been carried to power on the wave of ‘Alid popularity, the ‘Abbasids came up (as we have already mentioned) with the idea

of their own legitimate right to rule by virtue of their ancestor’s kinship to the Prophet. This ‘Abbasid assertion, which began to be

heard increasingly after their rise to power, even before it was adopted as an official propaganda line, compelled the descendants of

Hasan and Husayn to seek counterclaims enabling them to define their unique status and to resist the arguments of the ‘Abbasids. It was at this time that the ‘Alids began to stress increasingly their 8 Qayrawani, Zahr al-Adab, Il, pp. 650-651. *° Muslim, Sahth, Fitan, no. 2888 (IV, p. 2213). © Marwazi, Kitab al-Fitan, MS BM or. 9449, fol. 9a.

20 Chapter 4 direct descent from the Prophet through his daughter, Fatimah. One can fix with a high degree of accuracy when the official

‘Abbasid propaganda began overtly to change its orientation, assuming a direction which received official approval during the caliphate of Mahdrt. The first public expression of the change was made in the reign of Mansur, following the deep split between the ‘Abbasids and the Hasanite branch of the ‘Alids. It is no coincidence that this split was considered by Mas tdi as one of the most important and decisive events of Mansur’s rule.** The cleavage was a consequence of the revolt of the Hasanites of Madinah in the year 145/762, which ended with the crushing of the insurrection and the death of Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah b. Hasan b. Hasan, the leader of the revolt, of his brother Ibrahim and of many other members of the

Hasanite family.** During the course of the revolt there was an exchange of letters between Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah and Mansur in

which each party asserted its claims.47 Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah argued that the ‘Abbasids had misled the ‘Alids and their supporters by their propaganda: “‘The right belongs to us,” wrote Muhammad, “through us you have claimed this matter (i.e., the caliphate, M.S.) for yourselves. You proceeded to seek it by means of our Shi ah and

you have attained it by using our prestige. Our father ‘Ali was the heir (wasiyy) [of the Prophet] and the imam; how could you inherit his title while his descendants are still alive?’’** This argument describes the ‘Abbasid propaganda as the ‘Alids viewed it, namely, that the ‘Abbasids had fraudulently wrested from them their exclu41 Mas‘iidt, Muruj, (Beirut) IV, p. 222: “He (Mansur) caused a split between the descendants of ‘Abbas b. ‘Abd al-Muttalib and the family of Abu Talib; prior to this their cause was common”. (“‘wa-gad kana qabla dhalika amruhum wahid’’).

“2 On this revolt see Tabari, III, p. 189 f.; Mas‘tidi op. cit., III, pp. 294-301: Fragmenta, pp. 230 f.; Maqatil, pp. 260-277; Noldeke, pp. 123-124. 4} For almost identical texts of these letters see Tabari, III, pp. 208f; Mubarrad, al-Kamil, (ed. Wright) pp. 786f.; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kdmil, V, pp. 536 f. Ibn Khaldtn, ‘Ibar, III, p. 407 refers his readers to Tabari and al-Mubarrad for the correspondence between Nv anstr and Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah. See Baladhuri, Ansab, III (ed. Mahmidi, 1977) pp. 95 ff., where the polemic notes of the Shrite editor are of great interest. Cf. also Traini. 44 Tabari, III, p. 209; Ibn al-Athir, vol. cit., pp. 536-537; cf. Goldziher, Vorlesungen, pp. 196-198.

Ideological Background — 91 sive “‘right’’ to rule.*° In the following part of the letter, Muhammad

b. ‘Abdallah makes a further claim: ““We are descended from the Prophet’s mother, Fatimah, daughter of ‘Amr in the Jahiliyyah,*°

and from his daughter, Fatimah in Islam.”*” To this argument Mansir replied that, while it might perhaps be possible to throw dust in the eyes of the mob and the ignorant, it was well known that ‘God has not given women such a status as He has given to uncles (on the father’s side) and to fathers.... For He gave the uncle equal

status with the father” (‘‘li’anna Allah ja‘ala al-‘amm aban’’).*° With regard to the ‘Alids’ claim to descent from Fatimah, Mansur t6ld Muhammad: “‘As for your assertion that you are direct descendants of the Prophet, God has already declared in His Book, ‘Muhammad was not the father of any of your men’ (Q, XXXIII/ 30);

but even though you be descended from the Prophet’s daughter, which is indeed a close kinship, this still does not give you the right of inheritance...’’*

The subject matter of this dispute, which resulted in much bloodshed, was soon given publicity at the initiative of both sides. The ‘Abbasids were obliged openly to rebut the assertions of the ‘Altds, which formed the ideological basis for the legitimacy of the * See Magatil, p. 233 where this ‘Alid idea, which is not far from the truth, is summarized in one sentence: “The propagandists of Banti Hashim scattered in various parts (of the empire) after Walid b. Yazid had been killed; and the first thing which they openly propagated was the praise of ‘Ali and his descendants, etc.”’. 46 The reference is to the Prophet’s grandmother (his father’s — ‘Abdallah’s — mother), Fatimah bnt. ‘Amr of the tribe of Makhztm. See Ibn Habib, Muhab-

bar, p. 49; Ibn Hisham, I, p. 109. Fatimah bnt. ‘Amr was also Abt Talib’s CAlrs father and the Prophet's uncle) mother. ‘Abbas’ mother was not Fatimah but another woman. Ibn Hisham, loc. cit; see also Baladhurt, Ansab,

I, p. 88. 47 ~~ Tabart, loc. cit; Ibn al Athir, loc. cit.. 48 Tabari, II, p. 211; Ibn al-Athir, op. cit., p. 538. Cf. Mastidi, Muri, (Beirut), III, p. 236. See particularly Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, ‘Igd, [V, p. 485, where al-‘Abbas

is referred to as: “abu rasul allah (s) ba'da abthi.” ” — Tabari, III, p. 213; Ibn al-Athir, op. cit., p. 539: S. Hourgronje, Muhanmmed-

anism, p. 27. Speaking about Khadijah, the Prophet’s wife, Hourgronje remarks: “She gave him the only daughter by whom he had descendants who, from the Arabian point of view, do not count as such, as according to their

genealogical theories the line of descent cannot pass through a woman’.

92 Chapter 4 latter's revolt. Indeed, we learn from the traditions of Mas udi that Mansir set forth his central arguments in this debate at great length in a khutbah which he delivered before the Khurasanites after the

revolt had been crushed.”°

The ‘Abbasids’ new line of argument, put forward by Mansur, was intended to prove, on the one hand, that the ‘Alids could not advance

any claim of “hereditary rights” on either their father;s or their mother’s side, and, on the other hand, to show that the “Abbasids were and had always been the only ones qualified to be the leaders of Islam. As early as the Mansir’s reign, history began to be rewritten in accordance with the following basic principles:

(a) ‘Alt’s father never adopted Islam, but died an unbeliever; whereas ‘Abbas not only became a Muslim, but was also the Prophet’s counsellor and guide, as befitted an uncle.” (b) ‘Alt was never recognized as having any special “hereditary

right’ to rule; on the contrary, he was passed over by the Prophet’s more important associates, while in the shura of ‘Umar they gave preference to ‘Uthman over him.”

(c) Even when the ‘Alids succeeded in attaining the ruling power, they showed themselves unfit to exercise it. Ali encountered strong opposition to his rule and showed a decided weakness when he had to deal with it. He undermined his own claim 0 Mas‘tdi, op. cit. HI, pp. 300-301. 51 = There ensued an endless manufacture of traditions proving not only that special relation existed between the prophet and his uncle ‘Abbas, but also that the Prophet regarded only this uncle as the natural leader of the Muslim community after his death. See e.g. Ibn Habib, Munammag, pp. 28-31; Baladhurt, Ansab, III, p. 5; and cf. El’, s.v. ‘“‘Abbas b. ‘Abd al-Muttalib’. Cf,

Tarikh Baghdad, VIII, p. 379. The author of Akhbar al-‘Abbds quotes many traditions in favour of ‘Abbas and his descendants in the first quarter of his work, such as the one in which ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas says to his son ‘Alt: “I heard the Prophet saying to your grandfather ‘the rule will pass to the hands of your children when it gets out of the Umayyad’s hands’”’ Akhbar, p. 130; Anonyme, fols. 248b-249a; Inafa,

pp. 254 f.; Suyuti, Tarikh, p. 14. The extreme movement of the Rawandiyyah which at a certain point came to regard the ‘Abbasid caliph almost as the personification of God, according to Ash‘ari, based itself on the idea of the rights to the caliphate of ‘Abbas and his descendants. See Ash‘ari, p. 21. Nawbakhti, p. 54; Mas‘tdr vol. cit., p. 236.

92 Tabart, HI, p. 213 (Il. 10-14).

Ideological Background 93 to the caliphate by acting as he did in the appointment of arbitrators. His son Hasan sold his caliphate to Mu awiyah for money.” (d) Arab and Muslim society does not recognize the right of inheritance based on descent in the maternal line. ‘Abbas, as the Prophet’s uncle, was no less eligible to succeed him than Abt Talib; if anything, more so, since he was a Muslim. (e) The ‘Abbasids had always befriended the ‘Alids and the Talibids. They had given them protection and guidance, and finally they rose to avenge their blood which had been spilt by the Umayyads.”*

The Reconstruction of ‘Abbas’ Image It is evident from what has already been said that a priority was given

to the reconstruction of ‘Abbas’ image and with it to the radical revision of the Prophet’s strah in Manstir’s and Mahdi’s reforms of the official ‘Abbasid propaganda. The ‘Abbasid-Hasanid controversy which triggered these reforms introduced into the debate over the problem of legitimacy the issue of wirathah, namely, the inheritance of the Prophet. The wirathah was thus added as a separate element to the already existing issues around which the argument about the legitimacy of powér had been revolving for almost a century: rida wa-jamda ah, sabiqah, qarabah,

wasiyyah and nass. Concurrent with the court propagandists’ efforts to prove that ‘Abbas had a better stand than ‘Alias far as each one of these elements of legitimacy was concerned, they also strove

to prove that ‘Abbas, not ‘Ali, was the natural inheritor of the Prophet, who died leaving no male offspring or brothers. In the traditions that grew out of the political strife within Islam, the issue >> Tabari, WI, p. 214; Ibn al-Athir, vol. cit., p. 540: “fa-in kana lakum ftha shayun fa-qad bitumihu wa-akhadhtum thamanahu — and if you ever had a part in it (the caliphate — M.S.) you have already sold it and received its price.’ Thus wrote Caliph Mansiir in a letter to Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah referring to the adbication of Hasan. Cf. Mas‘tidi, ibid., p. 300 where Man-

sur’s criticism is sharper but less accurate. See also Hodgson, p. 1, n. 5. 4 Tabart, Ill, p. 215; [bn al-Athir, vol. cit., p. 541. Cf. Mas‘idi, ibid., p. 301.

94 Chapter 4 of the Prophet’s inheritance was intentionally confused so that no Clear line could be drawn between the personal inheritance, that is to

say, the Prophet's private property, and the succession to the Prophet's spiritual and political authority. This intentional confusion, which served, no doubt, the ‘Abbasid requirements at the early

stages of their debate with the ‘Alids, proved to be double-edged,

and was turned against them by the elaborate Shiite counterpropaganda, as we shall presently see. In their efforts to outmanoeuver the ‘Alids, the ‘Abbasids combined wirathah and wasiyyah:

while claiming the inheritance of the Prophet by virtue of “Abbas

being his paternal uncle,” they also produced a profusion of hadiths, according to which the Prophet had explicitly nominated ‘Abbas as his heir and declared that the caliphate would pass to ‘Abbas’s descendants and remain in their hands until doomsday.” Of special interest are the traditions which attribute an eschatological character to the ‘Abbasid caliphate in the context of the Prophet’s wirdthah. These traditions renounce any anti- Abbasid argument by stressing the eternal nature of the ‘Abbasid rule. One such tradition runs as follows: ‘‘Umm Salamah said: ‘we were with the Prophet (s) and (those who

were present) discussed the caliphate after him and said: (it will rest with the) children of Fatimah. Whereupon the Messenger of Allah (s) said: they will never obtain it, for it (namely, the caliphate) belongs to the sons of my uncle, the brother of my father,

until they hand it over to Christ (hattad yusallimunaha ila almasth)’’?’

The combination of wirathah and wasiyyah in ‘Abbas appear to *> In addition to what has already been quoted, note particularly the tradition in which the Prophet says referring to ‘Abbas: “hadha ‘ammt wa-baqiyyatu aba’t — this is my uncle and the remainder of my forefathers’. Baladhurt,

Ansab, Ill, p. 5. 6 ~—-«Inafa, pp. 255-260, especially nos. 41-47, 55-56 and the extensive parallels

quoted by the editors there. 7 ‘Ibid. no. 62. The staightforward rejection of the ‘Alid claims in this tradition needs no further comment. The indirect message is no less significant: the ‘Abbasid rule is an integral part of God's predestined course of history; any rising against this rule amounts to rebellion against the Almighty Himself.

Ideological Background 95 have been the major concern of the court traditionalists. The traditions were categorically clear and direct: ““Al-‘Abbas is my wasiyy and my warith (heir),”’ the Prophet is made to say (onthe authority of Ibn ‘Abbas).”® Another tradition combines the status of the uncle with the issues of the Prophet’s inheritance: the Prophet is sitting with some of his companions when ‘Abbas arrives and on seeing him, the Prophet says: “This is ‘Abbas b. ‘Abd al-Muttalib; (he is) my

father, my uncle, my wasiyy and my heir.’’”? Probably the most significant hadith on the subject is the one in which the Prophet says: Allah chose me to be His friend in the same manner that he

Allah).’’°

had chosen Ibrahim (Abraham) to be His friend (khalil). My abode in

Paradise is opposite that of Ibrahim and the abode of my uncle ‘Abbas is between the two of us: a believer between two friends (of

These hadiths have a further significance because of the termi-

nology which they employ. This terminology is pertinent not only to

the ‘Abbasids, but was also in current usage with the Shi ah. In actual fact, the issue of Muhammad’s wirdthah-wasiyyah and the terminology that went with it were the direct outcome of the controversy between the ‘Abbasids and the ‘Alids in the same manner that the terminology relating to the question of the legitimacy of authority was the product of the Shrite-Umayyad debate. The terms wirathah and wasiyyah are usually regarded as syn-

onyms, meaning inheritance or legacy, yet in the context of the Shrite-’Abbasid debate, there is an essential difference between them. It seems to me impossible to coin this difference which bears a profound meaning and political intention in one word. However, it is possible to show with much accuracy the method in which these two

terms were introduced into the debate and point out, more or less, the period in which they must have been given public currency. The term wirdthah was the first of the two to be introducd by the ‘Abbasids after their accession to the throne. Putting the stress on

‘Abbas’ inheritance (wiradthah) of the Prophet, the ‘Abbasids thought that they would invalidate any ‘Alid claim based on ‘Ali’s 8 Ibn al-Jawzi, Mawdurat, Il, p. 31.

‘Ibid.

6° Ibid. p. 32; Baladhurt, Ansab, Ill, p. 5.

96 Chapter 4 being the Prophet’s cousin or on Fatimah’s being the Prophet’s daughter. Hence the supermagnification of ‘Abbds’s status as the Prophet's uncle. The above mentioned exchange of letters between

the Hasanid an-Nafs az-Zakiyyah and Caliph Mansir, and the Caliph Mahdi’s decree relating to the establishment of ‘Abbas as the only source of legitimacy for the ‘Abbasid rule enable us to ascribe

the birth of the wirdthah idea to the Manstr-Mahdi period. By stressing the tribal nature of the wirathah (or the Prophet’s inheritance), the ‘Abbasids were sure that they won a great advantage over

the ‘Alids; for by so doing, the former returned the question of legitimacy again to the realm of legal discussion, where they thought they had better arguments. The ‘Abbasids claimed that the paternal uncle takes precedence when it comes to inheritance, over a cousin, and even over a daughter. This line of argumentation proved shortlived. The ‘Alid partisans rejected it on the ground that ‘Abbas was only the half uncle of the Prophet: ‘Abdallah, the Prophet’s father,

and ‘Abbas shared the same father but not the same mother,” whereas Abu Talib, ‘Ali’s father, was the Prophet’s full uncle.” Therefore, if kinship is to be considered as establishing the right of inheritance, then surely a full uncle has precedence over a half uncle, the Shi‘ah argued. Moreover, if indeed ‘Abbas was truly considered

to be the most eligible inheritor of the Prophet, why did he not inherit the latter’s personal belongings, which passed instead to Fatimahe* But even if the ‘Abbasids could prove their ancestor’s entitlement to inherit the Prophet, this would still mean no more than a wirathah in the limited sense of the word, relating to personal property and 61 Zubayri, Nasab Quraysh, p. 17 (for the Prophet’s father’s mother) and p. 18 (for ‘Abbas’ mother).

62 ‘Abdallah and Abu Talib shared both mother and father (and so also the Prophet’s third full uncle Zubayr). See ibid, and especially Ibn Shahrashub, I,

p. 225: “inna ‘Al? kana ibn ‘ammihi liabihi wa-ummihi wa-al Abbas ‘ammahu liabthi khdssatan wa-man yaqrub bisababayn kana aqrab mimman yagrub bisabab wahid wa-law lam takun Fatimah mawjudah bad arrasul lakana ‘Alt ahaqq bitirkatihi.” 6} Sa‘id b. Jubayr (d. 95/714, Tadhkirah, I, p. 76) is said to have discussed with Ibn ‘Abbas the relative importance of ‘Abbas in comparison to Fatimah in the

course of which Sa‘id proved that only Fatimah inherited her father. Ibn Shahrashub, loc. cit..

Ideological Background 97 not to office. Even if ‘Abbas were the warith of the Prophet, the fact still remains that ‘Alt is the latter’s wasiyy: the only person whom the Messenger of Allah had chosen as his successor, granting him the patronhood (wildyah) over the Islamic ummah. The hidden aim of this argument was to draw a clear distinction between wirathah

and wasiyyah, the first being restricted to family and personal matters, while the second elevated to represent the cardinal issues of

political leadership and spiritual succession. And although in the Shi'ite literature there cannot be a question as to ‘Ali's, Fatimah’s and their descendants’ exclusive right to both the wirdthah and wasiyyah of the Prophet, it is the wasiyyah which was always stressed when it came to the Prophet's succession. The ‘Abbasid court propagandists reacted by producing a large number of traditions in which the Prophet explicitly bestowed both wirathah and wasiyyah on his uncle ‘Abbas. These hadiths and others dedicated to ‘Abbas’s fada il (praises) were soon combined to form a coherent body of Prophetic traditions supplying the Abbasid rule with divine legitimacy. In attributing the wasiyyahto Abbasthe ‘Abbasids sought to abolish the similar claim which the “Alids had made some 80 years earlier. At the same time, they stressed the fact

that Abu Talib, ‘Ali’s father, never embraced Islam so as to cast doubt on the validity of his status as the Prophet’s uncle. By so doing, however, the ‘Abbasids stepped upon very slippery ground, for there were many questions asked about the role ‘Abbas played ‘4 The ‘Abbasid propagandists did not hesitate to remodel pure Shrite traditions around ‘Abbas and his descendants. The famous Shr‘ite hadith al-kisa’ in the ‘Abbasid version reads as follows: Tirmidht on the authority of Ibn ‘Abbas: The Prophet said to ‘Abbas: “... come to me with your children so that | may invoke (God) on their behalf

in a manner that Allah benefit you and them”. In the morning he (Abbas) came, and we came with him (Ibn ‘Abbas said), and the Prophet wrapped us in a robe (albasand kisd@an), saying:‘O Allah grant ‘Abbas and his children full redemption (literally: manifest and secret pardon

| which will leave no sin). O Allah, keep him (‘Abbas) safe amongst his children... and let the caliphate remain with his descendants”’. Indfa, no. 39 and the long list of parellels in pp. 254-255. Another ‘Abbasid version of this hadith is mentioned above. p. 77 . The frequent recurrence of this tradition in the hadith literature attests to the ‘Abbasids’ success in making this tradition popular as well as authoritative. Cf. Ibn ‘Asakir, Tahdhib, VII, pp. 234-235.

98 Chapter 4 during the Prophet's lifetime. The participation of “Abbas in the

poor light.

battle of Badr on the side of the Meccan infidels against the Prophet was only one of a few cases which put ‘Abbas’s Islamic status in a

The details of “Abbas’s attitude to Muhammad's Islam were not secret. By the time the ‘Abbasids came to power, the sirah of the Prophet, in its more popular version, had already been compiled by

Wahb b. Munabbih. It was not only popular, but, as Kister has shown, it was essentially a Shi ite version in which ‘Ali plays a major

role on the side of the Prophet. The fragment which survived on papyrus and was published by R.G. Khoury furnishes all the proof

needed to show the extent of the Shrite influence on the early biographies of the Prophet. The major event dealt with in this fragment is the Hijrah and the events that preceded it. Of all these events, the most important were, no doubt, the'Aqabah meeting and the Prophet’s flight from Mecca. In the ‘Aqabah meeting, though ‘Abbas plays his role as an uncle, seeking from the Madinians proper

guaranties for the safety of his nephew Muhammad, there is no question about his rejection of Islam there and then. On the other hand, in the events relating to Muhammad’s flight from Mecca, Wahb b. Munabbih chose not only the popular version in which Satan prepares the plot to kill the Prophet, but also the Shrite version in which ‘Alt offers his own life to save the Prophet by passing the night in the Prophet’s bed, while the assassins were encircling the Prophet’s house.® There was very little Ibn Ishaq could (or would) do in order to alter ‘Ali’s prominent role next to the Prophet when he compiled the sirah in the time of Caliph Abu Ja far

al-Mansur. The tradition of the miraculous escape of the Prophet, which represented also the triumph of good over evil and of Allah’s Will over Satan’s plotting, was too popular to be meddled with. Itis no accident, therefore, that this version in its entirety entered every sirah of the Prophet thereafter. Much, however, was done to improve ‘Abbas’s image. In Ibn 6 Khoury. Wahb b. Munabbih, pp. 122-142. For the nature of Wahb’s tradition and especially the one relating to the events just mentioned, see Kister,

‘Papyrus account’, pp. 406 ff.; idem., “Papyrus of Wahb’, pp. 563-564. 66 See Sellheim, “Prophet”, pp. 41ff. and particularly pp. 49-53.

Ideological Background 99 Ishaq’s version, ‘Abbas plays a prominent role in the ‘Aqabah meet-

ing not only as a responsible uncle, but more as the Prophet's adherent and an ardent Muslim. Ina similar manner the part he took

in the battle of Badr was explained away and other events were remodelled or invented so as to make him worthy of having his descendants assume the leadership of Islam.° The reconstruction of ‘Abbas’s Islamic biography, so soon after the beginning of the ‘Abbasid caliphate, must have greatly influenced the official version of the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah. It is with this in mind that the sources relating to the early history of the revolution should be studied. To sum up: after the revolt of Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah and his brother Ibrahim in the reign of Mansur, the ‘Abbasids felt an urgent

need to modify the politico-religious principle on which their Da'wah was originally based, namely, the “testament” of Abu Hashim. As a result, a new ideology was formulated setting up the ‘Abbasid family, in their own right, as the sole legitimate claimants to the ruling power in Islam. This ideology, as already mentioned, received official endorsement during the time of Mahdz. As for the authenticity of the account of ““Abt Hashim’s testament’ ’, the very fact that this account was preserved in all its details in the ‘Abbasid literature proves its authenticity. We must now first see just how the link between the Hashimiyyah and the ‘Abbasids was originally forged.

67 Note the predominant part played by ‘Abbas at the Prophet's side in the battle of Hunayn. Ibn Hisham, Sirah, Ul, pp. 444-445; Baladhurt, Ansab, I, p. 365 and the fully developed ‘Abbasid tradition according to which the Prophet

owed his life to ‘Abbas at Hunayn, idem., op. cit. Hl, pp. 3-4.

ee Although this movement originated from a profound Sht ite background and came into being more or less with the claim of wanting to avenge the blood of the Household of the Prophet and although people were even asked secretly to give allegiance to a qualified member of the family of the Prophet, it did not rise

directly as a result of the instructions of the Imams. Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai Shi'ite Islam, p. 62

The Hashimiyyah 103 5

| Penitents and Avengers The murder of Husayn b. ‘Alt in Karbala’ (Muharram 61/October 680) caused a deep emotional upheaval within the Shiah at Kifah. Many Shiites did indeed express remorse for the crime; they blamed themselves for not having done anything to aid Husayn, whom they

had themselves invited to come to Ktfah.' The sense of shock and crisis induced the Shi‘ah to take practical steps to atone for what they regarded as a serious crime. The first real initiative was undertaken by a Shr ite group which came to be known as Tawwabun, that is, the Penitents’’. They were the first tolaunch publicly the idea of fighting against the Umayyads and of avenging Husayn’s murder by

killing his murderers or by devoting their lives to this task. They were also the first to express this idea in a slogan which later became

the battle cry of many Shiite rebels: “ya latha’arat al-Husayn — Rise to avenge Husayn’s blood!’’?

Notwithstanding the prolonged period of preparation’ and the ambitious hopes of the Tawwabun to organize a fighting force not only from among the ranks of the Shi‘ah in Kifah, but also from among its supporters, in Basrah and Mada’in,* once again the Iraqi Shrah proved itself well equipped to give verbal, but not practical, assistance. Out of 16,000 men enrolled in the ditwan of Sulayman b. Surad al-Khuza1, who was the leader of the Tawwabin, not more than 4,000 appeared at the mustering place to form an expedition to

fight against the Umayyads. Moreover, just as this force finally ' See Baladhuri, Ansdb, V, p. 205 (Il. 5-10): Anonyme, fols. 98a (I. 14) — 98b (1. 1); Fakhri, p. 165. * — Tabari, I, 538. About two of the tawmdbitn, who appeared in Ktifah with this slogan in order to raise supporters, AbG’ Mikhnaf says “wa-kdand awwal Rhalg allah ddawa ya lathaarat al-Husayn — they were the first people to raise the call of ‘rise to avenge Husayn’s blood’.”” Baladhuri, vol. cit. p. 208: Anonyine, fol. 99a (I. 12).

' Anonyme, fol. 99a (I. 3). According to Baladhuri’s account (rol. cit., pp. 206-207) the organization of the tarwabitn began at the end of the year 61/681 and their militant appearance was in 65/end 684. Sce Tabari, II. p. 345.

' — Baladhuri, vol. cit. p. 206.

104 Chapter 5 began to move from Kifah northwards in the direction of the Jazirah, three-quarters of his men deserted and Sulaym4an b. Surad

was left with a total of 1,000 warriors.° The departure of this tiny Tawwabin force to fight against the Umayyads’ Syrian warriors was a suicidal attempt. Apparently, Sulayman and his comrades knew what lay ahead of them. They were

not fighting men and, despite their courageous spirits, the majority were almost totally destroyed at ‘Ayn al-Wardah (Ra’s al-‘Ayn)° in the Jazirah in a battle which lasted three days, from Wednesday to

Friday 22-24 Jumada I 65/4-6 January 685.’

This action of the Tawwdbun, although it ended in selfannihilation, was a turning point in Shr ah history. It was the Shr ah,

through its own initiative, that raised the idea of avenging the murder of the ‘Alids, especially of Husayn, and turned the motto “ya

latha arat al-Husayn’’ into a principle of action. The Tawwabiun had no political programme beyond this motto, nor did they connect their activity — so far as appears from our sources — with the image of any living member of the ‘Alid family.’ Nevertheless, the Shrite

agitation in Kufah, which had brought the Tawwabin movement into being, also produced another movement led by Mukhtar b. Abi ‘Ubayd, ath-Thaqafi, who raised the standard of revolt in Kufahand

succeeded in taking the city in Rabr I 66/October 685. Mukhtar appropriated the motto of the Tawwabun, making revenge for the murder of Husayn one of his principal objects,’ but unlike the Tawwabiun, he also had a political programme. He was not satisfied

only to identify himself with the memory of the dead leaders, but also set up a living ‘Alid — Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah — at the > Tbid.. pp. 208-209: Tabari, Il. pp. S40f. © Baladhurl, vol. cit. p. 204. ‘ Tabara, Il. p. 559. For the date cf. ibid., p. 576: see also Wellhausen, Khawarij, p. 195 and note 2 there: idem. The Arab Kingdom, p. 185. S — Tabart. loc. cit.: Baladhurt, ibid., pp. 210-213. On the whole affair see also, Mas‘tidi, Murty (Beirut), Hl. pp. 93-96: Anonyme, fols. 98a—100b, Wellhausen, loc. cit.. idem, Khawarij, pp. 189-196. ” On the date of Mukhtar’s revolt see ibid., pp. 206-208: Baladhurt, vol. cit. p. 223. The call to avenge the blood of the members of the Prophet's family must have had a great influence on both Arabs and Mawali of Persian origin. See a very interesting tradition relating to this matter, Baladhurl, ibid., p. 223 (ll. 17-21).

