Biosecurity in Putins Russia 9781626377134

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BIOSECURITY in PUTIN’S RUSSIA

BIOSECURITY in PUTIN’S RUSSIA Raymond A. Zilinskas Philippe Mauger

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2018 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

© 2018 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Zilinskas, Raymond A., author. | Mauger, Philippe, 1991– author. Title: Biosecurity in Putin’s Russia / by Raymond A. Zilinskas and Philippe Mauger. Description: Boulder, Colorado : Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017041825 (print) | LCCN 2017059027 (e-book) | ISBN 9781626377134 (e-book) | ISBN 9781626376984 (hardcover : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Biological weapons—Russia (Federation) | Biotechnology—Government policy—Russia (Federation) | Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1972 April 10) Classification: LCC UG447.8 (ebook) | LCC UG447.8 .Z55 2018 (print) | DDC 358/.384—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017041825

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

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Contents

List of Tables and Figures Acknowledgments

vii ix

1

Putin’s Direction in the Biosciences Notes 6

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The Legacy of the Soviet Union’s Biological Warfare Program The First-Generation Program, 1928–1971 7 The Second-Generation Program, 1972–1992 9 Legacy in Russia 10 Conclusions 23 Notes 25

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Russian Biosecurity and Military Modernization Russia’s Military R&D Doctrine 35 Biosecurity Threat Perceptions and Biodefense Programming 51 A Warning Sign: The Hawks Within the NBC Troops 66 Conclusions 68 Annex 3.1 Selected Russian Documents and Statements 75 Annex 3.2 Russia’s Science and Technology Priorities Since 2002 76 Notes 77

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Biodefense and High-Technology Research and Development Russian Ministry of Defense Institutions 91 Military Institutions Responsible for Advanced Weapons Acquisition Planning and R&D 115 Select Military-Industrial Complex Institutions 125 Civilian Research Institutes with Biodefense Roles 131

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Contents

Open Financial Flows Throughout Both Military and Civilian Networks 154 Conclusions 159 Annex 4.1 A 2008 NBC Troops’ Tender Describing Future Infrastructure Work 162 Annex 4.2 Russia’s Scientific Electronic Library: eLibrary.ru 165 Notes 167 5

Civilian Bioscience and Biotechnology Since 2005 Developments in Biotechnology 200 Federal Programs, 2005–2016 207 Case Study 1: Consolidation of Russian Pharmaceutical Production 227 Case Study 2: Space Biology Projects 235 Case Study 3: Reforming the Russian Academies 240 Conclusions 249 Annex 5.1 Excerpts from Science in Siberia no. 26 (2911), July 3, 2013 253 Notes 254

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Russia Addressing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention BWC Policy Process 277 Statements Related to the BWC, 2010–2016 283 Preparations for the BWC Eighth Review Conference 310 Conclusions 330 Annex 6.1 Chronological List of Documents and Events Analyzed in Chapter 6 333 Annex 6.2 Cases of African Swine Fever in Europe and the Caucasus, 2014–2015 334 Annex 6.3 USA Today Reporting on US Biological Failures, August 4, 2015–June 24, 2016 336 Notes 337

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Policy Suggestions and Possible Future Collaborations Space Biology 357 US and Russian Academies 357 Countering False Allegations 358 Notes 359

List of Acronyms Bibliography Index About the Book

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361 365 369 385

Tables and Figures

Tables 2.1

3.1 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2

Bacterial and Viral Pathogens Used As Payloads for Soviet Anti-Personnel Biological Weapons Estimated Russian Defense Expenditures, 2008–2015 The Primary Institutions Selected to Generate Figure 4.6 Yearly Breakdown for the Tenders Used to Generate Figure 4.6 Planned Financing of BIO-2020 as Given in the Underlying 2012 Document List of RAS Departments and Their Publication Records, 2006–2015

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Figures 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6

Organization Diagram for the Institutions Detailed in Chapter 4 Bermed Storage, Unit Parade Grounds, and Probable Labs N4 and N5, 33rd Institute at Shikhany-2 (see color insert between pages 150 and 151) Rospotrebnadzor Institutes, Journal Publications, Overview Page Data, 2006–2015 (see color insert between pages 150 and 151) Rospotrebnadzor Institutes, All Publications, Overview Page Data, 2006–2015 (see color insert between pages 150 and 151) Rospotrebnadzor Institutes, All Publications, Actual List Data, 2006–2015 (see color insert between pages 150 and 151) Network Diagram Displaying Open Financial Flows Between Institutions of Interest (see color insert between pages 150 and 151)

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Tables and Figures

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Russian Doctor of Sciences and PhD Degrees Granted per Year in the Biological and Pharmaceutical Sciences, 1994–2015 Russian Doctor of Sciences and PhD Degrees Granted per Year in the Biological and Pharmaceutical Sciences as Percentage of Total Number of Such Degrees Issued, 1994–2015 Output of Journal Articles from 314 RAS Institutes, 2006–2015 Map of Resolved and Continuing Outbreaks of African Swine Fever, 2014–2016 (see color insert between pages 150 and 151)

5.2 5.3 6.1

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Acknowledgments

Many individuals contributed greatly to the success of this project, and we wish to thank all of them for their assistance. In particular, we are indebted to a few scientists who once worked in the former Soviet Union, as well as to experts on Russian politics, who provided crucial information during interviews and in less formal discussions. Despite our desire to openly recognize these individuals for their contributions to our work, we honor their wishes to remain anonymous. Although not named, we are enormously thankful to them for their assistance. James W. Toppin was our highly skilled translator, and he also undertook specialized research for us. We thank Lesley Kucharski as well for assisting with translations. Several experts read and commented on the draft manuscript of the book, which undoubtedly helped us produce a better finished product; they were W. Seth Carus, Malcolm R. Dando, Michael (Scott) Davis, John Hart, David E. Hoffman, Roger Roffey, and John H. Walker. Allison Puccioni analyzed Zlatoust’s infrastructure for us based on satellite imagery. Vladimir Motin helped clarify how science is being conducted in Russia. We thank Nadia Schadlow for her patience during the several years that were required to complete the book. Finally, Marie-Claire Antoine, senior acquisitions editor at Lynne Rienner Publishers, provided unfailing support to us as we worked to finish the book with all its tables, figures, and illustrations.

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1 Putin’s Direction in the Biosciences

Two events converged in 2012 that led us to conduct the project whose findings are reported here. The basis for the first event was laid on February 19, 2012, when the newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta published a long article authored by Prime Minister Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin titled “A Smart Defense Against New Threats.”1 The article included the following passage: What is the future preparing for us? . . . In the more distant future, weapons systems based on new physical principles (beam, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical and other technology) will be developed. All this will, in addition to nuclear weapons, provide entirely new instruments for achieving political and strategic goals. Such hi-tech weapons systems will be comparable in effect to nuclear weapons but will be more “acceptable” in terms of political and military ideology.2

As expected by most Russians and external commentators, on March 4, 2012, Putin won the presidential election for the second time. On March 22, 2012, he convened a ministerial meeting “on the tasks he set in his articles as a presidential candidate.” Employing carefully vetted language, the future ministers took turns explaining what their ministries would do to operationalize Putin’s electoral platform. In particular, the minister of defense, Anatoly Serdyukov, explained to Putin how his Ministry of Defense (MOD) would match the contents of the aforementioned Rossiiskaya Gazeta article. He stated: “Mr. Putin, we have thoroughly studied your article and prepared a plan for implementing the tasks set there for the Defence Ministry.” 3 Serdyukov promised to implement twenty-eight tasks. Of these, the fourth task was: “The development of weapons based on new physical principles: radiation, geophysical wave, genetic, psychophysical, etc.”4 1

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Commentators in Russia and abroad immediately picked up on Serdyukov’s statement, some of whom remarked that it was difficult to conceive of any “genetic” weapon that would not violate the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).5 These commentators were right to be alarmed, given that the MOD’s encyclopedia defines “genetic weapons” as “a type of weapon able to damage the genetic (hereditary) apparatus of people. It is assumed/expected that some viruses can/may serve as the active principle,” and lists no other examples.6 Rather than clarify what it had meant by this announcement, the Russian government simply edited out the disquieting paragraph from the public transcript of the meeting.7 The second event occurred just three months after Putin was inaugurated president on May 7, 2012. In August 2012, the US Department of State’s yearly compliance report was issued and, like its predecessors, it expressed concerns about Russia’s possible noncompliance with the BWC.8 As in the 2011 compliance report, the Department of State averred that: “Available information during the reporting period indicated Russian entities have remained engaged in dual-use, biological activities. It is unclear that these activities were conducted for purposes inconsistent with the BWC. It also remains unclear whether Russia has fulfilled its BWC obligations in regard to the items specified in Article I of the Convention that it inherited.”9 And as in previous reports, the Department of State noted that: “Although Russia had inherited the past offensive program of biological research and development from the Soviet Union, Russia’s annual BWC confidence-building measure declarations since 1992 have not satisfactorily documented whether this program was completely destroyed or diverted to peaceful purposes in accordance with Article II of the BWC.”10 Where all prior compliance reports had stated that the US government had engaged Russia through bilateral and multilateral discussions over these BWC compliance issues, this one was different. The 2012 report’s section on Russia’s compliance with the BWC concluded with the observation: “during the reporting period, no discussions took place regarding Russia’s compliance with the BWC.”11 To us this meant that the Putin and Obama administrations had stopped all bilateral diplomatic efforts to address BWC-related issues the very year that Putin and his minister of defense appeared to have promised to develop genetic weapons. Our intent was to investigate as much as open sources and interviews would allow the Putin administration’s views on biosciences and biotechnology for civilian and military purposes, as well as what activities it had launched in support of these fields. Given the extensive legacy of the Soviet offensive biological warfare (BW) program and the well-resourced nature of the Russian biodefense system of the Putin and Medvedev administrations, the reactivation of an illicit Russian BW program would mostly be a question of motivation. It would require the acquisition of little to no new

Putin’s Direction in the Biosciences

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capabilities or facilities that might be detected through open-source research. We therefore had no illusion that our investigation would unearth a Russian BW program even if such a program had been launched. Rather, our objective was to discover and document the dual-use activities alluded to in the Department of State report, and in doing so move the discussion over Russian compliance concerns to the public sphere, where issues could be at least partly evaluated on the basis of evidence rather than wholly on the basis of trust in either US or Russian official statements. We were concerned by our discovery of a buildup and modernization of the Russian biodefense establishment under the Putin administration that had gone publicly unreported in English-language sources, including in Department of State compliance reports. We sought to draw attention to this development and to highlight specific activities of concern. Concerns left to fester with no diplomatic recourse can rapidly devolve into paranoia. Russia is home to some of the world’s brightest civilian experts on dangerous infectious disease. It is in the world’s interest that their already underused research be openly applied to benefit the public health sector. If US-Russian relations on BWC issues continue to deteriorate, their research instead risks languishing because of the twin effects of Russian publication controls and travel restrictions, and a US unwillingness to fund research and invest in joint ventures. For that reason, while we focus on Russian activities that we deem are of concern, we also propose certain steps that Russia could realistically take to improve transparency or decrease diplomatic brinksmanship without losing face. In addition, we devote a considerable number of pages to analyzing the state of Russia’s civilian life sciences research and commercial biotechnology sectors, with an emphasis on specific programs that have in the past involved cooperation or co-publication with the West. Our hope is that the findings reported here will help the US government to reengage with their Russian counterparts on BWC-related compliance issues without having to reveal US intelligence sources and methods. We also wish to foster greater interest on the part of BWC States Parties generally, as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the public at large in BW involved in interdiction efforts, because their renewed engagement and pressure on this topic is a necessary precondition for diplomatic progress on the current issue and more generally for the BWC’s effective functioning in the future. At the same time, doctrinal pronouncements tend to be vague by design, and dual-use activities by definition lack a unique plausible explanation. We wanted our readers to be able to view the same evidence as we have discovered and derive value from our work regardless of whether they agreed with our interpretations. We therefore took a facts-heavy approach when reporting what we had found in the hopes that this work’s

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numerous lists, figures, charts, and translated quotes will at a minimum serve as a useful reference for anyone interested in BW-related security in general as well as those who follow Russian developments. We took a dual approach to analyzing the Putin administration’s plans for biotechnology, including the possible military application of genetics. First, we directly evaluated the MOD’s designs for biology through a systematic assessment of Russian governmental doctrine and activities related to biodefense and high-technology weapons such as “weapons based on new physical principles.” Chapters 2 through 4 contain the results of this direct approach. In Chapter 2 we present a brief history of the Soviet BW program to provide context for the entire project, as well as to elaborate an initial list of active facilities of concern that will be prioritized when investigating for ongoing dual-use activity in Russia. In Chapter 3, we consider Russian government military planning and MOD doctrine regarding biodefense or hightechnology weapons, with an emphasis on pronouncements made in the 2008–2016 period. We studied this set of changing official beliefs to better understand the strategic and bureaucratic drivers behind Russia’s biodefense buildup and stated desire for “weapons based on new physical principles.” In Chapter 4 we analyze the Russian biodefense and high-technology weapons planning and acquisition institute networks that are meant to implement said doctrine. This chapter is the heart of our project, as it presents a long list of institutes conducting specific dual-use activities in biology, gauges the level of interest among various high-technology research and development (R&D) institutes possibly involved in weaponizing biotechnology, and assesses the level of institutional support for being involved in such biotechnological activity. The open-source information underpinning this assessment was acquired through a close reading of Russian state media articles and specialist publications, by tracking the research topics and the overall volume of scientific publications by researchers based at institutes of interest, and by conducting satellite imagery and financial network analysis. Most of these “off-site measures” had been considered by BWC States Parties experts participating in the 1992–1993 meetings of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint.12 Since that time, the development of the Internet and of online services built upon its network has led to a massive increase in publicly available information and research tools, ranging from freely available satellite imagery to the ability to almost instantaneously retrieve and machine-translate foreign documents. In this regard our findings may prove useful in establishing what can and what probably cannot be determined today when conducting open-source monitoring of a foreign biodefense program. Based on our experience in putting together Chapter 4, the greatest value appears to be in determining discrepancies of facility operations,

Putin’s Direction in the Biosciences

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either by finding disparate accounts of facility activity or by noting a marked absence of information on certain programs. We have found open sources to be sufficient to meet our stated goal of uncovering dual-use biological activities in Russia, and even to raise pointed questions about specific developments we uncovered that we found to be of concern, but certainly not to determine whether Russian activity had gone beyond what could be understood as permissible under the BWC. Our second approach to analyzing the Putin administration’s plans for biotechnology was indirect. We assessed the state of the current broader socioeconomic and international diplomatic environments that either enable or hamper the Putin administration or the MOD should either seek to weaponize the life sciences. The findings derived from this indirect approach are summarized in Chapters 5 and 6. We examine the health and governmental independence of Russia’s civilian biotechnology sector since 2005 in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 we describe Russia’s activities in the international sphere, and compare Russian internal assessments of foreign BWC compliance against its official declarations and activities at the BWC meetings and with the content of relevant Russian disinformation campaigns. Overall, we address the following eight overarching questions in the five substantive chapters that follow: 1. What do Russian government planning and military doctrine documents and statements reveal about the Putin administration’s concept of biodefense? 2. What do these sources mean when they speak of “weapons based on new physical principles” and “genetic weapons”? 3. When and why did these concepts become “popular” with the military and civilian security people, and with what impact on Russia’s commitment to the BWC? 4. How has the Russian biodefense program evolved and, further, who runs experimental weapons development programs, and what types of weapons are they aiming for? 5. Are Russian life sciences scientists sufficiently rewarded for conducting civilian R&D to remain in academy and university laboratories, or are they disgruntled and therefore considering emigration or work at military institutions? 6. Does the Russian government really believe that the United States is in noncompliance with the BWC, as claimed in Russian disinformation campaigns? 7. Who runs the Russian propaganda campaigns alleging US biological warfare activities, and to what end? 8. What are the Russian objectives in terms of affecting the BWC now and in the future?

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We then return to these eight overarching questions in Chapter 7 as a means of summarizing the results of our research. Notes 1. Putin’s original article was reprinted in English by the following source: Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia,” Russia Today, February 20, 2012, http://rt.com/politics/official-word/strong-putin-military -russia-711 (accessed March 20, 2017). 2. Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia,” (in Russian) February 20, 2012, http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18185 (defunct), retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20120504063733/http://premier.gov.ru /eng/events/news/18185 (accessed May 13, 2016). 3. Anatoly Serdyukov, “Statement at Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Holds a Meeting on the Tasks He Set in His Articles As a Presidential Candidate” (in Russian), March 22, 2012, http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18490 (accessed May 13, 2016). 4. Putin fired Serdyukov on November 5, 2012, for alleged fraud, and appointed Moscow regional governor Sergei Shoigu to replace him. Unless information is received to the contrary, the twenty-eight tasks are assumed to still be in force and guiding the Ministry of Defense’s future activities. 5. David Hoffman, “Genetic Weapons, You Say?” Foreign Policy, March 27, 2012, http://hoffman.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/27/genetic_weapons_you_say; Raymond A. Zilinskas, “Take Russia to ‘Task’ on Bioweapons Transparency,” Nature Medicine 18, no. 6 (2012), p. 850; Alexander Khramchikhin, “Dreams of a New Weapon” (in Russian), Independent Military Review 11, no. 1 (April 6, 2012); Alessandro Bianchi, “Ultimate ‘Zombie’ Mind Control: Myths and Facts About Weapons of Future,” Russia Today, April 8, 2012, http://rt.com/news/weapons -future-zombie-media-486 (accessed May 13, 2016). 6. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Encyclopedia: Weapons on New Physical Principles (in Russian), n.d., http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia /dictionary/details.htm?id=13770@morfDictionary (accessed December 20, 2016). 7. The original transcript has been taken down and the website edited, as remarked in an unrelated publication: Julian Cooper, “Military Expenditure in the Russian Federation During the Years 2012 to 2015: A Research Note,” p. 4 n. 14, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/publications/unpubl_milex/military -expenditure-in-the-russian-federation-2012-2015 (accessed May 13, 2016). 8. US Department of State, 2012 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, August 2012, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/197295.pdf. 9. Ibid., p. 12. 10. Ibid. We explain what is meant by “confidence-building measure declarations” in Chapter 2. 11. US Department of State, 2012 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, p. 13. 12. Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint, “Report,” BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9, 1993, pp. 11–20, http://www.unog.ch/bwcdocuments /1993-09-VEREX4/BWC_CONF.III_VEREX_09.pdf (accessed February 23, 2016).

2 The Legacy of the Soviet Union’s Biological Warfare Program

In this chapter we describe the Soviet Union’s long-standing biological warfare program in order to detail the program’s legacy in Russia. As we describe later, that program had two generations, with the first one existing during 1928–1971 and second during 1972–1992. As is discussed, the Soviet Union’s stupendous violation of the BWC starting in 1972, and the begrudging and opaque way in which this program was ostensibly terminated in Russia explains why we and other commentators viewed Serdyukov’s promise to Putin to develop “genetic weapons” as alarming and worthy of study. The First-Generation Program, 1928–1971 The first-generation program was characterized by Soviet military scientists applying classical applied microbiology techniques of mutation, selection, and propagation to weaponize bacterial and viral pathogens found in nature.1 What this means is that scientists would first collect natural strains of pathogens found in nature, such as Bacillus anthracis (B. anthracis) or Yersinia pestis (Y. pestis).2 Second, cultures of these natural strains would be exposed to X-rays or mutagenic chemicals to create mutant strains. Third, the infectivity and virulence of natural and mutated strains would be animaltested and those whose properties were found to be practicable for weapons purposes would be selected for large-scale propagation. If propagation was successful, the mass of pathogens would be formulated and loaded into a weapon as payload. If this weapon when open-air-tested proved to be effective as a biological weapon, it would be accepted by the military. As can be realized from this process, when we use the term “biological weapon,” we refer to a complete system composed of three elements: a payload consisting 7

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of a quantity of a formulated pathogen, a munition that delivers the payload to the targeted population, and a mechanism for dispersing the payload over the targeted population.3 The Russian MOD established three major R&D institutes and one open-air test site during the first-generation program.4 The major institute is the Scientific-Research Institute of Epidemiology and Hygiene in Kirov, which has two subsidiary centers, the Virology Center of the ScientificResearch Institute of Microbiology of the Ministry of Defense of Russia in Zagorsk (now Sergiyev Posad), and the Center for Military-Technical Problems of Biological Defense of the Scientific-Research Institute of Microbiology of the Ministry of Defense of Russia in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg).5 For convenience, the three institutions are named the Kirov Institute, Zagorsk Institute, and Sverdlovsk Institute. The three MOD institutes remain an integral part of the modern Russian biodefense system and, similar to Soviet times, are closed to persons who do not possess the appropriate clearances. We emphasize that as far as we are aware, no non-Russian national has been allowed to enter any of these institutes to this day. The MOD’s large open-air test facility, Aralsk-7, was located on Vozrozhdeniye Island (Rebirth Island) in the Aral Sea. Aralsk-7 was closed down in 1992 when the Soviet Union dissolved and the jurisdiction of Vozrozhdeniye Island became split between the new Kazakh and Uzbek republics. The first-generation BW program had by the early 1970s weaponized several bacterial and viral pathogens, as well as one toxin (see Table 2.1). Table 2.1 Bacterial and Viral Pathogens Used As Payloads for Soviet Anti-Personnel Biological Weapons Bacteria/Virus

Bacillus anthracis Brucella suis Burkholderia mallei Burkholderia pseudomalleia Coxiella burnetii Francisella tularensis Marburg virus Rickettsia prowazekii Variola virus Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus Yersinia pestis

Diseases

Anthrax Brucellosis Glanders Melioidosis Q fever Tularemia Marburg Epidemic typhus Smallpox Venezuelan equine encephalitis Plague

Source: Milton Leitenberg and Raymond A. Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 288. Notes: a. Questions remain whether B. pseudomallei was weaponized to the satisfaction of the MOD. The Soviet Union also weaponized Botulinum toxin. It probably discontinued the weaponization of Rickettsia prowazekii and Botulinum toxin in the 1960s.

The Legacy of the Soviet Union’s Biological Warfare Program

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We also know that a Soviet bomblet’s variola virus payload was accidentally released in 1971 while being open-air-tested at Aralsk-7, and came to infect a marine biologist who was working on a research vessel that was traversing the Aral Sea at that time.6 Some days later, this biologist became the index patient of a smallpox outbreak that sickened eleven persons in Aralsk city, Kazakhstan, of whom five died.7 Little is known about the Soviet Union’s type-classified biological weapons8 because the development and testing of these weapons was the purview of the MOD, and as far as is known there has been no defector from any of the MOD’s BW institutes, nor has any military Russian author publicly revealed important aspects of the Soviet offensive BW program. Conversely, a great deal is known about the weaponization of bacterial and viral pathogens in the civilian institutions that conducted BW work as part of the second-generation program because many of the scientists who researched, developed, and tested these pathogens eventually defected abroad in Soviet times, or emigrated abroad to Israel and other Western countries subsequent to the Soviet Union’s dissolution.9 The Second-Generation Program, 1972–1992 On November 25, 1969, US president Richard M. Nixon issued an executive order that terminated the US offensive biological weapons program.10 The momentum generated by the US announcement helped bring years of international negotiations on a biological weapons ban to fruition, and the BWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972.11 Despite being one of the initial signatories of the BWC, the Soviet government decided that same year to contravene the BWC’s treaty obligations. Namely, it decided to establish and operate a large offensive BW program that would be driven by newly discovered powerful biotechnologies. By introducing the innovation of recombinant DNA technology, commonly referred to as genetic engineering, the goal of the Soviet effort was to create bacterial and viral strains that were more useful for military purposes than were strains found in nature. This then was the beginning of the Soviet Union’s BW program’s second generation.12 The Soviet decision owed much to a highly capable and influential scientist named Yuri A. Ovchinnikov. He relentlessly pushed for the application of then-new genetic engineering techniques to biological weapons work, promising the MOD that this would result in Soviet military scientists being able to develop a new generation of powerful biological weapons.13 Further, he warned that the United States, which was far ahead of the Soviet Union in biotechnology, would harness genetic engineering for weapons work.14 Ovchinnikov also argued that such a covert program

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should be operated under the cover of civilian institutes so as to prevent detection. Ovchinnikov’s proposals were strongly backed by Colonel General Yefim I. Smirnov, the head of the Soviet BW program.15 The Central Committee of the Communist Party ruled in their favor, and in 1972 it issued a top secret decree that ordered the building and equipping a greatly expanded organizational system called Biopreparat that would apply genetic techniques to weaponize bacterial and viral species to kill or incapacitate humans. The codename for this program was Ferment.16 In addition, the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture’s long-running antianimal and anti-plant biological weapons program was expanded.17 Rimmington, who has extensively studied this program, codenamed Ekologiya, reported that it involved nine institutes and two production facilities. 18 Of these, five institutes and one production facility were in Russia proper.19 To manage the new BW system, the MOD created a directorate—the 15th Main Directorate—and appointed Smirnov to be its head. The 15th Main Directorate was in charge of all activities related to research, development, testing, and production of biological munitions, as well as defenses against biological weapons that were carried out by a program called Problem 5, which is described later.20 However, after 1973, the majority of BW-related R&D was carried out by civilians working for Biopreparat, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Health (MOH). In addition, the KGB, the Ministry of Medical Industry, and elements of the USSR Academy of Sciences and USSR Academy of Medical Sciences had important roles in the BW program.21 Detailed accounts of the second-generation BW program have been published by several authors since the publication of two primary accounts, the first by Igor Domaradsky published privately in Moscow22 and the second by the high-level defector Ken Alibek.23 We therefore focus on the aspects of that program’s legacy that exist in Russia and could be reactivated as part of a hypothetical third-generation BW program.

Legacy in Russia The four major elements of the Soviet BW program’s legacy are those facilities in which BW agents were researched, developed, and tested that remain closed or mostly closed facilities; the agents that were weaponized and the detailed research documentation that established weaponization and industrial production protocols; the munitions that were developed and manufactured; and the personnel with F-level clearances that had accrued BW knowledge and know-how.

The Legacy of the Soviet Union’s Biological Warfare Program

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Soviet BW Facilities

In 1992, Yeltsin ordered the MOD to close down the offensive BW program. The MOD’s response was to partially implement that order. Funding to operate the military biological R&D institutes were cut by more than 50 percent, while funding to enable Biopreparat and its institutes to operate was cut even more. Though the MOD’s scientific workers experienced some hardships, they and their families survived fairly well in their military compounds. Biopreparat fared worse. There were years where Biopreparat’s institutes had no heating in winter, and employee salaries, which were below a living wage, were often withheld for many months. As a consequence, Biopreparat’s workforce diminished by about 80 percent. Nevertheless, key Biopreparat research institutions survived alongside their MOD counterparts until Russia’s financial situation improved in the late 1990s. For their part, the Ministry of Agriculture’s institutes involved in Ekologiya were either in newly independent nations or were transferred out of the ministry’s control, and all are now open institutions.24 The status of each Russian institute identified by Rimmington is as follows: • The All-Union Foot-and-Mouth Disease Institute (now the Federal Centre for Animal Health) was placed under Rosselkhoznadzor, cooperates with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), and even posts English-language videos of its laboratory activities online.25 • The Institute of Phytopathology is now under the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences and advertises its open status on its website.26 • The North Caucasus Scientific Research Institute of Phytopathology (now the Institute of Biological Plant Protection)—presumed to have been involved in Ekologiya—has had recent research ties with the West, from submitting proposals to secure research funds to inviting Western scientists to a conference held at its center in 2012.27 • As for the Central Russian Branch of the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Phytopathology and the Pokrov Factory of Biopreparations, both were turned into civilian research and production centers.28

Since the institutes that conducted Ekologiya R&D now appear to be involved only in civilian endeavors, we will not concern ourselves with them for the remainder of the book. Conversely, when considering the legacy of the Soviet BW program, we focus on facilities from three separate systems: those managed by the MOD, Biopreparat, and MOH’s anti-plague institutes and stations. In addition to these three, the KGB also was interested in BW, so we discuss what

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little is known about the structure of its program, the facilities it employed, and the work it conducted.

MOD Institutes and Facilities. The three major Soviet MOD microbiologi-

cal R&D institutes that ran the Soviet first-generation BW program and greatly contributed to the second-generation program remain active facilities in today’s Russia, although their current tasking is now ostensibly biodefense. The lead agency for military biology research in Russia is still the Kirov Institute and its two subsidiaries, the Zagorsk Institute and the Sverdlovsk Institute. Each of these institutes is briefly introduced here from a historical perspective;29 Chapter 3 contains descriptions of what we know of their current status and operations. In addition to these three research institutes, the MOD operated a fourth through a different command structure, ran the nowdefunct Aralsk-7 major live-agent open-air test site, and maintained at least two independent munitions storage and/or filling stations. The Kirov Institute was dedicated to researching, developing, testing, and manufacturing BW agents of bacterial and toxin origin. In addition to carrying out militarily directed R&D, it was a major training facility for military biological scientists who were to staff other MOD BW institutes and the ostensibly civilian biotechnology facilities. The Zagorsk Institute weaponized viruses and rickettsial bacteria for the Soviet BW program. Its research remains focused on such agents, albeit now ostensibly for biodefense purposes. The Sverdlovsk Institute’s initial main function was to produce large quantities of bacterial pathogens for BW purposes. It became infamous after its personnel by accident released B. anthracis spores into the open air in April 1979. The wind carried the spores over parts of Sverdlovsk and then into adjacent rural lands with their villages. Due to the Soviets having kept this incident secret, we do not know the exact casualty figures. Available estimates suggest some 200 persons were stricken with inhalation anthrax and approximately 60–70 died of the disease.30 Hundreds of farm animals also died in the outbreak.31 The production unit was quickly closed down and its mission, as told by Soviet officials, changed to developing defenses against BW, the environmental remediation of military sites, and the development of goods and services for civilian markets. The persons who staffed the production unit that was responsible for the outbreak were transferred to Stepnogorsk, Kazakh SSR, where they came to operate the Soviet Unions’ largest BW production facility named Biopreparat’s Scientific Experimental and Production Base (SNOPB). In addition to these three institutes, the MOD operated a research facility of which little is known. We know that this facility went through several name and subordination changes, but in Soviet times it was known as the Scientific Research Institute of Military Medicine.32 It conducted both offensive

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13

and defensive biological weapons research in Soviet times. In 1998 it was renamed the Medico-Biological Defense Research Test Center and became a subsidiary center of the State Research Test Institute of Military Medicine,33 which conducted radiological, chemical, and biological defense research during Soviet times.34 As with the Kirov, Sverdlovsk, and Zagorsk institutes, this research institute and its subsidiary center remain closed to outsiders. The MOD also owned and operated a large open-air test site on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea, codenamed Aralsk-7, where all its biological weapons were tested under realistic conditions. Aralsk-7 was closed down in 1992 and its most secret and important equipment was transferred to unknown sites in Russia. Due to the near complete evaporation of the Aral Sea, Vozrozhdeniye Island is no longer an island, but rather a long peninsula that is shared by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. As we discuss in Chapter 3, there are signs that the MOD has begun to refurbish a littleknown institute proving ground to serve as a chemical and/or biological open-air test site in Russia, ostensibly for testing decontamination methods. Perhaps the MOD’s most secret facilities were secluded storage and/or filling stations for biological weapons. Only two secluded facilities have been identified in open sources as having been biological weapons filling sites in Soviet times. One is located at a site called Railroad Station Zima, near Malta, at Usolye-Sibirskoye in Irkutsk oblast; a second is rumored to have been located in Zlatoust.35 Some Russian sources describe Zima simply as a munitions storage area, and not also as a filling station.36 Uncertainty regarding the site’s purpose or purposes remains. Unlike the MOD, Biopreparat, and anti-plague institutes that continue to have legitimate roles in Russia’s military biodefense program, munitions storage and filling stations have, to quote the BWC’s Article 1, “no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.” The Russian government has not provided any information about the fate of the Soviet BW munition filling equipment, nor the conversion or destruction of its associated facilities, such as the filling stations. The number and location of such facilities are unknown. That being the case, it is possible either that the filling stations have not been dismantled or converted to civilian use and therefore can be activated to operate as in Soviet times, or it could be that the filling stations have been abandoned or destroyed. The Russian government has chosen not to publicly clarify such matters. The Zima station may have been a part of a compound known as Object 506, which is a now-dismantled site near the Malta train station that hosts a series of storage bunkers similar to those at the Sverdlovsk Institute.37 It appears that a rail line connects to the storage site, which would be consistent with the Railroad Station cover name. In a positive development, most of the compound has been razed and appears to be accessible for civilian use. Local news confirmed that the site in Soviet times had an underground

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refrigerated complex but noted that its purpose was classified. However, in the article it is stated that the site was linked to a nearby airbase.38 Local video footage inadvertently confirmed these points by showing underground storage and a building displaying a unit patch displaying the distinctive wings typical of Russia’s airborne troops (VDV).39 We initially identified the site as a possible BW filling and/or storage station by matching the historical descriptions of the Zima station to what we saw on public satellite imagery. Since we first posed this hypothesis, information has been published to the effect that the site consists of a series of linked military bunkers suitable for biological munitions storage and/or filling. It bears pointing out that the nearby airbase is far closer to China than to Europe, and that a military unit located at Object 506 at one point was a cartographic unit specialized in the Mongolia-China border area.40 As such, it is likely that the Soviet MOD had primarily planned to assign Chinese targets to the bomber wing at this airbase in the years following the 1960 Sino-Soviet split.41 If the storage area near Object 506 truly was a BW munitions storage site, as we believe, no Russian government has seen any benefit in revealing its destruction. On the assumption that the Zima site handled BW munitions destined for use by aircraft based at this airbase, the Russian government’s lack of transparency regarding the station’s dismantlement may involve more than their general unwillingness to admit the existence of the Soviet BW program; it also could reflect a desire to avoid diplomatic embarrassment vis-à-vis China. Even less information is available about the alleged BW filling station at Zlatoust than about the Zima station site. One account avers that the Zlatoust site had equipment to fill munitions using bulk biological agent formulations produced at the Sverdlovsk Institute and shipped by rail.42 Per this account, the filling was reportedly done at Zlatoust because the special metal containers that held the formulations were manufactured there.43 This account is consistent with known facts regarding Sverdlovsk and Zlatoust, but could not be independently verified. The Sverdlovsk Institute indeed produced formulated agents in bulk until 1979, had a rail connection that enabled the transport of bulk agent to Zlatoust, and held bulk storage containers in proximity of this rail line.44 As for Zlatoust, it has been home to military manufacturing industries since Soviet times and is well known for its specialty metals work.45 Allison Puccioni, a renowned imagery analyst and the author of several publications on open-source satellite imagery analysis of military installations, kindly donated her time to identify and analyze sites of interest within Zlatoust and in its surrounding areas. Several military-industrial sites within the city have rail access and have sufficient power and related infrastructure to hypothetically support a filling station. However, we have no evidence that would prove that a given site was used in such a way.

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Moreover, even if we knew that a particular industrial complex had had a biological munitions filling line, it would likely be difficult to confirm the BW line’s abandonment amid the extensive conventional industrial background activity of the city. In sum, significant uncertainties remain regarding the number, location, and current status of Russian independent BW storage and/or filling stations.46 What is known is that four MOD research institutions of significant concern remain active, and an originally minor open-air defensive testing site used by one of these institutes is being refurbished (discussed later). Biopreparat Institutes. In the Soviet era, the Biopreparat system was com-

posed of five major R&D institutes, as well as approximately forty specialized facilities that supported the institutes. The five major institutes were: • All-Union Research Institute for Applied Microbiology (SRCAM) in Obolensk • Research Institute of Highly Pure Biopreparations (IHPB) in Leningrad • All-Union Research Institute of Molecular Biology (Vector) in Koltsovo • SNOPB in Stepnogorsk • Institute of Engineering Immunology (IEI) in Lyubuchany

We address only SRCAM and Vector, since the IHPB and IEI appear to conduct strictly civilian research under transparent conditions and SNOPB has been demolished. The supporting institutes included instrumentation and equipment manufacturers, producers of agars and substrates, mobilization plants, storage plants, and others. We know little or nothing about the fate of the specialized support facilities. Vector was a leading BW research center in the Soviet BW program, whose major objective was to study viruses to learn which ones were most suitable for weaponization. It was particularly involved with R&D involving hemorrhagic fever viruses and variola virus. Of the hemorrhagic fever viruses, Vector scientists developed a dry Marburg virus formulation that was tested in aerosol chambers on nonhuman primates, and succeeded in developing an effective industrial-scale production method for this formulation.47 In addition to its advanced weaponization of Marburg virus, its scientists with assistance of researchers from the Zagorsk Institute designed a production line using cell culture techniques to mass produce variola virus.48 The facility’s construction was terminated under Gorbachev, amid the collapse of the Soviet Union.49 Vector was then demilitarized. Between 1991 and 1992, all classified documents, especially those designated as F-level,50 were transferred to unknown locations, and secret work at the site ceased.51

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SRCAM had an important role in the Soviet BW program because it conducted advanced R&D to weaponize bacteria. Its scientists studied Y. pestis, F. tularensis, B. anthracis, and other bacteria. In the 1980s, SRCAM developed a close relationship with the Volgograd Anti-Plague Institute, which provided Burkholderia mallei and Burkholderia pseudomallei strains for weaponization R&D. 52 After the Soviet Union dissolved, and SRCAM scientists were able to publish their work in international journals, the institute gained notoriety in the West when two of its scientists reported the successful transfer of genes from B. cereus into B. anthracis, yielding a pathogen they claimed could defeat available anthrax vaccines.53 Partial information on this experiment was presented at an international conference in 1995.54

Anti-Plague Institutes. The main objective of the Soviet anti-plague system, which was an organization unique to pre-revolutionary Russia and subsequently the Soviet Union, was to control deadly endemic diseases and prevent the importation of exotic pathogens from other countries.55 In Soviet times, the MOH managed six anti-plague institutes, each of which had between two and ten field stations (the one exception was the antiplague institute in Volgograd, which had no field station). The six antiplague institutes were:

• Central Asian Scientific Research Anti-Plague Institute in Alma-Ata (Almaty), Kazakhstan • Scientific Anti-Plague Institute of the Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus in Stavropol, Russia • Scientific Research Anti-Plague Institute of Siberia and the Far East in Irkutsk, Russia • Scientific Research Anti-Plague Institute, Rostov-on-Don in Rostov, Russia • Scientific Research Anti-Plague Institute in Volgograd, Russia • State Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology of South-East USSR “Mikrob” in Saratov, Russia56

Most of these institutes conducted R&D under a program codenamed Problem 5, which was the Soviet Union’s biodefense program. In addition, the Volgograd Anti-Plague Institute had an important role in the Soviet offensive BW program. All five anti-plague institutes located in Russia to this day remain active and are mostly closed to non-Russian nationals, so their work programs cannot be verified independently. We say mostly closed because a Swedish-Russian cooperative research exchange took place one time at Rostov-on-Don in 1991.57 In contrast to the Russian antiplague institutes, the Kazakh anti-plague institute, renamed M. Aikimbayev

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Kazakh Scientific Center of Quarantine and Zoonotic Diseases, is open and welcomes foreign visitors.

KGB Interest in Biological Weapons. There are two major pieces of evi-

dence regarding the KGB’s interest in BW research.58 First, defector Ken Alibek maintained that the MOH’s Flute program was operated solely for the benefit of the KGB and that Biopreparat Bonfire’s research on regulatory peptides indirectly contributed to this effort.59 He noted that regulatory peptides were of “particular interest to the KGB,” because of their “moodaltering possibilities” and “the fact that they could not be traced by pathologists.”60 Second, Domaradsky’s account confirmed the scale and objective of the Flute program when he noted that “several labs” under Flute focused on BW for use against “individual human targets.”61 As with the other unknown programs discussed here, the scale, degree of access, objectives, and achievements of the KGB’s BW efforts remain unknown. The KGB certainly had wide-ranging access to BW program results and its successor agencies may have kept copies of certain classified research findings in their archives. One anecdote illustrates the KGB’s access to Soviet BW-relevant information. A historical account by two Russian scientists tells of how a fellow scientist at an anti-plague institute had his safe broken into by KGB operatives, who proceeded to steal all of the scientist’s notes on research that involved genetic engineering of Y. pestis.62 The KGB agents’ reason for doing so remains unknown, but the end result was that the products of the research ended up in KGB hands. In addition to whatever Soviet results the KGB’s successors may have kept, they may also have retained BW-relevant research results obtained abroad through the KGB’s technical espionage network. Primary sources indicate that the KGB accelerated collection of BW-relevant information in the 1930s and again in the mid-1970s, at the start of both generations of the Soviet BW program.63 Vadim J. Birstein diligently researched and published considerable information about the KGB’s secret laboratories that developed weapons that utilized toxins for assassination purposes.64 In particular, the KGB Laboratory 12 (also called Laboratory X), which was attached to Directorate OTU (Operational-Technical) of the First Chief Directorate, manufactured poisons, including toxins, to arm weapons used for assassinations.65 This laboratory, for example, manufactured the ricin used by the Bulgarian security service to assassinate Bulgarian dissident Gregori Markov. The weapon used for this purpose was an air rifle camouflaged as an umbrella that used compressed air to propel a pellet carrying ricin into the tissue of the victim.66 Multiple sources indicate that the KGB also worked on poisoned bullets and adapted other devices to shoot a poison pellet or deploy a hypodermic needle.67 In addition, a Soviet-run animal research institute in present-day Uzbekistan produced animal toxins for

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unnamed end users within the KGB’s assassination program until the dissolution of the Soviet Union.68 Although a plausible hypothesis, we do not know whether Laboratory 12 was the recipient of these animal toxins or of the products derived from the Flute and Bonfire BW programs. Based on the accounts mentioned here, it appears that the KGB relied at least in part on non-KGB institutes to produce chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents, but this does not preclude the existence of other specialized KGB laboratories in addition to Laboratory 12.69 As with many of the programs discussed in this subsection, the fate of the KGB BW programs in the postSoviet era is unknown. The KGB’s BW efforts are of particular concern because its Russian successors, the domestically oriented Federal Security Service (FSB) and the external-oriented Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), may have retained biological weapons information and operational processes. It may be indicative that in 2000, the FSB reportedly requested $1 billion to fund a program that would have had as its objective the development of “nontraditional methods of fighting terrorists,” including “biological” methods.70 We lend this report some credence because “nontraditional” chemical methods were prominently applied by the FSB in subsequent years.71 Agents Weaponized During the Soviet Period

The results achieved by the Soviet BW institutes, namely selected pathogenic seed strains and extremely detailed documentation of weaponization methods, almost certainly remain in Russia today. These were most likely concentrated at one or more of the MOD institutions of concern. On May 15, 1990, Lev N. Zaikov, who was the secretary of the Communist Party’s Central Committee on Defense Department, wrote a memorandum to the president of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, in which he summarizes the status of the Soviet BW program. The most important information is contained in the following passage: “By 1985 they [the MOD and other Soviet agencies] had developed 12 recipes and means for using them.” 72 If Zaikov was being truthful, his statement meant that at that time the Soviet Union possessed twelve types of biological weapons. Leitenberg and Zilinskas list ten pathogens and one toxin that were validated by the Soviet anti-personnel BW program, which we duplicate in Table 2.1. Although B. mallei was weaponized, questions remain whether B. pseudomallei was also in fact weaponized to the satisfaction of the MOD. It is probable that the Soviets decided to discontinue weaponizing Rickettsia prowazekii and botulinum neurotoxin after the 1960s. Table 2.1. does not include Ekologiya’s anti-crop and anti-animal pathogens.73 Probably all of the Soviet type-classified agents had been weaponized using the first-generation program’s classical techniques. By the time the

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second-generation BW program closed down in 1992, some pathogens had been genetically engineered in laboratories and were very close to undergoing open-air testing, but it appears that only one such testing took place before the closure of Aralsk-7 and that this involved a genetically engineered strain of F. tularensis.74 We have three concerns in regard to the legacy of this development and testing work. First, it is reasonable to assume that seed cultures of the genetically engineered pathogens that were weaponized by the second-generation BW program are stored at the MOD institutes, and perhaps elsewhere in lesserknown facilities such as some of the anti-plague institutes. Our second concern is over the fate of recipes. As defined by Leitenberg and Zilinskas: Each biological weapons system deployed by the Soviet military was completely described in a specific recipe (“reglament” in Russian), including its weaponization process. Each recipe begins with a description and characterization of the agent in question and ends with a protocol for the mass production of the weaponized agent. A recipe may be comprised of several volumes, each book length, and was classified Top Secret. Recipes would be updated if, for example, the strain was considered for new weapons systems or it was to be genetically engineered for special purposes.75

During the Gorbachev administration, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and USSR Council of Ministers ordered the destruction of recipes as follows: “For the goals of ensuring openness of work in conditions of international control, to agree with the suggestions of the USSR Defence Ministry on liquidation before 1992 of the stockpile of biological recipes and industrial capacities for production of biological weapons located at the sites of this Ministry.”76 There is no evidence that this order was implemented; quite the opposite. The 1987–1991 period was when the Soviet BW program was conducting some of its most important work, especially as related to the weaponization of pathogens. The MOD staunchly opposed the orders by the civilians in the Gorbachev administration to terminate the BW program and, instead, was actually able to secure funds for constructing additional facilities and securing advanced equipment.77 Since the MOD institutes remained inviolate during the Yeltsin administration, it is reasonable to believe that recipes remain stored in the MOD institutes, the MOD archives, or both. Since recipes undoubtedly are linked to delivery systems, blueprints of weapons and test data on their performance during realistic open-air tests at Aralsk-7 almost certainly remain under MOD control. Third, the Russian government has not released information of the number of subprograms that were tied to the Soviet BW effort, nor their objectives and achievements. Since the lead agency or ministry in charge of the subprograms mostly remains unknown, it is impossible for all but

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a handful of former Soviet officials with F-level security clearances to clarify whether any or all of the subprograms were dismantled or continue in some fashion. As far as we know, eleven codenames of Soviet BW subprograms are more or less known: Bonfire, Factor, Metol, Chimera, Hunter, Flute, Fetish, Centralka, Podvizhnik (Ascetic), Kontuziya (Contusion), and Elling.78 The first five were subprograms of Ferment, and were carried out under the Biopreparat cover.79 Flute was conducted under the MOH’s auspices. 80 No details are known apart that it sought to weaponize immunotoxins for assassination purposes. 81 Fetish was conducted by the KGB, although nothing else is known about it. 82 The last four programs are completely obscure. A further three subprograms codenamed Fagot, Flask, and Fouette are known to be related to chemical or biological warfare, but there is no further information about them in the open literature.83 Overall, information about all non-Biopreparat programs is mostly lacking. Delivery Systems Developed by Soviet Engineers

The Soviet BW delivery systems are mostly unknown, but those few whose existence have appeared in open sources include air-dropped cluster bombs containing Gshch-304 submunitions, and two types of spray systems mounted on aircraft platforms.84 Some preliminary work was conducted on a “thermal container” for packing and protecting Gshch-304 submunitions within a ballistic missile warhead, and on a cruise missile fitted with a spray system; however, at the time when the Soviet Union was dissolved, both projects were years from being realized.85 The Soviet arsenal may have included a BW rocket artillery round, although the available opensource evidence in this regard is unreliable, as the case for its existence rests on retired general Anatoly Kuntsevich’s veiled mention of filled “warheads” in a 1992 interview.86 When Zilinskas and Leitenberg first published information on the Gshch-304 submunition, they reported that it was a bounding submunition. More specifically, the bomblet was reported as designed to arm after a set number of rotations caused by the action of air against external vanes as they descended, after which it would “bounce” on impact with the ground and split into two hemispheres so as to detonate and release its BW agent payload above the ground for enhanced dispersal effect. This account is credible, in part because at least one other country—France—investigated bounding BW bombs as part of its BW program in the early years of the Cold War.87 In addition, Mauger has since identified Russian primary sources that describe the development of a family of Soviet bounding submunitions with a mechanism of action that very closely matches that of the purported Gshch-304 submunition.

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Starting in the mid-1960s, the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Search began development of a range of new fuzes for rotating submunitions to be dispersed by a range of air-dropped bombs designed by the arms manufacturer Bazalt and by the cluster warheads of the Kh-20 and Kh-22 air-to-surface cruise missile warheads.88 At the end of 1966, the Soviet military set requirements to develop a capability similar to small US rotating fragmentation submunitions by improving upon the latter’s “well known” fuze design.89 During 1968–1972, Search researchers focused on fuze designs for spherical submunitions designed to rotate when in free fall through the action of external vanes and arm themselves after a set number of rotations.90 These munitions ranged in weight from 0.5 to 2.5 kilograms.91 In early 1969, Search began work on fuses for submunitions that would detonate above-ground. That same year, to bypass proximity fuze issues, Search and personnel from the Bazalt arms manufacturer’s “special cluster munitions” department decided to focus their efforts on bounding munitions, with the aim to field a prototype in two years.92 In 1973, after two years of testing, the Soviet military approved a submunition bomblet design that would separate in half into two hemispheres, at which point each hemisphere would bound in the air and detonate.93 Bazalt produced a range of submunitions based on this general design, including the OAB-2.5RT and the AO2.5RTM submunitions.94 The Gshch-304 mass and design characteristics closely match those of the submunitions designed by Search and Bazalt as just described and therefore probably were developed based on the same design. This account also likely explains the confusion around the role and possible fillings of the AO-2.5RTM submunition. The latter has been extensively used as a conventional fragmentation submunition by Russian forces in the ongoing Syrian civil war,95 a topic that brings us to ongoing issues pertaining to cluster munitions and submunitions of proliferation concern. The Soviet Union was a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions, and Russia continues this tradition. Russia, alongside other major cluster munition producers such as the United States and China, is not a state party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Its spokesperson has explained why not, stating that “cluster munitions play a very substantive role in its defense and therefore cannot be abandoned yet.”96 Russia remains secretive about most aspects of its cluster munition arsenal, as reflected in a statement made by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) official: “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions . . . are confidential and will not be publicized.”97 Nevertheless, since Russia continues to sell and use cluster munitions abroad, data on these munitions become publicly known, for instance, through the detailed work published by analysts of the Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.98 For the purposes of this book, we underscore that continued development and production of many cluster munition dispensers and of some submunition

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designs have BW-proliferation implications. As United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) experts have noted: “the technology that lends itself to the successful design and manufacture of conventional cluster munitions, may by virtue of its very design contribute to the efficient dissemination of chemical or biological agents,” and “the nature of cluster munitions is such” that once the concept is “proven and tested with conventional sub-munitions, it can easily be applied to chemical or biological sub-munitions.”99 The UNMOVIC conclusions are particularly troubling given that submunition systems were at the peak of the Soviet chemical and biological delivery capabilities in terms of reliability, flexibility, and military effectiveness.100 Countries such as Russia whose militaries are heavily reliant on cluster munitions and have fielded systems developed to carry CBW submunitions in the past pose a more serious concern in this regard than others. It bears to mention recently advertised Russian work on cluster munitions designed to disseminate “incapacitant” chemical agents in large quantities and over large areas.101 Knowledgeable Personnel

Of the approximately 60,000 persons who once were employed by the Soviet BW program, most by far did not have F-level clearance and would therefore not possess comprehensive BW knowledge. We agree with Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley’s assessment that although some government reports estimated that 15,000 specialists possessed expertise with BW agents, “the real number is probably lower than that, considering that the number of scientists and technicians with bioweapons expertise in each facility varied greatly, in some cases representing 80 percent of the staff, while in others, no more than 10 percent.”102 At the same time, these figures tend to omit the staff previously employed at special weapons and facility design units within support institutes, for which no reliable personnel figures are available. Staff at such support institutes involved in the design of weapon systems meant to carry BW payloads and associated filling equipment, and those involved in the design and optimization of BW facilities, possess knowledge of substantial proliferation concern.103 Of the civilian scientists and engineers in the Biopreparat system who had F-level clearance, we believe most are retired. As for MOD military scientists with F-level clearance, those who have not retired continue to work in the closed MOD institutes, and those who have retired now live within limited-access military compounds. Retained knowledgeable individuals likely include scientists involved in weaponization research on pathogens at the MOD biological R&D institutes, and also engineers and other technical individuals with direct experience in the design, manufacture, filling, and open-air testing of BW delivery systems.

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Many of the best civilian Biopreparat scientists who have not retired were hired by one of the three MOD institutes, or immigrated to Western countries, mainly to Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom. A few Biopreparat scientists continue to work at the diminished Biopreparat institutes or have been recruited by Russian biotechnology companies. As three Swedish analysts employed by the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI)104 noted in a 2000 report on the Soviet BW program’s legacy: “through all [of its ownership] transfers and the ‘civilisation’ [demilitarization] of Biopreparat, the organization, as well as other related ones, has retained the bulk of its military personnel. . . . Summing up, it appears clear that Biopreparat personnel occupy a pre-eminent position within both the Russian military and the civil biopharmaceutical sectors.”105 Compounding the passage of time since this report was published, numerous Biopreparat scientists who remained at their institutes became disgruntled after Sanitation Inspector-General Gennady G. Onishchenko was placed in charge of Biopreparat (more on this in Chapter 3). As a result, many abandoned their institutes after having secured positions at universities or Russian industries, or retired. Conclusions To sum up this chapter on the Soviet BW legacy, the three major MOD biological institutes are fully operational, and are closed to foreigners. A fourth MOD institute maintained under a separate command chain has survived numerous restructurings, and also remains closed to foreigners. Two major Biopreparat institutes are functional and since approximately 2009 have been mostly closed to foreigners. Five major anti-plague institutes are fully functional and also are mostly closed to foreigners. Very little is known regarding non-Biopreparat BW programs, such as those that in Soviet times were sponsored by the KGB and currently may be serving their Russian successors. Agent seed strains and “recipes” detailing weaponization and production protocols almost certainly remain in Russia within the MOD network. The MOD also undoubtedly retained possession of design, engineering, and test data on BW munitions, including sophisticated BW submunitions. Although the number of MOD military BW experts undoubtedly has been reduced since 1992 by retirement, illness, and death, it is reasonable to assume that some of them continue to work at the four MOD biological institutes and might be passing on their knowledge and know-how to a new generation of military bioscientists. The Russian government’s refusal to address the legacy of the Soviet BW program has two components: a lack of transparency that prevents outsiders from understanding the full scope of the Soviet program, and an

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unwillingness to reduce dual-purpose activities occurring at sites known to have been involved in the Soviet BW program. The crux of the transparency issue is that, in the words of the US Department of State, “Russia’s annual BWC CBM submissions since 1992 have not satisfactorily documented whether this [Soviet BW] program was completely destroyed or diverted to peaceful purposes.” 106 Nor is it simply US diplomats who remain dissatisfied with the degree of Russian information on the Soviet BW program. For example, Swedish FOI experts have publicly described the 1992 Russian CBM declaration as being “very limited” in the information it contained.107 Since issues related to the term “confidence-building measures” (CBMs) will come up again and again in the chapters that follow, we take this opportunity to summarize what they are. The BWC’s second Review Conference (RevCon), which was held in 1986, agreed that States Parties are to exchange seven CBMs that were to be written in forms (more later). The CBMs if properly written would provide information about the originating country to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities and suspicions about its activities in the biological field, and to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities. The third RevCon, held in 1991, modified the CBM form to enhance its usefulness, specifically through the inclusion of information in additional areas including past offensive and defensive programs. As a result of this process, the yearly CBM form now consists of six measures, A to G (without D). The six CBM measures are: A. Part 1: Exchange of data on research centers and laboratories. Part 2: Exchange of information on national biological defense research and development programs. B. Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins. C. Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge. E. Declaration of legislation, regulations, and other measures. F. Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes. G. Declaration of vaccine production facilities.108

Countries that do prepare CBMs submit them annually to the BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU). If the submitting State Party wishes to make its CBMs open to the public, the ISU makes them available for download on its website. The United States is among the few States Parties that allow public access to their CBMs, while Russia does not. Leitenberg and Zilinskas have previously published a summary list of what they believe were the major deficiencies identified by the US State Department in the Russia’s CBM Form F declarations.109 It suffices to note

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here that the CBM exchange process has failed to clarify the scope and results of the Soviet BW program. Adding insult to injury, several former Soviet BW scientists, as well as current Russian officials, have since 1999 made spurious statements denying that the Soviet Union possessed an offensive BW program. As for the Russian government’s unwillingness to reveal dual-use activities at known Soviet BW sites, we reproduce ten steps reportedly proposed in 1991 by a joint US-UK team to their Soviet counterparts as actions that the Soviet government was encouraged to carry out if it wished to prove it was serious about dismantling its BW program: • Dismantle all explosive test chambers. • Stop all work on smallpox except at the WHO-approved laboratory at Vector. • Stop all open-air testing of dangerous pathogens. • Destroy all hardened bunkers at BW facilities. • Destroy all BW production buildings. • Destroy either Building 1 at SRCAM or Building 6A at Vector. • Reduce production capacity to defense standards at one BW facility. • Reduce biocontainment at any one site. • Reduce research at one site on pathogens that are not a public health risk. • Cut back significantly on the military’s role in classified research on dangerous pathogens.110 Several of these steps were not carried out. All hardened bunkers and production lines at BW facilities have not been destroyed. The dismantlement of all explosive test chambers was either not carried out or cannot be verified because of the closed nature of the MOD facilities. As demonstrated in the following chapters, the reduction of biocontainment levels at ex-BW facilities, the reduction of research on pathogens that are not a public health risk, and a decreased military role in research on dangerous pathogens are all trends that are currently occurring in reverse. Of note, Vector’s Building 6A is currently being reconstructed as a BSL-4 laboratory. The stage is thus set for persistent uncertainties and suspicions regarding the nature and purpose of Russian biodefense activities. Notes 1. Milton Leitenberg and Raymond A. Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). 2. We spell out the complete name of a bacterium, genus and species, the first time it is mentioned, but shorten the name of the genus to one letter afterward.

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3. Raymond A. Zilinskas, “The Soviet Biological Warfare Program and Its Uncertain Legacy,” Microbe 9, no. 5 (2014), p. 191. 4. Valentin Bojtzov and Erhard Geissler, “Military Biology in the USSR, 1920–45,” in Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon, eds., Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development, and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945 (Oxford University Press: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1999), pp. 153–166. 5. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, p. 82. 6. Based on the historical and epidemiological evidence, a BW variola virus field test was almost certainly the cause of the outbreak. The identification of the biological weapon that caused the outbreak as a “bomblet” is more tenuous; it is based on a public account given to the Russian press by an individual who was very senior at the time, but who also has a past history of fabrications. Parts of his account are known to be false, but “the general thrust” of his admissions “seems credible.” We believe it was a bomblet because, according to his account, only 400 grams of viral payload was “exploded.” See Alan P. Zelicoff, “An Epidemiological Analysis of the 1971 Smallpox Outbreak in Aralsk, Kazakhstan,” in Jonathan B. Tucker and Raymond A. Zilinskas, eds., The 1971 Smallpox Epidemic in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, and the Soviet Biological Warfare Program, Occasional Paper no. 9 (Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002), p. 20–21. 7. Ibid. 8. A type-classified weapon is one that has been adopted for military service use. The equivalent term used by the Soviet and Russian MOD is prinyatie na vooruzhenie. 9. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 45–46. 10. Jonathan B. Tucker and Erin R. Mahan, President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program, Case Study Series 1 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, October 2009). 11. John R. Walker, Britain and Disarmament: The UK and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Arms Control and Programmes 1956–1975 (Burlington: Ashgate, 2012), p. 71. 12. Raymond A. Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program and Its Legacy in Today’s Russia, Occasional Paper no. 11 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, July 2016), p. 18. 13. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 51–62. 14. Ibid., p. 62. 15. Ibid., p. 60. 16. Ibid., p. 699. 17. Anthony Rimmington, Anti-Livestock and Anti-Crop Offensive Biological Warfare Programmes in Russia and the Newly Independent Republics (Birmingham: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, June 1999), pp. 1–11. 18. Anthony Rimmington, “Invisible Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Soviet Union’s BW Programme and Its Implications for Contemporary Arms Control,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 13, no. 3 (2000), pp. 13–16, annex 3. 19. Ibid. 20. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, p. 699. 21. Ibid.

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22. Igor V. Domaradsky, Troublemaker, or The Story of an “Inconvenient” Man (in Russian) (Moscow, 1995). With English language and editing assistance from US author Wendy Orent, an expanded and updated version of this book is available in English: see Igor V. Domaradskij and Wendy Orent, Biowarrior: Inside the Soviet/Russian Biological War Machine (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 2003). 23. Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World—Told From Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York: Random, 1999). 24. Our data are in agreement with Domaradskij and Orent’s conclusion, namely that: “As far as the authors are aware, the Special Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR was liquidated and its facilities are now used for civilian purposes.” I. V. Domaradskij and W. Orent, “Achievements of the Soviet Biological Weapons Programme and Implications for the Future,” Revue Scientifique et Technique (International Office of Epizootics) 25, no. 1 (2006), p. 159. 25. Federal Center for Animal Health, “Home,” arriah.ru (accessed December 15, 2016). 26. All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Phytopathology, “Pages of History” (in Russian), December 18, 2015, http://vniif.ru/vniif/history/page/50 (accessed December 15, 2016). 27. “All-Russian Scientific Research Institute, Biological Plant Protection” (in Russian), n.d., http://www.vniibzr.ru/ru/institut (accessed December 15, 2016); “FP7 Partner Offer Profile: All-Russian Research Institute of Biological Plant Protection Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences—KBBE.2012.1.1-01: Improving Seeds For Agriculture and Conservation Activities,” Regional Information Centre for Scientific and Technological Cooperation with EU, http://www.ric.vsu.ru/en /uforms/view_item/1442 (accessed December 15, 2016); “The 7th International Research and Practice Conference, “Biological Plant Protection as the Basis of Agricultural Ecosystem Stabilization,” http://www.iobc-wprs.org/events/20120925 _Conference_Russia.doc (accessed December 15, 2016). 28. Russian Federation, “On Measures for the Development of the Agro-Biological Industry and Strengthening the Material-Technical Base of Veterinary Services” (in Russian), Decree no. 499, May 27, 1993, http://ipravo.info/russia2/legal14/586.htm (accessed December 15, 2016); Jo Warrick, “Russia’s Poorly Guarded Past,” Washington Post, June 17, 2002. 29. For a detailed description of their activities during Soviet times, see Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 79–120. 30. The exact number of deaths is still not known; Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 104–112. See also the collection of declassified documents on the Sverdlovsk release maintained by the National Security Archive: “Volume V: Anthrax at Sverdlovsk, 1979: U.S. Intelligence on the Deadliest Modern Outbreak,” in Robert A. Wampler and Thomas S. Blanton, eds., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 61 (Washington DC., November 15, 2001), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB61. 31. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 113–115. 32. Ibid., p. 114. 33. Ibid. 34. Anthony Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex? The Conversion of Biological Weapons’ Facilities in the Russian Federation,” Contemporary Security Policy 17, no. 1 (1996), pp. 86–87.

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35. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 103–104, 135, 311, 388, 761 n. 69, 801 n. 53. 36. Alibek with Handelman, Biohazard, p. 300; Sergei Pluzhnikov and Aleksey Shvedov, “Investigation: Murder from a Test Tube” (in Russian), Sovershenno Sekretno no. 4 (1998), pp. 12–14. 37. Object 506 is located at 52°48’33.85”N, 103°29’30.32”E. The following source gives the “Object 506” name, but does not discuss any potential BW activity: Lyudmila Shagunova, “Civilian Future of a Military Town,” August 28, 2013, http://www.ogirk.ru/news/2013-08-26/34043.html (accessed May 13, 2016). 38. Shagunova, “Civilian Future of a Military Town.” 39. Igor Pyhanov, “Base for Skiers and Biathletes Will Appear on the Site of a Military Unit in Belorechenskii” (in Russian), June 25, 2014, http://vesti.irk.ru/news /news_day/165627 (accessed May 13, 2016). 40. Shagunova, “Civilian Future of a Military Town.” 41. Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Report: The Evolution of Soviet Policy in the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, No. ESAU XLV/70, April 28, 1970, p. 9, initially marked Top Secret, declassified and approved for release in May 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-44.pdf. 42. Pluzhnikov and Shvedov, “Investigation,” pp. 12–14. 43. Ibid. 44. One route would be as follows: Sverdlovsk to Chelyabinsk using the Ivdel Rail Line, followed by a transit out of Chelyabinsk to Zlatoust using the TransSiberian Rail Line Ufa to Omsk. We discuss the dedicated rail access of the Sverdlovsk Institute compound, and note the possible presence of rusted storage units near the rails, in Chapter 3. 45. We emphasize the distinction between Zlatoust and Zlatoust-36; the latter is a separate, closed city dedicated to nuclear weapons. Oleg Bukharin, Thomas B. Cochran, and Robert S. Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook: New Perspectives on Russia’s Ten Secret Cities (Washington, D.C.: NRDC Nuclear Program, October 1999), p. 20. 46. The 1998 article by Pluzhnikov and Shvedov, “Investigation,” also claimed that a BW storage site in the mountains near Makhachkala received munitions filled at Zlatoust with bulk B. anthracis produced at Sverdlovsk. Lev Fedorov claimed in 1996 that chemical weapons munitions storage sites were used to hide BW munitions after 1992, and offhandedly alleged the existence of a prior BW site at Makhachkala. We do not know if Pluzhnikov and Shvedov drew on Fedorov or the same underlying source(s) as Fedorov for this particular claim. In Fedorov’s latest book on Russian BW, he maintains that chemical weapons storage sites were temporarily used to conceal BW munitions, but casts doubt on the two journalists’ Makhachkala account in a bizarre passage that accuses them of having been paid by a “client in the security services.” In 2000, Interfax quoted “a reliable source in the Dagestani Interior Ministry” who alleged that Chechen rebels had four containers of B. anthracis and were planning to blast them in “Nalchik, Pyatigorsk, Mozdok, and Makhachkala.” The threat was probably spurious. If Interfax is correct regarding the reliability of their source, then one wonders why the rumors of B. anthracis containers in the area appeared plausible to this individual. We have no further information on the subject and consider all of these claims to be at present unsubstantiated. See Pluzhnikov and Shvedov, “Investigation,” pp. 12–14; Dany Shoham and Ze’ev Wolfson, “The Russian Biological Weapons Program: Vanished or Disappeared?” Critical Reviews in Microbiology 30, no. 4 (2004), pp. 246–247; Lev A. Fedorov, Soviet Biological Weapons: History, Ecology, Politics (Moscow: URSS, 2013), pp.

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102–103; Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, The CBW Convention Bulletin, CBWCB 48, supplement no. 2 (June 2002), p. 23, http:// www.fas.harvard.edu/~hsp/bulletin/supp48b.pdf (accessed December 13, 2016). 47. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 703–704. 48. Ibid., p. 704. 49. Ibid. 50. Only persons who had F-level clearance were informed of Ferment’s objectives and the work that was done to reach those objectives. Soviet F-level clearance functioned in a similar way to US Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance. 51. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, p. 241. 52. Raymond A. Zilinskas, “The Anti-Plague System and the Soviet Biological Warfare Program,” Critical Reviews in Microbiology 32 (2006), p. 50. 53. Roger Roffey, Wilhelm Unge, Jenny Clevström, and Kristina S. Westerdahl, Support to Threat Reduction of the Russian Biological Weapons Legacy—Conversion, Biodefense, and the Role of Biopreparat, FOI-R-0841-SE (Umeå, Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency [FOI], April 2003), p. 71. 54. Ibid., p. 72. 55. Moisey I. Levi, ed., Interesting Stories About the Activities and People of the Anti-Plague System of Russia and the Soviet Union (in Russian), vols. 1–12 (Moscow: Informika, 1996–2002). This twelve-volume history of the anti-plague system was published in Russia during 1996–2002, but has not been translated into English as of this writing. We once possessed a copy of the volumes and had parts of them that are relevant to this book translated. The volumes now are archived at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University. See also Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Alexander Melikishvili, and Raymond A. Zilinskas, “The Soviet Anti-Plague System: An Introduction,” Critical Reviews in Microbiology 32, no. 1 (2006), pp. 15–14; Alexander Melikishvili, “Genesis of the Anti-Plague System: The Tsarist Period,” Critical Reviews in Microbiology 32, no. 1(2006), pp. 19–31; Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, “Growth of the Anti-Plague System During the Soviet Period,” Critical Reviews in Microbiology 32, no. 1 (2006), pp. 33–46; Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Alexander Melikishvili, and Raymond A. Zilinskas, “What NonProliferation Policy for the Soviet Anti-Plague System?” Critical Reviews in Microbiology 32, no. 1 (2006), pp. 65–67. The preceding articles are also available on the CNS website: http://cns.miis.edu/research/antiplague/index.htm. 56. For an extensive history of the Soviet anti-plague system, see Casey W. Mahoney, James W. Toppin, and Raymond A. Zilinskas, Stories of the Soviet AntiPlague System, Occasional Paper no. 18 (Monterey, Calif.: Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, August 2013). 57. G. Sandström, A. Sjöstedt, M. Forsman, N. V. Pavlovich, and B. N. Mishankin, “Characterization and Classification of Strains of Francisella Tularensis Isolated in the Central Asian Focus of the Soviet Union and in Japan,” Journal of Clinical Microbiology 30, no. 1 (January 1992), pp. 172–175. 58. Soviet interest in BW for assassination purposes predates the formation of the KGB. Under Stalin, the KGB’s predecessor organization, the MGB, had planned to assassinate Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito. One option considered was to have an assassin release a Y. pestis aerosol from a hidden disseminator concealed in the latter’s clothes. Dmitrii A. Volkogonov, “Stalin’s Plan to Assassinate Tito,” trans. Natasha Shur, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 10, p. 137. 59. Alibek with Handelman, Biohazard, pp. 154–155, 164, 171–172, 222, 302–303.

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60. Ibid., p. 164. 61. Domaradskij and Orent, Biowarrior, p. 109. 62. Zilinskas, “The Anti-Plague System,” p. 50. 63. John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (Ann Arbor: Sheridan, 2009), p. 358–359; Vasili Mitrokhin archive, “Coordination of Soviet and Czechoslovak Intelligence Operations: Folder 80—The Chekist Anthology,” in Wilson Center Digital Archive, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112587 (accessed June 2015); Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 70–71, 75–78. 64. Vadim J. Birstein, The Perversion of Knowledge: The True Story of Soviet Science (Boulder: Westview, 2001). 65. Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping,” approved for release September 22, 1993, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for -the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol19no3/html/v19i3a01p_0001.htm; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic, 2005), p. 401; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic, 2001), p. 389. 66. James W. Martin, George W. Christopher, and Edward M. Eitzen, “History of Biological Weapons: From Poisoned Darts to Intentional Epidemics,” in Zygmunt F. Dembek (senior ed.) and Kermit D. Huebner, M. Sofi Ibrahim, Mark A. Poli, and Chris A. Whitehouse (section eds.), Medical Aspects of Biological Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Borden Institute, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 2007), pp. 9–10. 67. Vadim J. Birstein, The Perversion of Knowledge, p. 120; Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, 84th Congress, 2nd sess., June 11, 1957, pp. 4818, 4824–4830, http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015035346512 ;view=1up;seq=658; Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, p. 533. 68. Judith Miller, “U.S. and Uzbeks Agree on Chemical Arms Plant Cleanup,” New York Times, May 25, 1999. 69. Ken Alibek writes that the First Main Directorate of the KGB “controlled several covert research units for chemical warfare and biological weapons, including Laboratory 12.” Alibek with Handelman, Biohazard, p. 303. 70. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, p. 694. 71. John Daniszewski, “Poison Hidden in a Letter May Have Killed Rebel in Chechnya,” Los Angeles Times, May 1, 2002. A Russian soldier reportedly stated that the chemical agent used during the Moscow Theatre Siege had been created “in a KGB laboratory.” In any case, two FSB units led the attack. See Scott Peterson, “Gas Enters Counterterror Arsenal,” Christian Science Monitor, October 29, 2002, http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1029/p01s03-woeu.html/%page%29/2. 72. Lev N. Zaikov, “To the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Comrade M.S. Gorbachev” (in Russian), May 15, 1990 (from Kataev Archives at Hoover Institute). 73. Rimmington, Anti-Livestock and Anti-Crop Offensive Biological Warfare Programmes, E2, F1. 74. Alibek with Handelman, Biohazard, pp. 26–27. 75. Ibid., p. 728. 76. Ibid., p. 576. 77. Ibid., chap. 21.

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78. Lev Fedorov, “We Were Preparing for All-Out Chemical War,” Obshchaya Gazeta no. 4 (January 1995), p. 9; Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 68–29. 79. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 68–29. 80. Ibid., pp. 72–73, 754 n. 43; Domaradskij and Orent, Biowarrior, pp. 97, 109, 302. 81. Ibid. 82. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 72–73, 754 n. 43. 83. Ibid., p. 754 n. 43. 84. Ibid., pp. 303, 634. 85. Ibid., pp. 255, 303, 320. 86. This account is unreliable for two reasons. First, there is no guarantee that Kuntsevich was being truthful. Second, he was vague as to the type of weapon he was referring to. In Russian, the same term raketa translates to both “missile” and “rocket,” depending on the context. In Russian as in English, the generic term warhead is used to refer to the destructive payload of both missiles and rockets. Anatoly Kuntsevich’s veiled mention of “warheads” was therefore deliberately ambiguous, although it was interpreted at the time as referring to rocket artillery warheads. R. Smith Jeffrey, “Russia Fails to Detail Germ Arms,” Washington Post, August 31, 1992, pp. A1, A15. Two other unclear mentions of “warheads” or “missiles” from reliable sources are worth flagging. Pasechnik reportedly told his debriefers about some kind of warhead that had to be refilled every few months with formulated Y. pestis. See David Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy (New York: Doubleday, 2010), p. 334. The English edition of Domaradsky’s (sometimes spelled Domaradskij) memoir mentions “missiles” being filled in passing, without further specifying what kind or type; these may actually have been artillery rockets. See Domaradskij and Orent, Biowarrior, p. 149. 87. Olivier Lepick, “The French Biological Weapons Program,” in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rózsa, and Malcolm Dando, eds., Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 114–115. 88. Prior to the publication of this Russian primary account, the Kh-20 and Kh22 missiles were not known in open sources to have had cluster munition warheads. See “Designer of Fuzing Devices, L. S. Yegorenkov: 50 Years in the Profession (Part 2)” (in Russian), Gazeta Voenmeh 22546, no. 2 (March 2009), http://gazeta .voenmeh.ru/n22009/n22009.html (accessed June 15, 2016). 89. “Designer of Fuzing Devices.” Although not mentioned in this Russian account, Soviet intelligence was also able to secure plans in the 1970s of several US biological munitions, as explained in Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 301–302. 90. “Designer of Fuzing Devices.” 91. Ibid. 92. Ibid. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid. 95. Kenton Fulmer, “Jabhat al-Nusra Re-Purposing SPBE and AO-2.5RT Submunitions in Syria,” ARES Armament Research Services, October 18, 2015, http:// armamentresearch.com/jabhat-al-nusra-re-purposing-spbe-and-ao-2-5rt-submunitions -in-syria. 96. Statement by Georgy Todua, minister counsellor of the Russian embassy in Columbia, at the second Mine Ban Treaty Review Conference, Cartgena, December 4, 2009, http://archives.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/2146.

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97. Statement by Sergei Ivanov, parliamentary hearings on ratification of Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II, November 23, 2004. 98. “Russia: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, July 23, 2012, http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/russian-federation /cluster-munition-ban-policy.aspx. 99. United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), Compendium of Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes in the Chemical, Biological, and Missile Areas, June 2007, pp. 173, 175, http://www.un.org/depts /unmovic/new/pages/compendium.asp. 100. Jeffrey K. Smart, “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective,” Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Borden Institute, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 1997), pp. 44, 49, 50–51, 59, ke.army.mil/bordeninstitute/published_volumes/chemBio/Ch2.pdf; Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 299–302; Zilinskas, “The Soviet Biological Warfare Program,” pp. 194–195. 101. Michael Crowley, Drawing the Line: Regulation of “Wide Area” Riot Control Agent Delivery Mechanisms Under the Chemical Weapons Convention (Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Project & Omega Research Foundation, April 2013), pp. 37–38, 55–58, http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/publications/ORF_RCAMunitions Report.pdf; Michael Crowley and Dana Perkins, Beyond the Horizon: “Wide Area” Riot Control Agent Means of Delivery and Their Relevance to the CWC, BWC, and UNSCR 1540, Policy Paper no. 4, Biochemical Security 2030 Project (Bath, Sommerset, UK: University of Bath, February 2014), pp. 1, 4–5, 7, 13–15, http:// www.brad.ac.uk/nlw/publications/crowley-perkins-policy-paper-4-final-1802.pdf. 102. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Barriers to Bioweapons: The Challenge of Expertise and Organization for Weapons Development (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), p. 94. 103. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 161–164. 104. The Swedish name for FOI is Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut. 105. Petra Lilja, Roger Roffey, and Kristina S. Westerdahl, Disarmament or Retention: Is the Soviet Biological Weapons Programme Continuing in Russia? (Umeå, Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, Division of NBC Defense, March 3, 2000), pp. 35–36. 106. US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, 2014 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, July 2014, p. 16, http://www.state .gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf. 107. Jan T. Knoph and Kristina S. Westerdahl, “Re-Evaluating Russia’s Biological Weapons Policy, as Reflected in the Criminal Code and Official Admissions: Insubordination Leading to a President’s Subordination,” Critical Reviews in Microbiology 32, no. 1 (2006), pp. 1–13. 108. United Nations Office in Geneva, “The Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs),” n.d., http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/5E2E8E6499 .843CCBC1257E52003ADED4?OpenDocument (accessed September 5, 2016). 109. Ibid., p. 636. 110. Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000), pp. 424–425.

3 Russian Biosecurity and Military Modernization

Although of indeterminate reliability, official statements and documents generated by Putin’s administration and military provide the most direct means of attempting to ascertain their biosecurity plans and whether they wish to harness biotechnology for military purposes as part of Russia’s military modernization drive. At a minimum, these documents detail the Russian government’s rationale for its actions; at best, if carefully parsed, they reveal actual institutional fears and objectives. We studied doctrinal pronouncements on Russia’s military modernization and on the directions of Russia’s military R&D as one way to determine whether the Russian administration or MOD was interested in the weaponization of biotechnology. A close reading of Russian military doctrine is needed to understand why the Soviet concept of “weapons based on new physical principles” was suddenly resurrected and why Serdyukov saw fit to promise “genetic weapons” among other such arms to Putin. By doctrine, we mean a set of guiding official beliefs on a strategic subject codified through high-level speeches, federal documents, and military planning or training. In Russia as elsewhere, various interested political, military, and industrial factions compete to shape the future of their country’s armed forces. Proposed reforms designed to apply lessons derived from conflict experience or strategic analysis often also serve parochial interests. Thus the strategic rocket forces can be counted upon to ask for more missiles, the navy to lobby for more ships, and the ground forces to stress the importance of new ground combat vehicles—all, of course, to counter alarming foreign technical and strategic developments. The victorious parties of such modernization debates have their rationale enshrined in the Russian Military Doctrine and detailed in official speeches and specialist articles penned by military officials. In reviewing the Russian Military Doctrine and associated texts and pronouncements, we sought to determine what bureaucratic 33

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battle had been fought that had yielded the surge in “weapons based on new physical principles” and “biotechnology-based weapons” mentions. Likewise, the biosecurity threats faced by Russia and the biodefense tasks set to counter them were formalized through official documents and speeches under successive Putin administrations and one Medvedev administration. For a brief few years these were at least partially publicized. Russia’s resultant public biodefense doctrine justified Russia’s ongoing dualuse biological activities and defined primary defensive objectives. We stress that doctrine is rarely entirely coherent when dealing with such specific issues as biodefense, given that texts tend to reflect the specific interests and fears of the institutions that issue them and often change over time.1 It would be surprising to discover a perfectly uniform set of biosecurity problems and proposed solutions across documents issued by the Russian federal government and the MOD. Likewise, these lists can be expected to have undergone changes in priority and direction since the start of the millennium. We searched for precisely these differences in available doctrinal pronouncements to analyze Russian high-level conceptions of biodefense under the Putin and Medvedev administrations. In particular, we sought to determine whether threats grew in perceived severity over time, and whether Russian state and/or military biodefense doctrine identified state-level BW attacks as a threat. Because biodefense is one of many issues of military modernization and hence doctrinal documents sometimes deal with both biodefense and high-technology weapons development, and because biodefense and biotechnology-based weapons are two sides of the same coin, we address both topics in this chapter. We selected for analysis twelve Russian official documents, eight speeches by Putin and top Russian military officials, one key article by Putin, and four unofficial articles by authoritative Russian active or retired military personnel. We took an exhaustive approach when deciding which official documents to include, as there were few relevant texts and these were all major Russian doctrinal documents. Speeches and articles were included when they provided context to changes in these official texts, gave insights into possible military modernization R&D priority areas, or highlighted the worldview held by Russia’s military units in charge of biodefense. The two recent editions of Russia’s Military Doctrine (2010 and 2014 versions) provided a long list of threats that Russia’s military had to be ready to face, but only hinted at the direction that Russia’s military modernization would take. We therefore relied on important speeches and specialized articles to flesh out evolving desires of high-technology weapons in Russia hinted at in the doctrine text. Biosecurity priorities were set and updated through specialized State Policy federal documents in 2003 and 2013, and implemented through resultant National System documents in 2008 and

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2015, which we analyzed. These documents, alongside Russia’s National Security Strategy (2009 and 2015 versions), Foreign Policy Concept (2013 and 2016 versions), and Public Safety/Security Concept (2013), provided a wealth of information into the types of biological weapons threats foreseen by Russia. We also drew upon two articles authored by military officers tasked with biodefense to highlight their perspectives on the issue. The documents relevant to high-technology weapons issues and those dealing with biosecurity are presented in the first two sections of this chapter. Since English-language translations for many of these underlying documents are not publicly available, we quote and translate relevant sections at length. The third section is dedicated to the vocal disregard for arms control treaties among the troops meant to protect Russia from biological threats. We then present our overall analysis of the documents in the concluding section, including our interpretation of the “weapons based on new physical principles” affair. In Annex 3.1, at the end of this chapter, we provide a reference list of the selected documents and pronouncements detailed in the chapter. In Annex 3.2, we add information on the Russian government’s science and technology (S&T) priorities as published in 2008, 2011, 2012, and 2014. Russia’s Military R&D Doctrine The early 2000s were marked by the recovery and growth of the Russian economy and by Putin’s consolidation of power.2 Despite political reasons to push military reform, ranging from the Second Chechen War to the Kursk submarine disaster, Putin’s willingness and ability to force military reforms were insufficient in this period to significantly alter the doctrine, composition, and training of the Russian military.3 The Kremlin did not issue clear guidelines regarding threats that had to be prepared against and hence was in no position to force its views on the MOD.4 The MilitaryIndustrial Commission (MIC),5 the government organ formally tasked with coordinating the entire military equipment procurement process from initial weapons R&D to final procurement, was in a state of constant flux during this timeframe. 6 In particular, R&D policies were subjected to “ever-changing lines of subordination” between the MIC and various ministries. 7 Given the inability of the government to put in place a coherent policy and a bureaucratic framework for military modernization and military R&D on high-technology weapons systems in this time period, we will not dwell on pre-2008 events. A major speech by Putin delivered at the start of 2008 portended the wide-ranging reforms that would be unveiled at the end of the year and the start of a forceful push for high-technology weapons. On February 8, 2008,

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Putin addressed a speech to “Citizens of Russia” on the subject of what had been accomplished over the “past years” and on setting a “long-term vision of the future.”8 By “these past years” he was probably referring to the eight years of his presidencies (2000–2004 and 2004–2008). We reproduce segments of this important speech for three reasons. First, it outlined the Putin administration’s public portrayal of threats in the post-2008 international arena and the Russian position on international security agreements and obligations. Second, it foreshadowed the major Russian military modernization drive through to 2020, but which was launched in the fall of 2008. And third and of greatest relevance to this book, the speech pointed out that biotechnology could bring about “revolutionary changes in weapons and defence,” and called for a modern Russian army capable of being “entrusted with the deployment, servicing and use of new generation weapons.” Reflecting on the status of the Russian military when Putin had first become president, he observed that: Our armed forces were demoralised and not prepared for combat. Military servicemen received a pittance, which even then was not always paid on time. Equipment was becoming outdated at an alarming rate. Our defence industry, meanwhile, was choked by debts and its human resources and production base were shrinking.9

Putin then asserted that this situation had drastically changed for the better: “Russia has returned to the world stage as a strong state, a country that others heed and that can stand up for itself.”10 However, he observed that all was not well in the international arena: It is now clear that the world has entered a new spiral in the arms race. This does not depend on us and it is not we who began it. The most developed countries, making use of their technological advantages, are spending billions on developing next-generation defensive and offensive weapons systems. Their defence investment is dozens of times higher than ours. We have complied strictly with our obligations over these last decades and are fulfilling all of our obligations under the international security agreements, including the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. But our NATO partners have not ratified certain agreements, are not fulfilling their obligations, but nevertheless demand continued unilateral compliance from us. NATO itself is expanding and is bringing its military infrastructure ever closer to our borders. We have closed our bases in Cuba and Vietnam, but what have we got in return? New American bases in Romania and Bulgaria, and a new missile defence system with plans to install components of this system in Poland and the Czech Republic soon it seems. We are told that these actions are not directed against Russia, but we have received no constructive responses to our completely legitimate concerns. Russia has a response to these new challenges and it always will. Russia will begin production of new types of weapons over these coming years, the quality of which is just as good and in some cases even surpasses those of other countries. The use of new technology also calls for a rethinking of strat-

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egy in the way our Armed Forces are organised. After all, new breakthroughs in bio-, nano- and information technology could lead to revolutionary changes in weapons and defence. Only an army that meets the most modern demands can be entrusted with the deployment, servicing and use of new generation weapons. The human factor is becoming more important than ever. What we need is an innovative army, an army based on the very highest modern standards of professionalism, technical breadth of horizon and competence. Overall, strengthening our national security requires a new strategy for developing the Armed Forces through to 2020, a strategy that takes into account the challenges and threats to our country’s interests today.11

In the third paragraph just quoted, Putin argued that Russian military reform was necessary in order for Russia to field “new generation weapons.” Much of this speech drew upon military concepts popular among Soviet military theorists: that of generations of weapons and warfare, and of Revolutions in Military Affairs. The overall message is that Russia’s military must reform itself lest it be left one generation behind a new Revolution in Military Affairs,12 during which foreign militaries harness novel technologies and transform the nature of warfare. This theme is prevalent throughout Soviet and Russian security writings.13 What makes the speech interesting is that the set of technologies viewed by Putin as most likely to occasion such a new Revolution in Military Affairs are “new breakthroughs in bio-, nanoand information technology.” All three fields are long-standing Russian S&T priority areas (see Annex 3.2.). These three fields, in that same order, had been flagged in a 2006 governmental resolution as priority “technology development” directions to be funded as part of the Federal Program for R&D in priority directions for 2007–2013.14 The “bio-, nano-, and information technology” phrasing is also strikingly similar to language found in US military science speeches and publications during the George W. Bush administration. Thus, for instance, in 2007 one American weaponeer wrote: “While nuclear issues are at the top of the list when considering disruptive technologies, other key areas to target for possible applications are bio, nano and information technology.” 15 This striking similarity in text and argument structure raises the possibility that Russian military strategists were mirroring US statements. Russian military strategists may have concluded that the United States was developing “bio-, nano-, and information technology” weapons, and therefore articulated arguments to push for similar developments at home. In the United States, potential military applications of the “biology” field considered at the time apparently included biometrics and other identification systems, biosensors, and bio-based tracking and identification systems. 16 However, it would not be surprising to learn that Russian and other non-US military analysts interpreted this regrettable US defense industry jargon as a move toward more sinister applications of biology, and planned accordingly. Crucially, we do not know whether the BWC

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was one of the international agreements Putin had in mind when he claimed that “NATO partners” were “not fulfilling their obligations.” If so, the mention of harnessing biotechnology-based revolutionary changes could have been more than just boilerplate language mirroring Western statements, and instead may have been designed as a veiled counterthreat. We mention the worst-case second explanation because, as we shall see, bizarre claims of “biotechnology-based weapons” being developed in the West began to appear in the hawkish doctrine of recent years. In any case, Putin’s speech justified new Russian high-technology weapons to counter the perceived Western violations of arms control agreements. This issue linkage remained popular in later pronouncements. In its promises of “new types of weapons” and a “rethinking of strategy,” Putin’s speech hinted at the direction and scale of the upcoming New Look military reforms put in place in October 2008. The lessons of the Russo-Georgian War in August 2008 presumably reinforced the impetus for these changes and consolidated the power of reformers whose ideas appeared vindicated by battlefield experience. However, Putin’s speech makes clear that his faction was already aiming to reform Russia’s military before the war. During the Russo-Georgian War, Russian forces demonstrated their ability to deploy in overwhelming force to defeat the Georgian military. However, the Russian military performed poorly in crucial aspects of hightechnology warfare. The Russian forces’ command, control, and communications (C3) network was obsolescent and performed poorly.17 The resultant weaknesses in Russian operations planning were compounded by a lack of key specialized equipment, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and a satellite guidance network of sufficient reach to employ precisionguided munitions outside of Russia.18 Notable adverse results from the Russian perspective included the downing of several Russian aircraft by Georgia’s air defense network.19 Overall, Russian and foreign accounts that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the war to dissect the Russian military performance emphasized three key failures: • The Russian military did not have the technical means for waging certain aspects of high-technology warfare; • Even when the equipment was available, the Russian military lacked a military doctrine encouraging its proper use and/or the necessary training to carry out operations as planned; • The Russian government was not able to control the narrative of the conflict.20 The mixed Russian military performance during the Russo-Georgian War provided the Putin administration with a strong rationale to push

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through the painful and expensive military modernization reforms designed to facilitate the fielding of high-technology weapons already hinted at in Putin’s speech.21 In October 2008, then–defense minister Serdyukov and the chief of the General Staff (GS), Nikolai Makarov, began to implement a wide-ranging series of reforms for the Russian armed forces, including mass layoffs to achieve a smaller force composed of better-trained and equipped units.22 For detailed information about the New Look reforms and their outcome, we refer the reader to a series of exhaustive analytic reports on the Russian military authored by the FOI.23 It suffices to note here that the military’s defense budget was substantially expanded in the years that followed (see Table 3.1), and that defense procurement efforts concentrated on the purchase of newly designed high-technology weapon systems. As detailed in Chapter 4, new military organs were set up to facilitate high-technology weapons development, and large-scale military training exercises greatly increased in frequency, size, and complexity. It took well over a year for the strategic rationale underpinning these expensive and controversial military reforms to be enshrined in a revamped Russian Military Doctrine. On February 5, 2010, President Medvedev approved the first new Russian Military Doctrine since 2000. As noted in the document’s introduction, the Military Doctrine “is one of the fundamental strategic planning documents in the Russia Federation and constitutes a system of the views officially adopted in the state on preparations for armed defense and on the armed protection of the Russian Federation.”24

Table 3.1 Estimated Russian Defense Expenditures, 2008–2015 2008

Spending 1,396 in billion rubles Percentage 3.3 of GDP

2009

2010

2011

2012

2,513

2,813

3,251

4,047

4.0

4.2

4.5

5.4

1,636

1,783

2,064

4.1

3.8

3.7

2013

2014

2015

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Military Expenditure,” https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military -spending/military-expenditure (accessed April 1, 2017). For other estimates and detailed analyses, see also Lyudmila Pankova, “Russian Defence Budget: Key Problems and Possible Solutions,” in Alexei Arbatov and Sergei Oznobishchev, eds., Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academies of Sciences (IMEMO), Russia: Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security IMEMO Supplement to the Russian Edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2015 (Moscow: IMEMO, 2016), pp. 143,149; Susanne Oxenstierna, “Russia’s Defense Spending and the Economic Decline,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016), pp. 60–70.

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An old training manual helps place the Military Doctrine’s viewpointdefining function in perspective. According to a military manual published in 1997 that was designed to help train officers of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, the Military Doctrine was ranked higher in importance than the equivalent to the presidentially issued National Security Concept then in existence.25 The book authors presented the Military Doctrine document as the highest-level document for planning military security. The doctrine has four main sections: a “general provisions” introductory section, one on “military dangers and military threats” facing Russia, one laying out Russia’s “military policy,” and one final section on the “military-economic support” for Russia’s defense. In reproducing passages of interest here, we employ the unofficial English translation made available online by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Under the “military dangers and military threats” section, and under the “main external military threats” subsection, one finds a vague series of statements implying foreign state-level proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and of treaty noncompliance, but no specific reference to biological weapons: f) The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and missile technologies, and the increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons; g) the violation of international accords by individual states, and also noncompliance with previously concluded international treaties in the field of arms limitation and reduction.26

The Military Doctrine thus cryptically claimed that unnamed states were in noncompliance with unstated accords and arms treaties. Whether this included the BWC is anyone’s guess; it is not even clear whether all relevant Russian state institutions had agreed upon a list of violated treaties by the time the Military Doctrine was published (a question we return to at length in Chapter 6). Indeed, this passage is softened in tone compared to the analogous passage in Putin’s 2008 speech, which had bluntly alleged that “NATO partners” were “not fulfilling their obligations.” We presume the paragraph in the Military Doctrine was meant to echo Putin’s speech: it was left vague because its purpose was simply to justify the necessity for a stronger, and incidentally far more expensive, Russian military. Within the same document section, a different subsection detailed the “characteristic features of contemporary military conflicts,” and included the following: “b) the massive utilization of weapons and military equipment systems based on new physical principles that are comparable to nuclear weapons in terms of effectiveness.”27 This mention of weapons based on new physical principles was peculiar. We found a passing mention of such arms in a parenthetical statement in the old 2000 doctrine.28 How-

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ever, as just shown, the Russian government had ignored this Soviet concept in high-level official documents released prior to the Military Doctrine. It was notably absent from the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020 (NSS-2009), which had only just been made public a few months beforehand. This absence is notable given that the NSS-2009 authors included forceful language regarding BW and bioterrorism threats to Russia that went beyond that found in the Military Doctrine (we analyze these specific biodefense-related points in the second section of this chapter). That is, the NSS-2009 authors did not shy away from highlighting perceived security threats they felt were credible. Since NSS-2009 was a consensus document involving mostly high-level civilian officials, and the Military Doctrine a consensus military document, it appears that the “weapons based on new physical principles” concept was primarily pushed by the military during this time frame. The desire inherent in the New Look reforms for a modern Russian army came at a very high cost, and the sudden doctrinal necessity to fight in such an apocalyptic high-technology environment as described in the new doctrine was probably meant to justify the planned expenditures. In December 2010, Prime Minister Putin announced the State Armament Program (SAP) for 2011–2020 (SAP-2020).29 SAP is the Russian military’s budget line. It typically covers military equipment needs over a ten-year period, but is supposed to be replaced by a new SAP every five years to reflect domestic budget and military strategy changes. Compared to the preceding SAP 2007–2015, SAP 2011–2020 indeed featured a markedly increased overall budget line: the Russian government eventually allocated 20 trillion rubles to fund SAP-2020, plus 3 trillion rubles to fund the Federal Target Program and the construction of new defense industrial enterprises.30 For comparison purposes, we provided spending for national defense between 2008 and 2015 in the prior Table 3.1. In a 2011 interview with a reporter for the Russian-language National Defense online publication, First Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin described the priorities for SAP-2020 as follows: • The balanced development of strategic weapons systems; • The completion of deliveries of modern and advanced weapons, especially to the military units kept in a state of permanent readiness; • The creation of basic management information systems to provide for the application of high-precision weapons; • The creation of a scientific and technological base and ensuring the development of new systems and armaments; • Ensuring the maintenance of the existing fleet of combat-ready weapons.31

Since R&D efforts funded by SAP-2020 were not openly detailed, we do not know what types of research projects were included in the program

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to satisfy priority four. We note that nowhere in the public SAP-2020 text can one find the words “biology,” “biotechnology,” or “genetics.” Further, the public SAP-2020 made no mention of “weapons based on new physical principles.”32 The Military Doctrine had made it clear that Russian forces should be ready to fight under attack from such weapons, but neither the public SAP-2020 text itself nor descriptions given by Popovkin or other important military officials claimed that Russia would develop these weapons. Of course, the classified SAP-2020 text may well have funded R&D on Russian “weapons based on new physical principles.” Our point is only that, if funds were allocated for this purpose in the 2010–2011 period, Russian officials did not see fit to publicize this development. While Russian “weapons based on new physical principles” had no official champions at the time, “bio-, nano-, and information technology” weapons remained the jargon of choice. In December 2011, retired majorgeneral Vasiliy M. Burenok published an article that probably was influential due to his former position as director of the MOD’s 46th Research and Development Institute.33 The institute is “the leading research organization under the MOD on problems of the development of the domestic technological base,” and is in part tasked with the rational planning for “the implementation of modern high technology projects in the defense industry” (see Chapter 4).34 As such, whatever new technologies the 46th Institute highlights are likely to feature as scientific priority areas for the defense industry. Burenok’s article provided a glimpse into the organization’s likely preferences, and by proxy into the types of military R&D topics that SAP-2020 might have funded. Burenok proposed that a new, sixth generation of technologies had arisen that were exerting substantial influence on militaries of the world’s leading nations.35 He designated the sixth generation as “NBIC,” which consists of nanotechnology (N), biotechnology (B), information technologies (I), and cognitive technologies (C).36 This accorded with Putin’s 2008 speech, where the latter had stated that “breakthroughs in bio-, nano- and information technology could lead to revolutionary changes in weapons and defence.” Burenok asserted that the “greatest influence of NBIC technologies is expected to be in the field of biology, especially in medicine, since it most obviously affects the very basis of the existence of the living world, society, and man.” He further observed that “the spectrum of threats posed by NBIC technologies in the field of medicine is quite obvious, since almost all of its achievements can be reversed to the detriment of man and society.”37 Burenok’s article, written using terms clearly in fashion among Putin’s advisers, did not dwell on the potential offensive aspects of biotechnology, nor did it openly advocate for such illegal applications. Burenok’s article did however reflect the general interest in strengthening military biotechnology research, something already hinted at in Putin’s 2008 speech.

