Athens Transformed, 404-262 BC: From Popular Sovereignty to the Dominion of Wealth (Routledge Monographs in Classical Studies) [1 ed.] 9780415873925, 9781315693149, 0415873924

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Athens Transformed, 404–262 BC

During the heady, democratic days of the fifth and fourth centuries, the poorer members of Athenian society, the lower two classes of zeugitai and thetes, enjoyed an unprecedented dominance in both domestic and foreign politics. At home, the participatory nature of the constitution required their presence not only in the law courts and assembly, but also in most of the minor magistracies; abroad, they were the driving force of the navy, which ensured Athens’ control of the Aegean and the Black seas. Their participation at all levels was made possible by state pay (for jury duty, attendance in the assembly, public office and military service). In the fifth century state pay was financed largely through the tribute paid by members of the empire, supplemented by the liturgical contributions of the rich and, beginning during the war, a property tax (the eisphora). In the fourth century, almost the whole burden was shouldered by taxation upon the wealthy, especially those who owned property. In this book, author Phillip Harding traces the major changes that occurred in the administration of the state that eventually deprived the lower classes of their supremacy and transferred power into the hands of the wealthy land-owners. Things changed radically after Athens’ defeat in the Lamian (or Hellenic) War in 322 BC. Over the next several decades, restriction of the franchise, elimination of pay for some public offices, the loss of the navy, the increased dependence upon local grain from the larger estates in Attika, the removal of the tax burden from the rich by the ending of such major liturgies as the trierarchia and the choregia and the abandoning of the eisphora all contributed to this transformation. Phillip E. Harding is professor emeritus to the Department of Classical, Near Eastern & Religious Studies at the University of British Columbia. He is author or editor of several books, including From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus (1985), Androtion and the Atthis (1994), Didymos: On Demosthenes (2006) and The Story of Athens (2008).

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12 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman Equal, Therefore Inferior Elena Blair 13 Roman Literature, Gender, and Reception Domina Illustris Edited by Donald Lateiner, Barbara K. Gold and Judith Perkins 14 Roman Theories of Translation Surpassing the Source Siobhán McElduff 15 Displaying the Ideals of Antiquity The Petrified Gaze Johannes Siapkas and Lena Sjögren 16 Menander in Contexts Edited by Alan H. Sommerstein 17 Consumerism in the Ancient World Imports and Identity Construction Justin St. P. Walsh 18 Apuleius and Africa Edited by Benjamin Todd Lee, Ellen Finkelpearl and Luca Graverini

19 Lucian and His Roman Voices Cultural Exchanges and Conflicts in the Late Roman Empire Eleni Bozia 20 Theology and Existentialism in Aeschylus Written in the Cosmos Richard Rader

23 Athens Transformed, 404–262 BC From Popular Sovereignty to the Dominion of the Elite Phillip Harding Other Books in this Series:

21 Rome and Provincial Resistance Gil Gambash

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22 The Origins of Ancient Greek Science Michael Boylan

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Athens Transformed, 404–262 BC From Popular Sovereignty to the Dominion of the Elite Phillip Harding

First published 2015 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2015 Taylor & Francis The right of Phillip Harding to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Harding, Phillip. Athens transformed, 404–262 BC : from popular sovereignty to the dominion of the elite / by Phillip Harding. pages cm. — (Routledge monographs in classical studies ; 23) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Athens (Greece)—Politics and government. 2. Greece—Politics and government—To 146 B.C. 3. Social change—Greece—Athens— History—To 1500. 4. Social classes—Greece—Athens—History—To 1500. 5. Poor—Greece—Athens—History—To 1500. 6. Elite (Social sciences)—Greece—Athens—History—To 1500. 7. Democracy— Greece—Athens—History—To 1500. 8. Political participation— Greece—Athens—History—To 1500. 9. Representative government and representation—Greece—Athens—History—To 1500. 10. Athens (Greece)—Economic conditions. I. Title. DF277.H285 2015 938'.5—dc23 2014048438 ISBN: 978-0-415-87392-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-69314-9 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

For Imbi, whose resolute social conscience has been a constant inspiration

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Contents

Preface Maps Abbreviations Introduction

xi xiii xv 1

1

Sovereignty Regained Oligarchs vs. Democrats The Constitution The Sociology of Attika The Peiraieus Suggested Reading

3 3 9 16 20 23

2

Sovereignty Regained Foreign Policy Feeding the People Suggested Reading

25 25 46 51

3

Sovereignty Lost At Home and Abroad The Population of Athens in the Late Fourth and Early Third Centuries Suggested Reading

53 53

4

By Land and Sea Defending the Democracy Athens’ Military in the Post-Democratic Period Suggested Reading

75 75 80 83

5

From Taxation to Benefaction Financing the Democracy: Taxation After Democracy: Benefaction Suggested Reading

84 84 91 97

70 73

x

Contents

6

Philokleon Would Not Be Amused The Demise of the Jury-Courts Suggested Reading

98 98 104

7

Farewell Strepsiades, Bonjour Tristesse The Peasant Leaves the Stage Aristophanic Comedy Menander and New Comedy Suggested Reading

106 106 106 114 118

Epilogue Appendix 1: The Sources of Information for the Fourth and Early Third Centuries Appendix 2: Historical Outline Index

121 123 145 175

Preface

During a lifetime of teaching and writing about Greek history, I have often been asked whether I had written anything that could be read by an interested layperson. This has become even more the case since I retired from university teaching and began lecturing to adult lay audiences. Sadly, the answer was always in the negative. My books were full of wissenschaft (of course!), but were not bedtime reading. Now, in my closing years, I thought I would try to rectify the situation. This work is the result. I have eschewed scholarly paraphernalia, notably footnotes. Scholars will not be happy about this, but then this book is not for them. I do not think the readers for whom it is intended will mind. I have learned from experience that the majority of readers, even academics, dare I say, do not read footnotes. Who needs to count the heads of those who agree or disagree with a statement? And only scholars are really interested in the niceties of scholarly dispute. However, in deference to my training, and in the hope that some readers might want to explore issues further, I have inserted into the text references to those ancient sources that are readily available in translation, and added at the end of each chapter a bibliography of selected works that I have found useful in my own reading. Also, for those who are especially interested, I have included two appendices, one containing a review of the literary and material sources for the period, and the other containing a detailed historical outline. This is an unabashed paean to government by the Many. I have attempted to make discreet connections to some of the social, economic and political issues of our own times. The reader will decide for him or herself whether I have succeeded. But, reader, beware! Sensibly, you will understand that there are many ideas here that would be objected to by one or another ancient historian. There are also those, however, who would agree and have voiced similar opinions on some aspects of this narrative. But, in the final analysis, this is my own interpretation, for which I take full responsibility. It is a summary compilation of the ideas about Greek history, especially the period with which this book is concerned, which I have lectured and written upon over fifty years.

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I should explain my practice with regard to the spelling of names. Put simply, I have tried to adhere to the Greek spelling, which may be unfamiliar to some, but I hope not too challenging. All dates are BC, unless otherwise noted, and all translations are my own. In conclusion, I would like to acknowledge Laura Stearns and her colleagues at Routledge for allowing me this forum. And I owe a special debt of gratitude to my wife, who has not only helped create the maps, but has also devotedly read this whole manuscript in a noble effort to eliminate excessive obscurity. For any that remains, I am solely responsible. Phillip Harding, Vancouver, 2014

Maps

1.1 1.2 2.1

Attika Peiraieus Aegean and the Black Sea

19 23 50

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Abbreviations

Aiskh. Ath. Pol. Dem. Diod. Hell. Oxy. Herod. IG I3 IG II2 TDGR1 TDGR2 TDGR3 Thouk. Xen. Hell.

Aiskhines Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia Demosthenes Diodoros of Sicily, Bibliotheke Historike Hellenika Oxyrhynchia Herodotos, Histories Inscriptiones Graecae, volume I, third edition Inscriptiones Graecae, volume 2, second edition Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, volume 1, ed. C. W. Fornara Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, volume 2, ed. P. Harding Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, volume 3, ed. S. Burstein Thoukydides, Histories Xenophon, Hellenika

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Introduction

During the heady, democratic days of the fifth and fourth centuries, the poorer members of Athenian society, those whose livelihood depended upon their labour, whether as farmers or artisans (in Athenian terms, the lower two classes of zeugitai and thetes), enjoyed by virtue of their number an unprecedented dominance in both domestic and foreign politics. At home, the participatory nature of the constitution required their presence not only in the law courts and Assembly, but also in most of the minor magistracies; abroad, they were the driving force of the navy, which ensured Athens’ control of its sphere of influence, the Aegean and the Black seas, whence came its trading wealth and grain supply. Their participation at all levels was made possible by state pay for jury duty, public office and military service, and in the fourth century for attendance in the Assembly. In the fifth century, state pay was financed largely through the tribute paid by members of the Athenian empire, supplemented by the public service contributions (leitourgiai) of the rich and, beginning during the war, a property tax (the eisphora). In the fourth century, almost the whole burden was shouldered by taxation on trade and upon the wealthy, especially those who owned property. This situation was not altered by the victory of Philip of Macedon over the Greeks at Khaironeia in 338, as might have been expected. In fact, the prosperous years between 338 and 322 (the so-called Lykourgan period) were good to the lower classes. Things changed radically, however, after Athens’ defeat by Macedon in the Lamian (or Hellenic) War of 323/2. Either immediately or over the next several decades, despite some ups and downs, major changes occurred in the administration of the State, either by chance or design, that deprived the lower classes of their supremacy and transferred power into the hands of the wealthy landowners. Restriction of the franchise; elimination of pay for some public offices, especially jury duty; the loss of the navy; the garrisoning of the Peiraieus by foreign troops; the increased dependence upon local grain from the larger estates in Attika; the removal of the tax burden from the rich by the ending of such major public service contributions as the trierarchia (the obligation to finance a trireme for a year) and the choregia (the obligation to finance a dramatic or choral presentation); and

2

Introduction

the abandoning of the eisphora (the property tax) are some of the changes that brought this transformation about. The corresponding rise in generous benefaction (euergesia) in the form of extra donations (epidoseis) by the wealthy, extravagantly praised in lengthy honorary decrees, was a natural corollary. Much of this resulted from the changed international situation that followed upon the conquests of Alexander the Great, but certainly played into the hands of the landed rich and enabled them to fulfil long-held desires to regain control of the administration. Whilst Athens remained in name a democracy during most of the Hellenistic period, and whilst the epigraphic record shows that the machinery of democratic administration continued in operation, it is wrong to conclude from this that little had changed. To do so is to emphasize procedure over substance. After all, to employ one contemporary analogy (amongst the many available in the increasingly conservative West), if the Tea Party should ever take power in the United States, no doubt Congress and the Senate would continue to meet and pass resolutions and bills, and other trappings of democratic government would still be observable, but that would not alter the fact that the relationship between the wealthy elite and the poorer members of society had changed. Less revenue from taxation would limit the ability of government to provide services, even to maintain the physical infrastructure of the State. Increasingly, such necessities would depend upon private initiative and benefaction, a situation much preferred by the wealthy elite. Private initiative yields profit, and benefaction brings public recognition through publication. On the other hand, the payment of taxes is profitless and anonymous. It is the contention of this book that an Athenian peasant, who had enjoyed life under the constitution of the fifth and fourth centuries (before 322), would have found his world transformed by the changes that took place during the early Hellenistic period (322–262). This book will trace this transformation from the restoration of the sovereignty of the people in 404/3 after the civil war, through to the situation that pertained at the end of the Khremonidean War in 262. It brought about a world that fulfilled the prejudices of an unknown fifth-century author, who is unfortunately rather affectionately referred to as the Old Oligarch. His distorted view forms the backdrop and antithesis to the one advocated in this book. In fact, all over the world the cream of society is in opposition to democracy. Naturally, since the smallest amount of intemperance and injustice, together with the highest scrupulousness in the pursuit of excellence, is to be found in the ranks of the better class, while within the ranks of the People will be found the greatest amount of ignorance, disorderliness, and rascality—poverty acting as a strong incentive to base conduct, not to speak of lack of education and ignorance, traceable to the want of means that afflicts some portions of mankind (‘The Old Oligarch,’ Pseudo-Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians, 1.5).

1

Sovereignty Regained

OLIGARCHS vs. DEMOCRATS In the last decade of the fifth century there were two oligarchic attempts to overthrow the democracy. Both were supported by the landed rich, but in both cases the ringleaders were intellectuals with a clear preference for the elite. One was Antiphon of Rhamnous, a teacher of rhetoric, who was the mastermind behind the Revolution of the Four Hundred (Thouk. 8.68) in 411/10, the other was the leader of the Thirty Tyrants (404/3), Kritias, uncle of the philosopher, Plato, whose admiration for Spartan customs and institutions was manifest in his writings.

In the aftermath of Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War, a small group of disgruntled individuals (later nicknamed the “Thirty Tyrants”) engineered a takeover of the State. In the manner of juntas throughout history they took power under the specious claim that they were only temporarily in office with a mandate to revise the constitution. They expelled the democratically selected Council and installed one of their own choosing. Ten of their friends were put in charge of the Peiraieus, the port of Athens, and another group of magistrates, the Eleven, who had powers of arrest and execution, joined them. Their ambition for power was cloaked under an announced programme that combined ultra-conservative politics (liberally laced with moralizing mottoes) with a promise of fiscal restraint. Most of them had been exiled by the democracy for one reason or another, many for participating in an earlier attempt at establishing an oligarchy (the Revolution of the Four Hundred) in 411/10. So, the Thirty represent the second attempt of anti-democrats to overthrow the democratic constitution. Their leader, Kritias, had not, however, participated in that previous attempt. His background and his relationship to Sokrates and Plato are important for this study and his career deserves a brief digression.

Kritias, Son of Kallaiskhros Kritias was born about 460. As he himself boasts (Plato, Timaios, 20e), he was a descendant of a very old Athenian aristocratic family that could trace

4

Sovereignty Regained

its lineage back to the time of the great reformer, Solon, a man whose name was cited by all sides of a contest at the end of the fifth century over the form of Athens’ ancestral constitution (patrios politeia). Kritias appears to have spent his adolescent and early adult years studying with sophists. Maybe as early as 433 he attended a lecture by Protagoras in the company of his friend Alkibiades (Plato, Protagoras, 316a) and he is said to have admired the rhetorical technique of Gorgias of Leontini, who came to Athens in 427, but his most enduring association was with Sokrates. This we learn not only from the fact that Plato features him conversing with Sokrates in several dialogues (Kharmides, Timaios and the one named for him, Kritias), but because ancient tradition linked them together to the point that it could be said that the Athenians put Sokrates to death because he had been the teacher of Kritias (Aiskh., Against Timarkhos, 1.173). Inspired by these associations Kritias took up writing on rhetorical, philosophical and political topics, and even dabbled in poetry and drama. Kritias appears to have been uninvolved politically until 411/10, when he was close to fifty years old. Then, he came out of the woodwork, as it were, and proposed a macabre motion to exhume the corpse of Phrynikhos, one of the Four Hundred who had been assassinated in mysterious circumstances, to put the corpse on trial for treasonable dealings with the Spartans, and to have the bones cast outside the borders of Attika (Lykourgos, Against Leokrates, 1. 112–113). This should not be taken to indicate that Kritias was opposed to the Four Hundred. Rather he was motivated by personal hostility. Phrynikhos’ most likely crime in Kritias’ eyes was that he had been steadfastly opposed to the recall of Kritias’ friend, Alkibiades, from exile during the negotiations that led up to the revolution of the Four Hundred (Thouk. 8. 48–50). Indeed, Alkibiades and Kritias had a longstanding friendship that bore fruit later, in 407/6, when Kritias successfully moved the motion for Alkibiades’ return (Plutarch, Alkibiades, 33.1). Unfortunately for Kritias that favour came back to haunt him, when Alkibiades was exiled for a second time after the Battle of Notion (406). This was the occasion and cause of Kritias’ own exile (406), since he was prosecuted by Kleophon, a leading democrat, for his responsibility in the recall of Alkibiades. During the two years between his exile in 406 and his return in 404, Kritias was in Thessaly. It was probably then that he wrote works that openly declared his admiration for the Spartan way of life. Two were about the Lakedaimonian constitution, both of which show more interest in Spartan morality than in the Spartan political system. Considering the intellectual milieu in which he moved—i.e., the Sokratic circle—this is not surprising, since the Spartan way of life was much admired by that group. The overall impression one derives from this analysis of Kritias’ background is of a man with a rather sheltered, apolitical upbringing and an education that was heavily inclined towards issues of morality and ethics, who was probably radicalized by his exile at the hands of the democracy in 406, and returned to Athens in enthusiastic agreement with the stated aim of the Thirty, “that it

Oligarchs vs. Democrats

5

was necessary to purge the city of unjust men and turn the remaining citizens in the direction of virtue and justice” (Lysias, Against Eratosthenes, 12.5). He became the intellectual and ideological leader of the Thirty. In many respects he was the successor of Antiphon (Thouk. 8.68.1–2), the ringleader of the Four Hundred, and the precursor of a subsequent ruler of Athens, Demetrios of Phaleron (see Chapter 3).

The Thirty Like their predecessors in the Four Hundred, and like conservatives elsewhere both ancient and modern, the Thirty would not have answered to the name ‘oligarch.’ In their minds, they were democrats with a different view of how and by whom the State should be governed. They believed in smaller government with lower taxes and less state interference in the private lives of individuals, particularly the wealthy. They advertised a constitution, which they tendentiously traced back to the early lawgiver, Solon, under which the franchise would be restricted to those above a certain property census, so that there would be no need for state pay for magistracies. All others would be excluded from participating in politics. The Thirty were especially eager to reduce or eliminate the involvement of poorer citizens in the administration of justice, an involvement that they enjoyed through the elaborate system of paid popular juries. Theramenes, a notorious member of the Thirty, expressed his contempt for the Demos thus: “I have always been against those who maintain that democracy cannot be successful unless slaves and men of a kind that would sell their fatherland for a drachma, if they needed, participated in government” (Xen. Hell. 2.3.48). The Thirty probably expected support amongst the wealthy land-owning elite, the upper two classes in Athenian society (the pentakosiomedmnoi— five-hundred bushel men—and the hippeis—cavalry). These fifteen hundred or so men mostly came from families that had governed Athens in the aristocratic society that existed before the rise of the Democracy. These were the people most likely to be alienated from the democratic administration, not only from family background, but also because their financial burden had increased during the Peloponnesian War with the introduction of the eisphora (a property tax), and because some of their possessions had been ravaged by enemy forces in the last phase of the Peloponnesian War (Hell. Oxy. 17.4–5). Hence, there was a close relationship between the oligarchy and the cavalry (hippeis). The Four Hundred had promised to produce a list of five thousand men with the full franchise, while the Thirty less generously limited the number to three thousand. Nevertheless, both groups held off publishing their list, in a manner that was strategically designed to put off resistance. The more people hoped to be on the list, the less they were likely to oppose. The Thirty began by erasing the calendar of sacrifices and festivals inscribed in the Agora. This calendar was the first part of a publication of a revised law-code that had been undertaken by the restored democracy after

6

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the expulsion of the previous oligarchy, the Four Hundred, in 410. The laws (nomoi), and the popular courts through which they were enforced, were fundamental to the democratic constitution, and it had been decreed in 410, “that the magistrates were not to use anything but the written law-code” (Andokides, On the Mysteries, 87). It is not surprising, then, that the oligarchs wanted to publish a written law-code of their own and put it in the very place where the democratic code was meant to be. Other reforms of the oligarchs are more transparent in their appeal to a segment of the wealthy. They diminished the powers of the law courts (dikasteria) over the owners of property by “cleaning up” the ambiguities in the law regarding inheritance. The specific example given by Aristotle concerned the right of a man to leave his fortune to whomever he chose, by removing the limitation “unless he is out of his mind, or senile or under the influence of a woman” (Ath. Pol. 35.2). This particular clause had come to offer an opening for people called sukophantai (fig-revealers), a segment of society whom the wealthy despised even more than they disliked the popular juries. The sukophantai, like the popular juries, were one of two of the most fundamental elements of democratic ideology, which were: the control of the law courts by the ordinary citizen, and the belief that every citizen not only could, but should, prosecute any infringement of the laws. In the absence of a police force or a state prosecutor, neither of which existed in ancient Athens, the sukophantai were the true guardians of the laws (nomoi). Depending on your point of view, they were either civic-minded citizens or interfering busybodies. No doubt some of them were overzealous and prosecuted for malicious reasons or personal gain, and had thus incurred the hostility of the wealthy. There is equally no doubt that curtailing the power of the popular courts was a major plank in the oligarchs’ programme at the end of the fifth century, as it would be later in the fourth century, after the Lamian War (see Chapter 6). So, we are told that the supporters of the Thirty were even more pleased when they proceeded to the physical elimination of known sukophantai and some of the more extreme democratic politicians, who were described in terms of moral disapproval as “men who go to bed with the demos for her favours contrary to her best interest” (and evil doers (kakopragmones) and “low types” (poneroi) (Ath. Pol. 35.3). But, if the supporters of the oligarchy were pleased to see the removal of sukophantai and democrats, they were soon to find out how mistaken they had been in allowing the junta to transgress the laws of the State by summarily doing away with “undesirables.” A combination of fear and desire for revenge caused the Thirty to remove opponents, real or imagined. At first this was tolerated or ignored, until they began to cast their net wider and to remove respectable citizens of some note, men of their own class who had remained aloof out of conviction or personal animosity or been excluded from the oligarchy. “Within a short period of time they had killed no fewer than fifteen hundred” (Ath. Pol. 35.4). Eventually their behaviour stimulated a reaction and a group of sixty to

Oligarchs vs. Democrats

7

seventy exiles, led by Thrasyboulos, son of Lykos, of Steiria, seized a fort at Phyle in northern Attika and began the movement to restore the democracy. This was the beginning of the Athenian civil war (404–403). As the Thirty’s popularity, such as it was, began to erode, they responded in two very typical ways: one being to look for outside support in the form of a Spartan garrison, the other, to make concessions to win back support at home by publishing the list of the three thousand citizens to whom they were prepared to extend the franchise. The latter was too little to achieve its object and only exacerbated the resentment of the majority, who were thereby formally excluded from the franchise. The former only served to give their opponents a new cry, namely that they were fighting not only to restore the democracy, but to liberate the country from foreign domination (two ideas that would become inextricably linked in the minds of nationalistic Athenians from this point on). Thus the movement against the oligarchs increased in strength, and they were caught up in the spiral that was to end in their overthrow. Though the oligarchs sent forces out to attack their position, the men at Phyle repelled their assault. Gradually the democrats’ numbers grew and they were able to march down and capture the Peiraieus, the crucial naval and trading centre of Attika. The oligarchs attempted to dislodge Thrasyboulos and his ever-growing number of supporters from the Peiraieus, but were defeated in a battle in which they lost seventy men, amongst them their leader, the pro-Spartan intellectual, Kritias, and his cousin, Kharmides. Eventually, after the intervention of the Spartan king, Pausanias, reconciliation between the two sides was negotiated and the oligarchy was ended. By 401/0, the archonship of Xenainetos, the democracy was firmly restored, equipped with a new law-code and surrounded by safeguards. Just as they had done after the overthrow of the Four Hundred, the democrats took pains once again to regain control of the civic spaces in the city, such as the Agora and the Akropolis, and to enforce the narrative that democracy was the only valid constitution for Athens. It was a major task of the restored government to win the support of the elite, whose wealth and contributions in the form of public services (leitourgiai) were so important to the running of the State. Its success in achieving this aim and in reintegrating the different social and economic elements in the State was remarkable and deserved Aristotle’s praise (Ath. Pol. 40.3), even though the reconciliation took longer than he implies. For, despite the general amnesty and the oaths that were sworn not to remember past wrongs (me mnesikakein), in 400/399 the democrats were only too happy to send out three hundred cavalrymen, who had sided with the oligarchs, to aid the Spartans in Asia, “thinking it would be beneficial to the democracy, were they to stay abroad and perish there” (Xen. Hell. 3.1.4), and the elite were still settling scores amongst themselves in the law courts into the 380s. Nevertheless, unity was eventually achieved, so that Xenophon, writing later in the 350s, could look back and recollect: “Oaths were sworn that there should be an amnesty for all that had happened in the past, and to this day both parties live together

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as fellow citizens and the people abide by the oaths which they have sworn” (Xen. Hell. 2.4.43). The only people the democrats failed to placate were the intellectuals, like Plato and Isokrates, who retired from active public life following the trial of Sokrates for ‘corrupting the youth,’ and his death at the hands of the restored democrats. They tried to influence affairs from the sidelines by establishing schools for educating the elite. Isokrates ran a very successful institution that taught them how to manipulate the People by the art of persuasion; thanks to his influence, the fourth century witnessed the heyday of Greek rhetoric. Others excogitated alternatives to democracy, like the idea of government by an oligarchy of bodiless minds advanced by Plato in his Republic, or the concept of the ideal, morally trained monarch, explored by Xenophon in his Kyropaideia. Whilst these ideas had little impact upon real politics in Athens during the democratic years, they were more positively received elsewhere (i.e. Macedon) and came to the fore in Athens itself under individuals like Phokion and Demetrios of Phaleron (see Chapter 3). Also, because of the enduring influence of literature, the ideas of these antidemocratic writers have had a considerable and negative effect upon the political history of the Western world. The death of Sokrates was not simply an act of petty vengeance. It symbolized the resolution of one of the leading issues of the fifth century: the clash between the prerogatives of the individual (epitomized by the career of Sokrates’ favourite pupil, Alkibiades) and the interests of the polis. For the time being, the polis had won. Flashy individuals who thumbed their noses at public opinion do not appear in the history of fourth century–democratic Athens. Whilst many studies have demonstrated that the governing class in fourth-century Athens still came from the few wealthy families at the top of the social register (maybe as few as three hundred), those powerful individuals governed Athens by rules laid down by the Many (to Plethos). The medium of exchange between the Few and the Many was rhetoric. Studies of the political and legal speeches of the fourth-century orators make it clear that the ethos of the polis was conditioned by the prejudices of the ordinary citizen, in other words, by popular morality, and that popular attitudes then were no different from the ones that comedians, like Aristophanes, exploited in the previous century. In short, the dominant groups in both the fourth and fifth centuries in the Assembly and the law courts was the same as in the Theatre, i.e., the independent peasant farmer and his colleagues, the artisans and shopkeepers in the city and the demes (the villages of Attika). This remained the case until Antipater restructured Athenian society in favour of the rich after his victory in the Lamian War. Then, the tables were turned, and the anti-democratic education of the intellectual elite, which originated with Sokrates, was from that time on triumphant. This brief examination of the oligarchy of the Thirty and the successful reestablishment of the democratic constitution is intended to provide a background to the social and political history of Athens in the fourth century

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and, to an extent, in the third. It shows that there was a strong movement in favour of democracy supported by people from all classes. The restoration was led by men from the wealthy class, though they may have been few (the Heroes of Phyle numbered seventy or fewer), and may have represented the newly rich, whose fortunes lay in trade rather than in land. Indeed, the supporters of the democratic restoration included a large number of men who lacked the franchise (resident aliens or slaves), but whose livelihoods depended upon the trade in the Peiraieus (Ath. Pol. 40.2; IG II2 10). On the other hand, the true oligarchs were very few and their motives were often personal, rather than ideological. Their support was found amongst the cavalry class, which was largely composed of the landed rich. But, a surprising number of Athenians (for example, the so-called Three Thousand) were somewhat passive, waiting to see which way the wind blew and ready to acquiesce in the state of affairs, whatever it was (Hell. Oxy. 6.3). They were neither oligarchs, nor democrats, and, probably, not ideologically committed to anything except stability. They tolerated democracy, but equally were willing to acquiesce in oligarchy. They have been identified with the lesser landowners, the hoplite class, but that would be a simplistic categorization of that section of the population, since many of them participated enthusiastically in the new government. Recently, these uncommitted individuals (apragmones) have been dubbed the “quiet Athenians” (Carter, 1986). In reality, they represent a substantial element in any democratic society, who sit on the fence for one reason or another, or are just apathetic. To the credit of the restored democracy, the evidence shows that it succeeded in motivating the involvement and participation of these apathetic members. There were, of course, other factors that conditioned the Athenians at the beginning of the fourth century. In the first place, those who had fought to restore democracy had fought not only a civil war, but a war of national liberation to rid the land of the occupying Spartan garrison. As a result, the democratic constitution became from this time on physically, as before it had been only verbally, identified with the freedom of Athens. The abstract concept Demokratia was personified into a female figure that can be seen crowning an old man, representing the Athenian Demos, in 337/6, on a sculpted relief on top of the stele containing Eukrates’ law against tyranny (TDGR2, No. 101), and was then (at least by 333/2) deified in the form of a statue to whom sacrifices were to be made in the Agora (IG II2 1496.131–2, 140–1). Democracy was the unquestioned choice of Athenians down to 322, and remained the rallying cry for nationalists long after. THE CONSTITUTION The constitution and the administrative institutions that the fifth and fourthcentury Athenians developed and operated successfully for almost two hundred years are amongst the greatest achievements in the political history of

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the free world. Though some like to complain (smugly, but anachronistically) that it did not give the vote to women (did we before the twentieth century?) or (ridiculously) to children (who does?), it was an experiment in open government by the people that has never been replicated. Furthermore, the system of wealth distribution practiced especially in the fourth century was the closest approximation to Socialism the world had seen before the twentieth century. The argument that Athenian society was based upon the exploitation of slave labour is more challenging, though this is rather an issue of morality than politics, and the story of man’s abuse of his or her fellows on the basis of race, colour, religion or economic expediency did not begin in Greece and has not ended yet. Slavery was the norm throughout the ancient world and persisted (after a flirtation with serfdom, when the free peasant was reduced to a state of dependence upon someone more powerful) until the nineteenth century. In some form it still exists. This is not in any way to excuse the Greeks (or anyone else) for this practice, but to point out that it is not a criticism of any constitution that it does not enfranchise its slaves (that’s a non sequitur), but of its morality that it has slaves at all. But, politically speaking, the frequently voiced criticism that Athenian participatory democracy was only possible because slave labour freed the peasants to perform their civic duties is overstated. It is true that most peasant farmers would have owned a slave, but they worked side-by-side in the fields and, in any case, the nature of ancient agriculture meant that there were many periods in the year when there was little or nothing to do. There were a few times of intense activity, when the grain, grapes or olives needed to be harvested, and on those occasions it was not slaves who provided the helping hands, but poorer citizens from the thetic class who were hired for pay. For the rest of the year the farmer had plenty of free time, unlike his counterpart today. A trip to the town for the Assembly could easily be combined with business, to sell his produce or buy some extra luxuries in the Agora. As for the members of the lowest class (the thetes), it is hardly likely that many of them could afford, or would even need, a slave. In fact, in many fields of employment, such as construction, skilled slaves, resident aliens (metoikoi) and free citizens all worked together on the same project for the same pay. Indeed, the Athenians tolerated some strangely anomalous situations, as, for example, the powers entrusted to the public slave for the certification of coinage (TDGR2, No. 45), and they allowed themselves to be policed by slaves, in the form of five hundred Scythian archers. Finally, during the latter half of the fourth century (if not before) it appears that some process for the liberation (manumission) of slaves evolved. But, from the point of view of this study, the issue of slavery is hardly relevant: slavery existed before, during and after the transformation of the political and economic circumstances of the poorer citizens that will be traced here, and so was clearly not a precondition for their dominance during the democratic years. What made the supremacy of the Many possible was a complex of factors, which antedate the period of this study—the

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reforms of Solon and Kleisthenes, the development of naval power under Themistokles and the creation of the harbour-city of Peiraieus, and the existence of pay for service in the military, on the boards of public officials and in the law courts. Essential to all that, in the fifth and fourth century, was a thriving trading economy, based in the Peiraieus. A brief outline of the constitution follows, based upon Aristotle’s Athenaion Politeia, written, ironically, in the 320s, only a few years before the constitution was extinguished by Macedon, after which the triumph of Macedonian monarchy instituted centuries of subservience of the People to the ambition and corruption of autocrats and the wealthy. It was only in the Hellenistic cities, the inheritors of the ideals of the city-states especially modelled upon Athens, that any semblance of democracy survived. The essential feature of the constitution Aristotle described is the extent of participation of all classes of citizens, including the lowest class of thetes, in almost every aspect of the administration, which operated on the principles of rotation in office, whereby no one could hold the same office twice until all eligible citizens had had their turn; sortition (selection by lot), on the belief that all were equally competent; and collegiality in magistracies (i.e., boards of officials), on the sensible understanding that all were not equally competent and that there was safety in numbers. The level of accountability for all executive officers was extremely high and would scare away most candidates today (see the following section titled “Accountability”).

Legislature The key element in the state was the popular Assembly (ekklesia), which was open to all male citizens over the age of eighteen. During the fifth century, attendance at the Assembly was unpaid, but, soon after the restoration of the democracy in 403, payment for attendance was introduced. In the Assembly the citizens would appraise and vote on new laws (though they would pass them on for scrutiny and final ratification to a subset of themselves, the nomothetai), entertain embassies from abroad, decide on war and peace and hear cases of impeachment. Since six thousand was a quorum for many decisions, we have to assume that this number of men attended on a regular basis. Anyone who has ever tried to control, organize, or even hold the attention of a crowd of this size, let alone one that is composed of young and old, educated and illiterate, rich and poor, will recognize the challenge. The Athenians solved the problem of how to organize their open democracy by the institution of the Boule, a council of five hundred, all over thirty, chosen by lot, fifty from each of the ten tribes (phylai) of Attika, which were units into which the Athenians had been divided artificially by Kleisthenes in 507/6 for voting purposes. Within this Council the demes (the smaller communities of Attika) were represented in proportion to their population. The task of the Boule was to prepare the agenda for the assembly meetings, down to the point of drafting resolutions for discussion and ratification

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(probouleumata), controlling debate, and then, after the voting had taken place, to communicate the people’s will to the executive officers. The combination of the Assembly (ekklesia) and the Council (boule) represented a judicious blend of open democracy and proportionate representation.

Executive All executive officials, with the exception of the ten generals (strategoi), other military commanders and certain specialized positions such as treasurers and architects, were selected by lot on the principles outlined above. The age requirement was thirty years. They were usually grouped in boards of ten, such as the ten public auctioneers (poletai), ten accountants (logistai), ten supervisors of conduct in the agora (agoranomoi), or the ten superintendents of the shipyards (epimeletai ton neorion). Aristotle tells us there were seven hundred citizens who held domestic executive positions annually (Ath. Pol. 24.3). Even the nine archons, who in early Athens had been the most influential magistrates, were now selected by lot and their number was often rounded up to ten by the addition of the secretary of the Boule. The outstanding anomaly (numerically) was the archaic institution of the Eleven, the prison commissioners.

Accountability All these magistrates underwent a scrutiny (dokimasia) in front of the jurors in the law courts before entering office and an accounting for their performance in office (euthyne) after completion. Any citizen who wanted (ho boulomenos) could challenge a candidate’s eligibility or bring a charge of misconduct in office, but malicious prosecution was discouraged by the severe penalty of disfranchisement for failing to secure one-fifth of the votes on three occasions. The one apparent exception to the rule of public scrutiny appears to be the role of the rhetor, which was the closest thing to our notion of politician. In the Assembly, anyone who wanted, or had the courage, could speak on any topic. Some, usually with training in the schools of rhetoric, made a career of speaking to the public. Demosthenes and Aiskhines are only two of the best known. These speakers were neither selected nor elected, but they were influential. They could sway the members of the Assembly with their powers of persuasion. But the adversarial nature of public debate meant that there was always someone to argue on the other side. Nor were the rhetores immune to prosecution. The prosecution for unconstitutional proposal (graphe paranomon) ensured that the proponent of any motion was open to prosecution in the law courts (dikasteria) by his opponents. In fact, political differences usually ended up in lawsuits before the popular juries in the courts, where the contending parties battled each other on intensely personal rather than ideological grounds. This is true of none more than the greatest orator of them all, Demosthenes. In one

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famous passage (On the Crown, 129) he attacked his opponent, Aiskhines, with abusive invective that was entirely fabricated, in which he impugned his opponent’s origin by asserting that his father was a slave and his mother a prostitute. Earlier in the same speech Demosthenes called Aiskhines a “gossip-gathering-agora-dandy, the very devil of a bureaucrat” (On the Crown, 127). There is much similar material in the corpus of the Attic Orators. It bears a striking resemblance to the language of Aristophanic comedy, where influential leaders in the polis were pilloried to the delight of the audience.

Judiciary In all respects, the constitution was protected by a well-developed system of checks and balances, much of which involved the juries in the law courts. While the ordinary citizen could vote on motions prepared for him by the Council (Boule), his real power lay in the law courts (dikasteria). Each year, six thousand citizens over the age of thirty (the same number as represented a quorum in the Assembly, but with a different age requirement) would be empanelled as potential jurors for the trials of lawsuits both public and private. An elaborate allotment procedure (described in Chapter 6) was established to ensure that the jurors were chosen at random, and then assigned to courts and trials in a way that prevented corruption. No juror could know until he arrived in his courtroom which case he would be judging. Once again, the system believed that there was safety in numbers: no jury was smaller than 101, and really serious cases could require 1,501 members. All cases had to be concluded by nightfall. After the trial was over the jurors received a stipend of three obols (about half an average day’s wage). The concept of trial by a jury of one’s peers is one of the most enduring contributions that Athenian democracy has made to Western civilization. All aspects of life in the city came under the oversight of the citizen juries. Though officials, like the nine archons, supervised the courts and made sure that proper procedure was observed, they were not judges and gave no legal direction to the jurymen. Decisions in all cases were made by the jurymen alone, based upon their own interpretation of the evidence presented to them by the litigants. They heard private cases between people arguing over inheritance, injury, and business deals. They also had the responsibility (outlined earlier) for scrutinizing the credentials of candidates for executive officials and for conducting their accounting for their performance in office. They adjudicated between rival rhetores over proposed legislation. Even lawsuits involving out-of-state activities had the dikasteria as their final court of appeal. In short, Aristotle was not wrong when he observed, “When the people control the pebble (i.e., the ballot in the courts), they control the constitution” (Ath. Pol. 9.1).

State Pay Before I begin this topic, a few words are required to put the payments described below in context. They concern the monetary system: There were

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six obols in each drachma and six thousand drachmas in one talent. More relevant is the fact that pay for skilled labour for work on the Erekhtheion in the late fifth century was one drachma (six obols) a day, whilst similar work at Eleusis in 329/8 earned more than double, 2–2.5 drachmas. Unskilled labour was paid at half this rate. Athenian democracy provided modest pay to facilitate the participation of its citizens in every aspect of its operation, especially in the period under consideration here, namely 404/3 to 323/2. To begin with the civilian side: payment for attending the Assembly was first introduced after the restoration of the democracy in 403. It started low at one obol, but very quickly rose to three obols. By the time of writing of the Athenaion Politeia (early 320s) it was six obols (one drachma) for each of the thirty-six regular annual meetings and nine for the kyriai ekklesiai (authoritative meetings), which happened ten times per year, and at which the people voted on major issues like the food supply, national security and the competence of magistrates (Ath. Pol. 62.2). So, assuming that at least six thousand attended, since that was the number required for a quorum, the annual cost to the State for the Assembly alone in the prosperous 330s would have been at least fifty talents. For most of the fourth century, however, it was half that figure. To this expenditure must be added the cost for the five hundred Council members, each of whom received a daily stipend of five obols; fifty of them (the prytaneis or presidents) were paid an additional obol for rations. That adds another twenty-five talents, presuming that the Councillors were paid for the whole year (Thouk. 8.69.4). But this is by no means certain, and the Councillors, apart from the prytaneis, may only have been paid for the days they attended. That would reduce the cost by a substantial but incalculable amount. At a guess, it might take off fifteen talents. Finally, we need to take account of the numerous other civic officials, who were paid at one drachma per day, surely for the whole year. Aristotle tells us that there were seven hundred of these domestically and as many again who served abroad (Ath. Pol. 24.3). The latter figure is hard to believe, even for the days of the empire, but there were certainly some Athenian officials who travelled around on state business. Even the figure of seven hundred for magistrates within Attika seems high. Somewhere between three hundred and four hundred may be a more reasonable number. The cost for these would range from 18.5 to 24 talents. However, it should be noted that a substantial number of scholars believe that pay for magistrates had not been reintroduced after it had been cancelled by the Four Hundred in 411, because it is never mentioned. In sum, if we assume that officials were not paid and that Councillors were only paid when in meetings, for the first half of the fourth century, when Assembly pay was at 3 obols, the State only needed 35 talents (210,000 drachmas) to finance the legislative and executive aspects of its administration. If, however, we believe that officials were paid and that Councillors received remuneration for the whole of their year in office, then in the 330s,

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when Assembly pay was 1 drachma a day, the State needed almost 100 talents (600,000 drachmas) to provide the same level of service. There remains the judiciary. Pay for jury duty was introduced by Perikles in the 450s. It was the earliest form of state pay. At first it was a mere two obols (one-third of a drachma), but it was raised in the 420s by Perikles’ successor, Kleon, to three. Even at three obols, it was quite low and never raised subsequently. In time, it became even less significant, as other stipends increased in line with inflation. Whilst a great deal of fuss was made about jury pay by the opponents of democracy, like the Old Oligarch, and while it was the source of much humour in the plays of Aristophanes, especially the Wasps, it did not deserve the bad press it received. It was little more than a contribution to encourage participation in the most important element in the Athenian democratic system—the delivery of justice in accordance with the laws, which were the foundation of the constitution. The cost to the State for this service cannot be calculated precisely, since we do not know how many jurors were selected for duty on each day the courts met. One might, however, hazard a guess that at least two-thirds of the eligible six thousand, who were selected for service by lot at the beginning of each administrative year, would be needed on average over the two hundred or so days in a year that the courts sat. This would yield a total annual cost between sixty and seventy talents.

Other Disbursements There were numerous other disbursements made by the State, most of which are impossible to calculate. For example, a subsistence allowance of one obol a day was provided to all the children of those whose fathers had died fighting for Athens (war orphans), until they came of age. A similar sum was handed out to the incapacitated (adynatoi), men who were physically handicapped and owned property worth less than three minas (three hundred drachmas). The state also provided dinner in the town hall (prytaneion) for various distinguished visitors, some Olympic victors, the descendants of Harmodios and Aristogeiton (men who slew Hipparchos, son of the tyrant Peisistratos, at the end of the sixth century), and certain other honourees. None of these expenditures can be quantified, for obvious reasons. Also unquantifiable is a potentially greater outlay, one which late in the fourth century was referred to by the orator, Demades, as the “glue of the democracy” (Plutarch, Moralia, 1011b), namely the Theorika. Its origin is variously attributed to Perikles, to Agyrrhios about 400 BC and to Diophantos and Euboulos in 355/4. The Theorika was a subvention of two obols per time to enable poorer citizens to purchase a ticket to each of the state festivals, in particular the dramatic performances at the Lenaia and the Dionysia. Later, it seems to have been extended to all attendees. Its cost has been hypothetically estimated at anywhere from fifteen to one hundred talents. The latter figure is credible for the period after 355/4, when any

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surplus monies were diverted to the Theoric Fund from the Military Fund (stratiotika). At that time the board controlling it (hoi epi to theorikon) assumed wider responsibilities over more than theatre tickets. In sum, pay for state service was approximately at the level of unskilled labour and only half that which a skilled craftsman could earn. It was not, therefore, an inducement to slothful ease, as the opponents of democracy complained, but a fair compensation to citizens for giving their time and effort to make the system work. After all, they were performing all the functions of government for which a modern democratic state pays heavily, since they were members of parliament, civil servants, judges and jury, all in one. And it must not be forgotten that the citizens also served in the military. That will be treated separately in Chapter 4, as will the sources of revenue from which the State derived the necessary funds to pay for their service (Chapter 5). THE SOCIOLOGY OF ATTIKA (See Map 1.1 of Attika on page 19.) The size of the citizen population of Attika in the fourth century is a matter of considerable speculation and debate. One estimate of the number of adult males after the Peloponnesian War in 405 is as low as fourteen thousand to sixteen thousand. At the other end of the democratic period, we have a report by an obscure historian (Ktesikles, Chronika, fr.1) that Demetrios of Phaleron, at some point in his rule (317–307), took a census of the people in Attika and found there to be twenty-one thousand male citizens. More generous modern estimates put the figure closer to thirty thousand at the middle of the fourth century, and it will be convenient to work with that figure. To this number of adult males it is customary, for the sake of argument, to add a wife and two children, thus raising the total citizen population to c. 120,000. This figure is relevant when it comes to calculating the food, especially grain, required to feed the people, but for administrative and military purposes only the number of adult males is pertinent. The criterion for citizenship was “to be born of a citizen father and a citizen mother” (Ath. Pol. 42.1). Beyond that, a citizen had to be registered in one of the 139 villages (demes) of Attika, where records were kept by a local magistrate (demarch). For this reason, an Athenian male will always be defined by both his father’s name (patronymic) and his deme affiliation (demotic), for example: Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paiania. Men also had to be assigned to one of the ten tribes (phylai) into which Athenians had been artificially divided by Kleisthenes in 508/7, and belong to a brotherhood (phratry), a relic of the past that by now was more like a men’s club. The closest a woman got to that institution was to be introduced by her prospective husband and approved by the members at marriage time. As for wealth, it has been shown that the vast majority of Athenians, whether subsistence farmers (zeugitai) or artisans of some kind (thetes),

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were at approximately the same level. In other words, the difference between the two classes was negligible as far as income was concerned—each being worth slightly above (zeugitai) or below (thetes) two thousand drachmas. Since, however, the Solonian census classes were based upon the ownership of property, there was a difference in status, in as much as the farmers’ wealth lay in their land, whereas the thetes supplemented the value of any property they owned by manual labour. The zeugitai were the yeomen, who could afford the panoply of the infantry soldier (hoplites) that the thetes supposedly could not. I say, supposedly, because it is wise not to be too dogmatic about this distinction. It is important to remember that such a notable figure as Sokrates was an artisan. The son of a stonemason, he was a sculptor himself. Yet he fought as a hoplite in three battles, at Poteidaia, Amphipolis and Delium (Plato, Apology, 28e and Symposion, 220d). In reality, both zeugitai and thetes were united by the fact that they needed to work for a living, a necessity that separated them from the wealthy few (the plousioi), who made up the leisured classes. In Solonian terms, the leisured class were the hippeis, the cavalrymen who had enough land to keep a horse, and the pentakosiomedimnoi, those whose land produced five hundred bushels or more of produce. The property rating of the cavalry class has been estimated at between one and two talents, which is three to six times as much as that of a peasant farmer, while the super wealthy at the top of the scale could own anything from five to fifty or more talents of property. They were the billionaires of Athenian society. There were about one thousand hippeis, and no more than three hundred pentakosiomedimnoi. In short, the leisured class comprised less than 5 percent of the population, and the super wealthy represented the top 1 percent. This is not unlike the case today. The emphasis upon land ownership makes it clear that originally the elite had based their wealth upon the production of their property, but during the years of the Athenian Empire in the fifth century a new source of wealth had arisen that involved entrepreneurial activity, such as mining, dealing in slaves, and operating mini-factories for the production of leather, furniture, and weaponry for the war. As a result, there developed a rift within the leisured class between those who preferred to stay on the land and those who were prepared to branch out into commercial endeavours, some of whom rose to the ranks of the wealthy from below. This is almost an ancient version of the dissention that arose between the wealthy after the Industrial Revolution. To a certain extent, this rift expressed itself in politics, where those whose wealth was based on commerce tended to be more likely to support, or be supported by, the democrats, but some members of the landed wealthy also exploited the opportunities offered by trade. Regarding the two lower classes, it is an easy assumption, based on rather unthinking reading of ancient literature (comedy in particular), that there was a radical dichotomy between the city and the country, that there

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were yeoman farmers in the fields and rabble in the city. This was, of course, the Roman literary view and one that was eagerly picked up by the opponents of democracy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In England, in particular, the very conservative historian of Greece, William Mitford, wrote like a latter-day Old Oligarch. This is a simplistic, if not ridiculous, interpretation. In the first place, there were as many as 139 smaller communities, called demes, throughout Attika. Many were as old as Athens, some even older. They ranged in size from very small to quite large (e.g. Eleusis, Akharnai), but they were in essence mini-versions of Athens itself. Each had its own administrative structure, headed by a sort of mayor (demarch), who was responsible for keeping the register that was the basis of a person’s citizenship. It was in the demes that the members of the Boule were selected. Each deme had its own cult centres and practices, with priests or priestesses and cultic associations, and each had its own agora, where local produce would be exchanged. Whilst most of the demesmen were probably subsistence farmers, each community needed the full range of services that could be found in the big city, and some that were particular to country life—like the smithy for making farming equipment. No doubt the average peasant was a competent enough carpenter to erect the frame of his own house and fabricate rudimentary furniture, but it is unlikely he could make roof tiles, everyday pottery, lamps, and olive presses for the important olive oil industry. These had to be purchased, no doubt from local producers. It was only necessary to go to the city for fine ware, such as was created in the famous pottery centre of the Kerameikos. Charcoal burners, muleteers, bakers, stonemasons, and barbers are just a few of the essential workers that were necessary for each of these communities to operate. Not to mention the professions that existed in the many demes that were situated on the coast. There, fishing was a major source of livelihood and that required boats, sails, rigging and nets. Much would have been produced by the fishermen themselves, but a supporting economy surely existed. Finally, we must not neglect the women of the families. Amongst the many functions they performed was the weaving of clothes and carpets. Some of their produce was for the family, some for market. Their work required looms and loom weights, wool and the whole complex of the dyeing industry. All these functions were performed locally. This account is by no means an exclusive review of all the ancillary professions that existed in and around the demes, but it should dispel any notion that only farmers lived and worked in the countryside. Furthermore, beyond the demes, there were major industries like marble quarrying on Mount Pentelikon and silver mining in southern Attika around Laurion. While slaves performed most of the hard labour for these enterprises, there were supervisors, assayers, haulage contractors with teams of oxen for the marble and, for the silver, once it had been brought out from under the ground, a number of skilled workers who were employed in the workshops

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(ergasteria) above ground, where the ore was separated and refined for shipment to the state mint. Meanwhile, in the city of Athens there was no rabble. There were, by contrast, countless artisans and professionals plying their trade. Beside the “butcher, the baker, and the lamp-wick-maker,” sausage-sellers, soothsayers, barbers and so on; there were silver and goldsmiths making the fine art works which Athens exported, bronzesmiths making cauldrons, sculptors and creators of bronze statues working on the south slope of the Akropolis, and, of course, the potters of the Kerameikos, whose superior products were in demand around the Mediterranean. There were doctors, architects, teachers, and personal trainers in the gymnasia and palaistra and, on the other end of the spectrum, dung collectors, who had the unenviable task of cleaning the streets of Athens at night. All these individuals with their rich variety of skills interacted within the structure of the measured and well-balanced constitution described above. Each had their place, though the masses (to Plethos) held the power by virtue of their numbers, whilst the elite few filled all the leading positions as a result of their superior education, their wealth and their leisure time.