The Hashimiyyah 105 centre of the movement’s political aspirations. Under Mukhtar’s leadership, the Shrites in Kifah took a new initiative, the ultimate

political aim of which was to wrest the ruling power from the Umayyads and hand it over to the “family of the Prophet”’. Unlike the Tawwabiun, Mukhtar was a man of action. Even before

the Tawwabun departure for the Jazirah, he had foretold their failure because they had no military experience and their leader “had no knowledge of war or the Jeadership of men.’’*° Mukhtar, on the contrary, had attracted to his service experienced soldiers, the foremost of whom was Ibrahim b. Malik al-Ashtar. chief of the Nakh’ tribe of Madhhij, a talented general and one of the most important Shrite leaders of Ktfah.*! His action in joining the ranks of Mukh-

tar’s supporters led to a like action by most of the warriors of his

tribe. This demonstrates a further unique quality of Mukhtar’s movement: its warlike character. His supporters are described as ‘the leaders of qurra (i.e., the most important religious leaders, M.S.), the shaykhs of the misr (Ktfah) and the formidable Arab warriors’ (‘sadat al-qurrad’ wa-mashyakhat al-misr wa-fursan al‘arab’’).*?

Mukhtar’s movement occupies a special place in Islamic history by virtue of the terminology it coined, a terminology which was transferred intact to ‘Abbasid da‘wah.

(1) The original version of Mukhtar’s political appeal ran as follows: ‘I appeal to you to uphold the Book of Allah and the sunnah of His Prophet, to avenge the blood of the family (i.e., the Prophet's, M.S.), to protect the weak and to fight a holy war (jihad) against the

sinners (the Umayyads, M.S.) (ad tkum ila kitab Allah wa-sunnat

nabiyyihi wa-at-talab bidima ahl al-bayt wa-ad-daf ‘an addu afa’ wa-jihad al-muhillin’’).? In another version of this appeal, it is made clear who “the weak”’ are: those of the Prophet’s kinsfolk who lacked anyone to defend their interests, namely, the “Alids.”’ 0 “La ‘ilma lahu bi-al-hurtb wa-siydsat ar-rijal’, Baladhurt, vol. cit. p. 207. 1 [bid., pp. 222-223; Wellhausen, Khawarij, pp. 205-2006. 2 Tabari, Il, p. 612. The remnants of the Tawwabin also joined him immediately after his initial call. ibid., p. 599. 3 Baladhurt, vol. cit. p. 213; cf. ibid., p. 228. 4 Kafi, VI, p. 113 (Ul. 14-15): “wa-adh-dhabb an ad-duaf@ min al Muhammad al-mustafa — and the protection of the defenceless members of the Prophet’s family”.

106 Chapter 5 (2) The concept of ahl al-bayt and the synonymous terms Al Muhammad and even Al ‘Ali, were placed in the centre of the political hopes and aspirations of Mukhtar’s movement. The movement’s entire activity, both then and later, depended’‘on this concept of ahl al-bayt.'® The immediate task was to avenge Husayn’s murder and the slogan “ya latha’arat al-Husayn”’ was continually invoked by Mukhtar and his followers.!” The ultimate aim was to secure for

ahl al-bayt the leadership of Islam. (3) The movement focused its hopes and those of Islam for

righteousness, equity and divine justice on Muhammad b. alHanafiyyah. Muhammad b. ‘Ali (b. al-Hanafiyyah) was presented as the divinely guided mahdi, the son of the Prophet’s heir (wasiyy).?® This term of messianic origin and similar expressions, such 4s imam

or imam al-huda'’ became foundation stones in the doctrine of the

Shr'ah and later of the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah.” | -Mukhtar, who presented himself as the representative of the mahdi Muhammad b. ‘Ali, took the title of Wazir Al Muhammad,”! and, in addition, the titles of thigah, amin, muntajab and amir.”” It was he who, as the mahdi’s assistant, confidant and chosen representative, transmitted the mahdi's teachings to the faithful. Mukhtar received the oath of allegiance (bay ah) on his behalf. The bay ah to the mahdi was the genuine and correct bay ah, superseding every other oath of allegiance except the bay ah to ‘Ali himself. Mukhtar assured those who joined the movement: “You have not sworn any oath of allegiance since the oath of allegiance to ‘Ali and his family '> — Baladhurt, vol. cit., p. 228 (I. 12).

'© See above pp.63-70 (ahi al-bayt). 17 Baladhuri, vol. cit., pp. 225, 232 (Il. 18—19): Kuff, VI, p. 105 (I. 4); Tabart,

I, p. 620. 18 ~~ Baladhurt, vol. cit., pp. 218, 222; Tabari, II, pp. 608, 611. Kuff, VI, pp. 132 (I. 1), 183 (1. 6) and particularly the verse on p. 241 (1. 16) where Muhammad b.

al-Hanafiyyah is called: ““mahdi ibn al-muhtadi’; Akhbar, pp. 101, 164165.

19 See Tabari, II, p. 608; for the appellation “wasiyy al Muhammad’ see ibid., . 747. 20 Lewis. “The regnal titles’, pp. 13f. and note 2; Goldziher, Vorlesungen, pp. 216-218. 21 Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 225; Goitein, “Vizier”. 22 Baladhuri, vol. cit., pp. 218, 222 (I. 21).

The Hashimiyyah 107 which follows the right course more than this oath of allegiance (to Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah, M.S.)’’, (‘md baya'tum ba‘d bay at amir al-mu’minin ‘Ali wa-dl ‘Ali bay ah ahda minha’’).”* This idea was copied in its entirety by the ‘Abbasids at the time of the investiture of Abi al-‘Abbas as-Saffah, as the first ‘Abbasid caliph.** The terms Wazir Al Muhammad, Aminand Amin Al Muhammad, Amir

and Amir Al Muhammad, as we shall see later, all appear subsequently as titles of leaders of the Dawah.” To sum up: Mukhtar’s movement which historically was the forerunner of the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah, not only contributed to the latter a system of technical terms, but also a basic distinguishing

feature: the imam, the mahdi, on whom the aspirations of the movement were focused, was kept remote from its members; his enactments and teachings were transmitted to the faithful by leaders who were his confidants and intimates; (they also administered the oath of allegiance in his name and directed the activities of the movement on his and his family’s behalf. In Mukhtar’s movement the identity of the Imam, Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah, was known to the faithful, whereas the Hashimite-‘Abbasid Da’wah kept the

identity of the Imam secret. |

The dispute over the question whether Muhammad Db. alHanatfiyyah was in fact the true leader of the movement or not is irrelevant both historically and to the theses of this book. What is relevant is that the movement’s members and followers gave the sole

credit for establishing the movement to Muhammad b. alHanafiyyah, whose personality radiated the necessary authority to set it in motion. Since it was this image of the man that gave the movement its original motive power, he was regarded in effect as its leader, even if for understandable reasons of caution he later refused to take an active part in it. The special feature of this movement, as of the Hashimite-"Abbasid movement which succeeded it, was this: that the Imam was neither required nor expected to play an active 23 Ibid., p. 288 (I. 12). 4 Tabari, IH, p. 33; Anonyme, fols. 292b (I. 18)—293a (1. 2); Azdi, p. 124; al-Maqdisi, al-Bad’ wa-at-Ta’rtkh, VI, p. 70; Ibn Khaldtin, ‘Ibar, II, p. 73. *° See below p. 199. On amir and amir al Muhammad as the titles of Aba Muslim see Kufi, VIII, p. 168 (ll. 16-17). ~

108 Chapter 5 part in the movement’s day-to-day functioning, nor was it even desirable that he do so. It was precisely his remoteness from the faithful that emphasised the aura of mystery surroundig his person,

and that also protected him from the machinations of his opponents.*°

It need not surprise us that Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah was accepted as Mahdi by the Shirah in Kifah, although he was not Fatimah’s son. In Arab society, as we have seen, descent on the father’s side was the decisive factor. Muhammad was his father’s legitimate son and his favourite. In the “Battle of the Camel’ he bore his father’s standard,’’ and after Husayn’s death he was the family’s senior surviving member, and hence its leader.*® It was, therefore, quite natural that also the Shr ah, in which the various sects had not yet crystallised,*? saw in him the senior representative of ‘Ali's family and the one responsible for avenging the blood of his brothers and kinsfolk.*° Mukhtar’s movement was the forerunner of the ‘Abbasid Da’ wah in yet another way: in the large-scale participation of mawali and slaves side by side with Arab tribesmen in its operations” and the 26 For detailed discussion on the subject see Cahen, pp. 304-306. He thinks that at this period one can detect the beginnings of the doctrine of the tagiyyah, according to which both the imam and his followers are expected to

conceal their true identity if revealing it will expose them to unnecessary dangers. This doctrine, Cahen says, was invented to explain post factum why

certain persons who had regarded themselves (or had been regarded) as imams had not appeared publicly as such. 27 Mas‘tdi, Muraj (Beirut, 1965), II, p. 361. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, ‘Iqd, II, p. 276 (ed. 1944, IV, pp. 313-314). 28 — Ibid., Il, p. 352 (ed. 1944, IV, p. 475).

2? Hodgson, pp. 1-13. 30“ Shite veterans in Kifah like Ibrahim b. Malik al-Ashtar and the remnants of the Tawwaban had no doubts about the personality of Muhammad b. alHanafiyyah, and from the moment they were convinced that Mukhtar was his representative, they had no second thoughts about joining him. Baladhurt, vol. cit., pp. 213, 218, 222-223; Tabart, I], pp. 599, 606-61 3. 1 Majlisi, Bihar, XLV, p. 334: Tabart, II, pp. 619-620, 623, 689; Kufi, VI, pp. 108, 111, 141, 146-147. When Mukhtar was defeated and killed, his troops, who had fallen captive, were all put to death, Arabs and mawalt alike. Baladhurt, ibid., p. 263 (Il. 15-17); Tabari, II, pp. 749-750. The tradition that Mukhtar freed every slave who killed his master is clearly one of those traditions which were invented to blacken his memory. See Majlist, vol. cit., p. 338.

The Hashimiyyah 109 mawali even received ‘ata’ just as the Arab tribesmen did.” Thus Mukhtar anticipated Abii Muslim, who as we shall see later, enrol-

led Arabs and mawali together in a single diwan. The clearest expression of Mukhtar’s revolutionary step appears in words spoken, according to one of the traditions, by his Kifite opponents: “This imposter has set himself up as ruler over us against our will; he has taken our slaves and our mawali, has advanced them, mounted them on horseback, given them money and fed them on the fay...” Then, addressing Mukhtar, their representative is supposed to have said: ““You have set your eyes on our slaves, who are our fay ...and

you have taken them for yourself. Not content with taking them,

you have even made them share our fay’ with us.” The bitter animosity of Mukhtar’s opponents was caused by the equalisation of

the social status of the mawalt to that of the Arabs, especially through the payment of ‘ata’, which undermined the accepted order in which non-Arabs were regarded as the spoil (fay ) of the ArabMuslim warriors, and the status of warriors, with all the privileges

it conveyed, was essentialy an Arab status. Conditions in Kufah were not ripe for such revolutionary measures, and it is possible that this experiment should be counted among the reasons for Mukhtar’s

failure. Nevertheless, while Mukhtar was unsuccessful in Kifah, Abt: Muslim succeeded in Khurasan.* Mukhtar’s revolt failed and Mukhtar himself was killed on 14 Ramadan 67/3 April 687 in the last desperate battle against Mus ab b. Zubayr.*? But Mukhtar’s movement lived on. Its surviving supporters, who were certainly not numerous, concentrated themselves around a number of leaders (whom we shall have occasion to meet

later on), and maintained the link with Muhammad b. alHanafiyyah.*° As for Mukhtar himself, the sources tend to represent him as an adventurer, animpostor, and to attribute to him teachings

2 Kafi, VI, p. 146. 3 ibid., And see Wellhausen, Khawarij, pp. 211f. Wellhausen overestimates the participation of mawali in Mukhtar’s revolt.

4 See below pp. 214-226 > Tabarti, II, p. 750; and Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 264 (I. 14) where the word should be read sab’, not tis’.

36 Wellhausen, p. 504, Cahen, p. 306. :

110 Chapter 5 and actions opposed to the basic tenets of Islam, including the doctrine of the divinity of ‘Alf.*’ In point of fact, Mukhtar’s activity was defined in the following words, said to be his own, addressed to

one of his followers shortly before his death: : ‘See now, I am one of the Arabs, I saw that Ibn Zubayr seized the ruling power in Hijaz and that Najdah (the Kharijite leader, M.S.) did the same in Yamamah and Marwan in Syria, and I did not see myself as inferior to other Arabs. Therefore, I took over this region and became like one of them, except that I sought to avenge the blood of the Prophet’s family, while the other Arabs neglected the matter. I slew everyone who had taken part in shedding their blood

and I have continued doing so until this day...” | This is an accurate and balanced summing-up of Mukhtar’s activ-

ity. He was also, beyond all doubt, an adventurer; but behind him was an ethical ideal acceptable to Arab society, and this ideal proved

to be one with great power of attraction.*”? The uncompromising pursuit of this ideal, namely, revenge on all who had shared in the killing of Husayn, was the decisive factor which enlarged the circle of his implacable enemies both in Iraq generally and especially in Kufah.* ** Some stories claim that he is supposed to have said that he conversed with angels and received divine revelations. Baladhurt, vol. cit., pp. 223-224. In other traditions (ibid., p. 231 (I. 18)) he is called kahin, probably because of his practice of making extensive use of rhyme (saj') in his speeches, ibid., pp. 222, 228, 235, 237, 241, 245-246, 247. On special ceremonies around ‘Ali's chair (kurst ‘Alt) which Mukhtar is said to have introduced, see ibid.,'pp. 241-242: Tabari, II, pp. 702-706: Ash‘ari, p. 18, see a detailed discussion of

the matter, Wellhausen, Khawdrij, pp. 234f. and the sources there; also Tabari, II, pp. 742, 745. Wellhausen regards Mukhtar’s movement as an extremist one which developed the raj‘ah ideas of Ibn Saba for its own needs. Wellhausen, p. 504: cf. Goldziher, Vorlesungen, p. 217, but see Cahen, p. 304.

8 Tabart, II, p. 737. Cf., Baladhurt, ibid., p. 261. One may add in this connection the evidence of Mukhtar’s wife who could have saved her life had she confirmed the charges against her husband. Instead, she said: “May Allah have mercy on him: he was one of the righteous servants of God...” Tabart, II,

p. 744: Baladhurt, ibid., p. 263 (I. 21). *° — Baladhurt, ibid., p. 223 (Il. 15-21). #2 On the many cruel executions of all those suspected of having any connection with the murder of Husayn, see Baladhuri, ibid., pp. 236-241; Kufi, VI, pp.

120 ff.; Majlisi, vol. cit., pp. 332 ff.; Fakhri, p. 166.

The Hashimiyyah 111 The historical importance of Mukhtdr’s activity lies in the fact that he founded a movement which was the first to attach itself toa living leader of the “Alid family, to Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah. Moreover, it was the sole Shr‘ite movement with real political and military achievements. Owing to Mukhtar’s creative mind and imagination, the Shr ite movement acquired a permanent organizational structure and created a procedure essential for the orderly transference of allegiance from imam to imam, long before the other Shiite organizations took shape around the personalities of various descendants of ‘Alt. The unique feature of the ‘Abbasid movement — to stress once again an idea which we have already adumbrated — lay precisely in the fact that the most highly organized and effective Shrite body, the Mukhtariyyah-Hashimiyyah, was the one which constituted the basis of ‘Abbasid activity.

Early ‘Abbasid -‘Alid Contacts When was contact established between the ‘Abbasids and the Hashimiyyah? We can say with certainty that these links were already forged when Mukhtar’s movement began. The basis of these

links was the close personal and family ties between ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas and Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah, each of whom was the head of his respective family.*' It is difficult to describe precisely the

nature of these ties and to say which of the two was the dominant

partner in this friendship; the later “Abbasid traditions tend to portray the “Abbasids as the leaders, guides and avengers of the ‘Alids.** What is clear, however, is that the leaders of the two families resided in the same place and cooperated with each other, at least from the beginning of the revolt of ‘Abdallah b. Zubayr after *! During his lifetime, nobody challenged Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah’s leadership of the ‘Alid family since he was the oldest surviving son of ‘Ali. Later developments in the Shr‘ah led to attempts to diminish his status because he was not the son of Fatimah. The weakness of this argument has been discussed above. See Baladhurt, Ansab, HI (ed. Mahmtdi, 1977), p. 272 (and note 1 of the Shi‘ite editor). Cf. Nawbakhti, pp. 47-48.

See e.g., Mas‘tidi, Muruj (Beirut), p. 301; Akhbar, pp. 45, 48 ff. Baladhurt, Ansab, IVb, pp. 18-19.

112 Chapter 5 the death of Husayn b. ‘Alt; but all the signs bear witness that there were close ties between the two families even before this period. In the conflict between ‘Abdallah b. Zubayr and the Umayyads, both ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas and Muhammad b. ‘Ali preserved their neutrality and refused to cooperate with ‘Abdallah b. Zubayr.*? It seems that they were even inclined to support the Umayyads, but they waited to see how the fortunes of war would fall. Their opposition to ‘Abdallah

b. Zubayr went so far that he threw them both into prison; it is possible that he took this severe step just because he suspected them of pro-Umayyad tendencies.** This occurred after the outbreak of 48 Akhbar, p. 99: ‘Abdallah b. Zubayr revolted in Mecca and his position there was strengthened after the death of Yazid b. Mu‘awiyah. When this happened and the civil wars began (wa-waga‘at al-fitan), Muhammad b. ‘Alt b. alHanafiyyah and ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas sought refuge in Mecca after the Battle of

the Harrah. They both retained a neutral position in the internal strife (faitazala al-fitnah). “Abdallah b. Zubayr invited them to swear allegiance to him, wherepon they (both Muhammad and ‘Abdallah) said to him: ‘We shall swear allegiance only to him whose leadership the Muslim community accepts unanimously’ (inna la nubayr illa man ajma‘at alayhi al-ummah...)”. Wellhausen does not know when ibn al-Hanafiyyah moved from Madinah to Mecca. He assumes that it was during the Hajj of the year 66 since “this could have been the only opportunity though the sources do not mention anything about it” (Wellhausen, Khawdrij, p. 216 n. 1). The sources which have been discovered since enable us to solve this minor problem. According to both the Ansab and the Akhbar, Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah moved to Mecca immediately after the battle of the Harrah (25.1.63/4.X.682) and before Ibn Zubayr was besieged at Mecca (I. 64/IX. 683). See Baladhuri Ansab, III (Mahmiidi), p. 279 (Il. 12-14). On the battle of the Harrah see idem, Ansab, IVb pp. 30-37; Fakhri, pp. 161-162; Wellhausen,pp. 153-155: Kister, ‘‘Harrah”, pp. 33-49 (an extensive bibliography on the subject is listed on p. 33 note 1).

44 There is little doubt that Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah maintained good relations with the Umayyad court and especially with Yazid I. An anonymous tradition quoted by Baladhuri, Ansab, II] (Mahmudi), pp. 276-278, relates

that after the murder of Husayn, Yazid I invited Muhammad b. alHanafiyyah to Damascus most probably in an effort to conciliate the new leader of the ‘Alids. Muhammad went to the Caliph’s court and was received cordially. Yazid apologized for the murder of Husayn, explaining that it had

not been carried out at his orders and expressing great sorrow about the whole affair (wa-la’in kana awja‘aka fa-laqad awja‘ani). ‘Had I been in the position — (the Caliph is supposed to have said) — to prevent his death even at the price of having my fingers cut off or my eyes blinded I would have done so.” (ibid., p. 277, ll. 4-5). Yazid then presented him with a huge sum of money and sent him back to Madinah.

The Hashimiyyah 113 Mukhtar’s revolt in Kafah. Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah requested

his help in a letter, the text of which is preserved in Akhbar al‘Abbas and in Kitab al-Futuh of Ibn A‘tham al-Kiuft.*’ This letter, which caused Mukhtar much joy, because it implied recognition of his position, bears many marks of authenticity. Muhammad b. ‘Ali appealed to “‘shi‘at ahl al-bayt” in Kifah through the mediation of Mukhtar, begging them to assist him and his followers who were

imprisoned with him. He reminded them of their treachery to Husayn and asked them not to repeat in his case the error which had

given them cause for sorrow. The special feature of this letter, in

contrast to another letter attributed to Muhammad b. alHanafiyyah, in which he had allegedly requested Ibrahim b. Malik al-Ashtar to join forces with Mukhtar, is that Muhammad does not describe himself as mahdi,* but rather emphasizes that his appeal is

made to the Shiah of the Family (shiat ahl al-bayt). Ibn alHanafiyyah’s appeal to Kufah need not surprise us, since it is to be understood that even before this episode Ibn al-Hanafiyyah was in

close touch with the Shiah in this town, as appears quite clearly from our sources. First, Tabari relates that ‘Abdallah b. Zubayr imprisoned not only Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah, but also 17 Kufite notables who were with him at the time.*’ Baladhurt's tradiWhen Madinah rebelled against the Umayyads, Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah refused to join the rebellion and even defended the Caliph publicly. When the rebels leveiled charges against Yazid that he drank wine and did not observe the religious laws, Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah is supposed to have said:

‘Fear God, have any of you seen him do what you say he. does? | have accompanied him more than you have and | have not seen any thing wrong come from him.”’ He refused to take part in the fighting against the Syrian army which was sent against Madinah and called for political quietism and military inactivity in order to avert the spilling of Muslim blood. See also Akhbar, loc. cit. The Hashimite-‘Abbasid anti-Zubayrid tradition exaggerates in the story of how ‘Abdallah b. Zubayr wanted to burn Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah and ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas alive for holding back his bayah. See

also Mastdi, Muruj (Beirut), Il, p. 76-78. Tabari’s tradition speaks only about their imprisonment. See note 27 in ch. 4 above. * Akhbar, pp. 99-100; Kiafi, p. 131. This letter is mentioned but not quoted by Tabari, II, p. 693. It is partly quoted by Baladhuri, Ansab, II] (Mahmiud)), p.

283. Cf. Wellhausen, Khawarij, p. 216 and notes. “© Baladhuri, Ansab, V, p. 222 (I. 20): Tabari, II, p. 611. 7 Tabari, II, p. 693. A hint of their presence is found in Muhammad's letter as recorded by the sources mentioned above.

114 Chapter 5 tion explicitly says that these were Shr ites from Kifah who had come to visit him and it gives their names.** Secondly, and more decisively, when Mukhtar brings a letter to Ibrahim b. Malik alAshtar, asserting that he has received it from Muhammad b. alHanafiyyah, in which the latter describes himself by the title mahd1,” Ibrahim b. Malik al-Ashtar says: ‘I have written letters to Muhammad b. ‘Ali and he to me, and he never wrote otherwise than by using

his personal name and patronymic.” Thirdly, in a tradition recorded by Fakihi in his Ta’rikh Makkah on the authority of ‘Amr b.

Dinar, it is related that 2,000 Kifite horsemen defended Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah in a quarter of the ‘Alid family in Mecca, called

“Shib ‘Ali b. Abu Talib.” “If he were to order them to move a mountain, they would move it.’’ These horsemen, ‘Amr b. Dinar says, explicitly referred to Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah as ‘“mahdi’.”' These three pieces of information prove beyond all doubt that a connection existed between Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah and the

Shi‘ah in Kifah. This connection was strengthened and put on a proper foundation during and after Mukhtar’s revolt. When Mukhtar received Ibn al-Hanafiyyah’s letter, he sent from Kifah cavalry forces which liberated him and Ibn.‘Abbas from Ibn Zubayr’s pri-

son.@ ‘Abdallah b.‘Abbas certainly knew of the ties between Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah and the Shi‘ah in Ktfah, and he received tangible proof of them in the shape of the large Kufite forces which Mukhtar poured in to liberate them. At the Hajj ceremonies of the year 66 the independent existence of the Shi'ah under the leadership of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah was demon48 Baladhuri, Ansdb, III (Mahmtdi), pp. 279-280. #9 In the sources there is a debate over the authenticity of this letter. See Cahen, p. 305, note 4. Mubarrad, al- Kamil, p. 598, regards it as authentic. See Tabart,

I, pp. 611-612; Baladhuri, V, pp. 222-223. 0 ‘Ibid. p. 223; Tabart, loc. cit. A letter (quoted in Akhbar al-‘Abbas, pp. 100101) in which Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah requests Mukhtar’s help, opens

in fact only with Muhammad’s name and his patronymic. | 1 Fakihi, Ta’rikh Makkah, Ms. Leiden or. 463 fol. 515b. I am indebted for this reference to Professor M.J. Kister. Akhbar, pp. 106-107.

52 Wellhausen, Khawarij, pp. 216-217; Akhbar pp. 102ff; Tabari, II, pp. 693-695. Cf. Cahen, pp. 312-313.

The Hashimiyyah 115 strated in concrete form for the first time. The ceremonies were held by three different groups, each antagonistic to the others: “On one side, Muhammad b. ‘Ali and his followers, on another ‘Abdallah b.

az-Zubayr and his supporters, on a third Najdah b. ‘Amir the Kharijite with his followers. ®? Muhammad b. al-Hnafiyyah could not be induced to enter the struggle for rule which was then being waged,™ and in order to avoid any further clash with ‘Abdallah b. az-Zubayr, he left Mecca and went to live in Aylah (Eilat), apparently

at the beginning of the year 67, after the end of the Hajj of 66.” ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas remained in Mecca.

Sometime after this, Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah returned to Mecca from Aylah, apparently because he did not wish to come into

conflict with ‘Abd al-Malik, who was also demanding an oath of allegiance from him. Since he could not stay in Mecca either, on account of ‘Abdallah b. az-Zubayr, both he and ‘Abdallah b. “Abbas migrated to Ta’if and settled there. It would appear that their move

from Mecca to Ta’if took place after the news of the collapse of Mukhtar’s revolt had become known.” It is possible that they both felt more secure in Ta’if, which was the dwelling place of Mukhtar’s tribe, the tribe of Thaqif. From Ta if they could observe the struggle between Ibn Zubayr and the Umayyads without becoming involved in it. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas did not see the end of the struggle; he died in

Ta’if in the year 68/687-8, aged 72.7’ The ‘Abbasid tradition recorded by the author of the Akhbar tells > Akhbar, p. 107. 4 He forbade the Ktfite warriors who had come to release him to raise their arms against ‘Abdallah b. az-Zubayr and preached to them to refrain from war. There is no doubt that Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah had no ambition to rule. “We call neither for injustice nor for war. We want security and that unity be preserved’, he used to say. Akhbar, p. 101. There is no reason to doubt this political credo. »° — Akhbar, p. 107; Mas‘tidi, op. cit., p. 77. 6 The traditions quoted in the previous note to the effect that the move to Ta'if took place after ‘Abdallah b. az-Zubayr’s death are mistaken, because Ibn ‘Abbas died in Ta‘if four years before the death of Ibn Zubayr. The original tradition probably reads: “fa-agama bi-Aylah hattd qutila al-Mukhtar” and not “hatta qutila Ibn az-Zubayr.”’ Akhbar, ibid. ” Or 69/688-9. Dhahabt, ‘Ibar, I, p. 76; Anonyme, fol. 243a; Akhbar, p. 133: Mas udi, op. cit., p. 101; Ta’rikh Khalifah b. Khayyat, I, p. 336. Ibn Habib (Muhabbar, p. 24) says he died in 70/689-70. For traditions that give var-

116 Chapter 5 us that before his death, ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas had commanded his son ‘Alt to leave Hijaz and immigrate to Syria and to swear allegiance there to Abd al-Malik, since ‘Abd al-Malik was, after all, nearest of

kin (through ‘Abd Manaf) and would surely show favour to the ‘Abbasids who came to him. Although this tradition contains some elements which belong to the realm of ‘Abbasid legend, among them a prophecy about the rise of the ‘Abbasids to power in succession to the Umayyads, the fact that ‘Ali and his family really did migrate to Syria, where they swore allegiance to ‘Abd al-Malik, proves that

there is a nucleus of truth in the tradition. Exactly when did the ‘Abbasids migrate to Syria? It seems that it

was not before the death of Muhanimad b. al-Hanafiyyah, who continued to act as leader of the two families in Ta’if. The period between the death of Ibn ‘Abbas and that of Muhammad b. alHanafiyyah is wrapped in obscurity. The sources relate virtually nothing about the two families. Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah continued to maintain ties with the survivors of Mukhtar’s movement in Kufah, but true to his principles concerning the need to preserve the unity of Islam, he swore allegiance to ‘Abd al-Malik as soon as the latter had united the kingdom after the killing of “Abdallah b.

az-Zubayr in the year 73/692.” Concerning the date and place of Ibn al-Hanafiyyah’s death, the traditions are confused. The earliest date recorded by the traditions

is the year 81/700; but there are also traditions which speak of him as having died in 84/703 and even in 86/705." His death constitutes an important turning point in the history of the Shiah. He was the last ‘Alid leader to unite the ‘Alid family and its Shi ah ious other dates of his death (63, 73, 67 and even 79) see Ibn Kathir, VIII, p. 306 (cf. also pp. 295 and 309). The prayer over his grave was conducted by Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah. Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 2a.

6 Akhbar, p. 131, and the parallel tradition on p. 130 which describe the activities of the members of Ibn ‘Abbas’ family after his death in a form of Ibn

‘Abbas’ “will” (wasiyyah) to his son ‘All. »”” ~~ Cahen, pp. 305-306 and his sources there.

0 Nawbakhti, p. 48; Mas‘tdi, op. cit., p. 116; Dhahabi, op. cit., I, p. 93; Ibn Qutaybah, Ma‘arif, p. 111.

st Ta’rikh Qumm, p. 238, where the first date of his death is given as Rabi I, 81/April-May, 700. He was born in the year 17/638 (or 19/640) and died aged 64, cf. ibid., p. 136.