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It would thus not surprise us to learn that SAP-2020 had made more funds available for MOD-run biodefense projects. The official events and pronouncements issued during the 2010–2011 period thus reflected a growth in emphasis on high-technology weapon systems, coupled with an equally growing dissatisfaction with the way military R&D was being conducted. For example, in July 2011, Serdyukov complained that military R&D expenditures had “vanished” without results, implying that whatever programs had received funding through to 2011 had not yielded novel weapons.38 These reflections set the tone for the events of 2012, when core issues pertaining to high-technology weapons R&D came to the forefront. In February 2012, as part of his reelection campaign, Putin had an article published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta on the necessity for Russia to be strong in order to guarantee its security.39 An English-language version was simultaneously published online on the official website of the Russian prime minister.40 The text echoed Putin’s February 2008 speech discussed earlier in that it described the potential for technological advances to revolutionize military affairs. While the 2008 speech framed the issue in terms of advances in the “bio-, nano-, and information technology” spheres, the 2012 article instead used the concept of the future emergence of “weapons based on new physical principles.” As far as we know, it was the first time that Putin made a public reference to this old Soviet concept (a point we return to at length in the conclusion of this chapter). The context in which this is done is as follows: We should not tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to be weak. It is for this reason that we will under no circumstances surrender our strategic deterrent capability, and indeed, will in fact strengthen it. It was this strength that enabled us to maintain our national sovereignty during the extremely difficult 1990s, when, let’s be frank, we did not have anything else to argue with. . . . We have adopted and are implementing unprecedented development programmes for our armed forces and for the modernisation of Russia’s defence industry. All in all, we will allocate something like 23 trillion rubles for these purposes over the next decade. . . . We need a response system for more than just current threats. We should learn to look “past the horizon,” and estimate threats 30 or even 50 years away. This is a serious objective and requires mobilising the resources of civilian and military science and reliable standards for long-term forecasting. What kinds of weapons will the Russian army need? What technical requirements will be established for our defence industry? In effect, we need to develop a qualitatively new and smart system for military analysis and strategic planning, for prescribed approaches with prompt implementation by our security-related agencies. . . . The military capability of a country in space or information countermeasures, especially in cyberspace, will play a great, if not decisive, role in determining the nature of an armed conflict. In the more distant future, weapons

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systems based on new physical principles (beam, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical and other technology) will be developed. All this will, in addition to nuclear weapons, provide entirely new instruments for achieving political and strategic goals. Such hi-tech weapons systems will be comparable in effect to nuclear weapons but will be more “acceptable” in terms of political and military ideology. In this sense, the strategic balance of nuclear forces will play a gradually diminishing role in deterring aggression and chaos.41

The mention of weapons “based on new physical principles” with effects “comparable to nuclear weapons” is directly taken from the similarly themed section of the 2010 Military Doctrine on the trends in modern warfare (cited earlier). As was done with the text of the 2010 Military Doctrine, Putin used the passive voice when stating that weapons based on new physical principles would be built in the future, leaving it ambiguous as to who would develop and field such arms. By including this passage in his speech, Putin extended his support for a concept mostly pushed by the military and ignored by the civilian administration. His text undoubtedly reached receptive ears at the MOD’s top echelon. As we note in the introduction to this book, after Putin was elected president in March 2012, he chaired a meeting attended by a select group of his ministers “on the tasks set in his articles as a presidential candidate.” The ministers took turns explaining what their ministries would do to implement tasks based on Putin’s articles, including the Rossiiskaya Gazeta article cited earlier. At this meeting, Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov42 stated: “Mr. Putin, we have thoroughly studied your article and prepared a plan for implementing the tasks set there for the MOD. There are 28 such tasks.”43 It is not necessary to list all twenty-eight tasks here; we list only those five that are of relevance to this book: 2. Put in place a system to provide reliable long-term forecasts of security threats to the Russian Federation for 30–50 years. We plan the development and implementation of a comprehensive research programme, and the system will be formulated by January 2013. 3. The creation of a qualitatively new system of military analysis and strategic planning for preparing recipes and their prompt introduction in the military and security agencies. We will try to formulate and prepare the implementation of that task as part of the same programme. 4. The development of weapons based on new physical principles: radiation, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical, etc. 10. Ensuring dynamic development of military education, fundamental military science and applied research programmes. We have plans starting from 2012 until 2015, and we will double-check them and prepare for approval. Restoration of the former competences of military institutions and their integration within the evolving system of military education. We will prepare a plan for improving the system of scientific research in Armed Forces and Defence Ministry research organizations until 2015, and I believe that in the next few months we will be able to prepare these

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proposals because we are already in the process of preparing that programme conceptually. 12. The integration of military research and civilian science. We are planning to prepare the programme within this year, and as of January 1, 2016 similar decisions are to be taken for the next period.44

Of the twenty-eight tasks, the fourth is of highest concern to us. Subsequent to comments in Russia and abroad that it was difficult to conceive of any “genetic” weapons that would not violate the BWC,45 the Russian government quietly deleted the offending twenty-eight-point list from the public transcript of the meeting.46 An official Russian response eventually was issued in May 2014, in response to a US congressional meeting during which Putin’s speech was brought up and the “genetic weapons” issue was discussed. The Russian MFA’s response was that Putin had never called for the development of “genetic weapons,” nor of “weapons based on new physical principles” in general, in his article.47 This claim is technically true; Putin noted only that such weapons would be built in the future, but did not specify by whom. However, the Russian official argument conveniently fails to mention Serdyukov’s promise to Putin, which was quite explicit in stating that Russia would design such weapons. We emphasize that during the March 2012 meeting Putin did not disapprove of Serdyukov’s report that Russia would build such arms. We chose the other four tasks (numbered 2, 3, 10, and 12) to emphasize that all are meant to improve novel weapons R&D. These are in keeping with the desire for a reformed high-technology weapons R&D cycle noted in prior years. The long list of tasks meant to achieve this objective suggests that it was a top priority. Overall, Serdyukov’s promised tasks presented a significant escalation of Russian doctrine in favor of high-technology weapons. That Serdyukov was pushing for this development is not surprising given that the continuation of his reforms, and therefore his power base, depended on it. What was more surprising was that Putin was willing to publicly support this policy to a far greater extent than he had done previously. However, Serdyukov soon fell from grace and was sacked on November 5, 2012. And while no Russian officials have denounced Serdyukov’s promise to develop “genetic” weapons or other “weapons based on new physical principles,” to our knowledge no official has since publicly championed the development of “genetic” weapons either. The developments in the Russian doctrine that have occurred since 2012 nevertheless remained troubling. The drastic deterioration of USRussian relations solidified the hardline doctrinal position that Russia must have new-generation weapons to prepare for the increased likelihood of a new-generation war. This policy is somewhat paradoxical because the

46

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downturn in the Russian economy and the inflicting by the Western countries of sanctions subsequent to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 have significantly increased the relative budgetary costs of high-technology weapons development. The root cause of this policy was already visible in Putin’s 2008 speech, where the latter used a confrontational view of US and NATO military forces to justify the pursuit of novel weapons. As relations with the West deteriorated, the perceived deterrent value granted by the possession of new-generation weapons—emphasized in Putin’s 2012 article—increased. Putin and his new minister of defense, Sergey K. Shoigu, both adopted a confrontational tone in early 2013 and used this to push for more modern weaponry. In January 2013, Shoigu visited the Academy of Military Sciences (AVN) in Moscow and declared that: Force still continues to play an important role in resolving economic and political disagreements between countries. Military dangers for Russia are increasing along some directions, and some hot spots are near our borders. Therefore, we should be ready to respond to any challenges and threats. To this end, we need armed forces with an optimal structure, an efficient control system, modern weapons, and professional personnel.48

Putin himself continued the threat theme one month later at an expanded Defense Ministry Board meeting, where he demanded that Russia’s military leaders deliver a “drastic upgrade” to Russian military capabilities.49 Putin justified this request by identifying “potential threats, including U.S. missile defense deployment, further eastward NATO expansion, and militarization of the Arctic.”50 Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the retaliatory Western sanctions against Russia led to a collapse of USRussian diplomatic relations in 2014. Hardliners increasingly sought weapons that would “scare the West”—to borrow the term used by progovernment Russian mass media writers—and this desire in turn strengthened the rationale for the development of “weapons based on new physical principles.”51 Our assessment echoes that of the Russian military strategy expert Dima Adamsky, who flagged the MOD’s growing anti-Western sentiment and associated desire for advanced weapons capable of achieving “non-nuclear deterrence” even before 2014.52 Accordingly, when Shoigu took stock of the effects of sanctions in 2014, his public pronouncements made clear that there would be no cutback in the pursuit for new-generation weapons. While addressing the MOD Collegium in May 2014, he acknowledged that sanctions would have an impact on the Russian defense industry complex but simply stated that the military scientific institutes were expected to take countermanding actions to efficiently develop possible domestic replacements for imported pieces of equipment.53 To do so, he emphasized the need to

Russian Biosecurity and Military Modernization

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oversee how our work on NIOKR [scientific research and experimental design projects] and NIR [scientific research projects] is being structured. A particular role in the fulfillment of this task is being assigned to the military scientific institutes. . . . The military scientific institutes must facilitate the forecasting of national security threats, develop forms and methods of countering them, and create concepts for advanced arms systems and for the requirements for them.54

By speaking of “forecasting” national security threats and conceptualizing “advanced arms systems,” Shoigu echoed Serdyukov’s third and fourth tasks and made clear that there would be continuity of goals. This continuation in policy, as well as its anti-US rationale, is most clearly reflected in an unofficial article that had been published a few days before Shoigu’s speech. Vasiliy Burenok (previously introduced) had just published another article on military and defense industrial complex issues.55 Of particular interest to this book, Burenok listed what he considered the seven major threats to Russia: • The creation of a full-fledged U.S. missile defense system, and the main elements of a Chinese missile defense system; • The adoption before 2025 of hypersonic cruise missiles by the U.S. Armed Forces; • The creation by NATO countries of the technologies behind high-velocity kinetic weapons, laser systems, precision onboard control systems for weapons, combined systems of weapons guidance, high-precision strapdown inertial navigation systems, new explosives, etc.; • The intensive development in leading countries of space technologies, including those based on mini- and nano-satellites for various functional purposes (combat, reconnaissance, jamming); • The increasing use of information warfare, and cyber operations, forces and means against Russia; • The creation and introduction of VVST [Weapons and Specialized Military Equipment] based on technologies of the sixth technological generation. Development of technical solutions based on nanotechnology (technology for alternative energy sources, etc.), biotechnology (chemical and informational technologies, technologies of robotics, genetic engineering methods, etc.), and informational and cognitive technologies (technologies of a “biological element base,” solutions of weakly-formalized creative problems) will enable the creation of fully intelligent VVST models of arms and military equipment capable of satisfying previously unattainable tactical and technical specifications and empowering the concept of waging “knowledge-centric” warfare; • The creation and actual replacement of traditional weapon systems in favor of unmanned aerial, as well as ground and naval robotic systems for various purposes and developed on the basis of fundamentally new technologies of autonomous power supply sources and artificial intelligence, capable of independently executing combat missions in any situation.56

Burenok ended his article with an admonition and a suggestion as to what might be done. His admonition was that: “Behind all this is the desire

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of the leading countries, primarily the United States, to realize the concept of technological warfare, that is, to achieve technological superiority over any potential enemy through the creation of VVST models based on new physical principles.”57 As for what was to be done, Burenok suggested: The general direction of the innovation strategy is to place emphasis on equipping the Russian Armed Forces with high-technology weapons and a new generation of weapons based on new physical principles, an improved intelligence system with a single management center, and a distributed secure system for the automated control of troops and weapon systems to manage non-contact and information warfare.58

Burenok’s views as expressed in this article synthesized ideas expressed in Putin’s 2008 speech (in terms of framing military advances in the “bio-, nano-, and information technology” fields) and in Putin’s 2012 article (with its references to “weapons based on new physical principles”). We stress Burenok’s article because its points are consistent with those expressed in the new Military Doctrine unveiled a few months later. Toward the end of 2014, articles began appearing in the Russian press that a new Military Doctrine designed to replace the 2010 version was about to be published that would emphasize “non-nuclear deterrence.”59 Putin himself, at a mid-December meeting of the National Defense Control Center, mentioned the new draft military doctrine and stressed its importance for long-term military planning.60 A few days later, the Russian government published the new Military Doctrine. Putin commented on the new doctrine, stating that it “remains a defensive document, despite the rise in NATO activities in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, our military doctrine has not changed and is known to be purely defensive, but with regard to our security our response will be tough and consistent.”61 However, as other authors noted at the time, the Military Doctrine’s text did in fact reflect Russia’s gravely deteriorated relationship with the West.62 Here we begin by noting the major threats spelled out in this document, which are the US concept of Prompt Global Strike, US plans to deploy strategic weapons in space, US deployment of strategic nonnuclear precision weapon systems, NATO’s buildup of its military potential, NATO’s military structure that continues to approach Russia’s borders, and NATO’s expansion. The aforementioned unofficial article by Burenok published a few months before the new doctrine had a more detailed list of perceived US and NATO military developments seen as of concern, although every item that he named fit within the Military Doctrine’s fears of NATO’s “build-up in military potential” and US “strategic weapons in space” and “deployment of strategic non-nuclear precision weapon systems.” Burenok’s list was thus consistent with the broad topics listed in the subsequent 2014 Military Doctrine, which suggests to us

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that his article was well grounded in the reality of military modernization discussions in Russia. As in its 2010 predecessor, the 2014 Military Doctrine included the use of “weapons based on new physical principles” in the section devoted to the characteristic features and specifics of modern military conflicts: (b) massive use of weapons systems and military technology, high-precision hypersonic weapons, means of electronic warfare, weapons based on new physical principles that are comparable to nuclear weapons in terms of effectiveness, information management and control systems, as well as autonomous air and naval vehicles, guided robotic weapons and military equipment.63

And yet, despite the general policy continuity, it is not known to what extent funds for “weapons based on new physical principles” have been disbursed. On June 10, 2015, the head of the 3rd Central Research Institute, Igor Anatolyevich Sheremet; one of his lead researchers, Vladimir A. Ischuk; and the vice president of the Russian Engineering Academy, Vitaly Valer’yanovich, published an article on the future of Russia’s weapons development system. These authors are influential because the 3rd Central Research Institute is a major weapons development center for the ground forces and has a leading place in the MOD’s “unconventional” and “nonlethal” weapons development programs, while the Russian Engineering Academy author is the head of the latter’s section on military-technical problems and therefore is an important member of the defense industry (see Chapter 4). We reproduce two paragraphs from their article: The actual area of cooperation of the RAS [Russian Academy of Sciences], RIA [Russian Engineering Academy], RAMAS [Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences], universities, NIIs [Scientific-Research Institutes], the Ministry of Defense, and the organizations of the Russian defense industry is the consolidation of efforts in the development and application of systems modeling to ensure the formation of a new technological structure for the economic development of the country and its military-industrial sector. In this way “industrial production must be based on discoveries in biotechnology, nanotechnology, new materials information and communication, cognitive, membrane, quantum technologies, photonics, micromechanics, robotics, genetic engineering, virtual reality technology, fusion energy.” The creation of new weapons of a new technological order involves the integration of new types of weapons and military equipment based on the achievements of nano-bio-info-cognitive technologies (NBIC technologies), and others. Without the use of advances in new scientific fields for further increases in the number of weapons, there will not be improvements in the quality and effectiveness of combat means. This will undoubtedly be taken into account during the formation of a new State Armaments Program to 2025, which envisages the use of the latest innovative military technologies and the wide application of robotics and weapons based on new physical principles.64

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The rest of the article argued that “proven” organizations (i.e., the authors’ organizations) have a key role to play in this process. As with Burenok’s 2014 article, the authors draw from both the “NBIC” and the “weapons based on new technologies” concepts and actively call for the development of Russian weapons using such technologies and of such types. The “wide application of . . . weapons based on new physical principles” phrasing is likely a reference to the “massive utilization” phrasing of the recent Military Doctrines. The text therefore makes heavy use of official phraseology; this is a deliberate choice made by the authors given that their article is not an official government document. The timing of the article’s release is no coincidence; it occurred while the budget allocations for SAP-2025 remained in debate. We conclude that these three representatives of the Russian defense industry base are hoping to receive SAP funds by appealing to the current doctrine and promoting their ability to develop “weapons based on new physical principles” and “weapons and military equipment” based on “NBIC technologies.” As of the end of 2016, the weakening of the Russian economy has created serious tensions within the MIC. The defense budget for 2016 had been announced in January by the Russian government; it was 3.14 trillion rubles for the national defense sector as a whole, of which 2.24 trillion rubles (68 percent) was to be allocated to the MOD. However, due to Russia’s poor economic situation, 5 percent of the MOD’s budget (160 billion rubles) was sequestered, which led to less funding being available to purchase new weapons and delayed repairs of equipment, and in general cut down on military developments.65 The budget shortfall is the likely cause for the delay in the updated SAP for 2016–2025 (SAP-2025). First supposed to have been published at the end of 2014,66 and then in December 2015,67 it has as of this writing not appeared and is now apparently slated for release in 2017 or 2018.68 The budget for the SAP-2025, which according to an estimate made by a Russian analyst would have been 56 trillion rubles, was probably impossible to raise given the economic conditions in Russia, and therefore SAP-2025 had to be redrawn to fit reality.69 Planned military spending in 2016 designed to meet SAP-2020 objectives was understood by most Russian planners to be untenable given the new economic difficulties faced by Russia.70 The resultant budget restrictions will negatively impact the planned starting points for SAP-2025, and the Russian government will constantly have to readjust SAP-2025 plans to reflect reality for as long as the current yearly defense spending and objectives remain in flux. Russian defense industry analyst Andrei Frolov wrote in March 2016 that Putin’s February 2012 article gave hints as to what one should expect to be included in SAP-2025. He stated his belief that the future SAP would probably include funds for research on “weapons based on new

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physical principles (beam, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical weapons, and others).”71 Less than one month after Frolov’s article, Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov argued in a speech to representatives of Russian defense industries and Russian Academy of Sciences scientists that SAP-2025 should be based on results of R&D work on “weapons based on new physical principles” alongside materials engineering and hypersonic technologies.72 This comment is notable because, as we will describe in more detail in Chapter 4, Borisov is in charge of MOD institutions dedicated to economic and logistical planning studies for advanced weapons procurement. In addition, Borisov has since 2011 served on the MIC, first as a first deputy chairman and now as an executive secretary.73 Given the visibly rocky state of the defense planning process in Russia in 2016, the level of funding carved out of the SAP-2025 for such arms remains unknown. What is clear is that the official MOD doctrine supports the “weapons based on new physical principles” concept and that MOD weaponeers are lobbying to develop such arms and to harness biotechnology in unspecified ways for the creation of new-generation weapons. And yet, despite Putin’s endorsement of the “weapons based on new physical principles” concept in his 2012 defense editorial and its prominent mentions in the 2010 and 2014 Military Doctrines, the term still does not figure in the updated NSS-2015. It was not mentioned in Putin’s 2013 Foreign Policy Concept nor its 2016 update. Therefore, the term “weapons based on new physical principles” remains primarily conceptualized and employed by Russian military thinkers rather than their civilian counterparts. The continued lack of civilian enthusiasm for the concept is somewhat unsurprising, given that it will be their civilian budgets that will be cut should the MOD continue its pursuit of ever-more-expensive novel weapons with which to target the West. Biosecurity Threat Perceptions and Biodefense Programming As will be seen in the documents presented here, the distinct subjects of biological and chemical safety and security are generally addressed simultaneously in policy documents. The conflation of safety and security is unsurprising given that the Russian language uses the same term (bezopasnost) for both safety and security, and hence uses the same term for biosafety and biosecurity.74 As for the simultaneous inclusion of chemical and biological issues, this may reflect Soviet heritage whereby military response measures for chemical and biological incidents were (and still are) handled by the same MOD units. One anecdote speaks to this general point:

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on Russian military maps, chemical and biological weapon–contaminated zones are to be marked using very similar symbols, and only one symbol is used to identify decontamination areas.75 In this subsection we focus on presenting and analyzing translated excerpts dealing with biosecurity. In translating chosen passages, when the textual context proved insufficient to determine whether safety or security was a better translation or when the Russian text was clearly considering both safety and security issues, we translated the Russian term as “safety/security” so as to maintain the intended meaning. Our primary objective was to discover how Russian officials perceived biosecurity threats and what policies they had drafted to address said threats. Influential individuals within the early Putin administration, and perhaps Putin himself, have had a long-standing interest in chemical and biological safety and security. This conclusion is supported by the early date (2003) of the first relevant guidance document on the subject, which was released near the end of Putin’s first term in office. Specifically, on December 4, 2003, the Putin administration issued a set of two linked presidential decrees establishing the “Principles of State Policy in the Field of Nuclear and Radiation Safety/Security in the Russian Federation to 2010 and Beyond,”76 and the “Principles of State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation to 2010 and Beyond.”77 The latter is the document of direct relevance here, as it remains a periodically updated document outlining the government’s priority tasks for improving biosafety and biosecurity in Russia. The 2003 State Policy decree described nine challenges facing Russia in the chemical and biological safety and security domains that require action, including the need to comply with “the provisions of international treaties and agreements to which Russia is a party in the fields of chemical and biological safety/security.”78 A list of planned activities followed, including the following tasks of particular importance for this book: The development of public governance at the federal, regional, territorial, sectoral and local levels (including at the facility level) in the creation and improvement of the development, production, stockpiling and maintenance of stocks of systems providing protection from exposure to hazardous chemical and biological agents in the interest of public safety, the personnel at facilities dealing with hazardous materials, the personnel of the emergency services, the special anti-terrorist units, and the units involved in emergency response; Ensuring the ability of the Russian Federation to oppose the development, acquisition, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons by other states, including by maintaining an adequate level of protection against chemical and biological weapons, as well as through anti-terrorism measures and through military deterrence of the potential use of these weapons; The development of international cooperation, including the improvement of international cooperation and mechanisms for the implementation of

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international treaties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is party to in the field of chemical and biological safety/security.79

The language and structure used to describe and address biosafety and biosecurity threats to Russia have remained consistent between the state policy document and the implementation programs discussed later. The format whereby chemical safety, chemical security, biological safety, and biological security issues are all addressed through a single federal program has been conserved in subsequent decrees. Indeed, the decree formalized this approach by mandating “the creation of the state system for ensuring chemical and biological safety/security of the Russian Federation (as a subsystem of the unified state system of prevention and liquidation of emergency situations).”80 This was to be done in part by setting up a separate funding mechanism by 2007 for achieving chemical and biological safety and security.81 The Russian government completed this task by October 2008, and in doing so established the single most important unclassified funding line for biosecurity work in Russia. It did so when it issued Decree 791, which set up and funded a Federal Targeted Program titled the “National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2013).”82 For simplicity’s sake, we hereafter refer to this document as “the Program” or “Decree 791.” Decree 791 remains the most comprehensive official document on the structure, objectives, and directions of Russia’s biodefense system ever published. We accordingly spend much time analyzing this document’s justifying text in the current chapter, and the facilities it names in Chapter 4. The Program remained in force into 2014 and it was officially amended to extend its reach until the end of 2014.83 The Program’s goal was to gradually reduce threats from hazardous chemical and biological materials that pose an “unacceptably high level of risk to the biosphere, technosphere, and ecological system” in Russia.84 Decree 791 had an intensive and intricate text on why the Program is necessary, and that details its objectives and how they are to be achieved. It also had six lengthy appendices that detailed the target indicators for use in the evaluation of the program’s success and the program tasks and facilities that were to receive funding, and provided further budget information. The funding allocated to carry out the Program was close to 33.9 billion rubles (in 2008, the exchange rate was about $1 = 30 rubles).85 The Russian government funded the programmatic items through the federal budget, the budgets of the Russian government components, and unnamed “other sources.”86 In the 2014 edition of Decree 791, the budget was slightly increased to approximately 36.4 billion rubles.87 Decree 791 provides much information on the numerous, severe, and varied public health and environmental problems that face Russia in the chemical and biological fields. We mostly limit ourselves to describing the

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Program’s sections that deal with biosecurity, including defenses against BW and bioterrorism. The Program specifies that threats from both natural and deliberate disease outbreaks shall be addressed. Specifically, the program’s biological components address the following four threat scenarios: • Transboundary drifts of known and previously unknown non-endemic pathogens and environmental pathogens into the territory of the Russian Federation; • Unauthorized use of potentially dangerous genetically modified organisms that have not passed the relevant tests and are unknown to the specialized services of the state supervision of the Russian Federation; • Use of dangerous and especially dangerous biological agents and chemicals within the Russian Federation’s territory for terrorist purposes; and • Use against Russia of various types of biological and chemical weapons designed to cause death or other harm that have been created abroad on the basis of the latest achievements in genomics, proteomics, genetic engineering of pathogens, environmental pathogens, as well as in organic and inorganic chemistry.88

Decree 791 makes clear that Russian experts view the biological weapons threat as increasing in severity: Because of the broad accessibility of technologies for culturing pathogenic microorganisms and the lack of a mechanism for monitoring compliance with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, the risk that biological weapons will be manufactured and used by various terrorist and extremist organizations is increasing.89

As for the specific diseases to be considered as priority threats warranting substantive protective work, the document mentioned many that either are endemic to Russia, or that might be imported into or reemerge in Russia. Many of the agents that cause these diseases are also strong candidates for arming biological weapons, although only B. anthracis is explicitly identified as such in the decree’s text. The named pathogens that were also investigated for weaponization or were fully weaponized by the Soviet Union were the causative agents of highly virulent diseases such as smallpox, anthrax, plague, brucellosis, viral hemorrhagic fevers (Crimean-Congo, Bolivian, Lassa, Marburg, and Ebola fevers), and tick-borne viral encephalitis.90 The Program text reveals the large scale of the Russian biological laboratory base researching these dangerous pathogens, and discusses in highly alarming terms the status of their infrastructure:91 Maintaining the production capacity of the federal government agencies for the manufacture of medical immunobiological preparations and keeping their

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operation reliable and stable will make it possible to ensure the protection of the Russian population despite the continuing high probability that terrorists will use biological weapons, and to also ensure the biological safety of the work involving microorganisms belonging to pathogenicity Groups 1 and 2 [equivalent to BSL-3 and BSL-4 pathogens] conducted in organizations involved in the development of such protective preparations. However, more than half of the manufacturing equipment used in the main stages of production of immunobiological preparations namely preparing culture media, culturing, filtering, drying, and packaging have reached the end of their established service life and need to be replaced. Particular attention should be paid to potentially hazardous biological facilities, i.e. organizations that conduct work on dangerous biological materials and agents. Within Russia’s territory, more than 160 organizations under the jurisdiction of the federal executive bodies are engaged in work involving infectious agents in pathogenicity Groups 1 or 2. Preventing unauthorized access to biological materials and agents and harm to personnel and the population requires improving the biological security systems of these facilities, including through the development of modern means of protection. Particular attention needs to be paid to issues related to ensuring the security of collections holding pathogenic microorganisms (pathogens of dangerous and especially dangerous infectious diseases in humans, animals and plants), first and foremost at those having the status of national microorganism collection. Moreover, the engineering systems ensuring the safety of work with microorganisms belonging to pathogenicity Groups 1 and 2 (ventilation, water supply, cable lines, and transformer substations) at biologically hazardous facilities that were put into operation more than 20 years ago have become obsolete. They have exceeded 80% of their specified lifespan.92

Decree 791 highlighted Russian biodetection and disinfection capabilities as areas where improvements are urgently needed: Highly sensitive preparations, based on genetic and immunochemical methods and that permit rapid analysis, must be developed and introduced as quickly as possible, alongside effective sample collection devices capable of detecting pathogens in the environment and diagnosing the diseases they cause. The network of centers to detect and diagnose infectious disease and chemical poisonings located in the federal districts of the Russian Federation must be improved. Furthermore, intensive technologies for plasma-optical and aerosol disinfection of objects (transports, buildings and structures, etc.) must be developed and put into practice, alongside environmentally friendly disinfectants that are effective against a broad spectrum of pathogens, including sporeforming microorganisms, and that are active at both above-zero and belowzero temperatures. This is particularly important for disaster recovery efforts following large-scale accidents at biologically hazardous facilities and terrorist attacks with biological weapons.93

Of special interest to us is that Decree 791 ordered the following tasks in the biosafety and biosecurity field:

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• The development of methods and means for the detection and identification of biological agents and chemical substances in biological fluids and in the environment; • The development of modern means of prophylaxis, diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation, and of the technologies for their production; • The development of protocols for diagnosing diseases, whose occurrence is associated with exposure to chemical and biological factors, and medicoeconomic standards for their treatment; • The creation of competitive means and systems of individual and group protection, of chemical and biological surveillance based on sorption, and of new generation protective composite materials with increased chemical and biological activity and selectivity with respect to hazardous chemicals and biological agents, and their introduction into production; • The creation of a unified database on the Russian Federation’s scientific, technical, and technological potential to solve problems of chemical safety/security; • The creation of information and analysis and forecasting systems, including expert geo-graphic information system, economic and mathematical models and methods of risk management, as well as software modules; and • The development of criteria and algorithms for evaluating the effectiveness of measures aimed at ensuring chemical and biological safety/security.94

Decree 791 revealed the large scale of the Russian chemical and biological safety and security systems that are, or will be, involved in achieving Russian biosecurity. It cited 211 facilities and organizations that belong to the MOD, Rospotrebnadzor (Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being), Rosselkhoznadzor (Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance), and the Federal Medical-Biological Agency (FMBA) that will receive new equipment and/or funding for infrastructure repair or development work meant to bolster biosafety, biosecurity, chemical safety, and/or chemical security. With regard to the aforementioned network of centers to detect and diagnose infectious disease and chemical poisonings, the program notes the existence of fifteen such centers: two under the MOD, two under the Ministry of Agriculture, eight under Rospotrebnadzor, and three under the FMBA. Serving as a budget line for infrastructure and research work at many of these 211 institutions, the Program has become the largest unclassified funding source for biosecurity work in Russia. As we spell out in Chapter 4, the Program has yielded tangible results. In particular, the Program funded sizable infrastructure reconstruction and expansion at many of the Soviet sites of concern described in Chapter 2. In closing our discussion of Decree 791, we emphasize that Russia’s total biodefense spending is far more than just the Program’s budget, even though Russian media tends to conflate the two when presenting estimates. The most obvious additional source of biodefense funds is that spent on radiological, chemical, and biological defense (RChBD) R&D as well as on nuclear, biological, and chemical protection troops, which we hereafter designate as

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“NBC Troops” for short. As far as we have learned, RChBD laboratories and the NBC Troops were funded through the SAPs.95 The Program was apparently designed to supplement existing budget lines, since the exiting MOD network of institutes are already tasked with several of the priority tasks related to detection, prophylaxis, and response that were named in the decree. The Medvedev presidency did not decrease the doctrinal importance assigned to biodefense nor did it interrupt the planned spending under the Program. The National Security Strategy to 2020 (NSS-2009), issued by the Medvedev presidency less than a year after Decree 791, was more explicit and more pessimistic in describing biosecurity threats faced by Russia. In addition, the Medvedev presidency denoted the growth of Russia’s biotechnology sector as a security priority. Issued on May 12, 2009, NSS-2009 emphasizes that the NSS is of high importance because it outlines a standing administration’s grand strategy for Russian domestic security and foreign policy over a specified period of time. Through this document, an acting administration lays out its perception of Russia’s place in the world community, its national interests, threats to its national security, tasks set to meet the overall strategy, and the indicators to be used in assessing the stated strategy. For context, Russia’s NSS is a periodically reissued document. Two predecessor documents to NSS-2009 called “National Security Concept” documents were issued by the Yeltsin administration in 1997 and the Putin administration in 2000; both were repealed by NSS-2009.96 As can be seen by the differing intervals of time between updates, the document has no set review period in the Russian bureaucratic system. NSS-2009 was the product of an interdepartmental working group supervised by the Russian Federation Security Council and composed of “the government staff, the presidential staff, staffs of the presidential plenipotentiary representatives to the Federal Districts, the RAS, as well as the expert community and major businesses.”97 The Security Council is a governmental organ dedicated to security policymaking, and typically meets every week.98 The Security Council secretary, who is appointed by and reports to the president (in this case, officially to Medvedev), organizes its work.99 As such, NSS-2009 was a presidential-level consensus document. In line with Medvedev’s “security through development” concept, the security impact of domestic issues was emphasized in NSS-2009 by including numerous domestic factors under the “national security” heading.100 The scope of NSS-2009 was thus broad. It was explicitly designed to “become a motivating factor in the development of the national economy; the improvement of the population’s quality of life; the assurance of political stability within society; the reinforcement of national defense, state security and law and order; and the enhancement of the competitiveness and international status of the Russian Federation.”101

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Of particular relevance is the fact that NSS-2009 tied Russia’s state and public security to the development of its civilian high-technology sector, explicitly including the biotechnology sector. The two predecessor National Security Concepts had mostly framed Russia’s high-technology sector as an economic issue facing Russia, and had not explicitly mentioned biotechnology as a key field.102 Whereas both predecessors emphasized state support for technology transfers from the military high-technology industrial sectors to the civilian realm (one-way transfers) as a method for modernizing Russia’s civilian sector, the NSS-2009 emphasizes the need to produce dual-use goods satisfying both military and civilian aims. Further, issues involving biotechnology are given substantial attention in NSS-2009. The aforementioned Program for Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation, decreed less than one year before, narrowly focused on biosecurity threats posed by “terrorist and extremist organizations.” Not so with the NSS-2009, whose authors did not shy away from also mentioning the threat posed by state-level proliferators acquiring and using biological weapons. NSS-2009 addressed biological weapons threats in a vaguely worded introductory paragraph that described the trends affecting Russian national security: A negative influence on the assurance of Russia’s national interests will be exerted by the likely recurrence of one-sided use of force in international relations, disagreements between the main participants in world politics, the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their use by terrorists, and likewise the improvement of forms of illicit activity in the cybernetic and biological domains, in the sphere of high technology.103

The “ensuring national security” subsection clarified this above passage by dividing biological weapons threats into state-level threats (affecting national defense) and nonstate threats (affecting state and public security). Threats affecting national defense and military security include the policies of a number of leading foreign countries, directed at achieving predominant superiority in the military sphere, primarily in terms of strategic nuclear forces, but also by developing high-precision, informational and other high-technology means of conducting armed warfare, strategic nonnuclear arms, by unilaterally creating a global missile defense system and militarizing space, which could lead to a new arms race, and likewise policies directed at the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological technologies, and the production of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems or components.104

The passage on nonstate actor threats is more explicit, and highlights specific potential Russian targets that might be attacked with biological weapons:

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The activity of terrorist organisations, groups and individuals, directed at violent changes to the constitutional system of the Russian Federation, the disruption of normal functioning of state bodies (including violent action against governmental, political and social actors), the destruction of military or industrial sites, enterprises and institutions providing for vital social activities, and intimidation of the population, including by means of nuclear and chemical weapons or dangerous radioactive, chemical and biological substances.105

We compared the contents of the 1997 and 2000 NSS documents with the NSS-2009 document and found that the Russian government greatly emphasized its concerns over biotechnology threats in the latter. The 2010 Military Doctrine unveiled the following year also contained a surprising biosecurity mention, which when seen together with the NSS2009’s language, indicated a growing official dissatisfaction with the BWC among both civilian and military officials. The 2010 Military Doctrine authors used the term “biology” twice, in passages found in sections 21 and 35. Section 21 specifies nineteen main tasks for Russia with regard to deterring and preventing military conflicts, with the seventeenth task being: “the development and adoption of an international mechanism to monitor compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.”106 Section 35 spells out fourteen tasks related to the development of the military organization, with the last task calling for “the improvement of the system of radiological, chemical and biological protection of troops (forces) and population.”107 It bears noting that of the three Military Doctrines that have been issued since 2000, this Military Doctrine is the first to mention the BWC and suggest how it might be improved.108 The Russian MFA did call on the BWC States Parties to add a new mechanism to the BWC some months after the public rollout of a major Russian diplomatic initiative at the BWC Meeting of Experts held in August 2014. This desire for a reform of the BWC appears to have emerged in late 2013 at the earliest, since no mention of this initiative is made in the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept. We return to Russian diplomatic activities related to the BWC, including in detail the preparations for the BWC’s eighth RevCon, in Chapter 6. Here we simply point out that, as with the “weapons based on new physical principles” discussion, there is an apparent mismatch between the military doctrine text and certain official documents produced by Russia’s civilian government branches. The MFA presented its proposal as a means of “strengthening the Convention and improving its implementation.”109 The MFA made explicit that its reform plan did not include “routine inspections” nor “challenge inspections (field and facility investigations) initiated by one state against another.”110 The MFA proposals are therefore far from establishing the “mechanism for verifying observance” called for in the Military Doctrine.

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That the MFA’s new BWC policy was not carefully rolled-out is evident by the notable absence of mentions and arguments in favor of this initiative in other Russian relevant documents. The most glaring omission is the mid-February Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation rolled out by Putin. It contained the same passage on the BWC found in the 2008 predecessor policy,111 namely that Russia reaffirms its unwavering policy towards developing multilateral political and legal frameworks for a universal and stable regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery; stands for compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.112

The text contained no other biology-relevant mentions, and neither expressed dissatisfaction with the BWC nor did it detail any new Russian diplomatic efforts in this sphere. These omissions cannot be explained away as an issue of timing between government draft documents and policies, because the 2016 edition of the Foreign Policy Concept did not depart from the minimal coverage of the BWC found in its predecessors.113 These omissions are especially strange given the growing hardline stance observed in subsequent documents, including those also released in 2013. In November 2013, Putin issued two important edicts. The first was an updated “State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation” to 2025 and beyond.114 It replaced the prior State Policy in this field established on December 4, 2003, that had been designed to cover to 2010 and beyond (discussed in the first section of this chapter).115 As such, we expect this policy document to be updated on a ten-year basis. The new policy remains very wide, encompassing topics that range from environmental degradation, to public health, to bioterrorism, and more. Approximately half of the text is dedicated to chemical problems; we address only the parts of it that deal with biodefense and biosecurity. While these overall topics remain the same, the 2013 policy departs from its predecessor in substance. The difference between the 2013 policy and the 2003 policy is of greatest importance for this book as is the inclusion of the following brief paragraphs under the list of major tasks to be completed: f) Analysis of the threat of the use of dangerous biological agents and chemical substances, including those created on the basis of the latest achievements in the field of genomics, proteomics, genetic engineering, organic and inorganic chemistry and other related fields, for terroristic purposes against the Russian Federation, and the development of countermeasures to minimize the possible negative consequences; g) the analysis of dual-use technologies and new foreign weapons that use chemicals and biological agents and that are not prohibited and controlled

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within the framework of international agreements to which the Russian Federation is a party.116

The authors of this updated policy document evidently based task f on the very similar passage found in the Program establishing a “National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2013)” (quoted in the second section of this chapter). As with the Program text, the authors left the text ambiguous as to whether the paragraph includes threats from foreign states rather than terrorists. Indeed, the term “terroristic purposes” is ambiguous, as it may refer to the likely endgoal of the use of biological weapons rather than the expected malicious actor using the weapon. Given the heavy emphasis on advanced subjects and the mention of genetic engineering of pathogens, either Russia is expecting attacks from extremely sophisticated terrorists or this passage obliquely refers to foreign states. The second paragraph, task g, has no known precedent and is highly alarming. Task g makes clear that the current Russian leadership believes that other states are developing weapons based on chemical and biological agents that somehow do not violate the BWC or the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In addition, it tasks the Russian biodefense laboratories with the “analysis” of such weapons. Also in November 2013, Putin approved the “Russian Federation’s Public Safety/Security Concept.”117 Here we present the two sections that deal with biological security. In the section that addresses improvements of systems that ensure public security, the report calls for measures designed “to improve governance in the field of fire, chemical, biological, nuclear, radiation, hydro-meteorological, industrial, and transport safety/security.”118 And in the section named “Main Sources of Threats to Public Safety/Security,” the Concept authors note that: There are worrying signs in the field of protection of the population and the environment from dangerous biological and chemical agents; the analysis of the situation in the various spheres ensuring biological and chemical safety/security leads one to the conclusion that there are serious risks of harm to the life and health of people and the environment. Amid a significant deterioration in the provision of sanitary-epidemiological, veterinary-sanitary, phytosanitary and ecological safety, as well as the decline of the biotechnological and chemical industry, there are new biological and chemical threats to public safety/security.119

Compared to the “State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation” discussed earlier, this document does not clarify or provide examples of the “worrying signs” and “new biological and chemical threats to public safety/security” it mentions.

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Toward the end of 2013, a team of military officers published an article in Military Thought on the topic of strengthening Russia’s NBC defenses. In part, they considered the possible effects of destruction of chemically, biologically, or radiologically hazardous facilities on the behavior of troops and on the protection of the Russian population and territories, specifically including “biotechnology companies” in their list of possible targets.120 The authors framed the need for greater NBC defenses by arguing that, in modern and future wars, “environmentally dangerous civilian objects” would be deliberately targeted and that radiological, chemical, and biological contamination would result from such strikes.121 The authors stopped short of explicitly planning for the threat of direct contamination due to biological weapons use against Russia, simply remarking that “research continues in the field of biotechnology and genetic engineering” and that the “hotbeds of international terrorism are multiplying.”122 In carefully crafting their statements to avoid claiming the existence of a state-level BW threat, the authors echo the text found in the 2008 Program. We note that the NSS-2009 authors, as shown earlier, had no such compunctions. In a common theme in this chapter, MOD personnel on one hand and high-level civilians such as those leading the NSS drafting process on the other had demonstrably not reached a consensus public doctrinal position by 2013. The authors continued to draw upon the 2008 Program text in describing Russia’s current biodefense capabilities in sharply negative terms. They posited that the current state and development prospects of Russia’s NBC defenses left “no room for optimism.”123 In their view: The number of highly qualified personnel is diminishing. The stockpiles and production of both specialized equipment and major consumables are in critical conditions. Weapons and equipment for the NBC Protection Troops, which have been in storage for over 15–20 years, have become obsolete or have broken down. Special products are created in unacceptably small quantities.124

After a lengthy discussion about the tasks and objectives of NBC Troops, the authors developed a list of what actions were required to update a more modern new NBC Troop system: • Equipping airborne and ground-based automated NBC reconnaissance complexes with remote-sensing and local devices. • Improving means of detecting and identifying toxic and biological agents. • Providing multifunctional and modular personal protective equipment as part of the individual military combat equipment. • Developing a new generation of collective protection complexes for mobile and stationary objects using modern technologies. • Developing special treatment technologies that enable one-step decontamination of weapons and military equipment by the personnel of field units

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using individual (carried by each soldier) and onboard (stored on weapon systems) decontamination agent resources. • Producing obscurants based on aerosols, foams, and radar-absorbing coatings and materials offering maximum efficacy against enemy reconnaissance capabilities and precision-guided weapons. • Developing high-tech means of remote maintenance and repair of special vehicles, complexes, and instruments.125

It is difficult to for us to know whether the NBC Troops convinced their government of the necessity to fund all of the actions on this wish list because the transparency of Russia’s biodefense doctrine markedly decreased in the years that followed. On April 28, 2015, the Russian government approved the updated “National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2015–2020).”126 The text of its predecessor Program, covering the period from 2009 to 2014, was and remains a public document. In a drastic decrease in transparency, the Russian government classified the entire text of the 2015–2020 system.127 Aside from pointing out this negative development, we can remark that the time required between a Policy and its subsequent Program has markedly decreased (from roughly fifty-nine months to eighteen). This shortened time frame suggests that the process of assigning money through a new Program is now better developed since the first iteration. The fact that even the passages justifying the Program’s existence were classified, rather than just the Program details, hinted at a significant revision upward in Russia’s internal threat assessment. The growing biosecurity concerns expressed in subsequent documents also released in 2015 during Putin’s third administration explain the sudden decrease in transparency. On October 30, 2015, Putin presided over a Security Council meeting called to discuss state policy on Russia’s chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) security.128 In regard to the biological aspects of this meeting, he observed that: In various parts of the world, we see regular outbreaks of dangerous infectious diseases. As we know, the recent Ebola epidemic killed more than 11,000 people. We must act to ensure reliable protection for our country and people against threats of this sort. Above all, we must ensure the security of our nuclear energy facilities and of facilities storing, producing or using dangerous radioactive, chemical or biological substances and materials. We must reduce to zero the risk of accidents or unlawful actions taking place at such facilities. . . . First, our current strategic planning documents contain many provisions on preventing nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological security threats, both in peacetime, and—let’s hope it never happens—in wartime. We must analyze these provisions, see how well they meet today’s demands, and make adjustments if need be.

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Second, we must pay close attention to analyzing the security threats and challenges in these areas. The Defense Ministry and several other agencies are working on this now. We need to establish common views on these threats and challenges. This will help us to protect our citizens more effectively against these threats. Third, we need to implement our science and technology policy in the areas of developing and using modern radiological, chemical and biological protection methods. This policy should ensure effective prevention [against] all types of potential threats. We should carry out an inventory over the coming period of individual protection means for people, identify which are outdated and technologically obsolete now, and draft measures to replace these protection systems with modern models. Of course, all of the development and production of these new systems should take place here in Russia. We already have a good technological base for this. . . . We need to continue paying much attention to the health and epidemiological situation. We must minimize the risks of infections spreading and prevent them from entering Russia from abroad and from neighboring countries.129

We draw two conclusions from the transcript of this meeting. First, the mention of the “need to establish common views on these threats and challenges” implies that disagreement reigns among various Russian agencies as to the level and type of risks posed by CBRN threats in general, and thus likely on the risks posed by biological threats in particular. Second, Putin’s instructions implied the continuation of Program objectives, namely the rollout of upgrades at Russian biodefense facilities and the development of new protection and decontamination gear. The only surprising aspect of the speech in that regard is that this language is exactly what could have been left in an unclassified justification introduction for the 2015 Program. The 2010 NBC Troop article showed how the latter paid close attention to the Program text, but not to the pronouncements contained in NSS-2009. We presume that the MOD lobbied to have the Program entirely classified on security grounds by noting that some of the text and earmarked funds directly concerned them. This stance would have resulted in a blanket classification of the associated justifying statements, even though the MOD apparently does not accord much interest to civilian mentions on analogous topics. Our interpretation of these events is further supported by the strongly worded passages dedicated to biosecurity contained in the updated National Security Strategy (NSS-2015). Released on the last day of 2015 by the President’s Office, NSS-2015 supersedes NSS-2009, discussed earlier.130 It remains the current NSS in Russia at the time of writing. The NSS-2015 authors continued in the trajectory set by NSS-2009, where biological threats began to be mentioned explicitly for the first time. NSS-2015 introduced stronger accusatory language in this regard, including mentioning the United States by name. In the section titled “Russia in the Modern World,” the following passages are found:

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The role of force as a factor in international relations is not decreasing. The desire to build up and modernize offensive weapons, and develop and deploy new types of weapons, is weakening the global security system and the system of treaties and agreements on arms control. The principles of equal and indivisible security are not being observed in the Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, and Asia-Pacific regions. The processes of militarization and arms-racing are developing in regions adjacent to Russia. . . . There remains a risk of an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons, the proliferation of chemical weapons and their utilization, and also uncertainty with regard to foreign states’ potential possession, development, and production of biological weapons. The network of U.S. military-biological laboratories on the territory of states adjacent to Russia is being expanded.131

In addition, the following threat assessment mentioning biological weapons can be found early in the section titled “Ensuring National Security,” and is listed as one of “the main threats to the state and public security”: The activities of terrorist and extremist organizations, aimed at the violent change of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation, the destabilization of the work of the bodies of state power, the destruction or functional disruption of military and industrial facilities, public infrastructure, and transport infrastructure, and the intimidation of the population, including through the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, radioactive, poisonous, toxic, and chemically and biologically dangerous substances, through the commission of acts of nuclear terrorism, and through the violation of the security and robustness of the Russian Federation’s vital information technology infrastructure.132

Several tasks listed in this same section are designed to address identified biosafety and biosecurity threats. For instance, “in order to counter threats in the field of environmental safety/security and environmental management,” the “bodies of state power and of local government in interaction with institutes of civil society” will enhance the technical capacity and equipment of the forces participating in activities to prevent and eliminate negative environmental consequences of technogenic catastrophes and other emergencies; . . . prepare for the elimination of harmful consequences of anthropogenic impact on the environment, as well as for the rehabilitation of territories and areas contaminated as a result of such exposure, through the implementation of military activities; . . . develop a state-level environmental control and oversight system, and perform state-level monitoring of the environment, fauna and flora, and land resources, to exercise control over radioactive, chemical, and biological hazardous waste, thus ensuring compliance with sanitary-epidemiologic and hygienic standards for drinking water, atmospheric air, and soil.133

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We found the following under the subsection titled “To resolve the tasks of national security in the spheres of science, technologies, and education it is necessary to ensure” the development of promising high technologies (genetic engineering, robotic, biological, information, communication, and cognitive technologies, nanotechnologies, and convergent technologies that resemble Nature); . . . the development of interactions between educational institutions and research centers, and industry, and the expansion of the practice of government entity and entrepreneur co-financing for long-term fundamental research and programs with long implementation times; . . . the ensuring of Russia’s leading positions in the spheres of basic mathematical education, physics, chemistry, biology, technical sciences, and humanitarian and social sciences.134

On the list of tasks to counter threats to public health, the relevant entry reads, “The development of a system to monitor the biological situation on Russia’s territory.”135 Once again, we are left with a document with plenty of paragraphs that could have been used as an unclassified introduction to the revised Program. We conclude that the MOD and the Putin administration’s executivebranch bureaucrats have so far displayed poor coordination on the release of documents dealing with Russian biosecurity. Although the specifics therefore vary between documents, these have generally reflected a persistent and growing concern over biosecurity. Moreover, these documents have since 2013 begun to carry overtly anti-Western and especially anti-US mentions. These mentions predate the collapse of US-Russian relations subsequent to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, although these events have likely accelerated their inclusion. It therefore appears that Putin’s third term, which begun in 2012, brought to bear a new hardline vision regarding biosecurity threats faced by Russia.

A Warning Sign: The Hawks Within the NBC Troops We devote an entire subsection to one particularly alarming article penned by senior researchers at a Russian institution supposedly devoted to defending against NBC threats and published in a prestigious Russian military journal. We do so because, in this article, they advocate for Russia’s development and use of certain types of so-called non-lethal chemical weapons, and more generally demonstrate little respect for the norms set by the CWC and the BWC. We fear that the hawks within the NBC Troops share the same disregard for the BWC’s intent as they showed in this article with regard to the

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CWC. The following article demonstrates that some influential members of the NBC Troops are enthusiastic about Russian non-lethal chemical weapons, and we see no reason why they would not be equally interested in biological non-lethal weapons. Putin’s changes to the Russian biodefense doctrine since the publication of their article has provided them with the necessary rationale should they wish to research such arms. Specifically, the 2013 “State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation” cited both chemical and biological weapons when it tasked unspecified Russian units with the “analysis of new foreign weapons that use chemicals and biological agents and that are not prohibited and controlled within the framework of international agreements to which the Russian Federation is a party.”136 In sum, the article that follows is a prime example for how the drive for novel weapons, repeated claims of foreign noncompliance with arms control agreements, and growing anti-US sentiments as enshrined in Russia’s new military doctrine could enable interested parties to successfully lobby for the violation of Russia’s arms control obligations. In May 2010, two senior military NBC researchers based at the 33rd Institute (see Chapter 4), including the institute’s chief researcher, published an article in the prestigious monthly Military Thought journal distributed by the Russian GS.137 The authors proposed an “assessment of the legal framework regarding the use by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of chemical-based non-lethal weapons,” although they peripherally brought up non-lethal biological weapons as well.138 Here we emphasize that the BWC imposes a blanket ban on biological weapons and makes no exceptions for “nonlethal” weapons. The authors justified their legal study of chemical-based non-lethal weapons by stating, “in spite of the intensive development of these tools abroad, but also in our country, the legal basis for their use has not been thoroughly studied.”139 The authors began by acknowledging the existence of both the CWC and the BWC, although they mostly downplayed the latter because of its lack of a verification mechanism.140 They then pointed out that the CWC allows the use of riot control agents as long as the agents are not used “as a method of warfare.” The authors interpreted this exception in very broad terms and clearly believed it applied to more than just riot control or anti-terrorism operations within Russia: In the modern world, large scale combat operations involving the regular armed forces of different states (coalition of states) can be carried out without a declaration of war. . . . Based on the above, apparently, it can be assumed that in future events such as combat, the Armed Forces can use these reserves (including incapacitating compositions) to achieve their goals more humanely, without prejudice to the provisions of the CWC.141

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In other words, the authors argued that the CWC’s prohibitions would not prevent Russian use of non-lethal chemical weapons because Russia did not have to declare war to conduct “large scale combat operations.” Thus, while acknowledging certain restrictions on their design and application, the authors nevertheless claimed that: “non-lethal chemicals can be widely used to solve many special tasks in conditions of armed conflict.” Having in their minds sidestepped international prohibitions, the authors turned to Russian laws governing the use of “non-lethal” weapons. The authors pointed to several federal laws enabling Russian armed forces to use “special means” under various circumstances, where special means is defined as means by which a person can be temporarily disabled without causing irreversible harm.142 They concluded their article by calling for the rapid development of a legal framework favoring the use of nonlethal weapons so as to allow the creation of an effective system for the development and adoption of new models of this type of weapon, ensure the legality of their use, and provide legal protection to the decision-makers ordering application, as well as to the soldiers who will possess non-lethal weapons.143

We close our discussion of this article by noting that it justifies a close monitoring of the unassuming “non-lethal” and “special means” categories of Russian weapons projects. For instance, in Chapter 2 we noted that in 2000, the FSB reportedly pitched a program that would have seen the development of “non-traditional methods of fighting terrorists,” including “biological” methods. 144 If there is any truth to this account, these biological weapons would most likely have been conceptualized as “special means” and justified through the 2006 federal law enabling the use of “special means” during “counter-terrorist operations.” Searching for suspicious projects matching either of these two subject lines indeed yielded concerning findings, as we detail in Chapter 4. Not least among these is that the NBC Troops at Shikhany-2 in this 2010 article lobbied for non-lethal chemical weapons now neighbor a new storage area for “irritants” maintained by the “115 State Special Chemical Arsenal” (see Chapter 4). This development raises the question as to whether some influential MOD individuals share the same enthusiasm for undermining arms controls expressed in this article.

Conclusions It is clear from discrepancies in proposals and differences in language found in the military doctrine and the civilian-produced documents that

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Russian officials hold differing views on high-technology weapons issues and on how to achieve biosecurity. For instance, the 2010 and 2014 Military Doctrines’ emphasis on “weapons based on new physical principles” differs from civilian-produced security documents such as NSS-2009 and NSS-2015 that do not mention such weapons. Similarly, the passage in the December 2014 Military Doctrine text that deals with the BWC does not accurately reflect the content of an MFA public proposal on the subject rolled out in August that same year. It is therefore not surprising that Putin, during his speech at the October 2015 Security Council meeting on CBRN threats, emphasized the need for consensus, and hence confirmed that Russian thoughts on the subject were not monolithic.145 The creation of the 2008 National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of Russia, a process first begun by Putin’s administration in 2003, thus becomes all the more significant in that it established a coordinated policy mechanism for addressing biosecurity issues. Our analytic focus is thus on how the various views expressed in the cited texts—themselves the products of genuine individual differences in viewpoints and more base, parochial interests—are coalescing into government consensus action. We draw four conclusions. First, while official documents portray the root causes of biosecurity threats differently, they all conclude that the Russian government must strengthen biosecurity in the face of growing threats. Some documents, such as the decree that specifies the 2008 National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of Russia, emphasize the terrorist threat and only implicitly allude to foreign state-level programs by referring to biological weapons “created abroad on the basis of the latest achievements in genomics, proteomics, genetic engineering of pathogens, [and] environmental pathogens.” Other documents are more explicit and, in addition to the terrorist threat, mention the need to oppose foreign “development, acquisition, production and stockpiling of . . . biological weapons.” Passages of this kind are found in the 2003 State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security and in NSS-2009, and most explicitly in NSS-2015. The latter even explicitly names the United States as undertaking uncertain actions with regard to BW by noting: “[There remains] uncertainty with regard to foreign states’ potential possession, development, and production of biological weapons. The network of U.S. military-biological laboratories on the territory of states adjacent to Russia is being expanded.” Further, the updated 2013 State Policy includes a third justification not found in any predecessor document on the posited existence of “new foreign weapons that use chemicals and biological agents and that are not prohibited and controlled within the framework of international agreements to which the Russian Federation is a party.” Overall, we note that official documents and statements have

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become more hawkish over time regarding the supposed existence of foreign state-level biological weapons threats. Second, as shown in the quote from the 2013 State Policy presented earlier, the Russian government now openly maintains that there exists a “new generation” of weapons developed using biotechnology and using biological agents that somehow do not violate the BWC, and that foreign countries are developing such weapons. We emphasize this first aspect because we do not see how a weapon using “biological agents” could avoid violating the BWC’s Article I blanket prohibition on weapons designed to use biological agents and toxins “for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.” Yet that is precisely what the current 2013 Russian State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security states. This belief is alarming because it opens the door for Russian military funding of weapons based on biotechnology or otherwise using biological agents. Indeed, the 2013 State Policy called on the relevant Russian organs to “analyze” such alleged foreign arms, without publicly specifying how this is to be carried out. Third, Russian officials have actively called for just such a weaponization of civilian advances in biotechnology. Putin’s 2008 speech opened the door for this possibility: “The use of new technology also calls for a rethinking of strategy in the way our Armed Forces are organized. After all, new breakthroughs in bio-, nano-, and information technology could lead to revolutionary changes in weapons and defense. Only an army that meets the most modern demands can be entrusted with the deployment, servicing, and use of new-generation weapons.” 146 Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin subsequently made several statements calling for Russian weaponization of biotechnology. In a 2013 article written when Rogozin still was the chairman of the MIC, he specifically mentioned the life sciences when he stated that work was ongoing to determine “the procedure for carrying out projects on the development of advanced models of weaponry, military and specialized equipment (VVST), which in turn are being included in the armaments program after carrying out the necessary life-sciences, technological, manufacturing and other research efforts to define the full spectrum of the state’s capabilities to develop them.”147 Further, in a November 2013 report, Rogozin remarked that industrial manufacturing breakthroughs would come from discoveries in fields such as “biotechnology”, “nanotechnology,” and “gene engineering,” and would lead to “innovations, which [would] be able to support a path of a fundamentally new level in state management systems, the Armed Forces, the economy and society as a whole.” 148 Vasiliy Burenok’s 2014 article echoed both Putin’s 2008 speech and Rogozin’s comments. He similarly highlighted biotechnology (including genetic engineering meth-

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ods), alongside nanotechnology and informational and cognitive technologies, as enabling the creation of a new generation of VVST. Burenok’s article went further than Putin’s 2008 speech; after having accused the United States of pursuing such arms, he called for equipping the “Russian Armed Forces with high-technology weapons and a new generation of weapons based on new physical principles.”149 These comments fit within a general mind-set calling for, in the words of the then–minister of defense Serdyukov, the “integration of military research and civilian science,” and simultaneously for the development of Russian biotechnology as a critical high-technology sector (NSS-2009, NSS2015). 150 More generally, these comments fit the stated desire of the Russian administration and the Russian military to drastically upgrade its armed forces with high-technology weapons and to predict and preempt future Revolutions in Military Affairs so as not to fall behind the West once more. The conduct of the Russo-Georgian War emphasized the necessity to do so, given that poor Russian performance was in part due to their inability to effectively use the weapons of the last Revolution in Military Affairs: high-precision weapon systems and associated strikeplanning capabilities. Serdyukov laid out twin objectives in this regard in his 28 Tasks plan, notably the “reliable long-term forecasts of security threats to the Russian Federation,” and the development of a system to allow the “prompt introduction in the military and security agencies” of novel weapons systems. The Russian calls to weaponize civilian advances in biotechnology cited earlier can be understood as the product of this process. Since the Russian government views biotechnology developments abroad in part as an emerging threat, biotechnology is listed as a field (alongside nanotechnology and information technology) likely to yield a future Revolution in Military Affairs. In keeping with this appraisal, Russian planners have highlighted biotechnology as a potential source for new Russian weapons. The linkages between calls to apply biotechnology for weapons purposes and calls to develop “weapons based on new physical principles” including “genetic weapons” brings us to our fourth point, namely that the funding for the latter category of arms may end up being used to achieve both objectives simultaneously. The question then becomes, what did Serdyukov have in mind when he reported to Putin in March 2012 that the MOD had “prepared a plan” that included “the development of weapons based on new physical principles: radiation, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical, etc.”? What did Russian deputy minister of defense Oleg Ostapenko mean when he remarked in August 2013 that Russia had the potential to develop weapons based on new physical principles? 151 And why do the authors of the 2010 and 2014 Military Doctrines envision the

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“massive use” of “weapons based on new physical principles that are comparable to nuclear weapons in terms of effectiveness” as a characteristic feature of modern military conflicts? Answering these questions is difficult because the concept of “weapons based on new physical principles” is inherently vague. The concept’s long history, dating back to at least 1978, provides little insight into its meaning nearly forty years later. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov is credited with having coined and popularized the concept during the Cold War.152 General Makhmut Gareev, regarded as Russia’s foremost military theoretician and personally honored by Putin,153 has continued to promote this concept in the post-Soviet era through the AVN.154 However, neither author has proposed criteria for determining whether a weapon is “based on new physical principles.” Even prior government officials that called for the development of such weapons in the past kept the concept vague. In late 1999, for instance, then–minister of defense Sergeyev advocated the development of unspecified “weapons based on new physical principles,” which he vaguely described as weapons that would contribute to upset the military balance between powers and revolutionize the way wars were fought.155 It is therefore not surprising that a survey of the current Russian military science literature and media reports mentioning the concept shows little agreement between commentators on what is and is not a “weapon based on new physical principles.” The glossary on the official website of the Russian military (mil.ru) provides no clarity in this regard, offering a tautological definition: “weapons based on new physical principles” are “new possible types of weapons, the lethality of which depends on processes and phenomena that have previously not been employed.” 156 We conclude that “weapons based on new physical principles” is a nebulous concept used when an official wishes to refer to the promise of high-technology wonderweapons, for instance during debates over the costs and benefits of highrisk weapons R&D. The concept reappears in MOD documents, and remains confined to MOD documents, beginning with the 2010 Military Doctrine during the Serdyukov era. As such, it appears that Serdyukov’s supporters are responsible for the concept’s resurgence. Just as Putin employed the NBIC concept in his February 2008 speech to justify reforming the military into a smaller but more technologically capable force, the old “weapons based on new physical principles” concept was perhaps dusted off by Serdyukov’s MOD staffers as an implicit justification for the New Look reforms that implemented Putin’s vision. MOD officials would not have missed the underlying Soviet historical context: when Soviet theoreticians first spoke of a Revolution in Military Affairs occasioned by the harnessing of novel weapons, their concept was used to justify the 1964 cuts in the ground forces and its reorganization into

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smaller formations. 157 In any case, it appears doubtful that any of the aforementioned individuals—whether they be Putin, Serdyukov, Ostapenko, Rogozin, or other officials—had or have a clear idea of what types of projects should be included in the military’s “weapons based on new physical principles” R&D efforts. The issue becomes that a modern-day Ovchinnikov (see Chapter 2) would find plenty of official justifying statements to rebrand biological weapons work using genetic engineering techniques as “genetic weapons” and thus as “weapons based on new physical principles,” and consequently lobby for military R&D funding along these lines. In the words of the deputy director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, Alexander Khramchikhin, the vague Russian statements on weapons based on new physical principles including genetic weapons “cannot but raise questions about how the authors of the statements themselves understand what is at stake.” 158 To see why, we return to the aforementioned official MOD glossary and note that it is far more explicit when it comes to defining the specific examples of “weapons based on new physical principles” that Serdyukov promised to Putin. Notably, it defines “genetic weapons” as: Genetic weapons: a type of weapon able to damage the genetic (hereditary) apparatus of people. It is assumed/expected, that some viruses can/may serve as the active principle. These viruses are in possession of mutagenic activity (with the capability to cause hereditary changes) and can introduce into a chromosome cells that contain deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and even chemical mutations, taken from natural sources by chemical synthesis or biotechnological methods. The primary result of the use of genetic weapons is damage/injury and changes to basic/primary structure of DNA, which can lead to serious diseases and their hereditary transmission.159

This definition makes clear that the Russian military mainly conceptualizes “genetic weapons” in terms of viral agents damaging a target host’s DNA.160 In addition, the official Russian military glossary of terms makes explicit that “geophysical” weapons includes chemical and biological weapons, by noting that “various kinds of incendiary, biological, chemical and other weapons” have “geophysical” effects.161 Serdyukov’s announcement that Russia would develop “genetic weapons” alongside “geophysical weapons” and other “weapons based on new physical principles” therefore at best did not exclude biological weapons, and at worst actively called for their development. The recruitment drive for scientists willing to propose blueprints of “weapons based on new physical principles” including “genetic weapons,” coupled with the public high-level encouragement to weaponize

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advances made in the biotechnology sector, is therefore highly troubling. As is noted in the joint 2015 article coauthored by the head of the MOD’s 3rd Institute, members of Russia’s defense industrial base have already lobbied for funds by arguing that they are best positioned to deliver on the top-level promises of “weapons based on new physical principles” development. The effect of this lobbying based on doctrinal pronouncements is made worse by the fact that many of the specific types of “weapons based on new physical principles” promised by Serdyukov are not plausible. If the Russian military is still concerned that its R&D funds will “vanish without results,” as Serdyukov complained in July 2011, it will funnel funds to the programs proposed by industry that are most likely to result in usable weapons, and use the rest for propaganda aimed at the domestic and foreign audiences. The least likely to receive and maintain funding are the proposed classes of weapons based on new physical principles that are outright pseudo-science. For instance, academician E. P. Kruglyakov once remarked that he saw “no need to comment on such an absurdity” as an “individualor mass-action psychotronic [psychophysical] weapon.”162 Other types of “weapons based on new physical principles” promised by Serdyukov may at least be conceptualized by the MIC. However, it remains to be seen whether funding agencies can be convinced to fund these few proposals given the currently tightly constrained military budgets. For instance, the Moscow Radio Engineering Institute reportedly developed an anti-UAV system using microwaves,163 and a “leak” purportedly showed a Rubin design bureau proposal for a torpedo designed to cause extreme radiological contamination when detonated near an enemy harbor (a “radiation” weapon).164 Russian industry probably lobbied for these weapons to be developed and produced by proposing them under the “weapons based on new physical principles” umbrella. However, it is unclear if the Russian military was convinced to pursue these programs and, if so, with what results. Compared to many of the other potential “weapons based on new physical principles,” Russia can undoubtedly develop a new generation of biological weapons. Should Russian biotechnologists propose any such biological weapons projects as novel “genetic weapons,” they will succeed in receiving funding. Whenever a government requests proposals from industries to conduct R&D to realize vaguely defined high-technology weapons, such as “weapons based on new physical principles,” weapons violating treaty law are likely to be proposed. The onus then rests on the supervising government agency to review submitted designs and exclude those that propose illegal work. In today’s Russia, there now appears to be an incentive for both those proposing and those vetting weapons development programs to fund work that contravenes the BWC.

Annex 3.1 Selected Russian Documents and Statements Date

December 4, 2003

February 8, 2008

October 2008

May 12, 2009 February 5, 2010 December 2010 July 2011

December 2011

February 20, 2012

March 22, 2012 May 2012

January 26, 2013 February 12, 2013 February 28, 2013 November 2013

November 2013 December 2013 May 2014

May 2014

December 25, 2014 April 28, 2015

June 10, 2015

October 30, 2015 December 2015

April 1, 2016

November 30, 2016

Description

Principles of State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation to 2010 and Beyond. Putin’s speech on what had been accomplished over the past years and on setting “a long-term vision of the future.” National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation, 2009–2013 (later changed to 2009–2014). National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020 (NSS-2009). Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2010). State Armament Program for 2011–2020 (SAP-2020). Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov complains that military R&D has “vanished” without results. Article on nano-, bio-, info-, and cognitive technologies (NBIC) by retired major-general Vasiliy M. Burenok, prior head of the MOD’s 46th Institute. Putin’s reelection campaign article on defense mentioning “weapons based on new physical principles.” Minister of Defense Serdyukov details twenty-eight tasks to Putin, including: “The development of weapons based on new physical principles radiation, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical, etc.” V. B. Antipov and S. V. Novichkov publish “Assessment of the Legal Framework Regarding the Use by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of Chemical-Based Non-Lethal Weapons” in Military Thought Speech by Minister of Defense Sergey K. Shoigu at the Academy of Military Sciences in Moscow on the need for a modern Russian military given that “military dangers for Russia are increasing along some directions.” Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2013). Putin demands a “drastic upgrade” to the Russian military. State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation to 2025 and Beyond. Russian Federation Public Safety/Security Concept. V. A. Vetrov, L. N. Ilyin, and V. V. Rylin publish an article in Military Thought on “Modernization of the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense Forces.” Shoigu addresses Ministry of Defense Collegium on the effects of Western sanctions. Vasiliy Burenok publishes an article advocating his position on Russia’s future weapons systems priorities, including the development of “weapons based on new physical principles.” Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014). National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2015–2020) (text classified by Russia). The head of the MOD’s 3rd Institute, one of its lead researchers, and the vice president of the Russian Engineering Academy publish an article in part advocating the development of weapons and military equipment based on “NBIC” technologies and “weapons based on new physical principles.” Putin chairs a UN Security Council meeting on CBRN threats. Updated version of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020 (NSS-2015). Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov speech on SAP-2025 and “weapons based on new physical principles.” Updated version of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2016).

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Annex 3.2 Russia’s Science and Technology Priorities Since 2002 Russian S&T priorities are defined through two simultaneous lists, the list of “priority areas in science, technology, and engineering,” and the list of “critical technologies.” The former lists a handful of scientific or broad topical fields, while the latter is a longer and more concrete list of research topics. Both lists are typically simultaneously updated through a presidential decree every four or five years. As documented here, a second security topic has been introduced since 2006. In addition, the “life sciences” category grew out of the “living systems technologies” priority area and remains a priority. Presidential Decree No. 577, March 30, 2002, listed the following nine priority areas: • information and telecommunication technologies and electronics; • space and aviation technology; • new materials and chemical technologies; • new transport technology; • promising types of weapons, military and special equipment; • manufacturing technology; • living systems technologies; • ecology and environmental management; • energy saving technologies.165

Presidential Decree No. 843, May 21, 2006, listed the following eight priority areas: • security and counter-terrorism; • living systems; • industrial nanosystems and materials; • information and telecommunications systems; • promising types of weapons, military and special equipment; • environmental management; • transportation, aviation and space systems; • energy and energy efficiency.166

Presidential Decree No. 899, July 7, 2011, listed the following eight priority areas: • security and counter-terrorism; • industrial nanosystems; • information and telecommunications systems; • life sciences; • promising types of weapons, military and special equipment; • environmental management; • transport and space systems; • energy efficiency, energy conservation, and nuclear energy.167

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Since December 2015, the list now includes a “military, special, and dual-purpose robotic systems” subcategory under the “environmental management” category.168 Notes

1. We borrow the concept of a “coherent” or “incoherent” doctrine from Dima Adamsky’s work. Dima Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Art of Russian Strategy,” IFRI Security Studies Center Proliferation Paper no. 54, November 2015, pp. 15–18, http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp54adamsky.pdf. 2. For the major economic trends 2000–2007, see Petr Aven, “Russia’s 2000–2007 Economic Success: Pros and Cons,” Alfa Bank, May 8, 2008, pp. 1–15, https://piie .com/sites/default/files/publications/papers/aven0508.pdf (accessed April 24, 2016). 3. Carolina Vendil Pallin, Russian Military Reform: A Failed Exercise in Defence Decision Making (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 171. 4. Ibid. 5. The Russian acronym is VPK. 6. Pallin, Russian Military Reform, pp. 21, 129–131. 7. Ibid., pp. 129–131. 8. Vladimir Putin, “Speech at Expanded Meeting of the State Council on Russia’s Development Strategy Through to 2020,” February 8, 2008, http://en.kremlin .ru/events/president/transcripts/24825 (accessed March 6, 2016). 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. The first Revolution in Military Affairs is defined in the Soviet era Explanatory Dictionary of Military Terms, p. 393, as follows: “The whole sum of fundamental, qualitative changes in the means of armed conflict, of methods of combat actions, in the organization of troops, their training and education, which has come into being in the last fifteen years in the more developed countries relative to science and industry and which is primarily connected with the creation of the nuclear rocket weapon. Going along new paths in the business of strengthening the defense potential of the country, and raising the preparedness of the Armed Forces to repulse the aggressor, the Soviet Union was the first to achieve the organic combination of a thermonuclear charge with a ballistic intercontinental and global rocket. The basic fire and striking power of our Armed Forces now is the nuclear weapon and the chief means of delivery to the target is the rocket. The revolution in military affairs enveloped all the basic branches. Simultaneously, the further perfection of troop organization and methods of armed conflict took place on all scales with the creation of automatized guidance systems, the most important of which were the electronic computer, radiolocator, and radiotelevision apparatuses. The methods of training and educating the troops have also been adapted to the solution of new problems. As a result of the contemporary revolution in military affairs, all services of the Armed Forces and branches of service of our country are equipped with firstclass military equipment and powerful weapons.” Translated by William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), pp. 400–401. 13. See Kintner and Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs, for an annotated and translated selection of Soviet writings on the first Revolution in Military Affairs.

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14. Measures 2.2–2.4 in Russian Federation, “On the Federal Program ‘Research and Development in Priority Areas, Development of the Scientific and Technological Complex of Russia in the 2007–2013 Period’” (in Russian), Governmental Resolution no. 613, October 17, 2006, http://fcpir.ru/upload/iblock/2b1 /postanovlenie_pravitelstva_rf_ot_17.10.2006_n_613.docx (accessed December 2, 2016). 15. John C. Keefe, “Disruptive Technologies for Weapon Systems: Achieving the Asymmetric Edge on the Battlefield,” WSTIAC Quarterly 7, no. 4 (December 31, 2007), p. 6, unclassified, approved for public release, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai ?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA521026. 16. Ibid., pp. 4–5. 17. Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War,” Parameters (Spring 2009), pp. 69–71, http://strategicstudiesinstitute .army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/09spring/mcdermott.pdf. 18. Ibid., pp. 71–72. 19. A scathing critique of the Russian Air Force’s performance has been written by the deputy director of the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST): Konstantin Makienko, “Air Farce: The Russian Air Force Didn’t Perform Well During the Conflict in South Ossetia,” Russia & CIS Observer 4 (November 2008), retrieved from http://www.cast.ru/eng/?id=328 (accessed April 21, 2016). 20. On Moscow’s diplomatic isolation, see Mike Bowker, “The War in Georgia and the Western Response,” Central Asian Survey 30, no. 2 (June 2011), p. 198. 21. McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces,” pp. 67–69. 22. Makarov’s public pronouncements regarding the reform efforts are reprinted in Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces,” p. 68–69. Makarov resigned in November 2012 and was replaced by Colonel-General Valery Gerasimov. 23. Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), “Russian Military Capability,” http://www.foi.se/en/Our-Knowledge/Security-policy-studies/Russia/Russian-Military -Capability (accessed April 15, 2016). 24. Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on February 5, 2010; unofficial English translation provided by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf. 25. N. Y. Lysuhin, Strategic Missile Forces in Russia’s System of National Security (A Historical and Political Analysis) (in Russian) (Moscow: Peter the Great Military Academy of the Strategic Missile Troops, 1997), p. 13. 26. Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” February 5, 2010, para. 8. 27. Ibid., para. 12. 28. See the English translation: “Russia’s Military Doctrine,” Arms Control Today, May 1, 2000, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/658. 29. The Russian acronym for SAP is GPV. As such, the document is sometimes referred to as GPV-2020 or GPV 2011–2020. 30. Lyudmila Pankova, “The Dynamics of Modernization of the Russian Armed Forces,” in Alexei Arbatov and Sergey Oznobishchev, eds., Russia: Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2015), p. 141; Jim Nichol, “Russian Military Reform and Defense Policy,” Congressional Research Service, August 24, 2011, pp. 21–22, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row /R42006.pdf.

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31. Igor Koshukov, “Interview of Vladimir Popovkin: In the New State Armament Program Priority Is Given to High-Tech Models” (in Russian), National Defense, March 14, 2011, http://www.nationaldefense.ru/includes/periodics/maintheme/2011 /0314/21345724/detail.shtml (accessed April 25, 2016). 32. Regarding plan details hinted at in the press before the plan was officially released, see “Russia’s State Armaments Program 2020: Is the Third Time the Charm for Military Modernization?” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo no. 125, October 2010, https://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/pepm_125.pdf. 33. Vasiliy M. Burenok, “Armaments of the 21st Century Will Have Intuition and Attitude: New Nano-Bio-Info-Cognitive Technologies Threaten Human Society” (in Russian), Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, December 2, 2011, http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2011-12-02/6_nanobioinfo.html. Burenok’s former position within the 46th Institute is detailed in several places, for instance in his biographical details in the following book, which he coauthored: Lev V. Kozhitov et al., Organization of Innovative Activity in High School (Moscow: MGIU, 2009), p. 6. 34. Russian Ministry of Defense, “46th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), http://ens.mil.ru/science /SRI/infrmation.htm?id=11391@morfOrgScience (accessed May 13, 2016). 35. Burenok, “Armaments of the 21st Century.” 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Nichol, “Russian Military Reform and Defense Policy,” p. 22. 39. Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia,” February 20, 2012, http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18185 (defunct), retrieved from http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18185 (accessed May 13, 2016). 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Putin fired Serdyukov on November 5, 2012, for alleged fraud and then appointed Moscow regional governor Sergei Shoigu to replace him. However, neither the MOD nor representatives of the Russian government have published information indicating that Serdyukov’s twenty-eight tasks had been terminated or altered. 43. Russian prime minister’s official website, Vladimir Putin holds a meeting on the tasks he set in his articles as a presidential candidate, “Anatoly Serdyukov’s Statement at This Meeting,” March 22, 2012, http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news /18490 (entry has been removed on an unknown date). 44. Ibid. 45. Hoffman, “Genetic Weapons, You Say?”; Zilinskas, “Take Russia to ‘Task’ on Bioweapons Transparency”; Khramchikhin, “Dreams of a New Weapon”; Bianchi, “Ultimate ‘Zombie’ Mind Control.” 46. The original transcript has been taken down and the website edited, as remarked in an unrelated publication: Cooper, “Military Expenditure in the Russian Federation,” p. 4 n.1. 47. “Russia Rejects Bioweapons Talk in U.S. Congress as ‘Propaganda,’” NTI Global Security Newswire, May 13, 2014, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/bioweapons -claims-prompt-russian-rebuke. 48. Sergey K. Shoigu, “Military Dangers to Russia Worsening Along Some Directions—Defense Minister Shoigu,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, January 26, 2013, https://rbth.com/news/2013/01/26/military_dangers_to_russia_worsening_along_some _directions_-_defense_min_22233.html (accessed April 28, 2016). 49. Ivan Nechepurenko, “Putin Demands Military ‘Upgrade’ in Face of Threats,” Moscow Times, February 28, 2013, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article

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/putin-demands-military-upgrade-in-face-of-threats/476185.html (accessed April 29, 2016). 50. Ibid. 51. Anonymous, “Russia’s Genetic and Beam Weapons Scare the West,” Pravda, July 4, 2012, http://www.pravdareport.com/russia/politics/04-07-2012/121557-russia _absolute_weapon-0.. 52. Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion,” p. 23–24, 31–35. 53. “Shoigu Expects Clarity on Russian Military Scientific Research Institutions’ Potential to Accomplish Import Substitution Tasks” (in Russian), InterfaxAVN Online, May 22, 2014, translation retrieved from Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) OE Watch, “Ukrainian Fallout on Russian MIC,” http://fmso .leavenworth.army.mil/OEWatch/201407/Russia_08.html (accessed April 29, 2016). 54. Ibid. 55. Vasiliy Burenok, “Readiness for Technological Warfare: Ways to Improve Effectiveness of Russian Federation Armed Forces System of Armament for Countering Modern Threats” (in Russian), Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (VPK) Online, May 15, 2014, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/20234 (accessed March 16, 2014). 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Vladimir Mukhin, “From the Nuclear Cudgel to Nonnuclear Deterrence: The Renewed RF Military Doctrine Will Specify the Domestic Threats” (in Russian), Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, December 15, 2014, http://www.ng.ru/armies/2014 -12-15/1_army.html (accessed March 12, 2016). 60. Defense Ministry Board, “Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board 19 December 2014,” December 19, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news /47257 (accessed March 12, 2016). 61. Russian Federation, “Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine Decree No Longer Valid,” Interfax, December 26, 2014, http://interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=562864 (accessed June 2, 2016). 62. See, for example, Polina Sinovets and Bettina Renz, Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine and Beyond: Threat Perception, Capabilities, and Ambitions, Research Paper no. 117 (Rome: NATO Defense College, Research Division, July 2015); Dmitri Trenin, “2014: Russia’s New Military Doctrine Tells It All,” Carnegie Moscow Center, December 29, 2014, http://carnegie.ru/2014/12/29/2014-russia-s -new-military-doctrine-tells-it-all; Pavel Podvig, “New Version of the Military Doctrine,” December 26, 2014, http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/new_version_of _the_military_do.shtml. 63. Russian Federation, “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict no. 2976 on December 25, 2014, http:// static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf (accessed May 9, 2016). 64. Vitaly Panov Valer’yanovich, Igor Borisovich Sheremet, and Vladimir A. Ischuk, “Organization of Development and Prospects of Application of Modeling for Russia’s Military-Industrial Complex” (in Russian), Business Information Agency “Slavica,” June 28, 2015, http://www.slaviza.ru/1764-metody-modelirovaniya -slozhnyh-sistem.html (accessed June 10, 2016). 65. Andrei Frolov, “Obstacle for the Aircraft Carrier: The State Armaments Program to 2025 Has Difficulty Fitting Within Economic Realities” (in Russian), Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (VPK) Online, March 16, 2016, http://vpk.name /news/151372_tormoz_dlya_avianosca.html (accessed April 5, 2016).

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66. “Meeting on the Development of the Draft State Armament Program for 2016–2025” (in Russian), September 10, 2014, http://kremlin.ru/news/46589 (accessed April 15, 2016). 67. President of Russia, “Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board,” December 19, 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23410#sel= (accessed June 2, 2016); Vasiliy Burenok, “The State Program of Disarmament: The Finance Ministry Saves on National Security,” August 31, 2016, http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/32056 (accessed September 9, 2016). 68. See the following article by the Russian former deputy finance minister Sergey Aleksashenko, “The Russian Armament Program Comes Under Reconsideration,” Center on Global Interests, May 26, 2015, http://globalinterests.org/2015 /05/26/the-russian-armament-program-comes-under-reconsideration. 69. President of Russia, “Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board”; Jason Bush, “Putin’s Defense Fixation Deepens Russian Budget Problems,” January 15, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/01/15/russia-crisis-budget-idUKL6N0 US25520150115; “Putin Launches GPV 2016–2025,” Russian Defense Policy, September 10, 2014, https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2014/09/20/putin-launches -gpv-2016–2025. 70. Lyudmila Pankova, “Russian Defence Budget: Key Problems and Possible Solutions,” in Alexei Arbatov and Sergei Oznobishchev, eds., Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academies of Sciences (IMEMO), Russia: Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security IMEMO Supplement to the Russian Edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2015 (Moscow; IMEMO, 2016), pp. 130–131. 71. Frolov, “Obstacle for the Aircraft Carrier.” 72. Pankova, “Russian Defence Budget,” pp. 140–141; Vladimir Gundarov, “Defense Ministry Has Asked for Help from Academics,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, April 1, 2016, http://nvo.ng.ru/nvoevents/2016-04-01/2_acad .html (accessed November 8, 2016). 73. Russian Ministry of Defense, “Yuri Ivanovich Borisov” (in Russian), http://structure.mil.ru/management/deputy/more.htm?id=10330305@SD_Employee (accessed November 8, 2016). 74. Personal communication with James Toppin, January 2017. 75. A. A. Psarev and Valery N. Filatov, Russian Military Mapping: A Guide to Using the Most Comprehensive Source of Global Geospatial Intelligence (Minneapolis: East View Cartographic, 2005), p. 171. 76. Security Council of the Russian Federation, “Principles of State Policy in the Field of Nuclear and Radiation Safety/Security in the Russian Federation to 2010 and Beyond” (in Russian), approved by the President of the Russian Federation by Order no. PR-2196 on December 4, 2003, http://www.scrf.gov.ru /documents/38.html (accessed April 20, 2016). 77. Security Council of the Russian Federation, “Principles of State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation to 2010 and Beyond” (in Russian), approved by the President of the Russian Federation by Order no. PR-2194 on December 4, 2003, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents /37.html (accessed April 20, 2016). 78. Ibid. 79. Security Council of the Russian Federation, “Principles of State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation to 2010 and Beyond.” 80. Ibid.

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81. Passage 19 of the “Principles of State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation to 2010 and Beyond” decree specified the “creation of a system of state non-budgetary funds (federal and regional) to ensure chemical and biological safety” in the 2005–2007 period. 82. Russian Federation, “Federal Targeted Program the National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2013)” (in Russian), Decree no. 791, October 27, 2008, retrieved from http://www.alppp .ru/law/bezopasnost-i-ohrana-pravoporjadka/2/postanovlenie-pravitelstva-rf-ot-27 -10-2008-791.html (accessed March 19, 2016). 83. Russian Federation, “On the Federal Target Program ‘The National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2014)’” (in Russian), Government Decree no. 791, October 27, 2008 (as amended on October 17, 2014), retrieved from Russian Emergency Situations Ministry, http://www.mchs.gov.ru/document/3582457 (accessed April 18, 2016). 84. Ibid. 85. Since the value of the ruble versus the US dollar has varied greatly during the time this book covers, we do not always estimate the dollar values when rubles are expressed. In general, during the time 2008–2014, $1 = 30 rubles; but during the time 2015 to the present, $1 = 65–72 rubles. See Trading Economics for historical charts of the worth of the ruble: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/currency (accessed May 5, 2016). 86. Russian Federation, “On the Federal Target Program ‘The National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2014).’” 87. Ibid., p. 5. 88. Ibid., pp. 7–8. 89. Ibid., p. 12. 90. Ibid., pp. 10–11. 91. Unlike Western countries, which have agent threat levels ranging from Biosafety Level-1 (BSL-1) to BSL-4 and where BSL-1 agents are those that pose the lowest threat, the Russians use threat levels Group 1–Group 4, with Group 1 posing the highest threat. 92. Russian Federation, “On the Federal Target Program ‘The National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2014),’” pp. 11–12. 93. Ibid., p. 12. 94. Ibid., pp. 16, 18. 95. “Russia to Spend $183 Mln on Chemical, Bio Defense in 2013,” RIA Novosti, November 12, 2012, http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20121211/178070125 .html (accessed April 27, 2015); “Russia Observes the Day of Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Forces” (in Russian), Weapons of Russia, November 13, 2012, http://www.arms-expo.ru/news/pamyatnye_rubezhi/v-rossii-otmechayut -den-voysk-radiacionnoy-himicheskoy-i-biologicheskoy-zaschity-13-11-2012-12-35 -00 (accessed April 27, 2015). 96. Marcel de Haas, “Medvedev’s Security Policy: A Provisional Assessment,” Russian Analytical Digest no. 62 (June 18, 2009), p. 3, http://www.laender-analysen .de/russland/rad/pdf/Russian_Analytical_Digest_62.pdf (accessed April 18, 2016). 97. Keir Giles, “Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020,” June 2009, p. 2, http://www.conflictstudies.org.uk/files/rusnatsecstrategyto2020.pdf. 98. Ivan Yegorov, “Confidential Advice: Nikolay Patrushev—Changes in the World Required Revising the Very Concept of ‘Ensuring National Security’” (in

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Russian), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, May 30, 2012, http://rg.ru/2012/05/30/patrushev.html (accessed April 6, 2016); Pallin, Russian Military Reform, pp. 24–27. 99. Yegorov, “Confidential Advice.” 100. Ekaterina Chirkova, “Policy Briefing: Key Aspects of Russia’s Current Foreign and Security Policy,” Directorate-General for External Politicies, Policy Department, European Parliament, October 2012, p. 7, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData /etudes/briefing_note/join/2012/491446/EXPO-AFET_SP(2012)491446_EN.pdf. 101. Russian Federation, “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation Until 2020” (in Russian), Decree no. 537, May 12, 2009, retrieved from Security Council of the Russian Federation, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html (accessed April 18, 2016). Unofficial English translation available at Rustrans, May 12, 2009, http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to -2020 (accessed April 18, 2016). 102. Russian Federation, “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), Decree no. 1300, December 17, 1997, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents /1.html (accessed April 22, 2016); Russian Federation, “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation,” Decree no. 24, January 10, 2000, http://archive.mid.ru/ns-osndoc .nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/36aba64ac09f737fc32575d9002bbf31? (accessed April 23, 2016). 103. Russian Federation, “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation Until 2020.” 104. Ibid. 105. Ibid. 106. Ibid. 107. Ibid. 108. The 1993 “Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” included a passage stating that Russia’s policies included “ensuring compliance with the regime of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction.” See the English translation at “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” Federation of American Scientists, http://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html (accessed May 5, 2016). 109. Russian Federation, “Strengthening the BWC Through a Legally Binding Instrument (Protocol),” August 5, 2014, pp. 1–6, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD 006B8954/(httpAssets)/E93A399D0E6488FEC1257D2E003F87C5/$file/BWC+MX +2014+-+Side+events+-+Evening+Russian+Federation.pdf (accessed September 9, 2016). 110. Ibid., p. 6. 111. Russian Federation, “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” approved by the President of the Russian Federation on July 12, 2008, http://www.russianmission.eu/userfiles/file/foreign_policy_concept_english.pdf (accessed July 12, 2008). 112. Russian Federation, “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” approved by the President of the Russian Federation on February 12, 2013, http://archive.mid.ru//ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676 /869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d9002b1c38?OpenDocument (accessed May 4, 2016). 113. Russian Federation, “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” approved by the President of the Russian Federation on November 30, 2016, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/international/document25 (accessed April 11, 2017). 114. Russian Federation, “Principles of State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation to 2025 and Beyond” (in

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Russian), approved by the President of the Russian Federation by Order no. PR-2573 on November 1, 2013, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/18/127.html (accessed March 14, 2016). 115. Russian Federation, “Principles of State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation to 2010 and Beyond.” 116. Russian Federation, “Principles of State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation to 2025 and Beyond.” 117. Unattributed report approved by Vladimir Putin, “The Concept of Public Security in the Russian Federation” (in Russian), November 20, 2013, http://kremlin .ru/acts/news/19653 (accessed March 10, 2016). 118. Ibid. 119. Ibid. 120. V. A. Vetrov, L. N. Ilyin, and V. V. Rylin, “Modernization of the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense Forces” (in Russian), Military Thought (Moscow) 12 (December 2013), pp. 44–51. 121. Ibid. 122. Ibid., p. 46. 123. Ibid. 124. Ibid. 125. Ibid., p. 51. 126. Russian Federation, “Approval of the Regulations on the Management of the Implementation of the Federal Target Program ‘The National System of Chemical and Biological Safety of the Russian Federation (2015–2020 Years),’ Approved by Resolution of the Russian Government Dated April 28, 2015 N 418 (Restricted),” http://docs.cntd.ru/document/420283522 (accessed April 13, 2016). 127. Ibid. 128. “Vladimir Putin Chairs a Meeting of the Security Council Devoted to the Implementation of the State Policy in the Field of Nuclear, Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Security of the Russian Federation,” October 30, 2015, http://en .kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50596 (accessed March 21, 2016). 129. Ibid. 130. Vladimir Putin, “The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy” (in Russian), Edict no. 683, December 31, 2015, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/40391 (accessed March 17, 2016). 131. Ibid., sec. II, paras. 14, 19. 132. Ibid., sec. IV, paras. 43, 86. 133. Ibid., para. 86. 134. Ibid., para. 70. 135. Ibid., sec. IV, para. 75. 136. Russian Federation, “Principles of State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation to 2025 and Beyond.” 137. The following analytic piece is useful to understand both the journal’s reputation and its usual content: Dmitry Gorenburg, “Russian Military Threat Assessment Stays Old School,” Russian Military Reform, March 17, 2010, https://russiamil .wordpress.com/tag/voennaia-mysl. 138. V. B. Antipov and S. V. Novichkov, “Assessment of the Legal Framework Regarding the Use by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of ChemicalBased Non-Lethal Weapons” (in Russian), Military Thought (Moscow) 5 (May 2012), pp. 56–62. 139. Ibid., p. 57. 140. Ibid., p. 58.

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141. Ibid., pp. 59–60. 142. Ibid., p. 60. 143. Ibid., p. 62. 144. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, p. 694. 145. “Vladimir Putin Chairs a Meeting of the Security Council Devoted to the Implementation of the State Policy in the Field of Nuclear, Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Security of the Russian Federation.” 146. Putin, “Speech at Expanded Meeting of the State Council on Russia’s Development Strategy Through to 2020.” 147. “Russian Paper Views Plans to Develop New State Armaments Programme,” BBC Monitoring, Former Soviet Union—Political, February 8, 2013. 148. “Russian Deputy Premier Notes Need for Technological Progress,” BBC Monitoring, Former Soviet Union—Political, December 3, 2013. 149. Burenok, “Readiness for Technological Warfare.” 150. Russian Federation, “Working Day: Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Holds a Meeting on the Tasks He Set in His Articles As a Presidential Candidate” (in Russian), March 22, 2012, http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18490 (accessed May 6, 2016). 151. “Russia Has Potential to Develop Weapons Based on New Physical Principles —Russian Defense Ministry,” Interfax, August 2013, retrieved through EBSCOHOST Connection, http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/89618593/russia-has-potential -develop-weapons-based-new-physical-principles-russian-defense-ministry (accessed April 27, 2015). 152. Mary C. FitzGerald, “Marshal Ogarkov on Modern War: 1977–1985,” Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper no. 443.10, revised November 1986, pp. 30–31, http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/5500044310.pdf (accessed May 6, 2016). See also Jacob W. Kipp, “The Labor of Sisyphus: Forecasting the Revolution in Military Affairs During Russia’s Time of Troubles,” in Thierry Gongora and Harald von Riekhoff, eds., Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs? Defense and Security at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century (Westport: Greenwood, 2000), p. 90. 153. Roger McDermott, “Putin Considers New ‘Defense Plan’ as ‘Reform’ Dies,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 10, no. 21 (February 5, 2013), http://www.jamestown.org /single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40417&no_cache=1#.VAdsSPnIZtg(accessed April 27, 2015). See also Kremlin, “Meeting with Makhmut Gareev,” July 25, 2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/5759 (accessed April 27, 2015); “Vladimir Putin Presents 3rd Class Order for Service to the Fatherland to Makhmut Gareev,” TatarInform, July 26, 2013, http://eng.tatar-inform.ru/news/2013/07/26/43585 (accessed April 27, 2015). 154. “Automatic control systems, robotics, unmanned reconnaissance and attack tools, weapons based on new physical principles—all of this will make a lot of changes in the nature of warfare. The Academy of Military Sciences is designed to thoroughly explore all of the new developments in military science and in the military art.” In Makhmut Gareev, “On the Threshold of an Era of Upheavals: Ensuring Security Requires an Objective Evaluation of Threats” (in Russian), VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer (VPK) Online, January 23, 2013, http://vpk-news.ru/articles /14094 (accessed April 27, 2015). 155. Central Intelligence Agency, “Evidence of Russian Development of New Subkiloton Nuclear Warheads,” August 30, 2000, approved for release in October 2005, p. 7, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801 /DOC_0001260463.pdf.

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156. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Weapons Based on New Physical Principles” (in Russian), http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary /details.htm?id=13770@morfDictionary (accessed May 24, 2016). 157. General Sergei M. Shtemenko, chief of the Main Organizational-Mobilization Department of the GS, in relation to Revolution in Military Affairs, wrote in 1965 that: “It is obvious that today the ground troops can no longer be of decisive importance as in the past and that the queen of the battlefield has now yielded her crown to the strategic rocket troops.” See William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), pp. 30–31, 47–48, 213, 216–217. Steven Zaloga, a renowned specialist on the Soviet military, developed this interpretation in Steven J. Zaloga, Scud Ballistic Missile and Launch Systems 1955–2005 (Oxford: Osprey, 2006), pp. 6, 11. 158. Khramchikhin, “Dreams of a New Weapon,” p. 1. 159. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Weapons Based on New Physical Principles.” 160. Ibid. We understand that nonbiological substances such as radioactive materials theoretically would also fit the given definition of a “genetic weapon,” but the Russian glossary only mentions viruses as the mediating mechanism for genetic damage and categorizes radiological weapons independently as another potential type of “weapons based on new physical principles.” 161. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Weapons Based on New Physical Principles.” 162. E. P. Kruglyakov, “Pseudoscience. How Does It Threaten Science and the Public?” translated by G. Goldberg, report at a RAN Presidium meeting on May 27, 2003, Saint Petersburg Branch of the Russian Humanist Society, http://humanism.al .ru/en/articles.phtml?num=000010 (accessed April 27, 2015). 163. “Russia to Kill Drones, Missiles with 10km-Range Super–High Frequency Cannon,” Russia Today, June 18, 2015, https://www.rt.com/news/267187-shf-cannon -russia-drones (accessed April 24, 2016). 164. Pavel Podvig, “A Status-6 Update,” April 21, 2016, http://russianforces.org /blog/2016/04/a_status-6_status_update.shtml. 165. President of the Russian Federation, “Priority Directions of Development of Science, Technology and Engineering of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), Presidential Decree no. 577, March 30, 2002, http://www.sbras.ru/win/elbib/data/show _page.dhtml?7+910 (accessed December 2, 2016). 166. President of the Russian Federation, “On Approval of the Priority Areas in Science, Technology, and Engineering of the Russian Federation and the List of Critical Technologies of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), Presidential Decree no. 843, May 21, 2006, http://ispu.ru/node/2680 (accessed December 2, 2016). 167. President of the Russian Federation, “On Approval of the Priority Areas in Science, Technology, and Engineering of the Russian Federation and the List of Critical Technologies of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), Presidential Decree no. 899, July 7, 2011, http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_116178 /594d7dd112d737966851b3611b36f8cf3b09034c (accessed December 2, 2016). 168. President of the Russian Federation, “On Approving the Priority Areas in Science, Technology, and Engineering in the Russian Federation and the List of Critical Technologies of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), amended by Presidential Decree no. 623, December 16, 2015, http://www.consultant.ru/document /cons_doc_LAW_116178/594d7dd112d737966851b3611b36f8cf3b09034c (accessed December 2, 2016).

4 Biodefense and High-Technology Research and Development

If the proposed biodefense and advanced weapons plans described in Chapter 3 are being implemented, work must be occurring within two networks of Russian institutions. The first network is Russia’s collection of institutes tasked with advanced weapons planning and development. The development of any new advanced weapon system, conventional or otherwise, is a long process.1 Civilian educational centers, industrial institutions, or dedicated military weapons design bureaus must first conduct fundamental research. The MOD’s Scientific and Technical Council, perhaps through the intermediate intervention of one of the abundant military R&D planning organs, must be convinced to include development work under the SAP’s R&D budget. A prototype must be designed and tested to the satisfaction of supervisory organs. Last, fullscale production must successfully compete for a slice of the military budget against a plethora of other weapons projects and military priorities. In Russia as elsewhere, this process plays out within a large and sometimes dysfunctional network of institutions. As discussed in Chapter 3, the second network is Russia’s national biodefense program. For this network to function effectively, the Russian government must coordinate its civilian and military institutes involved in fundamental research on pathogens and toxins, those conducting applied work on NBC defense equipment, detection equipment, and disinfectants, and those involved in responding to a biological incident. An investigation of the institutions involved in these two networks can shed light on the topics of concern brought up in Chapters 2 and 3 regarding Russia’s BWC-relevant activities. Activity at institutions in the first network that is labeled as work on “weapons based on new physical principles” will clarify with whom this concept is popular, and whether there is any interest from weapons R&D institutes to deliver products 87

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matching Serdyukov’s promises. The level of activity in the second network details the implementation of the biodefense policies laid out in Chapter 3, details activity at institutions previously involved in the Soviet BW program, and gauges to what extent the Russian government takes its public threat pronouncements seriously. Any interaction between both networks would be a key indicator of Russian concern. If detected, such activity is worth close scrutiny. A hypothetical bioweapons program, regardless of its label (“genetic weapons,” “weapons based on new physical principles,” or otherwise) would likely involve elements from these two networks, much as the second-generation Soviet BW program combined military organizations for their weaponization expertise with civilian institutions for their excellence in life science fundamental research (see Chapter 2). Simultaneously, some civilian reasons exist for weapons development institutes to be interacting with biodefense institutions. We present the results of our study of elements of both of these networks in this chapter. Our focus is on organizations involved in Russia’s biodefense system as well as select organizations involved in advanced weapons R&D policymaking and prototyping. Some of these institutions of interest are named in national programs summarized in Chapter 3 or have affiliated individuals whose statements are presented in that chapter. Others were identified independently based on reports of their function. For each institution, we attempted to determine its assigned tasks, its formal chain of command, and its relationship with other institutions. We searched for recent activity in media articles, in technical literature, and in budgetary documents and government tenders.2 The “National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation” for 2009–2014 features a list of important organizations along with brief descriptors of renovation work at each site. For four of the most important military biodefense organizations, a 2008 tender funding work related to the national program (reproduced in Annex 3.1) provided crucial details when matched to relevant entries in the 2009–2014 program text. We compared our findings to previously published accounts in the secondary literature and in declassified documents. We also examined open-source satellite imagery for activity at selected sites, such as repair or construction work. The effectiveness of each institute depends on successful personal relationships between directors and their workers, with superiors in their chain of command, and with directors of other institutes working in the same field, and ultimately on whether they can leverage a relationship with Putin or one or more of his close associates. Obtaining reliable insight into such interactions is extremely difficult. Knowing this, we paid attention when describing Russian media interviews of key personnel, particularly to the

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language used by directors and researchers when they described future advanced weapons and compared these utterances to key terms used in documents summarized in Chapter 3. For instance, we noted whether directors or institute researchers used the term “weapons based on new physical principles,” or if they pointedly avoided doing so. We did so because champions of the concept are likely to be those whose institutions are best positioned to obtain funding for such arms, and who enjoyed the patronage of officials like Rogozin who have repeatedly called for the development of such weapons (see Chapter 3). We are careful about which information we make public. We have seen that the Russian government does on occasion dry the wells of information used by researchers monitoring its biodefense policies, ranging from censoring the controversial portions of Serdyukov’s 2012 report to classifying the text of the latest “National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/ Security of the Russian Federation” for 2015–2020 (see Chapter 3). We fear that the Russian security services scrutinize the sources of information used by foreign analysts and adapt their efforts accordingly. We have therefore decided not to release some details, making some difficult choices as to when the inclusion of an additional piece of information was simply not worth the risk of losing the entire underlying information stream. In addition, given the threat of terrorism, some details are best left unpublished even if publicly available. In general, research conducted using information derived solely from open sources can be sufficient to uncover activities of interest. However, such information is rarely sufficient to reveal underlying human motivations and objectives. This lack of context is especially problematic when we try to determine motives behind dual-use life sciences research. We are well aware that the limitations brought about by a dependence on open sources are not a license for speculation. In cases where we report on dual-use research, we refrain from passing judgment as to the authors’ ultimate objective and describe, to the extent possible, both civilian and potential military justifications for the work. Entries for organizations of interest are given in the sections that follow, categorized as follows: MOD institutions involved with biodefense, select MOD institutions involved with advanced weapons planning and development, select organizations of the MIC, and civilian institutions with a biodefense role. To assist readers in navigating the maze of institutions, subinstitutions, and military services detailed in this chapter, we provide an organization diagram in Figure 4.1. We also survey how these institutions interact with one another by tracking a portion of their openly published financial flows. We then present our overall assessment of the military R&D and the biodefense networks as they relate to the BWC and describe two conflicting visions of their future.

Figure 4.1 Organization Diagram for the Institutions Detailed in Chapter 4

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Russian Ministry of Defense Institutions The MOD’s top leadership is composed of the minister of defense, his first deputy ministers and deputy ministers, and a powerful GS that, on paper, reports directly to the minister.3 The GS chief also is a first deputy minister of defense.4 In practice, however, the GS chief has at times engaged in power struggles with the minister of defense, as occurred in the early 2000s under Putin’s first watch.5 Given this experience and the importance of the military reform process to Putin, he allowed Serdyukov to replace both existing first deputy ministers and thus establish a high level of control over the MOD’s institutions, including the GS.6 This pattern was repeated by Shoigu, who in November 2012 induced Putin to replace both the GS chief and the other first deputy.7 The MOD maintains the combat readiness of the armed forces through arms acquisition, training, and the supply and lodging of military personnel.8 The GS, for its part, is responsible for planning for the use of force and as such formulates doctrine and force requirements.9 For instance, when Putin gently criticized the MOD for overly frequent “changes in requirements” for new weapons that were upsetting industry and financial planning efforts, he directed the comment at the new GS chief.10 The MOD institutions are divided among portfolios of the several MOD deputies. In line with their respective tasks, the GS chief has the lion’s share of institutions involved with planning and operations issues, while the non-GS’s first deputy minister has control over the property and construction sphere and thus key financial flows. The current GS chief is Valery Gerasimov,11 who replaced Makarov in 2012 following Serdyukov’s sacking.12 Gerasimov controls key military science advisory panels, such as the Military Scientific Committee of the Armed Forces and the important MOD’s Scientific and Technical Council. They also include the Office of the Chief of the Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Forces and the three most important leftover MOD facilities from the Soviet BW program (see Chapter 2). As GS chief, Gerasimov is expected to “use foresight to develop the theory and practice of future war” and thus plays a crucial role in formulating military doctrine.13 Currently, the MOD’s other first deputy minister is Ruslan Tsalikov, who replaced Arkady Bakhin in 2015.14 Tsalikov was Shoigu’s trusted subordinate when he was minister of emergency situations.15 He heads, among other institutes, an MOD institute left over from the Soviet BW program that was not assigned to the GS chief, namely the State Research Test Institute of Military Medicine. Three deputy ministers are of note here because they are in charge of institutes involved in advanced weapons R&D and planning or with “unconventional” weapons. Those under Deputy Minister Yuri Borisov are dedicated

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to economic and logistical planning studies for advanced weapons procurement. Deputy Minister Pavel Popov heads down-to-earth R&D groups that assist the MOD in rapidly militarizing civilian breakthrough technologies, notably through prototyping initiatives. For his part, Deputy Minister Bulgarkov controls the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate, which itself controls the 3rd Central Research Institute, whose tasks include the development of “unconventional” weapons for the ground forces. These institutes each have separate subsections later. Russian MOD institutions and their assigned staffs are often known by many names, and the ones presented in this section are no exception. Thus, we first present the following explanatory note on the Russian byzantine military naming conventions before providing detailed institution entries. Russian MOD military units are assigned five-digit military cover unit designators (MCUDs). Military organizations commonly use MCUDs because, unlike true unit designators such as “120th Artillery Brigade,” they can use MCUDs to refer to units without revealing details about their function or equipment. For similar obfuscation purposes, Russian defenserelated Scientific Research Institutes are assigned numbers in the one- to three-digit range. For example, one institute we have studied at length and will describe below is codenamed the “48th Central Research Institute.” The Russian term for “Central Scientific-Research Institutes” is tsentralnyy nauchno-issledovatelskiy institute, which in turn has the English acronyms TsNII or NII. For example, the usual acronyms for the 48th Central Research Institute are TsNII-48 or NII-48. In the Soviet Union, many NIIs were located in closed cities, which had their own name and number; for instance, Volsk-18. These location names are sometimes used as shorthand to refer to the military installations based within them, particularly in cases where the NII is the sole noteworthy institution in a given closed city. In a practice begun sometime around the end of the 1940s and reformed in the middle to late 1960s, the Soviet security apparatus also assigned a P.O. Box number cover name to classified Soviet military organizations.16 For instance, the entire Biopreparat system was referred to as “P.O. Box A-1063.”17 A decision to stop the use of this P.O. Box number system was reportedly taken in 1989.18 The organizations we researched heavily relied upon the NII numbering system, whereas we saw no recent use of the P.O. Box numbers. Usage of MCUD and NII covers can in practice be another source of confusion. First, legal documents involving a military NII will often use the MCUD of the military unit assigned to the base to refer to the NII itself. Second, staff at a subsidiary research center will often use the principal research center’s cover name. For example, military researchers can file open patents or present research to the public using the cover name of the principal research center rather than that assigned to their subsidiary.

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In the entries that follow, we have cross-referenced publication and tender data with other sources of information whenever possible to minimize the impact of these practices on our understanding of the tasks assigned to particular centers. 33rd Central Research Test Institute at Shikhany-2

The current codename for Russia’s premier research center supporting Russia’s NBC Troops is the 33rd Central Research Test Institute.19 The institute’s director in 2013 was Sergey Kukhotkin.20 From sources that included a government decree, a government hiring advertisement for students in biology, a Red Star news article about the center, and satellite imagery, we confirmed that the center is sited within Shikhany-2, which is, as it was in Soviet times, a closed city. This military site, also known as Volsk-18, is located approximately 500 miles southeast of Moscow.21 The site is close to the civilian town known as Shikhany-1 (Volsk-17). The location is ideal for this role, given that Shikhany-2 has a long history as a chemical weapons test site, and a BW defensive equipment testing site.22 In the early 1920s, the Soviet Union and Germany established a joint chemical weapons proving ground in Shikhany. When the cooperative project floundered in 1933, the Soviets kept the equipment and maintained the chemical weapons test site.23 The Soviet military also established a Chemical Defense Institute in Moscow in 1928, which conducted both offensive and defensive chemical warfare (CW) research.24 In 1962, this institute was moved to Shikhany and merged with the test site, eventually becoming the Central Research Test Institute.25 The Shikhany-2 site eventually came to cover an area of 400 square kilometers. The Soviet MOD conducted tests of chemical weapons at Shikhany-2 throughout the Cold War. In an interlude of openness to help support negotiations on the CWC, in 1987, the Soviet Union invited military delegations from forty foreign countries to view a display of its old chemical weapons at the institute. After the foreigners departed, military work continued at the site as before. The Russian military chemist and environmental activist Vil Mirzayanov maintains that the test site continued CW testing activities as late as 1993.26 Following the Soviet Union’s dissolution and Russia’s ratification of the CWC, the Shikhany-2 test area was converted into a largescale training ground for the NBC Troops. From the imagery we have scrutinized it appears as if Shikhany-2 hosts at least two such units. In addition to its retained test area, the large Shikhany-2 site appears to be divided into three main zones. In one zone we observed a parade ground used by Unit 71432, while a second zone held a parade ground used by Unit 29753.27 Within the third zone we observed two laboratory-like buildings under renovation. We conclude that this third zone houses the 33rd

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Central Research Test Institute’s research laboratories and the ongoing construction work matching what has been funded under the National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014. This identification is particularly important because the third zone includes an access-controlled area holding what appear to be six small bermed storage pens for explosives.28 The implication of what it means if indeed explosives are present on site is discussed later. The 33rd Central Research Test Institute’s scientific workers publish little in the open arena. Our search of the eLibrary.ru (see Annex 4.2 at the end of this chapter) holdings revealed that institute workers have had a mere three publications and thirteen patents as of March 2015.29 The keywords used to classify the publications were not biodefense-specific. Aside from one generic article whose topic was military industry, key terms are related to multiuse detector systems (“chemical detector,” “detection accuracy,” “LIDAR sensing,” “monitoring”), or chemical and nuclear accidents or attack mitigation (“accident,” “chemical environment,” “concentration fluctuation,” “dose rate,” “emergency emission,” “filtering-absorbing material,” or “induced radionuclides”).30 A subsequent search of the patent literature using specialized databases other than eLibrary.ru uncovered other research interests, in particular on biodefense topics. 33rd Central Research Test Institute researchers have filed patents on, among other inventions, biological aerosol detection by fluorescence, a fuel-air explosive munition design, personal protective gear, the use of laser-illuminated detection and ranging (LIDAR) techniques for the detection of radioactive contamination, and novel chemical disinfectants.31 A promotional video produced by the 33rd Institute about itself and its work confirms the presence of at least one high-containment biological laboratory on site, as evidenced by the laboratory workers’ use of highcontainment suits and the laboratory’s biohazard marking.32 The video also displays an NBC suit design testing facility, 33 a library holding Englishlanguage reference texts on NBC defense equipment,34 a manufacturing line for gas-mask filters, at least one chemical laboratory working with highly toxic compounds,35 a probable laboratory for working with radiological sources,36 and footage of NBC Troop field exercises.37 The video confirms that the field test sites remain under the 33rd Institute’s authority. The footage shows a panel bearing the institute’s name and insignia that reads: “field complex for carrying out tests of flamethrower-incendiary and aerosol vehicles of the NBC Troops” (the “aerosol vehicle” mention is almost certainly a reference to the smokescreen-generating vehicles used by the NBC troops).38 The video reveals that the training ground has more uses than only the movement of troops. It contains footage of the testing of a truck-based flare protective system, which demonstrates that the center conducts weapons testing for the NBC Troops.39

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Equipment tenders issued by the institute further indicate that the center is involved with biodefense research and conventional explosive weapons work, and they confirm that the center has its own biodefense research laboratories. Tenders issued include requests for equipment for microbiological production,40 refrigerators,41 repair work tenders for its climate-control chamber (type MPS-8000),42 PCR analysis supplies,43 repairs of freeze-drying machines (type TG-45, MASS-25, AKSS, LZ-45.27),44 a steam generator (type PEE-250),45 and 3D printing (additive manufacturing) equipment.46 A public datasheet for the LZ-45.27 type freeze-dryer states that this model has a condenser capacity of 30 kilograms of ice per cycle and fits vials holding a total material volume of 22.5 cubic decimeters, making it a freeze-dryer ideal for biological research applications rather than industrial-scale production.47 Some of these equipment purchases are recent. For example, the Russian company STC Industrial Technologies completed upgrade work on the MPS8000 climate-control chamber in February 2014.48 The 3D printing equipment was described as for the manufacture of “models,” which suggests that the center is doing developmental and prototype work and not only testing, producing, or repairing already-designed equipment.49 This conclusion would be consistent with the aforementioned patents and video footage. Notably, the institute has put out a tender for the repair of a “wind tunnel” (the Russian term used is aerodinamicheskoj truby), won by the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Scientific Research Institute for Biological Instrumentation” (GosNIIBP).50 The company was established in 1975 “in accordance with the decision of the USSR Government to accelerate the development of molecular biology and genetics, the use of their achievements in the industry and in strengthening the country’s defense.”51 The firm works on commercializing a range of biodefense equipment, including detectors and personal protective equipment.52 It is under the Russian government’s FMBA,53 whose entry appears later in the chapter. We suspected that a biodefense institute that typically develops biological instruments would not be doing work on a traditional “wind tunnel” but rather on an aerosol propagation chamber. The underlying tender documentation validated our suspicions.54 In a section describing the necessity of the repairs, the tender author included the need for creating and testing automatic aerosol alarms in terms of determining their sensitivity threshold, speed, and aerosol sampling efficiency.55 This passage mentions the TSA-13 alarm system;56 the TSA detectors, according to data provided by the Belarussian MOD website, are specifically designed to warn against biological agents.57 Indeed, the prototype successor system TSA-14 is described in an unrelated tender also assigned to GosNIIBP as an analyzer and alarm system for “biological aerosols.”58 As such, the “wind tunnel” is almost certainly designed to disperse bioaerosols in a contained environment.

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Given the presence of storage pens for explosives on site, it is possible that some of the institute’s research involves the explosive dissemination of bioaerosols; in effect, it is possible that the institute has an explosive testing chamber. However, we caution that the explosives storage pens may instead be used by the center for its research on fuel-air explosives. We used two major Russian documents to piece together ongoing infrastructure work at MOD institutes, including at the 33rd Institute. First, we reproduced the short descriptions of future work found within the infrastructure section of the Federal Targeted Program National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014. We then cross-referenced these descriptions with work items listed in a 2008 MOD tender (reproduced in Annex 4.1).59 The MOD document proved useful because it sometimes revealed details that had been left out of the Program text. Whenever we list infrastructure information taken from both the MOD tender and the Program text, we first reproduce the infrastructure work item as listed in the Program text. We then list, in brackets, the associated MOD tender lot number and any additional details gleaned from the latter document. The Federal Targeted Program National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014 has funded the following activities: • Major renovation of the diesel power plant at Volsk-18 city [Lot No. 20]. • Major renovation of the secure area physical protection system at Volsk-18 city, including project design and site investigation work [probably Lot No. 18]. • Major renovation of the laboratory building No. 4 at Volsk-18, Saratov region [Lot No. 17]. • Major renovation of the laboratory building No. 5 at Volsk-18, Saratov region [Lot No. 19]. • Major renovation of the water treatment plant site No. 3 to ensure effective cleaning and uninterrupted water supply to facilities at Volsk-18, Saratov region [Lot No. 21, the tender descriptor is in this case less specific than the one in the program]. • Construction of the storage of toxic chemicals areas, ensuring safe storage conditions, including design and survey works and storage area for irritants at the “115 State Special Chemical Arsenal” of the MOD at Volsk-17 [Lot No. 22].60

Our analysis of commercial satellite imagery of the 33rd Central Research Test Institute area indicates that two laboratory-sized buildings have received new roofs, as evidenced by their different colors. They probably are the two laboratory buildings, No. 4 and No. 5, mentioned in the infrastructure work plan. There has also been some construction work at a nearby site.61 Imagery analysis of the overall site reveals that physical security changes were made at its periphery,62 in part to accommodate a significant increase in military vehicle storage at a nearby site (see Figure 4.2 in

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the insert section following page 150).63 In addition, a high-security military storage area outside of the main complex was significantly expanded in 2010. It probably is the storage area for the “toxic”/“irritant” chemicals to be maintained as part of the 115 State Special Chemical Arsenal.64 Satellite imagery of the overall Shikhany-2 area confirms that extensive NBC Troop training exercises are conducted relatively frequently, which is in line with our prior findings. Based on the above information, we conclude that the 33rd Central Research Test Institute is specialized in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and thermobaric/enhanced explosives (CBRNE) defense work, is used to test and in some cases develop NBC Troop weapons and equipment, and has advanced biodefense testing capabilities. We further conclude that the Shikhany-2 site remains a major exercise ground for Russian NBC Troops. Scientific Research Institute for Microbiology of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Kirov Institute)

The Kirov Institute is located in Kirov (Vyatka), Kirov oblast.65 Its cover name is 48th Central Research Institute. It is subordinate to the Office of Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Safety (RKhBB) of the Head of the CBW Troops. As noted in Chapter 2, it was and remains to this day the lead MOD institute for biological weapons and defense problems. The Kirov Institute retains its two subsidiary centers, informally known as the Sverdlovsk Institute and the Zagorsk Institute (see Chapter 2). The continued association between the Kirov Institute and its subsidiary centers in Sverdlovsk and Zagorsk can be deduced from reading a Red Star news article and the contents of a civilian lawsuit.66 That the 48th Central Research Institute has a virology center, which is the Zagorsk Institute, was also noted in a news article reporting on R&D related to an H1N1 influenza vaccine.67 Since the institute and its two subsidiary centers are military installations closed to outsiders, their work programs are mostly unknown. Of the institute and its centers, we have the least information on the Kirov Institute. We know that as in Soviet times, it specializes in investigating bacterial pathogens such as B. anthracis and Y. pestis. Institute scientists have for some time worked to develop a plague vaccine. In Soviet times, the Kirov Institute maintained at least one BSL-3 unit, several aerosol test chambers, an explosive test chamber, a vivarium, a pilot plant, and a small production plant.68 In addition, either the Kirov Institute had a BSL-4 unit, or it conducted experiments normally designed for BSL-4 containment in a BSL-3 unit.69 Since the Kirov Institute recently ordered primates, it is safe to assume that it houses a vivarium. As the animal supplier’s delivery address for the primates was in Kirov, the Kirov Institute almost certainly ordered

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the primates for its own use and not for redistribution to a subsidiary facility. A news article detailing the primate purchase claimed that the Kirov Institute was conducting civilian work on blood chemistry and studying viral diseases such as HIV.70 In 2016, the Kirov Institute purchased two enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) kits for use to detect human myelin basic protein in the cerebrospinal fluid and two kits for the detection of antibodies to human myelin basic protein in serum samples, plasma, and other biological fluids by immunoassay.71 In the Soviet era, SRCAM scientists created a unique genetically engineered strain of Legionella pneumophila that would cause a human’s immunological defense system to attack the host’s own myelin sheath, which would induce paralysis leading to the victim’s death.72 Knowledge of this history made us initially highly suspicious of the Kirov Institute’s purchase. However, the aforementioned press article mentioning HIV work provided a civilian justification for the kits’ presence, which was that the Kirov Institute scientists were investigating HIV-related demyelination.73 To avoid any misunderstandings about such dual-use research, we are hopeful that Russia reported the Kirov Institute’s research on myelin in one of its recent BWC CBMs. Since Russia, like many other countries, does not release its CBMs to the public but only to BWC States Parties, we cannot verify whether this has been done. The National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014 has provided the Kirov Institute with funding for the following infrastructure work (as before, we add in brackets lot number taken from the 2008 tender): • The major renovation of Building No. 19 to accommodate a federal center for detecting and diagnosing dangerous infectious diseases [and “defeating toxins of biological origin”; Lot No. 1]. • The major renovation of engineering systems and of Building No. 6 for the production of medical immunobiological preparations [“against anthrax”; Lot No. 3]. • The major renovation of Building No. 6a for the production of vaccines [“against plague”; Lot No. 4].74

The prophylactic products that the Kirov Institute is slated to produce as a result of this funding are in line with its long-running, considerable research on B. anthracis and Y. pestis, especially its R&D on a plague vaccine. We note that this renovation work does not directly pertain to R&D that seeks to develop therapeutics for treating HIV or other viral pathogens. The commercial satellite imagery available to us does not reveal significant additions to the institute’s site. The renovations noted above therefore have probably been carried out internally or perhaps have not yet been carried out.

