Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline (Southeast European Studies) [1 ed.] 9781472452689, 9781315568348, 1472452682

Citation preview

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Southeast European Studies Series Editor: Florian Bieber, Centre for Southeast European Studies, University of Graz, Austria The Balkans are a region of Europe widely associated over the past decades with violence and war. Beyond this violence, the region has experienced rapid change in recent times, including democratization and economic and social transformation. New scholarship is emerging which seeks to move away from the focus on violence alone to an understanding of the region in a broader context drawing on new empirical research. The Southeast European Studies Series seeks to provide a forum for this new scholarship. Publishing cutting-edge, original research and contributing to a more profound understanding of Southeastern Europe while focusing on contemporary perspectives the series aims to explain the past and seeks to examine how it shapes the present. Focusing on original empirical research and innovative theoretical perspectives on the region, the series includes original monographs and edited collections. It is interdisciplinary in scope, publishing high-level research in political science, history, anthropology, sociology, law and economics and accessible to readers interested in Southeast Europe and beyond. Other titles in the series Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro Effects of Statehood and Identity Challenges Jelena Džankić State-Building and Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina Edited by Soeren Keil and Valery Perry A Discourse Analysis of Corruption Instituting Neoliberalism Against Corruption in Albania, 1998–2005 Blendi Kajsiu The Politics of Social Ties Immigrants in an Ethnic Homeland Mila Dragojević After Ethnic Conflict Policy-making in Post-conflict Bosnia and Macedonia Cvete Koneska

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece Civil Society at the European Frontline

Edited by Jennifer Clarke University of the Peloponnese, Greece Asteris Huliaras University of the Peloponnese, Greece Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos University of Athens, Greece

First published 2015 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © Jennifer Clarke, Asteris Huliaras and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, and the contributors 2015 Jennifer Clarke, Asteris Huliaras and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been applied for.

ISBN: 9781472452689 (hbk) ISBN: 9781315568348 (ebk)

Contents List of Figures   List of Tables   List of Abbreviations   Notes on Contributors   Acknowledgements   1

Introduction   Jennifer Clarke, Asteris Huliaras and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos

Part 1

vii ix xi xiii xv 1

Between Citizens and the State: The Context for Greek Civil Society

2

Greek Civil Society: The Neglected Causes of Weakness   Asteris Huliaras

3

Social Capital Levels in Greece in Times of Crisis   Nikoleta Jones, Marina Proikaki and Spyridon Roumeliotis

4

Informal Relationships and Structures in Greece and their Effects on Civil Society Formation   Tina Mavrikos-Adamou

45

Solidarity and Survival: A Multidisciplinary Exploration of Volunteering during the Greek Crisis   Jennifer Clarke

67

Urban Social Movements in Greece: Dominant Discourses and the Reproduction of ‘Weak’ Civil Societies   Lila Leontidou

85

5 6

9 29

Part 2 Sectoral Analyses of Greek Civil Society 7

NGOs and Social Welfare in Greece Reassessed: Comparative Insights and Crisis Repercussions   Periklis Polyzoidis

109

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

vi

8 9 10

When Best is Not Enough: Greek Environmental NGOs and their Donors amidst the Economic Crisis   Iosif Botetzagias and Eirini Koutiva

125

Towards a Hybrid ‘Shadow State’? The Case of Migrant-/RefugeeServing NGOs in Greece   Dimitris Skleparis

147

Citizens’ Solidarity Initiatives in Greece during the Financial Crisis   Eugenia Vathakou

167

Part 3 Local Case Studies of Civil Society Development 11 12

NGOs, Minority Politics and Alterity in Pre-Crisis Athens. A Case Study from Gazi and Metaxourgeio   Leonidas Karakatsanis

193

Civil Society Development in Microcosm: The Case of Anavra Village, Greece   Fotini Papoudakis

215

13 Conclusions   Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, Jennifer Clarke and Asteris Huliaras

239

Index  

253

List of Figures 3.1 3.2

33

3.3 3.4

Social trust levels across Europe (10-point scale)   Levels of institutional trust in the National and the European Parliaments, across Europe (10-point scale)   Trust in Greece in the European Parliament (%)   Trust in Greece in the National Parliament (%)  

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5

Volunteering rates across Europe (%)   The importance of family across Europe   Preferred option for care of elderly parents across Europe   Attitudes towards trusting people across Europe   Percentage of people trusting political parties across Europe  

49 51 52 53 57

8.1 8.2

The development of Greek ENGOs over time   Placement of environment NGOs in the top-10 of ‘best-known’ Greek NGOs   WWF-Greece’s income sources by year (1,000s euro)  

8.3

34 36 36

127 128 131

This page has been left blank intentionally

List of Tables 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

The relational perspective typology   115 Welfare state ideologies and the role of third sector organisations   115 The Social Origins approach   116 Non-profit sector regimes and family policy models by country    118

8.1 8.2

Members and workforce of Greek ENGOs (for 1996)   EU-related sources’ per cent contribution to selected Greek ENGOs’ budget   Legitimacy judgments conditioning donors’ financial giving to environmental NGOs: Comparing the views of donor foundations and businesses and of ENGOs  

8.3

128 130 137

This page has been left blank intentionally

List of Abbreviations ADEDY Confederation of Civil Servants of Greece CSO Civil Society Organisation CSR Corporate Social Responsibility CEBSD Combined European Bureau for Social Development DoW Doctors of the World DwB Doctors without Borders EBU European Broadcasting Union EC European Community/ies EEPF Hellenic Society for the Protection of Nature EKKE National Centre for Social Research ENGO Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation ERF European Refugee Fund ERT Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation ESPA National Strategic Reference Framework for EU funding ESS European Social Survey EU European Union EU-SILC EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions GCR Greek Council for Refugees GDP Gross Domestic Product GSEE General Confederation of Workers of Greece HACD Hungarian Association for Community Development HSPN Hellenic Society for the Protection of Nature IACD International Association for Community Development ICT Information and Communication Technologies ILO International Labour Organization IMF International Monetary Fund KKE Communist Party of Greece MEDASSET Mediterranean Association to Save the Sea Turtles MOM Society for the Protection of the Monk Seal ND New Democracy Party NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NERIT New Hellenic Radio Internet and Television NIMBY Not-In-My-Back-Yard OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PAME Workers’ Militant Front PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement PIIGS Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain

xii

PROSKALO RSC SMO SMS SPAME STPS SYRIZA TEM UAEGEAN UN UNHCR WHO WWF WSF

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Cooperation Initiative for the Social and Solidarity Economy Refugee Settlement Commission Social Movement Organisation Short Message Service Panhellenic Without Middlemen Network Sea Turtle Protection Society Coalition of the Radical Left Alternative Currency Network of Magnisia University of the Aegean United Nations United Nations High Commission for Refugees World Health Organization World Wildlife Fund World Social Forum

Notes on Contributors Iosif Botetzagias is Assistant Professor of Environmental Politics and Policy at the Department of Environment, University of the Aegean, Greece. Jennifer Clarke holds a PhD from the University of Kent and is Visiting Research Fellow at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of the Peloponnese, Greece. Asteris Huliaras is Professor in Comparative Politics and International Relations at the Department of Political Science and International Relations of the University of the Peloponnese, Greece. Nikoleta Jones is Lecturer in Human Geography at the Open University, UK. Leonidas Karakatsanis holds a PhD from the University of Essex and is PostDoctoral Fellow at the British Institute at Ankara, Turkey. Eirini Koutiva is a researcher and holds an MSc in Environmental Policy and Management from the Department of Environment, University of the Aegean, Greece. Lila Leontidou is Professor of Geography and European Culture at the Hellenic Open University, Greece. Tina Mavrikos-Adamou Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science at Hofstra University, NY, USA. Fotini Papoudakis is Associate Professor at the Department of Business and Public Administration of the Technological Educational Institute of Peloponnese, Greece. Periklis Polyzoidis is Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Policy and Administration at the Democritus University of Thrace, Greece. Marina Proikaki is a researcher and doctoral student at the Department of Environment, University of the Aegean, Greece.

xiv

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Spyridon Roumeliotis is a doctoral student at the Department of Environment, University of the Aegean, Greece. Dimitris Skleparis is a research executive at qed and doctoral student at the School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary, University of London, UK. Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of the University of Athens, Greece. Eugenia Vathakou, who holds a PhD from the University of Kent, is a researcher in civil society and development and teaches global inequalities, at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of the Peloponnese, Greece.

Acknowledgements This volume would not have been possible without the support and commitment of many people: colleagues, collaborators, family and friends. We are particularly grateful to the many representatives of civil society organisations and initiatives who generously shared their knowledge and experiences with us during the research. We would also like to record our gratitude to the team at Ashgate, and in particular to the Senior Commissioning Editor, Rob Sorsby, who has been unfailingly helpful and constructive, and to the Series Editor, Florian Bieber, for his support of the project. The research for this volume was co‐financed by the European Union (European Social Fund – ESF) and Greek national funds, through the Operational Programme ‘Education and Lifelong Learning’ of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) Research Funding Programme ‘THALES Investing in knowledge society through the European Social Fund’.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 1

Introduction Jennifer Clarke, Asteris Huliaras and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos

Situated at the cultural and political boundaries of Europe, the migration frontier for the Eurοpean Union, and the epicentre of the Eurozone crisis, Greece presents a unique and challenging context. For the past six years, the country has rarely been out of the news headlines. Dozens of reports by international organisations and numerous academic papers and books have underlined the structural problems of the Greek economy, castigating the clientelistic nature of Greek politics and pointing to the inability of the Greek state to reform. However, much less research has focused on Greek society. Published accounts of Greek society have mostly been journalistic and often based on stereotypes (Tzogopoulos, 2013): lazy Greeks, living beyond their means, a society of takers, not givers. Some of these perceptions have been supported in part by available data. Greece’s rankings for associational density, volunteerism and levels of social capital have, for years, been among the lowest in Europe (e.g. Jones et al., 2008; European Commission, 2010; Charities Aid Foundation, 2010). However, since 2008, there has been a great proliferation of organised civil society initiatives, as well as a huge rise in (often violent) demonstrations and strikes. Has this been a belated awakening of Greek civil society? This volume aims to explore and explain the complex context behind these developments. It offers a broad overview of contemporary Greek civil society, taking into account wider international developments. It explores how various characteristics of Greece’s socio-political context have affected the development of civil society and examines in detail the effects of the economic crisis on it. We believe that the contributions to the volume are of interest to a wide audience, beyond those who follow developments in Greece. As it will be shown, the analysis of contemporary Greek civil society can be useful not only for a better understanding of similar movements across Southern Europe and beyond, but it also contributes to wider academic debates on societal responses to economic crises. The terms ‘third sector’ and ‘civil society’ are umbrella terms which, despite having different conceptual roots, are today frequently used interchangeably, though without consensus regarding their precise meanings. They both refer to a domain which has been described as a ‘loose and baggy monster’ (Kendall and Knapp, 1995), and has often been considered unsuited to rigid categorisations. In this context, we decided not to impose narrow definitions on contributors, but

2

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

to leave them free to choose the theoretical debates with which they wished to engage and to which they wanted to contribute. Nevertheless, in the interest of the coherence of the volume, the various contributions were selected so as to fall within certain broad parameters, which, for the sake of conceptual clarity, it is worth expounding briefly. Our working understanding of ‘third sector’, taking the well-trodden path that follows Etzioni (1973), is of a realm of activity that is independent from both market and state, and, as Corry puts it ‘ruled neither primarily by market logic nor via a bureaucratic chain of command’ (2010, p. 13). The concept of civil society has meant many things to many people during its long history; here we follow Scholte in considering as civil society actors ‘voluntary associations [which] deliberately seek to shape the rules that govern one or the other aspect of social life’ (2002, p. 283).These may include both formal and informal actors who participate in the public sphere in order to make demands on the state or to pursue the self-organisation of citizens from below. For the purposes of this volume, we were chiefly interested in contributions that shine a light on the diverse range of actors that can be seen to occupy the common ground between these understandings of the third sector and civil society. Of course, in reality, the boundaries between categories of actors are not clearcut, and this necessitated making some difficult editorial choices. It was with regret that we decided to exclude an interesting contribution on co-operatives, due to their essentially for-profit character, and, following the same rationale, the volume does not explore other types of for-profit citizens’ initiatives that have multiplied in Greece since the beginning of the crisis, including start-up business networks. A number of the authors describe in some detail their own understandings of the concepts of civil society and the third sector (see, in particular, MavrikosAdamou, Chapter 4; Leontidou, Chapter 6; and Papoudakis, Chapter 12). The contributing authors take diverse approaches and reach different and, at times, even conflicting conclusions. They also focus on a wide array of organisations and initiatives, ranging from professionalised non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to informal initiatives and protest movements. We consider it to be strength of the volume that it brings together authors who represent different disciplines and who write from a range of perspectives. The chapters share, to a greater or lesser extent, a focus on the crisis and its effects on Greek civil society. As is by now well known, Greece’s fiscal crisis rapidly spiralled into an economic crisis and a recession of proportions that are almost unprecedented in modern history (Matsaganis, 2014). In 2010, there was an abrupt reversal of income, pensions and social assistance policies which had been followed throughout most of the 2000s. The socialist party (PASOK) government had promised to continue, if not expand, such policies and had won the 2009 national elections on a Keynesian policy platform. Yet, upon coming to power, PASOK realised that it had to backpedal, if only to save the country from default. It soon resorted to the European Union, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (which came to be known collectively as the ‘Troika’), as it became obvious that Greece could not service its public debt

Introduction

3

(129% of the GDP in 2009). The Greek budget deficit (16% of the GDP in 2009) was unsustainable and the competitiveness of the Greek economy was reaching an abyss, as the value of imported goods by far exceeded the value of Greek exports. By the beginning of 2010 the coffers of the Greek state were nearly empty. Greece’s international creditors agreed to a rescue plan, a bailout accompanied by a loan agreement that included harsh austerity measures. The combination of the recession and the austerity measures had profound social impacts (see also Huliaras, Chapter 2; and Polyzoidis, Chapter 7). Amongst others, the unemployment rate quadrupled between 2007 and 2012, whilst those in employment suffered severe income cuts, leaving average wages far below the Euro area average (Matsaganis, 2014; Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos, 2014). Anchored poverty rates rose steeply, as did extreme poverty rates, meaning that a significant proportion of the population became unable to meet basic living expenses (Matsaganis, 2014). This context has had a major impact on Greek civil society in at least three respects. Firstly civil society has been increasingly called upon to fill the growing gap between social welfare needs and the state’s ability to provide welfare services. Secondly, the crisis has provoked new forms of social mobilisation. Thirdly, the crisis has affected the ability of Greek NGOs to raise funds to support their activities, whether through public funding or through individual charitable donations. These themes and more are explored in depth over the following chapters. The volume is split thematically into three parts. The chapters in Part 1 explore the social and political context for civil society in Greece; Part 2 presents a number of sectoral analyses of Greek civil society; and Part 3 comprises two local case studies of civil society development, one urban and one rural. Parallel to the thematic logic of the volume, the contributions have also been selected so as to offer an overview of many different types of Greek civil society actors, including urban social movements, social welfare NGOs, environmental NGOs, refugee- and migrant-serving organisations, solidarity initiatives and minority organisations. A brief overview of each of the remaining chapters is offered below. In Chapter 2, Asteris Huliaras presents a wide review of relevant literature, arguing that organised civil society in Greece is weak compared to that in western European countries. His analysis focuses on neglected factors for this weakness, particularly those related to public-policy choices. These include a close churchstate relationship, weak tax incentives for charitable giving and a lack of civic education in public schools. He also outlines the mixed impact of the economic crisis on civil society, documenting how new social movements and organisations have appeared but older ones have been undermined by a change of citizens’ priorities and a sharp reduction in public funding. In Chapter 3, Nikoleta Jones, Marina Proikaki and Spyridon Roumeliotis employ sociological insights for understanding of the impact of the crisis on civil society, through their analysis of the effects of the crisis on social capital levels. They draw on an amalgam of the most recent data pertaining to Greece to assess the impact of the crisis on various social capital indicators, and argue that while

4

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

institutional trust levels have dropped sharply, social trust, albeit comparatively low in Greece, has been less affected, and participation in social networks has actually increased. Tina Mavrikos-Adamou shifts the focus of the analysis in Chapter 4 to informal social structures and relationships and their role in shaping civil society. She examines how networks of family, friends and patron-client relationships have historically been the key loci of social trust in Greece. She argues that low levels of volunteering in formal organisations are counterbalanced by the importance of family and friends and by informal social capital, located in the myriad of informal arenas that dot the rural and urban neighbourhoods of the country. Linking some of the themes of the preceding chapters to the applied context, in Chapter 5, Jennifer Clarke explores the effects of the crisis on volunteering in Greece, through qualitative research with representatives of voluntary organisations. She also draws on international scholarship on volunteering during crises and in other difficult contexts, in order to interpret the significance of the widely reported increase in volunteering in Greece. She argues that the phenomenon of crisis volunteering is more ambivalent than is frequently acknowledged, being typically linked to solidarity aroused by proximity to suffering and increased needs on the part of volunteers themselves. In Chapter 6, Lila Leontidou focuses on the recent developments of Greek urban social movements in order to illustrate how various discourses, including those related to globalisation, organisation theory and, most recently, the ‘Orientalist’ labelling of Southern Europe as ‘PIIGS’, have functioned to cast grassroots civil society initiatives as ‘weak’ and to subsume them into the dominant cultures and values. Leontidou highlights the cosmopolitan character of the spontaneous mobilisations that have gathered pace across Southern Europe and calls for the greater recognition of the contribution of grassroots social movements to strengthening Mediterranean civil societies. In Chapter 7, Periklis Polyzoidis notes that the crisis has reshaped the field for Greek NGOs providing social welfare services, making a reassessment of their role particularly timely. Noting the value of comparative research for understanding trajectories of civil society development, Polyzoidis firstly assesses how the patterns of relationships between Greek welfare NGOs and the state fit into a number of comparative models of the third sector. Secondly, he assesses the repercussions of the crisis on the social welfare NGO sector. Whilst noting the increased activities of some organisations, he argues that the NGO sector has neither the resources nor the institutional power to fill the current gaps in welfare provision. Iosif Botetzagias and Eirini Koutiva provide an overview of the development of environmental NGOs in Greece, in Chapter 8, and, more specifically, they explore the relationship between the funding criteria of donors to the flagship Greek environmental NGOs and the perceptions of these NGOs themselves of the funding process. They find that donors and environmental NGOs hold highly similar views, which poses a conundrum: NGOs are already the best in

Introduction

5

their donors’ eyes, yet, in the midst of the fiscal crisis, this top performance is not enough to provide them with the funds they need. Accordingly, the chapter concludes by presenting how the NGOs have tried to answer this puzzle and by discussing the challenges they face in the medium term. In Chapter 9, through his analysis of the changing role of several migrant-/ refugee- serving NGOs, Dimitris Skleparis explores the response of this part of civil society to the growing inability of the state to meet basic welfare needs. He argues that the curtailment of the welfare state and worsening living standards have broadened the mandate of civil society organisations to the extent that we can observe a bottom-up and unplanned emergence of a ‘shadow state’. Skleparis draws on a three-month fieldwork study and 20 interviews, and also offers an overview of refugee- and migrant-serving NGOs in Greece. Eugenia Vathakou examines the citizens’ solidarity initiatives that have been emerging throughout Greece over the past five years, in Chapter 10. She identifies a number of defining characteristics of these initiatives, attempts an evaluation of their impact, and offers a critical analysis of challenges that these initiatives encounter. Vathakou argues that despite their differences, citizens’ initiatives work on the basis of a common understanding of the causes of the current crisis, which they consider to be not only financial but deeply political and social. In Chapter 11, Leonidas Karakatsanis explores the complicated socio-political relations between social welfare NGOs and a Turkish-Muslim community at the heart of Athens. Drawing on a four-year long ethnographic study, supplemented by additional field research in 2014, he documents how the wider social and political context inevitably permeates the NGO sphere, with political discourse and social and economic policies interacting with the local power relations and politics of identity and alterity. In doing so, he highlights the inescapably political character of even seeming ‘anti-political’ civil society activity. Karakatsanis also offers detailed empirical insights into the work of minority NGOs and community associations in this part of Athens. Offering a counterpoint to the urban focus of the preceding chapter, Fotini Papoudakis presents a second in-depth case study of civil society development, focusing on the mountain village of Anavra, in Chapter 12. In an analysis which spans over two decades up to the crisis context of the present day, Papoudakis continues some of the themes of previous chapters, including the role of both informal social structures and local policies and politics on civil society development. However, she gives particular emphasis to the agency of key individuals who, she argues, played a key role in transforming the social, economic and civic development of the village. Apart from offering rare longitudinal insights into civil society development, Papoudakis also provides a unique window onto civil society development in rural Greece. Finally, in the concluding chapter of the volume, the editors review the continuities and discontinuities in the evolution of civil society since the onset of the economic crisis. The authors focus on observing some of the common themes which have emerged, but also on highlighting some issues which they deem to

6

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

be important, but which have received little treatment over the preceding pages, including the darker aspect of civil society manifested in the increased mobilisation of violent and extremist groups. The volume also closes with some thoughts on the implications of the recent developments for the future development of civil society in Greece and beyond. References Alcock, P., 2010. A strategic unity: Defining the third sector in the UK. Voluntary Sector Review, 1(1), pp. 5–24. Charities Aid Foundation, 2010. World Giving Index 2010. [online] London: Charities Aid Foundation. Available at: [Accessed 30 November 2014]. Corry, O., 2010. Defining and theorizing the third sector. In: R. Taylor ed., Third Sector Research, New York, Dortrecht, Heidelberg, London: Springer, pp. 11–20. European Commission, 2010. Volunteering in the European Union. Final Report submitted by GHK. [online] Available at: [Accessed 30 November 2014]. Etzioni, A. 1973. The third sector and domestic missions. Public Administration Review, 33(4), pp. 314–23. Jones, N., Malesios, C., Iosifides, T. and Sofoulis, C.M., 2008. Social Capital in Greece: Measurement and comparative perspectives. South European Society & Politics, 13(2), pp. 175–93. Kendall, J. and Knapp, M., 1995. A loose and baggy monster. In: J. Davis Smith, C. Rochester and R. Hedley (eds) An Introduction to the Voluntary Sector London: Routledge, pp. 66–95. La Spina, A. and Sciortino, G., 1993. Common agenda, southern rules: European integration and environmental change in the Mediterranean states. In: J.D. Liefferink, P.D. Lowe and P.J. Mol, eds. London: Belhaven Press, pp. 217–36. Matsaganis, M., 2014. The catastrophic Greek crisis. Current History, 113(761), pp. 110–16. Pelagidis, T. and Mitsopoulos, M., 2014 Greece: From Exit to Recovery? Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press. Scholte, J.A., 2002. Civil society and democracy in global governance. Global Governance, 8(3), pp. 281–304. Tzogopoulos, G., 2013. The Greek Crisis in the Media: Stereotyping in the International Press. Farnham: Ashgate.

Part 1 Between Citizens and the State: The Context for Greek Civil Society

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 2

Greek Civil Society: The Neglected Causes of Weakness1 Asteris Huliaras

Introduction The 2009 Greek debt crisis led to the adoption of an austerity programme supervised by the IMF and the EU (Featherstone, 2011). Austerity took effect when the Greek economy was already in recession and made it much deeper. The GDP in 2013 had contracted by 23% relative to 2007, amounting to a dramatic fall in living standards. Such a recession has very few precedents in modern economic history (the 1929 Great Depression in the United States led to a fall in GDP of 30% within four years) (Matsaganis, 2014, p. 112). Joblessness rose steeply: in 2008 the unemployment rate stood at 7.5%; five years later it was at 27.8%. For 14% of Greeks, poverty was, by developed country standards, extreme: about 1.5 million people were unable to purchase a basic basket of goods (Matsaganis, 2014, pp. 114–15). Policy responses to the social effects of the crisis were at best inadequate. For example, only one jobless worker in ten had access to unemployment benefits (Matsaganis, 2012). In turn, the ineffective formal welfare provision ate into the liquidity of the informal residual family-based support system, transmitting the crisis from the state to the family (Lyberaki and Tinios, 2014). Economic misery, combined with a pervasive sense of impotence, led to the polarisation of domestic politics and a rise in political extremism. As the economic crisis worsened and public spending for the social sector contracted, attention shifted to the ability of civil society organisations to offer social services. Moreover, as trust in the political class reached unprecedented lows, many focused on the ability of social movements to promote social and political change. Expectations regarding civil society’s role ran high in the period 2010–2012. The Greek and international media were full of stories of

1 An earlier version of this text previously appeared in 2014 as a working paper in the Jean Monnet Papers on Political Economy series of the University of the Peloponnese, under the title ‘The Dynamics of Civil Society in Greece: Creating Civic Engagement from the Top (available at: https://www.uop. gr/images/stories/monnet/huliaras.pdf). The present text has been significantly reworked.

10

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

‘unprecedented’ levels of solidarity.2 Analysts confidently talked about a rise of citizen-based social movements that could offer an alternative to traditional politics (e.g. Douzinas, 2013; Pantazidou, 2013). Unfortunately, as time passed, there was much disappointment. With few exceptions, Greek civil society organisations remained unable to provide reliable and large-scale social services, while the ability of social movements to offer political alternatives remained in serious doubt. The first part of this chapter presents evidence that proves that civil society in Greece is, relatively to West European countries, weak. Then it attempts to answer two research questions: first, what are the reasons for the weakness of Greek civil society, and secondly, how the economic crisis has affected its development. It concludes by arguing that weakness remains the dominant characteristic – despite the spectacular increase in petitions, protests, rallies, demonstrations and strikes. However, this does not mean that Greek civil society is doomed to remain weak. The chapter argues that its weakness is not only a consequence of the commonly-cited historical factors (such as delayed modernisation, partitocracy and clientelism) but also the result of much less-studied structural factors (in particular religious homogeneity and the historically close relationship between the Greek state and the Orthodox Church). Moreover, and more importantly for policy-makers and activists, this weakness reflects a number of public non-policies (in particular, weak tax incentives for charitable giving and the almost complete lack of civic education in public schools), policies that can change and produce results in relatively short periods of time. The chapter also argues that there is gradual change: the well-documented strengthening of Greek civil society within the last two decades (especially in terms of numbers of organisations, geographical scope, people involved and size of activities) is a result of the rise of post-materialistic values (quality of life, environment, human rights etc.), EU funding and changed political tactics of the parties of the Greek Left. The rise of political mobilisation and activism since 2010 is an important change in Greek civil society and is a direct result of the economic crisis. Nevertheless, it is by no means an indication of a rising civil society that is sustainable in the long-run. In several respects, the crisis seems to have weakened rather than strengthened most organised forms of civil society in Greece – especially foundations and NGOs that rely on public funding and/or on small private donations. The chapter proceeds as follows: the first part reviews quantitative data on Greek civil society; the second part reconsiders a number of explanations of Greek civil society’s weakness and emphasises some neglected factors in the relevant debate; the third part examines the dynamics that influence civil society growth; the fourth part focuses on the crisis period (this part is based on 32 semi-structured interviews 2 See the reports from the study ‘The Greek Economic Crisis in International Press’ (in Greek) that was conducted by the Institute of International Relations, Panteion University, Athens (available at: ).

Greek Civil Society

11

and informal discussions with civil society activists in Athens and Thessaloniki); and, finally, the conclusion section sums up the arguments presented, claiming that Greek policy-makers should reconsider church-state relations, introduce generous tax incentives for charitable giving and promote civic education in public schools. The Facts The 2005 Civicus Survey concluded that civil society in Greece is weak and that the state, political parties and the family are the country’s strongest institutions. The survey noted widespread apathy and a lack of civic engagement among Greek citizens and underlined that institutionalised civil society organisations are few and poorly organised and, consequently, have little impact and limited influence (Sotiropoulos and Karamagioli, 2006). This bleak picture is shared by most observers. In the words of one analyst: ‘every social scientist studying civil society in Greece or documenting and measuring social capital at the societal level … agrees that [Greek] civil society is cachectic, atrophic or fragile’ (Hadjiyanni, 2010, p. 20). In an introduction to Greek politics, Keith R. Legg and John M. Roberts argued that ‘if a latter-day de Tocqueville were to visit Greece, he would not conclude that Greece is a country of joiners’ (Legg and Roberts, 1997, p. 198). The European Social Survey (ESS) offers the most systematic documentation and analysis of trust and other indicators that are crucial for fostering mutual support, solidarity and collective action. In the 2008 round of the ESS,3 to the question ‘can we trust or should we be cautious of other people’ 59.8% of Greeks responded that ‘we should be cautious’ (in comparison to a 38.8% average in Europe). Similar responses were also obtained from the question ‘Do you believe that most people would try to take advantage of you if they had the opportunity or would they be fair to you’, to which 62.1% of the respondents answered that most people would try to take advantage of them (in comparison to an average of 28.4% across Europe). Finally, to the question ‘Do you believe that people often help each other or they care mostly about themselves’, 58.3% of the respondents answered that ‘people care more about themselves’ (in comparison to 31.3% in Europe). Not unexpectedly, according to several rounds of the ESS, participation in all types of voluntary socio-political organisations in Greece is low in relation to the European average. And this does not only include sports, cultural, business, professional, environmental, human rights and consumer organisations but also more ‘traditional’ voluntary groups like religious organisations, trade unions and political parties. Volunteerism in Greece follows the low levels of trust. A recent study has shown that although around 22% of Europeans aged over 15 are engaged in voluntary work, in Greece less than 10% of adults are involved in voluntary 3 The relevant data is available at . The cited calculations are made by the author.

12

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

activities and only a very small fraction of them (around 32,000) are regular volunteers (European Commission 2010, p. 61). Furthermore, the economic value of volunteer work in Greece is estimated at less than 1% of GDP, compared with 3–5% in northern Europe (European Commission, 2010, p. 8). Similar results come from The World Giving Index which is compiled by the Charities Aid Foundation, using data gathered by Gallup. The Index ranks 135 countries according to how charitable their populations are. The survey asks respondents if in the last month they have donated money to a charity, volunteered their time to an organisation or helped a stranger who needed help. In the 2013 Index, Greece occupies the last position. Only 6% of the Greek respondents had given money to a charitable cause and only 4% had given time to a philanthropic activity. The positive responses to the ‘Helping a stranger’ question were much higher (30%), but even this was among the lowest in the world (Greece occupies the 126th position out of 135 countries) (Charities Aid Foundation, 2013). Finally, in the Composite Active Citizenship Indicator, which measures 61 indicators ranging from voter turnout to engagement in trade union organisations, Greece also scores much lower than its northern European partners (with the exception of involvement in protest) (Hoskins and Mascherini, 2009). In sum, we have data from various sources that confirm that Greece has low to very low levels of associational density and civic engagement. Some researchers have claimed that, behind the scenes, there exists a vibrant unofficial, non-institutionalised and informal civil society. Dimitri Sotiropoulos has argued that there are several informal collective actors aiming to protect vested interests in their region or locale, take sides in public disputes, object to governmental policies or volunteer to help people in need (Sotiropoulos, 2004). According to this argument, ‘there is an informal civil society in Greece which may be not be as weak as the formal one’ (Sotiropoulos, 2004, p. 25). The Civicus Survey reiterated this argument, noting that various informal civic activities (ranging from self-help groups and groups of volunteers offering services to people in need and networks of computer users), which are difficult to measure, exist and even flourish at the local level (Sotiropoulos and Karamagioli, 2006). However, there is very little evidence that can confirm this claim. After all, the legal ‘barriers’ for creating formal civil society organisations are not very high in Greece. It is relatively easy to create a ‘not-for-profit organisation’ (‘astiki mikerdoskopiki etaireia’) or an ‘association’ (‘somation’) – the main legal forms of not-for-profit civil society organisations in Greece. There is no apparent reason that many of these supposedly ‘strong’ informal collectivities fail to become formal groups. However, this is relative. A British academic who has worked with both UK and Greek civil society organisations, has found that the process of setting up an organisation in Greece is both more complicated and more expensive than in the UK. In her own words: ‘in Greece it requires paying a lawyer and an accountant from day one. Every lawyer and every accountant has a different

Greek Civil Society

13

interpretation of the requirements, which is disheartening, and it is difficult to find impartial advice’.4 The Causes The assertion that Greek civil society is weak demands explanation. Several studies cite a number of historical, economic and political reasons to explain and account for its lack of robustness and vigour. Most factors cited are country-specific. Let us start from the more general or ‘structural’ explanations. The level of economic development of a country is crucial for the strength of its voluntary organisations and associations. Most quantitative studies show a clear positive correlation between levels of income and levels of trust. Greece became a high-income country relatively recently. It is one of just 13 states worldwide that managed in a little more than a generation to escape the so-called ‘middle-income trap’ and become ‘highly developed’ countries (The Economist, 2012). The rapid pace of economic change may well be a problem. Indeed, the fact that the Greek economy grew quickly from the 1960s onwards may mean that social transformations – which are usually more gradual – have remained incomplete. Moreover, Greece’s income per capita never reached the levels of its northern EU partners. Since there is a strong and well-documented correlation between levels of income and levels of interpersonal trust, it is rational to expect lower levels of trust in Greece in comparison to richer countries. Data seems to confirm this. However, the correlation is not perfect. There are huge differences in levels of interpersonal trust between countries with similar household incomes. For, example Spain and Greece had similar household income levels in the mid-2000s, but the percentage of people expressing high levels of trust in others differed spectacularly (62% in Spain compared with 40% in Greece in 2008) (OECD, 2011, p. 93). Furthermore, there are huge differences in what the OECD (2011) terms ‘prosocial behaviour’ (in fact this is based on the same data as the Gallup World Poll that is used by the Global Giving Index). Here there are huge differences between Greece and countries with similar levels of income. Mexico and Poland which have an average household income less than half that of Greece exhibit percentages of pro-social behaviour (money and time devoted to charitable causes) that are almost three times higher (OECD, 2011, p. 95). Consequently, we need to seek other explanations. Some analysts have paid attention to the dirigistic nature of Greek capitalism. According to Legg and Roberts (1997), the dominant role of the state in the Greek economy has turned politics primarily into a struggle for office. Politicians and their supporters have typically employed an emotional nationalistic rhetoric and avoided genuine issues. In turn this has led to the polarisation of the political debate and diminished the 4 Interview with a British researcher who wants to remain anonymous, Athens 15 September 2013.

14

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

space for the development of civil society organisations. The state became a prize for the party that won power and the government budget became a tool for the reward of loyal supporters. For decades, the Greek political elite were unable to find ways of legitimisation other than clientelistic networks. In turn, this led to the malfunction of institutions. Meritocracy was the exception in a spoils system that rewarded the party cadres and led to discontinuous public policies. Clientelistic networks undermined interpersonal trust and subverted all social contacts beyond immediate kin, neighbours and community members. The state dominance explanation is linked to the party dominance argument. For many analysts, the most important factor negatively affecting the strength of civil society in Greece is the dominant role of political parties. Throughout the postjunta period, trade unions, student associations and even cultural organisations were affiliated with a political party. Mouzelis and Pagoulatos (2005) have claimed that Greek civil society is the victim of ‘partitocracy’, that is of parties ‘colonising’ the associational sphere. The Civicus survey also follows the same line, arguing that political parties have ‘absorbed’ social demands and aspirations in a way that no civil society organisation could match. The authors of the survey persuasively argue that Greek parties were so successful in mobilising citizens that even civil society organisations campaigning for global disarmament and peace in the 1980s were highly dependent on them for personnel, infrastructure and other resources (Sotiropoulos and Karamagioli, 2006). Both the ‘state-dominance’ and the ‘partitocracy’ argument are based on Nicos Mouzelis’s much-cited analysis of the emergence of the modern Greek state (Mouzelis, 1995). Mouzelis explains the weakness of Greek civil society as a symptom of the country’s imperfect modernisation – ‘early parliamentarism and late industrialisation’ – that led to the dominance of clientelism and patronage and to the vertical, rather than horizontal, incorporation of the social spectrum into politics. Another factor that may explain the weakness of Greek civil society is religion and more specifically the different – in comparison to the West – role of the Church and its relations with the state. Bailer et al. (2013) have found that an important predictor of a strong civil society is religious fragmentation. Although they argue that it is hard to find a convincing explanation for this finding, they claim that one reason could be that ‘religious groups are highly effective in mobilizing civil societal action and that in religiously heterogeneous societies competition could increase such mobilization’ (Bailer et al., 2013, p. 307). Greece is religiously homogeneous (religious minorities represent no more than 4–5% of the population). The competition motive simply does not exist. In addition, the Greek law prohibited ‘proselytism’ (conversion) for decades and even required that the building of a temple of another religion required the ‘permission’ of the local Greek Orthodox bishop! Moreover, the Greek Orthodox Church is traditionally organised as a national/ ethnic-based church. The Greek state was successful in reducing the church’s

Greek Civil Society

15

autonomy by offering the clergy secured state salaries and making it part of the state administrative apparatus (Danopoulos, 2004, p. 48). In short, the Greek state ‘nationalised’ religion. This ‘nationalisation’ of religion may well help to explain the weakness of Greek civil society. With secured status and funding and a clear role, the Greek Orthodox Church was not obliged to create ‘parallel’ institutions (religious schools and associations) to safeguard its position. In sharp contrast to Catholic countries, the ‘nationalisation’ of the Greek Orthodox Church acted as a disincentive for civic engagement. Indeed, Greek Orthodox parishes did undertake philanthropic initiatives, but the resources devoted – though important compared to non-religious organisations – were small in comparison to, say, the Catholic Church or the Protestant Churches in other European countries. There is no doubt that state formation and the evolution of state-society relations have shaped the attitudes and orientations of modern Greeks. The semi-authoritarian past of Greece’s political institutions for much of the 20th century was also not conducive to civil society growth. And the Greek junta strongly discouraged civic engagement with political demands. The latter seems particularly important since the rise of the activism of the feminist, student, peace and environmental movements in the West grew spectacularly at about the same era (late 1960s and early 1970s). However, for other analysts it is also quite fruitful to look at the long durée and go back to the pre-modern era. Social relations developed in the Ottoman Empire may not only explain the weakness of Greek civil society but also the weak performance of civil societies throughout southeast Europe – irrespective of post-independence experiences, regime type or level of development. The Ottoman elite were authoritarian and predatory. In the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 92–3): the Ottoman state was absolutist, with the Sultan accountable to few and sharing power with none. The economic institutions the Ottomans imposed were highly extractive. There was no private property in land, which all formally belonged to the state …

The Ottoman state was unrepresentative and unfair: it offered little in return of heavy taxation. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), the Ottoman era heavily and adversely shaped the way the Balkans and the Middle East developed. The Industrial Revolution and the technologies it unleashed did not spread to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Moreover – as there was very little space for challenging the Ottoman authorities – individualistic strategies became the norm. The historians Koliopoulos and Veremis have used Ernest Gellner’s concept of ‘segmentary society’ to describe the pre-modern structures that the Greek state inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The ‘segmentary society’ that was characterised by extreme familism, clans and splinter groups acted as an impediment to modernisation. According to the two authors, this reactionary part of Greek society constantly militated against development and westernisation for much of the 20th century (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2010, p. 190).

16

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Comparative studies could shed some light to the question of why Greek civil society remained weak. One observer argues that there is a ‘Mediterranean pattern’ and that Spain, Portugal and Greece have only recently acquired a nonprofit sector ‘because of the restriction or even prohibition of the freedom of association during the authoritarian or dictatorial regimes that these countries went through’ (Archambault, 2009, p. 10–11). Strangely, there is relatively little research on civil society developments in southern or eastern European countries. In one of the few comparative studies, Sotiropoulos notes that the levels of interpersonal trust in Greece are lower than in most post-communist Southeast European countries (2005, p. 254). This is a strange finding since civil society in former communist countries is generally considered very weak. Thus, it may be that ‘historical explanations’ are not enough. Maybe the answer to the question on Greek civil society weakness is related less to ‘our history is our destiny’ and more to contemporary developments. Tax incentives may offer an explanation for civil society strength or weakness, in particular in relation to associational density and the size of charities. Tax breaks seem to increase charitable giving. The United States offers by far the most generous tax breaks and has the highest giving as a proportion of GDP (1.67%). A similar relationship is evident in Britain (0.73%) and Australia (0.69%). In contrast, Germany does not offer similarly generous tax exemptions and, as a result, giving is much less (0.22% of the GDP) (Oxford Economics, 2012). The Greek tax system offers limited and rather complex incentives to charitable donations (Dehne et al., 2008). For example, according to the Greek Tax Code (Law 2238/1994, now revised by the Act 4110/2013), there is a 10% reduction of assessed tax, provided that the amount of the donation does not exceed 5% of the total taxable personal income. There is also a more generous treatment of donations to the state, the Church (in particular the Athos Monasteries and the Constantinople Patriarchate) and to cultural institutions, than to NGOs, charities or other civil society organisations. However, one should be careful in reaching easy conclusions. First, tax breaks do not always work: despite the existence of tax incentives, the French give donations that account to just 0.14% of GDP. Secondly, studies have shown that tax rules affect the size and timing of gifts but not the initial decision to give (The Economist, 2012a). Third, tax exemptions for civil society organisations in Greece were, until recently, not the only tax breaks, allowances and deductions available– and as a result failed to give clear signals. Furthermore, the poor functioning of the tax administration in Greece and the lax tax enforcement result in high levels of tax evasion (Kaplanoglou and Rapanos, 2013). This may also mean that much charitable giving is not recorded. Another factor that may explain the low associational density and the weak levels of activism is the lack of civic education. Schools are very important in fostering civic engagement. The 2009 Civic and Citizenship Education Study evaluated civil and citizenship education in the lower-secondary systems of 24 European countries (IEA, 2010). The study showed that Greece is among the countries where civic and citizenship education is offered in the lower secondary

Greek Civil Society

17

school as a specific and compulsory subject (IEA, 2010, p. 35). However it is a badly organised and superficial course focusing on the constitution and state institutions with an almost complete lack of extra-curricular activities. As a result, in the IEA Civic Education Knowledge Index, Greek students scored significantly below both the European and the international average (IEA, 2010, p. 48). Furthermore, Greece is one of two European countries that do not offer training to teachers on civic education (IEA, 2010, p. 41). Finally, the study noted that in Greece less than 10% of school principals cited the promotion of students’ participation in the local community as one of their three most important aims (in the UK the relative figure is over 40%) (IEA, 2010, p. 127). As a result, it could be argued that the lack of proper civic education is a factor that explains low levels of civic engagement in Greece. Civil Society Rising? Most observers of Greek civil society argue that the number and strength of voluntary organisations started to increase from the late 1980s onwards. Among the factors cited is the decline of ‘partitocracy’: the grip of parties somewhat loosened in the second half of the 1980s, leaving some free space for voluntary organisations. Surveys and anecdotal information have identified an upward trend in the number of active volunteers in Greece during the last two decades.5 According to a European Commission survey (2010, p. 8), among the reasons for this trend (which also characterises most EU countries) are an increased awareness of social and environmental concerns. EU funds have provided further incentives for collective action and helped to mobilise citizens. EU financial support for environmental programs was important in promoting public awareness and activism: since the launch of the LIFE programme by the European Commission in 1992 until April 2013, a total of 204 projects worth €269 million have been financed in Greece (European Commission, 2013). LIFE was a great boost to environmental awareness in Greece and helped environmental NGOs to develop their capacity and attract public support (see also Chapter 8). A similar development took place in service-providing NGOs – especially those supporting migrants and refugees. After decades of outward migration, Greece became a destination of migrants in the 1990s. Gradually, migrants created their own associations – usually comprising of co-nationals – and demanded rights and access to citizenship from a reluctant Greek state (Clarke, 2013). Irregular migration continued unabated throughout the last 25 years. At some point (2010), 90% of irregular migrants in the EU arrived first in Greece (McDonough and Tsourdi, 2013, p. 69). In order to share the costs of the reception, integration and voluntary repatriation of refugees and migrants, EU member states agreed in 2000 5 See for example Roumeliotis and Jones (2010).