The Hashimiyyah 117 under one supreme authority. His death brought to an end the general agreement concerning the identity of the single leader within

the family and, as a result, the first traces of the split in the Shi ah began to appear. It is no coincidence that precisely around him was woven the

legend that he had not died but was hidden away in a valley in Yemen, known as “‘Shi‘b Radwa’’, or on a hill near Madinah, called ‘Jabal Radwa’’, where he dwells between two lions and is kept alive by two springs, one of honey and another of water, until he appears at the end of days and fills the world with justice and righteousness, as is expected of the Mahdi.” This legend is very early and undoubt-

edly originated among Mukhtar’s followers, whose movement is sometimes called Kaysaniyyah,® who said that Muhammad b. alHanafiyyah was the Mahdi. The poems of Kuthayyir ‘Azzah (d.725)

and of as-Sayyid al-Himyari (d. 789) also prove that this legend found an echo in the hearts of the people.% It is difficult to say just how old the legend is, but it is evident that its origin lies in the crisis

that developed in the Shrah after Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah’s death. One group, possibly led by one Kaysan, Mukhtar’s confidant, remained faithful to Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah’s memory and in time evolved the idea of his raj'ah. (There is no certainty that even before his death the entire Kufite Shiah accepted the idea that

he was the true Mahdzi, and there are hints that even some of Mukhtar’s supporters did not.) 2 Ashvari, p. 19; Baghdadt, pp. 27, 34; Mas‘idi, op. cit., pp. 77-79. On the location of Jabal Radwa (near Madinah) sce Istakhri, p. 21. One has to remember that the title mahdi was first created in the Shrah for Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah and it is not by chance that Zubayri points out that “the Shi‘ah refers to him by the title of al-mahdi™. Nasab Quraysh, p. 41 (I. 17). > The origin of the name Kaysd@niyyah is disputed. There are those who say that it refers to Mukhtar who used to be called Kaysan, Ash‘art, p. 18: Baghdadi, p. 26; Mas‘udt, op. cit., p. 77. Others say that it refers to another Kaysan who had been a mawld of Caliph ‘Alt. Still another view has it that Kaysan was the

commander of Mukhtar’s private guard (haras), that he was a mawld of ‘Uraynah and that his kunyah was Abu ‘Amrah. Baladhuri, Ansdb, V, p. 229

(Il. 2-3). See Wellhausen, Khawarij, p. 214; Cahen, p. 309 and note I. °* — Mas‘udi, op. cit., pp. 78-79; Nawbakhti, p. 51: Ta’rikh Qumm, p. 237: and

especially, Zubayri, op. cit., pp. 41-42; Aghani, VII, p. 32; an-Nashi’ alAkbar, pp. 26-30. Cf. Wiet, pp. 87-88.

118 Chapter 5 One may, therefore, link the name of Ibn al-Hanafiyyah with the beginnings of Shr ite mystical and apocalyptic teachings. His death,

as already indicated, was also a turning point since it marks the beginning of the schism within the Shiah. Ibn al-Hanafiyyah was the last leader of the ‘Alid family who belonged to the generation of ‘All's sons. His death brought with it the problems of leadership of the family whose members and branches had increased greatly and of leadership to its Shi‘ah. A section of Mukhtar’s Shi‘ah in Kufah

transferred its allegiance to ‘Abdallah Abt Hashim, the son of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah,® but this transfer did not obligate the rest of the family. Abu Hashim could not enjoy full authority over the family, both because his mother had been a slave-girl and because he had living cousins who were candidates for leadership,

especially his cousin ‘Ali b. Husayn (subsequently called Zayn al-‘Abidin). The various factions of the Shrah, including the ‘Abbasid Da‘’wah, later created the concept of wasiyyah, which has already been men-

tioned several times. It is significant that this concept took form when any one of the different competitive Shiite groups needed to prove that its imam, the ‘Alid leader on whom it focused its aspira-

tions, was the true imam. Hence there developed in the course of

time the theory of imamah, which stated that the ‘Alid leader transferred to his heir, by this act of wasiyyah or testament, not only his status as head of the family and its supporters, but also his ‘“‘ilm” or esoteric wisdom, which gave him his authority. As Cahen rightly points out, the need for this theory of imamah arose only after the ‘Alid family had ceased to be united around the figure of a single leader®® and this occurred after the death of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah.

It appears that ‘Ali b. Husayn (Zayn al-‘Abidin) was the one destined to inherit the leadership of the family; we infer this not only

from the late Shrite tradition which relates how the imamah of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah (!) had passed to him,®’ but also from 6 ~— Zubayri calls him “‘sahib ash-shiah’’, a term which he does not use for any of the ‘Altds. I understand this term to mean the only ‘Alid who had an organized

shi ah. Zubayri, op. cit., p. 75 (I. 14). 66 ~~ Cahen, p. 307.

6? Baghdadi, p. 27.

The Hashimiyyah 119 an interesting tradition in Akhbar al-‘Abbas that tells how after the death of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas and of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah,®

the members of the two families were left like sheep without a shepherd; “‘they went one to another and mentioned the testament of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas which had bade them to migrate (to Syria, M.S.); some of them went to ‘Alrb. Husayn b. ‘Aliand told him about

the matter, begging him to leave Madinah (for Syria, M.S.); ‘Ali replied: ‘God be praised! Do you bid me leave dar al-hijrah for dar al-a'rab in order to become a Bedouin (a‘rdbi) after the hijrah? Do you bid me forsake the Prophet’s tomb and His mosque (which I visit every morning and evening), wherein every prayer is equal in value to a thousand prayers offered elsewhere?’ [When the men heard this] they left him.® The Shiite ithna-‘ashari origin of this tradition can

hardly be disguised. It may reflect, however, the initial absence of any close relations between the ‘Abbasid family and the children of either Hasan or Husayn. In consequence the ‘Abbasids resolved by a majority to migrate to Syria under the leadership of ‘Altb. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas.”° This tradition, incidentally, explains that it was not by chance that ‘Alt b. Husayn is a very blurred figure in the Shi‘ah and that his name is not linked with any separate group of adherents.”! ‘Alt b. ‘Abdallah did not attain to leadership of the family without some commotion. He seems to have been destined for leadership by

his father and it may be that he was made leader through having gained support from the majority of the members of the family for his

political orientation, namely, to support the Umayyads. However ‘Abbas, who was the firstborn son of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas, objected to his brother becoming leader since ‘Ali was the youngest son,

but the family did not support ‘Abbas, either because he was politically oriented towards b. Zubayr or because he was childless (he ultimately died without heirs).’? ‘Abbas went his own way: he did ** Although Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah’s death is not mentioned in the tradition, it is clear from its sequel that he was already dead.

°° Akhbar, p. 107.

0 Ibid., p. 108. “* ~~ Cahen, ibid.

“ Zubayri, op. cit., p. 28 (ll. 17-19). ‘Abbas was famous for his good looks. Because of his beautiful neck he was called al-A‘naq. Baladhuri, Ansab, III, p. 70; Akhbar, p. 117; Ibn Habib, Munammag, p. 534. On ‘Altb. ‘Abdallah who

was the youngest of his father’s sons see also Akhbar, loc. cit.

120 Chapter 5 not accept either ‘Ali's leadership or the decision of the family to migrate to Syria and join the Umayyads; instead, he migrated to Iraq, where he joined Mus‘ab b. Zubayr. When ‘Aliand the members of his family went to ‘Abd al-Malik in Syria, the latter received them

joyfully and in a friendly manner and offered them a place where they might settle at their pleasure. After prolonged exploration, Ali decided to purchase as a family estate the small village of Humaymah in the mountains of Sharat, south of the Dead Sea, where he and the members of his family settled.” The departure of the ‘Abbasids for Syria created a new situation in

the relations between them and the ‘Alids. After a period during which the two families had been closely linked, even to the extent of Akhbar, p. 108. This event is recorded by the author of the Akhbar (p. 131) in an interesting tradition which originated from the ‘Abbasid family that ran as follows: “Muhammad b. Ydsuf b. Ya'qib al-Hashimi > ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abd ar-Rahman b. ‘Isa > Sulayman b. ‘Isa b. Musa > Isa b. Musa b. Muhammad b. ‘Alt > Abu ‘Abdallah, Muhammad b. ‘Alt: When ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas was about to die, Abd Muhammad, ‘Ali b. “Abdallah said to him: ‘whom of the two men shall I join?’ meaning, “Abd al-Malik b. Marwan or ‘Abdallah b. az-Zubayr? He answered: ‘My son, join thy cousin ‘Abd al-Malik, for he is nearer in kin and better suited for rule and forsake Ibn az-Zubayr and beware of him for I have perceived that he does not differentiate between his friend and his foe. He who is such as this will never succeed and (will never) reach his goal. ‘Abd al-Malik is advancing and Ibn az-Zubayr is retreating...’ After which he said: ‘My son, when you go to Syria and ‘Abd al-Malik allows you to choose your abode, dwell in the mountains of ash-Sharat, for the rule, when it leaves the hands of Bana Umayyah will pass to a man from the people of the Sharat, from the largest family (ahl bayt) and from the most numerous clan (hayy) —

he meant “most numerous’ from the point of view of sharaf — and (evidently) these are you.’ And when ‘Abdallah died, ‘Alt and Abbas the sons of ‘Abdallah separated. Al-‘Abbdas joined Mus‘ab b. Zubayr and ‘Ali went to ‘Abd al-Malik in accor-

dance with his father’s order. And when he (‘All) came to him (to ‘Abd al-Malik), the latter offered him (to choose) an abode, and (‘Alt) chose ashSharat. “Abd al-Malik honoured him and recognized his right”’ (cf. Anonyme Leiden, fol. 3a). This tradition contains the ‘Abbasids’ principal political considerations for migrating to Syria, namely that the Umayyads should be supported because they are the best suited for rule and therefore they, the members of the ‘Abbasid family should leave the Hijaz and, at least as long as the civil war continues, to take up residence in Syria within the Umayyad realm. From the very outset, they decided, however, to get away from the centre of government in Damascus and settle in some remote village on the

border of the desert.

The Hashimiyyah 121 a common leadership in the person of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah, they separated. Abi Hashim, followed only by his immediate family, after the death of his father, found himself more closely linked with the ‘Abbasids than with the families of his paternal uncles. He was also connected with the ‘Abbasids by marriage, his wife, Fatimah, being the daughter of Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas.”* Finally, after becoming embroiled in a quarrel with his cousins in Hijaz, he

resolved to leave his home there and join the ‘Abbasids in Syria.”

The Testament of Abu Hashim From a political point of view ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah, the ‘Abbasid leader, was not an outstanding personality. The sources stress only his great

piety; they say of him that in his prayer he used to perform a thousand prostrations (rak‘ah) daily, earning for himself the title of “‘as-sajjad” and “‘dhu ath-thafinat’’.’° The later ‘Abbasid traditions embellished his image, depicting him as one who had inherited his father’s learning’’ and attributing to him gifts of prophecy which enabled him to foresee the ‘Abbasid rise to power.’® Nevertheless, these traditions did not connect his name with the leadership of the 74 Ibn Sa‘d, V, p. 241; Zubayri, Nasab Quraysh, p. 76 (I. 9). All the males born to Abi Hashim by her and other women died too young to leave any offspring. Zubayri, ibid., pp. 75 (I. 15), 77 (1. 1). Abd Hashim’s wife, Fatimah, was Muhammad b. ‘Ali’s cousin; her aunt al-‘Aliyah bnt. ‘Ubaydullah b. ‘Abbas was Muhammad’s mother. Akhbar, p. 161; Zubayri, p. 29 (Il. 10-11); Balad-

hurt, HI, p. 71. > During the caliphate of Walid b. ‘Abd al-Malik (86/705 — 96/715). Akhbar, pp. 173-174; Anonyme, fol. 246 b. See below pp. 125ff. 76 Baladhuri, ibid. Another tradition narrows down the number of his daily prostrations to only five hundred, idem, vol. cit., p. 75; Akhbar, pp. 117, 132-134, 144. Baladhuri says that the title of dha ath-thafindt was given to

his son Muhammad who also used to perform many prostrations in his prayer. He got this title because the signs which the prostrations left on his forehead and his nose resembled the callouses of a camel. Baladhuri, ibid. Likewise, Muhammad b. Alli, was also called as-sajjdd. Ibn Habib, Munammaq, p. 534. The same titles, incidentally, were also given to ‘Ali b. Husayn b.

‘Alt (“Zayn al-‘Abidin’’). Mas‘adi, Muruj (Beirut), III, p. 160.

77 Anonyme, fol. 245a (I. 13): cf., Akhbar, p. 161. 78 Akhbar, p. 139; Baladhurt, vol. cit., p. 79.

122 Chapter 5 Shiah. The circumstances of his birth were also a basis of traditions intended to prove that ‘Ali b. Abt Talib had designated him and his descendants to rule in Islam. One tradition, which does not explicitly contain these elements, states that he was born on the night of ‘Ali's murder, 17 Ramadan 40/25 January 661, and for this reason his father, ‘Abdallah, had named him ‘Ali.”” For some time he was also known by ‘Ali’s kunyah — Abt al-Hasan.*° Another tradition with a similar tendency says that ‘Alrb. ‘Abdallah was born while ‘Ali was still alive. Learning of the birth, ‘Alrcame to the house of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas and asked: ““What name have you

given to the newly-born?” “Am I permitted to give him a name before you name him?” replied ‘Abdallah. Said ‘Alt: “Bring him out to me.”’ When they brought the infant out, ‘Alrtook him in his arms,

chewed a date, then put it into the baby’s mouth (hannakahu), blessed him and returned him to his father, saying: “Take unto thyself the father of kings” (khudh ilayka aba al-amlak); “I have named him ‘Ali and have given him the surname Abd al-Hasan’’.*? Although ‘Ali had bought a family estate in the hills of Sharat, he

himself did not live there until the reign of the Caliph Walid |] (705-715). Instead, he lived most of the time in Damascus, where he became one of the proteges and intimates of ‘Abd al-Malik and a Akhbar, p. 117; Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 70: Anonyme, (Leiden), fol. 2a. 8° Akhbar, p. 134: Anonyme, (Leiden), ibid. ‘1 Ibn Abt al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balaghah, VII, p. 148; Akhbar, p. 134; Mubarrad, Kamil p. 360. This tradition relates that Mu‘awiyah disliked the fact that both ‘Ali’s name and kunyah were given to the same person, and he demanded that ‘Abdallah change his son’s kunyah. For this reason ‘Alt had the patronymic of “Abd Muhammad”. Another tradition relates that Mu awiyah wanted his own name to be given to the baby, but this ‘Abdallah rejected. (wa-kdna Mu'awiyah arddahu ‘ald an yusammiyahu Mu'awiyah faaba). Baladhurt, vol. cit., p. 70. The account of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas’ birth is strikingly similar to the account of ‘Alt b. ‘Abdallah’s birth. The only difference between the two is that in ‘Abdallah’s case it was the Prophet who administered the tahnik to the baby, gave him the name ‘Abdallah and, handing him over to his mother, said: “take

unto thee the father of the caliphs’. These two traditions could have been created at the same time, since they represent the ‘Abbasid endeavour to supress the ‘Alid claims by ascribing the rise of the ‘Abbasid dynasty both to the Prophet and to ‘Alt. It is evident that if ‘Alt himself foretold the advent of the ‘Abbasid caliphate his own descendants can not claim it. See Inafa, p. 256 (no. 46).

The Hashimiyyah 123 favourite at his court.®* Towards the end of ‘Abd al-Malik’s life, “Ali lost his favoured status with the Caliph for personal reasons: he had

married Lubabah, a daughter of ‘Abdallah b. Ja‘far b. Abu Talib, whom the Caliph had divorced. ‘Abd al-Malik took no steps to oppose this marriage; he merely ceased showing ‘Ali any special marks of friendship. When Walid I b. ‘Abd al-Malik succeeded his father, he resolved to punish ‘Ali for his misdeed: it is related that he

had him whipped and banished from his presence. It appears that it was at this time that ‘Alileft Damascus and went to live permanently in Humaymah.*® But according to another tradition, recorded by Baladhuri, ‘Ali removed to Humaymah only after the death of Walid I and the accession of his brother Sulayman. The same tradition relates that while in Damascus, ‘Ali was involved in the murder of a youth named Salit, who had claimed he was ason of

‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas and had demanded his share in the latter's inheritance. ‘Alt was suspected by Walid of complicity in the murder

and the Caliph, after having him tortured in Damascus, banished him to the island of Dahlak, whence he was later transferred to a place of banishment at Hijr in the Hijaz. Only after the death of Walid, in the year 96/715, did he go to live in Humaymah.** ‘Ali himself was not the actual leader of the family, which was led by his son, Muhammad. Of the latter, it is told that the difference in 2 Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 2b; Baladhurt, vol. cit.. p. 74. °° Ibid., p. 76; Ibn Abu al-Hadid, ibid., pp. 146-147; Akhbar, pp. 138-139; and _ see Wellhausen, p. 501 note 1. Zetterstéen thinks that “Alt b. ‘Abdallah was expelled from Damascus because he secretly conspired against the Caliph Walid I (EI’, “*Ali b. “Abdallah b. ‘Abbas”’). This conclusion is hardly possible.

True, there is a tradition which relates that Walid ordered ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah tlogged, then mounted on a camel facing the animal's tail, and led through the streets by a herald who announced: “This is “Ali the liar’’. Thereafter, the

caliph banished him from Damascus, because ‘Alt used to say that the government would pass to the hands of his children. However, the apocalyptic nature of this tradition is so transparent that it should not be accepted as historical fact. The story of ‘Ali's involvement in the murder of Salit and his marriage to the caliph’s ex-wife are more plausible reasons for his troubles with the court. Such personal jealousies were not uncommon reasons for a reversal of fortunes among notables. Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik confiscated the property of his uncle, Yahya b. al-Hakam, when the latter married a woman who had refused to marry the caliph. See Baladhuri, Anonyme, pp. 197-198.

4 Baladhuri, Ansab, Il, p. 78; Akhbar, pp. 149-150.

124 Chapter 5 age between him and his father did not exceed fourteen years; so that

in later years, they could be distinguished only by the colour they used to dye their beards.® “Alt remained in Humaymah until his death in 118/736,*° but he is scarcely mentioned in the sources, which focus their interest on the dynamic personality of his son, Muhammad. Despite their mistreatement at the hands of Caliph Walid I, the

‘Abbasids maintained good relations with Caliphs Sulayman (96/715-99/717), ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (99/717-101/720) and Hisham (105/724-125/743).®’ Although the estate at Humaymah was in existence, it was only after the death of Walid I that it became a centre for the family. However, even then we still find its leading members in Syria, and especially in Damascus, from time to time. Does this fact cast any light on the link between the ‘Abbasids and

Abt Hashim? Wellhausen, assuming that Abt Hashim arrived in Humaymah in the year 95/714, suggests that he may have come there before the ‘Abbasids and that it was they who joined him and

not he them.’§ Wellhausen’s basic assumption is correct. Abu Hashim’s coming to the ‘Abbasids in Syria was a natural and under-

standable move in view of the very close links already existing between the two families. As to the question who reached Humay-

mah first, this is surely a matter of secondary importance. Our sources make clear that the ‘Abbasids were there first, but the bond between them and Abt Hashim was formed in Damascus and not in Humaymah. Aba Hashim arrived in Syria while Caliph Walid I was still alive and it was there that he met Muhammad b. ‘Alt, who had not been affected by his father’s quarrel with the Caliph. Muhammad b. ‘Ali joined Walid I’s army on occasion®’ and cooperated with other members of his family in the summer raids (sawa if) against 85 Baladhuri, ibid., pp. 71-72; Akhbar, p. 161; Ibn Qutaybah, Ma‘arif, p. 60. 86 = This date is based on Wagqidi’s traditon. The traditions of Haytham b. ‘Adr and Abu al-Yaqzan have the year 117/735 as the year of his death. Balad-

huri, Ansab, III, pp. 79-80; and see Tabari, II, p. 1592; Azdi, p. 39; Ibn Qutaybah, op. cit., p. 59; Ibn Kathir, IX, pp. 320-321; Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 3a.

87 Ibn Abd al-Hadid, op. cit, pp. 147-148; Akhbar pp. 139-141. 88 ~=Wellhausen, p. 503 and n. 1.

8° Akhbar, p. 173.

The Hashimiyyah 125 the Byzantines and in defending the coastal cities.” Concerning the nature and circumstances of the link between Muhammad b. ‘Ali and Abi Hashim, a tradition preserved in the Akhbar al-‘Abbas, and ascribed by its transmitter to ‘Isa b. ‘Alt has something to tell us. This tradition relates that ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas sent his son Muhammad to the court of Caliph Walid and

that he joined the Caliph’s army there. Abd Hashim was then already in Damascus, and Muhammad came to him and “wrote down the ‘ilm from his own lips’. “And whenever Abt Hashim rose

to mount his horse,’ so the tradition continues, “Muhammad would seize hold of his stirrup’... ‘Alt would also send gifts to his son

in Damascus from time to time, and the latter would send them on

to Abt Hashim. “Once ‘Ali sent Muhammad a mule to ride in Walid’s army and Muhammad sent it to Abu Hashim’’.”*

This tradition makes it evident that the closest ties between Muhammad b. ‘Alt and Abt’ Hashim were formed in Damascus. Muhammad b. ‘All is represented as the pupil of Abt: Hashim, writing down the “‘ilm”’ at his dictation. This concept of the “‘ilm”’ — the special lore possessed by the ‘Alids — later became a basic

principle in the theory of the transference of the imamah and the rights of the ‘Alids from Abt’ Hashim to Muhammad b. ‘Alt. Even before we examine the traditions describing the transference of the ““ilm’, we can assume that Abu Hashim, who had no male children,” regarded Muhammad b. ‘Ali as his heir and prepared him, while in Damascus, to inherit the leadership of his Shirah. Wellhausen rightly remarks that despite the fact that Abi Hashim was himself a person of little importance, he was nevertheless accepted by a small but well organized group of followers as eligible for inheriting the ima@mah of his father, Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah.”* It is beyond any doubt that this group was drawn from Mukhtar’s men. Its members are known to us by name; they had

been with Mukhtar and were later present at Abu Hashim’s side 0 Akhbar, p. 174: “‘wa-yaghzu as-s@'if wa-yurabit bi-as-swahil huwa waikhwatuhu wa-wulduhu’™’. Cf., Anonyme, fol. 246b. °! ~~ Akhbar, p. 173. *? See note 74 above. See also Akhbar, p. 177; Ibn Qutaybah, Ma‘arif, p. 111:

and Cf. Baladhuri, II] (Mahmitdi) p. 271. °>— Wellhausen, p. 503; Anonyme, fols. 247a, 248a: Akhbar, p. 174.

126 Chapter 5 during the last days of his life.” The theory which we have been developing, that Abu Hashim prepared Muhammad b. ‘Ali to succeed him as leader of the first organized movement in the early Shr‘ah, is an innovation. It is this movement, or organization, which the heresigraphers call ““Hashtmiyyah’’. At this time, namely, the years 95-96, the organization had about 30years of activity behind it, most of it underground. One

can assume that during these years the movement’s doctrine of succession began to take shape. At the basis of this doctrine was the primary assumption, which was determined by actual practice, that the leadership of the movement passed from father to son within the family of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah after the latter had himself succeeded to his father.°®> However, by confirming Muhammad b. ‘Ali as his heir, Abd Hashim introduced a new principle: the imam might appoint someone other than his sonto inherit his imamah, and

furthermore this heir might be someone not belonging to ‘Ali's family altogether. The supporters of the Hashimiyyah, or at least its leaders, had to be prepared for such a fundamental innovation and

there was no certainty that they would in fact accept it. The heir designate was indeed a member of the Prophet’s family in the broader sense of the word, but we have seen that at this period the term ‘“ ahl al-bayt’’ was applied exclusively to the ‘Alids; it was not

for naught that the later ‘Abbasid traditions made a great effort to have the term include the ‘Abbasids.*° This effort went to the extent of creating a tradition relating to Muhammad b. ‘Ali, emphasizing

not only that he belonged to ahl al-bayt, but that he was the head and chief of all the ahl al-bayt and took precedence over the other

members in everything that concerned the privileges of the Prophet’s family. This tradition stresses that the other members of

ahl al-bayt (i.e., the ‘Alids) acknowledged that his rights were superior to theirs and that his precedence over them was based on his personal qualities as an outstanding man of piety and learning, °4 Ibid., and pp. 179, 180; Anonyme, fols. 246b. 248a, 249b-250a. °5 Baladhuri, Ansab, III, p. 80 and n. 6; an-Nashi' al-Akbar, p. 30. % On the concept of ahl al-bayt as referring only to the ‘Alids see above p. 75. and Baladhurt, Ansab I] (Mahmiddt), p. 238; Akhbar pp. 100-101 and on expanding the meaning to include the ‘Abbasids, see ibid. p. 109. Cf. Kufi, VIII, p. 191.

The Hashimiyyah 127 his integrity and beneficence; as well as on his descent from ‘Abdal-

lah b. ‘Abbas, the Prophet’s first cousin, the son of his uncle.” A tradition such as this could never have been created had not the

problem of the transference of an ‘Alid imamah to the ‘Abbasids arisen. We shall see later that the Hashimite Shi‘ah did not readily accept this innovation and that they remained loyal to the memory and the persons of the ‘Alids during the period of the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah in Khurasan almost until the ‘Abbasids rose to power.” In order to enable Muhammad b. ‘Ali to obtain the leadership of the Hashimiyyah, Abt Hashim initiated him into the secrets of the organization and arranged for him to become acquainted with the movement’s chief members. If one considers “‘ilm’”’ in this context,

this was, from a practical standpoint, the most important “‘ilm”™ which Abu Hashim conferred on Muhammad b. ‘Alt: he had, in effect, made Muhammad b. ‘Alrhis heir. In this connection, a unique

tradition, recorded in Akhbar al-‘Abbas, tells of the initial and negative reaction of these leaders to the appointment. It runs as follows: “Some men of the Khurdsdnites were accustomed to go frequently to Abu Hashim until he fell sick with the illness of which he died. Some of the Khurdasanites said:

‘Unto whom dost thou bid us come after thee?’ He replied: ‘To this man here,’ and he (Muhammad b. ‘Ali, M.S.) was beside him. 7 Akhbar, pp. 165-166; Fragmenta, pp. 179-180. For more traditions in which the ‘Alids recognize the rights of the ‘Abbasids and their priority over the ‘Altds see Baladhuri, Ansab, Ill, p. 80. The ‘Abbasid tradition puts the following words into the mouth of Abd Hashim, who was made to say to Muhammad b. ‘Alt: “We used to think that the ima@mah and rule belong to us, but (now) doubt has disappeared and certainty has become evident that you are

the imdm and the caliphate belongs to your descendants.” (“inna kunnda nazunnu anna al-imadmah wa-al-amr ftnd fagad zalat ash-shubhah wasaraha al-yaqin bi-annaka al-imam wa-al-khilafah ft wuldika.”’) Cf. Akhbar, pp. 167, 168, 169-170. °*8 Although the whole structure of the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah during its 30 years of activity was based on Abu: Hashim’s “testimony” and although this testimony was the primary legitimate basis for the ‘Abbasid seizure of power, nevertheless the “betrothal” between the ‘Abbasids and the Hashimite Shi ah, ideologically speaking, was unsuccessful and had to be abandoned.

128 Chapter 5

Hashim. .

Said they: “Who is he?’ ‘This is Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas,’ answered Abi

‘And what have we to do with him?’ they asked. Replied Abi Hashim: ‘I do not know [a man] who is more learned or better than he. Come ye unto him.’ Said ‘Isa b. ‘Alt (in whose name the tradition is recorded, M.S.): ‘Hence our link with Khurasan’’’.”

One need hardly add a word to this tradition, which makes perfectly clear the attitude of the leaders of Abi Hashim’s Shiah to the new heir. Even after Abt Hashim had told them who he was, they still could not understand Muhammad’s connection with a purely ‘Alid movement (“And what have we to do with him?’’). This tradition also, incidentally, teaches us that the Hashimiyyah had a centre outside Kiifah in Khurdsan. We shall presently see just when this centre was established, but what is immediately relevant is that the ‘Abbasids’ choice of Khurasan was not a completely new departure. Rather, when they had taken the movement into their own hands, they also by this very fact became party to the Hashimiyyah’s already existing clandestine activity in that province.'” Akhbar al-‘Abbas is the only source of detailed information about the transfer of Abu Hashim’s Shi‘ah to the leadership of Muhammad b. ‘Alt. This information gives a clear and unequivocable picture of how the transfer was effected and the circumstances surrounding it.

From a series of lengthy traditions attributed to Ishaq b. al-Fadl al-Hashimi — an important figure at the ‘Abbasid court at the time of Saffah and Mansur, '°! — it is evident that Abt Hashim remained in Madinah until the end of 91/710 after his father’s death and after the ‘Abbasid departure for Syria. In Madinah he became embroiled in a quarrel with the members of the Hasanite branch of his family, and

with Zayd b. Hasan in particular. The quarrel is represented in the traditions as being concerned with the inheritance of ‘Ali's sada” Akhbar, p. 173. 109 Wellhausen (pp. 503-504) noted that the Hashimiyyah had a centre in Khurasan.