Map 1.1

Attika

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THE PEIRAIEUS (See Map 1.2 of Peiraieus and Athens on page 23.) In the early years of Athenian history, the land was the basis of wealth and the source of power. Gradually, with the reforms of Solon (594) and Kleisthenes (507), the peasant-farmers acquired more rights. But in 493, the chief magistrate (arkhon) of that year, Themistokles, proposed that an otherwise unused space, with three excellent harbours, should be fortified and used as the base for the Athenian fleet, such as it was—around fifty ships that until then had been beached further down the coast at Phaleron. The space he meant was the Peiraieus. This simple suggestion had revolutionary consequences, especially when only a few years later the Athenians struck it rich from the discovery of a new vein of silver in the mines at Laurion. It was traditional practice on such occasions to distribute the proceeds amongst the citizens, but Themistokles proposed that the people forego the usual hand-out and use the money to build a fleet of two hundred triremes instead. The suggestion was foresighted, but no less so was the people’s decision to act upon it! With this fleet, the Athenians were able to play a leading role in defeating the Persian navy at Salamis in 480, and later to become the supreme naval power in the Aegean. Athens had ceased to be a typical land-based city-state. The social and political consequences were enormous, as her power became increasingly dependent upon the rowers on the ships—the nautikos ochlos (“naval mob”) as they were disparaging referred to by conservatives, who found themselves losing influence in the new order. The Peiraieus was not only the home of the fleet, but of all those who were involved in building and maintaining it, including both the citizens and also the foreigners, who came to the Peiraieus in large numbers, and made it the most culturally diverse place in Greece. As a result it grew in size rapidly, to such an extent that in the mid-fifth century the famous city planner Hippodamos of Miletos was hired to lay out a grid for the new city. Shortly after, in recognition of the fact that Athens was now tied to the sea, the so-called Long Walls were built, joining the two urban units of Athens and Peiraieus together in an impregnable defensive system. Port and city (asty) were now one. The management of the fleet, especially as we know it from fourth-century documents, will be described in Chapter 4, “By Land and Sea.” But the Peiraieus meant more to Athens than just serving as a base for her naval might. It was a major source of her wealth, and the mainstay of her food supply. As the great fifth-century politician, Perikles, said, “On account of the greatness of the city all the produce of the whole world is brought in to us, so that it turns out that it is no less natural for us to enjoy the fruits of other lands than of our own” (Thouk. 2.38). Indeed, from the early sixth century, Athenians had been advised by the reformer, Solon, to produce material for export, since they were unable to produce enough grain locally

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to feed themselves and needed to import large amounts. By the mid-fifth century the Peiraieus was the port through which all food supplies flowed, and it continued to be so down to the last decade of the fourth, when the city was severed from its port. The import and export business not only yielded revenue for the city in the form of the 2 percent tax (pentekoste), it also created a new class of wealthy citizen, men whose riches derived not from the land, but from trade and investment. Already, in the latter part of the fifth century, nouveau riche individuals like Kleon, who ran a leather-tanning factory, and Hyperbolos, who owned a factory that made lamps, and even Nikias, who hired out large numbers of slaves for the silver mines, became influential in politics, to the great displeasure of the landed gentry. This situation was even more the case in the fourth century, when Athens created her Second Confederacy, since it was much more an economic sphere of influence than it was an empire. The financial portfolio of the great orator, Demosthenes, will serve as an example. Demosthenes’ father, also called Demosthenes, was almost certainly the first member of the family to become wealthy. He was one of the nouveau riche mentioned above. His birth is placed in the last quarter of the fifth century, around 420. He married his wife, Kleobule, before 386/5, since his son, the orator, was born either 385/4 or 384/3. The father died of a sickness in about 376/5, when Demosthenes was only seven years old. By the terms of the father’s will, the estate was held under the guardianship of some relatives and friends until the son reached maturity at eighteen. At that time, much of the value of the estate had been squandered or embezzled, according to the orator, who proceeded to prosecute his guardians for redress. His speeches in this long, drawn-out case have been preserved (speeches 27–31 in the corpus of Demosthenes’ works), so that, allowing for some rhetorical exaggeration, we can form a fairly clear idea of the father’s wealth from the figures provided. The first thing to note is that Demosthenes’ father did not own any land, only a house. This was quite substantial, however, since it was not only valued at three thousand drachmas (half a talent, the equivalent of one and a half times the property rating of an independent peasant farmer), but was also large enough to contain two workshops (ergasteria), one for making swords, the other for fabricating couches. These were operated by a total of fifty-two slaves, who presumably lived in. The value of the slaves was close to four talents, and the annual income from their labour was calculated at almost another talent. The material for their products that was unused at the time was estimated to be worth two and a half talents. The furniture and other possessions in the house were said to amount to two and two-thirds talents, while, most interestingly, well over 4 talents were in cash, or deposited with bankers, or out on loan. One of the largest loans was a bottomry of seven thousand drachmas for a maritime venture. The total value of the

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estate was close to fourteen talents, which made Demosthenes senior one of the richest men in Athens at the time. And, he had amassed this wealth in the first two and a half decades of the fourth century, hardly one of the most prosperous periods in Athenian history. The picture presented by this evidence is most instructive. It shows a man who knew how to make money through investment, trade and industry. He is typical of the entrepreneurial investors of late fifth and fourth-century Athens. Their activities, especially in maritime trade, were facilitated by the emergence of investment bankers, the most famous of whom was Pasion, a liberated slave. These were the middlemen between those who had cash and those who needed it. And the greatest need was for the riskiest business, overseas trade, all of which came in and out of the busiest port in the Aegean—the Peiraieus. That was also where the greatest profits lay. Fortunes were to be made in the import-export business, but they could also easily be lost. A ship and its cargo could be captured by pirates, lost in a storm or destroyed in war. For lenders like Demosthenes Senior, who financed a trading mission, if anything of the sort happened to the ship they had invested in, all was lost. That was why they charged an exorbitant interest rate of almost 25 percent for their money. If, on the other hand, the journey was completed successfully, they did very well. It is also instructive to note how liquid Demosthenes’ father’s wealth was. Most of it would escape the net of the taxation system, which was conservatively based upon the value of land. This surely helps explain the resentment toward trade and trading held by some of the more conservative amongst the landed rich. In their eyes, the Peiraieus was hardly an asset, rather the cause of their discontent; but for the thousands who lived and worked there, the economic activity that was generated by the navy, the trade, and the investments of entrepreneurs, like Demosthenes’ father, was a source of steady employment and income. The alternative that was offered by the landed rich was poorly paid seasonal labour at harvest time. Unfortunately, from the time of their defeat in the Hellenic/Lamian War in 322 until 229/8, the Athenians rarely controlled the Peiraieus. It was either watched over by a Macedonian garrison on Mounykhia hill or held outright by Macedonian forces. For a short period, from 317 to 295, some economic activity might have been tolerated, but only at the whim of the Macedonian rulers, either Kassander or Demetrios Poliorketes. From 295 to 229, more than sixty years, the port was severed from the city (asty). For the supporters of democracy and national independence, recovery of the Peiraieus was an issue of the greatest importance. The landed gentry saw the situation otherwise. The loss of the Peiraieus meant a new opportunity for them to regain their lost status and influence. Wealth based upon trade was diminished, if not eliminated, and the difficulty of importing overseas grain, except as a gift of largesse by one monarch or another, ensured that local grain, grown on their lands, now became the primary source of food for the population.

Oligarchs vs. Democrats

Map 1.2

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Peiraieus

SUGGESTED READING Ancient Works Aristotle (1984), The Athenian Constitution, trans. P. J. Rhodes (Harmondsworth) Thoukydides (1954), History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. R. Warner (Harmondsworth) Xenophon (1966), A History of My Times, trans. R. Warner (Harmondsworth)

Modern Works Bogaert, R. (1968), Banque et Banquiers dans les Cités grecques (Leiden) Carter, L. B. (1986), The Quiet Athenian (Oxford) Christ, M. R. (2006), The Bad Citizen in Classical Athens (Cambridge) Connor, W. R. (1971), The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens (Princeton) Davies, J. K. (1981), Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens (Salem) de Ste. Croix, G. E. M. (1981), The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (Ithaca) Eliot, C. W. J. (1962), Coastal Demes of Attika (Toronto) Garland, R. (1987), The Piraeus: From the Fifth to the First Century B.C. (Ithaca, New York) Hansen, M. H. (1987), The Athenian Assembly (Oxford) Hansen, M. H. (1991), The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Cambridge, MA and Oxford)

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Hansen, M. H. (2005), The Tradition of Ancient Greek Democracy and Its Importance for Modern Democracy (Copenhagen) Harding, P. (1994), ‘Comedy and Rhetoric’ in Persuasion, ed. I. Worthington, 196–221 Harding, P. (1987), ‘Rhetoric and Politics in Fourth Century Athens,’ Phoenix 41: 25–39 Jones, A. H. M. (1978), Athenian Democracy (Oxford) Krentz, P. (1982), The Thirty at Athens (Ithaca and London) Lambert, S. D. (1993), The Phratries of Attica (Ann Arbor) Millett, P. (1991), Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens (Cambridge) Ober, J. (1989), Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton) Oliver, G. J. (2007), War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens (Oxford) Osborne, R. (1985), Demos: The Discovery of Classical Attika (Cambridge) Rhodes, P. J. (1972), The Athenian Boule (Oxford) Rhodes, P. J. (1981), A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford) Roberts, J. T. (1982), Accountability in Athenian Government (Madison) Shear, J. (2011), Polis and Revolution: Responding to Oligarchy in Classical Athens (Cambridge) Sinclair, R. K. (1988), Democracy and Participation in Athens (New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney) Thompson, W. E. (1978), ‘The Athenian Investor,’ Rivista di studi classici 26: 403–423 Traill, J. S. (1975), The Political Organization of Attica (Hesperia, Suppl. 14, Princeton) Travlos, J. (1971), Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Athens (New York) Wakefield, R. (2009), Why Socrates Died: Dispelling the Myths (New York) Whitehead, D. (1977), The Ideology of the Athenian Metic (Cambridge) Worthington, I. (ed.) (1994), Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action (London)

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FOREIGN POLICY (See Map 2.1 of the Aegean and Black Sea on page 50.) The idea that a People’s Assembly cannot manage a rational and coherent foreign policy is nonsense.

End of the Peloponnesian War (405/4) to the King’s Peace (387/6) Athens survived her defeat in the Peloponnesian War by the skin of her teeth. The whole Greek world rejoiced at her surrender out of hostility to her imperial past. This feeling is caught by Xenophon’s brief statement that, after Lysander sailed into the Peiraieus, the Long Walls that connected the city to the port were pulled down “among scenes of great enthusiasm and to the music of flute girls. It was thought that this day was the beginning of freedom for Greece” (Xen. Hell. 2.2.23). There were even those, like the Corinthians and Thebans, who demanded more: nothing less than the ultimate penalty: razing the city to the ground, slaughter of males and enslavement of women and children (Xen. Hell. 2.2.19). But the Spartans opposed this extreme measure, arguing that it was not right to “enslave a city that had done such great things for Greece at the time of her supreme danger” (Xen. Hell. 2.2.20). The reference, of course, was to the Persian Wars (490–479) and to the reputation, not uncontested, that Athens had nurtured for herself in the aftermath of the invasions, namely, that she had been the saviour of Greece (Herod. 7.139.5, 9.27.1–28.1). So now, and not for the last time, Athens benefited from her carefully constructed image of her past. But the Spartans were not dupes. They cannot have failed to notice the increasing confidence and ambition of the Boiotians, who had profited grossly from their rape of Attika during Agis’ occupation of Dekeleia in the last phase of the Peloponnesian War (Hell. Oxy.17.3–5), and surely found it very convenient for pragmatic, political purposes to keep a subservient Athens on the map. Thus a combination of good luck, the reputation of her real or imagined past, and the self-interest of the victor saved Athens at this time.

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But the terms of surrender were humiliating. The Long Walls and the fortification of the Peiraieus were to be torn down; all the warships except twelve were to be surrendered and the Athenians were to become allies of Sparta, serving under “Spartan leadership in any expedition Sparta might make either by land or sea” (Xen. Hell. 2.2.20). Furthermore, they had to endure the abrogation of their constitution and the rule of the Thirty Tyrants. Whether the oligarchs were imposed by the Spartans, as some sources suggest, or were merely supported by them, their rule was certainly congenial to Spartan political ideology to the extent that, when requested, they sent a garrison and governor (harmostes) to shore them up. Nevertheless, as we have seen, some Athenians were not prepared to put up with this situation and began the movement to restore the democratic constitution. Not only did they manage to bring the restoration about, but they negotiated the withdrawal of the Spartan garrison and Sparta’s approval of their new relationship. The democratic restoration and the associated reconciliation show that the Athenians were not lacking in spirit or overwhelmed by their defeat in the Peloponnesian War. Neither had they lost their sense of humour, as is demonstrated by the number of titles of comedies from the period 404 onwards that have been preserved. They were not cowering in their boots, as has been suggested. Nevertheless, their situation internationally was weak, to say the least. They were reduced in strength financially and militarily, severely short of manpower and subservient to their conqueror. Fortunately, as so often happens in geopolitical affairs, external factors came to their assistance. The first to help them out were their former enemies, the Spartans. Not only did they save Athens from total destruction at the hands of the Corinthians and Thebans and acquiesce in the restoration of a constitution to which they were ideologically opposed, but they proceeded to make several serious errors in foreign policy. In the first place, they alienated their former allies, the Corinthians and Thebans, by failing to share the spoils of victory. That was the reason why, almost immediately, especially in Thebes, popular opinion turned 360 degrees. Indeed, it was the Theban protection and support of Thrasyboulos and his colleagues that helped bring about the democratic restoration in Athens. But, while Corinth and Thebes were disgruntled and disaffected, they were not powerful enough to challenge Spartan supremacy. The State that could was the Persian Empire, the power that had supported Sparta against Athens in the Peloponnesian War. The story of the interaction between the Greek city-states and the Persian Empire has been often told and, therefore, can be briefly summarized. It began in 546 BC when Cyrus the Great defeated Kroisos of Lydia and extended the rule of Persia to the shores of the Aegean. In this process Persia gained control of the many Greek cities that had existed along the Aegean coast for several centuries. These communities would remain a source

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of contention between mainland Greece and Persia throughout the next two hundred years, until they were finally ‘liberated’ by Alexander the Great in 334 BC. In 499, the Ionian states attempted to revolt, but were crushed. However, following the failure of Xerxes’ invasion of Europe (480–479), Athenian forces drove the Persians back from the shores of the Aegean and incorporated the Asia Minor cities into a defensive alliance called the Confederacy of Delos. It is still unclear whether Persia ever extinguished its claim to those cities in a formal treaty (the so-called Peace of Kallias), but there is no doubt that the Great King of Persia desired to regain control of the Aegean seaboard. From his point of view, the obstacle to his doing so was the power of Athens. Over time, the Delian Confederacy evolved into the Athenian Empire, the dissolution of which was Sparta’s professed aim in initiating the Peloponnesian War. But, in the last phase of that war, Sparta, in order to gain monetary support from Persia, recognized Persian control of the Asia Minor cities in a formal treaty, conceding that “all the territory and all the cities held now by the King or held in the past by the King’s ancestors shall be the King’s” (Thouk. 8.18). This act of expeditious betrayal came back to haunt the Spartans after the war and earned them considerable opprobrium. Whether to counteract this negative reputation or, more likely, because they were attracted by the idea of assuming the role of imperial master in Athens’ place, the Spartans began to interfere in Persian affairs. The Spartans’ first mistake was to provide support for an army of mercenary soldiers (the Ten Thousand), who marched up country (Anabasis) into the Persian Empire under the leadership of Cyrus, the younger son of the recently deceased Great King, Darius. Cyrus, who had close ties with leading Spartans, especially Lysander, aimed to challenge his older brother, Artaxerxes, for the throne. Unfortunately, at a battle at Cunaxa, near Babylon, Cyrus was defeated and died (401 BC). Artaxerxes was not amused. He sent his agent, Tissaphernes, to take control of the Asia Minor cities. The cities, in turn, begged the Spartans to come to their aid. This they did, in flagrant contravention of the treaty they had signed with Persia. Their first commanders, Thibron and Derkyllidas, achieved some minor success. As a result, the Persians took two initiatives: they sent a Rhodian, called Timokrates, to mainland Greece with substantial funds to stir up the simmering hostility to Sparta, and then initiated the construction of a large fleet in the Phoenician ports of Tyre and Sidon. In response the Spartans sent out to Asia Minor an enlarged force under the leadership of their new king, Agesilaos. Athens benefited greatly from both of Artaxerxes’ actions. First, the Athenians were the recipients of some of Timokrates’ money (Hell. Oxy. 7.2) and found themselves joined in a coalition with Thebes, Corinth and Argos against Sparta. This was balance-of-power politics city-state style. The result was that within ten years of the conclusion of the Peloponnesian

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War, the Greek states were at war again, the so-called Corinthian War of 396–387/6, but in this conflict, Athens, initially, was a junior partner, whilst the leader was the increasingly powerful Boiotian League centred in Thebes. The second benefit for Athens was more significant. Thanks to the influence of Evagoras, king of Salamis in Cyprus, Artaxerxes chose as one of two commanders of the fleet he was having constructed in Phoenicia Konon, a former Athenian general, who had escaped the last disastrous naval battle of the Peloponnesian War (Aigospotamoi) with a squadron of triremes and taken refuge with his friend, Evagoras. This choice was to have far-reaching consequences. The Spartans realized that the Thebans were their real threat and invaded Boiotia, but suffered a defeat in which Lysander, victor of the Peloponnesian War, was killed. The situation in Greece led the powerful Spartan officials, called ephors, to recall Agesilaos from his campaign in Asia, which had up to that point been successful. Persian money had achieved its first objective, namely to get the Spartans out of Asia. The allies—Thebes, Corinth, Argos and Athens—sent a combined force into the Peloponnese, but were defeated at Nemea. The war bogged down in a stalemate around the city of Corinth, with the exception of two notable battles in 394. In the first, Agesilaos, returning from Asia through Boiotia, defeated the allies at Koroneia, thus reasserting Spartan supremacy in pitched battles on land. In the second, which tradition claimed happened on the same day, Konon and Pharnabazos defeated the Spartan fleet near Knidos, a promontory at the bottom of Asia Minor, opposite the island of Kos. They proceeded to sail through the islands, ‘liberating’ them as they went, and finally ended in the Peiraieus, where their crew helped in the ongoing process of rebuilding the walls (393). From there they sailed to Corinth, where they established a mercenary force to help the allies, after which Pharnabazos returned to his home in northern Asia Minor, leaving the fleet for the Athenians. With this stroke of luck Athens was once again a fortified city with a naval competence, and a significant partner in the power struggle against Sparta. Unfortunately, the Athenians had not yet adjusted to the changed geopolitical structure, especially the renewed strength of the Persian Empire. In 392 they rejected a peace initiative that had been organized by the Spartan naval commander (navarch), Antalkidas, and the Persian satrap Tiribazos, on the grounds that it did not protect the freedom of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, and failed to recognize Athenian possession of the islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros that were crucial for their grain supply. From 391 onwards Thrasyboulos, the restorer of democracy, began a campaign in the Aegean to renew associations with Athens’ former subject-allies. He had reached Aspendos in Pamphylia when he was killed in battle. Artaxerxes promptly switched his support back to Sparta, which was represented by the navarch Antalkidas. Fighting moved to the Hellespont, control of which by Lysander had resulted in Athens’ capitulation in the Peloponnesian War, because the city depended heavily on the grain supply from her contacts in

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the Crimea. When Antalkidas gained control of this sensitive passage, Athens was compelled to come to the negotiating table. Most cities in Greece, with the exception of Thebes and Argos, were also happy to conclude the fighting out of war weariness. For his part, Artaxerxes, now king of Persia, was growing tired of playing the Greek balance-of-power game. He knew that Greek infantrymen were incomparable and he planned to hire many to help him regain some of the empire’s lost possessions, particularly Egypt. It was now in his interests to bring about a cessation of the fighting amongst the Greek city-states, providing he was ceded control of the Asia Minor states. The result was the conclusion of the Great King’s Peace, sometimes also referred to as the Peace of Antalkidas, in the spring of 386. The terms of the peace are briefly reported by Xenophon: I, King Artaxerxes, regard the following arrangements as just: 1. The cities in Asia and, among the islands, Klazomenai and Cyprus should belong to me. 2. The other Greek cities, big and small, should be left to govern themselves, except for Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, which should belong to Athens, as in the past. And if either of the two parties refuses to accept peace on these terms, I, together with those who will accept this peace, will make war on that party both by land and by sea, with ships and with money. (Hell. 5.1.31) The Great King’s Peace introduced a new concept to Greek history— the Koine Eirene, or Common Peace. In essence it provided for a general peace amongst the city-states, whilst guaranteeing their individual independence locally (autonomia). All signatories were bound to come to the assistance of any state whose autonomy was being infringed, but in practice the Great King appointed Sparta as guarantor for the implementation of the peace. Sparta thus had a second chance to show leadership in Greek affairs, but, just as after the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans interpreted the terms to their own liking and alienated many by throwing their weight around in the years between 386 and 379 (see Appendix 2, “Historical Outline,” for more on this). In the autumn of 379, the Theban general, Pelopidas, expelled a Spartan garrison from the Kadmeia in Thebes and began the recreation of the Boiotian League, which eventually led to the eclipse of the seemingly invincible Spartan infantry at the Battle of Leuktra in 371. Meanwhile, Athens had not been inactive. Of the two desiderata for a Greek polis, control of its own way of life at home (autonomia), and the ability to have an independent foreign policy that would secure its freedom to maintain its way of life at home (eleutheria), Athens had achieved the first by 401, but not the second. In the first two decades of the fourth century, the Athenians cannot be said to have had a coherent foreign policy, except perhaps the determination to be able to have one, and the mistaken

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belief that that could involve the recovery of their fifth-century empire. Luck, and the imperialistic policies of the Spartans, gave them an opportunity, and they grasped it. But they overstepped the mark. Fortunately, after the peace of 386, wiser policies evolved. The old hawks, like Thrasyboulos and Konon, were gone, and a new pragmatism emerged. Sensible minds recognized that the fourth century was not going to be a replay of the fifth. Athens had a fraction of the wealth and less than half the manpower she had had in the fifth century. Sparta was still the dominant power both by land and sea, and the Persian Empire was proving influential in Greek affairs. There were then, and likely to be in the future, more players in the field than before. A complex situation called for a complex response.

From the King’s Peace (387/6) to Khaironeia (338) Fifty years later (in 330) in his speech On the Crown (#301–2) Demosthenes gave a broad outline of the main strategic considerations that were observed by the Athenian state as vital to its national security: What was the right course for the patriotic citizen, for the man of forethought, activity and right intent in political affairs on his country’s behalf? Was it not to use Euboia as a defence for Attika on the seaward side, Boiotia on the mainland, and on the side of the Peloponnese her neighbours there? Was it not to take steps for the maintenance of the grain route along friendly coasts to the Peiraieus? To preserve some existing assets by the dispatch of expeditions to aid them, and proposing and moving resolutions accordingly—Prokonnesos, for instance, the Khersonese and Tenedos—and to maintain the friendly alliance of others— Byzantion, Abydos and Euboia? To deprive our enemy of his main sources of power and to fill the gaps in our own country’s? Whilst Demosthenes was specifically thinking of the strategic considerations Athens faced in the 340s and of his own performance as adviser to his fellow citizens during their conflict with Philip II of Macedon, nevertheless this excerpt does provide insight into the complexity of Athenian foreign policy and shows that it was no less sophisticated than that practiced by any modern state. In fact, as I have argued in the article on Athenian foreign policy listed in the Suggested Reading for this chapter, in the decades from 386 to 338, it was closely analogous to the policy of containment practiced by the United States during the Cold War. The remainder of this chapter is a gloss on the above quotation from Demosthenes; I shall treat the different theatres of operations topic by topic. Those who want to see the details presented in a chronological manner can consult the Historical Outline in Appendix 2.

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Relations with the Persian Empire The first lesson the Athenians had learned was not to cross the Great King of Persia. In 384/3 they made their first tentative move towards regaining their former system of relationships in the Aegean by contracting an alliance with the important island of Khios (IG II2 34; TDGR2, No. 31). In this document there is insistence on the recognition and observance of the terms of the King’s Peace: The Khians shall be treated as allies on terms of freedom (eleutheria) and autonomy (autonomia), provided that they do not transgress (any of) the (terms) on the stelai, (terms) that have been inscribed concerning the peace (i.e., the King’s Peace), in any way, and provided that, if anyone else transgresses (them), to the best of (their) ability they refuse to obey. (lines 19–24) The terms of this alliance between Athens and Khios became a model for subsequent agreements with other states, especially the famous decree of Aristoteles (IG II2 43; TDGR2, No.35), which was the foundation document for a new league that Athens created in the Aegean in 378/7 (the Second Athenian League or Confederacy). The clause inviting states to join reads as follows: If anyone wishes, of the Hellenes, or of the barbarians who are living on the mainland (i.e., of Europe), or of the islanders, as many as are not subject to the King, to be an ally of the Athenians and of their allies, it shall be permitted to him (to do so), remaining free and autonomous, living under whatever constitution he wants, neither receiving a garrison nor having a governor imposed upon him nor paying tribute, but (he shall become an ally) on the same terms (as those) on which (the) Khians and (the) Thebans and the other allies (did). (lines 15–26, emphasis added) This policy of avoiding conflict with Persia whenever possible was adhered to, with certain exceptions, throughout the whole period down to the eclipse of the Persian empire by Alexander the Great. Indeed, three of Athens’ best fourth-century generals, Khabrias, Iphikrates and Timotheos, fought at different times in the service of the King of Persia. The King, however, was not always so consistent and at times needed to be “contained.” One such occasion was in the 360s, during the time of the brief period when Thebes dominated affairs in Greece, from the Battle of Leuktra in 371 to the Battle of Mantineia in 362. At that time, the King

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chose to become a friend of Thebes, and Athens found itself under pressure in the Aegean. An indication of this was the presence of a Persian garrison and commander, Kyprothemis, on the island of Samos. Samos had not joined Athens’ new league. On the other hand, it was not one of the islands claimed by the Great King in the King’s Peace, so the presence of Persian forces there was at least provocative. In response to the change in attitude by the King, in 366/5 the Athenians sent out Timotheos, the son of Konon, with a naval force, ostensibly to provide support to a group of Asia Minor satraps (provincial governors in the Persian Empire), who were in revolt from the King (the so-called Satraps’ Revolt). Instead, Timotheos attacked the Persian force on Samos and took the island for Athens. Over the next several years the Athenians sent out contingents of Athenian settlers (kleroukhs) to Samos (TDGR2, No.77) and drove the opposition into exile. Some of these settlers may well have been from amongst the democratic Samians who had come to Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War and been given citizenship as a reward for their loyalty. As a result, Samos became an Athenian island, no less than Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, and the Macedonian decision to restore the exiled oligarchic Samians in 323/2 was one of the main reasons why Athens went to war at that time. Whilst many see the Athenian action on Samos in the 360s and 350s as aggressive, I prefer to view it as a strategic response to a threat to the Athenian alliance in the Aegean. The strategic importance of Samos to Athens was soon to become vital. Not long after the event described above there was another more serious threat, once again prompted by Persia. Mausolos of Karia was a vassel Persian dynast based at Halikarnassos. In the 350s, he was expanding his (and indirectly, Persia’s) influence offshore with his substantial fleet. Some of the nearby members of the Second Athenian League—notably Rhodes, Kos and Khios—decided that their future lay with this power on their doorstep, rather than with faraway Athens. They were joined by Byzantion, a Doric settlement at the mouth of the Bosporos that had been persuaded to defect from the league already in the 360s by the Theban leader Epameinondas, and had come to the realization that the tax charged by Athens on traffic through this crucial transit belonged to it, not to Athens. With the assistance of Mausolos, these states fought against Athens, and the Athenians made the mistake of trying to prevent them from withdrawing from the league. The ensuing short war (357–355) is now called the Social War, meaning ‘war against the allies.’ It was during this time that the Athenians sent a garrison to Andros and a governor to Amorgos as protection. As a result, the Cyclades remained loyal to Athens. In 355 Athens lost a naval engagement against the rebels at Embata and was financially and militarily strained. She was also fighting on more than one front, parrying the activities of Philip of Macedon in Euboia and Khalkidike. The conclusion of the Social War came, however, as a result of intervention by the Great King of Persia. The circumstances require explanation.

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Sometime in the 350s, following his victory against rebel satraps in the so-called Satraps’ Revolt, the Great King ordered his satraps (provincial governors) in Asia Minor to disband their armies of mercenary soldiers. This precipitated the situation in which an Athenian general, Khares, transgressed the rule of non-intervention by Athens in Asia. Some of these disbanded mercenaries joined the Athenian forces commanded by Khares, but found he could not pay them. Athenian generals were often short of funds to pay their troops, citizen or mercenary, and frequently found themselves pressured to find the money by themselves. That is not surprising. Fourth-century Athens was not the wealthy superpower that it had been in the fifth. So when Artabazos, a satrap still in revolt from the King, offered to pay Khares’ troops if he brought them back into Asia Minor on his side, the troops pressured Khares to do so, and he yielded. The result was a battle against the King’s forces in which Khares was victorious. He was rather proud of his victory and boastfully called it a second Marathon, but when the King threatened to send a huge fleet against Athens and assist the rebel states, the Demos commanded Khares to withdraw from the King’s territory (TDGR2, No.72). He immediately did as he was told, but the Athenians, fearing the King’s threat, promptly agreed to the de facto withdrawal of the rebels from the league and the Social War was over. The loss of the important naval contingents of Rhodes and Khios, which resulted from their leaving the Athenian League, seriously depleted Athens’ capability along the coast of Ionia. This surely explains the value the city placed upon possession of Samos, which from this point on was her naval base in the region. On the other hand, Artaxerxes did not send his fleet into the Aegean; instead, he used it against Egypt. Indeed, relations between Athens and Persia improved somewhat after this, and the Athenian Demos continued to try not to offend the King by interfering in Asia. In sum, from 386 onward the Athenians maintained an overall policy of trying to avoid conflict with Persia, except for those occasions when Persian actions required a response. Even when they were compelled to provide naval support for Alexander’s invasion in 334, the Athenians did so in such a way that Alexander distrusted them and sent them home after the first campaigning season. But, avoiding aggression against Persia was only part of the essentially defensive foreign policy Athens implemented in the fourth century in an attempt to protect its national strategic interests. Fundamental to their national interest was protection of the food supply.

The Grain Route If the need for oil was one of the main drivers of U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century, and remains so today, the equivalent compulsion for fourth-century Athens was its access to a reliable supply of grain to feed its people. Ever since the time of Solon, at the beginning of the sixth century, Athens had been a net importer of grain. By the fourth century there were

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boards of officials, particularly the so-called grain-guards (sitophylakes), in charge of the grain-exchange, who amongst other things were charged with seeing that two-thirds of the grain that reached the Periaieus was marketed at Athens (Ath. Pol. 51.4). The issue of the food supply was top of the agenda, on a par with defence of Attika for every kyria ekklesia in each of ten meetings during the administrative year (Ath. Pol. 43.4). The care given to the administration of the grain-supply will be treated separately in an excursus to this chapter; here we are concerned with the sources of the supply. There were four main sources for the export of grain in the fifth and fourth centuries—Sicily, Egypt, Kyrene in North Africa and the Black Sea region, especially the Crimea. Of these, Athens was largely excluded from Egypt at the times when it was under Persian control; Sicilian exports were hardly more available, since the dominant city-state, Syracuse, was a loyal Corinthian foundation and consequently aligned with the Peloponnese; Kyrene and the Black Sea area remained. Not surprisingly, Athens had paid great attention to these two regions. In the case of the Black Sea especially, the city first took steps to control the Dardanelles during the reign of the tyrant Peisistratos and his sons (546–510), and subsequently appropriated the key islands along the route: Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros. A clear indication of the importance of the supply line from the Black Sea, through the Hellespont (Dardanelles), across the Aegean past these islands, round the bottom of Euboia to the Peiraeus, can be seen in the speed with which Athens was brought to its knees in 405, when Lysander was able to cut this route off, and the similar success of Antalkidas in 387/6. Equally telling is Athens’ insistence on regaining control of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros after losing them to Lysander. Athenian ownership of these islands was recognized by the terms of the Great King’s Peace of 387/6. Within a little over ten years, the Athenian settlers on these islands were supplying the city with a considerable amount of grain in the form of a tax (Grain Tax Law of 374/3), while by the middle of the century, Demosthenes could claim that half of Athens’ grain imports (four hundred thousand bushels) came to the Peiraieus from the Black Sea region (Dem. 20.31–2). There is no doubt about the importance of Black Sea grain to Athens’ national security. In the early 370s, the Athenians made moves to secure and protect this supply route. The first need was to turn the Aegean into a safe and friendly sea through which to export their products and import their grain. To achieve this, they issued the invitation, mentioned above, to states in and around the Aegean to join in a new confederacy, the so-called Second Athenian League.

The Second Athenian League: Confederation, Not Empire The announced purpose of the Second Athenian League was to ensure that the Spartans “allow the Hellenes to live in peace”(IG II2 43, 9–11; TDGR2,

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No. 35, 9–11), but the largely Aegean composition of its membership suggests a more specifically economic motivation for Athens. The Athenians proclaimed that this new league would not be a repeat of the fifth-century empire in as much as it guaranteed that allies would be free and autonomous, would not pay tribute, nor have a governor or garrison imposed upon them. They also promised that For those who have made alliance with (the) Athenians and their allies, the People shall give up the properties, however many there are found to be, either privately or publicly held by Athenians in the land [of those who] make the alliance. . . . (IG II2 43, 25–31; TDGR2, No. 35, 25–31) On these conditions, about sixty states joined. Had the Athenians transgressed these terms, they would be open to the charge of renewed imperialism. However, despite many modern assertions to the contrary, the Athenians stuck to their commitment with amazing consistency. The allies never became subjects. Whilst the allies did make contributions (syntaxeis) to enable the alliance to protect its members, there is no evidence that these were ever under the control of Athens—that is, they never became tribute. They were administered by a council (synhedrion) of the allies, which met separately from the Athenian Assembly and passed its own resolutions, which were sent on to the Assembly for consideration during its deliberations on any issue that concerned the alliance. This synhedrion was still meeting and making recommendations to the Athenian Assembly in the last years of the existence of the League, before it was disbanded on orders of Philip of Macedon after his victory at Khaironeia in 338. Nor is there any sign that the Athenians infringed upon the autonomy of any of the allied states. True, they did set up some garrisons in allied cities and did dispatch governors during the Social War, but the evidence supports the view that these actions were taken with the knowledge and approval of the allied synhedrion (see e.g. IG II2 123; TDGR2, No. 69) and were probably invited as part of a system of defence. In other words, they were not ‘imposed.’ In fact, an inscription from this time (TDGR2, No. 68), honouring the local historian Androtion for his governorship of the island of Amorgos, praises him as a benefactor. The final promise concerned expropriation of allied territory, either by individuals or the State. This was one of the most hated aspects of the fifthcentury empire. At that time, wealthy Athenians had been in the habit of taking possession of allied land for their own use, and the State had practiced the institutional form of expropriation known as the kleroukhy. These were tracts of allied territory that were settled by Athenian farmers, either as punishment for the locals, or in lieu of tribute. The settlers, called kleroukhs (allotment holders) remained Athenian citizens and served as a sort of

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garrison imposed upon unwilling allies. The Athenians had promised not to allow either practice in the fourth-century league, and the evidence shows that they honoured this commitment. Though they did send out kleroukhs to some sensitive spots, like Poteidaia, the Khersonese and Samos in times of trouble to counter aggression, none of these was a transgression of the charter document, since none of these places was a member of the league. No kleroukhies were set up on allied territory. Athenian actions were not aggressive, but defensive moves designed to counter the attacks of others just as recommended by Demosthenes (as discussed earlier, p.30), “to preserve some existing assets . . . and to deprive our enemy of his main sources of power and to fill the gaps in our own country’s.” Of course, a system of overseas alliances, such as the Second League, presupposed control of the sea. Athens did not enjoy that luxury in 378/7. Sparta was still the dominant naval power, and in 376 was attempting to use its fleet near Aigina and Andros to interrupt the supply of grain into the Peiraieus. Athens responded by sending out a fleet under the leadership of Khabrias, which not only defeated the Spartans in a battle off the island of Naxos, but reestablished Athenian mastery of the sea for the next fifty years, until 322. That Athens could do so should probably be connected to the refurbishing of the machinery for financing and maintaining her navy that is discussed in Chapter Four. Whilst this enabled the Athenians to send out large fleets in emergencies (the largest was the 170 ships that fought at Amorgos in 322), the usual function for the navy was to protect the convoys of grain ships, and for that purpose squadrons of twenty or thirty was sufficient.

Attika and the Mainland But it was not only overseas that Athens needed to be on guard. There was plenty of competition in Greece. To deal with these threats Athens developed an elaborate defensive system in its own territory, and used sophisticated diplomacy beyond its borders. In Attika, the Athenians had rebuilt the city-walls, as we have seen, already by 394/3. Later they re-fortified the Peiraieus, finally closing it off with a gate in 378/7. Further afield, they refined the system of forts they had developed in the fifth century, both on the northern border against the Boiotians, especially after Leuktra, and deeper into Attika, along the coast at places like Rhamnous, to guard against raids from the sea, either by pirates or enemy ships (see Chapter Four). Beyond the borders of Attika, to deal with the other Greek city-states, the Athenians adopted a cleverly calculating balance-of-power policy, forming an alliance with Corinth, Argos and Thebes to counteract the power of Sparta during the first two decades of the fourth century, then in the 370s (the period of the so-called Boiotian War) carefully distancing themselves from Thebes, as that state grew in power. Indeed, after the Theban

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assault on Athens’ longtime ally, Plataia, in 373 the relationship cooled considerably, until the Theban victory over the Spartans at Leuktra prompted the Athenians to completely reassess their system of alliances. As a result, Athens realigned itself with Sparta (Diod. 15.63.2; Xen. Hell. 7.1.1–15), and thereby gained the additional (if questionable) association with a loyal friend of Sparta, the Syracusan tyrant, Dionysios. Nevertheless, the Athenians felt free to have diplomatic relations with Sparta’s enemies in the Peloponnese when doing so countered the influence of Thebes in that area. An example of this is their alliance with the Arkadian League in the mid-360s (Xen. Hell. 7.4.2). And, whilst Athenian troops fought at Mantineia in 362 on the side of the Spartans, after that battle, when the death of Epameinondas took the steam out of Theban expansion, Athens moved into the vacuum by joining in alliance with states that were traditionally hostile to Sparta—Arkadia, Akhaia, Elis and Phlious (IG II2 112; TDGR2, No. 56). Again, much later in 331, when Agis III of Sparta, still technically an ally of Athens, tried to capture Megalopolis as a first step, supposedly, in a war against Macedon, the Athenians wisely declined to take part. It was not in their interest to waste scarce resources of men and money on what was most likely a Spartan attempt to regain control of the Peloponnese. The Athenians followed a similarly pragmatic policy in central and northern Greece. They used complex diplomatic means to counter the activities of Thebes in the 360s, backing Alexander, tyrant of Pherai in Thessaly, against Pelopidas (Diod. 15.71.3; Dem. 23.120; Plutarch, Pelopidas 31.6), but later, after Pelopidas was dead and Alexander proved perfidious, turning to his opponents, the Thessalian League, for support against him (IG II2 116; TDGR2, No. 59). This strategy fits well into the overall defensive policy recommended by Demosthenes. It was, to be sure, not always successful, as for example when Athens’ alliance with Phokis led it into the Sacred War (356–346), where she was outwitted and eventually outmanoeuvred by Philip of Macedon into signing the Peace of Philokrates (see the following section).

Philip of Macedon When Philip II came to the throne of Macedon in 360, Athens was ostensibly on top of the Greek world. Sparta had been eclipsed at sea by the Athenian navy in 376, and on land by the two Theban victories at Leuktra (371) and Mantineia (362). With the death of its two great leaders, Pelopidas and Epameinondas, Thebes lost its spark, though its army remained a force to be contended with. Athens, with its system of alliances on the mainland, its strong navy and its overseas league intact, was finally the dominant citystate in Greece. But, following his accession, Philip unleashed a whirlwind of troubles for the city in the next two decades and proved hard to contain. He did not, of course, lack for help from the contentious Greek city-states, especially Thebes, whose ally he was.

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During their heyday in the 360s, the Thebans had done their best to undermine Athenian influence in several areas. One, already mentioned, had been in the Bosporos, where Epameinondas had persuaded the Byzantines in 364 to drop out of the Second Confederacy. This had repercussions later when Byzantion joined Rhodes, Kos and Khios in the Social War (357–355). This was only one of the problems Athens had to deal with in the 350s. Another, closer to home, was Euboia. Euboia was an island of the utmost strategic importance to Athens, because it stretched almost the full length of the east coast of Attika. Euboia had often been a safe area for Athenian interests. During the first part of the Peloponnesian War, for example, the Athenians had been able to store their livestock on Euboia whenever the Spartans invaded. When the Second League was formed in 378/7, major Euboian cities, like Eretria, Khalkis and Karystos were amongst the first to join. But Euboia also stretched up the coast of Boiotia and into central Greece. It was, therefore, also a sphere of interest to the Thebans. During the 360s, the Euboian cities seem to have switched sides, since they were part of the first Theban force that invaded the Peloponnese in 369 and fought in 362 with the Thebans against the Spartan–Athenian alliance at Mantineia. As was the case with other defections from the league before the Social War, the Athenians restrained their response, though they can hardly have been pleased. But when in 358/7 the Thebans sent a military force onto Euboia, the Athenians responded promptly and effectively. A naval and infantry expedition was organized within a matter of days, and the Thebans were defeated and forced to retire within a month. Securing Euboia “as a defence for Attika on the seaward side” was one of the key recommendations made by Demosthenes. This quick victory, however, was soon eclipsed by several disasters. The Social War broke out in 357 and sapped Athens’ energy for the next three years. Meanwhile, Philip was active in Thrace and Thessaly. His first move in 357 was to capture Amphipolis, a city in Thrace that had been founded in 437 by Athens on the river Strymon, to control the timber trade from the north and the rich gold mining area of Mount Pangaion. Amphipolis had famously been turned away from Athens by Brasidas, the Spartan, in 424 and had since then resisted all Athenian attempts, whether military or diplomatic, to regain control. Nevertheless, as an independent city Amphipolis had obviously been happy to serve as an outlet for the export of the timber that was so important for the Athenian navy. When Philip moved his forces into the city, the situation changed. Now, access to this crucial material was under his control. As a result the Athenians declared war against Philip. This was probably an unfortunate decision, because the declared state of hostility allowed Philip to move against other Athenian interests in the area at a time when they were too tied up to respond effectively. In short order, Philip captured Pydna, a city in Macedonia, in 356, Poteidaia, in Khalkidike, in the same year and, finally, Methone in 354, all states that had been brought

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under Athenian control by Timotheos, son of Konon, in the 360s. Distracted by the Social War, the Athenians were unable to counter Philip militarily, and their attempt to contain him diplomatically, by making an alliance with a coalition of kings on his borders—Grabos of Illyria, Lyppeios of Paionia, and Ketriporis and his brothers in Thrace (IG II2 127; TDGR2, No. 64)— fizzled. Philip dealt with these kings in short order. However, the loss of Pydna, Poteidaia and Methone was not a matter of the greatest significance to Athens, since they had only been gained in the previous decade and were not crucial to Athens’ strategic design. More significant were events in central Greece.

The Third Sacred War It often happens in world affairs that minor disagreements drag major players into conflict through systems of alliance that seemed advantageous, but whose consequences were not foreseen. Such was the case in 356 when Phokis and Lokris started a dispute over control of the Delphic Oracle. The result was a Sacred War. In a polytheistic world, religious conflicts were not fought over dogma or belief, but over the far more practical matter of control of the dedications and other lucrative business that was carried on at sanctuaries. Phokis was allied to Sparta. Athens was also in alliance with Sparta. Since the fundamental clause of a Greek alliance was to ‘have the same friends and the same enemies,’ Athens was, by extension, an ally of Phokis. The ally of Lokris was Thebes, whose ally, in turn, was Philip of Macedon. The situation was full of potential for trouble, from which Athens, notwithstanding its treaty obligations, could have remained aloof, had it not been for its extreme hatred of Thebes at this time. This cannot be used to charge the Athenian demos with irrationality any more than, for example, the United States of America for numerous questionable actions it took during the cold war out of its fear and dislike of Communism. The immediate cause of the ensuing conflict was as apparently inconsequential as the cause of any other war. There was some territory close to the sanctuary that was dedicated to Apollo and was to be left untilled. Some members of the body that administered the sanctuary, the Amphiktyonic Council, accused the Phokians of transgressing that taboo, and imposed a large fine upon them. The Phokians responded with force by seizing the sanctuary. The Lokrians, who had frequently been at odds with the Phokians over Delphi, marched out to drive the Phokians from the site, but were badly beaten in battle. Allies were summoned by both sides and a minor squabble became a major conflict. It is unnecessary here to detail the course of the war. What is important is that no one could have foreseen the sacrilegious behaviour of the Phokians, who melted down the historic dedications at the sanctuary in order to hire a large mercenary army, with which they successfully defended their occupation until their final capitulation to Philip of Macedon in 346. This sacrilege

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earned the condemnation of all Greeks and tarred the allies of Phokis with similar opprobrium. Athens’ relationship with the Phokians not only cost the Athenians their moral standing in the eyes of many Greeks, it also brought them into real conflict with Philip of Macedon. The Phokian mercenaries under their leader, Onomarkhos, carried the war northward into Thessaly, an area into which Philip was in the process of expanding his kingdom. His specific aim at this time was to gain control of Pagasai (modern Volos) as an outlet for his exports. Three battles ensued. The first two were won by the Phokians, but in the last and conclusive engagement in 352, the so-called Battle of the Crocus Field, Philip’s new-style infantry with their long pikes (sarissas) was victorious, killing Onomarkhos and driving many of his soldiers into the sea, where they were rescued by an Athenian fleet, lying offshore. To everyone’s surprise, Philip followed up this victory by advancing on Thermopylai, the key passage into southern Greece. Only prompt Athenian action prevented him from getting through. Flanked by the navy, an Athenian citizen army marched to the pass and faced Philip’s forces. At this time he cautiously withdrew, content to wait for an easier opportunity. Philip was a master strategist. He immediately switched his attention to another sensitive area for Athens, namely the Khersonese (modern Gallipoli peninsula). In 353, the Athenians had captured Sestos and sent out settlers (kleroukhs) to this area in order to counter Philip’s expansion in this region and to secure the European coast of the Sea of Marmara (then the Propontis) for their grain ships. By the late autumn of 352, Philip was preparing to besiege an Athenian shipping station at Heraion Teikhos, near Perinthos. The Athenians responded vigorously and voted to send out a fleet of forty triremes, but did not have to, because Philip fell sick and retired back to Macedon. For the next while Philip contented himself with securing control of Thessaly and Thrace, but in 350/49 he turned his attention towards a state that had formerly been an ally of Athens, but was now technically his ally: Olynthos.

Olynthos The story of Olynthos gives an insight into the problems Athens faced with its allies in the fourth century, and the sensible response of the Demos to these problems. Olynthos was the major power on the three-pronged peninsula called Khalkidike. In the early fourth century it had managed to create a powerful confederacy, but this had been opposed and eventually disbanded by Sparta after the Great King’s Peace. The Spartans cynically used the same claim that they had used against the Boiotian League, namely, that any league (except, of course, their own) transgressed the provision of the King’s Peace that guaranteed the autonomy of all states. Not surprisingly, when the Athenians advertised their new league in 378/7 with a mission to oppose the Spartans, the Olynthians joined with alacrity. After the Theban victory

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at Leuktra in 371, however, when the supremacy of Sparta was broken, the Olynthians hoped to reestablish their old league in Khalkidike, and dropped out of their alliance with Athens. Later, when Philip became a power in their region, they made an alliance with him, sensing there was profit to be made managing his trade. Then, after Philip gained control of Pagasai as his own export facility, and after his power had become stronger than they had envisioned, the Olynthians began to be afraid of his intentions, and in 349 came to Athens seeking a renewal of the old alliance of 378/7. The Athenians, who had for the most part (the Social War was a mistaken exception) adopted a policy of patient tolerance of defection from the league, especially after Leuktra, and willing acceptance of those who wanted to return, recognized that here also it was to their own advantage to forget the past and send help to the beleaguered city. The help they sent is often criticized as being too little, too late, but it was, actually, quite extensive, and demonstrated the economical employment of resources typical of Athens’ limited capability in this century. We are fortunate in having a detailed account of the nature and timing of the assistance Athens sent to Olynthos from the Atthidographer Philokhoros (Fragments 49–51; TDGR2, No. 80). By comparing this information with what we know about the progress of Philip’s campaigning against Olynthos and its league, we can see how rationally the Athenian Demos responded. In the early stages of the campaign the nature of warfare was fast moving, as Philip roved around the Khalkidic peninsula attacking the allies of Olynthos. The need at this stage was for a fast response force, which could best be provided by light-armed professional troops. On the first request from Olynthos, Athens despatched 30 triremes and 2,000 mobile lightarmed mercenaries (peltasts) under the command of one of its best generals, Khares. Shortly after, following another request from Olynthos, they sent out another general, Kharidemos, with 18 triremes, 150 cavalry and 4,000 more mercenary troops. These were the right troops for this type of conflict, even though they cost the Athenians heavily, since they were mainly mercenary. The force was largely successful in countering Philip’s activities in the field. Not surprisingly, Philip then changed his tactics. He moved on the city of Olynthos itself, and was fortunate in having the port, Mekyberna, betrayed to him. From this point on the city of Olynthos was under siege. Now the campaign took on a very different complexion. What was needed at this point was more cavalry and a force of citizen hoplites. The Athenians sent both: 2,000 citizen infantrymen and 300 more cavalry in an additional 17 triremes. Thus, in total, they committed 2,000 infantry, 4,000–6,000 light-armed peltasts, 450 cavalry and 65 triremes and their crews to help a rather unreliable ally. This was a very large force; far larger, in fact, than the force they had sent with Kleon in 424, at the height of their power, to recover Amphipolis from the Spartans. But fortune was not with them. The Etesian winds, or Meltemi, that blow from the north over the Aegean from May to September, held them up, and by the time the new

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force arrived, the city of Olynthos had been betrayed to Philip. The city was razed to the ground, and refugees from its destruction poured across the face of Greece. Many were given refuge in Athens and the Athenian town of Myrina on Lemnos.

The Peace of Philokrates Unfortunately for the Athenians, their citizen hoplites fell into Philip’s hands. This gave him a trump card in negotiations that followed. The Athenians sent an embassy, led by Philokrates, to Pella to negotiate a cessation of hostilities and the release of their hoplites. Philip replied that he was willing to make peace, provided the Athenians agreed also to become his allies. This, of course, meant that they would have the same friends and enemies. The Demos really had no choice but to concede. The resultant agreement, called the Peace of Philokrates, tied Athens’ hands, and allowed Philip to secure the pass at Thermopylai that they had prevented him from entering in 352. Philip was thus able to enter central Greece and bring an end to the Third Sacred War. He was acclaimed as the champion of Apollo and saviour of Delphi. This was a low point for Athenian foreign policy, but it cannot be attributed either to incompetence or lack of energy. The Demos had acted with rationality and speed within the limits of its resources. There is no reason to believe that the forces that the Athenians had committed to the defence of Olynthos were inadequate for the task. Fortune and treachery brought about their failure. Philip, on the other hand, was on top of the world. He had now achieved mastery of Greek affairs without having to fight a major battle. He was king of a united Macedon, conqueror of Thrace, arkhon of Thessaly, master of central Greece through his position on the Delphic Amphiktyony, and ally of Athens and her league. He was still allied to Thebes, and through her to states in the Peloponnese opposed to Sparta, which remained the only state that was beyond his grasp. Things looked rosy for him and dismal for Athens. However, the situation soon changed. Philip learned what others knew full well, that one could not be a friend with all Greek states at the same time. The long-established hostilities between neighbours soon resurged, and he found himself involved in squabbles amongst allies.

The Way to Khaironeia Meanwhile, the Athenians, after a period of soul-searching, regained their composure and focus. Between 343 and 340 they reasserted their status as defender of Greek interests against Macedon. Whilst Philip was aggressing, Athens was resisting, not only militarily (in Euboia, Ambrakia and in the Thracian Khersonese), but more successfully, diplomatically. The Demos dispatched an embassy, led by Demosthenes, into the Peloponnese to arouse resistance to Philip, whose policy of supporting narrow elites in many states

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was causing resentment. Furthermore, in the Thracian Khersonese, Philip’s aggression alarmed two states, which were formally in alliance with him— Perinthos and Byzantion. When Perinthos closed its gates to him, Philip put it under siege. When Byzantion sent help to Perinthos, he besieged it also. Both states requested alliance with Athens. This was a golden opportunity for Athens to regain the initiative. Following a pragmatically expedient policy of forgiving past acts of hostility— which she had employed in the case of Olynthos, several states in Euboia and even Rhodes—Athens agreed to the request of both Perinthos and Byzantion for alliance. Philip responded with a surprise attack upon a huge convoy of 230 grain ships in the Hellespont in the autumn of 340. This was a crucial shipment of food from the Crimea, destined for the Peiraieus and the market in Athens. His capture of this convoy precipitated a more vigorous response. Athens declared war, and sent a fleet under Phokion and Kephisophon to oppose Philip and to give assistance to Byzantion. Byzantion was relieved and Philip was forced to raise his siege. Frustrated, he invaded the territory of Athelas, a king in Scythia, where he acquired much booty, most of which he lost on his way home to an attack by the Triballi. He was also wounded, and retired to spend the winter in Macedon. The tables had been turned. Fortune was once again on the side of Athens, which was now leader of a league of states for the defence of Greece against Philip. Even Thebes, still a powerful infantry force, was cooling to Philip, its longtime friend and ally, because in 346 he had handed over the key fort at Nikaia in the pass of Thermopylai to Thebes’ enemies, the Thessalians. Subsequently, a Macedonian garrison had been slipped into this fort. In the spring of 339 the Thebans pre-emptively attacked Nikaia and expelled the Macedonian garrison, thus robbing Philip of easy access to southern Greece. Everything that Philip had gained so easily in 346 had now been lost, except his pre-eminent position in the Amphiktyonic Council at Delphi. It was this position that provided him an opportunity in 339 to recoup his losses. Another seemingly insignificant event that was to have significant effects ensued. Like most minor incidents, the details are complicated, especially since the two main accounts come from Athenian orators, Demosthenes and Aiskhines, arguing against each other in court. It appears that in a meeting of the Amphiktyonic Council in the spring of 339, the delegate from Amphissa, a Lokrian community friendly to Thebes, made a speech attacking Athens, and put the Athenian delegation on the defensive. The Athenian representative at the meeting was Aiskhines. He tried to deflect attention onto the Amphissans, by accusing them of farming sacred territory nearby. His rhetoric was persuasive and aroused the anger of the members of the Council. To cut a long story short (see details in Appendix 2) a Sacred War was proclaimed against Amphissa, and Philip was called upon to be its leader (hegemon). Inadvertently, Aiskhines had given Philip the opportunity to enter Greece as champion of Delphi.

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In the autumn of 339, Philip marched towards Delphi along a route that took him via Kytinion in Doris. From there, he was expected to continue on to Amphissa, but, to everyone’s surprise, he made a sharp left turn and reached Elateia in Phokis. In this way, he had bypassed Thermopylai, and was on the road to southern Greece. According to Demosthenes (Dem. 18, 169f.), panic ensued in Athens. His dramatic narrative is tendentiously designed to show that he, alone, was calm and had sensible advice to offer. Rather, his description reveals a rapid, but orderly response to an emergency by all organs of the state—the prytaneis, the Boule and the Assembly. The reaction of the Thebans was crucial. Would they side with Philip, or could they be persuaded to stand up for Greece. Sensing the growing resentment towards Philip in Thebes, the Demos decided to forget all the harm Thebes had done to Athenian interests since the mid-370s and sent a delegation, led by Demosthenes, to approach the Thebans for an alliance. Philip’s ambassadors were present also, arguing the other side, but Demosthenes was successful, and persuaded the Thebans to enter into alliance with Athens against Philip. The campaigning season was now over. Next year there was much manoeuvring and counter-manoeuvring, but eventually, by September 338, the opposing forces had taken up positions at Khaironeia in Boiotia. Both sides were evenly matched in numbers (in fact, the allies may have had the advantage in infantry) and in the skill, experience and courage of the soldiers. So, the outcome was not a forgone conclusion. Our main narrative (Diod. 16.85f.) is late and brief. Diodoros gives a stereotypical account. “The battle was hotly contested for a long time and many fell on both sides” (Diod. 16.86). More useful details can be gleaned from comments in other sources—Plutarch (Alexander, 9), Pausanias (9.40.7–10), Strabo (9.414) and Polyainos (Stragemata, 4.2.2, 4.2.7)—which make it clear that it was superior generalship on Philip’s part, and the brilliant initiative of his son, Alexander, that won the day for the Macedonians.