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The Sverdlovsk Institute is one of the Kirov Institute’s two subsidiary centers, alongside the Zagorsk Institute.75 As noted in Chapter 2, it is infamous for its accidental, lethal release of B. anthracis spores in 1979.76 The Sverdlovsk Institute has accumulated a long list of cover names: Compound 19, Sverdlovsk-19, TsVTPBZ, and Military Unit 47051.77 Presumably, Unit 47051 is the military unit staffing the institute. In 1990, the institute’s director, Major-General Anatoly Kharechko, remarked that the institute’s work involved “a new direction, that of the investigation of the mechanism of the biological impairment of military equipment. Yes, there are microbes in nature that destroy metal and plastic. As you see, civilians also have an interest in the results of our research.”78 Two patents filed in 2008–2009 and using the 48th’s Kirov address confirm that work on oil-oxidizing bacteria has been carried out. A biocompound named Tsentrin is being produced and sold by the Sverdlovsk Institute for civilian use to clean up oil-spill sites. According to its producers, it has demonstrated high effectiveness and, after treatment has been completed, the treated soil will revive and become fertile once again.79 Although it is not clear whether the entire R&D done to realize Tsentrin was carried out at the Sverdlovsk Institute, it probably was since bioremediation R&D is one of its major publicly acknowledged interests.80 This research is dual-use in nature because oil-oxidizing bacteria can also hypothetically be used as an anti-materiel agent in military sabotage operations targeting enemy fuel stores and the fuel reserves of military vehicles, akin to the anti-materiel agents envisaged by Kharchenko. Aside from bioremediation research, the center’s staff is working on predicting the scales and effects of the use of biological weapons, developing means and methods for preventing and treating infectious diseases, and developing processes and lines for production of antibiotics and preparations that are advertised to enhance the immunological defense system. The latter line of research is particularly important because it provides the institute with a potential opportunity to convert its old BW-oriented production lines to civilian use. The story of Biosporin indicates that the institute’s researchers may have been interested in this type of civilian diversification during the cash-strapped years of the mid-1990s. A so-called immunobiological compound named Biosporin was developed at the Dmitri K. Zabolotnyy Institute of Microbiology and Virology of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences. First described in the literature in a 1994 Ukrainian paper, Biosporin is a probiotic compound composed of Bacillus subtilis and Bacillus licheniformis cells designed to treat patients suffering from acute enteric

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infections.81 In 1996, seven Sverdlovsk Institute researchers submitted a patent application that described a method for producing the “probiotic Biosporin” compound, a task the institute was well suited for given its history with bacteria from the Bacillus genus.82 The Sverdlovsk Institute apparently continues to produce its version of Biosporin. The compound remained identified in a 2013 Russian publication as a probiotic bacterial cocktail associated with the Sverdlovsk Institute.83 We note in this regard that a 2016 paper reporting on the use of Biosporin in chicken feed had conducted the tests in a farm in Sverdlovsk oblast; the paper did not detail where it had obtained its Biosporin, but one credible hypothesis is that it came from the Sverdlovsk Institute.84 The National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2014) has provided the Sverdlovsk Institute with a new opportunity to produce large quantities of civilian products by funding the renovation of two production facilities for the production of antibiotics. The planned industrial production of such compounds at the site provides the institute with a constructive way to increase transparency should it desire to do so, by allowing foreign medical production experts from the World Health Organization (WHO) to inspect and certify the production lines. Overall, the National System provided significant funding for laboratory facility renovations so that the Sverdlovsk Institute could carry out work on all of its aforementioned research objectives. Specifically, the program funded reconstruction at the site (we use the same bracket notation to show associated lot numbers): • The major renovation of laboratory facilities No. 101 for testing means and methods of protection against especially dangerous infections of viral and bacterial origin [specifically, “the renovation of the housing stand No. 101A for the aerobiological testing” of such means and methods; Lot No. 7]; • The major renovation of laboratory facilities No. 205 for testing collective means of protection, means and methods of disinfection [specifically, “the reconstruction of the climatic complex”; Lot No. 8]; • The major renovation of engineering networks to ensure the functioning of the laboratory and industrial buildings for production and testing of biological control agents; • The major renovation of the physical protection system of laboratory, testing and production base for the development, preparation and testing of biological control agents [perhaps Lot No. 5]; • The major renovation of the laboratory base area to assess the effectiveness of means and methods of disaster recovery [“reconstruction of the field test base “Pyshma” to assess the effectiveness of means and methods of biological prospecting and the elimination of the consequences of emergency situations”; Lot No. 9]; • The major renovation of production facilities No. 201 for the production of modern antibiotics for the prevention and treatment of hazardous and dangerous infectious diseases [Lot No. 10]; and

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• The major renovation of production capacity No. 122 for the production of modern antibiotics for the prevention and treatment of hazardous and dangerous infectious diseases [fluoroquinolone; Lot No. 11].85

Open-source satellite imagery makes clear that major reconstruction work has been carried out within the institute’s grounds and in neighboring areas. Notably, one of the buildings that in Soviet times used to be a B. anthracis spore production facility and one of the buildings that in the past supported the production of media and substrate have both been extensively renovated.86 The roofs of most buildings have been renovated. The necessity of this repair activity is revealed through an inspection of one apparently disused building near the bermed underground storage area whose roof collapsed in 2016.87 Other detectable changes predate the National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security program, namely a change in the forced ventilation stack supporting large buildings that in the past were thought to contain production equipment for propagating and formulating bacteria, and the construction of an entirely new building near the older buildings. Large-scale construction work serving an unknown purpose has also recently been carried out at a military territory neighboring the Sverdlovsk Institute; the military base was known in Soviet times as Compound 32. In addition to all of this activity in and around the Sverdlovsk Institute compound itself, its subordinate open-air test site at Pyshma is being refurbished. We detail this development directly below. The 2008 MOD’s NBC tender reproduced in Annex 3.1 confirms that the MOD had planned the “reconstruction of the field test base ‘Pyshma’ to assess the effectiveness of means and methods of biological prospecting and the elimination of the consequences of emergency situations.” This work was to be funded through the National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation. The latter text has an item for infrastructure work at Sverdlovsk Institute holdings for the “major renovation of the laboratory base area to assess the effectiveness of means and methods of disaster recovery.” In Soviet times, in addition to Aralsk-7, the MOD operated a mostly unknown open-air test site at Pyshma to test modern means of decontamination.88 This is almost certainly the same test site that now is being renovated and that it is to be run by personnel assigned to the Sverdlovsk Institute. The reconstruction of the test site was delayed. As of late 2015, it was still incomplete. We know this because on October 8, 2015, an arbitration court in the Sverdlovsk region issued a ruling in favor of a construction company against its allegedly nonperforming subcontractor. The company had paid the subcontractor for the construction and installation work on the Pyshma: A Refurbished Open-Air Test Site for the Sverdlovsk Institute.

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“reconstruction of the laboratory base area to assess the effectiveness of means and methods of liquidation of consequences of emergency situation” for use by the MOD.89 As shown earlier, this description matches the work item descriptor found in the National System. Virology Center of the Scientific Research Institute for Microbiology of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Zagorsk Institute)

The Zagorsk Institute is located approximately six kilometers from Sergiyev Posad.90 It is composed of two major components; one component contains scientific facilities including laboratories, and the second is a settlement where scientific workers, guards, and their families live. The second in effect is a village that its inhabitants call Vaktsina or Settlement 67 (it is located 67 kilometers from Moscow). The Russian military unit that operates the Zagorsk Institute appears to be Unit 44026. The commander of this unit as of January 2013 is Sergei Borisevich, who recently publicly expressed the wish that Sergiyev Posad, including the Zagorsk Institute, be converted into a “closed administrative-territorial formation,” which means an area closed to outsiders.91 There is strong opposition to this conversion, as most of the population does not want to be “behind the Iron Curtain.”92 Regardless of the town’s future status, the Zagorsk Institute was, and remains, closed to all outsiders. In 2004, a book about the Zagorsk Institute was published in Russia with limited circulation.93 The book provided an amazing amount of new, valuable information on the institute, its defensive R&D, notable scientists, and community. Unless otherwise referenced, much of the Zagorsk Institute’s history described here is drawn from this book. We have crossreferenced information about the center’s research with the institute’s meager open publications indexed in the eLibrary.ru database. The Zagorsk Institute’s predecessor was the Military-Biological Institute and it was established shortly after World War II. It specialized in creating biological weapons based on viruses and rickettsiae, as well as defenses against these types of pathogens. Currently, the institute’s principal stated tasking is to provide disease control support to the armed forces and Russia’s population. In addition, its scientists are engaged in developing methods to protect against infections that are potential biological weapons. As part of a series of anti-bioterrorism measures adopted during 1999–2003, a Centre of Special Laboratory Diagnostics and Treatment of Especially Dangerous and Exotic Infectious Diseases was established at the Zagorsk Institute.94 The FOI issued a detailed study of publications written by Russian scientists at Zagorsk during 1985–2004.95 From this work we have learned that the civilian-controlled Volgograd Anti-Plague Institute (discussed later)

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was designated as the Zagorsk Institute’s research partner under the antibioterrorism system.96 In this system, the Zagorsk Institute provides expertise in viral and rickettsial pathogens, while the Volgograd Institute provides expertise in bacterial and fungal pathogens.97 This division of labor is sensible as it matches Zagorsk’s historical specialization. The Zagorsk Institute has two facilities that house the National Collection of Groups 1 and 2 viruses. One facility contains Group 1 viruses such as the hemorrhagic fever viruses Ebola, Marburg, Lassa, Argentine, and Machupo. This facility also contains agents such as HIV and prions. Examples of Group 2 viruses contained in the second facility are Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus, Rift Valley fever virus, herpes encephalitis virus, and dengue fever virus. In addition to viruses, the Zagorsk Institute conducts research on a wide variety of rickettsioses.98 Zagorsk researchers have studied some twenty types of the latter diseases, including tick-borne rickettsiosis, ehrlichiosis, coxiellosis, epidemic louse-borne typhus, and bartonellosis. Zagorsk Institute researchers investigate not only the pathogens, but also the vectors associated with rickettsioses, such as ticks, fleas, lice, and blood-sucking mosquitoes. The institute has a vivarium that houses, among other animals, hamadryad baboons, rhesus macaques, green monkeys, Java macaques, and horses. It conducts experiments involving administering attenuated strains of viruses and vaccines to primates. In addition, the institute has permits to conduct phase 1 and phase 2 clinical trials that involve humans. An example of a recent clinical trial was to inoculate a cohort of willing persons with a vaccine that was based on Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus (VEEV), to determine whether the candidate vaccine was safe and effective. These research projects have yielded results; for instance, the institute’s researchers now believe that only hamadryad baboons adequately reproduce the clinical symptoms of the course of infection in humans caused by Ebola, Lassa, and VEEV. Immunobiological preparations based on immunoglobulins from equine blood serum and concentrated inactivated purified Ebola and Lassa virus antigens have been developed that, the Russians claim, protect up to 100 percent of infected monkeys against death. Publications confirm this general line of work, but report less promising results. A 1994 paper reported 80 percent survival rate for hamadryas baboons infected with Ebola and who were treated with a preparation composed of purified, concentrated Ebola virus antigen and complete Freund’s adjuvant.99 A closely related paper published that same year reported on research results of interest for the production of equine serum containing high titers of Ebola-specific immunoglobulin from horses immunized against the virus.100 The results of analogous work on Lassa virus were published in 1997, reporting 50 percent protection for monkeys against

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aerogenic infections.101 Research has continued along this general line. A 2008 paper describes how researchers at the institute obtained immunoglobulin from equine serum that protected guinea pigs that were exposed to Marburg virus.102 Zagorsk scientists also claimed that different forms of viruses and other preparations have been developed as vaccines that can be administered via aerosols. Such work has important biodefense applications as it potentially allows for the mass immunization of troops and/or civilians through group aerosol exposure.103 We have not seen any results published from Zagorsk researchers on aerosol vaccines.104 If this type of development has continued, it could be that the results are classified. Still on the subject of vaccine work at the Zagorsk Institute, in the context of a major Ebola outbreak in Africa, there were several news articles published in Russian publications in late 2014 about how Russian scientists had successfully developed Ebola vaccines. However, there are conflicting stories about the status of these vaccines as well as on the institutes involved:

• In October 2014, Minister of Health Veronika Skvortsova reported that three vaccines against the Ebola virus, one inactivated virusbased vaccine and two genetically engineered vaccines, were in development.105 • Shortly thereafter, Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets stated that work on “the Russian vaccine” was in “its final stage.”106 • Academician Valeriy Chereshnev, chairman of the State Duma Committee on Science, subsequently stated that two institutions were working simultaneously to develop Ebola vaccines, namely the Zagorsk Institute and the Vector. He also claimed that the vaccine had passed the animal testing phase.107 • Aleksandr Agafonov, a Vector scientist, elaborated on this claim, stating, “one of the vaccines protects guinea pigs and monkeys against Ebola virus, but to talk about it being effective and safe for humans is premature.”108 • General-Major of the Medical Service Andrey Belskikh in April 2016 claimed: “We have successfully participated in clinical trials of a vaccine against Ebola virus, and the [S. M. Kirov] Military-Medical Academy took an active part in the clinical trials, which were reported with a positive result. It was reported to the Supreme Commander at the end of last year [2015].”109 • At a “round table” organized by the Russian International Chamber of Commerce in March 2016, Minister of Health Veronika Skvortsova reported that pre-clinical tests of two Ebola vaccines had been jointly conducted by the Zagorsk Institute and the MOH’s N. F. Gamaleya Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology (she did not mention Vec-

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tor).110 She claimed that one of the vaccines possessed maximum prophylactic effect in that it generates both an immune reaction and provokes a cellular response. The second vaccine has its principal impact in individuals with immune deficiency problems, such as persons who are HIV-positive. She also claimed that if needed, production of the first vaccine could quickly reach 10,000 doses. At the end of the round table, Skvortsova presented the Republic of Guinea’s Minister of Health, Abdurakhman Diallo, a packet of documents that describe the Ebola clinical trials just mentioned. She claimed that Russia had an agreement with Guinea to conduct a clinical test, in the course of which 2,000 Guineans would be vaccinated. The trials were to be conducted by investigators at the Scientific-Clinical Diagnostic Center of Epidemiology and Microbiology, which RUSAL, an aluminum company that has operated in Guinea for many years, had funded. The clinical trials were reportedly planned to start in June 2016.111 We attempted to corroborate these accounts in part to determine how involved the Zagorsk Institute was in work on Ebola vaccines. As of March 2016, we were unable to find any MOH permits for the clinical testing of an Ebola vaccine in Guinea.112 We did find a link between Gamaleya, the Zagorsk Institute, and the S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy. In 2015, Gamaleya funded to the Zagorsk Institute for a study of antibody titer against the Ebola virus in the blood serum of volunteers after some type of prophylactic exposure.113 In addition, Gamaleya paid for a “clinical safety study of reactogenicity and immunogenicity of a combined vector vaccine against Ebola in healthy volunteers” to be conducted by the S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy.114 As shown above, the Zagorsk Institute has already done much work on anti-Ebola virus immunobiological preparations. Although we have found no recent Vector–Zagorsk Institute cooperation for Ebola virus, we have found publications on Vector scientists having developed monoclonal antibodies against Ebola virus. 115 If this accomplishment were correct, it would be an important step on the way of developing a recombinant vaccine against Ebola. We detail our research on Vector’s current work program in its entry below. Entries for Gamaleya and the S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy appear in separate sections in this chapter. The Russian government has funded the following infrastructure work at the Zagorsk Institute: • A major renovation of laboratory facilities No. 130 for testing means and methods of protection against the especially dangerous viral and rickettsial infections [specifically, the reconstruction of the climatic chamber complex; Lot No. 12];

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• A major renovation of laboratory facilities No. 1 to develop remedies using hybridoma technology [Lot No. 13]; • Project design and site investigation work for the construction of Building No. 96, in which development, production, and testing of means for specific prophylaxis for high-risk infections using large laboratory animals would be conducted [Lot No. 14]; • A major renovation of the production capacity of Building No. 70ar to improve production of medical immunobiologics [to ensure its “mobilization readiness”; Lot No. 15]; and • A major renovation of laboratory facilities No. 75 to maintain the national collection of especially dangerous viruses [hemorrhagic fevers; Lot No. 16].116

These infrastructure projects are consistent with the Zagorsk Institute’s public work profile summarized earlier, namely that its scientists specialize in diagnostics and treatments for especially dangerous viral and rickettsial pathogens, and research immunobiological compounds. As to its facilities, the institute has a large vivarium that houses primates, and is the site of a national collection facility that stores Group 1 and 2 viruses. We also note that the immunobiological compound production line is meant to be kept in a state of “mobilization readiness,” which means that were Russia to enter a state of emergency, the MOD could order the Zagorsk Institute to immediately begin production of whatever therapeutic or immunobiological medicines or compounds needed to meet the challenges of that emergency. As with the Kirov Institute but unlike the Sverdlovsk Institute compounds, most of the infrastructure work appears to be conducted inside buildings and hence does not appear on satellite imagery. Some lesser activity can be observed on satellite imagery; thus we have observed substantial exchanges of cars in the institute’s parking lot and busy movement of military vehicles on the road leading to Sergiyev Posad or Moscow. Also noticeable is that some activity at the site has been discontinued. For example, a building outside the highest-security zone sustained significant roof damage sometime between 2005 and 2010. As of the last available Google Earth imagery dated May 28, 2015, the roof still had not been fixed.117 Main Military Medical Directorate

The MOD’s Main Military Medical Directorate is responsible for providing medical support to Russia’s armed forces. According to Alexander Fisun, who has headed the directorate since 2013, this tasking includes military epidemiology, the vaccination of troops, the planning and organization of medical equipment, the management of the hospitals and medical teams of the Russian military, and a kind of combat support where the directorate must be able to assist in the application of certain types of weapons and its staff must be able to predict the possible medical losses that would result from such use.118

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In 2014, 310 million rubles were allocated for research and development in military medicine (up from 163 million rubles in 2013).119 The directorate’s research efforts focused on developing mobile medical teams, new tools for rapid evacuation, remote treatment, robotic search and rescue teams, and new tools to stem bleeding and replenish blood loss.120 It has recently expanded extensively, countering the effects of years of force reductions involving tens of thousands of layoffs and the closure of garrisons.121 The directorate planned in December 2012 to add 1,200 military officer positions. According to a January 2015 news report, it seeks 600 additional doctors and 1,500 lower-level staff.122 The directorate is in charge of a number of institutes, but only the S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy, which is described next, was specifically mentioned in the “National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014.”123 Sergey M. Kirov Military Medical Academy. The S. M. Kirov Military

Medical Academy is the premier military-medical training institution in Russia. It prepares attendees to become service medical doctors and military medical scientists. It was a partly open facility in Soviet times and remains so in Russia, in the sense that permission could and was granted for non-Russian citizens to train at the site.124 For instance, the academy trains military medical specialists from other countries.125 However, some of its subsidiaries (detailed later) remain closed institutions.126 Its current head is Andrei N. Bielski.127 The Medical Academy has a significant research output, with its scientists having published at least 626 journal articles in 2014 alone.128 These papers show an overwhelming focus on health care for military personnel, which encompasses subjects such as surgery, cardiology, therapy, and eye, skin, venereal diseases, and others.129 These publications do not directly pertain to biodefense topics. The departments directly run by the Medical Academy are mostly dedicated to similar subjects as those revealed by our publication search, with the sole exception of a department of “military toxicology and medical protection,” which would appear to have biodefense applicability.130 As in Soviet times, the Medical Academy conducts clinical trials for candidate vaccines.131 As noted earlier, the Gamaleya Institute granted a tender to the Medical Academy for a clinical trial to assess the safety of an Ebola vaccine administered to healthy volunteers.132 The preceding Kirov Institute entry and the successive Gamaleya Institute entry provide additional information on this research. Funding provided by the National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014 is being used by Medical Academy for:

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• Major renovation of the laboratory animal clinic, including project design and site investigation work; • Major renovation of housing Building No. 4/60 including project design and site investigation work; and • Major renovation of housing Building No. 4/61.133 State Research Test Institute of Military Medicine. The State Research Test Institute of Military Medicine was a closed facility in Soviet times and remains so in Russia. It is closely associated with the S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy.134 Unlike the Medical Academy, the State Research Test Institute is known to have conducted extensive biodefense research in the Soviet period. It is unknown whether any offensive BW activity was conducted there. The Test Institute’s recent history has been tumultuous. The Test Institute was ordered closed in 2010 or 2011 and its staff was slated to be drastically cut, with the rest transferred under the Medical Academy’s direct control, where they would be tasked solely with weapons ergonomics research.135 The Test Institute was subsequently formally reestablished as an independent institution in 2015.136 As of December 2015, the Test Institute’s director was Sergei Chepur.137 According to an MOD press release, its current official tasks are to conduct research on “the creation of hemostatic and analgesic agents, the physiology of military labor including in Arctic conditions, medical robotics, the development of technical means of medical service, and the creation of new medical technologies including by using the experience of folk medicine.” 138 The 2015 governmental decree that re-created the institute, however, instead emphasized that the center’s preservation would ensure “the development and testing of weapons and means of radiation protection.” 139 This second description matches the Test Institute’s extremely limited open publication output, where most publications are on radioprotectant substances or on the medical effects of radiation.140 The institute’s low publication output and the discrepancy in the publicly stated tasks assigned to the institute raised our suspicions that classified biotechnology research was still being conducted by the institute, perhaps in part or in whole through its subsidiary Medico-Biological Defense Research Test Center (see later entry). We have found two pieces of evidence that confirmed our suspicions regarding the State Research Test Institute of Military Medicine. First, the press release of a research conference held at the Medical Academy and hosting personnel from both the Test Institute and the Advanced Research Foundation (also see the section on the Advanced Research Foundation in this chapter) strengthens this conclusion: one of the topics of the conference was “advanced methods for the detection of

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biological damaging agents” (the formal Russian term for biological warfare agents). 141 This task of improving detection against such agents is classed by Rospotrebnadzor (see later entry) as a priority area under their “biosecurity and bioterrorism” classification and as such is understood as biodefense research.142 Second, a large 2012 MOD tender for equipment involved, among other items, the purchase of specialized biodefense equipment to be shipped to the State Research Test Institute of Military Medicine. Notably, the MOD purchased fifty “Quartz-1M” suits designed to protect their wearer from “microbiological aerosols” to be delivered at the institute.143 This suit is specifically designed for biodefense applications—commercial vendors refer to it as an “anti-plague” suit.144 The sizable order implies that these suits were for scientists to wear and not simply for testing and evaluation purposes. The same tender also sought to purchase a portable aerosol particle counter system ARS-M3 R 36050 (or an equivalent model), and a Buchi Nano Spray Dryer B-90 (or an equivalent model) meant for the generation of particles with an average size in the 0.3- to 5-micron range, for the institute’s use. 145 Both devices have applications outside of biodefense. The aerosol counter can be used to detect chemical particles such as pollutants, and the spray dryer can be used for the production of nanomedicine particles.146 Nevertheless, when put in context of the aforementioned biodetector work and the purchase of numerous suits for protection against bioaerosols, acquisition of such equipment by the test institute suggests that the latter is expanding work involving the propagation of bioaerosols. Overall, we conclude that the State Research Test Institute of Military Medicine is conducting classified biodefense experiments.

Medico-Biological Defense Research Test Center. A center known as the

“Scientific Research Laboratory No. 1” was initially formed within the S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy in 1955, and eventually relocated to its own site in 1969 near the Medical Academy.147 It conducted both offensive and defensive BW activities until 1991. 148 In 1998, it was renamed the Medico-Biological Defense Research Test Center and was reorganized as a subsidiary to the State Research Test Institute of Military Medicine.149 We have very little additional information about this center. We have not found any publication indexed in the eLibrary.ru database whose author was associated with the Test Center. The latest available information on the center was when four of the center’s researchers published a paper titled “Recombinant Cytokines—Promising Protection from Dangerous Infectious Diseases” in the proceedings of the ninth Actual Problems of Protection and Security conference held in 2006.150 This research topic implies that the center was, and likely still is, conducting biodefense work.

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Office of the Chief of Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Forces

As the name suggests, this office is in charge of the NBC Troops.151 As demonstrated by the NBC Troops tender reproduced in Annex 3.1 that funded work in part at the 33rd and the Kirov, Sverdlovsk, and Zagorsk Institutes, the office is also in charge of these MOD institutions. That the office has power over these institutes is consistent with reported information on post-Soviet hierarchy changes in the former 15th Directorate (this directorate was in charge of the Soviet BW program; see Chapter 2). The office has several layers of suborganizations; underneath the office the first layer contains the Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Directorate. Each one of the three weapons types then has its own directorate; that is, there is a Biological Defense Directorate, a Chemical Defense Directorate, and a Radiation Directorate.152 When the Soviet 15th Directorate was dismantled, it was merged into the Biological Defense Directorate.153 Major-General Yevgeny Starkov was appointed head of the office by presidential decree on June 9, 2008.154 Starkov gained notoriety in November 2012 when he publicly accused the West of creating new chemical weapons and possibly biological weapons.155 Soon thereafter, Starkov was replaced by Major-General Edward A. Cherkasov. As this is being written, Cherkasov remains in charge of the NBC Troops.156 Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Forces (NBC Troops). The

NBC Troops function as a hybrid between engineering units and the old Soviet chemical weapons corps.157 Their primary task, as their name suggests, is to detect, signal, mark out, and decontaminate NBC events. As engineering troops, they are also supposed to provide anti-fortification fire. Moreover, in the tradition of the old chemical weapons corps, they are assigned “flamethrowers” (which in modern times take the form of thermobaric rocket systems) and are responsible for laying down smoke cover.158 The equipment assigned to the NBC Troops can be divided into these three categories.159 The troops have been assigned a range of detection, analysis, and decontamination equipment necessary to complete their NBC defense tasks. The following paragraph provides some examples of equipment from each category to underscore this point; the given list is not exhaustive, and some of the equipment listed here may have been replaced by newer models. The “Dal” KDKhR-1N distant aerosol detection LIDAR unit, the RKhM-4-01 and the brand-new RKhM-6 replacement NBC reconnaissance vehicles, the K-612-O nuclear explosions detection vehicle and the RPM-2 radiological and chemical hazard detection vehicle, and infantrycarried detection kits enable the NBC Troops to scout, detect, signal, and

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mark off NBC-affected zones.160 Field analysis capabilities are provided by the AL-4M radiological and chemical mobile laboratory, the AL-5 mobile laboratory, and the PKhL-1 chemical field laboratory.161 The ARS14K, the ARS-15M, the TMS-65, and the Protektor vehicles are used for decontamination of areas, while the OPS-5 water purification vehicle decontaminates water.162 The second task, destruction of enemy fortifications, is carried out using the heavy “flamethrower” artillery system TOS1A and the infantry-carried “flamethrower” LPO-97 launch thermobaric rockets (potentially deployed out of the new BMO-T specialized armored carrier).163 The ARS-15M vehicle when used in smoke-generation mode, the older TDA-2K and the TDA-3 modern replacement dedicated smokegenerating vehicles, and infantry-carried smoke grenades and smoke generators are used to set up smoke screens.164 The NBC Troops appear unlikely to be responsible for a hypothetical deployment of chemical and biological (CB) weapons, even if Russia decided to take such a drastic step—much as they are not entrusted with Russia’s nuclear weapons. A review of the known Soviet BW delivery system types (see Chapter 2) makes clear that air force and artillery units would be more likely to be assigned such a role. The Russian MOD appears keen to distance the NBC Troops from any equipment that would serve a dual conventional and BW purpose. For instance, the TDA-2K smoke machine’s generator requires extremely high temperatures (900–950°C) to operate, as confirmed from videos of the machine in action as well as what appears to be the generator’s patent.165 As long as the machines are not modified to generate aerosols in ways that do not necessitate such extreme temperatures, it will most certainly be impossible to disseminate BW aerosols through these systems. The TOS-1A artillery system is similarly poorly adapted to BW without modification. It employs very short-range (three- to six-kilometer) rockets fitted with contact fuses, which would be significantly inferior for BW agent delivery when compared with other far-longer-ranged Russian rocket artillery systems in service with the ground forces. 166 No open sources that we have accessed contained any information or illustrations indicative of NBC Troops directly using any other kind of artillery system. Rather, since the late Soviet period NBC Troops function in support of other units equipped with systems far more suited for hypothetical CB payload delivery. For instance, in a publicized drill held in the fall of 2015, NBC Troops in the Western Military District conducted a joint exercise alongside rocket artillery troops.167 The NBC Troops have not been left out of Russia’s military reform and modernization program. NBC Troops have been reshuffled, with unit structures moving away from large brigades to smaller and more embedded regiments of around 300–600 soldiers.168 Ten “new” regiments were formed

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throughout all four of Russia’s military districts, while four large existing brigades were downsized.169 The Western Military District has two new regiments for the Nizhny Novgorod and Leningrad oblasts; the Central Military District has two new regiments for the Samara oblast and Altay Krai; the Eastern Military District has three new regiments for Buryatia, Chita oblast, and the Amur oblast; and the Southern Military District has three new regiments for the Volgograd Region, the Republic of Ingushetia, and the Black Sea Fleet at Sebastopol in the context of enhancing the Russian MOD’s coverage of annexed Crimea.170 Russian media have emphasized that the new regiments will have modern equipment funded through the SAP.171 Starkov’s statements in the following paragraph emphasizes the newness of equipment that NBC Troops will have at their disposal: The NBC defense troops conducted purposeful planned work to refurbish units with new weapons and military equipment. The main efforts of our activities are focused on the implementation of the state armaments program, which provides for equipment of all types that are not inferior to, and by some technical indicators are superior to, foreign analogues. This new equipment included mobile laboratories, as well as unique remote chemical detection systems based on new principles and technologies that are integrated into a single system of automated control of troops. . . . Work continues to create new models of individual and collective means of protection with improved performance. Currently, the supply branch has adopted a protective kit filter that protects personnel against chemical agents, biological aerosols, radioactive dust, poisonous substances, and the light emission of nuclear explosions. Work is underway to create a new generation of gas masks, which will be highly protective, ergonomic, and provide high operational performance.172

Cherkasov has also repeatedly mentioned the development of new equipment to reporters. The programs he has mentioned include the creation of a new mobile detector system, a new aerosol disinfection system, and new “flame” (thermobaric) ammunition.173 Other sources partly corroborate and expand on these stated modernization efforts. The MOD funded the development of a new three-vehicle early detection, analysis, and communication system in 2013.174 Russian researchers have published several articles on LIDAR aerosol-detection technology, a finding that suggests that a new LIDAR system is in the works. In particular, the results of field trials of a LIDAR system designed to detect bioaerosols were reported in a 2007 publication.175 A new TOS-1A rocket, with a reported two-kilometer increase in range, is also being developed.176 The defense publication IHS Jane’s reported on plans for the TOS1A to be replaced by a system called BM-2 based on an Armata tank hull, which will likely be given the designation TOS-2.177 New NBC protective infantry uniforms were displayed at a military parade in 2015.178 Finally,

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several newspapers carried a story on the development of an automated defense system, funded under the “National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2014)” for 284 million rubles.179 The media’s descriptions of the system claimed that it is to have the following five systems:180 • A decision system codenamed Berkut-1. It would display on an electronic map infection sites and is designed to calculate the spread of the disease in question, as well as present options to stop it. It would maintain an informational database on deadly viruses and bacteria, on all available relevant supplies (strategic reserves of gas masks, antidotes, disinfectants), and on the status of NBC units.181 • A system codenamed Nightingale-1 that would identify the pathogen through nucleic acid analysis. • A system codenamed Hoopoe-1 that would use genetic engineering to transfer pathogens’ DNA into laboratory cells and identify mechanisms to protect against the new creations. • A system codenamed Bustard-1 that would create antiviral tablets that can be stored for two years and that would grant hosts with immunity to target viruses—explicitly including smallpox virus—in 70 percent of cases. • A system codenamed Bittern-1 that would control all production steps.182

Just over 284 million rubles were allocated by the MOD in July 2013 for the development of a five-part system with the same codenames under the 2009–2014 Program, but the component descriptions given in the MOD tender document are different than those given in the media and overall are less ambitious.183 “Bustard-1” is only described as related to the production of an “adult tablet smallpox vaccine,” while “Hoopoe-1” is described as being for the development of “modified mammalian cell lines expressing the recombinant human erythropoietin.”184 (As an aside, the public minutes of the evaluation of proposals reveal that Vector, described below, unsuccessfully bid on the “Hoopoe-1” component.)185 Overall, it appears that the media descriptions of the system were exaggerated when compared to what had actually been funded. In addition, the component descriptions necessitate some context because their literal translation into English does not accurately convey the expected results. The words “automated control system” in Russian MOD parlance is a very broad concept. For comparison, the concept of an “automated troop control system” is defined as “a manmachine system providing automated collection and processing of information needed for optimizing troop control with the goal of more effective use of troops.”186 As such, the individual components of this new biodefense

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system are not necessarily all contained in one military vehicle or command post, nor must they be truly autonomous. We nevertheless highlight this project because it shows that the MOD desires to have greater integration of and control over the various components of Russia’s biodefense response system such as the NBC Troops, emergency stockpiles, and pharmaceutical production lines. Since 2013, there appears to have been a substantial increase in the number of training exercises of military troops and in the number of troopers that are being trained. Focusing on NBC Troops, in 2014, there were twenty large-scale training exercises involving NBC Troops in the Western Military District. In 2015, there were an estimated forty large-scale exercises in this district, of which twenty-five exercises were held during June–November. Two examples of what these exercises involved are as follows. First, in August 2015, more than 1,500 NBC Troops deploying 500 pieces of equipment exercised on the ranges of Shikhany, Donguz, and Totskoye in the Central Military District. The objective of this set of exercises was to practice remediation of “a CB event, conduct operations to deploy aerosol screens, and practice how to reduce the visibility of command posts and firing positions.”187 Second, during August 11–20, 2016, 2,500 soldiers with “about 350 units of military and special equipment” of the Southern Military District conducted an exercise in the vicinity of the Black Sea. The scenario was that the NBC Troops exercised tasks assigned “in the aftermath of the use of biological agents, radiological accidents, and chemically dangerous objects,” and tested “automated control systems and new developments and innovations in the field of military and special equipment.”188 The overall Russian military program has led to a significant modernization of the NBC Troops and has enhanced their training. It remains to be seen whether the Russian military budget will be sufficient to equip all NBC Troop regiments, and not just newly formed units, with modern equipment. Marshal S. Timoshenko Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense and Engineer Troops College. We mention this Engineer Troops College

because it plays a key role in training future MOD NBC Troop personnel and because it maintains its own research facilities. It is located in Kostroma city, reports to the Radiological, Chemical, and Defense Directorate, and is an advanced training institution for the NBC Troops.189 Following the Russian Federation Decree of December 24, 2009, No. 1951-p, the Engineer Troops College includes Nizhny Novgorod, Tyumen Higher Military Command School of Engineering, and the Saratov Military Institute of Biological and Chemical Safety.190 The Engineer Troops College does “applied research” through its research company,191 particularly in the

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application of nanotechnology to NBC protection, and has laboratories dedicated to this field of science.192

Military Institutions Responsible for Advanced Weapons Acquisition Planning and R&D Scientific and Technical Council of the MOD

The Scientific and Technical Council of the MOD decides which R&D projects receive MOD funding, and more broadly serves as the “main advisory body on issues of military-technical policy and the development of weapons systems.”193 Although critically important, we have very little information about the workings of this council. Described as a new structure in a 2011 Red Star article,194 we believe it is the successor to the Military-Technical Council of the MOD established in 1998.195 The latter’s day-to-day function was run by the GS first deputy and it was headed by the minister of defense when in session.196 The Military Scientific Committee, which as explained later provides advice and organizational services to the Scientific and Technical Council of the MOD, reports to the first deputy minister of defense. Thus, the most likely structure for the MOD’s Scientific and Technical Council is that it falls under the first deputy minister’s portfolio and is chaired by the minister of defense when in session. This proposed structure is consistent with reports of its meeting attendees.197 One of the Council’s few public activities is to organize arms expositions concurrent to its meetings.198 A report in preparation of one such exposition, “Army 2016,” stated that the MOD had twenty separate lines of research corresponding to the MOD’s “most pressing” problems, but did not identify what these were.199 The Military Scientific Committee, which is discussed next, provides expert advice to the Council and handles some of its administrative functions. For example, the Committee organizes the “Army” expos mentioned earlier and prepares associated material for the Council.200 Armed Forces’ Military Scientific Committee

Established in 2009, the Military Scientific Committee serves as a domestic think tank for military science and operations research.201 It reports to the GS chief.202 Its functions include making “goal-setting” recommendations regarding the type and quantity of military equipment to be ordered through the SAP (see Chapter 3).203 The Committee is of interest to us because it has the power to drive or impede the development of any novel weapons R&D through its recommendations. Lieutenant-General Igor

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Makushev, a deputy chief of the GS, is currently the head of Armed Forces’ Military Scientific Committee.204 In the paragraphs that follow, we analyze the Committee’s role through a close reading of the numerous interviews given by a prior head of the Committee, Igor Anatolyevich Sheremet. He was dismissed in May 2012, reportedly because he had criticized Serdyukov’s military reforms.205 Given that the latter championed the “weapons based on new physical principles” drive in what we believe was an effort to justify the massive layoffs in the military under his New Look reforms (see Chapter 3), it is unlikely that Sheremet’s old Committee provided support for the “new physical principles” concept. Sheremet’s choice of language when describing the work of the Military Scientific Committee and prospective new weapons is worth noting. In an interview given in 2011, he stated: “the enemy [is developing] new methods of warfare. And on this basis we must construct as well the armed forces groupings themselves, and work out by what method to use them in armed conflicts.”206 To do so: We first analyze the threat arising from the development of potential adversaries, as I said, new forms, methods, means of warfare. We compare with the capabilities of our armed forces. And based on that, we propose some areas of improvement, development of the Armed Forces, the means of warfare, those that are in service, those that are necessary to develop, to improve, and to increase their effectiveness. And to develop new means, fundamentally new means of warfare, which can fend off the possible breakaways of potential enemies in this sphere.207

The “new methods of warfare” and “fundamentally new means of warfare” would in theory include “weapons based on new physical principles” (see Chapter 3). However, Sheremet seems to have avoided using the latter term. The closest he came to doing so were a few specific references to the “production of electronic components based on new physical principles”— that is, for quantum computing—and even these references were made well after he had been sacked from the Committee.208 After his departure from the Military Scientific Committee, Sheremet was introduced by the vice deputy of the MIC as an expert on “issues of communication and control systems.”209 In contrast, that same interview introduced Andrey Ivanovich Grigoriev, the head of the Advanced Research Foundation (see the section on the latter), as engaged in work on “weapons based on new physical principles.”210 In another interview shortly before the creation of the Advanced Research Foundation but after Sheremet’s dismissal, he told his interviewer that he expected the Committee to have oversight over the future Advanced Research Foundation’s high-risk exploratory projects: “at a minimum the

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Military Science Committee can undertake an assessment of the expected prospects and the results obtained for the creation of weapons systems of future generations.”211 The uncertainty in Sheremet’s response confirms that the boundaries between the Committee and the about-to-be-formed Foundation had not been agreed. In particular, there exists an awkward overlap in tasks whereby both Grigoriev’s new foundation and Sheremet’s old Committee are supposed to predict the nature of future weapons and monitor foreign developments in this sphere. Tension between both institutions might further incentivize the Committee to reject “weapons based on new physical principles” projects by the Advanced Research Foundation. In that same interview, Sheremet also described the ideal relationship between the elements of Russia’s entire military-industrial complex: In our view, a very promising form of collaboration is integration by cluster, in which there is continuous interaction between the military scientificresearch institutes (tasked with the creation of new weapons), the institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences (shapers of the fundamental theoretical knowledge required to solve these tasks), the scientific-research institutes and design bureaus of the military-industrial complex (developers of weapons), civilian universities (“incubators,” within which are grown highly qualified and ambitious personnel for the defense industry), as well as military colleges, bringing knowledge on the operation and use of new weapons systems to the trainee officers.212

Sheremet’s description leaves the Committee’s role limited to influencing, but not controlling, Russian military R&D. The Committee’s role is to provide expert input to the MOD’s Scientific and Technical Council, the actual gatekeeper with decision power over which R&D projects are funded through the SAP.213 The Committee does have direct control over select MOD research institutes dealing with issues of command and control of ground, missile, aviation, and space systems and certain institutes dealing with problems of information infrastructure management, electronic security, and intelligence. 214 Sheremet mentioned in an interview that “five consolidated research organizations” were subordinated to the center to conduct research on these subjects, and confirmed in an interview that “some of the [MOD research] institutes remained under the supervision of the heads of the military command and control agencies because of their specificity.” 215 The subsidiary center specialties mentioned by Sheremet are all fields where military science techniques involving complex force-on-force computer simulation runs are useful, which when recouped with Sheremet’s public mention of supercomputing work at the center confirms that the Military Scientific Committee is focused on this type of work. 216 As such, we have no reason to believe that the Committee directs R&D at the biological research institutes listed

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in the earlier section on Russian Ministry of Defense institutions, although its overall recommendations might have some impact on tasks and equipment assigned to the NBC Troops. Defense Solutions Bureau

This bureau was created in 2010; in 2013 its director was Anton Tyurin. It was tasked with adapting new civilian technologies for military use.217 A news report on April 17, 2013, asserted that it had been overhauled by a new system.218 This new system appears to be the SPVIR, described later, which includes the Defense Solutions Bureau as a regional office.219 The Defense Solutions Bureau hosted a closed roundtable presentation on October 23, 2013, which further suggests that it has been retained within the new system.220 The bureau has an official mailing address in Moscow as well as a phone number with a Moscow area code.221 The Defense Solutions Bureau launched a military research competition that was held during October 8 and December 8, 2012, which included potential work in the “life sciences” and work on promising types of weapons.222 A full list of the biology topics issued for the competition is available; all were medical topics.223 The funding category for “prospective weapons” was troubling, with category item 6 simply labeled “new weapons and non-lethal ammunition” and item 10 as weapons “based on new physical principles.”224 This last category confirms that Russia has already allocated funds for the development of weapons based on new physical principles. System for Advanced Research and Developments of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (SPVIR)

We think that SPVIR is the unnamed successor to the Defense Solutions Bureau mentioned by Major-General Yevgeny Cherdakov to the media on April 17, 2013.225 The SPVIR therefore would have been created at the start of Shoigu’s tenure as minister of defense. This is consistent with the fact that all of the organizations under the SPVIR umbrella report to Deputy Minister Pavel Popov.226 The latter is one of Shoigu’s trusted associates from their time at the ministry of emergency situations.227 As such, the SPVIR system is most likely one of Shoigu’s personal initiatives. According to Cherdakov, this successor “system” does not duplicate the efforts of the Advanced Research Foundation (also see the section on the Advanced Research Foundation) because the new system focuses on developing military technology.228 One of the main tasks of the SPVIR is to coordinate with the Advanced Research Foundation in preparing a threeyear “consolidated Russian Defense Fund Program.”229

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The system’s exceedingly broad objective is to ensure “the technical superiority of the Russian Federation in the military field.”230 The system’s first task is to “organize the financing of innovative defense research” in directions matching the GS’s assigned priority fields,231 although as shown by the organization entries provided in this chapter it is far from the only MOD institute involved in this line of work. Like the Defense Solutions Bureau, which was transformed into an SPVIR regional office, the SPVIR is devoted to the rapid development of weapons prototypes. Its job is to facilitate, not conduct, the underlying research work. This explicitly includes promoting work on “weapons based on new physical principles” at civilian institutions, as explained in a 2013 article on the SPVIR’s function and results: For the first time in the modern history of Russia on the initiative of SPVIR, cooperation with leading scientific institutions of the Russian Academy of Sciences was organized. An agreement was reached on closer cooperation in the sphere of the implementation of the activities of the Armed Forces regarding fundamental scientific research and exploring the possibilities of creating weapons and military hardware operating on new physical principles.232

According to its official MOD description, it has two explicit monitoring and acquisition tasks, namely: • Monitoring and analysis of global research activities and development to prevent the sudden appearance of means that can pose a threat to Russia’s national security; • The use of domestic scientific resources and the scientific capacity of foreign countries in the interests of national defense.233

These tasks are partially redundant, as they overlap with those assigned to the Military Scientific Committee (described earlier). One potential explanation for this overlap is that SPVIR institutes are narrowly focused on specific technology trends, whereas the Military Scientific Committee performs holistic analysis. Alternatively, it is possible that the MOD wishes to have its own analysis on foreign trends conducted within non-GS institutions in light of the aforementioned history of bureaucratic conflicts between the GS and non-GS cliques within the MOD. The same article published on SPVIR makes it look like the latter explanation is most likely. That is, the presidential office and the MOD wanted a new and independent organ. According to this account, SPVIR was established in November 27, 2012, to satisfy a presidential and MOD requirement set at a September 22, 2010, meeting for a “separate structure” to promote breakthrough, high-risk, research.234 The SPVIR combines elements from various MOD organizations that conduct innovative weapons research. Like the already mentioned Moscow-based

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Defense Solutions Bureau, the St. Petersburg–based Department of Innovative Development was transformed into a regional office.235 At the ministry’s robotics institute, “elements of different branches of the armed forces,” and “other major military and industrial centers” are also involved.236 An older version of the MOD website’s page dedicated to SPVIR listed its specific components as follows: • Main Directorate of Research Activities and Technological Support of Advanced Technologies (Innovative Research) of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; • Information-analytical center (the collection, analysis and preparation of information) of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; • Coordination and Advisory office (research activities) of the Ministry of defense of the Russian Federation.237

The current page dedicated to SPVIR differs from the preceding:

• Main Directorate of Research Activities and Technological Support of Advanced Technologies (Innovative Research) of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; • Main Directorate of Information and Telecommunication Technology, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; and • Chief Research and Testing Center for Robotics of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.238

The change in the second two listed institutes occurred sometime between March and June 2014.239 We believe that the two changed institutes mentioned in the early versions of the webpage are actually components of the larger Main Directorate of Information and Telecommunication Technology and the Chief Research and Testing Center for Robotics currently displayed. We provide entries only for their subsidiary components that were initially identified as composing the SPVIR on the MOD website, as we suspect these to be the heart of the system. Main Directorate of Research Activities and Technological Support of Advanced Technologies (innovative research). This Main Directorate is

the MOD’s implementation and monitoring organ on matters related to innovative technology development. 240 Thus, it searches for R&D of “future models of military weapons and equipment.”241 The phrase suggests that this directorate is the lead agency for the development of weapons based on new physical principles. However, should R&D end up creating a promising product that reaches the prototype stage, we believe that the SPVIR, whose mission is to make sure that civilian technological breakthroughs are assimilated by the military, would transfer that product to the military.

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Ministry of Defense Information-Analytical Center. In 2012, this center was headed by Yevgeny Cherdakov.242 It is in charge of monitoring Russian and international innovative research with possible military applicability.243 It apparently serves as a technical reference point for the MOD on these issues, since one of its main tasks is the “comprehensive analysis of the resulting advanced domestic and international research and scientific and technical information, as well as domestic and foreign scientific resources and industrial potential in the interests of national defense and security.” 244 One of its reported tasks is to maintain a databank of ideas for future weapons proposed by military personnel and staff at research institutions who would otherwise be unable to “break through the bureaucratic machine.”245

Coordination and Advisory Office (research activities). As its name suggests, this office is tasked with improving the planning and coordination of innovative research with military applicability.246 Aside from continued maintenance of its database of innovative research results,247 the other technical or bureaucratic mechanisms through which this office can achieve its primary planning and coordination task are unknown to us.

Department of Promising Joint Research and Special Projects

This MOD department is headed by Colonel Sergei E. Pankov, and reports to Deputy Minister of Defense Yuri Ivanovich Borisov.248 The official Russian military website does not provide information about its generic tasks. Pankov authored a short insightful paper titled “The Role of Military Technology in the Development of Weapons Systems for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.”249 He explains that the development of critical military technologies should be pursued under the following groups, listed in order of increasing time, complexity, and project risk: the program for development of basic military technologies of the State Armaments Program, the Federal Targeted Program for the “Development of the DefenseIndustrial Complex for 2011–2020,” and the Advanced Research Foundation (also see the section on the latter).250 Based on the content and authoritative tone of the document, we believe that the Department of Promising Joint Research and Special Projects has a planning, coordinating, and/or supervisory role in MOD attempts to harness critical military technologies for its purposes. This assessment of the department’s probable function matches what one would expect for a department assigned to Yuri Borisov based on what we know of the latter’s general portfolio. As we saw in Chapter 3, the latter spoke enthusiastically about developing “weapons based on new physical principles” while addressing military industry representatives and scientists from the RAS.251

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Pankov also provided a general overview of the projects currently funded by the department in his short article. We reproduce the following translated extract: At present, research and development is carried out in the following areas: unmanned aerial vehicles; electronic warfare; inter-branch and system-wide research on the development of VVST [military and special equipment]; unconventional weapons (laser, microwave, high-speed kinetic, non-lethal, hypersonic weapons); robotic systems with inter-branch applicability; and special assets.252

Of the identified areas, the “unconventional weapons” category and its “non-lethal” weapon subcategory are worth highlighting in the context of this book. Although the author does not define these terms, unconventional weapons would be a logical category to encompass “weapons based on new physical principles.” Many military authors, including some Russian MOD analysts (see Chapter 3), categorize certain types of weapons based on biological substances as “non-lethal” weapons. These weapons include, but are not limited to, systems that disseminate biological substances to attack materials and fuels.253 Should Russia develop non-lethal weapons based on biological substances, these weapons would most likely be organized under this subcategory. However, there are plenty of “non-lethal” weapons that are not biological weapons, and there is substantial evidence of Russian interest in such devices.254 That being the case, the document should not be taken as an indication that illicit activity is under way. Sergei Pankov presents several examples of new weapons and technologies in development, but there are no mentions of “biological” or “genetic” weapons. Instead, the systems revealed to be in development include a hypersonic air-to-surface cruise missile, an airborne laser platform, an artillery system using electrothermochemical propulsion of sabot shells, a new solid-state active phased array radar, and many kinds of UAVs.255 46th Central Research Institute

As with the Department of Promising Joint Research and Special Projects introduced earlier, Deputy Minister of Defense Yuri Borisov’s portfolio includes the 46th Central Research Institute. Presumably, the institute has an actual name aside from its cover 46th Institute designation, but it is unknown to us. One of the 46th Institute’s specializations is defense economics, and at one point its experts actually drafted SAPs.256 However, the 46th Institute influence waned after a corruption probe in 2012 found that its management had misspent funds when preparing a SAP. 257 Thus the institute’s current level of influence in regard to developing SAPs is unclear.258 The official description in this regard simply notes that the institute

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determines the shape and the military-technical policy of the Russian Armed Forces for the next planning period. In addition, the Institute is the leading research organization in the Ministry of Defense on the problems of standardization and unification of arms and military equipment, the development of the domestic technology and element base, analysis of the modern knowledgebased projects in the defense industry, as well as preparing proposals and assessments for promoting Russian technologies and scientific developments.259

Advertisement materials prepared by members of the 46th Institute as part of a recruitment effort provide a more explicit list of tasks assigned to the institute: • conduct comprehensive research on the rationale and scientific support of the programs and plans of development of armaments of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; • design systems at the interspecific level, such as the development of strategic offensive, defensive, and supporting weapons; • monitor and analyze achievements of science and technology, coordinate and conduct interspecific integrated research for the development of military technology in order to create long-term basics of qualitative development of weapons, military and special equipment (VVST); • develop methods for economic management, development and procurement of VVST, process automation development, justification and management of implementation programmes, and development plans of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; • conduct research in the field of electricity, radar, information technology, and computing, artificial intelligence and robotics, optics, and study of properties of materials and substances; • coordinate and conduct studies of problems of cataloging, military standardization, and the development of common technical requirements for VVST.260

Publications by 46th Institute researchers are, unsurprisingly, focused on resolving economic planning issues pertaining to advanced weapons procurement. Publications with titles such as “The Innovative Potential of the Russian Military-Industrial Complex” and “Management of High-Tech Projects in the R&D Stage” confirm that researchers at the 46th Institute are involved in high-technology weapons procurement planning.261 This conclusion is consistent with known details, such as the fact that a 46th Institute researcher is a member of the editorial council for the journal National Interests—Priorities and Security, whose focus is on defense economics.262 Many of the publications written by 46th Institute researchers deal with issues of integrating “unconventional” and “non-lethal” weapons into the Russian military. This research line matches the programs for unconventional weapons, including non-lethal weapons, mentioned by Sergei Pankov of the Department of Promising Joint Research and Special Projects.263 Both the latter and the 46th Institute report to the same deputy minister, a fact that likely explains this apparent good coordination in research interests.

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The 46th Institute’s former director Vasiliy M. Burenok, who emphasized so-called NBIC technologies, stated that they must be considered in light of the institute’s clear “unconventional” and “non-lethal” workload. As quoted in Chapter 3, he is on record as calling for the development of Russian weapons based on, inter alia, biotechnology. These statements are worrisome given that the 46th Institute was at one point exerting a large degree of power over the national directions as spelled out in SAPs. Concern over these statements acquire further significance when known interactions between the 46th Institute and the 3rd Central Research Institute (see next entry), are taken into account. 3rd Central Research Institute

The 3rd Institute “conducts research for the development and creation of weapons, military and special equipment for general use,” with an apparent focus on missile and artillery systems for the ground forces.264 It has subsidiary centers and test sites, some of which were consolidated under the institute’s control in 2010 as part of the Serdyukov reforms.265 As with the 46th Institute, we infer that the 3rd Institute has an actual name that we do not know. Deputy Defense Minister Dmitry Bulgarkov’s portfolio includes the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate, to which the 3rd Institute reports.266 In a perhaps confusing turn of events, the current head of the 3rd Institute is called Igor Borisovich Sheremet.267 This is a different individual than Igor Anatolyevich Sheremet, whom we introduced earlier as the former director of the Military Scientific Committee. We include the 3rd Institute here for its role in developing and testing “unconventional” weapons and military technology for the ground forces based on “fundamental and exploratory research,” and because its staff is apparently enthusiastic about developing biotechnology-based weapons.268 We have obtained a published history of the institute’s work covering the years 1947 to 2007.269 This publication confirms that the institute had a close partnership with the RAS for “creating highly effective weapons systems and military equipment for the ground forces, as well as for addressing problems in creating unconventional weapons.”270 Specifically, the center has been tasked since 1994 with the development of “non-lethal” weapons.271 Before that date, reportedly only the Ministry of Interior and the FSB conducted such work.272 The 3rd Institute did work for the 46th Institute (described later).273 Since 2001, the department in charge of this line of research is called “Rocket Artillery Weapons Based on Unconventional Injury Factors and Special Non-Lethal Means.”274 Of greatest relevance here, the 3rd Institute has designed a dispenser for “incapacitant compounds” (presumably of a chemical nature) and has done work on engine-killing weapons.275 The details of this work are classified, as the 3rd

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Institute’s few publications deal exclusively with military software, military robotics, and armored vehicles.276 The 3rd Institute also maintains close relations with the Russian Engineering Academy. It is telling that the 3rd Institute’s director is a corresponding member of the latter.277 Thus, we noted with interest a three-author article written by the vice president of the Russian Engineering Academy and the head of its section on military-technical problems, Vitaly Valer’yanovich; the 3rd Institute’s director, Sheremet; and Vladimir Ischuk, a lead researcher at the 3rd Institute.278 In this 2015 publication, the authors emphasize the need for “the creation of new weapons” based in part on “the achievements of nano-bio-info-cognitive technologies (NBIC technologies).”279 We reproduced the relevant passages in Chapter 3. Of importance to this chapter is the fact that both the MOD’s 3rd Institute current director and the 46th Institute’s past director (described earlier) have publicly encouraged the development of novel weapons based on biotechnology. Both MOD institutes would profit from such development and have opportunistically seized onto this idea. The 3rd Institute has previously created “unconventional” weapons including “non-lethal” weapons, while the 46th Institute has promoted such work. In fact, the 3rd Institute has done unspecified work for the 46th Institute in this sphere. We are concerned that both institutes are likely to collaborate in proposing “biotechnology-based” versions of the chemical incapacitant system and the enginekilling weapons recently designed by the 3rd Institute. Federal Agency for Special Construction (Spetsstroy)

Spetsstroy is a construction agency that is headed by Alexander Ivanovich Volosov and is subordinate to the MOD.280 The agency oversees the construction of military-affiliated research institutes, nuclear missile silos, airdefense systems, and chemical weapons disposal plants.281 Spetsstroy plays a role in meeting the objectives of the National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2014).282 Specifically, Spetsstroy is responsible for the reconstruction of certain laboratories. A press release by the company highlighted Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu’s inspection on June 17, 2014, of the reconstruction effort being undertaken at the 33rd Central Research Test Institute.283 Select Military-Industrial Complex Institutions The two organizations classed in this section are those outside the MOD’s control that are involved in weapons development. This distinction between MOD and non-MOD institutions is important because the

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relationship between the MOD and its GS, and their counterparts in the MIC, has been defined by bitter long-running disputes about the quality and price of weapons in development.284 In 2004, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy gathered leading Russian military experts to generate recommendations for military reforms for the Putin administration. These were published in a book. Two recommendations regarding the MIC are worth noting here because they summarize the direction of the actual reform process subsequently implemented by the Putin administration. They are: Russia needs a decisive de-specialization of the military industry and its integration with the civilian sector of industry as the chief mobilization base for producing weapons; Control of the condition and development of the defense-industrial complex, as well as all financial resources that are allocated for defense . . . must be transferred under the total control of the Ministry of Defense.285

The Putin administration attempted to meet both objectives through three reforms. First, MIC’s military procurement decisionmaking power was transferred to the MOD and its GS, thereby consolidating financial resource allocation decisions to the MOD. Second, new institutions within the MOD, namely those under Deputy Minister Pavel Popov’s control as detailed earlier, were set up to increase MOD-industry cooperation. Third, a new organization, the Advanced Research Foundation (see later entry), was created outside of MOD’s control in an attempt to enhance militarycivilian integration in the defense sector. Military-Industrial Commission (MIC)

We review the MIC (the Russian acronym is VPK) and its responsibilities as defined in a presidential decree published on September 10, 2014.286 One of the new changes at that time was that the MIC henceforth will be headed by Putin, and the person who previously had headed MIC, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry O. Rogozin, was appointed MIC’s vice chairman and the chairman of the MIC’s board. Simultaneously, the deputy defense secretary, Yuri Borisov, was appointed as the MIC’s responsible secretary.287 The decree also created a new governmental entity, namely a “permanent board” of the MIC whose responsibility was to find solutions to problems that MIC’s activities engendered. Thus MIC’s permanent board is responsible for: • implementation of the state policy in the sphere of the military-industrial complex;

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• development of science and technology for military-technical and logistical support of national defense, state security, and law-enforcement activities; • the implementation of export controls on military and dual purpose goods; • mobilization preparation of the economy of the Russian Federation and the formation of the State Defense Order; • making certain that MIC’s decisions were implemented.288

We emphasize that Rogozin, who chaired this commission from January 17, 2012, until September 2014, has been one of the most vocal supporters of the development of “weapons based on new physical principles.” Putin did not state why he decided to order these changes, but we can proffer a plausible explanation. Rogozin’s work appears to us to have been, and to remain, appreciated by Putin. The changes do not appear to have been carried out to shuffle or remove personnel, since Rogozin simply became first deputy chairman and, according to the Russian media, all current permanent members kept their seats.289 Putin had previously expressed dissatisfaction over the GS’s frequent “changes in requirements” for new weapons that were upsetting the planning efforts of the MIC and the Russian military-industrial complex.290 With the Russian economy in crisis in 2014, perhaps Putin decided to take over the MIC to limit these increasingly unaffordable changes. We therefore believe that the reason for Putin’s decision was to endow the MIC with greater authority, and to increase his control over its activities.291 Advanced Research Foundation (ARF)

The ARF’s mission is to coordinate and provide beginning-to-end funding for high-risk innovative research projects with military applications.292 As stated by Rogozin, “We are creating an analogue of the U.S. DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), and it will get down to business soon.”293 Its Russian name has a plethora of unofficial translations in English, but we use the ARF’s official English translation and abbreviation provided in the text of the October 2012 law that formally created the organization.294 The ARF operates as an independent nonprofit organization, with its Board of Trustees appointed by the president.295 Although the MOD is its main customer, the ARF is tasked with providing input to the MIC.296 As such, there are close ties between the military and the ARF’s personnel. Thus, no one should be surprised that the ARF’s director-general, Andrey Grigoriev, is a retired lieutenant-general. Of potential interest when considering what projects might be funded by the institute is the fact that, after having earned degrees in aerophysics and space studies from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Grigoriev graduated from the Military Academy of Chemical Protection.297

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The ARF supports research necessary for developing, and defending against, future weapons based on new physical principles. Its deputy director-general, Vitaliy Davydov, noted that it “has proposals for projects, the results of which can be used for the creation of individual elements of weapons based on new physical principles.”298 He further asserted that “prototypes of such weapons have been developed, but that only models are being developed at the present time due to the high cost associated with developing the actual weapons on a mass scale.”299 This is in line with what Dmitry Medvedev had stated earlier, namely that “the Advanced Research Foundation was established to support the development of advanced weapons. However, this is not all that the foundation is designed to do. I hope that it will engage in other activities as well. We really need to focus on what our armed forces will look like 20–30 years from now.”300 Officially, then, the Russian government expects that the research topics pursued by the ARF will help identify and then meet MOD’s future needs, including those for “weapons based on new physical principles.” An analytical report used by the State Duma in an April 2013 roundtable set out the priority areas that the newly created ARF should focus on as follows: • Bioengineering and people (organ transplants, artificial blood, cryopreservation, resuscitation robot). • Biotechnological production of materials and fuel. • Integrated network technology and reasonable network management. • Transport systems (hypersonic aircraft airfoil, tiltrotor). • Energy (linear generators, redox batteries). • Military robotics (submersibles, high-altitude unmanned reconnaissance, transport robot, automated truck patrol robot exoskeleton).301

The organization’s official work program does appear to be based on this list. Since late 2013, the institute’s website has advertised that it conducts research in three fields: • Physical and technical research. • Chemical, biological, and medical research. • Information research.

In 2016, the ARF also began to advertise its subsidiary National Center for Technology Development and the Basic Elements of Robotics, and thus its robotics research, as a fourth research field.302 Of interest here, the “chemical, biological, and medical” research topics have remained constant and are divided into five subtopics: “bionics,” “future medicine,” future materials,” “new methods of energy extraction,” and “integrated biosystems.”303 The ARF is running its “future medicine” subtopic projects as its contribution to the governmental mega-project titled “Soldier of the Future.”304 ARF’s projects in “future medicine” are conducted in conjunc-

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tion with the MOH, FMBA, and Russian Academy of Medical Sciences (RAMS).305 These projects are mostly for the improvement of military medical care, with one exception; it hopes to obtain technology that “enhance [the] cognitive abilities of military operators.”306 Additional explicitly military applications under the other four ARF subtopics of interest include: “new technical solutions for the creation of weapons and military special vehicles on the basis of bionic principles”;307 “the creation of defenses against the most difficult-to-capture aerosols of submicron size using a nanofiber filter system”;308 and a “neurointerface with personalized feedback and enhanced cognitive ability to control robotic combat, reconnaissance, transport, and other units and to improve the quality of personnel training.”309 These programs might be examples of what Russian officials mean by “biotechnology-based” weapons and military equipment, although the ARF does not identify them as such and no source that has used the term has mentioned these as examples. The ARF works in two ways. It can request proposals for R&D projects, after which it decides which projects to pursue.310 More than 600 proposals were reportedly received when it first issued requests for proposals in 2013. By the end of 2014, the ARF had approved approximately forty projects. Of these, twenty had been funded and were functioning. (We do not know how many, if any, of these projects are biologically oriented.) The ARF’s action plan called for reaching the level of forty-five projects by the end of the year. The situation for 2015 was according to Davydov unclear since ARF’s funding level for 2015–2017 was not known.311 The ARF’s initial funding for 2014 was 3.3 billion rubles, but this amount was to be decreased by 12.5 percent in 2015.312 According to Rogozin, the ARF was meant to employ between 250 and 300 “leading experts in the field of military technology” and was supposed to create “a number of new defense enterprises in Russia, including for the production of strategic weapons systems, small arms and ammunition.”313 According to Vitaliy Davydov, ARF assistant general director, proposals are subject to a thorough vetting process. In a 2014 interview, he described the selection process in a way that echoed admonitions made by Serdyukov and Shoigu regarding the necessity for better military forecasting in determining Russian military R&D (see Chapter 3): Before selecting projects, we identify the threats that are critical from the standpoint of the country’s defense and security. Ways and means of countering each threat are identified, and research and development directions geared toward their implementation are formulated. . . . Project selection is regulated by the relevant policy.314

We note that the initial threat identification and threat-countering stages of this selection process that Davydov implied were conducted by the ARF

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are redundant with the functions of the Military Scientific Committee of the Armed Forces. The latter is theoretically supposed to be issuing guidance on these issues. We showed above that a repartition of tasks had not been assigned to the ARF and the Committee in the months leading up to the ARF’s formal creation. We do not know whether the government and the MOD are satisfied with this potential redundancy, or whether they have by now forced agreement as to which tasks are assigned to the ARF and which to the Committee. The ARF’s assigned task with regards to basic research tied to “weapons based on new physical principles” does appear to place it in competition with several MOD and MOD-tied institutes with a long history of conducting weapons R&D. These established institutions seek continued weapons R&D budget lines and see the ARF as a competitor. The previously cited three-author 2015 article by 3rd Institute director Sheremet, a lead researcher from this same institute, and the vice president of the Russian Engineering Academy, contains the following choice passage: The role of integrator in relation to the Russian defense industry is currently assigned to the Advanced Research Foundation, whose tasks are to promote the creation of new weapons prototypes and the identification of priority areas on which to focus the efforts of the entire defense industry on creating conditions to mitigate foreseeable threats to Russia’s security. Experience shows that different, including proven, organizational forms of influence by scientific organizations and structural subdivisions of the RAS, RIA, RAMAS, and AVN in the development and application of modeling systems provide the possibility of the formation of the relevant expert community.315

This paragraph reinforces the appearance of discord between the ARF on the one hand and established MOD institutions on the other, as introduced in the section on the Military Scientific Committee. These two groups are likely to clash when it comes time to determine what projects the MOD will fund. One concrete outcome of the ARF’s work has been the development of “fund laboratories.” The ARF requires that a special division implements any R&D grant given, and provides the necessary infrastructure to do so.316 By doing this, it hopes to force the creation of defense laboratories with modern equipment.317 Grigoryev explained that to reach this end, a plan to bolster the Russian military-scientific complex had already been put into motion.318 Also, the ARF is seeking formal partnerships with new laboratories. For instance, the ARF established a cooperative agreement in October 2014 with a new laboratory at the Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod for developing additive manufacturing technologies and engineering materials.319 One more point needs to be made about the ARF, namely that after it was established, there were some Russian analysts who were dubious of its

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worth. An early blistering critique of the ARF, published in a popular newspaper while Serdyukov was still the minister of defense, is worth quoting: A Russian version of DARPA would only be effective if it employed independent specialists who were able to distinguish between groundbreaking theories and useless pseudo-science. Given the complete lack of objective criteria for evaluating the soundness of scientific work done in Russia, finding such experts would be next to impossible. The new agency will almost certainly be staffed by servile bureaucrats rather than competent, independent-minded researchers. . . . Not long ago, Defense Ministry chiefs proudly announced that they had discontinued funding for useless scientific research that had been conducted for decades without producing any results. Yet Serdyukov, in blind obedience to Putin, is doing precisely the opposite, allocating billions of rubles to pointless research and development projects.320

This critique ignores the unofficial function of the ARF as a forum for bringing together numerous officials from different power structures to discuss R&D issues at the federal level. The critique’s author is perhaps correct in doing so given the bureaucratic turf war the ARF’s creation appears to have set off.

Civilian Research Institutes with Biodefense Roles Rospotrebnadzor (Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being)

Rospotrebnadzor was an MOH subagency until 2012, at which time it was promoted to ministerial rank. Rospotrebnadzor has wide responsibilities in the public health and biodefense spheres, and manages a host of institutes, stations, and other facilities. It is in charge of two former Biopreparat institutes, as well as the five anti-plague institutes in Russia and their subsidiary stations. This is quite a change since Soviet times, when Biopreparat had five major institutes and many subsidiary facilities, while the MOH’s 2nd Directorate managed six anti-plague institutes, each of which had one or more anti-plague stations in the field (the Volgograd Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute was an exception with no attached station). After the Soviet Union’s dissolution, five anti-plague institutes and twelve antiplague stations remained in Russia, while the one anti-plague institute in Almaty now belongs to Kazakhstan.321 For our purposes, the two former Biopreparat institutes SRCAM and Vector, and the five Russian anti-plague institutes located in Stavropol, Volgograd, Irkutsk, Rostov-on-Don, and Saratov, are of greatest interest given their history. Accordingly, each of these institutes has their own entry in a later subsection.

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Rospotrebnadzor’s head is also Russia’s chief state sanitary physician.322 This position was held for a long time (1996–2013) by the highly controversial Gennady G. Onishchenko, who will appear again in these pages. For unclear reasons, he was removed in October 2013, and soon thereafter, on October 24, 2013, Anna Y. Popova was appointed to this position. She has described the Federal Service as follows: For its more than 90 years of existence, Rospotrebnadzor has guarded sanitary and epidemiological well-being, working to solve problems and protect the health of the population. As of 2014, Rospotrebnadzor comprises more than 110.000 staff members, located in 84 regional offices and Hygienic and Epidemiological Centers in the Russian Federation, 29 scientific research institutions, including Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR and Central Research Institute of Epidemiology, 12 Plague Control Stations, over 100 disinfecting organizations, and 285 border inspection posts carrying out sanitary and quarantine control.323

Although it is in charge of a plethora of institutes and other types of facilities, Rospotrebnadzor has a simple hierarchical structure. The Rospotrebnadzor regional offices, Hygienic and Epidemiological Centers, Scientific Research Institutes, Anti-Plague Institutes, and the Sanitary Services of Russian Ministries and Departments all report independently to the Rospotrebnadzor central office.324 The annexes to “Order No. 88 of the Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare of 17 March 2008” list Rospotrebnadzor’s laboratories and describes their assigned tasks.325 The institutes and their tasks were as follows:

• Seven regional “Centers for Hygiene and Epidemiology” responsible for diagnosing diseases caused by Group 2 through 4 pathogens.326 • Nineteen institutions, specifically the eighteen anti-plague institutes and stations and Vector, responsible for diagnosing diseases caused by extremely dangerous pathogens of Groups 1 and 2 (similar to US BSL4 pathogens).327 • Seventeen strain reference centers, in part charged with detecting cultures with atypical properties and with the detection of new pathogenic agents.328 • Four national centers that held pathogen references collections, three of which also provided diagnostic reference functions.329

According to a 2014 Rospotrebnadzor report, its scientific research organizations are developing “four of eight priority directions for development of science, technology, and engineering and approximately 20 of Russia’s 44 critical technologies.”330 Unfortunately, the directions and critical technologies are not identified in this document.

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Our search of the Russian publication database eLibrary.ru for publications by institutes belonging to Rospotrebnadzor found that thirty-five of them have published research articles.331 In addition, three Rospotrebnadzor institutes have registered medical products and hence have an industrial biological production capacity: Vector, Mikrob, and the Rostov Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology and Parasitology (not to be confused with the Rostov-on-Don Anti-Plague Institute).332 We have no evidence that the Rostov Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology and Parasitology knowingly participated in the Soviet BW program; in addition, it is not listed in the National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014. Therefore, while we describe Vector and Mikrob in some detail in later entries, we omit the Rostov Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology and Parasitology. At least nine of Rospotrebnadzor’s institutes received funding through the National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014.333 We say at least nine institutes because the program lists only the names of institutes set to receive funding for infrastructure work. As a result, any institute earmarked only for research funding under this program would not be included as one of these nine institutes. In addition, Rospotrebnadzor could have used general funds made available through this National System to fund additional institutes. Given the importance of this National System for Russia’s biodefense system, each of these nine institutes, as well as their funding and their publication output, are discussed later.334 Vector, Mikrob, and four Russian anti-plague institutes were funded by this program; the Volgograd Anti-Plague Institute was the one major anti-plague institute that was not named. Put differently, three of the nine institutes have entries below solely because they were named in this National System, while the remaining six named institutes and Volgograd were previously known to us as playing an important role in Russia’s biodefense network. Graphs showing the research output by year of the key Rospotrebnadzor institutes studied here, as indexed in the Russian publication database eLibrary.ru, are provided in Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 (see insert section following page 150). This is a significant number given that yearly publication averages for many of these institutions do not exceed 100.

State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology “Vector.” The US Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program spent an estimated $10 million to help Vector transition to a civilian research institute after the Soviet Union’s dissolution.335 Today, Vector is a premier high-security laboratory complex, although the staff’s ability to carry out research has apparently been hampered by tumultuous management changes. Transparency at the site has also markedly decreased since the center was put under the control of Rospotrebnadzor in 2005.336

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In practice, Vector functions as two distinct research components: the special Collaborating Centre dedicated to variola virus research, and the rest of the Vector complex. In this subsection, we first describe the Collaborating Centre and then turn our attention to the rest of Vector’s activities. There are two WHO Collaborating Centres for Orthopoxvirus Diagnosis and Repository of Variola Virus in the world. One is located at the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, in the United States. The second is at Vector, in Novosibirsk, Russia. The variola virus collection at Vector consists of 120 strains that have in the past been collected from Africa, the Americas, Southeast Asia, Europe, and the eastern Mediterranean.337 The future of the Collaborating Centre at Vector is of interest because it appears to have narrowly avoided anti-transparency measures imposed during Onishchenko’s tenure at Rospotrebnadzor and during the leadership turmoil experienced at Vector. Unlike the rest of Vector, the small part of the research institute that is the Collaborating Center appears to have been able to continue “normal” operations, including being able to host foreign visitors and to send its scientists to meetings in foreign lands.338 This appears to have been a highly contested privilege. We have been told from an anonymous source that tensions between Rospotrebnadzor officials and the Center were very high in 2011.339 The situation appears to have improved since Onishchenko’s departure from Rospotrebnadzor in October 2013. When a WHO inspection team visited Vector’s WHO Collaborating Centre in 2015, it observed that the Centre was operating normally.340 Currently, the Center’s researchers are concentrating on developing a smallpox vaccine based on the variola virus (instead of the currently used vaccinia virus) and a new therapeutic agent that can be taken by mouth.341 The latter is the anti-smallpox drug NIOKh-14 that, as the Russians claim, is similar to the American anti-smallpox ST-246.342 The NIOKh name stands for the Novosibirsk Institute for Organic Chemistry, which synthesized the drug. Assuming that NIOKh-14 has a similar mechanism of action to that of ST-246, they both target a specific variola virus gene that codes for a protein required for the intracellular production of the virus. Without this protein, the virus cannot propagate in the infected host. Of course, at this stage of development it is not at all certain whether these products will in fact be realized and, if so, whether funding could be procured to pay for expensive and time-consuming human clinical trials and marketing efforts. A discussion of the activities occurring within the rest of the Vector complex first requires an explanation of the volatile leadership situation existing at the center since 2005. Rospotrebnadzor’s head Onishchenko assigned Ilya G. Drozdov as Vector’s permanent director-general on September 20, 2005.343 Drozdov was replaced in early 2011 by Aleksandr N. Sergeyev, a scientist who had been with Vector for many years.344 Sergeyev

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was then suddenly dismissed on February 12, 2014. No official reason was given for this action. Rumors circulating in Novosibirsk suggested that Sergeyev had raised the ire of the Russian government by stating during a press conference in January 2014 that the state was “not being very generous in its support for promotion of scientific development and that insufficient funding is making it impossible to do things such as initiating the trials of an AIDS vaccine.”345 Sergeyev was replaced by Valery N. Mikheyev, a graduate from Kazan State Medical Institute.346 Mikheyev was a candidate of medical sciences and an experienced administrator who had worked as director of the Rospotrebnadzor’s regional office in Novosibirsk oblast for fourteen years. In 2011, Vector hired him as assistant director-general, but in an administrative position. When Mikheyev was named director-general, several Vector employees were puzzled by his appointment, believing that he was not the person best suited for the job since he had no history of having managed a laboratory, much less an institute. Onishchenko was not the head of Rospotrebnadzor at the time, as he had been appointed an assistant to the prime minister of Russia in October 23, 2013.347 Nevertheless, it was probable that he had had a hand in Sergeyev’s dismissal and the appointment of a loyal Rospotrebnadzor staffer as director-general. Vector’s yearly public scientific publication output, as indexed in the eLibrary.ru database, is in the 140–170 publications range.348 This output is well above that of the other Rospotrebnadzor institutions that we have studied (see Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5). In addition, these publications are generally well-cited by other scientists, with Vector as an institution having a comparatively high h-index and g-index (two metrics used to assess publication activity and research impact). Based on an analysis of keywords, Vector’s publications have primarily dealt with influenza and variola viruses and, to a lesser extent, tick-borne encephalitis virus.349 Our review of tenders won by Vector since the start of 2014 shows that, after Sergeyev’s dismissal, Vector scientists received support to conduct R&D that included:

• preclinical studies on a DNA vaccine against melanoma350 • development of an enzyme immunoassay for the detection of Ebola hemorrhagic fever markers351 • development of a smallpox vaccine based on attenuated vaccinia virus352 • conduct of preclinical studies for a live seasonal influenza vaccine353 • tests of a system for the identification of genetic material from viruses in drinking water354 • development of three biosensors for the detection of pathogenic biological agents355

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• conduct of preclinical studies on smallpox vaccine based on vaccinia virus356 • development of a formulation for the anti-smallpox drug NIOKh-14 mentioned earlier357 • work in support of developing an oral smallpox vaccine called MikroVak358 • support for the development of an oligonucleotide microarray for the diagnosis of infectious diseases caused by Groups II and III pathogens359

Some of these tenders merely renewed funding for research projects begun before 2014.360 One research program was noticeably missing from tender announcements in the post-Sergeyev period. Every year since 2011, and perhaps even earlier, Vector had received funds to develop candidate vaccines against smallpox, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, and hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome.361 At the time of writing, no tender had been issued since Sergeyev’s dismissal for the development of vaccines against the latter two diseases. One series of tenders issued during Sergeyev’s tenure is peculiar. The MOD issued two tenders to Vector in 2011 that are worth up to 47.5 million rubles, but has not done so since.362 Since these tenders had no description, we do not know what kind of R&D related to biodefense was funded. Also starting in 2011, Mikrob and SRCAM began issuing tenders to Vector that similarly lacked descriptors. In 2011 and 2012, five SRCAM and six Mikrob tenders were almost simultaneously issued for unstated R&D work and were granted to Vector each year.363 In 2013, five SRCAM and five Mikrob contracts were issued.364 These tenders probably funded recurring research or work tasks, which were renewed each year until around the time of Sergeyev’s dismissal. These two lines of funding were largely discontinued in 2014, possibly by the abrupt change in directorship. SRCAM issued no tenders to Vector in 2014 and issued only two in 2015. Mikrob issued some tenders to Vector in 2014, but their worth was significantly lower than in previous years. No tenders were issued by Mikrob in 2015. The lack of descriptor text is uncommon for tenders received by Vector, although it is common that tenders issued by SRCAM and Mikrob lack accompanying descriptions. That all three institutes are part of Rospotrebnadzor and hence presumably coordinate at least some work privately might explain this lack of project details in public documents. Else, this lack of tender information could be because they were sensitive commercial or classified biodefense R&D that was subcontracted to Vector. The only vaccine currently registered by Vector is a live measles vaccine, and its only pharmaceutical being marketed is an immunomodulator

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brand name Neitrostim that is claimed to enhance the body’s production of white blood cells.365 We attempted to find more information about the putative Ebola and AIDS vaccine projects. Since neither the purported Ebola vaccine work nor the AIDS vaccine work is mentioned in any public tenders issued to Vector, we assume that these projects are directly funded by Rospotrebnadzor without the use of tenders.366 Vector’s general director, Valery N. Mikheyev, stated the following regarding Vector’s Ebola R&D “We have several kinds [of Ebola vaccines] and we will submit them for clinical tests shortly. One of our formulas is ready [to be tested] and another two or three will be ready soon. The Russian government has given the order to begin the clinical tests in August [2015].”367 More recently, Alexander Ryzhikov, head of Vector’s zoonotic infections and flu sections, was quoted on Rossiya 24 Television that Russia had successfully completed second phase clinical trials for an Ebola vaccine involving sixty volunteers. Ryzhikov asserted that “90 percent of the volunteers displayed the presence of virus-neutralizing antibodies, which is a good figure.”368 After the MOH reviews the results and accepts them, a third clinical trial will be tested in “parts of Africa.”369 We interviewed a former Gamaleya scientist, who asked to remain anonymous, to give an opinion on Vector’s putative Ebola vaccine R&D and clinical trials. The answer was as follows: Developing a vaccine is a very complex task; it is a 10 to 15-year job for an entire institute. . . . Even if you have a genetically engineered structure into which an Ebola virus gene has been inserted, that still will not result in a vaccine. Such work could be done at Vector, but lately it has not been performing well and what is more, everyone has been running from it every which way [it has lost some of its best scientists]. So I very much doubt that such a vaccine could be created at Vector as it now exists.370

A review of studies conducted at Vector and a discussion with another anonymous scientist provided sufficient insights to offer a possible explanation for the Ebola vaccine mystery. Since Vector was already working on a candidate vaccine against two types of hemorrhagic fevers, it most likely was developing a generic antigen-delivering biological system. When popular attention turned to Ebola fever in light of its outbreak in Africa, Vector or its parent Rospotrebnadzor probably saw it expedient to rebrand this existing vaccine work as targeting Ebola. In practice, this would mean an initial minor switch; the generic biological system would be made to deliver a well-known Ebola antigen instead of the previously considered antigens for the other hemorrhagic fevers. However, as the anonymous scientist noted, such a construct is still very far from a working vaccine; it would require extensive clinical testing. This account is consistent with Vector’s recent publication output, including the fact that

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it has drawn on publications from Zagorsk Institute researchers on antibodies against Ebola virus.371 Vector launched a flurry of tenders in August and September 2016 to have contractors arrange said clinical trials for the experimental antiEbola vaccine, whose name was revealed to be EpiVakEbola. The Vector tender authors did not reveal the specific peptide antigens and the carrier protein selected to serve as the active ingredient of the vaccine, but confirmed that this was the general mechanism of action for the vaccine. 372 Mikheyev has also spoken of an experimental AIDS vaccine developed at Vector. CombiHIVvac, also named KombiVIChvak and KombiHIVvac, is an experimental DNA vaccine whose antigen makeup is “multiple T- and B-cell epitopes of HIV-1 proteins.” 373 In October 2014, Mikheyev announced to the media that it was ready for phase two clinical trials, but that Vector had not yet been able to secure 200–300 million rubles ($5–7.5 million) of necessary funding.374 This vaccine has been a long-term Vector project; Vector had begun to set up a pilot plant to produce HIV proteins during Drozdov’s tenure, but this project was embroiled in one of the latter’s corruption scandals and the construction project was terminated in April 2010. 375 We have found several recent publications that confirm Mikheyev’s claims regarding CombiHIVvac’s status, including results of preclinical trials published in 2012,376 work related to the vaccine’s production quality control published in 2015, 377 and a 2016 publication reporting the success of its phase 1 trial.378 Beyond their R&D activities, Vector personnel have been active in Russia’s response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. Personnel from Vector and Mikrob were deployed to Guinea in 2014, where they served in a mobile laboratory to help contain the outbreak.379 On March 8, 2016, by Decree No. 104 issued by Russia’s president, six Vector scientists were awarded citations for having assisted with the organizing of the complex anti-epidemic measures and diagnosis of Ebola in the territory of the Republic of Guinea and thus were presented with medals titled “For Service to the Motherland II Degree.”380 Vector received funds under the National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2014) for infrastructure enhancement: • Major renovation of Building No. 6a to “improve physical and biological security.” • Major renovation of Building No. 104/1 to set up a production line of dry nutrient media. • Major renovation of Building No. 104/1 to set up a production line for a measles vaccine.381

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We have some concerns about what the “major renovation of Building 6a” means. In Soviet times, Building 6a was a Group 1 facility in which Marburg virus was produced in large quantities for BW purposes. 382 As noted earlier, when Drozdov was director of Vector, he ordered that with the exception of the Smallpox Collaborating Centre, all Group 1 and 2 facilities be closed, which was done. A key question is whether the former Group 1 facility in Building 6a will be re-created and, if so, for what purposes? We were able to confirm that the Russian government planned to reconstruct the former Group 1 facility, but the building’s ultimate purpose is mostly treated as confidential information. Vector placed an open contract for the reconstruction of Building 6a on July 31, 2013. That contract described the building as “designed for the industrial production of drugs; this production is to be carried out on the basis of causative agents of especially dangerous infections of the 1st group of pathogenicity at the highest virological laboratory protection level (BSL-4).”383 Two bidders filed complaints over two perceived irregularities in the documentation: first, the contract required a license for the “implementation of activities for technical protection of confidential information,” and second, the contract listed building material specifications.384 The open contract process was canceled and restarted. The subsequent contract documents contained even less information regarding the nature of the work to be conducted within Building 6a. The Vector contract authors only stated that this facility would be used for drug production and omitted the previous reference to work with Group 1 viruses under BSL-4 containment conditions. They noted that this building was within the “restricted area” of Vector and used this fact to justify their continued requirement for a confidential information license to ensure that the work would be carried out under “strict confidentiality.” Starting in January 2016, the reconstruction work became embroiled in a major corruption allegation.385 We do not know the current status of the building. One hypothesis for its new purpose is that it was designed to produce biodefense vaccines against Group 1 viruses, notably the EpiVakEbola vaccine and perhaps the planned Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever vaccine. If so, the facility may already be in service because some units of the EpiVakEbola vaccine doses must be manufactured in time for the aforementioned phase 2 clinical trials. It might be that the CBMs submitted in 2016 or earlier by Russia shed light on the status of this BSL-4 facility, including a description of its purpose and layout, but this we do not know. State Research Center for Applied Microbiology and Biotechnology (SRCAM). The conversion of SRCAM to a civilian R&D institute began in

1996.386 SRCAM received the second-largest amount of support after Vector from the US CTR program.387 In 2004, FOI researchers published the

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results of their assessment of the conversion process. They concluded that “the impression from the published research during the last decade is that the institute now has a new research profile with a pronounced peaceful focus.”388 However, they also noted that “a fraction of the scientists continue to study highly virulent pathogens,” and more specifically that “some work is still done on the tularemia, plague, and anthrax agents and this research involves some of the scientists who were active in the offensive era.”389 The FOI researchers flagged the problem of potential knowledge transfers to military facilities, noting that some of this research was done in collaboration with scientists from the MOD’s closed Kirov and Zagorsk institutes.390 SRCAM has had some ties with the MOD in recent years. In 2011, the MOD granted four tenders with a collective worth of 35 million rubles and in 2013 one tender worth 78 million rubles was issued.391 We were surprised to see this because SRCAM’s director, Ivan A. Dyatlov, and his senior staff, are scientists with a strong track record for publishing their R&D findings in prestigious international journals.392 We doubt that SRCAM researchers under Dyatlov’s leadership would agree to conduct much classified research aside from practical applied work on detectors, diagnostics, or disinfectants, because doing so would limit their ability to publish openly and reduce the effectiveness of their research. The typical output of SRCAM scientists has been forty to sixty publications per year, which is comparable to that of the five anti-plague institutes (see Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 in the insert section).393 The institute’s publications deal mostly with three pathogens: Y. pestis, F. tularensis, and Mycobacterium tuberculosis.394 The center continues work on other pathogens of biodefense relevance, such as B. anthracis and Burkholderia mallei. Research topics of interest mostly have to do with investigating antibiotic resistance among bacterial pathogens, though one publication discusses microbial oil remediation. We were surprised to see one publication on Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus, because SRCAM is not known to be investigating viral pathogens. This paper, published in 2015, was the result of a collaborative project with Vector and the Volgograd Anti-Plague Institute (see later) that sought to obtain monoclonal antibodies for use as immunodiagnostic aids in detecting the Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus.395 SRCAM received infrastructure funds under the National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2014) for four activities: • Major renovation of Laboratory-Experimental Building No. 1. • Major renovation of Building No. 14b, an isolation room for highrisk infections.

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• Reconstruction of housing building No. 8. • Construction of a boiler room (with engineering networks) in order to provide the institute with heating and process steam.396 Russian Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute “Microbe” (also Russian Scientific Research Institute for Plague Control “Mikrob”). Mikrob was

the first anti-plague institute drawn to BW-related R&D, becoming exceedingly involved in the Soviet BW program in the early 1950s.397 Some of its assignments included developing rapid methods for detecting Y. pestis in the environment, developing new methods to treat plague, and testing the efficacy of foreign antibiotics when used against bacterial pathogens weaponized in the Soviet Union.398 Scientometric information for the years 2006 to 2015 show an increasing number of publications being generated by Mikrob researchers; the number of scientific journals published in 2014 was over twice the number in 2006 (see Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 in the insert section).399 Even taking into consideration the unreliable nature of the yearly data presented in the underlying publication database, this is a substantial increase. Keyword tags for these publications show that the pathogens mainly researched by Mikrob researchers were V. cholerae and Y. pestis, followed by F. tularensis, B. anthracis, West Nile virus, rabies virus, and hemorrhagic fever virus with renal syndrome.400 Institute researchers have also published a few articles on brucellosis, Ebola fever, and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever.401 Our analysis of Mikrob’s publications indicated that its scientists focus on understanding virulence factors. Some such studies, notably those on V. cholerae, B. anthracis, Y. pestis, and F. tularensis, are dualuse in nature. The civilian application that Mikrob has pursued is the genetic engineering of bacterial and viral strains whereby genes coding for virulence factors are removed and high yield antigen producing avirulent strains are obtained.402 This research, however, has potential for misuse, as it theoretically facilitates the development of pathogen strains with enhanced virulence characteristics. Mikrob is conducting one set of studies for Rospotrebnadzor that concerns us. In June 2012, Rospotrebnadzor disbursed funds worth 12 million rubles from the National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2014) for Mikrob to conduct a fivepart study aimed at achieving two objectives as follows: • Determine the molecular-genetic characteristics of modern genetically modified strains of pathogens that cause anthrax, tularemia, plague, cholera and tick-borne infections and evaluation of their contribution to the change in virulence and adaptation of pathogens to changing environmental conditions, for the purpose of understanding the mechanism for the emergence of

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dangerous infectious disease pathogens with atypical pathogenic and epidemiological potential. • Develop new PCR test [detection] systems for genetic testing of strains with atypical virulence properties that increase the efficiency of epidemiological monitoring and lowers the cost of epidemic prevention measures and molecular-genetic investigations of potential bioterrorist acts.403

As can be seen from the second objective, the justification as to why this project should be done explicitly referred to biodefense. Of some concern is the work on B. anthracis and to a lesser extent that on F. tularensis. Under a section titled “Molecular-genetic characteristics of Bacillus anthracis strains and their significance in the alteration of virulence properties and adaptation to changing environmental conditions,” we found the following: • study of the conditions for the onset of vaccine resistance of B. anthracis strains and search for methods to prevent infection by them; • evaluation of the possibilities of the emergence of vaccine-resistant B. anthracis strains and development of methods of treating anthrax infections caused by them; • study of the molecular-genetic characteristics of B. anthracis strains with different plasmid compositions and their significance in the alteration of virulence properties; • patent searches.404

The expected results make clear that the R&D performed by Mikrob scientists involves modifying strains, since Rospotrebnadzor requested “deposit receipts for four B. anthracis strains at SRCAM’s State Collection of Pathogenic Microorganisms; one vaccine-resistant strain and three antibiotic-resistant strains” as proof-of-work under the contract.405 These strains are almost certainly virulent, given that another expected result is documentation on an “infectious B. anthracis test strain for evaluating the effectiveness of anthrax vaccines,” which is presumably the same vaccineresistant strain deposited in SRCAM.406 We explain through a comparison with US research regulations why we have some concerns over this line of work. If the targeted antibiotics and vaccine are in current use, and because B. anthracis is “not known to acquire” such traits “naturally,” the work that Mikrob is conducting with B. anthracis would almost certainly be categorized as “restricted experiments” under the US Select Agent regulations.407 Whether the vaccine and antibiotics to be evaded are currently used for treatment or not, the degree of virulence of the chosen B. anthracis strain, whether the vaccine to be evaded is Russian or non-Russian, whether the antibiotics are Russian or non-Russian, and what specific methods are to be used to achieve vaccine evasion and antibiotic resistance are all crucial fac-

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tors in determining the nature of this research program. In the case of Mikrob’s B. anthracis work, none of these details are known. We therefore refrain from passing judgment on the direction of this work aside from noting its dual-use nature. As for the studies on F. tularensis, the tender briefly describes it as work on “strains of tularemia pathogen with heterologous plasmids.”408 The following tasks are called for: • obtaining of Francisella tularеnsis strains (vaccine strain 15 and virulent strain 503) with рFNL10 and рSа’ plasmids; • study of morphological and culturing properties of the obtained strains; • study of the viability and stability of the obtained bacteria strains under different storage conditions.409

Again, proof-of-work involves the “deposit receipts for two plasmidcontaining strains of F. tularеnsis at the SRCAM State Collection of Pathogenic Microorganisms-Obolensk (two receipts),” and hence this work involves the actual creation of such strains.410 The pFNL10 plasmid has only been found in the F. novicida-like strain F6168 and was first isolated from bacteria in the blood of a man living in California.411 Scientists developed its use as a shuttle vector between E. coli and F. tularensis to facilitate genetic-engineering work in E. coli for subsequent transfer to the more complex and less-understood F. tularensis bacteria.412 The creation of shuttle vectors for F. tularensis has peaceful applications and indeed similar research has been conducted throughout the world, including in US laboratories. However, some applications are of inherently greater dual-use concern. When the MOH’s Gamaleya Institute (see section on the N. F. Gamaleya Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology later) recently announced that it was working with the pFNL10 plasmid to generate “recombinant vaccine strains for the prevention of especially dangerous infections,” it claimed to be the first “open laboratory” to use this plasmid.413 In doing so it implied that prior work with the plasmid had been conducted at closed institutions (defensive or otherwise). That is indeed the case. A 1996 publication from researchers at SRCAM described the creation of a plasmid based on a modification of the pFNL10 plasmid that “was able to replicate and to express the genes for chloramphenicol and tetracycline resistance” and “was found to be stably inherited during cultivation both on solid medium and in liquid cultures.”414 A review publication by US researchers provides additional context: The use of antibiotic resistance in F. tularensis subsp. (with the exception of LVS [live vaccine strain]) is restricted in the US. Resistance to any antibiotic that may be used therapeutically to treat tularemia may not be introduced into

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select agent forms of F. tularensis, which should preclude the introduction of resistance to chloramphenicol, ciprofloxacin, levofloxacin, doxycycline, gentamicin, streptomycin, and tetracycline. This has restricted the use of antibiotic resistance markers to kanamycin, erythromycin, spectinomycin, rifampin, and hygromycin resistance in these organisms. These restrictions do not necessarily apply to scientists outside the US, and thus examples can be found in the published literature of other antibiotic resistance markers being introduced into, e.g., F. tularensis subsp. Tularensis.415

The author of this article cited the aforementioned 1996 SRCAM paper as an example of such work banned in the United States but allowed abroad. Given the preceding, the purpose of Mikrob’s research program will depend on what is done with the modified virulent strain. Since the tender did not expound on this point, we tried to find answers in Mikrob’s publications. Mikrob researchers did publish exploratory work on the pSa’ plasmid and the tularemia vaccine strain 15 in 2013,416 but to our knowledge did not publish analogous work with virulent strain 503.417 Thus, we can only note that when Mikrob determines the “culturing properties of the obtained strains” and their “viability and stability . . . under different storage conditions,” it will have done so for a virulent strain that could serve as a research proxy to SRCAM’s antibiotic-resistant strain. It is worth mentioning that, according to Rospotrebnadzor’s documentation, it is SRCAM and not Mikrob that serves as a reference laboratory for “genetically engineered” and “new” infectious bacteria.418 This fact explains why Mikrob was to deposit the modified B. anthracis strains to SRCAM’s pathogen collection. As for why Mikrob is doing the work, this is presumably because it is specialized in the virulence factors of these pathogens. What this contract demonstrates is that while SRCAM is officially the reference collection for dangerous genetically modified strains, work on such pathogens is not constrained to SRCAM but is also performed in other research facilities. Aside from its research work, Mikrob currently produces a bivalent cholera vaccine and anti-rabies immunoglobulin based on horse serum.419 These products are consistent with their expertise as demonstrated by their publication output. In 2015, each of five Mikrob staff members were honored, receiving the Order of the President of the Russian Federation for their role in organizing anti-epidemic measures including diagnosis work in Guinea as part of Russia’s assistance to the Ebola outbreak in-country.420 As mentioned in the earlier Vector entry, some of its staff members were also involved in these assistance efforts. Mikrob received infrastructure funds under the National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2014) for three activities:

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• Major renovation of a complex at Yelshanka town, Voskresensky District consisting of a quarantine facility, isolation rooms, and a crematory. • Major renovation of Laboratory-Experimental Building No. 5. • Major renovation of Laboratory-Experimental Building No. 1, including a boiler room and transformer substation.421 Volgograd Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute (also Volgograd Scientific Research Institute for Plague Control). The Volgograd Institute

played an important role in both the offensive Soviet BW program and the Problem 5 defensive program. In late 1971, it was decided to transfer the glanders and melioidosis laboratory from the Rostov Anti-Plague Institute to the Volgograd Institute. As a result, Volgograd gained expertise on Burkholderia mallei and Burkholderia pseudomallei strains,422 and studied relevant antigens and antisera.423 Volgograd shared a part of this collection with SRCAM.424 The institute also did work on B. anthracis for offensive purposes.425 As discussed in the earlier Zagorsk Institute entry, it is designated as a lead anti-bioterrorism center in partnership the Volgograd Institute.426 According to Nikolai G. Tikhonov, who was the institute’s director in the 1990s, the institute was at that time tasked “to develop diagnostic materials and resources for treatment and prophylaxis of completely unfamiliar infections, namely very hazardous deep mycosis.”427 He did not identify which mycosis was being investigated other than state that that they were not found in Russia and that cultures had to be imported from the United States. In this regard he asserted that: “We have a collection of unique strains and are the only organization in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] where working with them is allowed.”428 Research output from Volgograd, considered later, confirms Tikhonov’s account and shows that the institute maintains an active research project along these lines. The FOI issued a detailed report on publications generated by the institute during the 1985–2004 period. 429 The FOI noted “an apparent reduction in publications” in the years 1995–1999. 430 This reduction in publication could have been due to the financial instability following the Soviet Union’s collapse, but the dates are peculiar given that 1995–1997 was a time of economic recovery. Alternatively, this reduction in publication could be because the aforementioned activities mentioned by Tikhonov were at least in part for biodefense purposes and the results were accordingly classified. Scientometric information retrieved through eLibrary.ru for the years 2006 to 2015 shows that aside from the Khabarovsk Scientific Research Institute for Epidemiology and Microbiology, Volgograd Institute’s publication output remains well below that of all other institutes (see Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 in the insert section). There are three ways of interpreting this finding. First, perhaps this is due to a difference in capacity, with

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fewer scientists and/or older equipment at the Volgograd Institute than at other institutes. Second, perhaps the research conducted at Volgograd is more specialized and therefore both less cited and harder to complete in a year’s time. Or third, perhaps a significant volume of classified work, which would not be indexed, continues to be carried out at the Volgograd Institute. Publications by Volgograd Institute researchers, in order of frequency, have focused on melioidosis (the disease caused by B. pseudomallei), West Nile fever, B. pseudomallei, Coccidioides immitis, glanders (the disease caused by B. mallei), monoclonal antibodies, and antigens.431 Since pathogenic Coccidioides species are not endemic to Russia and given that Coccidioides immitis in particular is endemic to the Western Hemisphere and in particular to the southwestern United States,432 the study of Coccidioides species by a Russian organization is probably indicative of biodefense work. Looking at the contents of these publications, we found, among others, a report from 2014 that evaluated the effectiveness of disinfectants on the Coccidioides family of fungi—an activity with clear defensive applicability.433 Work with any fungi from this family at Volgograd supports Thikhonov’s account, since the most likely explanation for the presence of such fungi in Volgograd’s collection is that somehow samples were secured from the United States. Irkutsk Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute for Siberia and the Far East (also Irkutsk Red Labor Banner Order Scientific Research Institute for Plague Control). Only a minimum of activity at the Irkutsk institute

during Soviet times was BW-related.434 The institute’s website states that its scientists currently conduct R&D on what is termed especially dangerous disease agents (i.e., Group 1), including those that cause cholera, brucellosis, tularemia, anthrax, and arbovirus infections.435 According to the Institute’s website, it employs ninety-five researchers.436 Scientometric information compiled by the Russian publication database eLibrary.ru shows that the Irkutsk facility is expanding its public research (see Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 in the insert section).437 The average Irkutsk author h-index and g-index were higher than those of their Mikrob colleagues and much higher than their Volgograd colleagues.438 For its publication output, Irkutsk has a smaller total number of authors than many other institutes that we have studied and hence maintains high scores on both of these indicators. Keyword tags for these articles show a focus on Y. pestis and V. cholerae, as well as on anthrax disease.439 The Irkutsk facility received infrastructure funds under the National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014 for the major renovation of a research-production building, including project design and site investigation work.440

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Stavropol Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute (also Stavropol Scientific Research Institute for Plague Control). The Stavropol Scientific

Research Institute for Plague Control was, until 2008, called the Stavropol Research Anti-Plague Institute. For convenience hereafter we refer to it as the Stavropol Institute. As with the Irkutsk Institute, the Stavropol Institute was minimally involved in the Soviet BW program.441 In terms of civilian research output, the Stavropol Institute is doing comparatively well, placing just below Mikrob and being able to keep pace with its increasing output of publications.442 The Stavropol Institute is unique in that it is the only producer in Russia of a live plague vaccine named EV NIIEG.443 Also, because it was near the 2014 Olympic Winter Games, being approximately 200 kilometers northwest of Sochi, it was assigned an important role in preventing and responding to any biological threats.444 (No untoward event occurred during the games.) Scientometric information retrieved through eLibrary.ru for the years 2006 to 2015 shows a usual profile for an anti-plague institute, with a general upward trend in publication output since 2006.445 Keyword analysis shows that institute researchers were most interested in pathogens that cause brucellosis, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, anthrax, and tularemia, as well as some work on plague.446 The Stavropol Institute received infrastructure funds under the National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014 for the major renovation of its laboratory building.447 Rostov-on-Don Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute (also Rostov-naDonu Red Labor Banner Order Scientific Research Institute for Plague Control). In Soviet times, the Rostov Anti-Plague Institute was the lead

institute for all matters related to cholera. As such, it supervised cholera control methodologies used in all anti-plague facilities and local public health agencies, conducted cholera research, and participated in measures during emergency epidemic situations. To undertake the last-named task, in the 1960s, the Rostov Anti-Plague Institute established specialized mobile anti-epidemic brigades (SPEBs). These rapid-response brigades of highly capable specialists were able to travel anywhere and within hours set up a laboratory that would detect the biological agent causing an outbreak, determine the boundary of the contaminated area, and work to eliminate the outbreak. These brigades proved highly effective, and by the early 1970s, had been set up at all anti-plague institutes. All new methods were fieldtested at the national training courses for SPEBs at Rostov. Subsequently, these brigades had a major role in suppressing cholera epidemics in 1965, 1970, 1971, and 1995–1996. Further, SPEBs successfully operated in Chechnya in 1995.448

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The SPEB system is still active in Russia and continues to serve a public health and biodefense purpose. Rospotrebnadzor maintains this system, although the MOH’s FMBA has also acquired mobile response units.449 Based on the Rostov-on-Don Institute’s history, we expected to see its continued involvement in this program, but this may not be the case. The National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014 earmarked funds for “improving the deployment preparedness of toxicological and epidemiological emergency response brigades.”450 However, this funding line was made available for the FMBA, not Rospotrebnadzor. A recent Rospotrebnadzor description of the antiepidemic brigades only mentioned two training centers, one at Mikrob and the other at the Stavropol Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute.451 It bears mentioning that in preparation for the eighth RevCon, the Russian government proposed that so-called specialized anti-epidemic units should be established under the BWC (see Chapter 6). These would-be units are based on the SPEB experience. In addition to their work with cholera, institute scientists investigate brucellosis. This work was closed down for some time before 1991 when the brucellosis situation improved. However, work on brucellosis at the institute resumed in 1991 due to increasing brucellosis problems, locally and elsewhere in Russia (notably due to the potentially growing brucellosis threat to cattle rather than to sheep and goats as in the past).452 Scientometric information retrieved through eLibrary.ru for the years 2006 to 2015 shows a marked increase in publications by the institute since 2013.453 Publication keywords show that the institute remains heavily focused on V. cholerae research.454 Other pathogens studied include Y. pestis and F. tularensis.455 Curiously, the aforementioned brucellosis work appears to be absent in publications.456 Unlike many of the facilities mentioned in this chapter, the Rostov-onDon Anti-Plague Institute did not receive funding for facility renovations under the National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014.457 The Khabarovsk Institute is listed as an anti-plague institution on the Rospotrebnadzor Russian-language website.458 Scientometric information retrieved through eLibrary.ru for the years 2006 to 2015 shows that the institute’s output of publications has been mostly at or below twenty publications per year, which is relatively low compared to outputs of the other anti-plague institutions, placing Khabarovsk roughly on par with Volgograd.459 Khabarovsk’s h- and g-indices are roughly half those of Volgograd, two rough metrics that imply that Khabarovsk’s research is less “impactful” than that of Volgograd.460 This comparison further flags VolKhabarovsk Scientific Research Institute for Epidemiology and Microbiology.

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gograd’s low publication output as unusual, since the papers it produces are comparatively highly cited when compared to an institution matching its public output. Our analysis of Khabarovsk’s publications reveals that its scientists focus on HIV, enterovirus, and tick-borne encephalitis infections, as well as on worm parasites.461 The Khabarovsk Institute received funds under the National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014 for major renovations to its facility and for an expansion that will accommodate a center with capabilities to detect and diagnose infectious diseases.462 This tasking is in line with the institute’s current work as can be realized by studying its publication output.

Federal State Anti-Plague Center, Moscow. The Federal Anti-Plague Center is listed as an anti-plague institution on the Rospotrebnadzor Russian-language website, but does not appear to be indexed in eLibrary.ru.463 The institute seems to have its own website, but it is as of yet devoid of content aside from contact and address information and a picture of the exterior of the building. 464 Based on its either nonexistent or invisible public research output and on a review of tenders linked to this center, we believe that it could serve as a coordinating administrative center. Nevertheless, it has its own laboratory. This institute received funds under the National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014 for the reconstruction of a building located at Str. Pogodinskaya 10/15.465 Federal Research Center of Medical and Preventive Technology for Risk Management of Public Health, Perm. We include this institute because it

received funds under the National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014 for the construction of buildings, without further explanation. We have not found evidence that the center conducts biodefense laboratory work, although it does carry out epidemiology and toxicology studies.466 The center was probably funded to continue its work on safeguarding civilians, in particular children, from harmful chemicals under the safety aspect of the National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014. The center’s publications have greatly increased since the start of the National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014, going from one journal publication in 2009 to thirty-nine in 2010 and eighty-six in 2014. 467 Keyword analysis shows that the institute’s research output has been mostly concerned with children’s health, with a heavy focus on chemicals.468 The center’s specialization in assessment and mathematical modeling work is also visible from its publication output.469

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Rosselkhoznadzor (Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance)

This service is charged with protecting Russia from the effects of animal and plant infectious diseases.470 As such, it plays an important role in the Russian biodefense system in regard to anti-plant and anti-animal agents. It also ensures the sustainability and health of ecosystems by controlling the use of pesticides, maintaining soil fertility, and monitoring and regulating the exploitation of land and aquatic living resources.471 Its director, Dankvert Alexeevich, has headed the center since 2004.472 Institutes under Rosselkhoznadzor’s control have received funds under the National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014. Specifically, the Federal Center for Animal Health, the Central Scientific and Methodical Veterinary Laboratory in Moscow, the Belgogrod Interregional Veterinary Laboratory in Belgogrod, the Bryansk Interregional Veterinary Laboratory in Bryansk, and the AllRussian State Center for Quality and Standardization of Animal Drugs and Feeds in the Moscow region all received funds.473 Most of the funding was used to upgrade veterinary laboratories in order to meet safety and security regulations.474 The Federal Center for Animal Health was slated to undergo significant upgrades to enable it to work with, and store, especially dangerous pathogens.475 Vaccine production lines will also be established at this center to produce vaccines against foot and mouth disease, highly pathogenic avian influenza, classical swine fever, and Newcastle disease.476 Ministry of Health

The Soviet MOH had an important role in the Soviet BW program, being in charge of its defensive aspects under the codename Problem 5. Although most of the institutes conducting Problem 5 research were transferred away from the MOH, the Russian MOH continues to play a role in biodefense to this day.477 It is included in the National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation for 2009–2014.478 The ministry is tasked with monitoring and responding to the spread of diseases.479 The ministry also has several departments for the control of the production, evaluation, and distribution of medical products.480 Since 2012, the minister of health is Veronika Skvortsova.481 MOH hospitals and personnel would be involved in responding to a biological accident or attack. The November 2013 Unified State System of Prevention and Liquidation of Emergency Situations government decree listed organizations that could respond to a wide range of emergencies, including epidemiological ones.482 Two organizations under the MOH are highlighted for their role in emergency preparedness and management: the

See the following six pages for Figures 4.2–4.6 and Figure 6.1

Figure 4.2

Figure 4.2

Bermed Storage, Unit Parade Grounds, and Probable Labs N4 and N5 with Renovated Roofs, 33rd Institute at Shikhany-2

Rospotrebnadzor Institutes, Journal Publications, Overview Page Data (eLibrary.ru), 2006–2015

Figure 4.3

Figure 4.3

Figure 4.4

Rospotrebnadzor Institutes, All Publications, Overview Page Data (eLibrary.ru), 2006–2015

Figure 4.4

Rospotrebnadzor Institutes, All Publications, Actual List Data (eLibrary.ru), 2006–2015

Figure 4.5

Figure 4.5

Figure 4.6

Network Diagram Displaying Open Financial Flows Between Institutions of Interest

103 distinct financial flows (directed edges)

Figure 4.6

Figure 6.1

Figure 6.1

Map of Resolved and Continuing Outbreaks of African Swine Fever, 2014–2016

Source: “Disease Outbreak Map: African Swine Fever, 2014–2016.” With the kind authorization of the World Organisation for Animal Health [OIE], www.oie.int. Figure extracted from the OIE website on August 15, 2016, at http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Diseaseinformation /Diseaseoutbreakmaps?disease_type_hidden=&disease_id_hidden=&selected_disease_name _hidden=&disease_type=0&disease_id_terrestrial=12&disease_id_aquatic=-999&selected _start_day=1&selected_start_month=1&selected_start_year=2014&selected_end_day=15 &selected_end_month=8&selected_end_year=2016&submit2=OK.