0! Tabari, II, p. 61; Mas‘tdi, op. cit., (Beirut), I, p. 302.

The Hashimiyyah 129 qat.'* The style and form in which the matter is presented points to

a later invention dating from the time when the Fatimid-‘Alids began to claim special rights to the Prophet’s inheritance through Fatimah.’®? The dispute between Abi Hashim and Zayd b. Hasan was, in fact, over the leadership of the ‘Alid family in Madinah, since

Abt Hashim was the eldest member of the whole family there, whereas Zayd was the senior member only of the Hasanite family. During the pilgrimage of the year 91, the Caliph Walid I came to Madinah,’ where the matter was brought before him. It is related that Zayd b. Hasan accused Abt Hashim, in the Caliph’s presence, of having a shit ah in Kifah, made up of survivors from Mukhtar’s movement. Zayd alleged that this shtah maintained close ties with Abu Hashim and brought him payments of the sadagah instead of paying them to the Treasury.’ It is difficult to know to what extent this is a later ‘Abbasid fabrication, made with the object of casting blame upon a Hasanites for having allegedly betrayed the members

of the Family, a fabrication which is likely in view of ‘Abbasid hostility to the Hasanites at the time of Mansur.! It is, however, evident from the sequel to this tradition that Zayd may also have hinted something to the Caliph; because when Walid was passing through Madinah at the conclusion of the Hajj in Mecca, he put Abi

Hashim under arrest and early in the year 92/October-November 102 Akhbar, pp. 173-174. 103 Zayd claimed that since he was the eldest of Ali's living descendants through Fatimah, to him belonged his father’s sadaqgat (due to dhii al-qurba) which ‘All, or rather Fatimah, had allegedly inherited from the Prophet. The case was presented to the qadis of Madinah who decided that the right of inherit-

ance did not rest with the mother but with the father: consequently, Abi Hashim had the right to inherit his father (who at the time had legally succeeded Alt). This is, no doubt, part of the later debate in which, as we have already seen, the ‘Alids put forward the argument of their Fatimid descent in order to show that the ‘Abbasid rule was illegitimate, whether they claimed it by virtue of Abt: Hashim’s “‘testimony” or by virtue of their being descend-

ants of ‘Abbas. Akhbar, loc. cit. 104 Tabart, II, p. 1234; Fragmenta, p. 12. 1 Akhbar, loc. cit; Fragmenta, p. 181; Baladhuri, HI (Mahmidi), pp. 272-273: Ibn ‘Asakir, Tarikh Dimashq, MS. Zahiriyyah, VI, fol. 301a (= Tahdhib, V, p.

46) quoted by Mahmud. 106 We shall see later that ‘Abbasid traditions similarly accuse ‘Abdallah b. Hasan b. Hasan of turning Ibrahim (al-Imam) b. Muhammad over to Caliph Mar-

wan II. Akhbar, p. 342.

130 Chapter 5 710, took him to Damascus, where he was cast into prison. The tradition does not tell us how long Abt Hashim remained in prison, but ‘Alt b. Husayn (subsequently known as “‘Zayn al-‘Abidin’’), chief of the Husaynite branch in Mecca, came to his help. Although ‘Ali b. Husayn was not politically active, as we have already noted, he

was, nevertheless, a central figure in the ‘Alid family and therefore felt it his duty to go to the Caliph in Damascus and appeal to him on behalf of his cousin, Abu Hashim.!°’ Walid accepted ‘Ali's appeal and released Abu Hashim, who stayed on in Damascus and even succeeded in becoming a member of the Caliph’s court for a while. But after some time he again fell out of favour and Walid banished him from his presence (“irhal ‘an jiwari!’’)*® Nevertheless, Abu

Hashim remained in Damascus until the end of Walid’s life and resided at the house of a mawla of Banu Hashim named Fadalah b. Mu‘adh b. ‘Abdallah.'°’ There he met Muhammad b. ‘Ali from time

to time, since the house served as a meeting-place for all the members of the Hashim clan who used to visit Damascus."® Towards the end of Walid’s life, or perhaps even after his death in the reign of Sulayman (96/715-99/717), Abt Hashim resolved to leave Damascus for Humaymah and there to arrange for the orderly

transfer of his Shrah to Muhammad b. ‘Ali. The tradition which reports Abu Hashim’s departure from Damascus with Muhammad b. ‘Ali represents it as an insignificant coincidence: he was waiting to

join a southbound caravan leaving from Damascus" and since Muhammad b. ‘Alt hapened to be in Damascus at the time and was intending to return to his home in the Sharat, Abu Hashim joined him. According to this tradition, Abu Hashim wished to return to 107 [bid., pp. 174-175; Walid accused Abi Hashim of wishing tafriqat aljamaah, meaning that he causes dissension in Islam by having a shiah of his own in Kufah.

108 Ibid, p. 177. 109 ~The Mugawgis of Egypt gave ‘Abdallah, Fadalah’s grandfather, to the Prophet as a gift together with a slave girl named Mariyyah and a mule called Duldul.

Here, again, traditions emphasize the problem of the Prophet’s inheritance, by pointing out that after the Prophet's death, ‘Abdallah owed wala’ to ‘Abbas and his sons. Akhbar, pp. 179-180. M0 Tbid., p. 180. Mt Tbid.

The Hashimiyyah 13] Madinah,!"? but this is not so. From subsequent traditions it can be

inferred that the story of the caravan which Abu Hashim was supposedly awaiting and the announcement which he caused to be publicized that his destination was Madinah were simply two secur-

ity measures taken to mislead the Umayyads. This practice of announcing a departure in a great caravan which was bound in a certain direction but without revealing the true destination was in fact by his Shi‘ah’s way of laying down a smokescreen to avoid the attention of the authorities.!!* The truth of the matter is that Abu Hashim never intended returning to Madinah. What was there for him to do in Madinah, the city of his Hasanite rivals? His destination was Humaymah, as he told one of his supporters in Damascus, ‘Tam going to Balqa’ with my cousin Muhammad b. ‘Alt, and J shall not leave his house.’’*'* Abu Hashim and Muhammad b. ‘Ali did not take their departure

from Damascus alone. With Abt Hashim in Damascus were a number of Kufites who were among his leading supporters. They served as a link connecting him to his Shi ah and they are known to us by name. They were headed by Salamah b. Bujayr, of the tribe of Banu Musliyyah, of the family of ‘Amir b. Isma‘l of this tribe. He had been the leader of the Shi‘ah in Kufah since the collapse of Mukhtar’s revolt. His father, Bujayr b. ‘Abdallah, was “one of the

closest intimates of Muhammad b. Al-Hanafiyyah’’,’” one of Mukhtar’s principal supporters and a zealous persecutor of all who had taken part in the murder of Husayn. He had been with Mukhtar in the fortress of Kufah during the last moments of the revolt and was executed after its suppression by Mus‘ab b. az-Zubayr.'"* After

his father’s death, Salamah b. Bujayr led what remained of the movement and maintained continuous contact with Abu Hashim. 12 Tbid.

3 hid, p. 191. 4 Ibid., pp. 182-183. > Tbid., p. 180. "° Baladhuri (Ansab, V, p. 262) quotes a tradition, which also appears in Akhbar al-‘Abbas, about Bujayr’s heroic death. He does not, however, mention him by name and refers to him only as “‘a man of Bant Musliyyah”’. The same tradition in the Akhbar is more detailed (pp. 180-181): it mentions Bujayr by

name and thus supplies the missing link which connects Mukhtar’s movement with that of AbG Hashim.

132 Chapter 5 He was a key figure in the whole episode of the transfer of the movement to Muhammad b. ‘Ali. There can be no doubt that Salamah b. Bujayr knew of this plan, since he was:Abi Hashim’s trusted confidant.'!” He did not leave Damascus with the caravan, but remained in the capital in order to handle a number of assignments for Abt Hashim; he was due, however, to join the party in Humaymah at some later date.'’® Salamah b. Bujayr was not to see Abt Hashim again alive. Abu Hashim, who was by no means a young man — one can assume that he was then more than 60 years old — fell sick in Humaymah and died. Tradition dates his death to 98/716-717."” If he did indeed

leave Damascus at the end of Walid’s life (i.e., about the year 96/715), then he must have spent something over a year at the house of Muhammad b. ‘Alt. But, since the exact date of his death is

unknown, it is difficult to be precise about how long he was in Humaymah. The fact that Salamah b. Bujayr did not manage to get to Humaymah from Damascus before Abii Hashim’s death suggests

the possibility that he died before the date given by tradition or alternately, that one must delay his departure from Damascus to the

reign of Sulayman. Several anti-Umayyad traditions attribute his death to one or other of the two Caliphs, Walid or Sulayman, who allegedly poisoned him.'”° Some quite early traditions cast doubt on the poisoning story, which may very possibly be another attempt to 17 Akhbar, pp. 182-183: wa-kdna Salamah b. Bujayr min thiqat Abi Hashim wa-ra's ash-shtah ma'ahu wa-kdnu yusammunahu ibn ash-shahid’; see especially, ibid., p. 188. 18 Ibid. pp. 182-183. Cf. Ibn Badriin (ed. Dozy), p. 213 (Cairo, p. 209): A short account indicating the existence of a group of Shiite Kufites at Abt Hashim’s side in Humaymah.

119 Mas‘adi, Tanbih, p. 338; Dhahabi, ‘Ibar, I, p. 116. Wellhausen, p. 503, Cahen, p. 311; Lewis, “‘Abbdasids”’. 120 Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, ‘Iqd, II, p. 297 (ed. 1944, IV, pp. 485-486), where there is a long description of how the Lakhm and Judham tribes caused his death with poisoned milk when he was on his way to Humaymah from Damascus at the time of Caliph Sulayman. Cf. Ibn Badriin, (ed. Dozy), p. 213. Mas‘iidi, loc. cit., says that Sulayman poisoned him in the year 98. Akhbar, p. 188; Baladhuri, Ansab, Ill, p. 80. The author of al-‘Uyiin wa-al-Hada ig (Fragmenta, p.

181) and others relate that he was poisoned by Walid. There is even a tradition which says that he died in Humaymah in the time of Hisham, Anonyme, fol. 246b, (Il. 3-4).

The Hashimiyyah 133 blacken the Umayyad name. It should be added, however, in this connection that once martyrdom became an essential feature of the Shrah, it became a common practice to turn every dead ‘Alid into a martyr by inventing the story of his murder by one of the Umayyad caliphs.*?* Regarding the date of Abi Hashim’s death, we are obliged to rely on the detailed traditions preserved by the compiler of the

Akhbar and on the Shiite tradition of Ibn Abi al-Hadid. In these traditions it is established that he died after leaving Walid’s court in

Damascus.’ The fact that traditions exist attributing his death to Sulayman can be explained to mean that he died after the death of Walid and the accession of Sulayman. We can, however, confidently

maintain that his death took place between the years 96 and 98, nearer to the earlier date, in Humaymah. One can conjecture how the poison story came to be fabricated, since we are told that Walid

was guilty of causing the death of Abt Hashim because of the distress he had caused the latter by openly insulting and provoking him in his court.}? Six of the leading members of the movement in Kifah were at his deathbed. They had come with him from Damascus (where, as we have seen, their leader, Salamah b. Bujayr, had remained) and their names are recorded in a detailed tradition in the Akhbar al-‘Abbas, which relates: ““And with [Aba Hashim] were a number of men of the Shi‘ah. Their leader at the time — Salamah b. Bujayr b. ‘Abdallah — was not present at the time of Abu Hashim’s death, for he had stayed

in Damascus on account of a certain matter.[The following are the 1 “Shrah”’, El, 2 Ibn Abi al-Hadid, op. cit., VII, p. 150. The author of Akhbar al-‘Abbas (p. 188) clearly doubted the story of the poisoning, and when mentioning it, he prefaced his account by saying “‘za‘ama ba'd an-nas — somebody alleged”’, a sentence which usually introduces an unreliable account. Cf. Anonyme, fol.

248b; Baladhuri, Ansab, II] (Mahmidi), p. 273, where the account of the poisoning does not appear, but see a tradition blaming the poisoning on Sulayman, ibid., pp. 274-275. > Akhbar, p. 183 and especially pp. 188-189. The author specifically points out that Abi Hashim’s poisoning ‘was mentioned neither by Ishaq b. Fadl al-Hashimi nor by anybody else who possessed information regarding his affairs’. As for the real reason for his death, “‘it is said that he died of distress

because of the humiliation he had suffered at the hands of Walid.” (“‘wadhukira annahu mata kamdan lima ra’a min istikhfaf al-walid biamrihi’’).

134 Chapter 5 names of the men:] 1. Abt Riyah Maysarah an-Nabbal (the arrow-maker),’*4 a mawla of Azd,or, as others say, a mawlda of Banu Asad... 2. Abu ‘Amr Yaqtin al-Bazzar (seed- and corn-chandler), a mawla of Banu Musliyyah...}?°

3. Muhammad b. Khunays, a mawla of Hamdan. 4. Abt Bistam Masqalah, at-Tahhan (the miller), a mawla of Banu al-Harith b. Ka’b. 5. Hayyan al-‘Attar (dealer in spices and condiments), maternal uncle (khal) of Ibrahim b. Salamah. One of the Kiufites relates that formerly Hayyan was a mawld of the Nakh‘ tribe and alleged

that he was a mawld of Ibrahim [b. Malik] al-Ashtar. | 6. Ibrahim b. Salamah, who was at that time a young lad...’’’° From this tradition we learn that most of the leaders, if not all, were mawali of southern tribes. Both Salamah b. Bujayr and Maysarah were connected with Bant' Musliyyah, a tribe which gave considerable support to Mukhtar’s movement, to the Hashimiyyah and later to the Dawah in Ktfah. To complete the picture we must examine a further traditon in the Akhbar which gives a list of the chiefs of the movement, including those who were not present at Humaymah. This list was transmitted to Muhammad b. ‘Ali by Salamah B. Bujayr. But in order to avoid disturbing the chronological order of events, we shall first consider what happened after the

death of Abt Hashim. Abt Hashim’s last instruction to his followers before his death was that they obey Muhammad b. ‘Ali and await the instructions by Salamah B. Bujayr (“my brother and yours’’).'*’ His death was a shock to the little band of his followers and a grave crisis ensued. 24 He is also called ar-Rahhal, the saddler, Akhbar, p. 191; Anonyme, fol. 249b. 125 His name, Yaqtin, appears in Dinawari'’s tradition (p. 358). Ibn Badrtin has

his full name: Yaqtin b. Musa. See also note 139 below. 26 Akhbar, pp. 183-184. On his activity at.Saffah’s side sce Jahshiyari, p. 85. According to Haytham b. ‘Adi’s tradition, Baladhuri, Ansab, UI (Mahmud), p. 274, Abt Hashim was accompanied by “Abi Maysarah and Abt ‘Ikrimah

the mawla of Quraysh and Hayyan, the maternal uncle of Ibrahim b. Salamah’’. From this tradition one can learn how inferior the usual traditions are concerning the early history of the Da'wah compared to the traditions of Akhbar al-‘Abbas.

27 Akhbar, p. 188.

The Hashimiyyah 135 Although they knew something about the transfer of the movement into the hands of Muhammad b. ‘All, they could not easily accept it.

After they had buried their Imam, it seemed to them that their function had come to an end and they wished to disperse to their homes. They did not yet recognize Muhammad b. ‘Alras their leader

and at this critical juncture Muhammad understood that only Salamah b. Bujayr could exert authority over the movement and bring about its orderly transfer to his (Muhammad’s) leadership. “Wait a little while,” he told the mourning Shrites, “until your leader, Ibn Bujayr, comes” (“Agimu qalilan hatta yaqdam Ibn Bujayr sahibukum’’).*° They stayed, but “they all felt that they were faithful disciples of Abi Hashim only and they wished to return to their homes.’”’!”? The picture is perfectly clear and bears the mark of

truth: What had they to do with Muhammad b. ‘Ali? Their loyalty had been and still was to Abd Hashim, even though he was dead. They did not yet give Muhammad b. ‘Ali their bay‘ah, nor did they feel any obligation towards him, especially since they still grieved for their dead leader and for what seemed to them to be the ruin of their Shr ah.

Then Salamah b. Bujayr arrived. He knew about the transfer of the movement to Muhammad b. ‘Ali, as Abt Hashim had let him into the secret with all its details.’*° For him, too, wise and prudent as he

was,” it was difficult to transfer his allegiance to Muhammad b. ‘Alt. “Abu Hashim is no more” he said, “and we remain loyal to him, whether dead or alive. Only this do we take upon ourselves.” Still, the instructions he had received were clear and he carried them out.

The movement was transferred to Muhammad b. ‘Ali and those leaders who were present pledged their allegiance to him then and there.1*?

The most obvious and important expression of this transfer of the 128 Ibid., p. 189. 129 Ibid.

39 When Muhammad b. ‘Ali told him that Aba Hashim had nominated him as his heir, Abt: Salamah answered forthwith: ‘“‘He informed me about this matter — gad alqd ilayya hadha al-amr’’. Ibid., p. 190. 3} Ibrahim b. Salamah said about him: “I have never seen among God’s creatures a wiser and cleverer person than Ibn Bujayr’’, ibid. 132 Akhbar, pp. 190-191.

136 Chapter 5 movement took the form of letting the new imam have the list of names of its members. This list (which tradition calls awwal diwan shit'at bani al-‘Abbdas) and the list of Abt Hashim’s followers who had been present at his deathbed are the sole basis of our knowledge of the persons comprising the Hashimiyyah in Kifah. The following are the names of the leaders as registered in the ““diwan’’ handed over to Muhammad b. ‘Alt: 1. Salim b. Bujayr, who was called Salim al-A‘mad (the Blind),’*’ as he later became blind and was therefore called by this nickname. 2. Abd Hashim, Bukayr b. Mahan. The father of Bukayr b. Mahan had been a mawld of a man of Bant Musliyyah, who lived in the Urdunn district of Syria. His son, Bukayr, was adopted into the tribe and was regarded as one of its Arab members (min salibati-

him). He thus had the right of being enrolled in the diwan among the other Arab warriors and took part, together with several other fighters from Band Musliyyah, in the expedition of

Yazid b. Muhallab against Jurjan in the year 98/717. 3. Abu Salamah, Hafs b. Sulayman al-Khallal (the vinegarseller).'* 4. Hafs, known by his nickname ‘‘al-Asir’ (the prisoner). “All these were mawali of the Banti Musliyyah tribe, of the family of ‘Amir b. Isma‘il’’.1*°

5. Abu Riyah Maysarah ar-Rahhal (the saddle-maker).'”’ 6. Musa b. Shurayh as-Sarraj (the saddle-maker). 7. Ziyad b. Dirham al-Hamdani.”* 133 He is probably the same person who, in Tabari’s tradition, is called Salim al- A‘yan and appears as one of the Shrite leaders in Kafah. Tabari, II, p. 146. 34 Wellhausen, pp. 446-447; Baladhuri, Futuh, pp. 236f.; Akhbar, p. 191; Ibn Isfandyar, Tartkh Tabaristan (ed. ‘Abbas Iqbal), pp. 162 ff.; cf. Huart, “Tabaristan’, EI. 135 Another tradition says that khallal means maker of sword sheaths (khill). See Jahshiyari, p. 84 and the poem quoted there to prove this rather unusual explanation of Abt Salamah’s nisbah. 136 See below note 156. 137 We have seen above that he is called ““an-Nabbal” as well. See note 124. 138 His kunyah was Abd ‘Ikrimah and he also was a saddler. Before leaving for Khurasan on Muhammad b. ‘Ali’s mission, the latter had instructed him to call himself by a new kunyah, Abu Muhammad (Akhbar, p. 203); thus he came to be known by two patronymics: Abd ‘Ikrimah and Abi Muhammad, a

The Hashimiyyah 137 8. Ma'n b. Yazid al-Hamdani. 9. Mundhir b. Sa‘td al-Hamdani. According to another tradition the following names should be added to the above list: 10. Abt ‘Amr al-Azdi (Abi ‘Amr Yagqtin b. Misa al-Bazzar or al-Abzari).'*° 11. Aba al-Hudhayl Hayyan as-Sarrdj. 12. Aba Ibrahim Muhammad b. Mukhtar. 13. A half-brother of Ziyad b. Dirham on his mother’s side, whose name is not mentioned. 14. Walid al-Azraq.!*° A comparison of the two lists — that of Abu Hashim’s followers

who were with him at the time of his death and that -given to Muhammad b. ‘Alt — shows that, except for Maysarah, who appears in both, they are not identical. In other words, Salamah b. Bujayr presented a list of Abd Hashim’s followers who were not present at his death in order that Muhammad b. ‘Ali might be able subsequently to identify them. Indeed, another tradition preserved in Akhbar al-‘Abbds actually notes that Muhammad b. ‘Alt recognized Bukayr b. Mahan when meeting him for the first time, thanks to the list of names which Salamah had given him.**! Are these two lists authentic? Can they be accepted as they stand? It is very difficult to answer these questions, but we must stress that

these are the only detailed traditions which have come down to us and that they contain a detailed description which has the signs of a factual report, free in particular of any mysticism, on the transfer of fact which caused certain confusion in the sources concerning him. See Tabari, II, pp. 1358, 1467, 1488, 1501-1503; Anonyme, fol. 249b. In the addenda to Tabart, De Goeje corrected the reading of Tabari's tradition (II, p. 1488) from “Abu ‘Ikrimah wa-Abu Muhammad as-Sddiq” to “Abu ‘Ikrimah

huwa Abt Muhammad as-Sddig.” The soundness of this correction is further supported by the tradition in the Anonyme of Leiden (fol. 4b) where the man is called “Abd ‘Ikrimah Ziyad b. Dirham as-Sadiq”’. 3° Aba ‘Amr Yaqtin b. Misa al-Abzari al-Azdi, played an important role in the traditions dealing with the transfer of the imdmah to Abt al-‘Abbas. Concerning him see also Ibn Badrtin, ed. Dozy, p. 214, (Cairo ed., p. 210). Cf. Akhbar, p.192.

49 For the whole list see Akhbar, pp. 191-192. 41 Thid., p. 196.

138 Chapter 5 the Hashimiyyah movement to the leadership of Muhammad b. ‘All.

It is very difficult to cast doubt on the truth of these traditions, particularly since they are our earliest means of identifying a number of very famous persons connected with the inception of the

‘Abbasid Da‘wah, whose names suddenly appear in Tabari’s traditions. These new traditions give us, at long last, conclusive information cocerning the circumstances and the contents of the ‘‘wasiyyah”’ or the “testament” of Abi Hashim. This was an operation which had been planned over a long period by Abu Hashim, Muhammad b. ‘Alt

and Salamah b. Bujayr, who was the chief of the Hashimiyyah in Kufah; its essential feature was an orderly transfer of the tiny band of Kifites, who formed the nucleus of the movement, to the leadership of the heir, Muhammad b. ‘Ali. This cut and dry historical account confirms the views of Van Vloten and Wellhausen, formed many years ago on the basis of the fragmentary material they had at their disposal.'*?

The later traditions enveloped this act of the wasiyyah in a number of legends and surrounded it with a halo of mysticism. It is

not difficult to imagine that the ‘Abbasid court historians and creators of “traditions” were obliged to add this dimension to the original dry reports of the wasiyyah. Thus were formed the many traditions telling how Abt Hashim had transmitted ““ilm”’, or esoteric knowledge, to Muhammad b. ‘Ali and this esoteric knowledge was the essential element of the wasiyyah. It was the ‘ilm that gave the ‘Abbasid imam real power and divine authority. Ibn Qutaybah, in

a quite early tradition, does not specify the kind of “knowledge ’’ transmitted to Muhammad b. ‘Alt, and says only that Abu Hashim “handed over his books to him and gave him the leadership of the Shi‘ah’’.!#* Zubayrt also quotes a tradition to the same effect.'** Mas‘udi relates how Abu Hashim imparted to him “the secrets of the Da‘wah and made him acquainted with the Du‘at” (“wa‘arrafa baynahu wa-bayna ad-du‘at’’).” In addition to these brief tradi142° Wellhausen, p. 503, Van Vloten, pp. 18f., 148; Fragmenta, p. 181 (a bal-

anced tradition in this spirit), cf, Cahen, pp. 311-312. ‘47 Ibn Qutaybah, Ma arif, p. 111. 44 Nasab Quraysh, p. 75 (Il. 13-15). 49 Mas‘udi, Tanbih, p. 338 (I. 12) and cf., Dhahabi, ‘Ibar, I, p. 116; Ash‘art, p.

The Hashimiyyah 139 tions which correctly note not only the transfer of ‘ilm (which was the mystical element of the wasiyyah), but also the transfer of the Shi‘ah (which was the real, material element of the wasiyyah) longer and more detailed traditions also came into existence. These were created in response to the need which the ‘Abbasids felt in the course of their struggle against the ‘Alids of a weighty counterclaim which would give supreme religious and mystical value to the wasiyyah of Abu Hashim and would in so doing bestow the seal of divine approval upon the ‘Abbasid rule. Thus was created the legend of the “Yellow Scroll” (“as-Sahifah as-Safra’”’) which is recounted in great detail in Akhbar al-'Abbas and in Sharh Nahj al-Balaghah.'** The legend tells how, when ‘Ali died, Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah came to his two brothers, Hasan and Husayn, and asked them for a part of his father’s inheritance. When they told him that their father had left no property behind, Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah replied that he meant his part of his father’s ‘ilm. When the two brothers heard this, they brought out and gave him a ‘yellow scroll” in which was written how the black banners would come out of Khurdsan, who should be the leaders of the Abbasid Da'wah, who would be the men to assist it and further prophecies relating to the ‘Abbasid rise to power.**” On the death of

Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah, the Sahifah was passed to Abu Hashim, who handed it on to Muhammad b. ‘Ali. Muhammad b. al-Hanatiyyah gave ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas some hints about the contents of the Sahifah, but did not give him any details.'** Even the Umayyads knew something about it, but not as muchas the ‘Abbasids. Before his death, so we are told, Abt Hashim handed the Sahifah over to Muhammad b. ‘Alt ‘and commanded the Shi‘ah to come unto him.’ 24?

What happened to this Sahifah? It is known that when Aba al-"Abbas, the first ‘Abbasid caliph, ascended the throne, he had no 21, Tabari, III p. 24; Ibn Sad, Tabagat, V, p. 241. 46 Akhbar, pp. 184-185. Ibn Aba al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Baldghah, VII, pp. 149-150. Cf. Ta’rikh-i-Qumm, p. 236; Anonyme, fols. 246a-246b. ‘47 Without mentioning the Sahifah, Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi quotes a tradition with similar contents, ‘Iqd, Il, p. 297 (1944 ed.,IV, p. 476).

“8 Ibn Abt al-Hadid, vol. cit., p. 150. 49 Ibid.

140 Chapter 5 evidence in his possession to prove that he was the one destined for

the caliphate; he certainly had no “scroll”. Where then was the hiding-place of this scroll, to which the ‘Abbasids gave the name ‘“Sahifat ad-Dawlah’’?'*° The fantasy which invented the Sahifah also provided for its disappearance. The author of the Akhbar has no knowledge of this matter and ends his narrative with the statement that the Sahifah passed from the hands of Muhammad b. ‘Alt into those of his son Ibrahim “al-Imdm’’. The tradition in Sharh Nahj al-Balaghah tells at length how they buried the Sahifah in a chest under “‘olive-trees in the Sharat”’ for fear of the Umayyads when

Marwan II, the last of the Umayyad rulers, imprisoned Ibrahim al-Imam. The tradition assures us that “these were the only olivetrees in the Sharat.’’ When the ‘Abbasids came to power they dug under all the olive-trees; they continued digging until they came to

springs of water, but they did not find the chest containing the Sahifah.'*! Thus the Sahifah was buried and gone, but the legend remained as proof to the ‘Alid rebels that it was their ancestors and only they who had prophesied the ‘Abbasid rule and that this pro-

phecy had originated with the Prophet himself.'”

The Centre in Kufah Traditions preserved only in ‘Akhbar al-Abbds illuminate two additional obscure chapters in the history of the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah: the structure, size and development of the Da‘wah centre in Kufah and the beginnings of the centre in Khurasan. After Mukhtar’s revolt, the Hashimiyyah in Ktfah was intention -

ally restricted to a very small number of adherents concentrated around the tribe of Banu Musliyyah in the city. The majority of the leaders of the centre in Kifah and of the supporters of the movement in the time of Abu Hashim and after the leadership had passed 199 Ibid., p. 149. 151 T[bid. and see above note 81. 82 Akhbar, pp. 185-187. Mas‘idi, Murij (Beirut), III, p. 206. As time passed, there appeared many claimants to the wasiyyah of Abu Hashim if one accepts the testimony of the heresiographers at its face value. See, Ashvarl, pp. 5-6, 20, 22-23; Baghdadi, p. 27; Ibn Abd al-Hadid, vol. cit., p. 150 (Il. 14-18).

