Beyond the Psychoanalytic Dyad: Developmental Semiotics in Freud, Peirce and Lacan 9781315811574, 9780415910682, 9780415910699, 0415910684

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JOHN f? MULLER

Beyond the Psychoanalytic Dyad

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Beyond the Psychoanalytic Dyad

Developmental Semiotics in Freud, Peirce, and Lacan

J o h n P. M u l l e r

U

Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

F ir s t p u b lis h e d 1 9 9 6 b y R o u tle d g e

P ublished 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, M ilton Park, A bingdon, O x o n 0 X 1 4 4RN 711 T h ird A venue, N ew York, N Y , 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint o f the Taylor & I-rands Group, an informa business

C opyright © 1996 by Routledge Design: Jack D onner All rights reserved. N o part o f this book may be reprinted or reproduced o r utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now know n or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, o r in any inform ation storage or retrieval system w ithout permission in w riting from the publishers. T he publisher greatfully acknowledges the following sources: China Men, by Maxine H ong Kingston, © by Maxine H ong Kingston, reprinted with per­ mission o f Alfred A. K nopf Inc. 1980, and Picador, London. The Sheltering Sky by Paul Bowles. © 1949 by Paul Bowles. First published by the Ecco Press in 1978. Joyce Carol Oates “ O ld Budapest” © by Joyce Carol Oates, originally published in the Kenyon Review, v.5, n.4, pp. 8-36. R eprinted with permission o f Scribner, an im print o f Simon & Schuster, Inc. from Still Life by A.S. Byatt. Copyright © 1985 A.S. Byatt, and with permsission from T he Peters Fraser & Dunlap Group Ltd., London. Parts o f the authors own work have been previously published in the following: “Language, Psychosis, and Spirit," by John P Muller, in: Attachment and the lTicnipetitic ftocess, Sacksteder, ed., 1987, pp. 9 9 -1 16.“A Re-reading o f Studies on Hysteria: T he Freud-Breuer Break Revisited” in Psychoanalytic Psychology, v. 9, n. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 129-56. “T he Mirror; Psychoanalytic Perspectives” in Psychoanalytic Inquiry, v. 5, n. 2,1985, pp. 233-52, by the Analytic Press. “Lacan and Kohut: From Imaginary to Symbolic Identification in the case o f Mr. Z ” in Self-Psychology: Comparisons and Contrasts, Detrick and Detrick, eds., published in 1989 by the Analytic Press.

Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Muller, John P., 1940Beyond the psychoanalytic dyad : developmental semiotics in Freud, Peirce, and Lacan / John P. Muller p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Psychoanalysis and culture. 2. Symbolism (Psychology) 3. Semiotics. 4. Lacan, Jacques, 1901-1981. 5. Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914. 6. Freud, Sigmund, 1856-1939.1.Tide. BF175.4.C84M 85 1995 150.19'5— dc20 95-14600 CIP ISBN 13: 978-0-415-91068-2 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-415-91069-9 (pbk)

To: William J. Richardson, S.J., Ph.D., teacher; colleague, friend

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Contents Acknowledgments Introduction

ix 1

I. Developmental Semiotics 1.

Mother-Infant Mutual Gazing

13

2.

Semiotic Perspectives on the Dyad

27

3.

Developmental Foundations of Infant Semiotics

43

4.

Intersubjectivity through Semiotics

61

II. Registers of Experience 5.

The Real and Boundaries: Walking or Falling into the Wild

75

6.

Language, Psychosis, and Culture

91

7.

A Semiotic Correlate of Psychotic States

105

8.

The Ego and Mirroring in the Dyad

119

9.

From Imaginary to Symbolic Identification in the Case of Mr. Z

135

A Re-Reading of Studies on Hysteria

161

Conclusion

187

References

195

10.

Name Index

221

Subject Index

226

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Acknowledgments

T h is b o o k spans m o re th a n a decad e o f w ritin g ; th e first h a lf was w ritte n w hile I was th e E rik E rik so n scholar in residence at th e A usten R ig g s C e n te r, 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 . I am w arm ly grateful to E dw ard Shapiro, M .D ., and M . G erard F ro m m , P h .D ., for m ak in g available to m e an e x tra o rd in a rily tran q u il year a m o n g deeply reflective clinicians. C h a p te r 5 was ch o sen as th e c o -w in n e r o f th e 1995 D eu tsch P riz e o f th e B o sto n P sychoanalytic Society In stitu te and was the E rikson Scholar lecture presented in May, 1993, at R iggs. Several o f the later chapters appeared in earlier form s elsew'here. C h a p te r 6 was previously published as “ L anguage, Psychosis, and S p irit” in Attachment and the Therapeutic Process: Essays in Honor o f Otto Allen Will, Jr., M .D ., ed ited by J. Sacksteder, D. Schw artz, and Y. A kabane. (N e w York: In tern a tio n a l U niversities Press, 1987, pp. 9 9 -1 1 6 ). C h a p te r 8 appeared as “ L acan’s M irro r Stage” in a 1985 issue o n m irro rin g o f Psychoanalytic Inquiry, v o lu m e 5, pp. 2 33—252. C h a p te r 9 was published in S e lf Psychology: Comparisons and Contrasts, ed ited by D. D e tric k and S. D e tric k . (Hillsdale, N J :T h e A nalytic Press, 1989, pp. 3 6 3 -3 9 4 ). C h a p te r 10 was p re sen te d to th e C h ic a g o P sychoanalytic S o c iety an d was previously published as “ A R e -re a d in g o f Studies on Hysteria: T h e F re u d -B re u e r B reak R evisited,” in Psychoanalytic Psychology, 1992, volum e 9, pp. 1 2 9-156. I am grateful to all those w h o have generously read various chapters, m ade num erous suggestions, and helped to set high standards for this k in d o f inquiry'.

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Introduction

In The Songlines, a remarkable view o f native Australian culture, the late B ruce C hatw in wrote: Aboriginal Creation myths tell o f the legendary totemic beings w ho had wandered over the continent in the Drearntime, singing out the name o f everything that crossed their path— birds, animals, plants, rocks, w aterholes— and so singing the world into existence. (1988, p. 2) In the traditional “ W alkabout” ritual, one retraced this ancestral path, singing the names o f these beings in order to keep th em and oneself in existence. T he form ative pow er o f signs, their causal im pact on m ind, brain, body, and subjec­ tivity, is the overarching them e o f this book, w hich exam ines the broad field o f semiotics. M y interest in sem iotics and its application in the practice o f psy­ choanalysis is shaped by my reading o f Lacan and m y psychoanalytic w ork, m uch o f it w ith hospitalized patients. I have also participated in textual studies in w hich a psychoanalytic perspective inform s the reading o f literature. It is this w eighing o f words w hich, in tu rn , moves us tow ard a m ore differentiated read­ ing o f Freud. M y interest in culture is b o th personal and conceptual. M y m o th er tongue is H ungarian. I learned to speak English as I approached m y fifth birthday, and I have gone out o f m y way to m ake it possible to speak and hear H ungarian in m y ow n analysis. I also w orked and lived for three years o n the R osebud Sioux R eservation assisting in the developm ent o f a Psychology departm ent at a new

Introduction

2

c o m m u n ity college. T h e e x p e rie n c e th at e n d u res b e y o n d such in te rcu ltu ral c o n ta ct is n o t sim ply that cultures are different, b u t that o n e ’s o w n culture is n o w different, e x p erien ced as different from itself. In his recent b o o k , the e m in e n t psychologist Jerom e B ru n e r urges us to c o n ­ sider w hy culture m ust be a central c o n cep t for psychology. “ B egin w ith the c o n ce p t o f culture itself—particularly its constitutive role,” he tells us (1990, p. 11). T h e constitutive role o f culture, w hat N o rth ro p Frye has called “ a sem i­ transparent envelope” th ro u g h w h ic h w e view nature (1981, p. 129), has b een neglected by the individualistic o rien tatio n o f A m erican psychology as well as by ego psychology an d the m o re recent dyadic focus o f psychoanalysis. W e are co m in g to realize, how ever, that a third is required to fram e the dyad, to provide an o rie n tin g structure, and this third m ay be u n d e rsto o d as the sem iotic fram e­ w o rk and c o n te x t o f culture. F or B runer, h u m a n ev o lu tio n crossed a divide “ w h e n culture becam e the m ajor factor in giving fo rm to th e m inds o f those living u n d e r its sway” (1990, p. 12). B ru n e r em phatically agrees w ith C lifford G eertz, w h o w rites, “th ere is n o such th in g as h u m a n natu re in d ep e n d en t o f c u ltu re ” (1973, p. 49). In argu­ in g fo r a cultural psychology, B ru n e r takes issue w ith a m ajo r n in e te e n th -c e n ­ tu ry legacy, the p rio ritiza tio n o f biology in o u r attem pts to understand h u m an behavior: T h e causes o f hum an behavior w ere assum ed to lie in th at biological substrate. W hat I w ant to argue instead is that culture and the quest for m eaning w ithin culture are the proper causes o f hum an action. T h e bio­ logical substrate, the so-called universals o f hum an nature, is n o t a cause o f action but, at m ost, a constraint upon it o r a condition for it. (1990, pp. 20-21) B ru n e r reverses th e traditional relation o f biology an d culture w ith respect to h u m a n nature: it is culture, not biology, that shapes hum an life and the hum an m ind, that gives m eaning to action by situating its underlying intentional states in an interpretive system. It does this by im posing the patterns inherent in the culture’s symbolic systems— its language and discourse m odes, the forms o f logical and narrative explication, and the patterns o f mutually dependent com m unal life. (1990, p. 34) As others have em phasized (Sacks, 1989; Levin, 1991; H a rre an d G illett, 1994), th e h u m an brain is especially plastic in response to the discursive e n v iro n m en t w h o se stru c tu re s o f

n a rra tiv ity go v ern w h a t is p re serv e d in m em ory.

N arrativity, in tu rn , “ relies u p o n th e p o w e r o f tropes— u p o n m eta p h o r, m etonym y, synecdoche, im plicature, and the rest” (B runer, 1990, p. 59).W e shall

Introduction

3

also see that this process o f narrativity, w hereby the hum an infant becom es an active participant in w hat B runer calls a “protolinguistic system,” is inaugurated soon after birth (1990, p. 69). In the follow ing chapters I will argue that the fram ework o f culture anchors the developm ent as well as the psychoanalytic investigation o f the individual, for subjectivity em erges first o f all as intersubjectivity.The transmission o f cul­ ture operates through the sem iotic codes governing the rhythm o f touching, gazing, and vocalizing o f b o th m o th er and infant. T h e individual em erges in dialogue w ith another sign-using subject, through a process o f m utual recogni­ tion and generalization. As B ru n er w rites, “ Is n o t Self a transactional relation­ ship betw een a speaker and an O ther, indeed, a G eneralized 0 th e r ? ” (1990, p. 101).T his O th e r is indispensable for understanding the Self. T h e psychoanalytic features o f such a self and its transactions, the com plex­ ities o f hum an developm ent and o f psychological structure, are discerned in a new way in the w ork o f the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901-1981). Lacan’s c h ie f co ntribution, in m y view, consists in o pening up experience into three registers o r dim ensions w hich he called the R eal, the imaginary, and the sym bolic. I take these three registers as constituting, in a broad way, Lacan’s sem iotic code for interpreting experience, his code that specifies w hat is a sig— nifier, w hat is a representation, w hat is unsignable, and w hat rules govern the dynamics o f each.T his way o f discerning experience has been quite useful for th in k in g a bout cultural p h e n o m e n a as well as th e com plexities o f a n o th e r realm, the treatm ent o f psychotic patients and the understanding o f treatm ent impasses. From a Lacanian perspective, for exam ple, the structural difficulty giving rise to psychotic states consists in th e absence o f m arked boundaries betw een the hum an subject and the dim ension o f the R eal. Because o f early developm ental failures to create a stable edge for the self, the risk o f dissolution and m erger w ith the O th e r remains high. T here is no firm line draw n on this side o f w hich is the predictable, consensually validated realm o f shared experi­ ence, and on the o th er side o f w hich lies the field o f the uncanny, the trau­ m atic, the unnam eable.T his perspective, o f course, is n o t unique to Lacan, for w e can find it from Sullivan (1953) to O gden (1989). W h at I find distinctive in Lacan is how he attem pts to call o u r attention to the fragile but necessary boundaries that circum scribe reality. T hese boundaries are effects o f language that create stable relations by nam ing objects as well as subjects.This signifying function o f language enables us to have perspective on experience and provides a zone o f m ediation so that we are n o t w holly capti­ vated by the im m ediate. B u t this tam ing and liberating function o f language is lim ited. Beyond its limits lies the undifferentiated R eal. Lacan calls it the R eal to distinguish it from reality, w hich is a differentiated social construction, a col­ lage built o f images and language. O liver Sacks (1990) is forthright about this:

Introduction

4

“T h e w orld does n o t have a p re d eterm in ed structure: o u r stru c tu rin g o f the w orld is o u r o w n — o u r brains create structures in the light o f o u r experiences” (1990, p. 48), and they d o so continuously. A lth o u g h Lacan p o in te d to the R e al as “ w h at resists sym bolization absolutely” (1 9 5 3 -5 4 , p. 66), we can com e close to it in B uddhist texts, in the w ritings o f C hristian mystics, and in literature. Usually w e go th rough o u r day w ith o u t attending to the lim its o f o u r consensually validated reality, b u t now and th e n w e e n c o u n te r th e R e a l in th e fo rm o f danger, catastrophe, death. Psychotic loss o f boundaries, the breakdow n o f stable categories o f thought, th e effects o f traum a, all b rin g the experience o f the R e al to the forefront. W e see h o w sexual abuse victim s struggle to reclaim their bodies and th eir histories by gradually fitting images and then names to their traum atic unintegrated expe­ rience. K o h u t describes a specific type o f dream , the “self-state” dream , as an attem pt to cover “frightening nameless processes w ith nam eable visual im agery” (1977, p. 109). Visual im ages are th e stu ff o f th e register o f the im aginary, th e narcissistic field o f self-presentation.T he essential feature o f Lacan’s im aginary register lies in th e o n e -to -o n e co rrespondence betw een features o f an object and its image, un lik e th e a rb itrary an d pluralistic relations b e tw e e n signs, m eanings, and objects. D e sp ite th e acq u isitio n o f speech, th e L acanian ego, fo rm e d b y its im age in a m irro rin g object, rem ains caught in th e allure o f external represen­ tations o f itself. T h e ego is narcissistically sustained in its cohesion by reflec­ tio n s o f itself su ch as p h o to g rap h s, a u to m o b ile s, m o n u m e n ts, and, in th e in te rp erso n al field, adm iration, im itation, and especially th e glow that com es from b e in g fo u n d desirable as glim psed in th e eyes o f an other. Joyce C arol O ates, in h er sh o rt story “ O ld B udapest,” presents the im aginary register w ith precision: O r was it, M arianne som etim es w ondered, the first significant gaze that passed betw een her and a m an, heavy w ith erotic m eaning, almost intolera­ bly exciting in all that it prom ised, or hinted at, o r threatened?— This gaze, this exchange o f looks, that constituted the pinnacle o f romance: for she had experienced looks from m en that penetrated her to the very m arrow o f her being, and left her dazed, and baffled, and w eak, and, in a sense, obliterated. A nd stricken by the realization that no physical gesture, follow­ ing such promise, could be equal to it. (1983, p. 24) W e can approach th e interrelationships a m o n g th e registers o f the R e al, the im aginary, and th e sym bolic by exam ining th e status o f the d e a f as described by O liv e r Sacks in Seeing Voices (1989). A c co rd in g to Sacks, o n ly re ce n tly (Stokoe, 1960) has A m erican Sign Language (ASL, o r Sign) b een recognized as a language, as satisfying “ every linguistic c riterio n o f a g en u in e language, in its

Introduction

5

lexicon and syntax, its capacity to generate an infinite n u m b e r o f propositions” (1989, p. 77 ).T h e sym bolic capacity o f this language and o f m ost d e a f people had b een underestim ated o r ignored, for signing was seen as m erely “ a species o f p icture w ritin g in the air” (E ncyclopedia B ritannica, 14th E ditio n , 1960), for, as Sacks p u t it, it was the c o m m o n n o tio n “ that ‘the sign language’ o f the d e af is n o m ore than a sort o f pantom im e, o r pictorial language” (1989, p. 76). T h e signs o f the d e a f w ere thereby reduced to iconic units, fu n ctioning m ainly in th e im aginary register, governed in form by a o n e -to -o n e c orrespondence b etw ee n th e sign an d its referent. T h e d eaf w ere therefore ju d g e d incapable o f m ore than a type o f co ncrete cognitive activity, unless they w e n t o n to learn ho w to sign English o r to lip read.T his stereotype o f the d e a f is itself th e type o f th in k in g fostered by the im aginary register, as w e shall see w h e n w e exam ine the Lacanian ego in later chapters. C o n trary to th e stereotype, Stokoe, according to Sacks, was th e first to ana­ lyze th e structural features o f signs, for he “ w'as con v in ced th at signs were n o t pictures, b u t com plex abstract sym bols w ith a co m p lex in n e r stru c tu re ” (1989, p. 77 ).W h a t is distinctive, m oreover, a b o u t Sign is its co m p lex use o f space: We see then, in Sign, at every level— lexical, grammatical, syntactic— a lin­ guistic use o f space: a use that is amazingly com plex, for m uch o f w hat occurs linearly, sequentially, tem porally in speech, becom es simultaneous, concurrent, multileveled in Sign. T h e ‘surface’ o f Sign may appear simple to the eye, like that o f gesture o r mime, but one soon finds that this is an illusion, and w hat looks so simple is extraordinarily com plex and consists o f innum erable spatial patterns nested, three-dim ensionally, in each other. (1989, p. 87) Sacks therefore concludes that the use o f “ picturing, pictorial pow er, goes w'ith the use o f Sign— even th o u g h Sign is n o t in the least a ‘picture-language’ itself” (1989, p. 107). Sacks provides additional data for the sym bolic status o f Sign, data th at sup­ p o rts L acan’s d istin c tio n b e tw e e n th e sym bolic an d the im a g in ary registers. Sacks w rites: T h ough unconscious, learning language is a prodigious task— but despite the differences in modality, the acquisition o f ASL by deaf children bears remarkable similarities to the acquisition o f spoken language by a hearing child. Specifically, the acquisition o f gram m ar seems identical, and this occurs relatively suddenly, as a reorganization, a discontinuity in thought and developm ent, as the child moves from gesture to language, from prelinguistic pointing o r gesture to a fully-gramm aticized linguistic system: this

Introduction

6

occurs at the same age (roughly tw enty-one to tw enty-four months) and in the same way, w hether the child is speaking o r signing. (1989, p. 90) As a language, Sign “ is processed by the left hem isphere o f the brain, w h ich is biologically specialized for ju st this fu n c tio n ” (Sacks 1989, p. 95), as in the ease o f speech. B u t since Sign is so spatial, this m eans th e brain m ust distin­ guish b etw een tw o kinds o f space, space encom passed by the sym bolic register and space fu n ctio n in g in p o in t-to -p o in t correspondence: “ T h e fact that Sign is based here in the left hem isphere, despite its spatial organization, suggests that th ere is a representation o f ‘linguistic’ space in the brain com pletely different from th at o f o rdinary,‘to p o g rap h ic ’ space” (Sacks, 1989, p. 95). A d d itio n a l e v id e n ce fo r this d istin c tio n b e tw e e n th e sy m b o lic an d th e im ag in ary registers com es from th e specific dysfunctions fo u n d in d e a f people w ith aphasia. In such “ Sign aphasias” the dysfu n ctio n can appear in various ways, in th e p a tie n t’s lexicon o r g ram m ar o r in the capacity to m ake p re p o si­ tional statem ents: B ut aphasic signers are not im paired in other, nonlinguistic visual-spatial abilities. G esture, for exam ple— the non-gram m atical expressive m ove­ m ents we all make (shrugging the shoulders, waving goodbye, brandishing a fist, etc.)— is preserved in aphasia, even though Sign is lost, emphasizing the absolute distinction betw een the two. (Sacks, 1989, p. 94) In these cases the use o f sym bolic space is im paired, b u t n o t the use o f ro u tin e gestures in th eir o n e -to -o n e correspondences. In o th e r cases th e reverse is true: Signers w ith right hemisphere strokes, in contrast, may have severe spatial disorganization, an inability to appreciate perspective, and som etim es neglect o f the left side o f space— but are n o t aphasic and retain perfect signing ability despite their severe visual-spatial deficits. (Sacks, 1989, p. 94) In th ese patien ts th e ro u tin e , fixed use o f space is im p aired , b u t th e rich ly am biguous use o f sym bolic space is not. In addition, signers use the face in a distinct m anner, linguistically, in a d d itio n to th e ro u tin e, affective use o f the face, and o n c e again th e n eu ro lo g ica l findings c o rro b o ra te th e d istin c tio n b etw ee n the sym bolic and the im aginary registers: T he few cases studied o f the effects o f brain lesions in deaf signers upon facial recognition show a similar dissociation betw een the perception o f affective and linguistic facial expressions.Thus, w ith left hemisphere lesions in signing subjects, the linguistic “propositions” o f the face may becom e unintelligible (as part and parcel o f an overall Sign aphasia), but its expres­ siveness, in the ordinary sense, is fully preserved. W ith right hem isphere lesions, conversely, there may be an inability to recognize faces o r their

Introduction

7

ordinary expressions (a so-called prosopognosia), even though they are still perceived as “propositionizing,” fluently, in Sign. (Sacks, 1989, p. 100)

Signing, therefore, is an elaborate sym bolic activity utilizing visual th o u g h t p at­ terns n o t sim ply as im ages b u t as sym bols, n o t based o n iconic resem blance any m o re th an w ords are. T h is fundam ental, system atic difference betw een iconic resem blance and sym bolic convention, som etim es referred to as analog versus digital co d in g (W ilden, 1972), in w h ic h the fo rm e r is hierarchically in tegrated in to the latter, appears to have d e te rm in e d h o w th e brain organizes spatial rela­ tionships. T his revolution in o u r u n d erstan d in g o f Sign as a language has dislodged o u r stereotype and allow ed us to see d e a f peo p le as having th eir o w n culture. H aving a culture m eans that d e a f people have a sym bolically-m ediated w'orld, a socially constru cted field o f intersubjectivity. W ith o u t such linguistic engage­ m en t, th rough speech o r Sign, th e d o m in a n t register o f ex p erien ce w o u ld be the R eal. D e a f signers d o n o t live in th e R eal b u t in socially co nstructed reality, as Sacks again tells us: “ It is certain th at w e are n o t ‘given’ reality, b u t have to co n stru ct it for ourselves, in o u r o w n way, and that in d o in g so w e are c o n d i­ tio n e d by th e cultures and w orlds w e live in ” (1 9 8 9 ,p. 73). T h e con stru ctio n o f reality requires th e use o f nam es, th e sym bolic d elin­ eation o f the su rro u n d in g e n v iro n m e n t.T h e passage from the im aginary regis­ ter to the o p e n in g u p o f reality th ro u g h the sym bol is presented by Sacks as he describes p io n ee rin g w ork w ith a d e af pupil w h o had n o language until alm ost age 14: T hen, to introduce Massieu to language, Sicard w rote the names o f the objects on their pictures. At first, his pupil “was utterly mystified. H e had no idea how lines that did n o t appear to picture anything could function as an image for objects and represent them w ith such accuracy and speed.” T hen, very suddenly, Massieu got it, got the idea o f an abstract and sym­ bolic repesentation: “at that m om ent [he] learned the w hole advantage and difficulty o f w riting . . . [and] from that m om ent on, the drawing was ban­ ished, we replaced it with w riting.” (1989, p. 47) W ith this change, w h e n M assieu “perceived that an object, o r an image, m ight be represented by a nam e, he developed a trem endous, violent hu n g er for nam es” (1989, p. 47). N am es create “ a region o f order in the chaos” o f th e R e al (1989, p. 55), the undifferentiated register in w 'hich o n e w ith o u t language appears to be fixed “ like an anim al, o r an infant, to be stuck in the present, to be confined to literal and im m ediate perception, though m ade aware o f this by a consciousness that n o infant could have” (1989, p. 44). Sacks describes such a consciousness as h e could perceive it in an eleven-year-old w ith n o language at all:

Introduction

8

It was n o t only language that was missing: there was n o t, it was evident, a d e a r sense o f the past, o f “ a day ago” as distinct from “a year ago.” T h ere was a strange lack o f historical sense, the feeling o f a life that lacked au to ­ biographical and historical dim ension, the feeling o f a life that only existed in th e m o m en t, in the p r e s e n t. . . [with] an intelligence largely confined to th e visual . . . H e seem ed com pletely literal— unable to ju g g le im ages o r h y potheses o r possibilities, unable to e n te r an im aginative o r figurative realm . (1989, p. 40)

In a word, he had not been acculturated, culture did n o t hold him , he existed in th e register o f the R eal. B eing deprived o f language m eans n o t only being incapable o f sym boli­ cally differentiating experience; it also m eans that the developm ent o f the brain is altered: “ Early language acquisition, w h eth er speech o r Sign, seems to kindle the linguistic powers o f the left hem isphere; and deprivation o f language, par­ tial o r absolute, seem s to retard d evelopm ent and gro w th in the left h e m i­ sphere” (Sacks, 1989, p. 105). Sacks w arns o f the neurological hazards o f congenital deafness, for if language experience is severely deficient, o r o th er­ wise aberrant, it m ay delay the m aturation o f the brain: “ N e ith e r language n o r the higher form s o f cerebral developm ent occur ‘spontaneously’; they depend on exposure to language, com m unication, and proper language use” (1989, p. 110). B ecom ing a hum an subject is an effect o f language, and this is w hat I take to be Lacan’s essential legacy for psychoanalysis. In b o th teaching and w ritin g I begin from the position that the Lacanian perspective may be unfam iliar to readers; for this reason the notions o f im agi­ nary, symbolic, and R e al will unfold gradually and be presented as distinctive approaches to data from a variety o f sources such as cognitive, social, and devel­ opm ental psychology, literature, history, art, and psychoanalytic treatm ent. Because the n o tio n o f the R eal is especially difficult to approach, it is co m ­ m only om itted from discussion. As B rett stated: “ Like m any others w h o discuss L acan’s w ork I will bracket the R eal and talk only a bout the Im aginary and Sym bolic” (1981, p. 193). B ut to om it the R eal, o r to designate it w ith a “ capi­ tal X ,” as som e do (e.g., W eber, 1982, p. 140), skews the m eaning o f the o th er registers. I have fo u n d it helpful to approach the R eal through literature, n o t as a m eans o f interpreting the w ork but rather in an attem pt to explore ho w the w ork interprets us, how it sets up effects in us by providing contact w ith the R eal. In this exploration I will try to use the triadic structure o f the sign as elaborated by Charles Sanders Peirce, as well as his three categories o f logical relations, w hich appear to have m uch in co m m o n w ith Lacan’s three registers. I hope by the en d o f the book the reader will com e to know and to evaluate how these registers, as a sem iotic code o f experience, can c ontribute to psy­ choanalytic understanding.

Introduction

9

R eaders w h o w ant an introduction to the ideas o f Lacan may find useful the books by Felm an (1987), C lark (1988), B oothby (1991), and M uller and Richardson (1982, 1988).T h e book in hand is an attem pt at integration rather than exposition; I d o n ’t m ean thereby to justify' lack o f clarity, but to alert the reader. I do not take part in the current debate pitting herm eneutics against nat­ ural science, since there seems to m e no quarreling w ith the position that it is helpful to bring findings into an argum ent and that findings arc only found and interpreted through a point o f view, as so cogently argued by Phillips (1991) in his definitive survey o f the philosophical issues. T h e b o o k ’s first four chapters present my reading o f selected data from child developm ent research, psychology, and linguistics, and approxim ate a sem iotic m odel o f “ n orm al” developm ent. T h e follow ing three chapters exam ine in a Lacanian fram ework the structural basis o f psychotic states as indicative o f mas­ sive semiotic failure in developm ent.T he final three chapters on hum an narcis­ sism suggest w hy “ norm al” developm ent may be impossible. I conclude w ith an attem pt to integrate hierarchical models in semiotics and psychoanalysis.

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Part One Developmental Semiotics

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Mother-Infant Mutual Gazing

T h e co n te m p o ra ry em phasis in psychoanalytic th e o ry o n the dyad is often p resen ted as an advance over individualistic, intrapsychic, d e fe n se /d riv e m odels o f hum an fu n c tio n in g .T h e relation to “ objects” is conceptualized as a separate d evelopm ental line, progressing cognitively from partial to w h o le percep tio n s o r affectively from split to in te g rate d relationships (K ernberg, 1980). K o h u t (1 9 7 1 ,1 9 7 7 ,1 9 8 4 ) elaborated a developm ental line o f narcissis­ tic integration in w hich the n o tio n o f a “selfobject” is offered to account for h o w one person m ay be used by a n o th er to carry o u t o n e ’s ow n psychologi­ cal functions, the m ost im p o rta n t o f w hich is the m aintenance o f a sense o f cohesiveness. A ch ief function o f the selfobject is to “ m irro r” the infantile, grandiose self, w hose developm entally appropriate exhibitionistic behavior is ideally m et in childhood by an approving, adm iring, m irroring adult. I f this process does not occur, the ensuing narcissistic pathology signifies a developm ental arrest. T h e appropriate treatm en t, according to self-psychologists (e.g., W olf, 1976; O rnstein, 1990; Fosshage, 1990), is for the therapist to “ m irro r” the patient by sustaining an intersubjective c o n g ru en c e, m ee tin g dem ands for adm iration, m aintaining affective a ttu n e m e n t. T h ey invoke recen t research o n m o th e rinfant face-to-face interaction (e.g., B eebe and Lachm ann, 1988) as evidence for the positive im pact o f em pathic resonance. I w ill try to re-fo rm u late the results o f these infant studies in term s o f developm ental semiotics, w ith sem iotics as defined by Charles M orris:

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DEVELOPMENTAL SEM IO TIC S

S em io tic has for its goal a general th e o ry o f signs in all th e ir form s an d m anifestations, w h e th e r in anim als o r m en , w h e th e r n o rm a l o r p a th o lo g i­ cal, w h e th e r linguistic o r nonlinguistic, w h e th e r personal o r social. S em iotic is th u s an interd isciplinary en terp rise. (1964, p. 1)

B y e xam ining infant studies in the light o f sem iotics (Deely, 1990; C olapietro, 1993), w e m ay be in a p osition to elaborate a distinctive developm ental line (A. Freud, 1963). T his developm ental line, I will suggest, spans a m o v em en t from coerced m irro rin g to recognition, or, in sem iotic term s, from enacted iconicity to in d ex to sym bol. From this perspective, m irro rin g appears to be an early c o n ­ straint o n th e infant s b ehavior w h ereb y the m o th e r’s em o tio n al presentation induces a m irro rin g response in the infant.T his dynam ic is w h a t I take Lacan to m e a n by th e im a g in ary register, w h o se dynam ics g o v e rn dyadic relations. R e c o g n itio n , in contrast, does n o t coerce sam eness b u t posits difference, and appears in th e m o th e r’s utilization o f a sem iotic code w h ic h th e infant begins to use in m utual in teraction w ith the m other. U n d e rsto o d in this way, the code, situated in the sym bolic register, functions as a third to th e dyad from the earli­ est p e rio d o f developm ent, w ith decisive consequences fo r o u r u n derstanding o f th e analytic relationship a n d th e relationship b e tw e e n psychoanalysis and culture. B efore I attem pt to establish th e sem iotic status o f such a code in th e fol­ low ing chapters, I w o u ld like to em phasize B ru n e r’s reference to a protolinguistic fram ew ork. B ru n e r conceptualizes th e child’s en try in to m eaning as a process o f cultural transm ission in w h ic h specific com m unicative functions are devel­ o p e d before the child has m astered form al linguistic expression, and these func­ tions include “ indicating, labelling, requesting, an d m isleading” (1990, p. 71). Such a “protolinguistic system ” (1990, p. 69) provides kno w led g e o f context, cuing, an d ostensive reference and is organized by a narrative fo rm at w ith fo u r m ajor constituents: goal-directed action, a segm ented order, a sensitivity to wThat is norm ative and w h at is deviant in h u m an interaction, an d a narratorial p er­ spective (1990, p. 77). I think we can find evidence for m ost, i f n o t all, o f th e features o f B ru n e r’s protolinguistic system in som e observations o f early in fan t-m o th e r interaction m ade a g e n era tio n ago. B razelton, Koslow ski, and M ain (1974) analyzed th e behavior o f five m o ther-infant pairs by coding films o f sh o rt periods o f intense interaction involving a tte n tio n and w ithdraw al. T h e infants w ere from tw o to tw enty weeks old and were ju d g e d to be norm al. B y three w'eeks o f age tw o dis­ tin c t systems o f in fan t beh av io r had em erged, o n e fo r objects an d o n e for m other. T h e difference was striking: “W e felt that w e could look at any segm ent o f the infant’s b o d y and detect w h e th er he was w atching an object o r interacting w ith his m o th e r— so different was his attention, vocalizing, sm iling, and m o to r behavior w ith the inanim ate stim ulus as opposed to the m o th e r” (1974, p. 53).

Mother-Infant Mutual Gazing

15

By four w eeks, sitting tensely before the in anim ate object, w ith shoulders h u n c h ed as if to “pounce,” fixating o n the o bject (by six weeks) for as long as tw o m inutes, the infant w o u ld suddenly look away, flail, cry o u t, and th en look at so m ething else. B razelton and his colleagues w rite: T he period o f disruption was followed by a turning back to the object and a resum ption o f the “hooked” state o f attention. Striking in all o f this was the intent prolonged state o f attention, during w hich tension gradually built up in all segments o f his body until abrupt disruption seemed the inevitable and necessary relief for him. This behav­ ior was m ost striking by twelve to sixteen weeks. (1974, p. 54) T h e authors affirm : “ O f course the expectancy engen d ered in an interaction w ith a static object, as opposed to a responsive person, m ust be very different” (1974, p. 55). Such expectancy is generated in response to th e m o th e r’s desire and they describe th e ensuing interactio n w ith a w ealth o f sem iotic detail. T h e typical unit o f observed behavior begins w ith the infant lo o k in g back at the m other, w ith b rig h te n in g eyes and face, extrem ities e xtended tow ard her. As m o th e r responds to his lo o k in g at her, “ th e infant assumes a state o f attention in w hich he alternately sends and receives cues” (1974, p. 56). H is sm iling is rein­ forced by h er co n tin g e n t sm iling, he becom es m ore active, and his excitem ent peaks, leading to a gradual deceleration w ith a dull expression that is quite dif­ ferent from th e sudden drop in activity before an inanim ate object. T h e infant then appears to w ithdraw from his m other, lo o k in g away b u t keeping h e r in his peripheral vision. H e th en turns back tow ard his m other, signalling h e is ready for a n o th er p e rio d o f interaction. T hese “ tim e outs” m ay be m ore than simply self-soothing m aneuvers, attem pts to reduce arousal th at has becom e noxious; they m ay be th e in fan t’s efforts to process inform ation, to “digest w hat he has taken in d u rin g th e interactio n ” (1974, p. 59). D u rin g these m om ents the infant m ay be learning the basic rule o f the interaction, to k n o w w h e n “to tu rn h er off, to decrease his receptivity to inform ation from h e r” in o rd e r to develop his “ capacity to attend to messages in a com m unication system ” (1974, p. 60). O n th e m o th e r’s side, th e “ m ost im p o rta n t rule fo r m aintaining an interac­ tio n seem ed to be th at a m o th e r develop a sensitivity to h e r in fan t’s capacity for a tte n tio n and his n eed for w ithdraw al— partial o r com plete— after a p e rio d o f atten tio n to h e r” (1974, p. 5 9 ).T h is ru le for th e m o th e r and the infant’s basic rule a b o u t w h e n to w ith d raw c o n jo in to form “ th e first rule each m ust learn from th e o th e r” (1974, p. 6 0 ).T h is rule is superordinate because it governs the learning o f all o th e r rules, cues, and codes. W ith the learn in g o f this superordi­ nate rule, the m o th e r goes beyond the eliciting o f sm iling by sm iling: by recog­ nizing th e infant as re q u irin g and capable o f taking a tim e o u t, she therefore also recognizes him o r h e r as capable o f sending signals as signs.T his opens the

16

DEVELOPMENTAL SEM IO TIC S

field o f c o m m u n ic a tio n to sym bolic reso n an ce an d a responsiveness vastly b roader th an the o n e -to -o n e sm iling response. A lth o u g h they d o n o t build u p o n an explicit sem iotic fram ew ork, B razelton and his colleagues describe the m o th e r-in fa n t interaction in term s that seem to req u ire it.T h e m o th e rs re co g n itio n serves to reinforce the in fa n t’s sem iotic capacity, and she does this by “adjusting h e r rhythm to his, follow ing his cues fo r a tte n tio n and w ithdraw al, and adding h er cues w h e n he dem onstrates his receptiveness” (1974, p. 64). She increases his capacity “ to receive and send m es­ sages” by “ [ajllow ing for reciprocity w ith sensitivity to his signals” (1974, p. 64). M oreover, she appears “ to teach th e in fan t h o w to suppress an d channel his o w n beh av io r in to a c o m m u n ica tio n system ” by learn in g the conditions “ for con tain in g h e r infant,” th ro u g h restraint o r “ w ith h e r face, h e r gestures, o r h er vo ice” (1974, pp. 6 4 -6 5 ). In all o f this she “ attem pts to elicit a signal from the infant c o n firm in g that h e is in to u ch w ith h e r” (1974, p. 65), and thereby c o n ­ firm in g th at in som e way she has b e e n recognized by him . H e r gestures, h e r ho ld in g and sm iling, h e r em phasis o n speech rhythm s, “ [t]hese behaviors w ere all desig n ed to h e ig h te n th e in fo rm a tio n -g iv in g aspect o f this in te ra c tio n seq u en ce” (1974, p. 66). E ven w h e n th e infant’s observable response is m inim al, she w ill “ e n d o w th e sm allest m o v em en ts w ith highly p ersonal m ea n in g and react to th e m affectively” (1974, p. 68). In h e r status as a desiring subject, n o t as an object, she recognizes in h e r anticipatory action, and therefore m akes possi­ ble, th e sem iotic status o f the infant. T h e a u th o rs re fe r to th e th e n u n p u b lis h e d research o f T ro n ic k , w h ic h d em o n strated “ reactions to violatio n o f expectancy, w h ic h are seen as early as fo u r w e ek s” (1974, p. 70). T h is research, su b seq u en tly p u b lish ed by T ronick, Als, A dam son,W ise, an d B razelton, invokes a sem iotic d im e n sio n from its first se n te n c e : “ In fa c e -to -fa c e in te ra c tio n s y o u n g in fan ts b e g in to le a rn an d define th e rules o f social in te rac tio n ,” for th ey lea rn “ cognitive an d affective in fo rm a tio n w h ic h allow s th e m to fit in to th e ir culture, to identify' w ith th eir caregivers, and to identify them selves” (1978, p. 1). F o r these infants aged tw o to tw e n ty w eeks, this culturally-specific “ c o m m u n ic a tio n system ” consists o f “ phases o f an in te ra c tio n ” th a t includes “ in itiatio n o f th e in te rac tio n , m u tu al o rie n ta tio n o f th e partn ers, greetings, cyclical exchange o f affective in fo rm a ­ tio n as in play dialogues an d gam es, an d m u tu al d ise n g ag e m e n t” (1978, p. 1). T h is ru le -g o v e rn e d b e h av io r is an e n o rm o u s a ch iev e m en t, o n e that “requires th a t th e system be m u tually regulated, that is, th at b o th p articipants re cip ro ­ cally m o d ify th e ir actions based o n the feedback th ey receive from th e ir p a rt­ n e r ” (1978, p. 2). T h e sem iotic w eight o f this achievem ent, its social gravity, b ecom es evident w h e n the ex p erim en ters instruct the m o th e r to break the learned rules, to v io ­ late the infant’s learned expectations by rem aining unresponsive to th e infant, by

Mother-Infant Mutual Gazing

17

m aintaining an expressionless face.T ronick, B razelton, and Als describe this p h e ­ n o m e n o n as follows: For example, if the m other remains still faced and im m obile in front o f an infant, the infant attem pts to get the interaction back on track w ith a spe­ cific set o f a sequence o f behaviors. Initially the infant orients to the adult and smiles, but w hen the m o th er fails to respond, the infant sobers. His facial expression is serious and he stills. H e stares at the adult and smiles again, but briefly.Then he looks away. He repeatedly looks toward and away from the adult, smiling briefly in conjunction w ith the look toward, and sobering w ith the look away. Eventually he slumps in his seat with his chin tucked, his head and eyes oriented away from the adult. (1978, p. 10) In 1982, C o h n an d T ro n ic k v id e o ta p e d th e responses o f tw elve m ale and twelve fem ale th re e -m o n th -o ld infants in th eir laboratory setting. M others w ere in structed to show n o rm al o r sim ulated depressed expressions in tw o fa ce -to face in te rac tio n p e rio d s w ith th e ir infants. T h e y a tte m p te d to test prevailing hypotheses regarding infant m o tiv a tio n and response. S tim u la tio n -ré g u la tio n theo ries (as fo u n d in S tern, 1985) w o u ld argue that sim ulated m aternal depres­ sion w ould n o t provide sufficient stim ulation to arouse interest and so the infant w ould look away m o re and episodes o f upset w o u ld be unlikely. Schem a-discrepancy theories (such as fo u n d in K agan, 1974) w o u ld argue that the change in m o th e rs ’ expressions w o u ld lead to positive in te rest in th e infants or, in extrem e discrepancy, som e degree o f upset follow ed by positive interest. T h e results argue against b o th o f these views and favor a rule violation hypothesis, as C o h n and T ronick conclude: T he rule violation hypothesis predicts that infants will respond to simulated m aternal depression w ith increased frequencies o f positive elicitations (brief positive) and increased proportions o f negative displays. It predicts that the structure o f infant behavior will clearly differ betw een conditions and that differences in negativity may continue into the next p e rio d o f norm al interaction.These predictions were confirm ed. Infants in the simu­ lated depressed condition had significandy and markedly higher propor­ tions o f protest and w ary [ratings o f b e h a v io r].. . . N orm al condition infants, conversely, spent a m inim al proportion o f their tim e in negative states (13 percent) and about 40 percent o f their tim e in positive o r m oni­ tor [states], (1982, p. 75-76) In short, th e infants “ structured th eir behavior in a radically different m a n n e r” in each c o n d itio n (1982, p. 76). T h e effect o n the infant o f the still face, fur­ th e rm o re , o c cu re d o nly w ith peo p le, n o t w ith objects. E llsw orth, M u ir, and H ains (1993), in studies o f th re e - and six -m o n th -o ld s, fo u n d that interactive

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DEVELOPMENTAL SE M IO T IC S

objects such as a cloth h and p u p p e t w hose m ovem ents w ere accom panied by a synthesizer voice p a tte rn did n o t elicit the effect. T h e infants’ status as sem iotic agents was q uite apparent to th eir m o th e rs.In th e study re p o rte d by T ro n ic k , Als, A dam son, W ise, and B razelto n , m o th e rs rep o rte d that they found it very difficult to sit still-faced in front o f the infant and resist his powerful sallies and bids to interaction. T hey found it at the same time very reassuring that the infant trusted his own powers to engage them in interaction. T hey well understood the infant’s anger at reunion and were flattered by his dem onstration o f their im portance to him. (1978, p. 10) T h e authors co n clu d e th at th e “ in fan t’s recognition o f th e m o th e r’s violation o f reciprocity in th e still—face c o n d itio n begins very early,” w ith anecdotal evi­ dence for it as early as tw o to three w eeks, w hile the p a tte rn described above “ is clearly established by four w eeks” (1978, p. 12). T h ese results n o t o nly favor a sem iotic perspective, b u t they also argue fo r a significant m e m o ry capacity in th e th re e -w e e k - to th re e -m o n th -o ld infant. T h is m eans that, u n d e r these c o n d itio n s o f ru le v io latio n , th e in fan t is n o t sim ply resp o n d in g to th e im m ediately preced in g m atern al cue, b u t to a m o re e x te n d e d interactiv e se q u e n ce as m easu red against a le a rn e d sem io tic co d e w h ic h has b eco m e an integral feature o f the interactio n al c o n te x t (Lewis and L ee-Painter, 1974). Infants are m u ch m ore capable o f lo n g -te rm m em o ry than has generally b e en assum ed. In an intitial study, infants averaging six -a n d -a-h a lf m o n th s old re ac h ed in th e d ark fo r an o b je c t th a t m ad e sounds; w h e n th e study was repeated o n e o r tw o years later, th e infants show ed that th ey had retained a m em o ry o f this o n e -tim e e x p erien c e (Perris, M yers, and C lifto n , 1990). T ronick and his colleagues conceptualize the observed m o th e r-in fa n t in ter­ action “ as a g o a l-o rien te d , reciprocal system in w h ic h th e infant plays a m ajor active role, constantly m odifying his o w n com m unicative displays in response to th e feedback provided by his p a rtn e r” (1978, p. 10).T h e “ ru le-g o v e rn ed ” in te r­ action consists o f “ em otio n al displays o f the infant and adult as m essage-carryin g displays” w ith a clear sem iotic im p o rt: “Language is n o t yet a part o f the interactio n , b u t there appears to be a lex ico n o f expression that conveys infor­ m atio n to each a b o u t th eir p a rtn e r’s in n er em otional state and serves to regulate th e in te rac tio n ” (1978, p. 1 l).T h e interactio n seem s to be regulated by th e rec­ iprocal cuing. Such cues, how ever, m ay n o t convey in fo rm a tio n a b o u t “ in n e r” em otio n al states, b u t rath er m ay signal q uite overt c o nditions o f recognition: “ T h e regulatory aspect o f a signal contains in fo rm atio n a b o u t a c o m m u n ica n t’s acceptance, rejection, o r m odification o f th e c u rre n t state o f th e in te rac tio n ” (1978, p. 11). In o th e r words, the participants signal th eir m utual recognition, o r

Mother-Infant Mutual Gazing

19

th e refusal o f such recognition, in the very act o f com m u n icatin g , as a m etacom m unication. As w e shall see in subsequent chapters, such m utual re cognition in the act o f com m unicating is b o u n d up in the use o f the personal pro n o u n s “ I” and “y o u ” (Benveniste, 1956).T ronick s study, fu rth erm o re, appears to agree w ith B ru n e r’s n o tio n o f a proto lin g u istic fram ew o rk that sets th e stage for saying “ I” and “y o u ” w h e n it concludes that “p rio r to the in co rp o ra tio n o f language in to the interaction, th e infant has developed and practiced the ability to regulate the pragm atic aspects o f an interch an g e” (1978, p. 1 l) .T h e experience o f recogni­ tio n is intim ately tied to such learning, for “th e seriousness o f the infant’s reac­ tio n w h e n th e m o th e r rem ains unresponsive despite his efforts dem onstrates h o w critical reciprocity is to h im ” (1978, p. 12).To equate such reciprocity w ith its affective co m p o n en ts overlooks h o w th e interaction is ordered, sustained, and rendered significant th ro u g h its sem iotic dim ension, and it is precisely the sem i­ otic violation, as a refusal o f recognition, that brings a b o u t the negative affective response. U nlike th eir responses to such refusal o f recognition, infants react q uite dif­ feren tly to in teractiv e e rro rs o r sim ple m iscuing. T ro n ic k an d C o h n (1989) exam ined the role o f synchrony and m iscoordination in th eir sam ple o f fiftyfour th re e -, six-, an d n in e -m o n th -o ld infants and th eir m o th ers. T h e y found that m o th e r-so n dyads w ere m o re likely th an m o th e r-d a u g h te r dyads to be in synchronous states, alth o u g h overall m atching o c cu rre d less than 30 percent o f the tim e .T h e authors speculate th at the 70 percen t o f the tim e spent in m isco­ ordination is crucial to “th e learning o f th e rules o f in te rac tio n ” (1989, p. 90). In such learn in g the interactive errors are identified and repaired; in an earlier study, T ro n ic k an d G ia n in o (1986) fo u n d th a t “ d u rin g n o rm a l fa ce -to -fa ce interactions at six m o n th s o f age a b o u t o n e -th ird o f the interactive errors are repaired in th e n e x t step o f th e in te ra c tio n ” and th a t in T ronick and C o h n ’s study “ th e repair rate ranges from a b o u t once every 3 seconds to once every 5 seconds” (1989, p. 90). C o h n and T ronick observed eig h teen m o th e r-in fa n t pairs each at three, six, and nin e m o n th s o f age (1988).T h e y looked for evidence o f p erio d ic cycling o f beh av io r (as re p o rte d earlier by Lester, H offm an, a n d B razelton, 1985), as well as the direction o f influence in the m o th e r-in fa n t face-to-face interaction. T h e ir results c h allen g e d th e v iew th a t th e in fa n t’s b e h av io r is biologically im pelled, m anifested in blind p erio d ic cycles w h ic h the infant gradually syn­ chronizes w ith th e m o th e r’s behavior. C o h n and T ro n ick fo u n d a significant p eriodic c o m p o n e n t in only five o f eighteen infants in th e th re e -m o n th -o ld group, in on e o f eig h teen at six m onths, and n o n e at nin e m onths, w ith the observed periodicity a cco u n tin g for less than 3 p e rce n t o f th e variation in sub­ sequent behavior. Instead o f show ing periodicity, roughly a third o f the in ter­

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DEVELOPMENTAL SEMI OTIC S

active b ehavior o f the infant as well as the m o th e r was observed to be c o rre ­ lated w ith the im m ediately p receding behavior: “ Babies w ere m o re likely to respond to changes in th eir m o th e r’s behavior if the m o th e r w ere responsive to changes in th eir beh av io r” (1988, p. 388). E xcept at six m o n th s, w h e n m o th ers w ere m o re likely to follow th e ir in fan ts’ leads, “ infants and m o th e rs w ere equally influential in influencing the d irection o f the interaction,” leading the au th o rs to conclude: “ W e found strong su p p o rt for the b e lie f that face-to-face interactions are a p ro d u c t o f bidirectional influence” (1988, p. 3 88).T h e m ean ­ in g o f these findings can be sim ply pu t: “ E arly m o th e r-in fa n t fa ce -to -fa ce interactions have a conversation-like p a tte rn in w h ic h each p a rtn e r appears to be responsive to th e o th e r” (1988, p. 386). T his conversation-like p a tte rn has b e en fo u n d to show cross-cultural vari­ ability, fu rth e r a rguing against blind biological periodicity. In 1988, Fogel,Toda, an d K aw ai v id e o ta p e d th irty -six Japanese an d th irty -six A m e ric an th re e m o n th -o ld in fa n t-m o th e r dyads in a standardized lab o ra to ry se ttin g in th eir o w n countries. M o th ers, all urban, m id d le -in c o m e , and over tw e n ty -o n e , were in stru cted to play w ith th e ir babies as they w ould at ho m e. O bservations w ere p rim arily directed tow ard the facial, gaze, and vocal features o f the interaction. A lth o u g h there w ere n o differences in th e rate and p ro p o rtio n o f m aternal expressiveness w h ile th e in fan t gazed at th em , A m e ric an m o th e rs c o m b in e d facial expressiveness w ith vocalization, w hereas Japanese m o th e rs c o m b in e d facial expressiveness w ith leaning close. In particular, Japanese m o th ers signifi­ cantly increased th e ir leaning close as well as th e ir to u c h in g w h e n the infant shifted from gazing away to gazing at th e ir m others. Infants in b o th cultures sm iled overall a b o u t the sam e p ro p o rtio n o f tim e, b u t th e A m e ric an infants sm iled three tim es as often as th e Japanese infants, w hile the Japanese infants sm iled for lo n g e r average duratio n s. D u rin g th e n in e seconds fo llo w in g the onset o f infant sm iling, m o th e rs in b o th cultures significantly reduced their fre­ q uency o f facial and vocal expressiveness, b u t the Japanese m others, as they did w ith infant gazing, increased th e frequency o f leaning close an d to u c h in g in response to infant sm iling. B o th c u ltu re an d sex affected vocalization. Ju st as th ey d id w ith sm iling, Japanese infants vocalized less often b u t for m o re e x te n d e d perio d s th a n th e A m erican infants, w hile girls in b o th cultures vocalized a g reater p ro p o rtio n o f tim e a n d less freq u e n tly than boys. A m erican m o th e rs w ere m o re expressive th a n Japanese m o th e rs w h ile th e ir infants w ere vocalizing, a n d o n ly the A m erican m others co-vocalized w ith th eir infants. For the Japanese m others, n o significant c o -o c c u rre n c e s w ere observed b e tw ee n th eir beh av io r an d infant vocalizatio n . In c o n tra st to th e A m e ric an m o th e rs, m o reo v er, th e Japanese m o th e rs signalled m o re w ith th e ir hands, by c lapping, w aving, a n d m ak in g in tric a te h a n d displays several tim es in a session. T h e re w ere n o differences,

Mother-Infant Mutual Gazing

21

however, in global m easures o f m aternal behavior: m others in b o th cultures show ed facial expressiveness 70 percent o f the time, touched their babies about 50 percent o f the tim e, and vocalized about 80 percent o f the tim e to their babies.This global similarity highlights the specificity o f the findings, those cul­ tural variations evidenced in tim ing and targeting o f m aternal cues.T he authors conclude that in “ b oth cultures, by three m onths o f age a com plex system o f interpersonal com m unication o f affect was well established” (1988, p. 405) and they speculate that the observed variations are consistent w ith the greater n o n ­ verbal features o f the Japanese, w hereas A m erican m o th e rs rely heavily on speech to com m unicate about and indicate a response to affective states. Specific differences have also b e en observed w ith variations in social class. In 1972, Lewis and W ilson observed infants and m others from middle-class and working-class backgrounds and found no differences in frequency o f m aternal vocalization in the presence o f the infant. M iddle-class m others, however, were m ore likely than working-class m others to respond to their infants’ vocalization w ith a vocalization. At this point we may tentatively conclude that these infant studies support the follow ing sem iotic claims:

1.

T he m other-infant interaction is governed by an exchange o f cues struc­

2.

T his code has the essential features o f a sem iotic code insofar as it speci­

tured by a code. fies cues as signs, indicates their legitim ate substitution and com bination, and organizes the pragmatics o f turn-taking for the positions o f sender and receiver o f these cues. 3.

T he infant learns to use and respond to such cues.

4.

T h e m other recognizes the infant as actively cuing.

5.

T h e infant’s role as sem iotic p artner impacts the m o th e r’s sem iotic behav­ ior.

6.

T h e m o th e r’s violation o f the sem iotic code is disruptive to the infant and this indicates that the infant has learned the basic rudim ents o f the code.

7.

T h e semiotic rules for the interaction are culturally distinct.

8.

T h e code that structures the interaction stands as a third term to the dyad,

9.

T h e m o th e r’s distinctive responsivity, w hat distinguishes her from o ther

as the holding environm ent for b oth m other and infant. objects in the infant’s environm ent, is n o t as a desired object b u t rather as a desiring subject. 10. T h e process o f m utual sem iotic recognition leads to the em ergence o f subjectivity in the infant, eventually effected in the use o f “ I” and “you.”

22

DEVELOPMENTAL SEM IO TIC S

A m o n g psychoanalysts, tw o distinct biases have led away from conclusions o f this sort. T h e first lies in the narcissism o f consciousness, w h ich insists that th e use o f signs requires a conscious ego. B u t to insist o n this is to dismiss o r overlook th e essential F reudian discovery regarding m ean in g fu l u n c onscious activity, th e u n c o n sc io u s play o f signifiers in th e dream s and parapraxes o f adults. T h e second bias equates the preverbal w ith the prelinguistic and invokes a prelinguistic stage o f developm ent in w h ich the use o f signs is impossible. B ut, as B ru n e r has show n, the verbal does n o t em erge from th e preverbal, b u t rath er from the protolinguistic, the sem iotic code. C h ild developm ent specialists have con clu d ed that “ there is n o such th in g as a ‘prelinguistic’ ch ild ” (O sofsky and C o n n o rs, 1979, p. 528). M y ow n integrative w ish is to em b race each o f these phases th rough L acan’s sem iotic registers. If w e can discern the “ conver­ satio n -lik e” c o m p o n e n ts o f th e face-to -face in teractio n as o p e n in g o n to th e dim ension o f the sym bolic register, th en perhaps w e m ay likew ise exam ine the observed affective c o m p o n e n ts, especially w h e n sy n ch ro n y is present, as the op eratio n o f the im aginary register in that broad intersubjective arena that we call empathy. In o rd e r to exam ine th e early d evelopm ental stru c tu re o f em pathy, three hypotheses em b ed d ed in th e observations o f B razelton and his colleagues w ere tested by C o h n and T ronick: (1) Interactions begin w ith the m o th e r’s positively eliciting her infant’s attention; (2) maternal positive expression precedes the onset o f infant’s pos­ itive expression; and (3) w hen the infant becomes positive, the m other will remain positive until the infant again becom es disengaged. (1987, p. 68) T h ese hypotheses w ere tested o n th ree groups o f 18 m o th e r-in fa n t pairs at three, six, and nin e m o n th s o f age, and all three w ere c o n firm ed . T h e evidence suggests ju s t h o w pow erful the in fluence o f a m o th e r’s e m o tio n al state is in pro d u cin g a m irro rin g effect in the infant. T h e ir “ dyadic-states m o d el o f m o th e r-in fa n t face-to -face in te rac tio n ” p ro ­ poses that “m aternal positive affective expression (e.g., smile, exaggerated ‘play face,’ o r anim ated vocal expression) fram es the infant’s positive affective expres­ sion (e.g., b rig h t face, smile, o r soft vocalization) as the infant cycles from a tten ­ tio n to and away from th e m o th e r” (1987, p. 68). in th e ir study th e m o th e r alm ost always becam e positive before the infant at three and six m onths; at nine m o n th s “ th ere was a significant increase in th e p ro b a b ility o f th e in fa n t’s b e co m in g positive before the m o th e r” (1987, p. 73). O bservations o f interac­ tions (Beebe and G erstm an, 1980; F afouti-M ilenkovic and U zgiris, 1979; Kaye an d Fogel, 1980) as well as e x p erim e n tal studies (C o h n an d T ro n ic k , 1983; T ronick, Als, A dam son, W ise, and B razelton, 1978) su p p o rt the hypothesis that “ th e change from a n e u tra l expression to a positive expression follow s th e

Mother-Infant Mutual Gazing

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m o th e r’s b e co m in g positive” (1987, p. 69). Infants are m ore likely to vocalize once the m o th e r vocalizes than w h e n she rem ains silent (A nderson,V ietze, and D olecki, 1977; P enm an, F riedm an, and M eares, 1986; S tern, Jaffe, B eebe, and B e n n ett, 1975). V ocalization, how ever, m ay n o t be as co nstrained as vision in m irro rin g the o th er; o n e study show ed that w h a t is m ost effective in pro d u cin g infant vocalizations are n o t m aternal vocalizations b u t specific m aternal tu rn taking signals (K ozak-M ayer and T ronick, 1985). T h e responses o f te n -w e e k -o ld infants (six boys and six girls) w ere studied in response to m o th e rs’ presentations o f happy, sad, an d angry faces and vocal­ izations (H aviland and Lelwica, 1987).T h e authors hypothesized that “ even an infant y o u n g er th an three m o n th s m ig h t respond w ith an e m o tio n th at m ir­ rored the e m o tio n stim ulus,” based o n th e assum ption “ th a t th e e m o tio n p re­ sentation, itself, is a stim ulus for the infant’s e m o tio n ” (1987, p. 9 7).T h ey refer to th e w o rk o f T om kins, w h o w ro te : “ All affects . . . are specific activators o f them selves— the principle o f c o n ta g io n .T h is is tru e w h e th e r the affect is ini­ tially a response o f th e self, o r th e response o f the o th e r” (1962, p. 296). In th e study by H aviland and Lelwica, m o th e rs m ade fo u r 15-second pre­ sentations o f joy, sadness, a n d anger. To qualify as a m irro rin g response, th e in fan t’s response had to follow the m o th e r’s presentation by n o m o re than o n e second. T h e authors sum m arize as follows: T h e results o f this study support three m ajor conclusions: First, by ten weeks o f age, infants respond differently to three m aternal affect expres­ sions w hen the presentation is simultaneously facial and vocal—joy, anger, and sadness. Second, these infants can m atch o r m irro r jo y and anger expressions. T hird, the infants’ m atching responses to the m aternal affects are only part o f com plex but predictable behavioral patterns that seem to indicate meaningful affect states and possibly self-regulation in the infants. (1987, p. 102) Specifically, the infants show ed significant m irro rin g o f m o th e rs’jo y expres­ sions o n th e first p resentation and a significant increase in interest o n later p re­ sentations o f jo y ; significant m atch in g o f an g er responses o c cu rre d o n all but th e second anger presentation, w hile infant m ovem ent and interest decreased; in response to the sad presentations, infants ten d e d to gaze d o w n and engaged in significantly m ore “ m o u th in g ” behavior: lip and to n g u e sucking, pushing the lips in and out. T h e au th o rs c o m m en t: “ T h is b ehavior did n o t o c cu r frequently u n d e r th e o th e r c o n d itio n s.T h e infants’ m o u th in g behaviors in response to the sad expressions could be seen as self-soothing” (1987, p. 103).T h e self-soothing w o u ld follow the state o f coerced em pathy, an iconic identification w ith the m o th e r’s sad p re sen ta tio n .T h e authors conclude:

24

DEVELOPMENTAL SEM IO TIC S

In o u r o p in io n th e in d u ced -affect hypothesis provides th e m ost reasonable explanation for infant m atch in g o f adult facial expressions o f e m o tio n .T h e m o th e rs’ expressions seem to have caused an em o tio n al ex p e rie n c e in the infants co rre sp o n d in g to the expression presented. (1987, p. 103)

T his m irro rin g effect, o r w hat sem ioticians have called “ enacted iconicity” (Johansen, 1993), as evidenced in the above studies o f infants u n d er six m onths, appears to sharply decrease after six m onths o f age. W olff notes how “ the quasiobligatory facial response o f six-w eek-old w aking infants to faces and voices” gives way at four m o n th s to a sem iotic selectivity: “ T h e fo u r-m o n th -o ld infant seems to be m aking ‘choices’ o f w h e th e r o r n o t to smile, and in w h ich way to acknow ledge the e n c o u n te r” (1987, p. 239), a shift w hich W olff calls “th e infant’s apparent release from ‘stim ulus-boundedness’” (1987, p. 124). C o h n and T ronick fo u n d that from “ 3 to 9 m o n th s there was a steady decrease in th e strength o f association, o r sequential constraint, am ong dyadic states” (1987, p. 73). M accoby and M artin (1983) and Schaffer (1984) “ th eorized that d u rin g the second halfyear o f life there is a tren d tow ard a m ore sym m etrical relationship in w h ich b o th m others and infants initiate positive dyadic states.” C o h n and T ronick c o n ­ clude: “T h e im plication for the dyadic states m o d el is that it m ay n eed to be m odified to reflect an (hypothesized) increase in the probability o f jo in t positive engagem ent b ein g initiated by the infant” (1987, p. 69).T h a t is to say, as th e sem i­ otic structuring o f th e infant develops, the infant becom es less vulnerable to the m irro rin g constraints and m o re capable o f initiating sem iotic interactions. T his b r ie f ex am ination o f research o n early m irro rin g responses suggests an im p o rta n t distinction b e tw ee n em pathy and reco g n itio n . As presen ted above, th e earliest e m p a th ic responses, as w ell as th e affective c o m p o n e n t o f later responses, are autom atic, alm ost coerced in constraining o n e ’s subjective state and behavior to m atch that o f a m o d el.T h e affective presentation is contagious, captivating, and produces a replica in th e other. R e c o g n itio n , o n the contrary, is an actio n that posits difference from self, ack n o w led g in g the specific state o f th e o th e r as other, n o t as an extension o r rep etitio n o f oneself. G ed o cautions th e analyst to refrain from assum ing “ that th e analysand is n o th in g b u t an alter e g o ” (1981, p. 184) and states: “ F rom this perspective, it m ay be n o exaggeration to state that the m ost difficult self-denial is th e necessity to cu rb o u r natural h u m a n propensity to take the m easure o f others by m eans o f em pathy, th at is, to delay closures until the analysand finds his voice and is able to speak for h im ­ self” (1981, p. 178). T h e distinction b etw ee n m irro rin g and re cognition has serious im plications for the th e o ry and practice o f psychoanalysis insofar as therapists are e n c o u r­ aged to m irror, by way o f em pathy, th e affective state o f patients, especially in response to patients w h o insist o n it. It m ay b e m ore helpful to such patients to respond by recognizing that perhaps they dem and to be m irro red because they

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25

experienced inadequate recognition. Such recognition, in analysis, is often best achieved in an accurate interpretation, for “ an accurately detailed, w ell-tim ed, vivid, and tactful interpretation carries arguably as m uch caring, authenticity, and gratification as anything a psychoanalyst may d o ” (Schwartz, 1990, p. 563). E ven Schw artz, a neurobiological psychiatrist, w h o takes the position “ that associative, representational, and affective processes are all biological p h en o m ­ ena” (1990, p. 554), states that “ after all, w hat deeper and m ore m eaningful plea­ sure can a suffering hum an being receive than precise em otional understanding and unqualified acceptance delivered w ith a verbal and prosodic tact that in itself conveys a profound com prehension and concern?” (1990, p. 563). R e cognition requires n o t objects b u t subjects— recognition o f a subject by a subject, as not the same, but precisely as other, w ith w h o m one is jo in e d by a code as Third. In such joining, as opposed to m erger o r fusion, dyadic states are contextualized by the defined shared task and relativized by the code (Shapiro and Carr, 1991). O n e shares w ith another this affective state in rule w ith the code so that the state can be held: that is to say, the affective state can be bound, be meaningful, and becom e predictable through its signs. It is quite otherw ise in the state o f induced affective resonance, o r enacted iconicity, for such resonance is coercive, fixed solely by the affective state o f the other, and eclipses any Third. T h e sem iotic initiation o f protolinguistic behavior appears to m ove from iconic m irroring to symbolic recognition and prom otes a m ovem ent that even­ tuates, w ith speech, in the saying o f “ I” and “you” by a hum an subject.T he sub­ jectivity o f self, ow nership o f desire, and action in history are opened up in w hat sem ioticians call the deixis o f h e re -n o w /th e re -th e n articulation. T his m ovem ent toward assuming o n e ’s status as subject takes place as we learn to sign ourselves. Psychoanalytic treatm ent aims at e n g en d erin g sem iotic em pow er­ m ent, the capacity to sign oneself and to recognize others, as a step toward the assum ption o f sem iotic responsibility, the ability to say w h at o n e wants and m eans and also to reflect o n the conditions that prevent the keeping o f o n e ’s word. Psychoanalytic treatm ent, by taking behavior as com m unication, affirms the operational presence o f a semiotic code for interpretation, and essential to this code is the recognition o f interacting subjects. For som e hospitalized patients w ho have n o t been initiated into the sem iotic code, w ho quite precisely com e from another culture, the articulation o f subjective states is simply im pos­ sible at first. For th em the n otion that behavior is com m unication addressed to an o th er com es as a shock to th eir protective isolation and may seem absurd. W h en the therapeutic com m unity insists on taking their behavior as signifying som ething, as som ething o th er than conscious actions, these patients may, for the first tim e, begin to experience the opening up o f their ow n subjectivity'.

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Semiotic Perspectives on the Dyad

In h e r com prehensive integration o f psychoanalytic perspectives w ith data from developm ental psychology, U rw in em phasized th e role o f th e sem iotic regula­ tion o f th e contexts in w h ic h children learn; such an em phasis sharply contrasts w ith w h a t have b een called “desert-island” o r “bell-jar” view s o f m o th e r-in fa n t in te ra c tio n th at isolate th e dyad (1984). W h e n th e sem iotic aspects o f such learning contexts are explicitly acknow ledged, studies o f m o th e r-in fa n t in ter­ action are en ric h ed an d b e co m e m o re com prehensible. In his ex am ination o f pathological m o th e r-in fa n t interaction, for exam ple, Massie stated: It is n o t just w hat a m other o r child does in the presence o f the oth er and the intensity w ith w hich they act that is significant, b u t also in response to w hat cues, w ith w hat rhythm , and in w hat sequence. Functionally, these elem ents underlie and becom e incorporated into the structure o f lan­ guage, as B runer [1978] has pointed out. Likewise, they characterize the regulation o f behavior betw een tw o people in the nonverbal as well as the verbal realm. (1982, p. 161-162) I f cues are taken as signs, rh y th m as m ark in g th e act o f signifying, and sequence as d e n o tin g ordered, syntactic relations a m o n g signs, th en the above paragraph refers to th e dom ains o f sem iotics as specified by M o rris in 1938: pragm atics defines th e rules for in teractio n (such as tu rn -ta k in g and tim ing), sem antics indicates the m eanings o f signs, and syntactics specifies the gram m ar for sequencing signs.

28

DEVELOPMENTAL SE M IOT IC S

W h ile n o t nam ed as such, a sem iotic perspective appears to be present in the reflections o f T ro n ic k , B razelton, and Als w h o state th re e initial capacities re q u ire d in o rd e r to achieve skillful recip ro city o r in tersubjectivity, nam ely “ org an ized units o f b e h av io r th at convey th e messages o f the infant,” “ th e arousal o f an in te n tio n o r a goal,” and “ a syntax o r set o f rules . . . that orders th e sequence o f constitu en t expressive behaviors” ; they go o n to state that b o th c o m m u n ic a to rs “ have to share th e m ea n in g o f th e c o n stitu e n t expressive behaviors” (1978, p. 1), b u t the last capacity is n o t required by a broad sp ectru m o f sem io tic th e o ry a n d som e w o u ld d o u b t that th e in fan t has this capacity from b irth .T h e in fan t does appear to possess the capacity to organize segm ents o f behavior, to m ake appropriate substitutions a m o n g these units, and to c o m ­ b in e th e m in orderly seq u en ce in in te rac tio n w ith th e m o th e rs se q u e n ce .T h e au th o rs stress that a “ syntax, o r set o f o rd e rin g ru les” , is operative in b o th the gesture o f reaching an d the behavioral displays o f face-to-face interaction, and such a syntax m akes it possible fo r jo in t reg u latio n to occu r. T h e syntax, o r sem iotic code, m akes jo in t regulation possible: “ M utual regulation requires that th e syntax b e sh ared ” (1978, p. 8). S uch a syntax o f a ctio n presupposes th a t “infants activate different behavioral co nstituents in th e presence o f different stim u li” (1978, p. 10). F or exam ple, tw o studies (Yogm an et al., 1976; D ix o n et al., 1976) fo u n d th a t infants a cted c o n jo in tly w ith b o th m o th e rs a n d fathers, b u t th a t th e sequence o f th eir actions was different w ith e ac h .W ith fathers infants vocalized less b u t had lo n g er play sequences th an w ith m others; w ith strangers, how ever, infants w ere m o re disjointed than w ith th eir parents and spent m o re tim e m o n ­ ito rin g and averting gaze. In contrast to h o w the B razelton g ro u p acknow ledges the stru c tu rin g influ­ ence o f a sem iotic code, a sem iotic perspective appears to b e absent in S te rn ’s w o rk o f 1985 an d 1990, leading at tim es to a so rt o f a th e o retica l m uddle, a lth o u g h m any o f his observations are c o n g ru e n t w ith h o w Lacan presents the im aginary register. F or exam ple, S te rn states th at th e n e o n ate is captivated in specific ways by visual images. R e fe rrin g to this as “ obligatory a tte n tio n ” (1990, p. 20), S tern w rites o f th e six-w eek-old infant: “A t this age, babies often stare at things as if th eir gaze has in d ee d b e en captured and th ey are obliged to stare at o n e sp o t” (1990, p. 19).T h e re appear to be in b o rn visual preferences for curves, lig h t-d a rk contrasts, acute angles, vertical sym m etry, an d m o v em e n t w ith in a fram e, all o f w h ic h predispose th e infant tow ard th e visual p resentation o f the m o th e r’s face (1990, p. 48). S tern em phasizes th e dynam ic, stim ulating aspects o f eye c o n ta ct (“ m utual gaze is ex trem ely arousing” [1990, p. 50]), an d notes the e ith e r/o r q uality o f this d im en sio n o f e x p erien c e : “ In hum ans, m u tu al gaze seem s to elicit eith er stro n g positive o r negative feeling d e p e n d in g o n th e c o n te x t” (1990, p. 50).