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FMBA and the All-Russian Service for Disaster Medicine.483 Entries for these two institutions can be found later. We also include the Gamaleya Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology and its subsidiary center because of their historical central role in Problem 5. The Gamaleya Institute was recently incorporated within the MOH.484 We are puzzled as to why the Gamaleya Institute was not earmarked for public funding through the System of Chemical and Biological Security. This omission is especially strange because the Gamaleya Institute is still conducting biodefense work, as documented later. It could have been indirectly funded through ministerial budget lines assigned under this national system.

Federal Medical-Biological Agency (FMBA). The FMBA is a federal executive body under the MOH that provides government-level health services ranging from emergency response to operating the national blood bank and manages government property involved in the health services. The current head of the agency is Vladimir Uiba.485 The FMBA organizes training activities and maintains units to “prevent, identify causes, location and emergency recovery, radiological, chemical and biological accidents and incidents, spread of infectious diseases and mass non-infectious diseases (poisoning).”486 Specifically, the FMBA maintains 13 anti-epidemic groups, as well as 62 chemical, 87 radiation, and 130 general groups.487 These groups are based out of health and sanitary units, clinics, hygiene and epidemiology centers, and FMBA district health centers.488 They maintain constant readiness, starting at the routine activities level, and if need be escalating to high alert and finally to an emergency-status level.489 The 2013 Unified State System of Prevention and Liquidation of Emergency Situations government decree highlights the potential role of the FMBA’s response groups in responding to emergencies, including epidemics.490 The FMBA also maintains teams specifically trained to respond to chemical weapons events, including in cases of accidents resulting from chemical weapon destruction operations.491 Although this is not explicitly stated, this chemical weapons emergency system would probably also be used to respond to events involving biological toxins. The Research Institute of Hygiene, Toxicology, and Occupational Pathology (Volgograd city); the Research Institute of Hygiene, Occupational Pathology, and Human Ecology (St. Petersburg city); and the Poison Center of the FMBA of Russia (Clinical Hospital No. 123, Odintsovo city, Moscow region) provide specialized assistance in chemical weapons cases.492 The FMBA maintains five advisory and consultative bodies. Of these, the most important for this book is the Scientific and Technical Council.493 This council runs six problem-solving commissions, including one for

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“Problem #3” on the “Development of Devices to Display, Diagnose, Prevent, and Manage Diseases of Different Etiologies Using Modern Biotechnological Methods” and one on “Problem #4” on “Toxicology and Occupational Hygiene, Pathology, Display, Degassing When Working with Highly Toxic Chemicals.”494

All-Russian Service for Disaster Medicine “Protection.” As its name

implies, the service conducts work on the “development and improvement of a unified system of health care for the population in emergency situations in peacetime and wartime.”495 One Russian practitioner noted that the service would be activated in situations such as “natural disasters, major accidents, catastrophes, epidemics, local military conflicts, terrorist attacks, and other emergencies” and would coordinate with the Ministry of Emergency Situations.496 The service is headed by Sergei Goncharov and is headquartered in Moscow.497 The service has shown interest in the “weapons based on new physical principles” concept. An article that featured the service noted: “The possibility of new global threats (previously unknown or little-studied diseases, weapons based on new physical principles, etc.) may result in atypical epidemic situations and intractable human infections requiring emergency medical treatment using new medical technologies.”498 The service is probably using this concept as bait to fish for large government funds to stockpile medical supplies to treat casualties from such weapons. The service’s capabilities for biodefense monitoring are set to grow. The construction of a national center that will report to the service and whose mission is to monitor Russia and neighboring states for signs of natural or manmade epidemics began in 2015.499 The center is expected to cost 2.2 billion rubles to construct and when operational to employ about 200 people.500 Based on the limited information currently available, it appears to be a sensor-fusion center. A few months after the center’s creation was publicly announced, security officials investigated allegations of corruption, namely that the center’s construction costs had been overstated by over 100 million rubles.501 We have no recent information on how work on this center is proceeding or whether its supposed opening date in 2018 will be met. N. F. Gamaleya Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology. In Soviet times, the Gamaleya Institute was the lead scientific institute for Problem 5 and as such hosted the Commission that coordinated it.502 It was assisted in managing Problem 5 tasks by the D. I. Ivanovsky Institute of Virology (currently a subsidiary, described later) and the M. P. Chumakov Institute of Poliomyelitis and Viral Encephalitides (currently a private research institute and thus not included here).503 The Gamaleya Institute’s classified R&D conducted under Problem 5 was focused on bacteria, select unusual viruses, epi-

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demiology, vaccine production, and diagnostics.504 Gamaleya scientists also conducted some offensive R&D for the Soviet BW program.505 Post-Soviet collapse, the institute was named in the New York Times because some of its scientist members had traveled to give lectures and workshops on the classical genetics of bacteria at the Pasteur Institute in Tehran, Iran.506 Recent work at the Gamaleya Institute has included investigations of the molecular evolution and ecology of Yersinia species, the molecular basis for the classification and taxonomy of Francisella and Brucella species, and methods to improve diagnosis of brucellosis.507 Research findings have led to improved detection and identification of Y. pestis and Brucella species. It has also led to the development of a recombinant live vaccine for F. tularensis.508 Institute researchers have also conducted research on the “mathematical modeling and computational prediction of epidemics and outbreaks of viral and bacterial infections caused by strains of modified microorganisms,”509 and on the “development of the methodology and mathematical models for operational analysis and prediction of the effects of the spread of especially dangerous infections in order to create a system of counteraction and protection of the population from acts of bioterrorism.”510 These are only samples of the Gamaleya Institute’s large output as its researchers have been creative and productive. Recently, the Gamaleya Institute also has conducted toxin R&D. Since 2007, its scientists have developed immunoassays for identifying botulinum toxins and diagnostic products for identifying staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) toxin.511 Given these R&D efforts, the Gamaleya Institute clearly remains involved in Russia’s biodefense efforts. Tenders issued in 2015 by Gamaleya to the Kirov Institute and the S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy (as already noted in both respective entries earlier) reveal that Gamaleya has a lead role in at least one of the several Ebola research programs being conducted in Russia.512 Unlike the other research efforts mentioned in this paragraph, the Ebola prophylaxis work does not figure on Gamaleya’s old and new websites’ lists of research interests.513 The most likely explanation for the rapid rate at which Gamaleya was able to present a vaccine for human testing is that, as discussed under the Vector entry, it modified a generic antigen-delivering biological system already in development. Gamaleya’s laboratory of active biostructures has carried out work on such generic systems.514 Given Gamaleya’s heavy involvement in Problem 5 research during the Soviet period, it may have also drawn on prior findings from classified research done on Ebola virus. The Gamaleya Institute’s publication output is superior to that of all other institutions presented in this chapter. If eLibrary.ru’s figures are to be believed, it generated an average of 223 publications of all types per year in the 2005–2016 period, placing it above Vector and well above all of the anti-plague institutes (see Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 in the insert section).515

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However, after reaching an all-time high of 308 publications in 2010, its output has declined. By 2014, it was down to 194 publications, and by 2015 it only had generated 73 publications of all types.516 It is possible that the dips in 2014 and 2015 are artifacts due to more recent publications not having yet been indexed, although we have not seen such dramatic dips in other indexed institutes in this chapter’s Annex 4.2. Another explanation to consider is that the institute could have been negatively impacted by recent financial constraints in the Russian budget. We find that explanation unconvincing given that all evidence suggests that Gamaleya is financially very well-off. One last hypothesis, which appears to us to be the most plausible, is that the institute’s share of commercial and/or biodefense work increased relative to its other research activities, and that the results of such work are not published.

D. I. Ivanovsky Institute of Virology. This institute, located in Moscow, is the oldest virology research institute in Russia. The MOD’s rationale for building and equipping the Zagorsk Institute in the early 1950s was that the only virological research institute in the Soviet Union was the Ivanovsky Institute, and, they argued, that it was too well-known to conduct covert BW research without being detected by foreign intelligence.517 However, as mentioned earlier, the institute did have an important role in Problem 5, along with the Gamaleya Institute, the Chumakov Institute, and four out of the five anti-plague institutes.518 It was responsible for studies on the biochemistry and molecular biology of viruses that were not investigated at the Gamaleya and the Chumakov institutes.519 The Ivanovsky Institute was brought under the Gamaleya Institute’s management in 2014.520 We have very little information about its current work; we have not found any of its publications indexed in the eLibrary.ru database. We presume this is because Gamaleya has fully absorbed the institute and its staff. If correct, it makes the ostensible drop in Gamaleya’s publications even more surprising. Gamaleya’s publication output should have increased subsequent to the influx of highly qualified D. I. Ivanovsky Institute scientists, especially given that they undoubtedly have had longlasting research ties with their Gamaleya colleagues and would therefore be relatively easily incorporated into Gamaleya’s research programs.

Open Financial Flows Throughout Both Military and Civilian Networks To better understand the research and funding links between the facilities and services named here, we built a database of open tenders given to the institutes in the organization diagram provided as Figure 4.1. We caution that the total ruble amount announced in a “request-for-proposal” tender is an upper

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bound on how much money the issuer will actually disburse, as the tender value is simply the maximum amount of money the issuer is willing to spend. We emphasize this point by referring to a tender’s “maximum worth.” We retrieved individual tenders through the Russian government’s official online portal Zakupki.521 Many of the non-research-oriented MOD institutes do not seek or answer open tenders. We were nevertheless able to find successful tender replies by 17 institutes of interest. We added a further three institutes, for a total of 20 core institutes, because of their known ties with flagged institutes in the Soviet period. Table 4.1 provides a list of the 20 core institutes we data mined, along with either their Chapter 4 subsection page numbers or a rationale for their inclusion. These open tenders showed how these institutes received funding from ministry budget lines, other governmental institutes, and private companies. We compiled summary information regarding the open tenders issued from the 20 institutes listed in Table 4.1 to one another, as well as tenders issued by another 27 institutions to these 20 core institutes. We emphasize that these 27 other institutions are not the only ones to have granted tenders to the 20 institutes of greatest interest. We selected these 27 additional institutions out of the total pool of such institutes because of their governmental status, because of their history, or simply because they served as a useful point of comparison to understand what typical financial transactions look like between various types of organizations in the Russian biotechnology field. To provide some examples, we included RAS institutes and the vaccine producer Microgen because of their important role in the Russian civilian biotechnology field (see Chapter 5), but we chose not to include local health authorities issuing small tenders for training.522 The oldest recorded transaction dates are from 2005 and the newest are from 2016. Out of a total of 560 tenders, only 11 tenders were issued in the 2005–2010 period. We aggregated the total ruble value of all of the tenders that we found to obtain a rough measure of the open financial flow between the 20 core institutes in this time frame. We display the results as a network diagram, shown as Figure 4.6 (see insert section following page 150). In Table 4.2, we provide the yearly cost and number breakdown for the tenders used to generate the network diagram. The diagram displays 103 aggregated financial flows encompassing 47 institutions. Of the 47 institutions pictured that issued or received tenders or conducted both activities, 43 issued tenders and 19 received tenders. Of these 19 tender recipients, only five did not themselves issue tenders to any of the other institutes. Thus, most institutions of interest had recently granted at least one public tender to another notable institution. In aggregate, the tenders issued by the core 20 institutes to one another had a maximum worth of 306,333,661 rubles. Tenders granted to these 20 institutes from the other 27 institutions represented a far more substantial

156 Table 4.1 The Primary Institutions Selected to Generate Figure 4.6

Diagram Abbreviations

33rd 48th

S. M. Kirov Medical Academy State Research Test Institute of Military Medicine 46th VECTOR

SRCAM

Mikrob

Volgograd Irkutsk

Stavropol Rostov-on-Don

Full Name

33rd Institute Aggregate account for the “48th Institute” (Kirov Institute) and its Sverdlovsk Institute and Zagorsk Institute subsidiaries S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy

Chapter 4 Subsection

p. 93 pp. 97–106 p. 107

State Research Test Institute of Military Medicine p. 108 46th Institute State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology “Vector” State Research Center for Applied Microbiology and Biotechnology Russian Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute “Mikrob” Volgograd Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute Irkutsk Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute for Siberia and the Far East Stavropol Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute Rostov-on-Don Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute Khabarovsk Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology (under Rospotrebnadzor)

Khabarovsk Research Institute Anti-Plague Center Federal State Anti-Plague Center, Moscow (Rospotrebnadzor) (under Rospotrebnadzor) Perm Federal Research Center of Medical and (Rospotrebnadzor) Preventative Technology for Risk Management of Public Health, Perm Gamaleya N. F. Gamaleya Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology D. I. Ivanovsky D. I. Ivanovsky Institute of Virology Chumakov Enterprise for the Manufacture of Bacterial and (Enterprise) Viral Preparations, M. P. Chumakov Institute of Poliomyelitis and Viral Encephalitis

Chumakov (Institute)

M. P. Chumakov Institute of Poliomyelitis and Viral Encephalitis

Mechnikov

I. I. Mechnikov Research Institute of Vaccines and Sera

p. 122 p. 133

p. 139

p. 141

p. 145 p. 146

p. 147 p. 147

p. 148 p. 149

p. 149 p. 152

p. 154 No subsection; included because of Soviet-era role; see Gamaleya subsection for more information. No subsection

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Table 4.2 Yearly Breakdown for the Tenders Used to Generate Figure 4.6

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total

Number of Tenders 1 1 1 0 4 4 145 103 105 73 87 36 560

Total Tender Amount (rubles)

58,380,000.00 115,992,232.00 22,546,500.00 0.00 168,810,000.00 22,792,000.00 1,188,939,478.81 659,918,805.88 736,449,994.21 310,972,719.74 773,195,429.15 183,110,846.50 4,241,108,006.29

Percentage of Total Value 1.38 2.73 0.53 0.00 3.98 0.54 28.03 15.56 17.36 7.33 18.23 4.32 100.00

additional 3,934,774,345 rubles. Overall, Figure 4.6 displays expected transfers of some 4.2 billion rubles, with the vast majority of the tenders and over 90 percent of the total value issued in the 2010–2015 time frame. To put this amount in perspective, the National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2014) described in Chapter 3 was supposed to provide some 36.4 billion rubles in total over the 2009–2014 period to many of the same institutions. This figure is just for comparison purposes, as few of the tenders summarized here were explicitly tied to this national program. What this comparison reveals is that while the tenders are a significant source of revenue for the 20 core institutions, the unknown direct funding lines from ministries to their own institutions could dwarf this amount. That said, even within a given bureaucratic structure, tenders are one method used by ministries to allocate funds. As can be seen in the diagram, both Rospotrebnadzor and the MOH issue tenders to their own institutes. This proved to be useful knowledge when paired with our other findings regarding the Volgograd and Gamaleya institutes. Gamaleya has been the recipient of a very large amount of government funding, as the thick arrows pointing toward Gamaleya in the network diagram demonstrate, but it did not openly receive MOD funding. By comparison, tenders assigned to Volgograd are almost invisible. Volgograd received no funds from ministries and few tenders from fellow institutes. As discussed in their entries earlier, both Gamaleya and Volgograd are most likely conducting biodefense research. The known projects run by Gamaleya are focused on detection, are well-publicized, and are not controversial. We assume that the Russian security services would not allow an

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institute to publicize the results of projects so highly classified that the underlying funding line came entirely from a classified budget. We conclude that the funds for Gamaleya’s known biodefense projects are probably coming from some of the tenders issued to Gamaleya from non-MOD ministries that are nevertheless involved in biodefense. Indeed, we found some tenders given to Gamaleya from its parent institution, the MOH, that openly mentioned dangerous pathogen biosensor work. By contrast, Volgograd’s funding and research program are opaque. As was the case for Volgograd, we have almost no data on the sources of funding for the MOD’s Kirov, Sverdlovsk, and Zagorsk institutes (collectively grouped under a “48th Institute” account). We did not find any MOD tenders issued to this collective account, which indicates that the MOD directly funds work at the three institutes through its budget rather than through open tenders. By contrast, we can see that the Ministry of Industry and Trade openly funds known military institutions, namely the 33rd Institute, the 46th Institute, and the S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy. Surprisingly, the Ministry of Industry and Trade has heavily funded Gamaleya. Gamaleya received tenders during the 2011–2014 period worth 738,545,000 rubles. The arrow from the Ministry of Industry and Trade to Gamaleya represents the greatest sum of money on the network diagram. In general, compared to the other institutes of greatest interest, Gamaleya has drawn in comparatively large sums of money from tenders. The large aggregate sum provided by the Ministry of Industry and Trade was nevertheless puzzling given that it was well above what Gamaleya made from responding to tenders from its own parent MOH. In addition, the network diagram shows that the Ministry of Industry and Trade is by far more often associated with MOD institutions than with civilian institutes with a biodefense role. A review of the underlying tender descriptors, which were mostly but not always available, revealed nothing suspicious. It appears the Ministry of Industry and Trade is funding several pre-clinical trials for perspective medications through Gamaleya. Open tenders provided direct information regarding the military ties of a select few civilian institutes of interest. The MOD provided some direct funding through a few large tenders to Vector (in 2011) and SRCAM (in 2011 and 2013). Vector itself then issued two tenders to the 33rd Institute, in 2011 and 2012 respectively. The 48th Institute (a joint account used by the Kirov Institute and its two subsidiaries, the Zagorsk and Sverdlovsk institutes) issued a tender to Mikrob in 2015. The S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy has repeatedly issued work to the Stavropol Anti-Plague Institute. As noted in their respective entries earlier, Mikrob and SRCAM have issued tenders to one another and to Vector at regular intervals that are peculiar for their lack of accompanying information. These may simply be poorly documented tenders, but this

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would be unusual for these institutes since they have properly issued plenty of other tenders. Instead, these tenders are probably funding sensitive commercial projects or are subcontracts for biodefense projects. Since all three institutes have recently received funding from military institutes, we cannot rule out the latter reason. A final detail gleaned from the exchange of tenders regards the interaction of certain RAS biotechnology institutions with the institutes of greatest interest. In recent years, Vector has established close ties with several RAS institutions. These institutes have contracted Vector for research work and for the provision of laboratory animals. RAS institutions that issued tenders to the institutes of greatest interest are almost always working exclusively with one such institute. Conclusions The Russian government has reached a critical juncture where it must decide on the future structure of its biodefense and military R&D policies with respect to the BWC. Serdyukov implemented the core of his military reforms, and Shoigu stabilized their political consequences. The success of these reforms undermined the bureaucratic rationale behind the “weapons based on new physical principles” discourse. Federal control over both the military and civilian biodefense institutes has been reestablished through the massive funding provided by the National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation. In particular, the program’s funding has enabled the upgrading of decrepit facilities and new construction at former BW institutes. As a result, the federal government’s control over these institutes has arguably never been stronger than since Soviet times. The Putin administration can wield its power to reassure BWC States Parties that its intentions in the biological field are strictly peacefully directed. To do so, the Russian government could choose to:

• Instruct MOD personnel, especially military R&D institution chiefs, to stop considering “genetic weapons” and “biotechnology-based weapons” in light of Russia’s BWC commitments. • Minimize cross-network interactions to lessen MOD’s influence on ostensibly civilian biodefense institutions. • Ensure that dual-use work, such as that conducted by Mikrob on genetically engineered strains, is appropriately flagged and explained in Russia’s annual CBMs. • Subtly demonstrate to fellow BWC member states the destruction or conversion of the remaining production infrastructure from the Soviet

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offensive BW program by internationally certifying the new medical production lines currently being built at the Kirov, Sverdlovsk, and Zagorsk MOD institutes.

Instead, the Russian government can continue to foster the conditions for developing “genetic” weapons and foster uncertainties as to its intentions in the biological sphere. It could choose to continue talking about developing “biotechnology-based weapons,” enable the military R&D and biodefense networks to collaborate on the development of such arms, further restrict what little information exists regarding key institutes, and spend the infrastructure renovation funds on dual-use production lines closed to foreigners. One can construct arguments that Russia is pursuing either vision of the future from the presented activities detected at its biodefense facilities and military R&D institutions. For instance, a major development that one can interpret as heading in either direction is the reconstruction and ostensible conversion of the idle BW production lines for the production of pharmaceutical compounds at the MOD’s Kirov, Sverdlovsk, and Zagorsk institutes. This work might be a positive development because it gives the Russian government the opportunity to invite foreign experts for the international certification of the production line’s quality, and hence certify the line’s new civilian nature without losing face. In 2004, the commander of the Zagorsk Institute left the door open for such an arrangement when he stated that his institute had not worked with the WHO simply because the center had not received an invitation to do so.523 However, as we have found out, the MOD plans to produce biodefense pharmaceuticals with these new production lines. In addition, the current commander of the Zagorsk Institute has been keen to keep the center closed to foreigners.524 As such, it remains an open question whether the Russian government will show the MOD lines to foreign experts. Should the Russian government not do so, the ostensibly civilian nature of their production work will be unverifiable. The end result in that case would be the reactivation of dual-use production lines at prior major BW facilities under the MOD’s control. Another development with unclear consequences for the BWC is that the military high command has invested significant efforts to reform the military R&D structure from the top-down Soviet planning approach to one incentivized to militarize civilian high-technology R&D breakthroughs. While official announcements have prominently portrayed the newly created ARF as achieving “new physical principles” technological breakthroughs for military purposes, in reality the relevant weapons R&D work in Russia has continued to take place at far more discreet MOD institutions bolstered and created by the Serdyukov reforms. Shoigu appears to have continued this push for greater MOD weaponization of civilian technological advances through the creation and staffing of the SPVIR network. This

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development was to be expected given the realities of Russia’s transition to a market-based economy. Given that the government cannot simply dictate industry to allocate resources for the R&D and production chosen by the MOD for developing new weapons as was done in the Soviet era, the MOD has an obvious need for structures that directly interact with the Russian civilian industrial base. However, in combination with talks of “genetic weapons” and “biotechnology-based weapons,” this MOD reform has created a network of weaponeers incentivized to view Russia’s civilian biotechnology industry as a source for future arms. Without firm negative guidance from the Putin administration and Shoigu’s staff, weapons violating the BWC are at risk of being proposed and funded. Specifically, a chain of events that concern us involves the apparent enthusiasm for “biotechnology-based weapons” at institutes planning and designing the MOD’s “non-lethal” weapons that also have significant influence over the SAP and the SAP’s R&D funds. A research group at the 3rd Institute runs the MOD’s non-lethal rocket artillery weapons program. This institute has done weapons development work for the 46th Institute along these lines, ultimately for the ground forces. The current director of the 3rd Institute and the prior director of the 46th Institute have gone on record as promoting biotechnology-based weapons as part of the so-called NBIC technology revolution in military weapons (see Chapter 3). The 46th Institute until recently drafted the SAP and likely retains significant influence over the direction of the SAP program, despite its decline of influence under Serdyukov. The Military Scientific Committee, which makes recommendations on which R&D programs to fund through the SAP, is heavily invested in maintaining large ground forces. When determining which projects to fund, it is likely to look favorably upon the 3rd Institute’s focus on ground forces equipment. In addition, it is likely to appreciate the fact that both the 3rd Institute and the 46th Institute are framing their new weapons as being for integration into the existing force structure, rather than as examples of “new physical principles” being harnessed for a Revolution in Military Affairs. The organization of interest here, the Department of Promising Joint Research and Special Projects, shares the same managing deputy minister as the 46th Institute. The department has actively indicated its support for unconventional weapons research, including “non-lethal” weapons. We know that the 3rd Institute has worked on a chemical incapacitant delivery system and on engine-killing weapons. We fear that, should the 3rd Institute follow its director’s bluster and lobby to develop “biotechnologybased” variants, it would have the strong bureaucratic backing of the 46th Institute, the Military Scientific Committee, and the Department of Promising Joint Research and Special Projects. The Russian government’s concerns over biological weapons enshrined in the official texts summarized in Chapter 3 have served to justify a major

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buildup of the Russian biodefense network. Within the MOD’s network, the NBC Troops have received new weapons, better personal and group protection, sophisticated mobile laboratories, and advanced training. The 33rd Institute at Shikhany-2 has been extensively renovated. The three military biological research laboratories that were of major importance to the Soviet BW program are as secretive in Russia as they were in the USSR, so their past and current work programs are opaque, as are their plans for the future. The Russian government and MOD have not maintained a coherent explanation regarding the main research directions of the State Research Test Institute of Military Medicine, while the very status of its Medico-Biological Defense Research Test Center subsidiary center is unclear. Moreover, the MOD has moved to refurbish a little-known open-air test site near Pyshma, ostensibly for testing disinfectants. The 2008 MOD’s NBC tender detailing infrastructure work at military sites under the National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation that revealed this test site (reproduced in Annex 4.1 of this chapter) also made puzzling references to maintaining a “mobilization capacity” at the National Collection of Microorganisms, of refurbishing “aerobiological testing” systems, and of establishing military storage for (presumably chemical) “incapacitants.” What the subsequent “National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation” for 2015 to 2020 has funded in this regard is not known, since it—unlike its predecessor—is a classified document. As for the civilian institutes previously involved in offensive BW work in Soviet times, they have been tasked with biodefense activities. Dual-use work with contestable civilian benefits and high military applicability continues at Mikrob, and perhaps elsewhere, on genetically engineered pathogen strains. We do not know the contents of any of the annual Russian CBMs, as they are confidential and only available to BWC States Parties. If Russia’s CBMs do not provide clarity on these developments, and especially if none of the measures listed above are taken to improve transparency, the combination of alarming governmental statements, the development of an R&D network in line with these statements, and the expansion of the Russian biodefense network risks to trigger a commensurate increase in US biodefense funding and perhaps even a diplomatic crisis over Russia’s BWC commitments. Annex 4.1 A 2008 NBC Troops Tender Describing Future Infrastructure Work This annex is taken from an open tender competition No. 109202230, posted by the “CNF NBC Russian Armed Forces” on June 19, 2008.525 The tender was titled: “placing orders for the execution of design and survey

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works for capital construction of objects of the troops of radiological, chemical and biological protection of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the needs of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in the framework of the Federal target program ‘national system of chemical and biological safety/security of the Russian Federation (2009–2013).’” Product deliveries were to be made in the Sergiyev Posad oblast, the Volsk district, and the Kirov and Yekaterinburg cities. The codes on the underlying attached files made clear that with one exception526 almost all of this work was to be conducted at facilities owned by the “33rd Institute” and the “48th Institute”—that is, territories owned by the 33rd Institute at Shikhany-2 and at those owned by the Kirov, Sverdlovsk, and Zagorsk MOD institutes. As discussed in the relevant entries for these four institutions in this chapter, a comparison with the text of the National System that funded this infrastructure renovation mostly uncovers which of these institutes control the infrastructure mentioned in a given lot. In total, the twenty-two lots had a maximum contract price value of 272,114,944 rubles. This tender only paid for project documentation work, and thus did not pay for actual facility construction work.

Lot No. 1: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of housing No. 19 to accommodate the federal center for the display and diagnostics of dangerous infectious diseases and the defeat of toxins of biological origin. Maximum contract price: 8,730,555 rubles Lot No. 2: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of engineering systems of the restricted area intended to contain the National Collection of Microorganisms and maintain mobilization readiness. Maximum contract price: 7,250,000 rubles Lot No. 3: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of housing No. 6 to accommodate facilities for the production of protective drugs against anthrax. Maximum contract price: 8,718,540 rubles Lot No. 4: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of the housing No. 6a to accommodate facilities for the production of vaccines against plague. Maximum contract price: 4,590,000 rubles Lot No. 5: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of the system of physical protection of sensitive areas, ensuring protection of laboratory buildings against unauthorized access. Maximum contract price: 10,800,000 rubles

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Lot No. 6: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of utilities, providing energy facilities territory regime for biosafety systems. Maximum contract price: 4,800,000 rubles Lot No. 7: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of housing stand No. 101A for the aerobiological testing of means and methods of protection against pathogenic biological agents. Maximum contract price: 6,416,735 rubles Lot No. 8: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of the climatic complex building No. 205 for testing collective protection equipment and means and methods of disinfection. Maximum contract price: 5,301,409 rubles Lot No. 9: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of the field test base “Pyshma” to assess the effectiveness of means and methods of biological prospecting and the elimination of the consequences of emergency situations. Maximum contract price: 11,070,241 rubles Lot No. 10: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of the equipment-technological process lines at building No. 201 to create production capacities for modern antibiotics for the prevention and treatment of dangerous and especially dangerous infectious diseases. Maximum contract price: 10,877,393 rubles Lot No. 11: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of production line in enclosure No. 122 for the production of fluoroquinolone antibacterial drugs for the prevention and treatment of dangerous and especially dangerous infectious diseases. Maximum contract price: 6,526,787 rubles Lot No. 12: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of the climatic chamber complex of building No. 130 for testing means and methods of protection against especially dangerous infections. Maximum contract price: 2,655,021 rubles Lot No. 13: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of laboratory building No. 1 for the development of remedies using hybridoma technologies. Maximum contract price: 9,463,626 rubles Lot No. 14: Development of project design documentation for the construction of housing No. 96 for the development and production of means of specific prophylaxis of especially dangerous infections through the use of large laboratory animals. Maximum contract price: 10,444,825 rubles

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Lot No. 15: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of facilities to ensure the mobilization readiness of the building No. 70ar. Maximum contract price: 4,678,831 rubles Lot No. 16: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of laboratory facilities for the maintenance of the federal collection of causative agents of especially dangerous hemorrhagic fever viruses in building No. 75. Maximum contract price: 14,012,039 rubles Lot No. 17: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of building No. 4. Maximum contract price: 120,708,991 rubles Lot No. 18: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of the system of physical protection of sensitive areas. Maximum contract price: 595,917 rubles Lot No. 19: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of the building No. 5. Maximum contract price: 12,897,562 rubles Lot No. 20: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction of the diesel power plant. Maximum contract price: 3,031,828 rubles Lot No. 21: Development of project design documentation for the reconstruction and equipping of area No. 3. Maximum contract price: 5,074,482 rubles

Lot No. 22: Development of project design documentation for the construction of the storage area for irritants. Maximum contract price: 3,470,162 rubles

Annex 4.2 Russia’s Scientific Electronic Library: eLibrary.ru One source we used throughout this chapter is the Scientific Electronic Library (eLibrary.ru), which is Russia’s largest digital library of scientific publications. It is integrated with the Russian Science Citation Index (RISC). It was created on order by the Ministry of Education with funding from the Russian Foundation for Basic Research and went into operation in 1999. After having accessed eLibrary.ru many times over two years, we have learned both its benefits and its problems. We believe it to be the largest collection of Russian-language scientific publications available online. It has

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benefited us in several ways; for example, it claims to contain information on more than 11,300 Russian scientific and educational organizations. Among this multitude, we have found entries for many of the organizations of interest to us. The site generates lists of publications whose authors are associated with a given institute, and provides a wealth of scientometric information on the institute’s publication output by means of an “overview” page. With this information in hand, we have been able to create graphs showing research outputs by year generated by the organizations we have studied, and which we can use to compare one organization with another. As for problems, we ran into the following two issues. First, as with any publication database, eLibrary.ru’s publication output numbers change over time as publications are added. Any publication dataset will see the last two years’ numbers grow over time as new publications are added, and collections of Soviet publications are likely to be incomplete. However, we noticed that publications were also regularly added to the 2000–2010 years in the eLibrary.ru database, causing large changes to what we had hoped would be stable yearly counts for this time period. During our two-year publication data collection, we observed over ten publications added to some yearly totals for past years. For example, when we first compiled data we had Mikrob’s 2011 output marked at 61 scientific journal publications and 75 publications of all types. When we retrieved data again on July 25, 2016, the value was 77 scientific journal publications and 103 publications of all types. This is a significant number given that yearly publication averages for many of these institutions do not exceed 100. Second, the “overview” pages that eLibrary.ru provides for organizations usually have differing publication counts by year than the count given in the actual list of publications. Some overview pages were missing large numbers of publications compared to what was available on the associated publication list. For example, the overview page on the State Research Test Institute of Military Medicine listed only three publications in total for the 2006–2016 period, whereas the associated publication list actually contained twenty-one publications in that time frame.527 Also, the overview pages sometimes report more publications than the list, although the list numbers are generally very close to the “publication of all types” total reported in the overview page. While any statistical analysis (other than basic comparative analysis) on such a poor dataset is likely to be meaningless, the eLibrary.ru collection is unquestionably the only comprehensive online Russian scientific publication portal. It is an immeasurable improvement over the old Soviet catalog system.

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Notes 1. As a reference point, Julian Cooper identified fifteen different stages in the Soviet development process for a major new weapons system, each involving different organizations. Julian Cooper, “The Soviet Union,” in John Beyer, ed., How Nuclear Weapons Decisions Are Made (New York: Oxford Research Group, 1986), p. 25. 2. A tender is a public call for bids on a project or procurement contract. 3. Details regarding the GS’s current function with respect to the MOD as well as its history can be found in Märta Carlsson, The Structure of Power: An Insight into the Russian Ministry of Defence, FOI-R-3571-SE (Umeå, Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency [FOI], November 2012), pp. 1–63; William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 10–11, 17, 20–29, 33, 53–54, 119–120, 189. 4. Currently, the Russian high command has a total of two first deputy prime ministers. This need not always remain the case. For instance, in 1964, the Soviet Union had three first deputy ministers of defense. William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), pp. 403–404. 5. Steven J. Main, Couch for the MoD or the CGS? The Russian Ministry of Defence & the General Staff 2001–2004 (Cambridge: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Russian Series, April 2004), pp. 1–24. 6. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Valery Gerasimov,” n.d., http://eng.mil.ru/en/management/info.htm?id=11113936@SD_Employee (accessed June 16, 2016); Anonymous, “Gerasimov New NGSh,” November 9, 2012, Russian Defense Policy, November 9, 2012, https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com /2012/11/09/gerasimov-new-ngsh; “Medvedev Said the New First Deputy Minister of Defense Would Upgrade the Armed Forces by 2020 with the Most Modern Weapons” (in Russian), TASS News, September 1, 2011, http://tass.ru/politika /499782 (accessed June 16, 2016); Anonymous, “Serdyukov’s New First Deputy,” Russian Defense Policy, September 1, 2011, https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com /2011/09/01/serdyukov%E2%80%99s-new-first-deputy. 7. “The President Made a Number of Appointments in the Leadership of the Defense Ministry” (in Russian), November 9, 2012, http://www.kremlin.ru/events /president/news/16776 (accessed June 16, 2016). 8. Oleg Bukharin, Timur Kadyshev, in Eugene Miasnikov, Pavel Podvig, Igor Sutyagin, Maxim Tarasenko, and Boris Zhelezov, eds., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 35–36. 9. Ibid. 10. Yuri Lipatov, “Appointed As the New Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), 1TV, November 9, 2012, https:// www.1tv.ru/news/2012/11/09/79076-naznachen_novyy_rukovoditel_generalnogo _shtaba_vooruzhennyh_sil_rf (accessed June 16, 2016). 11. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Valery Gerasimov,” “Profile: Russia’s New Military Chief Valery Gerasimov,” BBC News, November 9, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20270111 (accessed June 16, 2016). 12. “Personnel Changes at Defense Ministry,” November 9, 2012, http://en .kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16777 (accessed June 16, 2016). 13. Valery Gerasimov, “The General Staff and the Defense of the Country,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (VPK) Online, February 5, 2014, http://www.vpk -news.ru/articles/18998 (accessed June 16, 2016); Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov

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Right,” Military Review (January–February 2016), p. 31, http://usacac.army.mil /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art009.pdf. 14. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Tsalikov, Ruslan Hadzhismelovich” (in Russian), http://structure.mil.ru/management/info.htm?id=11312262 @SD_Employee (accessed June 16, 2016). 15. Presidential Decree no. 562, November 17, 2015, http://publication.pravo .gov.ru/Document/View/0001201511170011 (accessed June 16, 2016); Yuri Gavrilov, “The Deputy of All Deputies” (in Russian), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 12, 2012, https://rg.ru/2012/11/30/tsalikov-site.html (accessed June 16, 2016). 16. Julian Cooper, introduction to Julian Cooper, Keith Dexter, and Mark Harrison, The Numbered Factories and Other Establishments of the Soviet Defence Industry, 1927–67: A Guide, Part I—Factories and Shipyards, Soviet Industrialisation Project Series Occasional Paper no. 2 (Birmingham: University of Birmingham Center for Russian and East European Studies, 1999), pp. iv–vii, https://www2 .warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/vpk/history/part1/preface.pdf (accessed December 1, 2016). 17. Igor V. Domaradskij and Wendy Orent, Biowarrior: Inside the Soviet/Russian Biological War Machine (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 2003), p. 301. 18. Cooper, introduction to Cooper, Dexter, and Harrison, The Numbered Factories, p. vi. 19. “Institute at a Count’s Estate” (in Russian), Red Star, July 11, 2013, http://xn----7sbabjmgocx8a8ao2r.xn--p1ai/index.php/component/k2/item/10210 -institut-v-grafskom-imenii (accessed May 7, 2015). 20. Ibid. 21. A government decree and an advertisement for students in biology places it at Vol’sk-18, Saratov Region: “Order of the Government of the Russian Federation on June 25, 2013 N 1072-p Moscow 0” (in Russian), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, July 1, 2013, http://www.rg.ru/2013/07/01/nii-oborony-site-dok.html(accessed May 7, 2015); “33 Central Research Testing Institute of the Russian Defense Ministry Invites Young Professionals to Work” (in Russian), April 2, 2013, http://www .samsmu.ru/publications/news/2013/020413b (accessed May 7, 2015). A Red Star article confirms this, placing it at Shikhany, Saratov Region (Vol’sk-18 Shikhany-2): Vitaly Moroz, “The Institute in Shikhany” (in Russian), Red Star, July 9, 2008, http://old.redstar.ru/2008/07/09_07/2_01.html (accessed May 7, 2015). This site is located at the latitude-longitude coordinates of 52°05’50.28”N, 47°08’45.89”E. 22. Moroz, “The Institute in Shikhany.” 23. S. V. Kukhotkin, “Milestones” (in Russian), Voenno Istoricheskii Zhurnal 6 (June 2008), p. 31–36. 24. Moroz, “The Institute in Shikhany.” 25. Ibid. 26. Vil S. Mirzayanov, “Dismantling the Soviet/Russian Chemical Weapons Complex: An Insider’s View,” in Amy E. Smithson, Vil S. Mirzayanov, Roland Lajoie and Michael Krepon, eds., Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems and Prospects, Report no. 17 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, October 1995), pp. 24–25, 28. 27. Unit 74873 has long been associated with Shishkany-2. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, p. 752 n. 24, tab. 2.2. However, when we geolocated ground-level pictures of the barracks where Unit 74873 was based and where Unit 29753 is now, the locations matched. We believe Unit 74873 was moved or disbanded during the Serdyukov “New Look” reforms. 28. At 52°5’34.64”N, 47°8’35.96”E.

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29. “33rd Central Research and Testing Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Vol’sk” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated March 25, 2015, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile.asp?id=13761 (accessed March 31, 2015). 30. “Distribution of Publications by keyword: 33rd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense Test RF, Vol’sk” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated March 25, 2015, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile_keywords.asp?id=13761 (accessed March 31, 2015). 31. “33 Central Scientific-Research” (in Russian), http://www.freepatent.ru /search?searchid=2002563&text=33%20%D0%A6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82 %D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B9%20%D0 %BD%D0%B0%D1%83%D1%87%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D0%B8%D1%81%D1 %81%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%82%D0 %B5%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9&web=0# (accessed March 31, 2015). 32. The biohazard marking is visible on the equipment shown at the [0:31] time mark. CATF Shikhany Volsk 18, “33 TSNIII MO RF Shikhany-2 (Volsk-18) Video Part 1” (in Russian), uploaded June 4, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =zEN8ALzjJ2I (accessed May 31, 2016). 33. The testing setup consists of a treadmill upon which a soldier equipped with an NBC suit can run while wearing instrumentation. It is shown at the [0:33] time mark. Ibid. 34. A copy of Jane’s NBC Protective Equipment catalog is displayed next to an English-language dictionary of scientific and technical terms at the [0:07] time mark. CATF Shikhany Volsk 18, “33 TSNIII MO RF Shikhany-2 (Volsk-18) Video Part 2” (in Russian), uploaded June 4, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =Fdd1ov-pddc (accessed May 31, 2016). 35. Workers in protective clothing and wearing gas masks operate a Bunsen burner under a fume hood at the [3:29] time mark. Ibid. 36. A heavily clad laboratory space with robotic arm manipulators is displayed at the [2:39] time mark. Ibid. 37. For instance, a decontamination exercise is shown around the [3:40] time mark and an infantry and military vehicle deployment and firing exercise is shown around the [8:00] time mark. Ibid. 38. The sign is displayed at the [5:58] time mark. Ibid. 39. The footage is displayed at the [4:48] time mark. Ibid. 40. Contract no. 0360100043513000094, posted December 17, 2013, http:// zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber =0360100043513000094&source=epz. 41. Contract no. 0360100043513000095, posted December 17, 2013, http:// zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber =0360100043513000095&source=epz. 42. Contract no. 0360100043513000060, posted December 26, 2013, http:// zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber =0360100043513000060&source=epz. 43. Contract no. 0360100043513000047, posted September 22, 2013, http:// zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber =0360100043513000047&source=epz. 44. Contract no. 0360100043513000049, posted September 24, 2013, http:// zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber =0360100043513000049&source=epz; Contract no. 0360100043513000033, posted September 21, 2013, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html

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?reestrNumber=0360100043513000033&source=epz; Contract no. 0360100043513000032, posted September 21, 2013, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common -info.html?reestrNumber=0360100043513000032&source=epz; Contract no. 03601000 43513000031, posted September 21, 2013, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contract Card/common-info.html?reestrNumber=0360100043513000031&source=epz. 45. Contract no. 0360100043513000038, posted September 18, 2013, http:// zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber =0360100043513000038&source=epz. 46. Contract no. 0360100043513000059, posted December 6, 2013, http:// zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber =0360100043513000059&source=epz. 47. SBB Vacuum Group, “Development,” http://www.vacsushka.ru/development -ru. For reference, the Australia Group Control List regulates exports of “steam, gas or vapour sterilizable freeze-drying equipment with a condenser capacity of 10kg of ice or greater in 24 hours and less than 1000kg of ice in 24 hours.” Australia Group, “Dual-Use Biological Equipment and Related Technology and Software,” July 2015, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/dual_biological.html (accessed July 22, 2016). 48. STC, “Industrial Technologies” (in Russian), “About Us” (in Russian), http://ntcpromteh.ru. 49. The tender requested a ProJet 1000 printer and a two-kilogram cartridge of VisiJet FTI, Ivory. Contract no. 0360100043513000059, posted December 6, 2013, http://zakupki .gov.ru; State contract no. 11 \ OAEF-4646-Materials \ 5, “the supply of material resources for research activities in 2013,” September 2013, p. 7; “ProJet 1000 & 1500 Personal 3D Printers,” 3D Systems, pp. 1–2, https://www.3dsystems.com/sites /www.3dsystems.com/files/projet_1000_1500_us.pdf. 50. “Customer: FGKU ‘33 TSNIII’ Russian Defense Ministry” (in Russian), Contract no. 0360100043513000066, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard /payment-info-and-target-of-order.html?reestrNumber=0360100043513000066 (accessed September 8, 2014). 51. Catherine Novotroitskaya, “Life Science Research Institute Is Unique” (in Russian), Federal Specialized Magazine Who’s Who In Medicine 66, no. 2 (2014), http://ktovmedicine.ru/2014/2/nauka-o-zhizni-v-unikalnom-gosnii-biologicheskogo -priborostroeniya.html (accessed September 8, 2014). 52. Ibid. 53. Federal Medical and Biological Agency, “Subordinate Organizations,” http://fmbaros.ru/fmba/struckt_fmba/subordinate/?id_16=23. 54. State contract number 12\OAEF-4646-Services\1, “The Provision of Services (Works) for the Needs of the Treasury of the Federal State Institution ‘33 Central Research Test Institute of the Russian Ministry of Defense,’” 2013, pp. 1–13. 55. Ibid., p. 10. 56. Ibid. 57. It is possible that this detector series is also able to detect some toxins, although the Belarussian MOD website does not mention it having such a capability. Belarus Ministry of Defense, “Automatic Alarm for Specific Impurities” (in Russian), http://www.mil.by/ru/forces/special/rhbz/458/7857 (accessed September 15, 2016). 58. Contract no. 31502437221, posted June 5, 2015, http://zakupki.gov.ru /223/purchase/public/purchase/info/common-info.html?noticeId=2480554&epz =true. 59. These items are listed under “Volsk-18” in the National System text.

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60. Russian Federation, “Federal Targeted Program National System for Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2013)” (in Russian), Government Decree no. 791, October 27, 2008, http://www.alppp.ru/law/bezopasnost -i-ohrana-pravoporjadka/2/postanovlenie-pravitelstva-rf-ot-27-10-2008-791.html (accessed March 19, 2016). 61. At 52°05’50.38”N, 47°08’59.48”E. 62. At 52°06’5.02”N, 47°09’00.96”E. 63. At 52°06’11.91”N, 47°09’01.65”E. 64. At 52°05’03.82”N, 47°05’48.79”E. 65. At 58°36’6.59”N, 49°39’10.74”E. 66. “Seventeenth Arbitration Court of Appeal Decision Dated October 14, 2011 N 17AP-9186/2011-GC” (in Russian), http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi ?req=doc;base=RAPS017;n=58810 (accessed March 29, 2016); Yuri Belousov, “Object 19” (in Russian), Red Star, March 10, 2010, http://old.redstar.ru/2010/03 /10_03/2_04.html (accessed March 29, 2016). 67. Oleg Falichev and Yevgeny Starkov, “A Barrier Against Н1N1” (in Russian), Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (VPK) Online, November 11, 2009, http://vpk -news.ru/articles/6912 (accessed March 29, 2016). 68. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, p. 84. 69. The basis for this claim is that the Kirov Institute was working with aerosolized Y. pestis. See Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, p. 84. 70. Darya Fedotova, “Defense Ministry Buys Aggressive Macaques for the Development of New Vaccines” (in Russian), Moskovskiy Komsomolets, March 29, 2016, http://www.mk.ru/politics/2016/03/29/minoborony-zakupaet-agressivnykh -makak-dlya-razrabotki-novykh-vakcin.html (accessed July 19, 2016). 71. Order no. 0348100097816000038, posted June 24, 2016, http://zakupki.gov.ru. 72. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 194–196. 73. See, for example, J. E. Bell, “The Neuropathology of Adult HIV Infection,” Revue Neurologique 154, no. 12 (December 1998), pp. 812–829; F. Gray and M. C. Lescs, “HIV-Related Demyelinating Disease,” European Journal of Medicine 2, no. 2 (1993), p. 89–96. 74. Russian Federation, “Government Decree of 27.10.2008 N 791 on the Federal Targeted Program ‘National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2014)’” (in Russian), October 27, 2008, http://www .alppp.ru/law/bezopasnost-i-ohrana-pravoporjadka/2/postanovlenie-pravitelstva-rf -ot-27-10-2008-791.html (accessed March 19, 2016). 75. The Sverdlovsk Institute is located at 56°46’41.00”N, 60°34’45.00”E. 76. Paul S. Keim, David H. Walker, and Raymond A. Zilinskas, “Time to Worry About Anthrax Again,” Scientific American 316, no. 4 (April 2017), pp. 70–73. 77. A court case involved an apartment owned by the Unit, and noted that the individual could appeal through the Sverdlovsk court, tentatively placing the apartment—and thus the Unit—in Sverdlovsk. No. 2–619/2012, 16.03.2012, p. 2. 78. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, p. 112. The following translated text provided a very similar quote, but gave his rank as “colonel,” which in the Soviet/Russian system is one rank below that of major-general. See also: Sergey Parfenov, “The Secret of the Sarcophagus” (in Russian), Rodina no. 5 (1990), p. 88; “Soviet Union—Consequences of Alleged 1979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak Explore[d],” May 3, 1991, released January 3, 1997, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites /default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000100165.pdf. 79. Belousov, “Object 19.”

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80. “Method for Producing Granules Containing Immobilized Oxidizing Microorganisms” (in Russian), http://www.freepatent.ru/patents/2422521 (accessed March 19, 2016); “The Medium for the Cultivation of Hydrocarbon-Oxidizing Bacteria with Enhanced Destructive Capacity” (in Russian), http://www.freepatent.ru /patents/2390555 (accessed March 19, 2016). 81. V. V. Smyrnov, S. R. Reznyk, and I. V. Sorokulova, “The Highly Effective Biological Preparation Biosporin” (in Ukrainian), Likars’ka Sprava 5–6 (May–June 1994), pp. 133–138. 82. A. I. Poberi et al., “A Method for Producing Probiotic Biosporin” (in Russian), http://www.freepatent.ru/patents/2132196 (accessed June 6, 2016). 83. Only the cover name of the institute was used. I. V. Darmov, I. Yu Chicherin, A. S. Erdyakova, I. P. Pogorelsky, and I. A. Lundovskikh, “Comparative Assessment of Survival of Probiotic Microorganisms From Commercial Preparations Under the Conditions in Vitro,” Intestinal Microflora: Innovative Collection of Scientific Articles (in Russian) 2 (2013), p. 14. 84. I. A. Tuhbatov, “Intestinal Bacterial Composition Changes of Chicken-Broilers with Including in the Diet of a Probiotic and a Sorbent,” Agrarian Bulletin of the Urals—Russian Journal of Agrarian Research 3 (2016), http://avu.usaca.ru/en /issues/94/articles/2116. 85. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791, October 27, 2008. 86. See the insert Schema of Compound 19 in Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, p. 399. 87. Sited at 56°46’44.17”N, 60°34’30.62”E. 88. Sergei Pluzhnikov and Aleksey Shvedov, “Investigation: Murder from a Test Tube” (in Russian), Sovershenno Sekretno no. 4 (1998), pp. 12–14; Anthony Rimmington, “Invisible Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Soviet Union’s BW Programme and Its Implications for Contemporary Arms Control,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 13, no. 3 (2000), app. 2. 89. The court case assigns the test site’s benefactor as belonging to “FGBU 33 TSIII RF Ministry of Defense.” However, we also know from other sources that the 33rd Institute cover name was at one point used as a stand-in name by the Kirov, Sverdlovsk, and Zagorsk Institutes. The best explanation for this fact is that the Kirov Institute and its two subsidiaries were briefly put under the 33rd Institute’s formal control in the hierarchy of MOD institutes, and hence used their parent institute name. Decision of October 8, 2015, in Case no. A60-28714/2015. The original had been available at http://sudact.ru/arbitral/doc/nJcGPyoruZlK. A saved version of this now-defunct page can still be retrieved at http://archive.is/EN9gi. 90. Sited at 56°15’31”N, 38°07’08”E. 91. Anonymous, “Tough Choices for Vaktsina: Freedom or Closed Status?” (in Russian), Kopeika, January 23, 2013, http://www.kopeika.org/articles/view/4692 (accessed March 25, 2016). 92. Ibid. 93. Roza N. Lukina and Yevgeniy P. Lukin (eds.), The 50 Years of the Ministry of Defense Virology Center Deserve to Be Known (in Russian) (Sergiyev Posad: Veterans Council of the Virology Center of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense’s Scientific Research Institute for Microbiology, Publishing House Sergiyev Posad Ves, 2004), pp. 62, 178. (A copy of this book is available at the Hoover Institute Archives at Stanford University.) 94. Lena Norlander and Kristina S. Westerdahl, The Role of the New Russian Anti-Bioterrorism Centres, (Umeå, Sweden: Swedish Defense Research Agency [FOI], June 2006), pp. 14–15.

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95. Ibid., pp. 17–32. 96. Ibid. 97. Ibid., p. 52. 98. Rickettsia are bacteria that are similar to viruses because they live intracellularly. 99. V. V. Mikhailov, I. V. Borisevich, N. K. Chernikova, N. V. Potryvaeva, and V. P. Krasnyansky, “Evaluation of the Possibility of Ebola Fever Specific Prophylaxis in Baboons (Papio hamadryas),” Problems of Virology (in Russian) 39, no. 2 (1994), pp. 82–84. 100. V. P. Krasnyansky, V. V. Mikhailov, I. V. Borisevich, V. N. Gradoboev, A. A. Evseev, and V. A. Pschenichnov, “Preparation of Hyperimmune Horse Serum to Ebola Virus,” Problems of Virology (in Russian) 39, no. 2 (1994), pp. 91–92. 101. V. P. Krasnyansky, N. V. Potryvaeva, I. V. Borisevich, V. N. Gradoboev, T. P. Pashanina, and V. A. Pshenichnov, “Experience of Preparing Inactivated Vaccine Against Lassa Fever,” Problems of Virology (in Russian) 6 (1993), pp. 276–279; V. P. Krasnyansky, V. N. Gradoboev, I. V. Borisevich, N. V. Potryvaeva, E. V. Lebedinskaya, N. K. Chernikova, and G. D. Timankova, “Development and Study of the Properties of Immunoglobulin Against Lassa Fever,” Problems of Virology (in Russian) 42, no. 4 (1997), pp. 168–171. 102. I. V. Borisevich, N. V. Potryvayeva, S. A. Melnikov, A. A. Yevseyev, V. P. Krasnyansky, and V. A. Maksimov, “Design of Equine Serum-Based Marburg Virus Immunoglobulin,” Problems of Virology (in Russian) 53, no. 1 (2008), pp. 39–41. 103. Soviet military research on aerosol vaccines is described in R. A. Zilinskas and H. Alramini, “Aerosol Vaccines,” in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Innovation, Dual Use, and Security: Managing the Risks of Emerging Biological and Chemical Technologies (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012), pp. 263–264. Results of Russian aerosol vaccines against some classical biological warfare agents are summarized in Valentia A. Feodorova, Lidiya V. Sayapina, Michael J. Corbel, and Vladimir L. Motin, “Russian Vaccines Against Especially Dangerous Bacterial Pathogens,” Emerging Microbes and Infections 3 (December 2014), p. e86. 104. “Virology Center of the Scientific Research Institute for Microbiology in Sergiyev Posad” (in Russian), http://eLibrary.ru. 105. Nadezhda Markina, “The Vaccine Is for Official Use Only: Developers Do Not Disclose the Details of Creating the Russian Vaccines for Ebola Virus” (in Russian), Gazeta.ru, October 15, 2014, http://www.microsofttranslator.com/BV .aspx?ref=IE8Activity&a=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gazeta.ru%2Fscience%2F2014 %2F10%2F15_a_6261617.shtml (accessed April 13, 2016). 106. Ibid. 107. Ibid. 108. Ibid. 109. Anonymous, “Ministry of Defense: Vaccine Against Ebola Was Developed with Military Doctors” (in Russian), RIA Novosti, April 7, 2016, http://ria.ru /science/20160407/1404485263.html (accessed April 13, 2016). 110. Anonymous, “Round Table—Russian Ebola Vaccine: First Lessons and a View to the Future” (in Russian), Proceedings of Russian International Chamber of Commerce Meeting, March 15, 2016, https://www.rosminzdrav.ru/news/2016/03/15 /2844-ministr-veronika-skvortsova-vystupila-na-kruglom-stole-rossiyskaya-vaktsina -protiv-eboly-pervye-uroki-i-vzglyad-v-buduschee (accessed April 13, 2016). 111. Ibid. In December 2016, the WHO announced a successful clinical trial of the Ebola vaccine rVSV-ZEBOV in Guinea that involved 11,841 persons. The trial was conducted by the WHO, Guinea’s Ministry of Health, Medecins sans Frontieres, and the Norwegian Institute of Public Health. The vaccine was manufactured by Merck,

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Sharpe & Dohme after it had received breakthrough therapy designation from the US Food and Drug Administration. There was no mention of Russian involvement. 112. Association of Clinical Trials Organization, “Ebola Vaccine Research” (in Russian), Annual Report of the Association of Clinical Trials Organization no. 12 (2016), pp. 44–45, http://www.acto-russia.org/files/bulletin_12.pdf (accessed April 13, 2016). 113. Contract no. 1773401321415000112, posted March 30, 2016, http://zakupki .gov.ru. 114. Contract no. 1773401321415000100, posted September 11, 2015, http:// zakupki.gov.ru. 115. N. M. Zubavichene, V. V. Zolin, and E. A. Stavsky, “Liposomal and Suspension Forms of Immunoglobulins Against Ebola Fever as the New Medical Preparations,” Plague (in Russian) 4, no. 111 (2011), pp. 57–60 cites a paper by authors from the Zagorsk Institute, namely V. P. Krasnyansky, V. V. Mikhailov, I. V. Borisevich, V. N. Gradoboev, A. A. Evseev, and V. A. Pschenichnov, “Preparation of Hyperimmune Horse Serum to Ebola Virus,” Problems of Virology (in Russian) 39, no. 2 (1994), pp. 91–92. 116. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791. 117. The coordinates for the building in question are 56°15’34.62”N, 38°7’0.26”E. 118. Interview with Alexander Fisun and Sergey Buntman, “Military Council: Medical Support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), Echo of Moscow, April 26, 2014, http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/voensovet/1307736-echo (accessed March 19, 2016); “Ministry Planned Flu Vaccine for 100% of Military and Civilian Personnel of the Armed Forces” (in Russian), October 3, 2013, http://mil.ru /elections/news/more.htm?id=11851719@egNews (accessed April 6, 2014); Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “The Main Military Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), n.d., http://structure.mil .ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=9586@egOrganization (accessed April 6, 2014); Alex Krivoruchek, “Soldiers Became Less Sick” (in Russian), Izvestiya, July 3, 2014, http://izvestia.ru/news/573331 (accessed April 6, 2014). 119. “Military Medicine Will Receive More Than 300 Million Rubles for Research in 2014” (in Russian), RIA Novosti, November 14, 2013, http://ria.ru /defense_safety/20131114/976816335.html (accessed April 6, 2014). 120. Ibid. 121. “Source: Shoigu Restores the Status of the Main Military Medical Directorate” (in Russian), View, December 30, 2012, http://vz.ru/news/2012/12/30 /614444.html (accessed April 6, 2014). 122. “GVMU: Ministry of Defence Hospitals are Willing to Employ Moscow Doctors” (in Russian), RIA Novosti, January 19, 2015, https://news.mail.ru/politics /20772105/&usg=ALkJrhibiJ71vJkEYkAdONttvsbofrDMtg (accessed April 6, 2014); “Defense Ministry Will Employ More Than Two Thousand—Moscow Doctors Facing Redundancy” (in Russian), 360 TV, January 19, 2015, http://360tv.ru/news/minoborony -pomozhet-s-trudoustrojstvom-moskovskim-vracham-popavshim-pod-sokraschenie -12100 (accessed April 6, 2014). 123. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791. 124. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy” (in Russian), n.d., http://ens.mil.ru/education/higher/academy/more .htm?id=11170@morfOrgEduc (accessed June 14, 2016). 125. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Military Medical Academy Named After S. M. Kirov” (in Russian), n.d., http://ens.mil.ru/education/higher /academy/more.htm?id=11170@morfOrgEduc (accessed June 14, 2016).

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126. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 113–120. 127. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, S. M. Kirov Medical Academy, “About the University—Management” (in Russian), n.d., http://vmeda.mil.ru /vmeda/info/guide.htm (accessed June 14, 2016). 128. Federal State Military Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education of the S. M. Kirov Medical Academy, “Planning and Implementation of R&D” (in Russian), n.d., http://www.vmeda-mil.ru/planirovanie_i_realizacia_nir.html (accessed March 19, 2016); Medical Academy S. M. Kirov, “St. Petersburg” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated March 14, 2015, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile.asp ?id=5541 (accessed April 6, 2014). 129. “Distribution of Publications by Keyword, the S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy, St. Petersburg” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated March 14, 2015, http:// elibrary.ru/org_profile_keywords.asp?id=5541 (accessed April 6, 2014). 130. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, S. M. Kirov Medical Academy, “Structure,” n.d., http://vmeda.mil.ru/vmeda/info/structure.htm (accessed June 14, 2016). 131. For a Soviet example, see Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, p. 271. 132. Contract no. 1773401321415000100, posted September 11, 2015, http:// zakupki.gov.ru. 133. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791, October 27, 2008. 134. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “The Russian Defense Ministry Re-Established the State Scientific-Research Testing Institute of Military Medicine” (in Russian), http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12054710 @egNews (accessed June 14, 2016). 135. Dates differ between the MOD press release (2011) and the decree that reestablished the institution (2010). Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “The Russian Defense Ministry Re-Established the State Scientific-Research Testing Institute of Military Medicine”; Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “On the Re-Establishment of the State Scientific Research Testing Institute of Military Medicine (St. Petersburg)” (in Russian), Order no. 965-p, May 27, 2015, http://government.ru/docs/18298 (accessed June 14, 2016). 136. Although the Test Institute is still listed as a subsidiary to the Medical Academy on the MOD’s website, we believe this is only because the site has not been updated for some time and therefore does not reflect the 2015 changes. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “The Russian Defense Ministry Re-Established the State Scientific-Research Testing Institute of Military Medicine.” 137. Advanced Research Foundation, “Problems of Creation of Modern Military and Medical Technology Discussed in St. Petersburg” (in Russian), December 2, 2015, http://fpi.gov.ru/press/news/20151202(accessed June 14, 2016). 138. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “The Russian Defense Ministry Re-Established the State Scientific-Research Testing Institute of Military Medicine.” 139. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “On the Re-Establishment of the State Scientific Research Testing Institute of Military Medicine (St. Petersburg).” 140. “State Research Test Institute of Military Medicine, Saint Petersburg” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated June 9, 2016, http://elibrary.ru/org_items.asp?orgsid =15233 (accessed July 8, 2016). 141. Advanced Research Foundation, “Problems of Creating Modern Military and Medical Technology Discussed in St. Petersburg” (in Russian), December 2, 2015, http://fpi.gov.ru/press/news/20151202 (accessed June 14, 2016). On the use of this

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formal term, see, for example, Rospotrebnadzor, “Problem Commission 48.05, ‘Biosecurity and Counter-Bioterrorism,’ Coordinating Research Council on SanitaryEpidemiological Protection of the Territory of the Russian Federation,” n.d., http:// vnipchi.rospotrebnadzor.ru/directions/research/problem (accessed July 27, 2016). 142. Volgograd Anti-Plague Research Institute, Rospotrebnadzor, “Areas of Research” (in Russian), n.d., http://vnipchi.rospotrebnadzor.ru/directions/directions (accessed July 8, 2016). 143. Order no. 0173100004512002714, Russian Defense Ministry, posted October 5, 2012, http://zakupki.gov.ru/pgz/public/action/orders/info/order_document _list_info/show?source=epz¬ificationId=4458958. 144. “Plague Suit ‘Quartz-1M’” (in Russian), Lotos 911, November 7, 2016, http:// lotos911.tiu.ru/p295965-protivochumnyj-kostyum-kvarts.html (accessed November 7, 2016). 145. Order no. 0173100004512002714, Russian Defense Ministry. 146. Desmond Heng et al., “The Nano Spray Dryer B-90,” Expert Opinion on Drug Delivery 8, no. 7 (June 16, 2011), pp. 965–972, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih .gov/pubmed/21675936. 147. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 113–115. 148. Ibid. 149. Ibid. 150. A. V. Stepanov, V. M. Dobrynin, M. N. Smirnov, and G. V. Tsikharishvili, “Recombinant Cytokines—Promising Protection from Dangerous Infectious Diseases,” Proceedings of the Ninth National Conference on “Actual Problems of Protection and Security” (in Russian), vol. 6, Medical and Biological Problems, 2006, http://www.npo-sm.ru/pdf/conf_9_t_6.pdf. 151. “Chemical Weapons ‘Indestructible’ Russia Warns,” RIA Novosti, November 8, 2012, http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20121108/177303963.html. 152. “Yevstigneev on Russian Biological Weapons,” Yaderny Kontrol no. 11 (PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia, Summer 1999), http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat /nuclear/PIR071299.html; Greg Austin and Alexey D. Muraviev, The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia (New York: Victoria House, 2000), p. 168. 153. Ibid. 154. “The Russian Armed Forces Have Appointed Colonel Yevgeny Starkov as Chief of the Chemical Corps” (in Russian), Weapons of Russia, http://www.arms -expo.ru/049051124050055050057.html (accessed April 6, 2014). 155. “Russia to Spend $183 Million on Chemical, Bio Defense in 2013,” RIA Novosti, November 12, 2012, http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20121211/178070125 .html; “Chemical Weapons ‘Indestructible’ Russia Warns.” 156. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Office of the Chief Chemical Corps of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), http://structure .mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_Defense/details.htm?id=11172@egOrganization (accessed April 6, 2014). 157. On the history of the NBC Troops, see Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Chemical Corps—95 Years!” (in Russian), November 13, 2011, http:// function.mil.ru/news_page/world/more.htm?id=11866435@egNews (accessed June 17, 2016); Steven J. Zaloga and Leland S. Ness, Companion to the Red Army: 1939–1945 (The Mill: History Press, 2009), pp. 154–155. 158. Soviet GS study of the Afghan War authored by Colonel Valentin Runov et al., translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,

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2002), pp. 255–263; Charles Bartles, “Keeping NBC Relevant: Flame Weapons in the Russian Armed Forces,” March 2015, pp. 1–14, http://fmso.leavenworth.army .mil/documents/Flame_2015.pdf. 159. The following resources are useful for this paragraph: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Armament: NBC Troops” (in Russian), http://structure .mil.ru/structure/forces/ground/weapons/rhbz.htm (accessed April 6, 2014); “Radiation and Chemical Protection Facilities,” http://militaryforces.ru/firearms-3-68.html (accessed April 6, 2014). 160. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Armament: NBC Troops,” in Nikolai Spassky and Sergei Ivanov, eds., Russia’s Arms Catalog, vol. 1, Army (Moscow: Military Parade, 1997), pp. 218–219, 220–221; “Russia’s New NBC Units to Receive Advanced Equipment,” RostechnologiesBlog, September 26, 2014, https://rostechnologiesblog.wordpress.com/2014/09/26/russias-new-nbc-units-to -receive-advanced-equipment (accessed April 6, 2014); Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Division of NBC Defense YUVO [Southern Military District] Learn New Tools and Weapons Systems” (in Russian), November 13, 2012, http:// function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=11458409@egNews (accessed April 6, 2014); Vitaly Kuzmin, “Exercises of CBRN Protection Units—Part 2: Vehicles and Armament” (mostly in Russian but with some English translations), November 30, 2011, http://vitalykuzmin.net/?q=node/411 (accessed April 6, 2014); “Russian Airborne Troops: Troop Units Will Receive New Machines for Chemical Protection RKhM-6 at the End of 2014,” Arms Expo (in Russian), July 5, 2014, http://www.arms-expo.ru/news/armed_forces/vdv_rossii_podrazdeleniya_voysk _poluchat_novye_mashiny_khimicheskoy_zashchity_rkhm_6_v_kontse_2014_g (accessed April 6, 2014); IHS Jane’s, “NBC Reconnaissance Vehicles Are Advancing from the Wilderness,” International Defence Review, April 5, 2006, pp. 5–6. 161. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Armament: NBC Troops,” Russia’s Arms Catalog: Volume I Army, pp. 222–223; “Russia’s New NBC Units to Receive Advanced Equipment,” RostechnologiesBlog; Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “New NBC Defense Regiment ZVO [Western Military District] Successfully Completed Its First Field Training” (in Russian), March 26, 2015, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12011807@egNews (accessed April 6, 2014). The following two authors identified themselves as from the MOD: Viktor Kholstov and Alexander Gunyev, “Present and Future Chemical and Biological Warfare Protection,” in Proceedings of the Fifth International Symposium on Protection Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, supplement, Stockholm, June 11–16, 1995, FOA-R-95-00202-4.9-SE (Umeå: Swedish Defense Research Agency, Department of NBC Defense, December 1995), p. 27. 162. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Armament: NBC Troops,” Russia’s Arms Catalog: Volume I Army, pp. 220, 241–244; Kholstov and Gunyev, “Present and Future Chemical and Biological Warfare Protection,” p. 26; “OPS-5 Water Distillation Plant,” http://militaryforces.ru/weapon-3-68-482.html (accessed April 6, 2014). 163. There is also a TZM-T dedicated reloading vehicle used alongside the TOS1A. See Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Armament: NBC Troops” and Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Division of NBC Defense YUVO.” 164. A picture of the TDA-3 during a training exercise can be found at Vitaly Kuzmin, “Exercises of CBRN Protection Units—Part 2: Vehicles and Armament.” 165. “Gas-Thermal Generator of Smoke Machine RU 2489670” (in Russian), n.d., http://russianpatents.com/patent/248/2489670.html (accessed April 6, 2014).

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166. “Heavy Flamethrower System TOS-1A” (in Russian), Rocketr, July 2014, http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/tos-1a/tos-1a.shtml (accessed April 6, 2014); “Defense Ministry Tested New Missiles for Heavy Flamethrower Systems,” Lenta.ru, April 10, 2012, http://lenta.ru/news/2012/04/10/tos1a (accessed April 6, 2014). 167. “The Soldiers of the NBC Brigade Hid ‘Tochka-C’ From the Enemy” (in Russian), TV Vzvesda, November 16, 2015, http://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content /201511161031–1603.htm (accessed June 1, 2015). 168. Anonymous, “Ten ‘New’ Chemical Defense Regiments,” Russian Defense Policy, July 5, 2015, https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2015/07/05/ten-new -chemical-defense-regiments. 169. Ibid. 170. Ibid.; “Russia’s CMD to Create Two Chemical Defence Regiments,” Rostechnologies, October 10, 2014, https://rostechnologiesblog.wordpress.com/2014 /10/10/russias-cmd-to-create-two-chemical-defence-regiments (accessed April 6, 2014); “Russia’s New NBC Units to Receive Advanced Equipment,” Rostechnologies, September 26, 2014, https://rostechnologiesblog.wordpress.com/2014/10/10 /russias-cmd-to-create-two-chemical-defence-regiments (accessed April 6, 2014); “Crimea Sees Creation of First CBRN Defense Unit,” Sputnik News, June 30, 2014, http://sputniknews.com/military/20140630/190759256.html (accessed April 6, 2014). 171. “Russia’s New NBC Units to Receive Advanced Equipment,” RostechnologiesBlog; Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “The Russian Armed Forces Day of the NBC Defense Troops Is Celebrated” (in Russian), November 13, 2012, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=11457953@egNews (accessed April 6, 2014). 172. Falichev and Starkov, “A Barrier Against Н1N1.” 173. “Modern Multifunctional Mobile Complex for Analysis of Pathogenic Biological Materials Created for NBC,” RostechnologiesBlog, January 12, 2015, https:// rostechnologiesblog.wordpress.com/2015/01/12/modern-multifunctional-mobile -complex-for-analysis-of-pathogenic-biological-materials-created-for-nbc (accessed April 6, 2014); “Russian Army to Receive Advanced Flame Weapons,” RostechnologiesBlog, November 13, 2014, https://rostechnologiesblog.wordpress.com/2014/11 /13/russian-army-to-receive-advanced-flame-weapons (accessed April 6, 2014). 174. Alex Krivoruchek, “Shoigu Started the Fight Against Bioterrorism” (in Russian), Izvestiya, November 28, 2013, http://izvestia.ru/news/561574 (accessed April 6, 2014). 175. Anatoly Boreysho et al., “Remote Detection and Recognition of Bio-Aerosols by Laser-Induced Fluorescence Lidar: Practical Implementation and Field Tests,” in Gennadii G. Matvienko et al., eds., International Conference on Lasers, Applications, and Technologies 2007: Environmental Monitoring and Ecological Applications; Optical Sensors in Biological, Chemical, and Engineering Technologies; and Femtosecond Laser Pulse Filamentation: Proceedings of the SPIE vol. 6733, article ID: 673305, June 2007. The abstract is available at http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs /2007SPIE.6733E...1B (accessed April 6, 2014). 176. “Defense Ministry Tested New Missiles for Heavy Flamethrower Systems,” Lenta.ru; Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Division of NBC Defense YUVO.” 177. Christopher F. Foss, “Russian Armata MBT Trials Under Way,” IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 28, 2014, http://www.janes.com/article/33162/russian-armata -mbt-trials-under-way. 178. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “A Military Parade in Nizhny Novgorod Will Demonstrate the Latest ‘Nerehta’ Combat Gear of the NBC Defense

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Troops” (in Russian), May 5, 2015, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more .htm?id=12028990@egNews (accessed April 6, 2014). 179. “The Military Department Shall Establish a System to Neutralize Biological Attacks and Outbreaks of Deadly Diseases” (in Russian), Izvestiya, July 30, 2013, http://izvestia.ru/news/554429#ixzz2aWcfACjg (accessed April 6, 2014). 180. Ibid. 181. “Russian Military Protection Against Biological Threats” (in Russian), Pravda.ru, July 30, 2013, http://www.pravda.ru/news/science/30-07-2013/1167882 -ugroza-0/# (accessed April 6, 2014). 182. Izvestiya, July 30, 2013. 183. The total was 284,140,000 rubles, divided as follows: 21,640,000 for Berkut-1, 40,000,000 for Nightingale-1, 90,000,000 for Hoopoe-1, 44,500,000 for Bittern-1, and 88,000,000 for Bustard-1. See Order no. 0173100004513001917, Russian Defense Ministry, posted July 10, 2013, http://zakupki.gov.ru/pgz/public /action/orders/info/order_lot_list_info/show?source=epz¬ificationId=6557601. 184. Order no. 0173100004513001917, Russian Defense Ministry. 185. Ibid., “Minutes of the Evaluation and Comparison no. 0173100004513001917-P 3 Applications from 09.11.2013,” http://zakupki.gov.ru/pgz/printForm?type=PROTOCOL &id=11002305. 186. Ellen Jones, “Defense R&D Policymaking in the USSR,” in Jiri Valenta and William Potter, eds., in Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security (London: Allen and Unwin, 1984), pp. 118–119. 187. “In the New Academic Year, the Number of Combat Training in the Divisions of the Western Military District, NBC Will Double” (in Russian), Press Service of the Western Military District, November 12, 2014, http://function.mil.ru/news _page/country/more.htm?id=12092572 (accessed October 7, 2016). 188. Ministry of Defense, “The Russian Armed Forces Have Started Special Exercises by Type of Comprehensive Support” (in Russian), Press Service of the Office of Information, August 11, 2016, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country /more.htm?id=12092572 (accessed October 7, 2016). 189. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Marshal S. Timoshenko Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense and Engineer Troops College” (in Russian), n.d., http://ens.mil.ru/education/higher/more.htm?id=8690@morf .OrgEduc (accessed June 12, 2016); Falichev and Starkov, “A Barrier Against Н1N1.” 190. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Higher Education,” http:// eng.mil.ru/en/education/higher.htm (accessed June 12, 2016). 191. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Research Company of the Marshal S. Timoshenko Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense and Engineer Troops College” (in Russian), n.d., http://ens.mil.ru/education/documents/more .htm?id=12034629@egNPA (accessed June 12, 2016). 192. Falichev and Starkov, “A Barrier Against Н1N1.” 193. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “The Ministry of Defense Discussed the Measures to Improve the Military-Scientific Complex of the Armed Forces” (in Russian), February 17, 2016, http://mil.ru/et/news/more.htm?id =12078827@egNews (accessed June 13, 2016); Alexander Alexandrov, “The Vector of Development of Military Science” (in Russian), Red Star, March 18, 2011, http:// old.redstar.ru/2011/03/18_03/2_03.html (accessed June 10, 2016). 194. Ibid. 195. “Order of the RF Military of Defense on the Establishment of MilitaryTechnical Council of Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,” document as

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amended 2 February 2008, Order no. 104, February 17, 1998, http://zakon.7law.info /base44/part3/d44ru3311.htm (accessed June 13, 2016). 196. Ibid. 197. “‘Passion’ Will Not Let You Know What They Say” (in Russian), i-Mash, May 18, 2012, http://www.i-mash.ru/news/nov_otrasl/22344-azart-ne-pozvolit-uznat -o-chem-govorjat-voennye.html(accessed June 12, 2016). 198. See, for instance, JSC Concern “Constellation,” “Exhibitions: Meeting of the Military-Technical Council of the Ministry of Defense in Russia” (in Russian), February 27, 2015, http://www.sozvezdie.su/exhibitions/zasedanie_voennotehnicheskogo _soveta (accessed June 13, 2016); Igor Korotchenko, “Interview of Vyacheslav V. Presnukhin: The Defense Ministry Tells About the Program of the Forum ‘Army-2015’” (in Russian), RusNovosti, May 2, 2015, http://rusnovosti.ru/posts/372320 (accessed June 13, 2016); Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Chairman of the Military Scientific Committee of the RF Armed Forces: Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Lieutenant-General Igor Makushev Spoke About the Plans of Scientific-Business Program of the Forum ‘Army 2016’” (in Russian), n.d., http://mil.ru /army2016/statements/more.htm?id=12083052@cmsArticle (accessed June 13, 2016). 199. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Chairman of the Military Scientific Committee of the RF Armed Forces.” 200. Ibid. 201. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Military Scientific Committee of the Armed Forces,” n.d., http://eng.mil.ru/en/science/committee.htm (accessed June 1, 2016); Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Information Warfare: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?” in Roger N. McDermott, ed., The Transformation of Russia’s Armed Forces: Twenty Lost Years (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), p. 166. 202. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Military Scientific Committee of the Armed Forces.” 203. Ibid. See also the committee’s mentions in Dmitry Gorenburg, “Text of Makarov’s Speech at the Academy of Military Sciences,” Russian Military Reforms, April 5, 2011, https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2011/04/05/text-of-makarovs-speech -at-the-academy-of-military-sciences. 204. Anonymous, “Russian Army to Showcase Designs at Army-2016 Military Tech Show,” Sputnik International, March 3, 2016, https://sputniknews.com/military /20160303/1035704040/russian-army-researchers-showcase-designs-military -technology-show.html (accessed September 22, 2016). 205. “The ‘Mouthpiece of the August War’ in 2008 Dismissed from the Army” (in Russian), RBC, May 28, 2012, http://www.rbc.ru/society/28/05/2012/652401 .html (accessed June 10, 2016); “Igor Sheremet, Who Was Fired After His Criticism of Serdyukov, Became a Member of the Military-Industrial Complex,” RIA Novosti, November 20, 2012, http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20121120/911444576.html (accessed June 9, 2016). 206. Sergei Buntman and Anatoly Ermolin, “Interview of Igor Sheremet” (in Russian), Echo of Moscow, March 28, 2011, http://echo.msk.ru/programs/voensovet /778361-echo (accessed June 1, 2016). 207. Ibid. 208. The quantum computing mentions can be found in Sergey Ptichkin, “Interview of Igor Sheremet: Trojan Code” (in Russian), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, November 23, 2014, https://rg.ru/2014/11/21/kod.html (accessed June 9, 2016); Igor Sheremet, “Russian Cyber Threats Are Growing—Part 1” (in Russian), Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (VPK) Online, February 10, 2014, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/19092 (accessed June 9, 2016).

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209. Igor Korotchenko, “Interview of Ivan Kharchenko: The New Industrialization of the Country Begins with Defense,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (VPK) Online—War Diary Blog, March 14, 2013, http://vpk.name/news/86056_novaya _industrializaciya_stranyi_nachinaetsya_s_oboronki.html (accessed June 9, 2016). 210. Ibid. 211. Victor Malyutin, “Interview of Igor Sheremet: Planning and 3D-Modeling: Weapons of Military Science—A New Look” (in Russian), Moskovskiy Komsomolets Online, March 29, 2012, http://www.mk.ru/editions/daily/2012/03/29/687084 -planirovanie-i-3dmodelirovanie.html (accessed June 2, 2016). 212. Ibid. 213. Alexandrov, “The Vector of Development of Military Science.” 214. Buntman and Ermolin, “Interview of Igor Sheremet.” 215. Ibid. 216. Thomas, “Russia’s Information Warfare,” p. 166. 217. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Scientific Research Center ‘Defense Solutions Bureau’ of the Russian Ministry of Defense Presented a Report on the Project’s Work” (in Russian), October 23, 2013, http://ens.mil.ru/science /spvir/news/more.htm?id=11863181@egNews (accessed April 6, 2014); Anonymous, “Defense Ministry Creates New Research System,” Moscow Times, April 17, 2013, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/defense-ministry-creates -new-research-system/478793.html (accessed April 6, 2014). 218. “Defense Ministry Creates New Research System,”Moscow Times. 219. Several of the SPVIR’s institutes are known to be under Deputy Minister Pavel Popov’s portfolio, and hence are not directly under Shoigu’s control unlike what was implied in the media article. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Deputy Ministers” (in Russian), n.d., http://structure.mil.ru/management /deputy.htm (accessed June 12, 2016). 220. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Scientific Research Center ‘Defense Solutions Bureau’ of the Russian Ministry of Defense Presented a Report on the Project’s Work.” 221. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “National Research Center ‘Defense Solutions Bureau’” (in Russian), http://ens.mil.ru/science/SRI/bor/about .htm (accessed September 1, 2014). 222. This research competition was explicitly sold as, in part, a recruiting and training campaign aimed at young Russian professionals; the short time frame was criticized as favoring established professionals and active weapons projects, but it appears that this criticism was somewhat unfounded as the bureau offered training for individual participants based on the latter’s initial project idea. “‘Defense Solutions Bureau’ and ASI Announce a Competition for Projects, Aimed at the Creation of Dual-Use Technologies” (in Russian), Public Council for Improvement of Investment Climate Under the Aegis of the President of Bashkortostan Republic, October 3, 2012, http://investrb.ru/news/123(accessed April 6, 2014). 223. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Topics of Scientific Research Work” (in Russian), October 7, 2012, http://ens.mil.ru/education/contests /more.htm?id=1720@morfSimpleEvent (accessed April 6, 2014). 224. Ibid. 225. “Defense Ministry Creates New Research System,” Moscow Times. 226. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Deputy Ministers” (in Russian), n.d., http://structure.mil.ru/management/deputy.htm (accessed June 12, 2016). 227. Alexander Levashov, “Russia’s Defense Ministry Has Formed High-Tech Units and Hires Cyber-Soldiers” (in Russian), C News, April 18, 2014, http://www

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.cnews.ru/news/top/minoborony_rf_sformirovalo_hajtekpodrazdeleniya (accessed June 22, 2016). 228. “Defense Ministry Creates New Research System,” Moscow Times. 229. O. N. Ostapenko and I. M. Levkin, “Features of the Organization of Innovative Activity in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation,” Management Consulting (in Russian) 11 (2013), pp. 7–13. 230. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Information on SPVIR of the MOD of RF” (in Russian), n.d., http://stat.ens.mil.ru/science/spvir/about.htm (accessed October 25, 2014). 231. Ibid.; Igor Plugatarev, “Main Goal—Excellence” (in Russian), Belarussian Military Newspaper—To the Glory of the Motherland no. 112, January 14, 2014, http://vsr.mil.by/2014/01/14/glavnaya-cel-prevosxodstvo (accessed June 17, 2016). 232. Ostapenko and Levkin, “Features of the Organization of Innovative Activity,” p. 12. 233. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Information on SPVIR of the MOD of RF.” 234. Ostapenko and Levkin, “Features of the Organization of Innovative Activity,” p. 8. 235. Levashov, “Russia’s Defense Ministry Has Formed High-Tech Units.” 236. “Defense Ministry Creates New Research System.” 237. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Information on SPVIR of the MOD of RF.” 238. Ibid. 239. We used the services provided by the Wayback Machine website to make this determination. See the archived page at http://ens.mil.ru/science/spvir/about.htm (accessed June 17, 2016). 240. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “General Administration of Research Activities and Technological Support of Advanced Technologies (Innovative Research) of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), http:// structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_Defense/details.htm?id=11376@egOrganization (accessed April 6, 2014). 241. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “The Directorate of Scientific Research Activities and Technological Support of Advanced Technologies (Innovative Research) of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), http:// structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_Defense/details.htm?id=11376@egOrganization (accessed October 20, 2014). 242. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Information-Analytical Center (Collection, Analysis and Preparation of Information) of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), n.d., http://structure.mil.ru/structure /ministry_of_Defense/details.htm?id=11375@egOrganization (accessed April 6, 2014). 243. Ibid. 244. Ibid. 245. Leonid Kondratiev, “Stake—on Innovation” (in Russian), Defence Russia, September 23, 2013, http://ros-oborona.ru/publications/stavka-na-innovatsii (accessed June 22, 2016). 246. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Coordination and Advisory Office (Research Activities) of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), http://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id =11374@egOrganization (accessed February 13, 2014). 247. Ibid. 248. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Department of Promising Joint Research and Special Projects of the Defense Ministry” (in Russian), n.d., http://

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structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_Defense/details.htm?id=11419@egOrganization (accessed September 1, 2014); Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Leadership—Deputy Ministers” (in Russian), n.d., http://structure.mil.ru/management /deputy.htm (accessed September 1, 2014). 249. Sergei Pankov, “The Role of Military Technology in the Development of Weapons Systems for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), n.d., http://federalbook.ru/files/OPK/Soderjanie/OPK-10/III/Pankov.pdf (accessed April 6, 2014). 250. Ibid., p. 442. 251. Gundarov, “Defense Ministry Has Asked for Help.” 252. Pankov, “The Role of Military Technology,” p. 443. 253. For example, the following article highlights “chemical compounds and biological formulations that can change the structure of the base material of the main elements of military equipment” as types of “non-lethal weapons”: Viktor Alekseevich Vladimirov and Gennady Sergeevich Chernykh, “Major Lines of Development of Traditional and Nontraditional Means of Warfare and Protection Against Them” (in Russian), Civil Protection Strategy: Issues and Research 2, no. 1 (2012), pp. 13–22. 254. See, for instance, “International Scientific and Practical Conference and Exhibition ‘Safety and Security of Non-Lethals’” (in Russian), Security-Russia (organized by HVAC “Bison”), February 2, 2015, http://www.security-russia.com /news/415 (accessed April 6, 2014). 255. Pankov, “The Role of Military Technology,” pp. 4–6. 256. Julian Cooper, “Military Procurement in Russia,” in Roger N. McDermott, Bertil Nygren, and Carolina Vendil Pallin, eds., The Russian Armed Forces in Transition: Economic, Geopolitical, and Institutional Uncertainties (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), p. 171; Anonymous, “Rearmament Tempo Less Than 2 Percent per Year,” Russian Defense Policy, April 17, 2010, https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress .com/tag/46-tsnii (accessed June 21, 2016). 257. Alexander Shvarev, “RF IC Recounts the Funds for the State Defense Order” (in Russian), Rosbalt, November 22, 2012, http://www.rosbalt.ru/moscow /2012/11/22/1062243.html (accessed June 22, 2016). 258. See the discussion in Anonymous, “Rosoboronpostavka Understaffed, Ineffective?” Russian Defense Policy, March 15, 2011, https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress .com/2011/03/15/rosoboronpostavka-understaffed-ineffective (accessed June 21, 2016). 259. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov Held a Meeting on the Development Prospects of 46 CRI,” March 27, 2014, http://syria.mil.ru/news/more.htm?id=11912462@egNews (accessed June 21, 2016). 260. Anonymous, “46th TSNII MO RF,” n.d. 261. G. A. Lavrinov, A. A. Kosenko, and E. Y. Khrustalev, “The Innovative Potential of the Russian Military-Industrial Complex” (in Russian), National Interest —Priorities and Safety 22 (2013), pp. 2–14; Alexander I. Buravlyov, “Management of High-Tech Projects in the R&D Stage” (in Russian), Weapons and Economy 32, no. 3 (2015), pp. 39–47. 262. Publishing House Finance & Credit, National Interests: Priorities and Security —Editorial Board, n.d., http://www.fin-izdat.com/journal/national/editorial.php (accessed June 21, 2016). 263. Vladimir Y. Korchak, Alexander V. Leonov, and Borisenko I. Leonidovich, “Integration of Nonconventional Weapons in the Weapon System” (in Russian),

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Weapons and Economy 14 no. 2 (2011), pp. 63–70; Alexander V. Leonov and Alexey Yu Pronin, “Methodological Features of the Military-Economic Assessment of the Feasibility of Using Non-Lethal Weapons for Solving Parts of the Russian Armed Forces” (in Russian), Weapons and Economy 18, no. 2 (2012), pp. 30–37. 264. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “The 3rd Central Research Institute of the Russian Defense Ministry,” n.d., http://eng.mil.ru/en/science/sro /information.htm?id=10994@morfOrgScience (accessed June 17, 2016). 265. See, for example, Arbitration Court of Yaroslavl Region, Case no. A822600/2009-36, May 6, 2013 (in Russian), http://yaroslavl.arbitr.ru/cases/cdoc?docnd =2000422532 (accessed June 17, 2016). 266. Alex Sokovnin and Sergei Mashkin, “General Appropriated Money Meant for Science” (in Russian), Kommersant, September 19, 2009, http://kommersant.ru /doc/1241060 (accessed November 11, 2016); Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Dmitry V. Bulgarkov” (in Russian), http://structure.mil.ru/management /deputy/more.htm?id=10330303@SD_Employee (accessed November 8, 2016). 267. “Igor Sheremet, Who Was Fired After His Criticism of Serdyukov,” RIA Novosti. 268. Vitaly Panov Valer’yanovich, Igor Borisovich Sheremet, and Vladimir A. Ischuk, “Organization of Development and Prospects of Application of Modeling for Russia’s Military-Industrial Complex” (in Russian), Business Information Agency “Slavica,” June 28, 2015, http://www.slaviza.ru/1764-metody-modelirovaniya-slozhnyh -sistem.html (accessed June 10, 2016). 269. Panov et al., 3rd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: Historical Review, April 3, 1947–2007 (in Russian) (Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2007). 270. Ibid. 271. Ibid., p. 259. 272. Ibid. 273. Ibid. 274. Ibid. 275. Ibid. Another program involved a munition designed to dispense conductive fibers in order to short-circuit power systems. 276. “3rd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, http://elibrary.ru/org_items.asp?orgsid=2529 (accessed June 17, 2016). 277. Valer’yanovich, Sheremet, and Ischuk, “Organization of Development and Prospects of Application of Modeling.” 278. Ibid. 279. Ibid. 280. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Federal Agency for Special Construction” (in Russian), n.d., http://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of _defence/details.htm?id=11351@egOrganization (accessed June 11, 2016). 281. Spetsstroy, “Spetsstroy 1951” (in Russian), http://спецстрой.рф/upload/att _files/izdanija/prospekt_eng_lit1.pdf (accessed March 30, 2016). 282. Spetsstroy, “The List of Government Programs, the Implementation of Which Involved Units of Spetsstroy Russia” (in Russian), http://www.spetsstroy .ru/activity/federal_programs (accessed March 30, 2016). 283. Spetsstroy, “Developments” (in Russian), June 18, 2014, http://gusst5.ru /Press/News/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=672 (accessed March 30, 2016). 284. Notable public barbs from both sides are recounted in Charles Clover, “Russia’s Military: Modern Warfare the Moscow Way,” Financial Times, January 31,

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2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6c90e0c2-4b36-11e1-88a3-00144feabdc0.html #axzz4Brf12SZZ. 285. Andrei Shoumikhin, “Modernization of the Armed Forces in Russia: Goals and Problems,” National Institute for Public Policy, June 2004, pp. 4–5, http://www .nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/June-04-website1.pdf (accessed June 17, 2016). 286. President of Russia, “On the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), Decree no. 627, September 10, 2014, http://kremlin .ru/acts/bank/38862 (accessed June 21, 2016). 287. President of Russia, “Dmitry Rogozin Appointed Deputy Prime Minister,” December 23, 2011, http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/3275 (accessed April 6, 2014); President of Russia, “Meeting on Drafting the 2016–2025 State Armament Programme,” September 10, 2014, http://eng.state.kremlin.ru/commission/41/news /22930 (accessed April 6, 2014). 288. President of Russia, Decree no. 627. 289. Ibid.; Ivan Safronov and Yevgeniy Kozichev, “The Supreme DecisionMaker: Vladimir Putin Will Also Head the Military-Industrial Commission” (in Russian), Kommersant, September 5, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc /2559841 (accessed April 6, 2014); “Putin to Personally Head Top Russian Weapons Agency—Report,” Russia Today, September 5, 2014, http://rt.com/politics/185260 -putin-weapons-agency-arms (accessed April 6, 2014). 290. Yuri Lipatov, “Appointed As the New Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), 1TV, November 9, 2012, https:// www.1tv.ru/news/2012/11/09/79076-naznachen_novyy_rukovoditel_generalnogo _shtaba_vooruzhennyh_sil_rf (accessed June 16, 2016). 291. Anonymous, “Putin Launches GPV 2016–2025,” Russian Defense Policy, September 20, 2014, https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2014/09/20/putin -launches-gpv-2016-2025 (accessed April 6, 2014). 292. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, “We Are Ready to Work with All Kinds of Companies,” Moscow Defense Brief, October 29, 2013, http://www.cast.ru/eng/?id=538 (accessed April 6, 2014). 293. “Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin Addressing National Conference Nuclear Weapons and International Security in the 21st Century,” InterfaxAVN Online, November 8, 2012. 294. It is often referred to as the “Foundation for Perspective Studies” or the “Foundation for Advanced Studies.” Its formal English name is provided in: “Federal law of the Russian Federation from 16 October 2012 г. N 174-ФЗ: ‘On the Advanced Research Foundation’” (in Russian), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, October 19, 2013, http://www.rg.ru/2012/10/19/fond-dok.html (accessed June 12, 2016). 295. Ibid. 296. Peter Dunai, “Putin Talks Efficiency for Russian Advanced Research Group,” IHS Jane’s 360, January 20, 2016, http://www.janes.com/article/57327 /putin-talks-efficiency-for-russian-advanced-research-group; “Defense Ministry Creates New Research System,” Moscow Times, April 17, 2013, http://www .themoscowtimes.com/business/article/defense-ministry-creates-new-research -system/478793.html; “In Russia, an Advanced Research Foundation Is Being Created As an Analogue of the American Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency” (in Russian), Zemlya Masterov, http://zema.su/blog/v-rossii-sozdaetsya-fond -perspektivnykh-issledovanii-kak-analog-amerikanskogo-agentstva-peredov; “A Head of ‘Russian DARPA’ Has Been Found” (in Russian), Time of Electronics, January 29, 2013, http://www.russianelectronics.ru/leader-r/news/russianmarket/doc

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/62320; “Putin Signed the Law on ‘Russian DARPA’” (in Russian), Time of Electronics, October 19, 2012, http://www.russianelectronics.ru/developer-r/news/russianmarket /doc/61330. 297. After having completed his academic studies, Grigoriev worked at unnamed MOD research centers. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, “We Are Ready to Work with All Kinds of Companies.” 298. “Russian Agency Collecting Proposals for New Types of Weapons,” BBC Monitoring, Former Soviet Union, October 21, 2014, retrieved from LexisNexis. 299. Ibid. 300. Russian Federation, “Meeting on Cooperation Between the Advanced Research Foundation and Research Institutions,” February 28, 2014, http://government.ru/en /news/10794 (accessed June 12, 2016). 301. Dmitry Verkhoturov, “Prospective Defense Research: Where to Go?” (in Russian), Agency of Political News, May 21, 2013, http://www.apn.ru/publications /article29154.htm (accessed June 12, 2016). 302. We used the webpage archiving website Wayback Machine to determine the approximate date at which the ARF website began to display the robotics institute work. See Advanced Research Foundation, “Areas of Research,” retrieved through https://web.archive.org/web/20160314071428/http://fpi.gov.ru/activities/areas (accessed July 22, 2016). 303. Advanced Research Foundation, “Areas of Research” (in Russian), http:// fpi.gov.ru/activities/areas (accessed November 20, 2014). 304. Advanced Research Foundation, “Prospective Medicine” (in Russian), http://fpi.gov.ru/activities/areas/hmbi/630506416 (accessed July 22, 2016). 305. Ibid. 306. Ibid. 307. Advanced Research Foundation, “Bionics” (in Russian), http://fpi.gov.ru /activities/areas/hmbi/bionika (accessed July 22, 2016). 308. Advanced Research Foundation, “Advanced Materials” (in Russian), http:// fpi.gov.ru/about/areas/hmbi/perspektivnie_materiali (accessed July 22, 2016). 309. Advanced Research Foundation, “Integrated Biosystems” (in Russian), http://fpi.gov.ru/activities/areas/hmbi/656154842 (accessed July 22, 2016). 310. Verkhoturov, “Prospective Defense Research.” 311. “Putin: Advanced Research Foundation Should Search for Breakthrough Ideas” (in Russian), RIA Novosti, January 20, 2014, http://ria.ru/defense_safety /20140120/990271471.html (accessed March 30, 2016); Dmitry Petrov, “Putin Urged the Advanced Research Foundation to Abandon Illusions in Their Work” (in Russian), Vesti, January 20, 2014, http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1203302 (accessed March 30, 2016); “Russian Military Research Agency to Get $100M in 2014,” RIA Novosti, January 20, 2014, http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20140120 /186736005/Russian-Military-Research-Agency-to-Get-100M-in-2014.html (accessed March 30, 2016). 312. “Putin: Advanced Research Foundation Should Search for Breakthrough Ideas,” RIA Novosti; Petrov, “Putin Urged the Advanced Research Foundation to Abandon Illusions”; “Russian Military Research Agency to Get $100M in 2014,” RIA Novosti. 313. “The Brain of the Russian Military-Industrial Complex” (in Russian), Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (VPK) Online, January 24, 2012, http://vpk-news .ru/news/233 (accessed April 6, 2014). 314. Anonymous, “We Are Decreasing the Need for a Person’s Presence on the Battlefield by Leaps and Bounds,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (VPK) Online,

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October 22, 2014, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/OEWatch/201412/Russia_18 .html (accessed March 30, 2016). 315. Valer’yanovich, Sheremet, and Ischuk, “Organization of Development and Prospects of Application of Modeling.” 316. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, “We Are Ready to Work with All Kinds of Companies.” 317. Ibid. 318. Arun Mohanty, “Russia Poised to Boost Production of Futuristic Defence Technology,” Russia & India Report, January 24, 2014, http://in.rbth.com/economics /2014/01/24/untitled_resource_32517.html. 319. Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod, “New Lab of Additive Technologies Opens at UNN,” October 30, 2014, http://www.unn.ru/eng/news/153 (accessed March 30, 2016). 320. Alexander Golts, “The Miracle-Industrial Complex,” Moscow Times Online, April 24, 2012, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-miracle-industrial -complex/457343.html (accessed April 15, 2014). 321. The Almaty anti-plague institute is now called the M. Aikimbayev Kazakh Scientific Center of Quarantine and Zoonotic Diseases (KSCQZD). 322. Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being, “Sanitary and Epidemiological Surveillance,” http://www.rospotrebnadzor .ru/en/deyatelnost/san_epid.php (accessed September 6, 2014); Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being, “Government of the Russian Federation Resolution of May 2, 2012 N412: On Approval of Regulation on Federal State Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection,” http://www .rospotrebnadzor.ru/en/deyatelnost/comsumers_right_protections.php (accessed September 6, 2014). 323. Anna Y. Popova, “Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being,” http://www.rospotrebnadzor.ru/en (accessed September 6, 2014). 324. Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being, “Structures,” http://www.rospotrebnadzor.ru/en/region/structure (accessed September 6, 2014). 325. Rospotrebnadzor, “On Measures to Improve the Monitoring of Pathogens of Infectious and Parasitic Diseases,” Order no. 88, March 17, 2008, http://03 .rospotrebnadzor.ru/documents/ros/1616 (accessed July 26, 2016). 326. Annexes 1 and 2 to Rospotrebnadzor, “On Measures to Improve the Monitoring of Pathogens of Infectious and Parasitic Diseases,” pp. 1–2. 327. Ibid., pp. 3–4. 328. Ibid., pp. 5–7. 329. Ibid., p. 8. A Russian presenter claimed that there were sixty-nine laboratories charged with diagnosing “especially dangerous infectious diseases” such as smallpox, cholera, plague, and hemorrhagic fevers at the time in 2008. The subtotals listed in their slides do not reach this total. If sixty-nine laboratories is the correct figure, then some fourteen laboratories with unknown function exist that are not listed in the annexes to Order no. 88. Ivan Dyatlov, “Surveillance and Laboratory Diagnostics of Infectious Diseases in the Russian Federation,” EU-CIS Seminar “New Trends in Infectious Diseases,” Lyon, France, November 26–28, 2008, pp. 6–7, http://www.stcu.int/lyon2008/pr/Dyatlov.pdf (accessed September 6, 2014). 330. Rospotrebnadzor, “On the Results Obtained by the Rospotrebnadzor’s Scientific Research Organizations in 2013” (in Russian), Federal Service for Consumer Rights Protection, January 8, 2014, http://www.rospotrebnadzor.ru (accessed April 14, 2016).

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331. The database allows users to search for organizations. We conducted the search using the keyword “Rospotrebnadzor,” but in Cyrillic. “Search by Organization” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, http://elibrary.ru/orgs.asp (accessed April 17, 2015). 332. “Pharmaceuticals—Companies, Search Term: Rospotrebnadzor” (in Russian), Vidal, http://www.vidal.ru/drugs/companies?q=%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BF %D0%BE%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B1%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0 %B7%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B0 (accessed June 27, 2016). The Rostov Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology and Parasitology has the following address: 344000, Rostov on Don, Gazenty per., 119. The Rostov-on-Don Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute has a different address: 344002, Rostov on Don, M. Gorky str., 117. See Rospotrebnadzor, “Scientific Research Institutes of Rospotrebnadzor,” 2016, http://www .rospotrebnadzor.ru/en/region/structure/str_nii.php (accessed October 10, 2016). 333. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791. 334. Many of the Rospotrebnadzor institutions have had their names changed one or more times since 1991. We use names that are found on Rospotrebnadzor’s two lists— research organizations with focus on health (11) and those with a focus on epidemiology (18). See Rospotrebnadzor, “Scientific Research Institutes of Rospotrebnadzor.” 335. Judith Miller, “Russian Scientist Dies in Ebola Accident at Former Weapons Lab,” New York Times, May 25, 2004. 336. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 172, 245. 337. World Health Organization (WHO), “World Health Organization Inspects Russian Smallpox Laboratory,” October 25, 2002, http://www.who.int/mediacentre /news/notes/np7/en. 338. WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research, “Report of the Thirteenth Meeting, Geneva, Switzerland, 31 October–1 November 2011” WHO/HSE /GAR/BDP/2011.2, (Geneva, 2011). 339. Anonymous, personal communication, April 2, 2012. 340. WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research, “Report of the Seventeenth Meeting, Geneva, January 12–13, 2016” (Geneva, 2016), p. 13. 341. “A Pill for Smallpox and Other Vektor Vaccines” (in Russian), February 9, 2012, http://academ.info/news/19666?print=1. 342. In an interview, a Vector scientist stated that the compound had been worked on at Vector since 2008. “NIOKh-14: A Preparation in the Strategic Category” (in Russian), Science in Siberia, April 5, 2012, http://www.sbras.info/articles/science /niokh-14-preparat-iz-kategorii-strategicheskikh. For other mentions of the compound in the media, see, for instance, Alex Khadayev, “‘Black Death’ Will Not Return” (in Russian), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 21, 2014, http://www.rg.ru /2014/02/21/virus.html (accessed April 17, 2015); Mariya Kormiltseva, “Novosibirsk Scientists Want to Launch Production of Smallpox Drug in One Year” (in Russian), RIA Novosti, February 3, 2014, http://ria.ru (accessed April 15, 2016). See also Al. A. Sergeev et al., “Mice as Animal Model for Evaluation of Therapeutic Efficacy of Preparations Against Monkeypox,” Problems of Particularly Dangerous Infections (in Russian) 2 (2013), pp. 60–65, http://journal.microbe.ru/articles/mice -animal-model-evaluation-therapeutic-efficacy-preparations-against-monkeypox. 343. Popova, “Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being,” p. 245. 344. Ibid., pp. 245–246; Roger Roffey, Biotechnology in Russia: Why Is It Not a Success Story? FOI-R-2986-SE (Umeå, Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency [FOI], 2010), p. 37. 345. Yelena Anikina, “V-14 Virus” (in Russian), Novaya Sibir, February 21, 2014, http://www.newsib.net(accessed April 15, 2016).

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346. “In the Novosibirsk Region, the CEO of the Research Center ‘Vector’ Is Fired” (in Russian), ITAR-TASS, February 13, 2014, http://itar-tass.com/sibir-news /962534 (accessed April 17, 2015). 347. “Gennady Onishchenko Appointed Assistant to the Prime Minister,” October 23, 2013, http://news.mail.ru/politics/15329870/?frommail=1 (accessed April 17, 2015). 348. “State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology ‘Vector’ Rospotrebnadzor Koltsovo” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated March 14, 2015, http:// elibrary.ru/org_profile.asp?id=423(accessed April 17, 2015). 349. “Distribution of Publications by keyword: State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology ‘Vector’ Rospotrebnadzor Koltsovo” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated March 14, 2015, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile_keywords.asp?id =423 (accessed April 17, 2015). 350. Contract no. 1771053913515000545, issued by the Ministry of Education of Russia, posted January 18, 2016, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard /common-info.html?reestrNumber=1771053913515000545&source=epz. 351. Contract no. 1770751598415000084, issued by Rospotrebnadzor, posted September 29, 2015, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info .html?reestrNumber=1770751598415000084&source=epz. 352. Contract no. 1770751598415000085, issued by Rospotrebnadzor, posted September 29, 2015, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info .html?reestrNumber=1770751598415000085. 353. Contract no. 0173100009514001047, issued by the Russian Ministry of Industry, posted February 16, 2014, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard /common-info.html?reestrNumber=0173100009514001047&source=epz. 354. Contract no. 0173100003714000570, issued by the Ministry of Education of Russia, posted April 22, 2015, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common -info.html?reestrNumber=0173100003714000570&source=epz. 355. Contract no. 0360100026214000096, issued by Mikrob, posted September 23, 2014, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber=0360100026214000096&source=epz; Contract no. 0360100026214000097, issued by Mikrob, posted September 23, 2014, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract /contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber=0360100026214000097&source =epz; Contract no. 0360100026214000098, issued by Mikrob, posted September 23, 2014, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber =0360100026214000098&source=epz. 356. Contract no. 0173100001414000029, issued by Rospotrebnadzor, posted April 9, 2014, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html ?reestrNumber=0173100001414000029&source=epz. 357. Contract no. 0173100001414000028, issued by Rospotrebnadzor, posted April 9, 2014, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html ?reestrNumber=0173100001414000028&source=epz. 358. Contract no. 0173100001414000027, issued by Rospotrebnadzor, posted April 9, 2014, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html ?reestrNumber=0173100001414000027. 359. Contract no. 0173100001414000030, issued by Rospotrebnadzor, posted April 9, 2014, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html ?reestrNumber=0173100001414000030&source=epz. 360. See, for example, Contract no. 0173100001412000034, http://zakupki.gov.ru /epz/contract/contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber=0173100001412000034 &source=epz.

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361. Contract no. 0173100001411000062, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract /contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber=0173100001411000062&source=epz; Contract no. 0173100001412000035, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard /payment-info-and-target-of-order.html?reestrNumber=0173100001412000035; Contract no. 0173100001413000073, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/common -info.html?reestrNumber=0173100001413000073&source=epz. 362. Contract no. 017310000451100301 and Contract no. 0173100004511003015, http://zakupki.gov.ru. 363. For those issued by SRCAM in 2012, see Contract no. 0348100015212000115, Contract no. 0348100015212000116, Contract no. 0348100015212000117, Contract no. 0348100015212000118, Contract no. 0348100015212000119, zakupki.gov.ru. For those issued by Mikrob in 2012, see Contract no. 0360100026212000084, Contract no. 0360100026212000085, Contract no. 0360100026212000086, Contract no. 0360100026212000087, Contract no. 0360100026212000088, Contract no. 0360100026212000091, http://zakupki.gov.ru. For those issued by SRCAM in 2011, see Contract no. 0348100015211000157, Contract no. 0348100015211000160, Contract no. 0348100015211000161, Contract no. 0348100015211000175, Contract no. 0348100015211000176, http://zakupki.gov.ru. For those issued by Mikrob in 2011, see Contract no. 0360100026211000069, Contract no. 0360100026211000068, Contract no. 0360100026211000067, Contract no. 0360100026211000066, Contract no. 0360100026211000065, Contract no. 0360100026211000064, http://zakupki.gov.ru. 364. For those issued by SRCAM in 2013, see Contract no. 0348100015213000154, Contract no. 0348100015213000155, Contract no. 0348100015213000156, Contract no. 0348100015213000157, Contract no. 0348100015213000158, zakupki.gov.ru. For those issued by Mikrob in 2013, see Contract no. 0360100026213000146, Contract no. 0360100026213000147, Contract no. 0360100026213000148, Contract no. 0360100026213000149, Contract no. 0360100026213000150, http://zakupki.gov.ru. 365. “SRC VB Vector FSIS Rospotrebnadzor” (in Russian), Vidal, http://www .vidal.ru/drugs/firm/2750 (accessed June 27, 2016). 366. We considered the possibility that either of the two vaccines could have been funded through the SRCAM and Mikrob tenders that lacked descriptive text. We find this hypothesis unconvincing in light of the atypical complexity in coordinating vaccine research and funding it would imply. Even if that had been the case, it is unlikely that these two projects could account for more than two of the yearly tenders, given the common practice of issuing at most one tender per vaccine. 367. Anonymous, “Novosibirsk Virologists to Submit Ebola Vaccine for Clinical Tests in August,” Interfax, June 4, 2015, http://rbth.com/news/2015/06/04/novosibirsk _virologists_to_submit_ebola_vaccine_for_clinical_tests_in_au_46630.html (accessed April 14, 2016). 368. Moscow, Rossiya 24 Television (in Russian), December 9, 2016 (News Update by BBC Monitoring on December 9, 2016). 369. Ibid. 370. Anonymous, personal communication, August 2016. 371. For recent work, see E. I. Kazachinskaya, A. V. Pereboev, A. A. Chepurnov, and I. A. Razumov, “Monoclonal Antibodies to Ebola Virus: Preparation, Characterization, and Studies of Cross-Reactivity with Marburg Virus,” Plague (in Russian) 3 (2015), pp. 58–64. As an example of drawing from Zagorsk Institution research, this publication: N. M. Zubavichene, V. V. Zolin, and E. A. Stavsky, “Liposomal and Suspension Forms of Immunoglobulins Against Ebola Fever as the New Medical Preparations,” Plague (in Russian) 4, no. 111 (2011), pp. 57–60, cites a paper by authors from the Zagorsk Institute, namely V. P. Krasnyansky, V. V. Mikhailov, I.