18

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

to set up a European Refugee Fund (ERF). The ERF, UNHCR bilateral donors and the Greek state funded several NGOs in Greece to run reception centres, offer legal advice and provide social services, especially health or psychological care to asylum seekers (McDonough and Tsourdi, 2013, p. 81; see also Chapter 9). EU funds helped NGOs to mobilise citizens, reach wider communities and offer help to marginalised groups (such as the Roma). However, generous funding also created adverse incentives, blurring the distinction between profit and non-profit activities and between volunteers and professionals. Some NGOs were simply created to win bids. Consultancies presented themselves as NGOs. Many NGOs that started as voluntary associations were transformed into sub-contracting agencies. Clientelistic networks between NGOs and state agencies that managed EU funds undermined the autonomy of civil society and generated public suspicion and mistrust in their work. A number of scandals led to negative publicity: NGOs were considered as ‘lamogia’, meaning tricksters. As NGOs fiercely competed to win contracts for all sorts of projects, cooperation among them became difficult. Non-profits ended up accusing each other as non-reliable, useless or ‘dirty’ – in fact confirming the negative media reporting. Contingency factors also played a role in promoting citizen mobilisation and volunteering. The 2004 Olympic Games were a great boost for volunteerism (45,000 volunteers were mobilised) with long-term effects – especially for the sport sector.6 Natural disasters also played a role. In the early autumn 1999, an earthquake struck western Athens. Almost immediately a vast number of associations, NGOs, foundations and private businesses rushed in to offer money, food, clothes and also health care and psychological support to the victims. And in July 2007, in response to a forest wild fire which consumed a large part of the Mt Parnitha National Park, close to Athens, thousands of Athenians took part in an unprecedented demonstration, asking for protective measures and tougher legislation (Botetzagias, 2011). Some saw in the demonstration a rising environmental civil society, an indication of rising post-material values and growing mistrust of state institutions (Botetzagias and Karamichas, 2009). However, Greek environmental grassroots mobilisation and associations continued to be dominated by Not-In-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) movements (such as mobilisations against waste-disposal sites). Thus, other analysts were far more sceptical, arguing that these street protests should not be overestimated and should not be regarded as evidence of rising political mobilisation (Tsaliki, 2010). These analysts argued that on the contrary, they should be considered as ‘activist pyrotechnics’, acts of limited political significance that are facilitated and ‘sexed-up’ by new information and communication technologies such as e-mails, SMS and internet-based networks like Facebook and Twitter. According to this view, a supporting and contextual environment to promote and, above all, sustain citizen activism is missing. 6 Though it should be noted that there were some fringe benefits for volunteers. Group leaders received a ‘compensation’ and army conscripts were granted a 20-day leave.

Greek Civil Society

19

The debate became more intense in relation to the December 2008 events, after the fatal shooting of a 15-year-old boy by a policeman in central Athens. The civil unrest that followed and spread across Greece for more than a week was so massive and violent that some observers even talked of an ‘uprising’. Most commentators claimed that technology (mobile phones and the internet) played a crucial role in the young people’s mobilisation. SMS, Facebook and Twitter were credited as ‘facilitators’ of engagement and mobilisation. According to a recent Eurobarometer survey, Greece has the lowest percentage of household internet connectivity in the European Union: 49% of the households do not have access to the Web (the EU average is 32%) (Eurobarometer, 2013). In addition, 34.4% of the respondents in the recent survey have never used a personal computer and 36.3% have never accessed the Web. This may explain why youth protests in Greece have failed to mobilise larger segments of the population outside the major urban centres. Recent research on Greece has confirmed that technology is not by itself an important motivating factor: ‘online activity’ depends on ‘offline experiences’ (Afouxenidis, 2014). Although there was much reporting on the role of social media in the mobilisation of the youth, there was little agreement on the causes of the unrest. Police brutality was the obvious cause, but behind that many saw wider developments such as high youth unemployment and the legitimacy crisis of the Greek political system. Others focused on more structural factors, such as the rise of post-materialistic values in Greek society. Yannis Theocharis, for example, has analysed how postmaterialism influences online and offline political activity and indicated that young Greeks are disinterested in traditional forms of political participation – i.e. joining a political party – and are more interested in participating in political protests (Theocharis, 2011). Indeed, street politics have a long tradition in Greece. John Karamichas has offered a ‘memetic explanation’, noting a ‘self-reproducing, culturally legitimised pattern of youth rebellion in Greece’ that goes back to the student struggle against the military junta – the Polytechnion uprising that is marked by a yearly march to the American embassy (Karamichas, 2009). The Impact of the Crisis Poverty levels, unemployment rates and homelessness have increased sharply as Greece’s economic crisis worsened, leaving the country’s social welfare system struggling to cope. Family support networks came under increasing strain. The crisis hit hard NGOs, as public funding substantially decreased or even ceased altogether. From several respects this was a welcome development. For the first time, radical civil society voices criticised official rhetoric about deserving and non-deserving victims, brought to public scrutiny the lives of marginalised groups and illegal migrants and revealed hidden exclusions. The economic crisis acted as a motivating factor for civic engagement, political participation and associational

20

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

growth. Many new NGOs, civil society organisations and grassroots movements appeared and old ones reported an increase in volunteers.7 Several observers noted a spectacular rise in informal networks, grassroots movements and support networks with cooperatives, social groceries and solidarity bazaars. Some have enthusiastically predicted that an ‘alternative, parallel’ economy is in the making (Pantazidou, 2013). However, many people involved in civil society activism did not share this view. The conclusion from a number of interviews with staff of service-providing NGOs conducted by the author in 2012–2013, is that there is a clearly discernible increase in initiatives and activities in urban areas but it is neither widespread nor impressive and – above all – neither linear nor sustainable. Initiatives are shortlived and activism is related to specific events or projects. After all, as the crisis has reduced incomes by 25–30% and as unemployment rates reached unprecedented levels, the rise of post-materialistic values, which helped to create the quality-oflife movements of the past, has been reversed. As families struggle to survive, material priorities become more and more important and much less time and money is left for philanthropic and ‘social solidarity’ activities. There have been unprecedented political mobilisations and activity since the crisis began. The Greek Ministry of Public Order recorded 20,210 protests and rallies of various sizes between 8th May 2010 (the day the country agreed to its first bailout) and 28th March 2014 (almost one third of them in the greater Athens area) (Kathimerini, 2014). However, strikes, demonstrations and protests were largely organised by political parties and reached a peak in 2011. It is not clear if the subsequent decline is a result of fatigue and of people adopting more individualistic strategies for survival or whether it reflects changing tactics of political parties. Within the last decade, there has been an important change in strategy of the Greek Left, a change that seems to have significant consequences for the development of Greek civil society (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, 2013). By the mid2000s, both the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and SYRIZA, faced with the erosion of their electoral support, made a ‘turn towards civil society’. Indeed, their tactics were quite different, largely reflecting their distinct ideological orientations and organisational legacies. But they had the same objective: to increase their 7 Interviews conducted by the author with NGO staff in autumn 2012. Members of the following organisations were interviewed: Arsis, Artos-Drassi, Doctors of the World, Grammi Zois, Diktyo Neon Ellados, Diotima, Edra, Eimai Edo, Elix, Helliniko Symvoulio gia tous Prosfyges, Iatriki Paremvassi, Institouto Odikis Asfaleias, Caritas Athinas, Metadrassi, Oikoumeniko Programma Prosfygon, Polites se Drassi, Proteas, Forum Metanaston kai Prosfygon, Hamogelo tou Paidiou, Hatzipatereio Idryma and WWF Greece. Particular thanks to Tzanetos Antypas, General Director of the NGO Praksis, Veronika Paikou from Lalibela and staff from Stavros Niarchos Foundation and Bodossaki Foundation for sharing with the author several ideas and much information but also for introducing him to several organisations throughout Greece.

Greek Civil Society

21

influence and reach new constituencies. KKE decided to form its own ‘trade union front’ (PAME). SYRIZA, which (under the name SYN) had previously made a consistent effort to approach the emerging environmental movement, in 2001 established a political and electoral alliance with a host of smaller parties, groups and networks of the extra-parliamentary Left. This marked a significant change of strategy that initially did not seem to gain electoral support. However, since 2009, with the economic crisis leading to confrontational forms of activism, SYRIZA has created linkages with two new social protest movements that made their presence strongly felt in urban areas. The first was the ‘Won’t Pay’ movement (which refused to pay tolls on the country’s highways) and the second the ‘Indignant’ movement which occupied central squares in Athens and other Greek cities. SYRIZA offered support to these movements in an attempt to create an impression that it was the ‘vanguard’ of a range of social and political forces (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, 2013, pp. 96–7). It also offered discreet support to two NIMBY protests (against a waste-disposal site in Keratea and against a gold mining investment in Skouries, Khalkidiki) that made headlines. Thus, SYRIZA was successful in becoming the favoured party of any kind of activism with an anti-establishment political message. SYRIZA sympathisers are now active in a variety of civil society initiatives. The party sees them as natural allies. This transformation in strategy was also evident in the tactics of mainstream parties like PASOK and – to a lesser extent – New Democracy Party. Facing public indifference towards party membership, and unable to imitate the large party rallies of the 1990s, Greece’s traditionally dominant parties tried to build new constituencies through organised civil society. They approached civil society organisations and promoted well-known NGO activists to the parliament and prestigious governmental positions. In parallel, ambitious politicians endorsed NGO causes and initiatives. For example as early as the late 1990s, George Papandreou created a new agency in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs exclusively devoted to funding Greek NGO projects in less developed countries. And New Democracy Party in 2007 created the organisation ‘Ergo Politon’ under the aegis of the Ministry of Culture with the specific aim of promoting volunteerism and supporting NGOs. Civil society organisations were hit hard by the economic crisis. State funding has almost stopped. NGOs and philanthropic foundations told the author about their inability to raise funds from the wider public, and, though they also reported a rise in the number of volunteers, they were ready to acknowledge that many of them were job-seekers looking for work experience or opportunities.8 Philanthropic activities continued to be dominated by the local government and the Church. For example, interviewees with the NGOs Boroume, Artos-Drassi and the Greek Food Bank told the author that the main actors in this crucial sector are municipalities

8 Interviews in Athens and Thessaloniki, 20–24 September 2013 and 22–26 February 2014.

22

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

and Church parishes (initiatives by individual priests) – not NGOs or other civil society organisations.9 An important development is that the relative awakening of (mainly left-wing) activism is leading to a clear segregation between civil society actors. The Greek Orthodox Church, despite being a much less active actor relative to its size than the Catholic Church in Italy or Spain, has dominated philanthropic initiatives in Greece for decades, in fact creating a widely-held perception (especially in leftwing circles) that philanthropy is a ‘conservative’ activity. Even today, a significant proportion of philanthropic activities are run by Orthodox congregations and charities. The Greek Orthodox Church claims to feed more than 250,000 people every day (Henley, 2012) – probably a highly inflated figure. On the other hand, a significant part of the newly-born non-profit sector is linked to left-wing political parties, labour unions, migrant associations and cooperative networks. As the Greek Orthodox Church remains ‘discursively distant’ from political discussions related to the crisis, largely refusing to criticise local and foreign elites or castigate policies (Makris and Bekridakis, 2013), the secular and the religious ‘civil society camps’ are almost totally isolated from each other. Consequently, there is very little cooperation between religious and secular non-profits and there are indications of a growing antagonism and competition between them for funds and influence. Beneficiaries are also split between the two factions. The ‘for Greeks only’ philanthropic activities of the radical neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn (Chryssi Avgi), have made matters worse – leading to the further fragmentation of the emergent service-providing civil society. In short, the economic crisis and relevant political developments did help to mobilise citizens and gave birth to several new initiatives but at the same time it also undermined old initiatives due to a change in citizen priorities and significant reductions in state funding. Trust in civil society organisations remained at levels far below the EU average. According to Eurobarometer (2013a), 52% of Greek respondents (the second highest percentage in the EU) claimed that European citizens do not need Non-Governmental Organisations and only 56% (the second lowest percentage) claimed that they believe that NGOs can influence national decision-making. Moreover, Greek respondents showed among the lowest levels of trust for these organisations (with professional associations being an exception) and membership of associations in Greece remained much below average EU levels. Many academics have persuasively emphasised the supportive role of the state in strengthening civil society. Rather than considering civil society in opposition to the state, a strong, active and supportive state can greatly encourage the development of a vibrant civil society. Bailer et al. (2013), based on data from the Civicus Civil Society Index, have argued that the main predictor of a strong civil society is well-functioning political institutions. Better-governed states, credible, accountable and transparent politicians and civil servants are conducive to the 9 Interviews in Athens, September 2013.

Greek Civil Society

23

creation of a vibrant civil society. Ultimately, trust in political institutions is a prerequisite of interpersonal trust. Confidence in national institutions in Greece is much lower than the OECD average (OECD, 2011, p. 93) and trust in non-state institutions is also low. For example, trust in the media (radio, TV and press) is among the lowest in the EU (Eurobarometer, 2012). In many respects, Greek civil society cannot become strong while the Greek state is a ‘lame Leviathan’, a state unable to collect taxes and offer reliable services. After all, there is little evidence of a reverse causality: civil society is not a remedy for poor governance. Civil societies cannot build states. Conclusions This chapter has reviewed the evidence that proves beyond any reasonable doubt that civil society in Greece is weak in comparison to other European countries. It has also examined a number of causes that may explain this weakness and argued that well-cited explanations (such as a history of adverse state formation, semiauthoritarian governance, partitocracy and clientelism) should be re-examined, by taking into account other factors, largely neglected by researchers. The latter include church-state relations, weak tax incentives for charitable giving and a lack of proper civic education in public schools. There is a lot of evidence that organised civil society in Greece has grown in the last two decades. The numbers of NGOs, volunteers and civic activity have all increased – though this growth was gradual and did not alter the general picture of weakness. The rise of post-materialistic values, as well as EU and state funding, explain this growth. The economic crisis seems to have at the same time both encouraged and discouraged citizen participation in associations and activism. A variety of organisations providing social services, solidarity networks and social movements have been born within the last six years. However, at the same time, older organisations have been undermined due to changes in citizen priorities and reductions in public funding. It is probably too early to discern either the extent and depth or the positive or negative character of the impact. However, what is clear is that new forms of activism and engagement, neither linked to nor dependent on the state, are on the rise. There is – probably for the first time – a discernible civil society autonomous from traditional political authority (ministries, political parties etc.). A large part of it is virtual (Internet), ideological (mainly left-wing), secular, progressive – especially relating to human rights issues – and young in terms of membership (students, unemployed and professionals in their late 20s and 30s). To sum up, explanations that focus on historical developments to explain the weakness of Greek civil society are in a sense problematic, because their implicit message is that a nation’s fate is written in its past: that very little can be done to strengthen civic engagement, political participation and social activism. To be fair, none of the authors that emphasise historical factors claim that very little can be

24

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

done. Quite the contrary: they argue that if we change Greek institutions a lot can be done to strengthen civil society in Greece. However, it is our belief that if our research focus shifts from historical and structural explanations to public policy choices (such as the nature of Church-state relations, the availability of funding for NGOs, the weak tax incentives for charitable giving and the relative lack of civic education in public schools), then both policy-makers and activists will have a roadmap for how to strengthen civil society, should they wish to do so. This is not only true for Greece but for all countries in which civil society indicators are weak. References Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A., 2012. Why Nations Fail. New York: Crown Publishers. Afouxenidis, A., 2014. Social media and political participation: An investigation of small scale activism in Greece. Advances in Applied Sociology, 4(1), pp. 1–4. Archambault, E., 2009. The third sector in Europe: Does it exhibit a converging movement? In: B. Enjolras and K.H. Sivesind (eds) Civil Society in Comparative Perspective. London: Emerald, pp. 3–24. Bailer, T.B., Bodenstein, T. and Heinrich, V.F., 2013. Explaining the strength of civil society: Evidence from cross-sectional data. International Political Science Review, 34(3), pp. 289–309. Botetzagias, I., 2011. Green politics in Greece at the time of fiscal crisis. In: L. Leonard and I. Botetzagias (eds) Advances in Ecopolitics. Vol. 8. London: Emerald, pp. 161–79. Botetzagias, I. and Karamichas, J., 2009. Grassroots mobilizations against waste disposal sites in Greece. Environmental Politics, 18(6), pp. 939–59. Charities Aid Foundation, 2013. World Giving Index 2013: A Global View of Giving Trends. [online] Available at: https://www.cafonline.org/PDF/ WorldGivingIndex2013_1374AWEB.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2014]. Clarke, J., 2013. Transnational actors in national contexts: Migrant organizations in Greece in comparative perspective. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 13(2), pp. 281–302. Danopoulos, C.P., 2004. Religion, civil society, and democracy in Orthodox Greece. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 6(1), pp. 41–55. Dehne, A., Friedrich, P., Woon Nam, C. and Parsche, R., 2008. Taxation of nonprofit associations in an international comparison. Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 37(4), pp. 700–29. Douzinas, C., 2013. Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis. London: Polity Press. Eurobarometer, 2012. Media Use in the European Union. Standard Eurobarometer No. 76 [online] Available at: [Accessed 1 October 2014]. Eurobarometer, 2013. E-communications Household Survey, Special Eurobarometer No. 396 [online] Available at: < http://ec.europa.eu/digital-

Greek Civil Society

25

agenda/en/news/special-eurobarometer-396-e-communications-householdsurvey> [Accessed 1 October 2014]. Eurobarometer, 2013a. Europeans’ Engagement in Participatory Democracy. Flash Eurobarometer No 373 [online] Available at: [Accessed 1 October 2014]. European Commission, 2010. Volunteering in the European Union. Final Report submitted by GHK, 17 February [online] http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/ doc1018_en.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2014]. European Commission, 2013. LIFE. Greece: A Country Overview, 12 April, http:// ec.europa.eu/environment/life/countries/documents/greece_en_jun13.pdf Featherstone, K., 2011. The Greek sovereign debt crisis and EMU: A failing state in a skewed regime. Journal of Common Market Studies, 49 (2), pp. 193–217. Hadjiyanni, A., 2010. On social cohesion in Greece. The Tocqueville Review, XXXI(1), pp. 7–40. Henley, J., 2012. Greece on the breadline. A series of articles published in The Guardian on 11, 13 and 18 March. Hoskins, B.L. and Mascherini, M., 2009. Measuring active citizenship through the development of a composite indicator. Social Indicators Research, 90(3), pp. 459–88. IEA (International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement), 2010. Civic Knowledge, Attitudes and Engagement Among Lower-Secondary Students in 24 European Countries. International Civil and Citizenship Education Study 2009. European Report. [online] Available at: [Accessed 1 October 2014]. Kaplanoglou, G. and Rapanos, V.T., 2013. Tax and trust: The fiscal crisis in Greece. South European Society and Politics, 18(3), pp. 283–304. Kathimerini, 2014. More than 20,000 protests since 2010 bailout. Kathimerini [online] 26 April 2014. Available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_ articles_wsite1_1_24/04/2014_539198 [Accessed 1 October 2014]. Karamichas, J., 2009. The December 2008 riots in Greece. Social Movement Studies, 8(3), pp. 289–93. Koliopoulos, J.C. and Veremis, T., 2010. Modern Greece: A History Since 1821. London: Wiley-Blackwell. Legg, K.R. and Roberts J.M., 1997. Modern Greece: A Civilization on the Periphery. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Lyberaki, A. and Tinios P., 2014. The informal welfare state and the family: Invisible actors in the Greek drama. Political Studies Review, 12, pp. 193–208. Makris, G. and Bekridakis, D., 2013. The Greek Orthodox Church and the economic crisis since 2009. The International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 13(2), pp. 111–32. Matsaganis, M., 2012. Social policy in hard times: The case of Greece. Critical Social Policy, 32(3), pp. 406–21.

26

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Matsaganis, M., 2014. The catastrophic Greek crisis. Current History, 113(761), p. 110. McDonough, P. and Tsourdi, E., 2013. The ‘other’ Greek crisis: Asylum and EU solidarity. Refugee Studies Quarterly, 31(4), pp. 67–100. Mouzelis, N., 1995. Modernity, late development and civil society. In: J.A. Hall (ed.) Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 224–49. Mouzelis, N. and Pagoulatos G., Civil society and citizenship in post-war Greece. In: Birtek, F. and Dragonas, T. eds, Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey. London, Routledge, pp. 87–103. OECD, 2011. Society at a Glance: OECD Social Indicators. Paris: OECD Publishing [online] Available at: [Accessed 1 October 2014]. OECD (2014) Society at a Glance 2014: OECD Social Indicators, Paris: OECD Publishing. Oxford Economics, 2012. The Potential Impact of a Cap on Charity Tax Relief. [online] Available at: [Accessed 1 October 2014]. Pantazidou, M., 2013. Treading new ground: A changing moment for citizen action in Greece. Development in Practice, 23(5&6), pp. 755–70. Roumeliotis, S. and Jones, N., 2010. Volunteerism in the Context of the Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations in Greece. International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, 4(12), pp. 27–34. Sotiropoulos, D.A., 2004. Formal Weakness and Informal Strength: Civil Society in Contemporary Greece. Discussion Paper No. 16, February. London: The Hellenic Observatory/The European Institute/The London School of Economics and Political Science. Sotiropoulos, D.A., 2005. Positive and negative social capital and the uneven development of civil society in Southeastern Europe. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 5(2), pp. 243–56. Sotiropoulos, D. and Karamagioli, E., 2006. Greek Civil Society: The Long Road to Maturity. CIVICUS – Civil Society Index Shortened Assessment Tool, Report for the Case of Greece. [online] Available at: [Accessed 1 October 2014]. The Economist, 2012. The Middle Income-Trap. The Economist [online] 27 May. Available at: < http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/03/ focus-3> [Accessed 1 October 2014]. The Economist, 2012a. Charity and taxation: Sweetened charity. The Economist [online] 6 June. Available at: < http://www.economist.com/node/21556570> [Accessed 1 October 2014]. Theocharis, Y., 2011. Young people, political participation and online postmaterialism in Greece. New Media & Society, 13(2), pp. 203–23.

Greek Civil Society

27

Tsakatika, M. and Eleftheriou, C. 2013. The radical left’s turn towards civil society in Greece: One strategy, two paths. South European Society and Politics, 18(1), pp. 81–99. Tsaliki, L., 2010. Technologies of political mobilization and civil society in Greece. The Wildfires of Summer 2007. Convergence, 16(2), pp. 151–61.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 3

Social Capital Levels in Greece in Times of Crisis Nikoleta Jones, Marina Proikaki and Spyridon Roumeliotis

Introduction Several scholars have analysed the role of social capital in the economic development of a country (Miller and Rivera, 2007; Wallimann, 2014; Dudley, 1994; Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik, 2005; Knack and Keefer, 1997). Social capital is a component that enables a community to maintain its well-being, even in conditions of economic recession (Verick, 2009; Dudley, 1994; Putnam et al., 1993). It has also been claimed that high levels of social capital promote economic stability and equality alongside high levels of volunteerism (Liu and Besser, 2003; Casey and Christ, 2005; Helliwell et al., 2014). Apart from the influence of social capital on the economic development of a country, it is also interesting to observe how social capital changes in times of financial crisis. Several authors have revealed the significant impacts of the current recession in Greece (Zavras et al., 2013; Milios and Sotiropoulos, 2010; Verick, 2009). These concern a variety of impacts in the context of the economy, society and the environment (Matsaganis and Leventi, 2011; Declerq et al., 2011; Kouretas and Vlamis, 2010; Mazurek and Mielcova, 2013). In this chapter we will explore how the recent recession has affected the social structure of the Greek community and specifically the social capital levels of the country. A main question is how levels of trust and networks change as a reaction to a recession and whether these changes facilitate the ability of communities to deal with difficult financial times. We will try to answer this question by looking at recent data from Greece referring to elements of social capital. In the next section, we will briefly explain the term social capital and then analyse the main characteristics of the Greek political culture which are linked to social capital issues. We will then present data for social capital in Greece, divided into two main periods, before and after 2008. In the final part of the chapter, we will highlight the main changes in social capital levels and we will discuss the role of the state-citizen relationship in the changing levels of social capital in Greece.

30

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Explaining the Term ‘Social Capital’ One of the most important scholars analysing social capital for individuals and communities is James Coleman (1990). He emphasised networks as a fundamental element of social capital. Social networks are regarded as a structural feature of social capital (Uphoff, 1998; Grootaert and Bastelaer, 2002; Putnam, 1998) and refer to the involvement of citizens in both formal and informal social groups (Putnam, 1998). Informal groups include non-organised connections such as networks of family and friends. On the other hand, formal groups refer to the involvement of individuals in organised collectivities, such as NGOs. Due to the importance of social networks in the development of civil society, a consideration of social networks is included in several studies measuring social capital (e.g. Putnam, 2000; Narayan and Cassidy, 2001). The involvement in social networks provides individuals with an opportunity to improve their lives and well-being. This is because networks are associations of individuals that often share a common interest or unite a common body (Fischer et al., 2014; Garcia and Chavez, 2014).They also create links between different actors that are characterised by reciprocity and build on interpersonal communication and exchange (Siisiainen, 2000; Fischer et al., 2014; Piracha et al., 2014). Social capital through social networking may be converted into economic development. Among other functions, networks in society are the source of social ties that create solidarity and high levels of trust among citizens (Nandan and Ciccotosto, 2014). Furthermore, through strong social networks, the costs of transactions and dissemination of information can be significantly reduced (Cote and Healy, 2001). Regarding the link between social trust and economic development, the study of Knack and Keefer (1997) presents some initial findings. According to these authors, countries with higher levels of trust have also a more equal distribution of income (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Further studies have shown that when social trust is at a high level, the cost of the labour market decreases (Bjornskov, 2009). From an instrumental point of view, trust matters for the economy as it affects exchange relations, risk management and income inequalities (Lindstrom, 2014; Carpiano and Fitterer, 2014). A lack of social trust can prevent the implementation of required measures of economic performance, as they are not perceived as credible and accepted from the citizens (Gyorffy, 2013). However, social networks can also have a different important role especially in time of crisis. They can result in collective activities which support people in need, such as food banks, homeless support and daycare services (Helbing, 2013). Thus, communities with dense networks and strong civic associations may be able to deal more effectively with poverty issues, marginalisation and vulnerability (Narayan, 1997; Varshney, 2000; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Another important element of social capital is social trust (Coleman, 1990) which is closely linked with social networks (Putnam, 2000; Lindstrom, 2014; Carpiano and Fitterer, 2014). Social trust is one of the most commonly measured indicators of social capital. It refers to the level of trust and trustworthiness

Social Capital Levels in Greece in Times of Crisis

31

which is developed between citizens. Trust can be significantly promoted through networks and is associated with different forms of social engagement such as volunteerism (Putnam, 2000; Carpiano and Fitterer, 2014). High levels of social trust and reciprocity are able to give an effective solution to conflicts that are inherent in a governance system, and are related to polycentric approaches (Henry and Dietz, 2011; Jones et al., 2014). As Putnam states, social trust is embodied in individual relationships and establishes trustworthiness that can improve the level of efficiency in a society by facilitating coordinated actions (Putnam, 1993, p. 167). Social trust is often categorised in two types; one is linked with generalised trust and the other with particularised trust (Molm et al., 2000). The former refers to the level of trust in other people in general and the latter to the level of trust in specific social groups. Both types of trust are very important for the collective activities of a community. Social trust can be considered an element through which a society builds confidence to invest in collective or group activities (Pretty and Ward, 2001). Hence, high social trust co-exists with high levels of honesty in a community and assists in the prevention of corruption (Svendsen and Bjornskov, 2007). Furthermore, communities with high social trust can limit opportunistic actions and resolve ongoing collective issues (Grootaert and Bastelaer, 2002). A final important indicator of social capital is institutional trust. This refers to the level of trust towards institutions that exist in a community. These may include the level of trust in the national government, specific ministries and in general any organisations involved in the management of public issues which are fundamental for the functioning of communities. This type of trust is an important parameter of social capital as it represents to a significant extent how well the networks between citizens and the state work. For example, in communities with high levels of institutional trust, there is a higher level of acceptance of public policies, as citizens consider that proposed public policies will be effective (Cvetkovich and Winter, 2003). Furthermore, citizens tend to be more receptive of information coming from certain actors if the level of trust is higher (Jones, 2010). Institutional trust has also been linked to policy implementation and policy outcome. It has a significant impact on monitoring and control, in terms of conflict management and in negotiation procedures (McEvily et al., 2003; Warren et al., 2014). Thus, it is linked with the level of compliance with regulations of a community and also with the level of acceptance for proposed public policies (Jones, 2010). It should be noted that this type of trust is characterised by a top-down policy approach and is not depended on horizontal relations but on institutional performance. In this context, institutional trust is directly correlated with indicators like the GDP, the level of unemployment, the rate of inflation and corruption indexes (Mishler and Rose, 1998). For example, some scholars have pointed out that the state’s capacity to collect taxes is directly related to citizens’ trust towards the government (Kuokstis, 2012). This is because citizens are expected to accept a certain level of social services in return for their taxes (Uslaner, 2007).

32

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Social Capital in Greece Before exploring the impact of the current recession on social capital levels in Greece, it is important to analyse the general context in which social capital has been developed in Greece over the past decades. Several scholars have highlighted the low levels of social capital in Greece, along with the weak civil society and centralised state (Patra, 2012; Bezruchka, 2009; Kazemipur, 2006; Sotiris, 2010). Greece has also been characterised in the literature as a country with strong informal networks, in particular family networks (Paraskevopoulos, 2006; see also Chapter 4). Greek civil society, in particular, has been considered to have had an idiosyncratic development through the years (Mouzelis, 1987, 1995; Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 2003; Sotiropoulos, 2004; Tsoukalas, 1987; Mavrogordatos, 1988; Diamandouros, 1997, p. 64). This has been linked to the socio-political conditions which have developed since the establishment of the Modern Greek state, and are linked mainly with an irregular process of political integration of citizens (see Mouzelis, 1987; Tsoukalas 1987; Mavrogordatos, 1988), in the context of the broader process of democratisation of Greek society following the fall of the Greek Junta in 1974. This process is related to the gradual recognition of the independent role of labour and professional organisations and with the construction of a constitutional change, strengthening the democratic process in both civil and political society (Alivizatos, 1993; Tsoukalas and Panagiotopoulou, 1992). Two additional characteristics of Greece are the dominant role of political parties, especially in past decades, and the highly interventionist and centralised state (Tsoukalas, 1987; Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 2003; Matsas, 2013). The development of the centralised state was historically based on patron-client relationships between state actors and citizens. (Diamandouros, 1997, p. 61; Knight, 2013; Matsas, 2013). By the 1980s, statism was regarded as a major issue, obstructing significant structural changes in both the public and the private sector (Lavdas and Papadakis, 2003; Konstantinidis and Xezonakis, 2013). It is interesting that even during the 80s, when an increase in the levels of political participation was witnessed, the patron-state continued to exist and clientelistic networks flourished (Kairidis, 1997; Skouras and Christodoulakis, 2014; Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 2003). Measuring Changes of Social Capital in Greece Data Used in the Analysis In order to analyse the change of social capital levels in Greece, we will focus on three main indicators of social capital: social trust, institutional trust and social networks. The data used in the analysis were obtained from a series of Eurobarometer surveys (up until 2013) (European Commission, 2013) and four rounds of the European Social Survey in which Greece participated (ESS Rounds

Social Capital Levels in Greece in Times of Crisis

33

1, 2, 4, 5 conducted respectively in 2002, 2004, 2008 and 2010). All of these studies were conducted on a national level with a representative sample from all Greek regions. Additionally, a comparison of Greece with several European countries (up to 2008) is presented. Finally, data from a study conducted in 2011 by the University of the Aegean (UAEGEAN) is also used. We should note that the latter study was not conducted on a national level but rather in six research areas (Thessaloniki, Kavala, Mesologi, Korinthos, Chania and Lesvos). The study was part of a larger research project which explored several socio-environmental issues, including the measurement of social capital elements (Jones et al., 2014). Social Capital in Greece before 2008 Social Trust We will now look at each indicator of social capital separately. In several studies of social capital, social trust is measured through the question of whether ‘Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful’ (e.g. Paxton, 1999; Newton and Norris, 2000; Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005). Nevertheless, several other questions have been used concerning the level of fairness and helpfulness among individuals (e.g. Paxton, 1999; Narayan and Cassidy, 2001). Regarding the levels of social trust in Greece, it is interesting to see the data from the ESS in 2004, which used the question of generalised trust. This was measured on a 10-point Likert scale, with higher scores revealing higher levels of trust. According to this data, in 2004 Greece had one of the lowest levels of generalised trust in Europe, with a mean score of 3.9. Lower levels were presented only in Poland and Portugal. 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Figure 3.1

Social trust levels across Europe (10-point scale)

Source: ESS (2004)

Institutional Trust Another vital component of social capital is trust in certain institutions (e.g. Newton and Norris, 2000; Narayan and Cassidy, 2001), both national (e.g.

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

34

national parliament, police) and international (e.g. European Parliament, the UN). Data on this theme from Greece and other European countries were collected by the ESS in 2004. Here we present the data on the level of trust in the national parliament and the European parliament as these are the main institutions involved with state decisions, especially during the financial crisis. According to this data, it is interesting to observe that Greece had the highest level of trust in the European parliament in 2004 (Figure 3.2). Furthermore, the level of trust in the national parliament was at an average level compared to other countries in Europe. A possible explanation for the relative high levels of trust in Greece is that 2004 was the year that the Olympics were organised in Athens, a fact which had assisted in promoting economic development, reducing unemployment and developing of a feeling of national pride in the country. 7 6 5 4 3

Naonal European

2 1 0

Figure 3.2

Levels of institutional trust in the National and the European Parliaments, across Europe (10-point scale)

Source: ESS (2004)

Social Networks Concerning social networks in Greece, a general assumption in the relevant literature is that formal networks are weak whereas informal networks of family and friends are significantly denser (Lyberaki and Paraskevopoulos, 2002; Christoforou, 2005). According to the first wave of ESS (2002), it is observed that passive participation in formal networks (membership) tends to be in a higher rate than active participation (volunteerism). Specifically, 24.8% of the sample stated that they are a member of at least one from a list of organisations, whereas only 6% had participated in some type of voluntary work. By comparing Greece with other European countries (using the same data), Greece had the second lowest level of membership (after Poland) and the fourth lowest level of volunteering amongst a list of 21 countries.

Social Capital Levels in Greece in Times of Crisis

35

Changes in Social Capital Levels since 2008 Based on the available data, it is apparent that the weakest elements of Greece concerning its stock of social capital were the low levels of social trust and the low level of participation in formal networks. In this section of the chapter we will focus only on Greece and present the most up to date available data for social capital. We should note at this point that there is significant lack of data since 2011 as there has been a reduction of surveys conducted at national level measuring social capital elements. Apart from the results of Eurobarometer surveys and the ESS, we will also present results from the UAEGEAN study. Social Trust We will first look at the levels of social trust. According to the results of the national data of the ESS until 2010, there is a trend of increasing social trust over the past decade. Specifically, in 2002 the average level of social trust was 3.64 (ESS, 2004), in 2004 this was 3.9 (ESS, 2004), in 2008 it was 3.92 (ESS, 2008) and in 2010 social trust had increased to 4.02 (ESS, 2010). In the UAEGEAN study, which was conducted in 2011 and measured social trust in 6 cities of Greece, the level of trust reached approximately the mean score of 5 (in a 10-point Likert scale) which is the highest level of social trust reported in the past 20 years. We should note that, although these measurements may indicate a change in the level of social trust, the two sets of data cannot be considered comparable as they refer to a different sampling frame of the Greek population and sampling size. Social Networks Concerning social networks, there are very limited data available for Greece. By comparing the level of participation in formal social networks in 2002 (ESS, 2002) and the results of the UAEGEAN study in 2011, an increase in the level of volunteerism is observed. In particular, according to the ESS (2002) data, the level of volunteerism in 2002 was 6% and membership in NGOs was at 24.8%. In the UAEGEAN study, volunteerism in some type of NGO was at 24.9% and membership remained at similar levels to the 2002 study (22.3%). Although the two samples are not identical, there appears to be very clear increase in volunteerism. On the other hand, membership in NGOs does not seem to have increased. Institutional Trust A final indicator concerns the level of institutional trust. This is the indicator for which there are the most up to date measurements, as it is included in the standard Eurobarometers (European Commission, 2013). According to the available data up to 2013 (Figure 3.3 and 3.4), there has been a clear decrease in the level of trust, both towards the European Parliament and the National Parliament. This question

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

36 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1

Figure 3.3

Nov-13

Nov-12

May-13

May-12

Nov-11

May-11

Nov-10

Jun-10

Jun-09

Nov-09

Oct-08

Apr-08

Oct-07

May-07

Sep-06

Oct-05

Apr-06

Jun-05

Oct-04

Apr-04

Nov-03

0

Trust in Greece in the European Parliament (%)

Source: Standard Eurobarometers 2003–2013 (European Commission, 2013) 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1

Figure 3.4

1-May

1-Nov

1-May

1-Nov

1-May

1-Jun

1-Nov

1-Jun

1-Oct

1-Apr

1-Oct

1-May

1-Sep

1-Apr

1-Oct

1-Jun

1-Oct

1-Nov

0

Trust in Greece in the National Parliament (%)

Source: Standard Eurobarometers 2003–2013 (European Commission, 2013)

is measured in a dichotomous format and respondents are asked to declare whether they trust the specific institutions or not. For the national government, the lowest levels of trust are presented in 2012 and a small increase is observed in 2013. The very low levels of trust in 2012 can be attributed to the severe impacts of governmental austerity measures for Greek households. The slight increase observed in 2013 cannot be considered significant at the moment. Data over the next five years will show whether attitudes of Greek citizens have started to change towards the government in a positive way.

Social Capital Levels in Greece in Times of Crisis

37

Discussion The present chapter aimed to explore if and how social capital has changed in Greece over the past few years. According to the data presented, we would like to highlight two main issues. First, there has been a significant decrease in the levels of trust towards institutions. Although Greece in general is considered a country with low levels of institutional trust (Jones et al., 2008), this type of trust has decreased even further in the past decade. From the data, it is evident that there is a high level of distrust and dissatisfaction towards political institutions. Thus, it could be claimed that the financial crisis has exacerbated the lack of trust of the public to a significant extent. In this context, some scholars have highlighted the role of low institutional trust and the weak administrative capacity in widening the problem of economic recession in the country (Kroustalli, 2011; Papastamatelou, 2012). The observed decreasing levels of trust towards national and European institutions can be attributed to the impact of the austerity measures which have been imposed on Greek households in the past years. Austerity measures have resulted in an increase of taxes, the reduction of salaries and increased levels of unemployment. These measures are planned to have an effect in the long-term. As a result, Greek citizens are currently experiencing the consequences of these measures but without seeing any benefits. This could be a significant factor contributing to the decreasing levels of trust in Greece. A second issue we would like to highlight is that there is some evidence, according to the 2011 data from the UAEGEAN study, that the level of volunteerism has increased over the past years. This finding is to some extent in accordance with recent studies. Specifically, according to the study of Sotiropoulos and Bourikos (2013), social networks in Greece are a vital tool for providing social assistance or the necessary safety nets for the poor. In various Greek cities, local social movements and informal organisations have developed (see also Chapter 10). These social networks function to some extent as emergency relief mechanisms. They tend to cover the gap in social service provision in multiple sectors, such as health and education, especially for people in need. In this way they represent a shift from the mainstream type of economy, prioritising well-being and resilience as key targets (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos, 2013; Swinden, 2012). Some examples of these new initiatives are health clinics and pharmacies, which provide relevant services for free, educational centers for children for after-school activities, and food banks (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos, 2013). Another positive sign which is linked to the development of new types of social networks is that the levels of social trust do not seem to have changed over the past few years. Social trust in Greece has been traditionally lower that most European countries. This has been linked to the individualistic culture which has been developed since the creation of the modern Greek state. However, it is important that these levels of trust do not seem to have decreased further in this time of crisis. One assumption we can make at this point is that the creation of new social networks has assisted in the maintenance of social trust in Greek communities. This may be because these

38

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

new and emerging social networks have established strong social ties based on relationships of trust between their members. These changes in the social capital levels can be seen from two different angles. From one point of view there seems to be a shift towards more collective action aiming to replace the lack of state services. This is an important change taking into consideration the traditional individualistic character of the Greek society. On the other hand, a question is raised regarding whether this type of social change is a positive change. Should the retreat of the state, leaving space for new social movements, be seen as a positive change? In order to answer this question, significant further research is required, including both up to date quantitative data and also qualitative interviews exploring in-depth changes in the social structure of the society. Apart from the need for social data, we would like to underline that the specific change in the social networks of the country was a forced one and did not result from a gradual transformation of communities through the years. Although the new initiatives through informal networks could be seen as a positive sign of change in the Greek society we consider that the role of the state should remain as a main support mechanism for social services, especially for people in need. This view is based mainly on the fact that a positive change in the socio-political structure of a society needs several years in order to be effective. In the context of the Greek political culture, the shift from a centralised state to a more communitybased framework is a significant one. It is important that the state remains the main support mechanism for the following years for all social services while assisting in the gradual construction of the necessary institutions in order to promote community initiatives. References Alivizatos, N. ed., 1993. The Presidency, Parliament and the Courts in the 1980s in Greece, 1981–88: The Populist Decade. London: Macmillan. Beugelsdijk, S. and Van Schaik, T., 2005. Social capital and growth in European regions: An empirical test. European Journal of Political Economy, 21(3), pp. 301–24. Bezruchka, S., 2009. The effect of economic recession on population health. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 181(5), pp. 281–5. Bjornskov, C., 2009. Social trust and the growth of schooling. Economics of Education Review, 28(2), pp. 249–57. Carpiano, R.M. and Fitterer, L.M., 2014. Questions of trust in health research on social capital: What aspects of personal network social capital do they measure? Social Capital and Medicine, 116(9), pp. 225–34. Casey, T. and Christ, K., 2005. Social capital and economic performance in the American States. Social Science Quarterly, 86(4), pp. 826–45.

Social Capital Levels in Greece in Times of Crisis

39

Christoforou, A., 2005. On the Determinants of Social Capital in Greece Compared to Countries of European Union. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 68.05, np. Coleman, J.S., 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press. Cote, S. and Healy, T., 2001. The Well-being of Nations: The Role of Human and Social Capital. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, np. Cvetkovich, G.T. and Winter, P.L., 2003. Trust and social representations of the management of threatened and endangered species. Environment and Behavior, 35(2), pp. 286–307. Declerq, B., Delarne, E. and O’Haeseleer, W., 2011. Impact of the economic recession on the European power sector’s CO2 emissions. Energy Policy, 39(3), pp. 1677–86. Diamandouros N., 1997. Eλληνική Πολιτική και κοινωνία [Greek politics and society]. In: G.T.Alison, K.Nicolaidis and K.Papazisi (eds) Eλληνικό Παράδοξο. Υπόσχεση και επίδοση [The Greek Paradox, Promise Vs. Performance]. MAQ: The MIT Press, pp. 55–75. Dudley, K., 1994.The End of the Line: Lost Job, New Lives in Post Industrial America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ESS, 2002. European Social Survey Round 1 Data. Data file edition 6.3. Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. Available at: ESS, 2004. European Social Survey Round 2 Data. Data file edition 3.3. Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. Available at: [Accessed 15 October 2014]. ESS, 2008. European Social Survey Round 4 Data. Data file edition 4.2. Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. Available at: [Accessed 15 October 2014]. ESS 2010. European Social Survey Round 5 Data. Data file edition 3.1. Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. Available at: [Accessed 15 October 2014]. European Commission, 2013. Standard Eurobarometer (2003–2013). Public opinion in the European Union, Autumn, 2013, National Report, Ireland. Ireland: European Commission’s Representation. [Accessed 15 October 2014). Fischer, A.P., Vance-Borland, K., Burnett, K.M., Hummel, S., Creightan, J.H., Johnson, S.L., Jasny, L., 2014. Does the social capital in networks of ‘fish and fire’ scientists and managers suggest learning? Society and Natural Resources, 27(7), pp. 671–8.