The Hashimiyyah 14] to Muhammad b. ‘Ali were recruited — so it is said — from among members of this tribe or from among their mawali.’”? It is not for nothing that the traditions repeatedly stress the great value and the

decisive position of this tribe in maintaining the movement in Kifah.!** Concerning the great importance attributed to the members of this tribe after the rise of the ‘Abbasids, we have the evidence of so-called ‘“‘prophetic”’ traditions, traditions supposedly uttered by Muhammad b. ‘Ali, but actually created to cope with the fact that ‘Amir b. Isma‘il, a member of Bani’ Musliyyah,!** was the one who headed the force which killed Marwan b. Muhammad, the last Umayyad caliph, at Busir in Egypt.’”° Thus one tradition relates

that Muhammad b. ‘Alt said of Banu Musliyyah: “They are my intimates and my trusty lieges, my resting-place and my secret abode. They fill the place of my kith and kin. One of them it shall be who will rise up as our champion, and from their midst shall go forth the man who will slay the accursed son of the accursed father in the

distant lands of Egypt.’?” Bani Musliyyah were close relatives of the southern tribe — al-Harith b. Ka‘b of Madhhij.'*® From this 153 Salamah b. Bujayr, Salim al-A‘ma, Bukayr b. Mahan and Abu Salamah Hafs b. Sulayman al-Khallal belonged, as mentioned above in the second list, to

the clan of Bani Musliyyah. Apart from Salamah b. Bujayr, who is not mentioned as mawla, all the others are mawalli. 4 Akhbar, p. 192, where it is said about Bani Musliyyah: “tawallaw amr ad-Dawah wa-al-qiyam biha — they took upon themselves the affair of the Dawah and its upholding’. The major role played by this tribe in the movement is represented in another tradition in which Muhammad b. ‘Ali reportedly says to Salamah b. Bujayr (of the Bani Musliyyah tribe): “every person has his close friends; from among the people of your town, you and your tribe are the closest ones to me.” Ibid.

See the two lists above pp. 134, 136-137 6 Tabart, III, pp. 46f., Mas‘tidi, Muraj (Beirut) III, p. 246; Ibn Hazm, Jamharah, p. 414; Baladhuri, Ansab, III, p. 104.

157 “Inna hadha al-hayy min bani musliyyah khdssatt wa-ghayati wamustarahit wa-mawdi sirrt wa-hum minni bi-manzilat luhmatt. Minhum al-q@im bi-amrinad wa-minhum qatil al-la‘tn ibn al-lain bi-aknaf misr.”’ Akhbar, p. 238. 158 Before Islam Banti Musliyyah b. ‘Amir, a clan of Madhhij, had their abodes in Najran in the neighbourhood of their cousin tribe of Balharith (al-Harith b. Kab of Madhhij). In the wake of the Islamic conquests, some parts of Bantu Musliyyah migrated to Kufah and established a mosque of their own there. Caskel, I, pp. 258, 262. On their place within the Qahtani tribes, see ibid., p.

142 Chapter 5 tribe’’? came Raytah, Muhammad b. ‘Ali’s wife and the mother of Abd al-‘Abbas, the first ‘Abbasid caliph, to whom the tradition we have already cited alludes by the messianic term ‘‘al-Qa im’ (and later even al-Qa im al-Mahd?’).'° The marriage of Muhammad b. ‘Alt to Raytah, who had formerly been the wife of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abd al-Malik, took place in the time of ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-"Aziz (99/717-

101/720),'* that is, after Muhammad b. ‘Ali had taken over the leadership of the Hashimiyyah. It seems to me that one cannot exclude the possibility that this marriage had been contracted in order to tighten the bonds between the ‘Abbasids and this tribe, which bore the brunt of the Da‘wah in Ktfah. The ‘Abbasid apocalyptic traditions emphasize with unusual prominence the impor-

tance of Abu al-’Abbas’ maternal ancestry, and the title Ibn 176. Cf. Ibn Hazm, op. cit., pp. 414, 477. Qahtan

|| |

Kahlan |

Malik |

Jald |

‘Ulah |

‘Amr

Ka‘b ‘Amir

Harith Musliyyah |

Kab |

Malik |

Bant ‘Abd al-Madan (Raytah’s family)

89 Zubayri, Nasab Quraysh, p. 30 (Il. 15-18); Ibn Hazm, Jamharah, p. 20; Mas iudi, Tanbih, pp. 337 (1. 20) — 338 (I. 4); Akhbar, p. 234. 169 Akhbar, p. 238; cf. Kuff, VIII, p. 206 (I. 6). ‘6! Ibn Abt al-Hadrid, vol. cit., pp. 147-148. According to the ‘Abbasid apocalyptic traditions, the Umayyads knew that their end would come at the hands of Ibn al-Harithiyyah. Therefore, they prevented the members of the ‘Abbasid family from taking wives from the tribe of Bant al-Harith b. Ka’b. The pious

The Hashimiyyah 143 al-Harithiyyah, given to Aba al-‘Abbas, recurs regularly in these and other traditions.}” The tribal affiliation and social origin of the adherents of the Hadshimiyyah in Kufah leave no room for doubt. The number of its adherents is also known. One tradition stresses that the number of members of the movement initiated into its secrets was very small

indeed — not more than thirty.’°* The movement maintained an exclusivity by submerging itself in a single family which itself was part of a larger southern tribe. It worked underground and in strict

secrecy (a characteristic already apparent in the time of Abu Hashim), and kept itself apart from all political activity in Kdfah. We learn from the two lists that in addition to Banu Musliyyah and their mawali, the movement was also joined by a number of mawali ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, however, when approached by Muhammad b. ‘Ali to get permission to marry Raytah, did not object, ““She is her own master — the caliph said — and who can stop you from that.” Akhbar, p. 201; Baladhuni, Ansab, Il], p. 82. Cf. Ibn Abi al-Hadid, ibid., (particularly, p. 148). Magqrizi, al-Muqaffa, fol. 64b (ed. Muhammad ‘Aql, pp. 28-29).

‘62 These traditions were created not only because of the important position which Bant Musliyyah in particular and al-Harith b. Ka‘b occupied in the Da‘wah, but also because when Abi al-‘Abbas, the first ‘Abbasid caliph, finally reached the throne, he did not have clear proofs that he was the one designated to be the caliph. This must be the main, if not the sole, reason for the multitude of traditions which reiterate in various fashions the fact that he was designated by his father Muhammad b. ‘Ali to be the first ‘Abbasid caliph. As soon as Abt al-‘Abbas established himself in power, the ‘Abbasid propaganda also endeavoured to establish the legitimacy of his rule by circulating mystical traditions such as the one which says that his grandfather, ‘Alt b. ‘Abdallah too possessed esoteric knowledge to the effect that “from Humaymah will come the caliph. (He will be) one of them and his name is ‘Abdallah.’ See Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 3a. Cf. Ibn Abu al-Hadid, ibid., who quotes a similar type of tradition according to which the aged ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah presented his two grandchildren (both were called ‘Abdallah) to Caliph Hisham as the first two ‘Abbasid caliphs. In another group of traditions the veteran leaders of the Shi‘ah in Khurdsan were shown Abt al-‘Abbas when he was a few days old and wrapped in his diapers and were told “‘this is your master through whom the matter will be accomplished. and they kissed the ends of his diapers.’ See Baladhurt, [bid.; Maarizi, al-Mugqaffa, fol. 64b. (ed. Muhammad ‘Aq], p. 27). For a tradition which foresees the death of Marwan II at the hands of “Ibn al-Harithiyyah,”’

see ibid., p. 129 (Il. 1-2). Cf. Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 3b, for the mystical status accorded to Banu al-Harith in the ‘Abbasid tradition. 63 Akhbar, pp. 194, 196.

144 Chapter 5 from other tribes, and in particular the tribe of Hamdan. The leadership of the movement was in the hands of Arabs and mawali, the latter belonging to the merchant and artisan class anda surprisingly large number being saddlers. This class identity was of great significance in the history of the Da‘wah: it served as success ful camouflage both for those members of the movement who were active in the various centres and also for its emissaries when they

needed to travel from one centre to another or to maintain communications between one of the centres and the imam.'** Merchant and artisan mawali were less “‘visible” to the government than the

Arab muqatilah. Some adherents of the movement in Ktfah did indeed belong to the ranks of the Arab muqatilah of Banu. Musliyyah, but it is clear that we are here concerned with the support given by selected individuals who, after much scrutiny, were admit-

ted to membership of the small and exclusive band of the Hashimiyyah in Kufah.*®

Muhammad b. ‘Alt decided to retain the exclusive, politically passive and clandestine character of the centre in Kufah. This had been his original method and an original feature of the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah. He understood, as C. Cahen observes, that he could not rely

on purely Kufite organizations, nor build the future of the movement on them, especially in view of the bitter experiences of the past.'°° On the other hand, it would not be correct to go to the 164 When Bukayr b. Mahan goes to meet Muhammad b. ‘All, he disguises himself as a spice merchant (‘attar). Akhbar, p. 195 and see also ibid., p. 196 where

the concealment of the true identity of the Kifite Hashimite leaders under the disguise of merchants or pedlars is presented as an essential measure to keep secret the relations with the imam. An amusing story which emphasizes the fact that the leaders of the Da'wah possessed some kind of profession is quoted by Dinawari: “Abt Salamah was a vinegar merchant. In the evening Musawir (the butcher) would come and bring a cut of meat. Abt Salamah would then supply the vinegar and Yaqtin, the grain merchant, would bring grains (of wheat) or seeds of lentils all of which they would cook and eat.

About this Aba Jafar used to say: ‘Musawir’s meat, Abu Salamah’s vinegar and Yaqtin’s seeds — how delicious then is the broth’.”’ Dinawari, p. 358, cf. also pp. 335, 344. 165 In spite of the fact that Bukayr b. Mahan’s father was a mawlda he belonged to the diwdn-registered muqatilah of Banu Musliyyah. Later, he will appear as

the most prominent leader of the Kufite centre. 166 Cahen, p. 319.

The Hashimiyyah 145 extreme of saying that the ‘Abbasids could not rely on the Arab nobility in Kifah because it had Husaynite leanings or that it was impossible to integrate them into a movement whose traditions were Kaysanite.*®’ After all, the nucleus of the Hashimite movement, exclusive as it was since passing into the hands of Muhammad b. ‘Ali, was located, as we have just seen, within an Arab tribe and at least some of its leaders were Arabs and mawali of Arabs, who had

become completely assimilated to their tribes. This was not the obstacle. The obstacle was Kifah itself. Muhammad b. ‘Alt understood that this capital city was unsuitable for clandestine activity such as had evolved in his movement even before he had taken over the leadership. Kufah persisted in its tradition of ideological Shrite agitation, barren and ineffectual. The Kifites esteemed spéculative rather than practical activity. The first seeds of Shi‘ah sectarianism begin to appear gradually in Kutfah. Speculative activity began to change its character and to focus on various figures among the third generation of the ‘Alid family. Muhammad b. ‘Ali was not at all interested in introducing his movement to these circles, which were preoccupied with sterile academic debate. We can, therefore, understand the instruction attributed to him and addressed to the chief of the centre in Kufah: “‘Beware of the Kifites; do not accept any of them except those among them who had deep personal conviction (dhuwu al-bas@ ir) for they do not strengthen those whom they

support nor weaken those whom they abandon.’ ?* Kifah was under the watchful eye of the Umayyads, who drowned in blood any

attempt at opposition in the city. This is the background to the formation of a principle basic in the

‘Abbasid Da‘wah from its inception, namely, not to concentrate itself in Kufah, nor in Iraq at all, and to dissociate itself completely

from all connection with any ‘Alid activity. When the abortive Shrite rising of Zayd b. ‘Ali broke out in Kifah in 122/739-7400, one tradition relates that the leaders of the ‘Abbasid movement left Kufah for Hirah, where the loyal Syrian troops of the Umayyads were stationed, solely in order to avoid becoming implicated in the

rising, even unintentionally. 67 Ibid. 168 Akhbar, p. 200. ©? Akhbar, pp. 231-232. According to another tradition, Muhammad b. ‘Ali

146 Chapter 5 A second basic principle of the movement was the scrupulous observance of secrecy. This secrecy was maintained by ensuring that individual members who joined the movement in Ktfah were recru-

ited only after stringent checking of their reliability;!”° they were

kept in complete ignorance of the Imdm’s name and identity.'” Members of the movement were instructed to avoid making themselves conspicuous when travelling from place to place, to become absorbed into larger groups in great caravans,” and to keep their communications with the centre in Humaymah to a minimum. It is, therefore, clear that the centre in Kufah was not needed as a recruiting centre; nevertheless, it was vital to the movement. It was a crucial link in the chain of communication as well as a protective screen between the Imam in Humaymah and the centre which was to be developed in Khurdsan. Khurasanite traders and travellers arrived daily in Kifah and there was no a priori reason to suspect their bona

fides; but the unduly frequent appearance of Khurasanites in Humaymah was liable to attract the attention of the Umayyad spies.

The importance of the Kifite centre to the movement was thus inestimably greater than its modest dimensions might indicate and Wellhausen rightly asserts that Kifah was the centre out of which the movement in Khuras4an operated. ?!”’

It remains for us to survey the vicissitudes which befell the leadership of the centre in Kifah. After the completion of the operation by which the supreme leadership was transferred to Muhammad b. ‘Ali, the Ktfites, headed by Salamah b. Bujayr, made

for Kufah concealed in a great caravan. Salamah fell sick on the journey and died before reaching Kifah; the leadership passed to the next in order in the hierarchy, Abi Riyah Maysarah al-Rahhal. The

youngest of the supporters, Ibrahim b. Salamah, stayed on in instructed Bukayr b. Mahan, saying: “And warn our shi ah against participating in any movement instigated by our cousins of the family of Abd Talib, for their rebel is destined to be killed and their leader forsaken. Anyway, they

have no-portion in the matter’. ibid., p. 200. 170 Ibid., p. 196. 171 Tbid., p. 194.

72 Ibid., p. 192. 173 Wellhausen, pp. 513-514.

The Hashimiyyah 147 Humaymah in order to perform two functions: to act as a connecting link between the Imam and the Kifites in time of need and to

identify the movement’s supporters whom he knew personally, whereas Muhammad b. ‘Ali knew them only by name.” The Kifite party returned to Kifah and once again interspersed with the Bantu Musliyyah. They told the few adherents who enquired

about the new Imam that they were not at liberty to disclose his name, but that he had instructed them to conduct propaganda on behalf of “‘ar-Rida min al Muhammad” without specifying his name.'”> This vague expression, which spoke of an unidentified personage belonging to the Prophet’s family, became a fundamental

element in the propaganda of the Da‘wah throughout the whole period of its existence, both in Kufah and in Khurasan. Originally created as a device whereby the movement might protect itself behind a wall of secrecy, the slogan in the course of time became the heart of the movement’s propaganda. Its exact meaning was left to

the imagination of the faithful and thus, the way was open, at first unintentionaly, but later purposefully, for all those accustomed to think in ‘Alid terms to join the movement, particularly in Khurasan,

since until then the term ahl al-bayt, al Muhammad, or ahl arRasul had been regarded as connoting the ‘Alids.*”°

One of the most important leaders of the movement in Kufah, who was not present at Aba Hashim’s deathbed and who did not know that the leadership of the movement had passed to Muhammad b. ‘Ali, was Bukayr b. Mahan. When these events took place, he appears to have been in Jurjan with the army of Yazid b. Muhallab. While there, he took advantage of the opportunity to make converts

for the Hashimiyyah in its original form, that is, as the movement 4 Akhbar, pp. 192-193. ‘79 Ibid., p. 194 and especially, p. 204. ‘70 Ibid., p. 241: When the Khurdsanites, according to this tradition, invoke Ibrahim b. Muhammad (“al-Imam’’), who after his father’s death led the movement, to avenge the blood of Zayd and Yahya b. Zayd (whom we shall discuss later on), they refer to them as ahl baytika. An interesting tradition concerning the extensive use of the Prophet’s name has been preserved by Baladhuri (Ansab, Ill, p. 84): Caliph Hisham referring to the members of the Prophet's family said: “inna h@'ula’ qawm ja alu rasul allah lahum suqan — these are people who turned the messenger of Allah into a commercial object (literally: a market).”’ See, ““Da‘wah”’ in EI’.

148 Chapter 5 which supported Abt Hashim. The tradition which reports these matters as coming from his own lips, informs us that in the eastern provinces, among both Arabs and mawalzi, he perceived a tendency to favour those doctrines which stressed the special privileges of the Prophet’s family. This need not surprise us, since there is no doubt that the Arabs who had come from Kifah and Basrah to the Jranian East brought with them the orientations of the Iraqi Shi‘ah. This is especially true of those who came to Khurasan from Kifah. Hence, there developed in Khurasan some Shr ite ideological activity, parallel to that in Iraq, but restricted in its compass and based on Kdfah. The later traditions describe this activity by the term Fatimid. This description is basically correct since, just as after the collapse of Mukhtar and the disappearance underground of the Hashimiyyah, the Shrite activity in Kafah focused its expectations on the ‘Alids who were descendants of Fatimah, similar tendencies also developed in Khurasan, though on a smaller scale. Only the term Fatimiyyah or Fatimiyyun, is misleading, since it did not exist during these early periods. The moving spirit in the ‘Alid-Shrite activity in Khurasan was a man named Ghalib from Nishaptr, who made converts to his ideas and was a dangerous rival to the Hashimite-‘Abbasid Da‘wah when it began to operate with cryptic slogans in Khurasan.*’” Ghalib spoke in much more explicit language: at the centre of his propa-

ganda he put forward Muhammad b. ‘Alt b. Husayn (later to be known as Muhammad al-Bagir).!”8 One can give credence to these traditions, which relate how the doctrines of the Shi ahin Khurasan developed in the direction of supporting descendants of Husayn and especially the sons of ‘Ali (““Zayn al-‘Abidin’’). This development had great significance for the evolution of the Da‘wah in Khurdasan, since even among the Da‘wah’s supporters there was a tendency, until the appearance of Abt Muslim, to identify the slogan ‘“‘ar-Rida min al Muhammad” with some member of Husayn’s family, as we shall show later. It was Bukayr b. Mahan who was responsible for sowing the first seeds of the Hashimiyyah in Jurjan and in Khurasan. In Jurjan, he initiated three men into the secret of the movement: Abt ‘Ubaydah 77 Tabart, Il, 1501. 178 Akhbar, p. 204.

The Hashimiyyah 149 Qays b. as-Sari of the Band Musliyyah tribe and Isma‘il Abia ‘Amir (both Arabs) and a mawld, named Yazid b. an-Nahid, who manif-

ested great enthusiasm for the movement and what it stood for.’” Thus, Jurjan became a centre of the Hashimiyyah which was of considerable importance in linking Kdfah and Khurdas4n. This link was undoubtedly kept alive by caravans of pilgrims to the Hajj and by the trade bewtween Kifah and Khurdasan which passed through Jurjan. Bukayr b. Mahan set out to Kifah from Khurdasan at the end of the year 98 with the pilgrim caravan which had left Khurasan for Mecca.

With him were Abt ‘Ubaydah Qays b. as-Sari and Ismail Abt ‘Amir. The noise and bustle of the Hajj enabled Bukayr and his two

companions to try to make converts among the pilgrims. They became friendly with a man named Abd Muhammad Sulayman b. Kathir of the Khuza‘ah tribe, and succeeded in converting him to their views. Sulayman b. Kathir gave his bay‘ah to Bukayr b. Mahan, and thus the seed was sown also in Khurasan. Sulayman b. Kathir

was a member of the muqatilah (“men of the diwan’’) of the Khuza ah tribe; he was a resident of the district of Great Marw and his status in his tribe assured the development of the movement in Khurasan.*®°

When Bukayr returned to Kufah, he became aware of the changes

which had occurred in the movement during his absence. This cannot have been before the beginning of the year 99/717, when the

Hajj concluded. As the traditions cited by Tabart are extremely fragmentary, it is apparent that he knew nothing about this activity by Bukayr b. Mahan; he tells us that Bukayr joined the movement in Kufah in the year 105/723-4, after returning froma prolonged stay in Sind, with which we shall deal presently."** About a year or so 179 Ibid., pp. 198-199. Ismail Abd ‘Amir is known by his kunyah, because of the outstanding prestige accorded to his son, ‘Amir b. Ismail, who slew Marwan II. His name is Ismail b. ‘Amir b. Nafi' b. ‘Abd ar-Rahman (al-Musl1). Ibn Hazm, Jamharah, p. 414.

180 Akhbar, p. 199. Marw, or Marw ash-Shahijan, (to differentiate it from Marw-Riad) was the base of the Arab muqatilah, the central military camp of

the Muslim warriors after the occupation of the Sassanian domains. (wakdnat Marw mu‘askar al-islam fi awwal al-islam). Istakhri, p. 262. Cf. Ibn Hawaal (trad. Wiet), I], p. 422; Muqaddas!, pp. 311-312; Le Strange, p. 398. 81 Tabari, II, 1467. Cf. Dinawari, pp. 335-336.

150 Chapter 5 after Bukayr’s arrival in Kufah, apparently at the end of the year 100/719, Abi Riyah Maysarah ar-Rahhal died,!®* but not before handing over the leadership of the movement to his relative Salim b. Bujayr (not Salamah’s brother!), who was known by his nickname of

Salim al-A’amd. Tabart does indeed mention a man named Salim al-A’yan among the leaders in Ktfah who, according to his version, recruited Bukayr into their ranks. But Tabart knows nothing about this Salim. We, however, know that he was one of the oldest leaders of the Hashimiyyah in Kufah, a fact that can be clearly established from the lists contained in Akhbar al ‘Abbas.'® Through his ignor-

ance of this fact, Tabarl postdates Maysarah’s death to the year 105/723-724, the time when Bukayr took over the leadership of the movement. /*4

The task of informing Muhammad b. ‘Ali about these changes in the leadership fell to Bukayr b. Mahan. At the same time, information reached him that his brother Yazid b. Mahan had died in Sind and had left him a large inheritance. He delayed his departure for Sind and went off to Humaymah. The measures he took to conceal his identity and his aims are most instructive for understanding how

strictly, from its very inception, the Hashimite-"Abbasid Dawah cast a net of secrecy over its communications with the Imam in Humaymah. Bukayr first travelled to Damascus, where he disguised himself as an itinerant dealer in spices and condiments (‘utr). There he bought a large quantity of stock, with which he made the rounds

of the villages south of Damascus until he became known as an ‘attar. Arriving at Humaymah, he continued selling his goods until

he met Ibrahim b. Salamah, who recognized him and secretly brought him to Muhammad b. ‘Alt.'®? Bukayr gave Muhammad b. 82 Akhbar, p. 194. '83 Since the Anonyme is an abridgement of the Akhbar, various details are missing in it. P. Griaznevich was, therefore, unable to identify this Salim and

suggested that he is identical with Salamah b. Bujayr. The author of the Akhbar (ibid.) says that Salim was Salamah’s cousin. Anonyme, Russian text, note 158, and see a suggestion to correct the Arabic text, p. V (to fol. 249b). 184 Tabari, loc. cit. '85 Muhammad b. ‘Ali recognized him by the list which he possessed and by the special way by which Bukayr saluted him (taslim khdss). According to these traditions, one may infer that the techniques of secret communication per-

The Hashimiyyah 15] ‘Alt the information he had, but remarked to the Imam that he was

not satisfied with the measures taken to maintain secrecy in Humaymah itself. He suggested to Muhammad b. ‘Alt that he purchase an additional place strictly for his own use, in which it would be possible to communicate with him while avoiding the watchful eyes even of the other members of the family. Muhammad b. ‘Alt acted on this suggestion and bought himself an estate in a neighbouring village called Kudad.'®° But Bukayr b. Mahan was still

dissatisfied. He wanted absolutely to avoid all direct contact between the adherents in Kifah and the Imam himself, apart from quite exceptional cases. In his opinion, they should communicate with the Imam through a third party. Muhammad b. ‘Alraccepted this suggestion as well and it was decided to create a link connecting Humaymah and Ktfah in

Damascus. Cover was also provided for the departure of the two men for Damascus. According to his usual practice, Muhammad b. All was going to join a s@ ifah against the Byzantines, while Bukayr b. Mahan accompanied him to Damascus still disguised as an ‘attar and submerged in Muhammad b. ‘Ali's large suite.'®’ In Damascus, as already mentioned, was a mawld of Banu Hashim named Fadalah b. Mu‘adh; it was he whom Muhammad b. ‘Alihad chosen to serve as his contact with the Kifites. '88

Thus the communications network took form. Kifah was the screen between the Imam and Khurdas4an, while in Damascus there

was an intermediatry between Ktfah and Humaymah (or more correctly, Kudad).

fected by the Hashimite (later ‘“Abbasid) underground were among the finest in history.

18 Akhbar, p. 197 (I. 7). ‘87 Muhammad b. ‘Ali was accompanied on his trip to Damascus by some of his

brothers, his mawali, ‘Urwah, Muhalhil and Ziyadah and by Ibrahim b. Salamah. Ibid., p. 197 (ll. 11-14). ‘88 Ibid., p. 197 (the whole account is on pp. 194-197).

ee DA WAH G

“If men ask you my name, say: ‘we are in a state of taqiyyah we have been commanded to keep the name of our Imam secret’ .”’

Akhbar, p. 203 “The embellishment of this world — the Prophet said — will be

removed on the year one hundred and twenty five’.

Tanzih ash-Shariah, ll, p. 348

The best Islam was in the beginning. And now it deteriorates with every generation... While man cannot arrest the decay, he may slow it. Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, p. 240

God will send to this community on the eve of every century somebody who will renew its religion. Ibn Kathir, Nihdyat al-Biddyah, I, p. 30 King Shapur said to Shemuel: ‘‘You say that the Messiah will come (riding) on a donkey. Let me send him a shining white horse which I have’. — “‘Do you have a horse with a hundred colours?’ the sage asked.

Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin, 98a

The Da'wa Underground 155 6

Seeds of the Dawah in Khurasan In the year 101 (or 102) Bukayr b. Mahan left for Sind where he remained as the interpreter of Junayd b. ‘Abd ar-Rahman, the gover-

nor of Sind on behalf of Yazid b. ‘Abd al-Malik (101/720105/724). On his way to Sind he passed through Jurjan and Marw where he met all those whom he had previously enlisted into the movement. He instructed them how to conduct their propaganda

and stressed the need to preserve strict secrecy at all costs.’ He remained in Marw for two months making the acquaintance of all those whom Sulayman b. Kathir had succeeded in bringing into the movement. They were: Malik b. al-Haytham, of the tribe of Khu-

za‘ah; ‘Amr b. A‘yan, a mawld of Khuza‘ah; Ziyad b. Salih and Talhah b. Ruziq (or Ruzayq), both of Khuzaah. Abu an-Najm ‘Imran b. Isma‘il, a mawld of Abt Mu‘ayt (of Umayyah) and Musab. Ka‘b of the tribe of Tamim.” Most of these men (we know exactly when and how they joined the movement) are known to us from the traditions preserved by Tabari as having been leaders of the Da‘wah

in Khurasan,* but Tabari knows nothing about the time or the circumstances of their joining the movement. Bukayr b. Mahan remained in Sind until the year 105. While in the service of Junayd, he collected a large sum of money; he received his

inheritance from his deceased brother and returned to Kufah in 105/724, just when Hisham b. ‘Abd al-Malik came to power.* It appears that blindness had already incapacitated Salim b. Bujayr for directing the centre in Kufah; it is even possible that he died shortly after Bukayr’s return. The latter then assumed the leadership of the ' He himself appeared in Marw disguised as a merchant, just as he had done on his trip to Syria. Akhbar, p. 201.

: Ibid., pp. 201-202. * — Tabart, Il, pp. 1358, 1988; Azdi, p. 26; Anonyme, fol. 254a. ' — Tabari, II, p. 1467. The tradition in the Akhbar confirms this fact by putting into the mouth of Muhammad b. ‘Ali the following words addressed to Bukayr b. Mahan: “When you hear that the crossed-eye of the Umayyad became the ruler, come to me in haste...’’ (The crossed-eye was Hisham b. ‘Abd al-Malik). Akhbar, p. 200; Mas‘iidi, Muruj (Beirut) III, p. 205.

156 Chapter 6 centre in Kifah and managed the affairs of the centre in Khurasan

until his own death in 127/744-745.° The centre in Khurasan developed independently; its main link with the movement was forged by means of Bukayr b. Mahan’s two

hasty meetings with the Khurdsanite leaders. Muhammad b. Ali heard from Bukayr that a start had been made at organizing the movement in Khurasan and he showed great interest in this development. Bukayr’s prolonged stay in Sind and the fact that the centre in Kifah had been entirely inactive under the leadership of Salim the Blind had forced Muhammad b. ‘Alito take the initiative himself and

to tighten the links with Khurasan until the return of Bukayr b. Mahan. Contact with Khurasan was maintained via Kafah. Muhammad b. ‘Alf ordered Abd ‘Ikrimah Ziyad b. Dirham to conceal himself behind the kunyah of Abi Muhammad and to leave for Khurdasan. The tradition of Abt Zakariyya al-Azdi reveals approximately when

Abt ‘Ikrimah left for Khurdsan, a fact not ascertainable from the confused traditions of Tabari and Dinawari, or from the traditions cited by the compiler of the Akhbar, who for the most part gives only very few dates. It appears that Abt ‘Ikrimah left for Khurasan round

about the year 104/722-723,° a date that is consistent with the tradition of the compiler of the Akhbar, who relates that Abu ‘Ikrimah was sent to Khuradsan while Bukayr b. Mahan was still in Sind.” The detailed tradition given in the Akhbar about Abu ‘Ikrim> Tabari, II, p. 1916; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 125, 339. 6 Azdi, p. 18. The confusion in the traditions arose because Abu ‘Tkrimah went

to Khurdsadn at least twice. The first time was in 104/722-723 and the second, by the order of Bukayr b. Mahan, was in 107/725-726. On this second (recorded) trip, he met his death. See Tabari, II, pp. 1358, 1488; Ibn al-Athir, V, pp. 136-137 (in Tabari’s tradition Abu ‘Tkrimah was accompanied by Hayyan al-‘Attar, Muhammad b. Khunays and a large group of Shiites from Kifah). Dinawari mentions only Hayyan al-‘Attar. These traditions are

most probably late elaborations based on fragmentary information that seeped out of the inner circle of the Da‘wah. An echo of the tradition in the Akhbar is found in Baladhuri’s tradition which relates that Muhammad b. ‘Ali sent an emissary to Khurasan while Abu Hashim was still alive and on the latter’s advice. Ansab, III, p. 115. This last tradition may explain the detailed account in the Anonyme of Leiden (fol. 5a) which speaks about an emissary called Sallam al-Ghazi who was sent to Khurasan by Muhammad b. ‘All (see below, n. 14). For a parallel tradition on Abi Tkrimah’s mission to Khurasan

which verifies the tradition of the Akhbar see also ibid.