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V. Borisevich, V. N. Gradoboev, A. A. Evseev, and V. A. Pschenichnov, “Preparation of Hyperimmune Horse Serum to Ebola Virus,” Problems of Virology (in Russian) 39, no. 2 (1994), pp. 91–92. 372. For instance, the vaccine excipients are listed. See Contract no. 1543316134216000128, “Contract no. 141/16 to Conduct Clinical Trials of “EpiVakEbola” Vaccine,” August 23, 2016, pp. 11–12, http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/contract /contractCard/common-info.html?reestrNumber=1543316134216000128. 373. International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, “CombiHIVvac (KombiVIChvak),” n.d., http://www.iavi.org/trials-database/trial/81?tmpl=component (accessed August 4, 2016). 374. Anonymous, “Russian HIV Vaccine Ready for Phase 2 Clinical Trials,” Moscow Times Online, October 14, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business /article/russian-hiv-vaccine-ready-for-phase-2-clinical-trials/509432.html (accessed April 14, 2016). 375. Pavel Korchagin, “Open Letter to the Russian President from Deputy of the Settlement Council of the Koltsovo Science City in Novosibirsk Oblast” (in Russian), Novaya Gazeta Online, April 7, 2010; Novaya Gazeta editorial, “A ‘Laundry’ Marked ‘Secret’? Millions of Budget Rubles Dissolved at the Vektor Virology Center in Siberia” (in Russian), Novaya Gazeta Online, April 7, 2010. 376. A. B. Ryzhikov et al., “Testing in Preclinical Trials Method for Determining the Neutralizing Activity of Vaccine-Candidate Against HIV Infection CombiHIVvac Using HIV-1 Pseudoviruses Technology,” Epidemiology and Vaccination (in Russian) 63 no. 2 (2012), pp. 70–76; K. A. Sarkisyan et al., “Preclinical Validation of Specific Activity and Authenticity of the National Vaccine Candidate Against HIV Infection KombiHIVvak,” Epidemiology and Vaccination (in Russian) 62 no. 1 (2012), pp. 64–68. 377. O. N. Kaplina, L. I. Karpenko, V. S. Kaplin, L. R. Lebedev, A. A. Ilichev, and M. P. Bogryantseva, “An ELISA-Based Test System for the Kombi-VIChvak Anti-HIV Vaccine Control During Its Production” (text in Russian; English title as given), Russian Journal of Biotechnology 4 (2015), pp. 85–93. 378. L. I. Karpenko et al., “Combined Vaccine Against HIV-1 Based on Artificial Polyepitope Immunogens: Results of Phase 1 Clinical Trials” (in Russian), Bioorganic Chemistry 42, no. 2 (2016), p. 191. 379. “Siberian Scientists Lead Fight Against the Ebola Outbreak That Has Already Killed 4,400 People,” Siberian Times, October 15, 2014, http://siberiantimes.com /science/casestudy/news/siberian-scientists-lead-fight-against-the-ebola-outbreak -that-has-already-killed-4400-people/ (accessed April 17, 2015). 380. In total, eighteen medical scientists were awarded the Order of Friendship and medals for Service to the Fatherland, first and second degrees; they came from Vector, Mikrob Plague Research Institute, Pasteur Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, and Ivanovsky Research Institute of Virology. 381. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791. 382. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 212–213. 383. Canceled Contract no. 0351100000713000174, “Documentation of the Open Auction in Electronic Form for the Right to Sign the Agreement to Perform Activities of Stage I Reconstruction Building No. 6a FBUN SSC ‘Vector’” (in Russian), July 31, 2013, pp. 10–11, http://zakupki.gov.ru/pgz/public/action/orders/info/common _info/show?notificationId=6688477. 384. Office of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Novosibirsk Region, “Case no. 08-01-268: Decision on Complaints of ‘Construction Management–28’ and

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OOO ‘Unistroy’ Regarding the Actions of the Customer FBUN SSC ‘Vector’” (in Russian), August 22, 2013, http://novosibirsk.fas.gov.ru/solution/11809 (accessed October 5, 2016). 385. “The Court Returned to the Prosecution the Case of Theft in the Repair of the Virology Center ‘Vector’” (in Russian), TASS, January 25, 2016, http://tass.ru /sibir-news/2612169 (accessed October 5, 2016). 386. Roffey, Unge, Clevstrom, and Westerdahl, Support to Threat Reduction of the Russian Biological Weapons Legacy, p. 63. 387. Ibid., p. 62. 388. Britta Häggström, Åke Forsberg, and Lena Norlander, “Conversion of a Former Biological Weapon Establishment” FOI-R-1316-SE (Umeå, Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency [FOI], September 2004), p. 42. 389. Ibid. 390. Ibid., pp. 43–44. 391. Contract no. 0173100004511003219, Contract no. 0173100004511003220, Contract no. 0173100004513000522, Contract no. 0173100004511003099, Contract no. 0173100004511003100, http://zakupki.gov.ru. 392. NCBI Author Search, “Dyatlov IA,” http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed /?term=Dyatlov%20IA%5BAuthor%5D&cauthor=true&cauthor_uid=25923803 (accessed September 23, 2016). 393. “State Research Center for Applied Microbiology and Biotechnology, Rospotrebnadzor” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated March 14, 2015, http://elibrary .ru/org_profile.asp?id=7102 (accessed April 17, 2015). 394. “Distribution of Publications by Keyword, State Research Center for Applied Microbiology and Biotechnology, Rospotrebnadzor, Obolensk” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated March 14, 2015, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile_keywords .asp?id=7102 (accessed April 17, 2015). 395. N. P. Khrapova et al., “Obtainment of Monoclonal Antibodies and Prospects of Their Application as Basis for Immunodiagnostic Aids for Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever Virus Detection,” Plague, no. 1 (2015), pp. 89–93, https://elibrary .ru/item.asp?id=23092836. 396. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791. 397. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 140, 146; Ouagrham-Gormley, “Growth of the Anti-Plague System During the Soviet Period,” pp. 38, 41. 398. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, p. 146. 399. “Russian Scientific Research Institute Mikrob” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated June 6, 2016, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile.asp?id=1069 (accessed July 12, 2016). 400. Ibid. 401. Ibid. 402. See, for instance, O. M. Kudryavtseva et al., “Selection of Stabile and Efficient Recombinant Strains Overproducing Bacillus anthracis Protective Antigen,” Plague (in Russian) 91 (2006), pp. 38–41; E. N. Strelnikova et al., “Vibrio cholerae O1 Avirulent Strains—Producers of Protective O1 Antigen: Preparation and Properties,” Plague (in Russian) 106 (2010), pp. 39–42. 403. State Contract no. 53-D, “For Research and Development Work (for Lot No. 12: Molecular Genetic Characteristics of Genetically Modified Strains of Infectious Diseases and Their Importance in Changing the Virulence of Pathogens and Adaptation to Changing Environmental Conditions) Within the Framework of the Federal Target Program ‘National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the

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Russian Federation (2009–2014 Years) in the Year 2012’” (in Russian), Moscow, June 4, 2012. 404. Ibid. 405. Ibid. 406. Ibid. 407. APHIS, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Restricted Experiment Guidance Document,” February 27, 2015, pp. 1–7, http://www.selectagents.gov /resources/Restricted_Experiment_Guidance_Document.pdf; Jacinta Smith, Denise Gangadharan, and Robbin Weyant, “Review of Restricted Experiment Requests, Division of Select Agents and Toxins, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2006–2013,” Health Security 13, no. 5 (September 2015), pp. 307–316. 408. State Contract no. 53-D. 409. Ibid. 410. Ibid. 411. Andrei P. Pomerantsev et al., “Genetic Organization of the Francisella Plasmid pFNL10,” Plasmid 46 (2001), pp. 210–222. 412. Eric D. LoVullo, Lani A. Sherrill, and Martin S. Pavelka Jr., “Improved Shuttle Vectors for Francisella tularensis Genetics,” FEMS Microbiology Letters 291, no. 1 (February 2009), pp. 95–102; David A. Rasko, Carlos D. Esteban, and Vanessa Sperandio, “Development of Novel Plasmid Vectors and a Promoter Trap System in Francisella tularensis Compatible with the pFNL10 Based Plasmids,” Plasmid (September 2007), p. 159–166. 413. N. F. Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, “Department of Natural Focal Infections” (in Russian), n.d., http://www.gamaleya .org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=43%3A2009-12-03-08-33 -52&catid=38&Itemid=20 (accessed December 14, 2016). 414. V. M. Pavlov, A. N. Mokrievich, and K. Volkovoy, “Cryptic Plasmid pFNL10 from Francisella novicida-Like F6168: The Base of Plasmid Vectors for Francisella tularensis,” FEMS Immunology & Medical Microbiology (March 1996), pp. 253–256. 415. Xhavit Zogaj and Karl E. Klose, “Genetic Manipulation of Francisella Tularensis,” Frontiers in Microbiology 1, no. 142 (January 2011), pp. 1–8. 416. A. N. Mokrievich, N. A. Shishkova, I. A. Dyatlov, and V. M. Pavlov, “Peculiarities of the Conjugative pSa Plasmid Transfer from Escherichia coli into Francisella tularensis,” Problems of Particularly Dangerous Infections (in Russian), no. 2 (2013), pp. 80–82, https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=19100144. 417. As part of our search, we queried all publications with the keyword “pFNL10” indexed in the eLibrary.ru database. 418. Rospotrebnadzor, “On Measures to Improve the Monitoring of Pathogens of Infectious and Parasitic Diseases.” 419. “Mikrob Russian Research Institute for Plague Control Rospotrebnadzor FGUZ” (in Russian), Vidal, http://www.vidal.ru/drugs/firm/2912 (accessed June 27, 2016). 420. Rospotrebnadzor, “About the State Awards of the Russian Federation, Members of the Russian Research Anti-Plague Institute Rospotrebnadzor Mikrob” (in Russian), August 21, 2015, http://rospotrebnadzor.ru/about/info/news/news_details .php?ELEMENT_ID=4069 (accessed June 27, 2016). 421. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791. 422. Until the early 1990s, these two bacterial species were named Pseudomonas mallei and Pseudomonas pseudomallei. 423. Zilinskas, “The Anti-Plague System,” p. 50.

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424. Ibid. 425. Ibid., p. 54. 426. Norlander and Westerdahl, The Role of the New Russian Anti-Bioterrorism Centres, pp. 14–15. 427. Aleksey Papyrin, “Interview with Nikolai Tikhonov, Director, Volgograd Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute” (in Russian), Meditsinskaya Gazeta, January 17, 1996, p. 5. 428. Ibid. 429. Ibid., pp. 33–48. 430. Ibid., p. 37. 431. “Distribution of Publications by Keyword, Volgograd Scientific Research Anti-Plague Institute, Rospotrebnadzor, Volgograd” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated March 14, 2015, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile_keywords.asp?id=6592 (accessed March 20, 2015). 432. Ian L. Pepper and Charles P. Gerba, “Aeromicrobiology,” in Ian L. Pepper, Charles P. Gerba, and Terry J. Gentry, eds., Environmental Microbiology (San Diego: Academic Press, 2015), p. 97. 433. Nadine Vyuchnova et al., “Activity of Some Disinfectants Against Pathogens Coccidioidomycosis” (in Russian), Problems in Medical Mycology 16, no. 1 (2014), pp. 36–39, http://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=21431227 . 434. Zilinskas, “The Anti-Plague System,” p. 54. 435. Irkutsk Research Anti-Plague Institute of Siberia and the Far East, “About the Institute,” http://www.irkutsk.ru/chumin (accessed April 17, 2015). 436. Ibid. 437. “Irkutsk Research Institute of Siberia and Far East, Rospotrebnadzor” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated March 14, 2015, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile .asp?id=7552 (accessed April 17, 2015); “Russian Scientific Research Institute Mikrob” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated March 14, 2015, http://elibrary.ru/org _profile.asp?id=1069 (accessed April 17, 2015); “Volgograd Scientific Research Anti-plague Institute, Rospotrebnadzor” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated March 14, 2015, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile.asp?id=6592 (accessed April 17, 2015). 438. Ibid. 439. Ibid. 440. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791. 441. Zilinskas, “The Anti-Plague System,” p. 54. 442. “Stavropol Research Institute for Plague Control Rospotrebnadzor, Stavropol” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated March 14, 2015, http://elibrary.ru/org _profile.asp?id=6128 (accessed April 17, 2015). 443. NIIEG is an acronym for the Kirov Institute, which was the first to develop an attenuated live plague vaccine. 444. Tatyana Slipchenko, “Stavropol Scientists Will Provide Biological Protection for Olympic Games” (in Russian), Stavropolskaya Pravda, May 24, 2012, http://www.stapravda.ru (accessed April 15, 2016). 445. “Stavropol Research Institute for Plague Control Rospotrebnadzor, Stavropol” (in Russian), updated June 8, 2016, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile.asp?id =6128 (accessed June 27, 2016). 446. “Distribution of Publications by Keyword, Stavropol Research Institute for Plague Control Rospotrebnadzor, Stavropol” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated June 8, 2016, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile.asp?id=6128 (accessed June 27, 2016). 447. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791.

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448. Taisiya Belousova, “Bioterror: Who Will Protect Russia?” (in Russian), Sovershenno Sekretno no. 11 (1999), pp. 16–17. 449. Russian Federation, “The Experience of Operating Specialized Mobile Anti-Epidemic Units of Rospotrebnadzor (Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights and Human Well-Being),” April 2016, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954 /(httpAssets)/077A10D2C81F4169C1257FAF00437265/$file/SAEU-Russian +presentation+26.04.16.pdf (accessed August 27, 2016). 450. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791. 451. Russian Federation, “The Experience of Operating Specialized Mobile AntiEpidemic Units of Rospotrebnadzor.” 452. Ibid. 453. The institute has two entries in eLibrary.ru: one primary entry with almost all publications by the institute, and one small entry listing only two publications. The major entry is “Rostov-on-Don State Institute, Anti-Plague, Rostov-on-Don” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated June 8, 2016, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile.asp?id=1528 (accessed June 27, 2016). The stub entry is “Rostov-on-Don Anti-Plague Research Institute Rospotrebnadzor, Rostov-on-Don” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated June 9, 2016, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile.asp?id=14347 (accessed June 27, 2016). 454. “Distribution of Publications by Keyword, Rostov-on-Don Research AntiPlague, Rostov-on-Don” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated June 8, 2016, http:// elibrary.ru/org_profile_keywords.asp?id=7102 (accessed June 27, 2016). 455. Ibid. 456. Ibid.; V. V. Batashev et al., “Epidemiological Characterization of Brucellosis Under Modern Conditions,” Microbiology, Epidemiology and Immunology (in Russian) 3 (1998), pp. 23–26. 457. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791. 458. Rospotrebnadzor, “Anti-Plague Institutions” (in Russian), http://rospotrebnadzor .ru/region/structure/str_chum.php (accessed April 17, 2015). 459. Ibid. 460. Ibid.; “Volgograd Scientific Research Anti-Plague Institute, Rospotrebnadzor,” eLibrary.ru. 461. “Distribution of Publications by Keyword, Khabarovsk Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, Khabarovsk” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, last updated August 6, 2016, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile.asp?id=3882 (accessed June 9, 2016). 462. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791. 463. Rospotrebnadzor, “Anti-Plague Institutions.” 464. “FKUZ ‘Plague Center’ Rospotrebnadzor” (in Russian), http://protivochumcentr .ru (accessed June 10, 2016). 465. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791. 466. Federal Scientific Center for Medical and Preventive Health Risk Management Technologies, “About the Scientific Center,” last updated March 4, 2014, http://fcrisk.ru (accessed March 30, 2016). 467. “Federal Research Center of Medical Technologies Preventive Health Risk Management Standards, Rospotrebnadzor, Perm” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, last updated March 14, 2015, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile.asp?id=6281 (accessed April 17, 2015). 468. “Distribution of Publications by Keyword: Federal Research Center of Preventive Health Management Health Risk, Rospotrebnadzor, Perm” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, last updated March 14, 2015, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile_keywords .asp?id=6281 (accessed April 17, 2015).

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469. Ibid. 470. Rosselkhoznadzor, “Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance,” http://www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/main.html?_language=en (accessed April 17, 2015). 471. Ibid. 472. Rosselkhoznadzor, “Administration—Dankvert Sergey Alexeevich, Head of Federal Service,” http://www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/direction/dankvert.html?_language=en (accessed June 13, 2016). 473. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791. 474. Ibid. 475. Ibid. 476. Ibid. 477. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 144–145. 478. Ibid. 479. Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation, “Department of Health Protection and Sanitary-Epidemiological Well-Being” (in Russian), April 1, 2015, http://www.rosminzdrav.ru/ministry/61/18 (accessed April 17, 2015). 480. Russian Federation, “Ministry of Healthcare of the Russian Federation,” http://government.ru/en/department/23/events (accessed May 7, 2015); Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation, “Structure” (in Russian), http://www.rosminzdrav .ru/ministry/61 (accessed May 7, 2015). 481. Ministry of Health, “Minister” (in Russian), May 26, 2016, https://www .rosminzdrav.ru/ministry/61/15 (accessed June 13, 2016). 482. Russian Government Resolution of August 11, 2013, no. 1007, Laws of the Russian Federation 2013, no. 46, 2013, p. 5949, made available on November 14, 2013 through the official Internet portal of legal information: http://www.pravo .gov.ru (accessed May 7, 2015). More specifically see http://ips.pravo.gov.ru/ ?docview&page=1&print=1&nd=102168978&rdk=1&&empire=%E2%80%8B (accessed May 7, 2015). 483. Ibid. 484. N. F. Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, “Historical Milestones” (in Russian), n.d., http://www.gamaleya.org/index.php?option =com_content&view=article&id=18&Itemid=15. 485. Vladimir Uiba, “Federal Medical-Biological Agency,” http://government.ru /en/department/32 (accessed June 13, 2016). 486. Federal Medical-Biological Agency, “Protection of Populations and Services Territories,” http://fmbaros.ru/en/activities/directions/population (accessed May 7, 2015). 487. Ibid. 488. Ibid. 489. Ibid. 490. Russian Government Resolution of August 11, 2013, no. 1007, Laws of the Russian Federation 2013, no. 46, p. 5949. 491. Ibid. 492. Ibid. 493. Federal Medical-Biological Agency, “Advisory and Consultative Bodies,” http://fmbaros.ru/en/fmba/bodies (accessed May 7, 2015). 494. Federal Medical-Biological Agency, “Advisory and Consultative Bodies: Scientific and Technical Council,” http://fmbaros.ru/en/fmba/bodies/index.php?id _4=689 (accessed May 7, 2015).

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495. Ibid. 496. V. N. Krasnov, “Social, Community, and Individual Responses to Terrorist Attacks,” in Simon Wessely and Valery N. Krasnov, eds., Psychological Responses to the New Terrorism: A NATO-Russia Dialogue (Washington, D.C.: IOS Press, 2002), p. 98. 497. Federal State Institution All-Russian Center of Disaster Medicine “Protection,” and Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation, “Leadership” (in Russian), http://www.vcmk.ru/vcmk/rukovodstvo (accessed June 13, 2016); Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation, Federal State Institution All-Russian Center for Disaster Medicine “Protection” and “Structure and Principal Activities” (in Russian), http://www.vcmk.ru/structure/shtab (accessed May 7, 2015). 498. S. F. Goncharov, “All-Russian Service for Disaster Medicine—One of the Best Sub-Systems of the Unified State System of Prevention and Liquidation of Emergency Situations” (in Russian), http://federalbook.ru/news/analitics/20.08.2010 -2.html (accessed May 7, 2015). 499. Tatiana Borodina, Madonna Dunyaeva, and Mary Amirjanyan, “Russia Will Create Center for Combating Biological Threats,” Izvestiya, March 13, 2015, http:// izvestia.ru/news/584008 (accessed May 7, 2015). 500. Ibid. 501. Yuri Xiong, “They Came to the Defense Industry for the Hard Drives: They Were Searched As Part of the Case of Inflating the Value of the Contract” (in Russian), Kommersant, June 3, 2015, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2740063 (accessed June 13, 2016). 502. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 138, 142–145. 503. Ibid. 504. Ibid., pp. 145, 461. 505. Ibid., pp. 376–377, 490. 506. Ibid., pp. 490, 493–494. 507. N. F. Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, “Subjects of Research” (in Russian), page last updated October 29, 2009, http://www .gamaleya.ru/content/institute/science/subject.htm. 508. Ibid. 509. Ibid. 510. N. F. Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, “Department of Epidemiology” (in Russian), n.d., http://www.gamaleya.org/index .php?option=com_content&view=article&id=42&Itemid=20. 511. N. F. Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, “Subjects of Research.” 512. Contract no. 1773401321415000112, posted March 30, 2016, http://zakupki .gov.ru (accessed July 20, 2016); Contract no. 1773401321415000100, posted September 11, 2015, http://zakupki.gov.ru (accessed July 20, 2016). 513. N. F. Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, “Subjects of Research”; N. F. Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, “Research Areas” (in Russian), n.d., http://www.gamaleya.org/index .php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14&Itemid=13; N. F. Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, “Departments and Laboratories” (in Russian), n.d., http://www.gamaleya.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id =42&Itemid=20. 514. N. F. Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, “Department of Genetics and Molecular Biology of Bacteria” (in Russian), n.d., http://www.gamaleya.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44%3A 2009-12-03-09-04-48&catid=38&Itemid=20.

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515. “Federal State Research Centre for Epidemiology and Microbiology Named After Honorary Academician N. F. Gamaleya” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, updated June 8, 2016, http://elibrary.ru/org_profile.asp?id=4789 (accessed June 23, 2016). 516. Ibid. 517. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, pp. 86–87. 518. Ibid., p. 144. 519. Ibid., p. 145. 520. D. I. Ivanovsky Institute of Virology, “Subdivision Institute of Virology Named After D. I. Ivanovsky, FGBI FNITSEM Named After N. F. Gamaleya,” Russian Ministry of Health” (in Russian), n.d., http://virology.gamaleya.org/index.php?option=com _content&view=article&id=91&Itemid=518 (accessed June 23, 2016); N. F. Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, “Historical Milestones.” 521. The online portal is available at http://www.zakupki.gov.ru/epz/main/public /home.html. 522. Microgen has purchased nutrient media from SRCAM and lab mice from Vector. See, for example, Contract no. 57722292838160002520000, posted April 6, 2016, http://zakupki.gov.ru/223/contract/public/contract/view/general-information .html?id=1485474; Contract no. 57722292838150000980000, posted March 11, 2016, http://zakupki.gov.ru/223/contract/public/contract/view/general-information .html?id=1366311. 523. Norlander and Westerdahl, The Role of the New Russian Anti-Bioterrorism Centres, p. 18. 524. Anonymous, “Tough Choices for Vaktsina: Freedom or Closed Status?” (in Russian). 525. Tender no. 109202230, “Placing Orders for the Execution of Design and Survey Works for Capital Construction of Objects of the Troops of Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Protection of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the Needs of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in the Framework of the Federal Target Program ‘National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2013)’” (in Russian), posted July 19, 2008, deadline June 8, 2008, http://ru.dgmarket.com/tenders/np-notice.do?noticeId =2566308 (accessed July 21, 2016). An archived version of the associated webpage can be found at http://archive.is/GfYgI. 526. One set of files were associated with a “115” codename. This is most likely the 115th State Special Chemical Arsenal in Volsk-17, which is listed in the national system of chemical and biological safety/security. 527. The respective URLs are http://elibrary.ru/org_items.asp?orgsid=15233 and http://elibrary.ru/org_items.asp (both accessed July 27, 2016).

5 Civilian Bioscience and Biotechnology Since 2005

“The loss of quality of human capital in Russia is still going on.” —Sergei Erofeev, March 20171

The health and independence of Russia’s civilian biotechnology industry are of critical importance if the negative scenarios envisaged in the conclusions of the prior chapters are to be avoided. The degree to which well-paid opportunities exist for Russian scientists and engineers to conduct their work in the civilian sector will determine whether the MOD will have difficulty in recruiting talented individuals in their R&D and biology institutes (see Chapter 4). At the same time, the more the MOD involves itself in Russia’s civilian communities, the greater its ability to access civilian breakthroughs. This chapter presents our assessment of the state and direction of Russia’s biotechnology industry under the Putin and Medvedev administrations. Many publications have analyzed the travails of the sciences in Russia, including its nadir in the post-Soviet decade and its partial recovery that began in 2005 and gained traction in 2008.2 Changes are occurring on a large scale, as noted in a 2013 National Research Council publication: Currently, Russia is reshaping its scientific infrastructure. Several hundred Russian biology-oriented research laboratories are now well equipped and staffed to work at an international level. Many more health, agricultural, and environmental facilities provide updated services with broad-ranging benefits for important segments of the population.3

A directory of these players and projects in the Russian civilian biotechnology sphere is beyond the scope of this work; the interested reader will find a number of sources at the present endnote where numerous detailed company and project entries can be obtained.4 Instead, we have 199

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selected specific topics that we use as indicators to assess the health and independence of Russian civilian biotechnology. To accomplish our purposes, this chapter has six sections. In the first section, we discuss the background to the miserable status of biotechnology R&D and industry as it existed prior to 2008 in Russia. The second section is a chronology of programs whose aims were to stimulate the Russian biotechnology sector and that were developed and implemented during the latter years of the first Putin administration (mainly 2005–2008), during the Medvedev administration (2008–2012), and during the second Putin administration (2012 to the present). This section has two subsections; the first discusses the federal programs that are mostly relevant for domestic purposes, while the second deals with programs with international reach including attempts to entice Russian émigrés to return and foreign scientists to collaborate with Russian scientists and laboratories. The third, fourth, and fifth sections are composed of case studies that serve as indicators by which to measure the health and independence of Russia’s civilian biotechnology sector. These case studies are the consolidation of the immunobiological industry under Rostec, the space biology programs, and the reform of the Russian academies, respectively. In a sixth and final concluding section, we describe the currently bleak prospects faced by Russia’s civilian biotechnology sector and the implications that this will have on the sector’s independence from military funding. Developments in Biotechnology Since the 1970s, biotechnology has been a high priority field for both Soviet and Russian governments. However, after the dissolution of the USSR and the poor financial conditions of Russia since its founding in 1991 to approximately 2008–2009, science and technology generally were badly supported, as was the educational system. Many Russian scientists, especially those of high caliber and recent graduates, emigrated to the many countries that offered well-paid jobs in well-furbished laboratories. The director of the Shemyakin-Ovchinnikov Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry, Vadim T. Ivanov, estimated that 600,000 scientists across all specialties have emigrated since 1991 (Ivanov did not estimate what percentage of these émigrés were biotechnologists).5 It is no surprise that both R&D pertaining to biotechnology and its derivative industry suffered, with the bioresearch community generating fewer publications than most industrialized counties, and the share of Russian bioindustrial products in global markets dropping down to near zero. The FOI has closely followed developments in the USSR and Russia. It maintains one team of open-source researchers who focus on science and

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technology in Russia. For many years it was led by Roger Roffey, and has generated excellent reports on science and technology in Russia, including one of recent origin that focuses on biotechnology. By using information from two FOI reports,6 alongside that provided in Russian publications, we can in a few paragraphs offer reasons for why both the Putin and Medvedev administrations took steps to stimulate biotechnology in Russia. During 2004–2009, Russia’s share of the world biotechnology market was less than 0.2–0.8 percent. (For comparison, in 1991, the Soviet Union’s share was 5 percent.) It was expected that by 2010, Russian share of the world market for biotechnology products would be 0.3 percent (compared with 42 percent for the US, 22 percent for the European Union countries, 10 percent for China, and 2 percent for India). This did not occur. Instead, by 2012, an official Russian estimate given in a Russian Ministry of Economic Development planning document placed it at less than 0.1 percent.7 As a result, Russia was in 2012 importing more than 80 percent of its biotechnological products.8 Roffey points to the overall funding issue for why Russia has done so poorly. He notes that in 2005, the Russian government was spending only $0.04 billion a year on the biotechnology area, compared to $1 billion in China and more than $10 billion annually in the United States and the EU countries.9 In addition, he highlights the fact that “only a limited number of private companies” were investing in biotechnology innovations in Russia, with private companies accounting only for 30 percent of domestic biotechnology investments (compared to 60 percent in the United States and 50 percent in the EU).10 According to him, “such a high degree of state involvement in Russia increases the risks to investors due to widespread corruption” and therefore dissuades investments in the first place.11 Business analysts also frequently emphasize other negative factors that impede foreign investments and the development of Russian biotechnology industry, such as “excessive regulation” and the “poor quality” of legal institutions necessary to protect intellectual property and the prevalence of counterfeit pharmaceuticals.12 The number of foreign patents and of high-impact publications confirms the poor state of Russia’s biotechnology sector throughout the past decade. Researcher Ekaterina Streltsova from the Institute for Statistical Research and Economics of Knowledge in Moscow studied the distribution of biotechnology patents among industrialized countries. Her findings were as follows: Russia’s contribution to global patent activity in the biotechnology field is extremely small. In 2012, out of nearly 40,000 patents published by all the patent offices for inventions in this area, Russian applicants accounted for less than 1%. Russia falls far behind leading countries, taking 18th place globally for this indicator [behind Israel and ahead of Austria] . . . the level

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of Russian applicants’ patent activity abroad in the biotechnology field remained low over the entire period examined, which may be the result of various factors: the focus on the national technology market as the overriding business strategy [since filing patents abroad would not necessarily be needed for products strictly sold within Russia]; the lack of resources (above all, financial) required to obtain patents at foreign offices; and low competitiveness of domestic inventions.13

As for the number of new biotechnology patents registered by foreign organizations in Russia, the statistics are clear that the country is not a destination sought out by innovators. According to the 2015 China Biotechnology and Bio-industry Development Report, only 57 patents were registered by Chinese inventors in Russia in the 2005–2014 period; for comparison, 625 were registered in the United States and 61 in Spain during the same time period.14 Considering the meteoric rise of China’s biotechnology sector and the high-level promotion of Sino-Russian investments, the fact that so few patents were registered in Russia should be particularly troubling for the Putin administration.15 Russian fundamental research in the life sciences was and remains similarly imperceptible abroad. In 2007, by one estimate, only about half of Russia’s total yearly publication output was published in journals that were translated and made available abroad.16 According to a scientometric study conducted by Yu. Mokhnacheva from the RAS’s Library for Natural Sciences, Russian publications in molecular biology indexed in two databases of the Thomson Reuters Web of Science Core Collection (and therefore visible to Western researchers) fluctuated in the 1,000–1,200 publications-per-year range in the 2004–2012 period, only reaching some 1,500 publications by 2013.17 A study by Markusova et al. of Russian publications indexed in one of these two databases for the 2007–2011 period yielded a total publication count of 17,531 papers categorized as papers in biology as a whole.18 When that same team looked at highly cited papers, they found that only 227 publications in biochemistry and molecular biology had been cited at least thirty times and only 82 at least fifty times.19 Thus, even articles that were authored by Russians and were indexed in Western databases, and therefore could be retrieved with some ease by Western researchers, were likely to have minimal impact. In bionanotechnology, a cutting-edge field that partially overlaps with the modern life sciences, a four-author study showed that Russian publications indexed in another non-Russian citation database had gone from 29 to 153 in the 1995–2006 period.20 Tellingly, Russia had by 2006 been overtaken by a wide margin in terms of indexed publications by China, India, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, even though all of these countries had started with fewer publications than Russia in this field in 1995–1997.21 The disappointing performance in bionanotechnology is characteristic of the broader

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Russian life sciences research endeavor. Two researchers, Vladimir Pislyakov and Elena Shukshina, presented a breakdown of Russian highly cited papers across twenty-two scientific fields in a 2014 paper. They reported the following abysmal count of Russian highly cited publications given by subfields: 1 paper in immunology, representing 0.24% of the total Russian output; 2 papers in pharmacology and toxicology, representing 0.38% of the total Russian output; 6 papers in microbiology, representing 0.19% of the total Russian output; 13 papers in molecular biology and genetics, at 0.23% of the total Russian output; 43 papers in biology and biochemistry, at 0.43% of the total Russian output; and 74 papers in clinical medicine, representing 0.61% of the total Russian output.22

The lack of citations for Russian research is not simply reflective of Russian research output troubles, but is also caused by a range of access issues across all disciplines. Most Russian-language journals, and thus most of Russia’s research output, were not indexed in publication databases available abroad until very recently. Some improvements have occurred in recent years, notably with the launch of the online Russian publication database eLibrary.ru that we use in Chapter 4 and explain in that chapter’s Annex 4.2, but it will take time before this database becomes linked with its Western counterparts.23 As such, even foreign researchers able and willing to read a paper in Russian would have had a difficult time in obtaining the literature they wished to consult. In addition, Russian access to domestic research was and remains problematic. Foreign journal subscriptions are expensive, particularly since they must be purchased with foreign currencies. Russian researchers have also faced difficulties in accessing older Soviet and Russian research. The old Soviet-Russian library database is very difficult to use. The indexing system is so obtuse that librarians in Russia earn a little extra income by charging researchers a search fee to navigate the indexing system.24 Digitizing these holdings will be a herculean task. Publishing in foreign journals and, in particular, partnering with foreign coauthors remains the key to achieving visibility. In the aforementioned study by Mokhnacheva, over half of the Russian publications indexed in the Web of Science database involved a foreign coauthor.25 However, translating results into English for collaboration and submission abroad is costly for cash-strapped Russian institutions, and financial incentives to encourage productive international work have for a long time not been in place. For instance, unlike in countries such as China, Iran, and Turkey, scientists in Russia did not receive a financial bonus payment for publishing in international journals as late as 2007.26 Overall, Russian researchers are faced with numerous hurdles when trying to stay abreast of developments in their fields, which in turn limit their opportunities for an impactful career in Russia.

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In addition to all these difficulties, Russian researchers have persistently received lower salaries and minuscule research funding compared to what their Western counterparts received.27 As an indicative anecdote, a Russian scientist who was interviewed in 2008 revealed that his normal salary as provided by an RAS institute was a measly equivalent of $200 per month.28 It is therefore no surprise that Russian institutions have continually had difficulty in retaining the talent necessary to conduct research and transform results into commercial biotechnology products. These problems help explain why the new Russian generation has a decreased interest in pursuing such careers. To make this point, we first present baseline educational trends for Russia and then turn to the relevant data on advanced degrees earned in the life sciences. According to official data provided by the Russian Federal State Statistics Service, rates of enrollment in all graduate programs rose from a low in the mid-1990s up until 2005–2006, and have steadily fallen since then. In 2005–2006, there were roughly 1,640,000 admitted students in programs yielding a bachelor, specialist, or master’s degree.29 By 2014–2015, that number had decreased by 27 percent down to roughly 1,192,000 enrolled students.30 A similar downward trend is visible when the number of graduates is given per 10,000 employed in the economy, which suggests that the trend is not simply caused by demographic changes negatively affecting the workforce as a whole.31 The major decreases occurred between 2005–2006 and 2011–2012, with the 2008 financial crisis the probable cause. Of course, many students who seek graduate degrees to not wish to become researchers, let alone in the life sciences. But since an advanced degree is necessary for such a career, these numbers demonstrate that the pool of potential researchers is decreasing in Russia. The specialist website Science-Expert.ru tracks information on, and provides resources for, advanced degree candidates. In Russia, doctorates come in two ranks: a student first obtains a candidate of sciences degree roughly equivalent to a US PhD, and then can obtain a doctor of sciences degree, which roughly corresponds to the requirement in other countries that a postdoctoral fellow publish a major work. A professorship position most often requires a doctor of sciences degree. We refer to both as advanced degrees. Based on data hosted by this website for the 1994–2015 period, the yearly total number of validated advanced degrees has decreased since a peak in 2006.32 These values match the downward trend visible in the whole higher-education sector. Using other statistics retrieved from Science-Expert.ru, we aggregated the number of advanced degrees given in the two life sciences categories— biological sciences and pharmaceutical sciences—for the 1994–2015 period. As can be seen in Figure 5.1, the number of new candidates has decreased since 2006. Figure 5.2 expresses these totals as a percentage of

Figure 5.1 Russian Doctor of Sciences and PhD Degrees Granted per Year in the Biological and Pharmaceutical Sciences, 1994–2015

Source: “Statistical Indicators of Dissertation Councils in the Russian Federation—Persons Approved by the Higher Assessment Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science of Russian Academic Degrees (1994–2015)” (in Russian), Science-Expert.ru, http://science -expert.ru/dsrf/federal_level/Stat_dis_2.shtml (accessed August 10, 2016).

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Figure 5.2 Russian Doctor of Sciences and PhD Degrees Granted per Year in the Biological and Pharmeceutical Sciences as Percentage of Total Number of Such Degrees Issued, 1994–2015

Source: “Statistical Indicators of Dissertation Councils in the Russian Federation—Persons Approved by the Higher Assessment Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science of Russian Academic Degrees (1994–2015)” (in Russian), Science-Expert.ru, http://science -expert.ru/dsrf/federal_level/Stat_dis_2.shtml (accessed August 10, 2016).

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the total yearly number of granted candidate and doctor degrees. The lack of fluctuation in these percentages is evidence that the two life sciences subfields are following the same broad trends as that of candidate and doctor degrees regardless of specialization. In sum, the trends in higher-level education support the conclusion that Russian students have had less interest to pursue research careers in the life sciences in the past decade. The Putin and Medvedev administrations were well aware of the poor performance of Russia’s biotechnology industry and the need to do something about it—that is, to do whatever was necessary to boost biotechnology R&D in research institutes, encourage growth of the biotechnology industry, and encourage international collaborations. The following sections deal with their two major efforts, one that focuses on the domestic situation and the second that also seeks to improve domestic biotechnology but it has important international aspects. Federal Programs, 2005–2016 The Putin and Medvedev administrations have emplaced federal programs to bolster the failing Russian biotechnology industry. The first effort at the revitalization of this sector began in 2005 under Putin.33 This section has two subsections; the first discusses the federal programs that were mostly of domestic relevance, while the second deals with internationally oriented programs that attempted to staunch the “brain drain” affecting the Russian sciences. Biotechnology Programs Having Mostly Domestic Relevance

The Putin administration’s prioritization of biotechnology growth in particular began in 2005.34 A “National Program for the Development of Biotechnology 2006–2015” plan was drafted on the initiative of the Russian Society of Biotechnologists, with input from governmental agencies.35 The main objective of this effort was to design an integrated state-and-business modernization plan for Russia’s biotechnology industry.36 Roffey identified a number of key subjects that were to receive priority national or regional funding.37 One overarching objective, which became a recurring theme in Russian biotechnology planning documents, was to gain self-sufficiency of high priority biotechnology products that were being imported. Self-sufficiency in the production of medical products was especially sought after.38 The Putin administration proposed a biotechnology budget of 150 billion rubles (approximate $5.2 billion) to accomplish these objectives.39 According to Roffey, while the foregoing were activities in the civilian sphere, simultaneously “the Ministry of Defense took part in drawing up the national program

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but kept its own investment in R&D in biotechnology and protection against biological and chemical weapons under strict control.”40 In the years that followed, the Russian government installed several programs to bolster Russian biotechnology. Much of the scientific infrastructure had deteriorated after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The government recognized that infrastructure repair work was the first step of a long process to bring Russian science up to an international level. In regard to biotechnology, the first iteration of the previously discussed “National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation” was launched in 2008 and continues to this day (see Chapters 3 and 4). As seen in those chapters, this program provided funds for the construction and renovation of infrastructure involved in securing and countering dangerous pathogens and chemicals, as well as for associated research work.41 The MOD, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Industry, Rospotrebnadzor, Rosselkhoznadzor, and the Federal Medical and Biological Agency all had roles to play in administering the program (see Chapter 4 for details on many of these organizations).42 Part of the funding slated for infrastructure work went toward establishing production lines for the manufacturing of vaccines, antibiotics, medical immunobiologics, and remedies using hybridoma technology.43 More narrowly focused is the “Strategy for the Development of the Pharmaceutical Industry of the Russian Federation for the Period Up to 2020” (Pharma-2020).44 This strategy calls for the development of the innovative biotechnology sectors whose objectives are to develop and produce high-tech chemical and biotechnical substances useful in medicine. The Russian government appropriated 177,730 million rubles to fund Pharma2020 for the years 2009–2020. The funds are divided up as follows: 35,330 million rubles for training and establishment of infrastructure; 36,000 million rubles to transition to good manufacturing practice (GMP); and 106,400 million rubles for drug development. According to Minister of Health Tatiana Golikova, the strategy to substitute foreign drugs with domestic ones was adopted “after the government, acting upon the recommendations of the Modernization Commission, approved the lists of medicines that are of the highest priority to Russia.”45 Accordingly, fifty-seven medicines were selected for production by Russian industry.46 Golikova added that “[Russians] should remember that [they] have the potential to create novel medicines—there is a separate section in the programme for this.”47 The Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade (Minpromtorg) was entrusted with the strategy’s implementation. The Ministry of Industry and Trade quickly acted to establish a Scientific and Technical Council whose major responsibility was to review projects proposed by companies, research institutes, and other entities that fall within the purview of Pharma-2020.48 As stated by Medvedev and other government

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and Duma officials during a May 2009 meeting, biotechnology that was to be applied to produce medicines and clean energy was to be the foremost force for a special commission on economic development and modernization that was set up by Medvedev.49 The Russian government formally codified Pharma-2020 in a February 2011 decree and, further, it was embedded in the State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology in the Russian Federation until 2020 (BIO-2020), which is discussed later. We have received differing reports as to Pharma-2020’s successes. At a forum held in November 2011, one of the speakers cautioned that certain political, economic, and social problems will prevent biotechnological breakthroughs in the pharmaceutical realm. The problems that were mentioned were that Russia is “sitting on the oil needle” and the price of oil soon will drop steadily, Russia joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) will have a negative effect on the Russian pharmaceutical market (Russia joined the WTO in April 2012), obstacles to foreign investments will increase, cuts in the national health care budget will negatively affect the pharmaceutical market, and corruption in Russia will remain an enormous problem.50 On the other hand, as we show later, some of the pharmaceutical clusters that have been established with assistance from Pharma-2020 appear to be doing well. In addition, the Russian government has successfully encouraged the creation of pharmaceutical firms in Russia through investments by the state-owned enterprise Rusnano.51 An example of note is the SynBio Innovative Pharmaceutical Project joint venture, which brought together Russian, British, and German investors.52 We caution that the net effect of the governmental drive to bolster the Russian pharmaceutical industry is very difficult to measure and that the level of production of domestic medicines is not a sufficient indicator by which to measure success. For instance, stable governmental investment in the pharmaceutical industry necessitates some form of return-oninvestment, but any such profit margin made on the sale of the pharmaceutical compound in the domestic market would in turn negatively affect the Russian health care budget.53 Possibly the most important of all programs developed by the Russian government that aimed to promote biotechnology is the BIO-2020 Program, which was approved on April 24, 2012.54 The introductory text to this program highlighted recent governmental efforts at promoting biotechnology in Russia, including Pharma-2020. The authors of BIO-2020’s introduction emphasized that these prior measures had been insufficient and presented BIO-2020 as a broader program designed to lay the “systemic foundations” for Russia’s bioindustry.55 Its expected results are to: • increase in the volumes of consumption of biotechnology products in the Russian Federation by a factor of 8.3;

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• increase in the volumes of production of biotechnology products in the Russian Federation by a factor of 33; • reduce the share of imported biotechnology products by 50%; • increase in export share in the production of biotechnology products by a factor of more than 25; • advance biotechnological production in Russia so it reaches 1% of global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2020; • create conditions for raising Russian GDP by at least 3% by 2030.56

BIO-2020 was to receive 1.178 trillion rubles (approximately$39 billion) for the purpose of funding eight biotechnology “activities” between 2012 and 2020.57 These activities are biopharmaceuticals (of the program’s total budget, this activity will receive 9 percent), biomedicine (13 percent), agriculture and food biotechnology (17 percent), industrial biotechnology (18 percent), bioenergy industry (31 percent), environmental biotechnology (2 percent), forest biotechnology (4 percent), and marine biotechnology (6 percent).58 The allocation of funds for these “activities” can be seen in Table 5.1. The federal budget, regional budgets, and extra-budgetary sources were to bankroll BIO-2020. The Ministry of Economic Development was designated to coordinate BIO-2020, and at least fifteen entities participate. These entities include the Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Energy, RAS, and Russian Technology Platforms such as BioTech2030, which is a scientific-technical nonprofit partnership (the MOD is not mentioned in this context).59 BIO-2020’s biotechnology mission is “actively supported” by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research and the scientific programs of government academies like the RAS, RAMS, and Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences. “Applied and innovative projects” are funded by the Fund of Assistance to the Development of Small Forms of the Enterprises in the Scientific and Technical Sphere, Rusnamo, and JSC Russian Venture Company.60 A host of other government development institutes and corporations, big and medium businesses, and international businesses are expected to invest. The strategic imperative was to decrease imports of biotechnology products by 50 percent and increase the export of made in Russia biotechnology products by twenty-five times by 2020. Were these goals to be reached, Russia would be transformed from being a minor biotechnology powerhouse to joining the global leader in biotechnology.61 According to a BioTech2030 presentation, “the strategic goal [of BIO-2020] is that the level of ‘bioeconomy’ in Russia would be approximately 1% of GDP by 2020 and 3% of GDP by 2030,”62 which makes clear that the “at least 3% by 2030” objective given in the program text is aspirational. BIO-2020’s text mirrored the concept of a technological “race” mentioned in the aforementioned 2012 program on development. The great improvements in market performance called for in BIO-2020 depend

Table 5.1 Planned Financing of BIO-2020 As Given in the Underlying 2012 Document

Name of Activity

Biopharmaceuticsa Biomedicine Agricultural and food biotechnology Industrial biotechnology Bioenergy industry Environmental biotechnology Forest biotechnology Marine biotechnology

2011

2012

2013

1

5

16

10 0

1 14 0 1 1

9 5

10 22 2 3 3

7 10

14 26 2 3 5

Planned Volume of Financial Activities (billion rubles, prices of the corresponding years) 2014

2015

2016

2017

2019

2020

Total 2011–2020

Ratio (%)

18

18

20

24

30

40

200

17.0

6 15

20 28 3 3 7

8 20

21 31 3 4 7

8 20

24 31 3 5 7

10 20

24 35 4 5 8

16 20

28 60

4 7 10

22 20

32 70

5 8 12

106 150

210 367 30 45 70

9.0 12.7

17.8 31.2

2.6 3.8 5.9

Source: Russian Federation, “State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology in the Russian Federation Until 2020,” p. 55. Note: a. Financing of “biopharmaceutics” activities will be provided by off-budget subsidies, the federal budget, and budgets of state institutions of development, including funds provided by the Federal Target Program “Development of Pharmaceutical and Medical Industries of Russian Federation Till 2020 and Further Prospects.”

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heavily upon reversing negative infrastructure and personnel trends. The desired output had as a prerequisite the repair and further development of the Russian physical scientific infrastructure. To accomplish all goals, the drafters of the program gave special consideration to international cooperation—that is, each activity has funding that allows its scientists to interact with foreign counterparts (see later). It might have been that the overarching NSS-2020 (described in Chapter 3), which came into existence three years before BIO-2020, and which among other issues emphasized the importance of the biotechnology sector, was the impetus for BIO-2020. In particular, NSS-2020 stated that it was necessary to “form new markets of high-tech production/services and develop technologies for modernization.”63 Further, “breakthrough technologies” in “nanotechnology, biotechnology, medical engineering, electrical engineering, and instrumentation” were to be created to fulfill these tasks.64 The biotechnology sector has in fact received greater emphasis by the government since NSS-2020 became reality. About a year after BIO-2020 came into existence, the Ministry of Economic Development issued “On Approving the Action Plan (Roadmap) ‘Development of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering,’” which specifies the measures agencies will need to take in order to fulfill the objectives spelled out in BIO-2020.65 The measures to be taken to develop the eight priority sectors identified in BIO-2020 earlier are spelled out in detail, but there is no need for us to repeat them here. However, there is an interesting separate insert that specifies “systemic measures in the area of genetic engineering have been identified separately.”66 They are set forth in paragraphs 64–71: 64. Approve the state registration procedure for genetically engineered modified organisms that are intended for release into the environment, as well as the products obtained by using such organisms or containing them. 65. Approve a Russia-wide classification system for genetic modifications. 66. Approve the form for a certificate of state registration for genetically engineered modified organisms that are intended for release into the environment. 67. Begin the registration of genetically engineered modified organisms and the products obtained by using them according to the procedure stipulated in item 64 of this plan. 68. Develop a procedure for the certification (validation) of techniques and equipment. 69. Develop new generation genetically engineered modified organisms by using modern techniques to minimize the risks associated with their use (terminal technologies, etc.). 70. Develop a model for assessing the impact that genetically engineered modified organisms and the products obtained by using them have on human health. 71. Approve the procedure for monitoring the effects that genetically engineered

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modified organisms and products obtained by using such organisms or containing such organisms have on humans and the environment.67

This insert is very odd in that it appears to both lay down regulations and identify activities that should be regulated. One would have expected that by the year 2013 when the roadmap was being written that the issues pertaining to conducting genetic engineering and working on or releasing genetically modified organisms would have been considered and appropriate regulations or guidelines already would be in existence. And yet, if the text is to be believed, these regulatory issues had not yet been solved. The wide range of biotechnology programs on paper speaks to the political recognition of the importance of developing Russian biotechnology and the necessity of financial and political support to achieve this result. The plethora of governmental doctrinal and planning documents also makes clear that the Russian government views biotechnology sector modernization as a top-down process. The Putin and Medvedev administrations’ emphasis on long-term science and technology forecasts, meant to predict innovations in critical industries such as biotechnology in time for governmental action, is further evidence for this view.68 Even the rare bottom-up initiatives, for instance the Russian Society of Biotechnologists’ proposal for a “National Programme for the Development of Biotechnology in Russia 2006–2015” assumed that the government would develop long-term plans to boost biotechnology in the civilian sphere and accordingly structured its proposals as such.69 The top-down process is evidenced to an even greater extent by the contents of BIO-2020, which lists twelve ministries and agencies as program participants. Federal Programs That Aim to Encourage International Collaborations

Several programs were developed whose general aim is to reach out beyond Russia’s border to receive in some way assistance in building up its capabilities in biotechnology. The three methods for doing so that we discuss in this section are: (1) enticing Russian émigrés to return, and convincing foreign scientists to collaborate with Russian scientists and laboratories; (2) establishing “clusters” that include foreign companies; and (3) establishing a Russian version of Silicon Valley at Skolkovo, which is an international facility whose major envisaged components are a university and associated R&D units. Enticing Russian Émigrés and Foreign Scientists to Work in Russia. After

the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and in view of the long period during which the sciences were very poorly supported by the Russian government,

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many of the best Russian scientists departed to take up well-supported jobs in Western countries. In 2002, the RAS set up a funding program to provide grants in sixteen scientific disciplines, including genetics, for the purpose of enticing scientists to return to Russia from abroad.70 The programs in molecular and cell biology were for a short time successful.71 However, funding was abruptly cut in 2008.72 Two years later, in April 2010, a more encompassing program, called Mega-Grants, was approved by the government with oversight by the Russian Ministry of Education and Science. The Russian government funded the program at 12 billion rubles in 2010–2012, and about 11 billion rubles in 2013–2016.73 Mega-Grants’ objective was to attract high-profile scientists, who could be Russians or foreigners, to spend specified periods of time at university or academy laboratories where they would conduct internationallevel research while training Russian scientists and students. Almost every research area imaginable was to be supported: “astronomy and astrophysics, nuclear power and nuclear technologies, biology, biotechnologies, information technologies and computing systems, space research and technologies, mathematics, engineering, health sciences and technologies, mechanics and management processes, nanotechnologies, earth sciences, material sciences and technologies, psychology, cognitive research, construction and architecture, physics, chemistry, ecology, economics, international research, sociology, power production, energy efficiency and energy saving.”74 The applicants who were successful in securing a grant received stipends of 150 million rubles ($5 million) during 2010–2013 and 90 million rubles thereafter; from receipt these moneys had to be spent within two years for salaries, equipment, supplies, travel, and the like. MegaGrants tended to favor applicants who would conduct research at universities, because the government wanted to encourage greater integration between research and education, as well as increasing the international prestige of Russian universities (an objective we will return to later in the third case-study section).75 Mega-Grants worked well for some time, as evidenced by a large number of applications being submitted by émigré Russian scientists.76 As far as we are aware, to date there have been five “calls” for applications. The first call, in 2010, received 507 applications, of which 39 were successful; of the 39, 22 were to be conducted by Russian citizens and the remainder by foreigners. The program provided for 38 mega-grants in 2011, 42 in 2012, and 42 in 2013.77 After a two-year hiatus, the program was restarted in 2016.78 The Mega-Grant project website currently lists 162 projects that it supports and names the recipient researchers leading each project.79 It is probable that the two-year pause was due to rising dissatisfaction with the Mega-Grants program. Starting in 2012, scientists who once had been enthusiastic about the Mega-Grants program began voicing their dis-

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appointment. This came about due to the Russian government having adopted new rules for how grants were to be implemented. Before applying, scientists had to obtain permission from the Ministry of Education and Science for what they proposed to do, including describing in detail how it was to be done. Mega-Grant recipients became more and more aggrieved, complaining about visa problems, endless paperwork, spending restrictions, and lack of equipment and qualified staff. As a result of these issues, many of them asserted that it was impossible to set up a laboratory, hire competent staff, and conduct advanced research within two years (the new rules included the possibility of grantees being able to extend their projects for an additional two years).80 Whether the latest Mega-Grant call for proposal will succeed in easing or solving these problems is unknown at the time of writing. Émigré scientists have also taken steps from abroad to stay in touch with Russian scientists and institutes. Thus, in 2008, Russian émigré scientists meeting in Paris organized the Russian-Speaking Academic Science Association.81 Its objective is to maintain, strengthen, and develop common intellectual and cultural space of the Russian-speaking scientific community. Soon there were three RASAs: RASA-USA, RASA-Europe, and RASAAsia. RASA-USA’s current president is Nikolay V. Vasilyev, who is a staff scientist at the Boston Children’s Hospital. In 2016, the combined RASAs claimed to have ninety-nine members, of whom forty-two identified the United States to be their home.82 RASA-USA had its most recent annual meeting in November 2015. The conference was held at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., and its theme was the “prospects of Russian expert community with the involvement of scientists and compatriots living abroad.”83 Among the more than 160 attendees there were some high-profile officials including Dmitry Livanov, Russia’s minister of education and science; Sergey Kislyak, Russian ambassador to the United States; and Lyudmila Ogorodova, Russian deputy minister of education and science.84 The presence of Russian officials indicates that their government has acted to encourage the creation of these scientific networks. Biotechnology Clusters. Among the many activities spelled out in Pharma-

2020, there is a specific mechanism for the development of biotechnology for pharmaceuticals that specifies that clusters be set up and that they should be sited at major universities. The concept of clusters stems from the Soviet era, when the government ordered that large components of the Soviet MIC that specialized in the production of specific weapons systems be established. Each was composed of a research institute and an associated production facility. These components were called Nauchno-Proizvodstvennoe Obedinenie, which is translated as Scientific Production Association (SPA). One of first of its kind for biotechnology was established in 1989 in

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Vector, which in turn spun off a subordinate SPA in 1994 that still survives as Vector-Best.85 Today’s clusters in Russia are different in four major ways from SPAs. First, as far as we are aware, none of them are directly controlled by the MOD, although of course the MOD can purchase cluster products (for example, one St. Petersburg cluster participant produces medical kits advertised for use in MOD vehicles and by MOD medical personnel).86 Second, business, not the military, determines what products will be developed and manufactured. Third, in addition to having research units and production facilities, clusters have an educational component through their association with universities. Fourth and of great importance, most if not all clusters have as partners or associates foreign scientists, research units, or companies. One of the first clusters, called Severny, was established at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology’s BioBusiness Incubator. It specializes in pharmaceuticals and for this purpose has ten laboratories.87 Six domestic pharmaceutical companies are associated with this cluster, namely High Technologies KhimRar, Niopik, Akrikhin, Protek, Farmstandart, and Farmzashchita. As for international involvement, a Severny spokesperson asserted in July 2012 that Nobel Prize–winner Barry Sharpless would head one of the laboratories and that he had already given a speech at the institute.88 However, to date, there is no information evidencing that Severny has produced any pharmaceuticals. The cluster concept grew rapidly after 2012, and by 2016 the Trade Mission of the Russian Federation in Germany was advertising the existence of one biotechnology cluster, six pharmaceutical clusters, and five medical clusters out of a total of eighty-eight clusters.89 As we detail later, that number has continued to grow. A cluster at Obninsk, in the Kaluga oblast, was particularly emphasized in media accounts given the important foreign firms that were slated to do business in the region. A spokesperson from Kaluga claimed that already in 2012, seven of the world’s leading companies—AstraZeneca, Stada CIS, Novo Nordisk, Berlin Chemie, Niarmedik, and Galenika—were establishing branches in the oblast, though he did not make clear how many of them, if any, were joining the cluster. AstraZeneca had indeed invested some $224 million as of October 2015 in establishing a pharmaceutical plant in Kaluga.90 AstraZeneca, a British-Swedish company, has wide-ranging interests in Russia and as of the same date employed more than 1,400 people in Russia at the time.91 Other foreign pharmaceutical companies remain active in Russia, having recognized that it presents a large market for high-quality drugs, that the Russian government supports their investments via Pharma-2020, and that oblast and city governments also have funding to help support investors. We note that the Danish company Novo Nordisk in its information pages has useful descriptions of how it entered the Russian market,

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focusing mainly on the production of insulin in Kaluga.92 A study of the 250 largest industrial centers in Russia in 2010 found that several of Russia’s industrial centers had benefited from the presence of Western pharmaceutical companies.93 We consider the industrial centers that already housed Russian and foreign biotechnology companies in 2010 to be likely candidates for becoming Russian biotechnology clusters. The most up-to-date information on Russian clusters and their status can be retrieved at a dedicated website maintained by the Russian Institute for Statistical Studies and Economics of Knowledge.94 As of writing, at the end of 2016, its system had recorded two industrial biotechnology clusters, seven pharmaceutical clusters, and seven medical clusters, for a total of sixteen clusters.95 We list the clusters here:

• A pharmaceutical cluster in Biysk, Altai Krai (established in 2008; 11 participants).96 • A medical, environmental, and biotechnology instrumentation cluster in St. Petersburg (established in 2010; 39 participants).97 • A medical, pharmaceutical, and radiological technologies cluster in St. Petersburg (established in 2011; 13 participants).98 • An industrial biotechnology cluster for the production of products through the use of enzymes and microorganisms, located in Pushchino, Moscow oblast (established in 2012; 68 participants).99 • The aforementioned pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and biomedicine cluster in Obninsk, Kaluga oblast (established in 2012; 42 participants).100 • A pharmaceutical cluster called Fiztech XXI on the outskirts of Moscow (established in 2012; 25 participants).101 • A chemical and pharmaceutical cluster in Volgograd, Volgograd oblast (established in 2012; 10 participants).102 • A pharmaceuticals, medical technology, and information technology cluster in Tomsk, Tomsk oblast (established in 2013; 52 participants).103 • A pharmaceutical cluster in Irkutsk, Irkutsk oblast (established in 2014; 37 participants).104 • A pharmaceutical cluster in Belgorod, Belgorod oblast (established in 2014; 22 participants).105 • A medical industry, new chemistry, and biotechnology cluster in Moscow (established in 2014; 14 participants).106 • A pharmaceutical cluster in Oka, Ryazan oblast, as described in detail in the first case study later (established in 2014; 10 participants).107 • A medical technology cluster called South, in Moscow (established in 2015; 19 participants).108 • An industrial biotechnology cluster for the deep processing of grain, located in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov oblast (established in 2015; 10 participants).109

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However, only two clusters were listed in the institute’s database as having progressed beyond the “elementary” stage of development: the industrial biotechnology cluster at Pushchino and the pharmaceutical cluster in St. Petersburg.110 We note that all of these clusters are either in major Russian cities or in smaller but specialized science cities like Pushchino and Belgorod. As such, cluster companies can draw upon suitable existing infrastructure and skilled labor, and in many cases are co-located to target markets. Using the given cluster addresses, information on cluster participant websites, and Yandex Maps and Google Maps, we obtained geocodes for as many of the major cluster participants as we could so as to be able to inspect the sites on public satellite imagery and form an independent opinion on their progress. Assessing a cluster’s level of activity proved difficult because most active clusters turned out to be decentralized, with partnered companies scattered throughout a city. The decentralized nature of most clusters makes it almost cost-free for existing biotechnology companies to join an existing cluster or form a new one since these companies do not need to invest in new joint infrastructure. The major benefit of decentralized clusters is that it is a cost-effective method of increasing the visibility of each individual small company within the cluster and as a result may lead to reduced publicity costs or increased investments. For example, a small and new company can partner with an existing cluster and gain advantage from having their products prominently featured alongside those of better-known companies within the cluster’s joint product catalog. This decentralized arrangement is far less ambitious than the optimal development of joint or colocated production lines whereby companies within a cluster all collaborate on a common product line. At least some of the companies partnered into clusters have experienced visible progress. On public satellite imagery, we could sometimes see full parking lots and evidence of completed building construction or refurbishment. Of note is the construction of the large FORT Ltd. plant that forms the core of the Oka cluster (see later). The confirmation that at least some companies within advertised clusters are in activity as advertised supports the reported continued growth in Russian biotechnology clusters. Skolkovo: Russian Version of Silicon Valley. The Skolkovo project

launched by Medvedev and his advisers best exemplifies the Russian government’s top-down approach for revitalizing the country’s high-technology sectors. We have little doubt that Medvedev and his advisers had been thinking about potential reforms for some time before he became president in May 2008. These thoughts were put on paper in a long article he penned and had published in September 2009. The approach he championed relied on obtaining technology and know-how from abroad. This much was made clear in the following part of the article:

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The modernisation of Russian democracy and establishment of a new economy will, in my opinion, only be possible if we use the intellectual resources of post-industrial societies. And we should do so without any complexes, openly and pragmatically. The issue of harmonising our relations with western democracies is not a question of taste, personal preferences or the prerogatives of given political groups. Our current domestic financial and technological capabilities are not sufficient for a qualitative improvement in the quality of life. We need money and technology from Europe, America and Asia. In turn, these countries need the opportunities Russia offers. We are very interested in the rapprochement and interpenetration of our cultures and economies. . . . We will overcome the crisis, backwardness and corruption. We will create a new Russia. Go Russia!111

In June 2010, President Medvedev visited Palo Alto, California, and met with Russian émigrés who worked in the Silicon Valley, as well as founders of various enterprises. He spent several hours with them in a giveand-take session during which he made the following comments: As you know, we are creating a new special zone in Skolkovo. . . . The goal is to change the structure of our economy, to stop relying on high commodities prices as the only engine for our economic growth, to end decades-long dominance of raw materials exports. . . . I don’t know how successful it will all be, because it’s difficult to guess in advance, but in any case, we will try to do something good there. Today, we already signed a fairly serious agreement with Cisco; they will create a few R&D centres there. Overall, we had a good discussion. This is the very beginning, and I want to say again that nobody is trying to copy Silicon Valley, because that is most likely impossible. This is a special place, very powerful and with huge potential. But there are certain principles that we would like to borrow for Russia. Perhaps you can tell me what we should take away from here, other than people, of course (which is a given, since people are the most important asset).112

After returning to Russia, Medvedev addressed Skolkovo’s first cohort of scientists, technicians, and administrators who would staff the special zone he mentioned in Palo Alto, as well as a welcome guest, namely California’s governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. Some of his impressions were as follows: I make no secret of the fact that I was very impressed by what I saw in Silicon Valley, not just by the concentration of high-tech companies with high capitalisation there, but also by the achievements that Silicon Valley has produced. What made perhaps the biggest impression on me was the atmosphere, which really is something unique, creative, and at the same time calm and cozy. This is probably just the kind of climate that this kind of business needs. I visited big companies, some of which are represented here today, and also visited small companies, met with representatives of Russian companies there too. Overall, it was all very interesting. . . . The goal is to offer an example of what we can and must do, develop the conditions and then replicate this experience throughout the country, making use of the immense scientific potential that Russia possesses. But we

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first need to develop a modern and effective model that really works, and this is Skolkovo’s purpose. I hope that the special rules that will apply to Skolkovo, the various benefits the project offers, including the zero profit, corporate property and land tax rates, and also the customs breaks and simplified immigration procedures for foreign specialists will all help to ensure this project’s rapid and active development.113

Shortly after his visit to Skolkovo, he announced to the Federal Assembly that a new science innovation hub, the Skolkovo Innovation Center (SK), was to be established in order to create a science and technology enclave with special legal and regulatory regimes, fuel it with sizable government subsidy and support R&D and startups in one of two areas: Russia’s segments of comparative advantage (IT [information technology], space, nuclear) or high demand and large market (biomedicine and energy efficiency).114

Of course, SK is quite different from Silicon Valley in terms of its beginnings and growth patterns. Silicon Valley came about haphazardly— that is, it began, grew, and developed, and continues to develop, without a higher authority having planned it or guided its future course. Conversely, as we see from the statements earlier, the SK concept was created in the minds of Medvedev and, assumedly, his advisers. It is reasonable to believe that he, being the president of Russia, had little trouble establishing the Skolkovo Foundation (SF), which was to coordinate the entire SK project. Viktor F. Vekselberg, the chairman of the Renova Group, was appointed president of SF.115 Soon thereafter, in May 2010, SF received a grant of more than $3.2 billion from the Russian government for activities during 2011–2015. Of this sum, SK’s budget for 2010–2011 was 3.9 billion rubles,116 for 2012 it was 22 billion rubles (about $0.73 billion), and for 2013 it was 17.3 billion rubles (about $0.58 billion).117 The most important point to note regarding the entire SK project is that construction of core facilities at the entire site is still ongoing and therefore that key aspects of the project remain aspirational.118 Here we will concentrate on SK’s biotechnology aspects that are relevant to this book. Currently, SF manages the establishment of five components: SK, Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology (Skoltech), Skolkovo Technopark, Skolkovo Open University, and The City. A sixth component, the International Medical Center, is being planned for the future. Following we detail each component.

• SK is constituted by five technology clusters: biomedicine, information technology, energy, satellite and space technology, and nuclear technology.119 In biomedicine, the subfields of interest are bioinformatics, biological and medical-biological sciences, clinical medicine and health care, and

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industrial biotechnologies. According to a National Research Council committee: “Biomedicine is one of the main sectors of interest. Eleven of 30 grant applications for biomedical start-ups had been approved by April 2012. A total of $76 million had been invested, with each grant for $2–5 million over 3–5 years. The strategic goal of the biomedicine cluster is to create an ecosystem for biomedical innovations that consists of more than 90 companies.”120 In early 2016, SF reported that more than a thousand startup companies from fifty Russian regions were SK “participants” in the five clusters, of which forty had received grants from SF.121 Of the thousand participants, approximately 400 are in the biomedical realm. Subjects of interest in the biomedical cluster include: anti-microbial drugs, vaccines and diagnostics; anti-viral drugs, vaccines and diagnostics; and materials and devices modifying structure, physiology, or development of tissues (clinical bioengineering and including 3D printing).122

• Skoltech is a graduate institution that offers a master of science and a PhD program in five fields of study.123 All courses are taught in English.124 These fields mostly match the SK technology clusters, and are: energy science and technology, information science and technology, biomedical science and technology, space science and technology, and product design and advanced manufacturing.125 Skoltech is of particular interest to us since it has since its beginnings been in partnership with a US academic institution. On October 26, 2011, SF and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) signed a four-year agreement to establish Skoltech. The four years was to be the first phase of the MIT-Skoltech collaboration. MIT professor of engineering Edward F. Crawley was selected to be the Skoltech president. MIT educators were to design a curriculum; for the first year activities were to be undertaken in energy science and information science, and in 2013 a biomedicine program would begin. Essentially all expenses for realizing Skoltech—such as building, staffing, and furbishing—would be borne by the Russian government, as well as expenses related to MIT’s participation. Upon graduating from undergraduate studies, MIT students were welcome to seek admission to the master’s program at Skoltech and those who were admitted would receive full fellowships including travel, tuition, accommodations, insurance, and the like.126 SF reportedly paid MIT $300 million for its participation with Skoltech.127 In early 2013, six MIT faculty members were appointed Skoltech professors for one-year terms. Of these, two were biological engineers—Bruce Tidor and Forest White. The six were tasked to work with Skoltech faculty to help “launch joint research, innovation and educational programs, MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives-Russia activities and other mechanisms for collaboration.”128 When interviewed in May 2013, Crawley

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estimated that by the end of the decade, Skoltech would employ 200 faculty, and be attended by 1,200 graduate students.129 At the same time, Vekselberg stated that he wanted “Skoltech to be self-sustaining within five to seven years through endowment funding, corporate research grants, and venture capital.”130 At a meeting to celebrate the end of the first year of operation, Crawley proudly announced that fifteen international centers for research, education, and innovation had signed up with Skoltech. Each of the centers was to receive $60 million over five years. Of these, two were in the biomedical field; they would address infectious disease and RNA therapeutics, and stem cell research. The Skoltech campus is being built from scratch, with no on-site infrastructure available for use by the first cohort of students.131 Skoltech therefore relied on MIT and other partners to provide teaching and laboratory spaces. 132 For instance, according to Skoltech, the biomedicine program relied on MIT, the University of Groningen, Harvard Medical School, and the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center for conducting research. 133 The construction company working on the Skoltech building stated that construction work on the university campus began in 2015 and that as of July 2016, “the shell and core of the first buildings are nearing completion.”134 Thus, Skoltech’s flagship building is currently not in operation. Satellite imagery of the site shows largescale construction since 2012 at the overall Skolkovo site and since 2014 at Skoltech’s flagship building.135 Construction plans for the Skoltech building show the planned creation of a BSL-3 laboratory facility, a vivarium, and a center for biomedical research.136 The latter is composed of laboratory areas, including for tissue culture, robotics, imaging and microscopy, and histology and chemical analysis.137 In June 2015, Skoltech’s inaugural class of fifty master of science students graduated. 138 In February 2016, the first phase of the MITSkoltech collaboration ended and the partnership became of “reduced size and narrower focus.” 139 At this time, Crawley completed his tenure as president and Academician Alexander Kuleshov immediately was appointed Skoltech president. He is a renowned mathematician and the former director of the Kharkevich Institute of Information Transmission Problems. On the MIT side, Bruce Tidor was appointed director of the MIT-Skoltech initiative. He noted that, although the campus was still “fledgling,” Skoltech students could now draw upon staffed and resourced main administrative offices and functions.140 He then explained that three research center grants were ongoing, including one in the life sciences for functional genomics research under Daniel Anderson at MIT.141 We must stress that foreign universities other than MIT are involved in the Skoltech project. As of August 2014, seven foreign research teams were

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involved in a Skoltech program called Centers for Research, Education and Innovation (CREIs). Two of them were conducting stem cell research; they were the Research Institute for Biology of Ageing, University of Groningen, Netherlands; and Hubrecht Institute, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. Two were conducting research pertaining to infectious diseases and functional genomics; they were Harvard Medical School, United States; and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, United States. And three were working with composites; they were the University of South Carolina, United States; the University of Leuwen, Belgium; and Delf University of Technology, Netherlands.142 We do not know what the status of these seven universities is as of October 2016.

• Skolkovo Technopark is, according to SF, where science meets business, creating a special innovative ecosystem. The Technopark occupies 23,000 square meters and by the end of 2014 was populated by forty-eight resident companies employing 652 persons. SF claims that the Technopark has attracted 290 million rubles in investments and 1.3 billion rubles in grants.143 • Skolkovo Open University is a program designed to recruit talented young Russians skilled in science and technology and displaying entrepreneurial talent to provide them with advanced training for the purpose of developing them to be leaders within Russia’s innovation ecosystem.

• The City is planned to be the site of a congress center, hotels, cultural establishments, and other public facilities that will attract visitors. It is being built in a central zone around the main square and is connected with the main transport terminal. The Skoltech campus and the Technopark are located on opposite sides of The City.

• The International Medical Center supposedly will be built in the next five to seven years. SF will allocate 58 hectares of land, on which the center of 490,000 square meters will be built at a cost of 80 billion rubles ($1 billion). It is estimated that currently 80,000 Russians travel annually to other countries for medical care, spending about 2 billion rubles ($26 million). This center aims to provide the highest standard of health care, and by doing so hopes to attract Russians who otherwise would travel abroad for medical treatment.144 The fate of all these subcomponents of the Skolkovo project remains uncertain, as so much depends on continued Russian political support and international collaboration. Skolkovo is widely seen as having been a priority project for Medvedev and for individuals such as his economic adviser Sergei Guriev.145 When Medvedev’s presidential term ended and Putin’s new term began in 2012, the resultant jockeying for power saw

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the tables turn against some of Medvedev’s advisers. For instance, Guriev fled to France. 146 The Skolkovo project rapidly came under attack, with then–deputy prime minister Vladislav Surkov in October 2012 voicing his criticism of the infrastructure costs of two large buildings planned for SK.147 A major signal that SK’s fortunes were shifting occurred at the end of 2012, when Putin vetoed a proposal that would have, inter alia, given SK the ability to “approve urban planning and design standards and identify the list of necessary planning permits and authorisations and construction phases.”148 More legal trouble for the SK project followed in 2013. The Russian Investigative Committee, which reports directly to the president of Russia, opened corruption investigations against two former Skolkovo executives in February 2013.149 By August, however, all charges against one individual had been dropped and those against the second had been commuted.150 We stress that we do not know the ultimate findings by the investigators of this complicated imbroglio. Indeed, media attention in the first case quickly died down. The second incident was also reported in the media over several months in 2013, but that one continued to be raised in Russian newspapers and television news. It concerns a vice president of Skolkovo Foundation, Alexei Beltyukov, who was accused of having colluded with Russia Duma opposition deputy Ilya Ponomaryov in an embezzlement scheme. According to the Russian Investigative Committee, without receiving management approval Beltyukov allegedly paid Ponomaryov $750,000 of the foundation’s money for him to present lectures and undertake research projects between February 2011 and February 2012. According to these claims, only three lectures were delivered and no research project was conducted. Ilya Ponomaryov vigorously denied these allegations and claimed they were politically motivated.151 Ponomaryov’s background is important to note in this regard. He rose to prominence as one of three Duma deputies who helped lead anti-Kremlin street protests in 2011–2012, which apparently were perceived by Putin as a threat to his presidency.152 Further, in March 2014, Ponomaryov was the only Duma deputy to vote against the annexation of Crimea.153 Both Beltyukov and Ponomaryov reportedly are now abroad, as both had arrest warrants issued in absentia in 2015.154 To our knowledge, the latest media coverage of these two cases dates to mid-2015, when Beltyukov appealed his arrest in absentia.155 Aside from these domestic Russian issues, the Skolkovo project has come under attack from commentators in the United States for its purported role in facilitating high-technology dual-use transfers to Russia, where the technology or know-how may be applied for military purposes.156 For instance, Seth Elan has made the following claims:

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Although military activities are not an official cluster of activity, the Skolkovo Foundation has, in fact, been involved in defense-related activities since December 2011, when it approved the first weapons-related project— the development of a hypersonic cruise missile engine. The project is a response to the U.S. Department of Defense’s Advanced Hypersonic Weapon, part of the Prompt Global Strike program. Sophisticated physical security, consisting of cameras, thermal imaging, and alarms, also suggest that not all of the center’s efforts are civilian in nature.157

Responding to such claims, MIT spokesperson Nathaniel Nickerson stated that the university “is very careful to comply with all U.S. exportcontrol regulations” and emphasized that they “also have and continue to participate in various outreach programs conducted by various federal agencies, including the FBI and Department of Commerce.”158 However, transfer of dual-use technologies or know-how does not necessarily have to fall under those regulated by US export controls to be useful to foreign armies. It is true that several technologies developed at SK are dual-use in nature. One firm involved in SK projects openly advertised the military potential of its airship project in the 2014 “Made in Skolkovo” brochure.159 Another company that specializes in thin film technology boasted in the 2016 SK brochure how, with “the assistance of [the] Skolkovo Foundation . . . three contracts on the basis of [the] company’s participation in the exhibition ‘Army-2015’ were signed.” 160 We cannot but be concerned that SK, according to its own promotional material, appears to be assisting companies in marketing their products to the Russian military. With that said, it bears to emphasize that the technology transfers brought about by SK projects are not unidirectional in Russia’s favor. For instance, the hypersonic engine mentioned by Elan without reference is presumably the experimental engine design pursued by Airbus Group in collaboration with the Lavrentiev Institute through a grant from the Skolkovo Foundation since 2011.161 We highlight here that Airbus Group is no novice to defense contracts and export controls. Furthermore, the article cited by Elan as evidence for the “sophisticated physical security” claim is in fact a report in Izvestiya complaining that the security system purchased by Skolkovo was too fancy for an open institute and thus a waste of money. Indeed, the article quoted commentator Sergey Goncharov as follows: We need to understand why we spend astronomical amounts of money if there will be no secrecy. . . . It is also unclear how this system will be able to protect against industrial espionage and theft of technology. There is in fact a large number of foreigners, you need to consider all the points.162

As can be seen from this quote, critics on both sides view their country as the target of potential foreign espionage revolving around Skolkovo.

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With regard to biotechnology, Zilinskas queried Bruce Tidor, the current director of the MIT-Skoltech initiative, about his experiences at Skoltech. Tidor has spent much time at Skoltech since 2013. When asked if he had seen any signs of a military presence or of other military involvement in Skoltech’s biomedical work, he said no, none at all. The only physical security he had observed were fences that prevented persons from entering areas where construction was going on.163 Further, there are no plans for closed biomedical laboratories other than those where a higher biosafety level forbade unauthorized access. Zilinskas also sought to engage in a broader discussion with two multinational companies that have large investments in Russia. When he was asked what information he was seeking, which was pertinent to the paragraphs above, he was told by the persons in the information centers that the matter had to be discussed internally and that they would get back to him. Two days later the answers were that the companies did not wish to discuss the subjects posed to them. They also asked that their names not be mentioned. Overall, and especially if tensions continue to escalate between Russia and the West, the Skolkovo project will face growing opposition along the lines presented above. It will become increasingly difficult for Skolkovo to justify the international research it funds and its substantial construction expenditures in Russia’s current political environment and depressed economy. For an indication of what is to come, one can turn to a 2013 interview given by the renowned scientist Vladimir E. Zakharov: I know that a Scientific Committee is there [working for Skolkovo], which includes some good friends of mine, well-known scientists. But they are not actually the ones who do the expert review of the projects; that is done by anonymous experts. The scientists are given only a brief summary of the projects that passed the preliminary scanning. The mechanism is not very transparent, and I do not have complete information. On its own, the idea is bad. The Moscow area has many scientific campuses, and everything is already there in Novosibirsk Akademgorodok: grounds, laboratories, infrastructure. Why not create groups there, which would be much cheaper?164

This commentary, made before the crash of the Russian economy, illustrates how difficult it will be to maintain support for a project like Skolkovo. Skolkovo is an expensive top-down project that was established from scratch on farmland. Numerous underfunded research institutions that have existed for a long time are hostile to this new competitor. SF does provide research grants to other laboratories at the RAS and university institutes, which probably tempers criticism to some extent. However, Skolkovo’s ability to provide such grants depends on continued high-level political support. That support, once provided unconditionally by Medvedev and his adminis-

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tration, is increasingly uncertain. Unless Skolkovo’s physical campus near Moscow produces results in the near-term, Putin’s government may come to see Skolkovo as an expensive operation that does not generate funding and an unnecessary middle-organ for grant-giving. If this were to prevail, the government might well decide to scale back the program and disburse research grants to laboratories through existing federal mechanisms. Having described the state of the life sciences in Russia and the Russian government’s plans and programs aimed at rectifying its poor performance, we now present three case studies that we use to gauge the health and independence of civilian efforts in this field. Case Study 1: Consolidation of Russian Pharmaceutical Production Our first case study is the consolidation of Russia’s producers of immunobiological preparations under the Rostec Corporation. We have selected this topic as an indicator by which to measure the health and independence of Russia’s civilian biotechnology sector for two reasons. First, as made clear earlier, the increased production of pharmaceutical products is a key objective and metric for success of the Putin and Medvedev administrations’ plans to bolster their country’s biotechnology sector. We thus noted with interest when Rostec’s plans to consolidate companies in this sector, including those under the MOH, were presented as part of the plan to “ensure Russia’s independence in the provision of immunobiology drugs.”165 Second, Rostec is an extremely large corporation that receives substantial defense contracts and controls perhaps as much as two-thirds of Russia’s defense industry.166 It is currently under US sanctions.167 Notably, these prohibit all actors obligated to respect US sanctions from “transactions in, provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of greater than 30 days maturity issued by Rostec, and its 50 percent or more owned subsidiaries.”168 The transfer of pharmaceutical companies to Rostec therefore risks impacting the companies’ health and independence. Rostec Corporation

The Russian government established Russian Technologies (Rostekhnologii) Corporation in 2007 as part of its effort to modernize the scientific and technical resources of its civilian and military industries by promoting high-technology development and manufacture. It was renamed Rostec in 2012 (sometimes spelled Rostekh). It had two general aims to be achieved as specified as part of the “Strategy-2020” vision:

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• Commercial aims, which are expressed in establishing leadership in high-technology machine-building market, enhancement of business value and capitalization increase of the ventures. • Special aims, which consist in manufacturing top-quality weapon and military equipment surpassing world analogues leading to retention and consolidation of the Russian Federation positions in international market of weapon and military equipment.169

Currently, Rostec is composed of about 700 organizations that are part of fourteen holding companies, nine of which operate in the military-industrial complex and five in civilian sectors. It also includes twenty-two direct management organizations. The range of technologies that Rostec organizations and companies are involved in is wide, including those related to construction, weaponry of many types, aircraft of many types, information, security, and so on. Rostec states that it employs more than 900,000 people, which is approximately 1.2 percent of the entire Russian workforce.170 For the purposes of this book, we address Rostec’s acquisition of new subsidiaries dedicated to biotechnologies and related fields such as medical equipment and pharmaceutical industries. We present the necessary background information on the state of Russia’s pharmaceutical production in the lead-up period to Rostec’s acquisitions, and then provide individual entries for the major subsidiaries and their recent activities. In 2012, Russia’s Vital and Essential Drugs (VED) list contained 567 pharmaceutical products. These immunobiological drugs and medicaments include vaccines, antibiotics, sera, immunoglobulins, probiotics, hormonal agents, cancer drugs, and others. Of these, 93 products (16.4 percent) were wholly produced in Russia, 267 products (47.1 percent) were manufactured by both Russian and foreign companies, and 207 products (36.5 percent) were foreign-made.171 In this context of Russia depending largely on foreign sources for VEDs, Rostec established the National Immunobiological Company (NIC) on October 29, 2013.172 The NIC’s explicit objective is the Russian production of VED drugs that meet international good manufacturing practices.173 Meeting GMP standards requires high-level capabilities in all the steps it takes, including conducting applied research, development, pilot plant operations, manufacturing, animal testing, three-stage clinical trials, labeling, and packaging. As Putin himself has noted, “importing drug ingredients and packaging them here [in Russia] does not count as domestic production. We must strive to ensure that the ingredients are produced on the territory of the Russian Federation.”174 In 2014, when sanctions began to harm Russia’s economy, it was still importing most of the VEDs that are used to protect humans and animals against infectious diseases and provide treatment when protection fails. The issue of Russian production of VEDs became increasingly presented as a

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security threat. As a notable example of this framing, we cite the allegations made in a Russian article titled “VacciNation: Russia’s Dependence on Imported Vaccines Threatens the Country’s Security.” The article’s anonymous author(s), who display an excellent familiarity with vaccine production and importation procedures, allege that two Russian vaccines that are declared to be produced domestically depend upon imported antigens and claim that this situation is the norm across the entire Russian pharmaceutical industry.175 The author(s) cite the Russian foreign trade database and the two vaccines’ registration certificates to make this case.176 The argument of the piece is that the high degree of Russian dependence on pharmaceutical imports, especially those from the United States and Europe, is too dangerous to be left unchanged given the precedent set by the Western sanctions’ impact on Russia’s financial, defense, and energy sectors.177 Just five days after the United States imposed the first set of Ukrainerelated sanctions, on March 11, 2014,178 Rostec and the MOH concluded an agreement on the provision of a national system of health care with medical preparations. Under the agreement, the two parties stated their intention to work together to establish a partnership in the field of producing medicinal preparations, including vaccines and products derived from blood. In practical terms, this meant that the NIC was established as the lead agency for that system. In the first phase, the MOH’s enterprises NPO Microgen (hereafter Microgen; an NPO is a research and production company or association) and the Production of Bacterial and Virus Preparations of the M. P. Chumakov Institute of Poliomyelitis and Viral Encephalitis (the institute itself is part of RAMS) were transferred to the NIC.179 Rostec trumpeted this consolidation under the NIC as “eliminating Russia’s foreign dependence in the field of immunobiology.”180 Rostec’s industry consolidation under the NIC was positively portrayed along these lines in the anonymous article just cited.181 It is possible that Rostec received additional support from the Putin administration to carry out this consolidation effort by playing on the latter’s concerns over the foreign supply of pharmaceutical products in the post-sanctions era. However, Rostec established the NIC before US sanctions were imposed, and thus had already positioned itself for such a consolidation in the pre-sanctions period. Therefore, Rostec’s consolidation occurred despite the sanctions, not because of the latter. It remains somewhat surprising that the Putin administration allowed these acquisitions to proceed, given that the sanctions against Rostec also applied to any 50 percent or more owned subsidiaries, and would therefore risk their disruption. Either the Russian administration became convinced that it was only a matter of time before the sanctions would grow to encompass pharmaceutical imports, and were thus willing to accept the cost of Rostec’s planned consolidation, or the sanctions were just a useful pretext used by the latter to justify its commercial plans.

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National Immunobiological Company. The NIC was established on paper

on October 29, 2013, with a charter capital of 20 million rubles. Rostec State Corporation owns 100 percent of its shares. As such, the US sanctions against Rostec also appear to apply to the NIC.182 According to its website, its board of directors “includes representatives of the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade, MOH, Central Office of the Government of the Russian Federation, and Rostec State Corporation.”183 According to data released by Rostec and the NIC, the latter’s operations in 2014 had involved more than 5,000 staff, had made 3.1 billion rubles in revenue,184 and had yielded a net profit somewhat under 0.34 billion rubles.185 In 2015, its revenue rose to roughly 7.1 billion rubles and net profit to 0.6 billion rubles.186 According to the NIC’s latest annual report advertised on its website landing page and covering its activities from its creation through 2014, only forty-one people work at the NIC proper.187 This figure confirms that it is purely a holding company. The annual report listed the NIC’s priority directions as “ensuring the state’s needs in vaccines for prophylaxis of infectious diseases, tuberculosis medication, blood plasma specimens, preparations for the treatment of HIV and hepatitis, the production of medical devices, and the development of service competencies.”188 These priority directions are in line with those of subsidiaries acquired by the NIC. The authors of the annual report noted that in 2014, the NIC controlled 22 percent of the market for antituberculosis drugs and 7 percent of the market for medication falling under the “7 diseases” response program (treatments against hemophilia, cystic fibrosis, pituitary dwarfism, Gaucher disease, myeloid leukemia, and multiple sclerosis, and follow-on treatment to organ and tissue transplants).189 However, the annual report did not mention many of the other products produced by the NIC’s currently advertised subsidiaries, such as influenza vaccines. As such, the only available annual report does not appear to reflect the NIC’s current and more substantial holdings and market share, perhaps because the subsidiaries’ shares had not yet been purchased by or otherwise transferred to the NIC in the reporting period. The report noted that, post-2014, the NIC would spend: 0.7 billion rubles for the acquisition of shares in companies; 12.6 billion rubles for the organization and modernization of production lines; 0.85 billion rubles to create a research center for the development of medicines; 9.4 billion rubles for drug research; and, 1.93 billion rubles for unspecified “other projects.”190

The planned expenditures will apparently be carried out by 2020.191 Taken together, these expenditures represent an expected outflow of 25.5

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billion rubles, which is well above what the NIC has in capital and net profits. This sum is over forty times what the NIC reported in net profits in 2015. We expect that many of these projects will necessitate loans, perhaps with governmental support, and/or an infusion of funds from Rostec. Given that US anti-Rostec sanctions appear to apply to the NIC, the latter is effectively cut off from US debt financing and will therefore have to finance its projects without recourse to such arrangements. Of course, it is possible that not all of these projects will be funded, which could restore a balance to the NIC’s budget. One early failed venture is instructive in this regard. In September 2014, Rostec announced it had established a joint venture with a private pharmaceutical company called Genfa. Genfa was established in 2006, is headquartered in Switzerland, and has an international presence in such countries as Argentina, Canada, Israel, and India. It produces and markets twenty-two drugs that are “prescription pharmaceuticals used mostly in the field of oncology, in a hospital setting.”192 Its annual revenue is said to be over $100 million. The NIC and Genfa were to form a joint venture to put into effect “a complete cycle of drug development, clinical trials, production, and distribution.” Rostec’s press office issued a statement that among other claims asserted that this new enterprise would “help Russia achieve sovereignty in the sphere of biological security and also provide the national health care system with the state of the art medications that have been manufactured in Russia.” The newly appointed director of the NIC, Nikolay Semenov, promised that a new production plant costing $100 million would be built and become operational “in 2015–2016.” It would have three units focused on different areas, namely biotechnology, cancer drugs, and antibiotics and hormonal agents. It was slated to produce more than 1 million units per year of thirty import-replacing medications.193 However, the NIC’s annual report noted, without explanation, that this commercial agreement had been canceled.194 The NIC’s major early commercial advantage was that the Russian government designated it, through a July 2014 decree, as the “sole supplier of medicines, drugs, and medical services” for the Federal Penitentiary Service.195 Most of the NIC’s reported transactions in 2014 revolved around supplying this organization as well as supplying medicines to the government under the “7 diseases” program.196 On June 17, 2015, the Russian government took a decisive step when it further designated the NIC “as the sole domestic supplier of immunobiological drugs that the MOH may purchase for the purpose of preventive vaccinations included in the national calendar of preventive vaccinations for 2015–2017.”197 It is reasonable to assume that most of the MOD’s needs for vaccines and other immunobiological drugs save the few slated for production at MOD institutes (see Chapter 4) will be provided by production lines under the NIC’s control. The preferential treatment afforded to the NIC demonstrates that Rostec

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had rallied powerful supporters in the Russian government in support of the company’s market consolidation efforts. As of the time of this writing, the NIC held controlling shares in the following four subsidiaries: NPO Microgen, FORT Ltd., JSC Synthesis, and JSC NPO Metalist. We close the Rostec case study with brief entries for the first three subsidiaries here, which operate all of the NIC’s pharmaceutical production lines. One company, NPO Metalist, produces prosthetics and orthopedic devices and thus is omitted.198 NPO Microgen. Before being transferred to NIC, the MOH owned Micro-

gen.199 In 2015, Rostec claimed that it owns 100 percent of Microgen’s shares.200 If these shares have indeed been transferred as advertised, the US sanctions against Rostec would appear to also encompass Microgen.201 The company is the largest domestic immunobiological producer in the Russia, accounting for approximately 70 percent of Russia’s domestic production volume.202 Microgen controls seven enterprises that, in turn, own nine production sites, employ approximately 6,200 workers, and in 2014 reported 7.6 billion rubles in revenue.203 This amount is twice that reported by the NIC for that same year, and 0.5 billion rubles more than the NIC stated it earned in 2015.204 Microgen has extensive R&D experience pertaining to vaccines and bacteriophage therapy.205 While Microgen gained this experience, it conducted cooperative R&D with the Russian military. Of note, Microgen developed an H1N1 influenza vaccine with the help of military scientists from the 48th Central Scientific Research Institute of the MOD Virology center—in other words, the MOD’s Zagorsk Institute (see Chapter 4.).206 Microgen has also developed novel vaccines of relevance for biodefense, including a unique smallpox vaccine, a viral encephalitis vaccine, a brucellosis vaccine, and a tularemia vaccine.207 In addition to its vaccines R&D, Microgen has come to control the vast majority of commercial phage therapy production in Russia. In particular, the company has developed kits that provide aerosol bacteriophage therapy for the treatment of bronchitis.208 The Russian government has shown a willingness to approve such treatment methods even though some are experimental.209 For instance, nearly 56,000 doses of a particular bacteriophage therapy treatment were delivered by the MOH in 2013 to the Russian Far East as part of the response to extensive flooding that forced many thousands to abandon their homes and live in temporary shelters.210 In July 2014, Minister of Health Veronika Skvortsova and Rostec director Sergey Chemezov jointly sent a letter to Putin recommending that Microgen be the sole supplier to government agencies and hospitals of certain immunobiologicals including all vaccine.211 Their argument followed similar lines to that of the anonymous “VacciNation” article cited

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earlier. They began by arguing, as had been done in the anonymous “VacciNation” article, that Russia remained dependent on foreign suppliers because private firms were importing active ingredients. They used this claim to argue that if the Russian government provided its state enterprises with sufficient financial support, the latter could rectify the situation. Since already approximately 70 percent of all vaccines for use within the framework of the national inoculation schedule were supplied by Microgen, they argued for Microgen to receive additional support so that it could produce all such vaccines.212 Governmental support for this vision came the following year. On February 12, 2015, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree restricting government medical institutions and programs from purchasing VEDs from foreign sources after January 1, 2016, if they are available from domestic sources. Drugs that do not have analogues in Russia are not restricted. The idea for this decree came from the Ministry of Industry, which believes that by implementing the decree, domestic pharmaceutical industry will be supported.213 Similarly, in July 2015, Putin ordered that starting immediately and lasting through 2017, the NIC will be the sole supplier of medicines for the treatment of tuberculosis, HIV, and viral hepatitis.214 Microgen has made recent strategic arrangements with foreign companies in an attempt at gaining immunobiologics production technologies. The following paragraphs recount two such attempts involving joint ventures between Microgen and biotechnology industries in Cuba and China. The Cuban venture is between Microgen and the Cuban state-owned company called Labiofam.215 We found a patent filed in September 2011 by Labiofam researchers on formulations involving certain peptides “obtained from scorpion venom,” including one named RjLB-14, with claimed “anticarcinogenic, analgesic and anti-inflammatory properties”; the patent covered derived formulations, including those “processed homeopathically.”216 As part of a contract signed between these companies on January 28, 2014, they will develop and produce a Cuban-designed preparation based on the RjLB-14 peptide for the treatment of breast, liver, prostate, and lung cancers.217 Because of its long experience with researching and developing peptides, the RAS Biotechnology Center also has a role in this initiative; it was to be responsible for scaling up the production of peptides.218 In April 2014, a few months after the foregoing contract was signed, Microgen and the RAS Biotechnology Center signed a “long-term” contract (length not specified) to set up a joint R&D division to develop new drugs, but the Microgen press release made no mention of anti-tumor treatments and instead focused on a recombinant human plasminogen activator-analog drug project for treating strokes, thrombosis, and myocardial infarctions.219 We have not seen any information on how the Cuban-Russian joint venture

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is proceeding since it was last mentioned in an October 2014 Russian editorial.220 The other partnership involves a major Chinese vaccine producer. On October 14, 2014, Microgen announced having signed a contract with the state-owned China National Biotec Group Limited for the production of vaccines, which reportedly included technology transfer to Russia.221 The information released by the Russian government about this contract does not mention the vaccine or vaccines that are to be provided by the Chinese, nor any cost figures. China National Biotec Group Limited claims to be the fourth-largest producer of vaccines in the world, including all vaccines required by the Chinese national vaccination program. It operates more than 100 production lines and has capability to produce more than 200 biological products for disease prevention, diagnosis, and treatment.222 Clinical trials of Chinese vaccines were supposed to begin in 2015 and if things went well, Microgen would start purchasing the vaccines in 2016. The transfer of vaccine production technology was supposed to be completed by 2020. The imported technology was to be located at Microgen’s production facilities in Tomsk and Ufa. Microgen’s director Pyotr Kanygin stated that “cooperation between Microgen and the Chinese companies in immunobiological production is possible in several areas, from registration of Chinese drugs in Russia, the delivery in bulk and packaging, to technology transfers and establishment of Chinese drug production in Russia.”223 He also noted that their Chinese counterparts would be given information on the production of bacteriophage drugs and blood plasma drugs. We have no further information on this partnership since Kanygin’s statement in 2014. FORT Ltd. Rostec bought a 25.01 percent share of FORT on November 17,

2014.224 As long as Rostec’s current ownership percentage remains below 50 percent, FORT should not be affected by the US sanctions against Rostec.225 FORT is a biopharmaceutical company engaged in the development, promotion, and production of pharmaceutical drugs. On its website, it states that it is a scientific-industrial complex that is located in the Ryazan region that began commercial production in April 2014. It advertises a modern full-production infrastructure in line with international GMP requirements. FORT’s current product line is composed of seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccines based on virosome technology (virus-like particle vaccines).226 Its advertised production capacity is 40 million seasonal influenza vaccine doses and 120 million pandemic influenza vaccine doses.227 The company endeavors to develop and market therapeutic proteins starting in 2017.228 In the future, FORT seeks to develop therapeutics based on monoclonal antibodies, particularly for treatment of rheumatoid arthritis, as well as new vaccines, including against tick-borne encephalitis.229 In part to ensure that the company can maintain qualified personnel at its plant,

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FORT recently entered into a partnership agreement with the I. P. Pavlov Ryazan State Medical University for practical training and research collaboration.230 In early 2016, the company was hoping to establish a pharmaceutical cluster in the city with the assistance of regional authorities.231 Overall, FORT and the establishment of an upcoming cluster are important projects for the governor of the Ryazan oblast, Oleg Kovalev, who emphasized in a 2016 meeting with Putin that the production of influenza vaccine at FORT did not require “foreign substances” and thus was a success story of import substitution.232

JSC Synthesis. Rostec appears to hold a 32.38 percent share of Synthesis,

below the 50 percent ownership threshold for Synthesis to become affected by US sanctions against Rostec.233 Synthesis has manufactured medicinal drugs since 1958. Like FORT, Synthesis emphasizes that it is operating in accordance with international standards of drug production and that it produces a wide range of highquality products.234 In terms of production volume, the plant is among the ten leaders of the domestic pharmaceutical industry, providing about 3 percent of the Russian drug production. 235 It employs more than 3,000 people.236 In a similar vein to FORT’s recent partnership agreement, Synthesis has partnerships with several neighboring scientific centers for practical training.237 Case Study 2: Space Biology Projects We selected Russia’s space biology projects as an indicator for the health and independence of Russia’s biotechnology sector for three reasons. First, space programs have received high-profile political support and can draw upon Russia’s tremendous expertise in space systems and missions. Second, space biology is an area where Russian civilian and military institutes conduct intersecting research. And third, it is an area where long-lasting productive US, EU, and Soviet/Russian cooperation has previously occurred, even throughout times of severe political tension. The Russian government sees continued Russian activities in space as a matter of prestige and of national security. On April 6, 2011, Boris Gryzlov, former Speaker of the Russian Duma and a close ally of Putin, stated that space is “one of Russia’s absolute priorities.” 238 Space research is seen as having an important national security component owing to the potential risks of asteroids and comets, space debris, and the impact of electromagnetic interference from the sun on electronic systems.239 Space biology, also known as astrobiology, is an important component of Russia’s space program.240

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The Russian Federal Space Agency (FSA) was the lead agency for space research until December 28, 2015, when it was dissolved and replaced by the Roskosmos State Corporation.241 The FSA website is informative in Russian and French, although it has not been updated since 2014.242 The underlying space biology research takes place at many other Russian institutions. The report for a 2013 Russian biosatellite mission (discussed later) provides a list of thirty organizations that were involved in some way with the scientific experiments and seven organizations involved with the design and production of the necessary hardware.243 As can be deduced from the thirteen RAS institutes named on this list, the RAS plays a prominent role in Russia’s astrobiology program. In order to coordinate the research occurring at all of these institutes, the RAS formed in 2010 a Scientific Council on Astrobiology.244 The principal RAS institution for space studies is the Space Research Institute, but its focus is not on astrobiology.245 Rather, the lead RAS institute for astrobiology is the Institute for Biomedical Problems; it was this institute that designed the scientific research program for the 2013 mission.246 Another important civilian player is the RAMS, which has four of its institutes named on the aforementioned list. Aside from the institutes and companies already named on that list, one important additional civilian center is the Ministry of Education and Science’s Russian Federation State Research Institute of Genetics and Selection of Industrial Microorganisms (GosNIIgenetika). GosNIIgenetika is involved in both the production of space biology equipment and in space biology scientific research. For example, GosNIIgenetika’s researcher Tatiana Voeikov recently published an article titled “Effects of Space Flight on Microorganisms” that examined the effects of microgravity and radiation on enzyme synthesis and melanin production in Streptomyces bacteria.247 We also emphasize that military researchers have traditionally been, and continue to be, involved in astrobiology work. The S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy (see Chapter 4.) has researched space medicine since 1966, likely as an extension of their work on aviation medicine.248 Recently, representatives from the MOD participated in a conference on the future of space biology on August 30, 2012.249 The conference focused on, inter alia, synthetic biology, the human genome, and the creation of “artificial and chimeric forms of life.”250 As such, space biology is an overlap area for both civilian and military researchers. First the Soviet Union and then Russia launched a series of space biology research capsules known as Bion missions. In addition, although the primary purpose of the flights is materials science research, the Foton missions have also often carried life science research payloads.251 The Bion and Foton satellites (early flights of which were under the “Cosmos” series name but were retroactively renamed)252 have contained a variety of animal, plant, and microbial life forms to assess the effects of microgravity and ionizing radiation on them. The Bion program launched eleven Bion

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satellites during 1973–1996, followed by that of a Bion-M satellite in 2013; the Foton program launched twelve satellites during 1985–1999, followed by four Foton-M satellites in 2002–2014.253 The comprehensive book by Harvey and Zakutnyaya on Russian space probes contains a wealth of details on the Bion and Foton missions up to 2011.254 A review of the Bion 1–11 launches and scientific results can be found in the January 2000 edition of the Journal of Gravitational Physiology, which published the results of the Bion-11 experiments.255 Here, we only briefly review their history in order to discuss recent events impacting in turn each program. Two years after the Nixon-Kosygin agreement on peaceful space cooperation of May 1972, the Soviet government offered to carry US experiment payloads aboard Bion flights.256 Starting with Bion 3 in 1975, the Bion flights were used for joint US-Soviet research.257 The offer was also extended to European scientists, and they were the principal partners for the Bion 8 through Bion 10 missions.258 By the time the Bion 11 mission was completed in 1996, US scientists in collaboration with Soviet and Russian scientists had conducted more than a hundred experiments during the Bion 3–Bion 11 missions.259 As has been made clear by a NASA historian, the US-Soviet/Russian exchange turned out to be valuable to both sides, but especially to the United States: Biosatellite was cancelled [in 1969], power failures crippled Skylab in 1973 making it unable to host experiment packages, and the Shuttle would not open its manifest to experiments until the early 1980s. The Soviets came to the rescue. A good example of [NASA Research Center] Ames’ ability to do pioneering science quietly and on a small budget was the Cosmos/Bion missions. Every two to four years, between 1975 and 1997, the Soviet Union launched a Cosmos biosatellite into space carrying an array of life science experiments, many built at Ames, to study how plants and animals adapted to microgravity. The Cosmos/Bion program quickly became the single best source of data on the effects of weightlessness on earthly life. A unique spirit of cooperation underlay the success of Cosmos/Bion. Even in the darkest days of the Cold War—following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Reagan presidency—life scientists from Ames, western and eastern Europe, and the Institute for Biomedical Problems in Moscow collaborated on basic research.260

The drastic reduction in space-related project funding for a time prevented any follow-on launches to Bion 11; the few Foton launches in this period had to be relied upon to carry out space biology research.261 Bion satellite designer TsSKB-Progress used this time to develop an enhanced follow-on satellite named Bion-M.262 The first mission using this secondgeneration satellite, Bion-M1, was initially scheduled for 2010 but was repeatedly delayed.263 Its launch finally took place on April 19, 2013. Ten

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Russian and foreign scientific organizations conducted nineteen experiments in four areas on Bion:

• Animal physiology using forty-five mice, fifteen geckos, eight Mongolian gerbils, several snails, and fish in an aquarium as animal models. • Microbe and plant biology experiments that focused on Streptomyces and unspecified plants. • Biotechnology, which involved the experiments investigated organic matter decomposition and plant chemical compositions. • Biological effects of cosmic ionizing radiation.264

When scientists were extracting the biological payload from the spacecraft, they learned that all gerbils, snails, and fishes had died, as had twenty-nine mice. Nevertheless, experiments that did not involve the dead animals were successful, and even some of the experiments that involved measuring with sensors physiological reactions by animals before they died generated useful data.265 A few months after the Bion-M1 mission had ended, Russian media carried an appeal from Russian and US scientists involved in the Bion program to keep it alive, emphasizing that it was “unique” and could not be replaced by experiments run aboard the International Space Station.266 In late 2014, TsSKB-Progress’s general director Aleksandr Kirilin gave an interview during which the reporter asked him about plans for Bion-M2. Kirilin answered that a launch was possible sometime during 2016–2019. He stated that a program of scientific experiments would be carried out, including experiments with live organisms, though the organisms had not yet been decided on. He asserted “that vehicles with quality of life support systems and level of microgravity do not exist elsewhere. Consequently, our foreign partners are willing to enter into cooperation in this area. For instance, the science program for the flight of Bion-M1 comprised more than 70 experiments run by academics from Russia, Germany, France, the United States, and other countries.”267 In July 2015, TsSKB-Progress received a contract to design Bion-M2, and some details of the experimental plan were given to the media.268 In September 2015, Oleg Orlov, the first deputy director of the Institute of Medical and Biological Problems, was asked about the future of the Bion program. He answered that Bion-M2 would take five years to organize and that its launch was therefore planned for 2020.269 He stated that Bion-M3 was planned for 2025.270 The latest information available at the time of publication comes from an extract translated by the BBC in 2016: Russian-German negotiations are currently under way in Sochi to discuss cooperation in space. The working group comprises representatives of the

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German Aerospace Centre and Russia’s Institute of Medical and Biological Problems. This is the 14th meeting of the two countries’ scientists. The specialists are going to join their efforts to implement the Bion-M2 program. . . . The Bion-M2 project is to build a biosatellite. Its launch is scheduled for 2021. . . . The specialists will negotiate the joint space programs Neurolab, Cardiovector, Biorisk, and new isolation experiments to be conducted in 2017–2021.271

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As evidenced by the given time frame for Bion-M2, the next Bion program launch has consistently been delayed. Unlike in the 1990s to early 2000s period of budgetary constraints, however, there are no plans to shift experiments onto Foton launches. The latest Foton program launch, Foton-M4, took place on July 19, 2014. The satellite’s scientific mission was to study the effects of weightlessness on geckos, fruit flies, microorganisms, and seeds of higher plants, and to conduct experiments on the growth of semiconductor crystals. The satellite was supposed to have stayed in orbit for sixty days but due to a loss of communications and a problem with it not reaching its circular orbit of 500 kilometers, the spacecraft was brought to a landing on September 1 in the Orenburg region.272 On opening the spacecraft scientists discovered that the five geckos had died for unknown reasons. However, all of the other organisms survived. The supervisor of the Foton-M4 project, Vladimir Sychev, observed that: “The fruit fly experiment has enormous importance. There will be profound research based on genome analysis methods and understanding of gene expression. Up to three generations of fruit flies were born during the Foton mission.”273 As such, the mission was still a partial success. Nevertheless, both the latest Bion-M and FotonM launches encountered technical issues as noted above and it is not known what it will take to fix them. In January 2016, a Russian news article had cited the draft Federal Space Program text for the 2016–2025 period as evidence that a new capsule called Return-ICA would be created by 2025 to replace the Bion-M satellite series.274 Although the designator is unclear, it does appear as if a follow-on satellite system is to be designed for future launches. We find such expenditures on a new system of dubious value given that Bion-M2 and Bion-M3 still need to be launched and are already significantly delayed. In addition, as we have seen, both of the latest Bion-M and Foton-M missions had technical troubles. Moving to a new and untested capsule will only aggravate the risk of malfunction. When the Bion program ran into financial trouble in the post-Soviet era and launches became unaffordable, the downtime was used to design a new capsule. Perhaps that is the current, unstated, plan. In any case, the technical issues and rampant delays are sufficient for us to conclude that the Russian space biology program has run into trouble. International cooperation on space biology

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research can of course continue in the absence of a Russian biosatellite launch in the near future, as appears to be the case given the aforementioned joint German-Russia projects. However, a lack of Bion and Foton missions will most likely mean decreased international interaction for the Russian aerospace research community. Case Study 3: Reforming the Russian Academies Our third case study covers the wide-ranging and highly controversial reforms of the Russian academies, although the RAS has the most to lose. We have selected this topic because most of Russia’s high-caliber life sciences research institutions have been RAS institutes. However, the reforms that are being implemented starting in 2013 and continuing as this is written may end up having substantial deleterious effects on the Russian science community in terms of academic production, brain-drain, transparency, and involvement with military research. While Russian publications are poorly represented internationally, as shown in the statistics provided in the introductory section of this chapter, those of RAS researchers have historically performed better than those of non-RAS researchers. By non-RAS researchers we mean mostly universitybased researchers. With the one exception of the Lomonosov Moscow State University, in Soviet times universities were not designed to conduct publishable research, and despite a large Russian government push to change this trend, non-RAS researchers still lag behind RAS scientists in output and in visibility in the West. Data by Markusova and colleagues confirms that this general account applies for the life sciences; in 2011–2013, RAS institutes accounted for roughly 65 percent of Russian publications in biology indexed in a major Western database.275 RAS publications have also traditionally been significantly more impactful. According to Vladimir E. Zakharov (whom we cited earlier for his comments on Skolkovo), some 60 percent of citations to Russian research in recent years have gone to those authored by RAS employees, even though RAS scientists only make up some 15 percent of all Russian scientists.276 The well-being of the RAS’s life sciences institutions therefore has a sizable impact on the international nature of Russia’s life science research community. Many commentators have discussed the state of RAS institutes and the RAS reforms, but we will emphasize an account given by Vadim T Ivanov, a longtime academician and the director of the RAS’s Shemyakin-Ovchinnikov Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry. We do so because his institute is a leading life sciences research institute in Russia and is perhaps the country’s top research center on toxins. In an interview in September 2013, Ivanov described his institute, his work, and the current situation of science in Russia. About the first, his and other RAS institutes are generally in a

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bad state; he tells that the average scientist earns an equivalent of $1,000 per month in one of the most expensive cities in the world and, worse, that the institutes receive only a small percentage of what they need to function. Ivanov estimates that to properly operate his institute, it would cost 40 million rubles, but knowing that he could never get this sum, he requested 12 million rubles. In the end, he received 1 million rubles. In his view, “it is evident that there is a complete lack of understanding as to how state priorities need to be set.” He then went on to explain the problems with current priorities. When he was asked by the interviewer that it appears as if basic science is being strangled because the government is prepared to fund only that which provides a profit immediately, Ivanov’s answer was rather long: They have created a line of contention: higher educational institutions versus the Academy of Sciences. Livanov [Dmitry V. Livanov, the Minister of Education and Science] is ready to pour enormous amounts of money into higher educational institutions: none of our universities ranks in the world’s top 100, and it turns out that this is a matter of the country’s prestige, and so everything must be done to get them into this top 100. But in the sciences, there is a stagnation of the budget. For the government today, the Academy of Sciences is an unloved child, and this is completely unfair. We have almost twothirds of the country’s scientific potential—yet the money goes to Skolkovo, to Rosnano, and to the universities. It is a sad fact. Look at what the wages are like in Skolkovo, and you will just be amazed, the contrast with the Russian Academy of Sciences [salaries] is simply indecent.277

In his litany, Ivanov presents three major concerns: (1) RAS is an “unloved child” by the Putin administration; (2) Russian leaders do not understand the value of basic research and therefore it is underfunded; (3) the government’s priorities are skewed, being more interested in supporting universities and technology parks like Skolkovo than RAS institutes. For the purposes of this book, the three can be amalgamated by considering the RAS and the implications of its being reformed. Shortly after Russia became independent in 1991, its new minister of science, Boris Saltykov, acted to reform RAS because his ministry perceived it as a bloated institution whose mediocre members mostly lived privileged but useless existences. As documented by Irina Dezhina, criticism of the RAS coalesced around the following six arguments: • Low research productivity; • Low levels of commercial spinoff from fundamental research activities; • Lack of decision-making and funding allocation transparency; • Conflicts of interest whereby heads of institutes were in charge of deciding RAS funding distribution among institutes; • Inefficient management of state property;

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• Age maldistribution, whereby a great majority of academicians and a significant proportion of corresponding members were at least 70 years old.278

Saltykov did not succeed, but one of his successors, Andrey Fursenko, who served as minister of education and science during 2004–2012, and had about the same ideas of reforming the RAS as did Saltykov, was more successful. It helped that Fursenko had become acquainted with Putin when both lived in St. Petersburg. In September 2006, the government passed amendments to the science law that gave Putin’s cabinet the right to appoint future RAS presidents and amend the RAS charter. When this became known, the headline of an article in Science read: “Kremlin Brings Russian Academy of Sciences to Heel.”279 It is not necessary for us to go into the details of the give and take between the RAS and the Putin and Medvedev administrations between 2006 and September 27, 2013, because on that date, Putin signed a lengthy bill that listed a series of orders that changed how science in Russia would be managed and financed.280 As part of that package, the RAS and the other academies were drastically reformed along lines meant to redress the six major criticisms leveled against the RAS. The bill was understood to be highly confrontational, as can be surmised from its anonymous authorship; the Ministry of Education and Science went so far as to deny having proposed it.281 Despite these denials, the bill was widely believed to have been largely created by D. Livanov, who had been the minister of education and science since Putin’s 2012 election and who had been a vocal proponent for RAS reforms for some time.282 What appears to have transpired is that the RAS’s refusal to enact domestic reforms to address the five major criticisms leveled against it,283 summarized earlier, played into radical reformist hands. This intransigence was telegraphed to the new Putin administration when the RAS issued a quantitative measurement of the performance of its institutions using 130 criteria that concluded that 290 out of 297 institutions were efficient.284 This report presumably did more to enrage than to convince Russian government officials. In particular, the reformist officials who had made a concerted effort to promote the use of quantitative criteria for the evaluation of productivity at research institutions presumably interpreted the report as a parody of their efforts. The moment the draft bill was introduced to the Duma, RAS scientists and their institutions mounted an intense effort to have it dropped or, at the least, drastically changed (see Annex 5.1 at end of this chapter). A 2013 resolution by the RAS Presidium issued in reaction to the bill summarizes the views of an eminent group of RAS scientists on the reform: The document [bill] presented [to the Duma] is categorically unacceptable because it leads to the elimination of the Russian Academy of Sciences, inhibits

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reforms initiated within the Russian Academy of Sciences, and in the future, to the destruction and degradation of the scientific potential, defense capability and national security of the country.285

Vocal opposition to the reforms has continued unabated since June 2015, when more than 3,000 scientists demonstrated in Moscow against the reforms.286 More than 150 leading scientists (known as the July 1st Club) signed and circulated a petition against the current role of the Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations (FASO),287 and in July 2016 Putin’s press secretary was forced to acknowledge that Putin had received the letter.288 As a result of these actions and because lower-level government members have avoided identifying themselves as the instigators of the reforms, Putin has increasingly come to assume responsibility for the RAS reforms. As we are editing this book, RAS trade union workers are organizing a rally that is scheduled to be held during September 14–15, 2016, which was just before the State Duma elections on September 18. The workers’ grievance is that a presidential decree of May 2012, which included a provision that domestic spending on science is to be increased to 1.97 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), was never implemented. Therefore, the already low wages paid to workers remained as low as before, while the cost of living has gone up and the ruble has depreciated versus most foreign currencies in the preceding four years. The workers’ frustration was expressed by the trade union’s chairman Viktor Kalinushkin: “It is a paradoxical situation when people will have to take to the streets in order to force the government to implement the Russian presidential decree.”289 Following we detail and discuss the aspects of the bill that if fully implemented are likely to negatively affect the biosciences. The RAS, RAMS, and Academy of Agriculture are to be merged into one “super academy,” which will be managed and financed by a new institution named FASO. These changes mean that RAS loses its main privilege—the right to dispose of its allocated budget—and turns it into a “club of scientists.” The government provides funding for R&D to FASO, which then decides how much it will dispense to institutes for salaries, travel, equipment, supplies, and the like. However, each laboratory director must provide minute details on what he or she proposes to do in one year, two years, or longer. Further, they must explain in detail the research the laboratory will conduct, the results or findings of such research, and estimate how many publications their laboratory staff members will publish during the time period for which funding is requested. The funding then depends on the promises that were made. If a director or scientist is unable to fulfill promises for whatever reasons, future funding may be denied to the miscreant.290 As is well known by scientists, they cannot know for sure if experiments

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will be successful. Such a funding system discourages high-risk, highreward fundamental research. The fact that the appointed head of FASO, Mikhail Kotyukov, is a financial specialist and a nonscientist demonstrates that the government’s priority for FASO is the fiscal management of the academies.291 Kotyukov graduated from Krasnoyarsk State University with a degree in finances and credit, held his first job in the Krasnoyarsk regional government’s financial department, advanced rapidly thereafter, and was appointed deputy finance minister in June 2012.292 That someone with his profile was appointed is viewed by the affected scientists as evidence that the government intends to prioritize work likely to yield quick dividends over fundamental research. Salaries for scientists will be raised twice the average in the region in which they work. However, much of the money needed to accomplish this will come from cost-saving measures, such as a reduction of the proportion of technical and support staff from 50 percent to 41 percent. An academician estimated that “cuts in technical personnel would worsen the already miserable state of equipment and collections in Russia.” 293 Further, directors of institutes and their deputies will be retired at the age of sixty-five. Since approximately 50 percent of the directors and deputies of the RAS’s 800 institutes are sixty-five or older, an academician explained that when this rule comes into effect (it was supposedly to be applied in January 2015), it will “behead the majority of such institutions and probably ruin them.”294 As noted earlier by Ivanov, the funding situation is in a bad state because academies receive only 30 percent of the government’s R&D budget, with the remaining going to technology parks, Skolkovo, Kurchatov Institute, Rusnano, and other favored institutes and programs. This situation is not likely to improve for the academy institutes with FASO in charge of finances. Aside from the demonstrated demoralization of a significant proportion of RAS network scientists, the impact of the RAS reforms is difficult to assess impartially. Several factors prevent such an assessment; the reforms are still too recent, scientific indicators from a neutral source are lacking since the ironic reality is that many scientometric studies are conducted by researchers at RAS institutions, and Russia’s economic downturn is a major confounding variable. Reportedly, due to the latter, the RAS has suffered a 60 percent budget cut.295 As a result, RAS researchers have reportedly been laid off at some institutions.296 Rumors of planned mass layoffs recently surfaced in August 2016, although the government has so far denied the existence of any such plan.297 Despite the imbroglio surrounding the reform, according to data presented in a May 2016 Nature Index article by Annabel McGilvray, the RAS network experienced only a “slight decline in performance” in terms of the

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number of “high-quality” publications output by RAS scientists between 2012 and 2015.298 In addition, she noted that Russia’s total “high-quality” publications output had increased in the same time frame.299 As previously discussed, Russia’s publication output is poorly indexed in the West, and highly cited (“high-quality”) papers are small in numbers, making it very hard to draw statistically significant conclusions. We therefore turned to an official list of RAS institutes and the eLibrary .ru publications database to generate an estimate for the change in the number of both Russian-language and English-language RAS publications before and after the reform. The RAS institution network is currently composed of 707 primary research institutes divided into thirteen scientific departments (the number of total institutes varies across sources in part because some of these institutes control subsidiary institutes).300 As of late 2016, the eLibrary.ru database held publication data for 385 institutions indexed as belonging to the RAS network.301 We compared these organization profiles to the institutes listed on the RAS website and were able to match 314 eLibrary.ru profiles with the names of current RAS institutes belonging to eleven departments (see Table 5.2). We believe that trends within these organization subsets are representative of trends across their RAS departments because eLibrary.ru has no minimal staff size or publication count requirements for an organization to establish a profile that would otherwise bias our sample. The eLibrary.ru organization profiles provided institution publication totals by year for the 2006–2015 period. As can be seen from Figure 5.3., the sum of the publications across all institutes increased. Between 2010 and 2015, 210 institutes had an increased scientific journal article publication output, 98 had a decreased output, and 6 institutions had the same output. As can be verified from Table 5.2., this positive trend appears to hold at the level of individual RAS branches. Only the physiological branch experienced a decrease in publications when compared to pre-reform 2012 levels. Despite this drop in the physiological branch’s output, all eleven branches had more publications in 2015 than in 2010. We caution that raw publication output numbers are a crude metric for measuring the health of an institution, and that an increased publication output does not prove that all is well within the RAS network. For example, if bureaucrats demand an increased publication output from RAS scientists, the latter may simply resort to dividing up a single potential paper into several smaller papers. Doing so would inflate publication totals at the expense of scientific quality. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to reconcile the claim that the RAS reforms hurt fundamental research that lack ready commercial potential with the apparent increased research outputs in the social sciences, on global issues and international relations, and in the historical and philological sciences.

Table 5.2 List of RAS Departments and Their Publication Records, 2006–2015

RAS Department

Mathematical sciences Physical sciences Computer equipment and technologies Energy, engineering, mechanics, and control processes Chemistry and materials science Biological sciences Physiological sciences Earth sciences Social sciences Global issues and international relations Historical and philological sciences Medical sciences Agricultural sciences Total

Number of RAS Research Institutes

Number of Institutes for Which Publication Data Was Found

Percentage Accounted For

32

20

63

1,070

1,457

1,562

1,688

1,649

37

32

86

2,752

4,051

4,161

4,499

4,612

19 36

8 28

42 67 13 77 35

38 50 10 64 26

35 52 253

31 0 0

9

707

7

314

Source: http://eLibrary.ru. See Figure 5.3 for the institute ID numbers.

42 78

2006

1,110 5,273

2010

1,317 5,999

2012

1,410 6,718

1,381 6,664

1,593 6,771

7,021 5,445 832 5,108 1,974

8,607 7,521 1,014 7,077 3,786

89 0 0

3,200 no data no data

5,229

6,216

9,299

6,781

47,041

50,013

52,329

53,116

44

701

34,486

983

1,128

9,299 7,600 1,381 6,664 1,688

2015

90 75 77 83 74

78

8,462 7,308 1,153 7,402 4,493

2013

4,499

8,820 7,592 1,023 8,069 4,838

1,368

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Figure 5.3 Output of Journal Articles from 314 RAS Institutes, 2006–2015 Output of Journal Articles from 314 RAS Institute, 2006–2015

Source: http://elibrary.ru. Note: Publication information from each institute profile was combined to generate this chart. In the eLibrary.ru system, each institute has a unique ID number. To retrieve the institute home page, one simply adds the relevant ID number at the end of the following url: http://elibrary.ru/org _profile.asp?id=. To retrieve the institute publication page, one similarly adds the institute ID number at the end of the following url: http://elibrary.ru/org_items.asp?orgsid=. The relevant RAS institute ID numbers are as follows: 3, 4, 11, 20, 21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41, 43, 45, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 64, 66, 68, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82, 89, 90, 91, 95, 96, 97, 98, 102, 103, 104, 106, 110, 111, 112, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 122, 123, 127, 129, 132, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 153, 154, 157, 158, 161, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 171, 172, 176, 177, 179, 182, 184, 249, 254, 255, 256, 266, 267, 268, 273, 274, 275, 277, 284, 312, 316, 328, 337, 338, 339, 354, 368, 375, 380, 382, 383, 386, 389, 398, 405, 410, 411, 413, 414, 416, 426, 433, 439, 440, 444, 449, 452, 457, 458, 460, 462, 463, 466, 467, 473, 475, 477, 478, 480, 481, 487, 489, 491, 495, 496, 497, 503, 508, 509, 510, 512, 521, 522, 527, 532, 534, 536, 541, 553, 560, 570, 583, 593, 600, 614, 618, 623, 627, 630, 637, 652, 656, 660, 663, 667, 669, 682, 688, 696, 703, 707, 713, 714, 723, 734, 743, 755, 759, 762, 766, 779, 810, 816, 822, 836, 838, 865, 870, 886, 890, 895, 936, 942, 958, 977, 998, 1014, 1018, 1028, 1035, 1043, 1050, 1080, 1115, 1121, 1122, 1130, 1159, 1178, 1206, 1258, 1268, 1312, 1399, 1404, 1409, 1411, 1419, 1420, 1423, 1432, 1451, 1453, 1462, 1518, 1782, 1862, 1873, 1895, 1943, 1952, 1994, 1995, 2089, 2110, 2518, 3337, 3784, 5004, 5060, 5107, 5108, 5130, 5164, 5222, 5323, 5341, 5344, 5568, 5574, 6186, 6189, 6204, 6219, 6260, 6262, 6264, 6268, 6287, 6322, 6522, 6552, 6564, 6699, 6717, 6853, 6859, 6910, 6915, 6950, 7002, 7069, 7073, 7103, 7126, 7147, 7177, 7220, 7225, 7238, 7244, 7279, 7280, 7285, 7324, 7349, 7371, 7596, 7600, 7648, 8034, 8047, 8065, 8084, 8097, 8115, 13815, 13823, 13843, 13994, 14443, 14575, 14749, 14964, 15097, 15150, 15239, 15252.

If the RAS reforms do prove to have catastrophic effects on Russian science, we might expect to see a drop in the enrollment statistics discussed above. We see no such meaningful decrease in enrollment from the 2012–2013 period (pre–RAS reform and Western sanctions) to 2014–2015 (post-reform and Western sanctions).302 The lack of a drop in enrollment is however not very meaningful, as many of the students who enroll in

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upper-education programs are not interested in pursuing a research career (let alone in the life sciences). It is also too early to tell whether recent events including the RAS reforms will decrease interest in research careers and hence in advanced degrees. Given the amount of time necessary to earn an advanced degree, two years of data since the RAS reforms and the sanctions are probably an insufficient amount of time to rely on the total graduates presented in Figure 5.1 to gauge any derived negative impacts of these two events. We conclude that the net impact of Russian reforms on the overall health of Russia’s biotechnology research sector, rather than solely the RAS network, remains to be seen and that the impact of the RAS reforms likely cannot be disaggregated from that of the current negative economic conditions. We refer the reader to two Russian articles that provide a good summary of the arguments that have been voiced by scientists and bureaucrats for and against the reform law. 303 We do not take sides on this issue but only point out that these arguments make clear that the RAS reforms have generated much discord within the Russian science community. The RAS’s president Vladimir Fortov exemplifies the unhappiness within the RAS, having been quoted as saying that “the academy has stagnated and suffered from a lack of financial support since the government’s 2013 reforms of science and research institutions.”304 The government responded to Fortov’s oft-stated criticisms by firing him on March 23, 2017. A RAS vice president, Vladimir Kozlov, has been appointed acting president. We close this section on the RAS by discussing the potential impact that FASO may have on scientific openness in Russia. Russian government officials have persistently made reference to ensuring that scientific research be vetted before publication to ensure “state security.” A vaguely worded expansion of an existing states secret law was signed by Putin in May 2015, and was initially interpreted by several research institutes as requiring their scientists “to get approval prior to publication of any article and conference talk or poster” from the FSB.305 This interpretation of the law may have been overturned at institutions thanks to the publication of a Nature news article that exposed the growing practice to an international audience alongside negative coverage in the Russian press featuring declarations of opposition by respected Russian scientists.306 That same year, as we document in Chapter 6, Russian officials began to accuse the United States of having what they perceived as lax controls on life science research. These pronouncements made clear that the Russian government still hoped to reinstate some form of Soviet-era publication controls. In August 2016, FASO’s head requested that his organization be listed under organizations with the right to classify information.307 Should this request be granted, FASO would have the authority to vet and classify research at any of the institutions that are financially under its control. Dmitry Livanov

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had noted in a 2015 interview for Nature that the RAS reforms were designed to transform the RAS in such a way that the “academy will be primarily engaged in providing expert advice.”308 Such statements reinforce the impression that the Putin administration views the academies as a domestic scientific service provider and has a dim view of the RAS publishing its research internationally. This view of the RAS as a state service provider echoes remarks made by Russian military R&D planners, documented in Chapters 3 and 4, that the RAS should provide greater help in the development of new weapons systems. Conclusions As of this writing, the Medvedev and Putin administration programs meant to bolster Russia’s biotechnology sector have been in operation for approximately eight years. The programs that aim to encourage international collaborations in the biosciences have had mixed success and have an uncertain future. The three case studies we have selected all point to growing trouble for the health and independence of Russia’s civilian biotechnology sector. With regard to pharmaceutical production, Rostec’s consolidation of Russia’s production lines combined with the sanctions imposed upon it exposes its newly acquired civilian subsidiaries to financial risks and brings them under a company with large military ties. In the space biology sector, fewer launches will take place in the future and those few that have been planned are being significantly delayed. As for the reforms of the academies, they are significantly disrupting both Russia’s domestic scientific communities and the ability of Russian scientists to interact and collaborate with foreign scientists and professional international organizations. The number of individuals pursuing and receiving higher-education degrees in Russia is in decline, including those seeking advanced degrees in the life sciences. The cases we have presented make clear that the sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union and the downturn in the Russian economy are not the root cause for Russia’s currently underperforming biotechnology sector. Rather, these economic realities have exacerbated the negative impacts of policy choices made by the Putin and Medvedev administrations. As seen in the preceding sections, top-down planning with a predilection for the grandiose, political intrigue and corruption allegations, abrupt and unclear reforms and changes affecting international collaboration programs and the academy research network, and consolidation toward large enterprises instead of a focus on the small and medium enterprises that drive innovation are all detrimental factors. Russian analysts both recognize these continuing problems and are wary of what they see as their country’s overreliance on the West. They

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perceive their country as losing the “technological race” against Western countries in high-technology sectors, including in biotechnology.309 Such observations can be drawn from the following 2014 article extract published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta: The financial conditions for innovation in Russia are insufficient when compared with those in other countries. . . . According to a report by the US consulting company Booz & Company for 2012, expenditures on innovation in Russia amounted to just 1.05 percent of GDP ($24.9 billion) as opposed to 2.8 percent of GDP ($427 billion) in the United States and 1.5 percent of GDP ($175 billion) in China.310

Perhaps even more telling, on September 16, 2014, Dmitry Medvedev presided over a meeting of the presidential Council for Economic Modernization and Innovative Development whose purpose was to come up with ways to “overcome the technological lag behind developed countries.”311 A 2016 study made by two eminent Russian economists, one who works for Skoltech and the second at National Research University Higher School of Economics, came to a pessimistic conclusion regarding the future of Russia’s biomedical sector in particular: Modern biomedical research . . . does not offer any hope of competitive Russian methods and procedures emerging in the medium term. In this time frame, the Russian health care sector needs to borrow the latest methods and solutions, rather than relying on local breakthroughs. Around the world, advanced biomedical research is now conducted on neurotechnologies and genetics. It is reflected in some of the largest foreign projects of recent years, funded by both civilian and military sources. In Russia, however, extremely modest sums are channeled into areas that will be key in overcoming the demographic and migration problems facing the country.312

These concerns are not simply about Russia’s economic well-being. Russian officials also view their future military capabilities as dependent on a high-technology economy. We see a hint of this attitude in the paragraph above when the authors emphasize that foreign funding for “neurotechnologies and genetics” is coming in part from “military sources.” Official pronouncements and doctrinal documents dispel any doubts on the matter. Medvedev in particular repeatedly emphasized this viewpoint while president. In a March 2009 address to the Security Council, he said: “The main idea of [the National Security Strategy] can be briefly defined as security through development. This approach reflects the idea of achieving the strategic goals that we set for our country and is inextricably linked to the Concept of Social and Economic Development through to 2020, to those priorities that are already contained in this document.”313 Medvedev connected the development of the civilian technology sector to the military’s

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modernization: “Russia is a country in full development, and our goal remains the creation of the highest living standards in Russia, a high-tech society with a high-tech industry, and with modern defense capabilities.”314 This interconnectedness between the military and civilian spheres was then emphasized in NSS-2020, which reads: “Conceptual assumptions in the area of ensuring national security are based on the fundamental interconnectedness and interdependence of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020 and the Concept for Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation to 2020.” 315 Numerous high-level statements by Russia’s leadership have argued for the monitoring of civilian R&D advances, including in biotechnology, for possible applications for military use (see Chapter 3). In other words, the Russian leadership views the health of its civilian high-technology sectors versus that of their competitors as a key indicator of their relative military strength. Russia’s biotechnology sector is no exception, and its less than satisfactory state has caused high-level concern. These concerns have taken on a new urgency in the immediate aftermath of the Western targeted sanctions. Russian analysts have repeatedly emphasized the reliance of their country’s biotechnology sector on foreign imports. An August 2014 study covering the first half of 2014 conducted by the National Association of Innovations and Information Technology Development noted that: • As of mid-2014, Russia’s innovation sector had lost $50 million in investments because of sanctions. • The effects of the sanctions could increase because leading US and EU companies are cutting off access to technology. The information technology, medicine, biotechnologies, and transportation fields are especially at risk because they are the most dependent on Western technologies. • As a result of increased demand created by import substitution policies, the biotechnology sector experienced an 18% surge and the pharmaceutical sector experienced a 14% surge in new projects in May and June 2014.316

We also cite in this regard a 2016 article by four eminent Russian economists who emphasized the importance of foreign technology transfers for the development of Russia’s biotechnology industry: Russia’s economy is highly dependent on imports of pharmaceutical goods and medical equipment, machinery and equipment (except nuclear reactors, fuel elements, engines and turbines), and electrical equipment. The sectors with most imports originating from ‘sanction-imposing’ countries are aircraft, medical and optical equipment, engines and turbines, and pharmaceutical goods.317

We emphasize that despite these widespread concerns, it is unclear whether any transfers of biotechnology equipment or products have actually

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been disrupted. The US and EU sanctions are not purposefully targeting these sectors; it bears to repeat that it was Rostec’s post-sanctions acquisitions that indirectly placed some of its newly acquired Russian pharmaceutical firms under sanctions. According to Viktor Dmitriyev, director of the Association of Russian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, a number of companies have encountered delays in imported manufacturing and laboratory equipment that had already been paid for.318 Dmitriyev voiced concern that if this situation were to continue, it would pose a serious risk for development of biotechnology in Russia. However, the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade retorted that the situation was not as dire as claimed by Dmitriyev. Its representative stated that several biotechnology companies had not had problems with manufacturing and laboratory equipment deliveries from foreign sources. For outside observers like us it is difficult to know which source to trust. What is clear is that the simultaneous drop in prices of natural gas and the imposition of Western sanctions in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea have taken a heavy toll on an already imbalanced Russian economy. By mid-2016, the Putin administration began to encourage the military industry to play a role in developing Russia’s civilian industry.319 The previously emphasized doctrinal guidance to accelerate militarization of civilian high-technology breakthroughs (see Chapters 3 and 4) was turned on its head. Putin called upon defense industries to plan “for conversion and diversification of their production,” 320 while Rogozin began to argue that defense companies should “be subordinated to the logic of the parallel development of civil industry.”321 Using this talk of defense conversion as an implicit justification, the Putin administration also announced it would exempt the defense budget from the announced across-the-board 10 percent cuts designed to stabilize spending. 322 It remains to be seen how (or even if) the Russian government will balance its budget, but based on this announcement it is possible that the Putin administration will leave military funding relatively untouched at the expense of the civilian sector. Perhaps the Putin administration expects the Russian biotechnology sector to adjust and rely on the MOD for support—after all, some RAS institutes had ties to the Soviet BW program.323 Unlike Soviet times, however, today’s Russian civilian scientists are freely able to emigrate, which means that they can choose between seeking a potentially lucrative position that also allows them to conduct the research they prefer and can publish versus seeking a position in the classified environment with all its restrictions. Despite the Medvedev and Putin administrations’ emphasis on bolstering Russia’s civilian bioscience and biotechnology sectors, both appear to be in decline and, depending on what the reform of the academies brings about, the situation for scientists may worsen.

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Annex 5.1 Excerpts from Science in Siberia no. 26 (2911), July 3, 2013

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Science in Siberia is a weekly magazine published by the Siberian Branch of the RAS. This issue was dedicated to articles demonstrating the outrage generated by the RAS draft reforms.324 Table of Contents:

On the Draft Federal Law “On the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Reorganization of the State Academies of Sciences and Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation.” Resolution of the Presidium of RAS of 01.07.2013.

An Open Letter to President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the United Russia party D.A. Medvedev. Appeal to State Duma Deputies On behalf of Academician Zh.I. Alferov.

The RAS Trade Union’s Appeal to the Scientific Community.

On a New Legislative Initiative of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. Appeal of the Ural Branch of RAS to the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin.

Joint Statement of the Council for Science and Members of the Public Council of the Ministry of Education and Science. The RAS Presidium of St. Petersburg Scientific Center Appeal to the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin.

On the New Legislative Initiative of the RF Ministry of Education and Science. Statement of the Department of Chemistry and Materials Science of RAS.

Appeal of the Extraordinary Expanded General Meeting of the Department of Physical Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences to the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin.

Statement of the Foreign Scientists-Compatriots Related to the Announcing by the RF Government of the Reform Plan for the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Science Does Not Need Such a Reform! Russia Does Not Need Such a Government! Statement of the Presidium of Central Committee of Communist Party of Russian Federation.

At the Tomsk Scientific Center. A meeting of the Presidium of the Tomsk Scientific Center of SB RAS, devoted to the federal law “On the Russian

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Academy of Sciences, to reorganization of the State Academies and Amendments of Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation” has recently been held.

An Open Letter of the Scientific Council of G.I. Budker Institute of Nuclear Physics of the SB RAS.

Protest of Young Scientists. On July 1st, dozens of young scientists in white coats came out to the Academician Lavrentiev Avenue in the Novosibirsk Akademgorodok to express dissatisfaction with the RAS reform, supported by the Government of the Russian Federation.

Notes 1. Quoted in Rachel Ansley, “Emigration Threatens Russia’s Stability,” March 12, 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-antlanticist/emigration-threatens -russia-s-stability. 2. We recommend the following publications: Roger Roffey, Biotechnology in Russia: Why Is It Not a Success Story? FOI-R-2986-SE (Umeå, Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency [FOI], 2010); Milton Leitenberg and Raymond A. Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 679–697; Roger Roffey, “Russian Science and Technology Is Still Having Problems—Implications for Defense Research,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 26, no. 2 (2013), pp. 162–188; Committee on Future Contributions of the Biosciences to Public Health, Agriculture, Basic Research, Counterterrorism, and Nonproliferation Activities in Russia, Office for Central Europe and Eurasia Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, National Research Council of the National Academies, in cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences, The Unique U.S.-Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology: Recent Experience and Future Directions (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2013). 3. Committee on Future Contributions of the Biosciences, The Unique U.S.Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology, p. 3. 4. Committee on Future Contributions of the Biosciences, The Unique U.S.Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology, pp. 115–144. See also Kristina S. Westerdahl, “Building and Measuring Confidence: The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Vaccine Production in Russia” FOI-R-0189-SE (Umeå, Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency [FOI], December 2001), app. 1 pp. 1–77. 5. “On the Threshold of Artificial Life” (in Russian), Zavtra Online, September 19, 2013, http://zavtra.ru/content/view/na-poroge-iskusstvennoj-zhizni (accessed April 20, 2016). 6. Roffey, Biotechnology in Russia; Roffey, “Russian Science and Technology Is Still Having Problems.” 7. Russian Ministry of Economic Development, “Program on Development of Biotechnology in Russia Through 2020” (in Russian), p. 8, http://economy.gov.ru /minec/activity/sections/innovations/development/doc20120427_06 (accessed July 31, 2016). 8. Ibid., p. 9.

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9. Roffey, Biotechnology in Russia, p. 64. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., pp. 64–65. 12. The following article presents the results of a series of interviews on the state and troubles of the Russian high-technology market: Steve Johnson, “Russia Slides from Technological Superpower to Also-Ran,” Financial Times, March 15, 2016; Evgeny Kuznetsov, Alexandra Engovatova, Georgy Laptev, and Kendrick White, From University 1.0 to 4.0: Nurturing Innovation and Entrepreneurship in Russian Academia (Moscow: Russia Direct, 2016), pp. 23–24; Committee on Future Contributions of the Biosciences, The Unique U.S.-Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology, pp. 25–26; Economist Intelligence Unit, “Healthcare Report Russia 3rd Quarter 2016,” October 3, 2016, https://store.eiu.com/Product/aspx?pid =1557096955&gid=1750000175. 13. Ekaterina Streltsova, “Patent Activity in Biotechnology,” Foresight-Russia 8, no. 1 (2014), pp. 24–35, https://www.hse.ru/pubs/share/direct/document/135062458 (accessed April 20, 2016). 14. China Biotechnology Development Center, Department for Social Development of the Ministry of Science and Technology, 2015 China Biotechnology and Bio-Industry Development Report (in Chinese) (Beijing: Science Publishing House, 2015), p. 193. 15. Ibid., pp. 1–236; Zhou Yu, “After Western Sanctions Hit Moscow, China and Its Neighbor Develop Closer Economic Cooperation and Cultural Exchange,” Global Times, July 22, 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/933360.shtml (accessed September 1, 2016). 16. V. M. Moskovkin, “The Competitiveness of Scientific Research and Measures to Increase It,” Scientific and Technical Information Processing 34, no. 6 (2007), pp. 273–277. 17. Yu V. Mokhnacheva, “The Influence of Various Forms of Co-Authorship on the Scientific Productivity of Russian Scientists in the Field of Molecular Biology,” Scientific and Technical Information Processing 42, no. 3 (2015), pp. 162–172. 18. V. A. Markusova, A. N. Libkind, T. A. Krylova, L. E. Mindeli, and I. A. Libkind, “Publishing Performance Indicators by the Russian Academy of Sciences and by Russian Universities, WoS 2007–2011,” Scientific and Technical Information Processing 41, no. 2 (2014), pp. 145–154. 19. Ibid., p. 152. 20. L. F. Borisova, N. S. Bogacheva, V. A. Markusova, and E. E. Suetina, “Bionanotechnology: A Bibliometric Analysis Using Science Citation Index Database,” Scientific and Technical Information Processing 34, no. 4 (2007), pp. 212–218. 21. Ibid., p. 214. 22. Vladimir Pislyakov and Elena Shukshina, “Measuring Excellence in Russia: Highly Cited Papers, Leading Institutions, Patterns of National and International Collaboration,” pre-print of an accepted paper to the Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 65, no. 11 (2014), p. 9. 23. Thomson Reuters, “Thomson Reuters Collaborates with Russia’s Scientific Electronic Library eLibrary.RU to Showcase Nation’s Leading Research in Web of Science,” October 1, 2014, http://thomsonreuters.com/en/press-releases/2014/thomson -reuters-collaborates-with-russias-scientific-electronic-library-elibrary-ru-to-showcase -nations-leading-research-in-web-of-science.html. 24. Ibid. 25. Mokhanecheva, “The Influence of Various Forms of Co-Authorship,” p. 164. 26. Moskovkin, “The Competitiveness of Scientific Research,” p. 275.

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27. Martin Grueber, “BRIC Russia,” Global R&D Funding Forecast, December 17, 2012, http://www.rdmag.com/articles/2012/12/bric-russia. 28. Quirin Schiermeier, “Funding Freeze Shakes Russia’s Prodigals: Academy Pulls the Plug on Research Programme,” Nature, January 30, 2008. 29. Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service, “8.11 Enrollment in Bachelor’s, Specialist’s, and Master’s Programs and Graduation with Bachelor’s, Specialist’s, and Master’s Degree—Russia in Figures, 2015,” http://www.gks.ru /bgd/regl/b15_12/IssWWW.exe/stg/d01/08-11.htm (accessed August 10, 2016). 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Website on Highly Qualified Scientific Personnel, “Statistical Indicators of Dissertation Councils in the Russian Federation—Persons Approved by the Higher Assessment Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science of Russian Academic Degrees (1994–2015),” Science-Expert.ru, http://science-expert.ru/dsrf/federal _level/Stat_dis_1.shtml (accessed August 10, 2016). 33. Mikhael Rabinovich, “History of Biotech in Russia,” Biotechnology Journal 2, no. 7 (2007), p. 777. 34. Roffey, “Russian Science and Technology Is Still Having Problems,” p. 177. 35. Roffey, Biotechnology in Russia, p. 76. 36. Ibid., pp. 76–79. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid., p. 77. 39. Ibid., pp. 12, 79. 40. Roffey, “Russian Science and Technology Is Still Having Problems,” p. 178. 41. Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791, “On the Federal Targeted Program ‘National System of Chemical and Biological Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2014),’” October 27, 2008, http://fcp.economy.gov.ru/cgi-bin/cis/fcp .cgi/Fcp/File/FcpPassCons/64. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Russian Federation, “Strategy for the Development of the Pharmaceutical Industry of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2020” (Pharma-2020) (in Russian), Decree no. VZ-P12-1366, March 6, 2008, http://pharma2020.ru (accessed May 22, 2015). 45. Archive of the Official Site of the 2008–2012 Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Holds a Meeting on the Tasks He Set in His Articles As a Presidential Candidate,” March 22, 2012, http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18490 (accessed April 20, 2016). 46. Sergey Skylarov, “Production of High-Quality Pharmaceutical Glass Packaging: Investment Project v. 2.4, JSCo ‘VRN-Glass,’” February 2014, p. 51, http:// www.tikrf.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Investicioni-pojekat-VORONJE%C5 %BDMEDSTEKLO.pdf (accessed April 20, 2016). 47. Ibid. 48. Nadezhda Markina, “Russian Market Is Moving Toward the Creation of Generics” (in Russian), Gazeta.ru, October 17, 2013, http://www.gazeta.ru/health /2013/10/17_a_5710633.shtml (accessed April 20, 2016). 49. “Russia Will Set Up a Special Commission for Modernization and Economic Development” (in Russian), 1TV, May 15, 2009, http://www.1tv.ru/news/economic /8910 (accessed April 20, 2016). 50. Anastasiya Orlova, “Why We Need Foreign Clusters” (in Russian), Yeshednevnyye Novosti Podmoskovye, July 6, 2012, http://enp-mo.ru (accessed April 20, 2016).

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51. Committee on Future Contributions of the Biosciences, The Unique U.S.Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology, pp. 221–222, 231. 52. Human Stem Cells Institute, “Synbio Factsheet,” n.d., http://eng.hsci.ru /research-development/synbio-project (accessed September 1, 2016). 53. I. Kotliarov and A. Balashov, “Contradictions of Government Policy in the Field of Regulating Drug Prices: Problems and Ways to Solve Them,” Problems of Economic Transition 55, no. 12 (April 2013), pp. 76–90. 54. Russian Federation, “State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology in the Russian Federation Until 2020” (in Russian), VP-P8 322, April 24, 2012, http://owwz.de/fileadmin/Biotechnologie/Information_Biotech/BIO2020 _Programme_full.pdf (accessed April 20, 2016). 55. Ibid., p. 8. 56. Ibid., p. 5. 57. Ibid., p. 55. 58. A ninth budget item was for BIO-2020 to fund the upkeep of more than a hundred microbiological and plant culture collections. 59. See also Biotech2030, “About Us,” June 15, 2016, http://biotech2030.ru /about-us (accessed August 1, 2016). 60. Ibid., pp. 7, 13. 61. Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, “State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology in the Russian Federation Until 2020,” Protocol 2, Section I, Item 1, April 1, 2011, p. 9, http://owwz.de/fileadmin /Biotechnologie/Information_Biotech/BIO2020_Programme_full.pdf (accessed April 20, 2016). 62. Biotech 2030, “Russian Technology Platform ‘Bioindustry and Bioresources—BioTech2030’ Perspectives for Russian-German Co-operation,” http:// www.owwz.de/fileadmin/Biotechnologie/BioVeranst/Biotechnica2011/Plenary/Popov .pdf (accessed April 20, 2016). 63. V. A. May and J. I. Kuzminov, eds., A New Model of Growth, New Social Policy: The Final Report of the Results of the Expert Work on Current Issues of Socio-Economic Strategy for Russia for the Period up to the Year 2020, conducted under sponsorship of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, President of the Russian Federation, National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow: Publishing House Delo, 2013), p. 116, http://2020strategy.ru/data/2013/11/08/1214321112/%D0%A1%D1%82%D1 %80%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%B8%D1%8F-2020_%D0 %9A%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%B0%201.pdf (accessed April 20, 2016). 64. Ibid. 65. Russian Federation, “On Approving the Action Plan (Roadmap) ‘Development of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering’” (in Russian), Decree no. 1247-r, July 18, 2013, http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Russian %20Government%20Roadmap%20for%20Development%20of%20Biotechnology _Moscow_Russian%20Federation_9-20-2013.pdf (accessed April 24, 2016). 66. Ibid., p. 3. 67. Ibid., paras. 64–71. 68. On S&T forecasts, see, for example, Alexander Chulok, “S&T Foresight Studies in Russia: Current Status and Future Goals,” p. 3, https://www.hse.ru/data/2014/02/21 /1331455055/Chulok_ERA_30-01-14-%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%87%D0%B5%D1 %80.pdf (accessed August 1, 2016); Alexander Sokolov and Alexander Chulok, “Russian Long-Term S&T Foresight 2030: Key Features and First Results,” https://ec.europa .eu/jrc/sites/default/files/fta2014-t1Practice_177.pdf (accessed August 1, 2016).

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69. For a description of the program, see Roffey, Biotechnology in Russia, pp. 76–79. 70. Schiermeier, “Funding Freeze Shakes Russia’s Prodigals.” 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid. 73. Russian Federation, “Measures to Attract Leading Scientists to Russian Educational Institutions, Scientific Institutions of State Academies of Sciences and Scientific Centres” (Mega-Grants), Decree no. 220, April 9, 2010, http://www.increast .eu/en/180.php (accessed April 20, 2016). 74. Manfred Thumm et al., “Megagrant Research Project: Laboratory of Advanced Research on Millimeter and Terahertz Radiation at Novosibirsk State University,” in Gabriele Gorzka, ed., Knowledge Transfer: The New Core Responsibility of Higher Education Institutions—Practice and Perspectives in Russia and Germany (Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2012), p. 132. 75. Natalya Krainova, “Foreign Scientists Drawn by Lucrative State MegaGrants,” Moscow Times, October 4, 2011, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article .php?id=444745 (accessed April 20, 2016). 76. Alexandra Guzeva, “New Grants Revitalize Russian Science,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, March 20, 2012, http://rbth.com/articles/2012/03/20/revitalizing _russian_science_15120.html (accessed April 20, 2016). 77. IncoNet EaP, “Country Report: Russia,” April 2014, http://www.increast.eu (accessed April 20, 2016). 78. “Initiative of Excellence Megagrant,” France in Russia: Science and Technology (in French) April 28, 2016, http://www.ambafrance-ru.org/Initiative-d -excellence-Megagrant (accessed August 1, 2016). 79. Mega-Grant, “Projects,” n.d., http://www.p220.ru/en/home/projects (accessed August 1, 2016). 80. Vladimir Pokrovsky, “Russian Scientists Decry New International Funding Rules,” Science Insider, May 13, 2013, http://news.sciencemag.org/2013/05/russian -scientists-decry-new-international-funding-rules; “Russian Reformation,” Nature Physics 9, no. 683 (2013). 81. Ido Nativ, “Skoltech: Point of Access,” Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology, February 21, 2016, http://www.skoltech.ru/en/2016/02/skoltech-point -of-access (accessed May 24, 2016). 82. Russian Speaking Academic Science Association, “About,” http://www .dumaem-po-russki.org/about.php (accessed May 4, 2016). 83. Skolkovo, “VI Conference of RASA-USA: The Results” (in Russian), November 11, 2015, https://sk.ru/opus/b/otusnews/archive/2015/11/11/vi-ezhegodnaya -konferenciya-rasausa-itogi.aspx (accessed May 4, 2016). 84. Ibid. 85. Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, p. 784. 86. Health, Environmental Instrumentation, and Biotechnology Cluster (ClusterMedTech) in St. Petersburg (in Russian), http://clustermedtech.ru (accessed April 1, 2017). 87. Anonymous, “Innovative Pharmaceutics and Biotech Department Is Among Top Three Core Departments at Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology” (in Russian), FarmAnalitik, February 27, 2014, http://www.marketmed.ru (accessed April 24, 2016). 88. On April 26, 2016, one of us (Zilinskas) contacted Sharpless’s laboratory and learned that he did indeed visit the institute and gave a lecture in summer 2012 but since that time has had no contact with it and certainly does not direct a laboratory in Russia.

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89. Trade Mission of the Russian Federation in Germany, “Innovative and Industrial Clusters in Russia: Current Agenda of the State Policy,” pp. 1–16, https://www .innovationpolicyplatform.org/system/files/Russia_PPT07042016_.pdf (accessed September 30, 2016). 90. AstraZeneca, “AstraZeneca Opens New Manufacturing Facility to Support Continued Growth in Russia,” October 20, 2015, https://www.astrazeneca.com /media-centre/press-releases/2015/astrazeneca-opens-new-manufacturing-facility -to-support-continued20102015.html. 91. In April 2016, we attempted to contact AstraZeneca’s corporate affairs department to ask about doing business in Russia but were told “AstraZeneca is not able to comment on the specific subject of your inquiry.” 92. Novo Nordisk Russia, “Company Description,” n.d., http://pharmaboardroom .com/companies/novo-nordisk-russia (accessed April 25, 2016); Novo Nordisk Russia, “The Blueprint for Change Programme: Investing in Diabetes Care in Russia,” April 2015, http://pharmaboardroom.com/companies/novo-nordisk-russia (accessed April 25, 2016). 93. Urbanica, “Industrial Framework of Russia: The 250 Largest Industrial Centers of Russia—2010,” pp. 1–27, http://urbanica.spb.ru/?p=1321&lang=en (accessed September 30, 2016). 94. Russian Cluster Observatory, Institute for Statistical Studies and Economics of Knowledge, “Map” (in Russian), http://map.cluster.hse.ru (accessed September 30, 2016). 95. Ibid. 96. Ibid., http://map.cluster.hse.ru/cluster/246 (accessed September 30, 2016). 97. Ibid., http://map.cluster.hse.ru/cluster/152 (accessed September 30, 2016). 98. Ibid., http://map.cluster.hse.ru/cluster/65 (accessed September 20, 2016). 99. Ibid., http://map.cluster.hse.ru/cluster/213 (accessed September 30, 2016). 100. Ibid., http://map.cluster.hse.ru/cluster/73 (accessed September 30, 2016). 101. Ibid., http://map.cluster.hse.ru/cluster/207 (accessed September 30, 2016). 102. Ibid., http://map.cluster.hse.ru/cluster/107 (accessed September 30, 2016). 103. Ibid., http://map.cluster.hse.ru/cluster/168 (accessed September 30, 2016). 104. Ibid., http://map.cluster.hse.ru/cluster/39 (accessed September 30, 2016). 105. Ibid., http://map.cluster.hse.ru/cluster/144 (accessed September 30, 2016). 106. Ibid., http://map.cluster.hse.ru/cluster/95 (accessed September 30, 2016). 107. Ibid., http://map.cluster.hse.ru/cluster/195 (accessed September 30, 2016). 108. Ibid., http://map.cluster.hse.ru/cluster/90 (accessed September 30, 2016). 109. Ibid., http://map.cluster.hse.ru/cluster/158 (accessed September 30, 2016). 110. Russian Cluster Observatory, Institute for Statistical Studies and Economics of Knowledge, “Map.” 111. Dmitry Medvedev, “Dmitry Medvedev’s Article: Go Russia!” September 10, 2009, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/5413 (accessed April 24, 2016). 112. Dmitry Medvedev, “Transcript of Meeting with Russian Expatriates Working in Silicon Valley,” June 23, 2010, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts /8162 (accessed April 24, 2016). 113. Dmitry Medvedev, “Speech at the Global Innovation Partnerships Forum,” October 11, 2010, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/9209 (accessed April 24, 2016). 114. Alexei Sitnikov, “Case Study: Skolkovo Innovation Center,” in Insider’s Guide to Russian Hi-Tech Hubs, Russia Direct no. 9, June 2015, p. 21. 115. The Renova Group is a leading, international, private business group that globally manages companies and direct and portfolio investment funds owning and

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managing assets in the high-tech machine building, metals, mining, chemical, construction development, and the like. See About Renova Group, http://www.renova .ru/en (accessed May 2, 2016). According to Forbes, Vekselberg is the third-richest Russian and is the forty-fourth-richest person in world, worth approximately $10 billion: Forbes, “The World’s Richest People,” May 26, 2016, http://www.forbes .com/lists/2006/10/Worth_2.html. 116. In 2012, the exchange rate was about $1 = 30 rubles. 117. Committee on Future Contributions of the Biosciences, The Unique U.S.Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology, app. E3, “Skolkovo Foundation and Innovation Center,” p. 184. 118. Skolkovo, “Construction Progress” (in Russian), http://sk.ru/city/p/main _objects.aspx (accessed August 2, 2016). 119. Skolkovo Foundation, Annual Report of Skolkovo Foundation 2014, Moscow, 2015, http://sk.ru/foundation/results/b/results/archive/2015/06/09/annual -report-2015.aspx (accessed May 3, 2016). 120. Committee on Future Contributions of the Biosciences, The Unique U.S.Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology, p. 184. 121. The participants are listed on the SF website: http://sk.ru/net/participants /p/index.aspx (accessed May 5, 2016). 122. Skolkovo, “Sk Biomed,” November 20, 2014, http://community.sk.ru/foundation /biomed/p/directions.aspx (accessed May 5, 2016). 123. Skoltech, “Apply for Master of Science,” http://www.skoltech.ru/en /admissions/msc-programs (accessed August 2, 2016); Skoltech, “Apply for PhD Program,” http://www.skoltech.ru/en/admissions/ph-d-programs (accessed August 2, 2016). 124. Skolkovo, “Student Prospectus 2015,” p. 9, http://issuu.com/skoltech/docs /student_prospectus_high_res_singles/9?e=13430553/10035164 (accessed August 2, 2016). 125. Ibid., pp. 19–30. 126. MIT News Office, “Six Faculty Recognized for Russian Engagement,” MIT News, April 2, 2013. 127. Oliver Staley, “Russia Teams with MIT on Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology,” Washington Post, May 8, 2013. 128. “Skoltech, MIT Reflect on First Year Collaboration,” MIT News, December 21, 2012. 129. Staley, “Russia Teams with MIT.” 130. Ibid. 131. Declan Butler, “Russia Pins Hopes on Science City,” Nature News, August 14, 2013, http://www.nature.com/news/russia-pins-hopes-on-science-city-1.13550. 132. Ibid. 133. Skolkovo, “Student Prospectus 2015,” p. 20. 134. Payette, “Design and Construction Update: SkolTech,” July 21, 2016, http:// www.payette.com/post/3273826-design-and-construction-update-skoltech?platform =hootsuite (accessed August 2, 2016). 135. The Skoltech building is located at 55°41’56.34”N, 37°21’34.55”E. 136. Payette, “Skolkovo University Institute of Science and Technology Master Plan,” http://www.payette.com/project/2545608-institute-of-science-and-technology -master (accessed August 2, 2016); Payette, “Skolkovo University Institute of Science and Technology,” http://www.payette.com/project/2545519-institute-of-science -and-technology (accessed August 2, 2016). 137. Ibid.

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138. “3Q: Bruce Tidor on the MIT Skoltech Partnership,” MIT News, March 10, 2016, http://news.mit.edu/2016/3q-bruce-tidor-mit-skoltech-partnership-0310. 139. Ibid. 140. Ibid. 141. Ibid. 142. Skoltech Research, “Opportunities & Partnerships,” August 2014, http:// www.skoltech.ru/research/en/opportunities-partnerships/# (accessed October 8, 2016). 143. Skolkovo Foundation, “About Technopark,” http://sk.ru/technopark/about (accessed May 4, 2016). 144. Vitaly Shustikov, “World-Class Medical Complex for Moscow’s Skolkovo,” January 21, 2016, http://sk.ru/news/b/press/archive/2016/01/21/worldclass-medical -complex-for-moscow_2700_s-skolkovo.aspx (accessed May 4, 2016). 145. Henry Meyer, “Kremlin Intrigue Threatens Russia’s Silicon Valley,” Bloomberg News, July 18, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07 -18/kremlin-intrigue-threatens-russias-silicon-valley. 146. Ellen Barry, “Economist Who Fled Russia Cites Peril in Politically Charged Inquiry,” New York Times, May 31, 2013. 147. Adrien Henni, “Skolkovo Under Fire; Government Innovation Policies May Be Reshaped,” East-West Digital News, December 27, 2012, http://www.ewdn.com /2012/12/27/skolkovo-under-fire-government-innovation-policies-may-be-reshaped (accessed August 2, 2016). 148. “Veto on Federal Law to Amend the Law on Skolkovo Innovation Centre,” December 12, 2012, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17120 (accessed August 2, 2016). 149. “Investigators Search Skolkovo Innovation Hub, Question Billionaire Director,” Russia Today, April 18, 2013, https://www.rt.com/politics/skolkovo-director -billionaire-question-061 (accessed May 26, 2016); Maria Kiselyova, “Russia Science Park Skolkovo Hit by Fraud Probe,” Reuters, February 13, 2013, http://www .reuters.com/article/us-russia-skolkovo-fraud-idUSBRE91C0XC20130213. 150. “Charges Against Skolkovo Hi-Tech Hub Managers Lifted or Relaxed,” Russian Legal Information Agency, August 23, 2013, http://www.rapsinews.com /judicial_information/20130823/268639849.html (accessed August 2, 2016). 151. Leonid Bershidsky, “Power Grab Trumps Nanotechnology in Putin’s Russia,” Bloomberg News, May 16, 2013, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles /2013-05-16/power-grab-trumps-nanotechnology-in-putin-s-russia. 152. See Andrei Shary, “Duma Deputy Ponomaryov: ‘I Do Not Intend to Become a Political Émigré,’” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 8, 2015, http://www .rferl.org/content/duma-deputy-ponomaryov-i-do-not-intend-to-become-a-political -emigre/26945396.html (accessed May 30, 2016). 153. Ibid. 154. “Former Skolkovo Vice President Arrested in Absentia,” Russian Legal Information Agency, July 27, 2015, http://rapsinews.com/news/20150727/274281319.html (accessed May 25, 2016); “Russian Duma Approves Arrest of Opposition Deputy,” Moscow Times, October 16, 2015; “Russian Lawmaker Ponomaryov Placed on International Wanted List,” Russian Legal Information Agency, July 31, 2015, http:// rapsinews.com/judicial_news/20150717/274169974.html (accessed May 26, 2016). 155. “Former Skolkovo Vice President Appeals Arrest in Absentia,” Russian Legal Information Agency, July 30, 2015, http://rapsinews.com/judicial_news /20150730/274309370.html. 156. Lucia Ziobro, “FBI’s Boston Office Warns Businesses of Venture Capital Scams,” Boston Business Journal, April 4, 2014, http://www.bizjournals.com

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/boston/blog/startups/2014/04/fbis-boston-office-warns-businesses-of-venture.html; Carl Schreck, “FBI Wary of Possible Russian Spies Lurking in High-Tech Sector,” Voice of America, May 20, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/fbi-wary-of -possible-russian-spies-lurking-in-high-tech-sector/1918528.html. 157. Seth Elan, “Russia’s Skolkovo Innovation Center,” EUCOM Strategic Foresight–inFocus, July 29, 2013, p. 5, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration /COCOM/EUCOM/Skolkovo.pdf (accessed August 2, 2016). Elan cites the following reference on p. 9: “Anna Gorchakova, ‘Skolkovo prevratyat v rezhimyj gorod’ [Skolkovo is being transformed into a regime city], Izvestiya (Moscow), November 21, 2011, http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26273383 (accessed July 24, 2012).” When we cite this article, we translate rezhimyj gorod as “restricted city” and not “regime city,” because the Russian term means a city where entrances and exits are controlled and thus where freedom of movement is restricted. 158. Quoted from Schreck, “FBI Wary of Possible Russian Spies.” 159. The specific paragraph is as follows: “Particularly noteworthy is Atlant’s ability to deliver military cargoes. The introduction of this unique vehicle is fully consistent with the concept of creating a mobile army and opens up new possibilities for mobile use of the means of radar surveillance, air and missile defence, and delivery of airborne troops.” In Skolkovo Foundation, “Made in Skolkovo 2014,” p. 23, https://sk.ru/news/m/wiki/15505.aspx (accessed August 2, 2016). 160. Skolkovo Foundation, “Made in Skolkovo 2016,” p. 64, https://sk.ru/news /m/wiki/16061.aspx (accessed August 5, 2016). 161. Airbus Group, “Continuous Detonation Wave Engine,” http://www.airbusgroup .com/int/en/corporate-social-responsibility/airbus-group-innovations/Skolkovo-The -Centre-of-Innovation-in-Russia/Continuous-detonation-wave-engine.html (accessed August 2, 2016). 162. Anna Gorchakova, “Skolkovo Is Being Transformed into a Restricted City” (in Russian), Izvestiya, November 18, 2011, http://izvestia.ru/news/507238 (accessed August 2, 2016). 163. Bruce Tidor, personal communication, May 23, 2016. 164. V. E. Zakharov, “The World-Class Science That We Once Had Can Be Revived,” Problems of Economic Transition 56, no. 6 (October 2013), pp. 15–23. 165. “Rostec to Establish National Immunobiology Company,” http://www .ceepharma.com/news/207333/rostec-to-establish-national-immunobiology-company (accessed August 3, 2016). 166. “Sanctions Hit Profits at Russian Defense and Technology Giant Rostec,” Moscow Times, July 22, 2015, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/sanctions-hit-profits -at-russian-defense-and-technology-giant-rostec-48456 (accessed August 3, 2016). 167. US Department of the Treasury, “Announcement of Expanded Treasury Sanctions Within the Russian Financial Services, Energy and Defense, or Related Materiel Sectors,” December 9, 2014, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press -releases/Pages/jl2629.aspx. For more information, see “Sanctions Hit Profits at Russian Defense and Technology Giant Rostec” and “Ukraine Crisis: Russia and Sanctions,” BBC News, December 19, 2014; Vladimir Karnozov, “Russia’s Rostec Denies Major Impact from U.S., EU Sanctions,” AIN Online, August 3, 2015, http:// www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aerospace/2015-08-03/russias-rostec-denies -major-impact-us-eu-sanctions (accessed August 3, 2016). 168. US Department of the Treasury, “Announcement of Expanded Treasury Sanctions.” 169. Rostec Corporation, “Strategy,” n.d., http://rostec.ru/en/about/strategy (accessed May 8, 2016).

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170. Ibid. 171. Nicole Gray, “Russia’s Putin Reiterates Commitment to 90% Domestic Drug-Making by 2020,” Remedium.ru, September 11, 2015, http://www.remedium .ru/eng/news/detail.php?ID=66796 (accessed May 11, 2016). 172. National Immunobiological Company, “About Company,” http://nacimbio .ru/en/about/activity (accessed August 3, 2016). 173. GMP is a system for ensuring that products are consistently produced and controlled according to international quality standards. Ibid. 174. “Forum of the Popular Front ‘For Quality and Affordable Medicine!’” (in Russian), September 7, 2015, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/50249 (accessed September 27, 2016). 175. Anonymous, “VacciNation: Russia’s Dependence on Imported Vaccines Threatens the Country’s Security” (in Russian), Argumenty i Fakty Online, August 22, 2014, http://www.aif.ru/health/life/1322147 (accessed May 10, 2016). 176. Ibid. 177. Ibid. 178. These sanctions were put in place on March 6, 2014, through Executive Order 13660. See US Department of State, “Ukraine and Russia Sanctions,” n.d., http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia (accessed August 5, 2016). 179. Yelena Kalinovskaya, “Rostec Announces Creation of New National Immunobiologicals Company” (in Russian), Farmatsevticheskiy Vestnik Online, March 18, 2014, http://www.pharmvestnik.ru (accessed May 12, 2016). 180. Rostec, “New Pharmaceutical Holding Company to Appear in Russia,” March 11, 2014, http://rostec.ru/en/news/4344 (accessed August 3, 2016). 181. Anonymous, “VacciNation.” 182. US Department of the Treasury, “Announcement of Expanded Treasury Sanctions.” 183. Ibid. 184. Rostec, “About the National Immunobiological Company” (in Russian), n.d., http://rostec.ru/about/holdings/4517004 (accessed August 15, 2016). 185. The figure given in the annual report is 33,685,900 rubles. See National Immunobiological Company, “Annual Report, Joint Stock Company ‘National Immunobiological Company’ for the Period from 28.11.2013 till 31.12.2014” (in Russian), p. 55, http://nacimbio.ru/upload/iblock/642/the-company_s-2014-annual -report.pdf (accessed August 8, 2016). 186. National Immunobiological Company, “History” (in Russian), n.d., http:// nacimbio.ru/about/history (accessed August 15, 2016). 187. National Immunobiological Company, “Annual Report, Joint Stock Company ‘National Immunobiological Company,’” p. 55. 188. Ibid. 189. Ibid., pp. 27–28. 190. Ibid., pp. 55–56. 191. National Immunobiological Company, “History.” 192. Genfa Group, “Products,” n.d., http://www.genfamed.com/products.php (accessed May 12, 2016). 193. Anonymous, “Rostec, Genfa to Invest up to $100 Million to Produce Medicine, Replace Imports,” Interfax 23, no. 184 (September 30, 2014), p. 43. 194. National Immunobiological Company, “Annual Report, Joint Stock Company ‘National Immunobiological Company,’” p. 25. 195. Ibid., p. 32. 196. Ibid., pp. 32–53.

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197. Rostec Corporation, “Strategy,” n.d., http://rostec.ru/en/about/strategy (accessed May 12, 2016). 198. National Immunobiological Company, “JSC ‘MPO Metalist’—It Mainly Manufactures Prosthetic and Orthopedic Products and Means of Rehabilitation for the Disabled” (in Russian), http://nacimbio.ru/production/ooo-metallist (accessed August 8, 2016); JSC ‘MPO Metalist’ Production” (in Russian), http://mpometallist .ru/index.php/proizvodstvo (accessed August 8, 2016). 199. “NPO Microgen: A Major Producer of Immunobiological Products in the Country,” http://nacimbio.ru/production/npo-mikrogen (accessed August 2, 2016). 200. Rostec, “Rostec Received 100% of the Shares of ‘Microgen’” (in Russian), March 18, 2015, http://rostec.ru/news/4516150; Microgen, “History” (in Russian), n.d., http://www.microgen.ru/company (accessed August 15, 2016). 201. US Department of the Treasury, “Announcement of Expanded Treasury Sanctions.” 202. NPO Microgen, “Fact and Figures” (in Russian), n.d., http://www.microgen .ru/company/facts (accessed August 8, 2016). 203. NPO Microgen, “Our Businesses” (in Russian), n.d., http://www.microgen .ru/company/filials (accessed August 8, 2016). 204. Rostec, “About the National Immunobiological Company,” n.d., http://rostec .ru/about/holdings/4517004 (accessed August 2, 2016). 205. NPO Microgen, “Company NPO ‘Microgen’’” (in Russian), http://www .microgen.ru/about (accessed October 10, 2014). 206. Oleg Falichev and Yevgeny Starkov, “A Barrier Against Н1N1” (in Russian), VPK, November 11, 2009, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/6912 (accessed May 7, 2016). 207. We noted that the smallpox vaccine was not mentioned on their list of priorities, but was mentioned on their “development” page: NPO Microgen, “NPO Microgen Company Vision,” archived page retrieved through http://web.archive .org/web/20120630151109/http://eng.microgen.ru/about/conception (accessed May 7, 2016). See also NPO Microgen, “Key Priorities,” archived page retrieved through http://web.archive.org/web/20120629075659/http://eng.microgen.ru/about/priority (accessed May 7, 2016). Microgen’s official Russian-language price catalog can be retrieved through http://www.microgen.ru/media/pricelists/microgen_catalog.pdf (accessed May 7, 2016). A limited list of products is also available at the following site: “NPO Microgen FGUP,” Epharmapedia, http://www.epharmapedia.com/factory /profile/27371/NPO-Microgen-FGUP.html?lang=en (accessed May 7, 2016). 208. “Bacteriophages” (in Russian), http://www.bacteriofag.ru/faq/mozhno-li -mne-ispolzovat-bakteriofagi-pri-lechenii-bronkhita-pnevmonii-ili-plevrita-/?sphrase _id=91 (accessed May 7, 2016). 209. Stephen T. Abedon, Sarah J. Kuhl, Bob G. Blasdel, and Elizabeth Martin Kutter, “Phage Treatment of Human Infections,” Bacteriophage 1, no. 2 (March –April 2011), pp. 66–85. Table 1 in this article is especially informative. 210. Russian Federation, “Ministry of Healthcare Sends Vaccines to FloodAffected Regions of the Russian Far East,” August 21, 2013, http://government.ru /en/dep_news/3954 (accessed May 7, 2016). 211. Anonymous, “Putin Urged to Make Microgen Sole Vaccine Supplier to State” (in Russian), Remedium.ru, July 7, 2014, http://www.remedium.ru/news /detail.php?ID=62369 (accessed May 7, 2016). 212. Ibid. 213. Russian Federation, “On the Conditions of Admission and Restrictions Originating from Foreign Countries Medicines Included in the List of Vital and Essential Drugs for the Purposes of Procurement for State and Municipal Needs” (in Russian),

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Russian Federation Resolution no. 1289, November 30, 2015, http://www .dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2016/february/1/life-sciences-major-russian -legislation-changes-for-2015 (accessed May 13, 2016). 214. “Natsimbio Will Be Sole Supplier of Medicines for Tuberculosis, HIV, and Viral Hepatitis” (in Russian), Remedium.ru, July 23, 2015, http://remedium.ru/news /detail.php?ID=66400 (accessed May 15, 2016). 215. “LABIOFAM Delegation Headed by Its Director, Dr. José A. Fraga Castro, Visited Russia” (in Spanish), Official Website of the Cuban Foreign Ministry (Cuba MinRex), February 3, 2014, http://www.minrex.gob.cu/es/delegacion-de-labiofam -visito-rusia-presidida-por-su-director-dr-jose-fraga-castro. 216. Labiofam’s formal name is the Grupo Empresarial de Producciones Biofarmaceuticas y Quimicas. See Publication no. CA2812841 A1, PCT no. PCT/CU2011 /000006, publication date April 5, 2012, filing date September 27, 2011, “Peptides from the Venom of the Rhopalurus junceus and Pharmaceutical Composition,” https://www.google.com/patents/CA2812841A1?cl=en (accessed August 8, 2016). 217. Ledys Camacho Casado, “Russia and the Caribbean Nation Signed an Agreement for the Development of Anti-Tumor Peptides,” Opciones, November 8, 2013, http://www.opciones.cu/ferias-y-eventos/2013-11-08/suscriben-rusia-y-la-nacion -caribena-acuerdo-para-el-desarrollo-de-peptidos-antitumorales (accessed August 8, 2016); Microgen, “Russia and Cuba Will Work on the Development of Modern Cancer Drugs” (in Russian), January 30, 2014, http://www.microgen.ru/press/news /RossiyaiKubaporabotayutnadsozdaniemsovremennykhonkologicheskikhpreparatov /index.php (accessed August 8, 2016); Juventud Rebelde, “Spotlight on Cuban-Russian Collaboration on the Development of Anti-Cancer Drug” (in Spanish), Juventud Rebelde, February 12, 2014, http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/ciencia-tecnica/2014-02 -12/destacan-colaboracion-cubano-rusa-en-desarrollo-de-anticancerigeno (accessed August 2, 2016). 218. Microgen, “RAS ‘Bioengineering’ Center Will Take Part in the Work on the Creation of Anticancer Drugs Based on Peptides Within the Framework of the NPO ‘Microgen’ Russian-Cuban Cooperation” (in Russian), February 12, 2014, http:// www.microgen.ru/press/news/TSentrBioinzheneriyaRANprimetuchastievrab oteposozdaniyuprotivoopukholevykhpreparatovnaosnovepeptidovvramkakhrossi yskokubinskogosotrudnichestvaNPOMikrogen/index.php (accessed August 8, 2016). 219. Microgen, “NPO ‘Microgen’ Creates a Division of Research and Development (R&D) in Partnership with the RAS ‘Bioengineering’ Center,” April 3, 2014, http://www.microgen.ru/press/news/NPOMikrogensozdaetpodrazdelenieissle dovaniyirazrabotokRDvpartnerstvesTSentromBioinzheneriyaRAN/index.php (accessed August 8, 2016); “Russian Academy of Sciences’ Bioengineering Center to Take Part in Microgen Cancer Drug Creation Project” (in Russian), June 4, 2014, http://www .press-release.ru/branches/medicine/a3152d6270549 (accessed May 14, 2016). 220. Natasha Vázquez, “Chasing the Dream of Curing Cancer” (in Spanish), Sputnik News, October 16, 2014, http://mundo.sputniknews.com/opinion/20141016 /162504431.html (accessed August 8, 2016). The following source from 2013 also noted an apparent lack of results when searching for preclinical trial results: Elio Campitelli, “Labiofam RjLB-14 Peptide: Cure for Cancer or Delusion?” (in Spanish), Circulo Escéptico Argentino, October 8, 2013, http://circuloesceptico.com.ar /2013/10/peptido-rjlb-14-de-labiofam-cura-para-el-cancer-o-falsas-ilusiones (accessed August 2, 2016). 221. Microgen, “NPO ‘Microgen’ and China Biotec, China’s Largest Biotechnology Company, Will Cooperate in the Field of Technology Transfer and Production of Vaccines” (in Russian), October 14, 2014, http://www.microgen.ru/press/news

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/NPOMikrogeniChinaBioteckrupneyshayabiotekhnologicheskayakompaniyaKNR budutsotrudnichatvoblastitransferatekhnologiyiproizvodstvavaktsin/index.php (accessed September 1, 2016). 222. “China Biotec to Begin Supplying Vaccines to Russia in 2016, Transfer Technology,” Novosti GMP, October 14, 2014, http://gmpnews.ru/2014/10/mikrogen -i-china-biotec-podpisali-soglashenie-v-oblasti-transfera-texnologij-i-proizvodstva -vakcin (accessed May 13, 2016). 223. Ibid. 224. “‘Rostec’ Bought a 25% Stake in the Biopharmaceutical Company ‘FORT’” (in Russian), RBC Quote, November 19, 2014, http://quote.rbc.ru/news/fond/2014 /11/19/34262862.html (accessed August 15, 2016). 225. US Department of the Treasury, “Announcement of Expanded Treasury Sanctions.” 226. FORT Ltd., “The Prospects of Development and the Role of the Company in the Pharmaceutical Market of the Country as Discussed by the Director General of the National Biopharmaceutical Company ‘FORT’ Anton Katlinsky” (in Russian), June 28, 2016, http://fort-bt.ru/press-center/505 (accessed August 15, 2016). 227. FORT Ltd., “Production—Facts and Figures” (in Russian), n.d., http://fort-bt .ru/production/facts-and-figures.php (accessed August 15, 2016). 228. FORT Ltd., “The Prospects of Development …” (in Russian). 229. Ibid. 230. FORT Ltd., “National Biopharmaceutical Company ‘FORT’ and the Ryazan State Medical University Named After I. P. Pavlov (RZGMU) Entered Into a Contract in the Field of Education, Science, Production, and Implementation of Joint Programs: The Main Goal of the Project Is the Adaptation of the Curriculum of the University to Contemporary Trends in the Field of Biopharmaceuticals” (in Russian), May 10, 2015, http://fort-bt.ru/press-center/489 (accessed August 15, 2016). 231. FORT Ltd., “The Project to Create Pharmaceutical Cluster in the Ryazan Oblast Will Be Implemented on the Basis of Production Capacity ‘FORT’ Biopharmaceutical Company, with the Support of the Federal Corporation for the Development of Small and Medium Enterprises (SME Corporations)” (in Russian), February 8, 2016, http://fort-bt.ru/press-center/360 (accessed August 15, 2016). 232. FORT Ltd., “The Governor of the Ryazan Oblast Oleg Kovalev Praised the Work of the National Biopharmaceutical Company FORT During a Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin” (in Russian), February 8, 2016, http://fort-bt.ru /press-center/513 (accessed August 15, 2016). 233. “JSC ‘Synthesis’” (in Russian), May 31, 2016, http://ppnf.ru/oao/sintez/index .htm (accessed August 15, 2016). 234. National Immunobiological Company, “Sintez—One of the Leaders of the Domestic Pharmaceutical Industry,” n.d., http://nacimbio.ru/en/production/oao-sintez (accessed May 13, 2016). 235. JSC Synthesis, “Synthesis Today” (in Russian), n.d., http://www.kurgansintez .ru/company (accessed August 15, 2016). 236. Ibid. 237. Ibid. 238. “Medvedev: Space—The Priority Development of Russia” (in Russian), BBC News, April 11, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2011/04/110412 _gagarin_anniversary.shtml (accessed May 13, 2016). 239. Federation Council, Federal Council Committee on Science, Education, and Culture, “Space Risks and Threats: How to Ensure Planetary Protection,” March 12, 2013, http://neo.inasan.ru/node/2302 (accessed May 13, 2016).

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240. Space biology, also known as astrobiology, is the branch of biology concerned with the effects of space on human and other forms of life, as well as the search for life on other planets. 241. “Signature of a Decree on the Abolition of the Federal Space Agency,” December 28, 2015, http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/news/51025 (accessed August 5, 2016). 242. It is worth looking at the site’s photographs and illustrations of some of the Bion satellites. Space Rocket Centre, “Home,” 2014, http://en.samspace.ru (accessed August 5, 2016). 243. Ibid., p. 19. 244. Russian Academy of Sciences, “Russian Academy of Science Bureau: The Decision on the Organization of the Scientific Council on Astrobiology” (in Russian), November 23, 2010, http://www.ras.ru/presidium/documents/directions.aspx ?ID=3fbd5602-aa2f-4957-af09-6ca2e10d8b6e (accessed May 13, 2016). 245. Space Research Institute, “Space Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences,” http://www.iki.rssi.ru/eng (accessed August 5, 2016). 246. Institute for Biomedical Problems, “Information” (in Russian), http://www .imbp.ru/WebPages/win1251/Information/info.html (accessed August 5, 2016). 247. Scientific Council on Astrobiology, “First All-Russian Scientific Conference on Astrobiology, ‘Astrobiology: The Origin of Life on Earth and Life in the Universe’” (in Russian), September 16–19, 2012, p. 80, http://cryosol.ru/attachments /article/16/school2012.pdf (accessed May 13, 2016). 248. S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy, “Department of Aviation and Space Medicine: History of the Department” (in Russian), http://vmeda.mil.ru/vmeda /info/history.htm (accessed May 13, 2016); S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy, “Department of Aviation and Space Medicine” (in Russian), http://www.vmeda-mil .ru/kafedri_188.html (accessed May 13, 2016). 249. “Living AeroSpace: Nanobiotechnologies in Promising Space Experiments, ‘Partners’” (in Russian), The Future of the Industry conference series, http://living -aerospace.ru/partners (accessed May 13, 2016). 250. Ibid. 251. Brian Harvey and Olga Zakutnyaya, Russian Space Probes: Scientific Discoveries and Future Missions (New York: Springer and Praxis, 2011), pp. 440, 449. 252. Ibid., pp. 441, 448–449. The early Bion and Foton missions were retroactively labeled as such. 253. Ibid., pp. 448, 498–499. 254. Harvey and Zakutnyaya, Russian Space Probes, pp. 440–455. 255. Eugene A. Ilyin, “Historical Overview of the Bion Project,” Journal of Gravitational Physiology 7, no. 1 (January 2000), pp. S-1–S-8, in Proceedings of the International Symposium on Nonhuman Primate Research in Space, Moscow, June 22–26, 1998, http://isgp1979.org/journal/2000%20JGP%207(1).pdf. 256. Harvey and Zakutnyaya, Russian Space Probes, pp. 441, 448. 257. Ibid. 258. Ibid. 259. Glenn E. Bugos, Atmosphere of Freedom: 70 Years at the NASA Ames Research Center (Washington, D.C.: NASA Historic Office, 2010), pp. 192–195. 260. Ibid., pp. 192–193. 261. Ibid., p. 454. 262. Ibid., p. 449. 263. “In Samara, Satellite ‘Bion-M’ Will Send Mice, Lizards, Fish, and Snails into Space Instead of Monkeys,” RIA Samara citing News of Cosmonautics (in Russian), December 12, 2008, http://www.riasamara.ru/rus/news/region/science

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/article36576.shtml (accessed August 5, 2016); interview of Alexander Kirilin by Sergey Gvozdev, “Today We Think About the Future,” VK Online, January 28, 2011, http://www.vkonline.ru/73842/article/aleksandr-kirilin-my-segodnya-dumaem -o-budushem.html (accessed August 5, 2016). 264. Institute of Biomedical Programs of RAS, “Science Program ‘Bion-M’ no. 1” (Moscow, 2013), pp. 1–20, http://biosputnik.imbp.ru/download/pdf/BION.pdf (accessed August 5, 2016). This report is published in both Russian and English. 265. For a detailed description of Bion-M1 and the experiments conducted during its stay in space, see Jane’s Space Systems and Industry; Section: Spacecraft— Scientific; Country: Russian Federation (equipment operator); Organization: Bion/Biokosmos; Posted: 2014-Oct-16. 266. “Scientists from Russia and the United States Called for the Continuation of the ‘Bion’ Program” (in Russian), RIA Novosti, September 21, 2013, http://ria.ru /science/20130921/964931775.html (accessed August 5, 2016). 267. “Foreign States Interested in Bion-M Biological Experiments,” InterfaxAVN, July 7, 2014. 268. “Work Has Begun on the Creation of Biocompanion ‘Bion-M’ no. 2,” TASS, July 9, 2015, http://tass.ru/kosmos/2104954 (accessed August 2, 2016). 269. “Two Biosatellites Bion-M to Be Launched by 2025” (in Russian), Interfax, September 28, 2015, http://www.interfax.ru/world/469698 (accessed May 13, 2016). 270. Ibid. 271. BBC Monitoring, highlights from GTRK Kuban TV, Kommersant Yug. Rossii, and others, June 27—July 16, 2016. 272. “Chip in Russian Satellites Will Be Changed Because of Problems with ‘Foton’” (in Russian), TASS, November 18, 2014, http://tass.ru/kosmos/1580020 (accessed August 5, 2016). 273. “Geckos Killed by Unknown Space Factor,” Interfax, September 26, 2014, http://rbth.com/news/2014/09/26/geckos_killed_by_unknown_space_factor_-_russian _academy_of_sciences_40124.html (accessed May 13, 2016). 274. “In Russia, Until 2025 to Develop a New Biosatellite,” Interfax, January 30, 2016, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/492373 (accessed August 5, 2016). 275. Markusova et al., “Publishing Performance Indicators,” p. 148. 276. Zakharov, “The World-Class Science,” p. 20. 277. Alexander Nagorny, “Interview of Scientific Research Institute for Bioorganic Chemistry Director Vadim Tikhonovich Ivanov by Zavtra Correspondent ‘On the Threshold of Artificial Life’” (in Russian), Zavtra Online, September 19, 2013, http://www.zavtra.ru/content/view/na-poroge-iskusstvennoj-zhizni (accessed May 26, 2016). 278. Irina Dezhina, “Russia’s Academy of Sciences’ Reform: Causes and Consequences for Russian Science,” May 2014, Russie Nei Visions no. 77, pp. 1–27, https:// www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifri_rnv_77_ran_reforma_eng_dezhina _may_2014.pdf (accessed August 11, 2016). 279. Andrey Allakhverdov and Vladimir Pokrovsky, “Kremlin Brings Russian Academy of Sciences to Heel,” Science 314, no. 917 (November 10, 2006). 280. Federal Law no. 253-F3 of September 27, 2013, “On the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Reorganization of the State Academies of Sciences, and Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), retrieved at Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Federal Release no. 6194 (218), http://rapsinews.ru/legislation _publication/20130925/268940273.html (accessed May 29, 2016). 281. Dezhina, “Russia’s Academy of Sciences’ Reform,” p. 18. 282. Ibid.

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283. Ibid., p. 16. 284. Ibid., pp. 15–16, 19. 285. RAS Plenum, “Resolution of the Presidium of RAS no. 2014 from 01.07.2013” (in Russian), Science in Siberia no. 26 (2911) (July 3, 2013), http://www .sbras.ru/HBC/view_number.phtml?id=687&lang=en (accessed May 29, 2016). 286. Vladimir Pokrovsky, “Russian Researchers Protest Government Reforms,” Science News, June 8, 2015, http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/06/russian -researchers-protest-government-reforms (accessed August 5, 2016). 287. Vladimir Pokrovsky, “Russian Scientists Bracing for Massive Job Losses,” Science News, August 2, 2016, http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/08/russian -scientists-bracing-massive-job-losses. 288. “President Putin Heard the Scientists, Who Asked Him to Release Them from FANO” (in Russian), EDESKNEWS, July 25, 2016, http://edesknews.com /president-putin-heard-the-scientists-who-asked-to-release-them-from-fano (accessed August 5, 2016). 289. “Russian Academy of Sciences Trade Union Plans to Protest,” Interfax, August 23, 2016, http://www.interfax.com/news.asp?y=2016&m=8&d=23&pg=3 (accessed August 19, 2016). 290. Alexey Yablokov, “Academy ‘Reform’ Is Stifling Russian Science,” Nature 511, no. 7 (July 3, 2014). 291. “Siberian Financial Whizz-Kid Appointed to Lead Russian Science,” Siberian Times, October 25, 2013, http://siberiantimes.com/science/profile/news/siberian -financial-whizz-kid-appointed-to-lead-russian-science (accessed May 13, 2016). 292. Ibid. 293. Vladimir Pokrovsky, “Plan to Grade Institutes Rattles Russian Academy,” Science 345, no. 6192 (July 4, 2014), p. 15. 294. Ibid. 295. Sophie Manoukian, “Briefing: Russia in Danger of Losing Its Scientific Talent Due to Funding Gaps,” February 1, 2016, https://taia.global/2016/02/briefing -russia-in-danger-of-losing-its-scientific-talent-due-to-funding-gaps (accessed August 5, 2016). 296. Pokrovsky, “Russian Scientists Bracing for Massive Job Losses.” 297. Ibid. 298. Annabel McGilvray, “World’s Oldest Science Network Faces Uneasy Future,” Nature Index, May 6, 2016, https://www.natureindex.com/news-blog /worlds-oldest-science-network-faces-uneasy-future. 299. Ibid. 300. Russian Academy of Sciences, “Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences” (in Russian), http://ras.ru/sciencestructure/departments.aspx (accessed November 10, 2016). 301. “Compare Organizations” (in Russian), eLibrary.ru, http://elibrary.ru/org _compare.asp (accessed November 21, 2016). 302. Russian Academy of Sciences, “Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences.” 303. Oleg Sukhov, “Reform Will Lead to Death of Russian Science, Academicians Warn,” Moscow Times, December 24, 2013, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles /reform-will-lead-to-death-of-russian-science-academicians-warn-30739 (accessed September 24, 2016); Aleksandr Raskin, “Chamber of Commerce Auditors Estimate Wear of Academy Organizations’ Fixed Assets at 50 Percent” (in Russian), December 4, 2013, http://vademec.ru/news/2013/12/04/auditory_sp_osnovnye_sredstva _organizatsiy_akademiy_iznosheny_na_50 (accessed September 24, 2016). 304. “President of Russian Academy of Sciences Relieved of Duties” (based on reporting by Interfax and TASS), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 24, 2017,

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http://www.rferl.org/a/russian-academy-sciences-relieved-of-duties-fortov/28387141 .html (accessed March 24, 2017). 305. Quirin Schiermeier, “Russian Secret Service to Vet Research Papers,” Nature, October 20, 2015. 306. Daria Litvinova, “Russian Academia Divided over FSB Vetting of Research Papers,” Moscow Times, October 21, 2015, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles /reform-will-lead-to-death-of-russian-science-academicians-warn-30739 (accessed September 24, 2016). 307. Svetlana Bocharova and Pauline Nicholas, “Fano Will Be Entitled to Classify the Developments of Russian Scientists” (in Russian), RBC, August 4, 2016, http://www.rbc.ru/society/04/08/2016/57a2338f9a79475504fcf2a5?from=main (accessed September 26, 2016). 308. Quirin Schiermeier, “Russian Science Minister Explains Radical Restructure,” Nature, January 26, 2015. 309. Russian Federation, “State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology in the Russian Federation Until 2020” (in Russian), VP-P8 322, p. 6. 310. Aleksey Kryukov et al., “Innovation Clusters in Russia: A Look into the Future” (in Russian), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, August 12, 2014, http://rg.ru/2014/08 /12/klasteri.html (accessed May 26, 2016). 311. Vladimir Kuzmin, “Not Simply Catching Up: Dmitry Medvedev Encouraged the Pursuit of Russian Technological Sovereignty” (in Russian), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, September 17, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/09/16/medvedev-site.html (accessed May 13, 2016). 312. Alexey Ponomarev and Irina Dezhina, “Approaches to the Formulation of Russia’s Technological Priorities,” Foresight and STI Governance 10, no. (2016), pp. 7–15, https://foresight-journal.hse.ru/data/2016/03/28/1128067397/1-Dezhina -Ponomarev-7-15.pdf (accessed May 31, 2016). 313. “Beginning of Meeting with Security Council on National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation Through to 2020 and Measures Necessary to Implement It,” March 24, 2009, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/10076 (accessed May 13, 2016). 314. Ibid. 315. “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation Until 2020,” Rustrans, May 12, 2009, http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy -to-2020 (accessed May 13, 2016). 316. “NAIR: Sanctions by the EU and the US in the Near Future May Affect the Innovation Sphere in Russia” (in Russian), Ural Business Consulting, August 27, 2014, http://urbc.ru/1068031290-nairit-sankcii-so-storony-es-i-ssha-v-blizhayshee-vremya -mogut-skazatsya-na-innovacionnoy-sfere-rossii.html (accessed April 10, 2017). 317. Andrey Gnidchenko, Anastasia Mogilat, Olga Mikheeva, and Vladimir Salnikov, “Foreign Technology Transfer: An Assessment of Russia’s Economic Dependence on HighTech Imports,” Foresight and STI Governance 10, no. 1 (2016), pp. 53–67, https://foresight-journal.hse.ru/data/2016/04/03/1127809415/5 -Salnikov%20et%20al-53–67.pdf (accessed May 31, 2016). 318. Polina Zvezdina, “Effects of Sanction on Biotech Production” (in Russian), Farmatsevticheskiy Vestnik Online, November 4, 2014, http://www.pharmvestnik.ru /images/files/pdf/2ae7554afbf4a041f13b264b86e580c7.pdf (accessed May 30, 2016). 319. “Economic Analyst Dmitri Pskezin Comments on the Russian Government’s Plans to Successfully Convert Cutting-Edge Developments in Russia’s Military Sector to the Civilian Economy,” Sputnik News, June 28, 2016, http://sputniknews.com /business/20160628/1042103974/russian-military-industrial-complex-conversion -analysis.html (accessed July 31, 2016).

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320. Ibid. 321. Dmitry Pskezin, “Russian Defense Industry Goes to the ‘Peaceful Track’” (in Russian), Politrussia, June 28, 2016, http://politrussia.com/ekonomika/rossiyskuyu -laquo-oboronku-raquo-postavyat-517 (accessed July 31, 2016). 322. Richard Weitz, “Russia’s Defense Industry: Breakthrough of Breakdown?” International Relations and Security Network, March 6, 2015, http://www.css .ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/188933 (accessed May 30, 2016). 323. For examples, see Leitenberg and Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program, p. 71. 324. “Index,” Science in Siberia no. 26 (2911), July 3, 2013, http://www.sbras .ru/HBC/view_number.phtml?id=687&lang=en (accessed May 29. 2016).

6 Russia Addressing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Although diplomatic relations between the West and Russia have in recent years been tumultuous, their current abysmal state is a recent phenomenon. In an attempt to alleviate a strained United States–Russia relationship, the Obama administration launched a so-called reset policy in April 2009. It was inaugurated at a meeting between Russian minister of foreign affairs Sergey Lavrov and US secretary of state Hillary Clinton before the Group of 20 (G-20) summit of that year. This diplomatic initiative created a favorable atmosphere for the positive events that occurred soon thereafter. On July 6, 2009, the “Joint Understanding on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” was announced, which was signed by Medvedev and Obama during the US president’s visit to Moscow the same day.1 The treaty, called New START, entered into force on February 5, 2011.2 In addition to this important treaty, Obama’s administration sought to engage the Russian government to pursue foreign policy goals of common interest to both the American and Russian people. As explained in a lengthy White House fact sheet,3 the Obama administration was set on engaging directly with Russian society, including facilitating greater contacts between American and Russian business leaders, civil society organizations, and students. Many other activities were under way between the two countries that led to understandings on difficult subjects such as Iran, North Korea, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and managing the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008. Despite its length and the breadth of topics broached, the “reset” fact sheet did not mention the BWC and made no reference to a common understanding regarding the nonproliferation of biological weapons. US concerns over Russian compliance with the BWC appear to have been kept at a low level, with only a minimal number of routine Department of State statements addressing this issue. Russia, for its part, did not mount a significant anti-US challenge at 273

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the BWC’s seventh RevCon, held in 2011. It appears both sides kept contentious BW issues frozen so as not to jeopardize other aspects of the “reset” initiative. The United States did attempt to engage Russia on biosecurity topics during this time through a third channel aside from the “reset” talks and the BWC. Namely, the United States sought to engage this subject through the Group of Eight (G-8) and its Global Partnership. The Global Partnership was formed in 2002 with the mission to prevent catastrophic terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs. Although Putin’s government committed $2 billion over ten years to the Global Partnership, it vehemently opposed any biosecurity role for the latter. As a result, no biosecurity project was funded.4 Russia did its best to prevent the G-8 and the Global Partnership from dealing with biosecurity issues, possibly because it may be afraid that if this were done, questions about the legacy of the Soviet BW program as it exists in today’s Russia might be raised. The Swedish FOI commented on this Russian propensity: “The biological area was particularly sensitive and Russia consistently opposed its inclusion on the non-proliferation agenda at the G-8 summits. Had the matter been discussed, it could have been seen to imply a Russian admission that there had been a BW program and that its facilities and research staff needed to be converted to civilian activities.”5 Starting in 2006 under Putin and continuing during the “reset” period under Medvedev, the Russian government launched and sustained a public health initiative under the auspice of the G-8.6 This initiative was a counterproposal to the biosecurity activities the Western nations would have preferred. Russia committed to combating serious infectious diseases that have worldwide reach, such as HIV and influenza.7 Russia wished to “increase the capacity of public health systems in Central Asia and to develop collaboration among the public health authorities of this Region” and wished to combat HIV/AIDS in “Eastern Europe and Central Asia.”8 These initiatives fit nicely within the Putin administration’s geopolitical plans to exert influence in what it considers its “near abroad,” namely the countries that the Soviet Union once ruled. That one of the co-chairmen of the first conference convened on this topic was Onishchenko, an outspoken hardliner who in later years made numerous allegations of US biological warfare, is further evidence that this was a counter-proposal to the biosecurity topics rather than a pure public health initiative. In early 2012, just after Putin became president of Russia for the third time, the Global Partnership established an informal Biological Security Working Sub-Group to implement five activities: 1. Secure and account for materials that represent biological proliferation risks. 2. Develop and maintain appropriate and effective measures to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the deliberate use of biological agents.

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3. Strengthen national and global networks to rapidly identify, confirm, and respond to biological attacks. 4. Reinforce and strengthen biological nonproliferation principles, practices and instruments; and 5. Reduce proliferation risks through the advancement and promotion of safe and responsible conduct in the biological sciences.9

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The Sub-Group held its first meeting on October 25, 2012. At this meeting, one of the two Russian representatives indicated that Russia would participate fully in this Sub-Group’s future activities.10 However, this did not come to pass and, more generally, “reset” began to ebb under Putin’s term. In February 2014, a popular revolution ousted Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych. Russia subsequently invaded and annexed Crimea on March 18, 2014. In response, Russia was expelled from the G-8 on March 24, 2014.11 The “reset” initiative completely collapsed. While being interviewed by an American CNBC reporter, Dmitry Medvedev expressed dismay at President Obama’s speech before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) held on September 24, 2014, in which he devoted one line to criticizing “Russian aggression in Europe.”12 With this in mind, Medvedev stated: “A ‘reset’ of Moscow’s relations with the United States is absolutely impossible as long as destructive and stupid sanctions remain in effect. I don’t want to dignify it with a response. It’s sad; it’s like some kind of mental aberration.”13 The current confrontation has had negative repercussions on Russian social and diplomatic engagements related to public health, biosafety, and biosecurity, borne out in four ways. First, since Russia was expelled from the G-8, its planned public health activities were not carried out under this program and the promised involvement in biosecurity discussions never occurred. Second, the current political confrontation and its partly associated economic downturn have greatly decreased the number of Russian scientists who are able to travel to interact with colleagues abroad. When Zilinskas participated in an international conference on Yersinia pestis that was held at the Suzhou Dushu Lake Conference Center in China from June 24 to 28, 2013, he noted that eight Russian scientists were in attendance, five from universities and three from the anti-plague system. The ability of such Russian scientists to share research with foreign colleagues at international meetings has drastically changed for the worse since 2014; very seldom does one see Russian scientists at international scientific meetings. Third, meetings once confined to scientific topics have been harnessed by the Russian government as a means to push a political agenda. For example, at a meeting sponsored by the World Organisation for Animal Health in June 2015 in Paris, one Russian attended and he was a bureaucrat, not a scientist, who gave a short talk on the EU’s supposed abysmal treatment of Russia. He then

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departed without speaking with any of the attendees. Fourth and of greatest import here, Russian officials from various ministries and the governmental documents that they produce increasingly began to accuse the United States of noncompliance with the BWC. For the purposes of this book, compliance refers to BWC States Parties conforming to all of the treaty’s articles. The gravest allegations of noncompliance concern Article I, which in effect bans States Parties from acquiring or retaining biological weapons.14 How can one state party be certain that one or more other States Parties are in fact conforming to the BWC? Verification refers to the procedures, such as examinations, investigations, or gathering credible evidence, that States Parties or a competent body appointed by States Parties, take to establish the truth or falsity of allegations made by a state party that another state party has violated the BWC. The issue here is that the BWC has no provisions for verification activities, and thus does not possess a standing body such as does the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). As is readily seen, compliance and verification are intertwined. With no formal process to routinely verify compliance, States Parties must rely on their internal intelligence assessments to make such determinations. The discussion that follows in this chapter seeks to ascertain Russia’s beliefs and objectives with regard to the future of the BWC. Of utmost importance is whether the Russian leadership sees value in its political commitment to the BWC. Whether they do so depends on whether they believe that foreign states, and especially the United States, are in compliance with their treaty obligations. As shown in Chapter 3, while the relevant Russian doctrinal documents have expressed growing alarm regarding the biosecurity threats facing Russia since 2008, they show no consensus as to the specific nature of these perceived threats. From this finding we concluded that the concerned Russian ministries had not reached agreement on this topic. This finding was not altogether surprising given the wide array of ministries and institutes involved in Russia’s biodefense network surveyed in Chapter 4. Therefore, in order to understand the Russian objectives at BWC-related meetings, it is necessary to determine which ministries are in charge of the underlying preparations, and which institutes are providing the underlying risk assessments that inform Russia’s biosecurity positions. Complicating our assessment are the numerous Russian disinformation (dezinformatsiya) campaigns that have been mounted around the twin themes of foreign biological weapons and of foreign biosafety negligence. These have primarily targeted the United States, with a focus on US activities in states once under the Soviet Union’s rule. It is difficult for outsiders such as ourselves to discern which allegations are believed by Russian decisionmakers and thus contribute to the domestic Russian policy process

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around the BWC, which ones are coordinated make-believe attempts intended for foreign and domestic publics, and which ones are opportunistic declarations made by Russian officials interested in profiting from biodefense contracts. We present our analysis on these topics in the subsequent four sections and three annexes. In the first section after this introduction, we attempt to reconstruct the Russian domestic BWC policy process, and analyze the internal assessments of foreign compliance produced in Russia that we have obtained. The second section covers external Russian activities and pronouncements related to the BWC that took place during 2010–2016. We include both the MFA statements and the numerous disinformation campaigns and present these in chronological order. A very important event took place during November 7–25, 2016, in Geneva, namely the eighth RevCon of the BWC. Accordingly, the third section is dedicated to Russia’s activities at meetings in Geneva that have been held in preparation for the eighth RevCon since 2014, as well as the results of the eighth RevCon after it ended on November 25, 2016. In a concluding section, we present what we believe to be the Putin administration’s objectives with regard to the BWC, and analyze the methods used by the key Russian agencies in their attempts to achieve their goals. The three annexes provide information that expands on or clarifies the substantive sections of this chapter. As in Chapter 4, the first annex, Annex 6.1, is a chronological list of documents and events analyzed in the current chapter. Annex 6.2 is on cases of African swine fever in Europe and the Caucasus during 2014–2015. Annex 6.3 lists USA Today reporting on US biological failures from August 4, 2015, to June 24, 2016. BWC Policy Process In this section we describe the Russian institutions involved in the formulation of their country’s position at the BWC. We focus on the internal assessments that they generate regarding the state of foreign compliance with the BWC, as the authors of these assessments reached conclusions that do not always match the public Russian claims we analyze in the subsequent section. Division and Partial Duplication of Roles Across Institutions

Since 2008, the Ministry of Industry and Trade is in charge of coordinating all Russian activities dealing with implementation, compliance, and monitoring of the BWC.15 The ministry entrusted these new tasks to the department that already carried out similar activities for the CWC, the “Department Implementing the Convention’s Obligations.”16 The department has so far not

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changed its name to reflect the fact that it now implements two conventions. The fact that the same department handles both the BWC and the CWC is important, because it greatly facilitates the launching of coordinated Russian diplomatic initiatives across both conventions. Although the department is tasked with organizing the formulation of Russia’s diplomatic positions at the BWC and the CWC,17 it neither sets Russia’s diplomatic objectives with regard to these treaties nor does it conduct the necessary negotiations. Instead, these tasks are the prerogative of the Russian executive branch and hence of the Putin administration, especially the MFA. While the Ministry of Industry and Trade is an extremely powerful ministry in Russia, it does not have direct control over Russian biodefense institutes. As such, it is reliant on the ministries named in Chapter 4 that do control these institutes for information regarding Russian biodefense research. In addition, we discovered that this department had subcontracted out some of its BWC planning and compliance assessments to an institute not under its ministry’s control. It therefore depends on an external institution to assess foreign compliance with the BWC, and does not necessarily possess full information on Russian biodefense activities to use as a point of comparison. The Ministry of Industry and Trade provides active support to allegations made in diplomatic settings by the MFA regarding US conjectured noncompliance with the BWC. We do not know whether the Ministry of Industry and Trade is similarly actively involved in the preparation of media disinformation campaigns involving subjects related to the BWC or the CWC. Disinformation campaigns—for instance those that allege US noncompliance with the BWC—are conducted by separate state entities with potentially different views, objectives, and parochial interests than those of the ministry when it comes to the BWC. In Soviet times, disinformation activities were the purview of the KGB;18 particularly important or wide-ranging campaigns were coordinated with the Party leadership’s approval. In today’s Russia, responsibility for “Active Measures” (aktivnyye meropriyatiya), including disinformation campaigns, is fragmented. It falls under the purview of the FSB, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) security agencies.19 The job of spinning propaganda also appears to have become partly privatized or otherwise delegated to media groups whose exact source of funding is unknown to us;20 it is telling that in 2013 a prominent television host in Moscow complained that TV journalists had essentially become government functionaries.21 Presumably, the information compiled by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, for instance the entries of its database of “problems related to the BWC,”22 would make good fodder for disinformation campaigns. This possibility makes it all the more important to understand how the ministry gathers its information.

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One important point to note here with regard to the activities of the security services is that Russia’s positions at BWC-related meetings and Russian disinformation campaigns regarding BWC matters are the result of two parallel policy processes that need not be coordinated or designed to achieve the same policy objectives. The Ministry of Industry and Trade provides support to the MFA so that Russian objectives as defined by the Putin administration are achieved at the BWC. For their part, the disinformation departments are tasked with helping achieve much larger geopolitical objectives, such as undermining US diplomacy in countries once ruled by the Soviet Union, sowing discord between the United States and Western European countries in particular and among NATO members more broadly, weakening the EU, and achieving pro-Putin support abroad.23 These services have nothing to lose if, by successfully slandering the United States and other BWC State Parties, they gravely weaken the treaty. By contrast, although the Russian MFA shares the services’ list of broader geopolitical objectives as assigned by the executive, it has to answer for any unplanned negative repercussions that might occur around the BWC or other negative diplomatic consequences. As such, MFA drafters can be expected to be less unhinged in their statements than the ghost authors of the security services. Conversely, strongly worded MFA statements regarding the state of US compliance with the BWC almost certainly necessitated the approval of the Putin administration and must be taken more seriously than allegations disseminated through the mass media. We are of course not privy to the thoughts of Putin and his ministers on matters related to the BWC. The extent and content of whatever top-down guidance they provide to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, to the MFA, and to the intelligence services on BWC matters remains unknown. The degree to which MFA and propaganda statements coincide in their content and in the timing of their release is our best indicator to judge whether these acts are coordinated by the Putin administration. The degree to which domestic threat assessments match MFA public statements is our best indicator to determine whether publicly expressed Russian concerns over the state of US compliance with the BWC are genuine. Russian Internal Assessments of Foreign Nations’ Compliance with the BWC

Although the Ministry of Industry and Trade is tasked with monitoring foreign compliance with the BWC, Russia’s intelligence services are almost certainly also assigned this task. Given the highly classified nature of the information these agencies generate, and the ferocious infighting among these security institutions, we doubt that the Russian intelligence services share much information with one another on this topic, let alone with the

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Ministry of Industry and Trade.24 Rather, we suppose that these security agencies present individual assessments to Putin and his cleared circle on the subject, and that these receive some weight in the decisionmaking on BWC matters by the latter along with the information dug up in parallel by the Ministry of Industry and Trade. If history is any guide, the assessments prepared by the security agencies are probably the most alarmist of all Russian governmental assessments with regard to the state of US compliance with the BWC.25 However, we have no information regarding the content of these security assessments to test this hypothesis against, nor do we know the relative weight these assessments carry with Putin and his officials. We are limited to what we know of the assessments provided by the Ministry of Industry and Trade. We have been able to partly reconstruct the information generated by the Ministry of Industry and Trade and that provided by one of its subcontractors. Our partial records cover the years 2004–2016 and concern the work done by NII Medstatistika for the ministry on a series of threat assessments codenamed Course. The Course program has two known subprograms, both of which are ongoing: Course-KB, which involves monitoring the compliance of other states with the BWC and analyzing their positions at the BWC, and Course-KH, which does the same work but for the CWC. These subprograms are numbered sequentially over time as they are renewed: Course-KB-2 covered the 2004–2010 period, Course-KB-3 covered the 2011–2013 period, Course-KB-4 covered 2015, and Course-KB-5 appears to have begun in mid-2016. Medstatistika is subordinate to the FMBA, which itself is an organization of the MOH (see Chapter 4).26 According to a description provided by NII Medstatistika when it bid for work on Course-KB-4, it has “since its inception continuously monitor[ed] the foreign development of chemical and biological weapons.”27 The institute has indeed done similar CBW threat assessments on behalf of other contractors; these other funders include the 33rd Institute and the FMBA itself (see Chapter 4). The team at NII Medstatistika that is involved with the Course-KB program is very small. It is composed of staff trained in the biological and medical sciences that have been at the institute for a very long time. For instance, the company’s proposal for Course-KB-4 was that the assessment would be made by five individuals; of these, four had been working for the company for “more than 15 years.”28 Medstatistika financial documents describe the “main results” of the Course-KB-2 and Course-KB-3 programs. These two programs combined covered the 2004–2013 period. If these texts are to be believed, the programs did not find the United States in noncompliance with its obligations. Rather, the Russian researchers only made mention of growing US dual-use research with dangerous pathogens in their reports. The team did, however,

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express specific concerns over the US BioShield program, which it deems “dual-use,” and over unspecified “foreign studies . . . on the use of nanobiotechnology for military purposes.”29 Specifically, Course-KB-2 involved: An analysis of foreign sources on: the revitalization of biotechnology work with dangerous biological agents; the reason for the US refusal to develop an international instrument for the control of the BWC; the execution of the program “BioShield,” which has dual-use applicability; [and the] translation and analysis of the materials of the negotiations to strengthen the BWC, received from Geneva.30

The same financial document also contained a list of Course-KB-2’s findings and results, as follows: An increase [was noted] in dual-use biotechnology work, in the use of nanobiotechnology for military purposes, and in the dissemination of technology for the production of biological agents. [The Course-KB-2 program] identified and described objects, constructed in accordance with the program of the DOD, with high levels of biosecurity for work with biological agents. Information databases of relevance to the BWC were put into place. . . . Data were obtained on foreign governmental centers and institutions that work with controlled biological agents and toxins (the data showed the continued increase in dual-use biotechnological works in some foreign countries); and on national programs of foreign countries designed to ensure biosafety and biosecurity.31

The team’s concerns regarding the US BioShield program, which is a program meant to “accelerate the research, development, purchase, and availability of effective medical countermeasures” against CBRN attacks, is noteworthy because it probably was the internal justification for the refurbishment of production lines at ex-Soviet BW facilities ostensibly designed to produce biodefense-relevant medical countermeasures (see Chapter 4).32 The available descriptors of the subsequent Course-KB-3 program contained no mention of the US BioShield program, while the timeline of Course-KB-2 (2004–2010) corresponds with the launch of BioShield and encompasses the Russian decision to refurbish its production lines. This apparent decrease in Course-KB coverage of the BioShield program is thus perhaps because Course-KB-2 analyzed the program and that, from a Russian perspective, a suitable counter was put in place before the start of Course-KB-3. For its part, Course-KB-3 “materials were used to establish the position of the Russian delegation for negotiations at the [upcoming] Review Conference of the BWC, the annual meetings of Experts and of States Parties to the BWC, and in the negotiations in the framework of the ‘Group of Eight.’

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[The program team carried out] an update to information databases of relevance to the BWC.”33 This paragraph confirmed that the Russian G-8 negotiating positions on issues of biology were established at least in part with the BWC in mind. We obtained a midterm summary of the Course-KB-3 program generated by Medstatistika for the Ministry of Industry and Trade. This estimate complements the brief paragraphs on the findings of the Course-KB-2 and Course-KB-3 programs discussed earlier. In this status report submitted on March 15, 2012, Medstatistika reported having prepared analytic materials on the following topics: On the activity of the biological units of the U.S. Department of Defense overseas: there is an intensification of the study of tropical diseases by the U.S. military. Their main task is to collect and study pathogens that have a lethal effect on humans, as well as the use of techniques that allow the creation of new pathogenic microbial strains with specific pathogenic properties, affinity, and desired pathways. The resulting materials are deposited in the United States. Some of these units function at the highest level of biosafety [BSL-4], and the United States does not announce information on these units in the annual BWC confidence-building measures submitted to the ISU; On state laboratories with biosafety level BSL-4: There has been a sharp increase in the number of laboratories in the United States and in Europe and Asia. Several laboratories in European countries (the U.K., Germany, Sweden, Italy, Austria and France) are working closely on addressing the challenges posed by dangerous infectious diseases including potential biological warfare agents. In Europe there are already 19 BSL-4 laboratories operating, and a number of new laboratories are under construction. The question arises about the adequacy of the increasing number of laboratories, the real need for work with dangerous microorganisms on a large scale, the effectiveness of measures designed to strengthen the supervision of the procedure for handling micro-organisms and toxins; On ways of influencing the immune status of living organisms: a number of foreign research projects are aimed at studying the weakening or strengthening of immunity, and the ability of specific compounds to break the balanced interaction between the immune and neuroendocrine systems. The immune system is considered by many experts as a target for biochemical weapons; On the state-of-the-art for ensuring global security in relation to the genomic material and collections of variola virus; On the potential danger of promising advances in synthetic biology and the effect of artificially-created biological structures and materials for compliance with the BWC, and on issues of biosafety/biosecurity arising during the implementation of such work; and, On the prospects of using nanotechnology to develop efficient protection against biological agents.34

Based on these summaries, the internal assessments up until the end of 2013 do not appear to have found the United States in noncompliance with the BWC’s Article I obligations—that is, they do not seem to have claimed

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that the United States possessed or was developing some secret stock of biological weapons. The major concern raised by the monitors is that the United States was allegedly conducting dual-use work on dangerous pathogens at undeclared BSL-4 laboratories located abroad under the control of the US Department of Defense (DOD). As we show in the sections on Russian public statements later, this claim was often repeated to the public. We believe that the Ministry of Industry and Trade funders were pleased with the commissioned study and agreed with its conclusions because NII Medstatistika was eventually granted a contract to conduct the follow-up Course-KB-4. The year 2014 was a watershed year for this threat monitoring program. Course-KB subprograms appear to have come under greater scrutiny by the leadership and their work program was accelerated: while CourseKB-2 had run for seven years and Course-KB-3 for three, their successors became short single-year contracts. In addition, the start of Course-KB-4 seems to have been repeatedly delayed after the end of Course-KB-3, perhaps due to a change in the Putin administration’s overall biosecurity strategy. Further, Medstatistika documents became more parsimonious with details. Thus, although we were able to find the objectives of the CourseKB-4 (run in 2015) and Course-KB-5 program (run in 2016), we do not know the conclusions drawn by analysts during those years. This growing paucity in information is consistent with a trend toward the classification of previously public information regarding Russian biosecurity measures that had visible effects by 2015. These changes were probably the result of the collapse in US-Russian relations due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in February 2014 and the launch of a major Russian diplomatic initiative at the BWC discussed at length later. Overall, the Russian BWC policy process appears to have been disrupted in 2014, indicating that a new policy was likely launched that year. Whether Course-KB-4 and Course-KB-5 reports drew more hardline conclusions on the state of US compliance with the BWC than those reached in the preceding reports is unknown. This is a crucial piece of missing information, because as we shall see below, public Russian claims became far more virulent in those years. Statements Related to the BWC, 2010–2016 In this subsection, and those that follow, we address Russian public discourse pertaining to the BWC that deal with compliance and verification. We analyze the sources of information used by the Russian authors of allegations. We pay attention to the degree to which the various types of Russian public claims match the conclusions drawn in the internal assessments of foreign compliance with the BWC summarized earlier. In doing so we

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hope to understand which claims are made for information warfare purposes and which claims reflect the deep-rooted convictions of Russian officials. In addition, we seek to determine the degree of coordination between the various actors described earlier. Regardless of the purpose behind a particular public accusation of noncompliance, we emphasize that such claims undermine confidence in the BWC within Russia and abroad and threaten the treaty’s future. Hence, we are also interested in tracking the total volume of claims made per year because these provide an indication of the worth or lack thereof assigned to the BWC in the eyes of the responsible Russian officials. In regard to the BWC, one of the US Department of State’s responsibilities is to prepare reports to Congress that provide “a detailed assessment of the adherence of the United States and other nations to obligations undertaken in all arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements or commitments to which the United States is a participating state.”35 Such “compliance reports” were issued in 2001, 2005, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016.36 All compliance reports issued by the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations express concerns about Russia’s compliance with the BWC. The nine reports vary but little as to findings about Russia’s adherence to the BWC. None of the reports go into much detail regarding the nature of the existing concerns.37 The findings of interest to this book expressed in the 2016 report read as follows: Russia previously acknowledged both that it is a BWC successor state and that it inherited past Soviet offensive programs of biological research and development. Russia’s annual BWC CBMs submissions since 1992 have not satisfactorily documented whether this program was completely destroyed or diverted to peaceful purposes in accordance with Article II of the BWC. It remains unclear whether Russia has fulfilled its BWC Article II obligations in regard to the items specified in Article I of the Convention that it inherited. . . . Russian government entities remained engaged during the reporting period in dual-use activities. . . . It remains unclear if Russia fulfilled its obligations under Article II to “destroy or divert to peaceful purposes” the BW specified in Article I of the Convention that it inherited from the Soviet Union.38

Shortly after each compliance report is published, the Russian MFA publishes rejoinders, all of which contain allegations regarding the state of US compliance with the BWC. Examples of alleged US misconduct related to the BWC are listed in each rejoinder, although none of the MFA reports explicitly claim that the United States is in noncompliance with the BWC’s Article I. In some years, such as in 2010, the lists are long and detailed, while in other years, such as 2013, the alleged violations are described in only two short paragraphs. All of the rejoinders are presented later. With clockwork precision, disinformation is simultaneously distributed through

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Russian media outlets. Claims made in the media tend to be far more virulent than the formal MFA rejoinder, perhaps in part because those making the statements—either opportunistic officials or the security services—are not directly involved with the BWC and therefore derive no parochial gains from its continued existence. We present all such Russian statements in the following subsections, with each dedicated to one year starting with 2010. We have catalogued these under four different categories based on theme. The four are: (1) BWC compliance and verification; (2) BW-related R&D within the United States that violates the BWC; (3) actions by the United States in countries that were part of the former Soviet Union that violate the BWC; and (4) actions by the United States in Asian and African countries that ostensibly concern Russia. Some of the subsection entries do not have all four types of allegations because no relevant allegations were made, as far as we could discover, by the Russians. Annex 6.1 features a chronological list of all documents and events mentioned in this section. 2010 BWC Compliance and Verification. On August 7, 2010, the Russian MFA published a report that undoubtedly was a rejoinder to the US Department of State’s 2010 compliance report that castigated the Russians for having violated or failed to comply fully with several arms control treaties.39 The Russian rejoinder, which came less than a month after the public release of the US compliance report, went into detail on how the United States allegedly was violating or failing to comply fully with several treaties.40 The Russian report contains three sections dedicated to violations of the BWC. The first section describes what the MFA considers the state of US noncompliance with regard to the BWC’s Article I, the second contains alleged US violations of Article IV, and the third describes violations by the United States of its responsibilities pertaining to the CBMs. The MFA began its discussion on Article I by noting that: “While formally not in breach of its obligations and supportive of the importance of the BWC, the US administration, however, continues to avoid establishing international control over its biological activities in any form.”41 The MFA therefore adopted a position that mirrored that expressed by the US compliance report, which as we have seen concluded that serious questions remained regarding the state of Russian compliance with the BWC. Similarly, the MFA statement does not accuse the United States of outright noncompliance with the BWC’s Article I; it instead claims that US activities preclude it from verifying that the United States remains in compliance with the BWC.

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According to the MFA, there are two examples that indicate how the United States acts to achieve the “steady diminution of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention’s role in strengthening the procedure for nonproliferation of biological weapons.” The first alleged example expressed by the MFA is that research on artificially synthesized smallpox virus that was initiated at Penn State University and caused controversy worldwide back in 2002 is continuing in the United States. Despite the World Health Organization’s existing ban on conducting similar projects, the need for them is being justified as an attempt to study this pathogen at a qualitatively new level, which was done before its official eradication in 1980.42

The MFA’s first allegation is completely wrong, from beginning to end. No one at Penn State University has worked with smallpox virus before, during, or after 2002. The most likely explanation for the MFA’s allegation is that its staff confused research (perhaps deliberately so) that was at that time being conducted at the State University of New York by the Eckard Wimmer research team to synthesize poliovirus, not variola virus, the success of which was published in 2002.43 Neither the WHO, nor the US government, had any restrictions on this research. The fact that Wimmer and colleagues had for the first time synthesized a virus did generate controversy because there were those who believed that if scientists could synthesize poliovirus, they might in the not too distant future be able to synthesize more dangerous, complex viruses, such as variola virus (which causes smallpox). The paper by Wimmer and colleagues made no mention of such security considerations and more generally does not even contain the words “variola” or “smallpox.”44 The MFA’s second claim targeting US actions was regarding so-called “threat assessment” research that has been stepped up markedly in the past few years and is being justified by the need to fight terrorism looks particularly dubious from the standpoint of the principle of Article I of the BWC. It not only includes the study of the injurious effect of known pathogenic biological agents that is traditional for the “defense” theme but also includes attempts to actually create new (including genetically altered) agents within the framework of modeling the respective capabilities of terrorist organizations.45

There is no explanation in the report on what the Russians mean by “threat assessment research,” so readers are in no position to judge whether this research indeed is “dubious from the standpoint of the principle of Article I of the BWC.”46 We believe that what the MFA is referring to has to do with a series of reported US biodefense projects leaked to journalists at the New York Times and published in 2001. The journalists alleged in part that “the Pentagon drew up plans to engineer genetically a potentially more potent variant of the bacterium that causes anthrax, a deadly disease ideal

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for germ warfare. The experiment has been devised to assess whether the vaccine now being given to millions of American soldiers is effective against such a superbug, which was first created by Russian scientists.”47 The journalists had also mentioned a second program that allegedly revolved around a Soviet BW bomblet.48 Perhaps the MFA chose not to expand on what it called “threat assessment research,” because if it had done so, it would have sent readers to discover that the Soviet Union had maintained an illicit BW program. Or perhaps the MFA authors did not want to have to state whether it saw the reported activities as acts that would violate the BWC and thereby set a precedent. Article IV claims that follow depart from the MFA’s mirrored response to the US compliance report; the latter has no similar content. Article IV reads: “Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.”49 In this section of the MFA’s 2010 report, it is noted that under US laws, institutions that conduct scientific research involving dangerous pathogens must have received special certification from the US Department of Health and Human Services or US Department of Agriculture depending on the type of pathogen (human, animal, or plant) that is being worked on. According to the Russians, the laws are constantly being broken. The Russian report provides two types of such law breaking. The first claims that the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s “inspection service” uncovered a multitude of violations related to the procedure for reviewing . . . the safekeeping of pathogen collections, employees’ clearance for the respective work, and so forth. In 2005, the lack of appropriate oversight on the part of monitoring authorities led to discovery of three organizations that illegally possessed pathogens of dangerous plant and animal infectious diseases, including Eastern equine encephalomyelitis virus (the death rate of which for humans is 35%). As a result, the department’s activity in the sphere of monitoring circulation of pathogenic microorganisms was deemed unsatisfactory. Special mention was made of cases of officials concealing violations that had been discovered in organizations subject to monitoring.50

The second concerns

numerous cases of intra-laboratory infection of staff and other incidents in this area that have occurred in the past few years. In particular, such instances have been noted in the Boston University Medical Center (tularemia infection in August 2004), at a research institute in Oakland, New Jersey (anthrax infection in June 2004), at the Rocky Mountain Microbiology Laboratory in

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Denver (Q fever infection in February 2005), the Health Research Institute (loss of plague-infected rodents in September 2005), the Midwest Research Institute in Kansas City, Kansas (anthrax infection in October 2005), and others. . . . The case of brucellosis infection of a female employee at the Texas A&M University (College Station) that was concealed by senior university officials and made public only in 2007.51

According to the MFA, the occurrences that involved pathogens causing diseases among animals, plants, and humans demonstrate that the United States has violated the BWC’s Article IV numerous times. However, safety violations or laboratory accidents are not BWC violations in and of themselves. Nowhere in the MFA report is there an explanation of how the Russians believe the events they have listed evidence violations of the BWC. Instead, the MFA makes its case by innuendo. The MFA’s incident list is poorly researched. The accidental laboratory exposure to B. anthracis in 2004 occurred in Oakland, California, not New Jersey, and it caused no infection.52 While the exaggeration of the severity of the incident is in keeping with the paragraph’s purpose, the mistake in identifying the proper state would suggest a Russian-compiled list rather than one “lifted” from a US journalistic compilation or that of a US NGO or governmental report. A point that supports this conclusion is that the specific cases mentioned do not coincide with those listed in any single published lists of incidents available at the time that we know of.53 The paragraph was therefore most likely either independently generated by the MFA’s staffers, or reflects the use of Course-KB-2 information prepared under contract for the Ministry of Industry and Trade and passed on to the MFA. On balance, the latter explanation appears more likely. Almost all of these cases draw from information dating to the 2004–2005 time frame, with the exception of the very last case that would have necessitated an update using 2007 material. MFA staffers independently preparing the preceding paragraph close to its 2010 publication should have generated a list that reflected more recent safety incidents in the United States, especially since these would have been more recently publicized and thus more easily found. A hypothetical MFA list should have reflected a spread of incidents from 2004 to 2009 with a possible bias toward the latter years. By contrast, incomplete Course-KB-2 information generated at the time probably had a bias toward incidents in earlier years. Medstatistika conducted the study of “national programs of foreign countries to ensure biosafety and biosecurity” under CourseKB-2 from 2008 until the end of 2010. Its final report was therefore not ready in time for the MFA to use, and the data it had by then generated was probably skewed toward earlier cases; these features are consistent with the MFA list presented earlier. In addition, the rest of the MFA’s allegations are consistent with the topics studied by Course-KB-2. Course-KB-2 probably studied issues regarding the imagined synthesis of variola virus as part of its study of

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“dual-use biotechnology work” (Course-KB-3, for which we have more information, devoted a section to this specific topic). The MFA made this subject a focal point of its Article I allegation. If our suspicion as to the origin of the information is correct, this would imply good coordination between the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the MFA on BWC-related matters. The MFA report makes one further allegation, namely that the United States violates the CBMs in two ways. This claim returns to the MFA practice of responding tit-for-tat to the US compliance report; the latter included a comment that Russian CBM declarations have been inadequate. The Russian MFA claims that the United States excludes certain medical and biological facilities from the list of declarable facilities because of the insufficient clarity of the criteria for classifying national research programs (including military ones) in the specified category. In particular, year after year, the United States has not declared its system of military medical research centers in Indonesia, Thailand, Peru, Egypt, Kenya, and other countries under the pretext that they are located outside U.S. territory.54

Second, the MFA asserts that

under conditions of the sharp escalation of the scales and pace of biological research in the United States in 2001–2009, a substantial portion of it has been transferred to civilian departments and agencies and even to private firms. In addition, a portion of these projects have been moved from the “defense” category and declared to be antiterrorism [research projects], which also makes it possible to avoid the need to declare them within the framework of the confidence-building measures and even further reduce the world community’s monitoring capabilities.55

It is correct that the US government supports laboratories in foreign countries. For example, the US Navy has so-called Naval Medical Research Units in Cambodia, Egypt, Peru, and Singapore and the US Military HIV Research Program supports laboratories in Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Thailand, and Uganda. However, the US government holds that these units are guests of their respective host countries. The work done at each unit is transparent, as their work programs are reported on an annual basis to their hosts and are publicized on their websites. Further, each unit involves host country scientists and students in their work. For these reasons, the United States maintains that it is the responsibility of the host country to declare them and their work under the CBMs. As for MFA’s allegation that the US government neglects to declare defensive research that it has “transferred” to civilian departments, agencies, and firms, it is worth noting that the US CBMs that were submitted on July 9, 2012, to the ISU dedicate 216 pages to CBM A, Parts 1 and 2. These appear

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comprehensive in terms of describing defensive work being done at civilian departments, agencies, and firms.56 Further, the US submission is available to anyone with an Internet connection because US CBM submissions have been made public and available to all in digital form since 2010.57 2011

To the best of our knowledge, the MFA did not issue a rejoinder to the August 2011 US compliance report. In addition, we have not documented any concerted Russian media allegations made that year. Overall, 2011 was a successful year for Russia under the US-Russian “reset” policy; in December, Russia won approval after almost two decades of negotiations to join the WTO.58 We hypothesize that the Russian MFA decided not to respond to the US compliance report so as to minimize all risks of jeopardizing the all-important WTO agreement. The year 2011 was the last year of Medvedev’s administration, and the latter had put heavy emphasis on integrating Russia into the world economy (see Chapters 2 and 4). Medvedev’s staff and MFA personnel were almost certainly under tremendous pressure to seal the WTO deal before Medvedev’s term ran out. 2012 BWC Compliance and Verification. In June 2012, an international team

of researchers working in the United States and Netherlands and supported by government agencies in these countries published an article in a worldrenowned international scientific journal that demonstrated an experiment whereby highly pathogenic avian influenza virus that in nature is not transmissible to mammals through the air by aerosol or respiratory droplet was engineered to become transmissible in this fashion.59 This experiment was in the first instance approved by its funders, then was allowed by institutional review committees, and was accepted for publication by the editors of a highly reputable journal. However, its publication raised concerns among some researchers and the public. The scientific community soon became involved in a heated debate over what became known as “gain-offunction” experiments involving contagious pathogens such as influenza virus, a debate that continues as we write this.60 Starting soon after the first publication noted above, Russian officials immediately pointed to this type of experimentation to contest US compliance with the BWC. Without directly accusing the United States or the Netherlands of having carried out experiments that the Russians assert are counter to the BWC, the Russian representative at one of the early preparatory meetings of BWC State Parties for the eighth RevCon stated as follows:

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We are concerned over the arbitrary interpretation of the Convention provisions that allows to a number of countries to carry out scientific studies and projects under the veil of fight against infectious diseases, which result in the emergence of new microorganisms with altered pathogenic properties—potential biological weapons agents. Claims that data on such potentially weaponized research and developments is eventually made public do not exclude the question of how, given all the BWC bans, such studies could be carried out at all and who sponsored them.61

One firebrand official whose statements will frequently color the following pages made a number of allegations that far exceeded those contained in the MFA report. In 2012, Gennady Onishchenko, then director of Rospotrebnadzor (see Chapter 4) and Russia’s chief public health officer, expressed his concerns regarding the bird flu work: “The studies were devoted to genetic changes in this strain and were aimed at increasing its toxicity. This study was nothing but a prohibited activity of the Convention of 1971 [sic; incorrect year]. This activity was conducted under the aegis of the USA.”62

Russian Allegations Regarding US R&D. In a subsequent November interview, Onishchenko told the reporter what he thought about the US B. anthracis letter attacks of 2001 (“Amerithrax”): It was a planned act which was carried out by, at the very least, special services—a specially treated strain, resistant to all types of existing antibiotics, was removed from an American military institute, from military laboratories. . . . It was a combat strain which had been passaged at the same American military institute by an employee who later allegedly committed suicide. As a specialist, no one could prove to me that that person could have done it by himself.63

Onishchenko therefore implied that the US military was involved in developing antibiotic-resistant B. anthracis. In reality the strain used in the attack was not antibiotic-resistant (the strain was found to be antibiotic and vaccine sensitive) and was not genetically modified in any way.64 In what is to become a common conclusion, Onishchenko was probably accusing the United States so as to be able to justify his own institution’s work. For example, the “gain-of-function” experiments that Rospotrebnadzor had paid Mikrob to conduct that same year had involved, among other projects, the development of a vaccine-resistant virulent strain of B. anthracis (see Chapter 4.). 2013

The Russian government mounted a coordinated response to the 2013 US compliance report, composed of the MFA’s rejoinder and a simultaneous disinformation campaign attacking the Georgian lab. The 2013 allegations represent an escalation over that of previous years and demonstrate good coordination between the MFA and the propaganda issuers.

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BWC Compliance and Verification. In July 2013, the MFA issued a rejoinder to the US Department of State’s compliance report that covered 2012.65 Just two rather short paragraphs addressed BWC issues; one dealt briefly with the United States having prevented the so-called verification protocol to the BWC from being realized and the second concerned the Department of Defense’s biological activities near Russian borders.66 The MFA begins its report with the statement that once again the United States is accusing Russia of violating the BWC (and other treaties) but without having proof to back its accusations. The MFA then notes that “these American concerns could have been fully eliminated long ago, if the United States did not block the creation of a verification mechanism within BWC. Such mechanism would also allow removing many questions to the United States as regards the involvement of several US organisations into large-scale double application biological activities. As you know, results of such activities may be used for the purposes contrary to BWC Article I.”67 The assertion of the United States having blocked “the creation of a verification mechanism within the BWC” refers to the Bush administration in July 2001 having rejected to move forward on an initiative by some State Parties, including Russia, to seek to adopt a draft protocol meant to strengthen compliance with the BWC. This verification mechanism is commonly referred to as the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) protocol. For readers who do not know what this is about, we provide a short explanation. Unlike the CWC, the BWC lacks provisions for routine and challenge inspections that would verify treaty compliance, and has no supporting organization beyond the three-person ISU. By the beginning of the 1990s, revelations regarding the illicit BW programs run by the Soviet Union, Iraq, and apartheid South Africa had made clear that the BWC was a weak arms control treaty, mainly due to its lack of a verification mechanism. In 1992, the BWC States Parties established the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint (VEREX). VEREX identified twentyone verification measures, which were described and explained in its report to the States Parties in September 1993.68 In 1994, States Parties to the BWC agreed on a broad mandate to negotiate a legally binding document (a protocol) to strengthen the BWC. The States Parties attempted to develop a verification protocol that would be a legally binding document that, if signed and ratified by States Parties to the BWC, would bring verification to the treaty. The goal was for a new AHG to develop a draft protocol that would be considered by the BWC States Parties at the fifth RevCon, which was to be held in November 2001. The AHG’s chairman, Ambassador Tibor Tóth of Hungary, presented a draft protocol to the State Parties in June 2001 to give them sufficient time to consider it before the fifth RevCon began. On July 25, US ambassador Donald Mahley informed the BWC

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States Parties that the United States would not support the draft verification protocol, nor would it endorse the AHG’s continuation. The US government presented the following five points as justification for this decision: • If the draft protocol was adopted, it would not deter countries from seeking biological weapons. • The protocol would not improve the United States’ ability to verify compliance to the BWC. • The protocol’s on-site inspections could jeopardize proprietary information owned by biotechnology industry. • The protocol would not address the greater biological threat, which was bioterrorism rather than national BW programs. • Along with the bioterrorism threat, the protocol would be unable to stop potential proliferators to conceal significant efforts in legitimately undeclared facilities.69

At the fifth RevCon, in November 2001, numerous delegates considered US ambassador John Bolton’s statements and behavior to be surprising and unusually abrasive. Bolton stated that the draft protocol was “dead” and “would not be resurrected,” and insisted that the AHG be terminated.70 The pro-protocol states, with the acquiescence of several other states, succeeded in suspending the fifth RevCon for one year. When it reconvened, the negotiations on the protocol were dropped and although the AHG was not terminated, it was inactivated. The undiplomatic way in which the US representative went about opposing the protocol enabled several countries, including Russia, to pin all blame for the protocol’s demise on US intransigence.71 States that were opposed to the draft protocol behind the scenes, but were unwilling to bear the political costs of publicly rejecting it, were given a golden opportunity to portray themselves as champions of the deal and shift blame solely to the United States for having annulled it. Given this history, that the MFA’s July 2013 rejoinder has a section that blames the United States for having been responsible for the protocol’s demise is unsurprising. The return to this topic, however, is yet another indication of the deterioration in the US-Russian arms control realm that began that year. In retrospect, the MFA comments regarding the protocol were an indicator of what would come and served to set the stage for a major Russian diplomatic initiative at the BWC.

Russian Allegations Regarding US R&D. The MFA rejoinder averred that “there is no documentary evidence that all the site[s] under [the] United States’ jurisdiction or control, which earlier participated in military biological programmes, have been destroyed or diverted to peaceful purposes pursuant to the BWC’s Article II.”72 The MFA had this all wrong. In reality, the US offensive BW program was terminated by President Nixon in December 1969. As a matter of transparency, representatives from foreign countries and the media

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were allowed to witness the destruction of its weapons and related products during 1971, and vast quantities of highly classified documents related to the defunct program were rapidly declassified as a show of good faith. Russian Allegations of US Activities in Countries That Were Part of the Former Soviet Union. A propaganda campaign was launched in the

days near before and after the July 19 MFA rejoinder that directly supported one of the claims it had made. The large number of high-level interviews, the use of numerous media platforms, and the fact that the articles were all released in a tight cluster around July 19 indicates that this was a coordinated disinformation effort with state approval. On July 11, 2013, a reporter from the pro-communist paper Sovietskaya Rossiya interviewed Valentin Ivanovich Yevstigneev, the former head of the Soviet MOD’s Directorate 15 and then, for some time, had been head of the Russian MOD’s Biological Defense Department. When questioned as to whether the primary biological threat to Russia’s security came from the United States, Yevstigneev’s long answer included the following: Yes, it does. In a state of euphoria from global hegemony, the Americans prefer not to fulfill the BWC’s requirements but rather to establish their own mechanisms for total control over microbiological research worldwide. . . . The following sovereign states along Russia’s perimeter are now partners of the United States within the framework of this program; Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. In Kyrgyzstan, Canada exercises total control over the circulation of potentially dangerous biological materials in the country.73

A few days after Yevstigneev’s interview was published but before the MFA had published its rejoinder, Onishchenko once again expressed his opinion, but this time on Georgia. The Interfax headline read, “Onishchenko: ASF came from Georgia and microbiologists from United States work there.”74 In this article, he is quoted as saying “it is an objectively established fact that African swine fever, which caused loss of cattle in Russian regions, came to Russia from Georgia.”75 Further, according to Onishchenko, “last year Russia had allocated 15 million rubles for purchase of equipment for South Ossetia and Abkhazia to the threat posed by microbiological laboratory in Georgia . . . the same amount is planned to buy equipment for Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the current year.”76 The MFA rejoinder that followed noted that the Russian government had “serious concerns” over “the biological activity of the DOD near the Russian border.”77 Russian sources ranging from Kommersant to Pravda shortly afterward brought forth a new round of allegations around the theme that the Tbilisi Georgian-American Biological Laboratory was “a military laboratory of the U.S. Navy.”78

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For instance, Pravda published an article about the biological threats posed by Georgia and the United States on July 24. It begins by quoting from Onishchenko’s interview on July 15, and then adds new “information” about US activities in Ukraine: Another secret laboratory operates in Odessa, Ukraine, in the framework of the “Joint reduction of threats.” It specializes in the study of the most dangerous pathogens on the planet. Senator Richard Lugar . . . said at the opening of the facilities in 2010 that in addition to Ukraine, the United States will build similar laboratories in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. This seems like an excessive number of these establishments at the Russian borders, given that they may be involved in a large-scale biological activity of dual-use.79

We note that distinct variants on the theme of secret US labs existed in the articles disseminated in July; for instance, sometimes Armenia and Uzbekistan are included in the long list of cited countries and sometimes they are not.80 These changes indicate that this cascade of allegations was not simply the result of one popular article being copied across several news sites. Furthermore, on July 24, the Russian government issued an economic threat to Georgia. Onishchenko, representing Rospotrebnadzor, conveyed the message as he “warned Tbilisi that despite [the] partial opening of the Russian market for Georgian wine in Russia, deliveries of vegetables, fruits, and animal products remain questionable due to the existence in Tbilisi’s suburbs of the Georgian-American Biological Laboratory.”81 The L. Sakvarelidze National Center for Disease Control and Public Health laboratory (NCDC) director, Amiran Gamkrelidze, managed to make a statement to a Russian audience to counteract these claims. His rebuttal, published by the Russian Kommersant business magazine, is as follows: We have never produced biological weapons and Russia has full information about the activities of our laboratory. Russian specialists have already visited them and the Prime Minister’s Special Representative for Russian Issues Zurab Abashidze has brought all the information to the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin during their meeting in Prague. Moscow’s annoying insistence that the United States have a military facility in Georgia is incorrect.82

The Georgian explanation did little to stop the Russian government from continuing its attacks against the NCDC. An October article in RIA Novosti (now Sputnik International) contained the following text: Russian media quoted Onishchenko as saying, according to our assessments, this laboratory constitutes an important offensive link in the US militarybiological capability, adding that compounds developed at the facility could

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be secretly employed to destabilize the political and economic situation in Russia. Onishchenko suggested in July that the African swine fever virus had likely come to Russia from the US-funded laboratory in Georgia.83

With regard to the foregoing accusations about African swine fever (ASF) having its origin from the Georgian laboratory,84 we here explain why this is a ludicrous claim. The history of ASF in Georgia is as follows. Georgia experienced an ASF panzootic for the first time during April 2007. Levan Ramishvili, chairman of the Veterinary Union, Georgia Ministry of Agriculture, reported the panzootic to the World Organisation for Animal Health on June 5, 2007. He stated that it consisted of eleven nearly coincidental outbreaks of ASF throughout the country and in order to stop the epidemic, the government had to destroy 20,387 pigs.85 A ProMED moderator who discussed this initial zoonotic outbreak noted that although it is not unusual to find the disease in Africa, to have the disease in Georgia “represents a large geographic jump.” However, he also observed that: “A strikingly rather reminiscent situation has recently been reported from two Asian countries, China and Viet Nam. China has a strong and increasing presence in Africa, where the disease is widespread, and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a returning worker could have brought back some infected pork.”86 As can be readily realized by anyone who scrutinizes Annex 6.2 at end of this chapter, which lists all ASF outbreaks during 2014–2015 in Europe and the Caucasus region, there were no outbreaks in Georgia, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia during this time. If the reader next scrutinizes Figure 6.1 (see insert section following page 150), which features a map that was developed by the OIE, it is clear that during the 2014–2016 period, there were no outbreaks in Georgia or regions close to its borders. The pattern of ASF outbreaks is that most of them occurred in the middle and western parts of Russia and to a lesser extent in Ukraine and the Baltic countries. The allegations made by the Russians that somehow Georgian operatives had disseminated ASF virus by floating infected animals down rivers to Russia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, or by other means, make no epidemiological sense. If Georgians had done so, there would certainly have been outbreaks along a track that had emanated on or near Georgia’s border and thereafter spread mainly northwestward, and also westward to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. No such outbreaks occurred. We conclude that the Russian allegations of deliberate spread by a Georgian biological saboteur are wholly false. As can be seen, while other labs in countries once ruled by the Soviet Union were also targeted by this disinformation campaign, the Russian allegations were most strongly directed against the Georgian laboratory. It does not take much context to understand why the Georgian lab was the hardest hit; the Russo-Georgian War had ended on August 12, 2008, and the rela-

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tions between the two nations had remained very tense. The disinformation campaign was an attempt at ending a US-Georgian partnership in an effort to isolate the latter. As for why these allegations emerged at this particular time, we note that they did so during the last year of the Course-KB-3 program’s existence (see the first section of this chapter). This program had by 2012 already reported on the activities of what the Russians deemed “biological units of the U.S. Department of Defense overseas.” Perhaps the information generated under this program was used to prepare the Russian allegations, or perhaps the Course-KB-3 tasking simply reflected existing Russian concerns. All that we can say is that the broad topics covered by the Course-KB programs track well with the claims made in public Russian MFA allegations, but that the Course-KB program results did not make similar accusations as those spread in the Russian media. For reasons explained in the three paragraphs that follow, we believe that the Course-KB assessments reflect common beliefs shared by Russian officials tasked with BWC-related portfolio items, whereas the claims made in mass-media propaganda are less widely believed and are thus mostly propagandistic or opportunistic in nature. While some elements of the Putin administration have been busy with creating and disseminating false allegations about the cause of the ASF outbreak, Russian and American scientists have been collaborating in an R&D program to develop an anti-ASF vaccine. Specifically, scientists at the National Research Institute for Veterinary Virology and Microbiology at Pokrov have been working closely as a team with colleagues at the University of Connecticut, the Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory in Athens, Georgia, the University of Nebraska, and the University of Illinois to develop protective antigens for AFS. In early 2016, the team published an article in a highly regarded international journal on their accomplishments to date.87 Later in 2016, the team reported that it had created a vaccine that gave full protection to test animals against ASF for sixty days.88 Since several strains of the ASF virus exist in nature, the team is now working to develop a universal ASF vaccine. This project is very important to Russia in view of it having had 500 outbreaks of ASF, which resulted in the culling of one million pigs at an estimated cost of 30 billion rubles.89 We were able to speak with one American team member who informed us that the scientists at the National Research Institute for Veterinary Virology and Microbiology are highly competent virologists who are a pleasure to work with.90 The institute belongs to the Russian Academy of Agriculture Science and has received its funding from the Russian Science Foundation, which commits 5 million rubles annually for the project. The US research is funded by the Department of Agriculture. We mention this partnership because its existence shows that most Russian government professionals do not believe the Russian propaganda

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accounts that blamed the Georgians and the United States for the ASF outbreak—else, the Russian authorities would not have allowed US scientists to work on a joint vaccine. In addition, the internal Course-KB assessments made no mention of any Russian suspicions regarding the ASF outbreak. However, the Russian concerns regarding US-funded labs in states neighboring Russia are probably more than empty propaganda and are likely believed by hardliners within the Russian government. These laboratories are mentioned in Course-KB assessments, and Soviet hardliners had made similar allegations to justify the Soviet BW program.91 One of our major concerns is that the content found in Course-KB assessments may change to reflect that of propaganda campaigns—that is, that future Course-KB assessments may come to incorporate the ASF outbreak allegations or other such stories. As falsehoods disseminated online through Russian propaganda operations become cited and further distributed by hardliners and opportunists within the Russian government, these now-internal accounts may in turn influence the content and conclusions of Course-KB assessments. In the Soviet Union, the existence of strict governmental information controls meant that propaganda distributed abroad need not necessarily reach a Russian audience. It was therefore possible to disseminate one story abroad and another domestically. The advent of the Internet and the resultant widespread availability of online news services means that the Russian government has no information firewall to isolate domestic audiences from propaganda meant for audiences abroad. Today, nothing prevents a junior Russian staffer from adjusting their internal reports to reflect allegations made by senior Russian officials while the latter were engaged in propaganda operations. As these reports pile up on the desks of senior officials, they may in turn expect Course-KB material to reflect the allegations they have been reading about through internal channels. Thus, a suspicious MOD official may be wondering today why the Russian MFA has not raised concerns regarding the ASF outbreak. Actions by the United States in Asian and African Countries That Ostensibly Concern Russia. In the aforementioned interview given by

Yevstigneev, he also made comments on plans by the United States to take control over microbiologic research in nations beyond the former Soviet Union: “According to information from foreign experts, in the future, the [US] ‘umbrella’ of ‘biological defense’ should expand beyond the boundaries of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burundi, Kenya, and Uganda—and later, India, Iraq, Tanzania, and the Republic of South Africa—will become part of its coverage area.”92 Yevstigneev does not identify the “foreign experts.” As can be seen, these claims were subsequently narrowed down in geographic scope as the allegations were retold. Most of the subsequent articles focused on the Geor-

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gian lab and to a lesser extent other CIS countries—that is, those countries of greatest interest for Russian geopolitical goals. 2014 BWC Compliance and Verification. In 2014, the MFA issued a short

rejoinder to the US Department of State’s compliance report.93 As before, the document does not dwell long on the BWC. It presents two alleged BWC-related activities by the United States dealing with dual-use research that violate Article I and the defunct verification protocol. But, for the first time that we know of, the Russian MFA castigated the United States because the latter has not withdrawn a reservation it made when it decided to adhere to the Geneva Protocol (GP).94 The MFA writes that once again the United States is alleging that Russia is conducting dual-use research that could be counter to the BWC. However, according to the MFA, it is actually the United States that conducts or supports dual-use bioresearch of concern that it tries to hide. Thus, the MFA avers: It is evident that they make a stake at low awareness of the wider community that the United States have the most (up to 5000) biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) biological laboratories, of which, according to the data of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, no less than 1356 have licenses for working with listed (especially hazardous) pathogens. All these sites are dual-use sites, but the listed pathogens are directly related to the BWC.95

Next, the actions of the United States related to the defunct verification protocol are summarily castigated and the United States is condemned for weakening the GP and, by extension, the BWC and CWC.96 For readers who are not familiar with the GP, we take the opportunity to briefly explain it. After World War I ended, there was widespread repugnance of chemical weapons. At a conference held in 1925, the gathered nations agreed to never use chemical or bacteriological weapons in warfare. As states ratified or adhered to the GP, some of them added one or more reservations; most of them were that the ratifying nation reserved the right to reply in kind—that is, if a GP state party were attacked by an enemy that used chemical or bacteriological weapons, the attacked state party reserved the right also to resort to chemical or bacteriological weapons. When the United States ratified the GP in 1975, it attached the following reservation: The Protocol shall cease to be binding on the government of the United States with respect to the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices, in regard to an enemy state if such state or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.97

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The reservation text quotes the formal title of the GP, which prohibits “the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare” in war. As can be seen, the US reservation did not reserve the right to retaliate in kind if attacked by “bacteriological methods of warfare,” but rather only in the case of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases.”98 The United States has formally defined toxins, which are poisonous chemicals of biological origin, to be “bacteriological methods of warfare” and therefore outside the scope of this reservation. A presidential statement to that effect can be found, for instance, in the 1976 revision of military Field Manual 7-10.99 When the United States ratified the GP and made this reservation, it had already forgone biological and toxin weapons, but not chemical weapons. Hence, the US reservation only reserved the right to retaliate with chemical weapons. In general, the existence of reservations enabling retaliation with biological weapons creates a legal headache due to the BWC’s Article VIII and its deference to the GP, particularly when interpreted under Article 30 (on successive treaties) of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties.100 For that reason, most of the nations that had made reservations have in recent years withdrawn them. The United States has not done so as of this writing, probably because the Department of State has not viewed this arcane issue as a cause worth pushing the US Senate to act upon. By contrast, the Russian Duma adopted a resolution withdrawing the Russian reservations in 2000.101 Thus, the MFA took advantage of the United States having kept its reservation intact, as follows: Despite the recommendations adopted by consensus by all the participating states of the BWC and the CWC with regard to the removal of reservations under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 regarding the prohibition to use chemical and biological weapons in wars and also the UN General Assembly Resolution Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which is regularly adopted by consensus, the United States still have their reservations to the Geneva Protocol. This does not reinforce regimes of prohibition of biological and chemical weapons and raises big questions with regard to the real commitment of the United States to these regimes.102

The Russian MFA delegation also brought up the GP issue at the BWC Meeting of Experts in 2014, which opened three days after the release of the rejoinder. The MFA fails to mention that the US reservation does not actually cover “bacteriological methods of warfare.” The US government has recently explained its situation in regard to the GP and its reservation as follows: On May 13, 1991, during the Chemical Weapons Convention negotiations, President George H.W. Bush announced that ‘[t]o demonstrate the United States commitment to banning chemical weapons, we are formally forswear-

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ing the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any state, effective when the Convention enters into force.’ This pronouncement and our obligations as a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention prohibit all activities that were reserved under the Protocol and such legal obligations apply, despite existence of the reservation.103

Stated in a more direct fashion, the US reservation was for the right to retaliate with chemical weapons, but not with biological nor with toxin weapons, and in any case the United States has forsworn this option. We emphasize this point because, as described in the subsections that follow, the reservations issue has become a common topic in MFA statements and speeches. Russian Allegations of US Activities in Countries That Were Part of the Former Soviet Union. In July 2014, RIA Novosti published an op-ed

by Dmitry Sergeevich Popov, who was identified as director of the Urals Regional Information-Analytical Center of the Russian Institute of Strategic Research in Ekaterinburg.104 Much of the allegations revolve around US DOD laboratories abroad, with special emphasis on CIS countries: The United States, which even earlier [than 1991] had experience in setting up military-biological sites in Africa (Kenya, Egypt), Latin America (Brazil), Southeast Asia (Thailand), started to open them in close proximity to the borders of Russia. In addition to a network of smaller regional stations, U.S. base reference laboratories were operating in Ukraine starting since 2010, since 2011 in Georgia, while it is planned to open a Central Reference Laboratory [TsRL] in Kazakhstan in 2015. . . . Armenia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan have also been employed to cooperate with the United States in separate programs in the military biological field.105

The director rests his case regarding the nature of these facilities by claiming that both their financial expenditures and personnel numbers are much higher than those at comparable civilian facilities.106 He then presents a lengthy list of the possible illicit activities that could be conducted out of these laboratories. He expresses concerns that the United States will use these laboratories: • To obtain local microorganism data for the development of “a new generation of highly offensive biological weapons for use against Russia, as well as Iran and China.” • To conduct sabotage attacks designed to damage Russia’s economy (through the destruction of livestock and by discrediting Russia’s products on the global market) and harm its populace (by weakening the Russian people’s immune systems and lowering birth rates). At

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this point in his argument, the author alleged that an outbreak of African swine fever in southern and central Russia that occurred in 2012–2013 could have been one such attack, and claimed that the virus “could have been cultivated in the U.S. TsRL in Georgia.” He also accused the United States of having “widely practiced similar operations against Cuba” in the past. • To conduct in situ tests of biological agents. • To reinforce the dependence of Russia, China, and Iran on products of the Western pharmaceutical industry. • To circumvent the BWC’s restrictions by placing sites outside US national territory that could therefore be denied to “foreign inspectors,” with no fear of US public protests or of the consequences of violating US laws. Here we note that, contrary to what the director appears to believe, the BWC has no provisions for inspections. • To receive “access to the results of the Soviet military biological program.” On this subject, the director claimed that “Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan” had already “handed over their collections of agents of dangerous diseases in exchange for U.S. aid.”107

Yet more allegations, for instance that US “classified experiments” were performed in Indonesia, follow.108 The author expands on familiar themes by presenting a thorough recounting of the 2013 allegations against US assistance to labs in CIS countries and rehashing allegations of US genetic engineering of pathogens. The author goes beyond prior allegations, for instance by resurrecting old allegations of use against Cuba. The appearance of this article makes clear that the Russian disinformation campaign against joint laboratories in CIS countries was being expanded since its launch in 2013. This conclusion is unsurprising given the success of the campaign against the Georgian laboratory and the marked deterioration in US-Russian relations in 2014. The year 2014 also marks the start of the dissemination of a number of extreme propaganda articles through Russia Today (RT), a state-owned news agency. RT is one of the larger efforts that the Russian government funds at an estimated $300 million annually to get its message across to the world’s population. Russian government officials consider it a “core organization of strategic importance to Russia.”109 The channel broadcasts in English, Spanish, Arabic, German, French, and Russian and it claims to be watched by 700 million persons throughout the world; it supplements this coverage with articles posted on its websites in several languages.110 An RT correspondent prepared one of the vilest packs of allegations of US biological warfare and terrorism activities that we have seen disseminated in recent years as part of an August 2014 article for the platform. We quote a few falsehoods here: “Although the conventions on biological and

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chemical weapons make unlawful production, storage, and use of biological weapons, the United States maintains the largest arsenal of these weapons of mass destruction and has been the first country to apply them. . . . Since 2001, the United States has spent some 50 billion dollars on biological weapons. Before leaving, former President George Bush allocated for fiscal year 2009, nearly 9,000 million dollars more for expenses in bioweapons, i.e., 39% more than was allocated for the year 2008.”111 The article closes by claiming that the United States is behind the recent outbreak of Ebola fever.112 The article was edited as late as November 9, 2014, indicating that RT stood behind this piece of fiction and continued to spend effort to maintain its dissemination.113 Alleged US Actions in Asian and African Countries That Ostensibly Concern Russia. Just one day after the RT Spanish article, the RT English

team ran a piece titled “Ebola Can Be Turned into Bioweapon, Russian & UK Experts Warn.”114 This article included an interview with Onishchenko. In awkward English, perhaps the result of a poor translation from an initial Russian draft, the anonymous RT author writes: Russia’s former chief medical officer, Gennady Onis[h]chenko said that he can’t rule out the possibility that the Western African outbreak is suspicious. “I am concerned about the prevalence and pathogenicity of the situation, which is too much even for Ebola. Too many people are dying. I don’t rule out that there’s something artificial here. . . . What is happening with Ebola there, could there also be something man-made about it?” he said.115

The timing of this piece is remarkable, coming just one day after the Spanish RT piece. Given the time constraints required in conducting an interview with a high-level Russian official and editing a piece for publication, it must have been planned in advance since before the release of the Spanish RT piece. As such, RT mounted a concerted media campaign to spread this specific Ebola allegation. 2015 BWC Compliance and Verification. As the eighth RevCon approached

and US-Russian relations degraded, the MFA increased the number and vehemence of accusations that the United States was hindering, or would hinder, the strengthening of the BWC as envisioned by Russia. As it did in 2013 and 2014, the MFA issued a rather short rejoinder to the US Department of State’s compliance report that covered 2014,116 but this time the rejoinder was mostly dedicated to biological matters and to a lesser extent with chemicals.117 It starts with an admonition:

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Regrettably, the United States has long chosen the tactics of spreading provocative conjectures and insinuations about other states on the issues related to the BWC instead of fruitfully participating in the efforts of the international community to strengthen the Convention. Apparently, it serves as a smokescreen to hide the United States’ own poor record regarding the compliance with the BWC.118

Of the three points that are made by the MFA in its rejoinder, only one mentions the BWC along the lines in previous rejoinders—that is, the United States is doing its best to weaken the treaty. The following passage, taken from the MFA rejoinder, is indicative of this first effort: Worrying activity of Pentagon is being conducted in areas directly related to the BWC against the background of apparent lack of interest on the part of the US Administration in strengthening the Convention as a tool of mutual security. It is a known fact that in 2001 the United States unilaterally disrupted multilateral talks in Geneva on designing a BWC verification mechanism, and has been resisting the resumption of the talks ever since. The decade-long efforts of the international community to strengthen the Convention have been derailed.119

The other two points made by the MFA have to do with the scandal of US laboratories having unknowingly mailed live B. anthracis and the perceived threats posed to Russia by laboratories in the former Soviet Union funded by the United States. The MFA’s concerns in this regard are understandable and undoubtedly raised legitimate worries in Russia and elsewhere as to how the US Department of Defense was running its laboratories. These incidents probably also raised suspicions as to the nature of the research being conducted within these laboratories. The many headlines featured in USA Today were frightening to more than just Americans (see Annex 6.3), and undoubtedly the Russian paid attention to them and used their contents to develop the allegations. Russian Allegations Regarding US R&D. The subject of live B. anthracis

spores being sent by the US Department of Defense laboratories to other US laboratories and, even more threatening, to foreign laboratories, were heavily publicized by the Russians in both official reports and articles in the mass media. In the MFA rejoinder there is a long, involved paragraph on this topic: Take the case with the scandal about new instances of sending out live anthrax samples, a potential biological weapons agent. Just like in 2001, when a similar incident occurred, the source of the deadly infection was Pentagon’s military biological facilities back then, which was the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick, Maryland, whereas now it was the Lothar Salomon Life Sciences Test Facility (LSTF) at Dug-

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way Proving Ground, Utah. Due to the sending out of anthrax samples from the Lothar Salomon Life Sciences Test Facility, an increased risk of a highly dangerous infection threatened not only the US population but also that of other countries: Canada and Australia. The shipment of bacteria to the US military facility in the third country, Osan Air Base in South Korea, is particularly alarming.120

Russian Allegations of US Activities in Countries That Were Part of the Former Soviet Union. As usual, the MFA put special emphasis on US

biologically directed activities in the former Soviet Union. As with the other MFA allegations made in 2014, these claims were more virulent than those of years past: The Pentagon’s activities on deploying its medical and biological laboratories next to the Russian borders raise deep concerns. The most salient example in this respect is the R.G. Lugar Center for Public Health Research in a suburb of Tbilisi, a laboratory of a high biological isolation level. The Center is “home” to a medical research unit of the US army, a branch of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR). The US and Georgian authorities make efforts to conceal the true content and focus of the activities of this US army unit, which studies highly infectious diseases. The Pentagon is also trying to introduce similar undercover military medical-biological facilities into other CIS countries.121

2016 BWC Compliance and Verification. In February 2016, the Russian stateowned Sputnik News outlet published an article titled “Zika Virus Outbreak May Be Result of Bioweapon—Ex-Russian Surgeon General.”122 The anonymous article author wrote: “one of the possible causes for the spread of the deadly Zika virus outbreak could be the use of biological warfare, Russia’s former Chief State Sanitary Physician Gennady Onishchenko said Tuesday.”123 Seeing a new epidemic, Onishchenko charged once more unto the breach; he used his old professional status to lend credence to his unsupported allegations, and in so doing raised his audience’s fears of biological warfare. By the time Onishchenko gave an interview to the BBC on February 15, the story had evolved: he was now specifically concerned that the mosquito subspecies that carry the Zika virus had been identified “somewhere within a hundred miles” from “a military microbiology laboratory of the United States army” in Georgia.124 The BBC’s Russian headline duly read: “Onishchenko: Americans Are Deliberately Infecting Mosquitoes with the Zika Virus.”125 It appears that Onishchenko was punished in the context of this pronouncement, although his superior, Medvedev, did not force him to retract

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his comments. Medvedev served Onishchenko with a formal reprimand on February 24 over an unspecified failure “to comply with the rules of public speaking and service information.”126 The most likely candidate activity is the aforementioned interview with the BBC. Then, on May 21, Medvedev fired Onishchenko from his position as an assistant through a prime ministerial decree that cited this disciplinary action.127 Russian media sources speculated that this decree was the result of a preelection power struggle rather than the result of genuine displeasure over Onishchenko’s statements to the media.128 This explanation also appears most likely to us. Onishchenko’s Zika claims were more the norm than the exception. In addition, Onishchenko quickly became embroiled in legal troubles over alleged “undeclared assets,” which is typical for a fall from power in Russia.129 The MFA issued a longer rejoinder to the US Department of State’s 2016 compliance report than it had done in 2013, 2014, and 2015.130 This time the Russians heavily emphasized US actions in the past to prevent the verification protocol from being realized.131 As usual, MFA’s rejoinder was released within days of the US compliance report being released. For the biological section, the MFA begins with the admonition: “Only the politicization and interest in propaganda campaign against Russia can explicate the content of the section that ‘analyzes’ Russia’s compliance with the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC). It is illustrative that this year only Russia was chosen as a target of vain insinuations and figments in this area.”132 The lengthy MFA assertions about the United States are: The facts on the ground are that the US itself seriously damaged the BWC regime by ruining at its sole discretion the long-lasting multilateral talks aimed at elaborating the additional Protocol to the BWC, which were approaching to an end. According to the then-drafted Protocol the microbiological activity of the States Parties would have been subject to on-site inspections by an independent authority—the Technical Secretariat. Having derailed the Protocol, the US now complains of having apparently no possibility to verify the compliance with the BWC. It has nobody to blame but itself for this, including for the fact that it has been blocking any constructive attempts to step up a substantive work within the framework of BWC since 2001. Against this background, the international community is particularly concerned about the Pentagon’s dangerous microbiological activities. We shall give only two most alarming examples. First, the years long mailing of live anthrax spores by the US Department of Defense all over the world. Far from being accidental, this mailing occurred on 195 occasions and reached 12 States all over the world. As a result, not only nascent US citizens but also populations in other countries were exposed to a fatal danger of contamination. Until now, the scale of these violations has not been established, including the real purpose of the US Defense Department’s “manufacturing sites” where spores have been developed and the true objectives of their forwarding to the US military facilities overseas. Second, the continuous expansion of overseas military biological infrastructure of the US Defense Department. The corresponding facilities have

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sprung up in many countries, and in recent years they are being created increasingly closer to the Russian borders. There is no question of the “humanitarian orientation” of work of such microbiologists and doctors in uniform, who deal with highly contagious disease agents, but one can only guess as to the real subject of their activity because the latter is fully classified. For example, the US Department of Defense has built a high-level biological isolation laboratory in the village of Alekseyevka near Tbilisi to be used for its own, behind-the-scene purposes. It was declared for form’s sake that the facility was handed over to Georgia while a US Army medical research unit deployed there was just a “tenant.”133 A few days after the MFA published its rejoinder, an article appeared in the Russian Southern Military District’s weekly newspaper with some frightening allegations of U.S. misdeeds. The author informs its readers of the four reasons why the U.S. is intent on establishing a network of laboratory centers near the borders of Russia: in order to gain control over the public health of “one specific region of the former USSR” and the pathogenic microorganism research conducted there; obtain pathogenic microorganisms native to the regions near Russia; study the “susceptibility of the population in post-Soviet territories to various types of infectious diseases and the means for their treatment”; and to conduct “unimpeded large-scale testing of innovative medicines, taking into consideration ethnic and racial peculiarities of the local populations.”134

The author also insinuates that the “inexplicable” Zika virus epidemic was caused by the United States and cites Onishchenko to bolster these claims: On 15 February, Onishchenko (ex-head of Rospotrebnadzor and formerly the main public health doctor in Russia) touched on the subject of the Zika fever epidemic in an interview with the BBC. He stated that as early as 2012, Russian epidemiologists on the Abkhazian coast of the Black Sea recorded for the first time the appearance of the subspecies of mosquito which is the host of the Zika virus. In his opinion, “somewhere about 100 kilometers from the site where this mosquito lives today along our borders is a military microbiology laboratory of the US Army. And I think that it is doubtful that the American military microbiologists have been transformed into humanitarians who are only thinking about how to protect Georgian children from the blood disease. This is not why the Pentagon built this military biological base.” Onishchenko described his own position regarding the fact of “the presence of the American laboratory and the presence of the mosquito as deliberate interference in the natural progression of the epidemiological process.”135

Nevertheless, the author ends his article with very good news in that the Berkut-1 subsystem (detailed in Chapter 4) is being tested by the Russian military.136 This article is indicative of a worrying pattern by which a Russian propaganda article designed for foreign dissemination (as is obvious given its dissemination in English) is then recirculated in Russian specialized sources. As a result, this particular Russian disinformation campaign likely ended up heightening domestic beliefs of US noncompliance within the Russian military.

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Analysis of Russian Statements on Foreign (Non)Compliance with the BWC

We begin our analysis of the preceding documents by returning to the two metrics we set at the beginning of this section, namely the degree of coordination exhibited between MFA rejoinders and disinformation campaigns, and the degree to which internal threat assessments match MFA public statements:

• A propaganda campaign first appears in support of the yearly MFA rejoinder in 2013. The high degree of coordination exhibited by this simultaneous release, as well as the repeated quotes provided by Gennady Onishchenko, imply that the campaign received high-level support from the Putin administration. By 2014, the release of allegations along these lines became routinized, and the United States is now routinely accused of being behind epidemics (ASF, Ebola, and now Zika). • The continued litany of allegations made every year by Gennady Onishchenko, even after his departure as head of Rospotrebnadzor, signals that his comments have the blessing of the Putin administration. Through his well-timed interviews, this official continues to play a key role in enhancing the MFA rejoinder’s message by disseminating appropriately themed allegations to the media. • The Course-KB program contents track reasonably well with the topics of Russian MFA rejoinders. We suspect that MFA staffers draw from Course-KB threat assessment information in generating their response. However, Russian public allegations became increasingly grotesque starting in 2013, and by 2014 bear little resemblance to the findings of the threat assessments up to 2013 that we have information for.

From the preceding it is clear that the Putin administration made a decision in 2013 to politicize the BWC and use it as a political tool to achieve geopolitical gains, notably in CIS countries. The collapse of USRussian relations may be the cause of the Putin administration’s decision to sharply intensify this strategy in 2014, but it cannot explain the 2013 disinformation campaign. By 2013 at the latest, the Putin administration held a very dim view of the value of the BWC. We now analyze the methods and goals of these public pronouncements. As expected given their different provenance, the MFA rejoinders and the disinformation articles in the Russian mass media form two distinct categories in terms of their audience, the rhetorical techniques used, and the objectives they seek to achieve. Overall, we note that both categories of documents have become increasingly hawkish. Category one authors, through their production of MFA documents, cast doubts regarding US compliance with the BWC. They present an

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image of a concerned Russian government that strictly adheres to the BWC and seeks to strengthen the treaty despite alleged US objections. Their rejoinders have an informal tone (the 2013 rejoinder addresses the reader), through which they seek to raise doubts regarding US compliance through insinuation rather than outright declarations. They cast Russia as the victim of US aggressive actions, for instance through MFA statements regarding US laboratories abroad. These messages are mostly tailored to foreign diplomats and researchers and are meant to erode support for US positions with regard to the BWC. These efforts do not have to convince foreign diplomats that the Russian aims at the BWC are positive developments in order to be effective. The MFA’s personnel will have justified their salaries if foreign diplomats come to see US concerns of Russian BWC noncompliance as disingenuous. The category-two statements generated for public disinformation campaigns contain the most vile and misleading of accusations. The public that the Russians are reaching is both domestic and international. We draw on a 2016 report by a Czech Republic social science research team from Masaryk University with support from the Evropské Hodnoty (European Values) think tank to expound on how the Russian propagandists seek to achieve their aims.137 We found that there is much to learn from their project findings, though our focus is on Russian disinformation related to allegations about US biotechnology and microbiology that are aimed to reach individuals, groups, or nations on the domestic and international levels. The Czech researchers found that Russian propagandists used five major techniques when preparing false or misleading information for propaganda purposes: • Blame: pin blame for something awful on targeted persons, groups, or agencies. • Fabrication: create “information” about false or nonexistent events or deeds. • Labeling: pin despicable labels on persons, groups, or accomplishments. • Demonization: characterize persons or groups as evildoers. • Relativization: compare favorable or meritorious Russian plans or ideas versus idiotic, useless (etc.) plans or ideas proposed by opponents.

The effect that the propagandists sought to achieve by using these techniques was the elicitation of hatred, fear, or indignation among the population that was the recipient of the disinformation.138 These feelings were harnessed to support Russia’s broad geopolitical goals. We believe that by spreading misinformation on the theme of US biological warfare, Russian propagandists elicit hatred, fear, and indignation in their domestic audience. Hatred for Americans threatening its very borders with hideous diseases, fear that the threats are genetically engineered

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microbiological creations of the worst sort or brought about by the dispersal of natural viruses that destroy animals, and indignation that these activities violate international law. Any reader willing to believe these allegations will either become convinced that the United States is lying regarding the existence of the Soviet offensive BW program, or otherwise see it as having been a justified effort. Should controversial research projects occurring in Russia come to light, they will either dismiss it as a US fabrication or rationalize it. One can also imagine that if most of the Russian public believes this disinformation, it will be willing to support large, expensive government programs to defend against BW. The immediate task behind Russian dissemination of false information built around the US biological warfare theme is, we think, to instill fear among populations that they will be infected with pathogens that cause deadly diseases that they allege have been “developed” in US laboratories. In doing so, the Russian government seeks in part to negate goodwill generated through US developmental assistance to the public health sector of third countries. We well remember that the Soviet KGB’s “active measures” program carried out Operation Infektion, whose objective was to convince especially the developing countries that the US Army was responsible for the AIDS pandemic by having created the human immunodeficiency virus at Fort Detrick and then disseminating this virus in Africa.139 Operation Infektion was effective in that for many years, and even today, there are many persons in the United States and Africa who believe that the US military was responsible for this disease and its spread. Since 2014, readers of Russian news have been treated to what amounts to “reruns” of Operation Infektion; there are already conspiracy theories being spread abroad that the United States is responsible for the Ebola fever and Zika virus outbreaks. 140 Of greatest importance to the Russian propagandists are to weaken cooperative ties in countries Russia considers its “near abroad,” namely those countries which the Soviet Union once ruled. This is evident from the priority given to targeting US assistance to Georgia, and to a lesser extent other CIS countries. There are examples of such occurrences during the Cold War when active measures in, for example, India and Pakistan, led to research units supported by the United States having to be closed down. The Russian successes against the Georgian laboratory can only encourage further allegations of this nature. Preparations for the BWC Eighth Review Conference In the preceding section, we concluded from our analysis of public statements that the Putin administration decided in 2013 to use the BWC as a tool with which to diplomatically clobber the United States. In the subsec-

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tions that follow, we analyze Russian activities at BWC meetings themselves to see what the Russian delegations sought to achieve in this forum in the 2014–2016 period that followed. We note that the Russian MFA made routine pronouncements at BWC events in 2013, and that a major diplomatic initiative was launched by Russia in 2014 in the lead-up to the eighth RevCon, in 2016. We close with an analysis of what we believe the Russian diplomats sought to achieve, and discuss what they actually achieved, at the eighth RevCon, which was almost nothing. Before analyzing Russian positions at BWC meetings in chronological order, we first provide some necessary context. Per the “intersessional” format, in the lead-up to the eighth RevCon, BWC States Parties gathered for two events every year: during the summer for a Meeting of Experts (MX), and at the end of the year for the Meeting of States Parties (MSP). The MX is designed to give diplomats room to negotiate in the lead-up to the year’s MSP, as the latter involves the generation of a consensus-based document. Four such Reports of the MSP were generated since the 2011 seventh RevCon. The RevCon is the most important regularly scheduled BWC meeting; only a RevCon can generate consensus “additional understandings and agreements.”141 To prepare for the eighth RevCon, a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) was formed in early 2016 and met in April and August. The RevCon itself was then to be held at the end of November. The BWC Implementation Support Unit provides administrative and research support for all of these meetings, albeit in a limited capacity given that its staff is composed of only three people. 2014

The Russian MFA made two initiatives public—one major, one minor—at the 2014 MX of the BWC, held in Geneva August 4–8, 2014. The major Russian proposal at the 2014 MX was to renew negotiations on a legally binding document (Protocol) to strengthen the BWC.142 We provided a summary of the history of the previously defunct negotiations for such a protocol earlier; here we concentrate on the specific Russian proposals. The head of the Russian delegation, Mikhail Uliyanov, delivered a speech on the opening day that set the stage for the major proposal that would follow.143 His speech characterized the BWC as flawed and expressed the wish to see it strengthened. The relevant portion of Uliyanov’s statement is as follows: The need to strengthen the Convention because of the apparent flaws is long overdue. . . . Indeed, let us reflect on what has been done for the past four decades to make the Convention an efficient international tool? Not that much. In 1986, confidence-building measures were introduced within the BWC and were further developed in 1991 and 2011. However, the number of

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the participants to this mechanism is not that great. Finally, a small Implementation Support Unit saw the light of day. Actually, that is it. The results are quite modest, aren’t they? Especially if compared with the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] regime reinforced by the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] strong capacities or with the CWC with its Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW].144

Details on the Russian proposal released in the subsequent days made clear that they were not intending to retable the 2001 draft Protocol. Rather, they wished to use the 1994 negotiating mandate to propose a new instrument of its own devising. The Russian take on a protocol was presented at an open side event hosted during the MX,145 and detailed in a public document subsequently posted on the BWC official website.146 The Russian proposal called for the creation of a technical secretariat and appropriate policymaking organs under the roof of an Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW),147 which would be modeled after the OPCW.148 Under the Russian proposal, the OPBW would carry out investigation of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons; assistance and protection against such use; implementation of Article X (international cooperation for peaceful purposes); promotion of national implementation of the BWC; handling of the CBMs; and monitoring of science and technology trends. However, the OPBW would not conduct routine or challenge site investigations, nor any other kind of investigation into alleged violations of the BWC going beyond investigations of alleged use “initiated by the affected State Party and conducted on its territory.” 149 The document concluded as follows: Advantages of the proposal:

1. Strengthens the BWC and improves its implementation in many areas. Provides a permanent forum for co-operation among States Parties. 2. Creates an institutional, inclusive, and non-discriminatory body to look after the BWC; its Technical Secretariat also serves as the keeper of institutional memory and expertise. 3. The OPBW in the proposed form does not require universal membership (identical or even close to the BWC membership). The idea is to pool resources among interested states for agreed and mutually beneficial purposes. States Parties may join if and when they decide to do so. 4. The Technical Secretariat should be small in number (no routine or challenge inspections) making full use of and developing relevant capabilities in States Parties that may be activated in this or that situation. This results in reduced financial implications of creating the OPBW. 5. The OPBW’s mandate may be expanded and it may be given additional tasks if and when other additional and supplementary protocols to strengthen the BWC are concluded.

Disadvantages of the proposal (reflective of prevailing political realities):

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1. Routine inspections of dual-use facilities are not implemented. 2. Challenge inspections (field and facility investigations) initiated by one state against another may not be implemented. For that purpose, if and when required, BWC Article VI provisions (lodging a complaint with the UN Security Council) may be utilised.150

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The Russians revealed that, to ensure support for this initiative, they had since May 2014 circulated a questionnaire to States Parties asking whether the 1994 negotiating mandate remained valid.151 Because the negotiating mandate had been left open-ended as to what exactly would be negotiated, the Russian proposal could be discussed under this umbrella providing that at least some other BWC States Parties agreed that it remained in effect. The Russian delegation promised that they would brief States Parties at the MSP in December on the final results of the questionnaire, and noted that they would push their Protocol ideas for negotiation at the eighth RevCon. The United States made clear in a statement at the MX that they had not replied to the Russian questionnaire and saw the Russian initiative as a counterproductive “return to past disagreements.” 152 The Russian proposal also put the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in an uncomfortable position, forcing members to choose between their stated group position that segments of the Protocol text could not be negotiated separately, and a pragmatic offer that would see most of the old Protocol functionalities retained and which could achieve their known desire for a formal mechanism to implement Article X. The second Russian initiative in 2014 was comparatively minor, but helps reveal the intent of the first. The Russians forcefully argued for the removal of remaining reservations to the 1925 GP. A review of the list of reservations and withdrawals held in the French archives points to the United States as the only major target of this initiative.153 This initiative was further confirmed by the MFA rejoinder, published just three days before the opening of that year’s MX, which brought up the issue of the US reservation. The timing of these two initiatives is unlikely to have been a coincidence. The May 2014 questionnaire launch coincides with a US hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, at which a harsh assessment regarding the state of Russian compliance with the BWC was presented.154 The ongoing crisis in Ukraine, and the fact that the 2014 compliance report included the usual BWC-related statement as well as a new accusation that the Russians are in noncompliance with the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), are other possible catalysts.155 The two Russian initiatives in 2014 appear to have been counterattacks to the US actions, although to us they appear to have been very weak in that no discernible benefits accrued to Russia. The Russian protocol proposal in regard to the presumable OPBW would be in their favor if it was to be realized. First, setting up an OPBW

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in charge of investigation would reduce the power of the United Nations Secretary-General Mechanism (UNSG Mechanism) for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical, Bacteriological (Biological) or Toxin Weapons at a time when the latter is increasingly recognized within the context of the BWC.156 As we have described before, the BWC has no internal verification or inspection directorate. The BWC’s Article VI makes clear that the UN Security Council is the designated body for the investigation of alleged breaches of the BWC, but does not specify how the Security Council is to carry out an investigation it deems necessary. As such, the UNSG Mechanism remains the only preexisting blueprint for the conduct of investigations of alleged BW. Importantly, the role of the UNSG Mechanism within the BWC context was not challenged in 2014, unlike in times past. 157 The UNSG Mechanism’s recent use in Syria contributed to legitimize its potential role within the framework of the BWC. Pakistan in particular pushed to highlight the UNSG Mechanism in 2014 by openly requesting during the MX that the ISU prepare a background information document on the subject to be ready for the December 2014 MSP.158 The Russian initiative would halt advances in this direction in favor of its position that the UNSG Mechanism should only be understood within the context of the GP and therefore left to the sideline at the BWC.159 Second, setting up an OPBW in charge of Article X implementation would give Russia a new platform to gather information and mount a diplomatic challenge against US funding of laboratories abroad, funding that had led to statements like the Georgia lab accusations discussed earlier.160 Indeed, the Russian delegation pointedly remarked during the MX that it was “necessary to avoid ambiguity of assistance when as technical assistance, a country sends resources which are designed for goals other than those announced.”161 Finally, since the Russian conception of an OPBW does not include routine or challenge inspections and thus forces any Article VI complaints of noncompliance to go through the UN Security Council, the Russian Federation’s ability to veto any accusation would remain untouched. This last point is a more general remark that applies to all five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council. Russia continued its weak attacks at the MSP in December 2014. The Russian delegation emphasized that the BWC had shortcomings, and claimed that the majority of the forty States Parties that had responded to its questionnaire wanted these shortcomings to be addressed.162 The Russian interpretation of the survey results, as presented in the Russian opening statement, was that: “on the whole, the survey results testify to the dissatisfaction of the States Parties with the current situation within the BWC and their aspiration to address the existing flaws on a sustainable and long-term basis.”163 The Russian opening statement emphasized that in the Russian government’s views the treaty’s flaws are that its “provisions do not envisage the ban on the

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use of biological and toxin weapons as well as a mechanism to verify its implementation.”164 The statement made clear that the perceived issue with regard to the “ban on the use of biological and toxin weapons” was the necessity to withdraw “reservations to the Geneva Protocol that envisage the use of biological and toxin weapons in retaliation,” as otherwise, “different standards for the BWC and the Geneva Protocol will persist.”165 In addition to this opening statement, the Russian delegation is said to have expressed its disappointment on the last day of the meeting that language it had prepared on the GP was not included in the draft final report.166 The MSP was a highly contentious and confused affair, and as such the impact of the Russians’ proposals is hard to discern. Rounds of back-andforth between the Russian and the Ukrainian delegations probably weakened the Russian position.167 The Ukrainian delegation’s statement, delivered on December 2, charged that their country had “lost several important components of [their] Biosecurity system in Crimea,” most significantly the “Ukrainian anti-plague station and the Crimean republican diagnostic laboratory in Simferopol.”168 The Ukrainian statement continued: Having annexed Crimea, [the] Russian Federation simply seized all our National Academy’s property—buildings, equipment, telescopes, research ships, important tissue and cell culture collections, including collections of dangerous pathogens. One must have an extremely strange sense of humour to consider the situation, which happened in Crimea, as an example of appeal to the fruitful international cooperation in the field of Biosafety suggested yesterday by the Russian Federation.169

Russia exercised its right of response to the Ukrainian statements, and was at least once challenged by a subsequent Ukrainian right-of-response. 170 As a result, the Russian delegation was kept on the defensive throughout the second day of the conference. Some of the other events that transpired included the pre-circulation of a preparatory document and Cuba’s objection to this document’s existence, debate on export controls, and a final exchange on the draft report that culminated in a Cuban-initiated (failed) vote against a decision made by the chairman.171 Scholar Richard Guthrie of the BioWeapons Prevention Project emphasized that “some delegates felt the process [of adoption of the final report] had been confusing” and that “the difficulty of adoption of the final report was perhaps the lasting memory of this MSP.”172 After the MSP’s conclusion, Russia asked the ISU to make available a document detailing the Russians’ position by adding it to the list of official meeting documents. In this document, the Russian government argued that the Report of the MSP incorrectly portrayed the substantive paragraphs as having been approved by the meeting, rather than as text prepared by the chairman “under his own responsibility.” 173 As a result, the Russian Federation “suggest[ed] that an appropriate corrigendum be

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issued” and declared that it considered the substantive paragraphs “as having no approved status.”174 As of writing, Russia remains the only country to have openly challenged the document’s status. The ISU has so far not complied with the Russians’ request to have a corrigendum issued, which would imply that at least one state disagrees with the Russian interpretation and agrees with the document as it is presented. Russia’s insistence on the nonvalidity of the consensus document is perplexing given the lack of public support for this position by other delegations, such as Cuba, that were far more vehement in their opposition to the draft text at the meeting. It is hard not to see the Russian claim as part of a string of attempts at discrediting the BWC and its current process. 2015

In 2015, the MX was held during August 12–15. On the first day of the 2015 MX meeting, the Russian delegation demanded the right to reply to Ukrainian accusations. The member of the Russian delegation who made the oral presentation has not been identified, but their rather long written presentation has been published. Here we reiterate the sections involving the United States: According to our assessment, the domestic system of biosecurity in the territory that is still left under control of groups that came to the power after the coup d’état in Kiev is catastrophic. The prophylactic-epidemiological service built in the Soviet Union which had a unique methodological base and practical experience now is almost destroyed. A number of laboratories which used to run routine but rather important monitoring of circulation of microorganisms among people and in the environment is practically disbanded. Instead of that some laboratories for work with dangerous pathogens were built by US DOD with the function of concentration of collections under US administration that obviously causes great concerns among the neighboring countries. . . . Speaking on the bio-security in Ukraine, we would like to point out to the so called “Western Democratic World,” that it is high time we opened eyes to the fact that in the centre of Europe in XXI century the legal European President was violently overthrown with the support of the EU and the USA, the Constitution stopped functioning, the Constitutional court was disbanded, opposition political parties were forbidden, basic human rights stopped to be respected. . . . Crimean people, who witnessed terrible events in Kiev in Ukraine, indeed hold general referendum on March 16, 2014 on the basis of the resolution of the legitimate Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. According to the results of that referendum, 96% of the population of Crimea voted for withdrawal from Ukraine and expressed their will to reunify with Russia.175

On the meeting’s second day the deputy head of the Russian delegation, Victor Kholstov, probably raised some eyebrows when he voiced his

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lengthy opinions as to why the United States was against negotiations over a new protocol. The original document containing Kholstov’s speech is written in Russian, but an “unofficial translation” of it is posted on the ISU website. This version is poorly translated, leaving some of its contents garbled. Nevertheless, the strong opinions in Kholstov’s presentation are readily understood: One of the priority goals of the state policy in this realm is to ensure security of researches with microorganisms for the benefit of development of science and technique in peaceful purposes, socio-economic progress and wellbeing of the population. . . . All types and number of microorganisms which are used in Russia correspond to such goals. On the permanent basis Russia works on minimizing the risks of emergence of anthropogenic emergencies, related to the possibility of infection to working staff of microbiological objects, infection to the population residing around them or especially distribution of pathogens across the border. Simultaneously we attentively observe the situation in this field in other countries. We should note the profound concern about the situation due to the active researches of our US colleagues with causatives agents of extremely dangerous diseases and agents directly regarding the BWC. Analyses of the events occurred after the unilateral resolution adopted in 2001 concerning the suspension of work on the Protocol to the BWC reveals that all appeals to strengthen the Convention remain unrealized. What happens in reality is even decrease of effectiveness of the BWC. What are the reasons of this situation and USA refusal to elaborate Protocol? In our opinion, there are two possible reasons which could be analyzed. The first one. It can be suggested that in 2001 in the final part of elaboration of the Protocol to the BWC the USA official establishment realized, that they were not ready to take commitments on implementing control mechanism because they did not entirely control the situation in the field of safe use of such agents even in its own country’s territory. [Kholstov neglects to state the second reason.] Actually, in one and a half month after failure of the negotiations on Protocol in September 2001 in the USA happened an incident with posting bioterrorism—were posted spores of causative agents of anthrax. As a result, five people were dead, tens were injured. But the problems were not over. In the following years more than 100 various incidents of loss or theft of pathogenic microorganisms and violations of safety terms of working with them were revealed. In 2014, at the meeting of experts of the states-parties of the BWC we heard explanations about the finding unrecorded and practically unguarded samples for many years with causative agents of smallpox. Now it was exposed to the public a new emergency situation related with posting of viable causative agents of anthrax. The list of posting comprises 86 of objects in 8 countries. It is worth noting the sending of pathogenic bacteria to the USA military basis in other countries particularly in South Korea and Germany. The results of alleged investigations turned to be unconvincing—the guilty of that incident was made a scientific community. As a result of this incident not only American people were faced a high risk of extremely dangerous infection, but

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also citizens of other countries. The international attention was concentrated on the Test center in the name of L. Salomon.176 This military object [center] is situated on the territory of the biggest testing ground of the USA ground forces in Utah, in the past known for its active participation in creating American chemical and biological weapon. Now this center gets grand financing on updating basic funds. According to the US information about the Center in the name of L. Salomon, 35 scientists work there. Nevertheless, there is no reference to the publications of these scientists in the reviewed magazines. This confirms that the content and the results of researches of such scientists are strictly classified as secret. . . . The picture of consecutive distribution of biological pathogen microorganisms with expansion of spheres of coverage of the territories in the USA and abroad would be clarified at once. Under such approach it is required the factor of “addiction” to such phenomena of unauthorized emergence of bioagents where they are not waited for or they must not be there. Everyone is supposed to get used to the fact that such bio-agents “accidentally” appear in various corners of our planet even without the notification of proper states. So, the posting of viable causative agent of anthrax revealed that the reality of creation of regional centers which could be a base for further infection to the vast territories in any regions of the planet, confirming the argument of the authors of the article of the US Global Catastrophic Risk Institute.177 Exactly such approach apparently is hidden under the creation of new biological objects by the US Military Department [sic] on the territory of the states bordering with Russia and in many other regions of Asia and Africa. Besides, it becomes clear the purpose that the USA actively continues searching for causative agents of plague of the beginning of the 20th century— Spanish influenza and Black Death also and other most horrible pandemic of the past. We would like to get answer, with what purposes our American partners intend to expand its set of contagious agents. Within the framework of proposed control mechanism on Protocol to the BWC such actions [as revealed above] apparently would not be possible. It would be essential to notify the proper international organization and request a permission of concrete states. Proper groups of inspectors in the framework of the BWC would need to check it thoroughly.178

The MSP was held December 14–18. Among those who made opening remarks on the first day was Russia’s head of delegation Mikhail Uliyanov. He said that unlike other important arms control treaties that had been kept effective with new developments, during the preceding forty years there had only been minor improvements to the BWC, namely the CBMs and ISU. In view of ever-increasing biological threats facing the international community, this was far from being adequate. He reminded the meeting that for some time, Russia had been working on improving the BWC by having submitted for the consideration of the States Parties a legally binding instrument (verification protocol) and, more recently, called for the establishing of an openended working group (OWG) at the eighth RevCon. Possibly to the surprise of the other conference members, he stated that Russia “deems it useful to postpone these challenging issues for some time, in order to try to come to an

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agreement on the aspects that, in our view, could be harmonized in foreseeable future. The idea is to focus on the adoption of the legally binding instrument at the 9th Review Conference or, in case of successful negotiations, even earlier, at [a yet to be determined] Special Conference.”179 He then had some positive words for initiatives having been presented by other countries, in particular, “attention was drawn to two documents prepared by our colleagues from China and related to the code of conduct for scientists and development of the BWC export control system.”180 As what occurred at the earlier MX, on the meeting’s first day the Ukrainian ambassador again brought up the damage done to his country’s public and veterinary health facilities. We reproduce a small part of this presentation because it mentions prior US peaceful assistance: Unfortunately, in our efforts to increase the effectiveness of Ukraine’s national system for biosafety and biosecurity and to implement to a full scale the BWC provisions, we continue facing serious impediments related, first of all, to the inability, because of the external aggression, to engage three crucial components of our country’s biosecurity system: the Ukrainian antiplague station, the Crimean republican diagnostic laboratory in the city of Simferopol and Donetsk and Luhansk regional sanitary and epidemiological stations. The Ukrainian anti-plague station in Crimea, in particular, was the reference-laboratory of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine on diagnostics and identification of Vibrio cholera vibrios and other pathogens, as well as served as our national Centre for indication of biological pathogenic agents for Crimea and other regions of Ukraine. Thanks to technical assistance of the United States, the Luhansk regional laboratory for veterinary medicine was upgraded to BSL2 level. Now this laboratory is ruined by Russia-backed militants and its equipment has been transferred to an undisclosed location.181

We mention the Ukraine-Russian imbroglio because it has become a routine, if more muted, occurrence at subsequent BWC meetings. Both the Ukrainian and the Russian delegations have since attempted to keep these interventions to one initial Ukrainian statement and one Russian right-ofreply response. Two days into the meeting, four countries, Armenia, Belarus, China, and Russia, jointly submitted a proposal for strengthening the BWC; namely, they proposed that the upcoming 8th RevCon should establish the OWG introduced earlier at the MX by Russia. The rationale for this new entity and its responsibilities read as follows: 1. . . . The objective of this Open-ended working group shall be to elaborate on a basis of consensus appropriate measures and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument to be submitted for the consideration of the States Parties. In this context, the Open-ended working group shall consider the following: • the incorporation of existing and potentially further enhanced confidencebuilding and transparency measures, as appropriate, into the regime;

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• measures to promote national implementation of the Convention; • measures for monitoring developments in areas of science and technology relevant to the Convention; • measures for strengthening international co-operation for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article X of the Convention; • procedures and mechanisms for assistance and protection against biological weapons in accordance with Article VII of the Convention; • mechanism for investigating alleged use of biological weapons (to be initiated by the affected State and conducted on its territory) pursuant to Article VI of the Convention. 2. Stresses that the measures should be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to avoid any negative impact on scientific research, international cooperation and industrial development.182

On the morning of December 16, Yulia Demina, identified as a Rospotrebnadzor expert, made a presentation on developments in the biosciences of relevance to the BWC. Her concerns were as follows: In the last six months there were publications on studying pathogenicity factors that are able to decrease host immunity (for example, erlichia influence on cellular immunity, Microbial Infections, November, 2015) and develop multidrug resistance (for example, research on transferring these properties among Group A Streptococcus). The publication on the U.S. control system over scientific publications related to dual-use technologies, made this autumn in the Review of the American Society for Microbiology, drew our attention, since it shows that the decision on the publication is made by editorial boards of the largest publishing houses. Such censorship causes many questions, as decisions are made without engagement of state bodies and an author can publish his work in other journals, if one of reviewed journals refuses to publish it. What we see instead is a lack of thorough control, and this random control does not ensure that dual-use materials related to the BWC will not be published, but allows reporting back to the world community on “control established and measures taken.” However, should we expect any response from the State that seeks its leadership in biological security and does not take measures to establish strict control system to also cover scientific publications? We have already voiced out our concerns about the attempts to transfer the control over synthetic developments that can potentially lead to biological weapons agents’ development to the competence of other international organizations. We mean the wish of the World Health Organization to establish such control at the US initiative. Indeed, the issues, the WHO and the BWC work on, overlap to an extent, but it is only the responsibility of the BWC to address potential biological weapons agents. It is also known, that there are plans to charge the network of microbiological laboratories, built by the U.S. across the world, with carrying out research on antimicrobial resistance under the auspices of the WHO. In this case, the question on their ownership and agenda, including the declaration that these laboratories correspond to the BWC confidence-building measure, would be solved in a very “convenient” manner. There is a need to consider the development of criteria for research that falls within the BWC competence during our discussion on developments in science and technology. These criteria could become a benchmark for the de-

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velopment of the international community control system over dual-use research that may lead to the biological weapons development.183

Later that same day, the head of the Department Implementing the Convention’s Obligations of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Victor Kholstov, addressed the MSP. His speech included a lengthy and direct accusation that the United States was violating the BWC’s Articles III and IV and was designed in such a way as to also raise questions regarding the state of US compliance with Article I. Given the key role of his department and ministry, and both the official nature and the severity of the allegations, we reproduce a lengthy excerpt of his statement below: Our statement was based on grave deficiencies in the US system of safeguarding biological agents. We were convinced that the US official authorities would take into account the concerns we expressed and would address the situation and make sure that there would be no more violations related to use of biological agents. However, we see no real measures taken in this regard. The statements of the Defense Department officials on the suspension of operation of nine major science centers and the willingness to eliminate the causes of biological incidents by October, 2015 have not been implemented. The outcomes of the work done have not been published yet and, despite expectations of the world community, the necessary information has not been provided to the States Parties at the current Meeting. In this regard, we consider that these decisions were perfunctory and, in fact, the operation of the military biological facilities has not been suspended. This idea is also proved by the outcomes of the inspection carried out by the main US biological security oversight body, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta, Georgia) of the Department of Health, at military biomedical Pentagon facilities that revealed regular severe violations of requirements on the use, production and transfer of causative agents of particularly dangerous infectious diseases. The revealed inappropriate storage of large quantities of Yersinia pestis and Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis [virus] at the US Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (Aberdeen Ground, Maryland) was especially salient in this regard. In our view, this situation was caused by the fact that the inefficiency of technologies used for inactivation of biological materials has been disregarded for many years. However, it is just a part of the biological security problem. The cases of loss or theft of pathogenic microorganisms, release of biological agents out of laboratory facilities, contamination and death of people are detected time and again. It is a cause of our concerns, since terrorists and the so-called Islamic State strive to go beyond using chemical weapons, so they persistently seek opportunities to obtain biological weapons components. As mentioned earlier, we consider the repeated shipment of live anthrax causative agents by L. Salomon Land Forces Test Site (Dugway Proving Ground, Utah) to 194 addressees in 10 countries in 2005–2015 as one of the most significant cases. During the investigation a “research community that was not able to develop reliable methods of inactivation of biological agents” was named responsible for the problem.

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Moreover, we believe that the properly prepared live formulation was sent to at least one State, that is the Republic of Korea, on purpose in order to carry out another testing phase of the comprehensive biological assessment system JUPITR (Joint United States Forces Korea Portal and Integrated Threat Recognition) that is being deployed at the Osan Air Force Base and other military facilities of the US in the region for addressing “the possibility of a neighbor country using biological weapons. However, officially the United States do not have a specialized test range and laboratory base in the Republic of Korea geared to bioaerosol tests. Such facilities were declared neither in the Federal Republic of Germany nor in the US overseas territories (Virgin Islands, Guam and Puerto Rico), but similar formulations were also detected there. Obviously, this activity, including trans-border transfer of biological agents to other countries, is a grave violation of Articles III and IV of the BWC.184 The situation developing in the U.S. is contrary to the concept of “global leadership in biological security,” declared by Washington, and even tends to get worse, which means that it becomes a threat to biological security, as we noted in August. Let us recall that, according to Section 817 of the U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 the activity prohibited by the Convention is exempt from criminal responsibility, if it was duly authorized by the U.S. Government.185

These claims crossed a US diplomatic line. All US representatives to the UN since the collapse of the Soviet Union, including John Bolton (who did not include Russia in his “naming names” speech), have refrained from openly declaring Russia in noncompliance with any articles of the BWC at official BWC events. It was therefore not surprising to see that the US compliance report in 2016 included the following retort to the Russian’s speech to the MSP: In December 2015 at the annual Meeting of States Parties to the BWC, the delegation of the Russian Federation asserted that the United States had knowingly transferred live anthrax spores to a foreign country for use in open-air testing, and that this constituted a “grave violation” of Articles III and IV of the BWC. The transfers in question involved incompletely inactivated Bacillus anthracis samples intended for legitimate biodefense and preparedness purposes, and were fully consistent with the BWC. The samples’ incomplete inactivation (thoroughly disclosed by the U.S. Government and extensively documented in the press) was an unintentional biosafety lapse, but not a violation of U.S. obligations. The United States has encouraged Russia to engage in bilateral discussion to clarify any questions.186

The extreme nature of the allegations, and the fact that the speech to the MSP was given by a Ministry of Industry and Trade individual whose ministry is supposed to monitor US compliance (see the first section of this chapter) indicates a substantial hardening in the Russian outlook. 2016

We provide a brief interlude in our review of the Russian actions at the BWC to discuss a proposal made by Russia on March 1, 2016, at the Con-

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ference on Disarmament (CD), because it strongly parallels the Russian BWC proposal for a new protocol. On March 1, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recommended that CD negotiate a “convention for the suppression of acts of chemical terrorism.” Scholars Oliver Meier and Ralf Trapp, in an article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, analyzed the proposal and concluded that the Russian proposal seems to suggest that the CWC is somehow self-limiting and only concerned with eliminating state chemical weapons programs and stockpiles, not with the broader issues of maintaining and ensuring a world free of chemical weapons. Nothing could be farther from the truth, and Russia is of course fully aware of the intended nature of the CWC as a comprehensive ban not limited in either time or scope. . . . [T]he Russian proposal to create (yet another) international treaty might in fact run the risk of increasing fragmentation, resulting in legal uncertainties and incoherence.187

Based on the alarming pseudo-legal interpretation of the CWC promoted by the Russian NBC Troops and the weapons activities of concern that we have documented in passing in the prior chapters, we are blunter in our interpretation of this Russian proposal. It appears to us that the Russian MFA attempted to weaken the CWC’s scope, all the while making seemingly positive proposals. We reached a similar conclusion regarding the Russian proposal for a new protocol for the BWC. We recall that the same department within the Ministry of Industry and Trade is responsible for coordinating Russia’s positions at the CWC and at the BWC (see chapter section “Division and Partial Duplication of Roles Across Institutions”). Hence, it appears to us that by 2016 the Russians were satisfied with their performance at the BWC-related meetings, and decided to implement a similar strategy to target the CWC. We now return to discussing the Russian preparations for the eighth RevCon. The PrepCom held its first meeting during April 26–27, 2016, and scheduled a second meeting for August 8–12, 2016. Before the first PrepCom meeting commenced, States Parties were advised that if they so wished, they could submit “advance versions” of documents to facilitate States Parties’ preparations for the upcoming meeting. Among the States Parties that did so was Russia. Its advanced document dealt only with the GP and the reservations. An abstract of this document is as follows: Achieving the main purpose of the BWC is directly contingent upon the authority of the Geneva Protocol. Cognizant of that, States Parties to the BWC have agreed recommendations necessary for strengthening the regime of the Geneva Protocol. In practical terms, the most important of them are the following: that all States not yet party to the Protocol ratify or accede to it without further delay;

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those States Parties that continue to maintain pertinent reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol withdraw those reservations, and notify the Depositary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol accordingly, without delay. The latter circumstance is especially surprising since the withdrawal of such reservations is a relatively straightforward procedure that does not entail financial or other burden. Nevertheless, 18 States Parties to the BTWC continue to maintain reservations to the Geneva Protocol. Agreements reached in this regard may be incorporated into the Final Document of the Eighth Review Conference.188

The Russian MFA therefore continued to bring up the reservations issue. In keeping with its prior speeches delivered at the BWC, but unlike its 2014 rejoinder, it did not name the United States directly. The April PrepCom meeting was attended by representatives from eighty-six States Parties, one country neither party nor signatory to the BWC, one regional intergovernmental organization, and eight non-governmental organizations. The head of the Russian delegation, Vladimir Yermakov, gave his opening talk on the first day. His speech contained several surprises, including a new initiative involving mobile biomedical units: The international community requires concrete steps and solutions so that the BWC could fully realize their potential for the benefit of all States, without exception, our planet. To this end, we have prepared two new, practical, initiatives. First, the proposal to establish BWC mobile epidemiological units to implement the internationally-agreed upon provisions of Article X (cooperation in the prevention of diseases), Article VII (provision of assistance in case of use of biological weapons) and Article VI (investigation of alleged use of biological weapons). The main purpose of these groups would be purely humanitarian: at the request of the affected States, they would assist in the elimination of outbreaks of dangerous infectious diseases. If any States are attacked with biological weapons, the mobile detachments would quickly come to their aid to participate in the liquidation of the consequences of such use and conduct an investigation into the matter. Thus, our concept of these units reflects the very essence of the BWC—the harmonious combination of elements of collective security and humanitarian cooperation. It also lays a reliable and desirable institutional framework for strengthening and furthering the implementation of the BWC. Our second working paper contains a proposal to establish within the framework of the BWC a Scientific Advisory Committee for the review of scientific and technical achievements relevant to the Convention and to provide States Parties with appropriate recommendations. We have developed a concept that fully takes into account the requirements of efficiency, inclusiveness and broad geographical representation, as well as the economical use of resources. . . . I hope that inclusive and in-depth discussions of our proposals will lead to a decision-making outcome at the November Review Conference on the establishment of mobile medical-biological groups and the Scientific Advisory Committee. We kindly ask all delegations to support the Russian proposal.189

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Yermakov also mentioned two Chinese initiatives that Russia was willing to support: “there is a Chinese proposal of fundamental importance to establish, under the auspices of the BWC, a multilateral export-control mechanism. The Russian Federation supports this concept, considers it to be very helpful, and is willing to work together with the Chinese delegation and all other interested countries to further its development. We also consider as promising the Chinese initiative to develop a code of conduct for scientists-biologists.”190 On April 26, the Russian delegation sponsored a side event called “Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention.”191 During the twohour event, the Russians delivered an opening laudatory speech on the history and current importance of mobile biomedical units, which was followed by a PowerPoint presentation with thirty slides titled “Experience of Using Specialized Anti-Epidemic Units (SAEU) in Ensuring Sanitary and Epidemiological Well-Being of the Population in Emergency Situations.” 192 The event’s last presentation explained the necessity of empowering the BWC by equipping it with mobile biomedical units and once again explained the objectives of a scientific advisory committee. The Russian drive to set up mobile biomedical units as part of their proposed protocol was enshrined in an official working paper.193 This topic, introduced at the 2014 MX alongside the Russian protocol ideas, has become a fixture of the Russian diplomatic push for a new protocol at the BWC. The four-day August PrepCom meeting was a busy one, with representatives from several countries making speeches and entering into discussions. For the purposes of this book, we consider three publications that the Russian government has made available; one revealing document is available on the official Rospotrebnadzor website, and the second and third on the ISU site. We begin with the Rospotrebnadzor document because it is dated August 8, while the other two are dated August 9. We find it worrisome that Rospotrebnadzor appears to have had an important role in the Russian delegation at the August PrepCom meeting, while it seems to have only been an observer at the April meeting. Rospotrebnadzor maintains Russia’s mobile biomedical units (see Chapter 4) and so their heavy presence at the meeting is consistent with the special emphasis on the topic. The comments made by the Rospotrebnadzor representative would seem to have been more appropriate coming from the MFA or the Ministry of Industry and Trade instead of Rospotrebnadzor. In considering why the Rospotrebnadzor authors employed such harsh language, it bears to note that the ministry stands to gain from hyping a putative US biological warfare threat. As made clear in Chapter 4, Rospotrebnadzor runs large swathes of Russia’s biodefense sector. The Rospotrebnadzor document, which originally was published in Russian, has been poorly translated. We therefore have done some editing

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for clarity, but have not altered any of its substantive messages. The following are translated extracts from this document: In Rospotrebnadzor’s estimation, today the role of the BWC has grown as never before, as it is the only multilateral, legally binding international mechanism that prevents hazardous biological research and the development of dangerous microorganisms which could be used for unlawful purposes. This is evidenced by the significant increase in violations of biosecurity standards when handling especially dangerous pathogens in countries other than Russia, primarily in the United States, which, for its part, speaks about the significant amount of research in progress, the purposes and objectives of which are not always transparent and self-evident. Just in the US alone, there have recently been several serious incidents associated with especially dangerous pathogens that have received widespread media attention. The most high-profile incident occurred in 2015 when the US Defense Department’s biological warfare laboratory sent live anthrax cultures to ten facilities in at least nine Asian and European countries. Against this background, guided by the necessity to strengthen the BWC, the Russian delegation presented to each of its partners proposals to resume negotiations regarding enhancing the effectiveness of measures for the implementation of the Convention. In particular, the Russian delegation suggested increased monitoring of scientific and technological advances and ongoing research applicable to the BWC, as well as enhancing measures to implement the Convention at the national level for States Parties. Despite the broad support for Russia’s proposals by countries like China, India, Cuba, Iran, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Belarus, the position taken specifically by the US and its partners raises apprehensions. In 2001 they unilaterally blocked negotiations on the creation of an international verification and monitoring mechanism that would promote compliance with the provisions of the BWC. Today, they think the Convention already possesses sufficient tools and that it is a waste of time to look for new ways to increase its effectiveness. Moreover, while not supporting the proposals for strengthening the BWC’s compliance mechanisms, the US, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, Sweden and a number of other countries are advancing initiatives aimed at maintaining the status-quo and even weakening the Convention. In anticipation of the upcoming Review Conference, these countries’ proposals are geared more toward turning the BWC into some sort of debating club with no mechanisms for achieving humanity’s most important goals. The Convention is being designated as a forum for exchanging non-binding opinions without making any commitments, while planning to “outsource” (using the resources of organizations that have no ties with the BWC and no corresponding mandate) the real work. For example, instead of acting through the BWC, the US and its partners actively promote the G-7 Global Partnership against Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Global Health Security Agenda initiative. These forums, which are controlled by a group of countries rather than being multilateral in nature, clearly represent an attempt to sidestep the BWC in order to achieve their priority objectives of enhancing oversight of biosecurity activities in third countries and removing multilateral controls over their own military-biological activities.

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The initiative presented by the UK at the meeting in Geneva was particularly worrisome. It calls for the Convention to play the role of an outside observer for which, according to the document that was circulated, “nothing remains other than to recognize that third-party organizations and initiatives (such as the Global Partnership and the Global Health Security Agenda) are strengthening the BWC and facilitating its implementation.” Disagreeing with this approach, the Russian delegation at the meeting of the Preparatory Committee continued to work toward moving forward with initiatives aimed at girding the Convention with a solid foundation in the form of concrete action plans for establishing working mechanisms for its implementation.194

At its side event in August, the Russian delegation offered a nineteenslide PowerPoint presentation in English on mobile biomedical units titled “Operationalising Mobile Biomedical Units to Deliver Protection Against Biological Weapons, Investigate Their Alleged Use, and to Suppress Epidemics of Various Etiology.”195 So far in this section we have dealt only with Russian wishes and initiatives in the lead-up to the eighth RevCon. The US position has been spelled out in several documents and oral presentations but for our purposes we consider two sources, one document from 2015 and a presentation made by the head of the US delegation, Ambassador Robert Wood, in 2016 (see later). The important aspect to note here is that the United States has opposed the Russian initiatives without overtly responding to the Russian statements, and has offered proposals of its own for consideration at the eighth RevCon. The first source is a document that was coauthored by the Indian and US governments and asserts that the BWC would be enhanced if the States Parties would take steps to fortify or invigorate the BWC’s Article III. The two governments proposed three measures “to promote and strengthen the implementation of Article III.”196 We present short abstracts of these three measures: • National Legislation: Each State Party should establish, amend or review, as necessary and in accordance with its constitutional procedures, appropriate legislation, regulatory or administrative provisions to regulate transfers relevant to Article III (and as listed in S/206/853). • National Export Controls: States Parties should agree that such national measures should include essential elements, including national legislation and related administrative, regulatory provisions or rules that allow for effective implementation of Article III. • Cooperative activities: States Parties, in a position to do so and upon request, may provide assistance to other States Parties in establishing or improving their national export systems through training, sharing of best practices, and supply of relevant equipment and/or financial support.197

These positions do not depart from the standard US position at the BWC meetings.

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Our second source is Ambassador Wood’s statement. In it, he discloses US objectives: that the United States asks for the development of “more detailed options for constructive bilateral consultations” [Article III], with the understanding that “where bilateral or multilateral consultations are unsuccessful, a State Party could request the UN Secretary-General to use his or her ‘good offices’ to seek clarification.”198 Most important for our purposes, the US diplomat expressed his country’s position that: The ability to investigate allegations of use rapidly and effectively is important to effective implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention, and particularly to activating the assistance obligations set out in Article VII. The principal tool for such investigations resides with the United Nations, but this does not mean we need a new tool, nor does it mean there is no role for the BWC RevCon.199

Through this statement, the US delegate spoke out against the Russian proposals without explicitly naming them. As such, the lead-up to the eighth RevCon made clear that the latter would be a contentious meeting. Analysis of Russia’s Performance at the Eighth Review Conference

During the four years preceding the eighth RevCon, the Russian government publicized four proposals that it hoped would be adopted by the conference. They are as follows:

• The creation of an open-ended working group to negotiate on ways “to strengthen the Convention,” including aspects of the proposed Russian Protocol as unveiled in 2014. • The Protocol proposal includes the establishment of BWC mobile biomedical-epidemiological units. The Russian delegations portrayed the creation of these units as implementing the provisions of Article X (cooperation in the prevention of diseases), Article VII (provision of assistance in case of use of biological weapons), and Article VI (investigation of alleged use of biological weapons). • The Protocol proposal includes the creation of a technical secretariat and appropriate policymaking organs under the roof of an Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW), which would be modeled after the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Although the Russian MFA personnel do not emphasize this point, it is clear that this structure would be needed to ensure the deployment of the aforementioned epidemiological units. Importantly, the proposed OPBW would also consist of a Scientific Advisory Committee for the review of scientific and technical achievements relevant to the Convention and to provide States Parties with appropriate recommendations.

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• The removal of remaining reservations to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This action is aimed at the United States, which is the major nation that has not retracted its reservation and, for internal political reasons, is not able to do so. As had been done at previous Review Conferences, Russia proposed that the eighth RevCon also adopt a resolution requesting countries to retract their reservations. Russia also made a point of supporting two Chinese proposals, namely that under the auspices of the BWC a multilateral export-control mechanism be set up and that a code of conduct for scientists-biologists be developed. With these positions laid out, the stage was set for the eighth RevCon. The Russian Protocol initiative is a win-win diplomatic move for Russia. In the unlikely event that all States Parties agree to its proposals, Russia has much to gain from the proposed OPBW setup. Or, if the Russian proposal continues to be blocked for one reason or another at the BWC meetings, Russia positions itself to be viewed as a champion of the protocol treaty, rather than as a recalcitrant past violator—an objective also served by resurrecting the reservations issue. Russia unsurprisingly continued to push for all four proposals at the eighth RevCon.200 Since the first RevCon was held in March 1980, the eighth RevCon arguably was the second least-productive RevCon, second only to the acrimonious fifth RevCon, held in 2001. The eighth RevCon axed the MX process, failed to decide on future MSP topics, and did not expand the ISU.201 Of Russia’s four proposals, only one was acted on at the eighth RevCon, but only as a declaration and not a decision. Referring to the review of BWC’s Article VII, “The Conference calls upon all States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to fulfil their obligations assumed under that Protocol and urges all states not yet party to the Protocol to ratify or accede to it without further delay.”202 It is no wonder that, as Ulyanov’s farewell speech makes clear, the Russian delegation was exceedingly downcast as they departed from Geneva: We had high hopes when we arrived in Geneva to elaborate and approve concrete and meaningful measures to strengthening the BWC’s regime. . . . Regrettably, our efforts did not bear fruit . . . at the final stage of this meeting several members of the Western Group categorically refused to continue dialogue and withdrew from attempts to search for compromise . . . the adopted [final] report now looks even weaker than its predecessor five years ago. . . . The Russian delegation is profoundly disappointed by this and regrets such an outcome as a missed opportunity.203

As can be seen from this extract, the Russian MFA tried to frame Western countries for the failed eighth RevCon. Four days prior, the Russian delegation had already “suggested that many ideas by its delegation and

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from the NAM had been ignored and so, from its perspective, the articleby-article review [of a draft text] contained a bias towards the West.”204 In reality, it is widely known that Iran, not the West, blocked all consensus decisions at the BWC.205 Although Iran has always been a vocal country at the BWC, their intransigence at the eighth RevCon came as a surprise to most observers. One nongovernmental expert noted that, from his perspective, “the behavior of Iran remains a puzzle” and that “the devastation wreaked on the BWC by the sequential slicing away of inter-sessional activities by that delegation did not seem to have a clear purpose.”206 Iran is the unnamed party referred to in the following extract taken from the US delegation’s closing speech: “one delegation, in particular, has been inflexible and unwilling to compromise, or even engage in meaningful discussion, throughout this [RevCon] process.”207 Numerous NAM states criticized the outcome, in the process demonstrating that Iran’s actions had gone too far to be excused for the sake of NAM solidarity.208 These speeches undermine Russia’s anti-Western narrative. The fact that the Russian MFA tried to pin the blame on Western states for the eighth RevCon’s failure reinforces our impression that the desire to score a propaganda victory at the expense of the United States lies at the heart of the Russian negotiations at the BWC. Conclusions Our analysis of internal Russian assessments of foreign compliance with the BWC, public statements and allegations on this topic, and Russian diplomatic activities at the BWC strongly indicates that a major coordinated policy shift occurred at the end of 2013. Specifically, the domestic Course-KB threat assessment program was delayed throughout 2014 and its format altered to make it more responsive. MFA rejoinders became more confrontational in the 2014–2016 period, and public disinformation campaigns on themes of alleged US biological warfare began in 2013 and greatly intensified in 2014. Eventually, the Russian diplomats at the BWC meetings launched a major diplomatic initiative by mid-2014. Although it may initially have been crafted as a genuine overture laying potential paths forward for the BWC, this initiative has been utilized in practice by the Russian delegations to undermine the US position at the BWC. No single explanation exists to explain this change in policy. Perhaps the Russian government sought to impose upon the US government the view that Russia is a “great power” and could not be sanctioned out of global affairs. Under this interpretation, the Russian government demonstrated that it could damage the BWC and the standing of the United States at the latter to remind their US counterparts that Russian cooperation was essential on topics the US administration cared about, such as arms control and nonpro-

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liferation. This viewpoint has been expressed with regard to nuclear nonproliferation and arms control by a senior Russian commentator.209 Or it could be that the Russian government’s increasingly hardline policy reflects a growing genuine belief in the existence of US illicit activities. Although Course-KB-3’s final 2013 report probably did not reach such a judgment, we do not know what conclusions were made during the subsequent Course-KB programs. Indeed, the speech by a Ministry of Industry and Trade expert at the MSP on December 16, 2015, may reflect a more hawkish internal assessment reached in recent years. In any case, we cannot divine what Putin and his staff really believe based on fragmentary information on a single series of threat assessment programs. Rospotrebnadzor and the security services have a vested interest to continue seeding alarmist stories and to undermine confidence in the United States at the BWC. We do not know what relative weight Putin and his close advisers give to their views compared to those of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. We conclude this chapter by noting that the United States has so far used few of the diplomatic tools at its disposal to counteract Russian allegations regarding the BWC. Indeed, US diplomatic positions were figuratively overwhelmed when the Russian disinformation campaign targeting the Georgian lab began in 2013. We offer one specific recommendation for how the United States could counter this specific series of Russian claims within the BWC framework. Should repeat incidents occur, the United States could treat the official BWC MX 2014 speech delivered by deputy head of the Russian delegation Victor Kholstov as part of a formal request for information under the BWC’s Article V, as the speech closed by noting that Russia “would like to get [an] answer.” The United States could then request the ISU to make available a formal Article V response describing the nature and purpose of US funds proffered in assistance to foreign laboratories; this assistance should explicitly be identified as part of the US commitment to Article X on international assistance and cooperation. In doing so the United States should note that the laboratories are under the full control of the host nations, that the United States cannot speak for other states, and that any further Russian Article V requests for information regarding the research activities carried out at these laboratories should be directed at the relevant country or countries. Responding in this manner would have four benefits. First, the United States would provide a clear response to repeated Russian allegations and thereby minimize the chance that other states would take Russian claims seriously. Second, a response formulated in this manner would explicitly tie US assistance to the BWC’s Article X, placing the Russians in an embarrassing position should they continue to attack the US commitment. To see why, consider that any further Russian statements against US assistance to foreign laboratories could then be submitted by the United States for inclusion in a future BWC ISU informational document on “continuing challenges

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and obstacles to developing international cooperation, assistance, and exchanges” and in the yearly US Article X submission. Third, by treating the reply under Article V, the United States would remind the Russian delegation and their administration that inflammatory speeches delivered at the BWC are official pronouncements that can have serious ramifications. Fourth, doing so would demonstrate that the United States responds to Article V requests in good faith, laying the groundwork in advance should a future US Article V request regarding Russian activities be deemed necessary. This is but one example of how the United States could respond to growing Russian allegations of noncompliance with the BWC while simultaneously empowering BWC mechanisms. Other options include summarizing DOD activities abroad within the routine US report on its implementation of Article X, and maintaining up-to-date websites for all DOD-funded laboratories that emphasize their open nature. A positive example to emulate is the US Department of State’s advance document that explained how the United States is, and has been, in full compliance with each of the BWC’s first ten articles distributed in the lead-up to the eighth RevCon of the BWC.210 Regardless of how it is conveyed, a public US reply is urgently required in part because doing so might help moderate Russian analysts shore up their assessments against the work of hawkish individuals. Based on the Course-KB assessments, Russian analysts appear genuinely worried about the US DOD-funded labs abroad. Even if a Russian analyst did not buy into the false BW allegations stories, they would almost certainly still flag the DOD’s wide-ranging incomplete inactivation of B. anthracis samples as a reason why these laboratories posed a potential biosecurity risk to Russia. It is worth considering that had a hypothetical Russian-funded laboratory in Cuba mishandled B. anthracis samples, the US public response would likely be apoplectic. We echo the sentiments expressed privately to us by some independent experts in stating that we do not understand why the Department of State did not respond directly to the Russian allegations. If national sovereignty legalities truly prevent inclusion of information about specific US-funded labs abroad, a US response could still have described DOD research funded abroad in a single category that described projects without identifying the responsible laboratory. If the fear was instead that doing so would create a legal precedent with regard to the CBM process, a response to the Russian allegations could have been packaged in a myriad of ways. It could have been framed as an Article V request for information as described earlier, as part of a voluntary Article X assistance report, as a working paper, as a side event presentation at the BWC, or as a stand-alone Department of State public brief. While any such effort would probably fail to change the Putin administration’s views on the BWC, it would at least partly counteract Russian propaganda efforts and help inform the public regarding US compliance with the BWC.

Annex 6.1 Chronological List of Documents and Events Analyzed in Chapter 6 Documents and Events of Note

US Department of State, 2010 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Facts of Violation by the United States of Its Obligations in the Sphere of Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Arms Control,” no. 1093-07-08-2010 US Department of State, 2011 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments Gennady Onishchenko comments on gain-of-function research US Department of State, 2012 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments Onishchenko comments on the US B. anthracis letter attacks of 2001 Georgian government Decree no. 422 Interview of Valentin Ivanovich Yevstigneev US Department of State, 2013 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Comment of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia As Regards the Publication of the Report of the U.S. Department of State on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” no. 1457-19-07-2013 Pravda article citing Onishchenko Kommersant article conveying a rebuttal by Georgian NCDC director Amiran Gamkrelidze and Onishchenko’s economic threat to Georgia RIA Novosti article citing Onishchenko and Russian MFA RIA Novosti op-ed attributed to Dmitry Sergeevich Popov US Department of State, 2014 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Comment by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the Report of the U.S. Department of State on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” no. 1840-01-08-2014 Russian call for renewed negotiations on a legally binding document (Protocol) to strengthen the BWC is delivered at the 2014 BWC MX Russia Today Spanish article carrying Ebola allegations Russia Today English article carrying an interview with Onishchenko on his Ebola allegations Official Russian BWC document BWC/MSP/2014/6 challenging the substantive portions of the 2015 MSP final report as having “no approved status” US State Department of State, 2015 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments

Date

July 2010 August 7, 2010 August 2011 May 14, 2012 August 2012 November 19, 2012 May 7, 2013 July 11, 2013 July 12, 2013 July 19, 2013

July 24, 2013 July 24, 2013 October 15, 2013 July 23, 2014 July 31, 2014 August 1, 2014

August 4–8, 2014 August 7, 2014 August 8, 2014

February 17, 2015

June 5, 2015 continued

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Annex 6.1 continued

Documents and Events of Note

Victor Kholstov, in his role as a BWC MSP Russian representative from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, formally alleges that the United States has committed “a grave violation of Articles III and IV of the BWC” Sputnik News article citing Onishchenko’s thoughts on the Zika virus outbreak BBC interview runs with the headline: “Onishchenko: Americans Are Deliberately Infecting Mosquitoes with the Zika Virus” (in Russian) Medvedev serves a formal reprimand to Onishchenko Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov recommends that the Conference on Disarmament negotiate a “convention for the suppression of acts of chemical terrorism” US Department of State, 2016 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Comment by the Information and Press Department on the U.S. Department of State’s Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” no. 752-15-04-2016 Aleksandr Netyesov’s article in the MOD Southern Military District’s weekly newspaper Voyennyy Vestnik Yuga Rossii Medvedev dismisses Onishchenko Eighth BWC RevCon held in Geneva

Annex 6.2 Cases of African Swine Fever in Europe and the Caucasus, 2014–2015211 ASF Cases in 2014

Ukraine (05): (SM) wild boar, OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20141218.3040348 Europe (14): Estonia (VG) porcine, boar, 1st case, OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20140908.2757737 Ukraine (04): (CH) domestic, OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20140902.2743192 Lithuania (06): (PN) porcine, OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20140822.2715289 Russia (09): (VR) domestic swine, spread http://promedmail.org/post/20140816.2696765 Europe (13): Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, spread http://promedmail.org/post/20140806.2665646

Date

December 16, 2015 February 2, 2016

February 15, 2016 February 24, 2016 March 1, 2016 April 2016 April 15, 2016

April 29, 2016

May 21, 2016 November 7–25, 2016

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Europe (12): Poland, Lithuania, Latvia http://promedmail.org/post/20140725.2634809 Russia (08): wild boar, domestic swine, OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20140717.2617407 Europe (11): Poland (PD) wild boar, update, OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20140712.2605340 Europe (10): Poland (PD) official corrective update http://promedmail.org/post/20140709.2598113 Europe (09): Latvia (KS), Poland (PD), update http://promedmail.org/post/20140708.2596193 Europe (08): Latvia, porcine, boar, update http://promedmail.org/post/20140630.2577300 Europe (07): Latvia (KS, DD) porcine, boar, 1st rep. OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20140626.2568442 Russia (07): wild boar, domestic swine, OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20140624.2562583 Europe (06): Poland (PD) wild boar, recurrence, OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20140531.2510490 Europe (05): Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, wild boar control http://promedmail.org/post/20140321.2345369 Russia (05): (VG) wild boar, OIE, RFI http://promedmail.org/post/20140305.2314840 Europe (03): Poland (PD) 1st case, wild boar, OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20140218.2285021 Europe (02): (EU) prevention, control, epidemiology http://promedmail.org/post/20140215.2280473 Europe: Lithuania, Russia, wild boar control, OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20140211.2271563 Russia (04): (OL) susp, RFI, epid http://promedmail.org/post/20140207.2262565 Russia (03): (TL,BR) OIE, RFI http://promedmail.org/post/20140206.2259800 Russia (02): (KG) OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20140124.2230008 Lithuania: (AS) wild boar, susp, RFI http://promedmail.org/post/20140124.2228049 Russia: (VG) OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20140121.2222221 Ukraine: (LH) spread susp, RFI http://promedmail.org/post/20140116.2177657 Belarus: (HR) susp, RFI http://promedmail.org/post/20140115.2173728 Ukraine: recurrence, wild swine http://promedmail.org/post/20140108.2159764

ASF Cases in 2015

Europe (19): Poland (PD) wild boar http://promedmail.org/post/20151111.3784533 Europe (18): Ukraine, Russia, Baltic, Poland, spread http://promedmail.org/post/20150822.3595512

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Europe (17): Russia, Ukraine, Baltic, spread http://promedmail.org/post/20150815.3580029 Ukraine (05): (PL) domestic swine, OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20150812.3573464 Ukraine (04): (ZT) wild boar, OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20150707.3489805 Ukraine (03): (Rovno) wild boar, OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20150703.3482869 Ukraine (02): (CH) domestic swine http://promedmail.org/post/20150630.3471621 Europe (16): Latvia, spread, wild boar, domestic swine http://promedmail.org/post/20150627.3469240 Ukraine: (KV) wild boar, OIE http://promedmail.org/post/20150509.3350794 Europe: Poland (PD) domestic, OIE, Belarus, RFI http://promedmail.org/post/20150204.3142007

Annex 6.3 USA Today Reporting on US Biological Failures, August 4, 2015–June 24, 2016

• “Secret Sanctions Revealed Against University Hosting $1.25 Billion Biolab,” August 4, 2015 • “Labs Cited for ‘Serious’ Security Failures in Research with Bioterror Germs,” August 28, 2015 • “Pentagon Halts Work with Bioterror Germs at 9 labs,” September 4, 2015 • “Concern Grows over Pentagon’s Handling of Anthrax,” September 5, 2015 • “Latest Military Lab Concerns Involve Plague Bacteria, Deadly Viruses,” September 10, 2015 • “CDC Hires Top Lab Safety Official to Address String of Incidents, Culture,” September 15, 2015 • “In Key Anthrax Test, Scientist Just Threw Out Test Tube Showing Sample Was Alive,” September 17, 2015 • “FDA Hiring Top Official to Improve Lab Safety in Wake of Smallpox Incident,” September 23, 2015 • “White House Advisers Call for Greater Accountability, Safety at Biolabs,” October 29, 2015 • “Sanctioned Biolabs’ Names Still Kept Secret Despite White House Memo,” December 3, 2015 • “Top US Lab Regulator Replaced in Wake of Incidents with Bioterror Pathogens,” December 8, 2015 • “Latest CDC Lab Incident Involves Worker Infected with Salmonella,” March 31, 2016 • “New Website Tracks Oversight Fixes for Labs Working with Bioterror Germs,” April 9, 2016 • “CDC Labs Repeatedly Faced Secret Sanctions for Mishandling Bioterror Germs,” May 11, 2016 • “Newly Disclosed CDC Biolab Failures ‘Like a Screenplay for a Disaster Movie,’” June 2, 2016 • “CDC Failed to Disclose Lab Incidents with Bioterror Pathogens to Congress,” June 24, 2016

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Notes 1. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “The Joint Understanding for the START Follow On Treaty,” July 8, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press -office/joint-understanding-start-follow-treaty. 2. US Department of State, “New START,” n.d., http://www.state.gov/t/avc /newstart/index.htm (accessed May 22, 2016). 3. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-Russia Relations: ‘Reset’ Fact Sheet,” June 24, 2010, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-russia -relations-reset-fact-sheet. 4. Ibid. 5. Fredrik Westerlund and Roger Roffey, “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Carolina Vendil Pallin, ed., Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective— 2011, FOI-R-3474-SE (Umeå, Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency [FOI], August 2011), p. 152. 6. G-8 Summit, “Report on the G-8 Global Partnership,” July 15–17, 2006, http://en.G-8russia.ru/page_work/22.html. 7. G-8 Summit, “Infectious Disease Control: From Initiatives to Actions,” April 25–26, 2006, http://en.G-8russia.ru/page_work/9.html; G-8 Health Ministers Meeting, “Statement,” April 28, 2006, http://en.G-8russia.ru/news/20060428/1148826 .html (accessed May 22, 2016). 8. G-8 Health Ministers Meeting, “Statement.” 9. US Mission in Geneva, “2012 Global Partnership Biological Security Deliverables,” July 12, 2012, http://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/12 /GP-Deliverables.pdf. 10. Vyacheslav Smolenskiy, answer to question at G-8 meeting, October 25, 2012. Smolenskiy is the director of the Department of Science and International Cooperation, Russian Federal Service for Surveillance and Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being. 11. Russia’s departure from the G-8 does not affect it standing at the G-20; that is, Russia continues to be a full member of the G-20. 12. “Full Text of President Obama’s 2014 Address to the United Nations General Assembly,” Washington Post, September 24, 2014. 13. Karoun Demirjian, “Russian Premier Questions Obama’s Mental State,” Washington Post, October 15, 2014. 14. For a summary of the key provisions of the BWC, see BWC ISU, “About the BWC,” n.d., http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages) /77CF2516.DDC5DCF5C1257E520032EF67?OpenDocument (accessed May 22, 2016). 15. Russian Federation, Government Resolution no. 438, June 5, 2008. 16. Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade, “The Department Implementing the Convention’s Obligations,” n.d., http://minpromtorg.gov.ru/ministry/dep/#!16&click _tab_vp_ind=2 (accessed September 12, 2016). 17. Ibid. 18. Paul A. Smith Jr., “Soviet Strategic Propaganda Forces,” in Joseph S. Gordon, ed., Psychological Operations: The Soviet Challenge (Boulder: Westview, 1988), pp. 20–28. 19. Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services,” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 11, 2016, p. 3, http://www.ecfr.eu/publications /summary/putins_hydra_inside_russias_intelligence_services.