40

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Garcia, B.C. and Chavez, D., 2014. Network and based innovation systems: A capital base for the Monterrey city-region, Mexico. Expert Systems with Applications, 41(12), pp. 5636–46. Grootaert, C. and Bastelaer, T., 2002. Understanding and Measuring Social Capital. A Multidisciplinary Tool for Practitioners. Washington DC: World Bank. Gyorffy, D., 2013. Institutional Trust and Economic Policy: Lessons from the History of the Euro. Budapest: Central European University Press. Helbing, D., 2013. Globally networked risks and how to respond. Nature, 497(7447), pp. 51–9. Helliwell, J.F., Huang, H. and Wang, S., 2014. Social capital and well-being in time of crisis. Journal of Happiness Studies, 15(1), pp. 145–62. Henry, A.D. and Dietz, T., 2011. Information, networks and the complexity of trust in commons governance. International Journal of the Commons, 5(2), pp. 188–212. Jones, N., 2010. Investigating the influence of social costs and benefits of environmental policies through social capital theory. Policy Sciences, 43(3), pp. 229–44. Jones, N., Koukoulas, S., Clark, J.R.A., Evangelinos, K.Ι. and Dimitrakopoulos P.G., 2014. Social capital and citizen perceptions of coastal management for tackling climate change impacts in Greece. Regional Environmental Change, 14, 1083–93. Kairidis, D., 1997. Η Ελλάδα στη δεκαετία του 90: Η πρόκληση της μεταρρύθμισης [Greece in the 90’s: The challenge of reform]. In: G.T. Allison, K. Nicolaidis and K.Papazisi (eds) 1997. Το ελληνικό παράδοξο. Υπόσχεση και επίδοση [The Greek Paradox, Promise Vs. Performance]. Athens: Papazisis, pp. 149–66. Kazemipur, A., 2006. The market value of friendship: Social networks of immigrants. Canadian Ethnic Studies, 38(2), pp. 47–71. Knack, S. and Keefer, P., 1997. Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross country investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), pp. 1251–88. Knight, D.M., 2013. The Greek economic crisis as trope. Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology, 65, pp. 147–59. Konstantinidis, I. and Xezonakis, G., 2013. Sources of tolerance towards corrupted politicians in Greece: The role of trade offs and individuals benefits. Crime and Law and Social Change, 60(5), pp. 549–63. Kouretas, G.P. and Vlamis, P., 2010.The Greek crisis: Causes and implications. Panoeconomicus, 57(4), pp. 391–404. Kroustalli, D., 2011. Aπό τα γιαούρτια στο κίνημα … Πληρώνω [From yoghurts to the pay movement]. To Vima, 26 March 2011. Αvailable at: [Accessed 11 September 2014]. Kuokstis, V., 2012. Trust and Taxes: Estonian and Lithuanian, Fiscal Performance, During the Crisis. American Political Science Association Annual Meeting Paper.

Social Capital Levels in Greece in Times of Crisis

41

Lavdas, K.A. and Papadakis, N., 2003. Context, Process and Strategy in the Use of Memory: Remembrance, Neglect and Erasure in Greek Neo-Nationalism. European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, 28 March–2 April, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh. Lindstrom, M., 2014. Does social capital include trust? Commentary on Carpiano and Fitterer (2014). Social Science and Medicine, 116, pp. 235–6. Liu, A. and Besser, T., 2003. Social capital and participation in community improvement activities by elderly residents in small towns and rural communities. Rural Sociology, 68(3), pp. 343–65. Lyberaki, A. and Paraskevopoulos, C.J., 2002. Social capital measurement in Greece. In: OECD-ONS International Conference on Social Capital Measurement, 25–27 September, London. Matsaganis, M. and Leventi, C., 2011. The Distributional Impact the Crisis in Greece. EUROMOD Working Paper, No. EM 3/11, Leibniz Information Centre for Economics. Matsas, M.S., 2013. Greece and world capitalist crisis. Critique, 38(3), p. 502. Mavrogordatos, G., 1988. Μεταξύ Πιτυοκάμπτη και Προκρούστη: οι Επαγγελματικές Οργανώσεις στη Σύγχρονη Ελλάδα [Between Pitiokampti and Prokrousti: Pressure Groups in Modern Greece]. Athens: Odysseus. Mazurek, J. and Mielcova, E., 2013. The evaluation of economic recession magnitude: An introduction and application. Prague Economic Papers, (2), pp. 182–205. McEvily, B., Perrone, V. and Zaheer, A., 2003. Trust as an organizing principle. Organisation Science, 14(1), pp. 91–103. Milios, J. and Sotiropoulos, D.P., 2010. Crisis of Greece or crisis of the euro? A view from the European periphery. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 13(3), pp. 223–40. Miller, D. and Rivera, J., 2007. Setting the state: Roots of social inequality and the human tragedy of hurricane Katrina. In: K. Bates. and R. Swan. eds, Through the Eye of Katrina. Durham: North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, pp. 15–65. Mishler, W. and Rose, R., 2001. What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies. Comparative Political Studies, 34(1), pp. 60–62. Molm, L., Takahashi, N. and Peterson, G., 2000. Risk and trust on social exchanger: An experimental test of a classical proposition. The American Journal of Sociology, 105, pp. 1396–427. Mouzelis, N.P., 1995. Greece in the twenty-first century: Institutions and political culture. In: D. Constas and T.G. Stayrou (eds) Greece Prepares for the Twentyfirst Century. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 17–34. Mouzelis, Ν. and Pagoulatos G., 2003. Κοινωνία πολιτών και ιδιότητα του πολίτη στη μεταπολεμική Ελλάδα,[Civil society and citizens in post-war Greece]. Greek Review of Political Science, 22, pp. 5–29.

42

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Nandan, R. and Ciccotosto, S., 2014. Networks in knowledge-intensive industry: The case of a regional accountant’s networks. Journal of Accounting and Organisational Change, 10(1), pp. 2–21. Narayan, D., 1997. Voices of the Poor: Poverty and Social Capital in Tanzania. ESSD Studies and Monograph Series, 20. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Narayan, S. and Cassidy, M.P., 2001. A dimensional approach to measuring social capital: Development and validation of a social capital inventory. Current Sociology, 49(1), pp. 59–102. Newton, K. and Norris, P., 2000. Confidence in public institutions: Faith, culture, or performance? In: R. Putnam and S.J. Pharr (eds) Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 52–73. Papastamatelou, J., 2012. Active and passive bribery of state officials in Greece the ‘invasion’ of corruption in politics, law and society. Monatsschrift fur Kriminologie and Strafeechtsreform, 95(4), pp. 281–93. Paraskevopoulos, C.J., 2006. Κοινωνικό κεφάλαιο και δημόσια πολιτική στην Ελλάδα [Social capital and public policy in Greece], Science and Society, 16, pp. 69–106. Patra, E., 2012. Social Change and Collective Bargaining in Times of Crisis: The Case of Greece. Working Paper No. 38, Geneva: International Labour Office, Industrial and Employment Relations Department, (Dialogue). Paxton, P., 1999. Is social capital declining in the United States? A multiple indicator assessment. American Journal of Sociology, 105(1), pp. 88–127. Piracha, M., Tani, M. and Vaira-Lucere, M., 2014. Social Capital and Immigrants Labour Market Performance. Papers in Regional Science, Discussion Paper. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor. Pretty, J. and Ward, H., 2001. Social capital and the environment. World Development, 29(2), pp. 209–27. Putnam, R., 1998. Foreword. Housing Policy Debate, 9(1), pp. 1–177. Putnam, R., 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks. Putnam, R., Leonardi, R. and Nanetti, R.Y., 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Siisiainen, M., 2000. Two Concepts of Social Capital: Bourdieu vs Putnam. Paper presented at International Society for Third-Sector Research Fourth International Conference ‘The Third Sector: For What and for Whom?’, July 5–8, Trinity College, Dublin. Skouras, S. and Christodoulakis, N., 2014. Electoral misgovernance cycles: Evidence from wildfires and the tax evasion in Greece. Public Choice, 3(4), pp. 533–59. Sotiris, P., 2010. Rebel with a cause: The December, 2008, Greek Youth movement as the condensation of deeper social and political contradictions. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 34(1), pp. 203–9. Sotiropoulos, A.D. and Bourikos, D., 2014. Economic Risk, Social Solidarity and the Voluntary Sector in Greece: Summary Report of the Crisis. Observatory

Social Capital Levels in Greece in Times of Crisis

43

research project on the social consequences of the economic crisis in Greece and the response of civil society organizations to the crisis. Crisis Observatory, 10, Athens: ELIAMEP. Sotiropoulos, D.A., 2004. Formal Weakness and Informal Strength: Civil Society in Contemporary Greece. Discussion Paper, No. 16. London: The London School of Economics and Political Science. Svendsen, G. and Bjornskov, T., 2007. How to construct a robust measure of social capital: Two contributors, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis Research and Practice, 9(3), pp. 275–92. Swinden, S., 2012. Local currencies appearing in Greece, like they did in Argentina after the 2001 debacle. Pressenza, [online], 5 December. Available at: [Accessed 5 December 2014]. Tsoukalas, C., 1995. Free rides in wonderland or of Greeks in Greece. In: D. Constas and T.G. Stavrou (eds) Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 194–219. Tsoukalas, C. and Panagiotopoulou, R., 1992. Education in socialist Greece: Between modernization and democratization. In: T.C. Kariotis, ed. The Greek Socialist Experiment – Papandreou’s Greece 1981–1989. New York: Pella Publishing Company, pp. 305–34. Uphoff, N., 1998. Understanding social capital: Learning from the analysis and experience of participation. In: P. Dasgurta and I. Serageldin (eds) Social Capital: A Multiperspective Approach. Washington, DC: World Bank. Uslaner, E., 2007. Tax evasion, trust and the strong arm of the law. In: N. Hayoz, S. Hug (eds) Trust, Institutions and State Capacities: A Comparative Study. Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, pp. 17–50. Uslaner, E., 2010. Trust and the economic crisis of 2008. Corporate Reputation Review, 13(2), pp. 110–23. Varshney, A., 2000. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. New Haven: Yale University Press. Verick, S., 2009. Who is Hit Hardest During A Financial Crisis? The Vulnerability of Young Men and Women to Unemployment in an Economic Downturn. IZA Discussion Papers, No. 4359. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor. Wallimann, I., 2014. Special and solidarity economy for sustainable development: Its premises and the Social Economy Basel example of practice. International Review of Sociology, 24(1), pp. 48–58. Warren, A.M., Sulaiman, A. and Jaafar, N.I., 2014. (in press) Social media effects on fostering on line civic engagement and building citizen trust and trust in institutions. Government Information Quarterly, np. Woolcock, M. and Narayan, D., 2000. Social capital implications for development theory, research and policy. World Bank Research Observer, 15(2), pp. 225–49. Zavras, D., Tsiantou, V., Pavi, E., Mylona, and K., Kyriopoulos, J., 2013. Impact of economic crisis and other demographic and socio-economic factors on self-rated health in Greece. The European Journal of Public Health, 23(2), pp. 206–10.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 4

Informal Relationships and Structures in Greece and their Effects on Civil Society Formation Tina Mavrikos-Adamou

Introduction Concepts of civil society have long played a role in explanations of the ways in which human societies are organised and governed. Dilemmas arise when attempting to find a universally accepted definition of civil society, largely due to the fact that the term is used in a variety of different ways by many actors, both within academia and the world of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This makes definitional clarity particularly important when utilising the term. The definition of civil society that I will utilise in this discussion is an amalgam of previous definitions found within the existing literature. In this chapter, civil society is understood as the space between the state and the individual which is occupied by autonomous citizens’ organisations and associations whose activities are organised and have a collective character. These organisations and associations of citizens may come together not only because they share common interests, but also because they seek to affect the decision-making process. The sources and kinds of civic activism found within civil society differ greatly from one context to another, and this poses great difficulties for comparative analysis in this field. Civil societies are diverse in terms of their structures, topographies, and the forms of associational life that they contain. The associations and organisations that make up civil society should not be conceived of as being totally ‘freestanding’ either, given that they have connections and ties with other structures and institutions in society. Together, however, these organisations and associations can be understood to occupy a common space which constitutes a stage for their self-generated activity (Hall, 1995; Rosenblum and Post, 2002; Keane, 1998). Along with civil society, social capital and social cohesion are two additional concepts that require brief clarification here. In the existing literature, social capital is defined by its function (Coleman, 1988), and measured by the degree of citizen participation in formal associations within civil society. Social capital facilitates certain actions, some of which are difficult to quantify and which are a result of certain interactions among citizens. As Coleman states, the characteristic that differentiates social capital from other forms of capital is that: ‘ … social

46

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors’. (Coleman, 1988, p. 98) This results in social capital being less categorical than other forms of capital, since it is to be found within the very relations between individuals. Putnam, on the other hand, emphasises moral obligations and norms, social values, including trust (to be discussed below), and social networks when referring to social capital (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Putnam, 2000). Social cohesion, on the other hand, refers to the degree to which individuals in a group are willing to cooperate for positive outcomes. Underpinning the concept is the general belief that ‘sticking together’ is mutually beneficial. Social cohesion is important with regard to civil society organisations and associations, in that it allows individuals with similar interests to come together to work towards common goals. As with the concepts of civil society and social capital, huge challenges are encountered when trying to measure and quantify such features of group activity and how such behaviour develops in the first place. One of the central features of social capital is trust, which, from a rational choice perspective, can be understood as the degree of trustworthiness found within the social environment (Coleman, 1990; Hardin, 1996; 2004). Trust is largely an expectation, whereby one individual believes that another individual can be relied on, and neither will exploit the other (Herreros and Criado, 2008). Further definitions of trust within the literature have distinguished between general trust and particular trust. Generalised trust is found in societies where most people share common values and are open to trusting those who they do not know personally. The citizens in these societies have a positive view of human nature, and are willing to engage with others from different backgrounds and groups (Uslaner and Conley, 2003). These individuals are more likely to engage in civil society activities and organisations such as volunteering, NGOs and professional associations. This differs from particularised trust, which is based on ‘personal, first-hand knowledge of individuals’ (Newton, 2007, p. 344). ‘Particularised trusters’ are weary of those who do not share their same values, they tend to avoid strangers and instead cling to family, friends and acquaintances who they know personally (Uslaner and Conley, 2003, p. 335). This type of trust is based on the belief that the other has strong reasons to act in our best interests. Particularised trust is prevalent in the types of relationships that are found within Greek society, since there remains a general suspicion of unknown individuals, and thus interpersonal trust develops based on reciprocity and knowing the other through personal contact and personal experience (Rontos and Roumeliotou, 2013). Within discussions of civil society and social capital theory, distinctions have been established between formal versus informal social structures found within societies (Sotiropoulos, 2004; Paraskevopoulos, 2007; Rontos and Roumeliotou, 2013). Formal social structures denote the associations and organisations that are found in plural societies (NGOs, professional associations and their interactions via appropriate and legitimate channels). Informal social structures and interactions, on the other hand, are the relationships within family and friend networks, they tend to be more exclusive and have strong ‘in-group orientation’, which results in

Informal Relationships and Structures in Greece

47

members developing close ties and obligations to favour and support those within the group (Griesshaber and Geys, 2011, p. 3). When the common themes of much of the existing literature on civil society are brought together, some typically perceived characteristics of ‘robust’ versus ‘weak’ civil society emerge. On the one hand, a ‘robust’ civil society tends to be characterised by high social capital measurements, a prevalence of large and strong formal organisations and associations, generalised trust and many NGOs playing an important role in policymaking. On the other hand, a ‘weak’ civil society tends to be characterised by low social capital measurements, a prevalence of informal social structures and networks, and particularised trust. However, taking a broader perspective and looking at patterns of relationships between formal and informal social structures can arguably provide a more nuanced understanding of civic participation (Pichler and Wallace, 2007). The relationship between formal and informal social structures and relationships in Greece is key to understanding the dynamics of civil society and the environment within which it operates. Social support is found in Greece but largely not via the actors that have been identified in the literature (formal organisations), but rather through informal organisations that operate through clientelist or cronyist ties, or that operate on a local or neighbourhood level (Sotiropoulos, 2004). Involvement in such informal structures has taken the place of formal participation in some instances, and the support that they provide likewise takes the place of support provided by formal organisations. Clientelism refers to: … a personalized and reciprocal relationship between an inferior and a superior, commanding unequal resources; moreover, in contrast with the ‘ideal type’ of bureaucratic relationship, the norms of rationality, anonymity, and universalism are largely absent from the patron-client nexus (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972).

Clientelism turned out to be able to consistently operate and survive in the modern era, despite claims by modernisation theorists of its demise and incompatibility with democratic principles and practices (Roniger, and GunesAyata, 1994). Clientelism finds fertile ground where there is a strong central state, club-footed socio-economic development, leader-dominated political parties, a large public sector, and other structural and social factors (Kitschelt, 2000). Since the 2008 crisis, the role of informal organisations and network ties in Greece has been further augmented, largely due to state budget cuts for funding for NGOs and other formal structures. Filling the gap created due to the inability of the state to provide certain social services, informal organisations and network ties have taken on an increasing number of support services traditionally associated with a welfare state. With the number of Greeks in households without a wageearner doubling since 2007, family and friendship networks have been safe-havens for the unemployed (OECD, 2014, p. 100).

48

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

This chapter will explore the role that informal social structures and networks play in societies such as that of Greece, especially in times of crisis. It should be kept in mind that there are difficulties in generalising about these particularised trusted networks of friends, acquaintances, and kinship ties, as well as in measuring and quantifying them. Nonetheless, given that informal social capital plays a predominant role in Greece, its role within civil society needs to be explored and understood in relation to the wider social and political context. The remainder of this chapter will therefore proceed to explore the themes raised in the above discussion of social capital and the difference between formal and informal social structures within civil society in relation to the case of Greece. Data from Eurobarometer ‘Social Capital’ Surveys (European Commission, 2005), a Special Eurobarometer Survey on ‘Volunteering and Intergenerational Solidarity’ (European Commission, 2011), and Eurobarometer 80 (European Commission, 2013) as well as from OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) reports (OECD, 2014), will be utilised to provide empirical evidence demonstrating that Greece and other Southern European countries rank low on generalised trust, but high on particularised trust, in comparison with Western European countries. Results of these attitudinal and social survey data reaffirm previous studies and research conducted measuring social capital in Greece (see Lyberaki and Paraskevopoulos, 2002; Christoforou, 2005; Van Oorschot, Arts, and Gelissen, 2006) This chapter will then turn to identifying the informal and formal structures and relationships in Greece in the context of the wider state-society relations in the country. Civil Society and Social Capital: The Case of Greece When applying the aforementioned understanding of social capital to the case of Greece, one witnesses informal expressions of civic engagement taking priority over formal channels of participation, and a predominance of particularised forms of trust over generalised forms of trust. In Greece, ‘unsocial’ capital prevails (Levi, 1996) where distrust of politicians and political parties negatively effects civil engagement (Geys and Murdoch, 2008). ‘Bonding’ social capital, whereby family, neighbours and friends are the primary groups that one turns to for help and support, and whom one can trust, is prevalent within Greek society (Sotiropoulos, 2004; Paraskevopoulos, 2007, p. 5). Bonding networks tend to occur when people are similar to one another, and where the level of familiarity among members is high (Geys and Murdoch, 2008, p. 438). As a consequence, Greece consistently ranks low in most comparative studies of civic participation, as will be shown below. In research which focuses on official records of membership in civil society organisations (which are hard to come by in Greece since there is no central registry), Greece is classified as having a weak civil society with low levels of volunteering, trust, and generally devoid of social capital. It is only when the focus of research is broadened to cover all forms of civil engagement, and a distinction

Informal Relationships and Structures in Greece

49

is made between formal and informal aspects of civic participation, that a more accurate assessment of civic involvement in Greece can be established. The various data regarding both formal and informal forms of engagement will now be assessed. As Figure 4.1 indicates, when asked about whether they partake in voluntary work, 78% of Greeks responded that they do not participate actively (European Commission, 2005), confirming the observation that Greeks are hesitant to partake in activities with unknown individuals. This trend has been accentuated since the 87%

11%

PT

82%

15%

ES

82%

13%

HU

78%

22%

EL

77%

20%

PL CY

23%

76%

IT

23%

75% 71%

28%

MT

70%

23%

CZ

68%

29%

EU25

66%

16%

LT UK

33%

SI

33%

66% 66% 65%

27%

SK

65%

28%

EE

64%

35%

DE

60%

36%

FR

60%

38%

BE

57%

41%

IE

57%

42%

GK

56%

43%

AT

54%

46%

FI

53%

47%

LU

50%

49%

NL

50%

SE

34%

22%

LV 0%

49%

25%

50%

75%

do voluntary work not participate actively Figure 4.1 Actively Volunteering rates across Do Europe (%)

Source: Special Eurobarometer No 223, (European Commission, 2005, p. 66)

100%

DK

50

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

economic crisis of 2008 with further decreases in the percentage of the Greek population donating to charities (approximately -13%), as well as a drop in the number of Greeks volunteering time to an organisation between 2007 and 2012 (OECD, 2014, p. 143). As was discussed previously, particularised trust best describes the type of trust that prevails in Greek society. The data in this Eurobarometer complements that of the 2011 Special Eurobarometer on Volunteering and Intergenerational Solidarity (European Commission, 2011), in which 86% of Greeks replied ‘no’ to the question: ‘Do you currently have a voluntary activity on a regular or occasional basis?’ It should be noted that there is no official definition of volunteering in Greece. The state-supported national agency ‘Citizen in Deed’ (Ergo Politon), which was responsible for volunteering until it was shut down by the government at the start of the economic crisis, provided a general notion of volunteering as ‘action serving a common good’,1 but there is not a widely perceived understanding of volunteering as a basic framework for mutual aid in Greece. This is arguably related to the fact that Greeks have learned to rely on and trust their friends and kinship ties primarily. As demonstrated in Figure 4.2, Greeks perceive family to be very important to them. Greece ranks highest of all EU countries, with 97% of those polled declaring family to be ‘very important’, (European Commission, 2005), providing further validity to the claim that informal networks of family and friends are very strong in Greece. The avenues that are pursued for acquiring information are embedded in these ties. These results are further evidenced in another Eurobarometer Survey devoted to detecting the importance of friends (European Commission, 2005 p. 46), where 74% of Greeks responded that friends are ‘very important’. This corresponds to the central feature of social capital, namely, trust, and supports the claim here that particularised trust and bonding are principal features of the type of social capital that exists in Greece. Traditionally, the cohesive family in Greece has been identified as one of nurturing and caring, and historical roots can be traced for strong family allegiances. These structural characteristics reflect behavioural practices and reveal the type of political and social engagement indicative of social capital. Since the economic crisis began in 2008, resulting in an escalation of youth unemployment (European Commission, 2014), many sons and daughters have returned home to live with parents and extended family members, pooling economic resources to get by. Hence the economic crisis has placed strains on the family as a social structure. Passed on from generation to generation in Greece is the importance of caring for the elderly. The family in these social settings acts as an informal safety net, providing social protection that the state does not provide, or at least not efficiently (Lyberaki and Tinios, 2014). This explains why, when asked the question ‘Imagine an elderly father or mother who lives alone. In your opinion, what do you think would be best if that person could no longer manage to live on his/her own?’ 1 See their website which is still available [online], at: http://www.ergopoliton.gr/.

Informal Relationships and Structures in Greece

51

EL

97%

CY LU MT SE

94%

6%

94%

5%

93%

7%

93%

6%

SI

92%

8%

SK

92%

7%

IE

92%

7%

UK

92%

6%

BG HU D-E PL

9%

CZ

88%

11%

DK

88%

10%

86%

13%

FR

86%

12%

EU25

86%

12%

RO

86%

11%

D-W

85%

LT

84%

14%

LV

84%

13%

PT

83%

BE

82%

NL

81%

EE

80%

IT

78%

19%

AT

78%

17%

75%

11%

13%

15%

15%

16%

18%

80%

85%

Very Important

Figure 4.2

7%

90% 12%

DE

91% 10%

88%

87%

7%

90%

ES

FI

91%

2%

90%

95%

100%

Fairly Important

The importance of family across Europe

Source: Special Eurobarometer No 223 (European Commission, 2005, p. 45).

(Figure 4.3), a large proportion of Greeks would opt for their parents coming to live with them (53%), or that they should move into their parents’ home (8%) to provide care. As a third choice, 25% responded that children should regularly visit their parent’s home to provide care for them. Only 4% responded that their elderly parent should move to a nursing home (Figure 4.3). Figure 4.4 further illustrates this point by approaching the issue from a different perspective. The figure presents the results of a survey of European citizens about

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

52 LT

55%

EL

53%

BG

39%

PL

47%

RO

42%

IT

40%

LB

37%

EE

30%

SK

34%

CY

38%

PT

47%

D-W

26%

HU

29%

ES

42%

DE

24%

IE

30%

CZ

32%

EU25

31%

SI

30%

D-E

17%

AT

23%

MT

27%

UK

23%

FR

28%

BE

23%

LU

23%

14%

29%

14%

29% 6%

22%

13%

11%

11%

15%

19% 10%

16% 18%

21%

14%

24% 21%

17%

5%

7% 1%

19%

27%

3%

10%

21%

12%

36%

25% 24%

22%

35%

17%

3%

28%

15%

10%

6%

16%

6%

SE

15%

20%

9%

DK

9%

21%

9%

2%

15% 13%

26%

9%

4%

8%

29% 7%

8%

9%

14%

8%

7%

8%

21%

3%

FI

0%

6%

34% 15%

NL

4%

23%

11%

3%

12%

21%

7%

6%

9%

21%

11%

9%

5%

18%

14%

9%

6%

26%

15%

11%

7%

25%

16%

11%

4%

19%

12% 8%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Come & live with children

Children move into parent's home & provide care

Children regularly visit parent's home & provide care

Public or private service providers provide care

Move to a nursing home

It depends

DK

Figure 4.3

Preferred option for care of elderly parents across Europe

Source: Special Eurobarometer No 223 (European Commission, 2005, p. 83)

the reliability of people, in response to the question ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’. Greeks reveal their uneasiness about trusting those they do not know, with only 18% responding that ‘most people can be trusted’. This data together, then, provides an empirical basis for the claim that Greeks’ mistrust of the other on the one hand, can be understood as commitment to one’s own on the other. Bonding social networks can help with gaining access

Informal Relationships and Structures in Greece PL LT LV EL RO FR SI SK HU IT PT CZ BE LU UK EU25 CY MT EE IE DE ES AT FI NL BG SE DK

53 88% 84%

15%

82% 18%

74%

17%

73%

22%

69%

24%

69% 16%

68%

25%

61%

21%

60%

24%

60% 17%

59%

29%

58%

31%

58%

36%

58%

30%

58% 18%

55%

22%

55%

33%

53%

32%

51%

35%

48%

36%

48% 32%

36%

61%

34%

61%

30% 26%

17% 64%

26%

76%

19%

0%

25%

You can't be too careful

Figure 4.4

10% 14%

50% Most people can be trusted

75% It depends

100% DK

Attitudes towards trusting people across Europe

Source: Special Eurobarometer No 223 (European Commission, 2005, p. 41)

to resources and may substitute for formal relationships. Instrumentally, these relationships assist in the flow of information. Utilising these social ties and the reciprocity that is assumed (you may be called upon to help those who you are seeking help from) does form networks of individuals and in an unconventional way, allows social capital to accrue. This kind of social support is a feature of the type of relationships that make up informal structures and relationships in Greece.

54

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Identifying Formal vs. Informal Structures and Relationships in Greece In Greece there remain state, economic, and societal obstacles to the development of formal structures of civil society. Explanations for Greece’s weak civil society have been sought in a historical context, beginning with the country’s four-century experience under the Ottoman Empire before Greek Independence in 1821, which embedded patron-client networks into the social fabric of society, through to the Colonels’ dictatorship which ended in 1974. In the meantime, Greek society was also affected by the Balkan Wars, the war in Asia Minor, two World Wars including Italian-German occupation, and a civil war. Foreign intervention in the country by European powers and western forces likewise moulded the social environment in Greece and the way that Greeks perceive civic involvement. Socio-economic development in the country has also affected social capital and vice versa, and research examining the interrelationships between state actors and various powerful groups operating within the Greek economic sector contributes to an understanding of this phenomenon (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2012). Other characteristics of the Greek economic sphere, such as the prevalence of familyowned businesses and small enterprises, along with an over-regulation of areas of economic activity, are disincentives for the development of formal economic organisations and associations (Rontos and Roumeliotou, 2013). These features have shaped and influenced state-society relationships, and to a great extent have contoured the formal and informal structures that operate within society, the boundaries of which have often been porous (Sotiropoulos, 2004, p. 13). Furthermore, the particularities of the relationship between the public and private spheres in Greece likewise help to reveal how informal structures and relationships predominate over formal structures and relationships. A blurring of the private and public spheres often occurs in Greece, largely due to the enormous role that personal relations play, including in finding and retaining employment in the public sector, and thereafter retention, and in the placement of loyal party cadres in key decision-making positions. This has had an effect on how citizens understand civic roles in these two spheres. Legislative initiatives to spearhead changes to remove personal interests from the public sphere have been slow in practice to be adopted. Those who are benefitting from the established patterns of relationships do not want to lose power and therefore impede changes. Despite new legislation introduced in the 1990s, under pressure from the European Union, to develop and implement meritocratic recruitment for public workers, for example, the bureaucracy continues to be filled with loyal party supporters (Pagoulatos, 2003). These patterns of state-society relations and the malleable space between the private and public spheres are determinants of social capital in Greece and impact negatively the way in which civic participation takes place. Current EU policies demanding a down-sizing of the Greek public sector will no doubt affect state-society relations in Greece in so far as the restrictions being put in place limit the ability of the current government to continue to use

Informal Relationships and Structures in Greece

55

the bureaucracy to secure jobs for loyal supporters (Theodoropoulos, 2012). Nevertheless, corruption (both real and perceived) continues,2 and historically patterns of patron-client relations have morphed over the past century in Greece, rather than ceasing to exist. Like a relentless weed that resists being uprooted, patron-client relations have survived in Greece despite repeated policy attempts to bring them to a stop. Renegotiating existing state-society relations in Greece and delineating clear lines between the private and public spheres cannot be achieved through policy dictates alone. Attitudinal and behavioural practices need to accompany structural reforms for effective implementation to occur and real positive change to be seen. In other words, it is not only the patrimonial state that needs to reform, but society as well, for the ‘reformist’ culture in Greece to predominate definitively over the ‘underdog’ (Diamandouros, 1993; 2012). Formal Structures As was demonstrated earlier, formal structures of civil society in Greece, such as NGOs, are generally fewer in number than those found in other EU countries; they also remain less influential, and are not held in high esteem by the Greek general public. On several occasions, the Greek media has covered stories of NGOs under investigation for squandering state money.3 Part of the problem is that NGOs operate within a murky legal framework, they are beholden to the state for funding, and they operate in a social environment where particularised trust predominates. NGOs suffer from a bad reputation, a lack of independent funding and transparency, and they struggle to find members. Hence the environment in which these organisations operate is hostile, as a majority of Greeks do not participate in non-partisan forms of civic activism. To exacerbate these existing challenges, state funding to NGOs has been frozen.4 Additionally, other structural impediments to NGO formation, such as the hegemony that political parties have over civil society, as will be discussed below, and the collusive relationship between parties and the two largest trade unions (GSEE and ADEDY), have left little room for the establishment of independent organisations and associations. Some notable exceptions, however, need to be identified. The Greek Orthodox Church has traditionally played an important role in Greek society and in Greek 2 Greece is at the bottom of the list of EU and Western European countries in 80th place, according to Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Indices 2013. See their report available at: . 3 For example, see the article entitled ‘The whole truth about NGOs’ [Ολη η Αλήθεια για τις ΜΚΟ], in To Vima newspaper, 16 September 2012. Available at: . See also the article entitled ‘Ministry to Cast Wider Net to Catch Tax Evaders’, in Kathimerini newspaper, 27 February 2012. Available at: . 4 See the article entitled ‘Greece Freezes Public funding for NGOs’, in Kathimerini newspaper, 21 August 2012. Available at: .

56

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

identity, and has often provided what the state could not in terms of supporting youth organisations, summer camp programmes, and, in these times of economic crisis, soup kitchens, clothes drives, day care, and other social programmes. These philanthropic activities provide social protection and fill in some of the gaps left by the state since they deal with people’s real needs. Additionally, the epistemic community and legal and medical professionals in Greece have been forging ahead since the 1980s with creating independent, formal professional organisations, and these are much more akin to the types of other professional organisations found in other western societies. Nevertheless, they do not have readily available formal channels (such as lobbying, membership on policy committees) to influence policymaking. Other organisations that contour Greek civil society such as sports clubs,5 cultural organisations (European Cultural Centre at Delphi) environmental and wildlife associations (WWF Hellas, Arcturos), children’s organisations (SOS Children’s Village, The Smile of the Child), human rights organisations (Disability Now, European Union of Women), and some business organisations (Federation of Northern Industrialists of Greece), do contribute to the civic environment in Greece, but when compared to other EU members, these organisations have been unable to play an influential role in public policy. These organisations have been unable to ‘build bridges across different segments of society’, and thus fall short of contributing to dynamic social interaction that underpins a robust civil society (Uslander and Conley, 2003, p. 336). In part, the inability of formal actors to play a more decisive role in the civic life of the country has been due to the domineering role played by political parties which have hitherto monopolised political expression, and dominated the political environment to the point that little room was left for independent organisations and groups to grow. Political parties have been perceived to be the gatekeepers of political power in democratic systems, and this role has been maximised by Greek parties to control from above many interest groups in Greek society. Although the socialist party PASOK utilised the politics of patronage from its rise to power in 1981 and is the subject of much of the literature on party politics in Greece (Lyrintzis, 1984, Spourdalakis, 1988, Sotiropoulos, 1996, Pappas, 1999), all political parties in Greece practice patronage politics (Pappas, 2009). The primary goal of patronage parties is to maximise party votes and win state power. To this end, both of the major parties in Greece prior to the crisis, PASOK and ND, were able to utilise party cadres, win elections and form single-party governments, thus commanding the political environment to the detriment of the development of independent organisations and associations. But the tide appears to be changing. Due to the economic crisis that has beset Greece since 2008, Greek public opinion has turned against the two main political parties, as they have been identified as the main actors responsible for bringing 5 For a discussion of clientelism in Greece and how it has affected sports policy between 1981 and 1993, see Henry and Nassis (1999).

Informal Relationships and Structures in Greece

57

Greece to the brink of bankruptcy. Much resentment has developed within Greek society towards what is perceived as irresponsible behaviour on the part of political parties. As Figure 4.5 indicates, Greeks no longer have the same level of trust in political parties compared to the decade before the crisis, with only 4% believing them to be trustworthy, the lowest percentage among EU members.6 This is a 3% decline from that reported in Eurobarometer 77 (European Commission, 2012), in which 7% of Greeks polled responded that they tended to trust parties, and a 24% decline compared to a decade ago, when 28% of those responded said

UK

0.11

SE

0.34

FI

0.32

SK

0.16

SI

0.06

RO

0.08

PT

0.12

PL

0.14

NL

0.28

AT

0.34

MT

0.27

HU

0.23

LU

0.26

LT

0.09

LV

0.06

CY

0.07

IT

0.07

HR

0.08

FR

0.07

ES

0.06

EL

0.04

IE

0.11

EE

0.16

DE

0.21

DK

0.33

CZ

0.11

BG

0.12

BE

0.26

EU28

0.14 0

Figure 4.5

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

Percentage of people trusting political parties across Europe

Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 80, (European Commission 2013, p. 50) 6 See Eurobarometer 80, (European Commission, 2013, p. 50).

0.4

58

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

that they tended to trust political parties (European Commission, 2004). Whether this declining trust in political parties in Greece will change the dynamics of party partisanship remains to be seen. The current electoral re-alignment and the development of new party cleavages have brought forth new political parties on all points on the political spectrum. Party system transformation can usher in a myriad of changes to the political environment and affect the role of political actors in a variety of ways (Katz and Mair, 2002). Furthermore, additional research is necessary to establish whether weakening political patronage ties, resulting from the policies of the EU, International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank (referred to in Greece as the ‘Troika’), required for Greece’s economic bailout packages, will lead citizens to alternatives such as associational and interest groups, altering the existing imbalance in favour of political parties. In the past, political parties in Greece were likewise able to infiltrate organisations such as trade unions to the point where these organisations were no longer able to act independently of the dominant political parties of the country. A type of informal subordination of trade unions to political parties occurred, thereby stifling the ability of trade unions to act as independent articulators of interests. As a result, there was a lack of fertile ground for autonomous group formation. Today, civil society organisations continue to suffer from low levels of trust and support by the general public, they are looked upon with suspicion, and they are seen to represent obscure irrelevant interests with little importance to the general public (Polyzoidis, 2009). This is one reason why Greece has been unable to witness high social capital measurements and has been described as having a ‘weak’ civil society. Informal Structures As noted above, informal structures and the relationships that characterise them are harder to analyse and categorise than formal structures. As was discussed previously, one important informal structure in Greece is the family, which operates as an informal welfare system, providing care for the elderly, and financial support and housing for unemployed adult children, among other things (Lyberaki and Tinios, 2014). Particularly since the financial crisis struck hard in 2009, an increasing number of demands have overburdened the family as a provider of welfare, due to high unemployment in the country (especially youth unemployment) leading to a loss of individual self-sufficiency. The sizing down of the formal welfare state in Greece has resulted in Greeks relying even more on informal networks of family and friends to meet their subsistence needs. Other informal structures that operate in Greece are to be found in the various social spaces of the country, both in urban and rural areas. Such spaces include coffeehouses, tavernas, public squares, and a variety of other outdoor venues which provide opportunities for citizens to engage in informal discourse on topics ranging from sports to education, to politics and beyond. Social capital in these forums is encapsulated at the local group level, and can be understood to be a local

Informal Relationships and Structures in Greece

59

group asset. Coleman’s functional definition of social capital and his focus on the interactions of individuals in society is particularly apropos to the case of Greece. It is through these interactions that social capital is produced, albeit difficult to calculate and measure. Nonetheless, such informal spaces provide a platform for the discussion of societal needs – both tangible and intangible – and this puts informal structures and relationships within the sphere of social capital research (Lin, 1999). In part, an explanation as to how informal structures and relations came to play such an influential role in social relations stems historically from the patron-clientelist system that has operated in Greece since before the country’s independence, and which has been able to adapt to changing regimes and political systems, as noted above. These informal patron-client structures contain relationships of particularised trust, mutual understanding and reciprocity, and are of mutual benefit. Having a ‘meso’ – a go-between, someone who can facilitate the loan at the bank, the tractor licence, or assist in getting your son a position in the public sector – these are the types of relationships that involve ‘one’s own people’ – ‘hoi dikoi mas’ – and which continue to operate in Greece. Nepotism and cronyism also find a home in such societal settings, adding to the blurring of the public/private sector in Greece. The system of public administration in Greece continues to be influenced by informal structures and their respective relationships, despite attempts by various governments to create a system of meritocracy via legislation. The bureaucracy in Greece continues to be filled with loyal supporters of the government in power in exchange for their support at the polls. This leads to low levels of trust in public institutions, which further fuels the development of informal networks. Thus a vicious circle is created which poses formidable obstacles to reforming the system. The boundaries between formal and informal organisations and structures are often porous. The example of Greek senior citizen’s Open Care Centres for the Elderly (KAPI) illustrates this point. During an era of social expansionary policies under the socialist PASOK government in the early 1980s, municipal open care centres were created in order to provide a place for senior citizens to meet and socialise. The first KAPI opened in 1979 as a pilot centre, run by volunteer groups utilising public finances, with the aim of providing both informal medical services and a place to socialise. By 1981 eight KAPI’s had opened, staffed by volunteers from the Red Cross, and financed by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (Daniilidou et al., 2003). Senior citizens had often socialised in outdoor venues such as town squares and parks, but the PASOK government transformed this informal meeting space into a municipal-financed centre. By the mid-1980s local authorities assumed responsibility for the running of the KAPI, while the central government remained the main financial contributor. Providing entertainment (dancing and music), chess and backgammon, and excursions to cultural and historical sites, the KAPI became a central meeting place for elderly Greeks. The KAPI also provided preventive healthcare services, such as physiotherapy, informal medical services (for example blood-pressure and blood sugar testing, and advice on health-related

60

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

matters, such as relating to healthy eating and accident prevention). The combining of informal health care with a social space for the elderly to meet was successful since it was in tune with the cultural characteristics of Greek society. This mix of formal and informal care runs parallel with and reflects the often indistinct boundaries between formal and informal structures that contour Greece’s social space. In its own unique way, the KAPI has contributed to the civic space in Greece – not through formal means, but via indigenous, culturally appropriate avenues. Conclusion Recalling the distinctions between a robust and weak civil society made above, Greece exemplifies all of the characteristics of a weak civil society. However, as this discussion has attempted to reveal, such a classification is partially due to the lack of consideration of informal participation and the related informal social relationships, which often take the place of formal participation (Pichler and Wallace, 2007, p. 425). This contribution has tried to underscore the importance of taking into consideration the informal as well as the formal sector for understanding civil society in Greece. The interrelationship between the formal and informal sectors and the relationships that lie therein constitute an important dimension for understanding Greek civil society. As noted above, central to the study of civil society are the notions of social capital and trust. It is, however, important to distinguish between general and particular forms of trust, and this contribution has highlighted the significance of particularised trust in the case of Greece. Kinship ties, and networks of friends and acquaintances constitute the bulk of the web of social ties in Greece, and contour the social space within which social interaction takes place. By utilising Eurobarometer surveys it has been revealed that, although Greece ranks low in the percentage of citizens that volunteer in formal organisations and associations compared with other EU members, this is counterbalanced by the importance of family and friends and by informal social capital. Social capital in Greece can be detected in informal welfare structures such as that of the family, and in the myriad of informal arenas that dot the rural and urban neighbourhoods of the country. Since 2010, the number and variety of informal organisations have expanded as citizens have been left to fend for themselves, largely due to state consolidation and a cutting back of welfare provisions, as mentioned above. Realising that they could not rely on the state for assistance, local groups in Greece have formed their own networks of exchange, largely needs based, some providing basic food staples (bread, flour, sugar), others providing services on a volunteer basis, especially to the poor and unemployed who have been hit the hardest by the economic crisis. With gaping holes in the social safety net, and household income dropping by one third after six years of recession, informal groups and networks have tried to

Informal Relationships and Structures in Greece

61

mitigate the effects of austerity policies that Greece has been undergoing since 2010, in a variety of makeshift ways (OECD, 2014, pp. 15–68). This contribution has also aimed to set the discussion of Greek civil society in the context of wider state-society relations in the country. This includes taking into consideration structural factors, such as an interventionist and highly centralised Greek state. Patterns of socio-economic development have further impeded the development of autonomous organisations and associations (Tsoukas and Papoulias, 2005). Other explanations have been sought by examining the conditions under which modernisation took place in Greece and the clientelistic ways in which the mobilisation of the population has taken place (Mouzelis, 1995). The ways and terms under which the masses in Greece were drawn into the political arena have been described as the: incorporative-clientelistic mode, which brings people into the centre via their insertion into personalistic, highly particularistic patron-client networks – such networks cutting across and undermining more horizontal forms of political organization like trade unions or parties primarily based on universalistic criteria of recruitment (Mouzelis, 1995, p. 231).