From the Battle of Khaironeia (338) to the Lamian War (323/2) Until recently the Battle of Khaironeia was treated as the last chapter in the history of the independent Greek states. Now, more realistically, we recognize that one battle does not end a war. Defeat at Khaironeia might well have been disastrous for Philip, whose prestige and standing in his kingdom were on the line. It was certainly not the end of the world for the Athenians, who prepared their defences to withstand a siege. Philip wisely offered lenient terms, realizing that Athens would be a harder nut to crack than either Perinthos or Byzantion, especially since her fleet still dominated the Aegean. While it is true that the Athenians had to sue for peace and yield to his terms, which required the dissolution of their naval confederacy, their

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territory was not invaded, they retained their autonomia, they kept their fleet, and were not subjected to the imposition of a garrison. Their situation was much better than it had been after the Peloponnesian War. Furthermore, the loss of the Second Athenian League may not have been such a bad thing. After all, the most powerful members, like Rhodes, Khios and Byzantion, had long before defected, and the remaining lesser allies may well have been more of a burden than an asset. Indeed, under the careful supervision of a new magistracy (the administrator of the revenue), Athenian finances improved dramatically over the next decade and a half, to such an extent that the city could afford a building programme that rivalled that of the Periklean period. That was not all. Whilst the Athenians performed their obligations as allies of Philip’s Corinthian League perfunctorily and assisted Alexander’s invasion of the Persian Empire, at least in the first year, they used their prosperity to build up their fleet to an unprecedented size, completed the great arsenal of Philon in the Peiraieus (the largest secular building of its time) to house all their naval equipment and redesigned and modernized their fortifications. They also renewed the ephebic system, the training programme for the eighteen to twenty-year old males (epheboi), not only teaching them to handle military equipment, but also indoctrinating them in the “story of Athens” to give them a reason to fight for their country. Quite clearly, the Athenians were preparing to resist any attempt to infringe upon their independence. But they were not looking for trouble. During the last two years of Philip’s reign and the subsequent thirteen years of Alexander’s short but brilliant career, whilst first Thebes in 335 and later Sparta in 331 challenged Macedonian supremacy, Athens was content to keep quiet, so long as things went her way. In sum, this chapter has been at pains to demonstrate the rationality and the consistency of the foreign policy that was followed by the popular Assembly throughout the democratic years, down to Athens’ defeat in the Lamian War of 323/2. Whilst some scholars like to attribute this to the advice of the experts (rhetores), who addressed the Assembly, this cannot be the case. Their influence was actually ephemeral, inconstant (i.e., advisers kept changing) and never uncontested (i.e., for every proposer there was an opposer). It was, rather, the combined experience of the assembled citizens, gained from their participation in the Council (Boule), as officials, in the military, in the law courts and, of course, in the Assembly (ekklesia) itself, that guided the State’s policy in these years. This was an informed and educated electorate, even though they were mostly peasants. They would have understood the advice of the advocate of the post-WW2 policy of containment to the United States, George Kennan, in a speech he delivered in 1949, in which he advised that there were limitations on the energies and materials that any nation could devote to foreign affairs, and that it

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was necessary to be economical with resources and use them where they would be most effective. Demosthenes’ advice was essentially the same. This was simply common sense, a quality the People in general have in abundance.

FEEDING THE PEOPLE It is well known that much of the territory of Attika was unsuited for growing grain. The exceptions were the areas where the landed wealthy had their estates—the central plain behind Hymettos (the mesogaia), and the Thriasian Plain in the north. Consequently, Athens had been importing grain since the days of Solon, at the beginning of the sixth century. Not surprisingly, then, one of the main concerns of Athenian foreign policy in the democratic years was to ensure a supply of grain to feed the people. Indeed, it may not be going too far to say that it was the primary concern. As already mentioned, ten times per year, at the beginning of each Kyria Ekklesia, three topics came up automatically for discussion: whether the magistrates were doing their work properly, the defence of the khora (the territory of Attika), and the food supply. The first two were domestic issues. The last was a matter of foreign policy, because fully half the grain needed to feed the population, as much as four hundred thousand bushels, was imported from overseas. Not only was the food supply one of the three most important topics up for discussion by the Assembly, it was also surrounded by governmental regulation that was a match for anything that might be found in a heavily bureaucratic modern organization. As Aristotle tells us in his Athenian Constitution, written c. 330: There used to be ten Guardians of the Grain (Sitophylakes), selected by lot, five for the Peiraieus, five for the city, but now there are twenty for the city, fifteen for the Peiraieus. The first responsibility for these magistrates is to see to it that the unground grain is sold in the market at a just price; next, that the millers sell the ground meal at a price corresponding to the price of the barley, and also that the sellers of bread sell their loaves in accordance with the price of the wheat and that the loaves have the prescribed weight. (Ath. Pol. 51.3) To help these men enforce the regulations, they were given a judicial competence. For, example, in the law concerning the certifier of Attic silver coinage of 375/4 (TDGR2, No. 45) provision is made for denunciations against anyone who does not accept coins that have been approved. These denunciations are to be made to the appropriate officials; in the case of grain, specifically, before the sitophylakes in either the city market or in the

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Peiraieus. They had the authority to confiscate whatever a guilty party was selling up to a value of ten drachmas. Beyond that, the case was referred to the law courts. There was also another board of ten men, called the overseers of the exchange (epimeletai tou emporiou), with responsibilities regarding the importation of grain. They had general oversight over all trading exchanges, but, in particular, they made sure that two-thirds of all grain that entered Peiraieus by sea was transported up to the city for sale (Ath. Pol. 51.4). They also enforced the law that no Athenian or resident alien of Attika could transport or finance a cargo of grain to any other destination than the Athenian market (Dem. 34.37; 35. 50–51). The law was not the only way that democratic Athens controlled the grain-trade—naval power, diplomacy and settlements abroad were also employed to this end.

Naval Power and the Grain Supply During the fourth century, Athens’ formidable navy rarely fought major battles. The most usual functions for squadrons of the fleet, often as small as twenty or thirty ships in number, was to patrol the seas to keep pirates at bay, and as protection for convoys of grain ships. One example will suffice. In 340/339, an Athenian squadron of 40 triremes was guarding a large convoy of 230 merchant ships, loaded with grain that was destined for the Peiraieus. This probably represented the total year’s import from that region. It had gathered at a place called Hieron, on the Asiatic side of the Sea of Marmara, preparing to transit the Dardanelles, when Philip of Macedon fell upon it in the surprise attack mentioned above, and captured the whole convoy. It was this act that led the Athenians to declare war on Philip.

Diplomacy and the Grain Supply But the navy was not the only weapon in Athens’ arsenal; the Demos was also well versed in the use of diplomacy as a means of cultivating its trading contacts and securing special loading rights for its merchants. The Athenians did this by granting honours that included citizenship (politeia), freedom from taxation (ateleia) and the right to own property in Attika (enktesis) to anyone that had, would, or could be a benefactor to Athens. One might wonder what value these honours carried, especially to individuals who were powerful in their own states. The answer is, considerable. Since the fifth century, Athens had carefully cultivated the idea of itself as the cultural capital of Greekness. Perikles’ famous Funeral Oration (Thouk. 2.34–46), in which he declared that Athens was “an education to Greece,” was for Athenian consumption, but in the fourth century the rhetorician Isokrates, who ran an educational establishment attended by many foreign, as well as domestic, students, had internationalized the concept, not least in his Panegyrikos. This is an extensive eulogy of Athens’ gifts to Greece and

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all humanity, which claims, “It is agreed that our city is the oldest, greatest and most celebrated in the whole world” (Isokrates, Panegyrikos, 23). Before him, playwrights like Euripides, had promoted Athenian myth and culture. The end result was the great Athenian fiction of cultural supremacy, which has served it well, then and now. It captivated Hellenistic monarchs, especially the Ptolemies and the Attalids of Pergamon, Roman emperors, and countless generations of worshippers throughout the centuries. In short, it was a masterpiece of national propaganda. With specific regard to the grain trade, one of the most valuable allies for Athens to court in the fourth century was the Spartokid dynasty that ruled out of Pantikapaion on the Cimmerian Bosporos, now the modern city of Kerch in Crimea. From this region came a considerable part of the city’s imported grain (half, according to Dem. 20.31). The dynasty had been founded by a member of the Thracian royal family of the Odrysians, Spartokos, in 439/8 and continued in almost direct line of succession down to 109 BC, when it was given over to Mithridates of Pontos. The Spartokids controlled the whole of the Kerch peninsula and the land on the opposite shore, on both of which they produced the grain that made them wealthy. The Athenians probably first made contact with them at the time of Perikles’ circumnavigation of the Black Sea in 438/7. Trading relations began with the second ruler, Satyros, during the Peloponnesian War and became even stronger under his successor, Leukon, who ruled for forty years, from 389/8 to 349/8. It is believed that some Athenians developed personal ties with members of the Bosporan elite, maybe through contacts made in the school of Isokrates. At any rate, none other than the orator Demosthenes had family associations there, since his mother, Kleoboule, was a daughter of Gylon, an Athenian resident in the region, who had once been in charge of the Athenian town of Nymphaion. Demosthenes tried to capitalize on this relationship in his first political speech (Dem. 20, delivered in 355/4) against the law of Leptines, which sought to cancel all grants of ateleia (freedom from taxation) to people who had been honoured by the Demos, amongst whom was Leukon. In the speech Demosthenes made a great deal of the benefits Athens received from Leukon and how important it was for Athens to reciprocate. Leukon had granted Athenian merchants the privilege of first rights to load grain, which essentially meant that they went to the head of the queue. Given the amount of grain that went through the Peiraieus, either for Athenian consumption, or for trans-shipment, Leukon was sagely guaranteeing a secure market for his product. Further to this purpose, he also forgave Athenian merchants the excise tax of one-thirtieth of their cargo (Dem., Against Leptines, 31–34), which other merchants had to pay. In return, the Athenians honoured him with their usual slate of honours—citizenship, freedom from taxation, a gold crown—and even a statue. When Leukon died and was succeeded by his sons, Spartokos and Pairisades, these honours were

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renewed and extended, as we know from a decree (IG II2 212; TDGR2, No.82), proposed by an Athenian politician and historian, Androtion. The Athenians praise Spartokos and Pairisades for being virtuous and for promising to see to the export of grain in the same way as their father did. Furthermore, because they accord the Athenians the privileges that Satyros and Leukon gave them, the Athenians will reciprocate by granting the two sons the privileges they gave to their predecessors. Later, in 285/4, the nationalist democracy reaffirmed these honours once again for another Spartokos (IG II2 653), thus demonstrating the continuity of the relationship. Through this sort of cosy diplomacy, the Demos carefully nurtured its trade relations, especially with states that exported grain.

Athenian Settlements Abroad (Kleroukhies) and the Grain Supply But there was one other way the democracy attempted to secure its food supply. This was through its settlements abroad, the kleroukhies. We know from a recently discovered inscription of the Athenian Grain-Tax Law (see Stroud, 1998), that, at least, the settlers on the islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, were taxed one-twelfth of their produce of grain annually, an amount that could have reached almost 30,000 medimni per year (about the equivalent of 1,590,000 litres in the metric system). This inscription was only published in 1998, and there are still numerous elements that are in need of resolution, because it contains so much information that we did not know before. However, it is safe to say that it shows that the Athenian settlers on the three islands, who, like all kleroukhs, were still citizens of Athens, had to pay a hefty tax, equivalent to 8.3 percent of their produce. The procedure envisaged by the Grain Tax Law is not unusual in the Athenian taxation system. Individuals or groups competed for the rights to collect the taxes in a bidding process. The winners were required to pay the State up front and then recoup the amount from the taxpayers, if they could. Any surplus was theirs, but they also had to suffer any loss. In the particular case of the Grain Tax, however, they had to post a bond, because the tax from the islanders would be in kind (i.e., produce), not in cash, and could only be paid after the harvest. Then, the appropriate portion of the produce had to be brought to the Peiraieus and transported to the Athenian Agora in

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the autumn, to be stored in a building called the Aiakeion until the spring, when it would be sold at a price voted by the Assembly, very conveniently at a time when local supplies would be at their lowest. The State took the proceeds of the sale and apportioned them to the War Fund (stratiotika), but the possibility for the assembled citizens to fix the price of grain below the going rate for their own advantage is obvious. This is the only law of its kind and we do not know whether Athens’ other kleroukhies, for example, those in the Gallipoli peninsula and on the island of Samos, were treated similarly. All the above shows the great pains the Demos went to in order to make sure that it could feed the people during the democratic years. After Athens’ defeat in the Lamian War (323/2), however, and the abrogation of the democratic constitution, Athens lost its overseas settlements and was no longer able to maintain long-distance trade contacts for the importation of

Map 2.1

Aegean and the Black Sea

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grain from abroad. This was especially the case in the many years when the Peiraieus was under Macedonian control, and city and port were separated. From 322 on, home-grown grain, especially from the large estates of the landed wealthy, became the main source of food supply, and bringing in the local harvest was a primary aim of the militia. The elaborate taxation system was done away with, and replaced by a dependence upon gifts of grain from both citizens and foreigners. Several individuals are honoured in the third century for their service in this regard, notably the brothers Kallias and Phaidros of Sphettos, and Epikhares. These will be discussed in the Chapter 5, “From Taxation to Benefaction.”

SUGGESTED READING Ancient Works Diodoros of Sicily (1947), Bibliotheke, Books 16–18, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 9, trans. R. M. Geer (Cambridge, MA) Diodoros of Sicily (1963), Bibliotheke, Books 16–18, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8, trans. C. B. Welles (Cambridge, MA) Saunders, A. N. W. (trans.) (1975), Demosthenes and Aeschines (Harmondsworth) Saunders, A. N. W. (trans.) (1970), Greek Political Oratory, trans. A. N. W. Saunders (Harmondsworth) Xenophon (1966), A History of My Times, trans. R. Warner (Harmondsworth)

Modern Works Adcock, F. E. (1957), The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London) Briant, P. (2002), From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire, trans. P. T. Daniels (Winona Lake, IN) Buckler, J. (1980), The Theban Hegemony (Cambridge, MA) Buckler, J. and H. Beck (2008), Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century B.C. (Cambridge and New York) Cargill, J. (1981), The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London) Cargill, J. (1995), Athenian Settlements of the Fourth Century B.C. (Leiden, New York and Koln) Cartledge, P. (1987), Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta (London) Cawkwell, G. (1978), Philip of Macedon (London and Boston) Ellis, J. R. (1976), Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (London) Gaddis, J. L. (1982), Strategies of Containment (Oxford) Garnsey, P. (1988), Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge) Green, P. (1974), Alexander of Macedon, 356–323 B.C. (Harmondsworth) Hamilton, C. D. (1979), Sparta’s Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War (Ithaca and London) Hamilton, C. D. (1991), Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony (Ithaca and London) Hammond, N. G. L. (1994), Philip of Macedon (London) Hammond, N. G. L. and G. T. Griffith (1979), A History of Macedonia, vol.2 (Oxford)

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Harding, P. (1988), ‘Athenian Defensive Strategy in the Fourth Century,’ Phoenix 42: 61–71 Harding, P. (1994), Androtion and the Atthis (Oxford) Harding, P. (1995), ‘Athenian Foreign Policy in the Fourth Century,’ Klio 77: 105–125 Harris, E. M. (1995), Aeschines and Athenian Politics (New York) Hornblower, S. (1983), The Greek World, 479–323 B.C. (London and New York) Kremmydas, C. (2012), Commentary on Demosthenes Against Leptines (Oxford) Lane Fox, R. (1973), Alexander the Great (London) Loraux, N. (1986), The Invention of Athens, trans. A. Sheridan (Cambridge, MA) MacDowell, D. M. (2009), Demosthenes the Orator (Oxford) Markle, M. M. (1976), ‘Support of Athenian Intellectuals for Philip: a Study of Isocrates’ Philippus and Speusippus’ Letter to Philip,’ Journal of Hellenic Studies 96: 80–99 Mitchel, F. W. (1970), Lykourgan Athens (Cincinnati) Moreno, A. (2007), Feeding the Democracy (Oxford) Munn, M. H. (1993), The Defense of Attica: The Dema Wall and the Boiotian War of 378–375 B.C. (Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford) Ober, J. (1985), Fortress Attica (Leiden) Parke, H. W. (1933), Greek Mercenary Soldiers from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus (Oxford) Rhodes, P. J. (2006), A History of the Classical Greek World, 478–323 B.C. (Oxford) Rutishauser, B. (2012), Athens and the Cyclades: Economic Strategies, 540–314 B.C. (Oxford) Ryder, T. T. B. (1965), Koine Eirene: General Peace and Local Independence in Ancient Greece (London, New York and Toronto) Sealey, R. (1993), Demosthenes and His Time (Oxford) Strauss, B. (1986), Athens after the Peloponnesian War: Class, Faction and Policy, 404–386 B.C. (Ithaca and New York) Stroud, R. S. (1998), The Athenian Grain-Tax Law of 374/3 B.C. (Hesperia, Suppl. 29, Princeton) Worthington, I. (ed.) (2000), Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator (London and New York)

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AT HOME AND ABROAD After the Hellenic/Lamian War Athens was always subject to the power of one or another of the Hellenistic monarchs.

In the mid-320s, several things happened to disrupt the peace in Athens. At home, Lykourgos, son of Lykophron, of Boutadai, died sometime in the administrative year 325/4. His fervent patriotism and staunch support for the democratic ideal had been the inspiration for the collaborative politics that had produced the Athenian revival in the period after the Battle of Khaironeia. Once Lykourgos was gone, internal factionalism reared its head again. Overseas, the peace was shattered by the return of Alexander the Great from India. Many had not expected him to come back; not a few had hoped that he would not. Once back in Susa, Alexander began to put his empire in order.

Harpalos and the Exiles Decree Alexander started by purging his administration of people whom he felt had taken advantage of his absence (the purge of the satraps). This had disastrous consequences for Athens, because one of those who feared retribution was Alexander’s treasurer, an old school friend, Harpalos. He had ties to Athens through his Athenian mistress, Glycera (“Sweetie”), and his honorary Athenian citizenship, which he had received in return for a gift of grain a few years before. With thirty ships, six thousand mercenary troops and a huge supply of money (maybe as much as five thousand talents), Harpalos fled to Athens in the spring of 324. He arrived amidst a furor. Alexander had already indicated that he intended to take Samos from Athens and give it back to the Samians, who had been driven out of the island by Athens after Timotheos’ conquest in the 360s. Alexander’s decision was advanced by the lobbying of a man at court, Gorgos of Iasos (TDGR2, No. 127). The Athenians were not prepared to see their kleroukhs expelled from the island, but for the time being hoped to negotiate. Consequently, the arrival of Harpalos, Alexander’s renegade treasurer, was most inconvenient at this

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delicate moment, so he was turned away. Furthermore, admitting a force such as his into the Peiraieus was deemed an unacceptable risk. Harpalos dropped his ships and men off at Cape Tainaron in the Peloponnese, where there was a sort of market place for mercenaries, and returned to Athens with one ship, and an unspecified amount of money. This time he was admitted, but subsequently held under guard. His money, which he claimed was 700 talents, was taken up to the Akropolis on a motion of Demosthenes. There, it was counted and turned out to be only 350 talents (TDGR2, No. 120). Instead of suspecting Harpalos’ honesty, the Athenian politicians immediately began charging each other with accepting bribes. In an effort to control the situation, Demosthenes proposed that the investigation be put in the hands of the respected council of the Areiopagos. The Areiopagos took six months to produce its report. Meanwhile, in late July, Demosthenes was sent on a delegation to the Olympic Games in the hope of negotiating the Samian issue with Alexander’s messenger, Nikanor, who had been sent to Olympia to proclaim another of Alexander’s edicts, the Exiles Decree. This contentious decree, which required the Greek city-states to accept back their exiles, was probably Alexander’s blunt method of demobilizing the thousands of mercenary troops at large in his empire. After all, he was the man who had solved the conundrum of the Gordian knot by cutting it with his sword. At least twenty thousand such men are said to have come up from Tainaron to attend the proclamation in Olympia. The edict meant serious problems for the cities, which would have to accept back men, most of whom had been exiled for political reasons, and whose property had been confiscated long before and sold at auction in accordance with standard practice. Given the intensity of city-state politics, the hostility against the exiles was no doubt fierce. We have two documents that illustrate how difficult the process of reintegrating these men was. One is from the city of Tegea in the Peloponnese (TDGR2, No. 122), the other from Mytilene on Lesbos (TDGR2, No. 113). To strengthen his authority for this interference in the internal affairs of the city-states, which was contrary to the terms of the League of Corinth, Alexander demanded to be recognized as a god whilst still alive. This order was more of a nuisance than a threat, but was hotly debated in many Greek cities, where the apotheosis of heroes was recognized only post-mortem. Eventually, however, his request was granted, even in Athens, because the Athenians were making every effort to persuade the king to change his mind on Samos. But more excitement was created by the fact that somehow Harpalos was allowed to escape. He fled to Crete, where he was assassinated by one of his own soldiers. His life was over, but the trouble he had caused was not finished. After six months, early in 323, the Areiopagos Council came out with an unsubstantiated list of bribe-takers. Heading the list was Demosthenes. Unable to pay his fine of fifty talents, the great orator fled into exile.

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If this humiliation of the most outspoken opponent of Macedonian domination was designed to curry favour with Alexander, it failed, since he continued tacitly to support the restoration of the Samians to their home on Samos. Indeed, some of the Samians took the initiative into their own hands and tried to return. They were captured by the Athenian general on the island and sent to Athens, where they were condemned to death. Unwilling to incur the opprobrium that such an execution of innocent men, women and children would bring, the Athenians happily tolerated the offer of ransom from Antileon of Khalkis, who transported the refugees to his own city in Euboia (TDGR2, No 128). Nevertheless, clearly the tensions created by the Exiles Decree and the question of the Athenian settlement on Samos were growing. Then on June 10, 323 Alexander died at Babylon, supposedly claiming that there would be a great battle over his body. Whether he said this or not, it turned out to be famously prophetic.

The Hellenic or Lamian War, 323/2 The next fifty years, from 323 to 271, saw constant warfare between the successors of Alexander (the Diadokhi) fighting over control of the Empire. For most of that time the Greek cities were merely pawns in the conflict, but at the beginning some of them made a last great effort to shake off the Macedonian yoke. Led by Athens and Aitolia, several Greek states joined in an alliance for the freedom of the Hellenes. Both Athens and Aitolia had reasons to resist the return of their exiles, and Athens, moreover, was driven to war by the decision of Perdikkas, who was now regent of the empire, to honour Alexander’s edict regarding the Samian exiles. The resulting war was known in antiquity as the Hellenic War, but is now usually referred to as the Lamian War, because much of it took place around the city of Lamia in Thessaly. The Athenian orator Hypereides who delivered the funeral oration over those who died in the first year of fighting (323), defined the cause: “If these men had not fought . . . Macedonian arrogance and not the rule of law would be dominant everywhere” (Hypereides, Epitaphios, 20). Macedonian dominance was, of course, the end result, for whilst the war began well for the Greeks, the final outcome was hardly in doubt and only served to demonstrate to what extent Alexander’s conquests and the resources consequently available to his generals had transformed the geopolitical power structure of the ancient world. Even before the death of Alexander, the Athenian Boule had been dealing with an experienced Athenian mercenary commander, Leosthenes, who had connections with the soldiers at Cape Tainaron. After Alexander’s death, Leosthenes was given some of Harpalos’ money, which still resided on the Akropolis, to hire troops to support a showdown with Macedon. Leosthenes found eight thousand men willing to sign up, and with these he persuaded the Aitolians and the Thessalians, whose cavalry was second to none, to join the cause. Combined with the Athenian militia they made

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a respectable force, which defeated the army that Antipater, the governor of Macedon, brought against them. Antipater was compelled to take refuge in the city of Lamia, where he was besieged by the Greek forces. It is from this situation that the modern name for the war has derived. Though the situation looked positive for the Greek forces, things soon changed. Close to the end of the campaigning year 323, Leosthenes was killed in fighting outside the walls of Lamia. The loss of his leadership was a serious blow. Next, reinforcements came to Antipater’s aid from the eastern armies. The first to arrive was Leonnatos, from the Hellespont. Though his cavalry was defeated and Leonnatos himself killed in battle, his infantry fought their way into Lamia, and relieved Antipater. Finally, there arrived on the scene one of Alexander’s most successful and hardened generals, Krateros, bringing a large force of veteran soldiers. Meanwhile, the great Athenian fleet, which for over fifty years had ruled the Aegean Sea, was defeated in two major battles in July of 322. The Athenians had put to sea with their largest fleet since the fifth century, 170 ships, and sailed up to the Hellespont in an attempt to cut off reinforcements from crossing from Asia Minor to Europe, but their commander, Eution, was no match for the Macedonian fleet under their experienced general, Kleitos. Defeated, the Greeks withdrew with a refitted fleet to the island of Amorgos, where they fought a second battle, which they also lost. Athens’ naval supremacy was broken, and would never be regained. The scene was now set for the final showdown by land. In August, the two armies met in Battle at Krannon in Thessaly. The Greek infantry was outnumbered thirty-five thousand to twenty-five thousand, but thanks to the superiority of the Thessalian cavalry, the allies were victorious in the initial skirmishes. However, the Macedonian phalanx overpowered the Greek infantry, forcing it to retire to an elevated site, from where it resisted nobly. Nevertheless, their commanders concluded that further conflict was fruitless and sued for peace. Antipater, the victorious Macedonian commander, was in no mood to be generous. He demanded total surrender. Furthermore, he refused to deal with the Hellenic League as a unit, but insisted on settling terms with each city separately. In its negotiations with Antipater Athens was represented by two very different, though equally controversial, individuals; Phokion, son of Phokos, and Demades, son of Demeas, of Paiania. More will be said about them later. They returned to the city with harsh terms: 1. The democratic constitution was essentially abrogated by the exclusion of those who possessed property worth less than two thousand drachmas from the franchise. This meant that between twelve thousand and twenty-two thousand Athenians lost their vote (estimates vary), and the franchise was restricted to about nine thousand. 2. Antipater proposed to resettle the disfranchised in Thrace.

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3. A Macedonian garrison was installed on the hill of Mounykhia in the Peiraieus. 4. Athens lost control of the sanctuary of Amphiareus at Oropos. 5. Athens’ control of Samos was referred to the kings of Macedon, but eventually resulted in the decision that the exiles had a right to return and the Athenian settlers were expelled from the island. 6. The opponents of Macedon, including Demosthenes, Hypereides and others like them, were to be handed over to Antipater for execution. On a motion by Demades, they were all condemned to death by the truncated Assembly. They fled into exile, but were hunted down and killed by the bounty hunter, Arkhias. Demosthenes memorably committed suicide by poison at the temple of Poseidon on the island of Kalauria (Poros). Athens had made a supreme effort to reverse the tide of Macedonian imperialism, but, as indicated above, Alexander’s conquests and the huge resources in wealth and manpower that were now available to his generals made the outcome almost inevitable. The Athenian defeat in the Hellenic/ Lamian War began the transformation of Athens this book is concerned with. The consequences were felt in both domestic and foreign affairs. Abroad, Athens lost the ability to have an independent foreign policy. Though she had lost little more than half of the almost four hundred ships that were listed in the naval documents on the eve of the war, the remainder were effectively made ineffective, since the Macedonians controlled the Peiraieus from their garrison on Mounykhia hill. As has often been said, the Peiraieus was the key to the success of democratic Athens and its loss was devastating. For only brief periods in the next ninety-three years, from 322 to 229, were the Athenians in control of their harbour city, and then only at the whim of one or another of the Diadokhi. And, when the Athenians finally did regain possession in 229, it was too late for Athens to recover its naval and trading supremacy. That mantle had passed to Rhodes. So, sadly, the rest of this chapter is mainly a narrative of the machinations and conflicts of Alexander’s generals as they fought over control of his empire, and the resultant effect they had upon the city’s fortunes. The individuals, whose actions had the greatest impact upon Athens, were Antipater and his son, Kassander, from Macedon, and their opponents, Antigonos the One-Eyed (Monophthalmos) and his son, Demetrios the Besieger (Poliorketes) from Asia. Lesser, and more friendly, roles were played by Lysimakhos from Thrace and the Ptolemies from Egypt.

Democracy Is Only a Word, the Right to Vote is the Key. The Oligarchies of Phokion and Demetrios of Phaleron As previously stated, after his victory in the Hellenic/Lamian War in 322, Antipater, ruler of Macedon, effectively brought an end to popular sovereignty

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and democratic rule by imposing a restricted constitution upon the Athenians and removing the franchise from anyone who possessed property valued at less than two thousand drachmas. Property worth two thousand drachmas is usually referred to as the hoplite census—the amount of wealth needed for a man to be able to afford the whole panoply of a Greek infantry man (the hopla parekhomenoi), normally equated with the yoke-of-oxen men (zeugitai). Since the last decades of the fifth century, a constitution based upon this census had been the aim of those opposed to democracy. The result of Antipater’s imposition was that fully twelve thousand (twentytwo thousand in one source) poorer citizens were disfranchised. Through this act, the citizen body that met in the Assembly, provided the membership of the Boule and filled the other administrative posts was reduced to a bare nine thousand men. This was the sort of abrogation of democracy that the oligarchs of the fifth century, who had conducted or acquiesced in the Revolution of the Four Hundred and the Tyranny of the Thirty, had hoped for. No doubt, they were pleased. The truncated Assembly, which continued to meet and pass motions, most of which had not been pre-approved by the Boule as had been the democratic practice, chose two individuals known to be on good terms with Antipater, as leaders. These were the aforementioned Phokion, son of Phokos, and Demades, son of Demeas. Phokion was an austere character, of obscure parentage, who had reputedly been elected general (strategos) an astounding forty-five times without having achieved any notable victories. His preferred position was general for the home-guard (strategos epi ten khoran). Phokion usually counselled inaction. His pose of austerity was achieved by aping Spartan dress and manners, not least the practice of Laconic utterances. His brevity was proverbial; it is said that Demosthenes called him “the chopper of his speeches” (Plutarch, Phokion, 5). Indeed, we can be certain that he was politically opposed to Demosthenes, since he was a supporter of Demosthenes’ longtime opponent, Aiskhines (Aiskh. 2.184). The literary tradition about him, which includes a full biography by Plutarch, is generally favourable, treating him as a philosopher in politics and extolling his justice (dikaiosyne). He clearly had friends in philosophical circles, where democracy was abhorred. It has plausibly been suggested that the whole literary record in favour of him was created within those circles after his death in 319/18, at the hands of the briefly restored democracy. Probably the author was his friend and his successor in toadyship to Macedon, Demetrios of Phaleron, who put on an elaborate state funeral for Phokion in 318/17. The other, equally controversial individual, whom the enfranchised Athenians chose to manage their dealings with Antipater, was Demades, also a man of undistinguished origin. Demades was a self-made orator, famous for his ready repartee and for his ability to speak extemporaneously. Demades is the only one of the known Athenian orators who has left no corpus of written works. He was probably born about 390 and consequently was older

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than his fellow demesman, Demosthenes. Little is known of Demades until the 340s, when he appears to have supported Demosthenes’ opposition to Philip of Macedon in Euboia. Demades soon changed course, however, to a policy of appeasement of Macedon, though he did fight at Khaironeia, and was taken prisoner. Demades came to prominence immediately after the battle, when he negotiated the terms of Athens’ surrender and secured the ransom of Athenian prisoners from Philip, with whom he appears to have developed a good rapport. This positive relationship with Macedon carried over to both Philip’s son, Alexander, and the regent, Antipater. So, it is not surprising that the Athenians chose Demades as one of their spokespersons with Antipater, nor that he was prepared to put forward the obnoxious motion that imposed the death penalty on those of his fellow citizens who had most vigorously opposed Macedon, amongst whom was Demosthenes. Quick-witted and light-fingered, Demades was diametrically different from Phokion. While Phokion was ideologically anti-democratic, Demades cared about nothing but himself. The only common chords between them were their good relations with Antipater and their opposition to Demosthenes. But, his glib wit was his downfall. Demades is said to have written a letter to Perdikkas, the most powerful of Alexander’s successors in Asia, suggesting that he bring his forces to Europe, because it was “hanging by an aged and rotting thread” (Plutarch, Demosthenes, 31). By this he was referring to Antipater. So, when he went to Macedon in the spring of 319, accompanied by his son, to request the removal of the Macedonian garrison from Mounykhia, both were slaughtered in cold blood by Antipater’s son, Kassander. After the death of Demades, Phokion became the dominant influence in Athenian affairs. He controlled the administration with a small group of friends in accord with Antipater’s preference for elites. When Antipater died in 319, Phokion continued to collaborate with Kassander and the Macedonian commander of the garrison in Mounykhia, Nikanor. Phokion even refused to resist when Nikanor seized control of the whole Peiraieus and its fortifications. Given the importance of the Peiraieus to Athenian independence, prosperity and democracy, it is not surprising that Phokion’s acquiescence in Nikanor’s action angered a large part of the population, though probably not the landed rich. But Phokion’s inaction led to his comeuppance. This is the way it happened. When he died, Antipater did not choose his son, Kassander, to succeed him as Regent. Instead he appointed one of Alexander’s lesser generals, Polyperkhon, to that position. Insecure in his role and challenged by Kassander, Polyperkhon hoped to gain Greek support by championing the freedom of the cities. In particular, Polyperkhon moved his force towards Attika to ‘liberate’ Athens. The Athenians, probably mostly the disaffected disfranchised, packed the Assembly and demanded the removal of Phokion and his friends from office. Some of those friends, like Demetrios of Phaleron, fled into exile,

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but Phokion and his closest supporters set out to the court of Polyperkhon in order to plead their case. Another delegation from his opponents in Athens arrived at the court at the same time. Polyperkhon clearly sided against Phokion, but refused to condemn him himself. Instead he sent Phokion back to Athens under guard and told the Athenians to put him on trial. They did, and condemned Phokion to death. According to Plutarch, Phokion faced his death with truly Socratic heroism and thus became a martyr for the philosophical schools in the Academy and Lyceum to use as another stick with which to beat the democracy. The oligarchy of Phokion was over, but it was soon to be replaced by another. Polyperkhon failed to dislodge Kassander’s forces from the Peiraieus and Attika, so that within two years the Athenians were forced to come to terms with Kassander and accept Macedonian control of their affairs once again. As his supervisor (epimeletes) in Athens, Kassander appointed another scion of the philosophical schools, a man who had been a supporter and friend of Phokion, namely Demetrios, son of Phanostratos, of Phaleron. This pupil of Aristotle and Theophrastos, neither of whom was fond of democracy, ruled Athens for the next ten years, from 317 to 307. Demetrios’ administration was conservative, moralizing and thoroughly transformative. Demetrios’ legislative activity was extensive, so that he probably preferred the title “lawgiver” (nomothetes) to “supervisor.” To protect his laws, Demetrios created a new magistracy, a board of seven guardians of the law (nomophylakes), whose mandate was to compel the executive magistrates to obey his laws, and to preside over the Assembly to see that nothing contrary to the law was put to the vote. Through his legislation Demetrios of Phaleron implemented the most farreaching changes to the structure of the Athenian state, changes that were never fully reversed. Whilst Demetrios may have alleviated some of the popular discontent by limiting exclusion from the franchise only to those who owned less than one thousand drachmas, half the restriction imposed by Antipater, he abolished pay for attendance at the Assembly and probably at the juries (if they still existed; Demades is said to have closed them down) and put an end to the Theoric Fund, which had provided support to the poorer citizens for attending the dramatic festivals. Thus, not only was the right to vote limited, but even those who had this right found themselves unable to participate in the political, judicial and cultural life of the city to the same extent as they had under the democracy, because the State no longer supported them. Furthermore, there were severe economic consequences for the less wealthy resulting from the virtual elimination of the Athenian fleet, which was reduced to a mere thirty ships. By eliminating much of the expenditure formerly undertaken by the State, Demetrios was able to do away with the public service contributions (leitourgiai) that had been imposed upon the wealthy by the democratic government. The annual responsibility to provide and train a chorus

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for the many dramatic presentations that had fallen upon the shoulders of numerous individuals under the democracy (choregia) was replaced by a single official, the agonothetes, who was put in charge of staging the festivals at public expense. The onerous responsibility of paying for the upkeep and operation of a trireme for a year, the trierarchy, was done away with altogether. It was, in any case, no longer necessary, since military control over the Peiraieus was in the hands of the Macedonian garrison, and the Athenian fleet was almost non-existent. No doubt the many other former liturgies were done away with at the same time. As for the property tax (eisphora), though it may have existed in some form in the first half of the third century, there is no evidence that Demetrios exacted it. Whenever his government needed money, it called upon the rich, both citizen and resident alien, for voluntary donations (epidoseis). Benefaction, not taxation, became the norm. The wealthy, land-owning class was surely very pleased about all this. And, initially, others may have welcomed Demetrios’ presence also. An inscription of the year 317/16 from the Attic village of Aixone praises Demetrios as a “man of excellence toward the People of Athens and of Aixone,” because he had brought about peace and unity for the Athenians after a period of war (i.e., the war between Polyperkhon and Kassander) and because he had made good laws for the city (IG II2 1201; TDGR2, No. 129). While reducing the size of government, cutting the cost of public administration and curtailing the involvement of the lower classes in the life of the State were then, and always have been, desiderata for the elite, the wealthy may have been less pleased by some of Demetrios’ other measures. His philosophical training had inculcated a strong moralizing streak in Demetrios, which was reflected in his putting severe limits on extravagant expenditure and display of wealth. Demetrios legislated an end to the richly decorated, monumental tombstones that had marked the graves of the super-rich in the Kerameikos. From now on only a small, simple round marker was allowed. This effectively stifled one of the most lucrative private sources of income for sculptors and, as a consequence, they migrated from Athens in large numbers. Publically sponsored art and architecture, such as had existed under the democracy, became almost a thing of the past, of course. Demetrios enforced this sumptuary law through another new body, called the “supervisors of women” (gynaikonomoi). These officials were a form of morality police, who, amongst other things, “watched over gatherings in the houses both at weddings and at festivals” (Philokhoros, Atthis, Fragment 65). It was forbidden to have more than thirty guests at a party or feast; so, too, was excessive display of emotion, especially wailing at funerals. Though this new magistracy exercised control over all aspects of private life, the sexist origins of its title is not surprising, given the views of Demetrios’ mentor, Aristotle, about women, namely that they were overly emotional and needed to be ruled by men. In a manner reminiscent of the constitutional quarrels

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of the late fifth century, Demetrios invoked the name of Solon to support his sumptuary laws, thus making even clearer his connection to the oligarchic movements of those days. It was claimed by Demetrios’ supporters that he was a great financial expert, every bit as good as the democratic leader, Lykourgos, to whom he was surely being compared. Interesting, in this context, is the claim that Demetrios increased Athens’ revenues to twelve hundred talents, exactly the same revenue as had been achieved by Lykourgos. It is hard to see how he did this. Though, of course, he saved the State much expenditure by his cuts, as discussed earlier, to the cost of administration that eliminated pay for all kinds of public service, a corresponding increase in revenue is unlikely. After all, income from taxation was greatly reduced, and could hardly have been made up by voluntary donations. Also, the silver mines were no longer a source of much, if any, revenue for the State’s coffers, as they had been in the democratic years. Even the Peiraieus, though Kassander allowed it to be united with the city (asty), can hardly have been the scene of the same amount of mercantile activity as it had been, given that it was still under the watchful eye of the Macedonian garrison in Mounykhia. Furthermore, other trading states, such as Rhodes, were rising in influence and challenging the trading supremacy of the Peiraieus. Another of Demetrios’ actions was to hold a census of all the inhabitants of Attika. This information is contained in the first fragment of the Chronika of a little-known historian, Ktesikles. The date of the census is missing in the text, so we cannot be sure at what time in his ten-year administration Demetrios held it. As a consequence, it is equally unclear why he held it. If it was in the first year or two, then probably it was in connection with his exclusion from the franchise of those with less than one thousand drachmas worth of property. If later, it could have been a review of the men eligible for military service, though military affairs seem to have been low on the list of Demetrios’ priorities. To add to the confusion, the figures Ktesikles provides—twenty-one thousand citizens, ten thousand metics (metoikoi) and four hundred thousand slaves—are clearly not all from the census, and some, like the number of slaves, are manifestly fabricated. These figures will be discussed in a later section on the size of the Athenian population at the end of the fourth and beginning of the third centuries. During Demetrios’ rule, the Athenians stayed for the most part out of the struggles of the successors of Alexander for supremacy, but they could not avoid them altogether. In 315/14, an Athenian squadron under Thymokhares of Sphettos was at sea in the Aegean, aiding Ptolemy, Seleukos and Kassander against Antigonos the One-Eyed. The Athenian squadron captured the island of Kythnos in the Cyclades and eliminated the pirate, Glauketes, who had his base there. Later, in 314, Kassander organized an attack on the island of Lemnos, formerly an Athenian settlement (kleroukhy) and an important point on the route to the Dardanelles. Twenty Athenian triremes accompanied the attack. Lemnos was held by Dioskorides, naval

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commander for Antigonos the One-Eyed. Dioskorides defeated and captured the Athenian fleet, and then went on to take Delos, which had up to that time been in Athenian hands. The loss of both Lemnos and Delos were very damaging for Athenian trading interests. Demetrios of Phaleron was, himself, however, another casualty of the wars of succession. As a protégé of Kassander he was, by extension, an enemy of Antigonos the One-Eyed, governor of Phrygia, and his son, Demetrios (later the Besieger), who were ambitiously striving to gain control of Alexander’s whole empire. In 307/6 Antigonos sent his son from Asia to Greece to open up another front in the war. Demetrios sailed his large fleet, which was the most powerful in the Aegean, into the Peiraieus unopposed, and proclaimed the restoration of democracy in Athens. He proceeded to Megara on the isthmus of Corinth, which he took; then returned to drive Kassander’s garrison out of Mounykhia. Demetrios of Phaleron was conducted over the borders of Attika and retired to the court of Kassander in Macedon. Later, Demetrios of Phaleron took refuge with Ptolemy I (Soter) in Alexandria, where he is reported to have suggested the establishment of the famous library and the Mouseion. His life as a politician over, Demetrios had come back to the world of scholarship.

The Conflict between Kassander, Son of Antipater of Macedon, and Demetrios the Besieger (Poliorketes), Son of Antigonos the One-Eyed (Monophthalmos) of Asia for Control of Athens Athens was once again, in name, a free city with control of its port in its own hands; but, in reality, this freedom came as a gift from the Antigonids. What monarchs give, they can easily take away. On this occasion, however, they were in a giving mood. Antigonos returned Lemnos and Imbros to Athens, sent them a huge amount of grain, much money and timber sufficient for one hundred ships. We have no evidence that these ships were ever built. It is doubtful that there was a sufficient workforce or skilled shipwrights available, unless they were imported from Phoenicia. If they were built, however, they became part of Demetrios’ fleet, not Athens’. Regardless, the grateful people of Athens proclaimed sacrifices to Antigonos and his son as Saviours (Soteres) and established two new tribes or voting units (phylai), in their honour—Antigonis and Demetrias. The Athenians achieved this increase in the number of tribes by reassigning some of the existing local villages (demes). As a consequence of having twelve instead of ten tribes, the Council (boule) increased in size from five hundred to six hundred, since each tribe continued to send fifty members to the Council. Because the rule was that a person could only be a Councillor (bouleutes) twice in a lifetime (Ath. Pol. 62.3), serious questions arise about how this increase in membership could have been achieved, if the population was reduced to the level indicated by Ktesikles’ numbers. This question will also be discussed in the section below on the population.

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Demetrios very soon departed with his fleet eastwards to help his father, Antigonos the One-Eyed, in his battles against the other successors in Asia. For a short period the Athenians were left to manage their own internal affairs almost by themselves—Demetrios, of course, left some ‘friends’ behind. Nevertheless, exiled democrats returned and raised the standard of national independence. Amongst these was one Demokhares, nephew of Demosthenes. But storm clouds were brewing in the form of Kassander’s forces from Macedon, which entered Attika and put the city under siege (the Four Years War, 307–304). From an inscription, we know that the Athenians passed a motion to refurbish and modernize the defensive walls of both the city and the Peiraieus (IG II2 463; TDGR2, No. 134), probably on a motion by Demokhares. Another inscription (IG II2 505; TDGR2, No. 139) honours the contribution of two resident aliens, Nikandros of Ilium and Polyzelos of Ephesos, for their generosity in rebuilding the towers of the southern wall, demonstrating the continuing support for the democracy by resident aliens (metoikoi). Every effort was made by the Athenian democrats to resist their national enemy, the resident power in Macedon. But their resources were limited, even though Antigonos sent them more money and artillery, which they stored on the Acropolis (IG II2 1487; TDGR2, No. 135). Eventually, the Athenians were reduced to begging Antigonos to send his son back to help them. Demetrios Poliorketes returned to Greece and drove Kassander from the territory he had gained in Attika, especially the forts at Panakton and Phyle. Demetrios restored independence and security to the city—at least in name. Unfortunately, he chose to set up residence in the city, on the Akropolis. His outrageous behaviour there between 304/3 and 302/1, is described in lurid detail by Plutarch in chapters 24, 26 and 27 of his Life of Demetrios, especially his relationship with a notorious Athenian courtesan called Lamia. His outrages were assisted by honours and special privileges that were voted for him and his friends by the Assembly on motions put forward by one person in particular—Stratokles, son of Euthydemos, of Diomeia. Stratokles was the other side of the coin from Demokhares, with whom he clashed in 303, a clash that ended in Demokhares’ exile. Though Stratokles came from a family that became wealthy in the fourth century and had used its wealth in the service of the democracy, Stratokles turned out to be even more obsequious and toadyish to Demetrios Poliorketes than previous administrators had been to Kassander. To his credit, however, it should be noted that Stratokles was the proposer of posthumous honours for the democratic leader, Lykourgos, in 307/6 (IG II2 457). Demetrios’ behaviour was so autocratic and depraved that the Athenians began to realize that democracy at the whim of an autocrat was not democracy at all. There was no difference between the oligarchic government of Demetrios of Phaleron, where Kassander’s puppet had imposed his master’s laws through the Assembly, and the supposedly democratic situation under

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Demetrios Poliorketes, where his spokesperson, Stratokles, got all the king’s wishes approved by a reluctant but subservient Demos. One famous example of Stratokles’ obsequiousness will suffice here. In 302, Demetrios had gone to Corinth, where he had recreated the League of Corinth, a League of Greek States that had been founded by Philip II of Macedon and used by Alexander the Great. Not surprisingly, Demetrios was proclaimed leader of the league (TDGR2, No. 138; Plutarch, Demetrios 25), whereupon he wrote to Athens demanding to be initiated into the secret cult of the Eleusinian Mysteries at the highest level. This presented difficulties. First, there were several levels of initiation and the whole process usually took many years. Even if that could be ignored, time was a problem. Initiation into the first level took place at the Lesser Mysteries in the month Anthesterion (roughly February), but his letter arrived two months later. Next, the main initiation took place at the Greater Mysteries in Eleusis in the month Boedromion (roughly September). Stratokles found the answer by fiddling with the calendar. He coerced the Assembly to vote the present month to be Anthesterion, so that, on his arrival in Athens, Demetrios could be initiated into the Lesser Mysteries. He then pressured the Assembly to vote that the same month had become Boedromion, so that Demetrios could be initiated into the Greater Mysteries at Eleusis right away. Stratokles’ pre-eminence, however, depended upon the favour and support of Demetrios. Neither was destined to last long. Antigonos the OneEyed’s successes in Asia had resulted in several of the remaining successors of Alexander, notably Ptolemy, Lysimakhos, Kassander and Seleukos, forming an alliance against him. Realizing the threat to his gains, Antigonos summoned his son to his side. Demetrios Poliorketes sailed from Peiraieus to join his father in 302. In 301, the opposing armies came to battle at Ipsos in Phrygia, though Ptolemy’s forces were absent. Antigonos and Demetrios were defeated and Antigonos himself was killed. So ended their effort to unite the whole of Alexander’s empire under their rule. But Demetrios survived the defeat and fled to Ephesos, where he joined his fleet, which was still the most powerful navy in the Aegean. With this he sailed toward Athens, only to be met by a delegation from the city, informing him that he was no longer welcome. The Athenian Assembly had, in fact, declared neutrality and voted never again to admit a king into the city (Plutarch, Demetrios, 30.4). Demetrios graciously retired with his fleet and army to Corinth, where he had a secure base. His position was not strong anywhere else in Greece at this point, so he used his naval supremacy to enrich himself and his forces by piratical attacks upon the coastal territories of Lysimakhos in Asia Minor and the Hellespont. Athens’ declaration of neutrality was hollow, however, since she was powerless to defend herself and, more importantly, could not feed her population. Even in the democratic years there had been occasions when Athens needed outside help for a supply of grain, but basically then the State had a well-developed system for bringing grain to the Peiraieus, as

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has been described. After Alexander’s conquests, however, Athens no longer had easy access to her former sources of supply. The State now came to depend on the largesse of the kings, and, since it had turned its back on Demetrios, it needed to seek help from Lysimakhos in Asia and Kassander in Macedon. An Athenian comic playwright, Philippides, who was popular at the court of Lysimakhos, secured from Lysimakhos both a large gift of grain and the ransom of Athenians who had been captured fighting for the Antigonids at Ipsos. Rapprochement with Kassander was also achieved. The shortage of grain just mentioned led to complaints against the leading generals (strategoi), and provided an opportunity for a commander of mercenaries, Lakhares, to assert a tyranny over the city of Athens. He undoubtedly had the backing of Kassander, because one of Lakhares’ first moves was to negotiate Athens’ surrender to the king of Macedon. Kassander’s forces, thereupon, occupied the forts in Attika. Once again the Athenians had jumped from the frying pan into the fire. But Kassander’s success was not complete. There were still nationalist democrats around, and they seized the Peiraieus. City and port were in opposition once again, though the situation was now the reverse of that under Demetrios of Phaleron, when the Peiraieus had been controlled by Kassander’s garrison on Mounykhia hill.

Athens under the Control of Demetrios the Besieger (295–287) Lakhares was not to enjoy his ascendancy over the Athenians for long. In 297, his main supporter, Kassander, died, and the Macedonian kingdom became less powerful as a result of competition between Kassander’s two surviving sons, Alexander and Antipater, for the throne. The conflict between them provided an opening for a resurgent Demetrios, ever on the lookout for opportunity, to return to Greece. Demetrios’ first objective was Athens, which he hoped to use as his base of operations. He sent his fleet to attack the Peiraieus, but was unable to enter the harbour, because a large part of his fleet was lost in a storm. Demetrios then changed his tactics and moved his land forces against Athens itself. Later, with a new fleet, he cut off supplies by sea also, and the Athenians, besieged by land and sea, were starved into submission. In 295 they surrendered to Demetrios, and Lakhares ran away to Thebes. Demetrios entered Athens in triumph and convened an Assembly, where he chided the Athenians for their disloyalty to him, but assured them that he would be generous. This, however, was pretence. He kept a tight rein on the Athenians through a garrison he installed on the Mouseion Hill, on the outskirts of the city. He also had control of the Peiraieus. Furthermore, he made sure that his appointees controlled the administration. It soon became clear that Athens was no freer under Demetrios than it had been under Kassander! Fortunately, though, he did not set up court on the Akropolis, as

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he had done before; so the Athenians did not have to endure his arrogance and debauchery. In fact, Demetrios hardly resided in the city at all. Only one year later, in 294, he saw a further opportunity in the conflict between Antipater and Alexander, marched into Macedon, seized the throne, and declared himself king. From 294 to 287, Demetrios ruled Macedon. From there he controlled most of Greece, and especially Athens, by proxy and the use of garrisons. But his unpleasant behaviour sat no better with the Macedonians than it had with the Athenians and he lost their allegiance. Furthermore, his threatening ambition to regain his father’s former empire in Asia stimulated another coalition of powers against him, which led to the invasion of Macedon from the east by Lysimakhos, and from the west by Pyrrhos of Epiros. When his soldiers mutinied, Demetrios was forced to flee once again. He still had his holdings in Greece, however, and from these he hoped to recoup his losses. At this point, Athens turned against him, and in a memorable and courageous assault captured the Macedonian fortress on the Mouseion Hill. But Demetrios was not one to give up and was unwilling to accept defeat. He still held the Peiraieus, despite a desperate attempt by the Athenians to dislodge him. Though help reached Athens from Ptolemy, through the agency of an Athenian in his service, Kallias of Sphettos, Demetrios managed to overwhelm the Athenian resistance. Once again the Athenians were at Demetrios’ mercy, but they were saved by his irrepressible ambition. As mentioned earlier, he had decided to attempt to regain his father’s empire in Asia, and was eager to embark on this enterprise. For that reason, he agreed to a settlement that left Athens an independent city for the next twenty-five years, though it was always seriously circumscribed by Demetrios’ garrisons and fortresses. Demetrios then set out for Asia, leaving his Greek holdings in the hands of his son Antigonos, born to him by Phila, daughter of Antipater the regent. The history of Demetrios’ expedition to Asia, which ended in failure and his eventual death in 283 in the custody of Seleukos, is not relevant to this narrative. No tears were shed in Athens when the news arrived of the demise of a man, whom they had once proclaimed Saviour (Soter), and after whom one of their new tribes (electoral districts), Demetrias, continued to be named. Less welcome at Athens was the defeat and death of a longtime friend and supporter, Lysimakhos, at the hands of Seleukos (Nikator) at the Battle of Korrupedion in 281. The interminable Wars of Succession were finally over, it seemed, and Seleukos was now master of all Alexander’s empire, except for Egypt. He marched on Macedon to claim the throne. At the moment of his triumph, however, he was assassinated by Ptolemy Keraunos (“Thunderbolt”), the eldest son of Ptolemy I (Soter) and Eurydike, daughter of Antipater. He was a thunderbolt in name and in deed. While Seleukos’ Asian empire was inherited by his son Antiokhos, it was Keraunos who ascended the throne of Macedon.