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Stern views such arousal in term s o f the infant’s “ need for stim ulation,” and, as w e saw in the previous chapter, he emphasizes the absence o f such stim ulation as the m ain variable in the m aternal still-face ex p erim en tal c o n d itio n . H e describes the fo u r-m o n th -o ld in this c ondition as constrained by w hat I am calling coerced m irroring: “ H e n o t only reacts to the lack o f expected stim u­ lation, b u t m ay also identify w ith his m o th er; he m ay even im itate her and follow h e r in to h e r state . . . In identifying w ith her, he feels h e r em otional dullness creeping in to him self” (1990, p. 61). S te rn ’s psychoanalytic training alerts him to the im portance o f identification, but he acknow ledges its obscu­ rity: “ T h e process o f identification . . . th o u g h little u n d e rsto o d ,. . . is o f great clinical im p o rtan ce” (1990, p. 61). H e notes in the infant w hat he calls “ tw o capacities essential for identification” : First, he imitates, almost automatically, the facial expressions and gestures o f others. In fact, he has been perform ing parts and pieces o f these imitations almost since birth. Second, he, like an adult, is susceptible to em otional co n ta g io n .. . . T his contagion goes beyond m ere im itation. T he other person’s em otional state invades you, so to speak, to set up a responsive feeling within you. (1990, p. 62) Stern’s description o f “ em otional contagion” recalls the experim ental studies o f induced affective response as well as Lacan’s n o tio n o f the im aginary register; Lacan quotes Freud “ that suggestion (or m ore correctly suggestibility) is actu­ ally an irreducible, prim itive p h e n o m e n o n , a fundam ental fact in the m ental life o f m an ” (1953-54, p. 56; Freud, 1921a, p. 89). S tern sees in this dim ension, as he im agines the infant gazing in to the m o th e r’s eyes, the fuel for m utual recognition: “ I stare dow n into th eir depths. A nd there I feel ru n n in g strong the invisible currents o f h e r excitem ent. T hey ch u rn up from those depths and tu g at m e” (1990, p. 58). B ut the fo u r-m o n th old cannot yet use “ I,” despite S te rn ’s claim that “ three m ajor kinds o f hum an events are now form ing: events o f the self; events o f others; and events o f the self-w ith-another. It is for this reason that I can now use I, we, and h e r w hen speaking in [the infant’s] voice” (1990, p. 55 ).T his particular kind o f anthro­ p o m o rphizing is unsupportable from a sem iotic perspective, for pronouns such as “ I ” are n o t in the fo u r-m o n th -o ld ’s repertoire since they do n o t fun ctio n as ro u tin e signs, b u t, as w e shall see in C h a p te r 4, they have special status as “ shifters” o r “ indexes” indicating the subjective presence o f the speaker in the act o f speaking (Benveniste, 1956). S te rn ’s form ulations o m it the form ative role o f the sem iotic fram ew ork as a T h ird to the m o th e r-in fa n t dyad. H e w rites, for exam ple, o f th eir gazing interactions as if no code w ere operative: “ T h ey invent it as they go along” (1990, p. 51). Such alleged inventiveness, however, is tem p ered by the obvious

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influence o f rules in interactive sm iling and vocalizing play: “ It is the baby’s first and principal lesson in tu rn taking, th e cardinal rule for all later discourse b etw een tw o p eo p le” (1990, p. 65). W h e n S tern describes n ose-touching, he writes: “ T here are a host o f such international baby g a m e s. . . and they follow an intricate and interesting pattern. W hile the idea is sim ply to have fun, it is achieved by c o n fo rm in g to certain rules” (1990, p. 68). Stern does n o t state th at such rules are culturally specific, o r that the transm ission o f a c u ltu re’s rules is an im m ense sem iotic a chievem ent precisely because an in fan t’s “m o th e r does these things w ith o u t th in k in g , as p a rt o f ‘in tu itiv e ’ parental b ehavior” (1990, p. 68). Because culture as a factor is elided, S tern can only say it “ is astounding how m any things an average parent know s to do intuitively” ; culture is perhaps overlooked precisely in o rd er to favor biology: “ E volution has apparently shaped parental behavior to co m p lem en t babies’ a uditory pref­ erences” (1990, p. 69). B u t as the Japanese m others have indicated, the situation is far to o com plex for such a th eo ry o f evolution to encom pass usefully, and “ th e o ry is the deciding factor as to w hat w e can observe, because it d e te r­ m ines the type o f observation” (T. von U exkiill, 1986. p. 122). Sem iotic th e o ry addresses this co m plexity by distinguishing hierarchical levels o f com m unicative organization, each w ith its ow n p ro p e r sem iotic do m ain and codes. Sebeok broadly states th at th e “ subject m atter o f sem i­ otics— ultim ately a m ode o f extending o u r perception o f the w orld— is the exchange o f any messages w hatever and o f the systems o f signs w hich under­ lie th e m ” (1976, p. 1). W ith in the broad dom ain o f sem iotics Sebeok distin­ guishes three areas: anthroposem iotics deals w ith species-specific hum an sign systems, zoosem iotics em braces the study o f anim al c o m m u n ica tio n in the broadest sense, and endosem iotics studies cybernetic systems w ithin the body. T h e latter has becom e the d om inant paradigm in the life sciences, as seen, for exam ple, in a recent issue o f Science Times: “ O n e m echanism w hose universalism has only recently becom e clear is a vital signaling system in w h ich cells respond to messages co ntrolling th eir fate. T h e system w orks essentially th e same way in determ in in g the developm ent o f certain biological functions in w orm s, m ice, and hum ans. A nd in each case, the m olecules that respond to the signals are also m olecules know n to cause cancer w h en they go aw ry” (Kolata, 1993, p. C l). In considering in fan t-m o th e r interaction, w e m ight avoid reductionism by conceiving the process as one in w hich the m o th e r’s anthroposem iotic system quickly transform s the infant’s zoosem iotic system into an anthroposem iotic one, w ith decisive consequences for the endosem iotic system o f the developing brain. We can u nderstand developm ental sem iotics as an a ttem p t to give an account o f this transition, this m ovem ent from neonatal reflexes to an intersubjective position o f sem iotic em pow erm ent.

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F rom tim e to tim e L acan refers in his sem inars to th e w o rk o f C h arles Sanders P eirce (1 8 3 9 -1 9 1 4 ), w h o se in flu en ce o n Lacan seem s u n d e n ia b le (Balat, 1992a,b), leading h im at o n e p o in t to w o n d e r if som e o f his audience will accuse him o f fishing in Peircean w aters (see the sem inar o f M ay 2 3 ,1 9 6 2 [1961-1962, vol. II, p. 449]). H e m ay in d ee d have fo u n d in Peirce the source o f w hat he called “ m y categorical registers o f the im aginary, the sym bolic, and the real” (1974, p. 559). In his sem inar o n Joyce, Le Sinthome, speaking o f o u r te n ­ dency to drift in to dualistic th in k in g , Lacan n o te d that every object depends on a relation. W h at is annoying is that there is lan­ guage, and that relations are expressed in it w ith epithets. Epithets push toward yes o r no. Som eone nam ed Charles Sanders Peirce built on this his logic, w hich, because o f his emphasis on relation, leads him to construct a trinitarian logic. This is exactly the same path I follow, except that I call things by their names— symbolic, imaginary, and real. (1976, p. 33, m y translation) In his sem inar, The Ethics o f Psychoanalysis, after stating th a t h u m a n lib id o is “subjugated b y th e stru c tu re o f th e w o rld o f signs,” Lacan notes: “ A n d the sign, as Peirce p u t it, is th a t w h ic h is in the place o f so m e th in g else for som e­ o n e ” (19 5 9 -6 0 b , p. 91; see also 1966, p. 840; 1977, p. 222). T rained as a chem ist, astronom er, an d m athem atician, Peirce is o ften c ite d as th e m ost creative A m e ric an p h ilo so p h er and th e fo u n d e r o f A m erican prag­ m atism (G regory, 1987, p. 596). In an a tte m p t to develop a logic o f scientific discovery and co m m u n ica tio n , he spent forty years elaborating the rules o f the p ro d u c tio n , classification, an d m ea n in g o f signs (see B rent, 1993, for an excel­ len t biography). S taking o u t a philosophical p osition h e called “ fallibilism,” he m ade c o n trib u tio n s to probability th e o ry an d developed procedures fo r esti­ m atin g m easurem ent error. In a d d itio n to th e standard m o d es o f logical infer­ ence k n o w n traditionally as d e d u ctio n and in d u ctio n , he added a third m o d e o f inference w h ic h h e called “ a b d u ctio n ,” a disciplined fo rm o f guessing from the o d d detail (Eco an d Sebeok, 1983; G inzburg, 1983). Also referred to as “th e play o f m usem ent,” it resem bles closely w h a t F reu d called “ evenly h o v erin g a tte n tio n ” an d w h a t S herlock H o lm es referred to as his “ m e th o d ” (Sebeok, 1981); w e m ay also co m p a re it to w h a t P o e ’s d etectiv e D u p in refers to as “ analysis” (M uller an d R ich a rd so n , 1988). A triadic a p p ro ach governs P e irce ’s th in k in g , specified in term s o f th ree concep tio n s “ so very broad an d c o n seq u en tly in definite that they are h ard to seize and m ay b e easily overlooked.” Peirce calls these “ the conceptions o f First, Second, T h ird ,” and defines th em as follows:

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First is the conception o f being o r existing independent o f anything else. Second is the conception o f being relative to, the conception o f reaction with, som ething else.Third is the conception o f m ediation, w hereby a first and second are brought into relation. (1891, p. 296) In th e field o f psychology, Peirce finds that “ th e e lem en tary p h e n o m e n a o f m in d fall in to three categories,” w h ich h e elaborates as follows: First, we have Feelings, com prising all that is im m ediately present, such as pain, blue, cheerfulness. . . A feeling is a state o f m ind having its ow n living quality, independent o f any other state o f m ind. O r, a feeling is an elem ent o f consciousness w hich m ight conceivably override every oth er state until it m onopolised the m ind, although such a rudim entary state cannot actually be realized, and w ould n o t properly be consciousness. . . Besides Feelings, w e have Sensations o f reaction; as w h en a person blindfold suddenly runs against a post, w hen we make a muscular effort, or w hen any feeling gives way to a new feeling . . . Very different b oth from feelings and from reaction-sensations o r dis­ turbances o f feeling are general conceptions. W h en we think, w e are con­ scious that a connection betw een feelings is determ ined by a general rule, we are aware o f being governed by a habit. (1891, pp. 290-91) Feelings, n o t as discrete affects b u t as unlabelled, in them selves un d ifferen ­ tia ted states, have th e ir status in L acans register o f th e R e a l, c o rre sp o n d in g to P e irc e ’s c ateg o ry o f Firstness w h o se m em b e rs, P eirce w ro te , “ n e e d n o t be sub ject to any law, n o t even to th e p rin cip le o f c o n tra d ic tio n ” (1966, p. 404). W h e n such feelings are e x p e rie n c e d as reactions to an o th e r, th ey b e lo n g to P e irc e ’s c ateg o ry o f S econdness an d are g o v e rn e d b y th e dynam ics o f th e im ag in ary register. A ccordingly, H e rv ey states th at th e “ ap p ro p ria te m o d e o f rep re se n tatio n fo r ‘Secondness,’ an d fo r things th a t b e lo n g to the categ o ry o f ‘seconds,’ is as pairs: th at is to say as dyads” (1982, p. 2 4 ).W h e n feelings are p e r­ ceived as re la te d , as p re d ic ta b le by ru le o r c o n c e p tio n o f b e h av io r, th ey b e co m e organized a ccording to th e laws o f th e sym bolic register. O f this reg ­ ister o f T hirdness, H e rv ey states: “ W e m ay say, therefore, th a t th e key w o rd o f this hierarchically hig h est level o f existence is m ed ia tio n . A given th in g is a ‘th ird ’ i f its n a tu re (in fact its o v e rrid in g p u rp o se . . . ) is to m ed ia te a p a rtic u ­ lar, oth erw ise n o n -e x iste n t, relationship b e tw ee n tw o fu rth e r th in g s” (1982, p. 24). Peirce em phasized th at T hirdness is re q u ire d fo r th in k in g : “ In its g e n u in e fo rm ,T h ird n e ss is the triadic relation existing b etw ee n a sign, its object, an d its in te rp re tin g th o u g h t, itse lf a sign, c o n sid ere d as c o n s titu tin g th e m o d e o f b e in g o f a sign. A sign m ediates b e tw e e n th e interpretant sign an d its o b je c t” (1966, p. 389). Signs them selves have a triad ic stru c tu re an d are “ tria d ic m ed ia to rs th at exem plify ‘T hirdness’pur excellence” (Hervey, 1982, p. 26). F or Peirce a sign does

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n o t sim ply refer to an object; in place o f such an u n m ed ia te d dual relation, Peirce introduces the n o tio n o f th e “ in te rp ré ta n t” w h ic h is roughly equivalent to th e sign’s m ea n in g as distinct from its referent. Peirce succinctly d efined a sign as follows: A sign stands for som ething to the idea w hich it produces, o r m odifies . . . T h at for w hich it stands is called its object; that w hich it conveys, its mean­ ing; and the idea to w hich it gives rise, its interprétant, (quoted in Eco, 1976, p. 69) T h e interprétant c an n n o t be equated w ith th e o bject o r w ith th e in terpreter; it functions itself as a n o th e r sign, to be in tu rn in terp reted . F u rth e rm o re , “th e interprétant can be a response, a behavioral habit d e term in ed by a sign, and m any o th e r th in g s” (Eco, 1976, p. 70). T h is g reat variability an d apparently endless interpretability o f th e sign in feeling, action, and th o u g h t constitute the rich process o f semiosis. E co w rites: “T h e idea o f th e in te rp réta n t m akes a th eo ry o f signification a rigoro us science o f cultural p h e n o m e n a, w hile d etach in g it from th e m etaphysics o f th e referent” (1976, p. 70). Fem inist theory, fo r exam ple, has fo u n d in Peirce’s n o tio n o f h abit as the active by d efining in te rp réta n t o f a sign a tool for analyzing oppressive practices (deLauretis, 1984).T h u s H ervey states that Peirce’s “general th eo ry o f signs presum ably em braces every' field w here the ‘signification’ o f so m ething can in som e way o r o th e r be ‘in te rp rete d ’ ” (1982, p. 36). Peirce’s sem iosis is thus the A m erican fo reru n n e r o f F rench d e co n stru c ­ tionism ; Pettigrew (1995) w rites that D errid a spent o n e year at H arvard studying Peirce’s m anuscripts p rio r to his 1967 publications o n th e sign. French struc­ turalism , m oreover, inaugurated by Saussure (1916) and elaborated by B arthes (1964), w ith its p airing o f signifier-signified dom ains, is a m o re restricted fram e­ w o rk than contem porary' sem iotics as shaped by Peirce. T his broader c onception o f th e field o f sem iotics (Sebeok, 1971), present in th e w o rk o f Jak o b so n (1974) and in Lacan, m ay be term ed the Peircean effect: it includes a reference to th e o bject as well as th e actions o f speakers. Peirce distinguished three types o f signs: the icon, the index, and the sym bol, a lth o u g h he em phasized th a t m ost signs include features o f all three. T ursm an defines these features as follows: Iconic semiosis o r sign-action is the representing o f the object o f the sign by resembling the object. Indexical semiosis is representation by actual con­ nection with the object, as, for example, by being the physical effect o f the object. Sym bolic semiosis is representation o r signification by virtu e o f being so understood, and that by nature o r by convention. (1987, p. 47) W ith the m ajo r ex ce p tio n o f th e w o rk o f Piaget (1947), w hose fo rm u la­ tions regarding signs and representations rely o n th e distinctions d raw n initially

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by Peirce and Saussure, w e find that “ the o n to g en e tic d ev elo p m en t o f signs, w h ic h o u g h t to be o f central interest in sem iotics, has b e en neglected as a spe­ cial field o f sem iotic in q u iry ” (K ram pen, 1986, p. 153). D espite o u r uncertainty, w e can tentatively consider h o w the field o f devel­ opm ental sem iotics suggests a m ovem ent from enacted iconicity to the index to th e sy m b o l.T h is progression m ay appear to be at odds w ith a standard presen­ tatio n in w h ic h th e c h ild ’s active use o f signs develops from the index to the icon (as in ternal representation) to th e sym bol. As Johansen (1993) show s, h o w ­ ever, th e very earliest sem iotic particip atio n is th ro u g h en ac te d iconicity, th e in d u ce d affective m irro rin g response ex am in ed in C h a p te r 1. A t th e earliest stage th e in fan t m ay b e describ ed as already retain in g visual and auditory' associations th at differentiate sectors o f e x p erien c e , a n d so th e u tte rly sim ple, u n d iffere n tia te d status o f th e R e a l, o f P e irce ’s Firstness, is a m ythic original state, n o t an actual o rig in b u t ra th e r a level o f later regression from a m o re d ifferen tiated state. As D e m o s co g en tly argues, e v id en ce from d evelopm ental psychology “ clearly su p p o rts th e hypothesis th at th e capacity for psychic e x p erien c e exists at th e b e g in n in g o f e x tra u te rin e life, an d m ay even exist b e fo re ” (1992, p.207). Initially th e in fa n t’s interactive m o v em e n t, voice, and gaze are iconically stim ulated an d stru ctu red by th e m o th e r’s m ove­ m e n t, voice, a n d gaze w h ic h gradually c o m e to fu n c tio n as in d ices o f th e m o th e r’s caretaking presence. A ssociations based o n contiguity, th e basis fo r sub­ seq u en t p a rt-w h o le m eto n y m ic relations, develop predictability so that by four w eeks th e fu n c tio n in g code o f m o th e r-in fa n t face-to -face in te rac tio n can be violated, as w e saw in C h a p te r 1. T h e standard test for th e presence o f m ental icons has b e e n w h e th e r “ th e child begins actively seeking objects w h ic h have disappeared” (T. von U exkiill, 1986, p. 136). In h e r detailed in te g ratio n o f psychoanalytic perspectives and develo p m en tal data, U rw in claim s th a t c h ild ren “ refer to absent objects and events far earlier th a n th e o b jec t p e rm a n en c e m o d el presum es” (1984, p. 312). T h e results o f T ronick s studies w ith the m aternal still-face paradigm suggest th a t such active seeking o f w h a t is lost begins m u ch earlier th an P iaget p ro ­ posed. By four w eeks the infant show s the ability to seek th e interactive gaze o f th e m o th e r w h e n it is w ith d raw n . T h e in fan t’s gaze appears to enact iconically w h a t th e infant has c o m e to ex p ect from th e m o th e r, im p ly in g th e use o f a ru d im e n ta ry ico n o f th e m o th e r’s g a ze .T h e in fan t’s o w n act o f gazing aim s at th e m o th e r’s co rre sp o n d in g gaze, an d w h e n it is n o t fo u n d in th e w ith d raw n face o f th e m o th er, visible and co rre sp o n d in g w ithdraw al o n th e p a rt o f th e in fan t occurs; th e m o th e r’s gaze and vocalizing, m oreover, th ro u g h e m o tio n al in d u c tio n o r “ c o n ta g io n ,” creates its ic o n in th e m irro rin g response o f th e infant. In tim e th e auto m atic m irro rin g response decreases as th e infant gains sem iotic a u to n o m y in th e interactio n .

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T h e responsive gaze functions n o t only as an ico n o f th e o th e r’s gaze o r as an in d ex o f co n tig u o u s presence; it also em erges as a symbol w ith a distinctive interprétant— in this case, I suggest, th e in te rp ré ta n t o f the responsive gaze (the gaze o f e ith e r the m o th e r o r the infant) is initially the responsive gaze o f the other. As Peraldi states, “ T h e child has always p ro d u c ed signs, lo n g before he uses such signs as signs o f so m e th in g else” (1981, p. 1 7 4 ).To conceive o f the infant as sem iotically engaged is n o t preposterous; Peirce him self encouraged us to th in k o f the infant in this way. W h ile n o tin g , w ith K ant, that c h ild ren ’s rel­ atively late use o f th e personal p ro n o u n “ I” “ indicates an im p erfect self-co n sciousness in th em ,” Peirce e m p h asized th a t “ c h ild re n m anifest pow ers o f th o u g h t m u ch earlier” th an th e ir use o f personal pronouns: Indeed, it is alm ost impossible to assign a period at w hich children do no t already exhibit decided intellectual activity in directions in w hich thought is indispensable to their w ell-being. T h e com plicated trig o n o m etry o f vision, and the delicate adjustm ents o f coordinated m ovem ent, are plainly m astered very early. T h ere is no reason to question a sim ilar degree o f thought in reference to themselves. (1992, pp. 18—19) P eirce’s vision o f th e perceiving, th in k in g , in te n d in g in fan t is q u ite c o n g ru e n t w ith c o n te m p o ra ry in fan t research (e.g., D em o s, 1992), as I w ill re p o rt in the n e x t chapter. T h e re is n o exclusion o f affect as sign from th e sem iotic field, fo r Peirce includes it in his n o tio n o f the sign’s interprétant: “B u t w e m ay take a sign in so broad a sense that the in te rp réta n t o f it is n o t a th o u g h t, b u t an action o r expe­ rience, o r w e m ay even so enlarge the m ea n in g o f sign th a t its in te rp ré ta n t is a m ere quality o f feeling” (1966, p. 389). Such “ feeling,” as a response p ro d u c ed by the sign, as an in terp rétan t o f th e sign, is itself an o th e r sign that m ust receive its o w n in te rp réta n t. T h is o n g o in g process o f signing is alm ost instantaneous, largely unconscious, an d seem s to lie at the h e art o f the “ talking c u re ” and o f all dialogue. T h is is n o t a m a tte r o f c o n stru ctin g a subjective, o r even an intersubjective, p h en o m en o lo g y ' o f p e rc e p tio n , b u t o f delin eatin g , i f possible, th e effective stru ctu re o f th e sign w hose status is n o t reducible to its positio n in conscious­ ness.T his, I believe, has fundam ental im plications for psychoanalysis: the sign is n o t d ep en d e n t o n consciousness for its effects, and th e enactive response it p ro ­ duces opens u p the d im ension o f th e re p etitio n com pulsion. If th e sign can be taken n o t in its subjective b u t rath er in its objective m ode, w h a t is its function? Peirce states: It appears to m e that the essential function o f a sign is to render inefficient relations efficient— not to set them into action, but to establish a habit o r general rule w hereby they will act on occasion. A ccording to the physical

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doctrine, nothing ever happens but the continued rectilinear velocities with the accelerations that accom pany different relative positions o f the parti­ cles. All o th e r relations, o f w hich we know so many, are inefficient. K now ledge in som e way renders them efficient; and a sign is som ething by know ing w'hich we know som ething m ore. (1966, p. 390) In o u r exam ple o f th e responsive gaze as sign, the ob ject o r referent is d e te r­ m in e d by h o w the sign functions. T aken as an icon, its o b jec t is the p a rtn e r’s responsive gaze; taken as an index, as “a type o f sign causally co n n ected w ith its o b je c t” (Eco, 1976, p. 115), its o b ject is th e in dividual’s co n tig u o u s presence; as a sym bol, its o b ject is re co g n itio n .T h e in te rp réta n t o f the responsive gaze, I am proposing, is initially the responsive gaze o f th e oth er, th e e m o tio n al arousal p ro d u c e d by th e gaze, and eventually the e x p erien c e o f m u tu al recognition. W h a t I am suggesting is that by using Peirce’s no tio n s o f the sign w e can sit­ uate the infant as an active sem iotic participant, p rio r to the ability to speak and perhaps p rio r to th e ability to represent (although, as w e saw in th e w o rk o f T ro n ic k an d associates, th e ability to rep resen t w h a t is a b sen t m ay d evelop before o n e m o n th o f age). O u r m an n e r o f so con ceiv in g th e in fan t is greatly facilitated by th e n o tio n o f the in te rp réta n t as variable, as existing o n a devel­ o p m en ta l line: “ Peirce distinguishes b etw een in terp rétan ts w h ic h are feelings, those w h ic h are actions, an d those w h ic h are kinds o f ideas o r re c u rrin g p a t­ terns o f idea clu sterin g .T h ese th ree kinds o f in terp rétan ts are called emotional, energetic, and logical, respectively” (T ursm an, 1987, p. 53). If w e can say th at th e logical in te rp ré ta n t o f th e responsive gaze taken as a sym bol is th e practice o f m u tu al reco g n itio n , th e n w e have w ith in th e fram e­ w o rk o f sem iotics th e poten tial tools for a psychoanalytic u n d e rstan d in g o f th e em erg en ce o f th e h u m an subject. In this fram ew ork th e earliest u n c o n ­ scious basis for the rep etitio n com pulsion w o u ld n o t lie in “ instin ct” o r “ n e e d ” b u t in coerced, iconic, an d enactive m irro rin g , stru c tu re d by signs, inclu d in g m o st im p o rta n tly th e affect state o f the oth er, w hose logical in terp rétan ts are n o t available to th e sub ject’s consciousness. D em o s, m u ch like the early F reud (as w e shall see in C h a p te r 10), puts it in term s o f the in fan t’s psyche “ p ro tec t­ in g itself from disorganization and creating defensive strategies, w h e n ev e r n e c ­ essary, th at can result in k eep in g som e m eanings and co n ten ts o u t o f awareness o r in an u n c o n sc io u s m o d e ” (1992, p. 202). T h e o u tc o m e o f this defensive process, from a L acanian p o in t o f view, is th e u n c onscious “ stru c tu re d in the m ost radical way like a language” (Lacan, 1977, p. 234), i.e., semiotically. To restrict th e field o f th e e m e rg in g subject to th e dyad cuts o ff th e field from th e p rim a ry structures o f sem iosis th a t m ake th e dyad possible an d effec­ tive. T h e n o tio n o f the em o tio n al and active in te rp réta n t, fu rth erm o re, p ro ­ vides a way o f c o n c e p tu a liz in g early d e v e lo p m e n t n o t as a p re fo rm e d biological u n fo ld in g b u t as a cultural transm ission. T h e excellent integrative

Semiotic Perspectives on the Dyad

37

sum m ary by D em o s o f h e r o w n and o th e rs’ research o n infancy, w hile acknow ledging th e im p o rta n ce o f culture, is a g o o d exam ple o f ho w the dyadic fram ew ork calls for a sem iotic grounding. D raw in g on the ideas o f T om kins (1962, 1963, 1981) and the research o f E km an and his colleagues (1983), D em o s em phasizes the prim acy o f affect states in th e developing psyche. She endorses Sander’s epithet, contrary to Freud, that the ego begins as a “state ego, rather than a body ego” (Sander, 1985, p. 20; D em os, 1992, p. 206); she argues for the prim acy o f nonverbal com m unication over language, w hich she circum scribes as “ a sym bolic form o f representation, b u t only one o f sev­ eral such possible fo rm s... and one that has gone through several steps o f trans­ lation from direct e x p erien c e ” (1992, p. 209); and she claims that in the affective, nonverbal infant, before language, “ the distance betw een experience and expression is m uch sh o rter” than in the adult (1992, p. 209). T his recalls S tern’s claims that the infant, p rio r to using linguistic sym bols, is “ confined to reflect the impress o f reality” (1985, p. 182), that “ infants from the beginning m ainly experience reality” (1985, p. 255), for the infant is “ a relatively faithful recorder o f reality and all deviations from the n orm al are close to the accurate reflections o f the impress o f interpersonal reality” (1985, p. 230). As we saw earlier, this “ im press” m odel may have som e m erit in the very earliest phase o f coerced m irroring, characterized by the induced affective response, b u t such enacted iconicity quickly gives way to indexical learning as sem iotic au to n ­ om y increases. T his is learning m ediated by signs m u ch before the use o f lin­ guistic sym bols, m ak in g possible the lifelong process D em o s em phasizes as disem bedding know ledge from specific contexts and applying it to broader contexts (1993, p. 11). T h e p re -e m in e n t sem iotics scholar T hom as S ebeok1 (1994) takes the posi­ tion that the self is “ bio-sem iotic,” by w hich he m eans there is a double enve­ lope to th e self. T h e core self is bo d y -b ased and consists o f the im m u n e system. All living beings have such a self insofar as they have a system for rec­ ognizing th e difference b e tw ee n self and n o t-se lf.T h e second envelope c o n ­ sists o f the field o f signs that constitutes a social space (the Umvelt, as J. von U exkiill [1934] referred to it). Animals have such a field w hose signs (icons and indices) have m ostly fixed objects and in terp retan ts; for hum ans, th e signs include sym bols and en te r syntactic com binations in novel, intersubjectively d e te rm in e d ways that im pact o n the im m une system. F or hum an beings the boundaries o f the Umvelt are n o t sim ply given b u t m ust be constructed and m aintained in a cultural context. Freud was w ell-grounded, then, in claim ing th at the ego is “ first and forem ost a bodily e g o ” (1923, p. 2 6 ).T h e “ state” 1.

Sebeok was a student o f Charles Morris at the University o f Chicago; Morris was a student o f John Dewey; Peirce taught Dewey during his brief tenure at Hopkins.

38

DEVELOPMENTAL SEMIO TIC S

aspect o f such e g o -e m e rg e n c e , as Lacan a rgued, is o f decisive im p o rta n ce , b u t n o t as a state b u t ra th e r as a “ c u t” in a state, as the d isco n tin u o u s shift from a p rio r state o f helplessness to a p o st-m irro rin g state o f illusory c o h eren ce. To valorize the nonverbal over the verbal m ay be an a tte m p t to redress a p erceived cognitive bias favoring later stages o f d e v elo p m en t. W h a t m ay be m o re helpful, how ever, is to p u rsu e a h ierarchical m o d e l by c o n sid e rin g S e b e o k ’s

d istin c tio n s

am ong

c o m m u n ic a tio n ,

language,

an d

speech.

C o m m u n ic a tio n occurs in all living system s a ccording to sem iotic principles. A nim als co m m u n ica te b u t d o n o t use language (Sebeok, 1981). L anguage, fur­ th e rm o re , did n o t e m e rg e fo r c o m m u n ic a tio n (w h ic h carries o n q u ite well w ith o u t it), b u t for m o d el-b u ild in g . L anguage provides a system fo r m aking com plex differentiations, especially a m o n g types o f relationships, and a syntax fo r m ak in g co m p lex substitutions, co m b in atio n s, an d reconfigurations, espe­ cially o f o u r pasts an d futures. L anguage does n o t req u ire speech b u t speech requires language. Speech, in tu rn , th ro u g h form s o f address a n d deixis p ro ­ m o tes reco g n itio n (as w e shall exam ine in C h a p te r 4). F o r Lacan, “ Speech is essentially th e m eans o f g a in in g re c o g n itio n ” (1 9 5 3 -5 4 , p. 240), a n d such reco g n itio n constitutes intersubjectivity: “ Finally, it is by th e intersubjectivity o f th e ‘w e ’ th a t it assum es th a t th e value o f a language as speech is m easu red ” (Lacan, 1977, p. 86). T h e c o m m u n ic a tio n system s o f living organism s, w h ic h include, in m am ­ m als, nonverbal affect states, d o n o t have a syntax because th e ir signifying rela­ tio n s are fixed, each system u sin g a c e rta in n u m b e r o f signs. D e m o s n o tes “ that th e infant possesses p erceptual biases [“ stim ulus characteristics”] in h ere n t in possessing a h u m a n n ervous system , brain and body. T h u s, th e in fan t can h e ar sounds o nly w ith in c erta in freq u en cies, can see co lo rs o n ly in c ertain w ave lengths, can p erceive m o tio n o nly at certain rates, an d visually prefers lig h t-d a rk contrasts an d c o n to u rs ” (1993, p. 9). L iving system s therefo re p e r­ ceive reality a ccordin g to such “ stim ulus characteristics” w 'hich are th e lim ited sign system s p ro p e r to th e m a n d th e ir Umvelt. T h e re is n o d irect e x p erien c e available because all p e rc e p tio n is g o v e rn ed by signs (Peirce, 1868), a p o sitio n taken by F reu d in his le tte r to Fliess d ated D e c e m b e r 6, 1896 (M asson, 1985, p. 208). B ecause h u m a n e x p e rie n c e has b e en shaped by language in all cultures, w e in h ab it a “languaged” w orld and d o n o t readily e x p erien c e language as salient, as oth er, since it is as m u ch in us as w e are in it. Language, th en , is n o t ju s t o n e o f several possible fo rm s o f re p resen tatio n , it is a u n iq u e system p ro p e r to hum ans that alone enables us to conceive o f o th e r form s o f representation; by eliciting n e w c o n n ec tio n s, fu rth e rm o re , language shapes b o th c u ltu re a n d the h u m a n b ra in . L evin (1991) re p o rts som e rem ark ab le research by T su n o d a (1987) sh o w in g that Japanese, unlike W esterners, hear vowels, affect-signs such

Semiotic Perspectives on the Dyad

39

as laughter, crying, an d h u m m in g , as w ell as sounds o f natu re such as crickets, w ith th e left hem isp h ere; o th e r A sian g roups such as Polynesians an d K oreans lateralize, as W esterners do, to th e rig h t hem isphere. W esterners, how ever, w h o are flu en t in Japanese also lateralize such listening activities to th e left h e m i­ sphere. Levin concludes from this research “ that o n e ’s natural language is capa­ ble o f serving as a vehicle for alte rin g th e b ra in ’s o p e ra tin g in stru ctio n s” ; if a natural language can so affect th e brain, it m ay d o so because it has som e c o m ­ m on ality w ith “ th e language-based d e te rm in a n ts o f th e b ra in ’s hierarchical rules o f o p e ra tio n ” (1991, p. 115). L evin helps us to sec h o w lim itin g it is to re stric t th e role o f language to c o m m u n ic a tio n : “ F o r th e fu n c tio n o f lan ­ guage,” w ro te Lacan, “ is n o t to in fo rm b u t to e v o k e” (1977, p. 86). B u t Lacan fu rth e r added, given th e narcissism o f the h u m a n ego, th at he agrees w ith th o se w h o say th a t “ sp e e ch was giv en to m a n to h id e his th o u g h ts” (1951, p. 12).T h a t language, especially w ritin g , facilitates dissim ula­ tio n (T odorov, 1982, argues th a t it m ad e possible th e S panish c o n q u e st o f A m erica) does n o t m ean th at th e preverbal is so m e h o w u n m e d ia te d and p ro ­ vides direct ex perience. E x p erien ce is always m ediated. In addition to its m ed i­ a tin g fu n c tio n , how ever, w h a t language also seem s to provide is th e vehicle for th e u n iq u ely h u m a n propensity' for self-deception. W h ile d e ce p tio n occurs a m o n g all living things, self-d ecep tio n does n o t ap p ear to exist in anim als an d may n o t be possible w ith o u t language. T h e salient role o f self-d ec ep tio n in h u m a n b e h av io r is perhaps th e c h ie f e n d u rin g legacy o f F reud: th e h u m an subject is split, “ th e ego is n o t m aster in its o w n h o u se ” (F reud, 1917, p. 139). Psychoanalysis has recognized tw o prevalent form s o f self-deception: repres­ sion and disavowal. L evin exam ines data suggesting that these processes can be u n d e rsto o d “ in th e fo rm o f fu n c tio n al d isc o n n ec tio n s o f th e tw o cerebral hem ispheres” (1991, pp. 3 7 -3 8 ), as previously fo rm u la ted by Basch: T h e consciousness o f self that we call “ I” requires that the right-brain self-experience, the episodic m em ory, be translated into verbal o r oth er form s o f discursive language. In repression it is the path from episodic to semantic m em ory, from right to left, that is blocked. T h e self-experience can no longer be articulated and, therefore, cannot be either thought about or made conscious. Disavowal works to block com m unication in the oppo­ site direction, from left to right.T hat is, what is apprehended on the seman­ tic, left-brain level in term s o f language and logical categories cannot be translated into right-brain, episodic, self-experience. (1983, p. 151)

S elf-deception appears to require a hierarchical m o d el o f the self in w h ic h language structures b o th brain an d psyche. F reud appeared to say as m u ch w h e n he called repression a failure in trans­ lation in th e 1896 le tte r to Fliess previously cited:

40

DEVELOPMENTAL SE M IO T IC S

As you know, I am w orking on the assum ption that o u r psychical m echa­ nism has com e into being by a process o f stratification: the material present in the form o f m em ory traces being subjected from tim e to tim e to a rearrangem ent in accordance w ith fresh circumstances— to a retranscrip­ tion [eine Umschrift, 1986, p. 217]. Thus w hat is essentially new about my theory is the thesis that m em ory is present not once but several times over, that it is laid dow n in various kinds o f indications. [Zeichen, 1986, p. 217; “ signs” is the better w ord in this sem iotic context] F re u d goes o n to consider various registrations, “ arranged acco rd in g to associ­ ations by sim ultaneity,” “ o th er, perhaps causal relations,” an d “ th e th ird tran ­ scription, attached to w o rd presentations and c orresponding to o u r official ego.” H e continues: I should like to em phasize the fact that th e successive registrations [Niederschriften, 1986, p. 218] represent the psychic achievem ent o f succes­ sive epochs o f life. A t the boundary betw een tw o such epochs a translation [Übersetzung, 1986, p. 218] o f the psychic m aterial m ust take place. I explain the peculiarities o f the psychoneuroses by supposing that this translation has n o t taken place in the case o f some o f the m aterial, w hich has certain consequences. T hese consequences are epigenetic and speak to a hierarchical m odel: If a later transcript [Überschrift, 1986, p. 219] is lacking, the excitation is dealt w ith in accordance w ith the psychological laws in force in the earlier psychic period and along the paths open at that time. T hus an anachro­ nism persists . . . A t this p o in t F reu d gives his sem iotic d e fin itio n o f repression: A failure o f translation— this is w hat is know n clinically as “repression” [“ D ie Versagung der Ü bersetzung, das ist das, was klinisch ‘Verdrängung’ heist,” 1986, p. 219].T h e m otive for it is always a release o f the unpleasure that w ould be generated by a translation; it is as though this unpleasure provokes a disturbance o f thought that does not perm it the w ork o f trans­ lation. (Masson, 1985, pp. 2 0 7 -208,215) T ranslation involves a syntax, a co d e th at governs th e law ful substitution and co m b in atio n o f signs. S uch a code appears necessary for th e op eratio n o f w h a t F reu d called repression, an d such an o p e ratio n , o r th e o n e w e call disavowal, seem s to re q u ire language fo r successful se lf-d e c e p tio n to occur. Such selfd e ce p tio n m ay op erate th ro u g h the d istinction Lacan draw s b e tw ee n the level o f th e e n u n ciatio n an d the level o f the enunciated (1964, p. 138). In any act o f speaking th e e n u n ciatin g subject “ fades” as th e c h ain o f signifiers em erges.

Semiotic Perspectives on the Dyad

41

This yields a double lim itation: w hat is enunciated can never adequately express the subject, and, m oreover, the subject is n o t in com plete control over w hat is said, w ith the result that “slips” occur in the substitution and com bination o f signs that reveal the subject’s unconscious desire. L evin (1991) proposes that a code governs processes in the b rain in a m an n er c o n g ru e n t w ith sem iotic theory, specifically w ith Jakobson’s m odel o f the tw o axes governing all significant hum an activity. In exam ining aphasic deficits,Jakobson (1956) co ncluded that the use o f signs is subject to d e te rio ­ ration in tw o distinct ways. Som e aphasics can string w ords together according to law ful c om binations, b u t can n o t substitute one w o rd for a n o th e r; o th e r aphasics can provide substitutes for w ords based on a principle o f sim ilarity b ut cannot co m bine them in any lawful sequence. T h e axis o f substitution, also referred to as th e paradigm atic dom ain, regulates th e classification and interchange o f signs— “ one w ord for another,” as Lacan p u t it, referrin g to m etaphor (1977, p. 157). For, as Jakobson indicated, the structure o f m etaphor is that o f a substitution based on som e kind o f sim ilarity in the objects o f the signs. T h e axis o f com bination, also referred to as the syntagm atic dom ain, regulates the placing o f o n e sign after an o th er— “ th e w o rd -to -w o rd c o n n ex ­ ion,” w h ic h Lacan (1977, p. 156) saw, follow ing Jakobson, as the basis o f m etonym y, since the elem ent o f contiguity was essential in the objects o f the signs. L evin jo in s the axis o f c om bination, based on contiguity, to the sensory m odality o f to u ch , and the axis o f substitution, based on similarity, to vision and, based o n the w ork o f H e rm an n (1936) and Fonagy (1983; see M uller, 1989b), he adds to these a third axis, that o f sonority (hearing), in o rder to delineate how the brain integrates inform ation. H e attem pts to g ro u n d the neurological aspects o f intersensory integration and abstraction in the follow ­ ing way: Those readers familiar with the mapping o f the central parietal cortex will appreciate especially the beauty o f this, since this parietal sensory integra­ tion zone is placed equidistant from the prim ary cortical sensory areas for the perception o f touch, vision, and hearing. And it is within this parietal integration area that the perceptual equalities o f experience becom e “abstracted” into memories that are no longer coded according to any sen­ sory tag. In fact, this lack o f attachm ent to immediate sensory experience is the essence o f abstraction. (1991, p. 160) Like m any analysts, I am u n e q u ip p e d to ju d g e the accuracy o f L evin’s pro­ posal, but I can share the w o n d e r o f his anticipation as additional findings furth er m ap the brain-language link (e.g.,Jackendoff, 1994). I w ould also add that, according to Peirce, w h at L evin delineates is the essence o f T hirdness, o f

42

DEVELOPMENTAL SEMIOTICS

m ediation, o f lawful regularity, w hich is required for any systemic organization o f experience to develop. As n o ted earlier, in hum ans such organization is the p ro d u c t o f acculturation and is transm itted th rough signs, sem iotically, in a fram ew ork that holds the dyad in a defined relationship. As we shall see in the follow ing chapter, this process begins at o r before birth.

Developmental Foundations of Infant Semiotics

C h a p te r 1 exam ined a specific paradigm o f infancy research, m o th e r-in fa n t m utual gazing, in o rd e r to address its rich sem iotic com p o n en ts. C h a p te r 2 elaborated a sem iotic perspective based o n m y understanding o f som e ideas o f Peirce as they relate to dyadic interaction as well as to Lacan’s registers o f expe­ rience. I will now review additional data from infancy research in order to spell o u t m ore cogently and concretely a sem iotic m odel o f developm ent. If w e attem pt to use a sem iotic m odel in understanding research o n infantm o th er interaction, w e m ust exam ine in w hat ways the infant can be said to be sem iotically com petent. I think w e can usefully proceed by c ontinuing to take developm ental psychology from a Peircean perspective. T h e linguist R o m an Jakobson em phasized the great bread th o f P eirce’s sem iotic perspective: “ Peirce’s sem iotic edifice encloses the w hole m ultiplicity o f significative p h e­ nom ena, w h e th er a knock at the door, a footprint, a spontaneous cry, a painting o r a musical score, a conversation, a silent m editation, a piece o f w riting, a syl­ logism, an algebraic equation, a geom etric diagram , a w eather vane, o r a simple b o o k m ark ” (1974, p. 442). As we began to exam ine in C h a p te r 2, instead o f using a dual m odel o f sign and referent o r signifier and signified, Peirce em phasized the triadic char­ acter o f the process o f semiosis, the process w hereby signs have such pervasive influence: It is important to understand what I mean by semiosis. All dynamical action, or action o f brute force, physical or psychical, either takes place between

44

DEVELOPMENTAL SE M IOT IC S

tw o subjects . . . or at any rate is a resultant o f such actions betw een pairs. B ut by “ semiosis” I m ean, on the contrary, an action, o r influence w hich is, or involves, a cooperation o f three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interprétant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions betw een pairs. (1940, p. 282) As th e cultural variations indicate, the interactive b e h av io r o f m o th e r and in fa n t is n o t in te llig ib le unless th e c o d e is taken in to a c c o u n t, n o r can w e m ake sense o f th e b e h av io r o f each in relation to th e c o d e unless w e include th e b e h av io r o f th e oth er. In o u r specific exam ple from early d e v elo p m en t, th e m o th e r ’s sm iling gaze fu n ctio n s for the in fan t as a sign, an ico n o f the in fa n t’s sm iling gaze as well as an in d ex w hose c o n tig u o u s o b jec t is h e r recog­ n izin g presence and w h o se dynam ic in te rp ré ta n t is the in fan t’s sm iling gaze in response. It m ust be em phasized th at for Peirce th e in te rp ré ta n t is n o t d efined as a state o f consciousness: “ F or th e p ro p e r significate o u tc o m e o f a sign, I p ro p o se th e n am e, th e interprétant o f th e sign . . . it n e e d n o t be o f a m ental m o d e o f b e in g ” (1940, p. 275). F o r C harles M o rris, th e h e ir o f th e pragm a­ tism o f D ew ey an d M ead at th e U niversity o f C hicago, th e in te rp ré ta n t was c onceived in b ehaviorist te rm s:“ [T ]he in te rp ré ta n t, as a d isposition to react in a c e rta in way b eca u se o f th e sign (fo o d -se e k in g b e h a v io r o r site -p ro b in g b e h a v io r in th e case o f bees), has n o necessarily ‘su b je c tiv e ’ c o n n o ta tio n ” (1964, p. 3). In terp rétan ts m ay b e conceived as the effects o f the sign, “ the p ro p e r signi­ ficate effects” o f signs (Peirce, 1940, p. 276), effects that o p e rate in the in te r­ p re te r in an o n g o in g way o n m any levels an d are p roductive o f fu rth e r signs: T h e first proper significate effect o f a sign is a feeling produced by it.There is almost always a feeling w hich we com e to interpret as evidence that we com prehend the proper effect o f the sign, although the foundation o f truth in this is frequently very slight.This “em otional interprétant,” as I call it, may am ount to m uch m ore than that feeling o f recognition; and in some cases, it is the only proper significate effect that the sign produces. (1940, p. 277) T his first feeling-effect usually leads to action, w hich Peirce conceives as a n ec­ essary feature o f any fu rth e r elaboration o f the in terp rétan t: If a sign produces any further proper significate effect, it will do so through the m ediation o f the em otional interprétant, and such further effect will always involve an effort. I call it the energetic interprétant. T h e effort may be a muscular one, as it is in the case o f the com m and to ground arms; but it is m uch m ore usually an exertion upon the Inner W orld, a m ental effort. (1940, p. 277)

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45

In o u r exam ple, the infant’s responsive sm iling gaze is the energetic o r action interprétant o f the m o th e r’s sm iling gaze, as sign, and, in tu rn , functions as a sign to the m other, eliciting another feeling and action interprétant on her part. A later stage o f elaboration o f the interprétant, assum ing the cognitive capac­ ity, is w hat Peirce called the “ logical in terp rétan t” (1940, p. 277), o r a concept. In o u r case o f infan t-m o th er interaction, the concept o f “ m utual recognition” (present perhaps to the adult) w ould th en be the logical in terprétant o f their sm iling gazes, pro d u ced and b ro u g h t into actuality by th e preceding feeling and action interprétants, that is, by the affect and interaction o f the sm iling and gazing. For Peirce, this process o f semiosis is dynamic, for “ the logical interprétant is an effect o f the energetic interprétant, in the sense in w h ich the latter is an effect o f the em otional in terp rétan t” (1940, p. 283). Semiosis is incessant; we m ay w o n d e r h o w it drives developm ent at all levels in an intrinsically social way. In o u r exam ple, the concept as well as the state o f m utual recognition are determ ined by the actions taken to produce them , and these actions, in turn, are the consequences o f the feelings elicited by the sm iling gaze as sign. Such feel­ ings are in them selves variable, possess for Peirce only “ slight” reliability in them selves, and are easily changed by th eir interprétants, especially as influ­ enced by the narcissistic rationalizations o f the ego, as Peirce wrote: “M en m any tim es fancy th at they act from reason w hen, in p o in t o f fact, the reasons they a ttrib u te to them selves are n o th in g b u t excuses w h ic h unconscious instinct invents to satisfy the tea sin g ‘w hys’ o f th e ego.T he extent o f this self-delusion is such as to render philosophical rationalism a farce” (quoted in Colapietro, 1989, p. 40). I am em phasizing tw o m ain p oints in all o f this: th e infant can n o t be excluded from sem iotic participation on the grounds o f cognitive im m aturity, and the experience o f m utual recognition, the foundation for the experience o f hum an subjectivity, is an effect o f semiosis. T h e foundations o f sem iotic capacity in the infant are well d o cu m en ted in the research and w ritin g o f C o lw y n T revarthen and his associates. Spanning m ore than tw o decades, this body o f research constitutes a significant tu rn in the field o f infancy research, although, perhaps because he is n o t A m erican, his w ork is n o t w idely cited by A m erican psychoanalysts.Trevarthen acknow l­ edges the influence on him o f the ph ilo so p h er M acm urray (1957, 1961), w hose Gifford Lectures o f 1953-1954 grounded the self as an agent in rela­ tionships, and th e psychoanalyst Fairbairn (1941,1952), w hose object-relations approach, together w ith K lein and W innicott, m arked psychoanalysis w ith an interactional perspective on infancy. T revarthen, M urray, and H ubley review the history o f infancy research to point o u t how “a m istrust o f m entalism and o f in n er explanations o f hum an

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consciousness” led to “ the hypothesis that, at b irth , and for the first few m o n th s at least, a h u m an b e in g has little consciousness and n o in d e p e n d e n t v o litio n ” (1981, p. 2 1 1 ).T h is hypothesis was a bias th at h am p ered research: W hereas preceding scientific accounts stated the new born to possess only simple, unconscious, reflex brain functions, and expected the process o f psychological developm ent to lag behind acquisition o f autonom ous m o to r control and o f com m unication by speech, now there is abundant evidence that infants have elaborate consciousness even in early weeks. Increasingly, psychologists are led to revise and greatly expand their assess­ m ent o f the innate potentialities o f hum an beings for conscious, voluntary and interpersonal aspects o f life. (1981, p. 211) M icro an aly tic research tec h n iq u e s m ade possible by v id e o recordings have yielded sufficient data to conclude that “ there is pow erful c o m p eten ce in infants fo r c o m m u n ic a tio n w ith o th e r peo p le. In d e ed , it is n o w seen th a t infants actively engage in in terp erso n al relationships w ith th eir caretakers in th e first w eeks after b irth , and that n e w b o rn s establish rem arkably effective c o n tro l over th e m ental process o f those w h o seek c o m m u n ica tio n w ith th e m ” (1981, p. 212). W e have a strik in g convergence o f data regarding gestures, facial expres­ sion, gazing, grasping, vocalization, an d rep resentation th a t show s th e fo u n d a ­ tions o f th e in fan t’s early sem iotic capacity. I w ill a tte m p t to su m m arize T revarthen s findings b y focusing o n his paper, “ Signs B efore S p e e ch ” (1989), w h o se m ain p u rp o se “ is to describe infant semi­ otics— th e b e g in n in g s a n d early d e v elo p m en t o f sym bolic c o m m u n ic a tio n ” (1989, p. 6 8 9 ).T rev arth en takes a b ro ad view o f the d o m ain o f h u m a n sem i­ otics, distinguishing it from anim al sem iotics w h ic h , b e y o n d its role in c o o p e r­ ative anim al behavior, m ay even convey ideas and assist o th e r anim als to change th e ir consciousness o f surroundings. T h is is w ell d o c u m e n te d in th e case o f bees by B enveniste w h o view s th e ir c o m m u n ica tio n n o t as a language b u t as a signal code: “All th e characteristics o f a [signal] co d e are present: th e fixity o f the subject m atter, th e invariability o f the message, the relation to a single set o f circum stances, th e im possibility o f separating the c o m p o n e n ts o f th e message, a n d its unilateral transm ission” (1952, p. 54 ).T rev arth en w rites: “ B u t h u m a n beings live u n iq u e ly in a w o rld w h e re e v e ry th in g perceiv ed an d all related th o u g h ts and actions th at m ay b e im p o rta n t in th eir life to g e th e r are k n o w n in a sym bolic fo rm o f consciousness— a consciousness shared by m eans o f signs th a t are arbitrary b o th in th eir perceived fo rm and in th e ir p ro d u c e d uses, an d in d e p e n d e n t o f th e ‘h ere an d n o w ’ in any o n e ind iv id u al’s e x p e rie n c e ” (1989, p. 6 8 9 -9 0 ).T h is h u m a n w o rld is n o t sim ply the p ro d u c t o f social c o o p e ra tio n as, fo r exam ple, w e find in th e social stru c tu re o f b a b o o n s, ants, o r bees; T rev arth en stresses th a t h u m a n m ea n in g is th e p ro d u c t o f a u n iq u e m en tal

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trad itio n , n o t reducible to the signal co d e o f anim als, and requires th e distinc­ tive quality o f intersubjectivity. T h e p e rio d o f w h a t T revarthen calls “p rim a ry intersubjectivity,” from b irth to n in e m o n th s, has specific innate foundations in the ch ild ’s an ticipatory seek­ ing for m eaningful sh a rin g .T h e sem iotic process “ requires that m inds will m eet in m utual, m irro rin g consciousness, that they w ill neg o tiate and m ake som e m easure o f ag ree m e n t a b o u t h o w to represent th e factual b u t im aginary story they w ant to share” (1989, p. 690). Such agreem ent, such acts o f c o o p eratio n in g e ttin g at m ean in g “ require relationships o f trust, ad m iratio n , respect, o r o b e ­ dience. In a w ord, th ey require varieties o f empathy” (1989, p. 690). F rom his review o f infancy research, M odell co n cu rs “ th at m o th e r and infant u n c o n ­ sciously replicate w ith in them selves th e affective e x p e rie n c e o f th e o th e r ” (1993, p. 120). Such replicative em pathy, insofar as from the start it involves a m irro rin g consciousness, rests o n an iconic process.T his process, a feature o f L acan’s reg­ ister o f th e im aginary th at h e calls “h o m e o m o rp h ic id en tification” (1977, p. 3), is fo u n d in anim als. T revarthen w rites: “ M any species o f anim al have a level o f intersubjectivity, b u t only hum ans have evolved an interest in sharing, b o th im itatively and expressively, a sym bolic w orld o f historically g en era te d m ea n in g ” (1989, p. 6 9 2 ).T h is early, iconic, auto m atic form o f in tersubjectivity develops in to w h a t T revarthen calls “secondary intersu b jectiv ity ” n o t fo u n d in anim als. T his developm ental advance requires th a t a specifically sem iotic stru ctu re be operative from o r even before birth : A seemingly inescapable conclusion from the evidence o f the efficiency o f infant com m unication b e h av io r.. . . is that the intersubjective m ind has to be built in developm ent by self-organization o f a starting state that is dual— that is, it has to have a distinct self and a different other virtually func­ tional in it from the first tim e it com m unicates. (1989, p. 692) T h is “ o th e r” in th e in fa n t’s m in d I w o u ld in te rp re t as eq u iv alen t to L acan’s n o tio n o f th e c o u n te rp a rt, an ico n ic stru c tu re th at enables m irro rin g and em pathy to c o n stitu te th e earliest m o m e n ts o f consciousness. F or T revarthen, such o therness appears to be a b u ilt-in feature o f sem iotic capacity, perhaps intrinsic to th e act o f signing. T revarthen seem s to be saying th at som e so rt o f psychological self-o th er distinction m ust be present at b irth in o rd e r to acc o u n t for th e rapid sem iotic lea rn in g th at takes place in th e infant. T h e in fa n t’s reactions to th e still-face m other, for exam ple, also “ give revealing evidence as to the em otional and o th e r eq u ip m e n t w ith w h ic h th e child is en d o w ed to repair o r escape from a c o m ­ m unication th at threatens to fall apart” (1989, p. 6 93).T h e evidence he goes o n

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to present “ for the thesis o f ‘innate intersubjectivity’” (1989, p. 694) com es from observations o f the interacting infant’s gestures, facial expressions, gazing, and rhythm . W ith in a few hours o f b irth, the hum an infant shows a selective preference for his o r her m o th e r’s specific characteristics o f speech o r voicing, a fam iliar­ ity th at m ust have been learned in utero, as well as selective orien tatio n to a m o th e r’s individual odor. T h e infant’s orien tatio n to the m other, so unlike the autistic state som e psychoanalysts claim ed for the infant, was well k n o w n to Lacan, for in 1951 he had w ritte n o f the neonate: “ H is lack o f sensory and m o to r coordination does n o t prevent the n e w -b o rn baby from being fascinated by the hum an face, alm ost as soon as he opens his eyes to the light o f day, n o r from show ing in the clearest possible way that from all the people around him he singles o u t his m o th e r” (1951, p. 15). A t one o r tw o days infants will suck to produce th eir m o th e r’s voice, prefer speech sounds to o th e r sounds, and prefer female to m ale voices; by five m onths o f age infants can identify w hich silent visual im age o f lips articulating a sound m atches a previously heard vowel sound (Kuhl and M eltzoff, 1982), a set o f findings about the salience o f the hum an voice that leads M urray and T revarthen to conclude: “E vidence is accu­ m ulating that the quality o f em otion is transm itted w ith particular precision and refinem ent in the hum an voice, by pitch and intonation characteristics and quality o f the voice, and that these aspects have high salience in infant percep­ tio n ” (1985, p. 180).Terhune (1979) has also noted, from his tw enty-five years o f pediatric practice, the infant’s sensitivity to the hu m an voice, as well as the rel­ ative scarcity o f psychoanalytic references to the ear and hearing. Som e new borns, a few m inutes old, can m im ic a variety o f things like facial expressions o f em otion, m o u th openings, simple hand m ovem ents, and tongue pro tru sio n s (Field, 1985; Field et al., 1982; M aratos, 1982; MeltzofF, 1985; M eltzo ff and M oore, 1977,1983). A lthough som e o f these observations were initially challenged (Jacobson and Kagan, 1979), the findings have rem ained robust, lending support to the developm ental prim acy o f the icon in coerced em pathy. Expressive gestures are especially reactive to the flow o f the m o th e r’s vocalizations and facial expressions (Trevarthen, 1986). R egarding these neona­ tal observations,Trevarthen (1989) concludes th at “ the uniform ity o f the basic features o f timing (kinem atics), anatom ic form (physiognom y) and energy o f expressions, and th eir transitions in close engagem ents is sure evidence that autonom ous, self-organizing principles o f brain developm ent create m atching capacities for intersubjective engagem ent betw een infant and caretaker” (1989, p. 698). H e then exam ines how the infant progresses from the intensely intim ate m atch in g behaviors to “ the k in d o f open c o m m u n ica tio n that leads to the m aking o f w hat a sem iotician w ould call a sign” and states that this change “ to genuine, reciprocal exchange o f messages w ith inform ative and referential

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potential com es very early” (1989, p. 698). By three o r four w eeks o f age som e infants w ill stop crying at the sight o r sound o f the m o th e rs approach (D em os, 1992), suggesting th at th e indices o f h e r presence are b e in g used to alter states o f upset. A ro u n d six w eeks o f age th ere is noticeable im p ro v e m en t in the in fa n t’s ability to p e rfo rm selective visual o rien tatio n s; th e eyes are focused m o re quickly and fixed m o re definitely o n th e eyes o f a p e rso n leaning tow ard the baby and speaking softly. T h e in fan t’s response to voice and gaze “ gives a strong signal” (1989, p. 698) to the m o th e r w hose into n atio n s are paced in alternation w ith th e in fan t’s to create a tu rn -ta k in g fo rm o f v o calization th a t is tightly regulated. B u t this m u tually c o n tro lled process n o t only controls sound: it also coordinates head m ovem ents, facial expressions, an d h a n d gestures w ith such precision th at this fo rm o f expressive in teractio n has b e e n called a “ p ro to c o n ­ versation” (Bateson, 1975). In d eed , at tw o m o n th s o f age infants can discern p h o n e tic changes, such as from “b a ” to “ ga” , in less th an o n e -h a lf second, as d e te rm in e d by studies o f b ra in electrical c u rre n ts (D e h a e n e -L a m b e rtz an d D ehaene, 1994). F rom six to tw elve w eeks o f age such protoconversations are “ intensely and directly interp erso n al, and exclusive o f o th e r kinds o f in te rest” (T revarthen, 1989, p. 701). B u t infants are capable o f in te rru p tin g an d w ith d raw in g from these interactions and m ay even tu rn away to focus o n so m e th in g else, indicat­ in g that w h e n in te rac tio n does o c c u r it is a m u tu al engagem ent: Protoconversation betw een infants and their caretakers has, then, invariant features w hich reflect (a) coordination betw een the various channels o f expression and modalities o f awareness o f the infant, w ho behaves as a coherent subject; and (b) a m utual com prehension o r em pathy by means o f w hich infant and partner assist each other to create an integrated and pat­ terned engagement. Different qualities o f engagem ent are determ ined by a com m on o r shared spectrum of emotions w hich gain organization betw een them by th eir m utual influence on each o th e r in the com m unications. (1989, p. 702)

Infant c o m m u n ica tio n s are b e tte r co o rd in a te d a n d m o re elaborate in response to a p a rtn e r show ing appropriate em pathy, acting according to “ m atch in g e m o ­ tional and cooperative rules,” im plying that “ the infant is prepared to participate in a certain w ay” (1989 pp. 7 0 2 -7 0 3 ). C o n tra ry to o th e r w idely h e ld view s, T revarthen concludes that such sem iotic preparation is n o t reducible to a search for recurrent stim ulation, an interest in novelty, o r th e p ro d u c tio n o f con tin g en t events, for “th e pecu liar regularities o f e m o tio n s are ev idence for a m otivation that defines persons as having additional, special conversational and em pathic p ro p erties” (1989, p. 703).

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T his specifically h u m an m otiv atio n , w h a t Lacan called “ the sub ject’s funda­ m ental need, w h ic h is to gain re co g n itio n ” (1 9 5 3 -5 4 , p. 247), is salient, as we saw earlier, in th e distinctive way infants relate to persons versus in an im ate objects as well as in the unm istakable response to the still-face interaction: If the m other holds herself still and unreactive, this causes the baby to becom e unhappy and w atchful, then w ithdraw n and distressed . . . T h e behavior o f the infant is sad o r angry, depressed o r protesting; it is not chaotic or uninterpretable___ M ovem ents o f the body, face, eyes, and vocal system are coordinated to make clear and distinct messages that elicit strong feelings o f concern, unhappiness, and anxiety in the m other. (Trevarthen, 1989, p. 703) S uch distress in view o f th e still-face m o th e r is highly specific, fo r the in fan t is n o t distressed by th e d istracting en tra n ce o f th e e x p e rim e n te r (M urray an d T revarthen, 1985), perhaps because the 3 0 -se co n d in te rru p tio n is n o t e x p e ri­ en ced by th e in fan t as th e m o th e r’s refusal to recognize b u t as a m utual state o f in te rru p tio n caused by a th ird .1 Distress does occur, how ever, w h e n th e infant, e ngaging in live in te rac tio n by m eans o f vid eo screens, is u n ex p ected ly p re­ se n ted w ith a v id eo replay (a 30 seco n d delay) o f th e m o th e r in a previous happy and lively in te rac tio n w ith the infant w h ic h , o f course, is n o w in ap p ro ­ priate to the o n g o in g m o m e n t o f the protoconversation. W h a t is m issing in this delayed video con d itio n is n o t the m o th e r’s gaze o r positive affect b u t rath er h er m eaningful, o rganized behavior, h e r responsive reco g n itio n o f th e in fan t’s spe­ cific sem iotic gestures: “T h e test proves that it is the precise interplay o f address and reply in tim e that keeps the happy engagem ent g o in g ” (T revarthen, 1989, p. 703). F rom th eir data M u rra y and T revarthen conclude: “ T h e m o re co m p lex m otivations a ttrib u te d to infants by psychoanalytic and ethological theorists are substantiated by th e distinctive quality' o f response evoked in th e infant by each o f th e different kinds o f p e rtu rb a tio n ” (1985, p. 192). W h e n th e test is reversed an d th e m o th er, d u rin g live video interactio n , is presented, w ith o u t b e in g in fo rm e d , w ith a delayed video replay o f th e infant, she feels so m e th in g is w rong: in h e r a n x io u s response she b e co m es m o re 1.

In his Seminar Lacan refers to a paper by Susan Isaacs which mentions “ that very early on, at an infants age still, between eight and twelve m onths, the child simply does not react in the same way to an accidental knock, to a fall, a brutal mechani­ cal act related to a piece o f clumsiness, and, on the other hand, to a slap with a punitive intention” (1953-54, p. 179). Lacan had already alluded to this finding in his 1948 paper, “Aggressivicy in Psychoanalysis,” w'here he w'rote:“Only Melanie Klein, working on the child at the very limit o f the appearance o f language, dared to project subjective experience back to the earlier period w hen observation enables us nevertheless to affirm its dimension, in the simple fact for example that a child w ho does not [yet] speak reacts differently to punishment or brutality” (1977, p. 20).

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directive, corrective, and negative tow ard the infant, sim ilar to the c o m m u n ica ­ tive a tte m p ts m ade by those w h o w o rk w ith autistic c h ild ren (M u rra y and T revarthen, 1986). F rom a Peircean perspective, w e can say that the basic dis­ ru p tio n is in the process o f sem iosis, the o n g o in g interplay b etw ee n sign and in te rp réta n t, w ith the feeling and actio n in terp rétan ts n o lo n g er fu n c tio n in g as signs eliciting responses from the o th e r p a rtn e r despite repeated p ro d u ctio n s o f signs. W h e n the o th e r’s responses to the signing process fall o u t o f tim ing, th e stru ctu re o f intersubjective reco g n itio n collapses. S uch d isrupted sem iosis, furtherm ore, m ay provide som e o f the necessary conditions for projective id en ­ tification to o c c u r w h ereb y the feeling and actio n in terp rétan ts o f o n e ’s signs are disavowed an d en acted by th e o th e r m e m b e r o f th e dyad. A ro u n d th ree m o n th s o f age th e in fan t show s g re a te r e x p lo ra tio n o f th e e n v iro n m e n t an d m a n ip u la tio n o f objects. H e o r she can n o w lo cate an d trac k d istan t o b jec ts an d events by sight a n d h e a rin g , an d th e a tte m p ts to to u c h objects by h a n d b e c o m e b e tte r c o n tro lled . T h e b e g in n in g o f deictic activity, nam ely p o in tin g , has b e e n reliably o b se rv ed to o c c u r b e fo re th ree m o n th s , in c o n ju n c tio n w ith a rm e x te n sio n , v o c a liz a tio n , a n d m o u th in g (T u rkington, 1992). Such p o in tin g b e h av io r m ay indicate th e in fa n t’s g ro w in g sem iotic c o m p e te n c e to shift from ico n ic c o e rc io n to a m o re directive an d ostensive use o f th e index. As w e shall see later, this shift from en acted ico n ic ­ ity to active use o f th e in d ex and deixis m ay fu n c tio n as th e sem iotic fulcrum o f reality testing. B y th ree an d o n e - h a lf m o n th s infants behave in ways th a t in d icate they u n d e rstan d so m e th in g a b o u t o b jec t p e rm a n en c e . D e m o s (1992) review s th e w o rk o f B aillargeon (1990) w h o d e m o n stra ted th a t infants u n d e rstan d th at objects go on existing even w h e n h idden, th at they c an n o t traverse space o c cu ­ pied by objects, and that space is c o n tin u o u s.T h e in fan t’s experiences o f c o n ­ c ern at failure and jo y in m astery are also e v id e n t at this tim e. T h e in h ere n t m o tiv a tio n for e x p lo rin g and p e rfo rm in g actions, as so cogently presen ted by W h ite (1960), assists in the lea rn in g o f representations an d opens u p th e “ c o n ­ sciousness o f an in tegrated ‘b ehavior space’ cen tered o n th e b o d y ” (T revarthen, 1989, p. 707). M o re elaborate “ p e rso n -p e rso n ” gam es develop, in clu d in g the singing o f fo u r-lin e m usical stanzas, used by m o th e rs across varying cultures, w h ic h last a b o u t 12 seconds. T h e rhythm is quickly lea rn ed by th e infant and the song’s in tro d u c tio n , build-up, clim ax, and resolution provide the infant w ith a p ro to -n arrativ e stru c tu re (1989, p. 709). B y four and a h a lf m o n th s infants recognize their ow n nam es, prefer to listen to th eir ow n nam es in a prosodically sim ilar series, and therefore appear to have a differentiated re p resen tatio n o f th e so u n d p a tte rn s o f th e ir o w n nam es (M a n d elju sc zy k , and Pisoni, 1994). B y six m onths, as re p o rte d by K uhl and her associates, th e e xposure to a specific language alters p h o n e tic p e rce p tio n .

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resulting in “language-specific p h o n etic prototypes that assist infants in organiz­ ing speech sounds in to categories” (1992, p. 608). A fter five m o n th s T revarthen notes the appearance o f w h a t he calls “ a qual­ ity o f pretense” as the infant displays “self-regard, self-imitation, and, later, posingfo r self-appreciation in a mirror” (1989, p. 711). Lacan (1977), as w e shall exam ine in later chapters, had n o te d the in fan ts fascination w ith his o r h er m irro r im age as startin g aro u n d six m o n th s;T re v arth en observed infants at fo u r m o n th s staring at th e ir m irro r im ages in a o n e-w ay m irro r: “A tte n tio n to the m irro r is evi­ dently a side effect o f self-consciousness in response to the a tte n tio n o f others (i.e., p a rt o f a self-o th er consciousness), because at th e sam e tim e he o r she discovers th e fu n o f w a tc h in g th e m irro r self, th e baby is b e c o m in g m o re e x p ert at sharing jokes and showing off, w ith precisely an d appropriately regulated eye c o n tact, w ith the fam iliar an d appreciative p a rtn e r” (1989, p. 716). In this way th e infant has b eg u n to “ play w ith th e inten tio n s o f o th ers” (1989, p. 716), tu n in g in to th eir desires, eng ag in g desire w ith desire. A t six m o n th s o f age the in fan t’s play w ith m o th e r is full o f “ m e ta c o m m u ­ n icatio n s” in th e fo rm o f teasing, learn ed vocal perfo rm an ces, using habitual grim aces o r gestures, challen g in g o n e a n o th e r’s expressions: “ T h e in fan t im i­ tates m o re deliberately and w ith m ore discrim ination, and uses th e im itated acts as signs w hich can b e offered o r w ith h eld to control the p a rtn e r” (1989, p. 716), th ereb y show ing greater ability' to o rie n t b e h av io r to h e r interests and in te n ­ tions. In th e m ate rn a l still-face e x p e rim e n t, infants n o w w ill often re p ea t a le a rn e d tric k o r fu n n y exp ressio n “ w ith insistence an d lo o k in g h ard at th e m o th e r to excite som e response, thereby m aking it very difficult for the m o th e r to keep sober and unresponsive” as she “ averts h e r gaze an d struggles n o t to lau g h ” (1989, p. 717): T he very' w ide range o f m annerism s, expressions, actions, and ritual per­ form ances that are “show n o ff” as “jokes” o r “ tricks” by infants betw een six and twelve m onths o f age gives us a broad scope for in terpretation o f “ infant semiotics.” . . . All these “ displays” increase in subtlety and com ­ plexity in the second year, but they start in the first. It should be em pha­ sized that such acts o f com m unication are n o t sim ply fram ed or “scaffolded” by the partner, although they are learned at first by im itation in interaction.T hey are recreated by the child out o f this favorable intersubjective learning situation. (1989, p. 731) A t seven to e ig h t m o n th s o f age the infant, w h e n c o n fro n te d by a stranger, w ill m ake a b rie f show o f friendliness, o f lea rn ed tricks, along w ith indicating suspicious fear and sensitivity to in co m p reh e n sio n o r rid icu le by a stranger to w h o m such displays are unfam iliar. T rev arth en describes these “ o fferings” o f lea rn ed fragm ents o f beh av io r as “ protosigns,” fam ily conventions:

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T h e ir use w ith strangers, w hile inappropriate, is particularly interesting because it dem onstrates that these acts are, for the baby, som ething to be exchanged socially . . . U nlike a sign stimulus in animal com m unication, it does n o t stim ulate any particular innate pattern o f response; it has an inherent arbitrariness o f form o r application carried in phatic com m uni­ cation. (1989, p. 720) O v e r th e second six m o n th s o f age th e infant learns to m o re carefully c o o rd i­ nate w ith th e m o th e r’s o rien tatio n : “ ‘C h e c k in g ’ behavior, by w h ic h the baby directs a tte n tio n to th e eyes, face, voice, o r hands o f the p a rtn e r (or to various com binations o f these) show s h o w th e infants’ g ro w in g aw areness o f h o w to coordinate w ith the o th e r p e rso n ’s m in d is coupled to a n e ed for specific infor­ m atio n o n expressed details o f th e ir feelings, interests, and in te n tio n s” (1989, p. 724). From the earliest m o n th s th e infant has regulated such direct interpersonal contacts, b u t th e ch eck in g -b a c k b e h av io r show s rem arkable d e v elo p m en t over the first year: After six m onths they are increasingly aware o f the possibility that what they are about to do can be qualified by how their m others will feel about it, and they systematically start to o rien t to gain emotional referencing from their m others’ faces and v o ic e s. . . All these interactions o f subjectivities (intersubjectivities) lay the groundw ork for jo in t appreciation o f reality and for com m unication by symbols and language. (1989, pp. 724-25). All o f this I have q u o te d at len g th because it has e n o rm o u s im p o rta n c e for a psychoanalytic u n derstanding o f identification and desire. T h e infant as a c o m ­ m unicative and dissim ulating sem iotic p a rtn e r appears to b e in te n t o n k n o w in g h o w his o r h e r actions please o r displease m o th er; in ten t, w e m ig h t say, o n being fo u n d desirable. A fter nine m o n th s o f age the infant m oves o n to w hat T revarthen calls “ sec­ on d ary intersubjectivity,” as m arked by p e rfo rm a n ce o n a n ex p erim e n tal p ro ­ cedure in w h ic h m o th e rs w ere asked to get th e ir infants to p u t th ree w o o d e n dolls in a toy tru ck . B efore th e age o f n in e m o n th s, infants play w ith th e toys b u t d o n o t attend to th e instructions. A fter nine m onths, how ever, they are able and w illing to a tte n d an d com ply w ith th e m o th e r’s instructions. Infants can n o w assist and c o m m e n t o n an o th e r p e rso n ’s interest th ro u g h gesture and voice; such a tw o -c h an n e l system can be codified protolinguistically for d e af as well as h e a rin g infants: “ T h u s at th e age w h e n a n o rm a l h e a rin g ch ild is m asterin g h o w to p e rfo rm illo c u tio n a ry acts by vocalizing in a speech-like w ay w ith the help o f gestures, a d e a f child in a signing fam ily starts to pay a tte n tio n to and im itate h and signs, using th e m appropriately to indicate wishes, interests, and purposes to c o m p a n io n s” (1989, p. 728).