7 Akhbar, pp. 203-204.

The Da‘'wa Underground 157 ah’s mission to Khurdasan is of great importance since it contains a summary of the ideological content of the Da‘wah as it was taught there, as well as information about the communication link between Kufah and Khurasan (concerning the mission itself, the tradition is

not reliable in all its parts). The tradition runs as follows: ‘Said Hasan b. Hamzah, I heard Misa as-Sarraj® who said: ‘When Muhammad b. ‘Alt wished to send Abt ‘Ikrimah, whose name was Ziyad b. Dirham, one of the members of his Shi‘ah, to Khurds4n, he summoned him and said unto him: ‘Take to thyself the kunyah

Abt Muhammad’; Bukayr hath shown thee the way — go thereon!...Do not reveal anything of thy affairs until thou arrive in Jurjan, where thou shalt meet Abu ‘Ubaydah and shalt report unto him the things which I have told thee. After that, thou shalt come unto Marw, where thou shalt offer thy merchandise to the inhabitants of the place and thereby shalt cause the multitude to err in respect of thee. Then shalt thou go unto Sulayman b. Kathir and unto the men who answered the call of Abid Hashim (Bukayr b.

Mahan, M.S.). Refrain from over-exerting thyself, and do not exhort any to draw a sword. Write but little unto me and make thy communication with me as little as may be. Send thy letters unto

Abd al-Fadl (Salim al A‘ma)? and to Aba Hashim (Bukayr b. Mahan) if he returns [meanwhile] to Iraq. If thou wilt preach our doctrine to one of the common people, let thy preaching be on behalf of ar-Rida min al Muhammad. Only when thou art assured of the man’s wisdom and self conviction (basirah) [only then] mayst thou speak clearly unto him... [Together with this] keep my name secret (liyakun ismi masturan) from everyone. Reveal it only to the man whom thou deemest thine equal in the trust thou hast in him, and only after thou shalt have made him swear [by weighty oaths] and art fully assured of his loyalty and shalt have received ' The origin of this account is most interesting. It is attributed to one of the members of the centre in Kufah and a key figure in the Da‘wah as we shall later see. It is possible to doubt the authenticity of its isnad, but since the tradition is factual and not of a polemic nature, one may safely accept it as authentic.

' The patronymic Abt al-Fadl as-Salim al-A’mah’s kunyah is known from Baladhuri, vol. cit.,p. 117.

158 Chapter 6 his bay‘ah. Speak such words also to thine own emissaries. If men ask you my name, say: ‘Weare in a state of tagiyyah. We have been commanded to keep the name of our Imam secret.’?° When thou comest to Marw, dwell in the midst of the tribes of Yaman, draw

near unto Rabiah and beware of Mudar; but draw unto thyself whomsoever thou canst of the faithful ones among them." Attract as many Persians as possible because they are the ypholders of our da‘wah and through them God will support it. Beware of Ghalib [from Abrashahr]” and of the band of men whose place of origin is Ktfah and who support his ideas, among whom are ‘Ayyash b. Abu ‘Ayyash and Ziyad b. Nadhir — members of Bani Tamim and Abu Khalid al-Jawaliqi, they are all engaged in creating fitnah. For our part, we wash our hands of them.’ (Ghalib and his companions the tradition adds an explanation — were Fatimids who believed in the imadmah of Muhammad b. ‘Alt b. Husayn.)”’*?”

The essential points in this tradition, which to a great extent summarises the character of the Da‘wah in Khurasan, are these: 1. The Da‘wah to the masses: a vague slogan about supporting an unidentified leader from the House of the Prophet. 2. Extreme precautions to conceal the name of the real leader, even

from the inner circle of adherents." 10 Cahen, p. 306. 11 Cf. ‘Iqd, Il, p. 352 (1944 ed. IV, p. 476). In Haytham b. ‘Adi’s tradition these words were put into the mouth of Abt Hashim while addressing Muhammad b. ‘Alt.

12 The addition from Tabari, II, p. 1501. 13 Akhbar, pp. 202-204. Abi Khalid al-Jawaliqi in this tradition may be identical with Aba Khalid al-Kabuli, who according to an-Nashi al- Akbar, was one of the early leaders-ideologists of the Fatimiyyah. (“wa-kana min rwasa@ ashab ‘Alt b. al-Husayn — He was one of the heads of ‘Alt b. al-Husayn’s adherents’). An-Nashi’ al-Akbar, p. 25. 14 Cf. Baladhuri, ibid. The traditions in the Anonyme of Leiden, (fols. 4a-4b) which most probably represent the later official ‘Abbasid reconstruction of the events, postpone the beginning of all activity in Khurasan to the year 120. In that year, one detailed acount says, Muhammad b. ‘Ali sent a mawld of his called Sallam b. al-Ghazi to disseminate, among the Shrah in Khurasan, propaganda for an unspecified person from the Prophet’s family who was to be known only as ar-Ridd min al Muhammad and al-Mahdz. Later, Sallam was joined by Sulayman b. Kathir and his associates. This tradition, although

The Da'wa Underground 159 3. Concentration of the Da‘wah among the tribes of Yaman and Rabrah, though without excluding the possibility of admitting individual Mudarites. (This instruction was erroneously inserted

in our tradition from a later one, which apparently was more concerned with the activity of Abii Muslim at a time when the Da‘wah was indeed addressed to the tribes of Yaman who constituted an opposition to the government in Khurasan’”’.)

4. The propaganda was to be conducted clandestinely and without any violence, to avoid premature discovery.

5. The movement was to steer clear of purely Shrite activity, though the latter originated in Kufah; such Shrite activity was

seen as a rival movement to the Da‘wah.*° |

Humaymah Since the centres in Kifah and Khuradsan have already been discussed, one must turn, even briefly, to Humaymah, the ‘Abbasids’ place of residence. It is difficult to say why the ‘Abbasids (or, more precisely, ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah, if he was responsible for the selection) chose to acquire this out-of-the-way spot and make it their family estate. The difficulty lies in the silence of the ‘Abbasid traditions on

this matter. Whenever an ‘Abbasid tradition touches on the purchase of Humaymah, it invariably connects the question to “prophetic’’ words spoken by ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas on this subject. From these ‘‘prophecies”’ we learn only that someone went to the trouble of attributing an additional “vision” to ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas foresee highly confused as far as the sequence of events is concerned, stresses the deep secrecy which characterized the activity of the propagandists in Khurasan. As it proceeds, the tradition stresses the obscurity which typified the Dawah by calling it dawah majhulah. (wa-kana Muhammad b. ‘Ali gad baththa rusulahu ft al-aqalim al-arba’ (sic!) al-Hijaz wa-al-‘Iradq wa-ashSham wa-Khurasan bi-da'wa majhilah khawfan ‘ala nafsihi — Muhammad b. ‘Alt had scattered his emissaries in the four regions, Hijaz, Iraq, Syria and Khurasan with an obscure propaganda for he was anxious to guard his personal security.’’)

‘> Cahen, p. 320. ‘© See above p. 145 and cf. Tabari, II, 1501.

160 Chapter 6 ing that the first ‘Abbasid caliph would come forth from the Sha-

rat.’ Did ‘Alt purchase Humaymah during the lifetime of ‘Abd al-Malik as a part of his programme for launching the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah? Such a possibility seems remote. It is also possible that Humaymah was purchased, not in the time of ‘Abd al-Malik, but rather during the reign of Walid, since we are told that Walid banished ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah to a place of exile in Hijr, in the north of Hijaz. It is by no means improbable that his family, wishing to be

near him, chose the village of Humaymah in the mountains of Sharat, on the highway to the Hijaz, and settled there. Furthermore,

having experienced both the delights and the discomforts of the Umayyad court, the ‘Abbasids may have thought they would do well to avoid excessive proximity to the seat of government. Humaymah

was, indeed, far from Damascus and the other centres of government and hidden away from the watchful eyes of the Umayyad spies.!8 But whether the place was acquired in the time of ‘Abd al-Malik or in the reign of his son Walid, it is difficult to imagine a more successful choice of site than this. From Humaymah, it was possible to maintain efficient, secret and regular communications with the eastern provinces of the Empire. The trade and pilgrim route connecting Hijaz and South Arabia with Syria and the Jazirah, and thence with Khurdasan, passed through the vicinity of Humaymah. Another road linked Humaymah with Ktfah by way of Daw-

mat al-Jandal.’’ As to the importance of the site, the following tradition, preserved by Baladhurt, is instructive: ““‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abbas] was in Humaymah, which is in the district of Damascus, and

did not stir from his mosque there, in which he would pray five hundred rak‘ahs daily...Every wayfarer who passed by the place on the way from Hijaz to Syria or from Syria to Hijaz received hospital-

ity from him; if [the man]asked for alms, ‘Ali gave him charity.” This tradition stresses two significant facts: (1) the special position of Humaymah on one of the most important caravan routes in 7 Akhbar, p. 131. 18 On Humaymah, see Yaqit, II, p. 342; Marasid, I, p. 322; Harawi, Ziyarat, p. 17 (ll. 12-13); Le Strange, Palestine, pp. 455-456.

19 Baladhuri, Ansab, Ill, p. 128.

2 Ibid., p. 75.

The Da'wa Underground 16] the Empire and (2) that it was a natural thing for strangers, while on their journey to appear there from time to time since it was one of the few stops for rest and provisioning on the desert route which led

to Hijaz. It was not difficult for persons active in the Da’wah to conceal their connections with the Imam in the turmoil of the Hajj or the great trading caravans which travelled this route. (We have already seen that agents of the Da‘wah used to disguise themselves as merchants, an effective form of camouflage because many of them were in fact merchants or artisans).”’ Another thing which facilitated the maintenance of communica-

tions and their secrecy was the fact that only a small number of selected propagandists knew the identity of the Imam and, as a general rule, unless there was some case of urgency, they would communicate with him only at the times of pilgrimage, when they

would meet him not at Humaymah, but among the crowds of pilgrims in Mecca.** At these meetings they would give him a report on the progress of affairs in Khurasan and the large sums of money

collected there from the faithful in aid of the Da‘wah.*

Ambiguous Ideas and Anonymous Activity When Bukayr b. Mahan returned to Kufah in 105/724 and assumed

leadershp of the movement there, he also undertook the management of relations with Khurasan. Activity in Khuradsan had not yet passed beyond what we may call (following Dinawart) the sowing of 21 Tabart, II, p. 1434. According to this tradition, Asad b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri, the governor of Khurdasan said to one of the propagandists: “I have seen you in a shop in Damascus’’, and the man confirmed this adding that he had also come to Khuras4n to engage in commerce. Tabari, II, p. 1502. Cf. Baladhurt, ibid., p. 84 (infra); Ibn Khaldtn, ‘Ibar, III, pp. 215-217; and see above, ch. V,

n. 164. 2 Baladhuri, ibid., p. 119. The ‘Abbasid chief emissaries and propagandists knew in advance when the imam intended to perform the Hajj and planned the meeting with him in Mecca accordingly. Akhbar, p. 240-241. Cf. Noldeke, pp. 110-111. | 3 Tabari, II, pp. 1726-1727, 1769, 1869, 1916, 1953, 1962. Anonyme, fols. 260a-260b. Akhbar, pp. 387-388. This money was used among other things for buying public sympathy for the ‘Abbasids. On many occasions it is

162 Chapter 6 the first seeds.?* Much toil and effort was needed if these seeds were to develop and some day bear fruit. The tiny movement in Khurasan was doubly threatened. There was the physical threat from the local Umayyad governors. But there was also the more dangerous, ideo-

logical threat from the Shrite-Husaynite partisans which, as already indicated, were causing great concern to the designers of the ‘Abbasid propaganda.

Some time after the year 105/724, Bukayr again sent Abu ‘Ikrimah from Iraq to Khurasan together with two other missionaries, apparently Hayyan al-‘Attar and Muhammad b. Khunays, but the three fell into the hands of the governor of Khurasan who had

them executed.”? From the wording of the tradition, it is to be understood that one of the reasons these missionaries lost their lives was their failure to uphold the most important rule of the Da‘wah, namely, to preserve secrecy. They were also dragged into ideological disputes with the Shrite-Husaynite supporters, and hence it came about that they disclosed their real identify to the government spies and to garrulous persons generally. Mada’ini’s tradition also relates that Abu ‘Ikrimah had received explicit instructions to beware of Ghalib and his companions who were active members of the ‘Alid Shrah in Khuras4n, but he allowed himself to be drawn into disputes with them and spoke openly about his support of the ‘Abbasids in opposition to Ghalib who said he was ‘‘a supporter of Abu Talib’s family” (Ghalib yufaddil al Abi Talib, wa-Ziyad yufaddil bani al-‘Abbas).*° According to Mada’ini, this happened during Asad b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri's first term as governor

of Marw (106-109/724-5 — 727-8). In its present form, Mada’ini’s tradition cannot be correct, since it is difficult to imagine

Abt ‘Ikrimah being so incautious as to reveal the identity of the ‘Abbasids. Furthermore, the statement that Ghalib spoke of Abureported that the ‘Abbasids won the hearts of many people by their kindness, charity and benevolence. There is more than a grain of truth in these reports, although many were invented to extole the ‘Abbasids for their virtues. Balad -

huri, ibid., pp. 86-87, 125; Akhbar, pp. 163-164. 24 Dinawarl, pp. 338, 340. 25 For other reports on the dates of these events see, Tabart, II, pp. 1488, 1492, 1501 f.; Baladhurt, vol. cit., p. 116.

26 Tabari, II, p. 1501.

The Da‘wa Underground 163 Talib’s family in general as having a valid claim to rule is surely premature. The idea that the Talibids, and not only the ‘Alids, had a

claim to rule over Islam was to emerge 20 years later, during the revolt of ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah.2” Nevertheless, it is evident from its sequel that the tradition contains a nucleus of truth, namely, that the Kifite propagandists were either banished or put to death. With

their disappearance the Hashimite-‘Abbasid Da‘wah in Khurasan, still in its initial stage, suffered a most serious blow. The attention of

the government, which generally had been on the lookout for all strangers from Iraq, was now drawn to anyone who seemed to be an emissary of the Da‘wah in Khuras4n. Thus, until the year 120/738, we hear how from time to time ‘Abbasid propagandists were ban-

ished, imprisoned, tortured and, in some cases, executed.” Asa general statement it may be said that the repeated failures to maintain the link between Ktfah and Khurasan rendered it impossible for the ‘Abbasid propaganda in Khurdsan to make a deep and lasting impression and to develop its own traits which would set it apart from other Shiite activity being carried on there.”’ Although the government discovered quite a number of ‘Abbasid propagandists, it is clear that the Da‘wah did succeed in keeping the identity

of the ‘Abbasids secret. If they had not guarded this secret, how *7 Also in the case of ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyah’s revolt, it was asserted that the rule would pass to the hands of a member of ‘Ali’s family following the success of

the revolt. Cahen, pp. 305, 313. 8 Tabari, II, p. 1560. Junayd b. ‘Abd ar-Rahman, Bukayr b. Mahan’s former master and the governor of Khuradsan between the years 111/729-30 —

116/734-735, executed an ‘Abbasid propagandist in 113/731-2, and declared that the blood of any others could be shed with impunity (‘man ustba minhum fadamuhu hadrun’’). Asad persecuted them again in the years 117/735 — 118/736 during his second term of office in Khurasan. Tabart,

Il, pp. 1586-1589; Azdi p. 26; Wellhausen, pp. 506 ff. From a tradition quoted by Gardizi, it can be inferred that due to the independence of the Khurasanite centre, many of the first and inexperienced du‘at, acting on their own initiative, were attracted to Harith b. Surayj who rebelled in Khurasan in 116/734 and who made use of slogans and symbols that were fundamentally no different from those of the Dawah. When Harith was eventually beaten, many of his partisans fell into the hands of Asad b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri who put them to death. Among them were many supporters of the Da'wah. See Sharon, Advent, pp. 139 ff.

*? This situation prevailed until the arrival of Abd Muslim in Khurasan in 127/744 or 128/745. Tabari, II, p. 1937; Azdi, p. 65. On the activity in

164 Chapter 6 could they have kept themselves from being attacked throughout all this time? The ambiguous nature of the Shr‘ite-Hashimite activity in Khurdasan, in which there is not a hint of any ‘Abbasid connection,

is clearly evident from an account related in al-‘Uyun wa-alHada iq, which runs as follows: Propagandists (du'at) of the Shi ah [sic!] scattered themselves in _ Khurasan. They belonged to two parties. One party propagated the cause of the family of Muhammad (al Muhammad), and the other, that of Abd Hashim b. Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah. The propa-

ganda (da'wah) for the family of the Messenger of Allah was conducted by Ibn Kathir. The propagandists (du‘at), however, were guided ideologically and in matters of legal exegesis (directly) by Abu Salamah, Hafs b. Sulayman al-Khallal, who had concealed himself in Ktfah.’’*°

Although later developments have slightly distorted this account, nevertheless it clearly attests, firstly, to the existence of intensive Shi ite propaganda in Khurasan which spoke in general terms about the Prophet’s family and in more specific terms about Abu Hashim, and secondly, to the direct ideological dependence of the Khurasan-

ite Shrites on the Kufite-Hashimite centre. It appears, therefore, that those traditions which speak of the propagandists as having formed a Da‘wah for Band al-‘Abbds and

for Muhammad b. ‘Ali were created during the period when the ‘Abbasids were already in power and aimed at proving that, from the very outset, they had sought the leading position in Islam on their own merits.*? In actual fact, even the manufactured traditions which represent the official ‘Abbasid history, show that Muhammad b. ‘All insisted all his life on the anonymity of the Da‘wah (da‘wah majhulah). The Khurasan and its extent before the appearance of Abi Muslim, see Baladhuri,

vol. cit., pp. 116 ff. 30 Fragmenta, pp. 180-181.

31 Tabari, II, pp. 1358, 1501. One tradition relates that Caliph Hisham (105/724 — 125/743) suspected that the ‘Abbasids were behind the Dawah, but that he refrained from harming them because he was convinced that their eventual success had been predestined (‘‘kana fi-al-maqdur’), Baladhuni, vol. cit., p. 85.

The Da‘wa Underground 165 tradition in the Anonyme of Leiden, which summarizes his instructions to his emissaries, adds that Muhammad b. ‘All's insistence on vagueness and anonymity in the emissaries’ activities resulted from his fear of being personally discovered prematurely, that is “before the elapse of the time indicated in the Sahifah.’’*? The mysterious

sahifah safra’ (‘‘yellow scroll’) which foretells the advent of the ‘Abbasids designates the year 125 as the date when the Da‘wah emerges out of its anonymity and becomes ‘Abbasid.’ It is superfluous to add that the “‘prophecy”’ of the “‘yellow scroll” is nothing but the retrospective reconstruction of the actual events. The phase of transformation from the Hdshimiyyah to the ‘Abbasiyyah is closely connected with the personality of Khidash and his activity.

Khidash The broken link between Khurdsan and Kufah, the almost total lack

of communication with the ‘Abbasid Imdm, the character of the ‘Abbasid propaganda in Khuras4an and its vague content led toa state

of affairs in which not even ‘Abbasid leaders knew exactly what distinguished their movement from that of the other Shrites who seem to have been concentrated in Nishapur. We must not forget that Sulayman b. Kathir and his companions, who had been initiated into the secret of the Dawah by Bukayr b. Mahan, were attracted to

a movement connected with the name of Abu Hashim, that is, toa movement which at its inception had been ‘Alid. This is the background to the grave and dangerous upheaval that the ‘Abbasid propaganda in Khuras4n experienced, an upheaval that

was connected with the personage described in the sources by the name Khidash. Who was Khidashe The ‘Abbasid traditions purposely defaced his image and his name appears only incidentally in Akhbar al-‘Abbas.** *2 Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 4b. 33 Ibid., fol. 3b: “idhad kdna sanat khams wa-‘ishrin wa-miah, qdmat fityan khurdsdn wa-qadimu bi-ar-raydt as-siid wa-kana li-bani al-‘Abbas safwahad wa-li-aduwwihim kadraha’.

4 Akhbar, p. 212.

166 Chapter 6

following: :

From the traditions preserved by Tabari and Baladhuri we learn the After Asad b. ‘Abdallah al- Qasrihad ordered the execution of Abu ‘Ikrimah and his companions and had severely punished other propagandists, a missionary named Kathir b. Sa‘d, who was also known as Abu al-Husayn, was sent from Ktfah to Khurasan. He remained in Khurasan two or three years and conducted his propaganda from

the house of Abt an-Najm Imrdn b. Isma‘il, one of the supporters of the Da‘wah, who had been enlisted into the movement by Sulayman b. Kathir. As Kathir was an ignorant person, a man named Khidash succeeded in defeating him by his arguments and taking his place.»

Another tradition preserved in Tabari tells how this Khidash, whose real name was ‘Ammar or ‘Umarah b. Yazid, had been appointed by Bukayr b. Mahan to conduct the ‘Abbasid Shrah in Khurasan, while Baladhuri relates that it was none other than Muhammad b. ‘Ali who had personally appointed him to this office.*° Baladhuri goes on to tell how Khidash began to act strangely, that he “strayed away from the teachings of the Imam, changed the customs which had been accepted in the days of his predecessors and taught improper and loathsome doctrines. Then the supporters of Muhammad b. ‘Ali rose up against him and slew him. Some say

that the one who slew and crucified him was Asad b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri.”’?’ To this Tabarit adds that Khidash “began to preach a new doctrine,

which he called Khurrdmiyyah, permitting his followers to have

their wives in common and informing them that such was the teaching of Muhammad b. ‘All.’’*® He later says that Khidash was apprehended, brought before Asad b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri while the latter was in Amul and that Asad put out one of his eyes, cut off his

tongue and afterwards slew and crucified him.” Tabari gives the 35 Tabari, II, p. 1503; Baladhuri, vol. cit., pp. 116-117. According to this tradition, his name was ‘Ammar b. Yazdad, a Christian (of non-Arab origin) from Hirah, who posed as a Muslim.

36 Tabari, II, p. 1588; Baladhuri, loc. cit.

37 Ibid.

39 Tabari, I], p. 1589. |

38 —- Tabart, loc. cit.

The Da‘'wa Underground 167 year 118 as the date of these events, that is, during Asad’s second term of office as governor. Did Khidash really come to Khurasan from Kifah? If he did not come from Kifah, was he originally from Khurasan? The first time he is mentioned by Tabari, the tradition does not speak of him as having come from Ktfah. On the contrary, its wording implies that he seized control of the movement which had been unsuccessfully run by that ignoramus Kathir in Khurasan itself. In one place Tabari asserts that this event took place in 109/727, the last year of Asad’s governorship, while in another place he gives 118 as the year of Khidash’s execution. *° Wellhausen casts doubt on the dates, but is undecided, since Tabari was the only source for this episode available to him. Here we require the help of traditions cited by Baladhurt, who says that the predecessor of Khidash, Abu al-Hasan Kathir b. Sa‘d, was active in Khurasan from the year 108 or thereabouts for a space of three years; hence he must have remained in Khurasan until about the year 111/729 and only in this year did Khidash seize from

him the leadership of the movement in Marw.*! Khidash must, therefore, have acted as leader of the Da‘wah in Khurasan for about seven years, or perhaps longer. Wellhausen rightly observes that he must have been the man who organized and laid down the strong foundations of the movement in Khurasan. He was the first one to achieve real success and wide popular support among both Arabs

and mawali. Among the list of names of chiefs of the Da‘wah in Khurasan during his lifetime appear men from Khuza‘ah, Tamim, Rabi ah and other tribes including, at their head, the man who took

Khidash’s place after his death — Sulayman b. Kathir from Khuza‘ah.” Who, then, was Khidash? Why do the ‘Abbasid traditions go to

such lengths to blacken his character? And why was his image suppressed? Why did the ‘Abbasids disown him? Did he really preach doctrines which were opposed to Islam? Wellhausen asserts 0 Tabari, Il, pp. 1503-1504; 1589. 41 Abt ‘Ikrimah was killed around the year 107. During the year that followed, there was no connection with Khurasan and it was renewed only when Kathir was sent there. Baladhurt, loc. cit..

42 Wellhausen, p. 514; Tabari, II, pp. 1586-1587; Akhbar, pp. 216-223.

168 Chapter 6 that Muhammad b. ‘Alidisowned Khidash only after his death, when he was charged with having been a khurramt. In Wellhausen’s view, Khidash had actually been the chief of the Hashimiyyah in Khura-

san, that is, the leader of the original movement which supported

Abi Hashim. As to the charge that he leaned towards khurramiyyah, Wellhausen adds that the khurramiyyah was not a sect in the accepted sense, but rather a kind of speculative movement which

was opposed to puritanism in Islam and wished to preserve its character as a religion of nature and joy; for this reason it became attracted towards Iranian paganism. It is very possible, says Wellhausen, that it may even have adopted the social ideas of Mazdaq, hence the idea of the common ownership of women. In his opinion, neither Khidash nor the ‘Abbasid movement was selective in admitting converts to their cause and were prepared to accept them even from the ranks of the heretics. It was only after they had attained their aims that they took steps to rid themselves of such unwelcome adherents.*? Wellhausen further adds that Muhammad b. ‘All disowned Khidash not for ideological reasons, but out of political and tactical motives. Khidash had created a strong centre in Marw which was not prepared to recognize the supremacy of the centre in Kufah even after his death, though it remained loyal to Muhammad b. ‘All. The latter, fearing that the reins might slip from his hands, made great efforts to persuade the Khurdas@nites to accept the supremacy of Kifah. In the year 120/738, the Khurasanites refused to admit

Bukayr when he came to them,“ and it was only in 126/743 or 127/744 that they voluntarily accepted him; they still preferred to have personal and direct contacts with the Imam. The times of

followers.*?

pilgrimage served, as we have already seen, as a good opportunity for these contacts, when the Imdm received money and gifts sent by his

Claude Cahen is inclined to accept the available sources at ‘their face value and admits the possibility that Khidash really did stray from the principles of Islam. Why, he asks, should one not accept the words of Muhammad b. ‘Alt, when he commands his adherents 43 Wellhausen, loc. cit.; Cf. Néldeke, pp. 110 f.

4 Tabari, II, p. 1639. 45 Wellhausen, pp. 515-518.

The Da‘'wa Underground 169 to follow only the teachings of the Holy Book? Inthe present state of

the documentation, he says, it is difficult to ascertain with confidence whether Khidash was, in a formal sense, an ‘Abbasid emissary. Even if he were, this does not mean that the ‘Abbasids were obliged

to agree with all he said or did.** Lewis also accepts the view that Khiddsh did, indeed, preach extreme doctrines, thereby provoking the opposition of the moderate Shi ah with which Muhammad b. ‘Ali was seeking close liaison.‘ In order to solve the problem of Khidash, one must distinguish between his actions and the doctrines attributed to him. The sources which attribute libertinist and Mazdaqite teachings to Khidash do

not say, as Wellhausen tries to understand, that he attracted to himself persons holding such views; they only assert that he preached these doctrines in the name of his Shi ah. Cahen rightly observes that the extreme anti-Islamic views and doctrines which were labelled “‘zandaqah”’ were attributed to certain undesirable persons whether they had really professed such doctrines or not. In the case of Khidash, once he fell into disgrace, there was nothing to stop his being charged with “zandaqah’’, a charge which automatically joined him to the enemies of Islam.*® Mukhtar too, after his death, became a target for similar charges. The fact is that there was something else about Khidash’s activity which annoyed the ‘Abbasids; we learn about this from a unique tradition in Akhbar al-'Abbas which runs as follows: “Among the followers of Khidash there were some men of the Da‘wah of Bant al-‘Abbas, who were called by the name ‘Khalidiyyah’. In the time of Abd Ja‘far (al-Mansir, M.S.) they were called Fatimiyyah. This [came about] because the Shrah of Banu

al-‘Abbas was split after [the death of] Ibrahim (al-Imam, 132/749, M.S.) and one section of it asserted that the wasiyyah and the imamah had reverted to the family. of “Ali. Abu Khalid

(after whom the movement was called Khdlidiyyah,.,M.S.) appeared in Nishapur. Abt Muslim pursued him -but could not

46 Cahen, pp. 324-325 and n. 2. oo | 47 Lewis; “‘Abbdasids”’.

48 Cahen, p. 325 in his note to the term ‘khurramdiniyya’’.

170 Chapter 6 prevail against him.”’”

This tradition teaches us that Khidash’s movement did not disap-

pear after his death; it continued to exist underground inside the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah and came to the surface at the time of the crisis

which the movement experienced on the death of Ibrahim b. Muhammad. We further learn that Khidash’s movement did not preach doctrines contrary to Islam, but did cherish political aspirations which focused on the ‘Alids. Later, in the time of Abu Ja‘far al-Mansir, these aspirations were focused on the figures of the Fatimids who, during al-Mansur’s reign, became the main active power in the ‘Alid family. (This is additional proof of what we have

stated above about the beginnings of the Fatimid ideology in the time of Mansur being a counterpoise to the ‘Abbasid theory which the government had begun to develop.)”° But, as this tradition quite definitely asserts, the Khalidiyyah (which was the continuation of the Khidashiyyah) claimed, even before the time of Mansur, that the imamah belonged by right to the House of ‘Alt.”!