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The Nationalist Years (287–262) The years between 287 and 268 are often considered the most democratic and stable in the post-Lamian War period. Nationalist democrats, like Demokhares, returned from exile and almost immediately led out a force to recapture the important fort at Eleusis in northern Attika. The restoration of the outward machinery of democratic administration is evident from the number and terminology of decrees of the Assembly. But, there is equally no evidence that the changes made to the financial structure of the State by Demetrios of Phaleron, especially the removal of the tax burden of public service contributions, known as liturgies, from the shoulders of the wealthy, were ever reversed. The Administration continued to depend on the benefaction of public-spirited individuals for its operation, and could surely not afford any payment for public service. Gone were the days when the less wealthy could be induced to participate in government by the offer of state pay. It is hardly likely that the less wealthy had time or inclination to attend the Assembly—that is, those who still had the vote. On that score, we have no way of knowing whether the franchise was ever extended to those below the property census of one thousand drachmas. Their exclusion was certainly against democratic principles. The occasional reference in this period to “the democracy that is based upon all Athenians” (TDGR3, No 55, line 83) suggests that it was. The fact that the Macedonians controlled the Peiraieus greatly increased the hardship of the poorer members of Athenian society, not only because of the revenue that was missing, but mainly because of the difficulty involved in importing overseas grain. Increasingly the less wealthy came to depend on home-grown grain from the estates of the wealthy. But this produce had never been enough to feed the population in the democratic period, and now the politicians were constantly forced to court foreign donors for gifts of this staple part of the ancient diet. Lysimakhos, king of Thrace, was one such donor, but the most generous and consistent suppliers of the Athenians in this regard were Ptolemy I (Soter) and Ptolemy II (Philadelphos). These gifts of grain, when they came, had to be brought in through new, smaller, ports, like Rhamnous and Vouliagmeni, and transported thence by ox and cart. This required a military escort, by troops who were often housed in hastily created rubble camps. These troops were a mixture of mercenaries and citizens, though not the ephebes, the young eighteen to twenty-yearolds, who had patrolled the border forts as part of their military training in the democratic years, especially under Lykourgos. Pay for their service had been removed in 307 and never reinstituted. The ephebes had numbered five hundred to six hundred in the mid-fourth century, but now had dwindled to about thirty. For ten years, from 287 to 277, the Athenian democracy struggled successfully to preserve its independence against a man who could not have had a worse lineage from the democrats’ point of view. This was Antigonos

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Gonatas, the son of Demetrios the Beseiger and Phila, a daughter of the former Regent, Antipater. He inherited from his father control of Corinth, Demetrias and Khalkis (the Fetters of Greece, as they were called) as well as the Peiraieus and several forts in Attika. With these he held on resolutely through some tough times until an opportunity arose for him to regain the throne of Macedon in 277. An invasion of Celts from the north had overrun Macedon in 279, killing the king at that time, Ptolemy Keraunos. The Celts penetrated Greece as far as Delphi before being driven back by a coalition of Greek forces, amongst whom were as many as fifteen hundred Athenians. Later, in 277, Antigonos defeated another group of Celts at Lysimakheia in Thrace. On the basis of this victory he claimed the empty throne of Macedon. His position was soon challenged, however, by Pyrrhos of Epiros, who himself had briefly been king in Macedon and considered he had an equal claim to the throne. Out of their deep dislike of Antigonos, the Athenians made the mistake of siding with Pyrrhos. But, Pyrrhos was killed accidently in Argos in 272, and the Athenians found themselves headed for war with a triumphant Antigonos, who was now securely in control of the kingdom of Macedon.

The Khremonidean War (268/7–262/1) Just after midsummer in the administrative year 268/7, Khremonides, son of Eteokles, of the deme Aithalidai, put forward a motion before the Assembly that there be an alliance between the Athenians and the Lakedaimonians, led by their king Areus, to defend against “those who are trying to destroy the laws and ancestral constitutions of the Greek cities” (IG II2 687; TDGR3, No. 56). This was supported by the policy of Ptolemy II (Philadelphos) and his sister-wife, Arsinoe, with whom both states already have an alliance. Ptolemy II was carrying on his father’s hostility to the Antigonid dynasty. Also joining this alliance with Athens and Sparta were the people of Elis, Akhaia, Tegea, Mantineia, Orkhomenos, Phigalia, Kaphya and some Kretans. The manifest target of the alliance was Antigonos Gonatas, king of Macedon. The war that resulted was named after Khremonides (i.e., the Khremonidean War). It lasted from 268/7 to 262/1. Fighting broke out immediately, and the scene of action was almost exclusively in Attika. At some time before the Khremonidean War the Athenians had managed to regain control of the crucial fortress at Eleusis, which should have made it possible for forces from the Peloponnese to enter Attika and bring help to Athens. That was certainly the plan, but Areus was never able to get past Antigonos’ army, which controlled the countryside north of Athens. Furthermore, the other source from which assistance was expected to reach the Athenians, namely Egypt, was also frustrated. Though archaeologists have shown that an Egyptian force under Patroklos managed to land and make a camp for a short time at Koroneia, a peninsula close beside the bay of Porto Raphti in eastern Attika, and was operating at other points in

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southern Attika, it was never strong enough to break the lock Antigonos had on Athens. The Athenians held out manfully, struggling to bring in the crops and feed themselves from home-grown grain, but eventually they were worn down and forced to surrender. In the aftermath of the war, Antigonos took revenge on his opponents, much as Antipater had done in 322. One of these was Philokhoros, a scholar and patriot, who wrote the last and most authoritative local history of Attika (Atthis) in seventeen books (TDGR3, No.57). No one after him bothered to write the history of Athens. The brief period of Athenian independence, which had lasted from 287 to 262, was brought to an end, and Athens fell under Macedonian domination once again. Her government both at home and abroad was closely monitored. Though Antigonos died in 239, his successor, Demetrios II, followed the same policy. Only when Demetrios II died in 229, and the monarchy in Macedon entered a period of instability was Athens able to assert its independence anew. With 150 talents, raised mostly from its own citizens, it bought off the Macedonian commander in Peiraieus, who withdrew his forces from the port. Athens and the Peiraieus were reunited for the first time in more than sixty years. The Macedonians also handed over the forts at Eleusis, Rhamnous, and Sounion to the Athenians. But the quid pro quo that was agreed to was that in return for its freedom, Athens would be neutral and stay out of the conflicts that still raged between Greeks and Macedonians. In other words, Athens agreed to have no foreign policy. From 229 to 200, it maintained this stance, until a new player entered the field—Rome. That, of course, is another story. THE POPULATION OF ATHENS IN THE LATE FOURTH AND EARLY THIRD CENTURIES Any discussion of the size of the Athenian population in the late fourth and early third centuries must begin with three pieces of literary evidence. The first two are concerned with the results of Antipater’s establishment in 322, after his victory in the Lamian War, of property ownership of two thousand drachmas as the basis for the franchise, and his offer of a new home in Thrace for those deprived of their right to vote. Unfortunately, although it is generally agreed that both are derived from the same source, they give different figures. One, Diodoros of Sicily, in book 18, section 18.5, writes: He [Antipater] changed the constitution from democracy and ordered that the exercise of political authority be based upon an evaluation of wealth. Those who possessed more than 2,000 drachmas (of property) were to be in charge of government and voting, while he excluded from the constitution all those whose property was below this evaluation, on the grounds that they were disruptive and warlike, giving to those who

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wished a place in Thrace to settle in. These people, who were more than 22,000, were expelled from their fatherland. Those who possessed the stipulated evaluation, about 9,000, were defined as masters of the city and its territory and proceeded to govern in accordance with the laws of Solon. The second comment on this event comes from Plutarch’s Life of Phokion, section 28.7. He writes: Of those who were voted out of the body politic on account of their poverty, who were more than 12,000, some stayed and they were thought to have suffered cruel and dishonourable treatment; but those who on this account left the city and migrated to Thrace, to the city and territory that Antipater provided for them, they seemed like refugees from a city that had been taken by storm. The differences are threefold: 1. Plutarch clearly believed that some of the disfranchised stayed home, while Diodoros implies that they all went to Thrace. In this case, Plutarch’s version is considered the more credible. 2. Plutarch does not give a figure for those who continued to enjoy the franchise. In this instance, Diodoros’ more detailed account is accepted, especially since the figure is not implausible. 3. The really crucial difference is between the figures given for the disfranchised—“more than 12,000” or “more than 22,000.” The difference seems huge in translation, but in the Greek it involves a small prefix (dis) that means ‘twice’. Diodoros writes “twice ten thousand and twice one thousand,” while Plutarch has “ten thousand and twice one thousand.” Though the choice between the two palaeographically is an open question (in one case, a copyist is assumed to have duplicated the dis, in the other, he dropped it out), until recently scholars have preferred to emend Diodoros to agree with Plutarch. But, the idea that there were twenty-two thousand male citizens (and by extension their families) who belonged in the Thetic class, that is, the lowest category of Athenian society, is not hard to believe. The reason scholars have sided with Plutarch is that the figure twentyone thousand, for Athenians living in Attika in the census conducted by Demetrios of Phaleron sometime between 317 and 307, was contained in the first fragment of the Chronika of a little-known historian, Ktesikles. This figure fits all too conveniently with the number nine thousand for those with the franchise plus twelve thousand for those without. But, by this time several indeterminate variables have entered the picture. In the first place, we cannot tell how many disfranchised left Attika for Thrace in 322, nor how many returned, though some had by 318 (Plutarch, Phokion, 33.2). On the other side, there would certainly have been Athenian allotment holders (kleroukhs) who came home from Samos after that island was finally restored to the Samians by Perdikkas in 321, and probably also others from

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Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros in 314. It is impossible to put a figure on these, and also to be sure of their status. As kleroukhs they were of the hoplite census (zeugitai), but when they returned home, they were landless. Furthermore, if we knew the date of Demetrios’ census, we would be able to determine whether his figures were affected by another important event, which took a considerable number of landless Athenians out of Attika. This was the unfortunate expedition of Ophellas of Kyrene, who planned to march through Libya, and join the forces of Agathokles of Syracuse in an attack upon Carthage in 309 (Diod. 20.40–42). His large army of ten thousand infantry, six hundred cavalry, chariots and charioteers, was followed by an equally large collection of camp followers with their wives and children. Many who went on this expedition were from Athens, because Ophellas was not only a benefactor of the city, but also married to Euthydike, daughter of Miltiades, from a famous aristocratic family in Athens. The expedition ended in disaster, and it is likely that few ever returned, though Euthydike did and ended up becoming one of the many wives of Demetrios the Besieger. Another event that certainly happened after Demetrios’ census, but which also drained the population of early third-century Athens, was the foundation of Antigoneia-on-the-Orontes by Antigonos the One-Eyed in 306 (Diod. 20.47.5). Several thousand Athenians were amongst the original settlers of this Hellenistic city. They were later moved to the nearby foundation of Antioch by Seleukos in 301, after the death of Antigonos at Ipsos. Obviously, with all this coming and going it is hazardous to try to estimate the true population of Athens in the late fourth and early third centuries, but one fact argues in favour of the higher figure of thirty-one thousand adult males in 322, nine thousand of whom retained the franchise, twenty-two thousand of whom were excluded. Fifteen years later, in 307/6, the Athenians expressed their gratitude to the Antigonids (Antigonos the One-Eyed and his son Demetrios Poliorketes) for liberating them from Kassander, by creating two new tribes or voting units (phylai), named Antigonis and Demetrias, thus increasing the size of the Council (Boule) to six hundred. Unless the constitutional rules had been changed, appointment to the Council was only open to thirty year-old males and the position could only be held twice in a lifetime. Apparently, the system functioned well. This would be simply unachievable with a citizen population of twenty-one thousand, given that many citizens, namely the eighteen to twenty-nine-year-olds, would be ineligible for the Council. But the higher figure would have to assume that all those disfranchised in 322 had regained the vote by 307/6, an assumption that is quite unverifiable. The argument for the higher number of citizens has the support of most scholars today. But, regardless whether one sides with those who prefer the twenty-one thousand figure, or those who favour thirty-one thousand, the important and inescapable fact is that Athenian manpower in the fourth and

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early third centuries was a fraction of what it had been in the fifth century. Calculations for Athenian manpower in 431, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, range from a low of forty-three thousand adult males to a high of about sixty thousand. Thus, available manpower in the later centuries ranged from 50 percent (if twenty-one thousand) to 70 percent (if thirtyone thousand) of the lower figure (forty-three thousand) and 33 percent to 50 percent of the higher number. This must always be borne in mind by any study of fourth and third century Athens. Not only did it affect military capability, but it meant that there were fewer mouths to feed. And, increasingly, as the Hellenistic monarchs, especially the Ptolemies in Egypt and the Seleukids in Asia, competed to attract Greeks from the mainland to fight in their armies and populate the numerous new cities that they founded, Greece became depopulated. Athens was no exception. As peasants left for fresh opportunities abroad, their land was available to be purchased by those who could afford to stay behind. This cannot but have added to the power of the wealthy land-owning class.

SUGGESTED READING Ancient Works Diodoros of Sicily (1947), Bibliotheke, books 19 and 20, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 9, trans. R. M. Geer (Cambridge, MA) Diodoros of Sicily (1954), Bibliotheke, books 19 and 20, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 10, trans. R. M. Geer (Cambridge, MA) MacDowell, D. M. (trans.) (2004), Demosthenes, speech 27–38, vol. 8 in the series Oratory of Classical Greece (Austin) Plutarch (1973), The Age of Alexander: Ten Greek Lives by Plutarch, trans. I. ScottKilvert (Harmondsworth) (See especially the chapters on Demosthenes, Phocion, Alexander, Demetrius and Pyrrhus)

Modern Works Anson, E. M. (2014), Alexander’s Heirs: The Age of the Successors (Chichester and Oxford) Bayliss, A. J. (2011), After Demosthenes: The Politics of Early Hellenistic Athens (London and New York) Berthold, R. M. (1984), Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age (Ithaca and London) Billows, R. A. (1990), Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London) Bosworth, A. B. (1988), Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great (Cambridge) Ferguson, W. S. (1911), Hellenistic Athens (London) Gehrke, H-J (1976), Phokion (Zetemata, 64, Munich) Gomme, A. W. (1933), The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. (Oxford) Green, P. (1993), Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age (Berkeley)

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Grainger, J. D. (1990), Seleukos Nikator: Constructing a Hellenistic Kingdom (London) Griffith, G. T. (1935), The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (Cambridge) Habicht, C. (1997), Athens: From Alexander to Antony, trans D. L. Schneider (Cambridge, MA and London) Hansen, M. H. (1985), Demography and Democracy (Herning) Hansen, M. H. (1988), Three Studies in Athenian Demography (Copenhagen) Harding, P. (2008), The Story of Athens (London and New York) Heckl, W. (1992), The Marshals of Alexander’s Empire (London and New York) Hughes, S. (2008), After Democracy: Athens under Phokion, 322/1–319/8 B.C. (Diss., University of Western Australia, Perth) Oliver, G. J. (2007), War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens (Oxford) Palagia, O. and S. Tracy (eds.), (2003), The Macedonians in Athens, 322–229 B.C. (Oxford) Shipley, G. (2000), The Greek World after Alexander (London and New York) Tarn, W. W. (1913), Antigonos Gonatas (Oxford) Tracy, S. (1995), Athenian Democracy in Transition: Attic Letter-Cutters of 340 to 290 B.C. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London) Tracy, S. (2003), Athens and Macedon: Attic Letter-Cutters of 300 to 229 B.C. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London) Tritle, L. A. (1988), Phocion the Good (London) Williams, J. M. (1982), Athens without Democracy: The Oligarchy of Phocion and the Tyranny of Demetrios of Phaleron, 322–307 B.C. (Diss., Yale)

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Whilst the cost in time and money of maintaining the internal administration of the democratic State was onerous, it paled in comparison with the expenses and personal involvement the democracy required of its citizens for the defence of its territory and its interests at home and abroad. Some grumbled at the cost, but there was, and always is, a price for independence, not only of the State, but also of the individual. After the democracy, in the early Hellenistic period and beyond, the individual Athenian ceased to be able to take a significant role in paying for, or fighting for, the defence of Attika, and came increasingly to depend upon the initiative and wealth of the powerful Few. DEFENDING THE DEMOCRACY In a famous speech delivered in 432, just before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War between the Athenian Empire and the League of states allied to Sparta, the Athenian politician, Perikles, outlined the military resources of democratic Athens (Thouk. 1.140–144). There were forts throughout the countryside to counter low-scale attacks and protect the farms. But, in the event of a full-scale invasion by the whole Peloponnesian army, the citizens could take refuge in Athens itself behind the city’s fortifications and the Long Walls that joined the city to its port, the Peiraieus. There they would be supplied from abroad by the incomparable Athenian navy, which was the main strength of the democracy. Though Athens eventually lost the Peloponnesian War in 405/4 after twenty-seven years’ fighting, and much of the system of defence Perikles described was dismantled, it was reconstituted in the fourth century and continued to be the basis of Athenian military strategy in the democratic years.

Forts and Walls During the course of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians began to develop a system of forts throughout Attika as a first line of defence against Spartan

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invasions. These forts were on both the northern border at places like Eleusis, Panakton and Phyle, and on the coast at Rhamnous and Thorikos. They were not designed to prevent an attack upon the city, but to protect the assets in the countryside, especially the crops. They were manned by local militia and units of cavalry. It is not possible to put a cost on the fortifications, but the men were probably paid at the standard rate of four to six obols (two-thirds to one drachma) per day, half of which was an allowance for rations. The cavalry usually received twice as much and a subvention of four obols for fodder for their horses. This system of forts was modified throughout the fourth century in response to improvements in siege techniques. At some point, probably in the 370s, a wall was built on the northern border between Mts. Aigaleos and Parnes (the so-called Dema Wall). In the 330s, if not before, it was the task of the eighteen to twenty-year-olds (the ephebes) in their two years of training, to man the forts. In the third century and beyond, these forts became fundamental to defence of the home territory of Attika (the khora).

City Fortifications and the Long Walls Unlike many other city-states, the Athenians were quite exceptionally willing to abandon their lands to invaders for the common cause. They did so in 480 in the face of Xerxes’ invasion, when they took to their ships and won the great battle off the island of Salamis. At that time they surrendered the city itself. This was not the case in 431 when, on Perikles’ advice, many of them withdrew within the city walls at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. These city fortifications had been built hastily by citizen labour in 479 under Themistokles after Xerxes’ invasion. They were made largely of mud brick. They had been improved somewhat by Kimon, but it was Perikles in 460/59 who had suggested the building of the Long Walls that joined Athens to the Peiraieus and its circuit. From this point on during the democratic years, Athens’ ultimate line of defence against overland invasion was this conjoined fortification system. Its importance is shown by the jubilation with which the Long Walls and the walls of the Peiraieus were torn down by her enemies in 404, and by the fact that one of the first signs of revival was their rebuilding by the citizens and the crews of Konon’s ships in 395/4. We have some records of the rebuilding for the years 395/4–391/0 (IG II2 1656–1664). Though these are quite incomplete and make it impossible to estimate the total cost, they do provide some useful details. The work was divided up between the ten tribal units, each of which selected ten teikhopoioi (wall builders) to be in charge of their own section. These officials contracted out the work to individual contractors. Some contracts were to clear the rubble and level the surface for laying the foundation stones; others to provide the cartage for the stones from the quarries by oxen and cart; yet others to lay the mud bricks for the upper courses. One document (IG II21656) tells us that the cost of the

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yoke teams bringing the stones for a day’s work was 160 drachmas, and the cost of hiring iron tools for working the stones was 53. Another inscription (IG II2 1657) lists the cost for bringing up and laying stones from an unidentifiable (to us) point to the central pillar of the gates by the sanctuary of Aphrodite in the Peiraieus as 790 drachmas, and names the contractor as a non-Athenian, Demosthenes from Boiotia. Yet another (IG II2 1658) provides the amazing figure of 23,600 as the number of mud bricks laid by the tribe Aigeis, the cost for which was 306.5 drachmas, at 13 drachmas per 1,000 bricks. So long as she controlled the sea and the Peiraieus was in her hands, Athens could withstand a siege, by bringing in supplies from overseas. Down to the time of Philip of Macedon, the art of siege-craft in the Greek world was elemental. Cities would be taken by treachery or starvation, rarely by assault. Philip changed all that by adopting tactics and siege weapons that had been learned and developed in Sicily in the early fourth century in the warfare between Dionysios I and Carthage. Consequently, after Philip’s victory over the combined Greek forces at Khaironeia in 338, the Athenians, fearing an assault upon the city, rushed to refurbish and refine their walls, which had fallen into disrepair. We have from this time period another very detailed inscription for the work on the Long Walls and the defences of the Peiraieus (IG II2 244). The work was overseen by the Council of Five Hundred, who delegated assignments to the tribal teikhopoioi, to architects, and various other officials. To defend against Philip’s siege engines more of the fortifications had to be encased in stone and the towers had to be strengthened to enable them to house ballistic weapons. In addition, the city’s defences were protected by a ten-metre-wide ditch and a fore-wall (proteikhisma), both in front of the main fortifications. The work was again divided between the tribal teikhopoioi, one of whom was the orator Demosthenes. He made a special donation (epidosis) of ten thousand drachmas to further the work on his section. Realizing the strength of Athens’ renovated walls and the power of her fleet, Philip wisely decided not to try to take the city by assault.

Land Forces But, Athens was not only interested in the defence of her homeland (khora). There were times when the city needed to go to war beyond its borders. In 394 six thousand Athenian hoplites and six hundred cavalry fought at Nemea in the Peloponnese against Sparta and her allies (Xen. Hell. 4.2.17). Six thousand was probably the standard size for the citizen militia throughout the fourth century, when the city fought at Mantineia in 362, at Khaironeia in 338 and at Krannon in 322. Only slightly fewer, five thousand hoplites, marched out to Thermopylai in 352 to resist Philip of Macedon. If these troops were paid at the full rate, each hoplite would have received one drachma per day while on campaign, and, since a hoplite always had an

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attendant to carry his equipment (either a slave or a young relative), another drachma for him. Thus, a force of six thousand men could cost the state two talents per day. The cavalry were paid twice the rate for infantry. So, six hundred cavalry cost the State twelve hundred drachmas for each day on campaign. On the other hand, campaigns were usually not of long duration: a few days to march to the location, some manoeuvring, followed by the battle that lasted one day. But the battle of Khaironeia was much more expensive. The skirmishing and jockeying for position took up parts of two campaigning seasons, those of 339 and 338, and only took place late in the season in August.

The Navy The main arm of Athenian military power in both the fifth and fourth century was its navy. The navy involved an enormous commitment in cost and service. Each ship carried a complement of 200. Thirty of these were marines and the crew who ran the ship; the other 170 were the rowers, arranged on both sides in three banks of oars (hence the name, trireme). Thus, a squadron of even 30 ships would involve a contribution in time and effort of 6,000 men. Unlike their colleagues on land, these men were in service for several months at a time. But that was not all that was involved. The Athenian rowers needed to practice continually in order to be able to keep time and to carry out the complicated naval manoeuvres necessary for success. As Perikles said, in the speech referred to earlier, Seamanship, like anything else, is a skill. It cannot be acquired and learned in off-moments. In fact, it leaves no time over for other things. (Thouk. 1.144) The navy was also expensive. Each of the two hundred men on board a trireme was paid one drachma per day. Thus a squadron of thirty ships would cost thirty talents for each month it was on operational duty.

The Revival of Athenian Naval Power in the Fourth Century As has been noted, after the Peloponnesian War, Athens’ fleet was reduced to twelve triremes and it is unlikely that any more were built between 405/4 and 394, when Konon and Pharnabazos sailed into the Peiraieus after their victory over the Spartans at Knidos. At that time, Konon and Pharnabazos made a gift of a number of their triremes to Athens, though we cannot be sure how many. According to our sources the Persian fleet was ninety strong, of which Konon’s share may only have been half, since we are told that in his campaigning activities in 396/5 he only had forty ships. It is unlikely that the Persian satrap, Pharnabazos, left all his ships behind in Athens. Probably, he left none there at all. On the other hand, in the Battle

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of Knidos, Konon had captured fifty Spartan triremes. If he only left half of these at Athens, along with his own contingent, then the Athenians acquired approximately seventy ships, without expense. These would probably have been adequate for their naval activity during the Corinthian War down to the King’s Peace (397/6–387/6). Thus, apart from paying the crews, the State need not have made any significant expenditure on its navy. In the years after the King’s Peace until the formation of her new League in 378/7, Athens was at peace and had no good reason to invest in shipbuilding; unless, that is, a law, requiring the Council to see to it that a certain number of triremes, possibly ten, were built during their year in office (Ath. Pol. 46.1) was already in place, as is suggested by a first or second century AD papyrus (the Strasbourg papyrus; see TDGR1, No. 94), containing what appears to be a commentary on Demosthenes’ speech 22 (Against Androtion). But, I consider this unlikely. Things changed, however, when the Second Athenian League was founded. It is surely no coincidence that from that same year (378/7) right down to the end of the democratic period we have detailed records of Athens’ naval resources (IG II2 1604–1632; see TDGR2, No.47)) that were published annually by the Superintendents of the Shipyards (epimeletai ton neorion). We know from Diodoros that Khabrias had eighty-three triremes in 376/5, when he won the battle of Naxos against the Spartan navarch, Pollis, and regained supremacy at sea for Athens (Diod. 15.34.5). Subsequently, Athens must have gone on a shipbuilding spree, since, according to the naval records mentioned above, she had 283 ships in 357/6, 349 in 353/2, 410 in 330/29 and 412 in 325/4.

The Management of the Navy Each hull may have cost up to a talent (six thousand drachmas) to build, depending on the timber market. They were built of fir or pine and the joins were sealed with pitch. The usual source for the wood and the pitch was Macedon, from where it was purchased and shipped to the Peiraieus. That is why Athens was careful to keep good diplomatic relations with the kings of Macedon in the fifth and fourth centuries, down to the time of Philip of Macedon. Construction of the hulls was under the supervision of a shipwright, each of whose name was recorded in the naval documents. The ships’ names were feminine, e.g., Mousike (“Arts”), Eudia (“Fair Weather”), Nike (“Victory”), Bakkhe (“Bacchante”). In addition to the hulls the ships were equipped with 200 oars, one for each of the 170 rowers and some extras for breakage; ropes for rigging; sails; a main mast and yardarm and sometimes a smaller set for emergencies; 2 steering oars, 2 ladders and 3 poles; screens to keep the sun and missiles off the rowers, anchors, anchor ropes and mooring lines. The wood for the oars was from Macedon. The papyrus and hemp for the ropes and the material for the sails was imported, mostly from Egypt. On top of all that, there was the bronze that was needed

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to sheath the beak, which was the main striking force of the trireme. This also had to be imported. In sum, the ships of the Athenian navy were expensive to build and maintain. More than that, their construction depended on a complex trading world, centred upon the Peiraieus, and an elaborate system of diplomacy, nurtured by alliances and honours, which the Demos handed out jealously. Even this was not the whole story. Each ship needed to be hauled out of the water and kept in a shipshed (neosoikos), when it was not at sea. Almost four hundred of these sheds lined the shores of the three harbours of the Peiraieus: Zea, Kantharos and Mounykhia. As for the rigging, the sails, and other equipment, they needed a home, too. In the 350s the Athenians began the building of a great Arsenal in the Peiraieus, designed by two famous architects, Euthydomos and Philon. When it was completed in 330, it was one of the most famous secular buildings in antiquity—a virtual temple to the navy. It was four hundred feet long and fifty-five feet wide. We are fortunate to have a huge inscription that details the specifications, from foundation to roof-structure, to be followed by the builders. The inscription begins, Gods. Specifications for the stone arsenal for the rigging, (designed by) Euthydomos, son of Demetrios, of Melite and Philon, son of Exekestides, of Eleusis. An arsenal shall be built for the rigging at Zea, beginning from the gateway that leads out of the agora as one approaches from the rear of the shipsheds that have a common roof, length four plethora [four hundred feet], width fifty feet and five, including the walls. . . . and concludes, All this work shall be completed by the contractors in accordance with the specifications and to the measurements and any specimen the architect may contrive, and they will deliver on the dates on which they agreed in their contract for each part of the work. (IG II2 1668) This great building was destroyed by the Roman general, Lucius Cornelius Sulla, in 86 BC. ATHENS’ MILITARY IN THE POST-DEMOCRATIC PERIOD As has been indicated elsewhere, after the defeat of Athens by Antipater in 322, its military power was greatly reduced, especially the navy. Though, on paper, there could still have remained as many as two hundred triremes in the harbour, these were largely useless. Not only was there a Macedonian garrison on Mounykhia hill controlling the Peiraieus, but the manpower for manning the ships was decimated by Antipater’s restriction of the franchise

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and his deportation of an unknown number of the disfranchised to Thrace. In addition, the State’s financial resources were low. Its ability to import all the necessary material for building and maintaining a fleet was compromised by Macedonian dominance of the Aegean, and its trading relations with its former suppliers severed. More devastating than this, however, were the modifications to the taxation system enacted by Demetrios of Phaleron during the years 317–307. He effectively dismantled the financial basis upon which the operation of the Athenian navy was built by eliminating the obligation imposed on the rich to fund the operation and maintenance of the fleet. Though we hear of a squadron of Athenian ships operating in the Aegean under Thymokhares of Sphettos in 315/314, their initial success was reversed by a loss to Antigonos’s navy at Lemnos, following which Athens’ long-standing control of the island of Delos was terminated. Athenian presence on the sea was clearly not a matter of concern for Demetrios of Phaleron, and over the next few years any ships that remained must have declined in effectiveness through lack of maintenance. Things might have changed in 307, however, when Demetrios of Phaleron’s rule was ended by his namesake, Demetrios, son of Antigonos the One-Eyed. Demetrios liberated the Peiraieus, and gave the Athenians a gift of timber for building one hundred ships. We have no way of knowing how many of these were actually built, or what happened to them if they were. Did they become Athenian or did they enter the service of Demetrios? All we can say is that in the next year (306) Demetrios won a great naval victory against Ptolemy of Egypt off the island of Cyprus, which gave him mastery of the seas for many years. Although a squadron of thirty Athenian ships took part in that battle, we hear little more of specifically Athenian naval activity after this. Athens’ navy and its control of the sea was no longer a focus of the State’s military strategy. From the end of the fourth century onwards the main concern was protection of the territory (khora) of Attika, especially with regard to the local production of grain. The result of the degradation of the navy was that the forts and walls of Attika, described earlier, now assumed a primary role in the city’s defences. Walled centres like Eleusis, Panakton and Phyle to the north, and Rhamnous, Thorikos and Sounion on the east coast were strongholds of refuge for the locals, but primarily places where garrisons were stationed to secure the surrounding countryside and its produce. There were also makeshift rubble forts scattered around the countryside. The garrisons were manned by combined forces of citizen-troops and mercenaries, no longer by the young eighteen to twenty-year-olds doing their military training, as had been the case in the fourth century. Their number declined dramatically from a high of six hundred in the 330s to about twenty-nine or thirty in 262 at the time of the Khremonidean War. Even the command structure had changed in a manner to reflect the new reality. According to Aristotle’s Constitution of the Athenians of the early 320s, of the ten annual generals elected each year, four were delegated to

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specific duties—one for the hoplites operating abroad, one for the countryside (khora), and two others for the Peiraieus (Ath. Pol. 61.1). In the third century we find no generals for the Peiraieus (for obvious reasons), and the hoplite general clearly has responsibility for the defence of the city, using the tribal levies and the greatly depleted cavalry (now about two or three hundred instead of its fifth and fourth century strength of one thousand). In the countryside (khora) there appear two generals, one operating out of Eleusis in the north, the other out of Rhamnous on the coast. These were specifically in charge of the garrisons. In keeping with everything else that was going on in early Hellenistic Athens (i.e. the period between the death of Alexander the Great and the Khremonidean War), the commanders had to be men of means, since they often had to provide food, weapons and protection for their troops at their own expense. We frequently find inscriptions, voted by soldiers and/or local residents, honouring commanders of garrisons for such benefactions. One such is a detailed decree from the people of Rhamnous in honour of Epikhares, dated to 264/3, in the course of the Khremonidean War. A translation of the relevant portions provides a vivid picture of the scope and manner of warfare in and around the fortresses of the Attic countryside, and the significant role played by the commander. Nikostratos, son of Epiteles, of Rhamnous made the motion: Since Epikhares, having been elected cavalry commander in the archonship of Lysitheides (272/1), took good care of the cavalry in a manner that accorded with the law, he was voted a crown (then) by the council, the People and the cavalrymen, and when once again in the archonship of Peithidemos (268/7) the People elected him general (strategos) and assigned him to the coastal countryside, taking care of the guard in a noble and public-spirited manner, he saved the fort for the People during a time of war. And he helped to bring the produce into the camp, both the grain from the land and the fruit from the trees, within a radius of thirty stades, and set up towers in the countryside for the lookout men (kruptoi), while he himself lay in wait on guard with his soldiers to see that the harvesting of the crops may be accomplished as safely as possible for the farmers. And he took care of the vines in all the territory under his control. Furthermore, he erected a stoa at his own expense, so that, if the need arise, all might keep watch and help could arrive readily, if needed. He built two watchtowers and added dogs to the existing ones, the feed for which he himself provided, to make the watch more effective. He put up a general’s tent and refurbished the sanctuary of Nemesis, so that it might be respected and in a fine and pious state for the demesmen. He imported five hundred bushels of wheat and five hundred of barley, advancing the cost from his own funds, and distributed them to the citizens and the soldiers at the established price (Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum, vol.24, no. 154)

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The inscription goes on to record that he ransomed prisoners at a cost of 120 drachmas each, that he punished those who aided pirates by guiding them into the country and, finally, that he supplied the troops of Patroklos (the commander of Ptolemy’s forces) and provided them with adequate accommodation. The services rendered by this garrison commander in his year of office were manifold, but they were typical. They show, however, the extent to which the Athenian people had become dependent upon, and consequently subservient to, wealthy individuals.

SUGGESTED READING Ancient Works Aristotle (1984), The Athenian Constitution, trans. P.J. Rhodes (Harmondsworth)

Modern Works Casson, L. (1971), Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World (Princeton) Gabrielsen, V. (1994), Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations (Baltimore and London) Harding, P. (1988), ‘Athenian Defensive Strategy in the Fourth Century,’ Phoenix 42: 61–71 McCredie, J. R. (1966), Fortified Military Camps in Attica (Hesperia, Suppl. 11, Princeton) Morrison, J. S. and J. F. Coates (1986), The Athenian Trireme: The History and Reconstruction of an ancient Greek Warship (Cambridge) Ober, J. (1985), Fortress Attica (Leiden) Oliver, G. J. (2007), War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens (Oxford) Pritchard, D. M. (ed.) (2010), War, Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens (Cambridge) Pritchett, W. K. (1971), Ancient Greek Military Practices, Part I (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London) Sifakis, T. C. (1951), The Hoplite General in Athens (Princeton) Wycherly, R. E. (1978), The Stones of Athens (Princeton)

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From Taxation to Benefaction

FINANCING THE DEMOCRACY: TAXATION The Athenian democracy tolerated inequality in wealth, but sensibly taxed the rich for the good of its poorer citizens.

In 404/3 when the democrats regained control of the administration, the financial situation of the State was desperate. Not only did they no longer have the tribute payments or other forms of taxation they had imposed upon the members of the empire, they also had to face a serious loss in the income from the production of the silver mines in southern Attika, one of the main sources of Athens’ wealth, because the slaves who worked the mines had defected in huge numbers during the war. Furthermore, they had lost all their overseas possessions both public and private. For the public purse this meant the loss of the kleroukhies, especially those on the islands Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, from which they probably derived taxation in kind in the form of grain, if we can extrapolate from later fourth-century practice (see the following section, “Grain Tax Law”). The loss of overseas possessions in private hands only affected the wealthy, many of whom owned land outside Attika, but their loss would have diminished their ability to contribute to the revenues of the state in the form of taxes. Less significant, but still painful, was the decline in the number of resident aliens (metoikoi) in Attika. These were people who came to reside in Athens, accepting a variety of tax obligations, even though they lacked the political rights of the citizens. Though some of them became very rich through trade (only specially privileged metics could own land), most were like the foreign worker of today. In the fourth century, anyone who resided in Attika for more than thirty days had to register as a resident alien and pay the metic tax (metoikion) of twelve drachmas per day for men and six drachmas per day for independent women. It is not known whether this tax was in place in the fifth century. At any rate, these people were an important part of the economic engine of the Athenian state and the presumed decline in their numbers following the Peloponnesian War would have been a further drain on revenue. I say presumed, because we know

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that a substantial number of resident aliens remained in the Peiraieus and supported the democratic restoration in 403 (IG II2 10). Nevertheless, it is a reasonable assumption that their numbers increased with every sign of economic recovery at Athens. Indeed, the only positive economic data that we have for Athens at this time comes from the Peiraieus, where figures for the taxation on imports and exports, the pentekoste or 2 percent tax, indicate that trade was still flowing through the port. In a speech delivered in 400/399, the orator Andokides claims that in the previous year he had been part of a consortium that had purchased the right to collect the 2 percent tax for 36 talents, and that in this deal the consortium had made a small profit (Andokides, On the Mysteries, 134). That would indicate that already by 401/400, goods worth eighteen hundred talents were passing in and out of the Peiraieus, and the figures Andokides provides in the same passage suggest that the situation was much the same the year before (402/1). No wonder the democrats had seized the port as a key move in the restoration. As we have seen, the Peiraieus was a fundamental element in the prosperity of Athens during the democratic years. Since the oligarchic movements of the late fifth century had made elimination of state pay a fundamental part of their platform, it is not surprising that the restored democracy should have been eager to reaffirm the ideological commitment of democracy to remuneration for service in order to encourage popular participation. Sometime in the 390s, the Athenians even found the funds to introduce a new payment of one obol for attendance at the Assembly (Ath. Pol. 41.3. By 392, this payment had increased to three obols (Aristophanes, Assemblywomen, 289–311). And this despite the fact that since 396 Athens had been involved in the Corinthian War! We can only conjecture how this could have been managed in the first two decades of the fourth century, but revenue from trade must have played an important part. No doubt, also, the wealthy were pressed to contribute, however reluctantly. But the most important help came from the Great King in the form of cash and triremes. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, in 397/6 Persian money was distributed to several Greek cities, amongst them Athens, to stir up war against the Spartans, and in 394 a Persian fleet commanded by Pharnabazos, a Persian provincial governor, and Konon, an Athenian, defeated the Spartan fleet near Knidos. This fleet sailed to Athens, where some of the ships remained as a gift from the King. Gradually, Athens’ financial situation was beginning to improve, to the extent that in 388 Aristophanes could celebrate the return of some level of financial stability to the Athenian peasants in his last extant play, Wealth. In the play, Kremylos, a typical Attic peasant (Aristophanes’ usual comic hero), and his slave Karion, bring a blind old man to Athens. He turns out to be the god Ploutos (“Wealth”), who is blind so that he cannot distinguish between good and bad people when bestowing his favour. They take him to the sanctuary of Asklepios, the healing god, where his sight is restored.

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He can now tell the difference, and as a result prosperity returns to the deserving people—Kremylos and his friends, the chorus of farmers—but not before Kremylos wins a debate with an old woman representing Poverty, who warns against the corrupting influence of wealth and claims that she has kept people hard-working and honest. Her warnings are roundly rejected and the play ends with Kremylos preparing a festival procession to conduct Wealth to the Akropolis, to install him “in the place where he was previously installed, guarding the Treasury of Athena in the Parthenon” (Aristophanes, Wealth, 1191–1193). The King’s Peace of 387/6, which ended the Corinthian War, gave the Athenians a chance to rest from conflict and pull themselves together, but in the 370s, about the time of the foundation of the Second Athenian League, we have documentary evidence of moves to put the financial affairs of Athens on a sound footing. In 378/7 there was a major overhaul of the procedure for assessment of liability for payment of the property tax (eisphora), and probably a systematization of the responsibility of the wealthy for the performance of what were known then as liturgies (literally, ‘works for the people’). This was followed in 375/4 by a law designed to restore confidence in the value of Athenian coinage, and in 374/3 by another law regarding the 8 1/3 percent tax (dodekate) on grain from the islands Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros. From this point on, it is possible to analyse the Athenian financial system with a greater degree of confidence.

Basic Principles of the Financial System Aristotle’s Athenaion Politeia, chapters 47 and 48, provide valuable information about the financial system of the Athenian democracy in the fourth century. Whilst it appears that Athens operated with one central treasury in the fifth century, by at least 386 the State had adopted a procedure (the merismos, or allocation) of disbursing funds at the beginning of the year (midsummer) to each magistracy that had a financial competence on an estimated projection of how much it might need. Then, it was up to the individual magistracy to manage its own budget. A board of ten sellers, the poletai, selected by lot one from each tribe, sold out contracts and leases, and another board of ten, the receivers (apodektai), similarly selected, took in the proceeds and allocated them to the responsible bodies. All transactions were recorded by a public slave, though the whole process was supervised by the Council of Five Hundred, and conducted with absolute transparency. Most payments were due just before the end of the administrative year, which was midsummer. Any surplus that occurred was allocated to the Military Fund (stratiotika) down to the middle of the fourth century. After the Social War (357–355/4), however, the surplus was redirected to the Theoric Fund, a body of money that helped the less well-off pay for their attendance at the dramatic and other festivals, all of which were integral to the civic life of the State. The officials in charge of this fund somehow

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came to wield an overall supervision of the State’s finances. This elected body evolved into the board controlled by Lykourgos in the period after the Battle of Khaironeia in 338, the board in charge of the administration (hoi epi tei dioikesei). Under this more professional control, the State’s finances improved dramatically, from a low of 130 talents at the end of the Social War to 400 talents a decade or so later, and finally to 1,200 talents under Lykourgos after the dissolution of the Second Confederacy. This only goes to show that the Demos was sensibly prepared to surrender some of its control to experts when it saw the benefit. During the democratic period discussed here (404–322) there were many and varied sources of revenue. The following is a discussion of some of the main sources of revenue.

Mining Leases Athens was unusual amongst Greek city-states in having a source of mineral wealth in the silver deposits in southern Attika, near Laurion. Whilst the surface above the deposits was owned by individuals, usually farmers, the State owned the ground beneath. In a felicitous blend of state control and private initiative (what we might call a public–private partnership) the State auctioned the leases for the various mining veins, for shorter or longer periods, and at more or less cost depending on the projected returns, to wealthy speculators, who then had to organize the necessary facilities, negotiate with the owner of the surface territory for use of their land, purchase a workforce of slaves, all at their own expense. The great improvement in Athens’ financial position under Euboulos and Lykourgos, between 355 and 323, was to a considerable extent the result of their encouragement of mining activity by their wealthy friends. Once the ore had been extracted, it had to be sent to the state mint to be made into coin before it was returned to the speculator, minus a tax of 3 percent held back by the State for services rendered. The coinage that was produced was famous for its quality, and was recognized throughout the Aegean and beyond by its distinctive design of the head of Athena and her owl. Indeed, it was so famous that it appears that other silver-producing states often tried to forge copies. This was, probably, the motive for the introduction of a law in 375/4 regarding the public slave who was responsible for sitting in the city-agora to test coinage for forgery, and for the provision to purchase another such person to work in the markets of the Peiraieus. It begins “Attic silver shall be accepted when it is found to be silver and has the public stamp” (TDGR2, No. 45).

Other Leases and Contracts We have already mentioned the 2 percent tax on goods being imported and exported through the Peiraieus. In order to secure a stable income up front,

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the State auctioned the right to collect this tax to wealthy individuals (usually groups of investors), who were then left to collect the taxes by themselves, and were allowed to keep any funds in excess of their bid. This is another example of the system of “public–private partnership.” The public officials, the poletai, also sold at auction the property of anyone who had gone into exile after conviction or who had been deprived of his citizenship rights for any reason (e.g., the Thirty Tyrants). The proceeds belonged to the State, with a tithe going to Athena. Finally, another source of revenue came from the lease of any sacred lands that were owned by the State. The leases of these state-owned properties were presented to the Council by the archon basileus, the titular head of the state religion. There were other such properties owned by private cult groups and associations, which were similarly leased, but those proceeds belonged to them.

Eisphora On occasion, despite its best calculations, Athens sometimes needed supplementary funds on an emergency basis. This was usually to fund an unexpected military expedition or a squadron of triremes. On those occasions, the Assembly could be asked to vote an eisphora. The eisphora was a tax on property that already existed in the fifth century. It is first mentioned in an inscription of 434/3 as something that could only be proposed, or put to the vote, after a decree of immunity for the proposer from prosecution (adeia) had been voted by the Assembly (IG 13 52 B19). This implies that the idea was known, but strongly restricted. The first recorded use of the tax was in 428/7 in the early years of the Peloponnesian War (Thouk. 3.19). In the fourth century, after 378/7, the exaction of the eisphora was more structured. We are told by a very reliable source that, at a time when the Athenians and the Thebans embarked on a war against the Spartans (surely 378/7), they made an assessment of the total rateable value of the “whole land of Attika and the houses and likewise the remaining property” and found the total valuation to be 5,750 talents (Polybios, 2.62.7). This figure is confirmed by Demosthenes, although he rounded it up to 6,000 talents (Dem. 14.19), and he is followed in this by another authority, the Atthidographer Philokhoros (Atthis, Fragment 46). Thus we have a very precise figure for the tax base upon which the property tax (eisphora) was assessed by the Athenian state in the fourth century. We are surely right to assume that the State had a complete register of qualified properties as a result of the assessment mentioned above, even though the individual property owner may well have been responsible for making his own assessment (timema). So, when its finances fell short of need, the Assembly could call for the appropriate levy. If the situation called for a subvention of thirty talents, a half percent of six thousand would suffice, if

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sixty talents, then 1 percent, and so on. This is the system that Demosthenes describes in his speech, On the Symmories, paragraph 27. Regarding the number of citizens who were liable for the property tax, the evidence is unclear. The same reliable source, Philokhoros, is reported as saying that the Athenians were divided into “contribution-groups” (symmories) for tax-paying purposes for the first time in the archonship of Nausinikos in 378/7 (Atthis, Fragment 41), and that the number of the wealthiest men in Athens who performed the liturgies (to be discussed below) was twelve hundred (Atthis, Fragment 45). Some assume that these contribution groups were for both the payment of the property tax and for the liturgies and that, therefore, only twelve hundred citizens were liable for both. Others argue that the property tax must have been imposed upon a larger group, maybe even as many as six thousand. It is not possible, in the present state of our knowledge, to come to a definitive conclusion on this issue, but the arguments of those who believe that different numbers were involved are more persuasive. In any case, once again, the State made sure to get its money up front, by selecting the three richest men (payers of proeisphora) in each of one hundred contribution groups (symmories) to pay the allocation for its group and then left them to recoup their money from the other members.

Liturgies (Leitourgiai) And the seventh part of the State is the one that performs liturgies by means of its possessions, which we call the wealthy class. —Aristotle, Politics, 1291 a33–34

Far and away the most expensive imposition on the wealthiest twelve hundred citizens by the fourth-century democracy was the system of public services, called liturgies (“works for the people”). In this system a person would be selected, or would volunteer, to perform a certain service to the state at his own expense. It was up to him how extravagantly or stingily he performed this service. Technically the liturgy was not a tax, but a canny exploitation of the ambition for distinction (philotimia) of the elite members of the society. Nevertheless, since it was organized and obligatory, it was a very effective method of wealth distribution, and certainly must have felt like a tax. Though a liturgist could boast about his generosity to the demos, and hope to reap some sympathy, especially when on trial in the law courts, the fact that it was involuntary deprived it of spontaneity and consequently diminished its attractiveness. It was phased out during the rule of Demetrios of Phaleron (317–307), and never fully reinstituted. As we shall see, it was replaced by a system of private benefactions (epidoseis), which was much more to the liking of the wealthy. Philanthropy (euergesia) is a matter of personal choice, whereas the liturgy was a compulsory obligation.

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There was a large number of these liturgies—about one hundred annually. In other words, at least one hundred men were called upon each year to perform these services. Most were concerned with funding the state-run festivals. They might involve, for example, hosting a celebratory banquet for the members of one’s tribe or deme (hestiasis), leading a delegation to one of the Panhellenic festivals (arkhitheoria), paying the cost of a torch race ( gymnasiarkhia), or paying for the training and equipment of a chorus at a dramatic festival, like the Lenaia or the Dionysia (choregia). These were the recurrent obligations. They could cost the liturgist as little as fifty drachmas, or as much as three thousand (i.e., half a talent). Even wealthy metics were liable for some of these obligations. A person could not be required to perform more than one liturgy in the same year and, in the case of these recurrent duties, could not be required to undertake the obligation two years running (i.e., they had a year’s respite). Far more onerous were the irregular military liturgies. One of these, the responsibility imposed upon the richest three hundred to pay in advance the property tax on behalf of their symmory’s members (proeisphora), has already been mentioned. Though the eisphora itself was unquestionably a tax, the proeisphora was a liturgy in the sense that these wealthy men were performing a ‘service for the people’ by making the initial outlay, and then taking upon themselves the task of exacting contributions from their fellows. The most burdensome liturgy of all was the trierarchy (trierarkhia), which involved the liturgist in funding a warship (trireme) for any campaign that might take place in his year of service. The State provided the hull, the rigging, the oars and other equipment necessary, and paid the crew at one drachma per day. This may make it sound as though the trierarch’s expenses were minor, but that was not the case. He was responsible for returning everything in good condition, and had to pay for any loss or damage. A broken oar or two, or a torn sail would be minor compared with the possibility of replacing the whole ship if it had been lost or damaged. In order to avoid such expenses, trierarchs often opted to spend extra money in advance by fitting out their ship with better equipment, and hiring a more experienced crew at additional expense. This could also be a matter of self-preservation. Since the obligation also usually entailed sailing on the ship as captain, a faster hull and a fitter crew could be the difference between life and death. It was, however, possible to avoid this latter situation by hiring a professional to replace him. This liturgy could, and often did, cost the liturgist as much as a talent (six thousand drachmas), which would be a sizable slice out of most participants’ estate, given that the base eligibility for performing a liturgy was possession of property worth three to four talents. As a result the state generously gave a respite specifically for men who performed trierarchies two years’ grace before they were called upon again. The trierarchic system was reformed more than once in the fourth century. Already in the late fifth century it had become possible for two men to share

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the responsibility (syntrierarchy), and this idea was taken further by the law of Periander, which was passed in 357. Under this law the twelve hundred men liable for this liturgy were organized into twenty contribution groups (symmories) of sixty men. Each symmory was responsible for up to twenty triremes. Some men were on active duty as trierarchs, others helped cover expenses as “joint contributors” (synteleis). The wealthiest three hundred were spread amongst the symmories. The system sounds like a sensible way of dividing up the burden amongst the liturgists, but in fact it seems to have imposed a greater burden on the less wealthy, and enabled the richest three hundred to get off too lightly. Subsequently, in 340, on the eve of conflict with Philip of Macedon, Demosthenes changed the system again and made the wealthiest three hundred fully responsible.

Epidosis The epidosis was an extraordinary gift or donation. From of old it had been the practice in the city-states, at various levels of administration, from cult associations to demes and even the central government, to call upon its wealthy to make subventions of cash or kind in times of shortage or emergency. This was over and above contributions of tax and liturgy. The reward for the donor was a public recognition of his benefaction. Athens was no exception. But in the years following the Battle of Khaironeia (338), Lykourgos had elevated the epidosis into an important part of his financial programme, encouraging citizens and metics to step up to the plate when extra expenditure was called for. This was exemplified dramatically by Demosthenes, when he took over the supervision of a section of the rebuilding of the walls at a personal expense of ten thousand drachmas (one and a half talents). Later, after the fall of the democracy and the elimination of the liturgical and taxation system described here, this democratic practice of inviting extra contributions (epidosis) became the regular way for the State to raise funds or secure grain for the people. Besides the information provided in the following section, the importance of epidosis to the wealthy land-owning class is demonstrated by an inscription from the archonship of Diomedon (248/7), which lists over sixty citizens who responded to a request for donations up to two hundred drachmas to pay for troops to protect the collection of local grain. Almost all of the respondents were from families known to be wealthy. Unfortunately this is beyond the period of this study, but it is probably typical. AFTER DEMOCRACY: BENEFACTION During the time of the rule of Demetrios of Phaleron (317–307), the financial system of Athens was completely transformed, and never successfully reconstituted, even in the period of the so-called nationalist democracy

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(287/6–262/1). Demetrios put an end to the whole liturgical system, freeing the wealthy from organized and obligatory payments. Instead, the governing of the State came to depend on voluntary donations and benefactions from public-spirited individuals who had the inclination and wealth to be able to afford them. In return, these individuals received public recognition for their generosity (euergesia) and for their public-spiritedness (philotimia). These often took the form of detailed honorary decrees that read like fullscale histories of their services to the State.

Honorary Decrees To be sure, honorary decrees were not new. In the democratic years of the fifth and fourth centuries the Athenians had been in the habit of honouring those who acted in the interests of, or to the benefit of, the Demos. But these honours were originally not extravagant. For example, an Olympic victor would receive an olive crown and dining rights (sitesis) in the Town Hall (prytaneion). Even the sixty to seventy Heroes of Phyle, the men who restored the democracy in 404/3, only received an olive crown each and one thousand drachmas between them for making sacrifices (TDGR2, No 7; Aiskh. 3.187), though some of them may also have been granted freedom from taxation (ateleia). Citizens could be voted a gold crown worth a certain amount of drachmas, which they were expected to donate back to the city’s coffers, by handing it over, as a dedication, to the Treasurers of Athena on the Akropolis. For example, the annual Council (boule) of Five Hundred expected to receive a crown, if it had performed its term of office well. Sometimes, it might be stipulated that the crown be proclaimed publicly in the Assembly, at one of the festivals, or in the theatre. Such was the crown proposed for Demosthenes by Ktesiphon in 336 for “always speaking and acting in the best interests of the Athenians” (Dem. On the Crown, 57). This was the crown that so enraged Aiskhines that he indicted Ktesiphon for unconstitutional proposal (graphe paranomon), an indictment that led in 330 to the famous lawsuit, On the Crown. More generously, the Demos might honour a very distinguished performance (usually military) with a statue, as, for example, was voted for Konon after his victory in the Battle of Knidos (394), and for Khabrias after his naval victory over the Spartans in 376/5 at Naxos. More elaborate were the honours voted for foreigners who had been benefactors of the State—e.g., citizenship, freedom from taxation, the honour of representing Athenian interests and protecting its citizens in their home State (proxenia) and the right of owning land and a house in Attika (enktesis). These honours were a tool in democratic Athens’ diplomacy to cultivate good foreign relations, especially with important trading partners. But, the surviving honorary decrees from the democratic period are usually quite restrained in their vocabulary, commending the honouree for his virtue and for being “a good man” toward the People of Athens, and only

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briefly describing what he did. Much of the decree is devoted to describing the honours Athens is giving to the honouree in return, and laying out the bureaucratic process of how the decree will be implemented and which magistracy will pay for it. These decrees were designed to encourage others to act in a similar fashion by emphasizing that “the Council and the Demos know how to show fitting gratitude to those who work vigorously on their behalf.” Increasingly, however, in the latter part of the fourth century, especially during the so-called Lykourgan period (336–324), these decrees became more numerous and fulsome. Lykourgos himself proposed several of them to encourage the wealthy, citizen and resident alien alike, to use their money voluntarily in the service of the State. A good example are the honours voted for Eudemos of Plataia, obviously a rich contractor, for promising to contribute four thousand drachmas for military use and for employing at his own expense one thousand yoke of oxen to haul stones for the construction of the Stadium and a theatre (TDGR2, No. 118). The embellishment of the format of the honorary decree that evolved in the latter years of the democracy blossomed at the end of the fourth century. A very detailed inscription honouring the resident aliens (metoikoi), Nikandros of Ilion and Polyzelos of Ephesos, for their numerous acts of generosity to Athens in peace and war, over an extended period from 347/6 down to the time of the Four Years’ War (307/6–304/3), was voted in 301, probably at their own request (TDGR2, No. 139). This full-scale review of their services to the State is a harbinger of what will come in the third century. Outstanding, in this regard, are three huge inscriptions: one for Philippides of Kephale of 283/2 (IG II2 657), which is 73 lines long, another for Kallias of Sphettos of 270/69, 109 lines in length, and the third for his brother, Phaidros of Sphettos (IG II2 682), 101 lines. The last was voted in 255/4, at a time when Athens was once again dominated by Macedon and beyond the period of this book, but it is relevant, since it passes in review the long career of Phaidros, which extended back at least to 296/5, when he was first elected general (strategos). Over their long careers, these individuals donated time and money to the cause of “preserving the city and the countryside,” especially to bringing in the crucial local harvest. They also used their influence abroad with powerful rulers to secure gifts of largesse for the city. Only the very wealthy could have the leisure and resources for such benefaction. They are typical of the ruling elite in the city-states of the Hellenistic period.