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R eferentiality is n o w explicit and inclusive o f w hat lies beyond the dyad, for th e “ n in e - to tw e lv e -m o n th -o ld ’s awareness o f a shared reality and its signifi­ cance” m eans the infant can n o w learn a bout things from observing h o w others treat th em (1989, p. 731). A sim ilar tim etable for triadic in te rac tio n is rep o rte d by B akem an and A dam son w h e rein by th irteen m o n th s infants can “ e n te r read­ ily in to nonverbal referential c o m m u n ic a tio n w ith a p e rso n a b o u t a present o b je c t” (1984, p. 1279). In th e first study to d em onstrate such results, fo u rte e n m o n th -o ld s w ere o bserved to im itate a p e er w h o was previously train ed to pro d u ce specific effects w ith a set o f objects; the im itation was observed across different contexts (from lab to h o m e, from day care c e n te r to h om e), an d to o k place even w ith a delay o f tw o days (H anna an d M eltzoff, 1993). T oddlers c o m p re h en d w h a t is said in specific pragm atic and in terpersonal contexts even th o u g h th ey have little o r n o p ro d u c tio n o f speech. A lth o u g h th eir attem pts at speech m ay be po o rly articulated, th ey can co n tro l “ a range o f p ro to la n g u ag e

vocalizations

w ith

subtle

an d

a p p ro p ria te

in to n a tio n ”

(T revarthen, 1989, p. 734) an d gestural c o m m u n ica tio n is also w ell-developed. H andedness n o w em erges, ind icatin g h em isp h eric differentiation o f sem iotic functioning, ech o in g o u r earlier discussion o f h o w th e brain distinguishes sem i­ otic space from se n so ry -m o to r space in d e a f signers: An interesting feature is that, as children’s m anipulation o f objects becomes ruled by shared conventions and semantic principles, a m ajority o f them show an increasingly clear handedness. M ost are right-handed for m anipu­ lative acts o f m eaning, for using im plem ents, signs, etc., either in com m u­ nication or for their private imaginative play . . . O rdinary “sensory-m otor” or exploratory play, unqualified by interpretations o r recognitions that function in com m unication, does not show such clear asymmetry. (Trevarthen, 1989, p. 734—35) A fundam ental ch ange in self-awareness appears near the en d o f th e second year w ith th e appearance, as K agan (1981) re p o rte d , o f “ a heightened anxiety a b o u t b ro k e n o r defective things, a b o u t n aughty (punishable) acts, an d a b o u t po tential criticism — especially from a stranger— a b o u t inability to un d erstan d so m e th in g o r d o a p rescribed task” (T revarthen, 1989, p. 7 3 5 ).T h e e x p erien c e o f self-cohesion, o f a b o u n d e d self, n o w appears d e p e n d e n t o n th e m ee tin g o f standards, o n th e em brace o f an ideal, o n b e in g fo u n d pleasing (the role im ita­ tio n plays in this w ill be ex am in ed in C h a p te r 8). C o n g ru e n t w ith the co n so l­ idatio n o f a L acanian ego, som e au th o rs stress h o w the seco n d year is m arked by th e in fan t’s exercise o f p o w e r in relationships, self-assertion, and attem pts to co n tro l others, fo sterin g an illusion o f o m n ip o te n c e w h ic h , w h e n challenged, leads to c ry in g (U rw in , 1984). Im aginative play in this p e rio d is m ore discrim inating an d has m o re structure

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w h e n d o n e w ith m o th e r th an w h e n d o n e alone. Play w ith peers, described as “ parallel” o r in “ clusters,” tends n o t to be co m p le m e n ta ry b u t replicative and iconic. Lacan (1977) w ro te o f the “ transitivism ” o f the to d d le r w h o tends to confuse his o r h e r self-im age w ith the visual p resentation o f a n o th e r as c o u n ­ terp a rt, so that a child will cry o r even fall w h e n w atch in g a n o th e r child being struck o r pushed. B y th ree years o f age the child has b e co m e m o re self-possessed an d a rtic u ­ late and can speak to o th ers a b o u t n o n -p re s e n t events; th ere is a g reat deal o f e vidence “ for the e n try o f a ch ild o f this age in to a sym bolic an d cultural w o rld ” (T revarthen, 1989, p. 737), in to w hat Lacan called the sym bolic o rd e r o r w h a t Peirce te rm e d “ T hirdness.” F or T rev a rth e n , th e se m io tic c h ild grow s o u t o f th e se m io tic in fan t, engaged in c o m m u n ic a tio n from th e start, o p e n to th e o th e r an d to th e sem i­ otic field. H e cites V ygotsky (1962) in a ffirm ing th e p rio rity o f in te rm e n ta l processes over in tra m e n ta l ones: “ W e th in k an d re m e m b e r sym bolically because w e c o m m u n ica te sym bolically,” because th ere is “ m otivation for in te rsubjective relatedness an d m ix in g o f th o u g h ts w ith an ‘o th e r’” (T revarthen, 1989, p. 738), c o n tra ry to “ the Piagetian theoretical system [in w hich] the to d ­ d ler is describ ed as ‘p re o p e ra tio n a l’ an d ‘e g o cen tric,’ as i f incapable o f engag­ in g w ith a n o th e r p e rso n ’s th o u g h ts o r n o tic in g th e ir d ifferin g p o in t o f v ie w ” (T revarthen, 1989, p. 742; see also G ibson, 1987). F or T rev arth en , th e fo u n d a ­ tio n for th e in fan t’s sem iotic capacity is “ a general expressive m echanism in the brain th a t links oral, auditory, m anual, an d visual sensory an d m o to r channels in such a way th at th ey are c o m p le m e n ta ry an d equivalent fo r m ak in g ideas expressive in language" (T revarthen, 1986, p. 154). In P eircean term s, all o f these channels p a rticip a te in sem iosis, are g o v e rn ed by a c o m m o n sem iotic c o d e, a n d are e la b o rate d in a d e v e lo p m e n ta l line from e n a c te d ico n ic ity (coerced m irro rin g ) to in d exicality (pointing) to sy m bolization (conventional gestures and w ords), e n g ag in g a range o f signs w hose “ feeling in te rp re ta n ts” are m o re c o m m o n ly re fe rre d to as affects o r e m o tio n s. In th is fram e w o rk “ e m o tio n s are, i f n o th in g else, sem iotic m ed ia to rs lin k in g th e body, the sub­ je c t, an d th e social” (G .W h ite, 1994, p. 220). F ram ed by a sem iotic co d e th at is cultu rally d e te rm in e d , “ e m o tio n s can b e v iew ed as a set o f socially shared scripts c o m p o sed o f various processes— physiological, subjective, an d beh av ­ ioral— th at develop as individuals actively (personally an d collectively) adapt an d adjust to th e ir im m e d ia te sociocultural, sem iotic e n v iro n m e n t” (M arkus and K itayam a, 1994, pp. 3 3 9 -4 0 ). In d em o n stratin g th e iconic capacity o f neonates, ju s t th irty -six h o u rs after b irth , to discrim inate an d m im ic th ree different facial expressions (happy, sad, and surprised), Field and h e r associates co n clu d e

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that there is an innate ability to compare the sensory inform ation o f a visually perceived expression (as evidenced in this study by their ability to discriminate the facial expressions) with the proprioceptive feedback o f the m ovem ents involved in m atching that expression (as manifested by their differential responses to the facial expressions). (1982, p. 181) T his is rem arkably similar to the way Freud in his “Project for a scientific psy­ c hology” described how we learn to know others (1895, pp. 393-94). Iconic resem blance pow erfully fosters know ledge and solidarity across all natural dom ains. Peirce insisted the icon was essential to all form s o f know l­ edge: “ T h e only way o f directly co m m unicating an idea is by m eans o f an icon; and every indirect m eth o d o f com m unicating an idea m ust depend for its establishm ent u p o n the use o f an ic o n ” (1940, p. 105). T h e c o n te m p o ra ry exam ination o f layered resem blance know n as “ fractals” (Kellert, 1993), may have great m ethodological im p ortance in future psychoanalytic research. W e are familiar w ith the layered ways that repetition occurs. For exam ple, in super­ vision a therapist reports that a patient speaks o f taking on som e responsibility and thereby feeling “ ah ead ” o f th e th erapist’s o th e r patients; th e therapist responds by poin tin g o u t how this is similar to the patien t’s rivalry w ith a sib­ ling. T h e patient experiences this rem ark as hurtful and becom es angry. T h e supervisor points o u t how the therapist’s rem ark appears to have narcissistically injured the patient, placing the therapist “ ahead” o f the patient. W h en the th er­ apist in tu rn looks injured by the supervisor’s com m ent, the supervisor notes that perhaps the therapist now experiences a narcissistic in ju ry because the supervisor is n o w “ ahead.” T h e repetition appears to have a fractal structure, like a coastline w hose broad outlines are repeated n o m atter how small and detailed is the piece o f littoral we exam ine. Such resem blances have m athe­ matical and topological im plications for com plexity, chaos, and catastrophe the­ ories (see also M oran, 1991). T h e infant’s iconic response or, insofar as it is autom atic, this coerced m ir­ ro rin g o f the facial expression o f the other, is b u t one o f a set o f profoundly isom orphic natural processes elucidated by R e n é T h o m (1973) in his pio n eer paper on catastrophe theory. T h o m , w h o participated for a tim e in Lacan’s sem ­ inars, n o ted how a n u m b er o f images appear naturally, according to physical processes, such as the sun casting a m an’s shadow on the ground, o r a foot leav­ ing an im pression on the sand. H e states that b o th an im age and its m odel are extended in space, and that th eir correspondence m ay be form ulated according to a geom etrical transform ation. A n additional feature determ ining the im age’s longevity is the plasticity o f the im aging m edium o r receptor system, its “com petence” : the dynam ic o f life, even at the m olecular level o f D N A , has evolved rem arkable com petence in creating reproductive icons w ith hom eostatic systems. Processes o f perception

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are also remarkable for their capacity to receive sensorial impressions, store them in m em ory, and rem ain plastic for new ones. In this iconic proliferation, the signifier (the image) is engendered by the signified (the m odel), b u t the off­ spring in tu rn will engender its ow n image. Lacan had called attention to the engendering pow er o f the ico n as he review ed data from ethological studies: “T hese data show ed that the sexual m aturation o f the female pigeon depends entirely on its seeing a m em ber o f its o w n species, m ale o r female, to such an extent that w hile the m aturation o f the bird can be indefinitely postponed by the lack o f such perception, conversely the m ere sight o f its ow n reflection in a m irror is enough to cause it to m ature almost as quickly as if it had seen a real p ig eo n ” (1951, p. 14). For a living being to survive, certain actions are indispensable, especially w ith regard to its prey and its predators. T h e effects o f such actions are signs, w h at Peirce specified as indices. U nlike icons, w hich im pact through w h at Jakobson calls a “factual similarity,” indices operate “by a factual, existential c o ntiguity” (1965, p. 415). To prevent o r gain the biological “ catastrophes” o f eating o r b eing eaten, such indices (tracks, odors, shadows) m ust be precisely interpreted and soon enough. In distinction from the icon and the index, the sym bol stands for its object through learned convention, or, as Jakobson states, “ th ro u g h im puted, learned c ontiguity” (1965, p. 415). H um an language consists o f a system o f symbols w hich vastly increases o u r capacity to represent and to anticipate, if n o t always to forestall, catastrophe, including the ultim ate catastrophe o f death. A m ong hum ans, as am ong animals, sem iotic activity originates in regulation, the h om e­ ostatic regulation o f the living organism , as well as the stability o f th e social body. Sem iotics at first has an im perative value, w hich endures unconsciously, linked, T h o m stated, to the experience o f the sacred. T h e sym bol and the culture it makes possible have so altered experience that hum ans now differ from animals in three distinct ways. First, the psychic life o f animals appears captured in autom atic reactions to the perception o f biologically im p o rta n t objects such as prey o r predators. A t the sight o f prey th ere is a “ catastrophe” o f p e rce p tio n in w h ic h th e p re d ato r psychically “beco m es” its prey, it identifies w ith it, and does so only w h e n an index o f actual prey has been apprehended, n o t im agined o r rem em bered. T h e index, perceived and interpreted, triggers a fixed set o f m o to r actions that ru n their course tow ard capture. Second, because o f such “ fascinations” (just the w ord Lacan used w ith reference to “im aginary captivations”), the “ego” o f the animal is n o t p erm an en t but is re-fo rm ed in each se nsory-m otor pursuit. T h e anim al, m oreover, does n o t seem to have an ongoing consciousness o f its body as the center o f its activities, as T revarthen ascribes to the infant. T h ird , the anim al does n o t seem to have a continuous n o tio n o f space, a E uclidean geom etry, but

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rather a set o f unintegrated maps for actions taken by distinct “egos” in pursuit, escape, feeding, and courtship, maps, in o th er words, for specific “ physiological callings” (T hom , 1973, p. 103). Hum ans, in contrast, are liberated from the fascination o f things by giving them a nam e and thereby inhabiting a “sem antic space” structured by concepts, roles, relationships, and codes (this recalls the sym bolic use o f space, as Sacks n oted, in left-brain activity). T his liberation from the im m ediacy o f things enables hum ans to establish m ore perm anent egos based on the representation o f the body in space, a space conceived as a universal continuum , a subset o f w hich is enclosed by the reflective surface o f the m irror, w hose captivating quality is thereby relativized. Such a m ental construction o f space, in turn, provides a struc­ ture for founding the identity o f things on their spatial localization. O n e can consider, T h o m stated, that the infant evolves from a state o f fascination by things as the use o f symbols develops and the grip o f the “ h e re-and-now ” is loosened. W e recall W olff’s co m m en t about the apparent release o f the infant from “stim ulus-boundedness,” an exam ple o f how “ ontogenesis com prises a sequence o f discontinuous ‘catastrophes’” (Wolff, 1987, p. 266; see also Kagan, 1979). Such a sequence is n o t controlled by either intrinsic o r extrinsic executives, but brought about thro u g h small variations in the self-organizing dynam ics o f the infant interacting w ith small differences (such as the phonetic differentiations that begin to take hold by six m onths) in environm ental input (see also Fogel a n d T h elen , 1987;Thelen and Sm ith, 1994;Thelen, 1995). T h o m ends his paper by considering how, before ten m onths o f age, the infant’s vocalizations include all the phonem es (the phonetic inclusiveness o f babbling is parallelled by the gestural inclusiveness o f the “ sign-babbling” o f deaf infants,as reported by Petitto and M arentette [1991]). As parents discourse in th eir ow n language, the child retains only those phonem es he o r she hears (or, in the case o f gestures, sees) as the language is learned. In a closing m etaphor,T hom describes how the m athem atician (T hom , referring to himself) likewise babbles before nature; b u t only those w h o can hear M o th e r N a tu re ’s response will open a dialogue w'ith her and go on to learn a new language. A nd w here, T h o m asks, can the m athem atician hear the response o f nature? “ T h e voice o f reality is in the sense [le sens] o f the sym bol” (T hom , 1973, p. 106). I take sym bol here in the broadest sense, to m ean sign, and therefore inclu­ sive o f the icon and the index.T his is crucial, for the problem o f referentiality, o f w hat Freud called reality testing and the perception o f “ signs” o f reality (“ Realitatszeichen,” 1950, p. 417; 1985, p. 395) as well as scientific investigation, requires a consideration o f the index. In Lacan’s term s, ho w is it that psycho­ analysis can im pact o n the Real? H ow can speech alter physical processes? T h e system o f language is vast, and semiosis is an o p e n -en d e d hierarchical process, as sum m arized by D ew ey (1946) w h o stated

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that Pcirce uniform ly holds (1) that there is no such thing as a sign in iso­ lation, every sign being a constituent o f a sequential set o f signs, so that apart from m em bership in this set, a thing has no m eaning— o r is not a sign; and (2) that in the sequential m ovem ent o f signs thus ordered, the m eaning o f the earlier ones in the series is provided by o r is constituted by the later ones as their interprétants, until a conclusion (logical as a m atter o f course) is reached. Indeed, signs,. . . as such, form an infinite series, so that no conclusion o f reasoning is forever final, being inherently open to having its m eaning m odified by further signs. (1946, p. 88) T his endless dissem ination o f m eaning w ould lead to m adness if we co u ld n o t a n ch o r the process. D ew ey at this p o in t invoked th e role o f the index: Linguistic signs, constituting thought and conferring generality, continuity, law, are cases o f Thirdness. T hey have o f them selves no reference to “things.” Such connection as they can have is, accordingly, dependent upon the intervention o f a nother factor. T h is factor (called Secondness by Peirce) is o f a radically different sort from Thirdness. It is particularity as against generality; brute interruption as against continuity; contingency as against law. (1946, p. 90) A ny “ referen ce o f linguistic signs to th in g s is accom plished,” a cc o rd in g to Dewey, “ th ro u g h th eir g e ttin g in to c o n n e c tio n w ith indexical signs” (1946, p. 90) so th at, I take it, c o n tig u o u s “ facts” an d “ effects” b e c o m e a n ch o rs for th o u g h t; b u t th e in d ex brin g s us in to c o n n e c tio n w ith “ th in g s” (w ith the actions o f persons, m o re to the point) because, D e w e y w rites, there is a conjunction o f the “ Secondness” o f an indexical sign w ith the m ovem ent o f linguistic signs, o r “Thirdness,” thereby bringing the latter to a close in a way w hich links it to the form er, and thereby also conferring generality, reasonableness, upon w hat in itself is like a sheer bum ping o f things into one another. (1946, p. 91) T h e m o v em en t o f signs, the process o f semiosis, m ust be u n d e r way for the index to be apprehended as an index w ith general im p o rt, n o t sim ply as a signal trig g e rin g a fixed response as in anim als. B u t the sem iotic process, and psycho­ analysis itself as the talking cure, w o u ld be an irrelevant o r m ad d e n in g d rift o f verbiage w ith o u t the action o f indices to im pact o n the R eal and o n th e verbal process. In early infancy ico n ic relations are en ac te d . T h e m o th e r ’s sm ilin g gaze brings a b o u t its replica in th e infant; the in fan t’s sm iling gaze, in tu rn , produces a m irro rin g response in th e m other. W hile these are indices o f c ontiguous pres­ ence, th eir im m ediate im pact com es from th e ir fu n c tio n as icons, replicating w h a t is at first m issing in th e o th er. T h e relatio n sh ip b e tw e e n th ese iconic

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e n ac tm e n ts is reversible in d irec tio n o f causality and representability: e ith e r sm iling gaze can b rin g a b o u t th e oth er. In th e case o f th e in d ex , how ever, D ew ey states that w e find a “ principle o f irreversibility” w h ic h an ch o rs the sem iotic process in reality.2 Iconic relations are the su p p o rt o f fantasy and hal­ lucination; indexical relations w ith th eir irreversible co n d itio n s are required for reality testin g to develop, and for causal relations to be a p p reh e n d ed , fo r n o a m o u n t o f staring at the fo o tp rin t o f a d e p arted perso n will cause the perso n to re tu rn . T h e descriptive p o w er o f iconic relations su p p o rts the illusion that o n e can reproduce w h a t is m issing, b u t the index is required to co n firm w h a t is present. Peirce w rote: T h e actual w orld cannot be distinguished from a w orld o f im agination by any description. H ence the need o f pronouns and indices, and the m ore com plicated the subject the greater the need o f them (1992, p. 227) T h e index asserts nothing; it only says “T here!” It takes hold o f o ur eyes, as it were, and forcibly directs th em to a particular object, and there it stops. (1992, p. 226) T h e in d ex is an affront to infantile grandiosity; w e m ust learn to follow th e in d ex if w e are to survive, ra th e r th an im agine reality as w e w ish it to be. S uch b o w in g to necessity, as F reud emphasizes, constrains us in a n u m b e r o f ways. W e m u st learn to take th e in d ex as an index, n o t sim ply as an object; this requires th at w h a t w e perceive is also in scrib ed in a n o th e r register, that o f signs. T h e sign, th e index, refers to an o b ject; w e c a n n o t sim ply im ag in e th e o b ject as we w ish it to be, b u t as w e learn o f it from the index. W e c a n n o t sim ply retrieve th e lost ob ject by im a g in in g its index: th e in d ex m ust strike us, w e are n o t in co n tro l o f it. In its irreversibility, th e in d ex teaches us th a t w e m ust suffer th e loss, m ake m em orials to th e past, and m ake d o w ith substitutes.

2.

Jakobson makes the same point when he states: “ Indices, which the physicist extracts from the external world, are not reversible” (1985, p. 31).

Intersubjectivity through Semiotics

In attem pting to show that psychoanalysis m ust go beyond the psychoanalytic dyad, I have em phasized the place o f the T h ird as inclusive o f the sem iotic code that positions speakers, determ ines deixis, and governs semiosis. B rickm an conceptualizes the T h ird as the use o f inference in conju n ctio n w ith “a w o rk ­ ing m odel o f a dynam ic unconscious,” w hose effect is to stabilize the dyad and “ prevent a drift tow ard sym biosis” (1993, p. 905). I take him to m ean by this w hat I have been calling coerced m irroring: “ A m ajor effect o f the deliberate and undisavowed use o f inference is the prevention o f therapeutic tautology and symbiosis, as exists in the p h en o m e n o n o f ‘tracking’” (1993, p. 911). A n emphasis on tracking and attunem ent, “o n m utual understanding at the expense o f in te rp reta tio n o f conflictual m aterial in the transference,” m ay evoke “ m erger anxiety'” (1993, p. 912). T h e T h ird is required to frame the dyad and thereby enable th e partners to relate w ith o u t m erging. In this chapter I will try to show' that the c o ntem porary paradigm shift in psychoanalysis, a dyadic fram ew ork referred to as “ intersubjectivity” (see, for exam ple, Stolorow and A tw ood, 1992), requires and rests on a broader founda­ tion than self-psychology can provide and has a tw o -h u n d red -y ear-o ld history in c o n tin en tal philosophy. T h e co m plexity o f intersubjectivity, m any have argued (W illiams, 1992; T heunissen, 1977), can best be u nderstood w h en the dyadic processes o f em pathy and recognition are taken as operating in a triadic co ntext in w hich a sem iotic code fram es and holds the dyad. It is the d e te r­ m ining presence o f such a code, shaping culture, com m unication, and context,

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th at m akes possible the saying o f “ I” and “y o u ” w h ereb y the h u m an h o riz o n is o p e n ed to th e reach o f intim acy, b o th personal and perhaps also transcendent. T h e com plexity o f the reach is perhaps m ost clearly seen in the case o f autis­ tic children, w h o have a w e ll-d o c u m e n ted difficulty in the use o f “ I” and “y o u ” (Fay, 1979). In a rem arkable interview w ith an autistic adult, T em ple G randin, a farm -sciencc Ph.D . w hose publications, a n im al-handling m ethods, and cattlep en designs are w idely k n o w n a m o n g agriculturalists, O liv er Sacks w rites: I was struck by the enorm ous difference, the gulf, betw een Tem ple’s im m e­ diate, intuitive recognition o f animal m oods and signs and her extraordi­ nary difficulties understanding hum an beings, their codes and signals, the way they conducted themselves. O n e could n o t say that she was devoid o f feeling or had a fundamental lack o f empathy. O n the contrary, her sense o f animals’ m oods and feelings was so strong that these almost took possession o f her, overw helm ed her at times. She feels she can have sym pathy for w hat is physical o r physiological— for an anim al’s pain or terror— but lacks em pathy for people’s states o f m ind and perspectives. (1993-94, p. 116)

F ro m th e m o d el w e have b e e n e x am in in g , w e w o u ld say th a t a severe im passe o c cu rre d o n th e sem iotic d evelopm ental line from iconic m irro rin g to in d ex to sym bol; she is gifted in using icons and indices b u t has o n g o in g difficulty w ith culturally d e te rm in e d sym bols. In L acanian term s, th e transition from im aginary to sym bolic registers was severely d isrupted: “ A t the level o f th e sen so rim o to r, the concrete, th e unm ed iated , T em ple is e n o rm o u sly sensi­ tive,” w rites Sacks (1993—94, p. 116), b u t she does n o t have “an im plicit k n o w l­ edge o f social c o n v en tio n s an d codes, o f cultural presu p p o sitio n s o f every sort,” and as a child “she m ixed all h e r p ro n o u n s up, n o t able to grasp the differ­ e n t m eanings o f ‘y o u ’ and ‘I,’ d e p en d in g o n c o n te x t” (1 9 9 3 -9 4 , p. 116). She looks back o n a c h ild h o o d m ark ed by confusion an d social alienation: Som ething was going on betw een the other kids, som ething swift, subtle, constantly changing— an exchange o f meanings, a negotiation, a swiftness o f understanding so remarkable that sometimes she w ondered if they were all telepathic. She is now aware o f the existence o f these social signals. She can infer them , she says, but she herself cannot perceive them , cannot participate in this magical com m unication directly, o r conceive the m anylevelled, kaleidoscopic states o f m ind behind it. (1993-94, p. 116) I f w e keep P eirce’s perspective in m in d , I th in k w e can h e ar this as a precise an d p o ig n a n t d e sc rip tio n o f th e process o f sem iosis in h u m a n beings, a process th at is in trinsically in tersubjective for Peirce, and w h a t happens to this process w h e n th e sig n ’s in te rp ré ta n t b e co m es fixed o r th e m o v e m e n t from sign to in te rp ré ta n t to sig n -fo r-a n o th e r b eco m es b locked. T h e re is a frozen

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quality to T em ple’s n arratio n s, e v id en t in h e r m a n n e r o f rep eatin g stories in v irtually the sam e w ords. Sacks w rites: I was stru ck b o th by th e vividness o f th e re ex p ericn ce, th e m e m o ry for h e r— it se em ed to play itself in h e r m in d w ith ex tra o rd in a ry detail— and by its u n w a v e rin g quality. It was as i f th e o rig in a l scene, its p e rc e p tio n (w ith all its a tte n d a n t feelings), was rep ro d u c ed , replayed, w ith virtually n o m o d ific a tio n .T h is quality' o f m e m o ry . . . seem ed to m e b o th p ro d ig io u s an d p a th o lo g ic a l— p ro d ig io u s in its d etail an d p a th o lo g ic a l in its fixity, m o re akin to a c o m p u te r reco rd th a n to a n y th in g else. (1993—94, p. 121)

T em ple does n o t alter h e r narrative in response to cues from h e r listener, and therefore does n o t seem to b e in clu d in g th e subjective perspective o f h e r listener in h e r account. B u t sem iosis is intrinsically dialogic, the interprétants o f o u r signs (the feeling, action, and logical interprétants) circulate th ro u g h the feelings, actions, and th o u g h ts o f o th ers an d re tu rn to us, tran sfo rm ed by the subjectivity o f th e oth er, as n e w signs. T his process seem s im p e d e d for T em ple, h e r in terp rétan ts seem fixed, p erhaps because they are c o n stitu te d n o n -d ialo g ically an d h en ce n o t o p e n to th eir role as signs for a n o th e r and thereby o p en to influence by a n o th e r m in d . I f this is th e case, w e can u n d e rstan d why, as Sacks w rites, “ achieving genuine friendship, appreciating o th e r people for th eir o th e r­ ness, for th eir o w n m inds, m ay be the m ost difficult o f all achievem ents for an autistic p e rso n ” (1 9 9 3 -9 4 , p. 117). T h e q u e stio n o f h o w w e can appreciate o th e r m inds, o th e r peo p le in th eir otherness, has b e e n a m ajo r philo so p h ical q u e stio n at least since K ant. If, as K ant co n clu d ed , w e c a n n o t k n o w “ things in them selves” b u t only the appear­ ances o f things as stru c tu re d by the categories o f p e rce p tio n and u n d e rstan d ­ ing, th en h o w can w e affirm th e kno w led g e o f in d ep e n d en tly existing others? M o re th a n a c e n tu ry later, H usserl g ra p p le d w ith th e sam e q u e stio n as he explored the consequences o f his p h e n o m e n o lo g ic al m eth o d . I state this only to suggest the dim ensions o f the problem , n o t to dw ell o n it; readers w h o wish to pursue this are enco u rag ed to exam ine the w o rk o f T heunissen (1977), w h o surveys how' sociality is handled in th e w o rk o f H usserl, H eidegger, Sartre, and B uber, and concludes that dialogic considerations m ust play a central role in acc o u n tin g for th e kno w led g e o f the o th e r as oth er. T h e em erg en ce o f such know ledge o f the o th er, m oreover, is correlative w ith th e em ergence o f selfconsciousness an d is th e result o f th e active process o f m u tu al reco g n itio n . T h is is essentially the position o f H egel, as presen ted by W illiam s (1992). T h e relevance o f H eg el (1807) fo r an u n d e rstan d in g o f intersubjectivity' was em phasized by Lacan (1977) an d has b e e n n o te d subseq u en tly (M uller, 1982a; B enjam in, 1990;K irshner, 1992). In his m ost recent b o o k , M odel! states: “ I d o u b t w h e th e r o u r p re sen t p sychology o f in te rsu b je ctiv ity c o u ld have

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developed w ith o u t H egel . . . H egel can justifiably be te rm e d th e first in te rsubjective o r relational psychologist” (1993, pp. 9 8 -9 9 ). A lth o u g h he has b een stereo ty p ed as an Idealist, dealing in abstractions, H eg el saw th e co m p lex ity o f intersubjective processes in th eir im pact o n desire, know ledge, and action. For H egel, in tersubjectivity rests o n m o re th an in tu itio n o r feeling, for it requires a b ro a d er base in a cultural and linguistic d e te rm in a tio n o f a “ we.” N o tio n s o f the h u m an subject as a m ultilevelled process cam e p ro m in e n tly in to W estern philosophy th ro u g h H egel, in w hose w o rk b o th Lacan and Peirce fo u n d an em phasis o n the self n o t as substance b u t as subject, n o t as isolated subject b u t as a subject in the intersubjective m atrix o f culture, n o t as a fixed e n tity b u t a subject u n d e rsto o d as process, and n o t as a process th at gradually unfolds positively b u t, rather, a process th a t operates th ro u g h the dialectic o f n egation, suffering, division, an d th e shared m em o rializ a tio n o f loss. W illiam s states that “ w h e n e v e r the pro b lem o f th e o th e r is taken seriously, H e g el so o n e r o r later b ecom es a topic o f discussion” (1992, p. 12). W illiam s begins his ow n discussion o f H eg el by n o tin g w h a t H egel to o k from his prede­ cessor,J.G . Fichte (1794): the n o tio n o f reco g n itio n as an action, a p r io r action by an o th e r w h o su m m o n s m e to a free response. F o r F ichte,W illiam s w rites, “ H u m a n existence, as d istinct from bare existence, is possible o nly as an in te rsubjectively m ed iated social reality” (1992, p. 59) or, as F ichte p u t i t,“K ein D u , K ein Ich,” (1992, p. 53). W h at is crucial in constitu tin g an “ I” is n o t a p erception o r k n o w led g e o f th e o th e r b u t rath er an act o n m y p art w h e reb y I recognize th e o th e r re cognizing m e. W illiam s w rites: “ T h is transposition o f th e p roblem o f th e o th e r fro m ep iste m o lo g y to a ctio n is perh ap s F ic h te ’s m o st o rig in a l c o n trib u tio n ” (1992, p. 62). F ic h te ’s em phasis o n actio n is o f decisive im p o rta n ce to H egel, for H e g e l’s effort to give an a cc o u n t o f intersubjectivity is p art o f his effort as a social re fo rm e r to re -th in k th e place o f history, religion, law, an d com m unity. H egel affirm ed th at w e c a n n o t adequately co n ceptualize th e individual apart from a com m unity, and, even further, th e individual does n o t have an im m ediate rela­ tio n to th e self b u t relates to self only as m ed iated by th e oth er. Since such m ed ia tio n is never conflict-free, w h a t H egel adds to F ic h te ’s n o tio n o f recog­ n itio n is th e d im e n sio n o f d o m in a tio n , a lie n atio n , a n d struggle. C o n flic t becom es a m o m e n t in the process o f achieving m utual reco g n itio n in th e case o f love o r in the m o re w id ely cited exam ple o f th e struggle b e tw ee n m aster and slave. In th e m aster-slave episode o f H e g e l’s Phenomenology o f Spirit, w e have th e classic exam ple o f h o w by fo rcin g it o n e loses w h a t is m o st desired. Initially o n e h u m a n consciousness is c o n fro n te d by a n o th e r in a p rim o rd ia l m irro r­ ing. E ach first finds itself ou tsid e o f itself, in a n o th er, in a m o m e n t o f self­ a lienation. In o rd e r to overcom e the sense o f a lie n atio n an d to c o n firm its

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u n iq u e status, each seeks th en to im pose itself o n th e o th e r as th e o b jec t o f th e o th e r’s desire, as th e u n iq u ely h u m a n o b jec t o f desire. E ach proclaim s its h u m an privilege by d e clarin g its o w n biological ex istence w o rth risking in a struggle to th e d e a th to o b ta in th e o th e r ’s re c o g n itio n . In this m yth ical e n c o u n te r o n e m ust yield to th e o th er, o th erw ise b o th w o u ld be dead and th e process o f h isto ry w o u ld go n o fu rth er. T h e o n e w h o yields in fear o f death b eco m es th e slave, reco g n izin g the o th e r as m aste r.T h e slave’s p roducts are c o n su m e d by th e m aster, w h o th e re b y c o n fers re c o g n itio n o n th e m as h u m a n p ro d u cts. In th e m aste r’s case, how ever, th e re co g n itio n for w h ic h he stru g g led is n u llified , fo r its so u rce is th e slave w h o m th e m aste r w ill n o t re co g n ize as h u m a n . W h ile H e g e l c o n tin u e s th e process in its su b se q u e n t evo lu tio n th ro u g h stoicism , skepticism , C hristianity, and W estern capitalism , fo r o u r p u rp o se s w e sto p w ith th e m aster-slave e p iso d e as a rg u in g fo r the im p o rta n c e o f m u tu a l re co g n itio n in th e reso lu tio n o f im passe. W illiam s criticizes th e “ m istaken id en tific atio n o f m aster an d slave w ith H e g e l’s en tire a cc o u n t o f in tersu b jectiv ity ” (1992, p. 143), for H e g e l’s c o n c e rn is to d e lin e ate a m o re gen eral p a rad ig m o f intersubjectivity' as a process in w hich: 1) th e original, naive, and parochial consciousness is unable to recognize th e o th e r as o th e r b u t finds o nly itself in th e o th er; 2) this “ se lf-o th e rin g ” is ex p erien ced n o t as an elaboration b u t as an alienation from the self, as a reduc­ tio n from an all-inclusive status to a relativized, particu lar one, w h a t w e m ig h t call a narcissistic affront to th e grandiose, infantile self; 3) this loss o f self m ust be overcom e, p a rticularity m ust b e cancelled by the cancellation o f the oppos­ ing oth er, th e o th e r as opposing; 4) in th e ensuing struggle to gain th e o th e r’s recognition, the necessity for th e o th e r’s m ediation becom es established; 5) such m e d ia tio n is achievable o n ly by le ttin g th e o th e r g o free, to freely provide recognition. In this process th e self is re tu rn e d to itself, n o t as it was im m e d i­ ately tak en to be, b u t as e n ric h e d by th e actio n s o f m u tu a l re co g n itio n . W illiam s w rites: “T h is situation o f m utual reco g n itio n is o n e o f c o m m u n ica ­ tive freedom , w h ic h H eg el describes as b e in g at h o m e w ith self in a n o th e r . . . T h e road to in ferio rity passes th ro u g h the o th e r” (1992, pp. 1 4 9 ,1 5 1 ). I w a n t to try, as clearly as I can, to elaborate th e com plexity' o f this process. W h a t H egel is saying, as W illiam s em phasizes (o r at least as I u n d e rstan d it), is that intersubjectivity' involves a relation o f relations, a com plex d o u b lin g th a t is n o t a reflection o f sam eness. In this process the im m ed iate consciousness o f singularity o f id en tity becom es m ed iated th ro u g h a n o th e r subjectivity to yield a p e rm a n en tly altered sense o f “w e ” along w ith an in n e r relation to oneself. It is the self’s relation to itself, in b o th parties, th at m ust be active and transform ed in th e act o f m u tu al re c o g n itio n .T h e dual stru c tu re o f a “b e in g -fo r-se lf” and a “b e in g -fo r-o th e r” are e n h an c ed in b o th parties. T h ere fo re H eg el can w rite:

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“ S elf-consciousness is in a n d for itself in an d th ro u g h th e fact th at it exists in a n d fo r itself fo r an o th e r. T h a t is, it exists o n ly as re c o g n iz e d o r a c k n o w l­ e d g e d ” (1807, p. 111). 1 m u st d o to th e o th e r w h a t I desire th e o th e r to d o to m e, th a t is, to act as a self-consciousness freely re co g n izin g th e o th e r as a selfconsciousness d ifferen t fro m m e. T h e psy ch o lo g ical genesis o f such a dual stru c tu re — a b e in g -fo r-s e lf as a su b je c t a n d a b e in g - f o r - o th e r as in te rsu b je c tiv e — is m o st clearly realized th ro u g h love, as W illiam s w rites: “ In love, th ere is risk, b u t n o loss o f self; ra th e r love involves a fin d in g o f se lf in th e r e c o g n itio n g iv e n by th e o th e r. Love re n o u n c e s c o e rc io n a n d allow s th e o th e r to b e ” (1992, p. 184). In o rig in a ry love, w h o s e effects m ay b e o b se rv ab le in th e d e sc rip tio n s o f m o th e r- in fa n t m u tu a l gazing, o n e is s u m m o n e d to be, a ddressed as a “ y o u ” in a c le a rin g o p e n e d u p by d e ix is th ro u g h th e se m io tic c o d e th a t stru c tu re s Iy o u - h e re - n o w p o sitio n s. T o th e e x te n t th a t th e u n c o n sc io u s reso n ates w ith re c o g n itio n a n d is capable o f addressing a n d b e in g addressed, w e can speak o f a se m io tic su b je ct n o t lim ite d to th e c o n sc io u s ego. In th e process o f m u tu a l re c o g n itio n th ro u g h w h ic h I b e c o m e s I in b e in g a d d ressed as a “ y o u ,” w e e x p e rie n c e a “ y o u ” as th e so u rc e a n d p ro cess o f a c a llin g -to . S u c h a c a llin g to o r su m m o n in g , o fte n m o st e lo q u e n t in silen c e (D a u e n h a u e r, 1980), can b e tra n sfo rm a tiv e (B u b e r, 1970). S o m e re lig io u s tra d itio n s fin d in th e p o te n ­ tia lity fo r su c h an u n p re d ic ta b le a n d u n w a rr a n te d a d d ress b y a “ y o u ,” th e are n a fo r th e signs a n d o p e ra tio n s o f w h a t has b e e n called g race. In an y case, th e status o f “ y o u ” c a n n o t b e re d u c e d to a p ro je c tio n o f th e e g o o r a re p li­ c a tio n o f th e self. A. S. B yatt, in h e r novel Still Life, presents a m o th e r and h e r n e w ly -b o rn son: She had n o t expected ecstasy. She n oted that he was both m uch m ore solid, and, in the feebleness o f his fluttering m ovem ents o f lip and cheek muscle, the dangerous lolling o f his uncontrolled head, m ore fragile, than she had e x p e c te d .. . . She p u t o u t a finger and to u ch e d [his] fist; h e obeyed a p rim ­ itive instinct and curled th e tiny fingers ro u n d h e r o w n , w h e re they clutched, loosen ed, tig h te n e d again. “ T here,” she said to him , an d he looked, and the light p o u red through the w indow , b rig h te r and brighter, and his eyes saw it, and hers, and she was aware o f bliss, a w ord she d id n ’t like, but the only o n e .T h ere was her body, quiet, used, resting; there was her m ind, free, clear, shining; there was the boy and his eyes, seeing w hat? A nd ecstasy.Things w ould h u rt w hen this light dim m ed .T h e boy w ould change. B u t now in the sun she recognized him , and recognized that she did no t know, and had never seen him , and loved him , in the b rig h t new air w ith a sim plicity she had never expected to know. “ You,” she said to him , skin for th e first tim e o n skin in th e outside air, w h ic h was w a rm and shining, “you.” (1985, pp. 100-101)

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Such a saying o f “y o u ” opens th e d im en sio n o f intersubjectivity, n o t in w hat K o h u t te rm e d a self-selfobject relation b u t ra th e r in w h a t I w o u ld call a self­ selfsubject relation m ade possible by the sem iotics o f dialogic exchange. I do n o t th in k the infancy research, as w e saw in the last chapter, can be adequately c o m p re h e n d e d by re fe rrin g to th e m o th e r’s role as a selfobject fu n c tio n , as carrying o u t for the infant a fu n ctio n necessary to the stru c tu rin g o f a cohesive self an d thereby e x p erien c e d by the infant as part o f the self. W h a t I believe T revarthen (1989) show s is h o w an infant engages a m o th er, already k n o w n by voice an d smell an d tactile contiguity, n o t as an o b ject b u t as a subject. T h e m o th e r is n o t n eed ed o r sought as an o bject o f desire o r to carry o u t functions for the infant; th e m o th e r is sought as a subject, precisely w ith h er o w n h o rizo n o f desire and in te n tio n , in o rd e r to carry o u t functions w ith th e infant in acts o f m utual reco g n itio n . M utual reco g n itio n , as B enjam in rem inds us, “ is n o t a passion b u t a relational categ o ry ” (1993, p. 448). Such acts o f m u tu al reco g n itio n are possible because th e in fan t’s ru d im e n ­ tary sem io tic c o m p e te n c e is en g ag ed by th e m o th e r’s de ic tic fram ew ork, c o n cretized by h e r use o f p ro n o u n s. T h e F rench linguist, E m ile Benveniste, to w hose w o rk L acan o fte n refers (1955—56, 1966), w ro te several papers o n p ro n o u n s and subjectivity that have great relevance fo r psychoanalysis. In “ T h e N a tu re o f P ro n o u n s” he notes th at all languages have p ro n o u n s in o rd e r to carry o u t a set o f co m p le x functions. P ro n o u n s are p eculiar signs in utterances th at are pragm atic, acts th at in clu d e th e o n e using th e signs. T hese signs, th e p ro n o u n s “ I” an d “you,” are “shifters,” they have n o fixed c o n te n t, b u t instead refer to a u nique b e in g each tim e they are used. In fact, w h a t they refer to is n o t an o b jec t b u t a h ighly specific m o m e n t: / is “ th e individual w h o u tte rs the present instance o f discourse c o n ta in in g th e linguistic instance I ” (1956, p. 218).T h e same k in d o f reference is governed by “y o u ” as th e individual spoken to in the actual situation o f an address.T hese p ro n o u n s, u nlike o th e r w'ords, do n o t refer to a c o n ce p t, d o n o t assert anything, d o n o t stand alone. “ I” and “y o u ” are reciprocally, dialecdcally held in d istin c tio n .T h e y m ark o u t positions in the dialogic space. C onsciousness o f self can develop because this dialogic field is an ch o red by the personal p ro n o u n s. B enveniste w rites: Consciousness o f self is only possible if it is experienced by contrast. I use / only w hen I am speaking to som eone w ho will be a you in my address. It is this condition o f dialogue that is constitutive o f person, for it implies that reciprocally I becom es you in the address o f the one w ho in his turn designates him self as /. (1956, pp. 224-25). Because o f th e ir intrinsic reference to the present m o m e n t o f discourse, “ I” and “y o u ” are linked to a series o f indices o f th e h e re -n o w -th is sort th at

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“ delim it th e spatial and tem p o ral instance coextensive an d c o n te m p o ra ry w ith the present instance o f discourse co n tain in g / ” (1956, p. 219). In P eirces term s, these are indexical signs, c o n tig u o u sly related to th e ir objects, as in a fin g er p o in tin g to an o b ject, the sm oke that indicates th e presence o f fire, or, in th e case o f “ I ” and “ you,” as p ro d u c ts o f th e sam e act o f speech. S uch deictic term s d irect the listen er to the speaker’s tem p o ral and spatial co o rd in ates, as Lyons states:“ the basic fu n c tio n o f deixis is to relate the entities an d situations, to w h ic h reference is m ade in language, to the spatio-tem poral z ero -p o in t— the h e re -a n d -n o w — o f th e c o n te x t o f u tte ran c e ” (1982, p. 121). D eixis is required to establish c o n te x t, an in te rw e av in g k n o tte d at o n e p o le by th e sp e a k ers spoken “ I” as an in d ex in c o n tig u ity w ith his o r h e r act o f speaking, an d at the o th e r pole by “you,” spoken as p o in tin g to the in te n d e d listener, w h o is also in d ic a te d by gazing. T h e p sychologist K arl B iih le r n o te d th a t (in W este rn culture, at least) “ the m ost c o m m o n fo rm o f indicating th e addressee is th ro u g h tu rn in g to th e p e rso n and fixing h im w ith o n e ’s eyes” (Innis, 1982, p. 21). It is th e indexical stru c tu re o f deixis that m akes intersubjectivity possible a n d that gives it a sustaining stru c tu re . U n fo rtu n ate ly , as M a h o n y has w ritte n , “ T h e im p o rta n t linguistic n o tio n o f deixis has b e e n w oefully n eglected in A n g lo A m erican psychoanalytic lite ratu re ” (1989, p. 45). B enveniste states o f the pro n o u n s: “ T h e im p o rta n ce o f th e ir fu n c tio n w ill be m easured by the natu re o f the p roblem they serve to solve, w h ic h is n o n e o th e r th an that o f intersubjective c o m m u n ic a tio n ” (1956, p. 219). P ro n o u n s achieve this by co n v ertin g language, a general abstract system , in to discourse, a particular co n crete act o f giving v oice:“ It is by identifying him self as a u n iq u e person p ro n o u n c in g I th at each speaker sets him self u p in tu rn as the ‘sub ject’ ” (1956, p. 220). I b e c o m e I by using “ I” in relation to “y o u ” each tim e I refer to th e instance o f m y o w n discourse. I b e co m e a subject, w ith a subjective d im e n ­ sion, by b e in g addressed as “ y o u ” by a “ y o u ” w h o m I address, a n d this by su bjecting m y voice to th e stru c tu re o f language a n d th ereb y b e c o m in g capa­ ble o f p e rfo rm in g u n iq u e acts o f discourse, o f develo p in g m y u n iq u e voice. In his paper, “ Subjectivity in Language,” Benveniste em phasizes that language is n o t a to o l taken u p by a h u m a n subject. O n th e contrary, language “ is in th e natu re o f m an, and h e did n o t fabricate it . . . It is in an d th ro u g h language th at m an constitutes h im self as a subject" (1958, p. 224). L anguage alone estab­ lishes th e voice o f th e self in its actuality, as actually saying “ I” : “T h e ‘subjec­ tivity’ w e are discussing h ere is th e capacity o f th e speaker to posit h im self as ‘su b je ct’” (1958, p. 224), and such self-positing is possible o nly in a reciprocal relation to a “you.” Such a reciprocity o f persons is “th e fundam ental c o n d itio n in lan g u a g e ” w h ic h m akes discourse possible a n d is “ th e linguistic basis o f subjectivity” (1958, p. 225). Because the use o f “ I” “ refers to the act o f in d i­ vidual discourse in w h ic h it is p ro n o u n c e d , an d by this it designates the

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speaker,” B enveniste can claim: “ It is in the instance o f discourse in w h ic h I designates the speaker that the speaker proclaim s him self as the ‘subject’” (1958, p. 226). Such a self-positing has b e arin g o n o th e r central features o f language. T h e in d ic a to rs o f deixis d e p e n d o n th e p ro n o u n s, fo r th ey o rg an ize spatial and tem p o ral relationships aro u n d th e “ su b je ct” taken as referent. T h e expression o f tem porality, its linguistic o rg a n iz atio n in to tenses (w h e th e r g o v e rn e d by verbs, adverbs, o r o th e r particles), always involves a reference to th e present. B u t the “ present,” w rites B enveniste, is never a d e te rm in a tio n apart from the subject: N ow this “present” in its turn has only a linguistic fact as temporal reference: the coincidence o f the event described w ith the instance o f discourse diat describes it.T he tem poral referent o f the present can only be internal to the discourse . . . Linguistic tim e is self-referential. (1958, p. 227) To indicate th e present requires an act o f speech w hose spatial-tem poral c o o r­ dinates o f past and future are an ch o red by the spoken “ I” o f the speaker speak­ in g in th e p re sen t m o m e n t. T h e sem io tic k n o t tie d by this “ I,” its stable a n ch o rin g o f an entire epistem ological fram ew ork, is w h a t B arratt (1993) insists Freud has o v e rtu rn e d w ith his discovery o f u n c onscious processes. I h o p e to address this in th e final chapter. B enveniste co n clu d es his p a p er w ith a discussion o f th a t special class o f utterances that are called “perform atives,” speech acts that d o n o t sim ply describe o r refer to a state o f affairs b u t th at b in d th e speaker insofar as th e speaker speaks them : “ T h e utteran ce I swear is the very act w h ich pledges m e, n o t the description o f th e act that I am p e rfo rm in g ” (1 9 5 8 ,p. 229).T h e utterance is the act th at binds, b u t this is n o t given in th e m ea n in g o f th e verb, for “ it is the ‘subjectivity’ o f discourse w h ic h m akes it possible” (1958, p. 229), as can be seen w h e n w e substitute “ he swears” for “ I sw ear” and thereby retain m erely a description o f the behavior. A sim ilar subjective dim ension distinguishes saying to so m eo n e “ I forgive you,” o r its recip ro cal,“ I am sorry,” from th e statem ent, “ H e is sorry,” o r e v e n ,“ I am th e type o f perso n w h o is s o rr y .. . . ” T h e m ain p o in ts o f these papers by B enveniste are tak en u p by A n a-M aria R iz z u to in a rem arkable p a p er th at jo in s th e m to h e r psychoanalytic practice. She co n cu rs w ith h im w h e n she w rites th at “ th e e x p erien c e o f b e in g o n e se lf in an act o f subjective and intersubjective self-reco g n itio n results from th e use o f personal p ro n o u n s” (1993, p. 535). T h e p ro n o u n s “ I,” “ m e,” “ myself,” and “y o u ” “are the indispensable m ediators o f all affective experiences,” w hile “ I” is “ th e indispensable m e d ia to r o f all in trap sy ch ic k n o w le d g e ” (1993, p. 536). Because “ I” an d “y o u ” a n c h o r the poles o f dialogue, they thereby give a firm place from w h ic h to address an oth er, to express needs an d desires, to d irect

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anger and love, to focus em pathy and forgiveness. W ith o u t pro n o u n s, the entire range o f h u m an resonance w ould rem ain in obscure undifferentiation. R izz u to endorses Benveniste s claim regarding the sense o f subjectivity developing from th e use o f pronouns: T h e factual, concrete speech act is the only m anner o f know ing that there is an ego, a private reality to speak about. (1993, p. 540) We need the m ediation o f the pronouns I, me, and you in dialogual exchange, even in internal speech, for any act o f conscious awareness and self-awareness.There is no self-perception w ithout them . (1993, p. 545) P ro n o u n s enable us to c o n ta in , elaborate, and refer to w h a t R iz z u to calls so well “ the exquisite particu larity ” o f o u r experiences o f b e in g loved and recog­ nized (1993, p. 541).T h e p ro nouns are the signs that claim the te rrito ry o f affec­ tive e x p erien c e . T h e y are n o t th e signs th a t in d icate som e p resu m ed , p rio r, pre-sem iotic claim; they do th e claim ing. T h e entire process o f lo n g -te rm treat­ m e n t m ay be u n d e rsto o d as a process o f gradual sem iotic e m p o w erm en t, o f d eveloping a voice, o f claim ing o n e ’s ex perience. T h e “ exquisite p a rticu la rity ” o f e x p erien c e begins to b e stru c tu re d se m io tically, as w e have seen, very early in infancy, perh ap s even in utero. I have em phasized that th e in fa n t-m o th e r dyadic in te rac tio n is fram ed from th e start by th e stru c tu rin g T h ird o f th e sem iotic code, o rganizing cultural and linguis­ tic fo rm s o f c h ild care an d c o m m u n ic a tio n , in c lu d in g th e m o th e r’s use o f p ro n o u n s and o th e r form s o f deixis. Infancy research is o fte n used at th e present tim e to su p p o rt dyadic theories o f interaction, as if w h a t goes o n could b e u n d e rsto o d in term s o f a tw o -p e rso n system , apart from a larger c o n te x t. F or exam ple, S to lo ro w and A tw o o d w rite: “A n im pressive b o d y o f research e vidence has b e en am assed d o c u m e n tin g th a t th e d eveloping org an izatio n o f th e c h ild ’s e x p e rie n c e m ust be seen as th e p ro p e rty o f th e ch ild -ca re g iv e r system o f m utual re g u la tio n ” (1992, p. 23). I w o u ld change th at to re a d ,“ m ust be seen as th e property' o f th e triadic child -careg iv er-cu ltu ral system w h o se co d e stru c tu re s re sp o n se -p red ic ta b ility w ith in w h ic h m u tu a l re g u la tio n b e c o m e s possible.” A tw o o d an d S to lo ro w likew ise use infancy research to su p p o rt a dyadic view o f th e analytic process w 'hen th ey w rite: “ P atien t and analyst to g eth e r fo rm an indissoluble psychological system , and it is this system th a t constitutes th e em pirical d o m ain o f psychoanalytic inquiry'” (1984, p. 64). Again, this is m u ch to o lim ited, for the d o m ain o f psychoanalytic in q u iry m ust include th e fram e, th e cultural lim its and bo rd ers and h o w they d o o r d o n o t h o ld th e participants. T h is notab le effo rt to h a m m e r d o w n in te rsu b je ctiv ity as a psychoanalytic c o n c e p tio n does n o t go far e n o u g h if it fails to include th e stru c tu rin g role o f c ulture, sem iotics, an d linguistics, for a psychology o f th e self based o n self­

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o b jec t functions o r o n a psych o b io lo g y is unable to give an a cc o u n t o f the dialogic process. D ialogue is m ade possible n o t sim ply th ro u g h em p ath ie reso­ nance b u t th ro u g h th e w o rk o f clearing and m ark in g positions carried o u t by personal p ro n o u n s as w ell as the w o rk o f a n c h o rin g referen ce carried o u t by deixis and th e p ro n o u n as in d ex . T h e d e ic tic fu n c tio n o f p ro n o u n s is n o t g ro u n d e d in c o n ce p tu a l reference n o r in intersubjective feelings and is n o t a p ro p e rty o f e ith e r m e m b e r o f th e dyad, b u t is p art o f th e T h ird that stru c­ tures the dialogue, the T h ird o f cu ltu re and sem iotics th at gro u n d s th e posi­ tions o f each m e m b e r o f th e dyad and m akes possible a relationship b etw ee n them . A system atic u n derstanding o f the dyadic process is n o t possible w ith o u t taking this T h ird in to acco u n t. For Lacan dyadic process, as dyadic, operates in the im aginary register: “ the im aginary eco n o m y has m eaning, w e gain som e purchase o n it, only in so far as it is transcribed in to th e sym bolic order, w h ere a tern a ry relation is im p o sed ” (1 9 5 4 -5 5 , p. 255). B u t this does n o t m ean that for Lacan th e sym bolic register m akes a late appearance; o n the contrary, it is present from early infancy: Anyone w h o ’s observed a child has seen that the same blow, the same knock, the same slap, isn’t received in the same fashion, depending on w hether it is punitive o r accidental.T he symbolic relation is constituted as early as possible, even prior to the fixation o f the self image o f the subject, p rior to the structuring image o f the ego, introducing the dim ension o f the subject into the world, a dim ension capable o f creating a reality' other than that experienced as brute reality, as the e ncounter o f tw o masses, the collision o f tw o balls. (1954-55, p. 257) T h e c om plexity and distinctiveness o f o u r w o rk is at present u n d e r threat from tw o directions: by som e aspects o f c o n te m p o ra ry th e o ry an d by the m an ag em en t o f c o n te m p o ra ry practice. Shapiro (1994) calls a tte n tio n to h o w b o th m an ag em en t an d in te rp reta tio n are required for analysis to be effective. In te rp re ta tio n w ith o u t m an a g e m e n t o f th e fram e fosters a fusion w ith the p atient, w hile m an ag em en t w ith o u t in te rp reta tio n o f th e unconscious re p e ti­ tion o f transference m eans we direct patients as objects. N e ith e r o f these, in m y view, is th e k ind o f analytic relationship in w h ic h o n e can speak o f a “ real” relationship. T h e “ real” relationship can, I th in k , be specified as the im pact o n the patient o f the in te rp retin g analyst’s m anagem ent o f the frame, according to the analyst’s ch ara cte r.T h e effective relationship is the history o f the im pact o f the analyst’s unconscious (feeling and action) in terp rétan ts as well as conscious, logical notions o n the setting o r re-establishm ent o f th e fram e, especially w h e n the p atient acts to transgress the b o u n d a rie s o f th e fram e. A tw o -p erso n m o d el m ay be used to sim plify the interactional field, m aking it easier to reduce psychopathology to victim ization, as dam age d o n e by o n e to

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another, as the e n c o u n te r o f tw o masses, lim iting it to P eirce’s category o f Secondness. Patients them selves pressure us to think o f th em as victims. Such one-w ay th inking sees the patient as developm entally arrested by traum a and such thinking lends itself to one-w ay solutions: young, non-analytically trained therapists, cheaper to enroll in “preferred provider” organizations, readily take to the assignm ent o f d oing som ething to o r for the patient to com pensate for the developm ental deficit, the traum atization o f the patient by som eone else. T h eir practice is supported by the sort o f contem porary theory that M orris Eagle has called “ the deficiency-com pensation m o d el” (1984, p. 135). Such non-analytic practice deletes the “ I” o f the patient, the patient as distinctive subject, brackets the m eaning o f unconscious repetition, and manages the treatm ent in the ways one m ight m anage a business. If th e c ontem porary rush tow ard the dyad in o u r theo ries has served to eclipse the place we give the T hird, one possible ou tco m e is to leave the field vacant for an unw elcom e intruder. T h e place o f the T hird, I think, has been seized by the “ m anaged care” effort: the m anagers n o w structure the dyadic process from first phase to last, they determ ine its sem iotic conditions, influence w hat is to be said o r n o t said, dictate w hat shall be taken as m eaningful and w hat shall be desired as an ou tco m e o f the dialogical process.They do this in the socalled “ best interests” o f the patient w ho requires expedient and effective repair for debilitating sym ptom s. T h ey orien t new providers— I was told by a senior colleague in C o n n e cticu t— by telling them to avoid developing relationships w ith patients because it prolongs the treatm ent. T h e N ew York Times reported th at Sterling W in th ro p , a pharm aceutical com pany, reduced its em ployee psychotherapy bills by 47 percent by “ using the Integra system” o f standardizing sym ptom s, treatm ent, and outcom e, so that “the n um ber o f therapy visits aver­ aged 3.5 per patient, dow n from 5.5 visits tw o years ago” (Freudenheiin, 1994, p. D 2). T hose o f us w ith experience, w h o have functio n ed as supervisors and m entors to those less experienced, as in m ost o ther fields that involve a practice, have now in o u r ow n field becom e suspect, especially if we teach the com plex­ ity o f o u r w ork. W e are guilty o f engaging in lo n g -te rm treatm ent. W e do so because o u r m ore seriously tro u b led patients suffer from a p ro found dis-culturation o r radical failure in acculturation. T hey do n o t read cues predictably, in a consensually validated m anner. T h ey experience th eir participation in social groups as if they w ere foreigners, o r as infiltrators. W hile m edicine can m itigate the anxiety' they experience, no m edicine can enculture th em . T hey need us for that and that takes tim e. I f we d o n ’t acknow ledge the ongoing presence o f a semiotic code as instilling a culture that holds b oth o f us to o u r tasks, patients will believe that w e sim ply im pose o u r wills o n them or, worse, that we can fabricate together w hatever code is expedient.

Part Two Registers of Experience

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The Real and Boundaries Walking or Falling into the Wild

A recent N ew Yorker article (Brow n, Feb. 8,1993) presented the fatal life course o f C hris M cCandless, a 24-year-old college graduate w h o w andered for tw o years and was fo u n d dead o f starvation in Alaska. I believe his desperate w andering, an aberrant version o f the Australian W alkabout, exemplifies at the extrem e w hat E rik E rikson (1959) called a “life crisis” w hose solution required a “ m o rato riu m ” o n routine activities. C h ris’s m o rato riu m , insofar as it m ay be view ed as a com pulsive effort to attain the R eal, Lacans register o f undifferen­ tiation, failed because there was no structure available to keep him o n this side o f the boundary o f life. Such compulsive m ovem ent toward the edge contrasts w ith the effort others m ake to avoid collapsing into the R eal; they' often do this by cutting themselves, as if to place a secure m ark at the boundary o f the Real. T h e “R e al” is a notion to be distinguished from reality as its epistem ological frontier; if reality is a system o f images, logical categories, and labels, yielding a differentiated, usually predictable sequence o f experience, then the R eal is w hat lies beyond as the unim aginable, nameless, undifferentiated otherness in experi­ ence. Lacan stated:“ In o th er words, behind w'hat is nam ed, there is the unnam eable. It is in fact because it is unnameable, w ith all the resonances you can give to this name, that it Ls akin to the quintessential unnameable, that is to say to death” (1954-55, p. 211).To m ake contact w ith the R eal usually' causes great anxiety, w hich may be thrilling for som e, fragm enting for others. We receive hints o f the R eal in the details o f C hris’s death: w hen his decom posing body was discov­ ered in the shelter o f an old bus in the Denali wilderness, the presence o f a

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h o rrific o d o r sto p p ed th e h u n te r w h o fo u n d him . W h e n th e w rite r B ro w n visited the site five weeks later he was to ld ,“ T h e sm ell’s gone,” b u t his guide said, referring to the c o t w h ere the b o d y had b e e n ,“ I m ight have to p u t a tarp dow n before 1 sleep there again” (1993, p. 37). Smells have p erm eable boundaries; the tarp w ill provide a b a rrie r against the R e al for the n ex t sleeper.

Boundary Loss in Conrad's Heart of Darkness It m ay be difficult to ex p erien ce the progressive loss o f b o u n d a rie s as the R e al is ap p ro ach ed ; it has, how ever, b e e n pow erfully conveyed in c erta in literary w orks and I th in k it gives C o n ra d ’s Heart o f Darkness (1899) its persisting appeal. T h e loss o f b o u n d a rie s begins alm ost im m ediately, in th e second paragraph: “ T h e sea-reach o f th e T h am es stretched before us like th e b e g in n in g o f an in term in ab le waterway. In th e offing th e sea and th e sky w ere w elded to g eth e r w ith o u t a jo in t ” (1899, p. 3). T h e w aterw ay is “ in te rm in a b le ” because it has n o d efined end: the jo u rn e y ’s e n d u p -riv e r in A frica w ill be in the undefinable R e al. T h e absence o f the h o riz o n line, w h a t th e late Francois Peraldi used to p o in t to as the basic differ­ e n tia tio n in C hinese ideographs, suggests the absence o f a fundam ental o rie n t­ ing structure, the division b etw ee n heaven an d earth. A fter an inland trek C o n ra d ’s protagonist, M arlow , finds his b o at has sunk; as he waits for repairs an d learns o f K urtz, th e station c h ie f at his d estination, he observes the “ ‘smell o f m u d , o f prim eval m u d . . . th e high stillness o f prim eval forest . . . great, e x p ectan t, m u te . . . I w o n d e red w 'h eth er th e stillness o n th e face o f th e im m e n sity lo o k in g at us . . . w ere m e a n t as an appeal o r as a m e n a c e ’” (1899, p. 27). M arlow has e n co u n tere d the edge o f his civilized real­ ity, and as he steam s u p -riv er he jo in s a cosm ic regression tow ard massive dedif­ ferentiation: G oing up that river was like travelling back to the earliest beginnings o f the w orld, w hen vegetation rioted o n the earth and the big trees were kings. An empty' stream, a great silence, an im penetrable forest. T h e air was w arm , thick, heavy, sluggish.There was no joy in the brilliance o f sunshine. T he long stretches o f the waterway ran on, deserted, into the gloom o f overshadowed distances.. . .T he broadening w aters flowed through a m ob o f w ooded islands; you lost your way on that river as you w ould in a desert, and butted all day long against shoals, trying to find the channel, till you thought yourself bew itched and cut o ff for ever from everything you had know n once— som ew here— far away— in another existence perhaps. (1899, p. 34) As on e m oves tow ard the R e al, th e usual categories o f ex p erien ce, th a t is, the logic o f space, tim e, and causality, n o longer afford th e stability o f differentiated

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stru c tu re s.T h e loss o f fam iliar signs leads to a pervasive sense o f alienation: We penetrated deeper and deeper into the heart o f darkness... . We were wanderers on a prehistoric earth, on an earth that wore the aspect o f an unknow n planet. (1899, p. 35-36) T h e loss o f signification, the b reak d o w n o f the process o f sem iosis, o f signs eliciting in terp retatio n s, is com plete: We could not understand because we were too far and could not rem em ­ ber, because we were travelling in the night o f first ages, o f those ages that are gone, leaving hardly a sign— and no m em ories. (1899, p. 36) As they c o n tin u e up-riv er, th e inevitable dedifferentiation occurs: It was not sleep— it seem ed unnatural, like a state o f trance. N o t the faintest sound o f any kind could be heard. You looked on amazed, and began to suspect yourself o f being deaf—then the night came suddenly, and struck you blind as well. (1899, p. 40) N o th in g can be d ifferentiated in this dark stillness: th e re are n o gaps, n o separations, n o absences, as if w e had e n te red P eirce’s categ o ry o f Firstness, o f im m ediacy and indeterm inateness. T h e c o m in g o f daylight, ordinarily reas­ su rin g by h ig h lig h tin g differences and b o u n d a rie s, fails in this prim eval place: W h en the sun rose there was a w hite fog, very w arm and clammy, and m ore blinding than the night. It did n o t shift o r drive; it was ju st there, standing all round you like som ething so lid .. .W hat we could see was just the steam er we w ere on, her outlines blurred as though she had been on the point o f dissolving, and a misty strip o f water, perhaps tw o feet broad, around her— and that was all.T he rest o f the w orld was now here, as far as o ur eyes and ears were concerned. Just now here. G one, disappeared; swept off w ithout leaving a w hisper o r a shadow behind. (1899, pp. 40-41) N e ith e r th e sym bolic register (no w hisper) n o r th e im a g in ary register (no shadow ) can gain a h o ld o n th e u ndifferentiated R eal. T h e R ussian sailor, explaining h o w he becam e K u rtz’s assistant, tells M arlow, in w ords th at co u ld have b e en spoken by C h ris M cC andless, “ I w ent a little farther,” he said, “then still a little farther— till I had gone so far that I d o n ’t know how I’ll ever get back. N ever m ind. Plenty time. I can manage.” (1899, p. 55) T h e loss o f b o u n d a rie s is n o t ju st p erceptual and logical b u t also m oral, for th e R ussian says o f K urtz that “ th ere was n o th in g o n e arth to p rev en t him killing w h o m h e jo lly w ell pleased” (1899, p. 57), and o n th e riverbank o f his

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sta tio n K u rtz m ad e o f his killing a p erverse sign o f th e R e a l, as M arlow describes: You rem em ber I told you I had been struck at the distance by certain attem pts at ornam entation, rather remarkable in the ruinous aspect o f the place. N ow I had suddenly a nearer view, and its first result was to make me throw my head back as if before a blow.Then 1 w ent carefully from post to post w ith my glass, and I saw my mistake. T hese round knobs were not ornam ental but symbolic; they were expressive and puzzling, striking and disturbing— food for thought and also for vultures if there had been any looking dow n from the sk y .. . . I had expected to see a knob o f w ood there, you know. I returned deliberately to the first I had seen— and there it was, black, dried, sunken, w ith closed eyelids— a head that seemed to sleep at the top o f that pole, and, w ith the shrunken dry lips show ing a narrow w hite line o f the teeth, was sm iling too, sm iling continuously at som e endless and jocose dream o f that eternal slumber. (1899, p. 58) M arlow is n o t so m u ch frig h te n ed by death itself as by K u rtz ’s b e in g beyond lim its. As M arlow pursues the ailing K urtz in the ju n g le , h e realizes: d o n ’t you see, the terror o f the position was not in being knocked on the head— though I had a very lively sense o f that danger too— but in this, that I had to deal w ith a being to w hom I could n o t appeal in the nam e o f anything high o r low . . .T h e re was nothing either above o r below him , and I knew it. H e had kicked him self loose o f the earth. C onfound the man! he had kicked the very earth to pieces. H e was alone, and before him I did not know w hether I stood on the ground or floated in the air.” (1899, p. 67) B u t th e disso lu tio n o f h o riz o n s, the p ercep tu al, logical, an d m o ral loss o f bo u n d aries, eventually leads to the darkness o f d eath, th e R eal as the place o f death; M arlow tells us: 1 had turned to the wilderness really, n o t to Mr. Kurtz, w ho, I was ready to adm it, was as good as buried. And for a m om ent it seem ed to m e as if I also were buried in a vast grave full o f unspeakable secrets. I felt an intol­ erable w eight oppressing m y breast, the smell o f the dam p earth, the unseen presence o f victorious corruption, the darkness o f an impenetrable n i g h t .. .(1899, p. 63)

Walking into the Wild: The Negation of Boundaries C h ris M cC andless seem ed com pulsively d raw n to this fro n tier o f the R e al, draw n by its unboundedness. M o st o f us can probably acknow ledge fantasizing a b o u t n eg atin g som e bou n d aries; a re ce n t ad v ertisem en t ap pealed to such a desire. In a sepia p h o to g rap h , a m an was show n rid in g a h o rse in b each w ater,

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against a fading h o riz o n line b e tw ee n o c ea n an d sky, w ith th e w ords, “ T h e essence o f living w ith o u t boundaries: Safari for m en by R a lp h Lauren.” U nlike m ost o f us, how ever, C h ris seem ed in te n t o n actively erasing all b o undaries, all conventional categories and lim its.W hile h itch h ik in g in Alaska, his driver asked h im if he had a h u n tin g license, and C h ris said he did not: “W h y should the g o v e rn m e n t tell us w h a t w e can h u n t? F uck all those rules,” he re sp o n d ed (B row n, 1993, p. 42). O n a W -4 fo rm he w rote in capital letters: “ E X E M P T E X E M P T E X E M P T ” (1993, p. 38). H e began to use a different nam e, o n e he c rea te d :“ A lexander S upertram p.” W h e n asked if he had a com pass, he said:“ I d o n ’t w ant a com pass . . . 1 d o n ’t have to k n o w w h ere I am,” and w h e n asked a b o u t a m ap, he re sp o n d e d :“ I d o n ’t w ant to k n o w w h e re I’m g o in g ” (1993, P. 42). W h e n his driv er asked w hy h e w o u ld give away his w atch, he sta te d :“ I’m ju st g oing to th ro w it away. I d o n ’t w ant to k n o w w h a t day it is, o r w h a t tim e it is” (1993, p. 42). H e seem ed desperate to erase all c o n v en tio n al m arkers, all sem iotic indicators n o t o f his m aking, as if to reach som e non-arbitrary, ulti­ m ate lim it from w h e re h e m ig h t b e g in to be. S uch re p u d ia tio n o f sem iotic lim its stam ps B e ck e tt’s The Unnamable (1959): At the m ost obvious level the refusal o f the speaker in The Unnamable to enter into language as code, is very specifically linked to the assumption o f identity since w hat he finds intolerable is the confraternity im plied in adopting the shared language o f humanity. At a deeper level however . . . a m uch m ore radical refusal becom es evident. T h e factitious dem arcations by w hich language structures the universe are by turns derided and dissolved. (Cox, 1994, p. 88-89) W ith o u t th e b o n d b e tw e e n nam es and things, reference p o in ts dissolve, the subject b ecom es lost in “ the un th in k ab le unspeakable” (C ox, 1994, p. 89). Perhaps, in W in n ic o tt’s phrase, C h ris had an “ u rg e n t n e ed n o t to be fo u n d ” (1963, p. 185). B ro w n w rites: “ H e craved blank spots o n th e m ap, at a tim e w h e n his fa th e r was designing radar th a t co u ld p ro d u c e m aps from space— m aps th at co u ld practically show th e beaver in the p o n d . C h ris w an ted to take n atu re unfiltered , u n screen ed , alone, and he fo u n d a ch aracteristic so lu tio n to th e p ro b lem o f m aps w ith o u t blan k spots: h e threw ' th e m aps aw ay” (1993, p. 40). C h ris’s desperate a tte m p t to th ro w away all signs, to erase all m arkers, even to th e p o in t o f g e ttin g lost in th e R e al, m ay have b een a response to bein g o b jec tified , severely co n strain ed , n e g ated by th e signifiers o th e rs placed o n him . As W in n ic o tt p u t it: At the centre o f each person is an incom m unicado elem ent, and this is sacred and m ost w orthy o f preservation. (1963, p. 187)

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This preservation o f personal isolation is part o f the search for identity, and for the establishm ent o f a personal technique for com m unicating w hich does n o t lead to violation o f the central self. (1963, p. 190).

W e do n o t have m u ch inform ation, b u t we arc told that C h ris’s father said, “ I m isread h im ” (B row n, 1993, p. 39), and C h ris h im s e lf scratch ed o n to a plyw o o d -co v ered w in d o w o f his deathbed shelter: Two Years H e Walks T h e E arth. N o P hone, N o Pool, N o Pets, N o Cigarettes. U ltim ate Freedom . A n Extremist. An Aesthetic Voyager W hose H om e is The Road. Escaped from Atlanta. (1993, p.44) H e h ad g ra d u ated from college in A tlanta and last saw his parents th ere tw o years earlier. Since th e n h e had b e e n w andering; his favorite song was “ K ing o f th e R o a d .” D u rin g his final w eeks in Alaska he read T olstoy’s The Death o f Ivan Ilyich an d w ro te in th e m argins: “ C iv ilizatio n — Falsity— A B ig L ie” (1993, p. 45). H e had also scratched o n th e p ly w o o d in th e shelter: A nd N ow A fter Two R am b lin g Years C om es the Final and Greatest A dventure. T h e C lim actic Battle To Kill T h e False B eing W ithin A nd Victoriously C onclude the Spiritual R evolution! Ten Days and N ights o f Freight Trains and H itch in g B ring H im to the G reat W h ite N o rth N o Longer to Be Poisoned By Civilization H e Flees, and Walks Alone U p o n the Land To B ecom e Lost in the Wild. (1993, p. 44) T h e p o iso n o f civilization m ay have b e en , in e x tre m e fo rm , the constraints every adolescent m ust struggle against in o rd e r to find a way to b e m o re th an ju s t th e o bject o f so m eo n e else’s sem iotic co d e an d d e sire.W in n ico tt states: A t adolescence w hen the individual is undergoing pubertal changes and is not quite ready to becom e one o f the adult com m unity there is a strength­ ening o f the defences against being found, that is to say being found before being there to be found. T hat which is truly personal and w hich feels real m ust be defended at all cost, and even if this means a tem porary blindness to the value o f com prom ise. (1963, p. 190) T h e com pulsion to erase boundaries, w ith o u t com prom ise, had a tragic and ironic o u tco m e in C h ris’s case, for w ith o u t a m ap he could n o t find a way to cross th e T eklanika R iv er, n o w a sw ollen boundary, to reach help, a n d so he starved to death; o n A ugust 5, tw o weeks before he died, he w ro te in his jo u rn al: Day 100! M ade it! B ut in weakest condition o f life. D eath looms as serious threat, too weak to walk out, have literally becom e trapped in the wild— no game. (Brown, 1993, p. 46)

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T h e grandiose capital letters, w h ic h earlier called a tte n tio n to th e ir a u th o r, have h e re d ro p p e d o u t, in c o n fo rm ity to so m e a c k n o w le d g m e n t o f lim its, b o th sem io tic as w ell as physical. C h ris s “ life crisis” indicates th at th e issues o f b o u n d a rie s a n d id e n tity are, as E rik so n describes it, life an d d e ath m atters: O n the o th er hand, should a young person feel that the env iro n m en t tries to deprive him too radically o f all the form s o f expression w hich perm it him to develop and integrate the next step, he may resist w ith the w ild strength en co u n tere d in anim als w h o are suddenly forced to defend th eir lives. For, indeed, in th e social ju n g le o f hum an existence there is no feel­ ing o f being alive w ith o u t a sense o f identity. (1968, p. 130) W h a t E rik s o n p e rh ap s believ ed , b u t d id n o t state, is th a t d e v e lo p in g a sense o f id e n tity is a se m io tic process, in v o lv in g an e x ch a n g e o f signs, in m u tu a l re co g ­ n itio n w ith an o th e r, a c c o rd in g to a c o d e as a stable T h ird . B ecause sem iotic processes d efine relationships fro m b efo re b irth , they defin e id en tity as ro o te d in kinship a n d cu ltural fo rm s o f address in specific social settings. S e m io tic b re ak ­ d o w n results in loss o f id en tity , i f w e affirm , as th e a n th ro p o lo g is t M ilto n S in g e r states, “ th e c o n c e p tio n o f th e se lf as a se m io tic stru c tu re and process o f c o m m u n ic a tio n ” (1989, p. 233). W h e n th e social ju n g le o f ado le sc en c e b e c o m e s im passable, w h e n th e tra n ­ sitio n to m a n h o o d o r w o m a n h o o d has n o m ea n in g fu l p a th , th e n w h a t E rik so n called a “ psychosocial m o r a to riu m ” b e c o m e s u rg e n t: A M O R A T O R IU M is a p e rio d o f delay granted to som ebody w h o is n o t

ready to m ee t an o b lig a tio n o r forced o n so m e b o d y w h o sh o u ld give h im self tim e. B y psychosocial m o ra to riu m , th e n , w e m ean a delay o f adult c o m m itm e n ts, an d y et it is n o t on ly a delay. It is a p e rio d that is characterized by a selective perm issiveness on th e part o f society and o f provocative playfulness o n th e p art o f y o u th , an d yet it o ften leads to deep, if often transitory, c o m m itm e n t o n the p art o f y outh, and ends in a m o re o r less cerem o n ial c o n firm a tio n o f c o m m itm e n t o n th e p a rt o f society. (1968, p. 157)

In re fe rrin g to S haw ’s m o ra to riu m , E rik so n (1968) describes C h ris M cC andless: “ P o te n tia lly creativ e m e n like S h a w b u ild th e p e rso n a l fu n d a m e n t o f th e ir w o rk d u rin g a se lf-d ec ree d m o ra to riu m , d u rin g w h ic h th ey o fte n starve th e m ­ selves, socially, erotically, a n d , last b u t n o t least, n u tritio n ally , in o rd e r to let th e g rosser w eeds die o u t, a n d m ak e w ay fo r th e grow 'th o f th e ir in n e r g ard en . O fte n w h e n th e w eed s are dead , so is th e g a rd e n ” (1968, p. 4 1 -4 2 ). F o r C h ris th e process o f sem iosis, th e g r o u n d a n d m a trix o f significance, h a d b e c o m e paralyzed, fixated, rig id ified . In o rd e r to survive at all as a h u m a n subject, C h ris

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com pulsively sou g h t to negate all im posed m ean in g and erase all conventional distinctions, the gross weeds c h o k in g his life; he desperately declared him self to b e e x em p t from all c o n v en tio n al lim its, and placed h im s e lf b e y o n d h u m a n contact. H e represents an ex trem e type, unclaim able and u naccountable, as if ex em p t from c o n te x t and constraint.

Dissolution at the Edge of the Real T h e psychological effects o f such a com pulsion tow ard th e R e al are portrayed by Paul Bow les in The Sheltering Sky, in his character P o rt, a tro u b led you n g com poser, in w h o m w e find an obsession w ith g o in g to th e edge to test th e lim its o f W estern ways o f a n ch o rin g reality. T h e novel is m ark ed by a m o u n t­ in g dread o f w h a t lies bey o n d th e edge. F or exam ple, P o rt an d his w ife, K it, sit o n a cliff gazing at th e vast N o r th A frican desert below : “You know,” said Port, and his voice sounded unreal, as voices are likely to do after a long pause in an utterly silent spot, “the sky here’s very strange. I often have the sensation w hen I look at it that it’s a solid thing up there, protecting us from w hat’s behind . . . ” “ From w hat’s behind?” “Yes.” “B ut w hat is behind? . . . ” “ N othing, I suppose.Just darkness. Absolute night.” (1949, pp. 100-101). W h e n th e sky is e x p erien c e d as a protective c overing against th e u n differenti­ ated R e al, th e vision o f w h a t m ay lie “b e h in d ” o pens u p o n the vision o f death a n d o f those silent in fin ite spaces th at so te rrifie d Pascal (1670). As P o rt becom es deathly ill, h e begins to e x p erien c e th e b reak d o w n o f his sym bolic system and struggles to m aintain an im agistic h o ld o n the c o n se q u en t d estru c­ tu rin g o f reality': H e did not look up because he knew how senseless the landscape w ould appear. It takes energy to invest life w ith m eaning, and at present this energy was lacking. H e knew how things could stand bare, their essence having retreated on all sides to beyond the horizon, as if im pelled by a sinister centrifugal force. (1949, p. 165) Later, near death, as sem iosis shuts do w n , his m in d struggles to avoid collapsing in to a dedifferentiated mass: H e opened his eyes.The room was m alignant. It was em pty.“ Now, at last, I m ust fight against this room .” B ut later he had a m om ent o f vertiginous clarity. H e was at the edge o f a realm w here each thought, each image, had an arbitrary existence, w here the connection betw een each thing and the

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nex t had been cut. As he labored to seize the essence o f that kind o f consciousness, he began to slip back into its precinct w ith o u t suspecting that he was no longer w holly outside in the open, no longer able to consider the idea at a distance. It seemed to him that here was an untried variety o f thinking, in w hich there was no necessity for a relationship with life. (1949, p. 236) P o r t’s th in k in g has d isin te g ra te d , w ith o u t m ed ia tio n , w ith o u t relationship, alm ost w ith o u t structure: “T h e tho u g h t in itself,” he said . . .T h ey w ere com ing again, they began to flash by. H e trie d to hold one, believed he had it. “ B ut a thou g h t o f what? W hat is it?” Even then it was pushed o u t o f the way by the others crow ding b e hind it. W hile he succom bed, struggling, he o pened his eyes for help. “T h e room ! T h e room ! Still here!!” . . . H e looked at the line m ade by the jo in in g o f the wall and the floor, endeavored to fix it in his m ind, [that he m ight have som ething to hang on to w hen his eyes should shut.] T h ere was a terrible disparity betw een the speed at w hich he was m oving and the q uiet im m obility o f that line, but he insisted. So as not to go. To stay behind. To overflow, take root in w hat w ould stay here. A centipede can, cut into pieces. Each part can wralk by itself. Still m ore, each leg flexes, lying alone on the floor. T here was scream ing in each ear . . . (pp. 2 3 6 -3 7 ).

It is P o rt w h o is scream ing in th e h o rro r o f disintegration, and w e are led to w o n d e r w h a t the d y in g h o u rs o f C h ris M cC andless w ere like.

Falling into the Wild: Fear of Breakdown T hese w alkers in to th e w ild seem co m p elled to erase b o u n d a rie s in o rd e r to achieve, if th ey can survive, a sem iotic re c o n stru c tio n th ro u g h som e so rt o f c o n ta ct w ith th e R e a l.T h e y seem to be, in W in n ic o tt’s term s, in “ the stage o f I am w ith th e in h ere n t im plication I repudiate everything that is not me” (1974, p. 107). O n ly by g o in g to th e edge, to th e lim it, can th ey b e sure th at th e re p u ­ diatio n is com plete. I th in k w e can distinguish th e m from those w h o are te rri­ fied o f losing th e ir b o u n d a rie s, always o n th e verge o f falling in to th e w ild, in to th e R e a l, in to a regressive d e d iffe re n tia tio n an d m erg er, o r w h a t W in n ic o tt called “ a b reak d o w n o f th e establishm ent o f th e u n it se lf” (1974, p. 103)— a state o f frag m en tatio n th at b e co m es possible o nly after th e ego has been constellated. O g d e n refers to this state as th e “ a u tistic-c o n tig u o u s posi­ tio n ” w h ic h “ involves th e e x p erien c e o f im p e n d in g d isin te g ra tio n o f o n e ’s sensory surface . . . resulting in th e feeling o f leaking, dissolving, disappearing, o r falling in to shapeless u n b o u n d e d space” (1989, p. 133). W h a t is at stake in regression, therefore, is n o t a re tu rn to infancy (W eston, 1990), b u t ra th e r a loss o f structure developed in infancy, th e stru c tu re o f T hirdness, o f m ed iated

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relationships b e tw e e n persons and things. T h e b o d y as sign fragm ents in to a scram bled message and th ere is a collapse o f sym bolic perspectives, a verg in g o n th e R eal. Patients w hose daily efforts go tow ard m aintaining a b a rrie r b etw ee n th e m ­ selves and the R e al have often suffered severe trau m a.T h e post-traum atic devel­ o p m e n t m ay lack th e usual sem io tic m arkers th a t m ake possible stable and predictable relations, a ravaged state akin to w hat B ion called the d estruction o f alpha-elem ents, elem ents that are “ indispensable to the e x p erien c e that enables th e individual to k n o w so m e th in g ” (1992, p. 183), w hose d e stru ctio n leads to “starvation o f th e psyche in its supply o f reality” (1992, p. 96) because e x p eri­ e n ce rem ains un d ig ested . B io n w rites: “ B u t w e m ust n o w c o n sid er a n o th e r c onsequence o f the d estru ctio n o f alpha. Since its d e stru ctio n m akes it im pos­ sible to store ex p erien ce, re taining o nly undigested ‘facts,’ the patien t feels he c ontains n o t visual im ages o f things b u t things them selves” (1992, p. 97). In such a state the p a tie n t is “ unable to transform the e x p erien c e so th at he can store it mentally,” it rem ains u nm ediated, devoid o f relationships. H e continues: “ th e e x p erien c e (and his sense im pressions o f it) rem ains a foreign body; it is felt as a “ th in g ” lacking any o f th e quality w e usually attrib u te to th o u g h t o r its verbal expression (1992, p. 180). I th in k B ion is here describing w hat it is like to be in co n tact w ith L acan’s register o f th e R e a l w h ic h , alth o u g h w e g ro p e for w ords and co n ce p ts to place it at an epistem o lo g ical fro n tier, m u st re m a in nam eless. B ion states: “ 1 co u ld try to p u t it this way: the fundam ental reality is “ infinity,” the u n k n o w n , the situation for w h ic h there is n o language— n o t even th at b o rro w e d from th e artist o r th e religious— w h ic h gets anyw here n e ar to d escribing it” (1992, p. 372). M ost o f us are spared th e task o f avoiding o r d escribing “it,” b u t n o w and th e n w e brush against th e precariousness o f existence w ith sud d en terror, as W illiam Jam es described: W hile in this state o f philosophic pessimism and general depression o f spirits about m y prospects, I w ent one evening into a dressing-room in the twilight, to procure some article that was there; w hen suddenly there fell upon m e w ith o u t any w arning, ju st as if it came o u t o f the darkness, a horrible fear o f my ow n existence . . . It was like a revelation; and although the im m ediate feelings passed away, the experience has m ade m e sympa­ thetic w ith the m orbid feelings o f others ever since . . . I dreaded to be left alone. I rem em ber w o n d erin g how o th e r people could live, how I m yself had ever lived, so unconscious o f that pit o f insecurity beneath the surface o f life, (quoted in Erikson, 1968, p. 152) T h e pro tectiv e b a rrie r that p revented Jam es from falling in to th at pit, th at m arked its edge as a fence, was scripture, the re petition o f specific signifiers:

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1 have always th o u g h t that this e x p erien ce o f m elancholia o f m ine had a religious b earin g . . . 1 m ean th at th e fear was so invasive and pow erful, th at, if 1 had n o t clu n g to sc rip tu re-tex ts like “ T h e e tern al G o d is my refuge, etc. C o m e u n to m e all ye th at labor and are heavy-laden, etc., I am th e R e su rre c tio n and the Life, etc.” I th in k I should have g row n really insane, (q u o ted in E rikson, 1968, pp. 152-53)

Cutting as Marking Boundaries W h e n signifiers fail, w h e n the threat o f dissolution into the R e al becom es overw helm ing, patients struggle desperately to place a stable boundary-m arker at the edge o f the self and they often begin w ith their ow n skin, by m arking or cutting into it. W hile we can agree that all cutting is a form o f com m unication (Anzieu, 1985; Bick, 1967), I try to attend to the specific sem iotic im p o rt o f m utilating the skin. In attem pting to establish the self’s boundaries w ith reliable markers, patients w h o cut often trace figures, even letters, that are based on a system o f signs. O fte n the m ea n in g is obvious. F or exam ple, a y o u n g schizophrenic w om an frequently yielded to the com m ands o f a u d ito ry hallucinations to insert and clip safety' pins th ro u g h the skin o f h e r arm s, leaving th em over several days to b ecom e infected. She attem p ted to stop these com m ands by w ritin g “ em pleh ” o n her w'rist, read as “ help m e ” as though w 'ritten from the inside on her skin as a transparent m em brane. A nother patient, w ith a history o f m asochistic perversion and prone to psychotic agitation, scratched in to her w rist, in an act she labelled as “ recreational cutting,” th e gang nam e o f a biker boyfriend, oriented so that the nam e faced the view er as i f it were a tag claim ­ ing ow nership o f her body and its pleasures, an identity tag for h e r self as the object o f som eone else’s desire. Patients w h o engage in superficial o r m o d erate repetitive c u ttin g re p o rt “relief from a variety o f unpleasant sym ptom s such as h eightened anxiety and tension, intense anger and rage, racing thoughts, depersonalization, depression, and feelings o f loneliness” ; the subsequent scars “ im part a sense o f security and uniqueness that is difficult to give u p ” (Favazza and R osenthal, 1993, p. 137). Such a self-inflicted scar functions as an index;

Peirce com m ents,

“ A nything w h ic h startles us is an index, in so far as it m arks th e ju n c tio n b etw een tw o p o rtions o f exp erien ce” (1940, pp. 108-109). T h e scar as index functions as a T hird, a sign o f a boundary, providing a b o u n d e d experience o f self by m ediating inside and outside. As D avoine (1989) rem inds us, people are never m ore aware o f the exact location o f national boundaries than w hen an invading arm y crosses them . Patients w h o cut are attem pting to set a m arker at the edge o f the self so that they can experience a lim it and n o t becom e frag­ m ented in a diffuse unnam able scatter. C utting is often viewed as a regulatory action, but w hat does cutting regulate?

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C u ttin g soothes, I th in k , n o t because it provides a release b u t because it prevents one. T h at is, the im perative and transgressive m arking o f the skin signifies that there is a bo u n d ary betw een the subject and the R eal, it prevents m erg in g in to a dedifferentiated existence. Such m erger w ould b rin g n o t only dissolution o f the self b u t also o f the w orld o f experience, as Fast states: Every boundary loss, then, is a dedifferentiation o f self and nonself, and a loss in self structure and in the individual’s subjective structure o f the world. N o boundary loss can occur w ithout loss in the other. In the massive dedifferentiations o f psychotic breakdown, the individual’s experience is o f u tte r disintegration o f self and total dissolution o f the w orld around. (1985, p. 63) Fast stresses that “ in self-other dedifferentiation b o th self and the n onself w orld are u n a rticu la te d ” (1985, p. 64), th a t is, radically bereft o f th e g u id in g discrim ­ inations p rovided by e ith e r w ords o r im ages. A recen t study o f inp atien t selfin ju ries fo u n d that m o re than tw ice as m any o c cu r o n th e evening shift as o n th e day shift, c o n g ru e n t “ w ith patien ts’ reports th at episodes o f derealization, despair, o r general ten sio n increase d u rin g th e ev en in g h o u rs an d th at the patien ts feel c o m p e lle d to h u rt them selves to provide som e k in d o f re lie f” (H em kendreis, 1992, p. 394). I w o u ld suggest, again, th a t th e re lie f is in th e fo rm o f th e m ark in g o f a b o u n d a ry in o rd e r to m anage th e dread o f dediffer­ e n tia tio n before sleep. In such m o m e n ts o bject relations also have a b o u n d a ry d e fin in g fu n c tio n : it is especially at n ig h t th a t o th e rs are so u g h t to pro v id e reassuring feedback that b o u n d aries endure, that the self’s c o hesion is stable, th at th e regression o f sleep is tem porary.

Two Modes of Semiotic Breakdown I w o u ld n o w like to suggest th at these tw o desperate actions taken at the edge o f th e R e al, e ith e r by erasing b o u n d aries o r by m ark in g b o u n d a rie s o n the skin, are th e result o f tw o different kinds o f sem iotic b re ak d o w n . Peirce, a c o n te m p o ra ry o f W illiam Jam es, defined the self as a living sign fo r others and unconsciously responsive to the evocativeness o f o th ers as signs (C olapietro, 1989). As m ay have b een the case w ith C h ris M cC andless, w hose father said “ I m isread him ,” w 'hen signs so o verdeterm ine a h u m a n being, rigidly assigning an objectified status and congealing a m eaning for others, the only path to a possi­ ble survival as a subject m ay lie in a com pulsion to erase bo u n d aries, to tea r o ff a suffocating se m io tic skin. S uch individuals o ften c a rry th e b u rd e n o f a p a ren t’s o r g ran d p aren t’s traum a, a co n tact w ith th e R e al that was co n tain ed by displacing it thro u g h som e signifying chain o n to th e patient. For exam ple, w h e n a ch ild is n a m e d after a deceased g ra n d p are n t o r sibling an d th at d eath was problem atic, as in th e case o f a disappearance o r a v io le n t accident, m urder, o r

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suicide (Davoine, 1992), the one bearing the nam e of, o r a nam ed likeness to, the deceased, inevitably produces in the family the resonances, significances, and echoes o f m eaning that the original m em ber produced in life and in death. T h e w eight o f such signifying baggage, o f an unconscious script, can be suffocating, leading to sem iotic breakdow n because the individual is blocked from producing in action his or her ow n signs and thereby creating in others his or h e r ow n significance. Such an identity crisis may th en lead one to defy all conventional limits, to strip away the displaced signifiers in order to bum p up against the R eal so that the original traum a can be nam ed, o r to find an ulti­ m ate lim it that can h old from w here the subject, surviving this e n co u n ter w'ith the unim aginable and unnam able, can th en proceed, w ith a som ew hat fresh sem iotic slate, to collaborate in the acknow ledgm ent and definition o f limits. For such a patient, how ever, the grandiosity, entitlem ent, and c o n tem p t for the rest o f us w h o do not go this far may m ake hum an relationships alm ost im pos­ sible and leave the individual w ith a deep sense o f b eing culturally displaced. In the case o f those w'ho m ark th eir skin to prevent dissolution, the parental traum a has often been directly repeated on th em in the form o f a cycle o f family violence. R a th e r than being nam ed as the container o f the traum a, they suffer the traum a on th eir skin at the hands o f those w h o should m ost protect th em . T h e in h ere n t c o n tra d ic tio n betw een parental p ro tec tio n and parental abuse perverts the sym bolic dim ension o f th eir experience. Sem iotic break­ dow n occurs n o t because signs have becom e too rigid but rather too confusing and unstable, signs have no consensual validation. W h en parental desire becom es o m n ip o te n t whimsy, w hen th rough parental madness, hypocrisy, o r perversion w ords have lost th eir pow er to bind, there is radical failure in the b oundarysetting function o f language. F or such patients the code rem ains m ysterious, a nything can m ean anything. Sounds and smells produce unpredictable and disturbing resonances, leading to a basic chaos in com m unication and an o n g o ­ ing apprehension ab o u t w hat m eaning others find in o n e ’s speech and actions. In exam ining these tw o extrem e m aneuvers at the edge o f the R eal, to radi­ cally erase o r push beyond a boundary o r to m ark one, I began to see them as exaggerations o f tw o interactive tendencies present in all o f us and operative in a parallel series o f dual processes. O n e thinks o f B alint’s philobat and ocnophil (1959), H e rm a n n ’s drive to go in search and drive to cling (1936), B akan’s agency and c o m m u n io n (1966), B latt’s introjective and anaclitic personalities (1990), and even the tw o sem iotic axes o f R o m an Jakobson (1956), substitution and contiguity. B ut I rem ained uneasy about this way o f b rin g in g this chapter to a close, p utting a b o undary around it by invoking a series o f parallel conceptions, my ow n efforts to tam e the R eal. As Peirce m ight say, there w ere unw elcom e feel­ ing interprétants from this narrative that I found disturbing. I went back to C hris’s

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last w eeks and his m arginal notes to The Death o f Ivan Ilyich: “ C ivilization— Falsity— A Big Lie.” T olstoy’s pow erful w o rk presents the illness and d eath o f a successful 4 5 y e ar-o ld m agistrate w h o had always a cted to please those w ith m o n e y and p o w e r in o rd e r to gain prestige and co m fo rt. T h e story begins w ith his d eath notice, in response to w h ic h each o f his associates thinks, “ W ell, h e ’s dead b u t I ’m alive!” T h is c o m m o n reaction is so m e th in g like W o o d y A llen ’s: “ It’s n o t th a t I ’m afraid to die, I ju s t d o n ’t w a n t to be th ere w h e n it happens.” B u t T olstoy’s story does m ake it h ap p en as he presents Ivan Ilyich’s h o rrib ly painful act o f dying, an d w e see th e m ajo r social in stitutions o f that tim e, ed u catio n , law, m edicine, m arriage, family, religion, exposed for th eir rig id c o n fo rm ity to social pressure, in to le ran c e o f individuality, disavowal o f death, an d a false and fragile sense o f m eaning. Tolstoy brings h o m e th e unexpectedness o f physical illness: T hey were all in good health. It could not be called ill health if Ivan Ilyich som etim es said that he had a queer taste in his m o u th and felt som e discom fort in his left side. (1886, p. 120) As his m edical sym ptom s increase, how'ever, he is aghast: T here was no deceiving himself: som ething terrible, new, and m ore im por­ tant than anything before in his life, was taking place w ithin him o f w hich he alone was aware. T hose about him did n o t understand o r w ould not understand it, b u t thought everything in the world was going on as usual. (1886,p. 125) H e trie d to go back to w o rk in o rd e r to distract h im self from the edge: B u t suddenly in the m idst o f those proceedings the pain in his side . . . w ould begin its ow n gnaw ing w ork___ It w ould com e and stand before him and look at him , and he w ould be petrified and the light w ould die o u t o f his eyes, and he w ould again begin asking him self w hether It alone was tr u e .. . . A nd w hat was w orst o f all was that It drew his attention to itself n o t in order to make him take some action but only that he should look at It, look it straight in the face: look at it and w ithout doing anything, suffer inexpressibly. (1886, p. 133) In consequence, h e begins to assess his life: It occurred to him that w hat had appeared perfectly impossible before, namely that he had not spent his life as he should have done, m ight after all be true. It occurred to him that his scarcely perceptible attem pts to struggle against w hat was considered good by the m ost highly placed people, those

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scarcely noticeable impulses w hich he had imm ediately suppressed, m ight have been the real thing, and all the rest false. (1886, p. 152) So this story that o ccu p ied C h ris M cC andless’s final w eeks is a story that m akes o n e th in k a b o u t death, n o t in the abstract, b u t o n e ’s o w n death, o n e ’s ow n precarious existence, and o n e ’s o w n desire, h o w o n e should live. D e ath is the u ltim ate b o u n d a ry and lim it, o f o n e ’s body, o f o n e ’s culture. It tests any c u ltu re s ability to establish standards, to provide m eaning, to sustain life.W hen it w orks, culture gives us a shared security, a c o m m o n purpose, and a fram ew ork for forgiveness, based o n a process o f m u tu al reco g n itio n , inclu d in g the recog­ n itio n o f o u r m ortality. B u t Tolstoy’s w ords and C h ris’s ab erran t behavior show us th at, from th e perspective o f o u r o w n d eath, m any o f th e things w e d o and invest in and w o rry a b o u t seem wasteful, vain, m isdirected.T hey may even seem ridiculous. It does n o t seem ridiculous, how ever, to a tte m p t to answ er a y o u n g p e rso n ’s questions a b o u t the m ean in g o f life, a b o u t the real bo u n d ary o f death. It m ay be im possible, b u t n o t ridiculous. W e co u ld d o w orse than to say w ith R ilke: W e’re n o t at one. W e’ve no instinctive knowledge like m igratory birds. O utstripped and late, we force ourselves on winds and find no w elcom e from ponds w here we alight. We com prehend flowering and fading simultaneously. And som ewhere lions still roam , all unaware while yet their splendor lasts o f any weakness. (q u o te d in A u d en and K ro n en b erg er, 1962, pp. 3 -4 )

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Language, Psychosis, and Culture

D u rin g a flagrant psy ch o tic episode, a p a tie n t d e sc rib e d his auditory, verbal hallucinations as “ an in te rn al tape reco rd e r th a t goes o n an d off,” frig h ten in g , and n o t in his con tro l. I w a n t to com pare this exam ple to statem ents m ade by a French C anadian w ith w h o m I shared an afte rn o o n fishing in N o r th e rn Lake H u ro n . R a y was in his forties, m a rrie d , w ith tw o g ro w n c hildren, and ran a small restaurant in O n ta rio . H e spoke o f h o w he and his w ife to o k p art in a weekly, ch u rch -sp o n so red B ible reading g ro u p and o f h o w m u ch th e charis­ m atic m o v em en t had c hanged th eir lives, in q u ite co n cre te ways. F or exam ple, w h e n he was con sid erin g g o in g in to the restaurant business, after selling a small lu m b e r m ill, he d e b ated w h e th e r h e should b uy a d o w n to w n restaurant and take o n a large d eb t, o r w h e th e r he sho u ld purchase a small d in e r in a su b u r­ ban m all. O n e day w hile h e was sto p p ed for a red light, th e S pirit to ld him : “ D o n ’t go in to d e b t!” H e pro m p tly b o u g h t th e small diner. H e gave additional exam ples o f h o w the Spirit, he said, com m unicates w ith him . T his m an did n o t seem to be psychotic and, based o n th e evidence o f o n e fine breakfast, at least, he seem ed to k n o w his w ork. Is th ere a difference b e tw e e n these tw o linguistic m om ents? I w 'ould like to suggest that th ey are very different, th a t w ords u tte re d by th e “ in te rn al tape reco rd er” exem plify th e status o f w ords th at have passed in to w h a t Lacan calls the R e al, w hile th e w ords u tte re d to R a y by “ th e S p irit” m ay represent the process w h ereb y w'hat is ju s t at th e b o rd e r o f th e R e al passes in to w ords. B ut to go fu rth e r wre can step back for a m o m e n t an d try to fin d som e additional

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ways o f talking a b o u t the R eal and w h a t Lacan seem s to m ean by it, as well as w h a t h e m eans by th e “ im ag in ary ” and the “sym bolic” registers o f experience. I ’d like to beg in by sharing som e excerpts from a m arvelous b o o k called China M en by M axine H o n g K ingston. T h e N e w York Times b o o k review er, Jo h n L eonard, w ro te in 1980: “ Fiction, m em o ir, dream , epic, o r elegy— w hatever M axine H o n g K ingston is w ritin g , it is certainly art. F our years ago in the sam e space I said: The Woman Warrior [her first book] was th e best b o o k I’ve read in years. China M en is, at the least, the best b o o k I ’ve read in the fo u r years since.” China Men (a C h in e se -A m e ric a n ’s a cco u n t o f the m igration o f h e r ancestors to the U.S., w here they helped build th e railroads, am o n g o th e r things) is for m e the best c o n cre te in tro d u c tio n to Lacan in E nglish, precisely because o f th e a u th o r’s ability' to m ove sm oothly a m o n g th e th ree dim ensions o r registers o f th e im aginary, the R e al, and the sym bolic— “ these th ree registers w hich,” Lacan tells us, “ are in d ee d the essen­ tial registers o f h u m a n reality” (1953a, p. 2). T h e im aginary, as w e have seen, is defin ed by th e im age, w h e re the im age is taken to function in a stru ctu re g o verned by p o in t-to -p o in t correspondences, as w h e n an o bject is placed before a m irro r o r w h e n an im age is p ro jected on a screen (Lacan, 1964, p. 86). W h e n K ingston exposes th e im aginary, she m akes n o te o f m irrors, m ovies, reflections, racial stereotypes, and narcissistic preening, this last high lig h ted in im ages o f flying. T hese cues d e n o te th e arena o f visual captivation by a lure th a t is often erotic. Fantastic scope is given to desire, fero­ cious im ages o f b o d ily fragm entation shape hatred. T h e a lluring p o w er o f the im age has its o rig in , fo r Lacan, in th e m irro r stage o f child d e v elo p m en t. S om etim e d u rin g the p e rio d from six to eighteen m onths (or even earlier, as wre saw in C h a p te r 3), th e h u m an infant, still neurologically inco m p lete, b ecom es capable o f recognizing its reflection in a m irror, identifies itself w ith th e ex te ­ rior, erect, w h o le fo rm o f th e h u m an body, becom es narcissistically invested in this visible, ex tern al fo rm and thereby alienated from itself, and this id en ti­ fication w ith its reflected im age constitutes the ego. H e n ce fo rth the ego will be c o n c e rn e d n o t w ith o b jectivity and adaptation to “ reality,” as ego psychologists have p roposed, b u t ra th e r w ith dem ands for re co g n itio n and w ith defensive m aneuvers to p ro tec t self-esteem . Im ages o f o n e se lf and o f o th ers d o m in a te this register, im ages that distort, that prom ise an illusory happiness, that c a m o u ­ flage basic h u m a n longing. A n exam ple from China Me«: W ith som e e arn e d m oney, the father buys an expensive suit: “ In th e th ree-w ay m irror, he looked like Fred Astaire. H e w ore th e suit o u t o f the sto re ” (1980, p. 61). H e and his frien d “ strolled d o w n Fifth A venue and caught sight o f them selves in w indow s and hubcaps” (1980, p. 61). T h ere follow’, in th e subsequent four pages, references to posing, to photographs (nine tim es), tw'o m o re references to m ovies, and a n o th e r reference to m irrors.

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A t the e n d o f this episode, th e three o th e r partners cheat th e father o u t o f his share in th e laundry business and th e “ perfectly legal” theft sends the a u th o r’s disillusioned parents to search for a n e w life in C alifornia. K ingston also structures the im aginary register by using cross-racial iconic sym m etries th at u n d e rc u t racial stereotypes. For exam ple, the fa th e r’s difficul­ ties in C h in a in te a c h in g C h in ese c h ild ren “ w h o w ere m o re bestial th an anim als” (1980, p. 35) are m irro re d later in the b o o k by the teacher b ro th e r’s “ surprise at h o w d u m b the students w e re ” in his class in A m erica (1980, p. 277). T h ere are at least eight such sym m etrical, c o rre sp o n d in g episodes involv­ ing b irth , death, m ig ra tio n , an d lo n g in g , and K ingston seem s to b e telling us th at stereotypes o n b o th sides are in a m irro r-relatio n sh ip , that they are reflec­ tions from the sam e source; this source, in a Lacanian fram ew ork, is th e im ag­ in ary order, th e register o f narcissistic im ages th at lure an d captivate o u r gaze and shape w hat w e call reality. In d istinction from “ reality,” the register o f th e R e al has n o t b e en easy to c o m p re h en d in th e w o rk o f Lacanians, w h o variously refer to it as “ always in th e sam e place” an d “ already th e re ” (Falade, 1974, p. 33), as th at “ w h ic h lacks n o th in g ” (1974, p. 30), b ru te, undifferentiated e x p erien c e th at invades us from tim e to tim e b u t to w h ic h w e usually have a relationship m ed iated by language. Such m ed ia tio n transform s o u r c o n ta ct w ith th e R e a l in to reality, so m eth in g very different from the R e al, for reality is “ a m o n ta g e o f th e sym bolic an d the im ag in ary ” (1974, p. 36). W h e n th ere is “loss o f reality,” as in psychosis, th en c o n tact w ith the real can be h o rrify in g and m addening. T h e R e al, th en , m ust be so m eh o w filtered o r shielded from experience. T h e re is a k in d o f “ struggle against th e R e a l” (M .-L . L auth, 1982, p. 62). T h e re is a te a rin g -o u t o r “ u p ro o t­ in g from th e R e al by th e sym bolic” (1982, p. 61), th e R e a l m ust be “ m ade to draw b a c k ” (1982, p. 63). T h is “ struggle against th e R e a l” is precisely w hat K ingston provides a m e ta p h o r o f in th e lab o r o f th e C h in a m e n c u ttin g away ju n g le to establish sugar cane o n H aw aii. A nd th e R e a l is even m ore forbidding as th e C h in a m e n c u t th ro u g h m o u n tain s build in g a railroad: Beneath the soil, they hit granite. Ah G oong struck it w ith his pickax, and it jarred his bones, shattered his teeth. H e sw ung his sledgeham m er against it, and the im pact rang in the dom e o f his skull. T h e m ountain that was millions o f years old was locked against them and was not to be broken in to .. . . H e hit at the same spot over and over again, the same rock. Som e chips and flakes broke off. T h e granite looked everyw here the same. It had no softer o r w eaker spots anywhere, the same hard g ra y .. . . T h e rock is w hat is real, he thought. This rock is w hat real is, no t clouds or mist, w hich m ake m ysterious promises, and w hen you go through them are nothing. W hen the forem an measured at the end o f tw enty-four hours o f pou n d ­ ing, the rock had given a foot. (1980, p. 132)

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W e to u c h the R e al in the v io le n t deaths o f th e m en blow n u p by explosives, m en falling thousands o f feet. T h e u n b u rie d corpse was an unbearable in tru ­ sion o f the R eal: “ A fter a fall, the buzzards circled the spot and re m in d ed the w o rk ers for days th at a m an was dead d o w n there. T h e m en th re w piles o f rocks and branches to cover bodies from sight” (1980, p. 130). T h e h o rro r o f u n b u rie d corpses— corpses d e n ie d a place in the sym bolic order— h a u n te d th e living as they began to learn to use dynam ite: T h e m en w ho died slowly enough to say last words said, “D o n ’t leave m e frozen under the snow. Send my body hom e. B urn it and put the ashes in a tin c a n .. . . ” “Shut up,” scolded the hearty m en. “ We d o n ’t w ant to hear a bout bone jars and dying.” “You’re lucky to have a body to bury, n o t blow n to sm ithereens.. . . ” “ Aiya. To be buried here, nowhere.” “B ut this is som ew here,” Ah G o o n g prom ised. “ T his is the G old M ountain. W e’re m arking the land now. T h e track sections are num bered, and your family will know w here we leave you.” B ut he was a crazy m an, and they d idn’t listen to him . (1980, p. 136)

B u t this “ crazy m a n ” clearly realized th at th e o nly w ay to overcom e the R e a l is by m ark in g it, c u ttin g in to its mass w ith signifier, tran sfo rm in g its undiffer­ entiated fullness th ro u g h a k in d o f negation so that divisions appear and m ed i­ ated relationships b e co m e possible. Frontiers can th e n b e established m ak in g repression possible, graves can and m ust have m arkers so th at the dead can be fo rg o tte n and n o t h a u n t th e living. A n d th e railroad was a b u d d in g sym bolic n e tw o rk m ak in g such m arkings possible. W h e n th e K ingston sto ry b o o k character L o B u n S un shipw recks against an u n k n o w n shore he m anages to retrieve m any useful item s over several days, how ever: “ O n e m o rn in g , h e aw oke and th e ship was gone. N o m an -m ad e hulk served as a m ark er against all that sea” (1980, p. 226). Totally alone, h e im m e ­ diately orders his life by p u ttin g m arks o n th e R eal: he m arks th e days w'ith n o tch es o n a board, h e w rites in his diary, he fires clay pots and decorates them , h e teaches a p a rro t to say his nam e, “so that h e w o u ld h ear a voice o th e r than his o w n , a voice calling h im by n a m e ” (1980, p. 229). T h is socialization o f the R e al so that it becom es reality' is, Lacan tells us, the effect o f the signifier, m ark ­ in g th e R eal, the effect o f the sym bolic order. T h e sym bolic register is the n e tw o rk o f language and ritual. T h e decisive feature o f this register, o r o rd e r o f sym bols, is that it consists o f a relatively closed system o f reciprocally differentiated units, each o f w h ic h has n o m ea n ­ in g in itself but is differentiable solely w ith reference to all the o th e r units in the system. T his system is language, structurally understood as a system o f phonem es o r signifiers related by c o n v en tio n to w hat they signify b u t only in th e c o n te x t o f th e ensem ble. U n lik e th e im a g in ary register, th e re are n o o n e - to - o n e

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correspondences in the sym bolic order. T h e sym bolic order, w ith its polyphonic and polysem ic structure, is the source o f m eaning; it roots, it sustains subjects, it even contains ghosts. K ingston introduces the register o f the sym bolic by call­ ing a tte n tio n to w ords, syllables, phonem es, nam es, and a variety o f speech acts such as cursing, blessing, chanting, singing, scream ing, as well as speaking, w rit­ ing, and the force o f silence. In K ingston’s text m ore than o n e o u t o f tw o pages deals explicitly w ith these signifying elem ents, and they o c cu r in clusters, m ore frequent serially w h e n the register o f th e sym bolic is in play, absent w h e n the im aginary takes over. Even the b o o k ’s title— China Men— is used in the text to em phasize the sym bolic n e tw ork o f culture, as distinct from w h a t K ingston calls “ th e slu rre d -to g e th e r w o rd ” c h in a m en , reflecting the stereotypic im age the w hites have for the C hinese. It is th e act o f speech th at affords us a b a rrie r against th e R e al an d sustains us, and K ingston provides num erous exam ples o f this. W h ile crossing the ocean w ith a stowaway in a crate, the sm uggler periodically com es and knocks “ a code o n th e w o o d , and the stowaway fath er signalled back. T h is exchange o f g re et­ ings kept him from falling in to the trance th at overtakes anim als a b o u t to d ie ” (1980, p. 49). F o rb id d e n to speak w h ile c le arin g H aw aii fo r sugar cane, th e g reat-g ran d fath er c o u g h ed o u t his cursing syllables in th e dust: “ H e felt b e tte r after having his say. H e did n o t even m in d th e despair w h ic h dispelled u p o n speaking it. T h e suicides w h o w alked in to th e ocean o r ju m p e d o ff the m o u n ­ tains w ere n o t his kin d red ” (1980, p. 102). Later, an o th e r grandfather enables the a u th o r to n am e an aspect o f the R e al in an exam ple that show s h o w th e three registers articulate: Say G oong took m y hand and led m e into a cavernous shed black from the sun in my eyes. H e pointed into the dark, w hich dark seemed solid and alive, heavy, moving, breathing. T here were waves o f dark skin over a hot and massive som ething that was snorting and stom ping— the living night. In the day, here was w here night lived. Say G o ong pointed up at a wide brown eye as high as the roof. I was ready to be terrified but for his delight. “ Horse,” he said. “Horse.” He contained the thing in a w ord— horse, m agi­ cal and earthly sound. A horse was a black creature so imm ense I could not see the outlines. (1980, p. 165)

T his is a g o o d exam ple o f h o w th e R e al, initially undifferentiated as th e living night, opens up in a look, a seeing and bein g seen that is com pelling and fright­ en in g w h e n th e ch ild ’s eye m eets the h o rse ’s lo o k , unleashing the captivating p o w er o f th e im age, and th e n th e e x p erien c e is k n o tte d to g eth e r and given a boundary, a frontier, o n c e it is c o n ta in ed in the w o rd horse, so th at a m ediated relation is n o w established.

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T h e a u th o r docs n o t hide h e r adm iration for the C h in a m en , b u t th e tru e hero o f the b o o k is language, for language alone sustains these m en and w om en (as well as w rite r an d reader). As she narrates the psychotic episodes o f six o f h e r relatives, she show s us that w h at is central to psychosis has to d o w ith slip­ page in th e sym bolic order, failures in ritual, social upheavals, and cultural displacem ents, and h o w ritual itself is restorative. In h e r first exam ple, a gran d fath er goes in and o u t o f m adness w hile blast­ ing th e A m erican railroad o u t o f rock, far away from ho m e: “ W h e n he stu m ­ bled o u t” o f the tu n n el, w rites K ingston, “ he trie d to talk a b o u t tim e. ‘I felt tim e,’ he sa id ,‘I saw tim e. I saw w o rld ’” (1980, p. 132). T h e second relative, a great-grandfather, begins to see visions and hear ghosts o n H aw aii and w onders: “ N o w th at he was in a n e w land, w h o co u ld tell w h a t n o rm al w'as?” (1980, pp. 10 7 -1 0 9 ). T h e th ird relative, a cousin w ith a h o m e and fam ily in C alifornia, receives letters o f h o rro r from his starving m o th e r in C h in a, im p lo rin g h im to sell his daughters and re tu rn to C h in a. W h e n she dies, she haunts h im day and nig h t, accusing h im o f lettin g h e r starve to death. Finally, h e buys a b o a t ticket and returns, talking w ith h e r all th e w hile, to h e r grave: “ H ere you are m other,” he said, and the villagers heard him say it. “You’re hom e now. I’ve brought you hom e. I spent passage fare on you. It equals m ore than the food m oney I m ight have s e n t.. . . Rest, M other. Eat.” H e heaped food on her grave.. . . H e poured w ine into the thirsty earth. H e planted the blue shrub o f longevity, w here w hite carrier pigeons w ould rest. H e bowed his forehead to the ground, knocking it hard in repentance. “You’re hom e, m other. I’m hom e, too. I brought you hom e.” H e set off firecrackers near her grave, not neglecting one Chinese thing. “ R est now, heh. M other. Be happy now.” H e sat by the grave and drank and ate for the first time since she had made her appearance.. . . H e boarded the very same ship sailing b a c k .. . . to America, where he acted norm al again, continuing his A m erican life, and nothing like that ever happened to him again. (1980, pp. 178-79) A fo u rth relative, an o ld e r cousin in A m erica, gets c au g h t u p in th e g reat p o stw ar upheavals in C h in a and b eco m es delusional a b o u t w 'heat g e rm and c o m m u n ism : “ W h e n h e c o n n e c te d his tw o b ig ideas [w h eat g e rm an d c o m m u n ism ], h e to u c h e d w ro n g w ires to each o th e r, sh o t o ff sparks, and sh o rte d o u t. H e h ad b e c o m e a paranoiac. ‘T h e y are try in g to p o iso n m e,’ he said, ru n n in g in to th e lau n d ry . . . ” (1980, p. 195). H e calm s d o w n w h e n he decid es to re tu rn to C o m m u n is t C h in a . T h e fifth relative, an u n c le by m arriage, was to rn betw 'een rem aining in H o n g K o n g w ith his shoe factory, o r co m in g to th e U .S., w h e re his w ife was living. A fter a b r ie f visit to th e U.S., he p e rsu ad e d his w ife to re tu rn w ith h im , despite fears o f a C o m m u n is t takeover. O n e day h e b ecam e sensitive to light and so u n d s:“ H e explained later

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how he understood the stopping quality o f red light and the go o f green. . . . H e passed a h o o k store. Jets o f colored light ju m p e d along the b o o k s’ spines; he w anted to stop and see w h e th er Red Chamber Dream and C om m unist books were red . . . ” (1980, p. 213). H e w ent to a bank, w ith d rew all his m oney and left it w ith strangers. T w ice he did this, recovered, and th en re tu rn e d once again w ith his w ife to the U.S., having “ said goodbye properly, goodbye forever” (1980, p. 216). T h e sixth relative, the a u th o r’s father, becam e severely depressed after the police closed dow n the C hinese gam bling house and social hall he had m anaged in S tockton. H e stopped shaving, sat and stared, drank whiskey, no lo n g er w ent o u t, and scream ed in his sleep (1980, p. 246ff). In her seventh exam ple, a “w ild m an ” is found living alone in a Florida swamp. W h en th e police have him speak w ith a C hinese in terp reter, he tells how he left Taiwan and his seven children to sail on a L iberian freighter to earn m oney; how, becom ing hom esick and scream ing and w eeping as they trie d to re tu rn him on a plane, he was hospitalized and then later escaped into the swamp. A fter being recaptured, he hangs him self in jail (1980, pp. 222 -2 4 ). All o f K ingston’s exam ples o f psychotic states involve the link betw een madness and som e catastrophe in the social order, and w e shall retu rn to this. To recapitulate: w h at we do as hum ans is structured by reflected images that lure o u r desire and reinforce o u r egos, b u t we rem ain g rounded in a sym bolic netw ork that pervasively supports o u r speech, ritual, and even o u r perception o f the w orld, and we from tim e to tim e com e to the edge and touch upo n the nameless, the R eal th at is always there b u t usually m ediated by language. N o w w hat if language does n o t function as such a recourse against the Real? W hat if the R eal is experienced w ith o u t th e m ediation o f language? W h at if words them selves lose th eir referential co n tex t and are experienced as in the R eal? To say that words are in the R eal is to say that words have becom e like things: w h e th er they com e from th e therapist o r the titles o f books o r the “ internal tape recorder,” they can strike the p a tie n t’s ears, eyes, forehead, chest, like objects. T hey do not m ediate and refer to objects. M ediation involves a distanc­ ing w hereby th e person has a status as distinct from surroundings, precisely through having a relationship to words, w hich them selves c o m p o rt relation­ ships w ith o th er w ords. T h e w ord, the nam e, is taken as a substitute for the object, n o t identified w ith it, and correlatively the ob ject itself is taken as distinct from oneself, its name, and its interpretant. B ut in psychotic states the m ediation language gives us is problem atic, and I w o u ld like to approach a discussion o f psychosis by m oving from K ingston to Canada and draw ing upon a m eeting held in A ugust 1982 on an island in G eorgian Bay. T his five-day m eetin g was sponsored by the N iobrara Institute, u n d er the leadership o f G erald M ohatt, in order to brin g together A m erican therapists, Lacanian analysts, and native people, including m edicine m en, all o f w hom had

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an interest in the nonpharm aceutical treatm ent o f psychosis— that is, w hose practice relied essentially on the use o f words. We m et in a native setting (the W hitefish R iver O jibw a Reserve) in order to question ou r accustom ed m odes o f thinking, and we all shared the experience that w ork in g w ith psychotic patients challenges notions about reality. O tto W ill (w ho had a long-standing interest in Plains and Southw est Indians) could not be there, but m uch o f his w ork exem plified o u r concerns. We read, for example, in one o f his papers that “ the psychotic process, bizarre as it may be, reflects conflict, is problem -solving, and is goal-directed” (1972, p. 35). H e w rote o f “ dissociated representations o f e x p erien ce” as “ processes that lack the refinem ent (in term s o f tim e, logical sequences, cause and effect, space, and identity o f self and object) o f the ordi­ nary day-by-day form s o f th o u g h t,” and “ are n o t to be approxim ated in language” (1972, pp. 3 7-38). From this p oint o f view, he w rote: “schizophrenia is n o t looked upo n as a disease, but as a reaction to, and an expression of, the social scenes in w hich an organism w ith certain biological endow m ents— usually adequate, so far as I know, to the task o f becom ing fully hum an— has its being” (Will, 1959, p. 218). T his view was supported by w hat em erged as we discussed the nature o f psychotic experience, and the remarks m ade at that m eeting may clarify’ o u r tw o exam ples o f the tape recorder speaking and the Spirit speaking. T h e French Lacanian analysts Françoise D avoine and Jean-M ax Gaudillière stressed through case presentations that psychosis is n o t a function o f the indi­ vidual personality b u t rather always involves a relationship o f a special kind. T h e patient in psychosis relates by p utting death betw een him self o r herself and the other. If this o th er is the analyst, the patient will attem pt to force the analyst to that special place in the transference w here the death can be inter­ posed. W hat death is this? It has to do w ith a catastrophe, personal as well as social. T his catastrophe occurred originally in the presence o f a n o th er w'ho simply registered it w ith o u t responding, w ith o u t nam ing it. T h e patient in turn registered it in an unsym bolized m ode, akin to Bollas’s “ u n th o u g h t k n o w n ” (1987), on his o r her ow n body— that is to say, in the R eal. U nable to nam e it, the patient attem pts to interpose it so that it can be nam ed in the analysis. M any patients have suffered a catastrophe o f gigantic social proportions: the horrors o f war, massacres, the genocide o f native peoples, the radical changing o f national boundaries, the disappearance o f entire nations. O n the level o f personal proportions there is the disappearance, death, suicide, m utilation, o r prolonged depression o f a parent o r o th er close relation. For the psychotic p atient the experience has no nam e and no image. T h e experience remains foreclosed from the im aginary and sym bolic registers. T h e experience remains in the R eal, in Peirce s category' o f Firstness, and it is to this place the patient leads the analyst, w h o tries to resist by a variety o f secondary process activities— theory-building, fine interpretations, encouragem ent to get on w ith life— failing to see that the

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p a tie n t is e m b a rk ed o n a w ay o f k n o w in g , o n a p a th w h e re th e te rra in does n o t b e c o m e intelligible th ro u g h o rd in ary c o n ce p ts o f tim e, space, identity, and causality. T h e e x p lo ra tio n o f this field exists in a different tim e, a so rt o f tim e ­ lessness, an d in a space w ith o u t th e usual b o u n d a rie s. L acan (1953, p. 104), fo llo w in g H e g el, insists th a t th e re is an in tim a te link b e tw e e n d e ath an d n a m in g , fo r th e act o f n a m in g a th in g a m o u n ts to a kin d o f “ m u rd e r o f th e th in g .” H o w is this so? B ecause in th e n a m e , o r th e c o n c e p t o f th e th in g , th e o b je c t is c o n ta in e d in d e p e n d e n t o f its im m e d ia c y a n d its p hysicality. T h e p h ilo s o p h e r S o k o lo w sk i, in his b o o k , Presence and Absence, w rites: A vocal response can b e co m e a nam e w h e n I n o t only have the object before m e, but appreciate it as present. 1 recognize that the object here does n o t have to be here; it could have been absent instead. I appreciate its pres­ ence as contrasted to its absence. I no t only enjoy the object, I enjoy the o bject as present. T h e n I can nam e it; 1 am no longer lim ited to m aking a voiced response to it. I am said to have acquired som e distance towards the object. B ut the distance in question is n o t spatial, it involves only the in tru ­ sion o f the “as present” betw een the object and me. T his is w hat makes the object nameable. I now can “ have” the o bject in m ind as som ething to be spoken about; I n o longer m erely have it to be consum ed, fondled, o r provoked. T hings can be said about an object only w h en it is so held by a nam e. (1978, p. 4) To so h o ld o r c o n ta in so m e th in g o r so m e o n e by a n a m e tran sfo rm s its im m e ­ diacy; th a t is, th e n am e, fu n c tio n in g as a sign, in tro d u c es T h ird n e ss by g iv in g us a m e d ia te d re la tio n to th e p e rso n o r th in g . R e c a ll K in g sto n ’s e x am p le o f the ho rse w h o se fearsom e im age b e c o m e s instan tly tra n sfo rm e d in to a p art o f h e r w orld: “ H e c o n ta in e d th e th in g in a w o rd — horse, m agical a n d e arth ly so u n d . A h o rse was a black c rea tu re so im m e n se I c o u ld n o t see th e o u tlin e s” (1980, p. 165). E ven th o u g h th e c h ild c o u ld n o t see th e o u tlin e s, she now , g iv en the n am e, k n e w th ey existed, a n d she c o u ld , f u rth e rm o re , g o o n to n a m e th e horse in its absence (1980, p. 167). S okolow ski stresses th a t such n a m in g is n o t sim ply a m a tte r o f im ages o r rep resen tatio n s: W h en we nam e som ething absent, we do nam e w hat is absent. W e do not nam e a copy, an image, a phantasm , o r som e o th er present representative o f it. N am es stretch in to w hat is n o t h e r e .. . . Even w h e n they nam e w hat is present, they do so w ith a sense o f its capacity to be n o t present. (1978, pp. 2 8-29) L acan p u t it succinctly: “ N o m in a tio n is in v o ca tio n o f presence, and su staining o f p resen ce in a b se n ce ” (1 9 5 4 -5 5 , p. 255). S u ch n a m in g , fu rth e rm o re , is n o t solipsistic: “ N a m in g c o n stitu te s a p a c t w h e re b y tw o su b je cts in th e sam e m o m e n t agree to re co g n ize th e sam e o b je c t” (1 9 5 4 -5 5 , p. 202).

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In th e psychoanalytic trea tm e n t o f psychosis the h e art o f the p roblem is th e struggle to kill, to destroy the catastrophe as im p rin te d o n th e b o d y by nam in g it, by the creation o f a signifier for w h a t has rem ain ed unnam eable because it rem ains em b ed d ed in the R eal. W h at is in the R e al is n e ith e r present n o r absent: it is im m ed iate, that is, u n m ed ia te d . “ T h e re is n o absence in the real,” L acan stated (1 9 5 4 -5 5 , p. 359). To re n d e r a th in g p resen t o r absent requires negating it th ro u g h nam ing it: presence and absence are a fu n c tio n o f th e sym bolic register. T h is is n o t a m atter o f lifting a repression, as w ith an ex p erien c e that is fo rg o tten because it has b een inscribed in m em ory. O n th e contrary' the task is to create boundaries that m ake it possible to have repression. Psychotic patients are conscious o f the catastrophe; they are, in fact, h au n te d by the th in g (Davoine, 1992).W h a t m ust be d o n e in nam ing is to m ake an inscrip­ tio n o f it so that it can be fo rg o tten . “ O th erw ise,” D avoine w rites: this thing w ithout a nam e will return through hallucination to persecute the living by asking for rest and oblivion. So that w hen, for any reason, it has been impossible to accomplish this nam ing o f the thing, to accom ­ plish the inscription o f its disappearance in order to change it into a signi­ fier, one will necessarily have to make it disappear a second tim e in order to stop the return o f its ghost, w hich Lacan calls the return o f the real. Well, the only way to make it disappear is to kill it, to destroy i t . . . . T h e exploration o f the psychotic search consists in the creation and destruction o f limits in this space o f the real, even if these limits should be those o f the body itself.. . . T his lasts until som ething is definitely destroyed and gives place to a new signifier. (1981) T h e th erap eu tic fram e m ust h o ld o n lo n g e n o u g h so th at th e p a tie n t’s b o d y survives an d th e catastrophe can be tru ly fo rg o tte n , th a t is, in sc rib e d in the unconscious. D avoine continues: “ F reud defines th e u n conscious as a c o m p ro ­ m ise b e tw ee n ob liv io n an d m em ory. It is the only place w h e re the paradox o f m e m o ry com es to a resolution, th e paradox b e in g that n o th in g is m o re present than an unspeakable disappearance. O n th e o th e r hand, the only w ay to let it go is to have it w ritte n so m ew h ere in o rd e r to forget it th ro u g h m em ory.” She gives th e nam e o n a to m b sto n e as an exam ple o f th e fu n c tio n o f such inscrip­ tion: “ N o t so m u c h th at on e will forever re m in d so m eb o d y because it is w rit­ ten , b u t rath er that w e w ill forget thanks to this in scription.” (For a resum e o f th e m any texts in F re u d dealing w ith inscrip tio n , see D e rrid a , 1966.) In sum m ary, th e psychotic p a tie n t’s re p o rt o f bein g dead, decayed, o r em pty, th e negativism , th o u g h t disorder, and disturbed fam ily c o m m u n ica tio n patterns th at are well id entified (e.g., K aron, 1992; K aron and W id en er, 1994) have as th eir c o n te x t a specific field in a relationship w h e re th e representation o f an un n am ed catastrophe has to be killed: b e tte r for this killing to be sym bolic rather than real, and the sym bolic killing occurs th ro u g h nam ing. Such nam ing can be

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done in words or ritual, even by gesture o r by the use o f transitional objects. W h en we m et in C anada we all witnessed another kind o f nam ing, as enacted by a practicing m edicine m an. T h e late Joe Eagle Elk, a Lakota Sioux then in his fifties, from R osebud, South D akota, described how he had becom e a m edicine m an, how he experienced his relationship to w hat arc called “spirits,” and how he practiced. Joe described how the same dream recurred to him four times, beginning w hen he was twelve years old, w hen his father scolded him for having such dangerous dreams, until his thirties, w hen he finally brought it to a m edicine m an for inter­ pretation. T he m edicine m an prepared Joe to make a vision quest, whose outcom e m ade clear that jo e had to becom e a m edicine m an, and he began his rigorous training. H e was thereafter very respected and very busy. In describing his w ork w ith patients, he said, quite simply, that he has no power o f his own. T h e spirits tell him w hat is the nature o f the problem and w hat has to be done about it. O ften they do not tell him the cause. W h en he conducts a ceremony, he calls the spirits into the room , by name, for they are his friends. T hat is the general nam e for them: friends. Each spirit is called by its ow n individual name, and w hen they enter the room they speak to him . H e in turn articulates w hat they have to say about the patient and w hat the patient has to do. W e witnessed his healing cerem ony for an allegedly hexed O jibw a wom an w ho, by her ow n report, had suffered from m ulti­ ple somatic symptoms, including diabetes, liver dysfunction, vision problems, and severe headaches that had been ascribed by physicians to cerebral tumors. At one point in the cerem ony Joe put on the light and asked the w om an to stand in a special place while holding the ceremonial pipe. H e asked her to tell the thirty-five or so o f us w hat her problem was. T hen, in total darkness, we each voiced our concerns for this w om an, ourselves, and others. T h en there was further chanting while the spirits spoke to Joe (the manifestation o f the spirits’presence in the dark­ ness consisted o f small movem ents o f phosphorescent-like light.) T h en he again turned on a light and asked the w om an to stand as before and told her, through a translator, diat the spirits said: “T here is nothing w rong w ith you. You have just been confused by w hat others have told you.” In subsequent discussion w ith Joe about the actual Lakota words spoken, he said the spirits told him her problem was in her wowadn: the Lakota w ord means confidence as a com bination o f thought and desire (Buechel, 1970). It is the w ord used in the phrase “ to lose o n e’s mind,” b ut this was not h e r condition. T h e spirits said, through Joe, that her problem is w hat she allowed herself to assume from others, nam ely the thoughts and desires o f others about her; she accepted their labels into her wowacin, and she took these labels and exaggerated them into her symptoms. She was to leave her fears and w orries in the spot where she was standing, and the spirits instructed Joe to prepare an herbal m edicine, for w hich she was to return the next day. She did, and at a follow -up report, one year later, she was said to be fine.

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N u m e ro u s psychoanalytic authors have described such an event in term s o f p ro je c tio n and in tro je c tio n , o r even paranoia (D ucey, 1976); o th e rs have invoked n o tio n s o f g ro u p dynam ics, suggestion, and no n -v erb al c o m m u n ica ­ tio n (E rikson, 1950, pp. 174-75); som e call it o u trig h t trickery o r m agic, w here th e m ed icin e m an is n o m ore than a m aster illusionist o r c o n ju ro r w h o takes advantage o f th e so-called “ p rim itiv e ” beliefs o f the people (Boyer, 1964, pp. 40 3 -4 0 4 ). Such approaches fundam entally assume “ reality” as given and d o n o t adequately take in to a cc o u n t w h at Lacan draw s o u r a tte n tio n to as “ the R e al,” and h o w language shapes “ reality.” In contrast to these psychoanalysts, B ru n e r and his associate w rite that speakers “ co m e in to a w'orld already c o n stitu ted by language” and that th e child c a n n o t learn to speak “ u ntil th e child is in d u cte d in to a social w'orld w h ere language has already m ade a deep im pression in shap­ in g and even c o n stitu tin g th e reality to w h ic h speech w ill refer” (B ru n er and Feldm an, 1982, p. 36). In his in tro d u c tio n to his th o u g h tfu l and richly detailed ov erv iew o f S o u th A m e ric an religions, Sullivan cau tio n s us: “ S upp o sitio n s a b o u t prelogical m entality, infantilism , and prim itivism are revealing poses o f m o d e rn th o u g h t and deserve n o d ep ictio n here. T h e y m irro r back to us the illusory self-definitions that flaunt a fragile, even w istful, h o p e for a privileged place in h u m an h isto ry ” (1988, p. 2). W e can a tte m p t to co n ce p tu a liz e th e m ed ic in e m a n ’s practice in perhaps a n o th e r way. T h e m ed icin e m an, after rigorous discipline, is enabled to stand at th e edge o f th e R e a l in highly specific, co m m u n ity -b a se d rituals. S tanding at th e edge w ith o u t b e in g terrified, he is at th e p o in t w here, th ro u g h h im and the ritualized space, th e R e a l passes in to language. In his cu ltu re and in those care­ fully d efined m o m e n ts, this passage o f the R e a l in to language takes th e fo rm o f spirits w h o b e co m e articulated th ro u g h his voice. In this way th e p atient, w h o addresses h e r dem an d s to th e R e al, th e R e a l o f p a rt o f h e r body, th e R e al o f death, d estruction, and cultural catastrophe, receives a response, th rough th e m ed ic in e m an , fro m this R e al. T h e response is fram ed by th e e n tire sym bolic stru ctu re that includes, in this place and tim e, w h a t are called spirits. T h e y are part o f th e g ro u p ’s reality o n c e th eir presence is nam ed. S tanding at th e edge o f th e R e al, the m ed icin e m an names: he exercises w h a t Sokolow ski calls th e m astery o f p resen ce an d absence; his a rtic u la tio n establishes for him self, th e p atient, and th e c o m m u n ity a m ediated relation w ith th e R eal. In this con tex t w hat w e d o in the analytic m o m e n t o f the psychotic trans­ ference is sim ilar: w ith w hatever disciplined ways w e possess, w e stand at the edge o f the R eal to w h ic h o u r patients have led us. T h is m ay well be ex p eri­ enced as the p a tie n t’s a ttem p t to drive us crazy, and o u r discipline will often fail us as w e resist. B u t eventually we do stand at the edge, and n o w and th en we nam e: w e nam e the death the patient brings betw een us, w e find, usually w ith ­ o u t forethought, som e signifier, gesture, o r object that overcom es the im m ediacy

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o f the R eal, that frees the p atien t from a fusion w ith us and the surroundings, that renew s perspective o n his o r h e r body, that eventually leads to an u n c o n ­ scious inscription that allows the catastrophe to begin to be repressed, that puts a stop to “ the internal tape recorder.” W h a t n o w can be said o f th e tw o exam ples w'ith w h ich we began? For the patien t in the psychotic state, w ords n o lo n g er fu n c tio n in the sym bolic order: th ey have passed in to the R eal, and the p a tie n t is left w ith only the fantastic quality o f images w ith w h ich to grab hold o f their im p o rt. T hese images alter­ nately terrify o r seduce, prom ising d e stru ctio n o r paradise. T h e c o m m u n ity n o lo n g er has a m ed iatin g role; th e sense o f isolation is extrem e. F or Ray, in his c o m m u n ity o f charism atics, it appears q u ite different. H e rem ains firm ly e m b e d d ed in a stru c tu re o f ritual in w h ic h standing at th e edge o f the R e al has its ow n discipline and safeguards. N ative religion itself can be view ed as the universal h u m an effort to find ways to stand at th e edge so th at th e R e a l can pass in to language, can receive an articulation that is fresh and that challenges the com placent n o tio n s o f reality to w hich we all to o readily b eco m e adapted. T h e voice o f the Spirit, then, m ay be the particular m anifestation o f this sem i­ otic process, p articular to R a y ’s c o m m u n ity (a rath er large and gro w in g one) w ith its specific rituals. To speak in this way m ay perhaps re m in d som e o f C arlos C asteneda and D o n J u a n ’s e xploits o f seeing an d flying: b u t it has n o th in g to d o w ith C asteneda, for th e pervasive absence in his w o rk o f c o m m u n ity ritu a l u n d e r­ cuts his w hole fictional enterprise. As M o h att, a psychologist w h o spent tw enty years w o rk in g o n th e R o se b u d S io u x R ese rv atio n , cautions us: T h e m edicine m an does no t expect that we com m on people are confronted w ith spirits only for idiosyncratic reasons. T his experience says som ething about us in relationship to o u r co m m u n ity Was a ritual o f grieving not accomplished? Was the group in jeopardy because o f dishar­ m ony and unrepaired rips in family relationships? In addition, com m on people aren’t expected to interpret and m eet spirit phenom ena in everyday life. R itual is the proper place, the m edicine m an the proper person. Too often current literature has encouraged a rom antic idea that spirit experi­ ence can free a person o r is the stuff o f mystical experience. To the m edi­ cine m an, the solitary spirit experience for the com m on m an is dangerous. (1982, p. 14) Spirits, th en , m ay be con cep tu alized as the m o d e o f passage o f th e R e al in to language in a specific c o n te x t o f culture and ritual. To n am e th e m is to engage th e m as present, in the way nam es allow things to b e present, in the w'ay they w ere p resented to us by Ray, M axine H o n g K ingston, and Jo e Eagle Elk. Spirits need n o t b e th o u g h t o f as substances b u t rather as processes, perhaps an aspect o f the incom plete process o f the R eal as B eing co m in g into presence

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th ro u g h language in a particular way, particular to a cultural setting o f place and a ritual m o m e n t o f tim e. Such c o m in g in to language recalls the H eideggerean n o tio n o f B ein g as “ p erpetually u n d e r way to language” (H eidegger, 1947, p. 239). B u t such co m in g in to language, as H eidegger shows, is problem atic, for he w rites: “B u t if m an is to find his way once again in to the nearness o f B eing he m u st first learn to exist in the nam eless” (1947, p. 199). E ven if H eidegger, in w h a t w e can take as a confession, can claim to have d o n e this, few o f us can exist in th e nameless: perhaps the m ost w e can d o in o u r clinical w o rk is to acknow ledge w ith o u r patients that there is a nam eless a n d from tim e to tim e stand at its edge as a w itness (Felm an and Laub, 1992). In any case, to p ro n o u n c e th at spirits are im possible w ith in o u r n a rro w dayto-day conceptual fram ew ork o r to reduce th e m to projections is to p re te n d to k n o w th e R eal. W e d o n o t an d c an n o t k n o w th e R e al. In o u r usual fram es o f reference w e k n o w a b o u t reality, this necessary c o n stru ctio n that allows us to m ain tain w hat we call sanity, o n this side o f the R e al, an d it is language that m akes this possible, as th e M exican p o e t O c tav io Paz w rites: T h e reality that poetry reveals and that appears behind language— is liter­ ally intolerable and m addening. At the same tim e, w ithout the vision o f this reality, m an is n o t m an, and language is not language. Poetry is the necessarily m om entary perception (w hich is all that we can bear) o f the incom m ensurable w orld w hich we one day abandon and to w hich we return w hen we die. Language sinks its roots into this w orld but transforms its juices and reactions into signs and symbols. Language is the consequence (or the cause) o f o u r exile from the universe, signifying the distance betw een things and ourselves. At the same tim e it is o u r recourse against this distance. (1974, p. 132)

A Semiotic Correlate of Psychotic States

T h e breakdow n that occurs in psychotic states leads us to once again question the adequacy o f the dyadic paradigm for psychoanalysis, for psychosis is char­ acterized by the structural inadequacy o f the T h ird in b o th lim iting and m edi­ ating the hum an subject. T his chapter deals w ith the analytic T hird, as recently em phasized by Shapiro and C a rr (1991), B rick m an (1993), O g d e n (1994), Schoenhals (1995), and others w h o conceptualize the T h ird in term s o f task and function, but I will explicitly refer to the foundational status o f the T hird as the sem iotic code. As form ulated by C rapanzano, it is this T h ird that holds the dyad: “ T h e signifying chain, th e Sym bolic order, culture, and gram m ar we m ight say, serves to stabilize the relations betw een self and o th er by functioning as a T h ird ” (1982, p. 197). In 1946 Lacan told H e n ri Ey: “ N o t only can m an ’s being n o t be u n d er­ stood w ith o u t m adness [la folie], it w ould n o t be m an ’s b ein g if it did n o t bear m adness w ithin itself as the lim it o f his freedom ” (1966, p. 176). H e repeated this in 1958 and added: “ W h at I am saying here is that it is the business o f rea­ son to recognize the dram a o f m adness,. . . because it is in m an’s relation to the signifier that this dram a is situated” (1977, p. 214). This drama was presented by a nineteen-year-old patient first hospitalized in a psychotic state. Because o th er patients had disturbed him , he was in the Q u ie t R o o m on the afternoon w hen I m et him (this was not at the Austen Riggs C enter). After a nurse introduced us and left, I closed the d o o r and stood there as W illiam sat on his mattress w ritin g on a pad o f paper. W h e n I told him I

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w o u ld b e his therapist, he lo o k e d up at m e and th e n c o n tin u e d w ritin g . I w aited, ob serv in g th at he was a frag ile-lo o k in g y o u n g m an, th in , very alert, intense. W h e n W illiam paused, 1 said I e x p ected to see h im in m y office and th at if he w an ted to w o rk today I w o u ld be there. Ten m inutes later W illiam cam e, carrying the sam e pencil and pad o f paper. I closed th e d o o r an d said, “ You seem very serious a b o u t w hat you are d oing.” H e responded, “ W rite th at dow n.” 1 looked at him , unsure a b o u t h o w to take th at, and asked, “You w ant m e to w rite d o w n w h a t 1 say— is that w hat you are d o in g ?” “ W rite that d o w n , w rite that dow n,” he repeated. I decid ed to d o this, b u t at th e cost o f n o t k n o w in g w h a t it m ig h t m ean: w h at was I for him ? Was 1 rein fo rcin g his sense o f o m n ip o te n ce ? O r a cting like an im aginary c o u n te r­ part? I g o t up, fo u n d o n m y desk a pad o f pap er and a p e n , and sat d o w n , ask­ in g w h at w ere his reasons fo r co m in g in to th e hospital. H e responded, “ T h e e x p erien c e m ust take its toll, the e x p erien c e m ust take its course.” T h e w ords so u n d ed like a tap e -rec o rd ed message. I th en asked, w hile w ritin g , “ H ave you had this experience before?” T h is m ay indeed have so u n d ed to him like a tapereco rd ed question. H e th e n lo o k ed up and I said, “W ords can be such slippery' things.” H e ju st looked at m e and 1 repeated, “ Have y o u had this e x p erien c e before?” “ M y w h o le life,” he answ ered. “ I believe you,” I said. A fter a pause d u rin g w hich his b re ath in g was audible and he began alm ost to gasp, h e said: “ P eo p le always say to m e ‘A re you m ad at m e? ’ Leave m e alone. It’s ten to twelve.” I asked, “ W ould you like m e to w rite these w ords d o w n to o ? ” H e n o d d ed yes, saying, “ I can ’t w rite.” I again asked, “ D o you k n o w w h y you cam e to this hospital?” H e answ ered, “T o let the e x p erien c e take its toll, its course.” “ D o you k n o w h o w lo n g it will take?” H e responded, “ I k n o w e n o u g h to k n o w th e experience m ust be d o n e now. You can ’t th in k you k n o w it all, you have all th e answers.” H e was b re ath in g hard. I did n o t tell h im I was w o rrie d a b o u t his d eath an d had to ask questions for the hospital to assess his suicidal potential. H e th e n said, “ C o m e up for air.” I responded, “ S om etim es it feels like y o u ’re drow ning.” “W rite that dowrn!” he insisted, and th en he w ent on: “ I could never sw im . As hard as I tried.” “ S om ething prevented you from learning?” I asked. “W rite th at d ow n!” he responded and fell silent. I then said, “ You strike m e as th e k ind o f person w ho, as y o u r t-shirt says, m akes a 100 percen t effort” (his tshirt, in red, w hite, and blue colors, said: “ How' m u ch effort do you give?” w ith “ 100 percen t” b eneath the words). I w ent on, “You d o n ’t take things lightly o r in a sloppy way.” H e answ ered im m ediately, “ R ig h t. 1 w ould have affirm ations, like from R o b e rt, the guy from m achinery systems, the guy from professional ser­ vices— asking— h im questions. A question— the response— it was such a g o o d q uestion that it w ould take a w h o le sem ester to answer. 1 d o n ’t k n o w if I can answ er it all here.” “ You d o n ’t have to,” I responded, n o t k n o w in g th e tim e,

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person, o r place he was referrin g to b u t enco u rag ed that he seem ed m ore w ill­ in g to speak, even if in a grandiose way. H e resp o n d ed , “B u t I’ll try to. Y ou’re rig h t, I d o n ’t have to.” I said: “ I th in k you cam e here w ith som e d eep questions. It will take som e tim e to ask th e m and to beg in to answer.” H e responded, “ I k n o w e n o u g h n o t to know . T h e e x p erien c e m u st take its course, its toll.” I th e n said, “ I th in k you cam e to a g o o d place to ask questions,” pressing to have som e lim it, som e lack in him acknow ledged. H e resp o n d ed , “ I c a n ’t ask questions. I can o nly e n tru st g ra ce ­ fully th ro u g h G o d . Silence in tru stin g you.” I re sp o n d ed , “ It m ay take tim e for you to tru st m e an d I u n d e rstan d that.” H e th e n said, “ E v ery th in g happens gradually— ” “ Yes,” I alm ost clap p ed in a g re e m e n t— b u t he c o n tin u e d , “— th ro u g h th e subconscious,” a n d he w e n t on: “ G o d e n tru ste d m e to w rite the to ru s— take its toll.” H e paused, th e n added, “ H e always know s the tru th .” I said, “ W h ic h is som etim es hard for us to see,” a tte m p tin g to m ark th e differ­ ence b etw een us and G od. B u t he c o rrected m e, saying a b o u t th e tru th , “ It can o n ly be heard. F or us to see is q u e stio n e d — in q u e stio n — in q u estio n in g .” I was stru ck by his attentiveness to language an d w o n d e re d a b o u t his h e arin g voices. I n o w a tte m p ted to focus o n som e smaller, nearby tru th th at I had heard and I said, “ So you w ere in th e Q u ie t R o o m because it was th e m ost c o m fo rt­ able place for you?” H e responded, “ H e has en tru sted — w'rite that d o w n first (! had c o n tin u ed to w rite th ro u g h o u t the session)— he has en tru sted m e to let the tru th be k n ow n.” H e paused, th e n w en t o n , “ H e has given m e p ro fo u n d har­ m o n y and peace, gracefully and clear— spirit o f experiences.” I a tte m p ted again to lim it his g ra n d io sity by saying, “ W e have to be p a tie n t fo r th e tru th to em erge.” H e gestu red w ith his fin g er fo r m e to w rite th a t d o w n , th e n said, “ O .K .” and added, “ W rite that dow n.” H e th e n said, “ I k n o w e n o u g h n o t to k n o w — it happens for a reason.” “ I agree w ith you,” I said, an d I added: “ We h o p e to keep you safe w hile the e x p erien c e goes on.” H e responded, “W rite this dowm: I e n tru st you it sho u ld be w ritte n d o w n . I k n o w e n o u g h n o t to k n o w th at I m ust recall experiences, m ust be e n tru sted u p o n a p e rso n ’s real life ex perience. T h e y o n ly k n o w th e ir experience. I c a n n o t tell you w h at I th in k they d o n ’t know.” I th e n told h im , th in k in g o f his self-assured claim n o t to know , “ W h a t you say rem inds m e o f w h a t Socrates th e p h ilo so p h er taught.” I th e n said w e had to stop fo r today, gave h im an a p p o in tm e n t for the n e x t day, and sto o d u p and o p e n e d m y d o o r as I c o n tin u e d to w rite. H e rem ained seated and said so m eth in g that sounded like “w e are tw o no ted spetshirt— n o th in g is possible in a state o f m etaphysical forgetfulness. Philosophy is a way that helps us recall w hat w e som etim es forget. T h e spiritual— any spir­ itual experience can only be in relation to the experience. W e k n o w that people c an’t say tw o opposites at th e sam e tim e. T h ey can’t say/I like m yself’ and say i