Effectually, the vertical incorporation of interests has hindered the development of formal structures of civil society as well as influencing the predominant form of social capital. Patron-client relations have long infiltrated the system of public administration in the country, and strong, leader-dominated patron-based political parties have crowded out the political space in Greece, leaving little room for independent organisations and associations to form and grow. This is further exacerbated by Greeks’ low level of trust in formal organisations, which they know little about, and which they look upon warily. Further research is needed to evaluate whether the recent change in political party system (i.e. the June 2012 elections) will affect political party dominance of the political environment of the country, and whether this will have a further effect on the development of social capital and of civil society structures. Nevertheless, the dynamic between political parties in Greece and civil society should not necessarily be seen as a zero-sum relationship. Finally, social capital in Greece operates along dimensions that do not fit well with existing analyses measuring civil society. Assessing civil society through an analysis of both formal and informal structures and the various forms of social capital that they produce provides for a more nuanced understanding of the role of civil society and the social relationships that lay therein. Further study is needed to uncover the constituent parts of civil society. The question of whether formal or informal structures prevail, the wider effects of these patterns, and the nature of social capital that is produced through social interactions are important themes for further exploration. An understanding of how social capital functions and the various forms it takes, such as trust, assists in uncovering the idiosyncrasies and particularities of civil society development. The structural environment within

62

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

which civil society operates and state-society relationships provide additional dimensions to complement existing civil society discourse. References Christoforou, A., 2005. On the Determinants of Social Capital in Greece Compared to Countries of the European Union. [online] Nota Di Lavoro 68.2005. Milan: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. Available at: [Accessed 7 September 2014]. Coleman, J.S., 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of Sociology. 94, pp. S95–S120. Coleman, J.S., 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Daniilidou, N.V., Economou, C., Zavras, D., et al. 2003. Health and social care in an aging population: An integrated care institution for the elderly in Greece. International Journal of Integrated Care, 3(22), pp. 1–10. Diamandouros, N. 1993. Politics and culture in Greece 1974–91: An interpretation. In: R. Clogg (ed.) Greece 1981–89: The Populist Decade. New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 1–25. Diamandouros, N., 2012. Politics, culture, and the state: Background to the Greek crisis. In: O. Anastasakis and D. Singh, eds. Reforming Greece: Sisyphean Task or Herculean Challenge? South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) St Anthony’s College, London: University of Oxford, pp. 9–18. European Commission, 2004. Standard Eurobarometer 61. [online] Available at: [Accessed 7 December 2014]. European Commission, 2005. Special Eurobarometer 223/Wave 62.2. Social Capital. [online] Available at: [Accessed 7 December 2014]. European Commission, 2011. Special Eurobarometer Wave 75.2 Volunteering and Intergenerational Solidarity. [online] Available at: [Accessed 7 December 2014]. European Commission, 2012. Standard Eurobarometer 77. [online] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb77/eb77_en.htm [Accessed 7 December 2014]. European Commission, 2013. Standard Eurobarometer 80. [online] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb80/eb80_en.htm [Accessed 7 December 2014]. European Commission, 2014. Youth Unemployment Rate. Eurostat, 21 July 2014. Available at: [Accessed 7 December 2014].

Informal Relationships and Structures in Greece

63

Griesshaber, N. and Geys, B. 2011. Civic Engagement and Corruption in 20 European Democracies. Berlin: Social Science Research Center (WBZ). Geys, B. and Murdoch, Z., 2008. How to make head or tail of ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’?: Addressing the methodological ambiguity. British Journal of Sociology, 59(3), pp. 435–54. Hall, J.A. (ed.) 1995. Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hardin, R., 1996. Trustworthiness. Ethics, 107(1), pp. 26–42. Hardin, R., 2004. Trust and Trustworthiness. NY: Russell Sage Foundation Trust. Henry, I.P. and Nassis, P., 1999. Political clientelism and sports policy in Greece. International Review for the Sociology of Sport. 34(43), pp. 43–58. Herreros, F. and Criado, H., 2008. The state and the development of social trust. International Political Science Review, 29(1), pp. 53–71. Katz, R.S. and Mair, P., 2002. The ascendancy of the party in public office: Party organizational change in twentieth-century democracies. In: R. Gunther, J.R. Montero and J.J. Linz, eds. Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 113–35. Keane, J., 1998. Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Kitschelt, H., 2000. Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic politics. Comparative Political Studies, 33 (6–7), pp. 845–79. Lemarchand, R. and Legg, K., 1972. Political clientelism and development: A preliminary analysis. Comparative Politics, 4(2), pp. 149–78. Levi, M., 1996. Social and unsocial capital: A review essay of Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work. Politics and Society, 24(1), pp. 45–55. Lin, N., 1999. Building a theory of social capital. Connections, 22(1), pp. 28–51. Lyberaki, A. and Paraskevopoulos, C.J. 2002. Social Capital Measurement in Greece. OECD-ONS International Conference in Social Capital Measurement. London: UK. Lyberaki, A. and Tinios, P., 2014. The informal welfare state and the family: Invisible actors in the Greek drama. Political Studies Review, 12(2), pp. 193–208. Lyrintzis, C.,1984. Political parties in post-Junta Greece: A case of ‘bureaucratic clientelism’? West European Politics, 7(2), pp. 99–111. Mitsopoulos, M. and Pelagidis, T., 2012. Understanding the Crisis in Greece: From Boom to Bust. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mouzelis, N., 1995. Modernity, late development and civil society. In: J.A. Hall, ed. Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 224–49. Newton, K. 2007. Social capital. Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 344. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2014. Society at a Glance. Social Indicators: The Crisis and its Aftermath [pdf]. Available

64

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

at: [Accessed 4 August 2014]. Pagoulatos, G., 2003. Greece’s New Political Economy: State, Finance and Growth from Postwar to EMU. London: Macmillan. Pappas, T.S., 1999. Making Party Democracy in Greece. London: Macmillan Press. Pappas, T.S., 2009. Patrons against partisans: The politics of patronage in mass ideological parties. Party Politics. 15(3), pp. 315–34. Paraskevopoulos, C., 2007. Social Capital and Public Policy in Greece. (GreeSE Paper No 9) London: Hellenic Observatory. Paraskevopoulos, C., 2010. Social capital: Summing up the debate on a conceptual tool of comparative politics and public policy. Comparative Politics, 42(4), pp. 475–94. Pichler, F. and Wallace, C., 2007. Patterns of formal and informal social capital in Europe. European Sociological Review, 23(4), pp. 423–35. Polyzoidis, P., 2009. Non-profit organizations and human services in Greece: The residual segment of a weak sector. Voluntas, 20(2), pp. 188–206. Putnam, R.D., Leonardi, R. and Nanetti, R.Y. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Institutions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R.D., 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Rosenblum, N.L. and Post, R.C. (eds) 2002. Civil Society and Government. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Roniger, L. and Gunes-Ayata, A. 1994. Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Rontos, K. and Roumeliotou, M., 2013. Generalized social trust in Greece and its association with demographic and socio-economic predictors. Portuguese Journal of Social Science, 12(1), pp. 63–83. Sotiropoulos, D.A., 1996. Populism and Bureaucracy: The Case of Greece under PASOK, 1981–1989. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Sotiropoulos, D.A., 2004. Formal Weakness and Informal Strength: Civil Society in Contemporary Greece. Discussion Paper No. 16, London: Hellenic Observatory. Spourdalakis, M., 1988. The Rise of the Greek Socialist Party. London: Routledge. Theodoropoulos, S., 2012. Seeking a sustainable size and structure for the Greek public sector’s activities according to the fiscal pact for euro. SPOUDAI Journal, 62(3–4), pp. 75–92. Tsoukas H. and Papoulias, D.B. 2005. Managing third-order change: The case of the public power corporation in Greece. Long Range Planning, 38(1), pp. 79–95. Uslaner, E.M. and Conley, R. 2003. Civic engagement and particularized trust: The ties that bind people to their ethnic communities. American Politics Research, 31(4), pp. 331–60.

Informal Relationships and Structures in Greece

65

Van Oorschot, W., Arts, W. and Gelissen, J. 2006. Social capital in Europe: Measurement and social and regional distribution of a multifaceted phenomenon. Acta Sociologica. 49(2), pp. 149–67.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 5

Solidarity and Survival: A Multidisciplinary Exploration of Volunteering during the Greek Crisis Jennifer Clarke

Introduction Although there is no overall consensus on the meaning of the terms ‘third sector’ and ‘civil society’, most definitions of both include an element of volunteering as an important characteristic (e.g. Salamon and Anheier, 1997; Scholte, 2002; Kendall, 2009). As a contribution to the broader exploration of the effects of the crisis on the third sector and civil society in Greece, this chapter will therefore examine how volunteering has been affected by the turmoil of the past few years.1 The study of volunteering is, of course, subject to its own challenges of definition. In Greece, this has not been helped by a lack of legal definition or framework for volunteering, as noted by others (e.g. Afouxenidis, 2006; Polyzoidis, 2008). A recent initiative to promote comparable cross-national research in this field defines volunteering as ‘[u]npaid non-compulsory work; that is, time individuals give without pay to activities performed either through an organisation or directly for others outside their own household’ (ILO, 2011, p. 13).2 As Bourikos (2013) notes, this definition bridges the distinction that has frequently been made in the Greek literature between ‘formal’ volunteering within organisations and ‘informal’ volunteering in less structured contexts. This chapter, however, will focus on volunteering within organisations. This is due to both the practical need to delimit the study, and because volunteering in established organisations has arguably received less attention since the onset of the 1 The title of this chapter was in part inspired by the article of Beyerlein and Sikkink (2008) entitled ‘Sorrow and solidarity: Why Americans volunteered for 9/11 relief efforts’, which is discussed below. I am grateful to A. Huliaras and D.A. Sotiropoulos for their comments on an earlier version of this chapter. 2 While the clarity of this definition is useful for analytical purposes, it should be kept in mind that, in practice, the boundaries of what is understood as volunteering are not clear cut (Cnaan et al., 1996). In the Greek context, as elsewhere, the definition of ‘unpaid work’ is particularly problematic, given that volunteering may be motivated by economic incentives (see below).

68

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

crisis than participation in the various informal citizens’ movements and initiatives that have emerged (e.g. Ishkanian and Glasius, 2013; Pantazidou, 2013; Zambeta, 2014; Vathakou, Chapter 10). The boundaries between informal initiatives and established organisations are not always clear in practice, but the organisations included in this study were legally registered and respondents accepted the term ‘organisation’ as a description of the respective body. Existing data on volunteering in Greece during the crisis is limited and ambiguous. One of the challenges to understanding this issue is that the relevant variables are notoriously difficult to assess quantitatively, given that measurements are highly sensitive to the way in which questions are structured (Frane, 2006). In this context, the aim of this chapter is to enrich our currently limited understanding of volunteering in Greece during the crisis, through presenting new qualitative data on this theme, gathered through semi-structured interviews with representatives of 21 organisations which work with volunteers. The significance of this data will be interpreted, drawing on the multi-disciplinary ‘hybrid map’ of volunteering of Hustinx et al. (2010) and on other scholarship from the rich and diverse body of research on volunteering. The remainder of this chapter comprises of four parts. A brief overview offering an introduction to the subject of volunteering in Greece is followed by a summary of the theoretical framework and the methodology of the study. The subsequent section presents and analyses the findings of the study, whilst the final section discusses the implications of these findings, both at an empirical level and in relation to our conceptual understanding of the themes in question. Volunteering in Greece: An Overview Volunteering in Greece has been summed up as being ‘anaemic’ (Sotiropoulos, 2007; 2014). Over recent years there has been an increase in research in this field, although this has been hampered by the lack of comprehensive records regarding both volunteers and the organisations in which they work (European Commission, 2010; Greek Ministry of Education, 2012; Bourikos, 2013). Comparative studies have consistently indicated low levels of volunteering in the country. The first round of the European Social Survey (in 2002) indicated that levels of volunteering in Greece were amongst the lowest of the countries surveyed, along with those in Portugal, Italy and Spain (Jones et al., 2008, p. 180). Although their methodologies differ, both the 2006 Special Eurobarometer survey (European Commission, 2007) and a European Commission report on volunteering across the EU (European Commission, 2010a) also found Greece to have amongst the lowest levels of volunteering amongst EU-15 states. It is perhaps even more striking that Greece has been found consistently to have amongst the lowest levels of volunteering of over 130 countries included in the World Giving Index study (Charities Aid Foundation, 2010; 2012; 2013). The economic value of volunteering in Greece has

Solidarity and Survival

69

also been assessed to be amongst the lowest across the EU, estimated as less than 0.1% of the country’s GDP (European Commission, 2010a, p. 11). It has, however, been argued that participation in informal or ad hoc voluntary activities in Greece is somewhat higher than participation in formal organisations (Sotiropoulos, 2004; 2004a). Examples of informal or ad hoc volunteering include involvement with informal groups or networks, and spontaneous acts of volunteerism in response to specific events, such as the responses to the Athens earthquake of 1999 and to the forest fires of 2007 (Karamichas, 2007), and the participation of Olympic volunteers in 2004 (Polyzoidis, 2008). Research by the National Statistical Service of Greece has indicated that double the number of Greeks participate in informal volunteering compared to formal volunteering (Bourikos, 2013, p. 12). Analysts have put forward a number of explanations for the comparatively low volunteering levels, amongst which two main groups of arguments can be discerned. These are mutually interlinked, but can be distinguished for analytical purposes. The first of these groups of arguments is predominantly ‘top down’ and relates to the ways in which specific characteristics of the Greek state and political system are seen to be ‘obstructing the inclusion of citizens in public policy processes’ (Roumeliotis and Jones, 2010, p. 28) and hindering the development of volunteering amongst Greeks. A number of historical factors relating to the clientelistic nature of the state and the domination by political parties of the public sphere are seen to have inhibited the growth of independent civil society organisations (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 2005). A number of policy-level factors are also seen to have hindered the development of Greek civil society, including weak tax incentives for charitable giving and limited civic education in schools (Huliaras, Chapter 2). The second main group of arguments is predominantly ‘bottom up’ and relates to a lack of ‘volunteering mentality’ (European Commission, 2010, p. 18). Some analysts, noting similarities in this respect between Greece and other Mediterranean countries, have used terms such as ‘Mediterranean Syndrome’ (La Spina and Sciortino, 1993) to describe a ‘lack of a civic culture that can translate into an interest in engagement with collective goods that do not directly impact on what is seen as the familial and local (Karamichas, 2007, p. 522). Another ‘bottom up’ factor is the consistently low level of trust reported amongst Greeks – both in institutions and in their compatriots – which is considered to have inhibited involvement with voluntary organisations (Sotiropoulos, 2004; 2007; Jones et al., 2008). Several observers suggested that there had been a gradual increase in volunteering in the years prior to the crisis (Sotiropoulos, 2004, p. 24; European Commission, 2010a p. 8). In the absence of comprehensive statistical data, such observations have necessarily been based on estimates (European Commission, 2010a, p. 7, footnote 2). Moreover, there have been differences between the findings of studies of specific subsectors of Greek civil society organisations. For example, Polyzoidis (2008) noted a declining trend of engagement in welfare

70

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

organisations, whereas Karamichas (2007, p. 523) observed increasing levels of involvement with environmental organisations. A frequently reported explanation for a perceived increase in volunteering prior to the crisis is the impact of EU policies and programmes, which stimulated the creation of third sector initiatives in order to absorb available funding (Sotiropoulos, 2004, p. 24, European Commission, 2010, p. 17). Some have suggested that such top down initiatives had little effect on the underlying volunteering mentality, however. Ziomas argues that ‘it is only the minority of these [third sector] initiatives that base their strength on local solidarities, including voluntary work and civic commitment, elements which are still underdeveloped in Greece’ (2008, p. 328). Others have cited the influence of the Athens Olympic Games in 2004 as having a positive impact on public opinion towards volunteering. It is notable that some 160,000 volunteers officially registered to help at the Games (Polyzoidis, 2008, p. 98), a response which has been described as ‘perhaps the crowning moment of volunteering in the country’ (Greek Ministry of Education, 2012, p. 34) .3 Whilst it seems certain that the profound social shocks brought about by the economic crisis (see Chapter 1 for a summary) have had an impact on volunteering in Greece, the current data on this theme are limited and ambiguous. A comparison of Eurobarometer data from before and after the start of the crisis indicates that the proportion of Greeks who volunteer dropped from 18% in 2006 (European Commission, 2007, p. 36) to 14% in 2011 (European Commission, 2011, p. 6). According to the World Giving Index, the proportion of Greeks who volunteered their time to an organisation dropped from 5% in 2010 (Charities Aid Foundation, 2010) to 3% in 2012 (Charities Aid Foundation, 2012), but then climbed slightly to 4% in 2013 (Charities Aid Foundation, 2013). A small-scale volunteer survey (Human Grid, 2013) and other recent analyses (Greek Ministry of Education, 2012; Bourikos, 2013; Simiti, 2014) have reported an upward trend in volunteering, as have various media reports (e.g. Hope, 2012; Russo, 2012). This chapter aims to enrich our still limited understanding of this subject. Theoretical Framework and Methodology Research has shown that in everyday discourse ‘there is a tendency to de-politicize volunteer work, and to emphasize its virtuous and compassionate nature’ (Hustinx et al., 2010. p. 413). Indeed, a perceived increase in voluntary activity has sometimes been presumed to be a rare positive outcome of the Greek crisis (Zambeta, 2014). A normative view of volunteering as a desirable activity has also been widely promoted in political discourse, including at an EU level (e.g. European Council, 2009). However, as Wilson argues: ‘the generic term ‘volunteering’ embraces a vast array of quite disparate activities. It is probably not fruitful to try to explain 3 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for his/her suggestion regarding the significance of the 2004 Olympic Games.

Solidarity and Survival

71

all activities with the same theory nor to treat all activities as if they were the same with respect to consequences’ (2000, pp. 233–4). Different academic disciplines have made diverse contributions to the vast body of scholarship on volunteering, which can be drawn on in order to explore the significance of volunteering during the Greek crisis. In particular, various studies from different countries have explored volunteering in other difficult contexts, such as after terrorist attacks and natural disasters, and amongst unemployed and socially excluded groups. In order to take into account the widest possible range of these insights, this chapter will employ a multidisciplinary framework for analysing the data. More specifically, the ‘hybrid map’ of volunteering of Hustinx et al. (2010) will be drawn on, which in turn builds on Wilson’s work (2000; 2012) on synthesising some of the many and disparate branches of research on volunteering. This approach views volunteering as a ‘complex phenomenon’, and, amongst other things, highlights the ‘different meanings and functions’ (Hustinx et al., 2010, p. 411) of volunteering. The approach recognises the relevance of sociological, political, economic and psychological dimensions to the study of volunteering. These four dimensions will be used to structure the analysis below. As stated above, this study adopts a qualitative methodology. In order to gain an overview of general trends, and taking into account the limited time and resources available, the study focused on gathering data through semistructured interviews with representatives of a purposive sample of 21 NGOs that work with volunteers. This sample included 12 organisations based in the greater Athens area, and nine based in the northern region of Thrace, in order to ensure that the findings were not limited to the capital city. The organisations in the sample were selected to include a range of sizes, from small organisations with no paid staff to larger, professionalised organisations. They were also selected to include a variety of main areas of activity. These included working with children (three organisations), promoting volunteerism (three organisations), social welfare (three organisations), working with groups with special needs (three organisations), promoting culture (two organisations), protecting the environment (two organisations), working with young people (two organisations), international development (one organisation), mountain rescue (one organisation), and addressing addiction (one organisation). The fieldwork was conducted between November 2013 and June 2014. Respondents were asked about how the crisis had affected volunteering at their organisation, as well as about the reasons for any reported changes. The interviews were conducted in Greek and the responses were translated in to English by the author. In order to facilitate the uninhibited responses of the interviewees, all participating individuals and organisations remain anonymous and are referred to only by the relevant interview reference number. The limitations of such a smallscale study are acknowledged. The insights that are gained are only indicative and further research in this area is certainly needed.

72

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Presentation and Analysis of Findings A clear majority of organisations in both Athens and Thrace – 16 out of 21 organisations – reported an increase in the number of volunteers. Three organisations reported that the number of volunteers had not been affected by the crisis, and only two reported that they had seen the number of volunteers decrease. The activities for which the numbers of volunteers had increased were diverse. They included activities that were clearly related to the crisis, such as distributing food and giving free medical treatment. However, they also included a wide range of other activities, including running recreational programmes for children with special needs, mobilising young people in environmental projects, organising traditional cultural events, and fundraising to support international development work in Africa. This pattern supports the findings of other recent studies which have pointed to the emergence of a ‘new wave’ of volunteering in Greece since the start of the crisis (Bourikos, 2013). Drawing on the hybrid map of volunteering of Hustinx et al. (2010), the sociological, political, economic and psychological dimensions of the data will now be analysed, making reference to relevant literature in each case. Sociological Aspects A main focus of sociological approaches to the study of volunteering has been the exploration of how ‘ecological variables’, such as community characteristics and social networks, affect volunteering levels (Wilson, 2012, p. 178). Within this literature, particular emphasis has been given to the role of trust, due to its centrality to the concept of social capital, as conceptualised by Putnam and others, which has gained currency over recent years. Putnam (1993) highlights the positive correlation between voluntary involvement in various types of associations and organisations and levels of trust. He argues that features of social organisation ‘such as trust, norms and networks’ – by which he defines social capital (1996, p. 34) – can ‘enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives’ (1996, p. 34). Other studies have similarly demonstrated a correlation between volunteering and levels of trust, both between people and in civic institutions (see Jones et al., Chapter 3). In the light of such research, the reported increase in volunteers amongst Greek organisations is notable. In contrast to the positive correlation between volunteering levels and trust noted elsewhere, in the Greek context the apparent increase in levels of volunteering coincides with a sharp drop in reported levels of trust both between individuals and in institutions (Petrakis, 2012, pp. 145–7; Jones et al., Chapter 3). In order to understand this phenomenon, it is helpful to look beyond the general literature on volunteering, and to consider more specifically the research on volunteering in difficult circumstances. As Wilson notes, although it has been somewhat neglected in volunteerism studies more generally, solidarity is a sociological factor that has been found

Solidarity and Survival

73

to be important within studies of volunteering in crisis contexts (2012, p. 179). A number of studies of volunteering after natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes have shown that feelings of solidarity with victims of disaster increase the likelihood of volunteering, and that such feelings of solidarity tend to be higher amongst people who have themselves been affected or who live close to those who are suffering (O’Brien and Mileti, 1992; Kaniasty and Norris, 1995). In their exploration of the profile of volunteers in the rescue efforts in New York in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Beyerlein and Sikkink similarly argue that participation in volunteer efforts was related to volunteers’ feelings solidarity with victims of the disaster. They find that ‘[o]ne of the strongest factors was personal identification with victims, which was built through personal networks such as knowing someone who was killed or in danger during the attacks’ (2008, p. 190). Whilst the nature of the Greek crisis is obviously very different from such disasters, its impact is such that many if not most people can identify closely with those affected. It is notable that several of the respondents in this study referred to increased levels of solidarity when explaining the increased numbers of volunteers approaching their organisation. For example: In general there has been an increase in solidarity (A8) Young people want to do something to help in the crisis (A9) The crisis has affected us favourably, because solidarity has increased (T1) Volunteers have increased because people want to help in some way (T3)

The responses of the interviewees are in line with much of the public discourse that has emphasised the role of solidarity, particularly in relation to participation in the various new citizens’ initiatives, which have come to be known as ‘solidarity initiatives’ (Zambeta, 2014; Vathakou, Chapter 10). There is, of course, a possibility that respondents are reproducing this discourse in their interpretations of the increase in volunteering, and further research is needed with individual volunteers in order for firmer conclusions to be reached. Political Aspects Political science perspectives on volunteering have given particular emphasis to the relationships between volunteering and involvement in political processes (Hustinx et al., 2010, p. 419). Participation in voluntary organisations has been interpreted as an alternative form of political engagement, which has increased as trust in traditional political parties and institutions has decreased in many modern democracies (Inglehart, 1999). In line with such views, recent analyses of the informal citizens’ initiatives that have grown in Greece during the crisis have emphasised their political character. For example, Pantazidou argues that the growth

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

74

of such initiatives reflects that fact an increasing number of citizens are moving towards ‘anti-hierarchical, horizontal networks that resist the consequences of the economic crisis and create alternatives to the current democratic and economic model’ (2013, p. 755, see also Vathakou, Chapter 10). However, the majority of the representatives of the organisations interviewed within this study did not mention a political dimension to the engagement of their volunteers. The response of only one respondent can be interpreted as relating to such engagement. The representative of an organisation that cares for disadvantaged children stated that: The new generation have begun to realise that they need to get involved with changing society … The new generation of 17 to 22 year olds has started to get more involved and they have realised that they can change things through small actions. (A10)

Further research with individual volunteers is needed to gain a clearer picture of the relationship between political engagement and volunteering in the crisis. Nevertheless, the lack of evidence for the relevance of political engagement to volunteering within the majority of the organisations included in this study is in line with other recent research which found that fewer than 10% of young Greeks surveyed considered that participation in or support of an NGO was the most effective way for citizens to make their voices heard by policymakers (VPRC, 2013). A limited role of political engagement amongst volunteers does not mean that the act of volunteering itself is without political significance. Indeed, various commentators have noted that when volunteer activities relate to addressing social problems, they are linked the broader political context in which the problems arose whether or not the volunteers themselves are aware of this (Penner, 2004; Eliasoph, 2012). This issue is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter. Economic Aspects Economic approaches to the study of volunteering offer various insights regarding how volunteering relates to economic resources and rewards (Hustinx et al., 2010, pp. 415–16). These include the resources that volunteers have at their disposal, as well as the rewards they may gain through volunteering. Several studies from different countries have found that low-income earners tend to volunteer less than higher earners and that unemployed individuals volunteer less than those in employment (Pho, 2008, p. 233; Wilson, 2012, p. 187; European Commission, 2010a, p. 9). Within the present study there was little evidence, however, to suggest that levels of volunteering in Greece have been negatively affected by the widespread drop in income levels and sharp rise in unemployment since the beginning of the crisis. Only one respondent – a representative of one of the two organisations which reported a drop in volunteer numbers – made such a link, stating that:

Solidarity and Survival

75

We work for the environment, and the environment has become a luxury. If someone has been fired, if they are trying to feed their family, I can’t go and ask them to get involved in protecting trees. It’s not a priority. (K9)

Conversely, another respondent suggested that falling income levels had contributed to an increase in volunteers, describing how, in many cases, people who had previously supported the organisation through charitable donations were turning to volunteering ‘as an alternative for the financial support which they cannot give’ (A3). Other research has highlighted how volunteering can offer specific benefits to unemployed and socially excluded groups, including providing an opportunity to develop skills and contacts which may lead to employment (Nichols and Ralston, 2011). In line with such research, it was clear from several of the responses in this study that many of the new volunteers are indeed unemployed individuals who see volunteering as a potential route to employment. For example: [The volunteers] are usually young people, often looking for work. (A12) The number of volunteers has increased in some way as young people are looking for opportunities … There has been an increase in young people looking for volunteer programmes abroad. Before they were not so interested, now they are unemployed and looking for opportunities. (T2)

There was also evidence from the study that economic factors were playing an even more direct role in the motivation of some volunteers. The volunteers of several welfare organisations were simultaneously beneficiaries of the organisations’ activities, who, though volunteering, gained preferential access to the welfare services offered. Such volunteers have been termed ‘beneficiary volunteers’ (Evans and Clarke, 2010). Thus the representative of an organisation that distributed food reported that: Half of our volunteers are beneficiaries. They take food donations themselves and they help us to distribute it to others … Partly it is an exchange rather than volunteering, but they don’t have to do it. (A12)

Another organisation which distributed second-hand goods reported that: All of our volunteers are also our beneficiaries. Some of them are in a terrible situation. One of our volunteers doesn’t have water in her house – it was cut off – so she always drinks a lot before she leaves here. (A1)

In such instances volunteering is at least in part a way of meeting the urgent needs of the volunteers themselves. Whilst this practice may not correspond to the common ‘ideal type’ of volunteering as not involving any form of compensation

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

76

(Cnaan et al., 1996), it can still be seen as falling within the definition of volunteering given above, since the work is not paid, non-compulsory and serves others, at least in part. Such cases do, however, highlight the permeability of the boundaries between what is understood as volunteering and what is not (Cnaan et al., 1996). Bourikos (2013) also gives similar examples of beneficiaries working as volunteers for Greek organisations. There have been few references (e.g. Evans and Clarke, 2010) to this practice in the wider literature on volunteering, however. Though potentially posing ethical challenges, as Bourikos notes (2013), it is a practice which is likely to be more frequent in crisis contexts, and which would merit further study. Psychological Aspects Psychological approaches to the study of volunteering have focused on exploring key psychological traits that effect the predisposition of an individual to volunteer, as well as the psychological impact of volunteering (Hustinx et al., 2010, pp. 418–19). Studies from a range of different countries have tended to link volunteering to a range of positive psychological dispositions. It has been found that individuals are more likely to volunteer if they have extrovert personalities (Bekkers, 2005; Omoto, Snyder and Hackett, 2010, p. 1719) or positive emotionality (Atkins, Hart and Donnelly, 2005). Given the correlation between the effects of the economic crisis and an increase in anxiety and depression-related disorders (WHO, 2011, Economou et al., 2011), it seems unlikely that extroversion or positive emotionality could have played a significant role in the reported increase in volunteering during the Greek crisis, and there was no evidence from the study to suggest this. As above, it is useful to turn to the literature which deals more specifically with volunteering in difficult circumstances. Research into volunteering amongst unemployed and socially excluded groups has identified that volunteering can bring a number of psychological benefits, including a sense of job satisfaction that would be otherwise derived from paid work (Nichols and Ralston, 2011), or as a way of overcoming a sense of being ‘undeserving’ and ‘parasitic’ (Fuller et al., 2008). Several respondents in this study indicated that volunteering had such psychological benefits for volunteers who were unemployed and/ or living in poverty. For example: Unemployed people often want to do something to fill their time, they might just want get out of the house. (A9) [Through volunteering] they feel that they are giving, not just taking. It changes them. They all come to us thinking that they are the only one in that situation. They come and see that there are others – and some that are worse off than they are … They become more positive, have more energy. (A12)

Solidarity and Survival

77

Although further study with individual volunteers is needed, this data suggests that volunteering may play a role in the psychological as well as economic survival strategies for individuals who have been adversely affected by the crisis. Discussion and Conclusions This study has added to the small but growing body of evidence that formal volunteering in organisations has increased during the Greek crisis. There is some evidence to suggest that that the biggest increase in volunteers had been seen by organisations which are directly involved in tackling the effects of the crisis. One respondent from an organisation which promotes volunteering and which has links with a large number of other voluntary organisations, reported that: NGOs involved with social welfare have seen a big increase in volunteering. Others [ … ] are less affected. (A11)

Given the important role of solidarity, as noted above, it is understandable that many volunteers choose to become involved in activities that directly address the consequences of the crisis. However, a more surprising finding is that the increase in volunteering has also been experienced by organisations whose work is not directly related to the crisis. A similar pattern emerged in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in New York, whereby crisis intervention organisations registered an eight-fold increase in volunteer enquiries, but other volunteer organisations also registered a two to three-fold increase in volunteering enquiries (Penner, 2004). To some extent this phenomenon can also be explained by an increase in feelings of solidarity, which may lead some people to a general desire to help others, regardless of whether their needs were created by the crisis. A respondent from an international development organisation – which had no projects in Greece – explained the increase in volunteers in such terms: The economic crisis has led many of our fellow human beings to awareness of their universal identity as citizens and to the need for active solidarity. (A3)

Similarly, a respondent from an organisation which supports disabled people reported that numbers of volunteers had more than doubled over the past two years, due to the increase in people who want to help others (A8). However, as seen above, solidarity is not the only factor which has contributed to the new wave of volunteering during the Greek crisis. In many cases volunteering appears to be part of an economic and/or psychological survival strategy for volunteers who have themselves been adversely affected by the crisis. The reported increase in volunteering should be kept in perspective. Given the very low figures prior to the start of the crisis, the proportion of the population

78

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

involved in formal volunteering in Greece is still likely to be low in comparison to that found in other countries (Sotiropoulos, 2014; Huliaras, Chapter 2). The significance of the new wave of volunteering should not just be measured in quantitative terms, however. The above analysis suggests that that the impact of the crisis on volunteering is also qualitative. One shift resulting from the changes noted above appears to be an increasing proportion of young volunteers, some apparently motivated by solidarity, and others by the need to find employment. There was also some indication that the increased involvement of young volunteers is contributing to new and innovative approaches amongst some organisations. A respondent from an organisation that promotes volunteering and has links with many other organisations stated that: I expected the increased activity in the area of welfare. But for me the big surprise was how many original and imaginative ideas there are now, coming from young people … The impressive thing is that it is the young generation with these original ideas … Five years ago I couldn’t have imagined these types of activities. The crisis has brought out this originality, and has motivated young people to be active in these ways. (A11)

For example, a number of organisations are now using recent technology to map where volunteers are needed, to communicate with them, and to mobilise them. This contrasts sharply with Polyzoidis’ earlier description of the typical social welfare volunteer organisation: ‘Management is carried out with an outdated, traditional way, and the performance in using modern techniques is very poor’ (2008, p. 101). In conclusion, volunteering in Greece could be said to have become a little less anaemic during the crisis. It has been fortified by a new wave of crisis volunteering that appears to be both quantitatively and qualitatively different to previous patterns. Significantly, and largely in contrast to the patterns observed prior to the crisis, this new wave of volunteering appears to be driven by bottom-up factors. This is reflected in the fact that many organisations are apparently struggling to absorb the numbers of volunteers available, in a reversal of the previously observed tendency for volunteering to be driven by opportunities created by funding programmes. The representative of an organisation that links volunteers with organisations stated that ‘[a]t the moment there are more volunteers than there are places available within organisations’ (A2). In this context, an important question for the future development of the third sector in Greece is how this new wave of volunteering will affect the development of the sector in the longer term. Crisis situations have been associated with shortterm fluctuations in patterns of volunteering that have little relevance to longerterm trends. Musick and Wilson (2008, p. 370) state that:

Solidarity and Survival

79

We are not interested in short-term fluctuations in volunteering. People frequently respond to emergencies by volunteering. Many of them have never volunteered before and will probably never volunteer again.

It is indeed likely that the number of volunteers in Greece will drop again as the effects of the crisis ease. However, there is some evidence that the current wave of volunteering has been sufficiently sustained – due to the protracted nature of the crisis – to have a longer term impact on the development of Greek civil society organisations. At an organisational level, it seems likely that some of the innovations that have been introduced will continue to affect the organisations’ way of working. Apart from the introduction of new technologies, noted above, the increase of volunteer numbers is leading some organisations to make changes to their approaches to managing volunteers. An organisation that promotes volunteering was overwhelmed by the response to a training session on volunteer management: over 100 applications to attend the session had been received, and further sessions were planned (A2). Another respondent noted that: ‘We are just beginning to become more organised’ in terms of volunteer management (A8). At a broader institutional level, it was suggested by one organisation representative that the increased visibility of volunteer initiatives had increased political support for the creation of a legal framework for volunteers – a longstanding demand of NGOs which until recently had received little attention by policymakers.4 However, only time will tell what will be the longer term legacy of the current wave of crisis volunteering. At a conceptual level, it is notable that Greek crisis volunteering appears to share a number of characteristics with volunteering in various other difficult situations. Arguably, one of the reasons that volunteering tends to be idealised in public and political discourse is that it is associated with a number of positive characteristics identified in the many studies of volunteering in non-crisis contexts, such as social trust, political participation, economic security and positive emotionality. By contrast, volunteering in situations of crisis and other difficult circumstances appears to be more closely associated with solidarity aroused by proximity to suffering and increased economic and psychological needs on the part of volunteers themselves. Without questioning the importance of the work conducted by volunteers in crisis situations, the significance of increased levels of volunteering in such difficult circumstances is clearly more ambivalent than is frequently acknowledged.

4 At the time of writing, a draft law including provision for a legal framework for volunteering was at the stage of public consultation (available at: < http://www.opengov. gr/ypes/?p=2465>).

80

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

References Afouxenidis, A. 2006. Όψεις της κοινωνίας πολιτών στην Ελλάδα: το παράδειγμα των περιβαλλοντικών και αντιρατσιστικών ΜΚΟ [Aspects of civil society in Greece: The example of environmental and anti-racist NGOs]. Επιστήμη και Κοινωνία [Science and Society], 16 (Spring-Summer), pp. 163–78. Atkins, R., Hart, D. and Donnelly, T., 2005. The association of childhood personality type with volunteering during adolescence. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 51(2), pp. 145–62. Bekkers, R., 2005. Participation in voluntary associations: Relations with resources, personality, and political values. Political Psychology, 26(3), pp. 439–54. Beyerlein, K. and Sikkink, D., 2008. Sorrow and solidarity: Why Americans volunteered for 9/11 relief efforts. Social Problems, 55(2), pp. 190–215. Bourikos, D., 2013. Κοινωνική αλληλεγγύη στην Ελλάδα της κρίσης: Νέο κύμα ανάδυσης της κοινωνίας πολιτών ή εμπέδωση της κατακερματισμένης κοινωνικής ιδιότητας του πολίτη; [Social solidarity in crisis Greece: A new wave of civil society growth or a consolidation of fragmented social citizenship?] Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. Charities Aid Foundation, 2010. World Giving Index 2010. [online] London: Charities Aid Foundation. Available at: https://www.cafonline.org/pdf/ WorldGivingIndex28092010Print.pdf [Accessed 13 August 2014]. Charities Aid Foundation, 2012. World Giving Index 2012. [online] London: Charities Aid Foundation. Available at: www.cafonline.org/pdf/ worldgivingindex2012web.pdf [Accessed 13 August 2014]. Charities Aid Foundation, 2013. World Giving Index 2013. [online] London: Charities Aid Foundation. Available at: https://www.cafonline.org/PDF/ WorldGivingIndex2013_1374AWEB.pdf [Accessed 13 August 2014]. Cnaan, R.A., Handy, F. and Wadsworth, M., 1996. Defining who is volunteer: Conceptual and empirical considerations. Non Profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 25(3), pp. 364–83. Economou, M., Madianos, M., Theleritis, C., Peppou, L.E. and Stefanis. C., 2011. Increased suicidality amid economic crisis in Greece. Lancet, 378 (9801), pp. 1459–60. Eliasoph, N., 2012. The Politics of Volunteering. Cambridge: Polity Press. European Commission, 2007. Special Eurobarometer 273/ Wave 66.3. European Social Reality. [online] Brussels: European Commission. Available at: [Accessed 14 August 2014]. European Commission, 2010. Study on Volunteering in the European Union, Country Report Greece. [online] Brussels: European Commission, Educational, Audiovisual & Culture Executive Agency. Available at: [Accessed 14 August 2014]. European Commission, 2010a. Volunteering in the European Union. Final Report Submitted by GHK. [online] Brussels: European Commission, Educational,

Solidarity and Survival

81

Audiovisual & Culture Executive Agency. Available at: [Accessed 14 August 2014]. European Commission, 2011. Special Eurobarometer Wave 75.2. Volunteering and Intergenerational Solidarity [online] Brussels: European Commission. Available at: [Accessed 14 August 2014]. European Council, 2009. Proposal for a Council Decision on the European Year of Volunteering. [online] Brussels: European Council. Available at: [Accessed 14 August 2014]. Evans, S.H. and Clarke, P., 2010. Training volunteers to run information technologies. A case study of effectiveness at community food pantries. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 39(3), pp. 524–35. Frane, F., 2006. Social Capital Across Europe – Findings, Trends And Methodological Shortcomings of Cross-National Surveys. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. [online] Available at: [Accessed 14 August 2014]. Fuller, S., Kershaw, P. and Pulkingham, J., 2008. Constructing ‘active citizenship’: Single mothers, welfare, and the logics of voluntarism. Citizenship Studies, 12(2), pp. 157–76. Greek Ministry of Education, 2012. Μελέτη για τη Διερεύνηση και αποτύπωση της τρέχουσας κατάστασης του Εθελοντισμού στην Ελλάδα [Study to investigate and map the current state of volunteering in Greece]. [Available at: [Accessed 14 August 2014]. Hope, K., 2012. Volunteers step in as Greek poverty soars. Financial Times Online, [online] 16 April. Available at: [Accessed 14 August 2014]. Human Grid, 2013. Παρουσίαση αποτελεσματων πανελλαδικής έρευνας για τον Εθελοντισμό και τις συλλογικές δράσεις αλληλεγγύης [Presentation of results of a nationwide research on volunteerism and collective solidarity activities in Greece]. [online] Available at: [Accessed 14 August 2014]. Hustinx, L., Cnaan, R.A. and Handy, F., 2010. Navigating theories of volunteering: A hybrid map for a complex phenomenon. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 40(4), pp. 410–34. ILO, 2011. Manual on the Measurement of Volunteer Work. Geneva: International Labour Organization. Available at: [Accessed 14 August 2014]. Inglehart, R., 1999. Postmodernization brings declining respect for authority but rising support for democracy. In: P. Norris (ed.) Critical Citizens: Support for Democratic Government. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 236–56. Ishkanian A. and Glasius M., 2013. Reclaiming Democracy in the Square? Interpreting the Movements of 2011–12. [online] London: Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science. Available

82

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

at: [Accessed 14 August 2014]. Jones, N., Malesios, C., Iosifides, T. and Sofoulis, C.M. 2008. Social capital in Greece: Measurement and comparative perspectives. South European Society & Politics, 13(2), pp. 175–93. Kaniasty, K. and Norris, F.H., 1995. In search of altruistic community: Patterns of social support mobilization following hurricane Hugo. American Journal of Community Psychology, 23(4), pp. 447–77. Karamichas, J., 2007. The impact of the summer 2007 forest fires in Greece: Recent environmental mobilizations, cyber-activism and electoral performance. South European Society and Politics, 12(4), pp. 521–33. Kendall, J., 2009. The third sector and the policy process in the UK: Ingredients in a hyperactive horizontal policy environment. In: J. Kendall (ed.) Handbook of Third Sector Policy in Europe: Multi-level Processes and Organised Civil Society. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 67–94. La Spina, A. and Sciortino, G., 1993. Common agenda, southern rules: European integration and environmental change in the Mediterranean states. In: J.D. Liefferink, P.D. Lowe and P.J. Mol (eds) London: Belhaven Press, pp. 217–36. Mouzelis, N. and Pagoulatos, G., 2005. Civil society and citizenship in post-war Greece. In: F. Birtek and T. Dragonas (eds) Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey. London: Routledge, pp. 87–103. Musick, M. and Wilson, J., 2008. Volunteers: A Social Profile. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Nichols, G. and Ralston, R., 2011. Social inclusion through volunteering: The legacy potential of the 2012 Olympic Games. Sociology, 45(5), pp. 900–14. O’Brien, P. and Mileti, D., 1992. Citizen participation in emergency response following the Loma Prieta earthquake. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 10(1), pp. 71–89. Omoto, A., Snyder, M. and Hackett, J., 2010. Personality and motivational antecedents of activism and social engagement. Journal of Personality, 78(6), pp. 1703–1734. Pantazidou, M., 2013. Treading new ground: A changing moment for citizen action in Greece. Development in Practice, 23(5–6), pp. 755–70. Penner, L.A., 2004. Volunteerism and social problems: Making things better or worse? Journal of Social Issues, 60(3), pp. 645–66. Petrakis, P.E., 2012. The Greek Economy and the Crisis Challenges and Responses. New York: Springer. Pho, Y., 2008. The value of volunteer labor and the factors influencing participation: Evidence for the United States from 2002 through 2005. Review of Income and Wealth, 54(2), pp. 220–36. Polyzoidis, P., 2008. Social welfare voluntarism in Greece: A fall before the rise? Social Cohesion and Development, 3(2), pp. 93–108.