Phillipides of Kephale Philippides of Kephale was the son of Philokles, a man who had been a member of the elite in the fourth-century democracy. Philippides made a name for himself as one of the successful writers of comedy, winning first prize at the Dionysia of 312/11. Though he wrote New Comedies, he appears to

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have been willing to employ more of the personal attack associated with Old Comedy than his contemporary Menander (Plutarch, Demetrios, 12). It was, in fact, an attack on the politician Stratokles in 301 that led to his exile. He went off to the court of Lysimakhos in Thrace, where he became very popular. At Lysimakhos’ court Phillipides used his influence to secure many benefactions for his home State. He also performed several good deeds himself. These benefactions are described in an honorary decree of the archonship of Euthios (283/2), proposed by a fellow demesman, Nikeratos, son of Phileas, of Kephale (IG II2 657; TDGR3, No. 11). The deeds for which he is honoured extend over many years. In 299/8 he persuaded Lysimakhos to send the Athenians ten thousand medimni of wheat and a new mast and yardarm for hanging Athena’s peplos on the Panathenaic ship for the festival procession of 298. Phillipides himself had paid out of his own pocket for the burial of those Athenians who had died at the Battle of Ipsos (301), fighting for Antigonos and Demetrios. He secured the release of those who had been taken prisoner in that battle and arranged for those who wanted to reenrol in Lysimakhos’ army. He also paid for the return to their homes of more than three hundred men who wanted to be demobilized and negotiated the release of other Athenians who had been left behind in Asia, constrained to be there by Antigonos and Demetrios. Furthermore, Phillipides always aided any delegation from Athens to gain audience with Lysimakhos, “continuously doing and saying what was advantageous for the safety of the city,” and urging the king to provide assistance with money and grain to keep the Demos free. Finally, when in 284/3 he was elected agonothetes (man in charge of festivals), Phillipides performed all his duties for the citizens’ benefit at his own expense and amongst other things, put on an additional presentation for Demeter and Kore. In doing all this “he spent much money from his own pocket,” yet was willing to present himself for scrutiny of accounts in accordance with the laws, where he was found to have “done nothing contrary to the democracy either in word or deed.” For all these reasons he was praised for “his virtue and the goodwill he always showed towards the People of Athens,” and it was voted to honour him with a golden crown, which would be proclaimed at the Great Dionysia, and a bronze statue in the theatre. He and his oldest son also received dining rights at the town hall, and the privilege of sitting in the front row at the dramatic presentations.

Kallias of Sphettos Kallias of Sphettos was another Athenian who left Athens and made his career in the court of a Hellenistic king, in his case, Ptolemy. He and his brother, Phaidros, were both sons of Thymokhares, the man who had commanded an Athenian squadron in the Aegean in 315/14, when Athens was under the control of Macedon. Unlike his brother, who stayed at home in Athens and worked with the rulers in Macedon, Kallias left Attika,

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probably about the same time as Demokhares and Philippides, around the turn of the century. He went abroad and found employment in Egypt. Kallias rose to a position of importance in the court of Ptolemy I (Soter), king of Egypt, and, from there, provided much assistance to Athens in the same way that Philippides had. In 270/69, in the archonship of Sosistratos, he was honoured in an extensive decree that reviewed his benefactions over many years (see Shear in the suggested reading for the original publication and cf. TDGR3, No. 55. All translations here are mine). Unlike Philippides, who was a man of the theatre, Kallias had military and diplomatic responsibilities in Ptolemy’s administration. It is, in fact, in a military capacity that he is first mentioned in the decree. He was in charge of a Ptolemaic mercenary force on the island of Andros in 287/6, at the time when Athenian nationalists were struggling to liberate themselves from Demetrios Poliorketes, after his expulsion from Macedon. Kallias brought one thousand mercenary troops from Andros into Attika at his own expense and used them to assist in bringing in the harvest. When, despite his help, Athenian resistance to Demetrios was overcome, Kallias answered the call of the People and acted as their representative in the negotiations with Ptolemy’s ambassador, Sostratos. During this time Kallias kept his mercenary force in the city, presumably paying them himself. Later, after the accession of Ptolemy II (Philadelphos) in 283, Kallias begged Ptolemy on the city’s behalf for help, both in cash and grain, securing fifty talents of silver and twenty thousand medimni of wheat. In 282, when Ptolemy II established a festival, the Ptolemaia, in honour of his father, Ptolemy I (Soter), and the city chose Kallias to lead its official delegation, he refused to receive any financial support for his role, but instead performed all his duties at his own expense, including paying for the sacrifices. Also, in a religious context, he used his influence to persuade Ptolemy to donate new ropes for the hanging of Athena’s peplos on the Panathenaic ship, much as Philippides had extracted a mast and yardarm from Lysimakhos for the same ritual. Obviously, Kallias had returned to Athens at some time for him to be able to perform these functions, but clearly he went back to his duty as a mercenary commander for Ptolemy, since the last act for which he is honoured was performed while he was in Halikarnassos on Ptolemy’s orders. There, he aided and supported all the embassies that came from Athens and used his influence with the king for the benefit of the People. In conclusion, we learn that “after the overthrow of the democracy, and during a time of oligarchy” (the precise reference of these phrases is in dispute) Kallias had allowed his property to be expropriated, so that “none of his actions was in contravention of the laws or the democracy that is based upon all Athenians.” The last clause is an expansion of the same claim made about Philippides, that “he had done nothing contrary to the democracy either in word or deed.” Similar, too, are the list of honours accorded to Kallias. These two men, along with others, like Demokhares of Leukonoe, were amongst those Athenians who are often dubbed Nationalists by modern

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scholars, because they left Athens (or were exiled) during the rule of Demetrios of Phaleron and/or the oligarchic government instituted by Demetrios the Besieger between 295 and 287, and, by contrast, seem all to have returned during the ‘democratic’ years, 287–262. Demokhares, himself, was the object of similar honours, proposed by his son Lakhes (Plutarch, Moralia, 851 d–f) in 271, and had previously secured the reinstatement of the reputation of his uncle, the great orator Demosthenes. No doubt they all genuinely believed in the democratic constitution and passionately proclaimed themselves as supporters of democratic institutions, which demonstrably existed. But the outward appearance of their government belied the reality of life for the ordinary citizen. Nationalist democrats or not, they were all wealthy, and the operation of the administration depended upon their largesse, no less than that of other wealthy citizens of an opposing political persuasion, as can be seen from the frequent reference to their voluntary use of their own funds on behalf of the Demos.

Phaidros of Sphettos A quite different career can be witnessed in the case of Kallias’ brother, Phaidros, one that demonstrates that those who stayed in Athens and worked under all controlling powers could also be rewarded as benefactors of the People. The difference is that the award for Phaidros was made in 255/4 (IG II2 682), when Athens was controlled by the Macedonian king, Antigonos Gonatas. Though the wording is similar and the honours voted to Phaidros are identical to those given to his brother and to Philippides, the actions for which he is honoured took place during periods of Macedonian occupation. Indeed, the first eighteen lines of the extant inscription (the beginning is lost) are all about his father, Thymokhares, whose exploits belonged to the time when Kassander controlled Athens through his man, Demetrios of Phaleron. Phaidros is introduced in lines 18–19 as being of the same inclination as his ancestors, i.e., following his father’s policy. By contrast, the decree for Kallias, also a son of Thymokhares, makes no mention of his father’s career. From 296/5 to 287/6, when Demetrios the Besieger was managing the administration at Athens in an oligarchic manner, Phaidros was repeatedly elected to the key position of general (strategos) in various capacities, during the last of which, in the archonship of Kimon (288/7), he “preserved peace for the territory during troublesome times” and “brought in the local grain and produce.” His military career ended in the next year, at the same time as his brother Kallias came to the fore. A summary statement claims that he handed over to those who followed a city that was free and democratically autonomous. Thereafter, he held no other political position, but did perform the costly role of agonothetes and is said to have “fulfilled all his public services in a public-spirited manner” and contributed to all the donations (epidoseis) that were requested.

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This discussion is sufficient to show that there was still a lively disagreement amongst Athenians about the ostensible machinery of government, though they all called it democracy, a concept that was becoming increasingly meaningless. Both sides of the political spectrum could claim to be ‘democratic’; their difference lay less in the issue of who should be in charge, but more on the question of whom to support. Phaidros and his like sided with whomever was in power in Macedon. Kallias and company found support further afield in the service of Hellenistic monarchs like Lysimakhos and Ptolemy. Both groups were equally elite, and both could equally be called patriotic, in as much as they voluntarily contributed to the public cause. Those who were happy to accommodate Macedonian influence were surely the landed wealthy, who benefitted greatly from territorial security for their crops. Those who looked for outside influence were the adventurers, the equivalent of the entrepreneurial class of the late fifth and fourth century. The peasants were simply pawns in their game.

SUGGESTED READING Ancient Works Aristotle (1984), The Athenian Constitution, trans. P. J. Rhodes (Harmondsworth)

Modern Works Buchanan, J. (1962), Theorika (New York) Crosby, M. (1950), ‘The Leases of the Laureion Mines,’ Hesperia 19: 189–312 Crosby, M. (1957), ‘More Fragments of Mining Leases from the Athenian Agora,’ Hesperia 26: 1–23 Davies, J. K. (1971), Athenian Propertied Families (Oxford) Davies, J. K. (1981), Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens (Salem) Henry, A. S. (1983), Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees (Hildesheim) Hopper, R. J. (1953), ‘The Attic Silver Mines in the Fourth Century B.C.,’ Annual of the British School at Athens 48: 200–254 Oliver, G. L. (2007), War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens (Oxford) Rhodes, P. J. (1982), ‘Problems in Athenian Eisphora and Liturgies,’ American Journal of Ancient History, 7: 1–19 Shear, T. L. (1978), Kallias of Sphettos and the Revolt of Athens in 286 B.C. (Hesperia, Suppl. 17, Princeton) Thomsen, R. Eisphora (Copenhagen)

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THE DEMISE OF THE JURY-COURTS Democratic justice was equal justice for all by all.

Of necessity, this chapter will differ from others, because we know next to nothing about the administration of justice after the end of the democratic period in 322. Hence, this chapter will not follow the format of comparing the differences between the two periods, but rather focus upon the system as it existed in the fifth and fourth centuries and the objections of its critics amongst the elite, since those objections give the clearest indications about the way they probably administered justice when they became dominant, after the end of the democracy. Though we have references in the late fourth and third centuries in inscriptions and elsewhere to a law court (dikasterion), we have no idea how it functioned, and especially not who made up the jury. It is most unlikely, however, that the poorer elements of Athenian society predominated, as they had in the past, and questionable that they even participated at all. Not only had some been excluded from civic life, but the likelihood that jury duty was still remunerated is very slim. Despite what we are told about Demetrios of Phaleron’s financial abilities, the State’s revenues can hardly have been sufficient to afford such an expense. That is, of course, if anyone had wanted to. The ruling elite of the post-democratic period were the very people who had most vigorously railed against ‘the tyranny of the mob’ in the democratic law courts and, since we hear no more complaints of this kind, we can confidently deduce that things had changed to their liking.

Background to the Democratic System of Justice Nomos is a Greek word with a long history. Originally it denoted ‘habitual practice’ or ‘custom,’ but over time it came to stand for ‘the law.’ Nomos was the basis of community in any Greek city-state from the earliest days. But, in those early days, the so-called Archaic period (about 800–500), aristocratic families were in control of affairs. Those who controlled the State

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controlled the delivery of justice. In aristocratic society all magistracies were held by members of the leading families, and magistrates dispensed ‘justice.’ We see how this operated at the end of the eighth century from the writings of the epic poet, Hesiod. He was a hard-working peasant who had a dispute with his brother Perses over their property. Perses was more political than Hesiod and had gone to the Agora to court the judges, who dispensed justice there, and as a result he won the case. Hesiod angrily accuses these judges of being “eaters of bribes, who like to judge lawsuits” (Works and Days, 39). Gradually, the heads of leading families came together to form councils, like the Areiopagos in Athens. These councils represented the ultimate control of the judicial system by the elite. But there was another trend, that of the famous lawgivers of the late seventh and early sixth centuries. In Athens’ case, these were Drakon (621) and Solon (594). They introduced law-codes that defined the relationship between classes, and limited the uncontrolled ability of the wealthy to oppress the poor. Solon even established a popular court, called the Heliaia, to which people could appeal against the arbitrary judgements of the magistrates. The laws (nomoi) of Drakon and Solon, with modifications, became the basis of the laws of the Athenian democracy of the fifth and fourth centuries. They formed the underpinning of the democratic constitution and, through the work of other reformers, like Kleisthenes (507/6), Ephialtes (460s) and Perikles, the administering of them became the responsibility of the popular courts. Consequently, the courts increased greatly in number and many more jurors were required.

The Critics of Democratic Justice Now, it became the case that those who controlled the delivery of justice, controlled the State. As Aristotle pithily stated, “when the people control the ballot (in the courts), they control the State” (Ath. Pol. 9.1). It was not surprising that the elite did not like the situation and complained bitterly about the ‘tyranny of the mob’ in the courts. The antipathy of the elite to the popular courts (dikasteria) dated back to the mid-fifth century, when the highly esteemed politician, Perikles, a man of aristocratic lineage, introduced the idea of payment for jury duty. His proposal was opposed by another aristocrat, Kimon, son of Miltiades. In Plutarch’s view (Life of Perikles, 9; cf. Ath. Pol. 27.3–4), this clash between two political opponents was a matter of tactical expediency. Kimon was richer than Perikles and was buying votes by his generous largesse, in the form of free dinners and clothes for the poor. So, the latter hit upon the neat idea of winning popularity by using public money to counteract Kimon’s private wealth. This is probably a naïve interpretation, which conceals a fundamental difference of approach. Kimon believed in buying influence through benefaction, Perikles in wealth distribution by the State. Perikles’ purpose was to encourage participation in the handling of the increased workload of the courts, incurred by the operation of the democratic system and the administration of the empire.

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Following the death of Perikles in 429, a very different sort of man became associated with the popular jury-courts. This was Kleon, son of Kleainetos, a wealthy owner of a leather-tanning business. Not only was he a representative of the new class of entrepreneurial Athenians, who became rich through trade rather than ownership of land, but he was a new style of politician, whose oratory was of an inflammatory and populist kind. In particular, Kleon was very much a ‘hawk’ and attacked those who were less than enthusiastic about the Peloponnesian War, or had been unsuccessful in battle, or were in any way corrupt, and he prosecuted these people in the popular courts. Not surprisingly, Kleon was strongly disliked by the holders of old wealth, who despised him for his background and associated his success with the popular juries, whose pay he had increased from the original two obols to three. Thoukydides, the historian, who was one of those whose exile was brought about by Kleon, has nothing good to say about him (Thouk. 3.36.6; 4.21.3). Thoukydides’ views are echoed by Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 28.3). But the antipathy of the landed elite towards Kleon and, by extension, to the jury-courts, is particularly apparent in the plays of Aristophanes. Aristophanes liked to claim that he had a personal grudge against Kleon because the politician had taken him to court for maligning the State in his first, unpreserved play, Babylonians (Akharnians, 502–505). Whilst it is possible that all Aristophanes’ fuss on that issue may be much ado about nothing—it was the habit of the comedians to make fun of the leading politicians—he certainly attacked Kleon repeatedly and always in the context of his connection to the popular juries. For example, in the play Knights or Cavalrymen (discussed in the next chapter), the Paphlagonian is clearly a caricature of Kleon, who, when attacked, calls upon his jurymen supporters to come to his aid. The most explicit representation of this theme is to be found in Wasps, produced in the early spring of 422, just months before Kleon died in battle at Amphipolis. It is a typically Aristophanic play that at one and the same time ridicules both the jury system and its critics. Wasps centres upon a favourite Aristophanic theme of conflict between generations. Bdelykleon (‘he who loathes Kleon’) is the refined son of an anti-social, old peasant, called Philokleon (‘lover of Kleon’), whose life revolves around the law courts. The father is an obsessive juryman. He has passed over management of the family estate to his son, so that he can spend more time on jury duty. In an effort to cure him, his son has shut him up in the house. The opening scene sees his various hilarious attempts to escape, via the chimney as a cloud of smoke, through the door, and underneath the belly of a donkey, like Odysseus escaping from the cave of Polyphemos. But all is to no avail. Enter the chorus, dressed as wasps, because the stings in their tails represent the supposedly angry and aggressive character of the Athenian jurymen. They are a bunch of old men, illogically old enough to be Men-of-Marathon, who usually are cast in the role of standing up for traditional values. But, in

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this case, they are rabid jurymen, followers of Kleon, who are here before dawn to summon their friend Philokleon to join them at court. With the encouragement of the jurymen, Philokleon gnaws his way through the netting that is around the house and starts to lower himself down by rope. He is detected, however, by Bdelykleon and the household slaves, and stopped. There follows the standard battle scene, as the chorus attack Bdelykleon, but as usual they are calmed down enough to listen to argument. The debate (agon) follows. In this set piece of Aristophanic comedy, Philokleon and Bdelykleon put forward counterarguments—Philokleon to justify his passion, Bdelykleon to change his father’s ways. Philokleon begins with a lyrical description of the pleasures of jury duty, especially his delight in passing a guilty vote and demanding the harshest punishment, which he and his kind regularly do. And, how happy he feels when he returns home with his day’s pay of three obols, and is feted by his daughter and wife! Why, then, he feels like Zeus. Bdelykleon counters with the argument that Philokleon and his fellows are being taken advantage of by the politicians, who are paying them a pittance, while pocketing vast profits for themselves. Bdelykleon computes the annual revenue of Athens from tribute and taxes to be 2,000 talents and then proceeds to add up the cost of the dicasts’ pay over a year. He claims that it only amounts to 150 talents, just a small fraction of the total. Where, Bdelykleon asks, does the rest go? The answer, of course, is into the politicians’ pockets. On this basis, Bdelykleon refutes his father’s claim to be a god, like Zeus. Rather Philokleon is a dupe, and a slave to the tricks of the politicians and the litigants, who make settlements behind his back. The chorus is at once persuaded by Bdelykleon’s argument and urges Philokleon to yield, but he stubbornly refuses. So, his son tries another tack, and suggests that his father perform his jury duty at home, instead of going out to court. With much comic business a courtroom is set up and a hilarious mock trial organized. A criminal is found—the household dog, Labes, who has been caught stealing a cheese from the larder. The prosecutor is to be another dog, named Kur. These are thinly veiled stand-ins for real people— the general, Lakhes and the politician, Kleon. The trial is an allegory for Kleon’s real prosecution of Lakhes for embezzlement. Kur makes a good case and Philokleon is all set to cast his vote for guilt, but Bdelykleon takes over the defence of Labes and reduces his father to tears by his pitiful pleas. Finally, when Philokleon is ready to cast his vote, Bdelykleon persuades him to do it blindfold and leads him to drop his pebble in the urn for acquittal. When Philokleon realizes that he has done something he has never done before, he is devastated. At this point there is a pause in the action and a break in the dramatic illusion, as the chorus comes forward to deliver the parabasis, another formal element in Aristophanic comedy. When the action resumes, we find a stock transformation scene taking place, as Bdelykleon outwardly changes Philokleon from a peasant to a playboy, getting him to take off the clothes

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he wore to jury duty and doff an elegant cloak, and to change his old shoes for fashionable ‘Laconian’ ones. Philokleon also learns to walk in a mincing, aristocratic sort of way, and his son teaches him some ridiculous, highbrow conversational gambits. But the transformation is only skin deep. When he arrives at a dinner party, Philokleon’s true nature comes out. He gets drunk and violently disrupts the proceedings. He steals a slave girl, whom he brings back home, on the way abusing several people. The tables are turned on Bdelykleon, who, as master of the house, has to deal with the complaints against his father’s misbehaviour (just as a father would for a son). The play ends with Philokleon, rather like Zorba, inspired to dance. He challenges others to join him and some dancers come on stage. They all dance off stage together. As always with Aristophanes, the humour hits both ways and it is hard to tell where his sympathies lie, if anywhere. He makes fun of the jurymen, but equally ridicules the affected group of elitist critics. So, it is about time to turn from humour to reality. Though the voice of the critics of the democratic jury system has rung loudly down the ages, it is totally unjustified. Fortunately, Aristotle (in chapters 63–69 of his Constitution of the Athenians) has left us a detailed description of the organization and the operation of the jury-courts, a description that has been borne out by archaeological excavation in the Agora. These reveal a well-conceived system of jury selection and empanelment that was a model of rigorous scrutiny and impartiality, and was carefully designed to prevent bribery and corruption. This system stands in stark contrast to the negative depictions of the critics.

Democratic Justice and the Selection of Juries The Athenian legal system was victim-oriented, based upon the notion of self-help. A victim of crime was required to initiate a prosecution on his own behalf. In the case of a crime against a woman or a minor, the senior male relative was responsible for taking the perpetrator to court, and similarly in the case of a homicide, though homicide cases were tried in the court of the Areiopagos. Even in the event of a public crime, an offence against the State or its institutions, the citizen was the guardian of the laws. He was responsible for bringing the crime to the attention of the appropriate official by endeixis, essentially pointing the finger at the criminal. The State even encouraged people to bring suits on behalf of others, if they saw a crime being committed. These people were called sukophantai (‘fig-revealers’), and their activities generated a great deal of antipathy from the rich, since they could receive part of any fine imposed if they were successful, and, consequently, probably targeted the wealthy more than the poor. On the other hand, if they failed to get one-fifth of the jurors’ votes, or abandoned their case before completion, they were regarded as malicious and punished by a fine of one thousand drachmas or even loss of citizenship. Even magistrates were open to complaints from their fellow citizens (ho boulomenos, ‘the

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one who wants’), either at their scrutiny before entering office, or at their presentation of accounts at the end of their term (euthyne). All this litigation (and much more) came before the popular courts, which were the final court of appeal for all cases. Jury selection took place at the beginning of the administrative year in midsummer, when six thousand jurymen were selected by lot from the ten tribes, six hundred from each. They had to be a minimum of thirty years old. Thus, they were mature, but the comic notion that they were old men, long in the tooth, is not credible. There simply were not enough of those. These six thousand then became the pool of jurors for the next year. On any day when the courts were in session, in effect between 180 and 200 days, as many of these as were available turned up outside the courts, and lined up by tribe at one of ten entrances to the court complex in the Agora. These men had to be able to show that they were not in debt to the State and still had their civic rights. If they were accused of being in contravention, their case would have to go before a jury. The prospective jurors were met by ten officials—nine Thesmothetes and the secretary of that board, who made the tenth. One was assigned, by lot, to each of the ten tribal contingents. At each entrance there were two allotment machines, each with five columns of slots, headed with the first ten letters of the alphabet in order from alpha to kappa, and ten boxes. Into the boxes were placed the juror’s tickets, on which was written his name and one of the same ten letters of the alphabet. The first box would hold all the alphas, and so on. One ticket was chosen at random from each box by the presiding magistrate, and this person would be the ‘inserter.’ He would enter all the tickets from his box into the slots on the machine. All the alphas would go in the first column, one beneath the other. And the same would be done with the other tickets. Each machine was equipped with a tube with a large opening at the top and some sort of cranking mechanism at the bottom. The magistrate had a collection of black and white cubes, the white denoting acceptance, the black for rejection. There was the appropriate number of white cubes. The cubes would be put into the large opening and the crank turned. If a white cube came out, all the tickets across the machine, i.e. from alpha to epsilon on the first machine, or from zeta to kappa on the second, would be activated and the jurors would be working that day. If, on the other hand, a black cube appeared, they were rejected. The process was repeated down the slots, until the required number of jurors had been selected. Through this process, the potential juror, who set out to town before dawn to attend the courts, had no confidence that he would be selected for duty that day. Furthermore, after selection, he had no idea which court he would be assigned to. Those who had been chosen were required to select an acorn from another container, which had a letter on it. These letters ran from the eleventh letter, lambda, on. They had been assigned through a previous lottery to the courtrooms for the day. This random selection designated the court in which the juror would be on duty. In other words, not all alphas, for

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example, would go to the same court. The jurors were then given a coloured stick, which made sure that they went to the right courtroom, since the stick bore the same colour as the lintel block over the door of the court. Anyone trying to enter a court with the wrong coloured stick would be excluded. Finally, once in their seats, the jury in the first court witnessed the selection process for the cases to be tried and the presiding magistrates. Two machines were set up, one for the cases to be tried, the other for the magistrates. The same system of cubes was employed. The cubes in the first machine bore the colours assigned to the particular courts, while the second had the names of the magistrates. The result was a random appointment of presiding magistrate to each courtroom. It is hardly necessary to say more. This was a thoroughly transparent system of jury selection. Transparency was particularly important, because the jury was also the judge. The presiding magistrates, the thesmothetai, were only present to make sure that order was kept. They gave no legal advice or direction to the jurors, who judged the issues on the basis of the evidence put forward by the litigants, and cast their votes as they saw fit. They were shut up in court, and could not leave before they had rendered their verdict. Thus, they could not be tampered with. The extreme measures taken to ensure the integrity of the jury is often taken as an indication that jurymen were easily corrupted, but the description above shows how impossible that was. Rather it demonstrates the fundamental difference between justice, as delivered by democracy, from that preferred by the elite. That democratic justice was fair and impartial, especially in the fourth century, is demonstrated by the speeches of the orators that have come down to us. These speeches were written for litigants in a large variety of cases, from inheritance to homicide, intricate business dealings to intimate family matters, and, of course, political strife. There is no indication that the jury was incapable of comprehending the issues or made an irresponsible judgment. SUGGESTED READING Ancient Works Aristophanes (1964), Wasps, trans. D. Barrett (Harmondsworth) Aristotle (1984), The Athenian Constitution, trans. P. J. Rhodes (Harmondsworth)

Modern Works Cartledge, P, P. Millett and S. Todd (eds.) (1990), NOMOS: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society (Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne and Sydney) Christ, M. R. (1998), The Litigious Athenian (Baltimore and London) Hansen, M. H. (1974), The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Public Action against Unconstitutional Proposal (Odense)

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Harrison, A. R. W. (1968), The Law of Athens: The Family and Property (Oxford) Harrison, A. R. W. (1971), The Law of Athens: Procedure (Oxford) Hunter, V. and J. Edmondson (eds.) (2000), Law and Social Status in Classical Athens (Oxford) MacDowell, D. M. (1963), Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators (Manchester) MacDowell, D. M. (1978), The Law in Classical Athens (London) Ostwald, M. (1969), Nomos and the Beginnings of Athenian Democracy (Oxford) Ostwald, M. (1986), From Popular Sovereignty to Sovereignty of Law (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London) Todd, S. C. (1993), The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford)

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THE PEASANT LEAVES THE STAGE There is no more telling testimony to the wit and intelligence of the Athenian peasant than the comedy of Aristophanes.

Between Aristophanes, the best-preserved writer of Old Comedy, and Menander, the most famous writer of New Comedy, the life of the Athenian peasant suffered a seismic shift. The plays of Aristophanes are all about the peasant, whilst in those of Menander, he hardly features at all. Since comedy is a popular medium, and the plays were staged in a context in which the playwrights were competing for prizes that were judged on the basis of audience reaction, there can be no doubt that the transformation resulted from a change in the composition and nature of the audience. Aristophanes’ audience appreciated abusive and scurrilous attacks on leading individuals, whether politicians or thinkers, crudity of the most down-to-earth kind, fantasy and grotesquerie, colour and spectacle, combined with sophisticated literary parody, exquisite poetry expressed in language of the loftiest and most original form, and a lively choreography that was not always decent. Indecent, also, was the appearance of the leading actors, who not only wore ugly masks, but whose bodies were padded grotesquely around the shoulders and buttocks and ‘adorned’ in the front with a large leather phallus. Menander’s audience liked none of this, but preferred moralizing situation comedy of manners, depicting everyday situations infused with love and romance, all expressed in simple, everyday language. Aristophanes’ humour involved incongruity, exaggeration and surprise. Menander’s plays began with a prologue, in which someone foretold the outcome.

ARISTOPHANIC COMEDY Aristophanes was born sometime in the middle of the fifth century and died in the second decade of the fourth (maybe in 386 BC). We know the name of his father, Philippos, and that one of his sons, Araros, was also a writer

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of comedy. Otherwise we know little of his life or circumstances. Aristophanes’ flair for language and his ability to coin words and phrases of complex originality suggest, but do not prove, that he was well educated. The fact that Plato included Aristophanes amongst the active participants of his Symposion is perhaps supporting evidence that he was. During his lifetime he produced at least forty plays, of which eleven have been preserved. In the majority of these the comic hero is a representative of the working element in Athenian society, usually, but not always, a peasant farmer. His comic hero is depicted as an unscrupulous rogue, with an uncanny ability to solve the problem with which the play begins to his own fantastic advantage. This class of person also appears in other roles in his plays, such as the chorus, which played such an important part in his dramas. The prevalence of the peasant farmer and the artisan class in Aristophanes’ plays is undoubted evidence of the type of Athenian Aristophanes was addressing, and of the fact that they formed the majority of the audience in the theatre. Old Comedy has a number of regular formal elements that are more or less adhered to. The plays are centred upon a debate (agon). There is usually an introductory episode, in which the issue that is to be the object of contention is introduced, often, but not always, by the comic hero. Following that, the chorus enters (parodos), usually to play the role of opponent or supporter of the comic hero. After some skirmishing, the debate takes place. The protagonist usually wins, and some episodes follow in which he enjoys his success in a rather aggressive manner. At some point the dramatic illusion is broken by the parabasis, when the actors leave the stage and the chorus come forward to address the audience in praise of the author, and give their opinions on some issues of the day, often quite unrelated to the theme of the drama. The play may conclude with a komos, a wild party in honour of Dionysos, in whose festival, it must be remembered, these dramas were produced. The comic hero exits in triumph. For those who are unfamiliar with Aristophanic comedy, the following outline of the plot of a typical play will demonstrate the nature of his comedic genius.

Akharnians The first extant work that we have is Akharnians. It was produced in 425, in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian War. Most of Aristophanes’ plays were, indeed, composed against the backdrop of that great conflict, that is, they were wartime comedies. The play begins with a scene set in the Assembly. The protagonist, Dikaiopolis (his name means ‘just city’; Aristophanes liked significant names), a farmer from the country, is trying to get debate on the war, because he is unhappy with it. No one listens. His frustration is increased by the appearance of some individuals who had supposedly been on publicly funded embassies to Persia and Thrace. Their reports are fraudulent, and confirm his prejudice that public servants are ripping him off. This is made graphically real when one of them steals his lunch. So,

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Dikaiopolis resorts to fantasy. A demigod called Amphitheos had earlier appeared before the Assembly to announce that he, Amphitheos, had been delegated by Olympos to negotiate peace between Athens and Sparta, but he had been driven away. Dikaiopolis now engages this phantasm to get him his own personal peace treaty with the Spartans. Furthermore, Dikaiopolis dissolves the Assembly, as it were with the stroke of his wand, by declaring that he has felt a drop of rain. Amphitheos soon returns with a selection of treaties, and Dikaiopolis chooses a thirty-year one. He heads off to his home in the country to celebrate a festival to Dionysos, as the chorus enters, in pursuit of Amphitheos, the peace-maker. The chorus, which, as so often, gives its name to the play, is composed of men from the northern Attic deme, Akharnai. They are country folk, but specifically, as we learn, they are charcoal-burners, an activity for which that area is famous. They are also Men-of-Marathon, men of the generation that won that great infantry battle against the Persian invasion of 490 BC. They are belligerently warlike, even though (or maybe because) their part of Attika has suffered most from the repeated Spartan invasions over the previous six years of war. They are also pitifully old, since, in reality, if there were any from that period still alive, they would have been at least eight-five. Their choral ode is interrupted by the entry from behind the skene of Dikaiopolis and family, preparing to celebrate, as a result of their being at peace, their own private festival with a phallic procession. The chorus attacks and stones Dikaiopolis. He goes into his house and returns with a wicker basket for holding charcoal, which he threatens to sacrifice, if the chorus will not calm down and listen to his arguments. Recognizing the charcoal basket as one of their own demesmen, the chorus agree. The agon or debate is about to take place. It is worth noting that the charcoal basket scene, ridiculous as it is, was a parody of a similar scene in Euripides’ play, Telephos, which had caused a sensation by depicting the tragic hero as a beggar in rags. Euripides was far and away the tragic dramatist whom Aristophanes liked to parody, a fact that is often taken to indicate hostility, but in fact shows that both Aristophanes and his audience were very familiar with Euripides’ works. That parody sets up the next bit of chicanery, in which Dikaiopolis bargains for time to dress himself in a suitably pitiful garb for presenting his case. Where is he going to find a better outfit for doing this than from the workshop of Euripides himself, whose Telephos had been dressed as a beggar to make his appeal to the Greek army around Troy? Euripides is rolled on stage on an elevated platform, to suggest an ivory tower. From on high he banters with the wheedling hero, who manages to extract from him all the accoutrements of his Telephos. Armed with this outfit, Dikaiopolis prepares to argue his case—with his head on a chopping block. He begins with a direct parody of the speech given to Telephos by Euripides, breaking the dramatic illusion by pretending to speak as Aristophanes himself—“Pardon me, audience, if, though a beggar, I intend to speak about

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the city, while putting on a comedy” (Akharnians, 496–8). This might sound as though the playwright is going to put forward a serious argument, but instead he tries to blame the whole Peloponnesian War upon “the Olympian Perikles” (Akharnians, 530), for putting an embargo on Megarian products throughout the Athenian empire, because the Megarians had stolen two prostitutes from his mistress, Aspasia’s, establishment. This ludicrous misrepresentation of reality wins over half of the chorus, but the other half is still hostile. They call upon a contemporary, and by all accounts popular, general, called Lamakhos, to assist them as a representation of war. He comes blustering in, but is bamboozled and defeated by the mockery of the trickster hero. The chorus all comes over to Dikaiopolis’ side. As usual, the comic hero has won the debate (agon). All actors leave the stage and the chorus comes forward to deliver the parabasis (the ‘stepping aside’ from dramatic illusion), in which they sing the praises of their poet, Aristophanes, as the wisest adviser the city has! Then, the chorus move on to an appeal on behalf of the characters they are meant to represent, the old Men-of-Marathon, claiming that they need to be protected from the verbal attacks of the educated young—as though they had not just been won over by the verbal trickery of Dikaiopolis. This is the sort of incongruity with which Aristophanes is always teasing his audience. After the parabasis, there follows a series of episodes in which Dikaiopolis indulges in the enjoyment of his triumph, and those who try to take advantage of, or share in, his happiness are abused and ridiculed mercilessly. The play moves toward a conclusion with Dikaiopolis preparing to celebrate another festival to Dionysos, while Lamakhos, dressed for war, is called away on night-time border guard duty. The final scene sees Lamakhos brought on stage, embarrassingly wounded by a vine stake as he was crossing a ditch. He is lamenting in high tragicomic style. Meanwhile Dikaiopolis staggers off, inebriated, with a pretty girl on each arm, whose breasts he admires as “firm and quince-like” (Akharnians, 1199), and with whom he exchanges some very lascivious kisses and some even more suggestive dialogue. It is impossible to convey the full richness of Aristophanic comedy in a brief synopsis like this, but the main points should be clear. The prime mover of the action, the protagonist, is a crude, scheming trickster, portrayed as a peasant. He achieves his victorious triumph against all reality, through fantastic means. The audience, the majority of whom were peasant farmers, would have relished his success. That is not to say that they would have identified altogether with him or adopted his ways. Wartime comedy is an escape from reality. For the Athenians in the audience at that time, when after six years of war Athens had had little to be happy about and much hardship, especially for the inhabitants of northern Attika whose fields had been laid waste and whose crops had been burnt by Spartan invasions, Lamakhos represented the world they knew and that they had to return to; the play allowed them to leave it for a while and enjoy

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a great flight of fantasy. Aristophanes wrote comedy, not propaganda, and, in this case, was rewarded with the first prize for comedy at the dramatic festival.

Knights A briefer overview of some other plays will confirm the characteristics of Old Comedy. Two, Wasps and Wealth, have been discussed in previous sections. Here, I shall look at four others. The first is Knights or Cavalrymen, staged in the year following Akharnians. It also won first prize. It was the first play Aristophanes produced in his own name, as the chorus of cavalrymen, from whom the play gets its title, tells us in the parabasis. The Knights is a derogatory depiction of the political process, putting on stage the popular prejudice that politicians (rhetores) are crooks, who deceive the electorate (i.e., the audience) with false hopes and tricky rhetoric, while they are enriching themselves. It is usually taken to be ridiculing the popular new politician, the wealthy businessman Kleon, son of Kleainetos, a man who was much in favour with the Demos after the death of Perikles, but disliked by the elite. It is full of incongruity, exaggeration and bad language. It begins with allegory: Demos of the Pnyx runs a household. He has several slaves, the most recent of whom, a Paphlagonian (another significant name, denoting a man full of hot air and of non-Athenian parentage) has become his favourite. Two other slaves are outside the door lamenting their loss of status. To salve their misery the slaves get into the wine cellar and start drinking. This gives them the courage to steal a book of oracles from the sleeping Paphlagonian (citing oracles was one way in which a politician might influence his audience). From this book they learn that the Paphlagonian will be overthrown by an even lowlier character, a sausage-seller. Not surprisingly, a sausage-seller conveniently comes along. The two slaves tell him the good news, but he is reluctant to believe it. He is scared stiff of the Paphlagonian, who now emerges full of fury. As the Paphlagonian is about to attack, the sausage-seller incongruously calls for help from the cavalrymen, the second wealthiest class in Attika, who are the least likely people to sympathize with a man of his kind. The cavalrymen enter as the chorus of twenty-four, one man below, dressed as a horse, and another on his back as the rider. The rider has the appearance of a longhaired young fop, and has a tendency to lisp, like the notorious Alkibiades. In other words, the chorus is a caricature of popular prejudice regarding the sons of the wealthy. Strange situations can lead to strange allies. The cavalry dislike the Paphlagonian more than they dislike a sausage-seller! Emboldened by the support of the chorus, the sausage-seller assumes the role of comic hero, this time not a peasant farmer but a man of the marketplace. He challenges the Paphlagonian to a series of contests before the chorus, then in front of the Council and finally before Demos himself. These are

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essentially slanging matches, in each of which the sausage-seller out-boasts, outsmarts and overreaches any inducement his opponent can offer. By the end, the sausage-seller’s triumph is complete, and old man Demos, “an old man of the country, prone to anger, a bad-tempered vote-eater (Knights, 40–3),” chooses him over the Paphlagonian; Demos is restored to vitality by this lowly sausage-seller.

Clouds Aristophanes was not as successful with his next play, the Clouds, produced in 423. Just as Knights ridiculed both sides of the political process by exaggerating popular prejudice against both democratic politicians and their opposition amongst the elite, in the Clouds he tackled the topic of the new education provided by the sophists and the resultant generational clash it caused between the old peasants and the young sons of the wealthy. For local colour, he chose Sokrates to represent the sophists, even though everyone in a close-knit community like Athens would have known that he did not profess to teach anything and never ran a school. Aristophanes is frequently criticized for this misrepresentation, but he may have been closer to the truth than is realized. The effect of Sokrates’ questioning and moral advocacy began the most serious challenge to the democratic constitution then and thereafter. The first version of Clouds came third out of the three competing plays staged at the festival. Aristophanes revised it, and that is the version that we have. In brief, the plot of the Clouds centres around a country bumpkin, Strepsiades (“Twisterson”), who, like so many, had been forced to take refuge in the city on account of the Spartan invasions of their farms. Implausibly, he has married the daughter of an elite family. This has led to a problem for Strepsiades, which is that he is bitten by debts, graphically depicted as bedbugs, incurred by his son who apes the ways of the wealthy. Strepsiades’ solution is to approach the school (phrontisterion, ‘thinking place’) of Sokrates to learn the art of rhetoric, which has the power to make the worse argument triumph over the better one. If he learns this, he thinks, he will be able to argue his way out of his debts. Strepsiades is admitted and finds students researching all sorts of trivia, such as how far a flea can jump, or from which end a gnat hums. He pretends to be bowled over by their ingenious answers. We are introduced to Sokrates, suspended above the ground in a basket, studying airey-fairy things (meteora). After an exchange in which he agrees to admit Strepsiades as a student, Sokrates invokes his muses, the Clouds. The chorus of Clouds enters (parodos), singing charming lyrics about themselves and Athens. Sokrates proceeds to try to teach the old man the subtleties of language and science and the irrelevance of the old gods, but Strepsiades proves a forgetful and stupid pupil. In the end, in frustration, Sokrates expels him from the school. Desperate, thinking that he will not be able to avoid

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his debts, Strepsiades asks the Clouds for advice. They suggest he send his son, Pheidippides, to Sokrates’ school. Pheidippides obeys, and father and son are exposed to a set debate (agon) between two potential teachers for Pheidippides, Just Argument and Unjust Argument. Just Argument presents a case for the simple, old-style education, while Unjust Argument extolls the virtues of the new style that is now being taught by the itinerant professors (sophists), who were appearing in Athens and challenging the old ways. Unjust Argument outwits his opponent with his smart rhetorical tricks, and Pheidippides is entrusted to his care, not without warnings from the chorus that Strepsiades will live to regret this choice. Of course, Pheidippides, being a young man of the New Age, takes readily to the instruction and comes home well-versed in the art of persuasion. Somehow Pheidippides’ skill rubs off on Strepsiades. As a result Strepsiades is able to refute two creditors who come to collect what is owed to them, and he crows with pleasure. But the tables are about to be turned. Strepsiades has an argument with his son, who proceeds to beat him and then justify his doing so using his newly acquired abilities. Strepsiades complains and blames the Clouds for suggesting that he send his son to school, but the chorus tells him that he is the architect of his own fate for turning to evil ways and trying to get out of his obligations. In anger, Strepsiades and a slave go to Sokrates’ school and burn it down, symbolically representing the frustrated reaction of the old peasants to the new learning. In the Clouds, as in his other plays, Aristophanes addresses big issues, in this case the explosion of intellectual activity in democratic Athens in the last quarter of the fifth century and the effect it has on the education of the young. Aristophanes could expect his audience to be aware of the new ideas. Although Strepsiades voices the healthy scepticism of the ordinary person to change, the humour leaves no doubt that the majority in the theatre was quite familiar with the ideas that the sophists were exploring, and the sort of questions they were asking. That was certainly the case with Aristphanes himself, whose ability to toy with the theories of the sophists, and use the most sophisticated rhetorical devices in his dialogue, demonstrates that he was in tune with the avant garde. Furthermore, his comic hero, Strepsiades the Twister, mouthpiece of reaction, does not fare very well. He looks ridiculous in many of the exchanges he has with Sokrates and the Clouds. For example, when the Clouds are explaining how they make the rain, he expresses surprise to learn that it is not caused by Zeus pissing through a sieve. Not to mention the fact that he is explicitly punished for “turning to evil ways”(Clouds, 1455). It is never easy to tell which side of an issue Aristophanes is on; probably, like any good comedian, he sees humour in both.

Frogs Of Aristophanes’ surviving plays, Wasps was produced in 422, Peace in 421, Birds in 414, and Lysistrata and Thesmophoriazousai in 411. Two

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others, Ekklesiazousai and Ploutos, belong in the fourth century. This is not, of course, a book about Aristophanes, but about his audience. Though the majority of the audience were country folk, they were clearly, as we have just seen, not oblivious to the intellectual movements going on around them. These same people were also connoisseurs of high literature, since they also attended the tragedies, produced by the great dramatists, Aiskhylos, Sophokles and Euripides. They appreciated these complex dramas, comprehended them and remembered them. Famous lines obviously stuck in their minds and memorable lyrics were sung like popular songs today. The country folk also performed in the tragedies, since the chorus was composed of ordinary citizens, who had to memorize their lines. That explains why Aristophanes and the other poets of Old Comedy could pepper their plays with parodies of lines and whole scenes from the tragedies and expect the theatregoers to catch the reference. Indeed, one play, Frogs, staged in 405, was a tour de force of literary criticism, for which it won first prize. The Frogs opens with an incongruous sight, a figure that resembles the god Dionysos carrying the lion skin and club of the hero Herakles. He is accompanied by his slave, Xanthias, who is riding on a donkey. They knock on a door and Herakles emerges. Dionysos tells him that Euripides has just died and there are no more good poets alive in Athens (he can say this because Sophokles, who is ignored for dramatic reasons, has himself just passed away also). He, Dionysos, is determined to go down to the Underworld to bring Euripides back. Since Herakles had succeeded in returning from his visit to the Underworld, Dionysos asks for advice on how to get there. He receives some frightening answers—hanging, poison, etc. He decides to walk and sets off with Xanthias, after receiving some topographical advice from Herakles. One obstacle that has to be overcome is the great lake over which souls must be ferried by Kharon. Xanthias, being a slave, has to walk around the lake, but Dionysos is taken on board and told to row. As he does, he is serenaded by a chorus of frogs, after whom the play gets its name, even though they only appear in this one scene. Once on the other side, he is reunited with Xanthias, and the two proceed, not without some comic business involving monsters, or imagined monsters, on the way. Then they hear the charming singing of the initiates to the Mysteries of Demeter and Persephone, the real chorus of the play. The presence of the initiates is a sign that Herakles had foretold that they were near the house of Hades, lord of the Underworld. Other comic business follows, but eventually we learn that Euripides has been causing quite a disturbance since his arrival down below, challenging Aiskhylos for the chair of drama, which he has held since his death fifty years earlier. Hades asks Dionysos, given his experience of the theatre, to adjudicate between the two poets—Sophokles having stayed out of the contest because he was such a nice guy. The rest of the play is a literary agon, where the two poets throw at each other lines, phrases, metrical rhythms, and scenes and themes of their plays. In a manner reminiscent of

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the contest between Just Argument and Unjust Argument in the Clouds, the older poet, Aiskhylos, is cast in the role of defender of traditional values, while Euripides stands up for the new style, for which he was famous. The contest is essentially a draw, but in the end, going against his original intent, Dionysos chooses Aiskhylos as the winner, whom he has been given permission to take back above. It is testimony to the sophistication and literary sensitivity of the audience that they were not only able to catch some of the more delicate nuances of the debate, but concluded by awarding this play the first prize. To conclude this section as it began: the theatre of Aristophanes is all about the typical Attic peasant, whether in the character of the farting, abusive, salacious, disruptive, roguish buffoon who so often is the driver of the action of his dramas, or in the person of his audience, who clearly appreciated his crude and red-necked heroes, but at the same time applauded his linguistic artistry and could understand his literary parodies and allusions to contemporary intellectual movements. MENANDER AND NEW COMEDY In the plays of Menander, we enter a different world: the world of New Comedy. It is peopled by rich landowners, errant sons, pretty girls of uncertain or unknown background who ‘get into trouble’ rather frequently, braggart soldiers returning from the wars, clever slaves and master cooks, all of whom are involved in situation comedies in which the themes revolve around loss, separation, and eventual recognition, all served up with a liberal dose of moralizing. Menander, son of Diopeithes, was a well-born Athenian who lived from 342/1 to about 290. He studied under Theophrastos, the successor to Aristotle in the Lykeion, and was a friend of Demetrios of Phaleron, the man who was responsible in so many ways for the transformation described in this book. Not surprisingly, we find in Menander’s plays, as much as we have of them, a strong moralizing tendency. He eschewed almost all the elements of Aristophanic comedy, and wrote plays about real people in everyday situations. This was in keeping with the tenor of the times and reflected the more conservative nature of his audience. Menander was hugely admired throughout the Hellenistic world and was a main source for the later writers of Roman comedy, Plautus and Terence, through whom his influence passed on into the Western Tradition, not least to Shakespeare. It is one of the ironies of literary history that the works of a man who was recognized in the Hellenistic period as the greatest writer of New Comedy, and who was reputed to have written as many as 105 plays, should have perished without leaving a manuscript tradition. Fortunately, since the end of the nineteenth century we have begun to find fragments of his plays on papyrus in Egypt, and in 1959 a virtually complete play, the

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Dyskolos appeared. This title is usually translated as ‘The Misanthrope,’ or ‘Old Cantankerous,’ but for the sake of the title I have given this section, I will use ‘The Miserable Man,’ since the main character is, indeed, miserable and sad. Dyskolos is not only our one complete Menandrian comedy; it is also rare in that its leading character is a peasant. This might seem to be a matter of the chance of survival, but the evidence from the other fragments, and from the Roman adaptations, supports the notion that the peasant farmer does not feature very largely amongst the characters of Menandrian dramas. The preserved titles of some of his other plays will suffice to confirm this point: Samia (‘Girl from Samos’), Aspis (‘Shield’), Epitrepontes (‘Arbitration’), Misoumenos (‘The Man She Hated’), Perikeiromene (‘Rape of the Locks’), Perinthia (‘Girl from Perinthos’) and Dis Exapaton (‘Double Deceiver’). Only Georgos (‘The Farmer’) portrays life in the country which, just as in Dyskolos, is depicted as hard and unforgiving, except for the wealthy landowners. An outline of the plot of the Dyskolos will serve to illustrate the nature of Menandrian comedy and, by extension, the character and taste of his audience.

Dyskolos The play begins with a prologue, delivered by the god Pan, before whose shrine the action of the comedy will take place. He tells the audience that the scene is at Phyle, a deme in northern Attika. On one side of Pan’s shrine is the house of Knemon, a disgruntled old farmer who works all the time and hates everybody. He lives with an old servant-woman called Simikhe, and his nameless, unmarried daughter who is pretty and virtuous. She is dutiful in her observance of the nymphs, who share Pan’s shrine, and for that she will be protected by them. On the other side, lives another farmer, Gorgias, with his mother, Myrrhine. Gorgias is the very opposite of Knemon. He is poor, but loving and sensible. There is a family connection between the two households. Myrrhine had been left a widow by her first husband, who was the father of Gorgias. Knemon had married her and the result of their union was the young girl, who is, therefore, Gorgias’ half-sister. But Knemon’s misanthropic ways had caused the marriage to founder, and Myrrhine had moved back next door to her son’s home. There is also a love interest. The young son of a local wealthy land-owner, whose estate is described as worth many talents, a city boy, has caught sight of Knemon’s daughter and fallen deeply in love with her, thanks to a bit of magical interference by Pan. Having laid out the plot, Pan leaves the stage and Sostratos, the rich young man, enters with his parasite, Khaireas. A parasite (‘sitter-beside’) is a feature of Hellenistic society and a stock character of New Comedy. He is the sort of hanger-on who wants a free meal at the table, hence ‘sitter-beside,’ which he earns by flattery. Sostratos confides in Khaireas that he has fallen in love at first sight, and asks for his help in advancing his case. Khaireas equivocates.

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Suddenly, Sostratos’ huntsman, Pyrrhias, comes running on stage, fleeing in panic from a madman who is attacking him. He, Pyrrhias, had been sent by Sostratos to find Knemon on his farm and approach him, on his master’s behalf, to ask for Knemon’s daughter’s hand in marriage. Pyrrhias describes in frightening detail the violent reaction of Knemon to his presence on the farm. Khaireas excuses himself and leaves, to Sostratos’ disgust. Pyrrhias sees Knemon approaching and flees, leaving Sostratos to face him. Sostratos is, however, rather a weak-kneed young man, and decides to move aside. Knemon enters in fury, fulminating against people daring to trespass on his land and to speak to him. He wishes he had the gorgon’s head that Perseus had, because then he would turn everybody, including the audience, to stone. He spies Sostratos and asks him what he is doing. Sostratos pretends that he is just waiting for a friend, and Knemon goes into his house, still grumbling. As Sostratos stands bewildered alone, the young girl, object of his infatuation, comes out of Knemon’s house in great distress. Speaking to the audience she tells them that the old maid, Simikhe, has dropped a bucket down the well, as she was getting water for Knemon. Knemon will be very angry with his servant, if he finds out and does not get the water he wants. To protect the maid, she has come out to the Nymphs’ shrine with a jug, in order to get some water for her father, but is afraid to approach the shrine in case there is worship taking place. This is the moment for Sostratos. He comes forth from the shadows and offers to get the water for her. She accepts and he brings it back just in time. This exchange is, however, observed by Daos, the slave of Gorgias, who has just come out, unnoticed, from the house next door. He is suspicious of Sostratos’ intentions and resolves to tell Gorgias. So ends the first of five acts. The second act opens with Daos telling Gorgias of his suspicions about what he saw going on between Sostratos and the young girl. Gorgias believes him, and proclaims his responsibility to protect his sister from harm. Just then Sostratos re-enters, explaining out loud that his mother is organizing a sacrifice to some god, but he has slipped away to deal with his own problems. He intends to beard the lion in his den and approach Knemon. Gorgias comes forward and lectures him on the impropriety of trusting in his wealth to achieve the seduction of an innocent girl. Sostratos objects and tells him that his intentions are honourable, and that he wants to marry Knemon’s daughter. Gorgias apologizes, but tells Sostratos that he does not have a chance of persuading an ogre like Knemon. But Sostratos replies that nothing will deter him, because he is in love. Gorgias responds that he cannot afford love, which by implication is a luxury of the rich. Eventually, they agree on a plan. If Sostratos changed his city clothes for work clothes and went out to the fields with Gorgias and laboured with a mattock in the sight of Knemon, he might be seen as an acceptable mate for the daughter. They exit, and two stock characters enter: Getas, the slave, and Sikon, the cook. They are preparing a sacrificial feast for the mistress, Sostratos’ mother,

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who has had a dream, in which she saw Pan putting chains on Sostratos and sending him out to work in the fields in a leather jacket. The sacrifice is to make sure things turn out well. Act three sees a lot of action. Knemon comes out of his house to find a host of people: just the sort of thing he abhors. There is Sostratos’ mother giving orders to hurry up with the sacrifice, and Getas greeting her with the news that everything is ready for the party. They enter the shrine, while Knemon gnashes his teeth. He decides that he cannot work outside this day, there being so many people around, so he goes in to do some work in the house. There follows two exchanges, one between Knemon and Getas, the other between Knemon and Sikon. In the first Getas has been sent out to ask the neighbour for a pot that someone has forgotten to bring. He knocks loudly on the door and stirs up a furious Knemon, who berates him and threatens to do him harm for disturbing his peace. Getas runs back into the shrine. Next Sikon appears, claiming to know how to handle the old curmudgeon with subtlety and skill, but he fares no better, if not worse. The characterization of Knemon as an intolerably unpleasant person is complete. The stage is now empty and Sostratos enters, lamenting his aches and pains from a day’s labouring in the fields. His efforts were all in vain, however, because Knemon had not turned up that day. The audience knows the reason why. Getas appears and sees Sostratos. From the ensuing conversation, Sostratos learns that his mother is holding her festival at Pan’s shrine, and that his father will be coming shortly. The sacrifice is over and the feasting is about to begin. Sostratos forms the idea of inviting Gorgias to the meal and exits to find him. Getas is still on stage when Simikhe appears from Knemon’s house in great distress. Apparently, she had been trying to rescue the bucket, which she had dropped down the well, by tying Knemon’s mattock to a piece of rotten rope and lowering it down to the bucket, but the rope broke. Now, both the bucket and the mattock are down the well. Knemon arrives, angry as ever, and orders Simikhe inside. He resolves to go down the well himself. The act ends with Gorgias reluctantly accepting the invitation to lunch. Act four propels the play towards its conclusion. Simikhe enters, calling for help. Knemon has fallen down the well and needs to be saved. Gorgias rushes to the rescue, taking Sostratos with him. While Sostratos stays up top, holding the rope and making eyes at the girl, Gorgias is lowered down the well and brings Knemon up. In a lengthy speech, parts of which have not survived, an invalid Knemon confesses his faults and announces that he is adopting Gorgias as his son, giving him control of his farm and putting his daughter’s marriage in his hands. Gorgias accepts and announces that the man who helped save Knemon from the well is close by and very interested in marrying the young girl. Knemon obviously agrees. Sostratos now needs to get his own father’s approval. Conveniently, Kallipedes, the father, turns up. He goes in to the feast and Sostratos follows.

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The final act five concerns two issues, namely, one, will Kallipedes agree to his son’s marriage to a poor country girl and two, what will happen to the old misanthrope. The answer to the first portrays the generosity of the rich. Kallipedes will not only bless his son’s marriage to Knemon’s daughter, but will go much further. Presented by his son with a standard moralising argument about the transience of wealth and the need to be generous with it while you can (benefaction), Kallipedes agrees to betroth his own daughter to Gorgias and give him a dowry that will raise him out of his present station. As for Knemon, he has more trouble coming for him. After his big speech in which he confessed his faults and handed over his estate to Gorgias, one might think he has suffered enough, but he has not renounced his antipathy to interaction with others. It is the role of Getas and Sikon, both of whom have a grudge to settle with him, to bring him back into society. They drag the old man on his bed out onto the stage and subject him to ridicule, until he agrees to join the party that is going on in the shrine. No one can deny the genteel sophistication of Menander’s play. Its structural integrity would have pleased Aristotle’s theory of drama, and its moral content would have appealed to his audience. What is lacking is the voice of the peasants. In the person of Knemon, the peasant is depicted as downtrodden and unsociable, and Gorgias is raised from poverty by the generosity of Kallipedes, his rich neighbour. No longer was the rambunctious, conniving rogue of Old Comedy manipulating the action as protagonist or antagonist, rather he was the object of derision. This change in the status of the peasant in comedy can only be explained by his absence from the audience. Whether because of the exclusion of the least wealthy from the franchise, or the abolition of the theorika (the subvention for attendance at the theatre), the peasants were less likely to attend. Instead, the audience was predominately better off and more educated, what others might call ‘bourgeois,’ and they dictated the type of drama they got. The result has pleased many succeeding generations throughout the centuries, none of which espoused popular government, but for those who do, it lacks the spirited and anti-social voice of the canny peasant.

SUGGESTED READING Ancient Works Aristophanes (1964), Wasps, The Poet and the Women, The Frogs, trans. D. Barrett (Harmondsworth) Aristophanes (1973), Lysistrata, The Acharnians, The Clouds, trans. A. H. Sommerstein (Harmondsworth) Aristophanes (1978), The Knights, Peace, The Birds, The Assembly Women, Wealth, trans. A. Barrett and A. H. Sommerstein (Harmondsworth) Menander (1987), Plays and Fragments, trans. N. Miller (Harmondsworth)

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Modern Works Arnott, W. G. (1975), Menander, Plautus and Terence (Oxford) Dover, K. J. (1972), Aristophanic Comedy (Berkeley and Los Angeles) Ehrenberg, V. (1962), The People of Aristophanes: A Sociology of Old Attic Comedy, third edition, (New York) Gomme, A. W. and F. H. Sandbach (1973), Menander: A Commentary (Oxford) Harriott, R. (1986), Aristophanes: Poet and Dramatist (London and Sydney) Harvey, D. and J. Wilkins (eds.) (2000), The Rivals of Aristophanes: Studies in Athenian Old Comedy (London) Hunter, R. L. (1985), The New Comedy of Greece and Rome (Cambridge and New York) McGlew, J. F. (2002), Citizens on Stage: Comedy and Political Culture in the Athenian Democracy (Ann Arbor) Picard-Cambridge, A. W. (1962), Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy, second edition, revised by T. B. L. Webster (Oxford) Pritchard, D. M. (2012), ‘Aristophanes and de Ste. Croix: The Value of Old Comedy as Evidence for Athenian Popular Culture,’ Antichthon 44: 14–51 Sandbach, F. H. (1977), The Comic Theatre of Greece and Rome (London) Segal, E. (ed.) (2002), Oxford Readings in Menander, Plautus and Terence (Oxford) Sifakis, G. M. (1971), Parabasis and Animal Chorus: A Contribution to the History of Attic Comedy (London) Strauss, L. (1966), Socrates and Aristophanes (New York and London) Webster, T. B. L. (1974), Introduction to Menander (Manchester and New York) Wiles, D. (1991), The Masks of Menander (Cambridge)

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Epilogue

It would be quite possible to argue that the transformation described in these pages was imposed upon Athens by outside forces that were beyond her control. And, indeed, this is part of the story. In the last quarter of the fourth century, the conquests of Alexander changed the geopolitical balance in favour of the nation-state over the city-state and ushered in a world of powerful kingdoms ruled by monarchs, whose battles for supremacy played havoc with political processes within the cities. Their international reach paved the way for the emergence of the Roman Empire. The situation then was not unlike what we face today, where a different form of globalization has enabled multinational corporations to challenge and erode the independence of national governments. But this is not the whole story. Just as the triumph of the multinationals was aided and abetted from within the nation-states by leading politicians, like Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and Brian Mulroney, so, in late fourth-century Athens, there were those who embraced and encouraged the transformation of their society, because it fulfilled ambitions they had cherished since at least the last decade of the fifth century. Conservative politicians, like Phokion and Demetrios of Phaleron, espoused and legislated the same oligarchic policies as were advocated by Antiphon (the ringleader of the Four Hundred) in 411and Kritias (the leader of the Thirty) in 404. These were the desiderata of the wealthy landowners, who believed that they alone were fit to govern, and who despised the Many. In real political terms, they wanted control, but they concealed their ambition under the cloak of morality. They were encouraged in their antipathy of the Demos by their education in the places where only the elite congregated, the gymnasion and the wrestling ground (palaistra), and were reinforced in their attitudes by the teaching in the elitist schools of the philosophers and rhetoricians of the fourth century—Plato, Isokrates and Aristotle, all of whom advocated the moral and ethical principles they attributed to Sokrates, whose intellectual descendants they claimed to be. The increasing focus on moral issues that can be witnessed in the review of the literary sources described in Appendix 1 came to define the Hellenistic and later Roman world. It was a morality that justified and promoted the

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dominion of the elite. It created a world in which the peasant and artisan classes were reduced in actual fact to the dependent and irrational rabble the conservative Few, like the Old Oligarch, had always wanted them to be. There is no more pitiful nor more graphic illustration of the depths to which the once assured and independent lower classes had been reduced than the famous Hellenistic sculpture of a drunken old woman clutching a flagon of wine, now in the Staatliche Antikensammlungen, Munich. This sculpture appears on the cover illustration. In this book I have been at pains to refute the depiction of the peasant farmers and artisans of democratic Athens as a mob of rabble, and to champion the wit and intelligence, competence and fairness of the Many. The first chapter describes the machinery of the democratic constitution and shows that it was well run, balanced, and excruciatingly transparent. The second chapter demonstrates that the popular Assembly was capable of dealing with complex issues of foreign policy in a rational and consistent way and had a carefully crafted system for importing grain to feed the people. The third chapter illuminates the opposite side of the coin, when the Demos lost control, especially of the Peiraieus, which had been the bustling, lively, multicultural centre of mercantile trade in the democratic days. When Demetrios of Phaleron dismantled the financial structure upon which the ‘just society’ had been built, he tilted the balance in favour of the elite. The fourth chapter looks at the significance of the navy for the democracy and the elaborate way it was organized and financed; the fifth, at the system of wealth distribution under the democracy as opposed to the elitist preference for benefaction that followed; the sixth, at the equitable administration of justice by the popular juries; and, finally, the last laments the disappearance of the canny and earthy peasant from the stage. The focus throughout this book has been on power and politics, but it would be remiss not to mention the glaringly obvious, namely that the great achievements that people associate with the glory of Athens—in literature, art, architecture and sculpture—were made at a time when Athens was governed by the Many, at publicly sponsored venues on public occasions and at public expense. By contrast, any cultural or artistic works that were produced in the time of elite domination were the result of private donation and glorified the donor.

Appendix 1 The Sources of Information for the Fourth and Early Third Centuries

It is the historian’s most important task to know the sources of information for the period he or she is writing about, how to use them and what to expect from them. This appendix offers a brief but critical review of the many and varied sources available. I have not included in this survey the works of the Alexander Historians—Arrian, Curtius Rufus or Justin’s epitome of Pompeius Trogus—since they are only marginally relevant to my thesis. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS A fine thing, men of Athens, is the preservation of state documents. —Aiskhines, 3.75

The most reliable source of information about any state’s affairs is the official document. Fortunately, the Athenian democracy made quite a fetish of making available all details of public business to its citizens by having them inscribed on slabs of marble (stelai). This practice of the State was even adopted by private organizations, like cult groups or clubs. So when Athens revised her law-code at the end of the fifth century, the new code was inscribed on the walls of the Royal Stoa in the agora. Subsequent additions and modifications were published in a similar fashion. Peace treaties, alliances, the accounts of all important public officials, honorific decrees, trade agreements and other documents right down to the bye-laws of a small cult group, all were inscribed on marble and set up for public view. Athens was, indeed, a completely open society and historians are the beneficiaries. Inscriptions provide a huge amount of information on legal, economic, sociological, military and diplomatic matters. There are, however, drawbacks. It is very rare that an inscription has survived intact. Nearly all have been broken, and often the most important section of a document has been lost. In a large number of cases, the name of the annual magistrate (archon eponymous), the most reliable criterion for dating, has been destroyed. Even the parts that remain have frequently

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been mutilated, sometimes by the weather, sometimes by human agency. It is very tempting to recreate or restore the lost or damaged parts of a text. Many times this can be done with a fair degree of confidence, since Athenian official language, like most, tended to use formulaic expressions. On other occasions the restoration is given exempli gratia and is purely speculative. The reader should be especially cautious when dealing with such restorations, though he or she should never treat any restoration as certain. Athenian inscriptions of all periods have been edited in the great series of Inscriptiones Graecae, produced by the Berlin Academy over a number of years. The second edition of volume two (the edition minor) contains the most usually referred to version of documents for the period covered here. This will be cited as IG II2. New inscriptions and additional fragments of existing ones are still being found. These are published in various journals, but eventually they make their way into the series Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum (SEG). English translations of many of the documents relevant to this book are to be found in the series Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, published by Cambridge University Press, particularly volume two for the fourth century (cited as TDGR2) and volume three for the Hellenistic period (TDGR3). Documents are not only found on the stones on which they were inscribed; sometimes they were quoted either in whole or in part by literary sources that have survived where the original has not. These require special care. Ancient historians, with the notable exception of Herodotos and, to a lesser degree, Thoukydides, rarely provided their readers with documentary evidence, or even indicated the source of their information. This is unfortunate, because their employment of such material has the best chance of being unbiased. The majority of quotations of documents by literary sources are found in the orators and biographers or essayists. Both rhetoric and biography will need separate treatment, but their use of documents deserves to be discussed here. Orators introduced documents or parts of documents in the law courts and in the Assembly. They did so in two ways. Sometimes they would quote a section of a law or a decree in the body of their speech. Such quotations were always from memory and, not surprisingly, whenever they can be checked, have been found not to be verbatim. On the other hand, the essence of the original is preserved, only distorted by the fact that the quotation is partial and selective. More frequently, the orator called upon the official in the court or the secretary of the Council (in the Assembly) to read out the whole text of a law or decree that he (the orator) had provided. These texts were not included in the speech when it was published. So, where such documents are extant in the text of an oration, they are probably later forgeries, created by the Hellenistic, Roman or Byzantine scholars, who tried to explicate the works of the great writers of the past. This is especially the case with those cited in Demosthenes’ famous defence of his career (speech 18, On the Crown), as can be demonstrated by inaccuracies

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of language, officials’ names and other historical details. An exception to this rule is the quotations from the law on homicide in Demosthenes 23 (Against Aristokrates). On the other hand, there were undoubtedly collections of Athenian inscriptions made in Antiquity, when they were still available to be seen. The first we know of was made by Krateros the Macedonian in the latter half of the fourth century. One such collection may be the source of the documents appended to the Lives of the Ten Orators, which can be found in the tenth volume of the Loeb edition of Plutarch’s Moralia. These exhibit a rare degree of historical, technical and linguistic accuracy and, in one case—the honorary decree for Lykourgos—the mutilated original exists for comparison (IG II2 457). On the face of it, these have to be treated as valuable historical evidence. Despite the obvious value of inscriptions, we are often in difficulties to interpret their meaning. Most documents are silent on the crucial questions: why they were passed, whether they were ever implemented and how effective they were. To answer these questions we have to turn to the interpretations of the literary sources, especially the historians. But, for the history of the third century, when literary sources are largely lacking, inscriptions are often our only resource. HISTORIANS It would be possible to divide the historians who wrote about this period in at least two ways, either separating those who were contemporary with events from those who wrote later, or distinguishing between those whose works are preserved intact (whatever their date) from those of whose writings only fragments remain. For convenience of organization I have chosen the latter approach, beginning with the preserved historians. XENOPHON No one could begin to write the history of the first half of the fourth century without consulting Xenophon. Down to the year 362, his works provide the most detailed connected account of Greek affairs (Hellenika). Furthermore, one approaches his writings with high expectations, since Xenophon had all the prerequisites for a good historian. Born in the 430s into a good family, he moved in elite circles; exposed in his twenties to the intellectual stimulus of the great questioner, Sokrates, his mind had been trained in the art of criticism; invited from Athens in 401 to take part in Kyros’ march up country to challenge his brother for the throne of Persia (chronicled in Anabasis), he emerged as a not insignificant participant in some of the most important affairs of his time. Even his overt admiration for all things Spartan, which

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led to his living most of his life on an estate in Laconia, gave him a golden opportunity to see affairs as an outsider. And yet, all too frequently, one comes away from reading Xenophon with a feeling of disappointment. On many occasions he fails to give the sort of information we want or the details we need. For example, such a major event as the formation of the Second Athenian League went entirely unrecorded by Xenophon. Worse still, the fragmentary remains of the Hellenika Oxyrhynchia (discussed below) have raised the real possibility that Xenophon could be wrong, even in the information he did give. The truth is that Xenophon was not an historian by nature. Having been a student of Sokrates, he was interested in morality and character and was better suited to be a biographer than an historian. This is all too evident from the one purely historical work he tried to write, the Hellenika (‘Greek Affairs,’ translated in the Penguin series under the title A History of my Times). Xenophon began his history at the point where Thoukydides’ narrative stopped (411/10). In the first part of his seven-book work (book 1–book 2.3.10), he is clearly trying to imitate Thoukydides and complete his account of the Peloponnesian War. He has constrained himself to write in the Thoukydidean fashion with precise chronological references, but one can tell that he is ill at ease. But, once he moves on to the period after the war, his style changes and he begins to introduce more anecdotal material. Nervously, he apologises for including the story of Theramenes’ dedicating the last of the hemlock to “the fair Kritias,” explaining, “I realize that such tales are unworthy of mention, but I do believe that it is admirable that a man, with death impending, kept his wits and the penchant for jest” (Xen. Hell. 2.3.56). Xenophon came to the opinion that anecdotes revealed character, of a State or individual, and this became increasingly his focus. The emphasis was upon morality. The same emphasis can be detected in his Agesilaos, the eulogy of the Spartan king whom he admired; the Memorabilia, reminiscences of Sokrates and his teaching; and the Kyropaidia, a tract on the education of the ideal leader. It is somewhat ironic that, although many historians set out to complete Thoukydides’ unfinished narrative, Xenophon’s alone should survive intact. But this judgement may be unfair to Xenophon. In the first place, it is now accepted that Thoukydides’ reputation for objectivity may be rather illusory. His history, too, was all about morality and he had a lesson to teach. But, unlike Xenophon and most of those who followed him, his morality was exclusively political. Further, he did not write like a teacher, often not expressing a judgement on the moral issues he raised. Finally, of course, Thoukydides had an unparalleled genius for perceiving the universal behind the specific; few historians have so clearly seen the woods beyond the trees. So, though many tried to continue Thoukydides, very few chose his emphasis or had his acumen. Most writers of ‘historical’ works saw the genre as a medium for moralizing didacticism. Biographers were even worse. Xenophon stands at the forefront of this movement.

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Furthermore, it is in a way quite appropriate that Xenophon’s writings have survived while others have not, since he was very much a man of his time. In fact, the soldier-adventurer of the Anabasis, biographer of thinkers (Sokrates) and kings (Agesilaos), historian, philosopher (he wrote an Apology and a Symposion), and author of manuals on horsemanship and hunting, estate management (Oikonomikos), the economy of the Polis (Poroi, or “Ways and Means”) and, above all, a student of the theory of education epitomizes the period covered in this book and beyond through the whole Hellenistic period, when polymathic scholarship was in vogue. Xenophon’s Anabasis has been translated by Rex Warner for the Penguin series with the title The Persian Expedition (1949), with an Introduction and Notes added by G. L. Cawkwell in 1972. Warner has also translated the Hellenika for Penguin under the title, A History of My Times (1966), with an Introduction and Notes added by Cawkwell in 1979. There is also a new translation with extensive Introduction, Notes, and useful maps in the Landmark Series, The Landmark Xenophon’s Hellenika, edited R. B. Strassler (New York, 2009). DIODOROS OF SICILY (1st c. B.C.) Whilst Xenophon’s Hellenika at least had this in common with Thoukydides’ history that it can be classified as a monograph, that is, that it dealt with a limited subject matter that was defined in time and space (e.g., the Peloponnesian War/Greek Affairs), Diodoros’ Bibliotheke Historike (‘Library of History’) is a universal history that belongs to the tradition begun by Herodotos and continued by later authors, like Ephoros and Polybios. In the space of forty books, Diodoros wrote the history of the world from its mythical beginnings to his own day (or at least the time of Caesar’s Gallic Wars). Not all of his work has survived, but fortunately books 14–20, which cover the years 404–301, are preserved. It is a great loss that most of his remaining books have perished. For the purposes of this book, it is especially tragic that we do not have his record of the years from 301–262. Of the books that are extant, 14 and 15 cover the years down to 361, 16 is mainly concerned with Philip II of Macedon, 17 with Alexander the Great, and 18–20 with the Wars of the Successors down to the Battle of Ipsos (301). The title of his work, Bibliotheke Historike (‘Library of History’), would suggest a compilation of different sources and, despite his pretentious claims to original research in his Introduction, this is clearly what it is. Around a chronological framework of Athenian magistrates (arkhons) and Roman consuls (for the historical period, at least) Diodoros built a narrative culled entirely from the works of others. To this narrative he appended a general Introduction and several subsidiary ones that extoll history in standard rhetorical terms for the moral lessons it contains. So, the appreciation of Diodoros becomes an appreciation of his sources and the way he used them.

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Although none of Diodoros’ sources is preserved in more than a fragmentary form, a sufficient number of these fragments has survived in other places or, occasionally, on papyrus, for us to be able to assess Diodoros’ use of them. When these passages are set side-by-side with corresponding passages in the Bibliotheke, it can be shown that Diodoros, whilst usually rewriting the narrative in his own words, borrowed the facts and opinions of the original with scarcely any modification. Though this means that Diodoros was little more than a scissors-and-paste historian of little or no originality, the corollary is no less important: if we can identify his source and know something of the reputation of its author, we are in a good position for evaluating the reliability and accuracy of specific sections of Diodoros’ history. Authors whom he can be shown to have used for this period are Ephoros and, perhaps, Theopompos for Greek affairs and his account of Philip, Aristoboulos and Kleitarkhos for Alexander, and Hieronymos of Kardia for books 18–20, supplemented by Douris of Samos, and Timaios for Sicilian history. These authors, whose peculiarities are pertinent to the history of Athens, will be described individually below. Translation of the extant books of Diodoros can be found in the Loeb series, published by Harvard University Press.

FRAGMENTARY HISTORIANS

The Atthidographers Diodoros and Xenophon wrote the only two accounts of this period that have survived virtually intact, and, of these, only Diodoros provides a continuous narrative for the whole fourth century. No history of the third century exists. There were, however, many other histories of a variety of kinds, written both during the fourth century and after, that have only survived in fragments. These have been preserved by lexicographers (like Harpokration) who cited passages from literary works to illustrate the use of a word, or a scholion (ancient scholars’ comments in the margins of manuscripts), or as independent works on pieces of papyrus. Only the most important of these can be discussed here. They will be treated in order of relevance for the history of Athens. Pride of place on this criterion must go to a group of men, all of whom wrote the local history of Attika (the Atthis) from its mythical kings to their own day, to whom modern scholars have given the name Atthidographers. The best discussion of this genre of historiography still remains F. Jacoby’s Atthis, but more accessible to the general reader is the translation and commentary of all the fragments, arranged in chronological order, in The Story of Athens. The Atthidographers reflected the growing interest in scholarly research that typified the fourth century and Hellenistic period. They were antiquarians who collected information on geography, place names and etymologies,

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constitutional developments, military matters (such as battle sites and lists of generals), and many other facts of the sort that local historians revel in. Their compilations, therefore, contained a great amount of detail that is always, when preserved, to be taken seriously. There are two reservations about their usefulness, however. One concerns the way they organized their material: this was in the form of a chronicle, listing the events of each year under the name of the eponymous archon (the leading magistrate in Athens), using the heading “In the archonship of so-and-so.” The form of the chronicle by its very nature makes it difficult to show cause and effect and to indicate trends and developments. The second reservation about the fragments of the Atthidographers concerns the way they have been preserved. The lexicographers and scholars, who quoted them, did so for reasons that were usually anything but historical. A strange word or place name or title, these were most often what they entered in their lexicon and tried to explain by a quotation, such as one would find in a large modern dictionary. Just as it would be very difficult to gain a full or even proper understanding of a quotation in a dictionary without putting it back in its surrounding context, so, we can frequently be utterly confused about the historical information contained in a fragment of the Atthidographers. But, this is not quite the whole story. The Atthidographers were sometimes consulted by ancient authors for appropriate reasons. For example, the Atthis of the mid-fourth-century writer Androtion was probably used by Aristotle at some points in composing his Athenaion Politeia. And both Androtion and his successor, the third-century writer Philokhoros, were quoted by the Alexandrian scholar Didymos in his commentary on some of the speeches of Demosthenes; in the case of Philokhoros, the quotations are quite extensive and full of detail. Furthermore, the Atthidographic tradition (the sum of all their writings) formed one of the most important bases for the later chronographers, who from the Hellenistic period down to the church father Eusebios laboured to establish a chronological scheme for the history of the ancient world. But, for this book, it is especially tragic that we do not have Philokhoros’ views of the late fourth and third centuries, down to his patriotic death on the orders of Antigonos Gonatas in 262/1, at the end of the Khremonidean War. His seventeen-book chronicle was the most frequently consulted by later authorities, and presumably that was because it was the most respected. It was certainly the longest. But rather than trying to give more detail than his predecessors on the years they had covered, he skimped on them and focused on the time that followed. So, his last eleven books covered the years 322/1 to 262/1. His pricelessly detailed chronicle of those years, during which he lived and participated, has been almost totally lost. The Atthidographers will be cited by name, followed by the letter F (for fragment) and the number assigned to it by Jacoby in Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (FGrHist).

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HELLENIKA OXYRHYNCHIA Next in importance after the Atthidographers, not because it is less valuable but because it is not exclusively concerned with Athens, is the Hellenika that has been preserved on three separate fragments of papyrus that have come from Oxyrhynchos in Egypt. Two of these fragments do not concern this book since they contain material relevant to the years 410–407; the other, the London fragment, provides a detailed narrative of the events of 396/5. The identity of the author cannot be established to everyone’s satisfaction, so he is usually referred to as P. What is clear is that he was one of those who, like Xenophon, continued Thoukydides’ work from the point where it left off. Also, like Xenophon, he obviously carried his account past the end of the Peloponnesian War, but he did not go down as far as 362. Precisely where he did stop is disputed, but the time of the Great King’s Peace (387/6) is the most likely. P was obviously much more comfortable with Thoukydides’ approach to history than Xenophon. He followed the system of dividing the year into “summers and winters” (campaigning and non-campaigning seasons) quite naturally; showed a similar fondness for abundance of detail and possessed a comparable flair for analysis, especially of political affairs. The extant portions of his work contain no set speeches of the sort that Thoukydides had used so effectively. This could denote a real difference between the two. On the other hand, given that we have so little of P, it might be unwise to assert that he had rejected the set speech entirely; it is perhaps safer to say that he does not resort to this device at some points where we might expect him to, and, more positively, that he often uses digressions to provide background and explain the causes of events. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the absence of speeches from Thoukydides’ last book is to be explained by its lack of completion or by his own rejection of the device. Despite the fact that the London fragment covers such a short period of time, it contains in both its narrative and digressions a wealth of material that is not recorded in our other sources. Especially useful are the analysis of internal politics in Corinth, Thebes, Argos and Athens before the outbreak of the Corinthian War and several details about Konon’s movements at this time. Beyond purely Athenian matters, the description of the constitution of the Boiotian League is of inestimable value. As for bias, there is little evident. If, however, we accept that no person of intelligence can write history without a point of view, then perhaps we can discern an antipathy for the popular leaders of Athens, Kephalos and Epikrates, and possibly a slight pro-Spartan leaning. P’s sources were clearly not literary; he probably used the accounts of eyewitnesses, like Thoukydides. Thus, his numerous differences from Xenophon are especially valuable. Finally, the importance of the discovery of the fragments of the Hellenika Oxyrhynchia extends beyond the material contained in them; they have enabled us to establish that P was

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the ultimate source of Diodoros’ narrative of these years—that is, P was the source of Ephoros, who was in turn used by Diodoros. There is a translation of the Hellenika Oxyrhynchia by P. R. McKechnie, published by Aris and Phillips. ATHENAION POLITEIA In 1891, K. G. Kenyon published the text of four rolls of papyrus that had recently been acquired by the British Museum. He identified the work as the Constitution of the Athenians (Athenaion Politeia, abbreviated in modern discussions to AP or Ath. Pol.) by Aristotle, and, though Aristotle’s authorship has been and still is questioned, there is no doubt that what we have is the work scholars in antiquity attributed to Aristotle. The beginning is missing and with it the early chapters of the history of the constitution. Of the text as we have it, the first forty-one chapters trace the development of the democratic constitution from the end of the seventh century to the restoration of the democracy in 403, after the tyranny of the Thirty. His account of that tyranny (chapters 34–41) raises questions about his sources. It is generally agreed that for this part he used the work of an Atthidographer, most likely Androtion, for his factual framework, but he probably supplemented this with pamphlets and speeches from the time. What is not agreed upon is the extent to which the interpretation of the facts is original to the author of the Politeia, whether it was Aristotle or not. More important than the historical survey is the description of the constitution (chapters 42–69) as it existed in the fourth century, at least down to the time of the Lamian War. The information contained in these chapters, combined with the evidence from the inscriptions and other material produced by archaeological excavations, especially in the agora, has given us a very detailed understanding of the workings of Athenian democracy. There is a translation of The Athenian Constitution in the Penguin series by P. J. Rhodes. EPHOROS (FGrHIST 70) The survival of Xenophon’s Hellenika tends to give a quite misleading impression of fourth-century historiography. In fact, Xenophon was neither the only nor the most respected historian of the century. The great historians were Ephoros of Kyme and Theopompos of Khios. The tradition that knew these two men as two peas raised in the same pod—the school of Isokrates in Athens, also knew that they were as unlike as any two peas could be, that is, that Ephoros needed the goad and Theopompos the reins. This tradition is most likely apocryphal, the product of the ingenuity of some biographer of the Hellenistic Age, but it reflects a reality—the two men were utterly different.

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Ephoros was a scholar-historian, apolitical, uninvolved in the great affairs of his day, who wrote a Universal history of the acts of the Greeks and Barbarians from the Trojan War down to at least the siege of Perinthos by Philip of Macedon in 341. The history was thirty books long, though the last book—a separate study of the Third Sacred War (356–346)—was written by his son, Demophilos (Diod. 16.14.3). More than one hundred fragments have survived, but the bulk of our knowledge of Ephoros’ history comes through Diodoros, who used Ephoros as his main source for Greek affairs of the historical period. It does not require much imagination to appreciate that the major problem facing Ephoros when he embarked on such a huge undertaking was one of organization. How to present the histories of so many varied peoples over such an expanse of space and time? This is always the problem for this genre of historiography. Unless one is fortunate enough, like Herodotos, to find a theme that unites the material—in his case, to record the marvellous deeds of Greeks and barbarians, with particular focus on the conflict that arose between them—only two approaches are available. One is to arrange the material chronologically, the approach favoured by Diodoros; the other is by theme (kata genos). This was Ephoros’ choice, a choice that is largely responsible for the low opinion modern scholars have held of him until quite recently. Not, of course, that the arrangement by themes is any less satisfactory than the chronological; the difficulty lies in mixing the two. When Diodoros chose Ephoros as his main source but rejected his organization in favour of a year-by-year chronology, he often found it difficult to separate the details in Ephoros’ excursuses to fit his system. The resultant confusion has hurt the reputation of both, but, while the failings of Diodoros are beyond question, those ascribed to Ephoros are not. Admittedly, the Hellenistic historian of the rise of Rome, Polybios, censured him for his “quite imaginary” descriptions of land battles like Leuktra and Mantineia, but in the same breath he conceded that in the case of naval engagements, like Knidos, Ephoros’ account was to be admired “for its forcefulness and practical knowledge” (Polybios, 12.25f). Ephoros had his good qualities, as Polybios was the first to concede. In his view, Ephoros had written “a first-rate account of the foundation of cities, genealogies, migrations, and leaders (of colonial ventures)” (Polybios, 34.1.3); it was so good, in fact, that Polybios felt it “a waste of effort” to go over the same ground (9.1.4–9.2.3). Again, whilst modern scholars are averse to the excessive concentration on moral instruction that seems to have infused and motivated his approach to the writing of history, it is good to remember that Polybios thought this was his strongest point (Polybios, 12.28.10). Finally, for Polybios and all Antiquity, Ephoros was “the first and (before Polybios) the only man who undertook to write a Universal history” (Polybios, 5.32.2).

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THEOPOMPOS (FGrHIST 115) Tradition knew Theopompos as a contemporary of Ephoros. As stated, both were believed to have been students of Isokrates, though very different in character. Theopompos, unlike Ephoros, was involved in the politics of his home state, Khios. It is reported that both he and his father were exiled from Khios for showing pro-Spartan sympathies. It is also reported that none other than Alexander the Great personally secured Theopompos’ return by a letter. This event, if true, would belong in the period 334/3–332. After Alexander’s death, Theopompos seems to have run away to Egypt, where Ptolemy was only narrowly persuaded from putting him to death. Amongst his writings were two historical monographs, the Hellenika in twelve books that continued Thoukydides history down to the Battle of Knidos (394) and the Philippika, a giant study in fifty-eight books of the life and career of Philip II of Macedon that digressed far and wide from its professed topic. Of the former we have very few fragments, of the latter over two hundred. Theopompos was also known as an orator, and a reading of his fragments reveals that, while Ephoros knew where to draw the line between rhetoric and history, Theopompos did not. All too often his evaluation of individuals is based upon rhetorical simplifications of moral prejudices. So, for example, his unusually favourable evaluation of the Spartan commander, Lysander, praises him for his “temperance and control over pleasures. At any rate, though he became master of almost all Greece, it will be clear that in none of the cities did he give himself over to sexual pleasures or indulge inappropriately in drinking and carousing” (FGrHist F20). By contrast, his condemnation of Philip (“a man the likes of whom Europe has not produced before this,” FGrHist F27) contains all the graphic description of moral depravity one finds in the Philippics of Demosthenes. In short, Theopompos was one of those historians who could write neither without bias, nor without emotion. The fragments of Theopompos can be found translated in Appendix B of G. Shrimpton’s book, Theopompos the Historian, published by McGillQueen’s University Press. RHETORIC Mention of the increasing obtrusion of rhetorical principles and ideas into the narrative portions of historical writings brings the discussion inevitably to that genre. The canon of the ten “great” Athenian orators (rhetores) is Antiphon, Andokides, Lysias, Isaios, Isokrates, Aiskhines, Demosthenes, Hypereides, Lykourgos and Deinarkhos. Of these, all except Antiphon practiced to some extent within the period covered by this book. They were a mixed bunch. In the first place, they were not all Athenians. Lysias and Deinarkhos

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were certainly resident aliens (metoikoi) and the same has been maintained about Isaios. As such, they could not appear in person in a law court or the Assembly. They could, however, write speeches for others, and the abundance of their works shows that the profession of speech-writer (“logographer”) flourished in late fifth and fourth-century Athens. Even some of those who were Athenian citizens found it a lucrative business. Isokrates got his start that way, before he set himself up as a teacher of rhetoric, and Demosthenes was still writing speeches for pay at the end of his career. The speeches thus produced were all for use in the courts of law (dikanikoi logoi). They range over a wide variety of legal issues, including homicide, inheritance, breach of contract, assault and battery, libel, sacrilege, perjury and bribery, and they form the basis of any study of Athenian law. Obviously, the speech writer had to have more than a nodding acquaintance with the laws of Athens and some, like Isaios, concentrated their efforts in a particular area, in his case, inheritance. But he could not represent his client in court like a lawyer, since the Athenian citizen was required by custom and the law to present his own case, whether he was prosecutor or defendant. A competent orator would, of course, write his own speech. So, we find dikanikoi logoi amongst the works of all the Athenian orators, even those like Lykourgos and Aiskhines, who did not write speeches for others. Since all the orators, who were Athenian citizens, were, with the exception of Isokrates, active in politics, it is not surprising to find that the suits they were personally involved in were usually concerned with political issues. In fact, all the extant speeches of Aiskhines and Lykourgos were composed for personal presentation in the courts in political trials. A glance at the corpus of extant Athenian oratory might leave the impression that rhetoric flourished in and for the courts of law. This impression is misleading. The Athenian orators also made addresses to their fellow citizens in the Assembly, in which they spoke for or against a policy or motion (logoi symbouleutikoi, speeches of advice). Few of these speeches have survived, but typical of this branch of rhetoric are Demosthenes’ Philippics and Olynthiacs. In addition, orators were often called upon to produce display pieces (logoi epideiktikoi). The most important example of this variety from our point of view is the epitaphios, the funeral oration proclaimed over those who had died fighting for the State on the occasion of their public burial (Thouk. 2.34). From its inception, probably after the Persian Wars (490–479), throughout its long history (at least to 323, when Hypereides pronounced the oration over those who had died in the first engagements of the Lamian War) it served as the medium of Athenian national propaganda (i.e., as the way the Athenians wanted the world to see them). The fullest rehearsal of all the themes of the epitaphios can be found in sections 19–100 of Isokrates’ Panegyrikos. Plato parodied the genre in his dialogue, Menexenos. Whilst the classification of the works of the majority of the orators into the categories described earlier (dicanic, symbouleutic and epideictic) is

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standard, this is not the case with Isokrates. In Antiquity Isokrates was considered a master teacher of rhetoricians (Cicero, De Oratore, 2.94), and his speeches were admired for their smoothness and artistry and studied for the morality they proclaimed. This was the case until as recently as the late nineteenth century, when a political purpose was discovered in many of them. Since then, works like the Panegyrikos, On the Peace, Areiopagitikos and Philippos have been viewed as political pamphlets designed to influence contemporary affairs in a conservative and moralistic way, though the extent to which they did so is debated. It is well to remember, however, that this was not the way they were understood in Antiquity. The speeches of the orators constitute one of the most valuable primary sources for the history of the fourth-century democracy, yet their very existence is often what deters people today from studying this period. They are viewed by some as boring verbiage, by others as deceptive and mendacious. It is appropriate, therefore, to say a few words about the use of rhetoric as a source for history. Rhetoric is the art of persuasion. The Greeks appear to have had a natural ability for it. At least since the emergence of the polis, there was always someone or some group to persuade, whether it was king, council or jury. But with the advent of the democratic constitution at the end of the sixth century, old-style rhetoric became obsolete. The types of argument and the style of presentation that were effective with an individual or a small group, like the old aristocratic council of the Areiopagos, were not capable of holding the attention of a shuffling, sneezing, chatting audience of at least six thousand. For a while a great name or a strong personality, like Perikles, could dominate the Assembly, but eventually the ‘art of persuasion’ opened the way for anyone to become prostates tou demou (“most influential man in the polis”), provided, that is, he could afford the time and money to acquire the technique involved. For it should be no surprise that as rhetoric became the key to success in politics, there appeared teachers (sophists) to instruct and theoreticians to systematize. The greatest change involved the style of presentation. The fifth-century demagogue, Kleon, was the first to realize this and to introduce lively gestures. Aristotle accuses him of shouting, using abusive language and hiking up his toga while addressing the people (Ath. Pol. 28.3). His opponents cried out against this, no less than a modern parliamentarian might object to another party manipulating the vote through clever use of the media and opinion polls. But what Kleon did was perfectly legitimate and, by the time of Demosthenes, delivery had become a matter of separate study. In fact, as we can see from an anecdote in Plutarch’s Life of Demosthenes (chapter 7), a good delivery was a theatrical one. Maybe that was the reason Aiskhines could move so easily from the stage to the bema (the stone on which speakers had to stand to address the Assembly). The technique of delivery is described by the ancient scholar Dionysios of Halikarnassos (On Demosthenes, 53f.), who emphasizes its emotive purpose. This was the technique in which, as all agree, Demosthenes surpassed all others.

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The level of argument or appeal was affected hardly less than the style of presentation by the change in audience. When the average Athenian (in essence, the peasant farmer) was in the majority in the Assembly and the law courts, as he was also in the theatre, it is not surprising to find a basic similarity in the attitudes assumed by the writers of comedy and the orators. Both comedy and oratory were popular media, the one attempting to entertain, the other to convince the majority of the audience. In both, we find the level of appeal is to popular opinions and prejudice. Within the polis, class antipathy, especially against the ostentatiously rich, was played upon, and foreign policy was often reduced to considerations of national pride. Historical examples and factual documentation introduced to support an argument were often distorted or wholly fabricated. As long as they were reasonable, they were likely to be accepted, since the Athenian audience, whether in the law court, Assembly or theatre, was a captive one, being required to vote on the basis of what it heard. So, even these details cannot be believed uncritically, unless supported by independent evidence. In short, there is no trick of the trade of a modern politician or lawyer that was not known to and employed by the ancient rhetor. Yet this does not mean that we must revert to a sort of Platonic horror at the mere mention of the word rhetor. Rhetoric, in as much as its use is an open acknowledgement by the politician that he must persuade, not bribe or coerce, the electorate, is fundamental to the democratic constitution. It confirms the sovereignty of the people and the freedom of anyone to put forward his opinion to the best of his ability. Only let the people be on their guard! Obviously, from time to time innovations in technique and superior skill will give one practitioner an advantage over others and over the voters. This happened at the end of the fifth century, but by the mid-fourth century there were a number of Athenians who were more than competent in the use of rhetorical skills, and the demos itself was well versed in the tricks and devices that could be used to sway its vote. Furthermore, there were sources of reliable information available to the people at the time when they made their decisions that could serve as a check upon the distortions of the politicians. For example, laws were quoted in the courts, reports of ambassadors and generals were read out in the Assembly, and most of the citizens had personal experience of affairs from service as magistrates, councillors, or on campaign in foreign parts. That is quite apart from the fact that the agenda of an Assembly meeting were published beforehand in the market place and that the laws and all other public documents were on display throughout the city on stone stelai. There was little excuse for ignorance. Furthermore, the fact that they would hear both sides of an issue presented with comparable skill by competing orators in an adversarial setting provided the counter-balance to offset the danger of rampant rhetoric. In conclusion, the record of the Athenian demos in its decisions taken in the law courts and the Assembly during the democratic period fully demonstrates that oratory did not have the evil effect its detractors believe it did.

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And, finally, if we cannot look to the speeches of the rhetores for hard and fast historical details, we can hope to find something else; they serve as a mirror to the psyche of the Athenian people. Good articles on the life and works of the orators can be found in the Oxford Classical Dictionary. A translation of the speeches of Demosthenes and Aiskhines against each other in their two notorious clashes in the courts is by A. N. W. Saunders in the Penguin series (see the Suggested Reading for Chapter 2). The same author has also translated a number of other speeches in a separate Penguin volume, entitled Greek Political Oratory. Useful translations of all the orators can still be found in the Loeb series, but most recently the University of Texas Press has been working on a fresh version of the whole corpus, with translations by a number of scholars, under the overall supervision of M. Gagarin. Many volumes have already appeared and the project is virtually complete. THINKERS AND EDUCATORS No one who knows anything about the fourth century can fail to recognize that during this time there lived and worked at Athens two of the most influential thinkers of the Western tradition. One, Plato, was an Athenian citizen from an elite family. A contemporary of Isokrates and Xenophon, he had an intimate knowledge of the workings of Athenian politics. He had toyed with the idea of joining the Thirty Tyrants, but was deterred by their atrocities. He had been put off politics altogether by the treatment of Sokrates at the hands of the restored democracy. Maybe one of the most versatile authors of Greek prose (including rhetoric), certainly one of the broadest and deepest thinkers of the ancient world, he is nevertheless almost irrational in his dislike of and criticism of popular government and quite religious in his view of ‘reality.’ His school, the Academy, was like a close-knit commune or cult-association. He had few students and few, if any, in his own day who ascribed to his vision of the ideal State, though he did try to put his ideas into practice in Syracuse without success. His enormous influence on Western thought tends to conceal this harsh truth. Aristotle of Stageira in Khalkidike, by contrast, had at least one foot on the ground. The son of a doctor with contacts at the Macedonian court at Pella, he came to Athens at age seventeen in 367 and entered the Platonic circle, where he spent the next twenty years of his life. When Plato died in 347, Aristotle, probably miffed that Speusippos had been chosen to head the Academy instead of him, left Athens. He lived and taught for a while at Assos (opposite Lesbos on the gulf of Adrammytium) on the invitation of Hermias of Atarneus, whose niece, Pythias, he married. In 343/2, he took the post of instructor of Alexander (and several of his friends) at Mieza in Macedon. This association lasted until 340, but Aristotle remained in Macedon until 335, when he moved back to Athens to found his own school

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in a grove outside the city, called the Lykeion. His school was modelled on the Academy, that is, it was essentially a religious association or thiasos. But there the similarity ends. While Aristotle did subscribe to a modified version of Plato’s theory of Ideas and to some extent believed in the soul’s immortality and continued the Socratic enquiry after ethics and morality, his view of knowledge and, consequently, education was totally different. In Plato’s teaching, the soul had absolute knowledge, but had been required to forget it in order to enter the body at birth. It could be helped to recall what it once knew by being asked the right questions. This is the process of anamnesis that underlies the question and answer format of the Dialogues. Aristotle, on the other hand, held the more practical belief that understanding had to be based upon empirical and rational study, and that is the way he went about his research. And research is the key word, because the Lykeion became a mini-research institute, exploring a great variety of knowledge including zoology and botany, literary criticism, the theory of rhetoric and political science, as well as more traditional ‘philosophical’ pursuits right up to metaphysics. An example of his concern for empirical detail is his publication of the list of victors at the Pythian games. In tandem with his great theoretical study, Politics, he and his students researched the constitutions of fifty-eight different states, one of which was the Athenaion Politeia (discussed earlier). His school provided the inspiration for the Mouseion in Alexandria, but more importantly established the spirit and direction of Hellenistic scholarship. A third educationalist of this period, less well known to us as a thinker, but highly regarded in Antiquity as a moral essayist, and hardly less influential, until recently, upon the Western tradition, was Isokrates. A member of the Athenian elite, like Plato he associated with Sokrates, but later became a student of the rhetorician Gorgias. Following the restoration of the democracy in 403, Isokrates, like Xenophon, chose to absent himself from the city for a while, possibly living on the island of Khios, but he returned to Athens in 391. Soon afterwards he established his school of rhetoric. Of the three major institutions of higher learning in fourth-century Athens, his alone was totally secular and practically oriented. His instruction was probably along the lines of a liberal arts college—history, geography, language and literature, with a heavy dose of moral philosophy thrown in—and his method of teaching was probably of the seminar type. In a sense he can be viewed as the founder of humanistic education. But everything else was, of course, subsumed to the use of rhetoric, the subject that emerged as the central element in the training of the young elite. In this business, Isokrates became the acknowledged master. Even Cicero, no mean practitioner himself, called him “the magister rhetorum, from whose school, as from the Horse of Troy, none but leaders emerged” (On Oratory, 2.94). If these teachers had anything in common, besides the elitist background of their students, it was their lack of sympathy for the democratic constitution and the irrationality (as they saw it) of the common people.

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Plato, of course, with his thoughts still living in the fifth century, saw democracy as a tyranny of the mob over the mind, but Isokrates and Aristotle were trying to grapple with a more appreciable problem, the question of whether, in the expanding and increasingly complex world that was evolving in their time, the People could keep on top of affairs. Both came to the conclusion that they could not, and that the best constitution was monarchy, provided, that is, that the individual who was monarch had received the right education in morality. In this view they had been preceded by Xenophon (Agesilaos, Kyropaidia). On the practical side, a similar view can be found echoed at several points by the great opponent of autocracy, Demosthenes, in his Olynthiacs and Philippics, pointing out that Philip, whom he saw as thoroughly immoral, had an advantage over the Athenians, in that for him formulation and implementation of policy was almost instantaneous, whereas for them it was a matter for deliberation and debate. It would be improper to conclude this section without mentioning three thinkers who lived and taught in Athens in this period, although they are more relevant to the thought of the wider Hellenistic and Roman world than to the narrower world of the city-state. These are Diogenes the Cynic, from Sinope on the Black Sea (late fifth century to the last quarter of the fourth); Epikouros, son of Neokles, of Gargettos, founder of the Epicurean school (341–270); and Zeno, of Kition in Cyprus, founder of Stoicism (335–263). Their presence in Athens is a reflection of the intellectual significance and vitality of the city, but their teachings are not relevant to the thesis of this book. Short articles on these philosophers can be found in the Oxford Classical Dictionary. COMEDY One of the great gifts of democratic Athens to Western civilization was comic drama. The genre was created later than tragedy, but while all the major tragic poets lived in the fifth century, that is not the case with the writers of comedy. The first play was produced in 486, and the Athenians were still creating original comedies beyond the period of this study, though of a quite different sort. Early comedy (Old or Attic Comedy), which is represented for us largely by the works of Aristophanes, since only fragments of the works of his peers have survived, was a manifestation of the freedom of speech (parrhesia) that characterized democracy. As a genre it is without parallel, a zany mixture of fantasy and very down-toearth crudity, of personal abuse and sophisticated literary parody, of exquisite poetry and grotesquerie. Its tendency to find humour in current ideas and movements or the behaviour of contemporary individuals, especially those in positions of authority, makes it an obvious hunting ground for historians.

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But it is not an easy source to use. Many of the references are as obscure as one could find in a Monty Python show, while even the basic point of a drama, if there is one, is unclear. As a result, there are widely differing opinions amongst modern scholars regarding Aristophanes’ attitudes on foreign and domestic politics (the empire, the Peloponnesian War and democracy), town and country, the new education and the law courts, to name only a few of the issues that he and the other writers of old comedy reflected upon. Some think Aristophanes represented the conservative reactionaries in Athenian society, others see in works like the Ploutos (“Wealth”) and Ekklesiazousai (Women in Assembly) evidence for his sympathy with the poor and destitute and support for women’s rights, while another view considers that neither of these extremes is correct—rather Aristophanes, like any good comedian, could see humour in both sides of an issue and in all aspects of society. This last view is, in my opinion, closer to the truth. Not a reactionary, but an avant-garde poet of great sensitivity, Aristophanes enjoyed teasing his fellow citizens from all walks of life, not in a spirit of heartless cynicism, but with warm humanity. But if this is a matter of opinion, there is no disputing the fact that, when Aristophanes entered his plays at the dramatic festivals, he was entering a competition, victory in which was decided by the response of the majority of the audience. Naturally, he wanted to win (he certainly complained when he did not), and it would not be surprising if he pitched his humour to the level of the majority of the audience. The frequency with which the peasant farmer is the ‘hero’ of Old Comedy has been noticed and has been taken to indicate that he was the ‘typical’ Athenian. This leads to the observation that Aristophanic or Attic Comedy reflects the attitudes of the ordinary Athenian and is, consequently, a source for the study of the sociology of democratic Athens. Aristophanes wrote well into the fourth century, and two of his extant works will be relevant to this study, Ekklesiazousai (Women in Assembly) of 393/2 or 392/1 and Ploutos (Wealth) of 388. He was not alone. We know of works by Plato (the comedian), a Theopompos, Ameipsias, Arkhippos, Strattis and others, who continued to write Old Comedy well into the fourth century. Unfortunately, their plays are only preserved in fragments. Not the least significance of their survival is the fact of their existence. It is often believed that their defeat in the Peloponnesian War dealt a devastating blow to the spirit and genius of the Athenian psyche, but, if a sense of humour is anything to go by, life had lost little of its vigour. Old Comedy did not die, it simply changed its ways, becoming first Middle, then New Comedy. In the process it lost most of its aggressive and fantastic elements and became domesticated—a situation comedy full of mistaken identities and recognition scenes, such as had originated in the later plays of Euripides, the humour of which lay in the fact that the audience knew from the Prologue onwards what it would take the characters the whole play to discover. Its absence of topical or ‘historical’ references makes

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it less dated, but also less obviously a source for historians. We do, however, find the occasional flash, as in the following allusion from Philemon’s Babylonian to the adulation of Harpalos, Alexander’s friend and treasurer in Babylon, for one of his Athenian mistresses, Pythionike: “You may be made mistress of Babylon someday, as Harpalos does for his Pythionike” (Philemon, Babylonian, Fragment 16). Later, the comic poet, Philippides, would attack Stratokles in his plays. Menander (342/1–c.290), a well-born and well-educated Athenian and friend of Demetrios of Phaleron, was known in Antiquity as the best writer of this genre, though there were many others. Until the last decade of the nineteenth century we knew his work little better than that of the other New comedians, only through quotations and the adaptions of his plays by the Roman authors, Plautus and Terence. The texts of his plays had been lost in the seventh or eighth century after Christ. Now, the discovery of some substantial pieces of papyrus has given us the almost complete text of one play, the Dyskolos (‘The Misanthrope’ or ‘Miserable Man’), and large parts of several others. One important point has been clarified. Though Menander’s characters are ordinary people, they are real people, not caricature. So we are able to appreciate the famous dictum of the great Hellenistic scholar, Aristophanes of Byzantion, who wondered which of the two imitated the other, Menander or Life. Menandrian, like Aristophanic, comedy, therefore, gives us a rare insight into everyday life. But it is wise to remember that it is in the nature of comedy to exaggerate. We should not, for example, conclude from the number of heroines who claim to have been raped at festivals that this was a normal feature of, say, the Panathenaia in the late fourth century. Conversely, the absence of reference to current affairs should not be taken as an indication that politics at Athens was no longer of consequence, after her defeat at Khaironeia or in the Lamian War. There is plenty of documentary evidence to the contrary. Rather, we may see Menander’s concentration on the everyday as a culmination of a literary development that originated with Euripides. It would find an echo in the realism of Hellenistic art and sculpture. There are good translations of the works of Aristophanes and Menander in the Penguin series. BIOGRAPHY Biography is another genre of literature whose form we owe to the Greeks. It arose from the growing interest in the individual that developed in the late fifth century and found its early fourth century expression in the works on Sokrates (Plato’s Apology; Xenophon’s Memorabilia). Rhetoric refined the enkomion (Isokrates’ Evagoras), but the historian, Xenophon, has left us the closest model for later biography in his Agesilaos. From these it is a long path, illustrated only by fragments, to the parallel lives of famous Greeks

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and Romans of Plutarch of Khaironeia, who lived from about 50 to 120 after Christ. Several of the men written about by Plutarch are of importance to the fourth and early third centuries, and some of these lives are available in the Penguin series (Lysander, in the volume The Rise and Fall of Athens, Demosthenes, Phokion, Alexander, and, crucially for the end of the century, Demetrios the Besieger, in The Age of Alexander). There is also a life of Artaxerxes II, a translation of which can be found in the Loeb series (vol. 11, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge, MA). Plutarch’s Lives constitute one of the most perplexing sources for the student of ancient history. Since today biography is treated as a form of historiography, we approach his material with high hopes. A first reading seems not to disappoint, since Lives is full of detail and, unusual in Antiquity, specific reference to the source of information. These references reveal one of Plutarch’s weaknesses—a lack of sensitivity to the quality of his sources. This fault is made worse by the great expanse of time that separates Plutarch from the classical world and the great difference between that time and his. This is nowhere more obvious than in the area of politics, which he tends to analyse in terms familiar to a provincial magistrate in the Roman Empire, which is what he was. But the greatest weakness of all lies in the medium itself. In its origin, Greek biography was concerned with anecdote and gossip in their ability to reveal character, and employed praise and blame regarding the subject’s morality or lack of it. When Xenophon introduced anecdote to illustrate the manner of Theramenes’ death (Hell. 2.3.56; see earlier under Xenophon), he was writing as a biographer. So, too, Plutarch reveals his purpose in writing in his introduction to the Life of Alexander: “I am not composing history, but biography, and, in truth, the most illustrious actions often reveal nothing about the virtues and vices of those who did them. On the other hand, a fortuitous saying or a jest may show more of a person’s character that success in winning battles” (Plutarch, Alexander, 1). In short, Plutarch was a moral essayist who wrote biographies of famous men in order to illustrate good qualities that should be imitated by the young readers, for whom he wrote, and bad behaviour that was to be avoided. For all that, Plutarch’s Lives contain a great deal of information that is not found elsewhere. In dealing with this the best approach is to use caution. If Plutarch reveals his source, then the value of the information is only as good as that author’s credibility. Most of Plutarch’s sources for this period will be the writers discussed in these pages. In addition, he will refer to his predecessors in the writing of biography, especially of the Hellenistic period, like Hermippos and Idomeneus. The unscholarly work habits of these individuals and their tendency to introduce pure fiction into their narrative are well known. Finally, if Plutarch does not name the author or work from which he has taken some information, then that information can only be safely accepted if there is absolutely no reason to discredit it.

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OTHER AUTHORS Occasionally, useful pieces of information can be found in some other authors, whose works were not specifically concerned with our period. Two of these are particularly valuable. One is Strabon of Amaseia, who wrote a seventeen-book geography of the known world in the Augustan period. His geography is a great work of scholarship, based upon much of the best Hellenistic research. Another is Pausanias from Magnesia in Asia, who in the second century after Christ wrote his Periegesis, a travellers’ description of Greece, based upon his own personal autopsy. He describes the major sanctuaries like Delphi and Olympia, and many Greek monuments, including those in Athens. He transcribes dedications, which are now lost, and gives background information on the object he is dealing with. The source of that information is usually not declared. Strabon’s Geographika can be accessed through the Loeb Library, though there is now an elegant new translation by D. Roller produced by Cambridge University Press in 2014. Pausanias’ Periegesis is available in the Penguin series. ARCHAEOLOGY No review of the sources for a history of Athens in the fourth and early third centuries would be complete without reference to the material remains of the city and its environs. Excavation has produced numerous inscriptions (discussed earlier) and revealed the plan of the agora, the evidence for the building programme of the ‘Lykourgan period,’ the sophistication of the city defences, the elaboration of the system of forts for the protection of the countryside, the sheds for the storage of triremes in the Peiraieus and the architecture of the country home. Many other artefacts have contributed immensely to our understanding of this period. This information is especially important for the period after 300, when literary sources are lacking.

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Appendix 2 Historical Outline

This outline of basic facts and dates is intended to serve as a resource for those reading the historical narratives in this book. Dates are often given covering two years (e.g. 405/4) because the Athenian administrative year, upon which most chronologies are based, ran from midsummer to midsummer. THE STRUGGLE FOR HEGEMONY Lysander captures Athenian fleet at Aigospotamoi. A small group led by Konon escapes to Cyprus. Lysander drives Athenians to Athens. As he sails towards the Peiraieus, he “liberates” the Aegean islands, establishing juntas of ten pro-Spartan locals (dekarkhies) supported by Spartan garrisons and governors (harmosts). Samos resists him. Athens under siege by land (Agis) and sea (Lysander). 405/4 (winter) Negotiations at Sparta for capitulation of Athens. Theramenes heads the Athenian delegation. 404 (spring) Capitulation of Athens. Demolition of the Long Walls seen as the “beginning of freedom for Greece”(Xen. Hell. 2.2.23). (June) Election of the Thirty oligarchs as syngrapheis to revise the law-code at Athens. (autumn) Fall of Samos. Elimination of ‘undesirables’ by the Thirty begins. Thrasyboulos and others flee to Thebes. Kallibios and garrison of seven hundred set up on the Akropolis in Athens at request of the Thirty. Death of Theramenes. Thrasyboulos seizes Phyle. Oligrachic forces fail to dislodge him. 403 Thrasyboulos moves his forces, now one thousand strong, to Peiraieus and takes up position on Mounykhia hill. The Thirty attack, but are defeated. Kritias and Kharmides killed. The Thirty retire to Eleusis and are replaced by 405/4

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403 (autumn)

403–401

402–400

401/0

400/399

the Ten. Lysander is sent with one hundred talents to hire mercenary forces to help the oligarchs and his brother Libys blockades the Peiraieus, but they are soon superseded by king Pausanias with an army of the Peloponnesian levy. Pausanias wins a battle against Thrasyboulos in the Peiraieus and then proceeds to mediate reconciliation between the Athenians in the city and those in the Peiraieus. By the terms of this settlement, democracy is restored at Athens in the archonship of Eukleides in a spirit of concord (homonoia) and forgiveness (me mnesikakein). The Spartan garrison also leaves Attika, but the Athenians enter into a state of ‘friendship and alliance’ with Sparta. The Thirty are guaranteed refuge in Eleusis, which remains a separate state. Any Athenians from the city unwilling to live under the restored democracy is allowed to retire to Eleusis, but the time allowed for registering to do so is arbitrarily cut short by Arkhinos and most are forced to stay. Rewards are voted for the liberators and some scores are settled against the supporters of the oligarchs, though on the whole the spirit of reconciliation and concord praised by Aristotle pertains. Work proceeds on the revision of the law-code by a new board of anagrapheis. Sparta settles old scores in the Peloponnese. They make war against Elis, ending in the capitulation of Elis. Also in 400, the Spartans expel the Messenians from Naupaktos and Kephallenia, where they had been settled by Athens in 456. Cyrus makes his march up-country (anabasis), but dies at Cunaxa in Babylon. His ten thousand undefeated Greek mercenaries march to Trapezos on the Euxine. Sparta has backed the wrong horse and falls out of favour with the Great King, Artaxerxes. The revised law-code of Athens is inscribed on marble stelai in the Royal Stoa. In the same year Eleusis is captured and the people there are reintegrated into the state. Attika is once again reunited. Death of Agis. Spartan commander Thibron requests three hundred cavalrymen from Athens for his campaign in Asia Minor to liberate the Greek city-states from Persia. Athens sends former supporters of the Thirty. Thibron plunders his allies and is removed and exiled by Sparta. Derkyllidas replaces him. Sokrates is put to death for “corrupting the youth and introducing new gods” (Plato, Apology 24b). Plato and other intellectuals withdraw from active participation in public affairs.

Appendix 2: Historical Outline 399/8 397 397 (winter) 396 396 (winter)

395

394 393

392

147

Dispute over the succession to Agis. Agesilaos, supported by Lysander, is chosen to succeed him. Derkyllidas campaigns against Pharnabazos in Aeolis. Derkyllidas and Pharax (Sparatan navarch) make a truce with Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes. Pharax intercepts an Athenian embassy on its way to the Great King. Herodas the Sicilian reports shipbuilding activity in Phoenician ports. Lysander proposes Agesilaos to lead Spartan campaign to Ionia. Agesilaos takes up station at Ephesos. Sends Lysander to Bithynia. Agesilaos loses cavalry engagement against Tissaphernes and retires to spend the winter in Ephesos. Konon secures the revolt of Rhodes from Sparta. Timokrates of Rhodes brings money from the Great King to Greece to promote resistance to Spartan dominance. The Demainetos affair. Agesilaos wins the Battle of Sardis. Tissaphernes dies. Democratic revolt in Rhodes results in the overthrow and death of the famous athletic family of Diagoras while Konon is in Kaunos. War breaks out between Lokris (allied with Athens and Thebes) and Phokis (allied with Sparta). Thebes invades Phokis. Outbreak of the Corinthian War between Sparta and an alliance of Thebes, Athens, Corinth and Argos. Spartan authorities recall Agesilaos from Asia and send Lysander and Pausanias into Boiotia to attack Thebes. Battle of Haliartus results in death of Lysander and disgrace and exile of Pausanias. Battles of Nemea (Spartan victory), Knidos (naval victory for Konon and Pharnabazos) and Koroneia (victory for Agesilaos returning from Ionia). Following their naval victory at Knidos, Konon and Pharnabazos sail to Athens and assist in the rebuilding of the Long Walls. They proceed to Corinth and install a mercenary force there. Pharnabazos returns home. The Corinthian War becomes a stalemate around the Isthmus of Corinth. In the Spring of this year Aristophanes produced his comedy Ekklesiazousai (“Women in Assembly”). Corinth and Argos agree to share citizen-rights (isopolity). Reaction of Corinthians, Pasimelos and Alkimenes, who admit Spartan forces into Lechaion, the port of Corinth. Peace negotiations at Sardis between Tiribazos and Antalkidas, the Spartan navarch. Tiribazos arrests and imprisons Konon.

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392/1

391/90

389 388

387 (spring)

387 (autumn)

In the winter, negotiations about peace move to Sparta. Athenian delegation consents to terms proposed and brings them home to Athens. Andokides, one of the Athenian representatives, delivers his speech On the Peace at Athens. But the terms of peace are not supported by Artaxerxes. They are also rejected at Athens because of a clause that abandoned the Ionian cities to Persia. The Athenian negotiators, who spoke in favour of the peace terms, are exiled. Konon escapes to Cyprus, where he dies. Artaxerxes replaces Tiribazos by Strouthas. Teleutias, brother of Agesilaos, gains control of Gulf of Corinth. Evagoras, king of Salamis in Cyprus, falls out of favour with Artaxerxes and is attacked. Athens sends ten ships to assist him, but these are captured near Rhodes by a Spartan squadron under Teleutias, who has taken the Spartan fleet into the Aegean (Xen. Hell. 4.8.24). Iphikrates defeats Spartan mora with peltasts. Thrasyboulos takes Athenian fleet to Thrace and the Hellespont, winning back former allies of the Athenian empire. Athenian alliance with Medokos and Seuthes of Thrace and resumption of alliance with Thasos. Thrasyboulos proceeds down the coast of Asia Minor. Isokrates opens his school and publishes his pamphlet Against the Sophists as his prospectus. Death of Thrasyboulos at Aspendos. Spartans send Anaxibios to the Hellespont, but he is defeated and killed in battle with Iphikrates. In the spring, Aristophanes staged the Ploutos, his last extant comedy. It appears to celebrate the economic recovery of Athens. Artaxerxes, worried about Thrasyboulos’ attempt to revive the Athenian empire, reappoints the pro-Spartan Tiribazos to the satrapy of Ionia. Spartans respond by sending Antalkidas to Persia. Teleutias raids the Peiraieus. Antalkidas secures the Hellespont for Sparta, because the Athenian generals failed to heed the warning of Phanokritos of Parium about Antalkidas’ movements. Peace negotiations take place at Sardis, which result in the signing of the Great King’s Peace (also called the Peace of Antalkidas) early in the spring of 386 at Sparta. There is to be general peace and local independence in Greece (Koine Eirene) under the guardianship of Sparta. Sparta fails to demonstrate unselfish leadership once again, but uses the terms of the peace to demand the dissolution of the

Appendix 2: Historical Outline

385 (summer)

384

383

382 (summer)

381 (spring)

380 379 (spring) 379 (summer) 379 (autumn) 378 (spring) 378 (autumn)

149

Boiotian League and the isopolity between Argos and Corinth. Athens votes honours for Phanokritos of Parium. Probably in this year, Plato founds the Academy. Sparta next demands the dissolution of the synoecism of the five villages of Mantineia, under the claim of local independence. When Mantineia refuses, Sparta attacks and forcibly dissolves the city in the winter of 385/4. Sparta interferes in the politics of democratic Phleious by supporting the return of oligarchic political exiles. Athens and Khios conclude an alliance, swearing to observe the terms of the King’s Peace. Alliance formed between Athens and Olynthos. Akanthos, Apollonia and Amyntas of Macedon appeal to Sparta for help against Olynthos and the Khalkidic League. Sparta demands the dissolution of the league, on the grounds that it violates the provision for local independence in the King’s Peace. Spartan expedition against Olynthos sets out under the leadership of Phoibidas. As it passes through Boiotia, he enters Thebes and seizes the Kadmeia. As a result of Theban protests, Phoibidas is replaced by Teleutias and brought to trial at Sparta. He is acquitted, thanks to the influence of Agesilaos. A Spartan garrison remains on the Kadmeia. Teleutias dies at Olynthos. In the summer he is succeeded by Agesipolis. Agesilaos begins the siege of Phleious, which had refused Spartan intervention in its dealings with the property demands of the restored oligarchs. Agesipolis dies at Olynthos and is succeeded by Polybiadas. Agesilaos captures Phleious. Olynthos falls. The Khalkidic League is dissolved and its members incorporated into the Peloponnesian League. A group led by Pelopidas liberates Thebes from Spartan occupation. A Spartan levy under the new king Kleombrotos invades Boiotia, but retires without accomplishment. Thebes begins to reassemble the Boiotian League. Sphodrias, the Spartan commander at Thespiai in Boiotia, makes a surprise night-time raid into Attika. He withdraws without achieving anything more than angering the Athenians. They protest to Sparta, where Sphodrias is tried but acquitted, thanks to Agesilaos. The Athenians make an alliance with the Thebans, “put gates on the Peiraieus and began to build ships.” (Xen. Hell. 5.4.34). They also

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377 (spring)

377 (summer) 376

375

375/4 (winter) 374/3

begin contracting more alliances overseas, with the Byzantines, Methymnaians, Mytilenaians and Rhodians and Khalkidians on Euboia. On the motion of Aristoteles the Athenians proclaim the foundation of a new Confederacy “in order that the Lakedaimonians may allow the Hellenes, free and autonomous, to live in peace, holding in security the land that is their own” (IG II2 43. 9–12). Sixty members are recorded, mainly islanders but including Thebes. Agesilaos leads army into Boiotia but becomes sick. Beginning of naval records at Athens. Reorganisation of Athenian finances for the payment of liturgies like eisphora and the trierarchia. Extant records of the epimeletai ton neorion (Superintendents of the Shipyards) in the Peiraeus begin in this year and continue until 323/2. Athenian strategos, Khabrias, campaigns in Euboia and the Cyclades. Failure of Kleombrotos to invade Boiotia disappoints allies of Sparta. Sparta sends Pollis with a fleet to cut off grain supply to Athens. Khabrias leads Athenian fleet in opposition and wins great victory off Naxos. Revival of Athenian naval power in Aegean and concomitant eclipse of Spartan naval power. Numerically superior Spartan force in Boiotia comes into conflict with new Theban contingent (the Sacred Band) under Pelopidas at Tegyra, but is defeated. Khabrias takes an Athenian fleet to Thrace and the Hellespont, while another Athenian strategos, Timotheos, son of Konon, sails around the Peloponnese and gains the adherence of Kephallenia, Akarnania and Kerkyra to the Athenian League. Spartans send a fleet under Nikolokhos to counter Timotheos, which results in the inconclusive Battle of Alyzia (summer). All parties are weary of war and peace negotiations begin at Sparta. These lead to a new Common Peace (Koine Eirene), which is basically a renewal of the Great King’s Peace. Even Thebes signs, though reluctantly. Stasis on Zakynthos. Oligarchs seek Spartan aid. Spartan expedition under Mnasippos (navarch) to Zakynthos and Kerkyra. Timotheos put on trial at Athens for not helping Kerkyra, and Ktesikles is sent out in his place. Mnasippos gains control of Kerkyra. Athens passes a law on legal tender and the testing of coinage. Iphikrates works with Pharnabazos and helps mount an expedition to recover Egypt for Persia, but they fail. Evagoras of Salamis in Cyprus dies.

Appendix 2: Historical Outline

373/2

372

151

Athens introduces a grain-tax law, regulating the importation of grain from Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros. Iphikrates returns to Athens and is sent out to Kerkyra (late summer 373). Mnasippos dies. Peace of 375/4 is terminated and war is resumed. Thebes takes the opportunity to recover control of Thespiai and Tanagra. Thebes attacks Plataia. Isokrates publishes Plataikos. Thebes captures and destroys Plataia, which causes great dismay at Athens. Plataian refugees given citizenship at Athens. Thebes destroys Thespiai.

THE PERIOD OF THEBAN HEGEMONY (371–362) 371

370

Thebes invades Phokis. In response, Kleombrotos is sent to Phokis with a force of Spartans. Meanwhile, Artaxerxes, king of Persia, eager to hire Greek hoplites as mercenaries for a new attempt on Egypt, tries to stop the Greeks fighting amongst themselves by negotiating a new peace. Meetings take place in Sparta. A Common Peace is agreed upon, but Epaminondas of Thebes demands to sign on behalf of the Boiotians. Agesilaos, king of Sparta, refuses to agree to this and threatens to exclude Thebes from the peace. Thebes is now isolated, since Sparta is hostile and Athens is nervous of the growing ambition of the Thebans. Agesilaos orders Kleombrotos to lead his army from Phokis into Boiotia. The Thebans under Pelopidas and Epaminondas meet him at Leuktra. In the ensuing battle Kleombrotos is killed along with about four hundred other Spartiates. The Spartan phalanx retreats to its camp, acknowledging defeat. A Spartan levy under Archidamos, son of Agesilaos, rushes to the isthmus. Jason of Pherai, ally of Thebes, arrives with reinforcements, but mediates disengagement to allow the Spartan force to leave Boiotia. All Spartan troops return home and their allies are disbanded. The Athenians, not overjoyed at the Theban victory, organize peace negotiations at Athens to renew the Common Peace recently signed. A clause calls upon all signatories to come to the aid of any city that is attacked. This is obviously designed to obviate Theban expansionism. Thebes is not present and does not sign. Spartan domination of the Peloponnese is challenged by Elis, which wants to recover the places lost in the Elean War (discussed earlier under 402–400), and Mantineia,

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370/69 (winter) 369

368

which resolves to reconstitute the city dissolved by Agesipolis. There is also factional strife between pro- and anti-Spartan groups in Tegea. Mantineia takes the lead in forming a League of Arkadian States. Agesilaos leads a Spartan force into Arkadia and marauds the land unopposed, then returns home. An alliance is formed between the Arkadian League, Elis, Argos and the Boiotian League. In response to requests from Mantineia and Elis Epaminindas leads Boiotian forces into the Peloponnese, ravages Lakonia but fails to attack the city of Sparta itself, then marches into Messenia, liberates the Messenians and founds Messene. Sparta looks around for other help and finds Athens, which forms an alliance with its old enemy out of fear of Thebes, which had probably already brought about the defection of Akarnania and Euboia from the Second Confederacy. The Athenians and Spartans agree, quite unrealistically, to divide the hegemony of Greece between them, Sparta ruling by land, Athens by sea. An Athenian force under Khabrias is sent to the isthmus to help prevent a second invasion of the Peloponnese, but Epaminondas gets past and wins Sikyon and Pellene away from alliance with Sparta. He then ravages Epidauris. Returning to the isthmus, he makes an attempt upon Corinth, but is driven off with losses by the Athenians under Khabrias. Dionysios, tyrant of Syracuse, a long-time friend of Sparta, sends twenty ships and men (Celtic and Iberian mercenaries) to help. Epaminondas returns home to Boiotia through the Isthmus. Meanwhile, Pelopidas campaigns in Thessaly and Macedon and expands Theban influence in the north. Alexander, king of Macedon, gives hostages to Thebes, one of whom is Philip, later Philip II. With additional support from Dionysios of Syracuse the Spartans under Arkhidamos invade Arkadia and defeat a combined force of Arkadians and Argives without loss to themselves (the “tearless battle”). This revives Spartan morale. In response, the Arkadians with some Theban help found the new city of Megalopolis in southern Arkadia. Athens joins in alliance with Dionysios I of Syracuse. Pelopidas makes a second campaign into Thessaly and Macedon, but is captured and imprisoned by Alexander, tyrant of Pherai, who has the assistance of a naval force from Athens, his ally. A relief force under Epaminondas fails to rescue Pelopidas.

Appendix 2: Historical Outline 367/6

366 (spring)

366/5

365/4 364

364/3 362/1

153

Epaminondas invades Thessaly and this time secures the release of Pelopidas, who is promptly sent on embassy to Persia, where several states have representations before the Great King in an effort to win his favour in negotiations for another Common Peace. Pelopidas is successful on behalf of Thebes. A congress takes place at Thebes to agree on terms. Since the terms include the recognition of the autonomy of the cities of Messene and Amphipolis, and furthermore the laying up of the Athenian fleet, it is not surprising that they are rejected. In the same spring Epaminondas leads a third expedition into the Peloponnese, this time to Akhaia, where he overthrows oligarchies in Sikyon and other towns. After he leaves, however, his work is undone. Timotheos, son of Konon, is elected strategos and takes a fleet to Khalkidike in Thrace, where he wins Poteidaia, Torone, Pydna and Methone for the Athenian League. He then proceeds to the coast of Asia Minor, where he is to assist the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes. Timotheos besieges and captures Samos and sets up an Athenian kleroukhy there. In the summer the Thebans take the disputed territory of Oropos from Athens. Athens makes an alliance with the Arkadian League. War breaks out between Elis and the Arkadian League over the cities of Triphylia. In the course of the conflict, the Arkadians seize control of the sanctuary at Olympia and hand over the administration to the Pisatans. Elis forms an alliance with Sparta and Akhaia. Epameinondas sails with a Boiotian fleet into the Aegean and Pelopidas leads a new expedition into Thessaly to oppose the ambitions of Alexander of Pherai. Theban forces defeat Alexander at Kynoskephalai, but Pelopidas is killed. The Thebans conclude a treaty with Alexander. The Arkadian League begins to break up; the Tegeans favour the Thebans, while the Mantineians side with Elis and Sparta. Epameinondas makes his fourth expedition into the Peloponnese to defend his policy there, especially the independence of Messenia, as dissension threatens to break it apart. The result is the Battle of Mantineia (autumn), in which Theban troops defeat the opposing Spartan phalanx. This

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Appendix 2: Historical Outline Theban victory over the Spartans ensures that Spartan dominance over the Peloponnese is ended. But the Athenians are victorious on their wing. In addition, Epameinondas is killed in the battle. With the deaths of both Pelopidas and Epameinondas, Theban hegemony founders. Thus, the outcome of the Battle of Mantineia is inconclusive and not the one hoped for by many Greeks—namely, that a dominant power would emerge to lead Greek affairs. Rather the opposite; “In fact, there was even more uncertainty and confusion in Greece after the battle than there had been previously” (Xen. Hell. 7.5.27). At this point, a dispirited Xenophon ends his Hellenika. Nevertheless, the Greek states conclude a Common Peace treaty (Koine Eirene), which is agreed by all major parties except Sparta. This treaty is cited as a reason for rejecting an embassy from satraps in revolt from the King of Persia.

ATHENS’ LAST CHANCE AT HEGEMONY—SHORT-LIVED 362/1

361/0 360

Athens makes an alliance with Arkadia, Akhaia, Elis and Phleious. Athens sends out kleroukhs to Poteidaia at the request of a pro-Athenian faction there. Athens enters into perpetual alliance with the koinon of the Thessalians in opposition to Alexander of Pherai. Athens sends out a second group of kleroukhs to Samos. Agesilaos, king of Sparta, and Perdikkas, king of Macedon die. Arkhidamos succeeds his father on the throne at Sparta. Philip II becomes king in Macedon.

THE EMERGENCE OF MACEDON 359

Athens supports Argaios as claimant to the throne of Macedon. His attempt is defeated by Philip. Athens concludes a treaty of peace and alliance with Philip, who agrees to remove the Macedonian garrison from Amphipolis, maybe “saying that he would hand over Amphipolis and fabricating that well-known secret that was much talked about” (Dem. 2.6). Philip eliminates Pausanias, another claimant to his throne, supported by Thrakians. Philip defeats Agis, king of the Paionians, and secures the northern borders of Macedon.

Appendix 2: Historical Outline 358

357

356

355

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Philip defeats Bardylis, king of the Illyrians and marries his daughter, Audata, thus securing the western borders of Macedon. He espouses the cause of the Aleuadai, the opponents of Alexander of Pherai in Thessaly. He marries Philinna of Larissa. Philip concludes a treaty with the king of Epiros and marries his daughter, Olympias. Athens campaigns in Euboia and regains much of the island from Theban influence. Athens concludes an alliance with Euboian cities—Khalkis, Eretria, Karystos and Histiaia. Athens is embroiled in the Social War against a group of defecting allies—Byzantion, Rhodes, Khios and Kos, supported by Mausolos, satrap of Karia, and the Thebans. Whilst Athenian attention is focused on Euboia and the Social War, Philip of Macedon seizes control of Amphipolis. The Khalkidic League is alarmed by Philip’s success at Amphipolis and approaches Athens for an alliance, but is rebuffed. Instead, the league concludes a treaty of peace and alliance with Philip. Athens declares war on Philip and makes an alliance with the three kings of Thrace, Berisades (western Thrace) Amadokos (central Thrace), and Kersebleptes (eastern Thrace), successors to the Odrysian king Kotys I. Philip captures Pydna from Athens. Athens responds by making an alliance with Ketriporis, son of Berisades (d. 357), king of western Thrace; Lyppeios, king of Paionia; and Grabos, king of Illyria. Athens loses naval engagement off Khios; Khabrias is killed. Philip’s wife, Olympias, gives birth to a son, Alexander. Philip captures Potidaia from Athens. Parmenion, Macedonian general, defeats Grabos of Illyria. Arkesine on Amorgos honours its governor, Androtion. An Athenian garrison is established on Andros. Athens loses major naval battle against defecting allies off Embata, near Erythrai. At a meeting of the Amphiktyonic council Thebes charges its enemy Phokis with the sacrilege of tilling sacred land. Phokis seizes the sanctuary at Delphi. The Social War comes to an end. No source describes the terms, but at least it is clear that the defecting states secure their independence from Athens, although both Rhodes and Kos soon come under the control of Mausolos of Karia, who may have encouraged their defection from

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Appendix 2: Historical Outline Athens for this purpose. Byzantion, on the other hand, expands its influence over Khalkedon and Selymbria, former members of the Second Athenian League, and, whilst it does not impede Athenian grain convoys from passing through its waters, it probably levies the taxes that formerly went to Athens. The remaining members of the league stay loyal to Athens and their synhedrion continues to meet and contribute to policy. On the motion of the Thebans, at the autumn pylaia the Amphiktyonic Council proclaims a Sacred War against Phokis. This Third Sacred War over Delphi pits the Thebans, Lokrians and Thessalians against the Phokians and their ally, Sparta. Athens, following a policy of opposition to Thebes, joins in alliance with Phokis. Philip of Macedon, as an ally of the Thessalians and Thebans, has the option to be involved, but is otherwise engaged. Philomelos, the Phokian commander, uses sacred funds from the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi to hire mercenary troops. Philip begins the siege of Methone. Philip captures Methone from Athens, but loses an eye in the process. After some initial successes, Philomelos is defeated and killed at a battle at Neon in Phokis. Onomarkhos assumes the leadership of the Phokians. Euboulos becomes prominent in Athenian politics, reforms the financial situation and transfers any annual surplus in the treasury from the stratiotic fund to the theoric fund. Philip begins the year campaigning in Thrace. In the summer he moves his forces into Thessaly and campaigns there into the autumn. He is defeated twice by Onomarkhos and his mercenary forces and retires to spend the winter at home in Macedon. Meanwhile, in the Hellespont, Khares captures Sestos, slaughtering the fighting men and selling the rest of the population into slavery. In the spring Philip returns to Thessaly and defeats Onomarkhos overwhelmingly at the so-called Battle of the Crocus Field, somewhere in Magnesia. Khares, offshore with an Athenian fleet, rescues some of the defeated soldiers. Philip captures Pherai and Pagasai, the latter giving him a port onto the Aegean. In the summer Philip is elected archon of the Thessalian League, in celebration of which he marries Nikesipolis of Pherai.

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350 349

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In August, Philip marches upon Thermopylai, where he is faced by the Athenian general, Nausikles, with a strong force of Athenians (five thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry), possibly supplemented by one thousand Spartans and two thousand Akhaians. Philip withdraws and swiftly moves his attention to Thrace, where he campaigns against Athens’ ally, Kersebleptes, with the assistance of Amadokos, Byzantion and Perinthos. Kersebleptes is reduced to suing for peace. Alarmed by Philip’s successes, the Khalkidic League again approaches the Athenians for a treaty of peace and this time the offer is accepted. In November, the Athenians hear that Philip is preparing to besiege Heraion Teikhos, a link in the chain of Athens naval communications with its Black Sea grain supply. The Athenians vote to send a squadron of forty triremes to oppose him, but change their mind when they hear he has fallen sick and been forced to return to Macedon (Dem. 3.4). Sometime in this archon-year, the Athenians dispatch a third group of kleroukhs to Samos and this is probably the occasion when they expel the Samian opposition from the island. In the spring Philip invades Khalkidike in an attempt to overawe the Olynthians and persuade them to reject their peace treaty with Athens. He is unsuccessful. He then moves to Epirus, where he campaigns against Arybbas. Nikesipolis gives birth to a daughter, Thessalonike (future wife of Kassander), but dies soon after. Demosthenes delivers his First Philippic. Arrhidaios and Menelaos, half-brothers of Philip of Macedon, are given refuge from him by the Olynthians. Philip’s demand for their return being refused, he declares war. In the summer, Philip invades Khalkidike. A Khalkidian delegation approaches Athens for alliance. Demosthenes delivers the First Olynthiac. An agreement is concluded. In the autumn, maybe on the urging of the Second Olynthiac, Athens sends the first of three forces to help the Olynthians: Khares, who was already in the vicinity with thirty triremes and two thousand peltasts, is diverted to Olynthos, and the Athenians man an additional eight triremes. Athens is distracted by trouble in Eretria on Euboia, where she has to send a strong force under the leadership of Phokion. This produces inconclusive results at the Battle of Tamynai. Meanwhile, Philip prosecutes his assault upon

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348/7 (winter)

347

346

the Khalkidic League, taking city after city and isolating Olynthos. He is then called to Thessaly to deal with an opponent in Pherai. The Athenians now send out a second force to assist in the fighting in the Khalkidike. Kharidemos, the general in the Hellespont, is sent there with 18 triremes, 4,000 peltasts and 150 cavalry. Together with the Olynthians these troops lay waste to Pellene and Bottiaia. By midsummer Philip is back in Khalkidike and this time he invests Olynthos with his siege weapons. Maybe as a result of the Third Olynthiac, the Athenians send out a third force to Olynthos; seventeen more triremes, two thousand citizen hoplites and three hundred cavalry in horse transports, under the overall leadership of Khares. These arrive too late to save the city, which is betrayed to Philip (autumn). The city of Olynthos is sacked and the population sold into slavery. The Athenians fall into Philip’s hands and become his hostages. One of them, Iatrokles, is sent to Athens to reiterate Philip’s willingness to negotiate terms of peace. Over the winter, on a motion by Euboulos, an effort is made by Athens to rouse the Greeks to ally against Philip. As part of this, Aiskhines goes on embassy to the Peloponnese, where he witnesses the plight of Olynthian refugees. The effort is unsuccessful. Political dissension in Phokis leads to the removal of Phalaikos from the leadership of the Phokian forces. A Macedonian force appears in central Greece. The new leaders in Phokis offer Thermopylai to Athens and Sparta. In the Hellespont, Athens supports Kersebleptes’ establishment of forts. Plato dies and Speusippos succeeds him as head of the Academy. Aristotle leaves Athens and makes his way to Assos on the invitation of Hermeias of Atarneus. There he marries Pythias, niece or adopted daughter of Hermeias, and establishes a community of scholars. Athens passes another decree inviting the Greeks to join a Hellenic alliance. At about the same time, Athens confirms its relationship with the new rulers of the Kimmerian Bosporos by renewing the honours formerly granted to their father, Leukon. The Athenians also renew their alliance with Mytilene on Lesbos. Phalaikos regains control of Phokian forces and begins negotiations with Philip. He denies access to Thermopylai to an Athenian fleet led by Proxenos. A key element of Athenian strategic calculation is removed. The way is now open

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159

for Philip to march into Greece. As a result of this change in situation and in order to facilitate the release of the Athenian hoplites held as hostages by Philip from the siege of Olynthos, in February the Athenians vote to send a delegation of ten men to Philip to discuss terms for peace, despite the fact that other Athenian embassies are still out trying to arrange an Hellenic alliance against him. The delegation to Philip is led by Philokrates. Demosthenes and Aiskhines are both members. They return with the unwelcome news that Philip is willing to make peace and cease hostilities, if the Athenians will join in alliance with him. This means having the same friends and enemies, which would make it impossible for them to help their allies, e.g., the Phokians and Kersebleptes. This information is revealed and debated at a meeting of the Ekklesia on the 18–19 Elaphebolion (c. April), at which both Parmenion and Antipater are present as representatives of Philip. Despite a recommendation (dogma) of the synhedrion of the Second Confederacy that the Assembly should debate peace only and that the terms should include a clause allowing any state that wishes to sign on within a three-month period (essentially creating a Koine Eirene), the Athenian Assembly reluctantly but realistically agrees to Philip’s conditions, mollified by suggestions from some of the ambassadors that Philip will turn against the Thebans, his allies, will not be hard on the Phokians, and that the Athenians will regain both Oropos and Euboia. The Athenians agree to make peace with Philip, recognizing the possessions of each party at the time of signing, and to join in perpetual alliance, having the same friends and enemies. The treaty includes Philip’s allies on the one side and the members of the Second Confederacy on the other. Excluded from the agreement are the Phokians and Kersebleptes, both allies of Athens. The Athenians ratify the terms and dispatch the same ambassadors (3 Mounykhion, beginning of May) in haste to Pella to secure Philip’s signature. Philip, however, has been campaigning in Thrace, defeating Kersebleptes and capturing Hieron Oros, and only returns to Pella on the twenty-third day of the next month (Thargelion, c. June). There he is met by delegations of ambassadors from many states in Greece. He treats them all courteously, and then sets out on the march to Pherai, where the oaths to the treaty with Athens and her allies is finally sworn by Philip

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Appendix 2: Historical Outline and his allies. The Athenian ambassadors now return home and report to the assembly, but within a few days (13 Skirophorion) Philip has reached Thermopylai with his army. The Athenian assembly confirms the treaty and votes to send the ambassadors back to tell Philip. But Demosthenes and Aiskhines do not go. Demosthenes and Timarkhos prosecute Aiskhines by eisangelia for false embassy (parapresbeia), claiming he was bribed by Philip to mislead the People with false promises. Shortly afterwards, Philip uses the terms of the Peace of Philokrates and requests Athenian military support in his war with Phokis. On the advice of Demosthenes, the Athenians refuse. The Phokians surrender to Philip and the Third Sacred War ends. Philip, the Saviour of Apollo, presides over the Amphiktyonic Council. The Council decides on the punishment of the Phokians: the razing of their towns and dissolution of the population into small villages, prohibition against owning horses and carrying weapons, and the payment of an annual fine to replace the value of the pillaged treasures. The Athenians in protest do not send an official representative to this meeting, but Aiskhines is there in a private capacity and speaks for leniency towards the Phokians. On his return, Aiskhines lodges a counter-suit (paragraphe) against Timarkhos, claiming he is debarred from public life on account of his unsavory background (Aisk. I, Against Timarkhos). Isokrates writes his Philippos, in which he celebrates Philip’s success and recommends he gain the support of the four major states in Greece (Athens, Sparta, Thebes and Argos) so that he can lead a Panhellenic campaign against the Persians. Demosthenes delivers his fifth public speech On the Peace.

PHILIP TRIUMPHANT King of a united Macedon, conqueror of Thrace, archon of Thessaly, master of Central Greece through the Delphic Amphiktyony, ally of Athens and her League, allied to Thebes and, through her, to states in the Peloponnese opposed to Sparta. 346/5

Sometime in this archon-year (the archonship of Arkhias) the Athenians conduct a review of the citizens rolls (lexiarchika grammateia), on a motion of Demophilos. Aiskhines’

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345

344/3

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suit against Timarkhos comes to trial. Aiskhines wins and Timarkhos loses his citizen rights. At some point in this archon-year, the Messenians and Megapolitans apply for admission into the Delphic Amphiktiony, probably out of fear of Spartan aggression and in the hope of securing support from Philip, but their request is rejected. Aristotle and Theophrastos leave Assos and move to Mytilene on Lesbos. Philip campaigns in Illyria against Pleuratos, king of the Ardiaioi. He is victorious, but in the fighting he has his collarbone broken. Isokrates writes a letter to Philip advising him not to risk his life in battle. Some trouble in Thessaly requires Philip’s intervention. He removes opponents and puts garrisons in Pherai and Larissa. He appoints tetrarchs over the four traditional districts of Thessaly (Thessaliotis, Pelasgiotis, Histiaiotis and Phthiotis). In the Peloponnese, Philip supports Messene and Argos against Sparta. Demosthenes goes on embassy to the Peloponnese, reminding states friendly to Philip of the fate of Olynthos. Demosthenes delivers his Second Philippic when an embassy of (now) unknown provenance is present in Athens. In the winter, an embassy from Artaxerxes III tours Greece to secure mercenaries for his planned invasion of Egypt. At Athens the embassy requests merely that the ancestral friendship (philia) between the city and the king continue to exist. The Athenians agree, provided the king not attack the Greek cities of Asia Minor. Later, Philip sends an embassy headed by the orator Python of Byzantion to Athens to offer a revision (epanorthosis) of the terms of the Peace of Philokrates. The Athenians respond by a resolution to send a delegation, led by Hegisippos, to Philip to negotiate two revisions to the Peace. 1. That it be expanded into a Common Peace (Koine Eirene), which could be joined by any state that wished. 2. That the clause “each party should have what it holds” at the time of signing be amended to read “each party should have what belongs to it.” This latter clause is intended to open the way for the Athenian delegation to negotiate for the return of Poteidaia, Amphipolis and other possessions Athens has lost to Philip. Not surprisingly the delegation is sent home unsuccessful.

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343–340: PHILIP LOSES THE INITIATIVE, FINDS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BE FRIENDS WITH ALL GREEKS AT THE SAME TIME In the spring and early summer of 343, Philip is pulled into involvement in the internal politics of several states in Greece. In all cases he assists oligarchs or tyrants. 1. Stasis in the Peloponnesian state Elis results in Philip providing monetary support for the oligarchic faction that eventually emerges victorious. 2. In Eretria on Euboia he sends Hipponikos with one thousand soldiers to support the tyrant Kleitarkhos in defeating his rival. Later he is said to have given money to Philistides in his conflict with Euphraios for control of Oreus. These interventions close to home disturb the Athenians, though they are unable to do anything about them at the time. 3. Perillos and Ptoiodoros, friends of Philip, attempt to seize control in Megara. In this case the attempt is foiled by an Athenian force led by Phokion, who fortifies Nisaia, the port of Megara, and builds Long Walls to the city. Philip’s activities, coupled with the failure of the attempt at revision, fuel the overall discontent at Athens with the Peace of Philokrates and members of the team that negotiated it are prosecuted. Philokrates himself flees into exile, but others stay and argue their case in the courts. One of these is Aiskhines, whose case comes to trial in the summer of 343 and who barely escapes conviction (by a mere thirty votes) in the suit On the False Embassy. Later in 343, Kallias of Khalkis, alarmed at the rumour that Philip and the Thebans are preparing a joint campaign against him, comes to Athens seeking support for his plan to form a united federation of Euboian states. With the support of Demosthenes he gains the approval of the Assembly. 343

343/2

Athens sends out kleroukhs to the Khersonese under the command of Diopeithes. Aristotle is invited by Philip to become tutor to Alexander and friends at Mieza. Over the winter, or maybe in the early spring 342, Philip attacks Arybbas, king of the Molossoi in Epeiros. He deposes him and makes Alexander, brother of Olympias, king in his place. Arybbas flees to Athens, where he is given asylum. On his way from Epeiros, Philip marches through Kassopia and threatens to attack Ambrakia. The Athenians respond by sending a contingent to Akarnania, on the Gulf of Ambrakia. The Athenians also send out ambassadors to the Peloponnese to rouse resistance to Philip. Demosthenes, Hegesippos and Lykourgos are amongst the delegates. In his travels Demosthenes visits both Akarnania and Ambrakia. For whatever reason, Philip does not attack Ambrakia, but returns to Macedon.

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Also in the spring or early summer of 342, Philip writes a letter to the Athenians (not extant) replying to their demands and offering to negotiate about some of them (though not Amphipolis). In addition he offers to “give” them the island of Halonnesos, which had once been Athenian, had been captured by pirates and then taken by Philip. In the speech On Halonnesos (speech 7 in the corpus of Demosthenes’ orations), the author, Hegesippos, ridicules all Philip’s offers, famously objecting that Philip could not “give” Halonnesos to the Athenians, since it was not his but theirs. He should “return” it, therefore. This semantic distinction does not impress Philip. During this year, Artaxerxes reconquers Egypt. About midsummer, at the beginning of the archonship of Sosigenes, Philip sends first Eurylokhos, then Parmenion with forces into Euboia to secure Kleitarkhos in Eretria and Philistides in Oreus. He, himself, sets out for Thrace and the Khersonese, ostensibly to protect the Greek states from Kersebleptes. During the last part of 342 and early 341 Philip overcomes Kersebleptes and his ally, Teres, son of Amadokos. His campaigning brings him close to Kardia, a state on the Khersonese that is allied to him, but which is claimed by Athens. Diopeithes, leader of the Athenian kleroukhs, has been harassing the Kardians and they ask Philip for help. Philip suggests to the Athenians that they allow the issues between themselves and the Kardians to be settled by arbitration, but they are not willing. He sends troops into Kardia as support. In response, Diopeithes leads a raid into Thrace and captures two towns. He also abuses Philip’s messenger, then retreats to the Khersonese. Philip complains to Athens. In response, Demosthenes defends the actions of Diopeithes in his speech On the Khersonese. Nevertheless, Diopeithes is probably removed from command, since the commander of Athenian forces in Thrace in 341/0 is Khares. In spring 341 Athens makes an alliance with Khalkis on Euboia and provides naval support to Kallias of Khalkis in raids on the Gulf of Pagasai. Shortly before midsummer 341 the Athenians send an expedition under the strategos Kephisophon, which joins forces with the Khalkidians and succeeds in liberating Oreus from Philistides. Demosthenes delivers his Third Philippic (speech 9). At the beginning of the archon-year of Nikomakhos, an Athenian expedition under the leadership of Phokion liberates the city of Eretria from Kleitarkhos and restores democracy to the people.

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341 (Winter)

340 (Spring)

340/39

340 (Autumn)

340 (Winter)

Demosthenes delivers his Fourth Philippic (speech 10). In this he refers to the arrest of Hermeias of Atarneus by Mentor of Rhodes, the Great King’s agent in north-western Asia Minor (10.31). Hermeias is sent to the King in Sousa, where he is tortured and dies (though sources disagree about the manner of his death). Aristotle writes a paian on his death. Philip makes an alliance with Kothelas, king of the Getai. He marries his daughter, Meda. Demosthenes and Kallias of Khalkis go on embassy to the Peloponnese to rouse opposition to Philip. This embassy is successful and leads to a meeting in Athens on 16 Anthesterion (c. March) where a League of Greek States for the defence against Philip is founded. Athens votes honours for the city of Elaious, located on the tip of the Thracian Khersonese. The Athenians approve the foundation of a Euboian League under the hegemony of Khalkis. Philip invades the Thracian Khersonese and brings up his fleet. Probably in reaction to his proximity, the Perinthians repudiate their alliance with him. He puts the city under siege, but it successfully resists his attacks, thanks to assistance from the Byzantines (also technically an ally of Philip) and the local Persian satraps. Philip breaks off his siege of Perinthos and invests Selymbria and then Byzantion. Perinthos and Byzantion seek alliance with Athens. Philip makes a bold move overland and captures a large convoy of 230 grain ships that has been gathered under the protection of the Athenian commander Khares with 40 triremes at Hieron, on the Asiatic coast of the Bosporos, about seven miles from the entrance to the Black Sea. Philip sells the grain and hides for as much as seven hundred talents and uses the ships’ timbers for his siege engines. On a motion of Demosthenes the Athenians declare war upon Philip and vote to break into pieces the stele on which is inscribed the terms of the Peace of Philokrates. Khares drives Philip’s fleet into the Black Sea. An Athenian fleet under Phokion and Kephisophon sails to the Bosporos to help the Byzantines. Ships are also sent by Khios, Kos and Rhodes (allies of Byzantion in the Social War). The people of Tenedos also contribute funds to this campaign, for which they are honoured in an Athenian inscription from this year. The siege of Byzantion is relieved. Philip extricates his fleet from the Black Sea and retires from Byzantion frustrated.

Appendix 2: Historical Outline 339 (Spring)

339 (Summer) 339 (Autumn)

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Philip marches into Scythia against King Ateas, who has rejected his offer of alliance. Philip is victorious and gains much booty. At the Spring Pylaia the Amphiktyons vote to fine the Lokrians of Amphissa for farming sacred land, following a speech by an Athenian representative, Aiskhines. The Amphiktyons march out against the Amphissans, but are driven away ignominiously. At an extraordinary meeting, from which Thebes, an ally of Lokris, and Athens are absent, the Thessalian delegation secures a vote to use force against Amphissa. The Amphissans are overawed and agree to pay the fine. The Thebans capture Nikaia, a key fort in the Thermopylai corridor, and expel the Macedonian garrison. Philip no longer controls access to southern Greece. On his way back to Macedon Philip is attacked by the Triballi; he is wounded and loses much of his booty. He recuperates at home over the summer. Since the Amphissans have not paid the fine imposed upon them, the Amphiktyons at the Autumn Pylaia declare a Sacred War against Amphissa and call upon Philip to be hegemon of their forces. Philip senses an opportunity to regain the initiative. In the early winter of 339 he marches south, bypasses the route to Thermopylai and takes a route via Trakhis past the site of Herakleia into Doris. There he captures Kytinion. Up to this point he seems to be heading for Delphi, but then he turns east and advances into Phokis, where he takes Elateia. The way south to Boiotia and Attika now lies open to him. Panic ensues in Athens, vividly described by Demosthenes (On the Crown, 18.169ff.). On a motion of Demosthenes, work on the Arsenal in the Peiraeus is stopped and all surplus funds are designated for military purposes (stratiotika). Also on his suggestion a delegation, of which he is the head, is sent to Thebes to seek alliance against Philip. Present at Thebes is a number of ambassadors from the Amphiktyony and some from Philip also, who hope to win Theban support against Athens (Thebes is still technically allied with Philip). There is a demand, however, that the Thebans hand Nikaia over to the Lokrians. The Thebans are persuaded by Demosthenes to recognize that Philip is a threat to their interests and agree to join the Athenian alliance to resist him. Over the winter 339/8, the Greek forces gather, with contingents sent from Euboia, Megara, Corinth, Akhaia,

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338/7

Appendix 2: Historical Outline Leukas and Kerkyra, but the bulk of the army comes from Thebes and Athens. Their combined forces are numerically a match for Philip’s. They take up position on the border between Boiotia and Lokris. Philip outmaneuvers a contingent under Khares and captures Amphissa. Parmenion takes Naupaktos, which Philip hands over to the Aitolians, much to the annoyance of the Akhaians. Over the summer the allies move back to Khaironeia. On 7 Metageitnion (22 August) the Battle of Khaironeia takes place, in which Philip through superior generalship is victorious. The Athenians prepare to be attacked and hurriedly repair their fortifications and call up the reserves. Phokion is sent out to protect the borders of Attika. Supplies of grain and other foods are brought into the Peiraeus.

PHILIP MAKES PEACE AND ALLIANCE WITH ATHENS Philip wisely decides to settle with the Athenians on lenient terms and sends back their captives without ransom. Athens retains her autonomia (i.e., control of her internal affairs) and keeps her fleet. No garrison is imposed. Though her confederacy is disbanded, she keeps possession of Lemnos, Imbros, Skyros and Samos. In addition, she retains the administration of the sanctuary on Delos and is given back control of the disputed territory at Oropos that she had lost to Thebes. ATHENS AFTER KHAIRONEIA: THE LYKOURGAN PERIOD (338–326) A new quadrennial administrative position (epi tei dioikesei) with overall supervision over the financial affairs of the state is created at Athens. Lykourgos, son of Lykophron, of Boutadai, a member of the aristocratic priestly family of the Eteoboutadai, is the first to hold the position. He, or people allied to him, control this office for the next twelve years. It is a period of renewal and recovery financially, militarily and spiritually. PHILIP PUNISHES THEBES The fate of Thebes is not so gentle. A Macedonian garrison is installed on the Kadmeia and some key opponents are put to death. The Thebans have to pay a ransom to recover their citizens who died or were captured at Khaironeia. Though it is possible that Philip allows the Boiotian League to

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continue in existence, several cities (Plataia, Orkhomenos and Thespiai) that the Thebans had destroyed are restored by him. PHILIP REWARDS HIS FRIENDS IN THE PELOPONNESE 338 (Late autumn) 337 (Spring)

337 (summer) 336 (Spring)

336/5

Philip leads his forces into the Peloponnese and reaffirms his alliance with Argos, Megalopolis, Messene and Tegea. He leaves Sparta isolated in Lakonia. Philip, now the undisputed master of Greece, calls all Greek states to a meeting at the Isthmus of Corinth, where a new Common Peace (Koine Eirene) is concluded, with himself as the hegemon. He announces his intention to invade the Persian Empire in the following year and calls for contingents from the Greek states. Philip marries Kleopatra, his sixth wife, but the first from Macedon. Olympias goes home to Epiros in a huff, and, her son, Alexander’s nose is temporarily out of joint. Athens votes to honour the Akarnanians for their support against Philip in the Battle of Khaironeia. On the motion of Eukrates, the Athenians pass a law threatening severe punishment against members of the Areiopagos should they convene a meeting at a time when there is an overthrow of (or a plot to overthrow) the democratic constitution. An advance force under Parmenion and Attalos crosses the Hellespont and proceeds down the coast of Asia Minor as far as Ephesos. Before joining his troops in Asia, Philip stages an elaborate wedding party at Aigai for his daughter by Olympias (also called Kleopatra) and Alexander, king of Epiros, brother of Olympias. The ceremony begins with a procession of statues of the Twelve Gods, followed suggestively by one of Philip, who then enters. At that moment he is struck down by an assassin’s dagger. The assassin is quickly hunted down and killed by friends of Philip’s son, Alexander, who is promptly brought before the assembled people by Antipater and acclaimed king. Alexander marches south and renews his father’s relationship with Greece; he is recognised as archon by the Thessalians, as hegemon by the Amphiktyonic League, and at Corinth he reconvenes the League of Corinth. Next, he goes north to assert control of his kingdom by campaigning in Illyria and Scythia and even crosses the Danube.

168

Appendix 2: Historical Outline

335

334 (Spring)

334 331–324

331–330

330

325/4

Ktesiphon moves a motion to honour Demosthenes with a crown for “doing and saying what was best for the city” (Dem. On the Crown, 57). His proposal is indicted as unconstitutional by Aiskhines. In Alexander’s absence, the Thebans decide to revolt and seek help from other states. None is offered, not even by Athens, though Demosthenes flirts with the idea. Alexander marches back south to Boiotia and takes Thebes, which he razes to the ground. At a subsequent meeting of the League of Corinth Alexander renews his father’s plan to lead an invasion of the Persian Empire in revenge for Xerxes’ invasion of Greece. He calls for contingents from the Greek states to gather at Amphipolis next Spring. Few actually do join his expedition. In fact, many serve as mercenaries on the Persian side. Athens, however, contributes 160 triremes to provide naval support along the coast of Asia Minor, as requested. Alexander’s expeditionary force of about fifty thousand men, of which six thousand are cavalry, sets out from Amphipolis. Antipater is left behind at Pella as regent, to look after the kingdom and keep a watch over the Greek states. By the end of the campaigning season Alexander has made his way to Halikarnassos. There he dismisses the Athenian fleet, thus ending the official involvement of the Athenian state in his anabasis. Athens reorganizes the training programme for ephebes. A severe shortage of grain is experienced by the states of Greece, as is shown by an Athenian inscription honouring Herakleides of Salamis for his generous epidoseis to the state from 330/29 to 325/4, and another inscription from Cyrene, detailing its gifts to various states and individuals over this period. Harpalos, treasurer of Alexander, also sent grain to Athens, for which he received honorary citizenship. Agis, king of Sparta, leads an uprising against Macedon in the Peloponnese. He receives no help from Athens. Agis gets bogged down besieging Megalopolis, where he is defeated by Antipater and dies. Aiskhines’ suit against Ktesiphon for unconstitutional proposal finally comes to trial. Demosthenes, whose career is under attack, speaks in support of Ktesiphon. The speeches Against Ktesiphon (Aiskhines) and On the Crown (Demosthenes) are delivered. Aiskhines wins less than one-fifth of the votes, leaves Athens and goes to Rhodes. Athens votes to dispatch a colony to the Adriatic under the leadership of Miltiades of Lakiadai, “in order that there may

Appendix 2: Historical Outline

324 (July)

324 (late July/ early August)

323 (February/ March)

169

exist for the people for all time its own commercial outlet and supply of grain” (TDGR2, No. 121, lines 217–20). Harpalos, boyhood friend and treasurer of Alexander, flees to Athens, where he has honorary citizenship for supplying the city with grain during the shortage of 331–324. His first arrival with thirty ships and six thousand mercenaries is rejected, but he is subsequently admitted when he returns alone without ships and men, which he leaves at Cape Tainaron in the Peloponnese. Antipater demands his surrender, but, on the motion of Demosthenes, he is held in prison until such time as Alexander himself asks for his return. He brings with him a sum of money (he says it is seven hundred talents), which is taken up to the acropolis and stored there for safe keeping pending news from Alexander. A few days later Harpalos escapes from prison and flees to Crete. When the Athenians examine the money on the acropolis, it is discovered that it only amounts to 350 talents. Frightened at what Alexander might do, a search is instituted to discover who has taken the money. Demosthenes suggests that the Areiopagos be put in charge of the investigation. Their investigation takes 6 months, News arrives that Alexander has proclaimed the return home of all political exiles and that this edict will be formally announced at the Olympic Games. This edict would affect many states and not least Athens, which would have to allow the return of the Samians they had expelled in 352. Demosthenes is sent to Olympia as the head of an Athenian delegation to negotiate the exclusion of Samos from this edict. The edict is publicly announced by Nikanor of Stageira at Olympia. The Areiopagos publishes a list of people it has found guilty of taking bribes from Harpalos in an apophasis. Demosthenes and Demades are at the top of the list. Ten public prosecutors are chosen and trials begin (maybe in March). The first to be tried is Demosthenes, who is found guilty and fined fifty talents. Unable to pay, he goes into exile.