The Khalidiyyah had its centre in Nishapdr, a focal point for ‘Alid-Shrite ideological agitation which, as we have seen, was a serious barrier to the development of the ‘Abbasid Da‘wahin Khura-

san. Khidash did not go to Marw from Kutfah; his name does not appear in any list of Kufite leaders who transferred their allegiance to Muhammad b. ‘Ali after the death of Abt Hashim.” If he did not

come from Ktfah, he must have been in Khurasan, and, as his followers were concentrated in Nishapur after his death, one may conjecture that he went to Marw from Nishapdar or somewhere in its vicinity. Incidentally, Tabari in one of his traditions mentions that

Khidash was the leader of the Hashimiyyah in Khurasan.”? This 49 Akhbar, p. 403. 30 See above pp. 89-90 51 An echo of this tradition may be discerned in Ktfi's tradition about a similar ideological split which occurred around the same time in Kufah. Kuff, VIII, _177.

>a i is possible that the ‘Abbasid chroniclers intentionally obliterated his name from these lists. However, this is highly improbable in view of the existence of several traditions which relate his mission to Khurasan to Muhammad b. ‘Ali himself. see Ibn al-‘Ibri, Ta’rikh, (ed. Salhani), Beirut, 1958, p. 117.

53 Tabari, II, p. 1589; cf., Ibn Khaldtn, ‘Ibar, Il, p. 216.

The Da'wa Underground 17] means that even before the ‘Abbasid Da'wah began its activities in Khurdasan, he held Shi‘ite views in the Hashimite form which had been introduced into Khurdsan from Kdfah. It is, therefore, to be understood that precisely at the time when Bukayr b. Mahan was making converts for this doctrine during his first stay in Jurjan (in 98) and was permeating the district of Marw with his teaching in the

same year through the agency of Sulayman b. Kathir, a similar ideological circle, centred around Khidash, was already in existence. After the death of Abt Hashim, Khidash continued to hold on to his basic theories of loyalty to the ‘Alids. It is possible that he was in

communication with persons of similar Shrite views who gave allegiance to other members of ‘Ali's family;”* there is no need to assume that they focused their aspirations on any particular personality.°’ But since, in the course of time, ‘Ali’s family became more and more identified with the descendants of Hasan and Husayn, this entire circle of upholders of Shrite ideology in Khurasan was identified with the Fatimids. In the tradition recorded by the compiler of the Akhbar in which followers of the Da‘wah are warned to beware of the Shi ah of Nishaptr which supported the ‘Alids, three names appear: Ghalib, ‘Ayyash and Ziyad, who are all mentioned as leaders of the Shiah of Nishapur.”°

4 This fact is perfectly clear from a note which appears in the margin of folio 253a of the Anonyme. Referring to Muhammad b. ‘Ali's rejection of Khidash, the note reads as follows: “Khidash, a man who professed a certain doctrine in Khuradsan and related himself to the ‘expected one’ from the family of the Messenger. His affair faced the Shrah with a dilemma’’. °> —_-In one of his traditions (p. 204), the author of the Akhbar says that they had focused their aspirations on Muhammad (al-Bagir) b. ‘Alt b. Husayn. It is safe, however, to assume that such a tradition reflects a later development in the Shrah. In reaction to such ideas, the ‘Abbasids invented a tradition that

Muhammad al-Baqir himself hinted that the imdmah belonged to the ‘Abbasids. Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 116. See Cahen, p. 307. We shall later see that another son of ‘Alt (Zayn al-‘Abidin) — Zayd and the latter's son Yahya were the ‘Alid figures on whom the Shrite hopes were focused in that generation. Muhammad al-Bagir died in 114/732. Zubayri, p. 59. His father, ‘Alt, died in 94/712-713, a year which came to be known as sanat al-fugqaha — the year of the scholars — “because of the many religious

scholars who died in it’. ibid., p. 58; Mas‘tidi, Muruj, (Beirut) III, p. 160.

6 Akhbar, p. 204.

172 Chapter 6 The manner in which Khidash’s movement continued to develop leaves no room for doubt that he was a loyal follower of the House of ‘Ali and that he went to Marw when he heard about the development

there of what seemed to him to be a similar movement. From Tabari's fragmentary tradition it is to be understood that Khidash was not satisfied with the manner in which the propaganda was being directed by Kathir b. Sa‘d and that in the course of time he took over the leadership of the movement by virtue of the authority he had as a Shrite leader in Khurasan.*’ It is very possible that his seizing control of the movement had the agreement of Kufah and perhaps the consent of Muhammad b. ‘Alt. It may be that this was necessarily tacit consent; as long as Khidash was alive and active in Khurasan, we do not hear of any reaction either from Kifah or from Humaymah. As the Da‘wahin Khurdsan was still far from resting on a firm foundation of theory or organization when Khidash took it

over, there can be no doubt it was he, during his seven years of activity, who gave it these foundations. His preaching did not deviate from the basic principles taught by the Hashimite- (later, ‘Abbasid) Da'wah. He also preached on behalf of the House of the Prophet. Since he had originally held the opinions of the Hashimite Shi‘ah, it is reasonable to assume that he even used the MukhtariteHashimite slogan — ar-ridad min al Muhammad — which was also the basic motto of the ‘Abbasid Daw‘ah. His many years of labour in Khurasan thus achieved what the fragmentary and inefficient activ-

ity of the Da'wah’s emissaries from Kufah had been unable to accomplish. Indeed, the leaders of the Da‘wah in Khurasan were closely attached to him, and the doctrine he preached, a doctrine of support for the rights of the ‘Alids, seemed to the earliest followers of the Da‘wah to be the true teaching, emanating from the Imam

himself; all the more since, during all those years, no one had opposed Khidash nor raised any objection to his leadership. Khidash turned a tiny circle of adherents to the Hashimiyyah into a sizeable

movement which was concentrated chiefly in Marw and the surrounding villages; hence the great diversity in the origins of his supporters who came from most of the Arab tribes, northern as well 57 See note 53 above.

The Da‘wa Underground 173 as southern, and from the mawali. In the villages, activity could be carried on among a wide variety of tribes with incomparably greater

ease than among the muqatilah, whose political sentiments and feelings of ‘asabiyyah were sharper. The establishment of an independent centre in Khurasan — inde-

pendent both in organization and ideology — was completely opposed to all the plans of the ‘Abbasids. It was necessary to renew the connection linking this centre with the ‘Abbasid Imam and his Da‘wah. An opportunity to do this arose after Khidash’s execution

in the year 118/736.8 The Khurdsanites then made Sulayman b. Kathir of Khuza‘ah their new chief; his fellow tribesmen lived in Marw and the surrounding villages where the movement had been concentrated. As we have already mentioned, Sulayman b. Kathir was the first to respond to the propaganda of Bukayr b. Mahan and the Da‘wah’s representative in Marw (although he was not officially

appointed), until the appearance of Khidash. Sulayman b. Kathir was elected independently by the movement in Khurasan; this election is the most conspicuous expression of Khurasan’s independent status since the time of Khidash, because until his time we hear of

missionaries coming from Kufah to head the movement. As the officially recognized representative of the Khurasanites, Sulayman b. Kathir was in direct contact with Muhammad b. ‘All, from whom he received instructions orally.’ Later, when Abt Muslim came to Khurasan as the Imam’s representative, he ran into great difficulties because of Sulayman b. Kathir’s election to leadership by his own followers.

The Dawah Becomes ‘Abbasid Sulayman b. Kathir’s meeting with Muhammad b. ‘Alt ended in a serious crisis. The Imam impugned the ideology underlying Khi*8 Tabart, II, p. 1589. © — ‘Tabari, II, p. 1640. In the account about Sulaym4an’s election by the Khurasdnites, the tradition says: “‘fa-ijtama'u ‘ald ar-rida bi-Sulayman li-yalqahu

(i.e. Muhammad b. ‘Ali) bi-amrihim — They unanimously agreed upon Sulayman, that he should be the person to present him (i.e. Muhammad b.

‘Ali) with their affairs.”’

174 Chapter 6 dash’s preaching, saying that it was inconsistent with his own views.©° Sulayman and the Khurdas4anites could not understand what

fault the Imam could find in Khidash’s teachings and the ties between them and Muhammad weakened. This seems to be the reason for Muhammad b. ‘Ali’s prolonged, but vain, attempts to renew his connection with Khurasan through the mediation of the Kufite leader, Bukayr b. Mahan, and through direct talks with the Khurasanite leaders at times of pilgrimage.®! It was only after the death of Muhammad b. ‘Ali (at the beginning of Dhu al-Qa‘dah, 125/26 August 743) and the succession of his son Ibrahim as chief of the Da‘wah that the obstacles to understanding were removed. In 126/744, the Khurdasanites voluntarily accepted Bukayr b. Mahan and through his agency transferred to the new Imam large sums of money and a great number of gifts which had been collected from the supporters in Khurasan.© What had happened to change the views of the Khurasanites? The

answer is two important events in the history of the Shrah during the period between the death of Khidash and the death of Muhammad b. ‘Altin 125: the violent death of Zayd b. ‘Alrand the murder of his son, Yahya. In 122/740 the Shr ah suffered a grave blow through the abortive revolt of Zayd b. ‘All, who was executed in Ktfah and his body left exposed on across for a long time.®* His defeat was a great shock to

adherents of the Shi‘ah in Kifah; and just as Husayn’s death had given rise to the movement of the tawwabun, so also the death of Zayd produced similar reactions, except that this time the’ reaction did not take the form of violence, as had happened in the case of the 60 “Hamala shtatihi ‘ala ghayr minhajihi’, Tabart, I, p. 1640. 61 Tabari, II, pp. 1640, 1727, 1769; Baladhuri, vol. cit., pp. 117-118. 62 Tabari, II, pp. 1769, 1869; Baladhurt, loc. cit.; Yaqubt, Ta'rikh, p. 399. Fora tradition antedating Muhammad’s death to the year 124/741-742 see, Akhbar, p. 239; Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 87. 63 = Tabari, II, p. 1869; Baladhurt, vol. cit., p. 119. 64 Tabari, Il, pp. 1667 f., 1698 £.; Akhbar, pp. 230 £.; ‘Iqd., I, p. 293 (1944 edition, IV, pp. 482-483); Dinawari, p. 345; Dhahbi, ‘Ibar, I, p. 154 (indicates 121 as the year of his death); Anonyme, fols. 205b f.; Wellhausen, pp. 337-339: idem, Khawarij, pp. 256-260; Magatil, pp. 127-151; Baghdadi, p. 25: Ibn Sa‘d, V, pp. 239-240; Kufi, VIII, pp. 110 f.

| The Da‘wa Underground 175 tawwabun, but rather of ideological activity. The pro-‘Alid sympathy which existed in Khurasan was identified with Zayd, since he had been made a new martyr in the family’s cause, but this sympathy

remained passive. We have seen that the leadership of the Hashimite-‘Abbasid Shiah in Ktfah opposed Zayd’s revolt and made great efforts to avoid becoming involved in it in any way. Its leaders even left Kifah on the outbreak of the revolt and went into voluntary exile in Hirah, the stronghold of the Syrian army in Iraq, not returning home until after the revolt had been crushed and Zayd

killed and crucified. The ‘Abbasid tradition relates that it was Muhammad b. ‘Alt who

had instructed his Shrah not to join the insurgent nor to become identified with the revolt, since he foresaw that the outcome of the

revolt would be no better than that of other ‘Alid insurrections which had relied on the support of the Kifites. It is clear from both the wording and the spirit of the tradition that Bukayr b. Mahan was obliged to make great efforts to dissuade his followers and sympathizers from helping Zayd; the more so since the latter’s revolt was supported by men of the Banu al-Harith tribe and especially Banu Musliyyah, from which the Da‘wah also derived support.°®’ The followers of the Da‘wah, both in Kufah and in Khurdasan, were perplexed whenever they had to define their relation to any Shrite

activities or initiatives. The ‘Abbasid Da‘wah sought to guard against this ideological embarrassment by not explicitly defining the

subject matter of its propaganda. Even at the peak period of its activity it was convenient for the Da‘wah to identify itself with “Alid

martyrs, thus earning the sympathy of their followers, and at the same time to avoid committing itself to any tangible deeds which might have assisted their cause while they were still alive. This ideological embarrassement was particularly obvious during the revolt of Zayd b. ‘All, since his slogans did not at all differ from

the original slogans of Mukhtar’s Shrah and of the Hashimiyyah ” — Zubayri, p. 61; and see Wellhausen, Khawarij, p. 261; Ibn Khaldun, ‘Ibar, III, . 368.

66 Akhbar. p. 231. °’ — Ibid., pp. 230-232. Zayd must have found some followers also among other Southern tribes such as Azd, ‘Ans, and Hamdan. Kdfi, VII, pp. 113, 121.

176 Chapter 6 which succeeded it. Zayd based his appeal on the Qur'an, on the Sunnah of the Prophet, the defence of the weak, war against the Umayyad oppressors and support for the family of the Prophet, exactly as Mukhtar had done before him and Abt Muslim did after him.®® Even the war-cry, “Ya Muhammad ya Mansur!” or “Ya Mansur amit!” was shared by the Shi‘ah and the militant ‘Abbasid Da‘wah. Muslim b. ‘Aqil b. Abt Talib appeared in Kufah with this war-cry in order to prepare the ground for the advent of Husayn;®’ it was heard at the revolt of Mukhtar, at the revolt of Zayd b. ‘Ali and was on the lips of Abt Muslim and the supporters of the Da‘wah.”” 68 Ibid., pp. 113-114, 115; and compare Mukhtar’s call in Baladhuri, op. cit., V, p. 228. Incidentally, Kufi calls Zayd’s supporters in Kufah “Shi at al Muham-

mad’, Kufi, VIII, p. 124. 8° Mas‘iidi, vol. cit., p. 58. 79 Baladhurti. op. cit., V, p. 225; Tabari, II, pp. 616, 1972; Kuff, VI, p. 102 (Mukhtar) VIII, p. 117 (Zayd); Akhbar, p. 245; Dinawari, p. 359; Mas‘idi, vol.

cit., p. 239 (the Da'wah). Concerning the term Mansur, Lewis showed that originally it was the title of the Messiah of Yemenite tribes (mansur alYaman, or mansur Himyar). Although one is tempted to relate the term to the “Southern” tribes, it seems to me that initially both the early Shrah and the Dawah adopted this war cry because it had been an old war cry said to have been used by the Prophet himself. The Shrah and the Da‘wah both regarded themselves as following the Prophet’s example. Traditions asserting

that the war cry (shiar) “yd mansur amit’ was used by the Prophet are plentiful. See e.g. Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Wafa ft Ahwal al-Mustafa, Dar al-Kutub al-Hadithah, Cairo, n.d., II. p. 708. According to Bayhaqi, al-Mahasin wa-

al-Masawi, I, p. 179, the tribe of Bakr b. Wail adopted the shi'ar “ya Muhammad ya mansur’’ even before accepting Islam. See also Safadi, Tamam al-Mutun, p. 176 (I am indebted for this reference to Prof. M.J. Kister); Lewis, ‘““Regnal titles’, pp. 16-19. On the term manszur, as indicating

the Yemenite Messiah, see Hamdani, [klil, VII, pp. 59, 118-119; Shams al-‘Ulum, p. 103. The Yemenite connection of the term in its messianic connotation appears in the tradition on the early stages of Ismaili-Fatimid activity in Yemen. Abt

al-Qasim Hasan b. Farah b. Hawshab al-Kufi, the chief of the IsmailiFatimid da'wah in Yemen, was called mansur by his local followers. Learning

about the messianic expectations with which the term was charged, Abt al-Qasim utilized it by stressing that ‘“‘mansur is an imam, one of the imams from the family of Muhammad” (‘gala lahum: al-mansur imam min aimat al Muhammad (S)’’). As a proof he is said to have recited the verses:

‘When the mansur of Muhammad's family appears, say then to Bant al-‘Abbas: Stand ye up!”’ The transmitter of the tradition adds that “there are many hadiths about

The Da'wa Underground 177 Viewed against this background, it is not difficult to understand

that if the veteran followers of the Hashimiyyah in Ktfah were inclined to support Zayd this tendency was very much stronger in Khurdsan, where the Shrite-‘Alid leanings were even more definitely directed towards the family of ‘Alt b. Husayn, Zayd’s father. This was especially noticeable in connection with Yahya b. Zayd.

Yahya escaped from Kufah after his father’s death and fled to Khuradsan. There he found asylum among the followers of the Shr ah, who kept him in hiding for nearly three years. Concerning one of these followers, al-Huraysh b. ‘Umar of the tribe of Bakr, a resident of Balkh, who hid Yahya in his home, it is related that when he was suspected of harbouring Yahya, he was brought before the local Umayyad governor who ordered him to receive six hundred lashes. In spite of this cruel torture, he refused to reveal Yahya’s whereabouts, saying “Even were he beneath the sole of my foot, | would not lift it from him.’’” This is only one of the many expressions of sympathy which the ‘Alids, and epecially the followers of Zayd, received in Khurasan. The most striking expression of sym-

pathy was demonstrated after Yahya had been put to death and crucified by Nasr b. Sayyar’s men. On that occasion — so Mas‘udr

relates — “the Khurasanites kept mourning for seven days for Yahya b. Zayd in all the regions of Khuradsdan...and every male child born in Khurasan in that year was named Yahydor Zayd by reason of the grief which descended upon the Khurdasdnites and their mourn-

ing for him.’’” Ibn Habib relates: “the Khurdsanites put on black al-mansur.’ On the authority of Ja‘far b. Muhammad (as-Sadiq) it is reported tnat the Prophet said: “The mahdiis one of us; the mansar is one of us.” Another hadith relates that the Prophet also said: ‘“‘Hear the good tidings: the days of the oppressors (jabbarin) are about to end, then the Restorer (Redeemer) shall appear, through whom Allah will restore (unity) to the community of Muhammad. He is the mahadi, the mansur (the victorious). Allah will bring victory to the religion through him’’. There is little doubt that these ideas were already prevalent among Shiite circles in Iraq in the early stages of the development of the Shrah religio-political ideology. See Risdlat Iftitah ad-Da'wah, pp. 32-33. “} Tabari, II, pp. 1770-1771. On the existence of a Shi'ah in Khuradsan with whom Yahya b. Zayd found refuge, see Kuff, VIII, p. 128. Some of the remnants of Zayd’s supporters fled with Yahya to Khurdasan, ibid., p. 126.

Mas‘idi, vol. cit., pp. 212-213.

178 Chapter 6 garments as a sign of mourning for him, and this (black colour) became their dress.’’” Kufi enlarges on this by saying, “there was not a town in Khurasan whose citizens did not put on black raiment and begin to mourn and lament for Zayd b. ‘Alt and his son Yahyab. Zayd and to recount the manner of their slaying.”’”* Yahya was put to death in the year 125/743 and was left impaled on a cross until

the appearance of Abi Muslim in Khurasan.” The year 125 is the year we have been seeking! The year in which the Hashimite Shirah in Khurasan finally turned ‘Abbasid and was once more linked with the name of Muhammad b. ‘All. This step is

intelligible and natural when seen against the background of the distress, depression and pain which the Hashimite Shrah had to endure after Yahya’s death. It was left with a single hope, embodied in the person of the Imam in Humaymah. There was no one but he on whom its supporters could pin their hopes. They turned to him in

the hope that he would avenge the spilt blood of the latest ‘Alid martyrs. In their eyes this was his first, most natural and most important duty.” > Ibn Habib, Muhabbar, p. 484. 74 This subject will be discussed later. However, it is instructive to mention at this point an interesting report recorded by Kufi, which substantiates Ibn Habib’s account. Kufi’s report says that when the Da'wah assumed its open militant form in the time of Abd Muslim, it chose the colour black as a token of mourning for Yahya b. Zayd. This statement corresponds very well with the attempts of the ‘Abbasid Shrah to harness Shrite sentiments to its objectives. Abu Muslim appeared in Khurasan as the avenger of Yahya b. Zayd’s blood. He persecuted whoever was suspected of having taken any part in the murder, just as Mukhtar had done in the case of Husayn b. ‘Ali. The repeated use of slogans connected with avenging the blood of ‘All's family indicates that such slogans deeply impressed the public. The indentification of the Umayyads as the murderers of the Prophet’s family supplied a kind of general Islamic legitimacy for rebelling against them. Ibn Habib, op. cit., pp. 483484; Akhbar, p. 288: Anonyme, fol. 266a; Kuff, VIII, p. 160. Cf. Ibn Khaldun, ‘Tbar, Ill, p. 223. 7> On Yahya b. Zayd’s affair, see Akhbar, pp. 242-244; Ibn Khaldun, vol. cit., pp. 222-223; Kati, VIII, pp. 126-137; Tabari, II, pp. 1770-1774; Ibn Kathir, X, pp. 5-6; Maqatil, pp. 152-158; Gardizi, pp. 89-90. Yahya’s tomb in Sar-iPul (Afganistan) to this day serves as a centre of pilgrimage, See A.D.H. Bivar, ‘“Seljukids Ziydrats of Sar-i-Pul (Afganistan)’’, BSOAS, XXIX, 1966, pp.58-63. 76 Akhbar, p. 241. Yahya b. Zayd was also Abii Hashim’s grandson, his mother,

The Da‘wa Underground 179 Van Vloten held the view that the deaths of Zayd b. ‘Ali and his son Yahya created a situation which enabled the ‘Abbasid propagandists to begin to construct their theory of the right of the ‘Abbasids to rule. In this view, Zayd’s fall was a disappointment to the Shrites, since the messianic hopes they had placed on him were now shattered; it was proved that he was not the mahdt. Their disappointment increased after the death of his son Yahya, when they lost all their hopes in this branch of the Prophet’s family. A€cording to Van Vloten, it was in the context of these events that the ‘Abbasids were able to come forward and place themselves at the heart of Shiite aspirations.” Van Vloten’s theory is inaccurate, first and foremost because the reaction in Khurasan to the disasters which befell Zayd and Yahya was one of pain rather than disappointment.” This reaction was like that of the Shrah after the death of Husayn. There had been painful regret that ason of the Prophet had been slain in their midst and that they had failed to help him; as a result of this regret, there had been an upsurge of eagerness to avenge his blood. The ‘Abbasids, in the year 125, found themselves in a situation analogous to that of the

tawwabun and Mukhtar 6O years earlier. To a great extent they re-enacted Mukhtar’s actions, but where he had failed, they succeeded. Van Vloten did not have at his disposal materials now available; we know today that by the year 125 the Da‘wah propagan-

dists had not yet created the idea of the ‘Abbasid family’s priority over the ‘Alids; all traditions to this effect are of a later date. These traditions represent the official retrospective reconstrucRaytah, being Abu Hashim’s daughter. Ibn Sa‘d, V, p. 241.

77 Van Vloten, pp. 60-61. 78 Van Vioten built his theory on Tabari, II, 1676. According to this report, the Shrah said to Zayd: ‘““We hope that you are the victorious one and that this is the time of Banu Umayyah’s extinction” (“inna narjué an takin al-mansur wa-anna hadha az-zaman al-ladhi tuhlak fthi Bani Umayyah’’). Cf. Ano-

nyme, fol. 207a. It is questionable whether the term mansur here has a messianic meaning. However, Maqrizi quotes a poem deriding Zayd in which the pro-Umayyad poet says: “We have crucified your Zayd on a palm beam But we have never thought that a mahdi on a beam is crucified.”’

Maqrizi, an-Niza wa-at-Takhdsum, p. 14. Cf. Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 3b.

180 Chapter 6 tion of the Da‘wah’s early history and seek to prove that Khurasan was from the outset an ‘Abbasid centre alone whereas Kiifah was an

‘Alid one.” This reconstruction grew out of the special status accorded to the Khurds4nites in the ‘Abbasid state. Recently, Muhammad Rekaya has argued, basing himself on these reconstructed traditions (against Wellhausen and the present writer), that Khurasan should be viewed as an ‘Abbasid centre and not ‘Alid. “It does not

fit,’ he says, “to pose the ‘Abbdsiyyah against the Hashimiyyah,

both being synonymous, not different from each other. First, because the Hashimiyyah was more numerous in Kiafah than in Khurasan, which was an ‘Abbasid and not an ‘Alid centre; second, because the people who followed Khidash and whose names we know, such as Malik b. al-Haytham al-Khuza‘t and al-Huraysh b. Sulayman mawla Khuza‘ah, found themselves anew in the ‘Abbasid side after Khidash had been rejected; and third, because the oppo-

nents of the ‘Abbasids were the Fatimids...who opposed the Has himiyyah.”®

These arguments are erroneous. To begin with the last one: the Fatimid argument is erroneous since the whole Fatimid ideology appeared, as we have shown, only after the ‘Abbasids were already in

power. The Khurdasanite public in those early days was far from being aware of the difference among the various sons of ‘Ali b. Abu Talib. The argument that supporters of Khidash found themselves on the ‘Abbasid side is not at all surprising. We shall presently see how the whole Khurasanite centre, including all its leaders, transferred its allegiance to the ‘Abbasid Imam, who then completely reorganized it. As for the first argument, that the Hashimiyyah and the ‘Abbdsiyyah are synonymous, this is exactly what the ‘Abbasid traditions strove so hard to prove up to the days of Caliph al-Mahdz, as we have already seen. In reality, the picture was totally different:

for the Hashimiyyah was not always identified with the ‘Abba77 See e.g. Akhbar, pp. 199-200. It was along these lines that the tradition (quoted at the beginning of this book) concerning the political characteristics

of each of the provinces of the Islamic Empire was created: Hijaz — Abu Bakrite and ‘Umarite; Syria — Sufyanite-Marwa4nite; Jazirah — Kharijite: Kufah — ‘Alid. Only Khuradsan remained free of any political inclinations and

was thus — ‘Abbasid.

80 Rekaya, pp. 177-178.

The Da‘'wa Underground 181 siyyah; it had been an independent movement for 38 years from the

time it was born, after the collapse of Mukhtar’s revolt, until the year 125. It had engaged in independent activity both in Iraq and Khurdsan and only in that year did it undergo the final transformation whereby the general loyalty to the House of ‘Ali began to focus on the ‘Abbasids. This is the meaning of the detailed apocalyptic tradition in the Leiden Anonyme, quoted above in note 33, which

specified the year 125 (idhad kanat sanat khams wa- ishrin wami ah) as the date of the appearance of the black banners. Now that it has become clear why a renewal of the ties between the centre in Khurasan and the Imam in Humaymah became both necessary and possible in the year 125, we can clarify the words of an

interesting tradition, unique of its kind, which appears in the Akhbar al-’Abbas. The tradition runs as follows: Zayd b. ‘Ali was slain in Kifah and his son Yahya b. Zayd was slain

at Jizjan in Khurasan’ during the governorship of Nasr b. Sayyar al-Kinani, who sent against him Salim b. Ahwaz at-Tamimi and [the latter] slew him. He (Nasr, M.S.) wished to crucify him, but they did not know how to crucify him properly. A man from Iraq passed by and taught them [the method of crucifixion] and they crucified him (Yahya) in Juzjan. It was this deed that caused the rising of the Khurasanites and of their du‘at. Muhammad b. ‘Ali called upon them to obey the family of the Prophet, and [then] Qahtabah b. Shabib came unto him at the time of the Hajj.®!

This tradition both summarizes and offers decisive proof of our argumentation concerning the episode of Khidash and the state of the Da‘wah in Khurasan during the period of his activity and after his death. Only after the deaths of Zayd and his son Yahya did the real activity of the ‘Abbasid Da‘wah begin in Khurasan. Indeed, it would almost be correct to say that a purely ‘Abbasid propaganda did

not exist there before this time. Wellhausen was right in calling attention to the fact that the centre of the Da‘wah in Khurasan became more independent after the downfall of Khidash and that this independence was expressed in the form of the direct, personal 81 Akhbar, p. 167.