Solidarity and Survival

83

Putnam, R., 1993. Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R., 1996. The strange disappearance of civic America. American Prospect, 24, pp. 34–48. Roumeliotis, S. and Jones, N., 2010. Volunteerism in the context of environmental Non-Governmental Organizations in Greece. International Journal of the Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, 4(12), pp. 27–34. Russo, M,. 2012. Alarming poverty rates in Greece spark volunteer movement. The Cultureist, [online] 18 April. Available at: [Accessed 14 August 2014]. Salamon, L.M. and Anheier, H.K., 1997. Defining the Non-profit Sector: A Crossnational Analysis. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Scholte, J.A., 2002. Civil society and democracy in global governance, Global Governance, 8(3), pp. 281–304. Simiti, M., 2014. Κράτος και Κοινωνία Πολιτών την περίοδο της Οικονομικής Κρίσης [The State and the Voluntary Sector during the Economic Crisis in Greece]. Greek Political Science Review, 14 (July), pp. 36–61. Sotiropoulos, D.A., 2004. Formal Weakness and Informal Strength: Civil Society in Contemporary Greece. London: The Hellenic Observatory, The European Institute, LSE. Sotiropoulos, D.A. (ed.) 2004a. Η άγνωστη κοινωνία πολιτών [The Unknown Civil Society]. Athens: Potamos. Sotiropoulos, D.A., 2007. Υποθέσεις εργασίας και ανοικτά ερωτήματα στη βιβλιογραφία για την ελληνική κοινωνία πολιτών [Working hypotheses and open questions in the literature on the Greek civil society]. In: X. Kondiadis and H. Anthopoulos, eds. Kρίση του πολιτικού συστήματος; [Crisis of the Greek political system?]. Athens: Papazisi Publications, pp. 317–30. Sotiropoulos, D.A., 2014. Civil Society in the Wake of the Economic Crisis. Athens: Konrad Adenauer Foundation Greece, and Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. VPRC, 2013. Οι Νέοι και η Στάση τους απέναντι στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση [Young People and their stance towards the European Union]. [online] Available at: [Accessed 14 August 2014]. WHO, 2011. Impact of economic crises on mental health. [online] Copenhagen: World Health Organization. Available at: [Accessed 14 August 2014]. Wilson, J., 2000. Volunteering. Annual Review of Sociology, 26(1), pp. 215–40. Wilson, J., 2012. Volunteerism research a review essay. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 41(2), pp. 176–212. Zambeta, E., 2014. Education and social solidarity in times of crisis: The case of voluntary shadow education in Greece. Education Inquiry, 5(1), pp. 69–88.

84

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Ziomas, D., 2008. Social co-operatives for persons with mental health problems in Greece: A specific form of social enterprise. In: S. Osborne, ed. The Third Sector in Europe: Prospects and Challenges. London: Routledge, pp. 327–38.

Chapter 6

Urban Social Movements in Greece: Dominant Discourses and the Reproduction of ‘Weak’ Civil Societies1 Lila Leontidou

Major Discontinuities in Urban Greece, 1981–2014 Dominant discourses on civil society in Europe prioritise NGOs and voluntary associations in general (Ruzza, 2004) rather than social movements as an emancipatory cultural and political force and indeed the ‘third sector’ in sociopolitical structures. Governments fund NGOs to fill societal gaps in the waning welfare state, most authors throw positive light on NGOs as antidotes to clientelism and family networks and sometimes refer to social movement organisations (SMOs), too.2 NGOs are more formal and do not by definition compose a ‘strong’ civil society, because they are often dependent on the state. They are usually statesupported or elite- and bourgeois-sponsored associations (Afouxenidis, 2004; 2014). In works that prioritise NGOs, ‘civil society’ is simplistically understood as complementary to the state apparatus [ … ] rather than as a source of potentially disruptive forces and energies – sometimes radical/ revolutionary forces and energies which challenge the status quo …

1 Part of the research for this chapter was conducted during the Senior Fellowship awarded to the author by the LSE in March–July 2012, for which I am very grateful. Another part was completed with the kind support of the European University Institute (EUI), Florence, which funded the Mersin Workshop in March 2013, and to which we are indebted. The author also wishes to thank A. Huliaras and an anonymous referee for their constructive comments. 2 SMOs are different from spontaneous social movements, but literature on the role of the latter in civil societies, as, for example, Della Porta and Diani (2006), does not differentiate between them adequately. As for NGOs, some have started as social movements, but the movements analysed in this chapter, especially the Indignados and Aganaktismenoi, cannot be considered as NGOs, because they do not have the relevant formal characteristics, i.e. a legal form and an organisational hierarchy.

86

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece A social movement may contain organizations, while an NGO is an organization in itself. (Souza, 2013, p. 259)

NGOs are formal and ‘overwhelmingly professional organisations driven by funders, boards and directors rather than members’ (Pithouse, 2013, p. 253). Members, people and collectivities, are subsumed and often forgotten in narratives about NGOs using fashionable concepts like ‘social capital’, ‘political opportunity structures’ (or processes, according to Montagna, 2006), ‘resource mobilisation’, and other concepts concerning the ‘third sector’. In this context, countries such as Greece, which have been dominated by spontaneous social movements for a long period, are branded ‘weak’ civil societies (Leontidou, 2010). The coexistence of this with a weak welfare state is a conspicuous contradiction in relevant narratives: if both civil society and the welfare state are weak and yet society functions, who takes up the tasks of the latter? Our answer in this chapter is neither patronage nor NGOs, as usual, but social movements, at times, and often just nobody. The definitions used here are based on Gramsci’s work, his definition of civil society and especially the ‘geographical’ aspects of his Notebooks: the exposure of the constructivism of the European South (see below, Neoliberal Possessiveness, Coercion and Quasi-Orientalism), which is repeated today on a wider scale, the relationship between civil societies, social movements and urban settlements, and the concept of spontaneity. Gramsci’s path-breaking couplets, such as state/civil society, hegemonic/coercive power, organic/traditional intellectuals, productive/ parasitic activities, and especially his concept of ‘spontaneity’/conscious leadership (but not organisation; Leontidou, 2012a; 2014) are all basic in understanding Mediterranean civil societies in their urban context. In fact, Gramsci presents one of the earliest attempts to discuss Southern civil societies as distinct from the state. Contrasting with mainstream approaches, usually based on Hegel and Locke’s state which contains civil society (Bobbio, 1979, p. 22), ‘Gramsci’s theory introduces a profound innovation with respect to the whole Marxist tradition. Civil society in Gramsci does not belong to the structural moment, but to the superstructural one’ (Bobbio, 1979, p. 30, his emphasis). This is evident in the following famous extract (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12): What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural ‘levels’: the one that can be called ‘civil society’, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private’, and that of ‘political society’ or ‘the State’. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of ‘hegemony’ which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of ‘direct domination’ or command exercised through the State and ‘juridical’ government.

The above extract connects the couplets state/civil society and domination/ hegemony, and presents dominant groups as drivers of civil society. However, in our present time of crisis, civil society is detached from the dominant groups,

Urban Social Movements in Greece

87

which are no longer hegemonic, as argued in yet another famous extract by Gramsci (1971, p. 275–6): If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer ‘leading’ but only ‘dominant’, exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously, etc. The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.

In Mediterranean Europe such ‘morbid symptoms’ during the present crisis can be discerned in coercion, police brutality, ‘urbicide’, and the rise of neo-Nazi groups, as well as the emergence of quasi-Orientalist discourses of the dominant bloc, which will be contrasted in this chapter with struggles against such ‘morbid symptoms’. All means have been used by power elites to subsume alternative grassroots initiatives into the dominant cultures and values and to annihilate the momentum of social movements in strengthening those ‘weak’ civil societies of the past, instead of appreciating their contribution. Our focus on 2010–2014, when the debt crisis is at its worst, will offer the opportunity for reflection on the bleak future opened up by hostile top-down policy: while often supportive of NGOs, both Greek and European ruling elites are outright hostile to the creation of strong grassroots movements and consequently civil societies.3 This is an international trend, as argued by Harvey (2014, p. 280), who points to increasingly violent militarised responses to any and all movements that threaten to break through the walls of that repressive tolerance so crucial to the perpetuation of liberal governmentality. Consider as examples the unduly violent police repression of the Occupy movement in the United States; the even more violent response to ongoing peaceful protests in Turkey that began in Taksim Square; police actions in Syntagma Square in Athens that smack of the fascist tactics of Golden Dawn; the continuous police brutality visited on student protesters in Chile; the government-organised attack upon protesters against the unsafe labour conditions in Bangladesh; the militarisation of the response to the Arab Spring movement in Egypt; the murder of union leaders in Colombia 3 See Part 3 and Leontidou (2014). The three ‘collective bads’ specified by Almeida (2010: 305–6) are all present in Greece: State repression/ Erosion in fundamental political rights/ State-attributed economic problems. The EU is especially active in the latter two, also through the Troika, while the state exercises repression through police brutality. In addition, hostile discourses against the dignity of citizens emanate from both the Greek and the EU dominant blocs. It is not spontaneous social movements which have benefited from EU support, but always organisations, NGOs, in the form of Civil Society Organisations; see for example Souza (2013), Sanchez Salgado (2013). Spontaneous social movements are treated with coercive apparatuses in Greece until 2014.

88

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece and many more. All of this is occurring in the midst of a rapidly widening net of surveillance, monitoring and punitive legislative activism on the part of state apparatuses intent on waging a war on terror and liable to view any active and organised anti-capitalist dissent as akin to an act of terror.

The analysis of contentious cultures and politics in postwar Greece until 2014 in this chapter highlights three periods of intense social transformation. These have affected social movements in stages different from those anticipated in the current bibliography. There are several periodisations proposed, such as that by Bringel and Echart Munoz (2010), who suggest four periods of social movements during the 20th century, and Kousis (2014) who adds a fifth one during the 21st. For Greece, however, there are not five phases, because the first four phases are not so discernible (Leontidou, 2010): transformations can be considered in the light of three periods separated by two turning points, as we will argue here. Greek social movements have changed since the 20th century following three basic discontinuities affecting overall Greek socio-economic and cultural development. The first happened as a result of EU accession (Leontidou, 1990). In the second part of this chapter we will argue that, though there was a period of illusion about the strengthening of civil societies after the overthrow of dictatorships in the South and EC Southern enlargement (the accession of Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986), spontaneous urban social movements were undermined in this transition. The other two major discontinuities, on which this chapter focuses, appeared at the turn of the 21st century. The first of these was a transformation at the level of political economy, social restructuring and urban development. After a long period of wide distribution of land and urbanisation profits and value to large populations in the 20th century, the country passed into neoliberal possessiveness by the 21st century: mounting privatisation, accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2012; 2014), the concentration into a few hands of the provision of infrastructure, land development and speculative profit through frequent land-grabbing procedures. Sellout of the ports (airports had come first), the occupation of the coasts, of the city centres, pending evictions and other indications of the passage from dispersal to concentration are under way in Greece during the debt crisis (Leontidou, 2014). This very important rupture in urban development became obvious during preparations for the Olympics, but it had started earlier, about a decade after EU accession. The other basic discontinuity at the turn of the 21st century relates to the widening use of the Internet and the consequent speed of communication and the new public realm affecting civil societies. In the 21st century, Information and Communication Technologies (henceforth ICT), digital broadband technology, wireless communication and social media have penetrated economic, political and socio-cultural life with enormous speed and dissemination (Castells, 2012; ESPON SIESTA, 2013; Gonzalez and Carril, 2013; Afouxenidis, 2014). Wireless technology and digital communication have become interactive, and Web 2.0

Urban Social Movements in Greece

89

applications4 have penetrated every household. Greece has low Internet penetration in relation to its EU partners: an interesting mapping by ESPON SIESTA (2013) shows low broadband penetration (15–30%) and low e-commerce in Greece during 2006–9, coupled with a high rate of individuals who have never used a computer in comparison to other EU countries (Gonzalez and Carril, 2013, Leontidou et al., 2013). However, the young generation tends to be most frequently online through mobile phones, tablets and laptops. Their small illuminated screens show that they are vividly active during concerts and other events in public spaces, but also during mobilisations in the city streets and piazzas. The above two major discontinuities since the turn of the 21st century not only create shifts and transitions affecting civil societies, but also influence the state of constitutional democracy and political participation (Afouxenidis, 2014). In the third part of this chapter it will be shown that, unfortunately, the debt crisis has had an erosive effect based on the onslaught of neoliberalism, urban entrepreneurialism, privatisation and accumulation by dispossession. These have brought back the era of the reproduction of ‘weak’ civil societies during the 21st century. However, contentious citizens have started blurring this picture. Increasingly, social movements have culminated in the electoral victory of the Left. Grassroots creativity, facilitated by the dissemination of ICT, tends toward the strengthening of civil societies, as argued in the fourth part of this chapter. It is expected then that we will find oscillations in mobilisation strategies and types 4 We thus name a wide range of interactive social networking sites, concisely presented by the Institute of Employment Studies (2009: 7): Facebook – a social networking service where users create personal profiles, add other users as friends and exchange messages, including automatic notifications when they update their own profile; additionally, users may join common-interest user groups, organised by common characteristics (e.g. workplace); Twitter – a microblogging service enabling its users to send and read publicly visible messages called tweets, i.e. text-based posts of up to 140 characters displayed on the user’s profile page; users may subscribe to other users’ tweets; LinkedIn – a business-related social networking site mainly used for professional networking, users maintain a list of contact details of people with whom they have some level of relationship, called connections and this list can then be used to build up a contact network, follow different companies and institutions and find jobs, people and business opportunities; MySpace – an online community of users’ personal profiles, which typically include photographs, information about personal interests and blogs; users send one another messages and socialise within the MySpace community; YouTube – a video-sharing website on which users can upload, share, and view videos, including a wide variety of user-generated video content, including film and TV clips as well as amateur content such as video blogging; media corporations including the BBC also offer some of their material via the site; most videos enable users to leave and exchange comments; Wikipedia – a collaborative web-based encyclopaedia project with 18 million articles in 2009, and millions more today, which have been written collaboratively by volunteers around the world, and almost all articles are freely editable by any visitor. The latter is a prominent web 2.0 site but not an example of social networking site per se; and there are many other web 2.0 sites, multiplying every day.

90

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

of spontaneous action in Greek social movements, directly affected by the abovementioned two 21st-century discontinuities and fundamental double ruptures. This is the place to expand on them, following which we will finally turn to policyrelevant options in the last part of this chapter. Spontaneous Urban Development and Civil Society in the 20th Century During the interwar period, the legendary cosmopolitan cities of the broader Mediterranean – Constantinople, Thessaloniki, Alexandria, and the unluckiest of all, burnt Smyrna – turned to national or, occasionally, provincial cities. Interwar Athens and Thessaloniki were flooded by refugees after the Asia Minor disaster in 1922 and the population exchange with Turkey, and became a prototype of Mediterranean, or even Third World, rapid urbanisation without industrialisation from the 1920s to the 1970s. Greek civil society after refugee settlement was subsumed not only to state control, but also international intervention. This was primarily a period of assisted informality in the context of foreign aid and sympathy. Informal work was assisted, and so was self-employment and informal housing surrounding the city. The League of Nations and the Refugee Settlement Commission (RSC) adopted a site-and-services policy, aiming at a large population of owner-occupiers, in order to ‘avert the communist threat’ (Leontidou, 1989, p. 234–5). These intentions backfired in two ways: the creation of ‘red enclaves’ on the periphery of Athens and Piraeus, and the massive popular illegal building practices. Urban development escaped from the hands of the RSC and the government, as refugee settlement practices triggered spontaneous popular suburbanisation, which made urban expansion highly irregular, like a patchwork. The RSC settlements were immediately surrounded by popular land invasions and illegal building. Informal housing, afthereta, were created first by refugees, then by internal migrants and the poor, on land where it was illegal to build. Spontaneous settlements on the urban periphery, and social segregation in Athens, were embedded in a cityscape antithetical with the Anglo-American one, i.e. an inverse-Burgess model (Leontidou, 1990). There were extensive popular settlements built with shacks but lacking in essential urban infrastructure, as in several other South European cities, from Lisbon (Beja Horta, 2006) and Madrid (Castells, 1983) to Rome (Fried, 1973) and Athens. In Greece, urban spatial segregation since the 1920s inside/outside the official city plan was echoed in other dualities in civil societies, such as middle/working classes, Right/Left politics, royalists/venizelists, as well as inner city/outskirts (Leontidou, 1989). In the geography of the Athens basin as early as the 1920s, an SW/NE axis emerged, defining the contrast between the east and the west of the agglomeration. The elegant architecture of bourgeois buildings proliferated around the centre and the sector to the northeast, and the self-built shacks crowned the suburbs, especially along the western ring of the city. Civil societies were not dual, but they were weak and saturated by informality.

Urban Social Movements in Greece

91

After the 1930s, the middle classes and their petty entrepreneurs built a very compact inner city with multi-storey apartment buildings, which proliferated because of the generalisation of legislation for ‘horizontal property’ (Leontidou, 1989). Multi-storey polykatoikies were produced by a system of exchange arrangements (antiparochi) with entrepreneurs building on land provided by the landowning family in exchange for some flats. Vertical differentiation of groups and classes emerged in these high-rise buildings in parallel with neighbourhood segregation (Leontidou, 1990). This cohabitation resulted in cohesive civil societies, as in Naples: ‘On the ground floor of these palaces and tenements are found the famous bassi in which the poorer families live; the upper classes inhabit the upper floors of the same buildings. The cohabitation accounts for the ideological unity of all social groups’ (Allum, 1973, p. 59), a feature also commented upon by Gramsci and other observers (Leontidou, 1990, p. 13).

In compact Mediterranean cities, porosity, spontaneity, informal housing, small property ownership, mixed land use, and the employment linkage5 have impacted on civil societies. There are echoes of postmodernism in the kaleidoscopic and porose urban landscape (Leontidou, 1993), which is these cities’ power and their peril. Athens saw all the solidarities, but also the risks, involved in multi-ethnic mixed landscapes, but the cohesion of civil societies in the 20th century has given way to strife in the 21st, when migrants from Asia and Africa came to inhabit lower floors and basements. Explosive local divisions were nurtured by the involvement of neo Nazis in dense neighbourhoods such as Ag. Panteleimon (Kavoulakos and Kandylis, 2012). It would be worth staying a little longer in Naples, contrasting the above with Walter Benjamin’s urban images, which are useful for a theoretical debate on Southern cities. He referred to primitive communities and used a third-world metaphor. ‘What distinguishes Naples from other large cities is something it has in common with the African kraal; each private attitude or act is permeated by streams of communal life’ (Benjamin, 1979: 174). In other words, Benjamin saw porosity and the interpenetration of public and private in extra-European terms, outside modernity, as primitive or archaic – with Naples compared to Africa, a symbol for dynamism and the transformation of a decaying European culture (Robinson, 2006, p. 32). Many artists of his day, but also many urbanists since then, have considered Mediterranean cities as preindustrial. But this is only an interpretation through Western eyes (Leontidou, 1990) – and an Orientalist image at that. The Athenian ‘wretched folk’ encountered by Simone de Beauvoir (1965) in Piraeus were actually the people who started Greek industry, slums of hope, 5 The employment linkage, i.e. the neighbouring proximity of workplace and residence in precapitalist societies, was not broken in Athens until the 20th century (Leontidou, 1990).

92

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

the first cooperative movement and labour unions, and a lot of Greek culture, poetry and music (Leontidou, 1989). They were the refugees from Asia Minor, who developed an important labour movement during the 1930s and a massive underground resistance movement in the 1940s, especially in the Athens refugee enclaves. Those civil societies were by no means ‘weak’; but they were hit hard during and after the civil war and became polarised. In 20th-century Greek cities, civil societies were marked all along, not by NGOs, but by spontaneous urban movements in popular suburban squatter settlements. Grassroots mobilisations for popular squatting and the ‘right to the city’ (Lefebvre, 1968) were the expression of alternative or oppositional imaginations of urbanism and urban living vis-à-vis those of the state and the planners. Cities were also dominated by the audacity of the informal economy of petty commerce, home working and small productive activities. Squatting was tacitly accepted by the state as a shock absorber of poverty, homelessness and social discontent. This was also a conscious policy for conservatism through popular owner-occupation, but again it escaped government intentions. Struggles and movements for the ‘right to the city’ (Lefebvre, 1968; Mayer, 2009) erupted, and illegal building became a form of civil disobedience. Radicalisation escalated, especially in the ‘red enclaves’ of Athens (Kaisariani) and Piraeus (Drapetsona, Kokkinia, Perama). Finally a dictatorship was imposed in 1967, shattering the emergent civil societies. During the first postwar years, the Marshall Plan succeeded the RSC in providing aid to Greece, and a real estate bubble evolved in Athens. In the years of the Greek ‘economic miracle’, rural to urban migration increased the Greater Athens population from 453,042 in 1920 to 1,124,109 in 1940, 1,852,709 in 1961 and as high as 3,016,457 in 1981 (Leontidou, 1990): during that year of EC accession, the capital concentrated about one third of the entire Greek population. Those were the years of optimism after democratisation in the 1970s, followed by the southern European enlargement of the 1980s, a brief period driven by the illusion that civil societies in Southern Europe were picking up strength (Mouzelis, 2002). Of course, the lean welfare state and lack of planning created contrasts with the North, but EU support was considered an antidote. Southern informal economies and fast spontaneous urbanisation, which reproduced socio-spatial dualisms in cities, were no longer so vibrant. Some reforms indeed took place after EC accession, aimed at the ‘Europeanisation’ of the South, because the dominant preoccupation was that it should approach the North (Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001). After the 1980s, laws were amended and European programmes and frameworks, like the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, began to make some difference. Southern Europe was now turning to the world with a different face, and this triggered immigration. In the early 1990s, the region became a destination for international migrants, rather than their point of origin, as in the past (King and Black, 1997). Urban segregation patterns changed (Arapoglou and Sayas, 2009) as transnationalism took the stage, which is not interchangeable with cosmopolitanism, involving

Urban Social Movements in Greece

93

mediation and negotiation of difference (cf. also Kothari, 2008, p. 501). Southern Europe felt these changes in its civil societies. Cities kept growing spontaneously and planning was weak, but at the same time illegal popular suburbanisation was subsiding. Emigrants now lived in the overcrowded urban core. Urban social movements were also finding different channels during the latter part of the 20th century: spontaneous movements of squatting and civil disobedience gave way to alter-globalisation movements (Mayer, 2000; Hamel et al., 2000), which the South first felt in 2000 in Nice (Della Porta, 2008, p. 2; Leontidou; 2006, 2010). The ESF and the WSF6 had several Greeks among their members. However, during the G8 Summit in Genoa an activist lost his life in street fights (Rauch et al., 2007). This coincided with the wounds of September 11, 2001 and resulted in a major setback to alterglobalisation movements. It took years for them to reappear in Greece on a limited scale during the Olympic bid and after the Olympics of 2004. But soon thereafter everything changed, as a result of the debt crisis. Neoliberal Possessiveness, Coercion and Quasi-Orientalism The previous section introduced changes during the 20th century, before and after EU accession, and until the turn of the 21st century. Massive squatting was crushed during the dictatorship and popular suburbs were either demolished by force (Perama, Petroupoli, Kamatero, etc.) or ‘legalised’ for consent, and stopped growing, in a sweeping implementation of Gramsci’s couplet of ‘force and consent’ by the state (Leontidou, 1990). The wide distribution of property was coming to an end. The rupture of the tight private control of material assets was first felt during the period of preparations for the Olympics infrastructure (Couch et al., 2007). The onslaught of privatisation intensified during the Olympics of 2004 and is well under way now. Cities and coasts are being destroyed from the viewpoint of Greek inhabitants, with the sell-out of several resources to a few entrepreneurial units, real estate speculation triumphs at a large scale, and the population is excluded, expelled or evicted from several urban niches and tourist coast locations. This ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2012) seized the whole country as the debt crisis came to destroy Southern Europe, and it has intensified ever since. The turning point in the constitution of civil society in the 21st century followed this major rupture in urban development, from the period of dispersal of urbanisation profits among the wider population – workers, middle classes, informal labour and squatters – to neoliberal possessiveness and the concentration of profits and revenue in just a few hands. The crisis intensified this process, especially in Greece, which was the first victim of speculator attacks that have plagued the periphery of

6 World Social Forum, henceforth WSF, a cosmopolitan annual meeting based in Brazil, first convened in 25–30 January 2001 in Porto Alegre.

94

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

the Eurozone (Lapavitsas et al., 2010) – the PIIGS (Portugal-Italy-Ireland-GreeceSpain) as they are disrespectfully called. Social movements were profoundly affected. Alter-globalisation demands faded throughout the Mediterranean, seized by the crisis in the 2010s, and mobilisations of a different sort exploded. After the massive uprisings against autocracies, which shook North Africa during the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2010–2011 (Dabashi, 2012; Filiu, 2011; Kourtelis, 2014), the Mediterranean was shaken by the anti-austerity movements exploding in Southern Europe in 2011–14 (Leontidou, 2012a). Antiausterity movements are spontaneous, but the nature of ‘spontaneity’ changed immensely over the course of a century: from the spontaneous illegal building of popular squatter settlements with workers and casual labourers as a driving force of civil disobedience and movements struggling for the ‘right to the city’ (Leontidou, 1990; 2010), we have come to see the shrinkage of popular squatting and the emergence of anti-austerity spontaneous ‘movements of the piazzas’ in central urban areas during the crisis. This is a major change, entailing important recent alterations of ‘spontaneity’, consisting in its juxtaposition to social mobilisation, which bring it closer to Gramsci’s definition, as it were (Leontidou, 2012a; 2014). Urban transformation from the wide to the narrow distribution of property and material urbanisation gains (see Part 1) is behind this change. The transformation of social movements has also been geographical, with the move from the urban periphery (squatter settlements) to the centre, and smaller-scale solidarity initiatives in neighbourhood niches (stekia and occupations). There is also a change in government attitude, from tacit acceptance (of squatting) to outright coercion: anti-austerity mobilisations until 2014 have all met with the reactionary response by governments, who insist on autocracy and in imposing neoliberal rules, but always refuse to accept emancipatory movements and the consequent strong civil societies, as argued in this section. The mobilisations of the Indignados in the cities of Spain ignited the ‘movement of the piazzas’, and Greece followed suit with the Aganaktismenoi in its cities, centred in Athens’ Syntagma Square. Different forces later ignited another piazza, Taksim in Istanbul, against the building-up of Gezi park, in an upheaval that shook many Turkish cities in 2013 (Eraydin et al., 2014). The chain was never broken, as this coincided with protest against TV censorship in Greece (Leontidou, 2014). All these were initially local grassroots movements, but then grew, with the considerable help of ICT, to become substantial national or even European movements. They all moved so much in parallel throughout Mediterranean Europe that a temptation for comparisons among these uprisings arises, despite differences in their demands and social composition. As argued in the next section, one unifying condition has been digital communication for instant mobilisation and internationalisation, which has given rise to transnational contention of a different sort from earlier alter-globalisation movements. The other unifying condition is discussed here: repression by governments. South European mobilisations have been mainly triggered by austerity imposed due to the debt crisis. The crisis is not exclusively economic, but also

Urban Social Movements in Greece

95

social and cultural. It is manifested in civil society, with the breakdown of the social democratic settlement in the UK and the North, where neoliberalism has eroded the welfare state (Afouxenidis, 2014), and of informal and also popular modes of subsistence in the South (Leontidou, 2012a, 2014). As if this were not enough, a cultural North/ South divide has re-emerged alongside the economic one (Leontidou, 2012b). Economic imbalance under possessive neoliberalism has initiated cultural transformations, which can be summed up in a fierce offensive against Southern cultures and ways of life by Northern power elites. The negative construction of ‘the South’ by European bankers, civil servants, government agents, and even notables in EU institutions, is weakening Southern civil societies and also defeats all of those promises of European unification, all those decades of cohesion policies, Integrated Mediterranean Programmes and Community Support Frameworks, which were supposed to harmonise sustainable development throughout the EU. Gramsci’s constructivism and his ‘the Southern question’ in Italy returns to haunt the whole of Europe (Leontidou, 2012b). The reconstruction of a European ‘South’ is machinated through a systematic offensive by Northern power elites. As in Gramsci’s interwar period: The causes of poverty were not external, to be sought in objective economic and political conditions, but internal, innate to the population of the South – … the organic incapacity of the inhabitants, their barbarity, their biological inferiority. These already widespread opinions (Neapolitan ‘vagabondry’ is a legend which goes back a long way) were consolidated and actually theorised by the sociologists of positivism … acquiring the strength of ‘scientific truth’ in a period of superstition about science. … Meanwhile, in the North there persisted the belief that the Mezzogiorno was a ‘ball and chain’ for Italy, the conviction that the modern industrial civilisation of Northern Italy would have made greater progress without this ‘ball and chain’, etc. (Gramsci, 1971, p. 71).

Gramsci’s constructivism is still relevant and actually communicates the message of a self-fulfilling prophesy. Once again today, Northerners squeeze Europe’s poor regions to make sizeable profits for themselves, and keep blaming them, too. Southern particularities are stigmatised from the standpoint of neoliberalism and the dignity of citizens is assaulted. Greece has been long a scapegoat, burdened with responsibilities for the collapse of the euro in a quasiOrientalist colonial discourse (as in Said, 1978) bordering on racism (Leontidou, 2013; 2014). After the elections for the EU Parliament in May 2014, a bleak prospect of deeper North/South divisions, centred on politics, emerges: the ‘insurgent’ parties which have been successful in the North belong to the extreme Right, those in the South belong to the democratic Left. Moreover, Syriza won the 2015 national elections in Greece: anti-austerity indignation thus found its way to the Left, while the extreme Right, which rose in the EU elections in France, Denmark and the UK, came third in Greece. The balance has something to do with

96

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Euroscepticism, but more with clear-cut political ideology. It will be difficult to avoid North/South clashes on that front. Top-down policy is obviously not targeted at strengthening Southern civil societies. On the contrary, the overall climate of coercion and quasi-Orientalist discourses trickle from EU to Greek power elites. For example, in order to announce redundancies and evictions, the Greek government based its propaganda on narratives against the dignity of several actors of Greek society: people employed in education, health, commerce, the public sector, communications etc. were constantly vilified until 2014. This, which was exceptional to Greece and not to other Southern countries, was unfortunately assisted by foreign quasi-Orientalist dismissive discourses.7 These are no longer just ‘weak’ civil societies. The worst branding has been used, debasing them to abject civil societies of corrupt and lazy people, legitimating assaults against social movements by the police, with tear gas if not with weapons. This offensive, on top of the crisis and austerity measures, was simply unbearable until 2014. The reproduction of ‘weak’ civil societies under possessive neoliberalism is thus achieved by a blend of coercion, propaganda, quasi-Orientalism and constant surveillance against any kind of spontaneous movement and popular creativity. European power elites and the national government seem determined to obliterate most of the particular Mediterranean characteristics of these societies, let alone destroying vulnerable development initiatives. Dominant discourses on civil society in Europe target especially spontaneity and informality and stigmatise them in their quasi-Orientalist branding (Leontidou, 2012a; 2013; 2014). They were also stigmatised before, in the 20th century, but tacitly accepted, too, as pillows against poverty and social upheaval, as shown in the second section. Now that spontaneous settlements belong to the past, and other types of spontaneous social movements are shaking the cities, anti-austerity movements, they are dealt with by aggressive branding, assaults, cooptation and recuperation by power elites. In Southern Europe (during the debt crisis) and in the broader Mediterranean (as the ‘Arab spring’ unfolded), power elites and the media have mostly stressed popular aggressiveness and violence. ‘Urbicide’ has been made a spectacle, which has frequently ensured appealing news reports and photogenic instances (Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2007). Massive peaceful demonstrations have been less eye-catching. Media framing has acted as a discursive filter, distorting our understanding of social processes by stressing competitiveness and aggression rather than peaceful demonstrations of conflictual cultures and oppositional social movements. This puts into motion the opposite regressive process toward suppression (Douzinas, 2013) and reiterates aggression. It is a breakdown of hegemony, in Gramsci’s (1971) world, where the state no longer cooperates, let alone merges with, civil society.

7 The example of German periodicals such as Der Spiegel and Focus is indeed shocking (Leontidou 2013, 2014).

Urban Social Movements in Greece

97

Europe appears fragmented once again, unable to stop economic aggression or even warfare within its limits, from financial centres but also among its nation states. This new regressive process turns back the clock to the Europe of the past, a ‘dark continent’ of wars and conflict (Mazower, 1999). In this context, Southern Europe now experiences unemployment, poverty, enterprise closures, depressed housing markets, homelessness, and consequent despair, polarisation, criminality. These are concentrated in the cities. The assault of savage privatisation and entrepreneurialism is felt especially in the largest urban agglomerations of Southern Europe. This is where the vote was overwhelmingly against the status quo of austerity measures in the recent local, national and European elections in 2014–2015. The vote to the Left – Syriza as the first party in Greece, Podemos rising in Spain – showed the extent to which the debt crisis mostly affects urban populations rather than provincial ones. Crisis and counter-urbanisation go hand in hand. Evictions are much more massive in Spain, but relevant legislation was prepared for Greece as well. All south European countries have a host of negative indicators of urban development (Gialis and Leontidou, 2014). The central Athens municipality, which entered the EU with 885,737 people in 1981, was suddenly found to have lost almost a quarter of its inhabitants, remaining with a population of 655,780, according to the 2011 census.8 Urban blight, unemployment, out-migration and the brain drain have caused a crisis in civil society, with ‘morbid symptoms’ such as the rise of the extreme Right and urban criminality. These haunt the whole EU south. The global financial crisis, followed by disurbanisation and underdevelopment, has transformed urban political economy and life beyond recognition, throughout Mediterranean Europe. Urban Social Movements in Digital Societies Popular mobilisations in Mediterranean cities today do not actually constitute contentious political movements, but in effect social movements, as defined by Castells (2012; 2013): they prioritise goals for alternative values and ways of life, rather than political power, and aim at introducing alternative discourses, such as notions of direct democracy and concepts challenging neoliberal, takenfor-granted axioms. Social movements have changed between the 20th and the 21st century in Greece, following the two basic discontinuities outlined above, affecting overall Greek socio-economic and cultural development. This section continues the discussion on changes after the turn of the new millennium, turning to another important axis of that change: new communications technology. 8 Adapted by the author from Statistical Service of Greece (ESYE/ ELSTAT) general census data. However incomplete this census was, with migrants frightened from police ‘clearances’ and hiding, the major population loss is significant and worth investigating further.

98

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

In the summer of 2011, like a fire ignited and spreading around the Mediterranean, urban spontaneous social movements against autocracies appeared everywhere for different reasons, but with important similarities in their methods: they all introduced innovations in interaction, now related with ICT. After the Arab Spring which spread rapidly from Tunisia to Egypt by digital means, the Indignados movement in Spanish cities affected their Greek counterparts. Social movements have become increasingly creative and inventive, embedded as they are in digital societies of the most democratic ‘industrial revolution’ ever (Leontidou, 2012a,b, Afouxenidis, 2014). A new public realm emerges which is largely virtual (Leontidou, 2014), composed of social media where mobilisations are embedded, and alternative or oppositional initiatives emerging in the context of online interaction among people and collectivities. Mobilised populations try to safeguard their independence through aggression, but often, and now more frequently, with constructive rather than destructive action. No doubt, the Internet has made all of this possible, as researchers now admit. Some of them are still glued to old, negative stereotypes of Janus-faced ICT and networking. They present social networks and the web, more generally, not as a promise for a more democratic future, but as a process which acts as yet another catalyst in terms of concentrating power in the hands of the few (Hindman, 2008) and threatening breaches of privacy, the surveillance of peoples’ activities, and risks to the young. Others stress the risk of misinformation and deception. This ambivalence cannot be resolved, because the Internet is indeed Janus-faced, as is globalisation and its discourses. The ‘Big Brother’ is really there, as the state controls electronically every account, transaction, every move by every citizen. Even if we allow for negativities, however, the fact is that digital communication brings into contact and instant communication large numbers of people. Those who throw a positive light on ICT, tend to acknowledge effective and democratic communication facilitated by the Internet (Castells, 2012). Social media speed up digital interaction among individuals, collectivities and cities (Craglia et al., 2004; Gonzalez and Carril, 2013). Digital communication and social network sites are integrated into everyday life and practice for millions of people and organisations and the online/offline distinction tends to weaken (Afouxenidis, 2014) as time passes and online mobilisations have an impact on the real world. ICT can no longer be ignored. Interactive technology affects civil societies profoundly. It offers new opportunities for the counter-hegemonic use of the Internet, social media and e-networking. New prospects for trans-local communication have forged cosmopolitan solidarities, transformed places and spaces, and innovated on several levels. Translocality was already realised in the period of alter-globalisation movements, but it was felt even more strongly during the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2010 and the ‘Movement of the Piazzas’ in 2011, which shook the Mediterranean. The impact of the Internet on urban social movements had already attracted attention during the previous decade (Tilly, 2004; Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005), but during the 2010s it is conspicuous, and enhanced by Web 2.0 applications

Urban Social Movements in Greece

99

(ESPON SIESTA, 2013; Leontidou et al., 2013; Afouxenidis, 2014). Geographical dimensions are stressed especially by Castells (2012), who expands on Africa, Spanish Indignados and the Anglo-American Occupy movements, but barely makes any references to Greece, Italy and Portugal (cf. also Castells, 2013). Harvey (2012) does not much discuss urban movements in Southern Europe, and makes limited references to digital communication. It is worth investigating new spatialities emerging in the South because of the capacity of cellphones and e-networking for the instantaneous mobilisation of people to materially gather in streets and piazzas. This creates uprisings with the most unlikely speed: Flash mobs are relatively impromptu social gatherings in urban spaces that are organized using social media. This movement, which developed from the ‘Reclaim the streets’ movement in the late 1990s, employs mass text messaging and email lists to organize pseudo-spontaneous raves, political demonstrations, and performance act experiences. (Meek, 2012, p. 1432).

The intersection of the material and the virtual, the offline and the online, has been thus named. ICT locates social movements at the epicentre of civil societies with instant communication. Calls for demonstrations no longer require the infrastructure, the offices and printing machines, the party mechanisms and/ or the funding necessary to NGOs in order to have a massive impact. This was felt in the ‘Arab Spring’ and the Spanish Indignados movement. In the case of Greece, the importance of this instant communication, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of urban social movements during the crisis in relation to the constitution of civil societies, have been already felt in the Athens December 2008 (Vradis and Dalakoglou, 2011), but more vividly illustrated in the massive mobilisations of Aganaktismenoi in Syntagma (Constitution Square) in 2011 and in the ERT (Hellenic TV) courtyard in 2013 (Leontidou, 2014). From late May until late July 2011 when the piazzas were ‘cleared’ by riot police, massive ‘indignant’ crowds, Aganaktismenoi, were constantly on the streets and piazzas of Athens. The central city piazza, Syntagma, was not only constantly full of crowds, but it was also occupied by activists in tents, flags and banners for 60 days. Solidarity for the occupation was expressed by crowds from around Europe. Activists, artists, intellectuals passed through Syntagma, there were kiosks for communication by social media, and Skype brought Athens and Madrid popular assemblies together in the ‘lower’ piazza (Leontidou, 2012a, p. 307–8). This movement subsided, chiefly because of police force; but it was ignited again in 2013. On 11 June, ERT, the Hellenic television broadcaster, was suddenly silenced by the government, in an unprecedented act of censorship in Europe. The television blackout was rationalised by the Greek government with a quasi-

100

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Orientalist discourse against the ‘corrupt’ journalists and employees.9 Activists, journalists, artists, intellectuals coming from all over the world expressed their solidarity and joined Greeks to protest in the ERT courtyard and also online and through newspapers, especially French ones. A lot of support surrounded the clandestine ERT, the co-operative online television channel that kept broadcasting through websites such as that of the European Broadcasting Union, EBU, for five months.10 People went online to watch, and a wave of growing digital literacy swept Greece. A civil society was resurrected – and a cosmopolitan one, too, not only in Athens, but also in all ERT premises in Thessaloniki and other Greek towns. This is one of the urban futures to be cherished and sought after. But it was attacked when the ERT courtyard was ‘cleared’ by the police in November 2013 (Leontidou, 2014). A year later, we are stuck with NERIT and its closely monitored programmes, as also strongly criticised by the EBU, which does not consider it independent enough for membership.11 During the mobilisations in Syntagma 2011 and ERT 2013 contentious events heightened in Greece,12 but the major mobilisations must not be fragmented into the smaller events that they triggered.13 Young citizens, the unemployed and casual labourers have been at the frontline of the new social movements, which have spread locally but also globally via ICT use, while workers have been mobilising using traditional forms of syndicalism. These spontaneous emergent movements 9 They were blamed, among others, for a system which ‘withheld’ from every household 4 euro per month (paid with electricity bills). The hypocrisy is exposed now that NERIT (the substitute ERT, formally established on 4 May 2014 at 6 p.m. but also broadcasting earlier) withholds the same amount for one-tenth of TV and radio broadcasts! 10 This was at http://www3.ebu.ch/cms/en/sites/ebu/contents/news/2013/06/monitorert-online.html (last accessed 08.08.2013). Now it is at www.ertopen.com (last accessed 13.09.2014). 11 EBU does not accept NERIT as a full member, because of the lack of independence from the government, evident in procedures and the appointments of the NERIT Council. See among others http://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Νέα_Ελληνική_Ραδιοφωνία,_Ίντερνετ_ και_Τηλεόραση and http://www.ertopen.com/news/ellada/koinwnia/item/22173-h-ebuden-anagnwrizei-th-nerit-ws-plhres-melos. The EBU letter, sent to NERIT in August 2014, has been published in http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=444291 (last accessed 04.09.2014). Evidence of NERIT lack of impartiality was given in 13.09.2014, when the opposition leader was excluded from the channel and his speech presenting the programme of Syriza at the Thessaloniki International Trade Fair was broadcast by ERT Open and other sites, while NERIT only broadcast the criticisms made against the programme by the government! But it had to broadcast the press conference the next day, which was shown by all Greek channels. 12 Protests and demonstrations of several occupational categories and groups took place in Syntagma and the ERT courtyard while the general mobilisation lasted, and strikes increased, as evidenced in http://www.apergia.gr/, the site for strikes in Greece (last accessed 14.09.2014). 13 Fragmentation by Kousis (2014) gives very interesting tables and figures, but the larger picture should be always kept solidly in the frame.

Urban Social Movements in Greece

101

are still vulnerable and scorned, not only by power elites, civil servants and planners, but also often by parties of the Left and their syndicalists (Leontidou, 2012a). Several important niches of society are blind to emergent development dynamics among urban populations of the 2010s. As a result, unfortunately, ‘weak’ civil societies are reproduced. After the mobilisations, many young people return to linger in unemployment in cities, or often opt to emigrate abroad, speeding up the brain drain and increasing the skilled Diasporas of migrants originating in Greece. Sparks from the summers of 2011 and 2013 are always important for the Greek population, but emancipated civil societies are still in the making. Conclusion: Antinomies and Transformations of Mediterranean Civil Societies There were two streams of argument in this chapter, besides the main one concerning social movements as the main component of the ‘third sector’ and the reproduction of ‘weak’ civil societies during ruptures and discourses of the debt crisis. The untold stream was the re-emergence of cosmopolitan cities in southern Europe during the crisis, in places where we reminisce about cosmopolitanism – Athens, Istanbul (once Constantinople), Thessaloniki, Smyrna, Alexandria, but not yet Jerusalem. We are watching Tsircas’ Drifting Cities (1974, trsl.) of the 1940s now drifting toward trans-locality. In Southern Europe, EU accession helped to promote transnationalism. In Greece, the Olympics gave an illusion of that, but soon thereafter this was smudged by the crisis. Despite being undermined, however, international solidarity and interaction among Southern cities are changing the nature of their civil societies into cosmopolitan ones. Digital communication plays a considerable role in this. The other stream of argument in this chapter concerns the self-fulfilling prophesy of southern ‘weak’ civil societies. The crisis has brought to the surface several contradictions of capitalism, which in fact undermine its very existence (Harvey, 2014). Rigid austerity measures accompanied by quasi-Orientalist discourses by Northern European elites have halted development processes. Conservative governments, their Memoranda and their discourses, also undermine any positive change brought about by grassroots creativity. Top-down policy has to be reversed in order to resume development dynamics and to pass from ‘weak’ civil societies and leaderless movements to a long-lasting emancipatory politics. After the exploration of the new round of ‘spontaneous’ urban social movements against austerity, we have argued that these may provide the key to this effect. Gramsci (1971: 199) had already foreseen the danger of neglecting popular spontaneity and play it into hands of reactionary forces (Leontidou, 2014). Those interested in civil society in Greece have to weigh up their quasi-Orientalist branding against the rise of reactionary agents taking advantage of the indignation of the people against austerity and suppression.