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hate myself.’ R e je c tio n m oves us to the ultim ate p o w er o f acceptance in the present tense.” 1 finished w ritin g and told h im , “ I am e n d in g the session now,” and I ges­ tu red for him to leave. H e g o t up and as we w alked d o w n the c o rrid o r he p u t o u t his hand for m e to shake, I did, and th en he p u t his a rm around m y sh o u l­ der, saying “ T hanks.” I rem in d ed him about o u r nex t a p p o in tm en t tim e and he began to w rite that d o w n as I handed him over to the head nurse w h o said h e llo to him . H e d id n o t lo o k at h e r b u t c o n tin u e d w ritin g . She lo o k ed annoyed and said, “ So you d o n ’t feel like talking?” and I tried to explain that he finds w ords to be slippery so he w rites th em dow n. I f w e reflect o n this b r i e f dram a o f m adness, w h a t can w e say a b o u t W illiam ’s relation to th e signifier? W h a t is o d d a b o u t W illiam ’s speech? In g en ­ eral, W illiam m akes sense w h e n he speaks. D espite a few gram m atical aberra­ tions and perhaps a few neologism s, his c h ie f problem is n o t w ith the selection an d c o m b in a tio n o f signifiers, the tw o axes o f language as p re se n te d by R o m a n Jak o b so n (1956). W h at, th en , is his problem ? R o se n b a u m an d S o n n e (1986) exam ined 100 sam ples o f psychotic discourse an d co n clu d ed th e aber­ ra tio n is in the stru ctu re o f the e n u n ciatio n , th e ways in w h ic h th e speaker as first p erso n anchors th e tex t in a consistent p a tte rn o f deixis, o r “ I-y o u -h e re n o w ” references (Innis, 1982; B enveniste, 1958).Jakobson and L ubbe-G rothues, in th e ir analysis o f th e late poem s o f the n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry G e rm a n p o e t H ö ld e rlin , w h ic h he c o m p o sed w'hile e n tre n c h e d in his e x te n d e d psychotic state, called a tte n tio n to the fact that “ these poem s have n o deictic language signs o r any references to th e actual speech situ atio n ” (1985, p. 138), they no te “ th e a b an d o n m e n t o f deixis” in these poem s, “ the suppression o f any allusion b o th to th e speech act and its tim e as w'ell as to th e actual particip an ts” (1985, p. 139). In contrast to th e earlier poem s, th e dialogic c o m p e te n c e o f his later poem s “is m ore o r less destroyed,” and the authors q u o te Peirce to indicate the essential role played by indices o f tim e, place, and perso n in any discourse: It was Charles Sanders Peirce w ho particularly stressed the vital im p o r­ tance o f the various “ indices” for daily speech: “ If, for exam ple a m an remarks,‘Why, it is raining!’ it is only by some such circumstances as that he is now standing here looking out a w indow as he speaks, w hich w ould serve as an Index (not, however, as a Symbol) that he is speaking o f this place at this time, w hereby we can be assured that he cannot be speaking o f the w eather on the satellite Procyon, fifty centuries ago.” (1985, p. 138) Sass also notes th e failure in deictic aspects o f the speech o f schizophrenic patients (1992, p. 177). S uch deictic references are o fte n absent in W illia m ’s speech; his use o f first-p erso n references, m o reo v e r, a p p eared o n ly afte r I repeatedly addressed questions to him as “you.” As w'e saw in C h a p te r 4, this

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“you,” spoken by an “ 1” as its necessary correlative, n o t only designates the o th er in dialogue: the saying o f “ y o u ” is perform ative, it opens an intersubjec­ tive space that makes possible the em ergence o f the subjectivity o f the other. We may place W illiam ’s grandiosity n o t in a linguistic co ntext b u t in the larger fram ework o f sem iotics (Deely, 1982). In a sem iotic fram ework, taken as the structure that makes possible the use o f signs, 1 think his problem consists o f an identification w ith the O ther, w ith a capital O, understood as Lacan co n ­ ceives it, as “le lieu ou se constitue le je qui parle avec celui qui e n te n d ” (1966, p. 431), “ T h e locus in w hich is constituted the I w ho speaks to him w h o hears” (1977, p. 141), “ the O th e r qua locus o f the code” (1957-58, D ecem ber 11, p. 1). T h e O th e r is that w hich opens the signifying dim ension as such, antecedent to the individuals w h o are speaking. T h e im plicit premise wrhen I speak to you w ho listen is that w e are b oth subordinated to the context and code governing ou r exchange. O r, as som eone at the Austen R iggs C en ter once said, “Two peo­ ple cannot, w ithout being psychotic, have a dialogue unless they are aware o f the O th e r saying ‘n o ’” and thereby setting lim its on the generalizability and grandiosity o f their speech (Ess A. W hite, M .D ., q u o ted in M uller and R ichardson, 1988, p. 366). T h e O ther, Lacan tells us, is “ the guarantor o f good faith” (1977, p. 173), for “ the signifier requires an o th er locus— the locus o f the O ther, the O th e r wdtness, the witness O th e r than any o f the partners” (1977, p, 305). T h e O th e r is “ a third locus w hich is neither m y speech n o r m y interlocu­ to r” ; Lacan goes on: “ T his locus is none o th er than the locus o f signifying con­ vention” (1977, p. 173). T h e O th e r is n o t simply the collection o f words, as in a dictionary, no r is it an abstract underlying gram m ar, b u t rather we m ust invoke, Lacan writes, “ the no tio n o f the O th e r w ith a capital O as being the locus o f the deploym ent o f speech” (1977, p. 264). T his locus includes all the com plex­ ity o f culture and co ntext in w hich hum ans exchange signs. In term s o f Peirce’s architectonic theory, W illiam , by identifying w ith the O ther, has collapsed T hirdness o n to Firstness: the category o f law and m edia­ tio n has been aggrandized by him in a posture o f exaggerated control and m ono-relatedness, thereby elim inating a place for Secondness, for the dyad, dia­ logue, deixis, and negation. D ew ey quotes Peirce: “ T h e idea o f other, o f not, becom es a very pivot o f th o u g h t” (1946, p. 90), and it is precisely this w hich is structurally problem atic in psychotic states. W illiam ’s grandiosity' is distinguished from infantile grandiosity, w hose exhi­ b itionism and idealizations are addressed to others, w hereas his psychotic grandiosity, as an identification w ith the O ther, dismisses others, we others w ith small o ’s. T h e tragic elem ent in W illiam ’s case has to do w ith the fragility o f this identification. H is young age, his newness to treatm ent, his changeability in the course o f o u r session, suggest he has n o t consolidated a delusional identifi­ cation. A t first, in the Q u ie t R o o m , he w rote w hat he heard, as if he is the

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O th e r w h o inscribes all, th e w itness and re co rd o f the tru th . In o u r initial en co u n ter, w h e n I invited h im to jo in m e in som e w ork, he insisted I w rite d o w n w h a t I say, retaining his o m n ip o te n t position. W h e n I offered to w rite dow n w h at he said also, he stated, “ I can’t w rite,” giving up his identification w ith th e O th e r, n o lo n g er in control o f the code, th e signifying convention, and I becam e w ith him a c o -p articip an t in the O th e r— until the lim it o f tim e p u t an end to o u r jo in t w ork. H e th en rejoined the O th e r as special agent, the suffering servant o f G od, the o n e w ith access to the w hole tru th based o n w hat he hears that n o o n e else can hear: “ G o d en tru sted m e to w rite. . . . H e always know s th e t r u t h . . . . H e has en tru sted m e to let the tru th be k n o w n .. . . W rite this dow n: I entrust you it should be w ritte n dow n.” H o w m ay w e u n d e rstan d structurally th e sem iotic p ro b lem here? If o n e says, in a Lacanian fram ew ork, that sym bolic castration, the affirm ation o f lim it, has b een foreclosed in the psychotic p atien t, this m eans th at difference as such is re pudiated, refused, n o t recognized. As Francois Peraldi stated, th e n o tio n o f difference “ prevents us from th in k in g w e are G o d , o r talking black in to w hite, . . . o r to confuse th e sign w ith the signified” (1981, p. 171). T h e m ost basic difference is b etw een o n e se lf and th e O th e r. W illiam has n o t established a firm b o u n d a ry h ere and th erefo re his grandiosity, his delusion o f om niscience, is inevitable. T h e inability to claim that o n e is in co m p lete is correlative w ith th e delusional o m n ip o te n ce o f th e O th e r. For such a p atien t there is n o constraint o n th e O th e r as delusional totality and therefore n o place for w h a t Lacan calls th e B arred O th e r, th e O th e r as finite, as the lim ited field o f signifying c onven­ tion. If th e O th e r can d o a n y th in g o r m ean anything, th e n on e m ust b e p re ­ pared to be terro rize d , to be th e ob ject o f th e O th e r ’s u n lim ite d pleasure, o r else o n e m ust be the O th e r an d thereby find salvation. D u rin g th a t first n ig h t o f his hospitalization, W illia m trie d to leave th e u n lo ck ed lodge several tim es, u n til finally th e security' staff was called. T h ey sim ply stood in his way and he re tu rn e d to his room . T h e nex t day, and in sub­ sequent sessions, W illiam did n o t insist that I w rite, so I am now using m y sum ­ m ary notes. H e was late for his session. I wraited ten m inutes and th en w e n t to find him . H e was again sitting in the Q u ie t R o o m b u t cam e w ith m e to m y office. H e began by saying he had learn ed to “ tru st” th e n ig h t before w h e n “ ten security guards had to be called tw ice.” H e stated he felt m ore relaxed now, and I saw that he was b re ath in g calmly. I m ade som e reference to his Slavic n am e and he said he is n o t Slavic. H is fa th e r was a d o p te d a n d h e to o k th e ir nam e. H is m o th e r, he th in k s, has an English nam e. H e w e n t o n to speak o f his m o th e r’s a u n t w h o to o k care o f h im at age three w h e n his m o th e r was frequently hospitalized for psychosis. H e spoke w arm ly o f this aunt. In his n e x t session he was again late. I on ce again w e n t to find him . W h e n

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wc sat dow n in my office I brought up an earlier patient com m unity m eeting in w hich patients had spoken about his violations o f boundaries: his w alking into oth ers’ room s, lying on o thers’ beds, bum ping in to people, and o pening their food in the patient refrigerator, taking a bite, even rubbing his snot on the food, and retu rn in g it to the refrigerator. W h en asked at the m eeting to explain his behavior, he had said that it had to do w ith sexual feelings. I now asked him w hat he m eant and he said, “ Sexual feelings m eans elation.” I encouraged him to say m ore about this, but I got now here and then rem inded him that he had to observe the c o m m u n ity ’s boundaries in order to live here. T h e n I asked h im how h e understood his reasons for being here. H e said he was here so th at others could e x p erien ce and grow from w hat G o d has entrusted to him . 1 th en asked how' long he th o u g h t he w ould be here. H e said until he invents an autom obile engine w 'ithout exhaust. I said that may take som e tim e and asked how m uch insurance coverage he had. H e said he d id n ’t know but had requested the telephone nu m b er o f the C hairm an o f the Board o f the insurance com pany and that “ G o d will provide o u t o f his great abun­ dance.” I said that w ould be great, but I had to know' how m uch tim e w e had to w ork together, and so I w ould inquire. W h en I asked him if he w ould like to know w hat I found out, he said “ N o.” For o u r fourth session he was again late and after ten m inutes 1 w'ent to find him . H e had told m e the previous day that he rem em bers everything and did not need m y appointm ent card (w hich I had given to him anyway). I pointedly asked h im w hy he was late— did h e forget after telling m e he rem em bered everything? H e said he forgot. W e again spoke o f that m o rn in g ’s patient co m ­ m unity m eeting w'hen patients again spoke to him about his ongoing assault on th eir boundaries and th eir culture. I said I h o p e d he could learn from w hat they had said to him . H e said he w ould and had already learned. 1 said it was im portant that w e acknow ledge th at he was here for help for him self and not ju st for the sake o f others. I then told him w hat 1 had learned o f his m edical history': th at he had been b o rn w ith cerebral palsy, was in n o w'ay retarded cognitively, b u t had a slight lim p and his speech was m arked by a m ild dysarthria and in te rm itten t stutter. I asked him how he had m anaged all these y e an to deal w ith his vulnerabilities. H e said they w ere obstacles given by G od to be overcom e. “W h at obstacles?” I asked. H e said n o t w alking until age three and believing for a tim e that he had a speech problem because his father w ould insist that he p ronounce w'ords cor­ rectly. H e said his father rejected him . 1 did n o t say that I heard that his c hron­ ically angry parents m arried because his m o th e r was pregnant w ith him , and that he was b o rn tw o m onths prem aturely a few' days after his m o th e r becam e very dru n k in a half-conscious attem p t to abort him , and that she had periods o f psychiatric hospitalization d u rin g his childhood. W illiam w ent on to say he

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notices h o w som e peo p le use w ords o f fo u r syllables in o rd e r to get a tte n tio n o r show o ff that they had w ealth— he had difficulty saying the w o rd “ w ealth.” I asked if he felt 1 w o u ld criticize his speech, that 1 w ould be like his father. H e said he told his father, “ I c an n o t satisfy y o u r needs and I’m n o t w illing to do so.” “ W h a t w ere m y needs in the transference?” I w o n d e red to myself. H e th en w e n t o n to speak o f h o w his m o th e r had called his au n t to tell her, “ W illiam is afraid you are going to d ie— can ’t you tell him so m eth in g ?” I h ad read in his record that o n e w eek before his hospitalization he b ecam e alarm ed w h e n he heard that his ag in g a u n t, actually his m o th e r’s a u n t, had breast cancer and was to have surgery. H e had stayed up all nig h t, insisted o n visiting her, an d had to be esc o rte d from h e r hospital bedside. H e had also th rea te n e d to ru n in front o f a tru ck i f his parents did n o t take h im to his favorite restaurant. I did n o t say this to him , and W illiam w e n t o n to tell m e th at in th e previous year as p art o f his “ neuro -lin g u istic p ro g ram m in g ” course he had “ w alked on fire,” o n h o t coals, and did n o t feel pain o r get h u rt. T h a t night he again trie d to push his way o u t o f th e lodge and had to be restrained physically by staff for several m inutes. H e cam e o n tim e for his fifth session and said he felt relieved, that d u rin g th e n ig h t he was “ try in g to test force w ith force to find th e force.” I told h im I had b e e n in fo rm e d o f a n o th e r lim it, nam ely th at his insurance covered sixty days o f hospitalization an d that m aybe w e c o u ld w o rk o u t a trea tm e n t p lan fo r c o n tin u in g o u tp a tie n t treat­ m e n t after that. H e b ecam e very quiet. I w aited an d th en asked him w h a t he was th in k in g . H e said he was th in k in g a b o u t m ed icatio n . U p to that p o in t he had refused all m ed icatio n from th e psychiatrist and I n o w urged him to take m ed icatio n so that h e w o u ld n o t feel so agitated. B efore o u r next, an d last, session I lea rn ed there had b e e n a m istake, th at he had only thirty' days o f coverage, o r ju s t tw o w eeks m ore. W h e n I told h im this h e lo o k ed m o m e n tarily stu n n e d and th en declared th at he did n o t n e ed to be here anym ore and w anted to leave. I explained the legal procedures o f his sign­ in g a five-day n o tic e an d th e n a psychiatrist w o u ld assess h im regarding his safety w h ich w ould probably lead to a c o u rt-o rd e re d transfer to a n o to rio u sly bad state hospital. H e said he k n e w all o f th at and was eager to fight w ith the ju d g e for his freedom and th at if G o d decid ed he should go to a state hospital th e n it w o u ld be so th at he co u ld help o th e r patients there. I u rg ed h im to stay w ith us so th at w e co u ld perhaps m ake o th e r plans, a lth o u g h at the m o m e n t I had n o b e tte r alternative. H e decid ed to leave and th e n was transferred to th e state hospital. I have heard n o th in g o f h im since then. W illiam ’s pro b lem w ith th e O th e r has evident roots in his precarious, u n d e ­ sired existence and in th e freq u en t breakdow ns of, as Lacan puts it, “ the subject w h o is actually led to o ccu p y th e place o f the O th e r, nam ely, the M o th e r” (1977, p. 311). A k in d o f substitute m o th e r was available in th e aunt, b u t h e r

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recen t illness exposed W illia m ’s precarious existence and th e radical failure o f w h a t has b e en called “ the h o ld in g env iro n m en t.” 1 w ill a tte m p t to translate L acan’s O th e r in to the n o tio n o f the “ h o ld in g e n v iro n m en t” in o rd e r to elaborate the sem iotic fram ew ork o f treatm en t. T h e n o tio n o f the ho ld in g en v iro n m en t was presented by W in n ic o tt in 1954 w h en he w ro te about th e earliest p e rio d o f infancy: “ In p rim a ry narcissism the envi­ ro n m e n t is h o ld in g the individual, and at the same time th e individual know s o f n o en vironm ent and is at o n e w ith it” (1975, p. 283). P rio r to the differentiation o f subject and o b ject, a process w h ic h , F reud stressed (1925a), requires the act o f negation, and w h ic h , in th e developm ental m o d el I am proposing, requires shifting away from enacted iconicity, there is only the O th e r. In an earlier paper, W in n ic o tt (1945) did n o t use th e n o tio n o f “ h o ld in g e n v iro n m e n t” directly b u t foreshadow-ed it by describing h o w the early m o n th s o f infancy are m arked by u n in te g ratio n and that th e process o f in te g ratio n is p ro m o te d by “ the te c h ­ n iq u e o f in fan t care w hereby an in fan t is kep t w arm , h an d led an d b a th e d and rocked and n a m e d ” (1975, p. 150), thereby c o m b in in g physical ho ld in g w ith the c o n ta in in g fu n c tio n o f th e n am e as sign. T h is p a p er was discussed by Lacan in his Sem inar, The Formations o f the Unconscious (1 9 5 7 -5 8 , F ebruary 5). H e stated that c o rre sp o n d in g to th e role o f instincts in m ap p in g th e w orld o f anim als, th e signifying d im en sio n m aps the h u m a n w o rld before th e use o f speech: . . . even before language-learning is elaborated on the m o to r plane, and o n the auditory plane, and on the plane that understands w hat he is being told, there is already from the beginning, from his first relationships w ith the object, from his first relationship w ith the m aternal object, in so far as it is the prim ordial, prim itive object, the one on w hich depends his first sur­ vival, subsistence in the world, this object is already introduced as such into the process o f sym bolization, it already plays a role that introduces into the world the existence o f the signifier, this at an ultra-precocious stage. (1957-58, p. 9)

T h e m aternal h o ld in g is stru ctu red by an d as a sem iotic field. M o d e ll takes u p th e n o tio n o f “ h o ld in g e n v iro n m e n t” in analysis as a “ fram e” w ith “ constraints” (1990, p. 39), fu n c tio n in g as an “ illusion” (1990, p. 88), n o t a literal re p e titio n o f physical h o ld in g b u t a sym bolic o n e. In this fram e, levels o f e x p erien c e are tran sfo rm ed in term s o f tim e, m ean in g , and m em ory. M odell m akes an explicit reference to Lacan w 'hen he w rites: T h e experience o f the analytic setting as a holding environm ent is not uncom m only elaborated further into the illusion that this setting functions as a protective alternative environm ent that stands betw een the patient and a dangerous w orld. T his is truly a transform ation into a nother level o f

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reality that is not the “real” world, nor is it the world o f imagination and pure fantasy. Perhaps this is what Lacan (1978 [1964]) m eant when he dis­ tinguished the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary. (1990, p. 47)

T h e R eal aspects include th e elem ent o f tim e as a m ovem ent tow ard death, aspects o f the body, and som e destructive actions taken as attacks on the frame o f treatm ent (w hat the French call “passage a Fact”). T h e im aginary aspects include all form s o f m irro rin g (as we shall see in the next tw o chapters), w hile th e sym bolic aspects include the sem iotic code governing substitutions and com binations, the unconscious as dynam ic system, and enactm ents as con jo in ­ ing b o th partners in displaced semiosis. Such analytic transform ation, w e m ight say, reiterates an original transfor­ m ation in w hich the effect o f the O th e r is to initiate semiosis, to articulate the in fan t’s bod y through signs as a set o f needs. Such signing eventually trans­ form s th e experience o f need-satisfaction in to the desiring subject, probing and responsive to the desire o f the m other. Likewise the analytic fram ew ork transform s the patient into the transference subject, probing and desiring the analyst’s response, keen to kn o w and respond to the analyst’s desire. U nderstood in this way, the ho ld in g e n vironm ent is precisely w'hat socializes th e infant, transform ing the level o f b ru te need into a culturally-based ritual o f n u rtu rin g that involves an exchange o f cues. T h e sem iotic fault in psychosis appears to be due to a failure in this process. T h e radical failure o f the holding environm ent to serve as a lim ited field o f signifying convention and thus contain grandiosity is typically seen in the psy­ chotic patien t’s conviction that radio, television, and o th er signs are self-refer­ ential and m utually im plicated: th e p a tie n t’s ego totally overlaps the field o f the O ther, so that the patient resonates w ith all signifying possibilities. W h en there is a failure in treatm ent to articulate clear and firm boundaries, the psy­ chotic patien t’s grandiosity swells to fill the available space. Such responsivity to variations in bo u n d ary -d efin in g acts o f others suggests th at som e degree o f differentiation has occurred and this is o u r basis o f hope that such patients can change. W illiam ’s responsivity appeared in his readiness to en te r into the relations defined by “ I” and “you” once I indicated m y willingness to share in his illusion o f the holding environm ent as inscription. N e ith e r o f us challenged the basic function o f the Q u ie t R o o m as holding him , but I presum ed and expected him to be capable o f d oing w ork according to the code o f m y office, to be held by the sym bolic order, as I was. I seduced him into an im aginary role w ith m e as my patient ju st as he seduced m e into being his scribe. M y participation in these illusions, th rough my w riting, m y questions, m y com m ents about how' he “ seem ed” to m e, was an attem pt to create an alternative im aginary register,

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o n e that was n o t, how ever, purely personal, for 1 had n o t left m y place in the sym bolic fram ew ork o f the hospital and the culture, and I deliberately in tro ­ d u c ed in to o u r sessions the cu ltu re an d b o u n d aries o f the th erap eu tic c o m ­ m unity. B u ild in g these shared illusions w ith such pa tie n ts can provide an alternate fram e for eventually tran sfo rm in g th eir delusional identifications by establishing a transitional space as a w id e r b o u n d a ry o utside o f th e ir im agi­ nary dom ains. By b u ild in g such illusions w e a tte m p t to w o rk w ith the im agi­ nary register as a necessary transitional m o m e n t. In this regard w e can q u o te W in n ic o tt again: O u g h t vve not to say that by fitting in w ith the infant’s impulse the m other allows the baby the illusion that w hat is there is the thing created by the baby: as a result there is not only the physical experience o f instinctual satisfaction, but also an em otional union, and the beginning o f a belief in reality as som ething about w hich one can have illusions. (1975, p. 163) We have already n o te d an u n fo rtu n ate prejudice a m o n g psychoanalysts w h o w o rk w ith severely disturbed patients and am o n g those w h o engage in infancy research— nam ely, a k in d o f preverbal bias. T h e p h e n o m e n a th ey e x am in e o c cu r before th e child can speak, and so they c o n clu d e th at such p h e n o m e n a are pre-linguistic, pre-sym bolic, an d p rim a rily biological. W h a t w e m ust n o t overlook, as psychoanalysts, is the pervasive role o f the O th e r, as D o re e m p h a t­ ically rem inds us: We all readily believe that children acquire language in som e sense. We are less ready to believe that “language acquires c h ild re n .. . . ” We need a th e ­ ory o f w hat happens betw een speakers, and especially a theory o f the interaction betw een how the child acquires language cognitively and how a society acquires a child functionally. (1989, p. 256) W ilson and W einstein a tte m p t to in tro d u c e psychoanalytic readers to the ideas o f Lev V ygotsky w h o died in 1934 and in w hose w o rk w e can also find th e place o f the O th e r: “To Vygotsky, all h ig h er m ental functions first appear as social (“ interpsychological” ) p ro cesses.. .w hich are in te rio riz ed (“ priv atized ”), and transform ed u n d e r the aegis o f language” (1992, p. 362). In a sim ilar m an ­ ner, W ertsch and Tulviste present V ygotsky s ideas in term s o f th eir relevance to developm ental psychologists: Instead o f beginning w ith the assumption that m ental functioning occurs first and forem ost, if n o t only w ithin the individual, [Vygotsky] assumes that one can speak equally appropriately o f m ental processes as occurring between people on the interm ental plane. Indeed [he) gives analytic priority to such interm ental functioning in that intramental functioning is viewed as being derivative. (1992, p. 548)

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T h e develo p m en t o f “ in terio rized ,” “privatized,” “ in tra m en tal” processes is facilitated by the appearance, aro u n d age three, o f w hat V ygotsky term s “ eg o ­ c e n tric speech,” th e c h ild ’s self-speech, w h o se d ialogic features, how ever, as Lacan n o ted , m ark it as inclusive o f the O th e r and n o t tru ly e g o ce n tric (see also W ertsch, 1991). Such self-speech appears to be crucial in the c h ild ’s learn ­ in g to separate his o r h e r th o u g h ts from those o f o th ers and thereby lea rn to control o n e ’s beh av io r as o n e ’s ow n. “ W h a t w e find o n c e again here,” Lacan states, “ is th e co n stitu tio n o f th e subject in the field o f the O th e r ” (1964, p. 208). S uch a subject is n o t only intersubjective b u t is in subjection to the sem i­ otic fram e as h o ld in g e n v iro n m e n t, as T h ird , as th e lim ite d basis fo r p re­ dictability'. B u t identification w ith the O th e r, w ith th e u n b a rre d O th e r, negates intersubjectivity because it negates the place o f th e T h ird , thereby rem oving lim its o n grandiosity an d o m n ip o te n ce . S om e clinical im plications follow from this sem iotic correlate o f psychotic states. A p o in t o f view, a perspective th at includes th e T h ird , th e O th e r, this is th e m ost im p o rta n t aspect o f w ork in g w ith psychotic patients, and th e m ost difficult to m aintain in the face o f transference pressures. As R o se n b a u m and S o n n e (1986) em phasized, these patients m ake you feel as if y o u r p o sitio n an d y o u r p o in t o f view d o n ’t exist. T h is refusal o f re c o g n itio n results from the p ro fo u n d disturbance at the level o f th e e n u n ciatio n w h e re in th e second p e r­ son o f th e address is elim inated o r c o n v erted in to the O th e r w ith a capital O. T h e y address th e O th e r, n o t you. You are trivial, in co m m en su rate w ith th eir grandiose aims. As transference develops, how ever, y ou can b e co m e id entified w ith th e O th e r, th e u n b arred O th e r, all-pow erful to the patient. Such m o m en ts o f psychotic transference m ay be dangerous, for th e p a tie n t m ay attack you in o rd e r to destroy such pretensions in the O th e r, m ay in te rp re t your responses as a co m m a n d to attack so m e o n e else, o r m ay a tte m p t suicide in o rd e r to elim i­ nate th e felt difference and separation from th e O th e r. If I perceive such a psychotic transference developing, 1 try to em phasize the lim its o f m y know ledge and powrer by clearly ad m itting m y ignorance as well as by declaring that the fram ew ork o f treatm ent, the rules o f the O th e r, apply to m e equally, and precede m e, and are n o t the p roduct o f m y whimsy. I try to indi­ cate that each o f us, singly an d as a dyad, are b o u n d by and secured in the T hird. It is crucial at tim es for the analyst to speak fo r the O th e r, b u t n o t as the O th er. It is only after the patient and I begin to m ark the boundaries that lim it us that I attem pt to address sym bolic derivatives, such as W illiam ’s m essing w ith food o r c o n ce rn about exhaust, as possible signifiers. I th in k it is im p o rtan t to hear these elem ents, but n o t to in terp ret th em in speech, for th eir signifying function, th eir generativity in p ro d u c in g associated signifiers will, I think, m ost likely be over­ w h elm ed by the patien t’s narcissism. If o u r ow n narcissism com pels us to showr h o w sm art we are in h earing these clues, we will likely generate hostility.

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W h en the patien t’s identification w ith the O th e r is challenged, the patient often reacts by attacking limits and boundaries. Such behavior includes com ing late, w anting to m eet in the patien t’s room , not washing, threatening to injure som ebody, throw ing things in the office, and the various ways W illiam show ed he was n o t subject to the culture o f the therapeutic com m unity. Such b o u n d ­ ary violations m ust be addressed directly, calmly, and repeatedly, and in a hospi­ tal setting it is im portant to explain to o th er staff and patients, w h o have to endure the unpleasantness, and som etim es destructiveness, o f such behavior, that the p atient is am bivalently struggling to put an acceptable m arker at the edge o f his o r h e r being and requires feedback from others to succeed in c o n ­ taining his o r h e r inflated ego. Such repeated b o u n d a ry violations, w h en addressed in this way, usually expose in the patient a powerful c ontem pt for the sym bolization o f limits. This con tem p t often takes the fo rm o f seeing the o th e r patients as inferior because they have swallowed the staff’s ideology that sym bolization can provide stable references, that cultural norm s can contain behavior, that there is any w eight to form s o f hu m an influence beyond b rutal force. Such patients eventually say quite clearly that words are useless. T hey put to the test Peirce’s claim that sem i­ osis produces effects at least equal to those o f m echanical forces. Because words are indeed slippery things, because they can m ean anything o r nothing, they are often useless to such patients. Instead o f attem pting verbal interpretations, I have som etim es fo u n d that asking the patient to draw has proved stabilizing d u rin g psychotic episodes in o rd er to p erfo rm a kind o f reverse sublim ation, a transform ation w hereby the edge o f the R eal becom es an object (M uller, 1987b). I have also attem pted to take an explicit sem iotic stance w ith patients w h o periodically becom e speechless and then deliberately cut themselves. I ask w hat they cut and m ore often than not, as no ted earlier, such cutting appears to be a form o f w aiting, o f inscription o n the skin, as if the patient is attem pting to p u t a m arker at the edge o f the self, to m ark the frontier by transgressing it (Davoine, 1989). T h e challenge for o u r treatm ent o f these kinds o f patients is to articulate and sustain the holding environm ent, the O ther, long enough so that they do n o t destroy them selves o r the thera­ peutic com m unity. As W illiam ’s case sadly illustrates, how'ever, such a ho ld in g environm ent, w here w e can conduct the kind o f necessary treatm ent, is n o t available in m ost o f the U nited States because o f the econom ic politics o f health care. This is not only detrim ental to the patient b u t also to us, for w e m ust continue to learn from such w ork w hat makes us hum an beings, and to understand w'hat Bataille m eant w h en he w rote, “ no longer to wish on eself to be everything is for a hum an being the highest am bition, it is to want to be h u m an ” (1954, p. 25).

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The Ego and Mirroring in the Dyad

For Lacan, th e grandiosity o f th e psychotic ego, th e narcissistic re je ctio n o f limits, has its structural basis in the ego itself. Lacan endorses th at side o f F reud’s crid q u e o f h u m an self-awareness that sees the ego as narcissistic, as w h e n Freud w ro te :“ T h e desire fo r a pow erful, u n in h ib ited ego m ay seem to us intelligible; b u t, as w e are ta u g h t by th e tim es w e live in, it is in th e p ro fo u n d est sense hostile to civilization” (1938, p. 185). In this ch ap ter I will review data that supports L acan’s c ritiq u e o f the ego. T h is data suggests th at th e lim ited capacity o f the subject to say “ I” in any b u t a self-serving m a n n e r casts d o u b t o n the “ I-y o u ” relation itself. I am inclined to th in k (o w n in g at least som e o f m y o w n self-serving biases) th at th e e g o ’s narcissistic d o m in a tio n o f th e “ I-y o u ” relation is in p art illusory an d dislodged by th e u n predictability o f “ y o u ” speaking from th e po sitio n o f th e O th e r. For this reason, I believe, Lacan stated: “ T h e I is essentially fleeting in natu re and never entirely sustains th e th o u ” (1 9 5 5 -5 6 , p. 287). B u t th ere m ay b e m o re to th e ego th a n L acan grants: S m ith (1991) has cogently argued that in Freud and even w ith in L acan’s o w n fram ew ork w e have to grant to th e ego a n o n-defensive fu n c tio n th at seeks to face d anger and to integrate ra th e r th an disavow data. L acan’s c ritiq u e o f th e ego, how'ever, is in p art a reaction to its elevation in A m e ric an ego psychology to th e p osition o f arbiter o f reality, a role especially reserved in th a t trad itio n to th e ego o f th e analyst. His critiq u e m ay b e useful to engage n o w as w e see in th e ascendancy o f the dyad th e elevation o f th e fu n c tio n o f m irro rin g .

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As m irro r p h e n o m e n a have received increased atte n tio n , w e have fo u n d a diffusion o f m eaning. D e rv in sees m irro rin g as perhaps “ a q u ite natural p h e n o m e n o n that c o n trib u tes to b o th self and o bject representations” (1980, p. 138). O n the o th e r hand, C . G oldberg (1984) view s the d ouble as a second self b u t, at th e same tim e, also a co u n ter-self and a m irro r o f unacknow ledged, even unattainable aspects o f oneself. T hus, w hat is m irro red can include w hat is visi­ ble at th e surface as well as w hat is n o t visible, that w hich is disavowed, and even impossible. In this usage, the m irro r becom es n o t a reflector b u t a kind o f m agi­ cal w indow . W hile G o ld b erg stresses h o w m irro r p h e n o m e n a cast d o u b t o n the se lf’s u n ity an d identity, Pines claims th e opposite. Pines em phasizes th a t th e m o th e r’s selective responses to th e child’s behaviors reinforce certain behaviors and thereby p ro m o te an identity: “basically the sam e invariant personal th em e o f id en tity has b e en laid d o w n in a m irro rin g relationship to m o th e r” (1984, p. 32). B u t u n d e r a category o f m irro rin g response, Pines includes a w ide variety o f responses and in th e process seems to equate feedback and responsiveness o f any sort w ith a m irro rin g response. Feedback a b o u t o n e ’s actions o r presenta­ tions, how ever, is n o t necessarily m irroring; feedback m ay convey a recognition o f difference and otherness precisely by refusing to m irror. L acan provides a fram e w o rk fo r u n d e rsta n d in g this d istin c tio n b e tw e e n m irro rin g and re co g n itio n in th e way h e specifies th e stru c tu re o f m irro rin g p h e n o m e n a. H e locates m irro rin g in th e register o f th e im aginary, th at sensu­ ous, perceptible aspect o f ex p erien ce that has p o in t-to -p o in t c o rre sp o n d e n c e as its essential feature (Lacan, 1 9 54-55, p. 65; 1964, p. 86). T h e im aginary regis­ te r is stru c tu re d by a field o f spatial (and usually visual) representations w hose c h ie f visual p ro p e rty is fixed b u t illusory c o rre sp o n d e n c e . F or exam ple, b e tw ee n a slide o r im age in an overhead p ro je c to r and its reflected im age o n a screen, a series o f straight lines can be draw n, passing th ro u g h lenses th at create v irtual im ages so th at th e p a tte rn o f relationships o f th e ir p oints o f o rig in is d u p lic a te d by th e p a tte rn o n th e screen. T h is illusory p o in t- to -p o in t c o rre ­ sp o n d e n c e is th e essential feature o f m irro rin g , th e c h ie f a n d m o st salient process in th e register o f the im aginary. T h u s, m irro rin g reflects back th e illu­ sion o f sam eness and is alm ost always fo u n d in a dyadic relationship w h e re in o n e seeks to b e affirm ed as idealized by the o th er, to be fo u n d iconically in th e consciousness o f th e o th e r ju s t as o n e is fo u n d in o n e ’s o w n narcissistic consciousness. W h e n th e o th e r does n o t h old this view, o n e m ay th e n seek to im pose it, often in aggressive coercion. G iven this stru c tu re o f illusory correspondences, conveying differences is beyond th e capacity o f m irro rin g . In o rd er to convey difference there m ust be a structure that does m o re th an m erely represent iconically, for it m ust have the capacity to sym bolize o p p o sitio n , and such a stru ctu re is provided o n ly by language (Fodor, 1981). T hus, for Lacan, difference is a function o f the sym bolic

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register, th at aspect o f experience w hereby signification is introduced as distinct from representation.R epresentation, u ndersto o d as Peirces icon, requires resem ­ blance, w hereas signification rests o n difference, the difference betw een the index and its cause, the difference betw een the sym bol, its interpretant, and its object. At its m ost basic level, signification rests on the absence o f the object nam ed, o n the difference b etw ee n w o rd and thing, and on the differences a m o n g w ords: “ in language there are only differences,” w rote Saussure (1916, p. 120).Jakobson and Halle followed w ith :“ All phonem es den o te n o th in g b u t m ere otherness” (1956, p. 11). W ords have salience, n o t thro u g h any positive substance o r value each is assum ed to contain (and certainly n o t because they resem ble things), b u t rather through the reciprocal differentiations enabling phonetic distinctiveness to occur: “ P honem es are characterized not, as one m ight think, by th eir o w n positive qual­ ity b u t simply by the fact that they are distinct. P honem es are above all else oppos­ ing, relative, and negative entities” (Saussure, 1916, p. 119). For differences to be conveyed, therefore, th ere m ust be som e fo rm o f articu latio n (m aking use o f words, gestures, even im ages taken as signifiers) that m irro rin g , as such, can n o t provide. W h e n a group provides such articulation in the fo rm o f feedback about an individual’s behavior, it w ould seem inappropriate to call this m irro rin g rather than recognition and feedback. T herefore, I will use the n o tio n o f interpersonal m irro rin g to m ean that k ind o f iconic relationship in w h ich one images another, reflecting back an identity o f thoughts, feelings, o r behavior, im plying an identi­ fication o f desires, a positive agreem ent, an adm iration that provides narcissistic support. In 1936 Lacan delivered at the 14th In tern atio n al Psychoanalytic C ongress in M a rien b a d an unpub lish ed pap er o n the orig in s o f th e ego in the “ m irro r phase” o f child dev elo p m en t, w hose basic them es th e n appeared in an ency­ clopedia article o n “ T h e Fam ily” (1938). His later published pap er,“T h e M irro r Stage as Form ative o f th e F u n c tio n o f the I as R e v ea le d in Psychoanalytic E x p erien c e ,”

was

delivered

at

th e

16th

In te rn a tio n a l

C o n g ress

of

Psychoanalysis in Z u ric h in 1949. T h is pap er provided L acan’s basic fo rm u la­ tions about the m irro r phase, to g eth e r w ith “Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis,” delivered in 1948, and, in 1951,“ S om e R eflectio n s o n th e Ego.” T h e first tw o w ere published in his collection o f papers titled Ecrits (1966) and w ere selected by Lacan for translation in to E nglish (1977). Lacan, draw ing o n the w ork o f the F rench child psychologist H e n ri W allon (1931), presented a basic observation w hich “consists sim ply in the ju b ila n t inter­ est show n by th e infant over eight m o n th s at the sight o f his o w n im age in a m irro r . . . [and] in games in w h ich the child seem s to be in endless ecstasy w h en it sees that m ovem ents in the m irro r correspond to its o w n m ovem ents” (1951, p. 14). Lacan p resen ted this paper, in E nglish, to the B ritish P sychoanalytic Society; W in n ic o tt later responded by em phasizing “ the child’s seeing the self in

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th e m o th e rs face” (1967, p. 117). A lthough Lacan recognized (1938, pp. 4 5 ,4 8 ) that the w h o le h um an form w ith w hose im age the child is likely to identify is that o f a n o th e r’s body, and specifically the m o th e r’s (R ichardson, 1 978-79), he to o k as his basic paradigm for the origin o f the ego the infant’s positive response to its im age in a m irror. F rom the w o rk o f W. K o h ler (1925) Lacan k n e w that chim panzees are also capable o f resp o n d in g to th eir m irro r reflections as im ages o f them selves, b u t th ey so o n lose interest, w hereas the infant sustains a “ju b ila n t” response to his o r h e r o w n im age (1977, p. 2). R e se arc h by G allup (1977) late r fo u n d that chim panzees and orangutans are th e o nly anim als thus far sho w in g this capa­ bility.' T h e research o f Lew'is an d B ro o k s-G u n n (1979) m oreover, p rovided am ple e x p erim e n tal verification fo r L acan’s d e sc rip tio n o f th e in fan t before th e m irro r (M uller, 1982b). Lew is and B ro o k s-G u n n re p o rte d th a t m ost infants indicate they' perceive the im age in the m irro r as th e ir ow n by eighteen m o n th s o f age, and at e q u iv ­ alent m ental ages sim ilar indications are given by m entally retarded children (M ans et al., 1978; H ill and T om lin, 1981). T h is p e rio d from eight to e ig h te en m o n th s w h e rein Lacan located th e m irro r phase (at tim es he d ated its onset at six m onths) also includes the co nsolidation o f o bject p e rm a n en c e req u ired if th e infant is capable o f identifying its o w n im age as persisting and distinct from o th ers (Baer and W rig h t, 1974, pp. 3 7 -3 8 ; Lewis and B ro o k s-G u n n , 1979, p. 224). M oreover, this is also w h e n the capacity for lo n g -te rm m e m o ry appears, as ev id en ced in delayed visual re co g n itio n o f previously p resented co m p lex fo rm s (C o h e n , 1979; R o se , 1981), a lth o u g h , as w e have seen earlier, som e capacity fo r lo n g -te rm m e m o ry is e vident by o n e m o n th . L acan a ttrib u te d th e in fa n t’s positive response to th e w h o le fo rm o f the h u m a n b o d y w ith w h ic h it id entifies to th e universal h u m a n c o n d itio n o f p re m a tu rity at b irth , a c o n d itio n n o ted by F reud (1926, p. 154) an d argued by G o u ld as necessary i f the in fan t’s head (only o n e -q u a rte r o f its eventual size) is n o t to exceed th e lim its o f the m aternal pelvic cavity. G o u ld cited evidence that led h im to conclude: “ H u m a n babies are b o rn as em bryos, and em bryos th ey rem ain fo r a b o u t th e first n in e m o n th s o f life” (1976, p. 22)— th at is, they are “ ready” to be b o r n d u rin g th e p e rio d at w h ic h Lacan located th e m irro r phase, th e p e rio d o f readiness to perceive and identify w ith th e Gestalt o f th e h u m a n form . T h e in fan t’s ju b ila n c e at this m o m e n t is d u e to th e im aginary anticip atio n o f th e fo rm ’s coherence, m astery, stature, and unity1, a Gestalt that 1.

Epstein and colleagues have attempted a Skinnerian demonstration o f this capability in pigeons (1981) and have presented it in a film which has been criticized sharply (Gallup, 1984). Gallup, in turn, has been criticized for claiming that m irror self-recognition is linked to the cognitive capacity to attribute mental states to others (Bard, 1994).

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sharply contrasts w ith the con co m itan t features o f prem aturity, namely, a perva­ sive neurom uscular discoordination and ex p erien ce o f helplessness. To identify w ith th e w h o le h u m a n form in this narcissistic way has a defensive fu n c tio n o f c o n ce alin g helplessness and d isc o o rd in a tio n u n d e r the cover o f p erceived coh eren ce, unity, and mastery, and this defensive fu n c tio n is o n e o f th e central roles th e ego w ill c o m e to play in d e v elo p m en t, fo r th e b o d y in h u m an s is never sim ply a given in experience, b u t m ust be c o n stru cted th ro u g h th e elab­ o ra tio n o f the b o d y im age (Ver E ecke, 1983). A further consequence o f the m irror phase is w hat Lacan, follow ing C. B iihler (1927) and E. K o h ler (1926), called “transitivism.”2 D u rin g th e p e rio d from sbc m onths to tw o -a n d -a -h a lf years th e child is subject to a captivation by the image o f an o th e r child o f roughly th e same age (Lacan, 1977, p. 19). In dual play each is observed to alternate b e tw ee n th e positions o f p u rsu e r/p u rs u e d , se d u c e r/ seduced, m aster/slave. O n e cries at seeing the o th e r fall. W h a t o n e desires the o th e r wants. T his confusion o f identities argues for th e pow erful effect o f the visual form o f th e c o u n te rp a rt as well as th e lu rin g aspect o f b e in g seen by another. T h e vision o f th e h u m a n fo rm as a Gestalt th a t th e in fan t takes to be oneself, this m irro r-re fle ctio n o f th e h u m an body, is fo r Lacan distinct from “ th e self” o r “ the subject.” In calling it th e ego, Lacan em phasized its stru ctu re as th e fo undational, narcissistic identification an d basis for all subsequent id en ­ tifications; in this sense it is precisely th e ego defin ed by F reud as “ th e precip ­ itate o f ab an d o n e d o b jec t-c a th e x es” (1923, p. 29) and is consistent w ith his view o f the ego as “ first and forem ost a bodily e g o ” (1923, p. 26), responsible for resistance, self-protective, and th e first love ob ject (1914a, p. 75). T h e stru c ­ ture o f reflected id en tity that gives rise to the ego necessarily situates the ego in an inevitable d istortion p ro p e r to all m irrors (T hom as, 1980) and in an alien­ ation from th e individual taken as subject. R eflected identity is an o bject for the subject, an o th e r for th e subject, for its o rig in gro u n d s it as an e x te rio r repre­ sentation. C onsciousness thereby b eco m es p ro n e to view in g itself as “ c o rre c t” w h e n it reflects reality, and this iconic n o tio n o f th e m in d b e in g a “ m irro r” o f nature has b een a m ajo r obstacle to g en u in e in q u iry (R orty, 1979). N o t only is an intrusive alienation thus established at the c en ter o f consciousness, b u t the ego as reflection is a rig id rep re se n tatio n fu n c tio n in g as “ th e a rm o u r o f an alienating identity, w h ic h w ill m ark w ith its rig id stru c tu re th e sub ject’s entire m ental d e v elo p m en t” (Lacan, 1977, p. 4). T h e ego resists flexible change, exerts a repressive effect o n th e u n conscious desire o f th e subject (Freud, 1918, pp. 2.

Henri Wallon, whose influence Lacan acknowledged (1977, p. 18) referred this notion to Wernicke (1900, p. 226):“T he attribution to another o f what is proper to us results from an illusion signalled by Wernicke under the name o f transitivism” (1921, p. 53).

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110—12), and shapes reality to suit its o w n req u irem en ts— namely, the m ain te ­ nance o f its o w n attributes o f p e rm an en ce, identity, and substantiality (Lacan, 1977, p. 17). T h e m irro r phase, m oreover, establishes the fram ew ork for in te r­ subjective illusion insofar as it enables the child n o w to m irro r th e m o th e rs desire, to be w h a t th e m o th e r w ants so as to please her. A n early, persistent, and perhaps m o re c o m m o n way o f pleasing o thers is by im itatin g th em . T h e self-serving role o f im itatio n as m irro rin g appears, fo r exam ple, in th e effect that im itatio n generally has o f m ak in g the im itato r m o re attractive to th e o n e b e in g im itated (Yando et al., 1978). T h e le n and K irkland (1976) su m m ariz ed research in d ic a tin g that b e in g im ita te d increases o n e s a ttraction tow ard the im itato r and leads to increased allocation o f rewards and to reciprocal im itation. T h e y also fo u n d that schoolchildren like and im itate those older children w h o im itate th em , b u t this was n o t the case w h e n im itated by y o u n g e r children (presumably, because the y o u n g e r children w ere view ed as o f low er status and less m asterful). T h e sam e children also ju d g e d th eir ow n p e rfo rm a n ce s to be b e tte r w h e n th ey w ere im itate d by an o ld e r child th an w h e n im itated by a y o u n g e r child, w hose im itatio n was actually fo u n d to be u nw anted. W h ile th e research trad itio n in th e area o f im itatio n is vast, previous n a tu ­ ralistic observation as wrell as co n tro lled studies ten d e d to date the capacity for im itatio n at “a ro u n d the e n d o f the first year, roughly b e tw ee n n in e and th ir­ te e n m o n th s ” (A bravanel and Sigafoos, 1984, p. 381). T h ese researchers a tte m p te d to p ro d u c e im ita tio n in y o u n g e r infants, b u t generally n o w ellfo rm e d copies o f adult m o d elin g appeared in infants aged o n e to five m o n th s (to n g u e p ro tru sio n , th ey suggested, app eared as a released response, n o t a g e n u in e im itatio n ). A n earlie r study re p o rte d th at im itative b e h av io r w'as o bserved d u rin g the first w eeks o f life (M eltzoff and M o o re , 1977), b u t this re p o rt was severely c riticize d o n m e th o d o lo g ic a l g ro u n d s (A nisfeld, 1979; M asters, 1979) and an a tte m p t to replicate it (Jacobson an d K agan, 1979) failed to o b tain results sho w in g that o n e - to tw o -m o n th -o ld infants can selectively im itate a m odel. As we have seen, how ever, th e m o re re ce n t research o f Field and h e r associates (1982) as well as T revarthen (1989) c o n firm that very y o u n g infants can in d e e d be b ro u g h t in to a resonantial, ico n ic facial m irro rin g response to adults. T h e deg ree o f active c ontrol that im itatio n requires m ay be unavailable at this early age, and this variable o f control m ay usefully distinguish im itatio n from th e involuntary, em pathic, and less conscious processes o f id en ­ tification based o n em o tio n al c o n ta g io n and en acted iconicity. W e have additional data c o n g ru e n t w ith the L acanian m o d el o f the m irro rphase infant. A sen d o rp f and B audonniere (1993) observed 112 pairs o f n in etee n -m o n th -o ld s in dyadic play. Sustained synchronic im itation occurred only in those dyads in w hich b o th partners show ed, on a n o th e r m easure, the capacity for

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explicit self-rcco g n itio n . T h is suggests that overt im itatio n o f a n o th e r p e er requires discrete self-awareness. K agan fo u n d that infants beg in to im itate an adults behavior around nine o r ten m o n th s o f age, b u t thereafter p eer im itation increased w ith age, especially after tw o years. T h is p e rio d (after o n e year) includes the appearance o f “m astery smiles” o c cu rrin g w hile pursuing o r having attained a goal in solitary play. A t e ig h te en to tw e n ty -fo u r m o n th s K agan observed the e m e rg en c e o f evaluative standards, as indicated by a tte n tio n to broken toys, m issing upholstery buttons, and o th e r Gestalt violations, w h ich , in a psychoanalytic co n tex t, can also be view ed as cues suggesting the possibility' o f bodily fragm entation and, therefore, a violation o f th e basic evaluative standard o f body integrity. K agan also observed distress follow ing an adult m o d el’s perfor­ m ance, in d icatin g a p p reh e n sio n “because o f a self-im posed o b lig a tio n to perform actions th at [the child] is n o t sure she can im p le m e n t” (1981, p. 54). Such “ obligation,” w e can fu rth e r surm ise, is im posed by th e e g o ’s pu rsu it o f m astery in im itation o f m asterful m odels o r in an a tte m p t to m aintain desir­ ability in the eyes o f the m asterful m odel. A review o f m o re th a n 80 studies o n im ita tio n in c h ild ren y ield e d an acco u n t o f im itatio n as a cognitive to o l e n h an c in g c o m p e ten c e and stren g th ­ en in g attachm ents (Yando et al., 1978). O n e w o u ld expect, therefore, that chil­ dren w ill prefer to im itate parents, an d this is precisely w h a t R o th b a u m (1976) rep o rte d in his study o f children aged seven, ten, and fo u rte e n years, w h o w ere found to im itate parents over strangers, an d especially parents w h o agreed w ith each other. C h ild re n are also m o re likely to im itate a m o d e l’s beh av io r if they are rew arded fo r d o in g so (that is, im itatio n gets th em w h a t th ey w ant); som e characteristics o f th e m o d el, such as prestige, co m p e ten c e, o r dom in an ce, can signal to the child th at im itation o f these m odels w ill get th e m w h a t they w ant (B andura, 1971). C h ild ren m ay also k n o w that th ro u g h im itation they can m anipulate adults, for the self-enhancing effects o f b e in g m irro re d th ro u g h im itatio n e x te n d to adults. Bates (1975) fo u n d th at adult m odels w ere m o re sensitive to children w h o im itated them than tow ard those w h o did not; that is, adults displayed in the presence o f the im itating child m ore nonverbal cues o f positiveness and respon­ siveness, talked m ore, rem ain ed in closer proxim ity, lo o k ed at th e c h ild ’s face m ore, show ed few er negative expressions, and, further, they rated the im itating child h ig h er o n intellectual and social characteristics. T h e effects o f m irro rin g and b e in g m irro re d even ap p ear to in flu en ce punitiveness. B erk o w itz and D u n a n d (1981) fo u n d th at subjects in a h o t ro o m gave the m ost severe p unish­ m e n t to a p eer w h e n she appeared n o t to be b o th ere d by the heat and w ere least punitive w h e n she seem ed to share in the suffering: “ In sum , w e c o m e to like those w h o (we believe) have th e same em o tio n al feelings w e d o w h e n they are exposed to th e sam e unpleasant c o n d itio n ” (B erkow itz, 1983, p. 114).

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E vidence for such narcissistic influences on ju d g m e n t extend well beyond research on im itation. C onsistent and repeated experim ental findings show a pervasive self-serving bias in o n e ’s judgm ents (Greenwald, 1980; see also M uller, 1986). T his bias takes the form o f exaggerating o n e ’s role in effecting desired outcom es w hile m inim izing o n e ’s role in brin g in g about undesired outcom es. For exam ple, in a study by Jo hnston (1967), subjects w ere told that each had a p artner w ith w h o m they had to perform a task o f skill; “ feedback” was subse­ quently given to each “ team ” (there was, in fact, no partner). Afterward, in cases o f designated “above average” perform ance, subjects took credit for the success, w hile the assum ed p a rtn e r was blam ed w h e n th e p erfo rm an ce was labeled “ below average.” E ven w h e n the p erform ance was called “ average,” subjects believed that th eir ow n above-average perform ance was low ered by the below average perform ance o f the fictive partner, and this resulted in the “ average” designation. T h ere are m any experim ents o f this sort that yield a consistent pattern o f results (Z uckerm an [1979] review ed m ore than 75 such a ttribution studies; see also G reenberg and Pyszczynski [1985]) in w h ich the self-serving bias appears w h e n subjects engage in direct com petition w ith o n e a n o th er o r w h en o n e ’s ow n p erform ance is the focus o f the evaluation, b u t n o t w h e n a n o th er is the focus. It is in the dom ain o f oneself th at w e find the e g o ’s self­ e n h an cin g activity to be predictably p ro m in e n t. A recen t study by Jussim (reported in Bower, 1994) once again found that college students claim ed m ore responsibility for th eir perform ance outcom es w hen they were given positive feedback than w h e n they w ere criticized, b u t this finding held only for those w ith high self-esteem and was reversed in the case o f those w ith low self­ esteem. A dditional findings (A bram son and Alloy, 1981) indicate that depressed subjects, w h en com pared to “ n o rm al” subjects, do n o t show this self-serving bias; that is, nondepressed subjects exaggerate o thers’ positive views o f th em (Lewisohn et al., 1980); they claim to be able to control uncontrollable events (Alloy et al., 1981); they underestim ate the am ount o f negative feedback others give th em (N elson and C raighead, 1977); they overrew ard th eir o w n perfor­ m ances (R ozensky et al., 1977); and they m ake internal attributions for th eir successes w hile blam ing their failures on external factors (A bram son and Alloy, 1981). O n the o th e r hand, those w h o m ake such self-serving, distorted attri­ butions have b e tte r cancer outcom es. Taylor (1983) exam ined the treatm ent course and beliefs o f w o m en w ith breast cancer and found that patients w h o do best m ake exaggerated and illusory attributions that they o r th eir physicians can control the illness, and they make self-enhancing social com parisons (no m atter how severe th e ir illness, they claim to be b e tte r o ff th an others). If idealization can be term ed a form o f “ m irro rin g up,” th en these self-enhancing social com parisons can be view ed as a type o f “m irro rin g d o w n ” w herein

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th e reflection o f th e o th e r contains o n e ’s m isfortune, b u t w orse. In subsequent research (rep o rted in B ow er, 1994) T aylor fo u n d th at peo p le are realistic w h e n assessing and m ak in g plans to resolve personal problem s, b u t m anifest positive illusions a b o u t them selves w h e n im p le m e n tin g th eir plans. T h e jo in in g o f this experim ental data w ith L acan’s m o d el o f ego fo rm atio n in th e m irro r phase can be in te rp re te d in light o f a constraints m o d el o f the ego. Keil (1981) suggests a paradigm that w e can use to co n ceptualize th e ego as a set o f constraints restricting an d d isto rtin g k n o w led g e o f th e d o m ain o f oneself. Such a set o f constraints lim its h o w this d om ain is view ed, accounts for the effortless and rapid acquisition o f d isto rte d k n o w le d g e o f this d o m ain , m akes such know ledge less accessible to conscious intro sp ectio n and change, is associated w ith felt anom alous n e u ro tic sym ptom s, an d leads to specific struc­ tural features. I f w e view th e arena o f im itatio n , social co m p ariso n , and self-evaluation in this way, namely, as th e field w h e rein the ego attem pts to buttress its position o f m astery and c o h ere n ce th ro u g h m irro rin g illusions, th e n these em pirical findings appear to c o n firm som e psychoanalytic o bservations. F o r exam ple, Freud describes “ the m etam orphosis o f the parental relationship into the super­ e g o ” in th e follow ing term s: T h e basis o f the process is w hat is called an “ identification”— that is to say, the assimilation [eine Angleichung, a likening o r approxim ation] o f one ego to another [ein fremdes, a foreign, even unfamiliar] one, as a result o f w hich the first ego behaves like the second in certain respects, imitates it and in a sense takes it up into itself. (1933, p. 63) T h e first ego, confronted w ith the overw helm ing (and strange) superior a u th o r­ ity o f the parent, does its best to resem ble by im itation that parent, and thereby placates him o r h e r by m irro rin g . Just three years later A nna F reud w ent o n to describe identification as “ o n e o f the e g o ’s m ost p o te n t w eapons in its dealings w ith e x te rn al objects w h ic h arouse its a n x ie ty ” (1936, p. 110). She explicates “ o n e o f th e m ost natural and w idespread m odes o f b e h av io r o n the p art o f th e p rim itive e g o ” as “ the physical im itatio n o f an antagonist” (1936, p. 111): “ By im personating the aggressor, assum ing his attributes o r im itating his aggres­ sion, th e child transform s him self from th e p erson th rea te n e d in to the person w h o m akes the th rea t” (1936, p. 113). W e can w o n d e r h o w m u ch this m irro r­ ing pro ced u re o f th e ego accounts fo r c h ild ren ’s aggressive beh av io r (Hall and C airns, 1984) as well as for the influence o f televised aggression (H uesm ann et al., 1984), especially i f the g ro w in g child appears to learn th at in o u r society aggression is a sanctioned way to assert mastery. G iven th e defensive, self-protective, and d isto rtin g effects o f im itatio n and identification, w h a t valence d o w e give such processes w h e n they d o o c cu r in

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trea tm e n t, w h e n , for exam ple, the p a tie n t begins to dress, act, speak, o r th in k like th e analyst, a d o p tin g th e analysts a ttitu d e s an d o p in io n s, and in q u irin g silently w h a t th e analyst w o u ld d o in a given situation? M eissner view s such form s o f im itatio n as problem atic: A d ifficu lt q u e s tio n fo r th e analyst to assess is w h e th e r th ese im itatio n s serve th e p u rp o ses o f th e analysis o r w h e th e r th ey rep re sen t resistances. W h e n these im itative p attern s are m o tiv ated by th e n e e d to please, placate, o r attach o n e se lf to an idealized o r feared o b ject, th ey m u st b e recognized as defensive. (1981, p. 12)

I f th e Lacanian ego is at w o rk here, such im itation w o u ld seem to be intrinsi­ cally defensive. Is this n o t precisely h o w the ego, w ith its iconic structure, neces­ sarily functions? M eissner distinguishes im itation (w hich he view's as an external b ehavior) from id en tific atio n (w'hich he calls an in te rn al process) an d th en reserves a positive place for “ the eg o ’s in h eren t ten d en cy tow ard identification” because the “ p atient’s imitative use o f analytic attitudes, especially in the c o n te x t o f a positive therap eu tic alliance, can have a pow erful inductive im pact o n the developm ent o f m eaningful, constructive identifications w ith the analyst” (1981, p. 15). S uch iconic processes m ay be required to prevent fragm entation, to estab­ lish cohesion and boundaries for th e self in the m ost regressed m odes o f a hier­ archical fram ew ork (G edo and G oldberg, 1973; G edo, 1993), b u t they m ay b e a source o f resistance w h e n assum ed as a goal o f treatm ent. T h is goal o f analysis, fo rm u la ted in term s o f som e k in d o f intern alizatio n o f o r identificatio n w ith the analyst, appears to be w id ely accepted. L oew ald states that id en tification b e tw ee n p a tie n t and analyst “ is, as is always claim ed, a necessary re q u ire m e n t for a successful analysis” (1960, p. 19). Schafer w rites o f “a k in d o f in tern alizatio n o f th e analyst as analyst in to th e analysand’s ego and ego ideal organization that has m u ch to d o w ith his o r h e r subseq u en t capac­ ity for, an d interest in, b enignly influential self-analysis” (1976, p. 47). K o h u t addresses h o w th e analytic process, th ro u g h “ o p tim al frustrations” an d “ tim ely in te rp re ta tio n s,” leads to “ th e tran sm u tin g in te rn a liz a tio n o f th e selfobject analyst an d his fu n c tio n s a n d th u s to th e a cq u isitio n o f p sychic stru c tu re ” (1984, p. 172). A tw o o d an d S to lo ro w also u n d e rsc o re “ th e p a tie n t’s gradual in tern alizatio n o f th e analyst’s observational stance” (1984, p. 61). T h e p atien t b e c o m e s able to to le rate se p a ra tio n by u sin g “ an im age o f th e analyst’s em p ath ic responsiveness,” an d gradually “ th e co n cre te im ages o f th e analyst” are n o lo n g e r necessary “ o n c e th e in te rn a liz a tio n o f th e analyst’s e m p a th ic qualities b eco m es fully in te g rate d in to th e subjective se lf” (1984, p. 62). T h is c o n te m p o ra ry fo rm u la tio n can b e read as essentially re-p resen tin g earlier ones; fo r exam ple, Strachey em phasized that th e c h ie f curative m echanism in alter­ in g th e status o f in tro je cted an d p ro jected “bad objects” lies in th e w ay the

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p a tie n t’s super-ego is m odified by “ the repeated process o f in tro jectio n o f imagos o f the analyst” w hich functions as the patient’s “ auxiliary su p er-eg o ” through m utative interpretations w hose aim is “ to cause the introjection o f the analyst” (1934, p. 157n). Sim ultaneous w ith Strachey’s paper appeared a paper by Sterba (1934) and, although B ergm ann and H artm an view the tw o as “ poles apart in w'hat they consider crucial for the process o f psychoanalytic treatm ent” (1976, p. 361). Sterba also stressed the curative value o f interpretation in the co ntext o f “ a c ertain a m o u n t o f positive transference, on the basis o f w hich a transitory strengthening o f the ego takes place thro u g h identification w ith the analyst. This identification is induced by the analyst” (1934, p. 121). T his focus on iden­ tification w ith the analyst is neither old-fashioned n o r a “ deviance” due to self­ psychology; S o lo m o n , in

her

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th e

A m erican

Psychoanalytic Association, stated: Thus self- and object representations are modified as a result o f analysis. T he modification o f the self-representation is based in part on the identi­ fication with the analyst. The effective identification is . . . with the “ real­ ness” dem onstrated by the consideration and respect for the p a tie n t... (1982, p. 341). Blum , endorsing Loew ald’s position, states that the “ analyst is an extraordinary new object w ith w h o m the patient identifies and w h o offers th e patient the awareness o f the patient’s developm ental potential” (1981, p. 59); Blum goes on to endorse the views o f Strachey and Sterba on the p atien t’s identification w ith the analyst (1981, p. 61). O n e finds sim ilar views voiced elsew here (e.g., G reenson, 1967; Z etzel, 1970). Since I have n o t been able to find a citation o f Freud advancing the cura­ tive role o f identification w ith th e analyst, 1 w 'onder i f Freud ever prom oted this n o tio n . C learly Lacan does n o t (19 5 4 -5 5 , p. 88), and he criticizes this “ term inal identification” o f th e p a tie n t’s ego w'ith the analyst’s ego because it leads to a “reinforced alienation” (1977, p. 274) o f the original alienation o f the m irro r phase. T h at is, the patient enters analysis precisely because he suffers from sym ptom s due to the splitting o ff o f his unconscious desire by an ego rigidly m aintaining the faltering illusion o f coherence and mastery. H ow then can analysis assist if it serves to reinforce and strengthen th e ego’s illusory' posi­ tion? T here is no d o u b t that the patient’s ego will aim at an identification w ith the analyst, and it m ay be true that Lacan’s ow n analysands suffered such a fate (Silverm an, 1983), b u t w hat can justify giving this process a central curative role in the theory o f psychoanalysis? Althusser offers one way to understand the pro m o tio n o f the goal o f iden­ tification w ith the analyst w hen he analyzes the con cep t o f ideology in term s

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o f m irro rin g . H e argues from a M arxist position that the repressive State appa­ ratus achieves its goal o f m ain tain in g c o n tro l by m eans o f ideology, w h o se m ain effect is to create the illusion o f individual subjectivity, w h o se fictive a u to n o m y m irro rs, as a reflectio n , th e auto n o m y , in tu rn , o f an absolute Subject. In his co n cre te exam ple, he analyzes the tradition o f ju d a e o -C h ristia n religious teach in g and practice in term s o f the way it “subjects the subjects to th e S u b ject, w h ile g iv in g th e m in th e S u b ject in w h ic h each su b ject can c o n te m p la te its o w n im age (present and future) th e guarantee that this really c o n ce rn s th em and H im ” (1971, p. 180). A lthussers analysis captures, I th in k , the way religion operates w h e n it loses its place in the T h ird in relation to the State; in o th e r w ords, w h e n it identifies w ith political aspirations, th ere b y c o llu d in g w ith dyadic processes, in c lu d in g th e lo v e-h a te oscillations th a t increase th e lik e lih o o d o f vio len ce. L ikew ise w h e n id en tific atio n w ith the analyst becom es the goal o f treatm ent, the analyst has lost the required place in th e T h ird from w h ic h dyadic processes can be discerned (as w e w ill see in the n e x t c h ap ter o n K o h u t’s analysis o f M r. Z ). A lthusser draw’s o n Lacan in utiliz­ in g th e category o f the im aginary for all ideologies insofar as they are in h e r­ ently structured by m irro rin g m odes. I f we utilize this fram ew'ork regarding the view o f psychoanalysis that relies o n identification w ith th e analyst as a central curative factor and a goal, th e n w e m ay w o n d e r h o w m u c h o f th e effect o f tre a tm e n t is d u e to th e effects o f ideology. T h e “psy ch o an aly tic id e o lo g y ” w o u ld aim , th en , to create th e illusion o f individual, a u to n o m o u s subjectivity s tre n g th e n e d as a result o f m irro rin g th e p re su m ed a u to n o m o u s k n o w in g subject w h o is the analyst (M uller, 1992b). A relentless suspicion governs L acan’s trea tm e n t o f th e ego: “ T h a t th e ego is a capacity to fail to recognize [méconnaissance] is th e very fo u n d a tio n o f th e te c h n iq u e o f analysis” (1 9 5 3 -5 4 , p. 153). B u t from the e g o ’s defensive posi­ tio n , any regression to an earlier p e rio d is associated w ith anxiety and loss o f auto n o m y : “T h is illusion o f unity, in w h ic h a h u m a n b e in g is always lo o k in g forw ard to self-mastery, entails a constant d anger o f sliding back again in to the chaos from w hich he sta rte d ” (1951, p. 15). Such regression, Lacan notes, ty p i­ cally occurs in dream s that involve b o d y fragm entation, decapitation, rip p in g o p e n , etc., especially d u rin g a phase o f analysis dealing w ith the earliest problems o f the patient’s ego and w ith the revelation o f latent hypochondriacal p reoccupations.. . . T h eir appearance heralds a particular and very archaic phase o f the transference, and the value we attributed to them in identifying this phase has always been confirm ed by the accom ­ panying m arked decrease in the patient’s deepest resistances. (1951, p. 13) Such archaic transference m ust, o f course, be treated w ith care, for any a tte m p t to dism antle th e ego produces aggressivity as an inevitable response (1977, pp.

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16—22). All aggression, in fact, can be view ed as a response to insult, challenge to th e e g o ’s sense o f m astery, o r physical v io la tio n o f th e sense o f b o dily integrity. G u n trip w rites that “ aggression is a personal m eaningful reaction to bad o bject relations, to a threat to the ego, aroused initially by fear” (1971, p. 37). T h e ensuing aggression serves to reinforce th e e g o ’s illusion o f c o h ere n ce and m astery, and as n o te d earlier, research evidence suggests that the absence o f such illusions is associated w ith depression. In paranoia, such illusions rem ain intact b u t b e co m e expansive to the p o in t that o therness as such b ecom es intolerable. T h e re are n o relative perspectives, there is only o n e tru th (the e g o ’s), an d w h a t is attacked in delusions o f perse­ c u tio n is precisely o n e ’s ideal ego pro jected o n to others. D eW aelhens w rites: “ T h e paranoiac is o n e for w h o m every relation to o th ern ess is structurally a rep ro d u c tio n o f the m irro r-c o u p le ” (1972, p. 74), w h ic h is th e p ro d u c t o f the m irro r phase, namely, th e libidinal tie b etw ee n th e subject and its im age, th e ego. In this m irro r-c o u p le , “ th e ego and its o th e r are indefinitely reciprocal and reversible. T h e subject seeks to find his identity in th e im age, b u t this id en tity w ith h im self is, in som e fashion, his o th e r” an d this o th e r is th e priv ileg ed m em b er o f the couple “since it will serve as th e n o rm , the imago, o f that w hich I m ust b e c o m e . . . in o rd e r to be.” T h e desire to e lim in a te “ all difference betw een the m em bers o f the couple, and the im possibility o f accom plishing it, engenders a destructive aggressivity that, o n w hichever m e m b e r o f th e couple it is set loose, w ill always be self-destructive” (D eW aelhens, 1972, p. 73). T h u s Lacan uses the p u n haine-arnouratioti (love - hate = enam oration) to describe the affective rie b in d in g dyadic o b ject relations in w h ic h ego is related to ego as an “ im a g in ary c o u p le ” (1966, pp. 54, 3 4 4 -4 5 ). Such a view o f psychoanalytic practice as red u ced to a dyadic relation, as a practice in w h ic h th e sym bolic register is suppressed in favor o f a “ u to p ia n rectificatio n o f th e im a g in ary c o u p le ” can arouse in “ everyone o f g o o d faith” o nly “ th e se n tim e n t o f abjec­ tio n ” (1966, p. 54, m y translation). L acan ackn o w led g es th a t m irro rin g an d id en tific atio n are inevitable ego processes and, therefore, that th ey w ill go o n in analysis. H e charts th e ir place in th e course o f tre a tm e n t th at b eg in s w ith a “ rectification o f th e su b je ct’s relation w ith th e real” ; 1 take this to in clu d e m ak in g th o se in te rv en tio n s that are “ bey o n d in te rp re ta tio n ” (G edo, 1993), in o rd e r to assist th e p a tie n t suffer­ in g from frag m e n ta tio n anxiety, by p u ttin g a b o u n d a ry at th e ed g e o f th e R e al. W e m ove from th e R e a l to th e im a g in ary re g iste r as tre a tm e n t th e n “p ro c e e d s . . . to th e d e v elo p m en t o f the transference,” w h e rein th e analysand repetitively seeks to lu re th e analyst in to a dyadic h ate-love relationship as ego to ego. T h e o b se rv atio n o f such re p etitiv e re co n fig u ra tio n s leads “ th e n to in te rp re ta tio n ” (L acan, 1977, p. 2 37), w h e re b y th e se m io tic m a trix o f th e p a tie n t’s u n c o n sc io u s desire can b e re co g n ize d an d a rticu la te d . F o r Lacan,

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“ th ere is no tw o -b o d y psychology w ith o u t the in te rv e n tio n o f a third elem ent. If, as w e m ust, we take speech as the central feature o f o u r perspec­ tive, th en it is w ith in a th ree- rather than tw o -te rm relation that we have to form u late th e analytic e x p erien c e in its to ta lity ” (1 9 5 3 -5 4 , p. 11; see also 1974). T h e treatm ent ends not w ith the patients identification w ith the analyst but w ith the patient finding the analyst to be no longer necessary, since the patient w ould now have the capability o f finding and being held by the T h ird in future situations and relationships. If identification w ith the analyst and thereby strengthening the ego is n o t the goal o f treatm ent, w h a t then becom es the aim o f analysis? Lacan stresses that the aim o f analysis is the recognition and articulation o f desire. Desire em erges in the gap o r lack (manque) o p e n ed by the separation betw een the in fan t’s fantasy and the m o th e r’s reality. T his separation is due to the m o th e r’s in te rm itte n t absence and th e ch ild ’s realization th a t th e m o th e r has o th e r objects o f desire besides the child. T h e separation is enforced by the law against incest and o th e r societal n o rm s w hose delegate is the father, o r the paternal function. L acan’s paradigm for the m o m en t w h e n “desire becom es h u m an ” (1977, p. 103) was the Fort-Da episode o f Freud’s grandson (described by Freud, 1920, pp. 14-15) in w'hich the child was observed to throw a spool tied to a string over the edge o f his crib u tte rin g “ O - O - O - O ” (the G erm an Fort, “ G o n e ” ) and, w h e n retrieving it, Dal (“ th ere ”). T h e absent and th en present spool, conjoined w ith the reciprocally opposed phonem es, is taken as an enactm ent in transitional space o f b o th the m o th e r’s absence as well as a loss o f that aspect o f o n eself im plicated in th e fo rm er im agined state o f b e in g the m o th e r’s com pletion. T h u s the sym bolization makes a place for absence, as such, w hose recognition is h enceforth inscribed in language. T h e w ant is a w a n t-to -b e o r lack in being (“ manquc-a-etre,” 1977, p. xi) that gives rise to desire as an inces­ sant series o f displacem ents o f this original w ant, a series structured by artic­ ulated linguistic form ations w hose conventional structures stand in the way o f free associations. Lacan asks: W hat use do we make o f language and o f speech in the cure? In the analytic relation there are two subjects linked by a pact. This pact is set up on levels w hich are very diverse, even very confused, at the beginning. It isn’t, in essence, any the less a pact. And we do everything, via the prelim ­ inary rules, to establish this aspect quite firmly at the beginning. W ithin this relation, the initial task is to untie the m oorings o f speech. (1953-54, p. 181) W h e n desire is repressed by a strong, n o t a “w eak” ego, substitutions appear: these are sym ptom s, structured as m etaphors (M uller and R ichardson, 1982,

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pp. 113—14), w hose dissolution is achieved w hen the repressed signifier is artic­ ulated through the process o f interpretation. In this paradigm o f analysis, the identification o f the p a tie n t’s ego w ith th at o f the analyst is a re petition o f the original m irror-phase transference o nto an idealized image taken as oneself. As a narcissistic and aggressive attem p t to shore up a faltering sense o f co h er­ ence and mastery, clearly it will occur, but ju st as clearly it is a questionable goal o f treatm ent.