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20. Andrei Soshnikov, “The Capital of Political Trolling” (in Russian), Moi Raion, March 11, 2015, http://mr7.ru/articles/112478 (accessed September 20, 2016); Adrian Chen, “The Agency,” New York Times, June 2, 2015. 21. For this person’s safety, he/she remains anonymous. 22. The database’s name is abbreviated as IAS PZBTO. 23. Martin Kragh and Sebastian Åsberg, “Russia’s Strategy for Influence Through Public Diplomacy and Active Measures: The Swedish Case,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 6 (2017), pp. 1–44. 24. Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra,” pp. 1–20. 25. Milton Leitenberg and Raymond A. Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 70–71, 402–403, 597–598, 627–628. 26. Federal Medical-Biological Agency (FMBA), “Federal State Unitary Enterprise Scientific Research Institute ‘Medstatistika’ of the Federal Medical-Biological Agency,” n.d., http://fmbaros.ru/fmba/struckt_fmba/subordinate/?id_16=20 (accessed September 13, 2016). In Soviet times, the institute was probably under the MOH’s Third Department: Lev Fedorov, “We Were Preparing for an All-Out Chemical War,” Moscow Obshchaya Gazeta no. 4, January 26, 1995, p. 9, http://fas.org/news/russia /1995/jptac006_l95060.htm (accessed September 7, 2016). 27. Contract no. 0173100009514000067, Protocol no. 33Kv-113/15-GP-07.05 .ok, “Opening Envelopes with Applications for Participation in the Open Competition,” Moscow, May 28, 2014. 28. Ibid., p. 10. 29. Ibid., p. 5. 30. Contract no. 0173100009514000067, p. 5. 31. Ibid., p. 5. 32. US Department of Health & Human Services, Public Health Emergency, “Project BioShield Overview,” October 18, 2016, https://www.medicalcountermeasures .gov/barda/cbrn/project-bioshield-overview. 33. Ibid., pp. 7–8. 34. Contract no. 017300009511000135, “Act of Acceptance of Work (Intermediate) on 21 May 2012 Regarding the State Contract of 18 April 2011 no. 110208.0810300.15.054 to Perform Research Work ‘Information Monitoring of Compliance by Other States of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons’ code ‘Course KB-3,’” p. 3. 35. US Department of State, 2012 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt. 36. US Department of State, 2016 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2016/index.htm. 37. Each report has an unclassified and a classified version (the fact that the latter exists is unclassified, as it is sometimes mentioned in unclassified compliance reports). It is possible that the classified versions spell out specific concerns regarding Russian compliance with the BWC. 38. US Department of State, 2016 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, pt. 3, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2016/255651.htm#BWC. 39. US Department of State, 2010 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/170924.htm.

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40. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Facts of Violation by the United States of Its Obligations in the Sphere of Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Arms Control, Doc. no. 1093-07-08-2010, August 7, 2010, http:// www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content /id/239726 (accessed July 7, 2016). 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. C. Cello, A. Paul, and E. Wimmer, “Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of Infectious Virus in the Absence of Natural Template,” Science 297 (2002), pp. 1016–1018. 44. Ibid. 45. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Facts of Violation. 46. Ibid. 47. Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William J. Broad, “U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits,” New York Times, September 4, 2001. 48. Ibid. 49. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. 50. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Facts of Violation. 51. Ibid. 52. US Centers for Disease Control, “Inadvertent Laboratory Exposure to Bacillus anthracis—California, 2004,” MMWR Weekly, April 1, 2005, http://www.cdc.gov /mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5412a2.htm (accessed May 22, 2016). 53. On January 9, 2009, the White House issued Executive Order 13486, which established a working group on “Strengthening Laboratory Biosecurity in the United States.” This group was co-chaired by the secretary of defense and the secretary of health and human services; other members of the group included designees of the secretaries of state, agriculture, commerce, transportation, energy, and homeland security; the directors of national intelligence and the National Science Foundation; the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; and the US attorney general. The working group’s report, which mentions two safety incidents that occurred in the United States on p. 13, can be found at: http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal /boards/biosecurity/Documents/biosecreportfinal102309.pdf (accessed July 13, 2016). 54. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Facts of Violation. 55. Ibid. 56. United States of America, “Confidence-Building Measure Return Covering 2011,” July 9, 2012, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets) /DBE5A41DDFEAC499C1257A370036DA5D/$file/BWC_CBM_2012_USA-Public .pdf (accessed July 15, 2016). 57. United Nations Office in Geneva, “CBM Returns,” 2016, http://www.unog .ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4FA4DA37A55C7966C12575780055D9E8 ?OpenDocument (accessed July 15, 2016). 58. “High and Low Points in Obama’s Effort to ‘Reset’ U.S.-Russian Relations,” Washington Post, January 2, 2014. 59. Sander Herfst, Eefje J. A. Schrauwen, Martin Linster, et al., “Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus Between Ferrets,” Science 336, no. 6088 (June 22, 2012), pp. 1534–1541. 60. Arturo Casadevall and Michael J. Imperiale, “Risks and Benefits of Gain-ofFunction Experiments with Pathogens of Pandemic Potential, Such as Influenza Virus: A Call for a Science-Based Discussion,” mBio 5, no. 4 (August 2014), 4e01730-141.

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61. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement by Mr. Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, MFA of Russia, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,” December 12, 2012, http://www.rusemb.org.uk/press/958 (accessed July 22, 2016). 62. Anonymous, “Onishchenko Considers Agricultural Products from the Netherlands Unsafe,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, May 14, 2012, https://rg.ru/2012/05/14 /onishenko-anons.html (accessed April 11, 2017). 63. Anonymous, “Onishchenko Proposed to Include a ‘Black List’ of Americans Including Those Responsible for the Anthrax Leaks As a Response to the ‘Magnitsky Act’” (in Russian), Interfax-West, November 19, 2012, https://www.interfax.by /news/belarus/1120540 (accessed April 11, 2017). 64. US Department of Justice, “Amerithrax Investigative Summary,” February 19, 2010, p. 14, https://www.justice.gov/archive/amerithrax/docs/amx-investigative -summary.pdf. 65. US Department of State, 2013 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, July 12, 2013, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2013/211884.htm. 66. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Comment of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia as Regards the Publication of the Report of the U.S. Department of State on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, no. 1457-19-07-2013, July 19, 2013, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign _policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/101606 (accessed July 14, 2016). 67. Ibid. 68. Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, “Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint,” BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9, September 24, 1993. 69. Many publications have been written about the process to bring about the BWC verification protocol and its failure. If the reader wishes to read just one publication on this subject, we recommend: Jonathan Tucker, “The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Compliance Protocol,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 1, 2001, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/biological-weapons-convention-bwc. 70. US Department of State, “Bolton Briefing on Biological Weapons Pact, November 19: He Says BWC Draft Protocol Is Dead and Won’t Be Resurrected,” US Department of State International Information Programs, November 20, 2011, https://web.archive.org/web/20011122085700/http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical /pol/terror/01112003.htm (accessed September 19, 2016). 71. Seth Brugger, “BWC Conference Suspended After Controversial End,” Arms Control Association, January 1, 2002, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_01 -02/bwcjanfeb02; Rebecca Whitehair and Seth Brugger, “BWC Protocol Talks in Geneva Collapse Following U.S. Rejection,” Arms Control Association, September 1, 2002, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_09/bwcsept01; Kerry Boyd, “U.S. Attempts to Sink BWC Review Conference,” Arms Control Association, October 1, 2002, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_10/bwcoct02. 72. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Comment of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia As Regards the Publication of the Report of the U.S. Department of State on Adherence to and

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Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.” 73. Valeriy Kirillov, “Interview of Valentin Ivanovich Yevstigneev, Former Head of the USSR Ministry of Defense’s Department of Biological Defense Department and Later Head of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense’s Biological Defense Department—Biological Weapons—A Real Threat?” (in Russian), Sovietskaya Rossiya Online, July 11, 2013, http://sovross.ru/articles/936/15819 (accessed September 21, 2016). 74. “Onishchenko: ASF Came from Georgia and Microbiologists from United States Work There” (in Russian), Interfax, July 15, 2013, http://www.interfax.ru/russia /318507 (accessed July 22, 2016). 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid. 77. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Note Press and Information Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in Connection with the Publication of the Report of the U.S. Department of State on Compliance with the Agreements and Commitments in the Field of Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament” (in Russian), July 19, 2013, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline /44C8A0DBC9AB5BF644257BAD001FAD8F (accessed August 30, 2016). 78. Georgi Dvali, “US Laboratory Will Close Deliveries to Russia” Kommersant (in Russian), July 24, 2013, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2240124 (accessed May 22, 2016); Elizabeth Zyavkina, “Russian Foreign Ministry Concerned by the ‘Biological Activity’ of the United States at the Borders of the Russian Federation” (in Russian), MK.ru, July 19, 2013, http://www.mk.ru/politics/2013/07/19/886679-mid -rf-obespokoeno-quotbiologicheskoy-deyatelnostyuquot-ssha-u-granits-rf.html (accessed August 30, 2016). 79. Lyuba Lulko, “US Biolabs Threaten Russia’s Security,” Pravda, July 24, 2013, http://www.pravdareport.com/russia/politics/24-07-2013/125246-usa_russia -0/?mode=print (accessed July 22, 2016). 80. Anton Sergienko, “Experiment to Create Genetically Engineered Biological Weapons?” (in Russian), Weekly 2000, July 18, 2013, http://2000.net.ua/2000/forum /na-grani/92584 (defunct link). 81. Georgi Dvali, “United States Laboratory Closes Off Supplies to Russia” (in Russian), Kommersant, July 24, 2013, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2240124 (accessed July 22, 2016). 82. Ibid. 83. “US Lab in Georgia at Center of Storm over Biological Warfare Claims,” Sputnik International, October 15, 2013, http://sputniknews.com/world/20131015 /184149734/US-Lab-in-Georgia-at-Center-of-Storm-Over-Biological-Warfare -Claims.html (accessed July 22, 2016). 84. The African swine fever virus is a DNA virus that causes a lethal hemorrhagic disease in domestic pigs as well as boars and other like animals in the wild. There is no effective treatment or vaccine. 85. ProMED, “African Swine Fever, Georgia,” June 7, 2007, http://promedmail .org/post/20070607.1845 (accessed August 30, 2016). 86. Ibid. 87. G. Burmakina et al., “African Swine Fever Virus Serotype-Specific Proteins Are Significant Protective Antigens for African Swine Fever,” Journal of General Virology 97 (2016), pp. 1670–1675. 88. Svetlana Arkhangelskaya, “Russian and U.S. Scientists Join Forces to Fight Deadly Virus,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, September 6, 2016, http://rbth.com

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/science_and_tech/2016/09/06/russian-and-us-scientists-join-forces-to-fight-deadly -virus_627603 (accessed December 30, 2016). 89. Ibid. 90. Daniel L. Rock, personal communication, December 15, 2016. 91. See, for instance, Lev Zaikov to M. S. Gorbachev, “To the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Comrade M. S. Gorbachev,” May 15, 1990, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB315. 92. Kirillov, “Interview of Valentin Ivanovich Yevstigneev.” 93. US Department of State, 2014 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, July 31, 2014, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2014/230047.htm. 94. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Comment by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the Report of the U.S. Department of State on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” no. 1840-01-08-2014, August 1, 2014, http://www.mid.ru /en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/675835 (accessed July 7, 2016). 95. Ibid. 96. Ibid. 97. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Treaties, States Parties, and Commentaries: Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,” Geneva, June 17, 1925, United States of America, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf /Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=EFD4B7E2E4A4232BC125 6402003F7670. 98. US Department of State, “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol),” current as of September 25, 2002, http://www.state.gov/t /isn/4784.htm#narrative. 99. Department of the Army, “The Law of Land Warfare,” FM 27-10, approved for public release, distribution unlimited, July 15, 1976 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 3, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm27-10.pdf. 100. “Report of the Meeting of Experts: Submitted by the Chairman,” BWC /MSP/2014/MX/3, Annex I, pp. 44–45, Russian Federation S 7/8PM, http://unog.ch /80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/FC579188E931164FC1257D6600542F20/$file/B WC+MSP+2014+MX-03-English.pdf (accessed August 30, 2016). For a thorough explanation of the Reservation problem, see Nicholas A. Sims, The Evolution of Biological Disarmament: SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies, vol. 19 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 152–157. On interpreting Article 40, consult Mark Eugen Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijoff, 2009), p. 405. 101. “The Withdrawal of Reservations to the Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 June 1925,” no. 143-FZ, December 6, 2000, adopted by the State Duma on October 27, 2000, approved by the Federation Council on November 24, 2000, http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?doc_itself=&infostr=x&backlink=1&fulltext=1&nd =102068589#I0 (accessed November 30, 2016). 102. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Comment by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the Report of the U.S. Department of State on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.”

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103. United States of America, “United States Compliance Statement to the 2016 BWC Review Conference,” p. 4 (no date given but probably April 2016), http:// www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/ACD4EE074CCD63EAC1257FF D0056F848/$file/U.S.+Compliance+Compilation_FinalCleared_for+ISU_1607021 .docx+pdf.pdf (accessed August 3, 2016). 104. Valery Melnikov, “Anti-Russian Virus in Laboratories of the American ‘BioPRO’” (in Russian), RIA Novosti, July 23, 2014, http://ria.ru/cj_analytics/20140723 /1017236855.html (accessed July 20, 2016). 105. Ibid. 106. Ibid. 107. Ibid. 108. Ibid. 109. “The List of Strategic Organizations, as Approved by the Government Commission to Improve the Stability of the Russian Economy Development” (in Russian), 2008, p. 2, https://web.archive.org/web/20081227071316/http://www.government.ru/content/governmentactivity/mainnews/33281de212bf49fdbf39d611cadbae9 5.doc (accessed September 19, 2016). 110. Simon Shuster, “Inside Putin’s On-Air Machine,” Time, March 16, 2015; Ronn Torossian, “Russia Is Winning the Information War; America Can Learn a Thing or Two About PR from Putin’s Pugilistic Propaganda,” The Observer, May 31, 2016. 111. Karen Méndez, “USA Fort Detrick Biological Research: Behind the Outbreak of Ebola?” (in Spanish), RT Actualidad, August 7, 2014 (last updated November 9, 2014), http://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/view/136298-centro-investigacion -biologica-eeuu-fort-detrick-brote-ebola (accessed July 27, 2016). 112. Ibid. 113. Ibid. 114. Anonymous, “Ebola Can Be Turned into Bioweapon, Russian & UK Experts Warn,” Russia Today, August 8, 2014 (last edited September 21, 2014), https://www .rt.com/news/178992-ebola-biological-weapon-terrorists (accessed July 25, 2016). 115. Ibid. 116. US Department of State, 2015 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, June 5, 2015, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2015/243224.htm. 117. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Comment by the Information and Press Department on the U.S. State Department’s Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” June 18, 2015, http://archive.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070 -f128a7b43256999005bcbb32ad860cac57cb99743257e68005286fb!OpenDocument (accessed July 15, 2016). 118. Ibid. 119. Ibid. 120. Ibid. 121. Ibid. It is curious that the MFA misnames the Tbilisi facility as “R. G. Lugar Center for Public Health Research” when it should have known that this facility was renamed “L. Sakvarelidze National Center for Disease Control and Public Health (NCDC)” in May 2013. 122. Anonymous, “Zika Virus Outbreak May Be Result of Bioweapon—Ex-Russian Surgeon General,” Sputnik News, February 2, 2016, https://sputniknews.com/world /20160202/1034077724/zika-virus-biological-weapon.html (accessed May 22, 2016). 123. Ibid.

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124. “Onishchenko: Americans Are Deliberately Infecting Mosquitoes with the Zika Virus” (in Russian), BBC News, February 15, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/russian /news/2016/02/160215_onishchenko_zika_virus_us (accessed August 30, 2016). 125. Ibid. 126. Anastasia Berezina, “Medvedev Reprimanded Gennady Onishchenko” (in Russian), RBC, February 26, 2016, http://www.rbc.ru/politics/26/02/2016 /56d056b49a794767776230d3 (accessed October 10, 2016). 127. Russian Federation, Order no. 965-p “On G. G. Onishchenko” (in Russian), May 21, 2016, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201605240012 (accessed October 10, 2016). 128. Maria Leyva, “Medvedev Took Disciplinary Action Against Onishchenko” (in Russian), RBC, May 24, 2016, http://www.rbc.ru/politics/24/05/2016 /57441bda9a7947f402c7e654 (accessed October 10, 2016). 129. Vladislav Gordeev, “The Media Learned of Onishchenko’s Undeclared House and Plot of Land” (in Russian), RBC, August 30, 2016, http://www.rbc.ru /politics/30/08/2016/57c4dc359a794733f2be78c3 (accessed October 10, 2016). 130. US Department of State, 2016 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, April 2016, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/255898.pdf. 131. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Comment by the Information and Press Department on the U.S. Department of State’s Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” no. 752-15-04-2016, April 15, 2016, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy /news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2237950 (accessed July 25, 2016). 132. Ibid. 133. Ibid. 134. Aleksandr Netyesov, “The American ‘BioABM’ and a Ukrainian-Georgian Virus” (in Russian), Voyennyy Vestnik Yuga Rossii, April 29, 2016, http://www.redstar .ru/images/files/regions2016/2904/290416-v-v-u-r.pdf (accessed October 10, 2016). Translated excerpts available at: “The Spreading Propaganda Virus,” Foreign Military Studies Office OE Watch 6, no. 6 (June 2016), pp. 61–62, http://fmso.leavenworth .army.mil/OEWatch/201606/201606_OEW.pdf (accessed October 10, 2016). 135. Ibid. 136. Ibid. 137. Miloš Gregor and Petra Vejvodová, “Research Report: Analysis of Manipulation Techniques on Selected Czech Websites,” StopFake.org, August 10, 2016, http://www.stopfake.org/en/research-report-analysis-of-manipulation-techniques-on -selected-czech-websites (accessed August 12, 2016). 138. Ibid. 139. Thomas Boghardt, “Operation Infektion: Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign,” Studies in Intelligence 53, no. 4 (December 2009), pp. 1–24. 140. Yevhen Fedchenko, “Kremlin Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures by Other Means,” Estonian Journal of Military Studies (March 21, 2016), http://www.stopfake .org/en/kremlin-propaganda-soviet-active-measures-by-other-means (accessed August 15, 2016). 141. BWC ISU, “Additional Agreements Reached by the Previous Review Conferences Relating to Each Article of the Convention,” http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD00 6 B 8954/(httpAssets)/EBB7A76E3DC19651C1257B6 D003A0028/$file/BWC%20& %20Additional%20Agreements%20Post%207RC.pdf (accessed August 30, 2016).

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142. “Report of the Meeting of Experts: Submitted by the Chairman,” BWC /MSP/2014/MX/3, Annex I, pp. 52–53, Russian Federation S 7/8PM. 143. Russian Federation, “Statement of Director General of the Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Head of the Russian Delegation Mr. Mikhail Uliyanov at the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties,” Geneva, December 1, 2014, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/D81B 7C24E98FAD21C1257DA300658988/$file/Russia_English.pdf (accessed August 1, 2016). 144. Ibid. 145. BWC ISU, “Biological Weapons Convention 2014 Meeting of States Parties Side Events Flyer,” http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets) /42EA76688EB5C2ECC1257D25004D0119/$file/side+events+flier+2014.pdf (accessed September 15, 2016). 146. Russian Federation, “Strengthening the BWC Through a Legally Binding Instrument (Protocol): Discussion Points,” August 5, 2014, http://www.unog.ch /80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/E93A399D0E6488FEC1257D2E003F87C5/$file /BWC+MX+2014+-+Side+events+-+Evening+Russian+Federation.pdf (accessed April 27, 2015). 147. Ibid., p. 2. 148. The OPCW implements the CWC and is at the center of chemical disarmament and verification activities. 149. Russian Federation, “Strengthening the BWC Through a Legally Binding Instrument (Protocol),” pp. 1–6; “Report of the Meeting of Experts: Submitted by the Chairman,” BWC/MSP/2014/MX/3, Annex I, pp. 52–53, Russian Federation S 7/8PM. 150. Russian Federation, “Strengthening the BWC Through a Legally Binding Instrument (Protocol),” pp. 5–6. 151. Ibid., p. 1. 152. Richard Guthrie, BioWeapons Prevention Project, The Start of the Meeting of Experts: Introductory Statements and Article VII, MX Report no. 2, August 5, 2014, p. 1, http://www.bwpp.org/documents/MX14-02.pdf. 153. “Protocole Concernant la Prohibition D’emploi à la Guerre de Gaz Asphyxiants, Toxiques ou Similaires et de Moyens Bactériologiques, Fait à Genève le 17 Juin 1925,” accord no. 19250001, http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/vues/mae _internet___traites/Accede-Traites.php?accord=TRA19250001 (accessed August 30, 2016). 154. “Russia Rejects Bioweapons Talk in U.S. Congress as ‘Propaganda,’” NTI Global Security Newswire, May 13, 2014, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/bioweapons -claims-prompt-russian-rebuke. 155. US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, 2014 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, July 2014, pp. 9–10, http://www.state .gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf; Jon Wolfsthal, “Russian Cheating Is Not New—Neither Is Compelling Them Back into Treaty Compliance,” July 31, 2014, http://www.nonproliferation.org/russian-cheating-treaty-compliance. 156. Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, “Implementing the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism on Alleged Use Investigations for Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons,” paper presented at the Second Global Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories and Collaborating Centres, Paris, June 21–23, 2010, http://www.oie.int /fileadmin/Home/eng/Conferences_Events/sites/VETO2010/Session%203/Session _3_5_Gabriele_Kraatz-Wadsack.pdf (accessed October 10, 2016).

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157. See, for example, Islamic Republic of Iran, “Paper on Investigation,” BWC /MSP/2004/MISC.4, December 9, 2004, http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943 .nsf/%28httpPages%29/da292636ae31f1cbc125718600361e55?OpenDocument &ExpandSection=3%2C2%2C1#_Section3 (accessed April 27, 2015). 158. Richard Guthrie, BioWeapons Prevention Project, The Final Day: Article VII and Adoption of the Report, MX Report no. 6, August 14, 2014, p. 1, http:// www.bwpp.org/documents/MX14-06.pdf. 159. “Unofficial Translation: Statement by H.E. Ambassador Anatoly Antonov, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Director, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Meeting of Experts of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,” Geneva, August 20, 2007, p. 3, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD00 .6B8954/(httpAssets)/0A68AAE7F72C45B9C1257344004B6E4A/$file/BWC_MSP _2007_MX_Russia-070820.pdf (accessed April 27, 2015). 160. “US Lab in Georgia at Center of Storm over Biological Warfare Claims,” RIA Novosti, October 15, 2013, http://en.ria.ru/world/20131015/184149734/US-Lab-in -Georgia-at-Center-of-Storm-Over-Biological-Warfare-Claims.html (accessed April 27, 2015). 161. “Report of the Meeting of Experts: Submitted by the Chairman,” BWC/MSP/2014/MX/3, Annex I, pp. 8–9, Russian Federation S 5/8PM, http://unog .ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/FC579188E931164FC1257D6600542F20/ $file/BWC+MSP+2014+MX-03-English.pdf (accessed April 27, 2015). 162. Richard Guthrie, BioWeapons Prevention Project, The First Day: Opening Remarks and Statements, MSP Report no. 2, December 2, 2014, pp. 1–2, http:// www.cbw-events.org.uk/MSP14-02.pdf. 163. “Statement by the Director General of the Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, Head of the Russian Delegation, Mr. Mikhail Uliyanov, at the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties” (in Russian), Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva, Geneva, December 1, 2014, p. 3, http://www.unog.ch /80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/201F6D99B3E55FC5C1257DA100613D4F/$file /Russia.pdf (accessed August 30, 2016). English translation (likely unofficial, although not marked as such): http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets) /D81B7C24E98FAD21C1257DA300658988/$file/Russia_English.pdf (accessed August 30, 2016); retrieved at the website maintained by the BWC ISU: “Meeting of States Parties (1–5 December 2014),” United Nations Office at Geneva, http://www.unog.ch /__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/e75aaa1d8234b830c1257d63002c7def ?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=5%2C6%2C1#_Section5 (accessed August 30, 2016). 164. Guthrie, BioWeapons Prevention Project, The First Day, p. 2. 165. Ibid., p. 4. 166. Richard Guthrie, BioWeapons Prevention Project, Consensus by Confusion: The Final Day of the 2014 MSP, MSP Report no. 6, December 10, 2014, pp. 1–2, http://www.cbw-events.org.uk/MSP14-06.pdf. 167. Guthrie, BioWeapons Prevention Project, The First Day, p. 1; Richard Guthrie, BioWeapons Prevention Project, The Second Day: Cooperation & Assistance and Science & Technology, MSP Report no. 3, December 3, 2014, p. 1, http:// www.cbw-events.org.uk/MSP14-03.pdf. 168.“Statement by H.E. Ambassador Yurii Klymenko, Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva, Head of the Delegation of Ukraine to the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention,” Geneva, December 1, 2014, http://www.unog.ch

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/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/8CCF1421CA7A3382C1257DA200602807/$file /Ukraine.pdf (accessed April 27, 2015); “Statement by Professor Serhiy Komisarenko, Deputy Head of the Delegation of Ukraine at 2014 Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention,” Geneva, December 2, 2014, http://www .unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/80C0A48E89FFB871C1257DA200619821 /$file/Ukraine_S_T.pdf (accessed April 27, 2015). 169. “Statement by Professor Serhiy Komisarenko.” 170. Guthrie, BioWeapons Prevention Project, The Second Day, p. 1. 171. Richard Guthrie, BioWeapons Prevention Project, The Fourth Day: Universality, the Isu, and Preparing the Report, MSP Report no. 5, December 5, 2014, p. 2, http://www.cbw-events.org.uk/MSP14-05.pdf; Guthrie, BioWeapons Prevention Project, Consensus by Confusion, pp. 1–2. 172. Guthrie, BioWeapons Prevention Project, Consensus by Confusion, pp. 1–2. 173. Russian Federation, “Explanation of the Position by the Russian Federation,” Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, February 17, 2015, p. 1 paras. 2–3, BWC/MSP/2014/6, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/E2F5 25FC2CC56F7AC1257DF0003BD001/$file/BWC+MSP+2014–06-English -1502707(E).pdf (accessed August 30, 2016). 174. Ibid., p. 1 para. 4. 175. Russian Federation, “Russian Delegation’s Talking Points in Exercising the Right of Reply to Suggestions Made by Ukrainian Delegation with Regard to the Epidemic Situation in the Russian Federal Region of Crimea and in the Territory in the South-East of Ukraine Which Is Not Under Kiev’s Control,” August 12, 2015, http:// www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/95D535CC0804B245C1257EA7005 A5FF7/$file/Russian+Intervention+in+English.pdf (accessed August 1, 2016). 176. The Lothar Salomon Life Sciences Test Facility at the Dugway Proving Ground has six convertible Biosafety Level 3 laboratories to test defenses against biological agents. 177. Kholstov does not identify the second reason, but we guess that it is this paragraph. 178. Russian Federation, “BWC Meeting of Experts Statement by Victor Kholstov, Deputy Head of the Russian Delegation Director, Department for the Fulfillment of Conventional Obligations, Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation” (unofficial translation from Russian), August 13, 2015, http://www .unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/AE8CC9A202BD0920C1257EA60054288E /$file/Russian_Statement_NI_English.pdf (accessed August 2, 2016). 179. Russian Federation, “Statement by the Head of the Russian Delegation Mikhail Uliyanov, Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention,” December 2015, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets) /23729FB37722E87CC1257F1E0059276F/$file/Russia+General+Statement+2015 +MSP.pdf (accessed August 2, 2016). 180. Ibid. 181. Ukraine, “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Yurii Klymenko, Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva, Head of the Delegation of Ukraine to the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention,” December 14, 2015, http://www.unog .ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/787D610288E027B1C1257F1D002989F9 /$file/Statement+of+Ukraine+at+the+BWC+MSP+(December+2015).pdf (accessed August 2, 2016).

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182. Russian Federation, Armenia, Belarus, China, and Russia, “Proposal by the Russian Federation for Inclusion in the Final Document of the Eighth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention,” Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC /MSP/2015/MX/WP.14, August 124/Rev.1, December 16, 2015, http://www.unog .ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/1524B57D89C7FDE4C1257F1F0042BF16 /$file/G1528664q.pdf (accessed August 1, 2016). 183. Russian Federation, “Statement by Yulia Demina, the Russian Delegation, Meeting of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Review of Developments in Areas of Science and Technology Relevant to the Convention,” December 16, 2015, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/6B2F5 .041CE316503C1257F1E0059DD16/$file/ST+Russia+2015+msp.pdf (accessed August 2, 2016). 184. BWC’s Article III forbids member states from providing by whatever means any microorganism or entity spelled out in Article I to states, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals. However, in November 2006 the UN Security Council elaborated a “list of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology related to other weapons of mass destruction programmes” (see S/2006/853) that all nations are forbidden to sell or provide in any way to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 185. Russian Federation, “Statement by Victor Kholstov, the Director of the Department for the Fulfillment of Conventional Obligations, Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, National Authority of the Russian Federation on the BWC Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, Agenda Item 9, Strengthening National Implementation,” December 16, 2015, http://www.unog.ch /80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/29B6AE6AF84594E7C1257F1E0059845D/$file /Russia+national+implemntation+2015+msp.pdf (accessed August 2, 2016). 186. US Department of State, 2016 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, pt. III. 187. Olivier Meier and Ralf Trapp, “Russia’s Chemical Terrorism Proposal: Red Herring or Useful Tool?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 7, 2016, http:// thebulletin.org/russia%E2%80%99s-chemical-terrorism-proposal-red-herring-or -useful-tool9531. 188. Russian Federation, “The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925: Agenda Item 7,” http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954 /(httpAssets)/6CC3954C6728C1CCC1257FFE003858F1/$file/Russia+WP+-+BTWC +and+the+Geneva+Protocol.pdf (accessed August 2, 2016). 189. Russian Federation, “The Acting Head of the Russian Delegation Vladimir Yermakov, the Preparatory Committee, the Review Conference of the Convention of Biological and Toxin Weapons” (in Russian), April 26, 2016, http://www.unog .ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/7A76F00F6F0C881BC1257FAF003A7062 /$file/BWC_PC_8RC_Russian_Federation.pdf (accessed August 2, 2016). 190. Ibid. 191. Russian Federation, “Side Event: Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention,” April 26, 2016, http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages) /be0b6b9f091aa80dc1257fa7003362b6?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=7# _Section7 (accessed August 23, 2016). 192. Russian Federation, “The Experience of Operating Specialized Mobile AntiEpidemic Units of Rospotrebnadzor (Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights and Human Well-Being).”

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193. Russian Federation, “Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Operationalising Mobile Biomedical Units to Deliver Protection Against Biological Weapons, Investigate Their Alleged Use, and to Suppress Epidemics of Various Etiology,” BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.1/Rev.2, July 4, 2016, http://www.unog.ch /80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/890278DD80A68208C1257FF0003583AD/$file /BWCCONF.VIIIPC2.Wp1.Rev.2.pdf (accessed August 2, 2016). 194. Rospotrebnadzor, “On the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons” (in Russian), August 22, 2016, http:// rospotrebnadzor.ru/about/info/news/news_details.php?ELEMENT_ID=6955 (accessed August 28, 2016). (This document was first made available on August 8 to participants at the PrepCom.) 195. Russian Federation, “Establishing Mobile Biomedical Units Under the BWC: A Multipurpose Capability to Strengthen Collective Security Under the Convention and Pursue Its Humanitarian Mandate,” August 9, 2016, http://www.unog .ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/be0b6b9f091aa80dc1257fa7003362b6 ?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=7#_Section7 (accessed August 26, 2016). 196. India and United States of America, “Strengthening Implementation of Article III of the BTWC,” BWC/MSP/2015/WP.1, November 5, 2015, http://www.unog .ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/27AC6A43C1617C2DC1257EF900366236 /$file/Strengthening+Implementation+of+Article+III+of+the+BTWC.pdf (accessed August 29, 2016). 197. Ibid. 198. UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/43/74, December 7, 1988, requested the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the relevant parts of the second RevCon’s final declaration, which includes modalities for the exchange of information and data according to Article 3. 199. United States, “Statement by Ambassador Robert Wood, Special Representative for Biological Weapons Convention Issues, United States of America, Preparatory Committee Meeting for the Eighth Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference,” Geneva, April 26, 2016, http://www.unog.ch /80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/1D45204CF11437BBC1257FA3003467E6/$file /BWC_PC_8RC_US.pdf (accessed August 2, 2016). 200. Russian Federation, “Statement by the Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation Mikhail I. Uliyanov at the VIII BWC Review Conference,” Geneva, November 7, 2016, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/05449D .941B07980DC12580680035B459/$file/%D0%92++%D0%AB++%D0%A1++ %D0%A2++%D0%A3++%D0%9F++%D0%9B++%D0%95++%D0%9D++%D0 %98++%D0%95.pdf (accessed November 30, 2016). 201. Richard Guthrie, The Eighth BWC Review Conference: A Minimal Outcome, BioWeapons Prevention Project, RevCon Report no. 16, December 1, 2016, pp. 1–2, http://www.cbw-events.org.uk/RC16-16.pdf. 202. Eighth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, “Draft: Final Document of the Eighth Review Conference.” 203. Russian Federation, “Statement by Mr. Mikhail Ulyanov, Head of the Russian Delegation, Director, Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” Geneva, November 25, 2016, http://www.unog.ch /80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C53804E09D9749C2C125807A00574FD8/$file /Ulyanov-BWC+RevCon+closing+remarks.pdf (accessed November 30, 2016).

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204. Richard Guthrie, First Reactions to the Draft Elements and the “Alternative BWC,” BioWeapons Prevention Project, RevCon Report no. 11, November 21, 2016, p. 2, http://www.bwpp.org/documents/Dailyreports/RC16-11.pdf. 205. “Weapons Treaties Look Ready to Unravel, and That’s a Big Problem,” Washington Post, November 30, 2016. 206. Guthrie, The Eighth BWC Review Conference. 207. United States of America, “Statement by Ambassador Robert Wood, U.S. Special Representative for the Biological Weapons Convention,” Geneva, November 25, 2016, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/4228C43A 8E40AE06C125807A0057164D/$file/USA+closing+and+compromise+text.pdf (accessed December 1, 2016). 208. Jean Pascal Zanders, “BTWC 8th RevCon Final Document,” The Trench, November 25, 2016, http://www.the-trench.org/btwc-8th-revcon-final-document. 209. Comments by Alexei Arbatov, “Nowhere to Go But Up? US-Russia Relations and the Threat of Nuclear War,” panel discussion held at Monterey, Calif., May 9, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xgA0MjUOy0s (accessed December 5, 2016). 210. United States of America, “United States Compliance Statement to the 2016 BWC Review Conference,” n.d. (probably April 2016), http://www.unog.ch /80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/ACD4EE074CCD63EAC1257FFD0056F848 /$file/U.S.+Compliance+Compilation_FinalCleared_for+ISU_1607021.docx+pdf .pdf (accessed August 3, 2016). 211. ProMED, “Subject: PRO/AH African Swine Fever—Europe (09): Poland (PD), Porcine, Domestic,” August 10, 2016; ProMED Digest 50, no. 29 (August 9, 2016), http://www.promedmail.org (accessed August 15, 2016).

7 Policy Suggestions and Possible Future Collaborations

The two events that motivated us to write this book, namely the Putin administration’s threat to develop “genetic” weapons and the collapse of US-Russian engagement over the BWC, simultaneously occurred at the start of Putin’s third presidential term in 2012. In the introductory Chapter 1, we laid out eight questions whose answers we hoped would shed light on the causes and consequences of these twin events. Our first three questions sought to define Russia’s doctrine for biodefense and for high-technology weapons, with a focus on “genetic” weapons and that of other “weapons based on new physical principles.” Our fourth question was on the state of two parallel networks that would implement said doctrine: the network of military and civilian institutes that run Russia’s biodefense programs, and the network of institutions that would presumably implement the threatened military biotechnology projects. Our fifth question, on the state of Russia’s civilian biotechnology field, asked whether civilian researchers could make meaningful international contributions in the scientific and commercial arenas, or were instead increasingly pushed by the Putin administration toward making a hard choice between military work and emigration. Our sixth and seventh questions revolved around knowing whether the Putin administration believed its own propaganda alleging US biological warfare activities. Our eighth question sought to determine what the Russian diplomatic objectives were at the BWC. We summarize our individual findings in the paragraphs that follow, and close with a short discourse of the overall situation, future prospects, and one recommendation. Based on our review of government documents and speeches and articles by high-level individuals presented in Chapter 3, we believe that Russian ministries hold varying interpretations as to what has to be done to achieve biosecurity and why such actions are necessary. Doctrinal documents since the Putin administration issued the “Principles of State Policy in 351

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the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security” in 2003 have been explicit about the vast range of perceived internal biosafety hazards.1 For anyone who has followed public health publications issued by the Soviet Union, statements by the Russian government often are astounding in the information they reveal about the many real and possible biohazards facing Russia (though less and less information is being made available since 2013). Hazards identified in the 2003 decree and in those issued in subsequent years—such as the many thousands of unsecured burial pits for animals that were killed by anthrax, contaminated industrial sites due to Sovietera deplorable safety records, and aging biosafety systems within biological laboratories—were classified information in Soviet times.2 But external security threats have also featured prominently in these doctrinal documents. In October 2008, the administration established a national program that provided federal funding for biodefense and whose justifying text defined priority biosafety and biosecurity threats (see Chapter 3). This document listed four biological threat scenarios: transboundary drifts of pathogens, unauthorized use of genetically modified organisms, use of biological agents by terrorists, and biological weapons designed abroad “on the basis of the latest achievements in genomics, proteomics, genetic engineering of pathogens, environmental pathogens, as well as in organic and inorganic chemistry.”3 We noted that doctrinal statements have gotten increasingly hawkish regarding the assumed severity of these threats. We also flagged how the text of the new national program is now classified in a return to Soviet-era secrecy standards and in a break from its refreshingly open predecessor document. We documented how the vague Soviet-era “weapons based on new physical principles” concept resurged under Serdyukov’s tenure. We hypothesized it was reintroduced as part of an effort to justify the military reform pushed by the latter. We found that the MOD defines “genetic weapons” as weapons that are capable of damaging the genetic code of an individual, and that the MOD’s sole hypothetical example of such weapons was as follows: “It is assumed/expected that some viruses can/may serve as the active principle.” 4 Thus, if one takes seriously Serdyukov’s 2012 promise to Putin that the MOD would develop such weapons,5 it is reasonable to assume that these will be based on viruses as active agents and therefore violate the BWC. We noted the numerous high-level calls for the development of biotechnology-based weapons in Russia, without further specification. When taken in conjunction with the MOD’s apparent support for the development of “genetic” weapons, these statements erode normative barriers toward biological weapons in Russia. Should a military official or an ambitious scientist lobby for a new Russian BW program, they would be able to justify their requests for funding by referring to language found in doctrinal documents as well as in texts prepared by Putin and by several notable

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technocrats. Under Serdyukov and Shoigu’s leadership, the MOD established new organizations for the rapid fielding of high-technology weapons, including through rapid weapons prototyping based on civilian technological breakthroughs (see Chapter 4). Weaponeers at these institutes have therefore been encouraged by their superiors to view Russia’s civilian biotechnology sector as a source of future weapons. For instance, in a 2008 speech Putin himself argued that biotechnology could bring about “revolutionary changes in weapons and defence,” and called for a modern Russian army capable of being “entrusted with the deployment, servicing and use of new generation weapons.”6 Specifically, the leaders of MOD institutes that implement “non-lethal” weapons programs and that have significant influence over the SAP and the SAP’s R&D funds have advocated for the Russian development of “biotechnology-based weapons.” As documented in Chapter 4, one of these institutes has in recent years developed a chemical agent dispenser as part of a “nonlethal” ground projectile project, a finding which raises concerns that it might develop a “biotechnology-based” variant with the support of this network. We were alarmed that the Russian government now openly claims the existence of a “new generation” of weapons developed using biotechnology and using biological agents that in their minds do not violate the BWC; that foreign states are developing such arms; and therefore that Russia itself must “study” these weapons.7 These statements raise serious questions about the Putin administration’s intentions vis-à-vis the BWC, in part because it is how that administration excuses the Soviet BW program. That is, according to the fiction spun by hardliners in Russia, the Soviet program was established only to defend against BW, and that whatever agents it weaponized, it did so only to learn how to protect itself. This fiction is maintained despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, summarized in Chapter 2. The world now knows that the Soviet Union had the largest and most sophisticated offensive BW program in history, one that was acknowledged by President Boris Yeltsin and declared in Russia’s 1992 CBM return. This history leads us to view recent doctrinal statements issued by the Putin administration with unease. These statements were issued while the Russian biodefense network underwent a substantial expansion under the Putin and Medvedev administrations. As detailed in Chapter 4, institutions of concern highlighted in Chapter 2 have received enormous sums of money, in the billions of rubles, to modernize their infrastructure and to conduct research in the life sciences. As a result, dual-use activities conducted at institutes that once were important components of the Soviet BW program have greatly increased. Production lines at the MOD’s Kirov, Sverdlovsk, and Zagorsk Institutes, as well as at Vector, are now being refurbished, ostensibly for the production of pharmaceutical compounds or vaccines. The MOD is refurbishing an open-air

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test site at Pyshma, supposedly for testing disinfectants. Rospotrebnadzor has funded “gain-of-function” work on virulent BW-relevant pathogens, notably B. anthracis, at Mikrob—and did so at a time when the head of Rospotrebnadzor denounced gain-of-function experiments in the Netherlands and United States as violating the BWC. The roughly 10,000-strong NBC Troops have seen their main research and training institute at Shikhany2 revamped, have received new equipment, and have been subjected to more frequent and realistic training exercises. Overall, the activities at the Biopreparat institutes SRCAM and Vector that were transparent when they were receiving funds from the US CTR program during 1995–2010, but after the Putin administration ordered the closing down of CTR in Russia, SRCAM’s and Vector’s involvement in Russia’s biodefense network has led to their becoming largely opaque to outsiders. In order to place this defensive buildup in its local context, we needed to establish a baseline of Russian civilian biotechnology and pharmaceutical activities. With regard to the developments in the civilian biotechnology sphere that are described and assessed in Chapter 5, Russian analysts perceive their country as losing a “technological race” against Western countries.8 Despite ambitious governmental plans, the civilian biotechnology sphere in Russia has not developed as planned. While the civilian sector has recovered from the post-Soviet collapse years, it is not in excellent health and its independence is increasingly threatened by abrupt and controversial reforms. Although US and European targeted sanctions were not designed to impact Russia’s pharmaceutical sector, they have reinforced Russian fears of overreliance on the West. These have been used to justify the securitization framework employed by both Medvedev and Putin when describing the necessity of modernizing Russia’s civilian biotechnology and pharmaceutical fields. As evidenced by official comments made during the RAS reform debates, some Russian government hardliners apparently view these fields as zero-sum in that whatever the West gains, Russia loses. This viewpoint has manifested itself in a desire to reinstitute Soviet-style publication and travel controls on state-funded researchers, ostensibly because of security concerns. Whether this viewpoint continues to gain in prominence among Putin administration officials will depend in part on whether US and European civilian institutions are willing to make strenuous efforts to maintain productive ties with their Russian counterparts. We believe that as late as 2013, the Russian ministry in charge of implementing the BWC in Russia had not asserted that the United States was in noncompliance with the BWC. Nevertheless, it did raise concerns over what it saw as dual-use activities. The fact that the Russian government accelerated its threat assessment programs post-2013 suggests growing attention within the Putin administration to this issue.

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It is striking to note how rapidly the situation pertaining to the BWC deteriorated since Putin’s reelection in 2012. Propaganda campaigns alleging US biological warfare activities began in 2012 and have since then increased in frequency and virulence. These reached a peak in odiousness in 2015, when particularly vicious allegations once grist for the mill for news outlets were expressed by Russian diplomats at BWC-related meetings (see Chapter 6). A major Russian diplomatic initiative was unveiled by the MFA in 2014 and was continued through 2016; the proposed changes are all in Russia’s favor and appear designed to occasion diplomatic tensions at the expense of the United States at the BWC meetings. Russian diplomats even attempted to blame the highly disappointing outcome of the eighth RevCon on the West, even though all present knew that the true culprit in terms of having hindered progress had been Iran. In sum, the Putin administration apparently decided for unknown reasons to adopt a new hardline BWC policy by the end of 2013. Since that time, it has increased its biodefense capabilities, revised upward its BW risk assessments enshrined in doctrinal texts, decreased transparency over its biodefense funding and activities, accelerated the frequency of its internal threat assessments of foreign compliance with the BWC, and launched a combined propaganda-diplomatic campaign meant to challenge the state of US compliance with the BWC. The lack of an overt US response to these concerning developments was likely the result of prioritization in favor of then-emerging diplomatic crises with Russia, of which there is now no shortage. Pressing issues included Russia’s apparent noncompliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, its annexation of Crimea, and its military intervention in the Syrian civil war. Appetite for action to address the state of Russian compliance with the BWC was presumably low in part because doing so was seen as unlikely to yield positive results. Further, doing so would have risked convincing Russia’s leadership that it had nothing left to lose from conducting activities that were outright in noncompliance with the BWC. We believe that this nonresponse strategy is no longer advisable given the continued Russian biodefense buildup and the escalation of their antiUS disinformation campaigns on BW issues. We cannot discern whether Putin and his confidantes simply plan to maintain a large-scale biodefense program to rival or surpass that of the United States while challenging US diplomatic power abroad, or is instead bent on subverting the BWC. It seems to us that the alarming developments in Russia warrant the implementation of a new US Department of State strategy designed to ensure the latter outcome does not occur. We list possible options for such a response in the paragraphs that follow, not because we presume to know what must be done, but instead to highlight the existence of diplomatic paths forward as a positive conclusion to an otherwise pessimistic assessment.

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If, like us, the Department of State is increasingly unable to ascertain Russian compliance with the BWC, it should make such a determination in its yearly compliance report so as to empower the US executive and legislative branches to take appropriate measures. For example, compliance reports could point to the growth of the Russian biodefense apparatus and the Russian doctrinal requirement to “study” alleged foreign biotechnologybased weapons that somehow do not violate the BWC as developments that frustrate compliance analysis. The Department of State does not need to stand alone in responding to Russian BW propaganda and in asking tough questions regarding Russian activities in return. NATO allies, in particular the UK in its role as a BWC Depositary State, have a responsibility to jointly counter Russian security threats, including that posed by the spread of propaganda on biosecurity issues. More broadly, all countries that benefit from US assistance in the life sciences stand to gain from continued publicity of the benefits gained from this partnership in light of the growing likelihood of Russian disinformation campaigns targeting these cooperative programs. A more creative, albeit more difficult, option would be to foster an unclassified discussion with Chinese analysts on issues of biodefense. The latter probably have concerns of their own regarding the legacy of the Soviet BW program; after all, the Soviet BW munitions site in Malta appears to have been designed to facilitate strikes against China. The United States would also benefit from discussing with Chinese biodefense officials to prevent misunderstandings that could arise from successful Russian propaganda campaigns. Whether Chinese counterparts would be willing to engage on these issues can, however, only be guessed. The Department of State has the means to more forcibly counteract Russian disinformation campaigns. Regardless of the specific measures chosen to do so, we argue that it is imperative for the United States to ensure foreign trust in its commitment to the BWC. The United States is already far more transparent than Russia in terms of its biodefense activities, while the latter must reckon with the legacy of the Soviet Union’s grand violation of the BWC. The Department of State has nothing to lose from compiling and publicizing already available information on the subjects raised in Russian propaganda, while Russian delegates will presumably be far less willing to have tit-for-tat questions posed at BWC meetings or during public events regarding their ongoing refurbishment of former Soviet BW facilities, including of an open-air testing site. Although we realize that the US-Russian diplomatic relationship is unlikely to fundamentally improve in the foreseeable future, we nevertheless propose three activities that might, if implemented, sustain civilian bioscience cooperation between the two countries and mitigate the impact of Russian propaganda campaigns on public trust in the BWC.

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Space Biology Joint US, European, and Soviet/Russian space biology research missions were successfully undertaken for decades, as we describe in Chapter 5. Even during the worst days of the Cold War, for instance during the period of extreme tension that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, scientists and their societies were able to operate peacefully directed space biology programs. Further, the international partnership that operates the elements of the International Space Station has been in existence since 1998, and the US and Russian governments both have funded its operation to 2024. Based on the successful history of the space biology research missions and the continuing International Space Station program, it appears to us that no great steps need to be taken between Russia and the United States and other interested countries to reestablish such missions without too many problems. From the US side, NASA would once again be the lead agency, but would have to be provided with sufficient funds by Congress to enable it to pull its weight to build, equip, employ experts, and launch the required space platforms. The National Academy of Sciences would, of course, be heavily involved in this endeavor. From the Russian side, its space biology program supposedly continues under the auspices of the federal space program with some connections with other countries, especially Germany. However, future Russian launches are considerably delayed and may end up being canceled due to the grave financial situation facing Russia. Even if Russia would support future joint experiments to take place, it is questionable whether the Putin administration will allow other countries, especially the United States, to participate in them. But perhaps this would not occur if the supposed good relations between Trump and Putin do exist or would bloom starting in 2017. US and Russian Academies The US National Academy of Sciences and the RAS have a long, close relationship, which has been described in detail in a fascinating book well titled The Unique U.S.-Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology: Recent Experience and Future Directions.9 This relationship has wilted during the past two years for reasons that are not clear to us. We have heard that there are some interactions between the academies, but that it has become much more difficult than in the past for the Americans to easily contact Russian scientists by email or in person at meetings. But as we describe in Chapter 5, the fact is that the RAS is no longer its own master but must report to FASO, which is Putin’s creation. As was mentioned in

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Chapter 5, it might be that the Putin administration’s priorities do not include supporting basic research other than at a low level, which would result in Russian academicians not being able to have good communications or be able to undertake foreign travel. Perhaps more pernicious is that scientists working at academic institutions must submit their publications to FASO for clearance before being able to publish them. It could be that this restriction also includes communications with foreign persons and entities. If so, it would explain the difficulties with communications as Russian scientists are afraid to exchange emails with foreigners. Countering False Allegations In December 2016, we learned of two reports that deal with the same subject. First, the Czech government is to set up a specialist “anti–fake news” unit as officials attempt to tackle falsehoods, predominantly about migrants, which they claim are spread by websites supported by the government of Russian president Vladimir Putin. Second, the German government plans to create a center in Berlin to fight “disinformation. We are aware that other countries have already set up such centers, for example in Estonia and Finland. We have learned that such centers or units also exist in the classified realm, including in the United States. However, as far as we know about open centers, none of them deal with biological matters. We think it is very important that this gap be filled. We suggest that a unit dedicated to adducing evidence in order to refute statements or claims that deal with biological or biotechnological subjects that are false, erroneous, and/or invalid. This unit should be set up by NGOs that possess the necessary expertise to conduct such investigations and are highly regarded because they are generally considered fair, honest, and impartial. On the international level, we think that two organizations have the required qualifications to set up such refuting units, the International Council for Science (ICSU) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The ICSU is a nongovernmental organization with a global membership of 122 national scientific bodies representing 142 countries and 31 international scientific unions.10 The ICSU’s mission is to strengthen international science for the benefit of society. The problem as we see with the ICSU is that organizations from both the United States (National Academy of Sciences) and Russia (RAS) are national members plus they both are likely to have memberships in the 31 international scientific unions. The ICSU’s general assembly is empowered to establish ad hoc committees, but since the council does not usually get involved with political issues, it is unlikely that the general assembly would approve a technical research unit that undoubtedly would be dragged into politics.

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SIPRI is an international NGO that is mostly funded by the Swedish government. Additional funds are secured for specific projects from other governments and private foundations. SIPRI prides itself to be “the independent resource on global security.”11 While SIPRI does not have in-house biological expertise, it does have staff members who are well versed with BW issues and could act as cadres to the unit. This being the case, funding would be needed from outside sources to pay for expenses to have scientific experts on call via Internet and, should it be necessary, to gather the experts in Stockholm. These are not insurmountable obstacles to setting up a refuting unit. On the national level we suggest that certain professional societies would be best situated to setting up refuting units, assuming that moneys could be secured for this purpose. A good example of such a professional society is the American Society for Microbiology (ASM). The ASM explains itself as being the largest single life science society, with a membership of over 47,000 scientists and health professionals. Its mission is to promote and advance the microbial sciences. Among its activities, it seeks to promote a deeper understanding of the microbial sciences to diverse audiences.12 The ASM already has a board of public and scientific affairs that monitors legislation and regulation and develops positions for the Society on public policy issues. As such, it seems to us that it is well positioned to house a refuting unit. It is important that the funding for setting up and operating a refuting unit for the long term should not come from a government agency because populations of countries other than the funder probably would doubt that the refuting unit’s findings would in fact be fair, honest, and impartial. It would be best if highly regarded foundations such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation in the United States and the Volkswagen Foundation (VolkswagenStiftung) in Germany could be convinced to support a few refuting units in Europe and Asia. We add that refuting units might have a wider scope of operation than only refuting Russian allegations. They could have a role of quickly providing authoritative information on disease outbreaks that the mass media sensationalizes or misrepresents.13 They could also emphasize the existence of the BWC, especially when refuting allegations of BW use, and in this way remind their public audience of the ongoing relevance and importance of the treaty. Notes 1. Security Council of the Russian Federation, “Principles of State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation to 2010 and Beyond” (in Russian), approved by the President of the Russian Federation by Order no. PR-2194 on December 4, 2003, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/37 .html (accessed April 20, 2016).

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2. Vladimir Putin, “Speech at Expanded Meeting of the State Council on Russia’s Development Strategy Through to 2020,” February 8, 2008, http://en.kremlin .ru/events/president/transcripts/24825 (accessed March 6, 2016). 3. Russian Federation, “On the Federal Target Program ‘The National System of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation (2009–2014)’” (in Russian), Russian Federation, Government Decree no. 791, October 27, 2008 (as amended 17 October, 2014), retrieved from Russian Emergency Situations Ministry, http://www.mchs.gov.ru/document/3582457 (accessed April 18, 2016). 4. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Encyclopedia: Weapons on New Physical Principles (in Russian), n.d., http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia /dictionary/details.htm?id=13770@morfDictionary (accessed December 20, 2016). 5. Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia” (in Russian), February 20, 2012, http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18185 (defunct), retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20120504063733/http://premier.gov.ru /eng/events/news/18185 (accessed May 13, 2016). 6. Putin, “Speech at Expanded Meeting.” 7. Russian Federation, “Principles of State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation to 2025 and Beyond” (in Russian), approved by the President of the Russian Federation by Order no. PR-2573 on November 1, 2013, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/18/127.html (accessed March 14, 2016). 8. Russian Federation, “State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology in the Russian Federation until 2020” (in Russian), VP-P8 322, April 24, 2012, p. 6, http://owwz.de/fileadmin/Biotechnologie/Information_Biotech/BIO2020 _Programme_full.pdf (accessed April 20, 2016). 9. Committee on Future Contributions of the Biosciences to Public Health, Agriculture, Basic Research, Counterterrorism, and Nonproliferation Activities in Russia, Office for Central Europe and Eurasia Development, Security, and Cooperation Policy and Global Affairs, National Research Council of the National Academies, in cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences, The Unique U.S.-Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology: Recent Experience and Future Directions (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2013). 10. About ICSU: http://www.icsu.org/about-icsu/about-us (accessed December 29, 2016). 11. About SIPRI: https://www.sipri.org/about (accessed December 29, 2016). 12. About ASM: https://www.asm.org/index.php/about-the-american-society -for-microbiology (accessed December 29, 2016). 13. One of the authors, Zilinskas, is long-term member of the ASM.

Acronyms

AHG ARF ASF ASM AVN BW BWC C3 CB CBMs CBRN CBRNE

CBW CD CDC

CIS CREIs CTR CW CWC DOD ELISA FAO FASO FMBA FOI

Ad Hoc Group Advanced Research Foundation African swine fever American Society for Microbiology Academy of Military Sciences biological warfare Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention command, control, and communications chemical and biological confidence-building measures for the BWC chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced explosives chemical and biological warfare Conference on Disarmament Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (United States) Commonwealth of Independent States Centers for Research, Education and Innovation Cooperative Threat Reduction program (United States) chemical warfare Chemical Weapons Convention US Department of Defense enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations) Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations Federal Medical-Biological Agency Swedish Defense Research Agency 361

362

Acronyms

FSA FSB G-8 G-20 GDP GMP GP GRU GS HIV ICSU IEI IHPB INF Treaty ISU IT LIDAR MCUD MFA MIC

MIT MOD MOH MSP MX NAM NBC NBIC

NCDC

NGO NIC NII NPO NRC NSS OAO OIE OOO OPBW

Federal Space Agency Russian Federal Security Service (see SVR) Group of Eight Group of 20 gross domestic product good manufacturing practice Geneva Protocol (1925) Main Intelligence Directorate General Staff of the Russian Ministry of Defense human immunodeficiency virus International Council for Science Institute of Engineering Immunology Research Institute of Highly Pure Biopreparations Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty BWC Implementation Support Unit information technology laser-illuminated detection and ranging military cover unit designator Ministry of Foreign Affairs Military-Industrial Commission (Russian acronym VPK) Massachusetts Institute of Technology Ministry of Defense Ministry of Health BWC Meeting of States Parties BWC Meeting of Experts Non-Aligned Movement nuclear, biological, and chemical nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technologies, and cognitive technologies L. Sakvarelidze National Center for Disease Control and Public Health nongovernmental organization National Immunobiological Company Scientific-Research Institute (see TSNII) Research and Production [company or association] National Research Council (United States) National Security Strategy open joint stock company World Organisation for Animal Health limited liability company Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (nonexistent)

Acronyms

OPCW OWG P5 PrepCom R&D RAMS RAS RASA RChBD RevCon RISC RKhBB

363

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons open-ended working group permanent five members of the UN Security Council Preparatory Committee for the RevCon research and development Russian Academy of Medical Sciences Russian Academy of Sciences Russian-Speaking Academic Science Association radiological, chemical, and biological defense Review Conference of the BWC Russian Science Citation Index Office of Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Safety Rospotrebnadzor Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being Rosselkhoznadzor Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance RT Russia Today S&T science and technology SAP State Armament Program (alternatively abbreviated GPV) SF Skolkovo Foundation SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SK Skolkovo Innovation Center Skoltech Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology SNOPB Biopreparat’s Scientific Experimental and Production Base SPA Scientific Production Association SPEB specialized mobile anti-epidemic brigade SPVIR System for Advanced Research and Developments of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense SRCAM All-Union Research Institute for Applied Microbiology SVR Foreign Intelligence Service TSNII Central Scientific-Research Institute (see NII) TsRL central reference laboratory UAV unmanned aerial vehicle UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNMOVIC United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission UNSG Mechanism United Nations Secretary-General Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical, Bacteriological (Biological), or Toxin Weapons

364

Acronyms

VDV

Vector VED VEEV VEREX VVST WHO WMD WTO

Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska (Russia’s airborne troops) All-Union Research Institute of Molecular Biology Vital and Essential Drug list Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint weapons and special military equipment World Health Organization weapon of mass destruction World Trade Organization

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Index

Note: Figures on the color insert pages are indicated by “fig” and the number.

Academy of Military Sciences (AVN), 46, 72, 130 Actual Problems of Protection and Security conference, 109 Ad Hoc Group (AHG), 292–293 Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint (VEREX), 4, 292 Adamsky, Dima, 46 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, 333–334 Advanced Research Foundation (ARF), 118, 121; criticism of, 130–131; mission of, 127; MOD disagreements, 130; projects and proposals of, 128– 129; robotics research of, 128; Rogozin on, 129 Aerosol particle counter system (ARS), 109 African Swine Fever (ASF): cattle loss and, 294; in Europe and Caucasus, 334–336; outbreaks, 277, 302, fig6.1; panzootic, 296–298; from US laboratories, 296, 298; vaccines, 150, 297, 298 Agafonov, Aleksandr, 104 AHG. See Ad Hoc Group AIDS vaccine, 135, 137, 138, 274 Alexeevich, Dankvert, 150

Alibek, Ken, 10, 17 Allegations: of BW, 359; countering false, 358–359; at MSP, 322; by Onishchenko, 308; against United States, 291, 293–310, 316–322, 330– 332 All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Phytopathology, 11 All-Russian Service for Disaster Medicine Protection, 152 All-Union Foot-and-Mouth Disease Institute, 11 All-Union Research Institute for Applied Microbiology (SRCAM), 15–16, 136, 156tab; as civilian institute, 139–141; funding of, 354; MOD and, 140; peaceful focus of, 140; plasmid publication of, 143–144 All-Union Research Institute of Molecular Biology (Vector), 15–16, 25, 156tab; AIDS vaccine and, 135, 137, 138; Bittern-1 and, 113; as civilian research institute, 133–139; Collaborating Centre, 134; control of, 133; Ebola vaccine and, 104–105, 137–138; expansion of, 353; funding of, 354; measles vaccine and, 136– 137; outreach work in Guinea, 138; renovation of, 139; smallpox vaccine and, 134; studies at, 135–136; tenders to, 158; volatile leadership in, 134– 135 American Society for Microbiology (ASM), 359 Anthrax, 8tab, 141–143, 288, 321, 322; United States and, 304–306, 326, 332

369

370

Index

Anti-fake news, 358 Antigens, 103, 137, 138, 141, 145, 229, 297 Antipov, V. B., 67, 75 Antisera, 145 AO-2.5RTM submunition, 21 Aralsk-7, 8–9, 12–13, 19, 101 ARF. See Advanced Research Foundation Arms control, 330–331, 333, 334; agreements, 284; obligations, 67; treaties, 35, 65, 285, 318; violations, 38 ARS. See Aerosol particle counter system ASF. See African Swine Fever ASM. See American Society for Microbiology “Assessment of the Legal Framework Regarding the Use by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of Chemical-Based Non-Lethal Weapons” (Antipov and Novichkov), 67, 75 Association of Russian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 252 AstraZeneca, 216 Astrobiology program, 235, 236 Avian influenza, 150, 290 AVN. See Academy of Military Sciences

Bacillus anthracis, 7, 8tab, 16, 54, 98– 99, 140–143, 354. See also Anthrax Bacteriological methods of warfare, 300– 301 Bakhin, Arkady, 91 Belskikh, Andrey, 104 Beltyukov, Alexei, 224 Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Sonia, 22 Bielski, Andrei N., 107 BIO-2020. See State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology in the Russian Federation until 2020 Bioaerosols, 95–96, 109, 112, 322 Biodefense: civilian research institutes for, 131–150; concept of, 5; electronic library for, 165–166; flows through military and civilian networks, 154– 159, 156tab, fig4.6; funding, 352; institution diagram, 90fig; Medvedev

expanding, 353; military institutions for, 115–125; military-industrial complex institutions for, 125–131; MOD institutions for, 91–106; MOD Main Military Directorate for, 106– 115; MOH and, 150–154; NBC troop future work, 161–165; overview of, 87–89; planning, 4; programming for, 51–66; Putin expanding, 353; United States projects, 286 Biodetection capabilities, 55 Biohazards, 94, 352 Biological agents: BWC and, 61, 353; detecting, 135, 147; dissemination of, 22; exposure to, 52, 54; identifying, 56, 62; in munitions, 14, 70; NBC troops and, 114; production of, 281; protection from, 164, 282; responding to, 274; safeguarding, 321; in terrorism, 60, 286, 352; testing of, 302; transfer of, 322; warnings against, 95 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), 2, 9, 13; acknowledgment of, 67; assessments of foreign nation’s compliance, 279– 283; biological agents and, 61, 353; CBM submissions, 24–25, 98; China on, 319; code of conduct and, 319; collapse of engagement in, 351; compliance and verification statement, 2010, 285–290; compliance and verification statement, 2011, 290; compliance and verification statement, 2012, 290– 291; compliance and verification statement, 2013, 291–299; compliance and verification statement, 2014, 299–303; compliance and verification statement, 2015, 303–305; compliance and verification statement, 2016, 305–310; compliance issues, 3, 276, 283–285; declarations and activities of, 5; division and duplication of roles in, 277–279; documents and events of, 333–334; export control system for, 319; Foreign Policy Concept and, 60; ISU, 24, 282, 289, 314–318, 325, 329; MFA and, 59–60, 69, 279, 284–

Index

285; Military Doctrine on, 59, 69; Ministry of Industry and Trade and, 277–279; overview of, 273–277; permits under, 5; policy process of, 277–283; preparations for RevCon, 310–330; Putin and, 279, 332, 355; Rospotrebnadzor on compliance, 325–327; tasks for compliance with, 159–160; Ukraine crisis and, 319; United States commitment to, 356; United States compliance with, 286– 287, 290; United States proposals for strengthening, 327–328; violations of, 45, 70, 353, 354, 356; work that contravenes, 74. See also Arms control Biological failures, 336 Biological laboratories, 54–55 Biological Security Working Sub-Group, 274–275 Biological warfare (BW), 2, 3, 109; allegations of, 359; delivery systems for, 20–22; dismantling, 25; first generation program, 1928-1971, 7–9; FOI on, 23; illicit programs in, 287; legacy of, 10–23; MOD institutes for, 8–9, 12–16, 23; pathogens used as weapons in, 8tab; personnel for, 22– 23; propaganda campaigns on, 355, 356; RAS and, 252; secondgeneration program, 1972-1992, 9–10, 88; security, 4; sophisticated, historical, 353; Soviet facilities for, 11–18; termination of, 19; United States and, 9, 69, 330; virus payloads for, 9; weaponized agents during, 18– 20 Biological weapons: contaminated zones, 52; Decree 791 on, 54; designed abroad, 352; genetic engineering for, 9, 54; KGB and, 17–18; pathogens for, 8tab; stockpiles of, 283 Bion missions, 236–239 Bio-nano-information technology weapons, 37–38; breakthroughs in, 42, 70; Burenok on, 70–71, 75; Putin on, 43–44, 48, 70 Bionanotechnology, 202–203 Biopreparat, 10–14, 92; Bonfire research, 17, 20; cover of, 20; institutes of, 15– 16; scientists in, 23

371

Bioremediation, 99 Biosecurity: documents and statements on, 75; funding for, 53; hawks in NBC troops and, 66–68; Military Doctrine and, 35–51; NSS on, 64–65; overview of, 33–35; priorities, 76–77; threat perceptions to, 51–66, 69, 352. See also Civilian bioscience and biotechnology; specific topics BioShield program, 281 Biosporin, 99–100 Biotechnology: China spending on, 201, 250; discoveries, 70; funding of, 201; salaries paid in, 204; threats, 59; in United States, 201–202. See also Civilian bioscience and biotechnology; Nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive technologies Biotechnology clusters, 215–218 Bioterrorism, 41, 54, 60, 102–103, 109 BioWeapons Prevention Project, 315 Bird flu, 291 Birstein, Vadim J., 17 Bittern-1, 113 Bolton, John, 293, 322 Bonfire research, 17, 20 Borisevich, Sergei, 102 Borisov, Yuri, 121; as Deputy Minister, 91–92; on SAP work, 51, 75 Brucella suis, 8tab Brucellosis, 8tab, 54, 141, 148, 153, 232, 288 Budgets: of Decree 791, 56; of MOD, 50; for SAP, 87 Bulgarkov, Dmitry V., 92, 124 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 323 Burenok, Vasily M., 42, 124; on bionano-information technology weapons, 70–71, 75; on innovation strategy, 48; on new generation weapons, 48; on threats to Russia, 47–48; on weapons based on new physical principles, 75 Burkholderia mallei, 8tab Burkholderia pseudomallei, 8tab Bush, George W., 37, 284, 303 BW. See Biological warfare BWC. See Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

372

Index

C3. See Command, control, and communications CBM. See Confidence-building measures CBRN. See Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security CBRNE. See Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and thermodynamic/enhanced explosives CBW. See Chemical and biological warfare CD. See Conference on Disarmament CFE. See Conventional Forces In Europe Chemezov, Sergey, 232–233 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and thermodynamic/enhanced explosives (CBRNE), 97 Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security (CBRN): countermeasures against attacks, 281; disagreement on threats to, 64; Putin on, 63–64, 75 Chemical and biological warfare (CBW), 18, 22, 97, 280 Chemical terrorism, 323 Chemical warfare (CW), 93 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 61, 93, 277–278, 300–301; acknowledgment of, 67; NBC interpretation of, 323; prohibitions of, 68 Cherdakov, Yevgeny, 118, 121 Chereshnev, Valeriy, 104 Cherkasov, Edward A., 110, 112 China: in Africa, 296; Biotechnology and Bio-industry Development Report, 202; biotechnology spending by, 201, 250; bonus plan in, 203; on BWC, 319; cluster munitions and, 21; code of conduct and, 325; embarrassment with, 14; joint ventures in, 233; National Biotec Group, 234; proposals by, 329; weapons against, 301, 356; Yersinia pestis conference in, 275 Cholera vaccine, 144 CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent States “Citizens of Russia” (Putin), 35–38, 42 Civilian bioscience and biotechnology: academy reform case study, 240–249;

advanced degrees in, 204, 205fig, 206fig, 207; BIO-2020, 209–210, 211tab, 212–213; developments in, 200–204, 207; domestic programs in, 207–213; FOI on, 200–201; funding of, 201; international collaboration programs in, 213–227; monitoring of, 251; National Programme for the Development of Biotechnology in Russia 2006–2015, 213; NSS on, 251; overview of, 199–200; Pharma-2020, 208–209; pharmaceutical consolidation case study, 227–235, 354; publications, 202–203; under Putin and Medvedev, 199–200, 207, 249; space biology case study, 235– 240, 357 Civilian research institutes: Federal Research Center of Medical and Preventive Technology for Risk Management of Public Health and, 149; Federal State Anti-Plague Center, Moscow, and, 149; Irkutsk Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute for Siberia and the Far East as, 146; Khabarovsk Scientific Research Institute for Epidemiology and Microbiology as, 148–149; Mikrob and Microbe as, 141–145; Rospotrebnadzor as, 131–133; Rosselkhoznadzor and, 150; Rostovon-Don Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute as, 147–148; SRCAM as, 139–141; Stavropol AntiPlague Scientific Research Institute as, 147; Vector as, 133–139; Volgograd Anti-Plague Institute as, 145–146 Clinton, Hillary, 273 Cluster munitions, 21 Cold War, 93, 310, 357 Command, control, and communications (C3), 38 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 145, 216, 298, 301–303, 310 Conference on Disarmament (CD), 322– 323 Confidence-building measures (CBMs): BWC submissions, 24–25, 98; as confidential, 162; dual-use technologies and, 159; improvements

Index

to, 318; issuance of, 139; process of, 332; United States submissions, 289 Convention on Cluster Munitions, 21 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 54, 59 Conventional Forces In Europe (CFE), 36 Cooperative Threat Reduction-United States (CTR), 133, 139 Course-KB program, 280–283, 288–289, 297–298, 308, 330–331 Coxiella burnetii, 8tab Crawley, Edward F., 221–222 Crimea annexation, 46, 66, 275, 283, 355; MOD and, 112; sanctions and, 252; statement on, 315–316; vote for, 224. See also Ukraine crisis CTR. See Cooperative Threat ReductionUnited States Cuba, 36, 302, 316, 326, 332; joint ventures in, 233 CW. See Chemical warfare CWC. See Chemical Weapons Convention

D. I. Ivanovsky Institute of Virology, 152, 154, 156tab DARPA. See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency-United States Davydov, Vitaliy, 128–130 Decree 577, 76 Decree 791: addressing health and environmental problems, 53–54; on biodetection and disinfection capabilities, 55; on biological laboratories, 54–55; on biological weapons, 54; budget of, 56; goal of, 53; on MOD facilities, 56; tasks ordered in, 55–56 Decree 843, 76 Decree 899, 76 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency-United States (DARPA), 127, 131 Defense expenditures, 39tab Defense Solutions Bureau, 118, 120 Demina, Yulia, 320–321

373

Department of Agriculture-United States, 287, 297 Department of Defense-United States, 225, 282–283, 292, 304, 306–307, 316, 332 Department of Health and Human Services-United States, 287 Department of Promising Joint Research and Special Projects, 121–122 Department of State-United States, 2–3, 333 Disinfection capabilities, 55 Disinformation campaigns, 276, 278– 279, 296–297, 355, 358. See also Propaganda campaigns Dmitriyev, Viktor, 252 Domaradsky, Igor, 10, 17 Drozdov, Ilya G., 134, 138 Dual-use technologies: CBMs and, 159; NSS on, 58; United States and, 320, 354

Ebola, 104–105, 137–138, 310; Onishchenko on, 333 “Ebola Can Be Turned into Bioweapon, Russian & UK Experts Warn,” 303 “Effects of Space Flight on Microorganisms” (Voeikov), 236 Eighth Review Conference of BWC (RevCon): CD proposal and, 322– 323; meeting of, 334; MFA initiatives, 2014, 311–316; MX of 2015, 316–322; preparations for, 310–330; PrepCom meeting, 2016, 323–328; Russian performance at, 328–330; United States proposals for strengthening BWC, 327–328 Ekologiya, 10, 11, 18 Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), 98 Erofeev, Sergei, 199 European Union (EU), 316; biotechnology spending, 201; cooperation with, 235; sanctions imposed by, 251, 252; weakening of, 279 EV NIIEG plague vaccine, 147 Evropské Hodnoty, 309 Fagot, 20

374

Index

Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations (FASO), 243–244, 248, 357–358 Federal Medical-Biological Agency (FMBA), 56, 95, 129, 148, 151–152 Federal Research Center of Medical and Preventive Technology for Risk Management of Public Health, Perm, 149, 156tab Federal Security Service (FSB), 18, 68, 124, 248, 278 Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being (Rospotrebnadzor), 56, 109, 291, 295; all publications, fig4.4, fig4.5; on BWC compliance, 325–327; as civilian research institute, 131–133; gain-of-function research, 354; journal publications, fig4.3 Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor), 56, 150 Federal Space Agency (FSA), 236, 239 Federal State Anti-Plague Center, Moscow, 149, 156tab Federal Target Program, 41 Ferment, 20 First generation BW program, 19281971, 7–9 Fisun, Alexander, 106 Fiztech, 217 Flask, 20 Flute program, 17, 20 FMBA. See Federal Medical-Biological Agency FOI. See Swedish Defense Research Agency Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), 18 Foreign Policy Concept, 35, 51, 59, 60, 75 Foreign technology transfers, 251–252 FORT Ltd., 234–235 Fortov, Vladimir, 248 48th Central Research Institute, 92, 97, 156tab, 158, 163, 232 46th Central Research Institute, 42, 75, 122–125, 156tab, 158, 161 Foton missions, 236–237, 239–240 Fouette, 20

Francisella tularensis, 8tab, 16, 19, 140– 144, 146–148, 153, 232, 287 Frolov, Andrei, 50–51 FSA. See Federal Space Agency FSB. See Federal Security Service Fund of Assistance to the Development of Small Forms of the Enterprises in the Scientific and Technical Sphere, 210 Funding: for biodefense, 352; for biosecurity, 53; of biotechnology, 201; of civilian bioscience and biotechnology, 201; of genetic weapons, 71; by Ministry of Industry and Trade, 158; by National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation, 94, 96, 98, 100–101, 107– 108, 113, 138, 140, 146, 147, 157; SAP and, 43, 50–51, 117; of SRCAM, 354; of Vector, 354; of weapons based on new physical principles, 42, 118 Fursenko, Andrey, 242 Fuze design, 21

Gain-of function research, 333, 354 Gamkrelidze, Amiran, 295, 333 Gareyev, Makhmut, 72 Gates Foundation, 359 General Staff (GS), 39, 67; personnel, 91–92; power of, 91; priorities of, 119; Putin on, 127; reporting to, 115 Genetic engineering, 47, 49, 73; achievements in, 60, 66, 69, 352; for antigen production, 141; in BIO2020, 212; for biological weapons, 9, 54; Hoopoe-1, 113; introduction of, 9; research, 17, 62; by United States, 302 Genetic weapons, 5; development of, 7; funding of, 71; MOD defining, 2, 73, 352; Putin on, 45, 351; Serdyukov on, 1–2, 73, 352 Genetically modified organisms, 54, 141, 144, 213, 352 Geneva Protocol (GP), 299–300, 315, 324, 329 Genfa, 231 Genomics, 54, 60, 69, 223, 352 Geophysical weapons, 73

Index

Georgian-American Biological Laboratory in Tbilisi, 294–295 Gerasimov, Valery, 91 Germ warfare, 287 Global Health Security Agenda, 326–327 Global Partnership, 274–275 Global Partnership against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 326–327 Golikova, Tatiana, 208 Golodets, Olga, 104 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 15, 18, 19 GosNIIgenetika. See Russian Federation State Research Institute of Genetics and Selection of Industrial Microorganisms GP. See Geneva Protocol Grigoriev, Andrey Ivanovich, 116, 127 Group of 7, 326 Group of 8, 274–275 Group of 20, 273 Gryzlov, Boris, 235 GS. See General Staff Gshch-304 submunitions, 20–21 Guriev, Sergei, 223–224 Guthrie, Richard, 315

Harvey, Brian, 237 HIV, 98, 103, 138, 149, 233, 274, 289 Hoopoe-1 project, 113

I. I. Mechnikov Research Institute of Vaccines and Sera, 156tab I. P. Pavlov Ryazan State Medical University, 235 ICSU. See International Council for Science IEI. See Institute of Engineering Immunology IHPB. See Research Institute of Highly Pure Biopreparations Ilyin, N., 75 Implementation Support Unit (ISU), 24, 282, 289, 314–318, 325, 329 INF Treaty. See Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Inorganic chemistry, 54, 60, 352 Institute for Statistical Research and Economics of Knowledge, 201 Institute of Engineering Immunology (IEI), 15

375

Institute of Phytopathology, 11 Interfax, 294 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), 313, 355 International Council for Science (ICSU), 358 International Space Station, 238, 357 Irkutsk Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute for Siberia and the Far East, 146, 156tab Ischuk, Vladimir A., 49, 125 ISU. See Implementation Support Unit Ivanov, Vadim T., 200, 240–241, 244 Ivanovich, Alexander, 125

Joint United States Forces Korea Portal and Integrated Threat Recognition (JUPITR), 322 Journal of Gravitational Physiology, 237 JSC Russian Venture Company, 210 JSC Synthesis holdings, 235 JUPITR. See Joint United States Forces Korea Portal and Integrated Threat Recognition

Kalinushkin, Viktor, 243 Kaluga, 216–217 Kanygin, Pyotr, 234 Kazakh Anti-Plague Institute, 16–17 KGB, 10, 11; assassination program, 18; biological weapons and, 17–18; disinformation programs of, 278; Laboratory 12 of, 17–18; Operation Infektion, 310 Khabarovsk Scientific Research Institute for Epidemiology and Microbiology, 148–149, 156tab Kharechko, Anatoly, 99 Kharkevich Institute of Information Transmission Problems, 222 Kholstov, Victor, 316–319, 321–322, 331, 334 Khramchikhin, Alexander, 73 Kirilin, Aleksandr, 238 Kirov Institute, 8, 12–13, 97–98, 163, 353. See also 48th Central Research Institute Kislyak, Sergey, 215 Kommersant, 294–295, 333 Kotyukov, Mikhail, 244

376

Index

Kovalev, Oleg, 235 Kozlov, Vladimir, 248 Kruglyakov, E. P., 74 Kukhotkin, Sergey, 93 Kuleshov, Alexander, 222 Kuntsevich, Anatoly, 20

Laboratory 12, 17–18 Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, 21 Lavrov, Sergey, 273, 323, 334 Leitenberg, Milton, 18–19, 20, 24 LIDAR techniques, 94, 110, 112 Livanov, Dmitry, 215, 242

M. P. Chumakov Institute of Poliomyelitis and Viral Encephalitides, 152, 156tab, 229 Main Directorate of Research Activities and Technological Support of Advanced Technologies, 120–121 Makarov, Nikolai, 39, 91 Makushev, Igor, 115–116 Marburg virus, 8tab, 15 Markov, Gregori, 17 Markusova, V. A., 202, 240 Marshal S. Timoshenko Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense and Engineer Troops College, 114– 115 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 221–222 McGilvray, Annabel, 244–245 MCUDs. See Military cover unit designators Measles vaccine, 136–137 Medico-Biological Defense Research Test Center, 13, 108, 109, 162 Medstatistika: analysis of topics, 282; Course-KB program, 280–283, 288– 289, 297–298, 308, 330–331 Medvedev, Dmitry, 34, 39, 273; biodefense expansion of, 353; civilian bioscience and biotechnology under, 199–200, 207, 249; development and modernization by, 208–209; on military sources, 250–251; NSS issued by, 57; on Obama, 275; Onishchenko reprimanded by, 306, 334; science emphasis of, 213; SF launched by, 218–219, 223

Meeting of Experts (MX): allegations against United States, 2014, 330–331; allegations against United States, 2015, 316–322; axing of, 329; design of, 311–312; topics in 2014, 325, 331; United States at, 313–314 Meeting of States Parties (MSP), 311, 331; allegations at, 322; as contentious and confused, 315; documents for, 314; Kholstov addressing, 321; opening remarks at, 318 Mega-Grants, 214–215 Meier, Oliver, 323 MFA. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs MIC. See Military Industrial Commission Microbe. See Russian Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute Microbiologic research, 298–299 Microgen: China and Cuba ventures of, 233–234; phage therapy and, 232; Rostec Corporation ownership, 229, 232–234; vaccine experience at, 232– 233 Mikheyev, Valery N., 135, 137–138 Mikrob. See Russian Scientific Research Institute for Plague Control Military conflicts, 40 Military cover unit designators (MCUDs), 92 Military Doctrine, 75; analysis of, 33–34; on attack, 42; biosecurity and, 35–51; on BWC, 59, 69; “Citizens of Russia” speech on, 35–38, 42; language differences in, 68–69; massive utilization phrasing in, 50; mechanism for verifying observance called for, 59–60; on military conflicts, 40; on new generation war, 45–46; non-nuclear deterrence emphasized, 48; NSS compared to, 69; revamping, 39; sections of, 40; of Serdyukov, 72–73; on warfare trends, 44; on weapons based on new physical principles, 49, 69, 351 Military Industrial Commission (MIC), 70, 116, 215; in flux, 35; MOD disagreements, 126; responsibilities of, 126–127; Rogozin appointment to, 126; tensions within, 50

Index

Military Scientific Committee, 91, 115– 119, 124, 130, 161 Military Thought, 62, 67 Military-industrial complex institutions, 125–131 Ministry of Defense (MOD): antiWestern sentiment, 46; ARF disagreements, 130; biodefense institutions of, 91–106; biology designs of, 4; biotechnology clusters and, 216; budget of, 50; BW institutes established by, 8–9, 12–16, 23; Coordination and Advisory Office, 121; Crimea annexation, 112; Decree 791 on facilities of, 56; Department of Promising Joint Research and Special Projects, 121–122; document release by, 66; 48th Central Research Institute, 92, 97, 156tab, 158, 163, 232; 46th Central Research Institute, 42, 75, 122–125, 156tab, 158, 161; genetic weapons defined by, 2, 73, 352; hampering of, 5; InformationAnalytical Center, 121; Main Directorate of Research Activities and Technological Support of Advanced Technologies, 120–121; Main Military Directorate for biodefense, 106–115; MIC disagreements, 126; naming conventions of, 92; reforms of, 161; Scientific and Technical Council, 87, 115, 117; scientific workers in, 11; Serdyukov on tasks for, 44–45, 47, 71; Shoigu leadership of, 353; SPVIR and, 118–121; SRCAM and, 140; tasks of, 44–45, 47; tenders from, 158; 3rd Central Research Institute, 49, 74–75, 92, 124–125, 130, 161, fig4.2; 33rd Central Research Test Institute at Shikhany-2, 93–97, 125; unconventional and nonlethal weapons development, 49; on weapons based on new physical principles, 72; weapons based on new physical principles and, 4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 21; allegations against United States, 291, 293–310; BWC and, 59–60, 69, 279, 284–285; BWC compliance and verification statement, 2010, 285–

377

290; BWC compliance and verification statement, 2013, 292– 293; BWC compliance and verification statement, 2014, 299– 303; BWC compliance and verification statement, 2015, 303– 305; BWC compliance and verification statement, 2016, 306– 310; diplomatic settings for, 278; propaganda campaigns by, 294, 297– 298; RevCon initiatives, 2016, 311–316 Ministry of Health (MOH), 10, 129, 143, 148, 227; biodefense and, 150–154; Flute program, 17, 20; institutes of, 11, 16–17; Rostec Corporation agreement, 229; tenders from, 158 Ministry of Industry and Trade, 230; BIO-2020 and, 210; BWC and, 277– 279; funding by, 158; power of, 278; project administration by, 208; VED decree by, 233 MIT. See Massachusetts Institute of Technology MOD. See Ministry of Defense MOH. See Ministry of Health Mokhnacheva, Yu., 202, 203 Moscow Radio Engineering Institute, 74 MSP. See Meeting of States Parties MX. See Meeting of Experts Myelin, 98

N. F. Gamaleya Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, 104–105, 152–154, 156tab, 157–158 NAM. See Non-Aligned Movement Nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive technologies (NBIC), 42, 49–50, 70, 75; achievements of, 125; Burenok emphasizing, 124; Putin and, 72 NASA, 237, 357 National Academy of Sciences-United States, 357, 358 National Association of Innovations and Information Technology Development, 251 National Center for Disease Control and Public Health laboratory (NCDC), 295

378

Index

National Defense, 41 National Immunobiological Company (NIC): Genfa collaboration, 231; Rostec Corporation establishing, 228– 232; 7diseases response program, 230–231; staffing and expenditures of, 230–231; subsidiaries of, 232 National Interests-Priorities and Security, 123 National Programme for the Development of Biotechnology in Russia 2006–2015, 213 National Research Council, 199 National Research Institute for Veterinary Virology and Microbiology, 297 National Security Strategy (NSS), 35, 62, 75; BIO-2020 and, 212; on biosecurity, 64–65; on biotechnology threats, 59; on civilian bioscience and biotechnology, 251; on dual-use technologies, 58; by Medvedev, 57; Military Doctrine compared to, 69; tasks for civil society listed in, 65–66; threat assessment in, 65–66; weapons and, 41; by Yeltsin, 57 National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation, 63, 69, 75, 88; funding by, 94, 96, 98, 100–101, 107– 108, 113, 138, 140, 146, 147, 157; infrastructure of, 96; launch of, 208; Serdyukov on, 89 NATO, 279; expansion of, 46, 48; Putin on, 36, 40; responsibility of, 356 Nature Index, 244 Nature journal, 248 Nauchno-issledovatelskiy institute (NII), 92 Nauchno-Proizvodstvennoe Obedinenie, 215 NBC troops. See Nuclear, biological, and chemical protection troops NBIC. See Nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive technologies NCDC. See National Center for Disease Control and Public Health laboratory Netyesov, Aleksandr, 334

New generation weapons: acknowledgment of, 70; Burenok on, 48; development of, 9, 36–37, 51, 56, 62, 74, 353; knowledge of, 23; need for, 45; possession of, 46; Putin on, 71 New Look reforms, 38–39, 41, 72, 116 New START treaty, 273 New York Times, 286 NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations NIC. See National Immunobiological Company Nickerson, Nathaniel, 225 NII. See Nauchno-issledovatelskiy institute NIOKh. See Novosibirsk Institute for Organic Chemistry Nixon, Richard M., 9, 293 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 313 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 3, 288, 359 Non-lethal weapons, 66–68, 122–125, 161, 353 Non-nuclear deterrence, 48 Novichkov, S. V., 67, 75 Novo Nordisk, 216–217 Novosibirsk Institute for Organic Chemistry (NIOKh), 134 NSS. See National Security Strategy Nuclear, biological, and chemical protection troops (NBC troops), 56– 57, 87; automated defense system for, 113; biological agents and, 114; building and updating, 62–63; CWC interpretation by, 323; equipment for, 112, 162, 354; functions of, 110–111; future work, 161–165; hawks within, 66–68; reshuffling of, 111–112; suit design for, 94; training of, 114, 354

Obama, Barack, 2, 273, 275, 284 Object 506, 13–14 Office of Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Safety (RKhBB), 97 Office of the Chief of Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Forces, 110–115 Ogarkov, N. V., 72 Ogorodova, Lyudmila, 215

Index

OIE. See World Organisation for Animal Health Onishchenko, Gennady G., 134, 274, 291, 295; allegations by, 308; on Ebola, 333; on gain-of function research, 333; Medvedev reprimanding, 306, 334; as Rospotrebnadzor head, 132; on Zika virus, 305, 307, 334 OPBW. See Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons OPCW. See Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Open-ended working group (OWG), 318–320, 328 Operation Infektion, 310 Organic chemistry, 134, 352 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 275, 276, 312, 328 Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW), 312– 314, 328, 329 Ostapenko, Oleg, 71, 73 Ovchinnikov, Yuri, 9–10, 73 OWG. See Open-ended working group

Pankov, Sergei E., 121, 122 Pathogens for biological weapons, 8tab Penn State University, 286 Phage therapy, 232 Pharma-2020. See Strategy for the Development of the Pharmaceutical Industry of the Russian Federation for the Period Up to 2020 Pharmaceutical consolidation, 227–235, 354 Pislyakov, Vladimir, 203 Pokrov Factory of Biopreparations, 11 Ponomaryov, Ilya, 224 Popov, Dmitry Sergeevich, 301–302, 333 Popov, Pavel, 118, 126 Popova, Anna Y., 132 Popovkin, Vladimir, 41–42 Pravda, 294–295 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), 311, 323–328 PrepCom. See Preparatory Committee “Principles of State Policy in the Field of Nuclear and Radiation Safety/Security in the Russian

379

Federation to 2010 and Beyond” (Putin), 52, 75, 351–352 Programs for Russian Émigrés and Foreign Scientists to Work in Russia, 213–215 Prompt Global Strike, 48 Propaganda campaigns, 5, 278, 307; on BW, 355, 356; by MFA, 294, 297– 298; Putin and, 308; through RT, 302–303; techniques for, 309–310 Prophylactic products, 98 Proteomics, 54, 60, 69, 352 Psychotronic weapons, 74 Puccioni, Allison, 14 Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich: administration disinformation, 358; biodefense expansion of, 353; on bionano-information technology weapons, 43–44, 48, 70; BWC and, 279, 332, 355; on CBRN, 63–64, 75; “Citizens of Russia” speech, 35–38, 42; civilian bioscience and biotechnology under, 199–200, 207, 249; consolidation of power by, 35; edicts of, 60–61; election of, 44; on Foreign Policy Concept, 51; on genetic weapons, 45, 351; on GS, 127; health initiative of, 274; on hitech weapons, 1; inauguration of, 2; on NATO, 36, 40; NBIC and, 72; on need for consensus, 69; on new generation weapons, 71; propaganda campaigns and, 308; RAS and, 241– 242; SAP announced by, 41; science emphasis of, 213; on security, 48, 52; Serdyukov and, 91; on threat, 46; Trump and, 357; on weapons based on new physical principles, 44, 45, 75 Pyshma test site, 101–102, 162, 164, 354

Rabies vaccine, 144 Radiological, chemical, and biological defense (RChBD), 56–57 Railroad Station Zima, 13–14 RAMAS. See Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Science Ramishvili, Levan, 296 RAMS. See Russian Academy of Medical Sciences RAS. See Russian Academy of Science

380

Index

RASA. See Russian-Speaking Academic Science Association RChBD. See Radiological, chemical, and biological defense “Recombinant Cytokines—Promising Protection from Dangerous Infectious Diseases,” 109 Red Star, 93, 97, 115 Research Institute of Highly Pure Biopreparations (IHPB), 15 RevCon. See Eighth Review Conference of BWC Revolution in Military Affairs, 37 RIA. See Russian Engineering Academy RIA Novosti, 295, 301, 333 Rickettsia prowazekii, 8tab Rickettsioses, 103 Rimmington, Anthony, 11 RISC. See Russian Science Citation Index RKhBB. See Office of Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Safety Robotics, 47, 49, 120, 123, 128, 222 Roffey, Roger, 201, 207–208 Rogozin, Dmitry, 252; on ARF, 129; MIC appointment of, 126; on weaponization, 70–71, 73, 89; on weapons based on new physical principles, 127 “The Role of Military Technology in the Development of Weapons Systems for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” (Pankov), 121 Roskosmos State Corporation, 236 Rospotrebnadzor. See Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being Rosselkhoznadzor. See Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 1, 43, 44, 250 Rostec Corporation: establishment and aims of, 227–228; FORT Ltd. and, 234–235; JSC Synthesis holdings, 235; Microgen ownership, 229, 232– 234; MOH agreement, 229; NIC establishment, 228–232; organizations and holding companies of, 228; sanctions imposed on, 249 Rostov Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology and Parasitology, 133

Rostov-on-Don Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute, 147–148, 156tab RT. See Russia Today Rusnamo, 210 Russia Today (RT), 302–303, 333 Russian Academy of Medical Sciences (RAMS), 129, 210, 229, 236, 243 Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Science (RAMAS), 49, 130 Russian Academy of Science (RAS), 49, 57, 121, 124, 159; astrobiology program of, 236; BW and, 252; call for reforms at, 241–244, 248–249; enrollment in, 247–248; FASO and, 357–358; Library for Natural Sciences, 202; National Academy of Sciences-United States and, 357; programs for Russian émigrés and foreign scientists to work in Russia, 213–215; proposed mergers in, 243; publications of, 245, 246tab, 247tab; Putin and, 241–242; researcher performance at, 240 Russian Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute (Microbe), 141–145 Russian Engineering Academy (RIA), 49, 125 Russian Federation State Research Institute of Genetics and Selection of Industrial Microorganisms (GosNIIgenetika), 236 Russian Federation’s Public Safety/Security Concept, 61, 75 Russian Institute for Statistical Studies and Economics of Knowledge, 217 Russian Science Citation Index (RISC), 165 Russian Science Foundation, 297 Russian Scientific Research Institute for Plague Control (Mikrob), 16, 133, 136, 156tab; anthrax study of, 141– 144; cholera and rabies vaccines of, 144; as civilian institute, 141–145; publications of, 141; tenders to, 158 Russian Society of Biotechnologists, 213 Russian-Speaking Academic Science Association (RASA), 215 Russo-Georgian War of 2008, 38–39, 71 Rylin, V. V., 75 Ryzhikov, Alexander, 137

Index

S. M. Kirov Military Medical Academy, 104, 107–108, 153, 156tab, 158, 236 SAEU. See Specialized Anti-Epidemic Units Saltykov, Boris, 241–242 SAP. See State Armament Program Satellite imagery, 4, 14, 88, 93, 96–98, 106, 222 Schwarzenegger Arnold, 219–220 Science and technology priorities, 76–77 Science in Siberia, 253–254 Scientific Experimental and Production Base (SNOPB), 12–13, 15 Scientific Production Association (SPA), 215–216 Second-generation BW program, 19721992, 9–10, 88 Semenov, Nikolay, 231 Serdyukov, Anatoly, 159; armed forces layoffs and, 39; on genetic weapons, 1–2, 73, 352; Military Doctrine of, 72–73; on military R&D, 43, 71; on MOD tasks, 44–45, 47, 71; on National System for Chemical and Biological Safety/Security of the Russian Federation, 89; promises of, 88; Putin and, 91; reforms of, 160; on weapons based on new physical principles, 74, 75 Sergeyev, Aleksandr N., 72, 134–136 7diseases response program, 230–231 Severny, 216 SF. See Skolkovo Foundation Sharpless, Barry, 216 Shemyakin-Ovchinnikov Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry, 200, 240 Sheremet, Igor Anatolyevich, 49, 116– 117, 124 Sheremet, Igor Borisovich, 124, 125 Shoigu, Sergey K., 159; on military forecasting, 129; MOD leadership of, 353; pattern of, 91; press release of, 125; on sanctions, 75; on security threats, 46–47, 75; tenure of, 118; weaponization and, 160 Shukshina, Elena, 203 SIPRI. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Skolkovo Foundation (SF): components of, 220–221; first graduating class of, 222; foreign research teams in, 223;

381

Medvedev launching, 218–219, 223; MIT partnership, 221–222; Open University, 223; opposition to, 226; problems of, 224–225; research grants from, 226–227; technology transfers of, 225 Skvortsova, Veronika, 104–105, 232–233 Smallpox vaccine, 113, 134–136, 232. See also Variola virus “A Smart Defense Against New Threats” (Putin), 1 SNOPB. See Scientific Experimental and Production Base Sovietskaya Rossiya, 294 SPA. See Scientific Production Association Space biology, 235–240, 357 SPEBs. See Specialized mobile antiepidemic brigades Specialized Anti-Epidemic Units (SAEU), 325 Specialized mobile anti-epidemic brigades (SPEBs), 147–148 Spetsstroy, 125 Sputnik News, 305 SPVIR. See System for Advanced Research and Developments of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense SRCAM. See All-Union Research Institute for Applied Microbiology Starkov, Yevgeny, 110, 112 State Armament Program (SAP), 115, 161; Borisov on work of, 51, 75; budget for, 87; development of, 122; funding and, 43, 50–51, 117; priorities of, 41–42 State Coordination Program for the Development of Biotechnology in the Russian Federation until 2020 (BIO2020), 209–210, 211tab, 212–213 State Policy decree, 2003, 52–53 State Policy in the Field of Chemical and Biological Safety/Security in the Russian Federation, 60–61, 67, 70, 75 State Research Test Institute of Military Medicine, 13, 91, 108–109, 156tab, 162, 166 Stavropol Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute, 147, 156tab STC Industrial Technologies, 95

382

Index

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 358–359 Strategy for the Development of the Pharmaceutical Industry of the Russian Federation for the Period Up to 2020 (Pharma-2020), 208–209 Streltsova, Ekaterina, 201–202 Streptomyces bacterial genus, 236, 238 Surkov, Vladislav, 224 Sverdlovsk Institute, 8, 12–13, 97; expansion of, 353; history and research of, 99–102; Pyshma test site, 101–102, 162, 164, 354; territories of, 163 SVR. See Foreign Intelligence Service Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), 140, 145; on CBM declaration, 24; reports of, 39; on Russian biotechnology, 200–201; on Soviet BW program, 23 Sychev, Vladimir, 239 SynBio Innovative Pharmaceutical Project, 209 Syrian civil war, 21, 355 System for Advanced Research and Developments of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (SPVIR), 118–121, 160

Technological race, 250, 354 Terrorism, 61, 274; biological agents in, 60, 286, 352; bioterrorism, 41, 54, 60, 102–103, 109; chemical, 323; counter-terrorism operations, 68; international, 62 3rd Central Research Institute, 49, 74– 75, 92, 124–125, 130, 161 33rd Central Research Test Institute at Shikhany-2, 93–97, 125, 156tab, 163; aerial view of, fig4.2 Tidor, Bruce, 221–222, 226 Tikhonov, Nikolai G., 145–146 Transboundary drifts of pathogens, 54, 352 Trapp, Ralf, 323 Trump, Donald, 357 TSA detectors, 95 Tsalikov, Ruslan, 91 Tsentrin, 99 TsSKB-Progress, 237–238 Tularemia. See Francisella tularensis

Tyurin, Anton, 118

UAVs. See Unmanned aerial vehicles Ukraine crisis, 313, 319 Uliyanov, Mikhail, 311–312, 318 The Unique U.S.-Russian Relationship in the Biological Science and Biotechnology: Recent Experience and Future Directions, 357 United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), 22 United Nations Secretary-General Mechanism (UNSG Mechanism), 314 United States: activities in CIS countries, 301–303; Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments document, 333–334; allegations against at MX, 2014, 331–332; allegations against at MX, 2015, 316– 322; anthrax and, 304–306, 321, 326, 332; ASF from laboratories, 296, 298; biodefense projects, 286; biological activities in former Soviet Union, 305; BioShield program of, 281; biotechnology in, 201–202; BW and, 9, 69, 330; BWC commitment, 356; BWC compliance, 286–287, 290; CBM submissions, 289; cooperation with, 235; CTR, 133, 139; DARPA, 127, 131; Department of Agriculture, 287, 297; Department of Defense, 225, 282–283, 292, 304, 306–307, 316, 332; Department of Health and Human Services, 287; Department of State, 2–3, 333; dual-use technologies and, 320, 354; foreign laboratories supported by, 289; genetic engineering by, 302; Global Partnership of, 274–275; JUPITR, 322; MFA allegations against, 291, 293–310; microbiologic research in Asian and African countries, 298– 299; at MX, 313–314; National Academy of Sciences, 357, 358; Prompt Global Strike and, 48; sanctions imposed by, 249, 251, 252; Zika virus and, 307 Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 38, 74

Index

UNMOVIC. See United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission UNSG Mechanism. See United Nations Secretary-General Mechanism Urals Regional Information-Analytical Center of the Russian Institute of Strategic Research, 301 USA Today, 277, 304; on biological failures, 336

“VacciNation: Russia’s Dependence on Imported Vaccines Threatens the Country’s Security,” 229 Valer’yanovich, Vitaly, 49, 125 Variola virus (smallpox), 8tab, 9, 15, 25, 54, 113, 135, 282, 286, 288, 317. See also Smallpox vaccine Vasilyev, Nikolay V., 215 VDV. See Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska Vector. See All-Union Research Institute of Molecular Biology Vector-Best, 216 VED. See Vital and Essential Drugs VEEV. See Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus Vekselberg, Viktor F., 220 Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus (VEEV), 8tab, 103 VEREX. See Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint Vetrov, V. A., 75 Vital and Essential Drugs (VED), 228, 233 Voeikov, Tatiana, 236 Volgograd Anti-Plague Institute, 16, 102–103, 133, 156tab, 157–158; as civilian institute, 145–146; West Nile fever research, 146 Volkswagen Foundation (VolkswagenStiftung), 359 Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska (VDV), 14 VVST. See Weapons and Specialized Military Equipment

Warfare: bacteriological methods of, 300–301; CBW, 18, 22, 97, 280;

383

CW, 93; germ, 287; Military Doctrine on, 44. See also Biological warfare Weapons: BioWeapons Prevention Project, 315; chemical-based nonlethal, 67; against China, 301, 356; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 54, 59; geophysical, 73; MOD development of, 49; non-lethal, 66–68, 122–125, 161, 353; NSS and, 41; pathogens used as, 8tab; psychotronic, 74; Putin on high-tech, 1; Rogozin on, 70–71, 73, 89. See also Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; Biological weapons; Bio-nano-information technology weapons; Chemical Weapons Convention; Genetic weapons; New generation weapons Weapons and Specialized Military Equipment (VVST), 47, 48, 70, 71, 122, 123 Weapons based on new physical principles: All-Russian Service for Disaster Medicine Protection and, 152; Burenok on, 75; development of, 1, 46, 74, 89, 119–121, 127; funding of, 42, 118; interpretation of, 35; Military Doctrine on, 49, 69, 351; MOD and, 4; new generation of, 71; nuclear weapons compared to, 72; Putin on, 44, 45, 75; rationale behind, 159; research on, 50–51, 73, 130; resurgence of concept, 33–34, 41, 43, 50, 87, 352; Serdyukov on, 74, 75; Sheremet, I. A., avoiding, 116 Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 40, 274, 303, 326 West Nile fever, 146 White, Forest, 222 WHO. See World Health Organization Wind tunnel, 95 WMDs. See Weapons of mass destruction Wood, Robert, 327, 328 World Health Organization (WHO), 25, 100, 134, 160, 286, 320

384

Index

World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), 11, 275, 296, fig6.1 World Trade Organization (WTO), 209, 290

Yanukovych, Viktor, 275 Yeltsin, Boris, 11, 19, 353; NSS issued by, 57 Yermakov, Vladimir, 324–325 Yersinia pestis, 7, 8tab, 16, 17, 97, 98, 140–141, 146, 148, 153, 275, 321 Yevstigneev, Valentin Ivanovich, 294, 298

Zagorsk Institute, 8, 12–13, 97, 160; expansion of, 353; history and research of, 102–106; territories of, 163 Zaikov, Lev N., 18 Zakharov, Vladimir E., 226, 240 Zakupki, 155 Zakutnyaya, Olga, 237 Zika virus, 305–308, 310, 334 “Zika Virus Outbreak May Be Result of Bioweapon—Ex-Russian Surgeon General,” 305 Zlatoust station, 14

About the Book

In March 2012, at a meeting convened by the recently reelected Russian president Vladimir Putin, Minister of Defense Serdyukov informed Putin that a plan was being prepared for “the development of weapons based on new physical principles: radiation, geophysical wave, genetic, psychophysical, etc.” Subsequently, in response to concerns expressed both in Russia and abroad, the Russian government deleted the statement from the public transcript of the meeting. But the question remains: Is Russia developing an offensive biological warfare program? Raymond Zilinskas and Philippe Mauger investigate the multiple dimensions of this crucial security issue in their comprehensive, authoritative survey. Ranging from the Soviet legacy to current doctrine, from advanced weapons-development networks to civilian biotechnology research, from diplomatic initiatives to disinformation campaigns, they document and analyze the buildup and modernization of Russia’s biodefense establishment under the Putin administration. Raymond A. Zilinskas is director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons

Nonproliferation (CBWN) Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS). Philippe Mauger completed work on this book while conducting research at MIIS.

385