102

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Despite these negativities, spontaneous social movements have always shaped civil societies to a large extent, and have played a stronger role in constituting their foundations than NGOs throughout the world. Policy-relevant suggestions emanating from the above analysis must stress the necessity of appreciation of grassroots creativity, at the same time releasing the ‘third sector’ from the exclusive grip of NGOs. Social movements have to get rid of constant coercion and governments must leave them alone to strengthen civil societies, rather than funding NGOs to that effect: The enormous increase in and nature of the complicitous activities of the humanist NGOs over recent decades would seem to support Althusser’s criticisms. The growth of the charitable industrial complex mainly reflects the need to increase ‘conscience laundering’ for a world’s oligarchy that is doubling its wealth and power every few years in the midst of economic stagnation. Their work has done little or nothing in aggregate to deal with human degradation and dispossession or proliferating environmental degradation. This is structurally so because anti-poverty organisations are required to do their work without ever interfering in the further accumulation of the wealth from which they derive their sustenance. (Harvey, 2014, p. 286).

Decentralised niches of innovation, and even accumulation, can have the opposite effect. Not only solidarities, but also synergies are necessary for the protection of creative niches emerging in Mediterranean cities, and also in the countryside. The support of grassroots creativity is essential in the Southern periphery of Europe and in the broader Mediterranean for the sake of restoring civil societies, empowering them, and thus safeguarding social cohesion, besides countering the crisis. Anti-austerity measures hitting blindly everyone except the wealthy, and especially bankers, who accumulate through the dispossession of the population, must be urgently abandoned, along with heavy-handed coercion, as well as quasi-Orientalist discourses in the EU. Government objectives and strategies for domination must re-engage in hegemony rather than coercion, as Gramsci would put it. Instead of a topdown policy building upon conflict and using all means to subsume alternative grassroots initiatives into the dominant cultures and values, the empowerment of creative niches must be sought. Their vulnerability means that assaults might obliterate them at the very period when cities need them most, in order to recover from the crisis. Policy avenues have to be explored, which will not only bring back economic vitality, but will also counteract the reproduction of ‘weak’ civil societies and strengthen social cohesion. The contribution of social movements in strengthening Mediterranean civil societies must be realised at last.

Urban Social Movements in Greece

103

References Allum, P., 1973. Politics and Society in Post-war Naples. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Afouxenidis, A., 2004. Κοινωνικό Κεφάλαιο και Μη Κυβερνητικές Οργανώσεις στην Ελλάδα [Social Capital and NGOs in Greece], Koinonia Politon, 10, pp. 60–65. Afouxenidis, A., 2014. Social media and political participation: An investigation of small scale activism in Greece. Advances in Applied Sociology, 4(1), pp. 1–4. Almeida, P.D., 2010. Globalization and collective action. In: K.T. Leicht and J.C. Jenkins (eds) Handbook of Politics: State and Society in Global Perspective. London: Springer. Arapoglou, V.P. and Sayas, J., 2009. New facets of urban segregation in southern Europe: Gender, migration and social class change in Athens. European Urban and Regional Studies, 16(4), pp. 345–62. Beja Horta, A.P., 2006. Places of resistance: Power, spatial discourses and migrant grassroots organizing in the periphery of Lisbon. City, 10(3), pp. 269–85. Benjamin, W., 1979. One Way Street. Verso: London. Bobbio, N., 1979. Gramsci and the conception of civil society. In: C. Mouffe, ed. Gramsci and Marxist Theory. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 21–47. Bringel, B. and Echart Munoz, E., 2010. Ten years of Seattle: The anti-globalization movement and the transnational collective action. Ciencias Sociais Unisinos, 46(1), pp. 28–36 Castells, M., 1983. The City and the Grassroots. London: Edward Arnold. Castells, M., 2012. Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. Castells, M., 2013. Social Movements in the Age of Internet. [online video] Available at: [Accessed 8 January 2013]. Craglia, M., Leontidou, L., Nuvolati, G. and Schweikart, J., 2004. Towards the development of quality of life indicators in the ‘digital’ city. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 31(1), pp. 51–64. Couch, C., Leontidou, L. and Petschel-Held, G. (eds) 2007. Urban Sprawl in Europe: Landscapes, Land-use Change and Policy. Oxford: Blackwell. Dabashi, H., 2012. The Arab Spring. London: Zed Books. De Beauvoir, S., 1965. The Prime of Life. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Della Porta, D. and Diani, M., 2006. Social Movements: An Introduction. London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd edition. Della Porta, D. and Tarrow, S., 2005. Transnational Processes and Social Activism. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. Della Porta, D., 2008. The emergence of European movements? Civil society and the EU. European Journal of Legal Studies, 1(3), pp. 1–37. Douzinas, C., 2013. Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis: Greece and the Future of Europe. Cambridge: Polity Press.

104

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Eraydin, A. and Tasan-Kok, T., 2014. State response to contemporary urban movements in Turkey: A critical overview of state entrepreneurialism and authoritarian interventions. Antipode, 46(1), pp. 110–29. ESPON-SIESTA (2013) Territorial Dimensions of the ‘Europe 2020’ Strategy. [online] Available at: http://www.espon.eu/main/Menu_Publications/Menu_ ATLAS2020/ [Accessed 8 September 2014]. Featherstone, K. and Kazamias, G. (eds) 2001. Europeanisation and the Southern Periphery. London: Frank Cass. Fried, R.C., 1973. Planning the Eternal City: Roman Politics and Planning Since World War II. London: Yale University Press. Gialis, S. and Leontidou, L., 2014. Antinomies of flexibilization and atypical employment in Mediterranean Europe: Regions of Greece, Italy and Spain during the crisis of the 2010s. European Urban and Regional Studies. Published online before print 10 August. Doi:10.1177/0969776414538983. Gonzalez, R.C.L. and Carril, V.P. (eds) 2013. ESPON-SIESTA – European Regions in the Strategy to Emerge from the Crisis: The Territorial Dimension of ‘Europe 2020’. Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Compostela Publicacions. Gramsci, A., 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers. Hamel, P., Lustiger-Thaler, H. and Mayer, M. (eds) 2000. Urban Movements in a Globalizing World. London: Routledge. Harvey, D., 2012. Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution. London: Verso. Harvey, D., 2014. Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hindman, M., 2008. The Myth of Digital Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Institute for Employment Studies, 2009. Workplaces and Social Networking: The Implications for Employment Relations. Research Paper. Brighton: Institute for Employment Studies. Kavoulakos, K. and Kandylis, K., 2012. Νέες μορφές αστικής σύγκρουσης στην Αθήνα: το πολιτικοκοινωνικό πλαίσιο, ο λόγος και οι πρακτικές της απόρριψης των μεταναστών [New forms of urban conflict in Athens: Political-economic framework, discourse, and practices of rejection of migrants]. In: Afouxenidis, A. (ed.) Ανισότητες την εποχή της κρίσης [Inequality in the period of the crisis]. Athens: Propompos, pp. 79–100. King, R. and Black, R. (eds) 1997. Southern Europe and the New Immigrations. Sussex: Sussex Academic Press. Kipfer, S. and Goonewardena, K., 2007. Colonisation and the New Imperialism: On the Meaning of Urbicide Today. Theory and Event, 10(2), pp. 1–39. Kothari, U., 2008. Global peddlers and local networks: Migrant cosmopolitanisms. Environment & Planning D: Society and Space, 26(3), pp. 500–16. Kourtelis, C., 2014. Integrating the North African Countries into the EU Market: The ENP as a Three-level Game. PhD thesis, King’s College London.

Urban Social Movements in Greece

105

Kousis, M., 2014. The transnational dimension of the Greek protest campaign against Troika Memoranda and austerity policies, 2010–12. In: D. della Porta and A. Mattoni (eds) Spreading Protests in Social Movements of the Crisis. Colchester: ECPR Press. Lapavitsas, C., Kaltenbrunner, A., Lindo, D., Michell, J., Painceira, J.P., Pires, E., Powell, J., Stenfors, A. and Teles, N., 2010. Eurozone crisis: Beggar thyself and thy neighbour. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 12(4), pp. 321–72. Lefebvre, H., 1968. Le Droit à la Ville. Paris: Anthropos. Leontidou, L.,1989. Πόλεις της Σιωπής: Εργατικός Εποικισμός της Αθήνας και του Πειραιά1909–1940 [Cities of Silence: Working-class space in Athens and Piraeus, 1909–1940]. Athens: ETVA and Themelio. Leontidou, L., 1990. The Mediterranean City in Transition: Social Change and Urban Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leontidou, L., 1993. Postmodernism and the city: Mediterranean versions. Urban Studies, 30(6), pp. 949–65. Leontidou, L., 2006. Urban social movements: From the ‘right to the city’ to transnational spatialities and flâneur activists. City, 10(3), pp. 259–68. Leontidou, L., 2010. Urban social movements in ‘weak’ civil societies: The right to the city and cosmopolitan activism in southern Europe. Urban Studies, 47(6), pp. 1179–203. Leontidou, L., 2012a. Athens in the Mediterranean ‘movement of the piazzas’: Spontaneity in material and virtual public spaces. City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action, 16(3), pp. 299–312. Leontidou, L., 2012b. Επανακατασκευή του «ευρωπαϊκού Νότου» στn μετααποικιακή Ευρώπη: από τnν ταξική σύγκρουση στις πολιτισμικέs ταυτότnτεs [The reconstruction of the ‘European South’ in post-colonial Europe: From class conflict to cultural identities]. In: Afouxenidis, A., ed, Ανισότητα στην Εποχή της Κρίσης [Inequality in the period of the crisis]. Athens: Propobos, pp. 25–42. Leontidou, L., 2013. Mediterranean cultural identities seen through the ‘western’ gaze: Shifting geographical imaginations of Athens. New Geographies, 5. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, pp. 111–22. Leontidou, L., 2014. The crisis and its discourses: Quasi-Orientalist attacks on Southern urban spontaneity, informality and joie de vivre. City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action, 18(4–5), pp. 546–57. Leontidou, L., Afouxenidis, A., Gialis, S., Stringli, A., 2013. Persisting digital society territorial divides. In: R.C.L. Gonzalez and V.P. Carril, eds. ESPONSIESTA – European Regions in the Strategy to Emerge from the Crisis: The Territorial Dimension of ‘Europe 2020’. Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela Publicacions, pp. 101–17. Mayer, M., 2000. Social movements in European cities: Transitions from the 1970s to the 1990s. In: A. Bagnasco and P. Le Gales, eds. Cities in Contemporary Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 131–52.

106

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Mayer, M., 2009 .The ‘right to the city’ in the context of shifting mottos of urban social movements. City, 13(2–3), pp. 362–74. Mazower, M., 1999. Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century. London: Penguin Books. Meek, D., 2012. YouTube and social movements: A phenomenological analysis of participation, events and cyberspace. Antipode, 44(4), pp. 1429–48. Montagna, N., 2006. The de-commodification of urban space and the occupied Social Centres in Italy. City, 10(3), pp. 295–304. Mouzelis, N., 2002. Από την Αλλαγή στον Εκσυγχρονισμό [From Change to Modernisation]. Athens: Themelio. Pithouse, R., 2013. NGOs and urban movements: Notes from South Africa. City 17(2), pp. 253–57. Rauch, J., Chitrapu, S., Eastman, S.T., Evans, J.C., Paine, C. and Mwesige, P., 2007. From Seattle 1999 to New York 2004: A longitudinal analysis of journalistic framing of the movement for democratic globalisation. Social Movement Studies, 6(2), pp. 131–45. Robinson, J., 2006. Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development. London: Routledge. Ruzza, C., 2004. Europe and Civil Society: Movement Coalitions and European Governace. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Said, E., 1978. Orientalism. London: Pantheon Books. Sanchez Salgado, R., 2013. Rebalancing EU interest representation? Associative democracy and EU funding of civil society organizations. Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(2), pp. 337–453. Souza, M.L. de, 2013. NGOs and social movements: Convergences and divergences. City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action, 17(2), pp. 258–61. Tilly, C., 2004. Social Movements, 1768–2004. London: Paradigm Publishers. Tsircas, S., 1974. Drifting Cities. New York: Knopf. Vradis, A. and D. Dalakoglou (eds) 2011. Revolt and Crisis in Greece: Between a Present Yet to Pass and a Future Still to Come. London: AK Press and Occupied London.

Part 2 Sectoral Analyses of Greek Civil Society

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 7

NGOs and Social Welfare in Greece Reassessed: Comparative Insights and Crisis Repercussions Periklis Polyzoidis

Introduction The field of social welfare is one of the few areas of third sector activity in Greece to have been surveyed in some detail. This chapter aims to build on this earlier research, in order to further our understanding of this sector in two respects. Firstly, the chapter assesses how the previously identified patterns of relationships between NGOs and the state in this field fit into a number of comparative models of the third sector. Despite recent progress in the research on Greek civil society, comparison with other countries is an important area of study which is still underdeveloped. Secondly, the chapter assesses the repercussions of the crisis on the social welfare NGO sector. The unprecedented depth and unknown duration of the crisis, combined with the increasing inability of the Greek state to provide basic social services, have led to fundamental changes to the context in which these organisations work, which makes a reassessment of their role particularly timely. Research Issues and Limitations Increasing attention has been paid to the role of NGOs in the provision of the social welfare over the last two decades. For a long time, the study of social protection focused primarily on the state. However, as greater attention was given to the contribution of other institutions, the term ‘welfare state’ was replaced by the more accurate term ‘welfare regime’, which, besides the state, includes the non-profit sector (Esping Andersen, 1999). At an international level, the current crisis, as well as the failure of the public sector to face the growing needs for social care, the radical change of the traditional family model and other complex global issues, are rendering the role of the non-profit sector increasingly important in the provision of welfare. The extent to which Greek welfare NGOs are in a position to take on a greater role in this changing context is not yet clear. It is undeniable that the recent crisis has a substantial impact on the structure and functioning of the NGO sector in Greece. However, our understanding

110

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

of this issue is limited by a lack of data on the NGO sector prior to the crisis. Data collection on NGO activity in Greece is still at a very early stage and the figures that we have at our disposal are not adequate for systematic analyses; the various partial studies are unrelated to each other and incompatible in terms of methodology. At the same time, there is a complete absence of longitudinal data, and the inherent difficulties of cross-national research pose further challenges to comparative research in this field. Big differences in previous estimates of the overall number of NGOs in Greece are indicative of some of the challenges for research in this area. This number has been estimated at 210 (Chrysakis et al., 2002), 618 (Polyzoidis, 2004), 900 (European Expression, 2014), 1,200 (Stasinopoulou, 1997), 1,554 (National Centre for Social Research, 1997), 1,600 (Panagiotidou, 1999), 2,000 (Anthopoulos, 2000), 13,552 (Tsoukalas and Koronaiou, 2000) or even 17,565 (Hadjiyanni, 2004), while the Foreign Ministry’s Commission for NGOs recorded over 30,000 organisations. Beyond that, a large number of articles in the press and on the Internet report different figures, which are difficult to assess in terms of accuracy and reliability. These big variances are related to the different aims, criteria, methodology, location, access issues and timing of each approach. More specifically, a first reason for the divergences is that these surveys have similar, but not identical objects of study: the study of civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations, voluntary organisations, and even social enterprises are just a few examples of the great diversity of approaches, which, logically, end up with different results. Moreover, even when the objects of research are apparently identical, the lack of universal definitions creates a problem. A slight variation in the definition of the term NGO can lead to large differences in the final estimates of the number of organisations. Furthermore, it is impossible to accurately record various parameters such as the nature and scope of NGO activities and NGO resource levels, since organisations may not record this data or may not be willing to share it. Finally, the data changes over time and the relevant information soon becomes out of date. Regarding the subject of this chapter, there are further challenges relating to the categorisation of NGOs as being active in the field of social welfare. Whilst NGOs active in social welfare constitute a rather distinct part of the wider NGO sector, it should be borne in mind that the boundary is not absolutely clear. The Role of NGOs in the Greek Welfare Regime As has been argued in greater detail elsewhere, in Greece NGOs involved in social care have long constituted the ‘residual segment of a weak policy sector’ (Polyzoidis, 2009). Social protection systems are comprised of three main areas: healthcare services, social security and social care. The latter services may be provided by a range of different actors, including statutory bodies, for-profit

NGOs and Social Welfare in Greece Reassessed

111

actors, informal support structures, and the non-profit sector (Munday, 1996). In Greece, the social care sector as a whole is weakly developed, and the contribution of the NGO sector to this area has been particularly limited. The limited development of the social care system reflects a distinctive characteristic of the Greek welfare regime. Although overall social expenditure rose progressively through the 2000s the distribution of social expenditure is uneven. Some groups of people employed in the official market have been well protected, particularly in terms of generous pension schemes, whilst almost every other group has been neglected (Polyzoidis, 2009, 192; Matsaganis, 2011). The absence of a powerful civil society contributed to this situation, since civil society actors failed to build the coalitions necessary for building consensus and representing the needs of the wider social strata (Polyzoidis, 2009, p. 192). The driving force behind policy in this area, as elsewhere, has been the priorities of the ruling political parties. The highly polorised nature of political party confrontations (Robolis et al., 1995) and the close links between the political and economic power of elite social groups (Petmesidou, 1987) obstructed the development of a more comprehensive approach to social care provision. Partly as a result of the limited provision of the social care sector, a very large proportion of social care activities are conducted by the family. The Greek Orthodox Church also plays an important role in this area (Polyzoidis, 2009, p. 191). However, in contrast to the social care role of the Catholic Church, the welfare activities of the Greek Orthodox Church have not, on the whole, evolved into well-developed non-profit organisations comparable to the major Catholic welfare organisations. This is related to the fact that in Greece the Church has not created bridges between political and civil society actors in to the same extent as the Catholic Church in Italy and Spain (Petmesidou and Polyzoidis, 2013). Even within this under-developed social care sector, the contribution of nonprofit organisations has been relatively small and service provision is mainly conducted by state actors. This is for a number of reasons. Apart from restricting the development of the social care system itself, the dominance of political parties has also inhibited the development of a wider role for the non-profit sector within this limited policy segment. As Petmesidou argues (2001, p. 45): The strong grip of party politics on civil society constrains the possibilities of broad structural changes which would facilitate a more flexible response to social demands by a mix of voluntary and statutory sectors.

The high degree of centralisation that characterises the state social care system is a further factor that has restricted the ability of NGOs to play a more active role in terms of involvement in policy development, since the great majority of organisations involved in welfare are only active at a local level. A lack of collaboration between organisations and the lack of effective federations and confederations within this part of the non-profit sector has hindered the ability of

112

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

organisations to communicate effectively with centralised state actors (Polyzoidis, 2004, p. 402). A final factor limiting the contribution of the non-profit sector to social care provision is the weak nature of Greek civil society overall. This is in part a structural characteristic of Greek society. The incomplete adaptation of the state to modern capitalism and the resulting hegemony of political parties have hindered the development of an autonomous civil society. Moreover, the state has not actively supported the development of the non-profit sector. The lack of consistent policy towards the sector has contributed towards its segmentation (Polyzoidis, 2009, p. 192). Whilst a few well-established organisations working in specific fields have been well-supported or controlled by the state, many organisations have been left to their own devices (Tsakraklides, 1998). A number of recent scandals regarding public money abuse by NGOs have proven that public funding was often not combined with government control. At least before crisis, a ‘take the money and run’ philosophy prevailed upon the entire sector. In this context, the only comprehensive survey of Greek non-profit organisations active in social care to date, conducted in 2004, found that this sector was weak in terms of membership, voluntary performance, beneficiaries and budget (Polyzoidis, 2009). It was constituted by just over 600 organisations, with 9,000 active volunteers and 3,300 paid employees, and served approximately 53,500 beneficiaries annually. The main areas of activity of these organisations were: serving elderly people (118 organisations), serving the poor (104 organisations) collecting blood (104 organisations), serving families, children and adolescents (99 organisations), serving people with diseases (98 organisations), serving people with disabilities (66 organisations), and helping socially excluded groups and victims of natural disasters (29 organisations). More than half of the overall budget of these organisations came from insurance funds (28.9 %) and donations from non-members (24 %). Other income sources were real estate and portfolio management (15.9 %), state subventions (9.6 %), subventions by the Greek Orthodox Church (9.2 %), European Union projects (4 %), events, galas, balls and lotteries (2.7 %), membership fees (2.7 %) and sales of artefacts made by members (1.7 %), (Polyzoidis, 2009). Because the Greek third sector has rarely been viewed in comparative perspective, it has been difficult to assess how the patterns described above compare to the situation in different countries or to what extent they are a uniquely Greek phenomenon. Below, a first tentative attempt is therefore made to place the case of Greece within a number of existing comparative third sector typologies. The Greek Third Sector in Comparative Perspective As noted above, one aim of this chapter is to build our understanding of the contribution of NGOs to social welfare in Greece through reassessing our knowledge of this sector through the wide lens that is offered by comparative third

NGOs and Social Welfare in Greece Reassessed

113

sector research. A brief introduction will first be made to value of comparative third sector research and to the history of this area of study. Cross-national comparisons are crucial for the understanding of complex social phenomena and are therefore widely used in the whole spectrum of social sciences. The most comprehensive form of cross-national learning, from a research perspective, occurs when systems, rather than specific problems or programs are compared (Klein, 1991). Making comparisons is easier than establishing a credible basis on which those comparisons can be made. While end-results may be profiled, these results are a product of the systems and societies in which these voluntary sectors operate (Elson, 2010). Comparative studies of the third sector have begun (Anheier and Siebel, 1990) but progress has not been substantial as might have been expected. Although comparative research of the NGO sector between countries can multiply knowledge and improve understanding, it is fair to say that studies in this field are still in their infancy – especially in contrast to the well-developed comparative literature on welfare states. Despite the fact that the study of the third sector has grown impressively during the last years, cross-national comparisons in this field still remain scarce, not least as regards the variety of countries that are (not) taken into consideration within the existing models. Furthermore, comparative studies of specific subsectors are non-existent or still in their infancy. At a theoretical level, comparative analysis has the difficult task of answering complex questions, like what encourages or allows non-profit associations to develop (Salamon and Anheier, 1998). At a practical level, we tend to compare the non-profit and voluntary sectors for four reasons: to monitor our performance against that of others, to gain ammunition for domestic policy debates, to assess the relationship between system strategies and outcomes, and to learn from others and transfer and adapt lessons to our own system or programmes (Klein, 1991). Kramer’s (1981) study was seminal for this area of comparative research. He develops concepts about the varying roles that voluntary organisations play in relation to the state, comparing divisions of responsibility between government and voluntary agencies (1981). At the time he constructed his theory, there were neither analytical tools nor even basic data about the third sector in many countries, and even where data existed it was often not reliable or comparable. Although he did not integrate his comparisons of voluntary sectors with the existing theories of welfare state development, Kramer drew attention to the importance of distinctive national histories and socio-political contexts. This view, shared by many later scholars who use the term ‘path dependence’, is still important for comparative research. Analyses of relationships between the NGO sector and the government are often central to efforts to identify similarities between different countries (Anheier and Seibel, 1990, p. 384). Anheier and Seibel argue that the political context of the voluntary sector should be examined on the basis of three parameters. The first is the dominant political tradition, which can be liberal, conservative or social democratic. The second parameter is the degree of religious homogeneity,

114

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

and the third is the degree of administrative decentralisation. Elements of these parameters are also existent to some extent in many of the subsequently developed approaches. Gidron et al. (1992) develop a comparative approach based on the relationship between the third sector and the state. This first systematic typology is based on the combination of two factors: the financing and authorising of services on the one hand and the actual delivery of services on the other. The four resulting models are the Government Dominant, the Third Sector Dominant, the Dual and the Collaborative models. This typology has been criticised for being too formalistic (Kuhnle and Selle, 1992). However, according to this approach, Greece would clearly belong to the government dominant model. The Relational Perspective of Kuhnle and Selle (1992, p. 1), which focuses on voluntary organisations working in social and welfare fields, takes into consideration two variables, which are considered to be dynamic, and not static. The first is the degree of proximity between welfare NGOs and the state, which is measured by the scope, frequency and ease of communication and contact. The NGO sector can be excluded from, close to or even integrated into the state function. The degree of proximity is determined by political tradition and cultural factors. In this theory, the quality of communication is not affected by political/ideological differences between the government and the NGOs, and so the collaboration can be very close even when they have very different ideologies. This is not the case in Greece, where the political influence of NGOs is closely related to the ties they establish with individuals in government and state funding may depend on political affiliation. The second dimension relates to the degree of independence of the organisations from the state in terms of financing and control. In all western societies, including Greece, service-providing NGOs are dependent to some extent on some form of public financing, though this does not necessarily entail strong governmental control. As noted above, recent scandals regarding the abuse of public funds by NGOs demonstrate that in Greece state financing does not always imply state control. Greece could be placed therefore either in box 2 of the original typology, on the basis of dependence in terms of financing, or in box 4, on the basis of independence in terms of state control (Table 7.1). Taylor and Lansley (1992) focus on the ideological dimensions of welfare state regimes in combination with the mix of actors which finance and deliver services. They identify four categories (Table 7.2). In Conservatism, third sector organisations share a provider role with the private sector and conduct upstream campaigns on behalf of the needy. In the Welfare State model, the role of NGOs is residual and social policy is controlled through voting and elected representatives. This is the case in Greece, where the NGO sector is relatively small and (with very few exceptions) has no impact on social policy decision making (Polyzoidis, 2004, p. 402). In Welfare Pluralism, NGOs mainly act as service providers but they also participate in decision making. Finally, in Market Pluralism they again have a residual role, but policies are decided through consumer choice rather than voting.

NGOs and Social Welfare in Greece Reassessed

Table 7.1

115

The relational perspective typology Communication and Contact Distance

Nearness

Dependence Financing and Control

Independence

1 Integrated Dependence Norway Britain Germany Netherlands 3 Integrated Autonomy (no case)

2 Separate Dependence France Italy Hungary Slovenia [Greece] 4 Separate Autonomy Spain [Greece]

Source: Based on Kuhnle and Selle (1992, p. 30)

Table 7.2

Welfare state ideologies and the role of third sector organisations

Ideology Conservatism Welfare State Welfare Pluralism Market Pluralism

Services financed by Philanthropy State State Consumer and Market Place

Services delivered by Voluntary and Private Sectors State Voluntary Sector Private Sector

Source: Based on Taylor and Lansley (1992)

Sarasa (1995) adds a third variable to the above typology, namely the extent of institutionalised channels of public private relations. Four regimes are identified: in the Scandinavian regime (Sweden and Norway), there is a strong centralised third sector and a relatively strong state that seeks consensus on policies through corporatist arrangements. In the Rhineland model (Austria, Belgium, Germany and Holland), there is again a strong and primarily state-funded third sector, which is based on strong ideological-religious divisions. NGOs have significant influence on a relatively weak state, through strong corporatist arrangements based on subsidiarity. Public-private relations in both these models are close, structured and hierarchical. In the North American model (USA), the third sector is very strong and is based on multiple ethnic, religious, social and geographic identities. There is public funding, but there are also significant levels of private funding and revenue from the sale of services. In the Mediterranean model (France, Italy and Spain), finally, the Catholic Church dominates the third sector and non-religious

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

116

organisations have generally been less organised. Policy processes are statedominant, and there are relatively few formal channels of communication between the public and the private sector; distrust and conflict between the two is common. The situation in Greece corresponds in most respects to this model, apart from the fact that, as noted above, the role and the status of the Greek Orthodox Church is very different from that of the Catholic Church in terms of its role in the third sector (Petmesidou and Polyzoidis, 2013). Salamon and Anheier (1998) suggest the Social Origins approach, which focuses on broader social, political and economic relationships in order to explain patterns of non-profit sector development in different countries. They identify two critical dimensions. The first is the scale of the non-profit sector, as measured principally by employment, volunteer time, and operating expenditures. The secondly is the level of government social-welfare spending relative to the contribution to welfare of other service providers. The combination of these dimensions leads to the formation of four models (Table 7.3). Table 7.3

The Social Origins approach

low Government social welfare spending

high

low Statist Japan

Scale of the non-profit sector high

Social Democratic Sweden Italy [Greece]

Liberal US UK Corporatist Germany France

Source: Based on Salamon and Anheier (1998, p. 240)

In the Corporatist model, the state has either been induced or forced to cooperate with non-profit institutions, in an effort to retain the support of key social elites while pre-empting more radical demands for social-welfare protections. This results in a sizeable non-profit sector combined with a high level of government social-welfare spending. In the Liberal model, low government social-welfare spending is associated with a relatively large nonprofit sector. In the Statist model, limited government social-welfare protection does not translate into high levels of non-profit action as in the liberal model. Rather, both government social-welfare protection and non-profit activity remain highly constrained. In the Social Democratic model, state-sponsored and state-delivered social welfare protections are quite extensive and the room left for service-providing non-profit organisations quite constrained. This could be the case for Greece. Nonetheless, according to the social origins theory this type

NGOs and Social Welfare in Greece Reassessed

117

of model is most likely in countries where working class elements were able to exert effective political power, albeit typically in alliance with other social classes – a situation very different from the Greek political culture, as noted above. In their subsequent scholarship, Anheier and Salamon (2001) test and verify this theory using additional criteria: the frequency of volunteering, the social characteristics of volunteers, and their motivations. Bahle and Pfenning (2001) identify five groups of Western European countries, on the basis of three indicators: childcare coverage rates, coverage rates relating to the care of the elderly, and the mix of service providers. France and Belgium are characterised by extensive services for children, whereas services for the elderly are limited. In Germany and the Netherlands the nonprofit sector is been strong and integrated into public social services. On the other hand, Sweden and Denmark are characterised by a high level of social services for all population groups and a predominance of public providers, mainly at the local level. England and Wales have similarities with the patterns found in Sweden and Denmark, but services for families and for children have remained very limited. Finally, in Spain and Italy the welfare mix is dominated by public agencies and those organised by the Catholic Church. Reasons for the limited nature of social services include the strength of the institution of the family and a conception of the state as an entity almost separate from society. This is very close to the case of Greece, where public welfare services are not provided on a universal basis and the family fulfils a variety of social tasks and social-service functions. Appleton (2003) tests the validity of the Social Origins approach, using criteria which are more specific and quantifiable: government social spending, as a proportion of GDP, and employment in the non-profit sector, as a percentage of the total employment. She applies the theory empirically to a greater number of EU countries, including Greece. Furthermore, she examines the extent of government – NGO co-operation, especially in the formulation of family policy, and identifies four models. In the Cross-sector Partnership (France and Sweden), there is strong co-operation and absolute consensus. In Cross-sector Advisor model (Germany, Ireland), third-sector organisations are involved in family policy formulation, but executive power belongs exclusively to government. According to Appleton, Greece corresponds to the Subsector Advisor model, as far as the development of family policy is concerned, along with the UK, Italy, Spain and Poland. In this model, state – third sector relations are more weakly developed but certain organisations contribute to policy formulation. The level of cooperation varies between different organisations. In last model (Estonia, Hungary), both the third sector as a whole and individual organisations are very weak, and so are their relationships with the state and their ability to influence policy formulation (Table 7.4).

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

118

Table 7.4

Non-profit sector regimes and family policy models by country Corporatist

Social origins theory (sector level)

Family policy formulation (field level)

Liberal

Statist

France Germany

Socialdemocratic Sweden Italy

UK Ireland

Spain Greece Poland Hungary Estonia

Cross-sector partnership

Cross-sector advisor

Subsector advisor

France Sweden

Germany Ireland

UK Greece Italy Spain Poland

Weak sector and organizations Estonia Hungary

Source: Appleton (2003, p. 86)

The above analysis represents a tentative attempt to place the case of Greece in various existing third sector typologies. As noted above, this attempt is necessarily limited by both the lack of up-to-date and comprehensive primary data on NGOs in Greece and by the incompatibility of the existent data from different countries and between different studies. Further research in this field is therefore clearly needed. Future models should take into account the existence of these existing approaches; it is a weakness of the above models that they tend to be developed without taking into account the others. Notwithstanding these limitations, the insights gained from these comparative models highlight the fact that the pattern of both limited state social care and limited NGO involvement in this field is not a uniquely Greek phenomenon. The historical trajectory of Greece, which has shaped the development of both its welfare state and its third sector, is certainly different in many respects from that of other countries of the western world. However, the pattern of state – third sector relationships in Greece also appears to shares various characteristics with that found in other countries. It is notable that the country which is most frequently found in the same category as Greece in the above analysis is Spain – a country with which Greece has much in common in terms of its modern history. A more comprehensive comparative study of the third sector in Greece and Spain could arguably increase our understanding of the development of the third sector in both contexts. One of the most significant factors affecting the development of the third sector in both these countries today is the economic crisis, and it is to an assessment of the effects of the crisis on NGOs active in social care in Greece that we will now turn.

NGOs and Social Welfare in Greece Reassessed

119

NGOs and Social Welfare in the Crisis As is by now well known, the crisis has had profound effects on social welfare in Greece, in terms of both the increase in needs and the increasing inability of the state to meet those needs (see also Chapter 1). Following the introduction of the euro in 2001, by 2009, just before the crisis hit, Greece had converged towards the Western European average in terms of welfare spending. In 2010 the Greek government was forced to announce a first round of austerity measures. These failed to satisfy the markets, and, to meet the conditions for a massive €110 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank (the so-called Troika), a second round of austerity measures were reduced, aiming to dramatically reduce the country’s public deficit. However, the measures were introduced when the Greek economy was already in recession and merely exacerbated it. By the end of 2013, the size of the economy had contracted by more than 23% in real terms relative to 2007. That year, relative living standards in Greece fell by around 20 percentage points to 34.3% below the EU average (Matsaganis, 2013). One of the first and most characteristic features of the Greek social landscape in the current crisis has been the steep rise in joblessness. By December 2013 (the last month for which data were available at the time of writing), the overall unemployment rate stood at 27.5%, and unemployment rates for young people and for women had recently reached 61.4%, and 31.6% respectively (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2014). On the other hand, the loss of earnings for those still in employment has also been significant. Anchored poverty (measuring those no longer able to purchase the goods and services that were just affordable on poverty-line incomes before the crisis erupted) has risen by almost 6 percentage points each year (from 20.0% in 2009 to 37.0% in 2012). Inequality has also increased significantly after the crisis, and much anecdotal evidence suggests that a considerable number of individuals and families are now facing extreme hardship. The weak Greek welfare state was unfit for the crisis. The attempt to reduce budget deficits through austerity policies deprived it of precious resources just as the need for social protection increased. Between 2009 and 2011 public spending on health was reduced by 24.3% in real terms, while total spending (which includes private expenditure) also declined by 21.0% (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2013). In some cases, insurance providers have failed to pay their share to hospitals and pharmacies, and so the access of many insured people to health services has been severely restricted (Polyzoidis and Moysidou, 2012). The crisis has also resulted in the deterioration of the health of the population (Kentikelenis et al., 2011). At the time of writing, the rate of self-reported unmet need for medical care because it was ‘too expensive’, as reported in EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC),stands at 4.2%, which is the fourth worst performance amongst EU 28 (European Commission, 2014). There has

120

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

also been an increase in mental disorders, including a recent spike in suicide rates (Economou et al., 2011). According to the Reception and Solidarity Centre of the Municipality of Athens (2013), the number of people seeking food in soup kitchens has increased dramatically, and, in the early phase of the crisis, municipal homeless services also faced a 20% increase in demand. Our knowledge of the recent development of social care NGOs is necessarily limited as there has been is no systematic survey since the study referred to above. The Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity keeps a National Register of Social Care Organisations, where charities, specifically recognised institutions, charitable foundations, civil society organisations, national committees and branches of international non-governmental organisations are registered. At the time of writing 1,030 organisations had registered, including 559 working with children and/or families, 193 organisations working with people with diseases, 319 organisations working with people with disabilities and 77 organisations involved in blood collecting. Furthermore, 12 Federations and 49 Pan Hellenic (that is national) associations are also included (Manthou, 2012). However, only 189 organisations on this register had been officially certified, while the certification of a further 336 bodies has been pending since 2006. Perhaps the areas of NGO welfare activity which have increased most since the start of the crisis are those related to healthcare and the provision of food and basic goods. Two trends can be detected in these areas. On the one hand, the demand for such services has risen, and on the other hand, an increasing number of Greeks are turning to such services, which prior to the crisis were mainly used by immigrants and marginalised groups such as the Roma. For example, the NGO Doctors of the World reported that 30% of users were Greek in 2012, compared to only 4% before the start of the crisis (Doctors of the World, 2012). The response of the welfare NGO sector to the new challenges of the crisis has been ambiguous. On the one hand there are the few large NGOs which have professional management, high budgets and sufficiently paid scientific, administrative and auxiliary staff. These organisations have permanent serviceprovision structures, and they also have very good cooperation with the State. Their revenues are supported by their participation in both national and EU projects. At the same time, there is clear evidence that the financing of activities through corporate social responsibility programmes has gradually become very important. Several of these organisations have been able to significantly expand the services they offer in response to the increased needs. To give just a few examples, in the field of health, the Greek branches of Doctors of the World and ‘Médecins sans Frontières’ as well as Praksis, an independent organisation which was established as a legacy of the domestic projects of the latter, have all significantly expanded the services they offer, in response to the increased needs (see Skleparis, this volume, for a detailed account). In the area of food provision, the NGO ‘Mission’ (Apostoli) was established by the Archdiocese of Athens in 2010, and grew rapidly: in 2012 it supported 1,945,010 recipients with 3,600,000 servings of food and 26,808 packages of groceries, according to the author’s personal correspondence

NGOs and Social Welfare in Greece Reassessed

121

with representatives of the organisation in 2014. The NGO Bread-Action offered services to 25,000 people in 2013, including 140,000 meals, 4,000 furniture items, 25.000 household appliances and cookware, 145 tons of clothing and 280 tons of food, according to figures published on the organisation’s Greek website (Artos Drassi, 2014). On the other hand, there are the many hundreds of smaller NGOs, many of which have also expanded their welfare activities in response to the social needs. However, these often lack permanent structures for the provision of services, and do not have systematic cooperation with the public sector. They rely more on volunteer work on than paid staff. Their meagre budgets are mainly based on private donations, and to a lesser extent, on other sources such as the sale of artefacts, membership fees and state subventions. Many of these organisations have struggled as their members have become increasingly impoverished, and their volunteers may have themselves become beneficiaries. There is some evidence, however, that although the average size of charitable donations to such organisations decreased, their absolute number increased (Polyzoidis, 2010). Although the overall size of the contribution of such organisations is small, it can be very important as small local organisations can be flexible in their activities and can target specific local needs. Conclusion The crisis has reshaped the field for Greek NGOs providing social welfare services. The state provision of social protection was cut back exactly at a time when social needs increased, leaving huge gaps. Despite the important and increased activities of many organisations, it is clear that the non-profit sector has neither the resources nor the institutional power to fill these gaps. The limited capacity of the sector is in part related to the long-standing patterns of limited cooperation between NGOs and the state in the field of welfare. An appreciation of comparative research in this field can help us to better understand these patterns. Further research on the Greek context in comparative perspective could help to further our understanding of the factors that have inhibited this cooperation to date, as well as offering pointers for how cooperation could be strengthened in future. Recent revelations of scandals regarding the action many NGOs have acted as further a barrier to closer communication and it will take a long time and hard work to regain public trust. On the other hand, the increased scrutiny of NGO activities is providing the opportunity for genuine NGOs to be distinguished from the fraudulent ones, and the crisis is enabling many organisations to demonstrate their value. A further challenge, however, is that as social welfare NGOs struggle to meet the increased welfare needs, a lack of resources may be forcing many organisations NGOs to focus entirely on service provision, meaning that they are unable to develop other activities that could contribute to strengthening the sector, such as information sharing, formulation of social policy, fundraising,

122

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

control of the quality of public social services, social research and advocacy. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that in Greece NGOs involved in social care will continue to constitute the residual segment of a weak policy sector at least for the foreseeable future. References Anheier, H.K. and Salamon, L.M., 2001. Volunteering in Cross-national Perspective: Initial Comparisons. Civil Society Working Paper, 10. London: The Centre for Civil Society. Anheier, H.K. and Siebel, W., 1990. The Third Sector: Comparative Studies of Nonprofit Organizations. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Anthopoulos, X.T., 2000. Εθελοντισμός, Αλληλεγγύη και Δημοκρατία. Η Εθελοντική Δράση στη Συνταγματική Προοπτική [Volunteering, solidarity and democracy. Voluntary action in the constitutional perspective]. Athens: Oxy. Appleton, L., 2003. The contribution of NPOs to family policy formulation in EU member and applicant states, Voluntas, 14(1), pp. 79–103. Artos Drassi, 2014. Ο Άρτος-Δράση σε Αριθμούς [Bread-Action in Figures]. [online] Available at: [Accessed 28 October 2014]. Bahle, T. and Pfennig, A., 2001. Angebotsformen und Traegerstucturen Sozialer Dienste im Europaeischen Vergleich. Arbeitspapier 34. [Forms of provision and support structures of social services in European comparison]. Manheim: Manheimer Zentrum fuer Europaeischer Sozialforschung. Chrysakis, M., Ziomas, D., Karamitropoulou, N. and Hatziantonis, D., 2002. Προοπτικές Απασχόλησης στον τομέα της Κοινωνικής Οικονομίας [Employment prospects in the social economy sector]. Athens, National Labour Institute. Doctors of the World, 2012. Polyclinics. [online] Available at: [Accessed 28 October 2014]. Economou, M., Madianos, M., Theleritis, C., Peppou, L. and Stefanis, C.N., 2011. Increased suicidality amid economic crisis in Greece. Lancet, 378, p. 1459. Elson, P., 2010. A comparative analysis of voluntary sector – government relations in Canada and England. In: L. Mook, J. Quarter and S. Ryan (eds) Researching the Social Economy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Esping-Andersen, G., 1999. Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford: Polity Press. European Commission, 2014. Health and Long Term Care. Eurostat Statistics Database. [online] Available at: [Accessed 28 October 2014]. European Expression, 2014. Homepage [online] Available at: [Accessed 8 May 2014].

NGOs and Social Welfare in Greece Reassessed

123

Gidron, B., Kramer, R.M., Salamon, L.M., 1992. Government and the third sector in comparative perspective: Allies or adversaries? In: B. Gidron, R.M. Kramer, and L.M. Salamon (eds) Government and the Third Sector: Emerging Relationships in Welfare States. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, pp. 1–30. Hadjiyanni, A., 2004. Voluntary associations. In: D. Charalampidis, L. Maratou Alipranti and A. Hadjiyanni, eds Recent Social Trends in Greece, 1960–2000. Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, pp. 60–65. Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2014. Main Employment Figures. [online] Available at: [Assessed 8 May 2014]. Kentikelenis, A., Karanikolos, M., Papanicolas, I., Basu, S., McKee, M. and Stuckler, D., 2011. Health effects of financial crisis: Omens of a Greek tragedy. Lancet, 378(9801), pp. 1457–1458. Klein, R., 1991. Risks and benefits of comparative studies: Notes from another shore. Milbank Quarterly 69(2), pp. 275–91. Kramer, R.M., 1981. Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State. Berkeley: California Press. Kuhnle, S. and Selle, P., 1992. Government and voluntary organizations: A relational perspective. In: S. Kuhnle and P. Selle (eds) Government and Voluntary Organizations: A Relational Perspective. Aldershot: Avebury, pp. 1–34. Manthou, G., 2012. Ο Χάρτης του εθελοντισμού προς τα παιδιά στην Ελλάδα του 21ου αιώνα [Chart of volunteering for children in 21st century Greece]. Athens: National Centre for Social Solidarity. Matsaganis, M., 2011. The welfare state and the crisis: The case of Greece. Journal of European Social Policy 21(5), pp. 501–13. Matsaganis, M., 2013. The Greek Crisis: Social Impact and Policy Responses. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Department of Western Europe/North America Munday, E., 1996. Definitions and comparisons in European social care. In: B. Munday and P. Ely (eds) Social Care in Europe, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, pp. 1–20. National Centre for Social Research, 1997. Ανάλυση στατιστικών αποτελεσμάτων της αρχικής έρευνας για τις ΜΚΟ [Statistical analysis of the initial NGO survey]. Athens: National Centre for Social Research. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2013. Health Data. Paris: OECD. Panagiotidou, E., 1999. Η Κοινωνία των Εθελοντών [Volunteers’ Society]. Athens: Union of Citizens for Intervention. Petmesidou, M., 1987. Social Classes and Mechanisms of Social Reproduction, Exantas, Athens. Petmesidou, M., 2001. Statism, social policy and the middle classes in Greece. Journal of European Social Policy, 1(1), pp. 31–48.