THE HELLENIC OR LAMIAN WAR 323 (June)

Alexander dies in Babylon. The Athenians, the Aitolians and a few other states join in alliance against Macedon to fight for the freedom of Greece. Some of Harpalos’ money is sent to Leosthenes, an Athenian commander of mercenaries at Cape Tainaron, to hire troops. The navy is prepared for action. Demosthenes is recalled from exile.

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322 August (Metageitnion)

Antipater marches north with an army of c. 13,000 infantry and 600 cavalry, accompanied by a fleet of 110 triremes, but is defeated by slightly superior forces (7,000 Aitolians, 5,000 Athenian infantry and 500 cavalry, plus 2,000 mercenaries) under Leosthenes and takes refuge in the city of Lamia, where he is besieged. Hence the modern name for this war, which the ancients called the Hellenic War, is the Lamian War. His fleet is blockaded in the gulf of Pagasai by one hundred Athenian triremes. Unfortunately for the Greeks, Leosthenes is killed in a skirmish outside the walls of Lamia. Antipater calls for help from Alexander’s generals, Lysimakhos, Leonnatos and Krateros. The Athenians man another fleet of 170 triremes and send it to the Hellespont under the command of Euetion. They aim to prevent reenforcements from Alexander’s generals crossing into Europe to help Antipater, but Euetion is defeated near Abydos by a Macedonian fleet of 240 ships under Kleitos. The crossing of the Hellespont is now open. Lysimakhos gets stuck in Thrace fighting Seuthes. Leonnatos gets through to Thessaly with twenty thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry, but is defeated by the Athenians under Antiphilos and killed. Nevertheless, Antipater breaks out of Lamia and joins the remainder of Leonnatos’ soldiers. Euetion with a refitted Athenian fleet of 170 ships sails into the Aegean, but is defeated again by Kleitos’ larger Macedonian fleet at the Battle of Amorgos. Krateros arrives in Europe with an army of ten thousand demobilized infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry from Asia. The now heavily outnumbered Greek forces are defeated by the combined Macedonian armies under Antipater and Krateros at the Battle of Krannon and the remaining Athenian triremes in the gulf of Pagasai are defeated by Kleitos. The allies sue for peace. Antipater settles with each state individually. For Athens the terms are severe:

1. The democratic constitution is essentially abrogated by the exclusion of all those who possessed property worth less than two thousand drachmas from the franchise. This meant that twelve thousand Athenians lost their vote and the franchise was restricted to about nine thousand. 2. Antipater proposed to transport the disfranchised to Thrace.

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171

3. A Macedonian garrison was installed on the hill of Mounykhia in the Peiraieus. 4. Athens lost control of the sanctuary of Amphiareus at Oropos. 5. Athens’ control of Samos was referred to the kings of Macedon, but eventually resulted in the decision that the exiles had a right to return and the Athenian kleroukhs were expelled. 6. The opponents of Macedon (i.e., Demosthenes, Hypereides and others like them) were to be handed over to Antipater for execution. They all fled into exile, but were hunted down and killed by the bounty hunter Arkhias. Demosthenes memorably committed suicide by poison at the temple of Poseidon on the island of Kalauria (Poros). AFTER THE LAMIAN WAR Warning: several of the dates and facts given here are in dispute, not least the dates of Lakhares’ tyranny. I have used the earlier date, but some put it as much as five years later. 322/1–319/8 319

318

317 317–307

315/4 314

Phokion and Demades in control at Athens as puppets of Antipater. Demades and son put to death by Kassander. Phokion now in sole control. Soon after, Antipater dies. Polyperkhon becomes regent for the heirs to Alexander. Kassander is not happy. Polyperkhon declares freedom of the Greek cities, while Kassander, in line with his father’s policy, supports rule by the elite. Polyperkhon moves his forces towards Attika; at war with Kassander. Phokion sides with Kassander. Nikanor, commander of Kassander’s garrison in Mounykhia, seizes Peiraieus. Phokion does not object. Phokion deposed and tried, found guilty and put to death. Demetrios of Phaleron, friend of Phokion, flees into exile. Kassander’s forces hold the Peiraieus and force the Athenians to surrender. Demetrios of Phaleron returns and is established as epimeletes of Athens by Kassander. He rules until 307, instituting many anti-democratic reforms, although he moderates the property census for the franchise to one thousand drachmas instead of two thousand. An Athenian naval squadron in the Aegean under Thymokhares of Sphettos captures Kythnos and eliminates the pirate Glauketes. The same Athenian squadron participates in a failed attack on Lemnos. Athenian control of Delos is ended by Dioskorides, naval commander of Antigonos.

172

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309 307

307/6

304 304/3–302/1

302/1 301

300

297 (spring) 296/5

All heirs to Alexander’s kingdom having been put to death, the Successors are free to compete for mastery. Demetrios (later the Besieger), son of Antigonos the OneEyed, is sent from Asia with a strong force to invade Greece. He sails into the Peiraieus and liberates Athens from Kassander’s control. The Macedonian garrison at Mounykhia is destroyed. Demetrios of Phaleron, Kassander’s puppet, leaves Athens. Democracy is restored. The Athenians vote offerings to Antigonos and his son as Saviours (Soteres) and create two new tribes named after them, Antigonis and Demetrias. The nationalist Demokhares, nephew of Demosthenes, returns from exile. Stratokles, another democratic politician, proposes honours for Lykourgos. Demetrios, son of Antigonos, sails off to Cyprus, where he wins a great naval victory against Ptolemy. He and his father assume the title of King, and they are followed by all the other Successors. In the absence of Demetrios, Kassander invades Attika and begins the Four Years’ War (307/6–304/3). The Athenians, exhausted by war with Kassander, ask Demetrios, now the Besieger, to help. He returns and drives Kassander from Attika. Demetrios sets up court on the Akropolis, where he cavorts with courtesans and others, offending the sensibilities of the citizens. During this time, Stratokles is his toady. Demokhares objects, but is exiled in 303. A coalition of Successors is formed against Antigonos in Asia, and he summons his son, Demetrios, to his side. At the Battle of Ipsos, in Phrygia, Antigonos and Demetrios are defeated and Antigonos is killed. Demetrios escapes to Ephesos, where he has his fleet, which still controls the sea after the victory over Ptolemy near Cyprus. He sails back to Athens, but is turned away, the people having voted never to accept a king in the city as a result of his previous bad behaviour. Demetrios quietly retires to Corinth. A grain shortage leads to a clash amongst the generals, and Lakhares, a mercenary commander, seizes power, probably with the connivance of Kassander. A delegation from Athens negotiates rapprochement with Kassander, who controls the countryside of Attika, but not the Peiraieus, which is held by a group of nationalist resisters, called Peiraikoi. Death of Kassander. Succeeded by three sons, who fight over the throne of Macedon. Demetrios the Besieger returns and besieges Athens.

Appendix 2: Historical Outline 295

294 (fall) 294–287 287

286 (spring)

287/6–262/1 285/4 283 281

279

277

173

Athens surrenders to Demetrios. Lakhares flees. A garrison is installed on the Mouseion hill and Macedonian forces take control of the Peiraieus. Demetrios sets up an oligarchic regime in Athens, appointing magistrates friendly to himself. Demetrios takes the throne in Macedon. Demetrios controls Athens by proxy through his appointed magistrates, Olympiodoros, Dromokleides and Stratokles. Demetrios is driven out of Macedon by Pyrrhos of Epiros and Lysimakhos of Thrace. Athens grasps the opportunity to get free. Olympiodoros, now on the other side, leads a force that storms the Macedonian garrison on the Mouseion hill. Another attempt to take the Peiraieus fails and 420 Athenians die. Demetrios invades Attika. Kallias of Sphettos brings Ptolemaic forces to Attika and brings in the harvest. Nevertheless, Demetrios’ forces hold the Peiraieus and the Attic countryside and Athens is, once again, forced to come to terms. These are negotiated between Demetrios and the Ptolemaic ambassador, Sostratos of Knidos, with Kallias of Sphettos representing Athens. Demetrios, being eager to sail to Asia, where he hopes to have better fortunes, agrees to leave Athens independent, but neutral. Demokhares once again returns from exile. Demetrios sails for Asia, leaving his son, Antigonos Gonatas, to look after Greece. Antigonos is in possession of several strongholds in Greece, in particular, the Peiraieus. The twenty-five-year period of nationalist democracy in the third century, though constantly under pressure from Antigonos. Demokhares recaptures the key northern fort-city of Eleusis. Demetrios the Besieger dies in captivity. The Battle of Corrupedion is the final showdown between rival Successors. Seleukos defeats Lysimakhos and claims the whole kingdom of Alexander, minus Egypt. He marches on Macedon to assume the throne, but is assassinated by Ptolemy the Thunderbolt (Keraunos), who takes the throne for himself in 280. Celtic tribes invade Macedon and Greece. Ptolemy Keraunos is killed and Delphi is under attack. The Greeks drive them back. Fifteen hundred Athenians take part in this memorable accomplishment. Antigonos Gonatas takes the vacant throne in Macedon and declares himself King. For a while he is challenged by Pyrrhos of Epiros, but the latter is killed in Argos. Antigonos now turns his full attention on Athens.

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Appendix 2: Historical Outline

268/7

268/7–262/1

The decree of Khremonides proposes an alliance with Areus, king of Sparta, and a number of other allies, supported by Ptolemy in Egypt, against those who are trying to destroy their laws and ancestral constitutions. By this, he means Antigonos. War breaks out. The so-called Khremonidean War. Despite receiving help from Egyptian forces, which land in Attika, Athens is finally defeated. Antigonos puts garrisons in the countryside and the Peiraieus and controls domestic politics through his appointees, who are members of the elite wealthy. This is the end of the nationalist democracy.

Index

Note: The following words have not been indexed, because they are so pervasive: Athens, Athenian(s), Attika, citizen, citizenship, democratic, democrat(s), democracy, Lakonia, Macedon, Macedonian(s), Peiraieus, Peloponnese, Sparta, Spartan(s). Abydos 30, 170 Academy 137, 138, 158 accountability 11, 12–13 adeia (immunity from prosecution) 88 adynatoi (handicapped) 15 Aegean 1, 20, 22, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 44, 56, 62, 63, 65, 81, 94, 145, 148, 150, 153, 156, 170, 171 Agathokles of Syracuse 72 Agesilaos II (King of Sparta, 400–360) 27, 28, 147, 149, 150, 151, 154 Agesipolis I (King of Sparta, 395–380) 149, 152 Agis (King of Paionia) 154 Agis II (King of Sparta, 427–400) 25, 146, 147 Agis III (King of Sparta, 338–331) 37, 168 agon (debate/contest) 101, 107, 108, 109, 112, 113 agonothetes 61, 94, 96 Agora (Athenian) 5, 7, 9, 19, 49, 99, 102, 103, 123, 131, 143 agoranomoi (supervisors of the agora) 12 Agyrrhios (Athenian politician) 15 Aiakeion 50 Aigai (in Macedon) 167 Aigaleos, Mount (in Attika) 76 Aigeis (Athenian voting unit/phyle) 77 Aigina 36 Aigospotamoi (Battle of) 28, 145

Aiskhines 12–13, 43, 58, 92, 133, 134, 135, 137, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 165, 168 Aiskhylos 113–14 Aitolia/Aitolian(s) 55, 166, 169, 170 Aixone (deme of Attika) 61 Akanthos 149 Akarnania/Akarnanian(s) 150, 152, 162, 167 Akhaia/Akhaian(s) 37, 69, 153, 157, 165, 166 Akharnai (deme of Attika) 18, 108 Akharnians (play by Aristophanes) 107–10 Aleuadai (clan in Thessaly) 155 Alexander, of Epiros (brother of Olympias) 162, 167 Alexander, son of Kassander 66, 67 Alexander (tyrant of Pherai) 37, 152, 153, 154, 155 Alexander II (King of Macedon, 370/69–368/7) 152 Alexander III, the Great (King of Macedon, 336–323) 2, 27, 31, 33, 44, 45, 53, 54, 55, 59, 65, 82, 121, 127, 133, 137, 141, 142, 155, 162, 167, 168, 169, 171, 173 Alexandria 63 Alkibiades 4, 8, 110 Alkimenes 147 Alyzia (Battle of) 150 Amadokos (King of western Thrace) 155, 157

176

Index

Ambrakia 42, 162 Amorgos 32, 35, 36, 56, 155, 170 Amphiareus (sanctuary of) 57, 171 Amphiktyon(s)/Amphiktyony(-ic) 165, 167; Council of 39, 43, 155, 156, 160; Delphic 42, 161 Amphipolis 17, 38, 41, 100, 153, 154, 155, 161, 163, 168 Amphissa/Amphissan(s) 43, 44, 165, 166 Amphitheos (a demigod) 108 Amyntas III (King of Macedon, 393/2–370) 149 Anabasis (march up country) 27, 125, 146, 168 anamnesis (recollection) 138 Anaxibios (Spartan general) 148 Andokides (Athenian rhetor) 85, 133, 148 Andros 32, 36, 95, 155 Androtion, son of Andron, of Gargettos (Athenian historian and politician) 35, 49, 129, 131, 155 Antalkidas (Spartan general) 28, 29, 34, 147. 148 Anthesterion (Athenian month, c. February) 65 Antigoneia-on-the-Orontes 72 Antigonis (Athenian voting unit/phyle) 63, 72, 172 Antigonos Gonatas, son of Demetrios Poliorketes (King of Macedon, 277–239) 67, 68–70, 96, 129, 173–4 Antigonos, the One-Eyed (Monophthalmos) 57, 62, 63–5, 72, 81, 94, 171–2 Antileon of Khalkis 55 Antioch 72 Antiokhos, son of Seleukos 67 Antipater, regent of Macedon 8, 56–60, 67, 70, 71, 80, 159, 167, 168, 169–71 Antipater, son of Kassander 66, 67 Antiphon of Rhamnous (Athenian rhetor, ringleader of the Four Hundred) 3, 5, 121, 133 Aphrodite (sanctuary of) 77 Apodektai (Receivers) 86 Apollo 39, 42, 156, 160 Apollonia 49 apragmones 9 Araros, son of Aristophanes 106 Archaic Period (about 800–500) 98

Areiopagos (Council of) 54, 99, 102, 135, 167, 169 Areus (King of Sparta, 309–265) 69, 174 Argaios 154 Argos/Argive(s) 27, 28, 29, 36, 130, 147, 149, 152, 160, 161, 167, 173 Ariobarzanes (Persian satrap) 153 Aristogeiton (tyrant-slayer) 15 Aristophanes of Byzantion (Hellenistic scholar) 141 Aristophanes, son of Philippos/ Aristophanic 8, 13, 15, 85, 100, 101, 102, 106–14, 139, 140, 147, 148 Aristotle of Stageira (Philosopher) 60, 61, 100, 102, 114, 118, 121, 129, 131, 137–8, 139, 146, 158, 161, 162, 164 Aristoteles (decree of, 378/7) 31, 150 Arkadia/Arkadian(s) 152, 154; League 37, 152, 153 Arkesine (on Amorgos) 155 Arkhias (Athenian archon, 346/5) 160 Arkhias (bounty-hunter) 57, 171 Arkhidamos III, son of Agesilaos (King of Sparta, 360–338) 151, 152, 154 Arkhinos (Athenian politician) 146 arkhitheoria 90 archon(s)/archon(s) 12, 13, 42, 127; basileus 88; eponymous 123, 129; year 157, 160, 161, 163 Arrhidaios, half-brother of Philip II 157 Arsenal of Philon 45, 80, 165 Arsinoe, wife of Ptolemy II 69 Artabazos (Persian satrap) 33 Artaxerxes II (King of Persia, 404–358) 27, 28, 29, 33, 142, 146, 151 Artaxerxes III (King of Persia, 358–338) 161, 163 Arybbas (King of the Molossoi) 162 Asia (Minor) 28, 32, 56, 63, 65, 67, 73, 94, 146, 153, 164, 167, 168, 172, 173; cities of 27, 29, 161 Asklepios 85 Aspasia (mistress of Perikles) 109 Aspendos 148 Assembly 1, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 25, 35, 44, 45, 46, 50, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 85, 88, 92, 107, 108, 122, 124, 134, 135, 136, 159, 160, 162

Index Assos 137, 158, 161 asty (city) 22 Ateas (Scythian King) 165 ateleia (freedom from taxation) 47, 48, 92 Athelas (Scythian King) 43 Athenaion Politeia 11, 14, 86, 129, 131, 138 Attalos/Attalid(s), of Pergamon 48 Atthidographer(s) 128–9, 130, 131 Audata, daughter of Bardylis, wife of Philip II 155 autonomia 29, 31, 45, 166 Babylon 55, 141, 146, 169 Babylonian (play by Philemon) 141 Babylonians (play by Aristophanes) 100 Bardylis (King of Illyria) 155 Bdelykleon 100, 101, 102 bema (speaker’s stone) 135 benefaction/benefactor(s) 2, 35, 47, 61, 68, 72, 82, 84, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 99, 118, 122 Berisades (King of central Thrace) 155 biographer(s)/biography 126, 127, 131, 141–2 Birds (play by Aristophanes) 112 Black Sea 1, 34, 48, 157, 164 Boedromion (Athenian month, c. September) 65 Boiotia/Boiotian(s) 25, 30, 36, 38, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 165, 166, 168; League 28, 29, 40, 130, 149, 166; War 36 Bosporos 32, 38, 164 Bottiaia 158 Boule see Council (of 500) Brasidas (Spartan general) 38 Byzantion/Byzantine(s) 30, 32, 38, 42, 44, 45, 124, 150, 155, 156, 157, 164 Carthage 72, 77 Celts 29 choregia 1, 61, 90 Cicero 138 Cimmerian Bosporos 48 Clouds (play by Aristophanes) 111–12 Coinage (Athenian) 86, 87 Cold War 30, 39 collegiality (magisterial) 11 comedy (-ies) 106, 107, 109, 110, 115, 118, 136, 139–41; Aristophanic 106, 107, 109, 114, 140, 141;

177

Attic 139, 140; Menandrian 115, 141; Middle 140; New 93, 106, 114, 115, 140; Old 94, 106, 107, 110, 113, 118, 139, 140; Roman 114 comic hero 107, 109, 110, 112 Confederacy of Delos/Delian Confederacy 27 Corinth/Corinthian(s) 25, 26, 27, 28, 34, 36, 63, 65, 69, 130, 147, 148, 149, 152, 165, 167, 172; League of 45, 54, 65, 167, 168 Corinthian War (396–387/6) 28, 79, 85, 86, 130, 147 Corrupedion see Korrupedion council/councillors (of five hundred) 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 44, 45, 55, 58, 63, 72, 77, 79, 82, 86, 88, 92, 93, 110, 124, 136 Crete 54, 169 Crimea 29, 34, 43, 48 Crocus Field (Battle of, 352) 40, 156 Cunaxa (Battle of, 401) 27, 146 Cyclades 32, 62, 150 Cyprus 81, 145, 172 Cyrene see Kyrene Cyrus, son of Darius II 27, 125, 146 Cyrus the Great (Founder of the Persian Empire) 26 Daos (slave of Gorgias) 116 Dardanelles see Hellespont Darius II (King of Persia 423–405/4) 27 Deinarkhos (rhetor) 133 Dekarkhies 145 Dekeleia 25 Delium 17 Delos 63, 81, 166 Delphi/Delphian(s)/Delphic 39, 42, 43, 44, 69, 155, 156, 165, 173 Demades, son of Demeas, of Paiania (rhetor) 15, 56, 57, 58–9, 60, 169, 171 Demainetos 147 demarch (deme official) 16, 18 Dema Wall 76 deme(s) (villages of Attika) 8, 11, 16, 18, 63, 90, 108, 115 Demeter and Kore (Persephone) 94, 113 Demetrias (Athenian voting unit/phyle) 63, 67, 172 Demetrias (city in Thessaly) 69

178

Index

Demetrios II (King of Macedon, 239–229) 70 Demetrios Poliorketes (the Besieger), son of Antigonos the One-Eyed 22, 57, 63–7, 72, 81, 94, 95, 96, 142, 172–3 Demetrios, son of Phanostratos, of Phaleron 5, 8, 16, 57–63, 71, 72, 81, 89, 91–2, 96, 114, 121, 122, 141, 171–2 Demokhares of Leukonoe 64, 68, 95, 96, 172–3 Demophilos (Athenian politician) 160 Demophilos, son of Ephoros 132 Demos (the People) 5, 6, 9, 33, 39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 65, 79, 82, 87, 89, 92, 93, 95, 96, 110, 111, 121, 122, 136, 139, 160 Demosthenes of Paiania 21–2 Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paiania (rhetor) 12–13, 21–2, 30, 34, 36, 37, 38, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 54, 57, 58, 59, 77, 89, 91, 92, 96, 124, 129, 133, 134, 135, 137, 139, 142, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 168, 169, 171 Derkyllidas (Spartan general) 27, 146, 147 Diadokhi see Successors of Alexander Diagoras 147 Dialogues (of Plato) 138 Didymos (Alexandrian scholar) 129 Dikaiopolis 107–9 dikaiosyne (justice) 58 dikanikoi logoi (legal speeches) 134 dikasteria see law courts/People’s courts Diodoros of Sicily 70, 71, 79, 127–8, 131, 132 Diogenes of Sinope (the Cynic) 139 Diomedon (Athenian archon 248/7) 91 Dionysia 15, 90, 93; Great 94 Dionysios I (tyrant of Syracuse) 37, 77, 152 Dionysios of Halikarnassos 135 Dionysos 108, 109, 113–14 Diopeithes (Athenian general) 162, 163 Diophantos 15 Dioskorides 62–3, 171 disfranchise(d)/disfranchisement 12, 56, 58, 59, 71, 72, 81 dodekate (81/3 per cent tax) 86 dokimasia (scrutiny) 12

drachma(s) 14, 15, 17, 21, 47, 56, 58, 60, 68, 70, 77, 78, 79, 83, 84, 90, 92, 170, 171 Drakon (lawgiver, 621) 99 Dromokleides 173 Dyskolos (play by Menander) 115–18, 141 educators 137–9 Egypt/Egyptian(s) 29, 33, 34, 57, 67, 69, 73, 79, 95, 114, 130, 133, 150, 151, 161, 163, 173, 174 eisangelia (impeachment) 160 eisphora (property tax) 1, 2, 5, 61, 86, 88–9, 90, 150 ekklesia see Assembly Ekklesiazousai (play by Aristophanes) 113, 140, 147 Elaious 164 Elateia in Phokis 44 Eleven, the (prison commissioners) 3, 12 Eleusinian Mysteries 65, 113 Eleusis 14, 18, 65, 68, 69, 70, 76, 81, 82, 145, 146, 173 eleutheria 29, 31 Elis/Elean(s) 69, 146, 151, 152, 153, 154, 162 elite/elitist(s) 2, 3, 7, 17, 19, 61, 89, 98, 99, 100, 102, 104, 110, 111, 121, 122, 125, 137, 138, 171, 174 Embata (Battle of) 32, 155 endeixis 102 enktesis (right to own property in Attika) 47, 92 Epameinondas (Theban general) 32, 37, 38, 151, 152, 153, 154 Epeiros see Epiros epheboi/ephebes/ephebic 45, 68, 76, 168 Ephesos 65, 147, 167, 172 Ephialtes (Athenian politician) 99 Ephoros of Kyme (historian) 127, 128, 131–3 ephor(s) (Spartan officials) 28 Epidauris 152 epidosis (-eis) (benefaction/s) 2, 61, 77, 89, 91, 96, 168 Epikhares 51, 82 Epikouros, son of Neokles, of Gargettos (philosopher) 139 epimeletai tou emporiou (superintendents of the exchange) 47

Index epimeletai ton neorion (superintendents of the shipyards) 12, 79, 150 Epimeletes (Supervisor) 60, 171 Epiros 155, 157, 162, 167 Erekhtheion 14 Eretria 38, 155, 157, 162, 163 ergasteria (workshops) 19, 21 Euboia/Euboian(s) 30, 32, 34, 38, 42, 43, 55, 59, 150, 152, 155, 157, 159, 162, 163, 165; League 164 Euboulos (Athenian politician) 15, 87, 156, 158 Eudemos of Plataia 93 euergesia see benefaction Euetion (Athenian general) 56, 170 Eukleides (Athenian archon, 403/2) 146 Eukrates 9, 167 Euripides (playwright) 48, 108, 113–14, 140, 141 Eurydike, daughter of Antipater 67 Euthios (Athenian archon, 283/2) 94 Euthydike, daughter of Miltiades 72 Euthydemos, son of Demetrios, of Melite 80 euthyne (accounting) 12, 103 Evagoras (King of Salamis on Cyprus) 28, 148, 150 executive 12, 60 Exiles Decree 53, 54, 55 Few, the 8, 17, 19, 75, 122 Forts 75, 76, 81, 143 Four Hundred, the (Revolution of) 3–7, 14, 58, 121 Four Years’ War (307–304) 64, 93, 172 franchise 1, 5, 7, 9, 56, 58, 60, 62, 68, 70, 71, 80, 118, 170, 171 Frogs (play by Aristophanes) 113–14 Funeral Oration (epitaphios) 47, 55, 134 Gallipoli peninsula see Khersonese generals see strategos (-oi) Getas (a slave) 116–118 Glauketes (a pirate) 62, 171 Glycera (mistress of Harpalos) 53 Gordion knot 54 Gorgias (a farmer) 115–18 Gorgias of Leontini (sophist) 4, 138 Gorgos of Iasos 53 Grabos (King of Illyria) 39, 155 grain 16, 20, 22, 28, 30, 33–4, 36, 40, 43, 46–50, 53, 63, 65, 66, 68,

179

70, 81, 82, 84, 86, 91, 94, 95, 96, 156, 157, 164, 168, 169, 172 Grain Tax Law (374/3) 34, 49, 84, 151 graphe paranomon see unconstitutional proposal Great King (of Persia) 27, 29, 31–3, 85, 147, 153, 154, 164 Great King’s Peace (387/6) 25, 29, 30, 31, 40, 79, 86, 130, 148, 149, 150 Gylon 48 gymnasiarkhia 90 gymnasion 121 gynaikonomoi (supervisors of women) 61 Hades (Lord of the Underworld) 113 Haliartos (Battle of) 147 Halikarnassos 32, 95, 168 Halonessos 163 Harmodios (tyrant-slayer) 15 harmostes (Spartan governor) 26, 145 Harpalos 53–4, 55, 141, 168, 169 Harpokration (lexicographer) 128 hegemon 43, 165, 167 Hegesippos (Athenian politician) 161, 162, 163 Heliaia (People’s court) 99 Hellenic War see Lamian War Hellenika Oxyrhynchia 126, 130–1 Hellenistic: age 131; art 141; city 72; early (323/2–262/1) 2, 75, 82; historian 132; monarchs 48, 53, 73, 94, 97; period (323/31) 2, 93, 114, 124, 127, 128, 129, 142; research 143; scholar(s) 124, 138, 141; sculpture 122, 141; society 115; world 114, 121, 139 Hellespont 28, 34, 43, 47, 56, 62, 65, 148, 150, 156, 158, 167, 170 Herakleides of Salamis 168 Herakles 113 Hermeias (Hermias) of Atarneus 137, 158, 164 Herodas the Sicilian 147 Herodotos 123, 127, 132 Hesiod 99 hestiasis (banquet) 90 Hipparkhos, son of Peisistratos 15 hippeis (cavalry) 5, 7, 17 Hippodamos of Miletos 20 Hipponikos (Macedonian general) 162 Histiaia 155

180

Index

ho boulemenos (everyman) 12, 102 hoi epi tei dioikesei (men in charge of the administration) 87, 166 hoi epi to theorikon (men in charge of the Theotic Fund) 16 Honourary Decree(s) 2, 92–6, 125 hopla parekhomenoi see hoplite census hoplites (hoplite/infantryman) 17, 41, 42, 77, 82, 158, 159; census 58, 72 Hymettos 46 Hyperbolos 21 Hypereides (Athenian rhetor) 55, 57, 133, 134, 171 Illyria 161, 167 Imbros 28, 29, 32, 34, 49, 63, 72, 84, 86, 151, 166 inscriptions see official documents Iphikrates (Athenian general) 31, 148, 150, 151 Ipsos (Battle of) in Phrygia 65, 66, 72, 94, 127, 172 Isaios (Athenian orator) 133, 134 Isokrates (teacher of rhetoric) 8, 47, 48, 121, 131, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 141, 148, 151, 160, 161 Jason of Pherai 151 judiciary 13, 15 jury(-ies)/juror(s)/juryman(-men) 12, 13, 98–104, 122; courts 98, 100, 102; duty 1, 15, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102; selection 102–4 Just Argument 112, 114 justice 5, 15, 58, 98–9, 102, 104, 122 kakopragmones (evil-doers) 6 Kallias of Khalkis 162, 163, 164 Kallias, son of Thymokhares, of Sphettos 51, 67, 93, 94–6, 97, 173 Kallibios 145 Kallipedes, father of Sostratos 117–18 Kantharos (Harbour of Peiraieus) 80 Kaphya 69 Kardia/Kardian(s) 153 Karion, slave of Kremylos 85 Karystos 38, 155 Kassander, son of Antipater 22, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63–6, 72, 76, 171–2 Kennan, George 45

Kephallenia 146, 150 Kephisophon (Athenian general) 43, 163, 164 Kerameikos 18, 19, 61 Kerch 48; peninsula 48 Kerkyra 150, 151, 166 Kersebleptes (King of eastern Thrace) 155, 157, 158, 159, 163 Ketriporis (King of western Thrace) 39, 155 Khabrias (Athenian general) 31, 36, 79, 92, 150, 152, 155 Khaireas (parasite of Sostratos) 115–16 Khaironeia (Battle of, 338) 1, 30, 35, 42–4, 53, 59, 77, 78, 87, 91, 141, 166, 167 Khalkedon 156 Khalkidike/Khalkidic 32, 40, 41, 153, 157, 158; League 149, 155, 157, 158 Khalkis/Khalkidian(s) of Euboia 38, 69, 150, 155, 163, 164 Khares (Athenian general) 33, 41, 156, 157, 158, 163, 164, 166 Kharidemos (Athenian general) 41, 158 Kharmides, cousin of Kritias 7, 145 Kharon (ferryman in the Underworld) 113 Khersonese (Thracian) 30, 36, 40, 42, 43, 50, 162, 163, 164 Khios/Khian(s) 31, 32, 33, 38, 45, 133, 138, 149, 155, 164 khora (territory of Attika) 46, 76, 77, 81, 82 Khremonidean War (268/7–262/1) 2, 69–70, 81, 82, 129, 174 Khremonides, son of Eteokles, of Aithalidai 69, 174 Kimon (Athenian archon, 288/7) 96 Kimno, son of Miltiades 76, 99 King’s Peace see Great King’s Peace Kleopatra, wife of Philip II 167 Kleisthenes (Athenian reformer, 508/7) 11, 16, 20, 99 Kleitarkhos (tyrant of Eretria) 162, 163 Kleitos (Alexander’s general) 56, 170 Kleobule, wife of Demosthenes of Paiania (senior) 21, 48 Kleombrotos (King of Sparta, 380–371) 149, 150, 151 Kleon, son of Kleainetos 15, 21, 41, 100–1, 110, 135 Kleophon (Athenian politician) 4

Index kleroukhs (kleroukhs)/kleroukhy 32, 35, 36, 40, 49–50, 53, 62, 71, 72, 84, 153, 154, 157, 162, 171 Knemon 115–18 Knidos (Battle of, 394) 28, 78, 79, 85, 92, 132, 133, 147 Knights/Cavalrymen (play by Aristophanes) 100, 110–11 Koine Eirene (Common Peace) 29, 148, 150, 154, 159, 161, 167 komos 107 Konon (Athenian general) 28, 30, 76, 78, 79, 85, 92, 130, 145, 147, 148 Koroneia (Battle of, 394) 28, 147 Koroneia (near Porto Raphti) 69 Korrupedion (Battle of, 281) 67, 173 Kos 28, 32, 38, 155, 164 Kothelas (King of the Getai) 164 Kotys I (King of Odrysian Thrace) 155 Krannon (Battle of, 322) 56, 77, 170 Krateros (Alexander’s general) 56, 170 Krateros the Macedonian (historian) 125 Kremylos 85, 85 Kritias, son of Kallaiskhros 3–5, 7, 121, 126, 145 Kroisos (King of Lydia) 26 kruptoi (lookout men) 82 Ktesikles (Athenian general) 150 Ktesikles (historian) 62, 63, 71 Ktesiphon 92, 168 Kur (a dog) 101 Kynoskephalai (Battle of) 153 Kyprothemis (Persian general) 32 Kyrene 34, 168 kyria(i) ekklesia(i) 14, 34, 46 Kythnos 62, 171 Kytinion 44, 165 Labes (a dog) 101 Lakedaimonian(s) 69 Lakhares (tyrant in Athens) 66, 171, 172–3 Lakhes (Athenian general) 101 Lakhes, son of Demokhares of Leukonoe 96 Lamakhos (Athenian general) 109 Lamia (Athenian courtesan) 64 Lamia (town in Thessaly) 55, 56, 170 Lamian War (323/2) 1, 6, 8, 22, 44, 45, 50, 53, 55–7, 68, 70, 131, 134, 141, 169–71

181

Larissa 161 Laurion 18, 20, 87 law(s) 6, 98, 99, 102, 136; law-code 5–6, 7, 99, 123, 145, 146; law courts (People’s courts) 1, 6, 7, 12, 13, 98, 99, 100, 103, 124, 134, 136; lawgiver(s) 11, 60, 99; suits 99 Lechaion 147 legislature 11 leitourgiai see liturgy (-ies) Lemnos 28, 29, 32, 34, 42, 49, 62, 63, 72, 81, 84, 86, 151, 166, 171 Lenaia 15, 90 Leonnatos (Alexander’s general) 56, 170 Leosthenes (mercenary general) 55, 56, 169–70 Leptines (law of) 48 Leukas 165 Leukon I (King of Pantikapaion, 389–349) 48, 49, 158 Leuktra (Battle of) 29, 31, 36, 37, 41, 132, 151 lexiarchika grammateia (citizen rolls) 160 Libya 72 Libys 146 liturgy (-ies)/liturgical 1, 7, 60, 86, 89–92 logistai (accountants) 12 logographer (speech-writer) 134 logoi epideiktikoi (display speeches) 134 logoi symbouleutikoi (speeches of advice) 134 Lokris/Lokrian(s) 39, 147, 156, 165, 166 Lucius Cornelius Sulla 80 Lykeion (Lyceum) 114, 138 Lykourgos, son of Lykophron, of Boutadai 53, 62, 64, 68, 87, 91, 93, 125, 133, 134, 162, 166, 172 Lykourgan Period (338–322) 1, 93, 143, 166 Lyppeios (King of Paionia) 39, 155 Lysander (Spartan general) 25, 27, 28, 34, 133, 142, 145, 147 Lysias (rhetor) 133 Lysimakheia 69 Lysimakhos (Alexander’s general, King of Thrace) 57, 65, 66, 67, 68, 94, 95, 97, 170, 173

182

Index

Lysistrata (play by Aristophanes) 112 Lysitheides (Athenian archon, 272/1) 82 Mantineia/Mantineian(s) 69, 149, 151, 152, 153; Battle of (362) 31, 37, 38, 77, 132, 153, 154 Many, the (to Plethos)/the People 8, 10, 11, 19, 45, 121, 122 Marmara (Sea of) see Propontis Mausolos of Karia 32, 155 Meda, daughter of Kothelas, 164 Medokos (Thracian king) 148 Megalopolis/Megalopolitan(s) 37, 152, 161, 167, 168 Megara/Megarian(s) 63, 109, 162, 165 Mekyberna (port of Olynthos) 41 Meltemi (Etesian winds) 41 Menander, son of Diopeithes (comedian) 94, 106, 114–18, 141 Menelaos, half-brother of Philip II 157 Men-of-Marathon 100, 108, 109 Mentor of Rhodes 164 merismos (allocation of funds) 86 Messene/Messenia/Messenian(s) 146, 152, 153, 161, 167 Mesogaia 46 Methone 38, 39, 153, 156 Methymnos/Methymnaian(s) 150 metoikion (tax on resident aliens) 84 metoikoi see resident aliens Mieza 137, 162 Military Fund see stratiotika Miltiades of Lakiadai 168 mine(s)/mining 17, 18, 20, 21, 38, 62, 84, 87 Mithridates of Pontos 48 Mnasippos (Spartan general) 150, 151 Mount Pangaion 38 Mounykhia 22, 57, 59, 62, 63, 66, 80, 145, 171, 172 Mouseion (in Alexandria) 63, 138 Mouseion Hill (Athens) 66, 67, 173 Mulroney, Brian 121 Myrina (on Lemnos) 42 Myrrhine, mother of Gorgias 115 Mytilene/Mytilenaian(s) 54, 150, 158, 161 Nationalist(s) 7, 9, 49, 66, 68–9, 95, 96, 172, 173, 174 Naupaktos 146, 166

Nausikles (Athenian general) 157 Nausinikos (Athenian archon, 378/7) 89 nautikos ochlos (naval mob) 20 navy/naval 7, 11, 20, 22, 28, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 40, 44, 45, 47, 56, 57, 62, 65, 75, 78–81, 122, 147, 150, 152, 155, 157, 163, 168, 169, 171, 172 Naxos (Battle of) 36, 79, 92, 150 Nemea (Battle of) 28, 77, 147 Neon in Phokis (Batle of) 156 neosoikos (shipshed) 80 Nikaia (fort at Thermopylai) 43, 165 Nikandros of Ilium 64, 93 Nikanor, of Stageira 54, 169 Nikanor (Macedonian commander in Mounykhia) 59, 171 Nikeratos, son of Phileas, of Kephale 94 Nikesipolis of Pherai, wife of Philip II 156 Nikias 21 Nikolokhos (Spartan general) 150 Nikomakhos (Athenian archon, 341/0) 163 Nikostratos, son of Epiteles, of Rhamnous 82 Nisaia (port of Megara) 162 Nomophylakes (Guardians of the law) 60 nomos/nomoi see law(s) Nomothetes/nomothetai see lawgiver(s), under law(s) Nymphaion 48 Nymph(s), shrine of 115, 116 obol(s) 14, 15, 76, 85, 100, 101 Odysseus 100 Official documents 123–5 Old Oligarch 2, 15, 18, 122 oligarch(s)/oligarchic/oligarchy 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 26, 57, 58, 60, 64, 85, 95, 96, 145, 146, 149, 150, 153, 162, 173 Olympia/Olympian/Olympic 54, 92, 153, 169 Olympias of Epiros, wife of PhilipII 155, 167 Olympiodoros (Athenian politician) 173 Olympos 108 Olynthos/Olynthian(s) 40–2, 43, 149, 157, 158, 159, 161

Index Onomarkhos (Phokian general) 40, 156 Ophellas of Kyrene 72 Orkhomenos 69, 167 Oropos 57, 153, 159, 166, 171 Pagasai (modern Volos) 40, 41, 156, 163, 170 palaistra (wrestling ground) 19, 121 Pan 115, 117 Panakton (fort in northern Attika) 64, 76, 81 Panathenaia/Panathenaic 141; Ship 94, 95 Panhellenic campaign 160 Pantikapaion 48 Paphlagonian 100, 110–11 parabasis (stepping aside) 101, 107, 109, 110 paragraphe (counter suit at law) 160 parapresbeia (charge of false embassy) 160 Parmenion (Macedonian general) 155, 159, 163, 166, 167 Parnes (mount in northern Attika) 76 parodos (entry of the chorus) 107, 111 parrhesia (freedom of speech) 139 Pasimelos 147 Pasion (a banker) 22 patrios politeia (ancestral constitution) 4 Patroklos (Egyptian general) 69, 83 Pausanias of Magnesia 143 Pausanias (King of Sparta, 409–395) 7, 146, 147 pay for public office/State pay 1, 5, 11, 13–16; elimination of 1, 85 Peace (play by Aristophanes) 112 Peace of Antalkidas see Great King’s Peace Peace of Kallias 27 Peace of Philokrates (346) 37, 42, 160, 161, 162, 164 Peisistratos (tyrant of Athens, 546–527) 15, 34 Peithidemos (Athenian archon, 268/7) 82 Pella 42, 137, 159, 168 Pellene 152, 158 Pelopidas (Theban general) 29, 37, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154 Peloponnesian War (432/1–405/4) 3, 5, 16, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 38, 45, 48, 73, 75, 76, 78, 84, 88, 100, 107, 109, 126, 130, 140

183

pentakosiomedmni (five-hundred bushel men) 5, 17 pentekoste (2% tax) 21, 85 Pentelikon (mount in Attika) 18 People, the, see Demos peplos (Athena’s) 94, 95 Perdikkas (Alexander’s general) 56, 59, 71 Perdikkas (King of Macedon, 365–360) 154 Periander (law of, 357) 91 Perikles 15, 20, 47, 48, 75, 76, 99, 100, 109, 110, 135 Perinthos/Perinthian(s) 40, 43, 44, 132, 157, 164 Perses, brother of Hesiod 99 Perseus 116 Persia/Persian(s) 27, 31–3, 85, 107, 108, 125, 146, 148, 150, 153, 160, 164; Empire 26, 27, 28, 30, 31–2, 45, 167, 168; Wars 25, 134 Phaidros, son of Thymokhares, of Sphettos 51, 93, 94, 96, 97 Phalaikos (Phokian general) 158 Phaleron 20 Phanokritos of Parium 148, 149 Pharax (Spartan general) 147 Pharnabazos (Persian satrap) 28, 78, 85, 147, 150 Pheidippides, son of Strepsiades 112 Pherai (in Thessaly) 156, 158, 159, 161 Phigalia 69 Phila, daughter of Antipater 67 Philinna of Larissa, wife of Philip II 155 Philip II (King of Macedon, 360–336) 1, 30, 35, 37–45, 47, 59, 65, 77, 79, 91, 127, 132, 139, 152, 154–67 Philippides, son of Philokles, of Kephale (comic playwright) 66, 93–4, 95, 96, 141 Philistides (tyrant of Oreus) 162, 163 Philokhoros (Atthidographer) 41, 70, 88, 89, 129 Philokleon 98, 100, 101, 102 Philokrates (Athenian politician) 159, 162 Philomelos (Phokian general) 156 Philon, son of Exekestides, of Eleusis 80 philotimia (ambition for distinction) 89, 92 Phleious/Phlious 37, 149, 154

184

Index

Phoibidas (Spartan general) 149 Phokion, son of Phokos 8, 43, 56, 57–60, 121, 142, 162, 163, 164, 166, 171 Phokis/Phokian(s) 37, 39, 40, 147, 151, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160 phratry (brotherhood) 16 phrontisterion (thinking place) 111 Phrynikhos (one of the Four Hundred) 4 phyle/phylai (tribe(s)/voting units) 11, 16, 63, 72 Phyle (fort/deme in northern Attika) 7, 64, 76, 81, 115, 145; heroes of 9, 92 Pisa/Pisatan(s) 153 Plataia/Plataian(s) 37, 151, 167 Plato (the philosopher) 3, 4, 8, 107, 121, 134, 137–9, 141, 146, 149, 158; Platonic 136, 137 Plautus 114, 141 Pleuratos (King of the Ardiaioi) 161 plousioi (wealthy/leisured class) 17 Ploutos (Wealth, a play by Aristophanes) 85, 86, 113, 110, 140, 148 Plutarch, of Khaironeia (biographer) 58, 60, 64, 71, 99, 125, 135, 142 Pnyx 110 poletai (public auctioneers) 12, 86, 88 polis 8, 13, 29, 135, 136 politeia (citizenship) 47 politician(s) see rhetor(es) Pollis (Spartan general) 150 Polybiadas (Spartan general) 149 Polybios (historian) 127, 132 Polyperkhon (Alexander’s general) 59, 60, 61, 171 Polyphemos 100 Polyzelos of Ephesos 64, 93 poneroi (low types) 6 population (of Attika) 16, 70–3 Poseidon, temple of, on Kalauria 57 Poteidaia/Poteidaian(s) 17, 36, 38, 39, 153, 154, 155, 161 probouleumata (resolutions for denate in the Assembly) 12 proeisphora 89, 90 Prokonnesos 30 Property 17, 47, 54, 56, 58, 62, 70, 88, 90, 96, 99, 149, 179; census 5, 68, 171; owners of 6, 88; rateable value of 88; rating 17, 21; tax see eisphora

Propontis 40, 47 prostates tou demou 135 Protagoras (sophist) 4 proteikhisma (fore-wall) 77 proxenia 92 Proxenos (Athenian general) 158 prytaneion see town hall prytaneis (presidents of the Council) 14, 44 Ptolemaia 95 Ptolemy/Ptolemies/Ptolemaic 48, 57, 62, 73, 81, 94, 95, 97, 133, 172, 173, 174; Ptolemy I (Soter) 63, 65, 67, 68, 95; Ptolemy II (Philadelphos) 68, 69, 95; Ptolemy Keraunos 67, 69, 173 public service contributions see leitourgiai Pydna 38, 39, 153, 155 Pyrrhias (a huntsman) 116 Pyrrhos of Epiros 67, 69, 173 Pythias, wife of Aristotle 137, 158 Pythionike (mistress of Harpalos) 141 Python of Byzantion (rhetor) Reagan, Ronald 121 resident aliens (metics/metoikoi) 10, 61, 62, 64, 84, 90, 91, 93, 134 Rhamnous (deme of Attika) 36, 68, 70, 76, 81, 82 rhetor (-es) 12, 13, 45, 100, 101, 106, 110, 133, 136, 137 rhetoric/rhetorician(s)/rhetorical 3, 4, 8, 12, 21, 43, 47, 111, 112, 133–7 Rhodes/Rhodian(s) 32, 33, 38, 43, 45, 57, 62, 147, 148, 155, 164, 168 Rome/Roman(s) 70, 80, 115, 121, 124, 127, 139, 141, 142 rotation in office 11 Royal Stoa 123, 146 Sacred Band (Theban) 150 Salamis 20, 76 Samos/Samian(s) 32, 33, 36, 50, 53, 54, 55, 57, 71, 145, 153, 154, 157, 166, 169, 171 Sardis 148; Battle of 147 sarissa(s) 40 Satraps’ Revolt 32, 33, 154 Satyros (King of Pantikapaion, 407–389) 48 Second Athenian Confederacy see Second Athenian League

Index Second Athenian League (#78/7–338) 21, 31, 33, 34–6, 38, 45, 79, 86, 87, 126, 150, 152, 153, 156, 159 Seleukos (Nikator)/ Seleukid 62, 65, 67, 72, 73, 173 Selymbria 156, 164 Sestos 40, 156 Seuthes (Thracian King) 148, 170 Sicily/Sicilian(s) 34, 77 Sidon (Phoenician port) 27 Sikon (a cook) 116–18 Sikyon 152, 153 Simikhe (servant of Knemon) 115–17 sitesis (dining rights) 92 sitophylakes (grain-guards) 34, 46 skene 108 Skyros 28, 29, 32, 34, 49, 72, 84, 86, 151, 166 slave(s)/slavery 10, 17, 18, 21 Social War (357–355) 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 41, 86, 87, 155, 164 Sokrates/Sokratic 3, 8, 17, 111–12, 121, 125, 126, 127, 137, 138, 141, 146; circle 4; enquiry 138; heroism 60 Solon (lawgiver) 4, 5, 11, 20, 33, 46, 62, 71, 99; census classes of 17 Sophist(s) 112, 135 Sophokles 113 Sosigenes (Athenian archon, 342/1) 163 Sositratos (Athenian archon, 270/69) 95 Sostratos, of Knidos (ambassador of Ptolemy) 95, 173 Sostratos, son of Kallipedes 115–17 Sounion 70 Sortition 11 Soter/Soteres (Saviour(s) 63, 67, 172 Spartokos/Spartokid(s) 48; dynasty 48 Spartokos and Pairisades, sons of Leukon I 48, 49 Speusippos 137, 158 Sphodrias (Spartan general) 149 state pay see pay for public office stelai 31, 123, 136, 146 Strabo of Amaseia 143 strategos (-oi) 12, 58, 66, 81, 93, 96, 150, 153, 163; epi ten khoran 58 stratiotika 16, 50, 86, 156, 165 Stratokles, son of Euthydemos, of Diomeia 64–5, 94, 141, 172–3 Strepsiades 106, 111–12 Strouthas 148

185

Strymon (river) 38 successors of Alexander (Diadokhi) 55, 57, 62, 127, 172, 173 sukophantai (fig-revealers/informers) 6, 102 Sousa (Susa) 53, 164 symmory (-ies) (contribution-group(s) 89, 90, 91 Symposion (of Plato) 107 syngrapheis 145 synhedrion (Council of Athenian allies) 35, 156, 159 syntaxeis (contributions of Athens’ allies) 35 synteleis (joint contributors) 91 syntrierarchy 91 Syracuse/Syracusan(s) 34, 137 Tainaron, Cape 54, 55, 169 talent(s) 14, 15, 17, 21–2, 53, 62, 70, 78, 79, 85, 88, 89, 90, 101, 115, 146, 169 Tamynai (Battle of) 157 Tanagra 151 tax/taxes/taxation 5, 22, 47, 49, 51, 61, 62, 68, 81, 84–92, 101 Tegea/Tegean(s) 54, 69, 152, 153, 167 Tegyra 150 teikhopoioi (wall-builders) 76–7 Telephos (play by Euripides) 108; King of Mysia 108 Teleutias, brother of Agesilaos 148, 149 Tenedos 30, 164 Terence 114, 141 Thasos 148 Thatcher, Margaret 121 Thebes/Theban(s) 25–45, 130, 145, 147, 149–56, 159, 160, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168 Themistokles 11, 20, 76 Theophrastos (philosopher) 60, 114, 161 Theopompos of Khios (historian) 128, 131, 133 Theorika (Theoric Fund) 15–16, 60, 86, 118, 156 Theramenes (member of the Thirty) 5, 126, 142, 145 Thermopylai 40, 42, 44, 77, 157, 158, 165 thesmothetai (judicial officials) 103, 104 Thesmophoriazousai (play by Aristophanes) 112

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Index

Thespiai (in Boiotia) 149, 151, 167 Thessalonike, daughter of Nikesipolis 157 Thessaly/Thessalian(s) 37, 38, 40, 43, 55, 56, 152, 153, 155, 156, 160, 161, 167, 170; Koinon (League) of 154, 156 thetes/thetic class 1, 10, 11, 16, 17, 71 Thibron (Spartan general) 27, 146 thinkers 106, 137–39 Third Sacred War (356–346) 37, 39–40, 132, 156, 160 Thirty Tyrants, the 3, 5–8, 25, 58, 88, 121, 131, 137, 145 Thorikos 76, 81 Thoukydides, son of Oloros (historian) 100, 123, 126, 127, 130, 133 Thrace/Thracian(s) 38, 40, 48, 56, 57, 69, 70, 71, 81, 107, 148, 150, 153, 157, 159, 160, 163, 170, 173 Thrasyboulos, son of Lykos, of Steiria 7, 26, 28, 30, 145, 146, 148 Three Thousand, the 9 Thriaisian Plain 46 Thymokhares of Sphettos 62, 81, 94, 96, 171 Timarkhos (colleague of Demosthenes) 160, 161 timema (assessment) 88 Timokrates (the Rhodian) 27, 147 Timotheos, son of Konon (Athenian general) 31, 32, 39, 53, 150, 153 Tiribazos (Persian satrap) 28, 147, 148 Tissaphernes (Persian satrap) 27, 147 Torone 153 town hall 15, 92 Trapezos 146

Treasury/Treasurers of Athena in the Parthenon 86, 92 trierarch(s)/trierarchic/trierarchy(-ies) 90 trierarchia (obligation to finance a trireme) 1, 90, 150 Triphylia 153 trireme(s) 20, 28, 47, 62, 78, 80, 88, 90, 91, 157, 158, 168, 170 Troy/Trojan 108, 132, 138 Tyre (Phoenician port) 27 Unconstitutional proposal 12, 92 Unjust Argument 112, 114 Vouliagmeni 68 Walls (fortifications) 75, 76, 77, 81; Long, at Athens 20, 25, 26, 75, 76, 77, 145, 147; Long, at Megara 162 War Fund see stratiotika Wasps (play by Aristophanes) 100, 110, 112 Xanthias (slave of Dionysos) 113 Xenainetos (Athenian archon, 401/0) 7 Xenophon (historian) 7, 8, 25, 29, 125–7, 130, 131, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142, 154 Xerxes (King of Persia, 486–465) 27, 76, 168 Zakynthos 150 Zea (harbour of Peiraieus) 80 Zeugitai 1, 16, 17, 58, 72 Zeno of Kition on Cyprus (founder of Stoicism) 139 Zeus 101, 112