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From Imaginary to Symbolic Identification in the Case of Mr. Z

C linical im plications o f L acan’s c ritiq u e o f h u m a n narcissism stand o u t w h e n w e com pare th e ideas o f L acan and K o h u t. K o h u t’s w id ely c ited p a p er o n his tw o analyses o f M r. Z (1979), n o w alleged to be in fact a b o u t h im self and his self-analysis (C ocks, 1994), helps us to see m o re clearly, in a clinical c o n te x t, th e differences b e tw e e n L acan’s im a g in ary and sym bolic registers. A lth o u g h K o h u t does n o t m e n tio n L acan in his p a p er (he d id elsew here, e.g., 1977), they p articip ated in a c o m m o n if n o t shared effort. N o t o nly d id th e ir lives overlap, b o th d y in g in 1981, b u t th e ir w o rk , too, show s rem arkable c o rre sp o n ­ dences, at least at first glance. B o th w ere p ra ctic in g analysts w h o d re w u p o n th e ir o w n e x p e rie n c e to o ffer a re fo rm ist c ritiq u e o f m ain stream p sy c h o ­ analysis, especially o f ego psychology. B o th criticize m ak in g the eg o th e c ri­ te rio n fo r tru th an d reality, K o h u t by focusing o n a co m p reh en siv e n o tio n o f “ self,” and L acan by e la b o ratin g th e “ subject o f th e unconscious.” B o th m en em phasize d isin te g ra tio n a nxiety and p u t m irro rin g p h e n o m e n a in th e fo re­ fro n t o f processes o f id en tific atio n th a t shape subjective e x p erien c e . B o th challenge th e a cc ep te d n o tio n o f th e p a tie n t’s “ resistance” and instead stress th e clinical im p o rta n c e o f re co g n itio n . B o th c riticize th e k in d o f train in g p ro v id ed by psychoanalytic in stitutes an d are equally critical o f th e “ th era ­ p e u tic m a tu rity - o r re ality -m o rality ” reinforced by such train in g (K o h u t and 1.

T he reader is referred to the following texts to pursue similarities between Kohut and Lacan.In their criticism o f ego psychology, see Kohut (1984, p. 59, 65, 148), Lacan (1977, pp. 1-29, 128-29, 132,306); in their critique o f naive notions o f “reality,” see

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W olf, 1978, p. 4 2 3 ).1 In th e ir overall c h aracterizatio n o f c o n te m p o ra ry exis­ ten ce, b o th K o h u t and Lacan use th e figure o f “ tragic m a n ” (K o h u t, 1984, pp. 45, 2 0 7 -2 0 8 ; L acan, 1951, p. 16; 1 9 5 9 -6 0 , p. 361). Finally, a lth o u g h b o th o p e n ly o p e rated from a reform ist position, each stressed his p ro p e r orthodoxy. W h ile K o h u t offered “ a n e w d e fin itio n o f th e essence o f the self an d a new co n ce p tu a liz atio n o f its structural d e v e lo p m e n t” (1984, p. 8), he m ain tain ed th a t his v ie w p o in t “ is placed squarely in th e c e n te r o f th e analytic trad itio n , th a t it is in th e m ainstream o f th e d e v elo p m en t o f psychoanalytic th o u g h t” (1984, p. 95). L acan, critical o f th e n e o -F reu d ia n s, re itera ted th a t his effort consists in a “ re tu rn to F re u d ” an d to the foundations o f psychoanalysis (1977, p. 117). L acan never a b an d o n e d this claim , even th o u g h he w as co n sid ered a re n eg a d e by m o st analysts afte r he w as e x c lu d e d in

1953 from

th e

In te rn a tio n a l Psychoanalytic A ssociation (Turkle, 1978). T h e Freudian u n conscious, a ccording to Lacan, is “ stru c tu re d in th e m ost radical way like a language” (1977, p. 234): th e unconscious, as O th e r to c o n ­ sciousness, as in tru d in g o n rational discourse, is an articu latio n governed n o t by biological instincts b u t by sem iotic patterns. F reud (1900a) describes h o w th e d re a m -w o rk follow s the tw o g o v e rn in g prin cip les o f c o n d en satio n an d dis­ p lac em e n t; Lacan (1977, pp. 160, 258), app ly in g th e stru c tu ra l linguistics o f Saussure (1916) an d Ja k o b so n (1956), re in terp re ts F re u d ’s data in term s o f m eta p h o ric substitution an d m eto n y m ic co m b in a tio n . T h e u nconscious artic­ ulation, preserved in repression an d insistently repeated in sym ptom s and parapraxes, is inscribed in a m a n n e r foreign to th e conscious ego. T h e unconscious, therefore, is th e “ discourse o f th e O th e r ” (Lacan, 1977, p, 172), and h u m a n desire is “th e desire o f the O th e r ” (1977, pp. 2 6 4 ,3 1 2 ).

The Other As w e saw in C h a p te r 7, the O th e r is n o t any individual person (although the O th e r is often p ro jec te d o n to individuals), n o r is it a k in d o f universal, like M e a d ’s “ the generalized o th e r” (1925, p. 193). F or Lacan, the O th e r is a field, “ th e very fo u ndation o f intersubjectivity” (1956, p. 35), a n c h o rin g the place in w h ic h dialogue can arise and m ean in g b e co m e possible. Lacan illustrates this w ith a jo k e o f F re u d ’s: “ ‘W h y w ere you lying to m e?’, o n e character shouts breathlessly. ‘Yes, w h y d o y ou lie to m e saying y o u ’re g o in g to C ra c o w so I sho u ld believe y o u ’re g o in g to L em berg, w h e n in reality you are g o in g to Kohut (1984, p. 36,173), Lacan (1977, p. 135,230); on disintegration anxiety, see Kohut (1984, p. 16), Lacan (1977, p. 11,137); on resistance: Kohut (1984, p. 144, 148), Lacan (1977, p. 7 8 ,1 0 1 ,1 4 3 ,1 6 9 ,2 3 5 ); on training and reform, see Kohut (1984, p. 40, 164), Lacan (1977, p. 3 5 -3 7 ,7 6 , 144); on "reality-morality,” see K ohut (1984, p. 208), Lacan (1959-60, p. 349; 1966, p. 677).

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C racow ?’ ” (1956, p. 36; Freud, 1905a, p. 115). To m ake sense o f this jo k e, the lis­ ten e r m ust go beyond th e w ords them selves, beyond th eir literal signification, and also beyond the speakers them selves in to a n o th e r d im en sio n o r positio n b e yond w ords and speakers, in to th e sem iotic field. In u n d erstan d in g this jo k e, w e affirm the status o f the O th e r, n o t an o th e r person in an I-you relation, b u t the O th e r as the structural T h ird , giving perspective o n any I-you relation, the O th e r as a po ten tial place to stand an d ju d g e th e tru th o f any tw o -p a rty c o n ­ tract. T h e very fact that it is possible to lie, Lacan rem inds us, is an affirm ation o f this th ird position, for to tell a lie requires that the speaker take in to account the perspective o f tru th , the perspective afforded by the O th e r. F o r this reason Lacan refers to the O th e r as “ the g u aran to r o f G o o d F a ith ” (1977, p. 173) and “w itness to th e T ru th ” (1977, p. 305). T his reference to th e O th e r resonates w ith F re u d ’s use o f F e c h n e r’s phrase, ein anderer Schauplatz (an o th e r scene), in d escribing th e u n c onscious staging o f dream s an d as a gen eral re fe re n ce to th e u n c o n sc io u s (F reud, 1900a, p. 48; 1900b, pp. 5 0 -5 1 ). As “ th e discourse o f th e O th e r,” w h ic h transcends it, the u n conscious articulates w h a t is received from elsew here an d w h a t is p rim a rily received is “th e desire o f the O th er.” D esire arises in an intersubjective c o n te x t stru c tu re d by th e O th e r, by th e sem iotic fields o f language an d th e u n c o n ­ scious. Lacan w ro te th at it is “ as desire o f th e O th e r th at m a n ’s desire finds fo rm ” (1977, p. 311), th at is, “ it is qua O th e r th at he desires” (p. 312). In the m a trix o f th e m o th e r-in fa n t re la tio n , o n e ’s desire finds its fo rm , b e co m es u nconsciously stru c tu re d by, an d as, th e desire o f a n o th e r, and this id entifica­ tio n o f o n e ’s desire w ith th a t o f a n o th e r can never be c o m p letely dissolved; is th e dynam ism expressed in re p etitio n , an d persists as stru c tu re d by signifiers. L acan illustrates th e F reudian discovery by m eans o f e x -c e n tric circles, cir­ cles w hose centers d o n o t c o in c id e and th at c a n n o t be sub su m ed and u nified by a larger circle w ith a single center. H e c autions th at “ i f w e ig n o re th e se lf’s radical e x -c e n tric ity to itself w ith w h ic h m an is c o n fro n te d , in o th e r w ords, th e tru th discovered by F reud, w e shall falsify b o th th e o rd e r an d m eth o d s o f psychoanalytic m e d ia tio n ” (1977, p. 171). W e c a n n o t m ed ia te this split as ana­ lysts by b e lieving th e p a tie n t can b e c o m e a “ w h o le p e rso n ” o r a “ c o m p lete se lf” (1 9 5 4 -5 5 , p. 243). L acan objects “ to any reference to totality in th e in d i­ v id u al” (1977, p. 80) because th e in -d iv id u u m is n o t co nceivable given the split in tro d u c e d by “ th e su b je ct o f th e u n c o n sc io u s” (1977, pp. 128, 299). T h u s, Lacan insists th a t th e “ radical h e te ro n o m y th at F re u d ’s discovery show s gaping w ith in m an can nev er again be covered over w ith o u t w h atev er is used to hid e it b e in g p ro fo u n d ly d ish o n e st” (1977, p. 172). F o r this reason L acan’s m o d el o f th e h u m a n sub ject is n o t th e sphere, c o n n o tin g w holeness, b u t the topological figure o f the torus, th e d o u g h n u t w ith an e m p ty center. For Lacan (as fo rW rig h t, 1991) loss is essential to the c o n stitu tio n o f th e h u m a n subject.

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Fragmentation and Mirroring H ow , th en , does consciousness com e to experience itself as a unity, as cohesive instead o f as fragm ented? Lacan claims that the source for such e x p erien c e o f unity lies in the fo rm atio n o f th e ego in w h a t he called the “ m irro r stage” o f child dev elo p m en t. As n o te d in th e preced in g chapter, L acans a tte n tio n was d raw n to m irro rin g p h e n o m e n a by th e F re n c h psychologist H e n ri W allon. W allo n ’s early em phasis o n the in fa n t’s visual p re co c ity and sociality (1921, 1931; see alsoVoyat, 1984) m ade it clear that there was n o initial prim ary nar­ cissism o r autistic p e rio d o f infancy. T h e h u m an infant is b o rn in to a linguisti­ cally stru ctu red social m ilieu in w h ic h its consciousness o f self is shaped by w h a t it takes itself to be as th e o b jec t o f the m o th e r’s desire. B e g in n in g in u tero as th e o b ject o f th e m o th e r’s fantasies (Ver E ecke, 1984, p. 76; see also K o h u t and W olf, 1978, p. 416), th e visually precocious n e w b o rn m oves tow ard psychological d ifferen tiatio n th ro u g h th e process o f id en tific atio n w ith th e im age o f th e w h o le h u m a n b o d y as a Gestalt.2 Processes o f m irro rin g lead to th e c e m e n tin g o f id entifications, n o t ju s t betw ee n th e ego and its im age in others, b u t also b e tw ee n th e ego and objects in the w orld. T h e ego takes o n to itself from th e m irro r th e attributes o f c o h er­ ence, substantiality, a n d p e rm a n e n c e an d in tu rn pro jects these a ttrib u te s o f itself o n to th e objects o f its w orld. T h e Lacanian ego, as F reud describes it, is “first and forem ost a bodily eg o ” and “ the projection o f a surface” (1923, p. 26). T h a t is, th e ego arises w ith the im age o f th e b o d y to fo rm a p ro jected plane, th e foundational g rid o f consciousness. T h is g rid establishes consciousness o f self as a staging arena in w h ic h an “ I” coordinates th e narrative seq u en ce o f experience, a stage o n w h ic h this “ I” creates representations that distort ex p e ­ rien c e b u t enhance o n e ’s sense o f m astery' and effectiveness by exaggerating o n e ’s im portance and, as we have seen, by m inim izing the positive contributions o f others. T h e p e rce p tio n , fu rth erm o re, th at so m eo n e else has w h a t o n e w ants is intolerable to the ego and breeds envy, resentm ent, and revenge. In w ritin g o f “ th e dram a o f p rim o rd ial jea lo u sy ” (1977, p. 5), Lacan acknow ledges K le in ’s c o n trib u tio n in u n d e rstan d in g th e role o f re sen tm en t in o u r culture (1977,p. 20-21). H e notes h o w th e envy o f the analyst’s skill is an affront to the ego as th e p a tie n t exclaim s, “ I can ’t b ear the th o u g h t o f b e in g freed by anyone o th e r th an m y se lf” (1977, p. 13). H e q u o tes from A u g u stin e ’s Confessions h o w he “ foreshadow ed psychoanalysis” w h e n h e observed “ th e psychical and som atic c o ordinates o f original aggressivity” :

2.

We can speculate about how the infant’s own form is reflected in the pupils o f the m others eyes. Brown and Witkowski found that “slightly over one-third o f the lan­ guages o f the world equate pupil o f the eye with a human or humanlike object” (1981, p. 600), including “established figurative expressions translating literally as ‘baby o f eye,’ ‘girl o f eye,’ or ‘doll o f eye’ ” (1981, p. 597).

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I have seen with m y ow n eyes and know n very well an infant in the grip o f jealousy: he could not yet speak, and already he observed his foster-brother, pale and w ith an envenom ed stare. (1977, p. 20) Lacan em phasizes certain consequences o f this process o f m irro r identifica­ tion. Since left and rig h t are reversed, the reflection is disto rted (1 9 6 1 -6 2 , p. 471). Since it takes place before the infant has an active role in m aking m eaning th ro u g h speech, this reversal process is a com pelling one: the infant is iconically captured by its im age w h ic h lures its narcissistic investm ent. B u t because this image com es to it from a nother and is perceived as being “ o u t th ere ” as an other, som e confusion persists a bout identities. As w e saw in C h a p te r 8, in this confused p e rio d the infant, identifying w ith the im age o f the body o f another, will cry at the sight o f a n o th e r child falling o r b e in g struck as if he o r she w ere suffering the injury. In this stage o f ego developm ent the child is learning to m anage com petitive aggression and to m aintain self-esteem . T h e ego for Lacan plays a dynam ic role in stru c tu rin g a sense o f im aginary identity w ith un ity an d coherence precisely because w ith o u t its defensive a rm o rin g the child w o u ld experience bodily frag­ m en tatio n , an ex p erien ce o f corps mórcele, the b o d y in bits and pieces. To avoid this loss o f coherence, the ego will strive to buttress its m asterful position against threats from w ithin as well as from others. In identifying w ith parental and o th er adult desires, the ego uses denial, disavowal, repression, and pro jectio n to evade o n e ’s o w n desire. C o n trary to C o e n ’s claim (critical o f K ohut) that m aintaining cohesion “is n o t a p re d o m in an t m otivation for b ehavior” (1981, p. 404), w h e n experien cin g an attack o n its cohesion o r preem inence, th e ego m obilizes fan­ tasies o f an o th e r’s fragm ented body in its counterattack. For K ohut, aggression is “ always m otivated by an in ju ry to th e self” (1984, p. 116). Likewise for Lacan, aggression is “secondary to identification” (1938, p. 39) and is a structural co rre­ late o f the ego; he defined it as “ the correlative ten d en cy o f a m ode o f id en ti­ fication that we call narcissistic” (1977, p. 16). T h e narcissistic investm ent in o n e ’s cohesive image, w h e n threatened by th e other, is tu rn e d in to an effort to frag­ m en t the other, in a prim itive, iconic reversal o f the threat. Aggressiveness, there­ fore, cannot be controlled by strengthening the ego, by reinforcing the ideal ego, b u t rather by shifting focus to “ the pacifying function o f the ego ideal” (1977, p. 22) th rough “ O edipal identification,” w hich is “ th at by w h ic h the subject tran­ scends the aggressivity that is constitutive o f the prim ary subjective individua­ tio n ” (1977, p. 23).

Identification and the Ego Ideal Before w’e go fu rth er w ith L acan’s th in k in g a b o u t “ O edipal identification,” w e have to acknow ledge that the n o tio n o f identification as such poses e n o rm o u s difficulties. As W id lo ch er noted, “ In psychoanalysis, the con cep t o f identification

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is a blurred one, and will probably rem ain so for a long tim e to c o m e ” (1985, p. 31). T his confusion is especially prom inent w ith regard to the concept o f “ p ri­ m ary identification,” w hich “ turns o u t to be anything but clear” (Etchegoyen, 1985, p. 5). In this instance, the psychoanalytic confusion appears to rest on the com plexity o f the history o f the w ord itself. In the Compact Edition o f the Oxford English Dictionary (1971) we read that identification is “ the action o f identifying or fact o f being identified.” Two definitions follow: 1) “ the m aking, regarding, or treating o f a thing as identical w ith . . . another, o r o f tw o or m ore things as identical w ith one a n o th e r.. 2 ) “ the determ in atio n o f iden­ tity; the action o r process o f determ ining w hat a thing is; the recognition o f a th in g as being w hat it is.” Identification thus m eans b o th being in an iconic relation o f identity w ith or likeness to another and also being determ ined o r recognized as being separate, as b eing w hat o n e is. T h e w ord “ identity,” w hich has as an obsolete fo rm the w ord “ idem ptitie,” derives from the late Latin w ord identitas, w hich is “ pecu­ liarly form ed from ident(i)-, for [the Latin] idem ‘sam e’ + -tas,-tatem !' Its m ean­ ing is given as the “ quality o r c o n d itio n o f b e in g the same . . . essential sameness; oneness . . . the c ondition o r fact that a person o r thing is itself and n o t som ething else.” In the dictionary there is explanatory no te regarding the origin o f the w ord “ identity” from the Latin idem: “ Various suggestions have been offered as to the form ation. N e e d was evidently felt o f a nou n o f condi­ tio n o r quality from idem to express th e n o tio n o f ‘sameness,’ side by side w ith those o f ‘likeness’ and ‘oneness,’ expressed by similitas and unitas: hence the form o f the suffix.” All o f the psychological confusion o f oneness, sameness, and likeness is packed into the history o f the w ord itself, and Lacan therefore began here in his attem pt to m ake sense o f the concept o f identification. H e started w ith the Latin root idem and then considered its Indo-E uropean root em, as found, for example, in the French w ord for “same,” même. H e then considered identification from the angle o f recognizing som eone, o f determ in­ ing that he or she is the “same,” the very person one has taken him o r h e r to be. H e postulated that such “ identity” o f the subject rests o n a signifier, a nam e, n o t on a specific appearance no r on a consciousness o f continuity. T h e “prim ary identification” is achieved through nam ing, through the use o f a signifier, func­ tioning as an index, contiguously related to the one nam ed as an effect o f the act o f nam ing. This form o f identification is symbolic identification, it is the process w hereby one Ls identified by a sign and in fact is designated as “this o n e ” only through the use o f a sign. Such symbolic identification is also operative w h en o n e ’s identity is unconsciously constellated by o th er signifiers, bestowed by par­ ents in specifically designated ways. W e are all subjected to these words in child­ hood, and they structure a kind o f unconscious sym bolic m ap o f desire that Lacan term ed the ego ideal. It is the ego ideal that enables one to channel desire,

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and Lacan contrasted it to the ideal ego, w hich, in striving for com petitive mas­ tery, resists the assumption o f one s necessarily lim ited desire. T he ideal ego is the product o f an im aginary identification, an identification with the image held by consciousness as a reflection o f the m irror or the m irroring gaze o f another. In im aginary identification, a dual, iconic relation is established based on a likeness in w hich one or b oth poles are idealized, inflating the ego. Such imaginary iden­ tification cannot be prim ary since it occurs only w ith the onset o f the m irror stage and ordinarily follows upon the decisive consequences o f nam ing, kinship specification, and initiation into the sem iotic code. In Lacan’s view, the oedipalization o f the subject does n o t stimulate conflict but, rather, generates structure. I f the m o th e r’s role in the genesis o f the subject is to engage desire, then the father’s role is to structure desire and symbolically individuate it through the action o f w hat others have called “ early triangula­ tio n ” (Abelin, 1975, p. 296) and w h at Lacan called the “ paternal m eta p h o r” (1977, p. 199). In m etaphor, one signifier is substituted for another, w hich remains operative but in a repressed state. In the “paternal m etaphor” the father’s nam e is the signifier o f the symbolic order, a consequence o f w hich is the incest prohi­ bition, the end o f m other-infant duality, and the introduction o f a third. This structure o f sym bolization as such substitutes for a fusion o f desires associated w ith w hat Lacan called the “phallus.” T h e phallus, the image o f w hat is im agined to be lacking in the m other, is w hat the infant becom es for the m o th er in an im aginary identification. W ith the structure o f the paternal m etaphor, the infant “ gives u p ” being the phallus, the latter then becom ing repressed as a generalized signifier o f the desire o f the O ther. In repression it continues to function but now precisely as a another signifier in unconscious associative netw orks o f sig­ nifiers that follow the laws o f displacem ent and condensation. As a consequence, the child becom es a subject, n o t simply o f language, but o f desire, and no longer ju st an object o f the m o th e r’s o r father’s desire, as identified in an im aginary m anner w ith th eir desire. T h e child can no w sym bolize and experience as a desiring subject the parent’s absence. B ut the very possibility o f im aginary iden­ tification, o f experiencing oneself as com plete and the com pleting object o f another’s desire, rests on the m ore fundam ental identification by a nam e as this one. To be nam ed is to be placed in a symbolic netw ork that sets one apart pre­ cisely as not being som eone else. Kinship relations, sex roles, social status, pre­ scribed obligations and opportu n ities all rest on w hat Lacan, follow ing Lévi-Strauss, called “th e symbolic order” (1954-55, pp. 29,326).

The Symbolic Order and the Signifier In this and the previous chapter w e have focused prim arily on the im aginary register, that aspect o f experience structured by dual resemblances, p o in t-to point correspondences, and m irroring reflections. At the heart o f such reflections

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is the lure o f likeness, o f being liked o r liking because o f likeness, o f narcissis­ tic preening, ostentatious display, com petition, and com parison. T h e im aginary register includes w h at is proper to the image, the sensuous play o f light and sound that draws our interest and that constitutes m uch o f w hat we call “ reality,” to be distinguished from w hat Lacan calls the R eal. As we have seen in earlier chapters, the register o f the R eal is w hat we from tim e to tim e e n co u n ter in ecstasy o r in h o rro r as that w h ich has no nam e. It appears in that startling m o m e n t o f the breakdow n o f technology (as in the explosion o f the C hallenger o r the Bhopal gas leak) as the intrusion o f loss o f m eaning, sudden catastrophe, death. T h e R eal is w hat rem ains w hen images and symbols carve o u t objects in experience; it is a m argin o f n o t ju st w h at is “ undecidable” but w hat is im possible to sym bolize o r im agine. We are bro u g h t to the edge o f the unspeakable R eal in a piece by the G erm an painter Anselm Kiefer, titled Ausbrennen des Landkreises Buchen, Cauterization of the Rural District o f Buchen (R osenthal, 1987, p. 65). As

I view this w ork, the atrocity o f

B uchenw ald, and the retroactive effort to place it in a sem iotic fram ew ork (to p u t it in a “b o o k ”), is presented in the form o f a series o f large op en “boo k s” constructed o f b o u n d burlap sheets w hose “pages” are covered w ith black oil and charcoal. T h e eye searches desperately for a tex t o r an image by w hich to grasp the horror, but there is no w ord and no image: the “b o o k ” brings us to the very edge o f signification and, by this very negation o f w ord and image, the h o rro r o f the unspeakable and unim aginable is conveyed to us. If we manage to live w ithout going mad, it is because we construct and m ain­ tain a boundary at the edge o f the R eal; this line, this lining o f o u r daily lives, provides the essential, prim al boundary for the hum an subject. Ordinarily, the images and words provided by o u r culture shield us from contact w ith the R eal, but in severely traum atized o r psychotic states patients are often at the edge o f the R eal; and the experience o f being driven slightly crazy by psychotic patients is a response to their attem pt to bring the treatm ent to that edge so that they can draw som e kind o f boundary there, to place som e m arker at that frontier. T h e m arker that sets o ff the R eal, th at “introduces difference as such in the R e a l” (Lacan, 1961-62, p. 78) is the signifier, a sem iotic term Lacan to o k from F erdinand de Saussure, the Swiss fo u n d e r o f m o d e rn structural linguistics. Saussure m ade a basic distinction betw een speech and language, insisting that speech is an individual psychom otor act w hereas language is a system o f signs that makes speech possible. T h e linguistic sign is com posed o f th e ju n c tio n o f a signifier and a signified, a signifier being a p h onetic sound-im age, a concept being the signified. Saussure stressed that signifier and signified are related solely by convention, that is arbitrarily, w ith o u t intrinsic co nnection. H e also em pha­ sized that each, in itself, is w ith o u t positive substance b u t consists, rather, solely in its difference from the o th er units in the linguistic system:

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Everything that has been said up to this point boils dow n to this: in lan­ guage there are only differences. Even m ore im portant: a difference gener­ ally implies positive term s betw een w hich the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences without positive terms. W hether we take the signified or the signifier, language has n either ideas n or sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic dif­ ferences that have issued from the system. T he idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is o f less im portance than the other signs that surround it. (Saussure, 1916, p. 120) P utting it another way, language is a form and not a substance___ T his truth could not be overstressed, for all the mistakes in o ur term inology, all o ur incorrect ways o f nam ing things that pertain to language, stem from the involuntary supposition that the linguistic phen o m en o n m ust have sub­ stance. (p. 122) It is this “ d istinctive fe a tu re ” o f th e signifier, th e fact th a t it is established w ith in th e system n o t as an id e n tity b u t as a difference, th a t distinguishes th e sym bolic register from th e im a g in ary register, o n o n e h a n d , d o m in a te d as it is by its m irro rin g id en titie s, and, o n th e o th e r h a n d , from th e register o f th e R e a l, w h e re th ere is n o d iffere n tia tio n . T h is n o tio n o f th e substanceless sig­ n ifie r as id e n tity -in -d iffe re n c e finds its p rim e expression in m usic: a single n o te has n o “ m e a n in g ” in itself, it derives its value solely th ro u g h its differ­ e n ce from o th e r notes. I o n c e heard a Japanese p sychoanalyst d escrib e this even m o re su c c in c tly w h e n h e said th a t th e m usic rests o n th e silence b e tw e e n th e notes.

The Subject of the Unconscious W e e n c o u n te r g reat difficulty w ith this n o tio n o f p u re difference w h e n it is used to define the h u m a n subject. As w e have seen, Lacan sharply distinguishes ego from subject an d locates F re u d ’s Kern unseres IVesens, w h a t K o h u t (1984) likew ise calls “ th e co re o f o u r b e in g ” (1984, p. 140), n o t in consciousness b u t at th e level o f th e subject. B u t this m eans th a t w e are d ealing n o t o nly w ith w h a t L acan calls “ a su b ject w ith o u t a h e a d ” (1 9 5 4 -5 5 , p. 167; see also R ic h a rd so n , 1983) b u t a su b je ct w ith o u t positive substance. T h e subject o f th e un co n scio u s, th e sub ject o f psychoanalysis, is n o t c o n stitu te d by positive a ttributes. R a th e r, it receives its id en tity th ro u g h a process o f sym bolic id e n ­ tification w h ereb y it is designated as som e “ one.” Such sym bolic identificatio n is achieved th ro u g h signifying differentiation, co n cretized in the conferral o f a p ro p e r nam e. Lacan stated that “ to nam e is first o f all so m e th in g th at has to do w ith a reading o f th e m ark one designating th e absolute difference” (1 9 6 1 -6 2 , p. 148). Such id en tific atio n , such “ o n e -in g ,” is n o t fo u n d e d o n qualitative dif­ ferences o r representable c o n te n t. S elf an d o b jec t representations (as used, for

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exam ple, in o b jec t relations th eo ry ) are seco n d ary to this m o re fu n d am en tal id en tific atio n based o n the signifying difference, “ th e inaugural id en tificatio n o f th e sub ject w ith th e radical [or root] sig n ifier” (Lacan, 1 9 6 1 -6 2 , p. 38). W h a t seem s to be at stake h e re is th e a ffirm in g o f a stru c tu ra l basis for uniqueness, and Lacan fo u n d it in the signifier: “ It is as pure difference that the u n it, in its signifying fu n c tio n , is stru c tu re d , is c o n stitu te d ” (1 9 6 1 -6 2 , p. 58). T h is u n it m arks th e subject as “ one,” and this m ark, given in o n e ’s nam e, is the least d e te rm in e d by any qualitative, positive characteristic. B e in g so sy m b o li­ cally m arked as “ o n e ” is th e necessary c o n d itio n o f possibility for th e subject to d ifferentiate from o th ers, an d specifically from th e field o f th e desire o f th e m o th e r. Lacan linked his v iew o f sym bolic id en tific atio n to F re u d ’s seco n d type o f id en tific atio n . F reu d w ro te th a t w ith this ty p e “ id e n tific a tio n has appeared instead o f o b jec t-c h o ice , and that o b je c t-c h o ic e has regressed to id en tifica­ tio n ” (1921a, p. 1 0 6 -1 0 7 ). In o th e r w ords, this type o f id en tific atio n occurs in th e place o f th e lost object, and such identificatio n is “ th e earliest and o riginal fo rm o f e m o tio n al tie ” (1921a, p. 107). It can o c c u r in re la tio n to o n e w h o is loved, o r o n e w h o is n o t loved, b u t “in b o th cases th e id en tific atio n is a partial an d ex trem ely lim ite d o n e and only b o rro w s a single trait [einen einzigen Zug\ from th e p e rso n w h o is its o b je c t” (1921a, p. 107; 1921b, p. 117). L acan zeroed in o n F re u d ’s phrase einen einzigen Z ug as suggestive o f a single trace, une trait unaire in F rench, basically ju s t a line o r a m ark. H e e x p lo re d th e o rig in o f this m ark, follow ing th e linguistic research o f L ero i-G o u rh a n (1964, pp. 2 6 2 -4 ), in th e cuts o r n o tch es m ade o n b o n es 35,0 0 0 years ago, n o tch e s m ade perhaps to in d icate a “o n e ” in a series o f ones, k eep in g c o u n t, fo r exam ple, o f b irth s o r anim al kills o r astro n o m ical p h e n o m e n a (see also H a rris, 1986). T h e use o f this trace o r m ark, Lacan speculated, gave rise to th e e x p erien c e o f segm ented tem porality, n arrative sequentiality, and firm o b jec t b o u n d a rie s. T h is trace o r m ark is a signifier, specifically an index, and as such has its status in th e O th e r, “ th e lo cu s o f th e sig n ifie r” (Lacan, 1977, p. 3 1 0 ), th e se m io tic field; an d because this m ark gives th e first, radical stru c tu re to th e h u m a n subject, it is “ th e fo u n d a tio n , th e k e rn el o f th e ego ideal” (Lacan, 1964, p. 256), th e first in te rv e n tio n o f th e T h ird as o rd e rin g p rin cip le.3 B y b e in g designated “ one,” o n e is affirm ed as n o t b e in g so m e th in g o r so m e o n e else. P sychotic stru c tu re appears to lack this m ark , an d th ere fo re, as w e saw in C h a p te r 7, w e find b o u n d a ry b lu rrin g a n d fusion w ith a cosm ic O th e r in psychosis.

3.

Ultimately the designation or mark o f “one” rests on an act o f writing, Lacan claimed, but that would take us too far from our task, although it is o f some historical interest to see Lacan grappling in his 1961-1962 seminar with the relation between speech and w riting as later would Derrida.

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The Analytic Field T h e effect o f this m ark o f “ o n e ” is n o t to unify b u t rather to m ake unique. Besides insisting that the subject-ego split can never be healed, Lacan rejected a tw o-person m odel o f analysis: “ the field that o u r experience polarizes in a rela­ tion that is only apparently two-way, for any positing o f its structure in m erely dual term s is as inadequate to it in theory as it is ruinous for its tec h n iq u e ” (1977, p. 56). Instead o f a dyadic relationship, Lacan offered a fo u r-co rn ered structure (1977, pp. 139,193), as presented in Figure A: Position 1, the Subject corner, locates the patient as barred o r divided ($) w ithin him self o r herself, that is, irrem ediably split by repression, disavowal, and language, and therefore inca­ pable o f full know ledge regarding w h o he o r she is, w hat he o r she is actually saying, w hy there is this sym ptom . Position 2, the Ego corner, is the place o f the patients ego as reflecting the so-called objective w orld but especially reflect­ ing o th er egos. Position 3 m arks the place o f o th er egos, and specifically the place o f the analyst’s ego, w hich the p atient’s ego attem pts to lure iconically and m aintain in a m irroring reflection w ith itself. In position 4 Lacan located the O ther, from w'here “ the discourse o f the O th e r” can be articulated. H ere the analyst as subject resonates w ith those sonorous and gestural, as well as them atic, aspects o f the patient’s discourse that are n o t in his o r h e r o r even the analyst’s awareness until the analyst speaks. Familiar to seasoned clinicians, this experience includes the use o f unintended puns, the spontaneous guessing o f a disavowed loss o r pleasure, the sudden appearance o f a vivid image. T h e discourse o f the O th e r is Lacan’s way o f calling attention to how lan­ guage, as o th er than, w ider than, not reducible to, the individual consciousness o f any speaker, has already structured hum an experience and therefore has already 3. other

1. Subject

2. Ego

4. Other Figure A: Lacan's Schema L (modified)

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channelled hum an desire. As we saw earlier, the discourse o f the O th e r is that sem iotic structuring o f desire w hich Freud discovered in his analysis o f dreams and symptoms as constitutive o f the unconscious. Lacan m aintained that because the unconscious is structured like a language, the effects o f the unconscious can be u n d ersto o d and interpreted. Position 4 therefore provides perspective on w hat is happening to the patient’s desire in his o r her sym ptom s as well as w hat is happening betw een the two individuals w hen they relate as egos, w hen the socalled object relation betw een patient and analyst develops. This object relation Lacan called an “ im aginary relation,” m arked on b oth sides by narcissism and illusion, an effect o f m irrors. O n this axis linking the patients ego and the analyst’s ego we can observe all the em otional variations o f that haine-amouration w e no ted earlier, an oscillating love-hate relationship. C o m petition, coercion, pow er struggle, seduction, and im aginary identification are pursued on this axis o f object relations. A ccording to Lacan, the A m erican emphasis on strengthening the ego, on encouraging the patient’s ego to m odel itself on and identify w ith the analyst’s ego, m arks a fundam ental betrayal o f Freud and o f the place o f the O ther, leading to loss o f perspective regarding the subject o f the unconscious, the subject as distinct from the ego. As we saw in the preceding chapter, this emphasis on getting the patient to identify w ith the ana­ lyst has a long tradition and is still being m aintained as a goal o f treatm ent in m ainstream A m erican psychoanalytic w riting. K ohut appeared uneasy w ith the n o tio n o f such identification, referring to “gross identification” w h en the issue was raised (1984, pp. 101,169; see also pp. 100, 160). It may be useful to introduce into K o h u t’s fram ew ork Lacan’s dis­ tinction betw een sym bolic identification by the O th e r and the im aginary iden­ tification with an other, w ith an image o f the o ther o r w ith an image o f oneself held by the other. Im aginary identification reinforces likeness and constrains the field o f desire in a m irroring relation; sym bolic identification structures differ­ ence and opens desire o n to the field o f substitution and displacem ent. T h e dis­ tin c tio n is one that K o h u t appeared to m ake b u t only by separating “ gross id entification” from “ transm uting internalization.” T hus, for exam ple, he described a patient w h o “ at the end o f a long analysis d u rin g w hich there had been periods o f gross identification w ith m e ,. . . said: ‘N o w I am similar to you only in one respect: I am an independent person ju st like y ou’” (1984, p. 169). T h e patient had gone from m odelling him self as a reflection o r image o f the analyst in im aginary identification to assuming the status o f one w h o is sym­ bolically identified by the O th e r and so recognized by the analyst.

The Desire of the Other W h e n recognition is effective it is because the o th e r’s desire has been recog­ nized. T h e m ost dom inant aspect o f psychic structure is n o t the satisfaction

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o r frustration o f needs b u t the p h e n o m e n o n o f desire, and therefore desire is th e d o m in a n t feature o f transference-countertransference. H o w does desire arise? In distinguishing the three registers o f R e al, im agi­ nary, and sym bolic, w e can follow Lacan and argue for a parallel distin ctio n a m o n g need, d em an d , and desire. N eed s are physiological c o n d itio n s, ro o ted in th e o rg a n ism s tissues and organs, and they are im perative: food, w ater, w a rm th , and air are essential for life, and there are n o substitutes for th em — we c an n o t live o n th eir m etaphors. T hese needs in infancy arc m et by a caretaking o th e r (usually the m o th e r), w h o n u rtu res in a cultural, familial, and sem iotic system o f intersubjective exchanges in w h ic h b o th the infant and th e m o th e r learn to associate th e in fan t’s expressions o f n e ed w ith o rganic and psychic states. As w e e x am in ed in earlier chapters, rh y th m , to u c h , affect, and m utual responsivity quickly establish, in ways specific to th e given culture, a sem iotic fram ew ork o f com m u n icatio n in w h ic h language is present from th e begin n in g as stru c tu rin g th e m o th e r’s w orld. T h e child’s cries soon b eco m e signifiers, w ith the result that th e ch ild ’s needs are channeled th ro u g h “th e defiles o f th e struc­ tu re o f th e signifier” (Lacan, 1977, pp. 255, 309). O n e o f L acan’s stu d en ts expressed it in this way: W hen the m other responds to the cries o f the infant, she recognizes them in constituting them as a dem and, b u t w hat is m ore m om entous is that she interprets them on the level o f desire: desire o f the infant to have the m other next to her, desire that she bring her som ething, desire to aggress against her, o r whatever. W hat is certain is that by its response the O th e r is going to give the dim ension o f desire to the cry o f need and that this desire w ith w hich the infant is invested is always initially the result o f a subjective interpretation, a function o f just the m others desire, o f her own phantasm . (Aulagnier, 1962, p. 401; my translation) T his rapid developm ent m eans th at it becom es im possible to directly express needs o r directly respond to th em (M uller, 1990). T h e state o f n e ed becom es partially a rticu la te d w h e n addressed to an o th e r an d in this signifying form functions as a dem and. T h e o th e r can n o lo n g e r respond only to th e state as n eed b u t m ust respond to it as an articulated d em and. In this responding, th e o th e r w ill o f necessity in d ic a te ju s t h o w he o r she is re co g n izin g th e o n e m aking th e d em an d (as m anipulative, as appropriate, as delightful, as o b n o x ­ ious). In tu rn , th e ch ild m ak in g th e d e m a n d w ill o b tain from th e o th e r ’s response proofs and disproofs o f love and caring, evidence that th e relationship affirms th e child as desirable o r undesirable. T h e process is o n e in w h ic h sem i­ osis takes over: o n e ’s in te rp reta n t fo r an index becom es in tu rn an ind ex for the o th e r th at generates its o w n in te rp reta n t, and so on. W ith th e c o n stellatio n o f th e ego, as discussed earlier, the child seeks to

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m axim ize his o r h e r positio n as th e all-fulfilling o b ject o f th e m o th e r’s desire. T h is will so e ntangle the c h ild ’s desire w ith th e m o th e r’s desire th at w e can th e n speak o f an identification o f th e c h ild ’s desire w ith the m o th e r’s desire. T h is id en tific atio n necessarily takes place at th e level o f th e u n co n scio u s, in d e e d as p art o f th e process w h e reb y th e u n c o n sc io u s is stru c tu re d : “ It is th ro u g h th e bias o f th e u n conscious o f the O th e r that th e subject m akes his en tra n ce in to th e w orld o f desire, and he will have to initially co n stitu te his desire as a response, as an acceptance o r refusal to take th e place that the u n c o n ­ scious o f th e O th e r designates fo r h im ” (A ulagnier, 1962, p. 401; m y transla­ tion). In an intersubjective m atrix there can never be any “ natural” desires, since th e idiosyncrasies o f th e o th e r ’s unconscious responses, w h a t in P eirce’s term s w e m ay call disavow ed in terp retan ts, will d e te rm in e h o w th e in fan t’s desires em erge in to awareness o r are enacted. Such an identification o f desires m ay be total an d su p p o rted by the m o th e r’s w ords and beh av io r and, if so, w ill absorb the c h ild ’s desire, consciously and unconsciously, in th e absence o f any effective in te rv e n tio n by a T h ird . T h is T h ird , for Lacan, is th e presence in the m o th e r’s life o f sociocultural fram e­ w orks th at c o n te x tu aliz e and d e lim it th e role o f th e child in h e r life and is usually h ig h lig h te d by th e p resen ce o f th e father, w h o sets lim its o n the grandiose to talization o f desire. Specifically, it is th e “ sym bolic father,” o r patern al fu n c tio n , th a t lays th e fo u n d a tio n fo r d iffere n tia tio n by n a m in g th e child. As w e have seen, such nam in g m arks th e child as o th e r th an all others, and in b e in g so id entified the child has the structural possibility o f eventually assum ing his o r h e r o w n desire ra th e r th an b e in g m erg ed in th e desire o f th e m o th e r o r o f the father. T his sym bolic identification th e n enables the child to m obilize his o r h e r ego ideal as a “signifying m ap p in g ” (Lacan, 1964, p. 272), w 'hich th e n subordinates th e ideal ego to the task o f lim iting and channeling desire according to the constraints o f finite existence. T h is is h o w Lacan conceived o f the O edipal resolution, w hose o u tco m e is “ sym bolic castration,” structuring th e subject as pluralistically related (no lo n g er in a dual relation w ith th e m o th e r), as sexed (no lo n g e r b e in g the phallus b u t ra th e r h a ving a penis o r having a vagina), and as capable o f finding and co m b in in g substitute objects o f desire (rather than claim ing the w holeness o f totalized desire an d n o t desirin g at all).

The Two Analyses of Mr. Z In m y reading o f “ T h e Two Analyses o f M r. Z ” (K ohut, 1979; unless otherw ise indicated, all subseq u en t q u o tatio n s are from this text), a reading in fo rm e d by h o w I use Lacan, I find that desire o ccu p ied the central place b o th in M r. Z ’s history and in th e transference-countertransference relationship w ith his analyst. In so em phasizing th e crucial im p o rta n ce o f desire, I am d raw ing o n L acan’s

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th eo ry o f desire in th e spirit o f A. G oldberg w h e n he quotes P opper in affirm ­ ing that “ facts are in te rp rete d in the light o f theories; they are soaked in theory, as it w e re ” (1980, p. 91). In the first analysis o f M r. Z , despite his initial resis­ tance, th e analyst (K l) p ro m o te d an id en tification b e tw ee n him self and M r. Z so that M r. Z shifted his desire from his m o th e r’s desire to K1 ’s desire. In so identifying w ith his analyst, M r. Z reinforced K l ’s p o sitio n as the o n e w h o is supposed to k n o w (M uller, 1992b), thus re n d e rin g h im desirable, and, in tu rn , by identifying w ith his desire, M r. Z also becam e m o re desirable in his analyst’s eyes. T h is identificatio n o f desires c o n stitu ted an im aginary identification: it was based o n M r. Z ’s b e c o m in g like his analyst’s m o d e l o f h im . K o h u t a cknow ledged in th e second analysis th at M r. Z ’s ch an g ed beh av io r is rightly called a “ transference success” (p. 16). As he did w 'hen his desire was m erged w ith his m o th e r’s desire, M r. Z show'ed “ an attitu d e o f co m pliance an d accep­ tance th a t h e had now ' rein stated w ith regard to m e a n d to th e seem ingly unshakable co nvictions th at I h e ld ” (p. 16). K o h u t w'rites: T h e im provem ent w hich resulted from the first analysis m ust therefore be considered in essence as a transference success.W ithin the analytic setting, the patient com plied w ith m y convictions by presenting m e w ith oedipal issues. O utside the analytic setting, he acceded to m y expectations by sup­ pressing his sym ptom s (the m asochistic fantasies) and by changing his behavior, w hich now took on the appearance o f norm ality as defined by the m aturity m orality to w hich I then subscribed (he m oved from narcis­ sism to object love, i.e. he began to date girls), (p. 16) B u t in th e second analysis, the analyst (K2) n o lo n g er fostered such co m p li­ ance: he shifted from try in g to be recognized to recognizing M r. Z . A fter M r. Z disengaged his desire from his analyst and from his m other, K o h u t p ro m o ted the process o f sym bolic identification in w h ich M r. Z ’s ego ideal could be affirm ed and engaged to d elim it his desire as his ow n. K o h u t em phasizes how he at first view ed th e “ analytic m aterial entirely from th e p o in t o f v ie w o f classical analysis” (p. 3), w hereas th e se c o n d analysis o c cu rre d after his shift to “ a n e w v iew p o in t, w h ic h , to state it briefly, allow ed m e to perceive m eanings, o r th e significance o f m eanings, I had form erly n o t consciously p e rce iv e d ” (p. 3). B u t w'hat is at stake in this shift is n o t o n ly a m atter o f p e rce p tio n , b u t m o re p ro fo u n d ly a shift in w h a t Lacan (1 9 5 9 -6 0 b ; 1977, p. 252; see also R ich a rd so n , 1987) designated as th e ethical fu lcru m o f psychoanalysis, nam ely a shift in K o h u t s desire, a shift n o t so m u c h in h o w he thinks as in w 'here he desires. T h is shift in desire has a p ro fo u n d im p act o n the patient. M r. Z ’s identification w ith his m o th e r’s desire was ind icated by his fantasies o f bein g a w o m a n ’s slave w ith n o w ill o f his o w n , reinforced in his c h ild h o o d

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by his m o th e r’s reading aloud to h im Uncle Toni’s Cabin, w h ic h opens w ith the th reaten ed separation o f a slave-child from his m o th er. Indeed, M r. Z ’s m o th e r spent m u c h tim e “ re ad in g to h im , playing w ith h im , talk in g w ith h im , and spinning o u t fantasies w ith h im a b o u t w hat his future w o u ld be like” and “ in h e r im agery about him as a grow n m an, she had always taken totally for granted th at, h o w ev er g reat his successes in life, th e ir relatio n sh ip w o u ld nev er be altered, he w o u ld never leave h e r” (p. 14). As the first analysis drew to a close, M r. Z appeared to be reluctantly c o m ­ plying w ith the desire o f the analyst. T h e reluctance is signified in a dream that o c cu rre d about a h a lf a year before te rm in atio n o f the first analysis, a dream K o h u t saw as th e “ m o st significant sign o f his advance” : “ he was in a house, at th e in n e r side o f a d o o r w h ic h was a crack o pen. O utside was the father, loaded w ith giftw rapped packages, w a n tin g to enter. T h e p atien t was intensely fright­ en ed and attem p ted to close the d o o r in o rd e r to keep th e father o u t” (p. 8). T h e p a tie n t’s associations p o in te d to th e tim e w h e n th e absent fath er re jo in e d th e family, and h e also h ad “m an y associations re fe rrin g to present experiences (including th e transference) and to th e past. O u r c onclusion wras that it referred to his am bivalent attitude tow ard the father” (pp. 8 -9 ) and th ere­ fore was taken as c o n firm atio n o f the c astration-anxiety th em e proposed by K o h u t. B u t w h a t is th e am bivalence about? I m yself h e ar th e “ g iftw rap p ed ” in th e d re am as “ g ift-tra p p e d ” : M r. Z fears b e in g b rib e d an d trap p e d in the fa th e r/a n a ly s t’s desire as he was in his m o th e r ’s desire. It does n o t seem , as O sto w suggests, that “ th e patien t sees the analyst (as w ell as th e father) as an in tru d e r in to his a tta ch m en t to the m o th e r” (1979, p. 532), b u t ra th e r th at he feels K o h u t’s desire is coercin g h im , as we can read for ourselves: And, in view o f the overall image I had form ed o f the construction o f his personality and o f his psychopathology, I stressed in my interpretations and reconstructions especially his hostility towards the returning father, the castration fear, vis-à-vis the strong, adult m an; and, in addition, I pointed o u t his tendency to retreat from com petitiveness and male assertiveness either to the old pre-oedipal attachm ent to his m other o r to a defensively taken submissive and passive hom osexual attitude toward the father. T h e logical cohesiveness o f these reconstructions seem ed impeccable and . . . in line w ith . . . precepts that were then firm ly established in m e as alm ost unquestioned in n er guidelines in co n d u ctin g my therapeutic w o r k .. . . (p. 9)

K o h u t’s desire here is to get M r. Z to recognize him as th e o n e w h o know s, w h o know s n o t only M r. Z ’s character structure b u t also w hat constitutes reality and m aturity, an d M r. Z eventually com plies by actin g in accordance w ith K o h u t’s desire.

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Initially, M r. Z struggled to get the analyst to m irro r his states, b u t in the end, as his desire b eca m e disengaged from his m o th e r’s, he id en tifie d w ith K o h u t’s desire b u t risked feeling trap p ed again. K o h u t sensed that so m e th in g was “w ro n g ” w ith th e te rm in a tio n o f the first analysis because it was “ e m o ­ tionally shallow and u n e x c itin g ” (p. 9). B u t such a state w o u ld be c o n g ru e n t if, in fact, M r. Z did n o t e x p erien c e term in atio n . T h a t is to say, there was n o cut betw een th em since M r. Z ’s desire rem ained identified n o w w ith K o h u t’s desire. As Lacan p u t it, “ such im aginary identification is m erely a pause, a false te rm i­ n a tio n o f the analysis w h ic h is very frequently confused w ith its n o rm al ter­ m in a tio n ” (1964, p. 145). T h is w o u ld also a c c o u n t fo r th e lack o f zest and “ em o tio n al dep th ,” since M r. Z did n o t e x p erien c e th e process as his o w n , as th e realization o f his o w n desire (T h o m p so n , 1985). In short, M r. Z as subject was n o t recognized in th e dual, im aginary relation b etw een positions 2 and 3 o f L acan’s Schem a L, as presen ted in Figure A.

Second Analysis F o u r and a h a lf years later, M r. Z co n ta cte d K o h u t to ren ew th e analysis."1 At th at tim e he c o n tin u e d to live alone in his o w n ap artm e n t, did n o t enjoy his w ork, and had a succession o f affairs w'ith w o m e n , b u t h e felt his sexual rela­ tions w ith w o m e n w ere unsatisfying and shallow. W e can see th a t h e still had n o t claim ed his desire as his o w n an d was b e g in n in g to regress to an identifica­ tio n w ith his m o th e r ’s desire: he felt increasingly isolated socially, ju s t as his m o th e r had beco m e, o n e o f the signs o f h e r serious personality change, w h ich included a set o f circum scribed paran o id delusions. K o h u t w o n d e red w h e th e r M r. Z “was b e in g c o n fro n te d w ith th e loss o f a still u n relin q u ish ed love o bject from ch ild h o o d o r w ith guilt feelings a b o u t having ab an d o n ed h e r” (p. 10), as if she w ere the o b jec t o f his desire. In fact, as was d e te rm in e d later, M r. Z felt re lief in th e face o f his m o th e r’s g ro w in g disability, since it allow ed h im to disengage from h e r desire even m o re freely. T h e m aterial fo r th e seco n d analysis can b e d iv id ed in to tw o phases, “ th e alm ost exclusive p re o c c u p a tio n w'ith th e m o th e r” and “ th o u g h ts c o n c e rn in g his fa th e r” (p. 12). As we have seen, m aterial a b o u t th e m o th e r was also p le n ti­ ful in th e first analysis; and in a tte m p tin g to articulate w h a t was different about its e m e rg en c e in th e seco n d analysis, K o h u t em phasized “ th a t b e tw e e n M r. Z ’s first and se c o n d analysis m y theo retical o u tlo o k had sh ifted ” (p. 12). W h a t 4.

M y exam ination o f the second analysis is w ritten as if K ohut were the analyst and not the analysand. If he in fact was both, as Cocks (1995) has argued, we could exam­ ine the paradoxes entailed by his conform ing to his new paradigm and thereby rein­ forcing his transference position as the one w ho is supposed to know. T he use I make o f the reported data remains as is— although we can only w onder what the “term i­ nation” o f the analysis m ight mean in such a case o f self-transference.

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is th is sh ift a b o u t? “ I had in th e first analysis lo o k ed u p o n th e p a tien t in essence as a cen tre o f in d e p e n d e n t initiative an d h ad th erefo re e x p e c te d th at h e w o u ld , w ith th e aid o f analytic insights th at w o u ld enable h im to see his path clearly, relinquish his narcissistic d e m a n d s an d g ro w u p ” (p. 12).

W ith this attitu d e, K o h u t believed M r. Z co u ld choose to o rie n t his desire; h e saw “ th e p a tie n t’s persistent a tta ch m en t to the m o th e r as a libidinal tie that he was u nw illing to b re ak ” (p. 12). H e assum ed that M r. Z ’s desire was his ow n, thereby p resum ing the very c o n d itio n M r. Z cam e in to trea tm e n t to achieve. T h e shift, therefore, from the first to the seco n d analysis (w h ich to m e m arks a decisive difference, c o n tra ry to the efforts o f W allerstein [1981] to h a rm o n ize th e tw o phases) required tw o changes; first, in K o h u t’s o w n desire: “ I was n o w able, m o re g e n u in ely th an before, to set aside any g o a l-d ire c te d th e ra p e u tic am bitions. P u t differently, I relinquished th e h e alth - and m atu rity -m o rality that had form erly m o tiv ated m e ” (p. 12). T h e second change was in his view o f the p atient. H e n o lo n g er saw th e p a tie n t’s self as “ resisting change o r as opp o sin g m atu ratio n because it did n o t wra n t to relinquish its c h ild h o o d gratifications, b u t, o n th e contrary, as desperately— and often hopelessly— struggling to dis­ entangle itself from the noxious selfobject, to delim it itself, to grow, to b e co m e in d e p e n d e n t” (p. 12). T h e shift in K o h u t’s o w n desire enabled h im to see th e p a tie n t’s desire differently: “ W h e re wre h ad fo rm erly seen pleasure gain, the se q u e n ce o f drive d e m a n d a n d driv e g ra tifica tio n , w e now ' re co g n ize d th e depression o f a self that, w anting to d elim it and assert itself, fo u n d itself h o p e ­ lessly caught w ith in th e psychic organization o f th e selfbbject” (p. 17)— caught, in o th e r w ords, in th e m o th e r’s desire. T h e effort to give an a cc o u n t o f this shift h eld K o h u t’s a tte n tio n as m o re c h ild h o o d history was reported, having to d o w ith th e m o th e r’s intense scrutiny o f M r. Z ’s feces u p to th e age o f six and th e n h e r searching his face fo r black­ heads: We are again confronted by the puzzling question w hy this crucial m ater­ ial had n o t appeared during M r. Z ’s first analysis. To be sure, it had indeed appeared, b u t— w hat is even m ore incom prehensible— it had failed to claim o ur attention. I believe that we com e closest to the solution o f this puzzle w hen we say that a crucial aspect o f the transference had rem ained unrecognized in the first analysis, (p. 15) W h a t was u n re co g n ize d in th e first analysis? K o h u t affirm s th at it was h o w his o w n c o n v ic tio n s “ h a d b e c o m e fo r th e p a tie n t a rep lica o f th e m o th e r ’s h id d e n psychosis” (p. 16), w ith w h ic h the p a tie n t c o m p lied . B u t in a L acanian fram ew ork the crucial transference issue that rem ained u n re co g n ize d was how' M r. Z ’s e n ta n g le m e n t in K1 ’s desire re p lic a te d his e n m e sh in g w 'ith his m o th e r’s desire.

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W h at does this perspective add to K o h u t’s form ulation? It clarifies som e o f M r. Z ’s sym ptom s. We have already seen how the “ sexual m asochism ” was the enactm ent in fantasy o f M r. Z ’s position as the object o f m o th e r’s desire w ith no desire o f his ow n. K o h u t noted, and I w ould agree, that an object relations approach “ fails to do ju stic e ” to this sym ptom as well as to the “ chronic despair w hich could often be felt side by side w ith the arrogance o f his dem anding­ ness” (p. 12). I suggest that M r. Z ’s dem andingness was his m o th e r’s dem and­ ingness w ith w h ic h he was identified (we are to ld th at she “ em otionally enslaved those around h e r and stifled their in dependent existence,” p. 13), and his despair was precisely over this state o f his desire. H e could n o t b u t act in accordance w ith the unconscious structure o f his desire, form ed by his m o th e r’s desire. T hus, w h en he rep o rted w ith “ the m ost intense sham e” that as a young child “ he had sm elled and even tasted his ow n feces” (p. 17), he was indicating just how his desire was identified w ith his m o th er’s desire in taking such intense interest in his feces. W h en K ohut rationalizes that “ he had com e to understand for the first tim e in em pathic consonance w ith another hum an being, that these ch ild h o o d activities w ere n e ith e r w icked n o r disgusting, b u t they had been feeble attem pts to provide for him self a feeling o f aliveness” (p. 17), he does not acknow ledge that M r. Z ’s sham e was over the fact that he was like her, that he desired w hat she desired. W hile th e stru c tu re o f M r. Z ’s desire was n o t explicitly posed, K o h u t grasped its obvious im p o rt in relation to the m o th er: “ H is m ost significant psychological achievem ent in analysis was breaking the deep m erger ties w ith his m o th e r” (p. 25). A nd earlier: “ N o in d ep e n d en t self had gradually form ed; w h at psychological existence he had m anaged to build was ro o ted in his attachm ent to the m o th e r” (p. 23). H is very status as a self—in Lacanian term s, as subject o f desire— rested on the im aginary identification o f desires. His m o th e r’s desire provided the psychic scaffolding on w hich he built an unhappy and fragile sense o f himself. Because his experience o f cohesion rested on this m irro rin g , reflective structure, he e x p erien ced “ the deepest anxiety he had ever experienced” in a dream o f “ a starkly outlined image o f the m other, standing w ith her back tow ard h im ” (p. 19). T his o ccurred as M r. Z was focus­ ing explicitly in the analysis on his father. A n im m ediate sense o f the dream o ccurred to M r. Z th at as he m oved closer to his father, his m o th e r tu rn ed her back on him , ju st as she used to treat him w ith “ icy w ithdraw al” w henever “ he attem pted to step tow ard in d ep e n d en t maleness.” H e r tactic, h e r “ chilling look o f disapproval” (p. 15), always bro u g h t him back em otionally. B ut the “deeper m eaning o f the dream ” concerned “ the unseen, the unsee­ able frontal view o f the m o th e r” w hich, w hen the patient tried to im agine it, brought intense, nameless anxiety. W h en K ohut (acting for the m o m en t like K1 did in the first analysis) suggested “ the h o rro r o f castration, o f the sight o f the

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m issing external genital, o f fantasies o f b lo o d and m utilation,” in response “ the patient b rushed these suggestions aside” ; w hile h e agreed that “ the im agery o f m utilation, castration, and b lood was related to the u n n am ed horror, he was sure that this was n o t the essential source o f the fear” (p. 20). A n o th e r form ulation was offered by K ohut: “W h e n I suggested that the m o th e r m ay n o t have lost her penis b u t h er face, h e did n o t object b u t responded w ith prolonged silence from w h ich he em erged in a noticeably m ore relaxed m o o d ” (p. 20). I will attem p t a Lacanian u n d e rstan d in g o f K o h u t’s approach: the im ages o f m u tila tio n relate to th e e x p erien c e o f b odily frag m e n ta tio n and ego d isin te ­ g ratio n and are, as th e p atien t insisted, secondary consequences o f a m o re p r i­ m ary collapse. T h is p rim a ry fall is th e loss o f status as a d e sirin g subject, b e in g n o lo n g e r e m b ra ce d by th e m o th e r ’s gaze o r addressed by h e r voice. T h e dre am -tra u m a consisted n o t in w h a t was unseeable b u t in th e fact th a t th e m o th e r was unseeing, n o lo n g e r h o ld in g h e r son in h e r d e sirin g gaze an d n o lo n g e r p u ttin g his face be fo re h e r as a re fle ctio n — all o f this im p ly in g , o f course, th at she n e v er d id see h im as he was b u t o n ly as h e r im age. T h e very stru c tu re o f M r. Z ’s psychic consistency was here d eclared to be u n d o n e , and K o h u t p o in te d to this (by m e n tio n in g the loss o f h e r face) an d allow ed the pro lo n g ed silence to register the shift. W h ile w e d o u b t th at “ the unseen side o f th e m o th e r in this dream sto o d fo r h e r d isto rte d personality and h e r p a th o ­ logical o u tlo o k ” (p. 16), since conscious a c k n o w le d g em e n t ra th e r th an repres­ sion o f h e r pathology had recently b ro u g h t relief, w e can agree that the dream “ expressed his anx iety at th e realization th at his c o n v ic tio n o f th e m o th e r ’s stre n g th and p o w e r [o f h e r desire]— a c o n v ic tio n o n w h ic h he had based a se c to r o f his o w n p e rso n ality [as subject] in in te rm e s h m e n t w 'ith h e r [desire]— was itself a delusion [as are all such imaginary' identifications]” (p. 20, m y interp o latio n s). W h a t is he, if he is n o lo n g er th at so m e th in g he was in his m o th e r’s desire? T h e disen g ag em en t o f M r. Z ’s desire from his m o th e r ’s desire n o w m oved ahead differently th an in th e first analysis: K o h u t did n o t seduce co m p lian ce w ith his o w n desire b u t instead, by k eep in g his desire in th e analytic place o f th e O th e r, h e enabled M r. Z to engage in a process o f re triev in g th e k e rn el o f his ego ideal by focusing o n his father. T h e issue o f th e fath er was posed at the b e g in n in g o f th e se c o n d analysis. T h e n ig h t b e fo re th e b e g in n in g o f th e se c o n d analysis, M r. Z had th e follow ing d ream w ith o u t a ctio n o r w ords: It was the image o f a dark-haired m an in a rural landscape w ith hills, m ountains, and lakes. A lthough the m an was standing there in quiet relax­ ation, he seem ed to be strong and confidence-inspiring. H e was dressed in city clothes, in a com plex but harm onious way— the patient saw that he was w earing a ring, that a handkerchief protruded from his breast pocket,

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and that he was holding som ething in each hand— perhaps an um brella in one hand, and possibly a pair o f gloves in the other. T h e figure o f the m an was visually very plastic and prom inent— as in some photographs in which the object is sharply in focus while the background is blurred, (p. 11) M r. Z ’s associations show ed the figure to be a com posite o f a c h ild h o o d friend, a cam p c o u n se lo r (based o n th e landscape features relatin g to th e su m m e r cam p), the father (his hair), and the analyst (the um brella, gloves, handkerchief, and ring). M r. Z also recalled th e dream o f his father “ loaded w ith packages,” and this “ established a lin k w ith th e te rm in a l phase o f th e first analysis— a n n o u n cin g as it w ere th a t th e second analysis was a c o n tin u a tio n o f the first o n e ” and th at “ it to o k o ff from th e very p o in t w h e re th e first o n e had failed m ost significantly” (p. 11). If th e second analysis to o k o ff from this p o in t, th e n w e m ust consider the dream as o c c u rrin g ju s t w'hen the p atient, feeling he was still the o b ject o f K l ’s desire, was on ce again g o in g to c o n fro n t the am orphousness o f his o w n desire. I f w e can u n d e rsta n d th e first d re am o f th e fa th e r “ lo ad e d d o w n w ith giftw rapped packages” in term s o f M r. Z ’s asking th e qu estio n , “ W h a t does th e o th e r w ant from m e?” th e n this dream presents th e o th e r as d esiring n o th ­ ing from th e subject, as h o ld in g his gloves and um brella, ra th e r th an gifts, in his hands. T h ere m ay yet b e a space fo r th e sub ject’s o w n desire to em erge.

Idealization and the Ego Ideal H o w does “th e seco n d phase o f th e seco n d analysis” (p. 18) proceed? H aving given up th e ideal ego fashioned in m irro rin g response to and identification w ith his m o th e r ’s desire, M r. Z n o w a tte m p ts to reco v er an d a rticu late the sources o f his ego ideal, or, m o re specifically, w h a t Lacan called “ th e paternal id en tific atio n o f th e e g o -id e a l” (1977, p. 197). F o r a tim e, M r. Z ’s m o o d rem ained hopeless an d despairing, specifically because “ his father was w e a k ,.. . T h e m o th e r d o m in a te d an d su b d u e d h im ” (p. 18). H e th e n focused o n his c o u n se lo r frien d briefly, an d th e n began “ to express in ten se c u rio sity a b o u t m e,” a b o u t the analyst’s past, his early life, his interests, his family, his relationship to his w ife and child ren (p. 18). I h e ar this as M r. Z ’s a tte m p t to find o u t som e­ th in g a b o u t K o h u t’s desire, w h e re it w'as, w h a t sustain ed it, w 'h e th er M r. Z w ould again be seduced in to com pliance— all attem pts to safely a n c h o r his ego ideal. B u t K o h u t initially re sp o n d ed to this as he had earlier: “ W h e n e v e r I treated his inquiries as a revival o f infantile curiosity' and p o in te d o u t th e asso­ ciative co n n ectio n s w ith the sex life o f his parents, h e b ecam e depressed and told m e I m isu n d ersto o d h im ” (p. 18). G radually K o h u t c hanged his view and “ finally v e n tu re d th e guess th a t it was his n e e d fo r a stro n g fa th e r th at lay beh in d his questions, th at he w a n ted to know' w 'hether I, too, was w eak, sub­ dued in intercourse by m y wife, unable to be the idealizable e m o tio n al su p p o rt

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o f a so n ” (p. 18). As I hear the questions, M r. Z was addressing K o h u t about the follow ing: 1) A m I still the object o f your desire? 2) Are you a subject o f desire, and d o you have any o th e r objects o f desire? 3) D o you have so m e th in g I can pin m y ego ideal o n and m obilize m y desire along signifying lines? In o th e r w ords, M r. Z w a n ted to m ake co n ta ct w ith the paternal function: did K o h u t k n o w h o w to use his penis, and was he able to set lim its. K o h u t set lim its w ith “ friendly firm ness” in d e n y in g M r. Z ’s requests for in fo rm a tio n . In response to K o h u t’s change in approach, M r. Z d ro p p e d his dem ands and becam e d ra m a t­ ically less depressed and hopeless. H e also “ m ade d o w ith certain bits o f in fo r­ m ation w hich he had obtained eith er accidentally o r via inference— m y interest in art and literatu re, fo r e x am p le ” (p. 18). “ A rt an d lite ra tu re ” served as the verbal b rid g e b e tw e e n his m o th e r (p. 4), his co u n selo r frien d (p. 7), and K ohut, and, w e can speculate, fo rm ed o n e kern el o f his ego ideal. A t this p o in t “ the analysis to o k a n e w tu rn ” (p. 19) and focused directly o n M r. Z ’s father, w'ho until th en had rem ained a shadow')' figure. M r. Z now began to talk a b o u t “positive features in his fa th e r’s personality,” and he did so “ w ith a glow’ o f happiness, o f satisfaction” (p. 19). F or K o h u t, this was, “ as can be ju d g e d in retrospect, th e crucial m o m e n t in th e trea tm e n t— th e p o in t at w h ich he m ay be said to have taken th e road tow ard e m o tio n a l h e a lth ” (p. 19). H ow ever, w hile o n this road M r. Z had “ a n u m b e r o f frig h te n in g quasi-psyc h o tic experiences in w h ic h h e felt h im self d isintegrating and was beset by intense h ypochondriacal concerns. A t such tim es he d ream ed o f desolate land­ scapes, b u rn e d -o u t cities, an d m o st d e ep ly u p se ttin g , o f heaps o f p ile d -u p h u m a n b o d ies . . . h e was n o t sure w h e th e r th e b o d ies w ere th o se o f dead peo p le o r o f peo p le still barely alive” (p. 19). T h is d escription calls to m in d L acan’s earlier c o m m e n ts regarding b o d ily frag m en tatio n fantasies: W hat struck m e in the first place was the phase o f the analysis in w hich these images came to light: they were always bound up w ith the elucidation o f the earliest problem s o f the patient’s ego___ T h eir appearance heralds a particular and very archaic phase o f the transference, and the value we attributed to them in identifying this phase has always been confirm ed by the accom panying m arked decrease in the p a tie n t’s deepest resistances. (1951, p. 13) In K o h u t’s view, Mr. Z was now relinquishing the archaic self (connected w ith the selfbbje c t m other) that he had always considered his only one, in preparation for the reactivation o f a hitherto unknow n independent nuclear self (crystal­ lized around an u p -to -n o w unrecognized relationship to his selfobject father), (p. 19)

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T h e m o m en t had arrived for M r. Z to let go o f w hat had structured him , nam ely his place in the eyes o f his m other. At precisely this point M r. Z ’s dream o f his m o th e r o ccurred in w hich she was “ starkly o u tlin e d ” like the dream o f the standing m an. In the afterm ath o f this third dream , w hich finally freed Mr. Z ’s desire from his m o th e r’s, and the ensuing relaxed m ood, M r. Z recalled pos­ itive m em ories o f his father, “ preceded and accom panied by his idealization” o f K ohut, including a short-lived wish to becom e an analyst. T his “ idealization” was n othing like the grandiosity-building idealization o f his m o th er (to w hich we shall re tu rn shortly) but was m ore properly a b rin g in g in to focus o f the field o f his ego ideal. T h e m ain m em o ry o f his father to em erge at this p o in t was o f a trip to C olorado he had taken at the age o f nine. H e spoke “w ith an increasing glow o f jo y ” o f his father’s traits; as a “ m an o f the world,” he could amuse others w ith stories, was a good skier, show ed “ resoluteness, perceptiveness, and skill” in business dealings and, above all, M r. Z recovered “ the intensely experienced awareness that his father was an in dependent m an wrh o had a life in dependent from the life o f the m o th e r” (p. 21)— that is, th at father had his ow n desire in d e p e n d e n t o f his m o th e r’s. T h e n M r. Z com plained a b o u t h o w little he knew about his father, and, after “ a b rie f p erio d o f transference fantasies,” he suddenly voiced the suspicion “ that his father had a w om an friend” w h o had been present d u rin g the trip to C o lo rad o and that they m et in a bar the night before leaving. M r. Z never m en tio n ed this episode to his m o th e r w h e n they returned. A lthough his father did n o t explicitly request this, “ he felt that there was a silent understanding betw een them that he w ould be quiet a bout it” (p. 21). T his experience suggests the presence o f a n um ber o f key factors in the psychic structure o f M r. Z at that tim e: firstly, he knew th at his father had a penis and knew h o w to use it, and therefore was a subject o f desire, n o t ju st an object; secondly, the sight o f his father w ith this o th er w om an dem onstrated to M r. Z his in ferio rity to his father, that his father possessed a n te rio r sexual know ledge; thirdly, he could identify w ith a paternal prohibition by keeping the secret, b u t precisely because it was a secret it lent itself to repression; finally, in keeping the secret h e w on recognition from his father as being his ally. To be sure, this secret identification and identification through the secret m ust have rested on som e earlier foundation o f sym bolic identification (such as sharing his nam e w ith his father), b u t w e can agree th at because o f its secret status “ this m aterial represents, in term s o f the structure o f M r. Z ’s personality, the deepest layer o f the repressed” and that “no pathogenic oedipal conflicts still lay in hiding” (p. 22). T h e aforem entioned ingredients o f psychic structure suggest that the C olorado trip achieved sym bolic castration for Mr. Z , insofar as the paternal function decisively intervened and set limits to the m oth er-ch ild dual relation.

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I question, therefore, K o h u t’s c onceptualization o f the o u tco m e o f this process as the result o f an idealization. T here is som ething amiss in the fo rm u ­ lation o f M r. Z ’s “ glow o f jo y and the invigorating sense o f having finally found an image o f m asculine strength— to m erge w ith tem porarily as a m eans o f firm in g the structure o f his self, o f b e co m in g h im self an in d ep e n d en t centre o f strength and initiative” (p. 22). T h e “ glow o f jo y ” in d icated the m obilization o f his ow n desire, not because o f any additional m erger (he has, w ith relief, just ended his m erger o f desires w ith his m other) but because he has constellated an ego ideal that delim ited and anchored his desire and th ere­ fore facilitated his beco m in g a subject w ith “strength and initiative.” T h a t his recognition and affirm ation o f the paternal function were repressed and splito ff seems likely, b u t this repression appears to be a p roduct o f his grandiose ego, fueled by the idealized m o th e r w ith w h o m he was “ enm eshed,” “ subm it­ te d to the role o f b e in g h e r phallus” (in K o h u t’s w ords) and displaying “ a grandiosity that was bestow ed u p o n h im by th e m o th e r so long as he did not separate him self from h e r” (p. 24). In term s o f the p atient’s narcissism, it w ould be inconsistent for his ideal ego to repress a n o th er idealization (since an o th er idealization w ould only inflate his ego further); it is equally unlikely that in the split-off sector required by the narcissism o f m aternal enm eshm ent h e w ould have “ preserved the idealizations that m aintained a b o n d to his father” (p. 24). K o h u t understandably w anted to go beyond an object relations form ulation resting on drive-cathexes o f representable objects, but in its place he appeared to m ake idealization serve the function o f establishing ties, n o t betw een a drive and an object, but betw een a needy self and a selfobject. It seems to m e, h o w ­ ever, that M r. Z ’s recovery o f the repressed was n o t the recovery o f an ideal­ ization b u t o f an identification. T h at identification was, furtherm ore, based n o t o n “ an image o f m asculine strength” for h im to copy, b u t o n som e m arking by symbols, including the penis as sym bol o f m asculinity versus the phallus as a sym bol o f the o th e r’s desire (see Julien, 1987; Lacan, 1938, p. 59).W hile I agree that the dream o f attem pting to slam the do o r o n the gift-laden father “was n o t m otivated by castration anxiety” (K ohut, 1984, p. 86), M r. Z ’s reform ulation o f his dream (with w hich O rnstein, 1981, concurred), in w h ich th e danger o f the fa th e r’s re tu rn allegedly consisted in th e traum atic state o f bein g suddenly offered “ all the psychological gifts, for w hich he had secretly yearned” (p. 23), seems inadequate. W ith th e father back, there was no reason w hy “ m ale psy­ chological substance” could n o t have been gradually handled, provided the father could set lim its. T h e ad hoc explanation o f “ to o m u ch, too fast” appears less com pelling than one that emphasizes the structural effects o f b eing id enti­ fied w ith the desire o f th e m o th er, o n e effect bein g th e k ind o f grandiose m utual idealization that w ould split o ff any delim iting T h ird and that left the young Mr. Z w ith o u t an operative ego ideal.

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Termination T h e te rm in a tio n o f th e second analysis was different from that o f th e first one. T h e idealization o f the analyst was short-lived and w o rk ed th ro u g h , w ith th e analyst falling from b e in g identified w ith th e O th e r and the resulting gap providing a place for M r. Z ’s desire. T h e re was n o re tu rn o f earlier sym ptom s (the un d erly in g stru ctu re o f desire su p p o rtin g the sexual m asochism fantasies had dissolved); there was n o severe anxiety in the face o f losing the analyst’s presence. For several w eeks M r. Z was sad a bout losing his analyst and regretted that, w ith his father dead, he w o u ld have n o chance to develop a friendly rela­ tionship w ith h im . Significantly, “ for a few sessions he also expressed consider­ able a n g er tow ards m e fo r h av in g o rig in a lly failed h im , like his fa th e r in c h ild h o o d ” (p. 24)— a failure by th e fa th e r to disengage his desire from his m o th e r’s desire, a failure by K o h u t in forcing com pliance w ith his o w n desire. M o n th s w ere spent rev iew in g th e past an d a nticipating th e future. D u rin g the last few w eeks, K o h u t “ was very im pressed by his exp an d ed em pathy w ith and to leran t attitude tow ards the shortcom ings o f his parents” (p. 24). Such c o n textualization in a sym bolic m atrix ex te n d ed especially to his m o th er, w ith her pathology b u t also w ith h e r positive features, w h ic h h e c o u ld see “ w ith o u t a trace o f the idealizations w ith w h ic h he had b e g u n his first analysis” (p. 25). T h e c o n te n t o f his am bitions and ideals, w h ic h had arisen in the m atrix o f the now abandoned m erger relationship w ith the m other, [persisted b u t the] . . . w orking through o f his transference relationship to m e enabled him to reestablish a link w ith his father’s male­ ness and independence, and thus the em otional core o f his am bitions, ideals, and basic skills and talents was decisively altered, even though their content rem ained unchanged. B ut now he experienced these assets o f his personality as his o w n .. . . (p. 25) Fie had m ade his desire his o w n and co u ld pursue its realization according to its ow n signifying p a tte rn . R e tu rn in g to L acan’s Schem a L, w e can m ap o n to it the tw o positions o f K o h u t as w e have co m e to understand th em (see Figure B). In the first analysis, K o h u t abandoned his analytic stance and coerced the p a tie n t’s desire to identify’ w ith his ow n; in th e second analysis, h e successfully achieved sym bolic recogni­ tio n o f M r. Z as subject, n o t allow ing h im self to b e c o m e lu red by M r. Z ’s grandiose ego in to th e im aginary collusion o f “ stre n g th e n in g th e ego.” As a result, M r. Z claim ed his desire as his ow n in his efforts to realize his desire w ith others; this was m ade structurally possible by the constellation o f an ego ideal that delim ited his desire, giving it scope and direction. T h e ingredients o f the ego ideal had th eir source in the sym bolic m atrix o f the father/analyst— not that he can fill the place o f the O th e r; o n the contrary', his very' lim itations, as

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Subject

K1 (other)

Ego

K2 (Other) Figure B: Kohut and Schema L

K o h u t stressed, are th e fulcrum for th e shift b ro u g h t ab o u t by “ transm uting internalizations.” In th e end, the analyst becom es an other, one am ong m any others w hose significance to the patient, like that o f his parents, is now co n tex tualized in the sym bolic register, no longer captivating him as isolated elem ents in the im aginary register. H ere we see that the positive features o f oedipalization and the goals o f analysis overlap: to m ove from duality to plurality, from focus on the ideal ego to the ego ideal, from im aginary identification that represses desire in order to im agine oneself as like another to sym bolic identification as being different in o n e’s ow n desire. Clearly, in m any details K o h u t and Lacan reveal a sim ilarity o f purpose, and in their assessment o f psychoanalysis they said similar things, although the obvi­ ous differences have been no ted by Lacanians (see, for exam ple, L aurent and S chneiderm an, 1977; H arari, 1986; C o tte t, 1985; Peraldi, 1987). D espite these differences, K o h u t provides us w ith invaluable d o c u m e n tatio n o f w h at for Lacan was the essential analytic responsibility: to discern the effects o f o n e ’s ow n desire. We are all pressed, at certain m om ents in every treatm ent, tow ard the K1 position: this is an effect o f the transference, an effect o f the p a tie n t’s desire that constellates the supposed kno w in g subject in us and engages o u r ow n narcissism in countertransference (Lacan, 1964; R e n ik , 1993). O u r only recourse (and the patient’s as well) is to take n o te o f ju st ho w w e are (or were) bein g lured o u t o f position. In such m o m en ts we learn m ost a b o u t o u r patients, about ourselves, and about the Freudian discovery.

10 A Re-Reading of Studies on Hysteria

W h en Lacan claims his approach is a “ retu rn to Freud,” w hat Freud does he retu rn to? I have attem pted to show that in the case o f Freud o r o f Lacan, the retu rn is n o t to an idealized figure b u t to a co n cep tio n o f the com plexity o f hum an behavior, a sem iotic conception. T his chapter attem pts to take up w hat G adam er called “ the b u rd en ” o f historical consciousness, w h ich h e defined as “the privilege o f m o d ern m an to have a full awareness o f the historicity o f everything present and the relativity o f all opinions” (1975, p. 8). It is in this spirit that w e can re-read Studies on Hysteria (B reuer and Freud, 1895) in order to re-interpret the Freud-B reuer break, n o t as resulting from differences regard­ ing the role o f sexuality, as com m only assumed, b u t rather from a disagree­ m en t a b o u t th e role o f language in the unconscious d e te rm in a tio n o f sym ptom s. M y thesis is that the com m only accepted view, that Freud fearlessly uncovered sexuality w hereas B reuer shrank back, is a m yth, p ro p o u n d e d by Freud and E rnest Jones, w hich served to eclipse F reuds m ore disturbing discov­ ery that language structures hum an experience in ways th at are com pletely out o f conscious awareness. B reuer, I think, could n o t tolerate such an affront to rationalism , yet for a tim e Freud persisted in his attem pt to convince B reuer o f the non-physiological, broadly linguistic determ ination o f sym ptom s as m ay be seen thro u g h o u t the Fliess correspondence (Masson, 1985), in the Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), and in his exposition o f his treatm ent o f D ora (1905b). Freud, however, in later years, by so em phasizing sexuality as the c o n te n t o f sym bolism and

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p ro m o tin g him self as a “ conq u istad o r” o f sexuality, p ushed aside his discovery o f how, as Lacan puts it, “ the unconscious is structured in the m ost radical way like a language” (1977, p. 234), as a sem iotic system o f differential traces (for related view s, see Bär, 1975; Basch, 1976). T h e c o m m o n ly accepted view o f B re u e r’s te rm in a tio n o f his tre a tm e n t w ith A nna O. com es to us from Jo n es w h o w rites: “ F reud has related to m e a fuller a cco u n t than he described in his w ritings o f the peculiar circum stances su rro u n d in g the end o f this novel treatm en t. It w o u ld seem that B re u er had developed w h a t w e sho u ld now adays call a strong co u n tertran sferen ce to his interesting p a ti e n t . . . and he d ecided to b rin g the trea tm e n t to an e n d ” (1953, p. 224). A ccording to Jo n es, B re u e r a n n o u n c e d the te rm in a tio n to A nna O ., w h o later th e sam e ev en in g su m m o n e d h im back “ in th e throes o f an hysterical ch ildbirth (pseudocyesis), the logical te rm in a tio n o f a p h a n to m pregnancy that h ad b e e n invisibly d e v elo p in g in response to B re u e r’s m in istra tio n s” (Jones, 1953, pp. 2 2 4 -2 5 ). Jo n e s th e n presents w h a t has b e c o m e th e stereo ty p e o f B reuer: T hough profoundly shocked, he managed to calm her dow n by hypnotiz­ ing her, and then fled the house in a cold sweat. T he next day he and his wife left for Venice to spend a second honeym oon, w hich resulted in the conception o f a daughter; the girl born in these curious circumstances was nearly sixty years later to com m it suicide in N ew York. C onfirm ation o f this account may be found in a contem porary letter Freud w rote to M artha, w hich contains substantially the same story, (p. 225) Jo n e s w e n t o n to state th a t th e sep aratio n b e tw ee n B re u e r an d F reu d “ was b ro u g h t a b o u t by B re u er’s unw illingness to follow Freud in his investigation o f his p a tie n ts’ sexual life, o r rather, in th e fa r-re a ch in g conclusions F re u d was d raw ing from it. T h a t disturbances in th e sexual life w ere the essential factor in th e etiology o f b o th neuroses and psychoneuroses was a d o c trin e B reu er could n o t easily stom ach. N o r was h e alone in that!” (p. 253). As re p o rte d by Gay, F reud w ro te to his fiancee M a rth a in 1882 that B re u er had revealed “ so m e th in g s” a b o u t his fo rm e r p a tie n t A n n a O . th a t “ I am supposed to repeat only ‘on ce I am m arried to M a rth a ’” (1988, p. 64). Gay does n o t tell us w hat these things w ere b u t goes o n to endorse, in its essential details, Jo n e s’s picture o f B reuer, th at he was hesitant to publish his case o f A nna O. because o f reluctance “ to adm it that the ultim ate o rigins o f hysteria, and som e o f its florid m anifestations, w ere sexual in n a tu re ” (1988, p. 66). C uriously, Gay goes o n to co n trad ict h im self by stating, as Jo n es h im self had d o n e th irty-five years earlier (1953, p. 254), th at B re u er d id n o t deny “ the influence o f sexual conflicts o n n eu ro tic suffering” (1988, p. 68). B o th Jo n es an d Gay, d espite th eir

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o w n c o n tra ry ev id e n ce , p re sen t B rcuer, in co n tra st to F reu d , as tim o ro u s in th e face o f sexuality. T h is v iew o f B re u e r is re p ea te d by c o n te m p o ra ry p sy c h o a n ­ alysts (P erso n , 1988; R o s e n b a u m a n d M u ro ff, 19 8 4 )1 as w ell as in a re c e n t e d itio n o f F re u d ’s w o rk s by A n n a F re u d w h o w rites: “ E v en th e first surm ises th a t sexual im pulses m ig h t be at th e b o tto m o f hysterical sy m p to m s cost F reu d th e c o lla b o ra tio n an d frien d sh ip o f J o s e f B re u e r” (1986, p. 271). H o w d o w e a c c o u n t fo r th e p ersisten ce o f this stereotype? F re u d h im s e lf m a in ta in e d th a t his c h ie f d isco v ery h a d to d o w ith th e role o f sexuality a n d th a t this cost h im th e g o o d o p in io n o f o th e rs. In his C lark U n iv e rsity le c tu re s, r e fe r rin g to his c o lle ag u e s, h e said, “ th e y all b e g a n by c o m p le te ly d isb e lie v in g m y a sse rtio n th a t sex u al a e tio lo g y w as o f d ecisive im p o rta n c e ” (F reu d , 1909, p. 40). In a late r essay o n th e h isto ry o f p sy c h o ­ analysis, F re u d (1914b) w ro te th a t B re u e r “ b ro k e o f f all fu rth e r in v estig a tio n ” afte r p e rc e iv in g th e “ sexual m o tiv a tio n ” o f A n n a O .’s tran sferen ce: H e never said this to m e in so m any w ords, b u t he to ld m e e n o u g h at different tim es to justify this reco n stru ctio n o f w h a t happened. W h en I later began m ore and m ore resolutely to p u t forw ard the significance o f sexuality in the aedology o f neuroses, he was th e first to show the reaction o f distaste and repudiation w h ich was later to becom e so fam iliar to m e, b u t w hich at that tim e 1 had n o t yet learnt to recognize as m y inevitable fate. (1914b, p. 12) In F re u d ’s a u to b io g ra p h ic a l p ap er, w h ic h S trach ey in th e “ E d ito r ’s N o t e ” m isd escrib ed as “ a c o o l a n d e n tire ly o b jectiv e a c c o u n t o f th e e v o lu tio n o f his scientific v iew s” (1925b, p. 5), F re u d stated th a t his investigation o f th e sexual life o f p a tie n ts based o n his “ su rp risin g d isc o v ery ” o f “ d e riv in g hysteria from sexuality” cost h im his “ p o p u la rity as a d o c to r” (1925b, p. 24; see also p. 48). R e g a rd in g B reu er, F re u d w ro te , “ it w as easy to see th a t h e to o sh ran k from re co g n izin g th e sexual aetiology' o f th e n e u ro ses” (1925b, p. 26). H e th e n gave his v iew o f B re u e r’s te rm in a tio n w ith A n n a O.: I cam e to in te rp re t th e case co rrectly and to re co n stru c t, from som e rem arks w hich he had m ade, the conclusion o f his treatm en t o f it. After the w ork o f catharsis had seem ed to be com pleted, th e girl had suddenly

1.

In h er w idely popular book. Person w rote: “Breuer, w h o had becom e increasingly fascinated w ith Anna O .’s treatm ent, is thought to have ignored his wife and therebyprovoked h er jealousy. Belatedly recognizing the nature o f his w ife’s reaction, Breuer term inated Anna O .’s treatm ent. Shortly afterward, he was called back to find his patient in the throes o f a hysterical childbirth. H e calmed her dow n but, the next day, took his wife o n a second honey m o o n ” (1988, p. 245).

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developed a c o n d itio n o f ‘transference love’; he had n o t c o n n ec te d this w ith h e r illness, and had therefore retired in dismay. (1925b, p. 26) As re p o rte d by P o llo ck , F re u d also p re sen te d his v iew o f A n n a O .’s te r m i­ n a tio n in a le tte r to S tefan Z w e ig in 1932: W h a t really happ en ed w ith B reu er’s patient 1 was able to guess later on, long after the break in o u r relations, w h en I suddenly rem em bered so m e­ th in g B reuer had o n ce told m e in a n o th e r c o n te x t before w e had begun to collaborate and w h ich he never repeated. O n the evening o f the day w h e n all h e r sym ptom s had been disposed of, h e was su m m o n ed to the p a tie n t again, fo u n d h e r confused a n d w rith in g in a b d o m in a l cram ps. A sked w h a t was w ro n g w ith her, she replied, “ N ow ' D r. B.’s child is co m in g !” (1976, p. 140) F re u d w e n t o n to say: I was so co n v in ced o f this re co n stru c tio n o f m in e th at I p u blished it som ew here. B re u e r’s youngest d a u g h te r (b orn shortly after th e abovem en tio n ed treatm ent, n o t w ith o u t significance for the d eeper connections) read m y account an d asked her father about it (shortly before his death). H e con firm ed m y version, and she inform ed m e ab o u t it later. (Pollock, 1976, p. 140) F erenczi also re ite ra te d this v iew o f B re u e r as tim o ro u s in c o n tra st to F reud: U p o n the first m anifestations o f u n in h ib ited instinctual life he [Breuer] left n o t on ly th e p a tie n t b u t the w h o le m e th o d in th e lurch . . . Psychotherapy had to w ait for a m an o f stronger calibre, w h o w ould n o t recoil from the instinctual and anim al elem ents in th e m ental organization o f civilized m an; there is n o need for m e to nam e this pioneer. F reud’s experience forced him relentlessly to the assum ption that in every case o f neurosis a conditio sine qua non is a sexual traum a. (1929, pp. 109-110) N o w w h a t p o sitio n , in p rin t, d id B re u e r take reg ard in g a sexual e tio lo g y fo r neurosis? Jo n e s h im s e lf q u o te d fro m B re u e r’s “ T h e o re tic a l” c h a p te r in Studien iiber Hysterie (cf. B re u e r a n d F re u d , 1895, pp. 2 0 0 ,2 1 0 ,2 4 4 ,2 4 5 ) w ith B re u e r’s te x t tran slated as follow's: T h e sexual instinct is certainly the m ost pow erful source o f lasting increases in excitation (and, as such, o f the neuroses). T h a t such conflict betw een incom patible ideas has a pathogenic effect is a m atter o f daily experience. It is m ostly a m atter o f ideas and processes belo n g in g to the sexual life.

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This conclusion (about the disposition to hysteria) implies in itself that sexuality is one o f the great components o f hysteria.We shall see, however, that the part it plays is still greater by far, and that it cooperates in the most diverse ways in constituting the disease. T he greater num ber and the most important o f the repressed ideas that lead to (hysterical) conversion have a sexual content. (Jones, 1953, p. 254) In these passages, B reuer clearly endorsed the sexual etiology o f neurosis b u t Freud, to g eth e r w ith subsequent psychoanalysts, have som ehow persis­ tently denied this. F reud’s self-characterization, m oreover, as a m aligned soli­ tary because he proposed a sexual etiology o f neurosis has been disputed by the evidence presented by E llenberger (1970), D e ck e r (1977), and Sulloway (1979), w h ic h show s th a t F re u d ’s w o rk was n o t ig n o red by his m edical colleagues. B reuer’s “cold swreat” term ination o f his treatm ent w ith A nna O. has likewise been fabricated. As p o in te d o u t by P ollock (1976) and E llenberger (1970), B reuer’s youngest daughter, nam ed D ora, was b o rn o n M arch 11, 1882, well before the term ination o f A nna O.’s treatm ent, and, contrary to Jones’s state­ m ent, she “com m itted suicide w h en the Gestapo knocked at h e r do o r in 1944” (Pollock, 1976, p. 143). T h e view o f B reuer as wreak appears even in w hat is perhaps the m ost sym pathetic psychoanalytic account o f Breuer, w h ich stated that he “ did n o t have enough strength to c o n tin u e ” (G edo and Pollock, 1976, p. 134). Pollock stated that B reuer was “ frightened o f the personal c o u n te r­ transference reactions he perceived,” leading h im “ to deny, w ithdraw , and attem pt to isolate him self from w hat was too th reatening ” (1976, p. 148). B ut, according to Ellenberger, in B reuer’s original case notes “ there is now here any m ention o f a hysterical pregnancy,” and “Jones’s version o f the false pregnancy and hysterical b irth throes c an n o t be c o n firm ed and does n o t fit in to the chronology o f the case” (1972, p. 279). B reuer’s biographer, Hirschm tiller, stated unequivocally: “ T h e F reud-Jones account o f the term ination o f the treatm ent o f A nna O. should be regarded as a m y th ” (1978, p. 131). A ccording to Reeves, m oreover, the finding o f “seven o th e r case studies by Breuer, all em ploying the same cathartic technique, six o f w hich w'ere begun after his treatm ent o f A nna O . . . . effectively disposes o f Jones’s c o n te n tio n that B reuer was unnerved by his involvem ent w ith the case” (1982, p. 210). H irschm iiller (1978), w h o chal­ lenged Freud’s account o f his appeal to B reuer’s daughter as witness, had previ­ ously also em phasized th e im p o rta n ce o f these additional case reports o f patients w ith undisguised sexual sym ptom s, although H irschm iiller d o u b ted that B reuer used the cathartic m eth o d to treat them . Reeves proposed that w e take the phrase a ttributed to Anna 0 . , “ N o w Dr. B reuer’s baby is com ing,” as a reference to the anniversary o f the conception o f B reuer’s daughter D ora, w hose birth on M arch 11 w ould m ake h e r conception

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approxim ately b e tw ee n Ju n e 4 and Ju n e 11, 1881. B ecause the p atient was re­ living each day as it had o c cu rre d a year earlier, h er alleged rem ark m akes sense as a reco g n itio n o f this event in B reu er s life. T h e te rm in a tio n date o f Ju n e 7, 1882, m oreover, was n o t a result o f B re u e r’s w ith d raw in g in a cold sweat, b u t ra th e r m arked the anniversary o f A nna O.’s c o m m itm e n t to the sa n ito riu m at In z e rsd o rf o n J u n e 7, 1881; th e te rm in a tio n date was p lan n e d by h e r in c o m m e m o ra tio n o f that event. R eeves therefore concluded: O n this hypothesis it is quite credible that som e such verbal exchange as that reported by Freud did actually occur betw een Anna O. and Breuer and probably on the final day o f her treatm ent. I do not, however, feel that there are any grounds for believing in the phantom pregnancy and the hysterical childbirth symptoms. It seems m ore plausible to suppose that this reconstruction o f w hat took place was based on Freud’s faulty recollection o f w hat Breuer had actually reported to him . (1982, p. 210) R eev es proposed th a t w e take w h a t F reud h im self called a “ re c o n stru c tio n ” as a “ screen m e m o ry ” (1982, p. 211) w h o se d isto rtio n s w ere m o tiv a te d by an intellectual as well as p ersonal rift b e tw e e n B re u e r and F reud. “B re u e r’s appar­ e n t re p u d ia tio n (o r so it appeared to Freud) o f all th at th ey had jo in tly sto o d fo r” was m anifested in his criticism o f F re u d ’s overgeneralizations: “ In essence, w h a t B re u e r was saying a b o u t F re u d ’s latest in n o v a tio n (in his th e o ry o f defence and repression) was th a t w hilst descriptively is was full o f interest, scien­ tifically it was lac k in g a tru e basis in hard e m p irica l data (S .E . 2, p. 2 3 6 )” (R eeves, 1982, p. 213). W h a t I am proposing, m o re specifically, is th at w h a t B re u er o b jec ted to in F re u d ’s c o n ce p tu a liz atio n was the role he gave language in th e u n co n scio u s stru c tu rin g o f sym ptom s. B reu er’s rebuke, fu rth erm o re, so w o u n d ed Freud that it rem ained a m ajo r issue in his co rresp o n d en ce w ith Fliess; it p ro m p te d him to w rite th e Project as a defense o f his view o f the central im p o rta n ce o f speech processes; and it drove h im to c o n d u c t the trea tm e n t o f th e p a tie n t he nam ed “ D ora,” w h o was th e sam e age as B re u er’s daughter, D ora, in such a way that he m ig h t obtain p r o o f fo r his claim s a b o u t th e u nconscious linguistic d e te rm in a ­ tio n o f sym ptom s. T h e D o ra case, as D e c k e r d e m o n stra te d (1982, 1991), is replete w ith allusions to B re u er and was, I th in k , the cu lm in atio n o f a long struggle by Freud to prove h im self to B reuer.

The Polemic in the Text B re u e r decisively in flu e n ce d F re u d ’s th in k in g in N o v e m b er, 1882, w h e n he first to ld F reud details o f his tre a tm e n t o f A n n a O ., th e p a tie n t m ost often n a m e d an d discussed by F reu d (K arpe, 1961). W e to o can b e g in by read in g B re u e r’s a cc o u n t o f th e case in Studies on Hysteria, n o t in o rd e r to u p d a te o u r

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assessment o f the p a tie n t, b u t rath er o f the text. O u r historical consciousness regarding the o rig in o f psychoanalysis m ay be already shaped by h o w w e have read o r by w h a t o thers have said a b o u t Studies on Hysteria. It m ay be instructive, therefore, to a tte m p t a re-read in g , in accord w ith F re u d ’s o w n advice in his 1908 preface to the second edition: T h e attentive reader will be able to detect in the present book the germs o f all that has since been added to the theory o f catharsis: for instance, the part played by psychosexual factors and infantilism , the im portance o f dreams and o f unconscious symbolism. A nd I can give no better advice to any one interested in the developm ent o f catharsis into psycho-analysis than to begin w ith Studies on Hysteria and thus follow the path w hich I m yself have trodden, (p. xxxi) W e a tte m p t to follow the first steps o f this path in o rd e r to grasp th e germ s o f F re u d ’s discovery o f u nconscious sym bolic activity' in th e c o n te x t o f his rela­ tionship to Breuer. In his re p o rt o f th e trea tm e n t o f A nna O ., c o n d u c te d b etw ee n D ecem ber, 1880, and Ju n e , 1882, B re u e r m ad e n u m ero u s observ atio n s reg ard in g his p a tie n t’s speech processes. H e n o te d th a t she had g reat “ p o e tic ” gifts and suffered from “ paraphasia” (B reu er an d F reud, 1895, pp. 2 1 -2 2 ). D u rin g episodes o f h e r absences she w o u ld “stop in the m iddle o f a sentence, repeat h er last w ords and after a sh o rt pause go o n talking” (1895, p. 24). In the afternoons she w o u ld e n te r a so m n o len t state u n til after sunset: She w ould then wake up and com plain that som ething was torm en tin g her— o r rather, she w ould keep repeating in th e im personal form “ to rm e n tin g , to rm e n tin g .” For alongside o f th e developm ent o f the contractures there appeared a d e ep-going functional disorganization o f her speech. It first becam e noticeable that she was at a loss to find wrords, and this difficulty gradually increased. Later she lost h er com m and o f gram m ar and syntax; she no longer conjugated verbs, and eventually she used only infinitives, for the m ost part incorrectly form ed from weak past participles; and she om itted b o th the definite and indefinite article. In the process o f tim e she becam e alm ost com pletely deprived o f words. She put them together laboriously out o f four o r five languages and becam e alm ost unintelligible. (1895, p. 25) T his is a rem arkably precise description o f a patient’s speech difficulties, w ith a w ealth o f detail perhaps u n m atch ed in psychoanalytic observations o f speech phen o m en a. B reu er’s aptitude as an objective observer has b een n o ted by m any com m entators. B reuer him self w ro te in a letter that in his treatm en t o f A nna O ., he did n o t allow “ any preconceived o p inions to interfere w ith the sim ple o bservation o f th e im p o rta n t d a ta ” (C ranefield, 1958, pp. 3 1 9 -2 0 ). Pollock

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w rote: “ Breuer, the careful observer and scientist, researcher and e x p erim e n tal­ ist, c o u ld re p o rt the b ehavior o f his fam ous p atient in great detail” (1976, p. 148). Schlessinger et al. (1976) em phasized that B reuer had an impressive ability to observe objectively. As far as I know, only R izz u to (1989) has tied this im pres­ sive ability o f B re u er’s to his observations o f speech p h en o m en a. B reu er c o n tin u e d to describe his p a tie n t’s course o f illness four m o n th s into treatm ent: H er paraphasia receded; but thenceforth she spoke only in English— appar­ ently, however, w ith o u t know ing that she was doing so. She had disputes w ith her nurse w h o was, o f course, unable to understand her. It was only som e m onths later that I was able to convince h er that she was talking English. Nevertheless, she herself could still understand the people about her w ho talked G erm an. (Breuer and Freud, 1895, p. 25) A fter h e r fath er d ied she b ecam e m ore disturbed: She now spoke only English and could n o t understand w hat was said to her in G erm an___ She was, however, able to read French and Italian. If she had to read one o f these aloud, w hat she produced, w ith extraordinary fluency, was an admirable extem pore English translation. (1895, p. 26) T h e psychoanalytic m e th o d itself was lau n c h ed because B re u er repeatedly n o te d changes in his p a tie n t’s c o n d itio n th at c o rrelated w ith changes in h e r speech. She h e rse lf n o te d h o w she w o u ld lose h e r obstinate m o o d th ro u g h w h a t she called this “ talking c u re ” (1895, p. 30), an approach initiated “ to b e g in w ith accidentally b u t later in te n tio n a lly ” by m ak in g use o f a few o f h e r “ m u tte red w ords” : som eone near h er repeated one o f these phrases o f hers while she was com plaining about the “ torm enting.” She at once jo in e d in and began to paint some situation o r tell som e story, hesitatingly at first and in her paraphasic jargon; but the longer she w ent on the m ore fluent she became, till at last she was speaking quite correct G e rm a n .. . . A few m om ents after she had finished her narrative she w ould wake up, obviously calmed dow n, or, as she called it, “gehaglich” ___ If for any reason she was unable to tell m e the story du rin g her evening hypnosis she failed to calm dow n after­ wards, and on the follow ing day she had to tell m e two stories in order for this to happen. (1895, p. 29)

By th e a u tu m n o f th at first year o f tre a tm e n t B re u e r “ was h o p in g fo r a co n tin u o u s and increasing im provem ent, p rovided that the p e rm a n e n t b u rd e n ­ in g o f h e r m in d w ith fresh stim uli co u ld be prevented by h e r g iving regular verbal expression to th e m ” (1895, p. 32). (In th ree pages h ere [pp. 3 0 -3 2 ],

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B re u e r repeats th e phrase “ verbal u tte ra n c e ” o r “ verbal ex p ressio n ”— in G e rm an , Aussprache— at least seven tim es.) B re u e r th e n discovered th a t such utterances n o t only h ad a palliative effect, b u t co u ld also b rin g a b o u t th e disap­ pearance o f sym ptom s: “ W h e n this h ap p en e d fo r th e first tim e— w h e n , as a result o f an accid en tal an d sp o n ta n eo u s u tte ra n c e o f this k in d , d u rin g th e evening hypnosis, a disturbance w h ic h had persisted for a considerable tim e vanished— I was greatly su rp rised ” (1895, p. 34).T h e p a tie n t’s inability to d rin k w ater for six weeks vanished after she angrily recalled h o w h er m aid’s dog drank from a glass in h e r room . B y so articulating the experiences that gave rise to h er sym ptom s, they w ere elim inated o n e by o n e .T h e sym ptom s w ere “ talked away” by follow ing back “th e thread o f m em o ries” w ith th e result that “ finally [even] h e r disturbances o f speech w ere ‘talked away’” (1 8 9 5 ,p. 35 ).T hese disturbances in c lu d e d “ n o t h e a rin g ” w h e n so m e o n e spoke to h e r; B re u e r d etailed seven types o f such inability to h e ar and gave a separate c o u n t o f th e o ccurrences in each category (1895, p. 36), a lthough he apologized fo r th e “incom pleteness” o f his notes (1895, p. 40). B u t in his “ T h e o re tic a l” c o n trib u tio n to Studies on Hysteria, “from w h ich ,” Freud w ro te to Fliess o n Ju n e 2 2 ,1 8 9 4 ,“ ! w holly disassociate m yself” (Masson, 1985, p. 83), B re u e r m in im iz e d th e role o f speech an d language, in alm ost shocking contrast to the previous w ealth o f his observations. H e discussed the hysterical sym ptom u n d e r th e ru b ric o f a “ reflex” (1895, p. 208) w h ic h is facil­ itated “ a ccording to th e general laws o f association” : B ut som etim es (though, it m ust be adm itted, only in h igher degrees o f hysteria) true sequences o f associated ideas lie betw een the affect and its reflex. H ere we have determination through symbolism. W hat unites the affect and its reflex is often som e ridiculous play upon words o r associations by sound, but this only happens in dreamlike states w hen the critical powers are low and lies outside the group o f phenom ena w ith w hich we are here dealing. (1895, p. 209) In this way B reu er attem p ted to restrict the role o f language to “h ig h er” hyster­ ics an d in this case o nly d u rin g in ferio r states o f m ind; in any case, h e insisted that this p h e n o m e n a lay bey o n d o u r c u rre n t interests. W h e n h e later pressed his claim th at “ h y p n o id states are th e cause and necessary c o n d itio n o f many, indeed o f m ost, m ajo r and com plex hysterias,” h e again w ro te alm ost co n te m p ­ tuously o f th e role o f language: T hus it is almost only in these states that there arises a som ew hat com pli­ cated irrational “symbolic relation betw een the precipitating cause and the pathological phenom enon” [p. 5], w hich, indeed, is often based on the most absurd similarities o f sound and verbal associations. (1895, p. 216)

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N o t o nly d id B re u e r o n c e again show disdain for the way language is tied up w ith sym ptom s, b u t he also to o k th e o p p o rtu n ity to distance h im self from F reu d by q u o tin g th e ir jo in t “ P relim in ary C o m m u n ic a tio n ,” w ritte n in 1892 (1895, p. xiv), precisely at the p o in t w h e n that statem en t addressed the rela­ tio n s h ip o f language to th e fo rm a tio n o f sym ptom s. B u t B re u e r d id n o t sim ply q u o te th e sta te m e n t: H e b ra ck e te d it b e tw e e n tw o negative term s, c laim ing th at th e relationship is an “ irratio n al” o n e based o n “ the m o st absurd sim ilarities.” H o w can w e un d erstan d this sharp contrast b etw een B re u er’s careful, a tte n ­ tive re p o rt o f th e fu nctions o f speech in his p atient, a re p o rt in w h ic h he reit­ erated his surprise an d w illingness to learn from th e p a tie n t (1895, p. 46), and, o n th e o th e r hand, his dismissive approach to th e role o f language w h e n he offered his theoretical reflections? B re u er him self suggested a partial explana­ tio n w h e n he w ro te som ew hat polem ically: If it seems to us, as it does to Binet and Janet, that w hat lies at the centre o f hysteria is a splitting o ff o f a p ortion o f psychical activity, it is o ur duty to be as clear as possible on this subject. It is only to o easy to fall into a habit o f thought w hich assumes that every substantive has a substance behind it— w hich gradually comes to regard “ consciousness” as standing for some actual thing; and w hen we have becom e accustom ed to make use m etaphorically o f spatial relations, as in the term “sub-consciousness,” we find as tim e goes on that we have actually form ed an idea w hich has lost its m etaphorical nature and w hich we can m anipulate easily as though it was real. O u r m ythology is then com plete. (1895, pp. 227-28)

A lth o u g h B re u e r u rg e d us to avoid b e in g “ tric k e d by o u r o w n figures o f sp e e c h ” (p. 228), his a rg u m e n t here was n o t ju s t w ith language b u t, I believe, w ith Freud. F reud had used the term “le sub-conscient" in his 1893 French paper o n m o to r paralyses (B reuer and F reud, 1895, p. 45, e d ito r’s fo o tn o te ), w h ic h M acM illan (1990) v iew ed as F re u d ’s e laboration o f J a n e t’s thesis th a t hy steri­ cal sym ptom s are a fu n c tio n o f ideas (or, in Peircean term s, o f failed se m io ­ sis). F re u d (1893b, p. 52) d istin g u ish e d o rg a n ic lesions from th e h y ste ric ’s “ lesions” in w h ic h th e c o n c e p tio n o f a b o d y -p a rt loses its associative linkage: “ Le bras se c o m p o rte c o m m e s’il n ’existait pas p o u r le je u des associations” [“ T h e a rm behaves as th o u g h it d id n o t exist fo r th e play o f associations” ] (F reud, 1893a, p. 170). B u t th e a rm , th ro u g h its d issociated c o n c e p tio n , is en g ag e d in a su b c o n sc io u s association (“ est engage dans u n e association subconsciente,” 1893b, p. 52—53). A ny psychic im pression b eco m es traum atic, F reud w e n t o n to say, w h e n an individual c a n n o t discharge its affective value in m o to r reactions o r by m eans o f associative psychic w ork. Such discharge is im possible w h e n th e im pression rem ains in th e subconscious (“ L’im possibilité

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de l ’é lim in a tio n s’im p o se q u a n d l’im p ressio n reste dans le su b c o n sc ien t,” 1893b, p. 54). F reu d w e n t o n to state that “ w e ” (“ B re u er e t m o i”) lay claim to this th e o ry an d its c o rre sp o n d in g p sy c h o th era p eu tic m e th o d . B reuer, th e n , w ith his critical reference to th e te rm “sub-consciousness,” appears to have b e en criticizin g F reud and taking his distance from him in a typically positivistic m an n er, accusing F reud o f en g ag in g in m y th o lo g y by p o stu latin g a system ic u n co n scio u s w ith its associative sym bolic n etw o rk . F reud seem s to have been aware o f the dispute, for he to o m ade a p o lem i­ cal reference to the statem en t a b o u t sym bolization fo u n d o n page five o f the j o in t “ P relim inary C o m m u n ic atio n ,” w h ic h as F reu d earlier w ro te to Fliess o n D e ce m b er 18, 1892, “has cost e n o u g h in battles w ith m y esteem ed p a rtn e r” (M asson, 1985, p. 36). T h e reference occurs in his final case history (Fraulein Elisabeth Von R .) o f Studies on Hysteria in w h ic h he w rote: T h e patient ended her description o f a w hole series o f episodes by com plaining that they had m ade the fact o f her “standing alone” painful to her. In an o th er series o f episodes, w hich com prised h er unsuccessful attempts to establish a new life for her family, she was never tired o f repeat­ ing that w hat was painful about them had been her feeling o f helpless­ ness, the feeling that she could n o t “ take a single step fo rw ard .. . . ” I could not help thinking that the patient had done nothing m ore o r less than look for a symbolic expression o f her painful thoughts and that she had found it in the intensification o f her sufferings.The fact that som atic sym ptom s o f hysteria can be brought about by sym bolization o f this kind was already asserted in o ur “ Prelim inary C om m unication” [p. 5]. (Breuer and Freud, 1895, p. 152)

In fact, F re u d was now' asserting m u c h m o re, for th e “ P re lim in ary C o m m u n ic a tio n ” d id n o t state th at som atic sy m p to m s o f hysteria can be “ b ro u g h t a b o u t” by sym bolization, b u t ra th e r that th ere is a sym bolic relation b etw ee n th e precip itatin g cause and the p athologic p h e n o m e n o n . F reud here explicitly reaffirm ed w h a t B re u er fo u n d unpalatable, an d h e claim ed to have proof. T h is a rg u m e n t w ith B re u e r a b o u t th e role o f sy m b o lizatio n appears to have b e e n an o n g o in g o n e. F reu d , in th e case re p o rt o f his e n c o u n te r w ith K ath arin a, stated: “W e [B reuer a n d I] h a d o fte n c o m p a red th e sy m p to m a to l­ ogy o f h y steria w ith a p ic to g ra p h ic sc rip t w h ic h has b e c o m e in te llig ib le after th e discovery o f a few' bilingual in sc rip tio n s” (1895, p. 129). B ecause little, if any, o f this sem io tic p erspective e n te re d B re u e r’s th eo re tic al fo rm u ­ lations, w e can o n ly assum e th at it was F re u d w h o was m ak in g th e c o m p a r­ isons b e tw e e n sy m p to m s an d sc rip t an d a tte m p tin g to c o n v in c e B re u e r o f th e ir tru th .

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Freud was obsessed w ith this tru th from the m o m e n t he heard the details o f A nna O.’s treatm en t. As R iz z u to p u t it, “ T h e po w er o f the spoken w o rd had taken over F re u d ’s professional career” (1989, p. 112). Jo n es re p o rte d th at hear­ in g a b o u t B re u e r’s tre a tm e n t o f A n n a O. m ad e a p ro fo u n d im pression o n Freud: Freud was greatly interested in hearing o f the famous case o f Anna O., w hich he did soon after its term ination in Ju n e 1882; to be exact, on N ovem ber 18 [unpublished letter from Freud to M artha Bernays, N ovem ber 19, 1882], It was so far outside his experience that it m ade a deep impression on him, and he would discuss the details o f it w ith Breuer over and over again. (1953, p. 226) E ven a cu rso ry chronology' bears w itness to this im pact o n Freud. In N o v em b er, 1882, B re u er to ld F reud a b o u t his tre a tm e n t o f A nna O. W e m ay assume, because B re u er provided so m u c h detail in his re p o rt o f h e r treat­ m en t, th at he to ld F reud o f h e r “ paraphasias.” “ H e repeatedly read m e pieces o f th e case history,” w ro te Freud, “ and I had an im pression th at it accom plished m o re tow ards an u n d e rstan d in g o f neuroses th an any previous o b se rv atio n ” (1925b, p. 19). In 1885, Freud, still taken w ith B re u er’s re p o rt, repeated it to C h a rc o t w h e n he w e n t to Paris, b u t C h a rc o t appeared un in terested (Jones, 1953, p. 226; see also F reud, 1925b, pp. 19-20). C h a rc o t did accept F re u d ’s offer to translate a n e w volum e o f his lectures, th ree o f w h ic h w ere o n aphasia, in to G e rm an . F orty years later, F reud recalled th e th em e o f aphasia in C h a rc o t’s letter: “ I can still re m e m b e r a phrase in th e letter, to th e effect that I suffered o n ly from ‘l ’aphasie motrice’ [m o to r aphasia, i.e., th e in ability to speak] an d n o t from 'l ’aphasie sensorielle du français’ [French sensory aphasia, i.e., the inability to hear a n d un d erstan d F re n c h ]” (1925b, p. 12). In 1886, u p o n F reu d ’s re tu rn to V ienna, h e “ tu rn e d o n c e m o re to B re u e r’s o b se rv atio n a n d m ad e h im tell m e m o re a b o u t it” (1925b, p. 20). F reu d c oncluded: “T h e state o f things w h ic h he had discovered seem ed to m e to be o f so fundam ental a natu re th a t I could n o t believe it co u ld fail to be present in any case o f hysteria if it had proved to o c cu r in a single o n e ” (p. 21). In 1888, F reud w ro te fo u r unsigned papers fo rV illa ret’s m edical dictionary, o n e o f w h ic h was o n aphasia (Kris, 1954, pp. 1 8 ,4 4 8 ). In 1888 o r 1889, F reud used B re u e r’s cathartic m e th o d to treat E m m y von M . and h ad p ro bably b e g u n his tre a tm e n t w ith his “ teacher,” F rau C aecilie (B reuer and Freud, 1895, pp. xii, 48; see also M asson, 1985, p. 20, no te 2; Swales, 1986). In 1889, F reud visited L iébault and B e rn h e im in N a n c y and later w rote: “ I was a sp e c ta to r o f B e rn h e im ’s a stonishing e x p e rim e n ts u p o n his hospital

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patients, and I received the p rofoundest im pression o f the possibility that there co u ld be pow erful m ental processes w h ic h nevertheless rem ained h id d en from th e consciousness o f m e n ” (1925b, p. 17). In 1891 he publicly in d ic a te d his interest in th e issue o f language by p u b lish in g his m o n o g ra p h O n A phasia, d e d ic atin g it to B reuer. As Jo n es com m ented, “ he had h o p ed thereby to w in B reuer into a b e tte r h u m o r and was disappointed that for som e obscure reason it had the opposite effect” (1953, p. 213). In this b o o k , w h ic h F reud refused to include in the G e rm a n e d itio n o f his com plete w orks “ o n the grounds th at it b e lo n g e d to his neurological and n o t to his psycho-analytic w o rk s” (Kris, 1954, p. 19, n o te 1), his rem arks a b o u t paraphasia are suggestive, for he stated that: T h e paraphasia observed in aphasic patients does n o t differ from the incorrect use and the distortion o f words w hich the healthy person can observe in him self in states o f fatigue o r divided attention o r under the influence o f disturbing affects— the kind o f thing that frequently happens to o ur lecturers and causes the listener painful em barrassm ent. It is tem p t­ ing to regard paraphasia in the w idest sense as a purely functional system, a sign o f reduced efficiency o f the apparatus o f speech associations. (Freud, 1891, p. 13) Freud also expressed “ d o u b t a b o u t th e localization o f speech cen tres” (Kris, 1954, p. 18), as B ru n (1936) w rote: M oreover he firmly declines to localize ideas in locally circum scribed areas o f the brain (“ centres”) and instead explains th e fun ctio n o f speech genetically (on the basis o f its gradual acquisition in childhood) as the result o f the restim ulation o f a widespread visual, acoustic, tactile, kinaesthetic, etc., netw ork o f association. It wras the breaking o f this netw ork o f association and n o t the d estruction o f any special m otor, sensory or “ u n derstanding” centres w hich led to “c rip p lin g ” o f the functions o f speech and so produced the various form s o f aphasia, (quoted in Kris, 1954, p. 18, note 3)

Freud argued fo r th e system ic status o f a “z o n e o f language” in d e p e n d e n t o f anatom ic localization. Such a “ zone,” anathem a to th e prevailing n e u ro p a th o logical theories, w o u ld lend su p p o rt to his developing view o f hysteria, accord­ ing to w h ic h sym ptom s are n o t a fu n c tio n o f anatom ical lesions (Forrester, 1980, p. 25) b u t ra th e r a fu n c tio n o f disturbances in the n e tw o rk o f sym bol­ ization. Indeed, R iz z u to (1989) a rgued th at F reud w ro te his b o o k o n aphasia precisely in o rd e r to give an a cc o u n t o f th e rem arkable speech sym ptom s o f A nna O ., E m m y v on M ., and Frau Caecilie. From 1888 to 1892, F reud and B re u er actively collaborated in the treatm ent

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o f F re u d ’s cases (Pollock, 1976) an d Freud was in te n t o n collaborating w ith B re u er w ith regard to th e o ry as well, alth o u g h n o t w ith o u t disagreem ent, as F reu d later recalled: “ T h e re had been differences o f o p in io n b e tw ee n us at an early stage, b u t th ey had n o t b e e n a g ro u n d for o u r sep aratin g ” (1925b, pp. 2 2 -2 3 ). B u t gradually they did separate, and for years Freud argued w ith B reuer in his letters to Fliess. For exam ple, o n Ju n e 28, 1892, F reud w ro te to Fliess: “ T h e reason for w ritin g to you is that B reu er has declared his w illingness to publish jo in tly o u r detailed th e o ry o f abreaction, and o u r o th e r jo in t w itti­ cisms o n hysteria. A p a rt o f it that I first w an ted to w rite alone is finished, and u n d e r different circum stances w o u ld c ertain ly have b e e n c o m m u n ic a te d to y o u ” (M asson, 1985, p.31). Freud here apparently was re fe rrin g to the “ Prelim inary C o m m u n ic atio n ,” first published in 1893 (B reuer an d Freud, 1895, pp. ix, xiii), in w h ic h the issue o f th e role o f “ sym bolization” is pressed by Freud. H is phrase, “ o u r o th e r jo in t w itticism s o n hysteria,” recalls the sym bolic puns o f his p a tie n ts’ sym ptom s as well as B re u e r’s dism issal o f these as “ som e rid icu lo u s play u p o n w ords,” as q u o te d earlier (1895, p. 209). F reu d began his first case history in Studies on Hysteria, that o f Frau E m m y v o n M ., by stressing th a t h e r “ sy m p to m s an d p erso n ality in te rested m e so greatly that I devoted a large p art o f m y tim e to h e r” (1895, p. 4 8 ).T his ech o ed B re u er’s interest in and tim e-co n su m in g c o m m itm e n t to th e treatm ent o f A nna O ., and F reud m ade explicit that B re u e r’s trea tm e n t o f A nna O. was his m o d el at this inaugural m o m e n t. W h e n he d iscerned that his p a tie n t co u ld be easily h y p n o tiz e d he d e cid ed to “ m ake use o f B re u er’s tec h n iq u e o f investigation u n d e r hypnosis, w h ic h i had c o m e to k n o w from th e a cc o u n t h e had given m e o f th e successful trea tm e n t o f his first p atient. T h is was m y first a tte m p t at han d lin g th at th erap eu tic m e th o d ” (1895, p. 48). F reu d ’s o w n a cc o u n t o f this first trea tm e n t em phasizes, as B re u er’s a cco u n t did, th e d im en sio n o f speech in his p a tie n t. A fter g iv in g us an initial d e sc rip tio n o f Frau E m m y ’s physical appearance, F reud began his p resentation o f h e r sym ptom s as follows: She spoke in a low voice as though with difficulty and her speech was from tim e to tim e subject to spastic interruptions am ounting to a stam m er.. . . W hat she told m e was perfectly coherent and revealed an unusual degree o f education and intelligence. T his m ade it seem all the m ore strange w hen every tw o or three m inutes she suddenly broke off, contorted her face into an expression o f h o rro r and disgust, stretched out her hand towards m e, spreading and crooking her fingers, and exclaim ed, in a changed voice, charged w ith anxiety: “ Keep still!— D o n ’t say anything!— D o n ’t touch m e!” She was probably under the influence o f some recurrent hallucination o f a horrifying kind and was keeping the intruding m aterial at bay w ith this form ula. (1895, pp. 48-49)

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T h is dram atic o p e n in g u p o f th e d im en sio n o f speech m arks F re u d ’s in au ­ gural m ove: H e at o n c e placed him self o n the side o f B reuer, the listener and observer o f his p a tie n t’s speech. A t th e c o n clu sio n o f his final case study, th at o f F raulein E lisabeth von R ., F reud provided a synopsis o f his trea tm e n t o f his “ teacher,” Frau C aecilie. In it h e em phasized th e role o f sym b o lizatio n in th e fo rm a tio n o f sy m p ­ tom s, and th ere b y m an a g ed to m ain tain c o n tin u ity w ith his initial focus o n sp eech p h e n o m e n a , as B re u e r h ad d o n e , w h ile e n g a g in g in th e o n g o in g p o le m ic w ith B re u e r over th e th e o re tic a l significance to be giv en to such observations. Frau C aecilie p ro v id ed th e “ best exam ples o f sym b o lizatio n th a t I have seen,” w ro te F reud, an d h e d escribed h e r case as “ m y m ost severe and in stru c­ tive o n e ” (1895, p. 176), enabling him to gain “th e m ost instructive in form ation o n the way in w h ic h hysterical sym ptom s are d e te rm in e d ” (1895, p. 178). Freud th e n add ed , significantly fo r his p o lem ic w ith B reuer, th a t this case was as w eighty fo r h im as th e case o f A nna O. was fo r B reuer: “ In d eed , it was the study o f this rem arkable case, jo in tly w ith B reuer, that led directly to th e publi­ cation o f o u r ‘P relim inary C o m m u n ic a tio n ’” (1895, p. 178). F reud n e x t focused o n a series o f exam ples o f th e sym bolic d e te rm in a tio n o f sym ptom s, for exam ple, h e r re c u rre n t sym ptom o f facial neuralgia: I was curious to discover w h e th e r this, too, w ould tu rn o u t to have a psychical cause. W h en I began to call up the traum atic scene, the patient saw h erself back in a p e rio d o f great m ental irritab ility towards her husband. She described a conversation w hich she had had w ith him and a rem ark o f his w hich she had felt as a bitter insult. Suddenly she p u t her hand to h er cheek, gave a loud cry o f pain and said:“ It was like a slap in the face” W ith this her pain and her attack were b oth at an end. T here is no doubt that what had happened had been a sym bolization. She had felt as th o u g h she had actually been given a slap in the face. (p. 178)

T h e skeptics h ere m ust in clu d e B reuer, to w h o m F re u d d e ferre d w h e n it cam e to e x p la in in g th e “ first a tta ck o f n e u ralg ia , m o re th a n fifteen years earlier. H e re th e re w as n o sy m b o liz a tio n b u t a c o n v e rsio n th ro u g h sim ul­ taneity,” stated F re u d (1895, p. 178), an d th e n h e w en t o n to explain: “ T h e g e n e ra tio n o f th e n e u ralg ia at th a t m o m e n t w as o n ly explicab le o n the assum ption th at she was su ffering at the tim e from slight to o th a c h e o r pains in th e face, an d this was n o t im probable, since she was ju s t th e n in th e early m o n th s o f h e r first p re g n a n c y ” (p. 1 7 9 ).T h is assum ption o f a som atic, n o t a sym bolic, basis fo r th e sy m p to m appears to b e o ffere d in o rd e r to placate B re u e r’s physiological bias.

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In his follow ing exam ple, “w h ic h dem onstrates the actio n o f sym bolization u n d e r o th e r conditions,” Freud explicated h o w violent pain in his p a tie n t’s right heel arose w h e n h er physician was about to escort h e r dow nstairs to the d in in g ro o m after she had spent a w eek in bed, and h o w the pain disappeared “ w h e n th e patien t told m e she had b e en afraid at the tim e that she m ig h t n o t ‘find h e rse lf o n a rig h t fo o tin g ’ w ith these stran g ers” (1895, p. 179). F re u d th e n yielded additional g ro u n d to the o pposition: “ T h is seem s at first to be a strik­ in g and even a co m ic exam ple o f the genesis o f hysterical sym ptom s th ro u g h sym b o lizatio n by m eans o f a verbal expression. C lo se r e x am in atio n o f th e circum stances, how ever, favours a n o th e r view o f th e case” (1895, p. 179). Freud th e n ind icated th a t th e pains in h e r feet had b e en present before the physician’s gesture was m ade, since th ey wrere, in fact, the reason w h y she was in bed in the first place! Because n o o n e co u ld argue w ith this, F reud con clu d ed : “ In these exam ples th e m ech an ism o f sym bolization seem s to be re d u ce d to secondary im p o rta n ce , as is n o d o u b t the general ru le ” (1895, p. 179). Y ie ld in g thus, F re u d th e n insisted: “B u t I have exam ples at m y disposal w h ich seem to prove th e genesis o f hysterical sym ptom s th ro u g h sym bolization alo n e ” (1895, p. 179). H e th e n presen ted “ o n e o f th e best,” involving th e same patient, w h o , at th e age o f fifteen, felt a p e n etratin g pain in th e forehead after h e r g ra n d m o th er had given h e r a “p iercing” look; this pain, reproduced in treat­ m e n t after fifteen years, also disappeared w ith this n a rra tio n o f origins. F reud w e n t o n to give exam ples o f “ a regular collectio n o f sym bolizations o f this k in d ” fo u n d in his patient: “A w h o le set o f physical sensations w h ic h w o u ld ordinarily be regarded as organically d e te rm in e d w ere in h e r case o f psychical o rig in o r at least possessed a psychical m ea n in g ” (1895, p. 180). T h ere follow exam ples o f stabbing pains in th e h e art, th e sensation o f nails b e in g d riven in to th e head, an “ aura” in th e th ro at, each w ith th e ir a ccom panying articula­ tio n . F reud th e n e n d ed his case presen tatio n and c o n clu d ed this sectio n o f th e b o o k w ith an e x te n d e d reflection o n th e role o f sym bolization, w hose m e c h ­ anism “has its place, in som e sense, m idw ay b etw een autosuggestion and conver­ sio n ” (1895, p. 180).T h a t is to say, sym bolization does n o t op erate as a k ind o f conscious th in k in g o r in d ire ct suggestion (M acalpine, 1950, p. 504), n o r is it go verned by th e physical processes th at c o n v ert repressed energy in to physical sym ptom s: It is my opinion, however, that w hen a hysteric creates a somatic expression for an em otionally-coloured idea by sym bolization, this depends less than one w ould im agine on personal o r voluntary factors. In taking a verbal expression literally and in feeling the “stab in the heart” o r the “slap in the face” after som e slighting rem ark as a real event, the hysteric is not taking liberties w ith words, b u t is simply reviving once m ore the sensations to w hich the verbal expression owes its justification. (Freud, 1895, pp. 180-81)

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F reud th e n suggested that the figure o f speech o f “sw allow ing so m eth in g ,” used to describe an inability to respond to insult, “ did in fact o riginate from the in nervatory sensations w hich arise in the pharynx w h e n w e refrain from speak­ ing and prevent ourselves from reacting to th e insult” (1895, p. 181). Fie th en w rote: All these sensations and innervations belong to the field o f “T he Expression o f the Emotions,” which, as Darwin [1872] has taught us, consists o f actions w hich originally had a m eaning and served a purpose. T hese may now for the m ost part have becom e so m uch weakened that the expression o f them in words seems to us only to be a figurative picture o f them , whereas in all probability the description was once m eant literally; and hysteria is right in restoring the original m eaning o f the words in depicting its unusually strong innervations. Indeed, it is perhaps w rong to say that hysteria creates these sensations by symbolization. It may be that it does n o t take linguistic usage as its m odel at all, but that both hysteria and linguistic usage alike draw their material from a com m on source. (1895, p. 181)

A lth o u g h F reud here did n o t specify' w h a t th at “ c o m m o n so u rce” m ig h t be, it m ay w ell be th e u n c o n sc io u s sem io tic registration o f e x p e rie n c e as signs, p ro d u c in g feeling an d actio n interprétants. In th e v o lu m e ’s final piece, “ T h e P sychotherapy o f H ysteria,” w ritte n by Freud in 1895, w e can observe h o w he to o k his distance from B reuer, specifi­ cally aro u n d th e issue o f a system ic unconscious “ intelligence,” w h ic h appar­ ently was a b h o rre n t to B reuer. W e can observe a clear progression in the ex ten t to w h ic h F reud was w illing to stake o u t a positio n regarding the possibility o f unconscious a rticu latio n by m eans o f an o rd e re d set o f associations fu n c tio n ­ in g as signs. Freud tells us that in attem p tin g to use B re u er’s m eth o d w ith a large n u m b er o f p atients h e was forced to m ake m o re precise w h a t distinguishes hysteria from o th e r “neuroses” (1895a, p. 256), such as neurasthenia and “ anxiety n e u ro ­ sis.” T h e latter, he m aintained, “arises from an accum ulation o f physical tension, w hich is itself o n c e m o re o f sexual o rig in . T h is neurosis, too, has n o psychical m ec h an ism ” (1895a, p. 258), unlike hysteria, as o bserved by F reud in tw elve cases, “ w hose analysis provides a c o n firm atio n o f the psychical m echanism o f hysterical p h e n o m e n a p u t forw ard by us” (1895a, p. 260). In review ing the five cases published in the present volum e, F reud was led to affirm th a t o n ly o n e (Miss Lucy R .) c o u ld “ perhaps best be described as a m arginal case o f pure hysteria” (1895a, p. 260), w hereas th e others p resented hysteria in c o m b in a tio n w ith different neuroses. F or exam ple, in the “ c o m b in a tio n o f anxiety neurosis and hysteria” in the case o f K a th erin a,“ the fo rm er created the sym ptom s, w hile the latter repeated th e m and o p e rated w ith th e m ” (1895a, p. 260). F reud here

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was apparently reinforcing the p o in t he had m ade earlier about the orig in o f Frau C accilie’s facial neuralgia in a supposed toothache, nam ely that the sym p­ tom results from a physical cause but is propagated by psychical mechanisms, the ch ie f o f w hich is sym bolization. B ut he quickly w arns us n o t to w rongly th in k that he does not wish “ to allow that hysteria is an indep en d en t neurotic affliction” (his use o f double negation here suggests that som e intellectual co n to rtio n is present), o r that he views hysteria “m erely as a psychical m anifestation o f anxiety neurosis,” o r that he attributes only “ ‘ideogenic’ sym ptom s” to hysteria w hile “ transferring the som atic sym ptom s (such as hysterogenic p oints and anaesthesias) to anxiety neurosis” (1895a, p. 261). “ N o th in g o f the sort,” insists Freud (1895a, p. 261), and we can w o n d er at this p o in t about the danger o f his position becom ing transform ed, distoned, and partially evaporating in his attem pt to accom m odate B reuer. Freud n o w contradicts him self regarding the etiology o f hysterical sym ptons, as he postulates the following: 1.

Hysterical sym ptom s are m aintained by psychical mechanism s, the ch ief o f w hich is symbolization.

2.

Hysterical sym ptoms, “as a m atter o f theory',” can be elim inated by the articulation o f the underlying symbolic associations.

3.

H ysteria does n o t occur independently o f o ther disorders.

4.

These other disorders are the result o f physical mechanisms.

5.

In its origin the hysterical sym ptom has a physical cause. At the end o f his sum m ary o f his views regarding hysteria, Freud notes a

problem : It remains for me to m ention the apparent contradiction betw een the admission that not all hysterical symptoms are psychogenic and the asser­ tion that they can all be got rid o f by a psychotherapeutic procedure. T he solution lies in the fact that some o f these non-psychogenic symptoms (stigmata, for instance) are, it is true, indications o f illness, but cannot be described as ailments; and consequently it is not o f practical importance if they persist after the successful treatm ent o f the illness. (1895a, p. 265) T h e argum ent here has a spurious quality'. W h o , except the patient, is able to say that “ stigm ata” o r o th er “ indications o f illness” are n o t “ailm ents” and o f n o practical im p o rta n ce if they persist? B u t n o w F reud m akes a co m p lete about-face: As regards other such [non-psychogenic] symptoms, it seems to be the case that in som e roundabout way they are carried off along w ith the

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psychogenic sym ptom s, ju st as, perhaps, in some roundabout way they are after all dependent on a psychical causation. (1895a, p. 265) It is as if Freud, after struggling to give p ro p e r g ro u n d to B re u e r’s physicalism , w eary from the effort that he realized was co nvoluted and contradictory, finally gave up a c c o m m o d a tin g and affirm ed the role o f psychical, an d th erefo re sym bolic, causation. In the follow ing sectio n o f the paper, F reud gradually articulates a consis­ te n t position regarding the role o f u n c onscious sym bolic articulation in d e te r­ m in in g hysterical sy m p to m s. W ith p a tie n ts w h o c o u ld n o t be h y p n o tiz e d , “ alth o u g h th e ir diagnosis was o n e o f hysteria and it seem ed probable that the psychical m echanism described by us o p erated in th e m ” (1895a, p. 267), F reud pressed th e patients to recollect h o w th e ir sym ptom had b eg u n . In th e course o f thus w o rk in g w ith o u t hypnosis h e was led to see that: by means o f my psychical work I had to overcome a psychical force in the patients which was opposed to the pathogenic ideas becoming conscious (being remembered). A new understanding seemed to open before my eyes w hen it occurred to m e that this m ust no d oubt be the same psychical force that had played a part in the generating o f the hysterical sym ptom and had at th at tim e prevented the pathogenic idea from becom ing conscious. (1895a, p. 268) Such distressing path o g en ic ideas w ere “p u t o u t o f consciousness” by a defen­ sive m aneuver o n th e p art o f the ego: “T h e p a tie n t’s ego had b e e n approached by an idea w h ich proved to be incom patible, w h ic h provoked o n th e p art o f the ego a repelling force o f w h ic h the p urpose was defence against this in co m ­ patible idea” (1895a, p. 269). A lth o u g h the “psychical trac e ” o f th e idea “ was apparently lost to view,” nevertheless “ that trace m ust be th e re ” (1895a, p. 269): If I endeavored to direct the patient’s attention to it, I becam e aware, in the form o f resistance, o f the same force as had show n itself in the form o f repulsion w hen the sym ptom was generated. If, now, I could make it appear probable that the idea had becom e pathogenic precisely as a result o f its expulsion and repression, the chain w ould seem com plete. (1895a, p. 269) Freud appears to have recovered from the c o n to rte d state h e was in earlier as he n o w m o re clearly ap p ro ach ed a concep tu alizatio n o f u n c onscious processes as th e result o f disturbance in sem iosis b ro u g h t a b o u t by th e disavowal o f a sign’s interprétants: T hus a psychical force, aversion on the part o f the ego, had originally driven the pathogenic idea o u t o f association and was now opposing its return to m em ory.T he hysterical patient’s “not know ing” was in fact a “ not

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w an tin g to k n o w ”— a n o t w an tin g w h ic h m ight be to a g reater o r less ex ten t conscious.T he task o f the therapist, therefore, lies in overcom ing by his psychical w ork this resistance to association. (1895a, pp. 269-70) In this c o n te x t resistance is an obstacle to m ak in g th e u n w a n te d idea p a rt o f co n sc io u s a rticu la tio n . In d e sc rib in g th e m e th o d h e used, pressing th e p a tie n t’s fo reh e a d fo r a few seconds a n d asking th e p a tie n t to d e scrib e w h a t cam e to m in d , F re u d w rite s th a t h e c o u ld “ dissociate th e p a tie n t’s a tte n tio n fro m his c o n sc io u s search in g and reflectin g ” an d th ere b y a pproach the p a th o g e n ic idea w h ic h is “ always lying read y ‘close at h a n d ’ a n d c an be re a c h e d by associations th a t are easily accessi­ ble,” usually th ro u g h an idea “ w h ic h is a n in te rm e d ia te lin k in th e c h a in o f associations b e tw e e n th e idea fro m w h ic h w e start a n d th e p a th o g e n ic idea w h ic h w e are in search o f ” (1895a, p. 2 7 1 ).T h is c o n c a te n a tio n o f associations, th e o n g o in g d y n a m ic process o f sem iosis th a t bypasses th e ego, o u t o f consciousness b u t verbally retrievable, m ay b e so ela b o rate th a t F re u d is le d to w o n d e r: All these consequences o f the pressure give o n e a deceptive im pression o f th ere b e in g a su p e rio r intelligence o utside th e p a tie n t’s consciousness w h ic h keeps a large am o u n t o f psychical m aterial arranged for particular purposes and has fixed a planned ord er for its re tu rn to consciousness. I suspect, however, that this unconscious second intelligence is n o m ore than an appearance. (1895a, p. 272) W e can w o n d e r i f p re cise ly th is n o tio n o f a n “ u n c o n sc io u s s e c o n d in te lli­ g e n c e ” p ro m p te d B re u e r’s ste rn w a rn in g th a t w e n o t b e tric k e d b y “ figures o f sp e e c h ” in to m a k in g substantive w h a t h e j u d g e d n o t to b e so. F re u d ’s disclaim er, h ow ever, does n o t re m a in a firm o n e , fo r a fte r p ro v id in g several pages o f clinical v ignettes h e w rites: “ T h e revelations w h ic h o n e obtains th ro u g h th e p ro c e d u re o f pressing o ccasionally a p p ea r in a v ery re m ark ab le fo rm a n d in c irc u m sta n c e s w h ic h m ak e th e a s su m p tio n o f th e re b e in g an u n c o n sc io u s in te llig e n ce e v en m o re te m p tin g ” (1895a, p. 275). B u t F re u d does n o t w a n t us to shy aw ay fro m th is te m p ta tio n , fo r h e n o w pro v id es us w ith an e x a m p le o f a w o m a n su ffe rin g fro m p h o b ia s a n d o bsessions w h o o ffe re d a single w o rd , “ C o n c ie rg e ,” to his h a n d pressure, a n d th e n a n o th e r single w o rd , “ N ig h t-g o w n .” F re u d w rite s :“ I saw' now' th a t this was a n e w so rt o f m e th o d o f answ ering, an d by pressing repeatedly I b ro u g h t o u t w h a t seem ed to be a m ea n ­ ingless series o f w ords: ‘C o n c ie r g e ’— ‘n ig h t- g o w n ’— ‘b e d ’— ‘to w n ’— ‘fa rm cart.’‘W h a t does all this m ea n ? ’ I asked” (p. 276). S he th e n to ld h im “ th e story'” th a t h a d ju s t c o m e in to h e r h e a d o f h o w h e r p sy c h o tic sister h a d to b e tak e n aw ay in a c art w h e n she was a child. F re u d reflects o n th e process:

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T h e peculiarity o f this case lay only in the em ergence o f isolated key­ words w hich we had to w ork into sentences; for the appearance o f discon­ nectedness and irrelevance w h ich characterized the w ords e m itted in this oracular fashion applies equally to the com plete ideas and scenes w hich are norm ally p roduced u n d e r my pressure. W h en these are follow ed up, it invariably tu rn s o u t that the apparently disco n n ected rem iniscences are closely linked in th o u g h t and that they lead quite straight to the p a th o ­ genic factor w e are loo k in g for. (1895a, p. 276) A fter p ro v id in g a d d itio n a l clinical exam ples, a n d d isc o u n tin g a lo n g th e w ay B re u e r’s n o tio n o f h y p n o id states (“ S trangely e n o u g h , I have n e v e r in m y o w n e x p e rie n c e m e t w ith a g e n u in e h y p n o id h ysteria,” p. 28 6 ), F re u d n o lo n g e r hesitates to m ak e his claim : T h e first an d m o st pow erful im pression m ade u p o n o n e d u rin g such an analysis is certain ly th a t th e p a th o g e n ic psychical m aterial w h ic h has ostensibly b een fo rg o tte n , w h ic h is n o t at th e e g o ’s disposal and w hich plays n o part in association and m em ory, nevertheless in som e fashion lies ready to h an d and in c o rre c t and p ro p e r order. It is o n ly a q u estio n o f rem oving the resistances that b a r the way to the m aterial. In o th e r respects this m aterial is k n o w n , in the sam e way in w h ic h w e are able to know anything; the c o rrect conn ectio n s betw een th e separate ideas and betw een th em and the n o n -p a th o g e n ic ones, w h ich are frequently rem em bered, are in existence; they have b een com p leted at som e tim e and are stored up in the m em o ry .T h e pathogenic psychical m aterial appears to be th e pro p ­ erty o f an intelligence w h ic h is n o t necessarily in fe rio r to that o f the no rm al ego. (1895a, p. 287) T h is “ in te llig e n c e ” stru c tu re s th e psy ch ical m a te ria l in th re e d iffere n t ways: lin e a r dossiers o r files o f m e m o rie s are o rg a n iz e d b y se p arate th em e s; eac h th e m e is also “ stratified c o n ce n tric ally r o u n d th e p a th o g e n ic nu cleu s” ; a n d th ere is also linkage o f th o u g h t- c o n te n t by a “ logical th rea d w h ic h reaches as far as th e n u c le u s a n d ten d s to take an irreg u lar a n d tw istin g p a th , differen t in every case.T his a rra n g e m e n t has a dyn am ic ch aracter” (1895a, p. 289), like th e way th e k n ig h t m oves in chess. F re u d expands: I m ust dwell for a m o m e n t lo n g er o n this last sim ile in o rd e r to em p h a­ size a p o in t in w h ic h it does n o t do ju stic e to the characteristics o f the subject o f the com parison. T h e logical chain corresponds n o t only to a zig-zag, tw isted line, b u t ra th e r to a ram ifying system o f lines and m ore particularly to a converging one. It contains nodal p oints at w h ich tw o o r m ore threads m e e t and th ere afte r p ro ceed as o n e; an d as a ru le several threads w h ic h ru n in d ep en d en tly , o r w h ic h are c o n n e c te d at various points by side-paths, d eb o u ch in to the nucleus.T o p u t this in o th e r words,

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it is very remarkable how often a sym ptom is d eterm ined in several ways, is “overdeterm ined.” (1895a, p. 290) Such “ o v e rd e te rm in a tio n ” o f sy m p to m s is m ade possible by th e sem io tic c o m p le x ity o f o rganized u n c o n sc io u s processes. Signs registered as “ traces” c o n tin u e to p ro d u ce sym ptom s as th eir feeling and action interprétants w h ich , in tu rn , b e co m e n e w signs evident in the unaw are speaker’s to n e and behavior. T h e sem io tic space o p e n e d u p by th e presence o f a listen er enables th e disjointed sem iosis to p ro ceed th ro u g h the listener w h o can th en observe and resonate w ith th e signs’ in te rp ré ta n ts an d re tu rn th e m to th e speaker. T h e co m p lex ity o f sem iosis suggests the o p e ratio n o f an intelligence, a sym bolic register, th a t does n o t re q u ire th e e g o ’s aw areness, th a t o p erates w ith o u t conscious aw areness.T his is w h a t I th in k B reu er fo u n d m ost o b jectionable in F re u d ’s th in k in g a b o u t hysteria, n o t his em phasis o n sexuality.

Sexuality and Its Contingent Signifiers F reu d ’s position regarding the com plexity’ o f unconscious processes has received c o n te m p o ra ry c o rro b o ra tio n from beyond th e field o f psychoanalysis: Cognitive science views began to stress the autom atic nature o f activation o f sem antic netw orks [e.g., C ollins and Loftus, 1975]. In studies o f mem ory, com plex sem antic inform ation could be activated w ith o u t atten­ tion . . . [and] processes o c cu rrin g outside the focal awareness o f the subject were both lawful and com plex. (Posner, R o th b art, and H arm on, 1994, p. 199-200; see also J. Singer, 1990; Epstein, 1994) W ith in psychoanalysis, I have a tte m p ted to show h o w dyadic c o n ce p tio n s o f child d e v elo p m en t and o f th e analytic process generally red u ce th e sem iotic field in a variety o f ways. T h ese p o sitio n s m ay em phasize th e le a rn in g o f speech as a dyadic p h e n o m e n o n and as an o u tg ro w th o f “ pre-linguistic” stages. T h e y m ay treat language as a derivative com m u n icativ e process ra th e r th an as a stru c tu rin g system . T h e y m ay assum e an externalist p o sitio n and claim that psychopathology does n o t involve any sort o f translation b u t is the direct result o f v ictim iz atio n . T h e y m ay espouse a d eficit m o d e l in w h ic h u n c o n sc io u s dynam ics d o n o t require in te rp reta tio n and are sim ply an ech o o f conscious e xperience. It is still an o p e n d ebate w h e th e r an d w h a t k in d o f sym ptom s can be d e te rm in e d , stru ctu red , an d resolved th ro u g h sym bolization. T h is d eb ate repeats, reg ard in g sexuality, th e very term s o f F re u d ’s d isp u te w ith B re u er. D o sy m p to m s re q u ire a physical p re d isp o sitio n ? C a n sexual fantasy, e ith e r d e fen d e d against o r en co u ra g ed , p ro d u c e sym ptom s? Is a d u lt p sy c h o p a th o lo g y th e c o n se q u e n c e o f c h ild h o o d abuse? D o u n c o n sc io u s processes play a role? D o “ re trie v e d ” recollections c arry w e ig h t as fantasy, as

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re-categorizations, o r as historical evidence o f past abuse? D oes child h o o d sexuality exist? D o dream s and sym ptom s have sym bolic significance? C an we say w hat, if anything, is specifically hum an a bout hu m an sexuality? T h e ease w ith w hich sexuality' could be m ade to dom inate all o f F reud’s discoveries, to the e x te n t th at his observations a bout the fu n c tio n in g o f language could alm ost disappear, is perhaps c o n tin g e n t o n the nature o f language itself and the relationship betw een language and the body. It is precisely this relationship that Freud addressed in his initial cases and his th eo ­ retical form ulations in Studies on Hysteria: how the hysteric m akes the m ute bod y -p art speak; how the sym ptom goes about “jo in in g in the conversation” (B reuer and Freud, 1895, p. 296); ho w “ verbal bridges,” “ nodal points,” and “sw itchw ords” (1895, p. 290) operate in an unconscious system that determ ines sym ptom s; and h o w a d o c to r m ust position him self o r herself in relation to this T hird so as to be able to hear and read and be a participant in the dialogue. T h e fact that the stru ctu rin g effect o f language as a central Freudian discovery could alm ost drop o u t o f m uch subsequent psychoanalytic reflection, is partly a function o f w hat H eidegger (1950) called the “ nearness” o f language itself. Language, that w h ich enables us to “ see” and m ake sense o f o u r experience o f the w orld, is itself difficult to “see,” som ew hat like w earing a pair o f com fort­ able, w ell-functioning eyeglasses that are taken for granted. Perhaps there is also som ething about hum an sexuality, at least in W estern culture, that m ade it relatively easy for Freud to accuse B reuer o f faltering and to prom ote him self as a conquistador o f sexuality. Barthes stated: In the West, sexuality lends itself only to a language o f transgression, and that but poorly; but to make o f sexuality a field o f transgression is still to keep it imprisoned in a binary logic, a paradigm, a m ean in g .. . .W hat is difficult is not to liberate sexuality according to a more or less libertarian plan but to disengage it from meaning, including transgression as meaning. (1981, p. 123) T his suggests that sexuality’s “ tru th ” may have som ething to do w ith its status as beyond signification, in the R eal, as Lacan p u t it, n o t fully em braced by the register o f images o r sym bols. F reud’s proposition o f the sexual etiology o f psychoneurosis n o t only presum ed th e p a tie n t’s e x p erien ce o f sexuality as transgressive, but in so exposing sexuality, Freud pro m o ted him self as the soli­ tary investigator w hose discoveries transgressed contem porary m ores, for w hich he was punished by rejection. In this m yth, Breuer, in contrast, accom m odated him self to prevailing views and by n o t transgressing them did n o t suffer w hat Freud did. Sexuality seen p rim arily as a field o f transgression co u ld th en becom e a w eapon in the service o f the ego; n o t only was F reud’s ego served in relation to the narcissistic injury inflicted by Breuer, b u t this m anner o f using

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sexuality— as a field to be liberated, as a dom ain to b e claim ed and m astered and appropriated by the ego— served to buttress the role o f the ego in ego psychol­ ogy an d in th e history o f psychoanalysis. A n d as w e have seen in C h a p te r 8, th ere is a g o o d deal o f evidence suggesting h o w h u m an narcissism w ill d isto rt e x p erien c e fo r self-serving purposes, especially by claim ing to possess rational objectivity a b o u t itself. B u t h u m an sexuality persists in defying th e e g o ’s rationality and, because o f this e le m en t o f nonsense, passionate love has b e e n view ed, at least since Plato, w ith g reat am bivalence (N ussbaum , 1986).T h is nonsense is p resented to us in a p articu lar m anner: it is infantile sexuality', sensuality, and b o dily delight, an d n o t th e ego, th at b rin g som e elem ents o f e x p erien c e in to signification. T h is does n o t m ean th at sexuality creates sem iotics o r th e stru c tu re o f language; o n th e contrary, th e sym bolic register provides th e o p e n in g fo r th ere to b e any “ e x p e rie n c e ” at all. W h a t sexuality does is to so invest bits an d pieces o f ex p e­ rien c e w ith salience th at it generates effects outside o f th e conscious awareness o f th e ego. F reud saw these effects and speculated a b o u t th e role o f a “ seco n d intelligence.” B u t such “in te llig e n ce ” is a c o n tra d ic tio n to o u r conscious in te l­ lectio n an d its operations co n tra d ic t o u r conscious th o u g h t, as B arratt states: In this way, psychoanalytic m ethod exhibits the tw o dim ensionalities o f m eaning that com pose o u r lives and dem onstrates their inherent contradictoriness. It is this discovery o f the contradictoriness grounding all experi­ encing and understanding that is an anathem a to metaphysics since Plato and to the prevailing canons o f official science. (1988, p. 232) B arratt goes o n to characterize the u n c onscious d im e n sio n o f h u m a n e x p eri­ ence as a “ reco n d ite tem p o rality — th e tem p o rality o f th e ‘sexual body,’ o f a subtle ‘energy,’” th at he, along w ith L acan and oth ers, calls “ desire” (1988, p. 233). In o u r conscious th in k in g an d speaking, m anifest signs serve to repudiate this o th e r dim ension, the unconscious, to deny its co n trad icto rin ess and m ain ­ tain cohesion. As B arratt concludes: Thus, it seems that each manifest content o f consciousness endlessly repu­ diates a meaningfulness that is n o t even “there” semiotically, but is already alienated or estranged “w ith in ” the m anifest production itself, n o t as a sign generated by the law and order o f the sem iotic totality, b u t rather as the contradictorious being o f its recondite temporality. (1988, p. 233) Because language has reached in to th e h u m an subject th rough acculturation, w e are given perspective o n experience, w e have partially overcom e its im m ediacy, its chaos, and its unpredictability. B u t th e o p e n in g o n e x p erien c e m ade possi­ ble by signs com es at the cost o f an o p e n in g , a gap in ourselves. T h is o p e n in g is w h a t F reud referred to as th e unconscious, that d im en sio n o f ourselves th at

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involuntarily contradicts o u r conscious selves, that m akes use o f substitutions and com bines th em in ways that are bizarre to o u r conscious m in d s.T h e sem i­ otics o f conscious discourse are n o t the same as the sem iotics o f u n c onscious inscription. T h is reco n d ite d im ension o f the unconscious, w ith its infantile pace and insistence, m ay provide th e basis for intense and personally im p o rta n t signify­ ing effects we som etim es pro d u ce in o n e another. Such always surprising trans­ ference effects rest o n the p rio r selection and investm ent o f specific cues, cues th at beco m e signs invested by sexuality w ith the salience given by c o ntiguity in a radically c o n tin g e n t and ad h o c m anner. T h is radical c o n tin g e n c y m eans th at w h ere h u m a n sexuality is c o n c e rn e d (unlike anim al sexuality), a n y th in g m ay serve as a n in d ex o f a n y th in g else. T h ere is n o p re-g iv en signifier-signified set o f relationships stru c tu rin g h um an desire o r h u m a n sym ptom s. A t best perhaps w'e can speak o f a “ sem iotic a priori” consisting o f R o m a n Ja k o b so n ’s tw o axes, c o m b in a tio n (to u ch ) and su b stitu tio n (vision), the stru c tu re o f language th at governs th e c o n c a te n a ­ tio n o f signs. As we saw in C h a p te r 2, L evin add ed an axis o f so n o rity (voice) and referred to the use o f these sem iotic axes as a “ m ajo r sy n th e sis. . . regard­ ing fundam ental p rin cip les” an d he suggested th ey are “ m ost likely based o n th e b ra in s in te g ra tio n o f in fo rm a tio n alo n g th ree axes: contiguity' (touch), sim ilarity (vision), an d so n o rity (h earin g )” (1991, p. 1 6 0 ).T h ese e m p ty sem i­ o tic fram es are p a in te d in th ro u g h th e arbitrary h ig h lig h tin g o f absurd details by a necessarily disjo in ted infantile sexuality.T his disjointedness is n o t sim ply d u e to its “ re c o n d ite ” tem porality, its c o n trad icto rin ess to ego aims; at a m ore basic level, the disjointedness o f h u m an sexuality perhaps arises from its fleshly fu n c tio n to be at th e edge o f th e R e a l and to m ark this edge as th e edge o f life. T h e edge o f h u m a n life, its bo rd ers, is m ark ed o u t in a libidinal way. A special investm ent is m ade in th e b o d y ’s openings. L acan called a tte n tio n to h o w drive fo rm atio n s o rig in a te at these ero g en o u s zones as o n the edge o f a rim : th e m o u th , th e anus, the genitals, th e ears, th e eyes, w h o se drive objects inclu d e th e breast, feces, th e voice, th e gaze. I w o u ld add th a t it is at these o p enings th at an ex ch an g e is established, an in an d out m o v em e n t th at itself is th e sign o f life and th a t congeals a psychic inside and outside. T h e R e a l o f death, o f th e und ifferen tiated an d unim aginable n o n -e x iste n c e o f m y subjec­ tivity, is h e ld back fo r a w h ile at this b o rd e r o f life. F rom this b o rd e r o f th e fleshly R e a l, early sexuality snares, o r is snared by, c o n tin g e n t c o n tig u itie s o f so n o rity , sm ell, to u c h , c o lo r, m o v e m e n t, in o rd e r to establish, w ith in th e sem iotic fram e o f c o m b in a tio n and substitution, c ertain a n c h o r p o in ts, c ertain fam iliar bits, so th a t re p e titio n can b e g in . It is as i f th e sam eness o f th e R e a l, in itse lf u n in sc rib a b le, is p reserv ed in th e re p e titio n o f sexuality as a w'ay to sustain tran sito rin ess an d th e b u rd e n o f

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m o rta lity . S e x u a lity w o u ld th e n b e s o m e w h a t like th e “ D io n y s ia n ” in N ie tz sc h e : A n urge to unity, a reaching o u t beyond personality, the everyday, society, reality, across the abyss o f transitoriness: a passionate-painful overflow ing in to darker, fuller, m ore floating states; an ecstatic affirm ation o f the total character o f life as that w hich rem ains the same, ju s t as pow erful, ju st as blissful, through all change; the great pantheistic sharing o f jo y and sorrow that sanctifies and calls goo d even the m ost terrible and questionable qual­ ities o f life; the eternal will to procreation, to fruitfulness, to recurrence; the feeling o f the necessary unity o f creation and d estruction. (1901, p. 539) In th e e n d , w h a t m ay have d istu rb e d b o th B re u e r a n d F re u d w as F re u d s v ision o f an in te rp e n e tra tio n o f intellig en ce a n d sexuality, o p e ra tin g a cc o rd in g to a sem io tic c o d e c o m p le te ly o u t o f th e e g o s aw areness. I believe this rem ains as d istu rb in g fo r us to d ay as it w as 100 years ago.

Conclusion

In this b o o k I have trie d in various ways to be integrative ra th e r than disjunc­ tive. W ritin g in an analytic vein fo r psychologists, re p o rtin g psychological research data to analysts, relating infancy research to sem iotic m odels, e x p eri­ encin g literature as I am , I have perhaps lost focus m o re th an th e read er w ould w ish. In fact I have n o t trie d to m aintain focus th ro u g h a c o m m o n practice o f taking sides. I have n o t cast m y vote w ith the em piricists against the h e rm e n e u ticists (or the o th e r way around) because I have trie d to avoid such d ic h o to m o u s th in k in g . By n o w it m ay be clear th a t in m y perspective such d ich o to m o u s th in k in g is itself a sym ptom , a sign o f th e e ith e r /o r o p e ratio n o f Lacan’s im aginary register, a loss o f P eirce’s T hirdness. I w o u ld like to leave th e reader w ith som e reflections a b o u t th ree im plica­ tions o f this perspective. T h e first has to d o w ith the way Lacan an d Peirce g ro u n d th e field o f free association. If we allow Peirce to m ed iate betw een Freud and Lacan, w e can th en th in k o f F reu d ’s n o tio n o f th e Vorstellung, the representation o r idea th at gets placed before us, th e association, as a sign in a sem io tic process. W e can likew ise th in k o f L acan’s signifier in th e w ay he insisted, that it does n o t represent so m e th in g for so m e o n e b u t ra th e r leads to a n o th er signifier in a chain o f signifiers w e can call the process o f semiosis. For w h e n Lacan claims th at th e signifier represents th e subject for a n o th e r signifier, I read h im as precisely a rticu la tin g w h a t Peirce stated w h e n he called the h u m a n b e in g a sign fo r o th ers, a sign w h o se in te rp ré ta n ts are p ro d u c e d in others, even w ith o u t th e ir awareness. As a subject I am h eld a c ertain way by

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these in terp retaras p ro d u c ed in others: I am adm ired o r reviled, called u p o n o r ab andoned, feared o r desired, recognized in o n e way o r a n o th e r because sem i­ osis w orks in m e, th ro u g h m e, and beyond m e for others, always, o u t o f aw are­ ness, apart from m y conscious intent. Such sem iosis is n o t a linguistic process, at least n o t for Peirce and Lacan. In a le tte r Peirce c au tio n ed his co rre sp o n d e n t against abstraction, telling h e r “ that perhaps you are in d an g er o f falling in to som e e rro r in c o n seq u en ce o f lim it­ in g y o u r studies so m u ch to L anguage and am o n g languages to o n e very p e c u ­ liar language, as all A ryan languages are; and w ith in that language so m u ch to w ords” (1966, p. 421). Lacan show s sim ilar m isgivings a b o u t w ords; he distin­ guishes language as studied by linguists from w h a t he calls “ lalangue,” his neo l­ ogism (related to th e L atin verb ¡aliare, to sing “ lala” o r lullabye) for th e discourse o f th e unconscious: If I have said that language is w hat the unconscious is structured like, that’s because language, at first, does n o t exist. Language is w hat one tries to know about the function o f lalangue... .T he unconscious is the witness o f a know ing insofar as to a large extent it escapes the speaking being. This being provides occasions for perceiving w here the effects o f lalangue proceed, in that he presents all sorts o f affects w hich rem ain enigm atic. These affects are w hat result from the presence o f lalangue, in that, as a know ing, it articulates things that go m uch beyond w hat the speaking being puts up w ith in his enunciated know ing. . . . Lalangue affects us first o f all by all that it entails as effects w hich are affects. If one can say that the unconscious is structured like a language, it is because the effects o f lalangue, already there as a know ing, go well beyond everything that the being w ho speaks is capable o f enunciating (1972-73, pp. 126—27, my translation). Far from p rivileging a g ram m ar o f conscious discourse, L acan’s n o tio n o f “ lalangue” raises doubts about the very possibility o f a sem iotic approach. As w'e saw in the last chapter, B arratt (1988,1993) argues that the Freudian unconscious subverts n o t only the rational logic o f sem iotics, b u t operates as a “con trad icto rious b e in g ” (1988, p. 233) in any sem iotically-organized discourse. T his serious claim , challenging m u ch o f o u r integrative, interdisciplinary efforts, m ay be addressed if w'e can speak o f “lalangue” and its effects as operating in a Peircean fram ew ork; “lalangue” w ould th en refer to the earliest form s o f semiosis w hose unconscious aspects can only be glim psed in the infancy research w e review ed. W ith th e d ev elo p m en t o f psychic structure in a sem iotic su rro u n d , w e can expect that som e form o f semiosis governs unconscious processes n o less than conscious activities, som ew hat the way Freud spelled o u t repression as a failure to translate, to re-transcribe from an earlier to a later level o f experience and func­ tioning. In o th er w ords, a semiosis o f lalangue is n o t o u t o f the question if we

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take Peirce’s n otion o f the in terpretant to include, necessarily, the repressed, disavowed, incom plete, and inarticulable aspects o f experience. Intersubjectivity m eans we incessantly engage in a c o n jo in t process o f producing interpretants that becom e signs generating their ow n interpretants in feeling, action, and th o u g h t. T h e p ro d u c tio n o f in terp retan ts is n o t in my control, is w ider than m y conscious ego, and is enacted in o u r m utual behavior. Free association in the analysand, w ith its corresponding evenly hovering atten­ tion in the analyst, is Freud’s m ethod for bringing into articulation o u r mutually generated interpretants. Free association is intrinsically dialogic and therefore different from speaking to a m irro r o r in to a tape recorder. T h e dialogue, furtherm ore, is n o t sim ply dyadic, b u t passes through the O ther, the sem iotic field, the field o f the unconscious resonances o f history and culture. T h e second im plication I w ant to address is how triadic structures stretch back from the O edipal to earlier periods o f developm ent. Triadic structures, in a Peircean sense, are present and operative from before b irth and generate the sem iotic developm ent o f the hu m an brain and the hum an subject. W e have learned following W in n ico tt to say there is no such thing as an infant, but rather an in fan t-m o th e r dyad. T h e m ore co m m o n condition, however, is that there is no in fan t-m o th e r dyad but rath er an in fa n t-m o th e r-O th e r triad. T h e infantm o th e r dyad is held by the T h ird o f culture, as K irshner states: “ T his sym bolic fram ew ork, in fact, is the prerequisite for the basic m aternal function in hum an developm ent’ (1994, p. 241). W h en culture does n o t hold the dyad, w hen the m o th e r is alienated from h e r culture o r w h en cultural transm ission has broken dow n, then the in fan t-m o th er dyad is in trouble. For this reason I have com e to view dyadic processes in treatm ent as regressive: that is, w e can define a good deal o f regression in treatm ent as the patient o r analyst reducing the field to dyadic relations. In such regressive m o m en ts w e see th e re tu rn o f archaic w ishes, narcissistic illusions, the early ways in w h ic h infant o r m o th e r were in ten t on bein g fo u n d as the all-fulfilling object o f the o th e r’s desire.T he dyad provides a refuge from universality and com m unity. T h e dyad’s m em bers are convinced that only they possess know ledge o f particulars, that only they know one another, that no one else sees w hat they see, that they can keep a promise to provide w h at is “ n e e d e d ” by th e other. Transference w ill always include elem ents o f such archaic dyadic relations, and the countertransference under such press is to leave o n e ’s place in the T h ird and abandon oneself to dyadic m irro rin g or, in institutions, to abandon the th erap eu tic dyad to th e ir ow n dynamics, to give up functioning as the T h ird to the dyad. Peirce’s architectonic th eo ry and Lacan’s three registers lead tow ard a hier­ archical m odel for psychoanalysis, such as that proposed by G edo and G oldberg (1973) and furth er elaborated by G edo (1993). In this m odel archaic m odes o f functioning require recognition o f structural vulnerabilities th rough analytic

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responsiveness th at is “b e y o n d in te rp re ta tio n ” (G edo, 1993). H av in g re-discov­ ered this d im en sio n o f psychoanalysis (one can m ake a case that this is w hat Ferenczi grappled w ith and for w h ic h he was sco rn ed ), we are in d an g er o f d eclarin g w e have in “ intersubjectivity” a n e w paradigm for o u r analytic w ork. If I have argued o n e th in g in this b o o k , it is th at the dyad is n o t a n e w para­ digm b u t ra th e r a re d u ctio n o f th e field. T h e th ird im p licatio n , flow ing from th e first tw o, is that w e can e x te n d th e “ linguistic tu r n ” o f o u r epistem ic fram ew ork back in to sem iotics as its b roader base. T h e triadic n o tio n s o f Peirce assist us here as they did Jakobson and, less consistently, L acan as well. T h e triadic m o d el o f the sign allow's us to read the so-called prelinguistic realm o f dyadic enactm ents as an articulated sequence o f signs productive o f feeling and dynam ic in terp retan ts w h ic h , in tu rn , b e co m e signs for th e o th e r m e m b e r o f th e dyad. W h ile it seem s reasonable to say th at th e fo rm o f c o m m u n ic a tio n o r response th at w e call enactive is preverbal, perhaps even in c ertain c o n d itio n s prelinguistic, th e sign status o f such e n ac t­ m en ts rem ains com plex. T h e enactive, i f n o t sh e e r ra n d o m m o to ric ity , if in d e e d th e e n a c tm e n t constitutes a rep etitio n , is iconic o f th e earlier experience. Such iconic features, present as signs in th e dyadic e n ac tm e n t, are observable in th e oddities o f the behavior o r in th e reaction o f the observer; this reaction is em braced by Peirce’s n o tio n o f the in te rp re ta n t o f th e sign as distinct from th e ob ject o f th e sign. T h e feeling in te rp reta n t brings a b o u t a coerced affective m irro rin g o f th e past, be arin g a resem blance to th e past, a resem blance n o t usually perceived by th e o th e r m em b e r o f th e dyad, and rarely by the o n e acting, w h o is blin d to the a c tio n ’s m ea n in g o r to its status as a repetitive icon. M o d ell singles o u t such repetitive aspects in th e transference as “ th e iconic transference” (1993, p. 49). E arlier he had w ritte n o f th e transference re p e titio n as “ th e u n c o n sc io u s a tte m p t to m an ip u late th e secondary o b ject th ro u g h th e affects in d u ce d in th e countertransference” (1984, p. 3 5).T h e iconic features o f a repetition are gen er­ ally available for in te rp re ta tio n o n ly from th e positio n o f th e T h ird , by o n e w h o se p o sitio n is d istinct from th e dyadic poles. T h is is th e positio n o ccu p ied by th e analyst w'ho is sim ultaneously (and this m akes th e role un iq u e) also a m e m b e r o f th e dyad. A t tim es it m ay also be th e po sitio n o f an astute relative o r know ledgeable frien d w itnessing an in te rac tio n b u t w hose voice, unlike that o f th e analyst, is usually disqualified by the p a tie n t precisely because it com es from outside th e dyad. T h e e n ac tm e n t w h ic h can be so in te rp re te d from th e p o sitio n o f th e T h ird m ay be said to be pre-sym bolic, surely pre-verbal, b u t n o t pre-sem iotic, since it consists o f signs, is o rd ered as signs, is stru c tu re d w ith reference to signs o f the past. T h e sign-dim ension o f th e e n ac tm e n t is usually n o t available to th e actor, how ever, because th e in te rp re ta n t o f th e sign is disavow ed by th e actor. As

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F reud defined disavowal, it pertains n o t to drives b u t to u n w a n te d dem ands from reality, and w hat is disavowed is specifically “ the percep tio n s w h ich b rin g to kno w led g e this d em an d from reality” (1938, p. 204). W e can take P eirce’s in te rp reta n t as the p e rce p tio n o f the sign w hich brings to kno w led g e som e­ th in g a b o u t the sign’s object, in this case as a d em a n d from reality th at bears u p o n th e subject. W h e n the in te rp reta n t o f a given sign is disavowed, it is n o t th e subject b u t the o th e r w h o feels o r reacts in response to th e e n a c tm e n t, th ro u g h w h a t Peirce called “ th e D ynam ical In te rp ré ta n t,” w h ic h consists in direct effects “ actually p ro d u c ed by a Sign u p o n an In te rp re te r o f it” (1966, p. 413). F or Peirce, signs w ere so fundam ental th at h e a rgued th at th e in te rp rete r does n o t produce th e sign’s significance, its in terp retan t, b u t ra th e r th e sign in a given c o n te x t produces an in te rp reta n t in a receiver w h o m ay thereby b eco m e an in terpreter. As w e have seen, P eirce’s n o tio n o f the sign explicitly includes feeling and action as p relim inary aspects o f the sign’s signifying effects.T he feeling in te r­ p retan t is the sign’s initial im pact o n the sign’s receiver, an im pact that is a form o f coerced m irro rin g .T h is initial im pact m ay be sublim inal and directly lead to action, as w h e n traffic com es to a m o m en tary halt before a street “ S to p ” sign, o r w h e n we shake the hand e x te n d ed to us for a handshake. Such action consti­ tutes th e sign’s dynam ic in te rp reta n t, th e sign’s actualized, pragm atic m eaning. T h e abstract m e a n in g o f th e sign, its logical in te rp re ta n t, a gen eralizatio n re q u irin g the use o f verbal sym bols, is a fu rth e r d ev elo p m en t o f sem iosis in a hierarchy o f iconic, enactive, and sym bolic co m m u n ica tio n . Based o n these Peircean suggestions, w e can view en ac tm e n t as a dynam ic interpretant, o r the action-significance o f a sign, p ro m p ted by an induced affect state and potentially leading to a verbal in te rp reta tio n . As Boesky (1982) and G edo (1988) indicate, there is n o reason to assum e that e nactm ents are in trin ­ sically defensive; in a Peircean fram ew ork, they function as interpretants o f signs and in tu rn b e co m e signs to be fu rth e r in terp reted . In J o h a n ’s re p o rtin g o f a recent panel o n enactm ents, Jacobs stated: “ Because verbal co m m u n ica tio n is o f th e greatest im p o rta n ce in analysis, en actm ents often express w h a t is n o t yet otherw ise expressible . . . they are avant-garde m essengers th a t anticipate and signal w h at is to c o m e ” (1992, p. 836). O f course in psychoanalytic w o rk we often e n co u n ter enactm ents w hose sem iotic m ovem ent is in te rru p ted by devel­ opm ental disability o r defense. T h e patien t m ay acknow ledge the action, but disavow any p e rtin e n t affect, thereby c u ttin g th e action-significance o ff from th e feeling-significance o f a given sign. O r the p atien t m ay project th e initial interpretant. th e feeling-significance, so that the analyst n o w bears th e im pact o f a sign that is n o t yet in evidence, and m ay recognize its presence th ro u g h an im pulse to a ctio n , as C h u se d stated in the sam e panel: “ D u rin g analysis a sym bolic action that generates a corresponding im pulse for action in the analyst

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can provide substantial inform ation about unconscious forces and affects w ithin a patient” (Johan, 1992, p. 828). O r the patient may acknowledge the feeling and the action, but disavow the logical in te rp reta n t as expressed in the analyst’s interpretation o f the enactm ent. O r the patient may deny that any o f this has to do w ith the sign o r its object, as they may appear, for exam ple, in dream s o r in a relationship. O r th e p a tie n t’s failure to connect may be due to a failure to learn, to w hat G edo calls an “ apraxia” (G edo and G ehrie, 1993, p. 130). L ooking at enactm ent in this way, we can view repression and disavowal as bearin g on different aspects o f the sem iotic process. R epression im pacts on the sign, it negates the relationship betw een the sign and its object; as Freud suggests, it fails to provide the equivalent sign in translation. Disavowal bears on the in terp retan t itself, refusing to give the feeling o r action-significance the status o f m eaning elicited by a particular sign.T his is a refusal that, as M orris (1993) suggests, may b e a foundational act o f a hum an self-in-the-m aking, a self that narcissistically claims the rig h t to create m eaning and thereby inaugurate a split betw een the in terp retin g subject and the interp reted self. As w e saw in C h ap ter 2, such a split may require a degree o f hem ispheric disjunction that Levin (1991) and Basch (1983) propose as the neurological correlate o f repres­ sion and disavowal. T h e interpreting subject’s em ergence as a self requires the use o f signs. In sum m arizing Peirce, S h o rt w rites: “ O u r capacity to represent ourselves to ourselves [in a necessarily distorted m anner, I w ould add] transform s the sort o f selves w e are. H ow ever, that capacity is d ep en d en t n o t only o n biologically inherited cerebral powers, but also on culturally inherited (i.e., learned) linguis­ tic pow ers” (1992, p. 122). Cavell emphasizes the narrative form o f such self­ representations: “A creature that can tell a story ab o u t itself, and only such a one, is a self, som eone to w h o m w e can attribute subjectivity” (1993, p. 117). D oes narrative tend to elicit m ore enactm ents than o th er form s o f discourse? If so, th en perhaps the structure o f narrative has som ething to do w ith it. B ru n e r claims we have a “ prim itive predisposition to narrative organization” (1990, p. 80), and, as no ted earlier, h e defines four essential features o f narrative: agency, sequence, norm s o f deviance from social expectations, and narratorial voice o r po in t o f view. T hese features o f narrative are evident by three years o f age, although narrative structure is inherent m uch earlier “ in the praxis o f social in te rac tio n before it achieves linguistic expression” (1990, p. 77), in th at “pro to lin g u istic” fram ew ork I ex am ined in the In tro d u ctio n . T hese earliest sem iotic traces provide a rich developm ental base for the narrativation o f the categories o f m em ory.W e can speculate that once the narrative act is enjoined, the p atient as well as the analyst anticipates, possibly w ith dread o r excitem ent, the elem ents im plicit in the narrative form at: separate o r m erged active subjects, actions th at have consequences, objects that are gained o r lost o r changed,

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wishes that are approved or prohibited, conflicting points o f view .T he narrative structure is full o f danger zones for precarious selves w ith o u t firm boundaries o r for conflicted subjects w ith ambivalent wishes and confused priorities, and in touching any part o f the sem iotic w eb o f narrative, a string o f signs may elicit a variety o f feelings and enactm ents as their disavowed interpretants. A n object relations approach (e.g., B ion, 1992; O g d e n , 1986) typically emphasizes the analyst’s role (or in the case o f the child, the parent’s role) as container for the patien t’s disavowed o r projected feelings; by containing them , the analyst or parent de-toxifies the projected feelings and thereby makes possi ­ ble their re-internalization by the patient o r child.T his is typically accomplished through the a n aly st/m o th er’s reverie w hich creates an inner space for contain­ m ent. I w ould conceptualize this as a sem iotic process in w hich the analyst’s function is to rem ove the obstacle to semiosis w ith o u t im posing o n e ’s ow n interpretant o nto the p atient.T he reverie o f free association facilitates the sign’s reception in all o f its am biguity and resonance. It counters the fixity o f stereo­ typed responses, as w h e n a child has becom e a fixed sign to a parent o f som e narcissistic injury; it in te rru p ts the p ro jec tio n a n d c o u n te rp ro je c tio n o f disavowed feeling interpretants; it challenges the habitual action-interpretants o f family m em bers to a child’s sign-presence; and it provides an open forum to discuss the skewed, even delusional conceptual interpretants o f child and parent as signs for each other. W h en we are dealing w ith a patient w ith o u t firm boundaries, w'e intervene in a m anner that is “beyond interpretation,” even beyond language as such. We introduce by tone, gesture, object, o r silent reflection the transitional space for the p a tie n t to create a signifying m arker at th e n e ed e d boundary: betw een patient and therapist, betw een conscious and repressed, betw een th o u g h t and action, betw een words and things. Such w ork goes on w ith severely disturbed patients in w hat Kristeva calls the dom ain o f the “sem iotic” as distinct from the “ sym bolic” (1980, pp. 133-35).W e use m irroring icons and lim it-setting indices rather than symbols in order to prevent further psychotic fragm entation and to establish boundaries. By doing so w e do not abandon o u r position in the T hird. We are no less analysts for taking into account the patien t’s vulnerabilities as well as o u r own.

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Name Index

A belin.E., 141,195 AbravaneI.E., 124,195 Adamson, L„ 16, 18, 22, 54, 196, 200, 217, 219 Allen, W„ 88 Alloy, L„ 126,195 A ls,H „ 1 6 ,1 7 ,1 8 ,2 2 ,2 8 Althusser, L., 130, 195 Anderson, B., 23,195 Anisfeld, M ., 124, 195 A nisfeld.M ., 124,195 Anzieu, D., 85, 195 A sendorpf.J., 124, 195 A tw ood, G .,6 1 ,7 0 ,128,195,215 Auden,W . H „ 89, 195 Augustine, St., 138 Aulagnier, R, 147,148, 195 Baer, D., 122,196 Baillargeon, R ., 51,196 Bakan, D., 8 7,196 Bakeman, R ., 54, 196 Balat, M ., 3 1,196 Balint, M ., 87,196 B andura,A., 125, 196 B ar,E ., 162,196 Bard, K., 122, 196 Barratt, B„ 69,184, 188,196

Barthes, R ., 33,196 Barton, R ., 209 Basch, M ., 3 9,162, 192, 196 Bataille, G., 117,196 Bates, J„ 125,196 Bateson, M ., 4 9,196 Baudonniere, P. M ., 124,195 Beckett, S., 7 9,197 B eebe.B ., 1 3 ,2 2 ,2 3 ,1 9 7 ,2 1 5 Benjam in, J., 6 3 ,6 7 ,1 9 7 B ennett, S., 23, 215 Benveniste, E., 19, 2 9 ,4 6 ,6 7 -7 0 , 108,197 Bergmann, M ., 129,197 B ernheim , H ., 172 Berkowitz, L., 125, 126,197 Bick, E., 85,197 B inet.A ., 170 Bion, W., 84, 193, 197 Blatt, S., 87,197 Blum, H ., 129, 197 Boesky, D., 191,197 BoUas, C ., 98,197 Boothby, R .,9 , 197 Bower, B„ 126,1 2 7 ,1 9 8 Bowles, P., 8 2 ,8 3 ,1 9 8 Boyer, L., 102, 198 B razelton,T„ 14-19, 2 2 ,2 8 , 198, 200, 209, 217,219

222

Name Index

B rent,J., 3 1 ,1 9 8 B rett,J., 8 ,1 9 8 B rcuer.J., 161-186, 198, 199,200 B rickm an, H .,6 1 , 105, 198 B rooks-G unn, J., 122 ,2 0 9 B row n, C ., 7 5 ,7 6 ,7 9 ,8 0 ,1 9 8 B row n, C . H ., 138, 198 B ru n , R ., 173, 198 B ru n n e r, J., 2, 3, 14, 19, 22, 27, 102, 192, 198 Buber, M ., 6 3 ,6 6 ,1 9 8 B uechel, E., 101,198 B iih le r.C ., 123,198 B uhler, K., 68 Byatt, A., 6 6 ,1 9 8 C airns, R ., 127,205 C arr, A., 2 5 ,1 0 5 ,2 1 4 C asteneda, C ., 103 Cavell, M ., 192, 198 C haplin, W , 209 C harco t.J. M ., 172 C h a tw in .B ., 1 ,1 9 8 C h u se d ,J„ 191 C ich etti, D., 209 C lark, M ., 9 ,1 9 8 C lifton, R ., 18,2 1 2 C ocks, G ., 1 3 5 ,1 5 1 ,1 9 8 ,1 9 9 C o e n , S., 139, 199 C o h e n , D., 202 C o h e n , L., 122,199 C o h n .J ., 1 7 ,1 9 ,2 2 ,2 4 ,1 9 9 ,2 1 7 Colapietro.V., 1 4 ,4 5 ,8 6 ,1 9 9 C ollins, A., 182,199 C o n n o rs, K „ 2 2 ,2 1 2 C onrad, J., 7 6 -7 8 ,1 9 9 C o tte t, S., 160,199 C ox, O., 7 9 ,1 9 9 C raighead, W„ 126,211 C ranefield, P., 167,199 Crapanzano.V., 105, 199 D arw in, C ., 177,199 D auenhauer, B . ,6 6 , 199 D avoine, F., 8 5 ,8 7 ,9 8 ,1 0 0 ,1 1 7 ,1 9 9 D ecker, H ., 1 6 5 ,1 6 6 ,2 0 0 D eely,J„ 1 4 ,1 0 9 ,2 0 0 D ehaene, S., 4 9 ,2 0 0 D ehaene-L am bertz, G., 4 9 ,2 0 0 de Laurentis.T., 3 3 ,2 0 0 D em os, E „ 3 4 -3 8 ,4 9 , 5 1 ,2 0 0 D errida, J., 3 3 ,1 0 0 ,1 4 4 ,2 0 0 ,2 1 1 D ervin, D., 120, 200 D eW aelhens, A., 131,200

D ew ey,J., 3 7 ,4 4 , 5 8 ,5 9 ,6 0 ,1 0 9 ,2 0 0 D ixon, S., 28, 200, 219 D olecki, R, 2 3 ,1 9 5 D onnerstein, E., 197 D o re.J., 115,200 Ducey, C , 10 2 ,2 0 0 D unand, M ., 125, 197 Eagle Elk, Jr., 101,103 Eagle, M ., 72, 200 Eco, U .,3 1 ,3 3 ,3 6 ,2 0 0 E km an, P., 3 7 ,2 0 0 Ellenbergcr, H ., 165, 201 Ellsw orth, C ., 17,201 E pstein, P., 209 E pstein, R ., 122,201 E pstein, S., 182,201 E rikson, E., 7 5 ,8 1 ,8 4 ,8 5 ,1 0 2 ,2 0 1 E to n , L., 205 E tchegoyen, R ., 140,201 Ey, H „ 105 Fafouti-M ilenkovic, M ., 22,201 Fairbairn.W ., 45,201 Falade, S., 93,201 Fast, I., 86,201 Favazza, A., 85,201 Fay, W., 62,201 Fechner, G., 137 Feldm an, C ., 102,198 Felm an, S., 9 ,1 0 4 ,2 0 1 Ferenczi, S., 1 6 4 ,1 9 0 ,2 0 1 Fichte, J., 6 4 ,2 0 2 Field,T „ 4 8 ,5 5 ,1 2 4 ,2 0 2 Fodor.J., 121,202 Fogel, A., 20, 22, 5 8 ,2 0 2 ,2 0 6 Fonagy, I., 4 1 ,2 0 2 Forrester, J., 173,202 Fosshage.J., 13,2 0 2 Freud, A., 1 4 ,1 2 7 ,1 6 3 ,2 0 2 Freud. S., passim Freudenheim , J., 7 2 ,2 0 3 Friedm an, J., 2 3 ,2 1 2 Friesen, W., 200 Frey, N „ 2 ,2 0 3 G adam er, H . G ., 161,203 Gallup, G „ 122,204 G audilliere.J. M ., 98 Gay, P., 162, 204 G edo.J., 2 4 ,1 2 8 ,1 3 1 ,1 6 5 ,1 8 9 -1 9 2 ,2 0 4 G een, R ., 197 G eertz, C ., 2 ,2 0 4

Name Index Gehrie, M ., 192,204 Gerstman, L., 22,197 Gianino, A., 19,217 Gibson, E., 55, 204 Gillett, G .,2 ,2 0 5 Ginzburg, C ., 31,204 Goldberg,A., 128,1 4 9 ,1 8 9 ,2 0 4 Goldberg, C., 120,204 Gould, S., 122,204 Grandin,T., 62 ,6 3 Greenberg, J., 126,204 Greenberg, R ., 202 Greenson, R ., 129,204 Greenwald, A., 126,204 Gregory, R ., 3 1 ,2 0 4 Guntrip, H ., 131,205 Hains, M., 17,201 Hall, W., 127,205 Halle, M., 121,205,206 Hanna, E., 54,205 Harari, R ., 160,205 H arm an, C ., 182,213 H arre, R ., 2,2 0 5 Hartm an, F., 129,197 Haviland, J., 23,205 Hegel, G.W .F, 6 3 -6 6 ,9 9 ,2 0 5 Heidegger, M ., 6 3 ,1 0 4 ,1 8 3 ,2 0 5 Hemkendreis, M ., 86,205 H erm ann, I., 4 1 ,8 7 ,2 0 5 Hervey, S., 3 2 ,3 3 ,2 0 5 Hervey, S., 3 2 ,3 3 ,2 0 5 Hill, S., 122,205 Hirschmüller, A., 165,205 Hoffman, J., 19,209 Hölderlin, F., 108 Hubley, P., 45,216 Huesm ann, L., 127,205 Husserl, E., 63 Innis, R ., 6 8 ,1 0 8 ,2 0 5 Isaacs, S., 50 JackendoiF, R ., 41,205 Jacobs,T„ 191 Jacobson, S., 48, 124,205 Jaffe,J.,23,215 Jakobson, R ., 33, 41, 43, 57, 60, 87, 108, 12 1 ,1 3 6 ,1 8 5 ,1 9 0 ,2 0 5 James, W., 84-86 Janet, P., 170 Johan, M., 191,192 ,206 Johansen, J., 2 4 ,3 4 ,2 0 6

223

Johnston,W., 126,206 Jones, E., 1 6 1 ,1 6 2 ,1 7 2 ,1 7 3 ,2 0 6 Joyce, J., 31 Julien, P., 158,206 Jusczyk, P., 51, 209 Jussim, L., 126 Kagan.J., 17, 48, 5 4 ,5 8 ,1 2 4 ,1 2 5 ,2 0 5 ,2 0 6 Kant, I., 35 ,6 3 Karon, B„ 100,206 Karpe, R ., 166,206 Kawai, M ., 20,202 Kaye, K., 22,206 Keil, F., 127,206 Kellert, S., 56,206 Kernberg, O., 13,206 Kiefer, A., 142 Kingston, M ., 9 2 -9 7 ,9 9 ,1 0 3 Kirkland, K., 124,215 Kirshner, L., 6 3 ,1 8 9 ,2 0 7 Kitayama, S., 55,209 Klein, M ., 45, 50,1 3 8 ,1 9 7 Köhler, E., 123,207 Köhler, W., 122,207 K ohut, H ., 4 ,1 3 ,6 7 ,1 2 8 ,1 3 0 ,1 3 5 -6 0 ,1 9 8 , 199,207 Kolata, G., 30,207 Koslowski, B., 14,198 Kozak-Mayer, N., 23,207 Krampen, M ., 34, 207 Kris, E., 172, 173,207 Kristeva.J., 193,207 Kronenberger, L., 89,195 Kuhl, P., 4 8 ,5 1 ,2 0 7 Lacan, J., passim Lacerda, F., 207 Lachmann, F., 13,197 Lagerspetz, K., 205 Lanza, R ., 201 Laub, D., 104,201 Laurent, E., 160, 208 Lauth, M. L., 9 3,208 Lee-Painter, S., 18, 209 Lelwica, M ., 23,205 Leonard, J., 92, 208 L eroi-G ourhan,A ., 144, 208 Lester, B., 19,209 Levansen, R ., 200 Levin, F., 2 ,3 8 ,3 9 , 41, 185,192, 209 Lévi-Strauss, C ., 141 Lewis, M ., 1 8 ,2 1 ,1 2 2 ,1 9 8 ,2 0 9 Lewisohn, P., 126,209

224

Name Index

Liebault, A., 172 Lindblom , B., 207 L itow itz, B., 209 Litowitz, N ., 209 Loew ald, H ., 1 2 8 ,1 2 9 ,2 0 9 L oftus.E ., 182,199 L ubbe-G rothues, G., 108,206 Lyons, J., 6 8 ,2 0 9 M acalpine, I., 176, 209 M accoby, E., 2 4 ,2 0 9 M acm illan, M ., 170, 209 M acm urray,J., 4 5 ,2 0 9 M ahony, P., 6 8 ,2 0 9 M ain, M ., 14, 198 M andel, D., 5 1 ,2 0 9 M ans, L., 122,209 M aratos, O ., 4 8 ,2 0 9 M arentette, P., 5 8 ,2 1 2 M arkus, H ., 5 5 ,2 0 9 M artin, J., 2 4 ,2 0 9 Massie, H ., 27, 210 Massieu, J., 7 M asson, J., 38, 4 0 ,1 6 1 ,1 6 9 ,1 7 1 ,1 7 2 , 174,

210 M asters, J., 124,210 M cCaudless, C ., 7 5 ,7 7 -8 3 ,8 6 , 8 8 ,8 9 M ead, G. H „ 4 4 ,1 3 6 ,2 1 0 M eares, R ., 2 3 ,2 1 2 M eissner,W., 128,210 M eltzoff, A., 4 8 ,5 4 ,1 2 4 ,2 0 5 ,2 0 7 ,2 1 0 M iller,J., 214 M ischel.W ., 209 M odell, A., 4 7 ,6 3 ,1 1 3 ,1 9 0 ,2 1 0 M o h a tt.G ., 9 7 ,1 0 3 ,2 1 0 M oore, M ., 4 8 ,1 2 4 ,2 1 0 M oran, M ., 5 6 ,2 1 0 M orris, C ., 1 3 ,2 7 ,3 7 ,4 4 ,2 1 0 M orris, H ., 192,210 M uir, D., 17,201 M uller.J., 9 ,3 1 , 4 1 ,6 3 ,1 0 9 ,1 1 7 ,1 2 2 ,1 2 6 , 1 3 0 ,1 3 3 ,1 4 7 ,1 4 9 ,2 1 0 ,2 1 1 M uroff, M ., 163,213 M urray, L, 45, 4 8 ,5 0 , 5 1 ,2 1 1 ,2 1 6 M yers, N „ 18,2 1 2 N elson, R „ 126,211 N ietzsche, E, 186,211 N ussbaum , M ., 184,211 O ates, J., 4,211 O g d e n ,T „ 3 ,8 3 ,1 0 5 ,1 9 3 ,2 1 1 O rn ste in , P., 1 3 ,1 5 8 ,2 1 2

O sofsky.J., 2 2 ,2 1 2 Ostow , M ., 150, 212 Pascal, B., 8 2 ,2 1 2 P az.O ., 104,212 Peirce, C. S., passim Penm an, R ., 2 3 ,2 1 2 Peraldi, F„ 3 5 ,7 6 ,1 1 0 ,1 6 0 ,2 1 2 Perris, E „ 18,212 Person, E „ 163,212 Petitto, L, 5 8 ,2 1 2 Pettigrew, D „ 3 3 ,2 1 2 Pharies, D., 212 Phillips, J., 9 ,2 1 3 P iaget,J., 3 3 ,3 4 ,2 1 3 Pines, M „ 120,213 P isoni,D ., 5 1 ,2 0 9 Plato, 184 Poe, E .A .,3 1 Pollock, G „ 164, 165, 167, 174, 204, 213, 214 Popper, K., 149 Posner, M ., 182,213 Pry, G „ 213 Pvszczynski.T,, 126,204 R eeves, C „ 1 6 5 ,1 6 6 ,2 1 3 R e h m , L, 213 R e n ik .O ., 160,213 R ichardson, W „ 9, 31, 109, 122, 133, 143, 1 4 9 ,2 1 1 ,2 1 3 R ilke, R ., 8 9 ,2 1 3 R izzu to , A. M „ 6 9 ,7 0 ,1 6 8 ,1 7 2 ,1 7 3 ,2 1 3 R orty, R ., 123,213 R ose, S., 122,213 R o sen b au m , B., 1 0 8 ,1 1 6 ,2 1 3 R o sen b au m , M ., 163,213 R osenblum , L., 198 R osenthal, R ., 85,201 R o th , D „ 213 R o g h b a rt, M ., 1 8 2 ,2 1 3 R o th b au m , F., 125,213 R ozensky, R ., 126,213 Sabshin, M ., 214 Sacks, O ., 2-8, 5 8 ,6 2 ,6 3 ,2 1 4 Sadow, L .,2 1 4 Sander, L., 3 7 ,2 1 4 Sartre,J. P., 63 Sass, L., 108 ,2 1 4 Saussure, F. de, 3 3 ,1 2 1 ,1 3 6 ,1 4 2 ,1 4 3 ,2 1 4 Schafer, R „ 128,214

Name Index Schaffer, H ., 24,214 Schlessinger, N ., 168,214 Schneiderm an, S., 160,208 Schoenhals, H ., 105,214 Schwartz, A., 25,214 Sebeok,T., 30, 3 1 ,3 3 ,3 7 ,3 8 ,2 0 0 ,2 1 4 Seitz,V., 219 Shapiro, E., 25, 7 1 ,1 0 5 ,2 1 4 Shaw, G. B., 81 S hort,T., 192,214 Shotter,J.,215 Sicard, R .A .,7 Sigafoos,A., 124,195 Silverman, M ., 129,215 Singer, J., 182,197,215 Singer, M ., 81,215 Skinner, B., 201 Sm ith, L., 58,215 Sm ith, J., 119,215 Sokolowski, R ., 99,102, 215 Solom on, R ., 129,215 Sonne, H ., 108,116,213 Sroufe, L., 209 Sterba, R „ 129,215 Stern, D„ 1 7 ,2 3 ,2 8 ,2 9 ,3 0 ,3 7 ,2 1 5 Stevens, K., 207 Stokoe.W , 4, 5,215 Stolorow, R ., 6 1 ,7 0 ,1 2 8 ,1 9 5 ,2 1 5 Strachey.J., 129,215 Sullivan, H ., 3,215 Sullivan, L., 102, 215 Sulloway, E, 165, 215 Swales, P., 172,215 Taylor, S., 126,127,215 Terhune, C., 48,215 T helen ,W., 58,202 Thelen, M ., 124,215 Theunissen, M ., 6 1 ,6 3 ,2 1 6 T hom , R ., 56-58,216 Thom as, D., 216 Thom pson, M ., 151,216 Toda, S., 20,202 Todorov,T., 3 9,216 Tolstoy, L., 80, 88, 89,216 Tomkins, S., 2 3 ,3 7 ,2 1 6 Tomlin, C „ 122,205 Trevarthen, C., 4 5 -5 5 ,6 7 ,1 2 4 ,2 1 1 ,2 1 6 Tronick, E „ 16-19, 22-24, 28, 34, 36, 199, 2 0 0 ,2 0 7 ,2 1 6 ,2 1 7 ,2 1 9 Tsunoda.T ., 38,217 Tulviste, P., 115,218

225

Turkington, C., 51,217 Turkle, S., 136,217 Tursman, R ., 3 3 ,3 6 ,2 1 7 U rw in, C ., 2 7 ,3 4 ,5 4 ,2 1 7 Uzgiris, I., 22,201 Ver Eecke,W., 1 23,138,217 Vietze, R ., 23,195 Viscusi, D., 195 Von Bertalanfly, L., 217 von U exkiill.J., 37,217 von Uexküll,T., 3 0 ,3 4 ,2 1 7 Voyat.G., 138,217 Vygotsky, L„ 5 5,115, 116,217 Wallerstein, R ., 152,217 W allon.H ., 1 2 1 ,1 2 3 ,1 3 8 ,2 1 7 Weber, S., 8,218 W einstein, L, 115,218 W ernicke, C ., 123,218 W ertsch.J., 115,116,218 W eston, D„ 8 4,218 W hite, E „ 109 W hite, G„ 55,218 W hite, R ., 5 1,218 W idener,A „ 100,206 W idlocher, D„ 139,218 W ild e r,A .,7 ,218 Will, O., 9 8,218 Williams, K „ 207 Williams, R ., 6 1 ,6 3 -6 6 ,2 1 8 W ilson, A., 115,218 W ilson, C ., 2 1 ,2 0 9 W innicott, D., 4 5 ,7 9 ,8 0 ,8 3 ,1 1 3 ,1 1 5 ,1 2 2 , 189,218 Wise, S., 1 6 ,1 8 ,2 2 ,2 1 7 W itkowski, S., 138,198 W olf.E., 1 3 ,1 3 5 ,1 3 8 ,2 0 7 ,2 1 9 Wolff, P., 2 4 ,5 8 ,2 1 9 W oodson, R ., 202 W right,J., 122,196 W right, K „ 137,219 Y an d o ,R „ 1 2 4,125,219 Yogman, M ., 2 8 ,2 0 0 ,2 1 9 Z etzel,E „ 129,219 Zigler, E., 219 Z uckerm an, M ., 126,219 Zweig, S., 164

Subject Index

A bduction, 31 A bjection, 131 Absence, 3 4 ,1 2 1 ,1 3 2 ,1 4 1 A ction, 1 4 ,3 5 ,4 4 , 4 5 ,6 4 ,1 9 2 Adolescence, 8 0 ,8 1 , 89 Affect, 6 ,1 3 ,1 6 ,1 9 ,2 1 - 2 5 ,2 8 ,2 9 ,3 2 , 3 4 -3 8 ,4 5 ,4 7 -5 0 ,5 5 ,6 9 ,1 3 1 ,1 4 7 ,1 8 8 ,1 9 1 A ggression, 92, 116, 120, 121, 127, 131, 1 3 3 ,1 3 8 ,1 3 9 A lpha-Elem ents, 84 A nalog, 7 Anim als, 7 ,3 0 ,3 7 ,3 8 ,3 9 ,4 6 ,4 7 ,5 3 ,5 7 ,5 9 , 6 2 ,8 9 ,9 5 ,1 1 3 ,1 2 2 ,1 8 5 A n thropom orphizing, 29 A nthroposem iotics, 30 Anxiety, 1 3 0 ,1 3 1 .1 5 3 ,1 5 9 Aphasia, 6 ,4 1 ,1 6 8 ,1 7 2 ,1 7 3 A ttention, 1 4 ,2 2 ,3 1 ,1 8 9 A ttu n em en t, 61 Autism , 5 1 ,6 2 -6 3 ,1 3 8 Axes o f language, 41, 108,185 Babbling, 58 B arred O th er, 110 B idirectional, 20 Biology, 3 0 ,3 6 ,5 7 ,5 8 ,6 5 ,7 1 ,9 8 ,1 1 5 ,1 3 6 , 147,192

Body, 55, 57, 58, 84, 89, 92, 98, 100, 102, 1 1 4 ,1 2 1 ,1 2 3 ,1 2 5 ,1 3 8 ,1 3 9 ,1 7 0 B oundaries, 3 ,4 ,7 0 ,7 1 ,7 5 - 8 9 ,9 1 ,9 5 ,1 0 0 , 110, 111, 114-117, 131, 1 4 2 ,1 4 4 , 185, 193 Brain, 2 , 4 ,6 , 7 ,8 ,3 0 ,3 8 ,3 9 ,4 1 ,4 6 ,4 8 ,4 9 , 54, 5 5 ,5 8 ,1 8 5 ,1 8 9 ,1 9 2 C aptivation, 3, 24, 28, 57, 92, 93, 95, 123, 1 39,160 C haos T heory, 5 6 -5 8 C hecking-B ack, 53 C ode, 3, 14, 18, 21, 22, 28, 29, 40, 55, 61, 62, 66, 70, 72, 79, 80, 87, 95, 105, 109, 1 1 0 ,1 1 4 ,1 8 6 C oerced M irroring, 14, 2 2 -2 5 , 29, 34, 36, 3 7 ,4 8 ,5 1 ,5 5 ,5 6 ,6 1 ,6 2 ,1 9 0 ,1 9 1 Cohesiveness, 13, 38, 49, 54, 67, 86, 123, 1 2 7 ,1 2 9 ,1 3 1 ,1 3 3 ,1 3 8 ,1 3 9 ,1 5 3 C o m bination, 2 1 ,2 8 ,3 7 ,3 8 ,4 0 , 41 C om m unication, 3 0 ,3 8 ,4 6 C om m unity, 2 5 ,6 4 ,1 0 2 ,1 0 3 , 1 1 1,115,117 C o m p etitio n , 139, 141, 142, 146 C onflict, 64 Consciousness, 2 2 ,3 9 ,4 4 ,4 6 , 5 7 ,1 2 0 ,1 2 3 , 182 C onsensual Validation, 3 ,4 ,7 2 ,8 7

Subject Index C ontagion, 2 3 ,2 4 ,2 9 ,3 4 ,1 2 4 Container, 193 C ontext, 2 5 ,2 7 ,3 7 , 5 4 ,6 2 ,6 8 , 8 2 ,9 7 ,1 0 9 , 148,159 Contiguity, 34, 35, 36, 41, 57, 59, 67, 68, 185 C ounterpart, 47, 123 Countcrtransfcrence, 160, 162,165 Cultural Transmission, 14, 30,36 Cultural Variability, 20, 21, 30, 44, 51, 62, 6 8,114 Culture, 2 ,3 ,7 ,8 ,3 3 ,3 7 ,3 8 ,4 2 ,4 7 ,5 5 ,5 7 , 61, 7 0 -7 2 , 81, 87, 9 1 -1 0 4 , 105, 109, 111, 115,117, 119, 142, 147, 148, 184, 189,192 Cutting, 7 5 ,8 5 -8 6 ,1 1 7 ,1 4 4 Cybernetics, 30 Cycling, 19 Deafness, 4, 5 ,7 ,8 ,5 3 , 58 D eath, 4, 57, 65, 7 5 -8 9 , 94, 98, 106, 112, 185 D eception, 14, 39,53 Deconstructionism , 33 Dedifferentiation, 3 ,7 6 -8 9 Defense, 3 6 ,1 1 9 ,1 3 0 ,1 3 9 ,1 7 9 ,1 9 1 D eficiency-Com pensation M odel, 72 Deixis, 2 5 ,3 8 ,5 1 ,6 1 ,6 6 -7 1 ,1 0 8 ,1 0 9 Demands, 1 3 ,2 4 ,9 2 ,1 0 2 ,1 4 7 ,1 5 3 ,1 5 6 Depression, 126, 131 Desire, 1 5 ,1 6 ,2 1 ,2 5 ,4 1 ,5 2 ,5 3 ,6 4 ,6 5 ,6 7 , 80, 85, 87, 92, 101, 114, 124, 132, 137, 1 4 1 ,1 44,147-160, 184 Developm ental Chronology, 14-60 Developm ental Line, 14, 36, 55,62 Developm ental Semiotics, 30,3 4 D ialogue, 3, 35, 63, 67, 6 9 -7 2 , 108, 109, 136, 183,189 Difference, 14, 24, 66, 110, 116, 120, 121, 1 31 ,1 4 2 -1 4 4 ,1 6 0 Digital, 7 Disappearance, 100 Disavowal, 39, 40, 51, 88, 120, 139, 145, 1 4 8 ,1 79,191-193 Discontinuity, 5 ,3 8 ,5 8 ,6 4 Discourse, 68,69 Displacement, 132 Drawing, 117 Dreams, 2 2 ,1 3 0 ,1 3 6 ,1 3 7 ,1 5 0 ,1 5 3 ,1 8 3 Dyad, 1 3 ,1 4 ,3 2 ,3 6 ,4 2 ,6 1 ,7 0 ,7 1 ,7 2 ,1 0 9 , 1 1 6 ,1 1 9 ,1 2 0 ,1 3 1 ,1 3 2 ,1 4 5 ,1 8 2 ,1 9 0 Effect o f Language, 8 ,4 4

227

Ego, 4, 5, 37, 39, 40, 45, 54, 57, 58, 66, 70, 7 1 ,8 3 ,9 2 ,1 1 4 , 117,1 1 9 -1 3 3 ,1 3 5 ,1 3 8 , 145,179,180 Egocentric Speech, 116 Ego ideal, 128, 139, 140, 144, 148, 149, 154-160 Ego Psychology, 135,184 Em otion— see Affcct Empathy, 1 3 ,2 2 ,2 4 ,4 7 ,4 9 ,6 1 ,6 2 ,7 1 ,1 2 8 , 153,159 Enacted Iconicity, 1 4 ,2 3 ,2 4 ,2 5 ,3 4 ,5 5 ,5 9 , 113,124 Enactm ent, 5 1 ,1 1 4 ,1 3 2 ,1 4 8 ,1 9 0 -1 9 3 Endosemiotics, 30 E nunciation/E nunciated, 4 0,116 Envy, 138 Erotic, 4 ,9 2 Ethical, 149 Evolution, 30 Ex-centricity, 137 Fading o f the Subject, 40 Failed semiosis, 170 Fallibilism, 31 Family, 86-88, 100,103, 121, 147 Firstness, 3 2 ,3 4 ,7 7 ,9 8 ,1 0 9 Force, 43,117 Foreclosure, 98, 110 Fort-D a, 132 Four-cornered structure, 145-146 Fractals, 56 Fragm entation, 7 5 -8 9 , 92, 94, 125, 128, 1 3 0 ,1 3 1 ,1 3 6 ,1 3 8 ,1 7 9 ,1 5 4 ,1 5 6 Frame, 71, 113,116 Free Association, 132,187,189, 193 Fusion, 2 5 ,6 1 ,7 1 ,8 6 ,1 0 3 ,1 4 4 Future, 38 Gaze, 4 ,1 3 -2 5 ,2 8 ,2 9 ,3 4 ,3 5 ,3 6 ,4 4 ,4 5 ,5 0 , 5 9 ,6 6 ,6 8 ,9 3 ,1 4 1 ,1 5 4 Gender, 2 0 ,4 8 ,1 4 8 Generalization, 3, 37, 41,59, 109 Gestalt, 138 Gesture, 5 ,6 ,5 3 ,5 5 ,5 8 ,1 0 2 ,1 0 8 Goal o f Treatm ent, 1 2 8 ,1 3 0 ,1 3 2 ,1 3 3 ,1 6 0 Grace, 66 Grammar, 27, 105 Grandiosity, 13, 60, 65, 87, 107, 109, 110, 1 1 4 ,1 1 6 ,1 4 8 ,1 5 8 G rieving, 103 H abit, 3 2 ,3 3 ,3 5 H aine-A m ouration, 131, 146

228

Subject Index

Hallucination, 6 0 ,8 5 ,9 1 Handedness, 54 Helplessness, 38,123 H erm eneutics, 9 Hierarchical, 7, 30, 32, 38, 39, 40, 58, 128, 191 H istorical, 8 ,3 8 ,4 5 ,6 4 ,6 5 ,1 0 2 ,1 6 1 ,1 8 9 H olding E nvironm ent, 21, 72, 113, 114, 116,117 Hysteria, 162-181 I— see Pronouns Icon, 3 3 ,3 6 ,3 7 , 4 4 ,4 8 ,5 6 ,5 7 ,5 9 ,1 2 1 ,1 9 3 Iconic, 5, 7, 34, 36, 47, 51, 55, 56, 62, 93, 1 2 0 ,1 2 1 ,1 2 3 ,1 2 8 ,1 3 9 -1 4 1 ,1 9 0 Ideal ego, 131,133,139 ,1 4 1 ,1 4 8 ,1 5 5 ,1 5 8 , 160 Idealization, 120,12 7 ,1 2 8 ,1 4 1 ,1 5 7 -1 5 9 Identification, 29, 47, 53, 57, 92, 109,110, 1 15-117, 121, 123, 127-130, 132, 135-160 Identity, 65, 79, 81, 87, 98, 99, 120, 123, 1 2 4 ,1 3 9 ,1 4 0 ,1 4 3 Ideology, 130 Illusion, 1 1 3 ,1 1 4 ,1 1 5 , 1 2 4 ,1 2 6 ,1 2 7 , 129, 1 3 0,131,146 Image, 7, 56, 82, 84, 95, 99, 103, 122, 123, 128, 131, 138,139, 145 Imaginary, 3 -6 ,8 ,1 4 ,2 2 ,2 8 ,4 7 ,6 2 ,7 1 ,7 7 , 1 1 5 ,1 2 0 ,1 3 0 ,1 3 1 ,1 3 5 -1 6 0 ,1 8 7 Im itation, 4, 29, 52, 5 3 ,1 2 4 ,1 2 5 ,1 2 8 Im mediate, 3, 7 ,8 , 5 8 ,6 5 ,7 7 , 9 9 ,1 0 0 ,1 8 4 Im m une System, 37 Index, 1 4 ,2 9 ,3 3 -3 7 ,4 4 , 49,51, 55, 57-60, 62, 67, 68, 71, 85, 108, 121, 140, 144, 1 4 7.185.193 Interpretant, 32, 33, 35, 3 6 ,3 7 , 44, 51, 59, 6 2 ,6 3 ,9 7 ,1 2 1 ,1 4 7 ,1 4 8 ,1 7 7 ,1 7 9 ,1 8 2 , 1 8 7 ,1 8 9 ,1 9 0 ,1 9 3 ; feeling interpretant, 44, 45, 5 5 ,7 1 , 88, 190; dynam ic inter­ pretant, 44, 45, 71, 191; logical in ter­ p r e ta n te s , 191,192 Interpretation, 25, 54, 6 1 ,7 1 , 9 8 ,1 0 1 ,1 1 6 , 1 1 7 ,1 2 8 -1 3 3 ,1 8 2 ,1 9 1 ,1 9 3 Intersubjectivity, 3, 7 ,1 3 ,2 2 ,2 8 ,3 0 ,3 5 ,3 7 , 47, 4 8 ,5 1 ,5 2 , 53, 5 5 ,6 1 -7 2 , 109, 116, 1 2 4 ,1 3 6 ,1 3 7 ,1 4 7 ,1 4 8 ,1 8 9 ,1 9 0 Irreversibility, 60 Lalangue, 188 Language, 3, 5, 7, 8, 38, 39, 40, 68, 79, 9 3 -104, 115, 132, 136, 137, 142, 143, 1 4 5 .1 4 7 .1 6 1 .1 6 6 .1 6 9 .1 7 0 .1 8 3 .1 9 3

Law, 109, Life, 56,185 Lim it, 107, 110, 112, 116, 117, 119, 148, 156-158— see also Boundaries Linear, 5,35 Loss, 6 0 ,6 4 , 132, 137, 144,192 Love, 6 4 ,6 6 , 184 M anaged Care, 72 M anagem ent, 71 Marker, 7 5 -8 9 ,9 4 ,1 1 6 ,1 1 7 ,1 4 2 -1 4 4 , 148, 158.185.193 Mastery, 5 1 ,6 4 ,6 5 ,1 2 3 , 130,141 M ediation, 3 ,7 ,3 2 ,3 7 ,3 9 ,4 2 ,4 4 ,6 4 ,6 5 ,6 9 , 7 0 ,8 3 ,8 4 , 8 5 ,9 3 ,9 5 ,1 0 2 ,1 0 5 ,1 0 9 ,1 3 7 M edicine M an, 101-104 M emory, 1 8 ,3 8 ,4 0 ,6 3 , 100, 113, 122,169, 179,192 M etaphor, 141 M irror, 52, 5 7 ,5 8 ,9 2 M irroring, 4 ,1 3 ,2 3 ,2 4 ,4 7 ,5 9 ,6 2 ,6 4 ,1 1 4 , 1 1 9 -1 3 3 ,1 3 5 ,1 4 5 ,1 5 1 ,1 5 5 ,1 9 3 M irror Phase, 1 2 0 -1 24,138-139 M iscoordination, 19 M odel-Building, 38 M oratorium , 75, 81 M outhing, 23 M usem ent, 31 N am ing, 3, 7, 51, 58, 79, 87, 94, 9 7-104, 113,1 4 0 ,1 4 3 ,1 4 8 Narcissism, 13, 22, 39, 56, 65, 92, 116, 119-133, 135, 137, 139, 146, 158, 183, 184, 192,193 Narrativity, 2 ,1 4 ,5 1 ,6 3 ,1 4 4 ,1 7 6 ,1 8 0 ,1 9 2 N eed, 29, 3 6 ,5 0 ,1 1 4 , 147 N egation, 7 8 ,7 9 ,9 4 ,1 0 0 ,1 0 9 ,1 1 3 ,1 4 2 Neurology,— see Brain N odal points, 181,183 Nonverbal, 3 7 ,3 8 ,5 4 N orm s, 14,117 O bject, 1 4 ,1 5 ,1 7 ,2 1 ,2 5 ,3 3 ,3 6 ,3 7 ,5 0 ,5 4 , 57, 6 0 ,6 7 ,7 1 ,8 0 , 8 5 ,9 7 ,1 1 7 ,1 2 1 ,1 2 9 , 138,151 O bject Perm anence, 3 4 ,5 1 ,1 2 2 O bject R elation, 13, 45, 8 6 ,1 3 1 ,1 4 4 , 146, 153.158.193 Oedipal, 1 3 9 ,1 4 1 ,1 4 8 ,1 6 0 O m nipotence, 54, 87,116 O ther, 3 ,1 0 9 -1 1 7 ,1 1 9 ,1 3 6 -1 3 7 ,1 4 1 ,1 4 4 , 145,148,154, 159,189 O verdeterm ination, 182

Subject Index Pact, 99 ,1 3 2 ,1 3 7 Paradigm Shift, 61 Parallel Play, 55 Paranoia, 131 Paternal function, 1 3 2 ,1 4 1 ,1 4 8 ,1 5 6 -1 5 8 Perception, 3 5 ,3 8 ,4 6 ,4 8 ,5 6 ,6 0 ,6 3 ,6 4 ,7 7 , 9 7.104.191 Performatives, 69,109 Phallus, 141, 148,158 Phonem e, 49, 51, 5 8 ,9 4 ,9 5 ,1 2 1 , 132,142, 143 Pointing, 5 ,5 1 ,5 5 Pragmatics, 27 Predictability, 3 2 ,3 4 ,7 0 ,7 5 ,8 4 ,8 7 ,1 1 6 ,1 8 4 Prematurity, 122,123 Presence, 36, 4 9 ,5 9 ,6 0 ,6 7 ,6 9 ,9 9 ,1 0 3 Pretense, 52 Preverbal, 22,115 Projective Identification, 51 Pronouns, 19, 21, 25, 29, 35, 6 0 -7 2 , 108, 1 09 ,1 1 4 ,1 1 9 ,1 3 7 Protoconversation, 49 ,5 0 Protolinguistics, 3 ,1 4 ,1 9 ,2 2 ,2 5 ,5 3 ,5 4 ,1 9 2 Pupil o f eye, 138 Psychosis, 3, 4, 85, 86, 9 1 -1 1 7 , 142, 144, 193

229

Resonance, 13,16, 2 5 ,6 6 ,7 0 , 87,182 R e tu rn to Freud, 136,161 R everie, 193 R hythm , 16,27, 147 R itual, 94-104 R ule, 15,17

Sacred, 57,79 Scar, 85 Schema, 17 Schema L, 1 4 5 ,1 5 1 ,1 5 9 ,1 6 0 Scripts, 55, 87 Secondness, 3 2 ,5 9 ,7 2 ,1 0 9 Self, 3, 13, 29, 37, 39, 45, 64, 81, 86, 123, 1 3 6 ,1 3 7 ,1 4 3 ,1 5 6 ,1 9 2 Self-Alienation, 64 Self-Consciousness, 5 2 ,6 3 ,6 6 ,6 7 ,7 0 ,1 3 8 Self-D eception, 3 9 ,4 0 ,4 5 Selfobject, 1 3 ,6 7 ,7 0 ,1 2 8 ,1 5 2 ,1 5 6 ,1 5 8 Self-Organization, 4 7 ,4 8 ,5 8 Self Psychology, 61 Self-Regulation, 23 Self-Serving Bias, 126 Self-Soothing, 23 Self-State Dream , 4 Selfsubject, 67 Semantics, 27 Real, 3, 4, 7, 8, 32, 34, 58, 59, 7 5 -8 9 ,1 3 1 , Semiosis, 33, 35, 43, 44, 45, 51, 55, 58, 59, 6 1 ,6 2 ,6 3 ,7 7 ,8 1 ,8 2 ,1 1 4 ,1 1 7 ,1 4 7 ,1 7 0 , 1 4 2 -1 4 3 ,1 5 4 ,1 8 3 ,1 8 5 1 7 9 ,1 8 0 ,1 8 2 ,1 8 7 ,1 8 8 ,1 9 1 ,1 9 3 Reality, 3, 7, 37, 38, 54, 58, 64, 75, 84, 92, 9 3 .9 8 .1 0 2 .1 0 3 .1 0 4 .1 1 9 .1 2 3 .1 2 4 .1 3 5 , Semiotic a prior, 185 136.191 Semiotic E m pow erm ent, 2 5 ,3 0 ,7 0 Reality Testing, 51, 58 ,6 0 Semiotic Impasse, 6 2 ,8 1 ,8 6 ,8 7 Reciprocity, 1 6 ,1 8 ,1 9 ,2 8 ,6 8 Semiotics, 1 3 ,7 1 ,1 0 9 ,1 9 0 Sexuality, 157, 161-166, 182,186 R ecognition, 3, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 24, Shifters, 29,67 2 5 ,2 9 ,3 6 ,3 8 ,4 5 ,5 0 ,5 1 ,6 1 -7 0 ,8 1 ,8 9 , 116.135, 146,147,159 Signs, 5 ,2 7 ,3 1 ,3 2 ,3 5 ,4 0 ,4 3 ,4 8 ,5 8 ,6 0 R eferent, 5, 33,36, 58,97 Signal, 59 Reflex, 30, 169 Sign Language, 4 -8 R egisters o f Experience, 3, 4, 31, 92 -9 6 , Signifier, 3 ,3 3 ,1 0 0 ,1 0 5 ,1 0 8 ,1 1 3 ,1 1 6 ,1 3 3 , 114,141-143 1 4 0 ,1 4 2 ,1 4 4 ,1 4 7 ,1 8 5 R egistration, 40 Signifying C hain, 4 0 ,5 9 ,8 6 ,1 0 5 Regression, 3 4 ,8 3 ,8 6 ,1 3 0 ,1 4 4 ,1 8 9 Silence, 6 6,9 5 Smiling, 20 R eligion, 6 4 ,6 6 ,8 4 ,8 5 ,8 8 ,1 0 2 ,1 0 3 ,1 3 0 R epetition, 3 5 ,3 6 ,5 6 ,7 1 ,7 2 ,1 3 2 ,1 3 3 ,1 3 7 , Social Class, 21 185,190 Social C onstruction, 3 ,7 R epresentation, 3, 34, 36, 37, 38, 58, 99, Sonority, 41,185 1 2 1 ,1 2 9 ,1 3 8 ,1 4 3 ,1 8 7 Space, 5 ,6 ,5 1 ,5 4 ,5 6 ,5 7 ,5 8 ,6 7 ,6 8 ,6 9 ,8 2 , Repression, 39, 40, 9 4 ,1 0 0 , 103,124, 133, 8 3 ,9 8 ,9 9 ,1 0 0 , 102, 1 0 9,114,120,155, 139,141, 145, 154, 158, 160, 179, 188, 170 192 Speech, 7, 33, 38, 39, 58, 68, 69, 95, 108, Resistance, 123, 128, 130, 135, 136, 156, 1 0 9 ,1 3 2 ,1 4 2 ,1 6 7 ,1 6 8 ,1 7 4 ,1 7 5 179,180,181 Spirit, 9 1 ,1 0 1 -1 0 4

230

Subject Index

Stereotype, 5 ,7 ,9 2 , 93,193 Still-Face, 1 7 ,1 8 ,2 9 ,4 7 ,5 0 ,5 2 Stimulation, 1 7 ,2 8 ,2 9 ,4 9 Stimuius-Boundedness, 24,5 8 Stranger, 2 8 ,5 2 ,5 3 ,5 4 ,1 2 7 Subconscious, 170 Subject, 3, 8, 16, 21, 25, 36, 49, 55, 67-72, 7 9 ,8 6 ,8 7 ,1 0 5 ,1 1 4 ,1 1 6 ,1 2 3 ,1 3 0 ,1 3 5 , 1 3 7 ,1 4 1 ,1 4 3 ,1 5 3 ,1 5 6 ,1 8 7 ,1 9 2 Substitution, 2 1 ,2 8 ,3 8 ,4 0 ,4 1 ,6 0 ,1 3 3 ,1 4 8 , Suggestibility, 29 Sum m oning, 66 Superego, 129 Supposed K now ing Subject, 151,160 Symbol, 1 4 ,3 3 -3 7 ,5 5 ,5 7 ,5 8 ,6 2 ,1 2 1 Symbolic, 3, 5, 6, 8, 14, 22, 32, 46, 62, 77, 1 0 5 ,1 1 6 ,1 1 7 ,1 3 1 ,1 3 5 -1 8 6 Symbolic Castration, 148, 157 Sym ptom , 1 3 3 ,1 5 3 ,1 5 9 ,1 6 9 ,1 7 5 Syntax, 5 ,2 7 ,3 7 ,3 8 ,4 0 ,1 6 7 Talking cure, 168 Televison, 127 Term ination, 151,159-160 Theory, 30 Things, 84 T hinking, 32 Third, 1 4 ,2 1 ,2 5 ,2 9 ,6 1 ,7 0 -7 2 ,8 1 ,8 5 ,1 0 5 , 109, 116, 130, 132, 137, 141, 144, 148, 1 5 8 ,1 8 3 ,1 8 9 ,1 9 0 ,1 9 3 Thirdness, 3 2 ,4 1 ,5 5 , 5 9 ,8 4 ,9 9 ,1 0 9 ,1 8 7 T im e, 6 9 ,9 9 ,1 1 3 ,1 8 4 Touching, 2 0 ,4 1 ,1 4 7 ,1 8 5 Tragic M an, 136 Training, 7 2 ,1 3 5 ,1 3 6 Transference, 6 1 ,7 1 ,9 8 ,1 0 2 ,1 1 2 ,1 1 4 ,1 1 6 , 1 2 9 -1 3 1 ,1 3 3 ,1 4 8 -1 6 0 ,1 8 5 ,1 8 9 ,1 9 0 Transitional O bject, 101 Transitional Space, 115,132,193 Transitivism, 55,123 Translation, 39, 4 0 ,1 0 1 ,1 8 2 ,1 8 8 ,1 9 2 Transmuting internalization. 128,146,160, Trauma, 3, 4, 72, 84, 86, 87,142, 154, 158, 1 6 4 ,1 7 0 ,1 7 5 ,1 8 2 Triadic, 31, 54,141 T urn-T aking, 2 1 ,2 3 ,3 0 U m velt, 37, 38 Unconscious, 22, 35, 36, 41, 45, 57,61, 66, 69, 71, 72, 87, 114, 124, 135-137, 143, 1 4 6 ,1 4 7 ,1 5 3 ,1 6 1 -1 8 6 ,1 8 8 U ndifferentiated, 3 2 ,3 4 ,7 5 ,7 7 ,9 3 ,9 5 ,1 8 5 Uniqueness, 144,145

U nm ediated, 62 Unnam eable, 3 ,4 ,7 5 ,8 5 ,8 7 ,1 0 0 Verbal bridge, 156,183 Victim ization, 7 1 ,7 2 ,1 8 2 Violation, 1 9 ,2 1 ,3 4 , 111, 117 Vision Q uest, 101 Visual, 4, 8, 23, 28, 35, 38, 41, 49, 57, 92, 120.1 2 3 .1 3 8 .1 8 5 Vocalization — see Voice Voice, 1 6 ,2 0 ,2 1 ,2 3 ,2 4 ,2 8 ,3 4 ,4 8 ,4 9 ,5 3 , 5 8 ,6 8 ,7 0 ,1 0 2 ,1 5 4 ,1 9 2 W hole, 1 3 ,1 3 7 ,1 4 1 ,1 4 8 W ithdrawal, 1 4 ,1 5 ,4 9 W itness, 1 0 4 ,1 0 9 ,1 1 0 ,1 3 7 ,1 8 8 W riting, 7, 39, 40, 94, 95, 100, 105, 106, 1 1 4 .1 1 7 .1 4 4 .1 7 1 .1 8 5 Zoosemiotics, 30