124

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Petmesidou, M. and Polyzoidis, P., 2013. Religion und Wohlfartsstaatlichkeit in Griechenland. Die Orthodoxie in sozialpolitischen Klientelismus. In: K. Gabriel, H.R Reuter, A. Kurschat and S. Leibold (eds), Religion und Wohlfartsstaatlichkeit in Europa, pp. 177–215. Polyzoidis, P., 2004. Κοινωνική Φροντίδα στην Ελλάδα. Ο Ρόλος των Μη Κυβερνητικών Οργανώσεων [Social care in Greece: The role of NGOs]. Komotini: Paratiritis. Polyzoidis, P., 2009. Nonprofit organizations and human services in Greece: The residual segment of a weak sector, Voluntas, 20(2), pp. 188–206. Polyzoidis, P. and Moysidou, A., 2012. Οι επιπτώσεις της οικονομικής κρίσης στην παροχή υπηρεσιών υγείας στην Ελλάδα [The impact of economic crisis in the provision of health services in Greece]. Athens: Institute of Labour of the General Confederation Greek Workers. Reception and Solidarity Center of the Municipality of Athens, 2013. Data Analysis of the Target Group. Athens: Municipality of Athens. Robolis, S., Papadogamvros, V., Dimoulas, K. and Sidira, V., 1995. The Role of Partnerships in Promoting Social Cohesion: Greek National Study, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin. Salamon, L.M. and Anheier H.K., 1998. Social origins of civil society: Explaining the non-profit sector cross-nationally. Voluntas, 9(3), pp. 213–48. Sarasa, S., 1995. La sociedad civil en la Europa del sur: Una perspective comparada de las relaciones entre Estado y asociaciones altruistas [Civil society in Southern Europe: A comparative perspective of relations between state and voluntary associations]. In: S. Sarasa and L. Moreno (eds) El estado del bienestar en la Europa del sur [The welfare state in southern Europe]. Madrid: Consejo Superior De Investigationes Cientificas, pp. 157–86. Stasinopoulou, O., 1997. Ελληνικές εθελοντικές οργανώσεις: Μια πρώτη προσέγγιση μέσα από το ερευνητικό πρόγραμμα Volmed-Hellas [Greek Voluntary Organizations: A first look through the research programme Volmed-Hellas]. Athens: Panteio University, Centre of Social Morphology and Social Policy. Taylor, M. and Lansley, J., 1992. Ideology and welfare in the UK voluntary sector, Voluntas, 3(2), pp. 153–74. Tsakraklides, S., 1998. Structuring of Nonprofit Organizations: The Case of  Greece. Haven: Department of Sociology, Yale University. Tsoukalas K. and Koronaiou, A., 2000. Εθελοντισμός και ελληνική εμπειρία, Τόμος Β. [Voluntarism and the Greek experience, vol. 2]. Athens: ΕΤΕΒΑ.

Chapter 8

When Best is Not Enough: Greek Environmental NGOs and their Donors amidst the Economic Crisis Iosif Botetzagias and Eirini Koutiva

Introduction The dwindling of incomes across Greek society due to the ongoing economic crisis implies that both ordinary citizens and businesses will now have fewer financial resources to donate to civil society groups. The present chapter examines to what extent this has been the case for the Greek civil society environmental sector, and in particular for the leading (or ‘flagship’) Greek environmental NGOs (ENGOs). We begin with an overview of Greek ENGO development, paying special attention to their income sources over time. This overview shows that the ENGOs have predominantly depended on institutional donors (foundations, businesses, state agencies, the EU etc.), which have contributed substantial amounts to their budgets, and not on individual members. Yet, over the past few years, the size and number of these institutional donations has decreased substantially, posing serious operational problems for the ENGOs. The continuous shrinking of the institutional donations’ ‘pie’ makes it all the more important for the ENGOs to be able to meet the donors’ standards concerning funding. Thus, we set out to map and juxtapose the Greek institutional donors’ and ENGOs’ views on what makes a successful grantee, with the aim of establishing to what extent they match. If it turns out that they do not match, then arguably the Greek ENGOs have a way out of their current financial predicament, by improving their performance and by tailoring their applications to better suit the prospective donors’ expectations. Our results clearly show that this has not been the case. Donors and ENGOs hold highly similar views, leaving the latter with little (if any) room to improve and by so doing to increase the funding they receive. Hence the title of the chapter: flagship ENGOs are already the best in their donors’ eyes, yet, in the midst of the economic crisis, this top performance is not enough to provide them with the funds they need. Accordingly, the chapter concludes by discussing both the strategies that ENGOs have tried to adopt in order to face this obstacle and the challenges facing the ENGOs in the medium term.

126

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Greek Environmental NGOs: A Brief History Nature-related societies and groups have a long history in Greece. The end of the 19th century is marked by the emergence of a number of walking/hiking, mountaineering, touring and ‘nature-loving’ (φυσιολατρικών) groups and magazines (cf. Botetzagias and Kourouzides, 2011), as well as the establishment of the first ‘environmental’ group, the ‘Filodassiki (Friends-of-the-Forest) Society of Athens’ (Φιλοδασική Ένωση Αθηνών) in 1899. The post-war era is marked by the slow emergence of new and, aspiring nationwide, environmental groups, with the Hellenic Society for the Protection of Nature (Ελληνική Εταιρία Προστασία της Φύσης) paving the way in the early 1950s. Yet, as it is evident from Figure 8.1, the increase of Greek ENGOs was very slow until the mid-1970s.1 The seventies proved to be a turning point, and this was due mainly to the fact that the environment had moved centre-stage both at a global and at a national level. Over the next decade, the firm grounding of a democratic regime, the increasing realisation of the environmental problems facing the country, Greece’s participation in the European Community (and the subsequent, and ever increasing, influx of pro-environmental legislation) as well as the coming of age of more concerned, more affluent and better educated generations of Greeks (Botetzagias, 2001) paved the way for the creation of more and more specialised nationwide ENGOs, which developed into the flagships of the Greek ENGOs (see also next paragraph), such as the Sea Turtle Protection Society (STPS, established in 1983), the Hellenic Ornithological Society (1982), the Society for the Protection of the Monk Seal (MOM, 1988), WWF-Greece (1989), Greenpeace-Greece (1991) and Arcturos (an ENGO interested in brown bear protection, established in 1992). The 1990s witnessed the growth and consolidation of the Greek ENGO population, with their total number more than doubling and their membership base roughly tripling (Botetzagias, 2001). More importantly, though, this was the period in which the Greek ENGO population first exhibited its division into two very different categories of organisation, a pattern which still persists (Botetzagias, 2001). By the mid-nineties, according to data from the census of Greek ENGOs conducted by EKKE (1998), the vast majority of Greek ENGOs fell into the first category, being mainly small groups with virtual no resources: 70% had less than 200 registered members,2 65% had no assets whatsoever, 64% had a maximum 1 A note of caution is necessary. The graph is based on retrospective data, recording those environmental NGOs which were still active at the time of research (1997). Thus it is very likely that this survey underestimates the past numbers of environmental groups, since some of those groups might have ceased to operate by that year. Although it is not possible to estimate the exact numbers, available research (e.g. Botetzagias, 2001) lead us to believe that the actual numbers of Greek ENGOs for the period 1950–1970 are not that different than the ones presented herein. 2 Only half of these members had paid their membership fees for the year of the survey, thus the threshold of ‘active’ members was more likely around 100.

127

35

300

30

250

25

200

20 150 15 100

10

Total N of ENGOs

New ENGOs per year

When Best is Not Enough

50

5

0 0 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 New ENGO

Figure 8.1

Total N of ENGOs

The development of Greek ENGOs over time

Source: Authors’ own calculations, based on EKKE (1998; 2005)

of one volunteer worker while a little over 80% could not afford a single paid worker. On the other side, there was also a small group constituting the second category of ‘flagship’ ENGOs,3 with many members and a significant workforce (see Table 8.1).

3 We consider the flagship group of Greek ENGOs to consist not only of the organisations which are the largest (in terms of membership) and the most affluent (in terms of financial resources) organisations but also of those ENGOs which have traditionally served as the information sources for the remaining groups, which have participated in semi-governmental bodies (e.g. the governing boards of Greek protected areas and/or governmental committees) as well as those which have closely co-operated together on policy issues, while declining to collaborate with other (‘peripheral’) Greek ENGOs. For a further discussion see Botetzagias (2000); Botetzagias (2006). In the mid-nineties, this group included: Greenpeace-Greece; WWF Greece; Hellenic Ornithological Society (EOE); Hellenic Society for the Protection of Nature (EEPF); Hellenic Society for the Protection of the Environment and the Cultural Heritage (Elliniki Etairia); Arktouros (dealing with brown bear protection); Sea Turtle Protection Society (STPS); MOM (monk seal protection society); Network Mediterranean SOS (Diktyo Mesogeios SOS); Nea Oikologia (New Ecology, a magazine group). Since then, Nea Oikologia has ceased to exist while two more organisations, MEDASSET (Mediterranean Association to Save the Sea Turtles, a UK–Greece based ENGO, established in 1988) and Kallisto (dealing primarily with brown bear protection, established in 2004), have joined the ‘flagships’ group.

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

128

Table 8.1

Members and workforce of Greek ENGOs (for 1996) Members (mean) 542 5.967

Peripheral ENGOs (N=182) Flagship ENGOs (N=10)

Paid employees (median) 0 11

Source: Authors’ calculations, based on EKKE (1998)

These differences were maintained, and even further intensified, over the 2000s. While the vast majority of the smaller groups lingered on in the shadows of locality, the flagship environmental NGOs have been participating in an increasing number of semi-official networks and becoming even more prominent, some of them turning into household names (see Figure 8.2). 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

1 2

Placement

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 GREENPEACE HELLAS

Figure 8.2

ARCTUROS

WWF HELLAS

Placement of environment NGOs in the top-10 of ‘best-known’ Greek NGOs

Source: MEDA Communications (2011; 2012 and 2013)

This popularity, however, is not related to the Greek public becoming more involved with ENGOs: the percentage of Greeks being a member of a ‘nature conservation, animal welfare or ecology’ group has remained stable over time, ranging between 1.2–1.6% for the whole period between 1990 and 2010.4 Rather, the ENGOs’ prominence was due to years of long public awareness-raising, educational and/or fieldwork campaigns across the country, which, with the

4 Data from Eurobarometer surveys no 34 (for the year 1990), 56.1 (for 2001) and 73.4 (for 2010).

When Best is Not Enough

129

exception of Greenpeace-Greece, have not been supported by the ENGOs’ own, relative small, membership base but through institutional and donors’ resources. An early institutional opportunity for the Greek ENGOs to procure funds presented itself in 1992, with the establishment of the EC ‘LIFE’ programme as the Community’s only economic instrument purely dedicated to the environment, aiming especially at actions in the Mediterranean and Baltic regions. The influx of resources allowed the ENGO grantees to employ more and more specialised personnel and, due to the specialised and unique knowledge they gathered through those projects, to further enhance their expertise, or, in other words their ‘intellectual source of leverage’, that is the specialised knowledge and advice they could provide to decision makers (Gulbrandsen and Andresen, 2004). Thus the ENGOs did not just become authorities in their respective fields but also indispensible for the environmental Greek state machinery which had had no independent means for securing detailed information on scientific parameters for themselves.5 The recipient ENGOs had also the opportunity to enhance their public image and recognition. These developments helped to reinforce the flagship status of certain Greek ENGOs. Since, on the whole, the Greek ENGOs have not been particularly keen on publicising their income sources, it is not easy to determine the exact contribution of EU funds to the ENGOs’ budget over time. Sporadic evidence points towards great variations between ENGOs and across different years (see Table 8.2). These fluctuations suggest that, albeit important, EU project money was not a reliable source of income. Thus, over the 2000s, the Greek ENGOs tried to differentiate their income sources, attracting funding from governmental bodies, institutional and business donors as well as individual citizens. The latter source was by far the smallest and the most inconsequential for the majority of Greek ENGOs, with the notable exception of Greenpeace-Greece, which has always been totally dependent on supporters’ donations. Thus, for financial year 2008, the almost 20,500 individual supporters of Greenpeace-Greece contributed approximately €1.3 million (96% of total revenue) to its budget. By comparison, WWF-Greece’s 12,700 supporters contributed €540,000 (14.5% of total revenue), while individuals’ contributions to other ENGOs measured only a few thousands of euros.6 Accordingly, the onset of the Greek financial crisis in 2009–2010 was felt most severely by those ENGOs which had been totally dependent on citizens’ contributions. This group included the vast majority of the ‘peripheral’ groups and, amongst the flagship organisations, Greenpeace-Greece. Thus, Greenpeace’s fee5 A case to the point is the statement of Valaoras et al. (2000) that ‘[g]overnment authorities in Greece have stated that they are simply not capable of evaluating the specific scientific or biological parameters reported in the [LIFE] projects’. 6 For example, the figure for MED-SOS was a little under €8,000 (3% of total income) and for HSPN €54,000 (11% of total income). All figures originate from the respective ENGOs’ annual financial reports.

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

130

Table 8.2

EU-related sources’ per cent contribution to selected Greek ENGOs’ budget

ΜΟΜ (monk seal protection) Hellenic Ornithological Society Sea Turtle Protection Society Greenpeace-Greece WWF-Greece Arcturos

1998 48% 83% Not publicly available 0% 27% –

2001 40% 55% 60% 0% 4.4% 60%

2004 27.1% No answer No answer No answer 15.8% No answer

Sources: for the year 1998, Kousis and Dimopoulou (2000); for the year 2001: Kalamaras (2002); for the year 2004: ENGO’s response to the first author

paying supporters declined by over 17% between 2008 and 2013, while the revenue it received from its membership base dropped by €300,000 (a 21% decrease) – leading to a corresponding decrease in the ENGO’s total budget. GreenpeaceGreece has been able to cover this deficit through contributions from its maternal organisation, Greenpeace International;7 other flagship ENGOs did not have this option and thus they had to resort to controversial solutions. Thus, in summer 2013, Arcturos caused public controversy when it accepted a donation by the extreme-right (and widely perceived as neo-Nazi) political party of Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή). In late July 2013, Arcturos issued a dramatic open call for support since ‘Today that the economic crisis has hit every activity in Greece, Arcturos is going through the most difficult phase of its operation. In order to survive [and continue] its actions all over Greece, [Arcturos] has to shrink its administrative structure and close down its offices in Athens and Thessaloniki’ (Arcturos, 2013). Golden Dawn answered the call by donating €5,000 to Arcturos – and publicising the fact – a gesture which caused a public uproar against the ENGO. Arcturos tried to justify its acceptance of the money, arguing that throughout its history it: has never connected or aligned itself with any political ideology. It has never taken part in any event organised by a political party and group. Our constant ideology is the protection of the Greek wildlife and natural environment which, today, are more pressing than ever. (Arcturos, 2013a)

Yet this did not prove enough to quell the reactions. A few days later (August 2013) Arcturos returned the donation, commenting that ‘no economic need, no matter how urgent it may be, should be met by means which cause greater problems or confusion to the society, especially in a time of crisis. Thus Arcturos [ … ] recognizes that accepting (Golden Dawn’s donation) was a mistake and thus it rejects this contribution [.]’ (Arcturos, 2013b) 7 Rising from €18,000 in 2010 to €29,000 in 2013.

When Best is Not Enough

131

Even those ENGOs which were not as dependent on membership support were hit by the crisis. Thus, between 2008 and 2013, WWF-Greece supporters’ contribution to the ENGO’s revenue was reduced by €60,000 (or 11%). Yet, the overall income went down by €720,000 (a 19% decrease), and this was mainly due to the drastic reductions in the support of foundations and to, a much lesser extent of businesses (see Figure 8.3).

2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 2004

2005

Individuals

Figure 8.3

2006

2007

Foundaons

2008

2009

2010

Instuonal Bodies

2011

2012

Businesses

2013 Other

WWF-Greece’s income sources by year (1,000s euro)

Source: Based on data from WWF-Greece’s annual reports

We have used WWF-Greece as an illustration due to the availability of data, yet the story is similar for most flagship Greek ENGOs. Although the available data for the latter is much scarcer, the picture that emerges is the same. For MOM, total revenue dropped by one third between 2012 and 2013, due to similar drops in project funding from donors and EU or government sources.8 For the Hellenic Society for the Protection of Nature (HSPN), the number of fee-paying members almost halved between 2011 and 2013 ‘due to the difficult fiscal situation’.9 Although this drop did not have substantial financial repercussions (after all, members had not contributed more than 5% of HSPN’s total revenue), what was more worrying was the reduction in the number of institutional donors, which forced HSPN to reduce its workforce and rely more on part-time employees and volunteers. The organisation could therefore only continue those projects which had funding secured, while any other activities had to be curtailed.10 For STPS, donors’ funding similarly dwindled, with more donors contributing in kind instead of financially, forcing the ENGO to rely even more on its (already substantial) 8 Source: MOM’s financial reports for the years 2012 and 2013. 9 Source: HSPN ‘Report of Activities’ and ‘Planning Report’ for year 2013. 10 Source: HSPN ‘Report of Activities’ and ‘Planning Reports’ for years 2011–2013.

132

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

volunteer network, while MEDASSET has experienced severe drops in the number of people attending its fundraising events, while general purpose donations are now a rarity, with donors increasingly turning towards project-specific contributions.11 In such times of economic hardship, it is becoming all the more important for Greek ENGOs to secure the (continuous) funding of institutional donors, such as foundations and businesses, and the fact that even this pool of available resources has shrunk, due to the crisis, poses a further challenge. Since donors cannot satisfy all demands made on them, it is important that applicant ENGOs tailor their applications to better suit donors’ expectations. Thus, this chapter poses a broad research question: to what extent are Greek environmental NGOs aware of prospective donors’ expectations? Donors, ENGOs and ‘Legitimacy Judgments’ Available research on the relations between donors, such as firms and foundations, and NGOs has pointed out that they are greatly influenced by the latter’s ‘legitimacy’, ‘reputation’ and/or ‘status’ (e.g. Valor and Merino de Diego, 2009, p. 120; Graf and Rothlauf, 2011, p. 9; Sagawa and Segal, 2000, p. 20; Jepson, 2005, p. 517). In a recent paper of ours (Botetzagias and Koutiva, 2014) we showed the relative importance that donors attribute to the ENGO’s different ‘characteristics’, which constitute the latter’s, overall ‘sociopolitical legitimacy’, and how the results of this assessment guide the decision to support the particular ENGO. In this chapter we are interested in finding out to what extent the ENGOs themselves consider each of these ‘legitimacy’ characteristics as relevant for their selection as grantees. Our aim is to compare the ENGOs’ perceptions to those of their donors and to determine if the Greek ENGOs understand their donors’ priorities and selection criteria concerning funding. With the number and size of donations dwindling due the current economic crisis, a possible mismatch could have severe repurcursions for the Greek ENGOs, since it may lead to a failure to secure financial contributions from institutional donors, threatening the ENGOs’ operation and, ultimately, their very survival. Sociopolitical legitimacy runs over a ‘continuous scale’ from ‘pragmatic’ at one end to ‘moral’ at the other end (Bitektine, 2011, pp. 158–9). Suchman (1995) breaks down pragmatic legitimacy into the ‘exchange’, the ‘influence’ and the ‘dispositional’ sub-categories. ‘Exchange legitimacy’ stands for ‘support for an organizational policy based on that policy’s expected value to a particular set of constituents’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 578). Thus, the donors provide the ENGOs with resources in anticipation of some kind of reward, arguably for boosting their own public image by being associated with a well-known ENGO (cf. Elkington, 1998; Reith, 2010; Stirrat and Henkel, 1997). In the case of ‘influence legitimacy’, 11 Telephone interview with the Directors of the two ENGOs (May 2014).

When Best is Not Enough

133

‘constituents support the organization not necessarily because they believe that it provides specific favorable exchanges, but rather because they see it as being responsive to their larger interests’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 578; cf. Barker, 2008; Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Brulle and Jenkins, 2005; Brulle, 2000; Chartier and Deleage, 1998; Dowie, 2002; Delfin and Tang, 2007; Ramutsindela, 2010). Indicators of ‘influence legitimacy’ may be the ENGOs’ involvement primarily in ‘first generation’ environmental issues, such as wildlife and nature protection and conservation, which do not threaten the dominant economic paradigm (cf. Mitchell, Mertig, and Dunlap, 1991),12 as well as the existence of ‘board interlocks’ (i.e. having board members in common) between funding bodies and ENGOs. The final pragmatic legitimacy sub-category is the ‘dispositional’ one. Highly anthropomorphic, partly relating to ‘influence legitimacy’ yet also meshing into the ‘moral legitimacy’ domain (see below), dispositional legitimacy is accorded ‘to those organizations that ‘have our best interests at heart’, that ‘share our values’, or that are ‘honest’, ‘trustworthy’, ‘decent’, and ‘wise’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 578; see also Suchman, 1995, p. 588; Valor and Merino de Diego, 2009, pp. 115, 118; Seitanidi and Crane, 2009, pp. 419–22). ‘Moral legitimacy’ is also decomposed into four sub-categories for analytical purposes: the ‘consequential’, ‘procedural’, ‘structural/categorical’ and ‘personal’ categories. ‘Consequential legitimacy’ bases an organisation’s appropriateness on ‘what [it] accomplish[es]’, on the ‘quality and value’ of either its current output or of its past record (Suchman, 1995, p. 580). ‘Procedural legitimacy’ rests on the organisation using ‘proper means and procedures’ for doing business (Suchman, 1995, p. 580) which may include the ENGO’s employment of non-confrontational/ activist tactics while pursuing its agenda (cf. Brulle and Jenkins, 2005; Jenkins, 1987; Brulle and Schafer Caniglia, 1999; Elkington, 1998; Lucea, 2010). This type is also closely related to ‘structural/categorical’ legitimacy which rests on the organisation’s institutionally prescribed structures and/or format (cf. Suchman, 1995, p. 581) The final sub-category of ‘moral legitimacy’ is the ‘personal’ one, which ‘rests on the charisma of individual organizational leaders’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 581) and stems from the ENGO leaders’ social characteristics and, in particular, their embeddedness in (social elites’) networks (cf. Brown, 2005; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Lowry, 1999; Miller-Millesen, 2003; Provan, 1980).

12 On the contrary, ‘second generation’ issues (such as pollution) and ‘third generation’ issues (such as global warming) will feature less prominently, precisely because their root causes can be easily traced back to mainstream industrial and financial practices, that is, the donors’ own turf (cf. Brulle and Schafer Caniglia, 1999).

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

134

Comparing Donors’ and ENGOs’ Perceptions on Grantees’ Legitimacy In summer 2010 we contacted ten flagship Greek environmental NGOs,13 asking them to provide us with information concerning their organisational donors for the latest two fiscal years (2008–2010). Following a selection process, in early autumn 2010 we conducted semi-structured interviews with 16 representatives of 14 donor-organisations (five foundations, six banks and three (mobile) phone companies),14 concerning the criteria they use for selecting one particular ENGO grantee out of the multitude of applications they receive each year: we found that that donors prioritise the ENGOs with a ‘formal structure’, ‘professional character’ and ‘good past record’ (the ‘moral legitimacy’), which serve also as proxies of the grantee’s ‘good name’ (‘dispositional’) and ‘public recognition’ (‘exchange legitimacy’) (see Botetzagias and Koutiva, 2014, for details). In parallel, we also interviewed representatives from the 10 Greek ENGOs we referred to earlier, either their Chairperson or (Executive) Director. All interviews opened along the lines ‘we would like you to tell us why do you think your ENGO/ organisation was selected by the [X donor] to fund your project/proposal? Which do you think were the most important criteria which guided the donors’ decision?’. As in our interviews with the foundations and businesses, we allowed the ENGO interviewees to offer explanations to us without interrupting, yet if the interviewee did not mention some of the identified ‘socio-political legitimacy’ criteria, as soon as s/he finished, we would ask: ‘Do you think that [criterion not mentioned by interviewee] has played any role in the selection of your ENGO?’, and then let the respondent elaborate on the point. In the following sub-sections we present the ENGOs’ perceptions concerning the importance the various legitimacy aspects play in their selection by the institutional donors. Pragmatic Legitimacy The vast majority of the ENGOs consider that the fact that they are ‘well known/ enjoy public recognition’ (exchange legitimacy) is a crucial element in the donors’ selection, especially for businesses since: What private [donor] companies actually cash in [through their donation] is that their name, their logo, will appear on something which has a big impact (interview with ENGO 1). 13 These were: WWF Greece; Hellenic Ornithological Society (EOE); Hellenic Society for the Protection of Nature (EEPF); Hellenic Society for the Protection of the Environment and the Cultural Heritage (Elliniki Etairia); Arktouros (bear protection); Kallisto (large carnivores protection); Archelon (sea turtle protection); Mom (seal protection); MEDASSET (sea turtle protection); Network Mediterranean SOS (Diktyo Mesogeios SOS). 14 In two cases, two individuals from the same company attended the meeting and were thus jointly interviewed.

When Best is Not Enough

135

ENGOs feel that their donors take into account the membership size of the applicant organisation, the outreach of its newsletter or website, the fact the they are ‘flagship ENGOs’15 and/or the public opinion polls’ such as the one presented in Figure 8.2: ‘To be known’ [pauses] … Ι think it plays an important role and this actually works against us since we are not amongst the most well-known Greek organisations, according to relevant opinion polls, we are not in the top positions … we try to counterbalance this with the quality of our work. (ENGO 2)

While some ENGOs feel that they are a ‘brand name’ with which businesses naturally wish to be associated (ENGO 4), others think that what intrigues donors is the ‘niche’ character of the work undertaken by the ENGO, ‘the fact that we can do things that no other organisation in Greece may carry out’ (ENGO 3). Overall, there exists a feeling that foundations are less likely to put emphasis on ‘exchange legitimacy’ and would usual be content with no further publicity than ‘having their logo on the project’s report’ (ENGO 4). Concerning ‘influence legitimacy’, the majority of ENGOs agreed that the donors do prefer to support actions concerning ‘first generation’ environmental problems (species conservation, educational programmes, public awareness and so on) and at least a couple of ENGOs try to tailor their application to these requirements. As far as ‘board interlocks’ are concerned, for the handful of ENGOs for which such interlocks exist, this is not consider as a factor influencing selection: These interlocks are personally used, and not misused. I mean, [their use is that through them] we know what the [foundation/business] board is interested about and we try to prepare a relevant proposal [to apply for funding]. [.] Yet, [such an interlock] cannot tip the scales: if the proposal is not good, if it does not meet the donor’s requirements, it will not be selected. [.] Our a priori knowledge simply helps us to determine if it is worth it to prepare a proposal (ENGO 3).

Lastly, only two ENGOs stressed the importance of their ‘good name’ (‘dispositional legitimacy’) independently of the other legitimacy categories (see next sub-section). In both cases, it involved the vouching for other, already trusted, organisations (either ENGOs or donors) on behalf of the (still) unfamiliar applicant ENGO. This low number is hardly surprising if one considers that the vast majority of the ENGOs we are examining here have been active for decades and they are hardly newcomers.

15 Thus, most of the interviewees mentioned emphatically that their organisation is in ‘the top 10’ of Greek ENGOs.

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

136

Moral Legitimacy For the vast majority of ENGOs, a ‘good name’ is equivalent to a combination of ‘consequential’, ‘structural’ and ‘procedural’ legitimacies, with the former being the most important. Interestingly enough, only half of the interviewees explicitly mentioned the importance of their ‘proposal’s quality’ – perhaps because they consider it as a sine qua non precondition. They rather focused on their ENGO’s ‘past record’ as an easily available proof that they have the framework, the resources and the know-how necessary for the task: [T]he donor checks on what you have done, that you have cooperated with this and that [partner/donor], that you have delivered … he is not going to check your ‘structure’! (ENGO 6)

Concerning the other aspect of ‘procedural legitimacy’, regarding how the use, or avoidance, of activist tactics would impact on the donor’s decision, our interviewees stated the obvious, namely that, since they are not activism-oriented, they never had to deal with this issue. Finally, concerning personal legitimacy (i.e. applicant has high profile/well connected board members/personal networks), all ENGOs consider this an inescapable fact: Since we put forward a proposal [for funding] once or twice a year, it is only normal for personal, professional, relations to develop between personnel members [of the ENGO and of the donor] (ENGO 7).

Where opinions differ is on whether these relations and/or personal kudos play an important role. Thus the majority view was that: Knowing someone means that it is easier to go and knock on his/her door-that’s all (ENGO 8). If you have nothing to show for, no one is going to do you a favor, to ‘help’ you. Since it is also his/hers credibility at stake, this is not his family store (ENGO 6).

On the other hand, the minority view was that: Personal acquaintances play a great role. [Since] Each company receives a load of applications (for funding). Which dossier will be put at the top of the pile is very important (ENGO 9).

The previous findings and discussion, both for donors and for ENGOs, are summarised in Table 8.3.

When Best is Not Enough

Table 8.3

Legitimacy judgments conditioning donors’ financial giving to environmental NGOs: Comparing the views of donor foundations and businesses and of ENGOs

Legitimacy sub-categories

‘Characteristics’ assessed in the particular legitimacy judgment: The applicant ENGO …

Exchange

Influence

Dispositional

(Proposition, P) … is well known/enjoys public recognition (i.e. it offers good publicity to the donor) … proposed/existing projects concern ‘first generation’ environmental problems … and donor share board members (‘board interlock’) … has ‘a good name’

Consequential

… submits a good quality proposal … has a good past record

Structural

… has an institutionalised organisational format … employs business-like procedures … does not use activist tactics … has high profile/well connected board members/ personnel

Procedural

Personal

137

Proposition (P) is supported, or otherwise, per actor category Foundations Businesses

ENGOS



Rather 







Rather 

Unclear

Irrelevant

Rather 

Rather 

Rather 





 

 

 

Rather 





Rather 



Rather 

Unclear

Unclear

Unclear

Unclear



Source: Amalgam of data from the present study and from Botetzagias and Koutiva (2014, p. 301).

Conclusions and Discussion This chapter set out to investigate how the flagship Greek ENGOs are faring in securing the financial resources they need for their operation in the midst of the economic crisis. As we have shown in the opening sections, since the start of the crisis, the ENGOs have experienced a reduction of all their income sources, both from individual members/supporters as well as from institutional donors (EU, government, foundations, businesses). Since, with the exception of GreenpeaceGreece, these ENGOs have traditionally depended much more on the latter source, it was this reduction which has had the most important repercussions. Available

138

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

data reveal budget reductions running into the hundreds of thousands of euros for the flagship Greek ENGOs, within just a couple of years, and this was due to a combination of securing fewer institutional donors and of these donors contributing less money. Thus, it is important to examine whether the ENGOs are doing ‘all that is expected of them’ in order to safeguard and secure this vital source of income. Failure to do so would arguably contribute to further reductions, a development which will seriously jeopardise the ENGOs’ operation and their efforts to protect the Greek natural environment. The writing on the wall is quite telling: in just one year (2012–2013) WWF-Greece’s spending on nature-conservation projects dropped by 20%, in absolute numbers; MOM’s by 38%.16 Accordingly, this chapter focused on examining to what extent the ENGOs’ perceptions match the expectations of their donors on what makes a successful grantee applicant. Building on previous research (Botetzagias and Koutiva, 2014), we juxtaposed these two groups’ ideas regarding the importance that the various forms of ‘legitimacy judgments’ (Bitektine, 2011, p. 152) play in the process of securing funding and donations from foundations and businesses. It is evident that Greek donors’ and ENGOs’ views correspond to a great extent. Both sides place the greatest emphasis on ‘moral legitimacy’ components, on an ENGO’s proven capability -mainly through its past record – to carry out the task that the organisation asks to be funded for. This is also coupled with the importance attributed to the ENGO’s ‘public recognition’ (‘exchange capability’), yet there exists a subtle difference here. While business-donor interviewees maintained that they would fund a well-known ENGO because this organisation would be a ‘professional’ one (i.e. having an institutionalised organisational format, employing business-like procedures and not using activist tactics, corresponding to ‘structural’ and ‘procedural legitimacies’), the ENGOs themselves see a clear ‘exchange’ consideration here, with the business donor being interested in the most popular ENGO candidate, for self-advertisement reasons. The overall high correlation, notwithstanding the aforementioned minor differences, between donors’ expectations and ENGOs’ perceptions is a mixed blessing for the latter. Οn the positive side, it means that the Greek flagship ENGOs are already doing what it is ‘expected’ of them, thus they are not in any real risk of losing their donors’ benevolence. On the negative side, and rather ironically, this also means that the ENGOs have little room to improve and thus attract more or new funding from the particular donors categories (foundations, banks and telephone companies). As a matter of fact, since the available money from the existing domestic donors decreased due to the current economic crisis, and not due to any failings of the ENGOs themselves, the flagship ENGOs now find themselves in the awkward situation whereby their (continuous) top performance secures them fewer resources. The Greek flagship ENGOs are trying to deal with their current economic hardships with a varied mix of approaches. Foremost amongst them has been 16 Based on the respective ENGOs’ annual reports .

When Best is Not Enough

139

a reduction (e.g. Greenpeace-Greece, MOM), or at least a stabilisation (e.g. WWF-Greece), of their own operational expenses, that is of the money spent on administration and maintenance, achieved mainly through a more Spartan in-house management as well as by relying more on part-time employees (e.g. HSPN, MEDASSET) or volunteers (e.g. STPS). This is certainly a wise approach, yet it has some obvious limits if the ENGO is to remain functional. A second approach has been to try and offer more ‘value for (the donation’s) money’ or, in most cases, the same value for less money. Albeit appealing, this approach does not solve the root cause of the ENGOs’ financial predicament, the fact that existing donors now have less money (in absolute terms) to give out. The aforementioned problem explicates the final approach employed, namely to attract new and/or more (types of) donors. Thus a number of interviewees mentioned that they are in the process of preparing and applying for EU-funded LIFE 2014–2020 projects. Yet LIFE is an open-to-all, pan-European tender, so success is by no means guaranteed. Thus, and closer to home, the ENGOs have also been trying to mobilise the support of larger or new segments of the Greek public. The (limited) quantitative data available casts doubt on the extent to which they have been successful. Thus, in 2008, WWF-Greece and Greenpeace-Greece, the two largest and amongst the best-known ENGOs, dedicated 12% and 31% of their ‘Expenses’ budget in securing/recruiting financial support, respectively. In this way WWF was able to achieve a 4.7 ‘income/procurement expenses ratio’ (i.e. for every euro spent by the organisation in trying to attract financial resources in 2008, it received €4.7 in return) while Greenpeace’s ratio was 3.2. By 2012, both ENGOs had increased their proportion of spending in that domain, to 15% for WWF and 40% for Greenpeace: yet the income/procurement expenses ratios dropped, to 2.86 and 2.44 respectively.17 Apparently, trying harder and spending more had not delivered in the midst of the crisis, and one cannot be too hopeful that it will do in the near future.18 If the economic crisis continues for some time in the future, meaning that their existing donor-categories’ contributions will remain reduced, and the aforementioned measures fail to deliver, then the Greek flagship ENGOs may face a dilemma concerning what to do next. On the one hand, they could alter the mix of their activities, moving away from resource-hungry in situ conservation projects to less expensive public awareness projects. On the other hand, they, except Greenpeace, could try to attract more institutional donors. However, since 17 Data originating from ENGOs’ annual reports. The two ENGOs’ expenditure on resources procurement had increased also (and more substantially) in absolute terms: in 2012, it stood at €587,000 for WWF (33.7% increase from year 2009) and at €496,000 for Greenpeace (11.7% increase from year 2009). 18 These disappointing results, in tandem of course with the ENGOs ever diminishing incomes, might explain why, in 2013, both organisations drastically reduced that particular kind of expenditure: WWF spent €140,000 less than the previous year (-23.7%); Greenpeace, €192,000 less (-38.6%).

140

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

these ENGOs are already securing funding from a variety of donors’ categories, expanding their pull most likely entails including some of the business-donors’ categories which they have been avoiding so far. To date, Greek ENGOs have unanimously rejected donations and/or cooperating with industries related to firearms, child labour, tobacco and alcohol19 products – and this is unlikely to change. On the other hand, oil industries are not similarly rejected by all. Some may frown upon such a practice and dismiss it as ‘green-washing’. Others may counter-argue that if it is fine to accept donations from oil-consuming car industries, as some other flagship ENGOs had done, then it should not be an issue accepting money from oil-producing industries. Obviously, both rationalisations have their merits, and shortcomings. If the economic necessity does push the Greek ENGOs into accepting the support of novel donors’ categories, then they should do so with extreme caution. As the Arcturos-Golden Dawn incident has demonstrated, being funded by what the public opinion perceives as the ‘wrong’ donor may have severe repercussions, not least to the most important and only ‘tradable’ asset the ENGOs have: their ‘good name’.20 One may wonder whether what we have described and analysed previously is particular to the environmental sector of the Greek civil society, or whether is it typical of developments in other sectors as well. We believe that the latter is closer to the truth – although we lack the necessary empirical data to prove this point. The distinction between nation-wide, large, publicly recognisable, professional versus local, small, relatively unknown voluntary NGOs is not only valid for the environmental civil society sector. And since, across sectors, it is the former NGOs which have been more dependent on institutional donors, it is also such organisations that will be most affected by the crisis: the drastic reduction of the very type of donations which have allowed those NGOs to develop and to pursue their mission through a host of important yet financial-resource intensive activities also means that it is particularly these NGOs’ activities which will be largely curtailed. The crisis has of course taken its toll on the smaller NGOs, yet likely not to the same extent. These NGOs have been long accustomed to a scarcity of monetary funds, and thus have had a much smaller number and size of operations which have been rather time-resource intensive (i.e. dependent on voluntary work/ contributions): accordingly, they are arguably in a better position to continue what they have always been doing. That said, one should note that the environmental NGO sector, as a whole, is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other civil society sectors. Available research argues that environmental concern is positively correlated with personal income 19 One ENGO had an alcohol beverages’ company as its donor. 20 Things are not made any easier by the fact that recently the Greek NGO sector (and as a result also its environmental branch) has been swept by accusations of malpractices and fraud, following the arrest of the head of the Greek NGO ‘International De-Mining Centre’ who stands accused for defrauding the Greek state by €9 million (see Lambropoulos, 2014).

When Best is Not Enough

141

and overall economic affluence (cf. Botetzagias and Malesios, 2013 for data on Greece), meaning that it reduces in times of economic hardship – similarly to one’s willingness to pay for the environment (cf. Jones et al., 2009). Thus, while the social impact of the current economic crisis could likely make it easier for some NGO subsectors (e.g. poverty relief, childcare) to justify support for their cause, environmental NGOs will rather be facing an uphill struggle in persuading the public to donate them that extra penny. References Arcturos, 2013. Ο Αρκτούρος επιβιώνει … [Arktouros survives … ]. [online] Available at: http://arcturos.wordpress.com/2013/07/31/oarcturosepiviwnei/ [Accessed 28 May 2014]. Arcturos, 2013a. Post, TwitLonger, 13 August. [online] Available at: http://www. twitlonger.com/show/n_1rlsv08 [Accessed 28 May 2014]. Arcturos, 2013b. Ανακοίνωση Τύπου [Press Announcement]. [online] Available at: http://arcturos.wordpress.com/2013/08/21/anakoinwsitypou/ [Accessed 28 May 2014]. Barker, M., 2008. The liberal foundations of environmentalism: Revisiting the Rockefeller-Ford connection. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 19(2), pp. 15–42. Baur, D. and Schmitz, H., 2012. Corporations and NGOs: When accountability leads to co-optation. Journal of Business Ethics, 106(1), pp. 579–604. Bitektine, A., 2011. Toward a theory of social judgments of organizations: The case of legitimacy, reputation, and status. The Academy of Management Review, 36(1), pp. 151–79. Botetzagias, I., 2000. Patterns of Networking and Interaction for Greek ENGOs. Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research, Joint Sessions, 14–19 April, Copenhagen. Available at: [Accessed 3 December 2014]. Botetzagias, I. 2001. The Environmental Movement in Greece, 1973 to the Present. Ph.D thesis, Keele University. Botetzagias, Ι., 2006. ΜΚΟ και Κοινωνία Πολιτών, μια προβληματική σχέση; Η περίπτωση των Ελληνικών Μη-Κυβερνητικών Περιβαλλοντικών Οργανώσεων [NGOs and civil society, a problematic relation? The case study of the Greek Environmental NGOs]. Greek Review of Political Science, 27, pp. 71–95. Botetzagias, I. and Kourouzides, S., 2011. Η γέννηση και η ανάπτυξη του οικολογικού κινήματος στην Ελλάδα [The emergence and development of the Greek environmental movement]. In: C. Vlassopoulou and G. Liarakou, eds. Environmental History [Περιβαλλοντική Ιστορία]. Athens: Pedio, pp. 121–38. Botetzagias, I. and Koutiva, E., 2014. Financial giving of foundations and businesses to ENGOs: The role of grantee’s legitimacy. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 25, pp. 281–306.

142

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Botetzagias, I. and Malesios, C., 2012. The influence of economic affluence and environmental conditions on an individual’s concern for the environment: A Greek case study (2005–2007). Local Environment, 17(1), pp. 93–113. Brown, W.A., 2005. Exploring the association between board and organizational performance in nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 15(3), pp. 317–39. Brulle, R.J., 2000. Agency, Democracy, and Nature: The US Environmental Movement from a Critical Theory Perspective. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Brulle, R.J. and Jenkins, J.C., 2005. Decline or Transition? Discourse and Strategy in the US Environmental Movement. Paper presented at the annual conference of the American Sociological Association, Philadelphia, PA. Brulle, R.J. and Schafer Caniglia, B., 1999. Money for Nature: A Network Analysis of Foundations and Environmental Groups. Working Paper and Technical Report Series, 2000–01. Notre Dame, IN, USA: University of Notre Dame. Chartier, D. and Deleage, J.P., 1998. The international environmental NGOs: From the revolutionary alternative to the pragmatism of reform. Environmental Politics, 7(3), pp. 26–41. Delfin, F.G. Jr., and Tang, S., 2007. Elitism, pluralism, or resource dependency: Patterns of environmental philanthropy among private foundations in California. Environment and Planning A, 39(9), pp. 2167–86. Delfin, F.G. Jr., and Tang, S.Y., 2008. Foundation impact on environmental nongovernmental organizations: The grantees’ perspective. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 37(4), pp. 603–25. Dowie, M., 2002. American Foundations: An Investigative History. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. EKKE (National Centre of Social Research), 1998. Μη Κυβερνητικές Περιβαλλοντικές/Οικολογικές Οργανώσεις [Non-Governmental Environmental/ Ecological Organizations]. [online] Available at: [Accessed 28 May 2014]. EKKE (National Centre of Social Research), 2005. Μη Κυβερνητικές Περιβαλλοντικές/Οικολογικές Οργανώσεις [Non-Governmental Environmental/ Ecological Organizations]. [online] Available at: http://www.ekke.gr/estia/gr_ pages/gr_index.htm [Accessed 28 May 2014]. Elkington, J., 1998. Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business. Gabriola Island, BC, USA: New Society Publishers. Graf, N.F.S. and Rothlauf, F., 2011. The why and how of firm-NGO collaborations. Working Papers in Information Systems and Business Administration. [online] Available at: http://wi.bwl.uni-mainz.de/publikationen/WP-04-2011.pdf [Accessed 3 January 3 2012]. Gulbrandsen, T. and Andresen, S., 2004. NGO Influence in the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Compliance, Flexibility Mechanisms, and Sinks. Global Environmental Politics, 4(4), pp. 54–75.