182 Chapter 6 link which developed between the Khurasdnite leaders and the Imam.” Changes occurred also in the leadership of the centre in Kufah. Bukayr b. Mahan died in the year 127/744-745 and his place was taken by Abd Salamah, Hafs b. Sulayman al-Khallal, a mawla of the Sabi tribe (from Hamdan).® The latter, like Bukayr b. Mahan before him, sought to preserve the traditional link between Ktfah

and Khurasan. Following Bukayr’s death, he went to Khurasan where he was given a friendly reception; the Khurasanites even sent their gifts to the Imam through him, thus expressing their recognition of his honourable status in the movement.* But this recogni-

tion notwithstanding, they sought to maintain their separateness and independence under the leadership of Sulayman b. Kathir. As for Khidash, with whom we were concerned at the outset of this discussion, the ‘Abbasid traditions about the Da‘wah turned him into a black sheep. They did all they could to blur his image and

blacken his name, both because his activity was not viewed with favour and because his sympathizers continued to be active even after the ‘Abbasid rise to power. Thus a tradition was created alleging that his nickname “Khidash”’ or ““Khaddash”’ was derived from

the verb kh-d-sh, meaning to tear apart “‘because he tore the religion apart’ (khadasha ad-din),® while another tradition told that he was really a Christian from Hirah masquerading as a Muslim.®° A further tradition of this kind says that it was the “Abbasid supporters who revolted against him and slew him because of his opinions.®’ In a poem composed by Abd as-Sari al-A‘ma he was accused of nearly every possible deviation from Islam: of rafd, of takharrum and even of extreme kharijism according to the doctrines of the azdrigah.* It is evident from this that the charge of preaching 82 Tabari, II, p. 1916; Baladhuri, Ansab, II, pp. 118-119. Wellhausen, pp. 517-518. 83 = Tabart, loc. cit., Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 118. Abad Salamah was a moneychanger (sayrafi), according to one report quoted by Baladhurt.

84 Tabari, II, 1917. 8° = Tabari, II, 1503; Baladhurt, ibid. 86 = Baladhuri, vol. cit., p. 117; Ibn Khaldin, ‘Ibar, UI, p. 217.

87 Baladhurt, loc. cit. 88 = Ibid., p. 118. Cf., An-Nashi’ al-Akbar, p. 33. Van Ess assumed that the poet is Madan ash-Shumaytt.

The Da'wa Underground 183 the doctrines of khurramiyyah or khurramdiniyyah was only one of a longer list of accusations intended to represent him as an enemy of Islam; this charge should no more be treated as objective fact than that which depicts him, for example, as a khdariji-azraqi.”

The Development of Khidash’s Image in the ‘Abbasid Tradition It is evident that the ‘Abbasid tradition rejecting Khidash did not appear full blown. It was impossible to denigrate his name as long as

those who knew the truth were still alive; nobody could convince 89 | am tempted to present a theory of how the connection between Khidash and the Khurrdmiyyah was created. There is no doubt that the traditions about such a connection date from the time when the official ‘Abbasid version of

the Da‘wah crystalized, that is, most probably after the Khurramiyyah appeared as a dangerous militant movement in Babek’s rebellion during the

reign of Ma’mtm (198/813 — 218/833). The chroniclers confused two separate movements, both called Fatimiyyah. One of these movements emerged in Khurasan after the death of Abi Muslim (Sha‘ban, 137/Jan.-Feb., 755). It emerged in Iranian circles and might have professed ideas similar to

those attributed to the Khurrdmiyyah. Mas‘tdi says that the movement focussed its ideology on the image of Abi Muslim. However, it had two factions: one which held that Abd Muslim had not died and that he would appear as a mahdi at the End of Days to fill the world with justice and truth; the other, which said that after the death of Abd Muslim his imamah had passed to his daughter, Fatimah. This latter faction came thus to be known by the name Fatimiyyah. The movement participated ina rebellion (755) against Caliph Mansur under the slogan of revenge for the blood of Abu Muslim. (Ta'rikh Baghdad, X, p. 207). Its leader was an Iranian called Sinpadh. Noldeke rejects the Islamic traditions which present him as a Zoroastrian or a Mazdaqite. He argues that Sinpadh might have belonged to a half-Islamic sect which the majority of the people could naturally have accepted as fully Islamic. (Néldeke, p. 118). The other Fatimiyyah movement is the one mentioned by the author of the Akhbar (p. 403) namely the one that continued Khidash’s movement. It was called Khdlidiyyah but later, in Manstir’s time, Fatimiyyah, because it supported the claims of the descendants of Fatimah, the Prophet’s daughter. Both movements, Sinpadh’s and Abt Kh§lid’s, acted almost simultaneously

in the region of Nishapir. It is not surprising that the traditions confused two movements bearing the same name, and it is not hard to see that the ‘Abbasids were very interested in maintaining such confusion between the Khidashite-Khalidite Fatimiyyah and the Khurradmite militant Fatimiyyah in

184 Chapter 6 them that he had worked against Islam. The official ‘Abbasid tradition which distorted his image began to evolve only after the majority of the Da'wah’s veteran leaders were already dead. This is the

tradition which has been preserved, on the whole, in the major chronicles and in the heresiographies and which tends to be anachronistic, by projecting the present back into the past. The official reconstruction of Khidash’s image and the role went through several stages. Thanks to the Anonyme of Leiden, we know

the earliest stage. Just as the traditions preserved in this work Support our thesis about the year 125 being the key date in the transformation of the Khurdsanite Hashimiyyah into an ‘Abbasid movement, they also support our interpretation of Khidash’s activity. Initially, the “Abbasids were far from disowning Khidash; on the

contrary, they strove very hard to attribute his achievements to themselves. The earliest layers of the ‘Abbasid official history connected his name with Muhammad b. ‘Ali himself. The tradition of the Anonyme of Leiden says that it was Muhammad b. ‘Ali who sent Khidash to Khurasan to replace Kathir b. Sa‘d,”° who had also been the Imam’s emissary. Within the framework of this official reconstruction, Muhammad b. ‘Ali was made the recognized leader of the Khurdsanite centre from the very start of its activity. Moreover, he is presented as the one who initiated and activated the Da‘wah in all the major provinces of the Empire. “Muhammad b. ‘Aliscattered his

emissaries in the four regions (kana gad baththa rusulahu fi alaqalim al-arba‘), Hijaz, Iraq, Syria and Khurasan’’.”’ It is evident that this tradition belongs to the realm of legends concerning the ‘Abbasid forefathers. But precisely because of this, it is important to examine how Khidash’s image is reflected in it. His real name, we are the 9th century. See Mas‘iidi, vol. cit., pp. 293-294. The fact that an-Nashi’ al- Akbar associated the Khidashiyyah with the Muslimiyyah and called them both Khurramiyyah strengthens our theory. See an-Nashi’ al-Akbar, pp. 32-35: Sharon, ““Khidash’’, EJ*. Cf. Ibn Khaldin, ‘Ibar, Ill, p. 217; Baghdadi, pp. 160-161; Ibn an-Nadim, Fihrist, pp. 344-345; Margolioth, “Khurra-

miyyah’, El, and a detailed discussion, Rekaya, pp. 171-186; Lassner, ‘Abbasid Rule, p. 111. See also note 13 above. 90 ~MS.: Said. The report that Muhammad b. ‘Alt sent Khidash to Khurasan appears later on in all the sources known to us. Cf., an-Nashi’ al- Akbar, p. 34.

91 Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 4b.

The Da‘'wa Underground 185 told, was ‘Ammar b. Dawid (!). When he was sent to Khurasan, the Imam ordered him to change his name to Khidash b. Yazid. It is, therefore, evident that the name-exegesis which attributed a dero-

gatory meaning to his name was also a later creation which must have come into existence together with the hadith, assuring us that the Prophet detested the name Khidash.”’ The tradition contains no details about the nature or duration of his activity in Khurasan, but does describe his torture and death at the hands of Asad b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasri. Of the contents of his propaganda, it is only said that he

summoned the Khurdasanites to “certain things’ (da’ahum liashya’). One can hardly expect an elaboration of those “‘certain things”’ in an official ‘Abbasid history. When this tradition was created, however, those concerned knew that the “‘certain things” related to the question of the Khurdsanites’ loyalty to the original

‘Alid-Hashimiyyah rather than to the ‘Abbasids as such. This tradition is so transparent that when reading it one is constantly tempted to add the missing names when the tradition avoids mentioning them. After the execution of Khidash and of a few other

leaders of the movement, a Khurdasanite delegation comes to Muhammad b. ‘Alito bring him the bad news. The following conver-

sation between them is instructive. Muhammad: “This you deserve because of my anger.’

They: “And what is the sin?” Muhammad: “For you have accepted from the enemy of Allah,

Khidash, whatever he had presented you with, including that which he had changed and altered (ghayyara wabaddala).”

They: “But it was you who sent him [to us]as a trustworthy person, and we believed him.” At this point the tradition adds a sentence: “It was Muhammad b. ‘Ali himself who ordered him to change in order to examine if they (the Khurasdnites) would remain loyal to him in any circumstances (in times of anger as well as satisfaction) or not. Hearing this, they

said: ‘We bow to your order as well as to your forbidding.’ He 92 Ibn Wahb, Jami‘, Cairo, 1939, p. 97, quoted by M.J. Kister, ““Call yourselves by graceful names’, Lectures in menory of Martin M. Plessner, Jerusalem, 1975, p. 12.

186 Chapter 6 believed them and forgave them.’’”’ The importance of this tradition lies in its strong ending, which implies that Khidash was Muhammad b. ‘Ali’s loyal emissary and even if he apparently did follow a course contrary to the ‘Abbasid interests, he did so in adherence to the whims of his master. There can hardly be a question that the tradition, representing as it does an early layer of the official ‘Abbasid history, reflects the perplexity of the ‘Abbasids with regard to Khidash. Because of his tremendous influence on the Khurasanites, who no doubt knew the truth about

him, the ‘Abbasids were obliged to present him as an ‘Abbasid emissary. Only gradually and over a considerable period of time was his image transformed to that of the enemy of God. Khidash’s death

did not result in the obliteration of his name. On the contrary, a whole movement grew up faithful to his memory. In just the same way a similar movement grew up around the image of Abt Muslim after his murder. The heresiographers called both these movements ‘“Khurramiyyah’’. An-Nashi’ al-Akbar speaks about two types of

Khurrdmiyyah in connection with these two men: The Khurrdmiyyah of Khurdsan venerates Khidash, whereas the Khurramiyyah

of the Jibal respects Abt Muslim. Since the heresiographers reflected the past in the mirror of their times, it is not difficult to see how ideas that flourished some 150-200 years after Khidash’s death

were attributed to him.

The Structure of the Da'wah Centre in Khurasan One of the difficulties in determining the true facts about the Da‘wah’s organizational structure and its history stems from the image which the official ‘Abbasid propaganda and sources gave to the movement. The ‘Abbasids regarded their movement as the renewal of Islam in its pristine form. They considered themselves the

Prophet’s heirs not only because they had succeeded him in the actual leadership of the Muslim community, but also because they

regarded themselves as continuing his original spiritual legacy, % Anonyme, Leiden, fols. 5b—6a.

The Da'wa Underground 187 though not his Divine mission. They consequently drew a parallel between the history of their Da‘wah and the Sirah, the history of the Prophet’s life and activities. Just as the Prophet had appeared with the idea of Islam, presenting it as the renewal of the religion of Abraham, and had fought for it against the unbelieving Meccans led by Abu-Sufyan, the leader of the Umayyads, so did the ‘Abbasids appear as the fighters for the renewal of the Islam of the Prophet against the successors of Abu-Sufyan, the Umayyad caliphs. And just as Mutammad had sought supporters and followers — ansar — and had found them outside Mecca, among the Aws and Khazraj tribes in Madinah, so did the ‘Abbasids seek and find ansar of their own among the Khurasanites. Later, when the ‘Abbasids were in power, Jahiz tells us, the Khurdsanites boasted that: “‘Al-ansar ansaran: al-Aws wa-al-Khazraj nasaru an-nabiyy...fi awwal azzaman wa-ahl Khurasan nasara warathatahu fi akhir az-zaman’™ — “The ansdr are two: Aws and Khazraj helped the Prophet at the beginning of Time and the Khurdsdnians helped his heirs at the End of Days’’. As far as the ‘Abbasids were concerned, their dawlah was the “akhir az-zaman’”’ — the millennium awaited by Islam, the End

of Days associated with the appearance of the mahdi who would restore Islam to its purity and would establish justice and righteous-

ness in the world in place of oppression and wickedness. The Umayyads represented the jawr and the zulm — the injustice and oppression; the ‘Abbasid Caliphate represented the rule of ‘adl and haqq — the justice and uprightness of Islam. Hence, messianic elements penetrated into the traditions describing the Da‘ wah; after the rise of the ‘Abbasids these were expressed clearly and openly in the messianic titles which the caliphs took for themselves, such as Al-Mansur and Al-Mahdi, titles which were not adopted by the first four Caliphs, nor by the Umayyads.” One of the clearest expressions 4 -Jahiz, ““Mandqib”’, Rasdil, p. 15; and see Yaqut, Buldan, Il, 413. °° Lewis, “The regnal titles...”, pp. 13-15; idem., ““An apocalyptic vision’, p. 308. The ‘Abbasid tradition put very clear words into Muhammad b. ‘Al's mouth concerning the messianic nature of the ‘Abbasid caliphate. “‘The first of my sons will be Ibn al-Harithiyyah and after him they will succeed one another... and from amongst them will be the mahdi who will fill the earth with justice, just as it is now full of evil.’’ Akhbar, p. 207. The leaders of the Da'wah reportedly said to Muhammad b. ‘All: “‘la‘alla allah yuhyt bika al-‘adl

188 Chapter 6 of this messianic idea in the history of the Da‘wah is presented in a tradition which dates the beginning of the activities of the move-

ment to the year 100, that is, at the beginning of a century.” Another tradition attributes to Muhammad b. ‘Ali an instruction to his propagandists not to appear before the year 100 because that was the number of years of ‘‘the owner of the ass” (Sahib al-Himar).”

The beginning of a new century in Islam, like a millennium in Christianity, was a time of messianic expectations: it is therefore understandable that the ‘Abbasid traditions reconstructed the history of the Da‘wah with the deliberate intention of demonstrating that the movement fulfilled these messianic expectations.” In the course of reconstructing the period of the Prophet's activity wa-yumit bika al-jawr fa-inna hadha waqt dhalika wa-awanuhu al-ladht wajadnadhu ma’thur ‘an ‘ulama’ind — Perhaps Allah will resurrect through you justice and cause evil to die, for the Time and Date are up, as we found it

transmitted by our scholars (who possess the knowledge of tradition).”’

Dinawari, p. 334. Mas‘idi’s report (Tanbih, pp. 335-336) that the Umayyads had regnal titles similar to these of the ‘Abbasids does not seem trustworthy even to Mas'‘tidi himself.

°6 Tabari, II, 1358; Ibn Kathir, IX, p. 189. 7 Akhbar, p. 193. Dinawari, loc. cit.; Kiff, VII, pp. 154-155; Ibn Isfandyar, Tarikh-i-Tabaristdn, p. 166. The Anonyme explains that when a hundred years are mentioned it means that the “rule of Banti Umayyah approached one hundred years in the time of Marwan (the 2nd). For that reason, he was called ‘Marwan the Ass’ (Marwan al-Himar).’” Anonyme, fol. 250 a. Another tradition in the Anonyme (1967), fol 234a says that Qur‘dn verse 3 in Sura 97 refers to the thousand months of BanG Umayyah’s rule. It adds that, in fact,

they did rule this long plus two more years. Since the idea of the end of a century or the beginning of a new century did not correspond to the actual facts, an ‘Abbasid tradition was invented which harmonized the eschatological vision with reality. It speaks about the twenties of each century. It was said about Muhammad b. ‘Ali that he used to say: ‘In the twenties of each epoch, after the passage of a century there is good”

(‘bi-‘ishrin fi kulli hin idhd jazat al-mi'ah, yakin khayr in shda allah’), Anonyme, Leiden, fol. 4a. See also Ibn Badrtin, (ed. Dozy) pp. 213-214 (Cairo ed., pp. 209-210); Gardizi, p. 90. The usage “the owner of the ass” (sahib al-himdar) is based on the Qur'an II/259. Cf. Zakharia IX:9: ...““behold thy king cometh unto thee: he is just and having salvation; lowly and riding upon an ass and upon a colt the foal of an ass."’ Matthew, XXI:1-11. And see the discussion on the subject in Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin, 98a; ‘‘Mes-

siah” Jewish Encyclopaedia, Eisenstein, Ozar Midrashim, p. 552. °8 On the messianic expectation in Christian Europe in the Middle Ages see N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, London, 1962.

The Da‘wa Underground 189 in the history of the Da‘wah, the ‘Abbasid traditions relate that, just as the Prophet in his time had directed the call of Islam to Yathrib

through the agency of 12 nugaba@ and 70 du‘at, so also did the ‘Abbasid Da’wah when operating among its own ansar in Khurasan.”’ At the same time, we know from the traditions transmitted by the author of Akhbar al-'Abbas that the Da‘'wah centrein Khurasan

was organized as a hierarchy of propagandists, all of whom are known to us by name. Even if we assume that the later traditions inserted names of persons who had not taken part in the Da‘wah, so that they might be granted the prerogatives accorded to the Khurasanites and their descendants after the ‘Abbasids had come to power, we must, nevertheless, accept as authentic the basic organizational

structure of the Khurdsanite centre which the author of Akhbar al-‘Abbas sets out for the first time in full detail. He attributes the fixing of this structure to Bukayr b. Mahan who came to Khurdas4an after the death of Khidash.'° Since he does not

give any date, we must assume that it occurred at the time of Bukayr’s last visit to Khurasan, that is, in the year 126,'°' since on his previous visits there he had been ignominiously rejected by the Khurdsanites who remained faithful to the teachings of Khidash.'” Since 126 was the last year of Bukayr’s life, one must assume that if he did play any part in determining the organizational structure of the Khurasanite centre, that part must have been limited to authorizing a state of affairs which had been brought about there during the long years of Khidash’s activity. A suggestion that Bukayr’s last act in Khurasan was, indeed, performed in 126 is to be found in the

words of the author of the Akhbar, who states that Bukayr b. Mahan organized the Shiah when the tribal struggle was being renewed in Khurasan (“lammad idtaraba amr Khurasan’).'° ” — Tabari, I, 1358, 1988; Azdi, p.26. The harmony between 12 nuqaba’ — 70 du'dat, and the year 100 aroused Wellhausen’s suspicions (p. 506 and note) about the authenticity of the whole story.

00 Akhbar, p. 213. ! Tabart, Il, p. 1869. 102 Ibid., p. 1640. The year 126, in which Caliph Walid [1 was murdered, represents a turning

point in the Umayyad fortunes. In this year, intertribal war broke out throughout the whole eastern part of the Empire. The early Muslim histori-

190 Chapter 6 The traditions in Akhbar al-‘Abbdas which describe the organiza-

tion of the Da‘wah centre in Khurdsan are unique and extremely detailed. They include a document which can be regarded as a sort of

‘Convention of the Da‘wah in Khurdsan.”’ This document was drawn up at the end of a conference at which the leaders of the Da‘wah discussed with Bukayr b. Mahan the principles and practical

steps to be adopted in conducting the movement. One of the main problems which they discussed was how to avoid the intrusion of undesirable individuals into the closed and secret circle of the move-

ment. The difficulties they had experienced as the result of Khidash’s activities meant that everything must be done to prevent the

recurrence of something similar that might again deprive the ‘Abbasid Imam of his control over the movement and even completely destroy the whole enterprise. Moreover, the movement stood on the threshold of a period of considerable expansion in other parts

of Khurasan, far from the centre at Marw. Clandestine activity on such a scale rendered it necessary that every precaution be taken to guard against premature discovery by the authorities. It followed that procedures had to be defined and principles laid down to enable

every new recruit to the movement to be kept under observation. ‘Indeed one must thank Allah profoundly’, said Bukayr at that meeting, “for every man who answers your call...but there is no assurance that someone who is not like you will not penetrate into your midst.” (“Wa-qad yuhmadu Allah kathiran biman yastajibu lakum...(wa) la yu’ manu an yadkhula‘alaykum man laysa sha’ nuhu sha’nakum.”’)'°* The most efficient way of controlling the propa-

ganda activity and recruitment was to set up a supreme body of propagandists, a kind of exclusive managerial committee, to use modern terms, which would head the movement, maintain a contact with the centres to the west — Humaymah and Ktfah — and would be aided by a wider body of propagandists operating both in the area around Marw and also elsewhere in Khuras4n. There is no reason to doubt that out of a desire to remain faithful to the basic principle of ans and traditionalists single this year out as a landmark in Muslim history. See Ibn al-Kalbt, Jamharah, fol. 90a; Akhbar, loc. cit.; Tabart, II, 1855 ff. Cf. Anonyme (1967) fol. 231a. 104 Akhbar, p. 214.

The Dawa Underground 191 the Prophet’s sunnah, in which lay the core of the Da‘wah’s thinking, it was decided, following the Prophet’s example, that the higher body should number 12 men, to be called the nuqaba’, and the wider body of propagandists would number 70, to be called the du‘at. The numbers 12 and 70 were undoubtedly arbitrary, especially the latter. As time went on, the movement needed a larger number of du'at and

the internal organizational network was extended beyond these numerical limits. Nevertheless, the information given by the tradition that the Da‘wah organization was originally based on a pattern of 12 and 70 should not be dismissed out of hand. Particularly in this case, the account of events presented by the traditions, which compare them with the time of the Prophet and the words of the Qur an,

should be accepted as reliable. | |

Let us now see how these facts are presented in the document which we have called the “Convention of the Da‘wahin Khurdasan ’.

The Convention The document is transmitted on the authority of Musa b. Musa al-Jurjani, who was one of the first men in Jurjan to join the Da‘wah.!® It was recorded by Abi-Salih, Kamil b. al-Muzaffar, a mawla of Hamdan, whom we shall meet later on as one who fulfilled

an important function in dealing with the registers and correspondence of the Da‘wah. He was the man who read the letters which reached the leaders of the Da‘wah in Khurasan.! It appears that he had received the education of a katib (scribe) and knew how to read, write and compose letters and documents. The Convention reads as follows: ‘In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate. The first ones determined the way (sunnah) and the latter ones act accordingly. God says: “And Moses chose his people, 70 men, to meet with us.’*°” And He said in another verse: ‘And We raised up

5 Ibid., p. 215. 16 Ibid., pp. 213, 215, 279. 107 Q, VII/155. cf. Exodus, XXIV:1.

192 Chapter 6 from amongst them [from the children of Israel] 12 leaders.’!°8 And to the Messenger of Allah, on the night of the ‘Aqabah, came

70 men of the Aws and Khazraj tribes and swore allegiance (baya uhu) to him. Thereafter he appointed from their midst 12 leaders (ithna ‘ashar naqib), and surely your sunnah is the sunnah of the Children of Israel and the sunnah of the Prophet, peace be upon him. ‘Those present agreed upon 12 men, chosen from amongst the people of Marw, namely: 1. Abu ‘Abd al-Hamid, Qahtabah b. Shabib from Tay’, of the Banu Nabhan. 2. Abt an-Najm, ‘Imran b. Isma‘il, mawld of Al Abt-Mu‘ayt. 3. Abd Muhammad, Sulayman b. Kathir, of Khuzaah from Bant Aslam fin this tribe] 4. Abt Nasr, Malik b. al-Haytham, of Khuza‘ah from Bant Ka‘b fin this tribe]. 5. Aba Mansur, Talhah b. Ruzayg, the mawla of Talhah atTalahat fof Khuza‘ah}..?° 6. Abu al-Hakam, ‘sa b. A‘yan, the mawld of Ibn-Buraydah b. al-Khasib from Banu Aslam [of Khuza‘ah]. 7. Aba Hamzah, ‘Amr b. A‘yan, mawld of Khuza‘ah’”’ in place of

al-‘Ala’ b. al-Hurayth.!" 1068 ~Q, V/12. The numbers 12 and 70 had been firmly connected with the Prophet’s activity long time before the Da‘wah. In Wahb b. Munabbih’s Sirah, the Prophet selected his 12 nugaba and 70 du‘at saying that by doing so he was following at the footsteps of Moses and Christ. By the time the Da‘wah formed its organizational bodies, these two numbers must have become popular in their Islamic interpretation. The tradition about the usage of the terms du‘at and nuqaba, as well as that of the numbers 12 and 70, by the leaders of the Da'wah is, therefore, genuine and not a later insertion into the harmonized official history manufactured in the ‘Abbasid court. See Kis-

ter, “Papyrus account’, p. 138 note 22. 109 Abt Manstr Talhah b. Ruzayq (or Zurayq, such transposition of similar letters in Arabic being common) was in charge of reading the Imam’s letters to the du‘at and writing the reports to him. This function should be understood as part of the secret mode of communication between the Imam and the Khurasanite centre. Jahshiyari, p. 84; Akhbar, p. 270.

110 The addition from Tabari, II, p. 1358. 111 Al-‘Ala’ b. al-Hurayth, a Khuza‘aite, was nominated, as we shall see, propagandist in Khwarizm and consequently could not be enumerated among the

The Da'wa Underground 193 8. Abt Dawdad, Khalid b. Ibrahim, of Rabrah [from Bant ‘Amr b.

, Shayban!??] of Band Dhuhl fin this tribe] 9. Abu ‘Ali, Shibl b. Tahman, mawld of Bant Asad, and [others] say [that he was] mawla of Azd.1? 10. Aba ‘Uyaynah, Masa b. Ka‘b of Tamim, from Bantu Imru’ al-Qays, b. Zayd Manat.

11. Aba Ja‘far, Lahiz b. Qurayz of Tamim, from Bant Imrw’ al-Qays'** [in this tribe} 12. Abu Sahl (?)'!? (Qasim}*® b. Mujashi’ from Banu Imrt’ alQays [from Tamim] He replaced Bukayr b. ‘Abbas when the latter became blind (hina ‘amiya).1!’ After this they proceeded to choose the rest of the 70 (bdaqi as-sab‘in), that is, 58 men

from among the inhabitants of Marw and other places in Khurasan, according to the following distribution: 40 men from the inhabitants of Marw...etc...”’

There follows a list of the 40 men. The list makes it apparent that no fewer than 21 came from a wide range of northern and southern

Arab tribes: from Tamim (primarily Murrah), Dabbah, Sulaym, Banu Hanifah (Rabi ah), Khuza‘ah and Azd. Another four are mentioned specifically as the mawaliof Arab tribes, mainly Hamdan and 12 nuqaba of Marw. See below n. 118. In the discussions which preceded these nominations, al-‘Ala’ appeared as one of the chief speakers. He argued that the nugabd@’ should not be nominated arbitrarily, since there was no assurance that the leaders in the other regions would accept their authority. Consequently, Bukayr stated that the nugaba’ were the leaders of the movement only in Marw and its environs, whereas in the other parts of Khurasan each dai had the status of a nagib (amma sd@ ir al-kuwar fa-kull dai biha nagib). Akhbar, p. 215.

‘2 The addition from Tabari, Il, p. 1988. 3 According to Azdi, p. 26, he belonged to the tribe of Shayban, but Tabari says that he was Harawi and a mawla of Banti Hanifah (Rabrah — Bakr b. Wail). Tabart, II, p. 1358. One may safely conclude, that this means he was a mawla of Asad (Asad-Rabrah).

4 Lahiz b. Qurayz was Sulayman b. Kathir’s son-in-law. He was nominated naqib by the influence of his father-in-law, instead of another Tamimite who

was Originally designated for the post. The injured man bore resentment against Ibn Kathir from then on.Akhbar, p. 220.

"3 Akhbar, p. 217. "6 The addition from Tabari, II, p. 1358. Cf. Azdi, p. 26; Jahiz, Ras@il, I, p. 22. ''7 This list corresponds to the one in Tabari, loc. cit. Cf., ibid., p. 1988; Azdi, loc. cit.; Gardizi, p. 89.

a:.| :;i:|.

YS f MD i ee peer | ee , ee eee ee a jt i Ce ee ae li, ges li , " js i ee 7 I UN cay ‘oe , Po a A ON 2 Ny #8 p a Poe “J co he ‘ : et « Saw 4, | eee ee a | 2 —_ OOS eee ee 7 4 ee » 4 Fy, We Ni a |ey oe POO eas i | = a fp Ne _o : eee “i ° "Mesa 4 |Lp ee eee hy % SS om, % 4 i fp SEA SER Se a “ai, uh u |eee SSR te am S88 a athe a ie EN / PE IVE OS ee, Fee \ eee a \ ne iy 5A i :| ee eee oa DAY CU | Serre. eee ite ie CO a ‘ a rr seer | ‘sci OO EE i i ee I oe, a [ an o es ] Tee oe ee eeeeOE eeae| oh ‘ |Si,i‘'\ De OM ES iui OE "bain BA we Ree 2 saa ee OO Ad 4 ee ee a P : oe ae. 7 AN Me |. \ ty | rr a a os “ing % 4 ’ | es, Bs, oi i. aye ao x. ae : i; ] fies ‘i : k hw “i, we OO i |E Damghan Rd ee | [ ren ae ae 4 /1 yy wee “ i... | i eG OO a 7 :)|E|i‘“avma ran j Sy i ——_. ee iHerat So DOE: AGT oT GE ap “i a y 4 i Ad oe i tw See ee a @ (apas | athal 7 \ fey oe ||:o.||aa @ Yard 7 “|Frew | | “~_ | gw NS 7 Seal wat Poe ES hal ah Ou iy 7 Nail | m Karman 7 Kirman i io,oytakhe 3i ayeEa'| al | ese ia Wye ACTIVITY IN KHURAS : ee ee . fs Ne Siggy », i ae ii NN ARI ON RG aU Ue UE ee Ran UH ee CN RRL

|ee eeSone ee eee eee Us OE OE 4ai( WE OSES SUES Wee ee ee