When Best is Not Enough

143

Hillman, A.J. and Dalziel, T., 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. The Academy of Management Review, 28(3), pp. 383–96. Jenkins, C., 1987. Nonprofit organizations and political advocacy. In: W.W. Powell (ed.) The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 296–318. Jepson, P., 2005. Governance and accountability of environmental NGOs. Environmental Science and Policy, 8(2005), pp. 515–24. Jones, N., Malesios, C. and Botetzagias, I., 2009. The influence of social capital on willingness to pay for the environment among European citizens. European Societies, 11(4), pp. 511–30. Kalamaras, I., 2002. Περιβαλλοντικές μη κυβερνητικές οργανώσεις στην Ελλάδα: Επισημαίνοντας θετικά σημεία και αδυναμίες στο δρόμο προς την ωριμότητα [Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations in Greece], M.Sc. University of Athens. Kousis, M. and Dimopoulou, L., 2000. Environmental Movement Organisations in Greece in the 1990s: A Preliminary Assessment. Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Copenhagen, 14–19 April. Lambropoulos, V., 2014. Το σκάνδαλο της ΜΚΟ και ο Κάρατζιτς [The scandal of the NGOs and Karadzic]. Το Βήμα [To Vima newspaper] [online] 19 February 2014. Available at: http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=569008 [Accessed 21 May 2014]. Lowry, R.C., 1999. Foundation patronage toward citizen groups and think tanks: Who gets grants? The Journal of Politics, 61(3), pp. 758–76. Lucea, R., 2010. How we see them versus how they see themselves: A cognitive perspective of firm–NGO relationships. Business and Society, 49(1), pp. 116–39. MEDA Communications 2013, Social Barometer [Κοινωνικό Βαρόμετρο], A.S.B.I. (Awareness & Social Behavior Index). Available at: [Accessed 6 December 2014]. MEDA Communications, 2012. Κοινωνικό Βαρόμετρο [Social Barometer] A.S.B.I. (Awareness & Social Behavior Index). Available at: [Accessed 6 December 2014]. MEDA Communications, 2011. [Κοινωνικό Βαρόμετρο] Social Barometer.A.S.B.I. (Awareness & Social Behavior Index), Available at: https://www.google.gr/ url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0 CCYQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fglobalsustain.org%2Ffiles%2F%25C E%2594%25CE%25B5%25CE%25AF%25CE%25BA%25CF%2584%25

144

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

CE%25B7%25CF%2582%2520%25CE%2592%25CE%25BF%25CE%25 B7%25CE%25B8%25CE%25BF%25CF%258D%25CE%25BC%25CE% 25B5%25CE%25BD%25CE%25B7%25CF%2582%2520%25CE%2591% 25CE%25BD%25CE%25B1%25CE%25B3%25CE%25BD%25CF%2589 %25CF%2581%25CE%25B9%25CF%2583%25CE%25B9%25CE%25B C%25CF%258C%25CF%2584%25CE%25B7%25CF%2584%25CE%25B 1%25CF%2582%2520%25CE%259C%25CE%259A%25CE%259F.xls&e i=ua9DVbaUFIbZaozBgYAD&usg=AFQjCNFVzL75I6xaIInY-K7fRiPE_ gV90Q&bvm=bv.92189499,d.bGg> [Accessed 1 May 2015]. Miller-Millesen, J.L., 2003. Understanding the behavior of nonprofit boards of directors: A theory-based approach. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32(4), pp. 521–47. Mitchell, R.C., Mertig, A.G. and Dunlap, R.E., 1991. Twenty years of environmental mobilization: Trends among national environmental organizations. Society and Natural Resources, 4(3), pp. 219–34. Provan, K.G., 1980. Board power and organizational effectiveness among human service agencies. Academy of Management Journal, 23(2), pp. 221–36. Ramutsindela, M., 2010. The interconnections between environmental philanthropy and business: Insights from the Southern African Nature Foundation. Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, 70, pp. 54–69. Reith, S., 2010. Money, power, and donor-NGO partnerships. Development in Practice, 20(3), pp. 446–55. Sagawa, S. and Segal, E., 2000. Common Interest, Common Good: Creating Value Through Business and Social Sector Partnerships. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Seitanidi, M. and Crane, A., 2009. Implementing CSR through partnerships: Understanding the selection, design and institutionalisation of nonprofitbusiness partnerships. Journal of Business Ethics, 85(2), pp. 413–29. Spanou, C., 1995. Οι απαρχές της περιβαλλοντικής πολιτικής στην Ελλάδα: Η δυναμική της πολιτικο-διοικητικής ατζέντας στη διάρκεια της δικτατορίας [The beginnings of the environmental policy in Greece: The dynamics of the politico-managerial agenda during the dictatorship]. In: C. Spanou, Ed. Social Demands and State Policies [Κοινωνικές διεκδικήσεις και Κρατικές Πολιτικές]. Sakkoulas: Athens, pp. 223–86. Stirrat, R.L. and Henkel, H., 1997. The development gift: The problem of reciprocity in the NGO world. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 554, pp. 66–80. Suchman, M.C., 1995. Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), pp. 571–610. Valaoras, G., Ioannou, Y., Raftopoulou, C., Grasso, M., Moussouris, Y., Rovisco, I., Navarro, C., Snachez, A. and Alba, D. 2000. Assessing the Implementation of NATURA 2000 in Southern Europe. Paper presented in Environmental Studies Workshop ‘Coming to Terms with the Mediterranean Syndrome: The

When Best is Not Enough

145

Implementation of European Environmental Policies in Southern States’, European University Institute, Florence, May 18–19. Valor, C. and Merino de Diego, A., 2009. Relationship of business and NGOs: An empirical analysis of strategies and mediators of their private relationship. Business Ethics: A European Review, 18(2), pp. 110–26.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 9

Towards a Hybrid ‘Shadow State’? The Case of Migrant-/Refugee-Serving NGOs in Greece Dimitris Skleparis

Introduction Civil society has always been weak in Greece (Lyrintzis, 2002, p. 92; Mouzelis, 2002, p. 238–45). Few voluntary associations and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have been recorded compared to other countries, while participation in such bodies has remained relatively low (Sotiropoulos, 2004, p. 8). Additionally, civil society has been criticised for its strong, unhealthy dependence on the Greek state, as it has never actually succeeded in developing autonomous rules and values away from politics (Polyzoidis, 2009, p. 191). In this respect, civil society in Greece has not achieved anything of substance, particularly in the social field, mainly due to a lack of state support, inconsistent government policies (Polyzoidis, 2009), and persistent, highly polarised political party confrontations (Robolis et al., 1995). However, at the beginning of the 21st century, the civil society landscape in Greece started to change quite substantially (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2012). Migrant associations, networks of associations of migrant and mainstream human rights NGOs, or NGOs active in the protection of refugee’ and asylum seekers’ rights, anti-discrimination, or the fight against racism and xenophobia created an increasingly vocal civil society (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2009, p. 5). The availability of EU sources of funding1 greatly contributed to this development, which coincided with a period of consolidation of Greek civil society (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2009, p. 5). These two processes reinforced each other, in particular in the human rights and anti-discrimination field (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2009, p. 5). In this respect, a number of academic studies have been produced on migrant associations and migrant-/refugee- serving NGOs in Greece. With regard to the former, most of these studies have focused on a limited number of associations, which have been analysed as instances of self-organisation and solidarity of migrant communities in Greece (e.g. Kavoulakos, 2006; Petronoti, 2001; Schumbert, 2004; 1 EQUAL and INTERREG, for instance.

148

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

Zachou and Kalerante, 2009). Clarke (2013), however, has taken a much more holistic approach by examining how national contexts affect migrant associations as transnational actors in comparative perspective. Through qualitative interviews with members of migrant associations, and analysis of the most comprehensive relevant survey to date (i.e. Harokopio University, 2009), she identified 128 such organisations, which are non-professionalised, disproportionately concentrated in and around Athens, relying on informal social networks and volunteers, and which are underfunded, which inevitably limits their range of activities to social and cultural, practical support, education and training, and maintaining links with countries of origin (see also Papadopoulos et al., 2013). Indeed, the state-centred nature of the institutional framework in Greece renders migrant associations weak and suffering from limited recognition, and non-significant civil societal force (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2005). Migrant-/refugee- serving NGOs in Greece, on the other hand, are understood in the academic literature as ‘effective consulting or mediating organisations which act towards the improvement of migrants’ position in the host societies’ (Papadopoulos et al., 2013, p. 344), while they multiply their areas of activity in order to promote the social inclusion of the less integrated target populations (Kavoulakos, 2006; Varouxi, 2008). Papadopoulos et al. (2013) put forward an excellent account of migrant associations and NGOs2 in Greece in the context of the economic crisis, based on data collected in 2009 and 2010, by incorporating references to all recorded migration-related social actors operating in the country. According to their account, the majority of NGOs were established in the pre2000 period by non-migrants, and they are medium to large-scale organisations, using modern management tools and approaching migration as a topical issue of concern to Greece (Papadopoulos et al., 2013, pp. 346–55). They seek to address a broader range of issues, from the social inclusion of disadvantaged groups to the provision of services to migrant populations (Papadopoulos et al., 2013, p. 346). More specifically, their objectives include the protection of human rights, the encouragement of migrants’ social integration, the promotion of multiculturalism and intercultural dialogue, and the sponsorship of education/training of migrants (Papadopoulos et al., 2013, p. 347). Moreover, they appear to be over-concentrated in Athens, and they benefit from being strategically located near public services and decision-making centres, without being far away from migrant groups at the same time (Papadopoulos et al., 2013, p. 355). Due to their organisational ability to provide services to migrants, and their institutional capacity to participate in migration policy-making, they operate state services aimed at the social integration and healthcare of migrants 2 According to Papadopoulos et al. (2013), immigrant associations act like pressure groups that serve the short-term needs and/or interests of migrants in the host countries. Immigrant-/refugee-serving NGOs, on the other hand, play a pivotal role in the consultation processes for migration policy and act as intermediaries for and/or represent the interests of migrants/refugees in the host countries.

Towards a Hybrid ‘Shadow State’?

149

(Papadopoulos et al., 2013, p. 355). Yet, a number of them are also active along irregular migration gateways at the Greek-Turkish borders, monitoring vulnerable migrant groups and providing related medical care and support (Papadopoulos et al., 2013, p. 348). Furthermore, the social and business networks of NGOs extend transnationally and they also convey valuable social capital which allows them to influence migration policy-making and the integration process of migrants (Papadopoulos et al., 2013, p. 355). Finally, migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs typically have greater economic resources and a financial capacity superior to that of migrant associations, which allow them to have permanent salaried staff, while they also rely on voluntary work and internships (Papadopoulos et al., 2013, p. 347). It is worth mentioning at this point, that between 2005 and 2009, 61% of migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs were in receipt of state or EU funding, while 38% of them participated in funded projects related to migration (Papadopoulos et al., 2013). This picture has changed dramatically since the beginning of the economic crisis in Greece in late 2009. The vast majority of migrant-/refugee- serving NGOs are now facing major funding problems, mainly because they do not have an independent source of income (Schaub, 2013, p. 13). ARSIS and the Greek Council for Refugees (GCR) for instance, receive most of their funding from the European Commission,3 and the Greek government, which makes them significantly dependent on their donors’ agendas (Schaub, 2013). Moreover, the European Refugee Fund (ERF)4 will only cover up to 80% of an accepted project’s costs, leaving the remaining 20% to be covered by co-funding from the debt-ridden Greek state. It usually takes several months for the Greek state to pay its contribution, meaning that organisations have to pre-finance their operations without actually having the essential funds (Schaub, 2013). What is more, the ERF will start to disburse money only when the Greek government’s share has been made available, which really complicates the situation (Schaub, 2013). In this respect, a GCR official stated that the organisation is facing ‘huge problems’ due to the crisis, and the inability of the Greek state to make available its share of the ERF-funded programmes, which has led the organisation to a ‘critical financial situation’.5 This situation forced the GCR staff to work unpaid for months in 2010 and 2011.6 Along the same lines, a PRAKSIS official reported a significant lack of human resources, medical tools and money to buy essential medicines and vaccines, which hinders the effective implementation of the organisation’s programmes.7 Within this context, the austerity measures that accompanied the bailout of Greece are having a severe impact on social protection schemes and healthcare services. Policy responses have failed to redress the Greek system’s traditional 3 Through the European Refugee Fund (ERF). 4 ERF has been replaced by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). 5 GCR Official, Greek Council for Refugees, Athens, 20 February 2012. 6 GCR Staff Member, Greek Council for Refugees, Athens, 16 February 2012. 7 PRAKSIS Official, PRAKSIS, Athens, 6 December 2011.

150

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

imbalances or to strengthen social safety nets, which, as a result, ‘left many victims of the crisis with little or no support, exactly when the need for social protection was greater than ever’ (Matsaganis, 2012, p. 416). This situation has led to a large number of Greeks, such as pensioners, unemployed, uninsured, homeless, and HIV-positive patients, to turn for assistance to organisations that did not initially include them in their target populations but instead were providing services to migrants and refugees.8 As another interviewee stated, ‘[W]e are now dealing with problems that we were not dealing with in the past, such as families with no social insurance and no access to vaccines’.9 Thus, various migrant-/refugeeserving NGOs have stepped outside their usual responsibilities and launched new programmes that go beyond their initial aims and objectives. In this respect, this chapter argues that we are witnessing the gradual hybridisation of the ‘shadow state’ relationships between NGOs and the Greek state, which has been facilitated, and at the same time hindered, by the economic crisis. These hybrid ‘shadow state’ relationships consist of the decreasing or absent state financial support to migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs, and the simultaneous increasing conformity of the latter to the Greek state’s interests and agenda. In simple terms, it is argued that a number of migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs have started taking on various social welfare services for vulnerable populations, at a time when the Greek state was unable to provide them and was simultaneously reducing its financial support to the migrant-/refugee-serving third sector. This chapter draws on a three-month fieldwork in Athens in 2011 and 2012, semi-structured interviews with members and officials from migrant-/refugeeserving NGOs, and studies and reports that these organisations have produced prior to and since the beginning of the economic crisis. It focuses on three of the largest migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs in Greece: PRAKSIS, Doctors of the World (DoW), and Doctors without Borders (DwB). The criteria for the selection of these cases were, on the one hand, their size, which is also reflected in the large number of programmes and geographic areas in which they operate, and, on the other hand, the differences in their budgetary fluctuations amidst the economic crisis. More specifically, each one of these NGOs represents a unique case in budgetary terms. Since the beginning of the crisis, the budget of PRAKSIS has increased, while the budget of DoW has remained relatively unaffected and the budget of DwB has decreased. However, all three of them multiplied their areas of activity and expanded their target population. This chapter starts with an outline of the concept of the ‘shadow state’, which is followed by an overview of the consequences of the economic crisis on the Greek welfare state and society. The next section presents the ways in which three mainly migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs, PRAKSIS, Doctors of the World, and Doctors without Borders reacted to the curtailment of the welfare state and the

8 DwB Staff Member, Médecins sans Frontières, Athens, 14 November 2011. 9 DoW Staff Member, Doctors of the World, Athens, 25 November 2011.

Towards a Hybrid ‘Shadow State’?

151

decrease in or lack of state financial support. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in the last section of the chapter. The ‘Shadow State’ The 1960s, 1970s and 1980s were characterised by a series of privatisation activities by government agencies in the UK and North America with the aim of restructuring the welfare state system (Trudeau, 2008, p. 671). These activities involved the offloading of state responsibilities, such as service provision, to nonprofit and for-profit organisations (Kodras, 1997). The privatisation of welfare state services materialised through the purchase of service contracts that were shifting the responsibility of service provision from the state to civil society, while the state still maintained control over the identity of the services’ recipients and the amount and duration of the services provided (Smith, 2002). This transfer of services to the third sector was supported by the ‘Left’ because it seemingly created a welfare system friendlier to local preferences and needs (Kodras, 1997), and it was supported by the ‘Right’ too because it created a ‘lighter’, more flexible state apparatus based on individual initiative and self-sufficiency (Wolch, 1990). Thus, during this period, ‘the state became especially dependent in the area of service delivery, as the practice of contracting with nonprofits to provide statefunded services grew common’ (Trudeau, 2012, p. 444). In this respect, Geiger and Wolch (1986) pioneered the concept of the ‘shadow state’ in order to describe the effects of the increasing importance of the third sector to the operation of the welfare state in both the UK and North America during the 1980s. Wolch (1989, p. 201) defined the ‘shadow state’ as a ‘para-state apparatus with collective service responsibilities previously shouldered by the public sector, administered outside traditional democratic politics, but yet controlled in both formal and informal ways by the state’. In its most basic form then, the ‘shadow state’ refers to the existence of an assemblage of NGOs, coming from different parts of the voluntary sector, which are assigned to provide state-funded social welfare programmes that remain under state control and affect societal inclusion and exclusion (Trudeau, 2012, p. 444). However, at the same time, service contracting places specific rules, requirements and restrictions on NGOs that hinder the provision of state-funded social welfare services (Wolch, 1999). Such limitations are put in place in order for the state to monitor an organisation’s performance, enforce eligibility requirements and implement sanctions (Salamon, 2002). In consequence, ‘the increasing importance of state funding for many voluntary organizations has been accompanied by deepening penetration by the state into voluntary group organization, management, and goals’ (Wolch, 1990, p. 15), which ultimately obstructs the organisation’s potential to create progressive social change (Wolch, 1990). All in all, the ‘shadow state’ concept describes the influence of the state on the activities and agendas of the third sector, the capacity of the latter to operate

152

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

as an entree to civil society, and the implications that these relationships pose to democracy (Trudeau, 2008, p. 672). Nevertheless, recent developments in the third sector indicate that the relationships between the state and NGOs have become more complex and considerably different from those described by Geiger and Wolch during the 1980s (Milligan and Fyfe, 2005). This does not mean that the ‘shadow state’ has ceased to exist; on the contrary, it emphasises the need for the development of a theory that captures the variety of power arrangements between state and nongovernmental organisations that define contemporary hybrid ‘shadow state’ relationships (Trudeau, 2008; 2012). Indeed, NGOs are still able ‘to negotiate or inflect state influence, pursue independent agendas, and influence state agendas’ (Trudeau, 2008, p. 672). In this respect, Trudeau (2008) has suggested the conceptualisation of ‘shadow state’ relationships as a continuum in order to help make sense of the new multiple and hybrid state-civil society relationships. Towards one end of this continuum he identifies hierarchical arrangements that lead NGOs to implement the state’s agenda. On the other hand, towards the opposite end, he identifies flexible and reciprocal arrangements that can advance alternative interests and agendas. This latter situation consists of the marginal influence of the state over NGOs. These organisations may still receive state funding, but there is very limited capacity of the government to influence them in direct or indirect ways. Instead, NGOs pursue agendas that are minimally determined by the state, mainly because they prioritise local community agendas over those of the state. In this regard, Christensen and Ebrahim (2006) highlight the fact that NGOs have relationships of accountability to multiple constituencies. At the same time as being held accountable by the state, NGOs staff members also act on a sense of responsibility to their colleagues, and they may also develop a sense of responsibility to their beneficiaries and the communities that they serve. This chapter argues that we are witnessing the gradual hybridisation of the ‘shadow state’ relationships between NGOs and the Greek state. Despite the deep economic crisis and the accompanying extensive social welfare cutbacks that have affected the state funding of the third sector, and the severe bureaucratic obstacles in state funding even prior to the outbreak of the crisis, various migrant-/refugeeserving NGOs have continued pursuing the Greek state’s interests, with limited or no state financial support. To put it differently, these NGOs, not only have continued pursuing the Greek state’s interests to provide social welfare services to vulnerable populations through proxies, but they have also managed to multiply their areas of activity and expand their target population with limited or no state financial support. This has become possible through the gradual development on behalf of the NGOs of a keen sense of responsibility to their sponsors, beneficiaries and the communities within which they operate.

Towards a Hybrid ‘Shadow State’?

153

The Economic Crisis The current economic crisis in Greece is one of the deepest in the country’s modern history. It started soon after the October 2009 general elections, when the newly elected PASOK government announced that earlier fiscal statistics had been falsely reported by the previous government, and proceeded with their massive correction (see Bank of Greece, 2011). However, Greece’s economic crisis worsened since it was bailed out by the Troika in 2010, as the deep cuts have had a negative impact on the economy, as acknowledged by the IMF (2013). This resulted in a significant increase of inequality (Matsaganis and Leventi, 2014, p. 209) and social unrest among both native (Rudig and Karyotis, 2014) and migrant (Karyotis and Skleparis, 2014) populations. It is in times of such great social and economic crisis that ‘those who are most vulnerable are becoming even more vulnerable, not only in terms of access to health care services, but also with regard to other determinants of health, including the degree of social exclusion, education, housing and general living conditions, quality of diet, vulnerability to violence’ (WHO, 2010, p. 5). New forms of social exclusion have emerged as an increasing number of people have been left unemployed or on very low salaries (DoW, 2012, p. 14): for example, the ‘neo-homeless’ are homeless people who had until recently a satisfactory standard of living and have a higher educational level, but due to financial difficulties and unemployment they were forced out of their homes (Theodorikakou, Alamanou and Katsadoros, 2013, p. 206). At the same time, these conditions in combination with the persistent framing of migration as a security threat, have generated far Right statements and acts that stigmatise migrants and violate their human rights (Karyotis and Skleparis, 2013). Brutal attacks and hate crimes against ethnic minorities have become a daily phenomenon in Greece in the wake of the economic crisis (HRW, 2012). All this has led to a growing demand for all forms of social services and aid (DoW, 2012, p. 14), as ‘the need for social protection in Greece [is] more pressing than at any other point in the past since the end of the Civil War in 1949’ (Matsaganis, 2012, p. 413). However, vulnerable groups that were already facing numerous risks prior to the crisis, such as undocumented migrants, asylum seekers, drug users, sex workers, destitute European citizens and homeless people, have seen a reduction in or the termination of social safety nets, which formerly provided them with basic help (DoW, 2013a, p. 2). Despite the World Health Organization’s warning that ‘cuts to public spending on health [ … ]come at a time when health systems may require more, not fewer, resources’ (Mladovsky et al., 2012, p. v), the Greek government significantly reduced public spending on health and increased the cost of access to healthcare services (Kentikelenis et al., 2011). This resulted in larger numbers of people being excluded from the national healthcare system simply because they could not afford to pay (DoW, 2012, p. 14). All in all, public spending for health in Greece is now less than any of the other pre-2004 EU member states

154

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

(Stuckler and Basu, 2013), while the nation has surpassed all other EU member states in the scale of cutbacks to the health sector (Reeves et al., 2013). More specifically, prevention and treatment programmes for illicit drug use, and publicly funded pharmaceutical expenditure also underwent severe cuts (Kentikelenis et al., 2014, p. 748–9). The public hospital budget was reduced by 26% in the first two years of the crisis (Kentikelenis et al., 2014), and state funding for mental health decreased by more than 20% during the same period (Anagnostopoulos and Soumaki, 2013). These striking cutbacks were implemented within the context of the dramatic increase in the number of new HIV infections among injecting drug users from 15 in 2009 to 484 in 2012 (ECDC and WHO 2013). Moreover, these measures were forced in at a time of mental health deterioration due to economic hardships (Economou et al., 2013), the skyrocketing of deaths by suicide (Kentikelenis et al., 2014), and increasing mortality in people older than 55 years (Vlachadis et al., 2014, p. 691). Additionally, through shifting healthcare costs to patients, austerity policies rendered a large number of people unable to purchase the drugs prescribed by their doctors due to insufficient income (Mantzouranis et al., 2012), while they forced pharmaceutical companies that had profited excessively before 2010 to reduce their supplies due to unpaid bills and low profits (Sukkar and Smith, 2013). Furthermore, the cuts led to an increase in hospital staff workloads and the multiplication of patient waiting lists (Tripsa et al., 2013). This situation has driven people to rely increasingly on NGOs for assistance (DoW, 2012, p. 14). Migrant-/Refugee-serving NGOs in Greece As noted above, this chapter focuses on three primarily migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs in Greece: PRAKSIS, Doctors of the World, and Doctors without Borders. PRAKSIS PRAKSIS is an independent NGO aiming at the development and implementation of humanitarian and medical action programmes. It evolved from the ‘internal’ programmes of DwB in Greece, becoming independently established in 2004. PRAKSIS is active across Greece, but mainly in Athens, Thessaloniki, Mytilene, and Patras. However, volunteer teams can be found in various places across the country. The main aim of the organisation is to fight the social and economic exclusion of vulnerable groups of people and to safeguard their individual and social rights through the provision of free social, medical, healthcare and education services. The target population of PRAKSIS includes indigent, homeless or uninsured Greeks, migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, trafficking victims, homeless children, HIV-positive and mentally ill patients, drug users, Roma, sex workers, convicts and former convicts. Recently, PRAKSIS added ‘Greek families

Towards a Hybrid ‘Shadow State’?

155

that are stricken by the economic crisis’ to its target population (Praksis, 2013, p. 9). Between 2007 and 2012, the budget of PRAKSIS recorded a fourfold increase, despite the severe drop in state financial support. In 2007, the organisation’s budget was €906,430, of which 89% was institutional (i.e. state and EU) and 11% private funds (i.e. sponsorships and donations) (Praksis, 2008). However, in 2012, the budget of the organisation skyrocketed to €4,297,725.81, while the contribution of institutional funds shrank to 31%, and the input of the private sector grew to 69% (Praksis, 2013). This gradual turning of the organisation to private sources of funding in the face of state funding cutbacks allowed it not only to continue providing social welfare services to vulnerable populations in place of the Greek state, but also to multiply its areas of activity, and to increase the number of its staff members. With regard to the latter, there was a threefold increase in the number of people working for the organisation (salaried personnel, volunteers, interns) in 2012, compared to the same number in 2007 (Praksis, 2013). The areas of activity of PRAKSIS have also significantly expanded during the economic crisis, with the organisation increasing both its geographical reach and its portfolio of programs, including the introduction for the first time of holistic programmes targeted specifically to Greek families that were hit by the crisis (Praksis, 2013). Thus, despite the various problems associated with the economic crisis, PRAKSIS managed, not only to retain its core programmes, but also to expand its areas of activity. The multiplication of PRAKSIS’ areas of activity followed a dramatic increase in the number of people seeking the support of the organisation since the beginning of the crisis. This is reflected in the significant increases in the number of people that used PRAKSIS’ polyclinics, drugstores, legal services and housing services in Athens and Thessaloniki between 2007 and 2012. (Praksis, 2008; 2009; 2011; 2013). Apart from the expansion of PRAKSIS’ target population, a significant change in the organisation’s target nationalities can also be observed. More specifically, Greeks never or seldom sought the assistance of PRAKSIS prior to the economic crisis. For instance, a statistically non-significant number of Greeks visited the organisation’s polyclinics in Athens and Thessaloniki in 2007 (Praksis, 2008), while in 2008, only 5.5% of Thessaloniki’s polyclinic visitors were Greek nationals (Praksis, 2009). This percentage remained, more or less, at the same levels in 2009 and 2010 (i.e. 7%) (Praksis, 2011). However, in 2011 and 2012, this number more than doubled, as Greeks comprised 15.4% of Thessaloniki polyclinic visitors (Praksis, 2013). A similar increase in the number of Greek beneficiaries was observed in all service sectors of the organisation. In summary, within the context of the increasing needs of Greek society, the curtailment of the Greek welfare state and state funding cutbacks, PRAKSIS managed with limited institutional support not only to continue pursuing the interests of the Greek state, but also to multiply its areas of activity, broaden its target population and increase its budget and workforce, by gradually turning to private sources of funding. Indeed, PRAKSIS saw its target population grow

156

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

significantly in recent years compared to the period prior to the economic crisis. Even more migrants have sought the support of the NGO since 2010, while considerably large numbers of the native population have also turned to PRAKSIS for medical, social and legal assistance. Subsequently, this led to the multiplication of the organisation’s areas of activity in a period when the Greek state reduced its financial support to NGOs and struggled to provide social welfare services directly to vulnerable groups. Thus, the hybridisation of the ‘shadow state’ relations between PRAKSIS and the Greek state consists of the former’s gradual development of a keen sense of responsibility to its increasing number of beneficiaries, sponsors, and communities in need within which it operates, in order to continue acting as a proxy for the provision of social welfare services to vulnerable populations. Doctors of the World Doctors of the World (DoW) was established in Greece in 1990 as part of the international network of the organisation, which consists of 14 departments around the world. The target population of the organisation includes victims of natural disasters, famines, diseases, wars, conflicts and political violence, refugees, expatriates, minorities, street children, drug addicts, and in general, anyone who is unable to gain access to medical care. The budget of the Greek DoW remained more or less stable between 2007 and 2012, despite the decline in state financial support (DoW, 2008; 2013b). During the same period, one can observe a considerable decrease in institutional funding, and a significant turn towards alternative sources of funding, such as donations and sponsorships. In 2007, 78% of the organisation’s income consisted of institutional funds, while only 18% was derived from donations and sponsorships. In contrast, in 2012, the participation of the private sector in the NGO’s income skyrocketed to 46%, while, at the same time, the contribution of institutional funds dropped to 53%. This turning of the NGO to private sources of funding in the face of institutional funding cutbacks, allowed it not only to continue acting as a proxy in the provision of welfare services to vulnerable populations in accordance with the Greek state’s interests, but also to expand its target population and multiply its areas of activity. Until 2010, that is prior to the beginning of the economic crisis in Greece, DoW provided various services, including healthcare services through its polyclinics in Athens, Thessaloniki and Chania. In 2009 alone, approximately 18,000 people benefited from the Athens polyclinic services, coming primarily from Iraq, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, various African countries, Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine, and Albania (DoW, 2010, p. 3). Similar healthcare services were provided at the Thessaloniki, and Chania polyclinics.

Towards a Hybrid ‘Shadow State’?

157

However, between 2010 and 2011, the number of Greeks10 visiting the organisation’s polyclinics doubled (DoW, 2012, p. 14). Many patients were retired elderly citizens, whose pensions have been dramatically reduced since the implementation of the austerity measures in recent years (DoW, 2012). It is worth mentioning that, only in 2012, DoW provided their services at the Athens polyclinic to approximately 29,600 people, with around 20% of them being Greeks (DoW, 2013c). This is a more than a twofold increase in the number of people visiting the Athens polyclinic, compared to the annual number of the clinic’s beneficiaries prior to the economic crisis, which was around 14,000 people (DoW, 2010, p. 3). In the same manner, a dramatic increase in the number of people seeking the assistance of DoW was recorded in the Thessaloniki and Chania polyclinics too (DoW, 2010; DoW, 2013c). Within this context, the areas of activity of DoW have significantly expanded also during the economic crisis. Two new polyclinics have been established since the beginning of the crisis, one in Perama, and one in Patras. In contrast to the Athens polyclinic, the vast majority of the Perama polyclinic beneficiaries are impoverished and socially excluded Greeks (DoW, 2010, p. 4). Indeed, approximately 7,400 people visited the Perama polyclinic in 2012, the majority of whom were Greeks (DoW, 2013c). Moreover, the Patras polyclinic became operational in September 2012 aiming at covering the increasing needs of the uninsured and low-income residents of the city, people excluded from the national healthcare system, and those in need of international protection (DoW, 2013c, p. 3). In addition, the organisation’s mobile units also expanded to a number of areas across Greece (DoW, 2013a, p. 5). In December 2010, DoW set up two mobile units in order to assist migrants and asylum seekers accessing healthcare services in Patras and Igoumenitsa (DoW, 2012, p. 17). Neo-homelessness was also addressed by the organisation amidst the economic crisis, as a new mobile unit was set up in order to assist in the distribution of sleeping bags and food, and the provision of physical and mental healthcare services in different parts of Athens (DoW, 2013a, p. 6). Moreover, in order to meet the increasing needs of elderly people in Athens and Thessaloniki, DoW also set up a mobile unit for the provision of healthcare services and food at home (DoW, 2013a). Additionally, in collaboration with the Greek Council for Refugees, DoW developed the ‘Enough!’ project, in an attempt to address the issue of the rise of far Right extremist acts of violence by organising visits to secondary schools and raising awareness about the negative consequences of xenophobia for the whole society (DoW, 2013a). Finally, DoW developed the food distribution project that started in November 2011, which provided for the monthly nutrition needs of vulnerable groups in Athens and Perama (DoW, 2013c, p. 9). In summary, within the context of curtailment of the Greek welfare state, the subsequent dramatic increase in the numbers of native and foreign people seeking 10 This includes Greek Roma.

158

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

the support of NGOs, and the decline of state financial support to the third sector, DoW managed, not only to continue pursuing the interests of the Greek state, but also to multiply its areas of activity and broaden its target population. This became possible through the redirection of the organisation’s funds from missions abroad to operations and activities in Greece,11 and the subsequent turn to alternative private sources of funding, such as donations and sponsorships, without, however, upsetting the NGO’s budget, and the total number of operational programs (16) before and after the crisis. Thus, similar to the case of PRAKSIS, the hybridisation of the ‘shadow state’ relations between DoW and the Greek state consists of the former’s gradual development of a sense of responsibility to its expanding target groups, in order to continue acting as a proxy for the provision of social welfare services to vulnerable populations, with limited state financial support. Doctors without Borders Doctors without Borders (DwB) is an international medical humanitarian organisation established in France in 1971. It has been active in Greece since 1990 and has provided its services to local authorities in emergency situations, such as earthquakes, extreme weather conditions and conflagrations. More specifically, the organisation provided assistance to the population during the emergency situations that followed the earthquakes in Aigio and Athens, the conflagrations in North Peloponnese, the extreme weather conditions in 2012 and 2013, and in the prevention of malaria in the Sparta region in 2012. Since 2008, DwB has been offering healthcare services and psychosocial support to migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in detention centres across the Evros region, Thrace, Rodopi, and the islands of the Aegean Sea. In contrast to the other two NGOs analysed in the present chapter, the operational section of DwB in Greece is characterised by financial independence from institutional, that is state and/or European, funding. However, despite this self-sufficiency, the economic crisis has severely affected the budget of the organisation, which dropped by about one third, from €5,210,251 in 2010 to €3,391,057 in 2012 (DwB, 2011; 2013). However, the number of programmes of the organisation was not affected by the economic crisis or the subsequent income cutbacks. On the contrary, DwB managed to multiply its areas of activity. In 2011 the organisation managed not only to continue the provision of healthcare services to undocumented migrants across the Evros region, but also to expand its areas of activity to the native vulnerable population too. More specifically, after the reoccurrence of malaria in Greece, DwB started providing its, services to healthcare units across the country in an attempt to assist in the planning of the prevention, monitoring, management, control, diagnosis and cure of the disease (DwB, 2012, p. 5). In the same manner, 11 In 2010, DoW announced that it had redirected its humanitarian assistance from the developing world to Athens, as almost two million Greeks were facing severe poverty (DoW, 2010a).

Towards a Hybrid ‘Shadow State’?

159

in 2012, the NGO continued providing its services to undocumented migrants across the Evros region and the islands of the Aegean Sea, while it started targeting its actions for the prevention and cure of malaria to the Sparta region (DwB, 2013, p. 4–5). Moreover, during the same period DwB expanded its activities to the provision of basic healthcare assistance to the homeless population in Athens (DwB, 2013). Finally, in 2013 and 2014, the NGO broadened its target population even more, as, in cooperation with the Athens municipality, it started providing medical and psychosocial support to vulnerable Greeks and migrants (DwB, 2014). In summary, DwB has always been independent from institutional sources of funding, and this did not change when the economic crisis hit Greece and unsettled the income of the organisation. Despite the fact that the organisation was never dependent on state financial support, it continued pursuing the Greek state’s agenda, even when its income was severely affected by the economic crisis after 2010. By opening out its target population to both Greeks and migrants, and by multiplying its areas of activity in order to include the delivery of services to the native vulnerable population too, the NGO was able to serve the Greek state’s interests through the provision of social welfare services to vulnerable groups, without institutional funding. Thus, it can be argued that DwB gradually moved to a form of hybrid ‘shadow state’ relationship with the Greek state, as with no state support, it continued to serve the latter’s interests at a time of severe income curtailment, by developing a sense of responsibility, mainly to its beneficiaries, sponsors, and the communities within which it operates. Conclusion This chapter has argued that various mainly migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs in Greece are gradually forming hybrid ‘shadow state’ relationships with the Greek state amidst the economic crisis. These relationships consist of the decrease in or lack of state financial support for migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs, and the simultaneous increasing conformity of the latter to the Greek state’s interests and agenda. In other words, despite their budgetary fluctuations, these NGOs, have not only continued pursuing the Greek state’s interests in providing social welfare services to vulnerable populations through proxies, but they have also multiplied their areas of activity and expanded their target population. As noted above, this became possible through the gradual development on behalf of these NGOs of a keen sense of responsibility to their rising numbers of beneficiaries, sponsors and the communities in need within which they operate. Within this context, these NGOs were able to take on several social welfare services to vulnerable populations that the Greek governments were unable to continue providing in the face of the implemented social welfare cutbacks. These developments, amidst the economic crisis in the migrant-/refugeeserving third sector in Greece are in stark contrast to the classical ‘shadow state’ theory, which suggests that NGOs become increasingly funded and regulated

160

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

by the state as they take on state functions. In this respect, the analytical tool of the ‘shadow state’, in its initial conception by Geiger and Wolch in the 1980s (1986), is unable to capture the complexity of recent developments in the third sector in Greece. As was previously mentioned, these developments do not mean that the ‘shadow state’ has ceased to exist. Instead, they emphasise the need to create a theoretical concept that captures the diversity of power arrangements between the state and NGOs. In this regard, this chapter has drawn on Trudeau’s (2008) understanding of ‘shadow state’ relationships as a continuum. In these hybrid ‘shadow state’ relationships, state funding is not a decisive factor in the shaping of NGOs’ interests and agendas. Rather, it is the sense of accountability/ responsibility to multiple constituencies, such as the state, sponsors, communities and beneficiaries, which is developed by NGOs and influences their interests and agendas. Thus, a number of migrant-/refugee serving NGOs in Greece continued pursuing the Greek state’s interests amidst the decrease in or lack of state financial support due to this sense of responsibility. However, not all migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs are capable of creating these hybrid ‘shadow state’ relationships with the Greek state. This chapter has focused on PRAKSIS, DoW, and DwB, which are three of the largest NGOs in Greece, with important transnational connections. More specifically, the Greek departments of DwB and DoW belong to the international networks of these organisations, while PRAKSIS emerged as the evolution of the ‘internal’ programmes of DwB in Greece. These connections placed all three NGOs in advantageous positions when they decided to seek alternative private sources of funding amidst the decrease in or lack of state financial support. Indeed, within the context of institutional funding cutbacks in the migrant-/refugee-serving third sector in Greece, it is certain that several medium/small-size NGOs, with limited or no transnational connections, will not survive, despite their sense of accountability to their beneficiaries and communities in need within which they operate. The examples of the three NGOs examined in this chapter show hopeful signs of development of a strong, healthy civil society, independent from Greek state funding, with its own, autonomous rules and values. Yet, the fine balance in the provision of social welfare services to vulnerable populations through proxies without substantial state financial support and regulation can be quickly destabilised, creating in this way severe social problems, if NGOs prioritise their accountability to private actors over the Greek state. Indeed, ‘it is ultimately the responsibility of governments to ensure the protection of the most vulnerable populations, which they do not always do anymore. Patients facing multiple vulnerability factors need more protection in these times of crisis and xenophobia, not less’ (DoW, 2013a, p. 2).

Towards a Hybrid ‘Shadow State’?

161

References Anagnostopoulos, D.C. and Soumaki, E., 2013. The state of child and adolescent psychiatry in Greece during the international financial crisis: A brief report. European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 22(2), pp. 131–4. Bank of Greece, 2011. Annual Report 2010. Athens: Bank of Greece. Christensen, R.A. and Ebrahim, A., 2006. How does accountability affect mission? The case of a nonprofit serving immigrants and refugees. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 17(2), pp. 195–209. Clarke, J., 2013. Transnational actors in national contexts: Migrant organizations in Greece in comparative perspective. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 13(2), pp. 281–301. Doctors of the World, 2008. Ισολογισμός 31ης Δεκεμβρίου 2007 [Balance sheet on the 31st of December 2007]. Athens: Doctors of the World. Doctors of the World, 2010. Ετήσια αναφορά δράσης 2009 [Annual activity report 2009]. Athens: Doctors of the World. Doctors of the World, 2010a. Αθήνα, μια πόλη σε ανθρωπιστική κρίση [Athens, a city in humanitarian crisis]. [online] Press Release, 7 November. Doctors of the World, 2012. Access to Health Care for Vulnerable Groups in the European Union in 2012: An Overview of the Condition of Persons Excluded from Healthcare Systems in the EU. France: Doctors of the World. Doctors of the World, 2013a. Access to Healthcare in Europe in Times of Crisis and Rising Xenophobia. France: Doctors of the World. Doctors of the World, 2013b. Ισολογισμός 31ης Δεκεμβρίου 2012 [Balance sheet on the 31st of December 2012]. Athens: Doctors of the World. Doctors of the World, 2013c. Ετήσια αναφορά δράσης 2012 [Annual activity report 2012]. Athens: Doctors of the World. Doctors without Borders, 2011. Ετήσια αναφορά δράσης 2010 [Annual activity report 2010]. Athens: Doctors without Borders. Doctors without Borders, 2012. Ετήσια αναφορά δράσης 2011 [Annual activity report 2011]. Athens: Doctors without Borders. Doctors without Borders, 2013. Ετήσια αναφορά δράσης 2012 [Annual activity report 2012]. Athens: Doctors without Borders. Doctors without Borders, 2014. Πρόγραμμα των Γιατρών Χωρίς Σύνορα στο κέντρο της Αθήνας (Σεπτέμβρης ‘13 – Μάρτιος ‘14): Μία Αναφορά Δράσης [Doctors without Borders’ program in the centre of Athens (September ʼ13 – March ’14): Activity Report], [online] Available at: [Accessed 25 April 2014]. ECDC and WHO, 2013. Surveillance Report: HIV/AIDS Surveillance in Europe 2012. Stockholm: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Economou, M., Madianos, M., Peppou, L.E., Patelakis, A. and Stefanis, C.N., 2013. Major depression in the era of economic crisis: A replication of a

162

Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece

cross-sectional study across Greece. Journal of Affective Disorders, 145(3), pp. 308–14. Geiger, R.K. and Wolch. J.R., 1986. A shadow state? Voluntarism in metropolitan Los Angeles. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 4(3), pp. 351–66. Gropas, R. and Triantafyllidou, A., 2005. Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Greece. Country Report prepared for the EU Research Project POLITIS. Oldenburg: University of Oldenburg. Gropas, R. and Triantafyllidou, A., 2009. Immigrants and political life in Greece: Between political patronage and the search for inclusion. Policy Brief for EMILIE Project. Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). Gropas, R. and Triandafyllidou, A., 2012. Migrants and political life in Greece: Between political patronage and the search for inclusion. South European Society and Politics, 17(1), pp. 45–63. Harokopio University, 2009. Οδηγός ΜΚΟ και συλλόγων μεταναστών: καταγραφή φορέων που δραστηριοποιούνται στην Ελληνική Επικράτεια σε θέματα μετανάστευσης [Guide to NGOs and migrant associations: Profile of organisations in Greece active in migration issues]. Athens: Department of Geography, Harokopio University. HRW, 2012. Hate on the streets: Xenophobic violence in Greece. [online] Available at: